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<title>Research Publications and Outputs</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/2123/15948</link>
<description/>
<pubDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2026 15:09:12 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-06-13T15:09:12Z</dc:date>
<item>
<title>Claims Submitted to the Multilateral Development Bank Accountability Mechanisms – 1994-2025</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/2123/18949.7</link>
<description>Claims Submitted to the Multilateral Development Bank Accountability Mechanisms – 1994-2025
Park, Susan
The dataset represents a summary depiction of grievance cases brought to the Accountability Mechanisms (AMs) of the seven Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) from 1994 to 2024. These are: the African Development Bank,  the Asian Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/International Development Association) and the International Finance Corporation and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (together comprising the World Bank Group) . Version 7 of the database is notable for the addition of the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank. The Accountability Mechanisms were created to enable people adversely or potentially adversely affected by a project or program financed by the MDBs to take their concerns to the Banks for recourse. The Accountability Mechanisms generally do not stop the project or provide material reparations. They seek to stop or prevent harm and mitigate the negative aspects of a development project.&#13;
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The objective of the database is to be able to garner a quick qualitative snapshot of any given case, as well as to be able to aggregate quantitative data for each AM as a whole and to identify trends over time. Each of the grievance mechanisms has a specific name, which may have changed over time. It may also be comprised of more than one office with separate functions (i.e. consulting with affected people versus a compliance investigation). Most of the Accountability Mechanisms now have separate functions, with the consultation process also called problem solving. The compliance phase is to investigate whether the MDBs have complied with their environmental and social policies and whether this has led to harm. The Accountability Mechanisms are detailed below. Version 7 of the database is also notable for aligning the World Bank with the format of the other Accountability Mechanisms.&#13;
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The dataset includes cases received by the AMs from the beginning of each mechanism until 19th of September 2025. The last update for cases is 19th September 2025.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 02 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2025-12-02T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>The role of health systems for health security: a scoping review revealing the need for improved conceptual and practical linkages</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/2123/29022</link>
<description>The role of health systems for health security: a scoping review revealing the need for improved conceptual and practical linkages
Brown, Garrett Wallace; Bridge, Gemma; Martini, Jessica; Um, Jimyong; Williams, Owain D.; Choupe, Luc Bertrand Tsachoua; Rhodes, Natalie; Ho, Zheng Jie Marc; Chungong, Stella; Kandel, Nirmal
BackgroundPractical links between health systems and health security are historically prevalent, but the conceptual links between these fields remain under explored, with little on health system strengthening. The need to address this gap gains relevance in light of the COVID-19 pandemic as it demonstrated a crucial relationship between health system capacities and effective health security response. Acknowledging the importance of developing stronger and more resilient health systems globally for health emergency preparedness, the WHO developed a Health Systems for Health Security framework that aims to promote a common understanding of what health systems for health security entails whilst identifying key capacities required.Methods/ resultsTo further explore and analyse the conceptual and practical links between health systems and health security within the peer reviewed literature, a rapid scoping review was carried out to provide an overview of the type, extent and quantity of research available. Studies were included if they had been peer-reviewed and were published in English (seven databases 2000 to 2020). 343 articles were identified, of those 204 discussed health systems and health security (high and medium relevance), 101 discussed just health systems and 47 discussed only health security (low relevance). Within the high and medium relevance articles, several concepts emerged, including the prioritization of health security over health systems, the tendency to treat health security as exceptionalism focusing on acute health emergencies, and a conceptualisation of security as ‘state security’ not ‘human security’ or population health.ConclusionExamples of literature exploring links between health systems and health security are provided. We also present recommendations for further research, offering several investments and/or programmes that could reliably lead to maximal gains from both a health system and a health security perspective, and why these should be explored further. This paper could help researchers and funders when deciding upon the scope, nature and design of future research in this area. Additionally, the paper legitimises the necessity of the Health Systems for Health Security framework, with the findings of this paper providing useful insights and evidentiary examples for effective implementation of the framework.
