Comparative Nationalism

Imperial Legacies and the Strength of Nationalism: The Case of China and India since the 1990s

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This work is substantially my own, and where any part of this work is not my own, I have indicated this by acknowledging the source of that part or those parts of the work.
Image 1: Anti-Japan protests in China, Hunan Province, on the 18th of September 2012, in response to Japanese actions regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Protests took place in over 85 cities across China.

(Source: STR/AFP/Getty Images, 2012)
Abstract

Since the 1990s, there have been strong displays of nationalism in China, while in India the once dominant ‘secular’ nationalism has been challenged by a fragmentation of national identity along ethno-religious lines. This thesis seeks to explain why Chinese nationalism, since the 1990s, appears to be stronger and indeed more prevalent than nationalism in India. The phenomenon of nationalism in India and China has been extensively researched, yet there remains a deficiency in comparative research. Thereby, this thesis takes a historical comparative approach through which five explanatory hypotheses are evaluated; these are entitled: direct rule, types of foreign rule, regime type, foreign threat, and diversity. The findings of this thesis suggest that China's nationalism remains more prevalent since the 1990s, due to its experience of informal imperialism, a strong centralized Chinese state, and higher levels of militarized inter-state disputes. Simply, it is illustrated that because the experience of informal imperialism has centrally defined Chinese nationalism, it reacts intensely to foreign threats that are equated to imperial acts, while the unified nature of nationalism is reinforced by a strong centralized state.
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>The People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
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<td>KMT</td>
<td>The Kuomintang or the Chinese Nationalist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>The Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INC</td>
<td>The India National Congress, also the Congress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party, the Hindu Nationalist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh</td>
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<td>VHP</td>
<td>Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the World Hindu Council</td>
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<td>MID</td>
<td>Militarized Inter-state Dispute</td>
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<td>WVS</td>
<td>World Values Survey</td>
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<td>COW</td>
<td>Correlates of War</td>
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Introduction

Posing the Problem

The world's most populous states, China and India, have been rapidly developing as the potential great powers of Asia since the 1980s, ushering in what has been proclaimed the Asian Century. The impending rise of these two Asian giants poses critical implications for the regional power balance and the international system of states more broadly. Closer consideration of their respective nationalisms is imperative to gaining a better understanding of contemporary China and India. This thesis examines the developments of Chinese and Indian nationalism through a historical comparative study, focusing on understanding difference since the 1990s. It aims to better comprehend nationalism outside the European context by charting the phenomenon in the two pivotal rising states of Asia.

In doing so, this study addresses the gap in academic literature, whereby scholarly comparison of Chinese and Indian nationalism is rarely discussed. China and India are often compared in terms of their economic development, political systems, or material aspects more generally; issues of identity and nationalism are usually studied in isolation. Thus, this thesis offers a contribution to political discourse, particularly in the deficiency of comparative literature on Chinese and Indian nationalism. The resilience of nationalism into the twenty-first century, and its associated violent history, deems it pertinent to understanding the persistence of the phenomenon in rising powers like China and India.
The Puzzle

China and India are both multi-nation states that during the 1990s experienced a ‘wave’ of intense nationalism. After the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, it is evident that in China a strong and outward directed popular nationalism emerged (see Gries, 2004 and Zhao, 2000), while in India nationalism segmented along ethno-religious lines, producing a dominant Hindu nationalism, and a related parallel pan-Indian variety (see Roy, 2007; Bhargava, 2002; Aloysius, 1997; and Behera, 2007). Language, religion, region, and local culture compete as ‘alternative sources of allegiance’ within the Indian state (Woodwell, 2007: 129). Since the 1990s, Chinese nationalism has been the subject of vast scholarly interest and media coverage. Unlike Indian nationalism, it has drawn global concern, feeding into ‘China Threat’ theories that foresee a more aggressive China posing an essential danger to the established international system (see Derbyshire, 2001). The autocratic attributes of the Chinese state means that increased nationalism is often equated to more aggressive/assertive Chinese foreign policy (see Gries, 2005; Zhimin, 2005).

Prior to liberation in the late 1940s, nationalist sentiment and popular movements in India and China were forms of resistance targeted at external entities, taking shape in anti-colonial varieties (see Bandyopadhyay, 2009; and Barraclough, 2004). It is interesting to note that anti-imperial and anti-foreign sentiments evidently continue to powerfully resonate in Chinese nationalism today, but not so much in Indian nationalism (see Xu, 2000; Gries, 2006 and Liebman, 2007). In India the ‘mass euphoria over the British departure’ has ‘receded into collective memory,’ giving way to a ‘whole litter of communities divided from one another in terms of language, religion or caste’ (Aloysius, 1997: 1). Instead, it has been illustrated that the pan-Indian polity ‘no-longer attracts the allegiance of the majority of the masses’ (Aloysius, 1997: 2).
With the clear unifying potential of a history of subordination at the hands of colonial powers, it is interesting that it should be summoned to popular reception in China but not India – particularly as such a common history could serve to unite, as it has in China, the Indian population. It is curious that ‘nationalism in India—a country with a long history of direct colonization—should be any less anti-Western and anti-imperialist than nationalism in China, which was only ‘half-colonized’ and for a shorter time period’ (Liebman, 2007: 347).

Hence, the question explored in this thesis is as follows: *why is Chinese nationalism since the 1990s stronger and more prevalent than nationalism in India?* Stronger and more prevalent nationalism refers to collective political action that unifies large segments of a country's demographic. The collective display is frequent and has popular participation throughout the country; participants embrace, or seek to promote, a common national identity. This pertains gaging the intensity of nationalism through comparison, rather than measuring the strength of it. Darr and Tang (2012: 823) empirically substantiate that ‘China has one of the highest levels of popular nationalism in the world,’ rooted in the ‘imagined multi-ethnic community designed by the communist party’. In India, on the other hand, the persistent communalism and dominance of Hindu nationalism since the 1990s, among separatist movements, suggest various fragmented national identities, rather than one unified, strong, nationalism (see Behera, 2007; Roy, 2007).

The central puzzle thereby pertains to understanding this divergent facet of the dominant forms of Chinese and Indian nationalism. It is important to note that the scope of this thesis does not include minority separatist nationalisms in China, for example in Tibet and Xinjiang, as they do not challenge China's dominant nationalism in scope or scale. Furthermore, it has been established that ‘linguistic and religious minorities such as the Huis, the Manchus, the Uyghurs, and the Mongols show just as high levels of

**The Challenge of Comparative Nationalism**

‘The trouble with nationalism is that it refuses to go away,’ as increased globalisation and economic interdependence has yet to undermine the persistence of the nation as the core political unit of the modern state (Dube, 2004: 14). Yet the recurring force of nationalism still reveals a constant tension within the study of it: nationalism is ‘simultaneously universal and particular’ in character (Goswani, 2004: 6). Therefore the challenge is essentially a balancing act of deciphering what is distinctive, and what is general. The cases of China and India do not escape this difficulty, but it is only through systematic comparison of the particular, that the general may be obtained.

Within the study of nationalism there is a general consensus that national identities are distinct, historically contingent, and socially constructed. Despite this, there are three enduring general questions pertaining to nationalism, as outlined by Hechter (2000: 4):

1. What are its causes?
2. Why is it more prevalent in some countries than others?
3. Are there any means of containing the dark side of nationalism?

This study is primarily concerned with the second question as it relates to the study of India and China. Indian and Chinese nationalism are rarely compared because they are ‘perceived as distinct phenomena’ (Liebman, 2007: 351). However, it is precisely the puzzle of difference that motivates this study. While nationalism in each country may be distinct, neglecting a comparison between these two cases means potentially missing common underlying features. The utility of comparing divergent nationalisms lies in elucidating difference, while still pinpointing what it is that makes them both fall under
the term ‘nationalism’ in the universal sense. As suggested by Michael Hechter (2000: 4), rather than isolated case studies, more comparative studies of nationalism could usefully refine both general definition and broader causal explanations for the emergence of nationalism. Indeed, it is to gaining insights on nationalism in a non-European context that drives this thesis. It is my conviction that a comparative analysis of Indian and Chinese nationalism through a historical perspective enables an understanding of a phenomenon that, while experienced by both countries, has taken on such varied manifestations.

**Organization of the Thesis**

Chapter one lays the conceptual and theoretical foundations of the thesis, and pinpoints five hypotheses that are assessed throughout the chapters that follow. Chapters two, three, and four, are divided according to three selected historical intervals: the rise of nationalism (1900-1930), the post liberation nation state (late 1940s-1980s), and nationalism in the post-Cold War period (1989-present). They utilize historical observations in combination with quantitative data from the *World Values Survey* and the *Correlates of War* databases to facilitate interpretation and explanation. The concluding chapter draws together the analysis, outlining theoretical implications and findings.
Chapter One

Theorizing Chinese and Indian Nationalism

The nationalisms of China and India, before independence and revolution, were forms of anticolonial resistance (see Bandyopadhyay, 2009, Barraclough, 2004). Yet by the 1980s and 1990s, both experienced a renewed ‘wave’ of nationalism. In India, Hindu-Muslim rioting increased dramatically, separatist movements rose to prominence, and Hindu nationalism gained legitimacy and success in Indian politics (see Jaffrelot, 1996). With political parties seeking to establish India as a Hindu state, the secular nationalist ideology that had unified the Indian nation since independence lost plausibility (see Jaffrelot, 1996). China, on the other hand, saw a resurgence of ‘anti-foreignism’ and genuine popular mobilization in response to perceived foreign insults; it presented a unified face of the Chinese nation (Zhao, 2004; Gries, 2004). While differences will ultimately outweigh similarities between two such large countries, the question remains as to why their relatively similar anticolonial nationalisms morphed into such divergence by the mid-1980s, and that China’s, not India’s nationalism emerged as strong and united.

In this introductory chapter I review the available answers to the above puzzle, including a detailed review of the study of Chinese and Indian nationalism as separate fields. This is followed by a conceptual clarification of key terms such as nation, national identity, and nationalism. The final section of this chapter details the methodology of this thesis and pinpoints the hypotheses that are addressed in this thesis.
Available Answers

Comparative studies, specifically pertaining to nationalism in China and India, scarcely feature in the literature. Both countries represent such exceptional cases that this limitation is particularly pervasive (see Carlson, 2009). Instead, specialists have focused on country – or regional – case studies, often not significantly engaging with the larger debates pertaining to general theories of nationalism. Considering the size and complexity of both countries, specialization is understandable, if not necessary. Yet, disengaging a phenomenon from parallel developments elsewhere can result in missing crucial similarities and differences. Below a variety of studies are reviewed that explain similarities and/or differences in both the rise of nationalism and its contemporary manifestations.

Historical comparison

Geoffrey Barraclough (2004) pinpoints three roughly analogous stages in the development of nationalist movements in Asia during the early twentieth century, namely: proto-nationalism, new leadership, broadening basis of resistance. Proto-nationalism works to reexamine and reformulate ‘indigenous culture under the impact of Western innovation’ (Barraclough, 2004: 126). The rise of a new leadership with liberal tendencies forms the second stage. The final stage sees a broadening of the basis of resistance against an imperial power, involving the mass mobilization of the peasantry and workers (Barraclough, 2004: 126).

Both China and India experienced these three stages. In India the ‘representative names are Gokhale, Tilak, and Gandhi and the stages of development correspond fairly accurately to the three periods in the history of Congress: 1885-1905, 1905-19, 1920-1947’ (Barraclough, 2004: 126). In China the ‘three stages of nationalist development may be identified with Kang Yu-wei, Sun Yat-sen, and Mao Tse-tung, their sequence
represented by the Hundred days (1898), the revolution of 1911, and the reform and reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1924’ (Barraclough, 2004: 128).

Erez Manela (2007), addressing the international impact of Woodrow Wilson's liberal internationalism, also locates parallel developments in Indian and Chinese nationalist movements. Here, ‘ideological and political commitments to anticolonial agendas’ were cemented by the appeal of Wilson's idealism (Manela, 2007: 221). There were popular upheavals in both China and India in 1919: the May the Fourth Movement in China, and the Rowlatt Satyagraha and Amritsar in India – these movements were subsequently transferred into ‘narratives of colonial violence and popular resistance’ (Manela, 2007: 221). In other words, such movements ‘became focal points in the construction of national identity and inspired commitment to nationalist agendas’ (Manela, 2007: 221).

In comparing China and India, both Manela (2007) and Barraclough (2004) point to parallel developments in the rise of anticolonial nationalism in China and India. While these studies do not enable an understanding of why nationalism should be stronger in China than in India today, they usefully establish early similarities, indicating that the moment of divergence might be found in the post-liberation period.

*Indian and Chinese Nationalism Since the 1990s*

To my knowledge, only two recent studies are available that directly compare nationalism in India and China since the 1990s: Manson (2010) compares Chinese and Indian nationalism and its impact on Indo-China relations, and Liebman (2007) addresses triggers for intense nationalism in India and China (Liebman, 2007). Comparing ‘waves’ of nationalism in India and China since liberation in the 1940s, Liebman (2007) concludes that the most important trigger for nationalist movements in the 1990s was increased foreign threat. Focusing on the dominant forms of nationalism in India and China, Liebman tests three independent variables against the dependent of intense nationalism: regime type, ethnic composition, and the nature of foreign threat.
While all three variables together explain the divergence between Chinese (civic or state) and Indian (ethnic) nationalism, it is increased foreign threat that ultimately triggers intense nationalism. Following the logic of Liebman’s (2007) thesis, nationalism in China is stronger because there is more foreign threat.

Manson’s (2010) argues that the direction of Chinese and Indian nationalism in the twenty-first century sets the two states on a collision course. This is particularly the case since both states are increasingly looking outward after years of isolation and inward focus on development. Here, nationalism in India and China are: the ‘nations appeals to deeply ingrained sentiments: a nostalgic sense of lost greatness, a shared feeling of shame at the humiliation of the colonial experience and the ignominy of subsequent irrelevance, and a growing sense that the era of renewed dominance has come’ (Manson, 2010: 98). I challenge this claim by suggesting that Indian nationalism today no longer draws on its colonial history as extensively. Instead, Hindu nationalists draw on a much older history of Islamic rulers in India, especially the Mughals between the thirteenth and eighteenth century (Shani, 2000: 272).

