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THESIS SUMMARY: DAVID SIMPSON.
TITLE: PRAGMATICS AND THE POLITICS OF DISCOURSE.

This thesis is a study of pragmatics as it has developed within analytic philosophy of language and Anglo-American linguistics. The discussion of philosophical pragmatics concentrates on Austin's notions of the performative and the illocutionary act, Grice's explication of meaning in terms of intentions, and Searle's theories of speech acts and intentionality. Within linguistic pragmatics I examine discourse analysis, concentrating on Labov & Fanshel's analysis of therapeutic discourse, and conversation analysis, as it has developed from Garfinkel's ethnomethodology and as a critical response to discourse analysis and speech act theory. The central argument put foward here is that, through their exploration of the relation between language and the users of language, these approaches to pragmatics open as a field of study what can be called the 'politics of discourse', the operation through discourse of the political relations of an interactive community. However, this field is simultaneously closed, and it is argued that this closure is tied to the introduction of concepts, centrally that of the foundational linguistic subject, which ultimately undermine the validity of these approaches.

PRAGMATICS AND THE POLITICS OF DISCOURSE

by

David Simpson

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SUMMARY

This thesis is a study of pragmatics as it has developed within analytic philosophy of language and Anglo-American linguistics. The discussion of philosophical pragmatics concentrates on Austin's notions of the performative and the illocutionary act, Grice's explication of meaning in terms of intentions, and Searle's theories of speech acts and intentionality. Within linguistic pragmatics I examine discourse analysis, concentrating on Labov & Fanshel's analysis of therapeutic discourse, and conversation analysis, as it has developed from Garfinkel's ethnomethodology and as a critical response to discourse analysis and speech act theory. The central argument put foward here is that, through their exploration of the relation between language and the users of language, these approaches to pragmatics open as a field of study what can be called the 'politics of discourse', that is, the operation through discourse of the political relations of an interactive community. However, this field is simultaneously closed, and I argue that this closure is tied to the introduction of concepts, centrally that of the foundational linguistic subject, which ultimately undermine the theoretical validity of these approaches.

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INTRODUCTION

Pragmatics is a field of study which has developed relatively recently, and because of this it both requires and resists definition. Just as someone coming upon the term may find its meaning unclear, so within the field there is as yet no settled range of questions or phenomena covered by 'pragmatics'. Nonetheless, it is possible to offer a broad and provisional categorization, and through this to note some of the issues arising in the discussion which follows.

An initial step is to see pragmatics (following Morris, 1938) as falling within a tripartite division of linguistic or (more generally) semiotic study, along with syntax and semantics. Here, while syntax deals with the relation between signs, and semantics the relation of signs to objects, pragmatics studies the relation of signs to the users of a language. It studies those features of language (or other sign systems) whose explanation requires reference to language users.

Study of the relation between a language and its users involves interest in the context of language use, the context in which, for example, a given sentence may have different meanings on different occasions of use. Because of this, a partial further definition of pragmatics is that it studies those aspects of meaning which are not captured by semantics, or that it studies those relations between language and context that are basic to an account of understanding, or, further, that it studies the ability to pair sentences with context.1

Such definitions give a useful initial idea of the field of pragmatics, and I will allow their details to arise in what follows, rather than fill them out further here. But it should be noted that such definitions give a sense of 'pragmatics' which is usually thought of as 'analytic', and specific to Anglo-American

philosophy and linguistics. This sense sees pragmatics as constituting one part of a general linguistics (or the philosophy of language), and as not including within its scope areas such as sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics.

There is alternatively a wider, 'Continental' definition of pragmatics, which does include sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics within its scope, and which appears to regard pragmatics as a different way of doing linguistics, rather than just as an approach to be added to linguistics. This distinction should not be taken as hard and fast,[2] but it is within this theoretical distinction that the present study concentrates almost exclusively on (part of) the Anglo-American tradition in pragmatics.

Aside from the above definitions, there are certain characteristics of pragmatics which give rise to the major theoretical issues to be dealt with in what follows. The first characteristic is that the emphasis on the users of language and the context of utterance involves concentration on language as what has variously been called performance or parole, that is, on the actual production of speech or writing, rather than on language as an abstract calculus.[3] This has a number of consequences. It leads to an interest in supra-sentential features, in the relations between sentences, rather than those within sentences (as in traditional linguistics), and on rules relating context and language which account for linguistic organization at this supra-sentential level. It also leads to the utterance replacing the sentence as the central unit of analysis, since these organizational factors do not seem to operate on the grammatical sentence as such, but rather on units which are constructed (as well as organized) according to rules other than those which constitute a sentence in the traditional, syntactic sense.

These utterances are taken as the realizations of speech acts, or moves,[4] and as this indicates, they are both identifiable linguistic units and acts performed by the users of language. Just how these acts are to be characterized is a question which will be dealt with later, but the important point to note here is that with the emphasis on context, on the production or performance of utterances by language users, on the relation between utterances, and on language as action, a central feature of pragmatics is that it deals with interaction. The context relevant to pragmatics is the interactive context existing and arising between linguistic subjects engaged in various discursive

practices, and the acts these subjects perform gain their significance from being acts in interactive practices.

A further consequence is that the analysis in terms of interaction, which is, in effect, a functional analysis (see Levinson, 1981: 7) leads to an emphasis in some aspects of pragmatics on the subjective meaning, or the meaning for those engaged in discourse, of linguistic acts or phenomena. The aim of pragmatic analysis becomes here that of giving an account of the actual engagement of linguistic subjects in discourse, and so the subject is given a theoretical status denied to it (explicitly at least) by formalist or structural approaches to language.

Within linguistics, pragmatics is generally seen as one reaction to the Chomskian paradigm, but the opposition which I want to emphasize here is that between pragmatics and positivism. Within philosophical pragmatics this opposition arises most importantly with Austin's criticism of logical empiricism in the philosophy of language,[5] but this philosophical anti-positivism both parallels and influences part of a general anti-positivism within the social sciences.[6] Within philosophy, this anti-positivist trend can be seen to centre on three positions. First, there is a rejection of the theoretical primacy of the description as the paradigm or ideal linguistic phenomenon. Second, it is claimed that language usage is an institutional fact, requiring description in terms of constitutive rules, and never being adequately described in terms of 'brute facts' which supposedly precede and avoid interpretation. And thirdly, there is the notion, connected to the first two, that language does not simply describe phenomena, but imposes significance on them, and (at least) in the area of social phenomena, is importantly constitutive of them.

Within the social sciences there tends, along with the influence of these ideas, to be an emphasis on the necessity of interpretation of data, and with this a confrontation of issues which arise regarding the role of the analyst. This in turn involves the attempt, noted above, to study the subjective meaning for participants of their interactive practices, and their relation to the construction of social reality through these practices.

There is a further characteristic of pragmatics which is rarely, if ever, explicitly acknowledged within that tradition,

but which will be emphasized in this study: through its interest in language as interaction, pragmatics is involved in the analysis of political phenomena. There are two aspects to this. First, the interactive (and more specifically, discursive) relations which are confronted by pragmatics involve (in, for example, the implicit and explicit evaluation of the validity of utterances, and in their effectivity or otherwise - in the degrees to which utterances are felicitous) the operation of social roles and relations which are in an important respect relations of power (be these relations of oppression or relations of solidarity). They are, that is, political relations. Further, discursive interaction is a site of the contestation of concepts, or a site at which the concepts which go to make up an ideational or ideological framework are expressed, emphasized, opposed and changed. A central aspect of this involves the assignment of those social roles which in turn take effect in the operation of discourse; and these factors are combined in the constitution of those subjectivities which arise as discursive subjects. Thus, in confronting discourse, pragmatics is confronting the politics of discourse.

Secondly, in as much as it confronts discourse, pragmatics, as a meta-discourse, is itself involved in discursive practice. It is involved in the assignment of significance and at a site of the contestation of concepts. For pragmatics this focuses on such issues as the definition of a linguistic subject and the relation of a linguistic subject to discursive practice, and crucially, in this context, it focuses on the definition of the political. Because it is involved in a political relation to its object, and in relations of relative dominance and support with various social subjects and institutions, the question of whether these relations exists (whether abstractly for philosophy or at a more applied level for social science) are crucial in an analysis of pragmatics. Within pragmatics, these relations are generally ignored, but it will be argued (as may be clear from the preceding comments) that pragmatics in fact, and to some extent despite itself, exposes the politics of discourse while refusing to confront it.

This refusal is not arbitrary, however, but is tied to several aspects of pragmatics which undermine it theoretically and contradict those anti-positivist elements noted above. Importantly, it involves the adoption of the concept of a foundational linguistic subject which is taken to arise outside discurs-

ive relations, and in which the determination of meaning is assumed to be located.

In the following chapters the development of pragmatics in analytic philosophy is traced mainly through the work of J.L. Austin, H.P.Grice and J.R.Searle, and then responses to and developments of this work are examined in discourse analysis and conversation analysis. It should be noted at this point that it would be impossible in a work such as this to adequately cover the entire spectrum of work and issues which arise in Anglo-American pragmatics. Consequently, I have concentrated instead on that work and those issues which I consider to be central to pragmatics and which enable the most interesting aspects of pragmatics to be brought out.

That aspect of Austin's work which is important for pragmatics can be divided into two parts. In the first part (see Chapter One below), Austin develops the notion of the performative. This is an utterance which has the form of a statement, but which appears not to be true or false. Instead, rather than describing a state of affairs, a performative (such as 'I find you guilty') brings about a state of affairs, and seems to be more than just saying something. In order for a performative to be effective, however, it must satisfy various 'felicity' conditions: it must, for example, be said by the correct person, in the correct circumstances, and there must above all be a recognizable procedure to be invoked by the performative. It turns out, however, that performatives cannot be formally distinguished from standard descriptive statements, and this leads to the claim that 'performativeness' is a characteristic of utterances in general. Two important aspects of this approach, if it is successful, are that it undermines the notion of the paradigmatic linguistic role of the statement, which simply represents states of affairs as the expression of a subject's relation to reality, and that it introduces, with the idea of felicity conditions, the role of pragmatic factors in the operation of language.

The analysis of performatives leads on to the notion of speech acts (Chapter Two), involving three levels of act: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. The illocutionary act, and the concept of illocutionary force connected with it, have become central concepts within pragmatics. Austin's analysis has been criticized from a number of points (some involving misunderstandings and misreadings), and one of the more interest-

ing of these criticisms follows from Derrida's claim that despite his analysis Austin appears to rely on the unaccounted use of concepts of an originating subject and of ordinary language, both of which are problematic.

Grice's explication of meaning in terms of intentions is a departure from the type of approach developed by Austin, but in the later pragmatic tradition it has been very influential. Grice focuses the analysis of meaning explicitly on what he calls speaker's occasion meaning, and takes this as the central case, according to which other meaning, including conventional meaning, is to be analyzed. I criticize this approach as giving no account of how communication is possible, and as making use of an invalid equivocation with 'meaning' (between 'meaning-intending' and the linguistic meaning which is supposedly being explicated).

Searle develops his theory of speech acts (Chapter Four) through criticizing and adapting the work of Austin and Grice. I argue that this theory is largely inadequate, as it fails to overcome the major problems of Grice's account, and comes up against difficulties in giving a non-circular pragmatic account of speech acts and in dealing with the relation between speech act categories and their realizations. Searle also develops a theory of intentionality, aimed at supplying a naturalistic basis for the earlier theory. I argue that this has problems in explicating the relation between an essentially isolated originating subject and discourse as interaction.

Discourse analysis (Chapter Five), even as developed in the relatively independent program of Labov, shares several of the basic concepts and approaches of speech act theory. This approach analysis adds to speech act theory a more detailed use of interactive data and, especially in Labov's case, more sophisticated discourse rules. However, this linguistic work does not overcome the general theoretical problems confronting philosophical pragmatics, and furthermore, the problems of the use of a foundational and originating subject, and of the problematic relation between the interpreting analyst and discursive subjects, are highlighted.

Conversation analysis (Chapter Six), constitutes a radical departure from the preceding approaches to pragmatics. This work, informed more by phenomenology than by analytic philosophy, rejects the notion of a speech act and replaces the deductive

theorizing of discourse analysis with inductive generalization. Perhaps the most significant aspect of conversation analysis is that it purports to make no attempt to analyze the depth of discourse, either in terms of speaker's intentions or in terms of abstract speech act categories. Instead, it examines the practical reasoning in which conversationalists themselves, through the process of conversation, express and construct their linguistic and social categories. While this work does confront interaction much more directly, it is limited by an unsatisfactory empiricism in its account of the relation between analyst and data, and by the problem that unless it applies linguistic and social categories to conversational interaction (as it in fact does) it would be unable to say anything at all about conversation. Furthermore, because the relations between conversationalists are supposed to be only relevant in as much as they are expressed, conversation analysis gives an essentially conservative account of the politics of discourse, which is unable to confront underlying relations and assumptions of interaction. Attempts have been made to synthesize discourse analysis and conversation analysis, however, these do not appear to overcome the major problems with either approach.

The conclusion which arises from this work is that the politics of discourse is central to pragmatics, and that is can in fact be seen operating through its denial by the mainstream pragmatics discussed here. This conclusion in turn leads to the possibility of a pragmatics which takes note of the theoretical problems affecting this work, and through that directly confronts the political aspects of discourse which a pragmatic approach exposes.

CHAPTER ONE
AUSTIN ON PERFORMATIVES

INTRODUCTION.

Within that form of pragmatics which is now dominant in Anglo-American philosophy and linguistics, J.L.Austin's How To Do Things With Words (1962) is generally taken as the seminal text. Austin is regarded as having announced there a move away from truth-conditional semantics, and an opening of the possibility of studying language as communication within a context of rules and conventions, rather than as a calculus abstracted from the actuality and complexity of interaction. The general position of commentators within this tradition seems to be that Austin's basic insight is in need of development and expansion, and that his articulation of it is at times confused and in certain aspects mistaken, but that ultimately his conception of the relation between language, communication and intentionality offers a launch-pad and a reference point for pragmatics as a discipline.

In this chapter I want to make three basic claims. The first is that rather than a clear conception which is occasionally clouded-over we should see in Austin's text a series of unresolved tensions between radically different approaches to questions of semantics and communication.1 Secondly, readings which seek to ignore these tensions, and discover instead an underlying seamless and coherent intention, do so at the expense of what should be in their own terms quite outrageously selective and distorted representations and constructions of the text. Finally, I want to claim that if we allow ourselves to listen for the tensions which exist in Austin's text we can find there an alternative approach which has a value of its own, and which itself offers the possibility of a reappraisal of that tradition which has descended from Austin.

At the same time, and just because there are tensions in Austin's text, we find in operation there certain presuppositions which are central to the tradition he attacks and which seem invalidated by his own general position. These presuppositions focus on the notion of a transparent intending consciousness at the core of communication, and it will be necessary to gauge the effect of their role in Austin's own model of communication.

Austin's argument has two parts. The first, the analysis of 'performatives', being variously taken to collapse into or lead onto the theory of 'illocutionary force', which is generally regarded as the most significant part of Austin's legacy. The material discussed here is to be found in How To Do Things With Words, but the first part of the argument (the part discussed in this chapter) also occurs usefully in 'Performative Utterances' (1956) as well as in 'Performative - Constative' (1958).

SECTION 1: AUSTIN'S ANALYSIS OF PERFORMATIVES.

Austin places his discussion within a tradition he sees as originating with Kant, which has recognized that not only are not all sentences statements, but that certain forms of apparent statements themselves need to be examined more closely. He says that first of all we have the identification by verificationists of pseudo-statements, some of which have been analyzed as grammatically unexceptional but nonsense, while others have been seen as not being intended (at least solely) to impart information about facts.

He then refers to the later perception, by what he calls in 'Performative Utterances' (Austin, 1956: 234) the 'use of language movement' (but which he also places in the Kantian tradition - see 1962: 3) that ethical 'statements' involve emotive and prescriptive intent, and that many words within apparently descriptive statements serve to indicate, but not report, the circumstances of the making of the statement, or reservations to which it is subject, or the way in which it is to be taken. They thus cannot be sensibly taken as bearing on truth or falsity. To overlook these possibilities, Austin says, is to commit the descriptive fallacy. He says that these perceptions and the subsequent avoidance of the descriptive fallacy have led to a 'revolution in philosophy' whereby many traditional philosophical perplexities have been overcome. Austin sets up his project as an

attempt to give coherence to these later perceptions. (Austin, 1962: 1-3)

What follows falls, as I have said, into two main parts. In the first part Austin takes and analyzes a type of utterance which he calls 'performative', which has the form of a statement or constative, but which is not true or false, and involves in its utterance the performance of an act beyond just saying something. He then puts forward various ways of formally characterizing the peculiarity of performatives. However, each attempt is rejected, and only serves to clear new ground on which performatives and constatives will turn out not to be distinct. With each step, however (and this, it should be noted, is not something emphasized in all readings), it is not that performatives turn out to be merely a type of constative; rather, constatives are gradually subsumed (in an aspect of their utterance) within performatives. So after beginning with the position that some apparent statements (or constatives) are really performatives, Austin reaches the position that all statements are performative in as much as they all involve more than just producing meaningful and grammatical sentences. Thus, after setting himself up as clarifying the perceptions of a tradition which seeks to identify and distinguish utterances which do not fall into the traditional view of statements, Austin ends by claiming to show that statements per se are not what they have been traditionally thought to be. It is not clear that this has been generally recognized by all of Austin's commentators. In the second part of the argument Austin develops his theory of 'illocutionary forces', where all utterances (not just statements and 'apparent' statements) are analyzed first along a vertical axis into locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, and then along a horizontal axis into different illocutionary acts.

Already, of course, I have begged some interpretive questions, question which cannot be fully addressed until we consider some standard readings of Austin's argument, and so I want at this stage to suggest just a very general outline of the structure of that argument.

In 'Performative Utterances', Austin says of performatives that they are a type of utterance which, 'looks like a statement and grammatically, I suppose, would be classed as a statement, which is not nonsensical, and yet is not true or false' (1956: 235, and cf.1962: 12). He says that as well as not describing

anything, these utterances appear to be, or be a part of, the doing of an action 'which would not normally be described as, or as "just", saying something' (1962: 5). Examples of performatives which he suggests are,

'I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)', uttered in a marriage ceremony,

'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth', uttered in a ship-naming ceremony,

'I give and bequeath my watch to my brother', occurring in a will, and

'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow'.

Austin says of these examples that,

> to utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it. None of the utterances cited is either true or false: I assert this as obvious and do not argue it. It needs argument no more than that 'damn' is not true or false: it may be that the utterance 'serves to inform you' - but that is quite different. To name the ship is to say (in the appropriate circumstances) the words 'I name, & c.'. When I say, before the registrar or altar, & c., 'I do', I am not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in it. (Austin, 1962: 6)

On a note on the same page, Austin says that 'to issue a constative utterance ... is to make a statement. To issue a performative utterance is, for example, to make a bet' (1962: 6, n.2).

Austin rejects the idea that performatives are descriptions in the sense that they are 'the outward and visible sign, for convenience or other record of information, of an inward and spiritual act' (1962: 9). He says that the way performatives operate is that if they are uttered (in the appropriate circumstances), then the act is performed; and, importantly, the utterer is taken to have performed the act, to have promised, or bet, or whatever. Accordingly, if, for example, we promise in bad faith, the utterance, while insincere, is not a lie or a misstatement.

> At most we might make out a case for saying that it implies or insinuates a falsehood or a misstatement (to the effect that [the promiser] does intend to do something): but that is a very different matter. Moreover, we do not speak of a false bet or a false christening; and that we do speak of a false promise need commit us to no more than the fact that

we speak of a false move. 'False' is not necessarily used of statements only. (Austin, 1962: 11)

Performatives do go wrong, not because they are false descriptions, but because they are 'infelicitous'. They can be misfires, which are either misinvocations, where the act is disallowed because we invoke a procedure which does not exist or because we misapply the procedure, or misexecutions, where the act is vitiated by a flaw or hitch in the conduct of the ceremony. Performatives can also be abuses when the act has been successfully performed, but when certain thoughts, feelings or intentions required by certain acts are missing (when they are insincere), or when the subsequent actions required by some of these acts are not fulfilled. (See 1962: 14-18)

These classifications are subject to some comments and qualifications. First, Austin says that infelicity is an ill to which all conventional acts (acts which have the general character of ritual or ceremony) are heir, although every ritual is not liable to every form of infelicity. He also makes the point - the relevance of which we shall see later - that an actual statement, if it refers to something which does not exist (e.g., the present king of France), appears to be not so much false as void, and he says,

> the more we consider a statement not as a sentence (or proposition) but as an act of speech (out of which the others are logical constructions) the more we are studying the whole thing as an act. Or again, there are obvious similarities between a lie and a false promise.(Austin, 1962: 20)

A further point is that since in uttering performatives we are performing actions, then, as actions, these will be subject to certain whole dimensions of unsatisfactoriness to which all actions are subject but which are distinguishable from the infelicities which have been discussed. That is, actions may be done under duress, by accident, owing to mistakes, or otherwise unintentionally (1962: 21). As well, as utterances, performatives are also heir to problems which can infect all utterances. For example, an utterance will be in some way hollow or void if said by an actor, or introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. In such circumstances, Austin claims, language is used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use. Another type of infelicity can arise from misunderstanding, when a promise, for example, is not heard, or is not understood as a promise. Final-

ly, according to Austin performatives can go wrong in more than one way at once, and the ways they can go wrong overlap and are more or less arbitrarily divided.(1962: 22-4)

The converse of the various infelicities to which performatives are susceptible are a set of general conditions for a successful performative. These can be summarized as follows.

A. i. There must be a conventional (at least partly verbal) procedure having a conventional effect.
   ii. The persons and circumstances must be appropriate for the procedure invoked.
B. The procedure must be executed by all participants (i) correctly and (ii) completely.
C. In certain cases the persons must have thoughts, feelings and intentions appropriate to the procedure, and must carry out subsequent conduct if that is specified. (See 1962: 14-15 & 26-39).

From this point on, Austin starts to seriously attack the performative-constative distinction. He repeats a point made earlier when he comments that the statement 'the cat is on the mat' implies that the utterer believes the cat is on the mat, and that if the utterer does not so believe it appears to be insincere in a way parallel to the way promising but not intending is insincere (1962: 50). He says that the statement 'John's children are all bald' presupposes that John has children, but if John has no children it is not false, and not meaningless in a normal sense. It is rather that it is void, since, as with performatives going wrong in the first two ways noted above, conditions which are presupposed by the happy performance of the act are not present. Furthermore, the way that 'I promise' entails 'I ought' is parallel to the way one proposition entails another, so that 'I promise but I ought not' is parallel to 'it is and it is not' (1962: 51-2). Austin says that if we consider 'the total situation in which the utterance is issued - the total speech-act', we find a parallel between statements (i.e., constatives) and performative utterances, and the ways each can go wrong.

> So the total speech act in the total speech situation is emerging from logic piecemeal as important in special cases: and thus we are assimilating the supposed constative utterance to the performative. (Austin, 1962: 52)

Given that constatives and performatives bear a similar relation to presupposition, implication and entailment, Austin re-

considers the idea that the relation to truth and falsity offers a distinguishing criterion. The first argument he suggests here is that connected with the constative 'John is running' is the statement 'I am stating that John is running', and that 'this may depend for its truth on the happiness of "John is running", just as the truth of "I am apologizing" depends on the happiness of "I apologize"' (1962: 55). Secondly, he argues that performatives can be subject to truth and falsity, because if, for example, I utter the performative 'I warn you that the bull is about to charge', but the bull does not in fact charge, then while I may have succeeded in warning you, and done so sincerely (the warning, that is to say, is felicitous), it seems open to criticism.

> We should not in this case say the warning was void - i.e. that he did not warn but only went through a form of warning - nor that it was insincere: we should feel much more inclined to say the warning was false or (better) mistaken, as with a statement. (Austin, 1962: 55)

'So', he goes on to say, '... considerations of the happiness and unhappiness type may infect statements (or some statements) and considerations of the type of truth and falsity may infect performatives (or some performatives)' (1962: 55).

Austin next considers the possibility of distinguishing performatives and constatives grammatically, for it has seemed that performatives are in the first person singular present indicative active; however, he now finds many problems with this. First, the singular has to go, as there can be performatives such as 'We promise' and so on. But there are also performative in the second and third person and with the verb in the passive voice: consider 'You are hereby authorized to pay ...', and 'Passengers are warned to cross the track by the bridge only'. Or the verb can be passive impersonal, as in 'Notice is hereby given that trespassers will be prosecuted'. Austin suggests that mood can not be retained, because rather than 'I order you to turn right' I may say 'Turn right'; and we lose tense once we realize that I may say, for example, 'You were offside', rather than 'I call you offside', or 'You did it' rather than 'I find you guilty'. When we come to truncated sentences, says Austin, such as 'Done' in accepting a bet, or 'Guilty', the problem becomes even more acute. (1962: 58)

The possibility of a lexical criterion for the distinction, in which performatives would be marked by 'performative' words, is also rejected. First, performatives can occur without oper-

ative words, for example, 'Bull' rather than 'Dangerous bull', 'You will' rather than 'You are ordered to', or 'I shall' rather than 'I promise'. Secondly, we may get the operative word without the utterance being performative. For example, I may say 'you were guilty', or 'you were offside' without having the right to pronounce you guilty or offside, and in locutions such as 'you promised' and 'you authorize' the operative occurs in a non-performative use.

Austin suggests that what was convincing about the grammatical criterion was that it made explicit that in a performative there is something which is at the moment of uttering being done by the person uttering, and he says that where the utterer is not referred to in the verbal formula reference will be made, in speech, by that person being the utterer ('what we may call the utterance-origin'), or in written utterances by the utterer's signature being appended. So, he suggests, there is a temptation to say that a performative should be reducible, or expandable, or analyzable into, or reproducible in this grammatical form. Thus, for example, we would say that 'Out' is equivalent to, for example, 'I declare you out', or that 'Guilty' might be equivalent to 'I pronounce you guilty'. (1962: 60-2)

Further support for the grammatical criterion can be found in the fact that there is a systematic asymmetry between the first person singular present indicative active form of a verb and other persons and tenses of the very same verb. For example, when I utter the words 'I bet...' I do not state that I bet, I bet; but if I say 'He bets ...' I state that he uttered the words, and do not perform the act myself. This asymmetry is not found in verbs not used as explicit performatives, for example, in 'I run' and 'He runs'. (1962: 63)

Austin has doubts whether this is any longer a grammatical distinction, but in any case he finally rejects this sort of approach. He offers several reasons, but ultimately what they amount to is that for an utterance to have, or to be analyzable into, a given verbal form, is not enough to decide how it is being used in a given context. Thus, I may say 'I promise only when I intend to keep my word', which is to describe my habitual behaviour; or I may say 'on page 49 I protest against the verdict', which is to describe the 'historic present'; and some verbs may simultaneously be a performative and a description of naturally consequent performance, as in 'I call inflation too

much money chasing too few goods'. Also, this criterion would allow formulas we might not want to allow as performatives, such as 'I state that ...', 'j'adoube' said when giving check (which might be more appropriately called 'marking the action by the word'), and expressions having the correct form, but which do not operate as performative formulas, such as 'I insult you'. Finally Austin suggests that bringing an expression back to its normal performative form may often be to lose something of the original form. For example, 'I shall' can be meant in different ways other than promising; 'I am sorry' does not seem equivalent to the explicit 'I apologize'; and 'I approve' may give approval, or it may have the descriptive meaning 'I favor this'. (See 1962: 64-67)

Given that a grammatical criterion cannot work, the next move which Austin makes is to develop the already implied distinction between explicit and 'primary' performatives. He argues initially that to make explicit is not to describe or to state, so that an explicit rendering of a primary performative ('I promise ...' as against 'I shall ...', e.g.) is not a true or false description of what was previously implicit; and he also claims that the 'that-' clauses, following 'I promise', 'I find', 'I pronounce' and so-on are not the 'that-' clauses of indirect speech, which operate when reporting something (in this case one's own speech) (1962: 69-71).

He then suggests that the explicit performative (e.g. 'I promise that I will') is a later development in the evolution of language than certain primary utterances (e.g. 'I will'), which are often implicit performatives. He suggests that in primitive languages it would not be possible to distinguish what we were in fact doing with an utterance. So 'Bull' or 'Thunder' in a primitive language of one-word utterances could be a warning, information, a prediction and so-on, and the ability to distinguish the different 'forces' that these utterances might have would be 'a later achievement of language'. Austin says that primitive or primary forms of utterance will preserve the 'ambiguity' or 'vagueness' of primitive language, and they will not make explicit the precise force of the utterance (1962: 71-2). He recognizes that this can be useful, but says that sophistication and development of social forms demands clarification.

It is important to note that the clarification which arises with social change is not seen by Austin as necessarily express-

ing implicit distinctions. He says of this clarification that it is,

> as much a creative act as a discovery or description! It is as much a matter of making clear distinction as of making already existent distinctions clear. (Austin, 1962: 72)

He says also that we should not assume that the primary or primitive use of sentences must be statemental or constative, and that we know as little whether this was the case as we do whether they were initially imperatives or swear-words, and he suggests that the statement, like precision, may be a goal of the gradual development of science.

> Language as such and in its primitive states is not precise, and it is also not, in our sense, explicit: precision in language makes it clearer what is being said - its meaning: explicitness, in our sense, makes clearer the force of the utterance, or 'how' (in one sense ...) it is to be taken. (Austin, 1962: 73)

The explicit performative, Austin suggests, is merely the last and 'most successful' speech-device for making the force of an utterance clear. Other devices include lexical items expressive of mood, making the same utterance a command or an exhortation; tone of voice, cadence and emphasis, by which the same verbal string can be made a warning, a question and so-on; adverbs and adverbial phrases, which qualify the force of an utterance (compare 'I shall probably do it' and 'I shall do it without fail'); and different connecting particles, such as 'still', 'therefore', 'whereas', 'hereby' and 'moreover', which have a great effect on the force of an utterance. Apart from what we say and the manner of speaking, force may be put across by accompanying an utterance with gestures and ceremonial non-verbal actions, and sometimes these need be accompanied by no words. Finally, the circumstances of an utterance are very important in determining the way it is to be taken (who says it, where they say it, what has preceded it, and so-on). (1962: 73-6)

While Austin thinks that explicit performatives are superior to these devices, he says that there are problems with explicit performatives. They can be mistaken for descriptives (this, he says, is a philosopher's problem); they do not preserve the often congenial equivocation of primary utterances; and there may be cases where it is doubtful whether the expression is an explicit performative or not, and cases very similar to performatives but not performatives. He also claims (repeating what was an object-

ion to a grammatical distinction) that there 'seem to be clear cases where the very same formula seems sometimes to be an explicit performative and sometimes to be a descriptive, and may even trade on the ambivalence', and he suggests the case cited above of 'I approve', which may have the performative force of giving approval or it may have the descriptive meaning, 'I favour this'. (1962: 77-8)

This last point leads to the idea that we can have a gradual slide from explicit performatives to descriptions of emotional states. Some of the examples which Austin offers to demonstrate this are 'I thank' (performative), 'I am grateful' (half descriptive), and 'I feel grateful' (descriptive); 'I apologize', 'I am sorry' and 'I repent'; 'I approve', 'I approve of' and 'I feel approval'. The middle terms here, and others such as 'I blame', 'I welcome', and 'I am glad about', do not pass four tests Austin suggests for distinguishing whether a 'behabitive' (an utterance connected with feelings and attitudes) is an explicit performative or not, yet he feels that they do exhibit characteristics of performatives as well as those of descriptives, depending perhaps on their context of utterance (1962: 79-80).

The four tests are: (1), whether it makes sense to ask 'But does he <u>really</u>? (if it does make sense, then we are dealing with a description - Austin says that this is not a very good test); (2), to ask whether the speaker could be doing the action without uttering the performative (as in feeling sorry as distinct from apologizing); (3) to ask whether someone could say that they deliberately performed the act (compare 'I deliberately apologized' and 'I was deliberately sorry'); and (4) to ask whether what is said could be false or instead insincere. (See 1962: 79-80 & 83-4)

He finds the same sorts of cases with expositives (compare 'I conclude' and 'I assume'), and verdictives, within which 'I hold that' is a pure performative when said by a judge, but seems to be a descriptive outside official contexts (1962: 85-9).

The point which is taken from these cases, where it is unclear whether an apparent or suggested explicit performative verb itself operates, or operates sometimes or in part, as a description, true or false, of feelings, states of mind, frames of mind, etc., is that they suggest again for Austin the wider phenomenon,

> where the whole utterance seems essentially meant to be true or false despite its performative characteristics. Even if we take such half-way houses as, say, 'I hold that ...' as said by a non-juryman, or 'I expect that ...', it seems absurd to suppose that all they describe or state, so far as they do this when they do, is something about the speaker's beliefs or expectations .... And when we come to pure explicit performatives such as 'state' or 'maintain', surely the whole thing is true or false even though the uttering of it is the performing of the action of stating or maintaining. And we have repeatedly pointed out that some things that are quite clearly classic performatives like 'Over' bear a very close relation to describing facts, even if others like 'Play' do not. (Austin, 1962: 89-90)

One way out of some of these problems would be to distinguish the performative part from the true or false part of an utterance. But Austin rejects this because there are many cases which we can not split into two parts like this, even though the utterance seems to have an explicit performative in it; utterances like 'I liken x to y' or 'I analyze x as y', where the performative verb both places the utterance and determines the relation of the elements constated (1962: 90).

Looking back on the argument so far we can see that the performatives with which Austin begins involve the explicit (at least in most cases), and more or less ritualized constitution of various social facts, be these facts a promise, a bet, a bequest, the (institutionalised) name of someone or thing, or a marriage. These performatives, he says, are not subject to truth or falsity, as are constatives; they are subject to felicity, in as much as they can misfire or be abused. But it turns out that constatives also can misfire and be uttered insincerely, and furthermore, that certain performatives can be in a sense false. It seems that performatives display a peculiar grammatical structure, and that they are marked by performative verbs; but performatives can occur without this structure or the marking verb, and utterances having these characteristics are not always performatives. What is more, some utterances may swing between performative and constative. The final possibility is to analyze examples which upset this classification as being implicit or primary forms of explicit performatives, but we find that many cases which we can expand into explicit performatives must at the same time be allowed as constatives. So, Austin says, we must adopt

instead a different approach to the analysis of these issues.

SECTION 2: WAYS OF READING AUSTIN ON PERFORMATIVES.

Austin's analysis of performatives is generally taken as much less important than the theory of illocutionary forces. If it is mentioned at all it is usually in passing, and there are relatively few commentaries which deal in any detail with the material I have summarized.

The main readings I want to look at are those of Urmson (1979), Graham (1977: Ch.3), Black (1963) and Warnock (1973). All think (although their reasons vary) that Austin misidentified the true nature of the original examples of performatves, and that he makes an unjustified shift in the course of his argument to cases which do not share the crucial characteristics of performatives.

SECTION 2a.

For Urmson, the shift is from utterances which are governed by conventions, which make them the doing of something more than saying something, to 'self-labeling' utterances which indicate linguistically how they are to be taken. He refers to the original cases as formulas used as part of a ritual, and quotes Austin (1962: 5) as saying that they are, or are a part of the doing of an action which 'would not normally be described as saying something' (see Urmson,1979: 263). The later cases, he says (orders, questions, warnings, statements), do not have this ritual character, and 'are just the sort of things which would "normally be described as saying something"' (1979: 263). He also says that because the original cases have the form of statements we should not be looking to divide constatives from all non-constatives, but only from performatives; and he thinks that because none of these later cases are performative and most are not constative they cannot be used to break down a dichotomy between constatives and performatives (1979: 263).

Urmson thinks that Austin made the mistake of thinking that performatives and constatives are different types of speech acts, whereas performatives are in fact not speech acts, not acts which would 'normally be described as saying something', at all. He says that performatives, like speech acts, are 'wholly convent-

ional acts', acts which can only be performed following some rule, principle or convention that the performance of some arbitrary natural act is the performance of that conventional act (see 1979: 263-4); but he says that performatives are a subset of these acts in which 'the relevant conventions are not at all, or are not primarily or exclusively, linguistic conventions' (1979: 264). He expresses this difference by saying that if he were in Turkey he may ask 'How do I say "the cat is on the mat" in Turkish?', but that he would not ask 'How do I get married in Turkish?': rather, he says, he would ask 'How do I get married in Turkey?'. This may in part require him learning how to say certain things in Turkish, but it need not, and if it does the linguistic conventions operating there occur within the more general non-linguistic conventions governing how one marries in Turkey.

Urmson suggests that performative utterances are a type of performative act; and he says that

> performative utterances are that subset of wholly conventional acts which is constituted by non-linguistic conventions but where these non-linguistic conventions require one to act in accordance with specified linguistic conventions. (Urmson,1979: 265)

He concludes from this that the attempt to erect a performative-constative dichotomy is vicious, because the constative is merely one variety of speech act (acts governed primarily by linguistic convention) whereas the performative is a variety of conventional act primarily governed by non-linguistic convention. He says that Austin made the dichotomy plausible by assimilating self-announcing speech acts (warning, asking, declaring) to the common performative in the first person singular, and because he relaxed the requirements for performatives to the extent where 'I order you to shut the door' is a performative simply because it is the act of ordering and it is not true or false. He comments that 'it would be odd to say that "I order you to shut the door" is the utterance of a ritual formula or an act which would not normally be counted as saying something' (1979: 267).

Urmson does not see all this as effecting the theory of illocutionary acts. He just thinks that performatives should not be classed as speech acts. But we should take note of what for Urmson are the rudiments of the uneffected theory of 'locutionary and illocutionary force', (as he puts it). He says (1979: 262) that Austin's conclusion was that the original dichotomy of two

types of speech act (performative and constative) needed to be supplanted by a distinction between two distinguishable but inseparable levels within any speech act. At the first level, he says, we have the locutionary act, which just involves sense and reference, and 'at that level we can already consider the truth and falsity of the utterance'. He says that this is like the logician's proposition and is an abstraction from the total act, and not a special constative speech act. This may have, at the second level, the illocutionary force of a warning, prediction, or whatever. Urmson says that Austin thinks the confusion leading to the original attempted distinction arises because 'in different speech-acts one or other force, the locutionary or the illocutionary, is more important' (1979: 262).

This summary is presented before Urmson develops his criticism of the original attempted dichotomy, but we can see that the notion of a performative plays no role in it. Urmson thinks that for Austin the value of the original attempt was that it showed that we were looking at things in the wrong way, and should subsume the theory of performatives within the later theory (see 1979: 267). His difference with Austin is that for him performatives should not be seen as speech acts at all, because they are constituted by non-linguistic conventions.

Graham also thinks that Austin misidentifies the crucial characteristics of the examples with which he begins and thus allows counter-examples which are not true performatives. However, he says that the only true performatives are those cases where the act is specified in the utterance itself (the 'explicit' or 'self-labeling' performatives); thus cases like 'turn right' are not performatives, even though they fulfill the criterion of being cases where there is something which is at the moment of uttering being done by the person uttering and which are not true or false.

According to Graham, Austin originally defined performatives as being cases which do not describe or report or constate anything and are not true or false, and where,

> the uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as saying something. (Austin, 1962: 5, as quoted in Graham, 1977: 55)

His major difference with Austin, as he sees it, is that Austin was mistaken to say that just because performatives are not true or false descriptions of inner states they are not true or false at all. Graham says that performatives fall between logically self-confirming statements like 'I am saying something' and causally self-confirming statements like 'The price of gold will fall tomorrow' (said by an influential market analyst and causing the price to fall).

Graham says that because Austin assumes that truth and falsity are ascribed to statement-acts (rather than to statement-contents) he (Austin) thinks that as there is no radically different state of affairs corresponding to the act 'I promise ...', for example, then performatives cannot be true or false. However, Graham says, what we should say is that cases where the statement guarantees its own truth (as with 'I am saying something') are cases where the statement-act guarantees, or is sufficient for, the truth of the statement-content which it expresses, and this, he says,is the case with performatives. Performatives are different from these logically self-confirming utterances, however, because on the one hand they must be uttered in felicitous circumstances, unlike these cases, and on the other hand, not only are they sufficient for the truth of their statement-content, they non-redundantly guarantee it. That is, the statement-content would not be true unless the statement-act were performed, whereas 'I am saying something' would be true as long as I say anything. So, given a background of appropriate conventions and the fulfillment of felicity conditions, the statement 'I bet ...' is sufficient for the truth of its content. Given its felicitous, conventionally appropriate utterance, it is true that the utterer bets.

However, while a performative is not logically sufficient for its truth, it does not causally bring about a substantially separate state of affairs, as does 'The price of gold will fall tomorrow'. Rather,

> It conventionally brings about its own truth in the following sense: the content expressed by the utterance becomes true when the statement-act is performed because people regard it as being so as a consequence of the act of utterance. To put it this way is to emphasize that the existence of performatives rests not only on utterance but also on social attitudes. (Graham, 1977: 75)

This is why it is possible to imagine a culture where 'I promise'

would get the same response as 'I insult you' gets in our own - 'How?', perhaps - if in that culture a promise required the performance of, say, some extra-linguistic act. It is also why a statement cannot be a performative, because it refers to a state of affairs totally independent of its utterance and of a kind which social convention could not determine. Similarly, 'turn right' is not a performative because unlike 'I order you to turn right' it does not become true as a result of being uttered. The midway cases like 'I am sorry' are not performatives because they do not create on their utterance the truth of their content, as does 'I apologize', for example. Those cases which vary between being performative and not do not worry Graham, because he says that it is to be expected that variation of people and circumstances effects what is taken to be a performative. Graham says that it is true that the truth of 'I state that p' does follow from its being uttered, but that this is like 'I am saying something', and its truth does not follow from its being uttered as a consequence of social convention.

Graham says that this mediation of social convention is different from the way convention might be said to enter into <u>any</u> use of language as a collection of symbols with conventional meanings, but does not, unfortunately, make this clearer. He says that Austin should have confined the use of the term 'performative' to the sorts of examples with which he began, and use 'illocution' for the similarity between these and other more normal statements. He says that it is important to retain the initial term, as it shows that the way people conceive the world (e.g. taking 'I promise ...' to constitute the making of a promise) has an important role in constituting the social world, and that it shows that a sharp distinction between acting in the world and merely conceiving of it in a particular way is untenable.

Something we should notice about Graham's argument here is that if it works, then while there may be a difference between performatives and other utterances, performatives are, nonetheless, constatives - albeit a peculiar type of constative. For although Graham does not himself say as much, the fact that a performative, according to his analysis, <u>truly or falsely describes a state of affairs</u> makes it as good a candidate for a constative as any. That is, the performative 'I promise ...' is a much a constative as 'You promise ...', except that the felicitous utterance of the performative is necessary and sufficient

for its truth. Furthermore, all self-labeling utterances, whether performative or not on Graham's analysis, would, according to his approach, be constative.

Black expresses the difference between the original and later performatives as being between a sense in which an utterance counts as a case of 'the speaker's doing something other than, or something more than, saying something true or false' (Black, 1963: 212), and in which all non-performatives are constatives, and a sense in which there is some formal marker of the character of the utterance, where simply the self-labeling form 'I X [such and such]' counts as a case of the speaker thereby X-ing.

He says that the first sense derives from Austin's claim (1962: 6-7) that a performative is the doing of an action which is 'not normally thought of as just saying something' (as quoted by Black, 1963: 211). He says that it is crucial that we take Austin's 'saying something' as 'saying something true or false':

> a man who makes a promise is certainly 'usually thought of as saying something', viz., the very words that he pronounces ...: the point is that what he is saying is not rightly taken to have a truth-value. Similarly, 'action', as it occurs in Austin's explanation, must be understood to mean at least 'doing something other than saying something true or false', for it is certainly not wrong to think of a man who makes an assertion as doing something, viz., asserting; the point is that he is not doing something other than making a truth-claim (Black, 1963: 212).

It is not enough for the first type of performative that the utterance should in fact be a case of something other than or more than making a truth-claim. There must, Black says, be a convention or rule making it wrong not to recognize that this is so (thus 'The bull is loose' may in fact be a warning, but it is not a performative). He says also that by 'something other than, or more than, saying something true or false' he means that the speaker must be doing something more than making a truth-claim or more than making one in a special way that is indicated by the utterance (Black, 1963: 213). Black thinks that performatives (of the original 'more interesting' type) might not necessarily be in the statement form, and so would include cases like 'Hello', but he is willing to place these in a subclass (1963: 215). The distinction in the original form, Black says, is between

> a form of words used to make a truth-claim only and one that conventionally counts as being used to do something other than or more than this. (Black, 1963: 213)

Black says that Austin never makes it clear just what he means when he says that performatives are 'conventional' or 'ritual' or 'ceremonial'. He suggests, however, that we might say that a conventional act is one which is rule-governed, which (if performed according to these rules) is self-validating, which brings about certain social consequences (expectations and undertakings), and which has a certain non-natural meaning or significance (described by its being a bet, marriage or whatever). He says that these criteria can vary independently, and do not give a set of necessary and sufficient conditions.

Black's first objection to a notion of verbal performatives based on this definition is that <u>any</u> correct use of words may be held to be conventional in this sense. He says that it sometimes seems that Austin is thinking of a sub-class of conventional acts that are analogous to ritual or ceremonial acts in a narrow sense; however, he avoids making a special class of these more ritualized utterances (which would place him very close to Urmson), because he thinks that this analogy can be pushed too far, as we can promise, for example, in many ways that do not involve using a set formula. The main weakness which Black finds is in mixed utterances, which serve both to make a truth-claim and to do something more. He accepts that an explicit warning is a performative, and says that a case like 'I warn you that the bull is loose', as well as doing something more than making a truth-claim, seems to imply, or contextually imply, a truth-claim to the effect that the bull is loose. He says that even in the paradigm case of 'I promise that I shall be there' it begins to look as if there is at least an implied assertion, 'I shall be there' (1963: 216-7). He says that once we start to see these weaknesses in the attempt to characterize performatives,

> One might then be led to think of the 'performative'-'constative' contrast as dealing with <u>aspects</u> of utterances, rather than with mutually exclusive <u>classes</u> of utterances. (Black, 1963: 217)

G.J.Warnock says that we can find in Austin three different senses of performative. He says that the first sense arises out of the basic thought that <u>sometimes</u> to say something is to do something. In this sense, he says, the term was meant to pick out

a subclass of utterances contrasted with non-performatives. Warnock suggests that in this basic thought there is no particular restriction on the kinds of doings that sayings sometimes are. In particular, these doings do not have to be linguistic acts or what became known as 'speech acts'. This is because, on the one hand, if we were to say here that every utterance is the performing of a speech act, then we could not be dealing at this stage with a sub-class of utterances which are the doing or performing of something, and because, in any case, in the early examples of performatives Austin does not seem to be thinking particularly, or even at all, of linguistic acts. Warnock says that the question which this early notion raises is that of how it is that someone who issues an utterance thereby does something, over and above whatever it may be that is done in merely saying what is said, and he says that Austin's answer is that it is in virtue of conventions to the effect that to say these things counts as, or constitutes, doing whatever it may be. (Warnock, 1973: 69-71)

Warnock says that there seems to be nothing essentially wrong with this idea as such, whatever Austin and others may have come to think; however, he says that the notion of convention used here has to be made clear, importantly so that we can rope off the non-linguistic conventions (which nonetheless involve utterance) we are concerned with at this stage, and which govern this subclass of utterances, from those we may choose to say enter into all linguistic utterances. He says that the discussion of infelicity is thus quite reasonable as an examination of the ways the convention that to say X constitutes doing Y can go wrong, or as an examination of the non-linguistic conventions governing performatives. A further point is that when we utter a performative in this sense we do not commonly state that we are doing what we are, and he gives the examples of bidding in bridge and appealing in cricket. Finally here, Warnock says that if there is at this point no particular restriction on the kind of doings that sayings sometimes are, then there can be no restriction on the kind of sayings that can be doings. He says that sayings of any linguistic form or sort could take the role of being that which constitutes doing something; they need not be sentences or even otherwise meaningful words, but if they are sentences, they can be indicative, interrogative, or whatever. Thus, even though Austin at times denies it,

> A saying which, by convention, counts as doing something could perfectly well be the saying of something true or false (though indeed, in such a case, truth or falsehood

might not be the point mainly at issue) - so the happy-unhappy distinction does not in any way exclude the true-false distinction (though of course it differs from it); ... (Warnock, 1973: 73)

He says that there is also no reason why performatives should be of the form 'I X', because the distinguishing features of performatives are the extra-linguistic conventions which govern them, not their form. Warnock makes the further comment that performatives of this sort are not only a subclass of utterances, but also of what might be called conventionally significant doings, many of which will not involve utterance (1973: 71-4). He also says that this sense of performative, where the distinction rests on the presence or absence of conventions by virtue of which certain utterances count as doing something, does not break down under the infection of truth and falsity (1973: 75 & n.6).

Warnock says that we should be wary (and more wary than Austin) of thinking that the way performatives in this sense are constituted by convention can be carried across into speech acts in general, which involve the second sense of performative, in which to say something is always to do something. He says that we may say that conventions assign sense to our utterances, but that in general there are no conventions which make 'The train leaves at three' have the illocutionary force of warning, say, in the way that conventions make the original performative utterances the doing of something. That is, illocutionary forces, according to Warnock, are not in general (we shall see the exception to this later) convention-constituted acts; and he says that this is why, for most utterances anyway, illocutionary forces should be distinguished from meanings. A further point is that this second sense of performative does not exclude, and will often be, the saying of something true or false. (1975: 76-7)

This second sense of performatives is tied by Warnock to the third group, the explicit or self-labeling cases, where 'the speaker explicitly indicates something that he is doing in speaking by incorporating the word for what he is doing in what he says' (1973: 78). He says that if we treat these as the same as the original performatives the sketch of the whole text which would follow from this is that after starting out with the idea that to say something is sometimes to do something, Austin came to realize that to say is always to do something, and so saw that what was peculiar about the original performatives was that in them it was made explicit what the speaker is doing. This, War-

nock says, is quite mistaken. He says that the examples with which Austin begins are not all explicit performatives, and that there is nothing about what Austin says at that stage which suggests that they should be explicit.

> The idea of saying something which, by convention, counts as doing such-and-such, and the idea of saying something in which the words make explicit in a particular way what one is doing, are really completely different ideas; .... (Warnock, 1973: 79)

Warnock comments that Austin himself seems not to have been clear about this, and suggests that this is why he thought that the grammatical criterion was at least worth examining.

Warnock claims that the later explicit performatives should be seen as a particular type of ordinary utterance and should be construed as the autobiographical statements which their form suggests, and that if we do this it becomes obvious that because we make it explicitly clear what we are doing in these utterances we are saying truly or falsely that we do. (1973: 80-1)

With explicit performatives, he says, we are dealing with things people do in saying things, but things which are not independent of what is said. It is just because to promise is essentially to say something that it is to say that one promises; as with a notice which reads 'Customers are warned not to leave valuables in the cloak-room', which does just what it says. What is special is that the fact that the notice says it makes it true: saying customers are warned is warning customers (1973: 82-3). He says that the way the self-labeling performatives are true is like the way statements such as 'I exist' or 'I am alive' are true, but that they differ because a performative such as 'I promise', can be false if it is uttered in unhappy circumstances where it would not be true that I promise (1973: 84-5). He acknowledges that explicit performatives are therefore a special case, but thinks that this does not mean that these utterances are not statements.

> One can quite well concede, as clearly one must, that explicit performative utterances are a rather peculiar lot in this way, without holding that they are peculiar in not having truth-values at all .... (Warnock, 1973: 85)

Most of these explicit or self-labeling performative utterances are not performatives in the original sense, because, Warnock says, with most explicit performatives what makes it the

case that, for example, in saying 'I promise', I promise, is not a convention which constitutes this as promising, but simply the meaning of the words that I utter. To understand these explicit 'performatives', he says, is simply to understand English, whereas to understand an original performative one must understand the rules and conventions governing the activity to which it relates, because what a happily uttered original performative does is not done simply in virtue of what it means. (1973: 86)

The qualification to this is that some convention-constituted activities may require, by convention, an utterance in the form of the explicit performatives. The example which Warnock gives is the possibility that the closure of an innings in cricket requires the captain of the batting team to say 'I declare the innings closed'. If this were the case, he says, then the utterance would both mean that the innings is declared closed and be conventionally operative in so doing (1973: 87). Presumably Warnock also means to include here those cases of the original performatives which are in the explicit form.

Warnock says that the difference between conventionally operative utterances and explicit performative utterances tends to be obscured because these sub-classes are introduced simultaneously, without Austin being explicit, nor perhaps being aware, that they are different, and because when Austin moves on from the special sub-classes of performative to the sense where all utterances can be called performative he gives, and may have had, the mistaken impression that the old ways of being performative had turned out to be somehow illusory. (1973: 89)

It may be worthwhile briefly recapping these four commentaries. Urmson says that true performatives are ritual or formulaic utterances, having the form of statements but being governed primarily by non-linguistic conventions, which 'would not normally be described as saying something', and so are not linguistic acts. He says that what Austin thought he did was to show that rather than make a distinction between constative and performative speech acts we should make a distinction within speech acts of a proposition (the 'locutionary force' - sic) and that which the utterance is being used to do (the illocutionary force). Urmson thinks that as long as we do not subsume performatives within speech acts this conclusion is valid - the lesson about the correct axis of distinction being learnt (one gathers) from the case of self-labeling speech acts.[2]

Graham also picks out self-labeling speech-acts as special. He thinks, however, that the only true performatives are those self-labeling speech acts which are made true by their utterance being taken as the doing of the act they express. The character of performativeness is thus not something which can be carried across into speech acts in general. Performativeness is doing something, whereas speech acts as such are saying something.[3]

Black thinks that true performatives are not true or false in the way Warnock and Graham claim. He says that the original performatives are characterized by being the doing of something more than saying something true or false, and something governed by non-linguistic conventions. He says that Austin was mistaken to think that self-labeling utterances as such were performative in the same way, because an utterance of the form 'I X' is not by that the doing of something more than saying something true or false. It must be governed by conventions which make it the doing of something more. Black thinks the constative-performative distinction (in the strongest sense) breaks down because true performatives can also involve implication, and thus be true or false, and he thinks that this means that the original distinction has to be exchanged (as he says Austin does) for one between different aspects of utterances.[4]

Warnock also thinks that original performatives need to be distinguished from self-labeling utterances and speech acts in general, because they are subject to different types of conventions. He says that the original performatives do not have to have the form of a statement, but that when they do, in as much as they are saying something they will be true or false (and, one assumes, in as much as they are more than this they will be performative). The sense in which performatives are the doing of something which is constituted by non-linguistic conventions should not be carried over into the analysis of illocutionary acts. The self-labeling utterance (although they may be used as well in the utterance of a performative) are taken as statements which bring about their own truth and which make explicit (through the meaning of the words, and not through non-linguistic conventions) the illocutionary act which is being performed. Warnock thinks that some species of speech act are constituted by extra-linguistic conventions, but that this is only in as much as they are used as performatives.[5]

There is certainly a diversity to these analyses, but behind this diversity we can see a remarkably similar position regarding the analysis of linguistic acts. They all think that whether or not the notion of a performative can be made viable (and Black thinks not), it does not, in its characterization of certain species of action, take hold of elements which can be applied to the analysis of utterances in general, of what became known as speech acts. These latter are seen as being constituted by the meanings of the words of which they are made up, and as not being subject to conventions which might give meaning to certain whole acts, such as performatives. All four think that Austin did not recognize this difference.

All seem to think that the general lesson validly learnt (despite Austin's confusion) from the discussion of performatives was that utterances cannot simply be divided into different species; they must first be divided into different aspects of a speech act. Urmson, Graham and Black think that Austin rightly took this to mean that we should analyze speech acts first along a vertical axis into different aspects of speech acts and then along a horizontal axis into different illocutionary acts, of which performatives will not be one - although for Urmson and Graham speech acts may be used in performatives. Warnock, however, thinks that Austin wrongly thought that illocutionary acts should be analyzed in the same terms as performatives were analyzed, and he argues that the later theory should have been developed along the lines that the other three think it was in fact developed. Urmson and Black think that in the later theory we find the locutionary act, involving the utterance of a constative or a proposition (something assessable in terms of truth and falsity), and an illocutionary act, which involves the more or less explicit expression of the force of the utterance. Neither Graham nor Warnock address this issue, however they both see self-labeling utterances (whether simply expressive of force or, as Graham allows for some cases, performative) as constative.

SECTION 2b.

I find a number of problems with these approaches. I think that the analysis of speech acts which they involve is untenable, and I want to challenge this analysis by using a reading of Austin's discussion of performatives which is not only alternative to theirs, but which we can see actively suppressed in

their treatment of Austin's text. This suppression occurs at times through a simple misrepresentation, and at other times through a refusal to read or acknowledge large portions of the text. Of course, I am not speaking here of conscious misrepresentation or suppression, but neither am I speaking simply of mistakes. For these misrepresentations and suppressions are necessary, both for the construction of a certain reading of Austin's text, by which it is made to support a specific approach to language and communication, and for the avoidance of a reading which challenges this approach.

In order to address this issue we should first remind ourselves of the part of How To Do Things With Words where Austin begins the analysis of performatives. On page 5 he describes the original examples of performatives in the following way: He says that these examples have the grammatical form of a statement, are not nonsense, do not use problematic terms like 'good', 'all', 'ought' or 'can', and have verbs in the first person singular present indicative active, but that,

> A. they do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate anything at all, are not 'true or false'; and
>
> B. the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as, or as 'just', saying something. (Austin, 1962: 5)

In 'Performative Utterances' he says that they are grammatically statements, but that they are not true or false, and that if a person makes an utterance of this sort we should say that 'he is doing something rather than merely saying something' (Austin, 1956: 235). And again, on pages 6-7 of How To Do Things With Words, he says that the term 'performative' indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action, and that 'it is not normally thought of as just saying something' (Austin, 1962: 6-7).

