https://hdl.handle.net/2123/31070 2026-06-04T20:17:37Z 2026-06-04T20:17:37Z Teiwes, Frederick C. Sun, Warren https://hdl.handle.net/2123/32981 2024-08-22T03:55:48Z 2023-01-01T00:00:00Z

CCP Ideology, 1976-1980: From the "Two Whatevers,” to the “Criterion of Truth,” to the “Four Cardinal Principles,” and Beyond Teiwes, Frederick C.; Sun, Warren This Working Paper is a draft chapter for a book on the poorly understood CCP elite politics of the early post-Mao period, tentatively entitled Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and the Dismantling of Maoism. Nowhere is this period more misunderstood than in the area of ideology and its notional centrality to an imagined Hua-Deng power struggle. In the accepted narrative, a critical feature of this struggle is the February 1977 “two whatevers” editorial notionally requiring support for all of Mao’s decisions, that allegedly sought to prevent Deng’s return to work and to enforce a rigid ideological framework preventing significant change from Mao’s practices. In fact, Deng’s return to high office had been decided at the start of January, and more importantly, from the earliest days of Hua’s leadership, the task was to move away from Mao’s Cultural Revolution but to maintain regime stability and unity by expressing fealty to a leader still deeply worshipped in major sections of the population and respected by Party leaders, notably those of the revolutionary generation. Claims that “whateverists” engaged in an intense struggle with reformers seeking a pragmatic approach under the slogan “practice is the sole criterion of truth” beginning in May 1978 are not totally amiss, but they exaggerate the situation and do not adequately account for the fact that the conflict was largely among lower-level figures on the theoretical front who did not deeply engage the top leadership. There were nuanced differences between Hua and Deng on the “criterion of truth” question but nothing fundamental, and neither wanted ideological issues to disrupt the economic agenda of the fall 1978 pre-Third Plenum work conference. At the conference, however, arguments initiated by progressive theorists resulted in official acceptance of the criterion position, although there was high-level concern, most prominently expressed by Deng, for 3 proceeding with caution, particularly as it related to Mao’s prestige. More broadly, in Party ranks many felt the plenum’s policies had gone too far and were leading to disruption in society. At the end of March 1979, Deng reacted with his “four cardinal principles” speech that demanded adherence to the political practice of Mao’s pre-Cultural Revolution period. This not only alarmed progressives but it also created leadership concern that the practical focus of the Third Plenum policies was being undermined. Deng then sought to bolster those policies, but at the time of the 30th anniversary of the PRC, he still gave priority to the “four principles” and defence of Mao. Indeed, he explicitly affirmed a lavish claim concerning Mao’s essential role in the Party’s successes, the same claim that had appeared in the “two whatevers” editorial more than two and a half years earlier.

2023-01-01T00:00:00Z Teiwes, Frederick C. https://hdl.handle.net/2123/32915.2 2026-03-07T23:28:15Z 2024-08-08T00:00:00Z

Understanding Elite Politics Through Relentless Research: Warren Sun’s Hua Guofeng Nianpu, Chronology of Hua Guofeng (1971–1981) Teiwes, Frederick C. This Working Paper is a pre-publication review of an immense documentary collection prepared over the past 25 years by Warren Sun, Adjunct Associate Professor at Monash University and Affiliate Member of the Sydney CSC. It is based on the intellectual premise that elite politics in the CCP cannot be understood without deep penetration into the details of political decision-making and conflict. In its absence, simplistic narratives emerge and become widely accepted, especially when the Party itself is creating the basis for the narrative. This is most prevalent for the immediate post-Mao period as a Hua Guofeng-Deng Xiaoping struggle between different ideological lines and in the profound misunderstanding of Hua as a limited, merely transitional political leader. Hua nianpu uses a wide range of sources to uncover details that contest such views. These include: the contemporary PRC public record; official documentary collections; internal Party documents including unpublished speeches and compendia of circulars at major Party meetings; memoirs, oral accounts, and recollections published in the PRC by or about leaders; studies by Party history scholars in PRC journals; more-adventurous books published in Hong Kong by Party historians and former officials; interviews with scholars and retired officials; and unique interviews with officials who worked as secretaries or as aides to very senior figures and their family members, especially members of Hua’s family. However, these sources have limitations that must be considered critically and discussed in terms of what they can and cannot provide. Taken together the detailed information compiled in Hua nianpu undermines central features of the accepted narrative, most notably by showing that the 1978 work conference and the subsequent Third Plenum were joint Hua-Deng ventures to advance modernization, and when unanticipated developments weakened Hua, Deng did not act against him. Instead, he worked to lower tensions and to return the focus to their original joint plan. Hua nianpu is a major basis for our joint book project, Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and the Dismantling of Maoism. But this nianpu is entirely Professor Sun’s creation and exacting work. The target for submission of both these projects to their respective publishers is early 2025.