Direct Rule and Nationalism

Michael Hechter’s general theory of nationalism is of particular interest due to its emphasis on the impact of the imposition of direct rule on the rise of nationalist movements. Hechter defines nationalism as ‘collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit’ (Hechter, 2000: 7, authors emphasis). Hector’s definition is limited in that it does not occasion for nationalism after the boundaries of a nation and state are ‘congruent’. This is problematic as sometimes nationalism is ‘less about creating a governance unit than securing a larger share of benefits within a state (usually ethnic nationalism) or in the international system (usually state nationalism)” (Liebman, 2007: 349).
Hechter’s theory claims that nationalism only occurs where some kind of state already exists; there has to be a disjuncture between nation and governance unit in order for it to occur (Hechter, 2000: 36). As such, it is under the imposition of direct rule upon an existing state that nationalism arises. Alternatively, where there is indirect rule over a society, often providing ‘existing nations with their own governance units’, no nationalist challenge emerges because there is no demand for national sovereignty (Hechter, 2000: 54). Here, European colonial authorities in Asia and Africa were able to provide order in far-removed colonies through the imposition of indirect rather than direct rule (Hechter, 2000: 50). Following Hechter’s (2000) theory, nationalism arose in India during the early twentieth century due to a shift in British rule from indirect to more direct, increasing the demand of local people for national sovereignty.

**Review: Indian Nationalism since the 1990s**

Recent scholarship covering nationalism in India predominantly examines Hindu nationalism and its challenge to Nehruvian secularism. There is general agreement that Hindu nationalism has been resurgent since the mid-1980s, and the dominant form of nationalism in India since the 1990s (see Liebman, 2007; Momen, 2005; Shani, 2005; and Bhargava, 2002). The success of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the 1990s, taking political office between 1998 and 2004, is often taken as the best indicator for the ascendancy of Hindu nationalism in India (Jaffrelot, 2007; see also Liebman, 2007). Yet this ascendancy has to be viewed within the context of Muslim separatism, and Hindu-Muslim rioting, especially since the partition of British India in 1947.
Ashutosh Varshney (1993) catalogues three contesting nationalisms in India in the early 1990s: secular nationalism, Hindu nationalism, and two separatist nationalisms in Kashmir and Punjab. The official doctrine of India’s national identity since independence in 1947 remains secular and inclusionary (Varshney, 1993: 245). There is general agreement that the secular underpinnings of the Nehruvian state kept Hindu nationalism in check, until the late 1980s (see Jaffrelot, 1996; Bhargava, 2002). In theory, ‘segment identities’ based on region, religion, and language, are ‘subsumed under the overarching ‘Indian’ Identity;’ the reality displays tension and conflict between local, regional, and ‘pan-Indian ideals and goals’ (Behera, 2007: 80). As argued by Srirupa Roy (2007), the idea of India in post-colonial India is ‘beyond Belief’. National imaginings, as promoted by the government through films and national parades have simply failed to ‘resonate’ with the Indian citizen (Roy, 2007: 29).

A key area of debate regarding the ‘Indian’ nation surrounds the definition of secularism as it applies to India. The Indian context demonstrates a contrasting understanding of secularism as opposed to the ‘western connotations of separation between church and state’ (Momen, 2005: 245). Instead, secular liberal politics in India 'operated on the basis of exclusion', where secularism has meant the protection of minorities (Momen, 2005: 246). Since its inception, secularism 'subverted and discredited the traditional ideas of inter-religious understanding and tolerance,' downplaying minority characteristics while continuing to highlight Hindu symbols (Momen, 2005: 246). The rise of Hindu nationalism is argued to chart the failure of the Indian National Congress Party (INC) to establish a secular pan-Indian identity that manages ethnic and religious affiliations (see Bhargava, 2002; Momen, 2005).

Hindu nationalism is most often classed as an ethnic nationalism, even though it is based on a religious identity. This is because the doctrine underlying Hindu nationalism,
'Hindutva', is a communal ideology that fulfills the criteria of ethnic nationalism (Jaffrelot, 2007: 5; see Momen, 2005: 248). Here, its ‘motto ‘Hindu, Hindi, Hindustan’, echoed many other European nationalisms based on religious identity, a common language, or even racial feeling’ (Jaffrelot, 2007: 5). Additionally, Hindu nationalism is ethnic as it is directed against a subgroup within the state (Liebman, 2007: 354).

**Explaining the Resurgence of Hindu Nationalism**

Jaffrelot (1996) argues that Hindu nationalism is a distinctly modern phenomenon that was ‘constructed as an ideology’ between the 1870s and 1920s, relying upon ‘the invention of tradition’ (Jaffrelot, 1996: 6, 11). ‘Modern’ elements alien to Hinduism were introduced ‘through a process of cultural reorganization,’ in effect redefining Hindu identity in opposition to ‘threatening others’ (Jaffrelot, 1996: 6). Such threatening others included Christian missionaries, British rule, and militancy within the Muslim minority (Jaffrelot, 1996). Similar to Liebman (2007), Jaffrelot emphasizes the importance of external threats in mobilizing Hindu nationalism. Others have emphasized the role of democracy in perpetuating ethnic identities as ‘the very processes of a series of intensely fought elections and intense battles over religious sites, rituals, and spaces’ (Momen, 2005: 250, see also Snyder, 2000; Kohli, 1997). Finally, it has been suggested that the simultaneous growth of Hindu nationalism and caste conflicts indicates an identity conflict within Hindu society itself rather than outside it; here, ‘ethnoHinduism is ‘located’ between caste and class’ (Shani, 2000: 281).

**Review: Chinese Nationalism since the 1990s**

The Tiananmen Square protest in 1989, and the subsequent crackdown by the CCP, has marked a point of resurgent nationalism in China that has attracted vast scholarly interest. There are two main characteristics of this ‘new’ Chinese nationalism that are
generally agreed upon in the literature. The first is that Chinese nationalism is rooted in China’s past, and that this has been a relatively durable foundation (Carlson, 2009: 22). Here, the literature has ‘convincingly demonstrated that a pervasive collective memory of past national experiences play a central role in framing the content of modern Chinese nationalist sentiment’ (Carlson, 2009: 22, for example see Callahan, 2004, Wang, 2003). Second, recent studies on Chinese nationalism agree that the Chinese government has ‘intentionally worked to manufacture a particular strand of nationalist sentiment that positions the CCP in the role of rescuing China from its past humiliations’ (Carlson, 2009: 23). Here it is argued that to replace obsolete communist ideology the CCP has made conscious instrumental use of ‘pragmatic’ nationalism to ‘shore up its waning legitimacy’ (Zhao, 2004: 288).

Categorizations of Chinese Nationalism

China specialists emphasize the distinctiveness of China’s nationalism, thereby creating novel ‘types’ of nationalism. Most influential is Zhao’s (2004) typology that identifies three distinct but varying traits of Chinese nationalism: nativism, anti-traditionalism, and pragmatism (Zhao, 2004). Nativism calls for a return to Chinese traditions and pinpoints ‘the impact of imperialism on Chinese self-esteem and the subversion of indigenous Chinese virtues’ at the core of China’s weaknesses (Zhao, 2004: 250). Anti-traditionalism counters this by claiming that it is China’s cultural traditions that underlie its weakness, and so foreign cultures and models should be adopted (Zhao, 2004: 252). Lastly, pragmatic nationalists hold that ‘China fell victim to external imperialism because political decay, technological backwardness, and economic weakness precluded any possibility of defense’ (Zhao, 2004: 253). Whatever method effectively increases China’s strength is purported by pragmatist nationalists. While all three perspectives are present in China, it is the latter that retains dominance.
Yingjie Guo (2004), on the other hand, places a ‘battle for China’s soul’ since 1989. He proclaims an ongoing identity conflict between state and cultural nationalism. Both construct a particular Chinese ‘Self’ against the Western ‘Other’ (Guo, 2004: 1). The fundamental difference between cultural and state nationalism is in their ‘positions on nation versus state and tradition versus modernity’ (Guo, 2004: 17). Cultural nationalists do not necessarily place the CCP or the State at their core, rather ‘being Chinese’ means partaking in traditional cultural practices and accepting ‘Chinese’ morals and principles (Guo, 2004: 2). While there is no clear demarcation of cultural and state nationalists in China, Guo’s typology usefully illustrates the ethnic or cultural dynamics in Chinese nationalism. Although not the focus of this study, it should be noted that there are also ethno-nationalisms within China, particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang where nationalists seek self-determination and separation from China (Mukherji, 2010).

*History and Chinese nationalism*

Callahan (2004) locates a narrative of salvation, which depends on a parallel narrative of humiliation, as central to Chinese national identity. The ‘Century of Humiliation’ narrative refers to the period between 1839 and 1949. China’s defeat in the Opium War [1839-42] against Britain was followed by series of ‘Unequal Treaties’ that perpetuated China’s internal weaknesses, allowing foreigners to exploit China – or so the narrative goes. The narrative has been central to Chinese national consciousness since its inception during the early 1920s, forming a cornerstone of Chinese nationalism (Callahan, 2004; Gries, 2004 and 2005; Wang, 2003). It affirms notions of China’s ‘rightful place’ on the world stage, thus continually informing ‘Chinese foreign policy in both elite and popular discussions’ (Callahan, 2004: 214). Allison Kaufman (2010) demonstrates that the humiliation narrative is pervasive even in elite thinking on how China should engage the international system as it presents a source for believes on how the world works.
Dong Wang (2003) explores the *bupingdeng tiaoyue* (‘Unequal Treaties’ imposed by foreign powers) rhetoric as an overlooked component in the construction of Chinese nationalism. The phrase ‘Unequal Treaties’ charts back to the 1920s, where it was first harnessed by the CCP and the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party, henceforth KMT) to gain popular support among the ‘masses’. The battle for which party would lay claim to China’s ultimate salvation, ‘exhibits the unique pattern of Chinese nationalism’ (Wang, 2003: 424; see also Cohen, 2002).

A further study examines nationalist historical beliefs and patriotism; here, a causal relationship is established between nationalism and threat perception (Cai et al., 2011). It establishes that ‘historical beliefs co-varied with patriotism and nationalism, suggesting that histories of the national past and identities in the present are mutually constituted’ (Cai et al, 2011: 16). A further quantitative study found that China ‘has one of the highest levels of popular nationalism in the world’ compared to 35 other countries and regions (Darr and Tang, 2012: 823). The study further established that Chinese nationalism is rooted in the ‘imagined multi-ethnic community designed by the communist party’, is likely to decline as levels of urbanization and education increase, and has a ‘strong effect on regime stability and legitimacy’ (Darr and Tang, 2012: 823).

**Nation, Nationalism, National Identity**

Conceptual ambiguity in the study of nationalism remains problematic. In general, three approaches to the study of nationalism can be identified: primordialist, situationalist, and constructivist (Brown, 2000). Primordialist approaches, associated with the cultural approach of Clifford Geertz, suggest that the nation is organic and given, possessing its own language and culture. The situationalist school views the nation not as fixed but as undergoing a process of constant transformation; key authorities on nationalism such as
Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson generally follow this approach (Brown, 2000). The constructivist sees ‘nationalism as arising out of the search for new myths of certainty, constructed to resolve the insecurities and anxieties’, the emphasis is placed on the functionally of nationalism (Brown, 2000: 4).

Core Theories

The emergence of nationalism in the West is often linked with modernity and the rise of the nation-state; simply, nationalism follows the modern state (see Bayly, 2004). The nation-state is a ‘form of political organization based on particularistic features of ethnic composition, language, or territorial boundaries within which sovereignty is exercised by a government’ (Zhao, 2004: 40). Ernest Gellner (1983) construes nationalism to the occurrence of urbanization and industrialization. Here, ‘nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner, 1983: 1). The units in which nationalism occurs are ‘culturally homogeneous, based on a culture striving to be a high (literate) culture’ (Gellner, 1983: 138). However, as underlined by C.A. Bayly (2004: 203), Gellner’s theory is a modernization theory that works best for European societies and mono-nation states.

In particular, the emphasis on the cultural homogeneity of the nation has come under question, as nation-states like China and India evidently hold culturally heterogeneous nations (Mukherji, 2010). In India, the small kingdoms colonized by the British imperial power ultimately ‘gave rise to a modern multi-national Indian state’ (Behera, 2007: 86). In other words, Indian nationalism emerged within a ‘nation’ that evidently did not ‘inhabit the ‘homogeneous empty time’, but rather the ‘heterogeneous time of modernity’ (Bandyopadhyay, 2009: xviii). It has been argued that because the Indian nation was not homogeneous, the very notion of a nation-state becomes inept (Nandy, 1983). Theories of nationalism based on the European experience, such as Gellner’s, are problematic in the Chinese and Indian context precisely because they are not mono-
nation states. A multi-nation state may encounter various opposing identities only loosely unified by the political and territory boundaries of the state.

The nation is not a ‘primordial collective or immanent deity, but a peculiarly modern creation that realizes its collective destiny over the course of history’ (Zhao, 2004: 44). Benedict Anderson defines the nation as ‘an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign,’ (Anderson, 1991: 6). The ideational element of this definition locates a procedural understanding of the nation – it changes according to how it is imagined. Anderson’s (1991) study identifies the emergence of nationalism in social and economic developments, particularly in the technological innovation of the printing press. Anthony D. Smith's definition of the nation is more specific: it is a ‘named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members’ (Smith, 2001: 13).

Since the ‘cultural turn' of the 1980s in the social and political sciences, there have been several new approaches to the study of nationalism. Such approaches question the very basis of established theories, by asking how these themselves have been shaped by the discourse of nationalism (see Özkirimli, 2010: 170; Ballantyne, 2008). Here, post-colonial theory and the Indian subaltern school are of particular interest. Partha Chatterjee (2009) questions the assumption that nationalism was a mere European import to Asia and Africa. He objects to the notion that Europe and the Americas have thought on behalf of colonized people to ‘not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation', but also of their ‘colonial resistance and postcolonial misery' (Chatterjee, 2009: 4).

