THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND

AND AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE POLICY, 1901-1918

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CONTENTS

		Page
Abbreviations		iii
Acknowledgements		iv
Introduction		v-x
CHAPTER I	Building an Australian Army	1-43
CHAPTER II	The Russo-Japanese War and the Introduction of Compulsory Military Training	44-97
CHAPTER III	The Creation of an Australian General Staff	98-127
CHAPTER IV	The Development of the Australian General Staff	128-151
CHAPTER V	Australia and Imperial Defence	152-175
CHAPTER VI	Maintaining an Australian Defence	176-230
CHAPTER VII	The A.I.F. and Australian Defence and Foreign Policy	231-263
CONCLUSION		264-267
BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS		268-279
APPENDICES		280-320
BIBLIOGRAPHY		321-357

ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Australian Archives
AWM	Australian War Memorial
BM	British Museum
CDC	Colonial Defence Committee
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
CID	Committee of Imperial Defence
CIGS	Chief of the Imperial General Staff
CO	Colonial Office
GOC	General Officer Commanding
Lieut - Colonel	Lieutenant-Colonel
MBM	Military Board Minutes
MO	Military Orders
NLA	National Library of Australia
PRO	Public Record Office
SMH	Sydney Morning Herald

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INTRODUCTION

In 1976, the publication of A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, 1901-1923: Volume 1 - The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-1914 by Dr Meaney focussed attention on the advice given by professional naval and military staffs to Australian Prime Ministers and defence ministers in the formulation of an Australian defence and foreign policy from 1901 to 1914.[1] This discussion of the naval and military advisers, which was part of an enquiry to evaluate the impact of geopolitical events in the Pacific on the evolution of an Australian strategic perspective during that period, raised a broad question about the interpretation of the role of military in the history of Australia's defence and foreign policy. In Chapter I, Dr Meaney stated that 'the politicians gained little support or comfort from their professional military and naval staffs' and suggested that an explanation might be found as a result of an investigation into the relationship between social structures and the military establishment, the institutional spirit of the naval and military forces, and the capacity and capability of the armed forces to adapt to developments in industrial, communications and transport technologies.[2] The outlines of the investigation put forward by Dr Meaney were based on an outlook which saw Australian military history as part of international history.

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1. N.K. Meaney, A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, 1901-1923: Volume 1 - The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-1914 (Sydney, 1976).

2. Ibid., p.ix.

The study of British military history as part of general history and international history has been undertaken by Professor Howard and Mr Bond. They have shown in their writings that strategic policy cannot be isolated from national politics and international developments as well as the influences of social structures.[3] For example, Mr Bond studied the transformation of the character of the British Army from the Crimean War to 1914 through the Army Staff College, Camberley. By examining the history of the Staff College, he focussed on the 'professional quality of the Army' and the development of officer education.[4] The significance of Bond's study of the Victorian Army for Australian military history lies in the emphasis given to the inter-relationship of national politics and military affairs. Professor Howard, in his broad ranging writings, has shown the wide intellectual horizons of military studies and the complexity of warfare in military as well as political, social and economic terms. In the work entitled The Continental Commitment, which comprised the Ford Lectures given in the University of Oxford in 1971, Professor Howard discussed Imperial defence before World War I and how British defence strategy came to deal with the menace of Germany in Europe. The lectures illustrated the impact of technological developments in naval construction on British perceptions of Imperial defence and discussed the relationships between Britain and the dominions in defence matters.[5] In

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3. M. Howard, Studies in War and Peace (London, 1970); The Theory and Practice of War (London, 1965); The Continental Commitment (London, 1972); War in European History (Oxford, 1976); The Franco-Prussian War (London, 1961); B. Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (London, 1972); Liddell Hart - A Study of his Military Thought (London, 1977).

4. B. Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (London, 1972), pp.3-5.

5. M. Howard, The Continental Commitment (London, 1972), pp.9-46.

another work, War in European History, Professor Howard examined war in the context of economic, social, cultural and intellectual history, and put forward the case that a historian studying war 'cannot simply be a "military historian".'[6]

The idea put forward by Professor Howard that a military historian must have a broad appreciation of history also applies, conversely, to the general historian, who must understand the influence of military affairs on the course of human events. In Australia, historians such as Russell Ward and Professor Sir Frederick Alexander have not paid attention to the influence of the military profession on the history of Australian defence and foreign policy,[7] though it must be allowed that until now the general histories have not been able to draw on extensive studies which document the role of the military profession. In recent times, studies of various aspects of the military have contributed, however, to our knowledge of the problem. In the field of biography, Mr Hill has written about General Sir Harry Chauvel and Mr Coulthard-Clark about Major-General Sir William Bridges.[8] Mr Coulthard-Clark has also researched the history of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, and pioneered the early history of the Australian intelligence community.[9] On the question of compulsory military training, Mr Barrett has argued

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6. M. Howard, War in European History (Oxford, 1976), pp.ix-x.

7. R. Ward, A Nation for a Continent - The History of Australia, 1901-1975 (Melbourne, 1977). F. Alexander, Australia Since Federation (Melbourne, 1967).

8. A.J. Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse (Melbourne, 1978) and C. Coulthard-Clark, A Heritage of Spirit (Melbourne, 1979).

9. C. Coulthard-Clark, Duntroon and the Australian Army: A Study of the Royal Military College of Australia and its Place in the Australian Army, 1911-1979 (M.A. thesis, University of New South Wales, 1980) and The Citizen General Staff, The Australian Intelligence Corps, 1907-1914, (Canberra, 1976).

persuasively that most Australians accepted the exercise and challenges the idea hat they disliked National Service.[10] Further afield, on the question of defence policy, Dr Millar has discussed the 'defence heritage' of Australia in Australia's Defence and written more extensively on the history of Australia's defence and foreign policy in Australia in Peace and War.[11] Major Horner, taking a narrower, more specialised topic has studied Australian generalship in the context of the Japanese threat to Australia from 1941 to 1943.[12]

The strength of the studies of Australia's military history and affairs lies in the presentation of new information and in the way in which they have opened up avenues of enquiry for future researchers. For example, a history of the Australian intelligence community from 1901-1939 would advance the work done by Mr Coulthard-Clark on the Australian Intelligence Corps.[13] The building blocks provided by the pioneering studies of Australia military history also highlight the problem outlined by Professor Howard, except that it is placed in an Australian context. The general historian must take account of military affairs and the military historian needs to appreciate the wide dimension of international history. The claim made here is that this study of the 'high command' of the Australian Army from 1901 to 1918 provides one link between the

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10. J. Barrett, Falling In Australians and 'Boy Conscription 1911-1915' (Sydney, 1979).

11. T.B. Millar, Australia's Defence (Melbourne, 1965) and Australia in Peace and War (Canberra, 1978)

12. D.M. Horner, Crisis of Command - Australian Generalship and the Japanese Threat, 1941-1943 (Canberra, 1978). A list of theses, which relate to the military profession and Australian defence/foreign policy in the period 1901-1923, is contained in the bibliography, pp.

13. C. Coulthard-Clark, The Citizen General Staff (Canberra, 1976).

general historian and the military historian and contributes to a solution of the problem put forward by Professor Howard.

The thesis examines the question of how the military leadership of the Commonwealth Military Forces developed in response to events in the interlocking spheres of politics and strategy from 1904 to 1918. Following the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, Australia's military advisers were confronted with the challenge of implementing a new strategic analysis which took into account the changed geopolitical circumstances in the Pacific. The conflict between Alfred Deakin, the Prime Minister, and his main adviser, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Bridges, about the importance of the Russo-Japanese War for Australian defence and foreign policy, led to the divorce of the military advisers from the creation of a policy designed to defend Australia against Japan - that of compulsory military training. Despite the lack of co-ordination between the military leaders and successive governments from 1905 to 1909 on compulsory military training, the Commonwealth Military Forces were developed along British lines with the establishment of an Australian General Staff. With the introduction of compulsory military training in 1911, the General Staff was occupied with training recruits and making plans for the defence of Australia. In the light of the relations between military advisers and their political masters from 1905 to 1914, the thesis seeks to answer the problem of whether or not the development of the high command along British lines lessened the influence in defence planning of a strategic analysis based largely on Australian interests in the Pacific. The second part of the thesis investigates the impact of World War I on the defence plans drawn by the General Staff before 1914 and the way in which the home defence of Australia was managed with limited resources. For Prime Minister W.M. Hughes, the vulnerability of Australia in the Pacific during World War I was the prime reason for supporting all aid to

Great Britain.[14] He hoped thereby to help achieve an overwhelming British victory in Europe, which would deter Japan from attacking Australia and leave the British Navy free to come to Australia's aid in the Pacific. As a further expression of the Australian interest, Hughes also insisted on consolidating the Australian military forces into one command and ultimately on appointing an Australian, Sir John Monash, to the command of the A.I.F. The activities of the General Staff in Australia and on the battlefields during World War I highlighted the interlocking of the spheres of politics and strategy.

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14. The Australian Imperial Force (A.I.F.) was, in part, an emotional response to the call for assistance from Great Britain, as well as an arm of Australian foreign policy.

CHAPTER I

BUILDING AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY

Background 1870 - 1900

The withdrawal of the British legions from the Australian colonies and the growth of international tension after 1870 stimulated a greater interest in the problems of local defence in the Australian colonies.[1] From 1870 until Federation, the self-governing colonies adopted policies aimed at preventing the European powers from acquiring territory in the Melanesian and Polynesian Islands. The colonies feared that the natural harbours of the Melanesian and Polynesian Islands provided European powers with potential bases from which they might attack Australia. The Australian concern with the development of a greater defence capacity coincided with a movement in Great Britain to encourage greater Imperial unity.

The British government encouraged local colonial governments to develop military and naval forces but also desired to control them for Imperial purposes. Colonial initiative in the formulation of defence policy was however restricted in the Imperial constitution to the three mile limit.[2] In addition, the foreign relations of the colonies in the eyes of the Imperial government were regarded as the exclusive preserve of the Colonial Office.

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1. N.K. Meaney, A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, 1901-1923: Volume 1. The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-1914 (Sydney 1976), pp. 15-40.

2. G. Liik, 'Australian Defence, 1870-1900', Teaching History, vol. 1 (Part 1, June 1971), pp. 16-18.

The colonies acquiesced for the most part in this view of Imperial defence policy because they still believed that the basis of their security lay in the supremacy of the Royal Navy. This implied that the Royal Navy provided services beyond the limited defence capabilities and capacities of the colonies. Nevertheless, the belief in the supremacy of the Royal Navy did not allay fears about the racial and strategic threats facing the white Australian colonial communities in the Pacific Ocean. In an effort to guarantee their security in the Pacific, the colonial governments built local defence forces and tried to influence Imperial policy to their advantage.

The creation of defence forces depended on perceived threats, sound professional advice, and adequate budgets. From the outset, the Australian colonies relied upon British army officers who were invited to inspect and report on colonial defence. There were in the colonial period two major reports by British army officers. The first was that of Sir William Jervois. In 1876, the four colonial governments of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Queensland asked the British government to send 'Sir William Jervois or some other officer of high prominence' to inspect and comment on Australian defence.[3] As a result of this request, Sir William Jervois, the Governor of the Straits Settlements and Lieutenant-Colonel Scratchley, who was sent to assist him, arrived in Sydney in May 1877 to carry out the task. They were interested to investigate the technical subjects of colonial defence such as port fortifications, coastal defence and artillery.

The second report was that of Major-General J. Bevan Edwards in June 1889, who was commander of the British garrison troops at Hong Kong. He was appointed by the War Office to inspect the land forces in Australia after the colonies had disagreed about the allocation of costs for a coordinated

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3. N.S.W. (Votes and Proceedings), 1876-1877, vol. 3, p.81.

scheme of land defence.[4] The report by General Edwards (1889) criticised the lack of standardisation in organisation, training and equipment amongst the colonies, and recommended a federation of the armed forces. Both reports by the Imperial army officers reflected Australian interests and concern in military defence.

Another source of advice was the Colonial Defence Committee which the British government established in 1885 to advise on overseas defence questions.[5]

By 1900, the Australian colonies had built land defence forces for their protection and possibly to serve an Australasian Monroe Doctrine in the South Pacific Ocean.[6] The colonies tried to persuade Great Britain to annex the arc of islands fron New Guinea through the Solomons to the New Hebrides and Fiji and Samoa. In 1874, the British government agreed to Australian wishes and annexed Fiji. The next year, the colonies wanted to annex New Guinea, but Disraeli, the British Prime Minister, was unwilling to assist, because they failed to take responsibility for a portion of the costs involved. In 1883, three colonies, Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia, supported the Queensland action of claiming the eastern half of New Guinea on behalf of the British Crown. At an inter-colonial convention in November and December, the colonies unanimously passed a resolution calling on the British government to annex the territory in New Guinea not controlled by the Dutch, and gain control of the New Hebrides. However, the British government refused to act, and only after Germany indicated imperial ambition in New Guinea were they moved to action. In April 1886, the Anglo-German agreement acknowledged German control over north-eastern New Guinea and British hegemony over the south-eastern half.

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4. Major-General J.B. Edwards, 'Australian Defence', Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings, vol. XXII (1890-1891), pp. 195-224.

5. F.A. Johnson, Defence by Committee (London 1960), p. 16.

6. M. Tate, 'The Australasian Monroe Doctrine', Political Science Quarterly, vol. LXXVI (June 1961), p. 227. N.K. Meaney, op.cit., pp. 16-22.

With the settlement of the New Guinea question, the colonies concentrated their attention on New Caledonia and the New Hebrides. The British government agreed to consult the colonies about the negotiations over the remaining Pacific islands after the New Guinea episode. The vigorous protests by the colonies against French annexation of the New Hebrides led to a diplomatic solution in the form of an Anglo-French convention.[7]

The armed colonial forces from 1870 to 1900 were designed for local defence. They consisted of a small nucleus of permanent soldiers to avoid the high costs of a regular army and to maintain the discipline necessary for an effective fighting force as well as paid militia, and volunteers.[8] In 1881, the Royal Commission investigating the New South Wales Colonial Forces pointed to the difficulty of establishing a regular army based on the limited military experience and training of the commanding officers, and the untutored enthusiasm of its members. Nevertheless, the quiet call for an Australian military federation in the report of the commission pointed to a self-defence within the Empire as the solution to the defence of the Australian colonies.[9]

For the colonies, the only guide to strategic threats for defence planning were the reports by Sir William Jervois (1879) and General Edwards (1889). Jervois considered that Australia was a tempting target for attack from an enemy force of three or four vessels based in Russian ports or Saigon. A decade later, Edwards stressed the isolated nature of the coastline and its defencelessness. He recommended the federation of the defence forces, which included the standardisation between colonies of military regulations, uniform, armament, the

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7. J. La Nauze, Alred Deakin: A Biography, Volume 1 (Melbourne, 1973), p. 98; A. Deakin, The Federal Story: The Inner History of the Federal Cause 1880-1900 (Melbourne 1963), p. 22.

8. H.W. Zwillenberg, Citizen and Soldier - The Defence of South Australia, 1836-1901 (M.A. Thesis, University of Adelaide, 1970), pp. 8-20.

9. G. Liik, External Threats as a Factor in Australian Defence (PhD Thesis, University of Sydney, 1971).

establishment of a military college for training officers, a uniform railway guage between the colonies, a small arms factory, and the growth of rifle clubs.

The move towards co-ordinating the colonial military forces was encouraged by the inter-colonial military conferences in 1894 and 1896. These conferences were a response to the report by General Edwards and the argument by Henry Parkes, the former Premier and Colonial Secretary of New South Wales, that external threat was an important reason for political federation. However, the senior colonial military officers ignored the views of Edwards and Parkes on a possible threat from Asia. At the 1894 inter-colonial military conference, the senior officers made recommendations in accordance with the remarks of the Colonial Defence Committee, May 1890.[10] In a paper entitled 'Remarks on Proposed Organisation of the Military Forces of the Australasian Colonies', the Colonial Defence Committee had stressed that Australia was the safest part of the Empire. Two years later in January 1896, at the second inter-colonial military conference, the senior officers agreed that the colonial forces should defend each other and be controlled by a Council of Defence.[11]

When the premiers met in March 1896, the federal movement to draft a constitution was more important than the issues of national defence and Asian immigration.[12] The colonial leaders were aware of the threats from European powers and Asia but they did not believe that they were an immediate danger to the security of the Australian colonies.

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10. CDC, 4OR, 'Remarks on Proposed Organisation of the Military Forces of the Australasian Colonies, 16 May 1890', Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), Cab 9/1.

11. 'Report and Schedules of the Inter-Colonial Military Committee Assembled at Sydney, 29 January 1896', PRO, Cab 11/23.

12. M. Willard, History of the White Australia Policy (Melbourne, 1923), pp. 99-110.

The question of a national defence scheme, in their opinion, awaited the creation of an Australian federation.[13]

Federal Defence Planning, 1901-1902

The lack of urgency about national defence planning in the 1890s led to the divorce between the interlocking spheres of politics and military strategy in the early years of Federation.

In the first period of defence planning, from the inauguration of Federation until Major-General Hutton assumed command of the Commonwealth Military Forces in 1902, there was little scope for, or interest in, ambitious schemes of defence. The chief concern of Sir John Forrest, the defence minister, was to limit the cost of defence while amalgamating the colonial forces.[14] In a letter to the defence minister of Western Australia on 27 February 1901, he attached a copy of a memorandum to the Military Commandant, Western Australia, which outlined government policy. Forrest stated that until the Commonwealth passed its defence act the respective State military forces were subject to State law, and stressed that every effort must be made to contain costs.

On this last point he said,

> From the 1st March, until such time as a Defence Act for the Commonwealth becomes law, you will at once recognise that it would be inconvenient, if not impossible, to make any new appointments or promotions, as every effort must be made to limit the expenditure.[15]

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13. Ibid.

14. CPD, 1901-1902 Session, vol.II, 9 July 1901, pp.2159-2173. See Appendices A-F for details of defence Ministers, Council of Defence, Military Board and Chiefs of the General Staff.

Although Forrest was nervous about his inexperience in defence matters, he had little difficulty in containing defence costs.[16] On one hand, the factions and parties in partliament were anxious to limit defence spending. As well, the funds available for defence were severely restricted by the Braddon Clause, a measure which provided for the payment to the states of three-quarters of the customs and excise revenue for the first ten years of the Commonwealth.

