Chapter 3 Redundancy and Morphogenesis: Coding-Identifying Relations and Their Relevance to Social Positioning and Bureaucratic Processes

We self-creating tool-users cause new predicates to be true of ourselves whenever we create new tools with which to create ourselves. (Rorty 1994: 31)

3.0 Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is the exposition of how (linguistic or material) resources which speakers in planning settings draw on may either contribute to or detract from what I see is a general drift in bureaucratic planning (and in all kinds of other bureaucratic processes) towards 'de-differentiation', or the 'dissolving of difference'. I am not primarily concerned with the kinds of resources such speakers draw on; my focus is rather on the institutional drift which those resources instantiate.

De-differentiation, or agreement, in my view, is not an effect of each and every participant being totally aware of and explicitly 'happy' with what has been put forward. Rather, it is an effect of what Simon (1965) refers to as 'satisficing': settling for the closest approximation of what is regarded to be politically, functionally, legally, and pragmatically possible (Degeling 1996).

These kinds of de-differentiation manifest themselves in interaction as meanings which increasingly presume familiarity with other, now implicit, meanings. Finegan & Biber (1994), in their investigation of register and social dialect variation, focus (among other things) on the 'degree of shared context' (Finegan & Biber 1994: 321). They comment, "[g]reater shared context permits interlocutors to rely on implicit, contextual meaning to supply information left lexically and syntactically unexpressed; in situations where participants share less context, there is greater need for more elaborated and more specific expression" (Finegan & Biber 1994: 324). Hasan makes a similar point when contrasting Urdu and English speech styles in her 1984 paper, suggesting that "[i]t is by postulating a large consensus in the picture of the [social] role that we can explain the lack of ambiguity [in interaction]" (Hasan 1984: 154). Restating the above for planning situations, I argue that the bureaucratic process of de-
differentiation is essentially a construal of sharedness and a maximisation of presumed familiarity.

I take the perspective that the achievement of personal agendas and the enactment of broader institutional 'drifts' are but two aspects of the same phenomenon. So I ask: how are resources dynamically exploited to realise a particular agenda and bureaucratic 'drift'. This means that a particular linguistic or material resource, while satisfying certain standards of institutional appropriacy, may be effective at one stage of the interaction but not at another. Resources, in other words, are negotiated and derive their value from their place in the interactional dynamics. This also means that institutional agendas are realisable by means of a variety of resources, depending on what is possible.

Taking the broader 'drift' of bureaucratic process into account, it is possible to outline, for this particular series of planning interactions, not just which sets of resources typify whose agendas and how these are achieved, but also how the dynamic mobilisation of those resources realises such broader institutional goals. Thus, acknowledging the two-way-ness of realisation, it should be possible to come to a description of how broader goals are implicated in the realisation of specific agendas, and of how agendas are realised on the basis of resources which constitute institutional life.

So rather than focussing on, say, the 'phonology of power', the 'grammar of negotiation', or the 'semantics of planning', I will focus on the kinds of redundancies that are dynamically achieved, on the kinds of contradictions that occur, and on the kinds of new meanings (phonological, lexicogrammatical, semantic, contextual mappings) that become possible through dynamic negotiation. And I will focus on how those redundancies, contradictions, and new meanings 'drive' both the interactional dynamics and the broader institutional drifts the participants are part of.

This will involve i) tracking the dynamic nature of talk in great detail, and ii) assessing the degree to which it (dynamically) contributes to either further structuring or de-structuring 'existing' social resources (existing insofar as they have interactional relevance). To this end I will present a logogenetic analysis of two meetings (out of a total of five, although I will make reference to the three not presented in detail here) in Chapter 5. This analysis aims to show the realisation of individual agendas within the scope of bureaucratic context: how is it that
actors achieve situational and personal positioning within the range of institutional resources at their disposal.

The crucial issue with official institutional talk is its general concern with dissimulating interpersonal difference, with the result that any such difference tends to be metaphorised, and thus resolved or played out at a different level of abstraction. Bakhtin’s view of ‘official discourse’ touched on just that:

Official languages ... all privilege oneness; the more powerful the ideology, the more totalitarian (monologic) will be the claims of its language. Extreme versions of such language would be religious systems and certain visionary forms of government that have as their end that prelapsarian condition in which words are not necessary. Speech falls away because ... no mediation is necessary since everyone’s thought is in step with everyone else’s. There is no difference between individual and society. (Holquist 1990: 52/3)

Because multivocality or ‘dialogism’ is a fact of interaction, Holquist cautions against seeing monologism as ultimately realisable. “Of course such extreme monologism is both theoretically and practically impossible: dialogism is a realism” (Holquist 1990: 53). Interaction is multivocal, dialogic: it is only through ‘work’ that a degree of monoglossia is achieved. My focus therefore will be on the extent to which talk closes off, consolidates, and justifies (‘monoglosses’), and on the extent to which talk opens up, contests, or debates (‘heteroglosses’).

Deciding whether the talk ‘monoglosses’ or ‘heteroglosses’ involves determining how resources are dynamically put into play, and how they either echo or contrast with other resources in the talk. This means that such resources, which would not generally be able to lay claim to any obvious interpersonal status, may take on cryptogrammatical status in the talk (cf. Whorf 1956: 70ff): interpersonality may be realised by means of a prosody, i.e. a spreading of meaning across the interaction, realised by ideational resources, for example. Whorf’s cryptotypic description relies on the ‘reactances’ of those resources as they are dynamically mobilised. “It is a submerged, subtle, and elusive meaning, corresponding to no actual word, yet shown by linguistic analysis to be functionally important ...” (Whorf 1956: 70).

This functional importance may be achieved because certain resources may enjoy varying levels of redundancy in the talk. For
example, the realisation of the grammatical participant ‘users’ in predominantly embedded and circumstantial structures (not as fully-fledged syntactic participants) ‘redounds with’ the users’ semantic marginalisation (“we don’t want to say that to the users”) and situational marginalisation (the users’ absence at the first meeting). So rather than focussing on particular structures or meanings, I will focus on how, and to what extent, wordings, meanings, and situations redound, and this will provide me with a sense of their cryptointersubjective importance in the talk.

To be able to address these issues, I need tools. The tools I have decided on are provided by Michael Halliday’s work on and Kristin Davidse’s extension of ‘grammatics’ (Halliday 1996, Thibault 1987, Davidse 1996a/b). Halliday and Davidse see a particular grammatical relation (the ‘coding-identifying relation) as the principle that underlies grammatical modelling (‘grammatics’). I use that same relation (in a similarly heuristic effort) to talk about modes of social positioning.

As said, my ultimate aim is to link micro-interactional details to macro-bureaucratic (‘social program’) achievements. This effort is not to be misread as a study in ‘methodological individualism’. On the contrary, my aim is to show how socially located actors mobilise socially available resources to accomplish personal agendas as well as bureaucratic programs. Methodological individualism assumes an individual-social dualism. Here I take the position that it is illogical to distinguish individual and social (cf. Wilden 1987: 168; C. Taylor 1985a, 1991, 1995). I will elaborate these issues in Chapter 5.

3.1 The Coding-Identifying Process as Metaphor for Interaction

This section will propose the coding-identifying relation as tool for talking about social positioning and change (morphogenesis). Having established the coding-identifying relation as tool, I will be able to relate patterned uses of linguistic resources to more abstract and typological descriptions of positioning. More importantly, I will be able to link those descriptions to the ongoing ‘elaboration’ (or contestation) of bureaucratic ‘structures’.

Essentially, what I will be saying is that positioning (which could be seen as the more ‘local’ aspect of interaction) and bureaucratic process (its more ‘distal’ aspect; Mehan 1987) can be described on the basis of one and the same principle: that of relational transitivity. Taking relational transitivity as the basis of both positioning and institutional process helps me avoid the dualisms
that continue to pervade much socio-linguistic analysis: it allows me to address its realisation at different levels and from different aspects, while working from a unified analytical base.

3.1.1 Coding-Identifying Relations: Token and Value

As Davidse remarks, systemic functional linguistics is unique in its concern with both event transitivity ('doings') and relational transitivity ('beings/havings'; Davidse 1996b: 98).

'Event transitivity' "encodes a model of directed, unilateral 'energy transfer' ... from Ag[ent] to Pa[tient]" (Davidse 1996b: 98), thereby embodying "the grammaticalisation of the concept of causality familiar from philosophy - and common sense" (Davidse 1996b: 98). The event transitive model yields a two-cell paradigm, revolving around passivisation:

i  The vicar hit the burglar
ii  The burglar was hit by the vicar

Relational transitivity, on the other hand, grammaticalises "the very concept of representation" (Davidse 1996b: 98), and has been described on the basis of two different experiential paradigms: i) identification (involving Identified-Identifier; Id-Ir), and ii) coding (involving Token-Value; Halliday 1967b: 227; Davidse 1996b: 99). provides for yet a further set of possibilities. (I am not concerned here with attribution, nor with circumstantial and possession). Passivisation (as textual paradigm.)

Identification "fixes the 'direction of identification'" (Davidse 1996b: 107). Coding, on the other hand, treats the relation as one where one element (Tk - 'representer') represents the other (V1 - 'represented'; cf. the medieval aliquid stat pro aliquo: "something which stands to somebody for something in some respect of capacity"; Sebeok 1994: 11). Halliday locates the coding-identifying relation at the root of his 'grammatics':

If meaning arises out of the impact of the conscious and the material, as mutually contradictory forms of experience, then it is not surprising that when experience is construed semantically, these two types of process, the material and the conscious, should become systematically distinguished. But there is a further twist. The semogenic process, as we saw, involves setting up a relationship between systems such that one is the realisation of the other - that is, they stand to each other in a relation of Token and Value. This
Token-Value relationship is set up at both interfaces, and it is also what makes it possible to prise the two apart and wedge a grammar inbetween. Here then we find the third of the kinds of process construed by the grammar: the relational process, based on identifying a Token with a Value. The grammar of natural language, in its ideational metafunction, is a theory of human experience; thus it may reasonably be expected to take as its point of departure the very set of contrasts from which its own potential is ultimately derived. (Halliday 1992b: 31)

The variety of possibilities which interplay between the identifying and the coding paradigm and between these and the textual paradigm yields will be discussed below.

Halliday's exposition in *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*, as Davidse points out (Davidse 1992b: 112, 1996a: 369, 1996b: 102), allows for only one possible assignment of the functions Token (Tk) and Value (Vl) to the two terms of identification. In that treatment, only the 'upward' coding-identifying relation is addressed, with the Token as lower in abstraction than the Value. A typical example of this 'upward' coding-identification is: “the semantic features involved in this variation [Vl/Id] are realised, non-arbitrarily, through grammatical systems to which probabilities can be assigned [Tk/Ir]” (from Halliday 1991c: 48). Another example is, of course, ‘the grammar [Tk] realises the semantics [Vl]’.

Davidse goes on to revive the two other grammatical contrasts which Halliday had already specified in his “Notes on Transitivity and Theme” (Halliday 1967a/b; Davidse 1991, 1992b/c). She elaborates these still further in two more recent papers (Davidse 1996a, 1996b).

These additional contrasts allow for alternative mappings of the representing Token and the represented Value with respect to their status as either Given or New, as well as to their relative abstractness. First, Davidse notes that Halliday’s 1985/94 rendering of coding-identifying relational processes turns on “the distinction between unmarked and marked information focus” (Davidse 1996b: 106). This, in effect, equates Identified with Given and Identifier with New, and thereby obviates the distinction between coding and identification which Davidse posits as crucial to understanding the meaning potential of relational processes. (Davidse notes that in ‘That’s what I meant’, ‘that’ is Ir and ‘what I meant’ is Id, even though ‘meant’ carries the tonic,
and reminds us of Halliday’s claim that “non-contrastive anaphoric pronouns can never be intonationally focal” [Halliday 1967b: 231-233, cited in Davidse 1996b: 122]).

The most fundamental semantic break in the eight-cell paradigm [as opposed to Halliday 1985: 126/7’s four-cell paradigm] is marked by the redistribution of Tk and Vi to the two terms of identification, which encodes a re-orientation to the inverse direction of representation. (Davidse 1996b: 103)

Second, Davidse reintroduces the possibility of an abstract Token representing a concrete Value. The following example shows such a mapping:

So while the overall probability of past/present was fairly even (57%/43%) the conditioning effect of social class [Tk/Id] skewed this [Vi/Ir] in opposite directions. (from Halliday 1991c: 46, cited in Davidse 1996a: 378)

Here, ‘the conditioning effect of social class’ is the more abstract term which (crucially) represents the less abstract term ‘the overall probability of past/present’ or ‘this’ (the represented), while at the same time being identified by it (i.e. the Ir/Vi).

Davidse provides a list of processes which typically realise such construals: account for, favour, skew, condition, distribute, shape, effect, determine, govern, affect (Davidse 1996b: 78/9). The following clauses are somewhat simpler examples of this relational type, incorporating an abstract Token-Identified and a less abstract Value-Identifier:

Such institutional context and its formalised resources [Tk/Id] account for the cryptogrammatical manifestation of interpersonality [Vi/Ir].

‘The semantics [Tk/Id] shapes the grammar [Vi/Ir].’

Hence, what is at issue in coding relations is what (Tk represents what (Vi); not what is more abstract or concrete (as could be concluded from Halliday’s 1985/94 discussion). On that basis, ‘x is y’ structures are doubly ambiguous: does x represent y or is x represented by y? does x identify y or is x identified by y? (And, thirdly, which of these is textually backgrounded as Given and which foregrounded with a tonic/New?) These ambiguities are inherent, Davidse says, in the coding-identifying relation, because
it is essentially invertible (Davidse 1996a: 381): either the Token or the Value may be the more abstract participant, depending on whether we are dealing with an upward (concrete Tk -> abstract VI) or a downward coding-identifying relation (abstract Tk -> concrete VI).

Categorising types of relational processes, then, we can distinguish those which construe an upward directionality from those which construe a downward directionality.

In addition to this, coding-identifying relational processes can be classed as either encoding or decoding. Encodings map the Value onto Identified and Token onto Identifier; decodings map the Token onto the Identified and the Value onto the Identifier. Halliday has discussed this opposition in terms of 'casting': i.e. encoding: 'Who will play that role?' - 'Hamlet [VI/Id] will be played by John [Tk/Ir]', and 'play-acting': i.e. decoding: 'Who will John play?' - 'John [Tk/Id] will play Hamlet [VI/Ir]' (Halliday 1967b: 66-71; Davidse 1996b: 126; underline=New).

