Crises and perceptions in enduring rivalries

Abstract

The thesis assesses the impact of tense international crises on leadership perceptions, across enduring rival and non-rival dyads. Associated in the relevant literature with escalation and conflict, interstate militarized crises are systematically explored in order to ascertain their impact on perceptions. Cognitive theories of decision making suggest that rationality is compromised in crises, as emotional stress, time constraints and pervasive uncertainty intensify cognitive rigidities among policy makers. A strong possibility, therefore, exists that leaders will be oblivious to crucial information, which will either be neglected or erroneously interpreted. In that sense, crises are viewed with apprehension by analysts, fearing misperception and miscalculation that may lead to unintended war. Through a detailed assessment of severe crisis case studies (The Greco-Turkish Aegean Sea crisis of 1996, the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and the Cypriot S-300 missile crisis of 1998), this thesis suggests that crises may, contrary to expectations, shed light on long-running trends which were ignored or misinterpreted by decision makers, thereby “forcing” an accurate re-assessment of enemy and third party intentions and capabilities. Therefore, by posing a clarifying (shock) effect on leadership perceptions, cognitive mechanisms in crises could actually act supportively in drawing accurate inferences, bolstering objectivity.