Despite his pre-occupation with the question of how defence affected the finances of the Commonwealth, John Forrest moved quickly to create a national army. Forrest, like his Prime Minister, Edmund Barton, had a vision of an army based on citizen soldiers, rifle clubs and cadets, with a small permanent force to look after the forts, guns and armaments. He believed that the fighting record of Australian colonial troops in South Africa was an example of the utility, and cost effectiveness, of the citizen soldier.

> ... Our citizen soliders, as far as I have been able to judge, have proved themselves worthy to fight and do their duty under difficulties and privation side by side with the trained veterans of the Empire. I think we may confidently pursue that system in the future, seeing that we have had so recently evidence of its usefulness and efficiency ... [17]

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15. Copy of a Memorandum from John Forrest, Minister of Defence, to the Military Commandant, Western Australia, attached to a letter from John Forrest to the Minister of Defence, Western Australia, 27 February 1901, Premier's Department file no. 398/10, in the papers of Sir John Forrest, Battye Library, Perth, Western Australia.

16. CPD, 1901-1902 Session, vol.II, 9 July 1901, p.2159.

17. CPD, 1901-1902 Session, vol.II, 9 July 1901, p.2161.

Furthermore, Barton wanted to discourage the idea of a standing army and the introduction of 'gold lace provisions' in the Australian army, which were reminiscent of European militarism.[18] They were determined to see their views of an Australian national army embodied in legislation for a Federal defence bill.

In carrying out their task, they drew upon the advice of Australian officers and the Colonial Defence Committee. Forrest appointed a Federal Military Committee on the suggestion of the State Commandants, to gather information about the organisation and instruction of the State forces, arrange the inspection of warlike stores, supplies and contracts, as well as reporting on the state and serviceability of forts and guns. He also asked the committee to draft a Commonwealth Defence Bill.[19]

The Federal Military Committee met in Sydney at the end of March 1901 with Major-General G.A. French, Commandant, New South Wales Military Forces, as President, and Major W.T. Bridges, Royal Australian Artillery, as Secretary. The other members of the committee were the commandants of Victoria, Major-General R.M. Downes, West Australia, Colonel G.H. Chippindall, Queensland, Colonel H. Finn, South Australia, Colonel J.M. Gordon, and Tasmania, Colonel W.V. Legge. In their report on routine military matters to Forrest, the officers dealt with the establishments and training of the military forces, the organisation of artillery and engineer personnel, and the unsatisfactory state of armament in the Commonwealth.

On the recommendation of the committee, a sub-committee was appointed by the defence minister to consider further the question of military organisation and the preparation of a list

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18. CPD, 1901-1902 Session, vol.II, 9 August 1901, p.3601.

19. Coulthard-Clark, A Heritage of Spirit (Melbourne, 1980), p.41; Colonial Defence Committee, 'Secret Remarks - Subject Report of Military Committee of Inquiry, 1901', PRO, Cab 9/5.

of officers for administrative purposes. The sub-committee, consisting of Major-General Downes, Colonel Chippindall, Colonel Gordon, Colonel Legge and Major Bridges, met in Melbourne in late May. The sub-committee, following the recommendation of the 1894 Federal Military Conference suggested that the military forces be divided into a field force and a local force,[20] and that the Federal Military Committee discuss the division of the Commonwealth into Military Districts. As well, the sub-committee asked the defence minister to appoint another committee of five officers drawn for the General Staff, Artillery, Engineers, Departmental Corps, and Pay Department, to collect information on matter such as the organisation of a Veterinary Department, the separation of Field and Electrical Companies from the Submarine Miners, and supplies for military purposes and contracts.[21] Major Bridges was recommended as the officer to prepare the list of officers.

In discussing the question of the Federal Defence Bill, the commandants revealed their ideas about the Australian army. They wanted the permanent military forces to dominate the army and they desired to lessen the influence of the citizen-soldier, both the militia and the volunteers. In order to achieve that objective, they recommended that militia and volunteer officers be barred from rising to the highest positions in the army. For example, the Federal Military Committee stipulated that the position of District Commandant should be open only to officers from His Majesty's Imperial Regular Service and the Commonwealth Permanent Service. With reference to the service of troops overseas, the Committee suggested that the Commonwealth 'should have the power of

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20. The Colonial Defence Committee, London, had concurred with the suggestion of the Federal Military Conference, 1894, to divide the military forces into a field force and local forces. Parliamentary Papers: See 'Australian Federal Defence', PRO Cab 11/23.

21. C of A, 1901-1902 Session, vol.II, 'Further Report of the Federal Military Committee Assembled at Melbourne, Victoria 12 June, 1901', pp. 13-16.

calling out the land forces for service without the Commonwealth'.[22] The commandants' view on overseas service for Australian troops was a result of the Imperial enthusiasm generated by the participation of the Australian colonies in the Boer War, and the support given by the Colonial Defence Committee and British authorities to the idea of an Australian contribution to an Imperial force.[23] The 'Memorandum by the Colonial Defence Committee', 30 March 1901, expressed the hopes of Whitehall for Commonwealth participation in an Imperial defence scheme:

> The Colonial Defence Committee do not doubt that in dealing with this question the Commonwealth Government will be actuated by the same spirit that has in the past led the Governments of the Australian Colonies not only to expend large sums in perfecting their defences, but also to place the services of both naval and military forces at the disposal of the mother country for distant operations.... It is evident that the whole of the

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22. Ibid.

23. The first scheme for Australian colonial co-operation in Imperial service was put forward by Lord Brassey, Governor of Victoria in 1897. He advocated the raising of 5,000 Mounted Rifles in Australia for general Imperial service in case of war. In 1898, Colonel J.M. Gordon, Commandant, South Australian Defence Forces, put forward a scheme for an infantry regiment, based on Imperial specifications, and a company of mounted infantry, to be worked out in peace, and implemented by local colonial forces in war. Another scheme was outlined in 1899 by the Governor of New South Wales, which was the creation of Colonel Mackay. Mackay suggested that his personally raised force of 500 Volunteer Horse in the colony should be enlarged to a partially-paid Imperial corps of 1,000 men from N.S.W.. and eventually to 5,000 troops from Australia. In May 1900, Major-General French, Commandant, N.S.W. Defence Forces, suggested a reserve of 10,000 officers and men who had passed through the Defence forces.

    Lord Brassey's scheme was discussed by the Colonial Defence Committee, February 1897, and the Marquess of Lansdowne, in the House of Lords on 19 July 1900, commented on the schemes by Brassey and French.

    The British government, however, wanted the Australian government to tke the initiative in schemes of cooperation for Imperial defence. Mr Brodrick, Secretary of State for War, made this point in the House of Commons on 8 March 1901.

> Imperial army using the term in its widest sense to include all His Majesty's land forces, regular and auxiliary, at home and in the colonies, must now be regarded not only as an organisation for the performances of certain specific duties in war, mainly of a defensive character but also as a training school for men, who will form the nucleus of that greater army which it may be necessary to put in the field to enable the Empire to reap the fruit of its sea power. [24]

The Colonial Defence Committee also wanted to interchange military units between the Commonwealth and the Mother Country. The Federal Military Committee supported the interchange of units between the Australian and British Armies. In the area of civil-military relations, the commandants recommended that they have unfettered control of their authority in time of war and that the Governor-General be made commander of the Commonwealth Military Forces under the Federal Constitution Act.

After receiving the report of the Federal Military Committee, Forrest submitted the draft Federal Defence Bill to cabinet for discussion but there is no evidence extant about whether or not he was influenced by the Commandant's views. In cabinet, the military commanders wish to assert the dominance of the permanent forces over the citizen-soldiers was rebutted. Cabinet amended the bill to make it possible for the citizen-soldiers 'to rise from the ranks to the highest positions'[25] and dropped clauses giving permanent officers seniority over volunteer and militia officers. As well, the military were placed under ministerial control in peace and war. The Federal Defence Bill, embodying the alterations made by cabinet, was introduced to parliament on 31 May 1901.[26]

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24. C of A, Parliament Papers, 1901-1902 Session, vol.II, 'Defence Forces and Defences: Memorandum by the Colonial Defence Committee, 30 March 1901'.

25. CPD, 1901-1902 Session, vol.III, 9 August 1901, p.3601.

26. C of A, Votes and Proceedings, 1901-1902 Session, vol. I, House of Representatives - Defence, p.34. Volume I contains an outline of the progress of the Federal Defence Bill from 21 May 1901 until it was withdrawn on 26 March 1902.

The Federal Defence Bill was based on the defence acts of the Australian colonies and the reports of the inter-colonial military committees which met in 1894 and 1896. Forrest stated in his introductory speech that he was not acting in accordance with the views of the military commandants. In his opening remarks, the defence minister made clear the government's support for the policy of the citizen-soldiers as the 'backbone' of the army.[27] The defence bill contained no distinction between members of the permanent forces, the militia, and volunteers. In financial matters, Forrest wanted control removed from the military, the Governor-General with his Executive Council to carry as much of the administration as was possible, and to encourage economy by separating military expenditure from military duties.[28] The sole power in the army was vested in the Governor-General in Council, with a defence minister, a general officer commanding, the State commandants in the military districts of the Commonwealth, to carry out defence policy. Under Clause 31, all men between the ages of eighteen and sixty were liable to serve in times of emergency.[29] In Clause 48, the Governor-General was given the power to send Australian troops overseas 'at any time when it appears advisable so to do'.[30] However, the government stipulated in the bill that the men liable to serve outside the Commonwealth were the 'small body of Permanent men' who manned the forts and supervised armaments. No member of the citizen force was required to serve overseas unless he volunteered to do so.[31] Forrest explained that the Commonwealth need the power to send troops overseas to safeguard Australian interests in the South Pacific.[32]

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27. CPD, 1901-1902 Session, vol.II, 9 July 1901, pp. 2159-2169.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p.2168
30. Ibid., pp.2168-2169
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p.2169

In the debate about the Federal Defence Bill, the general feeling in the House of Representatives was that the Australian army must reflect the democratic ethos of the Australian nation. According to the national tradition, the parliament had the duty to safeguard the right of men to rise from the ranks to the highest commands without reference to their social background. The sole criterion for promotion was individual merit. As well, a democratic Australian defence force required the absence of pomp and ceremony. Edmund Barton, the Prime Minister, who wanted to safeguard the status of the volunteers and militia against the permanent forces, spoke about uniforms on 9 August:

> ... My suggestion to my colleague, the Minister for Defence, that the difference in the uniforms of the various grades of the service shall only be sufficient to enable the troops on parade to know who are their officers and to act accordingly. [33]

The idea of a democratic army also received support from citizen-officers in and outside parliament who realised the threat posed to their social position and privileges by the development of a professional permanent force.[34] Sir John Quick, for example, asked the government to appoint representatives of the citizen-officers to positions at central headquarters.[35] On the proposition that all able bodied male citizens were liable for military duty to defend Australia in time of emergency, there was no dissent. However, there was general opposition to overseas service with the Labor Party totally set against the idea. Henry Higgins asked the defence minister if Australian troops might be sent to India, or indeed, anywhere by the Governor-General, and how the government intended to control them.[36]

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33. CPD, 1901-1902 Session, vol.III, 9 August 1901, p.3601.

34. N.K. Meaney, op.cit., pp.57-58.

35. CPD, 1901-1902 Session, vol.III, 24 July 1906, p.2968.

36. Ibid., vol.II, 9 July 1901, p.2168.

In reply, Forrest gave no clue about the control or command of Australian troops overseas and suggested that they were most likely to look after Australian interests in the Pacific region.[37] The member for Oxley, Queensland, Richard Edwards, suggested that Australia needed to keep Japan and China in view as well as the defence problems of the motherland.[38]

The Federal Military Committee met again on 12 June, while the debate on the Federal Defence Bill was proceeding. This meeting of the Federal Military Committee in Melbourne illustrated well the supremacy of the government over its military advisers in the creation of the Australian army and the subordination of strategy to politics. The Commandants complained that the defence minister and cabinet dealt with military subjects without the advice of a military adviser. Furthermore, they reaffirmed that the Defence Bill they had prepared for Cabinet was adequate and suitable for the Commonwealth. In an effort to register their protest against the way in which cabinet handled military affairs, the Commandants told Forrest that "they consider(ed) it unnecessary to repeat their former objections'.[39] They asked the defence minister to consult them as Military Advisers until the Commonwealth apponted a 'responsible Military Adviser'.[40] The ill-feeling held by the Commandants towards the civilian authorities about the first Federal Defence Bill created the divorce between politics and military strategy in Australian defence policy which was not healed, until Alfred Deakin's clear outline of Australia's strategic problems in 1905 was translated into an appropriate military policy in 1910.

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37. Ibid.

38. CPD, 1901-1902 Session, vol.III, 9 August 1901, pp. 3597-3598.

39. C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 1901-1902 Session, vol.II, 'Further Report of the Federal Military Committee Assembled at Melbourne, 12 June, 1901.' p.6. (para 2).

40. Ibid.

The Federal Military Committee also considered the Report of the Sub-Committee which had met in May to discuss the organisation of the military forces. The Commandants accepted the division of the military forces into a field force and a local force, as well as the creation of military districts. To reorganise the former six colonial forces into the Commonwealth Force, the Federal Military Committee suggested the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry consisting of representatives of the Staff, and the several Arms and Sections of the army. The Committee of Inquiry was to be given the task of collecting data for the preparation of a Scheme of Defence.[41]

General Hutton and Australian Defence 1902-1904

The criticism which the bill faced in parliament, persuaded the government to withdraw the legislation and await the appointment of a General Officer Commanding to give direction on important questions of policy and principle. The idea of creating an office, General Officer Commanding, instead of a military board to command the Commonwealth Military Forces was supported by the Colonial Defence Committee.[42] However, the appointment of an Imperial Officer, as General Officer Commanding, did not guarantee that the Federal Military Committee's criticisms would disappear from the debate about Australian defence policy. As Barton and Forrest discovered, the post of General Officer Commanding, when occupied by a strong personality with definite ideas on Imperial defence, caused difficulties for the civilian leadership, and in the Australian case only isolated the military advisers from the policy making process.

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41. Ibid., pp.7-9.

42. 'Memorandum - Australia: organisation of Defence Department and Constitution of Headquarters Staff', no.226 m - Colonial Defence Committee, PRO Cab 8/3.

The Commonwealth government requested the British authorities on 3 May 1901 to nominate an active officer on the Army List, preferably with experience in the Boer War and the command of citizen soldiers[43], for the position, General Officer Commanding, Commonwealth Military Forces. One British officer, Major-General Pole Carew, refused the offer since it was unlikely to advance his career, and in another case, the Australian authorities were unwilling to accept Lord Dundonald, an aristocrat, who did not fit the egalitarian ethos of the Australian troops and society.[44] On 23 November 1901, agreement was reached by the Commonwealth on Major-General Sir Edward Hutton as the first General Officer Commanding.[45] His career pattern suggested that he was both efficient and able to understand Australian conditions.

Hutton had had a successful military career which reflected the global span of the British Empire. He was born in 1848, educated at Eton, and joined the 60th Rifles in 1867 at the age of nineteen. He saw active service in the Zulu War, 1879, the Egyptian War, 1882, and the Egyptian expedition, 1884-1885, in which he commanded mounted infantry. From 1888 to 1892, he commanded mounted infantry regiments at Aldershot, and then proceeded to command the colonial forces of New South Wales from 1893 to 1896. On his return to England, he assumed the post of Assistant Adjutant-General, Ireland, 1896 to 1898, before becoming General-in-Command, of the Canadian militia, 1898 to 1900.[46]

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43. Telegram from Lord Hopetoun, Governor-General, Commonwealth of Australia, to Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, 3 May 1901, PRO CO 418/9/515.

44. Telegram from Lord Hopetoun to Joseph Chamberlain, 13 June 1901, PRO CO 418/9/515 and to telegram from Lord Hopetoun to Joseph Chamberlain, 10 October 1901, PRO CO 418/10/234.

45. Telegram from Joseph Chamberlain to Lord Hopetoun, 12 November 1901, and telegram from Lord Hopetoun to Joesph Chamberlain, 15 November 1901, PRO CO 418/10/334.

46. N. Penlington, 'General Hutton and the Problem of Military Imperialism in Canada, 1898-1900', Canadian Historical Review, vol. 24 (1943), pp.166-9.

He served in the Boer War and commanded mounted infantry.[47]

The features which stand out in Hutton's military career are his personal drive and professional capacity and his notion about Imperial military co-operation. Hutton represented the 'functional approach' to military matters which was part of the movement to reform the British army in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The reformers campaigned for the abolition of purchased commissions, the creation of a general staff along European lines, officer education, promotion by merit instead of seniority and aristocratic privilege, and the fostering of such necessary qualities as organisation, efficiency and intelligence.[48] For example, Hutton argued that mounted infantry belonged to the period known as 'the nationalisation of the rifle'.[49] The range of modern weapons had produced concentrated rifle fire which called for rapid mobility, and the mounted infantryman possessed the capabilities of marksmen for skirmishes and manoeuvre. Mounted infantry were also ideal for dispersion under attack, flank marches in offence, the use of cover for advance or retreat, and finally, as an acknowledgement to immediate past military encounters, the charge, if the occasion arose. A characteristic of the new warfare was fluidity and this called for different relations between officers and troops. The virtues of blind obedience to commands on the parade ground were unsuited to the impact made by technology on armaments and the nature of warfare. This was as true of a regular army as it was of a citizen army. Hutton believed that discipline must provide cohesion so

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47. From 1902 to 1904, he commanded and organised the militry forces of Australia. His last posting was General of Administrative Eastern Command and Commanding the Third Division, 1905 to 1906. During world War I, he administered and commanded the 21st Division of the Third British Army, 1914-1915. He died in August 1923.
48. W.S. Hamer, The British Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1855-1905 (Oxford, 1970), pp.13-30.
49. L.D. Atkinson, Australian Defence Policy: a study of empire and nation 1897-1910 (Ph.D. thesis, ANU, 1964), pp.137-148.