Chatterjee argues that the fundamental feature of anti-colonial nationalisms in Asia and Africa is that it divides the ‘world of social institutions and practices into two domains – the material and the spiritual' (Chatterjee, 2009: 5). The material being the domain of
the ‘outside’ – the economy, statecraft, science and technology – and the spiritual that of ‘an ‘inner’ domain bearing the ‘essential’ marks of cultural identity’ (Chatterjee, 2009: 5). As such, it is here through ‘spiritual imagination’ that Indian nationalism permeated popular consciousness, and sustained its particular ‘Indianess’ (Bandyopadhyay, 2009: xix).

Definitions

Following a situational approach, this thesis adopts Anderson’s definition: the nation is ‘an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (Anderson, 1991: 6). A national identity is an inherently social identity – that is, to claim that one is Chinese or Indian and associate oneself with certain values, symbols and memories (see Hechter, 2000: 96-97). It is the ‘continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern and values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identifications of individuals with that pattern and heritage and with its cultural elements’ (Smith, 2001: 18). A national identity forms the basis for nationalist sentiments, but more fundamentally, having a national identity is inclusion in an imagined political community.

Within the study of Chinese nationalism since the 1990s, a key definitional dilemma arises due to the fact that the boundaries of the Chinese nation and state are already congruent (Hechter, 2000). Chinese nationalism is arguably conflated with patriotism. Patriotism is ‘the desire to raise the prestige and power of one’s own nation state relative to rivals in the international system’ (Hector, 2000: 17). Yet it has also been argued that nationalism is a combination of patriotism and xenophobia – a dislike for outsiders – it is a ‘process that is inclusive and exclusive at the same time’ (Bandyopadhyay, 2009: xxii, see Kedurie, 1994). This is also followed by Peter Hay Gries who very loosely defines nationalism as ‘any behavior designed to restore, maintain, or advance public images of that community’ (Gries, 2004: 9).
In order to suitably encompass nationalism in both India and China, I adopt a revised version of Gries’s (2004) definition: nationalism is *collective political action designed to restore, maintain, or advance public images of that national community*. For analytical purposes, this thesis refers to ‘types’ of nationalism: state-centered, state-building, civic, anticolonial, and ethno-religious nationalism. These are ideal types and are not exhaustive; categories may overlap.

**State-centered nationalism** seeks to further the aims and power of a state; it may involve ‘a movement that seeks to use the state as an instrument of conflict against other states’ (Liebman, 2007: 350). This type of nationalism legitimates the authority of the state, and promotes the state as rightfully serving the nation.

**Civic nationalism** membership is defined in terms of citizenship; it bases its ‘appeals on loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions that are perceived as just and effective’ (Snyder, 2000: 24).

**State-building nationalism** is inclusionary in its attempts to unify or assimilate ‘culturally distinctive territories in a given state. It is the result of the conscious efforts of central rulers to make a multicultural population culturally homogeneous’ (Hechter, 2000: 15).

**Anticolonial nationalism** is a movement and form of resistance led by a local elite, against a foreign power holding influence or controls the local governance unit. This nationalism seeks self-determination, full sovereignty over a given territory, and to expel the foreign nation(s). Its categories of inclusion are not necessarily based on one distinct ethnic or national group; rather it positions a local, indigenous, ‘Self’ against a foreign ‘Other’.

**Ethno-religious nationalism** is based on ethnicity and/or religion to define who is included in a national community. It seeks self-determination or control over the
political unit. An ethnic community or *ethnie* is defined as: ‘a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with a homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among elites’ (Smith, 1999: 13).

**Methodology and Hypotheses**

This thesis takes a comparative historical approach in understanding the divergent nationalisms in China and India since the 1990s. The general agreement in the literature that Chinese nationalism in the 1990s is rooted in the past deems it pertinent to include historical comparison. This type of approach is best illustrated by Theda Skocpol’s seminal comparative study *States and Social Revolutions*, where comparative historical analysis develops ‘explanations of revolutions that are at once historically grounded and generalizable beyond unique cases’ (Skocpol, 1979: 5-6). Situated within broader general theories of nationalism, the analysis of the phenomenon of nationalism in China and India builds upon existing theory and explanation. A most-similar systems research design is employed, the dependent variable (nationalism) being the point of difference. It adopts a mixed methodology. Quantitative data is utilized in conjunction within historical observation, to serve as the prism of explanation through interpretation.

This study adopts a historical research strategy. The types of primary documents consulted include: pamphlets, parliamentary transcripts, government statements, speeches, and newspaper publications. Secondary sources, were employed in shaping the historical narrative of this thesis. Importantly, the purpose of this study is not to establish historical ‘truths’, or challenge reputable interpretations of history, but to enable explanation of a given puzzle through a reading of history.
This study considers four plausible explanations as to why nationalism in China since the 1990s should be stronger and more unified than nationalism in India. The hypotheses are as follows:

**Hypothesis 1** Direct rule: The imposition of direct rule, by an external governance unit not congruent with the nation, resulted in increased, and ultimately stronger, nationalism (see Hechter, 2000).

**Hypothesis 2** Type of foreign rule: the experience of informal imperialism, rather than direct colonization, allows for the emergence of a stronger nationalism. Informal imperialism gives rise to an enduring nationalist discourse of past victimization, with greater unifying capacities.

**Hypothesis 3** Regime Type: China’s nationalism is stronger because of the centralized Chinese state that is able to effectively influence a top-down nationalism. Democratic governance in India engenders a fragmentation of nationalism.

**Hypothesis 4** Foreign Threat: China’s nationalism is stronger since the 1990s due to higher levels of foreign threat triggering nationalist responses (see Liebman, 2007).

**Hypothesis 5** Diversity: higher diversity levels – in terms of the ethnic and religious composition, and spoken languages – engenders fragmented and varied nationalisms, less diversity entails a stronger and unified nationalism.

The remaining chapters assess the validity and explanatory value of the above stated hypotheses. As *hypothesis 1,2 and 3* are historically dependent, the evaluation of the hypotheses is divided into chronological historical periods.
Chapter Two

Forms of Rule and the Rise of Nationalism in India and China

This chapter concerns the development of nationalism in China and India between 1900-1930. Presenting a macro-narrative, it offers a historical snapshot; references are provided to intensive historical research completed elsewhere. The chapter centers on hypothesis 1: direct rule and hypothesis 2: type of foreign rule. The former claims that the imposition of direct rule by an external governance unit, not congruent with the nation, ultimately resulted a stronger nationalism in China in the 1990s (see Hechter, 2000). Hypothesis 2, on the other hand, counters this by suggesting that informal imperialism by an external power(s), rather than direct colonization, allows for the emergence of a stronger nationalism with enduring anti-imperial sentiment. These are deep-structural explanations that situate China’s stronger and more prevalent nationalism within a set of historical conditions.

The chapter begins with a historical sketch of the emergence of nationalism in India and China. The intention is to begin to shed light on why anti-imperial sentiments should continue to resonate strongly in Chinese, and not Indian, nationalism today. Following this, the second element of this chapter employs historical observations to discuss the above hypotheses. As hypothesis 5: diversity is relatively stable rather than historically contingent, it is also touched upon here. It claims that ethno-religious composition and languages spoken determine the strength of China’s nationalism since the 1990s.
The Indian Nation and Nationalism

‘Englishmen! Who are Englishmen? They are the present rulers of this country. But how did they become our rulers? By throwing the noose of dependence round our necks, by making us forget our old learning, by leading us along the path of sin, by keeping us ignorant of the use of arms.... Oh! my simple countrymen! ... Has India's golden land lost all her heroes?’ (excerpt from the Indian newspaper *Hind Swarajya*, quoted in Chirol, 1910).

Valentine Chirol (1910), imperial observer and journalist, explained that Indian publications like the *Hind Swarajya* represented ‘the literature of unrest which has been openly circulated in India'. He describes this phenomenon as ‘illusory nationalism;’ a temporary alliance between ancient ‘Brahmanism’ (or Hinduism) and a new modern force, inspired by Western education, revolting against British rule. This alliance would not last as the British Empire...

‘... alone lends ... substantial reality to the mere geographical expression which India is. A few Indians may dream of a united India under Indian rule... India ... (is) but inhabited by a great variety of nations whose different racial and religious affinities, whose different customs and traditions, tend to divide them far more than any interests they may have in common to unite them ... British rule is the form of government that divides Indians the least’ (Chirol, 1910).

Of note are Chirol’s observations regarding the prominence of religious elements over a national Indian identity from the very outset. In terms of hypothesis 5: diversity, it suggests that the tendency of Indian nationalism to fragment along ethno-religious lines centrally determines its fragility compared to Chinese nationalism.

Chirol also draws attention to the unifying capacity of British rule in India. This underlines the centrality of British rule to the imagined political entity of a unified Indian nation. The foreign ‘Other’ made possible the Indian ‘Self’. Indian’s began to seek self-rule at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the fact that they did meant that a national ‘Self’ had been imagined (Robb, 2007: 6). Identity is always ‘premised on a dichotomy of ‘Self’ and Otherness;’ it only ‘assumes meaning when it is contextualized...
within this dichotomy' (Behera, 2007: 80). A distinctly nationalist discourse emerged in India around 1870, furthered by an intellectual and professional elite; it gradually reconfigured 'colonial space as national space' (Goswani, 2004: 7). This elite discourse presupposed the existence of the ‘national’ within an ‘imagined nation’s history, culture, people, and economy’ (Goswani, 2004: 7). British rule maintained three important legacies for the imagined Indian political entity and creation of ‘national space’ (Robb, 2007: 130):

1. The establishment of fixed borders
2. The assertion of undivided jurisdiction or sovereignty within those borders
3. The assumption of state responsibility for the well-being of the people

The Indian National Congress

The Indian National Congress (INC), today India’s largest political party, was the first significant all-India nationalist body (Manela, 2007). Founded in 1885 by a group of Western educated lawyers and professionals in Bombay, it was motivated by vast racial and economic inequities (Manela, 2007: 79, see also Bayly, 2004: 217). The INC was a ‘formal nationalist structure’ that ‘invented’ an Indian tradition and national past; it summed up the Indian nation as a ‘static, timeless ideal’ (Bayly, 1998: 105). Initially, it did not challenge the legitimacy of British rule, but rather aimed to expand the rights of Indians under British tutelage (Robb, 2002).

From the outset, the INC claimed to be the representative body for all Indians, a ‘kind of national parliament’ (Chandra, 2012: 54). However, skepticism surrounding the notion of an all-India nation remained. A prominent Muslim politician, Ser Syed, captured this in 1888: ‘is it possible, under these circumstances, two nations (qaum) – the Mohammedans and the Hindus – could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down’ (quoted in Chandra, 2012: 55). Nevertheless, as more ‘radical’ factions
began to emerge within the INC, expressing the desire for full Indian independence, the
British Raj placed its support firmly behind the moderate INC leader, Gopal Krishna
Gokhale (Manela, 2007: 80). This maintained British influence within the INC.

In 1905 the first popular nationalist movement (the Swadeshi movement) erupted in
response to the decision of the British Viceroy to partition Bengal (Goswani, 2004).
Here, the ‘radicals’ within the INC, took the lead: Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Lala Lajpat Rai,
and Bipin Chandra Pal. Tilak, addressing the INC in 1907, proclaimed:

'The point is to have the entire control in our hands. I want to have the key of my
house, and not merely one stranger turned out of it. Self-government is our goal;
we want control over our administrative machinery' (Tilak, 1907).

British authorities arrested Tilak in 1908. This sparked only further demonstrations
that culminated in limited British concessions to the INC (see Goswani, 2004). Tilak and
his supporters promoted a Western-type ‘nationalism of the nation-state,’ influenced
particularly by ‘the experience of the ‘White Dominions’ of British Empire’. (Bayly, 1998:
109). The British tried to suppress these ‘radical’ tendencies by supporting INC
moderates, arresting leaders like Tilak, and employing a mixture of repression and
concessions to keep nationalists in check (Manela, 2007). This is crucial in terms of

Hypothesis 2: type of foreign rule, as the British Raj was able to maintain a certain level of
cooption and control over the Indian nationalist movement. At a stretch, this is
comparable to CCP strategy in the 1990s employing mechanisms of suppression,
control, and cooption, to influence the direction of nationalism (see Gries, 2004: 121-
125).

Formal nationalist organizations like the INC, despite ‘harnessing disparate elements
into an appeal to all-India and all-Hindu sentiment,’ were primarily elitist undertakings
that ran counter to the ‘political and linguistic divisions of much of the preceding
centuries’ (Robb, 2002: 180). From its beginnings the INC was Hindu-dominated;
instead, there was a parallel Muslim body – the Muslim League. The two bodies formed a fragile alliance in 1916 under the Lucknow Pact (Masselos, 1985: 141). In terms of hypothesis 5: diversity, this again suggests various identity foundations in India rather than an unyielding Indian unity.

World War One (WWI) was a turning point for Indian nationalists. India’s contributions to Britain’s war efforts, and the economic hardships experienced during the war, meant that there was expectation of reward, such as the status of self-governing dominion (Manela, 2007). In the nationalist publication Young India, this dissatisfaction was expressed by, among others, Vithaldas K. Bhuta:

’Indians shed their blood and India’s money was lavishly spent on various wars for imperial purpose. Civilians were imported from England, though natives of the soil could manage the same posts with equal ability. Would England submit to the same “benevolent domination” and exploitation of their wealth by any foreign power, say Germany or Austria? Why, then, should you talk only of ‘security of British rule?’’ (Bhuta, 1918: 319).

Yet at the conclusion of WWI, the Indian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference at Versailles (1919) was unable to gain concessions in the form of self-determination for India. Instead, the British Montagu declaration for political reform was adopted, which claimed it would move India gradually towards self-government (Manela, 2007: 91).

Mahatma Gandhi and Peasant Nationalism

The return of Gandhi to India around 1915 was critical to the rise of a mass national movement towards Indian self-rule or swaraj (Robb, 2002). By swaraj Gandhi referred to a distinctly democratic definition:

’...The Government of India by the consent of the people ascertained by the vote or the largest number of the adult population, male or female, native-born or domiciled who have contributed by manual labour to the service of the State....
This Government should be quite consistent with the British connection on absolutely honorable and equal terms’ (Gandhi, c1925, 2008: 150).