This latter contrast has important implications, independent of whether we are dealing with an upward or a downward directionality. Encodings, what with their Token-Identifiers, are (in unmarked cases) oriented towards foregrounding as New that which represents, expresses, or construes Values: i.e. Tokens. By contrast, decodings, what with their Value-Identifiers, are oriented towards foregrounding as New that which is represented, motivated, or constructed by Tokens: i.e. Values. Thus, encodings are oriented towards (modes of) embodiment ('how is a Value realised in the here-and-now?'), whereas decodings are oriented towards (modes of) dis-embodiment ('what do these here-and-now Tokens construe as Value?'). This dual directionality is crucial to the explanation pursued here, and will be elaborated below with reference to the data.

With the Token as 'representer' and the Value as betokened or 'represented', and taking the Identifier-identified relation as well as textually unmarked and marked forms into account, an eight-cell paradigm can be built up (Table 3.1):
Table 3.1: The paradigm of coding-identifying grammar (Davidse 1996a: 371)

For the purposes of this thesis I will simplify the paradigm by omitting the textual variations (i.e. actives vs. passives), which leaves me then with the following four (unmarked) possibilities (i.e. Identifier = New). These are presented in Table 3.2:

Table 3.2: Simplified paradigm of coding-identifying grammar (adapted from Davidse 1996a: 371)
Subparadigm I deals with the kinds of contrasts set up by Halliday in *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* (Halliday 1985/94: 138), where the Token as the representer is the less abstract member of the pair and the identifying relation is upward in abstraction.

For the 'upward' directionality, we find the common semantic component of the more concrete stratum 'manifesting' the more abstract one symbolically (Davidse 1996a: 380).

Thus, the Token 'manifests' the Value. Davidse uses the term 'expression' for this kind of mapping (Davidse 1996a: 380).

Subparadigm II deals with downward readings where the Token takes on a more abstract meaning than the Value, and where the relation is one of 'motivation' (Davidse 1996a: 380):

In the 'downward' directionality, the more abstract semiotic stratum is typically construed as making clear the reasons, or determining factors, of specific forms of behaviour on the more concrete stratum. This is meant to be captured by the term 'motivation'. (Davidse 1996a: 380)

As pointed out, the basic ambiguity resides in the fact that

we are up against the profound semantic motivation of the intrinsic possibility of re-assignment of Token and Value to the two terms of identification. Quite simply, the semantic model of 'symbolic relationship' being grammaticalised by the coding-identifying grammatical paradigm is intrinsically invertible. (Davidse 1996a: 381; 'invertibility' here does not refer to active-passive inversion)

It is precisely this invertibility that distinguishes the Token-Value relation from straightforward or unilinear causal relations of 'event transitivity'. "So, ultimately, it is the intrinsic invertibility of the concept of 'symbolic correlation' that motivates the redistribution of Token and Value in the coding-identifying grammatical paradigm" (Davidse 1996a: 381). These distinctions will be put to analytical use below (see Chapter 5).

Table 3.3 sums these distinctions up:
Table 3.3: The coding-identifying matrix (cf. Davidse 1996a: 376)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>expression</th>
<th>encoding [Tk=Ir]</th>
<th>decoding [Vi=Ir]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>meaning [Vi/Id] is realised by form [Tk/Ir]</td>
<td>forms [Tk/Ir] express meanings [Vi/Ir]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>form [Vi/Id] is shaped by meaning [Tk/Ir]</td>
<td>meanings [Tk/Ir] motivate form [Vi/Ir]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Davidse the above distinctions are either aspects of clauses or principles underpinning the grammatics. I will apply the coding-identifying principles here to characterise both social positioning as enacted by participants in the planning process, and the broader tendencies of the bureaucratic process itself. Briefly, I will argue that encodings, since they are concerned with identifying the representing Token(s) relevant to an identified (and represented) Value, are implicated in positionings of ‘redundancy’: their starting point is a taken-for-granted Medium-Value, which is realised by a specific array of Agent-Tokens (Davidse 1992b: 115). Redundancy is thus an effect of various Tokens being able to ‘effectively’ (in both the ordinary and the transitive sense) represent the one Value: it represents the likelihood of association between a particular Value and a representative Token or a set of representative Tokens. It is in that sense, too, that redundancy typifies ‘power’: it is not the Value that is at risk here (i.e. is not the identifier), but the Token. In other terms, not the Value is (re)negotiated but the way it is realised or represented.

Decodings, by contrast, since they are concerned with decoding from representing Tokens into a represented Value, are implicated in ‘morphogenetic’ positionings: their starting point is the actually occurring (representing) Medium-Tokens and their end-point is the resultant Range-Value (Davidse 1992b: 115). The morphogenetic power of decodings is inherent in their putting the Value at risk, not the representing Tokens. I therefore associate morphogenesis with the ‘generation’ of new Values.

Another crucial difference between encodings and decodings, besides the former aiming to find an embodiment for a value and the latter a value for what has been or is embodied, is the nature of their directionality. As Davidse shows (see Table 3.4), encodings deal with Agent-Tokens and Medium-Values and thus harbour the feature agency (Halliday 1985/94: 168). Decodings, by contrast, deal with Medium-Tokens and Range-Values and are therefore medio-passives (Halliday 1985/94: 169) or what Davidse refers to as ‘pseudo-effectives’ (Davidse 1992a: 124).
Whereas encodings are ‘freely reversible’ in terms of active-passive (Davidse compares them to the please-type (Davidse 1992b: 115), decodings only allow marked passive constructions (Range-Values are marked as Subjects) and are therefore similar to the like-type (Davidse 1992b: 115): “[n]ot only are Ranges not Goals, they are not ‘true’ participants either ... ranged passives are always marked medio-passives, indicative of the limited participant status of the Range (Davidse 1992a: 125). Thus, the decoding Value-Range-Identifier is merely “a refinement of the process itself” (Halliday 1985/94: 149).

By way of example of these principles, consider the following:

(AHS official, Mntg 1, Phase 1)
their figure on this project [VI/Id] was 2.8 million [Tk/Ir]

This is an encoding, which can be reversed without problems: ‘2.8 million was their figure on this project’. The semantics of the encoding is evident here too: ‘their figure on this project’ is realised as Given, placing ‘their’ positioning effectively beyond negotiation as assumed value.

The following is a decoding:

(second architect, Mntg 1, Phase 3)
my comments [Tk/Id] were that ehm, that the budget was cut back and that sort of [VI/Ir]

Reversing the decoding is more problematic: *‘that the budget was cut back and that sort of ... were my comments’. This also brings out that the decoding foregrounds the Value as New.

Redundancy can now be further specified: it is an effect of the Value being ‘affected’ by the Agent-Token: textually (as well as interpersonally) the encoding is highly versatile. (Davidse suggests tentatively that encodings seem to exploit a greater range of tone contours than do decodings, which I take as evidence for the fact that encodings do more work, socially: they delimit one value for which support needs to be mustered. Decodings present the Value
as New [in unmarked cases, which is the majority, according to Davidse], thereby foregrounding it [as value]; Davidse 1992b: 117).

Association (the crux of redundancy; see below) is enabled by the effective nature of the relation (i.e. its specifying both how the process comes about and who/what is its primary participant). Morphogenesis is an effect of the various Tokens engaging in the process of being qualified and quantified by the (new) Range-Value. Thus, whereas encodings enable what is represented by means of that which represents, decodings merely qualify/quantify that which represents in terms of that which is represented. Encodings therefore may be seen to be making a greater grammatical-semantic claim than do decodings.

Moreover, the less textually versatile decoding (i.e. its tendency to position the Value/Identifier as New) is doubly morphogenic: not only does it foreground the Value (i.e. as New), it also prevents the relation ‘sliding backwards’ into an encoding, as it were. Due to its Medium\^Process\^Range constellation it ‘prefers’ a Token-Medium-Subject; i.e. the Value-Range is unlikely to be positioned as Subject, in contrast to the Token-Agent-New of the encoding. This means the Value less likely to be put at risk or given ‘modal responsibility’ (Halliday 1985/94: 76; Martin 1992: 461). I see these two characteristics as justifying my using encodings as metaphor for the overall morphogenic process, one feature of which is re-semiotisation, preventing the identification from ‘sliding backwards’.

As stated, my claim is that these directionalities and relationalities not only underpin relational grammar and systemic functional grammatics, but can also be used to describe behavioural, or rather, socio-positional proportionalities, as well as institutional processes. These contrasts and differences will be elaborated with reference to the data in Chapter 5. Before I can broach the analysis, however, I need to link the coding-identifying relation and the issues of redundancy and change (morphogenesis) back to the systemic-functional model itself, i.e. the grammatics.

The next section elaborates on Davidse's account of coding-identifying relational processes as embodying the principle underlying the grammatics: metaredundancy, and relates this to systemic change. Metaredundancy (Lemke 1984) also needs to be related to the notion of redundancy as defined above (in terms of encodings), in order to make way for my analysis of participants' social positionings and of bureaucratic processes in these terms.
3.2 Coding-Identifying Relational	and (Meta)Redundancy

In the previous section I argued that redundancy is implicated in encodings; a value is held constant (is identified) and its representation (token) is the identifying entity (which is foregrounded as new information in unmarked cases). I associated the possibility of change with decodings, where the token or tokens is/are given, and where the value is the identifying entity (which is foregrounded as new information in unmarked cases).

I justified this ‘analytical reduction’ of institutional processes to the coding-identifying relation on two grounds.

First, I referred to the contrast in transitive-ness that obtains between encodings and decodings to argue that encodings make ‘greater claims’ than do decodings. The encoding is ‘effective’ in Halliday’s sense of extending the process to a second participant, as well as ‘a the ordinary sense of ‘powerful’ or ‘efficacious’, and thus ‘authoritative’. By contrast, the decoding relation is mediopassive; here, the semantics are that of a ‘non-authoritative’, more tentative, relation (cf. Davidse 1992b: 119ff).

Second, I argued that power achieved by redundancy relies on the amplification of a constant meaning or meanings (‘value’). Change, on the other hand, necessarily involves the incorporation of new meanings (‘values’). The (unmarked) encoding relation may thus be seen to characterise those positionings which fail to put their values at risk, or up for negotiation. The (unmarked) decoding relation may be seen to characterise those positionings which work from given tokens of interaction (not values), and which do put new values at risk (up for negotiation).

This ‘analytical reduction’ involves relating redundancy and change to issues of metaredundancy. The notion of metaredundancy is crucial here because it provides the key to seeing the clausal coding-identifying relation as metaphor for both linguistic (as in Halliday’s grammatics) and extra-linguistic relations. Section 3.2.1 will elaborate the notions of redundancy and metaredundancy within the scope of systemic functional grammatics.

3.2.1 Redundancy and Metaredundancy

Davidse remarks that “the coding-identifying system can also be thought of as “the grammaticalisation of meta-redundancy” (Davidse 1996a: 383). Metaredundancy is what characterises the
inter-stratal relation: it involves more than two terms of different levels of abstraction (Halliday 1992b: 24).

Metaredundancy is just a way of describing how the redundancy, the predictable relation or connection of two things, can itself be redundant (i.e. have a predictable connection) with something else. This is redundancy of redundancy, or meta-redundancy. (Lemke 1995a: 169)

To aid this distinction, Lemke refers to redundancy as first-order redundancy and to meta-redundancy as second-order redundancy (Lemke 1995a: 171). The point is that redundancy relations need to be further contextualised: meta-redundancy relations are therefore contextualising relations, such that each redundancy relation is further contextualised at a higher stratum. In Lemke’s words, words redound with expressions, and this redundancy redounds with situations, and so on (Lemke 1995a: 173):

[words/meanings//situations///worlds///meaning systems]

The status of redundancy in the literature is ambiguous however: at times redundancy is used to refer to intra-stratal associations (e.g. in Halliday 1991c) and at other times to inter-stratal association (as Lemke does in the quote above): “When we say that contents p, q, r are ‘realised respectively by expressions a, b, c, what this means is that there is a redundancy relation between them” (Halliday 1992b: 24).

Here I will adhere to redundancy as referring to ‘association’ (this term will be discussed below); the ‘meta’ points to associations that obtain across levels of abstraction (cf. Halliday 1992b: 20; Davidse 1996a: 378, 383).

The Bateson-Wilden-Lemke notion of redundancy centres around the degree of probability inherent in such association, or ‘co-patterning relations’: the higher the probability of co-patterning, the higher the redundancy (Halliday 1991c: 40; Nesbitt & Plum 1988: 24/5). For Bateson, redundancy meant the following:

Any aggregate of events of objects (e.g. a sequence of phonemes, a painting, a frog, or a culture) shall be said to contain ‘redundancy’ or ‘pattern’ if the aggregate can be divided in any way by a ‘slash mark’, such that an observer perceiving only what is on one side of the slash mark can guess, with better than random success, what is on the other side of the slash mark. We may say that what is on one side
of the slash contains *information* or has *meaning* about what is on the other side. Or, in engineer's language, the aggregate contains 'redundancy'. (Bateson 1973: 103)

For Bateson, the slash does not encode a difference in abstraction; it introduces a means of talking about an 'aggregate of events or objects' which (i.e. the events or objects) are related by 'association'. In case the term (event/object) on one side of the slash 'contains meaning' about what is on the other side of it, this first term necessarily diminishes the meaningfulness of that second term by virtue of it enabling us to predict or expect that second term (possibly without actually having seen it realised).

But Bateson, and Wilden like him, was working within information theory where redundancy and metaredundancy are not distinguished. Their theory does not talk in terms of a stratified model of meaning-making (their theory does address levels of 'logical typing', but specific levels are not theorised semiotically). Hence, information theory is not concerned with contextualising hierarchies (cf. Lemke 1995a: 170).

Lemke, on the other hand, was working with a stratified model of language and context into which the notion had to be introduced. The 'meta', in Lemke's meta-redundancy, points to his tailoring the information theory notion of redundancy to the stratified model of systemic functional grammatics. Thibault summarises this move as follows: "the redundancy relations between a and b are not about the relations between two separate entities but about the probability of their co-patterning in some still higher-order relation(s) with which they covary" (Thibault 1991a: 92; see below).

Having defined redundancy then as association relation we must recognise that it refers to dyadic, not triadic meta-relationships, as does metaredundancy. But what kinds of associative relations are at stake here?