'individuality and self-reliance' would result 'in the field of battle'.[50] The attainment of discipline and cohesion depended on the recruitment of officers and men from a district where they had known one another in civilian life. Amongst the officers there was a need for a spirit of military co-operation as well as a realisation that the nature of the military profession in the British Empire was non-political. In an address to members of the Royal United Service Institution in 1908, he propounded his belief in the potential of colonial militia and mounted infantry and the advantage of raising an army by voluntary service:

> Believe me, gentlemen, that an army raised by voluntary service from a free people such as ours, where free institutions and the personal and political liberty of the individual are recognised as the bed rock of our existence, is the greatest and most potent factor for the defence of country which the world can produce.[51]

In Australia, Hutton, as General Officer Commanding, brought his ambition and accumulated military experience to the process of building an Australian army.[52]

The arrival of Hutton in Australia marked a new stage in the defence debate about the Australian army. From the outset, the General Officer Commanding was determined to lead the development of the Australian army. In a letter to Colonel Sir Arthur Bigge on 6 February 1902, several days after he arrived in Australia, he wrote:

> I feel thoroughly at home here but have, as you say, a most difficult and responsible task before me; however, the government and the public, and of course the troops extended to me a hearty welcome and there is every prospect of me having before me a pleasant if difficult period of command.[53]

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50. Lieut.-General Sir E. Hutton, 'The Territorial Army and Its Field Artillery', Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. III (July-December 1908), p.1586.

51. Ibid., p.1588.

52. Hutton was appointed commandant of the military forces of New South Wales in 1893. His first reform was the placement of the Department of Military Secretary, previously within the Premier's jurisdiction, under the control of the Commandant. On the public front, exercises and parades were presented for the benefit of taxpaying citizens. He also recommended that officers train in England for instruction in the art of war and in India for military experience. In his administrative action, Hutton did not escape the accusation that he was fitting the troops of New South Wales for service in India and wherever the interests of the Empire were at issue (S.M.H., 10 July 1893). He reported that this programme would bring effectiveness to the colony's defences and thus preclude the necessity of sending British troops to Australia in times of crisis. He also participated in the movement towards military Federation.

In Canada, Hutton advocated the local training of officers for senior command as an economy measure. As well, his experience with the militia reiterated his belief in their value as contributors to the military strength of the Empire. The impact of the Boer War in South Africa on Canadian politics raised the possibility that the GOC, Militia, had known of British proposals to force the Canadian government to provide an expeditionary force for the Imperial War effort. This suspicion only confirmed the view of Canadian nationalists that Hutton was in league with the imperialists. His action in preventing a Liberal member of parliament, under Borden's direction, from purchasing horses by contract for the First Battalion of the Canadian Mounted Rifles, prompted Borden to investigate in case the prices paid for the horses were higher than those paid for the horses of the Mounted Police. The agent appointed to inquire into the matter was the Liberal member awarded the contract in the first place. Hutton was dismissed over the incident and he returned to England before travelling to the Boer War. In South Africa, Hutton fought with Lord Roberts and commanded Australian and Canadian troops (mounted infantry) whom he held in high regard. (R. Preston, Canada's R.M.C. A History of the Royal Military College (Toronto, 1969), pp.166-171.)

53. Letter from Hutton to Colonel Sir A. Bigge, 6 February 1902, Papers of Lieutenant-General Sir E. Hutton (British Museum), add. Ms. 50078, vol.1; in a letter to Sir Montague Ommaney, written on 3 February 1902, Hutton said; 'I have to create everything in Australia'. Ibid.

His view of himself, as an important contributor to Australian defence, and as a person willing to confront difficult situations in the execution of his mission, became apparent when he outlined a strategic basis for Australian defence.[54] To Hutton, it was noticeable that the strategic environment for Australia included 'the relations of the Empire to the East'.. He wished to use the Australian fear of the unknown East to press for the formation of a field force of 20,000 troops to protect Australian and Imperial interests wherever they were threatened. In a letter to Sir Montagu Ommaney on 24 February, he spoke about his progress:

> I have had several long discussions with Mr. Barton and Sir J. Forrest upon the existing Defence Bill, which has passed two readings in the House of Representatives. I pointed out to them the unsoundness of the principles in the bill which restricted the service of Australian troops to operations within Australia. I pointed out and argued with historical illustrations to show the defence of Australia could not be best insured by the defence of Australian soil...[55]

On 7 April, he submitted a Minute on Australian defence to Barton and Forrest at their request which was printed as a parliamentary paper.[56]

The Minute was an examination of Australian defence although one of its purposes was to persuade the decision makers towards a favourable reception of the idea of an Australian contribution to an Imperial reserve. It stated that Australia was 'less liable' to attack because it was remote from foreign powers. Nevertheless, there was a threat to Australian interests beyond the littoral, but the Royal Navy was a guarantee against attack. Therefore, it was vital for

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54. Meaney, op.cit., pp.60-61.

55. Letter from Hutton to Sir M. Ommaney, 24 February 1902, Hutton Papers, add. ms. 50078, vol.1.

56. C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 1901-1902 Session, vol.II, 'Military Forces of the Commonwealth - Minute upon the Defence of Australia by Major-General Hutton, 7 April, 1902'.

Australia to remain part of the British Empire because 'the inviolability of her shores and the security of her commerce depend in large measure upon the power of Great Britain'.[57] Attack was possible in two ways: by raid of two or more cruisers carrying an armed force by landing and by invasion of a well equipped, large and numerous force.[58] Hutton dismissed the second scenario as difficult in the extreme. The logistics of transporting and supporting a large expeditionary force to the continent of Australia under technical and technological developments of the time was impossible. It was more reasonable to expect small raids on defended ports. This necessitated the protection of the naval base in Sydney, the strategic fuelling stations at Thursday Island and King George's Sound, and the trade centres of Sydney and Melbourne. Furthermore, the government was required to prevent the enemy access to 'all cities, towns and harbours of commercial importance'. There was also a need to end Western Australia's isolation by building a railway from Adelaide to Perth. The next part of Hutton's argument anticipated the extention of defence beyond Australian soil:

> The defence of Australia, cannot, moreover, be considered apart from the defence of Australian interests. Australia depends for its commercial success, and its future development firstly upon its seaborne trade, and secondly upon the existence, maintenance, and extension of fixed and certain markets for its produce outside Australian waters. It therefore follows that Australian interests cannot be assured by the defence alone of Australian soil. Defence is the primary duty of every State and of every citizen, yet the defence of Australian interests outside Australian waters is at the present time solely in the hands of the Imperial Government and of the Imperial Army and Navy. It is hardly consistent with the present development of Australia as a young and vigorous nation to neglect her responsibility for defence outside Australian water, and in the robust period of her youth to rely entirely upon the strong arm of the Mother Country.[59]

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57. Ibid., pp.1-3.

58. Ibid., p.2.

59. Ibid.

The notion of forward defence to the north, or elsewhere, when Australian interests were threatened, was supported by the suggestion of a threat from 'modern developments in the East'. The world powers, the United States, Russia, Germany, France, and now Japan, had interests in the Pacific Ocean which prevented Australia from taking a complacent approach to questions of national security.[60] Therefore, Australia was obliged to defend her interests beyond her shore to maintain her sovereignty and trade. There was also a greater need for greater self-reliance and self-sufficiency. To achieve maximum benefit from the defence forces, it was advisable to observe two principles in organisation. They were the requirements for the defence of Australian soil and those for the defence of Australian interests beyond the coast. It is worth noting that the Military Commandants in their report on Australian defence, 1901, had offered the same advice to Forrest.[61] Hutton stipulated two types of troops: garrison troops for the defence of centres of strategic and commercial importance, and field troops, available for service in support of garrison troops and in outlying areas of the continent. The Field Force had the potential to act as a mobile reserve 'capable of undertaking military operations in whatever part of the world it may be desired by Australia to employ them'. Section II of the Minute recorded the number of troops available in each State, the proportion of troops each State should possess based on population returns, and the numbers immediately available for the field force and its recommended size in wartime (see Appendix A).

The Minute also listed measures for organisation, instruction, training and equipment. As well, Hutton pressed for the creation of an arsenal for the independent supply of arms and ammunition to the defence forces in the future. The arsenal was to consist of storage accommodation for reserve stores, a grand magazine, a small arms factory associated with a cordite factory, and a gun foundry.

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60. Ibid.

61. C of A, Parliamentary Paper, 1901-1902 Session, vol.II, 'Further Report of the Federal Military Committee, Assembled at Melbourne, 21 June 1901'.

In his Minute, Hutton set out how he intended to reform and reorganize the Commonwealth Military Forces. An important part of his programme was the creation of a Headquarters Staff, which was based on his belief that a strong central administration was essential for the success of his defence scheme.[62] Hutton wanted the Headquarters Staff to translate his scheme into action. The Headquarters Staff was to consist of a Deputy Adjutant-General, Assistant Quartermaster-General, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Assistant Director of Artillery and Stores, Director-General of Army Medical Services, Deputy Judge Advocate-General, Deputy-Quartermaster-General, and an Assistant Adjutant-General for Engineer Services.[63] The staff had responsibilities for training and inspecting troops, preparing schemes of mobilisation, the collection and dissemination of military intelligence, supplies, and the preparation and maintenance of defensive works.

Following his reconstruction of the HQ staff, Hutton adopted policies to show how Australia might assist Imperial defence objectives. Lieutenant-General Sir W. Nicholson, the Director-General of Mobilisation and Intelligence at the War office, asked Hutton to obtain information about French military activities in New Caledonia, especially the fortifications built at Noumea.

Major Bridges, who was Assistant Quartermaster-General during Hutton's command, was chosen for the mission. He left Sydney on 24 May 1902, disguised as a commercial agent of Dalgety and Company Limited.[64] His cover as a commercial agent was

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62. Letter from Hutton to Forrest, 14 November 1902, Hutton Papers, add. ms. 50084, vol.VII.

63. The Headquarters Staff organisation was based on a Colonial Office paper, 'The Organisation of Defence Department and Constitution of Headquarters Staff Australia', written in July 1901 in answer to a request by the Australian government for advice on the development of a military staff. PRO, Cab 8/3.

64. C.D. Clark, The Citizen General Staff (Canberra, 1976), p.7.

arranged by Major Knox, a member of the New South Wales Lancers Regiment, who was also a managing-director of Dalgety and Company. Bridges was away for five weeks. He took photographs of Noumea and hiked across the island.[65] On his return, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. The report presented by Bridges provided the War Office with information about the fortifications of New Caledonia. On the strength of that report, and without an order from the War Office, or the Australian government, Hutton drew up plans for an Australian invasion of Noumea. Apart from this attempt to gain information for War Office purposes, there was no corresponding effort to collect and disseminate reports for Australian defence planning on the Pacific Islands or the geo-political threat from the East. Without knowledge about the world beyond Australian shores, there ws little hope of devising a coherent strategic doctrine and defence scheme.

In order to carry out Imperial defence objectives Hutton saw potential in a common Imperial system for training officers to facilitate joint operations between the members of the British Empire in the event of a crisis.[66] He therefore encouraged Australian officers to undertake higher military training to raise their military standards and increase their knowledge of Imperial defence.

As part of his plan to train officers for higher military command, Hutton selected Lieutenant Brudenell White for nomination to attend the Staff College, Camberley in 1906.[67] White was the first Australian to attend the Staff College, Camberley and subsequently rose to the position Chief of the General Staff in 1920 and so vindicated Hutton's faith in him.

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65. C.D. Clark, "The Invasion of New Caledonia', Army Journal 279 (August, 1972), pp.9-19.

66. Letter from Hutton To Barton, 14 July 1915; Hutton Papers add. ms. 5009, vol.IX.

67. C.E.W. Bean, Two Men I knew (Sydney, 1977), pp.79-229.

There is no evidence that White accepted fully the distinctive Australian perception about the Pacific, and Japan, until 1920.

A Federal Defence Bill

The efforts by Hutton to direct the development of the army and carry out his personal mission to make Australian troops available automatically in Imperial crises ran counter to the beliefs held by parliamentarians and the Australian cabinet that a defence force was designed to serve Australian interests. In the debate on the Supply Bill in April 1902, the central question was the need to prevent any 'exhibition of extreme militarism' or 'extravagant expenditure on defence'.[69] Sir Edward Braddon wanted the volunteer spirit encouraged to reduce the cost of an army, and John Watson, the member of Bland and a future Labor Prime Minister, from 27 April 1904 to 17 August 1904, warned his colleagues of the need to ensure that the Australian army was effective, and not merely a display of 'pipeclay and drill'.[70] Watson, in particular, argued that Australia needed to lessen its dependence on the 'old world' for the supply of small arms and ammunition and establish an ammunition factory. Another parliamentarian, J.W. McCay, the member for Corinella, who was a keen militia officer and a future defence minister in the Reid-McLean Free Trade-Protectionist Coalition from 18 August 1904 to 5 July 1905, urged parliament to develop the rifle clubs as a reserve. He noted that the basis for rifle clubs proposed by Hutton did not encourage their extension as a reserve force.[71] He also pointed out that in Victoria there were not sufficient field guns to take out on 'a Sunday

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69. CPD, 1901-1902 Session, vol.VII, 30 April 1902, p.12093.

70. Ibid., p.12094-99.

71. Ibid., p.12099.

afternoon' for practice.[72] At the same time, W.G. Spence, Labor member for Darling, mentioned that a complete re-organisation was necessary for Australia to meet an invasion,[73] and urged the government to produce cordite, ammunition and small arms.

The attitude of the Australian government towards Imperial defence was made clear at the Colonial Conference in June 1902. At the Conference, the British government attempted to promote closer co-operation between the self-governing units of the Empire. A number of schemes were drawn up in preparation for the consideration of the Colonial Premiers. In the military sphere, the War Office presented a paper by Lieut.-Colonel E. Altham, entitled 'The Organisation of Colonial Troops for Imperial Service.[74] Altham's memorandum was a secret paper written for the Secretary of State for War under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief. It suggested how the colonies might contribute to Imperial defence in war. The paper followed an examination undertaken in 1901 of the military needs of the Empire in a war with France and Germany.

Lieut-Colonel Altham's paper argued that the Empire should be considered as a single entity for the purpose of Imperial defence, especially in view of the self-governing colonies' willingness to assist in the Boer War.[75] The future of the British Empire depended on preparation for more difficult situations. This entailed an assessment of the reactions and likely contributions from the units of the Empire in the event of a war and the development of common patterns of organisation and training.

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72. Ibid., pp.12114-15.

73. Ibid., pp.12132-33.

74. Lieut.-Colonel E. Altham, 'The Organisation of Colonial Troops for Imperial Service', in the Hutton Papers, add. ms. 50086, vol.IX.

75. Ibid.

It was essential that contingents 'should be efficient in training and equipment'. Altham hoped Australia would raise a Field Force, called the Imperial Australian Force, of 9,000 men, consisting of two mounted brigades and one infantry brigade. The paper, however, left details to the local authorities in Australia.

> How and in what form these suggestions can be best laid before the Australian ministry is a delicate matter which needs careful consideration. It is believed to be the policy of His Majesty's Government not to press the self-governing Colonies in such matters, but to look rather to the Colonies to take the initiative... [76]

At the conference, the Secretary of State for War, Sir John Brodrick, added the condition that the cost of training troops for the Imperial reserve would be the responsibility of the self-governing and colonial governments. He also tried to limit the sovereignty of the colonial government by insisting that the War Office should have the right to use the troops when it wished. The Australian representatives, Barton and Forrest, with the Canadians opposed Brodrick's suggestion.[77]

The immediate problem faced by Barton and Forrest in defence policy after their return to Australia was the formulation of a defence scheme and bill. During April and May, the estimates in the Supply Bill were scrutinised and criticised, and as a result the defence minister had reduced the defence budget from £1,250,000 to £762,000 Sterling. In October the acting defence minister, Sir William Lyne, agreed with the suggestion by Watson to reduce the defence estimates by 35,000 Sterling for the financial year 1902-03.[78] Two months later in December, Sir John Forrest reiterated the financial restrictions placed on the development of a defence force.

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76. Ibid., p.7.

77. Meaney, op.cit., p.63; S.M.H., 6 May 1902.

78. CPD, 1901-1902 Session, vol. XII, 2 October 1902, pp.16 and 386. The military expenditure in 1902-03 was £600,652 Sterling and in 1903-04 it was £615,673 Sterling. (Commonwealth of Australia, Year Book, Australian 1924, no.17, p.595.)

He also stated that the scheme of organisation outlined by Hutton in his Minute on defence referred only to the 'internal defence of Australia' and did not involve any reduction of the citizen forces.[79]

The unsatisfactory state of affairs in defence was highlighted by Watson in December when he criticised the government for failing to pass a Defence Act as a guide for the establishment of an army.[80] The absence of an Army Act describing duties, and the role of permanent and militia forces, had led to unease and unrest amongst the defence force of South Australia. In South Australia, Hutton had gone against the wish of Forrest to reduce the cost of central staff by relying on the service of militia officers.[81] Instead, he compulsorily retired seven militia officers who drew £100 pounds sterling a year between them and were below the age limit for retirement. He also introduced drill instructors from the permanent forces who pushed aside the non-commissioned drill officers of the militia forces. Forrest, replying to these acts of insubordination which challenged his authority said that the imported drill insructors were due to leave South Australia at the end of 1902. On the question of the officers, Forrest stated that there was no ground for complaint, especially as the grievances were settled, but he did not list the solutions worked out by the government. However, he did place great emphasis on the need to pass a Federal Defence Bill to eliminate the problems and difficulties of establishing an Australian army.

In drafting a second defence bill, the Australian cabinet asked Hutton once more for advice. He was asked by Forrest and Barton to draw up a defence bill. With an eye on public opinion, Hutton gave the Commonwealth power to send Australian troops overseas to avert any criticism that he was creating an

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79. Argus, 10 December 1902.

80. Ibid.

81. Advertiser, 17 December 1902.

Imperial reserve force under Imperial control. He lobbied the opposition leaders, Reid and Watson, and told them that the Commonwealth needed the power to send troops anywhere to protect Australian interests.[82] In cabinet, Hutton's section on overseas service for Commonwealth troops was restricted further. The clause relating to overseas service was limited to permanent troops.

The decision by the Australian cabinet to control the use of its troops for the defence of Australian shores was a recognition that the Australian nation had distinctive interests in the Pacific. Furthermore, the Australian army was viewed by cabinet as a symbol of nationhood. Hutton, in his efforts to give preference to permanent professional soldiers, offended the Australian cabinet in 1903 over the role of citizen soldiers in an Australian defence force. During March 1903, Hutton gave the command of the Victorian Mounted Brigade at the Victorian Easter Camp to a permanent soldier, Colonel Lea, and dismissed the claims of Colonel Braithwaite, a senior militia officer, to the command.[83] Hutton's action provoked controversy, and he was asked to gain approval from cabinet in future appointments to commands. On 7 April 1903, he apologised publicly to the Prime Minister and cabinet for his action.[84]

The defence bill introduced by Forrest in July 1903 was designed to establish the defence forces on a national basis. Above all, the bill made clear that the defence of Australia for the army was confined to the continent. Forrest stated that:

> ... The defence of Australia, so far as the army is concerned, should be confined to operations on our own soil, and the Government should not have power to send away our men to take part in some war in which he might have little or no interest. [85]

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82. Meaney, op.cit., pp. 65-66.