When Urmson refers to the material on page 5 (he does not discuss the other two passages), his quotation is: 'the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as saying something'. That is, he leaves out the emphasis of 'normally' and the clause 'or as "just"'.

Graham quotes the A. and B. passages on page 5, and not the other two. He reproduces A. as I have, but gives B. as:

> the uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as saying something. (Graham, 1977: 55)

That is, he changes 'is a part of' to 'is part of' (a minor point, perhaps) and leaves out 'or as "just"'.

We should notice that these two take Austin to be talking about a type of utterance which looks like a statement but is not true or false, and which is not a case of saying something, in the sense of a speech act. They thus see Austin as initially 'realizing' that speech acts and performatives are a different class of utterance, but later confusing the two. While this reading may be possible without the peculiarity of their quotations, it certainly seems helped by not having to interpret a statement that a performative is the doing of an action which would not normally be described as just saying something, or as merely saying something (I have varied Austin's emphasis here) - which, to say the least, gives the strong implication that a performative is also the action of saying something.

Black quotes only the passage on pages 6-7 (but refers the reader to those on page 5), and reproduces the second part of that later sentence as, 'it is not usually thought of as just saying something' (Black, 1963: 211). I do not wish to make anything of the swapping of 'usually' for 'normally', but what we should notice is that when he restates this quotation as a part of his argument five lines on, he gives it as 'usually thought of as saying something', and retains this form, with 'just' deleted, throughout his argument. Now Black does think that uttering a performative is 'usually thought of as saying something', so he says that what Austin must mean is that uttering a performative is not usually thought of as saying something true or false (Black, 1963: 212). He presents Austin's distinction as being between an utterance used to make a truth-claim only and one that conventionally counts as being used to do something other than or more than this; and he says that this distinction between types of utterances is changed to a distinction between aspects of utterances. It seems from this that if he had addressed the two clauses (A. and B.) on page 5 he would have taken the second one as merely a restatement of the first (that a performative is not a constative). So while the effect of Black's peculiar quotation is different, it also assists his reading. It helps the idea that Austin is just distinguishing performatives from saying something true or false, whereas taking him as saying that they are not

true or false and that they are more than just saying something in general, seems to imply that the program is to look at the ways performatives relate to other (grammatical) statements which say something true or false and at the way they relate to just saying something. Black is interesting because he almost says this at times; but he insists on adding 'true or false' to 'saying something', and thinks that the original performatives do not have to have the form of statements.

With Warnock the issue is slightly different again. He, as we have seen, thinks that Austin's mistake was to not differentiate uttering a performative (in the original sense) and saying something. However, he thinks that the original performatives can have any grammatical form, and specifically do not have to look like statements. Furthermore, he says that if they are in a statement form, then it is quite consistent with Austin's original definition of performatives for them to be true or false. He says, for example, that,

> If our idea is, as I think it clear that Austin's idea originally was, that of sayings which, in virtue of conventions, constitute doings, it should be perfectly clear that sayings of any linguistic form or sort at all could figure in this role; .... (Warnock, 1973: 73)

And in a note to the claim that if they are statements they can be true or false, he makes the following qualification:

> Austin says at first that performative utterances are 'not true or false' ..., and even seems at times to take that as a partial criterion of performativeness. He qualifies this later - ... [on p.55] - not, however, ... for anything like the reason I have in mind here. (Warnock, 1973: 73,n.4)

He thus chooses to ignore the way Austin sets up the program as being an analysis of a type of utterance which is specifically in the statement form but which is not true or false (see, at least, Austin,1962: 1-5, & 1956: 233-5). He, unlike the other three, thinks that Austin was intentionally trying to carry an analysis of performatives, as acts which are both doing something more and saying something, over to the analysis of speech acts in general (but like them he thinks that it was untenable); however, because he largely ignores the first pages of the text he is able to avoid the possibility that Austin is challenging the idea that the statement form of an utterance means that it is saying something true or false. And again we find that the crucial point of Austin's analysis, the denial of the possibility of a semantic or grammatical distinction, is ignored.

I want to make one final point about the way these four approaches set the agenda for what will and will not be discussed in the later theory. There is a significant part of the analysis of performatives, which was mentioned in the summary, where Austin discusses the role of explicitness in language, which is completely ignored.[6] He says things there which contradict both the direction imputed to Austin's text and the general approaches to language and communication to which the four commentators at whom we have looked seem to subscribe. As with the more specific cases dealt with above, it is quite possible that the readings we have seen would be maintained in the face of a direct approach to this material; however, I want now to attempt a re-reading of Austin on performatives, taking account of this material and those passages mentioned above, and I want to show that Austin can be read differently.

SECTION 3: AN ALTERNATIVE READING.

To restate a point made earlier: the reading I want to suggest of Austin's discussion of performatives is not one which seeks to bring out an underlying coherent and unified authorial intention. It is one which instead seeks to allow for the tensions, ambivalences and possibilities lying in the text itself. We have seen four (albeit similar) possibilities in the last section, and here I want to concentrate on a different possibility, one which, as I have said, remains largely and interestingly suppressed, which is in parts contradicted by some of the material which supports the sorts of readings we have been looking at, but which itself contradicts and challenges those readings. This can be done briefly, as I have already brought most of the relevant material forward.

SECTION 3a.

The general strategic stance of this approach would be roughly as follows: The program is set up as an examination of a type of utterance which looks like a constative, but which on the one hand appears not to describe anything or be true or false, and on the other hand seems to involve more than just the action of saying something. It seems to involve the invocation, by the production of an utterance, of certain conventions governing or

constituting social procedures and relations; and thus the utterance is a social, as well as linguistic, act.

We then go on to show two things. We show on the one hand that it is impossible to formally characterize the difference between performatives and constatives; that an analysis of the linguistic act itself (the form of analysis standardly adopted by the tradition within which the discussion is nominally placed) will give us no distinction, and that no statement form is peculiar to performatives. On the other hand, we show that once we take account of that which is necessary to pick out a performative, i.e., 'the total situation in which the utterance is issued - the total speech-act' (Austin,1962: 52), we find that performatives are not as unique as we thought.

This occurs in two ways. First, we show that constatives themselves are subject to the very sorts of conventions which constitute performatives as acts which are more than just saying something; so we find that constatives cannot be described as just saying something. And secondly we show that performatives can involve truth claims; so that a relation to truth and falsity is not unique to constatives, it is just set up in a special way: the constative 'It is round' just places the utterer in a different communicative/social relationship than does the warning or promise or bet 'It is round'. What this means is that constatives are performatives; not that the performative is really constative, but that 'we are assimilating the supposed constative utterance to the performative' (Austin,1962: 52).

We thus begin to find that the total speech act in the total speech situation emerges from logic piecemeal as important in special cases (1962: 52), and this becomes more and more general. We find that,

> the more we consider a statement not as a sentence (or proposition) but as an act of speech (out of which the others are logical constructions) the more we are studying the whole thing as an act. (Austin,1962: 20)

So once we take in the whole speech act we find that the cases which were originally put forward were not so much a peculiar type of utterance as a type of speech act which brought to the fore a hitherto unrecognized aspect of all speech acts. All speech acts are at one level the act of saying something and at another level the act of invoking certain conventions by which

what is said is taken as having a certain force and by which the speaker is tied into communicative relations.

While this reading takes the text to be doing quite different things to those which our commentators take it to be doing, some aspects of the program it sets up are perhaps challenged by their responses to the text as they see it. First, there is the complaint against the introduction of cases which seem not to share the ritual character of the early examples. The response to this is that these later case, be they warning, ordering, apologizing or stating, simply <u>are</u> like the original cases once we read the original cases in our way. For like them the later acts are only operative as such if they successfully invoke the conventions which constitute them as the acts they are, if they are recognized as warnings or orders or statements or whatever. Thus when Urmson says that 'it would be odd to say that "I order you to shut the door" is the utterance of a ritual formula or an act which would not normally be counted as saying something' (1979: 267), one would respond that the utterance is certainly, like all speech acts <u>and</u> (thus) like the early examples of performatives, the saying of something. And we would say that it is <u>also</u>, when it is uttered as an order (and it may not be), the invocation of certain <u>contingent</u> conventions by which it is constituted as an order, conventions which <u>might</u> not exist, which are not operable in all situations, and which are <u>necessary</u> for an order to have been issued. Further, it could have been the case that 'I order you ...' is as inoperable as 'I divorce you', or 'I insult you', which of course are not meaningless, but are simply not explicitly performative: they are, rather, descriptions (in primary or inexplicit form) of our insulting or divorcing of someone, as 'I kiss you' and 'on page 48 I promise' are primary statements.

These later cases bring to mind another assumption we have seen made, that explicit utterances are true or false descriptions of the speech act they are. If this assumption is followed through we have the position where speech acts are constituted by the speaker describing the act he or she is performing when they are rendered explicitly (and perhaps one could say that a primary utterance carries an implied description); speech acts are thus seen as being constituted purely linguistically. A good initial response to this is to quote an argument given by Black. He says that 'it is hardly plausible to suppose that a promise-maker is telling his hearer that he is uttering the very words that he is uttering - for what would be the point of <u>that</u>?'.

> The point of the promise, its whole raison d'etre, is not to inform the hearer about itself, or about anything else, but to serve primarily as a way of binding the speaker to a subsequent performance .... Of course, the promise serves also to 'inform the hearer' (Austin's phrase), as moving a pawn informs the opponent that it has been moved, but it would be impossible for that to happen unless there was something to be informed about, viz., that the speaker was promising: promising is constituted by, not described by, the utterance of the promise-formula. (Black,1963: 211)

The last part of this is not quite right. Promising is constituted by conventions, which are invoked by the utterance of the promise-formula.

It is also worth considering the Islamic 'I divorce you', 'I divorce you', 'I divorce you'. Given that divorce only comes about on the third utterance (and each sentence can apparently be said years apart), it is not at all clear how one could take these sentences as true or false descriptions. The point which this case brings home to us is that the act is constituted, not by the utterance, but by conventions which it invokes, and which it (the utterance) logically precedes and therefore could not describe.

This is the point at which we need to take notice of Austin's comments on explicitness in language. We need to note his comment that the way an utterance is being used can be made plain by a number of devices other than performative verbs (see Austin, 1962: 73-6, or 1956: 244). None of these other devices, even when they are 'verbal', are descriptive, yet they play the same role as explicitly performative expressions. These expressions are sometimes clearer than the other devices, but they do suffer the philosophical drawback of looking descriptive. Also, these expressions are not overriding or exclusive, and presumably this is one of the reasons we could see through the possibility of a grammatical distinction: context or some other device may make it plain that the expression is being used in a way other than that made explicit.

This point also gives us a counter to another of Graham's arguments. His objection that inexplicit utterances are not performative arises in part from a failure to realize that once we recognize (via whatever device) the way an utterance is being used, then it is performatively operative as that speech act. The

utterance becomes the act it is here used as - a statement, a promise, or whatever.

The distinctions between different forces are (as Austin puts it - 1962: 72) 'created' rather than described by performative expressions; and what this means is that 'I shall do X' may be used as (have the force of) a promise, prediction, warning, expression of intention, or whatever, on different occasions of use, and we might on occasion make this force clear, but that 'I shall do X' is not implicitly any speech act in particular. And neither is 'the cat is on the mat'.

In particular, unclear or primary or primitive utterances are not implicitly statemental. Austin even suggests, as we have seen (1962: 73), that the statement may be a relatively late development in the uses of utterances, linked to the growth of science; and this brings us back again to the earlier point.

All speech acts, including constatives, are acts beyond the act of saying something, and the communicative acts they are, beyond being meaningful but 'useless' utterances, is given by this second level of performativeness. Of course, there could never be a merely meaningful and useless utterance in the sense just used. Every utterance act is in a 'context of utterance' which constitutes it as the act it is, and every utterance is, by that, made communicatively operative, constituting a certain relation amongst speakers. We have here a view where on the one hand speech acts are constituted by the communicative relations of a speech community, and where on the other hand these thus constituted speech acts then take effect or are operative in constituting the relations of that community.

SECTION 3b.

This reading of Austin hopefully offers a useful antidote to more standard interpretations. However, the approach brought out by such a reading does itself seem to involve certain tensions. These tensions appear to arise through the invocation by Austin of a series of moves which are located in the tradition he seems to be rejecting, and they seem to weaken a good deal of the power of his approach. The sorts of problems I am indicating here can be usefully noted by considering Derrida's reading of How To Do Things With Words.

Derrida is in many ways sympathetic to Austin's program. He suggests, following a reading which generally accords with that offered above, that Austin's approach acts as a counter to that approach to communication which sees it as essentially the transport of preconstituted truths via a medium.

> It could appear that Austin has exploded the concept of communication as a purely semiotic, linguistic, or symbolic concept. The performative is a 'communication' which does not essentially limit itself to transporting an already constituted semantic content guarded by its own aiming at truth (truth as an unveiling of that which is in its Being, or as an adequation between a judicative statement and the thing itself). (Derrida, 1971: 187)

Yet Derrida points to a number of aspects within Austin's approach which, he feels, act in contradiction to this general direction. These aspects, forms of which arise as problems in the work to be discussed in the following chapters, seem to centre on the notion of a unifying and transparent consciousness as the presupposed element of communication.

A claim which has a crucial place in Austin's analysis is that the total context of an utterance is central to an understanding and to the operation of that utterance as an act of speech. Thus, the discussion of infelicities involves an analysis of the appropriateness of the 'circumstances in which the words are uttered' (Austin, 1962: 8), and it has been noted in the discussion so far that it is through this emphasis on context that Austin is later able to break down the initial distinction between constatives and performatives, showing that constatives also are operative within a context of utterance.

But Derrida argues that this context has consciousness as its central element, as the focal point of the context, and that this constitutes a return to the foundations of the approach which he is attempting to overcome.

> The long list of 'infelicities' of variable type which might affect the event of the performative always returns to an element of what Austin calls the total context. One of these essential elements - and not one among others - classically remains consciousness, the conscious presence of the intention of the speaking subject for the totality of his locutory act. Thereby, performative communication once more becomes

> the communication of an intentional meaning, even if this meaning has no referent in the form of a prior or exterior thing or state of things. (Derrida, 1971: 187)

Derrida argues that in the construction of a felicitous performative offered by Austin (in Ch. 2) the values of conventionality, correctness and completeness which govern a performative constitute a demand for an exhaustively definable context, a free consciousness present for the totality of the operation, and an absolutely full meaning that is 'master of itself'. He describes this triple demand as 'the teleological jurisdiction of a total field whose intention remains the organizing center' (1971: 188). That is, a performative must avoid the infelicities, and such avoidance requires an exhaustively determined context, and this is only possible given a communicative consciousness (both of speaker and audience) which has a total grasp of the utterance and context. Thus an implicit intentionality, seen as the locus of meaning, seems to occur in the midst of Austin's rejection of such a notion.

It might be argued that context is used by Austin as a possible field within which the act is meaningful, not as a determinate field contained through some sort of intentional grasp of the total utterance. Such a reading certainly seems defensible; however, it must be granted to Derrida that the characteristics which Austin goes on to apply to a felicitous performative do seem to presuppose such an intentionality as a locus.

Austin's procedure is described by Derrida as that of recognizing the possibility of the negative as a structural possibility, or recognizing that failure is an essential possibility in the operations under consideration, and then, 'with an almost immediately simultaneous gesture made in the name of a kind of ideal regulation', excluding this risk as an accidental, exterior one that teaches us nothing about the language phenomenon under consideration (1971: 188).

In demonstrating this, Derrida claims that Austin points out that all conventional acts are heir to, or liable to, infelicity (1962: 18-19), but considers only the conventionality that forms the circumstance of the utterance. He ignores what Derrida calls 'a certain conventionality intrinsic to what constitutes the speech act itself, all that might be summarized rapidly under the

problematical rubric of "the arbitrary nature of the sign"' (1971: 189). That is, the utterance for Austin seems not itself to be conventional, but simply the context or circumstances of the act, and thus the utterance (or 'locution', to use Austin's later terminology) is spared the risks of infelicity. Such a claim seems unjustified, for while Austin does not go into the characteristics of the utterance-object at this stage of the argument, we will see in the following chapter that the locution is treated as conventional.

A more telling point, however, is Derrida's comment that Austin does not examine the possibility of failure as 'an essential predicate or law'.

> Austin does not ponder the consequences issuing from the fact that a possibility - a possible risk - is always possible, and is in some sense a necessary possibility. Nor whether - once such a necessary possibility of infelicity is recognized - infelicity still constitutes an accident. What is a success when the possibility of infelicity [failure?] continues to constitute its structure? (Derrida, 1971: 189)

For Derrida, this has the effect of rendering the opposition of the success/failure of an utterance insufficient or derivative. Such an opposition, he says, presupposes a general and systematic elaboration of the structure of locution which avoids the endless alternation of essence and accident; however, Austin, while acknowledging the possibility of such a theory, avoids bringing it in as part of his account.

At one point, it may be recalled, while discussing the general possibility of failure to which conventional acts are exposed, Austin says that while a very general high-level doctrine might embrace both what have been called infelicities and those other 'unhappy' features of the doing of actions in a single doctrine, he is not including this kind of unhappiness in his theory. He then goes on:

> We must just remember, though, that features of this sort can and do constantly obtrude into any case we are discussing. Features of this sort would normally come under the heading of 'extenuating circumstances' or of 'factors reducing or abrogating the agent's responsibility', and so on. (Austin, 1962: 21)

Thus duress or accident or other unintentional features effecting actions (in this case utterances), and in fact constantly obtrud-

ing into them, are excluded from the discussion of performatives. Intentionality is retained as the governing characteristic of performatives, and this even though, as we have seen, performatives can be operative when unintentional.

This exclusion involves problems facing performatives as actions, but the second exclusion, and the one which Derrida finds most interesting, involves ills to which performatives are heir which infect all utterances. Austin says that these are cases where a performative utterance will, for example, 'be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy'.

> This applies in a similar manner to any and every utterance - a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such circumstance is in special ways - intelligibly - used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use - ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of language. All this we are excluding from consideration. Our performative utterances, felicitous or not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary circumstances. (Austin, 1962: 22)

Derrida describes this 'ill' as the possibility that every performative utterance (or any utterance) may be 'cited'. He says that Austin's response involves regarding the possibility as abnormal and as constituting a kind of extenuation, an 'agonized succumbing of language that we should strenuously distance ourselves from and resolutely ignore' (1971: 190). Derrida comments further that the concept of the 'ordinary', and therefore of 'ordinary language', to which Austin has recourse, is in fact marked by this exclusion of possibilities to which every utterance is open.

In a reply to Derrida, Searle has argued that Austin simply saw here that it 'is necessary to hold in abeyance one set of questions, about parasitic discourse, until one has answered a logically prior set of questions about "serious" discourse' (Searle, 1977: 205). Searle also says that Austin's idea was that we should not start our investigation with promises made on stage or in a novel, 'because in a fairly obvious way such utterances are not standard cases of promises and statements' (1977: 204). Derrida's response to this objection is that 'what is at stake is above all the structural impossibility and illegitimacy of such an "idealization", even one which is methodological and provis-

ional' (Derrida, 1977: 206). That is, the 'obviousness' of these cases being non-standard already presupposes major claims regarding the nature of language. As Culler points out, such an exclusion (the assumption that ordinary language involves essentially the making of true or false statements, and the exclusion of all other uses as parasitical) is just what Austin objected to in his predecessors and attempts to overcome (Culler, 1983: 118).

Searle defends Austin's exclusion by saying that a pretended speech act is dependent on the possibility of the nonpretended speech act: 'there could not, for example, be promises made by actors in a play if there were not the possibility of promises made in real life' (1977: 205). This, however, is just what Derrida challenges. The conventional procedure described by Austin operates as a repeatable formula, and this 'citationality' thus seems to be central to a performative. That is, a performative utterance must repeat a 'coded' or iterable utterance, it must be identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, and so it must be in some sense a citation. Searle also argues that parasitism involves 'use' whereas citation involves 'mention', and that Derrida does not understand this distinction. However, this follows the same style of hierachical opposition, governed by the general opposition of intention/absence, seen above. And in a similar response one can say that to use an expression as conforming to a formula it is necessary to mention or cite it as an example of that formula. (Cf. Culler, 1983: 119, n.5)

Thus, rather than being something external to language, a trap into which it might fall, and from which language remains 'sheltered by its essence or telos', this citationality or iterability should be seen as the 'internal and positive condition of possibility' of language. In this case 'ordinary' language can no longer be defined by this exclusion, and the 'ordinariness' of its characteristics become highly problematic.

> In excluding the general theory of this structural parasitism, does not Austin, who nevertheless claims to describe the facts and events of ordinary language, pass off as ordinary an ethical and teleological determination (the univocity of the utterance - that he acknowledges elsewhere remains a philosophical 'ideal' -, the presence to self of a total context, the transparency of intentions, the presence of meaning to the absolutely singular uniqueness of a speech act, etc.)? (Derrida, 1971: 191)

Thus, just as the demand for an exhaustively determinable context

presupposes a conscious intention, which is totally present and actually transparent for itself and others, as the focal point of the context, so the concept of the 'ordinary' seems to presuppose this consciousness as the origin of meaning. And this is the very concept which Austin is attempting to supplant.

Derrida's point here is that what Austin describes as anomalous (citation on the stage, in a poem, or in a soliloquy) is in fact the 'determined modification' of a general citationality or iterability without which there could not be a 'successful' performative. And this means that a successful performative must be 'impure'. The citation involved here is a different type of citation from that in a play, or a philosophical reference, or in a recitation of a poem, and thus there is a relative specificity or purity of performatives.

> But this relative purity does not emerge in opposition to citationality or iterability, but in opposition to other kinds of iteration within a general iterability which constitutes a violation of the allegedly rigorous purity of every event of discourse or every speech act. Rather than oppose citation or iteration to the non-iteration of an event, one ought to construct a differential typology of forms of iteration, assuming that such a project is tenable and can result in an exhaustive program, ... (Derrida, 1971: 192)

Derrida says that the category of intention would occur in such a typology, but that it would not have a place from which it governs the entire scene and the entire system of utterances. He says that one would be then concerned with 'different types of marks or chains of iterable marks, and not with an opposition between citational statements on the one hand, and singular and original statement-events on the other'.

> Given that structure of iteration, the intention animating the utterance will never be through and through present to itself and to its content. The iteration structuring it a priori introduces into it a dehiscence and a cleft [demarcation?] which are essential. The 'non-serious', the oratio obliqua will no longer be able to be excluded, as Austin wished, from 'ordinary' language. (Derrida, 1971: 192)

He suggests that when it is alleged that ordinary language excludes general iterability, this 'ordinariness' harbours 'the teleological lure of consciousness whose motivations, indestruct-

ible necessity, and systematic effects remain to be analyzed'. Thus the concept of the 'ordinary' invokes the same presupposition as the demand for an exhaustively determinable context, a conscious intention which must be totally present and transparent for itself and others, since it is a determining focal point for the context. (1971: 192)

The point here is not to deny the effects of consciousness, presence, intention, speech, ordinary language, and so on. Rather, the point is that the effects of these features presuppose and are made possible by features generally opposed to them and excluded from an essence of language, and that these features cannot be set up in a series of hierachical oppositions as essential features of language. (1971: 193)[7]

CONCLUSION.

It seems that we are left in a rather ambivalent position regarding Austin's analysis of performatives. On the one hand, there are a number of readings of Austin on performatives (possible readings, perhaps, but certainly not necessary) which variously seek to tame his challenge to a positivist tradition in the philosophy of language. Austin's work can be salvaged from these readings, and can as a result be seen as a powerful denial of an approach which treats language and communication as essentially a system of descriptive utterances (which 'code' the relation of pregiven subjects to the world, and transport meaning between subjects) and which treats all other aspects of language as parasitic and derived from this central nature.

On the other hand, it seems that according to a further reading of Austin, which takes his project seriously and applies it to his own text, one can uncover a series of presuppositions which are typical of, and central to, that very tradition which Austin rejects. Thus, Austin's treatment of context as apparently necessarily determinable seems to presuppose a communicative consciousness which has a total grasp of the speech event and which acts as an intentional locus of its meaning. And his exclusion of non-serious utterances both explicitly repeats the habit of preemptive hierachization in favour of presumed essential features of language and seems also to presuppose that utterances which can be seen as located in an intending, 'serious' consciousness form the core of linguistic phenomena, from which

other phenomena are derived.

A point worth making here is that given this reading we can reappraise the difference between the early and later examples of performatives. It seems now that the difference is that in some performatives there is a high degree of iteration - or a high degree of ritual - and in others iteration is relatively less explicit. Probably in no case could we have an exact citation of a ritual, and also (and this is an important point) no performative (and, given the overall argument, no utterance) can avoid iteration (this citation making it recognizable as the act it is).

It may well be the case, as Culler (1983: 118, n.4) quotes Felman as suggesting, that Austin recognized all this, and is in fact parodying the habits of positivism - and she places emphasis, for example, on Austin's use of scare quotes around 'serious'. In this light, it might also be remembered that he does seem to initially set up what is in fact and attack on positivist philosophy of language as following in that tradition, and the form of the project itself is one in which he 'tries' to hive off performatives from constatives (a positivist move) and ends up changing our perception of constatives.

In fact, it is not important whether or not Austin was aware of what happens in the text (and why, indeed, should his conscious presence to the text be a factor in our interpretation of it?). For what we get in Austin's analysis of performatives is in either case a text which shows that a model of language which presumes an intentional subject at the core of meaning and which treats communication as essentially the transport of truths originating in this subject as its relation to the world is ultimately untenable. And this critique makes use of categories and moves found in the the model it attacks (as Derrida would say, it 'deconstructs' that model).

What is important, however, is the extent to which the positive model which Austin develops in the rest of How To Do Things With Words is itself undermined by some of the features identified in the previous section, and the extent to which these features inform the tradition which follows from Austin. One task of the following chapters will be to take note of the possible consequences of this influence.

CHAPTER TWO
AUSTIN ON ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS

INTRODUCTION.

In the second part of How To Do Things With Words Austin develops what is usually known as the theory of illocutionary force, or illocutionary acts. As influential as the approach which he is taken to have developed has been, a number of aspects of this later formulation have been strongly criticized and modified. Thus, as with the discussion of performatives, if we want to take account of Austin's place in a tradition we need to give as much emphasis to the responses he evokes as to his text itself.

In this discussion, two major issues arise. The first is the validity of the role given by Austin to extra-linguistic conventions in the operation of illocutionary acts, and the second is the question of whether we are, or should be, dealing with utterance-acts or utterance-objects when applying Austin's theory. I intend to defend Austin's treatment of extra-linguistic conventions, and will argue that emphasis should be placed on utterance-acts - in accordance with the reading offered of the discussion of performatives. However, it will also be important to take account of the carry-over of certain presuppositions noted in the previous chapter, and to gauge their effect on the later theory.

SECTION 1: THINGS WE DO IN UTTERANCES.

The fresh start initiated in Lecture VII of How To Do Things With Words involves the re-examination of what it is that we do when we issue an utterance, and Austin suggests that this can involve three acts. The first of these acts is called the 'locutionary act', itself involving three further acts, which 'together add up to "saying" something, in the full sense of "say"' (1962:

92). There is always, he says, the phonetic act of uttering certain noises, as a 'phone'. There is always the phatic act,

> of uttering certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain types belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary, in a certain construction, i.e. conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar, with a certain intonation, &c. [as a 'pheme'].

Finally, to issue an utterance is generally to perform a rhetic act,

> of using that pheme or its constituents with a certain more or less definite 'sense' and a more or less definite 'reference' (which together are equivalent to 'meaning'). (Austin, 1962: 93)

The utterance produced in a rhetic act is a 'rheme' (see 1962: 92-3). Austin comments that 'the pheme is a unit of language: its typical fault is to be nonsense - meaningless. But the rheme is a unit of speech; its typical fault is to be vague or void or obscure, &c.' (1962: 98). He says that he takes 'sense' and 'reference' here on the strength of 'current views', and he also comments that if the locutionary act which these three acts go to make up were to be discussed for its own sake many further refinements would be needed (1962: 95).

The second sense of 'doing something' which Austin finds in the issuing of an utterance he calls the 'illocutionary act'. He says that he wants to concentrate on this act as it throws light on the constative-performative distinction, which the locutionary act does not do.

> To perform a locutionary act is in general, we may say, also and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act .... Thus in performing a locutionary act we shall also be performing such an act as:
> asking or answering a question,
> giving some information or an assurance or a warning,
> announcing a verdict or an intention, ... (Austin, 1962: 98)

Austin claims that there is nothing mysterious about the 'eo ipso' in the definition of the illocutionary act, but says that there is a problem in making clear what is meant by saying we are using an utterance in a certain way. It makes a great difference with what sense we were using an utterance on a particular occasion, but also whether we were advising, suggesting or ordering, or whether we were promising or announcing a vague intention. In

this second sense we want to know what force a locution has or should be taken as having. He says that 'it may be perfectly clear what I mean by "It is going to charge" or "Shut the door", but not clear whether it is meant as a statement or warning, & c.' (1962: 98).

An illocutionary act is taken as the performance of an act in saying something, whereas a locutionary act is the performance of an act of saying something. (1962: 99-100)

The descriptive fallacy, Austin suggests, arises from treating philosophical problems of illocutionary usage as problems of locutionary usage. He says that this has been avoided with the realization that the occasion of an utterance matters seriously, and that the words used are to some extent to be 'explained' by the 'context' in which they are designed to be or have actually been spoken in a linguistic interchange; however, he says, people tend to give these explanations in terms of 'the meaning of words'. He says that we can use 'meaning' with reference to illocutionary force (e.g., 'He meant it as an order'), but that he wants to distinguish force and meaning in the sense in which meaning is equivalent to sense and reference, just as it has become essential to distinguish sense and reference. (1962: 100)

Austin also criticizes the use of 'use' instead of 'meaning'. He says that 'use' can be just as ambiguous and wide as 'meaning', and that we may clear up the 'use of a sentence' on a particular occasion, in the sense of the locutionary act, without touching upon its use in the sense of an illocutionary act. (1962: 100-1)

The perlocutionary act is now introduced, which is performed when the speaker intentionally, by saying something, produces certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons. (1962: 101)

Some examples of (reports of) locutions, illocutions and perlocutions are:

E.1

Act (A) or Locution.

He said to me 'Shoot her!' meaning by 'shoot' shoot and referring by 'her' to her.

Act (B) or Illocution.
He urged (or advised, ordered, & c.) me to shoot her.
Act (Ca) or Perlocution.
He persuaded me to shoot her.
Act (Cb).
He got me to (or made me, & c.) shoot her.

E.2
Act (A) or Locution.
He said to me 'You can't do that'.
Act (B) or Illocution.
He protested against my doing it.
Act (Ca) or Perlocution.
He pulled me up, checked me.
Act (Cb).
He stopped me, he brought me to my senses, & c.
He annoyed me.(Austin, 1962: 101-2)

Austin notes that the consequential effects in Ca and Cb do not include those achieved, for example, by way of committing the speaker as in promising, which come into the illocutionary act (1962: 102-3).

Austin wants to concentrate on the illocutionary act and keep it distinct, and he notes a tendency in philosophy to elide it in favor of one of the others. Just as 'meaning' and 'use of sentence' can blur the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, so to speak of the 'use' of language can likewise blur the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. He says that speaking of the 'use of "language" for arguing or warning' looks just like speaking of 'the use of "language" for persuading, rousing, alarming';

> yet the former may, for rough contrast, be said to be <u>conventional</u>, in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula; but the latter could not. Thus we can say 'I argue that' or 'I warn you that' but we cannot say 'I convince you that', or 'I alarm you that'. Furthermore we may be entirely clear whether someone was arguing or not without touching on the question whether he was convincing anyone or not.(Austin, 1962: 103-4)

Austin also warns that we often speak of the 'use of language' <u>for</u> something - for example, for joking - and that we may use 'in' differently from the illocutionary 'in', as when we say 'in saying "p" I was joking' or 'acting a part' or 'writing

poetry'. These references to 'use of language' have nothing to do with the illocutionary act. If I say 'Go and catch a falling star', the meaning and force may be clear, but which of these other things (joking, acting, ...) may not be. Further, there are aetiolations, parasitic uses, etc., various 'not serious' and 'not full normal' uses, and the normal conditions of reference may be suspended, or no attempt made at a standard perlocutionary act, no attempt to make you do anything (1962: 104). The effect of Austin's reintroduction of the 'serious'/'non-serious' distinction at this point will be discussed later.

There may also be some things we 'do' in some connection with saying something which do not seem to fall, intuitively at least, exactly into these roughly defined classes, or fall into more than one, yet are not like joking or poetry. For example, insinuating seems to involve conventions, like illocutionary acts, 'but we cannot say "I insinuate ...", and it seems like implying to be a clever effect rather than a mere act'. Or we may evince emotion in or by issuing an utterance, as when we swear, but it does not fit the performative formulas and the other devices of illocutionary acts. We might say, he says, that we use swearing for relieving our feelings. 'We must notice that the illocutionary act is a conventional act: and act done as conforming to a convention'. (1962: 104-5)

As we are dealing with three kinds of acts we need to distinguish between 'the act of doing x' and 'the act of attempting to do x'. With illocutions there is a distinction between attempting or purporting to perform a certain illocutionary act and the act of bringing off such an act. For example, we may try to thank somebody, but fail because we are not heard, or are taken as being ironical, or that person was not responsible for whatever it was, and so-on. With locutionary acts failures will not be unhappiness, but failure to get the words out, to express ourselves clearly, etc.(1962: 105-6)

Because the acts are acts there also needs to be a distinction between intended and unintended effects. We may attempt something at which we fail (attempt and achievement distinction), and we may produce something we do not intend to produce or intend not to produce. This occurs, he says, with all three acts, but mainly with perlocutions. As actions they may be things 'we do not exactly do', in that we may do them under duress, or in joking or acting a part, and we may perhaps do them by mistake or

unintentionally. (1962: 106-7)

The final task Austin sets himself here is to make the notion of an act clearer. He says that we have the idea of an act as a fixed physical thing that we do as distinguished from conventions and from consequences, but (a) the illocutionary act and even the locutionary act do involve conventions, so, for example, obeisance is done as conventional (and he notes the distinction between kicking a wall and kicking a goal), and (b) the perlocutionary act always includes some consequences, as when we say 'By doing x I was doing y'. Austin notes that we bring in a varying stretch of 'consequences', some perhaps 'unintentional' - and this is characteristic of all action. We can range from at least 'He shot the donkey' to 'He moved his trigger finger'. (1962: 107-8)

Austin says that the illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction seems the most problem, distinguishing, for example, 'in saying it I was warning him' from 'by saying it I got him to stop'. He says that the perlocutionary sense of 'doing an action' is irrelevant to the sense in which an utterance, if the issuing of it is the 'doing of an action', is a performative, 'at least if that is to be distinct from a constative', because almost any perlocutionary act is liable to be brought off by the issuing, with or without calculation, of any utterance, including a constative (1962: 110).[1]

He says that we thus have to draw the line between an action we do and its consequences. With physical action this is hard, because, as has been said, it seems possible to keep working back through what are 'only consequences' to a minimum physical act. However, with acts of saying something we have on the one hand nomenclature, wherein the names for illocutions seem to mark a break between the act (of saying something) and its consequences (while we name physical actions normally not in terms of a minimum physical act, but in terms which embrace its consequences). On the other hand, while with physical actions the minimum physical action is of the same kind as many of its immediate and natural consequences (<u>in pari material</u> with them), 'with saying something, the immediate and natural consequences are not normally further acts of saying something, on the speaker's part or others'. (1962: 111-3)

The problem with this is that it seems that the consequences imported with the nomenclature of perlocutions are really consequences of locutions. As has been said, to perform an illocutionary act we must perform a locutionary act, so there seems a connection between physical actions and saying something. However, Austin says, while this may be important 'in some connexions and contexts', it does not stop us drawing a line between the completion of the illocutionary act and all consequences thereafter; and we must avoid the implication that the illocutionary act is a consequence of the locutionary act, or that what is imported by the nomenclature of illocutions is an additional reference to some of the consequences of the locutions.

> The uttering of noises may be a consequence (physical) of the movement of the vocal organs, the breath, & c.: but the uttering of a word is not a consequence of the uttering of a noise whether physical or otherwise. Nor is the uttering of words with a certain meaning a consequence of uttering the words, whether physical or otherwise. For that matter, even the phatic ... and rhetic ... acts are not consequences, let alone physical consequences, of phonetic acts .... (Austin, 1962: 115)

Austin says that what we do import by the use of the nomenclature of illocution is a reference, not to the consequences (at least in any ordinary sense) of the locution, but to the conventions of illocutionary force as bearing on the special circumstances of the occasion of the issuing of the utterance. He also rejects the primacy of the locution given that we can know the locution without knowing the illocution, because the opposite can also be true. (See 1962: 113-5)

The illocutionary act is, however, connected with the production of effects in certain senses. First, unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been happily (successfully) performed. This is not to say that the illocutionary act is the achieving of a certain effect, but rather that the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake. Second, the illocutionary act 'takes effect' in certain ways, distinguished from producing consequences in the sense of bringing about states of affairs. Thus 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth' has the effect of naming or christening the ship. Third, many illocutionary acts invite by convention a response or sequel. Thus an order invites the response of obedience and a promise that of fulfillment. We must, however, distinguish 'I ordered him and he obeyed' from 'I got him to obey',

which is perlocutionary. Austin says that the general implication of the latter is that additional means were employed to produce this consequence. Thus, securing uptake, taking effect, and inviting a response, are ways in which illocutionary acts are bound up with effects, 'and these are all distinct from the producing of effects which is characteristic of the perlocutionary act'. (1962: 116-8)

Austin says that the perlocutionary act may be either the achievement of a perlocutionary object (convince, persuade) or the production of a perlocutionary sequel. He says that it is characteristic of perlocutionary acts that the response achieved, or the sequel, can be achieved additionally or entirely by non-locutionary means; but that this is not enough to distinguish illocutionary acts, since we can, for example, warn or order or appoint etc. (illocutionary acts) by non-verbal means. (1962: 118-9)

What is perhaps more significant is that we can achieve these perlocutionary sequels by non-conventional means - means that are not conventional at all or not for that purpose. Austin says that strictly speaking there cannot be an illocutionary act unless the means employed are conventional, whether the means are verbal or non-verbal. However, he acknowledges that it is difficult to say where conventions begin and end. I may persuade by swinging a big stick, but I may also warn by swinging a stick, in which case swinging the stick is a warning, something meaningful. Similar difficulties arise over tacit consent, or tacit promising, or voting by a show of hands. But the fact remains, he says, that many illocutionary acts cannot be performed except by saying something. (1962: 119-20)

In Lecture X Austin considers the possibility of using 'in' and 'by' to distinguish illocutions and perlocutions (e.g., 'In saying x I was y'ing', as against 'By saying x I was y'ing'). He rejects the possibility, as each form can often be used with regard to the other act; however the significance of this lecture is that it constitutes a circle in the course of How To Do Things With Words, and in Lecture XI the performative-constative distinction is taken up again. Before moving on to that material we need to pause and evaluate these later distinctions.

SECTION 2: SOME RESPONSES.

In saying something, then, we perform a locutionary act, 'which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, which is roughly equivalent to "meaning" in the traditional sense'; we also perform illocutionary acts, 'utterances which have a certain (conventional) force'; and we may also perform perlocutionary acts, 'what we bring about or achieve by saying something' (1962: 109).

Austin has relatively little to say about the locutionary act and its distinction from the illocutionary act, and feels much more concern, as has been noted, over the illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction; however, it is this initial distinction which has been most subject to criticism and modification, and it is to some of these criticisms that we can now turn.

SECTION 2a.

Cohen's (1964) criticism essentially involves rejecting Austin's separation of meaning and force. He argues that the performative clause of an explicit utterance must be taken as meaningful, only distinguished by the fact that it does not describe anything, but rather makes explicit how the utterance is intended to be taken: its meaning 'must be of a performative kind' (Cohen, 1964: 426). Thus, he claims, in an utterance such as 'I protest that I have not been allowed to speak' the performative clause (with its performative meaning) and the subordinate clause together give the meaning of the whole utterance, and this meaning does not have to be supplemented by any notion of force.

Turning to inexplicit utterances, Cohen argues that if 'Your haystack is on fire' is rendered explicit by 'I warn you that your haystack is on fire', and if the warning is part of the meaning of the later utterance, then 'it is hardly unreasonable to suppose that the warning is also part of the former utterance's meaning, though inexplicitly so' (1964: 426). Further, with utterances such as 'Is it raining?', even without being made explicit by 'I ask whether is is raining', it seems impossible to separate illocutionary force from meaning. 'What on earth could be the meaning of your locutionary act other than to ask whether it is raining?' (1964: 427).

Cohen says that Austin seems to hold that the various devices for clarifying what we are doing with an utterance clarify illocutionary force, and not meaning. However, he says that on this view there can be no difference in meaning between 'It must have rained, because the streets are wet' and 'It must have rained, therefore the streets are wet', since the connecting particles can only vary the force, and not the meaning of the sentence. He says that it is not that we use 'therefore' with the force of 'I conclude that', as Austin thinks, but that we use 'I conclude that' with the meaning of 'therefore'. In short, says Cohen,

> what Austin calls the illocutionary force of an utterance is that aspect of its meaning which is either conveyed by its explicitly performative prefix, if it has one, or might have been so conveyed by the use of an expression. (Cohen, 1964: 429)

Cohen does not restrict meaning to the bare utterance. He sees it as being given also by factors such as intonation (this will include making a given word-string a question or a statement) and contextual considerations (which, he says, effect both what Austin called the locution and the illocutionary force). He says that when a sentence has a meaning which is at variance with that which we would normally associate with its form, in, for example, institutional or technical usage, or with cases like 'I wish you good afternoon', this meaning is an alternative, not an addition to some basic meaning. This implies that a given verbal form has many potential meanings, not a basic meaning with many potential forces. (1964: 430-1)

A further point made by Cohen is that a reason why Austin's theory may seem plausible arises from the perception that the whole of the communication achieved by saying 'I promise to go' can also be achieved, in the right context, by 'I shall go'. It then seems, he says, that if the first utterance is to be called performative in virtue of the promise it makes, so to must the latter, and so all utterances are either explicitly or inexplicitly performative. However, if all normal utterances are performative, then, 'the descriptive value of the term has been eroded by a typically philosophical inflation' (1964: 438). This, he says, leads to the need for a new term.

> If all utterances turn out to be performative, then instead of distinguishing some utterances from others it looks as though we have to distinguish one aspect of every utterance

> from another. ... But all this philosophical inflation, and consequential coining of new technical terms, can be avoided if we keep 'performative' as a term applicable to verbs, verb-uses, particles, adverbs, phrases or meanings rather than to sentences or whole utterances. (Cohen, 1964: 439)

Cohen comments that it may seem that the only real difference between him and Austin is that Austin uses the word 'meaning' in a narrower sense, 'so that force stood out as something co-ordinate with meaning, rather than as one special form or aspect of it' (1964: 440). However, he says that by doing this Austin has the paradox where even explicitly performative utterances have distinct locutionary and illocutionary aspects. Also, this tends to obscure the continuity and similarity between certain kinds of context-dependence in linguistic usage, on the one hand, and the fact that performativeness is just as much tied as is reference to particular parts of speech, particular kinds of idiom and particular features of grammar, on the other. Moreover, he says, Austin's approach wrongly suggests that the dissimilarity between reference and sense is somehow less than that between force and sense. In fact, 'whereas the reference of many sentences, like "He met her there yesterday" changes on almost every occasion of its utterance, the range of forces a sentence may have is much more stable'.

> In this respect 'force' is much more like 'sense' than 'reference' is, if we accept any of the familiar definitions of 'sense' that make it a contributory element within the whole meaning of an utterance rather than just identical with that meaning. (Cohen, 1964: 440)

The central element in Cohen's approach here is the idea that force can be dealt with within the bounds of meaning as long as meaning is taken in an adequately wide sense. He seems to think that Austin's mistake was to try to separate parts of meaning and treat them as conceptually different, rather than simply develop a more sophisticated account of meaning. I do not want to deny that what Cohen says is an adequate response to a certain reading of Austin. Given that he takes force for Austin to be 'something co-ordinate with meaning', then a dispute over whether we should adopt a narrow or wide approach to meaning has validity as a dispute over how we should conceptualize different aspects of saying something. If, however, we hold Cohen's approach up against the sort of reading which I suggested in the first chapter, we find that it misses the interesting point of

what can be found in Austin's text.

In the sort of reading I have been emphasizing, analysis deals with the total speech act in the total speech situation. This is to emphasize that a speech act involves more than '"just" saying something', and here the analysis does not involve abstracting different aspects of saying something, but different aspects of the total speech act.

If we think back to Chapter One, Austin picked out performatives as utterances which were distinguished by not being true or false and by involving the action of more than just saying something. It turned out, at least on my reading, that they could be subject to truth and falsity, and that constatives as well seemed to involve more than just saying something. In the light of this, the way I want to take the second half of the argument is that the locutionary act is the act of 'just' saying something and the illocutionary act is the act of doing more than 'just' saying something - so we are not talking about different aspects of saying something. Neither are we talking about locutionary and illocutionary aspects of the utterance-object; we are talking about aspects of the utterance-act construed as the total speech act.

Now what Cohen claims to show is that an adequate analysis of the locution, as long as it is wide enough and takes in all those features which constitute the meaning of what we say, will include a representation of the way the utterance (object) is to be taken. If we read Austin as I have been suggesting, however, on the one hand, this is beside the point of the central issue, and on the other hand it involves an inadequate analysis of the total speech act.

Certainly the locutionary act is crucial to the speech act, in as much as it is by it and all its features that our act is recognized; but to say something which has the features of a warning that there is a bull in the paddock, for example, and to warn someone that there is a bull in the paddock, are different aspects of a speech act. To perform the second act we may perform the first act, issuing an utterance as conforming to certain linguistic conventions, even saying 'I warn you that there is a bull in the paddock'; but to perform the first act is not thereby to perform the second, the second is not a consequence of the first (Austin, 1962: 114-5); rather, the first is a means of

performing the second. To perform the second act, the illocutionary act, is to act in accordance with certain conventions (certain illocutionary conventions), and these require, in part, that we perform a locutionary act, but the illocutionary act does not arise out of (is not constituted by) the locutionary act: it is constituted by issuing the locution in accordance with certain illocutionary conventions. In the same way, the locutionary act is constituted by uttering words in accordance with certain locutionary conventions (1962: 115). As was quoted earlier,

> What we do import by the use of the nomenclature of illocution is a reference, not to the consequences (at least in any ordinary sense) of the locution, but to the conventions of illocutionary force as bearing on the special circumstances of the occasion of the issuing of the utterance. (Austin,1962: 115)

Cohen says that 'Your haystack is on fire' may give a warning that may be rendered explicit by 'I warn you that your haystack is on fire', and that the warning is part of the meaning of the latter sentence (Cohen, 1964: 426), but the warning is not in either of these sentences, either implicitly or explicitly. The warning is the act (the illocutionary act) performed by uttering one of these sentences according to the conventions of warning. In the same way, the locution 'Is it raining?' is grammatically a question, but when we are concerned with its utterance as a question we are concerned with it being uttered as an illocutionary act, as conforming to those conventions concerning the existence of the act, the relation of speaker and audience presupposed by the act, and obligations and expectations arising from the act.

These conventions come into play concurrently with the performance of the locutionary act, but they and the conventions which constitute the locutionary act relate to conceptually different aspects of the total speech act. Issuing the utterance 'Is it raining?' and asking whether or not it is raining may well be the same event, but, if we remain sensitive to the different aspects of communication as an interactive, social event, then we can abstract from that event the locutionary and the illocutionary acts as distinct.

I would suggest that this enables us to understand why Cohen's formulations, 'The warning is ... part of the ... utterance's meaning', and especially 'What on earth could be the

meaning of your locutionary act other than to ask whether it is raining?' are so awkward. He is trying to treat acts (warning and asking whether it is raining) as meaning, and somehow construe these acts as being constituted through the utterance-object.

In Cohen's paper we find a refusal to confront the illocutionary act theoretically. He writes standardly of the illocutionary force of an utterance, treating this as an aspect of the utterance as object, which is to treat it already as an aspect of the locution and of the act which is done as conforming to locutionary conventions. Perhaps it is philosophical inflation to use 'performative' to refer to an aspect of every utterance (object), but this is not what Austin does. The story in the discussion of performatives is that when we try to distinguish performatives we do get what might be called 'inflation', but we do not discover that all utterances as objects have performative and 'other' aspects: we find that an aspect of all utterances as acts is performative, or that from the total speech act in the total speech situation we can abstract an illocutionary as well as a locutionary act.[2]

SECTION 2b.

Another type of response is that made initially by Strawson (1964). He accepts a distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, and he allows that a notion of illocutionary forces as proposed by Austin has some worth, in as much as he thinks that some illocutionary acts are constituted as such by conventions beyond the linguistic conventions which constitute locutionary meaning.

Strawson thinks, however, that it is a mistake to treat all illocutionary acts as conventional. He says that cases like a verdict in a court of law, giving someone out in cricket or introducing someone are acts performed as conforming to a convention. But he says that 'The ice over there is very thin' could be uttered as a warning 'without its being the case that there is any statable convention at all (other than those which bear on the nature of the locutionary act), such that the speaker's act can be said to be an act done as conforming to that convention' (1964: 384). He also gives the example of an entreaty 'Don't go', which can be done 'conventionally' on bended knee, etc., but does not have to be conventional. 'What makes X's words to Y an en-

treaty not to go is something ... relating to X's situation, attitude to Y, manner, and current intention. ...'

> But to suppose that there is always and necessarily a convention conformed to would be like supposing that there could be no love affairs which did not proceed on lines laid down in the Roman de la Rose or that every dispute between men must follow the pattern specified in Touchstone's speech about the countercheck quarrelsome and the lie direct. (Strawson, 1964: 385)

So for Strawson the force of an utterance can be constituted by conventions, but also and instead by factors such as situation or context and the intentions of the speaker. He thus repeats something like a distinction we saw made earlier within performatives, between 'ritual' and 'non-ritual' acts. Unlike the position Cohen would presumably adopt, he does allow that genuine performatives exist, that is, that speech acts can involve more than just saying something, but like the four commentators discussed in Chapter One he restricts them to a relatively narrow group of utterances. Just as Urmson thinks that an order, say, need be constituted by no conventions outside linguistic conventions, so Strawson thinks that a warning or an entreaty need not be conventional in any extra-linguistic sense.

The next stage of Strawson's response is to take up Austin's point that an illocutionary act should secure uptake, and his comment that the illocutionary act is conventional in the sense that it could at least be made explicit by the performative formula. He says that this can be construed as saying that the speaker can make the intended force of the utterance clear to the audience by rendering it in an explicitly performative form, which is to make use of linguistic conventions. So he is saying that the illocutionary act is conventional in as much as it can be rendered conventionally (1964: 386). But what this also means is that illocutionary force is construed as essentially intentional, because what are made explicit are the speaker's communicative intentions.

This is done by taking the aim of achieving uptake as a standard element in the performance of an illocutionary act, and then tying this to (a modification of) Grice's explication of meaning in terms of speaker's intentions. I will be discussing Grice's work in detail in the next chapter, and so for now I will merely summarize Strawson's version of this explication: This

asserts that in communication a speaker must have the intentions of,

i) producing by an utterance a certain response in an audience,
ii) getting the audience to recognize the first intention (i),
iii) having the audience's reason for responding to be at least partly based on the recognition in (ii), and
iv) getting the audience to recognize the intention (ii) to get the audience to recognize the first intention (i).

The performative formula is then taken as a conventional means of making ones communicative intentions overt. (See Strawson, 1964: 390-2)

Strawson now says that there is a scale of illocutionary acts. At one end of the scale are cases where the illocutionary act is not an act done as conforming to a convention, but which 'may be linguistically conventionalized right up to the point at which illocutionary force is exhausted by meaning (in Austin's sense)' (1964: 386). At the other end of the scale are cases like marrying, giving a verdict and giving out in cricket, which are done as conforming to a convention, and which 'could have no existence outside the rule- or convention-governed practices and procedures of which they essentially form parts' (1964,p.397). Also, there may be no intended response (belief &c.) beyond securing uptake (1964: 393-4).

He says that the way the cases at each end of the scale are similar is that the utterance in a convention-governed practice is <u>overtly</u> <u>intended</u> to be operative in the practice. He acknowledges that we may perform acts unintentionally, when the form of words takes charge in the absence of appropriate intention, but when it does, he says, 'the case is <u>essentially</u> deviant or non-standard' (1964: 397). The difference between the two extremes is that with an act that is not essentially conventional the audience response may not be forthcoming, yet the act is performed as long as uptake is secured. With convention-governed acts, however, if the response (or the furthering of the procedure in some way) is not achieved then there has been a breach in the conventions which govern the act (1964: 398).

With convention-governed illocutionary acts, then, there are extra factors which come into play, but Strawson concludes that 'the illocutionary force of an utterance is essentially something that is intended to be understood'.

> And the understanding of the force of an utterance in all cases involves recognizing what may be called broadly an audience-directed intention and recognizing it as wholly overt, as intended to be recognized. (Strawson, 1964: 399)

The first issue which needs to be considered here is the question of extra-linguistic conventions. Strawson, as we have seen, argues that while highly ritualized illocutionary acts involve extra-linguistic conventions, many illocutionary acts do not, and are recognizable by linguistic conventions, plus the speakers situation, attitude to the audience, manner and current intention. I will return to the question of intention, however, we can perhaps see what is missing from Strawson's account by remembering part of the discussion of performatives.

Strawson builds an account of how warnings, entreaties and so on can operate, but fails to consider how they can go wrong, the infelicities to which they are subject. Thus, an entreaty for Strawson can be ritualized (on bended knee, etc, 'according to the book' - conventionalized), or simply in accordance with linguistic conventions. However, the infelicities can effect both sorts of act.

Mainly here, a 'simple' entreaty (as well as a 'ritual' one) may not invoke a suitable relation between speaker and audience whereby it is operative. In fact, I have especially latched onto Strawson's example here because it is not at all clear that an entreaty would be operative today (being likely, I suspect, to simply give rise to embarrassment). But whatever the case, the example points to the fact that, beyond the entreaty being produced as correct according to linguistic (locutionary) conventions, it must be, on the one hand, something that people do, and on the other hand, something that can be done between the people involved. And its being 'something that people do' means in this case that there is an accepted conventional procedure.

Now as a matter of fact we do, at least in the linguistic community within which this discussion is taking place, warn, state, predict, and so on - there are illocutionary acts for doing these things. But we might not. Prediction, for example, might be 'say-able', but not 'do-able'. It could be that our cognative relation to future events simply precluded prediction - perhaps because they were considered so arbitrary - and this might also mean that warnings did not make 'sense'. Or it might

be that we can warn, or inform, or let people know our expectations, but that we can only do this as a consequence of other illocutionary acts. They might, that is to say, be perlocutionary acts, as insulting is, but has not always been in all linguistic communities. The point is that the fact that these illocutionary acts are operative is not a necessary consequence of the locutionary acts which accompany them being possible.

At this point Austin would no doubt work through the rest of the possible infelicities (as we shall see he does), but this is not necessary here, and as I have raised problems regarding these further conditions governing illocutionary acts I will leave them aside. The main point is that a procedure by which the performance of a certain act of saying something is understood as, or recognizable as, a communicative act, an act of more than just saying something, is not a necessary consequence of a given locution being possible.[3]

It is because these acts are not necessary, specifically, not necessary consequences of locutionary acts, that we can say that they are constituted by conventions, or recognizable procedures, beyond those which constitute locutionary acts.[4] To put this in terms of one of Strawson's analogies, it may well be the case that we no longer have affairs according to the rules laid down in the Roman de la Rose, but we do have 'affairs', and this is not a necessary consequence of sexuality, but an arbitrary fact about the nature of some sexual relations (those which are recognizable as being 'affairs').

The second question which needs to be addressed is that of intentionality. For Strawson, warning, stating and so on exist as acts outside conventional practices. They do not have to conform to conventions and they are not constituted by conventions. They are recognized through linguistic conventions and contextual factors, but their actual existence as acts is determined and constituted by the speaker's intentions. Thus, to warn is essentially and constitutively to intend to warn, and warning (as well as stating and questioning and promising) has meaning as an act prior to any interactive relations. This is an initially interesting suggestion, because it can be argued that the fact that something is arbitrary does not make it conventional (see Davidson, 1984: 3ff.), and intentions offer an alternative constitutive factor.

The problem here, however, is that an act conceived in such terms seems unable to play any role in the things people do with language. We are told that an act of this sort is recognized through its being linguistically conventionalized, so that our communicative intentions are made overt through language. However, the language we use, we are told, is understood via an understanding of our communicative intentions - an utterance is understood as a warning because we recognize it as being uttered with the intention of warning.

But this means that we are left with a vicious circle in which there could be no communication. For in order to recognize that a given utterance is a warning we must reason from the appropriate Gricean intentions to this effect. But in order to recognize these intentions - as intentions to warn - it seems (unless we are to posit some mystical, pre-linguistic meeting of minds) that we must reason from the utterance. But again, the performative formula cannot be a way of making our communicative intentions overt, as Strawson claims, since the illocutionary act which a locution (explicit or not) is actually performing must be gauged from the speaker's illocutionary intentions. Thus, we seem left with a circle, to which there is no access, and with which communication can never get going.

In contrast, what Austin's analysis appears to offer is a way of avoiding such a circle by insisting that a speech act operates both as an act constituted by publicly recognized linguistic (i.e., locutionary) conventions and as an interactive procedure constituted by illocutionary conventions. Thus, we recognize a warning as a warning because it accords with the sort of practice we understand warning to be, not because we somehow first intuit an intention to warn. And we may recognize a warning without understanding the locution by which it is done, and we may understand a locution without recognizing what illocutionary act it is - without knowing how to take it.