</description>
<pubDate>Sat, 01 Jan 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item>
<title>Transportation in a Net Zero World: Transitioning Towards Low Carbon Public Transport</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/2123/28434</link>
<description>Transportation in a Net Zero World: Transitioning Towards Low Carbon Public Transport
Logan, Kathryn G.; Hastings, Astley; Nelson, John D.
This book discusses the importance of transitioning from conventionally fuelled, electric and hydrogen personal vehicles towards low carbon electric and hydrogen public transport. It presents international comparisons and case studies of countries who have successfully and unsuccessfully implemented policies to reduce their emissions from land-based transport. It discusses and provides policy recommendations to meet a net zero transport world by exploring potential issues, including infrastructure changes and electricity generation mix which may prevent targets being met successfully. The book also demonstrates how the COVID-19 pandemic has influenced individual transport choices and what will need to be done to ensure travel remains sustainable going forward. Aligned with an active area of academic and civil discourse on the topic of sustainable transportation systems, Transportation in a Net Zero World will be of interest to researchers, policy makers, and graduate students alike, in the fields of environmental science and transport studies.
</description>
<pubDate>Sat, 01 Jan 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>COVID-19: A Crisis of Borders</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/2123/26567</link>
<description>COVID-19: A Crisis of Borders
Boucher, Anna; Hooijer, Gerda; King, Desmond; Napier, Isabelle; Stears, Marc
ABSTRACT The public health crisis of COVID-19 has compounded preexisting crises of democratic stability and effective governance, spurring debate about the ability of developed democracies to respond effectively to emergencies confronting their citizens. These crises, much discussed in recent political science, are joined by a further crisis which complicates and reinforces them: A migration crisis. Widespread travel and immigration restrictions instigated the largest and fastest decline in global human mobility in modern history, and COVID-19 may fundamentally change immigration over the longer term. The migration crisis heightens three crucial and preexisting concerns within immigration policy: the role of visa design; the status of undocumented migrants and other migrants without recourse to public funds; and the interaction of immigration and the labor market policy. It could reinforce a rising tide of nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment, protectionist sentiment within labor-market policy debates, and a K-shaped recovery in migration patterns.
</description>
<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>International students struggling in the private rental sector in Australia prior to and during the pandemic</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/2123/26566</link>
<description>International students struggling in the private rental sector in Australia prior to and during the pandemic
Morris, Alan; Wilson, Shaun; Mitchell, Emma; Ramia, Gaby; Hastings, Catherine
</description>
<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/2123/26566</guid>
<dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>Dramaturgy and crisis management: A third act</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/2123/26144</link>
<description>Dramaturgy and crisis management: A third act
Ball, Sarah; McConnell, Allan; Stark, Alastair
Dramaturgical perspectives have been used successfully in the past by crisis management researchers. However, previous contributions have been limited because they have been actor-centered, which has meant that they have tended to ignore the critical role that an audience can play in the drama of a crisis. This article therefore presents a “third act” in which dramaturgical perspectives are used to deliver an actor-and-audience centered analysis of crisis management. This third act is built around the dramaturgical concept of “characterization,” which we introduce to assess how an audience receives the symbolic outputs and discourses that are produced by crisis actors. After this theorizing, we present an analytical model, which will allow future researchers to analyze the interplay between actor, audience, and legitimacy when examining crisis. We conclude by illustrating the model's analytical capacity via an examination of the role of leaders and experts during the COVID-19 pandemic.
</description>
<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item>
<title>The Alberta Effect and Canadian Climate Policy</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/2123/25554</link>
<description>The Alberta Effect and Canadian Climate Policy
MacNeil, Robert
This paper aims to develop the concept of an ‘Alberta effect’ as a type of antonym to the ‘California effect’ in the literature on environmental policy in federal states. The paper argues that Canada’s efforts to achieve an effective national climate strategy over the past 25 years have, to a large extent, been hampered by an Alberta effect, where a relatively small jurisdiction has not only used a permissive federalist architecture to grind federal action to a halt, but has also completely overwhelmed emissions reductions made elsewhere in the federation. The article explores the nature of this effect and the conditions which have allowed it to occur, and provides some preliminary insight into how Ottawa might hope to manage this situation and work towards decarbonising the Canadian economy going forward.