83. S.M.H., 7 April 1903.

84. Ibid.

85. CPD, 1903 Session, vol.XIV, 23 July 1903, p.2531.

The concern about overseas service was reflected in the vote by parliament to delete Clause 42 which gave the government the power to send troops overseas.[86] As well, the parliament decided to restrict the role of the permanent forces to facilitate the expansion of the citizen forces. In discussing the citizen forces, George Reid, the member for East Sydney, hoped that the citizen forces would regard the permanent forces as an example of military professionalism to which they might aspire. The bill also provided for the division of the defence force into permanent and citizen forces. The citizen forces consisted of militia (partially paid citizen soldiers), volunteers (unpaid citizen soldiers) and reserves which were members of rifle clubs. To meet the needs of officer training, Clause 26 of the bill envisaged the establishment of a naval and military college.

During the debate on the bill, Andrew Fisher, the member for Wide Bay and a future Labor Prime Minister, pointed out that 'well equipped intelligence is one of the essentials of successful warfare'.[87] His comment went unnoticed, but after the outbreak of World War I he followed his own dictum and instituted measures to gather information about Japanese activities in the Pacific. Another issue raised in the debate was the role of the volunteers in the national army. Austen Chapman, the member for Eden-Monaro, claimed that the military system favoured nepotism, and was the plaything of the conservatives, who were able to afford military expenses.

> ... There is too much of this spirit of nepotism pervading the military regime of this country - too much of a disposition to give to the 'tory classes' and plums of the service.[88]

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86. CPD, 1903 Session, vol.XV, 23 July 1903, p.2531.

87. CPD, 1903 Session, vol.XV, 5 August 1903, p.3104.

88. CPD, 1903, Session, vol.XV, 5 August 1903, p.3106.

Thomas Ewing, the member for Richmond and a future defence minister in the Protectionist Deakin ministry from 5 July 1905 to 13 November 1908, agreed with Chapman. Although further investigation is needed, it is worth noting that the volunteer and reserve forces before the Hutton reorganisation were officered in many cases by landowners and politicans who were well to do. An example is the Upper Clarence Reserve Corps of Light Horse from 1886 to 1888 in which the owner of Tabulam station, Charles Chauvel, and his two sons, Arthur and Henry, later Chief of the General Staff, were officers.[89] The point made by Chapman is that only the well to do would survive the new regulations in the defence Bill which forced the conversion of volunteer units to militia. The effect of Hutton's efforts to reduce the volunteer force was indicated by the remarks of A. McLean, the member for Gippsland, about the Victorian Rangers:

> ... I have no dobut that the General Officer Commanding thought that the men would prefer to join the militia forces, as members of which they would be partially paid, rather than remain pure and simple volunteers. I am credibly informed, however, that the great majority of the Rangers are not in a position to avail themselves of the opportunity offered, and that if the proposal is carried out, it will have the effect of disbanding them... [90]

Austen Chapman reminded McLean that the case of the Victorian Rangers was not unusual in New South Wales. At Cooma, the conversion of the volunteer military company to militia was difficult if you did not own a horse. A similar situation had occurred in the districts of Wellington and Dubbo.[91] Chapman thought that the decision by Hutton to create militia units in the Wellington and Dubbo districts was arbitrary. Another point raised during the debate was whether the control of the army should be vested in a Council of Defence or the General Officer Commanding. Samuel Mauger, the Labor member for

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89. A. Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse (Melbourne, 1978), p.6.

90. CPD, 1903 Session, vol.XV, 5 August 1903, p.3120.

91. Ibid.

Melbourne Ports, urged the establishment of a Council of Defence under Clause 26A which enabled the Governor-General to appoint a board to advise him on all matters of military policy. Forrest suggested that it was better to do away with the position General Officer Commanding and appoint a body of experts like the Admiralty Board in England.[92] He informed parliament that the British Government was contemplating the establishment of a board of administration for the army. McCay also entered the discussion and pointed out that the 'English Council' mentioned by Sir John Brodrick, the Secretary of State for War in the House of Commons, was a semi-political body 'intended to harmonise the relations between the political and military administrators upon all matters of policy'.[93] The 'English Council' referred to by McCay was the Army Council which was a recommendation by Viscount Esher in his inquiry on the British Army. The Esher Report, which was published in February and March 1904, recommended the abolition of the post Commander-in-Chief. William Wilks, the member for Dally, commented wryly that the Council of Defence would 'meet every year at Cup time in Melbourne'.[94] On the question of self-sufficiency in ammunition, Forrest told his colleagues that the government did not contemplate the establishment of an ammunition factory in connection with the Department of Defence.

> An ammunition factory was established by the State of Victoria previous to transfer under a lease with the Colonial Ammunition Company, which lease or agreement does not terminate until May, 1914, and under Section 85 of the Constitution Act, obligations under this lease or agreement for the supply of small arm ammunition have been assumed by the Commonwealth. The company is now able to supply the annual requirement of small arm ammunition of the several States of the Commonwealth and the ammunition supply has been fully equal to the standard of ammunition supplied from home.[95]

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92. CPD, 1903 Session, vol.XVI, 21 August 1903, pp.4064-65.

93. Ibid., p.4067.

94. Ibid.

95. CPD, 1903 Session, vol.XVI, 26 August 1903, p.4239.

The attention devoted to the development of Australian self-sufficiency in ammunition production increased after the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05, which altered the balance of power in the Pacific and exposed Australia to the threat of Japanese power.

Reaction to Hutton

For Hutton, the passage of the defence bill was a disappointment.[96] It signalled that he had failed to implement his policy of making Australian forces automatically available for Imperial duty overseas. At the same time, he had faith that the Field Force of the Commonwealth Military Forces would volunteer for service overseas in the event of a military crisis involving Great Britain.[97]

The new Protectionist ministry led by Alfred Deakin, which took office on 24 September following the resignation of Barton and Forrest, continued the defence policy of the previous ministry.[98] In particular, Hutton was asked by the Australian government about the size and organisation of an expeditionary force from Australia if Britain became involved in the Russo-Japanese War. The General Officer Commanding thought

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96. Meaney, op.cit., p.68.

97. Letter from Hutton to Ommaney, August 1903, Hutton Papers, add. ms. 50078, vol.I.

98. G. Greenwood and C. Grimshaw, Documents on Australian International Affairs, 1901-1918 (Melbourne, 1977), p.li.

that the request for advice, together with favourable circumstances in the Far East, would force Australia to change the policy restricting the service of troops overseas.[99] His hopes came to nought. Instead of an expeditionary force, the government decided to send a military observer, Colonel J.C. Hoad.[100]

Hoad had never showed any clear awareness of, or interest in broad strategic questions. He was a political general in the narrowest sense. Hutton had a poor opinion of Hoad, and it angered him greatly that Deakin, the new Prime Minister, had, over his objection, sent Hoad to the Russo-Japanese War as the Australian military observer. He wrote to the defence minister on 25 March 1904 about the appointment:

> ... Colonel Hoad, who has signally failed as Chief Staff Officer, has neither claim nor qualification to represent Australian troops with Japanese army. Had hoped opportunity would have been seized to send officer possessing sound military knowledge, high educational attainments, and special personal characteristics, making War experience gained valuable to Australia in future years.[101]

The purpose of Hoad's appointment was to gain first hand knowledge of the Japanese army and the military operations conducted during the war. His early departure from the theatre of operations prevented him from carrying out his task to the letter. The Argus criticised his action and raised a question about the political character of his appointment.

> When he left this country there seems to have been at most a more or less vague understanding that if military operations came to a standstill during the winter months and he could do no good, he should return home. Otherwise he was authorised to be away for 12 months.

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99. Meaney, op.cit., p.70; Letter from Hutton to Ommaney, 15 December 1913, Hutton Papers add. ms. 50078, vol.I.

100. 'Memorandum to the defence minister', AA MP 729/1.

101. Ibid.; Copy of a letter from Hutton to Lieut.-General Sir W. Nicholson, 8 April 1904, Hutton Papers, add. ms. 50082, vol.V. The letter included Hutton's Memorandum to the defence minister.

> Far from operations coming to a standstill before he started on his way back, the most important land fighting of the war had taken place since then. No doubt, Colonel Hoad when he arrives will have a satisfactory explanation. He was evidently desirous of going to the war, for he accepted the appointment from the political chief of his department and over other officers nominated by the G.O.C.....He would not like to create the slightest suspicion that the Commonwealth had suffered any loss through the political character of his appointment. [102]

Despite Hutton's opinion, and the poor quality of Hoad's report, Hoad was, two years after his return, promoted to the rank of Major-General, the first Australian to be given that rank.

The decision by Deakin to appoint Hoad as military observer of the Australian government at the Russo-Japanese War against the advice of Hutton was a reaction to the autocratic style of the General Officer Commanding. Under the Labor government of Chris Watson, from 27 April 1904 to 17 August 1904, a committee of enquiry was appointed with the task of investigating 'the command and administration of the Military and Naval Forces of the Commonwealth'. The Labor party favoured a collective leadership structure of the military forces.

The genesis of the idea of collective leadership for the military forces was the report by the Esher Committee in Great Britain which was established in 1902 to report on how to reform the War Office. As we have seen, a number of politicans, including Sir John Forrest, Austen Chapman, Lieutenant-Colonel J.W. McCay, and Chris Watson, favoured the administration of the armed forces by a military board. The decision to inquire into the question of military administration by boards was not, as Hutton thought, an idea prompted by the Labor Party.[103] The committee established by the Watson government consisted of Senator A. Dawson, the

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102. Argus, 9 November 1904.

103. Letter from Hutton to Sir M. Ommaney, 19 April 1904, Hutton Papers, add. ms. 50078, vol.I.

Defence Minister as chairman, Brigadier-General H. Finn, Captain M. Collins, Captain F. Tickell, and Lieutenant-Colonel W.T. Bridges.[104] The report was submitted to the Watson ministry on 16 August 1904, two days before the Reid-McLean, Free Trade-Protectionist coalition, came to power.

In the case of the army, the report reflected the concern of all sections of parliament to ensure that the best advice was available to the government on military matters. It made plain the dissatisfaction with the General Officer Commanding as the sole responsible adviser to the minister on all military questions.[105] According to the committee, a disagreement between the government and the General Officer Commanding left no adviser from whom the defence minister could obtain additional information.[106] Furthermore, there was little hope of a continuous military policy while policy depended on the G.O.C. who held office for a short period of time. The office of G.O.C. also prevented the government from obtaining first hand knowledge in technical matters. The Committee recommended that in order to avoid over-centralisation, it was vital to appoint an officer to inspect the forces who was not responsible for their efficiency, to place all information affecting questions of policy before the minister, and to integrate the financial and military branches. The office of Inspector-General was suggested as a means of providing an independent assessment of the armed forces.[107] In the

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103. Letter from Hutton to Sir M. Ommaney, 19 April 1904, Hutton Papers, add. ms. 50078, vol.I.

104. 'Report of the Committee of inquiry into the administration of the Australian Military and Naval Forces', Hutton Papers, add. ms. 55084, vol.VII.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid., p.1.

107. C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 1904 Session, vol.II, no.58. 'Memorandum by a Committee in regard to the Administration of Military and Naval Forces together with Memoranda by Senator the Hon. A. Dawson and Major-General Sir E.T.H. Hutton.'

administration of the Commonwealth Military Forces, the Committee recommended a military board consisting of military officers and consultative members.

At the head of the military and naval boards, and the defence policy structure, it was proposed that there would be a Council of Defence. It was to include the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Treasurer, members of the naval and military boards, the Inspector-General and consultative members. The council was to supply information and advice on general defence policy. The respective duties of the Council of Defence and Board of Military Administration were outlined in the report. (See Appendix B)

On 30 August 1904, McCay, the defence minister and a militia officer, paid Hutton the courtesy of seeking his views on the report with special reference to the rationale of the administrative scheme and its details. McCay requested information from him on the suitability of Australian officers for appointments to the Council of Defence and the Board of Military Administration.

Hutton disagreed with the report.[108] He reminded the minister that the lack of administrative assistance in his staff had impaired the execution of his duties. To help alleviate the difficulties, Hutton supported the idea of a Board of Advice which was mentioned in Clause 124(a) of the Defence Act, 1903. The Board had the potential to co-ordinate the civil and military elements and avoid conflict by the discussion of efficiency and expense in relation to each subject under discussion. The Board Hutton advocated included the following:-

President - Minister for Defence
Vice-President - G.O.C., Commonwealth Military Forces
The Second-in-Command

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108. Report by Hutton to the Minister of Defence, 6 September 1904, on the 'Memorandum of Command and Administration of the Military and Naval Forces of the Commonwealth', p.2, Hutton Papers, add. ms. 50084, vol.VII.

The Chief Staff Officer
The Assistant Quartermaster-General
A Selected Officer of the Militia
The Secretary, Department of Defence
Consultative members.[109]

The Board of Advice was in no way similar to the recommendations of the Esher Committee in Great Britain to establish an Army Council. The British reforms gave larger powers to the members of the Army Council than those previously held and exercised by the Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, Lord Esher's Committee pointed out that:

> "the criticism of military policy by civilians, whose functions should be limited to examination of estimated cost and expenditure, has become a habit incurable, unless drastic reforms are applied."[110]

As well, Hutton believed that the Commonwealth Military Forces did not contain enough well-trained and experienced officers to take the positions outlined in the Esher reform scheme.

Hutton rebutted the comment that there was no 'continuous military policy' by asserting 'that it is no part of military administration to deal with Defence Policy'. The Commonwealth of Australia had a general and defined plan. Furthermore, a number of advances had been made during his command. They were the introduction of a general system of military training in August 1902, the formulation of peace and war establishment tables in December 1902, the reorganisation of State troops into the Commonwealth military system, July 1903, the adoption of a service uniform in the same month, the publication of the military forces list in February 1904, and the passage of the Defence Act, 1903. On the question of leadership and direction in policy, Hutton noticed that the duties of the four members of the military board did not differ from the duties allotted to the headquarters staff of the G.O.C. The main change was

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109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

the appointment of the Minister of Defence as head of the military board. Hutton's personal feeling on the matter was expressed on page 11 of the report:

> "I can conceive of no system which is more certain to be fatal to the efficiency and well-being of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth than one which will place the control, administration and, indirectly, the command of the Troops in the hands of a civilian."[111]

With reference to the office of Inspector-General, Hutton made the observation that the Australian forces required a leader instead of an inspector. In his opinion, there was no officer in Australia who qualified for the office. He recommended that an Imperial Officer selected by the Secretary of State for War occupy the position. A list of names for appointment to the military board and commandants of districts was submitted. Colonel W.T. Bridges, a Hutton protegé, was recommended for the position of First Military Member with the designation, if the government desired, of Chief of the General Staff. On the question of the Council of Defence, he noted that the Council of Defence in Victoria before Federation had exerted a 'bad influence upon military administration and discipline.'[112] After two years of frustration in attempting to implement his military programme, Hutton resigned his position as G.O.C. on 15 November 1904.

Hutton's comments on the inadequacy of Australian officers to perform the task of advising government on defence matters were vindicated during the years from 1905 to 1908. The administration and fortunes of the Council of Defence and Military Board from 1905 to 1908 indicated the need for a body of trained officers with a compass of knowledge and experience about the strategic requirements of Australian defence.

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111. Ibid.

112. C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 1904 Session, vol.II, no.58. 'Memorandum by a Committee in regard to the Administration of Military and Naval Forces together with Memoranda by Senator the Hon. A. Dawson and Major-General Sir E.T.G. Hutton', and C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 1904 Session, vol.II, no.25, 'Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia. Second Annual Report of Major-General Sir E. Hutton, Commanding'.

McCay paid scant attention to the remarks by General Hutton, and on 2 November he introduced a bill to amend the Defence Act.[113]. In speaking to the bill, McCay reminded parliament that the United States, Switzerland and 'England' had opted for collective leadership in military matters.

> ... but they (the Dawson recommendations) also possess a further recommendation in that they practically follow the precedents of every important country in the world. England has been the last of the nations to abandon the principle of the Commander-in-Chief in connection with her army in times of peace. The United States, Switzerland, that chief prototype for Australia in so many respects, and all other countries that have constitutional government, have found that the system of Commander-in-Chief...has never been altogether satisfactory for the community. There have always been inevitable difficulties in properly adjusting matters of responsibility and administration under that system... [114]

For the defence minister, the Australian ideal was a defence carried out by citizen forces. He argued that a military board was essential to maintain continuity in defence policy. On 25 November 1904, the debate continued about the amending bill. G.B. Edwards, the member for South Sydney, and a journalist and businessman, stated that Hutton was out of touch with Australian sentiment. He wanted the Minister of Defence to exert strong control over the Department of Defence, and thought the Council of Defence would enhance the growth of military power in he Commonwealth.[115] However, he saw no need for a Council of Defence. C. Salmon, the member for Laanecoorie, Protectionist, and a minister in the McLean government, thought the reforms in Great Britain justified the implementation of the Dawson report recommendations.[116] The amending bill, in his opinion, was a criticism of General Hutton and the way his strong personality caused 'intense friction'. he admitted however, that Hutton had contributed to the professional advancement of the Commonwealth Military Forces.

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113. CPD, 1904 Session, vol.XXIII, 2 November 1904, p.6385.

114. Ibid.

115. CPD, 1904 Session, vol.XXIV, 25 November 1904, p.7492.

116. Ibid., p.7495.

R. Crouch, the member for Corio, and radical protectionist, offered a different opinion. He welcomed the idea of a military board but argued that it was essential to have 'one supreme control'.[117] In reply, McCay told Crouch that the Inspector-General would be the Commander-in-Chief in war as well as being responsible for the conduct of military training in peace. On the question of command, Crouch told parliament that 'Australian troops would be best led by Australian officers, or by officers in sympathy with Australia.'[118]

> ... We have trained some of the best medical men to be found anywhere in the world ... Similarly we have trained our judges ... and it seems to me a pity that we do not give Australians an opportunity to show what they could do in military matters. Until Australians are promoted to the highest positions, we shall never have Australian Officers able to take command. If the scheme we are now discussing were to be worked by Australian officers, it would have a better chance of succeeding than it will otherwise have. [119]

Crouch also wanted men to rise from the ranks and said that attempts were made to prevent such career lines of ascent. He went further and asked McCay to obtain the best talent available in the world to train Australian troops if there was not an Australian officer capable of high command. Kelly, the member for Wentworth, Free Trader and Liberal asked Crouch if he would select a Japanese officer to train Australian soldiers. In an evasive reply, Crouch said:

> We should obtain the best man, regardless of cost and of the nation to which he may belong, whether he be an American, a Canadian, a Frenchman, or a German. [120]

He was aware that the belief in White Australia, an article of faith for the Australian nation, placed limitations on the choice of military advisers from overseas. After the

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117. Ibid., p.7511.

