Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Access, Veto and Ownership in the Theory of the Firm 

      Bel, Roland (Department of Economics, 2006-01)
      Ownership may not always be the best driver for investment incentives in an incomplete contract context. This paper shows that ownership has two facets (access and veto) which can be used specifically, and sometimes ...
    • On Broadway and strip malls: how to make a winning team 

      Bel, Roland; Smirnov, Vladimir; Wait, Andrew (School of Economics, 2012-11)
      A successful organization – or Broadway production – needs the right team. A potential issue is that an existing synergy between complementary agents (or assets) can reduce the marginal return of effort, creating a ...
    • A Swarm of Innovators: Information, Leadership and Innovation 

      Bel, Roland; Smirnov, Vladimir; Wait, Andrew (School of Economics, 2011-11)
      We study the interplay between innovation, communication in an organization and leadership. Although a firm requires both strong leadership and sufficient communication in order to innovate, we posit that frequent ...