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Introduction.

Chapter 1 was a critical reconstruction of the institutional history of the schools and their representatives as specific types of schools, namely schools of philosophy. Chapter 2 looks at the intellectual history of the schools which was the historical process of the theorisation of philosophia and of the philosophical enterprise as a specific type of intellectual labour devoted to the construction of educational theory and practice.

Thus, chapter 2 reconstructs the intellectual tradition of the schools of philosophy from their initial emergence in the Pre-Socratics, notably Pythagoras and his school, to their separation as a specific kind of institution engaged in a distinct cultural activity sui generis. This was philosophy within a definite and continuous school setting, with philosophers as its exponents. The school of philosophy became distinct from other current, as well as new and emerging higher educational institutions. Furthermore, within the institution of the philosophical schools, there also emerged distinct individual and competing school traditions; particularly at Athens with its Academy, Lyceum, Garden and Stoa, their philosophies and their representatives in the centuries a.d..
2.1. The Schools and the External Division of Labour.

The history of the schools of philosophy was, as has been adumbrated, one of division in intellectual labour. This took place at the level of the theoretical elaboration of socio-political practices; especially of *logos*. It took the form of oral, and, later written discourse in the process of internal articulation of intellectual labour. It was geared towards educational system building within its conceptualisation, study, teaching and reproduction. It was a process of conscious theorisation, on the part of its practitioners, of the schools of philosophy as separate institutions of a kind and distinct from others. (1) Thus, for example, at the same time as a school of philosophy was engaged in constructing a separate identity for itself like other schools of philosophy, it was also engaged in formulating a separate identity like those of other institutions. These included the established institutions of the Greek state: family, gymnasium, religious rites, law courts, army, etc., as well as the new and emerging institutions of *paideia* along with their respective educators, who became professional rivals of the philosophers. For the older institutions, other than the gymnasium and palaestra which engaged in physical culture, education was a by-product of participating in those same institutions; for the newer, *paideia* was their primary concern. These included the rank and file professional sophists and rhetors who taught for a fee; the medical, rhetorical and later scientific, artistic and literary
teachers whose basic business was *paideia* as culture, in general, and schooling and education, in particular.

The Greek preoccupation with physical culture and well-being helped Medicine to effect one of the earliest separations of the disciplines and to become autonomous in its own right. In addition to the traditional system whereby fathers trained their sons in their medical profession, this initial division resulted in the formation of medical schools whose role was to produce physicians as both researchers and practitioners of the art. (2) Earlier, Presocratic philosophers such as Empedocles or Alcmeon could easily include medicine in their repertoire of accomplishments, and physicians in general could lay claim to the title philosopher, as Galen was to do seven centuries later; but by the Hellenistic period philosophers could no longer claim to be physicians, nor were their schools training them. The Academy did not produce doctors, nor did any of the other philosophical schools, although doctors could visit and attend them. (3) Doctors were produced by the well-recognised schools of medicine at Alexandria, Cos, Cnidus, Pergamum, Ephesus, etc. (4) They developed their own profession with a body of doctrine and practice, and they also underwent their own internal ideological transformation, as competing and rival schools of medicine emerged out of the process and split into opposing camps. Later in the Hellenistic period, they were generally, though arbitrarily, grouped under four schools of thought: Dogmatists, Empirics, Methodists, and Pneumatists. The division between philosophy and medicine
as separate institutional pursuits became fixed and codified in the axiom: medicine treats the body, philosophy the soul. (5)

The same was the case for the formation of rhetoric as a discipline, for although it was taught in the schools of philosophy, it was not the only or most important element of their teaching. The schools did not specialise in its study and teaching in the way that professional rhetors and sophists did. For the latter it was indeed the primary activity in which they engaged as teachers. Thus Isocrates called himself a sophist (in the non-pejorative sense) and a philosopher at the same time, designating his paideia as philosophia:

For you are eager for education, and I profess to educate, you are ripe for philosophy and I direct students of philosophy. (6)

But it was not the same type of philosophia which Plato and later Aristotle had in mind. Philosophy and Rhetoric for Isocrates could never be an exact science for it could not discover the Truth; (7) therefore neither could it teach truth, nor virtue, nor the just way of life. (Ag.Soph.291.ff) The best guide was common sense arrived at in a critical and systematic manner, informed by experience. (Antid.271 and passim) For Isocrates, philosophy dealt mainly with logos as the art of discourse about particulars, not universals. For Plato it was the opposite, and this is where he drew the distinction between rhetoric and philosophy. (8) The former was, for Plato, the science which dealt with the intelligible world of
 universals and the latter, that which dealt with the sensible world of particulars and constituted, primarily, discourse about the socio-political life of persons. In Plato's view, the former was concerned with knowledge (episteme) and the latter with opinion (doxa).

Rhetoric was treated in the Academy both as a philosophical problem and as part of the school's curriculum. (9) The intention was not to produce orators as such, but philosophers who by virtue of school training also made good speakers. The exercise was also political; a question of educational rivalry and serving one's own interests. Thus, although rhetoric in the Academy and later in the other schools could at best be only propaedeutic to further and higher study in philosophy, philosophers were not about to hand it over to their rivals. By teaching it themselves, they aimed at attracting students who would then proceed on to philosophy, but who would have otherwise gone elsewhere. Cicero (10) says that the competition for students and the popularity of Isocrates in particular prompted Aristotle to teach rhetoric in the Academy. His Protreptikos was no doubt meant to inspire those students to the study of philosophy in the Academy. (11) He maintained his interest in Rhetoric and later theorised it on a high philosophical level as the art of persuasion. (12) The practice of studying and teaching was maintained in the Lyceum and is well attested in the pedagogical activities of the school's successors. (13)

Philosophers could reject Rhetoric in theory, but they could not ignore it in practice. They were not blind to the
fact that the existing culture was a culture of the spoken word and more and more of the elaborated spoken word; in other words, a high culture of sophisticated talk. This was rhetoric. Thus Cicero says that his treatise on Oratory was based on the system of the Middle Academy. (14) The Academic Sceptics, too, could not altogether ignore it. The Epicureans rejected rhetoric, but were nonetheless well trained in the subject. It paid to know one’s enemies and the Epicureans were intimate with their opponents’ doctrine. (15) In his early days, before the foundation of the Garden, Epicurus was most probably himself a teacher of rhetoric for some time. (16) In the Garden he wrote on it and defended the value of rhetoric for purposes of style in prose only. (X.13) He and the Epicureans in general made good use of professional publications in clear literary form to disseminate their philosophy and gain converts. Three centuries later, Philodemus also wrote on rhetoric in his attack of the theory and practice of the rhetorical schools of the day and in his defence of his own school. (17) The Stoics accepted rhetoric as a category of logic and counterpart of dialectic, but theorised it from their own philosophical position. (18) (D.L.VII.56-63) The theorisation of logos as word and as thought was developed into a system of the philosophy of language; work in grammar and its elements in particular. The Stoics became the best exponents of grammatical studies and their expertise was acknowledged by their contemporaries, even the Alexandrian scholars. The school of Pergamum with its Stoic members was particularly influenced by the Stoic
philosophy, notably by their allegorical interpretation of Homer. Cleanthes and Crysippus did extensive work in grammar. Diogenes of Babylon's *The Art of Grammar* (19) influenced Dionysius Trax's *Art of Grammar*; a summary of the previous achievements in the field and a work that became the seminal reference text for the subsequent study and teaching of the subject. (20)