A study into the nature of association relations between systems, Nesbitt & Plum's (1988) paper concerns dyadic relationships affecting a set of instances. Taxis, they hypothesise, may at some stage in the past have been 'perfectly associated' with logico- semantics, setting up maximal redundancy (Halliday 1991c: 40):
The current state, as based on their findings, shows a partial move towards the dissociation of the taxa and logico-semantic variables:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{parataxis} \\
\text{hypotaxis} \\
\text{elaboration} \\
\text{enhancement}
\end{align*}
\rightleftharpoons
\begin{align*}
\text{parataxis} & \quad \text{elaboration .72} \\
\text{hypotaxis} & \quad \text{elaboration .22} \\
\text{elaboration} & \quad \text{enhancement .28} \\
\text{enhancement} & \quad \text{enhancement .78}
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 3.2: Present stage: 'partial association' (Nesbitt & Plum 1988: 25)

Then they hypothesise that in future the system may reach total dissociation, i.e. statistical independence, or minimal redundancy (I hypothesise elsewhere that this tendency towards disassociation may be the result of increased storage of linguistic/administrative resources. This storage, while 'grounding' valued semiotic resources, frees up new possibilities; i.e. enhances the semiotic freedom of related resources):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{parataxis} \quad .5 \\
\text{hypotaxis} \quad .5 \\
\text{elaboration} \quad .5 \\
\text{enhancement} \quad .5
\end{align*}
\rightleftharpoons
\begin{align*}
\text{parataxis} \quad .5 \\
\text{hypotaxis} \quad .5 \\
\text{elaboration} \quad .5 \\
\text{enhancement} \quad .5
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 3.3: The future: 'total dissociation' (Nesbitt & Plum 1988: 25)

The relation between taxis and logico-semantics, in other words, may be moving from a totally determined state, where certain features never occur with or without certain other features (1-0), to a state where any features can combine (0:5-0:5). The semogonic process proposed here, in other words, is one that moves from full redundancy (minimum information), via partial redundancy (increased information), to no redundancy (maximum
information). "At this [latest] stage, the optimum information-
making content of the system has been reached" (Nesbitt & Plum

Halliday 1991c draws on Nesbitt & Plum 1988 to elaborate their
account of semogenesis. Halliday’s point is that seemingly
simultaneous or independent systems can begin (semogenetically)
to provide a conditioning environment for one another. Thus, the
kinds of probabilities which Nesbitt and Plum registered may
represent a point in change where one independent system (e.g.
taxis) moves towards becoming the conditioning environment of
another (e.g. logico-semantic relation), or vice versa. Partial
association sets in with the likelihood of certain terms from
different systems co-occurring (the shift away from
equiprobability or a 0:5:0:5 likelihood of occurrence). Halliday
summarises the shift towards dissociation within the one system
as follows:

The hypothesis would be that at some earlier time there was
only one system, say, “projected speech/projected thought”,
the contrast between the two terms being realised by two
variables: “projected speech” by direct deixis plus a verbal
process: “projected thought” by indirect deixis plus a mental
process. Subsequently, these realisations were deconstructed
so as to be able to vary independently of each other; but the
association between them remained in a probabilistic form.
This “dissociation of associated variables” is ... an important
semogenic resource; and it is virtually inconceivable that it
should be other than a gradual process. (Halliday 1991c: 53)

Thus, systems may have been at one time either fully dependent
(0:0-1:0) or independent (with their terms displaying
equiprobable co-occurrence: 0:5:0:5), and have shifted towards
varying degrees of mutual predictability, reciprocity, or
redundancy.

Whereas independent systems will, per definition, not display any
degree of association, and are therefore equiprobable (Halliday
1991c: 54), associated or relatively redundant systems work with
probabilistic either/or relations, and dependent systems with
fully determined relations (total redundancy: co-patterning has
reached the level of certainty). In Wilden’s terms, any sequence of
events or symbols “in which the probabilities are fixed and
independent of the process itself” are inherently lawful and ‘zero-
memory’ (Wilden 1980: 231). It is only in cases where systems
are partially associated (either in the process of becoming
associated or dissociated) that it is useful to talk about the degree
of meaning invested in their co-occurrence, which lies anywhere
between 0:5-0:5 and 0:1-0:9 (Halliday & James 1993: 4).

The closer the degree of association is to equiprobability, the more
meaning is at stake. In such a case, the two systems are virtually
independent; the occurrence of the first term does not determine
that of the other, so the meaning of the second term is not implied
by or 'embodied' within but lies beyond the fact of occurrence of
the first term. The closer the degree of association is to skew, the
less meaning is at stake, and the more redundancy is evident.

In that case, if one term occurs it is relatively safe to assume the
other will too, and the meaning of one is therefore greatly
determined by the fact of occurrence of the other. Redundancy, in
other words, is a (more or less) predictable relation of association
of (two) terms, whose meaning is more a function of their co-
ocurrence than not.

Meaningful patterns in the sequence are random and accidental; the system exhibits a high degree of information
('surprise') per symbol and a low or zero redundancy. ... The
opposite of redundancy is either randomness, where any
combination or event is assumed to be unconditioned and
equiprobable, or strict determinism, where some
combination or event is assumed to have a probability of
one. (Wilden 1980: 231)

Halliday, like Wilden, draws on Shannon & Weaver's (1949; see
Reddy 1979: 304) informational principles and, as seen above,
applies them to the kinds of probabilities characteristic of
linguistic systems. Halliday argues that the reason information
theory fell in disrepute was that structuralist linguists were
working not with a paradigmatic but with a syntagmatic model.
"Information is a property of a system (in the Firthian sense); not
of its individual terms" (Halliday 1991c: 40; also Reddy 1979).

Before I pursue the redundancy-metaredundancy distinction, I
should relate this notion of redundancy to its earlier
characterisation as encoding relation (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). I
described redundancy as typically involving a 'constant value'
(Given) realised as a particular (range of) token(s) (New). In other
words, the 'identifying onus' is placed on that which represents:
the token. These identifying 'representings' or tokens will, in
relatively predictable ways, either 'express' or 'motivate' the
identified represented (values). Predictability is at play here
because a represented is necessarily and only known in terms of its representing(s); i.e. the represented only becomes visible on the strength of relatively consistent and related manifestations, the tokens. It is precisely that relation of predictable association between the 'represented' and the 'representing' that is at stake in the systemic notion of redundancy.

In sum, redundancy can be conceived of systemically (low level of information) as well as metaphorically (as encoding; always positioning the represented as already identified). This becomes important when analysing the AHS official's contributions during the planning in Chapter 5. In his case, a high level of repetition in conjunction with a specific (limited) range of tokens ensures a low level of information ('surprise' in Wilden's terms), and his positioning can be typified as favouring 'redundancy'. But now 'redundancy' is interpreted not merely as referring to 'low information', but also to 'certain values as always already being presumed' (and therefore placing these beyond negotiation).

Morphogenesis, on the other hand, is associated with decodings - which have a Given Token(s) and a New Value(s). Decodings allow the possibility of new meaning, and thus of 'high information', because what is now taken as already identified is the representing token(s), not the represented value. This relation 'works off' entities or phenomena that are put into play and seeks ways of identifying these tokens, either more or less independently from the status of the associations or combinations these tokens may suggest. This search for an identifier represented by the entities in play is the obverse of the drift of the redundancy relation discussed above. In morphogenesis representeds (values) are not predetermined; here the Value is at risk and is (or may become) the outcome of whatever representings (Tokens) are in play.

But so far I have been concerned with intra-stratal (redundancy versus independency) relations. The question that arises is, in what way is the notion of intra-stratal redundancy related to that of inter-stratal meta-redundancy? As specified above, redundancy is a dyadic phenomenon: it only takes two terms into account. This means that redundancy is defined as obtaining between two terms at the same level of abstraction. Metaredundancy is a multi-term account, and is defined as obtaining between more than two terms, at least one of which is at a different level of abstraction.
3.3 Inter-stratal relations and metaredundancy

In Nesbitt & Plum's account, dyadic relations are explicitly related to the inter-stratal meta-redundancy relations obtaining between lexicogrammar and genre (Nesbitt & Plum 1988: 32).

the association found between projection and genre and the association found between expansion and genre are explained by the fact that the choice between locution and idea and the choice between extension and non-extension are conditioned by choice in the system of genre at the degree of delicacy which distinguishes between the generic text-types of narrative, anecdote, recount, exemplification and observation/comment. (Nesbitt & Plum 1988: 32)

The meta-redundancy at work here is described as follows: "In terms of the system, the probability of choosing the feature location rather than the feature idea is greater in the context of narrative-type texts than in the context of exemplificatory-texts" (Nesbitt & Plum 1988: 32). In another paper by Plum & Cowling (1991), meta-redundancy 'constraints' are brought in to 'explain' the variations found in tense choice. Here, the variable seen to redound with i. tense choice and ii. modality choice is 'class'. Upper working class favours i. modality and ii. past, while lower working class speakers favour i. absence of modality and ii. present (Plum & Cowling 1991: 297; cf. also Halliday 1991c and Halliday & James 1993).

What is important in systemic functional linguistics, however, as Thibault has observed (Thibault 1991a: 92), is not the co-occurring of two features, but their co-occurrence itself co-patterning with another feature or other features at a different level of abstraction. In terms of the work presented here, positioned practices (Thibault 1991a: 25), as instantiated in interaction, may display varying degrees of (meta-)redundancy: this involves chains of coding-identifying relations.

In the case of what I will refer to as an 'encoding positioning', a clausal-process relation is used metaphorically to describe a relation obtaining between a dominant meaning, value, or 'ideology' and the particulars of talk in interaction. The main drift in the 'encoding-positioning' is from a represented meaning or value to a representing and identifying realisation of that value, the token. A particular more abstract 'value' will tend to motivate a specific range of less abstract resources (downward directionality or 'motivation'; Davidse 1996a: 376), or a more
concrete value will reflect specific more abstract resources (upward directionality or 'expression'; Davidse 1996a: 376). As argued above, in either case the represented is what is already identified and what remains beyond negotiation.

By way of example I will present brief extracts from the planning data. The AHS official starts off the first meeting describing the mental hospital renovation project in these terms (main lexical string underlined; Martin 1992: 331), appropriating extended turns at talk:

[Mtng 1: Phase 1]

CJ: ... there's always been a pressing need down there for medical eh mental health services, and now that they've finished a couple of other projects they've told that they have money to finance our project, however, in the interim eh, they had about 14 projects right across (when I say they I mean the Department of Health) had about 14 projects right across the state for mental health and they had about 15 million dollars or something and they said "look we can't afford them all" and they gave the cost frames that were available for those projects to another quantity surveyor firm, and that firm didn't come to any of the sites, didn't talk to any people, just looked at these, and must have looked at some rates or something or other, and went back to the Departmentals and said "oh I'm sure you can do this cheaper". And their figure on this project was 2.8 million, which is a million dollars roughly under our price of 1992. Now that was done in late 1992, eh the Area found out about it, they tried to keep it quiet, but we have some spies in head office that they don't know about but it fell of a truck for us, and as soon as we found we eh we went troppo, ehm, they said well the building design is very costly because it's the zig-zag and a lot of external walls, and you know that's all very costly, and I said "well look, it's not a million dollars costly!" Eh, and they said "well we cannot afford it you'll have to build it to that". They're now saying something quite different, that they've 2.8 million dollars in their budget that's approved for the project, and they recognize that we've got to do, go through the proper process: PDP, look at the options, come up with the the solution that fits it clinically with whatever it needs, and a cost plan will be developed, and then it will be set at that. Now I think I think they hope they can get it for 27, but I'm telling everyday I run into them that that was a 1992 price and then they keep saying "well we'll work it out and we'll approve whatever it is ...

The official's main concern here and during most of the remainder of the meeting is the cost of the project - not the size, the degree to which it suits the users, its aesthetics, or even the extent to which it fulfils government guidelines on mental health care provision (e.g. the 'Burdekin report'; see Chapter 4). This main concern is realised in a number of ways and at a number of
occasions. As such ‘cost’ constitutes the Value which is realised or ‘enabled’ by a set of Tokens, or lexicogrammatical ‘guises’.

One such ‘guise’ reveals an aspect of redundancy between the official’s talk and his grammatical choices (the notion of ‘choice’ as non-rationalist positioning device is discussed in Thibault 1987: 607). His positioning, realised as it is by a clearly identifiable ‘value’ or semantic (i.e. his concern with ‘costing’), I characterise as ‘encoding-positioning’. Importantly, his grammar redounds with this positioning in that it displays a preference for encodings (Tk=Ir):

[Mrg 1: Phase 1]
And their figure on this project [VI/Id] was 2.8 million [Tk/Ir]

All we have at the moment, in the Capital Works Program [VI/Id] is 2.8 million [Tk/Ir]

We’ve got to prove [Tk/Ir] whatever we need [VI/Id]
(this analysis is based on the following agnation: ‘whatever we need [VI/Id] is determines what we’ve got to prove [Tk/Ir]’)

Following Davidse 1992b, encodings may be seen as symptomising and thereby assume a degree of authority. As mentioned, the Value is what is taken for granted, and the Token(s) that represent(s) it is (in unmarked cases) the New Identifier. A meta-redundancy can now be posited as obtaining between the official’s concern with funding, his length of turn at talk, and the grammatical resources he uses to realise both of these. In my logogenetic analysis of the meetings below I will be able to point to other redundancies further supporting this thesis.

In what I will refer to as ‘decoding positioning’, the main drift is from an identified representing Token to an identifying represented Value. Here, a specific set of grammatical or phonological (less abstract) resources will construe a (more abstract) semantic value (upward directionality or ‘expression’; Davidse 1996a: 376), or a specific set of (more abstract) semantic resources will give rise to a (less abstract) set of grammatical resources (downward directionality or ‘motivation’; Davidse 1996a: 376).

The architect-planner’s positioning during the first meeting is not at all redundant as is that of the AHS official referred to above. In the planner’s case we see a number of discourses: the official’s financial concerns, the Department of Health’s requirement that mental health regulation be observed and that users be involved in the planning-design process, previous reports produced with
regard to the site, user concerns, architectural-technical possibilities and limitations. Ultimately, all these discourses are moulded into a new discourse: the Project Definition Plan report (see Chapter 4 for ethnographic details). Again, using the coding-identifying relation as a metaphor, we can say that the architect-planner’s positioning works from a given set of representing Tokens (of discourse) towards a represented Value.

For example, towards the end of the first meeting the architect-planner summarises what he understands to be his mission. He brings together the Department of Health requirements (“all the bases that are required for a PDP”), previous reports (“information that exists from the previous exercise”), the existing architectural plans (“There’s a better drawing somewhere ...”), as well as the AHS official’s financial concern (“write it up as like we’ve been doing for economic evaluations”), all of which are to become main elements in the PDP report he is expected to produce:

[Mung 1: Phase 13]
Fi- Ok, alright, good, well I think what we’ll do is we’ll go back and make sure that we hit all the bases that are required for a PDP, where we’ve got information that exists from the previous exercise that satisfies that process then we’ll plug that in, and then I think what we’ll do, we’ll just, we’ll get them all together, maybe the way to do is we’ll get everything together, write it up as like we’ve been doing for economic evaluations, economic evaluations are the other end of the process, having done it you go back and see whether it works, so we’ll use that method if you like to sort of revisit the thing, but write it up as though it was done first time ...