These issues will be dealt with in more detail in the following two chapters, however, it may be worthwhile noting Graham's response to this part of Austin's work in the light of Cohen's and Strawson's approach.[5]

SECTION 2c.

Graham (1977: Ch.4) rejects Cohen's 'wide' theory of meaning. He says that there is theoretical simplicity in aiming to give just one sense to a given verbal form rather than postulating a change in the meaning of a given form whenever there is a change in any of a large number of factors governing its total import (1977: 98). He also claims that a narrow theory has greater explanatory power, since it can postulate one sense to a sentence like 'He knows what time that train leaves', and then show how it is applied in many different situations.

> In contrast, if the meaning of sentences like these is constantly changing according to circumstances, then it becomes more of a mystery how we can use them and be understood at all. We do not, after all, have to learn a new meaning each time such a sentence is uttered, as a wide theory seems to imply. (Graham, 1977: 99)

Graham acknowledges that we cannot always postulate one sense for each verbal form, but says that we should only postulate more than one as a last resort. He also says that knowing the sense of an utterance is often not enough to fully understand it. He says here that rather than taking further factors as determinates of the meaning of an utterance, we should take Strawson's point that there is more than one level of meaning (see Section 1 of Strawson, 1973). This involves, for Graham, not following Austin in taking reference as part of the meaning of an utterance, because this gives up the attempt to explain the move from language to the world. 'It is the meaning of an utterance (together with the identity of the speaker, the situation in which it is issued, etc.) which leads us to its reference, not vice versa' (1977: 101).

We will see, in fact, that this is an issue which Austin recognizes. The point needs to be emphasized again that Austin, as I am taking him, sets out the locution in a summary manner so as to take care of 'saying something', making, certainly, strategically directed assumptions, but not claiming to give a completely adequate account of the locution. In any case, Graham says that what we can learn from this is that we need to distinguish firmly between sentence-meaning and statement-meaning, and that sentence-meaning is a level of meaning, complete in itself, which ought not to be ignored.

> The aim of a narrow theory, then, is to isolate the core meaning of an utterance, and then trace the moves from this to further levels of meaning. (Graham, 1977: 101)

Graham also rejects Cohen's argument that the sense of explicit performatives determines what illocutionary act is being performed. He says that if he says 'I promise ...' in infelicitous circumstances, then, though his utterance has the same meaning, it is not true that he has performed the illocutionary act of promising (1977: 102). He does not comment on Cohen's response to this sort of objection (see Cohen, 1964: 433-5).

He does, however, take from Cohen's argument the idea that when Austin gives reports of locutions in forms such as 'He told me to get out' and 'He asked whether it was in Oxford or Cambridge' (Austin, 1962: 95), these utterances, or some features of them, seem to determine the illocutionary act, since Austin says that 'tell' and 'ask' are both names of illocutionary acts (Austin, 1962: 162). The idea, then, is that grammatical structure determines at least the broader and less specific illocutionary acts.[6] The problem Graham finds with this, however, is that while we can postulate a conventional grammatical form for asking and telling, on the one hand it is not so easy for warning, making an appeal, and so on, and on the other hand an utterance meant as an order, say, might be given in the form of a request. (Graham, 1977: 102-3, & cf. Strawson, 1973: 55f.)

While this case leads Graham to mention Strawson's idea that speaker's intention determines force, he says that this account cannot be generalized either, since we may perform illocutionary acts unintentionally (and he rejects Strawson's claim that unintended performance is essentially deviant). (Graham, 1977: 104)

Graham also, however, denies that Austin's account of illocutionary force as being given by context and convention can be generalized. He says that a scrutiny of the conventional background will be material in determining whether a particular utterance of the words 'You will go to prison for three years' constitutes the pronouncing of a sentence, but that this cannot decide whether 'These measures will lead to unemployment' is a statement or instead a warning or a protest.

> No accretion of facts about the conventional relations and background obtaining when I make the utterance will tell us which, if either, of these other acts I am performing. I can

> warn whatever my conventional role and my conventional relations with my audience (unless we are talking of ... a formal warning or protest ...). (Graham, 1977: 105)

Graham responds to this situation by saying that we need not settle on any one candidate, grammatical form, intention or convention, as a determinant of illocution, because 'the concept of illocution is so broad that it cannot be dealt with in the ways we have been considering' (1977: 107). He says that the illocutionary acts which Austin mentions are so diverse that we have no reason to suppose that they have anything in common beyond the initial minimal characterisation that they are all acts which we can perform in saying something; 'what general conditions must obtain for me to perform such an act will depend on which act is in question' (1977: 107).

> Once we have recognized that 'illocution' is an umbrella term covering many different speech acts, it may be more profitable to attempt a sub-categorisation and develop analyses in relation to sub-categories of speech act. It is a curious fact that Austin and his commentators tend both to give verbal recognition to the diversity of illocution and still to seek for a general account of it. (Graham, 1977: 108)

What we see here is consistent with Graham's approach to the discussion of performatives, and shares the crucial feature of Strawson's and Cohen's approach. Again it involves a refusal to confront a notion of communication as centrally located and constructed within social relations. Instead it involves an attempt to represent communication as somehow originating as pure meaning in the communicative subject, and as being made up of acts which are constituted outside interaction. Whether we say, with Strawson and Graham, that illocutionary acts are distinct from locutionary acts, or that they are just a part of meaning, is not really important, for in both cases they are elided back into the meaning of the subject. And in both cases the step from this subjective meaning to communication is made magical, for as so conceived this meaning has no structural conditions or relations by which it can exist as a practice. It just exists, as pure meaning.

The decision as to whether we should adopt speaker's intention or grammatical form as determinate of illocution is also irrelevant. Behind both positions lies the assumption that the

act is constituted outside the communicative relations in which it is applied, and for both its role is of a pure message transmitted by language. Graham says that he can warn whatever his conventional role and his conventional relations with his audience, but to warn just is to situate oneself in a certain conventional role and relation with an audience. He can only warn because it 'makes sense' to warn, and that sense is given by a certain complex relation of speaker and audience within recognizable practices - that 'warning' makes sense does not guarantee that it makes sense to warn. Without those conventional relations Graham's intentions (given that it makes sense to talk of intentions in this way) drop out as irrelevant. They are intentions to perform no identifiable act. Thus the point of developing a 'general account' of illocutionary acts is that we want to develop an understanding of them as acts. Merely trying to describe different types in different terms leaves aside the general problem of what it is we do when we interact communicatively.

It is true that Strawson and Graham do allow for conventional illocutionary acts. But this is not to change their basic assumption, since these are acts which are governed by conventions, not constituted by them. The subject still constitutes the act, and merely must somehow perform it within conventional constraints.[7]

Graham at one point says that the picture of linguistic communication which Austin's theory rightly condemns is that of 'a speaker and audience respectively transmitting and receiving a "pure" message which is unaffected by and does not affect their actual situation, social relations, etc.'. He says however, that it is important to be able to isolate such a 'pure' message as one component in linguistic communication, in the form of 'a relatively stable and re-applicable statement-content as the core of an actual linguistic utterance' (1977: 108). The point is that this 'one component' restructures the whole theory of communication which is developed, for the very possibility of such a pure message depends upon the assumption of a subject which exists self-sufficiently and prior to interaction. The statement-content becomes the core from which communication is derived. The full implications of such a view will be seen in Chapter Four.

SECTION 3: AUSTIN'S RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ORIGINAL DISTINCTION.

Chapter XI of How To Do Things With Words constitutes the completion of the circle of Austin's argument. Here he reconsiders the performative-constative distinction, and this enables us to tie in some of the points made in the previous section. It is interesting that this part of the book is rarely emphasized in detail by commentators, and this is a pity, given the light which it throws on both the discussion of illocutionary acts and the analysis of performatives.

In the originally attempted distinction a performative is taken as doing something as opposed to just saying something, and is happy or unhappy as opposed to true or false. The first point which Austin sees as arising out of the preceding discussion is that,

> whenever I 'say' something (except perhaps a mere exclamation like 'damn' or 'ouch') I shall be performing both locutionary and illocutionary acts, and these two kinds of acts seem to be the very things which we tried to use, under the names of 'doing' and 'saying', as a means of distinguishing performatives from constatives. (Austin, 1962: 134)

Looking at the distinction from the side of constatives - specifically statements - Austin argues that to state is every bit as much to perform an illocutionary act as, say, to warn or to pronounce, and that 'I state that he did not do it' is exactly on a level with 'I argue that ...', 'I suggest that...', 'I bet that ...', & c. Austin also says that although the utterance 'He did not do it' is often issued as a statement, and is then undoubtedly true or false,

> it does not seem possible to say that it differs from 'I state that he did not do it' in this respect. If someone says 'I state that he did not do it', we investigate the truth of his statement in just the same way as if he had said 'He did not do it' simpliciter, ... That is, to say 'I state that he did not' is to make the very same statement as to say 'He did not': it is not to make a different statement about what 'I' state .... (Austin, 1962: 135)

This leads Austin to suggest that there is no necessary conflict between our issuing the utterance being the doing of something and our utterance being true or false, and he says that for that matter 'I warn you that the bull is going to charge' is both a warning and true or false.

Returning to some of the arguments seen in the previous chapter (and reaffirming points made in the previous section), Austin says that if we consider the issue of happiness and unhappiness we find that statements, for example, are liable to every kind of infelicity to which performatives are liable. They can be insincere, the speaker can breach commitments arising from the utterance, and they can be null and void. And just as we may say that someone does not have the right or is not in an appropriate position to order someone else, so there are things you cannot state, or do not have the right to state. I cannot without knowing state how many people are in the next room, and if I do I will be regarded as guessing. Austin notes that this is something about which I may in other circumstances be able to state;

> but what about statements about other persons' feelings or about the future? Is a forecast or even a prediction about, say, persons' behavior really a statement? It is important to take the speech-situation as a whole.
>
> Just as sometimes we cannot appoint but only confirm an appointment already made, so sometimes we cannot state but only confirm a statement already made.(Austin, 1962: 138)[8]

As has also been argued before, putative statements are also liable to infelicities arising from flaws and hitches, if we say what we do not really mean, or use the wrong word, and Austin comments that we will get confused about such utterances if we discuss them entirely in terms of meaning as equivalent to sense and reference.

> Once we realize that what we have to study is <u>not</u> the sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech situation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act. Moreover, ... it is an act to which, just as much as to other illocutionary acts, it is essential to 'secure uptake': the doubt about whether I stated something if it was not heard or understood is just the same as the doubt about whether I warned <u>sotto voce</u> or protested if someone did not take it as a protest, &c. And statements do 'take effect' just as much as 'namings', say: if I have stated something, then that commits me to other statements: other statements made by me will be in order or out of order. (Austin, 1962: 139)

While there is a perlocutionary object specifically associated with acts such as informing or arguing, there is not with

stating, and Austin says that this comparative purity may be one reason why we give 'statements' a certain special position; but he says that this would not justify giving descriptions, for example, if properly used, a similar priority, and that it is in any case true of many illocutionary acts. He does not says which. (1962: 139-40)

He says, however, that if we look at the problem from the side of performatives, we may still feel that they lack something which statements have, even if it is true that the converse is not so. It seems that performatives are not essentially true or false as statements are, and there is here a dimension in which we judge, assess, or appraise the constative utterance (given that it is felicitous) which does not arise with non-constative or performative utterances. Austin's response is that on the one hand it seems that just such a similar objective assessment of the accomplished utterance arises, at least in many cases, with other utterances which seem typically performative, and that on the other hand the account of statements assumed here is over-simplified. First, he says, with verdictives, for example, there is a slide towards truth or falsity, in as much as we can estimate rightly or wrongly, find correctly or incorrectly or pronounce correctly or incorrectly, and 'right', 'wrong', 'correct' and 'incorrect' are also used with statements, even though 'true' and 'false' are not used with verdictives. There is also, he suggests, a parallel between inferring and arguing soundly or validly and stating truly, and warning and advising may be done correctly or incorrectly or well or badly. (1962: 140-41)

Austin says that it is not clear that stating truly is a different class of assessment from arguing soundly, advising well, judging fairly, and blaming justifiably, because these seem to have something to do in complicated ways with facts, as do exercitives such as naming, appointing, bequeathing and betting. 'Facts come in as well as our knowledge or opinion about facts.' (1962: 142)

The objection that neither the soundness of arguments (which are not 'valid' deductive arguments) nor the meritedness of blame are objective matters, and that we should distinguish the 'statement' that the bull is about to charge from the warning itself, is countered by asking whether the question of truth or falsity is so very objective. Austin notes that we speak of a 'fair' statement, and asks whether the good reasons and good evidence

for stating and saying are so very different from the good reasons and evidence for performative acts like arguing, warning, and judging. He says that when a constative is confronted with the facts we in fact appraise it in ways involving the employment or a vast array of terms which overlap with those that we use in the appraisal of performatives. 'In real life, as opposed to the simple situations envisaged in logical theory, one cannot always answer in a simple manner whether it is true or false.'(1962: 143)

Austin says that rather than say whether the statement 'France is hexagonal' is true or false we would be inclined to say that it is simply a rough description. He says that in the case of stating truly or falsely, just as much as in the case of advising well or badly, the intents and purposes of the utterance and its context are important, and that 'what is judged true in a school book may not be so judged in a work of historical research'. He also comments that in statements such as 'All swans are white' reference is limited to the known. He says that we cannot quite make the simple statement that the truth of statements depends on facts as distinct from knowledge of the facts, and that reference depends on knowledge at the time of utterance (1962: 143-4).

The truth or falsity of statements is affected by what they leave out or put in and by their being misleading, and so on. Austin says that it is essential to realize that 'true' and 'false', like 'free' and 'unfree', do not stand for anything simple at all, but only for a general dimension of being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions.(1962: 144-5)

> In general we may say this: with both statements (and, for example, descriptions) and warnings, & c., the question can arise, granting that you had the right to warn and did warn, did state, or did advise, whether you were right to state or warn or advise - not in the sense of whether it was opportune or expedient, but whether, on the facts and your knowledge of the facts and the purposes for which you were speaking, and so on, this was the proper thing to say.
>
> This doctrine is quite different from much that the pragmatists have said, to the effect that the true is what works, & c. The truth or falsity of a statement depends not

merely on the meanings of words but on what act you were performing in what circumstances.(1962: 145)

Austin says that we end up with two conclusions regarding the performative-constative distinction. Firstly, with constatives we abstract from the illocutionary (and perlocutionary) aspects of the speech act, and we concentrate on the locutionary, and that we use a simplified notion of correspondence with the facts, one which ignores that correspondence brings in the illocutionary aspect. He says that this is the ideal of what would be right to say in all circumstances, for any purpose, to any audience, & c., and that 'perhaps it is sometimes realized'. Secondly, with performatives we attend as much as possible to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and abstract from the dimension of correspondence with facts. He says that there may be cases, such as the extreme examples given in the early lectures ('I apologize' and 'The cat is on the mat', said for no reason) where the distinction holds, however he says that the real conclusion must be that we need to distinguish between locutionary and illocutionary acts, and to establish with respect to each kind of illocutionary act what, if any, is the specific way in which they are intended, first to be in order or not in order, and second, to be 'right' or 'wrong'; what terms or appraisal and disappraisal are used for each and what they mean. This, he says, will not distinguish statements from other illocutionary acts. (1962: 145-7)

Finally, Austin says that in general the locutionary act as much as the illocutionary is an abstraction only, because every genuine speech act is both; but he says, typically we distinguish different abstracted 'acts' by means of 'the possible slips between cup and lip', in this case the different types of nonsense which may be engendered in performing them. He notes that we should compare this point with what was said in the opening lecture about the classification of kinds of nonsense.(1962: 147)

At the beginning of the final lecture Austin says that he has found that for all utterances (except, perhaps, for swearing) that there is (1) a happiness/unhappiness dimension, (1a) an illocutionary force, (2) a truth/falsehood dimension (2a) a locutionary meaning (sense and reference). He says that the performative/constative distinction stands to the doctrine of locutionary and illocutionary acts in the total speech act as the special theory to the general theory, and that the need for the

general theory arises because the traditional 'statement' is an abstraction, and an ideal, and so is its traditional truth or falsity. He then suggests five morals leading from this.
First, that the total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating.
Second, that stating, describing, & c. have no unique position among illocutionary acts.
Third, that these acts have no unique position in particular regarding truth and falsity, because these terms (except for artificial abstraction legitimate for certain purposes) are not names for relations, quantities, & c., but for a dimension of assessment.
Fourth, that at the same time, the familiar dichotomy, 'normative or evaluative' as opposed to the factual, needs to be dropped.
Fifth, that the theory of 'meaning' as equivalent to 'sense and reference' will require 'weeding-out and reformulation' in terms of the locutionary-illocutionary distinction (if these notions are sound). Austin says that he has taken the old 'sense and reference' on the strength of current views, but, he says, we should consider again the statement which he has called 'void' for breakdown of reference - for example, the statement 'John's children are all bald' if made when John has no children.(1962: 148-9)[9]

Austin says that in the light of the general theory we need a list, not of explicit performative verbs, but of illocutionary forces of an utterance. He says that the sorts of tests suggested for the explicit performative verbs ('to say ... is to ...', & c.) will still do, and in fact be better, for sorting out those verbs which make explicit the illocutionary force of an utterance. He says, however, that what will not survive, except perhaps as a marginal limiting case, is the notion of the purity of performatives. He says that this was essentially based upon a belief in the dichotomy of performatives and constatives, which has been abandoned in favor of more general families of related and overlapping speech acts. (1962: 149-50)

He suggests, loosely, that we will find between one and ten thousand different acts and he suggests five very general classes. These are verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives and expositives (1962: 151ff, & cf. 163 for definitions). He says that he does not offer these as definitive, because at this stage he is merely suggesting possible further work.

The overall program of How To Do Things With Words seems to be an attack on an approach which takes the statement as the central object of an analysis of language. In this approach the analysis of an abstract statement and the examination of the truth conditions which apply to it is taken to supply the core to a theory of language. From this core the various phenomena of language may be derived, but always as somehow parasitic on the workings of language as exemplified in this representation of the statement. The assumptions of this positivist and formalist philosophy of language can be taken, then, as the stalking-horse of Austin's text.

In response to this approach Austin claims to show that if we are to examine language as an interactive practice this assumed primacy of the abstracted statement must be discarded. He argues that under analysis the statement shows itself to be an act, not an essentially objective link with facts which is applied in communication, but a communicative act first and foremost. The statement-object which logically precedes communication is seen as an abstraction from communication, and not as an underlying condition of communication. Likewise, the truth and falsity which are taken to be attached to this statement-object as some absolute criteria of 'correspondence with the facts' are treated by Austin as an abstraction from the varied forms of judgement which are applied to the things we say in communication. They are treated not as exemplars of assessment, but as abstractions from assessment.

Austin does say that the notion of the abstracted statement may be valid for some uses, but his point is to disallow its place at the core of analysis. He says that what had been taken as this core was in fact that aspect of the total speech act in which the things we say are tied into the phatic, grammatical and semantic conventions of language - the locution. This aspect of the speech act has, as such, no communicative function, and it cannot be characterized as a statement or any other type of utterance. Its form, of course, may well be that of a statement or a question or whatever, but at this level of abstraction it does not exist or operate as a statement or question. At this level of abstraction it is not identifiable as any type of utterance.

Utterances are identifiable as such at the level of actual interaction, with the illocutionary act. Here we are dealing with conventions surrounding communicative interaction; not those which are operative in the construction of our utterances, but conventions which constitute and govern the acts which we perform in communication. Without these conventions the acts which they constitute would not exist. These acts are by this analysis distinguished from 'saying something' and from the non-conventional 'perlocutionary' consequences which may follow from them.

CONCLUSION.

This much is more or less clear about How To Do Things With Words. But I have tried to show, by taking account of several readings of Austin from within the tradition for which he is taken to have offered a significant foundation, that the lessons which can be taken from his work are not at all clear. I have tried to show that the ways Austin is read from within this tradition (which we can call 'philosophical pragmatics'), while certainly diverse, tend to involve approaching his work according to a paradigm grounded in the metaphysical assumptions of the tradition which he is attacking. I have not denied that these readings are possible, or in fact that we at points find in Austin's text a repetition of these same assumptions. But I have claimed that the construction of these readings as consistent can require a certain 'blindness' towards parts of the text, and that the approaches developed in these readings can be forcibly attacked by an alternative reading of the text which looks, not for a consistent text, necessarily, but for a consistent attack on certain programs and assumptions within an aspect of Western philosophy.

Partly, as I have said, we have a critique of and an alternative to the assumption by the positivist tradition of the primacy of constated experience as a foundation of knowledge and meaning - in which truth and meaning arise in a linkage of consciousness and reality. Austin historicizes and conventionalizes this constative, treating it as an illocutionary act among others, whose existence is both arbitrary and dependent on social convention. But also, and importantly given some of the readings we have seen, we have a necessarily related but apparently not always appreciated critique of the notion of the subject required by positivism.

This subject is essentially and necessarily pre-constituted, through that primary and foundational perception of reality in which meaning is assumed to arise. Its constitution as social, interactive consciousness is expressed as a derivation from this primacy, as the taking-up by consciousness of a place in the world. And interaction itself is represented as being grounded in the transmission, via the medium of language, of the pure consciousness of this transcendent subject. This is the subject which is involved in views which ground communication in intentionality or in the pure message. In response to this we can take from Austin's approach the realization that the consciousness of an essentially pre-active subject such as this is empty, and that consciousness can only arise as meaningful through its practice in interaction.

At the end of the first chapter I drew out some problematic aspects of Austin's approach, making use of Derrida's response to the analysis of performatives, and I commented that we would need to assess the possible role of the problems which were raised there in Austin's later theory. The conclusion I want to suggest is that his approach as developed in the theory of illocutionary force can be defended (as I have tried to do above) from attempts to reintroduce the statement and intentionality to the core of language, but that at the same time such attempts (as I have already suggested) are aided by certain features within Austin's discussion, and that these features also pose problems for a program of formal categorization such as suggested at the end of his discussion.

Thus, for example, Strawson's explication of illocution in terms of intention, while unworkable, seems to gain support from Austin's continued insistence that illocutionary acts are normally intentional and serious (see 1962: 104 & 138). It is perhaps a small step from claiming that unintended, non-serious speech acts are deviant and parasitic, to arguing that intentionality is the central and constitutive feature of illocutionary acts. But the initial claim in any case avoids confronting that part of Austin's argument which presents <u>all</u> illocutionary acts as operative dependent on their citation of conventionally recognized procedures, that is, as being operative dependent on their doing the sorts of thing which are done in jokes, acting and poetic language.

Paraphrasing a comment of Austin's regarding the notion of a 'pure' statement, we might say that the notion of normal or serious or ordinary language is an ideal, but one should add that it is the ideal of a certain positivist conception of language, and that it could never be realized as communication.[10]

What is important here is that this conception of ordinary language leaves a gap for the reintroduction of certain notions - centrally, of the intentional, constitutive subject at the core of communication, and of a pure statement at the core of meaning - in the tradition associated with Austin. We have seen such notions at work in some of the commentaries mentioned in these first two chapters, and we will find that they have a significant role in the material to be discussed below.

CHAPTER THREE
GRICE ON MEANING AND INTENTION

INTRODUCTION.

We have seen with Austin the beginnings of a program which attempts to move beyond a purely semantic account of language as it is used in communication, and in this chapter we will be dealing with an approach which is both an alternative to and a development of Austin's work.

Grice's contributions to pragmatics have been his explication of meaning in terms of intentionality and his theory of conversational implicature. This work (especially the explication of meaning) has been extremely influential within pragmatics. Grice's explication of meaning has been taken as a way of treating semantic questions in terms of action, and he can thus be seen as offering a pragmatic account of Austin's locutionary act (or at least of the rhetic act), and his theory of conversational implicature has been seen as offering an account of pragmatic rules which avoids the problems of applying the model of formal linguistic rules to pragmatic features of communication. I will not be dealing with the theory of conversational implicature here (although some of the issues arising there will be dealt with in later chapters); instead, I will concentrate on the theory of non-natural meaning. This aspect of Grices work is, as I have said, the more influential, and it has a more specific interest here, because it brings into focus issues surrounding the notion of an intentional subject at the core of communication which have been raised in the previous chapters.

In one sense, as I have said, Grice's work is a development of Austin's. Thus, it can be argued that Austin's and Grice's theories can be included within what Strawson (1970) calls 'communication-intention' theories (which roughly accord with what I have been calling philosophical pragmatics). Over the past twenty

years, these theories have been a significant alternative within Anglo-American philosophy of language to formal semantics in the Fregian tradition, regarding intention and rule-governed action as fundamental to the meaning of an expression, rather than treating the expressions of language, as far as possible, as having meaning independently of the communicative intentions and purposes of the users of language, as we find in formal semantics.[1]

Hence, Grice's work needs to be treated as a development of Austin's, because within pragmatics (and within communication-intention theories) it has been seen as filling-out certain gaps in Austin's theory. Broadly, this has involved adding Grice's intentional account of meaning to Austin's theory of illocutionary acts.

However, Grice makes explicit use of intention as the defining and constituting notion of pragmatics. So in this sense there exists within so-called communication-intention theory the distinction noted by Harrison.

> On the one hand there are those [theories], such as Austin's and Searle's which locate the distinguishing feature of language as a species of intentional action in the fact that it is rule-governed, and proceed to try to elucidate the rules in question.
>
> On the other hand there are theories such as those of H.P.Grice, Jonathon Bennett or David Lewis, which endeavor to avoid any reference to an unanalyzed notion of rule at a fundamental level by analyzing such notions as rule and convention in terms of speaker's and hearer's intentions and beliefs. (Harrison, 1979: 176)[2]

SECTION 1: A THEORY OF NON-NATURAL MEANING.

In discussing Grice's theory of meaning I shall first present its development from its original account through the two later revisions. I shall then consider the theory as a whole.

SECTION 1a.

The original formulation of Grice's theory occurs in his paper 'Meaning' (1957). In it, he firstly draws a distinction

between what he calls 'natural' and 'non-natural' meaning ('meaning-nn'). Grice comments that he does not want to maintain that all our uses of 'mean' fall easily, obviously or tidily into one of these two groups, but says that he thinks that 'in most cases we should at least be fairly strongly inclined to assimilate a use of "mean" to one group rather than the other' (Grice,1957: 379).

Examples Grice gives of (reports of) natural meaning are: 'Those spots mean (meant) measles', and 'The recent budget means that we shall have a hard year'. This type of meaning is characterized by the fact that: (1) If I assert that x means that p, I am committed to p (I cannot, according to Grice, say 'Those spots mean measles, but you haven't got measles'); (2) I cannot argue from 'x means that p' to a conclusion about what is meant by x; (3) I cannot argue from 'x means that p' to a conclusion that somebody meant something by x; (4) 'p' can never be replaced by a word or phrase in inverted commas, such as in 'Those spots mean "measles"'; (5) We can restate the assertions of natural meaning in the form of 'The fact that he had those spots meant that he had measles'.

Examples of reports of meaning-nn are: 'Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus is full' and 'That remark, "Smith can't get along without his trouble and strife", meant that Smith found his wife indispensable'. The five parallel characteristics of meaning-nn are: (1) The assertion 'x means-nn that p' does not entail p, so I can say 'Those three rings mean that the bus is full, but in fact it isn't'; (2) I can argue from 'x means-nn that p' to 'what is meant' by x; (3) I can argue from 'x means-nn that p' to the conclusion that somebody meant, or should have meant, p by x; (4) 'p' can be substituted by a word or phrase in inverted commas, as in 'Those three rings mean "the bus is full"'; (5) A sentence of the form 'The fact that the bell has been rung three times means that the bus is full' may be true, but it is not a restatement of the first sentence, and the two sentences 'do not have, even approximately, the same meaning' (1957: 378).

As a further statement of the opposition, Grice says that he includes under natural meaning the meaning exemplified in sentences of the pattern 'A means (meant) to do so-and-so (by x)', where A is a human agent, and under meaning-nn the meaning exemplified in sentences of the patterns 'A means (meant) something by

x' or 'A means (meant) by x that ...'. He says that this is an over rigid distinction, but it does seem to demonstrate what he wants to capture with the general distinction.

On page 379, Grice suggests that the question about this distinction is what people are getting at when they speak of a distinction between 'natural' and 'conventional' signs. But he thinks that his formulation is better,

> For some things which can mean-nn something are not signs (e.g., words are not), and some are not conventional in any ordinary sense (e.g., certain gestures); while some things which mean naturally are not signs of what they mean (cf. the recent budget example), (1957: 379)

This implies that the distinction between natural and non-natural meaning is something like a distinction between non-arbitrarily and arbitrarily meaningful 'things' (in fact, Grice usually does use 'sign' as a general term). In any case, natural meaning is a given, something we learn from the 'nature of things', whereas non-natural meaning is a function of the meaning given to 'utterances' by speakers. It appears that natural meaning is something we 'read off' or interpret from characteristics of things, events or behaviour in a judgement about what the thing, event or behaviour is a symptom of (certain spots are a symptom of measles) or likely to result in (certain budgets are likely to result in hard years). In the third case ('A means to do so-and-so by x'), it seems that we are making a judgement about what A wants (intends) to bring about by x, and that we are judging A's intention or desire to do so-and-so to be the cause of x. We can perhaps say that natural meaning is a state of affairs which we judge to be naturally or causally related to the state of affairs which we are interpreting.

While I am suggesting that for Grice natural meaning involves some sort of causal relation, he is critical of causal theories when applied directly to non-natural meaning, his argument being essentially that they cannot account for non-standard meanings, which vary according to the particular occasion of use. He refers to the causal theory put forward by C.L.Stevenson, in which it is claimed that,

> for x to mean-nn something, x must have (roughly) a tendency to produce in an audience some attitude (cognitive or otherwise) and a tendency, in the case of a speaker, to be produced by that attitude, these tendencies being dependent on

'an elaborate process of conditioning attending the use of the sign in communication'. (Grice,1957: 379)

The details of Grice's criticism need not concern us, but he says that with this type of account,

> we are furnished with an analysis only of statements about the standard meaning, or the meaning in general, of a 'sign'. No provision is made for dealing with statements about what a particular speaker or writer means by a sign on a particular occasion (which may well diverge from the standard meaning of the sign); .... (Grice, 1957: 381)

Later in the same paragraph he says:

> One might even go further and say that the causal theory ignores the fact that the meaning (in general) of a sign needs to be explained in terms of what users of the signs do (or should) mean by it on particular occasions: and so the latter notion, which is unexplained by the causal theory, is in fact the fundamental one. I am sympathetic to this more radical criticism, though I am aware that the point is controversial.(Grice, 1957: 381)

In fact, Grice does believe that the latter notion is fundamental. That it is so is the basis of the whole Gricean program dealing with meaning-nn. Grice's non-natural meaning is something given to a sign by an utterer or speaker. Non-natural meaning is something we judge an utterer to be trying to produce, and Grice takes it as dependent on the communicative intentions behind individual speakers' occasion-meaning.

As has been said, it is not easy to understand just what Grice is doing with the natural/non-natural distinction. On the one hand it is hard to draw out just what the relation in each case involves, and on the other hand, it is not clear whether natural meaning is taken as ultimately fundamental in the explication of non-natural meaning, despite the criticism of explicitly causal theories of meaning-nn. In the 1957 paper, after distinguishing natural and non-natural meaning, Grice makes the following comment:

> The question which now arises is this: 'What more can be said about the distinction between cases where we should say that the word is applied in a natural sense and cases where we should say that the word is applied in a nonnatural sense?' Asking this question will not of course prohibit us from trying to give an explanation of 'meaning-nn' in terms of one or another natural sense of 'mean'. (Grice,1957: 379)

It is consistent with Grice's style that this is saying that he will proceed to explain non-natural in terms of natural meaning, although this is never made explicit. Of course, it could be that Grice does not see natural meaning as involving a causal relation, but it is hard to see how else the naturally meaningful relations he describes could be taken. In any case, taking the program in this way at least allows the following fairly consistent picture to emerge: For Grice, all meaning is a function of a (causal) relation between a 'thing' which is interpreted and another 'thing' which is its meaning. With natural meaning this relation is (taken as) naturally given, whereas with non-natural meaning it is a function of an utterer's intentionality, this being filled out (as we will come to see) in terms of the ostensive linking of a sign and its meaning.

It is from the assumption of the primacy of speaker's occasion-meaning that the explication of meaning-nn sets off. That is, Grice wants to explicate (1a) 'x means-nn (timeless) something (that so-and-so)', and (1b) 'U (utterer) means-nn (timeless) by x something (that so-and-so)', plus 'means the same as', 'understands', and 'entails', by first elucidating the meaning of (2a) 'x meant-nn something (on a particular occasion)', (2b) 'x meant-nn that so-and-so (on a particular occasion)', (3a) 'U meant-nn something by x (on a particular occasion)', and (3b) 'U meant-nn by x that so-and-so (on a particular occasion)'; and (3a) and (3b) are taken as primary within the second group.

We now arrive at the 'first shot', which is to suggest that '"x meant-nn something" would be true if x was intended by its utterer to induce a belief in some "audience" and that to say what the belief was would be to say what x meant-nn' (1957: 381). This is the basic position. It has to be developed, but the idea that meaning-nn is something we intend to produce or induce in an audience is maintained right through the Gricean program.

The first development is that the audience must be intended to recognize the intention to produce the belief, for when this does not happen, says Grice, the meaning is read as from a natural sign. However this does not yet isolate the essence of meaning-nn, for even with this secondary intention it is still possible for the audience to read the utterance as natural (when Herod presents Salome with the head of John the Baptist, he presumably has the required secondary intention, but if he just left the head lying around she would equally understand what it

meant). So it must be intended to be by means of the recognition of the primary intention that belief is induced. For example, 'if I cut someone in the street ... I could not reasonably expect him to be distressed ... unless he recognized my intentions to effect him in this way' (1957: 384). We can now follow Grice's explication of type (1) meaning in terms of type (2) and type (3) meaning (see 1957: 385).

(3) '"[U] meant-nn something by x" is (roughly) equivalent to "[U] intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention"; and we may add that to ask what [U] meant is to ask for a specification of the intended effect ...'. This requires no comment at the moment.

(2) '"x meant-nn something" is (roughly) equivalent to "Somebody meant-nn something by x"'. Grice allows that there is a difficulty here. He says that when traffic lights change to red, this means-nn that the traffic is to stop, but he says that 'it would be very unnatural to say, "Somebody (e.g. the Corporation) meant-nn by the red-light change that the traffic was to stop"'. 'Nevertheless', he says, 'there seems to be some sort of reference to somebody's intentions'. I shall return to this issue in Section 3.

(1) '"x means-nn (timeless) that so-and-so" might as a first shot be equated with some statement or disjunction of statements about what "people" (vague) intend (with qualifications about "recognition") to effect by x'. We shall see later that if this suggestion is filled-out in terms of convention it is at least possible that a coherent account can be developed.

In the last part of the first paper, Grice says that he does not want to people all our talking life with 'armies of complicated psychological occurrences', and claims that 'there are no special difficulties raised by my use of the word "intention" in connection with meaning' (1957: 386). He says that the intentions which he refers to need not be regarded as explicitly formulated linguistic (or quasi-linguistic) intentions, and that with most linguistic intentions 'we would seem to rely on very much the same kinds of criteria as we do in the case of non-linguistic intentions where there is a general usage'.

> An utterer is held to intend to convey what is normally conveyed (or normally intended to be conveyed), and we require a good reason for accepting that a particular use diverges from the general use (e.g., that he never knew, or

had forgotten the general usage). Similarly in non-linguistic cases: we are presumed to intend the normal consequences of our actions.(Grice, 1957: 387)

Where there is doubt, he says, we tend to refer to the context (linguistic or otherwise) of the utterance and ask which of the alternatives would be relevant in this context ('A man who calls for a "pump" at a fire would not want a bicycle pump'); and with a non-linguistic case, relevance to an obvious end is a criterion in settling why a man is running away from a bull (1957: 387). Grice's final statement is that 'to show that the criteria for judging linguistic intentions are very like the criteria for judging non-linguistic intentions is to show that linguistic intentions are very like non-linguistic intentions'(1957: 387-8).

SECTION 1b.

In his paper 'Utterer's Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Word Meaning' (1968), Grice offers only a minor adjustment to what he regards as the fundamental notion of meaning, but he does attempt to fill out in more detail the move from this fundamental notion to those of sentence meaning and word meaning, and by way of this offers more support for the earlier move to 'x meant-nn something' and 'x means-nn (timeless) that so-and-so'. I shall ignore the adjustment to the fundamental notion in this paper, as it is developed in detail in the third paper. For the moment, we can use Grice's substitution of 'M-intending' for the communicative intentions involved in utterer's meaning.

The first step in the 1968 paper in moving beyond utterer's meaning is the explication of timeless and applied timeless meaning for unstructured utterance-types. That is, Grice wants to show how the meaningfulness - first for the utterer (established meaning) and then for groups of individuals (conventional meaning) - of an unstructured utterance such as a hand-wave can be defined in terms of the fundamental notion (utterer's occasion meaning), then use this to fill-out the notion of the meaning of structured utterance-types and the notion of applied timeless meaning.

The initial attempt to relate the timeless meaning for U to the occasion meaning of an unstructured utterance-type is to suggest that if, say, a certain hand-wave (H-W) means for U 'I know the route', then it is U's 'policy (practice, habit)' to

utter H-W if U is making an utterance by means of which (for some A) U M-intends to effect that A thinks U to think that U knows the route. Grice points out that only the notion of simple intention need be invoked here.

> If U's policy (practice, habit) is such that his use of H-W is tied to the presence of a simple intention to effect an audience in the way described, it will follow that when, on a given occasion, he utters H-W, he will do so, on that occasion, M-intending to effect his audience in that way. (Grice, 1968: 232).

'Simple intention' here is taken as synonomous with 'want', and what Grice is claiming is that to make an indicative utterance wanting someone to infer from that utterance that you believe it, is to M-intend that they come to believe that you believe it. So 'intends (wants)' is substituted for 'M-intends to effect that' in the definition.

Because 'policy (practice, habit)' does not allow an utterance to have more than one meaning (it implies that H-W, say, will be uttered only if U wants A to think that U knows the route - whereas H-W may well also mean for U 'I am leaving'), and because H-W may be only one option for getting A to believe that U thinks U knows the route (while Grice thinks 'policy (practice, habit)' implies the utterance will be used whenever its effect is intended) Grice suggests the substitution of 'having a certain procedure in one's repertoire'. This means that the definition of 'For U, utterance-type x means (has as one of its meanings) "p"' becomes:

> U has in his repertoire the procedure to utter a token of x if U intends (wants) A to have the propositional attitude that p. (See 1968: 232-3)[3]

The way Grice ties this definition to the notion of timeless meaning within a 'group of individuals' is to point out that if A is to understand the utterance, unless it is to be explained every time it is used, A's repertoire must contain the same procedure. Thus he assumes that for some group G each member will want his or her procedure with respect to a certain utterance to conform to the general practice of the group. Each member, that is to say, wants to be party to the conventional use(s) of the utterance. So 'for a group G, utterance-type x means "p"' is defined by:

> At least some members of group G have in their repertoire the procedure of uttering a token of x if, for some A, they

want A to come to the propositional attitude that p; the retention of this procedure being for them conditional on the assumption that at least some other members of G have, or have had, this procedure in their repertoires. (See 1968: 233)

Grice admits the obscurity of the notion of 'having a procedure in one's repertoire', which is crucial in these definitions (for it is by this that he wants to link up the, for him, primary notion of meaning as produced by individuals to the, for him, secondary notion of meaning as operating and shared within a community). However, he declines to explain it in any detail, beyond saying that it cannot mean that the possessors of procedures necessarily use them (I can understand an utterance which I have never used), and that we have to distinguish between an established procedure with respect to an utterance-type x which is current for a group G, which is current only for U, and which is not current at all but for which U has devised a system of practices which would invoke a readiness to utter x in such-and-such circumstances. I shall return to the problem of the notion of having a procedure in one's repertoire later.

Following from the above definitions, applied timeless meaning ('When U uttered x, x meant p') is defined by:

U intended A to recognize (and possibly, to recognize that U intended A to recognize) what U meant by uttering x (i.e., occasion meaning), on the basis of A's knowledge or assumption that, for U, x has as one of its meanings "p".

So, once U and A know that they are both operating within the same convention of uses of x, the communication of applied meaning is grounded back in the primary Gricean mechanism (see 1968: 234-5).

The final task which Grice sets himself in this paper is the explication of structured utterance-types. This involves the introduction of two notions: that of a 'resultant procedure', and that of 'correlation'.

A resultant procedure, says Grice, is a procedure for an utterance-type x which is,

determined by (its existence is inferable from) a knowledge of procedures (a) for particular utterance-types which are elements in x, and (b) for any sequence of utterance-types which exemplifies a particular ordering of syntactical cat-

egories (a particular syntactical form). (Grice: 1968: 235) (a) here follows from his claim that 'it is characteristic of sentences (a characteristic shared with phrases) that their standard meaning is consequential upon the meaning of the elements (words, lexical items) which enter into them' (1968: 235); so it seems that we can take a resultant procedure to be the ability or knowledge to construe semantic units out of semantic elements, and to do this according to a (correct or 'grammatical') syntactic structure.

With this notion, Grice is able to define timeless meaning of structured utterances in U's idiolect by adapting the definition of timeless meaning of unstructured utterances in U's idiolect. Thus, 'For U, a structured utterance-type Z (a sentence) means "p"', is defined by:

> U has a resultant procedure for Z, viz. to utter Z if, for some A, U wants A to come to the propositional attitude that p.

He suggests that the definition of timeless meaning within a language for unstructured utterances could be adapted to deal with structured utterances (but declines to do so), and goes on to define applied timeless meaning of structured utterances (by adapting the definition of applied timeless meaning of unstructured utterances).

Here, 'An utterance Y within a complete utterance Z meant "p"', is defined by:

> U meant by Z that "q", and U intended A to recognize that U meant by Z that "q" at least partly on the basis of A's thought that U has a resultant procedure to Y, viz. (for suitable A') to utter Y if U wants A' to come to the propositional attitude that p. (See 1968: 235-6)

At this point, Grice needs to start dealing with word meaning, and, as it stands, the notion of a resultant procedure seems inadequate to deal with the structuring of semantic units at a fundamental level (a structuring which he has felt able to leave unilluminated in the preceding definitions). Grice only attempts to deal with the structuring of the range of 'affirmative categorical (not necessarily indicative) sentences involving a noun (or definite description) and an adjective (or adjectival phrase)' (1968: 236), as an example of the sort of general schema which would show the role of word-meaning in determining sentence-meaning. The characterization of mood variations of these

sentences and of the various syntactic variations of the predication of an adjectival on a nominal are left up to linguistics, and Grice concentrates on the notion of the 'correlation' of semantic units. Specifically, he relies on two sorts of correlation - referential correlation (R-correlation), where we speak of some particular object as an R-correlate of a nominal, and denotational correlation (D-correlation), where we speak of each member of some class as being a D-correlate of an adjectival. (1968: 236)

With this notion, Grice is able to say that if U has the procedure to set up a correlation between a mood (e.g., indicative) and the infinitive version of a sentence, and the procedure to utter a predication thus correlated of the adjectival on the nominal if (using the example of the indicative) U wants an audience to think that U thinks a particular R-correlate of the nominal to be one of a particular set of D-correlates of the adjectival, then this can be described as a resultant procedure (see 1968: 236-7).

The idea of 'correlation' is very unclear, and Grice tries to fill out this notion at the end of the paper. He takes explicit correlation as a paradigm, and claims that this is,

> an act as a result of which a linguistic item and a non-linguistic item (or items) come to stand in a relation in which they did not previously stand, and in which neither stands to non-correlates in the other realm. (Grice, 1968: 238)

If the correlation is between, say, 'shaggy' and hairy-coated things, then there is a relation R such that (a) by uttering a particular utterance V, U effected that 'shaggy' stood in R to each hairy-coated thing, and only to hairy-coated things and (b) U uttered V in order that (or intending that) by uttering V this should be effected. Grice points out that he is forced to reintroduce the notion of intention here because, while a relation has been set up by 'shaggy' being uttered in 'conversational juxtaposition' with 'hairy-coated things', that same conversational juxtaposition has also set up a relation between 'shaggy' and the class of non-hairy-coated things, the compliment of the class to which it is asserted to belong - and this can only be avoided if we assume an intention to avoid the second relation. He comments that 'it looks as if intensionality is embedded in the very foundations of language' (1968: 239).

A further implication of the use of the notion of correlation is that while there are a number of ways an act of explicit correlation may be effected, it will always be to make,

> an indefinite reference to a relation(ship) which the act is intended to set up, and the specification of the relation involved will in turn always involve a further use of the notion of correlation. (Grice, 1968: 239-40)

For example, if we speak of a set of hairy-coated things, there is an R-correlation between a set and 'hairy-coated things'. Grice acknowledges that this seems to involve a regress, for 'though "correlation" is not used in definition of correlation, it will be used in specification of an indefinite reference occurring in the definition of correlation' (1968: 240), and he suggests that this may be avoided by bringing in the notion of 'ostensive' correlation. His idea is that if, for example, we say that U ostends a series of hairy-coated objects, simultaneously uttering 'shaggy' and intending to ostend objects which (and only which) are hairy-coated, then we can specify the relation which holds between 'shaggy' and hairy-coated things without referring to correlation (1968: 240).

There is one final problem which Grice attempts to deal with, and that is that many correlations are not explicitly made. His solution is to say that a non-explicit correlation consists in the fact that the utterer would make the correlation explicitly if he or she wanted to make an explicit correlation which would generate relevant existing procedures. This involves circularity, but Grice claims that it (the circularity) may be a special case of a general phenomenon which arises when it is noted that we act as if we accept and consciously follow linguistic rules, and so it is assumed that in some sense we implicitly do accept the rules. Thus he suggests that the difficulty of explaining implicit correlation is no different than the difficulty of explaining implicit acceptance of general linguistic rules. 'It seems like a mystery which, for the time being at least, we will have to swallow' (1968: 241).

SECTION 1c.

Whereas in the 1968 paper Grice was mainly concerned to explicate timeless meaning and applied timeless meaning in terms of the notion of utterer's occasion-meaning, in 'Utterer's Meaning and Intentions' (1969) he concentrates on strengthening this

fundamental notion. Before going on to summarize the development this notion receives in the 1969 paper, it should be noted that I am not concerned about evaluating the strength of the counter-examples which Grice considers, as my interest is in evaluating Grice's approach at both a more fundamental and a more general level than this. Thus I shall take for granted Grice's own evaluation of the counter-examples. It should also be noted that in this paper, as in the 1968 paper, Grice presents his definitions in a semi-formal manner, and, for clarity's sake, my reproductions of these definitions shall involve a certain amount of paraphrase and simplification.

As we have seen with the first two papers, Grice not only thinks that timeless meaning can be explicated in terms of utterer's occasion-meaning, but that this is explicable in terms of utterer's intention, and further, that an adequate specification of the utterer's intended effect of or response to an utterance would provide the material for a specification of the meaning of that utterance. It is Grice's development of these two latter ideas which is of main interest in the 1969 paper.

He starts of with the following definition of utterer's meaning:

'U meant something by uttering x' is true iff (if and only if), for some audience A, U uttered x intending

(1) A to produce a particular response r

(2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1)

(3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis of his fulfillment of (2).

The phrase 'on the basis of' occurs in the third clause rather than 'as a result of', because the fulfillment of (2) needs to be seen as a <u>reason</u>, rather than a <u>cause</u> for fulfilling (1), in order to eliminate cases where U, for example, intends A to be amused. Grice thinks that what U means (intends) here (to amuse A) is not meaning-nn (1969: 151-2).

Grice now considers counter-examples which purport to show that this definition is too weak, that it allows cases which are not cases of meaning-nn. The first range of cases within this group are cases where A is supposed to already know what response U desires, and where the 'request' for this already-understood response takes the form of the presentation of an inducement or a threat. It is the meaningful nature of the 'request' which is in question here. In the main case considered, some captors think their captive to possess information they want, and he knows they

want him to give them this information. If the captors then apply thumbscrews to the captive, this act fits into the definition of meaning-nn; for they perform the act with the intention of producing a certain response, they intend the captive to recognize this intention, and they intend him to respond appropriately on the basis of this recognition; but the desired response would not be recognized from the utterance (the mere application of thumbscrews). What it means is, e.g., 'talk!', not 'tell us what you know about such-and-such!' (which is what they mean - they do not just want him to talk). Grice's response to this is to amend clause (2) in the definition to 'U intends ... (2) A to recognize, at least in part from the utterance of x, that U intends (1) (1969: 152-3).

The second range of counter-examples within this group are cases where U intends A, in the reflection process by which A is supposed to reach the desired response, both to rely on some 'inference element' (some premise or inferential step) and also to think that U intends A not to rely on this inference element. An example within this range is a case where U and A are in a room and U wants to get rid of A, who is notoriously avaricious, but also proud. U's 'utterance' is to throw a five pound note out the window, wanting A to reason as follows: 'U wants to get me to leave the room, thinking that I shall run after the five pound note. He also wants me to know that he wants me to go (so contemptuous was his performance). But I am not going to demean myself by going after the banknote; I shall go, but I shall go because he wants me to go.' In this case, U intends by throwing the banknote that A should leave the room, that A should recognize, at least partly on the basis of the utterance, that U had this intention, and that A's leaving the room be based on this recognition; but Grice thinks that because the reasoning of U and A is not shared (U remains 'one intention up' on A) cases like this are not genuine cases of meaning-nn. His initial response is to add clauses to the effect that A should think that U had intention (2), and that A should think that U intended (what was) clause (3); however, because it may be the case that more and more complex examples like this would require the insertion of more and more clauses demanding further restrictions of the type, and because he wishes to avoid such a regress, Grice inserts the following catch-all clause (see 1969: 154-9):

> There is no inference-element E such that U uttered x intending both (1') that A's determination of r should rely on E and (2') that A should think U to intend that (1') be false.

The final range of cases within this group are those where U utters a sentence in a language which U thinks A does not know, intending A to reason from the utterance of the sentence and from other features of the utterance that U wishes to elicit a certain response r. The example of this (originally in Searle, 1965) as developed by Grice goes as follows: An American soldier is captured by Italians (this is supposed to be in W.W.II) and, while gesticulating and thumping his chest etc., shouts the only sentence of German he knows - 'Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen' - intending the Italians to think he is a German officer, who thinks that they speak German, who is telling them that he is a German officer. Grice says that here the American did not mean that he was a German officer, but rather that he meant the Italians to think that he was a German officer. He is not concerned by the fact that the utterance is not correlated conventionally with the intended response, but thinks that it is disqualified because the feature of the utterance which A are intended to recognize and go by (its being a bit of German, the chest-thumping etc.) is not the feature A are intended to think they are to go by (its being a particular German sentence). Grice copes with this by inserting a clause which says that U intends A to think that x possesses feature f, and another which says that U intends A to think f is correlated in a certain way (e.g., iconic, associative, conventional) with the utterance-type to which x belongs. That is, the feature of x A is intended to interpret is the feature of x A is intended to think A is intended to interpret. A's thinking that U intends A to produce r is now meant to be based on the fulfillment of these two intentions.

Before dealing with the next group of counter-examples, Grice says that in the case of imperatives the intended response should be regarded, not as that A should do such-and-such, but that A should have the intention to do such-and-such. Action is the ultimate objective, but Grice thinks that this is a better formulation as it makes the intended response with both indicatives and imperatives a 'propositional attitude', and as it catches the point that imperatives always call for intentional action.

The second group of counter-examples involve cases which purport to show that the original definition is too strong, that it excludes what should be regarded as genuine examples of meaning-nn. Specifically, in the cases Grice deals with, what is attacked is the idea that U wants to produce in A the belief that

so-and-so. In an examination, for example, when the examinee answer the question, 'When was the Battle of Waterloo?', with, '1815', he or she is not trying to produce the belief that the Battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815 in the examiner, but simply trying to tell the examiner that 1815 is when the examinee thinks the battle was fought. In cases of confession, where, for example, a mother says 'It's no good denying it: you broke the window, didn't you?', when the child says, 'Yes, I did', it is not trying to get its mother to believe it broke the window, as she obviously already knows. If someone is trying to remember a name, say, and says, 'Let me see, what was that girls name? It's on the tip of my tongue', and someone else says, 'Rose' (the girls name), the reply, 'Rose' seems not to be intended to produce the belief that her name was Rose. When two people are reviewing a list of facts on which they are already agreed, the one who reads out or recites the facts need not be seen as intending to produce a belief that the facts are such-and-such. When U states the conclusion of an argument from already stated premises, U does not intend A to reach a belief that such-and-such on the basis of U's intention that A should reach it, but rather from the logic of the argument.

Grice says that cases within this group (abuse is another example) cause two problems. Firstly,

> There is some difficulty in supposing that the indicative form is conventionally tied to indicating that the speaker is M-intending to induce a certain belief in his audience, if there are quite normal occurrences of the indicative mood for which the speaker's intentions are different, in which he is not M-intending (nor would be taken to be M-intending) to induce a belief (for example, in reminding). (Grice, 1969: 168)

'Yet', he adds, '... it seems difficult to suppose that the function of the indicative mood has nothing to do with the inducement of belief'. The speaker's intention that the audience should intend to act is regarded as by convention the function of the imperative mood, and Grice thinks that the function of the indicative ought to be analogous. He suggests that it might be possible to maintain the claim that the indicative is conventionally tied to the speaker's intentions, but to say that in some cases the speaker's meaning does not coincide with the meaning of the sentence, and to provide a mechanism for adapting these cases; however, Grice thinks that even if this does work, there is a second, more serious difficulty.

> Even if we can preserve the idea that the indicative form is tied by convention to the indication of a speaker's intention to induce a belief, we should have to allow that the speaker's meaning will be different for different occurrences of the same indicative sentence ... . But it is not very plausible to say that if U says, 'The Battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815':
>
> (1) as a schoolmaster (intending to induce a belief)
>
> (2) as an examinee
>
> (3) as a schoolmaster in revision class,
>
> U would mean something different by uttering this sentence on the three occasions. (Grice, 1969: 169)

Grice's first attempt to deal with this problem is to suggest that the M-intended effect is not just a belief but an 'activated belief', however, he thinks that if, for example, U says (reminding A) that Waterloo was fought in 1815 when the date was 'on the tip of A's tongue',

> U cannot expect (and so cannot intend) that A's activated belief will be produced via A's recognition that U intends to produce it. If A already believes ... that Waterloo was fought in 1815, then the mention of this date will induce the activated belief, regardless of U's intention to produce it. (Grice, 1969: 170)

If we then try to cope with this by dropping the requirement that U would intend A's response to be based on A's recognition of U's intention that A should produce the response, we will not be able to cope with the cases (such as the 'Herod' example mentioned in connection with the 1957 paper) which caused this requirement to be introduced in the first place.

After rejecting the possibility of retaining the notion of activated belief but distinguishing the case of reaching this response from 'assurance deficiency' (because this cannot cope with the examinee or confession cases), Grice suggests that we should make the direct intended effect 'not that A should think that p, but that A should think that U thinks that p'. In many cases U will also intend A to think that p, 'but such an affect is to be thought of as indirect (even though often of prime interest)' (Grice, 1969 171).

If, however, an imperative such as 'Do not cross the barrier' is considered, Grice thinks that it would be incompletely explicated unless it is stated that U intends A not merely to

think that U intends that A shall not cross the barrier, but also to form the intention not to cross. He covers this by distinguishing between 'purely exhibitive' utterances (utterances by which the utterer, U, intends to impart a belief that U has a certain propositional attitude), and utterances which are not only exhibitive but also 'protreptic' (utterances by which U intends, via imparting the belief that U has a certain propositional attitude, to induce a corresponding attitude in the hearer). Thus, the following clause is added: U intends A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (3) to come to a certain propositional attitude (to ψ) that p.

Grice now has to cover the following possibility: U wants A to leave, but considers A to be counter-suggestible and so asks A to stay. If we say of this case that U, who does not want A to stay, meant by the utterance that A was to stay, then, Grice says, the just-introduced clause needs to be amended to: U intends A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (3), to think U to intend A to ψ that p. If this last case is not interpreted in this way, then the amendment is omitted.

In this paper Grice sets himself one last task; to cope with cases of utterer's occasion-meaning in the absence of an audience. In these cases, U utters x (a) thinking it possible that there may be a future audience (e.g., a diary entry, a warning sign), (b) imagining that there is an audience (e.g., rehearsing a speech), (c) neither thinking it possible there will be an audience nor imagining an audience, but, 'talking to' him or herself, producing an utterance which would be appropriate were there an audience (Grice does not think that 'unframed' thoughts mean anything). His solution is to say that x should be such that anyone who was an audience, in a wide sense, would think that U had the appropriate intentions (1969: 174-5).

So we have the following, final, definition of utterer's occasion-meaning:

> Let *ψ be a mood marker. * is a dummy mood-indicator, which can be substituted by a specific mood-indicator like '+' (indicative) or '!' (imperative). ψ indicates a propositional attitude (e.g., intending to do such-and-such, believing so-and-so). Let ϕ (and ϕ') range over properties of persons (possible audiences). It could be substituted by, 'is a passer-by', 'is a native English-speaker', 'is identical with Jones', and so-on.

Let f represent features of the utterance.
Let c represent a mode of correlation, e.g., iconic, associative, conventional.

'U meant by uttering x that *ψ p' is true iff

I. U uttered x intending x to be such that anyone who as Ø would think that

(1) x has f

(2) f is correlated in way c with ψ-*ing that p

(3) U intends x to be such that anyone who has Ø' would think, via thinking (1) and (2), that U ψs that p

(4) in view of (3), U ψs that p;

and

II. (operative only for certain substitutends for "*ψ") U uttered x intending that should there actually be anyone who has Ø, that person would, via thinking (4), ψ that p;

and

III. It is not the case that, for some inference-element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has Ø will both

(1') rely on E in coming to ψ+ that p, and

(2') think that U intends x to be such that anyone who has Ø' will come to ψ+ that p without relying on E.