Thus, although the schools of philosophy engaged in rhetorical discourse and its teaching, the division between *logos* as philosophical discourse on the one hand and *logos* as other forms of discourse, namely rhetorical, scientific, literary, medical, musical, religious, etc., on the other, that division became institutionalised in the construction of schools of higher education. This division of *logos* emerged out of the separation that took place between philosophy, science and literature in the Mouseion of Alexandria sometime after the third century B.C. Here scientific and literary studies became distinct and autonomous disciplines whose practitioners engaged mainly in research and to a much lesser extent teaching. The Mouseion became an alternative and rival educational institution to the philosophical schools. Later, with new centres of learning emerging in the cities of Asia Minor, the Mouseion served as a powerful competing model. In fact literary studies became dominant in the late Hellenistic period, and at Alexandria itself science was pushed into the background. Hellenistic culture became a culture of literature. At the level of research and discovery the scientific disciplines of mathematics, geometry, astronomy,
medicine, etc., became each an object of study for the specialist and the professional. As in most other endeavors, like athletics, (21) music, or the plastic arts, the professional specialist was ousting the amateur and all-rounder who could no longer compete. Survival was now a matter of specialisation, for it was the professional's means of subsistence. Rhetoric ceased to even pretend to philosophical aspirations of serving the truth. Philosophy became more and more clear about its own sphere of concerns and interests.

Literature in general and the study of Homer in particular became a mania in Alexandria. (22) The Mouseion was its centre and its scholars created the literary disciplines; firstly through a thorough search and collection of written works and secondly through systematic arrangement, classification and criticism. Philology, the art of literary criticism (textual, lexicographical, historical; the whole gamut) was created, and Eratosthenes, third librarian and universal scholar, was the first to call himself: no philologos. (23) While in Athens he spent some time in the Academy under Arcesilaus, and in the Lyceum under Aristo of Ceos. Aristo of Ceos' Diadoche became the model for the writing of school histories in terms of Successors and Successions, influencing Hermippus' own work and the subsequent diadochist literature which proliferated in the Hellenistic period. The Lyceum's work on scholarship, especially historiography, biography, and doxography and their theories of art, poetry, aesthetics, etc., were taken up by the Alexandrian scholars, reworked,
extended and further refined by their own standards of scholarship, though not always for the better. Outside the Mouseion and its strict rules of scholarship, and in the hands of lesser scholars catering to the prevailing taste of the dominant culture which basically demanded entertainment, biography degenerated into hagiography, while historiography and doxography became amusing and often vulgar stories and witty anecdotes helped along by myth and fabrication. The epigram, (24) new comedy and romance novels completed the programme. Diogenes Laertius' history of Greek philosophy is a good example of the range and popularity of this type of literature.

The Stoic influence at Alexandria on language and grammar has been mentioned. There was also the Stoic exegesis of Homer through the use of allegory to draw a moral lesson and in order to save and preserve the tradition which had become the staple of Greek education. The Stoic-oriented scholar-philosophers at Pergamum took this type of exegesis of Homer with great enthusiasm and in opposition to Alexandria and its philologoi, they called themselves kritikoi, starting with Crates of Mallos, first librarian of Pergamum's school. (25) Homer and literary criticism won the day. Attic became the lingua franca of Hellenism. Paideia was its instrument.

The division of intellectual labour was itself predicated on the distinction between mental and manual labour. Aristotle's position was that only knowledge of being qua being (i.e. knowledge of universals) is autonomous and self-sufficient, (an end in itself) and that everything
else is secondary and dependent on it, therefore requiring some end towards which to work and be of use (such as the individual and/or community at large). This position was rejected when, with the separation of the disciplines and specialisation within them, each asserted its own independence. Autonomy from other disciplines, and from manual labour in particular, was theorised and maintained at the professional level in the earning of their means of subsistence by the selling of their intellectual labour for a fee. Scholars, artists, scientists, etc. learned this from the schools of philosophy. If philosophers could do it, why not they?. Thus the artist's view of art for art's sake; the scientist's talk of science for science's sake, not for any practical application. The mathematician, the geometer, and the astronomer engage in pure reasoning as much as possible and are loath to descend into the sensible world and practice. Peters aptly describes this cultural trend as the creation of a "high low brow culture". (26) The process of elaboration, codification and fossilisation had, thus by now, set in.

With the schools of philosophy, the general process was one of system building and its maintenance; a process of the levelling off and the routinisation of culture. Doctrinal representation took the form of school traditions with philosophy as separate intellectual labour sui generis. However, the other disciplines were quick to follow and soon claimed similar cultural validity for themselves. Subsequent intellectual labour revolved around the problem of justification and legitimacy in one's own
eyes as well as in the eyes of the dominant culture and over one's competitors and rivals.

2.2. Theorising Philosophy: Pythagoras on Philosophia and the Philosopher.

In his Tusculan Disputations (V.III.8-10) Cicero, on the authority of Heracleides of Pontus, (1) relates the story of how Pythagoras in a conversation with Leon, tyrant of Phlius, (2) called himself a philosophos as a self-description, and defined his activity as philosophia, comparing himself to a spectator at the Olympic games or an observer at a crowded festival. (Cic.T.D.V.III.9) Cicero continues:

These gave themselves the name lovers of wisdom (for that is the meaning of the word philosopher). (3)

Ancient tradition in general credited Pythagoras with having coined the terms philosopher and philosophy. Diodorus Siculus (X.10), Diogenes Laertius (I.12, VIII.8), and Iamblichus (4) report the main tradition and variations on the theme, especially the parable of the three lives of the games-festival analogy. Sosicrates (in D.L.VIII.8) says that:

"When Lyon the tyrant of Phlius asked him who he was, he said, 'A Philosopher' and that he compared life to the great games, where some went to compete for the prize and others went with wares to sell, but the best as spectators".

