Now showing items 21-40 of 54

    • Innovation in a generalized timing game 

      Smirnov, Vladimir; Wait, Andrew (School of Economics, 2013-08)
      We examine innovation as a timing game with complete information and observable actions in which firms decide when to enter a market. We characterize all pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria for the two-player symmetric ...
    • Is Monotonicity in an IV and RD design testable? No, but you can still check it 

      Edwards, Ben; Fiorini, Mario; Stevens, Katrien; Taylor, Matthew (School of Economics, 2013-04)
      Whenever treatment effects are heterogeneous and there is sorting into treatment based on the gain, monotonicity is a condition that both Instrumental Variable and fuzzy Regression Discontinuity designs have to satisfy for ...
    • Keynes’s economics and the question of public debt 

      Dwyer, Jack (2012-01-04)
      The Global Financial Crisis generated renewed interest in the relevance of John Maynard Keynes’s economic policy proposals, particularly those related to budget deficits, public debt and government expenditure. ‘Keynesian’ ...
    • League-Table Incentives and Price Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets 

      Cheung, Stephen L.; Coleman, Andrew (School of Economics, 2012-11)
      We study experimental markets in which participants face incentives modeled upon those prevailing in markets for managed funds. Each participant’s portfolio is periodically evaluated at market value and ranked by their ...
    • Likelihood-Based Confidence Sets for the Timing of Structural Breaks 

      Eo, Yunjong; Morley, James (School of Economics, 2011-08)
      We propose the use of likelihood-based confidence sets for the timing of structural breaks in parameters from time series regression models. The confidence sets are valid for the broad setting of a system of multivariate ...
    • Limitations of Network Games - a brief discussion 

      Newton, Jonathan (School of Economics, 2011-09)
    • Lying through Their Teeth: Third Party Advice and Truth Telling in a Strategy Proof Mechanism 

      Guillén, Pablo; Hing, Alexander (School of Economics, 2013-07)
      We test the effect of advice on the well known top trading cycles (TTC) matching algorithm in a school choice frame work. We compare three treatments involving third party advice [right advice (R), wrong advice (W), and ...
    • The Macroeconomic Effects of Quantitative Easing 

      Swain, Richard (2011-12-07)
      The recent crisis has raised two key macroeconomic issues. First, has the quantitative easing policy pursued by the Federal Reserve had an effect on output, employment and prices? Second, whether ‘quantitative easing,’ ...
    • Markov-Switching Models with Evolving Regime-Specific Parameters: Are Post-War Booms or Recessions All Alike? 

      Eo, Yunjong; Kim, Chang-Jin (School of Economics, 2012-02)
      In this paper, we relax the assumption of constant regime-specific mean growth rates in Hamilton’s (1989) two-state Markov-switching model of the business cycle. We first present a benchmark model, in which each ...
    • Marriage penalties, marriage, and cohabitation 

      Fisher, Hayley (School of Economics, 2011-09)
      I examine the effect of marriage penalties in the US income tax system on marital status. I construct a simulated instrument that exploits variation in the tax code over time and between US states to deal with potential ...
    • Mass Media and Aspiration Manipulation: An Experiment Altering Preferences Over Goals 

      Wu, Kevin (2011-12-07)
      Mass media consumption has increasingly been found to adversely impact upon psychological states but research has largely neglected the potential influence of media on aspirations. An experiment demonstrates aspirational ...
    • Modelling asset correlations: A nonparametric approach 

      Aslanidis, Nektarios; Casas, Isabel (School of Economics, 2011-01)
      This article proposes a time-varying nonparametric estimator and a time-varying semiparametric estimator of the correlation matrix. We discuss representation, estimation based on kernel smoothing and inference. An extensive ...
    • Monkey see, monkey do: truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others 

      Guillén, Pablo; Hakimov, Rustamdjan (School of Economics, 2014-01)
      We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played ...
    • More lottery tickets than milk and no money in the bank 

      Bakhtiar, Fayzan (2011-12-07)
      A significant proportion of US households have insufficient savings to cope with even moderate consumption shocks that can result in substantial externalities. At the same time, the most financially fragile households ...
    • New Insights into Conditional Cooperation and Punishment from a Strategy Method Experiment 

      Cheung, Stephen L. (School of Economics, 2012-01)
      This paper introduces new experimental designs to examine how conditional cooperation and punishment behaviours respond to the full range of variation in the contributions of others. It is shown that contributions become ...
    • The New Keynesian view of aggregate demand: some reflections from a Sraffian standpoint 

      White, Graham (School of Economics, 2012-11)
      The paper contends that the derivation of the aggregate demand curve in the new Keynesian literature is insufficient to provide the theoretical ground for the use to which it is usually put; namely, as a theoretical basis ...
    • A new solution for the moral hazard problem in team production 

      Guillén, Pablo; Merrett, Danielle; Slonim, Robert (School of Economics, 2013-11)
      We propose an intergroup competition scheme (ICS) to theoretically solve free-riding in team production and provide experimental evidence from a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) public goods game. The ICS includes ...
    • On Broadway and strip malls: how to make a winning team 

      Bel, Roland; Smirnov, Vladimir; Wait, Andrew (School of Economics, 2012-11)
      A successful organization – or Broadway production – needs the right team. A potential issue is that an existing synergy between complementary agents (or assets) can reduce the marginal return of effort, creating a ...
    • On the Elicitation of Time Preference under Conditions of Risk 

      Cheung, Stephen L. (School of Economics, 2013-09)
      Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) report evidence that distinct utility functions govern choices under certainty and risk. I investigate the robustness of this result to the experimental design. I find that the effect disappears ...
    • A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems 

      Newton, Jonathan; Sawa, Ryoji (School of Economics, 2013-06)
      This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings ...