Interactional Dynamics and Social Change: Planning as Morphogenesis

Roderick Aren Michael Iedema

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Department of Linguistics University of Sydney

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Rick A.M. Iedema
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Abstract

This thesis looks at social interaction from the point of view of social-institutional process. In doing so, it aims to account for i) how broader institutional processes are instantiated in local interaction, and ii) how western technologisation (in the Foucaultian sense) relates to or is instantiated in local interaction.

This thesis makes the claim that the overall drift of the bureaucratic process is to ‘con-textualise’ or to naturalise that which has been or needs to be seen to be agreed on, and which can thus be placed beyond negotiation. Thus, this process is, first, a device aimed at managing meaning (with a view to containing and controlling non-meaning or ‘noise’), and second, a process aimed at re-semioticising (new integrations of) meaning with a view to prevent its (re)negotiation.

The description is modelled, first, on the recontextualisation inherent in grammatical metaphor (Halliday 1985/94: §10). The description of recontextualisation is extended beyond language to include extra-linguistic recontextualisations or ‘re-semiotisations’ (cf. ‘inter-semioticity’; Jakobson 1971a). Second, the description is modelled on the coding-identifying process used (by Halliday and Davidson) to typify the grammar. This process sets up a relation of identity between a ‘token’ and a betokened or ‘value’, and that relation is seen as obtaining between the various stages of the planning project studied, leading from somatic to extra-somatic realisations. Each of the ‘identifications’ requires hegemonic ‘work’ for their social validation.

‘Work’ manifests itself as ‘redundancy’, or as the relatively predictable association of actions and meanings. For such ‘work’ to retain its relevance, it needs to remain sensitive to alternative associations of meanings and actions (‘symmetry breakings’). While a lack of sensitivity may result in entropy, sensitivity to new meanings will manifest itself as ‘morphogenesis’, or ‘the elaboration of new structures’ (Wilden 1980: 140). Morphogenesis is shown to take place linguistically, as grammatical metaphor, as well as extra-linguistically, as re-semiotisation.

This thesis also addresses another kind of change: ‘transaction’. This is the progressive amplification of contradiction and opposition, and, rather than achieving consensual and abstract meta-meaning (‘de-differentiation’) as in the case of morphogenesis, it spirals into a proliferation of incompatible meaning makings (‘differentiation’).
Chapter 1  Describing Social Change on the Basis of Interactional Data: Morphogenesis

In and through the work in space, social practice transcends the limitations by which other 'signifying practices'... are bound; in this way a consensus, a profound agreement is achieved. (Lefebvre 1991: 222)

1.0 Introduction

This thesis describes a bureaucratic planning process which achieves among its stakeholders the kind of "profound agreement" which Lefebvre refers to. The description proceeds from the perspective of the interactions that constitute the process, but aims to account for these in terms of its macro-institutional contexts and intertexts. Thus, rather than being concerned with interaction as a phenomenon that purely involves individuals speaking and acting on the basis of intentions and expectations (cf. Schiffrin 1990, 1994), I consider interaction here in the light of prevailing institutional (discursive and actional) practice.

I began this study as an extension of research I had been doing for the Write It Right project (Disadvantaged Schools Program Metropolitan East Sydney Region) which focused on workplace literacies. The last stage of that research dealt with the textual practices of the administrative/bureaucratic workplace; the results of that research are written up in Ledema 1994/6. That report mainly looks at the text types and the linguistic features which workers in administrative-bureaucratic situations routinely deal with in formal interaction. What was needed to complete that research, I felt, was an account of the bureaucratic process itself within which these texts were actually produced, mobilised, contested, and recontextualised. That is what I seek to do in the research presented in this thesis.

The bureaucratic process focused on here is a planning project concerning a considerable renovation of a mental hospital in Sydney's south-west. The ethnographic details of the project are written up in Chapter 4. My focus on institutional process, rather than on the state of 'administrative literacy' as in Ledema 1994/6, carries several consequences for the nature of my analysis. I will both be detailing the micro-interactions which I attended (i.e. the planning meetings) in linguistic-semiotic terms and account for
how these interactions are representative of the bureaucratic process as talked about by organisation theorists like Pettigrew, Degeling and others. Moreover, I want to link those considerations to accounts of socio-cultural change by writers like Foucault, Giddens and others. My ultimate aim is to link micro-analysis to sociological notions of bureaucratic practice and cultural-technological change in general (as encouraged by Lemke, among others; Lemke 1985a, 1995a).

As a consequence, I am concerned with doing a kind of micro-interactional analysis that will link into the broader sociological notions of social change and technologisation. To do this I will draw on information theoretical concepts, some of which have currency in functional linguistic modelling (i.e. ‘redundancy’), and on others which have not (e.g. ‘morphogenesis’, ‘schismogenesis’). These concepts will enable me to deal with the planning project both as social process made up of time-space located interactions, and as ‘dynamic open system’ in which meaning is progressively transfigured, or ‘re-semioticised’ over time. To achieve this ‘micro-macro’ view I will present an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of particular meetings, and link this to a longitudinal description of the whole project.

To unite these in-depth analyses of talk and the longitudinal-ethnographic descriptions I draw on a modelling ‘principle’ used in systemic-functional linguistics: the coding-identifying relation in its various sub-types and manifestations. I use this principle to describe how people position themselves dynamically in talk (‘positioning types’) as well as to reason about the different consequences of particular positionings: change, or stasis. This relational principle, itself drawn from the grammar of ordinary English (Davidse 1991, 1992b, 1996a), provides the means here of linking modes of talk to social change.

Moreover, this strategy will enable me to assess the role of planning within bureaucratic process from a theoretical viewpoint. Planning is talked about in postmodern planning theory in terms of a narrativisation of a specific ‘frame of reference’: e.g. an economic narrative; a user narrative, or a technology expert narrative (Forester 1989, 1993a/b; Fisher & Forester 1993a; Healey 1992, 1993; Roe 1994). While much of that strand of planning theory takes a Habermasian stand encouraging rationality over politics, I will align myself with those who recognise that planning occurs in settings dominated by “ongoing [institutional] dramas” where kinds of rationalities and political allegiances will be both defended and contested (Degeling 1996).
I had the fortunate opportunity to immerse myself to a degree in the practice of planning with the kind assistance and generous elaborations offered by Ian Forbes, the architect-planner who is the protagonist of this thesis. It is with his help and time, as well as with Associate Professor Pieter Degeling's reflections and discussions on the nature of planning, that I was able to fathom some of the intricacies of Ian's constructive actions, and relate these to my own functional linguistic and semiotic analyses. It is on the basis of these reflections and systematicities that I hope to not so much propose a new view on the practice of planning, but place planning 'under a different aspect' (Wittgenstein 1953: 193c; see Chapter 6).

1.1 Describing Change

Planning is, ostensibly, about changing the future. Although this thesis will question conceptions of planning as means to 'mapping the future', it acknowledges that bureaucratic planning plays a role in reconceiving existing modes of bureaucratic organisation.

Planning, I will argue, represents the catalyst crucially necessary to the process of bureaucratic hegemonisation. If bureaucratic power were realised on the basis of stasis and stability alone (i.e. routinised practices, disciplinary restrictions on organisational behaviour, 'work' as a coordinator of action), then it would not be sensitive to the enormous amount of social change currently taking place. Survival of bureaucracy's dominant meanings, or its 'code', depends on its sensitivity to new meanings; to non-meanings. I am referring here as much to local councils planning residential infrastructures, as to nation states planning educational and health strategies for their increasingly multicultural population mix. Planning, I will argue, provides the means par excellence to integrating as-yet-uncodified meanings into the dominant code, and thus to ensuring the hegemony of the prevailing bureaucratic power.

Change, following that view, is not so much something that occurs or will occur in the future. Rather, it is what is presently negotiated and brought about in planning settings on the strength of the varying insistences of new (non-) meanings. I argue that for these changes to achieve edification and thence to 'take effect', they need to be recontextualised. Recontextualisation, in this context, is the means to 'fixing' events, agreements, and changes, through re-presentation. As an example I could mention the Minutes of the Meetings (see Chapter 5, section 5.3) which
recontextualise the talk, and depending on whether the Minutes are passed at the next meeting they stand as a “true and accurate record” of what was said, in spite of specific individuals’ reservations, ignorances and indifferences. Recontextualisation will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

This thesis takes the view that semiosis is essentially multimodal (Kress & van Leeuwen 1996; Preziosi 1979b, 1984). It will focus on meaning realised as talk, writing, design, and physical structure. My concern, as mentioned above, is to provide a bridge between the details of interaction and their macro-institutional relevance, and to dissect and explain the genesis of (social) ‘structure’ - whether it mobilises linguistic, diagrammatic, or architectural-physical resources.

This kind of perspective involves, and here I draw on Basil Bernstein’s terms (see Chapter 2, section 2.3), a focus on the process where ‘framing’ becomes, affects, or mobilises modes of ‘classification’.

Change is therefore a focal issue in this thesis. It assumes that if change occurs, its seeds must be sewn in everyday interaction. It also assumes that if change occurs, it will affect macro-social orders of organisation. Without wanting to confuse individual development with systemic evolution (Wilden 1980: 330; Edelman 1992: 51), we need to be able to talk about the specific in terms of the general. Edelman’s neuro-Darwinist project is to “show how development ... is related to evolution” (Edelman 1992: 51); the project presented here focuses on how interactional development is related to institutional, and ultimately, social, evolution. My area of interest is meaning as largely but not solely realised linguistically.

The institutional evolution at stake in the planning project under focus concerned the renovation of a mental hospital. The bureaucratic process aimed at integrating a variety of salient intertexts (financial constraints, governmental regulations, user and service requirements, architectural and technological restrictions) into a workable consensus (a ‘Project Definition Plan’, henceforth ‘PDP’), and use that as the basis for the physical implementation of the renovation project. In practice, this meant dealing with a variety of voices each of which draws on various intertexts, and realises both ‘objectified history’, or “the history which has accumulated over the passage of time in things, machines, buildings, monuments, books, theories, customs, law, etc.” (Bourdieu 1981: 305) and ‘embodied history’, i.e. ‘habitus’
(Bourdieu 1981: 305) or positioning. These voices needed to be brought together in one meta-voice: the newly conceived, or morphogenetic, outcome of the integration of different voices and their intertexts into a new, and dominant voice.

The description offered in Chapters 4 and 5 makes clear that the dominant, or integrating, voice, is that of bureaucratic power: the centre of financial resource allocation. This voice, however, is regulated (by law and governmental-departmental policy) to be “needs driven ... with a strong customer focus” (NSW Dept. of Health Process of Facility Planning Manual, 1993: 1). This departmental regulation prescribes the formal involvement of the ultimate ‘users’ of the planned facilities (i.e. the doctors, managers, nurses - but not patients!). This involvement consists of both (spoken, faxed) input to the planning meetings and thus to the Project Definition Plan (PDP) referred to above, and ‘signing off’ (a kind of ‘validating’) the resultant document, the PDP.

In Chapter 5 I will detail some of the ways in which these various voices interacted dynamically during the meetings, as well as how, ultimately, ‘agreements’ were reached. But, as said, my focus is on how such dynamic interaction realises bureaucratic process, and what that process consists in. My main question is, in other words, what exactly is this bureaucratic process which involves meetings, minutes, reports, expert discourses, timetabled project stages, and rituals like ‘signing off documents’ and ‘putting briefs out to tender’. My answer to this question is contained in the next five chapters.

The next section of this introductory chapter looks briefly at the ways in which change has been addressed in the literature. This then provides me with a springboard into Chapter 2, where I will consider specific authors who play a role in the formulation of the present problematic, and who provide me with crucial resources to address it. Chapter 3 extends this discussion and proposes the application of a linguistic tool, the coding-identifying relation, to the description of social change.

1.2 Theories of Change

Social change has been and is amply addressed in the sociological and philosophical literature (as ‘sociogenesis’; Weber 1948/91; Elias 1982; Foucault 1977; Habermas 1979; Giddens 1981a, 1984, 1985; Harvey 1989; Bauman 1992). Change at the level of language has been under focus in both social psychology, as well as functional linguistics and in broader areas of communication
theory and discourse analysis (as ‘phylogenesis’; e.g. Mead 1934/67; Halliday 1993a-f; Habermas 1987; Goody 1977, 1987; Street 1984; Fairclough 1992, 1994). A further focus has been on change at the level of (the linguistic development of) the individual (‘ontogenesis’; Vygotsky 1986; Halliday 1975; Painter 1991). And in recent linguistic theory change has been studied at the level of the development of the individual text or interaction (‘logogenesis’; e.g. M. O’Donnell 1990; Seifon 1995; Matthessen in prep.).

The central concern of these historical perspectives on social interaction in general and language in particular is the phenomenon of change affecting systems over time. Sociogenesis reasons about changes and disjunctions that affected social forms of organisation (e.g. how feudalism gave way to capitalism and the nation-state; cf. Elias, 1982; Giddens 1981a/b, 1984, 1985, 1990). Phylogenesis theorises about the ways whole systems of language have changed and are changing (e.g. the vowel shift: cf. de Saussure 1983; or changes in the status of English ‘Theme’: Halliday 1977, 1992a, 1993a; Davidse 1992c; M. Davies 1996). Ontogenesis focusses on how an individual’s linguistic repertoire changes (e.g. how the child moves from protolanguage into adult language; cf. Halliday 1975; Painter 1991, 1993). Finally, logogenetic analyses focus on the changing ‘states’ of implicated systems while texts unfold as instances of language use.

These genetic perspectives enable theorists to reason about (the effects of) time on systems and on the structures that instantiate those systems. Within the social constructionist literature in particular (e.g. Schutz 1962; Berger & Luckmann 1966; Goffman 1963; Harré 1981; Giddens 1984; Shotter 1993, among others) there is fierce debate over the degree to which and the ways in which macro-level change is grounded in micro-level interaction and/or vice versa (Bhaskar 1989b; Archer 1982, 1995a/b; Giddens 1981, 1984; Manicas 1993; see Section 2.4). Yet the use of details of situated interaction in these arguments is rare if not non-existent.

This thesis adheres to the view that discussions about change in general need to be complemented with details of everyday interaction. This I think will give a better insight into what and how much actually changes in the course of particular interactions. It will also give insight into what is recapitulated; i.e. the structures or ‘classifications’ which we take for granted in interaction and on which we draw for resources.
At an abstract level, Anthony Wilden (1980) theorises about change as being a learning made possible by metacommunication. Thus, change affects ecosocial systems whose

\[\text{[m]aturation or learning over time according to the possibilities contained in the ‘instructions’ or the ‘program’ of a system (e.g. the genes) involves a continuous temporal metacommunication about antecedent states (Wilden 1980: 354).}\]

This thesis sets itself the task to provide an explicit account of such ‘learning over time’, and thus of how one kind of change occurs in the institutional context and intertext, and of the consequences of that change. Crucial here is the diachronic perspective on interaction, and a focus on meaning as it is reconstituted or re-semioticised (its ‘trace’; cf. Wilden 1980: 399).

I do not take generically delimited forms of interaction as my point of entry (e.g. ‘meetings’, ‘spoken exchanges’), but a dynamic institutional process which involved a range of participants, locales, and resources, a certain duration (several months), and which had specific institutional goals (see Chapter 4). The interactions will therefore not be studied as various occurrences of the same type of interaction, but as interactions that form part of an institutional sequence and which are construed as being infused with institutional telos.

1.3 Change in Systemic-Functional Theory

This thesis will make use of the systemic-functional view on meaning making. This involves modelling meaning making as essentially paradigmatic, stratified, and as metafunctional. These issues will be further detailed in Chapter 2, section 2.6.

While these various aspects of its theory are crucial for what I am trying to do in this thesis, I feel that the ways the theory has talked about change need to be complemented with a description that i) unites sociogenesis, phylogensis, and logogenesis and ii) takes a multi-modal perspective on meaning making. This will involve tracing micro-interactions over time, and tracking the nature of the social process(es) which they realise. Although such is not part of this project, Harré’s work on the self as dynamic interactional positioning practice would provide a means to slot ontogenesis into this picture as well (Harré 1981, 1989, 1991; Harré & Gillett 1994; also Shotter & Gergen 1989; Shotter 1993; Potter & Wetherell 1987; Billig 1991b).
Within systemic-functional theory, change is generally spoken about as a tension in the 'dialectic' between system and instantiation. In this view, process instantiates system and thereby perturbs it; systemic change occurs through marginal deviations (deliberately or accidentally) embodied in the instantiation.

This is the 'instantiation' referred to earlier, whereby each instance (which means, in this context, each utterance accepted by and produced by the individual) perturbs the probabilities of the system (Halliday 1994 mimeo: 18).

This seems to suggest that “[c]hange, in its potentiality, is thus inherent in all moments of social [linguistic] reproduction ... [and] systemic malleability is not only high but is constant over time” (Archer 1982: 466).

On the other hand, the systemic literature talks about 'grammatical systems', 'registers' (Halliday 1985), and 'genres' (Martin 1985, 1992), each term of which points towards aspects of relative stability in the area of linguistic meaning making. It would seem, therefore, that meaning making is described here as an issue involving both constant change and kinds of recapitulation. One could ask, then, how and in what respects particular instances of meaning making actually perturb and recapitulate 'systems' (cf. Kress' 1997 emphasis on meaning making as 'design').

Looking from the 'systems' end, Anthony Wilden makes clear that the lower the degree of constraint a system comprises, the higher its diversity and complexity, the higher its semiotic freedom, and the higher the likelihood of change (Wilden 1987: 77/168). That would suggest that certain aspects of interaction are less susceptible to change, because they are less semiotically 'free', than others.

The following therefore become viable research questions: where does change take place in interaction, how does it take place, and why and where does it take place less? With an eye on its the multiple levels of complexity, we should be able to describe an interaction and specify, for the various levels, the nature and extent of change.

In Chapter 5, I will detail changes that take place from turn to turn in dynamic spoken interaction. I will then show that these
interactional dynamics follow a principle that governs the
logogenetic drift of the overall project. I will argue that change, in
this case, involves alternative metaphorical-material realisations
of particular meanings and positionings. The overall ‘logogenetic’
drift is towards an increasingly extra-somatic and durable
materiality: the organisation of social space.

1.4 Change as Technologisation: Morphogenesis

My focus will be on this logogenetic process of increasing
materiality. The kind of change that is at issue here, then,
concerns the bureaucratically engineered shift from talk to more
durable realisations of meaning. As such, meanings may end up as
structuring contexts for subsequent talk and action, and are
themselves for that very reason less easily negotiable and
changeable. Logically then, certain realisations will prove to be
more resistant to change than others.

Some properties can be changed relatively quickly (tax
rules), some take longer to change (demographic or
knowledge distributions), some prove highly resistant to
change (bureaucracy, gender distinctions, ethnicity), and
some are unchangeable (exhausted natural resources or
environmental ruin). (Archer 1982: 462)

These realisations are generally enabled by particular
technologies which humankind has developed to de-
temporise, or fix, aspects of our own ‘forms of life’ (Foucault 1977:
221). Technologies comprise meaning makings which have
undergone extensive recontextualisation and transfiguration, and
which bear on subsequent generations:

Evolution in society, culture and history ... is Lamarckian,
based on the inheritance of acquired characteristics: the
discoveries, innovations, and inventions of one generation
are passed to the next. (Wilden 1987: 76)

Technologies include routinised forms of behaviour, e.g.
bureaucratic actions carried out according to plans or procedures,
but also the fossilised resources which make those routinised
forms of behaviour possible in the first place: language, physical
infrastructure, buildings, electronic technology, and so on. Each of
these ‘technologised systems’ represents the product of
recontextualised systems of talk and action, and each is relatively
resistant to change, depending on the situational (and cultural?)
context in which changes are proposed or enacted. Furthermore,
subsequent generations tend to take these extra-somatic and
durable meanings for granted: they become embodied (Bourdieu
1994: 13/4; see Section 5.3).

I will argue in this thesis that a logic other than constant and
ubiquitous change underlies and structures social interaction, and
that certain (semiotic) systems are less open to change than
others.