The common source of this tradition appears to be a
work by Heracleides of Pontus. (5) The opinion of scholars is divided between those who think that Pythagoras was not the originator of the terms; that Heracleides by way of justification was projecting the Academy's view of philosophy and the philosophic life back onto Pythagoras, (6) and those who argue for the Pythagorean case, for the view that Pythagoras could have invented the terms. (7)

Did Pythagoras really coin these terms? The evidence is meagre and conclusive proof is impossible. The ancient tradition, however, would have us believe so; and a good case can be made for Pythagoras as their inventor. (8) The earliest known instance of the term philosopher in a technical sense is found in Heraclitus (fr.35). (9) Interpretations differ. Heraclitus, who deliberately obscured his writings, was not called "the dark one" for nothing. (10) Socrates confirms this in his comment on a treatise by him, saying:

The part I understand is excellent, and so to is, I dare say, the part I don't understand; but it needs a Delian diver to get at it. (D.L.II.22)

Thus in fr.35, Heraclitus is thought to be criticising the polymathia of others (Pythagoreans?) in the light of his own wisdom, which he presumably called philosophia. (11) Another and more subtle interpretation has been offered (12) claiming that fr.35 is an ironical swipe at Pythagoras and Pythagoreans whom Heraclitus knew to be using the new term and to be professing a different kind of knowledge or wisdom (ie. philosophia); but as far as Heraclitus was concerned, these people who called themselves philosophoi
and liked to distinguish themselves from the seven wise men (the *sophoi* Thales, *et al.*) or *polymathoi* (persons who professed knowledge of many things), were in reality no different from them. This is an appealing interpretation, though it is no more than that. Heraclitus had the Pythagoreans in mind elsewhere in his criticism of *polymathoi*.

"Much learning (*polymathia*) does not teach understanding, else it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecataeus". (13)

Thus in his criticism of Pythagoras, Heraclitus attack was justified because at this early stage in the intellectual division of labour, the Pythagoreans had not theorised themselves and their activities clearly as something separate and autonomous from other forms of intellectual pursuit. The production of theory was beginning. The production of theory about one's theory would come later. Philosophy had yet to become self-conscious of itself as philosophical activity *sui generis*.

Then there was the work of Zeno of Elea, entitled *Against the Philosophers*. The Pythagoreans were the traditional rivals of the Eleatics and it is not unlikely that Zeno had them in mind, for he, too, would have been aware if they were the ones who called themselves *philosophoi*.

Other instances of the term philosopher occur after Pythagoras and before Plato (14), though as umbrella terms with no dominant single specific technical sense. In this however these terms were closer to Pythagoras, whose own
terms were also imprecise and general, than to Plato and the later schools. The terms sage, poet, polymath, philosopher, etc. were still interchangeable. (D.L.I.12) Theorising one's own mental labour was in its infancy. In both Cicero's and Iamblichus' accounts there is no elaboration or legitimation of the terms themselves, for the tradition was by their time firmly established and taken for granted, therefore needing no further justification. Nor is there corroboration of an alleged Pythagorean claim, stated in Diogenes (I.12), i.e. the doctrine that "no man is wise but God alone"; (15) a notion which runs against the current of Pythagorean philosophy and is not to be trusted in Diogenes Laertius.

If anyone other than Heraclitus could be credited with having coined the terms before Plato, then Pythagoras is our best candidate and there is no real proof to the contrary. The notion of Pythagoras as inventor of terms, of a philosophical language, was recognised well enough in Antiquity, (16) and later tradition burdened him with many more inventions than were actually his. (17) How is it that he could have come up with them and why? I think that it has to do with his school at Croton and the various practices (political, speculative, pedagogical, etc.) in which the community engaged: practices which required legitimacy. The school was a new kind of institution and the first of its kind. Its members engaged in a set of practices not previously found in any single institution within a Greek polis. Indeed, it took from existing institutions (family, religion, state, etc.) various
practices and constructed out of them a new totality: a school of philosophy. New institutions with new practices require new forms of representations. The political and pedagogical activities of the school thus became the object of theorisation. It was the construction of an identity. This led Pythagoras into designating himself and the activity of his school in terms different from those currently dominant, such as sophos or polymathos. As Iamblichus reports, "he called himself by this name [philosopher] instead of a wise man (sophos - one of the seven sages.)" (18) Pythagoras criticised the seven wise men (19) by way of legitimating his own alternative.

It was part of the external division of labour - the process of the articulation of a new institution, a school of philosophy; for unlike his predecessors and contemporaries, Pythagoras ran a school and engaged in systematic pedagogy. This he called philosophia and its practitioners philosophoi; not sophoi, already in possession of wisdom, but philosophoi, lovers and students of wisdom who were pursuing its acquisition. (20) For the uninitiated he used the title of akousmatikoi (listeners); for the initiated, the title of mathematikoi. On the whole it was a justification of the educational enterprise, for in the school it constituted the educative process; the active love (philein) of sophia which was paideia. (21) Thus it was no accident that Pythagoras, the first to form a philosophical school where the pursuit of knowledge and its exchange took place between teachers and pupils on a systematic basis, introduced new terms to describe this
network of practices and their social relations; terms that were understandably imprecise at this early stage of theorising. It not only makes sense but is a requirement in the process of the division of labour that this theorisation of school practices occurred.

Although the evidence is scarce, and proof impossible, the general picture of Pythagoras is thus sufficiently favourable without the need to dismiss it outright.

2.3. *Philosophia and Its Articulation in the Academy, Lyceum, Garden and Stoa.*

The intellectual history of the schools of philosophy was the historical process of theorising *philosophia* and articulating the philosophical enterprise and its practices in the formation and reproduction of the institution of schools of philosophy. *Philosophia*, which was *philia tes sophias* (love of wisdom), became in the Hellenistic period, as *paideia*, a *hairesis bios* (a way of life) and for its practitioners an *agoge* (movement, discipline) towards wisdom and the good life.

By the time Plato founded the Academy, the Presocratics had begun and the Sophists accelerated, the process of elaboration; of individuation, demarcation and the making and setting up of distinctions and boundaries. The construction of philosophical language and of the institutionalisation of *logos* as a separate mode of discourse in thought and language from everyday life was well on the way (1); and Isocrates, for example, made good
use of it in expressing and legitimating his own brand of rhetoric as philosophy.

Plato, too, had at his disposal a tradition with which to work, albeit one which was still diffuse and blurred. Thus, for example, it is no surprise to find Socrates being called a sophist and grouped with Protagoras and other sophists. Isocrates called himself a philosopher but Plato and his followers he called sophists in the pejorative sense, ones who engaged in word games. (2) In an inscription Aristotle is designated ho sophistes in the non-pejorative sense and not ho philosophos. (3) The mode of discourse was general and freely available to all who cared to make use of it. Clear distinctions were starting to emerge. What we are witnessing is the actual historical process of construction of the philosophical mode of discourse.

