This thesis addresses the question of whether time has an objective direction. Most philosophers of time hold that time has an objective direction, on the grounds that there are various phenomena which seem to suggest that time has a direction. These phenomena include the fact that there seem to be a range of temporally asymmetric phenomena such as the increase of entropy, causation, and deliberation. Amongst these phenomena are also appearances and linguistic data. It may seem as though we feel as though time passes, or we feel as if time has a direction. In addition, we use tensed expressions such as ‘the meeting will start’ or ‘that meeting has ended’. Most philosophers hold that since the best explanation of these phenomena posits objective temporal direction, we have a reason to posit that time does have an objective direction. That is, they appeal to an argument (or series of arguments) in the form of an inference to the best explanation (henceforth IBE) from the presence of these various phenomena to the positing of an objective direction to time.