Introduction

Within the field of the study of religion(s) the notion ‘Religion’ is both foundational and of methodological importance.¹ The notion of Religion is presupposed in all studies of religion(s) and, as such, founds the legitimacy of any study of religion(s). Furthermore, the preconception of what Religion signifies determines how religion(s) are interpreted and therein, forms the methodological horizon of the study of religion(s). As such, Religion poses two central problems for the study of religion(s): the problem of disclosing the meaning of the notion ‘Religion’ upon which the study of religion(s) may be founded, and furthermore, the problem of disclosing the proper notion of Religion which provides methodological guidance to the study of religion(s).²

This thesis will attempt to come to terms with the problem of the meaning of the notion ‘Religion’ by testing out the possibility of a phenomenology of Religion based on Martin Heidegger’s philosophical writings. I have decided to utilise Heidegger’s phenomenology, especially his writings preceding and up to Being and Time for two primary reasons. First, I have always felt that Religion is an intrinsic part of human existence. In this respect, Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology as ontology fits with my intuitive sense of the meaning of Religion. Further, as with many other readers of Being and Time, I was impressed with the potential of the phenomenological method given therein for an interpretation of Religion in relation to being human. Herein, the phenomenological method proposed by Heidegger appears at first glance to provide a legitimate and powerful way of understanding the meaning of Religion. However, with careful study, it became apparent to me that even though

¹ See Glossary: religion(s), Religion
² See Glossary: Proper.
Heidegger’s phenomenology does indeed provide a way of addressing the problem of Religion, his general thinking and writing actually reduces or overlooks Religion. Here, the writings of Heidegger utilise religious traditions and religious thinking as a way into philosophy, reducing the meaning of Religion in this process to an ‘ontic’ phenomenon within the truth of being. Additionally, Heidegger’s interpretation consistently transforms ‘religious thought’ into the question of an authentic existence upon which philosophy can be grounded. In this respect, it is the task of this thesis to test out the possibility of a phenomenology of Religion (as ontology) that does not repeat Heidegger’s reduction of Religion to a phenomenon within the truth of being.

The question this thesis proposes to address tentatively is: What does Religion mean as a phenomenon? Herein, the region of the question is philosophical, referring to Religion as a notion. Moreover, the question posed is ontological; referring to Religion as a notion that gains significance in relation to being-human. In other words, the question of this thesis constitutes Religion as a phenomenon that belongs to the being of humans. The question is, as such: what is the meaning of Religion in its ground of being-human?³

The structure of the thesis will follow the path of the question of the meaning of Religion as a phenomenon through the provision of mutually dependent layers of arguments and interpretations. Herein, each part of the thesis will found the parts to follow and will be dependent upon, and intrinsically related to, the preceding parts. The thesis, in detail, will contain four parts: the problem of Religion, Phenomenology as method, deconstructive case studies, and a movement towards an existential analysis.

³ See Glossary: being-human
The aim of the first part is to set the horizon for the thesis; establishing what sort of problem Religion is and how the thesis will address the problem. The second part will provide an overview and interpretation of Heidegger’s phenomenology with the aim of showing what phenomenology is and providing a theoretical framework for a phenomenology of Religion. The third part of the thesis will provide the first phase of the test of a phenomenology of Religion through the provision of deconstructive case studies of three Pre-Socratic philosophers. The fourth part of the thesis will then utilise the deconstructive case studies as the foundation for a movement towards an existential analysis of the meaning of Religion and further, the disclosure of some of the primary ontological structures of the meaning of Religion as belonging to being-human.

The thesis will provide two interrelated interpretations of the meaning of Religion as a phenomenon. The first will disclose the meaning of Religion in general as a relationship between being-human and what I will term ‘originary ground’.

The second is that Religion, with regard to its ground in being-human, signifies what I will call belief.
Part One: The Problem of Religion

The first part of this research takes up the notion of Religion as a problem. Here, Religion as a problem has three primary senses: of questioning why Religion is a problem, of what sort of problem Religion is, and finally, of ascertaining the proper way of questioning the meaning of Religion.

The first chapter will take up the task of problematising the notion of Religion, or, of questioning how Religion is generally preconceived, especially in the studies of religion(s). In this, the aim is to discuss how the general preconception of the meaning of Religion as religion(s), generates the problem of attempts to define Religion. As such, the first chapter has as its primary task problematising the preconception of Religion as religion(s). Furthermore, the first chapter will also have the task of revealing that the proper domain of the problem of Religion is ontology.

In the second chapter I will take up Religion as an ontological problem via a brief overview of the tradition of ontology. The question to be addressed is what sort of ontological system and what notion of being allows the problem of Religion to be approached properly. Insofar as Religion is conceived of as a problem in relation to the being of humans (being-human), or, of belonging-to the being of humans, the question then becomes how to properly approach the meaning of Religion through the being of humans.

The second chapter, then, begins with and prioritises Aristotle’s writings about being. There are two reasons for this prioritisation: first in the fact that Aristotle is the first philosopher to pose being (ontology) in a systematic fashion and as a systematic problem. Second, that Aristotle’s formulation of being dominates the way being is
conceived in the tradition of philosophy. As such, a task of the chapter will be to show
that Aristotle’s notion of being is a primary constitutive factor in the preconception of
Religion as religion(s).

Insofar as chapter two characterises ontology as a problem (both with respect
to the notion of Religion and being) it then moves on to a provisional acceptance of
Heidegger’s prioritisation of Dasein’s being as the proper way of formulating
Religion as an ontological problem. As this acceptance is only provisional, I also
outline the limits of this acceptance.

Finally, in chapter three, the first part of this research will conclude with a
formulation of Religion as a phenomenon through which the meaning of Religion
may be properly disclosed. Here, I will first discuss how phenomenon signifies an
ontological problem, and then, that this signifies the question of how Religion
belongs-to being-human: its meaning and ground therein. As a result of this
formulation, I will then argue that objects of Religion, i.e. God, must be excluded
from analysis.

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6 See Glossary: Dasein
Chapter One: The Problem of Religion:

The task of setting the background in preparation for ‘a phenomenology of Religion’ will begin with a preliminary look at the notion ‘Religion’. To prepare in this sense will be taken to be a re-look at the notion Religion as it is conceptualised and presupposed, for the most part, in ‘religious studies’ or ‘studies in religion’. Furthermore, in the re-look of preparation the aim and task will be the problematising of the notion Religion in theoretical approaches to religion(s). To problematise, in this sense, will operate as the questioning of the notion Religion in theoretical fields in order to point towards the space in which ‘a phenomenology of Religion’ may take place.

1. The Problem of Defining Religion: Introduction:

In the theoretical study of Religion the question invariably occurs as to what Religion is. This question is generally given as the problem of defining Religion and the equivalent question of whether Religion can be defined at all. In the first instance, this problem seems inevitably to operate in difference: a) between religion(s), and b) between religion(s) and Religion. The first difference here leads to the second insofar as the difference between religion(s) is seen to problematise the relation of the religion(s) to the notion Religion. The difference between religion(s) leads to the question of whether there is some object ‘Religion’, or equally, some notion ‘Religion’ in a universal sense that defines all religion(s) as such.

This problem can be, and has been, re-phrased in a variety of ways; from the question of the essence of religion(s) to the question of what consensus can occur in regard to boundary making with respect to what the notion ‘Religion’ may refer to in
relation to phenomena. Belying all of these phrasings of the problem, however, is the central question of how any and every religion(s) can be determined as Religion. This is undoubtedly, in one sense, the problem of defining Religion, of stating the precise nature of a thing or word.⁷ To show how the project of defining Religion is problematic will require that the notion of Religion be investigated further with regard to the theoretical approaches to religion(s) and the methodological thinking that arises from these approaches.

In this investigation two questions will be kept in mind: what sort of preconception of Religion is assumed by the theoretical study of religion(s) and equally, of how the notion of Religion is formulated as a type of object from within the methodological preconceptions of the study in religion(s).⁸ What is at stake then, is the question of how the essence of religion(s) is presupposed and formulated with regard to a universal notion of Religion. Moreover, this is the question of the meaning of Religion as that which determines religion(s) as religion(s).

2. The Initial Problem of Defining: In General.

Where the problem of defining Religion is investigated more closely a certain circularity appears wherein theorists studying religion(s) begin with the juxtaposition of the empirical reality of religion(s) to be analysed without any capacity to define Religion as that through which religion(s) could be delimited. In this, the circle contains, structurally, three moments: (1) the initial preconception of Religion – as the Religion behind the religion(s) in question, that allows the religion(s) to be called religion(s), (2) the moment of the religion(s) as phenomena, as the particular religion(s) in its expressions, and (3) the moment of returning the particular

⁷ J. Coulson (ed.) *Oxford Illustrated Dictionary*, p.211
⁸ See Glossary: preconception
religion(s) to the notion Religion in view of definition. This movement of methodological circularity is often referred to as the process of moving from a ‘working definition’ to a ‘definition’ proper.\textsuperscript{9} What occurs, however, is generally a failure for the end product of definition proper to eventuate. It is necessary then, in attempting to approach the problem of defining Religion in general, to pay attention to the structure of this methodological circularity in order to discover how and why this problem of definition occurs.

In the first moment, that of initial preconception, both the delimiting and formulation of methodological approach happens in advance. This is the case insofar as the initial preconception already determines Religion as an object of study in a certain way with a particular focus already in mind. In the study of religion(s) the initial preconception almost invariably refers the notion of Religion immediately back to the actuality and presence of the religion(s) to be studied.\textsuperscript{10} Accordingly, this preconception of Religion is often supported by an ‘everyday’ notion of Religion wherein the immediate, closest to hand, expression of Religion is given in religion(s).\textsuperscript{11} As such, the preconception of Religion which generally operates in the study of religion(s) can be seen to be generated from and refer to the immediate presence of religion(s) as a possible object of study.

The notion Religion tends to be founded upon the immediate object religion(s). This immediate preconception of Religion accordingly has implications for the methodological theorising in the study of religion(s) insofar as Religion will

\textsuperscript{9} P. Connolly (ed.) \textit{Approaches to the Study of Religion}, p.5. W. Capps, \textit{Ways of Understanding Religion}, p.184
inherently tend to be conceived of as a universal object Religion which underlies all religion(s), framed generally as the conceptual problem of what essentially determines, in a predicate-able way, religion(s) as Religion. In the initial moment of preconception, then, there is to be found the central conception of Religion as object and object-like. This object-like Religion will accordingly function as ‘Religion-ness’ as the essential, necessary and non-contingent dimension of all religion(s). If Religion is preconceived as object-ness, the question remains as to what sort of object Religion is and how it is to be determined.

(Second Moment) The determination of Religion as an object-like-ness in advance cannot be said, in general, to follow a clear theoretical exposition of the concept Religion, but rather, tends to follow the preconception of an object or category religion(s). In this, a majority of textual guides to the methodology of the study of religion(s) can be seen to open with a passing analysis of the problem of defining Religion which quickly slips into a discussion of Religion as the object religion(s). Some theoretical examples of this tendency need to be identified and discussed.

In Crawford’s text, *What is Religion?*, the introductory chapter begins precisely in this manner, initially identifying Religion in association with the everyday concept of religion(s).\(^\text{(12)}\) Admittedly, Crawford does question whether Religion may be defined via religion(s)\(^\text{(13)}\), but this question is soon passed over to be replaced by a methodological approach which nonetheless prioritises religion(s) and the phenomena associated with religion(s).\(^\text{(14)}\) For Crawford, the main identifiable problem of Religion becomes that of the failure of definitions to point to the essence of Religion. This problem is not, however, framed with regard to theory, but in

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\(^{13}\) Ibid. p.1
\(^{14}\) Ibid. pp.5-7
reference to the interpretation and analysis of the practices, organisation and belief systems of religion(s).\textsuperscript{15} In taking this methodological stance, Crawford drops the problem of defining Religion as the essence of religion(s), and replaces it with a functional and descriptive definition.\textsuperscript{16}

Likewise, Haught, in \textit{What is Religion? An Introduction} follows the position of thinking about Religion with regard to the phenomena of religion(s) to which the word ‘Religion’ refers. Here, the phenomena are categorically identifiable as standing out from the everyday\textsuperscript{17}. It is in this context, of the phenomena of religion(s) taken as data, that religion(s) may be correctly approached.\textsuperscript{18}

In brief, the general methodological approach to religion(s) and Religion can be viewed as following this path: in Connolly, as the problem of the scope of the phenomena that can be called religious\textsuperscript{19}, in Whaling, of the data belonging to religion(s)\textsuperscript{20}, in Capps, as the problem of the inclusion and exclusion of phenomena, and of a beginning with phenomena that almost everyone will agree as having something to do with Religion.\textsuperscript{21} Some, like Holm, feel it adequate to merely posit Religion to be religion(s).\textsuperscript{22}

(Third Moment) As a result of this preconception, and then methodological approach to the studies of religion(s) attempts to define Religion properly, become problematic. This problem gets expressed in two forms; that of the functionality of the definitional delimitations, and the question of the essence of religion(s) in the concept Religion. In the first case, the recurrent problem of the possibility of a definition

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. p.192
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid. p.8
\textsuperscript{17} Haught, Op. cit. p.2
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. pp.1-2
\textsuperscript{19} Connolly, Op. cit. p.4
\textsuperscript{20} Whaling, Op. cit. p.22
\textsuperscript{21} Capps., Op. cit. pp.8, 184
\textsuperscript{22} Holm., Op. cit. p.3
proper tends to be framed in regard to the elasticity of the notion of Religion put in relation to descriptive-categorical definitions. Here, the attempts to define Religion tend to be either too narrow or too broad, of not encompassing the complete range of predetermined phenomena, or of encompassing everything, even phenomena patently excluded in the predetermination.  

The question of the essence of Religion erupts from the first insofar as a definition of Religion, ideally and conceptually, pertains to the essence of religion(s). The problem of the ‘essence’ of religion(s) in the notion of Religion is twofold: that the phenomena of religion(s) does not allow of an essentialist conception of Religion, and furthermore, that the essence of Religion has already been predetermined, in the preconception, as the object religion(s). Accordingly, where a definition proper is considered there is a tendency for either an essentialist definition that is not related to the phenomena of interpretation, or, for a definition that denies the possibility of any essence of religion(s).

Examples of the first tendency can be found in Crawford and Connolly. In Crawford, the attempt to provide a definition proper results in a ‘supernatural’ definition wherein Religion is defined as ‘the divine’, the ‘sacred’ and a belief in ‘God’ (“in the broadest sense”). Likewise, in Connolly, Religion is defined as involving the supernatural, trans-empirical realm. Here, however, the definition proper is problematic in three ways: in drawing conclusions unsupported by the phenomena itself, as merely pertaining to possible objects of religion(s), and furthermore, prone to the accusation of a Christian-theological bias insofar as the definitions attempt to extend theological and metaphysical concepts to cover non-Christian religion(s).


On the other hand, many scholars deny the necessity of an essentialist definition altogether. For example, Charlesworth asserts that religion(s) have no essence which could be called Religion.\textsuperscript{26} Likewise, Holm argues that there is no point in attempting to discover the essence of religion(s) due to the manifest differences between religion(s) and also insofar as any essence would exclude the realm of Religion as a whole religious life.\textsuperscript{27} Accordingly, in this position it is argued that the notion of Religion as a universal concept must be dropped as an object of study from the theoretical field of religion(s).\textsuperscript{28}

Throughout the methodological circle that has been broadly and briefly outlined, the problem of Religion and the problem of defining Religion can be seen to arise out of the preconception of Religion as the object religion(s) and the corresponding lack of theoretical investigation into this preconception. In this, the lack of theoretical investigation into this preconception of the study of religion(s) allows Religion to be conceptualised as the object religion(s) in an unquestioned way, thus leading to the methodological approaches which take Religion for granted as an object. However, this also leads to the problematising of all definitions of Religion and the dismissal of Religion as a universal concept.

For the purposes of this paper the general problem of defining Religion as discussed operates as the platform for the paper’s own problem. This problem is best expressed via a discussion of the question of the essence of religion(s) in relation to the methodological circularity.

Initially, the problem of Religion arises out of the preconception of Religion as the object religion(s). Stated in such a way, it becomes evident that the general

\textsuperscript{26} M. J. Charlesworth, \textit{Philosophy of Religion: The Historic Approaches}, p.x
\textsuperscript{27} Holm, Op. cit. p.18
\textsuperscript{28} W. Cantwell Smith, \textit{The Meaning and End of Religion}, pp.194-5
preconception of Religion is unworkable and theoretically naïve insofar as Religion cannot be posited in a valid sense with regard to any particular religion(s). It is also impossible, however, to merely dismiss the notion Religion, as a universal concept, insofar as any study of religion(s) necessarily presupposes the notion Religion. For example, where religion(s) are compared, even as merely social institutions, the comparison is dependent upon the validity of the notion of Religion and also dependent upon Religion as the notion by which religion(s) are determined as a category of study. Furthermore, to compare religion(s) also depends upon the preconception of Religion, even if it is only a vague understanding, to determine whether something can be called religion(s) in advance.

Likewise, the position that dismisses Religion as a universal concept remains dependent upon the notion of Religion in some sense, whether in reference to the vague understanding that allows religion(s) to be recognised as such, or whether Religion has some meaning as a notion which refers to phenomena. Even to adopt a new term, such as: ‘religiosity’, ‘religious life’, ‘religious-ness’, does not alleviate the necessity of Religion as a notion.

In its most basic form, the problem of Religion must therefore be viewed as the problem of the notion of Religion. Indeed, the very possibility of studies in religion(s) as a discipline relies upon the validity and meaningfulness of the notion of Religion as a universal concept. This is a self-evident fact: the study of religion(s) requires that the category religion(s) be valid. The validity of the category ‘religion(s)’ furthermore, is entirely dependent upon the notion of Religion.

This allows of a preliminary formulation of the problem of Religion. Initially, the problem of Religion is that of what allows religion(s) to be religion(s). Religion, as such, can not be an object, nor established via the object religion(s), insofar as it
pertains to the ground of religion(s); the ‘reason-for’, the ‘cause-of’, or, the ‘how-it-is-allowed-to-be’ of religion(s). Insofar as Religion is no object its meaning as the essence of religion(s) will also not be found, or be derivable, from the phenomena predetermined as religious. Here, the phenomena, as phenomenal-empirical actualities cannot be utilised to identify the a priori, pre-empirical concept of Religion. Furthermore, for phenomena to be categorised as ‘religious’ already presupposes the notion Religion.

The problem of Religion, then, is a twofold problem of theoretical grounds in the study of religion(s): a) as a problem of that which allows the studies of religion(s) to be a valid discipline at all, which is also the question of how Religion is always already presupposed in the study of religion(s). As such, the problem of Religion is nothing more or less than the question of the possibility of grounding the studies in religion(s). b) Equally, the problem of Religion as a universal notion operates in a broader fashion as the philosophical question of what allows religion(s) to be religion(s). In both ways of expressing the problem of Religion, we must begin with the problematising and questioning of the meaning of the concept Religion as it is preconceived. Thus, the way into the problem inherently belongs, in some sense, to that everyday understanding, or preconception, through which religion(s) are identifiable as religion(s).

3. The Phenomenology of Religion:

As the paper aims at ‘a phenomenology of Religion’ the general methodological approach called the phenomenology of religion in the studies of religion(s) becomes important. The importance, here, is not initially the question of methodological approach, but rather, whether the field of study called the phenomenology of religion
attempts to address the problem of Religion in an adequate way. As such, where an analysis of the phenomenology of religion is given in broad outline, attention must be given to whether the notion of Religion is developed in such a way as to uncover and deal with the problem of the preconception and presupposition of Religion, or alternatively, whether this problem is overlooked and ignored.

As an approach to religion(s) the phenomenology of religion is attributed to have been first developed by Chantapie de la Saussaye in the late nineteenth century, well before the philosophical phenomenology of Husserl was developed. In this initial stage, Saussaye viewed the task of the phenomenology of religion to be that of discovering the essence and meaning of religious phenomena. Moreover, this task was to be fulfilled by the description of religious phenomena in a typological fashion from which generalisations were to be drawn. Here, the earliest form of the phenomenology of religion is generally depicted as having its impetus and philosophical inspiration in Hegel’s philosophical method, especially as it is expressed in ‘The Phenomenology of Geist’.

In more detail, Saussaye asserts that phenomenology of religion must be closely connected to psychology insofar as it deals with the facts of consciousness. As such, the phenomenology of religion aims to understand Religion as an internal feature of human existence, a feature of conscious acts, wherein the religious is distinguished from the non-religious via the study of internal relations in the structure.

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30 Ibid. p.51
31 Ibid. p.51
32 C. Erricker, 'Phenomenological Approaches', *Approaches to the Study of Religion*, Peter Connolly (ed.), p.76
of consciousness rather than any empirical phenomena.\textsuperscript{34} As a methodological stance the phenomenology of religion is then given two delimitations: that phenomenology must begin with the objects towards which religious consciousness is directed, and that furthermore, the problem of Religion must remain with philosophical thought and thus also remain excluded from the phenomenology of religion.\textsuperscript{35}

The phenomenology of religion, however, soon diversified from Saussaye’s position with the work of Husserl in philosophical phenomenology and Rudolf Otto in theology giving new impetus for the phenomenology of religion. Furthermore, soon after the development of Husserl’s phenomenology, theorists in the social sciences also appropriated the phenomenological banner via social-phenomenology, sociology of knowledge and phenomenological psychology. Accordingly, the theoretical scope of foundations for the phenomenology of religion broadened and produced a new diversity of styles and forms. In this diversification and growth two scholars are worthy of note.

The first of these, van der Leuuw, wrote \textit{Religion in Essence and Manifestation} with a methodological approach which appropriated from both Hegel and Husserl.\textsuperscript{36} Van der Leuuw’s style of phenomenology of religion has been interpreted by commentator’s to be heavily influenced by Husserl in regard to methodology via the use of \textit{epoche} and \textit{eidos},\textsuperscript{37} and also within an overall Hegelian position with regard to the preconception of Religion.\textsuperscript{38} In this, van der Leuuw appropriated (or misappropriated) Husserl’s terms of \textit{epoche} and \textit{eidos}, transforming them and broadening their use. \textit{Epoche} then came to signify the basic methodological manoeuvre of the ‘suspension of judgment’ wherein the truth, as objective, is

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid. pp.109-110
    \item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid. pp.110, 112
    \item \textsuperscript{36} Ursula King, Op. cit. p.51
    \item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid. p.51
    \item \textsuperscript{38} Erricker, Op. cit. p.77
\end{itemize}
dismissed from consideration.⁴⁹ Accordingly, the methodological notion of *eidos* was also broadened to refer to the accessibility of the essence of religion(s)⁴⁰ via ‘*eidetic vision*’: empathy and intuition.⁴¹ The Hegelian influence upon van der Leeuw’s phenomenology of religion is often attributed to the ‘evolutionistic principles’ of the early phenomenology of religion⁴², and also the focus upon the essence of religion(s) via its appearances and manifestations.⁴³ Furthermore, this focus also pertains to the basic foundation of the phenomenology of religion, as Hegelian, that Religion is the underlying unity and essence of the phenomena of religion(s).⁴⁴

Van der Leeuw’s phenomenology of religion as a method, however, lead to an ever increasing separation of the phenomenology of religion from philosophy and philosophical phenomenology. In this, it can be seen that the Hegelian influence upon the phenomenology of religion as it developed, in assuming that the essence of religion(s) was to be found via phenomena, formed a disjunction between the phenomenology of religion and philosophical phenomenology. For while the phenomenology of religion appropriated terminology from Husserl’s phenomenology, it also moved away from the basic intent of philosophical phenomenology: investigations into the a priori structures of consciousness. As such, the phenomenology of religion as it developed tended to become wary of philosophical phenomenology as too complicated and abstract.⁴⁵

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³⁰ Ibid. p.144
³¹ Ursula King, Op. cit. p.51
³⁴ Ibid. p.77
³⁵ Ibid. p.77
The second theorist of note, for our purposes, Brede Kristensen was influenced by Rudolf Otto.\(^46\) For Kristensen the phenomenology of religion aimed at the systematic grouping of characteristic behaviours in order to illustrate the human religious disposition.\(^47\) This aim was to be achieved via a methodological approach, or attitude, in which the scholar would accept the evaluations of the believer.\(^48\) As such, Kristensen’s approach can be seen to emphasise the theme of interpretation as a methodological question.

In its present state, the phenomenology of religion seems to have settled into two related forms of studies in religion(s) with shared methodological principles. The generally accepted terms for these forms are: descriptive and hermeneutic phenomenology of religion.\(^49\)

The descriptive form, or morphological, is the dominant and most commonly practised form of the phenomenology of religion. Here, the descriptive form is comprised of the formation of knowledge via phenomena, compiled in a descriptive manner, which finally, allows the classification of types and the thematic determination of what characterises religion(s) in a structural sense.\(^50\) The descriptive form, following van der Leuuw, also tends to utilise the methodological approach of suspension of judgment and empathetic-intuitive understandings.\(^51\) The descriptive form is also often connected to historical studies of religion(s) insofar as the phenomena to be analysed is often only given via historical interpretations of religion(s).\(^52\) Finally, in its aims and preconceptions, the descriptive form follows the

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\(^46\) Ibid. pp.80-81  
\(^47\) Ibid. p.80  
\(^48\) Widengren, Op. cit. p.150  
\(^50\) Erricker, Op. cit. p.82  
\(^51\) Brenneman, Op. cit. pp.16-18  
Hegelian influence of preconceiving Religion as the unity and essence of religion(s), and moreover, the attempt to define Religion via the manifestations and phenomena of religion(s).

The hermeneutic form does not differ to any great extent from the descriptive form in actual approach and preconceptions, but rather, tends to have an additional theoretical dimension added to it. In this, the hermeneutic form often gets discussed as having two historical grounds, the descriptive form of phenomenology via van der Leuuw, and the hermeneutic theory based upon the thinking of both Riceour and Gadamer.

The hermeneutical form grounds its methodological approach in van der Leuuw’s methodological appropriation of Husserl’s ‘epoche’ and ‘eidos’, expanding and unifying these terms within in a singular notion of ‘attitude’. In this, the approach is both hermeneutical, i.e., a theory of interpretation, but also phenomenological, in van der Leuuw’s ‘Hegelian’ conception of it. This ‘attitude’ gets discussed as an ‘art’ which is grounded in a common human essence, and furthermore, is constituted as the genuine attitude of humans. In this attitude, then, the scholar of religion(s) is purportedly able to reach a critical self-awareness of their own situation/situated-ness, which therein allows the scholar to overcome their own bias and approach religion(s) in a truly objective, universal fashion.

The interpretative and attitudinal approach of the hermeneutical phenomenology of religion is described from an external point of view as a methodological position wherein the analysis of interpretative attitude is constituted

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55 Ibid. p.16
56 Ibid. p.18
57 Ibid. p.18
58 Ibid. p.18
as methodological. Alternatively, the hermeneutical form is characterised as a descriptive phenomenology of religion(s) grounded in, or driven by, a particular theory of interpretation.

In general, it is possible to characterise the phenomenology of religion as containing two primary dimensions: of preconception and of method. In the first case, the common preconception of the phenomenology of religion is that Religion has an object-like-ness, a universal essence, determinable via the manifestations of religion(s) or religious phenomena. However, the phenomenology of religion repeats the problem of Religion, remains in the problem, and furthermore, maintains the avoidance of theoretical investigation of the notion of Religion. As such, it is no surprise that where the phenomenology turns to the problem of Religion in definition, it does so for the most part within the same preconception of Religion as religion(s) and religious phenomena. In this case, the phenomenology of religion again preconceives the notion Religion via the immediacy of religion(s) and the phenomena associated with religion(s).

This continuation of the problem of Religion is evidenced in one of the modern ‘masters’ of the phenomenology of religion, Ninian Smart. In Smart’s text, *The Phenomenon of Religion*, it is argued that the phenomenology of religion must be characterised as the descriptive and structural study of the phenomenon of Religion and the phenomena of religion(s). In this, the phenomenon Religion is discussed as being approachable as an object in two ways: as religious phenomena, and as religion(s). As such, insofar as it is implied that religious phenomena belong

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59 Erricker., Op. cit. p.82  
60 Ibid. p.82  
63 Ninian Smart, *The Phenomenon of Religion*, pp.10-11  
64 Ibid. pp.10-11, 17-18
inherently to religion(s)\textsuperscript{65}, the notion of Religion must be conceived of as a phenomenon inextricably associated with religion(s) and furthermore, as an object-like phenomenon.\textsuperscript{66} This is precisely the problem of Religion; the absence of the question of what Religion signifies developed and formulated in a theoretical sense.

For all that the phenomenology of religion may take up a new methodological position which broadens the object Religion into the general realm of religious phenomena, it nonetheless fails to question the meaning of Religion with regard to preconception. Even the additional methodological question of the human hermeneutical situation cannot succeed in its approach insofar as it does not first question the preconception of Religion as a notion. It has been made evident that the phenomenology of religion preconceives Religion as that which is the unity and essence of religion(s) and religious phenomena. It has also been made evident that the phenomenology of religion presupposes that Religion, as object-like, may be approached properly through the phenomena associated with religion(s), as that which unifies, and is common to all religious phenomena. Without further questioning, the phenomenology of religion becomes prey to Fitzgerald’s assertion that the phenomenology of religion operates upon the grounds of a simple categorical mistake.\textsuperscript{67} Furthermore, if the phenomenology of religion is to escape the present legitimate charge of reifying Religion as an object\textsuperscript{68}, it is necessary for the preconceived meaning of the notion Religion be questioned and grounded properly.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid. p.10
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid. p.19
\textsuperscript{67} T. Fitzgerald, \textit{The Ideology of Religious Studies}, Chapters one and three.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid. pp.56-7. Waardenburg, Op. cit. p.4
4. The Philosophy of Religion:

Perhaps then, insofar as the phenomenology has ceded the question of the notion ‘Religion’ to philosophy, it is possible that philosophy of religion has approached the problem of Religion. When we turn to the philosophy of religion, however, it becomes apparent that there is not one unified philosophy of religion, but rather, a whole spectrum of ways in which philosophy relates to what is called Religion. For convenience and clarity the philosophy of religion will be divided into two forms of the relationship between philosophy and religion; religious philosophy and the discipline of philosophy as it approaches Religion.

A. Religious Philosophy:

Religious philosophy has a common relationship with religions and therein also differs in its historic-cultural contexts. In the first instance that which is common to all religious philosophies has been called the intellectual dimensions of religion(s) or the philosophising of people whose agendas are driven by questions in religion(s), or from a religious believer’s perspective. As such, that which is common to all that is called religious philosophy belongs to the religiosity of the philosopher.

Religious philosophy, however, fractures immediately where any attempt is made to pinpoint some common element, a common theme or object. In this, what is called religious philosophy must then be differentiated, upon very ‘Western’ grounds, between philosophical works written in various religious contexts, i.e. Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, Judaism, Islam… and the objects common to each context or religion. Moreover, religious philosophy must then also be differentiated in a grand narrative style in regard to the ‘Western’ disjunction of church and state. Say that for

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the moment the disjunction of church and state is accepted, then the differentiation of religious philosophy must also, at least in the ‘Western’ world, follow the disjunction of pre and post separation: of pre-separation Christian-centric religious philosophy, and post-separation Religious vs. non-religious philosophy. This ‘Western’ disjunction, then, immediately returns to, and repeats, the question of and the problem of Religion insofar as it operates within a historical partitioning of Church and State. Here, religious philosophy, both pre and post disjunction, will tend to be characterised by its religious content and thus also tend to be determined by a notion of Religion strongly connected to the Church as a religious institution. Accordingly, in regard to non-Christian religious philosophy, this disjunction will also tend to operate in the study of religion(s) via the preconception of Religion in relation to religion(s).

The disjunction of church and state, of religious and secular philosophy makes problematic the question regarding the notion Religion. Any philosophising pre-disjunction, whether it be ‘Western’ or not, will not tend to formulate Religion as an object or phenomenon distinct from the rest of life. On the other hand, as a project of the disjunction, philosophy pre-disjunction will tend to be interpreted as religious or secular according to criteria of what constitutes the religious, i.e. the religious tradition. As such, what is called religious philosophy is seen to deal with objects which are now (post-disjunction) considered to be religious, theological, or operating within a specifically religious context of philosophising.

For example, many general texts books on the philosophy of religion comprise of large sections devoted to themes considered to be religious, such as: the existence
of God, Evil, freedom, Immortality of the Soul, and teleology. Accordingly, this trend and adoption of Greek metaphysics by Christian thinkers allows such works as Copleston’s *Religion and Philosophy* wherein he argues that metaphysics in general is ‘religious’, or contains intrinsically a religious character. As such, what is called religious philosophy is entirely dependent upon a disjunction of the religious and secular, religiosity and secular living, which itself presupposes a preconception of Religion within a certain context and framework, wherein Religion, religious, and religiosity are inseparable from religion(s). The very conception of religious philosophy therefore belongs to a particular preconception of Religion as an object: Church, religious institution, and religious tradition.

B. The Philosophy of Religion: Preconception in its origin.

The location of this preconception belongs to a particular point in time in the ‘Western’ philosophical tradition with the eruption of what is now called the ‘Enlightenment’. In the 18th century the philosophy of religion was first conceived of as a valid philosophical endeavour. In this case, the foundation this new philosophical endeavour belonged to a preconception of Religion in which religion(s) could be categorised as a valid object of philosophy. One of the Enlightenment philosophers, Hume, was crucial in this formulation insofar as his philosophical writings distinguished between reason and faith, and rejected the metaphysical-theological

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71 F. C. Copleston, *Religion and Philosophy*, pp.5-6, 12-13
73 Ibid. p.104
arguments pertaining to causality. In this rejection of non-experiential causality, Hume was also able to problematise the conceived necessity of God’s existence.

In response to and in confrontation with Hume’s philosophy, Kant then performed a further separation of reason and religion. Initially, Kant began by separating out and denying the purely speculative uses of reason in relation to traditional Christian religious objects in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Following this, Kant shunted the religious, as Christianity, into the realm of practical reason and the relation of reason to revealed religion. Furthermore, Kant also followed Hume in making an essential differentiation between belief, as subjective, and knowledge, in reason. In this, Kant formulated knowledge as derived from reason as *apodictic* judging: that which pertains to a universal and objective necessity. Conversely, belief (as religious belief) is formulated as an assertoric judgment pertaining only to a subjective necessity without objectivity.

What is found in both Hume and Kant is a separation of Religion from Reason. In this separation, the ground for the formulation of an object or category of Religion that can be separated out from the rest of living and thinking is provided. This object, or category, contains three distinctive, but related, characteristics: objects that belong to religion(s), people who believe, i.e. religious individuals, and finally, religious tradition, e.g. Christianity that can be distinguished from a secular, reasoned, world. In all three characteristics, however, it is presupposed that Religion is a valid category, an object-like phenomenon that can be differentiated from human living in general. This differentiation, again, operates within a preconception that Religion is

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74 Ibid. p.102
75 Ibid. p.103
76 See: Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, *The Critique of Practical Reason*, and *Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason*
77 Immanuel Kant, *Logic*, Robert Hartmann (trans.) p.72
78 Ibid. p.72
inherently connected to religion(s); is only manifested in religion(s) and the 
individual’s free decision to belong to religion(s).

This preconception of Religion as religion(s) is followed by many introductory 
texts to the philosophy of religion, such as: Ferre, Brightman, Fisher, and Smart.79 
Common to these texts is the assumption that Religion is object-like; that the 
philosophical analysis of Religion takes its data as religious phenomena belonging to 
religions, and finally, that certain objects belong to the phenomenon Religion. Again, 
therefore, the problem of Religion arises out of the unquestioned preconception of 
Religion as object ‘religion’ which does not, and cannot, approach the meaning of 
Religion as a notion.

C. The Philosophy of Religion: As Philosophical Thinking.

What is generally called the philosophy of religion, then, does not tend to operate as a 
philosophical investigation of Religion at all, but rather tends to investigate religion(s) 
and what constitutes religion(s) phenomenally-empirically within the preconception 
that Religion can be equated with religion(s). The problem of Religion, however, 
could perhaps be approached in a better way if, in the first instance, the preconception 
of Religion is dropped. In this case, the initial problem then becomes the question of 
what philosophy is. This line of argument is pursued by Fisher who states that the 
philosophical question of Religion is first and foremost the question of 
philosophising.80 In this, Fisher takes Religion to be a second order activity wherein 
what must be established first is the sort of philosophising to be done, i.e., logic,

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79 E. S. Brightman, 'Religion as a Philosophical Problem', Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion, A 
Philosophy of Religion, pp31-33. R. Fisher, 'Philosophical Approaches', Approaches to the Study of 
metaphysics, epistemology or ethics. In this case, what the philosophy of religion is, and how it approaches Religion, is entirely dependent upon which dimension, or dimensions, are to be utilised. This is perhaps a better approach than others, and yet at the same time has its own problems. Here, the dimension of philosophy utilised in approach will guide the way in which Religion is predetermined, and visa-versa, the way in which Religion is preconceived will guide the choice of which dimension of philosophy to utilise.

If the problem of Religion is to be investigated by philosophy, then, it follows that two questions need to be addressed: of what the problem of Religion is, and which dimension of philosophising properly addresses the problem of Religion. For the remainder of this section the paper will attempt to address the first question in a preliminary manner to be followed throughout chapter one in more depth. The second question will be left until the second chapter.

5. A way into the problem of Religion:

To enter into the problem of Religion properly it is first necessary to determine what can be said about the notion Religion. This will also allow of a discussion of how the notion of Religion should be approached. Furthermore, this discussion will aim to show a way into the problem of Religion.

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81 Ibid. pp.118-121
A. Religion as a Universal Notion:

The first determination of Religion possible is that Religion is a universal notion. In this, the universality of Religion as a notion is threefold: pertaining to preconception, presupposition, and essence.\(^2\)

Religion is a universal notion, initially, as the immediate preconception of Religion through which religion(s) and the religious may be identified as such. Herein, the universality of Religion belongs to the everyday understanding of what constitutes the various expressions of Religion which, no matter how vague and indeterminable, still allows the notion, or the term, ‘Religion’ to mean something.

It can be argued that the universality of the notion Religion in this sense extends even beyond those languages and cultures in which the term Religion is utilised. This is the case insofar as the immediate everyday preconception called Religion here is not necessarily located in the term ‘Religion’, but rather, in the possibility of any term and any notion that is directed towards what is here called Religion.

Furthermore, the universality of this everyday preconception of Religion becomes more evident if universality is taken in a strictly non-empirical sense, wherein universality refers to that which is necessary. As such, the everyday preconception must be conceived of as universal insofar as the identification of religion(s) and the religious is necessarily dependent upon a preconception of Religion as that which allows the religion(s) and the religious to be.

In the second instance, Religion is determinable as a universal notion with regard to presupposition. Here, the fact that any categorisation of religion(s) as religion(s), i.e., a possible region of study, presupposes the notion Religion as that

\(^2\) See Glossary: presupposition
which is somehow universal to religion(s). This is of the utmost importance to the study of religion(s) insofar as this discipline is dependent upon the presupposed notion Religion for: a) the validity of their object of study, b) the possibility of an adequate methodological ground, and c) the possibility of delimiting, properly, the area of study.

Religion must also be conceived of as a universal notion in a final sense, with regard to the essence of religions. In this, Religion is universal as the universal ground of religions in general. This, then, is the philosophical question of Religion as that which, not only enables the identification of religions as a region of study, but points back towards that which enables religions to exist. This, furthermore, is the determination of Religion as the notion pertaining to the essence of religions. As such, Religion as a universal notion is given its fullest meaning, in a pre-interpreted fashion as: the essence of what is called religions and the religious in general.

**B. Essence and Ontology:**

In formulating the meaning of Religion as the essence of that which is called religion(s) and the religious in general, the problematic of Religion has moved into the philosophical field of ontology. Here, the essence, the *esse*, belongs inherently to the being of something, and is often utilised as another term for the being of something. This question of essence, moreover, pertains to the question of ‘why’ something is what it is: being *qua* being (983a, 25-30)

As an ontological problem Religion does not, in the first instance, immediately pertain to an entity in its Being. For religions are not entities: are not determinable as entities, and do not have the characteristics of entities with being. Nonetheless, the problem of Religion, as the essence of religions, is an ontological problem and must,
as such, be determined in regard to an entity and their Being. This is the case due to
the fact that being is always the being of an entity.

As an ontological problem then, Religion can be formulated in two closely
connected ways: that of the meaning of Religion as it is already understood, and that
of which entity can also said to be religious, i.e. the ground of religion(s). This
furthermore, is the question of: which entity understands and is the ground of
religions and the religious in general?

C. Religion and the being of humans (being-human):

The problem of Religion, as ontological, finds its proper formulation in the twofold
question of: which entity understands something like Religion, and which entity
stands-under that which is called religion?

In the first question, that entity who understands the meaning of Religion, or
something like Religion, is none other than ‘we’ humans. Likewise, the entity that can
be said to be religious, who stands-under religion(s) is none other than human beings.
It is the human being, then, who must be the theme of any ontological analysis of the
meaning of Religion. Furthermore, this ontological analysis can be nothing other than
the analysis of the being of humans, or of being-human.

This analysis will not reach its goal, however, if the problem is taken to be that
of being-human in general insofar as this analysis will not direct itself towards the
particular problem of the meaning of Religion. The ontological analysis of being-
human, then, will only pertain to the problem of Religion so long as it enquires into
the being of humans as the entity who understands the meaning of Religion and who
stands-under religions as the entity for whom being-religious is a possibility. As such,
the ontological problem of Religion must be further formulated and given structure as it stands in relation to being-human.
Chapter Two: The Problem of Ontology:

In this chapter the problem of the notion of Religion will be formulated in relation to ontology, with the aim of providing the ground for characterising Religion as a phenomenon in Chapter Three. In order for this to be achieved, this chapter will proceed in a number of stages, from a general discussion of the tradition of ontology to the provisional acceptance of Heidegger’s notion of fundamental ontology. The discussion will proceed as follows: the tradition of ontology, the possibility of an alternative ontology, and the provisional acceptance of Heidegger’s ontology. In this, the primary goal of the chapter will be the provisional acceptance of Heidegger’s ontological system as the proper way of formulating Religion as an ontological problem via a critical interpretation of the ontological tradition.

There are three points that require preliminary clarification at this stage. First, this initial interpretation of the philosophical tradition will be implicitly ‘Heideggerian’, following his argument that the philosophical tradition contains the problematic preconception of being in an objective, abstracted sense, as an ‘always presence’. Second, this interpretation will also follow Heidegger’s prioritisation of Dasein’s being as the proper point of entry for the question of being. Finally, this chapter seeks to provide an interpretation of the traditional philosophical preconception of being in relation to ontology, e.g., the general concept of being. This must be distinguished from the overall aim of the thesis to address the meaning of Religion as a regional ontological problem; the problem of being-human. In other words, the aim of this chapter, in distinction to that of the entire thesis, is to pose the problem of ontology in a general sense – in relation to the question of the proper way of approaching the concept of being as a problem.
6. The Tradition of Ontology:

The tradition of ontology will be discussed with two primary dimensions in mind: the general structural components of ontology and in reference to the general conceptions of being. These two dimensions will serve as the platform for the discussion of Religion as an ontological problem insofar as it will allow of a broad but clear view of what ontology is, and furthermore, suggest the necessity of an alternative approach to ontology. In this, the discussion of the ontological tradition provided here aims to show that the accepted definition of Religion as an object ‘religions’ is founded in traditional ontology itself. As such, finding the proper way of formulating Religion will require that we find an alternative approach to ontology. To do so, however, requires that we first come to terms with the way in which the tradition of ontology, for the most part, preconceives being.

In light of the aims of this chapter it becomes important to distinguish between the interpretation of ‘ontology’ as the science of being and the interpretations that this thesis will provide, especially in relation to Aristotle, at later stages. The emphasis of this interpretation will be to disclose the general preconception of being that operates within the tradition of philosophy. Herein, the interpretation of ‘ontology’ will emphasise the problems disclosed by Heidegger as a means of providing a stronger ontological foundation for the phenomenological analysis of Religion. However, this will result in the semblance of a more ‘Heideggerian’ interpretation of ontology than this thesis aims to achieve or subscribes to. Thus, interpretations provided at a later stage will also appear at odds with this synopsis of the tradition of ontology insofar as a phenomenological interpretation of Religion requires more than a simply ‘Heideggerian’ formulation of being. In fact, this chapter will epitomise the way in
which I am attempting to utilise a ‘Heideggerian’ beginning, eg, the phenomenological way into the question of being via *Dasein*, without subscribing to the path of Heidegger’s thinking or his views on Religion.

**A. Aristotle:**

The Greek philosophers were the first to posit the problem of ontology via the question of being, and of the Greek philosophers, it is arguably Aristotle who first constitutes ontology as a problem in any systematic sense. In the discussion of Aristotle to be provided here, I will look at Aristotle’s ontology as a system. Furthermore, the focus of this interpretation will be towards three themes of the question of being: the preconception, the working out, and the presupposition of being.\(^8^3\)

*Preconception*

What is called preconception here must be outlined first as an interpretative tool in relation to ontology as a systematic endeavour. Preconception, in general, will signify a view in advance, or, a seeing and experiencing of the world in a certain way. This preconceiving takes up its impetus and importance insofar as to see the world in a certain way is equally to see some things, or some types of things, more than other things. Accordingly, to see the world in a certain way is to be able to see some things more clearly, to pick something out, or, to focus on some things rather than others. As such, to preconceive in this sense signifies the experiencing or seeing of the world in such a way as to prioritise some things over others. As a prioritisation, the preconception influences the ways in which the world will be, or can be, investigated.

\(^8^3\) See Glossary: ‘working out’, ‘presupposition’
This means that when the question of being is asked, it is already asked within the context of a certain view of the world, and a prioritisation of certain things over others.

Preconception will also refer to the question of origination: the grounds of, or, the origination of the preconception of being. In this, preconception as a seeing and experiencing of the world can be located in reference to its original location, i.e., the historical-cultural location in which the preconception is generated. As preconception is something implicit to Aristotle’s system of ontology, the interpretation of Aristotle will begin by looking for indications of a preconception of being.

When Aristotle introduces the question of being he states that being is spoken of in many ways, but is spoken of with regard to one thing and a single kind of nature (1003a30-35). Accordingly, Aristotle asserts, the science that studies being qua being has as its object ὀνόμα, with the corresponding themes of the ἀρχη and ἀτιον of ὀνόμα (1003b15-25). As such, the question of being in its investigative structure reveals three themes: ὀνόμα (the prioritised thing), ἀρχη (the grounds of things), and ἀτιον (the determined principles of knowing things). As indicators of Aristotle’s preconception of being, these three themes must be explicated in more detail.

In Book One of the Metaphysics Aristotle introduces the system of first philosophy as σοφία, with the task of attaining knowledge of principles (ἀρχη) and causes (ἀτιον) (982b20-30). Initially, it is important to note that etymologically ἀρχη can be taken to signify origin, source, or ground that generates rules.84 Accordingly, ἀτιον may signify the determined principles of entities (rules).85 As such, ἀρχη and ἀτιον are almost interchangeable in meaning, but are utilised by Aristotle in relation

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84 C. Witt, Substance and Essence in Aristotle: An Interpretation of Metaphysics VII-IX, p.16
85 Ibid. p.17
to differing conceptual content.86 This difference of conceptual content is, in this sense, the following: that \( \alpha\rho\chi\eta \) is generally used as the origin or source of something in an open-ended determining way87, while \( \alpha\iota\tau\iota\omicron\omicron \) is used to refer to determined \( \alpha\rho\chi\eta \) in a specific sense as the causal categories applicable to things.88 \( \alpha\rho\chi\eta \), then, signifies the most universal and highest conception of grounds as determining things as things. \( \alpha\iota\tau\iota\omicron\omicron \), accordingly, is the concrete explication of things as things, or, what is predicated of all things that are.

The conceptual correlation of \( \alpha\rho\chi\eta \) and \( \alpha\iota\tau\iota\omicron\omicron \), as such, shows that for Aristotle the grounds of a thing itself is also the grounds for knowing the thing, i.e., there is little distinction between the object itself and the known object. In part, this lack of distinction may be accounted for in Aristotle’s understanding of the \( \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma \) as revealing the truth of something in relation to reality, or a deep connection between language and what something is.89 However, this lack of distinction may also be viewed as originating from that type of thing that is given priority in Aristotle’s preconception of being. This is the question of the priority of \( \omicron\omicron\sigma\iota\alpha \) and the framing of knowledge as knowing \( \omicron\omicron\sigma\iota\alpha \).

In relation to \( \alpha\rho\chi\eta \) (which I will usually refer to as ‘ground’) Aristotle’s argument is consistent in positing \( \alpha\rho\chi\eta \) as singular. In this, being is always discussed as having a singular originary ground (\( \pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\tau\varepsilon\ \alpha\rho\chi\eta \)) that gets expressed in various ways (1003b5-6). Accordingly, where Aristotle discusses \( \alpha\rho\chi\eta \) specifically it is initially characterised as the primary origin within the varying levels of a conceptual hierarchy (1012b30 - 1013a24). The \( \alpha\rho\chi\eta \) is determined as having four levels: the thing from which something is produced, the form and shape of something, the origin

86 Ibid. pp.18-19
87 Ibid. p.19
88 Ibid. p.19
89 Ted Sadler, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being*, p.56
of change (or its lack) and finally, as a things τελος; what the thing is predestined to be (1012b34 – 1013a24). As such, the notion of αρχη is closely connected to the notions of essence, form, matter and ουσία.

Following this, cause is conceived of as the determined αρχη of all things (1013a24-25). As cause is the determination of ground, Aristotle also posits four ways of discussing causes: ουσία/essence, matter/substrate, origin of change and, the τελος of change (1013a24-35). Here, the formulation of possible causes follows the determination of ground, with additional oppositional poles for the four primary grounds of things. That cause is the determination of ground means that cause will also be closely connected to essence, form, matter and ουσία. In order to see these connections it is therefore necessary to discuss in some detail the notion of ουσία. This will, furthermore, bring this interpretation of Aristotle to the theme of ουσία as the prioritised thing in Aristotle’s preconception of being.

In book four of the Metaphysics Aristotle characterises ουσία in four ways: the subject as a simple body, the cause of a things being, the delimitations (this-ness) of a thing, and the essence (what it was to be) of a thing (1017b10-25). In this, the characterisation of ουσία always refers to a thing or things. Furthermore, the thing-ness to which ουσία refers can also be characterised as physical, or, a reference to physical things. This is evidenced in Aristotle’s discussion of nature and being. When nature is discussed as a concept five determinations are given. The two highest of these determinations connect ουσία to natural-physical things. In this, nature is determined in its highest conceptions as the ουσία of things with natural being, and in regard to ουσία in general (1015a5-15). Likewise, the highest formulation of being is given as ουσία, either potential or actual (1015a19).
In book seven, Aristotle formulates the question of being as the question of \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \) (1028\(^{a}\)30-35). The question of being must therefore refer to the question of \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \), the being-ness of concrete particular physical things.\(^{90}\) This is why, in the hierarchy of \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \), Aristotle formulates \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \) as having two dimensions: the things essence, and the thing itself (1031\(^{a}\)10-14). As such, \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \) is given as the unity of the thing and its essence (1032\(^{a}\)4-5).\(^{91}\) This unity can be seen to provide the framework for working out the relation of \( \alpha\rho\chi\eta \) and \( \alpha\alpha\tau\iota\omicron\upsilon \) in things as \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \).

It is evident that for Aristotle the thing that has ontological priority is \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \), determined as the essence and the thing itself. Furthermore, it is also evident that \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \) always refers in some fashion to physical things and a physical world. If \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \) is taken to signify the being of physical things it becomes important to provide an argument that draws out the priority of the physical in \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \). This will be provided via two themes: the priority of \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \) as Aristotle justifies it, and the implicit priority of the \textit{Physics} in the \textit{Metaphysics}.

The priority of \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \) is initially a question for Aristotle insofar as being can be said in many ways, but is at the same time a unity. In this, the question of priority then becomes the question of which way of saying being is primary.\(^{92}\) As \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \) is characterised as the primary way of saying being the problem of priority thus becomes the justification of \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \) as primary.\(^{93}\) It is, accordingly, Aristotle’s aim to show that all ways of saying being, as things that can be said to be, depends upon \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \).\(^{94}\) However, if Aristotle has already preconceived being as in some sense physical, it is also inevitable that \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \) is given priority. In this, the priority of \( \text{o}\nu\text{s}i\alpha \)

\(^{90}\)Ibid. p.47
\(^{91}\) Essence: ‘τι εἶν εἶναι’ – what it is/was to be that thing. See: M.J. Loux, \textit{Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z and H}, pp.72-74
\(^{92}\) C. Witt, Op. cit. p.38
\(^{93}\) Ibid.p.44
\(^{94}\) Ibid.p.45
indicates the preconception of being as physical in a number of ways, each evolving from the ‘to be’ of a thing. First, the meaning of being is taken to refer to the being of beings (1060b30-1061a5). As such, even though there are many ways of saying being and many accounts of being, the primary one will always centre on a single feature, i.e., the thing in its being (1061b10-16). Here, etymologically, οὐσία (to be) is related to οὐσίατ (proper entities – entities that are physically present as individual self-contained identities). Because of this relation, the question of being is constituted as the οὐσία of οὐσίατ, the being of things that are. The being of entities, the problem of detailing what is primary in regard to entities, will therefore not only inherently focus on the physical nature of entities but moreover, constitute the being of entities in regard to their physical nature.

The priority of the physical is not only evidenced in Aristotle’s question of being of entities, but can also be seen in the conceptual origin of Meta-Physics as the grounding of Physics and the priority of the Physics in the Meta-Physics. The relation of the ‘Physics’ to Meta-Physics is, in the first instance, a relation of grounding. In this, the Meta-Physics seeks to ground the Physics and the knowledge gained therein. This relation, however, also shows the dependence of meta-physics upon physics insofar as the agenda (and preconception) of the Meta-physics will be determined by the aims of physics. As such, physics can be posited as having priority in meta-physics and thus, also in relation to the question of being. The first sign of this priority occurs in book one of the ‘Metaphysics’ wherein the discussion of causes is already framed as the same causes of physics (983a23-32). It is evident, therefore, that the primary agenda of the ‘Metaphysics’ already constitutes itself in subservience to the ‘Physics’ (983b1-5).

95 Loux, Op. cit. p.15
In the ‘Physics’ the primary question with regard to things is of movement and change. In this, two problems arise, the grounds of physical things in their being and the question of a things being in the context of movement and change. In the first case, unless being is preconceived as the being of a physical individual entity, physics will have no proper grounds and can achieve no certain knowledge. For physics to be properly grounded, the being of entities as it is constituted in meta-physics will necessarily correspond to the problem of the being of things in regard to change and movement. This is why, when being is determined as οὐσία, the problem becomes the twofold determination of ὀρχη and ἀποικ, originary ground and concrete determination of the categories belonging to a physical thing, as it is present. Accordingly, the preconception of being in Aristotle must be viewed as the physical, and the question of being reiterated as the question of the being of physical entities. It is therefore, for our purposes, the question of just what being-physical is.

Working Out
In order to move towards the theme of presupposition I will now turn to the theme of ‘working out’. The ‘working out’ will signify two processes in Aristotle’s meta-physics: the ‘working out’ from the preconception of being as the being of physical entities and the ‘working out’ of the presupposition. In this, two issues will be addressed: how Aristotle’s question of being (οὐσία) gets informed by the preconception of being, and how this requires the positing of a presupposition (a presupposed object as ground). In the following interpretation of Aristotle’s ‘working

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98 This theme will be discussed at greater depth later.
99 Sadler, Op. cit. pp.62-3 (Ontology: what is the thing-ness of things?, and Physics: what is the physicality of physical things? Thus ontology, in subservience to physics, aims to ground things as they are physically there)
out’ the question of being I will utilise two interpretative theses: that Aristotle’s metaphysics is consistently hierarchical, and that ἀρχὴ and ἀττιον are the two notions through which the metaphysics is worked out. As such, the interpretation of Aristotle’s working out will begin with a discussion of ἀρχὴ and ἀττιον.

Initially, cause (ἀττιον) can be characterised as determined principles (ἀρχὴ). In this, causes are both principles that are determined in relation to things and the primary determining principles of things as things. As such, cause can be viewed as principles, which determine things as particular things, and the principles of all particular things. Accordingly, causes refer to things that are (present) and categorises that which constitutes the presence of particular things in general. In other words, cause functions as a determination of presence: that all things present in particulars are present in all particulars, and thus in the universals said of these particulars.\textsuperscript{100} This is also to say that all universal things (causes) present in particulars are things predicated in all other presented things.\textsuperscript{101}

Causes, as such, can be constituted as the universal necessary dimensions of physical things in their presence and also those features that are accidental to presented things.\textsuperscript{102} In this, cause has its highest expression in the categories wherein all causes therein are primary, the universal predicates of things that are present, and what can be said of all entities as presented.\textsuperscript{103} What can be said of entities is divided into primary features of all entities and the accidental features of entities. As the essential and accidental are constituted in relation to each other it follows that the categories as causes are formulated expressly with the aim of determining every and any physically present entity in regard to its individual identity within a conceptual

\textsuperscript{100} Loux, Op. cit. p.23
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid. p.23
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid. pp.237-238
structure of universal predicates of all physically present things. Thus, when Aristotle
discusses cause as a notion, it follows that the focus will be upon the primary
dimensions of what constitutes a thing as present, or, potentially present. As such, the
characterisation of cause must refer back to the question of ἀρχή as the ground of
things in particular. Furthermore, cause will refer back to the πρῶτη ἀρχή in relation
to a primary origin (1013a20-21).

What is the relation of cause and presence? This is the question that shows
how Aristotle’s meta-physics works out of his preconception of being as the being of
physical-entities. In this, the relation of cause and presence operates in the realm of
the justification of the priority of ύστερα: in knowledge, definition, and time.104

The first two justifications are interrelated, wherein both the possibility of
knowledge and definition relies upon the presence of the subject as a physically
present thing.105 In order to define something, this something must be self-contained,
i.e., it must have its own identifiable presence. Likewise, to know the object-itself, the
object must present itself in some way. As such, the thing must be present (have
matter) as the identifiable subject that also contains a knowable physical dimension
that allows of grounding.106 It follows that central to the possibility of defining and
knowing a thing as a thing is the thing’s matter: that it has physical presence. Matter,
however, is not what a thing is because it is not the thing’s ground. Rather, matter is
the bare substratum of concrete ύστερα (physical presence) that allows further
determinations of the being of physical things.107 In other words, presence is the thin-
ness of ύστερα in its primary sense, the bare physical self-delimitations of a thing as

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105 Ibid. pp.51, 55
106 Ibid. p.76
present/presented. As such, the preconception of being as the being of physical things is worked out as presence and the re-presentation of things. This remains an issue in relation to the αρχη.

With respect to cause and time, the presence of a thing must be considered as a temporal determination. When a thing is present, it is present now, in the present. Accordingly, the possibility of definition of knowledge, insofar as it requires presence, must also be seen to prioritise a temporal sense: the now, whether in reference to the thing as here/there-now or as re-present-able (brought into the present). Furthermore, if cause is given this temporal sense, then it would follow that the present also has some significance for the αρχη.

Aristotle formulates αρχη in two ways, in relation to the ground of particular things framed in a universal sense, and in relation to a singular unitary originary ground. The first formulation of αρχη aims to find the ground of physical things in relation to their particularity and determinable identity. Accordingly, the first formulation of αρχη can be viewed as the grounding of the categorical causes. In this, αρχη in the first sense will focus on the grounds of physically present things as determinable. As such, the first sense of αρχη involves the discussion of the essence and form of physically present things. In book four of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle discusses the notion of αρχη as: the ends, the intrinsic, origination of change, and as that by which a thing is primarily what it is (1013a24-35). These ways of conceiving the αρχη focus upon the notions of essence and form.

Essence can be determined etymologically (τι είναι ειναί) in English as ‘what it was to be that thing’ (1028b33-34). In this, essence may be interpreted as having

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two significations: the entirety of a thing temporally (its temporal origination, its becoming, and its completion) and the entirety of a thing as a unified whole (complete presence). The essence of something, as such, is the thing’s unity as a whole, or, a complete account of what it is/was/always-will-be to be that thing.\textsuperscript{110} Accordingly, the essence of something is the twofold ground of something as an independent thing: its form and matter.\textsuperscript{111}

The essence of physical things, of substantial things, is always twofold: containing its composition of form and matter. However, the composition of a physical entity is secondary, hierarchically, wherein ‘this-ness’ (matter) only determines the individual presence of a thing, but does not reveal what the thing itself is.\textsuperscript{112} Furthermore, a thing’s matter is also secondary to its form insofar as a thing’s presence may only be potential, may consist of accidental causes, and finally, insofar as the matter of a thing may change in its shape. In this sense, there is a close connection between shape and form. It is therefore the form of a physical thing that must be prioritised in relation to essence. This is so, because the form of a thing, like essence, is in some sense trans-temporal in relation to an individual entity whereas matter is not. Additionally, what makes something what it is ‘as a whole’ (essence) is equivalent to what it becomes or what it ought to be (form). As such, it is form that can be constituted as what truly differentiates one thing from another as their primary essence.\textsuperscript{113} The theme of \( \omega \pi \chi \eta \) given in the question of essence must, therefore, be determinable in relation to form.

The characterisation of form is, as the primary essence of what a thing is, fundamentally temporal. In this, the determination of a thing’s form, as its unity as a

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\textsuperscript{110} Loux, Op. cit. p.75  \\
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid. p.237  \\
\textsuperscript{112} Witt, Op. cit. pp.63-65  \\
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid. p.77
\end{flushright}
whole, will be inherently constituted in regard to time insofar as a physical thing moves and changes over time. As such, the interpretation of form will necessarily focus on how form is constituted in relation to time.

Initially, form is characterised in relation to the physical problem of how physical things are generated and corrupted while remaining what they are (unified whole/unified over time).\textsuperscript{114} In this, form is related to natural things in two ways: as self-generating and as self-completing.\textsuperscript{115} In this regard, form is determinable as the shape (μορφή) of a thing and the inner cause (τέλος) of what a thing is meant to become.\textsuperscript{116} As such, form is utilised in two ways: literally as the form (shape) of the thing and the inner cause of the thing. Of these two senses of form the second is the higher and primary one.

The second use of form is inherently temporal, referring to an origin, becoming, and completion in time. In this, the unitary whole of form will necessitate a conception of form that somehow unifies the temporal dimensions of a things presence. The primary dimension of a thing in time is its completion, or, what it is meant to become.\textsuperscript{117} As such, it would seem that form points towards a teleological notion of essence: that what something is represented as is essentially its completion, i.e., that the seed becomes a tree.\textsuperscript{118} This is certainly the case insofar form designates the completed presence of a thing, rather than its literal end (death, corruption). This completed presence, then, is no purely temporal τελος, but rather a τελος of highest presence: a peak (fulfilment) rather than end.

Form, as the completion of an entity and the entities highest presence views the essence of a thing as ultimately in time as the present. This is the case for at least

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid. pp.65, 67
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid. pp.67, 70
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid. pp.77-78
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid. p.81
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid. p.82
two reasons: first, the things origin (past) is viewed as already containing its complete presence, and furthermore, the things future is contained in its highest presence. In another sense, the way in which form signifies temporality must be conceived of as present, in the now, because form like essence is static, i.e., it is a universal determination of what a thing is. For something to be determinable in this way, in Aristotle’s philosophical view, means that the thing is present and re-presentable, even always-present. This is the case, more than anything else, because Aristotle does not distinguish between thought and object epistemologically. This, however, leaves us with the question of how the essence of something may be constituted in its highest mode as the ground of the presence of something in a trans-temporal way.

It is first worthy of note that the formation of things in becoming what they already are always follows fixed eternal patterns.\textsuperscript{119} Likewise, the coincidental factors of becoming never follow the eternal.\textsuperscript{120} As such, the formation of a thing, the becoming of form, always becomes in a certain way.

The temporal determination of presence is also pivotal in the possibility of knowledge, that something can be known for what it is, and equally, that something gives itself as an identifiable presence. In this, for a thing’s essence to be known the thing must be present and re-presentable.\textsuperscript{121} As such, a knowable thing in its ground must in some sense be constantly present, eternal (\(\alpha\varepsilon\tau\)).\textsuperscript{122} If the \(\alpha\rho\chi\eta\), essence and form of a thing were not in some sense always present the object could not be known and therefore never present in its \(\alpha\rho\chi\eta\). Furthermore, the always present structure of a

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p.92
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid. p.92
\textsuperscript{121} Sadler, Op. cit. p.83
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid. p.86
thing in its \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) also dictates that reality (in its originary ground) must also be constituted as eternal – always present (\( \alpha \varepsilon \varepsilon \)).\(^{123}\)

The necessity of the eternal (\( \alpha \varepsilon \varepsilon \)) as always presence of the grounds of reality returns to the way in which Aristotle’s meta-physics works out of the ontological preconception of being as being-physical. In this, the discussion will move from the working out from preconception to the presupposition.

**Presupposition**

There are five ways that will be utilised to show why the always-presence (\( \alpha \varepsilon \varepsilon \)) of reality is necessary in Aristotle’s meta-physics: matter, the categories, motion/change, modes of being-present, and finally, thinking as movement.

The first of these, matter, returns the discussion to the basic presence of reality as physical. In this, the material substratum of reality is formulated as universal.\(^{124}\) In the preconception of being as being-physical there is a necessity that reality also be formulated as physical. This physicality of reality must refer to the physical matter that constitutes real things as a universal substratum of the presence of things. The universality of matter constitutes every thing as a bare physical presence.\(^{125}\) As such, the universality of matter, the bare presence of reality, can be expressed in two ways: as everywhere (spatial) and always (universal over time).\(^{126}\) If this were not the case, there would be no-thing to be present. Thus, the bare physical content of reality necessitates the eternal, always presence of the real.

The categories also indicate the necessity of conceiving the real and reality in regard to always presence. In this, the categories as cause, the determined \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) of

\(^{123}\) Ibid. p.121
\(^{124}\) Scaltsas, Op. cit. p.33
\(^{125}\) Ibid. p.34
\(^{126}\) Ibid. p.33
things, function as universal determinations. However, the universality of determined causes is dependent upon the reality of always-present ways of being present. If there was no always-present reality, or ways of being real, there could be no ἀρχὴ of things, no determinable τέλος, origination, or primary ὀφθαλμος of a thing. This is the case insofar as ἀρχὴ inherently determines things with regard to their presence in the present, actual or possible.

The central theme of change/motion shows the necessity of an always-present reality in three related ways. Initially, the reality of movement (its presence) means that there must be a reality that contains and allows this movement. This reality, however, is one that may only allow movement in not being moved itself: it contains change without itself changing. In this sense, reality must be always present as a presence that does not change, that facilitates change while also being beyond change. Likewise, the ἀρχὴ and causes found in first philosophy only pertain to the always present ἀεὶ (1026a17-18). This is the case because the ἀρχὴ and its determinations are unchanging, not affected by movement/change in the subject/ὀφθαλμος (1026a27-32). As such, the highest presence of a physical thing, when it is determined, is real as always present.

Finally, in relation to movement and change, Aristotle asserts that movement always has its originary ground in a mover: something by which things are changed. In this, a mover may refer to a particular thing in its self-originary grounds, but also, in relation to reality as a whole (1074b1-14). Accordingly, the prime mover (in relation to reality as a whole) is not moved but rather contains movement in itself as the activation of all movement (1072a25). This mover, as such, is eternal: is always present as the generator of movement (1072a26).
The modes of being present also shows the necessity of the always presence of reality. In this, the modes of being present function as a hierarchy of presence and dependence. The modes of being present are threefold, but contain two fundamental distinctions: of sensible and non-sensible presence. The first of the two types of sensible presence is the finite or perishable mode of a physical thing (1069\textsuperscript{a}31). The second is the always-present thing (1069\textsuperscript{a}30\textsuperscript{31}). Insofar as sensible things in general are constituted in change/movement of nature it follows that this distinction of sensible things is the distinction of individual entities as mortal/finite or immortal/heavenly (1069\textsuperscript{a}31). Non-sensible presence is then constituted as singular and unmoved, an always-present thing (1069\textsuperscript{b}1-2). This eternal and non-sensible thing, insofar as it is the originary ground of reality as a whole, must also be constituted as the presupposition of being, i.e., the object that is necessarily presupposed as ground.