In respect to philosophy and its study within an institution, Plato was instrumental in shaping that tradition, one that was to become at the same time both separate from other forms of intellectual labour and a dominant model in subsequent history. On a broad level, Plato accepted the view of philosophy as a general term; as wisdom in all its forms and manifestations. (Rep.376b,475b.) On a more specific level, he theorised a restricted sense of philosophia which was the love and pursuit of knowledge and wisdom in the form of absolute Being. This was knowledge of Truth, and in the Platonic philosophy it meant the theory of Forms. (4) In general, philosophy may start in wonder (5) but with Plato it
proceeds from and ends with Truth, and this the philosopher loves to contemplate. (Rep.475e) To the notion of philosophy as love of truth—wisdom is added the idea that "only God is wise", (Phaedrus.278d) so that true philosophers in their love and study of wisdom are akin to the Gods (Soph.216a) and share their company. (Phaedo.82c) Here we have the famous Platonic doctrine of homoiosis theos kata dunaton (likeness to God, as far as we are able) (Theat.176b); a doctrine that was to become the core thesis of the philosophy of Middle Platonism and late Neoplatonism. This resulted in the view that there obtained an isomorphism between the structure of the mind of the philosopher and the structure of the mind of God; that the former was a microcosm of the latter. The isomorphism between what philosophers said about the nature of Reality was taken up by the schools of philosophy, as each offered its own version of the nature of Being and Truth as the only correct philosophical interpretation. Thus, for example, the structure of the mind of the Stoic wise man was said to be identical to the structure of the mind of God. Nor was it an accident that the Epicurean Gods resembled the Epicurean sage, and vice-versa.

Theoretical elaboration of philosophia accelerated in the Academy. It was like a phrontisterion (think-tank) (6) as members of the first generation of the school engaged in a crowded programme of activities. The school attracted numerous students and teaching personnel in the form of established scholars, in addition to training its own. Plato himself was in the process of developing his
philosophy, along with the other Academics; and the work of the school covered the range of human understanding. Under the rubric of philosophy, almost everything was studied and debated. The philosophers of the Academy addressed existing as well as emerging problems about the nature of reality (ontology), ways of knowing it (epistemology), and conduct in life (ethics).

Academic scholars like Phillip of Opus, Eudoxus, Heracleides, et al. were versatile philosophers, and worked on the variety of problems pursued in the school. They were philosophers in the broad sense of the term, but titles like mathematician, geometer, astronomer, and legislator, were also used to identify them. Similar titles were also applied to the Peripatetics (see infra). Diogenes Laertius uses these titles to describe Eudoxus (D.L.VIII.86). Heracleides of Pontus was a biographer who wrote Lives of philosophers that became the model as well as source material for later biographers. He investigated and wrote on the Presocratics themselves, on cosmology, musicology, ethics, etc. (7) The distinction between philosophy, the arts and sciences had not been firmly drawn, and even then the distinctions served to shape and inform rather than to separate the activities in which Academics engaged. It was left to later generations in Athens, and especially at Alexandria for philosophers and scholars to institutionalise the distinctions into separate forms of intellectual labour.

In the meantime, successors to Plato in the Academy continued the internal process of elaboration. Plato's
theory of Forms was not readily accepted in the school. In fact it was the object of constant and ongoing debate and criticism. Academics of the time, like Eudoxus rejected it as Aristotle did later. Successors like Speusippus and Xenocrates altered it in response to their own and Aristotle's criticisms. (8) At this time, the predilection was for mathematics influenced by Pythagoreanism, and for ethics. The range of subjects that fell under the cover of philosophy was still broad. Thus Speusippus, informed by his metaphysics, undertook the task of making a comprehensive classification of reality and its objects. An example is his classification of plants and animals. (9) He did considerable work in metaphysics, ethics, politics, etc., including a treatise, entitled: On Philosophy (D.L.IV.4) which was probably a defence of the school as well as an attack on rivals. The next successor was Xenocrates. The list of his writings preserved by Diogenes (IV.11-15) reveals an emphasis on mathematics and ethics, though these concerns cover most of the philosophic range. Xenocrates was the systematiser and formulator of Academic doctrine. (10) He is credited with making the three-fold division of philosophy into logic, physics and ethics, (11) one that became standard in the schools. (12) He also made philosophically current the definition of Rhetoric as episteme tou eu legein (the science of speaking well), (13) a definition which the Stoics adopted, (14) though they theorised it from their own philosophical position.

During the first generation of the Stoa and with the foundation of the Mouseion in Alexandria, the separation of
the disciplines and system-building was well on the way. In the Academy under Polemon, Crates, and Crantor, associates and students, systematisation gave way to ethical dogmatism in teaching, writing and publishing. This lack of dynamism enabled its rivals, particularly the Stoa and Garden, to gain the upper hand in the teaching of and the competition for students; forcing the sixth head of the Academy, Arcesilaus, to reformulate its intellectual labour. The new form that pedagogy took was thoroughgoing scepticism: rigorous, lively and dynamic. In the form of unrelenting polemic against its rivals, and employing all the instruments of logos, scepticism revived the fortunes of the school by competing successfully in the educational arena. The reformed Academy launched severe attacks on its opponents, especially the Stoics and Epicureans, and defended the school at the same time by attracting students to it and producing future followers. This was the practice of professional scepticism in the Academy, a philosophy of thoroughgoing negative scepticism that offered eposche (suspension of judgement) as the alternative telos of the philosophic life. (15) This characterised the pedagogy of the Academy and its intellectual labour for the remainder of its institutional history. Scepticism's best representatives were Arcesilaus, Carneades and his immediate followers. Academic scepticism worked brilliantly for two hundred years, until towards the first century b.c. when it ran out of permutations on the debate and its last representatives, like Antiochus, either turned against it or, like Aenesidemus, deserted. It then ceased as an
alternative philosophical position taught in a school. From then on Academic scepticism was relegated to the realm of mental gymnastics found in the writings of Plutarch and Sextus Empiricus. (16) System building based on certainty and its practices continued, and this was the case with the other schools of philosophy.