The coding-identifying metaphor employed here is apt: the ‘Value-Identifier’ construed by the planner is inherent in the talk (i.e. it is Range-like) in that each of these discourses had been raised earlier in the meeting. In that sense, the planner deals with a very different intertextuality than does the AHS official (Lemke 1985b: 286, 1995a: 10; Fairclough 1995e: 188). The AHS official’s intertext is one that was established elsewhere and previous to the meeting, and is ‘monologic’: “Undialogized [i.e. ‘monologized’] language is authoritative or absolute” (Bakhtin 1981: 427). By contrast, the planner’s intertext is the total of meanings brought up during the meeting, which together give rise to its dynamically achieved and newly emergent ‘value’. Hence, his talk is ‘dialogic’ (Bakhtin 1981: 276). The essence of decodings is that the Value needs to be (seen to be) emergent from the talk, or ‘agreed on’, for the it to take on social relevance.

Moreover, and grammatically speaking, the architect-planner does not display much overall ‘redundancy’ during this first meeting

111
(in contrast to the AHS official). His grammatical resources, especially near the beginning of the meeting, include interrogatives, modalisations, and decodings (suggesting non-power; Hodge & Kress 1979/93: 95 [basing this judgment on metaredundancies evident during the meeting, not subscribing to a one-way linguistic determinism of syntactic items]). Later in the meeting, his positioning shifts to include declaratives, modulations, and encodings (as in the example above).

More specifically, early in the meeting the planner tries to extract a sense of what his involvement entails and positions himself as minus-power. In this early utterance (Phase 4), the planner combines a decoding relational process with an interrogative:

[Mtng 1: Phase 4]
F: So the documentation post-PDP ehm [Tk/Ir] is to very much like a developed design stage [VI/Ir], is that really what it's about?

The following exemplifies the planner formulating his understanding of his role (in the logogenetic analysis presented in Chapter 5 it will become clear that this later utterance is the outcome of more than an hour of subtle and careful negotiation of positioning between planner and official):

[Mtng 1: Phase 13]
well I think what we'll do [VI/Ir] is we'll go back and make sure that we hit all the bases that are required for a PDP [Tk/Ir]

The planner's positioning cannot be characterised in terms of a monologic intertext or 'value' (constructed previously and elsewhere) which he aims to represent in terms of a particular set of 'tokens': instead, he works with the range of tokens he is presented with (and which he presents as well) during the meeting and which the dynamics of the meeting itself generates (i.e. current dialogically constructed intertexts) and moulds these into a new value. His concern, in other words, is not with a pre-determined 'represented', but with a set of current, ongoing 'representings' for which a suitable 'represented' is to be found: here, the available Tokens can be seen to influence the nature of such vValue.

The principle I am working with here revolves around extrapolating from the grammar, not towards the grammatics, i.e. the modelling of levels of abstraction involved in social semiotic interaction (context-semantics-lexicogrammar-phonology), but towards styles of social positioning and types of institutional process, i.e. instantiation. Where the encoding relation 'names'
what it sees as reality (as intertext or 'value') and thereby assumes a degree of authority, the decoding relation 'calls' what is presented as reality (its intertext), and thereby defers authority to what is/occurs. This diagram (Figure 3.4) schematises this broad opposition:

![Diagram](image)

Figure 3.4: Contrasting encodings and decodings

While thus far the encoding and decoding principles have been related to linguistic interaction, i.e. put to intra-semiotic use, they also provide a powerful metaphor for inter-semiotic recontextualisation.

### 3.4 Reasoning about the Language-Materiality Relation: The Coding-Identifying Relation as Metaphor

The language-materiality issue was touched on in the last section of Chapter 2, Section 2.8. To reason about how our meaning making practices affect our dealing with, and mobilisation and exploitation of the non-linguistic, we need to address the issue of time-space distanciation. I argue that the coding-identifying relation provides the means for addressing this issue in a linguistically and semiotically meaningful way.

Time-space distanciation occurs linguistically (through nominalisation or grammatical metaphor; cf. Iedema 1994/6) but also extra-linguistically. By analogy with their intra-linguistic function, extra-linguistic, or rather inter-semiotic, encodings (i.e. those coding identifications which obtain between pre-linguistic experience and language, e.g. a poem, or a narrative) may be seen as 're-instantiating' the extra-linguistic. I am reminded here of
Heidegger's 'bidding the thing into nearness' (Edwards 1990: 90). For Heidegger, the poem [Tk/Ir] 'names' a hitherto unnamed (i.e. pre-linguistic) experience [VI/Id]. Similarly, inter-semiotic decodings may be seen as 'transfiguring' the linguistic into the post-linguistic (e.g. the technologised, the technicalised; see Figure 3.5).

![Diagram: 'Intersemioticity'](image)

**Figure 3.5:** Using the coding-identifying relation as metaphor for describing inter-semiotic relations

This analogy is crucial for appreciating the full extent of the planner's bureaucratic specialisation as morphogenic catalyst. Not only does he work with intertexts that are dynamically generated during the meetings to construct his 'value', but he also controls the technicalising discourses (the writing of the *Project Definition Plan*, the architectural design, and, ultimately, assisting with the physical construction of the building) necessary for recontextualising (transfiguring or re-semiotising, and thereby also consolidating) the 'values' he has newly achieved.

Ultimately, then, the morphogenic specialisation of the planner serves the redundancy-seeking nature of state-power: the agreement which is cooperatively and hegemonically moulded from the meetings as intertexts reconsolidates the original power configurations, albeit affected by the interpersonal dynamics of the intervening negotiation.

The inter-semiotic and intra-semiotic applications of the encoding-decoding relation are summarised in Table 3.5 below:

114
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>coding-identifying configurations</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>en-coding: 're-instantiating'</td>
<td>de-coding: 'transfiguring'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;how the identified may be</td>
<td>&quot;what the identified means&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recognised&quot;</td>
<td>Token related to its significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value related to its embodiment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inter-semiotic</td>
<td>intra-semiotic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(language)</td>
<td>(language)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pre-linguistic -&gt;</td>
<td>Token/I'd -&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>linguistic</td>
<td>Value/I'r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phenomenon -&gt; name</td>
<td>'ranged'; inversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'effective'; textually</td>
<td>marked; textually less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>versatile (clefts,</td>
<td>versatile (only allows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thematic equatives,</td>
<td>proposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>predicated themes)</td>
<td>Complement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heidegger's 'thinging'</td>
<td>naming: external-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>calling: signifying mode</td>
<td>lising mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from plan to building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5: Coding-Identifying relation in language and as positioning metaphor

Following Davidse, the bi-directional coding-identifying relation underpins reasoning about inter-stratal relations. As such, these relations can be seen to selectively obtain between a social actor's positioning, her/his predominant meanings and wordings (as well as soundings). The main drifts are either towards embodiment or towards represented-ness, with the former being the domain of redundancy (one value represented by [associated with, predictive of, enabled by] a series of tokens), and the latter the domain of morphogenesis (a series of tokens construing [either 'expressing' or 'motivating'] a new value). I referred to Bakhtin's notion of dialogism above, but his notions of centripetality and centrifugality are relevant here too (Bakhtin 1981: 272): encodings presume centrifugal unification or 'monologism' (under a specific value), while decodings allow centripetal disunification or 'dialogism' (their principal starting point is not the 'representeds' but the 'representings').

As seen, while Davidse's 1992b account discusses the encoding-decoding relation in terms of a simple downward-upward directionality, Davidse's (1996a/b) elaboration of that discussion identifies expression (as moving up in abstraction) and motivation (moving down) as governing the four-cell paradigm referred to above. This bi-directionality is crucial to the thesis offered here: encoding-positionings aim either towards the specification of a
value in real terms, or towards the formulation of that value as generalisation. Decoding-positionings aim either towards the construction of a value out of an available set of tokens, or towards the translation of a set of tokens into a representative kind of technicality, such as design, lower in abstraction.

These proportions are summarised in Table 3.6 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>encoding</th>
<th>decoding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directionality</td>
<td>token identifies value (Vl/ld-&gt;Tk/lr)</td>
<td>value identifies token (Tk/lld-&gt;Vl/ld)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paradigm I: abstract Value -&gt; concrete Token</td>
<td>linguistic</td>
<td>ideology -&gt; realisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paradigm II: concrete Value -&gt; abstract Token</td>
<td>linguistic</td>
<td>'the requirement is that staff attend'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>extra-linguistic</td>
<td>ideology -&gt; realisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>linguistic</td>
<td>'this requirement is the result of disappointing staff attendance'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>extra-linguistic</td>
<td>value -&gt; practical generalisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6: Encoding versus decoding relations: intra- and extra-linguistic

As suggested above, it is on the basis of both Halliday’s realisational principle and Davidse’s grounding of that principle in relational transitivity that I propose that coding-identifying relationals provide the principle for not merely inter-stratal realisation (metaredundancy), but also the possibility for metaphorisation, re-semiotisation, and recontextualisation: i.e. morphogenesis. While linguistic decodings work off identified Tokens to construe an identifying Value, we can say that, metaphorically and inter-semiotically speaking, specific tokens may be manipulated to construe a new value in the form of a new discourse (as exemplified above), a new mode (a written PDP report), or even a new expression plane (design; building).

The following section goes more deeply into this ‘inter-semiotic’, with the aim to provide an interpretation of trans-semiotic time-space distanciation.

3.5 Semiosis and Materiality: A Formal Account

3.5.1 Symmetry-breaking and metaphorisation

In this section I will argue that the coding-identifying principle applies not only to the linguistic phenomena and relations
discussed in Sections 3.1-4, but also to extra-linguistic relations. Essentially, the coding-identifying principle is what underpins all kinds of metaphorical processes which link different entities in a relation of identity. Grammatically speaking:

In any identifying clause, the two halves refer to the same thing; but the clause is not a tautology, so there must be some difference between them. This difference is one of form and function; or, in terms of their generalised labels in the grammar, of Token and Value - and either can be used to identify the other. (Halliday 1985/94: 124)

Thus, the coding-identifying principle is paradoxical in that it provides the means for affirming "an identity while also denying it" (Corradi Fiumara 1995: 11). Metaphors complexify in that they institute 'higher levels of organisation'.

Metaphor directs attention to similarity in structure across realms or events; it represents the logic of ... structures by which different levels soar to further degrees of complexity ... thus creating what Bateson labels the 'pattern which connects' (Corradi Fiumara 1995: 13)

Martin, in his account of grammatical metaphors, refers to the way metaphors create a tension between the lexicogrammar and the semantics: "[g]rammatical metaphors in other words unhinge the two strata, allowing a degree of symbolic play between the two" (Martin 1993e: 31). Martin continues, highlighting the increased complexity of this 'symbolic play': "the play forces us to interpret metaphorical discourse on two levels in order to construe the meaning that is being made in the text" (Martin 1993e: 31). Martin shows how a metaphorical realisation stands in a coding-identifying relation to a more congruent one, with the wording the Token and the Meaning its Value:
The increase in 'symbolic play' or 'semiotic freedom' (Wilden 1980: 111) is a result of metaphorisation; i.e. the ascription of a Token to a Value or vice versa. Martin's 'stratal tension', read in conjunction with Davidse's (1996a) characterisation of the inter-stratal relation as a coding-identifying relation, enables us to see how linguistic 'congruence' represents a specific set of stratal relations or 'symmetries', and how metaphorisation involves the breaking of such symmetries in favour of new (coding-identifying) relations.

In this Section, I aim to show how such coding-identifying metaphorisation, as a kind of 'symmetry-breaking', involves time-space distanciation. Symmetry-breaking was introduced when discussing Lemke's ecosocial dynamics in Section 2.8; time-space distanciation was introduced in Section 2.4 on Giddens. Here I aim to apply the latter notion to a linguistically relevant account of morphogenesis and its metaphorical ('symmetry-breaking') effect on semiosis. (Semiosis here refers to meaning making practices, not to meaning products.)

Time-space distanciation, following Giddens definition, is inherent in the increased storage, mobilisation and exploitation of materiality.

As seen, morphogenesis brings about 'new structures' which in some sense go beyond the meaning(s) of the original tokens. 'Structures' here derives from Wilden's terminology, but these need to be seen as referring to configurations of meaning making practices and aspects of materiality. Such new meanings, while opening up a new potential systemically, tend obviate the original,
more time-space specific meanings, and in that way time-space
distanctiate us from those original meanings. This process can be a
linguistic one (on the basis of what Halliday [1985/94: §10] refers
to as grammatical metaphor) and an extra-linguistic one. In the
latter case I will talk about ‘intersemioticy’ (cf. Jakobson’s 1971a:
260’s ‘intersemiotic transmutation’). Here I am concerned with
linguistic/extra-linguistic relations: “[t]here is a semiotics whose
expression plane is another semiotics” (Eco 1976: 55). Essentially,
my aim to account for how one such intersemiotic transmutation
occurs.

A semiotic system is designed to interact with other
systems. (Preziosi 1979b: 33)

Acknowledging that language is what Sebeok refers to as “a
uniquely human verbal overlay” (Sebeok 1994: 7) on non-verbal
kinds of semiosis, we could posit two phylogenetic drifts: one
moving towards ‘linguistification’ (Habermas 1987: 80/107/145),
and the other moving towards ‘delinguistification’ (Habermas
1987: 154ff/184). The process of linguistification supposes that
previously pre-semiotic ‘thoughts’ (in Thibault’s 1997a: 290
sense) become realised in language; de-linguistification supposes
that meanings ‘drop out of language’ into alternative modes of
meaning making.

In Habermas’ phylogenetic account of his theory of communicative
action, linguistification occurs when

a higher level subjectivity of this type [relation-to-self],

distinguished by the fact that it can turn back upon itself
only mediately - via complex relations to others - alters the
structure of interaction as a whole. The more complex the
attitudes of the other are, which participants “internalize in
their own experience”, the more there is a shift in what
connects the participants (to start with organisms)
beforehand, in virtue of systemic features - from the level
of innate, species-specific, instinctual relations to the level of
intersubjectivity that is communicatively generated,
consolidated in the medium of linguistic symbols, and
secured finally through cultural tradition (Habermas 1987:
10)

linguistification, in other words, is in itself a form of ‘phylogenetic
morphogenesis’: to overcome increasingly complex social kinds of
relations, language provides a meaning making system with
sufficient ‘semiotic freedom’ to allow contradictory meanings to be
resolved in language as shared-ness, as morphogenic commonality, through metaphorisation.