Finally, Aristotle characterises thinking itself as a way of movement and change (1072\textsuperscript{a}25-35). In this, thought is movement in being moved, having its originary ground in a mover of thought (1072\textsuperscript{b}1-5). Accordingly, the intrinsic movedness of thought is expressed in its highest form where it is directed towards the mover (1072\textsuperscript{b}6-10). As such, the originary ground of thought and its highest expression belong to the mover of thought, the self-thinking thought, in the always-present entity (1072\textsuperscript{b}10-15). Thus, the movement of thought also reveals its ground in the always-present thinking and the entity who is always present as the originary ground of thinking in general.

The working out of the preconception has shown that insofar as reality and the real is necessarily constituted as always present, there is also necessarily an originary ground of the always-present. In this, the problematic of first philosophy becomes
twofold: in ontology, that all real things are determined in their own \( \varphi \chi \eta \) or always being-present; and furthermore, in theology, that reality as a whole is determined in relation to its highest mode of always-presence - the divine (1026\( a \)10-33, 1071\( b \)3-1074\( b \)14). Ontology, as such, is the working out from the preconception of determining things as what they are, and what they must be, in being-present. Theology, accordingly, is the positing of a presupposition, a presupposed thing, constituted as the originary ground of things in general (reality). This presupposed thing is necessary insofar as being is always the being of a being.

However, the preconception and presupposition are inherently connected, both belonging to an experience and interpreting of the world. Aristotle details this connection in various statements, but none more poignant than that wherein the prime mover (the divine) is posited in relation to primordial beliefs of Greek ancestors (1074\( b \)12-14). The theological dimension of first philosophy has, as such, often been associated with a Greek deification of nature.\(^{127}\)

The connection of preconception and presupposition in Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, as ontology and theology, can be said to be the primary theme of influence passed down into the tradition of ontology in ‘Western Philosophy’. In this, ontology has often been referred to as theology without distinction\(^ {128}\), a factor in the discrediting of ontology as a problem. What is more important to this paper, however, is the question of whether the preconception of being in Aristotle (being as being-physically-present) gets passed down. This is the case insofar as any preconception of being as being-physically-present will influence how Religion may be formulated as an ontological problem. As such, the paper will now turn to a brief discussion of the tradition of ontology solely in regard to the question of preconception. It is my

\(^{127}\) B.G. Kuznetsov, \textit{Being and Reason}, L. Visson (trans.) p.42

contention that the preconception of being will continue to determine how being is formulated, and furthermore, what ways of being are prioritised. This will lead into the question of whether there are alternative ways of preconceiving being that allow the notion of Religion to be addressed as an ontological problem.

B. Scholastic Ontology:

In this brief discussion of scholastic ontology I will aim to provide a general view of how Aristotle’s preconception of being as physical presence is carried over into a Christian theological environment. In this, there are three themes to be addressed; that of the ontological presupposition, the question of essence and existence, and finally, the reduction of being to presence.

The primary focus of a Christian philosophy, the ontological presupposition of God, defines scholastic ontology. In this, scholastic ontology does not originate in a philosophical school with a singular methodological approach, but rather, is the name for the philosophical endeavours of ‘Christendom’. Accordingly, the ontological presupposition of scholastic philosophy was God in the sense that philosophy was theology, and that there was no other possible primary object of thought. As such, the context of ontology, in the system of meta-physics, changed from the discovery and grounding of first principles to the philosophical construction and apologetics of the doctrine of God. Philosophy, thus, operates as dogma: the explanation of church doctrine in metaphysical terms. The ontological problem, in this context, was no longer the problem of knowing what originary ground could be called, but rather, the

130 Ibid.p.40. The doctrine of God equally constituted as speculative concept of God, and thus, theology determined as nothing less than philosophy itself.
131 Ibid.p.61. “The building up of the dogmas of the Christian Church.”
problem of establishing knowledge about things from the already presupposed truths of God’s nature, and the effects of these truths upon the way in which reality could be constituted.

In relation to the question of preconception, scholastic ontology can be seen to make an important distinction between essence (esse) and being (ens). This distinction operates as the question of being where the originary ground of being is already presupposed. In this, the problem of ontology remains as the working out of the presupposition (and implicitly, the preconception) solely in regard to the problem of the difference between essence and being. This difference becomes a priority of philosophical endeavour in that, following Greek philosophy, essence is constituted as inherently belonging to the αρχή (originary ground of being). Where the πρωτε αρχη is presupposed to be God, the problem of ontology becomes a question of whether individual entities have their own ground, and furthermore, whether being as a problem refers to originary ground at all. Three scholastic philosophers will be interpreted in relation to this question of difference: Thomas Aquinas, Dun Scotus, and Suarez.

Aquinas is credited with attempting to make theology philosophical and systematic. 132 This attempt was made within the context of Aristotle’s meta-physics, wherein Aquinas grappled with Aristotle’s texts themselves without the neo-platonic accretions common to other interpretations of Aristotle of that time. 133 As an Aristotelian, Aquinas can be interpreted via his (interpretative) adherence to Aristotle’s system of meta-physics. In this, Aquinas follows Aristotle in formulating

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132 Ibid.p.71
metaphysics as dealing solely with the question of being. Likewise, Aquinas also follows Aristotle in conceiving being (ens) as that which is common to all things. Furthermore, Aquinas also follows Aristotle in positing the problem of being as \( \text{o\nu\sigma\tau\alpha} \) (substance).

Substance is characterised as signifying the real, the being real of presence. In this, however, a difference arises between two ways of being real: either as the originary ground of the reality of all present things (God), and as the dependent reality of present things; the form and matter of individual physically present entities. As such, there are two ways of being real, God as essence and the physical reality of present things. Insofar as being is that which is common to all things it follows, then, that being signifies the reality of the existent. On the other hand, the reality of God refers to the reality of cause and originary grounds: the essence of what is real.

This determination of the real as twofold amends the Aristotelian system of ontology insofar as it denies the possibility of self-originary-ground for individual things. In this, the Aristotelian connection of matter, form, essence and \( \alpha\rho\chi\eta \) comes to be divided into two ways of being real: a) God - originary ground and essence, b) being - matter and form. This implies, however, that the question of being is contained in the problem of determining that which is common to all physically present things, eg., something like the categories. As such, Aquinas reduces the question of being to presence in the present, actuality and existence. Furthermore,
insofar as beings can be known in essence, it will always pertain to an external object as the ground, i.e., a ground that does not belong to the particular thing itself.\(^{141}\)

If we consider the problem of Religion for a moment, it becomes apparent that Aquinas’ conception of being allows only two possible approaches to Religion: either the description of ‘its’ matter and form (as a present object) or an essentialist definition of Religion which gets determined via an external object, i.e., God, the divine, and so on.

In interpreting the position of Dun Scotus and Suarez on essence and existence, I will aim to show that they both can be seen to reinforce the distinction provided by Aquinas in their own ways. In Dun Scotus the distinction between essence and (being) existence is formulated as a \(\textit{distinctio modalis}\), or, a distinction between modes of being: created and non-created.\(^{142}\) In this, Scotos asserts that the essence of created beings (finite beings) is that they are created.\(^{143}\) Accordingly, the essence of each particular thing is the essence it was given by God. Furthermore, God, as essence in general, is non-created/self-creating.\(^ {144}\) As such, being is determined as existence: the presence of created entities.\(^ {145}\)

In Suarez, the distinction of essence and being is formulated as a \(\textit{distinctio rationis}\), or, a conceptual difference applicable to created entities.\(^ {146}\) The question of what something is, its essence, is therefore conceptually differentiated from its presence.\(^ {147}\) In this, Suarez takes being to signify existence, the actuality or presence of something.\(^ {148}\) The distinction of essence and being is not real and does not refer to

\(^{141}\) Ibid. pp.177-8. “Being through another”
\(^{142}\) Heidegger, \textit{The Basic Problems of Phenomenology}, A. Hofstadter (trans.) p.93
\(^{143}\) Ibid.p.93
\(^{144}\) Ibid.p.93
\(^{145}\) Ibid.p.94
\(^{146}\) Ibid.p.94
\(^{147}\) Ibid.p.94
differing modes of being, but rather, is inherently co-constituted in the entity’s presence.\textsuperscript{149} This is to say that what something is, its essence, is co-presented in the actual presence of a thing. As such, what is presented in regard to essence in a thing’s presence is its created-ness, its finitude. Thus, the essence of a finite being is present as a dependency upon something else for its existence.

In summary, the brief discussion of scholastic ontology has brought two ontological problems to light: that being continues to be formulated in relation to physical presence, and furthermore, that in scholastic ontology being and essence are disconnected. As such, the problem of ontology has been re-enforced as the problem of the physical presence of things and, additionally, been reduced to the mere presence of things dependent upon some external thing for its ground (essence). This twofold problematic of ontology must be kept in mind in relation to ‘Enlightenment’ ontology.

\textbf{C. Enlightenment Ontology:}

In turning to the problem of ontology in Enlightenment philosophy I will follow the general schema that has been followed thus far. In this, the discussion of Enlightenment philosophy will be focused upon the question of how being is preconceived. As such, the discussion of Enlightenment philosophy will frame the problem of ontology in regard to three themes: the prioritisation of presence, the conception of being as presence, and the conception of being as the being of physical things. Of the broad spectrum of Enlightenment philosophers I will delimit the discussion to Descartes and Kant as the philosophers who exemplify Enlightenment philosophy in this sense.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.p.51
Descartes: 

Descartes, I will attempt to show, must be viewed as retaining the same ontological problem as the tradition before him in conceiving being as referring to things that can be said to be present. However, Descartes also amends this conception, positing the problem in relation to the problem of knowing. As such, the discussion of Descartes will focus upon indications of the ontological in his central work *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1642).

In the first meditation Descartes sets the scene for the ontological problematic in regard to the question of certainty, or, of knowledge that can be said to have indubitable certainty. In this, Descartes posits a balancing act, a set of scales per se, between knowing and living. In the first instance, knowing begins, methodologically, with complete scepticism, derived from the recognition that the senses are unreliable. Juxtaposed to the problem of knowing, however, is the necessity in ordinary life to get on with it: to suspend complete scepticism and accordingly presuppose some meaning by which everyday life can be grounded. Insofar as the task of philosophy is constituted as the grounding of certain knowledge, the problem is going to begin with absolute scepticism.

The second meditation is an attempt to begin this task, denying the senses, the reality of the world and the everyday presupposed grounds. In this, Descartes finds that the ‘I am’ or ‘I exist’ is the only necessary fact to begin with. The ‘I am’ is

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150 Rene Descartes, *Philosophical Writings*, E. Anscombe & P.T. Geach (trans.) p.63
151 Ibid.pp.61-2. “a wise man never entirely trusts those who have once cheated him”
152 Ibid.pp.64-5
153 Ibid.p.67
posited as a necessary condition of thought, the self-awareness of the self-thinking.\textsuperscript{154} As such, Descartes asserts, nothing is more manifest to me than my own mind.\textsuperscript{155}

In the indubitable certainty of the ego (\textit{cogito}) Descartes finds his ground of knowing. Without further explication, however, it is already evident that in the \textit{cogito} Descartes has already produced an ontological argument in reference to knowledge: that it is the being who can know, in the way that it may know, that is the ground of knowledge. In this, the \textit{cogito} of \textit{res cogitans} is self-giving: it is present(ed) to the self as the self-thinking. Accordingly, the indubitable certainty of the \textit{cogito} is posited via its necessary presence, its manifestation to perception. As such, the problem of knowing must be constituted as the grounding of knowledge via the presence of thinking to the entity who thinks. Furthermore, the \textit{cogito ergo sum} is necessarily the positing of being, of existence, via the presence of thought to the thinker. Therefore, to discuss Descartes as having an ontological problem with regard to knowledge is to discuss the prioritisation of a being in its being (self-present-ed). This is nothing other than a certain prioritisation of presence.

In the third meditation, Descartes turns to the problem of knowing in regard to its objects. In this, the problem of knowledge is twofold. Ideas (as knowledge) are given as either the being of \textit{res cogitans} (innate) or external sources (nature).\textsuperscript{156} Nature, for Descartes, is constituted as a problem: that somehow objects come to be imposed upon \textit{res cogitans} from outside.\textsuperscript{157} Accordingly, the problem of objects is given as that of effect, and the question of what causes these effects.\textsuperscript{158} These affects upon the \textit{cogito}, in their perfection (the seamlessness of their presentation), must then

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.p.67
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.p.75. “I thus clearly recognise that nothing is more easily or manifestly perceptible to me than my own mind.”
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.p.79
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.p.79
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.pp.80-81
be independent of the *cogito*.\textsuperscript{159} This leads to the presupposition of God, the ground of nature (*res extensa*) and of these effects; infinite substance, the cause/creator of all beings.\textsuperscript{160}

What we have in Descartes formulation of the ground of knowledge is an ontological system. This system contains two types of beings, *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, both of which have their grounds in infinite substance. In this, the ontological problematic of knowing means that both types of being are constituted in their presence: *res cogitans* by its self-presence in the awareness of the self-thinking, and *res extensa* by its presented-affects upon the *cogito*.

In the discussion of Descartes, it has been shown that Descartes follows the tradition of ontology in preconceiving being as presence. Furthermore, Descartes also follows the scholastic philosophers in presupposing God dogmatically with regard to the ground of reality. Descartes, however, also adds to the tradition via his absolute scepticism, which leads to the prioritisation of *res cogitans* as a knowing entity. In this addition, the question of being is degraded as a philosophical problem. The question of being is reformulated through the question of grounding knowledge and *res cogitans* and thus leads to a focus upon the problem of epistemology. This could only occur due to the disconnection of ground (*ἀρχή* and essence) from being, and the corresponding preconception of being as the presence of physical things.

This is perhaps, exactly where philosophy finds itself with Kant. On the other hand, it is also possible that in attempting to ground knowledge, Kant’s philosophical thinking engages in an ontological exposition of the Being of humans as knowing, with its own ontological preconception of Being.

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid. p.82
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid. pp.85-87
In Kant, the discussion of the ontological problematic reaches its philosophical culmination with regard to the tradition that has been discussed thus far. In this, the discussion of Kant will culminate in the question of whether Kant implicitly conceives being in reference to physically present things, and whether in Kant there is a possible alternative to this preconception. These questions are of the utmost importance insofar as they constitute the place in which Religion gets characterised as object-like and the possibility of an alternative approach to Religion.

Kant’s refutation of the ontological proof of God’s existence indicates Kant’s conception of being. In the first instance, Kant’s refutation belongs to the statement that “Being is obviously not a real predicate”. The conception and dismissal of being belongs to the term ‘real’ and in the phrase ‘real predicate’. The real, in its meaning for Kant, can only be understood within the context of Kant’s systematic agenda: the metaphysical problem of reality. As such, the conception of being must be introduced via a more general discussion of Kant’s critical agenda.

Kant’s critical agenda is first introduced as an attempt to rescue the sinking ship of metaphysics based upon the insight that Reason, an inherent mode of human thinking, consistently transcends its own powers. In this, metaphysics as a tradition becomes dogmatic, making and attempting to enforce claims that have no real legitimacy. Accordingly, the dogmatism of metaphysics has led to its downfall; that it becomes a questionable agenda, and produces only controversial knowledge. Kant’s agenda, in this light, is to find a ground for metaphysics that is not dogmatic

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162 Ibid.p.7
163 Ibid.p.8
164 Ibid.p.8
via a tribunal of Reason. This tribunal, the critique of pure reason, takes as its primary task the grounding of reason; as self-knowledge. Furthermore, this tribunal intends to find this ground, and security, in the faculty of Reason itself; independently of all experience.

In the preface of the second edition, the agenda of the critique is framed within the context of science and logic; wherein both have produced certain knowledge. In this, Kant’s search for certainty (ground) is associated with the sciences insofar as the sciences work. Furthermore, this working nature of the sciences, Kant claims, only came about via revolutions in the methodological principles by which they attained knowledge. As such, it seems necessary that metaphysics also undergo a methodological revolution, to which Kant has his own answer. “Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge… have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.”

The critical revolution, often called the Copernican revolution, also revolutionises the notion of reality in relation to knowledge. In this, Kant takes issue with the traditional notion of reality (as the self-given-ness of objects to humans) and picks up on the hidden clause in the traditional formulation: ‘as humans see them’, making this clause the central question of philosophy. Furthermore, insofar as metaphysics belongs to humans in the faculty of Reason, Kant will also constitute knowledge via an investigation of the structures of Reason as producing knowledge.

\[165\] Ibid.p.9
\[166\] Ibid.p.9
\[167\] Ibid.p.9
\[168\] Ibid.p.17
\[169\] Ibid.pp.17-20
\[170\] Ibid.p.21
\[170\] Ibid.p.22
This investigation of Reason will not merely reveal the structures of knowing, but will also attempt to show how reality itself is constituted in Reason as it produces knowledge. This is not to say that humans create or produce reality itself, but rather, that humans have a relationship with reality, via knowing, in such a way as to constitute reality as knowable.

The constitution of reality, of real objects, in Reason (as that which enables a knowing relation with objects) means that Kant’s conception of reality differs from the metaphysical tradition. In this, reality is first and foremost a concept of reason; as that which contains all predicates within itself in regard to the complete determination of anything in a totality. The real, as such, belongs to the determinable and determination of things. The concept of reality, thus, must ultimately signify that which explains how objects of experience and thought are possible for humans. This is to say that reality can only be conceived of primarily within the structure of knowledge, i.e., how objects are present and re-presentable for humans.

Even though reality and the real is constituted in the structure of knowledge Kant also posits an unknowable dimension to reality. This takes place in Kant’s system of transcendental idealism and empirical realism. It is not possible, here, to delve into this issue fully, but it is necessary to give at least the broadest outlines of this system. In this, it is possible to outline the transcendental/empirical system via the claim that “all our knowledge begins with experience”. This means, initially, that the problem of a priori knowledge (metaphysical knowledge) must be restricted to the investigation of the principles of the possibility of experience. If this restriction is

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171 Ibid.p.491
172 Ibid.p.491, & Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p.35
173 Sebastian Gardner, Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason, p.33
174 Ibid.p.49
175 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, p.41
176 Ibid.p.45
applied to the concept of reality then it follows that what is real can only be investigated in relation to experience; insofar as the thing is given to experience and in relation to the *a priori* structures of that experience. The objects thus presented to experience are only known in their presentation, re-presentation, and the way in which they get presented. On the other hand, the object-in-itself is not given, but only known through experience.\(^{177}\)

This distinction of the real, between a knowable and unknowable dimension of reality, means that for humans the knowable is the presented (in experience). Furthermore, the presentation of objects to humans, in its structure, is the sole question of metaphysics; the question of what is determinable of things in their presentation, i.e., of real predication. In this, the ‘real’ of real predication inherently belongs to the possibility or actuality of a thing’s presence in experience that allows of determinations. This is why, when Kant discusses being, he asserts that the reality of a thing must be distinguished from its possible existence (*Da-Sein*).\(^{178}\) The possible, or posited, existence of something cannot be added to the concept of a thing, for it is the identity (concept) of the thing itself, possible or not. The content of real predication, as the determination of a thing, operates solely within the realm of the object’s presence in experience and the *a priori* structures of that experience.

If we return to Kant’s view of the problem of being it comes as no surprise that being is not a real predicate. In this, there are two primary dimensions to the concept of being that need to be discussed: the concept of being, and being as the copula.

In regard to the former, Kant posits being as signifying a possible object.\(^{179}\) Being is the positing of a thing as existing.\(^{180}\) As such, the concept of being signifies

\(^{177}\) Ibid.p.440
\(^{178}\) Ibid.p.503
\(^{179}\) Ibid.p.505
\(^{180}\) Ibid.p.505
nothing in itself, but rather, merely asserts existence.\footnote{Ibid.p.505} This positing of being operates in two ways: either as the positing of an object in relation to its concept, or the positing of something as existing.\footnote{Ibid.p.505} The positing of an object in relation to its concept is analytic, i.e., it merely posits the identity of a thing. Likewise, being as the existence of a being signifies the content of a presented thing as an analytic determination, i.e., identity.\footnote{Ibid.p.505} Thus, the unity of the concept (being) and existence is given as an analytic signification, as the bare framework of identity. This means, overall, that being as the positing of existence is contingent; requiring the presence of the thing in experience, and furthermore, underpinned by the structure of reason as constituting the presence of things. This makes sense, in light of the ‘Copernican’ revolution, for if the object in its being-present-in-itself is rejected (the traditional formulation) then the concept of being must be reduced to being-possibly-present as the conceptual identity of a thing within the framework of how things get presented via reason. In this case, being is not only preconceived as being-present, i.e., existence, but is furthermore, reduced to the identity of presence – the mere concept of a thing as identifiable as a particular thing.

The second way Kant discusses being, as the copula (the ‘is’) in many ways clarifies Kant’s conception of being. In this, Kant formulates being as position or relation,\footnote{Ibid.p.505} wherein the ‘is’ posits the relation of subject and predicate.\footnote{Ibid.p.506} The relation of subject and predicate (S is P) means that being never adds anything to a subject at all other than its position as a possible/impossible or actual/non-actual object.\footnote{Ibid.p.505}

Being, as such, can only be constituted as a modality of presence: actual or possible. It
follows that being is not a real predicate because it does not determine anything about
an object other than that it is an identifiable object of experience. Being, therefore,
signifies the modality of identity in the copula; either present or possible. If it is a real
object, then, its being (conceptual identity) is undifferentiated from its existence
(actual identity). Accordingly, being must be viewed as subservient to the *a priori*
structures of reason that allow presence in the first instance.

In regard to this paper’s aims, the discussion of Kant has thus far shown that
the critical agenda conforms to the tradition of ontology in conceiving being in
relation to presence, or, the being-present of physical (experience-able) things. For
Kant, this conception of being means that being gets dismissed from metaphysics as a
primary concern. The task given to metaphysics by Kant, however, may also be
viewed as producing an implicit ontological revolution and a new way of conceiving
being. As such, the discussion of Kant will now consider the implicit possibility of an
ontological revolution via the analysis of the subject, i.e., the Being of humans.

In discussing Kant’s conception of the subject it will be at first necessary to
investigate the subject merely as a knower, i.e., via the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The
discussion will aim to provide a bare outline of how Kant’s critical agenda may be
characterised as an ontological argument. Kant conceives the self in two ways; as
appearance and as a thing-in-itself.¹⁸⁷ In this, the subject as knowing is itself viewed
as a knowable object. Accordingly, the subject as knowable, rather than knowing, is
conceived of as both an unknowable thing in itself and an appearance in
experience.¹⁸⁸ So much for the subject as knowable.

On the other hand, the subject *is* knowing; it is the being that can know. If
Kant supplies a structural account of reason, that shows how humans necessarily

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.p.28
¹⁸⁸ Ibid.pp.167, 329
experience the world as knowable, could it not be said that this account is implicitly ontological: an ontological account of the being of humans as knowing? Furthermore, if ontology is the study of beings in their being, would it not also be true that Kant’s structural analysis of the necessary conditions of experience must be constituted as an ontological analysis? This is precisely the argument that I would make here. If this were true, it would mean that Kant has achieved an ontological revolution of sorts: that ontology is no longer the study of present objects themselves, but rather, the study of how objects become present as knowable for humans in our Being.

Following this claim, it would seem that Kant’s formulation of the Being of humans is not enough in the Critique of Pure Reason, for a proper ontology must consider the being of a being in its unity/entirety, and not simply with regard to one particular region of that being. Furthermore, in relation to Religion, Kant’s analysis of the structure of knowing is not ontologically viable; for the reason it fails as mentioned above, but also insofar as it fails to address the question of human activities in relation to our Being. As such, if Religion is to be constituted properly as an ontological problem it must also be possible for the problematic of ontology to extend beyond the region of human knowledge, into such regions in human actions, such as: ethics, culture, religion(s), economics, and so on. Before this is possible, however, an ontological system must be found which is able to incorporate all ways

189 A clue to this claim, although it cannot be justified in full, can be seen in the relation between being, analytic judgments and identity. In this, Kant himself utilises the term ‘analytic’ to refer to the central argument of his discussion of the structure of reason, eg., the “Transcendental Analytic”. I would argue that the transcendental analytic itself, even merely as a title, indicates that for Kant the structure of knowing belongs to the identity of humans as rational beings who can know, i.e., it refers to the being of humans as knowing. Kant defines the Transcendental Analytic as “that part of transcendental logic which deals with the elements of the pure knowledge yielded by understanding, and the principles without which no object can be thought…the transcendental analytic is a logic of truth.” (p.100)... and also a “dissection of the faculty of the understanding itself” (103). Isn’t another way of saying this: the basic (a priori) ontological characteristics of human awareness by which objects are thought?
of being (all regions) within its structure. To further this aim, I will now turn to ethics as a possible source of a proper ontological system.

7. An Alternative Approach to Ontology:

If Religion is to be properly formulated as an ontological problem we must first work out the best way of formulating ontology itself, as a whole. In this, the discussion provided thus far has shown that, for the most part, the tradition of ontology has failed to produce a workable basis for the question of being, and therefore, a basis for Religion as an ontological problem. The problem that has been encountered thus far has been the preconception of being as the presence of physical entities. Furthermore, this has also led to the presupposition of some object as the ground of being. For Religion to be properly formulated as an ontological problem we must first find an adequate ontological system which is non-ωσιαλ-logical: not preconceiving being via the prioritisation of physical objects. Equally, the paper must attempt to find an ontological position that relates to the being of humans properly and completely. In order to achieve this aim, the paper will first attempt to interpret the Ethics of Aristotle and Kant within the context of an ontology that relates to the being of humans.

A. Ethics and Ontology:

Aristotle.

In Aristotle, the problem of Ethics is formulated as a twofold question: of what the highest good is, and the proper way of approaching this good. In this, Aristotle claims that there are two rational aspects of the soul; that which refers to the invariable and that which refers to the variable (1139α5-10). These two aspects of the rational,
however, are not differing ways of thinking, but rather, belong to two possible directions of thought (1139\textsuperscript{a}11-17). As such, Aristotle’s conception of the proper approaches to the good implies that there is a single highest intellectual virtue in φνώς (intuition/intellect) that may have two possible objects.\textsuperscript{190} In order to draw out the ontological implications of this formulation the discussion of Aristotle will focus on the following themes: the highest good and φρονήσις as an intellectual virtue.

Aristotle poses the question of the good as that of the object of life. In this, it is stated that every human activity can be viewed in relation to an aiming for good (1094\textsuperscript{a}1-17). Accordingly, if actions all aim at some good, there must also be things that are good for their own sake; that are not for the sake of some other end (1094\textsuperscript{a}18-24). This good for its own sake is the Good: the supreme Good (1094\textsuperscript{a}23). Furthermore, the supreme good towards which humans should aim towards is a fixed good, following the sciences, whose aim is knowledge of things that are not deficient (1097\textsuperscript{a}1-6). When Aristotle turns to the question of the highest good for humans, it is something self-sufficient that makes life proper: a happy life (1097\textsuperscript{b}7-21). As such, the highest good is an object towards which humans may relate and which results in happiness. As a result of this formulation of the highest good as an object, Aristotle may then characterise the highest good as the divine and the divine in humans (1177\textsuperscript{a}11-18). Equally, the divine as the object of highest good is reached only insofar as the human practices, and is able to practice, the virtue of contemplation in σοφία (1177\textsuperscript{a}18).

Humans, however, are not able to engage in contemplation as a whole life as practical considerations, i.e., sustenance, a place to live, the need to work, and relate

\textsuperscript{190} Aristotle, \textit{Ethics}, J.A.K. Thomson (trans.) p.369. Found in the glossary provided by the as 'intelligence, intuition’. The glossary of ‘De Anima’ is more verbose, [Aristotle, trans., H. Lawson-Tancred (1986) \textit{De Anima (On The Soul)}, London: Penguin Books.], stating that ‘φνώς’ signifies “the intellective capacity. Sometimes... it seems almost to be best to translate the word as ‘intuition’, the capacity for unreasoned grasp of the first principles...” (120)
to other people, draws even the philosopher away from contemplation (1177b26-34). In this, the primacy of the highest good (of seeking the divine) is also practically subservient to politics, the supreme good for humans in relation to our being (1181b10-23). In a practical sense, of living life, the highest good for humans is humans-themselves: the way humans are. Insofar as humans are inherently social beings the highest good in life is posited as the good for the community - πολιτικός (1194b3-11).

This means, for Aristotle, that there are two possible highest goods: the practical and the contemplative. In this, the contemplative good in its mode (σοφία) with its corresponding object (the divine - θεος) is the highest good that can be striven after. Nonetheless, this aim is practically impossible, which means that the highest achievable good is politics: the good for the community. This is derived from the claim that the being of humans is inherently social; dependent and not self-sufficient. If the being of humans is to be known, it follows that there will be an intellectual virtue that intuits the object of human good (the community) properly, and will intuit the good of human activities in life. For Aristotle, this intellectual virtue is φρονησις.

Φρονησις is, in Aristotle, the highest intellectual virtue in relation to grasping the good for humans (1140b20-21). In this, φρονησις is posited as being concerned with human goods, or, those things about which deliberation is possible (1141b8-12). This shows that to be human is to be able to choose, to deliberate over actions with regard to their outcome. Accordingly, φρονησις intuits actions in two ways: with regard to the universal and the particular (1141b14-16). The particular is the intuiting of the proper-ness of an action in relation to specific goals and circumstances.

191 This is why, at least in part, the being of humans is characterised as the being who can always also be otherwise than themselves.
(1141\textsuperscript{b}15-20). The particular, as such, stands in subservience to the universal scope of φρονησίς, wherein φρονησίς views particular goals in reference to the goal of life as a whole and the structural content of every action (1141\textsuperscript{b}21-22). This means that φρονησίς, in intuining the universal, performs two tasks: it sees the particular in relation to life as a whole and it sees action in regard to its proper structure, i.e., shows what proper deliberation is. This implies that φρονησίς is able to intuit what it is to be human properly: that to be human has a dimension of what is proper to action (that to be human is to act), and furthermore, to be human is to intuit and interpret life as a whole (to have a sense of the meaning of life). Insofar as Ethics is the question of good, the proper, then the aim of φρονησίς is to reveal the being of humans in προξενίκης as it is most proper rather than otherwise (1142\textsuperscript{b}30-35, 1143\textsuperscript{a}30-1143\textsuperscript{b}6).

\textit{Kant.}

In Kant, the question of Ethics in relation to the being of humans becomes heightened, in that the question of proper action (what ought I to do?) is deprived of any empirical elements. In this, the problem of ethics is posited as the question of whether reason by itself, and independently of all appearances, commands what ought to happen.\textsuperscript{192} The ontological problematic of the being of humans is explicitly formulated as the question of rational being. “Since moral laws have to hold for every rational being as such, we ought rather to derive out principles from the general concept of rational being…”\textsuperscript{193} The ethics of Kant can be viewed, in this, as the attempt to ground what ought to happen in human existence upon an analysis of the being of rational entities.\textsuperscript{194} For Kant, however, humans are not necessarily the only rational beings.

\textsuperscript{192} Immanuel Kant, \textit{Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals}, H.J. Paton (trans.) p.75
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.p.94
\textsuperscript{194} This claim of an ontological argument makes sense in regard to Kant’s formulation of the notion being: as the concept of an entity, or as the concept of an actual entity, i.e., identity.
This means that Kant’s explication of ethics will necessarily attempt to reveal both the being of rational entities in general and the specific nature of being human as a rational entity. This discussion of Kant’s ethical writings, as such, must pursue both formulations of being-rational.

The being of rational entities in general is given as existing as an end in itself.\textsuperscript{195} An end, in this sense, is not merely an activity, but rather, the determination of being-rational as being-an-end. Furthermore, the end is not the act itself, but belongs to the entities who are able to act; entities with a will. Kant determines the will, in this sense, as a ground of self-determination.\textsuperscript{196} As such, to determine the being of rational entities as an end in itself is to determine being-rational as fundamentally self-grounding, self-willing, self-determining. This, furthermore, is to characterise the will as free; a free causality with regard to action. This is why the ‘categorical imperative’, as the ought of determining action, can also be called the ‘natural law’. “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.”\textsuperscript{197} To understand this formulation of the ought it is first necessary, in brief, to outline the function of causality in Kant’s philosophy.

In Kant, causality belongs inherently to the problem of possible knowledge, or, the distinction between experience-able objects and objects in themselves. In this, the possible objectivity of knowledge demands that phenomenal experienced events happen according to rules, or, that events be explained in relation to causality.\textsuperscript{198} Causality, as such, is the temporality of phenomenal events as they can be experienced, via the \textit{a priori} structures of intuition, by humans: as how humans must experience physical events. Natural causality, in this sense, refers to the way that

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.p.95  
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid.p.95  
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.p.89  
\textsuperscript{198} Graham Bird, \textit{Kant’s Theory of Knowledge}, p.199
humans experience nature as knowable, that events occur according to rules.\textsuperscript{199} Natural causality is always conditioned\textsuperscript{200}, reliant upon spatio-temporal effects given by intuition, and does not refer to noumenal objects themselves. On the other hand, free causality belongs to a type of noumenal object, rational beings, in two ways. First, free causality is a freedom-from: a freedom from natural cause.\textsuperscript{201} Free causality is also a freedom-to: a being able to act spontaneously.\textsuperscript{202}

In reference to being-rational as an end in itself, this means that the ought of free will can only be re-presented to us in the actual living of life. In this, the living of life designates the phenomenal realm, the natural world, thus conjoining the moral ought to the natural causality of experience. As such, to know the being of rational entities, and also what these entities ought to do, must be inextricably linked to natural processes – natural cause. This is especially poignant with regard to the being of humans, who are inherently affected by natural causality.\textsuperscript{203} Humans always tend, Kant asserts, to be affected by our own subjective natures as they appear to us. These affections are not in harmony with our being-rational (objectivity). As such, the ought in humans is a ‘necessitation’: that we determine our will according to objective law.\textsuperscript{204} However, insofar as we can know, in our being, the only objective law is that of nature. Thus, the ought of human actions is ironically posited in relation to natural law and not, as hoped, in relation to the being of rational entities.

Kant, however, also posits a practical imperative grounded in the concept of the being of rational entities. In this, the ground for the practical imperative belongs to a typology of ways of being: things and persons. Natural objects, those entities that

\textsuperscript{199} Theodore Adorno, \textit{Problems of Moral Philosophy}, R. Livingstone (trans.) p.32
\textsuperscript{200} Immanuel Kant, \textit{The Critique of Pure Reason}, p.392
\textsuperscript{201} Henry E. Allison, \textit{Kant’s Theory of Freedom}, p.15
\textsuperscript{202} Kant, \textit{The Critique of Pure Reason}, p.392
\textsuperscript{203} Kant, \textit{Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals}, p.92
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid.pp.92-93
are solely determined by natural causality are called things.\textsuperscript{205} Those entities that are rational are called persons, having absolute value.\textsuperscript{206} This typology allows of the practical imperative: “act in such a way that you always treat humanity… never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”\textsuperscript{207} Thus, Kant determines the being of humans as: a) being-rational, and b) having absolute value as an end in itself.

In summary, the interpretation of Aristotle and Kant in relation to ethics has drawn out some possible determinations of the being of humans. In Aristotle, four basic characteristics are given: that humans are relational (community), that humans are προς κεισ (proper/improper – can always be otherwise), that humans are interpretative/intuitive in our ability to deliberate (we perceive actions in relation to interpretation/intuition of life as a whole: as purposive), and finally, that humans are circumstantial (we always deliberate and act within a particular context/horizon). In Kant, three basic characterisations have been given: that humans are deficient (‘necessitation’ – overcoming natural affects, inclination), that humans are rational (being a will), and that humans are an active will (directed towards things/persons in a world).

However, these characterisations must be considered lacking with regard to the problem of Religion. Both Aristotle and Kant determine the being of humans as secondary, as not having priority in their system of thought. In Aristotle, the being of humans is subservient to the possibility of being divine, while in Kant, the being of humans (as a whole) comes after the possibility of knowing (present objects). Furthermore, both preconceive being as the physical presence of things. This prioritisation means that other ways of being (regions) in which physical presence is

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid.p.96
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid.p.96
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid.p.96
not the primary characteristic are excluded from possible analysis. Finally, even though both Aristotle and Kant draw out interesting possibilities for analysis, in relation to the being of humans, these possibilities cannot be developed without a proper ontological system, and a proper formulation of the question of being.

The proper formulation of the question of being, and the resultant proper ontological system, requires that two demands be met: first, that it is inclusive of all possible ways (regions) of being; and second, that it finds the right entity (insofar as being is always the being of an entity) to prioritise. In other words, the question of being, an ontological system, must find the entity through which all ways of being are either included or encountered. The paper will now turn to an analysis of Heidegger’s question of being and Dasein as a way of properly formulating the question of being, an ontological system, and thus also, Religion as an ontological problem.  

**B. Dasein and Non-Ousiological Ontology:**

In viewing Heidegger’s ontological system, and his question of being, as a possible way into Religion as an ontological problem, the interpretation to be provided must contain two tasks: of showing how Heidegger’s question of being can be viewed as an adequate ontological system; and how Heidegger’s characterisation of Dasein allows of a preliminary characterisation of Religion as an ontological problem. With regard to the former, I will attempt to interpret *Being and Time* as providing the framework for this proper ontological system. With regard to the latter, I will discuss two of Heidegger’s early works as providing a basis for formulating Religion as a problem.

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208 See Glossary: Dasein
The Question of Being:

Heidegger introduces the question of being as a problem of what is meant by being.\(^{209}\) This is not initially a question of the everyday semantic or grammatical sense of the word ‘being’, but rather a philosophical conceptual problematising of the notion of being. Accordingly, where Heidegger explicitly problematises the notion of being he does so within the context of three traditional formulations of the sense of being.

The first of these traditional formulations of being is that being is a universal concept.\(^{210}\) This is so for three reasons. First, being is presupposed wherever entities are apprehended\(^{211}\), and as such being is universal to the apprehension of entities. Second, being is formulated as ‘transcendent’,\(^{212}\) as transcending any and every entity. As such, being is universal as above and beyond every concretely situated entity. Finally, being is considered as a unity of analogy in contrast to generic concepts.\(^{213}\) Here, being is some vague universal unity which allows of the categorisation of entities in their modes of being, eg., quantity, quality, relation and modality. In all three of these formulations of universality, however, being is not merely vague but also merely presupposed. As such, Heidegger states that this formulation of being has no clarity. In that Being is universally presupposed in ontology Being is also the darkest, the most hidden, concept of all.\(^{214}\)

\(^{209}\) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (trans.) p.19 (H1)
\(^{210}\) Ibid. p.22 (H3)
\(^{211}\) Ibid.
\(^{212}\) Ibid.
\(^{213}\) Ibid. pp.22-3 (H3)
\(^{214}\) Ibid. p.23 (H3)
The second traditional formulation of being that Heidegger discusses is the indefinability of being.\textsuperscript{215} In this, being is taken to be indefinable in so far as being is not an entity which contains definable characteristics.\textsuperscript{216} Even though being is not an entity and cannot therein be defined being is none the less utilised. This utilisation of being does not require any definition but rather always already entails a sense of being. As such, the formulation of being as in-definable, although correct, has hidden the problem of the way in which being is always already has a sense; that is, Being is already presupposed and understood in some vague and indefinable way. Therefore, the problem of the in-definability of being is that it obscures the question of this sense of being.\textsuperscript{217}

The final traditional formulation that Heidegger considers is that being is self-evident.\textsuperscript{218} This self evidence is contained in the ‘copula’ of each sentence as the ‘is’, ‘am’, ‘was’, ‘will be’ and other such structures. The self evidence of being here merely indicates the familiarity of use and a familiarity with being in language. This familiarity with being pertains to the vague understanding of being that human's have, but not to the sense of being which is presupposed by understanding.\textsuperscript{219}

Heidegger’s discussion of these three traditional formulations of being has problematised these formulations of being and thus the tradition of Ontology. In each case Heidegger points out that the philosophical tradition has not gone far enough in the question of being. In this the tradition shares a common, but as yet undiscovered, failing which prevents the question of being from proper formulation. This failing has something to do with a distinction between possible points of origin for formulating the question of Being; between grounding ontology in the vague understanding itself,

\textsuperscript{215} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid. p.23 (H4)
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid.
or the potential of grounding ontology upon the sense of Being which is a presupposition of this vague understanding. Insofar as the failure of the tradition of ontology belongs to the ‘not far enough’ its failure lies in grounding ontology upon the vague understanding of being and entirely forgetting that being always already has a sense in this understanding. Heidegger’s question of the sense of being can be seen therefore as the attempt to show how ontology can be grounded upon the sense of being.

In order to enter into the question of the sense of being properly Heidegger begins with a structural analysis of questioning in general which is followed by an analysis of the question of the sense of being.

In the first case, that of questioning in general, Heidegger posits a threefold structure of questioning viewed as a relation between questioner and questioned. The former is viewed as an entity whose behaviour has the character (Being) of questioning.220 As such, any question expresses the being of the entity who questions. With respect to the latter, any question is guided by what is sought221, i.e., the questioned shows itself as something to be questioned. The third component of the question lies in the relation between the two comprising such themes as what is asked by the questioner of the questioned and what is to be found out by the question.222 These elements of the question express a relation between questioner and questioned as mutually delimiting. In this, the questioner interrogates the questioned in a certain way with certain aims in mind. Equally the questioned delimits the parameters of what can be, and will be, found because of what it is and how it shows itself.

Heidegger develops this threefold structure of questioning as the proper formulation of the sense of being. Here, Heidegger begins with being as the

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220 Ibid. p.24 (H5)
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
questioned. In this, the former notion of guidance becomes formulated as the availability of the sense of being. The initial parameter of this guidance is given as the preliminary notion of being given in ‘what is asked about’. Being here has the sense of that upon which entities are already understood.

Accordingly, what is to be found out via the relation between Being and the questioner is the sense of being of entities. In this case, however, the sense of being belongs to a particular entity, the entity which already has a sense of being.

As such, it is Dasein (as the questioner) who is the locus of the question of the sense of being that needs to be analysed in regard to its Being. In this Dasein contains all three elements of the question; Dasein in the questioner, Dasein is guided by Being in that Dasein understands Being, and finally, Dasein has questioning as its behaviour, i.e., as a way of Being.

In this way Heidegger’s analysis of the formal structure of the question of the sense of being indicates three related components of the question. In the first instance the questioner is an entity which has its own Being. Furthermore, being’s sense is always that of the being of an entity. Finally, the sense of being only ever belongs to an entity who is capable of having a sense of Being. Therefore, the question of the sense of being in its proper formulation revolves around the relation between questioning and sense.

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223 Ibid. p.25 (H5)
224 Ibid. p.25 (H6)
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid. p.26 (H7)
229 Ibid. p.27 (H7)
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid.
The relation between the questioner and sense is taken up by Heidegger as the task of proving the relatedness of the questioner to the question.\textsuperscript{232} In this, the proof will be given as the proof of two related priorities; the priority of an entity in regard to its being\textsuperscript{233}, and the priority of the question of the sense of being.\textsuperscript{234} This is why the priorities as argued by Heidegger may be stated as the priority of the question(er). In this, Heidegger provides three priorities of the question(er); ontological, ontical and ontico-ontological.

The first priority, the ontological, is divided up via the themes of motive, aim and function. In this the motive is derived from the lack of proper formulation in the tradition of ontology.\textsuperscript{235} The functional priority of the question belongs to its priority for the sciences, both ontological and ontical.\textsuperscript{236} Here, being is always taken as the being of an entity derived from pre-scientific ways of experiencing and interpreting the sense of being.\textsuperscript{237} As such, the aim of the ontological priority is the ascertaining of the a priori conditions of the sciences and ontology.\textsuperscript{238} The ontological priority, then, belongs to the traditional philosophical and metaphysical problem of ontology as grounding science. It is, therefore, the priority of properly addressing the sense of being in order to ground science. It is also important to note, in regard to the ontological priority, that the Being of the questioner is already implicitly involved in this priority as having a way of Being, i.e., questioning, that makes the sciences possible.

The second priority is called the ontical priority which focuses on the being of the questioner (Dasein). Here, Heidegger begins with the claim that science is a

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid. p.28 (H8)  
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{234} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{235} Ibid. p.29 (H8)  
\textsuperscript{236} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{237} Ibid. p.29 (H8)  
\textsuperscript{238} Ibid. p.31 (H11)
manner of Dasein’s being. As such, being is an issue for Dasein. Equally, being can only be an issue for Dasein in so far as Dasein can also understand Being pre-scientifically. Thus, it is also a characteristic of Dasein’s Being to understand Being. In this way, the ontical priority of the question(er) is based upon the fact that Dasein is ontically distinctive in that Dasein is ontological. This being-ontological is first and foremost pre-ontological, i.e., not formulated. The way of being that Dasein has is called ‘existence’. In this, existence is Dasein’s way of Being-Ontological, where Dasein understands itself as the possibility of being itself or Not Being itself. Furthermore, this question of existence never gets worked out except via existing itself. As such, existence as Dasein’s way of being is first and foremost oriented around Dasein’s capabilities of understanding – in general and for itself. Existence, however, also pertains to Dasein’s understanding of Being via a world and the Being of entities. Existence as Dasein’s way of being is therefore the nexus of Dasein’s understanding in all its primordial forms, including Dasein’s formulations of questioning in the ontical and ontological sciences. Accordingly, Heidegger states that whenever ontology focuses on entities not-Dasein it has its foundations and motivation in Dasein’s ontical structure, including the pre-ontological understanding of being. The question of the sense of being must therefore be viewed as having its foundation and motivation in Dasein’s existence and the corresponding understanding of Being. This is to say the question of the sense of being is initially grounded in Dasein’s understanding of the being of entities.

239 Ibid. p.32 (H11)  
240 Ibid.  
241 Ibid.  
242 Ibid. p.32 (H12)  
243 Ibid.  
244 Ibid. p.33 (H12)  
245 Ibid.  
246 Ibid.  
247 Ibid. p.33 (H13)  
248 Ibid. p.33 (H13)
The third priority, the ontico-ontological, is founded upon the previous two priorities and is stated as that wherein Dasein has the capability to understand the being of entities that are not Dasein. In this, the priorities explicitly belong to Dasein in this way; ontically, Dasein’s being has the character of existence. Likewise, ontologically, existence is determinative for Dasein. Thus, ontico-ontologically, as constitutive of existence Dasein understands the being of entities not Dasein. As such, Dasein’s Being-Ontological, i.e., Dasein’s understanding in general, founds the question of the sense of being in and via existence. Thus the questioner and question are unified in existence.

In so far as the priorities have unified questioner and question in existence the priorities have implications for, and guide the way in which the sense of being is approached via an existential analytic. There are four implications that Heidegger draws out from the priorities for the question of the sense of being. The first is that the existential analytic must disclose the ontical structure of existence. This will allow Heidegger to reveal the ontological structure of Dasein, i.e., Dasein’s being. From this, Heidegger plans to show how Dasein’s being, as containing an ontico-ontological character, may reveal the sense of being. Finally, Heidegger states, the question of being is nothing other than the radicalisation of the pre-ontological understanding of being.

The priorities, in unifying questioner and question, thus reveals the proper way into the question of the sense of Being. The basic ground of this approach belongs to the recognition of a relation between Dasein and the sense of being. This relation, in general, is that the sense of being belongs to Dasein. If the sense of being belongs

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249 Ibid. p.34 (H13)
250 Ibid.
251 Ibid. p.35 (H14)
252 Ibid.
solely to Dasein (the questioner) as a possibility then it follows that it is Dasein’s being that must be discovered. Accordingly, where this sense of being is understood initially via existence, the question becomes an existential analytic. This existential analytic will begin with the ontical and work back to the ontological. This process of uncovering, in finding the structure of Dasein’s being will also provide the proper ground of discussing the sense of being as it belongs to Dasein. This, however, is not the final aim of the question of the sense of being, for Heidegger also wants to show how being can be talked of in general, or for itself.

In Heidegger’s question of being, and the ontological system provided therein, both demands have been met. In this, the first demand; that it include all possible ways (regions) of being, is met via the prioritisation of Dasein’s being. In the prioritisation of the question of Dasein’s being, Heidegger finds the entity through which all ways of being are incorporated, either as they are understood, or as ways of Dasein’s being. However, the question of being and the resultant ‘fundamental ontology’ is not complete, as Heidegger admits, in that it does not disclose the complete range of ways Dasein may be or the ways in which Dasein understands. As a starting point Heidegger’s question of being, especially ‘fundamental ontology’ can be viewed as providing the basic characterisation of being-human from which Religion may be constituted as an ontological problem.

The Basic Characterisation of Dasein’s Being

In Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity Heidegger frames his exposition of Dasein’s being explicitly in relation to the problem of ontology. In this ontology is formulated as an open-ended questioning of being which must necessarily ground
each and every region of life within the one system and the one question. It is Heidegger’s argument that traditional ontology is inadequate for this task in that it prioritises the objectivity (presence) of objects and cannot, therefore analyse the being of Dasein.

It is Heidegger’s aim to provide an exposition of Dasein’s being via a hermeneutics of facticity. In this, facticity is constituted as Dasein’s being: a being finite, being-there/here for a while in a particular time. The way of further explicating facticity is hermeneutics: an allowing something to be seen, or a self-interpretation of existence – of factual life. As a living of life facticity must, furthermore, be characterised as an encountering the world. This is to say that facticity, as it can be interpreted, takes place in a world, or, as a relationship of Dasein with the world. This relationship wherein the world is encountered by Dasein reveals ways that Dasein is via the structure of the relationship.

Heidegger asserts that three ways of Dasein’s being is revealed via an encountering of the world. First, it shows that Dasein’s being is such that it allows the world to be disclosed. This disclosure of the world takes place in advance, i.e., it is contained in Dasein’s being and constituted by Dasein’s ways of being. Furthermore, this disclosure of the world is equally a ‘with-world’, a world in which Dasein is with other people. Finally, the world is also encountered as an ‘in order to’, that Dasein’s being is such that we grasp things in relation to an ability to act or achieve goals. As such, the disclosed-ness of the world as encountered shows that

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254 Ibid. p.2
255 Ibid. p.5
256 Ibid. pp.7, 11-12
257 Ibid. p.71
258 Ibid. p.71
259 Ibid. p.71
260 Ibid. p.71
Dasein’s being may be characterised as ‘being-in-the-world’: purposive and relational.

Heidegger further develops the latter two characterisations via the terms ‘care’ and ‘concern’. In this, Heidegger argues that ‘care’ signifies the basic constitution of Dasein’s being-in-the-world as ‘being-with’: relating to other persons.\(^{261}\) Accordingly, the ‘in order to’ (concern) is posited as the practice of care (its actualisation) in Dasein’s dealings.\(^{262}\) Dealings, as such, signifies human activities in the world as they come to be directed towards encountered entities, and what may be achieved via these entities. Entities in the world cannot be viewed as isolated things, but rather, things that mean something to Dasein in regard to goals.

These two basic characteristics of being, however, may be levelled. In this, the levelling of care and concern occurs in ‘everydayness’ wherein entities lose their meaning ‘for us’ and become viewed as merely present to us.\(^{263}\)

In Heidegger’s paper ‘*Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle*’, the being of Dasein is developed further along these lines. In this, Dasein’s being is posited as fundamentally interpretative, in that Dasein sees the world as a ‘how’.\(^{264}\) This ‘how’ is ‘care’, that to be human is to care: to be directed out towards something.\(^{265}\) Accordingly, concern is the actualisation of care, wherein the way the world is interpreted comes to be fulfilled in activities or relations with other entities in the world.\(^{266}\) Furthermore, insofar as Dasein tends to get it wrong (interpretatively), Dasein has a tendency not to be-one’s-self, and care may also be taken up explicitly as

\(^{261}\) Ibid. p.79
\(^{262}\) Ibid. pp.77-8
\(^{263}\) Ibid. p.80
\(^{265}\) Ibid. p.361
\(^{266}\) Ibid. pp.361-2
a ‘how’ to be-one’s-self: to see one’s-self-properly. Heidegger calls care in this sense circumspection.\(^{267}\)

Following this train of thought, where the being of Dasein is fundamentally determined as equally being-in-the-world and as a question of being-one’s-self (or not), Heidegger argues that circumspection reveals three primary elements of Dasein’s being in existence. First, Dasein is a ‘how’: that life is always interpreted as significant.\(^{268}\) Furthermore, Dasein is ‘directed’: always being-out-towards the world.\(^{269}\) Finally, Dasein has its being only through living (existence): engaging in ways of relating to other entities (the practical).\(^{270}\)

I would contend that these three determinations of Dasein’s being provide a way into the problem of Religion. This is the task of formulating Religion as a phenomenon. Before attempting this task, however, I will first outline the provisional acceptance of Heidegger’s ontology.

8. The Provisional Acceptance of Heidegger’s Ontology:

Although Heidegger’s question of being can be viewed as providing the ontological system which allows entry into the problem of Religion, the question of being, as Heidegger’s path of thinking, must only be accepted in a provisional manner. This provisional acceptance, in part, belongs to the differing aim of this paper to Heidegger’s question of being. In this, the question of Religion takes up two places of origin in Heidegger’s question of being: the ontological system (the prioritisation of Dasein) and Heidegger’s characterisation of Dasein’s being. The paper will accept Heidegger’s determination of Dasein’s being (and sense of being) as a fundamental

\(^{267}\) Ibid. p.362. This is an appropriation of Aristotle’s term ἐπονομασία.
\(^{268}\) Ibid. p.362
\(^{269}\) Ibid. p.362
\(^{270}\) Ibid. p.362
ontology. However, the provisional acceptance of Heidegger’s question of being will also be delimiting, i.e., a non-acceptance. In this, there are dimensions to Heidegger’s question of being, as a ‘path of thinking’, which are unacceptable to the questioning of Religion as a notion. As such, the provisional acceptance of Heidegger’s question of being, both in its positive and negative senses, requires further elaboration.

A. Fundamental Ontology:

Heidegger calls the process of his own question of being, initially, a fundamental ontology. In this, Heidegger’s argument is, as I have already outlined, that ontology is only properly formulated in the investigation of the being of the questioner. The being of the questioner as it is to be investigated is then constituted in two ways: in its fundamental being (its most basic determinable characteristics), and equally, as the being who understands being. Heidegger hopes to achieve, via this fundamental ontology, a way of showing how Dasein, in our being, understands being (has a sense of being) and thus, also what fundamentally constitutes Dasein’s understanding of things that are not Dasein (things in the world).\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, pp.33-4 (H13)} In this aim Heidegger also intentionally overlooks other possibilities, like Religion, calling this fundamental ontology merely ‘provisional’.\footnote{Ibid. p.38 (H17)}

For the purposes of the research, it is worthwhile outlining the structural content of Heidegger’s question of being. For convenience and clarity, I will posit this structure as containing three moments: fundamental ontology, Dasein’s sense of being, and being-itself (‘being’). First, fundamental ontology has the task of disclosing the basic structures of Dasein’s being, the bare framework from which every other region can be investigated. Second, in engaging in a fundamental
ontology, Heidegger also tailors the ‘existential analytic’ to the question of how
Dasein understands entities other than itself. This means that Heidegger takes
fundamental ontology and develops merely one avenue of possible development, the
sense of being. This results in the thesis that time (or better: Temporality) is Dasein’s
sense of being. Finally, Heidegger attempts to move from Dasein’s sense of being, via
a ‘turn’ (kehre), to the way in which being gives itself to Dasein. Fundamental
ontology, as such, is merely the first stage of a path towards the question, or thinking,
about being. This has obvious implications for the possibility of formulating Religion
properly insofar as Heidegger’s question of being is problematic in regard to Religion.
This can be seen more clearly in relation to the notion of the ‘nothing’.

B. The ‘No-Thing’:

In the theme of ‘no-thing’, or non-being, the question of being reaches its highest
point of exposition. In this, the question of the ‘no-thing’ comes to signify three
dimensions of the question of being: the origin of Dasein’s being, the ground of
Dasein’s understanding of being(s), and finally, the question of being-itself (‘Being’).
These ways of saying the nothing, their significance, is in some sense the nexus of
ontological thought.

First, the ‘nothing’ as the ground of Dasein’s being signifies the
finitude/temporality/mortality of Dasein. In this, the nothing initially signifies
‘finitude’, as the temporality of Dasein’s being temporalising, and Dasein’s
mortality; that Dasein may always also not be-there. It is Heidegger’s claim that
the ground of Dasein’s being, in this sense, is nothing: a possibility of not being-there

273 Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, P.D. Hertz (trans.) p.134 “Language is the house of
Being because language, as Saying, is the mode of Appropriation”. Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter On
Humanism’, Basic Writings, D.F. Krell (ed.) “… in thinking, Being comes to language.”
274 Martin Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?’, Pathmarks, W. McNeill (ed.) p.93
275 Ibid. pp.93-4
(Da-Sein). Nothing is, furthermore, the ground of Dasein’s understanding of being. In this, it is nothing (as transcendence) that allows Dasein to understand entities that are not Dasein. Transcendence is framed as an ‘overcoming’ of beings, or, being able to grasp the being of beings and the world as a whole. Thus, Dasein’s being is essentially this transcendence/nothing: Dasein is no-thing (not a thing but person), and grounded in no-thing (the possibility of not being-there).

This verbal play on Da-Sein (being-there/here), which is also a play on Kant and Husserl’s formulation of existence, is an attempt to ground the ontological preconception of presence and re-presenting in Dasein’s being as that which constitutes the presence and presenting of things in temporalisation. Furthermore, the use of Da-Sein also shows that the ground of understanding is no-thing: in the sense of Dasein’s being, but also, in reference to Being-itself. In this, Heidegger argues that to understand anything at all Dasein must already understand Being and the nothing together.

‘Being’ is constituted as no-thing: Being is not a being. Moreover, as a concept, ‘Being’ is equivalent to ‘Nothing’. This means that ‘Being’, as the term signifying the ground of all beings and the world as a whole, of reality, is nothing at all: it is otherwise than being(s). As such, the path to knowing non-being, the nothing, and ‘Being’ is impossible. ‘Being’, the ground of the world and the being of entities, therefore, is no knowable object. It is, rather, the ground of Dasein’s being, and Dasein’s being understanding.

276 Ibid. pp.91, 93
277 Ibid. p.93
278 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Ralph Manheim (trans.) p.77
279 Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?’, p.94. Heidegger quotes Hegel as saying “Pure Being and Pure Nothingness is the same thing”.
281 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.111
If Heidegger’s ultimate question of ‘Being’ is placed in relation to the tradition of ontology, it can be seen that the nothing plays the same role as the divine, or God. In this, the claim that the divine or God cannot be known (seen) by human effort is no surprise. Likewise, the turn to hearing ‘Being’ itself parallels the notion of revelation, especially in relation to the hermeneutics of a sacred text. If there is a limit to the acceptance of Heidegger by this paper, it will accordingly be Heidegger’s question of ‘Being’ (the truth of being, the emergence of being). This is not only due to the parallels between the tradition of ontology and Heidegger in this regard, but also insofar as it could be possible to characterise Heidegger after the turn as thinking about something other than being when he thinks the nothing. The paper must, furthermore, be cautious in relation to Heidegger’s prioritisation of Dasein’s understanding of entities that are not Dasein.

C. Provisional as Delimitation:
Rather than entering into a detailed discussion of the contested notion of the turn (kehre) what is needed here is a general outline of why the turn (the question of being-in-general) must not be accepted in this research.

It is my contention that the notion of Being must be conceived of, somehow, as otherwise than being. This is to say, generally, that I would contend that being is a misconception of sorts. To support this contention it is useful to re-look at what could be called a hierarchy of the senses of being as a notion. In this, the lowest sense of being refers to entities: that entities are (present somehow as identifiable things). Being also signifies, a second sense, the being of an entity: what makes something what, or who, it is. Furthermore, being has a third sense as the being of the world, the real of reality (the world as a unified whole). Finally, there is the sense of being where
it gets called ‘Being’: the notion of first cause, originary ground, the divine, the unconditioned, absolute spirit/reason (λογος) and so on. It is this final sense of being that I would call a misconception, or, at least like to remain open to this possibility.

If we follow Heidegger’s path on the question of Being, via nothing, it is a valid question as to whether, if Being surpasses all human abilities to understand, ‘Being’ can be constituted as being at all, and whether it would be better to find some other way to frame the question. In any case, the sense of being as ‘Being’, which also gets called the divine and God, seems to me to relate some ‘how’ to the question of the being of humans as we are able to, and must, interpret the world. Furthermore, it is also possible that what gets called ‘Being’ may be better thought via ‘Religion’. What philosopher, including Heidegger, has not framed this question (if they ask it) in a Theo-logical or religious sense? As such, Heidegger’s turn could be nothing more or less than a religious turn - and there is much to support this contention if it were to be made.282 What is important, for the purposes of the paper, is to leave this question of ‘Being’ or ‘otherwise than being’ open: to leave it as a question that ‘A Phenomenology of Religion’ could possibly address.283 Thus, in the question of being (in general), the paper reaches its delimitation of an acceptance of Heidegger’s ontological thinking.

283 See Glossary: otherwise than being
Chapter Three: Religion as a Phenomenon

It has come time to formulate the notion of Religion, and in the formulation, aim for a proper notion. In this, the task is to formulate Religion properly as an ontological problem, and furthermore, to show that this formulation is properly that of a phenomenon. I will attempt to show how Religion may be formulated and therein accessed as a phenomenon of existence, of belonging-to the being of humans in the structures of living. This must also involve, in the formulation, a denial/exclusion of the object(s) of Religion. As such, this chapter will contain three sections: Religion as a phenomenon, Religion and Existence, and, the exclusion of the object(s) of Religion.

9. Religion as Phenomenon (As Belonging-to)

In formulating Religion as a phenomenon there are two issues to be addressed. First, the notion of phenomenon must be addressed, paying attention to Heidegger’s general (formal) conception of and, additionally, the conception of phenomenon as ontological. This will enable the second discussion, of Religion as a phenomenon, insofar as Religion is to be formulated as an ontological problem.

A. The Meaning of ‘Phenomenon’

In *Being and Time* Heidegger produces two interrelated conceptions of phenomenon: formal/ordinary and ontological. In this, the formal conception is the platform upon which the ontological gets developed. As such, I will address the formal/ordinary conception of phenomenon first, attempting to deal with some of the complexities of the argument.
The Formal/Ordinary Conception of ‘Phenomenon’

Heidegger discusses both conceptions of phenomenon within the context of showing how phenomenology, as a method of ontology, will be posited. It is therefore necessary, insofar as method is not being discussed here, to recognise initially that Heidegger’s conception of phenomenon is inseparable from both ontology and phenomenology. Insofar as I am attempting, here, to draw out the concept of phenomenon, I will also attempt to defer the question of method (phenomenology) and emphasise the ontological.

The discussion of the formal/ordinary conception of phenomenon begins with an interpretation of the term as it gets used in Greek philosophy. In this, the term ‘phenomenon’ is posited as a derivative of ‘φαίνεσθαι’ (to show itself).\textsuperscript{284} In general then, phenomenon signifies ‘that which shows itself in itself’, the manifest.\textsuperscript{285} Accordingly, the term ‘phenomena’ signifies the ‘totality of what can be brought to light’, or, entities.\textsuperscript{286} However, entities show themselves in many ways, not merely in the way they give themselves, but also, depending upon the way in which they are accessed.\textsuperscript{287} Already, then, it can be seen that the conception of phenomenon in its broadest outline posits some relation between entities, as they show themselves, and the entity who sees. This theme of relationship, which is also a pivotal question, will become heightened the further Heidegger gets into his discussion of phenomenon.


\textsuperscript{285} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, p.51 (H28)

\textsuperscript{286} Ibid. p.51 (H28)

\textsuperscript{287} Ibid. p.51 (H28). Heidegger emphasises ‘access’ and only implies that entities show themselves here.
Following the general outline of the meaning of the term ‘phenomenon’ Heidegger argues that there are two primary significations of phenomenon: ‘showing itself’ and its privation.\textsuperscript{288} The privative signification of phenomenon gets called ‘semblance’.\textsuperscript{289} Furthermore, it is implicit to this argument that the primary signification, at least in a formal sense, is that of ‘showing itself’. This is evidenced in Heidegger’s argument that the two significations of phenomenon are interrelated: that semblance is dependent upon ‘showing itself’, and likewise, that ‘showing itself’ is the fundamental signification of the term phenomenon.\textsuperscript{290}

In conceiving phenomenon in this general way, Heidegger is also concerned with distinguishing phenomenon from appearance. In this, Heidegger is primarily attempting to address Kant’s notion of appearance, attempting to draw out the conceptual structure of Kant’s notion of phenomenon and show its foundation. Kant’s conception, furthermore, is precisely what Heidegger is writing about when he posits formal and ordinary together.

Appearance, then, is distinguished from phenomenon. Heidegger initially argues that the two significations of phenomenon discussed thus far have nothing to do with appearance, and still less, ‘mere appearance’.\textsuperscript{291} Appearance, rather, indicates \textit{(indizeren)} something that does not show itself.\textsuperscript{292} As such, appearance is the entity as it announces itself, which is not a showing itself, but is also not a semblance.\textsuperscript{293} However, Heidegger asserts, appearance is only possible on the ground of ‘showing itself’, i.e., phenomenon proper.\textsuperscript{294} Heidegger then proceeds to outline four significations of appearance: announcing (not showing itself), that which does the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{288} Ibid. p.51(H28-9)
  \item \textsuperscript{289} Ibid. p.51(H29)
  \item \textsuperscript{290} Ibid. p.51(H29)
  \item \textsuperscript{291} Ibid. p.51(H29)
  \item \textsuperscript{292} Ibid. p.51(H29)
  \item \textsuperscript{293} Ibid. p.52(H29)
  \item \textsuperscript{294} Ibid. p.53(H29)
\end{itemize}
announcing (indication of something not shown), the thing itself (Kant’s formulation of noumena), and finally, as an indication of something which cannot be manifested.\textsuperscript{295} As such, the difference between a phenomenon and appearance can be given. A phenomenon is the way in which something can be encountered, while appearance is a reference-relation in regard to an entity itself.\textsuperscript{296} It becomes quite clear, therefore, that the primary signification of ‘showing itself’, upon which appearance and semblance are founded, is that of encountering entities. Furthermore, this encountering is such that it is the being of the entity that gets encountered in the ‘showing itself’. In order to draw out this claim in more detail I will attempt to ‘unpack’ the relation of appearance and phenomenon further, attempting to look at the subtleties in Heidegger’s argument thus far.

Initially, the relationship between appearance and phenomenon can be explicated further via the term ‘indication’. In this, I would argue that appearance (\textit{erscheinung}: to shine forth)\textsuperscript{297} as ‘announcing’ indicates nothing less than the being of an entity. Appearing (\textit{adparare}: to come forward)\textsuperscript{298}, as such, is the given-ness of a symbol, the sign, and an indication.\textsuperscript{299} It is connected to Husserl’s categorical intuition, the intuition of being, and the use of indication (\textit{anzeichen}) therein as the showing of ways things are of that which does not show itself.\textsuperscript{300} It is the noumenal in Kant that does not show itself (get manifested); the thing itself, the thing in its being. That which is not manifest, i.e., is not an entity, is being. This is why the manifest (phenomenon) in a formal sense has as its plural: entities (phenomena). Furthermore, insofar as appearance announces, and thus indicates, the thing itself, it does so in not

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{295} Ibid. p.53 (H30) \\
\textsuperscript{296} Ibid. p.54 (H31) \\
\textsuperscript{297} Inwood, \textit{A Heidegger Dictionary}, p.159 \\
\textsuperscript{298} Magda King, \textit{A Guide to Heidegger’s Being and Time}, p.110 \\
\textsuperscript{299} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, p.52 (H29) \\
\textsuperscript{300} Taminiaux, ‘The Husserlian Heritage in Heidegger’s Notion of the Self’, \textit{Reading Heidegger from the Start}, Theodore Kisiel & John van Buren (eds.) pp.270-271
\end{flushright}
being manifest. That this lack of manifestation is not privative means that appearance must be connected to something about an entity as it shows itself that cannot be made manifest. Again, this is nothing less than the being of the entity.