For Aristotle, as for Plato, philosophy began in wonder (17) and it comprised the whole and total sum of knowledge and understanding. In addition to this general sense, Aristotle, particularly in the *Metaphysics*, theorised, as had Plato, a special sense of the notion of philosophy. This special sense served as the basis for the articulation of *philosophia* and of pedagogy in the Lyceum. It was the definition of philosophy as that which concerns itself with Being qua Being. (18)

if there is a substance which is immutable, the science which studies this will be... primarily philosophy... And it will be the province of this science to study Being qua Being... (*Met.*1026a 31)

This science constitutes theology, which is the primary philosophy. It deals with Truth, Universals and their initial causes and principles. It is the business of the philosopher in this special sense to study philosophy. Philosophy leads to wisdom which is contemplation, - the highest and most desirable activity in life which is the life of the intellect in contemplation for its own sake and no other. (19) Contemplation is the *telos* of the philosophic life. Contemplating, however, is not all that a philosopher does, for a philosopher does not start by being
wise. Wisdom has to be acquired through systematic study and learning. Philosophy is an educative process with wisdom as its end-product.

Thus having theorised philosophy and the task of the philosopher in this way, Aristotle went on to develop a powerful system of division and classification of philosophy in general into specific sciences and disciplines. These constituted the secondary philosophies (*Met.* 1037a 15-16) dealing not with universals but with particulars. The basic division was between: (i) Theoretical philosophies and (ii) Practical philosophies. The former are (a) Mathematics, (b) Physics and (c) Theology. (*Met.* 1026a 19). The latter include all those individual crafts, arts and sciences which deal with politics, together with rhetoric, music, aesthetics, poetry, art, logic, history, and economics. These deal with parts of Being and are therefore proper objects for the philosopher to study (*Met.* 1005a 21) with a view to some practical and useful end in addition to that end of aiding an understanding of Being itself. Only Theology (Being qua Being) is studied for its own sake, for it is self-sufficient and absolutely autonomous.

Thus Aristotle's careful formulation of philosophy and the philosopher's job was able to account for and justify: (i) the end in itself intellectual life of the philosopher as contemplation; and (ii) the varied number of pedagogical, political and other activities in which the Peripatetics engaged both in and out of the school. That is, his theory proclaimed philosophy and its practitioners

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to be autonomous, and, through the study and teaching of the individual arts and sciences, to provide philosophers with access to the socio-political life of persons as holders of the correct and ruling world-view which informs, delegates, performs and carries out intellectual and manual labour. The justification was that only a person who has knowledge of Being qua Being is in a position to pronounce upon its parts, and since the axioms of Being apply to all particular things qua Being, it is the function of one who studies Being qua Being to investigate the particulars as well. (20) "Now this person is the philosopher" (Met.IV.III.7), and not the rhetor, politician, or sophist. This is a neat justification for the wide range of research, teaching and publishing activities in which Aristotle and his associates and students engaged: from theology to the massive collection of constitutions of 158 cities, a research project involving many members of the school. (21) Research on a wide scale was continued by his successor Theophrastus, a polymath. (22) His works on prose style (D.L.IV.47 peri legseos) and the history of philosophy (not extant) influenced later doxography, especially at Alexandria. His treatise on botany (which is extant) elevated it to a separate discipline, (23) and his work on character types (24) provided the stock-in-trade of Menander and of New Comedy generally.

The first generation of Peripatetics illustrates the division of intellectual labour taking place in the school as the process of the classifying and sorting out of the disciplines became more and more clear. Cicero says:
...indeed so great is the variety of subjects treated by them that no one ventures to approach any significant matter without prior knowledge of their works. (Cic.Fin.V.3)

This has to do with the Aristotelian and Theophrastian opinion that the progressive acquisition of knowledge and truth is a collaborative effort and would take much longer than the lifespan of any single person. (25) Thus the association of a community of scholars engaged in organised work in the division of labour, including the training of future workers who would take over as successors. Senior members of the school still ranged across the disciplines and early Peripatetics were as a rule versatile. Thus Dicaearchus is described in the Suda as: (26) philosopher, rhetor, geometer, one who wrote on geography, the history of Greece, constitutions, bioi, philosophy, on Homer, etc. and a defence of the bios praktikos, contra Aristotle and Theophrastus. Demetrius of Phalerum, one time governor of Athens and member of the Lyceum was a good orator, though not much of a philosopher, wrote on a variety of topics (27) and when in exile aided Ptolemy I Soter in the foundation of the Mouseion. Aristothenes on the other hand was more of a specialist, being the best musicologist of his time. (28) He also wrote biographies of philosophers, notably of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato. Eudemus of Rhodes concentrated on the history of mathematics, geometry and astronomy; Meno on the history of Medicine in his Iatrike Synagoge, a school text; Duris (later ruler of Samos c.300s) on Art and bioi of artists and painters;
Chamaeleon on the history of literary biography; while Praxiphanes concentrated on literary criticism. (29)

This process of philosophic elaboration entailed an internal division of intellectual labour and specialisation which culminated in the creation of the various disciplines and constituted the professional activity of the school. In the second generation and following ones, it led to greater specialisation where philosophers confined themselves to one or two of the special sciences. (30) Strato, third head of the school, is represented as having a one-sided erudition and is styled "the physicist" who devoted himself to the most careful study of nature. (D.L.V.58) His successor Lyco was a better rhetor and athlete than a philosopher (D.L.V.65-7) and was probably for this reason an excellent educator of boys; for knowledge of physical culture and verbal ability were highly desirable qualities in a Greek pedagogue. Little can be said of Ariston of Ceos except that he wrote on the history of the school and initiated the Diadochist tradition of school histories so popular from then on. He took up Theophrastus' character types, and the rest of his work is primarily anecdotal. (31) His own successor and namesake is mainly known for his rejection of the school's position on Rhetoric as an Art in favour of Plato's position in the Gorgias. (32) Cicero says of the last successors in the Lyceum:

Critolaus... even he is not true to the principles of his great ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil... cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. (Fin.V.5.14)

As to the Peripatetics of the late second and early
first century b.c., they are mere names to us now. It appears that the Lyceum was moribund at this time, and it did not survive Sulla's siege of 86 b.c.. Intellectual labour in the following centuries took the form of exegesis, especially with respect to the written corpus of Aristotle and his immediate disciples. After Andronicus drew up the canon of that corpus, succeeding Peripatetics and scholars from other persuasions carried out an extensive exegesis of Aristotle's works, especially at Alexandria in the later centuries a.d.; an effort that was surpassed only by the exegesis of Plato's works in the schools of the Middle Platonists and Neoplatonists, and one which was extended well into the sixth century a.d.. In the meantime Aristotle had become propaedeutic to Plato, and he in turn to the theurgy of the Chaldean Oracles, while intellectual labour, having long lost its material base, turned upon itself and got lost in its own ideology.