Habermas argues that linguistification involves a shift to communication as rule-based behaviour.

the transition from gesture-mediated to symbolically mediated interaction also means the constitution of rule-governed behaviour, of behaviour that can be explained in terms of an orientation to meaning conventions. (Habermas 1987: 16)

The shift towards rule-governed communication involves a commitment to adaptation of motivation and behaviour in general to the demands of a shared symbolism (also cf. Halliday 1994: 175; Eagleton 1991: 13):

The formation of identity and the emergence of institutions can now be approached along the following lines: the extralinguistic context of behavioural dispositions and schemes is in a certain sense permeated by language, that is to say, symbolically restructured. Previously, only the instruments for reaching understanding were transformed into signals, into signs with conventionally fixed meanings; at the stage of normatively guided action, however, the symbolism penetrates even into motivation and the behavioural repertoire. It creates both subjective orientations and suprasubjective orientation systems, socialised individuals, and social institutions. In this process language functions as a medium not only of reaching understanding and transmitting cultural knowledge, but of socialisation and of social integration as well. (Habermas 1987: 24)

Charles Taylor’s point regarding linguistification is largely similar to that described by Habermas above (leaving aside his reservations about Mead; C. Taylor 1995: 87): “[i]t is reflection that enables us to be language users” (C. Taylor 1995: 87). Reflection is given a means to abstraction in the form of language.

Gerald Edelman makes a similar point but from the perspective of neuro-Darwinism. For him, “[h]igher order consciousness ['symbolic memory'] cannot be abandoned without losing the descriptive power it makes possible” (Edelman 1992: 124). Also relevant here is Edelman’s notion of ‘re-entry mapping’ (Edelman

In contrast to linguistification, delinguistification, also seen from a phylogenetic perspective, again presumes increased levels of understanding:

Action oriented to mutual understanding gains more and more independence from normative contexts. At the same time, ever greater demands are made upon this basic medium of everyday language; it gets overloaded in the end and replaced by delinguistified media. (Habermas 1987: 155)

Habermas' term 'overloaded' presumes a (perhaps cybernetic and surely community specific) balance between background understanding ('similarising') and meaning making ('differencing'). The systemic view on meaning making is that meaning choice is socially or otherwise constrained to favour some options over others, and to totally disfavour yet others (as 'non-options'; cf. Lemke's 'disjunctions'; Lemke 1985b: 292, 1995b: 98; Foucault 1972: 118; Thibault 1991a: 211). 'Overloaded', then, in this context should be seen to refer to the situation where the totality of options becomes 'meaningful' (see Section 3.2 above), and the system 'suffers' an overloading of information and an excess of sensitivity to noise due to a lack of redundancy. Hence, it will be highly morphogenic (Wilden 1980: 410).

Delinguistification, as morphogenic resolution of such 'overloading', achieves time-space distanciation:

Delinguistified media of communication such as money and power connect up interactions in space and time into more and more complex networks that no one has to comprehend or be responsible for. (Habermas 1987: 184)

Habermas explicitly links 'consensus-formation' to delinguistification: the 'integration of noise into the code':

The more consensus formation in language is relieved by media, the more complex becomes the network of media-steered interaction. (Habermas 1987: 184)

This, as argued, involves a shift in abstraction, or more precisely, a 'decoding' TOKEN-VALUE de/recontextualisation, with the VALUE
achieving social relevance as identifier of the original token[s]. This I see as the formal basis of time-space distanciation.

Habermas' use of the word 'media' in the above quote requires comment. In speaking of 'delinguistified media' Habermas seems to suggest that these semiotic resources have gained some kind of causal influence over human action. This view is rejected by Bhaskar: "social structures ... do not exist independently of the activities they govern" (Bhaskar 1989b: 79). To talk about 'media-steered interaction' therefore might be seen to reify those media over and beyond the activities which mobilise them.

Thibault has reservations regarding the term 'medium' for similar reasons. He reminds us that the medium, as expression form, is not inherently meaningful; meaning is achieved on the basis of the mobilisation of an expression form realising a content form in human (inter)action:

it is said that the 'medium' has a significant potential for meaning making. But it is well to be wary of this term. The 'medium' is not a form which has or carries meaning (Thibault 1996 mimeo: 63)

With these reservations in mind, it must also be acknowledged that Habermas' exposition looks at (de)linguistification from a phylogenetic perspective. My claim is that bureaucratic interaction 'enacts' these drifts logogenetically. Linguistification, in my view, concerns the foregrounding of difference as text (cf. Kress 1985: 15), while delinguistification concerns the re-semiotisation of meaning into, first, 'delinguistifying' semiosis such as (practices drawing on) print, electronic communication and storage, and ultimately into non-linguistic semiosis, such as (practices enabled by) design, architecture, and infra-structure.

(This view does not see such delinguistifying or delinguistified semiosis as 'tools' for communication [viz. my reservations regarding Habermas' 'media' above; also Descombes 1994: 115], but as altered expression planes of 'morphostatic' content planes. "In morphostasis there is either the maintenance of structure, or the elaboration of 'programmed' structures, or the replacement of one structure by a homologous structure"; Wilden 1980: 355.)

In general, bureaucratic processes, and planning in particular, I claim, aim for morphostasis, or the maintenance of publicly agreed structures of action. While this may be true synoptically, the dynamics of these processes involve the mobilisation of both
linguistifying situations (e.g. meetings, debates, polls, and so on) as well as delinguistifying processes (planning, routinising, building). Without either of these, I suggest, state power would not be able to maintain hegemony; without sensitivity to noise and contradiction the redundancies of power would eventually give in to the pressure(s) of contradiction (we can see the 'openness' of power in the fact that current political issues cover meanings that would have been unthinkable as public domain meanings 20 years ago).

Speaking processually or logogenetically then, linguistification involves bringing (different) differences into the bureaucratic/public domain, whereas delinguistification involves the resolution of those differences into 'agreements' which require ongoing social subscription to maintain their 'validity' (cf. Foucault's 'rules of formation'; Foucault 1972: 40).

Bureaucratic ritual aims to achieve subscription to interpretations, summaries, and resolutions of positions. This occurs either through force:

[from a recent precinct meeting I attended: the chairman:] "I'm sorry, this is not the time to raise those issues, we've gone past that"

or compliance (the generic momentum of bureaucratic ritual is often enough to gain attention; cf. M. Atkinson, Cuff & Lee 1978: 146 on 'ritual machinery'; also Cuff & Sharrock 1985 on 'mutual implicativeness' of ritual activities; also Boden 1995).

These interpretations and summaries decontextualise and subsequently recontextualise (in Bernstein's sense, i.e. remove from their original 'field' [Bourdieu's term]) the original meanings and differences, unhingeing them from their contexts of emergence. I claim that it is that process of de/re-contextualisation (which may involve re-semiotisation, i.e. the transformation of meaning from one form of semiosis into another) which will help consolidate both explicit and silent subscription to the process and its re-processing of relevant meanings. (As mentioned above, these agreements need not be explicit and conscious acceptances of resolutions, but will tend to involve contingencies leading to synthesising statements being passed as agreements; cf. Lindblom 1959's 'incrementalism' and Simon 1965's 'satisficing').

The necessity of linguistification of bureaucratic issues is enshrined in the 'Process of Facility Planning' (planning guidelines
published by the Department of Health; see Chapter 4). The emphasis is on providing the opportunity for the public and users of planned facilities to ‘linguistify’ their ‘differences’: “The revised process is ‘needs driven’” (DoH 1993: 1), “planning is seen as a needs driven exercise with a strong customer focus” (DoH 1993: 1). This institutionalised opportunity for the linguistification of difference can be seen to ensure and maintain a sensitivity to ‘noise’ and contradiction.

Delinguistification is more cryptotypically inscribed into the bureaucratic process as a whole. Delinguistification involves the shift of meaning from linguistic semiosis to other kinds of semiosis. As proposed, the relations between these semioses will be described in terms of coding-identifying relations.

The bureaucratic process under description here moves through a series of decoding-identifying relations: from speech, to print, to design, to physical construction, each (having to be seen to be) ‘representing’ the next. Thus, the secretarial assistant produces Minutes of the Meetings, which have to be passed at the next meeting. The architect-planner produces a ‘Project Development Plan’ report on his understanding of what has been said and accepted as having been said (as well as drawing on previous reports and relevant government publications). These details provide the basis for his architectural designs. The designs become part of the tender which goes out to the builder who interprets them and, in negotiation with the architect, ‘translates’ them into physical structure. Each of these ‘steps’ involves a ‘transfiguration’ of the expression plane of meaning. It is the coding-identifying relation, I argue, which describes just that transfiguration: the re-semiotisation of meaning from face-to-face speech to physical structure. Each re-semiotisation requires hegemonic ‘work’ to achieve social validity: this ‘work’ is part of Gramsci’s hegemonising ‘molecular processes’ of daily interaction (as reported in Thibault 1991a: 212).

Delinguistification decodes TOKENS into VALUES (small caps to indicate these terms are used metaphorically, not grammatically): ‘what the users want means [x: Value] in design terms’. It was pointed out earlier in this chapter that the Token-Value relation may either go up in abstraction (‘expression’) or down in abstraction (‘motivation’). While the ‘expression decoding’ characterises the shift from speech to print (i.e. from here-and-now congruence to generalised and abstracted writing), the ‘motivation decoding’ characterises the shift from print (written mode) to design: here abstract kinds of language are re-identified.
in terms of a technicalised system 'closer to reality' (in the sense of 'more iconic of'; Sebeok 1994: 28). It is in these cases that the 'graphology' (or rather 'graph-etics') as expression plane is reconstituted from alphabetic script into architectural design.

As said, each of these 'shifts' requires hegemonic work: the re-semiotisation of meaning only gains validity through co-option of all involved (and especially the powerful). This shows that the resultant semiosis (VALUE) is not inherently or necessarily representative of the original semiosis: it remains an only relatively motivated VALUE identified with a TOKEN. The relations at stake here affirm "an identity while also denying it" (Corradi Flumara 1995: 11).

The reconstitution or resemiotisation of meaning upwards in abstraction yields an increasingly metaphorical semantics. In Chapter 5 I will set out some examples of this. The reconstitution or resemiotisation of meaning downwards in abstraction, by contrast, yields an increasingly 'iconic' or materially durable manifestation.

This iconisation enables the naturalising of the original meanings in two senses. First, the design as resemiotisation of meaning embodies a legitimisation of the original power relations underpinning the planning process as a whole (e.g. the project manager's mode of organisation of the project [i.e. who is invited to the meetings and who is not, where are the meetings held and when, etc]; the official's time and funding limits; the architect's technical superiority). Second, the design as technicalisation of meaning concerns not merely ideational visions of what a building should look like, but also interpersonal views on relevant positionings implied by the structure (cf. O'Toole 1990, 1991a/b, 1994 on the metafunctionality of architectural forms; Lloyd Wright 1954 on the 'grammar of architecture'; also Lefebvre 1991). In two senses then, does resemiotisation involve the increased fixing of social relations, or 'time-space distanciation'.

Considering the degree of delinguistification achieved, I aim to set up a cline of time-space distanciated resemiotisations in terms of the kinds of practices they make possible. Whereas grammatical metaphors (more abstract Values for here-and-now Tokens: 'expression decodings') remain relatively 'negotiable' (i.e. they retain the capacity for becoming Subject in the clause), I argue that delinguistifying re-semiotisations increasingly lose negotiability (i.e. the practices through which they are mobilised presume increasing degrees of agreement and naturalisation).
Print is generally harder to 'negotiate' than speech due to its status in the culture, the prestige attached to its production, and the nature of its content form. But architectural design, apart from incurring huge expenses when re-negotiated too late in the planning process, requires all kinds of technical and technological expertise. Physical constructions are still harder to 'negotiate': once they are there they are there; a lot of consolidated action is necessary to undo such semi-permanent structurations of social space.

The increased presumption of sharedness and the decreasing possibility for challenge and negotiation ensures an increase in the possibility that such resemiotisations will become 'contextualised': made into context, naturalised as 'mere' context, or background. The bureaucratic process has, in this way, construed non-difference. More precisely, it has re-construed difference (certain differences) as 'background context'. To raise such background differences to the status of current, linguistified, difference is hard: bureaucratic process, as institutionalised generic ritual, moves against such 'deviating' currents. In short, the bureaucratic process 'monologises' (cf. Holquist 1990: 53).

3.5.2 Time-Space Distanciation and Western System Integration

To bring what I have said so far in line with Giddens' broadly sociological view of time-space distanciation, I will briefly address the issue of the 'technologisation' of western society more generally, and then tie my discussion of time-space distanciation in to that.

My work on interactions in administrative settings suggests that (tensions in) interpersonal relations are generally the ground for metaphorisation and resemiotisation. Metaphorisation is illustrated by the example of a Council employee drafting a letter to a State Government Minister. As her branch manager's redraft suggested, the Minister was not to be addressed 'congruently' ('We would appreciate it if you could consider these issues') but 'incongruently': 'We would appreciate your consideration of these issues'.

My emphasis on the interpersonal or social pressures behind metaphorisation differs somewhat from Halliday's, who seems to privilege textual pressures exerted by the unfolding discourse as the main motivation for metaphorisation (Halliday 1993b, 1993d-g; Halliday 1994 mimeo: 26/7). From my perspective, I prefer to see metaphorisation as mainly abstracting interpersonal
differences and time-space specificities, by eliding ideational differences (cf. Kress 1995: 130 on Field as the domain of struggle and Tenor and Mode as its means). In a report written for the Disadvantaged Schools Program Write It Right research project (Iedema 1994/6, also Iedema in press for 1997), I argue that metaphorisation in the bureaucratic sphere provides the linguistic counterpoint to the increasingly coordinated and disciplined actional practices (the ‘doings’) which came into being with the Enlightenment (as recorded by Foucault 1977). Accordingly, a whole range of bureaucratic terms (e.g. ‘requirement’, ‘procedure’) came into use in English around precisely this time (the 17th century; Iedema 1994/6).

This social civilising process, achieved through mass discipline and pastoral care (Hunter 1993, 1994) mobilised and unified hitherto two separate techniques: i) the specification of the micro-aspects of action, and ii) the generalisation of modes and rules of behaviour across population types (Foucault 1978: 139). Whereas the former enabled the proceduralisation of behaviour, the latter enabled the imposition of these procedures onto generalised categories of people. Both these bureaucratic ‘advances’ made use of the same semiotic technology: the list (and its technological extension, the table).