So when Heidegger distinguishes between phenomenon and appearance it can be seen that phenomenon signifies the way in which Dasein may encounter entities (in our ways of being), while appearance refers to a formal distinction between the manifested entity and the being of an entity. The formal conception of phenomenon, as such, is in general ‘what shows itself’: remaining open to this showing itself being the entity itself, or, characteristics of the entity’s being.301 Kant’s notion of a phenomenon, as appearance, accordingly gets called the ordinary conception because it posits a distinction within the formal conception itself: that there is a difference (albeit of the ability to know) between the manifest and the non-manifest, wherein the non-manifest, the un-manifest-able is not considered via indication properly. Thus, the formal and ordinary conceptions of phenomenon are conjoined in Kant wherein ‘showing itself’ is reduced to manifestation. Reduced to manifestation, appearance may also contain, without realisation, the variant of semblance. For example, a flushed cheek, in its appearance, becomes merely present-to-hand.302 This is why Kant’s conception of phenomenon as the ordinary (or vulgar) is often interpreted as improper or deficient.303 Accordingly, Heidegger implies that the conception of phenomenon in the ordinary or vulgar sense will fail to realise the way in which the entity in its being will only show itself via the proper way in which Dasein sees. Thus, the criticism of Kant follows that directed towards Greek philosophy, Aristotle in particular, that \( \varphi \alpha \iota \nu \varepsilon \vartheta \alpha \iota \) only signifies \( \varphi \omega \varsigma \zeta \) (emergence) of entities and not their

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301 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.54 (H31)
302 Ibid. p.54 (H30)
being… and thus fails to see the being of Dasein and time (temporality). As such, the vulgar concept of phenomenon is that φονις, the physical gets prioritised over and against the being of humans: that entities are grasped (in semblance) as present-to-hand.

Nonetheless, Heidegger argues, the notion of appearance in Kant opens up the question of an ontological conception of phenomenon insofar as space and time (the a priori forms of intuition: structures of the way in which humans intuit things) are also phenomena. As such, the proper (most complete) conception of phenomenon must focus on the ‘encounter’, or, the way(s) in which Dasein intuits/understands the being of entities.

**Phenomenon as Ontological**

In discussing Heidegger’s conception of phenomenon as ontological I will, for the sake of clarity, emphasise two themes: that phenomenon proper refers to the being of entities, and that phenomenon proper must have as its foci the being of the entity who sees being. I am claiming, in this, that the proper conception of phenomenon, as posited by Heidegger, is constituted as ‘belonging-to’ the being of humans. This belonging-to signifies that a phenomenon, as ontological, is only ever a showing itself of the being of an entity in the human encounter with-in the world that allows being to be shown. A phenomenon, as such, is always a belonging-to the ways that humans can be (in the world).

When Heidegger discusses the term phenomenon as an ontological concept he gives two determinations: that phenomenon signifies, for the most part, a hidden-ness, and additionally (via hidden-ness) the possibility of the showing itself of the being of

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304 John D. Caputo, *Demythologizing Heidegger*, p.29
305 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.55 (H31)
306 See Glossary: belonging-to
entities. \[307\] In this, hidden-ness signifies that being has not yet been discovered and/or has been covered up. \[308\] I write and/or here because, as I interpret Heidegger, being has not been discovered precisely due the fact that being has already been covered up. This explains the ‘destruction–construction’ process of Being and Time and Basic Problems of Phenomenology. On the other hand, the phenomenon (being) is already grasped: intuitively and originarily. \[309\] This allows the hope that in the proper approach to the intuitive and originary, being may be grasped by thinking (through the proper being-understanding of Dasein).

In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger reiterates the conception of phenomenon as belonging-to. In this, phenomenon is connected to the understanding of being belonging-to Dasein. \[310\] Accordingly, the ‘showing itself’ of a phenomenon belongs-to the authenticity/inauthenticity of Dasein. \[311\] This is to say that being/phenomenon gets understood in such a way that either the phenomenon shows itself or it disappears. \[312\] As such, the manifestation of phenomena in differing modifications belongs-to the temporality of Dasein’s being. \[313\] The concept of phenomenon, therefore, primarily and properly refers to the ways in which showing itself belongs-to the being of humans. The following problem, of determining what gets shown and how it gets shown, for Heidegger and this paper, is the question of proper method, i.e., phenomenology.

In the concept of phenomenon proper, as ontological, there are thus two dimensions within the phrase ‘belonging-to’. In the first instance, the phenomenon

\[307\] Heidegger, Being and Time, pp.59-60 (H36)
\[308\] Ibid.p.60 (H36)
\[309\] Ibid.p.61 (H36)
\[310\] Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, A. Hofstadter (trans.) p.113
\[311\] Ibid. p.161
\[312\] Ibid. p.161
\[313\] Ibid. p.305
signifies being: the intuition of the being of an entity, the emanation of being, how being is indicated, as showing itself through/for us, and finally, that which lies behind everyday appearances. Furthermore, phenomenon signifies equally: the proper/improper ways of seeing being, and of uncovering/discovering being. Here, both dimensions of the concept phenomenon, as ontological, operate as a belonging-to insofar as being is grasped (intuited/understood) via Dasein’s ways of being: proper or improper.

B. Religion as a Phenomenon:

All the structural and conceptual pieces are now in place, and we are ready to formulate Religion as a phenomenon. In this, it is first necessary, on the basis of previous groundwork, to conceive Religion as the ways in which Religion may be said to belong-to the being of humans. Following this, it is then necessary to determine how Religion shows itself and accordingly, where Religion shows itself.

In the first case, Religion may be said to belong-to humans, in our being, in three ways. First, we humans understand Religion, we grasp the meaning of Religion. In this, Religion belongs-to us in the way we are understanding. Accordingly, for all that humans are understanding we also get it wrong: we misunderstand and thus fail to see Religion as it belongs-to us. As such, Religion as a phenomenon belongs-to us, in the first instance, primarily insofar as we misunderstand it, i.e., constitute Religion as an object or object-like, and the possibility therein that we may understand it properly.

314 Stephen Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, p.25
316 Taminiaux, ‘The Husserlian Heritage in Heidegger’s Notion of the Self’, p.271
319 Ibid.p.53 – See Glossary: authenticity
320 Mulhall, Op. cit. p.25
Second, Religion is a phenomenon belonging-to the ways in which we humans encounter the world. In encountering the world, we are able to constitute Religion (or not) as a way of engaging in the world as it shows itself: and thus shows itself in Religion. In this, we may encounter the world both socially (religions) and individually (religiosity) in Religion, constituting the world via Religion. Religiosity, here, also has the signification of an encountering of the world, that all humans may encounter the world religiously. As such, the possibility of religiosity shows that Religion is ontological, i.e., a way humans may be, and thus, in this sense prior to not being religious. In this way the primacy of religiosity does not belong to a formulation of humans as being individuals, but rather, shows how individuality (as identity) belongs-to the notion of being.

Finally, Religion as a phenomenon signifies our being: the being of humans. In this, Religion has its highest formulation and its primary sense of belonging-to. To say that Religion is our being is not merely to say that Religion is that name for a way we can be. Rather, Religion is our being, inseparable from who we are. This is not to say that we are religious and nothing else, but rather the necessary conclusion that if we can be religious, it is a possible way of being-human, then Religion must be constituted as an ontological problem – as belonging-to being-human.

This argument requires more careful consideration, and certainly more than can be provided here. Let me first begin by stating that there is no certain or proper way of showing that Religion belongs-to the being of humans as our being except through working it out, i.e., actually providing a ‘Phenomenology of Religion’. As such, it is in part, the task of the entire paper to support this argument. However, I will take the risk of a preliminary stab at it. We can start by saying that religions are a fact of existence, i.e., that there are such things as religions in such a way that they can be
called religions. Likewise, humans can be religious, and may call ourselves ‘religious’, equally factual in relation to existence. As such, there is some concept which gets called Religion that pertains to the human living of life. Philosophically, we must exclude empirical reductionist accounts of the notion of Religion insofar as they originate with the empirical and utilise empirical ‘evidence’ to produce causal accounts. So, psychological, neuro-physical, naturalist, and materialist accounts must be excluded. The question of philosophy, in regard to Religion then, has two primary possibilities: how humans are able to have the concept Religion, and what it is about humans (in our being) that enables us to be religious. The former is the question of human understanding. The latter, exemplified in Kant’s question of ‘who am I?’, or, ‘in what may I hope?’ These questions are conjoined as the ‘who am I?’ question insofar as the other implicitly requires that we come to terms with the first: that I am able to understand myself. This is the question of the being of humans as a whole, which then allows differing ways of being-human to be determined. The question of being, as such, is always primarily the question of being in the sense of entirety (the unified whole, a complete structural account). Therefore, if any way of being is to be formulated properly, it must first be formulated in relation to being (a unified whole). Thus, if we can state that Religion is a possible way of being-human, it is also necessary to determine this possibility in relation to being-human as a whole. Furthermore, if Religion indicates a way of being-human in life, Religion must also be conceived of as indicating something about the being of humans as a whole.

If we state that humans are religious, in that it is a potential way of being-human, the problem of Religion as a phenomenon must be formulated in relation to the way in which our being shows itself. In this, the question of Religion is twofold in

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321 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p.635 (A805/B833)
its broadest sense: first, of how to characterise the way in which humans are in our being are religious, and also, what are the determinable characteristics of Religion in a ontological sense, i.e., in what way is Religion integral to the human encountering of the world? These questions, initially, belong together in the phenomenon of Religion, and furthermore, are the primary questions of a ‘phenomenology of Religion’. In order for Religion to be formulated in this way as a question, we must first return to the dimensions of the ways in which the world gets encountered in existence.

10. Religion and Existence:

The phenomenon of Religion, in belonging-to the being of humans, must be characterised initially in relation to the way in which humans exist: encountering the world (being-in-the-world), live a life, properly or improperly. I will follow Heidegger’s early characterisation of existence (factual life) as threefold: mode, how, and directed-ness.

Mode in this sense determines that humans, in our being, encounter the world as an activity (προςεκτικός). In this, the phenomenon of Religion must also be determinable as activity. Religion, then, signifies a way in which the world gets encountered in what Heidegger calls ‘concern’: of our dealings with other entities in the world. The task of interpreting Religion as a phenomenon, then, is initially that of discovering/uncovering the way in which humans, in our dealings, are religious. This, however, is dependent upon what Heidegger calls ‘care’.

What Heidegger calls ‘care’, I will here break down into two terms implicit to Heidegger’s early characterisations of factual life: the ‘how’ and ‘directed-ness’. In this, the ‘how’ signifies the way in which humans are inherently interpretative in our encountering the world. The ‘how’, as such, is our encountering the world as
significant, or, meaningful. As a phenomenon belonging-to our being, Religion then signifies the determination of life as meaningful. It is in part ‘how’ we interpret life and living as such. The question of Religion, then, is given the task of discovering/uncovering the way in which we humans are religious in our constituting/interpreting existence as meaningful. Thus, we are attempting, in this, to characterise Religion as a meaning-full-ness that informs our dealings: our mode of being in the world.

In part, this will require a virtual (ideal) separating out Religion from the ‘how’ in general, but must also carefully constitute Religion as inseparable to the ‘how’ of being-human in general. This is a difficult proposition to make, insofar as it implies an inseparability of such terms as belief and knowledge, or, faith and reason. Nonetheless, in characterising Religion as a positive phenomenon it will be no longer possible to prioritise knowledge/reason over belief/faith, or, idealise one to the detriment of the other. Rather, the question of Religion as a phenomenon signifies an equalising of knowledge and belief insofar as they are both phenomenon belonging-to the being of humans. As equal, they are what Heidegger calls ‘equiprimordial’, and as such, co-dependent and co-constituting. Furthermore, in equiprimordiality, these phenomena must be determined in their ground: the being of humans. Insofar as the aim is in regard to Religion, this co-constitution will not be developed fully, but rather implied through the interpretation of Religion.

This is no less evident than in the final way of characterising Religion as a phenomenon belonging-to the being of humans, and thus, showing itself in existence which I will call ‘directed-ness’. In this, directed-ness signifies the being out towards the world, or otherwise, in being directed out towards being (or otherwise than being). Directed-ness, as such, has four primary dimensions: towards entities, towards other
human beings, towards the world as a whole, and towards the ground of existence. Accordingly, directed-ness is a being-able to relate to the things, persons, world, ground - to be able to have relationships with these regions of being (or otherwise).

Humans are, in our being, able to be in relation to entities in our directed-ness in such a way that they show themselves to us. This means, initially, that directed-ness as being able to relate, must also be determined as understanding, or, being-ontological. Here, Religion as a phenomenon belonging-to our being thus signifies the question of the connection of being-ontological and being-religious. In this way, the first three dimensions of directed-ness: entities, people, and the world, must be questioned/interpreted via Religion as that of religious-understanding, but also, understanding in general as religious in some sense. This is no more evident, or necessary, a question than in regard to the problem of being-in-general, or, the ground of existence. This, I have already pointed out, may be constituted as otherwise than being. The question of Religion as a phenomenon, then, has its highest expression via the term directed-ness insofar as this signifies the ability of humans, in our being, to relate to and question the originary ground of existence.

This question inherently engages in the traditional problem of metaphysics but intends to formulate it in regard to Religion as a phenomenon belonging-to the being of humans. In this, the question of originary ground and the human ability to be directed towards the otherwise than being, shows that some-‘how’ originary ground also gets understood in some way. This brings us to the task of interpreting Religion as the way in which existence gets grasped in its ground. This is initially the question of why, throughout ‘Western philosophy’, originary ground gets determined, for the most part, in relation to the ‘religious’. The paper, however, must attempt to pursue this question further in a phenomenological way, by opening up the relation of
originarily ground of existence and what gets called Religion as a question. Furthermore, this question must be asked properly: in interpreting Religion as a phenomenon belonging-to the being of humans and also via phenomenology. In regard to the former, I will, in the next section, discuss why the objects of Religion must be excluded from this interpretation. In regard to the latter, I will deal with method in the second part of the paper. It is my aim to show that the phenomenon of Religion in its highest and most general ontological sense, directed towards the originary ground of existence, is nothing other than what gets called belief. Belief, as such, is a relationship with existence directed towards that which is otherwise than being, and thus, a directed-ness towards that which cannot be seen by humans in our being. This claim can only be worked out via an interpretation of existence: the fourth and final part of this paper.

11. The Exclusion of the Objects of Religion:

In formulating Religion as a phenomenon it becomes necessary to exclude the objects of Religion, such as God, from the interpretation to be provided. In a general sense, it is necessary to exclude the objects of Religion in a merely negative sense: that it would be dangerous not to. In this, there are three primary dangers of accepting objects of Religion: of objectivity (object-like-ness), anthropomorphism, and of covering up the phenomenon of Religion.

In the first case, the danger of including objects of Religion is that it may tend to lead the interpretation of Religion into the space of presupposing objects that determine Religion, and thus, of determining Religion as object-centred and object-like. Furthermore, in predetermining objects of Religion we would also run into the danger of these objects informing what can be said about Religion. For example:
predetermining God as omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent may lead us down the garden path of determining Religion as a mere desiring (wishful thinking) for what we are not. Additionally, these predeterminations tend to lead to a confusing and conflation of the world and the ground of existence producing differing styles of 'naturalism'.

Likewise, the positing of objects of Religion leads to the danger of anthropomorphism: of predetermining objects of Religion as human-like. In this, the interpretation of Religion enters into a vicious circle wherein the everyday conception of what a human is gets written onto the objects of Religion, and thus, in turn re-writes and re-enforces the everyday conception of what it is to be human and what Religion is.

Both of the above dangers of accepting objects of Religion are conjoined in the third danger; that in positing objects of Religion we will tend to miss the being of humans, and thus the way in which Religion as a phenomenon belongs-to being-human, and can be characterised properly as such. In objectivity, the interpretation is tied to objects, to the priority of things, and the formulation of all things as object-like. This obscures and denies the proper possibility of interpreting Religion as a phenomenon. Likewise, in anthropomorphism, the interpretation tends to merely presume and re-enforce a shallow everyday conception of being-human, hiding the question of Religion from proper exposition. As such, the objects of Religion must be excluded from a phenomenology of Religion, initially, in a negative sense.

In exposing Religion (as a phenomenon) as the way in which being-human gets lived, objects of Religion cannot be, initially, characterised in themselves, or for themselves, but rather can be seen to belong-to the way in which humans live. In this, the primary determination of objects of Religion only gets carried out via the
dimension of directed-ness; that objects of Religion are possible objects of human directed-ness in relation to the ground of existence. As such, the problem of Religion as a phenomenon is not the possible objects of Religion (determining them as such) but rather the way in which humans are able to relate to these objects at all. Furthermore, the question of Religion in conjunction with directed-ness brings us to the possibility of these objects properly insofar as it shows the character of being-human that is able to relate to these objects.

Religion, as it is formulated as a phenomenon, is ontological. In this, it becomes necessary to exclude the objects of Religion in another sense: that they are not human (that they are otherwise than human and otherwise than being). As a phenomenon, the primary signification of Religion is its belonging-to the being of humans. Accordingly, everything that is not human (in its being) must therefore be excluded.

Finally, the objects of Religion must be excluded insofar as we aim to remain open to the question of ‘otherwise than being’. In this, humans in our being have the ability to relate to and grasp our own being. This ability, in one sense, is that of knowledge, but may be better expressed as an ability to see. Here, when we turn to the objects of Religion I am associating them, as philosophy generally does, not only with the ground of existence, but also with that which is impossible to see in general. This is not in the sense of a distinction between ontical and ontological, but rather, the distinction of ontological and the otherwise than being: that which is a sheer impossibility to see – the unconditioned, pure nothingness, absolute spirit (Geist) and so on… To remain open to the impossible to see, as such, is to attempt to characterise Religion as belonging-to humans as that which constitutes our ability to relate to the absolutely non-see-able (the impossible). Finally, in this sense, objects of Religion as
the impossible (to see, to know, to understand) can only get worked out, and related to, through existing itself, through a living of life. This is a location that phenomenology only attempts to interpret ontologically, i.e., in regard to the being of humans as it can be characterised structurally in relation to existence. The determination of the impossible, as such, cannot be worked out by phenomenology: except in relation to the possibility of the impossible.³²² The impossible, rather, only gets determined in the actual encountering of the world as a relationship that can be thought only in its possibility. This possibility I call Religion.

³²² See Glossary: impossible
Part Two: The Formulation of a Phenomenology of Religion

The primary question of this part of the research is that of how to formulate a phenomenology of Religion. In this, insofar as Religion has been posited as an ontological problem, the question then becomes: how to formulate a phenomenology of Religion that is ontological? In order to address this question, the second part of the research is then given the task of interpreting Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology as ontology, and therein, of grounding a phenomenology of Religion.

The task of interpreting Heidegger’s phenomenology will be divided into two distinct approaches: the first of characterising Heidegger’s phenomenology in context, the second of discussing the central structures of Heidegger’s phenomenology as ontology.

Chapter four will approach Heidegger’s phenomenology in its context or background, showing what phenomenology entails from the perspective of a broad overview of theorists that influence Heidegger and from whom Heidegger appropriates themes and ideas. Here, the aim is to show what phenomenology is for Heidegger from the broad perspective of the history of thinking, the philosophical tradition, and the incorporation by Heidegger of various ways of thinking into a phenomenology that is ontological.

Chapter five will provide an interpretation of the central structures of a phenomenology as ontology. Here, the chapter will first discuss the two central theoretical components of Heidegger’s phenomenology: fundamental ontology and ground. Following this, the chapter will then provide a discussion of how Heidegger’s phenomenology works out in deconstruction and existential analytic. The aim of this
chapter, then, is not merely to show what is central to Heidegger’s phenomenology, but additionally, to show how Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology may be utilised as the ground for a phenomenology of Religion. Thus, the chapter will also discuss openings that allow of a phenomenology of Religion and how Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology may be adapted or amended for that task.

Part two concludes, in chapter six, with a formulation of a phenomenology of Religion. This formulation will be grounded upon the interpretations of Heidegger’s phenomenology as ontology and will tailor this style of phenomenology to the problem of Religion. Herein, the primary characteristic of a phenomenology of Religion is given as the uncovering/discovering of the meaning and originary ground of Religion in being-human. This chapter also provides a discussion of the delimitations of the formulation of a phenomenology of Religion insofar as it is only a preliminary and preparatory investigation of the meaning of Religion. Finally, this chapter also provides an outline of how a phenomenology of Religion, in this sense, will be worked out through deconstructions and a movement towards an existential analytic.
Chapter Four: Background\Context

It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a clear as possible overview of the background, or context, of Heidegger’s phenomenology; which itself is the background to the style of phenomenology to be engaged in the research. In this, the primary aim of the chapter will be to provide an account of the socio-historical and philosophical context in which Heidegger’s phenomenology developed. This will require a broad overview of Heidegger’s biography and also that the philosophical indebted-ness and appropriations of Heidegger’s phenomenology be traced. This overview will be utilised as a way to provide a better understanding of Heidegger’s phenomenology (in its background/context) and, moreover, allow of a more rigorous and flexible development of any ‘phenomenology of Religion’.

In providing an overview of Heidegger’s background and context, I will be aiming to provide three related interpretations of Heidegger’s phenomenology in its background-context. Initially, I will provide a brief biographical account of Heidegger’s early life and career. In this, there will be two aims: of showing some broad socio-cultural themes of Heidegger’s context, and of providing an account of the biographical layering of Heidegger’s philosophical development. As such, the biographical component to be provided has the task of revealing some elements of the socio-cultural context that plays a role in Heidegger’s view of philosophy as a philosophical life and furthermore, of showing through biography, some of the foundational appropriations of Heidegger’s philosophical endeavours.

From this biographical account (S12), the second task (S13) will be to fill in, or expand in more detail, some of the primary dimensions of Heidegger’s philosophical context. In this, I will show how Heidegger takes up (appropriates)
various theoretical positions, how the question of being (the seinsfrage) develops and finally, how Heidegger approaches phenomenology as a way to deal with the question of being. As such, the main aim will be to show that Heidegger comes to phenomenology already having appropriated a wide range of philosophical thinking, and furthermore, having already decided what the question of philosophy properly is. This has implications, then, for how Heidegger will view phenomenology and what phenomenology will become. Thus, the third and final task, (S14), will be to provide an outline of Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology within the framework of his background.

12. Biography:

Heidegger was born in 1889 in Messkirch, a rural, conservative, and pious town. His early life was dominated by religious and cultural tensions between the ‘Old Catholics’ and the Roman Catholics. The ‘Old Catholics’ were a dominant minority of generally wealthy liberal and ‘modernist’ Catholics who had control of, and predominant use of, the town’s cathedral; forcing the predominantly poor, peasant, or rural Roman Catholics to meet elsewhere. Early in Heidegger’s life, however, the situation changed and Heidegger’s father, a master cooper and the Roman Catholic sextant, moved into the small house adjoining the cathedral. As such, Heidegger’s early life, for the most part, consisted of a life marked by the routines and world of the church: of ringing the bells, being an altar boy, and so on… Although Heidegger’s family were not poor, they were also not wealthy enough to finance Heidegger’s

324 Rudiger Safranski, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, Ewald Osers (trans.) pp.4-5
325 Ibid.pp.5-6
326 Ibid.p.7
327 Ibid.pp.7-8
Because of this, Heidegger was dependent upon church funding for his education, a fact which would have ramifications for Heidegger’s relationship with Catholicism. Heidegger’s early life, overall, was marked by a conservative rural worldview that contained corresponding anti-modern and anti-urban attitudes.

As Heidegger was considered to be a gifted student, he was given a scholarship by the church to attend a gymnasium in Constance. Here, in Constance, the early context of anti-modernism and anti-liberalism was exacerbated by the fact that Heidegger lived in a seminary while attending the gymnasium that strongly encouraged opposition to the liberal modernity of the city. Heidegger, was therein caught between two conflicting worlds insofar as he appreciated some of the anti-institutional and even anti-Catholic views of his gymnasium teachers, but was also fully involved in the seminarian portrayal of the secular world as shallow. At the gymnasium in Constance, Heidegger fell in love with German and Greek literature (as well as some Greek philosophy via Franz Brentano) but also engaged in the anti-modernist religious conservatism of the seminary.

From Constance Heidegger moved to Freiburg, again with funding from the Catholic Church, to study theology. At Freiburg, Heidegger continued his reading of German and Greek literature while also denouncing his age as decadent via an idealisation of rural life. Here in Freiburg, Heidegger also encountered Carl Braig, a complex and subtle anti-modern/liberal thinker who accused modernity of having its own secular faith in science, reason and humanism. It is also likely that during this period Heidegger also read Braig’s work On Being in which the Greek notion of time

328 Ibid. p.9
329 Ibid. p.10
330 Ibid. p.11
331 Ibid. pp.11-13
332 Ibid. p.13
333 Ibid. pp.14, 19-20
334 Ibid.p.17
is traced etymologically back to the word ‘*tanumi*’: “I stretch myself”. At this stage, then, Heidegger somehow manages to combine interests in German and Greek literature with conservative Catholic theology and a growing interest in philosophy; especially the question of being.

It appears that at this stage, in Freiburg, Heidegger’s misgivings about his relationship with the Catholic Church comes to the fore. In this, Heidegger begins to study (1911-1912) science and mathematics which then results in a doctoral dissertation (1913) on ‘The Theory of Propositions in Psychologism’. This move away from the Catholic tradition was complex: a mixture of disliking his financial dependency, his disagreements with Catholic theology (its limitations), and his growing interest in philosophical questions that are independent from Catholic doctrine. Furthermore, this ambivalence would have been heightened by the repeated rejections of Heidegger for Catholic philosophical tenure-ship on various occasions. In the meantime, Heidegger, with the view of attaining a lecturing position as a ‘Catholic Philosopher’ began his post-doctoral habilitation dissertation on Duns Scotus’ doctrine of categories and meaning.

World War I interrupts Heidegger’s progress, in a small way, but due to his ‘health’ his war service only consisted of light work for the postal service. Ironically, this interruption also provides Heidegger with an outlet of freedom from financial dependency upon the Catholic Church. In 1916 Heidegger finishes his dissertation that now, in its final chapter, stresses the importance of the theme of ‘life’ in philosophy. At the same time, Heidegger’s hopes of obtaining tenure as a Catholic philosopher is destroyed as he is considered to be both too young and

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337 Ibid.p.59
338 Ibid. p.65
dangerous by the Catholic nominators.\textsuperscript{339} With the loss of this hope, however, Heidegger becomes more ‘unsafe’ for Catholicism insofar as he now aims to pursue philosophy alone: excluding and perhaps even antipathetic towards Catholicism as an institution.

More important, however, to Heidegger’s changing relationship with Catholicism is that he meets, in Autumn 1915, Elfride Petri: an economics student from a well off Protestant family.\textsuperscript{340} Sadly, there is little discussion of Elfride Petri in most biographical accounts of Heidegger, for it seems that, directly or indirectly, their relationship formed the platform for many changes in Heidegger’s development. The little written about Elfride Petri notes that she was a member of an early form of the German women’s liberation movement, exemplified by her studies in economics at a time when it was considered a ‘male’ domain.\textsuperscript{341} Although the effect of this relationship in their lives, and in this case especially Heidegger’s, it undoubtedly formed a large part of the changes that took place in Heidegger’s thought during this period. For instance, soon after marrying Petri, Heidegger formally separates himself from Catholicism and calls himself simply a ‘Christian’.\textsuperscript{342} Additionally, it is during this period of Heidegger’s and Petri’s early relationship, that Heidegger also begins to study a wide range of Protestant theology, historical theory and hermeneutics.\textsuperscript{343}

The final biographical element I will discuss occurs in the same year as Heidegger finishes his dissertation on Duns Scotus, with the arrival of Edmund Husserl (1916) in Freiburg.\textsuperscript{344} Heidegger had previously encountered Husserl’s ‘Logical Investigations’ as a theology student, but now, with Husserl’s presence and

\textsuperscript{339} Ibid. pp.67-8
\textsuperscript{340} Ibid. pp.68-70
\textsuperscript{341} Ibid. pp.68-69
\textsuperscript{342} Ibid. p.70
\textsuperscript{343} Ibid. pp.110-111
\textsuperscript{344} Ibid.p.71
Heidegger’s move away from Catholicism, Heidegger begins to study under Husserl. Here, Heidegger continues to change his philosophical views via a broad range of philosophical and theological texts, while also appropriating some of Husserl’s phenomenological themes.

It is important to note, however, that the relation of Husserl and Heidegger may be characterised right from the start as one of misunderstanding and perhaps even misdirection. Heidegger’s background in Messkirch and Constance is marked by an anti-modernist stance that borders upon an anti-scientific one. At the same time, Heidegger was ambivalent about his background in the Catholic faith\thinking, his financial dependence, and was also by this stage antipathetic towards Catholic philosophy to some degree. As such, Heidegger’s relationship with Husserl was likely to have been motivated not only by Heidegger’s appreciation of phenomenology, but also by a desire to escape his financial and intellectual dependency upon Catholicism. Accordingly, it is likely that Heidegger down-played, in part, his theoretical disagreements with Husserl’s Phenomenology in their relationship with the hope that Husserl could provide him with career possibilities as well as non-Catholic philosophical status. Husserl desired to have disciples, who would not only develop phenomenology, but would continue phenomenological endeavours along the methodological lines he had founded. As such, Husserl was likely to have overlooked Heidegger’s differences, at least at first, in the hope that Heidegger would become a disciple-proper to phenomenology as a methodological endeavour.

It is quite clear, in hindsight, that Heidegger never really became, nor intended to become, a disciple of Husserl’s phenomenological method, as Heidegger’s early lectures of this period emphasise only the sixth investigation of the ‘Logical
Investigations’ and some extracts of ‘Ideas I’. In this, Heidegger took the sixth investigation to be the point of origin for phenomenology while Husserl viewed it as merely the preliminary breakthrough that allowed phenomenology to be developed. When Heidegger lectured on Husserl’s ‘Ideas’ he was critical of the Cartesian dimension of phenomenology, and became more so as Husserl developed transcendental phenomenology. At the same time, Heidegger was developing phenomenology in relation to the question of being, and thus emphasised categorical intuition, history (hermeneutics), and time (temporality).

Likewise, Husserl’s and Heidegger’s views of what phenomenology is also diverged. In this, Husserl viewed phenomenology as a method of rigorously scientific philosophy, returning again and again to methodological questions. Heidegger, on the other hand, already had the question of being and was already imbued within the tradition of philosophical thinking to the degree that phenomenology became a point of entry, or, a way into the question of being rather than a method. Here, the ‘way’ of philosophy is marked by ‘furrows’ (the plodding farmer ploughing the field): the progression of questioning and arguments that more persistently towards, and are directed by, the philosophical question to be asked. As such, phenomenology never constituted a ‘method’ for Heidegger, but rather, a way of seeing. Thus, Heidegger takes up phenomenology in an entirely different sense to Husserl’s formulation: not only in that Heidegger was already fixed on the question of being, but also of what phenomenology was to entail as a way of philosophical ‘seeing’.

345 Robert D. Cumming, *Phenomenology and Deconstruction: The Dream is Over*, pp.29-30
346 Ibid.p.29
347 Ibid.p.30
348 John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King*, p.204
349 Ibid.pp.204, 216-217
351 Ibid.p.61
352 Ibid.p.61
13. Philosophical Appropriations and Indebtedness:

In order to cover the range of theoretical positions that get appropriated and incorporated in Heidegger’s philosophy; especially in relation to his formulation of phenomenology, I will draw upon the brief biographical sketch as the basis for a broad overview of the development of Heidegger’s phenomenology. In this, the areas of Heidegger’s philosophical development worth noting on their own behalf can be divided into five loose themes: Catholicism, Neo-Kantianism, Protestant theology, hermeneutics, and Husserl. These thematic areas, of course, are not anywhere near the complete range of Heidegger’s developed philosophical position, but rather, are the main influences upon Heidegger as he developed his views on phenomenology.

A. Catholicism – Neo-Scholasticism – Towards Aristotle

In Heidegger’s studies in Catholic theology and philosophy the dominant theme is that of being. Reportedly, Heidegger first encountered the problem of being when he was given a copy of Brentano’s *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* while in high school. Additionally, as a theological student in Freiburg Heidegger reads Carl Braig’s work *On Being*. Even if Heidegger had not read these two works, the question of being would undoubtedly have been a central component of his student years in theology and Catholic philosophy, via such thinkers as: Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Suarez.

For Heidegger, the question of being originated in his studies in Catholic theology and philosophy as a question of reality and truth: of logic, the categories and

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the divine grounds of the categorical and history. If, then, the question of being arises for Heidegger in the context of Catholicism it does so in two distinct ways. In the first instance, Heidegger’s emphasis upon Brentano’s work as an inspiration is, if anything, a backhanded compliment insofar as the question of the sense of being, its unity and meaning/sense without reference to entities, is something entirely missing in Brentano’s writings. Furthermore, the question of the sense of being also travels a path through Catholic theology/philosophy through scholasticism back to Aristotle. As such, even in Heidegger’s earliest student days, the philosophical influence of Catholicism points back out of Catholic thinking to metaphysics and Greek philosophy.

On the other hand, Heidegger retains much of his Catholic upbringing and education in the form of an intellectual antipathy towards secularism, science and modernity (technology). Heidegger, however, was not a believer in biographical or historical contextual accounts of a philosopher’s thinking: a view that stands in the way of discussing his background. At any rate, there is a great deal of evidence in his personal and theoretical writings to suggest that Heidegger maintained these views throughout his life.

In general, it appears that from Catholicism Heidegger posed the question of being and set himself the task of viewing metaphysical questions in relation to their genesis in Greek philosophy. Even so, Heidegger had not yet discovered the crucial theme of time, seeing himself as a Neo-Scholastic-Aristotelian with the task of

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356 Ibid.p.56
357 Gadamer, *Heidegger’s Ways*, p.168
358 van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King*, see chapter’s 1 and 2. Here, Heidegger is documented as maintaining strict control over his writing and its editing, insisting on his own biographical accounts, and even of possibly destroying/losing or changing earlier texts to suit his later philosophical outlook.
360 van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King*, p.57
reviving the wisdom and mystical dimension contained in the genesis of philosophy with the help of modern philosophy; Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology.\textsuperscript{361}

B. Neo-Kantianism

Neo-Kantianism was the predominant force in German philosophy in Heidegger’s student days. In this, however, Neo-Kantianism like many such ‘periods’ of philosophical endeavour was both complex and contained a wide range of differing questions. In order to show the context of Neo-Kantianism in Heidegger’s phenomenology, then, it is useful to consider both its broad unity (that allows the title ‘Neo-Kantianism) and the particular style of Neo-Kantianism Heidegger was exposed to.

In its broadest sense, Neo-Kantianism signifies a German philosophical movement post Kant and Hegel, developing throughout the nineteenth century, and antipathetic to Hegel and German Idealism/Romanticism. In the first instance, Neo-Kantianism originated in such theorists as Helmholtz, who conjoined philosophy and science as a ‘scientific philosophy’.\textsuperscript{362} The motive source for early Neo-Kantianism, as such, was the impact of the natural sciences, especially in the fact that science worked, i.e., provided certain verifiable knowledge. Here, Neo-Kantianism followed Kant’s awareness of the work-ability of the natural sciences and that philosophy (as metaphysics) was losing credibility in the process.\textsuperscript{363} Accordingly, two themes came to the fore in philosophy: the question of how philosophy can be ‘scientific’ (and thus work-able) and how philosophy could play a role in understanding the workability of the natural sciences.

\textsuperscript{361} Ibid.p.53
\textsuperscript{362} Klaus Christian Kohnke, \textit{The Rise of Neo-Kantianism: German Academic Philosophy between Idealism and Positivism}, R.J. Hollingdale (trans.) p.96
\textsuperscript{363} Immanuel Kant, \textit{The Critique of Pure Reason}, See the Preface to the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} editions.
Neo-Kantianism then stabilised in the 1860s as ‘Erkenntnistheorie’ (theory of science).\textsuperscript{364} In this, Neo-Kantianism begins to confront the growth of the ‘human sciences’ within the framework of Kant’s practical reason.\textsuperscript{365} Furthermore, in this period, the Neo-Kantian Fischer appropriates Kant via Fichte’s interpretation; resulting in the foregrounding of experience as the problem of philosophy.\textsuperscript{366} Accordingly, the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant emphasised the transcendental analytic (the \textit{a priori} structure of reason – understanding), overlooking both the aesthetic and dialectic.\textsuperscript{367} Neo-Kantianism, as such, was epitomised in the thinking of Otto Liebmann, who studied mathematics and natural science before turning to philosophy.\textsuperscript{368} Liebamann coined the phrase ‘back to Kant’\textsuperscript{369}, while also attempting to overcome Kant’s distinction between the thing-itself and phenomena.\textsuperscript{370}

Neo-Kantianism, in general, signified four main themes: the critique of pure reason, an anti-Hegelian stance, the attempt to found individual sciences via ‘Erkinnistheorie’ rather than ‘Weltanschauungen’, and finally, the attempt to find the limits of philosophy in a scientific sense.\textsuperscript{371} Within these four general themes Neo-Kantian thinkers then ranged in their philosophical endeavours from philosophy of science, through to proto-analytic logic, aesthetics, and value/ethical systems via practical reason.

The form of Neo-Kantianism that forms an aspect of Heidegger’s context was called the ‘Marburg School’, dominated by such thinker’s as: Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp and Nicholai Hartmann.\textsuperscript{372} The Marburg school was overwhelmingly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{364} Kohnke, Op. cit. p.134
\item \textsuperscript{365} Ibid. p.119
\item \textsuperscript{366} Ibid. pp.120-134
\item \textsuperscript{367} Ibid. p.135
\item \textsuperscript{368} Ibid. p.139
\item \textsuperscript{369} Ibid. p.138
\item \textsuperscript{370} Ibid. p.142
\item \textsuperscript{371} Ibid. p.148
\item \textsuperscript{372} Gadamer, \textit{Philosophical Apprenticeships}, Robert R. Sullivan (trans.) pp.7-12, 21-26
\end{itemize}
Protestant in their outlook and general cultural horizon, to the extent that Gadamer recalls that the university did not have a copy of any writings of Thomas Aquinas until the arrival of Heidegger.\textsuperscript{373} The Marburg school of philosophy in this context contained two primary agendas: that philosophy is to serve as the methodological effort to achieve transparency as to the ground of the sciences with a corresponding aim to serve as the conscience of the sciences.\textsuperscript{374}

The founder of the Marburg school was Hermann Cohen, a philosopher opposed to the dominance of empiricism, positivism and materialism in philosophy.\textsuperscript{375} Cohen interpreted the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} to be a critique of experience, or, a philosophical exposition of experience wherein objectivity gets constituted.\textsuperscript{376} In this, Cohen argued that the \textit{a priori} construction of objects constitutes experience, and accordingly, the \textit{a priori} structures of experience produces the form of the object.\textsuperscript{377} As such, objects originate as the content of intuitive perception and form the product of intuitive perception of object content.\textsuperscript{378} Here, Cohen has been viewed as a Platonist insofar as the notion of beholding objects in their form is attributed to Plato’s notion of intellectual intuition.\textsuperscript{379} Apparently, Cohen’s motto was: ‘that we know \textit{a priori} of things only what we ourselves have put in them’.\textsuperscript{380}

However, the main agenda of Cohen’s philosophy is that of ‘\textit{Erkinnntnistheorie}’, which is neither a Kantian form of transcendental idealism nor epistemology.\textsuperscript{381} Rather, ‘\textit{Erkinnntnistheorie}’ aimed to discover, and make transparent, the fundamental preconceptions and presuppositions that operate in science in such a

\textsuperscript{373} Ibid.p.11  
\textsuperscript{374} Safranski, Op. cit. pp.36-7  
\textsuperscript{375} Kohnke, Op. cit. p.179  
\textsuperscript{376} Ibid. pp.178, 180-181  
\textsuperscript{377} Ibid. pp.181-182  
\textsuperscript{378} Ibid. p.183  
\textsuperscript{379} Ibid. p.183  
\textsuperscript{380} Ibid. p.186  
\textsuperscript{381} Carleton B. Christensen, ‘What Does (the Young) Heidegger Mean by the Seinsfrage?’, \textit{Inquiry}, Vol. 42, No. 3-4 (1999) p.414
way as to allow them to work.\textsuperscript{382} In this, the question of experience signifies a scientific view, or, as Husserl calls it: the natural attitude.\textsuperscript{383} Through this questioning of experience it was found that the natural sciences are made possible by an \textit{a priori} ‘\textit{Entwurf}’ of nature.\textsuperscript{384} As such, the Marburg school of thought stood for the argument that ontological views of nature, or ontological systems in general, are produced by epistemological assumptions as to what constitutes knowledge.\textsuperscript{385} Thus, the main thesis of Marburg Neo-Kantianism was that ontological systems are always founded in experiential or ontical motive sources.\textsuperscript{386} This means that within the structure of knowing there is a movement from epistemic motives to method and thus ontological systems. Here, the ontological system reflects the motive source which generates the preconceptions upon which the methodological/epistemological concerns operate.

In Natorp, Marburg Neo-Kantianism then signifies a philosophical questioning of unity; the relation of subjectivity and objectivity, which both operate within the constructive/projective process of experience/knowing.\textsuperscript{387} In this, science no longer signifies a narrow field of epistemological conditions, but rather, embraces life as a whole as experience.\textsuperscript{388} In turn, methodological determinations are then viewed in reference to a relation of thinking and being wherein to think reality engages in the primordially concrete: the \textit{Δογος} – the significance of being that precedes the rational.\textsuperscript{389} Again, in Natorp, Plato plays a dominant role insofar as being (reality) is framed as the primordially concrete then generates via the \textit{Δογος} the laws (ideas) of what is – the rational processes – in relation to the world.\textsuperscript{390} As such, the neo-
Hegelian and Platonist impetus of Marburg Neo-Kantianism signifies a philosophical question of the unity of being and thought, made possible in primordial living of the concrete: the Λογος.\textsuperscript{391}

In Marburg Neo-Kantianism, then, philosophy moves beyond a scientific reflection upon the way the sciences work into the question of what constitutes the experiences of things in the world in general, and moreover, what constitutes the ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’ of such experiences. In this, the notion of rational process breaks free from notions of epistemic conditions and may signify any experience that constitutes objectivity; values, aesthetics, ethics. Furthermore, Marburg Neo-Kantianism, in attempting to make the sciences transparent in their grounds, also renews the question of being insofar as ‘Erkennnisstheorie’ and ‘Entwurf’ discloses the structure of knowledge and ontological systems via foundations in ontical motive sources.

For Heidegger, Marburg Neo-Kantianism was fertile with possibilities with regard to the question of being. In this, there are two main themes in Marburg Neo-Kantianism that becomes important to Heidegger’s question of being: the relation of being and thinking and furthermore, the disclosure of the rational process of experience as constituting objectivity.

In the first case, the question of the relation of thinking and being, Natorp determines as the primordial life characterised by the λογος in ideas constituted via intellectual intuition. In this, the intuitive and the λογος combine as disclosing being in thought. Furthermore, this relation is characterised as operating within a primordial living. Here, the former gets appropriated into Heidegger’s phenomenology as the

\textsuperscript{391} Ibid. pp.25-26
notion of a truthful disclosure (λογος and αληθεια) of being (phenomenon) that operates as an intuitive and discursive possibility of living (a philosophical life).  

In the second instance, the Neo-Kantian disclosure of the constitution of objects provides Heidegger with an opening for an ontological revolution that reverses Kant’s Copernican turn. In this, Heidegger initially appropriates the disclosed structure of the constitution as an ‘Entwurf’ wherein the originary motive source determines epistemology and then the ontological system. Here, Heidegger reverses the Neo-Kantian notion that this motive source is epistemic, arguing against what, in The History of the Concept of Time, he calls the primacy of the theoretical. Rather, Heidegger argues, the originary grounds of epistemological concerns can be found in ‘everydayness’: that experiences are grounded in an ontological ‘Entwurf’ of function/use and significance. This reversal of Neo-Kantianism has two primary significations: first, that the originary ground is characterised as pre-ontological (being-ontological) rather than epistemologically motivated. Additionally, it also strengthens the Neo-Kantian claim that somehow human thought, in primordial living, constitutes both subjectivity and objectivity. In Heidegger, it is the being of Dasein (being-human) that replaces thought as the question of the constitution of subjectivity and objectivity: the in-between of subject and object.

C. Protestant Theology

One of the primary sources of appropriation within which Heidegger developed his early conception of phenomenology is Christian thought. This stage of appropriation

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392 Heidegger, Being and Time, (S7)
393 Christensen, Op. cit. p.428
394 Ibid. p.428
395 Ibid. p.429
396 Ibid. p.431
397 Ibid. p.430
began within the period wherein Heidegger distanced himself from Catholicism, married Elfride Petri, and studied under Husserl. In this, Heidegger reportedly began to study in depth such thinkers as: Kierkegaard, Luther, Augustine and Paul. There are two primary ways of interpreting Heidegger’s appropriation of Christian thought; first in regard to how Heidegger utilises Christian thinking/experience to oppose and critique various dimensions of the tradition of philosophy, and furthermore, how Heidegger appropriates Christian thought as a positive transformation of philosophy.

In light of Heidegger’s general context in a philosophical sense it can be seen that the destructive element of Christian thought contains three main movements: towards Catholicism and thus Aristotle, towards Neo-Kantianism, and finally, towards Husserl’s phenomenology. Together this destructive movement forms a critical reversal of the tradition of philosophy: the tracing back of thinking from contemporary philosophy to the originary source of philosophy. In this, Heidegger appropriates Christian thought in order to overcome Husserl’s notion of the natural attitude and furthermore, the primacy of the theoretical view of the world. Likewise, Heidegger appropriates Christian thought in order to overcome the notion of the epistemic (ontical) genesis of thought that dominates the Neo-Kantian task of ‘Erkenntnistheorie’. Finally, in his appropriation of Christian thought Heidegger finds a way of tracing back through Catholic philosophy/theology the concept of being as physical-always-presence to the Greek philosophy and context from which it was generated.

This destructive movement is only made possible within Heidegger’s positive appropriation of Christian thought as disclosing the proper point of origin for philosophical endeavours in the relation of the being of humans (Dasein) and a
genuine/proper life. In this, Heidegger’s positive appropriation of Christian thought also contains its own path of tracing back through history.

In Kierkegaard, Heidegger finds two interrelated themes of appropriation: that of the notion of being and anxiety. In this, Heidegger interprets Kierkegaard as showing how the tradition of philosophy has completely overlooked the significance of being in relation to non-being (no-thing) and purpose (τέλος). Additionally, anxiety gets interpreted in regard to the notion of being: a fear of loss in relation to the world of physical/material things, and a fear of the no-thing; even though the no-thing is sheer possibility itself, i.e., freedom.

From Luther, Heidegger appropriates five main themes: a typology of manifestation, death, time, θος and φρονησις. Here, Heidegger appropriates Luther’s discussion of the theologia crucis in opposition to theologia gloriae of the Catholic Church. In this, the opposition is transformed from a discussion of the proper conception of God into a philosophical question of the proper way to view being. This amounts to a distinction between being as it gets manifested to humans within a proper life and being-for-itself as hidden from human sight. Likewise, Heidegger appropriates Luther’s view of death in life (‘right from birth we begin to die’) as signifying the being of humans as finite and anxious in the face of death (no-thingness).

In finitude Heidegger appropriates Luther’s views on life as signifying a sense a ‘Chairological’ time: wherein humans in our being constitute time authentically in actualisation, non-objective performance (significance), becoming

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398 John van Buren, The Young Heidegger, p.197
399 Ibid.p.174
400 Otto Poggeler, Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking, pp.27-8
401 John van Buren, The Young Heidegger, p.175
402 Otto Poggeler, Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking, p.30
403 John van Buren, The Young Heidegger, p.198
and care.\textsuperscript{404} *Chairological* time can then be opposed to the linear time of philosophy (χρονος) that loses its sense of significance and thus authenticity.

These themes then enable a broader appropriation of Luther, in relation to ἑος and φρονησις, wherein Luther’s critique of Aristotle is utilised by Heidegger in opposition to the tradition of philosophy and science in general. From ἑος, Heidegger appropriates the notion of an authentic existence, a genuine being Dasein in life; now characterised as a faithful-dwelling and the interpretation of life significance in situated-ness.\textsuperscript{405} Φρονησις, accordingly, gets appropriated as the actualisation of this faithful-dwelling (ἑος) wherein the being of Dasein becomes transparent to itself, allowing of a proper understanding of being.\textsuperscript{406}

A further step back finds Heidegger appropriating Augustine; with similar themes as before pointing towards a notion of the proper life: and this proper life as the disclosure of the being of humans. In this, Heidegger’s appropriation of Augustine follows that of other Christian thinkers via such themes as: factical life (a proper performative life\textsuperscript{407}), care and concern (*cura* and *uti*\textsuperscript{408}), fallen-ness and temptation (curiosity\textsuperscript{409}), and death/fear.\textsuperscript{410} Likewise in Augustine, Heidegger finds the distinction between faithful living (παρουσια) and living through that which can be seen.\textsuperscript{411}

Finally, in Paul, Heidegger finds the highest expression of Christian thinking to be appropriated. In this, Heidegger interprets Paul’s writings to signify a basic schematism, or dual potentiality, of human existence: of authenticity (the light) or

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item Otto Poggeler, Op. cit. pp.29-30
\item John van Buren, Op. cit. p.200
\item Ibid. p.200
\item Otto Poggeler, Op. cit. p.26
\item Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Being and Time*, pp.105, 201, 203
\item Ibid. pp.207, 210-211
\item Theodore Kisiel, ‘Heidegger (1920-21) on Becoming a Christian: A Conceptual Picture Show’, *Reading Heidegger From the Start*, p.184
\item John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, p.179
\end{thebibliography}
inauthenticity (darkness). This basic schematism, which is taken to signify the potential ways of being Dasein in life, then gets applied throughout the dimensions of human existence: temporality, world, life. The authentic life, as such, generates a Chairological temporality; of waiting, anticipation, and hope – all of which constitutes life as performative/interpretative and imbues life with significance. Likewise, the world is authentically constituted in anxiety, care and concern. Life, then, gets determined in terms of finitude and mortality: death and weakness.

All of these expressions of authenticity have their corresponding inauthentic modes. Chairological time becomes chronological time; a time constituted as linear and which measures time out by the appearance (presence) of things in the world. The relation to the world, of constituting the world, now becomes a rampant curiosity (a mere looking/seeing) wherein things lose their significance. Accordingly, relationships between humans no longer take up care, but rather, falls into idle talk and use-valuating (objectification). Finally, life itself falls from performance (becoming) and significance into darkness: empty fear of losing the things of the world (possessions), of seeing one’s self through the world as a thing, and of becoming enthralled (possessed) by the world.

In Heidegger’s appropriation of Christian thought in general, then, he finds the proper originary content of the philosophical question of being. In this, if Heidegger has already decided that the proper way into the question of being is to be founded in the question of being-human in life, then Christian thinking provides him with an

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414 Ted Sadler, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being, pp.15, 182-3
416 John van Buren, The Young Heidegger, p.179
417 Thomas Sheehan, ‘Heidegger’s Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion (1920-1)’, p.58
exposition of the being-proper of humans as a proper life or ηθος (faithful-dwelling). From this foundation Heidegger then has the opportunity to disrupt the tradition of philosophy in its abstract grounds through the ground of facticity.\textsuperscript{418} Furthermore, in the notion of facticity as a faithful-dwelling, Heidegger also has the grounds to talk of an authentic philosophical life: a faithful-dwelling in the truth and questioning of being.\textsuperscript{419} As such, Heidegger’s appropriation of Christian thought enables two primary dimensions of his phenomenology: the disclosure of an authentic faithful-dwelling of Dasein and the possibility of an equally authentic philosophical ηθος.

The possibility of a proper phenomenology-ontology then becomes a question of a genuine philosophical life which can access the authentic being of Dasein, and thus Dasein’s sense of being. This possibility, however, also rests upon hermeneutics as the proper way of interpretation and temporalising (history). Accordingly, the issue of hermeneutics and history becomes important to Heidegger’s development of phenomenology.

D. Hermeneutics

For Heidegger, the ‘hermeneutical turn’ serves as the unifying theme that draws together the diverse range of theoretical positions incorporated in response to the question of being: the philosophical tradition and facticity unified as a fundamental ontology. The hermeneutical turn was not a sudden revelatory change in Heidegger’s thought, but rather, the combination of a long process of confronting the tradition of philosophy and theology, which finally results in a breakthrough facilitated via a short intense period of study (1919-1922). As such, this overview of the context of

\textsuperscript{418} John D. Caputo, \textit{Demythologizing Heidegger}, p.57
\textsuperscript{419} Martin Heidegger, \textit{Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research}, Richard Rojcewicz (trans.) pp.112-115 (From here on in, this text will be footnoted as: ‘Phen.Int.Aristotle’)

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hermeneutics will aim to cover the major themes of this context, such as: mysticism, Dilthey, Augustine, and a turn to Greek philosophy. Here, I am claiming that the context of hermeneutics provides a unifying force in relation to both facticity (as the object of philosophy) and philosophy (a way of living) that enables of formulation of phenomenology as a philosophical ‘how’ (hermeneutic).

In the first instance, hermeneutics enters into Heidegger’s thought via the mysticism of Meister Eckhart. Heidegger, in the midst of studying and confronting Catholic thought, engaged in the question of the λογος: the ‘breaking-forth’ or emanation of the divine in life. This ‘breaking-forth’ or manifestation of the λογος is then posited in Eckhart as a disclosure of true actuality and actual truth that reaches into and gets expressed out of both the personal and historical situated-ness of living. On the other hand, this emanation is difficult: it is rare, with life for the most part dominated by a concealment and absence. In Eckhart, then, Heidegger sees a prototype of hermeneutics wherein the question becomes that of how the λογος gets disclosed in and through the living of life (personal and historical) and the being of humans in which the truth breaks-forth.

In Heidegger’s studies of Dilthey, especially the correspondence with Count Yorck, the question of hermeneutics and personal/historical living begins to take shape. In this, the inspiration for hermeneutics is more a reaction against Dilthey found in the writing of Count Yorck. Here, Yorck responds to Dilthey by conceiving history in relation to the being of humans: that human life is the foundation of the historical. Accordingly, for Yorck, the problem with historical studies is that it

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420 John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, p.113
421 Ibid. p.113
422 Ibid. p.119
423 Ibid. p.121
424 Pogge1er, *Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking*, p.20
425 Ibid. p.21
tends to see history through an ‘eyepiece’ of time as presence or presentation, thus losing sight of life itself in its significance.\textsuperscript{426} For Yorck, then, the question of history is more poignantly that of human possibilities in living, and furthermore, a religious-ethical question of the highest possibilities of human life.\textsuperscript{427}

For Heidegger, hermeneutics develops as a possible alternative to Jasper’s and Dilthey’s philosophy of life (\textit{Lebensphilosophie}).\textsuperscript{428} In this, Heidegger attempts to counter the dualism of the rational and irrational division of life wherein history and the personal life get formulated as irrational.\textsuperscript{429} Additionally, Heidegger develops his view of hermeneutics in opposition to subjectivism and psychologism, exemplified in Schleiermacher’s writings.\textsuperscript{430} As such, Heidegger’s notion of hermeneutics becomes a question of the being of humans in life: a questioning of ‘how’ to access the temporality of life (personal/historical), and of what it means to be historical.\textsuperscript{431}

Heidegger then turns to Augustine for inspiration and therein finds two central claims to be appropriated: that life is inherently interpretative\textsuperscript{432} and that ‘to doubt is to live, in living a human thinks’.\textsuperscript{433} In regard to the former, Heidegger appropriates as a fundamental expression of being-human, i.e., to be-human is to interpret significance. Thus interpretation gets constituted as a fundamental expression of being-human: the object of philosophy. In regard to the latter, questioning then gets appropriated as a characteristic of philosophy (a genuine philosophical life). Philosophy as a genuine life, as such, is not only fundamentally hermeneutical but is also a life in the face of the sheer questionability of life. Thus, the question of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{426} Ibid. p.22
  \item \textsuperscript{427} Ibid. p.23
  \item \textsuperscript{428} Istvan M. Feher, ‘Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Lebensphilosophie: Heidegger’s Confrontation with Husserl, Dilthey, and Jaspers’, \textit{Reading Heidegger From The Start}, p.83
  \item \textsuperscript{429} Ibid. p.87
  \item \textsuperscript{430} Ibid. p.76
  \item \textsuperscript{431} Ibid. pp.74, 89
  \item \textsuperscript{432} Theodore Kisiel, \textit{The Genesis of Being and Time}, p.199
  \item \textsuperscript{433} Ibid. p.106
\end{itemize}
hermeneutics in philosophy becomes a question of the integral relation between
genuine living and philosophy. Insofar as philosophy is the proper arena for the
question of being, it follows that the question of hermeneutics will prioritise the
question of a genuine philosophical life and thus the proper way into the proper object
of philosophy. On the one hand, then, the proper object of philosophy is facticity. On
the other, the question of being leads into the question of a proper philosophical life: a
double reflection of philosophy upon itself as a life.

The question of a genuine philosophical life leads Heidegger back to Greek
philosophy, evidence by his writing and lectures in the years 1921-1923. The first of
these, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* (1921-22 lectures) takes up the
question of the history of philosophy.\(^{434}\) However, the question soon becomes that of
‘what is philosophy?’ and then, ‘what is the originary ground of philosophy?’\(^{435}\) Thus,
Heidegger’s question of what philosophy is then becomes a return to Aristotle and
Plato in order to make transparent the originary source of philosophy.\(^{436}\) In other
words, Heidegger posits Greek philosophy as the originary source of philosophy as a
genuine way of living: a genuine factical situation. As such, the originary ground of
philosophy is determined as a ‘primal decision’.\(^{437}\)

In 1922, Heidegger put together a paper called *Phenomenological
Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle* for the purpose of attaining a lectureship in
philosophy at Marburg. In this, the paper refines the hermeneutic question in two
ways: through the schematism of authenticity/inauthenticity and philosophy/life. The
paper begins with an assertion that the proper question of philosophy is being; and

\(^{434}\) Heidegger, *Phen.Int.Aristotle*, pp.3-4
\(^{435}\) Ibid.p.12
\(^{436}\) Ibid. pp.41-42
\(^{437}\) Ibid. p.61
moreover, the question of the being of humans.\textsuperscript{438} Philosophy then gets framed as a question of authentic living, or, a factual life.\textsuperscript{439} In this, Greek philosophy is interpreted as having the character of authenticity, insofar as Greek philosophy moved in response to the Greek life-situation in a genuine way.\textsuperscript{440} Following this, philosophy ‘today’ is characterised as inauthentic on two counts: that philosophy has lost the genuine impetus of Greek thought, and that philosophy has become inauthentic in the melding of Greek and Christian thinking.\textsuperscript{441} As such, Heidegger argues, the possibility of an authentic philosophising will only be found in further interpretations of Aristotle and Plato.\textsuperscript{442}

The final piece of writing relevant to hermeneutics in this sense is a lecture series from 1923 entitled \textit{Ontology} – \textit{The Hermeneutics of Facticity}. In this, Heidegger reiterates the connection and unity of hermeneutics in relation to facticity and philosophy via his opening claim that being-human in life is fundamentally interpretative, which in turn allows of the possibility of a genuine philosophical life.\textsuperscript{443} Here, hermeneutics is characterised as a genuine way of being-human wherein we communicate our ways of being to ourselves: we become self-transparent.\textsuperscript{444} Heidegger then goes on to claim four dimensions of hermeneutics as a ‘how’ of human existence: life as questionable, self-transparency discloses our being-temporal (finitude/historical), and finally, that in hermeneutics we are able to understand being.\textsuperscript{445} From these four claims, the rest of the lectures builds general determinations

\textsuperscript{438} Martin Heidegger, ‘Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical situation’, \textit{Man and World}, 25, Michael Baur (trans.) p.368 (Hereafter will be footnoted as ‘Phen.Int.R.Aristotle’)
\textsuperscript{439} Ibid. p.369
\textsuperscript{440} Ibid. p.370
\textsuperscript{441} Ibid. pp.370-371
\textsuperscript{442} Ibid. p.376. The outline given by Heidegger in the conclusion to this paper closely follows the structure of the lecture series ‘Plato’s Sophist’ that he gave at a later date.
\textsuperscript{443} Martin Heidegger, \textit{Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity}, John van Buren (trans.) p.5
\textsuperscript{444} Ibid. p.11
\textsuperscript{445} Ibid. p.13-14
of a hermeneutics of facticity; from a determination of the being of humans (in traditional hermeneutics) through to a preliminary formulation of a phenomenological-hermeneutics which moves from everydayness to the disclosure of the being of humans in its structures.

In general, hermeneutics as a context of appropriation in Heidegger’s phenomenology allows two important breakthroughs. First, the hermeneutical theme provides Heidegger with a proper philosophical object through which the question of being can now be asked in a positive sense. In this, the very interpretative dimension of facticity allows of a new formulation of temporality constituted through the interpretation of significance. Thus, history and existence get prioritised in Heidegger’s phenomenology. Furthermore, the theme of hermeneutics provides a genuine ground for phenomenology wherein it achieves validation upon the foundation of a genuine philosophical life. This possibility is then give two ‘equi-primordial’ foundations: in Greek philosophy as the historically genuine originary ground of present-day philosophical thought, and, in the ‘existential’ foundation of the sheer question-ability of life. Thus, the context of hermeneutics gets appropriated in Heidegger’s phenomenology as the ground (a genuine philosophical life) and designates the proper originary object.

E. Husserl and Phenomenology

When Heidegger eventually ‘officially’ becomes a disciple of Husserl’s phenomenology he does so having already broken away from Husserl. In this, Heidegger was by no means unfamiliar with Husserl’s phenomenology, but rather, utilised his apprenticeship to develop his own philosophical questioning and his own version of phenomenology. This is evidenced by the lectures given by Heidegger at
the time that not only focus upon Husserl’s early developments of phenomenology but also additionally provides critical interpretations of Husserl’s phenomenology as a platform for his own style.\textsuperscript{446} As such, Husserl’s phenomenology; for Heidegger, provides a measure, or counterpoint, to his own formulation.

For Heidegger, phenomenology operates as a way into the question of being and a way of interpreting the initial object of philosophy as such: the question of Dasein’s being. In this, Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology as a ‘way’ is itself, in part, an appropriation of Husserl’s conception of philosophy: as a way of seeing and a way of living. Initially, as a way of seeing, Heidegger appropriates Husserl’s prioritisation and emphasis upon the intuitive.\textsuperscript{447} However, this intuitive seeing is only possible insofar as it is validated by phenomenology itself as a way of living.\textsuperscript{448} Here, phenomenology is implicitly validated insofar as it is a genuine way of living: of analysis and solitude; that has the ability to reveal the being of the constituting consciousness.\textsuperscript{449} As such, in Husserl phenomenology attains its validation in a distinction between ‘natural consciousness’ that constitutes the world actively\textsuperscript{450} and phenomenological consciousness that properly ‘sees’ this constituting in its a priori structures.\textsuperscript{451} For Husserl, this implicit grounding of phenomenology as a way of life only ever gets conceived of via a conjunction of philosophy and science: as science. In other words, for Husserl, the implicit validation of a philosophical life gets framed as a question of methodological approach: of genuine consciousness.

Juxtaposed to Husserl’s methodological questioning, Heidegger attempts to formulate phenomenology (in its valid ground) with explicit regard to the question of

\textsuperscript{446} John Van Buren, \textit{The Young Heidegger}, pp.204-5
\textsuperscript{447} Herman Philipse, \textit{Heidegger's Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation}, p.103
\textsuperscript{448} Rudolf Bernet, ‘Phenomenological Reduction and the Double Life of the Subject’, \textit{Reading Heidegger From the Start}, F. Renaud (trans.) p.254
\textsuperscript{449} Ibid. p.252
\textsuperscript{450} Ibid. p.253-254
\textsuperscript{451} Ibid. p.252-254
a genuine philosophical life. This then leads Heidegger, as I have shown previously, into the realm of hermeneutics that reveals the parallelism of an authentic life and authentic thinking, i.e., philosophy. As such, the first and possibly the most important of Heidegger’s appropriations of Husserl’s thinking is the move from implicit validation of philosophy as a way of life/seeing to an explicit formulation of phenomenology as such, and upon this ground. Thus, in Heidegger’s initial appropriation of Husserl’s thought, phenomenology gets transformed from a question of methodology into a question of genuine living.

As a way of living, which is equally a way of seeing, phenomenology then becomes a ‘way’ in various senses. These senses of phenomenology as ‘way’ enables further appropriations from Husserl’s phenomenology, especially with regard to: intuition, intentionality, indication/reduction, and temporality. Rather than show the differing dimensions, or senses, of phenomenology as ‘way’, I will show how Heidegger appropriates Husserl’s methodological conceptions within these ways.

**Intuition:**

The first sign of Heidegger’s appropriation of Husserl’s phenomenology as a way appears with Heidegger’s fascination with the sixth logical investigation dealing with categorical intuition. This emphasis upon intuition forms Heidegger’s most basic notion of phenomenology as an applied way insofar as phenomenology gets actualised as a phenomenological way of ‘seeing’. In this, intuition gets appropriated by Heidegger as a seeing of being, or, a way of seeing that allows being to show itself.\(^{452}\) Here, the foundation of phenomenology as a way of living differentiates itself from the everyday living of life and the theoretical (objectified) views of life. Phenomenological seeing is differentiated insofar as it grasps the ontological

\(^{452}\) John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, p.204
structures of both everydayness and the ontical (scientific/theoretical) living of life. This, however, requires that phenomenology be marked out by its way of seeing and have a way of seeing that allows the ontological to appear. The phenomenological ‘sight’, as such, is intuitive, albeit what Husserl calls the categorical intuition.

In Husserl, categorical intuition operates as a founding/founded act in relation to acts of meaning within the context of meaning-fulfilment (objectification).\cite{453} Heidegger, then, takes up this relation as one of intuition and logos, conjoined as a discursive-intuitive disclosure of being.\cite{454} In Husserl, intuition is a seeing which then fuses with meaning-intention in a meaning-fulfilment expressed logically in judgment or assertions.\cite{455} For Heidegger, however, this relation is not clear with regard to any differentiations between the intuition and the expression. In part, this is explained by Heidegger’s criticisms of Husserl’s notion of intuition and expression, especially that Husserl fails to distinguish between factual truth and the truth of being.\cite{456} The failure, Heidegger argues, belongs to Husserl’s ‘logical prejudice’ wherein ontological facts are derived from ‘natural consciousness.’\cite{457} In a positive sense, however, the ambiguity of the relation between intuition and \(\lambda \sigma \gamma \circ \zeta\), for Heidegger, lies in the way Dasein is and has access to being.

I would argue that the clue to the relation of intuition and \(\lambda \sigma \gamma \circ \zeta\) returns to the theme of hermeneutics insofar as hermeneutics signifies the intrinsic belonging together of understanding/grasping and discourse/communication. As such, the concept of categorical intuition as fundamentally interpretative will necessarily be determined as \(\lambda \sigma \gamma \circ \zeta\): disclosing discourse. Heidegger’s appropriation of intuition,

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{454} Ibid. p.31
\footnote{455} Edmund Husserl, \textit{Logical Investigations, vol.2}, pp.201-202
\footnote{456} Daniel O. Dahlstrom, ‘Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’, \textit{Reading Heidegger From the Start}, p.235
\footnote{457} Ibid. p.235
\end{footnotes}
then, aligns with three primary dimensions of phenomenology as way. First, phenomenology as way signifies a proper philosophical living of life wherein life is taken up and questioned with regard to being. Accordingly, phenomenology is a way of seeing properly; of intuiting being. Finally, phenomenology is a way of disclosing being properly wherein being gets disclosed (communicated): ‘λόγος αποφαντικός’.

Thus, the connection of intuition and λόγος signifies the way humans are in our being: that in interpretation we communicate. As such, it is evident that Heidegger’s appropriation of Husserl’s notion of intuition is central to his formulation of phenomenology as way. This will remain apparent as I discuss other terms of appropriation.

**Intentionality/Comportment**

For Husserl intentionality implicitly contains two types; that of ‘natural consciousness’ that constitutes the world, and philosophical intentionality that sees the structures of natural consciousness. Intentionality, as such, signifies a directedness towards objects that is a constituting of objectivity or world. In Heidegger’s phenomenology the term ‘intentionality’ gets appropriated as ‘comportment’; designating both a wider usage and a multiplicity of modes. In this, Heidegger agrees with Husserl’s notion of intentionality (as a primary structure of lived experience and the belonging together of ‘subject’ and ‘object’), and also extends its use in a

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458 Taminiaux, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, p.31
460 Taminiaux, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, p.26
broader sense. As comportment, intentionality is appropriated as designating any way in which humans (in our being) may be directed towards the world.