I foreshadowed the main aspects of my argument above, and I
will elaborate these here in slightly more detail. For particular
meanings to prevail, and for particular actional and discursive
regularities to persist as 'social formations' they recontextualise, or
re-semiotise. This, I think, enables them to keep ahead
of the constant change that is inherent in their nature. I therefore
propose that recontextualisation (cf. Bernstein 1990; v. Leeuwen
1993), or more accurately, re-semiotisation (to allow for both
intra- and extra-linguistic recontextualisations), provides a means
of 'control over change'. Its control is never absolute, of course:
recontextualisation (re-semiotisation) is merely an approximation
of stasis; it never accomplishes stasis. Even the strongest
structures (laws, concrete buildings) are subject to all kinds of
contestation and erosion over time. In the meantime, however,
these structures provide a structuring context for ongoing action.

In general, the recontextualisation of linguistic, and, more
generally, semiotic, resources involves their shift from one context
to another; e.g. from the laboratory to the classroom, from the
planning meeting to the architectural design, from a formal to an
informal register, from authoritative talk to facilitative talk, from
modality to transitivity, from tonicity to rhythm, and so on. This is
essentially a 'transfiguration' from relatively temporary or
ephemeral (because congruent and 'somatic' and therefore more
easily negotiable) resources into relatively durable or lasting
('extra-somatic') resources.

This process of recontextualisation into increasingly lasting
resources I call 'morphogenesis'. Morphogenesis has been
defined in the sociological literature as "those processes which
tend to elaborate or change a system's given form, structure or
state" (Buckley 1967: 58-9). Morphogenesis in this context refers
to "the structural elaboration [of systems which] carries over to
future time, providing new contexts for subsequent interaction"
(Archer 1982: 458). Thus, the perspective here is on those aspects
of interaction which achieve and maintain relative stability and
prominence as a result of change.
The resultant 'objectified histories' (Bourdieu 1981: 305) may act as resources for our everyday interactions. Our roads and railway lines, being the outcome of specific interactional agreements on what constitutes acceptable meanings and doings, will constrain our comings and goings in more or less rigid and lasting ways. A striking example of how decisions can 'structure' forms of life is that of the decision to regulate window height in Amsterdam houses to prevent 'inappropriate' communications from those windows across the canals. Accordingly, windows were built sufficiently high up in walls to prevent people from leaning out and calling out to each other. Here, bureaucratic policy provided the basis for non-negotiable behavioural constraints imposed on citizens (van Leeuwen, p.c.; see Section 5.3 below).

To minimise conflict in the bureaucratic sphere, governmental regulations prescribe that planning projects are to be carried out, not by the bureaucrats of the relevant departments or branches which provide the funding, but by external planner-consultants, to ensure 'users' of the planned facilities get a fair hearing. So there is a clear division of labour: the government bureaucrats 'represent' the prevailing system of meanings - their role is the propagation and implementation of agreements or settled meanings. In other words, they ensure the system's 'redundancy'. By contrast, planner consultants 'represent' the catalysts that enable the prevailing system to cope with and co-opt alternative meanings. It is they who effectively achieve 'morphogenesis'.

In short, morphogenesis is not change as a result of increasing complexification or differentiation. Rather, morphogenesis concerns the 'elaboration of new structures' in the interest of the dominant system (Maruyama 1963, cited in Wilden 1980: 140).

1.5 Morphogenesis and De-differentiation

Morphogenesis effects the inclusion of new meanings through a meta-morphosis of old meanings:

instead of maintaining stability by homeostatic resistance to noise, [the system] will seek to maintain stability by accepting noise, by incorporating it as information, and moving to a new level of organisation (evolving) (Wilden 1980: 410).

Morphogenesis can thus be generalised as being the process that resolves differences: these 'resolutions' do not remain at the same
level of organisation (or 'logical typing') as the original differences - this would leave them open to (re)negotiation. Morphogenesis crucially involves the reconstitution of such resolutions at new levels of organisation. The planner's final report, which includes the agreements and specifications put forward by the parties involved during the project, is in the written mode. It is printed onto paper and multiplied, and this enshrines particular meanings in a new materiality. Rituals surround this re-semiotisation: to infuse the report with legality and validity, it is signed off 'as a true and accurate record' and it becomes the stepping stone for the next stage of the project.

I propose that bureaucratic processes will morphogenesise away from difference. This process involves, first, at the level of language, nominalisation and abstraction ('grammatical metaphor'; Halliday 1985/94: §10). These 'shifts', as I will show, remove the interaction from here-and-now specifics into a domain where knowledge of such specifics is either assumed or strategically backgrounded. Beyond language, such shift may remove 'meaning' from the explicit medium of language into the 'iconic' medium of visual design (Sebeok 1994: 28), and from there into the 'indexical' domain of the built environment (Sebeok 1994: 32). Each shift involves the mobilisation of increasing amounts of extra-somatic resources and 'work'. I define 'work' as 'the cooperatively achieved reconstitution of matter/energy according to certain informational principles'. Morphogenesis construes increasing degrees of consensus, or non-difference, through work.

A parallel may be drawn with the process of 'de-linguistification' (Habermas 1987: 155/184). De-linguistification, in Habermas' account, is a kind of 'consensus formation' in media other than language (Habermas 1987: 184). It is the process whereby a certain meaning (difference) is recontextualised from one medium (e.g. language) to another (e.g. money, infra-structure). The less linguistically explicit nature of the de-linguistifying medium allows it to "connect up interactions in space and time into more and more complex networks that no one has to comprehend and be responsible for" (Habermas 1987: 184).

Significantly, de-linguistification requires, construes, or at least assumes, high levels of solidarity and cooperation. In highly solidary interactions and intimate contexts, explicitness, precision and specification tends to drop out of language (and semiosis in general) on the presumption that certain things need not be endlessly repeated. For example, Urdu as linguistic system favours the construction of a high degree of solidarity or intimacy. In
contrast to English, person reference in Urdu is subject to high
degrees of 'non-specificity' on the grounds that Urdu speakers
assume that what they say in conjunction with the context will
'speak for itself' (Hasan 1984: 145). Hasan gives the following
example (among many others; Table 1.1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urdu:</th>
<th>kehā</th>
<th>Gaeb</th>
<th>ho</th>
<th>gei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>literal translation:</td>
<td>where</td>
<td>disappear</td>
<td>become</td>
<td>went</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gloss:</td>
<td>find out where she disappeared to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1 Example of Urdu non-specificity (Hasan 1984: 145)

Hasan explains this high degree of 'imprecise' or unspecific person
reference by stating: "[It is by postulating a large consensus in the
picture of the role that we can explain the lack of ambiguity"
(Hasan 1984: 154). Only if participants agree on the positionings
and actions that are in play or can appropriately be put in play,
there will be no ambiguity.

[R]ole systems can vary in respect of how well defined their
boundaries are; i.e. how clearly established the rights and
obligations accruing to the role are. Obviously the more
determinate these boundaries, the less likely it is that
ambiguity will arise in social interaction. I am suggesting
that the role system for the community of Urdu speakers is
considerably more determinate than it is for the middle-
class English speaker. (Hasan 1984: 154)

So if semiotic implicitness or imprecision presumes, and probably
necessitates, a known and fixed background positionings and
actions, then the understanding of any text (i.e. the making of
difference) is only possible against a backdrop of this shared
'horizon' of practices and language games (cf. also Finegan & Biber
1994). If it seems that our own semiotic abstractions,
generalisations, and so on, display a high degree of
'indeterminacy', we cannot overlook the semiotic (discursive and
actional) regularities that make them possible.

' Linguistic difference', or text, in this view, may but be the tip of
the meaning-making iceberg. The resources and structures which
make interaction possible can then not be regarded as aspects of
'natural context', but must themselves be viewed as 'structured
and structuring structures' (Bourdieu 1994: 13). .

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1.6 Outline of this Thesis

Chapter 2 will present a summary of readings in various fields (educational sociology, information theory, systemic functional linguistics, and eco-social semiotics) and will highlight the tools which I intend to apply to the data gathered. Chapter 3 will propose a further set of tools, drawn from Halliday's grammatics and Davidse's elaboration of that theory. Chapter 4 presents the ethnographic details of the planning project which I attended, and specifies some of the bureaucratic intra-texts, inter-texts, and contexts. Chapter 5 goes into a detailed analysis of the meeting data, as well as of some of the broader aspects of the project. Chapter 6 presents a re-assessment of prevailing theories of planning in the light of the analysis offered, and links this to a consideration of the kinds of analysis used here.
Chapter 2  The Now and the Past: Review of the Literature

2.0 Introduction

This chapter will look at those areas of work which have contributed to or in other ways inspired the study presented here. I have arranged the discussions in order of detail in relation to my concerns. I will first deal with Critical Discourse Analysis and its contribution to the ‘sociologisation’ of discourse studies as practiced by Norman Fairclough. Important starting points for this thesis are Fairclough’s mobilisation of the Foucauldian focus on discourse formations and practices and on the relation between social positioning and discursive production, of Gramsci’s focus on how subjects are co-opted into hegemonic orders (Fairclough 1992: 91), and of Bakhtin’s and Kristeva’s notion of intertextuality.

In my discussion of Michel Foucault’s work I will highlight his concern with tracing the historical change that affected practices in relation to the ways in which those practices were either talked and written about (‘linguistified’) or naturalised (‘delineistified’). Foucault’s emphasis is on how the modification of social relations and behaviours affects both social space and the kinds of discourses that are judged appropriate within those spaces, that is the ‘mode of institutionalisation of practices’, and that perspective is of primary importance here. Also, Foucault’s non-conspiratorial view of power, and his subtle forms of social critique (which Habermas overlooks; Habermas 1994: 210), go beyond other critical approaches which often fail to adequately problematise the notions of power and ideology in relation to space and embodiment.

I will then address the issues that underpin Basil Bernstein’s theory of social production and reproduction. Bernstein’s focus is on the structured and structuring nature of both context (his ‘classification’, or power) and ongoing interaction (his ‘framing’, or control). He explicitly links those structured and structuring structures through a focus, not on micro-social individuals engaging with macro-social institutions, but on social interaction as participation in particular types of practices which implicate and premise particular social positionings, resources, and representations. Bernstein thereby acknowledges that “[s]ocial science cannot be successfully ideoclastic unless it can convincingly demonstrate how the macrosocial consequences of
domination arise in, and are maintained by, and produce effects at the level of, microsocial practices” (Lemke 1985a: 6).

Bernstein’s mode of social participation is a function of what he calls ‘code’ or ‘coding orientation’, which is another term for a participant’s meaning repertoire. Bernstein thereby seems to subscribe to the view that what constitutes self-hood are meanings, rather than feelings and intentions, which are commonsense imputations generated by the language which our culture uses to talk about individuality. The question of the relation between biological self (i.e. geographically located organism) and social self (i.e. morally located subjectivity; cf. Harré 1991, 1993; Harré & Gillett 1994) is generally not addressed in sociolinguistics (cf. Williams 1992, notably Labov 1972a/b/c; Labov & Fanshel 1977) nor in more discourse oriented work (cf. Taylor & Cameron 1987; notably Stubbs 1983, Schiffirn 1994, as well as the earlier work by the Birmingham group: Coulthard 1977, 1992, among others). I will assess the extent to which Bernstein is consistent in subscribing to the view that folk-theoretical conceptions about individuality need to be rejected in favour of a focus on practices, discourses and embodiments. This involves a critical evaluation of Bernstein’s attempt to correct the micro-macro misstep by means of his focus on previous and current boundary-makings (‘classification’ and ‘framing’ respectively).

Bernstein’s concern to overcome structure-action conceptualisations interfaces with the micro-macro debate that still dominates much of current sociology (Archer 1995a/b; Manicas 1993; New 1994; Porpora 1989; Outhwaite 1990; Juckes & Barresi 1993; Jessop 1996; Isaac 1990; Jary & Jary 1995, among others). To operationalise classification and framing for the purposes of this thesis, I need to align linguistic and sociological solutions to this problematic. Here I draw on Anthony Giddens’ work, and show how he has circumvented both micro-macro dualisms as well as structure-action dialectics. I will draw a comparison between Giddens’ views on modelling the social and Halliday’s social semiotic model. Using the sociologist’s arguments, and referring to Peter Manicas’ work, I will argue that the macro-micro duality needs to be regarded simultaneously as varying degrees of abstraction (both are ‘information’, or ‘meaning’) and as possessing different ontologies (they differ in matter/energy terms).

I will then focus on Anthony Wilden’s work within the sphere of information theory, communication and exchange (Wilden 1980,
Wilden's exposition on the difference between closed and
open systems enables a less mechanical and more dynamic view
on the ways in which interaction relates to social structure.

Wilden sees 'redundancy' as providing the basis for morphostasis
(Wilden 1980: 355): that is, a system maintaining itself by
recapitulating its semiotic/material alignments (Wilden 1980:
409). This would involve forms of interaction which confirm
rather than challenge such established alignments. In contrast to
this, 'morphogenesis' provides a means of talking about learning,
or the 'emergence of new structures' (Wilden 1980: 355; see
below), and this would implicate 'alternative' forms of interaction.
Both these notions will be related to the planning interactions
analysed in Chapter 5, and in particular to how 'redundant' state
power contracts out precisely those functions without which it
could not learn, or 'morphogenesise'. The dynamic perspective on
the interactional instantiation of redundancy and morphogenesis,
and on the transformations or 'recontextualisations' of particular
aspects of the interaction presented in Chapter 5 aims to provide
greater linguistic insight into the concepts of structure and action
(or classification and framing) as complementarities.

Finally, and most centrally, I will discuss the work done within
systemic functional linguistics and its extension into eco-social
semiotics. Halliday's social semiotic theory of language draws, first
of all, on the refreshingly de-cognitivising and de-essentialising
insights of Firth - who was on bar-going terms with Wittgenstein
and must have 'imbibed' at least some of the more crucial aspects
of the latter's *Philosophical Investigations*: its emphasis on social
action as being 'overdetermined' and therefore its disinterest in
Newtonian causality (cf. Wilden 1987: 78); its radical re-
evaluation of meaning in the light of language use and the concept
of 'language game'; its revolutionary statement on rules and 'rule
following', to name but some of the more salient (Wittgenstein
1953; Firth 1968: 179).

In what follows I will highlight especially those aspects of the
sources mentioned thus far which bear on the kind of description
of interaction promoted here.

2.1 Norman Fairclough and Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis, or CDA, finds its theoretical origins in a
Gramscian reworking of Althusserian marxism. It places
responsibility for the reproduction of (inequitable) social relations
not just in economic practices (the division of labour; the 'base')
but also in cultural practices (the family and education system; the ‘superstructure’; Fairclough & Wodak 1997), and sees subjects as constituted in orders of discourse and practice.

Concerned as it is about this reproduction of inequitable relations, CDA sets great store by intervening “on the side of dominated and oppressed groups and against dominating groups” (Fairclough & Wodak to appear: 1). As such, “it openly declares the emancipatory interests that motivate it” (Fairclough & Wodak to appear: 1). This politically oriented concern of CDA has materialised in insightful analyses of anti-semitic news items in Austria (Wodak et al 1990; Wodak & Matouschek 1993), of educational institutional relations (Wodak 1996), of media discourse (Fairclough 1995d), and of the marketization of academic discourses (Fairclough 1995c), to name but some examples.

I will take Norman Fairclough and his account of the genesis of CDA as my focal point. CDA finds its roots in the earlier ‘Critical Linguistics’ of the then East-Anglia linguists Gunther Kress, Bob Hodge, Tony Trew, and Roger Fowler (Fowler, Hodge, Kress & Trew 1979; Hodge & Kress 1979/93; cf. Fairclough 1992: 25). Critical Linguistics (CL) was concerned with the problematisation of syntactic aspects in the light of their political, or ‘ideological’, applications. Fairclough offers a sympathetic critique of this work, with his main reservations centring on CL’s treatment of texts as transparently related to social issues and ideologies, and as unproblematically forming the exclusive focus of analysis to the exclusion of considerations of reading practices, intertextuality, and the dynamic contexts those texts hail from (Fairclough 1992: 28ff).

Critical Linguistics attempts to theorize the constrained nature of the meaning choices available to social agents in specific social contexts and to link these to structures and patterns of interaction that encode relations of power and domination in the social structure. (Thibault 1991a: 183)

By contrast, rather than seeing texts as merely lexico-syntactic constructs which realise (relatively static) ideologies, CDA emphasises both their role as manifestations of dynamic and historical processes and their intertextual fluidity (Fairclough 1992: 28).

CDA also draws inspiration from writers such as Michel Pècheux and Michel Foucault. Pècheux provides the possibility of
integration of a marxist critical theory with linguistic analysis by opening up the connection between Althusser’s ‘ideological state apparatuses’ (Althusser 1971: 136) and ideology critique through the analysis of texts and their ‘interdiscourses’ (Fairclough 1992: 33). The issue of ‘intertextuality’ plays a major role in Fairclough’s work (Kristeva 1980: 36; see below), and provides an important analytical tool for reasoning about the differences among the positionings instantiated by participants in the planning meetings (Chapter 5).

Besides intertextuality, Fairclough sees ‘discursive polyvalence’ as another important focal point for CDA kinds of analysis. CDA acknowledges the productivity and the ambivalence (the ‘openness’, Thibault 1991a: 56) of discourse following Bakhtin and Kristeva. CDA’s overriding concern, however, is the analysis of the accomplishment and maintenance of hegemony through ideological struggle as realised in discourse(s).

Hegemony is the effect of subjects’ “identification with the values and practices of the dominant” (Thibault 1991a: 113). This process is one of “fa accettare col fascino” (‘causing to be accepted with attraction’; Gramsci, cited in Thibault 1991a: 113). For Fairclough,

Hegemony is the power over society as a whole of one of the fundamental economically-defined classes in alliance with other social forces, but it is never achieved more than partially and temporarily, as an unstable ‘equilibrium’. Hegemony is about constructing alliances, and integrating rather than simply dominating subordinate classes, through concessions or through ideological means, to win their consent. Hegemony is a focus of constant struggle around points of greatest instability between classes and blocs, to construct or sustain or fracture alliances and relations of domination/subordination, which takes economic, political and ideological forms. (Fairclough 1992: 92)

The ‘concessions’ which Fairclough refers to as part of hegemonic strategy, and which Thibault links to Bakhtin’s notions of ‘hybridisation’ (Bakhtin 1981: 359; cf Thibault 1991a: 81), will be elaborated in this thesis in terms of their linguistic specificity, and will be described as aspects of ‘morphogenesis’ (see below). While domination, as defined by Wilden, can be characterised as more or less static redundancy (Wilden 1980: 401), hegemony may be seen as involving strategies which allow the incorporation of contrary meanings (‘noise’) into the code, that is, ‘make concessions’. This points forward to an argument advanced in
Chapters 3 and 5: power/control cannot be defined substantially or in terms of specific ideologies or beliefs, but only in terms of two diverging principles: redundancy (closedness) and morphogenesis (openness).

Avoiding a 'substantialist' view on language, meaning and ideological value, Fairclough emphasises that discourses come to be ideologically 'invested' or 'de-invested' (Fairclough 1992: 67) depending on their role in the social process. Fairclough rejects the kinds of cognitivist and essentialist views on language already critiqued by Firth and Wittgenstein in the fifties (Firth 1957; Wittgenstein 1953), a critique taken up by a host of other writers since (T. Taylor & Cameron 1987; T. Taylor 1993; Thibault 1986; Coulter 1989; Ellis 1993, McDonough 1993). The relevance of hegemonic strategy to and investment in the area of planning and its instantiation in interaction will be further elaborated in Chapter 5.

More interesting still is Fairclough's point that certain orders of discourse achieve a degree of durability:

One point of contrast between orders of discourse is the extent to which such elements do solidify into relatively durable blocs. I shall suggest ... a small number of different types of element: genres, styles, activity types, and discourses. (Fairclough 1992: 70)

Fairclough's focus on discursive change here is interesting insomuch as he sees certain orders of discourse as becoming less negotiable (i.e. changeable, 'harder') over time than others, due to their recontextualisation.