(N.B.: "ψ+" is to be read as "ψ" if Clause II is operative, and as "think that U ψs" if Clause II is non-operative. Both "Ø" and "Ø'" are used, because U need not intend his or her possible audience to think of U's possible audience under the same description as U does.) (See Grice, 1969: 174ff.)

SECTION 2: MEANING AND INTENTIONS.

The theory of meaning which Grice has developed is both complex and ingenious. However, as interesting as it is, I believe that it fails, that both the formulation of the 'fundamental notion' of speaker's meaning and the derivation of timeless and applied timeless meaning are based on the use of crucially misapplied terminology and of notions which can never be filled out into usable concepts. In the previous chapters I noted a tendency in Austin's work to make a series of exclusions which seemed to add up to the operation of an unargued implicit notion of communication as centered in the intentionality of a subject which is transparent to itself and is logically prior to interaction. With Grice, the centrality of such a communicative subject is explicit. He takes an intuition of communicative meaning,

demonstrates this in terms of the presence of an intentional utterer, and explicates the intuition in terms of this central presupposition. In what follows I shall detail some aspects of what I see as the failure of this project, but it may be worth briefly expanding on the general issues here.[4]

Chomsky may be right when he brands what Grice does as behaviourist (Chomsky,1976: Ch.2), however, it is perhaps more interesting to note the way in which Grice's analysis grounds itself in the notion of a speaker which is essentially a priori and constitutive of communicative relations. Grice's speakers act according to conventions of standard (timeless) meaning; but this communication is a function of the 'conventionalizing' of meaning constituted ultimately through the private ostension of individuals logically prior to language as a social entity, and the actual 'communication of meaning' depends on the simultaneous intersubjective communication of speakers' intentions. The pragmatic aspects of discourse, as seen through Grice's model, can perhaps be described as the details of a 'linguistic contract', as the practices of already understanding, already 'meaningful' subjects, whose status as discursive subjects is presupposed. We shall see that the model collapses, but it should be noted that even if it did not, all the interesting questions, the questions about these discursive subjects, would be left untouched. This is a major problem surrounding much of the material discussed in this thesis.

We have seen that for Grice natural meaning involves a natural relation between objects (be these states of affairs and their effects, states of affairs and their causes, or behaviour and its intentionality), whereas non-natural meaning involves an intentional relation between signs and their meanings (these meanings being filled out in terms of the effect the utterance of a sign is intended to produce). When explicating this material, I suggested that natural meaning seems to be taken as involving something like a perceived causal relation between a sign and its meaning. The issue is certainly not clear-cut, however, this parallel relation, one of causality and the other of intentionality, seems to bring about the first problem for Grice's theory. For Grice's intuitions of distinct types of meaning appear to collapse into an identical causal relation between sign and meaning once we start dealing with human behaviour: the meaning of naturally meaningful behaviour is the intention behind it, and the meaning of non-naturally meaningful behaviour ('utterance')

is the intention behind it. That is, the treatment of non-natural meaning slides into a representation of natural meaning, so that the sign-meaning relation becomes a naturally meaningful relation and the distinction which Grice sets up is lost.

That 'x means-nn p' does not imply p (characteristic (1)), that we can argue from 'x means-nn that p' to what someone meant or should have meant by p (characteristic (3)), that synonyms of non-naturally meaningful 'things' can be given (characteristic (4)), and that reports of non-natural meaning and their restatement as reports of natural meaning are not synonyms (characteristic (5)), shows that there <u>is</u> a difference in the way we use 'mean'.[5] But Grice treats both relations as somehow causal. In naturally meaningful relations we look for the cause behind or the effect leading from the thing we are interpreting, and in non-naturally meaningful relations we look for the effect leading from the thing we are interpreting (the utterance). Intentionality makes a defining difference up to a point. With non-natural meaning the relation is not naturally given, but is a function of the intentionality behind the production of the sign. But since natural meaning can also involve naturally meaningful behaviour, natural meaning and non-natural meaning are not kept separate, and the program collapses. However (and this is an equally important point), it is only because of this conflation that the program can get off the ground, for there is no reason and no use in talking about intentionality when talking about meaning in itself.

This conflation comes in initially with the second characteristic of non-natural meaning. Grice says that we can argue from 'x means-nn that p' to what is <u>meant by</u> x. This can be taken in two ways: that someone used x meaning that p; <u>and</u> that someone used x intending/wanting to bring it about that p. These are very different. In the first instance we do not refer to intentions in talking about the meaning of x, but in the second we do, because what caused x is taken to that person's intending/wanting to bring it about that p. In the first we are talking of a linguistically meaningful relation, while in the second we are talking of a naturally meaningful relation. By running together these two readings of what is meant by x, Grice is able to suggest that the linguistically meaningful relation is causal. On page 378 of 'Meaning', Grice says that 'A means (meant) <u>to do</u> so-and-so (by x)' exemplifies natural meaning (and this is the second way of reading 'what is meant by x'), and he says that 'A means (meant)

something by x' and 'A means (meant) by x that ...' exemplify non-natural meaning (the first way of reading 'what is meant by x'); and what happens is that 'to do so-and-so' and 'something' (or, less easily, '...') are conflated, so that the meaning of a sign ('something' or '...') is treated as that which A intends/wants to produce in an audience ('so-and-so'). It is as a result of this conflation that Grice is able to say (1957: 385) that 'to ask what A meant is to ask for a specification of the intended effect'. This is quite correct if we are asking what A meant to do (it is tautological), but not if we are asking what A's utterance means.

This is the most important point in my criticism of Grice. He says, both in the 1957 paper (page 385) and in the 1969 paper (page 151), that the fundamental notion implies that the meaning of an utterance is the effect intended by the utterer, and this is the way the notion is used, yet this contradicts the fifth characteristic of non-natural meaning. That is, (a) 'The fact that U uttered x means that p' is not a restatement of (b) 'U's utterance, x, means that p', in the same way that (c) 'The fact that he bell has been rung three times means that the bus is full' is not a restatement of (d) 'Those three rings mean that the bus is full'. 'Both may be true, but they do not have, even approximately, the same meaning' (Grice,1957: 378). Thus, what I am claiming is that Grice runs together naturally meaningful intentional behaviour and non-naturally meaningful signs (which can, of course, be used by people in their naturally meaningful pursuits of intentional activities). We may choose to accept that what is meaningful about peoples' intentional behaviour is the intentionality which 'lies behind' that behaviour, and we may also accept that by understanding what someone means to achieve (wants to achieve) when using a sign we may be able to understand what that person means by that sign (the way they are using it) - but (a) what U 'means'/intends/wants to bring about, and (b) what U 'means' by a sign are very different. 'Mean' in (a) can be used in phrases like '... means x to be understood in this way ...', or '... means to imply by x that ...'. 'Means' in (b) can be used in phrases having the form of 'x means the same as ...', or 'x means here that ...'. When we use 'means' in the second sense in phrases like 'U means that same as A by x', or 'U means here that p', it is crucial to recognize that we are talking about the meaning of a sign, not about what U means/intends to do. The best way to see this is in the statement 'U means x to mean that p'. Normally we would substitute an explicitly intentional verb ('in-

tends', 'wants' etc.) for the first use of 'mean' or a phrase like '... have the sense ...' for the second use, but in any case, the two uses of 'mean' are crucially different.

I believe that in many ways the problem which I have been trying to bring out is the same one which Wilson (1970) and Wright (1975) have raised.[6] Wilson's counter-example lies in the group of cases which purport to show that the Gricean mechanism is too narrow. The scenario is that, in conversation with Grice, Wilson says, 'Snow is white'.

> By uttering 'Snow is white' I mean that snow is white. It follows that by uttering 'Snow is white' I mean something. According to Grice it follows that I intend (1), (2) and (3) [of the initial Gricean mechanism - Wilson thinks that the case applies equally to the mechanism as developed in Grice, 1969]. Now I do intend to say (report the fact) that snow is white, but the only secondary intention I have is to avoid having any of the intentions Grice attributes to me in this or any subsequent papers of his. If Grice amends his definition, I amend my scenario. He can't win. ... One might cavil at the suggestion that one can intend to avoid intending to bring about y, but it hardly matters, since one can certainly avoid trying to accomplish y. (Wilson, 1970: 296)

It is not clear that there is any way that Grice can cope with this case. The insertion to cope with meaning without an audience will not work, for Wilson does not utter 'Snow is white' as if there were an audience towards which he has Gricean intentions. He simply refuses to have Gricean intentions; and even if Grice could somehow show that the utterance is an illegitimate use of language, the point still holds that it is quite possible to mean something without Griceanly meaning anything.[7]

I am not concerned to argue that Wilson sees Grice's problem in exactly the same way that I do, however, he does illuminate the issues I have raised, and I believe that he comes very close to the fundamental problem when he a comment by Stampe that meaning is not a <u>doing</u>, and goes on to say:

> There are some relevant things that one <u>can</u> do, viz., utter a token of 'Snow is white', ... But meaning that snow is white is not something that you can <u>do</u>. And I think we can see why. It has already been done, so to speak, in virtue of the corpus of utterances lying behind you and giving meaning to what you currently say. (Wilson,1970: 301)

The same sort of point is made by Wright. He concentrates on the non-linguistic 'utterances' offered by Grice, and comments that if the conductor's three rings of the bell or the police officer's hand wave to stop (another of Grice's examples) were not conventionalized the conductor and the officer would not be able to get their messages across. Just intending that a hand wave get a car to stop on the basis of recognition of that intention will not get the car stopped. The hand wave has to be recognizable by the driver as meaning 'Stop your car' (and not 'Hi!' or 'Make a left turn').

> But note that it is the utterance that is initially recognized, not the speaker's intentions. At best, the intention recognition is secondary. The driver stops his car because he recognizes the utterance 'upturned palm' as telling him that the officer intends him to do just that; .... (Wright, 1975: 370)

Wright also notes that if a speaker's goals are not achieved it would mean, for Grice, that the speaker has simply not intended hard enough or correctly.

> But if a speaker fails to get his message across to the addressee, he does not simply intend harder, or try to intend more clearly (if those things even make any sense). Instead, he switches to another conventional utterance that he feels that the addressee will recognize more readily; alternatively, he might repeat his utterance, for example, with more force, in a louder tone, and so on. (Wright, 1975: 371)

A further point which Wright makes is that understanding also depends on the utterance occurring in the appropriate circumstances (1975: 372f.).

On my reading of Grice the mistaken notion of meaning depends on a constant sliding between meaning as intending and meaning 'proper'. What he offers is not an explication of meaning-nn in terms of natural meaning. It is rather the presentation of meaning as meaningful behaviour and the refusal to deal with meaning as such. The correct analysis of, 'By uttering x U meant something', is, 'U meant/intended to do something; and meant/intended to do this by uttering x, which meant (which had the conventional meaning) "so-and-so"', and this analysis does not touch on explicating how it is that x means something.

Supposing, however, that we ignore this problem with Grice's program, we find that his analysis of meaning still fails, since

it involves a solipsism wherein there can be no communication on the one hand and no meaning on the other. Here I am adding detail to an argument used against Strawson in the previous chapter.

U's task is as follows: U signals, intending to effect A in way p ('p' being filled out as per Grice, 1969), which requires at least (for it to be Gricean meaning) U to intend that A recognize that U intends to effect A in way p; but to effect that A recognizes that U intends to effect A in way p, U must signal to A that U intends to effect A in way p (in order that A knows what U means), which requires that U intends that A recognize that U intends to effect A in way p, which requires that U signals to A that U intends that A recognize that U intends to effect A in way p, ... and so-on. So signaling can never get off the ground.

A's task is as follows: A must interpret, from the effect U intends, the meaning of U's signal (x), which is what U means; but what x means, which is what U means, is what U intends - and A can never get a start. A learns what U intends by understanding x, but can only understand x by knowing what U intends. So understanding can never get off the ground.

It may be true that in understanding a communicative sign we often rely on assumptions about what the utterer (or a supposed utterer) is trying to achieve. We need to work out how the sign is being used, and to do this we interpret the linguistic and extra-linguistic context of its utterance. But this is a quite separate point. These things are an aspect of communication; they are not constitutive of meaning.

As one final way of seeing this side of Grice's mistake, we can consider his comment at the end of the 1957 paper that 'to show that the criteria for judging linguistic intentions are very like the criteria for judging non-linguistic intentions is to show that linguistic intentions are very like non-linguistic intentions' (1957: 387-8). I believe that we can now see that in fact the criteria for judging linguistic and non-linguistic intentions will be exactly the same sorts of criteria, and that not only are linguistic and non-linguistic intentions very alike, they are the same, in as much as they are intentions <u>to</u> <u>do</u> something. The point is that there is <u>not</u> a difference between doing as meaning and doing as acting - the difference which Grice's program relies on. What distinguishes linguistic or comm-

unicative intentions is that we carry out these intentions by using signs which have meaning, and we may want to argue that when our linguistic intentions are directed at communication it seems that we try to make our intention to communicate explicit - but these differences are not the ground for a theory of meaning.

This last point is one which Wilson makes, when he claims that what does arise from Grice's papers is that,

> whatever <u>else</u> signaling is, it is of the essence of signaling ... that the signaler intend that the signalee would recognize that the signaler <u>is</u> deliberately signaling and, moreover, that the signaler intend, or at least take for granted, that the signalee should recognize that he is (primarily) signaling <u>this</u> and not something else. (Grice has bent his efforts to breaking the above circularity.) This observation on signaling seems to me to be true and interesting. It is, however, a contribution to what would be called the pure sociology of speech behaviour, not to semantics or meaning theory. (Wilson,1970: 299)

I believe that the circularity which Wilson mentions is an issue to be taken seriously, and one which brings into question the truth and interest of the observation, however, for the moment we can finish by looking at Grice's attempt to explicate derivative types of meaning in terms of his fundamental notion.

The main point to be noted in connection with the 1968 paper is that Grice does <u>not</u> explicate timeless and applied timeless meaning in terms of the fundamental notion. Once he brings in the notion of there being a procedure in U's repertoire to make a certain utterance if U wants to effect A in a certain way, and once, as Grice says, 'want' takes the place of 'M-intend', then the weight of making x mean that p falls onto U's 'procedure'. I think that a very strong reason for intention and meaning not being confused as obviously in the 1968 paper is that there the statements of meaning are no linger phrased in the ambiguous way they are in the original paper (compare; By uttering x U meant that p; and For U, x meant 'p'); nevertheless, the error caused by the original ambiguity remains, and meaning is still seen as a doing. But the fundamental notion does not remain. It dissolves into a claim about the 'pure sociology of speech behaviour' (to use Wilson's phrase), and the 'act' of meaning is taken over by the procedure.

At this point Grice could have stopped trying to explicate meaning. He could have spoken of a procedure to use x with a certain meaning and concentrated on explaining the notion of this procedure being shared within a community as part of a study of speech behaviour. This would involve adopting a position something like Ziff's (see Ziff, 1967: 7). However, Grice still wants to treat meaning as a doing, as a process.

As we have seen, the 'resultant procedure' which 'does' this meaning is that of constructing semantic units from semantic elements, which are linguistic items which have been correlated with non-linguistic items. As it is finally set out, this correlation involves the ostention of the non-linguistic items. So this procedure or process is what lies at the basis of the 'act' of meaning, and it is here that meaning-nn could perhaps be explicated in terms of natural meaning as fundamental.

But it seems impossible to effectively fill this out. Not even names can be defined by pure ostensive correlation, for to pick out the object to which I correlate the name I must be able to identify the object as, say, a cat. But this means that saying 'this and this and this are cats' depends on my knowing what cats are, on my having a concept of what I am going to call 'cats'. If I was to pick out an adjective ('hairy-coated', say) by pure ostension, this presupposes a concept of what aspect of things (their hairy-coatedness) is being picked out; and the problems become even greater with other parts of speech. Of course, we can define words ostensively, but only because we have a grasp of language already by which to carry out the definition. Grice, however, wants to explain this grasp of language by the very notion of ostensive correlation, and so cannot presuppose the language, and therefore cannot get his description of language off the ground. So, ostension cannot be a semantic foundation.

Finally, while I do not wish to go into the issue of the 'mystery' (as Grice puts it) of explaining implicit correlation by saying that the utterer would make an explicit correlation if he or she so chose, it is worth noting that if words get their meaning through correlation, then people must in fact have already correlated the linguistic items from which they construct the sentences with which they make explicit correlations, and even if we have to swallow the mystery of implicit correlation, we should not have to swallow the impossibility of any sort of pure correlation as a basis.

CONCLUSION.

As was noted earlier, Grice's theory of meaning-nn is probably relatively independent of Austin's work, and as such it offers an interesting alternative attempt to treat the communicative use of language as primarily a series of acts, rather than taking communication as derivative of a formal syntactic-semantic system. As relatively independent, there is a sense in which Grice's approach goes much deeper than Austin's in assigning pragmatic features to language - by including within the general theory those semantic aspects which Austin bracketed-off in the locutionary act.

On the other hand, and we saw this in the discussion of Strawson in the second chapter, Grice's approach can be seen as cashing-out Austin's account of illocutionary acts (be this a cashing-out of a certain revision of Austin or a certain version of Austin). The force of an utterance, its communicative meaning, is taken as intended force, and filled out according to Grice's schema. On such a view, Grice's work can be seen as a theoretical development of Austin's program.

In either case, however, Grice's theory appears to be fundamentally flawed. It begins with a conflation of meaning in the sense of intending and meaning as sense and reference (plus force), and a description of the former is supposed to give a description of the latter (though without the distinction being made clear). Such a view fails to account for the way in which meaning can exist independent and irrespective of the supposition of intentions and it fails to account for the way in which ascriptions of intentionality are dependent upon the interpretation of utterances (whole utterances, including naturally and non-naturally meaningful behaviour and context).

Because of this, the model of communication which Grice's theory involves cashes out into a situation in which communication would be impossible, leaving communicative subjects isolated with their intentions, and denied even the language-as-medium of a formalist account of communication. Further, when an attempt is made to discuss the origin of meaning within the intending subject, the account is reduced to a notion of ostensive definition which in fact presupposes meaning and an

understanding of language in the very act which supposedly constitutes language.

It may be worth briefly returning to the natural/non-natural distinction with which Grice's program begins. Grice couches the distinction in terms of the presence or absence of intentions in meaning, and we have seen that such an assumption, at least as he has developed it, is untenable, but this does not mean that we can make nothing of the original distinction.

An alternative might be to say that the non-natural meaning which Grice points to should be described as communicative meaning, as meaning which arises in communication. This meaning could be seen as realized and constituted through given procedures, which could be filled-out in terms of something like Austin's felicity conditions. As these procedures invoke more than what is said in a traditional sense, communicative meaning will go beyond the standardly conventional meaning of the bare utterance - it would have to be seen as a function of the whole speech act. As the 'whole speech act' is relatively indeterminate - and given that we do not invoke intentionality as a locus and boundary of the speech act - so communicative meaning will be relatively indeterminate, both for utterer and audience, depending on the context of utterance. Intentionality would not be excluded from such a model, but it would be treated as being constituted through meaning, and not as some unexplained originating factor of communication.

This point brings the focus again onto a general theme of this thesis. Grice's approach seems to be underlain by the notion of a subject which has two crucial features. On the one hand, it is constituted prior to interation as a linguistic subject. Meaning resides in it as the ostending consciousness and is then transmitted in communication. As such, all questions about the basis of meaning and communication are pushed, by the theory of meaning and communication which presupposes such a subject, out of the field of analysis. Furthermore, this subject is presupposed as a certain type of subject, as self-transparent and unitary, knowing what it means and giving determinacy to meaning, because meaning is grounded in its conscious intentionality.[8] In the next chapter we will see the notion of such a subject at play in a slightly different way, in Searle's theory of speech acts.

CHAPTER FOUR
SEARLE ON SPEECH ACTS AND INTENTIONALITY

INTRODUCTION.

Searle's place within pragmatics is of interest for two reasons. First, his theoretical position is initially developed through a critique and an assimilation of the work of Austin and Grice, and his work seems to be one attempt to offer a fully-fledged pragmatics within philosophy. Secondly, and perhaps because of this first point, Searle's work, and at least its basic theoretical position, has been that version of philosophical pragmatics which seems to be most influential within linguistic pragmatics.

The theory developed by Searle shares with the work of Austin and Grice an attempt to place emphasis on language as a system of acts. Like Grice, and like a certain reading of Austin, Searle treats language as explicable in terms of the actual intentional production of language tokens by language users, and is opposed to more formalist views, which place emphasis on language as a more or less abstract calculus, independent of language user's intentionality.[1]

At first sight Searle's approach might appear promising. He seems not to be as susceptible to charges of psychologism as Grice, and he also seems not as easily accused of 'bracketing' meaning as Austin has been. This is because, on the one hand, he attempts to ground meaning in the 'constitutive rules' of speech acts, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for a speech act to be successful, rather than in speaker's intentions (Grice); and because, on the other hand, he focuses attention on, and sees meaning as being found in (or mediated through) the illocutionary act, in gaining understanding, rather than seeing meaning as arising in the locutionary act (Austin), or as being expressed in the speaker's perlocutionary intentions (as he claims Grice has done).

Unfortunately this promise is not fulfilled. In many ways Searle adopts most of the failings and few of the virtues of the pragmatic program. We gain from Searle an approach which has ultimately no explanatory power, and which, in an attempt to analyze communication, is forced to postulate already-constituted language users as an explanatory base. Basically, this occurs because Searle collapses Austin's distinction between meaning and force, and with this move adopts Grice's equivocation regarding the two senses of 'mean'. We thus find no analysis of meaning, and an analysis of illocutionary acts (Searle's central concept) which is circular and describes an unworkable phenomenon.

SECTION 1: THE CRITIQUE OF AUSTIN.

In 'Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts' (1968) Searle's main concern is to attack Austin's distinction between the locutionary act and the illocutionary act and to substitute a distinction between phonetic, phatic, propositional and illocutionary acts. It will be remembered that for Austin the locutionary act consisted of the phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts, and constituted the sense and reference, or <u>meaning</u> of a given utterance, while the illocutionary act was the uttering of that locution with a certain <u>force</u>, <u>as</u> a question, command, constative, or whatever. The most important point to remember here is that for Austin meaning something by an utterance and using it with an illocutionary force are abstractable <u>acts</u>, and not just conceptual differences.

The essence of Searle's argument against this distinction lies in his claim (similar to one which we have earlier seen made by Cohen) that Austin's examples of supposed rhetic acts invariably involve illocutionary verbs. That is, Searle thinks that a <u>separable</u> rhetic act can never be picked out. He thus claims that 'every sentence has some illocutionary force potential, if only of a very broad kind, built into it'.

> [T]here are (in the utterance of complete sentences) no rhetic acts as opposed to illocutionary acts at all. There are indeed phonetic acts of uttering certain noises, phatic acts of uttering certain vocables or words (and sentences), and illocutionary acts, such as making statements, asking questions, giving commands, but it does not seem that there are or can be acts of using those vocables in sentences with

sense and reference which are not already (at least purported) illocutionary acts. ... a rhetic act is always an illocutionary act of one kind or another. (Searle,1968: 412-3)

It may seem that Searle still allows there to be two separately abstractable acts, but he goes on to say that,

> The concepts locutionary act and illocutionary act are indeed different, just as the concepts terrier and dog are different. But the conceptual difference is not sufficient to establish a distinction between separate classes of acts, because just as every terrier is a dog, so every locutionary act is an illocutionary act .... Every serious literal utterance contains some indications of force as part of its meaning. (Searle, 1968: 413)

We can get a grasp of the position behind this objection by considering the three linguistic principles which Searle says underlie his case.

First, Searle claims that the illocutionary forces of utterances may be more or less specific, and that there are several different principles of distinction for distinguishing different types of illocutionary acts. This means that we can use a general performative which still correctly describes the act (Searle's example is 'I asked you to do it', which may refer to a request, entreaty or plea, e.g.), so the descriptions may be more or less determinate. The more important point for Searle is that illocutionary acts themselves may be more or less definite and precise as to their force. Searle says of the 'I asked you to do it' example that 'I may not at all know myself which of the specific possibilities I meant it as', and he goes on:

> My own intentions may have been indeterminate within this range (which is not to say that they can be completely indeterminate - that I may not know if it was a statement, an order, a question). (Searle, 1968 416)

This point allows Searle to show that any supposed locutionary act (saying that ..., e.g.) is already a merely less specific illocutionary act, rather than a different type of act altogether (see 1968: 416-7), and it also allows him, in his own theory of speech acts, to have language users working within a set of public constitutive rules without thereby having to be in an omniscient relation to a precisely articulated system of rules.

The next principle is that whatever can be meant can be said. Searle admits that we may not be able to always say what we mean, because the lexical and syntactical resources of languages

are finite, and because - especially with a second language - our knowledge of these resources is limited. His point is, however, that there are no limits, in principle, to the enrichment of these resources or our knowledge of them (1968: 415). He claims that a neglect of this principle lies behind Austin's belief that uttering a sentence with a certain meaning (sense and reference) and uttering it with a certain force are different acts, and says that once we accept this principle we can see that while there is a category distinction between the sentence and the illocutionary act performed in its utterance, the acts which can be performed in the utterance of a sentence are a function of its meaning, and thus, according to the principle, it is possible with every illocutionary act to utter a sentence, the literal meaning of which determines that its serious literal utterance in an appropriate context will be a performance of that act, since it expresses its force. 'Since it is possible to mean (intend) that force it is possible to say that force literally' (1968: 417). Force is not something separable from the meaning of the sentence; it can always be a part of the literal meaning, and 'the meaning of every sentence already contains some determiners of illocutionary force' (1968: 417). Searle does not deny that often the said-meaning and the meant-force come apart, that the utterance often does not express its intended force, but, he claims, ' this is ... a contingent fact about the way we speak and not a conceptual truth about the concept of illocutionary force'.

Thus, while Austin takes the breakdowns in speech, the 'slips between cup and lip' as the starting point for analysis, and as indicators of pragmatic divisions in linguistic behaviour, Searle, in an attitude quite characteristic of his work, centres analysis on correct and successful acts, and from there explains 'contingent' and 'parasitic' behaviour. A further, connected point, is that while it may seem that the principle that we can say what we mean contradicts the principle that the meant force may be indefinite, being able to say what we mean does not, for Searle, mean that what we mean has to be definite. Nonetheless, we will see later that the determinacy of meaning and rules raise an important issue, and we should at least note here the assumed self-transparency of the speaking subject, a crucial presupposition in Searle's work.

Searle's final principle is that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of all its meaningful components. He says that Austin's concentration, when speaking of meaning, on

the Fregian terminology of sense and reference, leads to the assumption that words and word order are the only elements which determine meaning. He claims that we must include the sentence's deep syntactic structure, and the stress and intonation contour of its utterance (and punctuation in written speech), and suggests (in a comment which again shares something with Cohen's criticism of Austin) that one reason for Austin neglecting the extent to which force was part of meaning was that he failed to emphasize some of the most common elements in the meaning of a sentence which determine the illocutionary force potential of the sentence. (1968: 416-7)

While Searle rejects Austin's distinction between the locutionary (specific the rhetic) act and the illocutionary act, he does think that there is a distinction between the content or proposition in an illocutionary act and the force or illocutionary type of the act.

> We need to distinguish the illocutionary act from the propositional act - that is, the act of <u>expressing the proposition</u> (a phrase which is neutral as to illocutionary force). And the point of the distinction is that the identity conditions of the propositional act are not the same as the identity conditions of the total illocutionary acts.(Searle, 1968: 420)

He goes on to say (in a formulation which echos a comment of Austin's) that in constatives we concentrate on the proposition, while in so-called performatives ('so-called' because Searle agrees with Austin that constatives are performatives anyway) we attend to the force.

The first problem with the position put forward here relates to the collapsing of the locutionary-illocutionary distinction. Like some other criticisms of Austin's distinction (especially Cohen's) it is based erroneously on the fact that the force with which an utterance is made can be explicit in the utterance itself, and then treats illocutionary force as being determined by semantic features of the utterance (in this case, 'illocutionary force indicating devices').

A useful perspective on this problem can be found in the criticism of Searle's argument by Stampe. Referring to Searle's statement in the explication of the Principle of Expressibility that 'if it is possible to mean (intend) that force it is possible to say that force literally', Stampe says that 'this passage

very nearly defies comment', since the clause is so ungrammatical (1975: 5-6). But he construes 'to mean (intend) that force' as 'to mean (intend) one's utterance to have that force', and 'to say that force literally'[2] as the claim that,

> For every illocutionary act one intends to perform, it is possible to utter a sentence the literal meaning of which is such as to determine that its serious literal utterance in an appropriate context will be a performance of that act. (Searle, 1968: 418)

Stampe says, however, that this position involves 'mistaking the features of a sentence that render it unambiguous as to force for the factor that determines that its utterance has the force it has'.

> The proper explicit use of the performative preface has been taken not merely to indicate or to say what one is doing in saying what he say, but variously to 'constitute' his saying of it the making of a promise, a request, or whatever it may be - that is, to be what makes it the case that one has performed this or that speech act. (Stampe, 1975: 2)

In Chapter 2 we saw this same problem in Cohen's response to Austin (and Stampe notes that his criticism applies as much to Cohen as to Searle). The elision which takes place renders the notion of force vacuous, and misses the whole point of Austin's original insight.

Stampe says that it is nearly always possible to indicate what the intended force of an utterance is.

> But in doing so, what one makes explicit is neither what he means nor those intentions that constitute his meaning what he means, but, rather, certain intentions he has concerning what he says. He makes it clear how he intends what he says to be taken, e.g., whether as a promise or as a warning. And to do that is to say something about what one says or has said or will say, or, if not to say it, otherwise to give it to be understood .... But if this is so, then what he says, thus to make known what he intends what he says to be taken as, must be distinct from what he says (and what he means thereby) and further must pertain or refer to his saying of it. (Stampe, 1975: 11)

Searle argues that the distinction which Austin developed between locutionary and illocutionary acts is based on the mistaken treatment of them as 'mutually exclusive classes of acts'.

He says that just as every terrier is a dog, so every locutionary act is an illocutionary act. However, as Stampe points out (1975: 10, n.13), Austin did not treat them as mutually exclusive classes of acts. He said, as will be remembered from Chapter 2, that to perform a locutionary act is eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act, and he regards locutionary and illocutionary acts as acts which can be abstracted from the total speech act. Eliding the distinction altogether, as Searle wants to do by taking the illocutionary force as constituted by (because it can be made explicit in) the rhetic act loses the point of introducing the notion in the first place and gives no account of the forces utterances can have.

The second problem arises with the introduction of the notion of the propositional act. For when Searle collapses the locutionary-illocutionary distinction the meaning-content of the utterance is made dependent on its illocutionary force, which it has initially determined. Thus meaning as the propositional act becomes empty as a pragmatic concept. The study of speech acts becomes a study of illocutionary force (albeit that this force itself is dealt with inadequately).

In Speech Acts Searle at one time comments that the 'study of the meaning of sentences is not in principle distinct from a study of speech acts .... [They are] one study from different points of view' (1969: 18). However, when he argues that illocutionary force is or can always be part of the meaning of a sentence he says, as we have seen, that since it is possible to 'mean (intend)' a given force it is possible to say that force literally. Even if we ignore Stampe's criticism of this claim, it was hopefully shown in the discussion of Grice that the connection between meaning-intending and meaning-content is based on a completely misleading equivocation. Yet Searle here reflects a trend in his work of equating meaning with intended force, so that a study of force, of the illocutionary act, entails an adequate study of speech acts. This point relates to an accusation which is made by Harrison. In response to the passage from Speech Acts just quoted he says,

> If I state, for example, that Searle is a professor at Berkeley, the illocutionary act which I perform is, presumably, stating; it is not 'stating something about Searle', and certainly not 'stating that Searle is a professor at Berkeley'. (Harrison,1979: 172)

While a study of speech acts need not necessarily be solely a

study of illocutionary acts, as Harrison seems at times to imply, it is important to note at this point a tendency in Searle's work to slide in this direction, leaving meaning-as-content bracketed in favour of the central analytic category of the illocution.

It is true that Searle does introduce the notion of the propositional act, which is distinguished from the illocutionary act. A concept such as the propositional act seems needed by a semantic theory in order to take account of the meaning-content of an utterance. And if such a concept is to have analytic status within a pragmatic theory it must be of an act, otherwise it would have to be excluded from the conceptual armory of a pragmatic theory. This is the role assigned to Austin's rhetic act and to Grice's intentions. However, Searle's problem is that he needs to substitute an act for Austin's rhetic act which has content, but no force. In this he fails.

Searle wants to claim that expressing a proposition is neutral as to illocutionary force. It is merely the act supplying the content of a speech act, which cannot occur apart from an illocutionary act (see 1969: 29). In response to this we must, it seems, either reject his arguments against Austin's rhetic act, and regard this as having the same role as the rhetic act (but presented, note, as something like an already-constituted constative)[3] or deny that this is an act at all in a pragmatic sense. Obviously Searle does not want it as a rhetic act, but in that case he gives no reason why we should not read 'expressing a proposition' as a general illocutionary act in the same way as he reads Austin's examples of rhetic acts as more or less general illocutionary acts. However, if the propositional act is not to be equated with the illocutionary act, and if it is distinguished from Austin's rhetic act, Searle gives no indication how it is to be analyzed as an act at all. For Austin, to perform a locutionary act is eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act, as is the case with Searle's propositional act, but Searle's act must be protected from the type of analysis to which he subjects the locutionary (rhetic) act, and only arise through the performance of an illocutionary act. It must arise as an independently abstractable act.

Such a cloistered act seems to drop out of a pragmatic theory altogether. It determines illocutionary acts, but in turn is dependent on them. It determines them in as much as the force-indicating part of an utterance (the 'illocutionary force indic-

ating device') constitutes the force of an utterance, and this must be carried by the semantic content of the utterance, a propositional act. But it is dependent in as much as a propositional act can only exist as an illocutionary act and is not abstractable from the illocutionary act.

In this light it is worth considering an argument by Kambartel, who adopts the position that a radically pragmatic analysis of language needs elementary acts which mediate higher order acts. He thinks that Austin does this with locutionary acts, but suggests that Searle denies himself this possibility. He quotes the following passage from Speech Acts:

> The expression of a proposition is a propositional act, not an illocutionary act. And as we say, propositional acts cannot occur alone .... When a proposition is expressed it is always expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act. (Searle,1969: 29)

And Kambartel comments on this:

> [Searle] seems to analyze the so called propositional acts themselves as mediated by the corresponding illocutionary acts .... This leaves us with a pragmatic circle: The propositional acts are to be mediated by the corresponding illocutionary acts, the symbolic constitution of which on the other hand makes use of the respective propositional acts as primary acts. (Kambartel, 1976: 81-2)

The alternative is, as has been suggested, to say that because they cannot occur as self-sufficient acts propositional acts are not true acts, but Kambartel says that Searle can then no longer be seen as doing pragmatics.

> Either a symbolic act of the form !(p) 'contains' a pragmatically independent symbolic part p, which thus may be qualified as an act; or we simply do no know what is the sense of stating that the respective p 'expresses a proposition', which is the same proposition with all the different symbolic acts having the form F(p).(Kambartel,1976:82)

This point thus ties back in with the difficulties raised by Stampe. We will see later that the propositional act is ultimately constituted as a pre-linguistic act, a position with enormous problems of its own. For the moment, however, and taking the concept as it is presented in Searle's early work, it seems that given that we are dealing with a fully fledged linguistic act, and given that we are not simply dealing with Austin's rhetic act, then Searle's propositional act is tied into the pragmatic

circle described by Kambartel, in which it is dependent upon the illocutionary act to which it gives content.

SECTION 2: THE CRITIQUE OF GRICE.

In Speech Acts Searle discusses Grice's 'Meaning', and his criticism seems to come down to two basic objections. First, Searle claims that Grice fails to account for the extent to which meaning can be a matter of rules or conventions. Searle objects that because Grice defines meaning purely in terms of the speaker's intentions he thus does not show the connection between one's meaning something by what one says, and what that which one says actually means in the language.

> One's meaning something when one utters a sentence is more than just randomly related to what the sentence means in the language one is speaking. (Searle, 1969: 45)

His example to demonstrate this point (which has been noted previously) goes briefly as follows: An American soldier is captured by Italians, and attempts to make them think that he is a German officer by uttering in an authoritative tone the only German sentence he knows - 'Kennst du das land, so die Zitronen bluhen?'. On Grice's analysis in 'Meaning' the sentence means something like 'I am a German officer', but in fact the sentence means 'Do you know the land where the lemon-trees bloom'. This example has been criticized, and is perhaps not entirely convincing;[4] however, the point Searle seems to be trying to make is given, I think, much more convincingly by Ziff's cases (1967: pp.1-8). In one version, for example, George wants to offend an army testing board, and answers the question, 'What would you say if you were asked to identify yourself' by uttering 'pi. hi. y pi. y' (which is apparently a Hopi sentence which means 'I don't know'). Ziff claims that George both meant something by uttering the Hopi sentence (to annoy the board) and meant something by the Hopi sentence ('I don't know'), however,

> what [the utterance] meant had nothing whatever to do with what George intended to effect by uttering the utterance and hence had nothing whatever to do with what [the utterance] meant-nn [according to the Gricean mechanism]. (Ziff, 1967: 3)

It seems, in any case, to be this sort of example which lies behind Searle's claim that an analysis of illocutionary acts 'must capture both the intentional and the conventional aspects

and especially the relationship between them' (1969: 45).

Searle's second objection is that by defining meaning in terms of intended effects Grice in effect confuses illocutionary with perlocutionary acts. He says that while Grice defines meaning in terms of intending to perform a perlocutionary act (to use Austin's terminology), saying something and meaning it is a matter of intending to perform an illocutionary, but not necessarily a perlocutionary, act. What is important about meaning something is being understood, and only at certain times do we want to produce a perlocutionary effect.

He explains this point through the examples of saying 'Hello', 'I promise' and 'Get out'. With 'Hello', he says, we usually simply want the hearer to know that he is being greeted, to understand us, and we need intend no response or effect beyond understanding (beyond the illocutionary effect). 'I promise' can have no perlocutionary effect which will distinguish it from , for example, firm statements of intention and emphatic predictions. While all three may create expectations about the future, they have different meaning. Searle thinks that the meaning of 'Get out' is tied to an intended perlocutionary effect, but that it is the only one of the examples which suits Grice's account. He also claims that even with the type of speech acts which do suit Grice's account, it is quite possible to say these things and mean them without intending any effect. We may, for example, make a statement because it is our duty, not caring whether or not our audience believes it (1969: 46). Finally, Searle says that the Gricean reflexive intention does not even work for all cases where there is an intended perlocutionary effect, for in a philosophy book, say, the reasons for believing the author's claims do not include our recognizing the author's intentions that we believe the claims (1969: 46-7).[5]

Searle does not want to reject Grice's account wholesale. He does think that recognition by the hearer of the speaker's intentions is crucial in communication. However, he thinks that the reflexive intentions should be seen as the speaker intending to produce an illocutionary effect in the hearer (i.e., to get the hearer to understand the utterance) by means of getting the hearer to recognize the speaker's intention to produce the effect. This is based on the following claim about human communication:

> If I am trying to tell someone something, then (assuming certain conditions are satisfied) as soon as he recognizes that I am trying to tell him something and exactly what it is I am trying to tell him, I have succeeded in telling it to him. Furthermore, unless he recognizes that I am trying to tell him something and what I am trying to tell him, I do not fully succeed in telling it to him. (Searle, 1969: 47)

Thus, in place of reflexive perlocutionary intentions, Searle substitutes reflexive illocutionary intentions, plus rules governing the use of sentences and rules governing what the sentences count as; and meaning is determined by these rules. The reflexive intentions constitute an utterance as communication, they do not constitute the meaning - and this point maintains a distinction with Grice.

Searle, unlike Grice (who offers no mechanism for the recognition of intentions), seems to use meaning in explaining the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intentions. He says that the bridge between the speaker's saying something and meaning it (in a literal utterance) and the hearer's understanding it is given on the one hand by the fact that understanding a sentence is knowing its meaning - and this meaning is determined by rules specifying conditions of utterance and what the utterance counts as, these rules being known by both speaker and hearer. On the other hand, uttering and meaning a sentence is a matter of intending the hearer to recognize that certain states of affairs specified by certain of the rules obtain, intending to get the hearer to recognize this through recognition of the initial intention, and finally, intending this recognition of the first intention to arise through a knowledge of the rules for the sentence uttered. Searle claims that the sentence then provides a conventional means of achieving the intention to produce the illocutionary effect.

> If a speaker utters the sentence and means it he will have [the three intentions]. The hearer's understanding the utterance will simply consist in those intentions being achieved. And the intentions will in general be achieved if the hearer understands the sentence, i.e., knows its meaning, i.e., knows the rules governing its elements. (Searle,1969: 48)

It may seem that the objections voiced earlier are contradicted by Searle's stance against Grice, or perhaps that he has

here added an aspect of his approach which was missing in the earlier discussion. This is especially suggested by his insistence on the relevance of the meaning of a sentence in the language. However, the situation is not in fact improved. Force remains semantically determined and what is added is the notion that the utterance is constituted as communication by intention. Thus, it remains the case that meaning and force are tied into a pragmatic circle, and in his treatment of intentions moves no further than Grice does in his 1969 paper.

When he speaks of 'what the sentence means in the language' Searle is committed by his general theoretical approach to only speak about the influence of conventional meaning on the illocutionary force of the sentence. While the example he uses for his first objection is based on the difference between the sense and reference of the sentence as uttered and the sentence intended to be thought to be uttered, he uses it to argue that the speaker intends the recognition of the intended illocutionary effect, and that 'he intends this recognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact that the rules for using the expression he utters associate the expression with the production of that effect' (1969: 45). 'The rules for using the expression' only relate to its force, to what it counts as, not to what it means. The communication of meaning is not accounted for; and this is one of the major problems of Searle's work. Whereas it is not at all clear that we can even talk about meaning except in the context of its communication, and whereas this thought would seem to lie behind the very concept of a pragmatic view of language, Searle seems to leave meaning tied to the propositional act and locked within the linguistic subject.

When Searle speaks of the rules which lead to understanding, the only rules he speaks of are those which 'specify both conditions of utterance of the sentence and also what the utterance counts as' (1969: 48), and they seem to only cover the force side of meaning. He does say that knowing a sentence's meaning is knowing 'the rules governing its elements' (p.48), but it is still the case that they only show what the sentence 'means' in the sense of force, for they lead to the achievement of the intention of the hearer knowing 'that certain states of affairs specified by certain of the rules obtain' (p.48), and what they specify are 'conditions of utterance of the sentence and also what the sentence counts as' (p.48), and they determine what Searle is calling 'meaning', which is force, the intended uptake

of the speech act as the illocutionary act it is.

On the one hand, then, it remains hard to see how force can be constituted by conventional (semantic) meaning, and even if this is possible, semantic meaning remains dependent on force as its determining factor. The introduction of illocutionary intentions merely complicates the issue. For either an utterance is understood as having a certain force and a certain meaning from features of the utterance (according to its satisfaction of felicity conditions) - with these features (and thus the understanding of the utterance) possibly leading to interpretations as to the intentions with which the utterance is given - or the recognition of the intentions is taken as leading to an understanding of the utterance. If the former position is the case we return to Austin, and if the latter, we are left with Grice's problems. But Searle cannot return to Austin, as he regards illocutionary force as being constituted by semantic conventions, and he needs to introduce intentionality as a constituting act independent of the semantic representation of force.

Some of the problems here can be seen in Searle's own analysis (noted above) of 'Hello' (1969: 48-9). 'Hello' is in a way a 'contentless' greeting, where specifying conditions of utterance and what it counts as specifies all aspects of its meaning, but one is left wondering how Searle would cope with, for example, a complex greeting, or a different type of greeting. The rules and conventions which Searle introduces may enable him to distinguish a greeting from a promise or an order, but we still want to distinguish types of greetings, or promises, or orders; to distinguish 'Hello' from 'Hi' and so on, or 'I will do it' from 'I will get it'. And from a different angle, we need an explanation of how 'I will get it', uttered as a promise, means the same thing (as Searle would argue) as 'I promise that I will get it' (uttered as a promise) (see Stampe, 1975: 10-14 & ff.).

It is important to realize that this is not just something 'left out' by Searle. It is excluded by his whole approach. He collapses the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts and is denied a locutionary act which can be uttered with various forces, and he reduces the content of an utterance to the propositional act, which, even if it makes sense as a neutral act, is dependent on the illocutionary intentions of the speaker. So, Searle's account reduces to Grice's equation of meaning with intention (giving no account of meaning), plus Cohen's semantic

analysis of force (which gives no account of force as distinct from meaning).

SECTION 3: PROMISING.

This leads into Searle's actual analysis of promising. This analysis is significant in as much as it amounts to an attempt at a model for filling out the Austinian program regarding illocutionary acts. He sets out his task here as giving the conditions which are 'necessary and sufficient for the act of promising to have been successfully and non-defectively formed in the utterance of a given sentence' (1969: 54). He says that this will give an analysis of the illocutionary act. Searle acknowledges that illocutionary verbs, like other non-technical concepts in ordinary language, lack absolutely strict rules, but says that,

> This insight into the looseness of our concepts, and its attendant jargon of 'family resemblances' should not lead us into a rejection of the very enterprise of philosophical analysis; rather the conclusion to be drawn is that certain forms of analysis, especially analysis into necessary and sufficient conditions, are likely to involve (in varying degrees) idealization of the concept analyzed. (Searle,1969: 55)

Displaying an attitude seen earlier, Searle thus ignores marginal, fringe and partially defective promises, and proposes to handle counter-examples by explaining 'why and how they depart from the paradigm cases of promise making' (1969: 55).

The necessary and sufficient conditions for Searle's paradigm promise can be summarized as follows:

1) Normal conditions of linguistic communication obtain.

2) A speaker S expresses the proposition p in the utterance of a sentence T.

3) In expressing p, S says he will perform some act A in the future.

4) A hearer H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A, and S believes H would prefer this.

5) It is not obvious to S and H that S will do A in the ordinary course of events.

6) S intends to do A.

7) S intends that the utterance of T will put him under an obligation to do A.

8) The appropriate reflexive illocutionary intentions

mentioned earlier obtain.

9) The semantic rules of S and H's dialect are such that T is correct and sincere if and only if conditions 1-8 obtain.

It is important to realize what Searle has done here. He has given an analysis of his intuitions of paradigm promising; and this involves two crucial assumptions for which he gives no justification. On the one hand, he assumes the validity of his own intuitions regarding promising. That is, promising is to be picked out by criteria which he has deduced from his own intuitions of what constitutes promising, and this initial identification can be referred to no criteria other than, perhaps, its own sense of correctness. It is not as if Searle is analyzing identifiable concrete acts, in the way Austin does (although that has its own problems); he is analyzing an idealization of a paradigm, and if this analysis is to have any force it needs to be grounded in something more than Searle's own intuitions, otherwise it is circular. That is, Searle needs to find initial criteria by which to pick out the concept which he then analyses into necessary and sufficient conditions.

It might be replied that all Searle does is give us criteria by which to pick out what he has set up as the paradigm case of promising, and that there is nothing circular in that. However, the point is that while Searle's intuitions are not at issue, just what is the paradigm case of promising is at issue, and is given no justification. There is no reason why we should feel happier with Searle's intuitions about promising than with, say, Harrison's, who says that 'promising involves the acceptance by the promiser of certain goods in the shape of the reliance which others place on his words', which does not restrict promising to statements about the future (Harrison,1979: 179-80).

Following from this is the assumption that promising can in any case be analyzed in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and that it can be discussed in terms of a paradigm. As I have commented previously, this assumption reflects a stance common to most of Searle's work, and in this case it renders the analysis unworkable. For once we reduce an illocutionary concept to the necessary and sufficient conditions of an <u>idealized</u> paradigm of that concept, then <u>every</u> use of that concept has to be explained as an aberration of at least some 'necessary and sufficient' conditions for the use of the concept. So one is left wondering what these conditions given by Searle are necessary and

sufficient for, given that a notion of promising like Harrison's would, at least, not necessarily share conditions (3), (4), (5) and (7), which are just those conditions in Searle's list which pick out promising from other illocutionary concepts.[6] Harrison's notion of promising would, it is true, cover the sort of idealized case Searle is thinking of, but Searle's definition is of an act probably never performed. What we want, in that case, but do not find, is some explanation of the way promising as defined by Searle relates to the 'aberrations' and 'parasitic uses' which make up discourse.

Harrison claims that promising is a 'family resemblance' term, that it does not have an essential property, and that it is open ended.

> We can recognize a promise as having been made even where some or all of the common features of formal, ceremonious promising are missing - ... knowing the meaning of the term 'promise', we can project its reference to cover new and unforeseen kinds of promising - and ... similarly, we can recognize new sorts of ways in which promising can misfire. (Harrison,1979: 177)

I take it that this is true of promising, as it is of at least a number of illocutionary terms in general, and it is just this characteristic of these terms which precludes an analysis of them in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. And we return to the first point when noting that even if Searle could show that promising is not a family resemblance term, for this type of analysis to be convincing he needs to justify the arbitrary choice of his paradigm promise in favour of 'marginal' and 'aberrant' promises, and to explain why these cases do not deserve to be taken on as legitimate illocutionary acts in their own right and be analyzed into their own necessary and sufficient conditions. Of course, if the program were to follow this line of reasoning it would be an unending exercise, and it would be denied any possibility of developing some sort of general theory - we would end up simply analyzing every speech act uttered.[7] But if this is to be avoided there needs to be a justification of picking out certain idealized cases as paradigms, and there needs to be some mechanism by which concrete acts are related to the idealized paradigm: neither of which are to be found in Searle's work.

SECTION 4: THE INSTITUTIONAL FACT.

In Speech Acts (1969: 50-3), Searle claims that the fact that S performed a certain speech act is an 'institutional fact', like the fact that A and B got married, and is underlain by a system of rules of the form, 'X counts as Y in context C'. He says that it is not a 'brute fact', like 'I feel pain', 'F=MA', or 'This stone is next to that', and that language cannot be explained in terms of brute facts. If, he says, we tried to explain a football game in terms of brute facts (describing clustering, movement, etc.) we would have left out all those concepts, backed by constitutive rules, which make it a game of football. Searle thinks that the description of the brute facts can be explained in terms of the institutional facts, but that these can only be explained in terms of the constitutive rules which underlie them.

It is for this reason that Searle feels that attempts to describe semantics in terms of brute facts such as regularities of correlations of stimulus and response or correlations between utterances and states of affairs, cannot work. For without regarding language use as a rule-governed form of intentional activity, he says, the regularities remain unexplained. He says that in explaining illocutionary acts they must be analyzed into statements containing notions such as intentions and states of affairs specified by these rules (which will sometimes themselves involve institutional facts). The intentions mentioned here are not, he reminds us, Gricean 'perlocutionary' intentions; they are what one must intend in order for a speech act to be an act or such-and-such an act. That is to say, they intentions directed towards producing meaningful utterances, and not towards producing responses.

The notion of the institutional fact (which seems to have originated with Anscombe, 1958) is an important element in pragmatics, and is also a significant aspect of a rejection of positivist philosophy and social science. Searle's adoption of this concept is interesting because he finds it compatible with a naturalism, which he develops in his theory of intentionality. Here intentionality is a pra-linguistic (and pre-institutional) fact at the foundation of these facts.

SECTION 5: INTENTIONALITY.

The approach which we have seen developed here is one whose main characteristic seems to be the attempt to place meaning as sense and reference and meaning as intending on an equal footing. We communicate, according to Searle, by producing utterances which fit into sets of constitutive rules, which in turn relate to words and word order and to other meaningful components of utterances. It is through a knowledge of the rules governing speech acts that an audience will grasp our illocutionary intentions (how we want them to understand the utterance), and from these any further perlocutionary intentions, but the utterance is constituted as meaningful, as an illocutionary act, by illocutionary intentions. It may still seem from Searle's continued reference to rules, both semantic and illocutionary, that he does not really lock pragmatics into an isolated subject, but when we consider Searle's later work, in which he directly confronts the relationship between intentionality and language, this weakness of his approach becomes much clearer.

SECTION 5a.

Searle himself acknowledges the relevance of the later work for the theory of speech acts when he says that one of the objectives of Intentionality is to provide a foundation for his earlier work. He says that this follows from his basic assumption that the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind.

> Since speech acts are a type of human action, and since the capacity of speech to represent objects and states of affairs is part of a more general capacity of the mind to relate the organism to the world, any complete account of speech and language requires an account of how the mind/brain relates the organism to reality. (Searle, 1983: vii)

The central claim in this work is that the capacity of sentences to represent 'is not intrinsic but is derived from the Intentionality of the mind', and that this Intentionality of the mind is in turn is in some sense basic.

> The Intentionality of mental states, on the other hand, is not derived from some more prior forms of Intentionality but is intrinsic to the states themselves. An agent uses a sentence to make a statement or ask a question, but he does

not in that way use his beliefs and desires, he simply has them. (Searle, 1983: vii)

When speaking of 'Intentionality', Searle is concerned with 'intentional states', which include not only intentions, but all mental states 'directed at objects and states of affairs in the world' (1982: 259).

> A mental state is an intentional state if and only if the specification of the content of that mental state requires the specification of some object or state of affairs which is not identical with that mental state. On this test pains and aches and at least some cases of anxiety are not intentional, whereas beliefs, hopes, expectations and desires are. (Searle, 1979a: 182)

As Searle comments following this passage, this criterion does not give an analysis of the notion of intentionality, and it leaves the notion of a mental state very loose.

Searle claims that the intentional state relates to the intentional object by containing a representation of the intentional object in the same sense that speech acts contain representations of objects and states of affairs (1979a: 184). He does not fill out the notion of representation, and leaves it as an intentional term (see 1979a: 195), so, because this description of intentionality is circular (see 1979a: 195-7 & 1982: 275), Searle is again not analyzing intentionality - I shall return to this later. However, he does offer some explanation.

He says that sentences specifying intentional states are intensional, because they are at least in part about representations, and thus 'their truth conditions will sometimes depend on features of the representation and not entirely on features of - or even the existence of - the object represented' (1979a: 184-5). Searle also claims that intentional states do not have a peculiar ontological status.

> [T]he intentional object of a mental state is just the actual object or state of affairs represented by an intentional state. If there is no such object or state of affairs then the intentional state does not have an intentional object though it does still contain a representation. (Searle, 1979a: 185)

This distinction between the 'representative content' and the 'intentional object' of a mental state is regarded by Searle as

parallel to Frege's distinction between sense and reference.

> Just as a definite description refers to an object in virtue of its sense, but does not thereby refer to its sense, so an intentional state is directed at an object in virtue of its representative content, but is not thereby directed at its representative content. (Searle: 1979a: 185)

So it seems that in some sense the intentional state just is the representing of an object. Searle says also that the temptation to think that because sentences about intentional states may be intensional then somehow the states themselves are intensional (not directed at objects but rather at their own representative content) involves a confusion of the properties of the state described, 'to confuse the "mention" of the mental state with its "use"'.

> Specifications of intentional mental states are indeed (in general) intensional-with-an-s .... But intentional mental states are not about representations, they are representations. (Searle, 1979a: 187, & cf 1983: 22ff.)

He says that this leads to the picture of every intentional state consisting of a representative content in a certain mode, with the same content possible in different modes (I can believe it will rain, hope it will rain, want it to rain, etc.). 'Intentionality ... is so to speak a ground floor property of the mind. It is how the mind grasps other things' (1979a,p.189).

As has been noted, the central thesis of this work is that 'language does not create intentionality; ... in an important sense intentionality provides the foundation for linguistic acts' (1979a: 190), but Searle argues towards this claim by first showing the parallels, analogies and connections between intentional states and linguistic acts.

The first of these parallels is that the distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force referred to earlier carries over into a distinction between representative content and psychological mode. Searle claims that the distinction, for example, between the propositional content that you will leave the room and the illocutionary force with which that content is presented (as an order, prediction, etc.) parallels the distinction between the representative content that you will leave the room and the psychological mode (belief, fear, hope, etc.) in which one has that representative content (1983: 6).

He says that while it might be better to use 'propositional content' for Intentional states which are realized linguistically, and 'representative content' as a more general term for both linguistically realized Intentional states and those that are not realized in language, he will use the notion of propositional content for Intentional states that take entire propositions as contents, whether or not the state is realized linguistically. By this he wants to emphasize that not all Intentional states have an entire proposition as Intentional content. All, however, must have some representative content, which is not the case for speech acts, as some expressives, like 'Ouch!', 'Hello' and 'Goodbye', can have no content. (1983: 6-7)

Secondly, Searle thinks that the distinction between different directions of fit (a notion developed in his 1979b paper) carries over to intentional states. That is, he claims that just as assertives (statements, etc.) try to make the propositional content match the world (word-world direction of fit), directives and commissives try to make the world match the propositional content (world-word direction of fit), and apologies and congratulations have no direction of fit (as they assume the satisfaction of the propositional content), so with intentional states: belief has mind-world direction of fit, desire has world-mind direction of fit, and sorrow, gratitude and pleasure have no direction of fit (1979a: 191 & 1982: 261-2). Searle comments that the direction of fit for a speech act and its sincerity conditions are the same (1983: 7-9, & on sincerity conditions see, e.g., 1969: 57-61).

This point leads into the third connection, which is that in general the expression of an illocutionary act with a propositional content is also the expression of an intentional state with the same propositional content, and that the intentional state is the sincerity condition of the speech act. Thus a statement expresses belief, a promise expresses intention, an order expresses a wish, an apology expresses sorrow, and so on, and if these states are not held by the speaker, then the act is not performed sincerely. Furthermore, says Searle, to perform a speech act and deny the corresponding intentional state (e.g., 'It's raining, but I don't believe that it's raining'), while not self-contradictory, is logically odd (see 1983: 9).

Searle says that this does not mean that one always has to have the Intentional state that one expresses, 'but a lie or

other insincere speech act consists in performing a speech act, and thereby expressing an Intentional state, where one does not have the Intentional state that one expresses (1983: 9-10).