118. Ibid., p.7517.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid., p.7518.

discussion and debate the bill was passed a third time, and made law in December 1904. The amending act established a Council of Defence, Naval and Military Boards, established the office of Inspector-General and abolished the position of General Officer Commanding. The Council of Defence was to be composed of the Minister of State for Defence, Treasurer, Inspector-General, Naval Director, Chief of Intelligence, a representative of the Citizen Forces and expert advisers, and the Military Board of the Minister of State for Defence, Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Adjutant-General, Chief of Ordnance, Finance Member, and a representative of the Citizen Forces.

Under the 1904 Act, the Chief of Intelligence was responsible for schemes of defence and staff work and in 1908, his title was changed to Chief of the General Staff. The first Inspector-General was Brigadier-General H. Finn, an Australian officer with Imperial military training, who had risen from the ranks.

From 1870 to 1904, Australian defence policy reacted to fears about the balance of power in Europe and the Pacific. The fears about the Pacific were not given strict definition although the colonial governments before 1901, and the Commonwealth of Australia after that year, strove to minimise great power rivalry which might jeopardise Australian security by urging British annexation of all neighbouring islands in the South Pacific. During the first period of Commonwealth defence from 1901-1904, General Hutton attempted to use the increased international rivalry in the Pacific to argue for the creation of an Imperial Reserve Force capable of defending the interests of the Empire wherever they were threatened. His efforts to create an Imperial Reserve Force in Australia failed. The Australian governments from 1901 to 1904 wanted to retain control of their forces for the defence of Australian soil, and embarked on a successful legislative programme which was embodied in the Defence Act, 1904. As well, Hutton's term of office saw friction between the interlocking spheres of politics and strategy which led to the establishment of administrative machinery, a Council of Defence and Board of

Military Administration. The administrative machinery and Australia's defence preparations were soon tested by the changed balance of power in the Pacific after the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905.

CHAPTER II

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING, 1905-1915

Political and Military Developments, 1905-1907

The victory of Japan over Russia at the Battle of Tsushima, May 1905, made Australian political leaders aware of the change affecting power balances and arrangements both in Europe and Asia. Anglo-German rivalry had led Fisher, the First Sea Lord from 1904-1910, to recommend the withdrawal of five British battleships from the Pacific Ocean to the North Sea and the renewal of ther Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905 indicated Britain's dependence on Japan's goodwill to safeguard her interests in the Pacific. From 1903 to 1905, Alfred Deakin had studied the changing international relations in the Pacific with close attention. Within two weeks of the Battle of Tsushima, he had spoken about the implications for Australian defence.

On 12 June 1905, Deakin granted an interview to The Herald (Melbourne) in which he discussed his anxieties about the rise of Japanese power after the defeat of Russia at the Battle of Tsushima.[1] He pointed out that Australia could no longer afford to feel secure with the growth of American, German and Japanese naval power. More to the point, the rise of Japan had ended Australia's former belief that isolation was a guarantee of security.

The strategic revolution in the Pacific Ocean combined with technical developments meant that Australian ports were in striking distances from places such as Saigon, Port Arthur and Yokohama. Deakin's main concern was the ambition of Japan in the Pacific Ocean and the distance separating the Australian

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1. The Herald (Melbourne), 12 June 1905.

nation from the Mother Country. For too long, defence policy had dealt with the organisation and administration without looking at the broader background of defence issues. Firstly, harbour defences needed improvement so Australian ports might resist raids by small cruisers. Secondly, Australia had to acquire a naval force because the efficacy of the existing naval agreement with Great Britain was doubtful. The Naval Agreement of 1903 gave the Admiralty control of the Australian auxiliary squadron and the power to order it from Australian waters. In conclusion, he stressed that every able bodied man should fit himself for defence work. His proposals involved large federal expenditure.[2]

Knowing well that British military authorities did not share his view, and that Australia's senior military officers were divided about the deference due to the Colonial Defence Committee, Deakin sought advice from his Chief of Intelligence. Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, the Chief of Intelligence, at the request of the Treasurer, G. Turner, submitted a paper commenting on the Prime Minister's published views.[3]

Speaking in general terms, he held the opinion that the Minute of 1902 prepared by General Hutton was a sensible guide to the problem of defending Australia. He did not mention the Japanese threat which General Hutton had also included in the Minute of 1902, nor did he take into account the altered conditions in the Pacific region and the need for a re-examination of strategical considerations which Deakin had

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2. Ibid. The interview was printed in C of A Parliamentary Papers, 1905 Session, vol II, No 31 - 'The Hon A. Deakin - Statement re Present Condition of Defence of Commonwealth, communicated to The Herald, on 12 June 1905 - Return to Order'.

3. Report by the Director of Naval Forces upon the Matters Referred to in the interview regarding 'Defence' appearing in the Melbourne Herald, of the 12 June 1905, 8 July 1905 - and 'Remarks by Chief of Intelligence', 29 June 1905, AA MP 729/1, files of 6276 and 05/5018, and 'Remarks by Chief of Intelligence', 23 June 1905, AA B173, file 65/144. The date, 23 June 1905, in the AA B173 Series is incorrect, and should be 29 June 1905.

stressed in his Herald interview. The points raised in the article were dealt with in a matter-of-fact fashion. They revealed Bridges style, and his belief that the executive leadership had the responsibility for estimating the strength of a likely attack on Australia. Yet, it must be said that while he did not pay heed to the implications of the strategic revolution in the Pacific, he did make justifiable criticism of the politicians' failure to understand the difficulties of establishing an efficient fighting force from disparate colonial forces.[4]

He pointed out that the politicians had not bothered to endorse the organisation set out by the former General Officer Commanding, Major-General Hutton. As well, the G.O.C. had to deal with the equipment of the forces, the introduction of a unified system of training and regulations governing the forces. To the criticism that the guns in the fortified ports were obsolete, Bridges replied that new guns were on order. With respect to the Field Artillery, the Treasurer was reminded of the need to build ranges if the new guns were to prove useful for troops. The Treasurer was reminded that the Estimates did not provide sufficient finance for the Engineers. The last point he made stressed the importance of well trained officers:

> ... However good the troops themselves may be they will afford no security unless steps are taken to train officers who will command them and it should not be forgotten that efficiency cannot be improvised in time of war.[5]

Thus, Deakin gained little encouragement or support from his Chief of Intelligence.

There were, however, two military officers, Brigadier-General J.M. Gordon, and Major J.G. Legge, who understood the strategic concern and Deakin's interest in compulsory military

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4. 'Remarks by Chief of Intelligence, 23 June 1905,' AA B173, file 65/144.

5. Ibid.

training.[6] Brigadier-General J.M. Gordon, the Commandant of New South Wales, made a public statement endorsing the Japanese threat two months after Bridges submitted his report. In a talk to the United Service Institution of New South Wales on 7 August 1905, he outlined what he saw as significant factors for defence policy. The leader, in the Daily Telegraph on 8 August 1905, paraphrased his comments that:

> ... Australia will be menaced proportionately as it prospers, and that unless it is effectively defended it may fall prey, "to the greedy and enterprising alien" is clear! The position has never been locally appreciated for two reasons, namely that, the British Navy has always been relied upon to keep the invader off, and that the strength of Japan as a naval and military power is of such recent demonstration that even now it and its full significance in the Pacific are not fully appreciated. 7

Gordon also mentioned the apathy of the Australian citizen. The solution was a scheme of universal service to keep the country safe. His call for universal service was not novel. Major J. Legge, who became Chief Staff Officer, New South Wales, on 11 December 1905, had already addressed the United Service Institution of New South Wales in 1889 about the organisation of a reserve for the defence of Australia to make invasion a difficult undertaking.[8] He had estimated that 48,000 troops were required to repel a raiding force while 100,000 troops were needed to repel an invading army. A force of 100,000 troops required 4,000 officers and 8,000 non-

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6. See Biographical Details.

7. Daily Telegraph, 8 August 1905 and S.M.H., 8 August 1905; in a talk to the Riflemen's Association, reported in the SMH, 12 June 1905, Gordon said, 'Australia has done a good deal for Australians. What were Australians going to do for Australia?'

8. Captain J.G. Legge, 'Suggestion for an Australian Defence Force', Journal of the United Service Institution (NSW), vol. XI (1899), 28 August, pp 1-22.

9. S.M.H., 28 June 1905.

commissioned officers who were adequately trained. Although Legge was in favour of universal military service[9] he had, for political reasons, advised extending the rifle clubs.[10]

The division of opinion amongst the professional army officers made Deakin's task of finding a solution to meet the newly perceived threat a difficult one. His main military adviser, Bridges, the Chief of Intelligence, failed to appreciate the implications of the Russo-Japanese War. In a reply to a request of the Minister of Defence, Senator Playford, that he comment on Colonial Defence Committee Memorandum No 377R (July 1905), Bridges said that he agreed with the view of the Colonial Defence Committee.[11] The Committee thought that a large scale invasion of Australia was inconceivable until 'the British Navy had been definitely worsted.' Bridges pressed the Minister to decide whether the Commonwealth should prepare for territorial aggression or a raid by cruisers.[12]

In the face of Bridges' view about Australian defence, Deakin sought professional advice from the Committee of Imperial Defence. In a confidential telegram on 2 October 1905 to Sir George Clarke, the First Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence and a former Governor of Victoria, Deakin asked for advice on Australian defence.[13] He stressed that he was relying on Clarke's sympathy and knowledge of Australia in the request.[14] A day later, in a letter to Sir George Clarke, Deakin told him that he was not sure if 'we can work

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9. S.M.H., 28 June 1905.

10. Legge, op.cit., p.8. As well, see his references to the Swiss Army in The Times (London), 1 September 1897.

11. 'Secret Memorandum from Lt. Col. Bridges to the Minister of Defence, 11 October 1905', AA B173, file 05/187.

12. Ibid.

13. Confidential telegram from A. Deakin to Sir George Clarke, 2 October 1905, Public Record Office (London), Cab 16/48; Sir George Clarke was the author of the following works - Imperial Defence (London, 1897); Studies of an Imperialist (London, 1928), and his autobiography (as Lord Sydenham of Combe), My Working Life (London, 1927).

14. Ibid.

out a consistent national scheme of defence with the ability we have in the country.[15] On 6 October, Clarke asked Deakin for precise information about the problem of Australian defence and suggested that Bridges 'could be sent home' to assist the Committee of Imperial Defence.[16] One month later, Deakin made a formal approach to the Committee of Imperial Defence in almost the same words suggested by Sir George Clarke.[17] Deakin asked the Colonial Office to try to send the Committee of Imperial Defence's report to Australia by April 1906, that is, by the next session of Parliament. He also decided to send Bridges to London in January 1906 to assist the Committee with the preparation of the land defence scheme.[18]

In preparation for Bridges' visit to London, Deakin told Sir George Clarke that the Chief of Intelligence was 'biased' with regard to the present organisation through his association

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15. Letter from A. Deakin to Sir George Clarke, 3 October 1905, PRO Cab 17/48; La Nauze makes the point that Deakin had a sentimental attachment to the idea of voluntary military service. It seems he was influenced by Charles Pearson, the former Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, and author of National Life and Character: A Forecast (London, 1894), who was involved in the public affairs of the Colony of Victoria, 1874-1892. See J.A. La Nauze, A. Deakin - A Biography (Melbourne, 1965), Volume 1, pp. 19, 22, 29 and 89, and J. Tregenza, Professor of Democracy (Melbourne, 1968).

16. Letter from Sir George Clarke to A. Deakin, 6 October 1905, PRO Cab 17/48; letter from Sir G. Clarke to A. Deakin, 6 October 1905; Deakin Papers (National Library of Australia), MS 1540/2/1138; letter from Sir G. Clarke, 10 November 1905, Deakin Papers (N.L.A.), MS 1540/2/1138; copy of a telegram, A. Deakin to Sir G. Clarke, 11 November 1905, Deakin Papers (N.L.A.), MS 1540/38/461.

17. Copy of a telegram, A. Deakin to Sir G. Clarke, 11 November 1905, Deakin Papers (N.L.A.), MS 1540/38/461, and Meaney, op.cit., p. 137.

18. An Imperial Officer, Brigadier-General Kirkpatrick, who was inspecting fortifications in Australia in late December 1905, wrote to London about Bridges: '.... Bridges is a good man, was General Hutton's trusted staff officer, and is to a great extent imbued with General Hutton's ideas.' Letter from Kirkpatrick to the War Office, 26 December 1905, PRO Cab 17/48.

with General Sir Edward Hutton.[19] The government thus instructed Bridges to refrain from furnishing opinions instead of information to the Committee of Imperial Defence.[20] As well, Deakin pursued his notion of adapting the Swiss system of universal service to Australian conditions when he asked Bridges to visit Switzerland and report on its defence systems.[21]

In an effort to keep the deadline of April 1906 set by Deakin for the delivery of the report to Australia, the Committee of Imperial Defence assigned different parts of the Australian request to the relevant institutions in Whitehall.[22] Bridges was able to visit the officers who were entrusted with different sections of the report. In addition to the job of advising the Committee of Imperial Defence, he revised the Australian 'war establishment' tables,[23] with the assistance of the British General Staff.[24] They were approved by the Mobilisation Committee of the War Office which sent him a report on 7 June.[25]

When the CID report was finished, Bridges wrote a memorandum for the Minister of Defence explaining the envisaged changes and the measures needed to give effect to them.[26] He

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19. Letter from Alfred Deakin to Sir G. Clarke, 8 January 1906, Deakin Papers (N.L.A.), MS 1540/38/461.

20. 'R.M. Collins, Secretary of the Department of Defence, to Lt.-Col Bridges 21 December 1905.' AA MP 84/1, file no. 1856/2/12.

21. Ibid.

22. C.E.W. Bean, Two Men I Knew (Sydney, 1957), p. 12.

23. Tables showing the wartime establishment and location of units.

24. Note by J.W. Grierson, War Office, 28 July 1906, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1856/4/38.

25. Bean, op.cit., p. 13.

26. 'Remarks upon the General Scheme of Defence for Australia, C.I.D., Memo 40c,' 5 July 1906 by Lieut.-Col. Bridges, AA B173, file no. 66/54.

pointed out to Senator Playford that the Defence Forces and coast armaments were maintained at great expense because the Australian government had not adopted a view setting out the nature and probable strength of attack.

> ... The lack of all official statement of the object for which the forces are maintained has led in the past to great waste of both money and effort, and there is no reason to doubt that, if the views of the C.I.D. are not accepted, or some other equally definite statement approved, the same waste and consequent inefficiency will continue.[27]

The lack of clear organisation in colonial forces and the differences in the armament of the various states' coastal defences which had been established before Federation were continued under the Commonwealth with the subordination of questions of war preparation to 'peace administration and personnel'.[28] The assessment by the Committee of Imperial Defence that the scale of attack was not likely to exceed three or four unarmoured cruisers capable of landing 1,000 men meant guns no larger than six inches were required for coast defences. The C.I.D. considered that Australia would face 'hasty raids' rather than an expeditionary force which was designed to occupy the Australian continent. With reference to the C.I.D. suggestion that troops be recruited territorially, Bridges, following Hutton's earlier scheme, recommended the division of Australian troops into two categories - an organised force comprising the Garrison Troops and Field Forces, and a general force of volunteers anxious to serve with the military forces. The work by Bridges on the C.I.D. report was useful. However, it did not address itself to the main strategic issues canvassed in the C.I.D. findings on Australian defence. The report was completed in May 1906, a month later than Deakin's request, and reached Australia in July 1906.[29]

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27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 1906 Session, vol.II, 'Report of the Committee of Imperial Defence, upon a General Scheme of Defence for Australia,' pp. 65-70.

In July 1906, the Minister of Defence, Senator Playford, asked the Inspector-General, Brigadier-General Harry Finn, the Deputy-Adjutant General, Colonel Hoad, the Chief of Ordnance, Lieutenant-Colonel Le Mesurier, and the Director of Naval Forces, Captain Creswell, to make comments and recommendations on the report.[30]

The majority of the army officers accepted without demur the adequacy of the advice from the committee of Imperial Defence on Australian defence. Finn and Le Mesurier agreed with the report.[31] Finn, an Imperial Army Officer, paid greatest respect to the views of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

> The opinion of the Committee, the members of which possess the widest experience and highest knowledge, and who were in possession of the required data when considering the questions at issue, is worthy of the fullest reliance being placed therein, and I am in the main in accordance therewith.[32]

He urged the early introduction of the scheme outlined by the Committee. Perhaps the quality of his report was influenced by his imminent departure from Australia and resignation as Inspector-General. On 2 September 1906, Brigadier-General Finn left Australia to return to England.[33]

Le Mesurier, the Chief of Ordnance, was an artillery officer from New South Wales, who had attended the School of Gunnery at Woolwich and Shoeburyness in 1894 and fought in the

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30. 'Copy of Minute Paper, Report of the Imperial Defence to the Director of Naval Forces, the Deputy Adjutant General, and Chief of Ordnance, 26 July 1906', AA B173, file no. 06/58: the Inspector General was asked to comment in a note from the Secretary, Department of Defence, 27 July 1906, AA B173, file no. 06/68.

31. See biographical details.

32. 'Note from Major-General Finn to Senator Playford, 18 August 1906', AA B173, file no. 06/58.

