Citizenship and Democracy in Germany: implications for understanding globalization
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The history of the German nation and state has always had an important as well as profoundly ambiguous relation to liberal conceptions of both citizenship and democracy. On the one hand, both the social insurance schemes of Bismarck and the municipal welfare programmes of German cities served as models for state-sponsored social policy and for the non-government organisation of social work and social welfare. In relation to the social policy and welfare dimensions of citizenship, then, Germany has since the middle of the nineteenth century stood as a prototype of the way in which the relationship between individuals and state could best be organised (de Swaan 1988 187-92; Steinmetz 1996), and this is also true of the post-war welfare state in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The rise of fascism in Germany and the Holocaust have, on the other hand, also worked as the example which liberal democracy since 1945 has measured itself against, as the best example of what democratic citizenship should not be, the ideal-typical mistake which liberal democracies should take every measure to avoid. Above all, the German case offered a seemingly overwhelming argument for the dangers of too much democracy, of granting too unrestricted a range of powers to ‘the masses’, who inevitably became a violent, brutish ‘mob’ without the civilizing restraints of an educated (bourgeois) political elite retaining the lion’s share of real political power. Although Joseph Schumpeter’s (1987, but originally 1943) arguments against the ‘classical doctrine of democracy’ as government by the people was framed in general terms, the ‘elitist’ or ‘realist’ conception of democracy which emerged in political science after mid-century (see Hindess’s discussion above, pp. xx) was constructed as a direct response to the ‘failure’ of liberalism as well as democracy in the German Weimar Republic and the rise of German fascism (Pateman 1970: 2; c.f. also Almond & Verba 1963; Bachrach 1967; Thompson 1970; Verba 1965: 131; Verba & Nie 1972: 299-344).

More recently, the German experience of the central features of intensifying globalization - increased migration, the movement of peoples across state boundaries - also highlights the problems which the concept of multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka 1995) can encounter, particularly when seen against the backdrop of the German National Socialist experience - as well as offering some suggestions as to how this concept might be best realised.. The aim of this chapter is to outline the particular character of the development of the German nation and state, of German citizenship and democracy, to chart the problems and issues which this history has produced, and to highlight the ways in which the specificity of this history helps us come to a better understanding of the various ways in which citizenship, democracy, nation and state interrelate with each other, particular in a period where they are undergoing the tremendous transformations being wrought by intensifying social, political and economic globalization.

I will organize the discussion around two related issues: German fascism and the Holocaust, and the peculiarity of the German treatment of immigrants. Much of the liberal-democratic response to the Holocaust has revolved around the idea that it is possible to guard against the repetition of such events through the development of appropriate democratic institutions. The significance of a deep understanding of fascism and the Holocaust - and this is why it continues to fascinate social scientists - is that there may be features of advanced capitalist, modern societies other than their overt political forms which produce such ‘civilized barbarism’, which only a more complex and detailed historical, sociological and psychological analysis of German fascism can reveal (c.f. Elias 1996).

The overall argument concerning the significance of the German case will have two elements: first, that the tendency in political theory generally and citizenship debates in particular to see the two elements of the couplet ‘nation-state’ as naturally linked together, with citizens automatically sharing culture, language and way of life, prevents us from seeing many of the complexities of the operation of citizenship and democracy in real historical and geo-political contexts. Second, that we need to come
to a better understanding of how and why ‘nation’ and ‘state’ can rub up against each other as often as they work hand in hand, especially if we are to understand the effects of globalization and postmodernisation on contemporary social life. This is particularly important in coming to grips with the operation of ethnic and cultural differences among any particular grouping of citizens, in relation to both migrants and indigenous populations (Kymlicka 1995).

The ‘Dahrendorf thesis’ and its problems

Unlike his discussion of social policy, Marshall’s analysis of the historical development of citizenship was focused on the British example, although it was possible to extend his observations to other countries such as France and the United States (Marshall 1964). What was left out of the picture was the implications for a sociological theory of citizenship and democracy of their most spectacular failure, namely the rise of Fascism in Germany, Italy and Spain, and especially the most dramatic example of the removal - let us say ‘extermination’ - of citizenship rights in the Holocaust (Noakes 1987; Peukert 1987). Ralf Dahrendorf engaged with this problem in Society and Democracy in Germany (1968, originally 1965), and set out to establish some answers to ‘The German question’, the most important part of which was ‘How was Auschwitz possible?’