The fourth connection is that where there is a direction of fit the notion of conditions of satisfaction applies across intentional states as well as speech acts. That is, just as we say that a statement is true or false, an order obeyed or disobeyed, a promise kept or broken, depending on the fulfillment of conditions of satisfaction, so too a belief is satisfied if it is correct, a desire satisfied if it is fulfilled, an intention satisfied only if it is carried out. The crucial point for Searle is that in general the speech act will be satisfied only if the expressed psychological state is satisfied, the exception being cases where the psychological state is satisfied by way of something independent of the achievement of the illocutionary point (e.g., carrying out an order for reasons other than the order) (1983: 10-11).

Searle claims that these connections show, not that there are two things going on, the performance of the act and the expression of the psychological state, but rather that 'the performance of the act is eo ipso an expression of the corresponding psychological state and the propositional content of act and state are identical' (1979a: 192). The picture of intentional states which Searle sees as arising from these various claims is best demonstrated in the following passage from Intentionality.

> [E]very Intentional state consists of a representative content in a certain psychological mode. Intentional states represent objects and states of affairs in the same sense that speech acts represent objects and states of affairs (though, ... they do it by different means and in a different way). Just as my statement that it is raining is a representation of a certain state of affairs, so my belief that it is raining is a representation of the same state of affairs. Just as my order to Sam to leave the room is about Sam and represents a certain action on his part, so my desire that Sam should leave the room is about Sam and represents a certain action on his part. The notion of representation is conveniently vague. As applied to language, we can use it to cover not only reference, but predication and other truth conditions or conditions of satisfaction in the same sense that speech acts represent their conditions of satisfaction. (Searle,1983:11, & cf.1982: 264-5)

In Intentionality Searle tries to make 'representation' a little clearer by distinguishing his use from that in traditional philosophy and in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence. Arguing the first distinction, he says that his saying that a belief is a representation is not to say that a belief is a kind of picture, or to endorse the Tractatus account of meaning. He also claims that he is not saying that a belief represents something that has been presented before, or that it is a kind of thing from which one reads off its conditions of satisfaction by scrutinizing it.

> The sense of 'representation' in question is meant to be entirely exhausted by the analogy with speech acts: the sense of 'represent' in which a belief represents its conditions of satisfaction is the same sense in which a statement represents its conditions of satisfaction. To say that a belief is a representation is simply to say that it has a propositional content and a psychological mode, that its propositional content determines a set of conditions of satisfaction under certain aspects, that its psychological mode determines a direction of fit of its propositional content, in a way that all of these notions ... are explained by the theory of speech acts. (Searle, 1983: 12)

On the other hand, he claims that his use of 'representation' is different from its use in artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology, because for him a representation is defined by its content and its mode, not by its formal structure (1983: 12-13).

Searle sees speech acts as grounded in Intentionality, but he thinks that speech acts are more than just expressions of Intentionality, and in the 1979 paper he discusses what a being capable of intentional states would need in order to perform illocutionary acts. He says that first it would need to be able to deliberately express its Intentional states for the purpose of letting others know it has them; it must have some means of purposefully externalizing its Intentional states. Secondly, Searle thinks that the being should be able to express its intentional states for the purpose of achieving extra-linguistic aims (e.g., expressing belief for the purpose of giving information, expressing desire for the purpose of getting others to do things, expressing intentions for the purpose of creating expectations in others). Thirdly, there would need to be introduced

devices for conventionalizing the communicative expression of intentional states (the illocutionary acts) which correspond to the various extra-linguistic aims (the perlocutionary aims). (1979a: 193-5, & cf. 1983: 177-9)

The task for Searle at this point is to explain the way intentional states are manifested as illocutionary acts. He says that there is nothing intrinsically intentional about the utterance act, the noises that come out of our mouths or the marks that we make on paper, and goes on to say that from his point of view the problem of meaning is:

> How does the mind impose Intentionality on entities that are not intrinsically Intentional, on entities like sound and marks that are, construed in one way, just physical phenomena in the world like any other? (Searle, 1982: 273)

He thinks that this happens through a double level of Intentionality in the performance of the speech act: the Intentional state expressed and the ordinary intention with which the utterance is made. He sees this second Intentional state as bestowing Intentionality on the physical phenomena.

> The mind imposes Intentionality on entities that are not intrinsically Intentional by intentionally transferring the conditions of satisfaction of the expressed psychological state to the external physical entity .... [B]y intentionally uttering something with a certain set of conditions of success, those specified by the essential conditions for that speech act, I have made the utterance Intentional and thus necessarily expressed the corresponding psychological state .... I impose Intentionality on my utterances by transferring to them certain conditions of success which are the conditions of success of certain psychological states. (Searle, 1982: 274)

He puts this briefly by saying that what makes the production of marks or sounds more than just the production of marks or sounds is that he intends their production as the performance of a speech act (1983: 163).

This brings in again the project of analyzing meaning in terms of intentions, but Searle makes a basic change to both Grice's approach and his own earlier one. He says that the traditional discussion of problems of intention and meaning, including his own, suffers from a failure to distinguish between the intention to represent and the intention to communicate, and from the assumption that the whole account of meaning can be given in

terms of communication intentions (1983: 165-6). This change is possibly a response to problems similar to some I have raised earlier, but it is important to note that it is not a rejection of the attempt to explain meaning in terms of intentions. It sets up instead a hierarchy of intentions, with intentions to represent being prior to intentions to communicate.

Thus, one can intend to represent something without intending to communicate, but one cannot intend to communicate without intending to represent. 'I cannot, for example, intend to inform you that it is raining without intending that my utterance represents, truly or falsely, the state of affairs of the weather' (1983: 166). Meaning intentions are thus made up of this hierarchical pair of intentions to represent and intentions to communicate.

> The key element in the analysis of meaning intentions is simply this: For most types of speech acts, meaning intentions are at least in part intentions to represent, and an intention to represent is an intention that the physical events which constitute part of the conditions of satisfaction (in the sense of things required) of the intention should themselves have conditions of satisfaction (in the sense of requirement). (Searle, 1983: 167-8)

If, for example, it has been arranged that my raising my arm signals to you that the enemy has retreated, then the conditions of satisfaction of my intention are that my arm should go up, and that its going up has conditions of satisfaction, which are here truth conditions.

The step from representation intention to communication intention is that 'the communication intention consists simply in the intention that the hearer should recognize that the act was performed with the representation intention'. Using the same example, then, 'my intention when I signal you by raising my hand is to get you to recognize that I am signaling that the enemy has retreated' (1983: 168).

Searle says that he can now answer the Wittgensteinian question as to the difference between saying something and meaning it and saying it without meaning it.

> When I say something and mean it, my utterance has conditions of satisfaction in a way that it does not have any such conditions it I say it without meaning it. If I say 'Es regnet' as a way of practicing German pronunciation, then

> the fact that the sun is shining when I utter this sentence is irrelevant. But if I say 'Es regnet' and mean it, then the fact that the sun is shining is relevant, and it becomes relevant because saying something and meaning it is a matter of saying it with the conditions of satisfaction intentionally imposed on the utterance. (Searle, 1983: 169)

It is, then, with this transferring of an Intentional state onto the speech act that meaning is imposed. Searle says that we can simply believe that p without doing anything, but that to mean that p we must do something, we must state that p. For Searle, to mean that p is to believe that p, but in order to mean that p we must state that p.

> Stating is an act, unlike believing and meaning .... Stating is an illocutionary act that, at another level of description, is an utterance act. It is the performance of the utterance act with a certain set of intentions that converts the utterance act into an illocutionary act and thus imposes Intentionality on the utterance. (Searle, 1982: 274)

As I have noted, the notion of representation which Searle uses in his characterization of Intentionality is itself an Intentional term, and thus if his characterization of Intentionality is taken as an analysis it is circular. However, Searle does not see this as a problem. He thinks that this 'intentional circle' (1979a: 196) follows from the nature of the phenomenon.

> [I]n the way that intentionality underlies the possibility of linguistic acts there is nothing that conceptually underlies intentionality. Intentionality is precisely that feature of mental states, human or otherwise, that enables those states to represent other things. (Searle, 1979a: 197)

As he puts it elsewhere: 'there is no nonintentional standpoint from which we can survey the relations between Intentional states and their conditions of satisfaction. Any analysis must take place within the circle of Intentional concepts' (1983: 79).

SECTION 5b.

The major elements of this theory are the notion of Intentional states and the split within meaning intentions, and with these elements Searle hopes to show how language is derived from intentionality. However, it seems that in the end this theory is unable to do the job which it has been given.

The treatment of meaning intentions does appear to add a sophistication which was missing from both Grice's theory and Searle's earlier theory. For example, with this split, Wilson's counter-example (where he says that snow is white but refuses to have Gricean intentions) might be dealt with, by arguing that while he expresses the representation that snow is white, Wilson does not 'fully' mean that snow is white, because he lacks the requisite communication intention. There is a sense, however, in which such a response begs the question as to what meaning is, and we need to look more closely at the elements making up this theory, and its presuppositions.

The first point to be made here is that the argument that Intentionality as it is described underlies and determines language is unconvincing. What Searle does is to try to show that if Intentional states are described through analogy with illocutionary acts we get a relatively coherent picture, and then to show the connections between the two (which is hardly surprising, considering the model for the initial description). He then explains language as the physical and external realization of phenomena which have already been described on the analogy of language - so we have an explanatory/descriptive circle.

Because of this, the claim that language is derived from Intentionality is no stronger than the counter-claim that Intentionality is a function of the pragmatic structure of language. Searle might object that such a position cannot account for pre- or non-linguistic Intentionality, but the appeal of such a claim lies in the fact that it will always be couched (understandably) in linguistic metaphor, and if it is to have any force there needs to be a lot more evidence demonstrating that dogs have mental states analogous to illocutionary acts than Searle offers. All he does is claim that his intuition of an Intentional state is of something analogous to an illocutionary act; and to argue that because living organisms have various sensory relations with external object they must have Intentional states which are in turn analogous to Searle's intuitions of Intentional states is not in itself convincing. He claims that only someone 'in the grip of a philosophical theory' (1983: 5) could deny that animals and children have Intentional states, but one wants to respond that only someone in the grip of a philosophical theory could assume without evidence or argument that animals and children have Intentional states which accord with Searle's intuitions of

Intentional states, especially as we have not been given a demonstration that linguistic humans have such states.

A further concern relating to the description by analogy, but one which can be dismissed, is that by being described by analogy with illocutionary acts Intentional states take on the problems of the pragmatic circle identified by Kambartel. Thus, we might argue that as a representation can only occur in a given psychological mode and a psychological mode can only occur as a mode of representation, with neither mode nor representation having analytic priority, then an Intentional state could never get off the ground. However, the earlier problem does not occur here, because Intentional states and their elements are not acts. They are simply states by which the mind relates to the external world, and so the 'Intentional circle' is not something that is 'done', it just happens in the course of relating to the world.

This, in fact, is why Searle can avoid the infinite regress generated (as he notes) by the need for a separate Intentional state which relates mode to representation (cf. 1983: 21-2). Mode and representation are not brought together; they simply occur as the Intentional circle. It turns out, however, that by avoiding these problems Searle causes himself several serious difficulties.

The next problem relates to the intention to communicate. This is an important factor, because, as has been noted, the split between intention to represent and intention to communicate possibly allows Searle to cope with the weakness of the earlier grounding of speech acts in intentions. But the trouble with picking out a separate intention to communicate, which follows conceptually the intention to represent, is that there is nothing that this intention actually does. Searle says that the communication intention is the intention that the hearer should recognize that the speech act is performed with the representation intention, but hearer recognition is not something we can intend to do, because it is not something we can do. Intention that is like desire that, and we can attempt to satisfy it by doing (intentionally) something else, but it is not something which we satisfy by actually 'doing' it. We might say that an 'intention that' (or desire that) the hearer recognize our intention to represent could be satisfied by intentionally doing something (e.g., producing a speech act) which leads to this recognition, and so we might say that an 'intention to communicate' is the intention to

produce such an utterance. But in this case the 'intention to communicate' is an attempt to bring about the satisfaction of the 'intention that the hearer recognize the intention to represent', and we cannot say that the intention to communicate is the intention that the hearer recognize the intention to represent.

A further point is that hearer 'recognition' of intention to represent is not actually dependent on the intention to communicate. Rather, it is dependent on features of a speech act by which intention is inferred, and the inference may be correct or incorrect, and these features may be intended or unintended. But if we strengthen Searle's notion of the intention to communicate, by saying that it is the intention to bring about features of the speech act which lead to satisfaction of the intention that the hearer recognize the intention to represent, a regress is set up which stops the intention to represent ever being fulfilled.

If we intend to communicate (and hope thereby that hearer-inference of intention to represent is produced), then our speech act must have features which can lead to this inference - that is, which mean that we intend to represent. But in that case, the intention to represent must involve the intention to mean that we intend to represent, as well as the intention to fulfill the satisfaction conditions of the intention to represent. For example, the intention to represent associated with the illocutionary act, 'It is raining', must, if there is intention to communicate, include the intention to represent associated with 'I intend to represent'. But if the statement that it is raining and that this is uttered with representation intentions (which make up the satisfaction conditions of an intention to represent) is uttered with communication intentions, then we must indicate that this is uttered with the intention to represent, and this assumes a further level of intention to represent which includes the indication of the previous intention to represent in its satisfaction conditions, and so on.

One way of avoiding this regress would be to say that if the intention to represent is associated with communication intentions then the satisfaction conditions of the intention to represent will include the indication of the intention to represent, so the intention to represent in this case is partly self-referring, and there is no regress. But it is not clear that Searle would want to take this way out, for if the part of the utterance which indicates the intention to represent is meaningful according to

Searle's notion of meaning, if we mean that we intend to represent, it must be associated with communication intentions, and thus there must be further indication of that intention to represent which is associated with the original indication of the intention to represent, and we begin a regress. If we do not mean that we intend to represent, then it is not clear how (on Searle's model) some part of the utterance could mean to the hearer that we intend to represent, since meaning (for Searle) depends on both representation and communication intentions. Hence, it seems that the transparency of intention which Searle associates with meaning leads to meaning never being achieved.

The most serious problem with Searle's model arises from the actual notion of intention to represent. He says that the intention to represent is the intention that the physical events which constitute part of the conditions of satisfaction of the intention should themselves have conditions of satisfaction. So the intention is satisfied by, say, words being said, and by those words having conditions of satisfaction, which are the same as the conditions of satisfaction of an Intentional state. But the question immediately arises as to what it is that the intention is to represent.

There seem to be two possibilities here: that it is an intention to represent some state of affairs in the world, or that it is an intention to represent an Intentional state, and both seem highly implausible. It cannot be a state of affairs in the world, because this is already represented in the Intentional state (under a certain mode), so the intention to represent it is redundant. Indeed (and leaving aside the original Intentional state), an intention to represent a state of affairs presupposes (because it is itself an Intentional state) a representation of that state of affairs as its representative content. A version of this possibility might be to say that we intend to represent the state of affairs in the world with physical events (words, e.g.), rather than through an Intentional state, but this is equally unlikely. For an illocutionary act is not necessarily a <u>representation</u> of things; it can be a promise, a request or whatever, and while Searle would argue that these involve a representation in the propositional act, the intention to represent is supposed to lead to the whole illocutionary act, not just to its propositional content.

But if it is not the case that the intention is to represent a state of affairs in the world, it is equally implausible that it is to represent an Intentional state. First, if we think of the Intentional state which is the intention to represent another Intentional state, that Intentional state must contain the representation of the second Intentional state (as represented) under the mode of intention. Therefore, we again find that the intention to represent already involves the representation of that which it is the intention to represent. We might also with this possibility say that it is an intention to represent an Intentional state by means of physical events, but this offers no help. For there is something very strange about suggesting that the statement 'It is raining' is not a representation of the weather, but is rather a representation of an Intentional state (containing a representation of rain under the mode of belief). And it seems even more implausible if we are to accept that the order 'Pick that up' is not in fact an order to someone, but rather a representation of an Intentional state (containing a representation of that person picking it up - as obeying the order - under the mode of desire). Apart from anything else, a supposed indirect speech act, such as 'I wish you would pick that up', would have to be seen as in fact a direct speech act, and no speech act would directly refer to states of affairs.

Even aside from this implausibility, however, illocutionary acts cannot really be representations of Intentional states, because they are supposed to share the conditions of satisfaction of the Intentional state. The condition of satisfaction of the Intentional state of belief that it is raining is rain, but if an illocutionary act is a representation of an Intentional state, then the condition of satisfaction of 'It is raining' is the belief that it is raining, not rain.

Aside from these problems, the supposition that there can be an intention to represent something seems to ignore Searle's quite central claim that there can be no representation in itself, but only representation under a certain mode.

If we are going to salvage some part of this theory, we might try ignoring the term 'represent', and just say that an intention to represent is an intention to do some physical thing and an intention that this physical event has the conditions of satisfaction of a given Intentional state.

'Doing some physical thing' would be what Searle calls an action, and he says that an action, which may or may not follow a prior intention, consists of an experience of acting (which is an 'intention in action') plus the occurrence of an event, with the experience of acting causing the event. Using the example of raising one's arm, he says that the representative content of the prior intention can be expressed as 'I perform the action of raising my arm by way of carrying out this intention' (i.e., we must intend that the arm be raised intentionally). This prior intention then causes the action, and the 'presentational' content of the intention in action which is part of the action can be expressed as 'My arm goes up as a result of this intention in action'. Intentions in these cases are thus 'causally self-referential'. The prior intention both causes the action and represents it, and the intention in action both causes the event and presents it. (See 1983: Ch.3, esp. 91-8, & Ch.4.)

I do not wish to criticize Searle's views on action here, but I do want to re-examine the notion of an intention to represent in the light of these views. Given the formulation just seen, it seems that the intention to represent, if it is a prior intention (though the following discussion differs little if it is an intention in action), involves an Intentional state with a representative content consisting in part of 'I do some physical thing by way of carrying out this intention', and we can suppose for the time being that this 'physical thing' is vocal sound. The other part of the representative content would be 'I make the vocal sound have the conditions of satisfaction of an Intentional state, and I do this by way of carrying out this intention'.

We now have a major problem. If we cash out the 'intention that the physical events ... have conditions of satisfaction', as the intention to <u>make</u> these physical events have conditions of satisfaction, the intention seems hopeless, because we cannot just make events have conditions of satisfaction unless we step out of the intention to represent, go over to our hearer, and say, for example, 'When I raise my arm, it means that the enemy's about to charge, O.K.?'. The problem here is that we have gone from an intention <u>that</u>, to an intention <u>to</u>. An intention <u>that</u> is not part of an action. It is more closely related to a desire, and may <u>lead</u> to an action. This relates to a point made earlier regarding communication intentions.

A solution here might be to say that we satisfy the intent-

ion that the physical events have the conditions of satisfaction of a given Intentional state by either suitably defining the physical event as above, or, more usually, performing physical events which have these conditions of satisfaction by virtue of their meaning. The trouble here is that we are beginning to leave Searle's position way behind, as we are assuming meaning in the explication of the very act/state which in Searle's view constitutes meaning.

Nonetheless, a formulation of the content of the intention to represent might now be given as 'I make vocal sounds which accord with an illocutionary act which has the conditions of satisfaction of an Intentional state, and I do this by way of carrying out this intention'.

The next problem here is that the question arises as to what Intentional state the illocutionary act has the same conditions of satisfaction as. We have seen already that it cannot be 'the Intentional state I intend to represent', but maybe we can say that it is 'the Intentional state I intend to express' (which is a term Searle sometimes uses - cf. 1982: 163). Here, the content of the intention to represent would be 'I perform an illocutionary act which has the same conditions of satisfaction as the Intentional state I intend to express, and I do this by way of carrying out this intention'. Thus, an illocutionary act is the intentional expression of an Intentional state, and its being an expression of a given Intentional state consists in its having the same conditions of satisfaction.

It is not obvious how such a view would be cashed out, but but we might say that meaning already exists in the 'language' of our Intentional states, and that this private language is translated or expressed as public language. I find such a view problematic. It seems to cope with questions of language by simply positing an unanalyzable language of mental states, and the Intentionality which does the translating or expressing appears to involve an already constituted linguistic consciousness such as that which would be involved in translating between languges, or in expressing something with a pre-arranged arm-wave. That is, it seems to involve a second order Intentional state which is about first order states, and, as Searle says, such a situation leads to an infinite regress (1983: 22). In any case, it does not seem to be a view with which Searle would want to be identified, as it is perhaps quite close to the views of some cognitive

scientists; however, it seems that this is where we end up by following through and trying to make sense of his theory.

On the way, we have lost the notion of meaning being something which is constituted by a speaker's intentions. We could still claim that there are intentions to do things which mean something, or even that we can intend to mean that p by x, through dubbing, privately or publicly; but in either case, the meaning is constituted outside the intention to represent, and the intention to represent, if it makes any sense at all, is dependent on meaning.

To summarize this argument: I have claimed first that Searle's description of Intentional states by analogy with illocutionary states offers an unconvincing demonstration of either the nature of Intentional states or their primacy in relation to language. I then argued that the intention to communicate is unclear as it stands, but that if it is cashed out to any extent it seems to force the intention to represent associated with an intention to communicate (this being the intention to represent associated with fully meaning something) into an infinite regress. The next problem was that the notion of an intention to represent implies a representing which is what the intention is to do, however, there appears to be nothing which could be plausibly represented by or through the intention. Finally, I have suggested that the intention to represent could be construed as the intention to express an Intentional state as an illocutionary, and as I have said, whatever the plausibility of this view, it leaves us nowhere near a model in which meaning is constituted by meaning intentions.

As a final comment here, it seems that while Searle claims to avoid a dualism through his treatment of Intentional states as that by which the mind relates to reality, in his treatment of the move from Intentional states to language he seems to reproduce a dualism of sorts by having meaning intentions relating the mind (in the form of Intentional states) to language. The meaning intentions act as a bridge between Intentional states and language, and Intentional states (prior to language and underlying it) are essentially isolated from language.

It is true that meaning intentions themselves are Intentional states, but they are a peculiar sort of Intentional state, and not just in that they involve causally self-referential

intentions. They seem to constitute a consciousness at the pragmatic core of language which both knows what the subject means and brings about meaning at the same time. While Intentional states as such need to be 'represented' or expressed in order for them to be externalized, these particular Intentional states are somehow the 'representing' or expression of Intentional states, and Searle offers no explanation of this paradox.

CONCLUSION.

As I have commented earlier, Searle's work is extremely influential within pragmatics. It is taken as offering both the basic notion of a speech act and the model for classifying speech acts, yet it appears that the idea of pragmatics which it suggests is deeply flawed, and this raises major doubts regarding the possibility of developing a pragmatics based on this conception.

In this chapter I have argued that the theory of speech acts fails to give an adequate account of illocutionary acts because it leaves them tied into a pragmatic circle and because it attempts to explain meaning through an equivocation between meaning as intention and linguistic meaning. A further problem with this theory was that the characterization of illocutionary acts depended on an idealization of acts which gave no account of the relation between the idealized central case and the parasitic realizations of the central case which make up the actuality of conversation. And finally, it seems that the theory of Intentionality involves a detailed filling-out of the way intentions constitute meaning which does not in the end avoid the original equivocation. All of this, as I have said, raises doubts as to the viability of a pragmatics based on such a view.

CHAPTER FIVE
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION.

In the previous chapters I have discussed some of the main features of philosophical pragmatics, citing these as Austin's treatment of utterances as actions, Grice's emphasis on the role in communication of speaker's intentions, and Searle's attempt to develop out of this work a theory of speech acts and intentionality. The period of the development of these views coincided with, or perhaps slightly preceded, a major shift in linguistics.

Anglo-American linguistics had been dominated by the Chomskian paradigm of transformational linguistics. This program involved a rejection of Bloomfieldian positivism and an attempt to study competence, the linguistic intuitions of speakers in an abstract, homogeneous speech community in which everyone speaks alike and learns the language instantly. These intuitions, about which sentences are grammatical and which sentences mean the same (within a small class of abstracted or decontextualized sentences) are accounted for by rules which generate sentences and which characterize the set of grammatical sentences (see Chomsky,1957: 17f; & 1965: 3).

However, beginning in the 1960's, and accelerating in the early 1970s, attention was given to the limitations of this paradigm, and to the need to take account of the actual use of language as an interactive, concrete phenomenon. The most important voice in this period was probably Labov, and his essay, 'The Study of Language in its Social Context' (1972b: Ch.8) is central to recent approaches to linguistic pragmatics. Certainly it would be a mistake to ignore the influence of the Prague School in Anglo-American linguistics during this period, especially on Hymes' work in linguistic ethnography, and on Halliday, but this

material is not central to the type of approach I want to discuss in this chapter.

The work I want to discuss I will call 'discourse analysis', however, this use of the term should be immediately qualified, since at the present state of theory it is extremely ambiguous. Indeed, it shares much of the ambiguity of 'pragmatics'. On the one hand, it can be used to cover programs ranging from socio-linguistics through psycholinguistics and philosophical or formal linguistics to computational linguistics (see Brown & Yule, 1983: Preface). On the other hand, it can be defined as simply the analysis of language in small-scale conversational settings (Downes, 1984: 19), or can be used to cover ethnography of communication, speech act linguistics and conversation analysis (Coulthard,1977), or perhaps just speech act linguistics and conversational analysis (Stubbs,1983).

What I want to call 'discourse analysis' here is an approach to communication which concentrates on language as interactive performance and which has as its central conceptual device the notion of a speech act or similar basic category or unit of discourse. This second aspect offers the major distinction from conversation analysis, which will be discussed in the next chapter, and while, as has been noted above, conversation analysis and what I am calling discourse analysis are at times placed within the one general approach, they nonetheless appear to involve distinct bodies of work within linguistic pragmatics and distinct approaches to the study of discourse phenomena.

While discourse analysis can be represented as the analysis of purely spoken communication (Downes, 1984: 19 & 303ff), it seems more usual to include within it work by text grammarians such as Van Dijk, who focus, at least initially and centrally, on written texts. Nonetheless, I shall mainly be dealing with examples of that work which concentrates on conversation. This work tends to make use of models from the tradition of philosophical pragmatics of main interest here (whereas text grammarians follow more closely the textlinguistik tradition - see Edmondson, 1981: 4f. & Ch.2), and it shares the phonocentric emphasis of the work we have been looking at.

The style of discourse analysis dealt with here shares much with, and often owes much to, philosophical pragmatics, and is often described by its practitioners in terms of its relation to

philosophy; however, it would be a mistake to ignore the extent to which it is an independent program governed more by the demands of linguistic analysis than by some desire to fill out a philosophical program. In its concentration on performance rather than competence discourse analysis makes use of approaches discussed in the earlier chapters, however, as linguistics it involves an attempt to apply linguistic techniques and concepts to interaction, and therefore to linguistic units above that of the sentence (see Stubbs, 1983: 1 & Levinson: 1983: 286). Having said that, the main focus here will be on those concepts and approaches taken over from philosophy and paralleling those found in philosophy, and on their effect on the models of communication developed in discourse analysis.

One reason why an examination if discourse analysis is particularly useful in the light of the work discussed in the previous chapters, is that we find here that issues surrounding the conception of linguistic subjects and what I have called the politics of discourse are made much clearer. Whereas in philosophical pragmatics the focusing notion seems to be that of speech as action in a context, in linguistic pragmatics we find emphasis place as well on the notion of discourse as interaction. Because of this, the relations between linguistic subjects in interaction become more significant, and the influence of social roles and implicit assumptions regarding those roles come to be seen as important factors in the operation of discourse, in relation to both the production and interpretation of utterances. Further, it becomes much clearer that linguistic subjects do not and can not enter discourse without being taken up already in certain interactive and (therefore) discursive relations, relations which effect both the right and ability to assign significance or meaning, and which also govern the significance which arises in discourse. An important question which arises in what follows is the extent to which linguistic pragmatics is able to adequately theoretically acknowledge and account for these factors.

In this chapter I shall concentrate on a detailed examination of one example of discourse analysis - Labov & Fanshel's analysis of therapeutic discourse - but before that it will be useful, in Section 1, to note in more detail some of the main features of this approach.1

SECTION 1: AN OUTLINE OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS.

Even within the definition of discourse analysis given above we are dealing with a diverse and not fully unified body of work, and what follows is not intended to give the impression of anything like a tightly structured research program. Nonetheless, it does seem possible to make note of aspects of the self-location of work in this area, as well as certain features in common across its diversity.

There are three main features of discourse analysis as I have defined it. The first is an attempt to apply linguistic analysis to supra-sentential units; this leads into the aim of giving an account of how coherence and sequential organization in discourse is produced and understood; and this in turn brings about the theorizing of cognitive linguistic structures which are at play in the operation of discourse units.

Stubbs, for example, says that the term 'discourse analysis' 'refers to attempts to study the organization of language above the sentence or above the clause, and therefore to study larger linguistic units, such as conversational exchanges or written texts'. He goes on to say that discourse analysis is therefore concerned with 'language in use in social contexts, and in particular with interaction or dialogue between speakers' (1983: 1) According to Stubbs, the move from concentration on the sentence or clause to larger linguistic units and so to discourse phenomena arose out of questions raised when transformational grammar tried to take account of context.

> As soon as one writes context-sensitive rules of the form 'rewrite a as b in context c', one begins to wonder about the context which acts as the trigger for the rule. It is [sic] purely linguistic? Is it within the sentence? Or in the social context? Is there any important difference between these triggering contexts?
>
> It follows that the grammatical, structural units of clause or sentence are not necessarily either the most important units for language study, or the biggest, although the clause will probably remain basic as a unit of syntax, of propositional information, and as the potential realization of a speech act. (Stubbs,1983: 7)

Stubbs suggests that the upper limit of structural organization is given by discourse units such as lecture, conversation, speech and story.

Stubbs' own argument against the primacy of the sentence in analysis is based on his analysis of sentence-initial particles ('well', 'now','right'), adverbs, and 'please'. He argues (1983: Ch.4) that traditional grammars are unable to deal adequately with phenomena such as these, and that this is because these phenomena operate within units extending beyond the sentence, and that rules constraining their use must be based on these larger units, which he calls 'speech acts' (see esp. Stubbs,1983: 71-77ff.).

As Levinson puts it, the techniques employed by discourse analysis to extend analysis beyond the unit of the sentence are essentially 'the isolation of a set of basic categories or units of discourse', and 'the formulation of a set of concatenation rules stated over those categories, delimiting well-formed sequences of categories (coherent discourses) from ill-formed sequences (incoherent discourses)' (Levinson, 1983: 286).

Coulthard makes the point that once we confront interactive utterances we find that constraints operating between speakers cannot be expressed in grammatical terms, and that often in interactive utterances (he is discussing cases of enquiry and salutation) the linguistic form of the utterance is almost irrelevant.

> What is structurally important is its linguistic <u>function</u> and it is evidence of this kind which points to the existence of another level, <u>discourse</u>, between grammar and non-linguistic organization. Sequences, which from a grammatical viewpoint are a random succession of clauses of different types can be seen from a functional viewpoint to be highly structured. (Coulthard, 1977: 7)

In arguing that discourse does not consist simply of a string of grammatically well-formed utterances or sentences, Coulthard notes cases of discourse which are grammatically unexceptional, yet odd, such as,

A: I feel hot today.
B: No.

He says that in cases like this 'B's contribution obviously breaks rules for the production of coherent discourse', and says that discourse analysis aims to discover these rules and, even more fundamentally, to discover 'the nature of the units whose structure and occurrence the sequencing rules will describe' (Coulthard, 1977: 7).

Coulthard quotes a comment from the introduction to Labov's article on ritual insults, that the first and most important step in the formalization of discourse analysis is to distinguish 'what is said from what is done' (Labov, 1972a: 121). He takes this as saying that 'discourse analysis must be concerned with the functional use of language', and says that therefore, 'for all discourse analysts the unit of analysis is not the grammatically defined "clause" or "sentence", although the unit may very frequently consist of one clause or sentence'. Coulthard takes the fundamental unit as the speech act.

He says that while the relations between the basic units of discourse are generally agreed to depend on their respective functions, a problem for discourse analysis is how many functions there are. Another problem, Coulthard suggests, is the size of the basic unit. Commonly it is taken to be the utterance, but he, Sinclair, and others feel that it is in fact the move, which can be co-extensive with the utterance, but will often be smaller (so that an utterance may consist of one or more moves). A third problem which Coulthard sees for discourse analysis is to show 'how the functional categories are realized by formal means', for example, what the relationship is between 'request' or 'question' and the grammatical options available to the speaker. He notes, and we shall see this in the next chapter, that writers such as Sacks and Schegloff assume that their categories are intuitively recognizable from the label, whereas a discourse analyst such as Labov tries to write rules to explain how a given lexico-grammatical structure comes to realize a given function in a given situation. (Coulthard, 1977: 8)

As Labov himself puts this in the paper on the study of language in its social context,

> The fundamental problem of discourse analysis is to show how one utterance follows another in a rational, rule-governed manner - in other words, how we understand coherent discourse. (Labov,1972b: 252)

After making the point noted above about distinguishing what is said from what is done, Labov says in that paper (1972a) that there is a tendency to interchange terms for the small number of grammatical sentence types (statements, questions and imperatives) with the names for certain actions: assertions, requests for information, and commands. He says that there is, however, no such simple on-to-one relationship, since, for example, requests

for information can be made with statements, questions, or imperatives, and since a great many other actions are done with words and must be related by rule to the utterance, such as refusals, challenges, retreats, insults, promises, threats, and so on.

> The rules that connect what is said to the actions being performed with words are complex; the major task of discourse analysis is to analyze them, and thus to show that one sentence follows another in a coherent way. (Labov, 1972a: 121)

At the stage of Labov's work to which I have referred here he makes no reference to philosophical pragmatics. However, it seems clear that the sort of program which Labov sets up has much in common with the work seen in earlier chapters (even aside from the remarkably Austinian language in part of the last quotation). A difference worth pointing out at this stage between Labov's work and philosophical pragmatics is that the analysis of the speech act here places more emphasis on its status as an act within a sequence of acts. Certainly, in the work looked at earlier the discursive and social context of the act is recognized, but it seems that the linguistic interest in coherence sharpens the focus of this aspect of pragmatics, and places weight on the importance of the interpretation, and well as the production, of utterances. One implication of this is that what a discursive subject means is much more clearly exposed to the constraints of the discourse in which she or he is engaged. This is not just to say that meaning becomes something which is in a sense negotiated through the process and relations of production and interpretation which constitute discourse. It is also, and in many ways much more importantly, constrained by the possibilities of production and interpretation which are built into the discursive practices engaged in at the time.

My points here can be seen if we look at discourse rules which Labov suggests for requests for information. He takes the following discourse:

A: Are you going to work tomorrow? (U1)
B: I'm on jury duty. (U2)
A: Couldn't you get out of it? (U3)
B: We tried everything. (U4)

While this is intuitively coherent, Labov says that there can be no formal basis in sentence-grammar to explicate this intuition - other than having a grammar containing every known relation between persons and objects. However, discourse rules do not need

such detail, and once we realize that in U2 B is asserting that there is a proposition connecting the response with the request, we can formulate the following rule of discourse:

> If A makes a request for information Q-S1, and B makes a statement S2 in response that cannot be expanded by rules of ellipsis to the form X S1 Y, then S2 is heard as an assertion that there exists a proposition P known to both A and B:
>
> If S2, then (E)S1
>
> where (E) is an existential operator, and from this proposition there is inferred an answer to A's request: (E)S1. (Labov,1972a: 122)

Labov says that this is a rule of interpretation that relates what is said (S2) to what is done (the assertion of P and the answer to Q-S1), and notes that there is no direct connection between the two utterances Q-S1 and S2. So whereas Searle's rules focussed on the speaker, on the production, Labov's rules focus more on the hearer, on interpretation, and therefore highlight discourse as interaction. This difference is in fact made explicit in Labov's later work with Fanshel, which will be discussed below (see Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 81-2).

According to Labov the over-all relation of discourse rules to utterances shows several levels of abstraction, and he represents the connections between the four utterances cited above in the following scheme:



Labov glosses this scheme as follows:

> Speaker A begins with the intention of performing the action D1; by a production rule, he does so with the utterance U1. Speaker B uses the inverse interpretation rule to interpret U1 as A's action D1, and then applies a sequencing rule to

decide his response D2. He then codes D2 into the utterance U2 by a production rule, and Speaker A interprets this - in this case, by the rule cited which tells him that the statement I'm on jury duty is a response to D1 to be interpreted as "I'm not going to work because I'm on jury duty." The other sequences follow in the same manner. (Labov,1972a: 123, and see also 1972b: 254))

The two types of discourse rules which operate here are rules of interpretation, UD (with their inverse rules of production, DU), and sequencing rules, DD, which connect actions; and there are, Labov says, other rules that connect actions at higher levels of abstraction, so that the diagram may in fact have a structure such as:



D5, D6 and D7 can be considered as exchanges, encounters, inquiries, or even challenges and defenses, depending on the larger context of interaction and higher level rules. (1972a: 123)

Labov says that not just any statement will do as S2. If B said 'De Gaulle just lost the election', and A could not find a proposition which could make the connection between this and S1, A would reject B's response. However, the operation of the rule is invariant, and A must inspect S2 as a possible element in a proposition if S2 then (E)S1 before reacting. 'Failure to locate such a proposition may reflect a real incompetence: younger members of a social group may not be able to find the proposition being asserted' (1972a: 123).

The unstated proposition is presumed to be part of the communal shared knowledge, and Labov says that the concept of 'shared knowledge' is an essential element in discourse analysis. For example, statements are often used as requests for confirmation, requiring a yes-no response, and he says that these operate as requests rather than assertions because of an invariant rule of discourse which relies on the distinction between A-events (events which A knows about but B does not), B-events (which B knows about) and AB-events (known to both). In any two party conversation there is an understanding of these distinctions, and thus we get the following rule of interpretation:

If A makes a statement about a B-event, it is heard as a request for confirmation.

Labov comments that as well as these concepts of shared and unshared knowledge, there are other elements of discourse that are based on sociological concepts, such as notions of role, rights, duties and obligations associated with social rules. He demonstrates this with the following example:

RHODA: Well, when are you planning to come home?
RHODA'S MOTHER: Oh, why-y?

A first response is to say that here a question is answered with a question, but Labov says that questions do not answer questions, any more than statements do. 'Answers are given to requests; they may occasionally take the form of questions'. He says that on closer examination Rhoda's question can be seen as a request for action, not information, and that her mother's question is a refusal of that request. To explain this Labov says that the underlying rules for requests for action appear to have the form: A requests B to do X for the purpose Y under conditions Z, and for this to be heard as a valid command, it is necessary for certain pre-conditions to hold: B must believe that A believes that

1. X needs to be done.
2. B has the ability to do X.
3. B has the obligation to do X.
4. A has the right to tell B to do X.

He says that there are many ways to perform this request, and many ways of aggravating or mitigating the force of the command. One way involves statements or questions referring to any of the pre-conditions, and this can also be used to refuse the request. In the case above, Rhoda's mother refuses the request by asking a question concerning the relation of A, B and X, which is heard as a question about (and a challenge to) pre-condition 4 (Labov, 1972a: 124-5). We will go into this particular example in more detail later, but it should already be clear from these brief comments that not only the general importance of interaction and interpretation, but also the significance of social roles in this interaction and interpretation, are given much greater emphasis in Labov's approach than in philosophical pragmatics.

This gives a brief idea of the main aims and principles of discourse analysis, and a short account of the type of approach which Labov adopts. In the next section I want to examine in more

detail the analysis which he and Fanshel make of therapeutic discourse.

SECTION 2: LABOV AND FANSHEL ON THERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE.

SECTION 2a.

In Therapeutic Discourse: Psychotherapy as Conversation (1977), Labov & Fanshel present an analysis of the first 15 minutes of a therapeutic interview. The interviewer is described as an experienced therapist with 'a thorough familiarity with the psychoanalytic literature and viewpoint in regard to phychotherapy', and the viewpoint of the agency in which she worked is said to focus on ego psychology (Labov & Fanshel,1977: 12). The interviewee is described as 'a 19-year-old Jewish girl who resides in New York City' who had been diagnosed as having anorexia nervosa (1977:8-9). The interview in question is the 25th session.

In the introduction to the study, Labov & Fanshel say that the recognition of the complexity of the devices that speakers use to cope with each other led their attention to the higher-level questions of 'coherence in discourse, the relation between speech and speech act, and the rules of interpretation and production which relate speech to the actions being felt and performed'.

> To answer the question, What is taking place in this interview? we necessarily dealt with what speakers were doing to each other or felt that they were doing to each other: that is, with their interaction. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 6)

They go on to say that they found that sentences are not necessarily connected at the utterance level but that sequencing in conversation takes place between actions which may be far removed from the words as literally spoken, both in time and in degree of abstraction.

Labov & Fanshel say that they view this interview as a case of a relatively common and important therapeutic problem, but also as an example of human conversation in general. 'We explicate the specific features so that the application of the general principles can be seen' (1977: 8). Thus, they place their study within the two perspectives under which the therapeutic interview

has been previously examined.

> First, as an element in the case history of a patient, illustrating the etiology and dynamics of a disorder as well as its treatment; second, as a communicative event, a conversation in which therapist and patient interact under the general rules, constraints, and patterns of face-to-face interaction. (Labov & Fanshel,1977: 12)

Of these previous studies, those which Labov & Fanshel find most useful are microanalyses, which closely examine details of recorded verbal behaviour. They feel, however, that these are generally limited by a concentration on relatively empty paralinguistic cues, to the exclusion of the meaning of what is being said (see 1977: 19-23). An exception which they cite here is The First Five Minutes by Pittenger, Hockett, & Danehy (1960).

While the term 'speech act' is not used in the earlier work by Labov, he does there seem to be working with a similar concept. It is therefore no surprise to find that in Therapeutic Discourse 'speech act', or 'speech event', is a central analytic term, and Labov & Fanshel explicitly relate their study to work done on the general analysis of speech act, presuppositions, and sentence connection (1977: 23-4).

They also note the influence of the work of conversational analysts in developing general rules of sequencing in conversation, but they object that such work cannot answer the question of 'why X said Y here', and cannot confront the central question of this study: What is taking place in the therapeutic interview? 'We agree that ... sequencing is a matter of considerable importance for the understanding of what takes place in conversation,... but it will be helpful if we can develop a more exact characterization of the units that are sequenced'.

> Sequencing rules do not appear to relate words, sentences, and other linguistic forms, but rather form the connections between abstract actions such as requests, compliments, challenges, and defenses. Thus sequencing rules presuppose another set of relations, those between the words spoken and the actions being performed. (Labov & Fanshel,1977: 25)

Labov & Fanshel claim that most microanalyses, dealing with intonation or gestures, proceed on the assumption that we must gain a clear understanding of the signals that communicate before we can analyze larger units. They suggest that we find the same general strategy in studies of presuppositions and implications

of sentence structure, where the general aim seems to be to work out the possible combinations of single units, and so proceed gradually to write a grammar of discourse. Likewise, they suggest, those studying sequencing rules in conversation also begin with the smallest units of organization at their level of interest, hoping to arrive eventually at larger structures (1977: 29).

They say that in the course of their research they found that a different direction is required. When initially considering individual signals they found that there was a great deal of implicit communication in the form of vocal gestures such as intonation, voice qualifiers and hesitations. However, they say, they gradually discovered that there was an even richer body of implicit communication in the form of unexpressed social and psychological propositions. Furthermore, they found a large body of implicit activity which was not verbal at all and could not be translated into single propositions, which leads to the suggestion that most utterances can be seen as performing several speech acts simultaneously.

> The parties to a conversation appear to be understanding and reacting to these speech acts at many levels of abstraction. As we see it now, conversation is not a chain of utterances, but rather a matrix of utterances and actions bound together by a web of understandings and reactions. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 29-30)

In this approach, conversation is seen, following Goffman, as a form or subspecies of interaction in general. Labov & Fanshel say that they find that actions and utterances are regularly linked together in chains of exchanges, and note that this is a fundamental proposition for the therapy they are examining, and that one of the basic strategies of the therapist is to break down the common-sense view that actions are one thing and words another. We saw earlier that Labov wanted to make a distinction between what is said and what is done. We can now describe this as a distinction between the utterance and the speech act(s) performed by that utterance, and we can see this present claim as asserting that these speech acts (or 'speech actions') need to be placed and examined within the general matrix of inter-actions. (1977: 30 & 26, & see Goffman, 1975)

In order to understand therapeutic conversation as a form of interaction, Labov & Fanshel say that they have looked for the

largest context that conditions that interaction. They say that the conversational details of the therapy 'are seen and interpreted as they function in a series of concentric contexts, framed within the general definition of the situation' (1977: 30). A therapeutic interview is thus defined using Hymes' notion of the 'speech event': 'a routinized form of behavior, delineated by well-defined boundaries and well-defined sets of expected behaviors within those boundaries' (1977: 30 & see Hymes, 1964).

The therapeutic interview falls within the larger class of interviews in general, which are defined as speech events in which one person extracts information from another person which is in that person's biography - this being information which 'has been experienced and absorbed by that person and will be given back with a certain amount of orientation and interpretation that is conditioned by the other person's experience and orientation' (1977: 30 & 30n). In some interviews, such as surveys, journalistic interviews and police interrogations, the interviewer goes to the interviewee, whereas in medical, legal or therapeutic interviews the interviewee, as client, goes to the interviewer. Just as the initiation of the event varies, so does who is helped by it. Depending on whether it is a police interrogation, journalistic interview, school examination and so on, one or the other, and sometimes both, may be perceived to benefit. Depending on the type and character of the interview, the perceived benefit has a strong influence upon the type of verbal interaction which takes place, as does the degree of compulsion surrounding the event.

Labov & Fanshel claim that in cases like medical, legal and therapeutic interviews, where the interviewee goes for help, he or she is usually understood to benefit, and is usually paying for the service. In a therapeutic interview, the interviewee goes for help and gives information from his or her biography that will be used for that help. What is distinctive about the therapeutic interview is that this help will be given only through further talk, and unlike the lawyer or doctor, the therapist will generally not give the patient advice on what to do. (1977: 31)

The special nature of therapy leads to a number of paradoxes within the situation. Someone requiring psychotherapy is stigmatized as not fully able to care for him or herself, whereas the therapist is seen as someone who can take care of him or herself, and who can help others to take care of themselves.

> This asymmetry - the weakness of the patient and the strength of the therapist - is reinforced by any direct help that the therapist gives. This problem gives rise to the fundamental paradox of therapy. The most general goal of therapy is to bring the patient to the point at which he can function independently and no longer needs help; but can a person be taught not to need help by giving him help? (Labov & Fanshel,1977: 32)

In response to this paradox the patient may deny that help is needed or mitigate its need, and Labov & Fanshel suggest that this is one of the primary forms in which resistance to therapy appears.

This resistance in turn governs and is reflected in the discourse which occurs in therapy, as do other, secondary responses to the fundamental paradox. Because of the paradox, many areas normally and importantly unquestioned in conversation, such as feelings and experiences, loose their status as areas of the patient's personal expertise, and this leads to many of the conflicts in therapy. One effect of this is that the patient often retreats to narrative portrayal of everyday events relatively safe from contradiction (1977: 34-5).[2]

I have summarized the account of therapeutic discourse as a speech event in some detail because an understanding of the contradictions and pressures that exist in the therapeutic situation is important for an understanding of the different 'fields of discourse', with their different vocabularies and rhetorical devices, which occur in the speech event. One such field is 'the style of everyday life, in which the patient tells about the events of the preceding days in a fairly neutral, objective, colloquial style'. This style lacks both emotionally coloured and therapeutically oriented language, and contains a subvariety, called 'narrative style', where a speaker is giving an account of actual events that occurred in the past, and when there is a much sharper contrast between the reported events and the evaluation of them. A second field of discourse is 'interview style', which involves therapeutically oriented vocabulary, and in which emotions and behaviour are not expressed, but rather are evaluated as objects in themselves. In the case under study the special vocabulary of this style is mainly used by the therapist. The expression of strong emotions is generally contained in a third field, called 'family style', which can be recognized by idiom and intonation patterns used in the patient's family situation.

Labov & Fanshel represent these fields of discourse as embedded according to the following diagram:



> The fields of discourse form a natural part of the concentric frames in which the patient's behaviour is embedded. The outermost frame is the institution of psychotherapy [which effects speech behaviour in the ways outlined above]. ... Within that frame we find the therapeutic interview marked by a type of metalanguage - [interview style]. Embedded within the therapeutic interview are the narratives and discussions of everyday life, conveyed in [everyday style]. More deeply embedded in accounts of everyday life, we find brief excerpts from family style, with its characteristic linguistic features. (Labov & Fanshel,1977: 36-7)

They suggest, again following Goffman, that shifts from one frame to another are characteristic of ordinary conversation. They say that for them the recognition of distinct frames is particularly valuable because they determine so directly the linguistic forms that they will be examining. (1977: 37 & 355)

Conversations are thus studied as forming 'a complex matrix of utterances, propositions, and actions', which involves vertical relations between surface utterances and deeper actions, united by rules of interpretation and production, and horizontal relations of sequencing between actions and utterances, united by sequencing rules. The identification of these relations is tested by 'cross-sectional analysis', in which the components of the small units are identified and their internal relations shown. These cross sections are then linked in a longitudinal study of the sequencing of these verbal actions. (1977: 37 & 333-4)

This style of analysis requires the identification of units manageable enough to be subjected to analysis, and Labov & Fanshel divide the 15 minute block of conversation into five episodes. These episodes are based upon radical shifts in the overt topic or reference of the conversation, and they include some subepisodes. Within each episode, the units which are subject to

independent analysis in a cross section usually coincide with a change in speakers and an alternation of speech actions.

An important point here is that Labov & Fanshel feel that there is not any 'profound theoretical question that depends upon how small or large a unit is selected to be described as the basis for the speech act' (1977: 40). This is because the original sentences are not in any one-to-one relationship with the actions being performed. When utterances are expanded in analysis this expansion is open-ended, and cannot be terminated in any non-arbitrary manner, thus 'there always will be an arbitrary aspect to the correlation of speech units with the units of speech actions' (1977: 40).

Each cross section has four component parts: the text, the paralinguistic cues, the expansion of the text with embedded propositions, and the speech actions. The text is a transcription of the recording of the interview which tries to capture false starts, hesitation forms, self-interruptions and well-recognized, socially stereotyped dialect alterations. Labov & Fanshel note that editing the text is an open-ended process. Paralinguistic cues which are identified are tempo, volume, pitch, voice qualifiers (breathiness, glottalization, whine, etc.), significant changes in breathing (including laughter), and special idioms and lexical choices (where their expressive or nonreferential use can be separated easily from their textual significance). Some sociolinguistic variants on the phonetic level are also noted, however, they comment that most of these variables have attained a constant value in the present interaction, and that the most significant of these here is variation between '-in'' and '-ing'. Labov & Fanshel note the difficulty of coding paralinguistic cues, and as a way of partly overcoming this they make use of variable-persistence oscilloscope displays of overall amplitude and hesitation and spectrum analyzer displays of pitch contour. They say that this lack of agreement on the transcription of prosodic cues is not accidental, as it reflects the lack of clarity and discreteness of a channel of communication which is essential because it allows speakers a form of communication which is significant but deniable. (1977: 42-6)

Because of this ambiguity, even though intonation contour can be easily recognized as meaningful, it is not easy to characterize this meaning. Thus while the Yiddish 'rise-fall' intonation used by the patient in this study can be characterized as an

incredulous and aggressive request for confirmation, a pattern such as several heavy stresses in a row, while often indicating heavy implication, can also have a variety of other meanings which cannot easily be disambiguated. As well 'every individual draws differently from the repertoire of paralinguistic devices, even when he uses the same dialect features of vowels and consonants' (1977:47). In response to this situation, Labov & Fanshel have restricted themselves to a limited set of terms for the major meanings communicated by paralinguistic cues. 'Tension', 'tension release' and 'exasperation' indicate negative emotional states. 'Mitigation' and 'aggravation' evaluate an interactional move on the part of the speaker. 'Sympathy', 'derogation' and 'neutrality' evaluate an interactional move on the part of the listener. 'Formality' and 'Informality' convey overall stylistic information related to the fields of discourse. As well, a number of prosodic signals give 'reinforcement' by the listener, without interrupting the speaker and without conveying highly specific messages. (1977: 46-8)

Labov & Fanshel comment that such meanings are often necessary to account for the sequence of utterances that follow and precede a given utterance. 'If we did not attribute meaning to many of these paralinguistic cues, we would find that the discourse was incoherent at many points' (1977: 48). They acknowledge that the assignment of semantic values to paralinguistic cues is 'one of the less objective parts of the analysis', and say that while the labels they use are reasonably consistent within this study, the interpretation of the signals in different contexts can differ radically (1977: 356) The combination of text and cues gives the 'mode of expression', and the balance between text and cues varies between different styles of speech, signaling variations in the amount of indirection used. Labov & Fanshel comment that 'there is no way of stating in advance what a "normal" balance between text and cues would be, since it is highly determined by the social context of the interaction and the amount of shared knowledge between participants' (1977: 40).

The third element in the cross section is the expansion. Here, the text and cues, which have been separated through analysis from the closely interwoven state in which they occur in speech, are brought together in a synthesis of all the information which will help an understanding of the production, interpretation and sequencing of the utterance in question. There are four stages in this expansion:

1. We expand the meaning conveyed by the cues into the nearest equivalent in textual terms, according to our best understanding of it.
2. We expand and make explicit the referents of pronouns to other utterances and events in other time frames.
3. We introduce factual material that is presented before and after this utterance, sometimes from widely separated parts of the interview.
4. We make explicit some of the shared knowledge between participants, which we derive from a study of the therapeutic situation as a whole, other interviews, and the playback with the therapist. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 49-50)

Expansion is described as open-ended, with no limit to the number of explanatory facts which could be brought in from other parts of the interview. The analysis is terminated when 'it satisfies the needs of the particular analysis to follow' (1977: 356). There is thus no fixed relation between text and expansion. Nevertheless, they suggest, the notion of 'mode of expression' can include the overall proportion of text to expansion - a brief text and a long expansion perhaps indicating a heavy reliance on implicit information and heavily loaded intonation contours. A further qualification is that expansions 'magnify the strains and tensions in the social fabric and will produce distorted interpretation unless we remember that the expansion loses the important dimension of backgrounding, which subordinates one form of social interaction to another' (1977: 51).

Each expansion contains a series of propositions, which Labov & Fanshel define as 'recurrent communications'. These are either specific to the events being talked about or general to family life or the therapeutic series. They may not be explicitly stated, but can usually be found in an explicit form if we study various reports of interaction. 'They represent the cognitive component of conversational transactions; in one sense, they may be defined as "what we are talking about", or what is "really being talked about"' (1977: 51-2). The way in which propositions are related to the text is called the 'mode of argument'. Usually in therapy the propositions are not argued for directly, but rather events being talked about are taken as instances of general propositions. Also, many propositions, such as 'I am better than you', are difficult to assert explicitly. One of the goals of therapy, Labov & Fanshel suggest, is to extract and make explicit the general propositions that are implicit in the anec-

dotes and examples given by the patient. Because of this, propositions may play a more important role in therapy than in most conversation. (1977: 53 & 57)

The fourth step in the analysis is the determination of the actions being performed. Labov & Fanshel comment that the internal structure of speech actions is considerably more complex than the initial division between act and utterance seen in speech act theory. They say that a common characteristic of the more philosophical approach to speech acts is the absence of any treatment of the more abstract types of social interaction, which go beyond the linguistic structure. The crucial actions in establishing coherence of sequencing in conversation, they claim,

> are not such speech acts as requests and assertions, but rather challenges, defenses, and retreats, which have to do with the status of the participants, their rights and obligations, and their changing relationships in terms of social organization. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977:58-9)

'Interaction' is defined along these lines as 'an action which affects (alters or maintains) the relations of the self and others in face-to-face communication', and these relations are said to move along the dimensions of power and solidarity suggested by Brown & Gilman (1960). (1977: 59)

Labov & Fanshel define a speech act as an action carried out by means of speech, and say that in any all-over view, 'it is obvious that actions are more important than utterances, since it is actions that have consequences and affect people's lives'.

> In terms of meaning, the level of interaction can be defined as what is <u>really</u> meant in the deepest sense of 'really', bearing in mind that there will be many hierarchical levels of actions, and it is not always clear where the action <u>really</u> is. The action is what is <u>intended</u> in that it expresses how the speaker meant to affect the listener, to move him, to cause him to respond, and so forth. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 59)

For Labov & Fanshel, most utterances represent two or more speech actions, and the relations between these actions is 'fundamentally hierarchical: the more abstract actions are identified and interpreted through the identification of the others' (1977: 60). The speech actions they identify are restricted to those they see in operation in their study, and are divided into four groups: 'meta-linguistic', 'representations', 'requests' and

'challenges'. They note at one point that if a closed set of speech acts could be established, as has been attempted in speech act theory, it is not clear how they could be related to the set of syntactic options, that is, to possible realizations (1977: 358).

The meta-linguistic speech actions (or 'verbal interactions') have to do with the regulation of speech itself, and fall under the headings of 'initiate', 'continue' and 'end'.

Representations are divided into two groups. Those involving A-events, (as has been noted, events in the speaker's biography) will either be actions like giving information, expressing belief, uncertainty and so on, performed by A, or reinforcement or acknowledgement performed by B. Those involving D-events (disputable events) will be actions like assertion or evaluation by A, like denial or agreement by B, or like contradiction or support of A's initial position by A in response to B's response.

Requests involve initially A's action of requesting X, which could be action, information, confirmation, and so on. Then we have B's actions of giving or carrying out X or putting off the request (and these can be followed by further A-actions like acknowledgement, reinstatement or mitigation), or alternatively refusal, with or without account (and these can be followed by A-actions like renewal, acceptance or withdrawal in a 'huff').