There are three movements associated with the leadership of Gandhi: the Rowalatt Satyagraha of 1919, the non-cooperation-Khilafat movements between 1920-22, and the civil disobedience movements between 1929-34 (Robb, 2002: 185). They were based upon passive resistance or ‘truth force’ (satyagraha) and ‘Jain-influenced non-violence (ahimsa)’ (Robb, 2002: 185). While attacking Western materialism, the notion behind Gandhi’s movements were that ‘one’s suffering would shape and convert the enemy’, relying upon ‘self-discipline, suffering and sacrifice (brahmacharya)’ as a strategy of resistance (Robb, 2002: 185).

Gandhi was able to gain the support of peasants and tribals, making up the majority of the Indian population, as well as the elites. His role as mediator between elite and peasant, Muslim and Hindu interests, was central to his rise to pre-eminence around 1920 (Brown, 2009). His broad appeal was enhanced through his spiritual image and the invention of a kind of mythology around his person (Amin, 2009). India's large illiterate population meant that it was not the printing press, but word of mouth and rumors that allowed the spread of ideas. Here, Gandhi skillfully re-crafted Western notions of nationhood into ‘overtly Indian, even Hindu, terms and symbols’ (Brown, 2009: 63). Within the diversity of Indian society, this allowed a popular, peasant, nationalism to emerge during the 1920s.

*The All-India Nation and Anti-colonial Resistance*

From around 1922, the INC embraced the concept of ‘nationhood based on individual citizenship’ and building a nationalism with the goal of ‘sovereignty for the Indian nation-state’ (Bandyopadhyay, 2009: xxiv). Its success relied upon its credibility as not a mere Hindu establishment, but as a base representation for all Indians. During the 1920s, the INC led movements around the country that, while occurring simultaneously,
varied greatly according to region and locality. Simply, although unified by anti-colonial resistance, the ‘Indian masses were never a homogeneous entity’ (Bandyopadhyay, 2009: xxvi, xxviii). Protests varied from issues of religion, local authority, economic hardship, and class and caste inequalities, and they always had to function within the limits of British rule (see Robb, 2002: 193-194).

In terms of hypothesis 2, this again points to the barriers that direct rule by an external power can impose on local movements. However, the fact that nationalism emerged under British rule also lends weight to Hechter’s (2000) theory, that the nation seeks congruence over the governance unit when direct rule is present. Colonial rule allowed popular discontent to be harnessed by India’s elite to the nationalist cause (Robb, 2002: 196).

**The Chinese Nation and Nationalism**

The concepts of the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu) and the Chinese people (Zhingguoren), were introduced to China around the early twentieth century by the intellectual elite (Zhao, 2004: 45-46). From the outset, the concept of sovereignty (guojia zhuquan) became the most prominent theme of Chinese elite nationalism (Zhao, 2004: 49). Chen Duxiu, founder of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, defined sovereignty in 1904 as ‘the power of a nation to be its own master’ (quoted in Zhao, 2004: 49). A sense of withering cultural sovereignty and even inferiority, since Western intrusions into China mid 19th century, impelled scholarly recognition of China’s weakness, and need to ‘emulate the very source of that subjugation for modernization’ (Tsu, 2005: 19). In China, the emergence of nationalism was a distinct reaction to imperialism, dating back to the first Opium War (1839-42), and the subsequent imposition of numerous treaties (see Zhao, 2004, Wang, 2003; and Fung, 1987).
The Boxer Rebellion (1900) was the first movement in the twentieth century to express virulent anti-foreignism. Fei Ch’i-hao (1900), recounts the looting and murder of a foreign family during the Rebellion where ‘all day long a mob of one or two hundred roughs’ shouted: ‘Kill the foreigners, loot the houses.’ The peasant rebellion aimed to expel all foreigners from China (see Mitter, 2004). The Qing dynasty backed the rebellion and declared war against foreign powers in China; who put down the rebellion (Mitter, 2004: 33). The popular uproar against foreigners remains a central feature of Chinese nationalism today (see Gries, 2004).

*The 1911 Xinhai Revolution and China’s Nationalists*

The Chinese Empire had been under the control of the Qing Dynasty since 1664, it fell late 1911, at the hands of China’s newly established Nationalist Party (KMT) led by Sun Yatsen (Mitter, 2004: 27-29). Forced into resignation by military man Yuan Shikai, Sun Yatsen was President of the new Republic of China for a mere six weeks. The KMT was subsequently banned and Sun went into exile (Mitter, 2004: 36). Dissatisfaction with the Qing can be located in the arrival of the West, and Japan, in China via a series of military defeats. It disproved a general belief in Chinese superiority and centrality in the world. China’s defeat, beginning in 1842 with the Opium War, made China’s ‘backwardness’ visible (see Lovell, 2011).

The greatest source of ‘anger among the Chinese’ was the special rights granted to major powers in China under Treaty provisions (Mitter, 2004: 33). Rights included the renting of concession territories, control over treaty ports, and extraterritoriality that exempted foreigners from Chinese law. Foreigners had the right to: set up municipal administrations, establish police forces and ‘volunteer corps, acquire land, and in Shanghai, to extend roads beyond settlement limits’ (Fung, 1987: 797). In a series of lectures given in 1924, before his death in 1925, Sun Yatsen described China’s situation:

‘This economic force has reduced China to the position of a colony of all the
imperialistic Powers! Yet we still try in vain to console ourselves by saying that our country is only a semi-colony of the Powers. In fact, the present position of our country is inferior to that of a regular colony or of a dependent state... China is the colony of all the treaty Powers. All those countries having treaty relations with China are the masters of China... Our people are not only the slaves of one master, but of several masters' (Sun Yatsen, 1924: 13).

The nationalist model of Sun Yatsen, and the communist model of the CCP, presented alternative paths to modernity, they stemmed from a fear of the 'extinction of China,' through continued domination of foreign powers (Zhao, 2004: 39). Incursions into China by the West and Japan created the need for a Chinese nation-state that could compete with the major world powers (Zhao, 2004: 39).

Here, the beginnings of the 'Century of Humiliation' narrative were utilized to build a mass national consciousness in the 1920s (see Fung, 1987; Callahan, 2004). In the decade that followed the Xinhai Revolution, intellectual elites, students, teachers, and writers, ‘through articles, demonstrations, and petitions, drew attention to the country’s mistreatment at the hands of the powers,’ building around them a kind of 'National Humiliation' industry (Lovell, 2011: 314).

**The Treaty of Versailles and the May the Fourth Movement**

China’s Republic after 1912 was inherently unstable, particularly as it incorporated China’s old feudal system (see Skocpal, 1979: 236). In effect, state power de-centralized towards local, regional, and provincial centers, to those that possessed the means of coercion; the warlords (Skocpal, 1979: 237). Between 1915-16 President Yuan Shikai attempted to reinstate Confucianism to the center of Chinese state philosophy, and conspired to raise himself to the position of Chinese emperor (Mitter, 2004). After his death in 1916, regional warlords with their own armies gained dominance throughout
China (see Skocpal, 1979). National reintegration became the central goal of both dominant political parties, the KMT and the CCP, in the 1920s.

In the Chaos of the 1911 revolution, the Japanese government imposed ‘Twenty-One’ demands on China, claiming sovereignty over parts of Manchuria and Mongolia (Lovell, 2011: 314). This added fuel to the uproar of Chinese students on the fourth of May 1919. The key trigger for the popular uprising in 1919 was the Treaty of Versailles, where German concession territories in Shandong Province were not returned to China but given to Japan. The Chinese government had declared itself for the Allies in 1917 and sent 96,000 laborers. Like India, they were expecting a reward at the conclusion of the war, not further ‘Humiliation’ by another treaty (Mitter, 2004: 5). Three characteristics defined the May the Fourth movement, shaping not only the demonstration ‘but much of the path taken by twentieth century China’ (Mitter, 2004: 11):

1. Youth - the prime movers were young male students.
2. Internationalism – the events were triggered by external events, far outside China, and the protests were carried out to capture international attention.
3. Violence – the events of the day were violent.

These are enduring characteristics of nationalist movements in China. As recently as the 16th of September 2012, nationalist protests were led by Chinese students (Youth) protesting against Japanese actions (Internationalism) concerning the Diaoyu Islands, burning Japanese made cars and department stores (Violence) (Gao, 2012).

The Rise of the Nationalist Government

Throughout the 1920s, the KMT adopted anti-imperialism as a means to engage and appeal to popular national consciousness; it usefully provided a ‘convenient catch-all to explain China’s current problems’ (Fung, 1987: 802). The CCP also employed this strategy. Between 1923-27 the CCP and the KMT formed an alliance – the First United
Front – building nationalist armies (see Lovell, 2011). After the end of a military campaign to unite China (the Northern Expedition) between 1922-1927, new KMT leader Chiang Kaishek purged the communists in China's urban areas and formed a KMT government in Nanjing in 1927. In terms of hypothesis 2, this point is crucial. The Chinese nationalists and communists were able to build their own armies; the presence of the British in India did not make this possible to Indian nationalists. In addition to the lack of a centralized authority, Chinese nationalists possessed their own means of violence; the direction of Chinese nationalism was not obstructed by outside powers. This is where informal imperialism engenders the emergence of a strong, uninhibited, nationalism.

During the First United Front both the KMT and CCP utilized simple slogans such as 'Down with Imperialism!' and 'Down with Warlordism!' to capture a popular audience (Fung, 1987: 801). The term 'Unequal Treaties' was introduced by Sun Yatsen in 1924 and taken up by Mao Zedong in 1925; the so-called 'Unequal treaties' were painted as the 'unequivocal symbol of Western aggression and threat' (Wang, 2003: 422). One example is the Treaty of Nanjing (1842), concluding the Opium War, and establishing Hong Kong as a British protectorate. In the mid-twenties, 'Unequal Treaties' became the catchphrase used to 'awaken' mass mobilization, and attain political legitimacy for both political parties (Wang, 2003: 423). The importance of the 'Unequal Treaties' to anti-colonial nationalism in China is illustrated by the fact that both the CCP and KMT tried to take credit when they were finally relinquished in 1943 (see Wang, 2003).

With the KMT purge of urban communists, the CCP relocated to the countryside. This was essential to the rise of popular nationalism, as upon Mao's urgings, the CCP stirred up the peasantry. Mao was pivotal to this reorientation, which ultimately gained the communist victory in 1949 (see Knight, 2004). In a report in 1927 he wrote:
'For the present upsurge of the peasant movement is a colossal event. In a very short time, in China's central, southern and northern provinces, several hundred million peasants will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to hold it back. They will smash all the trammels that bind them and rush forward along the road to liberation. They will sweep all the imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, local tyrants and evil gentry into their graves' (Mao, 1927).

Addressing the revolutionary potential of the peasantry, Mao's eventual 'awakening' and support of the peasantry, the majority of China's population, made anticolonial nationalism a mass movement to the scale of China's population (see Knight, 2004).

**Early Similarities**

Anticolonial nationalism emerged simultaneously in India and China. In both cases, it began as a local elite effort influenced by Western ideas and often a Western education, to locate the nation around the turn of the twentieth century. Imagined by intellectual elites, the notions of a Chinese and Indian nation were instilled in the population through print, speech, rumor, and word of mouth. The nation was not inherent in either case. The presence of foreign powers spurred anti-colonial nationalism in both countries. This unified people towards the common goals of independence, reunification, and revolution. The imperial 'Other' meant that the anti-imperial 'Self' could be imagined. Further, it was external factors - World War One, the Treaty of Versailles, and imperialism generally – that drove 'intellectuals and publicists to adopt the language and practices of modern nationalism' (Bayly, 2004: 218). The elite intellectual phase was followed in both countries by mass mobilization of the peasantry.

Two determining differences are also apparent: ethno-religious divisions and types of foreign rule. From the outset, ethno-religious difference was pertinent to Indian, but not
Chinese nationalism. In China, Western ideas were integrated with China’s past to promote unity ‘among China’s multi-ethnic nationals’, creating ‘intense feelings of common identity and mutual belonging among the Chinese people’ (Zhao, 2004: 38). Ethnic or regional loyalties were denounced and painted as treacherous to the nation (Zhao, 2004: 38; Lovell, 2011: 319). In India, religious identities – being Muslim or Hindu – presented difficulties in imagining one Indian ‘nation’. The second difference pertains British formal colonization of ‘British’ India, and the numerous informal imperial powers present in China that did not administer the state other than through influence and Treaty terms.

**Types of Foreign Rule**

Robinson and Gallagher’s (1953) theory of the imperialism of free trade, first distinguished between formal and informal imperialism. Here, informal domination – through dependence on British ports – was an alternative means of advancing imperial interests in the 19th century. Formal annexation was only necessary if interests could not be managed indirectly (Robinson and Gallagher, 1953: 3-4). Informal methods of control are about creating reliance, an economic dependence, promoting free trade, and exerting indirect influence on political and social organization of a state. It is the latter that was experienced in China, while British India was directly ruled by Britain after 1857, also indirectly controlling the Indian Princely states.

The role of the British in India was crucial in terms of both the formation and limits of Indian nationalism. In China, on the other hand, the role of imperial powers was crucial only in terms of the formation of anticolonial nationalism, not its limits. In other words, the colonized centers of political power meant that nationalists in India were ‘forced willy-nilly to adopt a more de-centralized strategy of political mobilization’ (Bayly,
This suggests that nationalism in China remains stronger today because it was not constrained by a colonized center of political power. In terms of enduring colonial legacies, China did not encounter colonial administrative legacies after the revolution. In India, on the other hand, the legacy of British rule in India is pervasive. Britain helped draw up India's constitution, British administrative and legal bodies that were transferred into independent India, British minority protection policies like quotas of parliamentary seats were also adopted in post-independence India, and the legacy of Partition (Low, 1997).

Hechter's (2000) theory of nationalism claims that 'direct rule permits the state to become the governance unit in geographically extensive and populous territories... This means that the center assumes rights, resources, and obligations formerly held by local authorities' (Hechter, 2000: 60). This allows nationalist opposition to emerge, as the nation seeks to establish congruence with the state. Indirect rule inhibits the emergence of nationalism as nation and governance unit remain congruent (Hechter, 2000: 37). Hechter's (2000) theory accounts for the emergence of Indian nationalism: the British took full control over British India from the East-India Trading Company in 1857, becoming more interventionist thereafter (Robb, 2002: 181). The colonial state increasingly utilized 'objective legal rules and institutions, and penetrated more directly through society with its taxes, records and information, and its larger agenda of interference and control' (Robb, 2002: 151-153). The INC and anti-colonial nationalism formed and operated within these confines, they could not operate as successfully in the princely states that were only indirectly ruled by the British (see Low, 1997).