Dahrendorf’s answer to this question was essentially one of ‘uneven development’: a disparity between economic modernisation and political traditionalism, and a ‘failure’ on the part of the German bourgeoisie to assert its social and political position on German society, which in turn led to the weakness of the ‘liberal’ component of liberal-democracy. As he put it, in a chapter titled ‘The Faulted Nation’,

Just as the economy of Imperial Germany became industrial but not capitalist the German society of the time did not become bourgeois, but remained quasi-feudal. Industrialization in Germany failed to produce a self-confident bourgeoisie with its own political aspirations....As a result, German society lacked the stratum that in England and America, and to a lesser extent even in France, had been the moving force of a development in the direction of greater modernity and liberalism. (1968: 52)

Although Bismarck’s social policy initiatives did bring about a welfare state concerned with the needs and well-being of its members, it was an ‘authoritarian’ welfare state which excluded the transformation of subjects into citizens. Dahrendorf spoke of Imperial Germany as having ‘missed the road to modernity’, and he saw its early social policy programs as preventing rather than encouraging the development of ‘the citizen role’. The combination of industrialization and technological modernization with the continued ideological and political centrality of traditional military and aristocratic elites, which the German middle classes were unable or unwilling to displace, produced the paradoxical structure of ‘an industrial feudal society’ (p. 61). It was this paradox which, for Dahrendorf, formed ‘the explosive core of a society in which the liberal principle could settle only haltingly and occasionally’ (p. 48).

His explanation of the failure of the Weimar Republic’s democracy and the rise of the Nazis thus rests on a deep-structural analysis, one of a ‘fault’ inherited by twentieth century German society from the ways in which industrial modernity combined with political traditionalism in the nineteenth century. For these ‘unmodern men in a modern world’, predemocratic forms of conduct persisted throughout the German population, and ‘this could all too easily turn into the anti-democratic behaviour of a nostalgic demand for the nest warmth of the closed society’ (p. 387), precisely the fertile ground in which Nazism grew. So powerful was this deep-structural legacy, that Dahrendorf felt it persisted in German society into the 1960s, arguing that citizenship rights were still not generalized, and observing the continued presence of ‘second- and third-class citizens who are lacking many requisites of civilized life and chances of full development’; he found it ‘hard to dispute the suspicion that the ability to distinguish not only between men of different classes but also between men and “submen” is still slumbering in many Germans’ (p. 82).

For Dahrendorf, then, the significance of the German experience of democracy and citizenship was that the kind of development of citizenship rights charted by Marshall was heavily dependent on an effective liberalism within modern industrialized societies, and that this was in turn dependent on the social and political strength of the bourgeoisie. Many other commentators have agreed with this overall view, referring the significance of the absence of a bourgeois revolution in Germany, and developing a
similar linkage of the failure of parliamentary democracy in Weimar Germany with the political weakness of the bourgeoisie compared to military and aristocratic elites (most prominently, Moore 1966). To guarantee the proper development of genuine citizenship, then, one needed the development of a particular political culture, which in turn depended on the ideological and political dominance of the bourgeoisie. The association he established, and which has been taken up in many subsequent interpretations of the German case, was: Weak bourgeoisie = weak liberalism = weak citizenship, and in the case of German Fascism, the elimination of citizenship rights as they have usually been understood. Is this interpretation correct?

According to much of the German historiography since the 1980s, it is not, for two reasons. First, there is no basis for assuming that the bourgeoisie are always and everywhere liberal, and that authoritarian ideas only reside in the breasts of landed aristocrats, army generals and navy commanders. Geoff Eley points out that all of the supposed ‘traditional’ limitations on democracy and citizenship in Imperial Germany were typical for Europe at the time. Even more telling, rather than constituting a paradoxical ‘industrial feudal society’, Imperial Germany ‘was more frequently regarded as an exemplary “modern” state’, because of the technical efficiency of its bureaucracy, government and army, the active role of the state in both economy and civil society, its advanced social policy and social welfare system, and its early introduction of universal male suffrage (Eley 1996: 93).