By the time Epicurus and Zeno had founded their schools, the groundwork had been laid and the general mode of philosophical discourse, the *logos philosophikos*, established. The narrowing of the definition of philosophy and of the philosophical enterprise within *paideia*, especially of the Aristotelian formulation of the *Telos* (Arist.N.E.I.1.1) of philosophy and the philosophic life leading towards some end, was accepted by Hellenistic philosophy as a terminus point and goal towards which professional and personal activity was directed. With the emphasis away from the *polis* (which had by now lost its autonomy) to the individual within a cosmopolis, philosophy
offered itself as an alternative guide to personal conduct and became the art of life. (33) In the ruling class it became a kind of religion of intellectual culture. The telos as happiness was acquired through a proper understanding of the world, its workings, and of persons' relation to it and each other. Philosophy was the means, paideia the process, sophia the goal. (Sen.Ep.89.7) This would lead to happiness: the Good Life.

Epicurus was the first to offer philosophy as an alternative form of lifestyle for the purpose of individual and community happiness and not just for truth's sake or contemplation alone. This was a new emphasis and directly opposed to that of the dominant culture, and to the rival Academy and Lyceum. The Garden rejected the current positions of these schools, especially the study of dialectic in the former, (D.L.X.31) and rhetorical study (34) and practice in the latter. It rejected the religion of the masses, and the lofty theology of its rivals as well as the study of logic as it was undertaken by them. (Cic.Fin.I.19.63; Sen.Ep.89.11) For the logike of the Lyceum Epicurus substituted his own form of reasoning which he called Kanonike. Diogenes says that he divided philosophy into canonic, physics, ethics; subsuming canonic within the study of physics. (35) Kanonike dealt with the theory of knowledge and served as the introduction to the Epicurean system, while physics explained existence and ethics informed on the proper way to act and live. (D.L.X.30) The aim of the Epicurean philosophy was to bring about ataraxia (36) which was one of hedone (pleasure, joy)
through the use of reason in dispelling irrational desires of the body and mind, and fear of death, belief in fate, and in the Gods of popular religion, all of those things which cause unnecessary anxiety, pain and suffering. (37)

Thus in the Garden, the Epicurean philosophy centered on the process of pedagogy directed towards achieving the good life. Teachers at various levels of seniority with Epicurus as head engaged with students at different levels of study from beginners to advanced pupils in a systematic programme of education involving a thorough training in the doctrines of the school as well as those of their rivals and the dominant culture. In formulating their own position, the Epicureans spent a good deal of time writing and publishing critiques and refutations of opponents. Thus Epicurus recommended to his friends and students at home and abroad to follow rigorously the Epicurean programme of education.

Exercise yourself in these and similar precepts day and night, both by yourself and with him who is like you; then never, either in waking or on dream, will you be disturbed, but will live as a god among men.

(D.L.X.135)

The extent to which the Epicurean school was successful in promoting its philosophy through propaganda and systematic training of its members was unequalled. Orthodoxy was achieved and consolidated within Epicurus' lifetime and never later challenged from inside the school. (38) Over the generations little new was added other than increasingly sophisticated polemical devices. The doctrine
was refined for purposes of defence and exposition. (39) Possessing good internal organisation, the Garden kept going as an educational institution well into the Roman empire, and this was long after its rivals had been reconstituted both as institutions and as schools of thought.

Although the separation between philosophy, literature and science was now fast taking shape, philosophy still covered an extensive field, and the Stoa, latest of the four Athenian schools, had the most to inherit and deal with; including the establishment of itself as a distinct, legitimate and therefore rival institution of higher education, and in the process it became a massive edifice. Thus the Stoic definition of philosophy and its educational job in the construction of the Stoic system took on a peculiar shape. Seneca (40) gives an account of the Stoic division of philosophy and its parts along with variants upon the main theme. Unlike the Epicurean, the Stoic system of the first two generations was not homogeneous. There were differing and conflicting interpretations of doctrine, and splinter groups developed. (41) While there was a dominant formulation of sophia (wisdom) as "the knowledge of things divine and things human", (42) there was no uniform agreement on the definition of philosophy itself:

Philosophy also has been defined in various ways: some have called it 'the study of virtue', others have referred to it as 'a study of the way to amend the mind', and some have named it 'the search for right reason'. (43)
It should be noted however that at the most basic level, the Stoics maintained the unity of all virtues into a single monad of Virtue (S.E. M.IX.13) and not only subscribed to the tenet that Virtue is Knowledge, but also identified wisdom in the form of philosophy as virtue itself. (44) Nor was there agreement on the order for treating the several divisions within it, a question which appears to have been a procedural matter rather than disagreement over general content. (D.L.VII.40-4) As to the content, the Stoics made current the basic three fold division of philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics; (45) using a number of analogies to describe it. Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, ethics to the fleshy parts, physics to the soul. (D.L.VII.40)

These three formed the basic subdivisions of philosophy and they in turn were further subdivided into a multiplicity of disciplines. Thus for example logic was divided into dialectic and rhetoric. In fact Cicero (De Orat.XVIII.65) says that the Stoa was the only school "that has pronounced eloquence to be a virtue and a form of wisdom". Thus Quintillian says that the Stoics train philosophers, but talk like sophists. (Or.X.1.83-4) Logic dealt with the theory of knowledge, rhetoric with the science of discourse. These in turn were subdivided into various divisions and categories of their own and the process continued ad nauseam. (D.L.VII.42-83) The same applied to physics and ethics with their myriad of divisions and sub-disciplines. (46) Cicero (Fin.IV.3.6.) criticised the Stoic
predilection for system building down to the minutest
details and its excessive hair-splitting in logic in
particular which often took on a life all its own. The
whole process took centuries, and out of it emerged a
school of philosophy with an identifiable body of doctrine
that was extremely powerful.

The philosophy of the school was offered as the art of
the happy life; the happiness of living according to nature
(47) which was the same thing as living according to virtue
and wisdom: the goal of philosophy. Happiness involved the
acquisition of virtue in the form of knowledge of things
divine and things human which in turn led to wisdom.
(Sen.Ep.16.1) But as Seneca said: "No man is good by
accident. Virtue has to be learnt". (Sen.Ep.123.17) How?
Wisdom is to be acquired by way of pedagogy, (48) and
although to the Stoic the wise man was as rare as the
Phoenix, (49) wisdom was nevertheless thought to be
possible, and the later Stoicism stressed the ability of
philosophy to bring about individual salvation. Panaetius
especially humanised Stoicism and toned down the harshness
and severity of the system. (Cic.Fin.IV.28, 79) This trend
was continued in Posidonius, (50) while Seneca stressed the
practical aspect of the ability of philosophy to aid life,
something only a practical Roman could do. (51) Musonius
Rufus, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius in particular brought
out the human element of Stoicism. In Epictetus, philosophy
became a homily on the use of orthos logos, informed by the
Stoic wise man through God with a view to individual
freedom, salvation and happiness. (52) In Marcus, it was
the ability of philosophy "to keep unsullied and unscathed the divine soul within... and wait with good grace for death" (*Medit.*II.17). Epictetus, who was once a slave, knew the value of philosophical freedom and compassion. Marcus Aurelius, burdened with the responsibility of empire and isolated on the Danube repelling barbarian incursions, appreciated the spiritual comfort of philosophy.