Yet Hechter's (2000) theory poses no utility for the case of China. Here, Imperial powers gained informal influence through a system of treaty ports and the application of 'Most Favored Nation' clauses and Extraterritoriality (Fung, 1987). Within the framework of 'informal empire,' treaties enabled imperial powers 'to maintain a 'business system' in
‘semi-colonial’ China’ (Fung, 1987; 796). This is the context in which anti-colonial nationalism emerged in China, not direct rule, but within a system of diffused political power where various warlords competed, while economic power rested firmly in the hands of external powers. Simply, the cases of China and India demonstrate that nationalism arises both under direct rule and in its absence.

Building on Hechter (2000), hypothesis 1: direct rule suggests that stronger nationalism emerges where direct rule was present. Hypothesis 2: type of foreign rule inverses this to suggest that stronger nationalism emerges where there was informal imperialism rather than direct colonization. It is here claimed that the historical observations presented above support hypothesis 2 whilst debunking hypothesis 1 as direct rule was not present in China at all. This is the case because under informal imperialism, Chinese nationalists did not have to function within a foreign administration, and were able to raise their own nationalist armies. The militancy of Chinese nationalism is in stark contrast to Gandhi’s and the INC’s negotiations with the British for Indian independence (see Low, 1997). I suggest that even in anticolonial form, Chinese nationalism took on a more radical and unified tendencies than Indian nationalism.

**Conclusion and Findings**

This chapter has established early general similarities between Chinese and Indian nationalism. It also pinpoints underlying differences that help explain the divergences between Chinese and Indian nationalism in the 1990s: ethno-religious divisions and types of foreign rule. This chapter finds that Hechter’s (2000) theory of nationalism usefully explains the emergence of India’s nationalism, but not China’s. It further finds that hypothesis 2: types of foreign rule holds potential explanatory power in terms of China’s stronger and more prevalent nationalism since the 1990s. Between 1900-1930 an unconstrained nationalism was able to emerge in China due to the lack of colonized
centers of political power, nationalists were able to build their own armies. However, hypothesis 2 needs to be explored further in terms of the enduring legacy of informal imperialism and formal colonial rule for nationalism in China and India especially during the 1990s. Chapter two and three will further evaluate the impact of types of rule upon Chinese and Indian nationalism. As hypothesis 1 and 2 pose mutually exclusive explanations, hypothesis 1 will be not be explored further. Its explanatory power depends upon the presence of some direct rule in China.
Chapter Three

Nation and Nationalism after Independence and Revolution in India and China

Formal Indian independence in 1947 and revolution in China in 1949 were the moments of transition towards full sovereignty and the establishment of two nation-states. Put simply, for India the transition was from colonial state to nation-state, and in China, the transition from decentralized state and civil war to unified nation-state. These transformations encompassed essential categories of identity – from subject to citizen, from nationalist to national. Anti-colonial nationalism had to be renovated from a form of resistance and mass mobilization directed against state power, or the lack of it, into an ‘institutionalist discourse and practice of postcolonial nation-statism’ (Roy, 2007: 157-158).

This chapter focuses on the period between the late 1940s and 1980s, in addition to delineating the ethnic and religious compositions of China and India in terms of nationalism in the 1990s. It centrally evaluates hypothesis 3: Regime Type and hypothesis 5: Diversity. The former claims that China’s nationalism is stronger due to a strong centralized state, as opposed to democratic governance, allowing for greater state control of nationalist agendas. Effective top-down nationalism explains China’s stronger and more prevalent nationalism. The latter, Hypothesis 5, claims that high diversity levels – in terms of the ethnic and religious composition, and spoken languages – engenders fragmented and varied nationalisms, less diversity entails a stronger and
unified nationalism. As both India and China are multi-ethnic nation-states, these two hypotheses are necessarily intertwined.

The first section of this chapter outlines China and India’s demographics, and utilizes three waves of surveys conducted in India and China by the World Values Survey (WVS) to correlate diversity and national identity. The second section looks at the transformation of nationalism in India and China, from anti-colonial nationalism to state-building and ethno-religious varieties. This is followed by an analysis linking diversity, regime type, and nationalism in China and India since the 1990s.

**Ethnicity, Religion, and Language**

According to 2012 estimates, India has a total population of 1.2 billion and China 1.3 billion.¹ In India there are 15 official spoken languages, the most widely spoken language is Hindi (41%). Other languages like Bengali, Telugu, Marathi, and Tamil, are each spoken by less than 10% of the population. Notably, English is widely spoken and crucial in official endeavors in Indian politics or business. In China there are 8 commonly spoken languages, including Mandarin and Cantonese, and a multitude of ethnic minority languages.

China has a total of 56 recognized ethnic groups, including the Han majority (91.5%), 53 minority groups have their own distinct language, 22 their own scripts (PRC, 2012). While minorities represent a mere 8.5% of the population, there are 18 ethnic minorities with populations over 1 million. India has two main ethnic groups: Indo-Aryan (72%) and Dravidian (25%), Mongoloid and other smaller groups represent 3% of the population. In 2001 Hindu's made up 80.5% of the Indian population, 13.4% are

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¹ All demographic statistics presented here are taken from the CIA World Factbook, unless stated otherwise, see CIA Factbook, 2012
Muslim, 2.3% Christian, and 1.9% Sikh. In 2009, India’s Muslim ‘minority’ made up an estimated 161 million people (Linz et al., 2011: 41). In China, Daoism and Buddhism are the main religions, whilst 3-4% of the population is Christian and 1-2% Muslim. The PRC is a self-avowed Atheist state, and intolerant to adversary between religions (see Ashiwa and Wank, 2009). The key difference is that China’s minority groups are situated on the periphery of Chinese territory, while India’s ethnic and religious groups, and spoken languages, are found throughout the country (see Liebman, 2007).

Religion as Identity: Ethno-religious Nationalism

The 1990, 1995, and 2001, waves of surveys conducted by the WVS Association in India and China contain useful information with regards to the effects of religion and ethnicity upon national identity. The surveys utilized multi-stage random sampling stratification to account for regional, urban-rural, age, sex, occupation and education variances. Two questions, asked in both India and China, are relevant here:

- Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are... [a] a religious person, [b] not a religious person, or [c] a convinced Atheist. Question asked in the 1990 and 2001 (Table 1.2).
- To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all? Locality, Region, Country, Continent, or the World. Question asked in both India and China in 1995 (Table 1.3).

One question asked only in India is also relevant: Which of the following describes you? [a] Indian first, a member of ethnic group second, [b] Hindu, [c] Muslim, [d] OBC (other backward classes), [e] Indian, and [f] Dalit. While Hindus make up the majority of India’s population, they are not ‘culturally homogenous’ when broken down into ‘regional and linguistic diversity’ (Linz et al., 2011: 46). The revival of ethno-religious nationalism in India since the late 1980s, signals the centrality of religion to identity over identification to an all-India secular nation (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1: Identity in India, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which of the following best describes you?</th>
<th>India 1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian first, and a member of my ethnic group second</td>
<td>29.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>21.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBC</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>41.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalit</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (100%)</td>
<td>2040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: World Values Survey, 1995)

Table 1.1 shows that, while 70.6% people identify with being Indian or Indian first and an ethnic group second, 29% still specified that they identify with an ethnic group second. 21% described themselves as Hindu and 4.4% Muslim. This affirms the importance of religion to identity in India. Table 1.2 demonstrates that religion is more important to Indians than it is to Chinese. In 1990, 95% of the people in the Chinese survey, when asked about their religiosity, responded with either ‘not a religious person’ or ‘a convinced atheist,’ 85% in 2001. The variance between 1990 and 2001 can be attributed to either the small sample size or people in China are getting more religious. By contrast, in India the responses are the complete opposite. Most people in both 1990 and 2001 responded with ‘a religious person’. This again, helps to explain why religion based right wing parties, like the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), were able to gain mass popularity.
Table 1.2: Religion in India and China, 1990 & 2001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A religious person</td>
<td>4.90%</td>
<td>83.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a religious</td>
<td>51.30%</td>
<td>14.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>person</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A convinced atheist</td>
<td>43.80%</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (100%)</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>2455</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.3: Geographical groups belonging to first, China and India 1995.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Locality</td>
<td>40.10%</td>
<td>61.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>11.80%</td>
<td>29.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>39.30%</td>
<td>8.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continent</td>
<td>4.40%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The world</td>
<td>4.40%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (100%)</td>
<td>1471</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: World Values Survey, 1995)

Table 1.3 shows that identification with locality or region is more important in India than it is in China in 1995. Only 8.3% of respondents in India said they belong to the country, rather than region or locality, first. By contrast 39.3% of respondents in China that said they belong to the country first. This finding also corresponds to the claim that nationalism in China is stronger and more prevalent, while nationalism in India since the 1990s is more fragmented along regional and ethno-religious lines. However, 40%
of respondents in China still said they belonged to their locality first; it is only in contrast to India that these figures clearly demonstrate that identification with country was more widespread in China in the 1990s. Taken together, Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 signify that religious, regional, and ethnic identifications explain the relative weakness of a unified Indian nationalism, as compared to Chinese nationalism since the 1990s. However, both India and China have high levels of diversity in terms of ethnicity, religion, and spoken languages; that people in China should be less religious or identify less with ethnicity, needs to be explained in conjunction with other variables.

A study of Chinese nationalism has found that nationalism in China is a ‘trans-cultural concept’ as linguistic and religious minorities ‘show just as high levels of nationalism as the Han majority’ (Darr and Tang, 2012: 819). Further, one of the key complaints of Hindu nationalists is that minority groups receive preferential treatment (see Jaffrelot, 1996). In China minorities also receive ‘preferential’ treatment, for example they ‘may attend university with lower test scores than their Han counterparts and are less confined by family planning law,’ yet this has not resulted in Han specific nationalism (Liebman, 2007: 359).

**Secularism and Indian Nationalism**

In August 1947, the transfer of power from the British Raj to the two independent dominions of India and Pakistan took place (Masselos, 1985: 223). The Partition of British India was accompanied by intense ethnic violence where ‘nearly a million were killed and 15 million uprooted in Hindu-Muslim clashes’ (Snyder, 2000: 287). Partition perpetuated ethnic and religious difference, undermining the all-India national identity embodied by anti-colonial resistance during the 1920s and 30s. Under British rule, ‘neither Muslims nor Hindus could be termed as outsiders within the political unit,’ but
the creation of Pakistan effectively laid the foundations for the Muslim ‘Other’ in a predominantly Hindu India (Momen, 2005: 246).

In dealing with an ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse society, the ideology of secularism became foundational to the new Indian state and the notion of an all-India nation. It had ‘served and defined Indian nationalism in the formal independence movement,’ and was advanced by the INC and prominent leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru (Robb, 2007: 55). After the death of Gandhi in 1948, Nehru became the most influential member of the INC (see Khilnani, 1997). Educated in London, he was India’s first Prime Minister. The nationalism promoted by Nehru, and the Indian state, embodied a territorial and universalist version of nationalism (Jaffrelot, 1996: 83). The belief that self-government would benefit all Indians as equal citizens deemed secularism essential to dealing with India’s diversity (Robb, 2007: 55).

However, in the years prior to Indian independence, two dominant strands of nationalism had developed in British India, espousing alternative visions for the Indian nation. Ethno-religious nationalism was embraced by bodies like ‘the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League,’ accepting that ‘a community bounded by a single culture must have its own state,’ (Bhargava, 2010: 52). Here, Hindus and Muslims were imagined as separate nations. Composite-culture nationalism, on the other hand, associated with Nehruvians and Nehru himself, advocated that culture did not have to have an ethno-religious basis (Bhargava, 2010: 53). Indian culture was, instead, inclusively ‘defined by shared historical experience and a joint struggle against British colonial rule’ (Bhargava, 2010: 53).

This initial split is crucial to understanding Indian nationalism in the 1990s, as these two forms, each embraced by members of the elite, competed for dominance over the Indian national imagination. Composite-culture nationalism equates to state-building nationalism that seeks to unify ‘culturally distinctive territories in a given state’
Critically, the Indian constitution, adopted in 1950, promoted secular nationalism as the ‘official ideology of the Indian state;’ ethno-religious Hindu nationalism was rejected (Bhargava, 2010: 54). This official line, however, continued to conflict with underlying ethno-religious identities, that after 1985, once again, erupted onto the Indian political scene (see Shani, 2005).

**Partition, Secularism and Jawaharlal Nehru’s India**

In European history secularism has meant the clear demarcation of church and state into separate realms (see Chandra, 2012). And yet, for a deeply religious society like India, this meant that there was significant overlap in terms of the social role of the state and traditional social structures. Here, the caste system and culturally embedded social roles conflicted with the ideals of secularism and the alternative visions promoted by ethno-religious national groups (Chandra, 2012: 63). Secularism, in the political sense, ‘requires the separation of the state from any particular religious order’ and ‘goes against giving any religion a privileged position in the activities of the state’ (Sen, 1996: 13). This means that there is a basic requirement of ‘symmetry of treatment’ of all religious communities; in India this was expressed through institutionalized minority protection, for example – quotas in parliament for minority representation (Sen, 1996: 14).

However, Hindu nationalists in the 1990s viewed this kind of minority protection as simply, the government favoring the rights of minorities over the majority. India’s Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, states indignantly on their webpage, under ‘Manifesto’ and ‘Hindutva’, that:

> "India even gave the Muslim minority gifts such as separate personal laws, special status to the only Muslim majority state - Kashmir, and other rights that are even unheard of in the bastion of democracy and freedom, the United States of America. Islamic law was given precedence over the national law in"
instances that came under Muslim personal law. The Constitution was changed when the courts, in the Shah Bano case, ruled that a secular nation must have one law, not separate religious laws. Islamic religious and educational institutions were given a policy of non-interference’ (BJP, 2009).