Challenges can be direct, but are often a deeper level of interactive significance behind requests. They are any reference (asserted or by inference) to a situation, which, if true, would lower the status of the other person. As initial A-actions they can thus be challenges or questions. The B-actions in response can be defense, admission or breaking off the verbal interaction in a 'huff'. A's follow-up actions can be retreat, mitigation or aggravation.

Across these interactions apply certain modifiers that indicate how an action is performed or how actions are combined. Actions can be performed simultaneously, ambiguously, hesitantly or confidently, and they can be performed indirectly.[3]

We have already seen that indirection in conversation can be assessed according to the mode of expression (a measure of the relation between text and paralinguistic cues) and the mode of

argument (a measure of the explicitness with which propositions are embedded in the expansion). A third assessment can be made according to the mode of interaction, which reflects the extent to which the speaker uses the discourse rules of interpretation and production - the more indirect the mode of interaction, the more such rules of production and interpretation are required. A direct or indirect action can involve any balance of text and cues, and each can involve the direct expression of a proposition, so this mode is independent of the other two. As with the other two modes, Labov & Fanshel comment that they have no baseline for the total amount of indirection in ordinary conversation, although is seems, they suggest, that it is very great. (1977: 65-7 & 68f)

We now have an outline of the components making up a cross section. This cross section has two planes. The first is the plane of 'what is said'. It involves the text and cues (combined according to the mode of expression) and the expansion (containing local and general propositions embedded according to the mode of argument). The second plane is that of 'what is done', and involves the interaction component. It is a multilayered complex of speech acts, and is related to 'what is said', via rules of production and interpretation, according to the mode of interaction. (See diagram, 1977: 67-8)

Once we have produced these static cross sections of utterances, the task is to couple one utterance with another in the succession of cross sections. This involves the construction of a flow chart 'in which a number of ... cross sections are linked in a tight matrix of action and response, centering around a single topic or concern' (1977: 69). We have seen earlier the basic model of this sort of flow chart. Combined with this there need to be observations about the overall structure of an episode and the overall direction of an interview, and a tracing of the patient's and therapist's varying preoccupations with the external world of social fact and the internal world of feeling by following them through several fields of discourse, and there needs to be interpretation of where the therapist is going. However, the primary concern is with the mechanism of discourse.

The main point here is that the connections in discourse are not between utterances, but between actions.

> Sometimes one surface expression will predict the form of the next as in 'How are you?', 'I'm fine'. Yet obligatory

> sequencing is not found between utterances but between the actions which are being performed. It is not the linguistic form of interrogative which demands the linguistic form declarative, but rather requests for action which demand responses - to be complied with, put off, or refused. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 70)

Thus what is said and what is done are connected by a series of rules of interpretation and production, and the coherence of discourse lies in the connection of these speech acts (what is done) through a series of sequencing rules.

These two groups, sequencing rules, and interpretation and production rules, are called 'rules of discourse', and are outlined by Labov & Fanshel in Chapter 3, focusing primarily on rules of production and interpretation, and discussing rules required for understanding the five episode treated in their study. I shall not go into the details of this chapter, but rather concentrate on the main features of these discourse rules.

The discourse rules developed involve requests and narratives, which, along with sequencing, cover the groups of speech acts mentioned earlier. They are described as being like the rules of syntax in their unconscious, invariant character; and they are 'obligatory', meaning that 'the speaker has no choice but to interpret a given action in the same way that all the members of society would' (1977: 75). These rules <u>can</u> be violated, but their violation will cause a disturbance, sometimes obvious (and many jokes play on these violations), and sometimes below the surface and only emerging in certain circumstances.

The first group of rules dealt with are rules of requests. Requests are taken to include commands, orders, pleas, petitions, etc., where the relative status of A and B, and so their mutual rights, duties and obligations, differ. The underlying rule here covers requests for action based on the unmarked imperative form, and is similar to the earlier rule developed by Labov and noted above.

> If A addresses to B an imperative specifying an action X at a time T1, and B believes that A believes that
>
> 1a. X should be done (for a purpose Y) [<u>need for the action</u>],
>
> b. B would not do X in the absence of the request [<u>need for the request</u>],
>
> 2. B has the <u>ability</u> to do X (with instrument Z),

3. B has the obligation to do X or is willing to do it,
4. A has the right to tell B to do X,

then A is heard as making a valid request for action. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 78)

The immediate function of this rule is to distinguish valid requests for action from jokes, insults and proverbs.

The imperative mentioned in the rule will often in fact be substituted by a mitigating form, but Labov & Fanshel argue that these (e.g. 'Would you mind ...', 'Will you ...') do not operate with their literal meaning, but rather in the same way as 'please'. These 'frozen' mitigating forms can also be dealt with under the Rule for Indirect Requests. Time is often not specified in the operation of the rule; however, it operates as an obligatory category because it is necessary in the interpretation of the action requested. If it is not specified, then the time for the action is interpreted as 'right now' or 'at the first available moment', or 'always'.

The expression 'B believes that A believes' indicates that what B does 'depends upon his belief about A's intentions', which means that A's beliefs are shared knowledge, 'social facts directly accessible to both A and B' (1977: 80). The expression 'valid request for action' is described as being equivalent to a sincerity condition (the reference being to Gordon & Lakoff, 1971), but is meant to 'emphasize the objective nature of the social facts rather than implying something about the psychological state of the persons involved' (1977: 80).

A point worth making about the preconditions is that some of them may not exist until the moment of the request. For example, the request itself may make the hearer aware of the need for the request.

Labov & Fanshel feel that direct requests are in the minority. The demands of face-to-face social interaction lead to indirection through the use of mitigating devices, as is found in the Rule for Indirect Requests.

If A makes to B a request for information or an assertion about

a. the existential status of an action X to be performed by B,
b. the consequences of performing an action X,
c. the time T1 that an action X might be performed, or

d. any of the preconditions for a valid request for X as given in the Rule of Requests,

and all other preconditions are in effect, then A is heard as making a valid request of B for the action X. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 82)

Thus, just as direct requests can be mitigated, indirect requests tend to be mitigating, and Labov & Fanshel note that syntactic devices for mitigating and aggravating requests are supplemented a variety of intonational contours. They are not clear about this, but it seems that syntactic aggravation cannot extend beyond a clear direct request, other than by the addition of expletives.

Once we have these two rules we can introduce a Rule for Putting off Requests, where B responds with an assertion or a request for information about the existential status of X, or a request for information or a negative assertion about the time T1, or a request for information or a negative assertion about one of the four preconditions. Here, B is heard as putting off the request until the information is supplied or the negative assertion is contradicted. (1977: 86-7)

The rules so far cover requests for action, and Labov & Fanshel deal with requests for information, confirmation, attention, and permission by treating them as requests for specific types of action. The Rule for a Request for Information is thus,

If A addresses to B an imperative requesting information I, or an interrogative focusing on I, and B does <u>not</u> believe that A believes that

a. A has I,

b. B does not have I,

then A is heard as making a valid request for information. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 89)

This seems to be a very simple rule, but the point is that it is necessary to inspect each request for information to see if it is governed by the Rule for Indirect Requests (1977: 90). When a valid request for information is issued as a response to a previous request, it is what is termed an 'embedded request' (1977: 91).

The interactive significance of requests for information and action in actual discourse go far beyond the communicative functions discussed so far. Labov & Fanshel say that 'most of these

requests are employed to accomplish other purposes, which strongly affect the social and emotional relations of the persons involved' (1977: 93). One purpose is to challenge a person's competence in a given role. This can be done with a 'delayed request', calling attention to needs, abilities, obligations and rights which have been valid for some time, or by 'repeated requests' before B has responded (1977: 94-5). In general, a challenge is defined as,

> A speech act that asserts or implies a state of affairs that, if true, would weaken a person's claim to be competent in filling the role associated with a valued status. It therefore follows that a challenge, if successful, may result in a person's losing his claim to hold the status involved. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 97)

Often the response to a request for information has a grammatical form quite closely connected to the grammatical form of the request, or this form can be filled in by a rule of ellipsis, but in many cases discourse coherence is not obvious from the form of the sequences. We thus need a rule of implicit responses, whereby a statement by B in response to A's request is heard as an assertion that there exists a proposition which makes the statement a response. If such a proposition cannot be found, then A may reply with something like 'What's that got to do with the price of eggs?' (1977: 99). We also need rules which cover statements by A about B-events (known to B) which are heard as requests for confirmation, and statements by A about D (disputable) events, which are heard as requests for evaluation (1977: 100-102).

The rules for narratives are rather different, as they cover mainly the structuring and function of narrative (and the recognition of this), but we can pass over this material (referring back to it later where need be), and move on to the discussion of sequencing.

The first group of speech acts presented earlier concern, as was noted, the sequencing of conversational terms. Labov & Fanshel pass over them, saying that they are governed by the very general rules of conversational interaction explored by Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson (see the following chapter on conversation analysis). They say, however, that, at another level of organization, requests have their own general sequencing rules. The most important of these is that requests must be acknowledged

and responded to. If A makes a request, then B can (a) give the response requested, (b) put off the request, or (c) refuse the request, with or without accounting. In response to (a), A can acknowledge the compliance (e.g., 'Thanks) (to which B can possibly respond with a minimization, e.g., 'Don't mention it'), to (b) reinstate the request, redirect it to others, or retreat (and can at the same time mitigate or aggravate the request), and to (c) renew the request or accept the refusal (although to an unaccounted refusal A may respond with a 'huff'). (1977: 110-111)

Labov & Fanshel note that as many assertions and challenges can be further analyzed as requests of various kinds, the sequencing rules that govern them naturally follow from the sequencing rules for requests. They also make the important point that in this account, 'the rules for interpretation and production have absorbed much of the complexity that has appeared elsewhere in discussions of sequencing' (1977: 111). This claim is significant when considering the work dealt with in the following chapter, but it should also be related to the comment made in Section 1 of this chapter about Labov's discourse rules being more 'interactive' in character than Searle's, and also to Labov & Fanshel's comments (noted above) that in comparison to Searle they concentrate more on the hearer than on the speaker.

These discourse rules are presented as attempts to account for the flow of conversation as it is encountered, and their number is thus not limited. Labov & Fanshel say that the number of new rules declined as they worked their way through the episodes, but point out that if the number of discourse rules grew at the same rate as the number of conversations studied there would be little to be gained from such an analysis. (1977: 357)

The final point which Labov & Fanshel make here is that in this study they are very concerned with the nature of resistance in therapy. They say that if the therapist knew just what prevented the patient from following the suggestions that are generally agreed to, then the problem of therapy would be solved, and that they want to reach an understanding of this higher-level sequencing by examining the interaction itself. (1977: 111)

SECTION 2b.

I shall summarize Labov & Fanshel's analysis of one episode of the interview, and then link this briefly to the overall analysis. This episode, the first, has the following text:

1.1[a] R.[Rhoda]: I don't..know, whether...I--I **think** I did--
the right thing, jistalittle .. situation came up.....an' I tried to uhm.....well, try to.....use what I--what I've learned here, see if it worked.
[b] Th.[Therapist]: Mhm.
[c] R.:Now, I don't know if I did the right thing.

1.2[a] R.: Sunday..um--my mother went to my sister's again.
[b] Th.: Mm-hm.
[c] R.:And she usu'lly goes for about a day or so, like if she leaves on Sunday, she'll come back Tuesday morning. [Hm] So--it's nothing.

1.3[a] R.: But--she lef' Sunday, and she's still not home.
[b] Th.: O--oh.
[c] R.: And...I'm getting' a little nuts a'ready.

1.4[a] R.: I's...I haven't been doin' too much school work
[b] because--here this has to be done, here that has to be done,
[c] and.....I really--I'm getting tired. It-it's--I have too much to do, an' I can' con'trate on any one thing.
[d] Th.: Mhm.

1.5[a] R.: So.....it's in--its **not** that I--...I mean I--I-- I've proved that I can get along without my mother, it isn't that--I--I can't get along with**out** her, but it--
[b] I know that--when I don't have any **school**, an' she's gone away--she went away for a week, an' a **half** an'--i' didn' bother me in the leas'.
[c] Th.: Mhm.
[d] R.: But it seem that--I have jist--a little too much t'**do.**
1.6[a] R.: So at first, I wasn' gonna **say** anything. Then I remembered--that--if I keep it **in** what's bothering me
[b] Th.: Mhm.
[c] R.: then nobody else knows an' everybody thinks everything

is fine, and good
[d] Th.: Mhm.
[e] and I end up--hurting my**self.**
[f] Th.: Right!

1.7[a] R.: Which would be that if I kept letting her **stay** there and didn' say,"Look--uh--I mean y'been there long enough," I'd jus' get tired, an-nd I-I'm not doing my school work right,
[b] Th.: Mhm.

1.8 R.: An-nd so--when--I called her t'day, I said. "Well, when do you plan t'come **home**?"

1.9 R.: So she said, "Oh, why?"

1.10 R.: An-nd I said, "Well, things are getting just a little to **much!** [laugh] This is--i's jis' getting too hard, and.....I--"

1.11 R.: She s'd t'me, "Well, why don't you tell **Phillis** that?"

1.12 R.: So I said, "Well, I haven't talked to her lately."

1.13 R.: And--uh...I'm just gonna **tell** her.

1.14 R.: Now.....I **think** I did the right **thing**, I think that--

1.1[a] here is the first thing said in the session. There is no settling-in, and the therapist in a playback session says that this had become standard in the therapy. She says that she waits for Rhoda to start, and that Rhoda does it because 'she knows what her responsibilities are' (1977: 123). 1.1[a] is marked by hesitation and difficulty in getting the words out (each period indicates a half-second, a comma indicates a 'comma' intonation, and a dash indicates a sudden break or self-interruption; 'jist-alittle' indicates rapid, condensed delivery). There are a number of obscure references, which need to be filled out in the expansion, and also a significant ambiguity with 'right'. Two important propositions seem to be operating here: [1] 'I think I did the right thing', and [S] 'One should express one's needs and emotions to relevant others', which is a proposition central to the therapy; this leads to [1] being filled out as 'Rhoda carried

out [S] correctly'. Another underlying proposition seems to be [INT-TH], 'the therapist interprets the emotions of others'. The field of discourse of 1.1 is interview style. The cross section which is constructed here is as follows:

1.1

TEXT	CUES
R.: I don't..know whether...I--I **think** I did--the right thing jistalittle..situation came up.....an' I tried to uhm.... well, try to.....use what I-- what I've learned here, see if it worked.	Tension: hesitation, self-interruption; uneven tempo; condensation and long silences, 3 and 4 sec.

EXPANSION

I am not sure, but I claim that [1] I did what you say is right, or [?1] what may actually be right, when [4] I asked my mother to help me by coming home after she had been away from home longer than she usually is, creating some small problems for me, and I tried to use the principle that I've learned from you here, [S] that I should express my needs and emotions to relevant others, and see [?S] if this principle worked.

INTERACTION

R. initiates the session in Interview Style [IVS] by referring <S to the previous suggestion of the therapist and an incident from everyday life and asserting I> that she did right in carrying out [S] thereby asserting S>. She simultaneously expresses uncertainty about her assertion, ambiguously questioning <?I> that she carried out [S] correctly and questioning <?S> that [S] is appropriate, thereby challenging <?INT-TH> the competence of the therapist. (see Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 117-127)

The interaction arrows indicate the relations of the actions performed here to the sequencing rules that may be operating, connecting one cross section with another. Reference is a backward-operating action, not containing in itself immediate consequences for the next action to be performed. Assertions are forward looking, as they do contain consequences for the next action. Questions contain both the act of reference to a previous event or statement and the demand for a reply; and challenges are also double-faced. Labov & Fanshel note that this expresses the overlapping character of speech actions, and that the inclusion of past as well as present events in the semantic interpretation differentiates their approach from those modes of analyses that

define speech actions by isolating individual utterances. (1977: 127)

The main discourse rule operating in this initial utterance is the Rule for Challenging Propositions, in which 'If A asserts a proposition that is supported by A's status, and B questions the proposition, then B is heard as challenging the competence of A in that status'. This operates from the ambiguous questioning of whether Rhoda did the right thing or whether the thing Rhoda did was the right thing to do. The second side of this ambiguity leads to [?S], and this, via the rule, leads to [?INT-TH]. Labov & Fanshel comment that whether this ambiguity is conscious or not is not important, and that what is more relevant is its interactive significance (see 1977: 126f).

In 1.1[b] the therapist does not respond to either Rhoda's assertion that she did the right thing (or her doubting of that) or the implicit challenge. She simply offers 'Mhm', which has a pitch contour of 231 (see fig.9: 128), indicating neutral reinforcement, and having the interactive function of giving support (1977: 128-9). This leads to 1.1[c], which has the cues of 'tension release: fast tempo, falling contour', and the interactive function of repeating 1.1[a] with more confidence, seemingly in response to the support offered by the therapist (1977: 129).

In 1.2[a] Rhoda begins to recount the events referred to in 1.1, using Narrative Style, as a part of Everyday Style, thus using continuous speech without pause, which is rapid and has level intonation, and which has an unmarked vocabulary with few effective or evaluative expressions (see 1977: 129-30). This is interrupted at 1.2[b] by the therapist's 'Mm-hm'. It has a 'level falling contour' distinct from the rise and fall of 1.1[b], which is given the meaning 'expected sympathy'. The expansion is 'Not again! That's too bad', and the interactive component is 'sympathetic support'. This interpretation is partly aided by Rhoda's continuation in 1.2[c]. It begins even before the therapist's response is ended, and is marked by formality and the use of '-ing', rather than '-in'. It thus seems to be at once a recognition and a rejection of the therapist's sympathy. The expansion of 1.2[c] is therefore:

> <iv <n My mother has often gone away before for only two days, and [~STRN] I haven't had any trouble because I am an adult [AD-R] >n so it's nothing for me to be worried about when my mother goes away for only two days, and sympathy

isn't necessary. >iv
(The angled brackets, <>, enclose fields of discourse. iv stands for interview style, and n for narrative style. The proposition [STRN] is that 'Rhoda's obligations are greater than her capacity' (and so [~STRN] is its denial), and [AD-R] is 'Rhoda is an adult member of the household'. Both are important propositions in Rhoda's therapy.) (1977: 130-136)

The interaction component of this cross section is: 'R. gives evaluation of narrative thus far as not requiring sympathy, thereby asserting AD-R> her adult status and thereby refusing support'.

In 1.3 Rhoda explains, in Narrative Style, why her mother's absence on this occasion is causing problems, and the therapist gives strong sympathetic support (1.3[b]) with an expression showing a 242 pitch contour (see 1977: 138), translated as 'surprised sympathy' and expanded as 'Oh! It's **that** bad!', before Rhoda continues, dropping into Family Style, to express her frustration and confusion.

Through 1.4 and 1.5 Rhoda continues her narrative, showing tension and exasperation as she explains that the obligations she is under are extreme, and mean that her inability to cope, [STRN] is not because she is not an adult member of the household, which causes her to tire easily (as her mother asserts) <~(~AD-R:TIRE)> but because of external circumstances <X:STRN> (the colon indicates a causal relationship). Through this, at 1.4[d] and 1.5[c], the therapist gives support with prosodic features of 'neutral reinforcement. (1977: 140-5)

In 1.6 and 1.7 Rhoda dives an evaluation of her situation and her proposal for remedying it. The interaction in 1.6 is:

> R. continues the narrative with reconstructions of her thoughts as events, giving external evaluation in interview style within the narrative of everyday life, thereby asserting 1> her behaviour was governed by the suggestion [S] learned in therapy, thereby requesting approval <> from the therapist. Th. gives progressively stronger support.

And similarly in 1.7:

> R. gives further evaluation of the narrative, by role playing her forthcoming request to her mother, asserting 2> that her mother's secondary obligations have been fulfilled, thereby asserting 3> that her mother's primary obligat-

ions are being neglected, thereby challenging ?HEAD-Mo> her mother's role performance, and thereby requesting 4> that her mother come home thereby asserting again <I> that she was about to carry out the suggestion [S] of therapy. Th. reinforces at a high level. (1977: 145-153)

From 1.8 to 1.13 the focus changes, as Rhoda reports the actual interaction with her mother. Up until now we have been looking at what has been mainly narrative, involving relatively little interaction (which should not discount the importance, for Labov & Fanshel's analysis, of the therapist's expressions, or of the interactive tensions, between Rhoda and the therapist, involved). But with the analysis of the narrative of the interaction between Rhoda and her mother the discourse rules come much more into play.

The first point about the request reported by Rhoda in 1.8 is that it is more mitigating than that in 1.7[a]. Both use the Rule for Indirect Requests outlined earlier, but 1.7[a] is a statement about her mother's need to be away from home, while 1.8 is a question about the time she might return, and statements are generally less mitigating than interrogatives. While both imply a challenge to the mother's role as head of household, 1.7 uses the Rule of Overdue Obligations, in which 'If A asserts that B has not performed obligations in a role R, then A is heard as challenging B's competence in R'. This is much more direct than the Rule of Delayed Requests used in 1.8, in which 'If A makes a request for B to take an action in role R, based on needs, abilities, obligations, and rights which have been valid for some time, then A is heard as criticizing B's competence in role R'. The interactive component of this cross section can thus be compared with that for 1.7 given above.

R. continues the narrative, and gives information to support her assertion I> that she carried out the suggestion [S]. R. requests information on the time that her mother intends to come home and thereby requests indirectly 4> that her mother come home, thereby carrying out the suggestion [S], and thereby challenging her mother indirectly <?HEAD-Mo> for not performing her role as head of the household properly, simultaneously admitting <STRN her own limitations and simultaneously asserting again I> that she carried out the suggestion [S]. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 155-162)

Rhoda's mother's response in 1.9 is very brief, but complex. It shows a dramatic break in surface structure, and cannot be connected to 1.8 by regular rules of ellipsis; but at a deeper level it has a pitch contour of 212, defined as 'heavy implication' or 'there's more to this than meets the eye'. It is expanded by,

> R.:<n So my mother said to me, <f "Oh, I'm surprised; why are you asking me when I plan to come home, and do you have a right to ask that? There's more to this than meets the eye: Isn't it that [~AD-R] you can't take care of the household by yourself and I shouldn't have gone away in the first place, as I've told you before?">f>n

This expansion is aided by later reports on the interaction by Rhoda, in one of which she quotes her mother as saying explicitly **'See, I told you so'**. Labov & Fanshel feel that 1.9 is probably more accurate, because she and her mother are rarely this explicit, and because in a third retelling she just reports 'Oh!', concentrating on the intonation contour. Thus 'See, I told you so', would seem to be Rhoda's interpretation of her mother's expression. On top of this there is a context of family propositions about Rhoda's tendency to tire because of her anorexia.

On the interactive plane, Rhoda's mother makes use of the Rule of Embedded Requests, in which 'If A makes a request for action of B, and B responds with a request for information, B is heard as asserting that he needs this information in order to respond to A's request'. But while this demonstrates the coherence of the response, it is a request for information which is already known, so we now invoke the Rule of Redundant Responses, in which 'If A makes a request for action of B, and B responds with a request for information which A and B know B does not need, then B is heard as provisionally refusing the request'. We can now give the interaction component of the mother's response to Rhoda's challenge and admission as,

> Mother asks R. for <? further information which she already has, thereby putting off R.'s request for action and for help <~4,~S and asserts indirectly that she knows that the answer to her own question is that R. is asking for help because she cannot perform the obligations of household, thereby <~?AD-R> challenging R.'s status as an adult member of the household. (See 1977: 162-167)

Labov & Fanshel think that Rhoda has three possible responses to 1.9. She could ignore the intonation and respond to the

request for information; she could denounce her mother's request for information as irrelevant and insist on a response to her request; or she could ignore her mother's request for information and respond instead to the implication of the intonation contour. Her actual response in 1.10 ('An-nd I said, "Well, things are getting just a little too **much!** [laugh] This is--i's jis' getting too hard, and.....I--"') shows a return to features of tension seen in her Interview Style - hesitation, glottalization, and silence - and as well there is the nervous laughter. We thus get the following expansion:

> R.: <nAnd then I said to my mother, <f "Maybe I shouldn't have asked [4] you to come home, but [STRN] all the jobs I have are too much for me to carry out with the strength that I have".>f>n

1.10 is defensive. It argues that external circumstances are the cause of her immediate problem - and certainly not the behaviour of her family. As such, Labov & Fanshel say, it is the weakest of the possible responses, but it avoids family conflict. The reference to external circumstances is significant, because in earlier cases where Rhoda asserts [STRN] (1.4, 1.6 and 1.7) the first person pronoun is involved as subject or object, whereas in 1.10 Rhoda does not appear as directly involved, and impersonal circumstances are invoked - thus she indirectly asserts that while she is affected, the problem lies outside. This proposition is represented as [X:STRN].

By responding to the superficial request for information ('Why are you asking ...?') by saying things are too much for her, Rhoda has used the Rule for Reinstating Requests, in which 'If B has responded to a request for action from A by making a request for information, and A gives the information requested, then A is heard as making the original request again'. So we get the following interaction component:

> R. gives the information requested by her mother by asserting 2 that her obligations are greater than her capacity, thereby reinstating her request <4> that her mother should come home and thereby asserting indirectly <X:STRN> that external circumstances are the cause of this, thereby responding hesitantly to her mother's challenge <?~AD-R>. (1977: 168-171)

While her use of the Rule for Reinstating Requests has successfully returned the problem to her mother, in the course of doing this Rhoda has made herself vulnerable. She has had to state explicitly that she cannot cope, and her defense to the under-

lying challenge is weak and indirect. If she had responded with the imagined request in 1.8 she would have used the second available tactic suggested above, and would have put the blame onto her mother, and if she had used the third tactic of responding to the intonation contour (which, in a later section of the interview, which is not analyzed, Rhoda actually puts forward as a better possibility) her mother would have been faced with a different kind of challenge.

As it is, her mother's 'Why don't you tell **Phyllis** that?' (Phyllis is Rhoda's sister, with whom her mother is staying) enables her to put off the request to come home and the request for help again (Rule for Putting Off Requests) by saying that she should have asked her sister and implying that she (the mother) does not have the ability to do what is asked (denying precondition 2 of the Rule of Requests). (1977: 171-3)

Rhoda could have responded by rejecting her mother's refusal in 1.11, by denying that she should have told Phyllis, or by asserting that her mother is the right person to ask. But instead she says, in 1.12, 'Well, I haven't talked to her lately'. This immediately falls into the Rule for Admitting Presuppositions: 'If A responds to a request for information from B by giving that information, without specifically mentioning the presuppositions of the request, then B admits those presuppositions'. Her mother has begged the question, and Rhoda has accepted the fact. The interaction component here is:

> R. gives information requested by her mother, thereby agreeing with her mother's assertion that the request should have been made to R.'s sister, thereby agreeing that her mother's assertion that her original request for action and help <~ 4,5 were inappropriate, thereby retreating from these requests, thereby <~ 1 contradicting her original assertion that she had carried out the therapist's suggestion. ((1977: 173-5)

Labov & Fanshel present a diagram of the sequencing of Rhoda's narratives in 1.8 to 1.12, which captures the relationship of the acts performed here.



(Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 176)

Rhoda's next remark, 'And--uh...I'm just gonna **tell** her' (1.13) displays tension and is ambiguous as to whether it is part of the narrative or a comment on it. We thus have two possible expansions:

R.: <iv I'm telling you that I'm positively going to tell my mother next time I come home that I think - it's up to her to decide to come home, in spite of what she might think or say.>iv

or

R.: <n I said to my mother, <f I certainly will tell Phyllis that [4] I want you to come home when I get a chance to talk to her next as you suggest. >f >n

And this leads to the following interaction component:

R. ambiguously asserts that she will make her original request <4> to her mother again and carry out again <5> the suggestion of the therapist, or gives more information on her narrative that she agreed with her mother that she will redirect her original request <4> to her sister.

Labov & Fanshel comment that the ambiguity here permits Rhoda to blur the actual outcome of the narrative, asserting implicitly that it did not make any difference. They say also that the ambiguity is systematic.

> In one sense, it means that it is not clear whether Rhoda succeeded or not in carrying out the suggestion of the therapist; in the other sense, it is not exactly clear that the suggestion did not work. On careful analysis, we can see that it did not, but the narrative manages successfully to obscure this point. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 178 & see 177-8)

Rhoda's final utterance in this episode involves a restatement of her initial assertion. It displays tension release, with fast tempo and strong articulation. In terms of Labov & Fanshel's analysis of narrative, it is a 'coda', bringing us back to the present through the repetition. The therapist shows that she recognizes this by interrupting Rhoda with the comment that begins the next episode, and the therapist's comment, an evaluation of what Rhoda did, is also a response to Rhoda's utterance as a request. For 1.14 brings into play the Rule of Disputable Assertions. Here, 'If A makes an assertion about a D-event, it is heard as a request for B to give an evaluation of that assertion'. The interaction component of 1.14 is thus:

> R. signals completion of her narrative by repeating the assertion <1> in the same words as 1.1[c], thereby giving information that she has completed her justification of this assertion, thereby requesting indirectly the therapist to give evaluation. (1977: 178-9)

SECTION 2c.

The analysis of this first episode is the only one which will be presented in detail. Through it, however, a good idea can be gained of the style of Labov & Fanshel's cross-sectional analysis, and this method is repeated in the four other episodes. I want now to look at the way the overall session is treated, and at the general theoretical points which arise from the complete analysis. However, before doing so it may be worthwhile sketching

the direction which the following four episodes take.

In Episodes Two and Three the therapist takes the initiative. At the beginning of Episode Two she gives the approval asked for at the end of Episode One (that is, responds to the request behind one side of 'I think I did the right thing'), and then immediately responds to the implicit challenge, asking, with irritation, 'Well, what's your question' (on the interpretation of this, see 1977: 182-4). She then, without allowing a response, asserts that Rhoda has a lot of guilt, and that she does have a full schedule at school. Then, again without allowing a response, she asks Rhoda about getting help from her aunt, who lives with her and her mother. The rest of this episode and the next consist of Rhoda explaining through narrative why asking her aunt for help is a waste of time, and of the therapist reasking the question and trying to draw into the conversation the position of Rhoda's aunt in the household. The therapist comments during playback sessions with the analysts (and implies in the interview) that Rhoda's assessment of and response to her aunt parallels that of her mother towards Rhoda herself (see, 1977: 208-9).

In Episode Four Rhoda moves back onto her own status in the household, and the therapist takes this opportunity to go into the details of her mother's stay with her sister. The main point which is brought out of this material is that Rhoda continually blames her sister, rather than her mother, for the problem.

Episode Five begins with the therapist drawing a parallel between Rhoda's family's response to her claim that she is independent (of witholding all help) and Rhoda's response to her family's claim that she ate too much (of stopping eating altogether). Rhoda's response to this suggestion is silence (defined as a complete reservation or repression of speech). The therapist then says explicitly that Rhoda stopped eating '**entire**ly' when 'they said' she shouldn't be eating so much, to which Rhoda makes a low, monotone attempt to speak ('Well, when I said I could get along without my mother,') which is interrupted by the therapist finishing her utterance ('The other--she--she's making you get along en**tire**ly, without her...'). After this Rhoda presents her sister as the cause of her problems, and rejects her sister's claim, but also implicitly the therapist's, that she doesn't eat enough. The therapist challenges Rhoda's assertion here by claiming that she is not really sure herself that her weight is not

the cause of her tiredness. Rhoda rejects this, but uncertainly, and the therapist tries to get Rhoda to recognize the emotions (specifically anger) she and her family feel towards each other, and the part of the session under analysis ends with her (the therapist) saying explicitly that 'So there's a lot of **anger** passing back and forth', to which Rhoda agrees hesitantly.

Each of these five episodes is marked, on the one hand by concentration on a distinct topic, and on the other by the explicit initiative of the therapist's intervention (at least for Episodes Two to Five). These topics and interventions also serve to link the episodes, reflecting as they do Rhoda's everyday life, as raw material, and the therapist's therapeutic aims, as interventions. (see 1977: 330-332)

SECTION 3: EVALUATING DISCOURSE ANALYSIS.

As has been noted, Labov & Fanshel's central claim is that what is said should be distinguished from what is done, and that the fundamental coherence of conversation is reflected in connections between actions rather than connections between utterances. They say that in many ways speech actions can be seen as 'more fundamental or more central to human behaviour' than what is actually said (1977: 333). This claim, which they present as central to their approach to discourse, constitutes the most important link between their work and that considered in the earlier chapters.

We saw in the discussion of Austin that his fundamental point is that we should study the things we do - the acts we perform - with utterances, and that we should study speech in its context of utterance. With Grice we found an analysis of meaning, not in terms of the meaning of our words, but in terms of the acts we intend to perform by our utterances; and Searle offers a criticism and a synthesis of these two views. Here, Austin's acts are grounded in the expression of propositions whose meaning is constituted by the intentionality of the subject, and the performance of speech acts is analyzed according to rules accounting for the shared knowledge and assumptions of speakers. There seem to be many connections between these approaches and the work presented in this chapter, and the question immediately arises as to whether the approach developed by Labov & Fanshel suffers from the problems which I have argued beset

philosophical pragmatics.

The first step in answering this question is to consider those ways in which Labov & Fanshel's approach differs, for they appear to be significant. The first of these differences has already been noted, and lies in the nature of discourse rules. Whereas for Searle the success of a speech act depends on the speaker getting the hearer to recognize his or her illocutionary intentions, Labov & Fanshel regard the speaker's utterance as contributing only a small part to the shared knowledge required for the recognition of an act. They claim that 'most of the information needed to interpret actions is already to be found in the structure of shared knowledge and not in the utterances themselves' (1977: 82). The importance of this is that it may avoid the structural isolation of subjects which seems to cripple the philosophical pragmatics we have looked at.

A second difference, connected to the first, is that Labov & Fanshel construct their rules so as to confront directly the context of an utterance. Because the recognition of shared knowledge is written into the interpretation of utterances, Austin's injunction to deal with the context of utterance is carried out, something which neither he nor Searle fully succeed in doing.

Labov & Fanshel also treat more abstract types of social interaction as speech acts. They claim that coherence lies more crucially at the level of challenges, defenses and retreats than at that of requests and assertions. This is connected with the fact that they analyze utterances into a hierarchy of acts which cohere in a matrix (1977: 29 & 60), and the recognition of the complexity of the relation between utterances and acts seems to lie behind their doubts regarding the establishment of a closed set of speech acts (see 1977: 358). Interaction is thus analyzed in terms of rights, obligations, role and status, and so linked with the structure and structuring of social organization (1977: 58-9). This again seems to overcome serious limitations noted in the work discussed previously.

A central problem in philosophical pragmatics is that the model of interaction which is set up relies on the notion of a communicative subject which underlies communication and constitutes meaning through its intentionality. Such a subject, operating as foundational in the explanation of language, appears to be isolated, in the sense that it is analytically prior to comm-

unication and is not conditioned in any way by communication as interaction. What the subject means, which is construed in terms of intentionality and is seen as arising within the prior subject, can only be linked to the language in which it is expressed by intentions, which 'translate' intentionality into language. As we have seen with Grice and Searle, this linkage is theorized through an equivocal use of 'meaning', and without this equivocation no link is possible between intentionality and language, and communication becomes impossible.

Labov & Fanshel's speech act does seem at first not to be dependent on a foundational intentionality; that is, it appears that intentionality is arrived at by analysis by the hearer, and that it is not the foundation of interpretation. But when we look more closely we find that this is not the case. The action, or the interaction, is arrived at through an interpretation of the expansion of text and cues via rules of interpretation. The expansion which is interpreted is constructed by bringing together implicit and explicit shared knowledge, in the form of propositions. This seems fine. But the level of interaction, the meaning of the utterance, is constituted by the speaker's intentions, and these intentions, as with Grice and Searle, are outside the analysis. We can analyze the utterance into the interaction, but the interaction is unexplainable. It is simply what the speaker means/intends to do.

The problem here can be seen in Labov's earlier formulation of the model of discourse (a model which is carried into the work with Fanshel). We saw in Section 1 that for Labov discourse begins with the speaker's intention to perform an action (see Labov, 1972a: 123), and the model which follows from this amounts to discourse participants' intentions being coded into and decoded from language (the utterances) via production and interpretation rules. Such a model, which reduces language to a medium, seems inadequate.

Turning to discourse rules themselves, we find the model repeated. For the basis of each is the mutual recognition of belief and intention, and while it is an improvement to write B's recognition into the rule, there is no mechanism or criterion for this recognition. The recognition is the basis and presupposition of each rule, and no argument is given as to how this prior intersubjectivity could possibly arise.

This problem is also related to Labov & Fanshel's hierarchization of meaning/speech acts. An utterance can be the expression of a number of acts, but these acts have a hierarchy, and what we want to get to in our analysis is what is 'really meant'. We may not be able to reach it, but it exists as the originating act, at the core of the analysis - and its foundation, the guarantee of what is really meant, is the speaker's intentionality (and it is worth remembering here Austin's comments regarding tracing a chain of acts). This is made clear in the following passage.

> In terms of meaning, the level of interaction can be defined as what is <u>really</u> meant in the deepest sense of 'really', bearing in mind that there will be many hierarchical levels of actions, and it is not always clear where the action really is. The action is what is <u>intended</u> in that it expresses how the speaker meant to effect the listener, to move him, to cause him to respond, and so forth. (Labov & Fanshel 1977: 59. Emphasis their's.)

With this we see a repetition of the problems we found with Grice and Searle. The action as the 'real' <u>expression</u> of what the speaker meant, of how the speaker meant to effect the listener, becomes another surface of another depth. What is said, the utterance, is the expression of what is done, the action; and this action is the expression of what is meant, the intention. So in order to satisfy us Labov & Fanshel need to offer an analysis of this second relation, of meaning and expression; but this is impossible, and necessarily impossible, for intentionality, while operating as the basis of interaction, has to operate as the unifying core of meaning. If it <u>were</u> opened up to analysis it would, given the approach we find here, have to lead us to yet another depth, as its core.

It would be a mistake to ignore a certain ambivalence here. In connection with the implicit challenge in 1.1[a] Labov & Fanshel say that 'the question of speaker's conscious <u>intentions</u> (or the presence of "unintended effects") does not play a significant role in our analysis'. They suggest, by analogy with grammatical studies, that awareness of verbal processing is quite limited (1977: 126-7). The point to be made in response to this is that this comment occurs in possibly the only section of the analysis where the hierarchy of acts is not invoked in a search for a unitary 'real meaning'. It operates in finding the challenge, but it does not subordinate one side of the ambiguity (Rhoda questioning herself) to the other (Rhoda questioning the

therapist).

It does appear, however, that even if Labov & Fanshel's discourse analysis relies on the unitary, isolated subject as its foundation they at least offer an understanding of language use as tied up in the structures of social organization, and so allow pragmatics to confront the politics of discourse. Because of their hierarchy they recognize and analyze coherence at the level of challenge, support, and so on, as it affects role and status. They understand interaction as action which affects the relations of the self and others, and they treat these relations in terms of power and solidarity. This seems to offer something crucial, and lacking up until now. But the hope is not fulfilled.

If we construe politics as that aspect of social interaction which involves (or as social interaction when seen as) the invocation and contestation of roles, rights, obligations and status, then an approach such as Labov & Fanshel's, which analyzes speech in terms of action and interaction, and takes this level as necessarily involving role, status, and so on, seems to confront this politics as it operates in discourse. But because their analysis takes interaction as the expression of intention, and as being defined by intention, those political relations are continually viewed as an outside, taken up through interaction by the intentionality of a pre-given, unifying subject.

The problem is that while interaction is seen as affecting relations of power, it is treated as being outside those relations. Interactions or actions are done by the subject so as to affect these relations. Interaction, or discourse, is a tool used in the constructions of these relations. But it is not part of these relations: crucially, it is not constituted by these relations. It is constituted instead by the intentionality of the subject. Interaction is the object of analysis, in the search for what is really meant (the truth), and this meaning lies outside politics. So the analysis towards interaction does not reach anything like a social interactive depth, but instead the depth of the subject as the true foundation of intended inter-action.

The same thing happens with the notion of implicit propositions expanded from text and cues. We can see these as a theoretical concept which allows the analysis of the way meaning is governed by the operation of propositions or assumptions which inter discourse (according to the mode of argument) as an un-

avoidable background. These might be consciously invoked by speakers, but also and more interestingly they (both local and general propositions) are invoked by the discourse in which subjects are taken up. But the propositions are also taken as lying outside the intentionality of linguistic subjects. The analysis works through these propositions, on the plane of what is said, to interaction as what is done, and because of this, propositions tend to be taken as a resource, taken up in the satisfaction of intentions.

It would seem to be more useful to claim instead that these propositions, embedded in the total speech act and operating as shared knowledge, embody definitions and explanations of, and the possibilities of relations among, both the subjects engaged in discourse and the social facts occurring in that discourse. Seen in this way, these propositions are not so much, or not simply, a resource of linguistic subjects, but rather enter into (in varying ways) the constitution of the intentionality with which they engage in discourse.

Thus, we could argue that meaning arises within the social-political relations and presuppositions which surround and define discourse, and that ignoring the role of these relations and presuppositions in the operation and construction of discourse leads both to the impossible model seen in the two preceding chapters and to an inability to deal with large areas of discourse phenomena.

As has been noted, one of the things which is valuable about Labov & Fanshel's analysis is that at one level it shows us how discourses <u>are</u> tied up in politics, or relations of power. Not just in that they point out that the relation of the participants in a given speech event governs to a certain extent the nature of the discourse which takes place - although this in itself is important - but in that the interaction they present displays itself as the site of a struggle over status, role and rights (as they acknowledge) <u>through</u> a struggle over the meaning of acts. What we see in the interactions between Rhoda and the therapist and Rhoda and her family is that the meaning of their acts, what they really mean, is not there-to-be-discovered, but rather is constituted, at one level, through the interaction and within the relations of the participants. Speech acts are effective, but only given a certain meaning, and this meaning arises within the matrix of acts which condition that act. It does not arise in the

unanalyzable intentionality which constitutes the self-awareness of an a priori subject.

But unless we are to be left with merely discussing 'the politics of ... the family, therapy, the classroom', and so on, as more or less isolated sites of interpersonal contestation, it seems that we need to adopt a conception of the politics of discourse, as embodying, and being effective in the construction of, a complex matrix of general political relations, of which particular instances such as these form a part, and which also involve the definition and construction of the subjectivities which engage in discourse.

The point which develops from this is that the speech event does not just govern the language occurring and the constitution of meaning. It also, but because of this, is effective in the constitution of the subjects found here. At a general level this is to say that the speech event constitutes the therapist as therapist and Rhoda as client. Comments by Labov & Fanshel noted earlier appear to be an acknowledgement of this (see esp. 1977: 32). However, they fail to follow through (and they develop a system of analysis which excludes following this through) from the recognition of the fundamental contradiction of therapy to an understanding that this relation and its interactive outcome brings about (and is brought about by) a consciousness and a self-consciousness of the relation. That is, it occurs as a relation of constituted subjects. Certainly, the subjectivities arising in the interview occur as elements in a complex, sometimes contradictory, structuring of the self (Rhoda is not just the therapeutic subject), but in the situation being analyzed this aspect of the resulting matrix is crucial, and we need to be aware of its existence.

Part of this point is implicitly acknowledged by Labov & Fanshel, when they refer, in the construction of their expansions, to the therapist's assessment of meaning in playback sessions. The point is not, of course that it would have been better if they had asked Rhoda as well.

This leads into a further relation here which has so far not been discussed. This is the relation of Labov & Fanshel themselves, as social scientists, to the interaction they interpret, and is the other level at which meaning is constituted. They present themselves as trying to discover what is <u>really going on</u> in the

interview, what the speakers really mean, but to do this is to invoke a further discourse with its own relations of power, the discourse of social science, or the discourse of discourse analysis.

Thus the relation of power invoked by this discourse also acts to govern the meaning of its object, through its 'discovery'. I am not here referring to the observer's paradox (see 1977: 335n.), but rather to the point, in the interpretation of what is really meant, at which the impossible task of taking account of the total context of an utterance (see 1977: 73, 356 & 357-8) is ended, and meaning is assigned. This point constitutes the focus of the relations of roles, rights and power involved in the discourse, and the concern relating to it has been at play from the the first chapter, when Austin first invoked the total speech act in the total speech situation as the object of analysis.

Just as the model which we have seen developed so far treats meaning as unified and determined by the a priori and unitary subject, so the analysis of interaction which uses this model supposes the possibility of interpretation as a truth flowing from the intentionality of their own theoretical relation, as social science, to their object. There is a truth, or real meaning, lying within the linguistic/social subject, and this can be represented in the pure intentionality of social science.

None of this is to claim that Labov & Fanshel deny or distort the 'real meaning' of the interaction or what the participants 'really mean', for to claim this would be to invoke again the semantic foundation found in the intentionality of the pure subject. It is to claim that a given text or utterance can only have meaning given a certain interactive relation, and that this relation needs to be taken into account.

CONCLUSION.

There are of course other approaches within discourse analysis. Important amongst these is the work done by the so-called Birmingham group, and given more space it may have been worthwhile comparing the approach initiated by Labov with that found in Sinclair & Coulthard (1975) (where they analyze classroom interaction) and its development (see Coulthard, Montgomery &

Brazil, 1981, and Coulthard & Brazil, 1981).

Given these restrictions, however, such a comparison is not really justified. This approach does seem to share the basic presuppositions of discourse analysis noted by Levinson (1983: 286) (although there is a wariness regarding the concept of well-formedness which Levinson does not acknowledge - see Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975: 120 & Coulthard & Brazil, 1981: 82-6), however, there is a disinclination to explicitly address questions of meaning and subjectivity. This tends to leave the approach at a somewhat descriptive level, and while contextual factors and relations of power are noted as important, they do not find their way into the actual system of analysis. Where the implications of their approach <u>are</u> filled out we find a repetition of the constituting a priori subject, so that 'each individual constructs his private linguistic universe, and through his utterances gives hints as to its nature' (Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975: 130). Interactive relations of power are then discussed with this subject presupposed (see Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975: 130-2).

A similar point can be made regarding Burton (1980, 1981). She does develop an approach out of the work initiated in Sinclair & Coulthard which attempts to confront the interactive aspects of discourse phenomena, and which also works with examples of casual conversation. This second development may have effected the first, since the Birmingham approach was developed with material in which the situation defines the interaction fairly rigorously, so that its operation as a discourse phenomenon is less obvious (compare Burton's comments - 1981: 61-2). The most significant development by Burton is that she introduces the notion of a 'challenging move' (a move is roughly equivalent to a speech act) based on Labov's Rule for Requests (Burton, 1980: 150-2, & 1981: 71-2). This allows a further dimension to the study of discourse, in which factors such a role and status can be introduced to the analytic model. It does not, however, escape the presuppositions and limitations of Labov's approach. Nonetheless, given more space, a study of Burton's work (along with the other Birmingham work) would prove valuable.

I commented in the introduction to this chapter that different approaches to discourse analysis vary considerably in their details, and one should thus be wary of generalizing from the limitations found in that approach which derives from Labov's work. On the other hand, other practitioners of discourse analy-

sis do not distance themselves from the crucial positions (from my point of view) adopted in this material. Thus Labov's approach can be seen as a model of the major presuppositions of discourse analysis. As I have said, these presuppositions center on the assumption of an a priori, unitary subject, using language as a tool or medium for the expression of intentions, intentions which precede discourse and act as a foundation for unified and determinate meaning. This assumption leads, first, to an unworkable model of communication, since understanding a speaker's meaning presupposes recognition of the speaker's intentions, and the only mechanism for this recognition is a rule of discourse, which itself is grounded in this recognition. Secondly, this assumption leads to an inability to account for the construction of meaning through interaction, and a subsequent refusal to recognize the role of the discourse analyst in this construction of meaning. These problems have been noted with regard to philosophical pragmatics, but the value of an examination of discourse analysis is that the social/political/interpersonal issues surrounding questions of language use are brought into much sharper focus, and the effects of cashing-out the assumptions of philosophical pragmatics can be emphasized.

Discourse analysis has also been criticized from within linguistic pragmatics. This criticism, and an alternative to discourse analysis which follows from it, shall be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER SIX
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION.

The work discussed in the previous five chapters represents various approaches to an attempt to develop a pragmatic account of language, and perhaps the central characteristic of this work lies in its concentration of what is done in saying something rather than simply on what is said. Following from this is an analysis in terms of the actions - speech acts - which are realized in the surface features of discourse, and an examination of the rules governing the production and interpretation of these actions and the communicative functions they perform. In general, such an examination then leads to a final analysis in terms of the intentionality seen as lying behind these actions, supplying their foundation and defining them.

These features of the pragmatics so far discussed seem to involve what can be characterized as a depth analysis of discourse. That is, by taking the surface features of discourse as the realization of abstract acts, and by taking the coherence of discourse as lying, not in the relation of the surface features, but in the relation of the acts expressed by these features, analysis focusses on this deeper level of action, which is interpreted from the surface features. Meaning is seen as being found in and constituted through this second level of discourse, and thus meaning becomes a function, not of surface semantic features, but of actions performed in and expressed through a context of utterance which is construed as the total speech situation. This speech situation is presupposed by the rules according to which speech acts are performed, and it is the context according to which speech acts make sense.

I have criticized this approach on two general levels. First, I have argued that as it has been developed it seems to be theoretically untenable. On the one hand, in as much as meaning

is taken as being constituted through the intentionality of the speaking subject, this is theorized both through an equivocal use of 'meaning' and by taking intentionality as a 'language' of sorts, which is expressed or translated as discourse phenomena. In order for such an account to work, there appears to be presupposed the notion of a consciousness which does the expressing and (par impossible) the meaning, which is apart from and theoretically prior to the intentionality that it expresses - and the defining and translating role given to this consciousness presupposes language at the point at which the constitution of language is supposed to be explained. In order to do what it does, this consciousness must understand already what it is supposedly constituting. On top of this, when meaning is defined in terms of intending, communication itself seems impossible, since the meaning of discourse phenomena must apparently be understood from the intention with which they are expressed, and an audience is given no way of knowing intentions other than by interpreting phenomena which it cannot understand until it knows the intentions.

On the other hand, the notion of a speech act itself seems highly problematic. Given that we do not posit separate acts for every example of discourse, and embark on an endless and pointless explication of felicity conditions (which, apart from anything else, would assume an unlimited knowledge of speech acts by speakers), there seem to be no criteria for picking out central cases of speech acts, and there seems to be no way of relating these cases to their varied realizations in discourse.

The second level of my criticism (which will be developed more fully in this chapter and the conclusion) has been that generally in the approach we have seen there is on the one hand ultimately an inability to treat meaning or consciousness as in any way constituted within the social relations which interaction involves, and on the other hand they display no recognition or account of the way analysis imposes meaning on discourse phenomena, and in both cases this is because meaning is taken as a discoverable, objective given, lying in the consciousness of the speaking subject. In brief, the political dimension of discourse is denied, and this denial is made possible by the pragmatic theory which has been developed.

In this chapter I want to consider an alternative approach to pragmatics, which has been variously called ethnomethodology, conversational analysis, or as here, conversation analysis. Conversation analysis is interesting because it involves a rejection of this type of deductive account of discourse phenomena in terms of abstract speech act categories and intentionality, in favour of an inductive analysis of the surface phenomena of discourse, and because it attempts to overcome the problems arising in the relation between the analyst and the discourse to be studied. Before discussing conversation analysis itself I will summarize in the following section some of the criticisms of speech act theory from within linguistic pragmatics which have lead to an interest in this alternative.

SECTION 1: THE CRITIQUE OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS.

Conversation analysis has been adopted in two ways. Some have used it to fill in what they see as a gap in the speech act theory adopted by discourse analysis, but have retained the basic premises of speech act theory, while others have attempted to reject speech act theory (and discourse analysis) outright, and have replaced it with a model of interaction based solely on conversation analysis.

An example of the type of criticism of speech act theory which leads to the first option is found in Stubbs (1983). He argues that while indirection between surface linguistic forms and underlying meanings, functions and structures needs to be recognized, this should not be overemphasized. He claims that a discourse analysis must integrate an account of what is said into and account of what is done, whereas we have seen previously an attempt to distinguish what is said from what is done, with no attempt at integration. Stubbs says that without an integrated account we will have no realization rules or recognition criteria for underlying categories, and because 'speakers themselves are condemned to stand by what they say, not by what they mean or intend' (Stubbs, 1983: 177-8). These points are the same as those raised in earlier chapters. We saw in particular that speakers forced to operate within the scheme suggested by Grice would be unable to communicate because they are denied recognition criteria, and on the other hand, it seemed that some speech act approaches gave no account of the way that surface linguistic form can be operative irrespective of communicative intentions.

According to Stubbs, analysts should work with the generalization that while there may be no surface markers relating utterances, and while such indices can be deceptive,

> at least in some discourse types, including social casual conversations, a large proportion of the talk comprises precisely such superficial indices of underlying organization. (Stubbs, 1983:178)

Those parts of talk he is referring to are those parts concerned with structuring, repeating, emphasizing, mitigating 'and generally "padding"', rather than with expressing propositional content.

Stubbs suggests that a reason for the tendency in speech act theory and pragmatics to ignore overt surface signals of conversational organization is the reliance on idealized invented data. He exempts Labov from this criticism, but says that Grice and Searle both rely on examples of discourse which are stripped of almost all signals of speech act category (such as indicators of illocutionary force) or discourse sequence (such as ellipsis or discourse markers - e.g. a sentence-initial 'well'). They thus represent discourse as enigmatic and incoherent at a surface level.[1] Stubbs also notes Labov & Fanshel's point that when interaction is presented without markers of mitigation it appears much more aggressive than the original, and says also that idealized data leads to ignorance of the interactive role of redundancy. (1983: 179-8)

The main point, then, seems to be that the over emphasis of indirection leads to theoretical problems and that this overemphasis follows from a representation of discourse which denies just those surface features which supply recognition criteria and which are operative in establishing discourse cohesion. Stubbs says that an approach in many ways more hopeful for a naturalistic study of illocutionary force than the speech act approach of trying to specify speakers' intentions and the sincerity conditions for acts, thus relying on unobservable psychological phenomena, is one which studies how speakers indicate what point they have grasped or intend.

> First, it can provide a way of studying how participants display their own interpretations of discourse, in the sense of how they formulate the point of utterances they produce and hear, without forcing the analyst's interpretations on the discourse. ... Second, it can provide an analysis of one

pervasive way in which utterances are chained, in at least certain discourse types. (Stubbs, 1983: 182)

Levinson's (1983 & 1981) advocacy of conversation analysis against discourse analysis and speech act theory is put more strongly than this. A position such as that taken by Stubbs claims that the basic program of a study of illocutionary force can be maintained, but that it needs to make use of insights and approaches offered by conversation analysis. Levinson, however, claims that the sorts of approaches discussed so far are fundamentally misconceived, and that they need to be rejected in favor of conversation analysis. Crucially, he wants to reject the notion of illocutionary force in favor of the notion of conversational function.

Levinson characterizes discourse analysis as a program which attempts to isolate a set of basic categories or units of discourse, and formulate a set of concatenation rules stated over those categories, delimiting well-formed sequences of categories (coherent discourses) from ill-formed sequences (incoherent discourses), appealing throughout this to intuitions such as what is and what is not a coherent discourse (see Levinson, 1983:286).

This program is further characterized as involving (explicitly or implicitly) models with four general properties. (i) There are unit acts - speech acts (or 'moves' in the Birmingham work) - that are performed in speaking, which belong to a specifiable, delimited set. (ii) Utterances are segmentable into unit parts - utterance units - each of which corresponds to (at least) one unit act. (iii) There is a specifiable function, and hopefully a procedure, that will map utterance units onto speech acts and vice versa. (iv) Conversational sequences are primarily regulated by a set of sequencing rules stated over speech act (or move) types (Levinson, 1983: 288). Levinson says that the kernel idea is that since sequential constraints are clearly not easily stated on the form or meaning of what is said, utterances have to be 'translated' into the underlying actions they perform, because on this deeper (or more abstract) level rules of sequencing will be straightforwardly describable. He says that this model seems to capture the obvious regularities whereby answers generally follow questions, actions or excuses follow requests, and so on, and that the problems for the model are generally seen as lying at the level of the translation of utterances into acts (assumption iii), which leads to the interest in theories of indirect

speech acts. (Levinson, 1983: 289; and for another version of this characterization, see Levinson, 1981: 473-5.)

Discourse analysis is thus characterized as an approach in which a model of conversation is built up,

> from a linguistic base by utilizing (while improving) the basic notions of speech act theory, merely adding a syntax for the concatenation of speech act categories that will capture the simple regularities [of question-answer and so on] noted above. (Levinson, 1983: 289)

Levinson is extremely critical of the four assumptions which he claims underlie such an approach.

One problem with the first assumption follows from the fact that some single-sentence utterances 'clearly perform more than one speech act at a time' (e.g., 'Would you like another drink?' can be both a question and a response). He says that this makes the whole approach awkward, since the sequencing rules thus have to cover cases where more acts are being done than can reasonably be responded to directly. Also, because the sources for multiple functions often lie outside the utterance in question (in the sequential environment in which it occurs), and as such environments are not restricted in kind, the assumption of a well-defined and delimited set of speech act types is dubious. A further problem is that conversational responses can be directed not just to the illocutions performed by utterances, but to their perlocutions as well. The example Levinson gives is,

> A: It's getting late, Mildred.
> B: a. But I'm having such a good time.
> b. Do you want to go?
> c. Aren't you enjoying yourself, dear?