Recontextualisation also underpins what Halliday refers to as 'grammatical metaphor' (Halliday 1985/94: 340). Grammatical metaphor revamps the realisational relation between semantics and grammar, thereby engendering recontextualising technicility as well as abstraction (Martin 1993a: 209). While the theory of grammatical metaphor restricts itself to the tension between the lexicogrammar and the discourse semantics (Martin 1992: 406, 1993c: 152), Fairclough's notion of durability, although not greatly elaborated, applies to any aspect of semiosis. It is the aim of this thesis to place Fairclough's concepts of change and increasing durability of particular orders of discourse within an information theoretical framework (Wilden 1980) which includes grammatical metaphor as but one manifestation of morphogenetic change (see Chapter 1).
Moreover, Fairclough takes a non-logocentric perspective by regarding texts as instances of discursive practice(s) which comprise their production, distribution, and consumption, and as standing in dynamic interaction with non-linguistic, or extra-discursive outcomes. "Some texts lead to wars or to the destruction of nuclear weapons; others to people losing or gaining jobs; others again change people's attitudes, beliefs and practices" (Fairclough 1992: 79). Fairclough's focus is thus on the text's social 'trajectory' as well as on its historicity (its intertextuality/interdiscursivity). Fairclough, while raising the problematic of the interrelatedness of information and its material manifestation, does not take this idea further in any theoretical sense. This thesis would like to push this problematic further, and place the production of discourse, but also its material manifestation at the centre of its concerns.

To its credit, the focus of CDA is the totality of meaning making practices ('discourse'), whether linguistic or other: "

Like many linguists, I shall use discourse to refer primarily to spoken or written language use, though I would also wish to extend it to include semiotic practice in other semiotic modalities such as photography and non-verbal communication. (Fairclough 1995c: 131)

Although Fairclough is explicit about texts being "transformationally related to each other" (Fairclough 1992: 130), such as medical consultations and medical records, and despite his theoretical intentions, his analysis remains largely focused on the linguistic, to the exclusion of the consequences such transformational chains might have for non-linguistic realisations, for example spatial organisation.

This thesis takes the view that the principle of transformation has consequences for not merely discursive and actional practices, but also for the formation and the organisation of social space. In this view, "space is a social product" (Lefebvre 1991: 26) and as such contains and assigns specific places, as discourse assigns statuses, to particular social relations. I argue that it is only by focusing on both the content and the expression of meaning makings that the significance of interaction for social structures can be appreciated.

2.2 Foucault on power & change

Foucault's work forms a major inspiration for the study presented here, especially his thoughts on change and power.
Foucault has generally been commented on as favouring a mechanical, rule-governed notion of change, and therefore as minimising the role of human agency as well as the importance of the explanation of human (not structural) purposes and intentions (Giddens 1984: 154; C. Taylor 1985b: 171; Weedon 1987: 125; Fairclough 1992: 57). Charles Taylor insists that Foucault's analytical focus was on the 'pervasive strategies' of power rather than on the explanation of local action, which "leaves us with a strange kind of Schopenhauerian will, ungrounded in human action" (C. Taylor 1985b: 172).

This notwithstanding, Foucault makes clear that power always presumes an acting subject, and that that is the locus of change:

[Power] is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. (Foucault 1983: 220)

If I understand Foucault at all, his interest was in discriminating between those domains of social life which were rather less open to change than others thanks to their 'technologisation'. Foucault was not interested in power as a reifying notion, such as class, economics, race, or gender, thereby avoiding (neo-) Marxist reductions and totalisations. On the other hand, Foucault conceived of power not as arbitrary relation, reducing it down to what someone arbitrarily decided at some particular time (as proposed in Bourdieu 1991: 113; critiqued by Hasan in press: 29): instead power operates on the basis of specific resources, sites and relations. Power occurs as a result of the technologisation of particular aspects of human interaction (see below), and that was the precise object of Foucault's investigations.

Foucault's early works started to address the issue of change, aiming to resolve seemingly inexplicable 'discontinuities'. Foucault denies that his work ever proposed 'discontinuity' to be a valid historical phenomenon, however.

I set out ... from this self-evident discontinuity and tried to ask myself the question: is this discontinuity really a discontinuity? Or, to be precise, what was the transformation needed to pass from one type of knowledge to another type of knowledge? For me this is not at all declaring the
discontinuity of History; on the contrary, it is a way of posing discontinuity as a problem and above all as a problem to be resolved. My approach, therefore, was quite the opposite of a ‘philosophy of discontinuity’. (Foucault 1988: 100)

It is clear from “Madness and Civilisation” (1965), “The Order of Things” (1970), and “The Birth of the Clinic” (1973), that change did not remain unexplained at all, and that Foucault was very explicit about the principles which he saw as being at basis of those ‘seeming discontinuities’. These principles he collectively referred to as ‘technologies’, meaning “institutionalised mechanisms for the operation of power” (Hindess 1986: 121).

In “Birth of the Clinic”, for example, we find the modern clinic promoting its focus on the living organism and its diseases for at least forty years before it allowed the old anatomical knowledge a role in its practices and discourses (Foucault 1973: 126). Overall though, the gradual ‘medicalisation of the social’ (Foucault 1973: 32) changed the relation between what could be said and what could not, between what was visible and what was not: “it meant that the relation between the visible and the invisible - which is necessary to all concrete knowledge - changed its structure, revealing through gaze and language what had previously been below and beyond their domain. A new alliance was forged between words and things, enabling one to see and to say (Foucault 1973: xii; his italics).

At the basis of this new alliance between seeing and saying was the eye: ‘the gaze’.

The eye becomes the depositary and source of clarity; it has the power to bring a truth to light that it receives only to the extent that it has brought it to light; as it opens, the eye first opens the truth: a flexion that marks the transition from the world of classical clarity - from the ‘enlightenment’ - to the nineteenth century” (Foucault 1973: xiii).

The gaze, i.e. its potential to re-align seeing and saying as well as its potential for surveillance, plays a major role in Foucault’s interpretation of the becoming of power in both scientific (e.g. Madness and Civilisation; Foucault 1965) and non-scientific contexts (e.g. Discipline and Punish; Foucault 1977). What is vital here, however, is Foucault’s insight into how doings can impact on thinkings/sayings and vice versa: how observation alters
classification, and how social relations modify space to suit and naturalise their principles and prerogatives.

This interplay between doing and saying is brought out especially in Foucault's discussion about the link between medical and disciplinary knowledges and practices. He notes that social health and social discipline are closely linked: "A medicine of epidemics could exist only if supplemented by a police" (Foucault 1973: 25). Hence, medical knowledge concerned the social as much as the biological body:

the definition of a political status for medicine and the constitution, at state level, of a medical consciousness whose constant task would be to provide information, supervision, and constraint, all of which 'relate as much to the police as to the field of medicine proper' (Foucault 1973: 26).

Medical knowledge was therefore as much a matter of scientific investigation as of social control.

In Discipline and Punish (1977) Foucault sets out the disciplinary technologies that arose in the age of absolutism (18th century) and modernity (19th century). Foucault describes the importance of the gaze in the domain of social discipline, and proposes Bentham's Panopticon as the technology which brought about the birth of various economies of social control: the barracks, the factory, the school, the hospital (Foucault 1977: 221). The Panopticon is

the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a pure architectural or optical system; it is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use (Foucault 1977: 205).

The Panopticon technologises the practice of surveillance:

One must eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of individuals, the diffuse circulation, their unusable and dangerous coagulation; it was a tactic of anti-desertion, anti-vagabondage, anti-concentration. Its [partitioning] aim was to establish presences and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct
of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its qualities or merits. It was a procedure, therefore, aimed at knowing, mastering and using. Discipline organises an analytical space (Foucault 1977: 143).

The ‘monastic cell’ provided “an old architectural and religious method” (Foucault 1977: 143) for the organisation of social space. Space, in other words, becomes classified to serve the requirements of the disciplining gaze:

[...he rule of functional sites would gradually, in the disciplinary institutions, code a space that architecture generally left at the disposal of several different uses. Particular places were defined to correspond not only to the need to supervise, to break dangerous communications, but also to create a useful space” (Foucault 1977: 143).

Space however also codes hierarchy: “[...]he unit is, therefore, neither the territory (unit of domination), nor the place (unit of residence), but the rank: the place one occupies in a classification” (Foucault 1977: 145). In that way, spatial classification and organisation counters horizontal (solidary) relations and creates vertical (hierarchical) relations.

In organising ‘cells’, ‘places’, and ‘ranks’, the disciplines create complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierarchical. It is spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out individual segments and establish operational links; they mark places and indicate values; they guarantee the obedience of individuals, but also a better economy of time and gesture (Foucault 1977: 148).

The gaze became technologised through being recontextualised as specific practices and discourses (e.g. how ‘unreason’ and death and disease were dealt with and talked about; how populations were mapped, described, and organised) and as architectural re-organisation of space (the elevation and centralisation of disciplinary control; the classification and ranking of space). The principle of recontextualisation of a practice across a variety of semiotic modes or material expressions is what is at issue here.

2.2.1 Social control and the Institutionalisation of Practice

Architecture recontextualises, and thereby institutionalises - because it ‘concretises’ - the principle of surveillance by means of
the gaze. But architecture is not the only recontextualising
semitic. Recontextualisation occurs in a wide variety of ways and
modalities. The 'sovereignty of the medical gaze', for example (as
reported in The Birth of the Clinic), was not at all achieved purely
on the basis of its discoveries, but on the basis of a range of
institutionalising recontextualisations that both justified and
naturalised its practices.

[I]t was no longer the gaze of any observer, but that of a
docto supported and justified by an institution, that of a
docor endowed with the power of decision and
intervention" (Foucault 1973: 89).

Thus, the new medical knowledge did not merely concern the
changing relation between what is seen and what is said; it also
concerned changes in the relevant discourses ('codes of
knowledge'), practices (patient observation), and sites of practice
(clinics, hospitals) that ultimately enable and sustain its control.
Social control thus becomes a complex of disciplinary and spatial
biopolitics: it grows into a 'technology' comprising "a rich ensemble
of bodily disciplines" and normalising codes of knowledge. "To the
degree that the human sciences become the medium of ... power,
and the panoptical form of supervision is permitted to penetrate
into all the pores of the subjugated body and the objectified soul,
it is condensed into a new, precisely modern, power complex"
(Habermas 1994: 84).

This power complex is the result of technologisation (or the
'civilising process', in Elias' terms; Elias 1982: 232), which involves
the recontextualising of practices and knowledges in the service of
social control. The 'recontextualisation' of knowledges and
practices institutionalises them as procedures, codes, classified
spaces and times, which then may be further recontextualised
across various media and institutionalising sites.

Recontextualisation is at the heart of 'bourgeois power':

Feudal power, operating mainly through exaction and
expenditure, ended by undermining itself. The power of the
bourgeoisie is self-amplifying, in a mode not of conservation
but of successive transformations. Hence the fact that its
form isn't given in a definitive historical figure as is that of
feudalism. (Foucault 1980: 160)

This principle of 'successive transformation' or recontextualisation
and its link to power forms the focus of this thesis, and will be

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referred to as morphogenesis. In addition to providing the connection between change, surveillance, and power, this notion also furnishes insight into how a range of semiotic guises may both support and naturalise changes and power relations.

The point, it seems to me, is that architecture begins at the end of the eighteenth century to become involved in problems of population, health and the urban question. Previously, the art of building corresponded to the need to make power, divinity and might manifest. ... Then, in the late eighteenth century, new problems emerge: it becomes a question of using the disposition of space for economic-political ends. ... Then gradually space becomes specified and functional. (Foucault 1980: 148/9)

Foucault concludes that "[a] whole history remains to be written of spaces - which would at the same time be the history of powers - ... from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the habitat" (Foucault 1980: 148/9). In Foucault's view, space is not some naturalised, arbitrary, 'physical geography'; on the contrary, space is a 'historico-political problem' (Foucault 1980: 148/9).

Foucault's main focus was on the management, classification and design of space (i.e. the recontextualisation of social control into kinds of spatial organisation), but implied in his work in general is the reciprocity, or the 'morphogenetic' mutuality, of doings and sayings. There is a motivated (non-arbitrary) link, in other words, between the material (physical products and structures, standard practices and actional procedures) and the linguistic (discourses, knowledges, narratives). It is on the basis of that non-arbitrary link that Foucault refers to the total of doings and sayings as 'discourse' (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 250). I will use the term semiosis or meaning making to refer to the totality of 'meaningfulness' (if there can be said to be such a unitary thing or process).

In sum, technologisation is the history of recontextualised social control as it was enacted meaningfully: practically, intellectually and spatially.
2.2.2 A Non-Conspiratorial View of Power

So far the focus has been on the intricate relation between social change and social control. Especially in Foucault’s later work (Foucault 1978), power is neither subjectivist (i.e. a matter of individual choice and intention) nor objectivist (i.e. a matter of historical contingency; Kelly 1994a/b). Foucault is careful to advance a non-conspiratorial view of power:

One doesn’t have here a power which is wholly in the hands of one person who can exercise it alone and totally over others. It’s a machine in which everyone is caught, those who exercise power just as much as those over whom it is exercised. This seems to me to be the characteristic of the societies installed in the nineteenth century. Power is no longer substantially identified with an individual who possesses or exercises it by right of birth; it becomes a machinery that no one owns” (Foucault 1980: 156).

The claim that medical practice was the origin of sociological knowledge (Foucault 1980: 149) suggests that an important motivation behind this mapping, classifying, and segregating, was not (exclusively, nor necessarily) some perverse, egocentric interest, but an attempt “aimed at achieving certain ‘standards of living’” and “to secure the ‘moral and physical’ well-being of the social body” (Hunter 1993: 29).

For Foucault, power is a local(ised) phenomenon, a “multiplicity of force relations” (Foucault 1978: 92), and is ‘omnipresent’ (Foucault 1978: 93). This view rejects the answers derived from ‘inequality’ views of power grounded in predominantly socio-economic difference. It also calls into question the quixotism of those who see themselves as ‘broker for the oppressed’ (Rosaldo 1994), since it precludes any conclusions about what constitutes power and what does not, or who ‘holds’ power and who does not.

In reaction against Foucault’s definition of power, Habermas charges Foucault with obscuring the notion of power by interpreting it as pervading every inch of the social, and labels it a ‘total critique of reason’, and sees it as being ‘crypto-normative’ (Habermas 1994: 82; cf. Kelly 1994b: 374). The implication is, of course, that if power is everywhere, if all knowledge is infused with power, then Habermas’ notion of ‘unfettered communicative action’ (Habermas 1987: 145) is utopian. Kelly shows Habermas’ charge of cryptonormativity to be ungrounded:
As for the subjects Foucault studies in his various texts, they are ‘accessible’ to one another in a variety of ways, depending on the practice or institution in question; they are not just accessible to one another as objects since they are also the subjects in and of these processes (DP, 222-223). Moreover, when subjects do relate to themselves as objects under the gaze, it is only for the purpose of developing medicine, problematising sexuality, or developing some discursive or non-discursive practice. In other words, they do not transform themselves into objects, nor even into subjects who can relate only to objects. In all these respects, Foucault’s discussion of the gaze must be part of the larger picture of modern subjectivity, including the conditions of intersubjectivity which are Habermas’ particular concern. In short, I think Habermas’ concern that the gaze turns subjects into objects and leaves no bridges to intersubjectivity is unfounded. (Kelly 1994b: 377)

In Foucault’s own words:

[should it be said that one is always ‘inside’ power, there is no ‘escaping’ it, there is no absolute outside where it is concerned, because one is subject to the law in any case? Or that, history being the ruse of reason, power is the ruse of history, always emerging the winner? This would be to misunderstand the strictly relational character of power relationships. (Foucault 1978: 95)

In the section which follows I will discuss Basil Bernstein’s views on power and control, and further specify these two notions within the purview of his sociological-linguistic theory. That discussion will define power, in contrast to Foucault’s definition, as potentially omni-present (in the form of an accumulation of past decisions, actions, constructions), and control (affecting interaction in the present) as interaction that mobilises that ‘power potential’. Not wanting to subscribe to any dualisms that can be read into Bernstein’s distinction between power and control, I think that its interpretation as potential-actual overcomes the power as ‘all-or-nothing’ corner into which Habermas seems to want to paint Foucault (see discussion below).

2.3 Bernstein on Boundary Maintenance and Recontextualisation

Bernstein’s theory of cultural-social transmission is interesting, not least because it integrates a materialist perspective on social institutions with explanations about how (semiotic and actional)
practices affect consciousness. In that sense, Bernstein appears to avoid sociological macro-micro disjunctions (cf. Knorr-Cetina & Cicourel 1981; Lemke 1985a), as well as disjunctions between the social and the semiotic (Thibault 1986: 31). I will argue, however, that these issues have not been addressed explicitly enough by Bernstein, and that perhaps as a result interpretations of his work, by linguists in particular, have not come to grips with their (i.e. these issues') implications.

From the linguist's perspective, Bernstein first (1958-1961) related grammatical forms (Bernstein 1971: 76; cf. Halliday 1995a: 130), and later (1961-1966) meanings to socio-economic background (Bernstein 1971: 145; 1987: 564; Hasan 1973: 258; Halliday 1995a: 136). Linguists have generally interpreted Bernstein's main interest to focus on how 'critical socialising contexts' (Halliday 1973: 52) predisposes speakers to favour particular wordings and meanings over others. Generally, the more sociologically oriented issues mentioned above have not found their way into the linguistic discourse.

Two aspects of Bernstein's work are of special interest within the context of this thesis. First, I will address his notions of power and control, or classification and framing. These notions are important here, because the object of this thesis is to describe a process which illustrates the nature of the relation between classification and framing, and which hones in on the technologisation of classification (power). Second, his notion of recontextualisation, which has generally not been linked to logogenetic treatments of interaction. I will use the principle of recontextualisation as a way in to describing how classification and framing relate.

2.3.1 Classification and Framing: Distinguishing Power from Control

Classification refers to the degree of separateness "between categories, whether these categories are between agencies, between agents, between discourses, between practices" (Bernstein 1996a: 20; cf. Bernstein 1975: 88). The degree of classification is indicative of the degree of 'power'. Thus, power is defined as to do with the degree of separateness of categories. This, as I understand it, means that '+ power = + categorial separateness'.

Framing "refers to the controls on communication in local, interactional pedagogic relations: between parents/children, teacher/pupil, social worker/client, etc." (Bernstein 1996a: 26).
The degree of framing determines the degree of ‘control’. Thus, control is defined as to do with the degree of difference imposed on kinds as well as contents of interaction; this, in my understanding, means that control essentially affects the transmission, and only indirectly the negotiation and change of classified categories. Thus, ‘power’ defines the boundaries between categories (the “what”); ‘control’ defines the boundaries between relations (the “how”; Bernstein 1996a: 27).

Bernstein’s concern with defining classification and framing not as entities or phenomena, but as more or less rigid boundary makings signals his view of social relations as being essentially relations of meaning. Since classification and framing are defined as affecting arrangements and practices, the principles underlying these practices and arrangements are semiotic. These semiotic principles are informational contrasts or differences within which only certain differences ‘make a difference’ (Bateson 1973: 286).

The potential confusion inherent in the distinction between classification and framing, however, becomes obvious when we attend to how others have interpreted it. One such interpretation is that “classification controls discourse, and framing controls encounters” (P. Atkinson 1995: 91; also: Close-Thomas 1995). Looking at interactions, however, it is evident that the distinction between ‘discourse’ and ‘encounters’ is an impossible one to make (see below).

Part of the problem is that Bernstein does not explicitly locate his notions with reference to either sociological or linguistic perspectives on comparable issues: those to do with macro-micro, structure-action, or system-instance. Bernstein only goes so far as to say that they concern the setting of boundaries. While ‘boundarisation’ is a crucial point of entry into the study of social semiotic interaction (also cf. Douglas 1966, 1986), Bernstein’s work does not provide semiotically informed definitions showing exactly how the split of ‘boundarisation’ into power and control, or into classification and framing, is to be interpreted.

In what follows, therefore, I will trace the concepts’ genealogy and raise questions about the definition of power (C) and control (F) as aspects of the social relation. This involves elaborating Bernstein’s original definition of power as affecting ‘potential knowledge’ and of control as affecting its ‘realisation in a local context’ (Bernstein 1990: 23).