Hindu nationalists hence moved against the moderate tide of secularism that, according to the BJP webpage, presents the ‘greatest danger to our sense of unity and our sense of purpose’ (Kamath, 1996). India's ‘symmetry of treatment,’ through the protection of minorities, rather than embody equality for all religious communities, it seems, has fostered a sense of inherent inequality suggesting an intrinsic failure in India’s secularism.

The Partition of the British Raj into India and Pakistan meant that anti-Muslim sentiment undermined Nehru's ideal of a secular, ‘rational’, and modern India, from the outset (see Liebman, 2007). Communal violence erupted in Calcutta in 1946, and a year later in Punjab, where Muslims and Hindus murdered one another (Masselos, 1985: 222). The context of Partition is that by 1940 the Muslim League, having reorganized itself and allying itself with the British, emerged as a major political force in India and demanded a ‘separate Muslim homeland’ (Masselos, 1985: 190; see Snyder, 2000: 292). Under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the League claimed to represent all Muslims in India and gained extensive popularity, especially with regards to the demand for Pakistan (see Masselos, 1985).

After Partition, Hindu's formed an ‘even larger proportion of the population in independent India than in British India,’ providing a more ‘tangible focus for anti-Muslim feeling’ (Jaffrelot, 1996: 81). Hindu nationalists at the time, however, had to function within the dominance of secularism, which had become a ‘pillar of the state’ upon independence (Jaffrelot,1996: 81). Its relative success is suggested by a decline in communal violence, which lay largely ‘dormant until its resurgence in the late 1980s’
Hindu-Muslim rioting between 1947 and the 1980s ‘occurred from time to time in a few cities, but the overall pattern of relations among India’s ethnic and religious groups was moderate and stable’ (Snyder, 2000: 287). However, it was only around 1950 that secularism, as promoted by the state, emerged as a ‘legitimate norm of the Indian political system and organizations identified with Hindu nationalism were effectively marginalized’ (Jaffrelot, 1996: 81). In essence, while the strength of the INC and India’s secular elite ‘prevailed’ ethnic rivalries would remain at a minimum; the ultimate weakening of the INC in the 1980s gave room for political parties based on ethnic mobilization (Snyder, 2000: 290).

In terms of Hypotheses 5 (Diversity): this suggests that ethno-religious divisions, from the inception of the newly Independent state, undermined the all-India identity that placed secular ideals and the shared history of struggle against the British at its center. Communal violence did not plague China; rather, the shared struggle against imperial powers, including imperial Japan and warlords, became the centerpiece of a state-building nationalism that did not divide along ethnic or religious lines.

Nationalism, Communism, and ‘Saving’ China

From 1927-1937 (the Nanjing Decade), the KMT effectively governed large parts of China, until the Japanese invasion in 1937 (see Mitter, 2004: 166-8). By 1945 the CCP controlled a mass movement around its base areas, establishing ‘communist-led mass nationalism’ (Zhao, 2004: 109). After the defeat of Japan by America’s entry into World War II, an extended civil war was fought between the nationalists and the communists in China where the latter prevailed in 1949. The aims of the revolution were nationalist in that it pursued independence, and the renewal of China’s strength. The revolution of 1949 was a nationalist, not communist, revolution led by a communist party, creating an
'uneasy relationship between Chinese nationalism and communist internationalism' (Zhimin, 2005: 41).

While India relied upon secularism, the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC) dealt differently with its multiple nationalities, spoken languages, and the enforcement of unity. Article 3 of the 1954 constitution of the PRC explicitly states:

> The People's Republic of China is a unitary multinational state. All the nationalities are equal. Discrimination against or oppression of any nationality, and acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities, are prohibited. All the nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own customs and ways’ (PRC Constitution, 1954).

The above is partial to the ‘myth of the unitary Chinese nation-state;’ the accompanying story being that the multiethnic Chinese nation ‘shared the same origins,’ all groups being the ‘ancestors of the nation’ (Zhao, 2004: 168). In 1949 the CCP claimed to have liberated not only the Chinese people, but also ethnic minorities, from ‘the domination of foreign imperialism’ (Zhao, 2004: 175). Through a mixture of repression and ‘institutional arrangements’ built into the PRC, ethnic nationalist sentiment was controlled after 1949 (Zhao, 2004: 179). In effect, this supports Hypothesis 3 (Regime Type), illustrating the ability of an authoritarian state to regulate and influence nationalism in China. In fact, throughout the history of the PRC, the CCP had an unchallenged monopoly over the ‘discourses of nationalism and patriotism,’ it determined its ‘direction, content and intensity’ at least until the 1980s (Zhimin, 2005: 50).

Between 1949 and 1954 the Party was effectively embedded in society through the establishment of Party branches and cells, modeled on the Soviet system (Teiwess, 2000: 115). Through such organization, the CCP sold itself effectively as the 'Party of the
people,’ expounding a ‘Marxist view’ of mass nationalism (Gries, 2004: 117). In Maoist China, the CCP successfully fused the Party and the Chinese nation as the ‘heroic entity’ that defeated the West to save and renew China (Gries, 2004: 117). In other words, the CCP fruitfully ‘forged the Chinese nation’ out of the legacy of imperialism (Zhao, 2004: 117). Revolution, the Party, and nationalist mobilization, essentially created the link between the success of China as a country and nationalist sentiment. Mao’s uniting narrative expressed that the ‘Chinese people, as a nation, were to resist foreign imperialism and build a new China,’ restoring former glory which ‘required a state powerful enough to defend them and lead industrialization’ (Zhao, 2004: 118).

Mass mobilization continued into the 1950s through Mao’s political campaigns that tapped nationalism, for example, the ‘Aid Korea, Resist America’ campaign mobilized the people behind China’s Korean War efforts (Teiweis, 2000: 128). The Cultural Revolution, 1966-76, was the most radical expression of this, essentially collapsing the Party state (see Mitter, 2004). While revolutionary ideology largely ‘masked nationalist feelings’ during the Cultural Revolution period in particular (Jia, 2005: 12), a revival of nativism or anti-foreign nationalist sentiment was rallied to ‘make China strong by maximizing China’s distance from the modern world’ (Zhao, 2004: 262, see p. 255). On the whole, between the 1950s and 70s, ‘the salience of nationalism was shrouded by an overlay of the official ideology, Marxism–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought’ (Zhao, 1998: 288).

The destruction wrought by the Cultural Revolution meant that Maoist thought was reexamined under Deng Xiaoping, to the detriment of CCP credibility and authority. In effect, the redundancy of communist ideology could no longer viably mobilize the people, led to the re-discovery of nationalism by the CCP (Zhao, 1998). This was realized through the adoption of three simple nationalist aims: ‘economic development, national unity and independence, and greater international status’ (Zhimin, 2005: 52). Since the 1990s, as the CCPs nationalist credentials are tied to Party authority, it has to respond to
nationalist outcries to maintain social stability and unity or resort to costly repression (see Christensen, 2011).

**Regime Type, Diversity, and Nationalism**

After Liberation in 1947 and 1949, both India and China were characterized by political systems dominated by one-Party (see Roy, 2007). Despite India's status as a new democracy, the INC commanded Indian politics until the 1980s, and Nehru remained in Power until his death in 1964, to be succeeded by his daughter Indira Gandhi (see Snyder, 2000). Nevertheless, parliamentary institutions were established and elections were held in India, as opposed to communist China. Hence, regime type difference could potentially explain the prevalence of Chinese nationalism as compared to nationalism in India since the 1990s. Table 2 indicates how nationalism might be affected by both regime type and diversity; the mono-nation variables are predictions.

**Table 2.0**: relationship between regime type, ethno-religious composition, and the strength of nationalism, as suggested by hypothesis 3 and 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Autocratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multi-nation state</strong></td>
<td>Fragmented nationalism (Both civic and ethnic types present)</td>
<td>Unitary State-centered nationalism (and repressed ethnic nationalism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple ethnic and religious groups, and several distinct spoken languages</td>
<td>Civic nationalism</td>
<td>State-centered nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mono-nation state</strong></td>
<td>Civic nationalism</td>
<td>State-centered nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culturally Homogeneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*India*

According to Jack Snyder (2000: 39), ethnic nationalism emerges in countries with weak political institutions (democratic) and unadaptable elites, while civic nationalism emerges where political institutions (democratic) are strong, and elite interests are
adaptable. As such, a weakening of political institutions in the late 1980s explains the rise of ethnic conflict and nationalism in India (Snyder, 2000: 311). However, Snyder also points out that civic institutions can be fragile in a multi-ethnic setting, as found in India, ‘especially when schemes for minority representation in parliament or the bureaucracy create incentives for political organizing along ethnic lines’ (Snyder, 2000: 296). This is one of the legacies of British rule that allocated parliamentary quotas for minorities (see Low, 1997). Thus, fragmentation of interests along ethnic and religious lines occur as politicians resort to a strategy of ethnic mobilization, emphasizing difference and exclusion, perhaps to win a certain seat.

Political authority in contemporary India is ‘diffuse and layered’ pertaining a multitude of actors that express varied interests, including along ethno-religious lines (Roy, 2007: 163). Yet democracy alone does not explain the division of identity along ethnic lines, rather this is explained by the multi-ethno-religious character of Indian society and the foundations laid by the British for ethno-religious specific political mobilization.

China

The authoritarian Chinese state is commonly portrayed as a ‘state dominates society’ system and, accordingly, Western analysts paint Chinese nationalism as a top-down phenomenon fully controlled and orchestrated by the CCP (Gries, 2004: 119). While the CCP certainly has a role, it has to be remembered that Nationalism involves ‘both leaders and followers’ (Gries, 2004: 119). Since the 1990s, the CCP has employed a mixed tactic of repression and cooption to nationalist uproars. Repression is costly as it ultimately undermines CCP legitimacy and authority as the ‘party of the people’ (Gries, 2004: 120). Since the ‘Tiananmen square incident’ in 1989, one party rule has allowed the CCP to effectively re-establish the link between the Party and the nation; thereby ‘criticism of the party line’ becomes ‘an unpatriotic act’ (Zhao, 1998: 289). However, by basing CCP legitimacy on nationalist fervor, the Party risks placing itself at the mercy of
nationalist demands, should it lose their favor as representative of the nation. It has been established that Chinese policymakers are ‘hypersensitive to nationalist criticism at home,’ as the government is keen to preserve its legitimacy and ‘maintain social stability’ (Christensen, 2011: 54).

Yet, the CCP led government retains the option to repress or support nationalist movements, meaning that nationalism in China has to function within the levels of CCP tolerance. Scholars of Chinese nationalism agree that the role of the CCP in shaping nationalism in China, especially since the 1990s, remains pivotal (see Carlson, 2009; Zhao, 2004; Gries, 2004). Yet the link between nationalism and the CCP is not solely based on the regimes authoritarian nature, but rather: [1] on its history as the revolutionary Party of China that bought liberation, and [2] its popular appeal. In 2008, a Pew attitudes study ‘ranked the Chinese people among the most satisfied with their governments among 24 nations’ (Zhao, 2010: 435). The symbolic power of national liberation should not be underestimated; Chinese nationalism is historically bound to the CCP.

*Regime Type and Nationalism*

Comparatively, one could ask: If China were a democracy would ethnic and religious difference matter? If the INC had maintained its dominance of Indian politics, would secular nationalism be stronger in India? The democracy-authoritarian dichotomy alone cannot explain the differences in Chinese and Indian nationalism. First, India has been a democracy since 1947, and yet Hindu nationalism only rose to dominance in the 1990s. Second, despite CCP prevalence and authoritarian rule, nationalists sometimes challenge CCP legitimacy and actions (see Fewsmith, 2001; Gries, 2004). Third, top-down nationalism is not particular to authoritarian states; Nehru’s secular nationalism was also a top-down nationalism. The success of the CCP in binding nationalists to its cause does, however, speak to the power of top-down nationalism.
Conclusion and Findings

_Hypothesis 3: Regime Type_ - This chapter has found that a stronger centralized state allows for greater control over nationalist unity. The state is able to maintain unity through the repression of ethnic nationalisms, and continually monitoring them through the structures of the state. The strong state is able to effectively promote a nationalist discourse that unifies a people within a given territory by fundamentally merging nation and state, through a collective memory of victimization by outside powers. The case of India has indicated that a weakening of democratic institutions allows ethno-religious identities to dominate nationalist discourses promoted by the state (i.e. secular nationalism). This helps to explain the general continuity and centrality of anti-imperial sentiments in China.

_Hypothesis 2: Type of Foreign Rule_ – The hypothesis claims that informal imperialism, rather than direct colonization, and its legacy, allows for the emergence of a stronger nationalism. This chapter has demonstrated that the post-revolution state in China was able to promote a strong unifying discourse of national victimization through the combination of strong rule (_hypothesis 3_) and legacy of informal rule. In addition, informal imperialism meant that the Chinese state, as opposed to the Indian state, did not have to function within the institutional legacies of formal colonization, nor deal with the consequences of a partitioned state largely determined by the colonial power.

_Hypothesis 5: Diversity_ – While both China and India are multi-ethnic, multi-religious, states, the greater diversity present in India undermined the possibility of a strong unifying nationalist discourse encompassing India’s entire society. The case of China does however illustrate that diversity does not necessarily engender national fragmentation. In combination with _hypothesis 3: regime type_, the autocratic state was able to repress and control ethnic minorities and effectively promote unity. This
suggests that regime type crucially determines fragmentation of nationalism along ethno-religious lines.
Chapter Four

The 1990s and ‘New’ Nationalism in India and China

This chapter focuses on hypothesis 4: foreign threat and extends the analysis of hypothesis 2: type of foreign rule, hypothesis 3: regime type, and hypothesis 5: diversity. The foreign threat hypothesis claims that China’s nationalism is stronger and more prevalent than nationalism in India because there was higher foreign threat and cases of militarized inter-state dispute. Liebman (2007) establishes that foreign threat triggers intense nationalism in both India and China. This suggests that if China has a stronger and more prevalent nationalism than India, then more foreign threat should be present in China. This chapter tests this assumption. It further addresses the role of the state, ethno-religious diversity, and the legacy of informal/formal imperialism in China and India’s nationalism specifically in the 1990s, in terms hypothesis 2, 3, and 5.