33. SMH, 30 August 1906.

South African War from 1900 to 1901 and May 1902 to August 1902. His comments indicated that he accepted the report because Sir George Clarke and 'officers at the very top of their profession' were members of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The advice on the selection of ports for fixed defences was 'based on very sound and economical lines'.[34] He rounded off his report by observing that writers of articles in the daily press on defence know 'very little from a strategic point of view.'[35]

However, Colonel Hoad pointed to what he saw as an inconsistency in the strategical considerations of the report. He noted the confidence of the Committee of Imperial Defence in the ability of the Royal Navy to command and control the seas, especially in the event of cruiser raids on defended ports. Yet, in the same report there was an admission that the Royal Navy was not always able to prevent hasty raids on 'places of ... importance'. On the question of types of guns for Australian defence, Hoad expressed incredulity at the Committee of Imperial Defence for criticising the lack of homogeneity in the armaments of Australian ports when Imperial officers had advised colonial governments, and since 1901, the Commonwealth government. Hoad estimated that the salaries and allowances of the Imperial advisers from 1886 to 1906 was Sterling 363,000. He drew a simple lesson from the report:

> ... it is most unwise to disregard any possibility of what might happen and in any event, we should be prepared to defend ourselves.[36]

It was necessary to decide the likely methods of attack on Australian shores and to organise a force to combat them. Hoad attached a draft memorandum on the troops available for the Garrison and Field Force.

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34. 'Note from Lt.-Col. Le Mesurier to Senator Playford, 21 August 1906', AA B173, file no. 06/58.

35. Ibid.

36. 'Notes on Report of Imperial Defence Committee by Colonel Hoad', AA B173, file no. 06/58.

After the submissions by the three army officers and Captain Creswell, the Minister of Defence appointed two committees of local navy and army officers to consider the needs of Australian defence in the light of the report by the Committee of Imperial Defence.[37]

Deakin and Playford appointed a military committee made up of officers sympathetic to Australia's Pacific concerns. It is noteworthy that the president of the military committee was Hoad, who had been recently promoted Brigadier-General. He was also a member of the Australian Natives Association and a supporter of Alfred Deakin, and was appointed to succeed Major-General Finn as Inspector-General.[38] The committee had the task of completing a scheme of organisation for the Australian military forces with details about the peace and war establishments which included the allotment of troops to the Garrison and Field Forces. As well, it was to show how the scheme of organisation affected the establishment of troops, the necessary alterations to effect those changes, and the extent to which the recommendations agreed with or differed

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37. S.M.H., 28 August 1906; The Times, 28 August 1906; 'Defence Plans, 1906-1940, Box I', AA MP 826 Box I; 'Secret Correspondence Files, annual single number with "S" - secret prefix, 1905-1907', AA B173, file no. 06/60.

38. Five members of the committee of fourteen held strong views about various aspects of Australian defence: Brigadier-General Hoad was critical of advice from the Committee of Imperial Defence; Colonel Waddell, Commanding the First Infantry Brigade advocated 'compulsory training' with higher pay to achieve efficiency - see, Colonel J. Lyster, 'The Standard of Efficiency of the Commonwealth Military Forces', Journal of the U.S.I. (N.S.W.), vol. XVII (12 May 1905), p.56; Colonel Lyster, the Military commandant, Queensland, was aware of the changing balance of power in the Pacific - see his talk to the U.S.I. (N.S.W.), 12 May 1905; Lieutenant-Colonel J. Foxton, commanding the A.F.A., Queensland, was a keen military officer who was chosen by Deakin to attend the Imperial Naval Conference, 1909; and Lieutenant-Colonel G. Campbell, commanding 1st Regiment, NSW Scottish Rifles, was the organiser of the Australian National Defence League, N.S.W. - see, G. Campbell, 'Universal Training in Australia', Australian National Defence League, September 1925.

from those of the Committee of Imperial Defence.[39] The Minister of Defence also appointed a committee of army officers chaired by Brigadier-General Gordon, who also shared the government's Pacific fears, to report on coast defences with reference to the Committee of Imperial Defence report.[40] Both committees met at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, on 4 September, to prepare their reports.

General Hoad's committee, as might well be expected, rejected the belief of the Committee of Imperial Defence in the omnipotence of the Royal Navy. Australia was remote from the centre of British power in Europe with no guarantee that the Royal Navy had the capacity to prevent the loss of sea supremacy in the Pacific. They took little comfort from the advice of the Committee of Imperial Defence to prepare land defences for raids 'hastily carried out by single vessels or small squadrons' since, in their view, the Pacific was an arena of increasing international tension. Hoad's committee criticised the Committee of Imperial Defence's assumption that 'single enemy ships or small squadrons' would only temporarily evade British Naval Forces. They assessed

> that it would be unwise not to provide for the possibility of the supremacy of the sea being temporarily lost. Recent events in the East show how impossible it is to correctly anticipate what may be the result of Naval warfare in the future.[41]

The committee was also critical of the failure by the Committee of Imperial Defence to appreciate the difficulties encountered by defence planners such as the extent and nature of the

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39. AA B173, file no. 06/60; AA MP 826, Box I; C of A Parliamentary Papers, 1906 Session vol.II, 'General Scheme of Defence for Australia. Report of the Committee of Officers Appointed by the Minister of State for Defence to consider and Report Upon the General Scheme of Defence for Australia as submitted by the Committee of Imperial Defence.'

40. AA B173, file no. 06/60.

41. 'Comments by General Hoad's Committee', AA B173, file no. 06/60.

coastline. The C.I.D. recommendation that garrison units should be recruited locally was diffiult to implement. This implied that the corps allotted to the garrison had to undergo training in the most likely places of attack. In some cases, this was impossible. As well, the report by Hoad's committee endorsed the expansion of the cadet corps and the extension of 'total training' for reserves from sixteen to twenty-four days. It also recommended the organisation of the military forces in six divisions based on the six States and the conversion of volunteer troops into militia troops.[42] The report included tables showing the proposed organisation of the field force in each State, the proposed allotment of units to brigades for manoeuvre and the organisation of the garrison force in each State.[43]

At the end of the report was a note of dissent by Lieutenant-Colonel G.R. Campbell. He complained that the committee terminated its meeting before the Final Report was completed.[44] As well, Campbell was adamant that 'Militia Troops' were not able to belong to both the Field Force and the Garrison Force. In his opinion, the Field Force and the Garrison Force had distinct duties. The Field Force was designed to deal with an enemy force anywhere in Australia while the Garrison Force was an immobile force with the task of protecting ports of 'high strategic value'. It was

> not competent to place the same troops in both the Field Force and Garrison Force, for both forces may be operating against different bodies of the enemy at one and the same time hundreds of miles apart. To each Force must, therefore be allotted distinct and separate troops not included in the other Forces. [45]

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42. Ibid.

43. C of A Parliamentary Papers, vol.II, 1906, "Report of ...", pp. 8-26.

44. Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel G. Campbell to Senator the Hon. T. Playford, Minister of State for Defence, 12 September 1906, C of A Parliamentary Papers, vol.II, 1906, "Report of ...," pp. 28-30.

45. Ibid.

Campbell estimated that Hoad's committee had miscalculated by 3,653 the number of troops required for the Infantry to defend the garrison ports. In the case of Sydney, the garrison area extending from the Hawkesbury River on the north to Botany Bay in the South was allotted only half the infantry needed to protect the largest naval base in Australia. Furthermore, a considerable proportion of the Garrison Force was not recruited locally as recommended in the report by the Committee of Imperial Defence. Campbell wanted the needs of the Garrison Force met first. He reasoned that defended ports were targets of primary importance in the event of war, and invasion was a possibility only after the defended ports were attacked.

The Committee on 'coast defences', presided over by Brigadier-General J.M. Gordon, also presented a detailed report containing information on the type of guns for defence, armament, garrison troops, drill guns and the specification of 'new works' at defended ports. In the introduction, the committee accepted the strategical considerations set down by the Committee of Imperial Defence although five of its nine members expressed reservations. Lieutenent-Colonels Hall, Stanley, Lee, Lester, Wallace, and Mr J. Thompson, Finance Member, dissented from the 'traditional strategy' of the Imperial Navy. They were anxious that the sea-borne commerce was not 'paralysed at its very gates' by the limitation of the guns' range. Thus, it was essential to provide for naval defence by the local navy forces if the Royal Navy left the Australian littoral in time of war.[46] Under the heading, Places To Be Fortified, the committee recommended the retention of Albury as a defended port and its rearmament. Lieutenant-Colonel Le Mesurier disagreed with the Albury decision because it did not follow the advice of the Committee of Imperial Defence:

> I desire to have my dissent recorded on the ground that the recommendations of the Committee of Imperial Defence are based on sound strategical considerations which at

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46. 'Addenda I', AA B173, file no. 06/60.

> present obtain and are likely for some years to continue in these waters, and also that in their recommendations their one thought has been the combination of economy with efficiency. [47]

The committee also followed the recommendations of the Committee of Imperial defence regarding the numbers of infantry allotted to Garrison Troops. As well, the report included tables on the cost of new armament, the number and cost of electric lights, the details of organisation of the Royal Australian Artillery (Garrison Forces) and the Corps of Engineers (Garrison Forces). The last table was a summary of the approximate cost of the committee's recommendations:

	Sterling £A
Guns, Mountings and New Works	172,400
Ammunition, 6" Mk. VIII (400 rounds per gun)	106,548
Electric Lights	24,500
Personnel	120,910
	424,358 [48]

For the Prime Minister, the inter-service rivalry and the differing views about the strategical evaluation of the Committee of Imprial Defence left him with no alternative other than to take the initiative and formulate his own response to the needs of Australian land defence. The reports by the naval and army officers failed to reach a consensus about a solution to the problem of Australian defence. The two committees of army officers were critical of the value of the strategical appreciations of the Committee of Imperial Defence while the committee of naval officers argued for the creation of a local

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47. 'Addenda II', AA B173, file no. 06/60.

48. 'Appendix 6', AA B173, file no. 06/60.

naval force of destroyers and torpedo boats. Creswell's committee attacked the C.I.D. report for favouring land defence. The naval officers were trying to justify their role in the defence structure while the army officers promoted the continuation of the military forces without drastic reorganisation. By September 1906, Deakin had already moved cautiously in the public sphere to find a solution. In many respects, his caution was dictated by the Protectionists' weak political situation. On 30 June 1905, Deakin had assumed office with the help of the Labor Party after the Reid-McLean government fell. For the next three years till November 1908, Deakin's Protectionists governed with always uncertain Labor support. At the general election of December 1906, the Protectionists won only seventeen seats while the Free Traders gained thirty-two seats. With the help of Labor, who won twenty-six seats in the House of Representatives, Deakin stayed in power.

Deakin had very early evinced an interest in land defence. In July 1901, he argued that all men from the age of eighteen or nineteen to sixty should train for several weeks each year,[49] and in 1903, with the aid of Chris Watson, subsequently the first Labor Prime Minister of Australia, he had introduced a motion on the subject into parliament.[50]

Understandably, after the Battle of Tsushima, he gave his attention more fully to the subject.[51] He did not at this time express a decisive opinion about compulsory military training. In September 1905, his efforts to find a solution to the land defence question were assisted by the formation of the Australian National Defence League in Australia. The League popularised views about defence and included men of public note

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49. CPD, 1901-1902 Session, vol.III, 31 July 1901, p.3297.

50. CPD, 1904 Session, vol.XX, 12 July 1904, p.3093.

51. The Herald (Melbourne), 12 June 1905.

irrespective of political allegiance. It was an important pressure group and Deakin was associated with its broad aims. The Australian National Defence League was formed in Sydney on 5 September 1905. The prime mover in establishing the organisation was Lieutenant-Colonel G. Campbell, the founder of the New South Wales Scottish Rifles and a member of Hoad's Committee.[52] The League was established after Campbell responded to an invitation from the National Defence League in Great Britain to form a similar body in Australia.[53] At the first meeting in Sydney, the speakers were T.T. Ewing, representing the Federal Ministry, Sir W. McMillan, the Federal opposition, Watson and Hughes from the Labor Party, Sir Norman MacLaurin, a New South Wales anti-socialist and Chancellor of the University of Sydney, and W. Holman, the New South Wales Labor party leader. Watson captured the sentiments of the meeting when he declared that Australia must be independent in defence in order to compensate for its isolation from the rest of the Empire. His comments were paraphrased in The Times

> ... They must not be lulled into a false sense of security because the sky was clear. Australia must follow the examples of other communities ... They had decided upon a policy of racial purity. Could they maintain it? He said they could and would maintain the position they had ... taken up. [54]

The meeting passed a resolution urging the Federal Ministry to adopt a system of 'universal compulsory military training' based on the Swiss system. In an effort to influence national opinion and decisions about defence, the Australian National Defence League published a monthly journal titled The Call which was sent to every federal politician free of charge.[55]

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52. The Times, 25 December 1905.

53. The Age (Melbourne), 1 June 1905.

54. The Times, 25 December 1905; SMH, 6 September 1905.

55. The Editors of The Call were G.R. Campbell and Frank Fox. It was published in Sydney. See J. Barrett, Falling in (Sydney, 1979), pp. 42-81.

At the inaugural meeting of the Victorian branch of the League on 2 December the Prime Minister, Deakin, was seated on the platform with T. Bent, the State Premier, and Sir John Madden, the Chief Justice. Deakin addressed the meeting in the Melbourne Town Hall but still held back from publicly advocating a scheme of compulsory military training. He was in sympathy with the establishment of a branch of the League in Victoria. Since it 'would foster a healty and vigorous political sentiment as to the duties of citizens in defence of their hearths and homes'. He insisted on Australians being prepared to hold their own, that is, 'to stake their all rather than surrender'.[56] In May 1906, speaking in Sydney,[57] Deakin said that public opinion was not ready to accept universal service. Four months later, in a discussion on the report by the Committee of Imperial Defence on Australian defence, Deakin thought the government had to

> 'consider' whether we should not encourage a purely volunteer force with a view of advancing by steady strides, in connection also with the cadet and similar movements towards the ideal of universal service. [58]

He was advocating universal service by voluntary means. It is noteworthy that in September 1906, the Victorian branch of the Defence League was opposed to compulsion in military training.

The progress of Deakin's search for a solution to land defence depended on a suitable outcome in the general election, December 1906. In the electoral campaign, defence was a minor issue compared with topics like fiscal policy, protection and socialism which took the centre of the stage. George Reid, the leader of the Free Traders, talked about socialism as the great danger and made but a few minor references to national defence.[59] Chris Watson, the Labor Party leader, promised to

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56. S.M.H., 4 December 1905.
57. Patriot (Melbourne), September 1906.
58. CPD, 1906 Session, vol.XXXV, 26 September 1906, p. 5574.
59. Argus, 28 October 1906.

extend the citizen soldiery and the local manufacture of small arms and ammunition to meet all probable contingencies.[60] It was Deakin who expounded most fully on defence while speaking at Ballarat on 17 October about what he termed 'scientific national protection.'[61]

> ... How can you expect people to hold Australia unless we bring together all those parts in which white settlement is possible and link them together with that body of men who will give us the citizen soldiers whom we shall have to depend upon for our very existence in the time of trial. We feel that the time has come when, in addition to our land forces, we must have floating defences ... We hope to see our land and naval forces brought to such a stage of equipment that Australia will be able to hold her own... This is not a light matter...

On 8 November, during the election campaign, he received a deputation from the Victorian Branch of the Australian National Defence League. Deakin, with Hoad in attendance, discussed the proposals of the branch for the establishment of a volunteer reserve force. The deputation, led by S. Mauger, MHR, Melbourne Ports, asked the government to invite all male citizens over the age of eighteen and under forty-five to serve in a national reserve force. The government was to supply rifles, and belts, and at a later stage, a plain uniform. Deakin and Hoad agreed to look at the proposals. The newspaper mentioned that Hoad was present to criticise the scheme although he was personnally in agreement with the programme.[62] Despite Deakin's concern with national defence, and his association with the Australian National Defence League, he was, in the words of the Brisbane Courier, 'an Ishmael in the wilderness' after the election.[63] The Protectionists lost support and formed government once again with the aid of the Labor Party.

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60. S.M.H., 5 October 1906.

61. Argus, 18 October 1906.

62. Ibid, 8 November 1906.

63. Brisbane Courier, 17 October 1906.

Deakin's association with the Australian National Defence League had important implications when he attended the Colonial Conference in London in April-May 1907. When he arrived in London, his first public statement about universal service brought him to the attention of the British National Defence League and the League invited him to address one of its meetings.[64] Accepting the invitation, Deakin spoke of compulsory military training as a high ideal which diminished the importance of a standing army:

> With us the State places the whole of its population on a footing of absolute equality, and it is no longer possible, as it seems to us, for the State to say, "We shall hire, even in our own country, our own defence". It seems, after all, a better and nobler thing to say that the community defended should discharge the duties of its own defence (cheers). Will that make for aggressive war? Quite the contrary (cheers). Are those who have experience of war those who are most eager to enter into it? Quite the contrary. If it serves only to direct the attention of our people upon the questions involved in national defence, upon a study of our obligations abroad to other communities, to the obligations of the Empire to the civilised world in which it moves, if it only serves to do this, the time of compulsory training spent by every man will be well spent (cheers).
>
> If you want a community sober, if you want a community placable and reasonable, if you want a community which realises what war is and what war means, you must go to the community in which every man and every household shares the risk of war (cheers). And surely this is the nation we desire to see, slow to anger, and not subject to passion, not played upon by individuals or individual interests, but moving calmly, solidly and unitedly when it is called upon to move at all (cheers). Such a nation commands the respect of the would-be-aggressor, because he realises what the

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64. Morning Post (London), 17 May 1907.

> action of such a people means when they are unduly provoked, when the conscience of the nation responds, and the resort is to the dread arbitrament of war - the nation from which the aggressor will shrink is the nation which has prepared itself in peace, and faces unmoved all the sacrifices and risks of war (loud cheers).
>
> Of the financial spectre we have no fear. Even if the cost were great, our danger is greater, and must be provided against, whatever befall - or we perish.[65]

He predicted that universal compulsory service had an immediate future in Australia. The remarks were well received by the British National Defence League, and George Shee, Secretary of the British National Defence League, wrote to Lieut.-Colonel Campbell on 9 July 1907 about Deakin's speech:

> Mr Deakin made a tremendous impression here and certainly gave us to understand that he was convinced of the necessity of compulsory military training: for the safety of the Empire. I think therefore that we may claim to have converted him.[66]

In his last comment, Shee was incorrect because Deakin was already a convert to universal military service, but only for the defence of Australia.

On his return to Australia, Deakin made preparations to introduce compulsory military training. Deakin and Ewing appointed Legge to draw up suggestions for compulsory military training in Australia without reference to the Military Board.[67] Both the Australian National Defence League and

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65. The Call, August 1907.

66. Letter from G. Shee to Lieut.-Col. Campbell, 9 July 1907, Australian National Defence League Correspondence, Australian War Memorial.