In the course of that analysis, I will argue
i) that (C) and (F) should be seen as different aspects of ‘meaning’, or ‘information’ in Wilden’s (1980: 18, 138ff) sense;
ii) that (C) acts as resource(s) for (F) (interaction);
iii) that (C) as ‘time-space distanciated’ meaning/information can be realised (rather: ‘instantiated’) across various semiotic media, and
iv) that (C)’s increasing time-space distanciation is the outcome of technologisation, or ‘morphogenesis’.

2.3.2 A Genealogy of Classification and Framing

Bernstein’s main reason for separating classification-power and framing-control is that “knowledge of the rules does not necessarily permit knowledge of their contextual use” (Bernstein 1990: 23). This seems to mean that Bernstein adopts, in slightly different terms, a competence-performance dichotomy (also Bernstein 1971: 173; Halliday 1995a: 132), and therewith both cognitivises ‘rules’ (cf. Still & Costall 1991a) and sees ‘their realisation in a local context’ as the - rational? intended? - execution of those rules.

It is on the same grounds that Bernstein justifies his decision to “disconnect our analysis of the principles regulating the relations between categories from the principles regulating their practices” (Bernstein 1990: 23). This, I take it, effects a categorial separation between the “insulation between categories” (Bernstein 1990: 23) and “the specific practices between transmitters and acquirers”, i.e. the “form of its [the insulation between categories in question] acquisition” (Bernstein 1990: 33). Bernstein claims “there are also good analytic reasons for making such a separation” (Bernstein 1990: 23). One reason given is: “accredited knowledge of ... discursive rules is one thing and their realisation in a local context quite another” (Bernstein 1990: 23).

The genealogy of these concepts sheds more light on the exact nature of the distinction Bernstein insists on here. Bernstein acknowledges that “[f]rom Durkheim I took classification and from the early symbolic interactionists [i.e. Mead, Blumer] I took the concept of framing, although I defined both differently” (Bernstein 1996a: 101). For Durkheim, what is socially valued is created and contained by practices of separation:

the representation of a sacred thing does not tolerate neighbours. But this psychic antagonism and this mutual exclusion of ideas should naturally result in the exclusion of the corresponding things. If the ideas are not to coexist, the
things must not touch each other or have any sort of relations. This is the very principle of the interdict (Durkheim 1961, cited Wexler 1995: 117).

The ‘interdict’ affects both ritual practices and representations and categories of thought and language. For Durkheim, “the believer ... believes himself [sic] held to certain manners of acting which are imposed upon him by the nature of the sacred principle with which he feels he is in communion” (Durkheim 1965, cited in Giddens 1972: 109). Durkheim sees the practices of insulation in themselves as giving rise to collective acts and knowledges, or practices and discourses. Durkheim, however, does not detail how ritual insulation gives rise to shared discourses and practices, because he, unlike Mead, is not concerned with the minutiae of social interaction.

Framing may be traced to Mead’s explanation of how social power and control come to constitute self (cf. Bernstein 1971: 172). Mead makes a distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’, with the ‘I’ as memory of what was socially valid and operable (Mead 1934/67: 174). Bernstein critiques Mead for dichotomising ‘I’ and ‘me’, saying that

in Mead change is introduced only at the cost of the re-emergence of a traditional Western dichotomy in the concepts of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’. The ‘I’ is both the indeterminate response to the ‘me’ and yet, at the same time, shapes it (Bernstein 1971: 172).

Despite this, I think Mead’s distinction between ‘epistemic I’ and the ‘practical I’ (Mead 1934/67: 261; also Habermas 1987: 37; 1992: 179) is taken on board by Bernstein. Both the ‘epistemic I’ and the ‘practical I’ affect the ‘me’ and are recognitions and realisations of valid or operable kinds of social interaction.

Thus Meadian thought helps to solve the puzzle of the HOW but it does not help with the question of change in the structuring of experience; although both Mead implicitly and Durkheim explicitly pointed to the conditions which bring about pathological structuring of experience (Bernstein 1971: 172).

Bernstein’s discussion of how the social division of labour (i.e. power, classification) (re)produces consciousness (control, framing) has its roots in Durkheim’s notions of ‘interdict’ and of the recreation of society. But, in my view, Mead’s link between the
‘epistemic’ and the ‘practical’ provides him with an explanation of their interactional appearance and relevance. Habermas renders the relevant distinction which Mead raises thus:

The epistemic self-relation had been made possible by a ‘me’ that fixed in memory the spontaneously acting ‘I’, such as it presented itself in the performative attitude of a second person. The practical relation-to-self is made possible by a ‘me’ that places limits, from the intersubjective perspective of a social ‘we’, on the impulsiveness and the creativity of a resistant and productive ‘I’. (Habermas 1992: 180)

Mead saw the ‘me’ as a kind of agency keen to preserve what is, while the ‘I’ was a source of either presocial, natural drives, or of creative impulses, i.e. a spontaneity that eludes epistemic as well as practical consciousness. The ‘me’, to be able to recognise itself (‘see again’ in the generalised [social] Other), therefore had to have power over the ‘epistemic I’ (to achieve ‘self-vs.-other reference’), as well as over the ‘practical I’ (to achieve ‘self/other-relation’). Mead himself does not distinguish power from control, but he does distinguish “the reaching of self-consciousness” from “the development of co-operative activity” (Mead 1934/67: 253/4), and theorises social control as playing a role in both the development of consciousness and of cooperative interaction:

social control, as operating in terms of self-criticism, exerts itself so intimately and extensively over individual behaviour or conduct, serving to integrate the individual and his [sic] actions with reference to the organised social process of experience and behaviour in which he [sic] is implicated (Mead 1934/67: 255).

In Bernstein’s definition, power concerns socio-cognitive expectations (conscioussness), and control concerns socio-normative expectations (interaction): consciousness is classified (Bernstein 1990: 143), and interaction is framed (Bernstein 1990: 35). For Mead, the distinction between self-definition and self-control (both achieved on the basis of ‘taking the attitude of the Other’; Mead 1934/67: 154) reaches back to that between “thought and behaviour” (Mead 1934/67: 262). I think the parallel between Mead’s distinction and Bernstein’s consciousness and interaction is evident here.

At the basis of Mead’s notions lies an essentially Cartesian mind-body dichotomy (cf. Henriques et al 1984: 23; Manicas 1993: 222), that which opposes thought to behaviour, inner versus outer,
consciousness to interaction. The same dichotomy could be seen to inhere in the power-control (classification-framing) distinction - especially in the light of Bernstein's insistence on distinguishing between knowledge (as 'inner') and its realisation in a local context (as 'outer') referred to above. For Bernstein, it seems, inner (knowledge) and outer (realisation) are not dual meanings of a subjectivity constituted in meaning-making practices (Coward & Ellis 1977: 89), but are incommensurate aspects of the social which require different labels and appear in the form of different realities.

The problem lies, I think, in the use of the term 'knowledge'. As seen, in Bernstein's account the distinction between 'knowledge' and its 'realisation in a local context' is the basis for distinguishing classification from framing, power from control. But what does 'knowledge' refer to here? For Bernstein, it refers to 'recognition rules': "recognition rules regulate what goes with what: what meanings may be legitimately put together, what referential relations are privileged/privileging" (Bernstein 1990: 29). Knowledge is awareness of the "syntax of the generation of meaning" (Bernstein 1990: 29). But then Bernstein insists: "it is possible to have acquired the recognition rules of this syntax without acquiring the competence to produce what counts as effective messages in any of the discourses" (Bernstein 1990: 29). So recognition rules dictate what should be recognised as legitimate or illegitimate; yet such recognition, according to Bernstein, does not guarantee appropriate realisation of legitimate meaning. We can recognise classifications and boundaries but we may not be able to reproduce them in interaction. The following quotes from Bernstein's latest publication (Bernstein 1996a) further highlight his concern with the 'acquisition' of 'rules':

classification and framing procedures ... act selectively on the recognition and the realisation rules. These recognition and the realisation rules, at the level of the acquirer, enable that acquirer to construct the expected legitimate text ... (Bernstein 1996a: 32)

In spite this kind of vocabulary, Bernstein insists that he is not recapitulating Chomsky's competence-performance theory (Bernstein 1996 p. c.).

For Halliday, the only way to read a 'knowledge/realisation' distinction is to equate it with that which obtains between an abstract meaning potential and its instantiation in use:
the behaviour potential associated with the contexts that Bernstein identifies may be expressed linguistically as a meaning potential. Some such step is needed if we are to relate the fundamental concepts of the social theory to recognizable forms and patterns of language behaviour. A word or two should be said here about the relation of the concept of meaning potential to the Chomskyan notion of competence, even if only briefly. The two are somewhat different. Meaning potential is defined not in terms of the mind but in terms of the culture; not as what the speaker knows, but as what he [sic] can do - in the special sense of what he can do linguistically (what he 'can mean', as we expressed it). The distinction is important because 'can do' is of the same order of abstraction as 'does'; the two are related simply as potential and actualised potential, and can be used to illuminate each other. But 'knows' is distinct and clearly insulated from 'does'; the relation between the two is complex and oblique, and leads to the quest for a 'theory of performance' to explain the 'does'. (Halliday 1973: 52/3)

Hence, if Bernstein is not concerned with devising a 'theory of performance' but with a theory of socio-semantic variation, then the distinction between recognition and realisation does not involve different orders of abstraction, but different perspectives on the one phenomenon. Halliday continues:

The meaning potential is the range of significant variation that is at the disposal of the speaker. The notion is not unlike Dell Hymes' notion 'communicative competence', except that Hymes defines this in terms of 'competence' in the Chomskyan sense of what the speaker knows, whereas we are talking of a potential - what he [sic] can do, in the linguistic sense of what he can mean - and avoiding the additional complication of a distinction between doing and knowing. (Halliday 1973: 54)

If 'we' in the passage is to be read as including Bernstein (which is suggested by Halliday's linking into Bernstein's terminology on the previous page), then Halliday reads him as not being concerned with the distinction between 'knows' and 'does' (as are Chomsky and Hymes), but as exclusively focused on 'can do' as cultural potential and 'does' as actual. Halliday takes Bernstein's 'recognition' to refer to meaning 'potential', and 'realisation' to 'actual' (Halliday 1996 p.c.).
I favour this system-instance interpretation over other interpretations offered, such as classification = past, framing = present (Bernstein 1996 p.c.). This might lead to reification of both classification and framing, as Giddens points out with reference to structure and action (see Section 2.4. below). I will argue, however, that the system-instance interpretation needs to be complemented with a theory of change which can relate changing classifications to framing, relate durée and longue durée; or, in Giddens’ words, describe how structuration occurs (Section 2.4).

2.3.3 Recontextualisation

At the heart of Bernstein’s theory of pedagogic practice lies an analysis of “the recontextualisation of knowledge through the pedagogic device” (Sadovnik 1995b: 10). Recontextualisation is the process that adapts the meanings of one field to the exigencies and prerogatives of another field and regulates the re-deployment of those meanings. The recontextualisation of a discourse or practice is preceded by decontextualisation.

When a text is appropriated by recontextualising agents, operating in positions of this field, the text usually undergoes a transformation prior to its relocation. The form of this transformation is regulated by a principle of decontextualising. This process refers to the change in the text as it is first delocated and then relocated. (Bernstein 1990: 60)

Bernstein associates the following aspects with de/re-contextualisation:

[De/re-contextualisation] ensures that the text is no longer the same text:
1. The text has changed its position in relation to other texts, practices and positions.
2. The text itself has been modified by selection, simplification, condensation, and elaboration.
3. The text has been repositioned and refocused. (Bernstein 1990: 60/192)

One important aspect of this process, which Bernstein calls ‘primary contextualisation’ (Bernstein 1990: 59), is that it requires and presumes an original ‘encoding’ (in Halliday’s sense; Halliday 1967b: 227; Davids 1992b: 110): a notional fixing of the original experiential context. This process requires a technologisation of the discourse/practice in question.
Technologisation refers to the application of a device which enables interaction to become decontextualised (move the 'text' from a congruent or 'analog' to an incongruent or 'digital' realisation; Halliday & Martin 1993: 79; Wilden 1980: 155). Linguistically speaking, one technology involved will be grammatical metaphor (Halliday 1985/1994: §10). More broadly (i.e. semiotically) speaking, the technology involved can be that of print, or another kind of 'media-tisation' (J.B. Thompson 1990: 3), such as money or design, or even a spatialisation, like infrastructure, architecture, and so on. In any case, the technology abstracts away from the here and now of the original experience (is 'at a higher level of complexity', Wilden 1980: 170).

In science, for example, the 'excorporation' of experience is a prerequisite for the incorporation of the resultant text into the annals of science. “The passage between the three-dimensional setting and the narrative is obtained by the process of inscription” (Latour 1990: 63).

Visually, the inscribed results brought back from an expedition, from an observation, or from an experiment look alike ... They 'refer to', which means, etymologically, that they bring back things .... Anthropologists, geographers and zoologists ... can now indulge the two favourite gestures of realist philosophers, i.e. thumping the table ('this is a hard fact!') and pointing at details with their index finger (the other meaning of reference). But, what they point to and thump on are the inscriptions brought back through whichever means the ingenuity of scientists has invented. (Latour 1990: 58)

Primary contextualisation, encoding, and inscription all refer to the same process: “the process whereby new ideas are selectively created, modified, and changed and where specialised discourses are developed, modified or changed” (Bernstein 1990: 59). But what Bernstein insufficiently addresses is that these processes achieve a 'stability' in how experience is henceforth talked about; they create “a unanimity and, once this unanimity is ensured, they reverse the relations of forces elsewhere in the society. ... They have become objects, things, black boxes no one has made and which are going to change everyone's world” (Latour 1990: 75). It is precisely that 'reversal' that is at the heart of morphogenesis, or, going back to using Bernstein's terms, the conversion of framing into classification, and classification into framing.
The recontextualising context concerns itself with the relocation of discourse from the primary contextualising context into the secondary reproducing context (Bernstein 1990: 60). Taking science as example, its recontextualisation into R&D and educational contexts provides it with both support and legitimation. “Science has become institutionalised as a power through a university system and through its own constricting apparatus of laboratories and experiments” (Foucault 1988: 107).

The recontextualising context regulates the circulation of texts between the primary and the secondary contexts. Bernstein refers to specialised agents and agencies of symbolic control involved in determining “positions and oppositions” (Bernstein 1990: 61) appropriate to the recontextualised text. Bernstein’s focus is on the social (interpersonal) relations at stake in these processes. Importantly, however, social relations are enacted and ultimately meta-stabilised in specific technologised ways. To talk about social relations, therefore, it is necessary to address precisely those technologies mobilised for the exorporation, inscription, and recontextualisation of experience. It is these which, in the last analysis, throw light on how ‘control’ morphogenesises into ‘power’, and how ‘power’ affects ‘control’.

2.3.4 In Summary

Bernstein’s work provides an important step to linking social structures to modalities of communication and types of consciousness. There are moments in Bernstein’s work, as I have argued, where his exposition of how control/framing may affect modes of classification/power fails to foreground that we are dealing with different modalities, not with causally independent realities. But if we read his notions in the context of both Halliday’s and Giddens’ work (see below), his concern with boundarisation adds an important dimension to their linguistic and sociological discussions.

Taking a synchronic as well as diachronic perspective on what is recontextualised, I will show how control/framing becomes de-textualised, or ‘contextualised’, i.e. ‘de-differenced’, and thus incorporated into the structured and structuring background of interaction. In other words, the focus here is on how control becomes naturalised through its recontextualisation in the form of, for example, formal bureaucratic reports, architectural designs, construction tender documents, and, ultimately, the physical structures that form the settings for new interactions, new modes
of control and resistance, and for new modes of power and repression.

In the next section I will elaborate the nature of power and control within Giddens' sociological framework. I will deal with some of the issues that mark the structure-action debate in sociology, and conclude with Peter Manicas' dual reading of Giddens' structure-action duality as both potential-actual and as embodying separate ontologies.

2.4 Giddens on Time-Space Distanciation and Structuration

In the previous section I looked at Basil Bernstein' work and concluded that his concern with power (as classification) and control (as framing) displays sensitivity to the intricacy of the structure-action issue and to the necessity to integrate change into his model of social interaction. However, some aspects of Bernstein's account suggest he grants classification independent causal status and therefore it runs the risk of reifying macrosocial 'structures' as real outside of interaction (cf. Archer 1995b). Bernstein himself does not address specific instances of interaction (cf. Thibault 1991a: 230), and therefore does not detail the relation between power and control. This leaves the following questions unanswered: how does power bear on control? how does power 'accrue' out of control? how does control exploit or contest power? I think that Giddens' notions of structuration and time-space distanciation can provide the link between Halliday's 'abstract system potential/instansial occasion of use' view of classification and framing, and a more sociologically and therefore more materially oriented solution to the structure/action dialectic.

Giddens' 'structuration theory' aims to overcome the subject-object split, without sacrificing agents' knowledgerability or ability to enact change (Giddens 1981a/b, 1984, 1985, 1990; Bryant & Jary1991b; Kilminster 1991). Giddens' main concerns are both to avoid reifying 'structure' and to deny that the pre-social subject can be "present to itself in unmediated fashion" (Wagner 1993: 142, cited in New 1994: 188). Both concerns are rooted in the view that structure-agency or society-individual dualisms leave the possibility for one term of the pair to exist independently of the other. Giddens emphasises agents' knowledgerability (following Goffman and Garfinkel; Giddens 1984: 71ff), and, arguing that agents' reasons are themselves discursively constituted, places that knowledgerability squarely at the centre of social meaning making practices. At the same time, Giddens sees this knowledgerability as operating from within a (Heideggerian)
background ('the ontic'; Giddens 1981: 31; Edwards 1990). Action is enabled by the resources provided in social interaction; it is constrained by the conventions that define or are inherent in those very resources.

It is for that reason that Giddens talks about the 'duality of structure': structure is both "the medium and the outcome of social acts" (Giddens 1981a: 19, also: 1981b: 171, 1984: 25ff). Giddens' definition of 'structure' is motivated by the consideration that structure cannot be seen to encompass more than that which action mobilises, exploits, or draws on, i.e. socially sanctioned rules and resources. By defining structure in this way, Giddens emphasises both that action is constituted within socially available means, and that these social means cannot be reified beyond their mobilisation in action. Structure, in other words, defines the potential for action, while at the same time possessing a structure-specific ontology.

Giddens' work provides a valuable angle on sociological analysis for systemic linguists, because of his description of social action in terms of a Hjelmslevian system-instance complementarity.

Just as the rules of language, in contributing to the construction of a well-formed phrase or sentence, reproduce that language, so structures of rules and resources, in consequence of the duality that renders them both the medium and outcome of social interactions, reproduce institutions and social relations (Bryant & Jary 1991b: 11).

In Giddens' own words:

When I utter a grammatical sentence, I draw upon various syntactic rules of the English language in order to do so. But the very drawing upon those rules helps reproduce them as structural properties of English as recursively involved with the linguistic practices of the community of English language speakers. The moment (not in a temporal sense) of the production of the speech act at the same time contributes to the reproduction of the structural qualities that generated it. It is very important to see that 'reproduction' here does not imply homology: the potential for change is built into every moment of social reproduction (as a contingent phenomenon). (Giddens 1981b: 172)

This, according to Manicas (1993: 223), places Giddens in opposition both to those subjectivists and methodological
individualists who aim to reduce everything social to interaction (e.g. Homans 1975, R. Collins 1981, but also Schegloff 1972, 1984, 1992) and to those who reduce everything individual to an effect of structure (e.g. Althusser 1971, Pecheux 1982). The way Manicas presents Giddens is to say that his models make structure activity-dependent, without denying structure any degree of realism.

Insisting that, as Bhaskar has said, structures (and relations) are concept and activity-dependent (and not ... activity-connected) does not make social relations (or, more broadly, culture) and less real - nor, thus, any less constraining or enabling. (Manicas 1993: 223)

This suggests that Giddens' structuration does a more comprehensive take on interaction than does the system-instance duality. Halliday's system is an abstraction of the total of speakers' interactional options, both semantic, lexicogrammatical, and phonological. Giddens' potential (his 'structure' which is 'virtual'; Giddens 1982b: 9) comprises the total of 'langue' options, the potential of 'écriture' (cf. Thibault 1997b), as well as the total of other extra-somatic, material, meaning systems.