It was in fact the very *modernity* of Imperial Germany, argues Eley, which produced anti-democratic and imperialist policies rather than its supposedly ‘recalcitrant’ traditional character. The radical nationalism which fostered the rise of the Nazis was not a nostalgic image of the past, but an active vision of the future, and in this respect ‘it harnessed the cultural aspirations of many who were comfortably placed in the emerging bourgeois society, the successful beneficiaries of the new urban-industrial civilization, whose political sensibilities were offended by the seeming incapacitation of the establishment before the left-wing challenge’ (1986: 266-7). Rather than seeing the bourgeoisie - or any social group for that matter - as the natural ‘bearers’ of liberalism, as Dahrendorf and others have, Eley prefers to allow for the possibility that they can also be profoundly illiberal and authoritarian, and that the problem becomes one of identifying the particular circumstances of state- and nation-formation which produces outcomes like Nazism and the Holocaust.

Very crudely, the gist of the position taken up by Eley and historians like Detlev Peukert is to acknowledge the significance of historically and geo-politically specific conjunctures, especially economic and political crises, which need to be viewed alongside the supposed deep structures underlying whatever we call ‘the state’ and ‘civil society’. Eley suggests that ‘traditional’ concepts retained their power in Weimar Germany not because they had somehow ‘persisted’ as ‘relics’, but because they appeared to offer more effective solutions to the problems facing the country, particular the effects of the Versailles Treaty, the ‘crisis of reproduction’ which followed the end of WWI (Hong 1996; Peukert 1991), and of course the general economic crisis of the Depression years. As Eley puts it:

> ...the pace of social change outstripped the adaptive capabilities of the existing political institutions, particularly when the latter were called upon to be responsible to new social forces - agricultural populations concerned for their future in an economy increasingly structured by industrial priorities, urban populations demanding a more rational ordering of their hastily improvised city environment, a potential chaos of private economic interests, the mass organizations of the industrial working class, and the more diffuse aspirations of the new professional, administrative and managerial strata of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. (1986: 265)

Educated German citizens turned to a radical nationalism which emphasized national allegiances and priorities organized around a tightly defined *Volk* not because they simply failed to give such ideas up, but because they perceived the existing political system - liberal, parliamentary democracy - as ineffective and impotent. This political position then in turn had the effect of self-fulfilling prophecy, further undermining the ability of the Weimar Republic ‘to organize a sufficient basis of consent among the subordinate classes to permit stable government to continue’ (Eley 1986: 266).31

Peukert also stresses the particularity of the period between 1918 and 1933 in Germany, pointing out that it was characterized by a ‘feverish succession of events’ as well as ‘vast convulsions and violent changes in political culture and society’ which generated ‘a deep-seated sense of unease and disorientation’ (1991: 275). The Weimar period was one of a tension, not between tradition and modernity as Dahrendorf would have it, but between the development of a new, modern social, political
and economic system and the simultaneous strangulation of its real ability to deliver on its promises, to actually provide the benefits which were meant to compensate for its costs. There was virtually no growth in wealth to redistribute, and reductions in wages and welfare benefits made disputes over them increasingly bitter, further encouraging ‘social fragmentation and polarization’ (p. 276). Given that the introduction of parliamentary democracy coincided with all these developments, it is hardly surprising that there was a strong tendency - among both elites and non-elites - to attribute Germany’s woes precisely to the Weimar constitution itself, correspondingly increasing the attraction of radical, authoritarian nationalism. Modernization, argues Peukert, ‘took a more brutal, uncompromising form in Germany in the twenties than it did in other countries’ (1991: 280), and its ‘dark side’ made it difficult for many Germans to retain their faith in the ability of liberal democratic institutions to steer their way through the crisis. Although Peukert acknowledges the significance of the political relationships between the traditional elites and the bourgeoisie within the new parliamentary democracy, this alone does not explain the collapse of Weimar democracy, which can only be properly understood by placing its development within the context of a string of very particular historical circumstances, ones which would have tested - and which will test - any form of democratic rule within any cultural and ideological context.

We cannot quite leave matters here, though, because there are other things which can be said about German history which tell us more about the particular form of the response to these crises, and the specific way in which citizenship was conceived and practices of exclusion from citizenship were mobilised. As Ely remarks, all modern societies are cobbled together with pre-modern elements, making the crucial question not simply one of tracking down ‘feudal relics’, but of establishing ‘how certain “traditions” became selected for survival rather than others - how certain beliefs and practices came to reproduce themselves under radically changed circumstances, and how they became subtly transformed in the very process of renewal’ (1986: 261). To answer this question, we need to turn the work of Rogers Brubaker and others on the disjunction between the German ‘nation’ and the German ‘state’.