‘Lists decontextualise’ (Goody 1987: 274) and are therefore intrinsically metaphorical and time-space distanciating. As semiotic resources, they ‘store’ decontextualised information, and thereby enable time-space distanciated practices.

The argument is that the possibility of semiotic time-space distanciation is intimately linked to the actual ‘fixing’ of populations in social space. This fixing of populations occurred through the use of ‘material’ technologies such as the Panopticon (Foucault 1977: 200, 1980: 147) and other means of socio-physical segregation (Foucault 1980: 149). In my view, semiotic time-space distanciation, or the generation and mobilisation of ‘metaphoric’ or resemiotised devices, necessarily accompanied the increasing routinisation of specific kinds of social participation, manifested as ‘work’. I define ‘work’ as ‘the cooperative mobilisation of matter/energy aimed at maintaining, consolidating or contesting relations of meaning’. Hence, metaphorisation (as increased abstraction from the here-and-now) and social regulation (not so much the ‘regulating’ as the ‘becoming regular’) are two faces of the same coin. Both represent the technologisation (in Foucault’s sense; cf. Hindess 1986: 121) of social relations: the naturalising or semiotic ‘contexting’ of the particulars of material action. In this
way the metaphor, as abstraction, achieves the naturalisation (referred to above) of the behaviour it covertly prescribes, and overtly presumes.

There is thus an intimate link between the western civilising process as described by Foucault (1977) and the accompanying decontextualising semiotic technologies (Goody 1977, Ong 1982, 1992; Wilden 1980; Halliday 1985, 1993a).

Both in the scientific context and in the bureaucratic context, the here-and-now details would have to be managed, presumed, or 'fixed' for these contexts to be able to fruitfully employ metaphorisations, or abstractions, about what goes on. I argue that metaphorisations effectively background, 'contextualise', shift attention away from, the details of everyday life, thereby naturalising (rendering inappropriate to negotiate or question because backgrounded or 'contexted') routinised and routinising kinds of behaviour (in Callon & Latour's terms, these details become 'black-boxed'; Callon & Latour 1981: 285). The text-context punctuation is therefore political, or a matter of strategically backgrounding some things and foregrounding others, as in 'figure versus ground'. The bureaucratic process, I argue, actively construes background, context, out of foreground, text. The distinction between text and context can now be seen not only as a matter of degree, or as a matter of what is accorded strategic attention (thus constituting an arbitrary punctuation; Wilden 1980: 111; Goodwin and Duranti 1992: 9), but also as a matter that involves devices and practices aiming for the 'contextification of text/difference'.

3.5.3 Metaphorisation, Time-Space Distanciation, and Storage

Whereas time-space localised modes of interaction involve embodied (or somatic) kinds of matter/energy for the realisation of information, metaphorical or time-space distanciated modes tend to mobilise non-embodied kinds of matter/energy configurations (e.g., in the case of print: 'traced instances of graphemes onto a surface'; Thibault 1996 mimeo: 46).

Time-space distanciation, in other words, concerns a 'mobilising of meaning through means outside the body', i.e. a combination of somatic and extra-somatic constellations of matter/energy. The examples par excellence here are writing and print, but also non-linguistic 'storage containers' such as money, design and building. The notion time-space distanciation is thus tied in with the potential inherent in extra-somatic manifestations of meaning, in
that such realisations can achieve degrees of amplification beyond that typical of somatic or bodily realisations. That kind of extra-
somatic distanciation or amplification has been referred to as ‘storage’ (Giddens 1984: 261).

The issue of storage can be further exemplified using David Lockwood’s (1964) distinction between social and system integration. Integration itself “may be understood as involving reciprocity of practices between actors or collectivities” (Giddens 1984: 28). Social integration requires interaction in contexts of co-
presence (see Table 3.7). System integration, by contrast, involves kinds of interaction that span across large chunks of time and space thanks to some kind of storage, or technology (this can be an electronic or a bureaucratic technology).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>social integration</th>
<th>system integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>semiotic:</td>
<td>enact</td>
<td>store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matter/energy:</td>
<td>'embodied'/somatic: face-to-face (co-presence: time-space localised)</td>
<td>extra-somatic: print, design, building (absence: time-space distanced)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.7: Social and system integration: consequences for meaning production

Semiotically, this means that social integration ‘enacts’ meaning as it is embodied, whereas system integration ‘stores’ meaning, as it mobilises material resources (see Table 3.7 above). System integration, therefore, is enabled on the basis of the amplification, or rather the ‘making durable’ of certain meanings in extra-
somatic ways. Durability is enhanced with the shift from speech (which is temporal and local) to, for example, writing (which is a-temporal and spatial).

Speech is based on the heterogeneous and differentiated flow of acoustic events. In this sense, it is episodic. The perception of speech as an episodic sequence of events in this way explains the temporal dimension of speech. ... Writing, on the other hand, is based on the visual layout of the graphic images which have been traced onto a treated surface ... . In the case of writing and depiction, the reality underlying space is the adjacent order of the visual invariants [schemas] that have been traced onto a surface. (Thibault 1996 mimeo: 40; his emphasis)

So while speech takes place in time-space as ‘temporal-
corporeality’, writing is uniquely spatial (it is ‘spatial-corporeal’; Thibault 1996 mimeo: 45), and, in an important sense, more durable.
Thibault raises the question as to “how the different structuring principles of the phonic and the graphic orders of difference contribute to the structuring of the conceptual order of difference” (Thibault 1996 mimeo: 61). In other words, how do the different expression planes affect their associated content planes? Thibault acknowledges that “the grammatical organisation of the spoken and the written language is partly different on account of the different structuring effect of phonic and graphic substance” (Thibault 1996 mimeo: 61). This is the result of the different semiotic potential of the acoustic and the graphic, but also of the different contextual domains where speech and writing tend to be mobilised.

Generally, Thibault points out, the written (as expression form) can be characterised as i. adjacent in space (rather than subsequent in time), ii. arrested on a surface (in contrast to sound), and iii. static (rather than dynamic; Thibault 1996 mimeo: 67). I claim that it is technologies like writing and print, but also other semiotic systems like infrastructure and architecture, which represent more ‘durable’ realisations by persisting beyond single interactions and by enabling greater public access than speech. These technologies are therefore important bureaucratic-hegemonic resources.

Similar to Lockwood’s distinction between social and system integration, Wilden (following Lévy-Strauss) distinguishes between ‘hot’ (highly system integrated) and ‘cool’ (highly social integrated) societies, and notes that

In a hot [i.e. changing, technologised, system integrated] society, the cultural code is to a far greater extent ‘outside’ the individual. ... One might say that the hot society records itself in an essential way, on the world outside - on nature, on stone, on wax, on clay, on paper, on film, on tape, in its railway networks, its streets, its freeways - whereas the cool society is more nearly written on itself. (Wilden 1980: 408)

It needs to be emphasised that Wilden explicitly rejects any suggestion of evolutionary thinking, however: he sees the hot and cool societies as caught in different ‘double binds’, (see Wilden 1980: 410).

The hot society’s technologisation involves routinisation, and routinisation manifests itself as work: the socially coordinated mobilisation of matter/energy for the maintenance of meaning.
The notion of ‘work’ also refers to the nature of redundancy: in the hot society redundancy refers to ‘extra-somatic storage’; in the cool society it refers to ‘somatic (re-)enactment’:

In the hot society, it is the way that the cultural memory is stored which depends heavily on redundancy; in a cool society, it is the way that the cultural memory is used which is so heavily redundant. In the terms of the inverse relationship between redundancy and the efficient use of energy, the hot society uses or recalls its highly redundant cultural memory (code) more efficiently than the cool society can recall its highly efficient code by its highly redundant message system. (Wilden 1980: 409; his italics)

In simpler terms, system integration spends effort (‘works’) on storing information in matter (all these resources need to be maintained as relevant and therefore require continuous practical re-investment and adjustment), but this stored redundancy highly facilitates retrieval: its information is highly de- and re-contextualised. (This, by the way, may be a clue as to why Plum & Nesbitt’s [1988] systems are moving towards dis-association: storage [as print, electronic information, and so on] makes interactional [spoken] redundancy unnecessary). Social integration spends effort (‘works’) on enacting information, but this enacted redundancy makes retrieval of specific information difficult and laborious: its information is highly contextualised and context-sensitive.

System integration is thus characterised by its reliance on extra-somatic resources, such as printed text, but also as spatial structure. Human spatial structures have been described as merely more advanced types of bird’s nests or ant hills. I argue that human structures have ‘grammar’ (see Frank Lloyd Wright’s writings about ‘the grammar of architecture’; Lloyd Wright 1954: 181ff) and therefore do not only attest of metaredundancy, but are also metasemantically (because semiotically) organised (Lemke refers to the Presentational, the Orientational, and the Organisational semiotic metafunction; Lemke 1992a: 15; Table 5.10 below).

The deep analysis of the role of the lexicogrammar in meaning-making has revealed a set of general semiotic functions that transcend language itself. They are as much built into the construal of activity types and actional contexts as they are into every utterance, every structure, every painting, every meaningful action. (Lemke 1992a: 10)
The time-space distanciated effects of human work are thus no less interpersonal (and 'political') than the bodily work enacted in socially integrated situations or societies. Law and Mol (1995: 280/1) show how "artifacts may be strategically designed to have politics":

Robert Moses ... built his overpasses according to specifications that would discourage the presence of buses on his parkways ... the reasons reflect Moses' social class bias and racial prejudice. Automobile owning whites ... would be free to use the parkways for recreation and commuting. Poor people and blacks, who normally used public transit, were kept off the roads because the twelve-foot tall buses could not handle the overpasses (Langdon Winner 1986, cited in Law & Mol 1995: 280)

Law & Mol conclude that

They [physical structures] embody social relations in materials more durable than those of face-to-face interaction. (Law & Mol 1995: 281)

Other writers, too, have emphasised the social significance of extra-somatic realisations of meaning. Bernstein talks about the "metaphoric structuring of space": "we can see that classification constructs the nature of social space" (Bernstein 1996a: 26), suggesting that social space is a semiotic sign. Bourdieu (1994) notes how our physical contexts are crucially implicated in the shaping our (bodily) habitus:

in order fully to understand the immediate submission that the state order elicits, it is necessary to break with the intellectualism of the neo-Kantian tradition to acknowledge that cognitive structures are not forms of consciousness but dispositions of the body. ... The recognition of [the state's] legitimacy is not, as Weber believed, a free act of clear conscience. It is rooted in immediate, pre-reflexive, agreement between objective structures and embodied structures, now turned unconscious ... . (Bourdieu 1994: 13/4)

Bourdieu's 'turned unconscious' is precisely what is under focus here: i.e. the increased embodying, thingifying, contextifying, making natural and thence unconscious inherent in the bureaucratic process. Difference, in other words, is de-linguistified.
To integrate the 'political' relevance of our physical environment into semiotic theory we might expand the 'mode continuum' (as proposed by Martin 1992: 511) allowing for resemiotisation beyond language. Figure 3.7 below attempts that, by pointing to the possibility of meaning making becoming time-space distanciated (as a result of metaphorisation) and thus displaying morphogenesis, which may ultimately involve the mobilisation of semiotic resources other than language.

First (with reference to Figure 3.7), a distinction is made between symbolic (e.g. language) and non-symbolic open systems. Non-symbolic open systems are necessarily of a higher level of 'logical typing' (Wilden 1980: 500, 1987: 168). This means that there is no opposition between symbolic and non-symbolic open systems, since the latter are a pre-condition for the occurrence of the former.

Symbolic open systems (semiosis) are then further distinguished into time-space localised (meaning as bodily produced) and time-space distanciated systems (meaning as produced by mobilising resources outside the body). The focus of this thesis is on how time-space localised meaning (i.e. interaction in the here-and-now; Bernstein's 'framing') contributes to the maintenance of, and the transformation into, time-space distanciated meaning (Bernstein's 'classification'). As the diagram notes, the transformation into time-space distanciated meaning requires increasing amounts of 'cooperative work'.

Figure 3.7: Meaning - Localised vs Distanciated
Time-space distanciated resources are a product of the reconstitution of certain symmetries, i.e. metaphorisation. Metaphorisation, as a kind of ‘symmetry-breaking’, re-adjusts token-value identifications of wordings and meanings, and underpins intra- and inter-semiotic transfigurations. Lemke’s account of ecosocial dynamics as involving a material-semiotic dialectic driven by ‘symmetry-breaking’ enables me to introduce the problematic of the material in relation to the semiotic (i.e. expression planes other than phonology). It is that step that was necessary to take the final step, which consists in reasoning about that relation in terms of the principles underlying Halliday’s grammatics.

3.6 Morphogenesis as Symmetry-Breaking

Before entering into the details of the planning project, I need to tie both Wilden’s information theoretical notion of ‘morphogenesis’ and Giddens’ sociological notion of ‘time-space distanciation’ in with the systemic functional model of language.

As seen, tension comes about as a result of some kind of ‘symmetry-breaking’: certain saying/doing complexes are ‘disturbed’, and the resulting tension leads to their reconstitution at a different level of organisation. Differences between speakers may be resolved in talk through the use of generalising and abstracting metaphors (see Chapter 5), which, in turn, may be resemioticised beyond the somatic realm. In this sense, the linguistic generalising-abstracting metaphor parallels the shift from speech to writing. The morphogenetic principle may thus be schematised as follows (Figure 3.8):

```
  'congruent' realization ⇒ metaphor
    ∣ exp-dec ∣
  speech ⇒ writing
    ∣
  (Tk/Id) ⇒ (Vl/ir)
```

Figure 3.8: Expression-decoding speech as writing
(the arrow indicates a move up in abstraction)

The face-to-face interactions which took place during, just before and after the meetings including the phonecalls between various stakeholders become 'summarised', first, in the words of the project manager (who interjects with summaries during the
meetings; see Chapter 5), and then in the Minutes of the Meeting.
and finally in the draft and final draft reports (the 'PDP'; see
Chapter 4). The summary, in other words, provides the VALUE of
the talk as TOKEN.

The practice of summarising is a highly significant and prevalent
bureaucratic exercise (Feez 1993), and each shift involves a
recontextualisation (in Bernstein's 1990: 60/192 sense).

a written transcript of some original speech event is always
recontextualisation of the semiotic modalities which were
in operation in that event (speech, paralanguage, kinesics,
gestures, and so on) transforming them into the semiotic
modalities of the second (written) system. In this sense, a
written text has the status of a textual record of the
'original' event: the meanings of the first system and their
semiotic modalities are transformed in ways which are
specific to the semiotic and material potential of the second
system. Inevitably, this involves the loss of some semiotic
modalities, the addition of others, and the transformation of
still others. (Thibault 1994: 3)

Crucial to the success and progress of the bureaucratic process,
each shift or recontextualisation needs to gain subscription and
hegemony, i.e. be socially validated. Validation underwrites the
identifying relation set up between 'what was said' (as identified
TOKEN) and 'how what was said may be summarised in writing'
(the identifying VALUE). The very fact that we are here dealing
with a Token-Value relation suggests that identity is precisely not
possible (Corradi Fiumara1995: 11).

