An Examination of the Applicability of Dual-Process Models to Chronic Worry

Abstract

This four study project examined the applicability of dual-process theories for advancing the understanding of worry. Specifically, we examined the applicability of Epstein’s (1983) dual-process theory, Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST), as well as Ouimet et al., (2009) and Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) models of anxiety/worry in accounting for worry and its associated processes (e.g., cognitive biases). A university student sample (Study 1, N = 302; Studies 2-4, N = 106) completed: (i) Self-reported rational and experiential processing style and worry questionnaires (Studies 1-4); (ii) Deductive, inductive, and probabilistic reasoning tasks (Study 2), (iii) An Antisaccade attentional control task (Study 3 and Study 4), and (iv) Lexical decision and modified dot probe task (Study 4). We found that when faced with a situation in which they worry, individuals who reported high worry scores stated they engaged in greater levels of rational processing, compared to individuals with low worry scores (Study 1). However, this was found to be a self-perception, as actual strengths or deficits on reasoning tasks were unrelated to processing style and levels of worry (Study 2). Furthermore, no significant relationships were found between implicit tasks, self-reported processing style, and worry (Studies 3 and 4). The failure to replicate previous findings, with regard to experimental tasks, is discussed in the context of the limitations inherent in implicit measures of psychological processes. The results provided no support for the hypotheses derived from the dual-processing theories. However, the advancement of current limitations in the understanding of the processes involved in worry requires further research. To this end, research that simultaneously examines multiple worry-related processes is needed.