Levinson suggests that each of B's possible utterances responds not to the illocutionary force of A's utterance, but to possible perlocutionary intents which A might have had. But because perlocutions are unlimited in kind and number, any responses based on them will necessarily fall outside the scope of the model used by discourse analysis. (1983: 290)

The requirement in the second assumption that there be identifiable utterance-units upon which speech acts or moves can be mapped has problems, Levinson claims, with the fact that single sentences can be used to perform two or more speech acts in different clauses, and that each clause may perform more than one speech act. Also, sub-sentential units which occur as utter-

ances, non-linguistic vocalizations such as laughter, non-vocal actions, and silence, can occur appropriately in conversations. While for the functions in assumption (iii) to be well-formed there must be an independently specifiable set of utterance units onto which actions can be mapped, it is impossible to specify in advance what kinds of behavioral units will carry major interactional acts. Instead, the units in question (laughter, silence and so on) seem to be functionally defined by the actions they can be seen to perform in context. (1983: 191)

The third assumption, that there can be functions mapping actions onto utterance-units, requires that there be well-defined sets of relevant actions and utterance-units, but because of the problems with the first two assumptions these do not exist. A further problem here is that for the model to be interesting there should be not merely an abstract function which describes the mapping, but an actual procedure or algorithm which will implement the function. However, there is no simple form-to-function correlation (a point Levinson has made against speech act theory in general), and Levinson claims that attempts to bridge the gap between what utterances literally mean and what they actually do in the way of actions, with theories of indirect speech acts, have provided at best only partial solutions. He says (in a claim similar to one made in the last chapter against Labov & Fanshel) that both sequential context and extra-linguistic context are crucial in the assignment of utterance function, and so there cannot be simple 'force conversion' rules, but rather a very complex inferential process utilizing information of many different kinds - and there are not even the general outlines of such an algorithm. According to Levinson, such models are therefore unfalsifiable, for if it is claimed that given some set of speech act types or moves only some sequences of these acts are well-formed or coherent while all others are ill-formed, then it must be possible to test independently whether some sequence of utterances in fact corresponds to one of the coherent strings. However, such a test is only possible if there is an explicit procedure for assigning utterances to speech act categories, and as there is no such procedure there is no empirical content to the claim that given strings do not or should not occur in discourse. (1983: 191-2, & see 1981: 480-2)

He also questions the assumption that there is a set of sequencing rules, stated over speech act categories, which govern the sequential organization of conversation. He says that this

assumption embodies a strong claim about the 'syntactic' nature of sequential constraints in conversation, and that it is essential to such a claim that there be clear cases of ill-formed sequences just as there are in sentence grammars. However, cases of such impossible discourses are hard if not impossible to find. As Levinson notes, Edmondson (1981: 12-14) is a useful reference here, and he himself suggests reasons for the difficulty of finding impossible discourses. He says, referring to Grice's theory of implicature, that an apparent conversational violation is likely to be treated on the assumption that the utterances involved are in fact interpretable, if additional inferences are made. A second reason is that responses can be made to perlocutions, which are not limited in kind and number and are not solely predictable from the utterances involved - so such a response will be understood even though appearing sequentially odd to a view which concentrates on illocutions. Finally, Levinson says that our intuitions are not reliable guides in this area, since sequences which we might judge 'ill-formed' in isolation do in fact occur frequently, and are coherent given the conversation in which they are embedded. (1983: 292)

Levinson suggests that the sequencing rules approach is motivated by an initial consideration of paired utterances like questions and answers, offers and acceptances, greetings, and so on. However, he claims that conversation is not basically constituted by such pairs, and that in any case, the rules that bind such pairs are not of a quasi-syntactic nature. For example, a question can be followed by a number of responses (e.g., a partial answer, or a denial of the relevance of the question) other than a full answer. Levinson says that what we should say is that given a question an answer is relevant, and that responses can be expected to deal with this relevance. He says that such expectations are more like Grice's maxims than the rule-bound expectancy of an object after a transitive verb in English. (1983: 293)

In any case, he argues, sequencing constraints in conversation could never be captured fully in speech act terms. He says that what makes some utterance after a question constitute an answer is not only the nature of the utterance itself but also the fact that it occurs after a question with a particular content. Answerhood is 'a complex property composed of sequential location and topical coherence across two utterances, amongst other things'. Levinson also notes that it is significant in this light that there is no proposed illocutionary force of answering,

and claims that the speech act or discourse analysis model skirts the general issue of constraints on topical coherence, in spite of their relevance in making sense of apparently ill-formed sequences. (1983: 193)

Levinson also makes the general claim that in addition to these fundamental difficulties discourse analysis models lead to analyses which 'are often quite superficial and disappointing, involving an intuitive mapping of unmotivated categories onto a restricted range of data'. He says that while this is not the case with work such as Labov & Fanshel's, these analyses can often be shown to have obscured basic features of conversational organization. (1983:294)[2]

Finally, Levinson says that the basis for the rejection of discourse analysis is that the methods and theoretical tools advocated, those imported from mainstream theoretical linguistics, are inappropriate to the domain of conversation.

> Conversation is not a structural product in the same way that a sentence is - it is rather the outcome of the interaction of two or more independent, goal-directed individuals, with often divergent interests. Moving from the study of sentences to the study of conversations is like moving from physics to biology: quite different analytical procedures and methods are appropriate even though conversations are (in part) composed of units that have some direct correspondence to sentences. (Levinson, 1983: 294)

A summary of this position is Levinson's claim that 'dialogue has no syntax' (1981: 475).

I have presented Levinson's critique of discourse analysis in some detail because it represents one of the stronger attempts to undermine this approach, and from a perspective which differs somewhat from that adopted throughout the preceding chapters. For both Levinson and Stubbs the major problems of discourse analysis focus on the problem of identification and translation of speech act categories. For Stubbs this arises from an overemphasis of indirection, whereas for Levinson it is intrinsic to the very notion of abstract communicative categories, and we shall see that the question of whether speech act theory needs to be improved or discarded in the light of conversation analysis is significant in this debate (for a position more or less supporting Stubbs, see Coulthard, 1977, and for one closer to Levinson, see Brown & Yule, 1983). In any case, an important claim through-

out these critiques is that discourse analysis and speech act theory tend to ignore or distort what we can tentatively call the 'reality' of conversation.[3]

Conversation analysis is put forward as a way of grasping this reality, and very generally we can say that it proposes to do this by giving an account of how coherence and sequential organization in discourse is produced and understood in terms of the surface features of discourse. I will argue that conversation analysis is itself seriously flawed, however, it seems worthy of some study, because it offers an influential alternative to the style of 'deep analysis' which I have criticized in earlier chapters. It therefore seems important to understand its attraction, and to examine it as a counter to certain presuppositions in the philosophy of language.

SECTION 2: CONVERSATION ANALYSIS.

SECTION 2a.

Conversation analysis developed out of attempts within sociology to develop techniques for analyzing interaction which could overcome the perceived limitations of a sociological method based on statistical counts of a priori content categories. Such categories were felt to be imposed on the behaviour being analyzed, and instead an approach was proposed which involved a phenomenological analysis of the actual 'practical reasoning' of interactants.[4]

This work, under the name of 'ethnomethodology' and under the influence of Garfinkel, involved studies of interactive situations which concentrated on the strategies, management devices, categorization and common sense reasoning of the participants. There is no attempt to explain what the activity means, either in a social context extending beyond the interaction or in terms of an intentional level extending beyond the surface of what actually takes place in the interaction. Nor are categories assigned to the participants or the activities. The meaning of the activity and of participants' behaviour is taken as that which is assigned by the participants themselves, and context and psychological or cognitive depth is relevant only in so far as it arises in the displayed reasoning of those participants. Meaning, that is to say, is always 'situated meaning'.

In the Preface to his Studies in Ethnomethodology, Garfinkel says that,

> In contrast to certain versions of Durkheim that teach that the objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental principle, the lesson is taken instead, and used as a study policy, that the objective reality of social facts as an ongoing accomplishment of the concerted activities of daily life, with the ordinary, artful ways of that accomplishment being by members known, used, and taken for granted, is, for members doing sociology, a fundamental phenomenon. (Garfinkel, 1967b: vii)

He goes on to say that this production of social reality is a reflexive activity, in which practical actions, reasoning and knowledge are made accountable and analyzable as part of the ongoing process. He says that by this he means that they are 'carried on under the auspices of, and are made to happen as events in, the same ordinary affairs that in organizing they describe' (1967b: 1); and he says that ethnomethodology attempts to discover the formal properties of commonplace, practical common sense actions 'from within' actual settings, as ongoing accomplishments of those settings.

> Ethnomethodological studies analyze everyday activities as members' methods for making those same activities visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-practical-purposes, i.e., 'accountable', as organizations of commonplace everyday activities. The reflexivity of that phenomenon is a singular feature of practical actions, of practical circumstances, of common sense knowledge of social structures, and of practical sociological reasoning. By permitting us to locate and examine their occurrence the reflexivity of that phenomenon establishes their study. (Garfinkel, 1967b: vii, & see viii)

Meaning is thus seen as being reflexive in that any (lay or professional) sociological 'gloss' of what is said or done is itself a part of the operation of speaking and making sense, and must itself be accountable and the subject of other's glossing practices - and this process is open-ended (see esp. Garfinkel, 1967b: 7-10, & Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970: 362ff). And ways of speaking are indexical, in that their meaning will always be partly dependent on their situated occurrence. Thus any (lay or professional) sociological rule will always require an ad hoc 'looseness' in order to account for its situated application (see esp. Garfinkel, 1967b: 2-7).

These two central claims come together in the point that any practical activity, be it professional sociology, working as a juror or as a coroner, or family interaction, involves practical sociological reasoning. The formulation of a methodology for dealing with those situations (described as 'naturally organized activities'), and the creation of social reality, arises as the outcome of acting in those situations. Ethnomethodology thus becomes the task of displaying that methodology, which includes the methodology, or the practical reasoning, of the sociologist. As Garfinkel puts it,

> I use the term 'ethnomethodology' to refer to the investigation of the rational properties of indexical expressions and other practical actions as contingent ongoing accomplishments of organized artful practices of everyday life. (Garfinkel, 1967b: 11)5

SECTION 2b.

The style of analysis developed by ethnomethodology implies the study of conversational organization. The central phenomena of reflexivity and indexicality are manifested through conversational interaction, and the more recent work of Garfinkel, and also that of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, has developed, more by a change of emphasis than a change of style, into what I am here calling conversation analysis. The motivation for this work is still sociological, involving an attempt to develop what Schegloff & Sacks call a 'naturalistic observation discipline that could deal with the details of social action(s) rigorously, empirically, and formally' (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973: 289-90), but such work and such an approach has proved relevant to pragmatics and sociolinguistics, and according to some, offers the possibility of overcoming many problems in these areas. As I have said, the strongest claim for the benefits of conversation analysis is found in Levinson (1983: Ch.6).

The central point throughout this discussion is best summed up in Levinson's statement that 'the proper object of sociological study is the set of techniques that the members of a society themselves utilize to interpret and act within their own social worlds' (Levinson, 1983: 295). This principle is accompanied by suspicion of premature theorizing and ad hoc analytical categories:

> As far as possible the categories of analysis should be those that participants themselves can be shown to utilize in making sense of interaction; unmotivated theoretical constructs and unsubstantiated intuitions are all to be avoided. In practice this results in a strict and parsimonious structuralism and a theoretical asceticism - the emphasis is on the data and the patterns recurrently displayed therein. (Levinson, 1983: 295)

As has been mentioned earlier, in such an approach context is only given attention in as much as contextual categories are used in interaction by participants. Conversation analysts thus avoid the task of plotting a context by which to fill out the indexical aspects of an interaction.

Levinson claims that in their analyses, conversation analysts attempt to show, not only that a certain aspect of conversation can be viewed in a certain way, but that it is actually seen in that way by the participants producing it - so, again, they are trying to model the actual procedures and expectations of conversationalists. He says as well that a conversation analyst will try to give a functional explanation of the interactional problems that a particular conversational device is designed to resolve. He presents these as two basic methods of this style of investigation.

> (a) We should attempt to locate some particular conversational organization, and isolate its systematic features, by demonstrating participants' orientation to it
> (b) We should ask, (i) what problems does this organization solve, and (ii) what problems does this organization raise - and therefore what implications does it have for the existence of further solutions to further problems? (Levinson, 1983: 319)

He argues that these methods offer a way of avoiding the 'indefinitely extendable and unverifiable categorization and speculation about actors' intents' typical of discourse analysis.

An important way of demonstrating that a particular feature of conversational organization is implicitly recognized by participants and not just an artifact of analysis, is to concentrate on hitches in conversation. When an hypothesized organization does not operate in the predicted way, participants can be expected either to try to repair the hitch or to draw inferences from the absence of the expected behaviour. Thus an interruption can be distinguished from a legitimate overlap by sanctions and

reprimand in response, and the significance of a failure to respond to a summons will be demonstrated in the response of the person who made the summons. From this aspect of conversation, Levinson draws the following point. -

> Conversation, as opposed to monologue, offers the analyst an invaluable analytical resource: as each turn is responded to by a second, we find displayed in that second an analysis of the first by its recipient. Such an analysis is thus provided by participants not only for each other but for analysts too. (Levinson, 1983: 321, & see 320-1)

He quotes Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson's comment that 'the turn-taking system has, as a by-product of its design, a proof procedure for the analysis of turns' (1978: 44), and say himself that a good case can therefore be made for the methodological priority of the study of conversation over the study of other kinds of talk or other kinds of text.

The second of these methodological claims relates to the functional analysis of the operations identified by the first procedure. Levinson demonstrates this by taking the turn-taking system as the fundamental device (these various devices will be explained a little later). This device organizes the exchange of speakers and keeps only one speaker speaking at a time, but it leads to the problem of getting the mechanism going in the first place. This problem is solved by the structure of summons-answer-first topic, which establishes a co-ordinated co-participation, assigns speaking and receiving roles for the first three turns, and thus gets the turn-taking machinery going. Levinson describes summons sequences as 'rational solutions to particular organizational problems', and as not ad hoc or arbitrary (1983: 323). We now, however, have the problem of how to suspend the turn-taking machinery so that, for example, a story can be told. A device which solves this problem is that of an offer or bid (followed by acceptance or rejection) to suspend the turn-taking mechanism. This in turn leads to the problem of how to restart the mechanism, a solution for which is provided by devices for making story endings recognizable. The final type of problem is that of how to close down a conversation, and this is provided by the device of a pre-terminal and then a terminal exchange, whereby each speaker yields the floor and checks that the other wants to finish.

Each of these devices is both a solution to a descriptive problem for the analyst and the resolution of an organizational problem for conversational participants, and each can be seen as

demonstrated and recognized by the actual responses of participants. We can now consider briefly some of the actual analysis which leads to the identification and functional explanation of these devices.

Looking first at turn taking, it is regarded, as Levinson says, as a fundamental feature of conversation. Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson claim, in fact, that it is a significant feature of social organization in general. They suggest that turn taking,

> is used for the ordering of moves in games, for allocating political office, for regulating traffic at intersections, for the servicing of customers at business establishments, for talking in interviews, meetings, debates, ceremonies, conversations, etc (these last being members of the set of what we shall refer to as 'speech exchange systems'). (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1978: 7)

They say that in socially organized activity the presence of 'turns' suggests an economy, with turns for something being valued, and with means for allocating them affecting their relative distribution.

Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson say that in their research on natural conversation 'the fact of turn taking and that it must be organized, was something that the data of conversation made increasingly plain' (1978: 9). They say that 'a body of factual material accessible to rather unmotivated inquiry' exposed the presence of turn taking and the major facets of its organization. These facts include the facts that,

> one party talks at a time overwhelmingly, though speakers change, though the size of turns varies, though the ordering of turns change, though the size of turns varies, though the ordering of turns varies; that transitions seem finely coordinated; that there are obviously techniques for allocating turns that are used and whose characterization would be part of any model that would describe some turn-taking materials; that there are techniques for the construction of utterances relevant to their turn status that bear on the coordination of transfer and on the allocation of speakership .... (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1978:9)

If facts such as these are focused on, rather than particular outcomes in particular settings, they say that we get an investigation of the organization of turn taking per se, and not its application and consequences in particular contexts - although, they suggest, the more formal understanding of turn taking illum-

inates more particular findings.

This leads to the idea that a characterization of turn-taking organization for conversation could be developed that would have the important features of being context-free and also capable of extraordinary context sensitivity. This type of organization would avoid the problem of having to characterize the 'situation' of every conversation which is studied, by offering that which can be extracted as ordered phenomena from conversational materials 'which would not turn out to require reference to one or other aspect of situatedness, identities, and particularities of content or context' (1978: 10).

Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson say that the existence of some such type of organization can be expected because conversation can accommodate a wide range of situations. Thus, 'there must be some formal apparatus that is itself context-free, that by virtue of the ways in which it is context-free can in local instances of its operations be sensitive to, and exhibit its sensitivity to, various of the parameters of social reality in a local context' (1978: 10). Turn-taking seems to fill this role.

They then go on to present what they call 'a simplest systematics for the turn-taking organization of conversation', which attempts to account for facts about conversation such as those noted earlier (for a fuller list, see 1978: 10-11), and which can accommodate contextual factors without itself requiring reference to any particular context.

The turn-taking system is described first in terms of two 'components'. The turn-constructional component covers the various units-types with which a speaker can set out to construct a turn. In English these unit-types include sentential, clausal, phrasal, and lexical constructions, and allow a projection of what it will take for an instance of that unit-type to be completed. The projected completion point, known as a 'transfer-relevance place', constitutes a possible end of a speakers turn-entitlement, and it is by reference to such transfer-relevance places that transfer of speakership is coordinated. The fact that the end of a unit-type can be projected is a crucial feature of conversation, as it helps explain the split-second timing and coordinated overlap which occurs in conversation (see esp. Jefferson, 1973).

The turn-allocational component distributes turn-allocational techniques into those in which next turn is allocated by current speaker selecting a next speaker, and those in which a next turn is allocated by self-selection (for instances of speaker- and self-selection, see 1978: n.14).

Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson then present a set of basic rules which govern turn construction, providing for the allocation of a next turn to one party and coordinating transfer so as to minimize gap and overlap.

> For any turn:
> 1. At initial turn-constructional unit's initial transition-relevance place:
>
> (a) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as to involve the use of a 'current speaker selects next' technique, then the party so selected has rights, and is obliged, to take next turn to speak, and no others have such rights or obligations, transfer occurring at that place.
>
> (b) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use of a 'current speaker selects next' technique, self-selection for next speakership may, but need not, be instituted, with first starter acquiring rights to a turn, transfer occurring at that place.
>
> (c) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use of a 'current speaker selects next' technique, then current speaker may, but need not, continue, unless another self-selects.
>
> 2. If, at initial turn-constructional unit's initial transition-relevance place, neither 1(a) nor 1(b) has operated, and, following the provision of 1(c), current speaker has continued, then the Rule-set (a)-(c) reapplies at next transition-relevance place, and recursively at each next transition-relevance place, until transfer is effected. (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1978: 13)

Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson now go on to demonstrate how this system accounts for (produces or is compatible with) the facts they claim to find in conversation. I am not interested in presenting their whole argument here, but rather in showing the style of analysis they use, and thus I will just summarize a few of these demonstrations.

Central to the facts they have found are that speaker change occurs, and generally recurs, but is not automatic, that overwhelmingly one party talks at a time, and that occurrences of more than one speaker speaking at a time are common, but brief. Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson claim that the possibility of speaker change is built in, recurrently within any single turn's construction, and recurrently for each new turn, because any unit-type instance out of which a turn may be constructed will reach a transition-relevance place, at which the first two priority options, 1(a) and 1(b), involve transfer of turn to a next speaker. The fact that speaker change and change recurrence are not automatic is provided for because at each transition-relevance place these first two options may not be exercised, while the third is.

The fact of one party usually talking at a time is provided for because the system allocates single turns to single speakers, which turns include exclusive rights, and because all turn transfer is coordinated around transition-relevance places, which are themselves determined by possible completion points for instances of the unit-types. (1978: 15)

The explanation of the occurrence and brevity of overlap is more complex. The first point is that the system localizes overlap to transition relevance points, and Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson cite as an initial explanation of the brevity of overlap the fact that overlap occurs at transition-relevance places, which are places where speakers can or should exit. But this does not explain the actual occurrence of overlap, and they cite a number of systematic bases for this occurrence.

The first is that Rule 1(b), in allocating a turn to that self-selector who starts first encourages competition for the earliest possible start. For example:

Mike: I know who d'guy is.=
Vic: He's ba::d.
=[[
James: You know the gu:y?
(Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1978: 16) (== indicate latched utterances, with no gap. [[indicates utterances beginning together. :: indicate lengthened syllables.)

They note that simultaneous starts such as this testify to the independent-for-each-party projectability of possible completion points.

Another basis of overlap which they suggest also relates to the projectability of possible completion or transition-relevance points. As they put it, 'variation in the articulation of the projected last part of a projectably last component of a turn's talk, which is in fact a consequential locus of articulatory variation, will expectedly produce overlap between a current turn and a next'. One of the examples they offer is the following:

A: Well if you knew my argument why did you bother to a: sk.
[
B: Because I'd like to defend my argument.

Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson add here that the addition to a turn of elements that can specifically go after first possible completion without intending continuation, such as address or etiquette terms, will produce similarly structured overlaps (and that their absence will produce similarly structured gaps). This is shown by the following examples:

A: Uh you been down here before havenche.
[
B: Yeh.

A: What's yer name again please sir.
[
B: F. T. Galloway.

A further feature of conversation identified by Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson is that there are repair mechanisms for dealing with turn-taking errors and violations. They point out first that there are a number of repair devices directed to troubles in the organization and distribution of turns of talk. These are said to include questions such as 'who, me?', the lore and practices of etiquette concerning 'interruption' and complaints about it, the use of interruption markers such as 'excuse me', false starts, repeats or recycles of parts of a turn overlapped by others, and stopping before possible completion by parties to simultaneous talk.

Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson say that at least some of the mechanisms for turn-taking repair are intrinsic to the very system whose troubles they repair. The example given is the basic device for repair when more than one speaker is speaking at a

time, which is to stop a turn before its possible completion point. This involves a transformation of the use of turn-constructional units to their next possible completion. They say that as well there are places in the rule-set itself which are designed for repair. In particular, the cycle of options provided by Rules 1(b) and 1(c), whereby a current speaker continues after the non-occurrence of turn-transfer at a transition-relevance place, can be seen as a repair of a failure of turn-transfer. They comment at this point that 'it is a major feature of a rational organization for behaviour that accommodates real worldly interests, and is not susceptible of external enforcement, that it incorporates resources and procedures for repair of its troubles into its fundamental organization' (1978: 39).

The third point which Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson make regarding repair is that the turn-taking system constrains repairs of other than a turn-taking sort. For example, they say, repairs by someone other than the current speaker (called 'other than current speaker') are not done until a turn's completion, respecting the turn-taking system's allocation of rights to a turn even where repair is found necessary.

> In fact, most repair (e.g., correction of a word) is done within the turn in which the repairable occurs. But when repair spills over the boundaries of a turn, when, for example, 'other than speaker' initiates a repair in the turn following the one in which the repairable occurred, then the sequence so initiated is organized by the same turn-taking system, and the repair sequences exhibit the same features of turn taking as we have been discussing, ... (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1978: 39)

Thus, on the one hand the turn-taking system lends itself to, and incorporates devices for, repair of its troubles, and on the other hand it is itself a basic organizational device for the repair of any other troubles in conversation. (For more general discussions of repair, see Jefferson, 1972 & Schegloff, 1979.)

Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson characterize this system as a 'local management system', in that, first, all the operations are 'local', directed to the next turn and next transition on a turn by turn basis, and secondly, the determination of turn size is also accomplished locally, in the developmental course of each turn, under constraints imposed by a next turn and an orientation to a next turn in the current one. They also describe it as a 'party administered' system, because turn order and turn size are

under the control of the parties to a conversation, and furthermore, the system is 'interactionally managed'. On the one hand, the party-administered, local management of turn order is effected through the rule-set, whose ordered property provides a cycle of options in which any party's contribution to turn order determination is contingent on, and oriented to, the contributions of other parties. On the other hand, turn size does not arise through a division of labour in which the speaker determines its boundaries and other parties have the task of recognizing them. Rather, the constitution and boundaries of turns involve a distribution of tasks.

> [A] speaker can talk in such a way as to permit projection of possible completion to be made from his talk (from its start), and to allow others to use its transition places to start talk, to pass up talk, to affect directions of talk, and so on, and ... their starting to talk, if properly placed, can determine where he ought to stop talk. (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1978: 42)

The principle which is applied to this, and which is described as the most general principle particularizing conversational interaction, is 'recipient design', which means that 'the talk by a party in a conversation is constructed or designed in ways which display an orientation and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the coparticipants'. Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson say that they have found that recipient design operates with regard to word selection, topic selection, the admissibility and ordering of sequences, and the options and obligations for starting and terminating conversations, amongst other features. (1978:40-2)

It is worth mentioning here some consequences which Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson see as following from this model. The first point is that 'in its turn-allocational techniques, the turn-taking system for conversation builds in an intrinsic motivation for listening to all utterances in a conversation, independent of other possible motivations, such as interest and politeness' (1978: 43). This is because any willing or potentially desiring next speaker will have to listen for speaker-selection (and then for a transition place) or for a transition-relevance place at which to self-select.

Second, Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson say that turn-taking organization controls, at least partially, the understanding

utterances get, and this is said to follow from the previous point.

> A participant potentially willing to speak, if selected to do so, will need to listen to any utterance to find if, with it, he is being selected to speak next. A major class of 'current selects next' techniques being constituted by 'first pair parts', that is, by type-characterized utterances such as 'greeting', 'question', 'insult', and 'complaint', a willing speaker will need to analyze utterances to find if an instance of such an utterance-type is being employed, and is being employed in a way that possibly selects him as next speaker. And a potentially intending speaker will need to examine any utterance after which he might want to speak to find whether such a thing was being done to him or to some other party. (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1978: 44)

Finally, the turn-taking system is said to have, as a by-product of its design, a proof procedure for the analysis of turns. The same point has been noted earlier with reference to Levinson. When a speaker addresses a first pair-part, such as a 'question' or a 'complaint' to another, thus selecting the other as next speaker to fulfill the second part of an adjacency pair, that is, 'to do an "answer", or an "apology" (among other possibilities), respectively', the addressee, by 'doing' the second part, 'thereby displays (in the first place to his coparticipants) his understanding of the prior turn's talk as a first part, as a "question" or "complaint"' (1978: 44).

In the same spirit as Levinson, Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson claim that this offers a central methodological resource for the investigation of conversation 'by contrast with the investigation of literary and other "text" materials'. They say that this resource is provided by conversation's 'thoroughly interactional character', whereby the turn-taking organization obliges its participants to display to each other their understanding of other turns, so that 'a turn's talk will be heard as directed to a prior turn's talk, unless special techniques are used to locate some other talk to which it is directed'. One consequence of this is that it operates as an important basis for conversation's local self-correction mechanism, and also for the 'last as next' turn-order bias (see 1978: 18-9 & 22-3). This is because the prior speaker will be motivated to self-select if the understanding of the prior utterance which the current speaker displays is

unnacceptable.

But again, these understandings are available also to professional analysts, and afford the analysts a proof criterion and a search procedure for the analysis of what a turn's talk is occupied with.

> Since it is the parties' understandings of prior turn's talk that is relevant to their construction of next turns, it is their understandings that are wanted for analysis. The display of those understandings in the talk in subsequent turns affords a resource for the analysis of prior turns, and a proof procedure for professional analyses of prior turns, resources intrinsic to the data themselves. (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1978: 45)

One final point which I want to draw from this paper is that Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson suggest that conversation should be considered as the basic form of speech-exchange system, with other systems, such as debates, ceremonies, meetings, and so on, representing a variety of transformations on conversation's turn-taking system to achieve other types of turn taking system. (1978: 45-7)

We can now briefly turn to an analysis of conversation closings. With this work the functional explanation of conversational features is made more explicit, for the task is set up as outlining the solutions conversationalists adopt for addressing the problem of closing conversations. The problem exists in the first place because the fundamental mechanism for turn taking generates an indefinitely extendable string of turns to talk. For some household or office conversations, for example, where conversationalists are in a state of 'incipient talk', this is not a problem. But a telephone conversation, for example, needs to be ended at some point, and within the mechanism just presented, fundamental as it is to conversation, this seems impossible.

Just stopping talking will not work, for any transition-relevance place, as this would be, leads to another's turn, an extension of the present turn, or silence - and silence will be interpreted as part of the conversation (as pique, or whatever), as a violation in need of repair. The two central elements of the turn taking system and, indeed, two basic features of conversation, are that at least, and no more than, one party speaks at a time in a single conversation, and that speaker change recurs.

Silence in a conversation contradicts both these. Schegloff & Sacks (1973: 294-5) thus present the problem concerning closings as being: 'how to organize the simultaneous arrival of the coconversationalists at a point where one speaker's completion will not occasion another speaker's talk, and that will not be heard as some speaker's silence'.

Schegloff & Sacks say that a proximate solution involves the use of a 'terminal exchange' composed of conventional parts, such as an exchange of 'good-byes'. Utterances such as these form a type of 'adjacency pair', which is defined in part as a sequence having two utterance length, adjacent positioning of component utterances, and different speakers producing each utterance. Adjacency pairs also have a relatedness between the utterances, such that they are recognized as a pair, as with 'question-answer', 'greeting-greeting' and 'offer-acceptance/refusal'. Schegloff & Sacks say that the recognizability of the first part of a pair is handled in a number of ways, including constructionally, as when syntax is used to recognize that a question is being produced, or through the use of conventional components, as when 'hello' or 'hi' is used to indicate partially that a greeting is being produced. (See Schegloff & Sacks 1973: 295-6)

A basic rule of adjacency pair operation is that given the recognizable production of a first pair part, on its first possible completion its speaker should stop and a next speaker should start and produce a second pair part from the pair type of which the first is recognizably a member. A consequence of this is that by an adjacently positioned second a speaker can show understanding of what a prior is aimed at, and willingness to go along with it - and this understanding (or lack of understanding) is indicated to the first speaker. Schegloff & Sacks say that the systematic problem of where transition relevance is to be lifted can be therefore helped by an adjacency pair because,

> by providing that transition relevance is to be lifted after the second pair part's occurrence, the occurrence of the second pair part can then reveal an appreciation of, and agreement to, the intention of closing NOW which a first part of a terminal exchange reveals its speaker to propose. (Sacks & Schegloff, 1972: 298)

They also say that this solution has become institutionalized, so that saying 'good-bye' and not leaving a slot for a reply is a meaningful sort of activity, indicating anger perhaps, and is available as an alternative to leaving a slot for the reply.

However, the component parts of terminal exchanges, 'ok', 'see you', 'thank you', and so on, can be used in other ways as well, so the mere fact of their use does not mark them as unequivocal parts of terminal exchanges, nor does it alone indicate an exchange's status as a terminal exchange. This status is also given by the placement of the exchange. Schegloff & Sacks say that they have found that placement considerations are general for utterances, and that in fact, for example, 'there do not seem to be criteria other than placement (i.e., sequential) ones [specifically, placement after a question] that will sufficiently discriminate the status of an utterance as a statement, assertion, declarative, proposition, etc., from its status as an answer' (1973: 299).

The placement of the first part of a terminal exchange is not made by reference to some 'local' organization, say, to a prior utterance, as is the case with the second part of the terminal pair. Rather, its placement is organized by reference to a properly initiated closing section, and this raises the subject of the organization of topic talk. Schegloff & Sacks refer to what get talked about in a conversation as 'mentionables', and say that the ordering and distribution of talk about mentionables is one consideration for conversationalists. In some conversations, for example, some mentionables ought not or need not be placed in 'first topic' position (the first topic being the participant-analyzable 'reason for the conversation'). (1973: 300-2)

However, there is no guarantee that a given mentionable will 'come up naturally' in a conversation, and it seems an important consideration that a closing structure should involve the provision for placement of hitherto unmentioned mentionables. The first way of initiating a closing section which will do this is one kind of 'pre-closing', as in 'We-ell...', 'O.K....' or 'Sooo' (having downward intonation contours) when constituting the entire utterance. Such utterances occupy the floor for a speaker's turn without using it to produce either a topically coherent utterance or the initiation of a new topic, thus 'passing' and giving a 'free' turn to a next speaker, who can then introduce a new topic (e.g., a hitherto unmentioned mentionable) without violating topical coherence. Alternatively, the next speaker can decline this opportunity, and reply with another 'pass', thereby setting up the relevance of a closing section.

Such pre-closing utterances, can, however, be used in other capacities in conversation, so the occasion of their use needs to be considered as marking them as pre-closings, and Schegloff & Sacks say that one way of discriminating their operation as pre-closings is their placement at the analyzable (again, to participants) end of a topic. While some topics do not have an end, but rather are 'shaded' into a new topic, conversationalists have a number of techniques for establishing a topic boundary. Some topics, for example, can be 'closed down' (at a topically appropriate place), by a sequence such as 'Okay?'-'Alright'. Another way of bounding a topic is the utterance of a proverbial or aphoristic formulation of conventional wisdom which can be heard as the 'moral' or 'lesson' of the topic (e.g. 'Yeah well, things always work out for the best'). (1973: 305-8)

If the topic is successfully bounded, a closing section may consist of a sequence such as,

A: O.K.
B: O.K.
A: Bye Bye
B: Bye

However, closing sections can include components such as 'making arrangements', reinvocation of material from earlier in the conversation, and components giving a 'signature' to the type of conversation, such as 'Thank you'. Thus there can be closing sections such as the following:

B: Well that's why I said 'I'm not gonna say anything, I'm not making any comments// about anybody'
C: Hmh
C: Ehyeah
B: Yeah
C: Yeah
B: Alrighty. Well I'll give you a call before we decide to come down. O.K.?
C: O.K.
B: Alrighty
C: O.K.
B: We'll see you then
C: O.K.
B: Bye bye
C: Bye

(Schegloff & Sacks, 1973: 318) (// indicates the point at which the following line interrupts.)

Schegloff & Sacks say that the two crucial components in a closing section (for achieving proper closing) are the terminal exchange which achieves the collaborative termination of the transition rule, and the proper initiation of the closing section which warrants the undertaking of the routine whose termination in the terminal exchange properly closes the conversation. Also, at any point between the proper initiation of a closing and the terminal exchange (and also in the moments following the exchange) there are procedures for reopening the conversation to topic talk (1973: 318). A further point worth mentioning is that in a note Schegloff & Sacks say that they do not mean to deny the possible relevance of non-verbal behaviour to conversational closing - they say that they have not studied these phenomena. They add, however, that the 'purely verbal' techniques they have described do work for telephone conversations.

SECTION 2c.

The contrast between this type of approach and that of discourse analysis can be seen in part by noting Levinson's comparison of a section of Labov & Fanshel's analysis with his own conversation analysis-style analysis of the same material. The particular example has been discussed in detail in the previous chapter, and is reproduced here using conversation analysis transcription conventions (the figures in brackets indicate pauses in seconds).

R: I don't (1.0) know, whether (1.5) I- I think I did- the right thing, jistalittle situation came up (4.5) an' I tried to uhm (3.0) will, try to (4.0) use what I- what I've learned here, see if it worked
(3.0)
T: Mhm
R: Now, I don't know if I did the right thing. Sunday (1.0) um- my mother went to my sister's again ... ((story continues))

Levinson describes Labov & Fanshel's analysis as follows:

> In seventeen pages of painstaking analysis ... Labov & Fanshel ... analyze the patient's ... first turn here as containing various speech acts including questions, assertions and challenges. To achieve an understanding in such depth they look forward in the interaction to see what <u>the right thing</u> and <u>jistalittle situation</u> refer to; they then

> pack back into the gloss or 'expansion' of the first turn these details gleaned from later on. Despite the obvious discrepancy between the information thus available to participants (who cannot look ahead in a transcript) and analysts (who can), the authors feel this procedure is justified by the analysts' relative lack of the knowledge available to participants about each other .... They further argue that the various features here, including the glottalizations and hesitancy, and crucially the 'vague references' in thing and situation, can be attributed to aspects of 'interview style'. (Levinson, 1983: 352)

Levinson's analysis treats R's first turn as a pre-announcement, which is formulated to prefigure (a) the telling of something she did ('I think I did the right thing'), and (b) the describing of the situation that led to the action ('jistalittle situation came up'). This serves to warn the hearer to expect a story with two such components. The first turn also prefigures the point of the story and its relevance to the here and now ('use what I've learned here, see if it worked'). Levinson claims that the alleged vagueness of 'the right thing' and 'jistalittle situation' 'is in fact the provision of just those variables typical of position 1 turns in pre-announcement sequences' (1983: 353).

A position 1 pre-announcement is the first part of a pre-sequence to an announcement, and generally operates as a check on the newsworthiness of some information, announcement, story, etc., and also as a bid for an extended turn which suspends the turn taking machinery (see Levinson, 1983: 349ff). In the pre-announcement the speaker tries to prefigure the syntactic frame of the announcement (as 'news', a 'joke', a 'story', e.g.), the dating of reportable events, and the evaluation, so that the hearer has an idea what to expect and an idea whether it is newsworthy (as is found in, e.g., 'The two best things that happened to me today ...'). Levinson says that this analysis of the first turn is reinforced by the fact that the therapist waits for each prefigured segment of the story, and receives each segment with forms such as 'Oh', or 'Yes, I think you did [the right thing]', thus acknowledging the news but abstaining from substantial turns throughout the story.

Levinson claims that the original analysis 'proceeding in an act-by-act fashion, is not attuned to the larger sequential

structures that organize conversation; nor are such structures easily recognizable without a lot of comparative material' (1983: 353). Whereas Levinson has used this example in order to demonstrate the analysis of pre-sequences offered by conversation analysis, he notes that conversation analysis can also deal with other features of this first turn. For example, he says that the hesitation and glottal stops originally attributed to 'style' are also 'the typical markings of self-initiated self-repair, which is characteristic of the production of first topics' (1983: 353 n.25).

One consequence of this type of approach is that the issue of indirect speech acts does not arise for conversation analysis. So-called indirect speech acts are redefined by conversation analysis as 'position 1 turns - pre-requests - formulated so as to expect position 4 responses'. A pre-request sequence has four positions: pre-request (e.g., 'Do you have size C batteries?'), go ahead (e.g., 'Yes sir'), request (e.g., 'I'll have four, please'), and response (e.g., turns to get the batteries) (1983: 357). Of course, the go ahead here may have been a denial, and the response could be a refusal. Also, the go ahead could include and offer, which makes the request unnecessary, and the second turn can be occupied by a response, as in the following example:

S: CanIhave two pints of Abbot and a grapefruitand whisky? ((POSITION 1))
H: Sure ((turns to get)) ((POSITION 4)) ((later)) There you are ...

In cases such as this, the full specification of what is wanted in position 1 allows a position 4 at the next turn.(See Levinson, 1983: 160ff)

Levinson says that questions about whether such position 1 turns 'have "literal" or "indirect" (or both) forces or meanings simply do not, on this view, arise'.

> Such position 1 turns mean whatever they mean; that they can be formulated so as to project certain conversational trajectories is something properly explored in the sequential analysis of successive turns. (Levinson, 1983: 363)

In this section I have summarized only the central features of conversation analysis, but even from these features it seems that this approach offers at least a plausible alternative to the views discussed in earlier chapters.

A central feature of the relevance of the view examined here is summarized in Levinson's claim that conversation analysis has made important contributions to the understanding of utterance meaning, 'by showing how a large proportion of the situated significance of utterances can be traced to their surrounding sequential environments' (1983: 364). The boundaries of this 'large proportion' are never made clear, and we are never really given the outlines of how a non-speech act approach might deal with those aspects of situated significance falling outside this proportion (see 1983: 372); nevertheless, the point to emphasize is that for Levinson conversation analysis need make no use of the techniques and theoretical constructs of speech act theory.

As may have been clear in the preceding discussion, the rules invoked by conversation analysis do not operate like constitutive syntactic rules. Levinson says that they are as much regulative as constitutive, and that they describe unmarked expectations rather than the set of possible well-formed sequences. He compares them, as has been noted to Grice's maxims rather than to linguistic rules. (1983: 367)

In characterizing conversation analysis, Levinson draws parallels between it and the (Anglo-American) structuralist linguistics found before the 1960s. He says that both kinds of approach are concerned with corpora of recorded materials, and that both have as a central methodological tool the investigation of how sequential or syntagmatic considerations restrict the class of items that may be expected to follow, and of how items in that class contrast with one another, or stand in paradigmatic relations. He also acknowledges that conversation analysis may share some of the limitations of structuralist linguistics.

> Just as structuralist analyses of linguistic structure have been shown to be theoretically inadequate as models of human competence, so in the long run CA analyses may perhaps be found deficient as rather simple reconstructions of the no doubt immensely complicated cognitive processes involved in conducting conversations. (Levinson, 1983: 367)

However, he says that as yet no other kind of investigation of conversational organization has yielded such a rich harvest of insights.

SECTION 3: PROBLEMS WITH CONVERSATION ANALYSIS.

Conversation analysis seems to be grounded in three basic, and linked, methodological claims. The first and most important of these is that analysis must be based on a rigorously empirical treatment of data; the second is the foregrounding of reflexivity in conversation as an analytic resource; and thirdly, we find the notion of conversational motivation.

The empiricist side of conversation analysis is put forward by its exponents explicitly, and as constituting a major virtue. Schenkein, for example, says that conversation analyses are 'rooted in the close scrutiny of naturally occurring interaction'. He says that they are motivated by 'taking seriously the details of the natural interactions themselves', without trying to satisfy or fine-tune any theory of 'mankind, society or communication', without any 'morals, personalities or politics' in mind, and without trying to manipulate the natural interactions 'into scores on some test instrument, codes in some rating scheme, figures in some measurement plan, votes in some judgement exercise, categories in some sorting task, or positions in some scaling device' (Schenkein, 1978: 1-2). Schenkein says that conversation analysts, by studying recordings and transcripts endlessly, 'come to see details of conversational organization hidden by real time and ordinary sensibilities' (1978: 3), and he characterizes studies within this tradition as being committed to 'building nonintuitive descriptions of the organization of conversational interaction as the technical accomplishment of member conversationalists' (1978: 5). Schenkein supports his generalizations with quotations expressing like sentiments from each of the studies in his collection, the authors of which constitute the major writers in this area (1978: 3-5), and we find similar claims in Levinson's support of conversation analysis.

Levinson presents conversation analysis as 'a rigorously empirical approach which avoids premature theory construction'. He says that its methods are essentially inductive, and that 'search is made for recurring patterns across many records of naturally occurring conversations'. There is, Levinson says, as little appeal as possible to intuitive judgements - 'they may, willy-nilly, guide research, but they are not explanations and they certainly do not circumscribe the data'. (Levinson, 1983: 286-7)

The motivation for such a response is perhaps understandable. The difficulties in speech act theory and discourse analysis, those surrounding the imposition of categories onto communication, the use of constructed data, the analysis of contextual information, the interpretation of intentionality, and the role of intuitions of correctness or coherence, all raise grave doubts regarding the viability of this approach. And conversation analysis attempts to overcome just these problems, whether, as originally conceived, in sociology, or, as it has been taken up, in discourse analysis, by adopting a radically modified relation to interaction itself.

However, the first question which needs to be asked is whether the rather Baconian ideals which inform this response can offer any sort of a foundation. This response is one which sees that speech act categories are ultimately unworkable, and so vows to use no such categories in its analysis. It sees that data has often been restricted, and constructed so as to demonstrate preformulated theories, and so vows to work with what really occurs in conversation, making inductions from large amounts of data - and so on. But nowhere in this response is there any attempt to come to terms with the epistemological issues surrounding the problems which were originally perceived.

This approach assumes that by looking carefully at large amounts of 'actual' data the analyst will be able to make inductions as to the 'real' patterns of conversation, and two major problems immediately arise. The first problem is that the idea of a true relation between the analyst and a given conversation is extremely nebulous. In the previous chapter I noted Labov & Fanshel's comment that their transcript of a conversation had to be modified through repeated listening, and that this process seemed unending as new translations were made of what was heard, and, as we might expect, similar problems arise for conversation analysis (see, e.g., Jefferson, 1978: n.24). It would be extraordinary, in fact, to claim that a completely accurate reproduction of what 'actually' occurred was possible, partly just because conversations have those features which speech act theorists tend to ignore in their own examples of conversation, and so, quite reasonably, any reproduction of a conversation will involve acknowledgement, emphasis and translation of elements and features of the conversation according to interpretative expectations and interests imposed by the translator.

Certainly, some reproductions will be considered to be outrageous translations, and others will be considered to be adequate, or 'close enough' - and this is partly a question of the sociology of research programs. But the sort of methodological principle set up by conversation analysis requires a relation between analyst and object which is impossibly pure. It has to be a relation which brings about a qualitative break between deductive theorizing and inductive analysis, and it is extremely doubtful that such a relation could exist.

Supposing, however, that a true reproduction of a conversation could be given, which involved no interpretation and allowed no room for distortion by theoretical expectations and interests, we would still have a problem. For if we were able to achieve this, and come, to use Schenkein's phrase, 'to see details of conversational organization hidden by real time and ordinary sensibilities', we would then seem to be dealing with something quite a long way from the original conversation. Real time and ordinary sensibilities are major factors in a conversation, and a methodology which wants as a basic principle to impose no interpretations on its object, but rather make inductions from the practical reasoning of conversationalists, should surely avoid allowing its practitioners to see aspects of conversation denied to conversationalists, because it should only see what they see. In many ways analysis could be defined by just such a distancing from its object, but one of the defining characteristics of conversation analysis is that it is only interested in the theorizing or practical reasoning of the participants in a conversation. So just by looking at its object it undermines its principles.

One could say that a conversation analyst (or really an ethnomethodologist in this case) should instead study this case of practical reasoning displayed by the analyst, but to do that would be to start chasing our tails in very small circles. Such a regress is almost suggested by Garfinkel (1972: 306) as a way of making investigators aware of impositions they might make. But it sees clear that such a suggestion either assumes that it is somehow possible to halt the purification of investigation at some point, or would lead to an unending regress.

Shapiro makes a similar criticism, when he says that Garfinkel's approach to meaning 'fails to address the standpoint of the observer and the problems of interpretation attaching there-

to' (Shapiro, 1981: 104). Shapiro suggests that Garfinkel's emphasis on the process whereby actors produce and manage settings of organized, everyday affairs, and in which the actors' management is identical with their procedures for making those settings accountable, 'neglects an external standpoint from which one could characterize what is happening with this or that aspect of human conduct'.

> Ethnomethodology ends up providing an elucidation of various islands of conduct that have meaning with respect to various individual, process-oriented rationalities. But Garfinkel's norm of ethnomethodological indifference explicitly rejects a standpoint on collective rationality that we as observers can use to create implicitly an archipelago of the individual islands and to impute significance not only to episodes of purpose behaviour, that is, situations in which actors regard themselves as involved in decisions, but also, and more importantly, to episodes of nonchoice in which persons are continuously involved by virture of their affiliation with the symbolizing system that constitutes their world of objects and situations. (Shapiro, 1981: 104)

The broader points which Shapiro makes here regarding the imputation of rationality and significance will be taken up below and in the conclusion but for the moment it is worth noting his further comment that,

> Although Garfinkel's insights help us to understand human decision making and emancipate us from a misleading and restrictive construal of rationality, they nevertheless fail to provide us with a self-understanding of what we, as investigators, contribute to what we understand. (Shapiro, 1981: 105)

The more general issue behind these problems is the wider epistemological question of the necessity of structuring experience in order for it to be sensible - the ways in which seeing is seeing-as. However, rather than going into such a discussion we can consider the implication of the ways conversation analysis explicitly structures its experience, at the level of its representation of data.

The descriptions of the utterances constituting the data of conversation analysis require, as will have been noted, the designation of those utterances as questions, replies, requests, invitations, greetings, and so on, and this involves the categorization of data. This much is acknowledged by Levinson, when he

says that the use of categories such as these may appear to embody an implicit theory of speech acts (Levinson, 1983: 368), but he denies that this constitutes a problem for conversation analysis, or that it means that conversation analysis need yield any quarter to speech act theory.

His argument has two parts. First, he says that such category terms are not the inventions of speech act theory, but rather part of a rich natural language metalanguage, and he says that,

> It does not follow from the existence of such terms either that there is a close connection between 'folk' metalanguage and the categories actually utilized in speech production, or that such categories are properly explicated by providing sets of necessary and sufficient conditions for speech act category membership. (Levinson, 1983: 368)

I have no argument with this. It partly expresses a position I have adopted against speech act categories. But such a position hardly explains why the use of such categories does not involve the imposition of intuitive categorizations on conversation. What it does express is that the use of such categories (explicated as in speech act theory or not) is highly problematic.

Often when such categories are used in conversation analysis they are given 'scare quotes', and this is presumably an indication of what Levinson goes on to say. He says that, if pressed, conversation analysts would claim that the intuitive use of categories like 'request' should be backed up by at least a full sequential explication in terms of the range of expectable responses (like refusals, deferrals or compliances) and an account of the way that requests (or whatever) are typically formulated in order to obtain the desired responses (as in the treatment of indirect requests). (1983: 368)

This, however, is a puzzling statement, for what Levinson is suggesting here is just what we saw Labov & Fanshel do with their categories - and their categories are speech act categories. So it seems that Levinson's argument on the one hand expresses the problematic nature of categorizations such as those used by conversation analysis, and on the other hand suggests that they be treated in the very way discourse analysts treat their speech acts. Whatever the case here, conversation analysis is left with a major methodological conflict. For without such categorizations its analyses cannot get off the ground (that is, no sense can be made of its data), and <u>with</u> such categorizations it is left with

some of the major problems in speech act theory (ones which Levinson at least thinks cripple speech act theory), and is left with a contradiction of its basic methodological claims regarding its relation to its data.

Levinson is here rejecting the idea that conversation analysis should deal with inter-turn relationships, and leave speech act theory to deal with the internal characterization of the function of turns - the idea being suggested by the supposed implicit use of speech act categories. In this case, a possible response might be that even if the first part of the argument fails it does not really harm a large part of conversation analysis, and that a synthesis of the two approaches is possible. In Section 4 of this chapter this possibility will be discussed in more detail; however, the second part of Levinson's argument claims that conversation analysis cannot be relegated to this partial role.

He says that in the analysis of the taking-up of turns to speak (see 1983: 136-7) and of pre-sequences (including 'indirect speech acts'), conversation analysis shows itself to be 'specifically interested in the relationship between intra-turn structure and inter-turn organization or sequence (1983: 368). That is, at least from within conversation analysis, intra-turn and inter-turn features are interrelated and integral to the approach. Whatever this does for Levinson's argument, it seems clear that with regard to the problem I have been addressing, such categorizations, which I have argued have the same role as speech act categories, and the use of which I have argued contradicts the methodological foundations of conversation analysis, are integral to conversation analysis.

A possible response at this point is that all or most of the problems indicated above are solved by the sophistication given to conversation analysis' empiricism by the second methodological claim noted above - namely that reflexivity in conversation is a basic analytic resource. This phenomenological aspect of conversation analysis means that it is the perceptions and reasoning of the participants in a conversation which count, whatever the 'reality' of the conversation. Thus structural and functional categories are not imposed on a conversation by external analysis: rather, the conversation itself, as an ongoing process of practical reasoning, naturally involves the negotiation and analysis of the categories involved. All conversation analysis is

doing, therefore, is describing regularities and patterns in this process as they occur across conversations.

Such a solution will not work, however, and I have already hinted at the problem. Stepping back from the phenomena, and allowing the participants in the interaction, because they are involved in the same analytic/theoretical/practical reasoning exercise as the analyst, to do the work of the analyst, who is simply left with the task of description, may seem attractive, but it merely pushes the problem back one step. It does not overcome the problem. For the task of the analyst, unless she or he is to remain silent, still constructs a relation between the analyst and the phenomena. It is just that the phenomena in this case are the displays of the practical reasoning of the participants in interactions, not the 'real' interactions themselves.

The advocates of conversation analysis assert that what they are involved in is practical reasoning just like that carried out by conversationalists. But this means that either analysis involves a regress of studies of displays of practical reasoning (with each study being itself treated as a display of practical reasoning), with no descriptive/analytic foundation ever being reached; or we accept that conversation analysis shares the deductive, non-empiricist theoretical status of speech act theory and discourse analysis. In either case, the problems with the first methodological principle are not overcome.

It might be replied that the response which indicates a request, for example, does not have to be 'discovered' by the analyst, as its <u>own</u> status in the conversation is demonstrated by the ongoing process of conversation. However, there has to be some point at which, given that we are studying the conversation, we latch on to the conversation, and at this point the relation which conversation analysis needs to avoid is set up.

The empiricism advocated by conversation analysis involves at best (and only then if we ignore major problems with empiricism) nothing more than a descriptivism which is forced by its own principles to leave conversation at it is. And this means that conversation analysis has no role - or simply the role (itself problematic) of reproducing conversation, and saying nothing. As soon as conversation analysis wants to move beyond this role, and make sense of conversation, indicating patterns, regularities and similarities in conversation, it is necessarily forced to

categorize its data, and thus to undermine its founding principles.

The third methodological feature of conversation analysis is connected to the second, but introduces a functional aspect to the approach. This is the notion of conversational motivation, which allows reference to the needs of discourse rather than to the needs of participants. It enables features of an utterance to be explained in relation to demands imposed, through a structural determination, by other elements in the conversation. That is, general conversational features are explained as resolutions of problems posed by the existence of other features, and particular instances can thus be represented as paradigmatic selections for syntagmatic slots. The result is that the concept of illocutionary force can be replaced by that of conversational function (see Levinson, 1983: 285), and there is no need to go outside the conversation for inferred speakers' intentions or the contextual explanation of indexical elements. Speakers' intentions and context are relevant only in as much as they are expressed within a conversation as part of the practical reasoning of participants. Once we concentrate on the structural determinations of a conversation such concepts (which, as has been claimed in the preceding chapters, are extremely problematic) can be left aside.

Again, however, there are problems. First, such a procedure, by isolating conversation from intentionality and context, leaves conversation itself unmotivated. The supposed context sensitivity of the rules proposed by conversation analysis works by those rules being operable in a variety of contexts. But because they are also context independent, so that analysis does not have to bring in context, conversation, as represented by conversation analysis, is isolated from its contexts. This may seem to be a benefit, given some of the problems encountered earlier, however, it ends up leading to a repetition of these problems.

If we have a rule for requests, say (and we ignore the problems associated with distinguishing requests from other utterance types), and this rule says that given a request a certain range of replies are in order, the actual realizations within that range are irrelevant given this view of conversation. And what is more, the actual realization of 'request' is irrelevant. But this means that we have a view where the diversity of actual realizations is ignored. Syntagmatic slots are filled from a paradigmatic range of <u>categories</u>, but the realizations of those

categories cannot be dealt with.

This limitation plays an important important role in Levinson's criticism of speech act theory, and it has been raised before in the chapters on Grice and Searle. There I claimed that one problem with Grice's reduction of meaning to intentions is that it leaves us with no account of the diverse realizations of those intentions, and I claimed (like Levinson) that the move from Searle's categories to their realization is extremely problematic. And here we find the same issue arising with conversation analysis.

If we are left with no account here, and just deal with the structuring of utterance types, the general account of conversation seems severely limited. It seems that we would then have to accept that a given realization is an arbitrary way of expressing a type, and this again leaves the diversity of actual realizations or tokens unmotivated. 'Refusal', 'acceptance' and 'deferral' are types of responses to requests, but then, particular realizations of, say, 'refusal' are in turn different types of refusals. It seems quite unsatisfying, and certainly arbitrary, not to deal with this level of structure (and even to get this far we are assuming that the question of adequately characterizing a paradigm at the level of 'refusal' can be overcome - cf. the discussion of Searle's characterization of promising).

We might, of course, try to give a conversation analysis-style description of this further level of selection and structuring, but to begin this would be to return to another problem raised earlier, which is that we would be on the way towards having a rule for every possible realization. Such a task, as with that of supplying a speech act category for all utterances, on the one hand would be unending, and on the other would seemingly defeat the point of such a project in the first place.

Another aspect of the limitations imposed by the notion of conversational motivation is that when an attempt is made to discuss the place of conversation in overall interactive behaviour conversation analysis has no analytic resources at its disposal. Thus, when Sacks attempts an analysis of a dirty joke (Sacks, 1978) he introduces a number of contextual generalizations which are simply added to, rather than based on and justified by, his own methodology.

He begins with the claim that dirty jokes are, as stories, primarily concerned with transmitting information, but given a greater 'motive power' by being funny and given a circulation restriction by being obscene. He then argues that granted that dirty jokes are 'rational institutions', then the information component of a dirty joke cannot be its obscene content, since this serves to restrict its passage. (Sacks, 1978: 261-2)

The next stage in Sacks' argument is that in the data in which the joke under consideration is presented (see 1978: 250-2) it is not considered funny. He seems to think that the reason the joke falls flat has nothing to do with the competitive relations between the conversationalists, in which the teller seems to be, vainly, trying to gain status within the group. That is, the relation of the conversationalists is given no conversational role. For Sacks, it is just that the joke is not funny for '17-year-old boys' - and the evidence for this is that when told in this instance amongst this group of 17-year-old boys it falls flat. (1978: 262)

Sacks argues that the joke, which is repeated by the teller as having being told to him by his 12-year-old sister, is 'a joke with information relevant for, and passage intendedly restricted to, 12-year-old girls'. He then goes on to list a number of aspects of the needs, interests and behaviour of '12-year-old girls' which would attract them to the joke in question, and aspects of the joke which would specifically appeal to 12-year-old girls.

It may be that, judged according to some scheme or other, all of Sacks' speculations here turn out to be perfectly valid. But such validity would have little or nothing to do with anything offered by conversation analysis. By restricting itself to conversational motivation, any more general motivational features of interaction (such as why certain topical or semantic possibilities are adopted within the range allowed by conversational restrictions, or why, given certain relations between participants, conversational restrictions are overridden, or why, as in this case, certain jokes may or may not appeal to certain groups) have to be ignored, leaving the approach very limited (even assuming that we ignore the earlier problems). In the same way, in Levinson's re-analysis of the data from Labov & Fanshel's work all that could be said related to the conversational motivation

of the interaction, with no possible reference to the context or the situation and roles of the participants. The specificity of that interaction is reduced to an abstract (and apolitical) conversation-in-general. Alternatively, as in this later case, more general motivating structures can be dealt with by speculative generalizations about the characteristics of ill-defined groups of communicative subjects.