67. Argus, 23 September 1908; S.M.H., 26 September 1947, an article by C.E.W. Bean on Lieutenant-General J. Legge; Letter from Bridges to Hutton, 17 December 1907, Hutton Paper, add. ms. 50089, vol.XII, pp. 58-59.

Deakin were eager to use Bridges' report on the Swiss system as a justification for compulsory military training. The Australian National Defence League prejudged Bridges' report in February 1907, when in an article in the February 1907 issue of The Call it said that Bridges spoke of the Swiss military system 'in glowing terms ... and its excellence as a military model for Home Defence'.[68] But both were to be disappointed.

Bridges, in fact, did not speak of the Swiss model in 'glowing terms'. He reported that the Swiss were unhappy with the system. In Australia's case, the adaptation of the system might prove expensive because of the vast distances. The report did not recommend the introduction of compulsory military training.[69] Deakin, however, was not influenced by the report and remained convinced that a period of compulsory military training was necessary for Australian defence. He announced his proposals for compulsory military training to parliament on 13 December 1907. Deakin stated that 'every young man' in the Commonwealth would serve in the National Guard of Defence during his nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first years. The training period for each year was sixteen days.

> Whether they will attain the standard of European nations in regard to the minutiae of deportment on parade, or the precision of their movements, I do not know. But what we do know of our countrymen entitles us to feel well assured that at the end of that period they will suffice in all that is material. In a country of great distnces like our own with those characteristics they are familiar ... they will be able to render a good account of themselves ... owing to the local conditions under which any conflicts are likely to be waged. [70]

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68. The Call, February 1907.

69. C of A Parliamentary Papers, 1907 Session, vol.II, no. 129, 'Report on the Swiss Military System Compiled in the Department of the Chief of Intelligence, 1907.'

70. CPD, 1907-1908 Session, vol. XLII, 13 December 1907, p. 7528.

Deakin was adamant that the 'national Guard' was not to be a preliminary preparation for an expeditionary force outside Australia.[71] He also proposed the establishment of a General Staff.

The National Guard was designed to defend the continent, and represent the 'Spartan simplicity ... and habit' of Australian government and society. The model for the guard was the 'democratic system of military organisation in Switzerland'.[72] Deakin hoped that the training under universal service would rival the thoroughness exhibited by the Japanese military system.[73] To achieve high military standards, the citizen-soldiers had to aspire to 'a high national standard'. He wanted to realise the aphorism 'that every soldier should feel himself carrying a marshal's baton in his knapsack'.[74]

The scheme of compulsory military training was drawn up by Major Legge.[75] Legge, who belonged to a progressive school of military thought, was described by the Daily Telegraph in January 1908 as a 'revolutionary' for his role in drawing up the scheme.[76] Under the scheme every physically fit male between eighteen and twenty-one was required to serve in the national army - (1) for one year's depot training, (2) for three years in the first line [a line is bodies of troops placed side by side - this refers to the first or front line of defence], (3) for four years in the second line and (4) for one year in the reserve. In the first year, the youths underwent

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71. S.M.H., 14 December 1907.

72. CPD, 1907-1908 Session, 13 December 1907, p. 7528.

73. Ibid., p. 7530.

74. Ibid., p. 7531.

75. See biographical details; Bulletin, 21 November 1907; Letter from Colonel Bridges to General Hutton, 17 December 1907, Hutton Papers, add. ms. 50089, vol.12.

76. Daily Telegraph, 5 January 1908.

military training in prescribed districts for eighteen days. In the second year, they trained for another eighteen days, and in the third, they only trained for thirteen days. From the third year until the eighth year, the troops were part of the reserve.

The scheme was designed to increase the size of the military forces to 300,000 troops in ten years. This necessitated the expansion of existing units and the disappearance of volunteer regiments. In the case of the militia, it meant the disbandment of regiments and the creation of new brigades. For example, taking the infantry regiment as a guide to the impact of expansion, the regiment would increase from one battalion to three battalions. In other words, the war strength of a regiment before military training was equivalent to the peace strength of a regiment under Deakin's scheme:

		No. Companies	Militia Retained	National Guard	Total
1st Year	1 Battalion	4	130	800	930
	3 Battalions	12	390	900	1,290
2nd Year	1 Battalion	6	120	600	720
	3 Battalions	18	360	1,800	2,160
3rd Year	1 Battalion	8	100	900	1,000
		24	300	2,700	3,000

Source: Daily Telegraph, 4 January 1908.

By the fourth year, the existing militia would have disappeared and given place to compulsory military training soldiers.[77]

In the early stages of the scheme, instruction in training and drill was to be the responsibility of the permanent instructional staff, and the officers and non-commissioned officers of the disbanded militia regiments. The aim of compulsory military training was to train officers for the

77. Daily Telegraph, 4 January 1908.

National Guard. In the first year, potential officer cadets were examined for promotion to the rank of corporal and the year after, sergeants had the opportunity to qualify for a commission. There was no proposal to limit the length of a commission and officers on the first and second line of defence held equal status. As well, Deakin proposed to interchange officers with officers from other units in the British Empire.

On the question of supply, the Prime Minister stipulated a simple work uniform which included a hat, jumper, trousers, leggings, boots, bandolier and rifle. The Commonwealth also expected to import 20,000 rifles a year from Britain but planned to establish a small arms factory which would eventually make Australia self-sufficient in small arms. The scheme provided for the establishment of sixty batteries of field artillery (240 guns). Its total cost was estimated to be approximately Sterling 2 million.[78]

Reaction to Deakin's Announcement of 13 December 1907

The reaction to Deakin's announcement of 13 December 1907 was immediate. Newspaper headlines commented that the scheme was important and gave a full report on the details of compulsory military training.[79] On 21 December, the Argus gave a hint of future criticism when Deakin was reminded that compulsory military training was a proposal and not a law.[80] The Daily Telegraph made the most exhaustive criticisms of compulsory military training. From 4 January to 13 January 1908, the Daily Telegraph examined what it thought were the defects of the scheme. The newspaper appeared to play up to the political prejudices of the conservative leader, George Reid, and the criticisms levelled at defence policy by Bridges. In summary, the Daily Telegraph focussed on the need

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78. For further details of the estimates see Appendix C.
79. S.M.H., 14 and 16 December 1907; Mercury, 14 December 1907; Argus, 14, 16 and 21 December, 1907.
80. Argus, 21 December 1907.
81. Daily Telegraph, 4 and 5 January 1908.

to develop a general staff with the assistance of 'first rate' Imperial officers and the failure by Deakin to include the cost of transport requirements in the scheme.[81] Unlike Reid and the Daily Telegraph, the Sydney Morning Herald seemed to accept the proposal for stronger defence and a general staff, but urged more reliance on Imperial officers for training troops in Australia.

In the political sphere, George Reid, the leader of the Free Traders, commented upon Deakin's proposals in a speech to the Sydney Chamber of Commerce in St James Hall on 12 February 1908.[82] Reid, speaking as opposition leader, traced Deakin's conversion from a 'mild volunteer advocate in 1906' to a 'valid militarist' in 1907 and accused him of succumbing to Hughes' influence. Deakin was reminded by Reid that the Royal Navy was the first line of defence for Australia. He had forgotten that the battle for Australia would take place in the English Channel. Reid also mentioned that neither General Hutton nor the Committee of Imperial Defence supported Deakin's scheme of defence.[83] He argued that efficient fixed defences and an army of 30,000 in peace time with a war establishment of 50,000 were sufficient for the defence of Australia. With reference to Japan, Reid dismissed the possibility of invasion by that country because it was occupied with internal developments.[84]

The Labor Party, which supported Deakin in parliament, passed a resolution in favour of compulsory military training at the Commonwealth Labor Conference in July 1908.[85] Chris Watson, the Labor leader who was a member of the Australian National Defence League, proposed the resolution,

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82. S.M.H., 13 February 1908; Sir G. Reid, My Reminescences (London, 1917), pp. 265-266.

83. Ibid.

84. G. Reid, The Naval and Military Defence of Australia, (Sydney, 1908).

85. Proceedings of the Commonwealth Labor Conference (Brisbane), 6 July 1908.

> That this Conference approves of the principle of compulsory military training for all males, irrespective of class or condition, as the only method of giving effect to the plans providing for a Citizen Defence Force. [86]

Watson pointed out that Deakin's scheme was 'largely on the lines of that mapped out by Mr Hughes, to whom a great deal of credit was due in this connection.[87] He referred to the Japanese as 'clever and warlike' and to 'the awakening giant', China. Furthermore, he advised that the citizen force was in line with Labor ideology. Another speaker in favour of the motion was J. Hutchinson, the member for Hindmarsh in the House of Representatives, who spoke about the 'possibilities' from the East:

> When, as he hoped the Labor government was strong enough throughout the world to stop all wars nobody wanted "ground arms with greater delight than himself. ... But until that day arrived, he was prepared to protect his liberties and those of his country against any possible aggression, and the right thing was to be prepared . [88]

Other speakers, such as W.G. Spence, E.L. Batchelor, Senator Henderson, and Senator de Largie echoed the sentiments of Watson and Hutchinson. Both King O'Malley and Frank Tudor reminded the Conference of the need to do away with 'gold lace glorification and militarism', but they did not outline a programme to achieve that goal. At the end of the debate, a motion was passed which read,[89]

> The establishment of a citizen force, with compulsory military training and an Australian navy; any money required for such purposes to be raised by direct taxation. [90]

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86. Ibid., p. 16.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid., p. 17.

89. Age, 8 July 1908.

90. Proceedings of the Commonwealth Labor Conference (Brisbane) 6 July 1908, p. 20.

The permanent military officers, in so far as their reaction can be gauged from available sources, seemed to have accepted the C.I.D. report. Indeed, some senior military officers were totally opposed to Deakin's proposals. On 17 December 1907, Bridges wrote to his former chief, General Hutton, about Deakin's speech on 13 December 1907:

> "... You will be no more pleased than I am. I can say however that the Board have never been consulted - the suggestions are I believe due to Legge who has been working directly under the minister -
>
> It is apparently intended to destroy the existing troops and replace them by men without roles - (where the officers and NCO's are to come from is not at all clear)."[91]

Bridges also told Hutton that he had maintained the latter's principle of organisation but he was unable to answer for the future.[92] In another letter to Hutton on 8 June 1908, Bridges lamented that 'nothing can produce a worse effect than to criticise the Committee (sic) Imperial Defence'.[93] He insisted that Australia must have 'some final authority to appeal to in matters of opinion'. Brudenell White, a friend of Bridges and a Hutton protege, wrote to his former chief that it was difficult to criticise 'Mr Deakin's proposals' because it was not clear 'what they really are'.[94] The proposals did not 'mean much'. He hoped to gain influence over training and arrange a steady flow of Australian officers to the Staff College, Camberley, England.[95] His

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91. Letter from Bridges to Hutton, 17 December 1907, Hutton Papers, add. ms. 50089, vol.12.

92. Ibid.

93. Letter from Bridges to Hutton, 8 June 1908, ibid.

94. Letter from White to Hutton, 26 April 1908, ibid.

95. Ibid.

colleague, Lieutenant-Colonel Wallack, whom he described as 'at least a gentleman and an imperialist', thought compulsory military training made a 'Boy Army'.[96] A close friend of White's, Lt. C.F. Woodcock, who had served with him in Queensland, was disheartened by the proposal of compulsory military training:

> ... If things are not going to be better in our time why should we and those dependent on us suffer for loyalty to a thankless Parliament whose cry is "citizen soldiers" ... In my 11 years service things are no better than they were when I joined.[97]

Another critic of Deakin's proposals was Colonel Hubert Foster, the Director of Military Studies at the University of Sydney. Foster was an officer of the Royal Engineers with

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96. See biographical details, Lieutenant-Colonel E.T. Wallack; letter from White to Hutton, 26 April 1908, Hutton Papers add. ms. 50089, vol.12, and letter from Wallack to Bridges, 24 November 1909, Bridges Papers, uncatalogued papers in the possession of C.W. Bridges-Maxwell, Double Bay, Sydney.

97. Letter from Woodcock to White, 27 March 1908, White Papers, uncatalogued papers in the possession of Lady Derham, Vice-Chancellor's Residence, University of Melbourne, Melbourne. I am grateful to Lady Derham for giving me access to papers in her possession and those papers of the late General Sir Brudenell White, her father, held by the National Library of Australia and the Australian War Memorial.

    See biographical details, Lt. C.F. Woodcock: see the diaries of General Sir Brudenell White, White Papers (NLA), MS 5172, 9 May 1900, 11 August 1904 - on his return to Australia in February 1908, White met Woodcock at Adelaide, 17 February 1908.

    Woodcock also wrote a depressing and angry letter to White on 24 July 1908.

    > "... I sincerely hope for your sake that you will never have to soldier in Australia again - the system is rotten and always will be rotten till blood is spilt in our own country - given "peace in our time". It follows that we will never be any better off."

    Letter from Woodcock to White, 24 July 1908, White Papers, uncatalogued papers in the possession of Lady Derham, University of Melbourne.

thirty years experience in the British army, and from 1898 to 1900 he had served under General Hutton in Canada.[98] Foster, like Bridges, White and Wallack, was in favour of the strategic policy outlined for Australia by the Committee of Imperial Defence.[99] The Sydney Morning Herald seemed sympathetic to Foster's point of view in its columns.[100] To Foster, compulsory military training was unnecessary for the defence of Australia while the Empire retained the lead in world naval power. He agreed with the recommendations of the Committee of Imperial Defence and thought that 20,000 well trained troops were sufficient for Australian defence. His final point was the need for well trained officers, and it was expressed in a condescending way.

> Now the Australian has the capacity to become such an officer every bit as much as the British officer. But it needs more than capacity.[101]

Foster said that he was not hostile to Deakin's scheme but he remained unconvinced that it suited Australia's requirements.

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98. In his letter to Hutton on 26 April 1908, White said he thought that Foster had 'done some little good' in Australia: letter from White to Hutton, 26 April 1908, Hutton Papers, add. ms. 50089, vol.XII. For an outline of early military training in Australia, see S.B. Clark, 'General Bridges and Military Training in Australia before the Existence of R.M.C.'. RMC Journal, 1964.

99. S.M.H., 14 March 1908. Foster's publications included 'Australia National Defence', Australia To-Day (1912); 'Defence of Australia with Special Reference to the Panama Canal', Lone Hand, September 1914, pp.235-236; Organisation - How Armies are Formed for War (London, 1911); Defence of the Empire in Australia (Sydney, n.d.). Information about courses in Military Studies, University of Sydney, where Foster was the Director of Military Studies, 1906-1916, is contained in the Minute Book - Military Studies, 1906-1916. (Archives, Fisher Library, University of Sydney.) I would like to thank the archivist, Mr Gerald Fischer, for his assistance in obtaining details about military studies, University of Sydney. See biographical details for the career of Colonel Hubert Foster.

100. S.M.H., 14 March 1908.

101. Ibid.

A Defence Bill for Compulsory Military Training

In the wake of great excitement caused by the visit of the American Fleet to Australia, Deakin introduced a Defence Bill on 29 September which incorporated the proposal for compulsory military training.[102] The American Fleet had visited Australia between 20 August and 5 September 1908.

In accordance with the policy outlined by Deakin on 13 December 1907, the Defence Bill provided for the first stage of the National Guard Scheme, and for a scheme of compulsory military training for all eighteen year olds. On 9 September, four days after the US Fleet left Australian waters, T.T. Ewing, the defence minister explained that the government wished to introduce compulsory military training and arrest what he saw as the drift away from a strong defence policy since Federation.[103] The speakers, who supported the proposed Defence Bill during the address-in-reply mentioned the visit of the American Fleet, Japanese aspirations in the Pacific Ocean, and the relative decline of British naval power.[104] When the Defence Bill was introduced to parliament on 29 September, Ewing asserted that the scheme of compulsory military training was to keep Australia 'white':

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102. See Meaney, op.cit., pp.159-173 for an explanation and description of the visit by the US Fleet; CPD, 1908 Session, Vol. XLVII 29 September 1908, p. 454.

103. S.M.H., 10 September 1908.

104. CPD, 1908 Session, vol.XLVII, 16 September 1908, pp.13-26: Lt.-Col. the Hon. Cyril Cameron (Tasmania) said that Australia was near Japan while British naval power was concentrated at the 'Heart of the Empire'. As well, India was seething with sedition. Senator Millen agreed with Cameron's analysis of the strategic situation. Senator T. William (Victoria) regarded the Americans as our brethren and congratulated the government on introducing a defence scheme in the near future to maintain White Australia. In the House of Representatives, P. Glynn (Angas, S.A.), felt that the government ought to find money for the new defence bill while Mr Charter (Riverina) said that the population was stirred into action on defence. Dr Carty Salmon (Leoncoovie, Tas.) urged the parliament to remove the stigma of an inadequate defence system, especially as Japan was flushed with victory and anxious to join the front rank of the nations.

> ... The great work for us to do is to preserve Australia as a white man's country for our children and their descendants ... If honorable members read Professor Pearson's work ... they will see that he points out that Europe and America will certainly remain white, but that there are very serious doubts with regard to Australia. ... The Government proposal is to make the position of Australia such that no country will thoughtlessly interfere with her ... [105]

By contrast, the Free Traders rejected this rationale for the establishment of a National Guard. George Reid argued that the only threat to Australia was an attack upon floating commerce, and he affirmed that he was not haunted by a fear of Japan.[106] His views derived from articles in the Argus on 3 and 14 October written by Colonel Foster, the Director of Military Studies at the University of Sydney. Foster argued that Japan, the closest naval power to Australia, was as far away as Turkey was from the United States.[107] Furthermore, Australia was in less danger from attack than any other part of the British Empire.

> Nor have foreign powers in their tropical possessions in the Pacific many soldiers or resources of war. New Caledonia is to be given up as a defended base, and the Germans keep in New Guinea and the Solomons only a few Sikh police and a company of native infantry. Samoa and Tonga cannot be garrisoned more strongly. Any expedition aiming at Australia must come complete from its home ports, and traverse thousands of miles of tropical seas, where crowding troops mean sickness and inefficiency when landed. The French soldiers who conquered Madagascar were decimated by diseases owing to their ill health on crowded transports in the passage. ... [108]

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105. CPD, 1908 Session, vol.XLVII, p.454; 29 September, Charles Pearson, National Life and Character - A Forecast (London, 1894) - Alfred Deakin was influenced by Charles Pearson, a former Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, who was involved in the public affairs of the colony of Victoria, 1874-1892. Deakin and Pearson were members of the debating society at the University of Melbourne. See J. Tregenza, Professor of Democracy (Melbourne, 1968).