2024-08-08T00:00:00Z Goodman, David S G https://hdl.handle.net/2123/32924 2025-10-15T04:49:08Z 2024-08-09T00:00:00Z

Local Social Governance in China: Spatial politics and social welfare Goodman, David S G The policy goal of establishing local social governance in the People’s Republic of China since 2021 highlights two somewhat contradictory tendencies in its spatial politics. One is increased social welfare provision through economic, social and governmental institutions cooperating to create self-sustaining communities. The other is greater city-district and county level local control by the Communist Party of China. Local social governance remains in its infancy with limited policy implementation. The evidence to date though from an examination of the settings for local social governance, its causes, and preliminary implementation does not suggest major changes in the longer-term balance between the Party-state’s undoubted centralist and decentralist tendencies. Moreover, while there may be the desire both to improve social welfare provision, and to extend the reach of the state and the Party, the proposed programme of change faces immense and probably intractable challenges.

2024-08-09T00:00:00Z Huang, Jeanne https://hdl.handle.net/2123/31118 2024-03-27T01:41:26Z 2023-04-19T00:00:00Z

Digitalization of Special Economic Zones in China Huang, Jeanne Special Economic Zones (SEZ) have become the forefront in China to test legal and technological reforms for digital trade. This chapter explores three cutting-edge case studies in China’s SEZs: the Beijing blockchain-based Single Window deposit box; newly established big data exchanges in Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai SEZs; and pilot projects in financial, medical care and automobile industries to flow data across the border in the Shanghai SEZ. It scrutinizes China's experiments in the context of its applications to join CPTPP and DEPA. It argues that the development of Chinese domestic law for digital trade is shifting away from the traditional paradigm that uses international commitments to push domestic reform or make domestic law according to international law. The development of Chinese domestic law for digital trade relies much more on China’s domestic needs than what FTAs negotiations require. FTAs are increasingly becoming a tool for China to shape international law rather than a benchmark for legislating domestic Chinese law.

2023-04-19T00:00:00Z Goodman, David S G https://hdl.handle.net/2123/31117 2023-04-19T01:51:37Z 2023-04-19T00:00:00Z

Australia’s Response to the China Threat: The Case for Engagement Goodman, David S G The dominance of the China Threat discourse in Australia’s public affairs suggests poor prospects for any continued Australia-China relations, let alone positive interactions of mutual benefit. An exploration of alternative ways to approach Australia’s relationship with China may though prove not only more constructive but also better future-proofed. The first step is to recognize that while China certainly poses challenges to Australia the perception of threat is more relevant to the USA. The second is the recognition of differences and the development of ways to mediate those differences. And the third is to build on the complementarities for the benefit of both Australia and China, not just through economic but also through social interactions. As Europe discovered in the 1950s, the development of mutual understanding of other peoples, their cultures, and their social and economic systems is a precursor not simply to respect and the avoidance of unwarranted prejudice, but to cooperation for a wider public good.