In Heidegger’s early formulation of comportment, however, there are three main forms talked about: theoretical, practical, and phenomenological. In the first case theoretical comportment signifies a directed-ness towards the world wherein the world is passively observed and objects are prioritised with regard to their presence.\textsuperscript{461} Accordingly, the second form of comportment is everydayness: the world-building of the active, practical participant in life.\textsuperscript{462} Here, the everyday is posited in opposition to Husserl’s ‘natural consciousness’, viewed by Heidegger as a derivative form of the theoretical. Finally, there is philosophical comportment proper that comports towards being: precluding subject-object and seeing the ‘worldhood’ of the world.\textsuperscript{463}

The appropriation of intentionality as comportment, then, signifies a widening of the term intentionality; designating a broad interpretative directed-ness towards the world. As such, Husserl’s notion of intentionality gets appropriated by Heidegger as comportment: a term signifying the fundamental interpretative-directed ways in which humans are, and can possibly be.

\textit{Phenomenological Reduction and Indication:}

For Husserl, one could say, the phenomenological reduction is the primary methodological technique that reveals the \textit{eidetic ego} and thus the fundamental structures of consciousness (the being of the constituting consciousness). For Heidegger, however, the phenomenological reduction signifies a general movement

\textsuperscript{461} Hall, Op. cit. p.124  
\textsuperscript{462} Ibid. p.124  
\textsuperscript{463} Ibid. p.124
from the apprehension of beings to their being. Accordingly, the phenomenological reduction gets appropriated explicitly as: ‘leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being… to the understanding of the being of this being.’

However, the phenomenological reduction is not a central component of Heidegger’s phenomenology, but rather, is merely a negative starting point – an aversion. The phenomenological reduction, as such, signifies a way of phenomenological seeing but also signifies the first phase of this seeing, or even merely a preparation for seeing.

As a way of seeing the phenomenological reduction is closely tied to intuition, or, as Heidegger sometimes calls it: “a priori cognition”. In this, a priori cognition begins with the phenomenological reduction: apprehending beings with regard to their being and then averting the ‘gaze’ from the entity to being. As such, the phenomenological reduction only takes place insofar as being is already apprehended in some fashion. On the other hand, the phenomenological reduction is a positive movement of phenomenological seeing as well, insofar as it aims at an understanding of being, and intrinsically contains within it a way to understanding. Again, Heidegger appropriates a Husserlian term ‘indication’ as this positive way of the reduction.

The central component of the phenomenological reduction lies in the term ‘indication’ (in Husserl – Anzeichen, in Heidegger – indizieren) which signifies a mediation of intuition and the symbolic/sign. In this, the disclosure of being (phenomenon) is always initially mediated by signs and symbols through which intuition gets expressed, and furthermore, which indicates the being as it shows

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464 Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p.21
465 Ibid. p.21
466 Ibid. p.21-22
467 Ibid. p.20
468 Ibid. p.20
469 Jacques Taminiaux, ‘The Husserlian Heritage in Heidegger's Notion of the Self’, p.271
470 Ibid. p.272
itself.\textsuperscript{471} In other words, the way in which a phenomenon appears to intuition is initially mediated in both the intuition and through the intuition’s intrinsically communicatory function (expression, sign, symbol). As such, in the intuition of being there is already a structure of mediation which in itself indicates the phenomenon proper (being). Thus, the understanding of being provided through the phenomenological reduction operates as a tracing back from apprehension through indication to the phenomenon itself.

Indication, then, leads to the positing of a ‘formal indication’ as the way of phenomenology which is both a seeing and communicating. Initially, formal indication is given in opposition to Husserl, via Natorp: that Husserl’s concept of indication is static (freezing life) and only operates within a language which generalises and objectifies.\textsuperscript{472} On the other hand ‘formal indication’ is developed as a way of communicating ‘way-traces’: of saying the unsayable.\textsuperscript{473} In this, the problem of being, for phenomenology, becomes a hermeneutical ‘indirect communication’ (Kierkegaard).\textsuperscript{474} This indirect communication occurs due to the way that the sense of being is given in existence: in a temporal flux of situated-ness.\textsuperscript{475} So, phenomenological seeing must not only contend with the indirect communication of disclosure (intuition-indication-sign) but also with the situated-ness of ways in which things get given in experience. This means that, for Heidegger, phenomenology must be formulated as a way of seeing-communicating that gets determined by the thing as it gives itself (indication) in living life (situation).\textsuperscript{476} Formal indication, as such,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{471} Ibid. p.272
\item \textsuperscript{472} John van Buren, \textit{The Young Heidegger}, p.325
\item \textsuperscript{473} Ibid. p.324
\item \textsuperscript{474} Ibid. pp.327-8
\item \textsuperscript{475} Ibid. p.330
\item \textsuperscript{476} Ibid. p.333
\end{itemize}
signifies the way of phenomenology that follows traces of being in its sense\textsuperscript{477}, or, how it is for us to be here/there. Thus, formal indication is a movement which traces back from the apprehension of entities to their being via the sense of being (of Dasein) that mediates. Furthermore, formal indication draws out the problem of mediation as that of Dasein’s sense of being. To understand being, then, requires that the sense of being for humans be explicated first as that which mediates beings and being.

\textit{Time-Consciousness and Temporality:}

The final theme of appropriation that I will discuss is that of Husserl’s notion of time-consciousness. In this, the lectures on time-consciousness and Heidegger’s brief remarks on them serve as a poignant example of how Heidegger appropriates Husserl’s phenomenology, and furthermore, how their formulations differ. As such, I will provide a brief analysis of Husserl’s lectures on time-consciousness and Heidegger’s response.

Husserl begins his lectures on time-consciousness by stating that the task is that of gaining an understanding of how temporal objectivity is constituted by subjective time-consciousness.\textsuperscript{478} This is also framed as performing an analysis of the phenomenological content of lived experiences of time.\textsuperscript{479} Initially, then, the notion of ‘objective time’ must be excluded; wherein objective time signifies the notion of a singular external object-time.\textsuperscript{480} For Husserl, objective time as the appearing of time must be excluded insofar as it is given only through existing time: the immanent time

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{477} Ibid, pp.336-7
\item \textsuperscript{478} Edmund Husserl, \textit{The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness}, J.S. Churchill (trans.) p.22
\item \textsuperscript{479} Ibid. p.22
\item \textsuperscript{480} Ibid. pp.22-23
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
of the flow of consciousness.\textsuperscript{481} Objective time, as such, is presupposed as self-evidential in an empirical sense (objectivity), constituted as objective being (\textit{Sein}) – of one infinite objective time in which all things have temporal position: chronology.\textsuperscript{482} This is not the time to be analysed by phenomenology, but rather is shown via the results of the analysis of cognition that describes the characters of apprehension and regularities which make the empirical possible – and thus objective time.\textsuperscript{483}

Next, Husserl distinguishes phenomenology from psychology, wherein phenomenology is concerned with theory of knowledge and psychology with the origin of concepts constitutive of experience.\textsuperscript{484} In this, phenomenology has as its task, from the standpoint of the theory of knowledge, of disclosing the essence of experience.\textsuperscript{485} Phenomenology is concerned with the question of the origin of time: the primitive, or, fundamental structures of consciousness that reveal ‘authentic’ distinctions in the consciousness of time.\textsuperscript{486} Thus, the question is that of the fundamental authentic structures of time-consciousness insofar as they are lived and through this, exhibiting the \textit{a priori} truths of time consciousness that constitute objective time: the origin of objective time.\textsuperscript{487}

What follows in the lectures, then, exemplifies Husserl’s phenomenological reduction wherein he methodically traces back from the experience of temporal objects as they are comprehended (moment and endurance) to an analysis of the core authentic structures of time-consciousness (the temporal constitutive flux, retention and protention). In this, Husserl prioritises the ‘now’, as primal now, but also

\textsuperscript{481} Ibid. p.23
\textsuperscript{482} Ibid. p.26
\textsuperscript{483} Ibid. p.27
\textsuperscript{484} Ibid. p.27
\textsuperscript{485} Ibid. p.27
\textsuperscript{486} Ibid. p.28
\textsuperscript{487} Ibid. pp.28-29
characterises this now as extended: that the now is a moment/phase that extends to (unifies) that past as it gets held (retention) and the future (protention) as it is not yet – but anticipated. Most importantly, this temporal flux as an extended now is asserted to be ‘absolute subjectivity’: the source point of consciousness.

When Heidegger comments upon Husserl’s notion of time-consciousness he is full of praise, but praises in such a way as to at once show Husserl’s limits and where Husserl has unintentionally overcome his own phenomenological position. Heidegger asserts that time-consciousness in Husserl is the question of time in relation to intentionality, consciousness-of, in lived experience. This, Heidegger states, is the question of time asked genuinely and for the first time in its structures (retention, protention, and the primal-now). However, Heidegger asserts, these interpretations provided by Husserl also remain within the traditional ontological framework that prioritises presence and thus the object-objectivity. Heidegger’s final comment, then, both praises and criticises Husserl’s phenomenology as having inadvertently shown that what is called time-consciousness is time itself: temporality. Implicit to Heidegger’s final comment is Husserl’s assertion that the temporal flux is ‘absolute subjectivity’, or, that which constitutes time itself; temporalises. But this comment, as Heidegger infers, shows that Husserl’s phenomenological agenda of disclosing the structures of consciousness is itself dependent upon a further step back (behind subjectivity) of showing what constitutes consciousness primordially – being. In asserting that the temporal flux is absolute subjectivity Husserl, in Heidegger’s interpretation, reveals the sense of being of Dasein that is prior to consciousness. Thus, Husserl’s disclosure of the temporal unifying flux as absolute subjectivity (the

488 Ibid. p.100
489 Ibid. p.100
490 Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Michael Heim (trans.) p.204
491 Ibid. p.204
492 Ibid. p.204
grounds of consciousness) also denies the fulfilment and validity of the agenda of Husserl’s phenomenology that prioritises consciousness.

The theme of temporality epitomises the way that Heidegger appropriates from Husserl and how their formulations of phenomenology differ. In this, the distinction between their formulations of phenomenology rests upon the question of the ‘matter’ (Sache) of philosophy and then, what philosophy (phenomenology) is in pursuing this question. Here, it is Heidegger’s claim that the matter of philosophy is being, and furthermore, that being is prior to consciousness and thus subjectivity and objectivity, that distinguish their formulations. Additionally, Heidegger also formulates phenomenology as a way of philosophy, following philosophical tradition in pursuing questions without attention to methodology in a scientific sense, i.e., fixed methodological systems. Thus, in Heidegger, phenomenology becomes the genuine philosophical way of pursuing questions in holding faithfully to the ‘matter’. Husserl, on the other hand, views philosophy as in need of science; as scientific philosophy, and thus prioritises method. It follows, then, that Heidegger’s phenomenology will prioritise ways of being (existence, facticity) over consciousness and also, over any theorising of knowledge.

Accordingly, if we look at Heidegger’s appropriations from Husserl’s phenomenology there is a parallel transformation of methodological concerns into questions about authentic ways of being in the world, wherein key phenomenological terms/concepts get framed as dimensions of a genuine philosophical life. Likewise, the content and objects of phenomenology get transformed from a theorising about knowing things (presencing) into ways and traces of the sense of being that shows itself (gives itself) via existence.
14. A Preliminary Characterisation of Heidegger’s Phenomenology:

In providing a broad outline of the background/context of Heidegger’s phenomenology it has been shown that the primary formulation of phenomenology is that of ‘way’: a philosophically genuine way of living. It is then necessary to show how this formulation gets worked out in Heidegger’s characterisation of phenomenology in more detail. As such, this section will attempt to provide an interpretation of phenomenology in this way via *Being and Time* and the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. In this, the section will be divided into three parts, dealing with: ‘the things themselves’, \( \lambda \omicron \gamma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \), and the characterisations of phenomenology provided by Heidegger.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger asserts that phenomenology has as its maxim ‘to the things themselves’.\(^{493}\) This maxim, then, designates a how of research, the how of the question of being.\(^{494}\) In this, phenomenology is construed, not merely as a style of philosophy, but philosophy itself, its ‘how’ and its proper matter. Accordingly, the proper question of philosophy is being, which phenomenology grasps in the maxim ‘to the things themselves’.

Initially, the proper matter of philosophy is being. However, Heidegger claims, the tradition of philosophy has not addressed this matter properly; has not found the proper way.\(^{495}\) The pivotal determination of being, that being is always the being of an entity,\(^{496}\) then allows Heidegger to ask in which entity is the matter of being to be found, or, which being has a way of being – a sense of being? This then leads into Heidegger threefold claim that it is Dasein that is the entity to be prioritised.

\(^{493}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.50 (H28)
\(^{494}\) Ibid. p.50 (H27)
\(^{495}\) Ibid. pp.21-24 (H2-H4)
\(^{496}\) Ibid. p.26 (H6-H7)
with regard to its being. In relation to the maxim ‘to the things themselves’ then, it is precisely Dasein that signifies the things themselves in three ways.

First, Dasein is the being that has a sense of being, or, who understands being. This understanding of being can be directed towards three dimensions of being: the being of Dasein, the being of entities that are not Dasein, and being-in-general (being-for-itself, being differentiated from entities). Accordingly, if the question of being is to be asked the path to be travelled by phenomenology is precisely this: through the being of Dasein as understanding, to the sense of being that grasps the being of entities not Dasein, to the understanding of being-in-general. This is the first way in which Dasein is the things themselves.

Second, Dasein is also the things themselves as a phenomenon. In this, the task of philosophy of questioning being requires that some thing (some entity) show itself in its being in such a way that philosophy can see it. Here, Dasein then becomes the thing itself as the phenomenon through which philosophy may address the matter of being. As such, Dasein is the thing itself as the thing that shows itself in its being and its understanding of being. Therefore, in Dasein, a being shows itself in its being, and furthermore, in understanding of the being of entities not itself and thus being-in-general.

Finally, Dasein is the thing itself insofar as we can be philosophical. In this, the philosophical question of being belongs to the being of the entity Dasein. Accordingly, philosophy is not only a way in which the being of Dasein shows itself, but is also the originary ground of the question of being itself. Furthermore, in being-philosophical as a way of living, the matter of being also has its sole possibility of being understood genuinely. Dasein as philosophical, therefore, is the thing itself in a third sense.
If phenomenology is to approach the matter of being properly, and insofar as being is a philosophical question, it must take up the third sense of Dasein as the thing itself as primary (in a methodological sense). In this, the term \( \lambda \sigma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \) comes to the fore as the proper way of philosophy. The \( \lambda \sigma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \) is determined by Heidegger as discourse (\textit{Rede}).\(^{497}\) Here, the proper signification of discourse is given as that of making manifest what one is talking about in one’s discourse.\(^{498}\) Accordingly, \( \lambda \sigma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \) is intrinsically communicative as it lets what is being talked about be seen by someone.\(^{499}\) Furthermore, if the \( \lambda \sigma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \) is genuine then what is said relates to the very thing that the discourse is about.\(^{500}\) As such, \( \lambda \sigma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \) designates a way in which Dasein (as philosophical) can see being, pointing it out, and allows it to be seen by Dasein.\(^{501}\) The primary sense of \( \lambda \sigma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \) as genuine, then, is that of truth (\( \omega \lambda \eta \theta \epsilon \omicron \omicron \omega \)): of taking something out of its hidden-ness and of discovering.\(^{502}\) Finally, \( \lambda \sigma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \) signifies a threefold communication: of grasping, of exhibiting, and of relating (a relationship).\(^{503}\)

Phenomenology, as a genuine \( \lambda \sigma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \) of phenomenon (being), is formulated by Heidegger as a grasping of the matter in such a way that the discourse exhibits and demonstrates the thing directly.\(^{504}\) As \( \lambda \sigma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \), phenomenology is also a description of how the thing gets encountered as a relationship.\(^{505}\) As such, phenomenology is a genuine way of \( \lambda \sigma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \): an original and intuitive grasping that communicates the matter of being properly.\(^{506}\) As a genuine \( \lambda \sigma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \) phenomenology is intrinsically

\(^{497}\) Ibid. p.55 (H32)  
\(^{498}\) Ibid. p.56 (H32)  
\(^{499}\) Ibid. p.56 (H33)  
\(^{500}\) Ibid. p.56 (H33)  
\(^{501}\) Ibid. p.56 (H33)  
\(^{502}\) Ibid. p.56 (H33)  
\(^{503}\) Ibid. p.58 (H34)  
\(^{504}\) Ibid. p.59 (H35)  
\(^{505}\) Ibid. p.59 (H35)  
\(^{506}\) Ibid. p.61 (H37)
hermeneutical, initially as it is a genuine way of being Dasein,\footnote{Ibid. p.62 (H37)} but also insofar as the grasping of being by Dasein is inherently hermeneutical: that this hermeneutic belongs to Dasein’s existence (the existentiality of existence).\footnote{Ibid. p.62 (H37)}

In the Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger reiterates this formulation of phenomenology as way, and also outlines the structural process of this way. Initially, Heidegger asserts that phenomenology cannot be viewed as a movement in the history of philosophy (as a method) but rather is seen through what it deals with.\footnote{Ibid. p.62 (H37)} In this, the point (Heidegger states) is not to gain some knowledge about what philosophy is (as a subject), but rather, in phenomenology to learn how to be able to philosophise.\footnote{Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p.1} Phenomenology, as such, takes place as paths of reflection.\footnote{Ibid. p.2}

Phenomenology, then, takes its path of reflection via an orientation towards the matter of philosophy. In this, being is the sole and proper theme of philosophy.\footnote{Ibid. p.2} Accordingly, philosophy cannot take its task to see entities, but rather must seek in principle only to relate to being itself.\footnote{Ibid. p.11} However, being is only given insofar as it is already grasped in some sense via the entity Dasein as existing.\footnote{Ibid. p.19} This means that philosophy (phenomenology) has an ontical foundation insofar as philosophising is bound up with Dasein’s existence.\footnote{Ibid. p.20} In other words, the first task of phenomenology is to make philosophy transparent to itself by showing that philosophy is a way of being that Dasein has with its own ontical foundations, i.e., motive source/originary ground. So, phenomenology is a genuine way of philosophising because: a) it is a
genuine way of living, b) it makes philosophy transparent to itself, and c) relates the
two (as one) in the pre-ontological understanding of being.

The second task of phenomenology then arises out of a difference between
beings (entities) and being.\textsuperscript{516} In this, the problem is that of how Dasein (as being-
philosophical) transcends beings to an understanding of being. This, however, is the
question of a genuine philosophical way of living: as seeing, or, as Heidegger
sometimes frames it – the structure of \textit{a priori} cognition.\textsuperscript{517} Phenomenology, as such,
is a double seeing: it sees the proper structure of a priori cognition (intellectual
intuition – $\sigma\varphi\tau\alpha$, $\varphi\rho\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu$) and through this, sees being properly. At any rate, it is
the structural components of a priori cognition that constitute phenomenology as
way.\textsuperscript{518}

The first structure of \textit{a priori} cognition Heidegger calls the ‘phenomenological
reduction’ that signifies a movement from the apprehension of beings to the
understanding of being.\textsuperscript{519} Here, the phenomenological reduction is characterised as a
pure aversion from beings: a merely negative exclusionary movement (scepticism).\textsuperscript{520}
Following this, \textit{a priori} cognition then performs a positive movement of ‘Entwurf’
(free projection).\textsuperscript{521} Here, free-projection is a name that describes the positive
intuitive grasping of being: the antecedent (pre-ontological) grasping of being as it
gives itself.\textsuperscript{522} As such, the second component of \textit{a priori} cognition is called
‘phenomenological construction’.\textsuperscript{523} The third and final component of \textit{a priori}
cognition is then addressed as a movement towards the genuine originary grounds (of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{516} Ibid. p.20
  \item \textsuperscript{517} Ibid. p.20
  \item \textsuperscript{518} Ibid. p.20
  \item \textsuperscript{519} Ibid. p.21
  \item \textsuperscript{520} Ibid. p.21
  \item \textsuperscript{521} Ibid. p.22
  \item \textsuperscript{522} Ibid. p.22
  \item \textsuperscript{523} Ibid. p.22
\end{itemize}
philosophising) that is a discovery of the sense of being. At the same time, however, this final component is also destructive insofar as it must first destroy the tradition of ontology as concealing the sense of being.

As a whole, then, Heidegger formulates phenomenology in two ways. First, insofar as phenomenology is a priori cognition properly implemented, then a priori cognition and phenomenology get unified as a de-construction: the unification of uncovering (destruction) and discovery (construction). Furthermore, phenomenology gets formulated as the genuine way of a priori cognition that contains three dimensions: the grasping of being (reduction), the development of understanding (construction) and historical cognition (destruction).

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524 Ibid. p.23
525 Ibid. p.23
526 Ibid. p.23
527 Ibid. p.23
Chapter Five: Heidegger’s Phenomenology

Thus far, in interpreting Heidegger’s phenomenology through its background and context, the research has disclosed general themes of appropriation, and additionally, enabled a characterisation of Heidegger’s phenomenology as ‘way’. It is now necessary to provide a characterisation in more depth; disclosing the theoretical core and working out of Heidegger’s phenomenology. In this, there will be three main issues to be dealt with: the theoretical core, the working out, and the delimitations of Heidegger’s phenomenology. Initially, the research must come to terms with the two central aspects of Heidegger’s phenomenology in a theoretical sense: of fundamental ontology (S15) and the problem of ground (S16). This will be followed by an account of the working out of Heidegger’s phenomenology as a de-construction and existential analytic (S17). Finally, in (S18) this chapter will attempt to determine the delimitations of Heidegger’s phenomenology.

The overall agenda of this chapter, however, is twofold. In disclosing the theoretical core, working out, and delimitations, I will attempt to show what is central to Heidegger’s phenomenology, and additionally, attempt to provide openings for a phenomenology of Religion. In this, the chapter will also view Heidegger’s phenomenology with regard to necessary distinctions between a fundamental ontology and Religion, philosophical tradition and religion(s). Furthermore, it will be necessary to keep in mind the possibility of a phenomenology that is ontological (containing an existential analytic and de-construction) without pertaining to a fundamental ontology.
15. Fundamental Ontology

The notion of fundamental ontology is inextricably linked, and pivotal to, Heidegger’s phenomenology. There are three poignant questions, then, with regard to fundamental ontology: what is fundamental ontology? Why does fundamental ontology necessarily entail an existential analytic of Dasein and de-construction? What is the relation or distinction between phenomenology and fundamental ontology? In dealing with the first question I hope to provide a characterisation of the core of Heidegger’s theoretical path of phenomenology. The second question operates as a way of pinpointing what fundamental ontology is with regard to how it works out. The final question is posed as a way of showing the possibility of a phenomenology of Religion. In attempting to deal with these three questions four explicit tasks become apparent: of disclosing the aim of fundamental ontology, of disclosing the ground of fundamental ontology, of disclosing the working out of fundamental ontology, and finally, of distinguishing between phenomenology and fundamental ontology in relation to the existential analytic.

A. The Aim(s) of Fundamental Ontology

In discussing the aim(s) of fundamental ontology, fundamental ontology will be disclosed in regard to what it is and the problem it addresses. Heidegger characterises fundamental ontology in general as the ‘founding of ontological enquiry in philosophy’.

Here, fundamental ontology is a notion which recognises two dimensions of ontological research in philosophy: that ontology requires founding (properly) and additionally, that philosophy is itself founded in Dasein’s factual

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528 Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, Parvis Emad (trans.) p.25
As such, fundamental ontology may be characterised as the grounding of ontology as a philosophical endeavour through the recognition that philosophy is itself a way of living with its own genuine possibilities. In this recognition, then, a further question arises insofar as ontology, the core of philosophy, is a life. That is: what is presupposed in a philosophical life, and furthermore, what is presupposed about being? Therefore, fundamental ontology in its broadest sense signifies an awareness of the problem of grounding ontology insofar as being gets presupposed and thought about through a philosophical life.

The essence of fundamental ontology, then, is the question of ‘ground-laying’; of foundation and, furthermore, of the recognition that the ground of philosophy, and thus ontology, is the being-human of philosophy. In this recognition, the aim of fundamental ontology is revealed as the twofold question of being-human: about Dasein’s being and *qua* Dasein’s being (philosophical).

This is then explicated by Heidegger as the ‘idea of fundamental ontology’: the ground-laying of the inner possibility of the understanding of being. Here, the ground of understanding being is posited as the fundament of Dasein’s being finite. Accordingly, fundamental ontology is determined as unveiling the being of Dasein in such a way that the understanding of being is disclosed in its structures. As ground-laying, fundamental ontology aims to disclose the being of Dasein insofar as Dasein understands being. Fundamental ontology, then, aims primarily to lay the ground of ontology through a characterisation of the being of Dasein as understanding being.

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529 Ibid. pp.25-26
530 Ibid. p.27
531 Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Richard Taft (trans.) p.2
532 Ibid. p.162
533 Ibid. p.162
534 Ibid. p.163
535 Ibid. p.163
i.e., as philosophical. In this way, fundamental ontology is nothing more or less than the aim to provide the ontological foundation of philosophy.

However, fundamental ontology is also more than this ground-laying of philosophy, for its ultimate goal is also the fulfilment of philosophy. In this, Heidegger posits the goal of fundamental ontology as the problem of being as such (being in general). There is then a question with regard to Heidegger’s formulation of the goal of fundamental ontology in relation to: what is the difference between being in general, the understanding of being, and sense of being? Heidegger’s writings are unclear in this; sometimes these terms utilised almost synonymously, but also at times pointing towards clear distinctions. Unfortunately, the question of these distinctions is central to any determination of what fundamental ontology is.

Initially, we can distinguish between the understanding of being and the question of (the sense of) being insofar as the understanding of being is an aspect of living, i.e., ontical. In this, the understanding of being is characterised by Heidegger in three interrelated ways: in relation to everydayness, as ontical, and as pre-ontological. In regard to everydayness, the understanding of being can be characterised as preconception: how being is understood vaguely in the living of life. As ontical, the understanding of being likewise operates as a preconception of being that allows entities to be known (in a scientific, experiential sense), e.g., as present/represented. Finally, as pre-ontological, the understanding of being is constituted as also constituted as a preconception. However, in this case the emphasis is upon the facticity of the understanding; indicating the possibility of a formulation and structural description of the understanding of being in an ontological sense. Here, the understanding of being signifies the ‘fact’ that in life Dasein has an understanding

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536 Ibid. p.168
of being (preconception) and that furthermore; this indicates the being-ontological of Dasein. In other words, the understanding of being indicates that Dasein is ontological in our ontical endeavours: being is an issue for us. Thus, overall, the understanding of being can be determined as a preconception of being that belongs to living and therefore indicates something about the being of humans. This can clearly be distinguished from the sense of being as an explicitly ontological formulation and determination. Furthermore, it can also be distinguished from the question of being in general as the fundamental question of ontology.

The difficulty in distinguishing between the question of the ‘sense of being’ and ‘being in general’ lies in Heidegger’s own writing and the resultant interpretations of fundamental ontology. In this, Heidegger at times explicitly formulates the question of fundamental ontology as that of the sense (Sinn) of being.\(^{537}\) On the other hand, Heidegger also posits the ultimate aim of fundamental ontology as that of disclosing being (itself)\(^{538}\), the problem of being as such\(^{539}\), something like being\(^{540}\), and finally, the possibility of understanding being in general.\(^{541}\) This problem of distinction is made more evident in the conclusion to the unfinished *Being and Time* wherein, even though the sense of being has been disclosed as temporality, Heidegger yet asks whether the question of being in general can be answered.\(^{542}\) It is clear, then, that in some fashion the ‘sense of being’ and ‘being in general’ can be differentiated.

The sense of being can be determined as the ground of Dasein’s understanding of being.\(^ {543}\) In this, the sense of being is the ‘fundament’ of the ways in which Dasein

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\(^{538}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.488 (H437)

\(^{539}\) Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p.168

\(^{540}\) Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p.16

\(^{541}\) Ibid. p.281

\(^{542}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, S83

\(^{543}\) Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p.16
may possibly understand being in living whether it be that of everydayness, science, regional ontologies, or philosophy as metaphysics. In other words, fundamental ontology as disclosing the sense of being lays bare the fundamental ground of Dasein’s understanding of being in all its possibilities. Herein, fundamental ontology may be determined as having the aim of disclosing the sense of being where this signifies the ground of any human way of understanding being.

The final possible signification of fundamental ontology as that of disclosing the understanding of being in general, or, being-for-itself, is an aim unfulfilled in Heidegger’s early writings. Where it is approached later, in what gets called ‘Heidegger II’, it is no longer within the framework of fundamental ontology, nor within phenomenology as way. This has led some interpreters to conclude that fundamental ontology fails insofar as it aims to disclose being in general.  

As a final way of showing what fundamental ontology is, via its aims, it is worthwhile discussing some of the various interpretations of fundamental ontology. One way of interpreting fundamental ontology is to posit that it contains two distinct aims: the grounding of regional ontologies and the question of being in general. Here, the interpretation allows of a distantiation of fundamental ontology as grounding and fundamental ontology as completing. On the one hand, then, fundamental ontology can be viewed as determining the sense of being-for-Dasein or Dasein’s sense of being as temporality. Temporality, as such, is the horizon for any (human) understanding of being whatsoever; and therefore the ground of regional ontology’s, the sciences and the everyday average understanding of being. On the other, the question of being in general is viewed as a categorical mistake: a failure.

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545 Ibid. pp.294-5
546 Ibid. p.300
547 Ibid. p.299
Here, the question of being in general is interpreted to be the question of being-itself; distinct from beings altogether, and of Being; a universal and univocal determination of being. This interpretation, however, is somewhat problematic insofar as there is no clear evidence to suggest that in asking the question of being in general Heidegger was referring to a notion of being that signifies total independence, self-sufficiency, or some absolute being. Rather, this goes against the grain of all of Heidegger’s critical interpretations of the \( \text{οὐσία-θεολογία} \) of traditional metaphysics.

Another way of interpreting the relation of the question of the sense of being and being in general is to view them as two ways of asking the same question. This interpretation returns to Aristotle’s question of the unity of being in relation to its manifold senses. \(^{548}\) As such, the question of the sense of being (in general) can be determined as the question of the unified sense of being within its various origins, or, the unitary sense of being. \(^{549}\) Accordingly, if fundamental ontology succeeds in its aim to disclose the sense of Dasein’s being, i.e., the ground of Dasein’s understanding of being, then this is nothing other than the unified sense of being for Dasein and thus also for philosophy. The sense of being, therefore, discloses the unique unifying centre of intelligibility (the unity of being in its meaning). \(^{550}\) Fundamental ontology, then, grounds ontology insofar as it discloses the unitary sense of being for Dasein: the entity from which the manifold meanings of being can be clarified. \(^{551}\)

In comparing these two interpretations, however, it appears that both are correct in respects. On the one hand, fundamental ontology can be viewed as addressing the question of being in general through Dasein’s sense of being. At the same time, Heidegger does not appear to have been satisfied with the results of

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\(^{549}\) Otto Poggeller, *Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking*, p.35

\(^{550}\) Jacques Taminiaux, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, p.44

\(^{551}\) Ibid. pp.114-115
fundamental ontology, not merely in the fact that he never completed the planned outline of *Being and Time*, but also insofar as he later drops the agenda of fundamental ontology for the task of thinking: of language – of how being gives itself to Dasein and how Dasein ‘hears’ being. Certainly, in this respect, the disclosure of the sense of being (as belonging-to Dasein) cannot address the question of being distantiated from entities altogether, i.e., from Dasein. As such, Heidegger’s own writing can be viewed as evidencing a lack in the agenda of fundamental ontology insofar as it could allow of some discussion of being-for-itself. As it stands, it is possible to claim, whether fundamental ontology fails or succeeds, that it signifies certain concrete aims: the analysis of the human understanding of being which results in the disclosure of temporality as the sense of Dasein’s being/Dasein’s sense of being, and thus, the ground/unity for any understanding of being whatsoever.

**B. The Foundation/Justification of Fundamental Ontology**

The argument that founds fundamental ontology also equally justifies it as an existential analytic of Dasein. This argument takes place in two forms, one which builds up to a claim of the intrinsic connection of fundamental ontology and an analytic of Dasein, the other arguing for the priority of Dasein as the entity to be analysed. In the first case, the build up to fundamental ontology provides two clauses: that existence is the constitution of Dasein’s being and that all sciences and disciplines (that relates to entities that are not Dasein) are founded in the pre-ontological understanding of being.⁵⁵²

In more detail, the first argument in the build up can be called the ‘existentiell’ argument. In this, the ‘existentiell’ signifies a relatedness of the question of being and

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⁵⁵² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Joan Stambaugh (trans.) p.11 (H13)
living wherein, Heidegger states, Dasein always understands itself in terms of existence or the possibilities of ways of being: to be one’s self or not.\textsuperscript{553} Furthermore, the question of being (of one’s existence) only gets worked out through living: a living which founds an understanding of existence and thus being.\textsuperscript{554} Thus, the question of being is an intrinsic affair of living – it determines existence. Paradoxically, the fact that being is a question intrinsic to living does not signify that being is understood, nor that it has been analysed philosophically in a proper ontological manner.\textsuperscript{555} If being is to be understood properly, then, phenomenology must make the ‘existentiell’ transparent in its ground: its ontological structure, i.e., existence/existentiality.\textsuperscript{556}

The second argument then takes a different tack, referring to the sciences and disciplines. In this, the sciences and disciplines are conceived of as ways of being Dasein that comport towards entities that need not be Dasein.\textsuperscript{557} Here, Heidegger argues that Dasein’s living essentially contains a being-in-the-world; signifying that Dasein understands being only insofar as Dasein understands something like a world and the entities which become accessible through the world.\textsuperscript{558} As such, Heidegger claims, whenever ontology takes up for its theme entities which are not Dasein it does so upon the grounds of Dasein’s own ontical foundations and motivations, including the pre-ontological understanding of being.\textsuperscript{559}

In general, Heidegger’s two founding arguments make two pivotal claims. The first refers solely to the being of Dasein and is the claim that the question of being belongs intrinsically to being alive – to existing. As such, the first claim posits an
implicit relation between the being of Dasein and the question of being. The second argument then addresses the question of being as it gets developed and preconceived in the sciences and disciplines that theorise about entities, the world (reality) and being. Here, it is Heidegger’s claim that the notion of being that gets formulated (understood) in theoretical endeavours is also intrinsically linked to existence and the being of Dasein. This is the case insofar as theory, thinking, sciences and disciplines that refer to entities belong-to humans: are human endeavours. Furthermore, it is Heidegger’s claim that thinking about entities that are not human, the ontological theories therein, and attempting to gain knowledge of entities, are also inextricably linked to the being of Dasein. Thus, if ontology is to be grounded properly, then the being of Dasein must be made transparent first. This is why, as Heidegger states, fundamental ontology must begin with an existential analytic of Dasein.⁵⁶⁰

The existential analytic is also justified in another way which Heidegger calls the ontic-ontological priority. In this, if fundamental ontology is taken to signify the ground-laying for the question of being it must somehow show how an existential analytic provides access to being. Here, Heidegger determines the ontic-ontological priority as that of the possibility of ontology.⁵⁶¹ Ontology is made possible, then, insofar as Dasein not only understands existence (in the sense of our own being) but also in existence understands (grasps) the being of entities that are not Dasein.⁵⁶² In other words, in existence Dasein has the ability to transcend; of transcending our own being.⁵⁶³ As such, the existential analytic is only a fundamental ontology so long as it remains fixed upon Dasein’s transcendence.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid. p.34 (H13)
⁵⁶¹ Ibid. p.34 (H13)
⁵⁶² Ibid. p.34 (H13)
⁵⁶³ Ibid. p.34 (H14)
C. The Tasks of Fundamental Ontology

There are two primary ways of disclosing the tasks of fundamental ontology; the first showing the phases of development towards the aim, the second of showing what is implicitly at stake in fundamental ontology.

In the first case, the phased tasks of fundamental ontology follow the path from the existential analytic to the disclosure of the sense of being. Here, the path of fundamental ontology (given in *Being and Time*) contains three primary phases of analysis: being-in-the-world, Dasein’s being as care, and the ground of care as temporality. In this, insofar as the question of the sense of being dictates the agenda of the existential analytic, these phases focus on, and trace through, the understanding of being belonging-to Dasein. Accordingly, ‘being-in-the-world’ provides a general analysis of what it is to exist as Dasein which is tailored to the situation of understanding. Likewise, the analysis of care takes up the explication of Dasein’s being; positing care as a fundamental characteristic of Dasein’s being (a whole), but nonetheless explicating care in relation to the understanding of being, and furthermore, to the question of the being of entities that are not Dasein. This means, finally, that in the exposition of time/temporality as the fundament (ground) of Dasein’s understanding of being, the priority is not that of Dasein’s being (itself), but rather, the being of Dasein as understanding being.

Implicit to these phases of fundamental ontology, then, is something other than an existential analytic. What is implicit, rather, is the existential analytic as disclosing the structure of understanding that belongs to Dasein’s being. Fundamental ontology, as such, is the question of the phenomenon of understanding being belonging-to Dasein’s being. What is at stake in a fundamental ontology, then, is

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564 Ibid. p.241 (H196)
precisely the phenomenon of understanding in general, which then foregrounds the understanding of being.

Initially, the foregrounding of the understanding of being signifies the question of being-philosophical; of a philosophical understanding of life. This is the case insofar as the question of being is the philosophical question *par excellence*, and furthermore, insofar as an existential analytic of understanding discloses the authentic ways of philosophising. This is evidenced, as previously discussed, in Heidegger’s repeated and incessant claiming that being is the question of philosophy and that the ground of philosophy is to be found in being-philosophical as the questioning and understanding of being in life.

As the explication of the phenomenon of understanding, fundamental ontology also grounds the sciences. In this, the disclosure of the phenomenon of understanding shows how the sciences work from within the ontological structures of existence, revealing their ontic-ontological motives, their pre-ontological understanding of being, and finally, how the sciences belong to Dasein’s being understanding.

On the other hand, the analysis of the phenomenon of understanding also denies, or covers over, other dimensions of the being of Dasein. This denial takes two forms: initially that the foregrounding of understanding only barely covers the central structures of existence (as Heidegger acknowledges), and moreover, does not explicate the being of Dasein in regard to life itself as it belongs to Dasein in various ways. In other words, the task of fundamental ontology follows the tradition of philosophy in determining what is central to philosophy (metaphysics): the being of entities in their sense of the structures of presencing. Herein, fundamental ontology,

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565 Ibid. p.38 (H16-17)
566 Ibid. p.38 (H17) “It merely brings out the being of this entity without interpreting its meaning.”
567 Reiner Schurmann, *Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy*, C-M. Gros (trans.) p.132
in determining the being-understanding of Dasein as temporality also determines Dasein as the entity who presences (brings to presence).\textsuperscript{568} Therefore, as Heidegger repeatedly affirms, fundamental ontology has the task of grounding philosophy, and therein the sciences, through the disclosure of Dasein’s sense of being as temporality. As such, fundamental ontology has the task of disclosing the phenomenon of understanding without consideration of what could be called the ‘meaning’ of the world or life for Dasein.

D. The Distinction between Phenomenology and Fundamental Ontology? The question of the existential analytic

The possibility of a ‘phenomenology of Religion’ in this case is dependent upon the possibility of distinguishing between phenomenology as fundamental ontology and phenomenology as ontology (but not fundamental in Heidegger’s formulation). As such, the possibility of a ‘phenomenology of Religion’ belongs to a distinction between phenomenology and fundamental ontology, or, of a distinction between an existential analytic that is fundamental ontology or not. In this, the possibility I will discuss initially is that of Heidegger’s notion of the possibility of a ‘phenomenological anthropology’ that is not a fundamental ontology.

In \textit{Being and Time} Heidegger provides a distinction between a phenomenology that is fundamental ontology and a phenomenological anthropology, both of which are constituted in an existential analytic. In this, it is initially asserted that fundamental ontology discloses essential characteristics of being Dasein contained in any/every possible way of being.\textsuperscript{569} This means, then, that such characteristics as ‘being-in-the-world’, concern/care and so on are central (essential)

\textsuperscript{568} Ibid. p.72
\textsuperscript{569} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, p.38 (H17)
characteristics of Dasein’s being. Following this, Heidegger delimits fundamental ontology to the question of the sense of being: that it cannot provide a complete ontology, merely bringing to light the being of the entity of Dasein.\textsuperscript{570} So, on the one hand, fundamental ontology reveals the essential structures of being-human without developing these ‘pieces’ further.\textsuperscript{571} On the other, the existential analytic also has the possibility of further development: the complete analytic of Dasein.\textsuperscript{572} As such, any further developments would require a questioning of the being of Dasein in such a way as to disclose its meaning.\textsuperscript{573}

In the delimitation of fundamental ontology, then, lies the possibility of further developed phenomenological investigations of Dasein’s being. In this, fundamental ontology provides the most basic determinations of Dasein’s being upon which these investigations could be founded; either through more complete explication of the structural pieces, through additional structural pieces not yet shown, or finally, through the question of the meaning of Dasein’s being in general.

At any rate, in Heidegger’s disclaimer of the delimitations of fundamental ontology, he also provides various possible ways of developing the existential analytic in ways which do not foreground the phenomenon of understanding. This amounts to a distinction between phenomenology as fundamental ontology and phenomenology as the ontological exposition of Dasein’s being. This is also a positing of a phenomenology-ontology that is a developed analysis of Dasein’s existence.\textsuperscript{574}

\textsuperscript{570} Ibid. p38 (H17)
\textsuperscript{571} Ibid, p.38 (H17)
\textsuperscript{572} Ibid. p.38 (H17)
\textsuperscript{573} Ibid. p.38 (H17)
\textsuperscript{574} Ibid. pp.169-170 (H131)
16. Phenomenology and Ground:

Even though I have discussed ‘ground’ with regard to Heidegger’s phenomenology previously it is nonetheless important to provide a more detailed analysis of ground. Due to the fact that Heidegger’s phenomenology can be best characterised as a way, the question of ground does not arise as a specifically methodological issue. Rather, as I will show, the problem of ground refers back to the question of philosophising; what it is essentially, and equally, how philosophy gains its foundation in the essence of philosophising. The approach I will take with regard to the problem of ground is to divide the discussion into two parts: an initial general overview of the question of ground in its various senses, to be followed by a more detailed analysis of the problem of ground in Heidegger’s writings. The aim of this section, as such, is to provide a detailed account of the problem of ground, which furthermore, reveals the foundations of Heidegger’s phenomenology as way.

A. The Origin - Ground:

Initially, the problem of origin can be viewed as the general philosophical problem of ground; of finding the proper place to begin and found philosophical endeavour. In this the origin signifies the problems of defining what philosophy is, on what ground does the validity of philosophy rest, of what the proper object of philosophy is, and finally, of what the proper method of philosophical endeavour is.

For Heidegger, the question of origin takes on these significations in its own unique and complicated way in so far as the act or life of philosophising is interpreted via itself; in its situation, original generation and impetus. In this, the question of origin for Heidegger is both the question of grounding philosophy as a ‘science’ and also the question of the historical and ontological origins of philosophy. As such, the
origin of philosophy can be viewed, generally, in relation to three areas; the historical origin, the origin in the factically existing human and in the ontological foundation/motivation of philosophical endeavour.\textsuperscript{575}

Heidegger defines philosophy, at this early stage of his career, as a radical questioning\textsuperscript{576} and a fundamental questioning that seeks answers via research.\textsuperscript{577} Here, philosophy is interpreted in itself as visible via the act of philosophy; the living of a philosophical life.\textsuperscript{578} As such, philosophy is the historical grasping of life and comportment towards life itself.\textsuperscript{579} Accordingly, the two basic questions of philosophy are ‘what really matters’ (the proper object) and ‘what is the genuine way of asking questions?’\textsuperscript{580} Thus, the two questions of philosophy in reference to itself are object and method.

In so far as philosophy’s object is itself, it becomes apparent that the question of philosophy must revolve around the entity that philosophises, the life of that entity and the generation of philosophising in that entities living. As such, Heidegger states that the object of philosophy is human Dasein in its Being character, and furthermore, the mode of living which generates philosophical endeavours.\textsuperscript{581}

Accordingly, where Heidegger discusses the problem of method in general he provides three potential determinations of the object; where the object is originally accessible, the situation of life in which the object becomes accessible, and finally, the basic intention (motive) that generates the experience of accessing the object.\textsuperscript{582} All three potential determinations of the object relate to the problem of origin – as the

\textsuperscript{575} J. Pizer, \textit{Toward a Theory of Radical Origin; Essays on Modern German Thought}, p.147
\textsuperscript{576} Heidegger, \textit{Phen.Int.R.Aristotle}, p.359
\textsuperscript{577} Heidegger, \textit{Phen.Int.Aristotle}, p.4
\textsuperscript{578} Ibid. p.3
\textsuperscript{579} Ibid. p.3
\textsuperscript{580} Ibid. p.11
\textsuperscript{581} Heidegger, \textit{Phen.Int.R.Aristotle}, p.359
\textsuperscript{582} Heidegger, \textit{Phen.Int.Aristotle}, p.17
origin of access, the origin of situation, and the origin of motive. In so far as the object to be determined is the Being of human Dasein as comporting philosophically, the philosophical problematic becomes the question of the origin, in various senses, of philosophical comportment.

Origin, as such, operates as the locus of both object and method of philosophy insofar as the method is determined by the object – fits to the object characteristics, and insofar as the ‘object’ (human Dasein) produces the method in and of itself. It is not merely enough, however, to find any arbitrary origin. Rather, the origin must be determined as it belongs, genuinely, to the three possible determinations of human Dasein as philosophical; historical, factual and ontological.

*The Origin of Greek-Christian Culture:*

This first sense of origin, of Greek-Christian Culture, indicates in a preliminary way the historical situationality of origin, i.e., that the ‘Western World’ today originated – or has its origins in two historical situations that have melded in some way. In this, the origin of Greek-Christian culture is first and foremost an indication of present viewed as being affected by the past. As such, the origin in the past discloses the present, and the present discloses the past as remaining effective.\(^{583}\) It is, then, only through the disclosure of the past-origin that the present may be taken on authentically.\(^{584}\)

To take on the present in an authentic way is no dismissal of the past, especially the origin, but rather involves both a movement forward and backward between the past and present. The movement forward, marked by the effectivity of the past in the present, involves the critical analysis of what has been transmitted in the meld between Greek and Christian culture forward and remains effective in the

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\(^{583}\) Heidegger, *Phen.Int.R.Aristotle*, p.360

\(^{584}\) Ibid. p.360
present. As such, the movement forward for Heidegger requires a destruction of what remains hidden of the past in the present.\textsuperscript{585} The movement backwards is a proceeding towards the beginning; the situation and time from which the present has been generated.\textsuperscript{586} This movement backwards is marked by a search for what has been lost in the past that belongs to the origin.\textsuperscript{587} As such, the movement backwards is a search for the original way of living that has generated the present.

For Heidegger, in so far as he conceives of his present as Greek-Christian, the origin of the present belongs to two distinct historical situations; the Greek and the Christian. For these distinct historical situations to come together into one the movements forward and backward aim to disclose what has been transmitted and lost of each historical situation in order to fully disclose the present authentically.

For Heidegger, the origin of Greek-Christian thought reveals that Greek philosophy lives on in ‘our’ philosophy and ‘our’ lives in such a way that it is not realised.\textsuperscript{588} The origin in this sense, then, is to appropriate the original interpretation of life/world in the past through the acknowledgment that ‘we are the past’.\textsuperscript{589} This acknowledgement allows the origin to show how the present sciences and philosophical endeavours belong to the past – as an expression of original life/world interpretation.\textsuperscript{590}

In this, the origin of Greek-Christian thought enables a threefold analysis of theory; the original idea of human Dasein’s Being,\textsuperscript{591} the disclosure of original motive sources in life for theory,\textsuperscript{592} and the generating experience/interpretation of life.\textsuperscript{593}

\textsuperscript{585} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{586} Heidegger, \textit{Phen.Int.Aristotle}, p.140
\textsuperscript{587} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{588} Heidegger, \textit{Plato’s Sophist}, Richard Rojcewicz (trans.) p.7
\textsuperscript{589} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{590} George Kovacs, ‘Philosophy as Primordial Science’, \textit{Reading Heidegger From the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought}, pp.97, 99
\textsuperscript{591} Heidegger, \textit{Phen.Int.R.Aristotle}, pp.370-1. Note that ‘human Dasein’ is Heidegger’s wordage at this time.
\textsuperscript{592} Ibid.p.99 & Pizer, \textit{Toward a Theory of Radical Origin}, p.137
\textsuperscript{593} Otto Poggeler, \textit{Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking}, p.153
This sense of origin points towards a stronger sense of analysing the origin – as primordial.

*Origin and the Primordial:*

As it has already been briefly discussed, Heidegger conceives the original expression of theorising in Greek-Christian culture/history to be presupposed by an interpretation of the world and life that generates original conceptions in philosophy. It is likewise the case that these interpretations of life-world are presupposed by original primal experiences of life and world that occur both pre-theoretically and pre-life-worldly. These primal experiences, for Heidegger, function as an origin of dismantling return towards the motive sources of philosophy. In this, primal experiences are such experiences as ‘wonder’, anxiety and uncertainty. However, these primal experiences are not freestanding or isolated, but rather occur in the context of a living of life and a historical situation. As such, even motive sources point towards, or are presupposed by, a further sense of origin – the context of primal experiencing.

The context of primal experiencing is a historical and life situated-ness that is original in the sense of ‘primordiality’. In this, the context is both pre-theoretical and pre-life-world and yet is at the same time situated in life and the historical. As such, the context of primal experiencing points towards a conception of life as it is experienced pre-conceptually and pre-culturally (life-world). This context, then, refers to an original life, a life as characterised in its origins and in its basic possible characteristics in any and every concrete situation. Heidegger calls this sense of

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594 Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, p.21
596 Ted Sadler, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, p.158
598 Note: Heidegger’s notion of ‘primordial’ does not refer to the ‘primitive’ or the ‘mythical’, but rather related to basic experiences of self and world that generate thinking and views of the world.
primal experiencing in life ‘factual life’ or ‘facticity’.\textsuperscript{599} Facticity, here, refers to the basic origin of the historical, the theoretical and the individual existence of human Dasein.\textsuperscript{600} In this, factual life contains the complete possibilities that characterise human existence; history, individual existence, and world. As such, factual life is the proper place of access for philosophy and its object; the human in our own mode of Being,\textsuperscript{601} the sense of Being of human Dasein,\textsuperscript{602} and the sense of Being of factual life.\textsuperscript{603}

Insofar as factual life is the basic possible characterisation of human life, factual life must also be the originary location of all possible expressions of human existence. Initially, factual life can be viewed as the originary generation of history, of self-understanding and of the conceptualisations of primal experiences. In this, however, factual life as originary contains at least three differing possible directions of analysis; the characterisation of factual life in general, the characterisation of factual life in its extreme possibilities and as an enabling of ontological analysis. For Heidegger, all three directions of analysing factual life are interrelated, especially in reference to the problem of origin as the search for proper philosophical foundations. It is important, here, for proper ontological research that the entire complete characterisation of factual life be given, insofar as ontology refers to the entire possible Being of the entity. On the other hand, the entity in question (human Dasein) also contains the oppositional potentiality for Being, i.e., it can always also be otherwise.\textsuperscript{604} As such, an ontological analysis of factual life also requires the proper

\textsuperscript{599} Theodore Kisiel, \textit{The Genesis of Being and Time}, p.23
\textsuperscript{600} Thomas Sheehan, ‘Heidegger’s Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion’, pp.49-50
\textsuperscript{601} Heidegger, \textit{Phen.Int.Aristotle}, p.126
\textsuperscript{602} Ibid. p.126
\textsuperscript{603} Ibid. p.127
\textsuperscript{604} Heidegger, \textit{Plato’s Sophist}, p.34
access into these oppositional possibilities of factical life. For Heidegger, this is the question of genuine origin.

**Origin and the Genuine:**

Oppositional poles are determined as the basic directions of Dasein’s potentiality for Being; of Being one’s self and of not Being one’s self. In this, it is a possibility of factical life that in any given concrete situation human Dasein may genuinely be itself or not. For Heidegger this oppositional possibility occurs in factical life simultaneously. As such, authenticity and inauthenticity are equiprimordial characteristics of factical life and thus of Dasein’s Being - the oppositional origin of factical life. On the other hand, the Being of human Dasein is only genuinely expressed as itself, i.e., in the possibility of Being one’s self. As such, it becomes the problem of proper access to the genuine origin of factical life in Being one’s self.

It can be seen that Heidegger formulates two concurrent ways of accessing the genuine origin of factical life in Being one’s self; via facticity as containing a genuine historical situation of origin and via Being one’s self as an ontological problematic. In the first case, Heidegger intends to reveal ‘primal Christian experience’ as the historical location of genuine facticity, and the second, reveal the primordial insights into Dasein’s being itself in Greek philosophising. For both of these ways of access, Heidegger states, the analysis must proceed towards the origin, its time, aware that the genuine is derived from Being and indicated in everyday life. As such, the way to access both genuine origins is to seek in everydayness that indicates

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605 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.68 (H42-3)
607 Ibid. p.141
611 Ibid. p.142
the genuine. The genuine origin, then, is both situated in a time (historical location) and in modes of being that indicate the genuine.

Heidegger aims to show how ‘primal Christian experience’ (indicated via interpretations of Luther, Augustine, and Paul) is a historical location of genuine facticity. In this, factical life experience as an indication of genuine facticity is shown to be the proper object of philosophy, or the location of the object in which it is originally accessible. As such, the primal Christian experience enables access to the genuine object, the character of genuine life as it is lived. The genuine life, then, is characterised as containing the ontological sense of human Dasein in its Being and the characterisation of factical life freed of its traditional misunderstandings.

As the genuine object of philosophy, however, the primal Christian experience of life is not yet theorised, i.e., analysed ontologically, nor can it provide the genuine philosophical mode of access in so far as it is bare living of life genuinely. In this, it remains problematic for Heidegger that the genuine mode of philosophical access cannot be found in primal Christian experience. As such, Heidegger turns to Greek philosophy as the location of the genuine origin of philosophical access to life.

Origin and Philosophy

For Heidegger, the question of the proper mode of access revolves around the assertion that philosophy is a mode of comporting towards life, or a way of living that grasps living in its facticity and the historical. In this, any attempt to find the genuine origin of accessing life philosophically must take into account factical life itself; in its historical-ness, its living and its genuine possibilities for philosophical comportment.

612 Ibid. p.17
613 Ibid. pp.126-8
614 Ibid. p.3
Initially, Greek philosophy offers itself up as the original location of philosophical endeavour belonging to the present, i.e., tradition of philosophy. In this sense, Greek philosophy is literally the origin of philosophy in the shallow historical sense. In this, however, Greek philosophising also contains the genuine originary generation of philosophical thought as the factual historical location of experiencing life primordially in such a way that philosophy is generated.\textsuperscript{615} As such, the question of proper access belongs to the analysis of that concrete factual living which generated philosophy.\textsuperscript{616} In order to fully explicate the genuine origin in this sense, Heidegger aims to reveal the genuine modes of comportment towards life underlying this factual situation of the Greek philosophers.\textsuperscript{617}

Insofar as philosophy is conceived as a mode of living, and thus of factual life itself,\textsuperscript{618} the question of proper philosophical access belongs inherently to the task of revealing philosophy as a genuine mode of factual life.\textsuperscript{619} In this, Heidegger’s analysis of Greek philosophy cannot attempt to merely extrapolate genuine philosophical comportments\textsuperscript{620} from Greek philosophy, assuming that comportment is separable from living, but rather must attempt to reveal just what characterises a genuine factual life of philosophising; its comportments and the experiences that motivate this life. As such, what is at stake for Heidegger in analysing Greek philosophy is not merely a problem of method that stands on its own, but the characterisation of an entire factual life in its comportments as origin and originary

\textsuperscript{615} John D. Caputo, \textit{Demythogolising Heidegger}, pp.1-2
\textsuperscript{616} Ibid. p.4
\textsuperscript{617} Heidegger, \textit{Phen.Int.Aristotle}, p.142
\textsuperscript{618} Ibid. p.122
\textsuperscript{619} Heidegger, \textit{Phen.Int.R.Aristotle}, p.370
\textsuperscript{620} Note: Comportment is related to intentionality as the directedness of cognitive states, but also implies relation to world, interpretation of world and concrete activities directed towards the world in certain ways.
ground. Thus, Greek philosophy as a factual life pertains to the possibility of a genuine origin to philosophical endeavour (method). 621

B. The Problem of Ground

In the 1928 essay, ‘On the Essence of Ground’, 622 Heidegger takes up the problem of ground in detail. In this, the problem is initially posed via Aristotle as to the question of the αρχή. 623 Here Aristotle is interpreted to be struggling with the multiple senses of the ground; what-being, that-being, and being-true, attempting to find the essential unifying αρχή. 624 Heidegger takes this to imply the question of whether one αρχή; one of the already posited grounds, has priority as the unified ground. 625 As such, the entry point into the problem of the essence of ground, for Heidegger, is that of the αρχή that unifies, and thus has priority.

Heidegger then proposes to enter into the problem via Leibniz’s formulation of the principle of sufficient reason, an analysis that dominates the first stage of the essay. 626 However, it is Heidegger’s thesis that the problem of ground may only be entered insofar as its proper domain is set out in advance. In this, it is then proposed that transcendence is the proper domain of the essence of the ground; as the way of philosophy and as a finite endeavour marked by ‘non-essence’ in its essence – by lack. 627 It is evident that the problem of ground is already, in transcendence, characterised as belonging to being-philosophical (and thus being-human). Thus, transcendence is already drawn out as the proper domain of being-philosophical; in effect, the essential domain of being-philosophical. Heidegger then concludes his

622 Martin Heidegger, ‘On the Essence of Ground (1929)’ Pathmarks
623 Ibid. p.98
624 Ibid. p.98
625 Ibid. p.99
626 Ibid. pp.99, 100-107
627 Ibid. p.99
introduction to the essay by setting the phases through which the problem of ground will be resolved: the problem of ground (in general), transcendence as the domain of the question of the essence of ground, and finally, the essence of ground.\textsuperscript{628}

The problem of ground is approached in a general way via Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. In this, it is noted initially that for Leibniz the problem of ground belongs to the theme of truth, and furthermore, that the essence of truth is identity (a nexus).\textsuperscript{629} Identity, then, is determined as a unitary accord, not founded in predication/judgment, but rather given through a human relation with being.\textsuperscript{630} This relation is one wherein entities in the being first become manifested, which then shows that the essence of truth is ‘unveiledness’ in the sense of a relationship that reveals.\textsuperscript{631} This relationship, Heidegger maintains, is one between Dasein and being; an ontic-ontological relationship that generates the possibility of truth (being-true).\textsuperscript{632} As such, truth is founded in the essence of Dasein, transcendence, via the understanding of being and the comportments towards beings.\textsuperscript{633} Thus, the essence of truth is related to the essence of ground in transcendence.\textsuperscript{634} However, this relationship may only be disclosed in the being-true of Dasein’s transcendence; the proper transcendental relation of Dasein to being.\textsuperscript{635}

In order to get to the essence of ground, then, transcendence must first be disclosed for what it is with regard to the being of Dasein: being-philosophical. The meaning of transcendence in this sense, Heidegger asserts, is to surpass; a possibility belonging to the entity that is transcendent.\textsuperscript{636} This surpassing is a relation that is

\textsuperscript{628} Ibid. p.99
\textsuperscript{629} Ibid. p.102
\textsuperscript{630} Ibid. pp.102-103
\textsuperscript{631} Ibid. p.103
\textsuperscript{632} Ibid. pp.105-106
\textsuperscript{633} Ibid. p.106
\textsuperscript{634} Ibid. p.106
\textsuperscript{635} Ibid. pp.106-107
\textsuperscript{636} Ibid. p.107
called a ‘towards-which’, or, a relation with a world which is surpassed.\textsuperscript{637} Transcendence, as such, is a relation between Dasein and world. Heidegger then provides a characterisation of world, not as an object, but rather as a having a whole in advance.\textsuperscript{638} A world, then, cannot be construed as some universal object (universe), but is rather an act of unification: a unification of existence belonging to Dasein.\textsuperscript{639} Additionally, transcendence then gets characterised as world-forming: that Dasein projects its own possibilities (\textit{Entwurf}), and in doing so casts these possibilities over beings as a world (\textit{Uberwurf}).\textsuperscript{640} As such, transcendence is Dasein’s being as the relation between Dasein and being in which the world(s) gets formed. In other words, transcendence can be constituted as the human ability (ground of awareness) that unifies all that possibly is (beings) within a projected form called ‘world’.

Insofar as transcendence pertains to the essence of ground, Heidegger states, it has its own essence in freedom.\textsuperscript{641} Here, transcendence is conjoined to the essence of ground as the human freedom for grounding, or, the freedom to establish possibilities and accordingly, limit possibilities.\textsuperscript{642} Accordingly, the essence of ground is the essence of Dasein’s being-in-existence; the freedom to ground belonging to free projection.\textsuperscript{643} Therefore, Heidegger asserts, the essence of ground is nothing other than (Dasein’s) freedom.\textsuperscript{644} As Dasein’s, freedom is both positive and privative. On the one hand, Dasein is free to ground.\textsuperscript{645} On the other, this freedom is an abyss; the nothingness of the possibility of non-existence.\textsuperscript{646}
In Heidegger’s discussion of the essence of ground there are implicitly two ways of characterising ground. Initially, grounding in the sense of world forming is essentially who Dasein is, i.e., Dasein inherently forms worlds in existing. In this sense grounding is simply the activity of being alive as a human – of projecting possibilities and thus forming a world. However, the question of the ground for Heidegger is not merely this disclosure of the being of Dasein, for he is also aiming to show how philosophy has its ground. This is implied in Heidegger’s positing of a connection between being-true and ground, which furthermore, indicates a notion of proper or authentic grounding. This is the case insofar as a being-true cannot signify a mere being-true from me (individual Dasein). Equally, insofar as the proper ground Heidegger seeks is ontological it cannot be a matter of adhering to objects in their objectivity. Rather, if there is to be a proper ground of philosophy it must be founded in the being-true relation of Dasein and being. Heidegger hints at this in the conclusion to the essay through the argument that grounding is to be found in ‘true nearness’ to being and a willingness to ‘listen’ to being.\(^\text{647}\)

This theme is developed further in Heidegger’s work *Basic Concepts* as the problem of ground-concepts.\(^\text{648}\) In this, the question is taken to be that of the equivalence of Dasein’s essence, everything that Dasein takes for being, and the ground of everything.\(^\text{649}\) These are then united as the question of Dasein’s philosophical relation to that which is essential.\(^\text{650}\) The philosophical relation to the essential is then taken in two ways: the history of philosophy and the readiness (resolution) to face the essential.\(^\text{651}\) Insofar as ground is concerned, then, the question of the history of philosophy is then formulated as the necessity of uncovering the

\(^{647}\) Ibid. p.135  
\(^{648}\) Martin Heidegger, *Basic Concepts*, Gary E. Aylesworth (trans.) p.1  
\(^{649}\) Ibid. p.2  
\(^{650}\) Ibid. p.5  
\(^{651}\) Ibid. pp.6, 8
originary grounds of philosophy in the ‘Greeks’.\textsuperscript{652} This uncovering is called a ‘remembrance’ of the essential.\textsuperscript{653} Accordingly, the readiness to confront the essential gets formulated as seeking the ground of beings (being), of facing what is thought-worthy through a truthful living, and finally, of grasping being (‘being embraced by the essence of the ground’).\textsuperscript{654}

Heidegger’s provision of the ground of philosophy (as phenomenology) can be viewed, therefore, as a dual grounding. First, the ground of philosophy can be found in its historic-ness; of the essential that gets carried through the tradition of philosophy and that has its originary ground in Greek philosophising. Furthermore, the ground of philosophy is also found in a being-true that is a relationship with being in the truth. This relationship with being is an authentic/proper being-philosophical: a faithful-dwelling in the truth of being.

In the preceding discussion of the problem of ground it has been revealed that phenomenology as way, for Heidegger, is nothing more or less than the authentic being-philosophical of Dasein characterised by a ‘being in the truth’. This means, however, that phenomenology is a way of being that is world forming; an \textit{Entwurf} and \textit{Uberwurf}. Furthermore, if phenomenology is such a world forming it is also a way of grounding ‘truthfully’ with respect to being. As a grounding, then, phenomenology necessarily follows, in its very constitution, the two paths of grounding: the path of historical originary ground and the path of existential ground (being-human). Thus, when we turn to the question of how phenomenology gets worked out it will follow that the paths will be that of the historical trace of the proper originary ground (deconstruction) and the structural analysis of the proper being-human (existential analytic).

\textsuperscript{652} Ibid. pp.6, 9
\textsuperscript{653} Ibid. p.9
\textsuperscript{654} Ibid. pp.10, 16-18
This also has implications for a phenomenology of Religion, which must now signify the task of disclosing the phenomenon of Religion as that which is the ground of religion(s), via the phenomenological disclosure of ground: deconstruction and existential analytic. Furthermore, insofar as there are various traditions of religion(s) it follows that any de-construction will necessarily follow multiple paths of tracing the originary ground. I will discuss this in further detail in the next section and chapter.

17. DeConstruction and Existential Analytic: The working out of Heidegger's phenomenology:

What has been disclosed thus far is that phenomenology, for Heidegger, is a way of proper philosophical \( \eta \theta \omega \zeta \) (dwelling) that aims at the ground and the essential of the phenomenon in question. In this, the structural composition of the existential analytic has also been disclosed in some depth as a phenomenological interpretation of the central (essential) components of the being of Dasein. Rather than repeating this view, this section will aim to consider the existential analytic in terms of its relation to the deconstructive dimension of Heidegger’s phenomenology. As such, this section will foreground the deconstructive dimension of phenomenology, and through consideration of deconstruction, show in more detail how Heidegger’s phenomenology works out.

In focusing on deconstruction, this section will take up three approaches, initially engaging in an interpretation of Heidegger’s writings/statements about deconstruction, to be followed by a interpretation of deconstruction as containing three primary dimensions, and finally, an analysis of the relation of deconstruction and the existential analytic. Initially, then, I will provide a brief overview of *Being*
and Time, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology and the History of the Concept of Time. This will be followed by an interpretative analysis of deconstruction in context. Finally, I will provide a discussion of the relation between deconstruction and existential analytic with regard to their unity and their differences; the two-fold originary ground of being-philosophical.

A. De-Construction in Heidegger’s Writings.

Being and Time is the most often utilised source for interpretations of Heidegger’s formulation of deconstruction. In this, however, the formulation therein often leads to confusion about what deconstruction is: whether it is a phase of fundamental ontology or whether it is a more general aspect of phenomenology. Equally, this question often gets framed as that of whether deconstruction operates outside of the aims and programmatic agenda of Being and Time. Rather than engage in this debate immediately, this overview of deconstruction in Being and Time will identify both the programmatic ‘phased’ dimension of deconstruction (as ‘Destruktion’) and its more general context.

As a phased dimension of the agenda of ‘Being and Time’, deconstruction (Destruktion) tends to get translated as either ‘destruction’ or ‘dectructuring’. In either case, ‘Destruktion’ is formulated in a systematic sense as a phase of Being and Time to follow the existential analytic and the exposition of time/temporality. Here, Heidegger posits three sub-phases to the Destruktion: an analytic of Kant, an analysis of Descartes and Medieval ontology, to eventuate in an analysis of Aristotle which aims to find the ground and limits of ‘ancient ontology’. However, as mentioned

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655 This is the difference between the Macquarrie and the Stambaugh translations. Most scholars tend to follow one of the two, or leave the term in German.
656 Heidegger, Being and Time, Joan Stambaugh (trans.) p.35 (H40)
previously, this part of *Being and Time* was never published, leading to the debate about whether other lectures/writings contain these sub-phases of deconstruction.

Outside of this programmatic view of *Destruktion*, Heidegger also provides general formulations of *Destruktion*. These can be divided into five primary characterisations: of discovering the originary ground of philosophy, of disclosing the positive possibilities of the tradition of philosophy, the *Destruktion* of ‘today’s’ ontology, of disclosing phases in the tradition of philosophy, and finally, of a *Destruktion* of the concept of Time. In the broadest sense, these five formulations of *Destruktion* can be determined as containing two primary themes: the history (tradition) of philosophy with regard to the temporality of Dasein’s being and the question of the genuine/non-genuine. In the first case, it can be seen that each of these formulations of *Destruktion* above intrinsically pertain to the temporality of being-philosophical, either through the interpretation of tradition or explicitly through the concept of Time. Equally, insofar as the *Destruktion* aims at a true disclosure and in that the being-true of philosophical thinking, then the *Destruktion* also aims to disclose the authentic and inauthentic within the tradition of philosophy. This is why Heidegger states that *Destruktion* aims at an authentic historiography founded in temporality as the meaning of care.