</description>
<pubDate>Thu, 01 Jul 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/2123/25554</guid>
<dc:date>2021-07-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item>
<title>Life, death, and the living dead in the time of COVID-19</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/2123/25339</link>
<description>Life, death, and the living dead in the time of COVID-19
Der Derian, J.; Gara, P.
Is COVID-19 our first global zombie event? The question leads to others that fall outside the decorum of official discourse, possibly because the answers reach beyond the pale of the state. Unable to understand the nature of the threat, national leaders failed early and caught on late to the need for a globally coordinated response. Coupled with a deep resistance by states to the alienation of any degree of sovereignty to international institutions, the prospect of a global solution to the zombie question remains elusive. This essay offers an interpandemic response to the novel coronavirus that cuts across borders and against the grain. The first is transnational, to identify from the parallax view of Sydney and Los Angeles emergent risks that defy single-state fixes. The second is transhistorical, to counter efforts by China and the United States to subsume a human security crisis into the narrative of an eternal Cold War. The third is transmedial, to acquire new political and cultural perspectives on the pandemic through the zombie cinematic genre, including our documentary film, Project Z: The Final Global Event. A zombie inquiry can help us understand how COVID-19 is both disease and potential cure of late and rising empires.
</description>
<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/2123/25339</guid>
<dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item>
<title>What Does South Korea Think of the China-US COVID Blame Game?</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/2123/25052</link>
<description>What Does South Korea Think of the China-US COVID Blame Game?
Raswant, Arpit; Kim, Jiye
Amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, a “G-0” international system has surfaced. Countries like South Korea are pressed to consider pandemic management at a time when there are growing signs of a lack of cooperation between the two great powers, China and the Uny a general absence of global leadership and accountability – i.e., the “G-0” international order. Amid ongoing frited States, accompanied biction between China and the U.S. over pandemic-related issues, two leading discourses appear in South Korea. At first, most Korean analysts see the blame game over the virus’ origin as primarily related to China and the United States’ respective domestic issues. Then, the finger-pointing is linked to the underlying hegemonic competition between China and the United States. In addition to these two dominant views, there is an ongoing debate that about what is going on behind the scenes in this war of words. The local discourses observed in South Korea resonate in other countries with similar conditions and concerns about the G-0 international system’s potential outcomes: no multipolar, bipolar, or unipolar order of accountability. The COVID-19 pandemic is not the first and most likely not the last exogenous shock to move the world in that direction.
</description>
<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/2123/25052</guid>
<dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>South Korea and America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Yes, But Not Quite</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/2123/25044</link>
<description>South Korea and America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Yes, But Not Quite
Kim, Jiye; Wilkins, Thomas
In a call with South Korean President Jae-In Moon on 11 November 2020, the United States President-elect Joe Biden emphasised that South Korea represented the “lynchpin of the security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region.” It is too soon to comment on any possible variations that will appear in American policy towards Asia yet. But it seems likely that the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” – as detailed in the Department of Defense’s 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) and State Department’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) document – enjoys bipartisan support and will thus remain the centerpiece of US engagement with the region. This is also currently the consensus view among the Korean media and expert community. Like many ASEAN member states, South Korea has sought to avoid “choosing sides” between China and the United States. It has adopted an uneasy equidistance between the two great powers and their respective Indo-Pacific Strategy and Belt and Road Initiative power plays.
</description>
<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/2123/25044</guid>
<dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item>
<title>Finding the Common Ground with South Korea</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/2123/25029</link>
<description>Finding the Common Ground with South Korea
Kim, Jiye
This chapter contributes to the literature in two ways: understanding the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative from a Chinese perspective and analyzing China’s diplomacy with its neighboring countries. As a part of the Northeast Asian region, South Korea is geographically away from the primary geographical focus of OBOR, Central Asia. However, South Korea’s geopolitical significance still provides relevance to the OBOR initiative. This chapter consists of the following sections. Firstly, the understanding of OBOR from China’s perspective, the nature and goal of OBOR will be discussed. Secondly, China’s effort to engage South Korea in OBOR will follow.
