Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorWalsh, Elena Inez
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-17T03:50:20Z
dc.date.available2019-06-17T03:50:20Z
dc.date.issued2019-06-17
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2123/20573
dc.description.abstractThe field of emotion theory has been described as 'one of the last strongholds of orthodox cognitivism' (Lewis & Granic, 2000, p. 3). However, a small number of researchers have recently begun to dismantle the broadly computationalist framework that has dominated the field by applying formal and conceptual tools from dynamic systms theory (DyST). The first part of the thesis introduces this new approach, contrasting it against more orthodox approaches. The second part explores unresolved issues in the application of DyST to emotion theory. On a DyST approach, emotions are emergent products of complex causal interactions among domain-general physiological and psychological functions (hypothesised to comprise most, if not all, subsystems of the human organism). To explain how to separate emotional episodes from general business-as-usual system operations, I identify emotional episodes with synchronised patterns of change in emotion components. A related issue concerns what it means to say that such a pattern of changes is an 'emergent' product. I develop an account that highlights the explanatory utility of the concept of emergence and responds to criticisms of emergence based on its apparent 'logical incoherence' (Kim, 1999, 2006). I also provide an account of how top-down causation features within such a framework, arguing that it plays an essential role in the explanation of emotional episodes and emotional development. The discussion of these issues are framed in context of what I call the 'either/or' of emotion and reason, a common explanatory trope that portrays emotion and reason as distinct and separable processes. I explain why the DyST approach outlined here has revisionary consequences for 'either/or', inasmuch as it takes so-called emotional processes and reasoning processes to share a common substrate. The resultant picture is one broadly consonant with the embodied approach to mind (Varela, Rosch & Thompson, 1992).en_AU
dc.publisherUniversity of Sydneyen_AU
dc.publisherFaculty of Artsen_AU
dc.rightsThe author retains copyright of this thesis. It may only be used for the purposes of research and study. It must not be used for any other purposes and may not be transmitted or shared with others without prior permission.en_AU
dc.subjectemotionen_AU
dc.subjectdynamical systems theoryen_AU
dc.subjectdevelopmental systems theoryen_AU
dc.subjectmoodsen_AU
dc.subjectemergenceen_AU
dc.subjecttop-down causationen_AU
dc.titleModeling the embodied mind: The dynamical turn in affective scienceen_AU
dc.typePhD Doctorateen_AU
dc.type.pubtypeDoctor of Philosophy Ph.D.en_AU
dc.description.disclaimerAccess is restricted to staff and students of the University of Sydney . UniKey credentials are required. Non university access may be obtained by visiting the University of Sydney Library.en_AU


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record