In the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger’s formulation of deconstruction can be viewed as following a similar programme as in *Being and Time*. Here, the sub-phases of deconstruction are almost exactly the same as proposed in *Being and Time*, containing: an analysis of Kant on being, a tracing from Medieval

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657 Ibid. p.20 (H22)
658 Ibid. p.20 (H22)
659 Ibid. p.20 (H23)
660 Ibid. p.20 (H23)
661 Ibid. p.23 (H26)
662 Ibid. p.362 (H397)
ontology to Aristotle, an analysis of Descartes res extensa and res cogitans, and finally, an additional analysis of modern logic on the copula. Likewise, the general themes of deconstruction are posited in a similar fashion as a concern for the tradition/history of philosophy and the concern for the genuine.\(^6\) Distinctly different, however, is the formulation of deconstruction as phenomenology itself and the claim, furthermore, that the deconstruction must precede the existential analytic.\(^6\) Here, Heidegger claims that it is only through a deconstruction that genuine concepts are possible, which would also include the possibility of the genuine concepts provided in the existential analytic.\(^6\) 

In the lectures on *The History of the Concept of Time*, Heidegger characterises deconstruction as an analysis of the philosophical notion of Time (its history) and also as a ‘repetition’. Initially, then, these lectures cover part of the agenda of the *Destruction* in *Being and Time* that was to be an analysis of the concept of Time. Furthermore, deconstruction gets formulated in more detail as repetition and remembrance.

Initially, Heidegger formulates the aim of deconstruction to be that of a ‘bringing back to life’ wherein the questions and originary ground of philosophy in Aristotle and Plato are revealed and then repeated in a genuine way.\(^6\) At the same time, this repetition is also formulated as a return to the origin of philosophy and thus to a genuine way of asking the question of being.\(^6\) Deconstruction, Heidegger states, is therefore an ‘assumption of tradition’: a genuine repetition.\(^6\) In this, deconstruction is formulated as an opposition to the prejudices of the tradition, of

\(^6\) Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, pp.22-3
\(^6\) Ibid. p.22
\(^6\) Ibid. p.22
\(^6\) Ibid. p.137
\(^6\) Ibid. p.138
traditionalism, which is also a critical analysis of the self-evidence of certain
preconceptions about being and time. However, as repetition/assumption,
deconstruction also aims to achieve contact with the genuine in the tradition. Finally, as a repetition, deconstruction also aims to disclose the genuine originary
ground of the tradition of philosophy and repeat the question of being in the light of
the limits of Greek ontology.

Deconstruction, then, can be seen to contain three interconnected aims: to
destroy the non-genuine dimensions of the tradition of philosophy (self-evidence,
dogmatism), to reconnect to the genuine dimensions of the tradition, and to repeat the
genuine originary ground in such a way as something new is discovered.

B. Deconstruction in Context.

Here, the aim is twofold, to provide an overview of deconstruction in context and to
provide a discussion of the various scholarly interpretations of deconstruction. Initially, a brief discussion of the various interpretations will be utilised as the setting
for my interpretation. In this, the primary interpretative point of contention is whether
deconstruction must follow the path set in *Being and Time*, or, whether deconstruction
is a more general movement in Heidegger’s phenomenology.

The first interpretative thesis, that deconstruction must follow the path set in
*Being and Time*, views deconstruction as signifying the Destruktion of ontology based
upon the analysis of human temporality. In this view, deconstruction is determined
solely in relation to the agenda of fundamental ontology. Thus, the deconstruction

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669 Ibid. p.138
670 Ibid. p.138
671 Ibid. p.138
672 E.F. Kaelin, *Heidegger's Being and Time*, p.20
673 Ibid. p.289
(singular) is posited as the last phase of fundamental ontology, which also means that deconstruction is interpreted to find its ground solely in the existential analytic. As such, in this interpretative thesis, deconstruction is determined as Destruktion, to the exclusion of any writings external to Being and Time and fundamental ontology.

The second interpretative thesis sets any attempt to determine what deconstruction signifies within the broader context of Heidegger’s general philosophical endeavours. Within this interpretation, then, there is a wide range of possible characterisations such as: within the context of the question of being, in the context of metaphysics, of an opposition to the philosophical context of Heidegger, and within the context of a search for ‘what has been forgotten’.

In the context of the question of being, deconstruction is then characterised as ‘recollection’; the search for the proper ground of the question of being. In this, the emphasis is placed upon deconstruction as it engages with Greek ontology, disclosing its genuine and non-genuine dimensions. Equally, deconstruction is viewed as the disclosure of the history of being (the tradition of philosophy), a genealogy of transitions and epochs.

Within the context of metaphysics, deconstruction is viewed as an ‘overcoming’ of the self understanding generated by the tradition of metaphysics, and an overcoming (Uberwindung) or sundering of the preconceptions that dominate

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674 Ibid. p.289
675 Ibid. p.290
676 Ibid. pp.290-291
677 Jacques Taminiaux, Heidegger and the project of fundamental ontology, pp.68, 82
678 Ibid. p.103, R. Bernasconi, ‘Repetition and Tradition’, pp.126-8
philosophy. In this, the preconception is revealed as that of everydayness, of nature (object-objectivity) and theorising abstracted from life. Accordingly, deconstruction reveals the destructive (inauthentic) way of being of ‘Western culture’ generated through and in relation to the tradition of metaphysics. Finally, then, deconstruction is viewed as disclosing the onto-theological ground of metaphysics, the prioritisation of always-presence and the physical thing.

As opposed to the present of tradition, deconstruction is interpreted as a destruction of self-evidence and dogmatism. In this, the destruction is not merely aimed at metaphysics and ontology, but additionally, towards the impetus of the natural sciences: the idea of progress, ‘culture’, Weltanschauung, spirit and traditionalism. Furthermore, in this interpretation, deconstruction aims to destroy the preconceptions that allow the humanities to imitate the natural sciences. Thus, as a destruction of the present preconceptions of thinking (philosophy, the sciences and humanities) deconstruction appropriates the tradition of philosophy with regard to its originary ground and its authentic traces.

Finally, deconstruction is interpreted in its broadest sense to signify a ‘paying attention to the matter of thinking’; of what is thought worthy and the essential. Here, deconstruction as it works out is interpreted as containing two parallel
dimensions: of tracing \textit{(spur)} the genuine through the tradition to its originary ground and of appropriating (repeating) the genuine that has been forgotten.\textsuperscript{690}

Deconstruction in context, then, can be characterised in three ways. Initially, deconstruction operates in Heidegger’s earliest writings/lectures as a familiarity with the tradition of philosophy. Here, in such works as \textit{Phenomenological Investigations with Respect to Aristotle}, \textit{Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity}, and \textit{Plato’s Sophist}, Heidegger engages in historical research into the tradition of philosophy and ‘Greek-Christian’ culture which serves as a preliminary arena (or sketch) for further analysis of the question of being in regard to the genuine, originary ground, and time. As such, deconstruction can initially be characterised as a familiarity, or relationship, with the tradition of philosophy and ‘Western culture’ through which the question of being may be brought to light.

Later, in the existential analytic itself, deconstruction operates as a dialogue within the tradition of philosophy; a destruction of the non-genuine and a disclosure of the genuine through which the being of Dasein (existence, being-in-the-world, care, temporality) gets shown. Here, deconstruction serves two purposes, disclosing the genuine and this, disclosing temporality. The existential analytic must be framed as operating within such a deconstruction (dialogue within tradition) insofar as the existential analytic directly confronts traditional preconceptions, indirectly challenges many traditional problems and answers, and finally, takes place within the tradition of philosophy as a philosophical endeavour. Thus, as a dialogue within the tradition, deconstruction may be constituted as a destruction of the improper dimensions of the tradition, or, a clearing of traditional presuppositions and preconceptions of being.

\textsuperscript{690} Ibid. pp.138, 156
Finally, deconstruction also operates upon the ground of the existential analytic. Herein, the disclosure of the genuine and temporality then allows of a repetition and renewal of the questions belonging to the tradition of philosophy, which furthermore, is also an opening to asking the question of being in such a way that something new may be discovered.

This threefold characterisation of deconstruction follows its formulation in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* wherein phenomenology is determined as ‘intuition’, ‘destruction’, and ‘construction’. Deconstruction, in this sense, is nothing other than phenomenology itself as a genuine way of being-philosophical.

C. Deconstruction and the Existential Analytic:

In the more general interpretations of deconstruction, the relationship between deconstruction and existential analytic, for the most part, gets characterised as an inherent mutual dependence, or, a hermeneutical circle. Taking Heidegger’s philosophical endeavours as a whole, the relationship between deconstruction and existential analytic tends to spiral. Initially, the disclosure of Dasein’s being is clearly situated in a context with and dependence upon the tradition of philosophy.\(^{691}\) This is evidenced by Heidegger’s early lectures and writings where there is undoubtedly a deconstructive dimension to his analysis of the tradition of philosophy. At the same time, deconstruction, even in its earliest formulations is also dependent upon the analysis of facticity (a prototype of the existential analytic) as it is factical life revealed in primal Christianity that forms a basis for opposing the non-genuine of the tradition of philosophy.\(^{692}\) This basis of deconstruction, primal Christianity, is

\(^{691}\) Taminiaux, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, p.82

\(^{692}\) Ibid. p.82
evidenced in the term itself ‘Destruktion’, appropriated from Luther in his critique of Greek metaphysics.⁶⁹³

Overall, the mutual dependence of the relationship between the existential analytic and deconstruction is disclosed in the theme of time. In this, the nexus of Dasein’s being as existence and Dasein’s being-understanding is given as the temporality of Dasein’s being: temporality is Dasein’s sense of being, temporality generates the historical, and finally, it is genuine temporality that discloses the genuine of philosophy. Via genuine temporality, a genuine notion of Time, deconstruction is given its aim of destroying the non-genuine in the tradition and also the aim of seeking an originary ground both of which are temporal determinations. Through the existential analytic, genuine temporality is revealed as the sense of Dasein’s being, a determination allowed only via a deconstructive relationship with-in the tradition.

Equally, the existential analytic and deconstruction can be determined as unified in the same sense that Heidegger interprets the unity of φρονησις and σοφία in Plato’s Sophist as the same insight/intuition directed in differing ways to the question of being. Deconstruction, as such, is phenomenological intuition directed towards the question of being via Dasein’s being-temporal as historical and with regard to the dual possibilities of genuine/non-genuine. Likewise, the existential analytic is phenomenological intuition directed towards the phenomenon of understanding via everydayness and thus its ground of temporality. In deconstruction, temporality is intrinsically the ground as Dasein’s historic-ness. In the existential analytic temporality is disclosed as the ground of understanding. Neither, however, must necessarily precede the other insofar as they both belong to phenomenological

intuition directed towards the being-philosophical of Dasein: the question of being and time, time and being.

For all that deconstruction and existential analytic may be unified as phenomenological intuition, nonetheless, they are not identical. This follows, I would argue, the dual grounding of phenomenology mentioned previously: that philosophy as tradition is historic and that philosophy is also a living in the truth. What can be called deconstruction is a philosophical relationship with the historic originary ground of philosophy. The existential analytic is directed towards the question of being-philosophical as a truthful-dwelling, disclosing its fundamental structures and its originary ground. The former approaches the question of being via the historical originary ground, the latter via the originary ground of being-philosophical as the phenomenon of understanding (that which constitutes living in the truth of being).

18. Delimitations: Metaphysics and the Question of the Sense of Being.

In this section, I aim to elucidate a delimitation of Heidegger’s philosophical endeavours and thus also an area excluded from analysis in his phenomenology as ontology. In this, I will initially attempt to show that Heidegger’s question of the sense of being is in some way metaphysical even in its aim to overcome metaphysics. Here, I will argue that the question of being remains ‘metaphysical’ in the sense that it foregrounds the question of ‘how’ the being of entities (not Dasein) get understood, and thus, can be viewed as dealing with the traditional metaphysical question of reality – the what of entities in their being.

At the same time, I will also attempt to show that Heidegger, in excluding what is traditionally called the theological dimension of metaphysics, also excludes a valid and central dimension of metaphysics, namely: the ‘why’. The ‘why’ in this
sense, includes such important questions as: what is the meaning of the world? What is the meaning of human existence? And so on... These are questions that refer to the ‘why’ of Dasein’s being (being-human, ‘who-being’), of purpose, meaning, good and highest possibility. These are questions that cannot be dealt with in the problem of ‘how’: of what-being and ‘why is there something rather than nothing’? In this, it will be important to discuss the basis of Heidegger’s rejection of theology and the question of ‘why’ with regard to being-human, but also to show the inherent problems and delimitations this leads to in Heidegger’s philosophy. Primarily, I will attempt to show that the exclusion of the ‘why’ question with regard to who-being (being-human), even in its merely ontical sense, deprives Heidegger’s characterisation of the being of Dasein of fundamental structures and interpretative scope. This argument, on my part, will then lead into the poignancy of the question of Religion as a phenomenon belonging-to being-human and thus the ‘why’ of who-being.

As such, this section will be divided into three discussions. The first will involve a broad characterisation of metaphysics. The second will involve a discussion of Heidegger’s quest to overcome metaphysics and the exclusion of theology. Finally, the third discussion will take up Heidegger’s exclusion of theology from metaphysics, showing how this also excludes the question of ‘why’ for being-human.

A. A Characterisation of Metaphysics:

When Aristotle’s writings were compiled the texts referring to first philosophy became called ‘τα μετα φυσική’. In this, first philosophy became named ‘metaphysics’ insofar as it was deemed to refer to either ‘what comes after the

694 Thomas Mautner (Ed.) Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, p.351
physics’, or, ‘what lies beyond the physics’. Here, metaphysics intrinsically contains three dimensions: first philosophy, universal understanding of reality, and reason/wisdom (σοφία): thinking beyond, or to the exclusion of, the senses. Thus, metaphysics can be viewed as containing three basic themes: of seeking fundamental concepts of philosophy, of seeking universal truths about reality, and as a way of thinking philosophically.

Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* begins with a discussion of what wisdom (σοφία) is in comparison to sensory knowledge. Initially, sensory/experiential knowledge is determined to be knowledge of particulars, while wisdom is determined as knowledge of universals (981a12-981b12). Wisdom is then given a central role in first philosophy, as a way of thinking pertaining to the highest degree of universal knowledge: first principles and causes (981b25-982a2). Wisdom, as such, is characterised as a way of thinking (pursuing knowledge or truth) that is furthest away from the senses (982a20-25).

Metaphysics (as ontology) is characterised by Aristotle as the science that studies being *qua* being (1003a22). In this, the first causes or principles, Aristotle argues, can only be found via the study of being as being (1003a25-31). There are, however, many senses of being (1003a33-35). Aristotle then poses the question of being as that of which of the various senses of being have priority as the unifying and central sense of being (1003b15-18). In other words, the various senses of being (to be) have a singular originary ground - πρῶτε αρχή (1003b5-6). Metaphysics, as ontology, thus signifies the investigation of the various senses of being and οὐσία as the primary sense of being (1004a10-33). Therefore, a primary characteristic of metaphysics can be called ontology: the investigation of the sense of being.

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Ibid. p.351

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Ibid. p.351
For Aristotle, however, metaphysics also contains a second primary characteristic: the question of the ground and highest mode of being. This is initially the question of the ground, or first cause, of οὐσία: the super-sensuous, the immovable, and the prime/first/unmoved mover (1026a10-33). This, for Aristotle, is nothing other than the divine (Θεος): both the ground and highest mode of οὐσία (1026a20). As such, metaphysics is also θεολογία: the highest and most universal of philosophical problems (1026a19). Thus, theology is the best of all, for it deals with the highest of existing things (1064b1-5).

Both Leibniz and Kant also follow this threefold structure of metaphysics. Leibniz characterises philosophical thinking as ‘a priori reason’: either a priori synthesis (from principles to categories) or a priori analysis (the disclosure of principles).697 A priori Reason, in both its forms, excludes experience and seeks universal knowledge. In Kant, metaphysical thinking is characterised as pure reason: a thinking that is purely conceptual and completely isolated from experience.698

For Leibniz, the problem of metaphysics is given as the question of: why, in nature, there is something rather than nothing?699 In this, Leibniz conjoins ontology and theology together as the question of the reason for everything: being of entities and ground of everything as unified.700 This is the case insofar as the being of entities is their existence and the ground of existent entities (entities in their being) is found in a ‘real’ (actual) entity.701 Thus, in Leibniz, metaphysics contains both ontology and theology in the same way as in Aristotle: that theology has priority over ontology.

697 G.W. Leibniz, ‘Of Universal Synthesis and Analysis’, Philosophical Writings, p.16
698 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp.14, 21, 54
699 G.W. Leibniz, ‘A Resume of Metaphysics, Philosophical Writings, p.145
700 Ibid. p.145. The reason there is something rather than nothing is in some real entity or cause.
701 Ibid. p.145
In Kant, the division of metaphysics into ontology (the question of being) and theology is criticized as entirely speculative. However, Kant nonetheless divides metaphysics into two realms: theoretical and practical. Theoretical reason incorporates much of what constitutes ontology in Aristotle: the task of universal knowledge of reality, or, the determining of causes/principles/grounds (laws) of reality, as humans can know it. Practical reason follows, in part, Aristotle’s notion of theology (as the realms of theology and ethics). Here, practical reason incorporates two questions: ‘what ought I to do?’ and ‘in what may I hope?’ The first of these questions is that of morality, involving the analysis of the will, moral law (law of the good) and freedom as the being of rational entities. Additionally, practical reason also pertains to what in metaphysics is traditionally called theology: the question of freedom and the existence of God.

Overall, Kant defines metaphysics as the full and complete development of human reason and the grounds of all the sciences through principles. As such, Kant can be seen to also follow the tripartite structure of metaphysics: pure reason (analogous to σοφία), forms/causes/laws (αρχή/αιτιον), and (θεολογίκη) highest possible being (highest good – moral law, highest possible being – freedom/God).

B. Heidegger and Metaphysics:

Heidegger is credited with the ‘overcoming’ of metaphysics via phenomenology that is ontology and the question of being. At the same time, however, Heidegger’s ‘Seinsfrage’ is also the most traditional of metaphysical questions. This brings into

702 Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, p.659
703 Ibid. p.659
704 Ibid. p.659
705 Sadler, Heidegger and Aristotle, p.2
question just what ‘overcoming’ metaphysics signifies and whether is does not aim at the dissolution of metaphysics per se, but rather, at its renewal. As such, the first question to be pursued here is whether Heidegger’s question of being contains metaphysical traces or dimensions. Equally, Heidegger’s renewal of metaphysical questioning, in this sense, also excludes the theological dimension of metaphysics. Thus, the second question to be asked is why Heidegger excludes theology from the question of being. A final question arises: does Heidegger’s exclusion of theology also in some sense exclude valid problems from questioning in phenomenology as ontology?

An indication that Heidegger’s question of being aims to renew metaphysical questioning is found in his conception of λογος and the ‘a priori’. In Being and Time the conception of λογος plays an essential role in the formulation of phenomenology. Here, Heidegger acknowledges the traditional metaphysical translation of λογος as reason, judgment and logic, while also overcoming these conceptions by a renewed understanding of Aristotle. In returning to Aristotle, Heidegger then conceives the λογος as properly signifying a truthful (being-true) discourse that allows being to show itself. Likewise, in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger overcomes the traditional notion of a priori. Here, rather than leaving the meaning of a priori as a ‘coming before’ or ‘preceding’, Heidegger conceives the a priori as intrinsically referring to being. Accordingly, a priori reason is conceived anew as a priori cognition (the renewal of Aristotle’s notions of: νοος, σοφια, φρονησις). Thus, in both cases, what gets called reason in traditional metaphysics is critiqued via a return to Aristotle and renewed in relation to ontology.

706 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp.55-58 (H32-34)
707 Ibid. pp.56-57 (H33)
708 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p.20
709 Ibid. p.20
Heidegger’s question of being also overcomes and renews metaphysics in the same way. Heidegger admits to this in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, stating that his phenomenological approach to the question of being seeks what the tradition of metaphysics has sought.\(^{710}\) Furthermore, Heidegger explicitly follows Leibniz’s formulation of the question of metaphysics mentioned previously, i.e., why is there something rather than nothing?\(^{711}\) Equally, Heidegger also follows Hegel’s assertion in the *Science of Logic* that pure being and pure nothing are the same.\(^{712}\) It follows that if Heidegger’s sole question is that of being, then his endeavours are ultimately metaphysical, i.e., the renewal of metaphysical questioning, even as he overcomes the tradition with its sedimentations of self-evidence.

Another feature of Heidegger’s overcoming of metaphysics is his constant avowal and exclusion of theology in a metaphysical sense from the question of being and thus philosophy. In this, Heidegger presents two main arguments for the exclusion of theology from the question of being: the overcoming of metaphysics as onto-theology.

The first argument is aimed primarily at the prioritisation of \(\omega\sigma\tau\alpha\) (and its translation as substance) in metaphysics, but also by extension dissolves the theological component of traditional metaphysics. In this, the critique of the primacy of \(\omega\sigma\tau\alpha\), the critique of the primacy of categorical being (what-being) and always-presence,\(^{713}\) also critiques the God of metaphysics: the divine, the first mover, being-itself, and highest being. If \(\omega\sigma\tau\alpha\) is not the primary sense of being, as Heidegger claims,\(^{714}\) then the theological component of traditional metaphysics can be dismissed.

\(^{710}\) Ibid. p.21
\(^{711}\) Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction To Metaphysics*, Ralph Manheim (trans.) p.1
\(^{712}\) G.W.F Hegel, *Science of Logic*, A.V. Miller (trans.) pp.82-83, Martin Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?’, *Pathmarks*, p.84
\(^{713}\) Sadler, Op. cit. pp.48-9, 51, 57-8
\(^{714}\) Ibid. pp.57-8
as dogmatic thinking that simply supports the preconception of being as always-presence. In other words, theology has no cogency to the question of being if being is not preconceived of as οὐσία. In the first instance, then, the exclusion of theology from metaphysical questioning, for Heidegger, is merely a negative derivative result of the critique of traditional metaphysics in its preconception of being.

However, Heidegger also provides a positive argument for the exclusion of theology from ontology, directly in this sense, as an argument against theology as an ontic ‘science’ (a positive science) rather than ontological. In this, Heidegger’s argument connects theology (Θεος) to the question of highest being based upon Aristotle’s metaphysical writings. For Aristotle, highest being is not simply a highest entity, but also a highest mode of being, i.e., the highest good (1072\textsuperscript{24-31}). For Heidegger, however, the question of the highest good is simply an ontical rather than an ontological question. Additionally, as an ontical question, the question of the highest good, and the highest mode of being, may only be worked out through existing – through living life. As such, theology as an ontic affair is excluded from the question of being insofar as it can be thought ontologically.

Furthermore, Heidegger extends this argument to the exclusion of theology from the question of being insofar as it gets determined as one source of the dogmatic preconception of being as always-presence. In this, theology is not merely construed as supporting the preconception of being (as οὐσία), but also of producing it: as the understanding of being (Greek pre-ontological understanding), and of claiming

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715 Ibid. p.82
716 Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on “Humanism” (1946)’, Pathmarks, pp.268-271
717 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.33 (H12)
718 Heidegger, An Introduction To Metaphysics, p.7, Martin Heidegger, ‘Phenomenology and Theology (1927)’, Pathmarks, pp.43-4, 52-3
719 Heidegger, Plato's Sophist, p.154
what beings are already in advance in their proper and highest modes.\textsuperscript{720} Theology, as such, is the unity of the preconception of being in traditional metaphysics and faith (Greek-Christian). Thus, theology signifies faith (dogmatism): the indifference to the question of being\textsuperscript{721} and the mortal enemy of philosophy.\textsuperscript{722}

C. The Implications of the Exclusion of Theology

One interpretation of Heidegger’s exclusion of theology from metaphysics is that he was attempting to acknowledge and affirm the validity of theology in its own right, or, of rescuing theology from metaphysics.\textsuperscript{723} This interpretative thesis, in general, follows Heidegger’s argument in ‘Building, Dwelling, Thinking’ and elsewhere that: a) the destruction of traditional metaphysics liberates the divine, b) that it destroys the God of metaphysics, and c) it is only from the truth of being that the holy/divine can be thought.\textsuperscript{724} Thus, the question in an ontological sense is how the divine comes to presence.\textsuperscript{725}

There are, however, two problems with Heidegger’s exclusion of theology from the metaphysical – from the question of being. The first is that in excluding theology Heidegger’s phenomenology is then delimited in its ability to interpret religion(s) and the meaning of Religion insofar as he preconceives Religion as signifying the divine as it comes to presence. The second is that in excluding theology, Heidegger’s phenomenology is also unable to come to terms with both senses of ‘why’ as it is posited in Aristotle and the tradition of metaphysics, i.e., why

\textsuperscript{720} Ibid. p.154  
\textsuperscript{721} Heidegger, \textit{An Introduction to Metaphysics}, p.7  
\textsuperscript{722} Heidegger, ‘Phenomenology and Theology’, \textit{Pathmarks}, p.53  
\textsuperscript{724} Marion, Op. cit. pp.32, 35, 39-40  
\textsuperscript{725} Ibid.p.40, Martin Heidegger, ‘Building, Dwelling, Thinking’, \textit{Basic Writings}, pp.352, 355
do I exist? (what is the meaning of human existence: what is our highest good, our highest possibility/possible relationship?)

In the first case, Heidegger’s exclusion of theology from the question of being also hides and obscures the question of what Θεός means in general, i.e., in regard to Religion. This means, then, that Heidegger cannot with assurance write of the divine except through what he already preconceives about the divine: through Christianity and Greek philosophy. In other words, Heidegger’s restriction of the question of the divine to its emergence (φως) in dwelling remains entirely metaphysical. This has further implications for any proper phenomenological interpretations of theology, and more importantly, of the meaning of Religion.

The more fundamental problem of Heidegger’s exclusion of ‘theology’, in this sense, is the exclusion of the ‘why’ of Dasein’s (being-human) existence. In this, Heidegger’s exclusion of theology can be viewed as excluding the second sense of ‘why’ in Aristotle’s metaphysics: of highest possibility and highest good. This becomes problematic in the light of Heidegger’s reversal of the ontological question: the prioritisation of Dasein’s being (who-being) over categorical being (what-being).

In this reversal, rather than disclose the sense of being from the mode of the being of entities in the world (what-being, ως), Heidegger prioritises the sense of Dasein’s being as the being who understands being, and through this, discloses the unified sense of being (implicitly, the sense of being for Dasein). This orientation to ontology, then, directs itself towards the question of the being of entities in the world via a reversal of traditional ontology, through Dasein as the being who brings to

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727 Robert D’Amico, Contemporary Continental Philosophy, p.64
presence. On the other hand, this reversal that prioritises the being of Dasein also restricts itself to the question of being as a question of the emergence of entities in the world.

A fundamental limit of this reversal, when combined with the exclusion of ‘theology’, is the inability of Heidegger’s phenomenology to direct itself towards the being of humans (being-human) in itself, for itself, and thus: how being-human is the ground of the question of ‘why do I exist’ – meaning, purpose, good, possibility. This limit cannot be explained by its ontical foundation and expression. Rather, in the reversal of ontological priority brought about through Heidegger’s phenomenology, the question of the ‘why’ in this sense only gains greater urgency. For, ontological questioning always has an ontical foundation. If, then, it is possible for Heidegger to ask: ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ (What-being), then it is equally possible to ask: ‘why do I exist rather than not?’ (Who-being).728

These two problems, therefore, reveal a delimitation in Heidegger’s question of being insofar as it shows that Heidegger fails to either recognise or develop properly both senses of the ‘why’ implicit to the question of being. This is an important limit to recognise insofar as what is called ‘Religion’ lies at the centre of this limit (oversight/hidden-ness): the question of the meaning of being-human and the existential structures of this question.

728 See Glossary: Who-being
Chapter Six: A Phenomenology of Religion

It is the aim of this chapter to formulate and outline ‘a phenomenology of Religion’ as it will be worked out in the next two parts of the research. This chapter, as such, has two aims: the first is a formulation of a phenomenology of Religion grounded upon the discussions already provided and second, is outlining the content and agenda of this study. Thus, both aims of the chapter are transitional, as a movement from the groundwork provided thus far to an outline of the preliminary and preparatory phenomenological interpretation of the meaning of what is called Religion: a test of the possibility of a phenomenology of Religion that is ontological.

The chapter will be divided into three sections. The first (S19) will provide a philosophical-theoretical formulation of a phenomenology of Religion. The second (S20) will discuss the delimitations of the working out of a phenomenology of Religion to be provided. Finally, (S21) will outline the systematic content of a phenomenology of Religion as both a deconstruction and a ‘towards an existential analytic’.

19. A Preliminary Formulation of a Phenomenology of Religion

A. Phenomenon.

A phenomenon, in an ontological sense, signifies being. Insofar as being is always the being of an entity, within the modalities of ‘what-being’ or ‘who-being’, a phenomenon signifies how the being of an entity gives itself. Here, the given-ness of being thus has two basic possibilities: of what it is in its being (entities not Dasein) or
who it is in its being (being-human). In both cases, a phenomenon is characterised properly as a belonging-to.

Belonging-to, in this sense, has two dimensions: the grasping of belonging-to (understanding) and of who or what it belongs-to. In the first instance, the grasping of belonging-to is itself an expression of the being of Dasein (being-human). Here, Dasein’s grasping of being as it is given is intuitive and interpretative in its basic character. Furthermore, the grasping that belongs-to being-human also intrinsically contains the possibilities of understanding and misunderstanding (of proper and improper grasping). Thus, in the first instance, the belonging-to of a phenomenon is determined as the grasping by Dasein in being-human of the given-ness of being.

Here, the primary signification of grasping by Dasein is that of misunderstanding: that there is a tendency for humans to improperly grasp what is given. Thus, there is a tendency for entities to be grasped with regard to their presence, and from presence to presuppose ground, i.e., being. This eventuates in a view that constitutes being as that which underlies the entity, or, as that which does not appear but is nonetheless presented as the unity of the phenomena that make up the phenomenon. This tendency to misunderstand, moreover, can be characterised as the formulation of being as a presupposition that is worked out from everyday preconceptions of what something is. Therefore, the primary character of misunderstanding, of improper grasping, is that of unquestioned preconception – of self-evidential grounds of understanding being and thus a phenomenon.

Equally, then, the possibility of proper grasping is founded upon the revealing and questioning of preconceptions, the clearing away of preconceptions that determine what is found. In this, the possibility of proper grasping of a phenomenon, of being, hinges entirely upon the possibility of the proper itself: of proper
questioning, of proper understanding, and thus ultimately, of a proper notion of being-
human. For, the possibility of the ‘proper’ of questioning and understanding is itself
intrinsically connected to the question of ‘who’ it is to be-human. Accordingly, the
possibility of any proper grasping of being is founded upon the proper grasping of
being-human in advance. Insofar as this formulation of phenomenology is derivative
of Heidegger’s, as mentioned before, it will also accept Heidegger’s determination of
the basic characteristics of being-human: existence, being-in-the-world, concern, care
and time. However, the grasping of being-human in advance, here, will be determined
primarily in regard to the basic threefold characterisation of being-human as it is
given in existence: mode (actualisation), how (interpretation), directedness.\footnote{729}

Second, a phenomenon is a belonging-to insofar as it belongs-to an entity with
a modality of being. Here, insofar as there are two primary modalities of being: ‘what-
being’ and ‘who-being’, the determination of the belonging-to of a phenomenon has
its ground in the distinction between modes of being. For ‘what-being’, the belonging-
to of a phenomenon has its ground in the ontic-ontological relationship of being-
human via the phenomenon of understanding. Thus, with regard to categorical being,
or, entities not Dasein, the question of being refers to that of presencing (given-ness)
originating within Dasein’s dwelling (ηθος) in a world. On the other hand, for ‘who-
being’, the belonging-to of a phenomenon has a doubled ground: of self-
understanding and of an immediate ‘belonging-to (our) being’. Thus, at issue in a
phenomenon of ‘who-being’ is not merely the presencing-givenness relation (as with
‘what being’) but also a question of how does this phenomenon belong-to being-
human as a whole.

\footnote{729} This characterisation derived from S10: Religion and Existence.
The problem of interpreting Religion as a phenomenon, then, is first of all a question of what the meaning of Religion is with regard to its given-ness: of how Religion is given in human existence. This is the question of understanding: of the structure of what is understood about Religion (of how and where Religion is given), and the disclosure of the proper and improper of understanding.

The problem of interpreting Religion, as a phenomenon is equally that of what Religion means as it belongs-to being-human. Here, the meaning of Religion is only accessible insofar as the being of humans is given, and thus characterised in its given-ness at the outset. In this respect, there are two primary dimensions of the given-ness of being-human: the where and way. The where of the given-ness of being-human is the determination of how being-human gets given in existence: determinable as horizon - the past and everyday living. Equally, the way of being-human reflects a twofold potentiality of the actualisation of being-human: to be one’s self or otherwise, proper or improper, being-true or being-false. Religion as a phenomenon, therefore, can be disclosed via an interpretation that characterises the meaning of Religion as it belongs-to being-human given to presence in the where and way of existence.

B. Λόγος

The concept of λόγος to be utilised in this research, for the most part, will follow Heidegger’s conception in Being and Time. The primary meaning of the λόγος is, in my interpretation, a discursive relation that allows being to be given. Thus, as a discursive relation, the λόγος is being-true, or, a truthful relationship with being. The possibility of λόγος is founded in intuition that is inherently interpretive: the interpretative (and thus communicated) grasping of being as it gives itself.
Insofar as the λόγος, in this sense, is directed towards the phenomenon of Religion, the λόγος must be characterised as an interpretive-intuition of the meaning of Religion as it gets given in existence, and in belonging-to being-human, the ground of religion(s)/religiosity in being-human.

C. A Phenomenology of Religion

For this research, phenomenology will signify an intuitive hermeneutical discourse that has the task of disclosing the ground of the phenomenon, Religion, as it belongs-to being-human. A phenomenology of Religion, then, has as its task the disclosure of the meaning of Religion as it belongs-to being-human.

This is initially a task of what is called transcendence, of tracing from how and what Religion gives itself as, via indication, to an ontological interpretation of the meaning of Religion. In general, this transcending movement, towards which a phenomenology of Religion aims, will only succeed upon the ground of a preparatory interpretation of tradition(s) of understanding Religion that project and maintain preconceptions of what Religion means. These preparatory interpretations will be deconstructions, the critical analysis of tradition(s) within the context of the way Religion is understood. In this, the interpretation will necessarily be ‘critical’ in the sense of the ways Religion may be understood and actualised in life: proper and improper. Here, the deconstructions to be provided have two tasks: a) revealing and critiquing the improper, b) revealing the proper.

In pursuing the proper and genuine understanding/actualisations of Religion, via the ‘destruction’ of the improper, the task of the deconstructive dimension of phenomenology has as its primary characteristic the disclosure of the proper indications of the meaning of Religion. As such, the deconstructions to be provided
will be the groundwork of a phenomenological interpretation of the meaning of Religion in existence (being-human).

Once the groundwork is provided, it will then be possible to trace from the indications disclosed in the deconstruction to the ontological-existential structures of being-human that show the meaning of Religion, and furthermore, allow the interpretation of originary ground. This tracing, via indication, is nothing other than a movement towards an existential analytic: the movement from everydayness to existential structures and ground. The foundation of this movement of indication is the relationship between entities and being, that being gives itself in entities, and the reverse, that entities show being. Thus, indication signifies the phenomenological movement from the grasping of a phenomenon as it is actualised to the determination of the belonging-to of that phenomenon: an entity in its being. Moreover, in a phenomenology of Religion indication signifies the movement from what shows itself as Religion in actualisation [religion(s)/religiosity] to the determination of the meaning of Religion as belonging-to being-human, and what can be called the ground of Religion in being-human.

The movement towards an existential analytic, as such, contains two stages. The first stage is the movement from the actualisation of Religion to the determination of the meaning of Religion as belonging-to. In this, the task is to disclose the meaning of Religion within the existential structures of being-human. The second stage is a movement from these existential structures to the determination of what can be called the meaning of Religion in its ground.
20. Delimitations

A. The Possibility of a ‘Phenomenology of Religion’

The first delimitation arises from the preliminary and preparatory character of this research. The research is preliminary, in this sense, insofar as it is a question of possibility. Thus, the primary question of the research is not to provide a phenomenology of Religion, but rather, to establish the possibility of a phenomenology of Religion. As such, the preliminary character of the phenomenological interpretations to come can best be called groundwork.

The research is preparatory, in this sense, insofar as it aims to prepare for a more complete phenomenology of Religion. The phenomenological interpretations to come, then, aim to be foundational: as methodological-theoretical questioning that grounds, and thus prepares for the further phenomenological investigations. Here, the way towards a phenomenology will be prepared for via the disclosure of the meaning and ground of Religion.

B. Foregrounding of Foundational/Methodological Problems

The preliminary and preparatory character of the phenomenological interpretation of Religion, then, implies limit: of questioning and content. Initially, this means that the content of the investigations must be limited, heavily weighted towards the concerns of groundwork: of characterising the problem, of formulating the way of approaching the problem and of establishing proper conceptual grounds. The first two parts of the research, to which this discussion is the finale, exemplify the concern for groundwork in this sense.

More poignant, however, is the limits of the phenomenological interpretations to come, and the emphasis upon the task of working out the possibility of a
phenomenology of Religion. Here, the foregrounding of foundational problems leads to the delimiting of the scope of the investigations: restricting the investigations to the question of the meaning of Religion and what can be called its ground. Accordingly, the scope of the deconstructions and existential analytic to be provided will also be limited.

With regard to deconstruction, the foregrounding of foundational problems will then lead to three main limitations. Initially, this means that the deconstructive dimension will contain only the first preliminary movement of deconstruction: that is, a critical relation within the tradition(s) that clears a way for grounding, disclosing existential characteristics and originary ground. As such, the deconstruction to be provided will not seek to move further than preparing the ground for an existential analytic.

The deconstruction to be provided will thus also be limited in relation to interpretative content. In this, the priority of foundational concerns signifies the restriction of critical analysis to those tradition(s) intrinsically connected to the possibility of a phenomenology of Religion. Accordingly, the deconstruction of tradition(s) will begin with the point of origin of the ‘Western’ philosophical tradition: the tradition from within which phenomenology is made possible.

The final delimitation that requires discussion is the limit to be imposed upon the existential investigations. In this, the final part of the research could be better termed as ‘towards an existential analytic’ insofar as the ontological interpretation of existence to be given will only pertain to the question of ground and meaning. Due to this aim, the final part of the research will only outline the existential characteristics of Religion, moving towards an existential analytic through the disclosure of ground.
21. Outline of ‘A phenomenology of Religion’

A. Deconstruction

The deconstruction herein will contain an interpretation of the philosophical tradition in its Pre-Socratic origins as it understands Religion. There are four questions to be addressed in the deconstruction of the philosophical tradition.

1. What are the indications of the meaning of Religion as belonging-to being-human given in the origins of the philosophical tradition? (de-constructive case studies of Pre-Socratic thinking)

2. The question of ‘why’? (Why do we exist? what is the meaning of our existence? what is the highest possibilities of existence? What is the highest good of existence?)

3. The question of belief.

4. The question of the otherwise than being: the nothing and ωφχη.

B. Towards an Existential Analytic

The second part of the investigation into the possibility of a phenomenology of Religion will move towards an existential analytic of the meaning of Religion with regard to ground. In this, the movement towards an existential analytic will take place in three phases: indications, the transition from indication to being-human, and a preliminary outline of the meaning of Religion.

The first phase will provide various preliminary arguments that will draw out the essential of that which has been indicated in Pre-Socratic thinking. Herein, the indications given via Pre-Socratic thinking will be refined so as to pose the meaning of Religion as a question in its own particular way, determined by the unique
character of Religion as a phenomenon. Moreover, the unique character of Religion as a phenomenon will be disclosed through a discussion of being and non-being and the radical distinction between being and \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \). As such, the first phase of part four will attempt to show that the meaning of Religion intrinsically belongs-to being-human in relation to non-being as \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) and then to draw out the implications of this relation.

The second phase, of transition, will move from the implications drawn out of the indications of the meaning of Religion to an outline of the ontological-existential characteristics of Religion given therein. This phase, then, will attempt to disclose how the indications of the meaning of Religion are founded in existential structures within the potentiality of an ‘equiprimordial’ proper/improper. The aim, herein, is to provide an interpretation of the existential meaning of Religion via what has been disclosed in the deconstructions wherein the deconstructions will operate as the foundation for the movement towards an existential analytic: disclosing the improper and proper with regard to Religion as a phenomenon. This, as such, is the task of making the transition from indications to existential analysis via the groundwork provided by the deconstruction: the disclosure of the proper.

The third phase, then, will attempt to disclose the meaning of Religion. To disclose the meaning of Religion in this sense is the task of showing what Religion means as a phenomenon belonging-to being-human in a structural way, i.e., existential characteristics. Furthermore, to disclose meaning in this sense is to show what can be called the ground of Religion: of that which in being-human generates the possibility of being-religious and thus religion(s). Herein, the primary aim will be to provide an interpretation of belief as that which can be called the ground of Religion and to provide an outline of the meaning of Religion through belief as ground.
Part Three: Deconstructive Case Studies:

In providing deconstructive case studies of the Pre-Socratic thinkers; Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides, the ultimate aim is to interpret these thinkers in a phenomenological way. Furthermore, the question at hand is the phenomenon of Religion with regard to its meaning and its character of belonging-to being-human. The phenomenological way of interpretation posits the thinking of philosophy as indicative of the primary phenomenon to be addressed. That is, a deconstruction aims to show how, and in what sense, the thinking of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides discloses via indications the phenomenon of Religion.

As such, there are three questions to be posed in relation to Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides as thinkers. Initially it must be asked: how have the Pre-Socratic philosophers been interpreted? Here the question is twofold: through whom have the pre-Socratic thinkers been interpreted, and, what kind of preconception informs the interpretation of their thought? The second question is thus the corresponding: how have the pre-Socratic thinkers been translated? Here, the question signifies the relation between the preconception of what pre-Socratic philosophy is all about and the way in which the Greek gets translated within the tradition of philosophy as technical terminology. Finally, the third question is a purely phenomenological one: what does the thinking/textual fragments of these pre-Socratic thinkers indicate? Again, the question is twofold: with regard to being-human and with regard to the meaning of Religion. These three questions, as such, reflect the path of the deconstruction; the movement from preconception and destruction to indications and construction.
The first question will be taken up as the ‘how of interpretation’. In this, two poignant themes arise: of how Aristotle takes up the role of the thinker through whom the pre-Socratic thinkers may be interpreted and then, secondly, how the pre-Socratic thinkers are preconceived therein as philosophers of nature or natural theologians. As such, the problem of the ‘how of interpretation’ takes up as a question the ways in which the pre-Socratic philosophers get subsumed into the tradition of metaphysics. Likewise, the question of translation is the corresponding problem of how such terms as φόστης and Θεος are translated and transformed in being incorporated into the tradition of metaphysics.

In the third question, the problems of philosophy will be taken up as indicative ways. Herein, the presumed unity of αρχη and being will be shown to be problematic. Furthermore, the preconception of a strict duality within pre-Socratic thought will also be questioned. A pivotal question in this investigation will be the notion of Θεος, especially with regard to how this notion is equated with, and thus given the identity of, both αρχη and being as that which constitutes presence. Equally, the third question will also take up the theme of being-human: of what the pre-Socratic understanding of human existence indicates about being-human.

Thus, the primary question leading towards indication is this: how does it stand with Θεος? How does it stand with Θεος in relation to the structures of thinking/understanding reality? How does it stand with Θεος in relation to being-human as understanding? Here, the notion of Θεος is not taken up as an object, let alone an object of Religion, but rather, will be taken as a philosophical question which discloses characteristics of being-human and furthermore, the meaning of Religion as belonging-to being-human.
Chapter 7: Case Studies In Pre-Socratic Philosophy: Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides.

22. The How of Interpreting the Pre-Socratic Thinkers.

The translation and interpretation of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides is fraught with ambiguity and paradox. Taking Aristotle’s commentary as a point of origin there is to be found, therein, an interpretation that characterises these thinkers as confused and struggling with a lack of conceptual language for the task they engaged with (986b1-897a9). Here, the pre-Socratic thinkers are described as both φυσικος and θεολογη (983b20); conjoining the question of the αρχη of φυσις with Θεος within the notion of a singular identity. However, academic interpretations of these thinkers tend to draw out or prioritise one of these two notions, either φυσις or Θεος. Thus, aside from Aristotle’s commentary upon the pre-Socratic thinkers, the tendency is to preconceive either φυσις or Θεος as the primary questions of pre-Socratic thought. Before entering into a discussion of how Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides are interpreted as individual thinkers, it is first necessary to place these interpretations within a general context, i.e., Aristotle, philosophy of nature and theology.

A. Pre-Socratic Thinking in General: via Aristotle, Φυσις and Θεος.

Aristotle’s commentary on pre-Socratic thought, for the most part, can be found in the first book of the Metaphysics. Here, the general context of the commentary lies in such themes as wisdom, science and first principles (982a1-983a23). Aristotle goes on to comment that pre-Socratic philosophy as a whole is characterised by the conception

730 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, p.40
of the identity of αρχη and matter; that matter is both the principle/ground and element of all that is (Meta 983b5-15).\textsuperscript{731} Equally, Aristotle comments, pre-Socratic thinking tends to view the divine as material – elemental (Meta 983b28-984b23). Thus, for the most part, pre-Socratic thought eventuates in the conception of reality as a single entity; θεος and matter conjoined (Meta 986b8-987a2). For Aristotle, then, pre-Socratic thought is interpreted to display three features: a) the association of αρχη and matter, b) the association of αρχη and θεος, and thus c) the identity of θεος and φυσις.

In the academic interpretations of pre-Socratic thinking in general there is, as previously mentioned, a tendency to draw out either φυσις or θεος as the primary theme of pre-Socratic investigation. The dominant academic interpretative tendency is to prioritise φυσις, viewing pre-Socratic thought as natural philosophy. As philosophers of nature, pre-Socratic thought is interpreted as posing four interrelated questions: φυσις as nature, φυσις as becoming, φυσις as cosmos, and φυσις as αρχη. On the other hand, where pre-Socratic thought is preconceived of as theological, it is then found that the primary problem is that of the notion of θεος as a theme of philosophical investigation.\textsuperscript{732} In this, pre-Socratic thinking is viewed as the questioning of mythic narratives of the divine, attempting therein a de-anthropomorphic notion of θεος and equally, a divinisation of φυσις. As such, pre-Socratic thought is conceived as the foundations of rational and natural theology, thus being precursors to μεταφυσις proper.

Both of these interpretative tendencies, however, can be seen to implicitly follow the broad outline of Aristotle’s commentary in the Metaphysics as precursors

\textsuperscript{731} “Most thought the principles which were of the nature of matter were the only principle of all things…”

\textsuperscript{732} Jaeger, The Theology of Early Greek Philosopher’s, p.4
of metaphysical thinking within a text on metaphysical thought. As such, the general
drift of academic interpretations may be characterised as a doubled Aristotelian
reading: the interpretation of pre-Socratic thought via Aristotle and within Aristotle’s
systematic view of metaphysics as science. Thus, as in Aristotle, academic
interpretations tend to view pre-Socratic thought as the emergence of reason: of
natural science (φυσική), philosophy of nature (metaphysics) and the metaphysical
thinking of the identity of being as Theology. The discussions and analysis of these
interpretations of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides to follow will draw out
these Aristotelian and metaphysical interpretative tendencies as the groundwork for a
deconstruction.

B. Anaximander:

It is Anaximander, rather than Thales, who is generally considered the first
philosopher proper. Anaximander is credited with the first philosophical text of which
some fragments remain. In general, Anaximander’s thinking is credited with two
crucial themes: the question of αρχή and the notion of natural law (order).

In the first instance, Anaximander has been credited with the utilisation of the
term απειρόν in a technical sense, referring herein for the first time, to the αρχή, or,
the idea of the αρχή. In this way, the απειρόν has been interpreted to have the
following general significations: the ground of all things, not elemental but some
other απειρόν (infinite) nature, the ground of physical law, and finally, the
 genesis of the notion of the non-perceptible. The απειρόν, as such, is interpreted to
be a technical term related to the question of first principle; the ground of reality in

733 Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy, pp.75-6
734 Ibid. p.71
735 Ibid. p.75
736 Hussey, The Presocratics, p.24
737 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, p.78
general, and the ground of determinate things. The απειρόν, furthermore, is also associated, via extrapolations from the fragments, with the structure of reality and αεί (the eternal).

Equally, Anaximander is also credited with the origination of the idea of natural order; that everything occurs within and under law and necessity. In this, fragment one has been interpreted as signifying a temporal arrangement in the processes of becoming that is necessary and universal in association with justice. Thus, fragment one is interpreted as the positing of a general principle of justice at work in the physical world. Here, justice is associated with governance; physical law and order. Furthermore, insofar as fragment one contains reference to both απειρόν and justice, there is also an assumed connection between them, i.e., the απειρόν is given the attribute of justice. As such, it is assumed that justice can therefore be constituted as a property of the απειρόν.

Once these two themes are ascertained in their generalities, however, the subsequent interpretations as to the significance of the απειρόν, justice and their identity tends to become divided according to the presumed general aim or focus of Anaximander’s thinking: either φωσίς or Θεος.

A classic example of the interpretation of Anaximander as a philosopher of nature (φωσικός) can be found in Burnet’s work: Greek Philosophy. In this text, Burnet argues that the notion of απειρόν is derived solely from “Greek physical thinking”, that is: the appearance of opposites and the subsequent question of the

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738 Jaeger, The Theology of Early Greek Philosopher’s, p.25
739 Shibles, Models of Ancient Greek Philosophy, p.26
741 Freeman, Ancilla to the Presocratic Philosophers, Fragment 1: “according to necessity” (Unless stated otherwise, the source utilised for the Presocratic fragments will be: Freeman, Ancilla to the Presocratic Philosophers)
742 Freeman, God, Man and State: Greek Concepts, p.15
744 Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy, p.75
unifying ground of opposites. As such, the concept of \( \alpha \nu \zeta \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) is defined as the name for the material principle; the stuff from which all things arise and to which they return again. It follows, then, that justice is the order of physical relations: the balancing out of opposing elements. Finally, Burnet interprets Anaximander to be a “polite atheist”, utilising the term \( \Theta \varepsilon \omicron \zeta \) in a non-religious sense as the personification of natural phenomena. There are, therefore, three main themes associated with Anaximander conceived of as a natural philosopher: material ground, natural law, and the personification or deification of both of the above.

This interpretation of the \( \alpha \nu \zeta \iota \rho \omicron \nu \), in the first instance, follows Aristotle’s commentary on Anaximander’s thinking wherein the \( \alpha \nu \zeta \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) is viewed as an intermediate substance. This is evidenced, initially, by the definition of the \( \alpha \nu \zeta \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) as some other \( \alpha \nu \zeta \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) nature than the elements. Thus, the \( \alpha \nu \zeta \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) cannot be construed as an element, but nonetheless is interpreted to signify substance. As such, the \( \alpha \nu \zeta \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) must be (it is argued) a substance that lies in between the elements: that acts as their principle and source of matter.

Three justifications are then given for this interpretation of the \( \alpha \nu \zeta \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) as an in-between substance rather than a determined singular originative substance. First, the \( \alpha \nu \zeta \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) allows the elements to develop and undergo transformation only insofar as it is distinguishable from the elements. Second, the \( \alpha \nu \zeta \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) also serves as an indefinite substance: an infinite source material for determinate things. Finally, the \( \alpha \nu \zeta \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) as this in-between and non-determinate substance may be connected with

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\(^{745}\) Burnet, *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato*, p.22
\(^{746}\) Ibid. p.22
\(^{747}\) Ibid. pp.22-3
\(^{748}\) Ibid. pp.22-3
\(^{749}\) Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, p.111
\(^{750}\) Barnes, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p.75
\(^{752}\) Ibid. p.113
\(^{753}\) Ibid. p.114
justice: the origination and destruction of determinate things and thus the retention of matter in this process.\(^{754}\)

From the context of this Aristotelian interpretation, the \(\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\) is then generally defined as primal stuff; a material substratum that is not yet determined.\(^{755}\)

In this, the \(\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\) is also given the property of a common stuff from which everything arises, containing the potentiality of everything, which is also a neutral indeterminate unity.\(^{756}\) Thus, the primary character of the \(\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\) is non-determinate matter, or, material ground.

Various attempts to provide definitions and translations of the \(\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\) have also been given via etymological surveys. In the most general sense, \(\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\), from \(\alpha\pi\epsilon\rho\alpha\tau\alpha\) signifies lack of boundaries.\(^{757}\) In this, \(\pi\epsilon\rho\alpha\tau\alpha\) has a spatial connotation, which would then signify non-bounded or unbounded.\(^{758}\) There is, as such, a general consensus that the \(\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\), at the very least, has some spatial signification. Equally, the \(\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\) is also translated, on the basis of usage, to signify without limit or definition.\(^{759}\) Another early use of \(\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\) is that of surrounding: of binding, and the circular/spherical.\(^{760}\) Finally, there is also consensus that Anaximander’s use of the term \(\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\) signifies \(\alpha\rho\chi\eta\), principle or ground.

At this stage, however, the consensus dissolves with regard to further and more determinate philosophical connotations of the \(\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\). Some assert that the \(\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\) must have a physical or material signification\(^{761}\), others refute the physical

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\(^{754}\) Ibid. pp.114-115
\(^{756}\) Brumbaugh., *The Philosopher’s of Greece*, p.20
\(^{757}\) Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, p.84
\(^{759}\) Kirk, Op. cit. p.110
\(^{760}\) Guthrie, Op. cit., p.85
identity of the απειρον\textsuperscript{762}, and some argue that the απειρον is both material and non-material insofar as there is no distinction in Pre-Socratic thinking between matter and form.\textsuperscript{763} Thus, even amongst those who interpret Anaximander to be a philosopher of nature, there is no certainty as to what the απειρον signifies in detail as a material ground. The question, therefore, is whether the απειρον as material ground may be constituted as substance as Aristotle argues? Nonetheless, the essential definition given by commentators of the απειρον is “material ground”, which is in agreement with the general gist of Aristotle’s commentary. This is evident in the repeated characterisation of the απειρον as primal stuff, signifying some non-determinate substance.

The second theme, of justice as natural law, is then posited as the notion of balancing opposites, or, the management of waste. In this, the assessment of time and necessity are interpreted to signify natural law: the processes of nature, becoming, and the flux of opposites.\textsuperscript{764} On the one hand, then, it appears that Anaximander posits a harmony, or unity, of opposites: that opposing elements relate within an ordered process of balancing out.\textsuperscript{765} Equally, it also appears that there is an ordering or lawfulness to the process of becoming and destruction. Justice, as natural law, is also interpreted as the management of matter (conservation of matter).\textsuperscript{766} Herein, justice is interpreted as a primitive idea of natural law wherein determinate things come out of and return to the material substratum, thus preserving the quantity of matter in the universe. In general, as such, the interpretation of justice as natural law can be seen to

\textsuperscript{762} Kirk, Op. cit. p.116
\textsuperscript{764} Brumbaugh, Op. cit. p.24
\textsuperscript{765} Ibid. p.24, Burnet, Op. cit. pp.22-23
imply a vague governance of φοσις: of becoming and the relations between opposites.767

The question then arises as to what relation there is, if any, between the απειρον and justice. Here, the fragments of Anaximander provide no clear evidence or argument for any relation, simply positing that the απειρον is the source of all things and that to which all things return upon destruction. Rather, if anything, justice is associated with necessity and time: “according to necessity… according to the arrangement of time…” (Fr: 1). Another possibility is that justice is the relation of existing things themselves: “for they give justice and make reparation for injustice…” (Fr: 1)

Strangely, but unsurprisingly, those who interpret Anaximander to be a natural philosopher tend to assume a relation between the απειρον and justice wherein justice is an attribute or property of the απειρον. This is unsurprising for two primary reasons. First, in Aristotle αρχη signifies first principle or cause, that is: the unity of first cause as the ground of causality and Θεος as the id-entity of causality. Furthermore, the interpretation of the απειρον as material ground also makes this relation necessary insofar as it is necessary for the αρχη to signify unifying ground, i.e., the unity of what something is and the relations between entities (causality). Thus, if the απειρον is defined as material ground, then the απειρον must also predetermine what is thing is and how things relate. Therefore, the απειρον as material ground signifies the unity of form and matter, or, a lack of distinction between them.

This assumed relation between the απειρον and justice then leads into the problem of Θεος. Here, Θεος is characterised as a name for, or, personification of,

767 Ibid. p.116, Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, pp.8-9
this unity of the απειρον and natural law. In other words, the term Θεος can be characterised as the subsumption of natural law under material ground. In this, the notion of Θεος gets interpreted as either a personification of, or the positing of intelligence to, the απειρον. In the first instance, Θεος is defined as a response to the moral potentiality or significance of the natural order, or more bluntly, as a politic inclusion of the religious culture in which Anaximander lived. Accordingly, divinity is attached to the απειρον insofar as it may be constituted as an intelligent agent (thus incorporating natural law): as enfolding and directing the process of φυσις.

Ironically, the logical conclusion of the interpretation of Anaximander as a natural philosopher and the απειρον as material ground is the threefold identity of απειρον, justice and Θεος. In this, the only possible result of the interpretation is much the same as Aristotle’s: that Anaximander, in defining the απειρον as material ground, must conclude that the universe is a single entity. The inevitability of this conclusion must be shown.

The interpretation of Anaximander as a natural philosopher finds three primary philosophical themes in the notion of the απειρον: material ground, αρχη and Θεος. The first means that the απειρον must be constituted as physical in some sense, eg, as an idea of atoms or the idea of some basic constitutive building block of the physical universe. Equally, the απειρον is defined as signifying the αρχη in a metaphysical sense, eg, the unifying ground or first cause upon which both causality and the essence of things are founded. Finally, as Θεος, the απειρον is also associated with the metaphysical concept of the identity of the first cause as an intelligent

768 Vlastos, ‘Theology and Philosophy in Early Greek Thought’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 2/7 (1952) p.113
agency. What is found, therefore, in the unity of these three themes is a definition of the \( \alpha \pi \varepsilon \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) as a divine physical substance that unifies and causes all that is. The \( \alpha \pi \varepsilon \iota \rho \omicron \nu \), as such, is the universe as a unified physical whole, operating according to natural law, and also given the attribute of divinity. Thus, the inevitable conclusion of this interpretation of Anaximander as a natural philosopher is the identity of the \( \alpha \pi \varepsilon \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) as a universal entity. The question then remains: Does an interpretation of Anaximander as a theologian produce differing results?

The interpretation of Anaximander as a theologian views his thinking as containing two general trends. First, Anaximander is interpreted to be a thinker who poses the divine as a problem for reason. In this, the mythical narratives of the divine are questioned via reason and furthermore, also with regard to the notion of \( \phi \upsilon \sigma \iota \varsigma \). As such, Anaximander is interpreted to conceptualise \( \Theta \epsilon \omicron \omicron \) via \( \phi \upsilon \sigma \iota \varsigma \); of being a natural theologian for whom theology is an outgrowth of \( \phi \upsilon \sigma \iota \varsigma \). Thus, Anaximander is considered to be a natural theologian who takes up the ultimate metaphysical question: from whence comes the origin of everything (or) why is there something rather than nothing?

As a natural theologian, it is argued, there are three primary dimensions of Anaximander’s thinking: \( \Theta \epsilon \omicron \omicron \), \( \kappa \sigma \sigma \mu \omicron \sigma \) and \( \kappa \sigma \sigma \mu \omicron \iota \). Initially then, the divine is associated with the \( \alpha \pi \varepsilon \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) and \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \). Here, the \( \alpha \pi \varepsilon \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) is viewed as signifying the general concept of \( \Theta \epsilon \omicron \omicron \), and thus refutes the reading of the \( \alpha \pi \varepsilon \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) as material substratum. The \( \alpha \pi \varepsilon \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) is defined as: the ground of all things, and mind/love.

As such, the \( \alpha \pi \varepsilon \iota \rho \omicron \nu \) is identified with the idea of \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) in a strict sense, referring to a

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771 Jaeger, Op. cit. p.4
772 Ibid. p.23
773 Ibid. p.24
774 Ibid. pp.29-32
775 Cornford, Greek Religious Thought, p.41
non-material ground of all that is. This is also a metaphysical interpretation of the απειρόν insofar as it is interpreted to be merely a name for the αρχή to which Aristotle refers (first cause).

The second dimension of Anaximander’s theology arises out of the notion of cosmos. Here, cosmos is viewed as referring to the problem of the structure of reality, and accordingly, the way in which things happen.777 In this, the notion of cosmos is characterised as the unity of divine justice and natural law as the same.778 Thus, Anaximander is interpreted to be arguing for the idea of the divine as the intelligent agent that is the source and the guarantor of natural law.

The third dimension is then κόσμος, or, the notion of sub-divinities. Here, Anaximander is interpreted to be providing an argument that distinguishes between the idea of the divine in general (the απειρόν) and divinities (heavenly bodies, the gods, and so on...).779 In this, Anaximander is viewed as not only introducing a distinction between traditional gods and a universal God,780 but also opposing the traditional conception of the divine as created.781 Thus, in this interpretation, Anaximander can be viewed as a religious reformer who utilises reason in relation to the question of φωσίς in order to query the Greek religious tradition.

Overall, the interpretation of Anaximander as a natural theologian reaches three primary conclusions. Initially, the characterisation of the απειρόν as divine and as αρχή leads to the conclusion that the divine is the ground of φωσίς.782 Likewise, the second conclusion follows that the απειρόν, as divine, is a religious conception of

778 Ibid. p.36
780 Ibid. p.33
781 Ibid. p.32
782 Ibid. pp.24-7
the abstract notion of $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$.\textsuperscript{783} However, these conclusions also lead to a variation in the translation of φωσίς. For, while those who interpret Anaximander to be a natural philosopher translate φωσίς as ‘nature’, those who interpret Anaximander as a theologian tend to translate φωσίς as ‘becoming’.\textsuperscript{784} Thus, φωσίς is often viewed as signifying growth, life and movement in juxtaposition to nature or matter.\textsuperscript{785} In this sense, the translation of Anaximander’s notion of $\alpha\pi\varepsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ is transformed from material ground to the ground of all becoming and destruction.\textsuperscript{786}

Each of these conclusions, however, is problematic! The first conclusion is based upon fragments that are viewed to be questionable. Here, it has been argued that the assertion of the divinity of the $\alpha\pi\varepsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ is either a very loose paraphrase by Aristotle, or, in fact Aristotle’s interpretation of the $\alpha\pi\varepsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ as Θεος.\textsuperscript{787} As such, it is possible that the assertion of the divinity of the $\alpha\pi\varepsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ belongs to Aristotle’s philosophy rather than Anaximander’s writings.\textsuperscript{788} Likewise, the association of the $\alpha\pi\varepsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ and $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$ (in a technical metaphysical sense) is in doubt. Here, the problem lies in the sources of the fragments, which all provide general summaries of the notion of the $\alpha\pi\varepsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ rather than direct quotes.\textsuperscript{789} As such, the problem has three possibilities: 1. Did Anaximander utilise the term ‘$\alpha\rho\chi\eta$’ at all? – Is the reference to $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$ a later insertion by metaphysical commentators? 2. If Anaximander did utilise the word ‘$\alpha\rho\chi\eta$’, was it in a technical sense? 3. Even if Anaximander did utilise the term ‘$\alpha\rho\chi\eta$’ in a technical sense did it have a metaphysical significance as often assumed?

\textsuperscript{783} U Holscher, ‘Anaximander and the beginnings of Greek philosophy’, Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, pp.24-7
\textsuperscript{785} Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, p.7
\textsuperscript{786} Hegel, Lectures On The History of Philosophy, Vol.1, p.186, Nietasche, The Complete Works, pp.93-4
\textsuperscript{787} Vlastos, Op. cit. p.113
\textsuperscript{788} Ibid. p.113
\textsuperscript{789} Kirk, Op. cit. p.107: “…said that the principle and element of existing things was the $\alpha\pi\varepsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$”
Those who interpret Anaximander to be a theologian will necessarily answer that he did, indeed, utilise ἀρχὴ in a technical sense, and furthermore, in a metaphysical sense as well. This is the case insofar as the preconception of Anaximander as a natural theologian requires that the ἀπειρόν signify ἀρχὴ in a technical and metaphysical sense as the basis of the cohesion, coherence and systematic unity of the theological system. On the other hand, interpreting Anaximander to be a philosopher of nature requires that the ἀπειρόν signify ἀρχὴ, or at least a proto-metaphysical idea of ἀρχὴ, for the necessary unity of ἀπειρόν and natural law.

The third and pivotal problem of the interpretation of Anaximander as a theologian is that of the relation of preconception and translation. Herein, the interpretation of Anaximander can be seen to inform the way in which the fragments are translated within both interpretative trends. Those who interpret Anaximander to be a theologian also, for the most part, translate φύσις as becoming and the ἀπειρόν as God in the most abstract terms. In translating φύσις as becoming, however, the ἀπειρόν will also inevitably be viewed as another name for Being.790 This is the case due to the fact that preconceiving Anaximander as a natural theologian necessarily results in the translation of the fragments within the context of technical terminology belonging to metaphysics and its outgrowth natural theology. Thus, the fragments will get translated with an eye to key words that connect Anaximander to natural theology. Furthermore, the inevitable conclusion of the preconception of Anaximander as a natural theologian is that the ἀπειρόν is Θεός, and Θεός is Being: the unifying ground of φύσις.

790 Hegel, Lectures On The History of Philosophy, Vol.1, p.186
It can be seen therefore, that both interpretative trends preconceive Anaximander through the philosophical tradition and metaphysics within the two extreme possibilities contained therein. Thus, these two dominant interpretative tendencies also follow the extreme possibilities of Aristotle’s metaphysical system; physics and onto-theology. In the first case, the interpretation of Anaximander as a philosopher of nature draws out and emphasises a way of thinking about φύσις as nature through the commentary of Aristotle. Here, the preconception is that all there is; is φύσις – physical nature. This leads to the problematic conclusion that φύσις is a single entity. On the other hand, the preconception of Anaximander as a theologian results in the identity of απειρον and Being, or, the God of metaphysics. Again, this results in the idea of the απειρον as a universal entity, albeit a supernatural entity called Being.

C. Heraclitus:

The interpretative preconceptions of Heraclitus’ thinking follows three potential paths. Unlike Anaximander, Heraclitus’ thinking resists a traditional Aristotelian and metaphysical interpretation, but rather, can be taken via the extremes of natural philosophy and oracular theology through to the nexus point of metaphysics. In this way Heraclitus tends to be preconceived initially as either a radical philosopher of nature (the first epistemologist) or as a radical religious thinker: one of the few pre-Socratic thinkers who explicitly confronts the religious traditions of Greece. As with Anaximander, however, there are a few key concepts in Heraclitus’ thinking of which the divergent trends of interpretation centre, namely: the hidden essence of φύσις, πνευμα and λόγος.
Heraclitus as \( \Phi \nu \sigma \iota \kappa \omega \zeta \):

For those who interpret Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature, these three notions are viewed within the context of translating \( \phi \nu \sigma \iota \zeta \) as nature. In this, the pivotal notion of the \( \lambda \omicron \gamma \omicron \omicron \zeta \) is generally interpreted to signify natural law.\(^{791}\) Furthermore, the idea of \( \lambda \omicron \gamma \omicron \omicron \zeta \) is interpreted to support a theory of perpetual change: flux.\(^{792}\) Equally, the notion of \( \pi \omicron \varrho \) is interpreted to signify world stuff: a primal form of matter and identical with the cosmos (translated as universe).\(^{793}\) Finally, then, there is the concept of \( \phi \nu \sigma \iota \zeta \), or the idea of nature as process – of eternal causal law.\(^{794}\)

It is worthwhile drawing out this interpretation in greater detail. Here, the interpretation of Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature tends to develop four primary themes: epistemology, \( \phi \nu \sigma \iota \zeta \), \( \pi \omicron \varrho \), and \( \lambda \omicron \gamma \omicron \omicron \zeta \).

Heraclitus the ‘epistemologist’ begins thinking with the question of knowing or wisdom. In this, the question of wisdom presents two related problems: that of \( \phi \nu \sigma \iota \zeta \) (what \( \phi \nu \sigma \iota \zeta \) really is) and the problem of human knowledge (what is the nature of knowledge). The truth of \( \phi \nu \sigma \iota \zeta \), its essence, is hidden: \( \phi \nu \sigma \iota \zeta \) loves to hide.\(^{795}\) As the epistemologist, Heraclitus is viewed as beginning with the problem of appearances, wherein the non-apparent essence of nature is hidden and the apparent is characterised as illusory.\(^{796}\) As such, the primary consideration of Heraclitus’ epistemology is the human dimension of knowing, or, the human potential to know the truth of nature.