Thus, Giddens' structuration view on interaction accounts not only for the total of abstract meaning options (as does Halliday's system-instance view), but also for the principal manifestations of those options in the material world (all of which may function as resources for action). Where Halliday's conceptualisation of the semiotic restricts itself largely to a somatically delimited linguistic potential, Giddens' conceptualisation goes beyond the somatic to include both 'embodied' and extra-somatic or 'objectified' resources (cf. Bourdieu 1981: 305).

It is Giddens' concern with action potential as stretching beyond the purely somatic, as drawing on both somatic and extra-somatic resources, that frees our views on change from a pre-occupation with meaning as individually and locally produced. Taking Giddens' perspective enables us to place the social trajectory of meaning making at the centre of our concerns. It is from this perspective that it becomes possible to account for the changing social environment in which we find ourselves: it allows us to account for the role of action (framing) in structuration (classification), or, in Bourdieu's words, to see how action 'structures structure' (Bourdieu 1994: 13). It allows us, in short, to take a morphogenetic perspective which can show not only how abstract meanings change, but also how our environment is
progressively mobilised and modified for the realisation of those meanings.

Giddens' views on change are explicitly anti-evolutionist and 'discontinuous', and in that sense rejects teleology (i.e. a 'pre-determined' trajectory of development) in favour of a teleonomy ('goalseeking': a trajectory which ongoingly redefines itself in interaction with its environment; Wilden 1980: 492) characteristic of the dynamic open system: "[h]istory does not have an evolutionary 'shape'" (Giddens 1984: 236).

An evolutionary 'shape' - a trunk with branches, or a climbing vine, in which the elapsing of chronological time and the progression of the species are integrated - is an inappropriate metaphor by which to analyse human society. (Giddens 1984: 237)

Emphasising that "[s]ocieties simply do not have the degree of 'closure' that species do" (Giddens 1984: 237) Giddens insists that "[i]n explaining social change no single and sovereign mechanism can be specified" (Giddens 1984: 243). Despite this, Giddens places the distribution and exploitation of both allocative resources (i.e. material features of the environment, the means of production, and produced goods) and authoritative resources (organisation of social time-space, (re)production of the body, and organisation of life chances) at the centre of the (re)production of structures of domination (Giddens 1984: 258).

The augmenting of material resources is fundamental to the expansion of power, but allocative resources cannot be developed without the transmutation of authoritative resources, and the latter are undoubtedly at least as important in providing 'levers' of social change as the former. (Giddens 1984: 60)

For Giddens, authoritative resources, or the means for the production of behaviours (i.e. discursive and actional practices), is crucial for the maintenance and increase of power:

of essential importance to the engendering of power is the storage of authoritative resources ... 'Storage' is a medium of 'binding' time-space involving, on the level of action, the knowledgeable management of a projected future and recall of an elapsed past (Giddens 1984: 261).
Giddens does not define change as a series of evolutionary 'stages' through which societies may pass, but as the increasing capacity for storing resources. Such storage results in the time-space distanciation of social practices: meanings are 'stretched across time and space'.

In general (although certainly not universally) it is true that the greater the time-space distanciation of social systems - the more their institutions bite into time and space - the more resistant they are to manipulation or change by any individual agent. (Giddens 1984: 171)

Storage is the ability both to maintain and broaden a society's 'action potential':

In oral cultures human memory is virtually the sole repository of information storage. ... The storage of authoritative and allocative resources may be understood as involving the retention and control of information or knowledge whereby social relations are perpetuated across time-space. Storage presumes media of information representation, modes of information retrieval or recall and, as with all power resources, modes of dissemination. ... The dissemination of stored information is, of course, influenced by the technology available for its production. (Giddens 1984: 261)

Here Giddens' view on change approximates that of Wilden, who formulates change in terms of his theory of communication and exchange, with the central notion being the capacity of open systems to 'learn', i.e. to store and recall meaning, information, and thus adapt themselves to their environments (teleonomy).

Despite theorising about the necessity to see structure as instantiated in action, Giddens does not take the step necessary to offer a description of situated action by analysing its contribution to the modification or recapitulation of 'existing' (prevalent? favoured? predominant?) structures. As I will show in the next section, Anthony Wilden provides the means for looking at situated action and for reasoning about its homeostatic and morphogenic contribution to the social potential.

2.5 Wilden on change and evolution

In the previous section on Giddens' sociology I showed that Giddens would not see change as unproblematically an effect of
individual intention or motivation, due to the unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of action. While Giddens' notions of structuration and time-space distanciation are crucial notions within the context of this thesis, Giddens does not furnish tools to examine specific interactions. Wilden's account, although still abstract, provides important tools which can be seen to bridge the more sociologically oriented views presented so far and the interaction specific analyses of systemic linguistics.

Wilden's "anti-reductionist theory of communication and exchange" (Wilden 1980: 226) prefers to see change as 'historical evolution'. It results from the logical structure of the system being out of step with some other part of the system ('teleonomy'). Such 'being out step' gives rise to 'noise', which may result in systemic learning.

Learning is the ongoing and increased differentiation of energy-matter and information (viz. 'symmetry-breaking' in Section 2.7 below). Taking an example from Bateson (1973), Wilden notes that the 'bite' maps form directly onto function (compare Halliday's 'protolanguage'; Halliday 1975). The 'nip', by contrast, introduces a gap (a 'difference in abstraction'; Wilden 1980: 420) between behaviour (energy-matter) and significance (information). The nature of this 'gap' can become infinitely complex (viz. Halliday's 'grammar'; see below).

Noise impacts on the system as contradiction and can generate either of two things. It may cause the system to generate redundancy ('drown out noise') or it may cause the system to 'lift up': 'Aufhebung'. This second option results in gaps between form (matter/energy) and content (information): i.e. abstraction.

In terms of the systemic linguistics employed here, noise refers to either non-options, or to an inappropriately frequent use of options which are characterised by a specific probability within the system. In terms of Nesbitt & Plum's (1988) analysis, a non-option might be a projecting material process ("You're an idiot", she crashed) with the likelihood of it being perceived as a non-option, or as non-meaningful. The use of a behavioural process in projection ("You're an idiot", she smiled) may be seen as acceptable, but such use at a frequency far beyond its degree of probability as allocated by the system might equally be perceived as inappropriate, and thus as 'noise'. Noise, therefore, is a relative concept, dependent on socially constructed, negotiated and maintained perceptions.
Noise may push the system into two directions: redundancy, or morphogenesis:

There are two ways for a structure of a system to maintain its stability in the face of noise. If may either protect itself by massive redundancy, which reduces the noise to insignificance and prevents change, or it may maintain itself by changing. The first is a principle of morphostasis; the second is a principle of sensitivity to noise, a principle of morphogenesis. (Wilden 1980: 331)

In the latter case,

noise does not necessarily remain as noise, because of the adaptive capabilities of the naturally morphogenetic open system in relation to a changing environment. By the process of Aufhebung [literally: 'lifting up'] or emergence, the noise may be incorporated into the system as information. The intrusion is converted into an essential part of the system so as to maintain the relationship between system and environment. (Wilden 1980: 400)

Wilden’s information theoretical angle on the issue relieves him from having to specify contextualising relations as is the prerogative of social semiotics (Lemke 1995a: 170). His use of the notion of redundancy will be placed in context in Section 2.6 and 2.7 where I discuss the term as it is used in systemic functional linguistics (also Chapter 3).

Wilden prefers to describe noise as accidental (cf. Firth’s and Lemke’s ‘non-criteriality’, Bernstein’s ‘not-yet-thought’), lest it be invested with a functional or teleological role. But it is its ‘accidental’ Aufhebung that provides the bridge between systemic recapitulation (homeostasis, etc.) and change (morphogenic evolution):

The accidental characteristic of the event in nature, its very improbability, is all we have to account for the negentropic bridge between homeostasis, homeorhesis, and invariant reproduction (structure and synchrony) on the one hand, and morphogenic evolution (system and diachrony), on the other. (Wilden 1980: 400)

The more complex the system the more likely it is to make errors, and the more sensitive it will be to errors. Without implying functionality or telos, Wilden sees redundancy as a means of
coping with errors, or noise, and of maintaining a kind of stability. "[T]he redundancy of a communications system is a measure of its stability in the sense of resistance to change" (Wilden 1980: 409). So whereas morphogenesis gives in to noise and makes it part of the system, or the code, redundancy opposes noise, and drowns it out.

Stability is preserved by means of redundancy, until the noise 'overtakes'. Then, another means of achieving stability may kick in.

Stability is also achieved by sensitivity to change; morphogenesis, evolution, revolution, are all adaptive responses seeking to restore stability at another level (Wilden 1980: 409).

When levels of redundancy prove insufficient, either morphogenesis or schismogenesis (Wilden 1980: 225) occurs: either the system works noise into the code through Aufhebung (morphogenesis), or it desintegrates (schismogenesis) and gives in to entropy.

Morphogenesis is thus not merely differentiation, or complexification, but involves a quantum jump from 'quantity to quality', from 'metonymy (part of whole; 'condensation') to metaphor' (representative of the whole; 'displacement'; Coward & Ellis 1977: 99).

This [morphogenic] event is a quantum jump in organisation ... . We can look on this process in retrospect as one in which a series of ... messages in an unstructured system ... become combined in such a way that their 'last' set of individual messages 'emerges' as a qualitative leap into a structured whole. This new whole, as a code, is a second-level metaphor generated by the contiguous and originally random messages of the antecedent 'system'. It is a metaphoric Event - after the event - which is retained in the trace ... (Wilden 1980: 401)

Morphogenesis concerns the overcoming of opposition through inclusion: it is a quantum jump which gets beyond (cf. Carnap's 'meta-'; Carnap 1928/71) the original opposition between code and noise.

Wilden associates the following properties with emergent metasystems:
- Increased adaptive range (viability) or increased semiotic freedom.
- Increased variety or a new order of organisation (complexity).
- Structural innovation.
- The generation of modified subsystems (after the event).
- More sophisticated selectivity.
- Changes in the order of adaptivity or learning.
- Increased memory storage.
- Increased possibilities of simulation.
- Increased goal-changing possibilities.
- Increased sensitivity to noise.
- Increased level of noise between the new system and its environment. (Wilden 1980: 375)

Emphasising the dynamic openness of morphogenic systems, Wilden abjures cybernetics, and highlights the possibility of 'violent change'. "[Cybernetic] models leave out of the account the quantum jumps which are evident - after the Event - in history and evolution" (Wilden 1980: 377). Morphogenic systems, by contrast, "produce gestalt novelty" (Wilden 1980: 378).

Importantly, the morphogenic tendency of a system stands in an inverse proportional relation to its redundancy. The less redundancy in the information exchanges that define a society, the more 'efficient' the system, but also the more complex, fragile, and the more easily affected by noise. Such an efficient, complex, system must be highly morphogenic:

instead of maintaining stability by homeostatic resistance to noise, it will seek to maintain stability by accepting noise, by incorporating it as information, and moving to a new level of organisation (evolving). It is in this sense that change becomes an internal or internalised principle of the system, a product of its forms of organisation, since the stability of the system is a product of its continuing evolution (Wilden 1980: 410)

So whereas high levels of redundancy may signal 'power', 'authority', 'certainty', and so on, it also signals inflexibility, inefficiency, and inability to deal with (certain levels of) noise. In Chapters 3 and 5 I will show how these issues apply to modes of interaction in the context of planning, and how relatively low redundancy and dynamically strategic positioning can be
instrumental in achieving agreements, or ‘interactional morphogenesis’.

To summarise, morphogenesis is generated from noise. Depending on whether the system is or believes it is open or closed, noise can become productive (generate new structures) or (due to the system being unable to recognise itself as the ultimate source of the noise) it can become a disturbance. Thus, certain systems are open, negentropic, and morphogenic; others are closed, possibly redundant, and morphostatic, or perhaps even entropic. (Halliday seems to say that because grammar is unconscious, i.e. a trace, it is necessarily always negentropic [i.e. becoming more and more complex]. But grammar is often kept ‘closed’ - people often stick to ‘rules’ which functional linguists would say are outdated - and is therefore not entirely or unproblematically negentropic. More accurately, the process is ‘epigenetic’; Edelman 1992: 23).

Negentropy is unpredictable and ‘improbable’. “Negentropic evolution in levels of organisation - i.e. localised negative entropy drawing its energy from an entropic universe - is a measure of improbability” (Wilden 1980: 403). Not all systems have a flexible and versatile enough memory and learning capacity to deal with high degrees of improbability and unmediated edictability. In cases where the trace predominates over noise, ‘structure’ will predominate over system’ (Wilden 1980: 406), and memory (recapitulation) will dominate over novelty and change.

2.5.1 Morphogenesis

The concept of morphogenesis, as “the power to elaborate structures”, comes from the work of Magoroh Maruyama (Maruyama 1963, cited in Wilden 1980: 140). As mentioned above, morphogenesis provides a means of theorising the point where the ‘technologisation’ of the social takes place.

By using Bateson’s application of Carnap’s categories of object language and metalanguage to human communication, it is possible to view the synchronic processes of the morphogenic goal-seeking system as a combination of messages within norms (i.e. codes) according to primarily metonymic principles, and the diachronic emergence (Aufhebung) of the metasystem from the referent system as a metaphorical event, involving a code-switching quantum-jump (selection from a set of metacodes). (Wilden 1980: 141)
Wilden adopts a cybernetic vocabulary to address the ‘behaviour’ of open systems, without however subscribing to the mechanistic and goal-directed meanings often present in that perspective (cf. Dunsire 1978). Systems, according to Wilden, are not goal-directed (‘teleological’), but goal-seeking (‘teleonomic’; Wilden 1980: 385). Thus, goals are not specified in advance, nor are they inherent in any open system. Goals are defined in relation to values which are dynamically contested/maintained, ascribed to/inscribed into the contradiction between code and noise which is, necessarily, assymetrical (cf. the ‘assymetricality of contradictions’; Coward & Ellis 1977: 88). The co-optation of the noise into the system is the ‘metaphoric event’:

The regulated metonymic processes of the synchronic system are controlled by negative feedback (i.e. the contradictions and differences); the metaphoric event is brought about by the intensification of contradictions, that is to say, by their conversion into irreconcilable oppositions related by positive feedback. (Wilden 1980: 141/2)

Thus, the intensification of ‘positive feedback’ (feedback which the system cannot ignore on the pain of allowing in ‘noise’) can bring about an increase in the redundancy of existing options (i.e. amplification of what already is), or it can allow the ‘noise’ to take on meaning within the system through metaphorisation of the original opposition. The metaphoric shift overcomes or ‘syntheseses’ the original opposition between meaning (code) and noise (non-code) at a new level of meaning. An example of this is our everyday ‘formulations’ (Garfinkel & Sacks 1970: 351), or ‘abstractions’ or ‘gestalts’.

A gestalt, for example, is formed by the decision to digitalise a specific difference, so as to form a distinction between figure and ground. There is in fact a decision - which may be neural, or conscious, or unconscious, or habitual, or learned, or novel - to introduce a particular boundary or frame into the analog continuum. (Wilden 1980: 174)

This distinction becomes the “difference that makes a difference” (Wilden 1980: 174). It ‘makes a difference’ because it technologises the energy-matter/information relation and sets off a chain reaction: noise (non-code) becomes meaning (code); new meanings (code, information) generate new matter-energy configurations; such new configurations impact, in their turn, on the code; and so on.
Once the system has entered into such a reciprocal reconstitution of information and matter-energy configurations, its sensitivity to noise will be enhanced. Such an intensification of contradictions (between code [meaning] and non-code [non-meaning or noise]) is crucially dependent on the ability of the system to 'learn', i.e. to change as a result of and on the basis of 'blockages' (occurrences of noise which the system cannot ignore).

The distinction between morphostasis of the individual organism and the morphogenesis of evolution or of highly complex systems like societies, lies in their adaptive behaviour (Wilden 1980: 368).

The focus of this thesis is on those interactions which contribute to morphogenesis, or change within complex systems like societies. I believe that the dynamics of interaction, if perceived along a sufficiently extensive time frame, reveal the relevance of interaction for social morphogenesis, both at the level of human interaction (i.e. the becoming of new group relations and structures) and at the level of the organisation of social space (i.e. the becoming of organised space).

The section which follows will deal with systemic functional linguistics and its theorisation of 'language as a social semiotic' and of the relation between semiosis and context.

2.6 The Study of Meaning Making: Systemic Functional Linguistics

In contrast to the more cognitivist orientations in mainstream linguistics, Halliday takes a social perspective on meaning making. As seen above, he is primarily interested not in what people know, but in how the culture defines what is possible, appropriate,
or necessary in interaction. This position effectively abandons making claims about any kind of individual cognitive ‘competence’, and it takes a purely social or dialogic view on interaction.

In systemic linguistics, the culture’s definition of what is possible is presented as our set of cultural options. This is a total of ‘options’ established on the basis of what members actually do and say. Language is thus described as a ‘behaviour potential’, or a “meaning potential, where meaning is a form of behaving” (Halliday 1973: 55).

Halliday’s notion of system ultimately derives from Saussure’s langue, and his notion of instance from Saussure’s parole (Saussure 1983: 14), but is filtered through the critical commentaries of Firth and Hjelmslev.

Firth’s critique, like Voloshinov’s, centred on Saussure’s opposition between langue and parole (Firth 1957: 180; Volosinov 1973: 60). This opposition was seen as Durkheimian, or as instituting a discontinuity between the individual and the social. Saussure was read, following Russian critiques, as a ‘static mechanical structuralist’ (Firth 1957: 181). For de Saussure, Voloshinov says, “language stands in opposition to utterance in the same way as does that which is social to that which is individual” (Voloshinov 1973: 60). Voloshinov here identifies “the theses of individualistic subjectivism and the antitheses of abstract objectivism” (Voloshinov 1973: 63).

the speech act or, more accurately, its product - the utterance, cannot under any circumstances be considered an individual phenomenon in the precise meaning of the word and cannot be explained in terms of the individual psychological or psychophysiological conditions of the speaker. The utterance is a social phenomenon (Voloshinov 1973: 82, his italics).

Voloshinov aimed to place greater emphasis on the dialogic aspect of meaning making than on interactionists’ shared background of (linguistic/semiotic) resources. Thibault, commenting on Voloshinov’s critique of Saussure, notes that despite his concern with the dialogic “Voloshinov does not reject the systemic basis of word meaning” (Thibault 1997a: 253).

[Voloshinov] is concerned to relate what he called utterances (cf. texts) to their socially stratified conditions of production

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and reception. Volosinov's account does not include a theory of the lexicogrammatical resource systems (cf. *langue*) which make this possible ... (Thibault 1997a: 253)

In Thibault's reading, Saussure's account included a consideration of social use, namely when he talks of 'typical patterns of discourse', and this approximates Volosinov's/Bakhtin's 'speech genres' (Bakhtin 1986). Thibault argues, against Firth and Volosinov, that Saussure's view was that

> [t]he sign implies a praxis in which the means (the resources of *langue*) and ends (*parole*) are unified. Signs are not fixed and closed entities; they are dynamic open processes. It is their adaptability to changing contextual factors which ensures the constant renewal of the relations between language users and the system. (Thibault 1997a: 254)

In a related attempt to foreground parole, Firth borrowed Malinowski's (1923: 306) notions of context of situation and context of culture and incorporated these into his language theory. Around the time when Voloshinov was writing in Russia, Malinowski was already complaining that

> The lack of a clear and precise view of Linguistic function and of the nature of Meaning, has been, I believe, the cause of the relative sterility of much otherwise excellent linguistic theorising (Malinowski 1923: 310).

He goes on to say that "an utterance becomes comprehensive only when we interpret it by its context of situation" (Malinowski 1923: 310).

What interested Firth was that Malinowski describes "language, in its primitive function, as a mode of action, rather than a counter-sign of thought" (Firth 1968: 138). Firth makes a link here with Wittgenstein's work: "The meaning of words lies in their use" (Wittgenstein 1953: 80, cited in Firth 1968: 138; but see Wilden 1980: 184). What these writers had in common was their concern with the utterance as social phenomenon; i.e. a (Heideggerian) view of the subject as constituted and realised, socially, through language (Edwards 1990: 110).

