Now showing items 1-6 of 6

    • Cheap talk and editorial control 

      Newton, Jonathan (School of Economics, 2013-01)
      This paper analyzes simple models of editorial control. Starting from the framework developed by Krishna and Morgan (2001a), we analyze 2-sender models of cheap talk where one or more of the senders has the power to veto ...
    • A classification of bargaining solutions by evolutionary origin 

      Hwang, Sung-Ha; Newton, Jonathan (School of Economics, 2014-01)
      For games of contracting under perturbed best response dynamics, varying the perturbations along two dimensions (uniform vs. logit, directed vs. undirected) gives four possibilities. Three of these select differing major ...
    • Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution 

      Newton, Jonathan (School of Economics, 2013-01)
      This study considers pure coordination games on networks and the waiting time for an adaptive process of strategic change to achieve efficient coordination. Although it is in the interest of every player to coordinate on ...
    • Limitations of Network Games - a brief discussion 

      Newton, Jonathan (School of Economics, 2011-09)
    • A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems 

      Newton, Jonathan; Sawa, Ryoji (School of Economics, 2013-06)
      This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings ...
    • Stochastic stability on general state spaces 

      Newton, Jonathan (School of Economics, 2012-10)
      This paper studies stochastic stability methods applied to processes on general state spaces. This includes settings in which agents repeatedly interact and choose from an uncountable set of strategies. Dynamics exist for ...