Heraclitus characterises humans in various disparaging ways, calling humans foolish, living deaths, deaf, ignorant, unknowing, blind, sleepers, liars, deceived,
children, barbarians and wicked.\textsuperscript{797} There are two primary themes of this assault upon human awareness: the first that humans, for the most part, fail to grasp the essential truth of life and φυσις. The second, accordingly, compares this human failing to the divine as the exemplar of wisdom. The interpretation of Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature takes the first theme to signify the epistemic problem of the senses. Thus, the human failure to grasp the essence of φυσις is associated with the deceiving ways of the senses; the ways in which φυσις appears to us.\textsuperscript{798} Likewise, the statement: “human nature has no insight, while divine nature does”\textsuperscript{799} is interpreted to signify the potentiality of human knowing via reason: the intellect (νοῦς), λόγος and wisdom (σοφία).\textsuperscript{800} Thus, in the first instance, the divine is already viewed as a way of naming wisdom and thinking properly.\textsuperscript{801} Furthermore, this wisdom that reveals the truth of φυσις, that draws φυσις out from hiding, also subsumes the primary characteristics of the divine into itself: eternal, universality and justice.\textsuperscript{802} As such, in this interpretation, the divine may be characterised as wisdom about or the truth of φυσις. In an epistemic sense, the divine signifies the human potential for proper method and thinking in juxtaposition to the everyday awareness of φυσις gained via the senses.

With regard to φυσις, then, there are three primary dimensions: how φυσις appears, what φυσις essentially is, and finally, the αρχη of φυσις. In the everyday world of appearances, φυσις is misunderstood as it is grasped by the senses. In this the senses lead to an idea of opposition and differentiation. For instance, the senses tend to lead humans to the idea that opposites are non-unifiable and distinctly separate

\textsuperscript{797} Fragments: 5, 17, 19, 20, 21, 26, 28, 34, 56, 70, 78, 79, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 104, 107
\textsuperscript{798} Barnes, Op. cit. p.103
\textsuperscript{799} Ibid. p.112
\textsuperscript{800} Ibid. pp.104-5
\textsuperscript{801} Ibid. p.119
\textsuperscript{802} Ibid. pp.103, 104, 105, 119
individual agents of change. Here, the senses grasp φοσίς as a collection of individual 
things, full of chaos with innumerable discrete forces all randomly changing with no 
regard to others. Thus, to human understandings of φοσίς via the senses everything is 
differentiated, individual and disordered. This, as such, is how φοσίς appears to 
humans in the phenomenal sense.

Likewise, humans appear to each other and our selves in the same manner. In 
this, the sensuous understanding of human beings is twofold: we understand ourselves 
to be individuals with individual worlds 803, and furthermore, we view our life and 
history on the basis of differentiations: good/evil, just/unjust, life/death… 804

Heraclitus, then, in his famous statement posits the essence of φοσίς to be flux 
or becoming: “It is not possible to step twice into the same river”. 805 Thus, the 
essence of φοσίς for both humans and in general, functions as flux. 806 Φοσίς, as such, 
is essentially an ordered process of change (becoming, destruction and transformation) and furthermore, the relationship of opposites. 807 As a natural 
philosopher, then, Heraclitus’ characterisation of φοσίς is interpreted to develop three 
primary ideas. The first of these is natural law, or, the intrinsic order of the processes 
of flux and becoming. 808 This idea of natural law reveals two things: firstly, that the 
essence of φοσίς is becoming 809, and additionally, that the becoming of φοσίς is 
universally and necessarily ordered. 810 This law of the ordering of becoming is often 
called the theory of perpetual change, signifying an eternal law of the way elements

803 Fr: 2, 17, 89
804 Fr: 20, 23, 88, 102
805 Fr: 9
810 Ibid. p.99
relate and things originate and dwindle from existence. This law, as such, does not merely show how flux must occur, but also shows how this is the essential character of φωςίς. Thus, the essence of φωςίς is φωςίς: the processes of becoming under its own law.

The second primary idea in relation to the essence of φωςίς is called the unity of opposites. In this, the unity of opposites takes two primary forms: the unity of opposing notions and the unity of opposing material elements or forms. With regard to the former, the essential unity of opposing notions posits the non-differentiation of sensuous notions, eg, life/death, justice/injustice, war/peace and so on... Here, the positing of unity forms a refutation of the human understanding of φωςίς. In this refutation, Heraclitus establishes the essential unity of opposing notions within the structures of the whole and belonging together. An example of the structural unity of the whole is that of a whole day. Here a day is only complete in the unity of both day and night. Thus, as a concept, a day is only complete in the unity of apparent opposites, and furthermore, the proper concept of day must view day and night as a unified whole rather than two differentiated opposites.

Heraclitus also gives examples of the essential unity of opposing concepts as belonging together. Take for instance, the unity of life and death, and justice and injustice. First, the direction, task and end of life is death. As such, life and death are a unity of belonging together insofar as the τελος of life is death. Furthermore, life and death belong together insofar as they belong to each other as potentialities of the same notion: death is the potential of life and life is only actual on the basis of death. In other words, the concept of life intrinsically signifies both the present absence of

death and the inevitability of death in life. Neither concept has any significance without the other. Likewise, Heraclitus states, humans would not grasp justice without the presence of injustice.\textsuperscript{816} Thus, these notions belong together as mutually dependent concepts.

The second dimension of the essential unity of opposites relates to the material and elemental forms of φοσις. Here, this essential unity is also twofold; with regard to the relatedness and transformation of the physical.\textsuperscript{817} In this, the relatedness of opposites is shown via their simultaneous belonging together within the one identity or subject.\textsuperscript{818} Some examples Heraclitus gives is that of things like mud, rubbish, gold and the sea. In each case, a single thing has various opposing effects for differing entities, ie., differing relations between entities, which are, nonetheless unified in what they are and the relations between them. However, implicit to this unity of determinate relatedness is a broader notion of identity. In this, the relatedness of objects has a universal sense, signifying a necessity of the coherence of the relations between objects. In other words, there is an essential unity of material opposites and the effects of their relations insofar as they are always the same and within the same identity. Thus, the essential unity of relations signifies the characterisation of φοσις as essentially the relation itself rather than determinate or discrete individual objects.\textsuperscript{819} So, the essential unity of opposites is nothing other than the characterisation of the essence of φοσις as relations between things (under law and necessity) and thus the unity of things.

The unity of material and elemental forms of φοσις also pertains to transformation. In this, the unity refers to the processes of change, succession and

\textsuperscript{816} Fr: 23
\textsuperscript{817} Kirk, Op. cit. pp.189-190
\textsuperscript{818} Ibid. p.189
\textsuperscript{819} Ibid. p.190
becoming. Accordingly, Heraclitus is interpreted as outlining the unity of natural processes; the unity implicit in succession and transformation.\textsuperscript{820} An example of the first is that of water. Herein, water has differing successive states: ice, liquid, gas, and as such, has a unity which incorporates the opposites: cold and heat. Equally, however, this also applies to relations between seemingly opposite elements: water douses fire, fire heats water. As such, differing elements and differing material forms are also characterised within an essential unity. Here, the unity is grounded in the actualising processes. The way in which elements and material forms actualise in succession both internally (identity) and externally (relation) are all unified as phases of a single or universal process of becoming: of changing states, of effect and continuation within flux. Thus, again, the essential character of \( \varphi \nu \sigma \tau \zeta \) is an internally self-regulating unity of becoming: of the actualisation of matter under the law of actualisation.

The unity of the transformation of opposing elements and material forms also gets called ‘sameness’.\textsuperscript{821} In this, Heraclitus is interpreted as positing a direct sameness between opposing elements insofar as they become one another. For example, Heraclitus describes in fragment 31, the transformation of elements into one another: fire to sea and earth, earth to sea… Here, the unity is twofold. First, opposing elements are unified in transforming into one another; they are the same. Furthermore, their transformations are unified under law; they are balanced out (harmonised) and transformed in a regulated fashion. Thus, the essential unity of opposing elements and material forms in transformation is threefold: the essential sameness of the stuff/matter of which they are constituted, the essential unity of transformation of

\textsuperscript{820} Ibid. p.189
\textsuperscript{821} Ibid. p.189
form as potentialities, and moreover, the essential unity of the process of transformation as law.

So, we find that the second dimension of Heraclitus’ characterisation of φοσις leads to the third, namely, that of a primary substance of form or matter. In the interpretation of Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature it is often assumed that the notion of πνῷ is both a primal substance (material substratum)\(^{822}\) and also the originary form of all matter.\(^{823}\) However, many interpreters deny this claim, refuting the possibility of equating πνῷ with the απειρον (of Anaximander) or some other notion of primal stuff.\(^{824}\) As such, the primary question with regard to πνῷ is whether may be constituted as the material substratum, or the alternative, of primal form. This question is made more difficult insofar as πνῷ is also connected with both the λογος and Θεος in the fragments of Heraclitus. For, as Nahm argues, if πνῷ is indeed a material substratum and primal form of matter, Heraclitus’ thinking may be viewed as a more complex and developed version of his predecessors, especially Anaximander.\(^{825}\) This is, in fact, precisely Nahm’s argument: that the notion of πνῷ in Heraclitus exemplifies the idea of an infinite cosmos of substance, the idea of natural law as ordered change, and thus equivalent to such ideas as the conservation of matter within changes of states.\(^{826}\) Furthermore, Nahm also claims, πνῷ is not merely the primal material essence of φοσις, but it is also the αρχη that directs the universe; forming all things out of itself, according to its own internal law.\(^{827}\) Thus, as a philosopher of nature, Heraclitus is interpreted to be a highly developed and subtle thinker intrinsically grounded in the thinking of the φοσικοσ before him.

\(^{822}\) Nahm, Op. cit. p.64
\(^{823}\) Kirk, Op. cit. p.198
\(^{824}\) Ibid. p.198
\(^{825}\) Ibid. p.198
\(^{826}\) Nahm, Op. cit. p.64
\(^{827}\) Ibid. pp.64-5
\(^{827}\) Ibid. p.66
On the other hand, some such as Kirk argue that πορ must properly be interpreted as signifying primal form or ground.\textsuperscript{828} Here, πορ is viewed as signifying, in a strict sense, ‘world order’ (the same of all) that, moreover, discloses the essence of πορ as that which unifies.\textsuperscript{829} In this, rather than being a substratum or primal matter, πορ is associated with form and world forming. As such, πορ is characterised as an element rather than substratum for it is determined as a part of the cosmos.\textsuperscript{830} Thus, in this reading, the notion of πορ must be dismissed from consideration as the material substratum.

Rather than πορ, then, it is suggested that the notion of cosmos signifies the idea of material substratum. Unfortunately, however, Heraclitus’ outline of the cosmos, as the amalgam of elements unified under law\textsuperscript{831}, makes the cosmos an unlikely contender for the role of primal substance. Moreover, the notion of cosmos is often identified as πορ.\textsuperscript{832} As such, many conclude, as does Kirk, that even though Heraclitus is a philosopher of nature par excellence with regard to the notion and development of natural law, his thinking stands on the edge of a new philosophical tendency towards the rejection of nature.\textsuperscript{833}

When we turn to the notion of πορ explicitly, in its own right, we find that πορ has in this interpretation of Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature both a primary and secondary signification, namely: as the originative form of matter, and as σοφια/νους.

As discussed previously, πορ in its primary sense signifies such themes as form, unity, element and ground. It is worthwhile, then, to draw out these themes of πορ in greater detail. The first and most obvious of these is the role of πορ as the

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\item[829] Ibid. p.198
\item[830] Ibid. p.198
\item[831] Ibid. p.199
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primal form of matter. Initially, πορ in this role is interpreted to signify an argument that all matter, in its original or primal state, is πορ or has the form of πορ. In this way πορ as primal form and element discloses itself in two ways. First, πορ is viewed as the original state of all matter. In other words, πορ is the basic form which all matter begins as, and the form upon which all other forms of matter are based. Thus, φύσις, in its original material state or form is πορ. Equally, πορ is viewed, as elemental, to signify the original element upon which all other elements are based and thus grounded. Therefore, πορ as primal form and element points towards two more general characteristics of πορ: as unity and ground. For, in the first case, πορ as the original state of all matter also reveals πορ to be the unity of matter in its origin. Furthermore, πορ as the primal element also discloses πορ as the ground of φύσις: it is the element upon which all other elements depend.

As unity, πορ is a primal unity, or the unity of φύσις in general. In this, πορ can be seen to unify nature as a whole as the form/element through which all other forms/elements are unified: the unity of opposites and the identity of the unity of reality. Likewise, πορ is also interpreted as ground; as that from which all other things become. Initially, then, πορ signifies ground as the ground of differentiation, or, that which allows differentiation. As ground, πορ is also viewed as signifying the ground of φύσις as law. As such, πορ is that which, in itself, directs becoming, i.e., contains within itself the law of becoming that determines how and what things become. Therefore, in the most general sense, πορ is a name for αρχή, as first

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Ibid. p.198
Ibid. p.198
Barnes, Op. cit. p.131
Moore, The Religious Thought of the Greeks, p.121
cause, the ground of φύσις and the law of self-regulation of φύσις. Πορ, as such, is nothing more or less than the essence of nature and the essence of natural self-regulation.

In the fragments of Heraclitus, however, πορ also appears to signify θεος, either through explicit naming, through the attribution of divine attributes, or finally, explicitly connected to Zeus. For those who interpret Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature, the divinity of πορ is generally argued to be a secondary or derivative aspect of πορ. Furthermore, in this interpretative tendency, the notion of θεος is viewed implicitly as non-religious, and accordingly, containing a naturalist or physical signification. For example, Nahm dismisses the possibility of any religious content in Heraclitus’ fragments on the basis of his supposed renunciation of priestly offices. As such, the appearance of religious terminology and style in the fragments can be put down to his religious education, i.e., a style of thinking and writing that lends itself to an oracular and esoteric character. Thus, the associations of πορ and θεος can be understood simply as an inculcated habit of mind.

More subtle interpretations of Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature acknowledge the ambiguity of the quasi-religious significance of πορ. In this, the gist of the interpretation follows two arguments. Initially, the divinity of πορ is interpreted to have a naturalised meaning: signifying the concepts of law (justice) and intellect (νοος).

With regard to the former, then, it is argued that πορ signifies the notion of formal ground to which θεος may be added as a secondary characteristic by traditional association. As such, it is argued that πορ primarily refers to, and names,

843 Ibid. p.63
844 Ibid. p.63
the ἀρχή, which can then be called Θεός. Thus, the naming of πωρ as Θεός in this derivative sense may be constituted as either a religious awareness of nature, or as a polite deferral to cultural traditions. Certainly, this is the interpretation given to Heraclitus explicitly by Vlastos (the former) and Burnet (the latter), and also applied as a general rule applied to all the Pre-Socratic thinkers preconceived of as 'φυσικος'. Thus, the relegation of Θεός to a secondary attribute of πωρ belongs to the general preconception inherent in interpreting Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature. It is, furthermore, a preconception that serves as a basis of the interpretation of Θεός as a naturalised concept.

The naturalisation of the notion of Θεος, then, is given two related meanings. First, Θεός is interpreted to signify the natural concept of intellect (νοει) and thus associated with wisdom. In this, πωρ is viewed, in addition to its meaning as ἀρχή, to signify the intelligent or sentient capacity of φυσις in its ground. Thus, as a secondary, and doubtful, characteristic of πωρ, φυσις may be constituted as directed by an intelligent agent or force. However, this idea of the sentience of φυσις may be watered down or dismissed entirely. Here, πωρ as Θεος is then determined as the idea of the intellect in general, or, the possibility within φυσις that sentience may arise and thus grasp the essence of φυσις. As such, Θεός is interpreted to refer to the truth of φυσις that may be disclosed by entities with the capacity to grasp the truth. Thus, Θεος stands for the relationship between nature and sentient beings as the intellectual possibility of knowing: grasping the unifying ground and essence of φυσις. The divine, then, is the truth of φυσις: formed as a concept within the

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845 Vlastos, Op. cit. p.113
relationship between sentient beings and φωσίς. In this way, fragment 78, 113, 116 and 119, which all posit the potential divinity of human awareness, often get interpreted as an argument for the idea of wisdom which grasps the truth of φωσίς: the divine is another name for intellect, wisdom, and the truth found therein. Finally, then, Θεος in its most universal sense signifies the truth or essence of fusij as humans may grasp it.

Προ, viewed as a naturalised notion of Θεος, has a second dimension as the notion of justice or law. In this, again, the naturalisation of Θεος as justice has two primary senses: the idea of law and the potential grasp of the idea of lawfulness inherent in human awareness. In the first case, then, justice signifies the intrinsic lawful essence of φωσίς as becoming. Accordingly, the lack of distinction between justice and injustice for the divine is interpreted to signify the idea of a natural law that lies under the way φωσίς appears to humans. Equally, then, justice signifies the underlying natural law of human existence and thus of ethics (ηθος). Thus, in general, Θεος naturalised as justice signifies, in this interpretation, the universal idea of natural law intrinsic to φωσίς.

On the other hand, the general idea of justice as natural law also implies the potentiality of an intellectual grasp of natural law. Thus, Θεος may also be characterised as a truthful relation between humans, utilising the intellect, and the essence of φωσίς as natural law. This, however, brings us to the final theme of the preconception of Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature, namely: the idea of λογος.

851 Barnes., *Early Greek Philosophy*, p.104
For the sake of expediency, this discussion of the *λογος* in Heraclitus (where he is preconceived of as a philosopher of nature) will only draw out the two primary themes pertinent to the *λογος* in brief and in general terms. Here, the notion of the *λογος* signifies, first, method and additionally, of proper method that discloses truth.

As the idea of method in general, two points of relevance present themselves: the need for method and the translation of *λογος* in methodological terms. The need for method, initially, arises insofar as humans fail to grasp the truth in being deceived by the senses.\(^{854}\) Moreover, the need for method arises insofar as nature likes to hide itself and only shows itself via indications.\(^{855}\) Thus, the origin of method lies in the problem of appearances.

Equally, the point of origin for the need for method lies in the previously mentioned interpretation that unifies natural law for nature as a whole, including human nature. In this way, the dictum “know thyself” sums up the problem of method as the possibility of grasping one’s own nature and thus also grasping nature in general.\(^{856}\) Thus, the point of origin for the idea of method is twofold: an ethical ought and the requirement of certain knowledge – a requirement to comprehend the underlying coherence of nature.\(^{857}\)

Following this dual necessity for method, those that interpret Heraclitus to be a philosopher of nature, also translate the *λογος* in methodological terms. More explicitly, *λογος* tends to be translated as measure, reckoning, and proportion\(^{858}\), each of which has implicitly physical connotations. Elsewhere, *λογος* is translated as communication, or, common intelligibility and truthful disclosure.\(^{859}\) Here, the

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\(^{854}\) Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy, pp.102-3

\(^{855}\) Ibid. pp.112, 118-119


\(^{857}\) Ibid. p.186

\(^{858}\) Ibid. p.187

\(^{859}\) Shibles, Op. cit. p.41
translation fits conveniently into the pursuit of knowledge of natural law, or, how humans may know the unifying ground of nature. These translations of λόγος within the framework of natural method are then born out in the resultant discussions of λόγος throughout the texts.

Lambda, accordingly, has the fully developed signification of a truthful or proper methodological system with regard to nature. Initially, this is posited in relation to λόγος as wisdom: the grasping of the one, or universal unity. Furthermore, λόγος is also interpreted to signify the underlying coherence of nature; as both knowledge of the essence of nature and the corresponding natural law intrinsic to nature. In this way, λόγος is associated with both the notions of Θεός and πνεῦμα. As such, λόγος signifies knowledge of the essence, ground and truth of nature as a unified whole.

Lambda, as such, is in one sense the essential character of nature: its truth. On the other hand, the truth of nature belongs intrinsically to the intellect, or, reasoning in relation to nature grounded upon a proper methodological system. Thus, λόγος in this sense signifies wisdom: the truthful disclosure of nature as a unified and coherent unity in which becoming is actualised according to natural law. This, in fact, is the general consensus reached throughout the texts referred to thus far.

Overall, then, the interpretative tendency that views Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature can be seen to extract three primary themes from the fragments. 1. Nature is a unified whole that, 2. operates according to natural law, and finally, 3. λόγος is the proper method of disclosing the essence and ground of φυσικός. Thus,

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860 Ibid. pp.43-4, 48  
861 Barnes, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p.105  
863 Ibid. p.212  
865 Shibles, Op. cit. p.41  
λογος is the ground of the veracity of the first two themes. In the process, the notion of Θεος is either watered down or explained away in natural terms. Moreover, the possibility of any non-natural themes is dismissed without question. As such, any religious reading of the fragments is restricted to the slim chance that for Heraclitus the natural universe takes up some quasi-religious meaning, i.e., the universe or nature itself is worthy of awe and worship.

Heraclitus as a Theologian:

The task of outlining the interpretation of Heraclitus preconceived of as a theologian is, for the most part, straightforward insofar as this interpretative tendency utilises the notion of Θεος as a hermeneutical key to understand the fragments. In this, the task is also made easier insofar as utilising Θεος as a hermeneutical key produces a much clearer and concise interpretational structure of the fragments in comparison to the notion of φυσις as nature.

The point of origin for the interpretation of Heraclitus as a theologian lies in the general notion of Θεος. Here, fragment 32 plays a pivotal role, and as such, is worth quoting in full: “that which alone is wise is one; it is willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus.” This fragment is of primary importance insofar as it is interpreted as forming the general notion of Θεος as an intelligent agent or force that operates in φυσις, but also in some sense, stands outside of φυσις as a unifying ground. In this, the general notion of Θεος forms a flexible conceptual unity of the primary themes given within the fragments. As a general notion, then, Θεος is given various essential characteristics, such as: the ground of time, in the cosmos but also

867 Hussey, The Presocratics, pp.49, 58-9
868 Ibid. p.49
beyond the cosmos as a blueprint or plan, in the element πορ but also the creative force of πορ, called Zeus (life) but also that which steers life, in φοσις as justice which also binds φοσις from without, and finally, is in the κοσμοτ (heavenly bodies) but is not merely the cosmos. Upon the basis of this flexible utilisation of θεος the interpretation proceeds through θεος into the primary themes of Heraclitus’ fragments: πορ, αρχη, justice and λογος.

However, these primary themes are only entered into upon the basis of a discussion of the relationship between θεος and ηθος ανθρωπο: the character of being of humans. In this, all of the interpreters are in agreement about three points: 1. The being of humans. 2. The character of θεος in comparison. 3. The potential relation between humans and θεος.

The first point is that Heraclitus very clearly argues that everyday life, and thus the ηθος/φοσις of humans, is to be mortal and flawed. Some attributes of humans as such are: ignorance and delusion, fallibility, indiscriminate, foolish and evil. Kahn provides this argument in its most general scope as: “the underlying preconception (about φοσις in Heraclitus) is a basic antithesis between the divine and humans… Human nature is thus essentially characterised by mortality and fallibility.” Equally, the de-anthropomorphic tendencies of Heraclitus’ notion of the divine are interpreted to reinforce this point.

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869 Ibid. pp.58-9
870 Hack, God in Greek Philosophy, p.71
871 Cornford, Greek Religious Thought, p.80
872 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, p.485 (Fr:94)
873 Cleve, The Giants of Pre-Sophistic Greek Philosophy, p.43
874 Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, p.10
877 Guthrie, Op. cit p.412 (Fragments: 1,19, 29, 34 and 104)
878 Kahn, Op. cit. p.10
879 Ibid. p.11
In comparison, then, the divine is characterised as: discerning (νοῦς) and wise (σοφία),\textsuperscript{880} just and good,\textsuperscript{881} as ever-living πορεύτην,\textsuperscript{882} lightning,\textsuperscript{883} and finally as the λόγος (truthful discourse).\textsuperscript{884} In this, it is noticeable that the attributes of the divine are both personal (in reference to a sentient being) and furthermore, ethical. Thus, the primary signification of these attributes of the divine emphasise the sentient and personal in direct opposition to a mechanical idea of nature. In other words, this interpretation views Θεός as an entity of sorts with personal qualities and attributes.

The third point of agreement is the potential divinity of humans, or, the divine soul of humans as sentient beings. Various fragments referring to the inherent quality of the human θεος/φυσις as πορεύτην are utilised to support this argument, such as Fr: 36, 43, 77, 117, and 118. However, it is fragment 119 that stands out as the basis for this interpretation, translated as: human character is our δαιμον.\textsuperscript{885} Here, the word θεος is translated, as with ethics, to signify the most proper or highest good. Likewise, the term δαιμον is translated as divine like-ness\textsuperscript{886}, soul\textsuperscript{887}, and divine guardianship.\textsuperscript{888} As a result, fragment 119 reads something like this: the highest possibility of human existence is to be found in our divine-likeness, or, our adherence to the divine.

The hermeneutical key of Θεός and the θεος of humans are then utilised to interpret the primary themes of Heraclitus’ fragments: πορεύτην, ἀρχή, dike and λόγος. In this, the notion of Θεός constitutes not only a hermeneutical key, but furthermore, an integral unifying focal point for each theme.

\textsuperscript{880} Hussey, Op. cit. p.36  
\textsuperscript{881} Guthrie, Op. cit. p.413 (Fr:102)  
\textsuperscript{882} Cleve, Op. cit. p.40  
\textsuperscript{883} Kahn, Op. cit. pp.260-1, Lightning, here, is linked to both the revealing and steering of φυσις 
\textsuperscript{884} Ibid. pp.93-4  
\textsuperscript{885} Ibid. p.81  
\textsuperscript{886} Ibid. pp.81, 260-1  
\textsuperscript{887} Cleve, Op. cit. pp.40,43  
\textsuperscript{888} Guthrie, Op. cit. p.482
Starting with πυρ, we find that the highest expression or meaning of πυρ is Θεος. From this highest point, of πυρ αειζωον, the meanings of πυρ descend towards the physical in layers: as αιθηρ (soul), to the remotest layers of air (αιθηρ), to dark heat stuff, and then finally, to its common usage as the element fire. As such, πυρ is a term that has as its primary meaning Θεος, that then is also the ground of the soul, the cosmos, and in turn, the elemental. Moreover, πυρ is thus also given unity from with the notion of Θεος wherein Θεος is the ground and that which binds all of its meanings together. In this respect, πυρ is also the primal form of the cosmos and the creative force operating within φυσις. Θεος finally, may also be called πυρ-ζωον (soul life), the intelligence that steers and reveals all things through all things.

Accordingly, the notion of αρχη is constituted as a personal attribute of the divine. In this, the idea of Θεος serves as a non-physical ground of φυσις. Θεος, then, is an αρχη that operates in φυσις without being contained by φυσις. As such, αρχη as Θεος is that which surrounds and binds φυσις and thus grounds φυσις as a unified whole. Equally, Θεος as αρχη is interpreted to signify guidance, steering and the intelligent agency that is at work in the processes of becoming, thus providing becoming with an ordered unified ground. This is also called justice in the fragments.

Θεος, then, is interpreted to have the attribute of justice (δικαιωσυνη). Herein, the absolute goodness and wisdom of Θεος guarantees the ‘justice’ (universal ordering) of the processes of becoming. Thus, in this sense, justice does not imply an
impersonal natural law, but rather, an eternal guarantor of the ethical and good character of φύσις.  

Finally, in turning to the notion of λόγος, this interpretation also characterises the λόγος as an attribute of Θεός. In this way, the λόγος may be viewed as both intrinsic to φύσις and separable from φύσις as the notion of the intellect (νοῦς). The λόγος, as such, can be characterised as the unity of the following: wisdom, truth, divine revelation, the eternal, the proper of thinking, and finally, as the structure of reality as it is shown to be in truthful discourse.

Overall, the preconception of Heraclitus as a theologian results in a unification of the primary themes of the fragments under the concept of Θεός. In this, Heraclitus is revealed to be a radical philosophical theologian: an oracular thinker for whom, as with Socrates later, the problem of philosophy is characterised by the questioning of the ηθός of human existence in relation to the divine, and through the divine to the potential in humans for wisdom: to grasp the truth of φύσις.

Unfortunately, this preconception of Heraclitus’ thinking has the tendency to be subsumed under metaphysics as natural theology. This tendency goes hand in hand with the assumption that Θεός, as a non-physical ground, is identical with Being itself. For instance, both Hegel and Nietzsche interpret Heraclitus’ notion of Θεός to signify Being, thus integrating Heraclitus into the metaphysical tradition. This assumption, I would argue, is derived from the question of where it stands with Θεός, if in this sense, Θεός is constituted as a non-physical ground of the physical that is

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895 Fr: 102: “To God, all things are beautiful, good and just…” is interpreted to mean this (See: Guthrie, Op. cit. p.413)
897 Hussey, Op. cit. pp.36, 37, 39
898 Cornford, Greek Religious Thought, p.78
also an entity. Here, in the philosophical tradition, the only concept that has the identical attributes is Being: thus we find the identity of $\Theta\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ and Being.

D. Parmenides:

The overview of how Parmenides is preconceived and thus interpreted will differ slightly from the previous discussions. This is made necessary due to the fact that, initially at least, all three interpretative trends are in agreement about the general content and conceptual themes in Parmenides poem. In this, the differences of the interpretations occur later, in the arguments about the significance of these themes, and the details found therein. As such, I will outline the general themes extracted from the poem, showing the points of consensus and the origins of differentiation. From this outline, I will then briefly show how the poem is interpreted in three differing ways and the logical conclusions of these ways of interpretation.

Themes of Consensus:

There is a consensus among interpreters of Parmenides that the poem contains four primary themes: logic, $\varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$, the identity of $\varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ and thinking, and finally, $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$.

The first of these, logic, signifies the consensus among scholars that Parmenides thinking prioritises logic and utilises logic as a method of attaining truth. In this, whatever it is that Parmenides seeks (for there is disagreement on this issue), he does so logically, utilising clear logical arguments to prove or disprove claims. In general, Parmenides logical thinking can be shown in three ways. First, logic is the fundamental principle of Parmenides thinking; he constitutes thinking as founded upon truth statements.\textsuperscript{904} Equally, it is claimed, Parmenides consistently utilises logical form in arguments: if $x$ and $y$, they $y = x$ or nothing at all. Furthermore,

\textsuperscript{904} Burnet, Op. cit. p.67
Parmenides is interpreted to be consistent in the use of arguments in the form of mutually exclusive logical possibilities.\textsuperscript{905} Thus, in general, there is an agreement that Parmenides thinking is founded upon a principle of logical predication that follows a consistent form.

Even in the case where interpreters are in disagreement as to the ultimate aim of Parmenides’ poem, there is agreement that these aims are pursued logically. For instance, where Parmenides is viewed as a philosopher of nature, we find that the poem posits two logical possibilities: It Is (exists) and Is Not (non-existence).\textsuperscript{906} Likewise, the argument in the fragments against the ‘Is Not’ is interpreted as the logical necessity of non-existence.\textsuperscript{907} On the other hand, where Parmenides is viewed as a theologian, we find his thinking characterised as bearing the divine \(\lambdaο\gammaο\varsigma\) – as logic.\textsuperscript{908} Further, the divine is interpreted here to be thought of solely through logic.\textsuperscript{909} Finally, as a theologian, Parmenides is also viewed as utilising the logical form of ‘\textit{via negativia}’.\textsuperscript{910}

The second point of consensus is that \(\epsilon\sigma\tau\nu\) is the term upon which Parmenides thinking revolves. Here, three potential significations are assigned to \(\epsilon\sigma\tau\nu\) throughout the various interpretations: as the copula (\(\epsilon\sigma\tau\nu\)),\textsuperscript{911} as a derivative of \(\epsilon\nu\nu\alpha\) (to be),\textsuperscript{912} and finally, its potential reference to \(\omega\sigma\iota\alpha\) (Being).\textsuperscript{913} The disagreement arises, herein, as to which signification should be given priority, and furthermore, what the fundamental character of these significations is: existence or Being.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{905} Kirk, Op. cit. p.241  
\textsuperscript{906} Ibid. p.241  
\textsuperscript{907} Barnes, \textit{The Presocratic Philosophers}, pp.163-5  
\textsuperscript{909} Freeman, \textit{God, Man and State}, p.26  
\textsuperscript{910} Hack, Op. cit. p.83  
\textsuperscript{911} Kirk, Op. cit. p.245  
\textsuperscript{912} Hussey, Op. cit. p.83  
\textsuperscript{913} Taran, Op. cit. p.37
\end{footnotesize}
The third point of consensus is that Parmenides identifies \( \varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu \) with thinking. In this, it is agreed that the identity of \( \varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu \) and thought is the primary methodological theme of the fragments; as the ground of the veracity of logic,\(^{914}\) as the ground of knowing via logic\(^{915}\), and finally, the ground of dismissing the senses.\(^{916}\)

The fourth and final point of consensus, regarding \( \delta \omega \xi \alpha \), is the strongest point of consensus insofar as there is almost no disagreement as to what \( \delta \omega \xi \alpha \) signifies. In this, there are four agreed upon themes of \( \delta \omega \xi \alpha \): 1. In general, \( \delta \omega \xi \alpha \) is interpreted as the phenomenal world.\(^{917}\) Herein, the phenomenal world is associated with the senses; and their illusory character,\(^{918}\) the appearance of opposites and change,\(^{919}\) with the structure of mortal consciousness,\(^{920}\) and finally, with the untrustworthy nature of the senses in relation to knowing.\(^{921}\) 2. \( \delta \omega \xi \alpha \) is also constituted as the world of mortals: with mortal existence.\(^{922}\) The world of mortals, then, is associated with human life; belief, opinion and worldview.\(^{923}\) 3. The realm of \( \delta \omega \xi \alpha \) is characterised by confusion, or, the combination and mixture of the two ways of truth: two-headed.\(^{924}\) This is based upon fragment 6: “… that way along which wander mortals knowing nothing, two-headed… by whom To Be and Not To Be are regarded as the same and not the same…” 4. The final aspect of \( \delta \omega \xi \alpha \) agreed upon is that \( \delta \omega \xi \alpha \) is essentially a mortal and thus flawed way of thinking that serves as the ground of the idea of \( \varphi \nu \sigma \iota \varsigma \) as becoming.\(^{925}\) In this, \( \delta \omega \xi \alpha \) is characterised as thinking that posits difference,\(^{926}\)
connected with the naming of things, the determination of things as discrete and individual entities, and thus finally, that becoming and change are real.

**Natural Philosophy:**

In preconceiving Parmenides to be a natural philosopher, this interpretative tendency constitutes the themes of the poem as physical. In this, two primary pre-interpretative themes are posited: 1. What Parmenides refers to can be called physical reality, and 2. the key terms of the fragments therefore must necessarily have physical significations. As such, the aim of this overview is twofold; showing how key terms are translated/interpreted to have physical meanings and further, revealing the logical conclusion of this interpretation.

This interpretative tendency focuses on two features of Parmenides poem: the notion of logic and the term εἰσιν. Initially, the notion of logic is interpreted to signify the problem of method, which moreover, may be constituted as epistemology. In this, Parmenides logical method is viewed as operating primarily within epistemic concerns, or, the possibility of knowledge. Likewise, the identity of thinking and εἰσιν is given the character of a logical and epistemic concern as the correspondence of what something is and thought. As such, the equivalence of εἰσιν and λογός reveals the epistemic structure of knowing. Finally, then, logic expresses an epistemic argument against the validity of the senses. Thus, in this interpretation, the logical method of Parmenides is characterised as an

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927 Barnes, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p.142  
928 Kirk, Op. cit. p.262  
931 Ibid. p.241  
932 Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, p.164  
934 Shibies, Op. cit. p.54
epistemological position as such: anything thought is necessarily a real object, and can be known as existent in thought.\textsuperscript{935} On this basis, Parmenides is compared with Descartes and Cartesian scepticism.\textsuperscript{936}

The term $\varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu$, in general, is viewed as signifying the idea of existence,\textsuperscript{937} or, an existential: unrestricted existence.\textsuperscript{938} As such, three primary characteristics of $\varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu$ are discussed: as the copula, as presence, and as eternal physical presence. In the first case, $\varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu$ is translated as the copula (is). Herein, the primary attribute of the copula is argued to signify “it exists”.\textsuperscript{939} Additionally, as the copula, $\varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu$ may also mean “It is x (something)”.\textsuperscript{940} However, this ‘x’ is assumed to be something real in the sense of something physical and thus existent. Thus the second, and broader, sense of the copula is linked to the notion of the real, that is: a real object.\textsuperscript{941}

Equally, $\varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu$ is associated with existence as physical presence. In this way, the non-existence of something (x) is equivalent to the necessity of the non-presence of x.\textsuperscript{942} Accordingly, the ‘it is’ (existence) of x is equivalent to the necessity of the physical presence of x. As such, $\varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu$ is characterised here as existence: the physical presence of an entity. Finally, the notion of $\varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu$ is given an a-temporal character (as in Aristotle’s notion of $\omicron \omega \sigma \omega$) as always-presence.\textsuperscript{943} Thus, the notion of $\varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu$ as physical existence culminates in the idea of the necessity of an entity and reality as a whole, being always physically present.\textsuperscript{944}

The insistence, in this interpretation of Parmenides, then leads to two strange and paradoxical conclusions. 1. The physical universe is one undifferentiated whole,
like a well-rounded sphere.\textsuperscript{945} This is the case insofar as \( \varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu \) is interpreted to mean the physically real and \( \varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu \) is, in fragment eight, described as uncreated, non-divisible, and an inviolable uniform whole.\textsuperscript{946} 2. Additionally, the physical universe is disclosed in \( \varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu \) as unchanging.\textsuperscript{947} Thus, if \( \varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu \) is interpreted to mean physical presence the inevitable result is that the universe must be conceived of as one big undifferentiated and unchanging mass: a single frozen entity.

\textit{Theology:}

Turning to the second interpretative tendency there is to be found, I would suggest, an inversion of the problem posed by interpretingParmenides as a philosopher of nature. The point of origin for this interpretative tendency is the notion of \( \Theta \varepsilon \omicron \omicron \varsigma \). In this, it can be shown that Parmenides’ poem and the themes therein get interpreted through and out of the idea of the divine. As such, this discussion will provide an overview of the way the themes of logic, \( \varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu \) and the divine lead up to the inversion of the naturalist interpretation.

Logic, in this sense, is initially framed by an equivocation of the way of truth and the way of the goddess. Herein, logic in general is characterised as divine revelation.\textsuperscript{948} Equally, logic (as \( \lambda \omicron \gamma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \)) is equated with the divine itself: the divine is thought via logic and thus, is logic.\textsuperscript{949} As such, logic is the realm of the divine: the realm of truth and thinking.\textsuperscript{950} Finally, then, insofar as the divine is \( \lambda \omicron \gamma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \), divine revelation logic, it follows then that the philosopher is a human who has sought out

\textsuperscript{945} Nahm, Op. cit. p.90
\textsuperscript{946} Fr: 8
\textsuperscript{947} Popper, Op. cit. p.69
\textsuperscript{948} Jaeger, Op. cit. pp.94-5
\textsuperscript{950} Shibles, Op. cit. pp.50,54-5
the divine, who has had the truth revealed to them by the divine, and thus, their thinking has validity under the auspices of the divine. In this way, the interpretation of logic as divine, or divine revelation, posits an inherent connection between religious revelation and philosophy. Equally, logic can be constituted as truthful discourse. Therefore, logic in this sense has the character of onto-theology (the correspondence of truth and Θεος) wherein the truth of εστίν is identical with Θεος. This onto-theology is developed further in the notion of εστίν.

The interpretation of εστίν, here, is twofold. The primary sense of εστίν is being and the second, it follows, is existence. The primary question, with regard to εστίν, is whether Being and Θεος are identical. Insofar as the identity of Θεος and logic has been posited already, and the poem posits the identity of thinking and εστίν, the answer will be in the affirmative. The argument is presented in this way: 1. The divine is truth and thinking. 2. Thinking and εστίν are identical. 3. Therefore, the truth of εστίν is identical with the divine.

From this point, the interpretation of Parmenides as a theologian finds itself able to disclose the remaining aspects of the divine within the poem. The first is to identify the divine with being. In this, the divine is viewed as the primary meaning of εστίν in a non-physical sense as being-itself. As such, the divine is identical with the real as an idea, and furthermore, as the idea of Reality. Accordingly, the divine has a secondary sense as the being of beings, that is: of existing things. As such, the divine is also the being of physical things. A third attribute of the divine is then added

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955 Ibid. p.92
in the idea of justice.\textsuperscript{959} As justice, the divine has the character of binding, or, that which enforces necessity, i.e., the eternal singularity and unity of reality.\textsuperscript{960} The divine, as such, holds reality as a whole in bondage as limit.\textsuperscript{961} Finally, then, the divine is conceived to be the supreme monotheist God that is also the one reality.\textsuperscript{962}

At this point it becomes patently clear that the inevitable conclusion of this interpretation of Parmenides as a theologian is the identity of reality as an entity called God. For, if God is reality, then equally, everything is God. Moreover, if God is eternally unchanging, fixed and undifferentiated, then so also is reality a static singularity. As such, it becomes clear that this interpretation is an inversion of the interpretation of Parmenides as a philosopher of nature, for in the first reality is a singular physical id-entity and in the second, reality is a singular divine id-entity. So much for the interpretation of Parmenides as either a philosopher of nature or theologian!

\textit{Metaphysics}:

There is, however, a third interpretative trend which for the sake of convenience I will call metaphysical. This third trend is similar to the previous theological one, but also introduces a subtle differentiation that makes more sense of Parmenides thinking. In the first instance, this interpretation posits the same divide between truth and opinion, or, the divine and human opinion.\textsuperscript{963} Likewise, this interpretation also follows that of theology, arguing that truth is a property of the divine and divine revelation.\textsuperscript{964} Finally, this interpretation also corresponds to the theological in the assertion that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{959} Hussey, Op. cit. p.81
\item \textsuperscript{960} Ibid. p.81
\item \textsuperscript{961} Hack, Op. cit. p.85
\item \textsuperscript{962} Ibid. p.83
\item \textsuperscript{963} Barnes, \textit{Early Greek Philosophy}, pp.129-130
\item \textsuperscript{964} Ibid. pp.130-1
\end{itemize}
Parmenides provides being with the attributes of non-generated, indestructible, whole and so on…

However, the notions of ἔστιν, justice and Θεός are given subtly different significations with radically differing implications. First, the notion of ἔστιν as being is viewed to signify the being of beings rather than Being-in-general, and thus the divine.\(^{966}\) As such, the concept of the divine is given the primary character of justice. Herein, the divine attribute of justice is that which binds ἔστιν (the being of beings) from some external standpoint.\(^ {967}\) In other words, the divine is not being in the sense of ἔστιν: either physical presence or the being of entities. The divine, rather, is a primal God; creator, governor of all things, and first of all she devised love.\(^ {968}\)

The radically different implication of this interpretation, then, is that it escapes the problem of the identity of the divine and ἔστιν. Furthermore, this interpretation also makes sense of Parmenides’ insistence that ἔστιν does not come into being, nor change. For, if ἔστιν signifies the being of beings, as Hegel asserts, Parmenides has moved into the realm of the ideal.\(^ {969}\) The ideal, as such, signifies the being of a being, or, the unchangeable essence of an entity that makes it determinable as such. Thus, in this respect, we can posit the always-presence of the idea of “X” and its being as the same without denying changes in appearances. Rather, the priority, or, reality of a thing is determined by its being; its character as present. Kant’s example of 100 thaler provides much the same argument.\(^ {970}\)

In this interpretation, however, a complete or conclusive development of the divine does not eventuate. The question remains, herein, of how the divine may be

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\(^ {965}\) Ibid. p.134  
\(^ {966}\) Ibid. p.134  
\(^ {967}\) Ibid. p.134  
\(^ {968}\) Ibid. p.137  
\(^ {969}\) Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol.1, p.254  
\(^ {970}\) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.505 (A599/B627)
characterised if it is not a universal entity, nor identifiable with \( \varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu \). The notion of justice, standing outside reality contains too strong an implication of a super-physical entity; a supernatural being. Crucially, the question must also be asked as to how the divine enters into reality without becoming subsumed into \( \varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu \) as an entity with being? Unfortunately, at this point, a metaphysical interpretation tends to arise as the conclusion. Hegel’s interpretation exemplifies this trend insofar as \( \Theta \varepsilon \circ \varsigma \) ends up signifying absolute or pure being, which then subsumes \( \varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu \) within itself.\(^{971}\) In the process, the radical implications of the interpretation dissipate as again the divine unifies Being and Non-Being as the same.\(^{972}\) This is why I have name this interpretation ‘metaphysics’, for it results in the same onto-theological unification of \( \Theta \varepsilon \circ \varsigma \) and Being. The question remains: How does it stand with \( \Theta \varepsilon \circ \varsigma \)?

### 23. A Brief Excursus: Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Pre-Socratics as a Problem

There are two justifications for this excursus into Heidegger’s thinking. First, insofar as Heidegger’s thinking is central to the thesis it is necessary to provide a discussion of his interpretation of the Pre-Socratics as exemplifying the phenomenological way of interpretation to be utilised. Moreover, it is necessary insofar as I will attempt to break with Heidegger’s thinking in relation to the notion of \( \Theta \varepsilon \circ \varsigma \) given in his interpretation of the Pre-Socratics.

This attempt to break out of Heidegger’s interpretation is brought about by the phenomenon sought, Religion. For, the phenomenon of Religion is not addressed properly in Heidegger’s thinking. Furthermore, the task is that of showing how Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratics constitutes a problem with regard to

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\(^{971}\) Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 1, pp. 252-4

\(^{972}\) Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 82
the phenomenon of Religion. In this, the primary question is: where does it stand with ὘οκ in Heidegger’s interpretation? Moreover, the question is also: what is the relation between being-human and ὘οκ in Heidegger’s interpretation?

The argument I will provide, with regard to these two questions, is that Heidegger poses the solution to both within the notion of the truth of being. This Heideggerian solution, then, becomes a problem for this phenomenological investigation insofar as it expresses a monomania for being and, furthermore, fails to address the phenomenon of Religion as it belongs to being-human. For Heidegger, instead, the problem of ὘οκ stands in relation to the question of Being (for-itself, in general).

To show how this is the case, this section will place Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratics within the context of his quest for Being and thus, show how the interpretation of ὘οκ eventuates in a subsumption under Being and the problem of the truth of Being. As such, this section will contain four phases: An overview of Heidegger’s quest for Being, The way Heidegger interprets the Pre-Socratics in such a way as to subsume the notion of ὘οκ under Being, the way in which Heidegger conceives ὘οκ and being-human within the question of the truth of Being, and finally, the implications of this interpretation in relation to the phenomenon of Religion.

A. The Quest for Being:

In general, Heidegger’s monomania for being can be viewed as a desire to overcome the tradition of metaphysics, and likewise, the prioritisation of the physical sciences and technology that (in Heidegger’s view) goes hand in hand with metaphysics. Here,
Heidegger often calls the metaphysical tradition “Western thinking”, the occurrence of the forgetting of being, and the withdrawal of being.

For Heidegger, the question of being, in my view, formed a two-phased approach. Initially, Heidegger posed the question of the sense of being, or, Dasein’s sense of being. In this, the question of Being is entered into via the question of how Dasein understands Being. This is also the question: what is the Being of Dasein that is the foundation of understanding being. Heidegger’s solution, expressed in simplified terms, lies in the de-constructive progression of the existential analytic from concern to care and then temporality. Thus, the first phase of Heidegger’s quest for Being concludes with the finding that Dasein’s being is temporality (finitude) and, as such, Dasein’s sense of Being can be called Time. However, the quest for Being is not reached in this conclusion (of Being and Time), for, the quest is quintessentially to disclose Being-in-general (Being-for-itself).

The second phase of this quest, often called the “turn” (kehre), then pursues this question of Being-for-itself. On the basis of the first phase, this turn pursues the quest for being via such questions as: how does being communicate to humans and, how does being show itself? The turn, however, is also marked by a turning back to the pre-Socratic thinkers, behind the metaphysical thinking of Aristotle and Plato, albeit via thinkers like Nietzsche, evidenced by the large number of texts/lectures devoted to these themes in the latter part of Heidegger’s academic career. Thus, it may be asserted that a large part of this turn to the quest for Being-for-itself operates within and through Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratic philosophers.

However, before providing an overview of Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratics, it is worthwhile to take one last look at Heidegger’s quest for being via his preconception of Being-for-itself. Herein, three pivotal themes are evident.
As mentioned previously, the question of being for Heidegger is exemplified in the question of why there is something rather than nothing. Equally, this question is posited as a phenomenological problem of that which shows itself as itself. Herein, the question of being is posed as the problem of entities in their being, or, presence in its ground. Thus, in the first instance, the question of Being-for-itself is determined in advance as essentially the problem of disclosing the ground of presence.

Second, the quest for Being is determined an advance to be restricted to ontology as a way of thinking. In this, the problem may then be constituted as the possibility of philosopher proper, as thinking that discloses the truth of being. As such, the primary character of the quest for being given herein, is framed as a philosophical \( \eta \theta \omega \zeta \), or, a philosophical life within the truth of Being. Thus, the second characteristic of Heidegger’s preconception of Being-for-itself is that it is somehow lived, i.e., disclosed in a truthful philosophical life. Accordingly, this preconception of Being-for-itself posits a human potential to live in the truth of Being (for itself) distinct from being-for-humans.

Finally, the third preconception of Being-for-itself combines the previous two within the problem of the truth of being. In this, Being-for-itself is constituted as the true ground (truth) of presence, thought (presented) by a living in the truth of being. Thus, the truth of Being-for-itself as the ground of presence is conjoined with a thinking (living) within the truth of being as the identical truth (the identity of truth). As such, when Heidegger turns to the Pre-Socratic thinkers, the sole question asked is that of the truth of Being.

In this way, the context of Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratics may be characterised as a monomania for Being. This monomania gets expressed in three ways: 1. For Heidegger, the only legitimate question of philosophy is being. 2. Every
possible subject of philosophical questioning thus operates as secondary to, and a
derivative of, ontology. Moreover, Heidegger refuses to acknowledge the
legitimacy or possibility of any other philosophical question other than that of being.
For example, in *A Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger refutes any possibility of thinking
about ἐθικός except in relation to being. Likewise, in turning to Ὑσις as a question in
the Pre-Socratics, we will find that Heidegger conceived the notion of the divine
solely in relation to being. Thus, the monomania for being shows itself as a refusal, or
inability, to think anything except being and except the task of thinking everything
through being. Therefore, in effect, the monomania for being signifies the restriction
of truth to being: the only truth is being.

B. The Subsumption of Ὑσις under Being:

Two texts stand out as examples of Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratics:
*Heraclitus Seminar* and *Parmenides*. These texts, as such, will serve as the content of
this overview of the subsumption of Ὑσις under being. Herein, two features will be
sought out from the texts. First, what is Heidegger’s general interpretation of the
meaning of Ὑσις, and furthermore, what are the attributes given to Ὑσις therein? In
both texts, it will be shown, Heidegger views Ὑσις within the quest for Being and
interprets the fragments accordingly.

The *Heraclitus Seminar* begins with, and stays with, questions arising out of
fragment 64, translated as: “Lightning steers the universe.”973 In this, Heidegger poses
two questions: 1. What does παντα signify; every individual thing, or, everything in
general? 2. What is the connection between παντα and lightning/πορ?974 From these

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973 Heidegger and Fink, *Heraclitus Seminar*, pp.4-5 (This is the initial translation in German taken from
Diels text, translated into English by Freeman in: *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A complete
translation of the Fragments in Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*)

974 Ibid. p.5
opening questions the seminar then moves into a general discussion of various fragments through which the connection of παντά and lightning is construed as the “coming forth into appearance”, or, the ground of presence. Herein, the notion of the divine is first mentioned. The divine is conceived of as belonging to that which is. The notion of the divine, as such, is given as belonging, in some fashion, to Being.

Later in the seminar, the discussion turns to the connection between everything and lightning via the theme of being in relation to everything. In this, the relatedness of being and everything is exemplified by the question of the gods in relation to humans for the Greeks. Accordingly, the question becomes: where and how do gods and humans belong (together)? As such, this discussion concludes, the gods and humans belong together with respect to παντά (all that is) as understanding being. In other words, the notion of the divine is that of entities with being whose being, furthermore, is that of understanding being. In this way, the notion of the divine signifies entities who relate to being in a certain way, eg., as understanding being. Thus, in the first instance, the divine is determined as a type of entity, and therefore subsumed under being.

As an entity, the divine is then characterised as having three primary attributes: being-understanding, being immortal and lightning that steers. The seminar deals with the attributes of lightning that steers first. In this case, the discussion of the divine is provided via the initial question of the relation of “all that is” and lightning.

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975 Ibid. pp.86-9
976 Ibid. p.86
977 Ibid. p.108
978 Ibid. p.110
979 Ibid. p.117
980 Ibid. p.117
981 Ibid. p.111
982 Ibid. pp.116-117
Herein, “all that is” is determined as becoming: the coming into being and thus presence of everything.\textsuperscript{983} This coming into presence is related to lightning wherein lightning is constituted as that which brings to presence.\textsuperscript{984} Lightning, as such, has two primary attributes: of allowing becoming to be present, and of showing the presence of becoming. With regard to the latter, lightning signifies the notion of light: of revealing that which is. On the other hand, lightning is also interpreted to signify steering: the ground of becoming.\textsuperscript{985}

The first sense of lightning, as ground, is discussed via steering. In this, steering is characterised as guidance, control, and intervention.\textsuperscript{986} The phenomenon of steering is then differentiated into violent and non-violent, or, human and divine steering.\textsuperscript{987} As such, the divine is given the attributes of non-calculative, non-coercive steering: of ruling effortlessly.\textsuperscript{988} The divine, therein, is determined as an entity for whom steering (origination of becoming) is achieved without force or violence. Thus, the character of steering belonging to the divine is in some fashion akin to the law of φυσις without reference to material cause.

Accordingly, the following discussion takes up lightning in its second sense as the λογος, the disclosure of that which is in its unity.\textsuperscript{989} In this, lightning and πυρ are given an association with the λογος, in Heidegger’s terms, a movement from the λογος to πυρ.\textsuperscript{990} Throughout the seminar, this correlation of lightning and λογος is repeated, and, with each repetition Heidegger points out the divine attributes therein.\textsuperscript{991}

\textsuperscript{983} Ibid. p.7
\textsuperscript{984} Ibid. pp.8-9
\textsuperscript{985} Ibid. pp.10, 24
\textsuperscript{986} Ibid. pp.11-12
\textsuperscript{987} Ibid. p.12
\textsuperscript{988} Ibid. p.12
\textsuperscript{989} Ibid. p.21
\textsuperscript{990} Ibid. p.112
\textsuperscript{991} Ibid. p.31, for example
In turn, the characterisation of the divine as lightning in both senses turns implicitly to the question of thinking: of entities that think the ground and are also the ground of all that is. In this, the discussion provided attempts to interpret Heraclitus as a pre-metaphysical thinker via a post-metaphysical standpoint. Herein, the ontological character of Being is bracketed off, resulting in the question of the αρχή and its signification as that which stands under. As such, the pre/post-metaphysical conceptualisation of the αρχή is determined as understanding, or, the entity who thinks. Thus, the implied conclusion is that, for Heraclitus, the question of the αρχή and λόγος refers to thinking: the being of entities who think. The culmination of this interpretation, therefore, is a distinction between being-human and being-divine.

This differentiation between humans and the divine is given initially as the difference between mortals and immortals upon the basis of fragment 62. Herein, the divine is given the attribute of immortality, which somehow is in relation to the death of humans. As such, the divine is characterised as being in time as undying, but also conjoined with humans as having a relation to being as understanding. Therefore, Heidegger states, immortality is the way the divine understands itself in its being. Thus, the differentiation within time of the divine and human ways of being results in the notion of the divine as a type of entity for whom existence is understood as perpetual.

The belonging together of the divine and humans provides a third characterisation of the divine. In this, both humans and the divine are determined as entities whose being is that of understanding being. In relation to the divine, then, the way of understanding is differentiated from the human. Herein, Heidegger dismisses
any claim that the divine is the identity of Being, but rather, is within being as λόγος and light: as bringing to presence. Accordingly, the divine understanding of being is connected to its attribute of lightning and immortality. In the first case, the divine understanding is one of steering: the divine understands steering without violence. Likewise, the understanding of the divine is that of light, or, an understanding that reveals beings in their being. Finally, then, the divine understanding is also that of immortality; of a non-finite but within time, presenting of entities in their being. These are the attributes given to the divine in Heidegger’s interpretation of Heraclitus.

Poignantly, the divine is determined as a type of entity with a way of being rather than being-for-itself. Moreover, the divine is determined as belonging together with humans insofar as both are beings that are being-understanding. As such, the distinction between the divine and humans lies within the realm of being-understanding. This distinction only becomes evident in the problem of the truth of being.

There are at this stage, as such, four propositions that belong to Heidegger’s notion of the divine. 1. The divine is an entity with being character. 2. The divine must then be determined as it shows itself within being. 3. The being of the divine shows itself as a way of understanding being that is distinct from the human. 4. Finally, the notion of the divine only has validity in an ontological sense as subsumed under the truth of being.

In the text *Parmenides*, Heidegger provides a remarkably similar interpretation of Parmenides to that of Heraclitus. In this, the question of understanding is drawn out with greater emphasis with regard to the how of understanding rather than the relatedness of being human/divine to all that is. Accordingly, Heidegger takes

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*Ibid. pp.116, 122*
Parmenides’ way of truth to signify the way of the goddess, i.e., the way of being divine. As such, Heidegger interprets fragment 1 to signify nothing more or less than the general notion of being divine. Thus, in general, the way of being divine is the truth. In the context of the *Heraclitus Seminar*, then, it could be said that the way of being-divine is essentially the truthful understanding of being.

Putting this aside for the moment, an overview of the text reveals that Heidegger’s interpretation of Parmenides emphasises the way in which the divine as a truthful understanding shows itself within being. This is precisely, for Heidegger, the realm of sub-divinities or the daemonic. Here, Heidegger provides three descriptions of the divine: the uncanny, the looking at being, and the pointing and indicating of being.

The uncanny is determined as the extraordinary: that which surrounds and thus grounds the ordinary. In this, the uncanny shows itself as the ground of the ordinary and presents itself in the ordinary as the extra-ordinary. In other words, the divine shows itself as gods: the ground of presence showing itself as present entities. Thus, the uncanny signifies the way in which being-for-itself shows itself in presence as the divine.

Further, the realm of the daimonic is determined as the way the divine shows itself as shining into the ordinary: the emergence from concealment. In this, Heidegger translates Θεος, via etymological investigation, as “the looking one and the one who shines into”. Thus, the way of being-divine as it shows itself may be characterised as the entity that shows beings in their being and shows being-itself.

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998 Heidegger, *Parmenides*, pp.1-6
999 Ibid. p.101
1000 Ibid. p.102
1001 Ibid. p.101
1002 Ibid. p.111
Finally, the divine way of being is also determined as pointing and giving signs.\textsuperscript{1003} Herein, the divine shows itself as communicating to humans as the disclosure of the essential: being-human and being-for-itself. This determination of the divine, Heidegger argues, is a claim grounded in being-itself that shows being to humans in the λόγος.\textsuperscript{1004}

Thus, overall, Heidegger’s determination of the divine way of being as it shows itself contains three arguments: 1. The divine is an entity whose way of being-understanding discloses the essence of Being. 2. The divine way of disclosure of the essence of being is presented as the uncanny, the shining (light) and as indicating. 3. The divine is not being-itself, for the divine is grounded in being. In other words, the divine is subsumed under being as a type of entity whose being is that of understanding that discloses the essential.

C. The Problem of the Truth of Being:

Heidegger's notion of truth is central to the way in which he preconceives and thus interprets the pre-Socratic thinkers. In this, three pivotal themes arise in Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratics: truth as the truth of being, Θεός as the truth of being, and, being-human as having the potential to grasp the truth of being. I will utilise Heidegger’s text \textit{Parmenides} to evidence these themes.

In this text, Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides are conceived of as primordial thinkers.\textsuperscript{1005} In this, the Pre-Socratics are preconceived as thinkers who think the beginning, or, those who think being.\textsuperscript{1006} In thinking being, Heidegger

\textsuperscript{1003} Ibid. p.114
\textsuperscript{1004} Ibid. p.114
\textsuperscript{1005} Ibid. p.7
\textsuperscript{1006} Ibid. p.7
asserts, Parmenides attempts to think the essence of truth (\(\alpha\lambda\epsilon\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\)).\textsuperscript{1007} \(\alpha\lambda\epsilon\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\), then, is loosely translated as unconcealment\textsuperscript{1008}, a term then developed and determined over the following one hundred pages, via critical analyses of how the philosophical tradition has constituted the true and false.

The return to the question of the essence of truth, however, immediately brings to the fore a relation between the essence of truth and the divine. For, in the first instance, the looking that shows being (the outward showing itself of being) in unconcealment is the divine.\textsuperscript{1009} Likewise, the ground of the relation to beings, that which shows the truth of beings in their being, is the daimonic; translated as soul or the gods.\textsuperscript{1010}

The essence of truth is determined in two ways at this point. First, the essence of truth is inextricably tied to being. Moreover, that which shows itself as this truth of being is the divine: the daimonic and the divine as truth. In this way, Heidegger views the essence of being and the essence of truth to be bound together in the divine. Correspondingly, where the essence of truth and being are forgotten, so also does the divine withdraw.\textsuperscript{1011} As such, Heidegger states, the primordial essence of being is \(\alpha\lambda\epsilon\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\); truth as unconcealment.\textsuperscript{1012} Thus, the essence of truth is determined as the truth of being.

Returning to the point of origin for this text, the translation and interpretation of Parmenides poem, we find Heidegger providing an argument that the divine is the truth, and thus also, the truth of being. Herein, Heidegger determines Parmenides goddess to be the goddess ‘truth’. The goddess, however, is not a goddess to whom

\textsuperscript{1007} Ibid. pp.10-11
\textsuperscript{1008} Ibid. pp.15-16
\textsuperscript{1009} Ibid. p.102
\textsuperscript{1010} Ibid. pp.99-102
\textsuperscript{1011} Ibid. pp.112-113
\textsuperscript{1012} Ibid. p.114
the truth is entrusted, but rather, is truth the divinity.\textsuperscript{1013} As such, Heidegger’s initial formulation of the divine is somehow an entity with a way of being that is the truth of being as it shows itself (to humans).

Later, Heidegger determines the divine within the context of the ground of a relation between entities and thinking.\textsuperscript{1014} Herein, the ground of this relation is characterised as the daimonic; as that which strikes the thinker and thus allows them to think otherwise than the ordinary.\textsuperscript{1015} The daimonic, as such, is the uncanny or the astounding.\textsuperscript{1016} The astounding, therein, is determined as the visibility of being.\textsuperscript{1017} Moreover, the daimonic is the divine as it shows itself to humans as the pointing ones (entities), or, the way that, through the divinities, being shows itself.\textsuperscript{1018}

Equally, then, the divine as a concept is determined as that which offers the sight of being.\textsuperscript{1019} In this, the essential character of the divine is posited to be “the one who looks and who looks as the one emerging into presence… that in the look presents (itself) as the unconcealed.”\textsuperscript{1020} Heidegger then relates the divine to being-human: humans are “that being that has the distinctive characteristic of being addressed by being itself, in such a way that… the uncanny itself, god, appears.”\textsuperscript{1021} In the first instance, then, the notion of the divine signifies the truth of being. Furthermore, in the second case, the divine is determined as the appearance of Being-itself as a revelation to humans. Thus, in Heidegger’s interpretation, the divine is not merely the truth of Being (as an understanding) but is also the appearance of Being-itself for humans.

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{1013} Ibid. p.5
\bibitem{1014} Ibid. p.99
\bibitem{1015} Ibid. pp.99-101
\bibitem{1016} Ibid. p.101
\bibitem{1017} Ibid. p.101
\bibitem{1018} Ibid. p.102
\bibitem{1019} Ibid. p.102
\bibitem{1020} Ibid. p.104
\bibitem{1021} Ibid. p.104
\end{thebibliography}
What, then, can be made of Heidegger’s idea of truth as discussed thus far? It is evident that Heidegger determines truth as the truth of being. However, this also means that truth is conceived of being-true, or, the notion of truth as a phenomenon of being. Furthermore, through the formulation of the divine, it can also be stated that the notion of truth signifies true-being, or, the id-entity of truth and being. Thus, in general, truth and being are identical, and shows itself to humans as an identity: the divine.

Finally, the question must be asked: how does it stand with Θεός in Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratics? Heidegger states his argument in its clearest sense wherein he differentiates the Greek notion of the divine from the God of Christianity. Herein, Heidegger states, the fundamental essence of the Greek divinities consists in their origination out of the “presence” of “present” being. In this, the divine is not conceived of as being-itself (onto-theology), but rather, as being-itself looking and emerging into beings (for humans).

Herein, the notion of the divine is at once not being-itself, and also being-itself in the way it shows itself as the truth and as entities who communicate the truth. How can this distinction be made? The solution Heidegger offers is something like this: Θεός is and is not Being-itself solely in relation to humans. In other words, the Truth of being is called Θεός or Zeus by humans and via the way being-itself shows itself to humans. Accordingly, being-itself communicates to humans as the divine. Thus, Heidegger’s final formulation of the divine is, alike to Heraclitus, that Being is willing and unwilling to be called the divine.

1022 Ibid. p.110
1023 Ibid. p.111
D. Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Pre-Socratics as a Problem

Reflecting on Heidegger’s formulation of Θεός provides three poignant problems for a phenomenology of Religion. 1. Does Heidegger impose the concept of being upon the Pre-Socratics? 2. Is Heidegger’s subsumption of Θεός under being valid? 3. Is Heidegger’s claim that the divine is not a religious concept for the Greeks a valid one?1024

1. When Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratics is compared with the fragments, the question arises as to whether the monomania for Being effects an invalid reading. For instance, can Anaximander’s notion of ἀπειρόν properly called being? Moreover, in making this argument, does not Heidegger follow Aristotle’s commentary and metaphysical preconception of the Pre-Socratics? In this case, it can be said that Heidegger’s monomania for being is nothing more than metaphysics, albeit a non-physicist metaphysics. Accordingly, the question to be asked is whether Heraclitus utilises the term being in any technical sense? With regard to Parmenides also, a poignant question arises: what can Heidegger do with the divine revelation that non-being (the privative absence of being – the otherwise than being) is given the character of truth even if it cannot be thought or known. It would appear that insofar as Heidegger agrees with Hegel; that being and nothing are the same, he also contradicts Parmenides basic logical distinction of being and not-being, thus falling into a metaphysical formulation of a unifying ground. There are enough problems, here, to show that Heidegger’s monomania for being does indeed affect an invalid or improper reading of the Pre-Socratics.

1024 Ibid. p.109
This question leads to a secondary problem with regard to Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratics, namely: how different is Heidegger’s interpretation to Aristotle’s? They both acknowledge only being. Equally, they both determine the divine as the highest expression of being. The only difference to be found, herein, is that while Aristotle determines the ground to be οὐσία, Heidegger determines the ground as ἀλήθεια. Thus, for Aristotle, the divine is the first cause/highest substance. For Heidegger, the divine is the truth of being that shows itself as an entity or entities.

2. Is the subsumption of the divine under being valid? For the pre-Socratic thinkers, as all the interpreters and Heidegger agree, the essential attributes of the divine are found in such notions as the ἀρχή, truth and justice. For those who interpret the Pre-Socratics as pre-metaphysical thinkers these terms signify: Being, λόγος and first cause. Note, then, that for Heidegger, these notions are formulated in metaphysical terms: ἀρχή = being and λόγος = ἀλήθεια. Thus, the question of the validity of the subsumption of Θεός under being parallels the problem of translating/interpreting these attributes of the divine. Heidegger, in this respect, provides an entirely metaphysical translation of the terms attributed to the divine. Moreover, Heidegger’s preconception of being as it is utilised in relation to the Pre-Socratics is essentially the idea of being as unifying ground, or, the ground of presence – another metaphysical conception.

The critical question, then, is whether Heidegger and others are correct in presuming the identity of ἀρχή and being, or, the idea of ἀρχή as a (metaphysical) unifying ground of presence? I would suggest that, insofar as this metaphysical preconception of the Pre-Socratics has been shown to result in inconsistent and patently absurd formulations of reality, the id-entity of ἀρχή, Θεός and being must be
dismissed as a valid reading of Pre-Socratic thought. Thus, we must conclude that the
subsumption of the divine under being is also invalid.