The resemiotisation from writing to design involves a similar
relation, but one which makes use of the 'motivation decoding' (a
more abstract Token put in relation to a less abstract Value):
'these (written) agreements translate into design in this way'. This
can be schematised as follows (Figure 3.9):

```
  linguistic specifications \rightarrow_{mot-dec} architectural design
                     (Tk/Id) \rightarrow (VI/Ir)
```

Figure 3.9: Representing language as design (motivation-decoding:
the arrow represents the shift down in abstraction)
The last stage of the project concerns the construction of the building on the basis of the designs. Although this stage is strictly speaking beyond the analytical scope of this thesis, the relation involves again a shift further down in abstraction (i.e. a motivation-decoding). This can be represented as follows:

\[
\text{architectural design} \xrightarrow{\text{mot-dec}} \text{physical construction}
\]

\[
\text{(Tk/Id)} \xrightarrow{\text{(VI/IR)}} \text{(Vl/lr)}
\]

Figure 3.10: Representing design as building (motivation-decoding: the arrow represents the shift down in abstraction)

Each stage in the planning project represents a step further away from the original differences raised in face-to-face interaction. New differences arise, but these are subordinate, as it were, to those which are being resemiotised and contextified. The morphogenetic ‘role’ of the planner is thus to accomplish the following ‘trajectory’ from salient difference to naturalised/spatialised/contextified difference:

\[
\text{writing (metaphorised difference)} \xrightarrow{\text{motivation-decoding}} \text{design (technicalised difference)} \xrightarrow{\text{motivation-decoding}} \text{building (spatialised-contextualised difference)}
\]

Figure 3.11: Planner’s semiotic-material trajectory

This now sets the stage for Chapter 5 where I analyse the planning interactions and apply the theoretical tools proposed in this Chapter.

Given that the data underpinning this study are limited to one project and that my aim is to trace the morphogenetic (and schismogenetic) dynamics at the level of interaction, I will be working close to the grammar. This will enable a view on how
positionings are negotiated, and how hegemonic 'work' is done. It will also reveal how, and at what levels, metaphorisation is brought into play to 'achieve the resolution of contradictions'. My aim, broadly, is to trace the 'molecular processes' referred to by Gramsci and Thibault in the ongoing negotiation of hegemony.

The logogenetic analysis of the meetings presented in Chapter 5 will touch on these intra- and inter-semiotic transfigurations. But before I start analysing the meeting data I will set up an ethnographic account of the project, of its principles and procedures, of the participants typically and actually involved, and of my own role as researcher. I will do that in the following chapter, Chapter 4.
Chapter 4  A Case of Bureaucratic Planning: The Mental Health Hospital Project

4.0 Introduction

This Chapter gives an ethnographic description of the planning project which forms the empirical basis of this thesis. This ethnography provides the background for the analyses of the bureaucratic interactions as presented in Chapter 5.

4.1 Ethnography

This account focuses on the involvement of Mr Ian Forbes\(^1\) as Planning Consultant (representing the architect-planning company Jackson, Teece, Willis, Chesterman and Forbes; JTWC+F) in the Project Definition Plan stage of the Waratah House project. Waratah House currently provides mental health services in the Campbelltown area (South-West Sydney). Since the late 1980's plans have been discussed for the expansion of Waratah House.

4.1.1 History of the project

In accordance with the 1989 Barclay Report which recommended improvement of mental health services in South Western Sydney and other rural areas, JTWC (Forbes became a partner in the company in 1993) and Bates, Smart & McCutcheon (another architect company) were called on to prepare a proposal for the expansion of Waratah House. This project carried a budget of $8.2 million. Financial constraints prevented the project from going ahead, and the project was put on hold while a review of mental health needs in the South West Sydney (SWS) area was conducted. The following extract from the Project Definition Plan produced by Mr Forbes and his associates summarises the intermediate to's and fro's:

A Mental Health Steering Review Committee was formed to review all planning to date and develop an Area Strategic Plan for future development of Mental Health Services. Membership of the Steering Committee included representation from the Health Department Mental Health and Capital Works Branches, Clinicians, Area Advisors, Sector General Managers, staff from the Health Services

\(^1\) Mr Forbes has given me permission to retain his real name for the purposes of this thesis.
Development Unit and Area Administration. In March 1992 the Area Strategic Plan for Mental Health Services was approved by the Area Health Board. This provided a comprehensive development plan for Mental Health Services in the Area based on the Mental Health Resource Allocation Formula and the previously approved capital works budget. (Waratah House Project Definition Plan 1995: 5; see Appendix C)

Mental health needs were accommodated partly through the acquisition of 6 Browne Street, Campbeltown, a two-storey building which was renovated and redeveloped to serve infant, child, adolescent and adult non-inpatient services. Waratah House was to be upgraded as proposed in a 1992 plan prepared by JTCW costing $2.7 million, which included a reduction from the initially proposed 40 to 30 beds as well as a fully-enclosed security section for dangerous patients. It was on the basis of this plan and this costing ($2.7 million) that the go-ahead was given late 1994 for its implementation, after extensive discussions during the preceding year between the Department of Health and the users (clinicians, nurses, social workers) to ensure the proposed plan was "agreeable".

4.1.2 Waratah House Project 1995

When the project was given the go-ahead in early 1995, bureaucratic guidelines regarding the implementation of public works projects had changed "to reflect the changed roles and responsibilities resulting from establishment of Area and District Boards, revised policies in the provision of health care and health care facilities, and new Government guidelines as described in the Total Asset Management Manual" (DoH Process of Facility Planning Manual Sep 1993: 1). The revisions, the Manual claims, "provide for a simplified planning process which is applicable to a broader range of health care delivery models including private sector participation and service contracting" (DoH 1993: 1). The revised process proclaims to be "needs driven", which means that extensive discussion with users and clients and extensive review of all possible options (for design and construction) is required before the final design and construction stage can be entered into.

The stages of the planning process have thus been formalised to include 1) a Procurement Feasibility Plan, 2) a Project Definition Plan, 3) Design and Construction Documentation, 4) Implementation of the Project, and, finally, 5) its Evaluation. The diagram below sets these out in relation to the overarching
Process of State Corporate Planning (which I will not further specify):

![Diagram of Process of Corporate Planning]

These amendments caused the Waratah House project to be out of sync with current public health planning guidelines. A lot of the design had already taken place (viz. the three architectural options in the 1992 JTWC plan) without there being evidence of exhaustive user and client discussion. The South West Sydney Area Health Service (SWSAHS) made up for this by conducting interviews with Waratah House staff which were recorded in minutes and incorporated in the Consultant/Architect Brief issued by SWSAHS in September 1994.

4.1.3 JTWCForbes' "role" in the project

The following diagram shows the bureaucratic structure, and the dotted line specifies who was actually involved in the planning process insofar as I attended it:
The SWSAHS Consultancy Brief brief specifies what was expected from JTWCForbes hired (again) for the 1994/5 project (p. 6):

Phase 1:
- Input into Project Definition Plan (PDP)
- Building Survey (Provisional Sum)

JTWC was also involved in phase 2 of the project, but Ian Forbes' involvement, as planner, was not required here. Phase 2 was carried out mainly by the third architect who attended the planning meetings:

Phase 2:
- Schematic Design
- Design Development
- Construction Supervision
- Building Commissioning

4.1.4 The Project Definition Plan Phase

The analyses of the meeting interactions presented in Chapter 5 restrict themselves to that part of the brief which Ian Forbes was responsible for: Phase 1: PDP and Building Survey (for which the
fee approximated $10,000). This brief specifies the role of the Consultant:

Undertake the following duties of the Consultant including direction and coordination of all subconsultants to meet program and other requirements of the commission, in respect of all activities, including but not limited to:

Engage all subconsultants, as appropriate, to assist in satisfying the requirements of this commission

The PDP is defined as follows:

The PDP should fully define the content and costs of the project together with the strategy for implementation. The PDP will be prepared by the Project Director, with input into the following areas by the Consultant:

• Critique the areas proposed in the schedule of accommodation prepared in conjunction with SWSAHS
• Define scope of proposed development with description of each department
• Review site planning options for the new works with the existing master planning for the Campbelltown Hospital campus, including definition of development options and preliminary budgets
• Define preferred design option as a concept plan and submit for approval
• Prepare a project implementation proposal for the preferred option providing a program, staging, cash flow and recommended procurement strategy
• Liaise with the Quantity Surveyor to generate a detailed Cost Plan of the total project costs of the preferred option including furniture, fittings and equipment, construction costs and consultant fees using Department of Health Guideline DSS1
• Review design brief already prepared by SWSAHS and comment on its appropriateness.

Building Survey:
• Coordinate preparation of building survey.

This brief, in other words, does not account for the fact that at the time the project moved into “Phase 1” there was no completed Procurement Feasibility Plan. As will be seen, this provided some reason for tension while the role of the Consultant/Architect was being negotiated. What contributed to the confusion was the fact that documentation related to SWSAHS discussions with users during 1994 were not readily made available by the officials involved. According to the brief in question, Proposals/Interviews and a Review of the Design Brief took place in November of that year; a 1:200 Schematic Design was done in December and a cost plan in January 1995, for which SWSAHS approval was given in
the same month (SWSAHS Consultancy Brief 1994: 34). Although the Consultant/Architect was hired to produce only a PDP, it became clear during the meetings that the feasibility of the plan (its acceptability to all involved, in particular the users) had not been formally nor fully established, which necessitated the revisiting of "old sites" (Ian Forbes during the first [15/2/95] meeting). This accounts for some of the renegotiations of spaces, needs, functions and locations taking place in this PDP phase.

According to the Process of Facility Planning (NSW Department of Health Manual 1993), the Procurement Feasibility Plan considers the options available for addressing the current and future service and facility deficiencies/excesses and/or productivity improvements identified in the corporate planning process. The most appropriate solutions are then determined through Economic Appraisal and Value Management Review by the respective stakeholders (p. 5).

The PFP, in other words (number 1. in Figure 4.1 above), deals with options, their economic viability, and their qualitative assessment involving input from all involved. The Project Definition Plan, on the other hand (number 2. above), "is to fully define the content and costs of the project together with the strategy for implementation" (p. 13). This may involve

the clear delineation of redevelopment requirements for a particular site, definition of the type and volume of services to be purchased from the private sector, clarification of requirements for building rental, preparation for the sale of an asset, or other 'project' ... (p. 13)

as well as

a design brief, review of site master planning, accommodation schedules, capital cost estimates, equipment requirements, asset realisation implications, project implementation proposals detailing staging, cash flow, procurement strategies, consultant requirements, management structure and monitoring provisions, together with staff resourcing implications, an estimation of recurrent costs and the source of any additional funds required ... (p. 13).

The overall purpose of the PDP is to develop the proposals contained in the PFP to the point where "all project parameters
are identified and fully detailed". This document is performative, i.e. it enables the further implementation of the project, in that it is taken to constitute the agreement (VALUE) evidencing the 'sign-off' by all stakeholders involved (TOKEN).

It is a document which therefore faces in two directions. For the higher bureaucracy, it is representative of departmental constraints (budgets, regulations, requirements, recommendations) and user needs (staffing and service requirements) and preferences (economies and politics to do with use of the building in question) having been molded into a comprehensive statement to which all participants have signalled acceptance and agreement (i.e. they have signed the document). For those responsible for implementing the project (architects, builders), the PDP recommends not only a particular (semi-detailed) architectural option optimising the available budget, but also details room allocations and specifications (size, sound proofing, number of doors, desirable materials, location), optimum ways of ensuring patient safety and staff security (unobstructed vision, sealed windows, lockable doors, duress alarm, user-sensitive surfaces/edges), and routine practices to do with transportation (routes, methods, distances). In that sense, it represents the technicalisation of the above constraints, needs and preferences.

The PDP must, above all, address cost. It should include a capital cost estimate of the proposed design, such as materials, equipment, construction, consultancy fees, etc., as well as the proposed recurrent costs (operating cost of the building, maintenance, staff salaries). Finally, the PDP should include a plan for the implementation of the project, specifying the staging of the final design and construction, cash flow, and any other practical arrangements. If, as in this particular exercise, the design gives rise to higher than estimated or allowed cost, AHS or DoH officials will move back and forth between the the users, the Consultant/Architect, and the Project Manager on the one hand (i.e. the meetings focussed on here), and AHS/DoH officials on the other, to see to what extent the new required budget is feasible.

The PDP is submitted by the Area Chief Executive Officer to the Director General of the Department of Health for approval. This submission by the Area officer is taken to signal, “endorsement [...] of all the issues detailed in the report, particularly the capital and recurrent cost implications” (p. 17). As will be seen, this means in practice that preliminary negotiations have to take place and agreements have to be struck as to the acceptability of the PDP as it is being drafted by the Consultant/Architect. The AHS would not
want to be seen to be submitting a document which, in the eyes of the superior (Dept. of Health) bureaucracy, would be deemed to be unacceptable. By the time the PDP is finally submitted therefore, enough AHS and DoH officials will have been contacted and ‘tested’ to ensure the document’s viability, and its “true and accurate record of ... agreement” (Project Manager John Smith, meeting 4, 26/4/95).