</description>
<pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2017 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/2123/25029</guid>
<dc:date>2017-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item>
<title>China’s 4 Principles in the South China Sea Dispute</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/2123/25027</link>
<description>China’s 4 Principles in the South China Sea Dispute
Kim, Jiye
China’s principles regarding the South China Sea (SCS) dispute are erratic, yet becoming clearer as the regional status quo is threatened by littoral actors, led by China itself. Foreign Minister Wang Yi suggested four principles to guide the SCS dispute during a recent visit to Australia, in preparation for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit in November this year. First, he said that the dispute over the sovereignty of some reefs in the Nansha (Spratly) Islands is a leftover problem of history. He said historical facts should come first in handling the dispute. Second, he requested that other countries respect international laws, specifically referring to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Third, he said that direct dialogue and consultation between the countries involved should be respected. Last, he said that the efforts China and ASEAN have made to maintain peace and stability should be respected. He also limited the roles of the countries outside the region to “constructive” ones. China argues through the Four Respects that, firstly, the country does not set aside international law and abides by it as a legal signatory to UNCLOS, and secondly, it provides the littoral states with the opportunity to negotiate the waters around the Spratly Islands as well as their adjacent waters, over which China has demarcated its sovereignty. China has held to its “indisputable sovereignty” since the 1980s; however, the principle of “indisputable sovereignty” has been segmented and specified by the recent Four Respects.
</description>
<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2014 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/2123/25027</guid>
<dc:date>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item>
<title>Saving Lives: The civil-military response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/2123/15949</link>
<description>Saving Lives: The civil-military response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa
Kamradt-Scott, Adam; Harman, Sophie; Wenham, Clare; Smith, Frank III
The 2014 Ebola outbreak in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone proved to be an exceptional outbreak that blurred the lines between health and humanitarian crises. In so doing, it highlighted numerous problems with regard to the coordination of humanitarian disasters that have public health implications of international consequence. The manner in which the international response to this crisis unfolded has in turn prompted a number of high-level intergovernmental reviews of the key actors, institutions and systems that we - as a global community - currently rely upon. At the time of writing, some of these reviews are yet to hand down their findings. This study, which was funded by the University of Sydney, provides a number of independent insights into the civil-military response and overall coordination of the Ebola outbreak in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It also offers recommendations to inform future research and response efforts.  The domestic health systems of Liberia and Sierra Leone were ill-equipped to address the size and scale of the Ebola outbreak. Overwhelmed, rapid international assistance was needed to halt the spread of the virus and save lives. The international civilian response to this crisis was, however, widely perceived as slow and inadequate. While key institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) have been heavily criticized, the role of non-government organizations (NGOs) was also mixed. A small number of non-state actors and international NGOs (INGOs) such as Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) reacted swiftly to the outbreak, but the majority of other organizations found themselves unprepared for a crisis of this nature, withdrawing personnel and closing down operations. This raises serious concerns about the overall capacity of the existing humanitarian system and agencies to respond to health-related crises.  Due to the inadequate civilian response, the 2014 Ebola outbreak also witnessed the deployment of thousands of military personnel to help contain the outbreak. The majority of respondents interviewed for this study were positive about the role of foreign military assistance (FMA), which was seen as a necessary last resort. In addition, Sierra Leoneans were generally positive about the role of domestic armed forces, which played a larger role in the Ebola response than their Liberian counterparts. However, several significant criticisms and concerns emerged as well. Foreign armed forces were perceived as risk averse and slow in constructing Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs). Criticism of domestic armed forces included the threat - and in some instances use of - violence and intimidation.  Strong leadership from the President and the health sector in Liberia was recognised as key to the country’s effective response, whereas weak leadership and patronage within the health sector was seen to hurt the response in Sierra Leone. Limited trust in government undermined public health, inhibiting behavioural change and social awareness campaigns (particularly in Sierra Leone). These findings highlight that changes are warranted in how governments, international organisations, NGOs, civil society and even militaries approach health-related humanitarian crises in the future.
</description>
<pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2015 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/2123/15949</guid>
<dc:date>2015-10-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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