That such speculations can occur may well be connected to the possibility with which I want to end this section. This is the possibility that conversation analysis, in spite of claiming to simply make inductive generalizations from the surface phenomena of discourse, and while supposedly making no claims regarding the depth of discourse, in fact shares with speech act theory and discourse analysis an implicit and underlying notion of an a priori and universal conversational or interactive subject.

In previous chapters I have argued that behind approaches to interaction based on speech act theory there seems to lie the notion of a linguistic subject which is constituted logically prior to interaction and which operates as the originating locus of meaning. This subject appears to be at the same time both an unanalyzable foundation and that which guarantees the ultimate determinateness of meaning, and the model of pragmatics which is founded on such a subject seems to represent communicative interaction as the encoding and expression (by the subject) of what is meant, so that language seems represented as a second order semiotic system into which what is meant is translated.

I have argued on the one hand that a model such as this, which makes linguistic meaning dependent on 'speaker's meaning', would make communication impossible, and that it can only salvage communication by assuming some sort of universality which supplies the link between these isolated, a priori subjects. On the other hand, the model <u>treats</u> meaning as determinate, and as analyzable in terms of abstract categories, and given that the theoretical subject which guarantees this determinateness is impossible, and that the categories are arbitrarily given, analysis within this model must apparently be seen as the imposition of meaning according to categories imported from the framework of the analyst.

It seems initially that conversation analysis cannot be characterized in such a way. For it gives intentionality no

explanatory function, and it does not allow external intuitions of correctness or category to play a role in its analysis. However, if the argument so far in this section is correct, this second claim collapses, and conversation analysis thus seems to share a number of features with speech act theory. This is so to the extent that the concept of conversational function, which is supposed to take the place of illocutionary force, seems to share many of its features and limitations once the empiricist foundation and the reflexive analysis are challenged.

Nevertheless, conversational function is not grounded in the intentionality of an a priori subject. It is based on conversational motivation, and while I have argued that conversational motivation leads to major problems, this does seem to be an important difference. But the question is whether such a concept does not implicitly involve such a subject under a different guise.

The functional approach which one finds in conversation analysis seems to beg the question as to what needs are being expressed in the production of conversational structures. They are not participant needs in precisely the way found in speech act theory, but the needs of conversation appear to be the needs of some transcendent conversational subject. It seems that some such subject is operating implicitly in conversation analysis as the locus of the motivation which is otherwise denied to conversation by the adoption of this approach.

Support for this suspicion is given if we look back at the aims of conversation analysis. It is set up as a search for the 'common sense' or 'practical reason' displayed in the 'orderliness' of conversation. That is, perhaps the most basic assumptions of conversation analysis are that conversation is orderly and that this orderliness is due to common sense. The assumption of orderliness can be accepted for the sake of the argument - although such an assumption is a basic contradiction of the empiricist methodology (while being, according to my earlier argument, a necessary one). But the point I want to emphasize is that just by assuming the existence of a common sense behind this order, conversation analysis has presupposed that a certain universal subject lies behind conversation. It is the subject which explains the fact of ordering and is expressed in the motivation towards ordering, and is the subject necessarily presupposed by a functional analysis.

It is also the subject which explains the actual order which is 'found'; but given the argument so far in this section, conversation analysis cannot claim to 'find' the order of conversation - rather, this order must arise out of the analyst-object relation. So, not only is a universal ordering subject assumed, but its character in so ordering conversation is assumed - not only the existence of common sense, but the nature of common sense.

I do not mean by this that conversation analysis makes claims as to the basic structure of subjectivity, nor even that it makes claims about the universality of the organization it finds in the conversations it deals with (which tend to be restricted to the English-speaking, white, middle-class - see Schenkein, 1978: 6 and Levinson, 1983: 369). I am claiming rather that this approach presupposes a universalized subjectivity, and should be expected to read the organization of conversation according to the basic structures of subjectivity bound up in that presupposed subjectivity.

This can be made clearer by considering Levinson's discussion of the extent to which aspects of conversational organization are universal. He gives five reasons why this issue is central. First, if basic aspects of conversational organization are universal, then significant linguistic universals may be explainable by pointing to 'universal functional pressures exerted by basic patterns of language use'. Second, in this case general patterns of child language acquisition may be explained by reference to a single basic learning situation, which is conversational. Third, second-language teaching can take certain basic pragmatic parameters for granted. Fourth, this would mean that there are distinct limits to the kind of social variation in the use of language that has been explored in the ethnography of speaking. Fifth,

> such universals would throw light on a basic facet of human nature - perhaps humans as a species are as much characterized by conversational activity as they are by differing cultures, complex social systems and tool-making. (Levinson, 1983: 369)

Levinson is guarded about the actuality of such universality, which, it should be noted, he assumes would be discovered through the empirical methods of conversation analysis. He says

that a great deal of comparative work would need to be done, but he says that it seems safe to say that 'local management systems' such as turn-taking, adjacency pair organization and repair systems have a universal basis, even though their present description may be culturally biased. Overall structural units, such as the notion of a conversation are more likely to be culturally variable, while somewhere in the middle will be intermediate organizations such as preference organization and pre-sequences. (Levinson, 1983: 369, and see 301.)

These are speculations by Levinson, but if my argument so far is correct, then we would expect that conversation analysis is geared towards constructing a model of interaction where such universal structures, to more or less this extent, are 'discovered'. And we could also expect that the subject implicit within this is one naturally oriented to at least the interactive economy discussed by the ethnomethodologists and the local management systems of conversational analysis. This issue of the specific nature of the subject is not central to my argument, and I do not want to go into it any further here. I merely want to point out that conversation analysis is geared towards the 'discovery' of some such universal features, both in conversation and, implicitly, in the subject it presupposes.

It is important to point out here that I am not denying that there needs to be a certain 'common sense' (and indeed a commonness of sense) for there to be communication or interaction. What I am denying is that this can be assumed as universal and as lying in the pre-given nature of universal subjects (and as translateable from the diversity of its realization). I am suggesting instead that it needs to be seen as lying in the interactive relations of subjects, and as constituting the common sense of those subjects.

SECTION 4: THE POSSIBILITY OF SYNTHESIS.

Levinson claims that both speech act theory and discourse analysis are fundamentally flawed, and he argues that they need to be rejected wholesale in favour of conversation analysis. However, a more common response from within pragmatics is to argue that the study of discourse phenomena can best be served by a synthesis of the two types of approach.

theory give a static view of interaction.

In response to attempts to analyze communication as discrete units of discourse, Gumperz claims that interaction and interpretation are an ongoing process in which status, goals and so on - elements making up the implied context of an interaction - are negotiated and developed, and he feels that this characteristic cannot be captured when conversation is abstracted into static, bounded units. At the same time, Gumperz' approach does include the notion of certain abstract cognitive structures by which conversationalists interpret what is going on in an interaction. However, unlike the the schemata of the ethnography of communication or the speech acts of discourse analysis, Gumperz' 'speech activities' are not precisely labelable, are meant to reflect speaker's assessment of an interaction (rather than being the linguist's description of what is happening) and are not necessarily the same for all participants in an interaction ('what one person would identify as "lecturing", another might interpret as "chatting with one's child"'). Speech activities are assessments of an interaction by which participants, through past experience, identify an interaction and interpret it. This identification is conditional, for as well as being imprecise these interpretive frames are not static, nor do they determine interpretation. A speech activity assessment channels interpretation, and in the course of an interaction assessments may change retrospectively depending on the effect of responses according to a chosen path of interpretation, until the interaction reaches resolution - this resolution (or breakdown) being signaled by culturally more or less specific cues. (See Gumperz, 1982: 165-7, and also Levinson, 1978 for the initial development of the term 'speech activities'.)

In this approach three important characteristics - apart from the use of examples of natural interaction - are adopted from conversation analysis. First, we find the idea that utterances have a 'relational' significance, that their significance arises (in part, as we shall see) through their place in a discourse structure, and this operates to overcome the problem of the relation between utterances and corresponding cognitive categories. Second, there is the idea that discourse is a fluid and cooperative process of negotiation, reevaluation and repair of roles, meanings and topics, and not the carrying out of static and bounded acts.

Such a synthesis can already be seen in Labov & Fanshel's work, where it is suggested that the sequencing of utterances should be dealt with according to the approach of the conversation analysts and combined with a speech act analysis of the production of those utterances. That work also involved the use of unconstructed data, and a treatment of data which, while not as avowedly empiricist, and while combined with a deductive approach, shares the detailed approach of conversation analysis (and in some ways is more detailed).

Coulthard (1977) also insists on the use of detailed conversational data gathered from naturally occurring interactions (and this is typical of the Birmingham group), and he also suggests the use of a conversation analysis-style study of sequencing. Again with Stubbs (1983), the criticism of speech act theory presented at the beginning of this chapter does not lead to a wholesale rejection of that approach, but to a revised treatment of data, a wariness regarding intentions, and a recognition of the extent to which structural features of conversation govern content. Stubbs also seems to take more interest in the methodological innovations of conversation analysis regarding reflexivity and conversational motivation.

Another attempt to synthesize these approaches, and one which I want to look at in more detail in this section, is that put forward by Gumperz (1982). Gumperz' criticisms of discourse analysis involve some of the points summarized earlier, but he emphasizes two aspects in particular. First, he is critical of the ways in which event labels (in the ethnography of communication) and discourse categories are imposed as ideotypical constructs on everyday verbal exchanges. He says that although event labels and discourse categories are part of our everyday vocabulary and are regularly used when we talk <u>about</u> modes of speaking, 'they are highly abstract in nature and on the whole poor descriptors of what is actually accomplished'.

> When participants report on actual verbal encounters, they tend to do so by mentioning some item of content, or by referring to what people were getting at or what they were trying to do. Event names in everyday talk are most often used metaphorically to refer retrospectively to what was accomplished. (Gumperz, 1982: 157)

Secondly, Gumperz is critical of the way in which the abstract conceptual categories of discourse analysis and speech act

Third, Gumperz adopts from conversation analysis the methodological reliance on participant assessment as displayed in interactions, as a way of avoiding the imposition on an interaction of categories which do not necessarily reflect either the fluid and changing nature of a conversation or the understanding of participants.

While Gumperz adopts several important aspects of conversation analysis, he also feels that its approach has limitations when taken on its own. He complains that the work of the conversation analysts does not account for the linguistic bases of conversational cooperation. Conversation analysts, he notes, regard the post-Chomskian concern with grammatical rules as merely another instance of the normative sociological paradigm they have been trying to overcome; however, he points out that in much of the empirical work of conversation analysis, referential meanings that assume sharing of strategies for contextualizing a conversation, which involve linguistic knowledge in a sense ignored by this work, are taken for granted. (Gumperz, 1982: 160)

Gumperz says that conversation analysis thus has limitations which affect both the validity of the analysts' attempts to capture participants' interpretive processes and the social import of their work. He says that in order to account for inter-speaker differences in background knowledge a sociolinguist needs to know how speakers use verbal skills to create contextual conditions that reflect particular culturally realistic scenes.

> How are speakers' grammatical and phonological abilities employed in this? For example, if regular speaker change is to take place, participants must be able to scan phrases to predict when an utterance is about to end. They must be able to distinguish between rhetorical pauses and turn relinquishing pauses. Although overlap is an integral part of interaction, conversational cooperation requires that interactional synchrony be maintained so that speakers cannot be interrupted at random. To follow the thematic progression of an argument, moreover, and to make one's contribution relevant, one must be able to recognize culturally possible lines of reasoning. It is therefore necessary to show how strategies of conversational management are integrated into other aspects of speakers' linguistic knowledge. (Gumperz, 1982: 160)

This criticism leads to the other aspect of the model summarized above. The introduction of the notion of 'speech activities' supposedly removes the static and bounded nature of speech acts, but retains the abstract cognitive structures which Gumperz feels are a crucial part of communicative competence, and which reasserts the 'ideational' significance of utterances. As well, paralinguistic cues, of the sort dealt with in Labov & Fanshel's discourse analysis, are treated as an integral to the contextualization of interaction (see 1982: 162). Gumperz thinks that non-vocal conversational units can be in themselves significant, while Levinson, for example, regards such units as always functionally defined by the actions they perform in context.

There is much more detail to Gumperz' approach than I have been able to summarize here (including concepts from the ethnography of communication), but the theoretical model presented above constitutes the basis of this approach - and it is perhaps the development of such an analytic model which most clearly indicates his distance from the work studied in this chapter. Elsewhere, Gumperz & Hymes express concern that the 'universality and ubiquity' of methodological phenomena - the ways in which investigators must be involved in the same practical reasoning as the conversationalists they study - leaves the investigator unable to 'remedy or repair the presence of practical reasoning in investigations', that is, unable to overcome the problems of the analyst's relation to the data.

> One gains the impression that all the investigator can do is to collect and exhibit instances. Quite possibly, this posture of extreme empiricism - reminiscent of the descriptive linguists - is merely a passing phase, which will disappear with the accumulation of more properly documented case studies. (Gumperz & Hymes, 1972: 306)

This response seems to involve a lack of recognition of the extent to which this empiricism lies at the heart of conversation analysis, informing as it does all the significant methodological principles of that approach. It also fails to notice that conversation analysis' empiricism is compromised in the ways indicated in the previous section. However, Gumperz' own later criticism (noted above) does point to this compromise, and what I want to emphasize here is that in the position he develops himself Gumperz rejects the empiricist's refusal to theorize in favour of a model of communication, but one which acknowledges participant assessment.

One reason for concentrating on Gumperz' synthesis of conversation analysis and speech act theory (or discourse analysis) is that because he develops his approach as a way of confronting issues such as interethnic conflict he refocuses attention on the ways pragmatics is cashed out as social science, and confronts political phenomena.

Gumperz develops an approach to areas of social conflict which involves a conscientious liberal-pluralism. It is an approach in which the (linguistic and social) integrity of codes is acknowledged and theoretically respected. Conversation is not reduced to the same, as in conversation analysis, because he insists that 'extra-conversational' linguistic knowledge (carrying a range of specificity for each speech community), is a crucial aspect of communication. And he claims that part of the role of such knowledge is the maintenance of linguistic (which are social) boundaries. These boundaries will often be the site of conflict, and Gumperz sees a role for pragmatics in understanding and helping to intervene in those conflicts which are due to communication breakdown, communication being 'the symbolic tip of the iceberg reflecting the forces of history' (1982: 201).

I want to note two problems with this synthesis. First, Gumperz tries to overcome the difficulties surrounding speech act theory's imposition of abstract categories on communication by not presupposing such categories and forcing interpretation onto a conversation, but rather discovering them in the speech behaviour of conversationalists; however, the problem here is that the limitations of this aspect of conversation analysis are not confronted. Given that the investigator does not simply remain silent (and I have argued that even to merely 'collect and exhibit instances' is to necessarily interpret), and given especially that the investigator is explicitly interpreting the diverse codes with which he or she is confronted, then there must always be translation into the code of the investigator. Without such translation there would be incoherence (no sense having been made of the data), but with such translation there is representation in a code with its own implicit and more or less specific social/linguistic values, expectations and practical reasoning. In the sort of situations Gumperz is thinking of (but also in any investigation of communicative interaction) this means that sense must ultimately be made in the code of the social scientist, and this is a code which is always in a certain relation of power and

interest to the various conflicting codes it confronts. One might respond that the approach suggested by Gumperz involves the acknowledgement of the diversity of codes and their social/linguistic integrity; but then, this may well reflect part of the social/linguistic values of liberal social science - and this leads on to the second point.

Gumperz overcomes conversation analysis' descriptivism and (perhaps not intentionally) avoids its compromised empiricism by retaining abstract cognitive structures through his use of the notion of speech activities; but in doing this he fails to confront the central problem which I have associated with speech act theory. I have argued that when speech act categories are taken as an abstract paradigm of a realization it seems that no account is given of the relation between the realization and its paradigm. That is, no account is given of how any given utterance is a realization of any particular cognitive category. The resolution of this problem, I have tried to show, is supplied by taking the categories as constituting a language of intentionality and the realizations as constituting translations of this intentionality. Such a solution is inadequate, for a number of reasons already mentioned; yet in a sense this solution <u>is</u> effective, in as much as it allows the presupposition of a universal and a priori subjectivity which, while unanalyzable in itself (while being an unconditioned foundation), allows the supposedly objective assignment, by the analyst, of significance to the language of intentionality behind the surface of discourse.

Gumperz expresses the beginning of this analysis when he says that the key notion in discourse analysis is Grice's definition of meaning as 'the effect that a sender intends to produce on a receiver by means of a message', and he goes on to say that 'speech acts defined in terms of illocutionary force, i.e. utterers' communicative intent, become the main unit of linguistic analysis' (Gumperz, 1982: 156). But the problem is that this is the crucial aspect of discourse analysis which Gumperz carries over into his own model of communication. Certainly, we find a relational analysis of some conversational phenomena, and we also find a notion of the conditional interpretation of utterances, but in as much as interpretation is made into categories, and in as much as Gumperz avoids descriptivism and himself interprets utterances, we are left with the ultimate reduction of communication to the language of intentionality and to an unconditioned or a priori universal subjectivity imposed by analysis.

In the approach to social science which Gumperz is proposing, such a reduction involves the salvaging of identity from the diversity of codes, attitudes, beliefs and interests with which the social scientist is confronted. Such social factors are seen as expressed in language by the communicative subject, and their specificity is explained in terms of the specificity of social/linguistic environments - and this is fine. But because the communicative subject is seen as ultimately both constitutive and a priori - the intending subject - such factors in no way constitute the communicative subject. They are the socially specific translations of intentionality. And because intentionality is unanalyzable, but also ultimately represented in terms of the analyst's code (in order for it to be coherent within that code) the socially specific values and reasoning found in communicative interaction are seen as socially specific reflections of (and are therefore interpreted in terms of) a universal intentionality/subjectivity which reflects the values and standards of rationality expressed in the analyst's code.

CONCLUSION.

The methods employed by conversation analysis offer an alternative to speech act theory and discourse analysis, with their explication of communication as action in terms of abstract cognitive categories. It is an initially attractive alternative, if for no other reason than the pervasiveness of the problems confronting that attempt to approach communication by moving beyond the surface of discourse. Conversation analysis insists on going no further than the actions which exist as conversation, and examines these actions as themselves constructing and displaying social and communicative categories.

I have argued, however, that in as much as conversation analysis remains true to the empiricism on which it is based it is left as mere (although problematic) descriptivism. In fact, in its analyses conversation analysis consistently undermines its empiricist claims and indulges in the same categorization which leads to many of the problems with speech act theory. Thus, rather than moving beyond speech act theory, conversation analysis seems at times to involve merely a disguising of these problems beneath a phenomenological gloss.

Finally, attempts to synthesize conversation analysis and speech act theory or discourse analysis seem to be equally doomed. They tend to involve adding a version of speech act categories to an approach which is found to be too descriptivist, and such a response involves adding the limitations of the first view to those of conversation analysis' empiricism - a conjunction which conversation analysis in any case seems to implicitly make itself.

CONCLUSION
THE POLITICS OF DISCOURSE

With the discussion of conversation analysis the project of the thesis has been completed, and it remains now to bring together the points which have arisen in the preceding chapters, and to offer an assessment of the viability of pragmatics.

We began with a discussion of Austin's analysis of performatives, and this has operated as a focus for the present work in two ways. On the one hand, it seems to be the originating theoretical locus of much of the pragmatic tradition which has been discussed here. The tradition finds in that discussion the most important initial attempt to approach language as action, and to distinguish what is said from what is done. It is seen also as introducing the concept of pragmatic rules (under the guise of felicity conditions) and the importance of contextual features, in a displacement of the overriding authority of linguistic rules and formal (syntactic and semantic) features in determining the meaning of an utterance, inasmuch as that utterance is operative in an interactive, social environment. The analysis of performatives is thus seen as taking the first, tentative steps towards the theory of illocutionary acts.

But the analysis of performatives is a focus for another reason, for it seems possible to find in it an approach which is more theoretically radical than that which the tradition has discovered, and through which an interesting critique of that tradition can be developed. The path towards this alternative approach lies first in not taking the early discussion at its face value as an initial and tentative attempt to solve a puzzle brought about by certain anomalous linguistic phenomena, but rather taking it as a strategic attempt to undermine, by the use of this puzzle, a positivist conception of the relation between language, linguistic subjects and reality.

The case of utterances having the form of the verificationist's paradigmatc linguistic phenomenon (a constative which acts as the medium for the expression of a subject's relation to the world) but not having the function of such a paradigm (since they bring about states of affairs, rather than describe them) leads to the attempt to formally characterize the anomaly. But this project (a standard response to such an anomaly) leads to the position where all utterances, as utterance acts, and in as much as they are communicatively operative, involve the invocation of non-linguistic rules and procedures through which their communicative significance arises. Thus, the original performatives are a special case, but a special case which brings out a general feature of language in communication. Significantly, the original performatives are more or less ritualized, but this serves to indicate the ways in which utterances in general are dependent on rituals (as rule-governed procedures) in their operation. Thus, while an order is not a ritual in the same way that the naming of a ship is, what Austin shows is that for an order to be operative (for it to be understood, not just for it to be effective) there must exist an interactive procedure for ordering - it must make sense to order (as well as the words 'I order you ...' making sense), and so part of the meaning of an order must be non-semantic.

Some responses to Austin have, as we have seen, attempted to retain the notion of some sort of constative or propositional core of language. But once we read Austin in the way proposed above, it seems that a propositional content or its truth and falsity cannot be considered prior to the operation of felicity conditions, since this consideration depends on those felicity conditions - importantly, on the existence of a recognizable procedure for constating, but also on factors such as the purposes for which the abstracted content is being considered and the position of the person making the statement.

A further point to remember here is that Austin argues that distinguishing force linguistically, linguistically clarifying the force of utterances, can be seen as resulting from the demands of the sophistication and development of social forms and procedures, and he says that this clarification is as much a creative act as a discovery. From this we get the notion of pragmatics as involving the interrelation between social and linguistic forms. The forces of utterances are not somehow already there in language, but arise and change with the develop-

ment or change of interactive practices. At the same time, and because this is an interrelation, these forces are not described by language; rather, they are embodied in it as itself a part of interactive practice.

From this standpoint Austin is useful, not only in a discussion of pragmatics, but also in an examination of the politics of discourse. If we take politics as that aspect of social interaction which involves the operation (and contestation) of social roles and relations, then once we refuse, with Austin, the split between language and interaction, pragmatics offers an approach which confronts linguistic interaction or discourse, not just as the expression of political relations, but as a site of their operation.

As was noted earlier, the problem which arises in Austin's analysis is that while he offers an approach which, in rejecting a positivist view of language, treats it as a pragmatically oriented aspect of social interaction, he does not directly address the notion of a linguistic subject, and perhaps as a result of that appears to make use of an implicit notion which should be contradicted by other aspects of his approach. This implicit subject appears to operate, through its intention, as the organizing centre of a total field of context, giving pragmatic meaning a determinateness guaranteed by that intention. Thus the introduction into analysis of the context of utterance, which frees the utterance from the determinations of its formal features, seems undermined by the notion of an intention which, as an organizing centre, ties the utterance back into the determination of an originating moment which logically precedes interaction. It seems instead that when language use is viewed in its pragmatic aspects, meaning takes on a certain indeterminateness. This may be variable, and may be tied down through the negotiative process of interaction, but cannot be grounded in an originating moment as the true meaning of an utterance.

Connected with this is the problem that Austin appears to adopt, unargued, the notion of a paradigmatic 'ordinary language'. This ordinary language is not defined in terms of utterance type, but rather in terms of the linguistic subject's relation to an utterance. The relation is essentially one of seriousness, and is opposed to utterance as citation. The problem arises because on Austin's analysis all utterances necessarily involve the invocation of recognizable interactive-linguistic procedures,

and therefore all utterance involves the citation of these pragmatic procedures. Hence, it seems that there cannot be a distinction drawn in this way between serious and non-serious utterance, and the supposed seriousness of an originating linguistic subject cannot be used as a criterion by which to identify language which is 'ordinary'. The extent to which these assumptions are central to Austin's project need not be finally decided here, however, they do seem to be a problematic feature of much of the tradition which follows Austin.

The value of placing more emphasis than is usual on the analysis of performatives is that this can assist our understanding of the issues which arise surrounding the theory of illocutionary acts. Thus, in the light of responses (such as Cohen's) which attempt to give a semanticist reading of illocutionary force, and explicate it in terms of the total locution, it seems clear that the mistake which has been made is to focus on the utterance-object rather than the utterance-act. While there is a locutionary object (the locution) which results from the locutionary act, there is no illocutionary object resulting from the illocutionary act and being some sort of extension of the locution; rather, the illocutionary act has illocutionary meaning, which is of a different order to the semantic meaning of the locution. It is presumably to avoid just such a confusion that Austin insists on a distinction between meaning and force. Force is not a consequence of the locutionary act, but rather a consequence of the existence of certain interactive practices and procedures, and for an utterance-act to be interactively operative is must invoke these practices and procedures.

The reading of the analysis of performatives which has been offered also helps us understand the attack on the role of extra-linguistic conventions in the operation of illocutionary acts. Strawson thinks that those illocutionary acts which are not ritualized are not constituted by extra-linguistic conventions. For him, non-ritual illocutionary acts can be rendered conventionally, but by being made linguistically explicit, and what this rendering makes explicit is the illocutionary <u>intention</u> of the speaker. Apart from the problems which confront a view which takes intention as the origin of meaning, this response fails to grasp Austin's insight that illocutionary force is necessarily conventional in that it involves the invocation of interactive procedures, and that it is therefore relatively independent of both intentions and semantic meaning. An illocutionary act will

usually involve, or be carried out by, the intended production of a semantically meaningful locution, but its force is not a consequence of, and is not constituted, by this locution.

Among responses to the theory of illocutionary acts we find again the attempt to retain the notion of a pre-illocutionary message, as a statement-content, or propositional content, and as the relatively stable core of an utterance. Again we have the problem that as soon as we say anything about this content it must seemingly be represented as illocutionary, as a certain act in certain circumstances; and thus the content cannot operate as a pure message within communication (as Graham wants), but must be seen as an interactively constituted aspect of communication. Alternatively, it can be taken as the act of a subject which exists self-sufficiently and prior to interaction. Such a subject, in which meaning arises through a primary and foundational relation to the world, may be seen as entering into discourse and discursive relations, but it enters as pre-given, and its own presupposed cognitive relation to the world constitutes one side of a radical distinction between the subject and intersubjectivity.

We find this type of conception of the linguistic subject with Grice. If the subject as an a priori foundation which constitutes meaning is implicit in aspects of Austin's approach, in Grice's theory of meaning it is explicitly placed as the central component. What is interesting about Grice is that if pragmatics is in part an attempt to account for non-standard meaning, meaning which fails to accord with the formal features of an utterance, and to emphasize the role of acting linguistic subjects in communication, then he offers a clear picture of one limit of that attempt. For Grice, meaning originates as a speaker's intentions, and not only does this account for deviations from standard meaning, but standard meaning is itself taken as the conventionalizing of this speaker's meaning. We saw that the Gricean program collapses. The attempt to analyze meaning in terms of a speaker's communicative intentions turn out to be based on an invalid conflation of meaning as intending and communicative meaning. Even without this problem, with intentions as the indicators of what is meant no understanding would be possible, since publicly accessible indicators of meaning are dependent upon prior intentions as indicators, and these are private and inaccessible until already meaningful public indicators are available. The essential privacy of the foundation or constitut-

ion of meaning in this approach is further undermined because the private ostention which Grice posits at this basis of meaning appears to presuppose language and meaning in its operation.

Grice's approach to meaning follows from the insight that we do not always mean what we say, and he attempts to explain this by taking intentions, rather than semantic features, as the ground of meaning. This can be seen as an alternative to Cohen's approach of widening the notion of the semantic features of the utterance. We can now say, against both these approaches, that what is said and what is meant can come apart because there are both semantic and pragmatic levels of meaning, and that communicative interaction is dependent on the invocation and operation of pragmatic rules and procedures. These rules and procedures, and not wide semantic rules or speakers' intentions, constitute pragmatic meaning.

It seems from the discussion of Grice that if pragmatics wants to place theoretical emphasis on the role of the subject in interaction, it needs to avoid introducing this subject as presupposed, and constituted prior to interaction. For so conceived it appears impossible for the subject to enter into interaction. However, such a subject has become central to pragmatics, and especially so in Searle's work.

Searle's approach amounts to an interesting, although unsatisfactory, attempt to combine the approaches of Grice and Cohen. His response to Austin is to collapse the locutionary-illocutionary distinction through a semantic analysis of force (similar to Cohen's), and to introduce instead a propositional act within the reconstituted illocutionary act. As we saw, the effect of this is to give no account of meaning other than force, and ultimately no adequate account of force, for the propositional act (given that it is not simply a rhetic act represented as a constative) is dependent on the illocutionary act which it supposedly originally semantically determined. When Searle then reworks Grice's theory of meaning he develops a position which is essentially that to be found in the third of Grice's papers, and the explication of meaning in terms of illocutionary intentions does not overcome the basic limitations of Grice's approach, repeating the equivocal use of 'meaning' and the gap which is forged between intentions and understanding. Finally, Searle develops a naturalistic account of speech acts in terms of intentionality as a basic property of the mind, and this attempt appears to founder

on the problem of bridging the gap between the linguistic subject as so conceived and interaction.

A further problem which arises with Searle is that when he assigns and analyzes speech act categories he is unable to give criteria for picking out the paradigm cases which constitute these abstracted categories. Furthermore, because these categories are necessarily idealizations, his speech act approach is left with the problem of explaining the relation between such categories and their variously impure realizations in discourse. So we find again that the attempt to impose a determinateness on discourse fails.

In many ways Searle's work is puzzling, because while all these difficulties arise, we find also an acknowledgement of the importance of what words already mean in the language, an assertion of the necessity of treating language as an institutional fact, and an attempt to give an account of illocutionary acts in terms of interactive or pragmatic rules - and it seems difficult to reconcile these contradictory aspects. I would suggest, however, that in this contradiction lies the basic paradox of pragmatics. We get from it on the one hand an attempt to confront and account for language as interaction, but we find on the other hand that this attempt is continually undermined by a reliance on just those basic theoretical assumptions which underlie the positivism to which pragmatics is supposedly opposed.

Turning to discourse analysis, and specifically to Labov & Fanshel's work, many of these issues are brought into a sharper focus. For on the one hand discourse analysis involves a refinement and extension of philosophical pragmatics - in particular, a development of interpretive discourse rules and a more extended treatment of the relation between what is said and what is done, which leads to an account of discourse as dynamic process. On the other hand, discourse analysis, because it approaches examples of extended discursive interaction, develops an actual analysis of the variously organized interactive relations which are operative in discourse. This latter development leads to the re-emergence of insights which had been left dormant in Austin's work concerning the social construction of meaning. A pragmatic account of language is here taken to involve not just an account of action in a context, but of interaction in a social context, which directs and constrains the action and meaning which can arise. To this, Labov & Fanshel add an account of the importance of unex-

pressed social and psychological propositions in the operation of discourse.

But in spite of an explicit account of the place of factors such as role, status and power in discourse,[1] Labov & Fanshel's work seems undermined by the same fundamental assumptions which arose within Austin's work, and which cripple philosophical pragmatics as a whole. For example, there appears to be an ultimate reliance on foundational meaning intentions, as was found with Grice and Searle, and which may have been implicit in Austin's approach. This leads to these social factors being seen as external to the ground of meaning, and while there is certainly with Labov & Fanshel the notion of intentions being interpreted from what is done, this interpretation finds its determinateness in those intentions as origin.

This relates to a further issue. Labov & Fanshel adopt an approach which sees a multiplicity of speech acts relating to a given speech unit, and this seems initially to avoid the search for unitary meaning - tied through intention to the unitary consciousness of the intending subject. But this multiplicity is (usually) an hierarchical multiplicity, and so, while they regard conversation as 'a matrix of utterances and actions bound together by a web of understandings and reactions' (1977: 30), in which the participants understand and react to speech acts at many levels of abstraction, meaning as the object of interpretation is tied into a linear hierarchy, anchored in the 'real meaning' of the intending subject.

The final point to restate here is that these theoretical problems with pragmatics, resulting in the lack of an adequate account of the ways in which meaning arises, leads to the ultimate inability of work within that approach to recognize or account for the ways in which analysis itself constitutes the object which it discovers. Meaning is taken to arise in the intentionality of the speaking subject and to be interpreted within the context of utterance, and the determination of the originating act is taken as supplying the determination of meaning. Pragmatics then takes on the task of searching for and explicating this originating act - an act whose purity is in no way touched by a discursive relation between it and the analyst, for a linguistic subject so conceived, and its 'meaning', is independent of any effects of interaction, and exists as a pure object to be discovered. Once we reject this positivism, the

relation becomes much more problematic. The discovery of meaning becomes seen as the assignment of significance and the definition of the subject, both in its nature as a priori and foundational, and in what it 'really means'.

The problem of the role of the analyst is one of the central points which arose out of the discussion of conversation analysis. Conversation analysis, as we have seen, represents a response to these other approaches to pragmatics which adopts an analysis in terms of the surface of discourse, as opposed to one which works towards the depth of discourse, in the intentions of language users and abstract speech act categories. Conversation analysis attempts to overcome problems surrounding the search for unobservable intentions and and the correlation between form and function by examining the ways in which speakers display, through the reflexivity of conversation, their own interpretation of what is happening in a conversation. Cognitive or psychological depth is only relevant in so far as it arises in the displayed reasoning of participants, which is also a practical sociological reasoning; and conversation is essentially treated as the outcome of the interaction of independent, goal-oriented individuals, often with divergent interests. A crucial point here is that an analyst is seen as being involved in the same sort of practical reasoning activity as is a conversationalist.

This approach is undermined first and foremost by the empiricist premise by which it marks its break from theories based on speech acts. As conversation analysis sets up its empiricism it appears locked into what can at very best be described as a descriptivism which can never assimilate the data which it collects. We find, however, that while it sets itself the goal of an impossibly pure relation between analyst and conversation, it in fact claims to see in conversation things unobserved by participants (even though the perceptions of participants are the source of its data), and that it used categories which amount to, and are treated in the same way as, speech act categories. Thus, in as much as conversation analysis does social science, it unconsciously adopts just those deductive categories which it wants to reject.

Even more significantly, it appears that in attempting to account for conversational motivation conversation analysis is committed, like speech act theory and discourse analysis, to presupposing an a priori foundational subject. This subject both

motivates conversation and is the bearer of the common sense which conversation analysis claims to discover in conversation. As with other forms of pragmatics, the goal-directed individuals which are taken to participate in and bring about conversation are given no theoretical place within interaction. It is worth noting as well that the search for intentions is rejected because they are unobservable, not because they operate as foundational.

Sociological facts are seen by conversation analysis as being constructed through interaction, and this is a valuable point, but they are constructed by the interaction of individuals who somehow precede interaction, already constituted as subjects prior to interaction. It seems, on the contrary, that we should take the subjectivities which arise in interaction and take part in the ongoing process of reinforcement, negotiation and construction of sociological facts, as being themselves constituted through this interaction - as, we might say, sociological facts, and also as their own self-consciousness. With this we return to the question of the politics of discourse.

It seems that there can be put forward a weak and a strong argument regarding the politics of discourse. In the first, it would be argued that in its attempt to deal with language in relation to the users of language pragmatics necessarily comes up against political phenomena, in the shape of the relations operating among participants in the discourse which it examines. These relations, it could then be argued, are not neutral, but are variously structured along dimensions of power and solidarity, and we find them expressed as propositions which are embedded in discourse and which constrain the interpretation of discourse, and enter into the operation of discourse rules. By analyzing the relation between what is said and what is done, pragmatics would thus be in a position to make explicit these propositions, and to bring out the political relations which are expressed in various interactive practices.

From such a position it could be argued that pragmatics as social science should take account of these political aspects of discourse, but that the politics of discourse is certainly not intrinsic to pragmatics, and neither is politics intrinsic to discourse. It enters into discourse, because discourse is is bound up in interaction, and interaction (in at least some of its aspects) involves political relations, but it in no way underlies discourse.

This approach, which could be described as combining the more radical insights of Austin with the dynamic-interactive aspects of Labov & Fanshel and the conversation analysts, is perhaps quite attractive. However, as I hope will be clear from the arguments I have put forward so far, it has to be significantly extended, in the light of a stronger account of the relation between pragmatics and the politics of discourse.

The problem with the weak account is that it does not come to terms with the central and undermining features of the approaches to pragmatics which have been discussed. It notes and emphasizes the account of the politics of discourse which pragmatics, so to speak, backs into, but it does not confront the ways in which pragmatics is weakened, theoretically, by what in fact amounts to the exclusion of the politics of discourse as an intrinsic theoretical element. This means that we could take up an account of the politics of discourse from a pragmatics perspective, but that we would carry with this perspective an account which is theoretically troubled (no great problem, perhaps), but also, in this theoretical inadequacy, actively depoliticizing discourse. However, this criticism assumes that an account of discourse should treat discourse as politicized, and this must now be shown.

As I have argued throughout this study, the fundamental weakness of pragmatics (at least in those approaches viewed here) is that it continually avails itself of the notion of a foundational linguistic subject. This subject acts as the ground from which meaning arises, and analysis traces the meaning of discourse to its determination in the subject's intentionality. I hope that I have demonstrated that such an approach cannot work, but the point to emphasize and repeat here is that the use of such a model has the effect of tying the discursive or pragmatic significance which pragmatics discovers, in the form of speech acts or in shared propositions, back into this originating determination which exists outside discourse. Language thus becomes once again the resource or medium of positivism, by which individuals attempt to transmit what they mean as a primary and pure relation to the world and as the expression of their intentions.

If, however, we reject this approach, we can (and in line with, although extending, insights to be found in pragmatics - in Austin's work, and Labov's, for example) develop a quite diff-

erent conception of the relation between linguistic subjects and discourse. First, we can, and by taking note of Austin's demonstration of the ways in which language is a constitutive phenomenon, reject the idea of language as simply a medium. By this we can take meaning as not being simply born by language, as a translation from its ground in the pre-discursive experience of the subject, but as arising instead in the constitutive rules and definitions of more or less specific discursive formations.

The type of position I am suggesting here can be found in Shapiro's study, which is an attempt to undermine positivist assumptions within political science. He argues, for example, partly drawing on Austin's work, that,

> Language is not <u>about</u> objects and experience, it is <u>constitutive</u> of objects and experience. This is not the subjectivist position that there is nothing (no thing) in the world until we cognize it or speak of it. Rather, it is the position that the world of 'things' has no meaningful structure except in connection with the standards we employ to ascribe qualities to it. We therefore cannot speak about the world or experience without beginning with some presuppositions about the boundaries that distinguish one object or event from another. (Shapiro, 1981: 20)

This anti-empiricist position, as Shapiro goes on to say, does not imply that any given speaker arbitrarily employs rules to suit his or her purposes, and thereby moves about in a world of personally constituted objects and events, but rather that 'the language used by a society or culture contains rules which provide boundaries around phenomena and thereby produce the objects and events that are the referents of our speech' (1981: 21). Thus, individuals do not pre-linguistically pick out objects and experience and then describe them, and neither do they construct objects and experience by their use of language; rather, they use a language which, more or less peculiarly (both through history and across cultures) constitutes these objects for them.

The next step is to note, with Shapiro, that through language are constituted things (e.g., children, adults, hysteria, workers), actions (murder, playing, working), and institutions or collective phenomena (education, medicine, law enforcement). For example,

> When we speak about children and adults, ... we are identifying constituents that are not (a) a matter of mere observation (as some positivists would have it), or (b) a psych-

> ological commitment on the part of persons using the distinction. A person becomes a child or occupies that status not simply by dint of some physiological or chronological factors but because of the application of the constitutive rules of childhood. A person is thus a child because of the rules, derived from the social, political, and administrative organization of the society that identifies some humans as children. (Shapiro, 1981: 124)

This position involves the development of the intuition from pragmatics that speaking is a form of activity, but we need to push it further, as Shapiro does. For if our linguistic or interactive practices define and delimit the objects that can be spoken about, and if these objects include interactive subjects, then it follows that the subjectivities which arise as the self-consciousness of individuals involved in discourse are also constituted through the discursive practices of a social formation. Within discursive practice, that is, subjects are constituted, and are also constituted for themselves.

Claims such as these have been made in other theoretical contexts, but they need to be emphasized here as an alternative to the type of naturalistic essentialism which continually intrudes into pragmatics, and which leads, as has been seen, to unworkable accounts of the relation between language and the users of language. Further, once this account is reasserted the limitations of the initial formulation of the relation between pragmatics and the politics of discourse become clearer, for with that account the place of discursive subjects within discourse formations is not addressed, and these subjects are implictly taken on as the ground of meaning and as arising outside discourse.

If, on the other hand, we take discursive interaction as constitutive of meaning, and through that constitutive of the subjects arising in discourse, our approach to politics becomes quite different. For then we take the political relations which we see expressed in discourse (and these are not, it should be remembered, simply - or most importantly - those talked about in discourse), as being bound up in the operation of discourse and in the constitution of interactive practices. These relations are political because they involve the assignment and operation of social roles, and once we take Austin's and Labov's demonstrations of the place of these roles in the operation of discourse,

along with the conversation analysts' understanding of discourse as dynamic, then the politics of discourse takes a place at the core of a pragmatic view of language.

Furthermore, as was said earlier, an approach which fails to confront the politics of discourse at this level is not only theoretically weakened by this refusal - because it leads to and involves the problems associated with the subject as origin and language as a medium arising throughout this study - but takes on the political role of denying the politics of discourse. This role is political because, by denying the place within interaction of various structures of dominance, control and exclusion/inclusion, pragmatics serves to mask and conserve these structures - structures which it initially helps us recognize.

It is crucial to note here that I am not criticizing pragmatics for being 'political'. Given that political relations are operative in the pragmatic mechanisms of discourse, and given that pragmatics (as philosophy or as social science) is bound up in a given discursive practice, then it is necessarily involved in the operation of politics in discourse. And given that pragmatics is located and constituted as a discourse within and through certain discursive-social structures, we should expect it to be located politically. But it is equally important to note that along with its refusal to acknowledge the politics of discourse pragmatics refuses to acknowledge its own political location.

Pragmatics opens up the field of the social context of language use, but then, having acknowledged this field, constructs a model which turns away, to the real meaning of the a priori subject, performing paradigmatic acts of ordinary language according to common sense. This is not a conscious cloaking of politics, but it amounts to the cloaking of politics. The application of pragmatics, as social science, is probably more important in this regard, simply because it is there involved in the study of various interactive phenomena, and usually at sites of social conflict - be it family, educational, 'ethnic', racial, sexual or industrial conflict. But this application is, as we have seen, in accord with the abstract theorizing which occurs as philosophical pragmatics.

In its application, pragmatics as liberal social science is avowedly concerned to take seriously the experience of discourse

participants, and to let subjects speak for themselves (and this is raised to the level of a methodological principle in conversation analysis). But just by placing subjects in this methodological-theoretical position, yet failing to adequately overcome problems of interpretation surrounding the assignment of acts and the ground of meaning, pragmatics sets up in advance the ultimately conservative political role of its analysis.

For with the politics of discourse (and with it the discursive construction of meaning and subjectivity) denied at a theoretical level, the task of interpretation turns out to be that of the assignment of meaning, and this will necessarily be in terms of pragmatics' own conceptual-political framework - as it makes sense of the material it analyzes. Given also the assumption that this theoretical-political framework accords generally with that of the dominant political institutions and structures involved and bound up in the discourse being analyzed, then the effect of pragmatic analysis will be to legitimize the operation of these institutions and structures, reducing confrontation to senselessness or misunderstanding. Furthermore, by denying the political aspect of discourse, pragmatics has the effect of denying the operation of political institutions and structures in the very 'apolitical' discourses in which their operation is most interesting, and perhaps most effective. So subjects can speak for themselves, but pragmatics must make sense of what they say, and pragmatics must (and quite legitimately, given that it is involved in analysis as social science) have the last word. If it did not interpret, pragmatics would itself be reduced to silence, but given that it does, and that it does in this way, pragmatics is politically located as a legitimizing intervention in discourse.

Again, while analysis could be carried out within this framework that pointed to the operation of political structures within discourse, by searching for determinate meaning in the intentionality of a priori subjects, and by not taking meaning and subjects as constituted through discourse, the politics of discourse will always remain an outside, an epiphenomenon of discourse, and the interesting issues regarding its place in the very operation of discourse cannot be raised.

This discussion, and issues raised by it, could be taken much further, but that would be to go beyond the boundaries of the present project.[2] Here I have been concerned to show how the politics of discourse is opened as a field of study within

the mainstream of Anglo-American pragmatics, and how it is closed, and to show how this closure is tied to the introduction of elements which theoretically undermine pragmatics.

That which has been accomplished here raises a major problem regarding the viability of pragmatics. For in the preceding discussion there has arisen no way of salvaging pragmatics as an objective representation of discourse while at the same time rejecting those theoretical elements by which it as previously pretended its objectivity. Once we understand discourse as a phenomenon which is as much constituting as mediating, and see analysis as itself bound up in discourse and the political and discursive relations of discourse, then a position which transcends these relations seems as impossible as that of the a priori subject - and for the same reasons. Consequently, the pure theoretical relation which pragmatics as social science demands of itself becomes impossible.

This, however, does not mean that mainstream pragmatics loses viability as a project. On the contrary, if my arguments are correct as to the place it occupies in the politics of discourse by assuming that such a relation <u>is</u> possible, then there are good institutional-political reasons why as a project it is extremely viable - it is just that its legitimacy is brought into question. The possibilities for a pragmatics which does not demand of itself this relation, and does not pretend it, can be left open at this stage, and await further discussion of the issues which have arisen in this study.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION.

[1] These definitions are discussed in detail by Levinson (1981: Ch.1). Levinson also, in that chapter, gives an account of the origins of the term 'pragmatics' with Morris and Carnap. See also Stalnaker (1972).

[2] This standard division between Continental and analytic or Anglo-American pragmatics is adequate as a generalization, but needs to be qualified. On the one hand, some Anglo-American sociolinguists (Gumperz, 1982, e.g.) seem to regard their work as falling with a general pragmatics. On the other hand, 'Continental' philosophers such as Lyotard and Habermas should probably not be described as being interested in pragmatics in the wider sense.

[3] A significant issue arises regarding the distinction between speech and writing and the appropriateness and theoretical consequences of taking speech as the paradigm of language use - as is the case in the work to be dealt with here. The debate surrounding this issue (mainly associated with the work of Derrida) will not be taken up here.

[4] We shall see, however, that conversation analysis rejects the notion of a speech act as developed in Austin's and Searle's work (see Chapter Six).

[5] I am referring here to the context of this thesis. Wittgenstein's work is also important in this regard, but is not as influential in the pragmatic tradition covered by this study, and shall not be dealt with here.

[6] For a detailed account of this relation between analytic philosophy and anti-positivism in the social sciences, see Shapiro (1981). Shapiro also gives an account of Wittgenstein's significance in this regard.

CHAPTER ONE.

[1] On this issue, see Strawson (1973: 56).

[2] Compare Furberg's approach. He restricts performatives to 'classic explicit performatives', such as 'ceremonial formulae employed in the institutional procedures of acquitting, convicting, appointing, demoting, excommunicating, baptizing, and naming', and excludes acts like promising, warning, etc., which 'demand supplementation', and where the 'I promise ...', 'I

warn ...', 'I advise ...', etc. indicates how the supplement is to be taken. He says that these acts 'must have a content; otherwise nothing would be promised, warned or advised'. True or 'archetypal' performatives, on the other hand, are 'self-sufficient; I can acquit you (period) or demote you (period) or excommunicate you (period). These acts stand on their own feet'. (1969: 452-3 & ff.)

[3] On this issue Levinson says that performatives (including warnings &c., as well as 'ritual' ones) 'are not used just to say things, i.e., describe states of affairs, but rather actively to do things' (1983: 228). Yet he also writes of illocutionary acts, 'of which the various performatives and constatives are just special sub-cases' (1983: 231).

[4] Forguson comments that Black himself recognizes that performatives and constatives cannot be distinguished because there are not in the relevant sense two classes at all, 'but apparently fails to see both that Austin realized it, and that it was Austin's main reason for abandoning the performative-constative distinction'. (1966: 419,n.1)

[5] Schiffer claims that while in uttering an explicit performative he is not constating that he is performing an act of the kind named by the verb, explicit performative sentences are nonetheless constative. He says that the difference is that explicit performative sentences are not uttered 'with their full conventional force' (1972: 107ff.).

[6] Some commentators do, however, deal with this material. See Levinson (1983: 233), and Cohen (1964), in an article discussed in Part Two of this chapter.

[7] For further discussion of Derrida's reading of Austin, see Culler (1983: 110-34), Norris (1983: Ch.3) and Maclean (1985).

CHAPTER TWO.

[1] Note that at this point Austin resurrects the performative-constative distinction, which he has previously collapsed.

[2] Cohen's response to Austin is in many ways similar to Searle's, which shall be discussed in Chapter Four.

[3] This does not mean that a performative-seeming formula which lacks accompanying illocutionary conventions will not be communicative. It is just (as was noted in Ch.1) that 'I insult you' is the illocutionary act of stating (perhaps), not that of insulting. If, however, such an utterance was made in such a way that it seemed clear that it was being used as a performative, then our response would be puzzlement - we would not know what the speaker was trying to do.

[4] I want to avoid opening the Pandora's Box of conventionality,

as it is not necessary for the argument here, beyond what has been said. A discussion of conventionality in the light of the issues raised here would most usefully being with an examination of Lewis (1969) Bennett (1976) and Davidson (1984).

[5] Schiffer adopts an approach similar to that of Strawson (see 1972: 91ff). While he thinks the Strawson-Grice position regarding meaning has drawbacks he thinks that if we divide illocutionary acts into two jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive subclasses of assertives and imperatives they can be kept separate from locutionary acts and defined in terms of speaker's meaning (1972: 95ff). It is also worth noting that he does not share Strawson's worry regarding speech acts belonging to highly conventionalized institutions, saying that they are 'of marginal interest only' to the theory of language and communication (1972: 93). Forguson's approach to these issues is also in many ways quite similar to that of Strawson here (cf.1969: esp.160-171).

[6] See also Levinson's interesting discussion of a version of this type of argument (1983: 246ff). Probably the most well-known verson of this type of argument is that given by Searle (eg. 1965 & 1968), however I shall discuss that material in detail in the chapter devoted to Searle's work.

[7] Graham's approach does also allow for unintended illocutionary acts, and this seems to allow the act to be brought apart from intentionality (cf.esp.Graham, 1981b: 131-2). However, he does not then follow this through and develop an account of these acts as constituted outside subjectivity. Furthermore, he retains a scale of acts, with convention-governed acts at one end, and no account is given of the conditions by which illocutionary acts, whether 'highly conventionalized' or not, exist.

[8] A similar point is taken up in Austin's earlier paper 'Other Minds' (1946).

[9] This comment by Austin relates to one of Graham's objections noted earlier.

[10] Throughout this chapter I have focussed attention on those aspects of Austin's theory which have raised most response from commentators, and which have had most influence within pragmatics. This has meant that a more detailed discussion of the locutionary act itself has been left out (but see Ch.4 below). This has also meant that I have not gone into the illocution-perlocution distinction. It is not generally discussed in detail (but see Davis, 1979), however, it is the distinction with which Austin finds most trouble and has gained relevance in the light of recent action theory (as Davis notes).

CHAPTER THREE.

[1] It should be emphasized that these theories do not constitute the only alternative. The work of Michael Dummett, especially, should be noted - see, e.g., his Frege: Philosophy of Language (Duckworth, 1973).

[2] For further discussion of distinctions amongst so-called 'communication-intention' theories, see Harrison (1979: 63-5 & 165-7), Strawson (1970) and Chomsky (1975: Ch.2).

[3] In reporting the definitions offered in the 1968 paper, I am paraphrasing, and to a certain extent simplifying, Grice's formulations. Also, the use of the terms, 'propositional attitude' and 'A thinks that U thinks' will be explained in relation to the 1969 paper. Their use is not important in relation to the 1968 paper.

[4] I shall not be dealing with the many counter-examples offered against Grice's formulation. A useful summary and discussion of these can be found in Schiffer, who also offers a detailed explication of Grice's views (1972: Ch.1 & 2).

[5] I have accepted the validity of these intuitions for the sake of the argument. Wright, however, has attacked their validity as generalizations, claiming that speakers of American English tend not to share Grice's intuitions here (1975: 367, n.10). Wright has also criticized Grice's use of 'utterance'. Especially, he notes that by defining 'utterance' as 'a neutral word to apply to any candidate for meaning-nn' (Grice, 1957: 380), Grice 'leaves us with our fundamental concepts vacuously interdefined', 'meaning-nn' is supposed to be explicated by analyzing 'utterances' (1975: 365-6). Again, I will accept Grice's terminology for the sake of the argument.

[6] In fact, I have found the problem I have raised here also noted explicitly by Stampe (1975). In a comment directed at Cohen's and Searle's approaches (but with reference to Grice) he notes 'perfectly transparent equivocations on the term mean,' which involve 'resolutely confusing and conflating the matter of what one means to do (i.e., intends to do) with the matter of what one means by something, e.g. by something he says' (1975: 4).

[7] It might be claimed that Wilson is not involved in true communication. But this claim cannot be based on the fact that he does not have the appropriate Gricean intentions (for this would beg the question), and it seems indisputable that what Wilson says is meaningful. His utterance is meaningful without being Gricean. If it is at all possible to defend an intention theory of meaning from counter-examples, this can only be done with something like Searle's later theory of Intentionality, where he separates representation intentions from communication intentions. We could then claim that Wilson represents, but does not communicate, and so does not 'fully' mean (see Ch.4).

[8] It is worth noting that this same implicit self-transparent subject occurs in Grice's theory of conversational implicature. In that theory, non-conventional implicatures are said to be calculated from apparent violations of certain conversational maxims (which are basic to conversation) under the assumption that the speaker is at a deeper level being conversationally cooperative. For example, an apparently irrelevant comment can lead to the calculation of an implied premise according to which the comment is relevant. The problem with this is that implications of which the speaker is unaware (and so not intending) or only vaguely aware are denied a place in interaction - they cannot, it seems, even be treated as derivative. Communication is taken to presuppose speakers who are completely conscious of their (communicative) actions and the meaning which those actions have. So again, meaning is taken as being constituted by and coordinate with intentionality. (For Grice's theory of conversational implicature, see Grice, 1975 & 1978. For a detailed discussion, see Levinson, 1983.)

CHAPTER FOUR.

[1] For further discussion of Searle's place within pragmatics, see Harrison, 1979: 165-7.

[2] In a footnote, Stampe comments that 'the fact is that the force of an utterance is not something that could be "meant", "intended", "expressed", or "said". It is the wrong kind of thing for any of these predicates' (Stampe, 1975: 6, n.5). We might add that what one can do is mean or intend an utterance to have a certain force, or say that an utterance has a certain force (see below).

[3] See Ch. 4 & 5 of Speech Acts, where Searle discusses reference and predication in the propositional act.

[4] For discussion of this counter-example, see Schiffer, 1972: 27-30.

[5] We have seen Grice's attempts to avoid these sorts of criticisms, and I will not spend time evaluating them. I am more interested in the position Searle develops from these arguments.

[6] Note also Stampe's comment that Searle's conditions exclude promising someone a punch in the mouth (Stampe, 1975: 12).

[7] This possibility would also appear to threaten Austin's original program, and we will see that it is a major problem for discourse analysis.

CHAPTER FIVE.

[1] Due to the use of data by linguistic pragmmatics, and the complexity of the analytical model which is applied to this data, this chapter especially, and the next, will be considerably longer than the previous chapters.

[2] A problem with the term 'speech event' is that Labov & Fanshel are not always consistent in its use (see 1977: 104, e.g.), and it is important to recognize and maintain the distinction between a speech act or action and a speech event.

[3] For the details of Labov & Fanshel's account of speech actions, see 1977: 60-5.

CHAPTER SIX.

[1] This criticism is no doubt valid concerning Searle's treatment of indirect speech acts, but we have seen that illocutionary force indicating devices are in fact given an important place in his general theory.

[2] See Levinson (1983: 352) for a re-analysis of a section of Labov & Fanshel's data. This re-analysis is also discussed below.

[3] The question of just how the notion of the 'reality' of conversation operates in the framework of conversation analysis will be discussed below.

[4] The development of conversation analysis (or ethnomethodology) by Garfinkel was influenced by phenomenology, mainly from Husserl, and from Schutz's phenomenological approach to social theory. In a more extended study than this, or one presented in a larger scale, the relation of conversation analysis to phenomenology would be dealt with in parallel to the relation of discourse analysis to speech act theory. This would be similar to Shapiro's analysis of political science (see esp. 1981: 100-7 on Garfinkel and Schutz). It might be noted that even Garfinkel, and certainly his followers, make little or no reference to the philosophical background of their work, and this would make including such a discussion correspondingly harder than with discourse analysis, although no less interesting for that.

[5] The best short account of ethnomethodology is Ch.1 of Garfinkel (1967b), a different version of which occurs as Garfinkel (1972). See also Garfinkel & Sacks (1970), Ch.2 of Garfinkel (1967b), Turner (1974) and Garfinkel (1968). For examples of analysis, see esp. Garfinkel (1967b). See also the collections in Turner (1974) and Sudnow (1972).

CONCLUSION.

[1] It should be noted that while such factors arise in discourse analysis generally, Labov & Fanshel recognize and incorporate these factors to a much greater extent than most other work in that tradition.

[2] This extended discussion could involve, for example, an examination of Foucault's approach to discourse and politics (some of whose terminology has already informed this discussion). An example of such an examination in the context of some of the issues raised here can be found in the work of Shapiro already mentioned (1981, esp. Chs 5-7). The approaches to pragmatics by Lyotard and Habermas would also be relevant, as would the work of Trevor Pateman, Fredric Jameson, and that of Kress, Hodge and others working within the framework of Halliday's functional linguistics.

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