3. Is the Pre-Socratic notion of θεός non-religious? The solution to this question is
only found insofar as the notion of Religion is formulated in advance. Insofar as
Heidegger provides no adequate phenomenological determination of the meaning of
Religion his argument has no proper ground nor evidence. Furthermore, insofar as
Heidegger’s notion of the divine is patently metaphysical in its origin and remains
within metaphysics therein, Heidegger’s interpretation of the notion of the divine in
the Pre-Socratics fails to destroy, or critically analyse, the preconception of θεός
belonging to the tradition of philosophy (i.e., metaphysics), and thus also fails to
address the relationship of the αρχή to the divine as it is given in Pre-Socratic
thinking. Therefore, the question remains, even now, how does it stand with θεός in
Pre-Socratic thinking?

1025 See the appendix for a critical interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of Religion.
1026 Moreover, in An Introduction to a Phenomenology of Religion, Heidegger characterises the essence
of Religion as a phenomenon to be the factical experience of the truth of being as an entity (Chapter 5:
S30, pp.83-84). This determination of Religion (as the truth of being) so closely parallels Heidegger’s
interpretation of θεός in Parmenides that it is a patent contradiction to claim that θεός is non-religious
for the Greeks.
Chapter 8: De-Construction

24. Destruction:

Destruction, in a phenomenological sense, is nothing more than the questioning and critical analysis of preconceptions brought to bear upon the interpretation of thinking. In this, destruction aims to reveal how the interpretation of thinking is predetermined as thinking about something. For example, as previously shown, those who interpret the Pre-Socratic as philosophers of nature do so having already determined that what is thought about is nature. A destruction, as such, initially poses these preconceptions as questionable.

Equally, a destruction seeks to address the way in which the thinking gets expressed. In this, the task is of ‘destructuring’, or revealing, the preconceptions and ways of communicating what is sought operating within the Pre-Socratic thinkers. This task of the destruction is purely negative, disclosing distinctions between what is sought in thinking and the ways in which this is expressed in the fragments. Herein, the task is of destructuring the modes of communication in order to show more clearly what the Pre-Socratic thinkers pursued in their thinking.

Finally, then, a destruction has as a terminal aim, the clearing away of preconceptions and seemingly self-evidential modes of expression and terminology in order to provide the foundation for a new interpretation of Pre-Socratic thought. Ideally, this provision of foundation gives the possibility of a proper interpretation of Pre-Socratic thought within the framework of an authentic grasp of what the Pre-Socratic thinkers sought. In this, the ground provided by the destruction is no mere annihilation that permits any arbitrary interpretation. Rather, the destruction aims to reveal what the thinking cannot be about, and thus provides guidance for a new
interpretation. Further, a destruction aims to point towards what is sought in Pre-
Socratic thinking, leaving bare the essential conceptual framework and quest without
preconception.

Nor will the destruction eventuate in the absence of phenomenological
content. For, two questions are brought to the thinking of Anaximander, Heraclitus
and Parmenides, namely: How does it stand with Θεος and, what is the relation
between Θεος and being-human as it is thought therein? Thus, the destruction has the
ultimate aim of allowing a construction of the meaning of Religion indicated in Pre-
Socratic thought, upon the ground of the clearing of preconception and self-evidence.

A. Anaximander:

In providing a destruction of Anaximander the notions of the απειρον and justice will
be taken up as problems. Herein, the first task will be the questioning of these notions
with regard to their attributes. That is, of showing how the attributes given to these
notions refute traditional preconceptions of Anaximander’s thought. In doing so, these
attributes will be investigated in relation to their broadest significance as a foundation
of a proper interpretation of Anaximander. Finally, in investigating the attributes of
the notions of απειρον and justice, the destruction will pose the question of the unity
of the απειρον and justice in a positive, but non-traditional, sense.

The Απειρον

As a general rule, the primary sign of the way in which preconception determines
interpretation manifests itself as a failure to come to terms with the internal logical
consistency and conceptual coherence of thinking. In this, the preconception and
resultant interpretation attempts to bend the thinking within a text to fit the
preconception, forming a dissonance between the text and interpretation leading to paradoxical summations and conclusions about what is sought by the thinker and the conceptual coherence of this quest. Preconception, in this sense, denies the process of thinking: that what is sought in thinking determines what is found, and thus, also shapes the attributes and arguments posited therein. As such, the provision of determinate attributes and arguments, for the most part, is predetermined by what is sought in a logically consistent and conceptually coherent way.

Equally, insofar as what is sought (the ultimate subject of thought) is determined in advance by the thinker, all of the attributes then given as a result cannot be construed as arbitrary determinations, but rather, specifically chosen attributes which indicate what is sought and how it is thought. Thus, insofar as the process of thinking contains (in a phenomenological sense) this consistency and coherence in relation to what is sought and how it is thought of, in advance, any interpretation that posits dissonance between what is sought and its determination immediately shows itself as questionable. Moreover, the interpretation in its dissonance, also reveals an improper preconceptualisation of what the thinker is attempting to address.

In order to destroy the preconceptions of what Anaximander attempts to think, it is first necessary to ascertain how the attributes of the \( \alpha \pi \epsilon \rho \omicron \) and justice are given consistency and coherence within the fragments.

Initially, the notion of \( \alpha \pi \epsilon \rho \omicron \) may be characterised as a formal title for \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \). Herein, the \( \alpha \pi \epsilon \rho \omicron \) certainly signifies the philosophical notion of \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \), but additionally, does so in its own way wherein the term \( \alpha \pi \epsilon \rho \omicron \) has priority over the term \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \). In other words, the \( \alpha \pi \epsilon \rho \omicron \) signifies \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \), not in a metaphysical sense, but rather in the sense implicit to the word ‘\( \alpha \pi \epsilon \rho \omicron \)’.
Etymologically, \( \alpha\pi\nu\nu\nu \) means literally “lack of bounds”. A conceptually consistent interpretation of this term, based upon its use in the fragments, reveals the meaning of the \( \alpha\pi\nu\nu\nu \) to be something like absence of bounded-ness (absence of physical quantity), absence of physical properties (undeterminable), and further, absence of any physical qualities that can be thought (unknowable). In this sense, then, the \( \alpha\pi\nu\nu\nu \) is given an interpretation consistent with its use within the fragments as a name for the \( \alpha\nu\chi\nu \), wherein \( \alpha\nu\chi\nu \) signifies the absence of physical characteristics or knowable attributes in relation to the physical world.

This general view of the \( \alpha\pi\nu\nu\nu \) is evidenced in the attributes Anaximander gives to it elsewhere in the fragments. Initially, the \( \alpha\pi\nu\nu\nu \) is given the attribute of ‘surrounding’. Herein, it is not consistent to posit that there is some stuff that surrounds the physical, for in being physical, the \( \alpha\pi\nu\nu\nu \) could no longer surround. Rather, the attribute of surrounding has logical consistency as binding or holding together: something other than the physical that determines the physical. As such, surrounding belongs to some other indeterminable \( \phi\nu\sigma\tau\zeta \).

The use of this phrase: “some other \( \alpha\pi\nu\nu\nu \ \phi\nu\sigma\tau\zeta \)” reveals precisely the problem Anaximander faces in what is sought and the way it is thought. For, the dilemma revealed therein is of how to discuss a non-physical conception of the \( \alpha\nu\chi\nu \) without utilising physically loaded terminology. This task is in one sense impossible, for the very term \( \alpha\nu\chi\nu\ \pi\nu\nu\nu \) itself points to the non-physical via the physical. The absence, or negation, of the physical is conceived of in \( \alpha\nu\chi\nu\ \pi\nu\nu\nu \) as that which lacks boundaries. The physical therein, is posited essentially as that with boundaries; that which is bound.

An attribute associated with the \( \alpha\pi\nu\nu\nu \) through justice is steering. Herein, a careful analysis of the fragments reveals in justice a notion of that which stands
outside of the spatio-temporal order of things. Fragment one discusses the activities of things as just or unjust from which, by necessity, gets played out in time and according to the measure of time. Here, however, justice and injustice are not determined by the things involved nor by the measure of time. Rather, time is the realm through which things are subjected to justice in its effects: its judgments. Thus, time and φοιτεῖ in their unity is the realm of the effects of justice; a realm wherein justice steers.

In this way, justice as an attribute of the απειρόν shows itself as the ground of becoming and destruction. In this, the correlation of αρχὴ and justice brings forth the notion of the proper and improper in such a way as to deny any metaphysical subject of thought. Initially, the idea of the proper in metaphysics signifies what something is; the truth of something. On this basis, the proper is construed as what something properly is; what it really is in its being. However, in the fragments of Anaximander, justice is given as effect and, as such, has no bearing on what something is in its being.

Moreover, in metaphysics the proper is associated with the idea of highest being; the highest, or most proper, expression of what something is. Anaximander’s thinking denies this interpretation, for justice does not belong to the thing in its being nor the spatio-temporal realm. Thus, the correlation of αρχὴ and justice reveals itself somehow in the relation of the proper and becoming/destruction. Becoming and destruction, herein, are subservient to the proper. The proper forms a process of effect within time as the ground of becoming and destruction. As such, justice indicates something about the απειρόν in the idea of the proper, referring somehow to the significance of things in their presence and absence.
As steering, the απειρον is also associated with the attribute of Θεος. This attribution of Θεος is reinforced in fragments two and three. In this, the notion of the απειρον is given a number of divine characteristics: everlasting, ageless, immortal and indestructible. Again, these characteristics that attribute divinity to the απειρον are achieved through the rebuttal of the physical, or in opposition to the spatio-temporal realm.

In fragment two, the απειρον is given attributes signifying non-temporality. Herein, the eternal (αεί) is given conceptual coherence when interpreted as signifying the negation of time. Likewise, to be ageless signifies not having an age: the absence of temporal existence. In fragment three, the απειρον is characterised as non-physical; of not ceasing and thus of never becoming. In the same way, the indestructibility of the απειρον only holds conceptual coherence where it signifies a never having become, for everything that is physical becomes towards destruction, by necessity within time.

So, the απειρον is other than the spatio-temporal and signifies Θεος as such. In this, the notion of αρχη in Anaximander indicates Θεος; pointing towards αρχη as Θεος. Here, however, Θεος cannot be construed as theological. For, Θεος is not characterised as an always-present entity as in onto-theology (metaphysics), but rather is essentially an always-absence. Θεος, as such, is not metaphysical highest being nor any God with predetermined or revealed characteristics. Rather, Θεος as απειρον is granted only two attributes: 1. The always-absent ground that is thus unknowable, 2. the originary ground that has an effect within space and time called justice, or, the significance of things in their becoming and destruction.
B. Heraclitus

In providing a destruction of the thinking of Heraclitus, the primary theme of analysis shows itself as a relation of \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) and being. For, the preconceptions disclosed in the previous discussion of the interpretation of Heraclitus gather together as the presupposition of \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) as unifying ground and thus being. Herein, the preconception arises insofar as Heraclitus in interpreted via metaphysics, wherein unifying ground signifies being-in-general via the being of beings. Thus, the first task of the destruction is the questioning of the presupposed unifying ground of being, or, the identity of \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) and \( \phi \omega \sigma \iota \zeta \).

Upon this questioning the destruction will attempt to show that in Heraclitus’ thinking a distinction is made between being and \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \). Herein, the essential distinction shows itself in the fragments as that of an ordered cosmos (within divine justice) and a merely physical cosmos. As such, the destruction will seek to provide a basis for a proper interpretation of Heraclitus within this distinction.

In general, metaphysics conceptualises \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) as a unifying ground. The philosophy of nature, grounded in metaphysical thinking, tends to conceive the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) as reality (the physical) as the unity of what things are and the way things are ordered (natural law). Likewise, traditional metaphysics has the tendency to conceive \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) as being-in-general: the unity of the constitution of things and the unity of everything as a whole. As I have shown previously, however, both of these preconceptions of \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \), when applied to Heraclitus’ thought, results in the identification of nature as a singular entity.

A key theme with regard to Heraclitus, and the Pre-Socratics in general, is the supposed lack of distinction between form and matter. In this, the Pre-Socratics are interpreted (as pre-metaphysical thinkers) to be seeking a metaphysical unifying
ground, i.e., being, but fail insofar as they cannot distinguish between form and matter. As such, Heraclitus’ thought gets interpreted as seeking being, or the unifying ground of nature, without having posited the necessary distinction between form and matter. Without this distinction, then, the concept of being signifies both a physical unity (physical entity) and formal unity (unity of law). Thus, Heraclitus’ thinking results in this paradoxical unity of being as a single being: reality as an entity.

However, the phrase ‘pre-metaphysical’ does not necessarily signify a precursor to metaphysics, or seeking metaphysical answers. ‘Pre-metaphysical’ may also signify non-metaphysical or not pertaining to metaphysics. In this, it becomes a question as to whether Heraclitus sought a unifying ground in a metaphysical sense. Rather, it is possible that Heraclitus, as a non-metaphysical thinker, sought a radically differing αρχη. An αρχη, perhaps, which does not refer to unifying ground, nor a meta-physical unity at all. For, metaphysics belongs intrinsically to a ‘physics’ as an explanation of being as that which is the ground of physical entities and the unity of the physical as a whole. What if, in Heraclitus, the notion of φωσις is not only different to φωσις in metaphysics, but also secondary to the formulation of the notion of αρχη?

In Heraclitus’ fragments, that which could be called being is becoming. Various fragments, herein, discuss becoming as a process of change either in relation to the mutual becoming of opposites or in relation to the idea of the constant flux of the constitution of entities. As such, the notion of becoming refers to both the unity of opposites and the idea of change in general. At first glance, then, the notion of becoming appears to signify a unity of form and matter. For, the notion of becoming appears to constitute both the unity of form and the unity of matter.

1027 Fr: 88 for example
1028 Fr: 91, 49a
However, a closer perusal of the fragments discloses becoming as a secondary phenomenon.

In fragment one, becoming is clearly formulated as secondary to the λογος, for, the becoming of entities is subservient to the λογος. In this, a meta-physical explanation of φωσις is also criticised. Herein, Heraclitus offers a critique of the metaphysical tendency to prioritise the constitution of entities (being) and the ground of constitution (being) stating: their thinking pertains to “separating each thing according to its φωσις and explaining how it is made.”1029 It follows, then, that if Heraclitus criticises this prioritisation of that which constitutes an entity (its being), Heraclitus will also critique any meta-physical explanation of αρχη: any notion of being as that which is the unifying ground of entities.

Rather, Heraclitus posits the λογος as αρχη: “for all things become in accordance with the λογος”.1030 In this, Heraclitus provides a distinction between the λογος as αρχη and becoming-being as that which constitutes entities and also the formal ground of entities. Furthermore, what could be called being is characterised by Heraclitus as a secondary phenomenon. A phenomenon upon which a proper notion of the αρχη cannot be established. Thus, for Heraclitus the notion of the αρχη is the λογος; a refutation of the prioritisation of φωσις or being in a metaphysical sense.

An example of the distinction between αρχη and being is provided via comparison of fragments 30 and 124. In fragment thirty, Heraclitus states that: “this ordered cosmos, which is the same for all, was not created by any one of the gods or of mankind, but it was ever and is and shall be ever-living πνευ...”1031 The traditional interpretation of this fragment is, generally, that it signifies an identity of the physical

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1029 Fr: 1
1030 Fr: 1
1031 Fr: 30
as a unified whole in πυρ. In other words, πυρ is the basic constituency of the physical cosmos. However, the cosmos as merely physical is also characterised by Heraclitus in fragment 124. Herein, Heraclitus states: "the fairest cosmos is but a dust-heap piled up at random." So, the distinction provided herein is one between a merely physical cosmos and a cosmos ordered and common to all.

Fragment 124, I would assert, is Heraclitus’ description of the cosmos as merely physical. Further, by extension, this fragment pertains to the conceptualisation of reality as merely physical and the result of thinking of reality as the unity of that which constitutes entities. In other words, I would argue, fragment 124 is Heraclitus’ view of the result and point of origin of thinking about reality with regard to the merely physical, and further, any thinking that prioritises the question of that which constitutes entities in their presence, i.e., being.

Fragment 30, in comparison, reveals Heraclitus’ view of the proper notion of cosmos. Herein, the physical and becoming (being) is characterised implicitly as secondary to “order”: the ordered cosmos. Accordingly, the phrase “ordered cosmos” signifies the priority of that which orders and that which is common to all. As such, fragment 30 conceptualises the cosmos in relation to that which orders it: the λογὸς. Thus, the statement “this ordered cosmos... was ever and is and shall be ever-living πυρ (πυρ αειζῳων)" does not refer to the physical constitution of the cosmos, but rather, names that which orders the cosmos: the λογὸς is named ‘πυρ αει-ζωον’.

It has been uncovered, thus far, that the fragments of Heraclitus posit a distinction between being and αρχή. Herein, being as becoming signifies that which constitutes the presence of entities with regard to the φασις and their ‘from whence’ (how they are made). Equally, Heraclitus discusses being as a secondary

\[\text{Fr: 124, Fr: 30}\]
phenomenon: a process of actualisation. In contrast, the αρχή has been disclosed as the λόγος, also named πυρ αεί-ζωον. This is the primary phenomenon sought by Heraclitus, and is viewed as the proper task of thinking. The question remains, then, of what general task Heraclitus takes up in seeking to characterise the αρχή as λόγος and πυρ αεί-ζωον. In other words, how does Heraclitus generally characterise the αρχή? Herein, three themes arise: πυρ αεί-ζωον, lightning, and λόγος.

Πυρ αεί-ζωον
In the first instance, πυρ αείζωον implicitly signifies the idea of Θεος but also has the explicit signification of Zeus. The notion of ‘πυρ αεί-ζωον’, as such, can be discussed in relation to the general notion of Θεος, theological thinking, and the identity of Zeus. Each of which must necessarily be referred back to what is indicated about the notion of αρχή.

The general notion of Θεος derived from the term πυρ αεί-ζωον contains three characteristics; πυρ, αεί, and ζωον. In this, πυρ could signify fire, αιθηή or soul.1034 Insofar as πυρ as fire is a determinate element, the signification of fire cannot be construed as primary in this case. For, fragment 30 is not an argument pertaining to the elemental constitution of the physical realm, but rather, refers to πυρ as the αρχή of the ordered cosmos. Likewise, πυρ as αιθή cannot be the primary sense in this case, insofar as it pertains to the physical and not to the αρχή. Equally, both fire and αιθή are shown to lack primacy in this expression ‘πυρ αεί-ζωον’ insofar as neither can be properly conceived of as ever living. Fire as an element is constantly transformed and subject to becoming and destruction. This is also the case for αιθή as physical; for everything physical is subject to becoming and destruction. This leaves the third sense of πυρ; of soul or thinking. This makes a great deal of sense

1034 As shown in a previous discussion of the term πυρ
insofar as soul/intelligence and πυφ are associated with the divine potentiality of humans and the divine in general.

The term ‘αετ’ is also in Greek thought associated with the general notion of Θεος, in this case, referring to the non-spatio-temporal character of Θεος. I would argue, moreover, that ‘αετ’ has a non-metaphysical signification in Heraclitus as an always-absence (non-presence) rather than always-presence as in Aristotle. This follows Heraclitus’ argument, in fragment one, that thinking about that which constitutes things and how they are made is an improper path of thought. If it is improper to distinguish between things on the basis of their constitution as present, it is also improper to characterise Θεος and αρχη with regard to φυσις or in relation to being. Thus, it is not possible for ‘αετ’ to signify always-present, but rather, ‘αετ’ must signify an always-absence: an otherwise than φυσις (being).

The term ‘ζων’ signifies life. In this, life is no mere existence or actuality. Life, in this sense, cannot be construed as some quantifiable living, eg, living for 50 years. Rather, the signification of life is one of quality: of what sort of living, or, of what characterises the living as a life. As such, the living immediately refers to ‘αετ’ as a way of living: a character of living that is always-absence. Thus, the general notion of Θεος is formulated as an always-absent living, or, a way of life that is never actualised in φυσις (becoming-destruction).

Bringing the phrase ‘πυφ αετ-ζωον’ together as a unity reveals its meaning as a way of living soul/thinking that is otherwise than φυσις, and is never actualised in φυσις as an entity. In this, the general notion of Θεος shows itself as a way of living with the attributes of soul/intelligence and always-absence. The general notion of Θεος, as such, also indicates something about Heraclitus’ notion of αρχη, namely:
that the ορχη is an always-absent intelligent/purposeful life. Not an entity, but rather, a way of living.

Fragment 30 is also an anti-theological argument in relation to ορχη. Herein, Heraclitus’ position is opposed to the traditional Greek mythological narratives and also, against any tendency towards a meta-physical monotheistic theologising. In the first instance, Heraclitus objects to any narrative in which genesis is explained via the Greek divinities: “was not created by any one of the gods…”1035 As such, the result of Heraclitus’ argument is the rejection of traditional Greek mythology, or, theological explanations of the cosmos. On the other hand, however, Heraclitus’ argument is not opposed to the notion of Θεος in general, nor an argument against Θεος as a creative force. Indeed, the general notion of Θεος provided in this fragment is given the attribute of permanent genesis, or, as the originary ground of the cosmos as it’s ordering. Thus, the argument provided is an anti-theological argument, opposing any narrative of Θεος as an entity or entities within φυσις.

Heraclitus’ argument also curtails any potential meta-physical theologising. Here, a metaphysical theology identifies Θεος as a singular highest entity which can also be called being-itself. Heraclitus denies this type of theology by denying the primacy or priority of that which constitutes the presence of entities, i.e., being, and by refuting the search for ορχη via φυσις. Thus, Heraclitus’ position denies any metaphysical theology (natural theology) wherein Θεος is constituted as the unifying ground of presence and as an always-presence. Furthermore, this also indicates something about Heraclitus’ notion of ορχη; that the ορχη may not be constituted as a meta-physical unifying ground of the physical as presence. Rather, the notion of ορχη

1035 Fr: 30
indicated here refers somehow to an otherwise than \( \varphi \sigma \varsigma \): the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) is somehow otherwise than being.

Finally, the phrase ‘\( \pi \nu \rho \ \alpha \varepsilon \iota \cdot \zeta \omicron \omicron \nu \)’ is also connected to the divinity Zeus. Here, \( \pi \nu \rho \) is associated with Zeus. So also is \( \zeta \omicron \omicron \nu \) of which the name Zeus (\( \Upsilon \eta \nu \omicron \varsigma \)) is a derivative. Further, Zeus is the highest Greek divinity and thus the divinity closest to the general notion of \( \Theta \epsilon \omicron \varsigma \); Zeus in many respects exemplifies the idea of \( \Theta \epsilon \omicron \varsigma \). In fragment 32, Heraclitus states, “that which alone is wise is one; it is willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus.”\( ^{1036} \) In this respect, then, the name of Zeus represents many attributes of the general notion of \( \Theta \epsilon \omicron \varsigma \), such as: \( \pi \nu \rho \), lightning, life and wisdom. Thus, the name of Zeus indicates what the notion of \( \Theta \epsilon \omicron \varsigma \) properly signifies. However, the name Zeus is also a name of a divinity, that is, a name of an entity that is present in the physical realm and within time. Equally, then, the notion of \( \Theta \epsilon \omicron \varsigma \) is also not Zeus, i.e., not an entity, nor a Greek divinity in a theological and mythological sense. As such, the association of Zeus with ‘\( \pi \nu \rho \ \alpha \varepsilon \iota \cdot \zeta \omicron \omicron \nu \)’ is both a positive and privative one. The association is positive insofar as Zeus indicates something about the notion of \( \Theta \epsilon \omicron \varsigma \), and privative in the sense that Zeus is an entity present in the physical realm.

Lightning/Steering

The second primary attribute given to the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) is that of steering. Herein, Heraclitus argues that “that which is wise is one: to understand the purpose which steers all things through all things”\( ^{1037} \) This, I would argue, is the sole task of Heraclitus’ thought; the questioning of that which steers \( \varphi \nu \sigma \varsigma \) – the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \). In this, the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) sought by Heraclitus cannot be constituted as being, for, that which steers purposively

\( ^{1036} \) Fr: 32
\( ^{1037} \) Fr: 41
has no primary connection to the unity and constitution of present things (being). Neither does that which steers have any necessary connection to the unity of that which is. Rather, steering has the attributes of intent and purpose. Thus, in the first instance the αρχη Heraclitus seeks shows itself as the αρχη of intent and τελος. The question as such, is not why there is something at all, but rather, what significance belongs to φυσις in its αρχη.

This is why, when Heraclitus gives his answer to the question of the αρχη, he states “the thunder-bolt steers the universe.”1038 In this, the thunder-bolt signifies Θεος in general. It is Θεος, as the originary ground of ordering, i.e., purposiveness, that directs φυσις in its significance; that makes the cosmos ordered rather than a dust heap piled up at random. Again, Heraclitus’ notion of arch shows itself as Θεος: that purpose that steers φυσις. Further, the divine lightning that steers, and thus steering in general, is associated with justice: “Πυρ, having come upon them, will judge and seize upon all things.”1039 Thus, the αρχη sought by Heraclitus shows itself as divine justice.

I would argue that divine justice cannot be interpreted to signify merely natural law, nor being as that which constitutes things in their presence. Nor, I would assert, can divine justice be characterised in a theological sense; as the handwork of a divine entity. To be sure, these are possible phenomena or manifestations of divine justice, but they cannot be constituted as primary. The primary signification of divine justice, then, is the indication of αρχη as significance, or, the idea of τελος (purposiveness), which is the αρχη of φυσις. Thus, αρχη does not signify any ground of the physical as in metaphysics, but rather, the originary ground of what, in metaphysics, gets called the highest or most proper being. The αρχη Heraclitus seeks,

1038 Fr: 64
1039 Fr: 66
herein, moves ‘under’ and stands-under the concept of being as that which allows the
distinction between proper and improper being, i.e., the significance of being.

The αρχή as divine justice, then, is the purpose hidden within φῶςις as it
shows itself. Initially, divine justice makes itself known to humans as the concept of
right. Here Heraclitus states: “They would not know the name of right, if these things
did not exist.” Thus, divine justice shows itself as the concept of right brought
about for humans through the experience of wrong-ness.

A second way in which divine justice shows itself is in the general state of
affairs for humans and within the physical realm. Fragment 53 shows how divine
justice, called war, reveals the measure of intelligent beings: “some as gods, others as
men… some slaves, others free.” This revelation by divine justice, as such, reveals
the measure of intelligent beings in relation to their significance, not their physical
presence. Likewise, divine justice shows itself in nature as: “day-night, winter-
summer, war-peace, satiety-famine”. Herein, I would argue, divine justice shows
itself as the purpose or meaning of natural phenomena, and thus the unity of such. In
the fragment, it is not the physical presence, nor physical constitution of natural
phenomena that designates unity. Rather, the unity is grounded upon and within
structures of coherence and meaning associated with natural phenomena.

The appearance of divine justice to humans, Heraclitus asserts, shows itself
initially as strife: “war is universal and jurisdiction is strife, and everything comes
about by way of strife and necessity.” In this respect, change brought about by
divine justice shows itself as the appearance of violence insofar as change is violent.
As such, the effect of divine justice in its purpose initially appears as strife.

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1040 Fr: 23
1041 Fr: 53
1042 Fr: 67
1043 Fr: 80
On the other hand, as Heraclitus states, “To God, all things are beautiful, good and just…”\textsuperscript{1044} Herein, Heraclitus characterises divine justice in its essence rather than appearance. For, divine justice shows itself as the proper purpose that steers everything, as purposiveness in general, and as the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) (originary ground) that is itself the always-absent proper purpose. The appearance of right and wrong as they come to be named by humans is shown to be limited and to a certain degree a mere seeming. This is not to say that there is no such thing as injustice or evil, but rather, that divine justice steers everything as justice itself (proper purpose) and will also in this, find out injustice (human)\textsuperscript{1045}. This is of crucial importance in relation to humans insofar as divine justice is the measure of proper justice and good for all intelligent beings: “for all human laws are nourished by one, which is divine. For it governs as far as it will, and is sufficient for all…”\textsuperscript{1046} Thus, the measure of good and justice refers back to the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) of \( \tau \epsilon \lambda \omicron \zeta \) and meaning, and accordingly, human evil and injustice to the illusory understanding belonging to human beings.

Overall, the notion of divine justice discloses three aspects of Heraclitus’ notion of \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \). First, divine justice discloses the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) as the originary ground of the meaning of human existence. In this, a secondary signification of the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) is the law of the \( \pi \omicron \lambda \iota \zeta \) in its proper ground. Additionally, divine justice discloses the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) as the originary ground of \( \varphi \omicron \sigma \iota \varsigma \) in its significance. A secondary sense of the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) then, is of natural law: the coherence of \( \varphi \omicron \sigma \iota \varsigma \) as it is understood and directed by intelligent entities. Finally, divine justice discloses the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) as the originary ground of purpose in general. In other words, the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) signifies essentially, nothing more than meaning

\textsuperscript{1044} Fr: 102  
\textsuperscript{1045} Fr: 94  
\textsuperscript{1046} Fr: 114
or purpose in itself. Therefore, the αρχη indicates that originary ground is a proper purpose belonging to what is called Θεος.

The λογος

The third and final theme pertaining to Heraclitus’ notion of αρχη is λογος. Herein, the αρχη is disclosed as wisdom, or, the originary ground of thinking. Initially, Heraclitus posits the λογος as the central theme in a comparison between humans and Θεος. In this, a distinction is made between human λογος as faulty and fallible\textsuperscript{1047}, while the divine is λογος itself.\textsuperscript{1048} Thus, Heraclitus utilises the term λογος in a derogatory sense in fragment 87, stating: “A foolish man is apt to be in a flutter at every λογος.”\textsuperscript{1049} In comparison, the λογος as divine is generally translated as ‘law’.\textsuperscript{1050} Thus, translation issues aside, the use of λογος in association with the divine shows itself as a proper or necessary steering.

Another variation with regard to λογος its association with understanding and wisdom. Again, a comparison is made between the divine and human λογος. Thus, in fragment 78 Heraclitus states: “Humans in our being have no power of understanding; but the divine does.”\textsuperscript{1051} Further, in fragment 32 the divine is characterised as the only wise one, while fragments 28, 35, 56, 70 and 83 exemplify Heraclitus’ argument that wisdom is an unusual state of human existence. Thus, in fragment 83 Heraclitus pronounces: “The wisest human will appear an ape in relation to the divine.”\textsuperscript{1052}

Heraclitus also discusses the λογος in itself. Here, there are three primary attributes of the λογος to be drawn out for examination. First, Heraclitus utilises the

\textsuperscript{1047} Fr: 2, 87
\textsuperscript{1048} Fr: 45, 50, 93, 114
\textsuperscript{1049} Fr: 87
\textsuperscript{1050} Fr: 1, 114
\textsuperscript{1051} Fr: 78
\textsuperscript{1052} Fr: 83
term λόγος to signify that which orders, as in fragments one and two. “The λόγος is as here explained… all things come into being in accordance with this λόγος” and “therefore one must follow that which is common to all… the λόγος is universal…” 1053 Herein, the λόγος signifies the αρχή of φύσις, and further, the ethical αρχή of human existence. The λόγος, as such, turns back to the notion of divine justice, this time in the sense of a communication or understanding of divine justice. In this way, the λόγος signifies the communication of the divine through divine law and the potentiality of the divine law to be understood by humans.

Additionally, the λόγος also signifies proper thinking. Initially, the λόγος signifies truth: to understand the true purpose which steers. Furthermore, proper thinking signifies the grasping of this purpose itself, not merely its truth. Thus, in fragment 50, Heraclitus appeals to the λόγος as independent of human thinking: “When you have listened not to me but to the λόγος, it is wise to agree that all things are one”. This one-ness or common-to-all is the disclosure of φύσις in its ordering (truth), and moreover, the awareness of the purpose of this ordering (meaning). Therefore, the λόγος signifies a proper thinking that discloses the truth of φύσις, the purpose of this truth, and the purpose that directs everything.

The final and primary sense of λόγος given by Heraclitus is as the divine itself. Herein, the λόγος is constituted as the communication of the divine, or, the way the divine shows itself as the one, the common, and as that purpose that steers φύσις. As such, the essential character of the λόγος is Θεός: “the lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but indicates.” 1054 Equally, this reveals the notion of λόγος as αρχή; that for Heraclitus, the originary ground – its truth and proper meaning – is always initially hidden from humans (always absent) and is only ever

1053 Fr: 1, 2
1054 Fr: 93
uncovered by the difficult human pursuit of it and the way in which the divine communicates to humans via indications. In this respect, the love φύσις has for hiding refers to the always-absent ground that orders φύσις rather than that which constitutes φύσις and that which allows differentiation between things (being).

Thus, in general, the meaning of Θεος in Heraclitus’ thinking shows itself as the naming of the αρχη and further, through naming, the provision of positive attributes of the αρχη. In this, calling the αρχη ‘Θεος’ provides three positive indications of the meaning of αρχη: 1. The αρχη is truth as it shows itself, or, the significance and coherence of φύσις as it can be grasped. 2. The αρχη is ηθος: the ground of the proper of human existence. 3. The αρχη is the proper itself, or, the grasping and showing itself of the αρχη as purpose and meaning.

C. Parmenides:

In providing a destruction of Parmenides’ fragments I will focus upon the two potential ways of truth given by the goddess. Herein, the question to be addressed is that of the assumed primacy of the first way of truth, i.e., being in relation to the αρχη. I will argue, moreover, that it is the second way of truth (non-being) that indicates the notion of αρχη properly in Parmenides thinking.

The interpretation of these two ways of truth, for the most part, assumes that the first way of truth is valid, while the second is false. In this, the statement of the goddess: “this I tell you is a path that cannot be explored; for you could neither recognise that which is not, nor express it…” is interpreted to signify falsity. Thus, almost all interpretative attempts dismiss the question of not-being and immediately

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1055 Fr: 123
1056 Fr: 1
turn to the question of being as having primacy. The question I will pose, nonetheless, is why the goddess discusses not-being as a path of truth?

If the first way of truth is given primacy, Parmenides appears to be a pre-metaphysical thinker *par excellence*, for, his thinking considers only being in a logical way, thrusting being-itself as unifying ground into questioning. Parmenides, as a metaphysical thinker, also exemplifies the problematic dimension of metaphysical thought, namely: the problem of unifying ground – the unity of being and the αρχή.

Herein, the problem arises in the attempt to discover an αρχή of both the physical presence of things and the unity of everything as a whole. Furthermore, the problem gains additional urgency where the notion of the proper arises, i.e., justice, θος and τέλος.

In this respect, Parmenides thinking (viewed via the question of being) exemplifies the problem of metaphysical thinking that Kant puts under the tribunal of reason. In this, the questionable element of metaphysical thinking is the result of the search for a unifying ground that not only serves as a ground of physical presence but also is identified as the ground of the proper (called speculative reason by Kant).

Further, the results of interpreting Parmenides as a metaphysical thinker, via the question of being, are either paradoxical or entirely problematic. For, as shown previously, prioritising the question of being as the sole feature of Parmenides poem results in either a singular unchanging physical universe or a singular unchanging divine entity of which the physical is a constitutive element. As such, the problems associated with prioritising the question of being in Parmenides calls for a reconsideration of the fragments with regard to the ways of truth and αρχή.

In order to address the question of the second way of truth, not-being, I will propose an interpretation of Parmenides that prioritises not-being in relation to αρχή.
Herein it will be necessary to pay close attention to how the goddess frames the second way of truth. Equally, this analysis will attempt to show how not-being is implicitly associated with the notion of ὀρχή via the attributes of justice, λόγος, and Θεός. Finally, this analysis will attempt to show that the notion of ὀρχή in Parmenides is properly conceived of as Θεός, or, the impossible originary ground of being.

Paying close attention to the goddess’ address to Parmenides about the ways of truth will provide an entrance into the notion of not-being. Initially, in fragment one, the goddess states that Parmenides will inquire into everything: “both the motionless heart of well-rounded truth, and also the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliability.” Following this, in fragment two, the goddess tells Parmenides that there are only two potential truthful ways of inquiry: either being (it is) and not-being (it is not). The first, that of being, is given the qualities of credibility and of following truth. The second, of not-being, is a path not to be explored; unrecognisable and inexpressible. Two points arise here. First, the path of not-being is a way of truth as one of the two truthful ways of inquiry. However, the second path is denied insofar as it is not recognisable or expressible.

The sense of this denial of pursuing not-being is, in fragment three, revealed via the identity of being and thinking: “for it is the same thing to think and to be”. In this, the identity of thinking and being is founded upon the identity of a thing in its being. Thus, the idea of being that is proposed here is twofold: being is existential – referring to an entity in its presence and being is that which presents a thing as it is – the idea of presence in general. As such, wherever thinking thinks being, it thinks an
entity as present, or, in its presence. If not-being is then pursued via this way of thinking, not-being is necessarily impossible, for it is by definition not-present.

Fragment four reinforces this idea of thinking being as thinking presence, for the present physical absence of a thing does not signify not-being or always-absence insofar as the entity thought in its being is thought in relation to its constitution (presence), or, what it is when it is present. Here, in fragment four, then, there are also two significations of being: being is the always-presence of an entity and, being is the unity of reality as presented and re-presentable. Thus, to think being is to present and re-present the presence of an entity in its being.

Fragment six brings this initial conceptualisation of being to its conclusion, and also returns to the notion of not-being. In this, the notion of being is posited as that which is possible: “one should say and think that being is; for to be is possible.”¹⁰⁵⁹ The essence of being, as such, is the possible; either in relation to existence (actual presence of entities) or with regard to thinking being. In the second case, being as being-thought shows itself as restricted to that which is possible; always-presence and thus re-presentable. Accordingly, the goddess debars Parmenides from thinking not-being, insofar as it is impossible. As impossible, not-being signifies two themes: always-absent and impossible to think in relation to presence.

In general then, the idea of being is revealed in the goddess’ statements to refer to the idea of always-presence. Equally, then, the idea of being is restricted to the being of an entity. That is, being signifies the constitution of an entity that are always-present, founded upon the actuality of the entity as present at some point in time or space. Further, being signifies a universal rule of thinking; that truthful thinking about an entity, thinks the entity in its being – its constitution as always-

¹⁰⁵⁹ Fr: 6
present. Finally, the idea of being also signifies the idea of a unified reality, determined and determinable as a whole solely in relation to an always-presence.

In comparison, or in explicit relation to being, not-being is necessarily impossible. Two themes are worthy of note here. First, not-being is only impossible in relation to being and to a thinking that thinks the being of entities. It follows then that not-being is impossible to think with regard to always-presence insofar as it is the irreconcilable other to presence as always-absence. Does this mean that not-being must necessarily be relegated to illusion or falsity? I would assert, rather, that in restricting being to the idea of always-presence the goddess/Parmenides leaves open a path to not-being as the idea of the αρχη of being-itself: truth, justice and Θεος.

This open path to not-being originates in fragment seven wherein the goddess states: “For this can never predominate, that which is not, exists.” So, this statement indicates two attributes of not-being: 1. that which is not cannot be thought of as an entity with being – an identity, 2. That which is not cannot be thought of as present insofar as it is always-absent. For all the negative description of not-being, nonetheless, the goddess’ statement indicates some positive possibility of thinking not-being. This positive is explored further in the fragment.

Initially, Parmenides denies that being, as present, springs from not-being. Here, the denial refers explicitly to the notion of temporal creation or becoming. Thus, in the first instance, being cannot be thought of as originating from not-being in a spatio-temporal sense, i.e., the creation of something out of nothing. In this sense, Parmenides denies any onto-theological explanation of the creation of the universe, and further, the creation of things in their being out of nothing.

However, the next sentence provides a positive notion of not-being in relation to being: “nor will the force of truth ever admit that anything should come into being,
beside being itself, out of not-being.” So, Parmenides’ goddess affirms that being-itself (being-in-general) originates in not-being. Herein, the positive characterisation of not-being is revealed as the $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$ of being-itself. Thus, Parmenides has opened a way into thinking non-being as the $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$ of being-itself, or, the always-absent originary ground of being.

Furthermore, this statement provides the crucial distinction between the ways of truth revealed by the goddess. Herein, the way of the truth of being signifies the truth of entities in their being character (presence) and the knowable structure of the universe as always-present. The second way of truth, as such, is disclosed as the truth of the $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$; the question of the originary ground of being itself as the characteristics of ‘that which is not’. Thus, even though these characteristics of not-being cannot be grasped in relation to the presence of entities nor their physical absence, not-being can be thought with regard to being as $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$. The goddess, then, implicitly reveals the arch as not-being via three themes: justice, $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\zeta$, and $\Theta\omicron\omicron\omicron$.

The first way that not-being shows itself is via justice. In fragment 7,8, immediately following the previous statement, Parmenides goddess states: “so far as that (not-being) is concerned, justice has never released (being) in its fetters and set it free… but holds it fast”. Herein, not-being is given the attribute of justice: of binding being as being. Again, later in this fragment the goddess states: “but it is motionless in the limits of mighty bonds… for powerful necessity holds it (being) in the bonds of a limit…”. Thus, the $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$ shown in justice is something other than being that binds being. I would argue, here, that the name of the $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$ shown in justice is not-being, or, the otherwise than being.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1060] Fr: 7,8
\item[1061] Fr: 7,8
\end{footnotes}
Not-being also shows itself as the αρχη of λόγος proper, or, truth. Initially, it would seem that the λόγος (truth) is being; being-true, especially in light of the goddess’ revelation that being and thinking are the same. However, this statement cannot be taken literally to limit truth to thinking being, nor, that being is the αρχη of truth. In the first case, the identity of thinking and being is only true in relation to thinking being (the unity of always-presence) and thinking the being of an entity (the always-present constitution of an entity). Further, this identity of thinking and being is implicitly revealed as a characteristic of human thinking in its potential for truth. This is evidenced throughout the fragments insofar as the goddess consistently refers this rule to ‘you’ (the human thinker Parmenides).

In this respect the communication of the goddess to Parmenides (the human ‘you’) also reveals a distinction between the λόγος proper to philosophy, in thinking about being, and the λόγος of truth belonging to the goddess: the ground of truth. This distinction, I would argue, is one between the human philosophical truth; (the answer to the question of being and the truth as the truth of being-human - the αρχη of philosophical truth), and the essence of truth as belonging to the goddess (the ground of truth). Herein, the goddess communicates to Parmenides as somehow other than the truths conveyed therein. For Parmenides, the goddess is the truth insofar as she communicates the truth, but also is the ground of truth as the one who reveals the truth. Moreover, the goddess reveals herself explicitly as otherwise than the truth of being as the one who binds Parmenides thinking of being to its truth: “come, I will tell you – and you must accept my λόγος when you have heard it – the ways of inquiry which alone are to be thought…” Later, in fragment two, the goddess states: “this I tell you is a path that cannot be explored (by you); for you could neither recognise

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1062 Fr: 2
that which is not, nor express it.” I would argue, here, that the goddess is binding Parmenides to the proper way of thinking being for humans (you) rather than stating its absolute truth.

This brings us to the third way of characterising the όρχη as not-being, i.e., as Θεος. Initially, this is evidenced insofar as the divine is intrinsically identified with both justice and truth. Justice, here, is personified in δικαιοσύνη and its sub-agents. Likewise, Parmenides goddess is Αλήθεια, the goddess truth. Furthermore, in the fragments the divine is disclosed as not-being, or όρχη, explicitly as divine law. This divine law that binds being must necessarily signify the otherwise than being, for being cannot bind itself. As such, the goddess’ revelation of divine law as otherwise than being is also the self-revelation of the divine in general as otherwise than being; as the always-absent όρχη of being.

It has been shown, therefore, that Parmenides is no metaphysician who provides a unifying ground in being. Rather, I have shown that Parmenides poem discloses a radical differentiation between being and what gets called not-being: όρχη, Θεος, the otherwise than being. In this, Parmenides can be viewed as a thinker opposed to metaphysics in his refusal to consider any unity of being and not-being and thus always-presence and όρχη as always-absent. Parmenides, here, carefully distances being and not-being, keeping them in their radical difference and therein does not fall into the metaphysical trap of conjoining that which constitutes presence (being) and όρχη as originary ground: truth, justice, Θεος.

Parmenides, furthermore, is in agreement with the previously discussed pre-Socratic thinkers and can be seen to develop this thinking to its logical conclusion. Thus, the distinction between being and the όρχη that arises in the pre-Socratic quest for όρχη shows itself in Parmenides as a stark and unbreachable gap between being
and the otherwise than being; always-presence and the originary ground of presence – always-absence.

25. Construction:

A construction is founded in destruction in such a way that, ideally, the construction begins with what the destruction discloses as foundational. In relation to the Pre-Socratics then, the destruction provided disclosed the essence of pre-Socratic thinking to be the question of \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \). Upon this foundation, this construction will ask two questions in relation to \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \): 1. what is indicated about being-human? 2. How does it stand with \( \Theta \varepsilon \o \zeta \)? These two questions, as such, will allow a construction of the meaning of Religion as it shows itself in Pre-Socratic thought.

A. The Quest of Pre-Socratic thinking

Whether it gets called the \( \alpha \pi \varepsilon \iota \rho \o \nu \), \( \lambda \o \gamma \o \zeta \), or ‘that which is not’, the Pre-Socratic thinkers addressed in the deconstructive case studies all take as their ultimate problem the question of the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \). The question of \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \), therein, is clearly not metaphysical in relation to what is found and further, in relation to what is presupposed in the questioning. In this, the question of \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) cannot be interpreted as the onto-theological quest for unifying ground. As such, the destruction revealed that these thinkers; Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides, each prioritise the question of \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) in such a way that the philosophical notion of being recedes and moreover, is characterised as a derivative phenomenon. Thus, in each case, being is only considered after, or within the context of, a characterisation of the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \).

In this quest for the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) a radical difference emerges between \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) and being. Each of these thinkers, in their own ways, characterise being as essentially an
always-presence that is bound, limited and steered by ἀρχή. Accordingly, ἀρχή is then characterised in general, as essentially an always-absence; a non-physical originary ground, or, the otherwise than being. The ἀρχή the pre-Socratics found, as such, is impossible to grasp or disclose except through the negation of always-presence, or, by disclosing the otherwise than being as an always-absence.

Nonetheless, all three are in agreement as to how this originary ground shows itself to humans, namely; through the concepts of binding, steering and purpose. Binding, herein, signifies the delimitation of being in its actualisation. Likewise, steering shows how the ἀρχή shows itself as the significance and coherence within φύσις as it can be understood. Finally, then, in purpose, the ἀρχή is disclosed as purpose itself; purpose is the ground of significance and coherence. This purpose in itself, as such, is the essential character of the ἀρχή as it can be thought and as it shows itself.

Poignantly, it can be seen that the quest for the ἀρχή revealed in these pre-Socratic thinkers discloses the logical end point of non-metaphysical thinking about the ἀρχή. Here, the pre-Socratic fragments do not establish a physics first, or give priority to φύσις, and then search for the ἀρχή of the physics/φύσις (which is essentially what metaphysics is – the positing of principles and causes via abstractions from the human experience of φύσις). Rather, the pre-Socratics all constitute φύσις only after, or within, the notion of ἀρχή as already formulated and presupposed. Thus, the question of ἀρχή itself, independent of any physics, shows itself in these three ways: binding, steering, and purpose.
B. The Indications of Being-human:

The ways in which the αρχη shows itself are intrinsically linked to what it is to be human, and especially to the three aspects of human thinking disclosed in pre-Socratic thought. If we take Parmenides’ poem as a point of origin, we find three implicit characterisations of human thinking.

The last characterisation, the realm of δοξα, is described as the realm of human thinking that prioritises the way φως appears to the senses. Here, the realm of everyday existence is characterised as naming, or, the thinking of things as distinguishable. Likewise, this thinking views opposites as real or actual and measures the truth of things according to their appearance and seeming disappearance. The goddess reveals to Parmenides that the essence of this way of thinking is a two-headedness; thinking that being and not-being are the same and not the same. Thus, the essence of this way of thinking is not simply the prioritisation of physical appearances, but further, thinking that prioritises the physical and thus seeks an abstract unifying ground of the physical. This is a poignant argument against metaphysical thinking, for its logical conclusion as Hegel exemplifies, is the identity of being and not-being.

Heraclitus also discusses this way of thinking via appearances, and thinking founded upon the prioritisation of the physical. Herein, Heraclitus provides scathing attacks upon thinking via appearances, and further, links this to the prioritisation of the physical and the question of the constitution of entities in their presence (being).

The second way of thinking disclosed by Parmenides is that of the truth of being. This way of thinking is the first revealed by the goddess, but is secondary in terms of priority. This second way of thinking, in Parmenides, is the proper way of

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thinking being in relation to entities and the purely abstract idea of the being in
general. In Heraclitus, this second way of thinking is utilised in relation to a differing
focus, the intelligibility of φοσίς as a process, but nonetheless addresses being, in its
truth, in its coherence and significance for human thought. Thus, both Parmenides and
Heraclitus constitute this second way of thinking as the truth of being for humans, or,
the way in which humans, in our being, grasp being.

The third and final way of thinking is the second way of truth in Parmenides
poem: not-being. This way of thinking can be called the truth of the αρχη and is
characterised as entirely otherwise than human. Equally, in Heraclitus this way of the
truth of αρχη is described as entirely otherwise than human and shows itself only via
indications.

These three potential ways of thinking, as such, indicates two primary
potentialities of being-human. The first of these can be called everydayness, or, the
thinking that prioritises appearances and thus the physical. Here, everydayness as a
way of being-human will result in two ways of thinking about φοσίς. The first is
thinking that the real is determinable by what appears to be physically present to us.
The second, and an outgrowth of the first, is metaphysical thinking: the thinking of
being as always-presence, and further, as the unifying ground of everything. In this
respect, a semblance of the truth of being is thought via everydayness, but it is a
semblance marked by a failure to grasp the αρχη.

Thus, the first potentiality of being-human is essentially the actualisation or
praxis of human existence (being-human). This potentiality of being-human is, for the
most part, the way humans are in our being. In this way, the first potentiality of being-
human is both improper in relation to the αρχη, and yet at the same time, the truth of
being (being-human). The truth of being, of being-human, is thus presence, or, a way
of being that presents entities in their being. At the same time, the truth of being is also entirely improper, for as Parmenides’ goddess indicates; it is impossible for human beings to grasp that which is not present – the otherwise than being.

There is however, a second potentiality for being-human, namely; the potentiality to grasp the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) or to be grounded in the otherwise than being. Parmenides poem exemplifies the first dimension of this potentiality of being-human. For, the truth of being is shown in its \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) of the otherwise than being, revealed via divine communication. Likewise, this potentiality of being-human is characterised by Heraclitus as the quest to grasp the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \); the purpose that steers all things. The truth of the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \), the potentiality in being-human to grasp the proper, is only disclosed via the way the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) shows itself to humans as the revelation of indications. Further, Heraclitus also posits this potentiality as an actuality of human existence: \( \eta \theta \omega \zeta \) (the proper) for being-human is our \( \delta \alpha \imath \mu \omega \nu \) – the divine voice presented in thinking the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \).

The construction of the notion of being-human in the Pre-Socratics shown here in its twofold potentiality thus revolves around the unity and difference between being and originary ground. The unity of being and \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) signifies nothing more or less than the truth of being-human insofar as humans present being as that which constitutes entities and the structure of reality as a whole. In this, the human understanding of being and being-human produces an inauthentic unity of being and thinking wherein thinking is subsumed under presence – thinking that is determined by presence.

However, the proper disclosed in pre-Socratic thought is proper thinking itself, or, thinking the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \). Herein, the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) is disclosed as the proper, or, thinking the otherwise than being which is, essentially, thinking that has no relation to being
The problem of attempting to communicate the essence of thinking is insurmountable for humans (in our being), for we cannot think without thinking being. Nonetheless, the αρχή as it is disclosed in pre-Socratic thought is essentially pointing towards the otherwise than being as pure thinking that shows itself as the truth, ηθος, and ultimately, as the αρχή (the proper). This potentiality for humans, in our being, to grasp or to be gifted with the understanding of the otherwise than being, and further, to be directed by this originary ground in our living, is precisely what is sought in pre-Socratic thinking.

C. How does it stand with Θεος?

From the disclosure of the twofold potentiality of being-human arises the possibility of also disclosing how it stands with Θεος in the Pre-Socratic thinking of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides. Initially, then, Θεος shows itself as the identity of the proper in everyday human existence. Herein, Θεος gets called the divine, the daemonic, and the soul, each with determinable characteristics that relate to the human understanding of life. Likewise, in philosophical thinking, Θεος shows itself as the name for the αρχή. Herein, Θεος as a technical title signifies the unity of the ways in which the αρχή shows itself to the philosophical understanding of existence in its αρχή. Thus, in pre-Socratic thinking Θεος signifies the technical name of the αρχή in the unity of how it shows itself.

Θεος, as such, initially signifies the αρχή of being-itself. The αρχή of being-itself, however, is not constituted as some meta-physical entity. Rather, as the αρχή of being, Θεος signifies the notion of truth. As truth, Θεος then has two primary modes of showing itself. 1. Θεος signifies the potentiality for humans to grasp the truth in proper thinking. Herein, proper thinking is the pursuit of the question of the αρχή, and
furthermore, the disclosure of the truth of being. Accordingly, the truth of being may only be properly uncovered insofar as it is already thought through the question of αρχη rather than φυσις. 2. Θεος also signifies divine revelation. In this, Θεος stands for the αρχη as it shows itself to humans in such a way that the truth of being may be grasped. As such, Θεος signifies the ground of truth as truth itself; that which allows everything to be seen as it is rather than what it appears to be.

Further, Θεος signifies the way αρχη shows itself as justice. Initially, Θεος stands for the ground of the human idea of justice, that human awareness, with its δεικτημον, grasps life in reference to right and wrong. Moreover, Θεος also signifies the ground of interpretation and coherence: that there is a coherent purpose or intelligent αρχη that steers all that happens. Finally, Θεος also has the attribute of justice itself. Herein, Θεος means αρχη in the sense of purpose in general. As purpose in general, Θεος signifies not only good, coherence/interpretation and intelligence (thinking), but also the ground of interpretation and meaning itself. Thus, Θεος as justice (steering) shows itself in the attributes of coherence within φυσις, the actuality/possibility of good and further, in the potentiality of grasping coherence and the interpretation of human existence with regard to αρχη.

Θεος then, has a third attribute, namely: the proper. Herein, both the attribute of truth and justice are shown to be subservient to the proper, i.e., they both rely on the proper for validity. In this, Θεος shows itself as the essential character of the αρχη; it is only in the idea of the αρχη as proper that allows the notions of justice and truth to attain meaning or validity.

In this way, Θεος signifies the proper in comparison to being and being-human, showing how the pre-Socratic quest for the αρχη grasps the radical difference between being and αρχη. The αρχη, through the attribution of the proper belonging to
Θεός, shows itself as otherwise than being. For instance, the truth of being does not belong to being (the truth is not a predicate of being) but is rather determined in advance via the proper. Likewise, justice is not determinable as belonging to things or events in φύσις nor human existence (presence), but rather to the interpretation of coherence/good via its ground: the proper. As such, the end point reached by the pre-Socratic quest for the ἀρχή is the naming of Θεός as the essence of ἀρχή: the grasping of the proper and the proper as it shows itself.

D. The Meaning of Religion

The thinking of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides through the construction of the potentialities of being-human and the notion of Θεός has disclosed indications of the meaning of Religion in a phenomenological sense. Herein, the essence of the meaning of Religion shows itself as the relation between humans (in our being) and the ἀρχή. This relationship can be characterised either with regard to being-human (as a two-fold potentiality) or with regard to the characteristics of the relationship as proper.

In the first case, the meaning of Religion is construed via what it is to be-human. Herein, to be-human, for the most part, has shown itself as improper. The improper-ness of being-human is disclosed initially as everydayness, or, understanding that is grounded upon presence. This realm of opinion (δόξα) has the characteristics of misunderstanding, misinterpretation and the improper pre-conceptualisation of ἀρχή. As such, the misunderstanding results in the idea of φύσις as the physical (nature), and being as the unifying ground of both presence and absence. Thus, being and non-being are thought as the same.
This two-headedness described by Parmenides’ goddess also shows the meaning of Religion in its everyday actualisation and interpretation. Herein, the gods are conceived of as entities within φωσις, entities with the character of being. Further, the relationship of being-human to the αρχη as προξις in everyday life indicates the meaning of Religion in its improper-ness. Here, as Heraclitus shows, the meaning of Religion is a relating to the αρχη (Θεω) as present: “they talk to these statues as if one were to hold conversation with houses, in their ignorance…”\(^{1064}\) Thus, the meaning of Religion indicated (the relation of being-human with the αρχη) shows itself initially via the improper grasping of Θεος as an entity within being.

The indication of the meaning of Religion, in its improper potentiality, also shows itself as metaphysics (onto-theology). Herein, metaphysics as the disclosing of the αρχη via abstractions from φωσις, constitutes being and the αρχη as identical. This, then, leads to the idea of Θεος as unifying ground: an always-present entity in everything and causing everything. Thus, the meaning of Religion in the improper-ness of being-human gives rise to a super-natural God: a God whose presence explains the presence of everything.

On the other hand, being-human also holds the potentiality of the proper. This potential is described in three ways: 1. The proper of being-human is the quest for the αρχη and not-being: to understand the purpose which steers all things through all things. 2. The proper of being-human is also found in θος: the θος of being-human is our δομον. In this, I would argue, θος signifies the intrinsic potentiality of being-human in living to ground our living upon Θεος/αρχη, i.e., the living according to the proper in its ground as our ground. As such, the second dimension of the proper is that of θος: adherence and pursuit of the αρχη as the originary ground that shows the

\(^{1064}\) Fr: 5
ought of living. 3. The proper of being-human, finally, is found in what gets called (in pre-Socratic thought) divine revelation. Herein, the proper is disclosed insofar as the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) shows itself, or communicates, to humans. As such, the third and final dimension of the proper potentiality of being-human signifies the showing itself (as communication) of the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) to humans in existence. This showing itself, as Heraclitus argues, is never a presentation; becoming or being. Rather, the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) only shows itself via indications; through manifestations that point to something other than being. Thus, the communication of the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) is, essentially, what can be called the presentation of the impossible: the impossible showing itself within the possible – the interruption of the possible.

These three dimensions of the proper potentiality of being-human in relation to the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) disclose three indications of the meaning of Religion.

1. The first indication of the meaning of Religion is here disclosed as concern, or, the grasping of being (presence) within the quest for \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \). In this, the actualisation of the meaning of Religion shows itself as an approach to \( \phi \sigma \tau \varsigma \) as a secondary phenomenon. As such, \( \phi \sigma \tau \varsigma \) is not grasped in relation to its appearance, nor for itself, but rather through its significance or meaning already given by the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \). Thus, the actualisation of Religion (in its proper sense) is dependent upon what is already in advance understood through the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \).

2. This understanding of the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \), then, can be called care (as in Heidegger and others) or interpretation. Herein, interpretation is essentially a living in accordance to the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \). A living according to the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \), an allegiance, can also be called an interpretation of life in accordance with the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) rather than in accordance with being/being-human. Thus, care as the meaning of Religion shows itself as an
interpretation of existence via a pursuit of the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \), an \( \eta \theta \circ \zeta \) grounded in the otherwise than being.

3. Care as this \( \eta \theta \circ \zeta \), however, is dependent upon the showing itself of the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \). In this, the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) signifies the absolute other than being; the unfathomable, the unknowable and the impossible. Humans in our beings, as such, are entirely dependent upon the showing itself of the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) for our idea or understanding of the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \). In philosophical terminology, then, the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) as it shows itself is called ‘principle’; a principle that serves as a hermeneutical key through which existence gets interpreted and then actualised in \( \pi \rho \alpha \xi \zeta \zeta \).

For humans in our being, the meaning of Religion as a relation to the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) may be characterised as such (originary ground, principle) in two ways. First, through being (being-human) as the name calling of the otherwise than being. Herein, the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) is related to as a negation: a calling through what it is not. As such, the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) gets called such names as no-thing, the other, the name-less, and the impossible. Such naming, however, provides no positive characterisations of the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \), but rather, excludes any character of being from it. In addition, the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) gets characterised in a positive sense via the naming of principles, such as: Truth, Justice, Good and Love.

All of this naming, however, is dependent upon the showing itself of the \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta \) as the interruption of the everyday; the possible. This showing itself is essentially the advent of the impossible, or the interruption of presence through indications of non-presence; of no-thing that can be re-presented. Both Heraclitus and Parmenides’ fragments provide clear examples or statements of this showing itself of the otherwise than being (called \( \Theta \xi \circ \zeta \)). In Heraclitus, the fragments allude to this showing itself via the indications of the oracle at Delphi and the \( \delta \alpha \mu \omicron \nu \) (divine voice) found in searching one’s self. Likewise, in Parmenides, the ground of the truth provided in the
fragments is literally the goddess, who in this case, calls Parmenides out of the everyday mortal world (the realm of being).

In general, therefore, the thinking of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides provides indications of the meaning of Religion (in its belonging-to being-human) as a relation between humans and the ἀρχή. This relation, in essence, is no-thing other than a relation to the proper itself: the originary ground of meaning, coherence and truth.
Part Four: Towards an Existential Analysis.

In this fourth part of the thesis, the aim is twofold: of moving towards an existential analysis and providing a preliminary interpretation of the meaning of Religion within that movement. This fourth part of the thesis will contain two chapters, the first with the aim of moving towards an existential analysis, while the second will provide a preliminary interpretation of the meaning of Religion as a phenomenon.

This fourth part of the thesis, however, must first be resituated in the context of the research as a whole. The problem of Religion, as posited in part one of the research, has been constituted as the question of the meaning of Religion in its ‘belonging-to’ being-human. This way of characterising Religion, as such, is phenomenological; of disclosing the ontological region of Religion and seeking therein the ground of Religion in the character of being-human.

In part two of the research, phenomenology has been disclosed as a two-phased interpretative method involving the deconstruction of preconceptions that reveals indications and an existential analysis – an uncovering of the existential structures of the phenomenon. Herein, the third part of the research provided deconstructive case studies of pre-Socratic thinking that disclosed indications of the meaning of Religion as a relation of being-human and originary ground (πρωτε ἀρχη).

The horizon for this fourth and final part of the research, then, is the difficult and complex movement from a deconstruction to an existential analysis. Herein, the movement is entirely ontological and therefore, the terms and conceptual structures will also be entirely ontological. The basic problem of this movement is to be found in
disclosing the relatedness of what has been formally indicated and the existential character of being-human that founds the relation with ἀρχή called Religion.

The task of moving towards an existential analysis involves locating the indications of the meaning of Religion given by Pre-Socratic thinking within the horizon of existence. Herein, the indicated meaning of Religion as a relationship between being-human and originary ground must be situated in its existential structures; the structures of existence for being-human. The fundamental task of moving towards an existential analysis, as such, is the interpretation of Religion as a relationship that shows itself in existence (within the ontological structures of existence) that is grounded in the being-character of humans.

The movement towards the existential analysis will contain two phases. Initially, the movement towards an existential analysis will be facilitated by a transitional phase that takes the indicative content obtained through the deconstruction of Pre-Socratic philosophy and refines this content into a number of central arguments pertinent to the meaning of Religion as a concept. The next phase will then utilise Heidegger’s three-fold structure of existence as the model for integrating this indicative content into an existential analysis.

In the second chapter of part four, a preliminary interpretation of the meaning of Religion as a phenomenon will be provided. Herein, Religion will be interpreted in its modes of inauthenticity and authenticity. This interpretation will then set up the disclosure of the meaning of Religion as a phenomenon in its primary and originary sense.
Chapter Nine: Towards an Existential Analysis.

Throughout the tradition of philosophical thinking there is a tendency towards what can be called metaphysical thinking in which, I would argue, there is a persistent tension or paradox. The essence of the metaphysical tendency reveals itself in the term itself – thinking the physical in its overarching structural unity, or, what is it that unifies all that is? However, metaphysics also reveals itself as a quest for the universal $qua$ universal, which then also tends to become the quest for a universal notion or concept that covers everything present, representable or thought. Moreover, this unifying tendency of metaphysics shows itself as the quest for a universal question – a single question that encompasses and circumscribes all questions within it. The seeds of the destruction of metaphysics, as such, lie in the existential facticity of two primary philosophical questions neither of which can be adequately subsumed or unified with the other.

If we take philosophy to signify the human quest to think about thinking in the broadest sense, i.e., the quest for understanding, for knowledge of universals and wisdom, two questions immediately arise.

1. How is it that in being-human (Dasein)\footnote{Here, I take Heidegger’s term Dasein to signify being-human in a restricted sense: in relation to being-understanding.} we can understand being? This refers to the question of ‘what-being’: things, identity, and ‘reality’. This question, as such, is essentially the question of the relation between Dasein and the world of things (existents) and the how of being-human that constitutes presence ($\omega \sigma \nu \epsilon \alpha$) as understood and as such, representable. Thus, the first question is in itself threefold: who-being (being-human), $\phi \omega \sigma \tau \zeta$ (being
of existents) and the relation between Dasein and the being of existents (being-for-Dasein).

2. What is the meaning of life? This question immediately refers back to the question of the ground of being-human, i.e., the meaning of being-human in its ground. This question is also the question of θος, or, of the proper life. The essence of this question, as such, is that of the ἀρχή (originary ground).

To gain access to the meaning of Religion as a phenomenon, it will be necessary to pay close attention to what has been indicated by Pre-Socratic thinking - that holds being and originary ground as questions in a radical difference. For it will be through this radical difference that the phenomenon of Religion will be disclosed in its meaning. The question of the meaning of Religion, as such, is necessarily founded in holding open the difference between ‘what-being’ and ‘who-being’, and thus revealing in stark contrast to ‘what-being’ the question of the meaning of life in relation to its ground and thus being-human. In attempting to hold open this question, it is first necessary to formulate the question of the otherwise than being in this radical difference.

26. Preliminary Arguments:

The Notion of Being-in-general is an illusion:

a) The notion of being-in-general is an abstraction of the everyday character of being that belongs to being-human, wherein the character of Dasein is determined as the being who presents entities and the world as understood. In this, it is the character of being-Dasein to understand thought, and to think in
reference to ὁσις. This tendency of Dasein’s being presents the abstraction called being-in-general whenever the indeterminate or non-presentable is thought.

b) The notion of the identity of being-in-general and nothing is posited whenever being is understood in relation to originary ground – absolute genesis. Herein, the notion of being-in-general is an illusion brought to presence through Dasein’s sense of being as unity; the unification of being and originary ground in thought and as thought in its unity and ground. Further, the notion of being-in-general also signifies the subsumption of thinking (in its ground) under being within finitude and the temporal being of Dasein who cannot think without thinking being.

The Proper Notion of Being:

a) The everyday character of being is that which constitutes things as present (a unitary identity). The question of the everyday character of being, then, is that of Dasein: the being who presents beings as understood.

b) The unified analogy of being, or, the analogous unity of being, is the rule of thinking being for Dasein. In this, everything and anything that can be thought will necessarily be thought of as present, representable or within presence in general as an abstraction. As such, the rule of being is this: for Dasein in our being, thinking shows itself as present or as a like-ness to presence. In the same way, the subject of thought is ruled by the analogous unity of being insofar as an object can only be thought of as present or as present-like for us. The tyranny of being is such that we cannot think the otherwise than being, or

\[1066\] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp.75-82
grasp originary ground without thinking analogically; that is – positing a likeness to being or an “it is something like X’ – something with being. Therefore, when humans think, we think being and subsume all that is thought under being.

c) The modalities of being are what-being and who-being. What-being or being-for-Dasein can be called the phenomenon concern; the concern for working out the world in order to live (ἐπιστήμη and ἔχνη). In this respect the essence of concern is understanding that enables utility, and thus, concern is fundamentally a concern about that which constitutes something as an entity, i.e., being. Who-being, or being-human, can be called finitude; the being-in-a-world of others and in relation to others (being-with). Who-being, then, is essentially a caring about something, and thus, fundamentally a meaning-interpretative being within a world-horizon. Given the rule of being, the modality of who-being shows itself as a caring about things; the constitution of things as meaningful, and meaning as constituted through presence (φρονησίς, σοφία).

