China's Defection in the South China Sea: Its Development, Rationale and Limitations

Abstract

This research examines whether a security dilemma applies in the SCS, with a particular focus on China’s behaviour. By examining the constitutive elements of the security dilemma (uncertainty, lack of malign intention and self-defeating behaviour) between China vis-à-vis other claimants, and China vis-à-vis the US. The findings confirm that China has defected from defensive realism to offensive realism toward other SCS claimants, but it keeps adopting defensive realist strategy toward the US. The focus of this study is on the post de-escalation period (from 1995 until between 2007-2009) onward. This research analyses the nature of China’s behaviour in the SCS and studies its development, rationale and limitations. The major research strategy is the causal process tracing which incorporates (i) comprehensive storyline and (ii) smoking gun observation. Data have been collected from interviews, archives, media and academic publications. This thesis contends that China has defected from defensive realism to offensive realism toward other SCS claimants on two occasions: (i) the seizure of the Scarborough Shoal in 2012 followed by the halt of access for the Philippine fishermen to enter the Shoal; (ii) the monumental construction of artificial islands in 2014-2015. This research challenges the notion of offensive realist theory that believes all states are unchangeably offensive realist states. The findings of the research support the basic tenets of defensive realist theory that suggest the prevalence of uncertainty in international politics, the self-defeating aspect of power maximisation and the possibility of change in the nature of a state’s behaviour.