If we regard language as expressive or communicative we imply that it is an instrument of inner mental states. And as we know so little of inner mental states, even by the most careful introspection, the language problem becomes more
mysterious the more we try to explain it by referring it to inner mental happenings that are not observable. By regarding words as acts, events, habits, we limit our enquiry to what is objective and observable ... (Firth 1957: 170).

Firth was arguing against conceptions of language as ‘the expression of thought by means of speech sounds’ (Firth 1957: 171). Halliday also explicitly posits the ‘person’ as product of biology, language, and the social:

It is by means of language that the ‘human being’ becomes one of a group of ‘people’. But ‘people’, in turn, consist of ‘persons’: by virtue of his [sic] participation in a group the individual is no longer simply a biological specimen of humanity - he [sic] is a person. (Halliday 1978: 14)

Language is essential to participating as ‘person’ in the social, “since it is largely the linguistic interchange with the group that determines the status of individuals and shapes them as persons” (Halliday 1978: 14).

Accordingly, neither Firth nor Halliday foreground the distinction between subjective (individual) ability and objective (social) system of meaning options. Hence, meaning and function are not two different, separable things. The social essence of systemics lies in its definition of language as ‘meaning potential’: we are not concerned with how well speakers ‘control’ possible linguistic structures, but with what the social situation allows, encourages, or discourages, and with what actually gets ‘meant’. This is how Halliday justifies his stance:

It is of no great theoretical interest to try to predict what you or I are going to say next (even though in practice we are doing this with each other all the time). But it is part of our semiotic make-up, our higher-level consciousness, that our discourse as a whole will pattern quantitatively according to the probability profile of the grammar. (Halliday 1994 mimeo: 18)

Halliday’s focus is on the grammar in specific and on language in general as a socially available resource. While work like Chomsky’s would locate its source and emergence in the brain (cf. Ellis 1993; Halliday 1995b), others see it as subject to institutionalised modes of social distribution; such as Bernstein’s ‘distributive rules’ (Bernstein 1990: 180), or Bourdieu’s
‘inculcation and appropriation’ of language as ‘capital’ (Bourdieu 1990: 57).

Thanks to this social perspective on meaning making, Halliday’s framework enables a clear view on i) how certain positioning involve certain resources and ii) how those resources in particular relate to the positioning in question. We can now make two claims, the second significantly stronger than the first: i) the distribution of particular resources allows us to reason about the social positioning involved, and ii) (contra Bourdieu 1991) the inherent nature of those resources itself tends to be indicative of positioning. Bourdieu would go along with claim i), but explicitly rejects ii) as he sees the nature of powerful social resources as arbitrary (Bourdieu 1991: 113; cf. Hasan in press: 20ff). These issues will be elaborated in Chapters 3 and 5.

But where does change come in? Again, Halliday does not buy into an individualist or purely agentive perspective and neither does he adhere to a structuralist-teleological perspective. He sees change as the either more or less consciously intended result of accessing either more or less improbable options or non-options (viz. ‘disjunctions’, Lemke 1985b: 292) in the culture: “new meanings can arise at the disjunctions, and social orders can be transformed - either unconsciously, or by conscious linguistic engineering” (Halliday 1994 mimeo: 23).

This thesis takes the view that ‘planned change’ (as occurs in planning situations) draws on existing social resources (as both acknowledged and unacknowledged conditions), and therefore involves a re-combination of options or an elaborate re-evaluation of non-options as options (see Chapter 5). It sets as its task to link ‘planned change’ to the kinds of change talked about in systemic linguistics: phylogensis, ontogenesis, and logogenesis.

**Phylogenesis** concerns the history of the language system as a whole, or changes in ways of meaning. Halliday gives the following example:

With settlement, the shift from hunting and gathering to pastoral and agricultural practices there developed a new semiotic mode, namely writing; but the importance of writing lies in the grammar that develops along with it. This is a grammar in which *things* are construed as commodities . . . . It is also a grammar in which social relations are transformed into institutions. But the main source of
abstract meaning seems to shift from the interpersonal towards the ideational ... . (Halliday 1993a: 10)

Another phylogenetic shift Halliday comments on is the one which increasingly favours textual meaning:

The coming of this pattern [of ergativity] to prominence in the system of modern English is one of a number of related developments that have been taking place in the language over the past five hundred years or more, together amounting to a far-reaching and complex process of semantic change. These changes have tended, as a whole, to emphasise the textual function in the organisation of English discourse, by comparison with the experiential function, to emphasise the cause-and-effect aspect of processes by comparison with the ‘deed-and-extension’ one. (Halliday 1994: 163, cited in M. Davies 1996: 112/3; also Halliday 1993a: 18)

Ontogenesis is the trajectory of the human being into this socially available and socially negotiated meaning potential and thus into personhood (Halliday 1973, 1975; Painter 1991, 1993). Halliday hypothesises ontogenesis to “provide a model for phylogenesis” (Halliday 1973: 34); the individual’s linguistic system, in other words, follows the development of the overall linguistic system.

Halliday’s theorising about ontogenesis draws extensively on a study he did of his son, Nigel (Halliday 1975), which highlights several important ontogenic shifts. As the child moves from protolanguage, where content maps directly onto expression (i.e. an utterance has only one function), via a transition period where intonation becomes a resource for contrasting mathetic and pragmatic utterances, to adult language, where an utterance combines more than one overarching or meta function, the child moves into the (adult) grammar by gaining access into the Mood system. The Mood system differentiates kinds of interactive participation: interrogative, imperative, and declarative, each of which presumes a specific social positioning or sharing of the interactive ‘roles’.

In Halliday’s account, the advent of the grammar provides an extra interface between sounding (which interfaces with the body) and meaning (which interfaces with ‘the entire realm of human experience’). “A grammar is an entirely abstract semiotic construct that emerges inbetween the content and the expression levels of
the original, sign-based primary semiotic system" (Halliday 1996: 5). In Painter's account of this moment, the protolinguistic formfunction sign bifurcates into a content and an expression plane (Painter 1993). In other words, the grammar allows 'an indefinite amount of play' between content and expression by stratifying language: semantics (meaning), grammar (wording), phonology (sounding).

Logogenesis concerns the unfolding of a piece of discourse. "Any piece of discourse unfolds as a flow of meaning, a complex interplay of the predictable and the unpredictable" (Halliday 1994 mimeo: 19). The level of predictability is not so much individual-dependent, as socio-systemically invested with particular degrees of appropriacy and necessity. Halliday continues:

From the standpoint of the instance, this means a construction of 'given' and 'new' in relation to the text itself and its environment ('context of situation'). From the standpoint of the system, it means its overall pattern of information and redundancy" (Halliday 1994 mimeo: 19; his emphases).

The reference to information and redundancy draws on the kind of information theory advanced by Bateson and Wilden, introduced to systemics by Lemke (Lemke 1984; Jakobson 1971b: 571 remarks the term originates from "the rhetorical branch of linguistics"). This emphasises that the resources we draw on in social situations are not merely 'linguistic entities'; instead they are socially constituted relations which exploit language for their (increasingly complex) realisation. Linguistic behaviour is inconceivable without the specific probabilities of occurrence (with all the judgments of appropriacy and normalcy inherent in this) that attach to its systemic terms.

As already remarked in Chapter 1, the relation between system and instantiation is generally theorised as follows in systemics: process instantiates system and thereby perturbs it. Change occurs through marginal changes (deliberately or accidentally) embodied in the instantiation.

This is the 'instantiation' referred to earlier, whereby each instance (which means, in this context, each utterance accepted by and produced by the individual) perturbs the probabilities of the system (Halliday 1994 mimeo: 18).
As seen, Halliday acknowledges that language grows “not at an even rate, but with acceleration at certain ‘moments’ in the history of a culture” (Halliday 1996: 10). But the locus of specific changes as well as the nature of those changes can, I believe, be more clearly specified.

Although Halliday describes phylogenetic shifts and details a child’s ontogenesis, he has provided few examples of how language and context ‘unfold’ logogenetically (for Halliday’s logogenetic analyses: Halliday 1973: 121, 1985/94: 368, 1992a, 1993b: 86, 1994: 197). The dynamic analyses relevant to this thesis are those of spoken interaction (e.g. Halliday 1985/94, 1994), but Halliday’s are generally of relatively short interactions (except Halliday 1994). The perspective on contextual change is thereby limited.

Also, due to Halliday’s textual delimitation of the object under study, change is necessarily restricted to and described as linguistic change. Halliday’s analysis of a dissertation defence (Halliday 1994) is delimited on the basis of the tape recording of the event: the tape started at the opening of the meeting and finished at its end. It thus restricts itself to a single interaction, without focusing more specifically on the broader institutional process in which that language was embedded and which it was at least in part devised to further. By contrast, were the object of study institutionally rather than linguistically delimited (also Chapter 6), textual logogenesis could be seen to be an aspect of the kinds of recontextualisations that characterise institutional interaction more generally.

Logogenesis has been discussed in the literature as being reflected in shifting contextual ‘states’ (M. O’Donnell 1990) and as selectively mobilising options from a formal network (Matthiessen in prep. on instantial systems; Matthiessen & Bateman 1992 on ‘system versus process’). But in these accounts logogenesis is always linguistically circumscribed. In the view taken here, logogenesis has not generally been seen as involving a truly open dynamic exchange with what these analyses term ‘changing context’.

In an open dynamic exchange perspective, linguistic meaning can either be derived from other forms of semiosis which have not (yet) been linguistified (compare Heidegger’s ‘bidding the thing into nearness’, referred to in Edwards 1990: 90; Merleau-Ponty’s ‘ante-predicative becoming predicative’, in Descombes 1980: 60; ‘linguistification’, in Habermas 1987: 77; the ‘pre-semiotic'
becoming ‘semiotic’ in Thibault 1997a: 290). Logogenesis can also be described as involving processes of linguistic re-semiotisation: i.e. funneling linguistic meaning into semiotic modes other than language (compare ‘delinguistification’, in Habermas 1987: 155/184; also Wilden 1980: 408 on a society’s mode of material inscription; Bourdieu 1994: 13 on the state’s material framing of practices; Law 1994: 23 and Law & Mol 1995: 280 on the notion of ‘relational materiality’; see Section 5.3).

An example of linguistification is the shift from more or less subconscious ‘thought’ into language (cf. Thibault 1997a: 169). The shifts from talk into writing, or from either into technical design, monetary currency, or embodied and naturalised practice, are examples of ‘delinguistification’. This thesis aims to pursue a logogenetic ‘shift’ and trace its recontextualisation or re-semiotisation from meaning in face-to-face interaction to meaning as technologised re-organisation of social space. The dynamic traced here, in other words, is conceived of as increasingly inscribing negotiated and settled differences onto materiality - either as print, design, or physical infra-structure or architecture - as a result of morphogenesis (of which logogenesis is an aspect).

Morphogenesis, therefore, provides a view on change not restricted by an object of study, as seem to be Halliday’s genetic takes on language: the language as a whole, the linguistic individual, the linguistic text. Instead, morphogenesis addresses the principle and the possibility of social change itself, as do Fairclough’s inter-semiotic transformations (Fairclough 1992: 130).

The focus here will also be on what Bourdieu terms ‘universalisation’ (Bourdieu 1994: 17), or the enhanced relevance of morphogenic structures (for a broader populace). But I argue against their naturalisation: in a perspective where both text and context are always only temporarily, tentatively and politically delineated, a means needs to be found to reason about what becomes text, and what is relegated to context (‘context-ed’).

2.6.1 Systemics and Metafunctionality

Halliday has related the development of language to the functions it has been called on to serve socially, and this provides the link between change and Halliday’s metafunctionality hypothesis. Language evolves in interaction with its contexts of function. These contexts are of two main types. Language both represents material reality and constitutes social reality.
The emphasis on the representative-expressive role of language goes back to Herder and the romantics, who saw language not as mimesis (as mirror held up to nature, or as 'allegory') but as expression of how humankind sees reality ('symbol'). "We see that language is no longer an assemblage of words, but the capacity to speak (express realiza) the reflective awareness implicit in using words to say something" (C. Taylor 1985a: 230). Herder, and after him von Humboldt, was also important for furthering the view that language constitutes social relations, which insight came from the romantic notion that language "realises man's [sic] humanity. Man [sic] completes himself [sic] in expression" (C. Taylor 1985a: 233). In short,

The whole development, through the seventeenth-century designative theory and the Romantic expressive view, has brought language more and more to centre stage in our understanding of man [sic]; first as an instrument of the typically human capacity of thinking, and then as the indispensable medium without which our typically human capacities, emotions, relations would not be. (Taylor 1985a: 235)

In Halliday's systemic, these insights are worded thus:

The functional contexts of language fall into two major types, and the constitutive function that the grammar performs differs as between the two types. On the one hand, language 'constitutes' human experience; and in this context, the grammar's function is to construe: the grammar transforms experience into meaning, imposing order in the form of categories and their interrelations. On the other hand, language 'constitutes' social processes and the social order; and here the grammar's function is to enact: the grammar brings about the processes, and the order, through meaning. (Halliday 1996: 6)

In systemics, this dual function which language performs gives rise to the *metafunctions*: "the grammar achieves this 'metafunctional' synthesis of semiotic transformation and semiotic enactment (of knowledge with action ...)" (Halliday 1996: 6).

Other recent accounts of language and language use have adopted a similar largely dualist view of linguistic functionality (Habermas 1984, 1987; Harré 1991; Harré & Gillett 1994; Shotter 1993; C. Taylor 1985a/b, 1995). Halliday, however, takes the issue of metafunctionality one step further. Besides a 'transformative'
(ideational) and ‘enactive’ (interpersonal) metafunction, he speaks of an enabling or textual metafunction, netting in that aspect of language (semiosis) necessary for maintaining its own cohesion. In the following passage Halliday explains how his model differs from that of other writers:

I can explain very simply the relation between the functional framework that I use and that of Bühler. My own ideational corresponds very closely to Bühler’s representational, except that I want to introduce the further distinction within it between experiential and logical, which corresponds to a fundamental distinction within language itself. My own interpersonal corresponds more or less to the sum of Bühler’s conative and expressive, because in the linguistic system these two are not distinguished. Then I need to add a third function, namely the textual function, which you will not find in Malinowski or Bühler or anywhere else, because it is intrinsic to language: it is the function that language has of creating text, of relating itself to context - to the situation and the preceding text. So we have the observer function, the intruder function, and the relevance function ... . (Halliday 1978: 48; his emphases)

The textual metafunction covers that aspect of language which ensures its cohesion and its comprehensibility. Systemics’ concern with textuality, or ‘texture’ (Halliday & Hasan 1985: 22) derives from the fact that it takes not the sentence but text in context as its unit of analysis. Texture is achieved by means of those linguistic devices which create intra-sentential and inter-sentential cohesion, as well as contextual coherence.

As already referred to above, the textual metafunction came to play an important role when language moved from being primarily spoken to being also written. The increasing textuality of language (i.e. its increasing written-ness) ran in parallel with

a form of discourse in which the dominant patterns in the grammar, in the sense of those which determine primarily what options are taken up, are the textual patterns of theme and information rather than - or at least as much as - the ideational patterns of transitivity. (Halliday 1993a: 18)

Besides his introduction of the textual metafunction, another aspect of Halliday’s work is his contextual hypothesis: certain features of context systematically relate to certain features of language. “[C]omponents of the context are systematically related
to the components of the semantic system” (Halliday 1978: 189). Firth had already talked about context in terms of i) the participants, ii) their action (verbal or non-verbal), iii) relevant features of the situation, and iv) effects of the verbal action (cited in Halliday & Hasan 1985: 8). Also, Hymes’ ethnography of communication focused on largely similar contextual aspects (Hymes 1972a/b; Saville-Troike 1982).

Halliday narrowed the number of contextual components down to three: Field, Tenor and Mode. In his definition, Field refers to what is happening, Tenor to who is taking part, and Mode to what role the language is playing (Halliday & Hasan 1985: 12). Halliday’s text-context hook-up consists in the following pairings (Table 2.1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components of social context</th>
<th>Functional-semantic component through which typically realised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Field (social process)</td>
<td>ideational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Tenor (social relationship)</td>
<td>interpersonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Mode (symbolic mode)</td>
<td>textual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Context-Text hook-up (adapted from Halliday 1978: 189)

Field is realised linguistically by ideational semantics: lexical relations (Martin 1992: 286) and activity sequences (Martin 1992: 537). Ideational semantics puts the following systems at risk in clause grammar: TRANSITIVITY, LOGICAL RELATIONS, CIRCUMSTANTIATION, NUMERATION, MODIFICATION and CLASSIFICATION (Martin 1992: 536). Tenor is congruently realised by interpersonal semantics: NEGOTIATION, APPRAISAL and INVOLVEMENT (Martin in press b/c), which in turn put the following systems at risk at clause rank: MOOD, POLARITY, MODALITY, and attitudinal and specialised lexis, among others. Mode, due to its enabling orientation, is realised through “all systems on the level of the discourse semantics” (Martin 1992: 508), and impacts on Theme and Information distribution at clause rank.

Halliday uses Lemke’s notion of ‘metaredundancy’ to detail the nature of the ‘text/context hook-up’: a particular Field (Tenor, Mode) configuration will ‘rebound with’ a particular sphere of the ideational (interpersonal, textual) semantics which in turn will put a particular area of the experiential/logical (interpersonal, textual) grammar at risk (Lemke 1984: 35; 1995: 104; Halliday 1992b: 24). Halliday uses the notion of register to refer to the way in which situation types activate, with a degree of probability, particular ideational, interpersonal, and textual resources, depending on a situation’s Field, Mode and Tenor configurations. In that sense, Field, Mode and Tenor are generalisations about probabilities of the system in context, which are, to varying degrees, instantiated
(or changed) logogenetically. However, such a perspective does not deal with logogenetic subtleties (cf. M. O‘Donnel 1990; Sefton 1995), nor with recontextualisations (or ‘re-semiotisations’) of meaning.

2.6.2 Text and Context

The text-context theorisation in terms of Field, Mode and Tenor provides a way into thinking about the situation in which the text occurs (cf. Firth’s ‘mutual expectancy’ between text and situation). The notion of text might seem to be unproblematic as socially relevant linguistic unit (cf. Halliday & Hasan 1985: 10). The notion of context, as derived from Malinowski’s work, is used to talk about those features of the social environment of the text seen to be crucial to understanding what is going on. The utterance “becomes only intelligible when it is placed in its context of situation”. Malinowski argues that the notion of context must be “carried over into the analysis of general conditions under which a language is spoken” (Malinowski 1923: 306).

In-depth discussions of how the text-context relation may change are limited, however, apart from more abstract comments such as these:

The grammar’s model of experience is constantly being challenged and reinforced in daily life; thus it tends to change when there are major changes in the condition of human existence - not as a consequence, but as a necessary and integral element of those changes”. (Halliday 1996: 7

Meaning (acting semiotically) develops along with doing (acting materially) as independent modes of human behaviour; and both depend on interaction with the physical and social environment. (Halliday 1994 mimeo: 7/8)

Despite this, in descriptions of interaction (e.g. the logogenetic analyses by Halliday referred to earlier) the semiotic-material interdependence is rarely foregrounded (except perhaps in ontogenetic descriptions of ‘significant other-child’ interactions; Painter 1991, 1993; Hasan & Cloran 1990), and context is generally presented as relatively static (e.g. as in Halliday 1985, 1994). The consequences of this interdependence for how context is conceived are not made explicit: context seems to unproblematically remain context, despite its changes. By the same token, logogenesis remains a purely textual or linguistic affair (e.g. Sefton 1995; Matthiessen in prep).
In Halliday’s writings the notion of context comprises both culture and situation, and is a mix of both material and linguistic relevances. Context may thus refer to ‘a park bench’ or ‘a toy train’, but also a host of cultural or specialised knowledges and assumptions that accompany such details (cf. Fairclough on ‘Background Knowledge’; Fairclough 1995b: 43).