Wisdom is the goal and philosophy the means, as Seneca said, (*Ep.*89.9) and it is philosophy as pedagogy, for the wise man, who is a philosopher, is also "the pedagogue of the human race". (*Sen.Ep.*89.13) In the light of philosophy perceived as pedagogy and of the philosopher perceived as pedagogue, the division in intellectual labour generally was also made for pedagogical reasons, and this constituted the learning and teaching practices of the Stoa, as it did also of the other schools of philosophy.

Thus in the schools of philosophy, we can clearly identify the emergence, establishment and subsequent historical continuity of an intellectual tradition that within *paideia*, concerned itself with a separate and distinct aspect of culture. This was philosophical culture whose business was to represent, at its highest intellectual level, the socio-political life of Ancient society. It did this through systematic elaboration of itself and through teaching. The latter is our concern in the next chapter.
2.4. Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: Reformulations in Intellectual Labour.

In the schools of philosophy, in the decades towards the middle of the first century B.C., after centuries of philosophical rivalry, notably between Stoic dogmatism and Academic scepticism in the previous two hundred years, the permutations of the debate, in epistemology in particular, were just about exhausted. Trapped in a determined framework of discourse; locked into a magic circle from which the disputants could not escape, philosophy became less and less fruitful and more and more a logomachy between philologists, as Seneca later described it. (Sen. Ep. 108.18-24) If we compare the framework to a game of chess, then within this game, the players had long accepted and taken for granted the axioms of how to play the game, namely its rules. Within an empiricist epistemology that was foundationalist, (1) the rules of the debate in the schools of the Hellenistic period centered on shared understandings regarding the existence and nature of Being, Truth and Ethical Conduct. This was the business of philosophy and philosophers were its practitioners. The philosopher as sōphos having knowledge or understanding of the above principles was offered as the ideal model of the good life. Each school offered its own version of this ideal and most of its time was then spent in articulating, defending and propagating it. They accepted the paradigm as touchstone; as common ground for engaging in debate and rivalry. (2) Academic scepticism in particular, was
predicated on its rivals' epistemologies, (a negative epistemology is necessarily parasitic on the view it is attacking) and had no option but to work with the premises of its opponents in order to carry out an internal critique of its rivals' positions. The exercise consisted in demonstrating that on the basis of their own premises, their rivals' conclusions were contradictory or absurd, or both. Against the sceptical attack, Stoicism crystallised into a system with a formidable defensive armament. Academic scepticism, repetitious in its attack, self-refuting as an epistemology, and grossly unsatisfying as an alternative ethical philosophy of life in its recommendation of **epoche** (suspension of judgement), was no longer efficacious. Its last heir-apparent, Antiochus of Ascalon, turned against it. Others, like Aenesidemus, defected to Pyrrhonism and in Alexandria, the movement aligned itself to the Empiric school of medicine. Sextus Empiricus was its best and last representative. Epicureanism had long withdrawn from the debate, focusing its energies instead on spreading its message wide and converting as many people as possible. The Peripatetics, for their part, were too busy trying to keep their own tradition alive and intact, and after Andronicus edited the **Corpus Aristotelicum**, they confined themselves to a history of scholarly commentary upon it.

Thus with the end of the Academy and Lyceum, and probably the Stoa too, as educational institutions in Athens, the philosophical crisis of intellectual labour in the first century B.C. led to a reformulation of the
philosophical and pedagogic enterprise. (3) What actually took place afterwards, from Antiochus to Plotinus, still constitutes one of the major questions in the history of philosophy of this period; a question which, given the impoverished and fragmentary nature of the evidence, is still far from being answered. (4) Whether it was Antiochus (the traditional choice, now out of favour); or Eudorus and his fellow Alexandrians along with the Neopythagorean revival; (5) or Posidonus; or the reaction of the fourth Academy (6) that was the rescuer and bearer of the subsequent philosophical and pedagogical tradition is beyond the parameters of this chapter to deal with. That there was a crisis and subsequent reformulation is itself clear enough and Cicero was one of the first to see it. His philosophical works, (7) though they reproduce the rivalry model, in themselves plead for a dissolution of that model and argue for a synthesis of philosophy towards the unity of knowledge; a unity of doctrine he thought was to be found in the positions of the initial school founders.

Certain definite trends did emerge out of the confusion: In Rhetoric, for example, the trend known as Atticism, the movement of returning to the cultural tradition of Classical Athens, witnessed the re-emergence of the Sophist - the intellectual entertainer of the centuries a.d.. The title Ηο Sophistes and its holder were rehabilitated and purged clean of their previous pejorative meanings. Sophistic, especially under the Antonines, became a flourishing and lucrative profession. (8) Philostratus, who coined the term, Second Sophistic, wrote the
biographies of the most famous sophists, a laudatory and thoroughly uncritical celebration of a literary culture that was primarily concerned with form and technique, rather than content and truth, with entertainment, rather than inquiry. Epideictic oratory became the dominant form of public intellectual culture of the day at court and in the theatre, gymnasium, temple and market-place. (9) Athens and the cities of Asia Minor (notably Smyrna and Ephesus) in the second and third centuries; the cities of the empire, Rome, Athens, Nicomedia, Antioch, Constantinople, and others in the fourth and fifth centuries a.d. supplied the stage for a brilliant display of the literary culture of the elaborated spoken word designed for public consumption; a commodity that was sold and bought and consumed for the pleasure of the ear. Sophistic became the most profitable among the professions, and though few reached the heights of a Polemo, Herodes Atticus or Aelius Aristides, the practice was everywhere dominant in the empire. In the second sophistic, Aelius Aristides in fact ousted Demosthenes from his long held throne of the ideal orator. Philosophy was pushed into the background, and as a consequence some philosophers themselves turned sophists. (10) Sophistic occupied centre stage from the second century onwards, and only in the later fourth and fifth centuries a.d. (11) was it seriously challenged by rivals, namely the growing interest in the study of the Latin language and Roman law. In his later years, Libanius felt the ill-effects on his teaching of the influence of these studies, and in addition had to contend with the
encroachment of the state at both the imperial and local level upon his profession. Eunapius (V.P&S.490) noted the decline in the study and popularity of Greek when he mentioned the governor of Illyria who was "fond of Greek studies, in spite of the fact that the main current was setting in other directions". In addition, there was the increasing demand for shorthand writers to staff the massive bureaucracy, for this was a quick avenue for young men intent on entering civil and military service without lengthy training in rhetoric. The school of law at Berytus was too close for professional comfort and Libanius felt its adverse influence.

