Now showing items 1-9 of 9

    • Between the Sword and the Wall: Spain’s Limited Options for Catalan Secessionism 

      Griffiths, Ryan D.; Guillén, Pablo; Martinez i Coma, Ferran (School of Economics, 2013-09)
      We propose a game theoretical model to assess the capacity of Catalonia to become a recognized, independent country with at least a de facto European Union (EU) membership. Support for Catalan independence is increasing ...
    • The discreet charm of the collective contract 

      Chong, Sophia; Guillén, Pablo (School of Economics, 2012-02)
      We compare individual with collective contracts using variations of a repeated gift- exchange game. Firms consist of one employer and three workers. In the individual variation (I) different workers can receive separate ...
    • Lying through Their Teeth: Third Party Advice and Truth Telling in a Strategy Proof Mechanism 

      Guillén, Pablo; Hing, Alexander (School of Economics, 2013-07)
      We test the effect of advice on the well known top trading cycles (TTC) matching algorithm in a school choice frame work. We compare three treatments involving third party advice [right advice (R), wrong advice (W), and ...
    • Matching Markets with Mixed Ownership: The Case for A Real-life Assignment Mechanism 

      Guillén, Pablo; Kesten, Onur (Discipline of Economics, 2010-09)
      We consider a common indivisible good allocation problem in which agents have both social and private endowments. Popular applications include student assignment to on-campus housing, kidney exchange, and particular school ...
    • Monkey see, monkey do: truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others 

      Guillén, Pablo; Hakimov, Rustamdjan (School of Economics, 2014-01)
      We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played ...
    • A new solution for the moral hazard problem in team production 

      Guillén, Pablo; Merrett, Danielle; Slonim, Robert (School of Economics, 2013-11)
      We propose an intergroup competition scheme (ICS) to theoretically solve free-riding in team production and provide experimental evidence from a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) public goods game. The ICS includes ...
    • On-Campus Housing: Theory vs. Experiment 

      Guillén, Pablo; Kesten, Onur (Discipline of Economics, 2008-01)
      Many universities in the US offer on-campus housing opportunities to incoming as well as already enrolled students. Recent research has theoretically as well as experimentally shown that the most common student assignment ...
    • The Price of Luck 

      Bou, Silvia; Brandts, Jordi; Cayón, Magda; Guillén, Pablo (School of Economics, 2013-06)
      We find that the vast majority of students taking an advanced undergraduate finance course show a preference for luck in a classroom experiment. In Phase I of the experiment part of the students, group A, were asked to ...
    • Social Comparison, Aspirations and Priming: When Fiction is as Powerful as Fact 

      Wu, Kevin; Guillén, Pablo (School of Economics, 2012-01)
      This study uses a novel application of priming to provide experimental evidence that aspirations and social comparisons may be influenced by non factual sources. A textual narrative eliciting social comparison is shown to ...