4.2 Planning as Practice: the Planning Meetings

The data presented here are in the form of ‘texts-as-records’ (Lemke 1984: 79; Thibault 1994: 4): spoken words transcribed onto the page. Only minimal record was kept of non-linguistic semiosis. These texts-as-records are of several meetings and interactions that went on over a period of four months among government officials (representatives of the Area Health Service, the Department of Health, and Capital Works), consultant-architects, users, and contractors. The following table (4.1) lists the meetings in question:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting No.</th>
<th>Attendees:</th>
<th>Taped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Senior Planner, Project Manager, Area Health Service Official, Planning Architect, Building Consultant, [Researcher]</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Project Manager, Junior Planner, Users</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Senior Planner, Junior Planner, Users, [Researcher]</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Senior Planner, Junior Planner, Project Manager, Area Health Service Official, Planning Architect, Building Consultant, Users, [Researcher]</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Senior Planner, Junior Planner, Project Manager, Area Health Service Official and AHS Supervisor, Planning Architect, Building Consultant, Users, [Researcher]</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Senior Planner, Junior Planner, Project Manager, Area Health Service Official and AHS Supervisor, Dept of Health Official, Planning Architect, Building Consultant, Users, [Researcher]</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Waratah House planning meetings and attendants

The meetings used to be every two weeks on a Wednesday afternoon round the back of Liverpool hospital in South-West Sydney. The users had to come from Campbelltown, the AHS and DoH representatives from their respective offices in the region, and the consultants from their offices in the city. I generally joined Ian Forbes at either his city office or at his University of NSW office (where he is the Head of the School of Health Services Management) to get a lift in.
The meetings generally lasted 2 hours. All five meetings except the first were chaired by the Project Manager John Smith, who kept careful watch on the direction and purpose of the meetings. The directedness of these later meetings stands in contrast with the relative aimlessness of the first meeting where Smith was absent, and where Ian Forbes and John Case, the SWS Area Health Service (AHS) official both determined the focus or foci of attention. Smith was given to summarising: he was very concerned to make clear what he understood was said, promised, or proposed. Ian Forbes, however, found fault with his chairpersonship style. Forbes, in an interview I recorded in the car one day, felt that although Smith made clear who was to do what, he failed to provide adequate structure to support those actions.

Apart from John Smith, the other high-ranking official was John Case, the Area Health Service nominee. John Case was the link between those present at the planning meetings and the higher bureaucracy. Case's middle management position is distinctly brought out by his positioning vis-à-vis the higher bureaucracy. His use of direct quotes construes hierarchy (see Chapter 5; cf Hodge, Kress & Jones 1979 on the language of middle management):

... they had about 15 million dollars or something and they said “look we can’t afford them all” (John Case, meeting 15/2/95).

John Case was not the organiser, but rather the watchdog: making sure that enough detail went into the PDP, that everybody was clear about the financial and scheduling constraints, that PDP estimates were not going to “present any surprises”, and that the users were not going to get away with too many costly concessions. Later in the consultancy (meetings 4 and 5) Case would be accompanied by Wendy McGuirk also from AHS, and still later by Anne Taylor, representative from the Department of Health. These were the people who would be lobbying at their respective departments for whatever it seemed was needed to get the project off the ground (it was felt that costs were going to be around $3.5 million), while at the same time reassuring themselves that the planning process was one of agreement and satisfaction on the part of all involved.

On one occasion Ian Forbes was not able to attend the Liverpool meeting (meeting 3, 15/3/95) and Mary Potter went for him. Case had not been introduced to Potter and halfway during the meeting
he could not contain his dissatisfaction in the face of Potter’s questioning of protocol and procedure:

MP- So should I should I talk to you about ..., these things then, will you get back to me then or shall I communicate with you, about this, about ...?
JC- Oh, there’s too many players in this, I thought Ian Forbes was writing the PDP
MP- Oh sorry, I’m, I work with JTWCForbes

Although Smith was the Project Manager and directly responsible for the success of the exercise, Case took it upon himself to signal to Forbes that in order to maintain sincerity relations (cf. Forester 1993a: 144ff) he would have to show up and finish off the exercise which he had begun. Where Smith had assumed the role of organiser, Case was here construing himself as watchdog over the integrity of the process.

As the PDP was nearing completion, i.e. after a lot of negotiation about staff salaries, type of duress alarm, entrance design, the installation of a toilet in the secure zone, Smith was trying to prepare those who had contributed to the document for the “signing-off” moment. He had initially hoped to get everybody to sign it off round the end of April, but this did not happen until the end of May 1995. When it finally happened it was quite momentous (meeting 5, 5/4/95):

JS- Ok. Shall we agree that eh I sign it as a true and accurate record?

This statement wrapped up months of meetings, negotiations, faxes, phonecalls, worries, and disagreements. Those present must have been aware that they were now placed in a position to defend its contents against anybody who questioned them: it bound them for the foreseeable future to room sizes and space allocations, to structural designs and technological solutions, and to costings and deadlines. Everybody had had their say, or at least everybody who mattered, and insofar as they had had the time or inclination to say anything. Somehow the reduction in the available budget was never negotiated (although perhaps Dr Clarke, the hospital psychiatrist and managing director, was doing so in silence, perhaps biding his time until promotion). And the way the final meeting was construed was that everybody must have left feeling that justice had been done.

In Chapter 6 I will reassess the practice of planning as bureaucratic process in the light of the analyses and proposals of this thesis. Here, I have limited myself to largely the
'commonsense' view of things. Those comments, as well as the thesis in general, will be largely grounded in the detailed analyses of meetings 1 and 3, with minor references to the other meetings and interviews which I recorded. Although I will only present analyses of these two meetings, my work on the other meetings and interviews will bear on what I say. I will try to make these generalisations explicit when I get to them. What remains now is to assess how representative this project is of the bureaucratic process in general (and, foreshadowing Chapter 6), how relevant to it, and to describe my own place/role in all this.

4.3 'Observing the Process of Planning': Describing 'Reality' or Devising Tools for Considering Things under a Different Aspect?

Saville-Troike points out that "in observing group dynamics in a meeting or other gathering, it is generally better for a marginally accepted observer to refrain from taking active part in the proceedings" (Saville-Troike 1982: 123). I took no active part in the proceedings, but there were occasions when I became the focus of attention. The first time this happened because those present at the first meeting wanted to know what that black mouse-like thing was in front of me (my microphone), and later merely because speakers (only John Case and John Smith referred to this) wanted to know whether we were still 'on air'.

I have no doubt that my being present at the planning meetings had some kind of effect. I mean, the meetings might have been rowdier, more heated, and might have seen less 'show-off' had I not been there. I have no way of knowing. But then those were details I was not primarily interested in anyway. I wanted to find out how a bureaucratic process got from talk to all the kinds of momentous things which bureaucracies do: control and govern populations, build infrastructures, produce and enforce laws, policies and regulations, and provide the site for social consolidation and contestation. Whatever the resources which my presence elided or introduced, those present had to get from A to B, so I thought I was not going to end up empty-handed, whatever took place.

I was introduced to stakeholders as Mr Forbes' research assistant attached to the School of Health Services Management. I explained I was doing an in-depth study of Ian Forbes' planning discourse, so I needed to have him on tape for analysis. When everybody understood I was there to 'observe' Ian, not them, they relaxed.
Now, almost 18 months later, I admit that I ‘observed’ the others as much as I can to make sense of what was going on. But the word ‘observe’ has fallen into disrepute. ‘Objective observation’ entails the assumption that it is possible to disengage oneself from the ‘object(s)’ of investigation. The crisis that term is currently in originates with Kant who showed that all knowing relies on apriori categories (C. Taylor 1995: 27). Post-structuralist challenges to Cartesian-Hobbesian modes of ‘objectivity’, ‘disengagement’, and their resultant ‘grand narratives’ (Derrida 1978b; Lyotard 1984; cf. also Harvey 1989, Bauman 1978, 1992; Docker 1994; Bertens 1995) threw investigative research into a ‘legitimation crisis’.

While the Cartesian-Hobbesian standpoint was to read disengagement into the very nature of mind, the post-structuralist standpoint was (is?) to reject disengagement as a ‘metaphysics of presence’. The paradoxical thing of this stance is that in rejecting ‘objectivity’ and ‘disengagement’ as effects of mind-body dualisms, the possibility of any form of disengagement (including its own post-structuralist stance) is denied. While Descartes gave disengagement ontological status, the post-structuralists deny disengagement any status whatsoever, something which Taylor refers to as “an unmitigated disaster” (C. Taylor 1985a: 10; also Norris 1982: 129ff).

Accepting Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s notions of the background (or ‘Lebensform’) from within which we speak and act (Edwards 1990; C. Taylor 1995), the conception of total disengagement becomes incongruous and self-contradictory.

All intelligibility is engaged, and it is unnecessary to presuppose otherwise. ‘Engaged’ here is to be taken in both the Kantian (semiotic) sense, of knowledge being possible on the basis of apriori categories, as well as in the Heideggerian-Wittgensteinian sense, of all doing and saying occurring against a background of bodily intelligibility. For the latter two thinkers, the embodied becomes primary, and the categorised, the articulated, secondary: “the world of the agent is shaped by one’s form of life, or history, or bodily existence” (C. Taylor 1985a: 62). Our embodied engagement determines whether we can negotiate objects easily (those which ‘lie to hand’) or not (those which are ‘out of reach’). “To understand what it is to ‘lie to hand’ you have to understand what it is to be an agent with the particular bodily capacities that humans have” (C. Taylor 1985a: 62).

Articulating aspects of this embodied world is not impossible, or contradictory; on the contrary, it is precisely and only possible due
to and from within this shared background (or 'form of life'; Wittgenstein 1953: §23). Thus, the possibility of 'bringing to articulation', not founded on the illusion of total disengagement, or of ever reaching total articulation, is reinstated:

The paradoxical status of the background can then be appreciated. It can be made explicit, because we aren't completely aware of it. But the explicating itself supposes a background. The very fashion in which we operate as engaged agents within such a background makes the prospect of total explicating incoherent. The background can't in this sense be thought of quantitatively at all. (C. Taylor 1995: 70; cf. Garfinkel 1967: 73 on the 'etcetera clause')

In fact, articulation “is central to the innovative force” (C. Taylor 1985a: 75) of any pursuit. Articulation is necessary to counter “the hold of the disengaged ['objectivist'] view on our thought and culture, which has a lot to do, of course, with the hegemony of institutions and practices that require and entrench a disengaged stance” (C. Taylor 1985a: 75). It therefore has “a certain counter-cultural significance, an inherent thrust against the hegemonic forms of our time” (C. Taylor 1985a: 76). As long as it is acknowledged that “bringing to articulation still supposes a background” (C. Taylor 1985a: 69), these articulations will be seen for what they are: attempts at seeing common understandings under a different aspect.

The aim is to show that grasping things as neutral objects is one of our possibilities only against the background of a way of being in the world in which things are disclosed as ready to hand. Grasping things neutrally requires modifying our stance to them, which primitively has to be one of involvement. (C. Taylor 1985a: 73)

Bourdieu says similar things in a rather more mystifying way. In his critique of objectifying and disengaged kinds of investigation, he warns that the observatory practice which aims “to mark a break with the representations that agents claim to give of their own practice” (Bourdieu 1992: 250) often forgets “that we need to bring back into the scientific model the fact that the objective representation of practice had to be constructed against the primary experience of practice” (Bourdieu 1992: 250). It is naïve to take the primary objectification of practices as the endpoint of research, so a secondary objectification of the research practices themselves is necessary:
the *demi-habile* who trusts scholarly common-sense forgets to return to the primary experience that scholarly construction had to bracket and to set aside. ... In sum, it does not suffice to break with ordinary common sense, or with scholarly common sense in its ordinary form. We must also break with the instruments of rupture which negate the very experience against which they have been constructed. (Bourdieu 1992: 250/1; his italics)

How do we break with our own 'instruments of rupture', our own tools of objectification? We must

build more complete models, models which encompass both the primary naïveté and the objective truth that this naïveté conceals and at which the *demi-hables*, those who think they are smarter than everybody else, stop by falling for another form of naïveté. (Bourdieu 1992: 251)

This is a less positive, and more mystifying way (than that of Taylor's) of saying that the 'background' from within which I investigate must be seen as the condition for any kind of intelligibility (bodily, intellectually) which I achieve. More worryingly, the implication is too that 'more complete models' (note the scientistic mystique implied here) will overcome the dilemma of being a situated and engaged agent. I wonder if Bourdieu is suggesting here that an exhaustive account of background is actually possible (by those who are capable of generating 'more complete models').

I have always seen my work as directly springing from my own 'context(s) of intelligibility'. My reason for doing the kind of work that makes up this thesis is therefore explicitly and politically motivated: I have always felt disadvantaged in the face of technological talk, political talk, bureaucratic talk (i.e. the "hegemony of bureaucratic-technical reason in our lives", C. Taylor 1995: 78), and I have always seen as one of my tasks the deconstruction (in the sense of 'putting in crisis'; Norris 1982: 148) of these discourses. My main purpose in this thesis is to show how the now draws on the past, how control mobilises power, and how talk relates to structure (both institutional and physical), to achieve a deconstruction of those practices which structure our social lives, and to highlight the ways in which talk contributes to (institutional and physical) structure.

Bourdieu at least acknowledges that "sociology ... must first 'give new eyes'" (Bourdieu 1992: 251). For him, as for Taylor, the
fundamental norm of investigative practice is the "conversion of thought, the revolution of the gaze" (Bourdieu 1992: 251/2). This attempt to 'see under a different aspect' is precisely what drives my description (in Wittgenstein's sense of seeing the duck as a rabbit or vice versa, versus seeing that the representation can be seen under different 'aspects'; Wittgenstein 1953: 194*): instead of seeing (institutional or physical) structure as natural and obvious, I aim to show where that structure originates, namely in everyday interaction as it contributes to the morphogenesis or schismogenesis of the social.

Bourdieu strongly emphasises the embodied (as do Heidegger and Wittgenstein) and warns that the seeing under a different aspect may touch 'the deepest dispositions of the habitus', thereby foregrounding the worst case scenario for those demi-habiles who invest too much credence in uninvestigated or outdated beliefs and assumptions (cf. his comments on the degree of 'fit' between the habitus and the objective field; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 131):

Mais la souffrance que le dévoilement scientifique, en dépit de tout ce qu'il peut avoir de libérateur, suscite parfois, trouve aussi son principe dans le fait que le capital culturel a pour propriété spécifique d'exister à l'état incorporé, sous forme de schèmes de perception et d'action, de principes de vision et de division, de structures mentales. (Bourdieu 1989: 14)

Thus, the seeing/showing of things under a different aspect may cause suffering due to investment of the habitus in a form of life which excludes such (different) aspect.

I do not have any such Bourdieu-an illusions of 'grandeur' about the impact of the work presented here, but I do hope that the insistence which drove this thesis, of wanting to show how the now and the past are interwoven in both the linguistic and material resources around us, adds tools and resources to the ongoing demystification and negotiation of institutional practice and process, and of the incongruous worldviews of disengagement and monologism which undergird them.

The next Chapter, Chapter 5, will present an analysis of the interactions as I recorded them during the first half of 1995. I will also draw on things Ian told me in the car, on post-meeting 'raves' which I was fortunate enough to record as we drove home after meetings, and on discussions I taped between Associate Professor
Pieter Degeling, Ian Forbes, Mary Potter, and myself. In the main, the analyses aim to put the resources which I set up in Chapter 3 to use. Chapter 6 will summarise this effort and reassess planning 'under a different aspect'.