**Being and Originary Ground (in relation to being-human)**

a) The ground of understanding being is the factical living of Dasein. This character of Dasein’s being is constituted by the present: the tendency of everyday living towards judgment, measurement, manipulation, control and force. Equally, this character of being-Dasein is constituted by the holding-together of presence: unification, identification and universalisation. Thus, the essence of being-Dasein is literally being-present: of unification and determination.
b) The ground of being, which is always being-for-Dasein, shows itself in being-human as a whole. Herein, being-human is grasped ‘for itself’ as a being-with and being-directed. Being-with signifies a being within a world constituted by meaningful relations, or, of constituting world relations as meaningful. Equally, being-directed signifies a being towards the world with purpose and within the world as purposive. Insofar as being-human is understood, being-human is therefore given the being character of present-meaning (meaning of presence) and present purpose (the purpose of presence).

c) The originary ground of being-for-humans is both understood and impossible to understand. In the first instance the ground of being is understood as being-for-Dasein. Herein, the ground of being shows itself as temporality-finitude: the fundamental ‘how’ of human understanding. As such, temporality can be called the ground of being insofar as finitude is the ground of how humans in our being understand and insofar as grounding is an activity of being-understanding.

The originary ground of being-human as a whole, however, is impossible to understand: is nothing present, no-thing within presence, and no-thing to be identified. In this respect, the originary ground is a groundless-ground: there is nothing standing-under understanding. Therefore, the ground of being is not being, and must be thought of as otherwise than being.

With regard to being-human, then, the originary ground can be thought in two ways: in relation to Dasein (being-human as what-being) or through being-
human (as who-being). In the first case, the way of thinking originary ground can be called privation: thinking through absence and negation. The first way of thinking originary ground is thus essentially a determination of ‘what it is not’ – the negation of what-ness from thinking about the character of originary ground. This can also be called the negation of being.

The second way into thinking about originary ground in relation to being-human can be called the (positive) phenomenological way of indication. In this respect, the way into thinking about originary ground is founded upon the way who-being shows itself and the originary ground of the ‘who’ indicated therein.

The phenomenological way into thinking about the originary ground via the notion of indication must be made transparent. Herein, the point of origin for interpretation is the presupposition that in the character of being-human as who-being, traces of the originary ground shows itself in the difference between ‘what-being’ and ‘who-being’ in such a way that ‘who-being’ indicates the otherwise than being. Thus, the primary indicative ways towards the originary ground of being-human are constituted through the characteristics of being-human called meaning and purpose.

Additionally, any attempt to come to terms with a notion like ‘originary ground in general’ will prove illusory. First, any attempt to do so falls under the projection of being-in-general as an absolute abstraction: absolute unification. Moreover, any attempt falls under the analogy of being as a
projection of being-for-Dasein and the originary ground as object-like. Finally, the proper notion of being is being-human, that is, there is no such thing as being-in-general. Therefore, any representation of an originary ground of being-in-general proves to be privative in the everyday sense of false: a judgment which posits ‘that which is not, is’.1067

The Radical Difference between Being and Originary Ground:

a) The everyday character of this difference shows itself as the difference between presence and absence. Herein, being is characterised by emergence, presence, and within temporality (φωστίς). Alternatively, originary ground is indicated by absent-now, always-absent, and otherwise than temporality. This otherwise cannot be constituted as the eternal in the sense of always-present or necessarily present, but rather, shows itself in the difference between φωστίς as it emerges and the absent ground of Dasein that constitutes φωστίς.

b) The character of this difference in thinking shows itself as a difference between the possible and impossible. To think being is possible for humans in our being. To think otherwise is impossible.

c) The difference between being-human (identity) and our originary ground shows itself as a difference between unity and disunity. Herein, the unity of being-human is called identity, the unification of what and who we are subsumed within the analogy of being.

1067 Plato, Sophist, 263a-c
The originary ground of being-human, as otherwise than unity rather than the opposite of unity\textsuperscript{1068}, shows itself via the disruption of identity, the interruption of the emergence of who-being, and the discontinuity of who-being within φοσίς as an interpretation and directedness towards absence. Therefore, the essence of this difference can be called the projection of being (identity) in relation to the otherwise than being: the originary ground that interrupts identity through the ‘who’ of being.

27. The Point of Origin for the Existential Analysis

The point of origin for a phenomenological interpretation of the meaning of Religion involves a three phased consideration of the radical difference between being-human and originary ground. The first phase can be called the negation of Dasein. The second phase is the negation of being-human as understood. The third phase invokes indications of the originary ground of being-human as the disruption of the unity of what and who being, the interruption of identity as continuity, and finally, the otherwise that shows itself through life in meaning and directedness.

A. The negation of being-for-Dasein:

The negation of being-for-Dasein forms three logical imperatives insofar as the radical difference is adhered to. First, the idea that the originary ground may be constituted as an emergent entity must be excluded. Additionally, the idea that the originary ground may be characterised as within φοσίς in abstract form, eg., as first cause, unmoved-mover, or the idea of God as creator must also be excluded (originary ground as an ideal object/entity). Finally, the idea that originary ground may be

\textsuperscript{1068} Plato, Sophist, 258b-e
characterised via the ground of presence, eg., temporality as the ground of being-for-Dasein, must be excluded. These exclusions are each logical imperatives insofar as the originary ground is not-being. Thus, the negation of being leads inevitably to the negation of Dasein insofar as Dasein constitutes being as presence.

B. The negation of being-human as understood:

For humans in our being understanding is characterised by thinking being. In this way, to think about being-human is to understand being-human as a present entity with being. Initially, then, being-human must be excluded insofar as the originary ground of being-human is not an entity with being. Furthermore, being-human is understood as thinking-being; the presence of who-being in thinking. Equally, then, the understanding of being-human must be excluded insofar as the originary ground of being-human is otherwise than being, and thus otherwise than thinking-being. Therefore, the paradox of the analogy of being lies at the epicentre of the negation of being-human. For, insofar as being-human is thought, being or something like being is thought.

The essence of the negation of being-human as understood is the exclusion of thinking as thinking being. Herein, the point of origin for an existential analysis is precisely indication, in the sense of a likeness of who-being as thinking and who-being as present as thinking-being, insofar as this likeness indicates something otherwise than being where being is negated.
C. The negation of being-human – full sense:

In arriving at the full determination of being-human in who-being, we also arrive at the point of complete negation of being-human in relation to originary ground. The full determination and complete negation of being-human originates in the question of Ethics – the proper. Here, Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* serves as a pertinent point of orientation.

The full determination of being-human within the horizon of who-being is only possible insofar as the question of ηθος (a good or proper life) is addressed. Herein two questions arise: Are humans in our being good? What is meant by good? The first question involves determining the character of being-human in relation to goodness, and moreover, predetermining goodness as an inherent character of who-being. The second question, accordingly, involves the attempt to think-through the meaning of goodness in its ground for humans.

Let us start, then, with the assertion that humans in our being are not intrinsically good (1106\(a\)7-10).\(^{1069}\) Further, following Aristotle, let us assert that to be-human is to tend towards pleasure as a ground for and end of our living (1109\(a\)15-16). This assertion corresponds with the formulation of being-human as understood, i.e., subsumed under being, insofar as pleasure is inherently related to the priority of φύσεως. These two assertions, as such, destabilise the tendency to preconceive the good, the proper, and being as equivalent terms. Thus, a difference appears between being and good. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that in some fashion good is a potentiality of human existence. This potentiality, insofar as it does not belong to being-human, must have its ground in some otherwise than being-human that shows itself in who-being as a question.

\(^{1069}\) the notion of evil is not relevant to this point
Elsewhere, Aristotle argues, and Heidegger’s translation/interpretation of Aristotle suggests,\footnote{1070} that being-human is the being who may always also be otherwise than itself (1140a30-1141a1). To be-human, in a strict sense, is to be bound by presence – to be finite. We cannot say, in this regard, that to be human is to be good. So in fact, we must say rather: good is the otherwise of being-human. Therefore, goodness is a potentiality of human existence only insofar as we are not ourselves.\footnote{1071}

Aristotle then goes on to make two points: the intellect is that which most resembles the good (1178\textsuperscript{a}1-8) and additionally, goodness in humans is a result of some otherwise than being-human, originary ground (1179\textsuperscript{b}20-23). Therefore, it can be seen that the notion or actuality of goodness as a question leads to three primary outcomes. First, the notion of goodness in relation to being-human leads to the necessity of negating being-human. Further, the originary ground of goodness is otherwise than being. Finally, goodness shows itself as indications and traces through the intellect (νοῦς) as a ‘who’ that is otherwise than being-human. The opening into this otherwise than being, as such, can be found in the complete negation of being-human and in the traces called the good.

\footnote{1070} Heidegger, *Plato’s Sophist*, p.97 (Heidegger’s interpretation and translation of Aristotle’s Nic.Eth. VI, 9)

\footnote{1071} This is precisely, in my interpretation, what Aristotle means when he refers to the life of φιλο-σοφικός (1177b26-34): “But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not insofar as he is man that he will live so, but insofar as something divine is present in him…”
D. The propositions of Complete Negation:

1. Being-human is not being-proper. Good does not belong to humans in our being, and as such, good is absent from being-human.

2. Caring about good is intrinsic to human existence, and may be constituted as the essential character of who-being in existence. Thus, the character of the ‘who’ of being-human can be called: ‘the being who may always also be otherwise than itself’. As such, the facticity of caring about life indicates something about this ‘who’ that is otherwise than being.

3. This ‘who’ of caring completely negates being-human insofar as it is not being-human that shows itself as good, but rather, the potentiality of being-human to be for-given good through living somehow otherwise than being. This for-given-ness of the good shows itself as the traces of a ‘who’ in human existence in three primary ways: thinking the ‘who’, historical revelation of the ‘who’, and the ‘who in us’.

28. Indications of the ‘Who’:

A. Indications via who-being as intellect (ὡς):

According to Aristotle, the intellect is that rational part of the soul that serves as the ground of human thinking (1139a1-17). Herein, the intellect is characterised in three primary ways: as that which epitomises the potential good of humans, as that which serves as the ground of proper knowing (the truth), and further, as that which shows itself as the ‘who’ of being-human that most resembles the otherwise (1178b8-32). Thus, the intellect is characterised as the showing itself of the ‘who’ (διδασκαλον) of being-human that most resembles originary ground.
The resemblance of the intellect to the otherwise cannot be construed with regard to the knowing presented therein, the eternal (1177\textsuperscript{a}7-\textsuperscript{b}26), insofar as this knowing forms the absolute abstraction of the everyday being-character, and further, the illusion of being-in-general. Rather, the primary characteristic of the intellect in resemblance is the intuitive grasping and for-given-ness of the originary ground in the questioning of ηθος (1143\textsuperscript{a}19-24).\textsuperscript{1072} As such, life is grasped as somehow purposive, and already in advance means something for humans. The primary question of the intellect is of the good: of a living within proper purpose and true meaning. Thus, the showing of the ‘who’ of being-human in the intellect indicates the character of originary ground in the question of proper purpose and meaning within the negation of being-human.

Further, the resemblance of the intellect to the otherwise may be constituted as a trace of the character of originary ground. The intellect, as intuitive, gives some indication of the character of the ‘who’ deprived of being. That is, the intuition of purpose and meaning without regard to being(s). In this way, principles grasped in relation to purpose and meaning indicate something about the character of the ‘who’ in a positive sense (eg., good, love, friendship…).

Moreover, insofar as the intellect shows itself as some capacity for choice and action (being-human may always also be-otherwise than ourself) the ‘who’ is indicated by its for-given-ness to the intellect as a potentiality. In other words, the presence of choice is presupposed by a capacity to chose, and this is further presupposed by the for-given-ness of ways to chose (being and originary ground). Therefore, in this capacity for choice belonging to the intellect, an indicative trace of the otherwise must necessarily for-give the ‘who’ to humans.

\textsuperscript{1072} See footnote for this paragraph in Jonathan Barnes’ Revised Oxford Translation of Aristotle’s works regarding etymological relation of judgment and forgiveness.
B. Indications of Originary Ground in Factical Existence:

There are three basic ways in which the otherwise is indicated in factual existence: the historical, revelation, and the teleological. The first of these, the historical, is how temporality has been disrupted in such a way that traces of the otherwise become embedded in the historical conscience of human beings. These interruptions of the temporal form narratives of impossibilities (μυθος) through which demands are made upon human existence. These demands, then, form a hermeneutical system in relation to ηθος as the historical disclosure of the purpose and meaning of human existence. Thus, the essence of the historical indications of originary ground can be called λογος: the communication that discloses the meaning and purpose of living as ‘who-being’.

The second way, of revelation, is how the personal experience of factual existence becomes disrupted in such a way that way traces and questions form in relation to life. Herein, revelation marks the impossible disruption of being-human as a factual experience through which the security of human existence is negated. This experience, as such, is essentially the λογος that negates being-human: that reveals an absence of good, meaning and purpose.

The final way, of teleology, disrupts the future driven understanding of being-human as not-yet and being in control. Herein, indications of the originary ground emerge in the impossible future that cannot be controlled nor measured. The absence of being that beckons from the future confronts human existence in such a way that τελος becomes the impossible “to what end and what meaning is life grounded originarily”? 
C. The Originary Ground in Us:

The Originary ground is indicated insofar as it lives through us. Herein, the living through us of the originary ground shows itself as the ‘good’, or, the proper that comes to presence in us through the negation of being-human. As such, this way of indication is both the most immediate – as the impossible that comes to presence – but also the most paradoxical – for even present is impossible to understand. Nonetheless, the originary ground in us forms positive indications insofar as being-human is not merely negated, but also discloses positive phenomena that communicates.
Chapter Ten: The Meaning of Religion as a Phenomenon.

The meaning of Religion as a phenomenon is intrinsically located in the relation of being-human and originary ground. As such, the meaning of Religion must necessarily be characterised in two ways: as a relationship constituted within existence, and as a relationship presupposed in the ‘who’ of being-human. Within the first characterisation, the meaning of Religion will be addressed as a relation within existence that is both inauthentic and authentic; as belonging to being-human and the otherwise of being-human. In the second characterisation, the meaning of Religion will be outlined in its base ontological structures. In both characterisations, I will utilise Heidegger’s threefold determination of being-human previously set out: concern, care and directedness.

29. Religion as a Phenomenon of Existence:

The analysis of Religion as a phenomenon of existence begins within the context of the determination of the character of being-human, and further, in the light of the predetermined character of Religion as a human relation with originary ground. The former, then, discloses the character of being-human as a being who may always also be otherwise than itself. Herein, this characterisation signifies that the analysis of Religion as a phenomenon of existence must disclose how Religion shows itself as both an inauthentic and authentic life. Further, the latter signifies the way in which Religion may be determined as either improper or proper as it shows itself. Herein, the delineation between proper and improper lies in the difference between the otherwise and being in the showing itself of Religion. Insofar as being-human as
existence tends towards the improper the analysis will first outline the existential meaning of Religion as a phenomenon that shows itself as improper.

**A. Religion as Improper: An Object Oriented Belief System.**

The essence of the improper showing itself of Religion constitutes the human relation with originary ground as a knowledge system with regard to an object that serves as the originary ground; an object that stands under being. As such, the improper of Religion is essentially the way Religion shows itself within the realm of understanding and φόσις. Thus, Religion as improper is nothing other than the meaning of Religion belonging-to Dasein.

**Concern:**

Herein, the actualisation of Religion shows itself as an improper concern for working out and understanding the originary ground as an object or entity. Initially, then, this concern is actualised as a science of abstraction; concerned with the truth about this object/entity as present, representable, and within presence in general. Thus, the actualisation of Religion in concern shows itself initially in the tendency towards metaphysical thinking and theologising wherein Religion is constituted as concern for understanding the entity that is first cause or Being-in-general (the truth of being).

Moreover, the actualisation of Religion as an improper showing itself constitutes the relationship with originary ground to be a ‘holding-to-be-true’ within the realm of understanding in the sense of ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’. In this way, the relationship that constitutes Religion is improperly conceived of as a relationship of understanding; that the object/entity related-to can be understood and is understood within the realm of being-true and true-being. Accordingly, Religion becomes
actualised as the understanding of being-truth: the actualisation of true-belief in what could be called the modes of orthopraxis or orthodoxy.

In the first case, orthopraxis, Religion is understood as a being-true of human existence in relationship with the object/entity of belief. In other words, Religion shows itself in ortho-praxis as an understanding of being-good that humans may be-true to in existence. Orthopraxis, as such, is essentially the constitution of Religion as a being-good that belongs as a possibility to being-human in relation to the object of belief. Thus, being, truth and good are the same.

In the second case, of orthodoxy, Religion shows itself as an understanding of being-true as emergent to humans. Herein, belief is essentially an understanding of the entity/object constituted as the Truth. Moreover, insofar as belief is a relation characterised by understanding, the being-true of belief becomes manifest as a relation to a universal (always present) entity/object that is both determinable and unifying. Finally, then, in orthodoxy Religion shows itself as a being-true towards which humans believe, and in belief, understand as the Truth (objective being). Thus, in the mode of orthodoxy Religion shows itself as the human understanding of Truth as an object/entity that is-there (Da-Sein) and stands under presence.

Care:

There are three primary dimensions to the improper showing itself of Religion in care: the interpretative horizon of existence as causal (within judgment), the interpretation of life as ‘spiritual’ and the interpretation of life as ‘metaphysical’. The first pertains to the ἰθος of human existence, while the second and third pertain to the interpretation of the entity/object of the religious relation as present.
The interpretation of existence as causal is grounded in Dasein’s being: to think presence (to understand) is to judge. Likewise, the interpretative horizon belonging-to the everyday showing itself of Religion is one of judgment and causality. Herein, the everyday concern for truth is disclosed in its foundations; of universal law and an ἡθος of judgment.

The improper manifestation of Religion as an interpretation of life shows itself, in the first instance, as a caring about universal law, e.g., a singular cause that serves as the unifying ground of being. This caring about of everyday Religion, as such, cares about presence and constitutes the interpretation of life via presence. Thus, the caring about universal law manifests as an interpretation of life that constitutes the relation of being-human and originary ground as an always-present living under judgment. Further, the originary ground appears as present; present to humans as universal law and as that which poses universal judgment.

Intrinsic to this interpretative horizon, then, is the constitution of ἡθος (proper living) as a living within judgment (moral law). Herein, the relationship of humans and originary ground discloses life as a being-t/here (Da-Sein) under judgment. Accordingly, ἡθος is characterised by the human ability to adhere to this moral law as both a universal law of being and determinate laws for humans. As such, the essence of the interpretative dimension of the improper showing itself of Religion is both an interpretation of reality via an entity/object that is universal law and a subsequent interpretation of human living within the horizon of presented moral laws.

The interpretative horizon of ἡθος as moral law, then, projects two primary ways of constituting originary ground as present to humans; as an object and/or entity. The latter, which can be called the ‘subjective’ or ‘spiritual’ constitutes originary

1073 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp.106-107
ground as an entity with being who is personally present to humans in a supra-
physical/spiritual realm. Herein, life gets interpreted via the projection of a spiritual
realm that is understood in everydayness as the cause of good and evil, and further,
the cause of physical experiences in general. The spiritual realm, as the ideal
abstraction of everydayness in a ‘subjective’ sense, serves as an interpretative horizon
wherein causality is personified, and thus, all experience can be attributed to
spiritual/personified causes. Thus, the essence of what I have called ‘spiritualism’ is
an interpretation of life that constitutes cause as personified and thus, the originary
ground as a person with the attributes of first-cause; the personality of universal law.

In the second case, life is interpreted upon the basis of a metaphysical realm of
being-in-general. Herein, the interpretative horizon of life is constituted in the abstract
ideal of being as an object: always-present, binding (unifying), ruling and steering. As
such, ηθοζ is grounded in the ability to adhere to an interpretation of life within the
horizon of ‘objective’ universal law, through a being-likeness of humans to the object
being-in-general or through an imitation of the universal natural law. The meaning
of Religion, herein, is the necessary presupposition of an object that serves as the
foundation of physical presence, i.e., the religious relation is constituted by the
rational explanation of existence.

Directedness:
The meaning of Religion as an intrinsic directedness of Dasein towards originary
ground, with regard to everydayness, has three primary characteristics. First,
directedness towards originary ground belonging to Dasein constitutes originary

1074 Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, pp.70-71, 88-89 (Here Kant uses both senses of
ηθοζ and posits them as identical)
1075 Heidegger’s notion of Religion serves as an example here: the emergence of the truth of being as an
entity which also becomes an eschatology (predetermination) of being through time.
ground as a being with-in being. The presence of the originary ground, herein, is an always-presence; a presence with-in everything that works out though everything. The being of originary ground is that of highest unifying being; of universal law, always- genesis and the presence of Truth.

Likewise, the directedness towards originary ground belonging-to Dasein constitutes belief as a mode of understanding. As such, the primary character of belief is truth; the truth of what can be understood in relation to originary ground. Herein, true-belief is restricted to the realm of presence and the ways in which originary ground is understood therein, e.g., via Reason or revealed religion(s).

The meaning of Religion in an everyday, improper sense, is the self-projection of being-for-Dasein in relation to originary ground, characterised for the most part, by what gets called a subjective or objective relatedness. Herein, the subjective relatedness of Dasein to the originary ground projects a who-being as understood; a personality that serves as the ground of presence. The subjective, then, is inherently a theologising of the personality of who-being; the divinisation of the identity of who-being.

The objective relatedness of Dasein to the originary ground projects what-beeing as understood; a being that is an objective unifying ground understood as necessarily presupposed in the reality of presence. The objective, then, is inherently an onto-theological thinking that projects being-for-Dasein (everydayness) as a unifying ground called being or something like being. Being-for-Dasein, as such, is theologised; the divinisation of understanding towards that which stands-under all that is.

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1076 See Heidegger’s interpretation of Paul’s faith as pneuma in Introduction to the ‘phenomenology of religion’
B. Religion as a proper phenomenon of existence:

Concern:

There are two primary dimensions of the showing itself of Religion with regard to the proper of concern; the negation of concern and chairological temporality. The former signifies the negation of Dasein’s concern and the latter, the potential of the otherwise of being-human in existence.

The negation of concern belonging-to the proper of Religion in existence is inherently the negation of the identity of Dasein (the ‘I’) wherein the primacy of concern about the present is reversed. In the first instance, then, the negation of concern is characterised by a denial of the primacy of an individual’s concerns about living. Further, this denial extends to the negation of concern as a motive for directing living. As such, the negation of concern takes on two forms: the negation of the ‘I’ of Dasein and the negation of the primacy of presence.

The negation of the ‘I’ of concern is the threefold denial of self. Herein, the denial of self is given as the denial of selfishness – that ‘my’ concerns are of primary importance (primary meaning) and the prime motive for ‘my’ living. Additionally, the denial of self is given as the denial of the ‘they’; the projection of a general selfishness of humans as motive. Finally, the denial of self is given as the denial of ‘not I’; the concern about others as differing identities present to the ‘I’.

The negation of the primacy of presence negates the primacy of concern as a concern about the present and presence in general. Herein, the negation of the primacy of presence is given as the threefold denial of the meaning of presence. Initially, this is given as the denial of the tendency belonging to Dasein to think
meaning and purpose as a property of present things (things in their being). Further, the denial of the primacy of presence is given as an overcoming the tendency of Dasein to constitute meaning and purpose as belonging to ‘who I am’; meaning and purpose as an integral aspect of being-human. Finally, this denial of the primacy of presence is given as the denial of the meaning of abstraction; that the world of presence has as a property inherent meaning and purpose. Thus, in general, the negation of the primacy of presence signifies an active overcoming of the tendency to subsume meaning/purpose under presence and, moreover, the tendency to understand presence as standing-under meaning/purpose.

The potentiality of being-human to be otherwise can be called the actualisation of *chairological* temporality given as a concern for the absent. Herein, *chairological* temporality constitutes existence as a positive absence: the primacy of meaning/purpose as an impossible-possibility. As such, two primary modes of *chairological* temporality are given within existence: hope and expectation.

Hope signifies a concern for meaning and purpose that cannot be understood, nor shows itself in presence. Hope, then, constitutes the meaning and purpose of living as an avowal that meaning and purpose lives through us: the actualisation of originary ground through human living. Hope, as such, is essentially a choosing to be concerned for originary ground, and signifies a for-given-ness of originary ground without presence. The actualisation of *chairological* temporality, therefore, is the for-given-ness of hope for a proper life living through us.

The concern for the absent of *chairological* temporality may also be called expectation. Herein, life is constituted by the expectation for the interruption of presence and the disruption of understanding via meaning/purpose. As such, the

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1077 See Glossary: for-given-ness
expectation of *chairological* temporality awaits the disruption of temporality; the overcoming of presence by originary ground. This is not, then, an expectation for the future, for the present, nor the past, but rather, an awaiting the advent of the proper of living that comes to presence as the dissolution of temporality. Thus, the significance of expectation belonging-to *chairological* temporality is the for-given-ness of originary ground that overcomes temporality and presence via meaning and purpose. This is no more or less than the overcoming of Dasein’s being, or, of being-Dasein.

*Caring – Faithful Dwelling:*

The meaning of Religion as a phenomenon of existence, in the sense of the proper, shows itself as a caring characterised by faithful dwelling. As with concern, the for-given-ness of care is both a negation of given-ness and the positive for-given-ness of the potentiality of the otherwise of being-human in existence.

Initially, care shows itself as a negation of interpretation that holds open the radical difference between being and originary ground. Herein, the character of care is such that life is not interpreted via being and accordingly, that the interpretation of life is held open to originary ground. As such, the initial given-ness of care can be called a faithful dwelling within the question of originary ground. Further, care shows itself as an intentional interpretation of life remaining within meaning and purpose; as indicating remnants of the proper. Herein, care shows itself as intentional: seeking the originary ground as a way of interpreting life. As such, the showing itself of care may also be called a faithful dwelling that remains within the indications of originary ground.

Finally, care shows itself as a hermeneutical horizon. Hermeneutics, then, is characterised by a meaning-forming founded upon the indications of originary ground.
ground. Initially, this hermeneutical horizon holds faithfully to the relation of being-human and originary ground through the interpretation of the analogy of being as indicative of the otherwise than being. Further, through the hermeneutical horizon, life is interpreted via indicative principles of originary ground. That is, life is interpreted via principles such as: good, love, friendship… which form a meaningful life within the implications of response-ability. Thus, the essential character of care as a hermeneutical horizon shows itself as a potentiality belonging-to being-human called responsibility constituted in the holding faithful to principles as indications of the proper ‘how’ of living.

These principles of interpreting life belong intrinsically to the relationship between being-human and originary ground. Herein, the hermeneutical horizon exceeds the given-ness of indicative principles through the for-given-ness of originary ground as the potential otherwise of being-human. This excessive for-given-ness of originary ground may be called λογος in so far as, somehow the originary ground forgives the proper as discourse within the relation between being-human and our potential otherwise than being. This for-given-ness of the λογος, as such, shows itself as a hermeneutic key that founds the possibility of a proper interpretation of life. Thus, care shows itself as the potential otherwise of being-human; a relationship with originary ground wherein the proper is communicated to being-human as a proper interpretation of life.

Directedness: Religion as a meaning oriented life.

The meaning of Religion in its sense of the proper arises within the dissonance between life and meaning: being and originary ground. Herein, Religion signifies in

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1078 See Glossary: response-ability
its most general sense, the potentiality belonging-to being-human of an ηθος that is otherwise than being-human. As such, a fundamental meaning of Religion is the potential of faithful dwelling: a living within an authentic relationship with originary ground. This faithful dwelling, however, is presupposed by the potentiality of being-human to be oriented towards originary ground as indicated in life. This potential of orientation can be called belief.1079

Belief initially signifies the general ability to be-oriented towards originary ground. Further, insofar as originary ground discloses the proper meaning and purpose of living, belief may be characterised as a general being-directed towards a meaningful life, or, meaning and purpose in general. Accordingly, belief signifies a being-directed towards the originary ground as proper. Herein, the orientation towards the proper forms the potentiality belonging-to being-human of the otherwise, insofar as the otherwise becomes a potentiality of existence upon the ground of a directedness towards the proper and originary ground. Belief, as such, is the ground of being-human as the being who may also be otherwise than itself.

The fundamental character of belief is the potentiality of being-directed towards originary ground that belongs-to being-human in existence. Herein, belief initially shows itself as a being-towards nothing: a directedness towards that which cannot be understood or known. Further, belief also shows itself as a being-towards the otherwise of being-human: a directedness towards the question of meaning and purpose. Finally, however, belief exceeds both insofar as the being-directed of belief forms the potentiality of a relationship between being-human and originary ground upon which the indications of meaning and purpose are dependent. The primordial meaning of belief, as such, is the potentiality belonging-to being-human of

1079 See Glossary: belief
directedness towards originary ground that forms an authentic relation. Therefore, the meaning of Religion as a proper phenomenon of existence is essentially belief: the potentiality of forming an authentic relationship with originary ground. What remains, then, is the complete formulation of the meaning of Religion as belonging-to being-human.

30. The Meaning of Religion as Belonging-to being-human:

The primary difficulty in attempting to come to terms with the fundamental meaning of Religion as a phenomenon lies in the twofold potentiality of being-human. Herein, it is not simply a matter of disclosing the meaning of Religion within a binary opposition; either authentic or inauthentic, nor the disclosure of these potential meanings of Religion as ‘equiprimordial’. Rather, the problem lies in disclosing the meaning of Religion within the horizon of two ways of saying the proper and the aporia of the co-existence of these ways of the proper in being-human. Therefore, the disclosure of the primary meaning of Religion will begin with a discussion of the ways of saying the proper.

A. Ways of Saying the Proper:

As Aristotle notes in his Ethics, there are as many ways of saying the proper (or good) as there are ways of actualisation (1094a3-10). With regard to Religion, however, the ways of saying the proper are delimited to two primary possibilities: being-human and the potential otherwise of being-human. Herein, the proper of being-human, or the proper of being, is a legitimate how of characterisation. As such, the first way of saying the proper for our purposes signifies being: that this is properly the character of being belonging-to being-human. However, the proper also signifies the potentiality
of the otherwise of being-human, which, with regard to Religion signifies the possibility of an authentic relation of being-human with originary ground. But this possibility is only given in the negation of being-human. Thus, the second way of saying the proper signifies an authentic relation with originary ground only in the loss of the proper being of being-human. We have, then, an *aporia* of saying the proper with regard to Religion for both ways coexist even in the fundamental meaning of Religion as a phenomenon. The task of disclosing the fundamental meaning of Religion must therefore begin with the *aporia* of the ways of saying the proper and ascertaining how this *aporia* shows itself.

It becomes immediately apparent, insofar as the *aporia* of the proper belongs inherently to the realm of the showing itself of Religion, that the way of addressing the *aporia* will be found within a characterisation of Religion-for-Dasein, i.e., the how of understanding Religion as a phenomenon. This is the realm of concern; the realm of showing itself in which Dasein understands. Thus, the way of addressing the *aporia* of the proper lies within concern and the ways of constituting the proper as understood in existence. Further, we must seek within concern, the ways of saying the proper pertinent to the fundamental meaning of Religion.

**B. Concern:**

In concern, the actualisation of being-human as Dasein, there are three primary ways of saying the proper. Initially, the proper may be said with regard to being, which is equally the intrinsic inauthenticity of Religion as a phenomenon. Further, the proper shows itself within the analogy of being as a resemblance of originary ground in the understanding of an authentic relationship between being-human and originary ground. Finally, the proper may also be said as the proper relationship of being-
human and originary ground as it shows itself as an *aporia*: the negation of the proper of being.

**Bad Faith**

Initially, the proper meaning of Religion as it shows itself in concern can be called ‘bad faith’ in the sense of the actualisation of existence solely within a concern about being. Herein, the meaning of Religion shows itself as a living faithfully in accordance with being-human as proper, and as the only possible proper subject of understanding. As such, the meaning of Religion shows itself essentially as the understanding of life wherein being-human is reified and being-human constituted as universal law. The proper meaning of Religion, in the first instance, can therefore be called ‘bad faith’ insofar as it shows itself as a relationship with originary ground wherein the originary ground is negated or denied. The phenomenological content of ‘bad faith’ is as follows:

1. The ground of the meaning of Religion as bad faith is located in Dasein’s being concerned with being as it is understood. The ground of understanding being, it follows, is nothing other than being-human as understood. Thus, the intrinsic meaning of Religion as it shows itself is the relation of understanding being with the ground of understanding, i.e., temporality/finitude.

2. Accordingly, the meaning of Religion as bad faith is actualised in a concern for proper being. Herein, the proper is reduced to the singularity of being, i.e., the proper is a property of being. As such, Religion shows itself as a concern for being-properly-human and constitutes the proper as belonging-to being-human therein.
3. Further, this is actualised in a concern for proper understanding (Dasein) wherein the projection of understanding called ‘Truth’ becomes the primary character of Religion as it shows itself. Herein, the meaning of Religion is actualised as a proper holding-to-be-true within the possibilities of being-truly-human and/or being-truly-understood by humans. In the former, Religion is actualised as a concern for the subject: ‘truly-human’ while in the latter, actualised as a concern for an understanding of the Truth that belongs to being-human. In either case, Religion essentially shows itself as a concern for the proper belonging to Dasein’s being.

4. The primary character of understanding that belongs to Dasein is judgment. Bad faith discloses the meaning of Religion, as such, to be the judgment of truth belonging to being-human. Herein, the actualisation of Religion shows itself in two interrelated modes: the self-understanding of being-human as the being who judges the truth (constitutes the truth and thus the proper) and/or the self-understanding of being-human as the being who properly understands the Truth (the projection of understanding as the Truth). The former constitutes being-human as universal law: to be human is to be the originary ground of purpose and meaning of life. Accordingly, the latter constitutes being-human as the being who properly understands the true meaning and purpose of human life.

Religion as Morality: An authentic relation with originary ground subsumed within the analogy of being.

The second way of saying the proper of Religion as it shows itself in concern can be called ‘morality’. Herein, Religion shows itself as an authentic relation with originary
ground that is actualised as a concern for Dasein’s grasp of originary ground as it is understood. Accordingly, the meaning of Religion shows itself as a living faithfully within the law: that which is understood to be the laws of the proper given by originary ground. Thus, the essential meaning of Religion as morality is an authentic relationship of being-human with originary ground as it shows itself in the laws of the otherwise than being-human. The phenomenological content of the meaning of Religion as morality as such is as follows:

1. The ground of the meaning of Religion as morality is located in Dasein’s concern for the showing itself of originary ground. The ground of this concern, herein, is an authentic relation with originary ground insofar as it shows itself within Dasein’s understanding. Thus, the fundamental meaning of Religion as morality is an understanding of originary ground within the analogy of being.

2. Accordingly, the meaning of Religion as morality is actualised as a concern for the proper of being-human given by the relationship with originary ground as it is understood subsumed under the analogy of being. Herein, the proper is grasped as originary ground (otherwise than being-human), but is nonetheless understood as a likeness to being. As such, Religion shows itself as a concern for the proper wherein the proper is grasped as a likeness to being-human and thus understood in the sense of law.

3. The grasping of the proper as likeness is first and foremost dependent upon the way in which the originary ground shows itself to Dasein in our concern for the proper. Herein, the meaning of Religion as morality is actualised as a negation of concern. That is, the negation of human concerns and the denial of the primacy of presence. Within this negation of human concern and the corresponding human foregrounding of purpose and meaning, the potential
relation with originary ground arises. This relation, then, presents Religion as
the human understanding of purpose and meaning in judgment or under law.

4. Religion in this sense, is constituted by the showing itself of originary ground
as λογος understood by humans as laws. This is the case insofar as, for
Dasein, understanding is always characterised by judgment and the grasping
of causality. Herein, the meaning of Religion as morality is actualised in two
interrelated ways: grasping originary ground as proper judgment and
understanding the λογος of originary ground as law. With regard to the
former, the meaning of Religion is an authentic relation with originary ground
grasped within the analogy of being. With regard to the latter, the proper given
by the λογος is grasped as laws for the potential proper (otherwise) of being-
human.

Religion as the aporia of existence:

The third way of saying the proper of Religion can be called aporia. Herein, Religion
shows itself as an authentic relation with originary ground that is actualised as a
concern for the radical difference between being-human and originary-ground.
Accordingly, the meaning of Religion shows itself as a living faithfully in the aporia
(question/dilemma) of this difference. As such, the meaning of Religion has the
character of a faithfulness to faith itself; a relation of faith. The phenomenological
content of the meaning of Religion as this aporia is as follows:

1. The ground of the meaning of Religion as aporia is located in Dasein’s
concern for originary ground as radically different to being-human. The
ground of this concern is the groundless-ground of being-human: the
unfathomable, unknowable ground of the potential otherwise of being-human.
2. The meaning of Religion as *aporia*, then, is actualised as a concern for the potentiality of an authentic relation with originary ground given by the otherwise of being-human. Herein, the originary ground is grasped as radically different to being-human and given in indications of the otherwise. As such, Religion shows itself as a concern for the proper belonging-to the otherwise of being-human.

3. This concern for the proper as indicated, then, is given as a potentiality only insofar as originary ground communicates to Dasein within existence. The actualisation of this concern, as such, is twofold: of negation and indication. The former signifies the actualisation of a negation of human concerns and human understanding. The latter signifies a concern for indications of originary ground given in *chairological* temporality: the constitution of human existence within the hope and expectation of an overcoming of being-human.

4. The meaning of Religion in this sense is constituted by the λογὸς of originary ground that discloses indications. Religion, in this, is actualised in two primary ways: grasping the given-ness of the λογὸς as principles that indicate the proper of ηθὸς and grasping the for-given-ness of originary ground as the advent of the overcoming of being-human. The grasping of originary ground as the overcoming of being-human, then, discloses the meaning of Religion as an authentic relation that overcomes human existence as improper (the for-given-ness of human existence as proper). Further, in indicative principles, the meaning of Religion is disclosed as the given-ness of the how of a proper human life. These two ways of the actualisation of Religion disclose the full sense of the proper meaning of Religion as it shows itself in concern.
C. Care: The ‘who’ belonging-to being-human as a potentiality.

The task of disclosing the meaning of Religion in care contains two interrelated dimensions: the character of care as the foundation of concern, and the formulation of care within the context of a disclosure of the fundamental meaning of Religion. Herein, the character of care is predetermined as the dimension of being-human that forms an interpretative horizon upon which concern is founded. Therefore, in the first instance, care shows itself as the interpretative horizon that forms the ways of concern.

With regard to Religion, then, care signifies an interpretative horizon that forms the ways of actualising the given-ness and for-given-ness of originary ground. Further, insofar as the task is the disclosure of the primary meaning of Religion, care will only be analysed with regard to the proper of the relation of being-human and originary ground. For, the primary meaning of Religion is an authentic relationship with originary ground. Moreover, this potentiality of an authentic relation must be constituted as primary insofar as the privative meanings of Religion are dependent (as actualisations of concern) upon the potentiality of the otherwise of being-human. Care in this sense contains two primary structures:

1. The meaning of Religion disclosed in care is constituted by the proper relation of being-human and originary ground within the horizon of λογος: the given-ness of communication by originary ground to humans. Herein, the λογος gives meaning and purpose to human existence as a life; the provision of meaning and purpose that forms an interpretative horizon called living. As such, the proper meaning of Religion in care is a meaningful life – the given-ness of λογος through human living.
This λόγος of care is given in two primary ways: the content of the λόγος and the who of the λόγος. The content of the λόγος is given as the way of interpreting life wherein the λόγος contains principles that indicate the proper interpretation of life. Herein, the interpretative principles do not form or present rules, reasons or explanations about how to live, but rather, forms an interpretative horizon for life to be lived. In other words, the content of the λόγος gives an interpretative horizon as a life rather than content through which life is understood. The λόγος of care, as such, essentially forms the horizon of life.

The ‘who’ of the λόγος is the ‘who’ of the potential otherwise of being-human. In this way the character of the λόγος is life in the sense of the proper living through us. The potential otherwise of being-human, however, is only given as a life insofar as the λόγος lives through humans. Thus, the meaning of Religion in care signifies a life in which the λόγος lives, and through which, a life is formed.

2. The meaning of Religion as care is also constituted by the ability of being-human to be otherwise. In this respect, the character of care forms an interpretative horizon of intentionality in its belonging to being-human. Herein, intentionality is grounded in what could be called ‘responsibility’; the ability to respond to originary ground. Responsibility through intentionality projects choice, but it is not choice in the usual sense of freedom or free
will. Rather, responsibility is the character of care that resonates with and echoes the potential otherwise of being-human as an interpretative horizon. In other words, responsibility is like conscience: traces of originary ground given by the λογος in existence as a potentiality.

Responsibility, as the character of care, forms an interpretative horizon called θος. Herein, θος signifies the dwelling of being-human in a life that resonates with the way-traces and call of the proper as absent and as an indicated potentiality. As such, the proper meaning of Religion as care also signifies θος: a faithful dwelling within the interpretative horizon of the traces of originary ground to which humans are given the responsibility of choosing the proper.

D. Directedness: Belief as the fundamental meaning of Religion as a phenomenon.

Insofar as we are seeking the meaning of Religion as a phenomenon, the final task of the test of a phenomenology of Religion is that of uncovering the fundamental (foundational) meaning of Religion as it belongs-to being-human. The question, as such, is how humans in our being can be religious and what the proper meaning of Religion signifies therein? Insofar as Religion has already in advance been given as the authentic relation of being-human and originary ground, uncovering the meaning of Religion as a phenomenon intrinsically involves the disclosure of the character of being-human that may be directed towards originary ground. This potential directedness will be called belief. Herein, there are three ways of saying belief:

1080 Free will and freedom in the traditional sense, I would argue, are notions resultant of the abstraction of everydayness (ideals) and the understanding of being-human as Dasein (a present entity with being characteristics).
1. Belief signifies the directedness of being-human towards originary ground that negates presence as primary. Herein, belief gives existence meaning in its ‘towards which’ and discloses being-human as essentially an existence within the question of meaning and purpose. Insofar as being-human is this existence within the question of meaning, Religion is therefore disclosed as belief: the for-given-ness of a way towards originary ground.

2. Belief signifies the directedness of being-human towards originary ground that gives life. This directedness is an essential character of being-human that constitutes existence as a horizon in which life occurs and discloses being-human as fundamentally a dwelling within the questionability of life as improper or proper. Religion, as such, signifies belief: the for-given-ness of life as proper.

3. Finally, belief signifies the directedness of being-human towards originary ground that gives absence. Herein, the essential character of being-human is disclosed as the being-towards the absent-ground of the ‘who’ of being-human and the fundamental questionability of being-human in our ground. Religion as such signifies belief: the for-given-ness of being-human in our ground.

Therefore, the meaning of Religion as a phenomenon is belief: the threefold for-given-ness of being-human as an authentic relation with originary ground.
Conclusion

Having baldly, and perhaps brashly, provided an interpretation of the meaning of Religion as belonging to being-human I would like to conclude by placing two primary conditions upon the validity of this study.

The first of these is to acknowledge the background of the study; a broadly Christian and ‘Western’ heritage that undoubtedly informs what has been written in various ways. This Christian heritage has at least three themes that require acknowledgement. First, my heritage is Christian, and more explicitly; Protestant. Herein, there can be no doubt that this heritage forms the general horizon for this study and additionally, some of the terminology utilised therein. Moreover, I am as a person, someone who would call myself ‘religious’. In this respect, the motive and impetus for the study is founded in what could be called a ‘religious’ way of encountering and interpreting life. In fact, a large part of the impetus for this study originates in my personal questioning of the meaning of life and my resistance to various theoretical positions that reduce Religion to a merely human projection.

Further, the philosophical position and phenomenological-hermeneutical method of this study is both Christian and ‘Western’. Herein, it must be acknowledged that the way that Religion is addressed, and even the term itself, is located within the horizon of a particular ‘history of being’. As such, the whole study can be viewed as a questioning and interpretation of a notion bounded by and bound to the particular horizon of modernity, Enlightenment, Christianity and the Christian interpretation of the Hebrew, Greek and Latin traditions.

The second primary condition requiring acknowledgement is the particular way of philosophy called phenomenology. Herein, the study is delimited to the style
of phenomenology posited in the thinking of Martin Heidegger. In this way, phenomenology as philosophy imposes further conditions on the study. First, phenomenology is a way of thinking that questions preconceptions, and as such, the study is bound by the questioning of preconceptions. Moreover, phenomenology is a way of thinking about methodology; a questioning of ‘how’ a particular problem can be addressed properly. As such, a primary condition of the study is its relation to methodological concerns within the field of studies in Religion; the problem of providing a genuine foundation for the study of religion(s). Equally, this study is bound to the formulation of phenomenology as ontology. This signifies that the study approaches the question of the meaning of Religion via one of many possible ways, namely: through the presupposition that being-human is the ground of Religion.

This study has attempted to put forward a test of the possibility of a phenomenology of religion that is ontological. In this respect, the study has drawn out some possible meanings of Religion as a phenomenon of existence, and then attempted to disclose the fundamental characteristics of being-human that found these meanings. I hope that whether these efforts were successful or not, the study has shown that a phenomenology of religion is possible in this sense. Moreover, I hope that this study has shown the poignancy and importance of such an effort.

Within the context of the aforementioned conditions of the validity of the study, the research has provided two central arguments. First, I have argued that the general meaning of Religion as a phenomenon is the potential relation of being-human and originary ground. Additionally, I have posited that insofar as the meaning of Religion is a ‘belonging-to being-human’, Religion in its ground signifies what I have called belief. Belief, in this sense, is a name for the character of being-human upon which the relation of Religion becomes possible for humans as a potential
directedness towards originary ground that is intrinsic to being-human. With respect to both arguments, this study has only attempted to provide the barest outlines of the ontological structures that found the meaning of Religion.
Appendix: Heidegger on Religion

This appendix has two primary tasks: 1) providing an interpretation of Heidegger’s notion or preconception of Religion and 2) outlining the difference between Heidegger’s notion of Religion and that of the thesis. These tasks are themes left to an appendix insofar as Heidegger’s phenomenology as ontology is the method of the research, and yet, his conceptualisation of Religion is neither central nor acceptable to this research. Moreover, this appendix is the space for distinguishing the arguments of the thesis from Heidegger’s path of thinking. This gains poignancy in the inevitable question: why utilise Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology as ontology without utilising his corresponding notion of Religion? Thus, the following will be an outline or sketch of Heidegger’s notion of Religion, and though juxtaposition, an explanation of why this notion of Religion is unacceptable to this research.

31. Heidegger on Religion:

A. Religion as ‘Factical Life Experience’:

It is a generally accepted fact that Heidegger’s exposition of primal Christianity expresses an attempt to found phenomenology within the notion of ‘factical life’ and ‘authenticity’, or, of uncovering the basic characteristics of Dasein’s being in existence. Thus, the notion of Religion is developed implicitly within Heidegger’s grounding of phenomenology. The notion of Religion is, as such, preconceived within the two priorities of Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology: the question of

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being (the *seinsfrage*) and the prioritisation of Dasein’s being.\textsuperscript{1082} Insofar as Heidegger actually poses the phenomenological question of the meaning of Religion, there can be no doubt that the notion of Religion is already in advance subsumed within the question of being and the prioritisation of Dasein’s being.

Heidegger poses the question of Religion as: the explication of fundamental religious experience and the task of understanding this experience in connection to all religious phenomena.\textsuperscript{1083} In other words, the question is: what is the meaning of religion as a factical experience – what is the phenomenological content of this experience? Already then, the meaning of religion is constituted within factical experience.

Factual life experience is posited as the human being towards the world, the prioritisation of content, and the indifference to the ‘how’ of experience.\textsuperscript{1084} Equally, factical life experience is the performative ‘what gets encountered in living’ and the concern of Dasein.\textsuperscript{1085} Religion, as factical life experience, is therefore undifferentiated from the everydayness of human existence in general, and further, already constituted as ‘inauthentic’ as a phenomenon non-essential to Dasein’s being.\textsuperscript{1086} In general, Heidegger’s initial exposition discloses the meaning of Religion as a phenomenon of everyday concern that is grounded in Dasein’s being.\textsuperscript{1087}

The exposition of the meaning of Religion is then phenomenologically formalised – securing the originary character of enactment – via three dimensions of the factical: the originary what (content), the originary how (relation), and the

\textsuperscript{1082} Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Introduction
\textsuperscript{1083} Martin Heidegger, ‘Introduction to a Phenomenology of Religion’, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, p.51
\textsuperscript{1084} Ibid. p.8
\textsuperscript{1085} Ibid. pp.10-11
\textsuperscript{1086} Ibid. pp.35-7, 83
\textsuperscript{1087} Ibid. pp.22, 86-88, 97
originary how (enactment).\textsuperscript{1088} Heidegger posits these dimensions in relation to Religion as: law/faith (content), salvation (relation) and life towards God (enactment).\textsuperscript{1089} That which differentiates primal Christian experience from the concern of Dasein in general, is the concern for opposing Christian faith (experience) to the surrounding life-world.\textsuperscript{1090} For Heidegger, the essence of this distinction – the primary task of a phenomenological exposition of Religion – is the original Christian experience of its object (God) that constitutes enactment.\textsuperscript{1091} At this stage, there are three implicit formalised conceptualisations of the meaning of Religion:

1. Primal Christianity = primal factical experience belonging to and grounded in Dasein’s being.
2. Primal Christianity = experience – the everyday concern of Dasein for existence – implicitly inauthentic – the fallen-ness of Dasein from being-Dasein.

B. Religion – The Factical Experience of the Truth of Being as an Entity:

The essence of Religion is thus everydayness – concern – a relation to an object of concern. The object of Christian factical experience is God. This distinction of concern – a concern for God, operates as an un-modified having become that is not distinct from worldly facticity.\textsuperscript{1092} In other words, religious experience does not

\textsuperscript{1088} Ibid. pp.43-44
\textsuperscript{1089} Ibid. p.48
\textsuperscript{1090} Ibid. p.50
\textsuperscript{1091} Ibid. p.53
\textsuperscript{1092} Ibid. p.86
modify being (human) but rather, presents a non-worldly knowing.\textsuperscript{1093} This knowing (pneuma) is distinct as a non-human understanding of temporality (the eternal)… an understanding of the being of God that emerges from Christian experience… and thus, a knowing grounded on neither Dasein’s being nor being (in general).\textsuperscript{1094}

This distinction of primal Christian facticity (as a kind of faith-knowing) and worldly facticity revolves around knowing as the ground of enactment. Here, Heidegger interprets the distinction in Paul’s epistles of worldly (sarx – fleshly) and spiritual (pneuma) life to be a distinction between an authentic facticity belonging to Dasein (sarx) and living in the spirit (of God) that does not belong to Dasein.\textsuperscript{1095} As such, Heidegger’s notion of Religion becomes: the grounding of enactment (life as understanding within temporality - Dasein) on an object (God) that is not Dasein.

Heidegger’s exposition of Religion as factical life experience forms the inevitability of the doubled inauthenticity of Religion:

1. As belonging to Dasein’s being as concern – everyday enactment in relation to objects.
2. The understanding of being (Dasein) that is grounded on something not-Dasein.

C. Theology – The ontical science of faith:

Religion as factical life experience is theorised – religious thinking about faith. Insofar as this thinking addresses faith, theology is a positive science: a science of a being.\textsuperscript{1096} Accordingly, theology contains two primary characteristics: 1) that a being

\textsuperscript{1093} Ibid. p.88
\textsuperscript{1094} Ibid. p.84
\textsuperscript{1095} Ibid. p.88
\textsuperscript{1096} Martin Heidegger, ‘Phenomenology and Theology’, \textit{Pathmarks}, p.41
is already disclosed as the subject of objectification, 2) founded on the prescientific manner of approaching that being.\textsuperscript{1097}

Theology is thus, for Heidegger, the positive science of the religious – the study of faith/belief as an object.\textsuperscript{1098} Insofar as theology is the science of Christian religion, and thus for Heidegger, the science of religious factical life experience in general… theology indicates the meaning of religion as faith. Faith: a way of existence of human Dasein that is founded, not from Dasein or through Dasein, but rather, that which is revealed… from what is believed – the object of belief.\textsuperscript{1099}

The notion of Religion formulated in Heidegger’s thinking is only validated in a positive sense as an ontical science of the religious. For, the philosophical (ontological) interpretation of Religion discloses Religion as a secondary, non-essential expression of Dasein’s existence. The non-faith of Dasein ontically and ontologically precedes faith.\textsuperscript{1100} Thus, inasmuch as faith arises from something other than Dasein (through everyday actualisation and understanding) religion has no genuine meaning with respect to being(Dasein).

D. Theology – Metaphysical Ground:

Theology thinks not only about faith, but also about the object of faith. Theology, as an expression of religious factical life, engages with that which is believed… what do I love when I love you?\textsuperscript{1101} Heidegger takes St. Augustine’s answer – the truly happy life is truth (veritas) – to signify that the ‘towards which’ of faith/religious experience is God – the truth of being as an entity.\textsuperscript{1102}

\textsuperscript{1097} Ibid. p.42
\textsuperscript{1098} Ibid. p.45
\textsuperscript{1099} Ibid. pp.43-4
\textsuperscript{1100} Ibid. p.51
\textsuperscript{1101} Martin Heidegger, ‘Augustine and Neo-Platonism’, \textit{The Phenomenology of Religious Life}, p.130
\textsuperscript{1102} Ibid. pp.181-182, 143
There are two drawbacks to the religious experience of the truth of being:

1) Factual life experience is intrinsically concern and thus does not pertain to any genuine understanding of being. Factual life experience cannot form any genuine understanding of its own ground – its own ‘how’.

2) As concern, factual life experience, the religious experience of the truth of being formulates this experience in terms of an entity – the objectification of the truth of being as an entity (or) the abstraction of the idea(l) of the truth of being from pre-scientific understanding.

The foundation of the mortal feud between religion and philosophy lies precisely in this formulation of the truth of being – for philosophy, the truth of being belongs to the “free appropriation of one’s whole Dasein.”¹⁰³ For religion, the truth of being (in Heidegger’s interpretation) is founded on faith – on something not-Dasein.¹⁰⁴

The locus of this feud is metaphysics as onto-theology. Here, theology enters into metaphysics insofar as the ‘deity’ enters philosophy.¹¹⁰⁵ The deity enters philosophy via everyday concern where it emerges as the truth of being and as ground.¹¹⁰⁶ The deity as being and ground is constituted as highest ground¹¹⁰⁷: an account of first cause, being as generative ground and original matter.¹¹⁰⁸

Heidegger’s notion of religion, then, ultimately centres on the problem of metaphysics – that religious belief is identified with the metaphysical idea(l) of first cause. There are, as such, three primary dimensions to the conceptualisation of religion therein:

¹¹⁰³ Martin Heidegger, ‘Phenomenology and Theology’, pp.53-54
¹¹⁰⁴ Ibid.
¹¹⁰⁶ Ibid. pp.55-58
¹¹⁰⁷ Ibid. pp.58, 61
¹¹⁰⁸ Ibid. pp.71-72
1. Religion – the experience of being as an entity and the ground of the
metaphysical explication of ὢς as first cause.\textsuperscript{1109}

2. Religion – the experience of being as the appearance of the ought – the idea(l)
of being.\textsuperscript{1110}

3. Religion – the historical valuing of the super-sensory realm – non-human
ground and non-human values.\textsuperscript{1111}

Religion is therefore constituted as the mortal enemy of philosophy – the entirely
inauthentic experience of the truth of being. For example:

- The Last God
  - “The totally other over against gods who have been, especially over
    against the Christian God.”
  - Redemption: the subduing of “man”.
  - Awaiting God: the most insidious form of godlessness.\textsuperscript{1112}

- The God of Religion:
  - something extant
  - Expedient of “man”.\textsuperscript{1113}

- Faith (religion)
  - A holding to be true that does not pertain to the question of the truth of
    being.
  - Intrinsically inauthentic.\textsuperscript{1114}

\textsuperscript{1109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1110} Martin Heidegger, \textit{Introduction to Metaphysics}, pp.180-181, 196-197
\textsuperscript{1111} Martin Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche: “God is Dead”, \textit{The Question Concerning Technology
and Other Essays}, pp. 61, 70
\textsuperscript{1112} Martin Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowing)}, pp.32-34
\textsuperscript{1113} Ibid. p.357
\textsuperscript{1114} Ibid. p.258
32. Diverging from Heidegger on Religion:

In general, the fundamental distinctions between Heidegger’s notion of Religion and that of the thesis follow out of a relation and confrontation with metaphysics as ontotechnology constituted as an intrinsically problematic way of thinking. The distinctions arise, herein, between Heidegger’s quest for philosophy proper (thinking as ontology – thinking the truth of being) and the thesis’ attempt to approach that which is fundamentally religious – the ground of being-human as a life. There are, as such, four fundamental differences between Heidegger’s approach to metaphysics and that of this thesis.

A. The Question of ‘Why’

When Heidegger approaches metaphysics he does so on the basis of the preconception that there is only one proper question worthy of thought – the question of why there is something rather than nothing. Within this preconception the theological component of metaphysics must necessarily be framed as an improper attempt to think being motivated by the everyday understanding of both causality (that causality signifies an infinite regress without the idea of first cause) and ἐπηθις – as highest/ideal potentiality of being. To give Heidegger due credit, his interpretation is generally valid within the tradition of metaphysics.

On the other hand, it is the task of the research to address, in a phenomenological way, the meaning of Religion. Here, the task forms a fundamentally different challenge with respect to metaphysics, and thus, a differing appreciation of the theological dimension of metaphysics. The research has taken the concept of ‘what-being’ and ‘who-being’ as distinct problems with distinct foundational questions. Herein, ‘what-being’ as ontology forms the horizon for the
question of why there is something rather than nothing. Alternatively, ‘who-being’ forms the phenomenological-theological horizon of the question: ‘why are we alive? Who is the ground of life with respect to purpose/meaning?’

This distinction then forms the horizon for an alternative critical (deconstructive) relation with metaphysics insofar as the problem becomes the philosophical quest for unifying ground – that unifies two distinct fundamental questions of thinking. The problem of Aristotle’s metaphysics, as constituted via this research, is that Aristotle subsumes the notion of originary ground under being as a being.

From this deconstructive relation with metaphysics, the thesis aims to draw out the meaning of Religion as intrinsically interconnected with the second metaphysical-ethical question: ‘who’ is the ground of life with respect to meaning/purpose, i.e., being-human as a life? Herein, the implicit criticism of Heidegger’s notion of Religion is the improper subsumption of this religious question under ‘what-being’ - ontology. Further, the engagement of the thesis with Religion also, I would argue, points out a delimitation of Heidegger’s thinking – the inability to properly address either religion or ethics as valid philosophical questions. This is the first juxtaposition of Heidegger and thesis on the notion Religion.

**B. Dasein & Being-human:**

For Heidegger, Dasein is given ontological priority – forming a prioritisation of being-understanding with respect to the notion of humans. This prioritisation is arguably necessary for any proper formulation of fundamental ontology in relation to the traditional notion of being. However, in the same moment, the prioritisation of Dasein also operates within the horizon of a monomania for the question of being, and
therein, covers up other senses of being-human and other ways of thinking ontologically about human existence. Equally, there can be no doubt that the term Dasein is a reformulation of the term ‘rational’ that is prioritised throughout the philosophical tradition in relation to the being of humans.

Initially, the research attempts to engage with this covering over of human life – this restriction/reduction of life to understanding – by using the term being-human. This term is not used as a means of signifying ‘humanism’ (as Heidegger’s posited alternative to ontology) but rather, as a means to open up the question of the ground of human existence in the sense of life. In this way, being-human signifies something analogous to Heraclitus’ statement: the ethos of humans is our daimonion – in the sense of the character of human life in its purpose. The use of the term ‘being-human’ aims at two formal distinctions: a) in a negative sense – the limit of Dasein to being-understanding, and b) in a positive sense as a more general term that allows of the uncovering of existence as a ‘who’ of life.

C. Authenticity:

For Heidegger, the concept of authenticity signifies the truth of being, truly being-Dasein, or, living/seeking the truth of being. In this regard, the notion of authenticity is restricted to the strictly ontological – to being. This blocks any way into the phenomenon of religion insofar as Religion signifies: grounded in Dasein’s being without any intrinsic truth/essential identity to being-Dasein. Religion, as such, is an *aporia* of human identity as Dasein.

The research formulates two ways of saying ‘authenticity’ within the two primary questions of thought – one pertinent to being (as with Heidegger), the other pertinent to life. In other words, authenticity refers to both the truth (being) and the
proper (αρχή of life). In this way, the thesis aims to show that authenticity cannot be constituted as a simple identity (truly-being-Dasein and the truth of being).

D. Ground

For Heidegger, insofar as the only question is that of being, the concept of ground necessarily signifies being. Ground is either ‘being the ground’ or grounding(Dasein’s-being)… being as the in-between ground and the ab-ground of Dasein’s freedom for grounding. Aside from the questionability of Heidegger’s notion of freedom as a groundless-ground – a self-grounding-ground – his notion of ground has nothing to say on how to live or the ground of living.

For the thesis, the notion of ground signifies nothing less than the ground of being-human: as a life and as a being. Herein, the thesis excludes Heidegger’s notion of ground (aside from the early methodological aspect of grounding phenomenology) as invalid – for being is not the ground unless we are thinking about being-human as Dasein: the ground of the sense of being of entities. Rather, for the purposes of the thesis, I take the notion of ground to signify the προτή αρχή – the originary ground of being-human in relation to being-alive (a meaningful/purposive existence). Here, the idea of being as ground can be equated with Dasein – the everyday concern for physical existence. The proper notion of ground, however, is the unknowable, the impossible, the otherwise than being that for-gives life.
Overall, the juxtaposition between Heidegger’s thinking and that of the thesis centres on the debate (within the metaphysical tradition) about being. Heidegger sees and thinks only being. The thesis constitutes being as a secondary problem – the entrance point to the question of being-human – but, nonetheless – restricted to Dasein as the concern for our ‘daily bread’. The primary question of thought revealed by Religion, although not restricted to Religion, is the question of ground – the originary ground of being-human as a life upon which all regions of being-concerned are founded.
Glossary:

- **Authenticity**: (i) I interpret authenticity in Heidegger’s thinking to signify the phenomenon of truth in relation to Dasein’s being, i.e. truly being-Dasein, (ii) authenticity also signifies the phenomenon of truth in relation to human existence, i.e. the grasping of truth, (iii) For Heidegger, the terms ‘authenticity’ and ‘proper’ are used synonymously… while I use these terms as radically different: authenticity = truth/being, proper = ἐπηγος/originary ground, (iv) I also use the term authenticity in a non-Heideggerian sense – to signify the proper in a lived sense, see especially part four of the research.

- **Being-human**: (i) a term used to signify the being of humans in a complete sense, (ii) a term utilised in distinction to Dasein insofar as I would argue that Dasein is delimited to signifying ‘being-understanding’ and thus too limited for use in relation to the phenomenon of Religion.

- **Belief**: (i) an ontological term signifying the ground of Religion in being-human, (ii) the intrinsic directedness of being-human towards the question of originary ground.

- **Belonging-to**: (i) the essence of the phenomenological-ontological notion of phenomenon, (ii) that a phenomenon intrinsically signifies a ‘belonging-to’ the being of humans, (iii) the notion of phenomenon pertinent to Religion as an ontological problem.

- **Dasein**: (i) the term Dasein is often used through reference to Heidegger’s thinking,(ii) I interpret Dasein to signify the being of humans as being-understanding, or, the being who understands being in existing, (iii) Dasein is a term derived from Kant’s term existence – Heidegger’s play on Dasein as
being-understanding: ground of presence, the entity who presents, there-being, the emergence of beings in their being.

- **For-given-ness:** (i) used in the research to signify the relation of originary ground and humans in our being – an ontological concept signifying the ‘given-ness’ of originary ground ‘for’ humans, (ii) a play on Heidegger’s terminology, translated into English as ‘fore-given’ or ‘fore-having’ – this term signifies something about Dasein that grasps being in a temporal sense – My play with this term is meant to break with Heidegger’s prioritisation of Dasein, (iii) drawn from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics – the play on the related terms judgment and forgiveness, (iv) also used to emphasise and prioritise Religion and its connection to ethics – the intrinsic connection of the proper and originary ground, the proper as otherwise than human.

- **Given-ness:** (i) analogous to ‘showing itself’, signifying the way the phenomenon Religion is given to humans in existence, (ii) derived from Jean-Luc Marion’s *Being Given* – a way to discuss the notion of phenomenon with respect to Religion and of avoiding the term ‘showing itself’ that tends towards abstraction and objectification.

- **Indication:** (i) a foundational methodological concept within deconstruction – that which remains essential within the ‘destruction’ and that which founds the ‘construction’, (ii) in the broadest sense: the essential of the phenomenon – that which indicates the ontological, (iii) indication is derived from both Heidegger’s and Husserl’s formulations of phenomenology (see: Martin Heidegger, ‘Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion’).

- **Originary ground:** (i) my translation of the traditional notion of ἀρχή, especially πρῶτη ἀρχή, (ii) used to emphasise the ‘active’ sense of the notion
of the ground of being-human (as ἐπηος) in opposition to the static physical
notion of first cause, (iii) signifies in general, the ground of being-human as
otherwise than being, (iv) partially derived from the translation of Heidegger’s
term ‘originarily’, ‘originary’ and ‘primal’.

- **Preconception:** (i) central to the phenomenological destruction – signifying
the way in which humans pre-conceive or understand a phenomenon as an
object via concern, (ii) the basic problem of thinking with respect to
abstraction from experience or objectification from concern - thus signifying
the improper use of the terms: phenomenon, phenomena, phenomenal, (iii)
derived from various related terms/translations of Heidegger – ‘everyday
understanding’, pre-scientific, pre-ontological and fore-conception.

- **Presupposition:** (i) signifying the improper pre-supposing or formulation of
ground on the basis of objectification/abstraction wherein ground becomes
either being or the entity Being, (ii) intrinsically related to Heidegger’s term
‘un-grund’ – the necessary appearance of ground.

- **Principle:** (i) translation of άρχη, (ii) used generally in an ontological sense –
the interpretative horizon of life in relation to originary ground, (iii) also given
an existential sense – the formulation of interpreting life through the human
relation with originary ground given as λογος – communicated principles
(grounds) of interpreting life and thus the grounds of actualisation.

- **Proper:** (i) a phenomenological term that signifies the proper way of thinking
or methodology, (ii) a philosophical concept signifying the question of ἐπηος
– the good, (iii) an ontological concept signifying the question of the ground
of human life, (iv) a theological concept signifying the ‘who’ of the originary
ground, (v) the motive for the use of this term is to distinguish between the
concept of ‘being’ as truth or authenticity and the concept of ‘being-human’ in relation to ‘life’ – the proper refers to the question of the ground of life.

- **Religion, religion(s), religiosity**: (i) ‘Religion’ signifies the universal ‘ontological’ notion of Religion as a phenomenon, (ii) distinguished from religion(s) as religious traditions and (iii) religiosity – the personal lived experience of humans as religious.

- **Response-ability**: (i) a conceptual expression of the character of being-human that enables and demands an active response to the question of originary ground and the problem of the meaning/purpose of life, (ii) an ontological concept that emphasises the active constitution of being-human with respect to living, (iii) a play on Heidegger’s use of the terms ‘conscience’ and the ‘freedom to ground’, (iv) a term that is somewhat analogous to the traditional notion of freedom, except constituted within a relation of humans with originary ground… not an intrinsic property of humans as rational beings, (v) the term is derived in part from Derrida’s word-play in relation to religion (see especially: Jacques Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge’).

- **The Impossible**: (i) signifies the traditional notions of no-thing or not-being as impossible in various senses: to grasp, to understand, to experience, to think, (ii) in an existential sense, the impossible signifies the limits and finitude of being-human and how the no-thing/not-being becomes an existential issue for us, (iii) derived from Derrida’s interpretations of religion (see especially: Jacques Derrida, *Circumfession*)

- **Unifying Ground**: (i) the metaphysical and ontological tendency to posit being as an overarching or singular ground, (ii) the improper tendency of
human thinking to unify thought and the matter of thought within a singular conceptual system; see the critique of the unified analogy of being.

- **What & Who-Being:** (i) what-being signifies the general realm of ζούσα, Dasein and the question of why there is something rather than nothing, (ii) what-being is intrinsically connected to Heidegger’s term Dasein, (iii) who-being: the general realm of being-human in terms of life and thus the question: why are we alive, what is the meaning/purpose of life?, (iv) ‘who-being’ – the question of the ground of being-human, (v) the motive of using ‘who-being’ lies in a disagreement with Heidegger’s use of such terms as ‘care’ (from caritas) subsumed within the notion of Dasein.

- **Working Out:** a concept signifying the trace from preconception to presupposition – the justificatory process of objective/abstract theorising.
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