2023-04-19T00:00:00Z Johnston, Lauren A. https://hdl.handle.net/2123/31116 2023-04-19T00:00:50Z 2023-04-19T00:00:00Z

The Belt and Road Initiative as Ten Policy Commandments: Review of Xi’s Kazakhstan and Indonesia Launch Speeches Johnston, Lauren A. In 2019 Foreign Policy described China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as “the most talked about and least defined buzzword of this decade”. Given that confusion and the importance of leader political speeches in China, especially those of current President Xi Jinping, it is surprising that the BRI literature has little in-depth analysed the two launch speeches of 2013. This article seeks to fill that gap with study of those speeches and focus on the five cooperation-oriented areas announced in each. In comparative context those ten pillars appear not to be descended from New Era Chinese heaven but rather demonstrate substantive thematic overlap with the ten pillars of what was once relatively mainstream macroeconomic development policy, the Washington Consensus. Yet, in the case of the BRI there is a relative implicit implementation emphasis also. In forward context of contemporary global political economy tensions, the need to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, the G7’s Build Back Better and the European Union’s Global Gateway ambitions also, this article may offer a timely fresh and comparative lens on the BRI.

2023-04-19T00:00:00Z Blecher, Marc https://hdl.handle.net/2123/31115 2023-04-18T23:57:11Z 2023-04-19T00:00:00Z

Working Class Formation in China Since 1920 Blecher, Marc In the 20th century, the Chinese working class did have the opportunity, and from time to time it looked like they had might be turning the trick. But in the end, they lost. Why? Chinese workers have been the subjects of a great deal of analysis by scholars, documentation by journalists and activists, and portrayal by writers, filmmakers and artists. Light has been shone on the rich tapestry of economic, social, cultural and political forces driving them into low-paid, dangerous, degrading, alienating, mind-numbing, transient employment, on the obstacles to improvement, on workers’ understandings of their world and their lives in it, on their passivity and resistance, and on the effects of their responses. A World to Lose seeks the foundation for all this in three questions: what kind of class is the Chinese working class?; what are the historical forces and processes that have formed it?; and how does the pattern of class formation help explain the working class’s reactions historically, presently and even prospectively?

2023-04-19T00:00:00Z Teiwes, Frederick C. Sun, Warren https://hdl.handle.net/2123/31114 2025-10-15T04:49:08Z 2023-04-19T00:00:00Z

PRC Foreign and Military Policy, 1977-81: Shades of Mao, the Imprint of Deng Teiwes, Frederick C.; Sun, Warren This Working Paper is a draft chapter for a book on the poorly understood CCP elite politics of the early post-Mao period, tentatively entitled Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and the Dismantling of Maoism. Conventional wisdom pictures the period up to the December 1978 Third Plenum as a struggle between Hua and Deng, reflecting neo-Maoist v. reformist tendencies, and won by Deng at the plenum. In fact, there was broad consensus between them, Hua was more proactive in key areas, and there is no evidence of anything approaching a power struggle. This paper, however, deals with an area where elements of accepted views of Deng hold up. In essence, Deng held both the foreign policy and particularly PLA portfolios, notably where they concerned the crucial relationships with the US, Soviet Union, Japan, and Vietnam. In external relations Deng was broadly regarded to have performed brilliantly, while Hua was thought a mere cypher. Overall, Hua was clearly secondary in external relations, but he took the bold step of initiating relations with revisionist Yugoslavia, made the most telling proposal in the high-level negotiations with the US, and deeply impressed dominant European leaders Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Schmidt. Deng’s foreign policy outlook was deeply influenced by Mao, he could push Mao’s “horizontal line” concept to counterproductive extremes, almost losing the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, and rather than brilliantly negotiating US normalization, the Chinese side was slow to grasp the outcome that was always there. Most significant, and revealing of the underlying dynamic of CCP politics, was the war against Vietnam. This was truly Deng’s war, opposed by not only Hua, but also by a broad array of senior civilian and PLA officials, including surviving marshals. This was essentially the first time since his return to work in 1977, in contrast to persuading his colleagues through intense effort, that Deng simply asserted his authority. Neither here or elsewhere, was argument decisive as it had generally been under Hua’s leadership to that point. What was decisive was Deng’s enormous prestige as the most outstanding of the surviving “old revolutionaries” who achieved the success of 1949. It was the same factor that allowed Deng’s quiet coup against Hua at the turn of 1979-80, with no significant resistance from Hua or anyone else, and with no explanation being made in any official forum until well after the fact.

2023-04-19T00:00:00Z