Thus, adapting one of Halliday’s diagrams (Halliday 1991a: 8), the interactive ‘universe’ is presented as ‘made up’ of the following aspects (Figure 2.1):

![Figure 2.1: Modelling text in context (variation on Halliday 1991a: 8)](image)

The kind of representation in Figure 2.1 does not present a clear picture of how the semiotic-material relation is to be talked about, however.

Nevertheless, Halliday posited a semiotic definition of context early on: “The semiotic structure of the situation is formed out of the three socio-semantic variables of field, tenor and mode” (Halliday 1978: 122). Martin follows through the logical consequences of this proposal (in Martin 1992) and construes context in wholly semiotic terms, as consisting of genre and register (Figure 2.2 below).

![Figure 2.2: Martin’s stratified context (Martin 1992: 495)](image)
The whole of social processes (in Bakhtin’s sense of “the diverse areas of human activity”; Bakhtin 1986: 60, cited in Martin 1992: 494) is referred to as Genre, which uses Register as its expression form. Register, in turn, uses Language as its expression form (Martin 1992: 495). Here, Martin effectively provides a semiotic description of context, subjugating the material, or the ‘real’, to its semiotic relevance in interaction.

In more recent work, Martin presents Genre and Register as two faces of meaning making, with Genre as ‘past’ and Register as ‘present’ (cf. Bernstein’s view of classification as past and framing as present), both forming the connotative semiotic denoted by language as expression form (Figure 2.3).

![Figure 2.3: Martin’s complementarity perspective on semiosis (Martin 1996a).](image)

Martin’s semiotisation of context ‘cleans up’ the systemic account of the text-context relation, and solves, to a large degree, the staticness between text and context inscribed into earlier accounts. In his conception, the distinction between text and context is purely semiotic, and thereby opens up the possibility of ‘logogenetic’ descriptions of how, and what aspect of, the semiotic potential becomes instantiated. Yet it still leaves questions about
how the semiotic-material interdependence referred to above can be talked about.

It is with this in mind that Threadgold (1991: 69ff) critiques Martin's semiotisation of context. She argues that his model allows only for a linguistic realisation of context:

While this formulation is faithful to Hjelmslev's notion of connotative semiotic systems, that notion in Hjelmslev, and in the later use made of it by Barthes (1968/81) and Eco (1976) is reserved for understanding what Eco calls 'infinite semiosis', Derrida's 'differance', within a single semiotic system. (Threadgold 1991: 72; her italics)

Threadgold sees Martin's model as subjugating all semiosis to language, and her main reservation here centres on the elision of the practical, or non-linguistic, side of semiosis. Using Foucault's exposition in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977), Threadgold points out that "[a] system of visibility [i.e. materiality] and a system of language do not have the same formation ... The two systems may co-adapt but they are not isomorphic" (Threadgold 1991: 73). She goes on to cite Deleuze:

It is not an exaggeration to say that every mechanism is a mushy mixture of the visible and the articulable. The prison system combines in a single figure discourses and architectures, programmes and mechanisms. (Deleuze 1986: 38, cited in Threadgold 1991: 73)

The crux of Threadgold's critique is that Martin's model, as it stands, 'contains the non-discursive within the discursive' (Threadgold 1991: 73). Rewriting semiosis then as a multi-modal phenomenon, Threadgold puts forward the following proposal:

The suggestion that all texts are multi-medial extends the metafunctional hypothesis to all semiotic systems, and sees their interrelationships in bundles as like the simultaneity and interactions between metafunctional components in the clause. Each component, be it body, space, language, objects, has its own expression/content relationships. The bundles themselves are then theorised as the typical texts-in-situation which constitute the institutions and the practices of the social and which enact and embody social relations. (Threadgold 1991: 73)
The implications of this for Martin’s model are that language is not necessary posited as the only possible expression form of the semioticised context plane, and that phonology/graphology need not be the only expression forms of meaning. This suggests that particular social processes need not be linguistically delimited and circumscribed: such processes may mobilise semiotic media other than language, with their own ‘grammars’ and ‘graphologies’. The most obvious example here is architecture with its specific rules and resources which, in turn, delimit architectural realisations (i.e. its solutions and possibilities; see Chapter 5, Section 5.3 below).

Thibault (1994) resolves the dilemma by making two points. First, the text-context distinction is a matter of interactional salience: that which is perceived as ‘context’ is merely that which is relegated to semiotic modalities other than language (e.g. kinesic, proxemic, olfactory, somatic, sartorial, etc.), or is not semiotised at all (i.e. not [yet] entered into a system of socially valued differences: not ‘criterial’). Second, all that which is made semiotically relevant (whether highly relevant as language, or somewhat less so as dress, smell, gesture, etc.) is globally organised in terms of the four metafunctions (experiential, logical, interpersonal, textual). This ‘intrinsic metafunctionality’ (cf. Martin 1991) organises all that which is both highly or less highly relevant, or salient, i.e. all that which has been, is being, or will/can be semiotised. Thus, the choice ‘to text’ (verb) some aspects of this entire potential and ‘context’ others is a political decision.

Thibault points toward the ‘multimodality’ of social interaction: the continuous co-deployment of a multitude of semiotic modalities such as saying, doing, wearing, smelling, and feeling. He emphasises that these need not be ‘isomorphic’ (in Threadgold’s words), or ‘homologous’ (i.e. there is no ‘referentiality’ implied when talking about how speaking, doing and feeling may co-occur).

The cross-coupling of the semiotic-discursive and the physical-material domains does not occur on a one-to-one or correlational basis. Instead, it is the globally co-patterned nature of the internal redundancies among the various dimensions of semiosis which gets cross-coupled with the ‘outside’. (Thibault 1994: 19)

This points toward the notions of ‘symmetry’ (co-patterning) and ‘symmetry-breaking’ that will be discussed in Section 2.7
below. Importantly, Thibault herewith overcomes the reduction of the pre-discursive (the material) to the discursive.

The multifunctional and globally co-patterned nature of the various dimensions of semiotic form means that these [i.e. the semiotic and physical-material] contextualise each other. They also contextualise the ‘outside’ at the same time that this contextualises the ‘inside’. (Thibault 1994: 19/20)

In my discussion of both Lemke’s and Thibault’s work below I will address these issues in greater detail.

The crucial points that flow from the discussion so far are that i. the text-context relation is reconceived in terms of interactional salience (depending on the degree of attention bestowed on what aspect of the semiotic potential; cf. Forester 1993a: 101); ii. the semiotic and the material stand in dynamic tension, in that the semiotic may direct its focus onto aspects of the material and thereby semiotically mobilise it (changes in symmetries or ‘cross-couplings’); iii. the claim of semiotic multi-modality suggests the possibility of ‘ranking’ modalities in terms of explicitness or likely negotiability in interaction (in the way that a spoken statement is easier to negotiate than a written one; or similarly, in the way that a design is easier to negotiate than the constructed building proposed by the design: each modality has in inherent degree of ‘negotiability’, or ‘time-space-distanciation’; see Chapter 3).

In the next section I will focus on Lemke’s and Thibault’s work within the area of ‘eco-social semiotics’. I will refer to Lemke’s earlier work first, as it makes important links with the sociological work presented above.

2.7 Towards an eco-social semiotic analysis

Systemics provides the crucial link between language and social structures and this link provides the scaffold for social semiotics. Social semiotics, as an attempt to integrate social and historical issues into systemic-functional theory, was inspired by the recognition that Halliday’s theory of text and context of situation/culture (and their ‘hook-up’) needed refining, and of which Martin’s semiotisation of context discussed above was one outcome. The social semiotic project was born from discussions held at the Newtown Semiotic Circle, attended by Anne Cranny-Francis, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen, J.R. Martin, Stephen Muecke, Paul Thibault, Terry Threadgold, and others in the
eighties. Hodge & Kress' Social Semiotics (Hodge & Kress 1988) is a powerful statement of the breadth of this kind of social semiotics, and of its analytical principles. Several of those principles are crucial to the work presented here:

1 All semiotic activity takes place in time: all semiotic phenomena are diachronic, whether on a small scale (the time to produce or interpret a single syntagm, the flow of syntagms in discourse) or a larger scale, including the history of human semiosis.

2 Every syntagm is a moment in a process of transformations, leading backwards in time (to earlier syntagms in the same exchange, to earlier discourses or semiotic acts) and forward (to later uses of the syntagm, by decoders and encoders); and this process, in its strict chronological order, is a key to the interpretation of that syntagm.

3 Every structure and relation in the field of semiotics is subject to transformational activity: so there are syntagmatic and paradigmatic transformations as well as other transformational processes, which act together to constitute the semiotic object.

4 Every transformation is a concrete event, with agents, and reasons, deriving from material and social life: and the base line for the interpretation of any diachronic chain is its intersection with the material world. (Hodge & Kress 1988: 35)

Hodge and Kress' notion of 'transformation' plays an important role in this thesis, and will be detailed in terms of the principles of relational grammatics. This will be elaborated in Chapter 3.


Lemke defines as the most fundamental task of social semiotics "to weave together into one discourse accounts of particular social acts, in particular contexts of situation and on particular occasions, with accounts of the dynamic processes of the social system as a whole" (Lemke 1985a: 5). Modernist sociology traded in macro-social concepts such as class, institution, etc. and in micro-social concepts such as face-to-face co-presence, intention and
motivation. Such sociologies remained incapable of recognising any kind of 'metaredundancy' across levels of social interaction (cf. Knorr-Cetina & Cicourel 1981: 15), as they were caught in the traditional opposition between the social and the individual.

The macrosocial accounts remain speculative because however insightful their observations, if a macrosocial discourse has no unfolding in microsocial terms, it is impossible for microsocial observations (which are ultimately the only social 'data') to modify and contribute directly to the refinement of macrosocial theory. It is also then impossible to use macrosocial insights to guide specific practice in particular social situations (Lemke 1985a: 5).

Lemke argues that this dichotomy between micro and macro social analysis is no accident: the moral comfort that accrues from liberal individualist discourses is rooted in maintaining the bourgeois ideology which supports the interests and privileges that accompany current modes of domination (Lemke 1988: 1). The view of subjectivity that underpins such ideology maintains the individual as atomistic, creative, intentional, intellectualistic and rational; in short, a disengaged, 'individualistic' self more or less transparently visible to itself (also C. Taylor 1985a: 5).

Such unitary, monological notions of self are maintained, Lemke claims, to buttress a set of legal rights applicable to economically delimited categories of person: "not to analyse the social practices by which we constitute human individuality prevents us from seeing how those very practices contribute to human exploitation" (Lemke 1988: 6). Paradoxically, it is the construction of the individual as intentional, rational, and agentic in bourgeois discourses, together with the conception that individuals are real and society only an abstraction, which prevents recognition of the discursive constitution of subject positions and agency, which in turn obfuscates the relations between the biological (material) systems and systems to which subject positions and agents belong (cf. also Wilden 1980: 222). Such recognition would provide, if realised as discourse mediating between practices and systems, a social theory of the subject (Lemke 1985a: 9). Thus, the traditional notion of 'individual' is the "primary obstacle to the construction of social discourses intermediate between macro and microanalysis" (Lemke 1985a: 9).

In his earlier work, Lemke formulates two discourses to provide a link between micro and macro analysis. The first is able to relate specific situated acts to the types of activities and meaning-
makings of a particular community. Hence, a community is conceived as composed of types of practices, not acting individuals (cf. Giddens 1984: 2). These practices are enacted with particular resources and in particular ways (cf. ‘typified constructs’; Schutz 1962, cited in Heritage 1984: 49, or ‘genres’; Bakhtin 1986: 60; Martin 1992: 546).

The second discourse is able to interrelate these generic formations and focus on what is both typical and untypical, or on the ‘disjunctions’ in the culture (Lemke 1985b: 292), by defining a global system of social practices of the community, within which each typical formation and every intersection of formations in a particular production of meaningful social action will take a definite position relative to all the others. (Lemke 1985a: 11)

The meaning-making practices which social actors engage in are of diverse types and may co-exist, intersect, or come into conflict. This phenomenon was given the name ‘heteroglossia’ by Bakhtin (1981: 291). Heteroglossia provides the potential for destabilising practices; in that sense it is ‘centrifugal’, or moving away from a normalised, institutionalised harmony. (Threadgold reads heteroglossia as “that entropy in the system which constitutes the very possibility of change”; Threadgold 1987: 555.)

Drawing further on Bakhtin’s dynamic account of interaction, Lemke acknowledges that heteroglossia may be resolved by ‘centripetal’ or unifying forces, and the result will be monologic, in contrast to the dialogic effect of centrifugality (Bakhtin 1981: 272). It is at the nexus of monologism and dialogism, where heteroglossia may come into production, that there exists the possibility for both change and suppression of change. Thus, any interaction stands at the crossroads of conflicting forces and resemblances: forces which push it either towards monologic, unified, homogenising meaning or away towards dialogic, conflictual and multiple meanings. These issues are crucial to my description of the positioning practices observed during the planning project under focus here (see Chapter 5).

I should also clarify here Lemke’s adaptation of Bakhtin’s work and how it relates to Wilden’s adaptation of Bateson’s notions of redundancy and morphogenesis. Redundancy can be seen as monologic and centripetal: a ‘voice’ identifies with a normalised and institutionalised harmony to exclude noise and contradiction. By contrast, morphogenesis is grounded in the acknowledgement

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of heteroglossia, and thereby makes possible a dialogic or centrifugal destabilisation of redundant meaning(s), to effect a conciliation between these and contradictory meanings at a different level of abstraction (Wilden 1980: 400, 421). Morphogenesis, here, represents Wilden's and Giddens' systemic learning, or 'historicity' ('awareness of the 'progressive movement' of society shaped by that very awareness'; Giddens 1984: 203).

This systemic learning is what typifies 'open systems', some of which both learn as well as store (see below). Planning, in this thesis, is conceived as made up of 'redundancy positionings' (the agents of production: the Area Health Service official and the Project Manager, both personifying power) and 'morphogenic positionings' (the agents of symbolic control: the Architect-Planner, who personifies 'learning'). I will argue that this subtle division of 'positioning labour' ensures the maintenance, or rather metastability, of bureaucratic hegemony.

Lemke states that 'metastability' is vital for dynamic open systems to maintain themselves as systems: i.e. they depend on continuous interaction with their environment(s) for inputs (and outputs) of energy, matter and information (Lemke 1995a: 162). There is thus a continuous interchange between "the conflicts, tensions and disharmonies in the system (i.e. those relations and processes that can potentially change the system) and those processes and relations that work to stabilise or maintain the system of relations in a particular way" (Thibault 1991a: 26). While Lemke does not use the term 'morphogenesis', he does make reference to 'emergent structuration' (Lemke 1993: 263; see Section 2.8 below).

Lemke's description of change is information theoretical. The systemic nature of the processes and relations that make up social practices is such that

Any social system persists as a system only if, at any given time, only some and not all possible social practices occur in it; and only if, over time, only some kinds of changes in these practices take place (Lemke 1985a: 38)

There are thus (more or less) clear boundaries between what is considered meaningful and what is not. These boundaries (Foucault's 'dispersions'; Bernstein's 'classifications') regulate and inhibit challenges to the system of established practices as well as providing the gateway to the possibility of systemic (practical and discursive) change. Significantly, those areas of (discursive)
practice which are most strongly boundaried or classified are at the same time the most sensitive as well as the most ('ideologically') revelatory prerogatives of the system.

2.7.1 Linking language and practice

Halliday’s notion of register aims to provide the link between discourse (language, text) and practice (action; Halliday 1978: 32, also Lemke 1985b: 276). As pointed out above, register provides one way of talking about the typical linguistic resources which are made use of in particular situations.

Lemke distinguishes Halliday’s linguistically oriented notion of register from his own thematic systems and from Bakhtin’s heteroglossia as follows:

Registers are more closely articulated with individual texts than are heteroglossic varieties (which correspond most closely to Halliday’s fields, as do thematic systems), but heteroglossic relations reach out much further than do the merely interpersonal relations of immediate situational context, beyond even the typical role-relations of a social situation, to the relations of opposed interests between, say, whole social classes. (Lemke 1985a: 19)

Lemke notes that Foucault (Foucault 1972) shifted focus from semantic and syntactic analysis to discursive practices where particular themes play particular roles, and where particular subjects take on particular positions. The analysis now centres on social processes rather than objects, i.e. texts: "[w]ho, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use this sort of language? Who is qualified to do so?" (Foucault 1972: 50), illuminating the struggles over and contestations of the right to power and the enactment of control.

A link has thus been forged between (discursive) practices, i.e. action, subject positions, and discourse formations, or economies of social participation. This provides a discourse for talking about thematic choices, participant choices and (inter)textual choices, in that these will tend to pattern in particular ways in a specific community: i.e. the contextual and social distribution of the available alternatives will be the focus of both conservatory and contestatory attention.

There will be relations of incompatibility, of functional equivalence, of conventional linkage or disjunction of
objects, speaking practices, and text-types within a discourse formation. (Lemke 1985a: 33)

In Lemke’s systemic social semiotics, disjunctions represent non-options in the system, or at least non-options for certain speakers in certain situations. Disjunctions are “[t]heoretical contradictions, lacunae, defects [which] may indicate the ideological functioning of a [discourse]” (Foucault 1972: 186, cited in Lemke 1985a: 34).

The word ‘ideology’ could be used here to refer to the preference for specific options or ‘junctions’ and the dispreferredness of others. Hence, describing an utterance “does not consist in analysing the relations between the author and what he [sic] says (or wanted to say, or said without wanting to); but in determining what position can and must be occupied by any individual if he [sic] is to be the subject of it” (Foucault 1972: 96). The reconception of the social actor from ‘acting individual’ to ‘series of instantiations of specific actional and discursive formations of a community’ is crucial for linking discourse-as-text to discourse-as-social institution, and for appreciating ‘action’ as ‘structure’ and vice versa. The notion ‘instantiating a discursive formation’ will be put to use when I contrast the AHS official’s talk and the junior planner’s talk in Chapters 3 and 5. The analytical concept ‘disjunction’ will be shown to concern a ‘socially contested discursive space’.

In sum, social differentiation (hierarchical or communal) is maintained through systems of practices which are not overtly, or do not seem to be primarily, about domination or differentiation. Practices, in that sense, are sets of ‘junctions’ (options) in the system(s) of meaning-making intersecting with the available voices. This does not mean that the actions and discourse formations of a community are homogeneous and unproblematic; on the contrary, inconsistencies do not merely exist, but are vital for the maintenance, or the metastability, of the system as a whole.

To maintain themselves as systems, dynamic open systems depend on continuous interaction with their environment(s) for inputs (and outputs) of energy, matter and information (Lemke 1995a: 162). This is what Lemke refers to as metastability. There is thus a continuous dialectic between “the conflicts, tensions and disharmonies in the system (i.e. those relations and processes that can potentially change the system) and those processes and relations that work to stabilise or maintain the system of relations in a particular way” (Thibault 1991a: 26).
In his more recent work, Lemke moves away from the discursively oriented focus of Foucault's *Archaeology* to one that pays more attention to the system-environment relation. His notion of disjunction thus loses its discursive definition, and takes on a more 'ecosocial' role (see Section 2.8 below). Before addressing Lemke's recent formulation of 'ecosocial dynamic system', I will tie together his arguments uniting the macro and micro social scientific investigation of social change.

### 2.7.2 A Unified Social Discourse

Once sociology has freed itself from the biologist discourses which buttress individualism, humanism, liberalism, and the like, a more variegated account can be given of both modes and contexts of social interaction. As seen, at the centre of this account stands not the 'intentional' individual but the notion of social (discursive) practices.

[These] are not necessarily rigidly ritualised, stereotypical activities, nor roles in the traditional sociological sense of defined functions within an institutional organisation. Typical social practices all involve complex systems of options, where every option is contextualised so as to take on a set of meanings in the context of the other options chosen. (Lemke 1985a: 44)

Having displaced the intentional individual, we need to account for subject positioning as intersecting various discursive formations as well as intersecting typical action formations, and answer the question, what engenders change, and in what does change consist?