The first section of this chapter employs the Militarized Inter-state Dispute (MID) 3.10 participant level Correlates of War (COW) dataset (see Bennett et al., 2003; Bremer et al., 2004), to establish the levels of foreign threat and hostility intensity in China and India during the 1990s. The two remaining sections resume the macro-historical narrative of the previous two chapters, focusing on the developments in Indian and Chinese nationalism in the 1990s. Here, the link between increased nationalism and MID in China and India is detailed.
Nationalism and Militarized Inter-state Disputes (MIDs)

The participant level MID COW 3.10 dataset provides useful records in terms of assessing levels of foreign threat and hostility intensity in China and India in the 1990s. The database codes MIDs according to year and country; the two specific variables relevant to this thesis are [1] Highest Action and [2] Hostility Level. I introduce an additional variable: Hostility Intensity. It measures the overall hostility intensity level pertaining to China and India during the 1990s by multiplying the total number of disputes by the (average of) Hostility Level variable.

The correlation between increased nationalism and foreign threat is particularly pertinent to China, as it has been found that Chinese nationalism is rooted by the collective historical memory of ‘exploitation’ by external powers (see Gries, 2004; Callahan, 2004; Wang, 2003; Zhao, 2004). As illustrated in chapter 2, China’s experience of informal (rather than formal) imperialism enabled the rise of a distinctly anti-foreign nationalism, especially sensitive regarding issues of territorial and cultural sovereignty. The historical focus of Chinese nationalism in terms of the ‘Century of Humiliation’ means that any ‘insult’ to China’s sovereignty – whether Taiwan or an Island dispute – is likely to trigger intense nationalist protest.

Nationalism in India since the 1990s, on the other hand, has been based upon ethno-religious foundations rather than the historical memory of British rule in India that once united Indians in the form of anti-colonial nationalism (see Aloysius, 1997). Thereby, in terms of foreign threat, nationalism fueled by ethnic and religious divisions in India is likely to respond to issues concerning Pakistan and Kashmir. In other words, it has the opposite effect; inter-state conflict tends to further divide national affiliations in India while in China it unites nationalists. This opposite effect in determined by type of foreign rule, regime type, and ethno-religious composition (hypothesis 2, 3 and 5).
Table 3.1: Militarized Inter-state Disputes, 1988-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of disputes (T)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Hostility Level (A)</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>3.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostility Intensity (T x A)</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Hostility Level</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Frequent Highest Action</td>
<td>Show of Force</td>
<td>Use of Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Bennett et al., 2003)

Table 3.1 illustrates that China had more than double the number of total MIDs than India. However, India retained a higher average hostility level than China, suggesting that frequency rather than intensity of MIDs engenders stronger nationalism. Additionally, India resorted to the use of force most frequently in terms of Highest Actions, while China's most frequent Highest Action was a show of force. Even so, between 1988 and 2001 China resorted to the use of force 9 times as opposed to India's 7 times (Table 3.2). This suggests that China's overall actions, pertaining to both the threat, show, and use of force, determines its stronger nationalism since the 1990s. On the whole, China had both the most number of MIDs and a significantly higher level of Hostility Intensity between 1988 and 2001. Appendix A, p. 73, provides a narrative summary of all the MIDs pertaining to China and India between 1993-1999.

Table 3.2: Frequency of Hostility Levels 1988-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hostility Level</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1    No Militarized Action</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2    Threat of use of force</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3    Display of Force</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4    Use of Force</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5    War</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total disputes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Bennett et al., 2003)
Table 3.3: Highest Action by state in a Militarized inter-state dispute 1988-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Action</th>
<th>Hostility Level</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 No militarized action</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Threat to use force</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Threat to blockade</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Threat to occupy territory</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Threat to declare war</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Threat to use CBR weapons</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Threat to join war</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Show of force</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Alert</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Nuclear alert</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mobilization</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Fortify border</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Border violation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Blockade</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Occupation of territory</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Seize</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Attack</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Clash</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Declaration of war</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Use of CBR weapons</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Begin interstate war</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Join interstate war</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Bennett et al., 2003)

Table 3.2 and 3.3 establish that China’s most frequent Highest Action was a display of force; in India it was the use of force. In addition to India’s higher average hostility levels, it also engaged in an ongoing conflict with Pakistan between 1993 and 1999 culminating in the Kargil War 1999. This dispute was coded 5 (war) in terms of Hostility Level, albeit the Highest Action for this conflict was coded 17 (clash) for both sides. In terms of the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995-6, China’s highest action was coded 11 (fortify border) with a hostility level of 3 (show of force). The Diaoyu/Senkaku Island disputes between Japan and China in 1995 and 1996 were both coded 7 (show of force) with Hostility Levels of 3. The sections bellow will discuss Chinese and Indian nationalism with regards to these MIDs in particular (India-Pakistan 1993-9, Taiwan-China-US 1995-6, and China-Japan 1995-6, 2012).
Secularism and the Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India

Official Indian ‘secular nationalism,’ is based on an Indian ‘commitment to liberal values’ and ‘allegiance to the Indian state,’ independent of ethno-religious affiliations (Woodwell, 2007: 132). It is a form of civic, state-building, nationalism that remains a central pillar of the Indian state today. As highlighted in chapter 3, in 1947 the Indian government adopted secularism as the guiding national ideology of the nation-state. As a direct inheritance of earlier anti-colonial nationalism, it remained relatively successful while the INC continued to dominate Indian politics (see Snyder, 2000). However, from around the mid 1980s, a ‘communization of politics’ became evident in India, alongside increased ethno-religious and caste conflicts, separatist movements, and revived Hindu ethno-religious nationalism (Jaffrelot, 1996: 369). Secessionist tendencies emerged in ‘the Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, Assam, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh’ (Kinnvall and Svensson, 2010: 277).

From the 1980s, the INC government showed an ‘increased willingness to take sides in disputes within and between religious communities,’ resulting in the impression that the ‘power of the state could no longer be relied upon to defend secularism’ (Jaffrelot, 1996: 369-70). This called the secularism into question, allowing Hindu nationalist organizations like the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) more room to engage Indian politics (see Jaffrelot, 1996: 370, 410; Dirk, 2001: 6). Increased Hindu-Muslim rioting in the 1990s has been shown to correlate with increased BJP electoral success; in 1990 an estimated 1,404 riots took place, 905 in 1991, and 1,991 in 1992 (Jaffrelot, 1996: 447, 552). The decline of the centrist political party (the INC) and the ‘demise of secularism as a legitimate national ideology’, allowed underlying identity divisions to permeate Indian politics, lending further weight to hypothesis 5: regime type (Dirk, 2001: 6-7). In other words, the system of states that was established under the 1950 Constitution, based on the ‘absorption of ethnic identities
into a larger civic one,’ fell apart upon India’s encounter with mass politics (Bhargava, 2010: 65).

*Militancy, Hindu nationalism, and the success of the BJP*

Extremist Hindu organizations, like the RSS and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), both affiliated with the BJP, grew to prominence during the 1980s and 1990s (Shani, 2000: 267). The RSS advocated *Hindutva* – a philosophy that promotes a ‘restrictive definition of Indian identity that treated any non-Hindus as foreigners and even denied them citizenship,’ (Momen, 2005: 248). The event that dominated Indian politics in the early 1990s was the destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque in Ayodhya, December 1992, by Hindu activists (Shani, 2000: 271).

The popularized myth that the Mosque had been built on the ruins of a Hindu Ram temple fueled the anger that led to its demolition (see Shani, 2000). On the 6th of December, tens of thousands of activists broke through police lines to destroy the mosque with ‘axes, hammers, and their bare hands’ (Shani, 2000: 271). This pivotal event was followed by riots across the country, on a scale not seen since Partition; further undermining India’s assumed ‘secular statehood’ (Shani, 2000: 272). The BJP, RSS, and VHP publicly ‘touted the return of the Babri Masjid to Hindu access as a great victory;’ proclaiming the need to end secularism in India, to be replaced by an ‘ethno-religious state’ (Momen, 2000: 250).

Since 1947, the secular Indian state has uniquely attempted to manage high levels of diversity through democratic governance. Yet when the predominance of the INC in Indian politics was finally challenged, it tore at the very notions of a multi-nation society under one democratic state. The nationalist rightwing Party (BJP) rapidly ascended the national stage in the 1990s, more than doubling its vote share both regionally and on the national level, it went from 7.8% of votes in 1984 to 25.6% in the 1998 general elections (Linz et al. 2011: 83). The BJP was asked to form a minority government in 1998, which
lasted only a few weeks, and again in 1999, successfully forming a government (Kinval and Svensson, 2010: 281).

*Inter-State Conflict and Nationalism in India*

While Hindu nationalism is directed at subgroups within the state, they were most successful when India’s relationship with Pakistan was particularly volatile. As such, it has been argued that Hindu nationalists will only succeed ‘*when the public as a whole is antagonized over India’s foreign relations with Pakistan*’ (emphasis in original, Liebman, 2007: 363). Hindu nationalists used two key issues to stir up nationalist fervor in India: [1] the fate of Kashmir, and [2] ‘the threat of being ‘encircled’ by aggressive fundamentalist Islam’ (Liebman, 2007: 363).

The conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir originates at the Partition of British India. While the specifics of this conflict are beyond the scope of this thesis, a condensed account is necessary. The state of Kashmir initially joined the Indian Union, albeit Kashmir’s Hindu leadership at the time determined the decision, despite the states majority Muslim population. Pakistan contested the legality of this decision; India and Pakistan fought two wars over Kashmir in 1947 and 1965, and most recently in 1999 (Kohli, 1997: 338). Since 1989, two parallel movements emerged in Kashmir: secessionists seeking independence for Kashmir and irredentist forces, led by Islamic groups, seeking Kashmir’s unification with Pakistan (Tremblay, 2009: 934). The early 1990s saw a full-fledged ‘ethno-nationalist insurgency’ develop; the Indian government responded by dramatically increasing its military presence in Kashmir, with over half a million personal deployed (Trembley, 2009: 936).

The dispute situation between Pakistan and India during the 1990s, served to further fragment identity in along ethno-religious lines. The Islamic forces seeking to unite Kashmir with Pakistan gave Hindu nationalists’ only further cause to stir up images of the threatening Muslim ‘Other’ seeking to divide up India; India was the destined state
for Hindus according to the RSS and BJP (Liebman, 2007: 364). Foreign Threat (Hypothesis 4) in effect served only to entrench and further divide Indian society along ethno-religious lines, rather than unify Indians under one national identity.

However, India’s foreign threats during the 1990s all concerned issues dating back to the contentions of Partition, the main source for fragmentation between Hindu and Muslim Indians. In other words, the nature of the inter-state conflicts of the 1990s tugged at the very heart of ethno-religious divisions in India. It is thus argued that India’s nationalism is fragmented along ethno-religious lines, as compared to China’s more prevalent unitary nationalism, because it experienced lower levels of foreign threat and inter-state disputes worked to deeply divide rather than unify Indians.

### The State and Nationalism in China

Joseph Fewsmith (2001: 132) points to three dominant intellectual trends in China that became populist in orientation since the early 1990s: neostatism, postmodernism, and nationalism. They intersect in the promotion of a ‘common nationalism directed primarily against the United States, both in terms of its presumed desire to control China internationally and in terms of the American model of liberal democracy and neoclassical economics’ (Fewsmith, 2001: 133). Fewsmith (2001: 149, 154) argues that the emergence of popular nationalism became palpable through the mass audience for nationalistic publications such as *Looking at China through a Third Eye* (1994) and *China Can Say No* (1996), which became instant bestsellers.

Nationalism in China during the 1990s took on distinctly nativist – or anti-foreign – characteristics (see Zhao, 2004 and Gries, 2004). Nativism is hypersensitivity towards ‘perceived foreign insults and may easily result in nationalist xenophobia, which holds that other nations or nation-states are either inferior or threatening and must be dealt
with harshly' (Zhao, 2004: 253). Nationalists raised ‘Chinese culture up against Western cultural hegemony and argued that Asian values in general and Chinese values in particular were superior to their Western counterparts’ (Zhao, 2004: 255).

*The Official CCP Nationalist discourse*

The first two years after the ‘large scale anti-government demonstrations’ in Tiananmen Square in 1989 were ‘the most politically repressive years in PRC history,’ all CCP efforts were on ‘stabilizing the nation’ (Zhao, 2004: 212). During 1990s the CCP worked to successfully ‘re-nationalize’ the state (Guo, 2004). Through propaganda and education the Party sold itself as essential to the nation, the new catchphrase after 1989 was ‘the annihilation of the Party (*wang dang*) means the annihilation of the nation (*wang guo*)’ (Guo, 2004: 33). CCP conservatives stressed the notion of restoring Marxist-Leninism and Maoist ideology to the vacuum of ‘normative authority’ in post-Cultural Revolution China; Party pragmatists ultimately rejected this in favor of the ‘utility of nationalism’ (Zhao, 2004: 214).

In the early 1990s, the state launched highly successful patriotic education schemes; the aims of which were printed in the *People’s Daily*, September 6th 1994:

‘...Boosting the nations spirit, enhancing cohesion, fostering self-esteem and sense of pride, consolidating and developing a patriotic united front to the broadest extent possible, and directing and rallying the masses’ patriotic passions to the great cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics [and] helping the motherland become unified, prosperous, and strong’ (quoted in Zhao, 2004: 219).

Patriotic education also addressed the challenges of ethnic nationalisms in China by reinforcing a ‘connection between different ethnic heritages and national unity,’ attempting to inseparably bind Han and minority groups as interdependent (Zhao, 2004: 234).
The official history promoted by the PRC since 1949 – ‘The Century of Humiliation’ – was remolded to emphasize not only communist themes of saving China, but also nationalist themes of protecting China from the imperial foreigner (see Callahan, 2004). The CCP led education campaign emphasized the need to ‘remember past sufferings at the hands of the West and Japan to prevent the loss of Chinese identity through foreign cultural and political intrusion’ (Zhao, 2004: 245, see also Guo, 2004). Through this the CCP was able to restore support for its prolonged rule, and captivate China’s youth; a 1995 survey of youth attitudes by China Youth Daily found that ‘87.1 percent of respondents believed the United States was the country “least friendly” to China’ (Fewsmith, 2001: 155). Thus, when the US and other countries criticize China for its Taiwan policy or lack of democracy they are equated to foreign ‘attacks’ and ‘imperialist pressures’ exerted on China during the ‘Century of Humiliation’ (Sutter, 2010: 19).