The ‘Brubaker thesis’
Brubaker concerns himself primarily with a different problem - namely, the differences between the French and German models of the relationship between immigration and citizenship - but in the process of examining this question, he also casts light on the question of the ‘failure’ of citizenship and democracy in Germany. His thesis is that France and Germany can be regarded as two contrasting ideal-typical models of how particular nation-states, formed under different historical conditions, are differently disposed to accept immigrants as citizens.

On the one hand, France serves as a model of a ‘state-centred, assimilationist, essentially political’ (1990: 380) understanding of citizenship which allows, even demands the transformation of immigrants - as well as peasants - into Frenchmen (Weber 1976). The French understanding of national identity is a political-territorial one, following the principle of *jus soli*, established in 1889, in which French citizenship was, and continues to be, granted to everyone born and domiciled in France, partly in order to ensure that all French residents, no matter what their ethnocultural origins, would enter military service (Brubaker 1990: 395). The French elite were so confident, suggests Brubaker, of the capacity of French social and political institutions - especially the school and the army - to assimilate any foreigner into Frenchness, that they dismissed the dangers of different ethnocultural ‘nations within the French nation. This meant that by the second generation everyone within the territorial boundaries of France was regarded and treated as a French citizen with full citizenship rights, and conversely there were no ethnic French outside the boundaries of the French state who could make a claim on French nationalism. French citizenship and democracy was thus based on a close alignment of ethnocultural nation and political-territorial state, reflecting the particular trajectory of French nation-state formation. This does not mean that the two always overlap perfectly, as French conduct under the Nazis as well as the more recent history of ethnic hostility shows, but such ethnocultural understandings of national identity and citizenship rights always have to work against the *jus soli* foundations of citizenship, rather than being able to call on a legal tradition of ethnocultural exclusion, and their is still a strong institutional tendency towards defining the nation as a ‘nation of citizens’.

The German experience, on the other hand, ‘reflects an ethnocultural understanding of
nationhood as prior to and independent of the state’ (1990: 380), and the German model revolves around a ethnocultural ‘community of descent’ which is extremely resistant to the absorption of new members. German law has since 1913 conferred citizenship according to the *jus sanguinis* principle, that of kinship ties and descent. The German nation, as Ulrich Preuß observes, is conceived as ‘a prepolitical community of individuals who are bound to each other by the commonness of either their ‘nature’ (their blood) or their culture (their language, literature, religion, and history) (Preuß 1996: 542). Preuß suggests that the origins of this conception may lie in the dispersion of Germanic tribes on the outskirts of the Roman Empire, whereas the Gauls were included within the territorial boundaries of the Empire, and at the very least most commentators (e.g., Halfmann 1997: 267) also note the fact that German state-formation followed very belatedly, German nation-formation.

For Brubaker the foundations of this detachment of nation and *Volk* from the state had three original foundations. First, the western Germany was traversed by Europe’s ‘city belt’ - a dense belt of ‘cities, ecclesiastical principalities, and other small but autonomous political jurisdictions’ (1996: 113) all of which obstructed the development and consolidation of a territorial state encompassing all Germans. Second, a number of significant waves of German migration eastward since the middle ages produced a presence of ethnic Germans throughout Central and Eastern Europe, which also made it impossible for ethnocultural and political boundaries to coincide. Third, the experience of Polish-German citizens in East Prussia, and the clear failure to assimilate them into German culture underlay the elites’ reluctance to pursue assimilation as an overall nation-building strategy (Brubaker 1990: 397). Nonetheless, while the German state was perceived as effective and powerful, it remained possible to harness this *Volk* nation conception to the state, and Bismarck’s ambition was always to present the German territorial state as the expression of the German *Volk*. This changed dramatically with the outcome of WWI. The territorial and institutional boundaries of the state were highly contested by both the Left and the Right, and ‘the Weimar Republic proved unable to “embody” the nation or to “contain” nationalism”....within the territorial frame of the state’ (Brubaker 1996: 117). In Brubaker’s words:

> Because the state had lost much of its binding, integrative power, nationalism was partially de-territorialized and de-institutionalized. Nationhood, which had become firmly, though never exclusively, identified with the prestigious and “successful” state in the Bismarckian and Wilhelmine eras, was now detached from the devalued frame of the defeated state, and again identified primarily with the state-transcending, institutionally amorphous ethnocultural nation or *Volk*. (1996: 117-8)

The result was a conception of the ‘imagined community’ of the nation, not as a ‘nation of citizens’, but as a ‘Volk nation’, bound together not by shared citizenship rights within the state, but by ties of blood and culture which were regarded as more fundamental, more ‘sound’ and of a ‘higher order’ than political-territorial ties, especially those revolving around liberal conceptions of individual rights. This had a number of important consequences for both the operation of citizenship and democracy and the fate of liberalism in Germany. As Rainer Lepsius puts it:

> The folk is conceived as a prepolitical essence; the individual is subsumed under this collectivity on the basis of the identity ascribed to his properties. The nation does not develop as a politically constituted solidarity association of citizens. On the contrary, it appears as a prepolitical essence which has a higher status than the individual. The attribution of an essential nature based on natural law rests on the value of the collectivity of the people, not on the value of the individual....there is no necessity for legitimizing political order through equal rights for citizens and democratic rights of participation. (1985: 49).

Liberal conceptions of individual rights are then constructed as alien to the organic unity of the *Volksgemeinschaft* (folk community), and both democratic procedures and citizenship rights become susceptible to erosion in the name of the interests of the *Volk* as interpreted by ruling elites (Lepsius 1985: 50). Most importantly, the idea of *opposition* which is so fundamental to liberal conceptions of democracy has no place within this German Romantic organicist conception, and tends to get constructed as ‘treason’ or an attack on the *Volk* as a whole; in addition, the organization of citizenship rights around an ethnocultural definition of nation-membership has what Lepsius calls a ‘latent potential for degrading other peoples as inferior’ (1985: 51; c.f. also Sünker & Otto 1997; Peukert1987; Noakes 1987). The Janus-faced character of the concept of the *Volk* detached from the state was that it included those Germans outside state territorial boundaries within the definition of Germanness, but
excluded those German subjects who did not form part of the German community of descent. This exclusionary tendency in Volkish thought could more or less malign forms, so that we need to see the Nazis as having constructed it in a very particular way - there had never been, for example, an argument for the removal of citizenship rights from German subjects (Brubaker 1992: 166) - but the basic tendency towards an internal selectivity in allocating citizenship rights had still been established. As Lepsius points out, ‘the detachment of the concept of the nation from all constitutional foundations and nominal operational characteristics made possible the disenfranchisement, exclusion, and ultimate annihilation of German citizens of Jewish belief or Jewish origin without the recognition that this also abolished the civil rights and freedoms of all German citizens’ (1985: 52). Once those rights have been stripped from some citizens, they have in effect been destroyed for all citizens, for there is no longer any secure foundation for the protection of any individual or group should they be defined as lying outside that organic ethnocultural abstraction which is the Volk nation.

The kinds of ‘tradition’ which were drawn upon in response to the crises of the Weimar period, then, were ideas which centred on ethnicity and cultural homogeneity, an organic conception of the nation which was detached from the state in a way which one did not find in the Western European and North American experience. Although any conception of nationhood and citizenship will contain both ethnocultural and territorial-political elements, in the countries most frequently referred to in discussions of citizenship and democracy, such as France and Britain, the two are relatively integrated, whereas ‘in the German tradition...political and ethnocultural aspects of nationhood have stood in tension with one another, serving as a basis for competing conceptions of nationhood’ (Brubaker 1990: 391), and this competition leaves relatively little space for liberal understandings of citizenship. In times of particular socio-economic and political crisis, such as the Weimar period, this instability in the understanding of citizenship and nationhood certainly made it much easier for an ideology of the Volk community, which stripped some members of society of all their citizenship rights, to flourish.

**Conclusion**

Jürgen Habermas (1992) has identified three important features of current developments in the relationship between citizenship and national identity. First, the question of the future of the nation-state itself following German re-unification and the ethno-national conflicts breaking out throughout Eastern Europe. Second, the implications of the supra-national entity of the European Union for democratic processes based on autonomous nation-states. Third, the increasing waves of migrants and asylum-seekers from the poorer regions of Eastern and Southern Europe to the rest of Europe. The third process, in particular, ‘exacerbates the conflict between the universalistic principles of constitutional democracies on the one hand and the particularistic claims of communities to preserve the integrity of their habitual ways of life on the other’ (1992: 1).