First of all, agency is a function of change within a dynamic open system: no actor, at any moment of time, acts outside a system (or the act would not count or be recognised as act). Secondly, because every dynamic open system is embedded within higher level systems, it can be affected by both internal and external change. Thus, one source of change can be recombination of elements of the system itself (see below). Other sources of change can be the redistribution of resources, or just random novelty. In any case, however, "[i]nternal and external regulatory factors insure that the system consequences of even random new elements will not be random in relation to the previous history of the organism" (Lemke 1985a: 46). Change, and hence agency, is therefore systemically delimited.
Individual acts are constitutive of the typical formations of a social system, but no individual's activity can by itself (i.e. idiosyncratically) constitute a new social formation. Individuals cannot change social systems because they cannot interact with social systems; only other social systems may do so. (Lemke 1985a: 47)

Agency is taken to refer to the "small perturbations" occasioned by focused action. Lemke (1995a) makes the point that human agency is at the bottom rung of the hierarchically organised systems within which it is embedded and operates. As such, agency as

control-from-below is not in general possible in self-regulating, hierarchically organised systems because of the great differences in scale between levels (cf. Salthe 1985, 1993), and because such systems do not evolve with sensitive vulnerabilities to subsystem processes ... . (Lemke 1995a: 127)

However, change as a result of agency should not be ruled out, because

There are ... certain special conditions under which a developing, self-organising system becomes vulnerable to otherwise negligible influences. When the system is at a critical bifurcation point, when conditions are such that either of two (or occasionally more) dynamical configurations are newly possible for the system, its self-regulation is as it were suspended, and it becomes extremely sensitive to small fluctuations ... . Under these conditions, small perturbations from much smaller scales in the hierarchy may become greatly amplified, and coherent global effects can result, including the determination of which branch the system's further development takes. Effective control, however, does not extend in time beyond the critical juncture; it is only the unpredictable effects of that brief moment of control which may do so. (Lemke 1995a: 127/8)

Thus, agency, as systemically embedded phenomenon may have systemic effect at those junctures when the system hierarchy develops sensitivities to 'minor fluctuations'. This means that such a discursively-practically complexioned agency, given certain
contextual conditions, may affect a whole hierarchy of ecosocial systems.

No act by any subject is outside the system of signifying practices, although action may display, besides its criterial aspects (which give it meaning), some individual aspects that do not bear directly on its meaning; the “little things which become signs of the person as unique individual” (e.g. voice quality, accent, font type, etc.; Lemke 1988: 8). Lemke argues that it is such individual aspects of action that may, given the appropriate contextual configuration, happen to construct new ‘metaredundancy’ relations, i.e. relations of relations (co-copatternings) that become metastable within the systemic whole because they become construed as ‘meaningful’. An individual feature of action, in that way, may be promoted to become a criterial feature of the semiotic-practical act. In the terminology adopted here, non-meaning or noise may assume meaning: i.e. a meaningful role or value within the code.

With this notion of agency Lemke steers clear from both extreme post-structuralist forms of agentless determinism which favour the sign, or the discourse, as guiding human action, as well as from individualised, intentionalistic conceptions of agency which posit a ‘natural’ subject (i.e. the ‘conscious individual’) in opposition to a ‘cultural’ object (i.e. society and its structures; cf Henriques et al 1984). Consequently, Lemke talks in terms of subject positionings within social practices: subjectivity is realised within and through multiple ‘signifying practices’ (Lemke 1995a: 102).

Lemke thus constructs a unitary, non-Cartesian, social discourse, which does not set a micro/actional constituent up against a macro/structural entity, but construes micro-processes as being systemically (i.e. ‘realisationally’) related to macro-processes; which does not reason in terms of actors’ intentionality, but in terms of what is habitually done and considered socially appropriate; and finally, a discourse which does not assume unwarranted objectivity, but is explicit about its political stance (‘a unified model of social action is necessary to link practices to their social consequences’). Lemke’s ecosocial semiotic theory integrates Bateson’s and Wilden’s communication and exchange theory with something parallel to Giddens’ structuration theory: the result is a powerful tool for the investigation of micro-interaction and for its interpretation in terms of macro-social phenomena such as discursive formations and practices, as well as centripetal and centrifugal interactional ‘drifts’ in Bakhtin’s sense.
Lemke's investigation of interaction thus involves a hierarchy of abstractions, each foregrounding a particular interactional aspect (see Figure 2.4 below). Within his overarching system of formations (containing a 'system' of disjunctions), heteroglossic relations are enacted through typical formations (typical thematic and action sequences) that stand in dynamic opposition. The typical formations themselves construe specific intertextual relations among the thematic sequences and action sequences that define them. These intertextual relations are realised by specific texts or records of action. Figure 2.4 relates these several levels of abstraction (each level realised by the next level to the left):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semiotic Resource (language, image, etc)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Texts/records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intertextual relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical formations (actional, discursive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heteroglossic relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System of formations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discursive semiotic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nondiscursive/presemiotic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actional roles/subject positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System of disjunctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction/exchange relations of community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.4: A unitary social model (adapted from Lemke 1985a: 54)

In this view, texts/records do not exist outside of sociological discourse (Lemke 1985a: 53). For that reason, the texts/records presented here are to be seen as in large part generated by the discourse of which they are part, rather than as belonging to or representing some 'objective' outside reality. Construing texts/records in this way allows me to show how they instantiate discursive-practical formations, which typify either centrifugality, i.e. 'morphogenesis', or centripetality, i.e. 'schismogenesis'. This means I can show how institutionally situated actors either work with and build on previously achieved consensuses (thereby accepting that their meaning potential is to a large degree pre-determined), or contest such 'contracts' (Cicourel 1974: 31; Habermas 1987: 184; Halliday 1994: 175) and risk or enact 'schismogenesis' (Wilden 1980: 224).

This framework, in short, allows me to bring together the analysis of micro-interaction as texts/records in terms of social versus system integrating macro-sociological tendencies (cf. Lockwood 1964). Using Halliday's grammatics I aim to formalise these tendencies within a framework of coding-identifying relations, and thus give them semiotic relevance (see Chapter 3).
2.7.3 Hegemony

In *Social Semiotics as Praxis*, Thibault (1991a: 241) sets up a framework comparable to that of Lemke's portrayed above, in that it equally seeks to overcome the macro-micro sociological dilemma. Thibault draws more extensively on Bernstein's modelling of social relations, and incorporates his distributive rules, recontextualisation rules and evaluative rules, as well as his notions of classification and framing. Thibault's model thereby reworks Bernstein's (1990: 42, 1995: 138) representation of how consciousness (the 'not-yet-thought': non-meaning, noise) relates to social structure (the 'division of labour'), into a framework which shows how texts/records realise (ultimately) discursive formations.

In both Thibault's and Lemke's models, social interaction, communicative contexts, as well as class relations are reconfigured as aspects of textual (semiotic) practice whose distinction is a matter of degree of abstraction. Important, however, both Thibault and Lemke relegate the voice-message distinction which lies at the basis of Bernstein's model to the level of language (as metafunctions). They thereby undo the recognition-realisation dichotomy which could be read into Bernstein's work.

What is important about Thibault's social semiotics is that it integrates Gramsci's work on hegemony, struggle and historical social process - also notions of crucial importance to my account of planning in the later chapters of this thesis. Relating Lemke's notion of 'disjunction' (i.e. non-options in the system) to the constraints on what social actors can do and mean, Thibault emphasises that Gramsci's theorisation of the negotiation of power introduces a relativity: power is not (to be) defined on the basis of specific meanings, but on the basis of a managed metastability of systemic disjunctions (non-meanings).

Gramsci's conception of hegemony can help us more adequately to reconstitute the system of disjunctions in relation to questions of power and struggle in the social semiotic system. Gramsci defined hegemony and power as the ability of a given social group to articulate to its own hegemonic principle the interests and the social semiotic and material resources of other social groups. However, this is not a question of a one-way imposition of force or of already fully articulated worldviews in conflict with each other. (Thibault 1991a: 212)
On the contrary, what underlies hegemony is the ongoing and managed negotiation of what is meaning in relation to what is non-meaning. Thibault cites Mouffe on this issue:

The interests of these groups can either be articulated so as to neutralise them and hence to prevent the development of their own specific demands, or else they can be articulated in such a way as to promote their full development leading to the final resolution of the contradictions which they express. (Mouffe 1979: 183, cited in Thibault 1991a: 212)

Mouffe's interpretation of Gramsci's hegemonic principle is a re-articulation of the morphogenetic process as will be detailed in Chapters 3 and 5 this thesis.

As the following observation from Gramsci makes very clear, hegemony is never fully achieved, and needs to be ongoingly negotiated and 'invented'. It is for that reason that the concept of hegemony is eminently suited to the morphogenetic view, which unites a semiotic and material account of interaction. Records and products of interaction should not be considered merely in their semiotic aspect (i.e. analysed as 'texts'), but need to be seen as at once (semiotic) meanings, and as mobilising a mode of 'material insistence':

One could study in actual fact the formation of a collective historical movement, analysing it in all its molecular phases, which is not usually done because every treatment would become boring: instead we assume the currents of opinion already established around a group or a dominant personality. It is the problem that in modern times is expressed in terms of a party or a coalition of parties: how to initiate the founding of a party, how to develop its organised force and social influence, and so on. It is a question of a molecular process, very detailed, of extreme analysis, extending everywhere, whose documentation is constituted by a boundless quantity of books, pamphlets, articles in journals and newspapers, conversations and oral debates which are repeated an infinite number of times and which in their gigantic unity represent this work from which is born a collective will of a certain level of homogeneity, of that certain level that is necessary and sufficient for determining a coordinated action that is simultaneous in time and in geographical space in which the historical fact occurs. (Gramsci 1977: 101, cited in Thibault 1991a: 212)
Such material insistence, as Gramsci notes, results from meanings being “repeated an infinite number of times” either orally, or technologically (i.e. through print or other forms of technologised transmission, such as radio). The “gigantic unity” which certain hegemonic meanings achieve in the course of “work” (compare Berger & Luckmann’s “the social world gains its massivity in the course of its transmission”; 1966: 79) is thus both a semiotic process involving the negotiation of meaning in tension with non-meaning (‘noise’) and a material process involving the mobilisation of technologies such as print and the increased organisation of social space (Lefebvre 1991: 30) and other non-linguistic resources. It is these three foci which are crucial to the work presented here:

i) hegemony as ongoingly managed negotiation of (what is presented as) meaning in tension with non-meaning (disjunctions, noise): i.e. morphogenesis as the productive interplay between meaning and noise;

ii) hegemony as the strategic mobilisation of semiotic (authoritative) and material (allocative) resources: i.e. morphogenesis as metaphorisation (Hodge & Kress’ ‘transformation’) at the level of language, context, and semiosis in general;

iii) hegemony as the ‘massivity’ of particular meanings achieved through the boundless investment of ‘work’: i.e. morphogenesis as increasing ‘technologisation’.

Morphogenesis was introduced above as the ‘elaboration of new structures’. Now this process needs to be tied in with descriptions of interaction to show how it “works to neutralise [dialogicity] through the collective rearticulation of all the separate voices to a single, univocal authority” (Thibault 1991a: 213).


Thibault (1991a) elaborates this issue in relation to literary art (Nabakov’s Ada). In what follows I aim to apply these conceptions to the dynamics of a bureaucratic health planning project which involved several meetings, phone conversations, faxes, minutes of meetings, project schedules, draft and final reports including item listings and costings, as well as architectural draft designs and ultimately accepted design solutions and technological specifications. Before I can broach the tools and details of analysis
of the interactions, however, I need to set up a framework for talking about both the semiotic and material. To do this, I need to return to Lemke's most recent account of ecosocial dynamic systems.

2.8 Semiosis and Phenomenal Materiality

Without necessarily committing oneself to this or that [radical or tolerant] brand of idealism [following Peirce's "the entire universe is ... composed exclusively of signs"] - only the realist positions are, I think, altogether devoid of interest - it is clear that what semiotics is finally about is the role of mind in the creation of the world ... (Sebeok 1994: 15)

In semiotics the world is generally talked about from a relational (i.e. communicational or informational) perspective rather than from a material one: what we perceive is meaningful and hence, in true Kantian fashion, constituted purely through the categories which meaning 'imposes' on the world. However, this view squarely avoids the sociological question as to how and to what degree Uexküll's 'Natur' (Uexküll 1973, cited in Sebeok 1994: 12), or Hjelmslev's 'purport' (Hjelmslev 1961), out of which 'each animal models its subjective world' (Sebeok 1994: 11) is becoming increasingly exploited under the influence of our meaning making practices.

In social semiotics, the Kantian perspective on the world is taken deliberately (i.e. is politically motivated) to counter the tendency to equate self (as complex of meaning making processes) with the biological organism: the individual. As mentioned above, Lemke places not individuals and societies but practices and formations at the centre of social semiotic analysis.

Semiotic formations provide an intermediate level of conceptual analysis between the microsocial (utterances, texts, particular acts and events) and the macrosocial (dialects, institutions, classes, ideologies), but more importantly, they formulate the scale from microsocial to macrosocial in terms of actions (social practices) and patterns of relations of actions (cultural formations) and not in terms of entities and aggregations of entities (individual: corporate groups: societies). This is an essentially cultural view: social systems are systems of doings, not of beings as such. (Lemke 1993: 246, his italics; also 1985a)
In Lemke's most recent writings, he provides for a material or phenomenal view on meaning making. The ecosocial semiotic perspective sees "every human community [as] simultaneously a system of material events and a system of semiotic practices" (Halliday 1993c: 2/3; my italics).

Interestingly, however, Halliday goes on to point out that "[i]t is the dialectic of the semiotic and the material that is constitutive of human society" (Halliday 1993c: 3; also Lemke 1993: 262). But to say that the social is simultaneously material and semiotic is not the same as to say that the material and the semiotic stand in a 'dialectic' relation. The former suggests a semiosis-materiality complementarity (i.e. two ways of looking at the same phenomenon; cf. Halliday & Martin 1993: 122), while the latter suggests a kind of semiotic-material division of labour (i.e. semiotic and the material are not redundant but supplement each other).

The aim of this section is to focus on how (the relation between) semiosis and materiality can be clarified. Rather than conceiving of the semiotic as an independent "abstract linguistic system of language forms" (Volosinov 1973: 95), social semiotics conceives of semiosis as being 'situated' materially in two senses. First, there is the expression plane which grounds the stratified content plane in materiality (i.e. sound, or graphology, in the case of language). Second, semiosis takes place in a context of use, or a set of material circumstances (in contrast to the semiotic context as proposed by Martin 1992, which is akin to Wittgenstein's context as 'language game' to which some 'meaning making move' is seen to belong; Wittgenstein 1953: §525, as well as to Sebeok's (1994: 10) 'phoric' context).

Moving away from his earlier predominantly discursive orientation to meaning making, Lemke argues that

human sociocultural systems are essentially systems of social practices linked into the historically and culturally specific social formations in which they take their meanings; that these practices are simultaneously material processes in a complex, hierarchically organised, developing and evolving ecosocial system; and that the dialectical relations between the semiotically and materially based couplings of these practices/processes are the basis for a general ecosocial dynamics. (Lemke 1993: 262)
Lemke sees the material as constrained by the social semiotic formations that characterise a culture: "the material interactions of [the ecosystem's] elements (people, other species, resources, material and energetic processes and flows) are biased, constrained, and organised, in part, in accordance with social semiotic formations" (Lemke 1993: 262, his italics). So the meanings prevalent in the ecosystem govern, to a large degree, the culture's material interactions, excepting natural phenomena, of course (but as Lefebvre (1991: 30) points out, "(physical) natural space is disappearing")!

Lemke notes that the ecosystem does not merely consist of humans, it also consists of "buildings, tools, cultivated fields and soil bacteria" (Lemke 1993: 262). Social semiotic formations, as ecosystemic types of processes, are therefore not different in kind from the rest of the dynamics of the ecosystem:

it is a single, unitary system in which the dynamics of processes of human social interaction are not in principle or in practice separable from the dynamics of the rest of the ecosystem, except that cultural practices represent a second level of organisation of material processes according to relations of social meaning. (Lemke 1993: 262).

Lemke takes one step further towards specifying what he terms the semiotic-material dialectic:

[Ecosystem's] hierarchical structure arises from the interpolation of new intermediate levels of dynamical organisation as new patterns of process-coupling (directly or though the coupling of social practices in cultural formations) lead to symmetry-breaking and new dynamical states. (Lemke 1993: 263)

This Lemke refers to as emergent structuration (Lemke 1993: 263). This term is read here to be synonymous with 'morphogenesis': i.e. the 'elaboration of new structures' (Wilden 1980: 140; see above). (Negentropy I see as a more general term covering all forms of complexification and differentiation, including those differentiations which radically reconstitute semiotic-material symmetries, i.e. morphogenesis; see below).

Lemke goes a long way towards specifying what this means in terms of social semiotic theory. While features (i.e. meaning choices) may occur in certain frequencies across certain contexts, they may begin to occur in different frequencies in those or other
contexts. Lemke refers to this latter possibility as ‘symmetry-breaking’: “a feature proceeds from being equal across contexts to being unequal” (Lemke 1993: 265).

An essential part of this cycle is the existence of pre-semiotic features of events or situations: material differentiations which do not yet have cultural significance, but which can enter the semiotic system as new features (Lemke 1993: 265).

Such ‘pre-semiotic features or events’ are non-meaningful to start with, and as such may be seen to be non-criterial aspects of our social horizon (or ‘background’; C. Taylor 1995: 12).

These pre-semiotic features can come to be perceived as ‘noise’ in the event of ‘symmetry-breaking’, and the system may throw up redundancies for its own stabilisation “to minimise the effect of noise on the cultural code” (Wilden 1980: 409). However, such features can also be perceived as potentially capable of integration. Wilden’s view was discussed above:

[1]Instead of maintaining stability by homeostatic resistance to noise [i.e. through redundancy], it [the system] will seek to maintain stability by accepting noise, by incorporating it as information, and moving to a new level of organisation. It is in this sense that change becomes an internal or internalised principle of the system, a product of its forms of organisation, since the stability of the system is a product of its continuing evolution. (Wilden 1980: 409).

Lemke offers somewhat more detail here. He sees ‘symmetry-breaking’ as involving bifurcations in the material dynamics of an ecosocial system such that new differences are potentially distinguishable (Lemke 1993: 265). Differences, here, means ‘different differences’, of course, noticeable thanks to the way the semiotic and the material are recombined.

When features (of practices and/or contexts) uniformly co-occur (perfect redundancy) across all wider contexts, they are not semiotically separable as distinct features, but when they begin no longer to do so in some contexts, a semogenic process may begin in which they become separable in all contexts in which they occur. As their degree of redundancy falls from maximal to zero, they become interdependent resources of the meaning system. (Lemke 1993: 266)
Lemke has provided us here with a description of ‘emergent structuration’ or morphogenesis, i.e. a view on the process of material and semiotic (inter-)change. In Chapter 3, this kind of symmetry-breaking will be related to systemic descriptions as those advanced by Nesbitt & Plum (1988).

Lemke’s use of the term symmetry-breaking here is important. Identifications relating meanings, processes, practices and contexts work along the lines of: ‘this behaviour/sound represents that value/meaning when co-occurring with those material actions and conditions’. Such ‘symmetries’ may be broken and reconstituted.

In the terminology used here, the relationships which underpin material and semiotic processes and practices are socially constructed, maintained and contested, and as such they are essentially meta-stable (Wilden 1980: 494). It is that meta-stable process of ‘identification’ (yielding ‘symmetry’) of the material and the semiotic (i.e. in the sense of ‘that goes with that but not with that’; cf. Bernstein 1996a: 26) which provides the possibility for the ‘technologisation’ of social relations and resources (Foucault 1978: 145; cf. Hindess 1986: 121), or, in the terms used in this thesis, morphogenesis. The relevance of ‘identification’ as grammatic principle to metastable relations between the material and the semiotic will be detailed in Chapter 3.

The analysis of the planning project presented below will therefore have the following foci:
i. how do time-space localised interactions (involving particular material-semiotic configurational processes) generate time-space distanciated resources (configurations of the material and the semiotic which have been radically modified)?
and
ii. what does time-space distanciation mean in the context of social interaction?

Chapter 3 will specify the grammatic tools which I will use for the description of the planning process as a whole.