*Nationalist Responses to Inter-State Disputes and Foreign ‘Insults’*

Since the 1990s, Chinese nationalists have reacted with particular intensity to disputes with foreign countries. In 1995 China and the US came very close to direct confrontation after the US had allowed ‘Taiwan’s most senior leader to enter the United States’ (Ross, 2009: 133). This latter action in particular gave China’s leaders the impression that Washington had reversed ‘its Taiwan policy, thus encouraging Taiwan’s leaders toward a declaration of sovereignty’ (Ross, 2009: 133). In China, the 1995-6 confrontation – where China conducted missile tests, and naval and war exercises, while the US sent 2 aircraft carriers to the straights – was a means of deterring Taiwan’s ‘march toward independence’ (Ross, 2009: 137). This crisis had a distinct nationalist reaction in the form of the best selling xenophobic book *China Can Say No*; the authors took advantage of the ‘anti-American sentiment that had welled up in the wake’ of the crisis, especially pertaining to the dispatch of two American carrier task forces (Fewsmith, 2001: 154).
The book quickly sold over two million copies (Fewsmith, 2001: 154). It emotionally paints the US as the threatening ‘Other’, a hegemonic power with imperialistic aims in China (Jia, 2005). It expressed the popular opinion after the Taiwan crisis that had led ‘many in China to the belief that the US harbored ill intention…. has no respect’ for China, and seeks Taiwan’s independence as a means to ‘put China down’ (Jia, 2005: 20-21). The PRC endorsed the content of the book, despite its anti-government message that ‘the Chinese government had been naïve and soft in its dealings with the United States’ (Fewsmith, 2001: 156). Its fervently emotive language captured the unexpressed anger of the Chinese people, who saw only further attempts to humiliate China over the sovereignty of Taiwan (see Fewsmith, 2001).

*China Can Say No* also addressed the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute between Japan and China, hypothetically asking the government: ‘why are you so polite to Japan? …Don’t you see that Japan is even more wicked than America?’ (quoted in Gries, 2004: 123). The PRC, Taiwan, and Japan all claim sovereignty over the Islands, which ‘comprise an archipelago of eight desolate rocks’ in the East China Sea; Diaoyu is the Chinese name, Senkaku the Japanese name, for the Islands (Gries, 2004: 121). The first nationalist protests concerning this dispute broke out in 1971 in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the U.S. (Chinese diaspora), after an incident in 1970 concerning the removal of the flag of Taiwan from the Islands (Gries, 2004: 122).

In 1996 two MIDs between China and Japan in 1995 and 1996 (see Appendix A) sparked anti-Japanese riots in Hong Kong and Taiwan (Gries, 2004: 122). On the mainland, anti-Japanese street demonstrations were suppressed by the CCP, but is observable in print form, another example being the book *Be Vigilant Against Japanese Militarism!* (Gries, 2004: 123). Students were also denied Internet access in the wake of the crises; ‘virtual’ activism had become widespread with email networks and websites like ‘Defend Diaoyutai’ proliferating (Gries, 2004: 123).
Image 2: China’s largest search engine on the 18th of September 2012, picturing a Chinese flag on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

(source: Baidu, 2012)

The Island dispute reared again recently in September 2012 after the Japanese government moved to purchase the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, strengthening its claim of sovereignty (Liu, 2012). In response, hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets in 85 cities across the country (Gao, 2012). Anger was paramount, as images of protesters turning over and burning Japanese cars, destroying Japanese compartment stores, a Toyota dealership in flames, and seas of PRC flags, mushroomed on the internet (see Tan, 2012a; Gao, 2012; Liu, 2012; Spegele, 2012. See also Image 1, p. ii). China’s most popular search engine displayed a Chinese flag on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (see Image 2, above).

Thousands gathered outside the Japanese Embassy in Beijing on the 18th of September carrying posters of Mao; some further 50 protesters took to the US Embassy shouting: ‘Down with American Imperialism!’ (Tan, 2012b). Many protesters were carrying posters, captured in a photo posted by online newspaper The Shanghaiist on social media, one stated:
‘Forget not the National Humiliation!
Fear not the confrontation!
Defend our sovereignty!
Dare to use our military might!’
(Shanghaiist, 2012)

In 1999, similar outrage followed the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. While US officials claimed it had been an accident, it was not received as such in China. Demonstrations ‘erupted in over two-dozen major cities’, and tens of thousands of student protesters took to the streets in Canton China (Gries, 2004: 14). In Beijing, protestors outside the embassy shouted “down with hegemonic politics!” embassy cars were smashed, and American flags burned (Gries, 2004: 4).

The embassy bombing was followed by ‘a new wave of nationalistic writings,’ including publications such as China’s Road Under the Shadow of Globalisation (1999) (Fewsmith, 2001: 218). In China’s Road, pro-democracy author Wang Xiaodong paints China’s elite as ‘selling out the interests of China for their own selfish purposes’ and that it is ‘simply laughable to believe that Americans have a higher sense of morality’ (translation in Fewsmith, 2001: 218). Official CCP publications like the journal Seeking Truth have published several articles ‘denouncing Western “cultural imperialism”’ and the ‘promotion of colonial culture’ by “international monopoly groups” (Fewsmith, 2001: 220).

The above examples indicate that intense displays of Chinese nationalism are triggered by inter-state disputes, militarized and diplomatic. They present unified collective outrage across China, occasionally including Taiwan and Hong Kong. It suggests that Chinese nationalism is stronger and more prevalent than Indian since the 1990s both due to higher levels of MID and the nature of the disputes.
Conclusion and Findings

Hypothesis 4: Foreign Threat – This chapter has established that China had an overall higher foreign threat level and hostility intensity level in terms of MIDs between 1988 and 2001. It is argued that the nature of foreign threat in India tended to fragment identity in India along ethno-religious lines as inter-state disputes worked to deeply divide rather than unify Indians. In China, on the other hand, the nature of foreign threat united Chinese nationalists, as disputes were effectively associated with further ‘national humiliation’ of the Chinese people.

Hypothesis 2: Type of Foreign Rule – Here, the legacy of imperialism in China enabled nationalists to equate inter-state disputes and foreign demands on China to ‘imperial attacks’ enacting further ‘humiliation’ upon China. This allowed for a strong nationalist reaction to perceived foreign ‘insults’. In India the legacy of colonialism worked only to fragment Indian nationals, particularly as the nature of disputes in the 1990s acted to divide Indians; foreign threats could not be equated with past colonial humiliation. The legacy of informal imperialism, rather than formal colonization, had a much greater impact upon Chinese nationalism; in combination with foreign threat this explains the strength of Chinese nationalism as compared to nationalism in India since the 1990s.

Hypothesis 3: Regime Type – The weakening of the centrist political party (INC) in India allowed for the demise of the unifying secular nationalist discourse. The democratic state was not effective in promoting Indian national unity. Mass politics meant that people could be mobilized along ethno-religious lines other further entrenching identity divisions in India. In China, the strong centralized state was able to impose propaganda and education situating the Party (CCP) as essential to the nation. The autocratic state was able to maintain unity among China’s diverse population.
Hypothesis 5: Diversity – China's patriotic education scheme effectively addressed the challenges of ethnic nationalism by enforcing the imagination of the Chinese nation as an inseparable bind between the Han and minority groups. The higher diversity in India meant that foreign threats tended to divide rather than unite Indians. Chinese nationalism since the 1990s is stronger as it has less diversity; albeit this argument is only effective when viewed in terms of both the foreign threat, and regime type variables.
Conclusion

Fragmentation and Strength: Explaining Divergent Nationalisms

Solving the Puzzle of Difference

This thesis finds that the composite of Hypothesis 2: type of foreign rule, hypothesis 3: regime type, and hypothesis 4: foreign threat best explain the strength of Chinese nationalism since the 1990s, as compared to India.

The experience of informal imperialism has centrally defined both the rise of Chinese nationalism and its more recent manifestations. Guided by the CCP, nationalist discourse since 1949 has emphasized past victimization by foreign powers. Thereby, nationalism is strongest in China when foreign threats are present and frequent, as Chinese nationalists equate inter-state disputes and foreign demands on China to ‘imperial attacks’ inflicting further ‘humiliation’ upon China. Simply, the strength of Chinese nationalism is dependent upon foreign threats that undermine China’s sovereignty, both cultural and political, and territorial integrity. The Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-6) and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island disputes, explicitly illustrate this. Therefore, the higher levels of foreign threat in China during the 1990s, as opposed to India, produced a stronger and more prevalent nationalism.

Hypothesis 5: diversity, while important to understanding nationalism in India and China, is not included because its explanatory power largely depends upon hypothesis 3: regime type. That is, a strong regime type is able to more successfully enforce a unifying national identity upon a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, population. In terms of democratic
governance, as argued by Snyder (2000), strong institutions are more likely to allow for a unifying civic nationalism, whilst weak institutions engender ethno-religious divisions. 

Hypothesis 1: direct rule, claiming that the imposition of direct rule produces stronger nationalism, was dismissed in the conclusion of chapter 2. Its utility featured as an oppositional premise to hypothesis 2: type of foreign rule.

Table 4.0: summary of findings, nationalism in India and China since the 1990s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>India</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of foreign rule</td>
<td>Formal British colony, direct and indirect rule</td>
<td>Informal imperialism by various countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legacy of institutions and Partition of British India.</td>
<td>Centrally informs nationalism and nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Memory of British rule not central to nationalist</td>
<td>anti-foreign tendencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rhetoric.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>Democratic state</td>
<td>Strong centralized state, autocratic, able to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weakened institutions during the 1990s</td>
<td>influence direction and rhetoric of nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>Ethno-religious diversity throughout country. Large</td>
<td>Many small ethnic minorities located on periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minority groups. Many distinct spoken languages</td>
<td>of state territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Threat</td>
<td>Lower levels of foreign threat (as compared to India)</td>
<td>Higher levels of foreign threat (as compared to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>India)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This thesis has additionally shown that the comparably fragmented nature of Indian nationalism since the 1990s is best explained by the composite of hypothesis 3: regime type and hypothesis 5: diversity. That is, a weakening of democratic institutions allowed ethno-religious identities to dominate the nationalist discourses promoted by the state. Rather, the success of the CCP in binding nationalists to its cause speaks to the power of
top-down nationalism. There is no comparable connection to past colonial 'humiliation,' contemporary foreign threat, and Indian nationalism since the 1990s. Instead, Hindu nationalists have drawn on the much older history of Islamic rulers in India. Nevertheless, the legacy of British rule played an important role in the formation of contemporary ethno-religious and secular nationalism, in terms of the consequences of institutional legacies of formal colonization, and the Partition of British India.

**Implications and Further Research**

The claim that informal imperialism, rather than formal colonization, establishes a foundation for strong nationalism with xenophobic tendencies holds important implications for the study of non-European nationalism in particular. In order to better verify this claim, further research needs to be done on the implications of foreign rule on national identity and nationalism in other countries. Ideally, a general comparative study of countries that experienced a variety of forms of imperialism could better explicate this intriguing area. In terms of theory, more research is needed regarding the link between imperialism and nationalism, particularly in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, to allow for general theorizations.
Appendix A - Summary of militarized Inter-state Conflicts pertaining to China and India 1993-1999

All details below are summarized from the 'Dispute Narratives' accompanying the MID 3.0 Correlates of War dataset (Bennett et al, 2003).

India

1993-1999: general dispute between India and Pakistan relating to control over the contested territory of Kashmir.

1995: a brief border clash between India and Bangladesh where an Indian repair crew on the embankment of the Muhari River was fired upon.

1996: following a potential military coup in Bangladesh, Indian border security forces were set on high alert, military forces on regular alert.

1999: involved a total of 13 incidents between Pakistan and India, including 8 incidents between Indian and Pakistani troops in the territory Kashmir. 3 incidents concerned the disputed territories of the Rann of Kutch, a Pakistani aircraft was shot down in the Indian airspace over the Rann of Kutch, which was followed by Pakistani troops occupying the site of the crash. The 2 remaining incidents pertain military alerts by India and Pakistan.

China

1993: Conflicts included a series of 42 provoked border incidents with North Korea, following a deterioration of relations, a dispute with Vietnam over oil fields in the Gulf of Tonkin, and an armed boarding of a Russian trawler. In 1993, China also placed its air, naval, and land forces on high alert in response to fears that Taiwan was moving towards independence.
1994: There were a series of incidents between China and Vietnam concerning the Spratly islands, three incidents concerning China’s Military exercises on the Korean peninsula, aimed at making support for North Korea clear, and an incident of Chinese military servicemen opening fire on Russian fishermen. In 1994 China also took action three times aimed at deterring Taiwan from declaring independence, this included sub incursions, military exercises, and an accidental Taiwanese shelling.

1995: Incidents included a North Korean patrol boat firing at a Chinese fishing boat, 6 cases of Taiwan forces seizing, boarding, and firing at a Chinese fishing boats, and a series of military incidents between China and the Philippines over the Spratly Islands. Again, aimed at deterring Taiwanese independence, China deployed missiles near Taiwan, intercepted Taiwanese vessels, conducted military exercises, and conducted air and naval shows of force. Taiwan responded by placing its forces repeatedly on high alert, and American naval forces were deployed to the region in March 1996. There were also two incidents concerning the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, where Chinese fighter planes nearly violated Japanese airspace, so Japan responded by scrambling two fighters.

1996: Further militarized incidents occurred between China and the Philippines concerning the Spratly Islands; China deployed two submarines to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, after activities by ultra-nationalists on the Island and two disputes between Indonesia and China concerning naval exercises.

1997 & 1998: There was a border clash between North Korea and China in 1997, where troops exchanged gunfire. In 1998, there was further militarized conflict with the Philippines regarding the Spratly Islands; Vietnam was also at times involved.

1999: One border incident where Chinese border forces shot a Mongolian crossing into China, and two incidents occurred concerning the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands where in both cases China conducted large naval exercises around the Islands.


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