What does the German case tell us about these three problems, in a context of globalization, with greater migration across state boundaries reproducing the very features which made its experience different from the Anglo-French pattern of state-formation? States are bounded territories (Weber 1978), but nations are imagined communities (Anderson 1991), and the challenge of posed by globalization is how we are to respond to changed relationships between the two. The German experience of fascism indicates that there can be a profound tension between the ethnocultural ‘imagined community’ of the Volk nation, and liberal conceptions of citizenship and democracy, and it suggests that best possible ‘shell’ for the latter may a ‘cool’ and ‘thin’ (see Turner’s discussion of ‘cosmopolitan virtue’ above, pp. xx, as well as Elias’s (1987) discussion of ‘detachment’) political-territorial conception of both state and nation, rather than a ‘hot’ and ‘thick’ idea of a national or cultural identity. This is especially true in conditions where increasing migration makes it ever more difficult to maintain very much of the fit’ between nation and state, as is usually assumed in the conception of the ‘nation-state’ in most discussions of citizenship.

Will Kymlicka (1995) has recently suggested that the conception of liberalism which tries to deny cultural difference and treat every citizen as more or less equivalent individuals has become - if it was not already - ‘incoherent’ in the face of the real polyethnic and multicultural character of contemporary social life. An engagement with the German experience tells us that if we go beyond simply ‘explaining away’ the Nazi regime and the Holocaust in terms of German ‘exceptionalism’, and turn instead to understanding German history in terms of what it tells us about the different ways in which ‘nation’ and ‘state’, ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ can relate to each other under particular social,
political and economic conditions, we will have moved a considerable distance towards addressing what may be the most serious challenge facing our understanding of citizenship and democracy in a global era: that of formulating the social, political and economic bases of democratic and humane unity within societies composed of diverse ethnic, cultural and national forms.

References


\[\text{1}A\text{ basic} \text{ chronology may be useful:}\]

\[1815 \text{ German Confederation founded}\]

\[1870-71 \text{ Unification of Germany under Prussian leadership} \text{ Wilhelm I crowned Emperor, Bismarck become Chancellor}\]

\[1888 \text{ Wilhelm I dies, Wilhelm II becomes Emperor}\]

\[1914-18 \text{ World War I}\]

\[1919 \text{ Weimar Republic, Wilhelm II abdicates, replaced by elected Reich President, Friedrich Ebert}\]

\[1925 \text{ Ebert dies, replaced by Hindenburg}\]

\[1927 \text{ Beginning of Great Depression}\]

\[1930 \text{ NSDAP makes significant gains in elections, become largest party by 1932}\]

\[1933 \text{ Hitler made Chancellor by Hindenburg}\]

\[1934 \text{ Hindenburg dies, Hitler proclaims himself President as well as Chancellor,}\]
becomes Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
1939  Poland and Czechoslovakia invaded, World War II begins
1942  Extermination of Jews and other ‘outsiders’ (volksfremde) begins
1945  WWII ends
1949  Establishment of Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic
1961  Berlin wall raised
1989  Berlin wall falls
1990  Two Germanies reunified

iiIt would be fair to say that there is a strong Anglo-French bias in citizenship theory, ranging from Marshall himself through to examples such as the recent collection titled *Citizenship, Identity and Social History*, edited by Charles Tilly (1995), which says hardly a word about Germany. The Western European and North American experience is then treated as the norm for nation-state formation and cases such as Germany treated as exceptions or deviations from the ‘Western’ route to modernity, at enormous analytical cost.

iiiEley (1984) remarks that if the British bourgeoisie was more ‘liberal’ than their German counterparts, this was because ‘In Britain liberalism reaped the benefits of a ‘corporate’ working class and a poorly developed socialism; in Germany its options were severely restricted by the risks of co-operating with a relatively more advanced and vigorously independent party of the working class’ (p. 122). The ties between the bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy arose from ‘a rational calculation of political interest in a situation where greater levels of parliamentary democracy necessarily worked to the advantage of the Socialist left. In Britain in this period of parliamentary forms proved an admirable means of containing socialism’ in Germany they threatened to work in its favour’ (p. 125).