Another trouble arose which was a great shock to my profession. This was the flight from Greek and the migration to Italy of those whose object it was to learn to speak Latin. (Lib.Or.I.213)

Moreover, as regards my studies, they had now lost ground to Latin even more than before, so that I am afraid they may through the agency of law, become completely superseded. Yet it is not law or edicts that have brought this about, but the honour and power reserved for those acquainted with Latin. (Lib.Or.I.234)

Students were apparently deserting the sophists' classrooms for the lawschools of Berytus, Constantinople and Rome. "Every spring you see the sons of present, or past, members of the council sailing off to Berytus or to Rome". (12) Eunapius calls Berytus "the foster mother of all such
studies" (Eunap. V.P&S. 490). Anatolius of Berytus was one of its exponents. The Christian church established its own schools for the training of its members and clergy. In addition to this, in places like Alexandria in the fourth century and following, more and more professional teachers (grammarians, rhetoricians, philosophers, etc.) entrusted with the Greek tradition were, themselves Christian. In the sixth century, philosophers like Synesius, Ammonius, David, Elias, etc. were Christians interpreting the philosophy of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, the rhetoric of Isocrates and Greek culture in general. Christianity had not only accelerated the decline of pagan schools, but also appropriated their intellectual labour in the process of doing so. (13)

In philosophy, the initial trends that emerged out of the first century B.C. confusion later served to inform and shape the philosophy and intellectual labour of Neopythagoreanism, Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism for the next six centuries.

It is a religious development and exegesis of certain aspects of Platonism which furnishes the fundamental characteristics of this period. (14)
The movement of going back to the original founders, to Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Chrysippus, (15) etc., was one of reformulating their intellectual labour in a new direction, serving present needs and interests. Certain key passages in Plato's and others' writings were seized upon and these formed the nucleus for the new developments. Plato's doctrine of homoiosis theos, kata dunaton of the

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Theatetus (176b), the emphasis on transcendence, and the preoccupation with the salvation of the soul predicated on rejecting the body, culminated in the intellectual *ecstasis* of Plotinus: the mystic union with the One. (16) This became the *telos* of the philosophic life. With Iamblichus and his followers, and with the generation of Proclus, philosophy as theology was transformed into theurgy and the *telos* was supposedly achieved via magic. The magician took over the philosopher. The iatrosophist became priest, prophet, wise man and healer. (17) Philosophy succumbed to religion, *logos* to *mythos* and debate to the mysteries. Aristotle, Plato, Pythagoras and their philosophic enterprise became propaedeutic to the Orphic and Chaldean Oracles. Like the Virtues which Proclus acquired in succession one after the other, (19) those virtues now formed a procession in the chain of Being where an isomorphism obtained between the life of the philosopher and the chain of Being leading back to the One. The life of the philosopher-theurgist was an *epistrophe* (reversion) towards the One and everything else was directed to that goal. Finally, with the fantastations of late Neoplatonism, philosophy lapsed into irrationalism. It was now left to Christianity, Byzantium and Islam to salvage what they could or wanted.
Conclusion to Chapter 2.

The theorising of philosophia and the articulation of the philosophical enterprise arose out of the historical process in the division of labour. What was this division of labour? The development of schools of philosophy was in itself a historical process divided into intellectual and manual labour. At the institutional level, the external division of labour took place in the separation between schools of philosophy in Athens on the one hand and other forms of higher education on the other, namely: schools of medicine, rhetoric, literary, mathematical, empirical and other scientific disciplines in Greece, Alexandria and the cities of Asia Minor in the Hellenistic period. At the level of theoretical elaboration, the division between mental and manual labour effected the historical separation between these disciplines: between the arts and crafts, and within the arts, the internal division between philosophy, literature and science as autonomous, self-contained disciplines and as distinct forms of intellectual labour identifiable in themselves. In addition, they were separable in theory and practice from other forms of intellectual pursuit. Thus, like Pythagoras, Eratosthenes, the third librarian of the Mouseion, used a novel term and called himself a philologos (lover of words), and was the first to do so. He avoided the terms sophos, rhetor or philosophos, in order to describe and confer autonomy to the new activity of literary criticism. In opposition to the Alexandrians, the scholars of Pergamum, such as Crates
of Mallos, the first librarian of its school, appropriated for themselves the title of kritikos.

Differentiation in the form of philosophical elaboration took place as early as Pythagoras who is credited with being the first to articulate his activities at Croton, and to organise them under paideia. The state of theorising was at this time still on the level of the general and there were no hard and fast distinctions within the compass of human understanding. The Pre-Socratics and fifth century Sophists on the whole, however, had begun to make distinctions, and by the time of the formation of Isocrates' school, and of that of the Minor Socratics and the Academy, the groundwork had been laid. When Aristotle, Epicurus and Zeno founded their schools, clear and distinct lines were emerging. Epicurus retheorised the philosophic enterprise and made happiness, not truth, the telos of philosophy. Wisdom was a means to the good life and philosophical paideia was the learning process.

In the Hellenistic period, the construction of schools of philosophy as unique institutions, and within this model, the coming into being of competing alternatives were quickly taking shape. Division entailed diversification and specialisation. This was the process of the internal articulation within Greek intellectual labour of the philosophical enterprise; of the logos philosophikos, and of separate divisions within it in the Academy, Lyceum, Garden and Stoa.

In his doctoral dissertation Karl Marx characterised Hellenistic philosophy as a philosophy of self-
consciousness, saying:

Is it an accident that with the Epicureans, Stoics and Sceptics all moments of self-consciousness are represented completely, but every moment as a particular existence? Is it an accident that these systems in their totality form the complete structure of self-consciousness? (1)

The questions are rhetorical. Clearly it was no accident; but points to the historical process in the division of mental and manual labour. The process of individuation of schools of philosophy from other institutions of higher education led to specialisation in the division of intellectual labour at the professional level of study, of teaching, and research practices. In the form of pedagogy, this process continued in the schools of philosophy and their representatives in the early centuries a.d. as the intellectual labour of philosophers was devoted to formulations and reformulations of their school ideologies, at the time when philosophy, especially late Neoplatonism, surrendered to mysticism and magic.

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