106. CPD, 1908 Session, vol.XLVII, 7 October, pp.840-842 and 14 October 1908, pp.1128-1137.

107. Argus, 3 October 1908.

108. Ibid.

Foster invoked the writings of Admiral Mahan to support his case and concluded that the most attractive targets, the capital cities and major ports, were safe from attack with well garrisoned forces.[109] However, Foster was unable to influence the debate over strategic threat and military policy. The Commonwealth government asked Creswell to reply to Foster's articles in the Argus and his replies were published in a parliamentary paper in the 1908 parliamentary session.[110] Creswell contended that Great Britain would be unable to despatch a naval force to the Far East in the event of hostilities with Germany in Europe.[111]

Before a vote was taken on the Defence Bill, the Labor Party withdrew its support from Deakin and on 17 November, Fisher, the leader of the Labor Party, announced that the Governor-General had commissioned him to form a ministry.[112] The Fisher Labor government endorsed Deakin's defence programme and its strategic basis.[113] G.F. Pearce, the defence minister, was an early exponent of the Asian threat thesis. Fisher had at first disagreed with Hughes' proposal for compulsory military training, but by December 1908, he had become convinced that White Australia needed protection from the Asian racial threat.[114] Accordingly, both Fisher and Pearce were anxious to implement a defence programme. Their first step was to send orders to England in February 1908 for three torpedo-boat destroyers.[115] Furthermore, their

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109. Argus, 3 and 14 October 1908.

110. C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 1908 Session, vol.II, no.35, 'The Defence of Australia' by Colonel H. Foster, Director of Military Studies, University of Sydney, together with remarks therein, by Captain W.R. Creswell, Naval Director.

111. Ibid.

112. P. Heydon, Quiet Decision (Melbourne, 1965), p.52; Turner, The First Decade of the Australian Commonwealth, pp.196-197.

113. S.M.H., 1 April 1909.

114. CPD, 1908 Session, vol. XLVIII 19 December 1908, p.131.

115. G. Macandie, The Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy (Sydney, 1949), pp.216-221.

determination to build Australia's defence was demonstrated by their response to the Dreadnought crisis in March 1909. Popular and official opinion in Australia was shocked by revelations in the House of Commons that Great Britain was threatened by Germany's naval building programme.[116] But the Labor leaders refused to respond impulsively to the naval scare. The Dreadnought crisis threatened to embarrass the Labor government's plans for developing Australia's own defence capacity. Fisher assured Australians that the government would support Great Britain in a crisis, but he reminded them that the question of aid would be determined by national security priorities facing Australia at the time.[117]

On 30 March, he publicly set forth the Labor Conference defence policy at Gympie. It included a far reaching scheme of compulsory military training.

> ... We feel that the time has come when we must institute some kind of compulsory training. It will commence with the boy of 10, and ending as far as the compulsory training is concerned, at the end of the twentieth year.[118]

His defence minister, Pearce, added to the defence announcement on 6 April, when he reminded his audience in Bendigo that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance expired in six years time.[119] He also added that he supported the building of strategic railways.[120] However, before the Labor government could introduce its scheme of compulsory military training, it was ousted from office by the Fusion of Deakinities, Free Traders, and Protectionists.[121]

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116. S.M.H., 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26 March 1909.

117. Fisher: 'I say publicly what I said before that the resources of the Commonwealth will be at the command of Great Britain in time of trouble.' S.M.H., 23 March 1909.

118. S.M.H., 31 March, 1909.

119. S.M.H., 7 April 1909.

120. Ibid.

121. S.M.H., 29 May 1909.

When Deakin, as leader of the Liberal Fusionist party assumed office on 2 June 1909, four years had passed since his statement alerting Australia to the new threatening balance of power in the Pacific Ocean and no advance had been made in the development of Australia's capacity to meet the perceived dangers from Japan.

Internal political difficulties had prevented the Deakin and Fisher governments from giving effect to the defence programme. Now with a clear majority in parliament, Deakin was in a position to approach the problem of implementing his defence policy. To this end, on 21 September, Joseph Cook, Deakin's Minister of Defence, introduced a bill to establish compulsory military training.[122] The bill provided for the compulsory military training of all youths and men from fourteen to twenty years of age and required all boys from twelve to fourteen to undergo physical exercises on a regular basis.

The Defence Act of 1909 was the culmination of the initiative and effort taken by Alfred Deakin in the face of the changed balance of power in the Pacific Ocean after the Russo-Japanese War. He saw the need to adapt Australian land

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122. Legge, who drafted the bill, attended the House of Representatives from 1-9 October; he wrote to Bridges on 26 October 1909, and explained that the passage of the Bill was due to an Imperial crisis, and its implications for Australian defence.

> "... You will read the debates on the Defence Bill in Hansard. It is noticeable that although the passing of a Defence Bill was doubtful last year, if it had come to a vote, today not one member of the House of Representatives has spoken against it. Such is the result of the wider interest in the subject, and a good deal caused by the "Dreadnought" scare."

Letter from Legge to Bridges, 26 October 1909, Bridges Papers, uncatalogued papers in the possession of C.W. Bridges-Maxwell.

A comparison of the provisions of the 1909 Act and the bill introduced by T. Ewing in 1908 is set out below.

DEFENCE BILL 1908

Mustering	Age	Training
Cadets	12-18	53 one hour parades 4 one day parades
Defence Forces	18-21	18 working days or their equivalent
Citizen Forces	21-26	7 working days or their equivalent

Source: SMH, 30 September 1908, p.9; CPD, 1908 Session, 9 October 1908, p.967.

DEFENCE ACT 1909

Mustering	Age	Training
Junior Cadets	12-14	Physical Drill - 120 hours
Senior Cadets	14-18	4 whole day drills 4 whole day drills - elementary musketry 12 half day drills and 24 nights - musketry
Citizen Forces	18-20	16 whole days or their equivalent of military training
Citizen Forces	20-26	

Source: Commonwealth Acts, vol. 8, 1909, pp.227-228 (The Defence Bill passed parliament on a voice vote; CPD, 1909-10 Session, 7 December 1909, p.7109.)

defence to the possibility of a Japanese invasion after it became apparent that Great Britain was unable to protect her wide flung interests in the Pacific. He had moved cautiously to carry out the implications of his perception for Australian defence. His proposal for compulsory military training evolved with the development of opinion in favour of such a measure. In 1908, the Defence Bill embodying the proposal was not passed, but it was a testament to his influence that successive governments, the Labor ministry and his Fusion Ministry, adopted compulsory military training as a solution to the problem of land defence.

Implementation of Compulsory Military Training

In the search for a solution to the land defence problem in the face of the 'Commonwealth Crisis', Alfred Deakin ignored the most prestigious British strategic body, the Committee of Imperial Defence.[123] The 1909 scheme of compulsory military training (Act Number 69 of 1909, Commonwealth of Australia) lacked the Imperial imprimatur. Deakin was aware of the need to obtain some form of British approval in order to undercut his critics. As early as February 1907, the Minister of Defence, Thomas Ewing, had informed Deakin that the support of Lord Kitchener's name and prestige was likely to assist the introduction of his defence scheme.[124] Two years later, the prospect of a visit by Lord Kitchener raised possible advantages for Deakin in dealing with the CID, the CDC and the debate about Australia's perception of the Japanese threat. He invited Lord Kitchener in June 1909 to visit and inspect the military defence of Australia.[125] Deakin hoped that Lord Kitchener's report, based on his guidelines, would support the

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123. The term 'Commonwealth Crisis' is borrowed from Meaney, op.cit., pp.120-159.

124. AA MP 84/1, file no. 1901/13/16/.

125. Telegram, Dudley to Crewe, 14 June 1909, CO 418/70/386; Memorandum on the Defence Bill, 1909, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1901/13/16; and letter from Kitchener to A. Deakin, 17 July 1909, AA A2, file no. 1910/1731.

Australian strategic perception and add weight to his arguments with Imperial authorities.[126] The guidelines set for Lord Kitchener's enquiry by Alfred Deakin sought answers to the pressing question of how Australia was to defend itself in the face of the changed international relations in 'Eastern Waters', and the relative decline of British sea power.[127] Lord Kitchener, who accepted the invitation, advised the Australian government that he expected to arrive in Australia by December 1909 after he visited Japan.[128]

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126. Copy, telegram, Kitchener to Deakin, 10 July 1909, and telegram, Kitchener to Deakin, September 1909, Deakin Papers (NLA), MS 1540/38/459.

127. Deakin asked Kitchener to comment on the Australian strategic position.

    In view of

    1. The change in the relative strengths and disposition of the Naval and military forces of nations in Eastern Waters since 1906;

    2. The change in the armaments of battleships during the 5 years;

    3. The development of the "Imperial idea ...";

    4. The conclusions of the Imperial Conference on Defence, 1909.

    The Commonwealth government should

    in its ... future policy modify the application of the principles enumerated by the C.I.D. in its Memo of May 1906 especially in respect to the following matters

    (a) The nature and strength of the PROBABLE form of attack to which Australia is liable,

    (b) The nature and strength of the POSSIBLE form of attack to which Australia is liable.

    Source: Copy, telegram, Kitchener to Deakin, 10 July 1909 and, telegram, Kitchener to Deakin, September 1909, Deakin Papers (N.L.A.), MS 1540/38/459.

128. Philip Magnus, Kitchener (London, 1958), pp.243-244; papers of Field Marshal Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, PRO 30/57/39 - Far Eastern and Australian Tour.

For the Commonwealth Government, Lord Kitchener's visit was a success. His report sanctioned compulsory military training, and vindicated the Australian strategic perception. At the beginning of the tour in Port Darwin on 21 December 1909, Lord Kitchener was apprised of Australian conditions by Major General Hoad, who was placed at his disposal by the Prime Minister.[129] Hoad kept before Kitchener the principle of 'Australia for Australians' with effect. When Kitchener prepared the report on his inspection tour, he told Legge to delete the requirement of an Imperial officer for the Directorship of the military college. In his speech in Melbourne on 11 January 1910, he urged Australians to develop their natural military ability in the form of 'an efficient citizen force'.[130] Moreover, Kitchener appreciated the Australian fear about Japan. In his report, which was published on 13 February 1910, five days after he left Australia for New Zealand, Kitchener pointed out that the British Naval Forces, in the event of a great war, ran the risk of being unable to defend the self-governing Dominions. The self-governing Dominions, therefore, had a duty to develop an adequate military force for repelling an invasion.[131] The report endorsed Deakin's strategic views which had been originally published five years before in the Herald, and it fulfilled his hopes for Lord Kitchener's visit. Across the Tasman, Lord Kitchener found New Zealand also anxious about international relations in the Pacific, and distrustful of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a guarantee against an Japanese attack.[132] Sections of the New Zealand Press applauded his

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129. Age, 25 September 1909; Punch (Melbourne), 30 December 1909; Letter, from Legge to Bridges, 1 March 1910, Bridges Papers - uncatalogued papers in the possession of Bridges-Maxwell.

130. Argus, 12 January 1910; 'Draft Notes Undated', PRO 30/57/38, 30/57, 39, TT8.

131. C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 1910 Session, vol.II, no.8, 'Defence of Australia. Memorandum by Field Marshal Viscount Kitchener at Khartoum', p.5.

132. New Zealand Herald, 19 August 1908.

report on Australian defence with the rider that the general strategical principles applicable to Australia were relevant to New Zealand defence.[133] The significance of the Japanese threat for the Pacific dominions was not lost upon Lord Kitchener. In a letter to the New Zealand Prime Minister, Sir J. Ward, on 2 March 1910, Lord Kitchener recommended that New Zealand and Australia should adopt homogeneous military systems to assist each other in times of national danger.

> ... I think therefore that uniformity in training and establishment of units, as well as the closest ties of comradeship, in the armed land forces of New Zealand and Australia should be fostered in every way.[134]

Kitchener's letter containing the suggestion of Australian and New Zealand co-operation, was published in the Australian press on 11 March 1910.[135]

Lord Kitchener's support for the Commonwealth's Pacific centred strategic analysis was accompanied by detailed suggestions on how to organise and conduct the scheme of compulsory military training. In the preparation of his report on Australian defence, he was assisted by Legge, who had expended much energy publicising the need for universal training and drafting the Defence Bill of 1909.[136] Legge was surprised that Kitchener displayed a deep interest in the

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133. New Zealand Times, 26 February 1910; Evening Post, 25 February 1910; NZ Herald, 22 February 1910; Southland Times, 21 February 1910.

134. Letter, Lord Kitchener to Sir J. Ward, 2 March 1910, PRO 30/57/90. TT14; P. Magnus, Kitchener, p.245.

135. Argus, 11 March 1910.

136. J.G. Legge's Memorandum on Lord Kitchener's Scheme, 10 May 1910, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1902/2/15; E.W.O. Perry, 'Lieutenant-General J.G. Legge: Australia's First Wartime Chief of Staff', Victorian Historical Journal, vol. 48, no.3, pp.187-188.

details of the scheme which was more the task of a Divisional Commander.[137] Apart from providing Lord Kitchener with information about equipment and finance, Legge assisted with the important task of sub-dividing the continent into military training areas. Kitchener held the belief that the only way to train the Citizen Force was by dividing the country into areas from which the National Guard would be drawn.[138] Each area was to support part of a fighting unit under the supervision of a trained permanent forces instructional officer supported by one or two non-commissioned officers. Legge prepared the area work three times for Kitchener to ensure accuracy.[139] Australia was divided into 215 training areas based on the density of the population, the relation of the area to its place in the fighting unit, and the possibility of the instructional officer covering the area satisfactorily for training purposes.

The standard unit was the infantry battalion. In the city, two, and, in the country, three military training areas were allotted a battalion with the requisite number of other arms. Ten areas formed one group under a senior instructional officer who became the brigade major in war. Lord Kitchener proposed the organisation of the military forces into 21 brigades of 4 battalions each, 28 regiments of horses, 49 four-gun field batteries, 7 four-gun heavy and howitzer batteries, 7 communication companies, and 14 field companies of engineers.

The size of the military forces recommended by Lord Kitchener was 80,000 fighting men. He acknowledged the Defence Acts, 1903-1909, as the basis of the estimate, and not, as Legge hoped, the scheme outlined by Ewing in the 1908 Defence Bill. Kitchener proposed that men up to 25 years of age instead of 20, be included for training and that recruit

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137. Letter, Legge to Bridges, 12 January 1910, uncatalogued papers in the possession of Bridges-Maxwell.

138. C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 1910 Session, vol.II, no.8, 'Memorandum ...', p.8.

139. AA MP 84/1, file no. 1902/2/15.

training for 18 and 19 year olds was useful as a transition period for the production of well-trained soldiers from cadet training, and one year, for 19 and 20 year olds, as trained soldiers. From their twentieth to their twenty-fifth year, the trained soldiers were to continue the development of military expertise in annual camps of six days' duration. A muster parade once a year was suggested for 25 and 26 year old trained soldiers. After the muster parade commitment, the trained soldier was expected to become a member of the Reserves. A comparison of the Defence Act of 1909 provisions with the proposals put forward by Lord Kitchener are set out in the tables below.

Kitchener's scheme included enrolment by yearly quotas, based on the training periods, as follows:

	Infantry	Lt. Horse	Artillery	Total	Engineer Depts
18-19	12,500	1,956	1,450	15,900	1,175
19-20	11,806	1,850	1,370	15,020	1,125
20-21	11,200	1,750	1,320	14,270	1,075
21-22	10,700	1,650	1,240	13,590	1,025
22-23	10,200	1,600	1,190	12,990	975
23-24	9,800	1,500	1,130	12,430	925
24-25	9,300	1,450	1,050	11,800	875
	63,900	9,800	7,300	80,100	6,500
25-26	9,200	1,400	1,000	11,600	850

Source: 'Memorandum ... Lord Kitchener', p.7.

The key to the operation of Lord Kitchener's scheme was the role of the permanent instructional officer in charge of a military training area, and the development of citizen officers to lead the citizen force units. Permanent instructional officers of the military training areas were members of a proposed Staff Corps, fed by graduates from the military college advocated in the report - the staff corps was to provide officers for the district and headquarters staff, and the permanent troops.[140] The area officer had the

140. Ibid., p.12.

DEFENCE BILL 1909			KITCHENER PROPOSALS		
Mustering	Age	Training	Mustering	Age	Training
Junior Cadets	12-14	Physical Drill - 120 hours	Junior Cadets	12-14	120 hours
Senior Cadets	14-18	4 whole day drills 4 whole day drills - elementary musketry 12 half day drills and 24 nights - musketry	Senior Cadets	14-18	16 days
Citizen Forces	18-20	16 whole days or their equivalent of military training	Recruits	18-19	16 days - of which 8 must be in camp
			Trained Soldiers	19-20	16 days - 8 days in camp
Citizen Forces	20-26		Trained Soldiers	20-25	6 days/year in camp
			Trained Soldiers	25-26	Muster Parade only

A whole day drill was not less than six hours.

responsibility of organising, training, inspecting and registering all cadets and soldiers as well as maintaining the rifle clubs. While the staff corps provided the area instructors, the leadership of the national citizen force units was entrusted to citizen officers chosen for their ability, and 'devotion to duty'. They were to undergo extensive service in the citizen forces for at least twelve years, and study military subjects in the spare moments of their civilian life: Kitchener suggested that the area officers choose promising senior cadets as sub-lieutenants in the cadet corps for promotion to probationary lieutenant in the first years of their training in the citizen forces. After passing examinations, the probationary lieutenants were eligible to apply for His Majesty's commission. As well, the area officers had the duty of instructing the citizen officer in regimental work, and arranging tuition for them by the district headquarter staff in technical subjects. To assist citizen officers, Kitchener sought the publication of a military magazine with free circulation which would be edited by the central headquarters staff. In turn, the citizen officers were to instruct the non-commissioned officers. The general oversight of the scheme was to be undertaken by the Military Board and the Inspector General.

Before Deakin could implement the recommendations of Lord Kitchener, he was faced with a federal election. In the Federal election held on 13 April 1910, defence policy and the Pacific centred strategic analysis were unimportant. The debate about the 'Commonwealth Crisis' was finished, and the views held by the Australian people and its leaders had received the approval of Lord Kitchener. The election was sought on domestic issues such as the role of Labor leagues, socialism, and taxation, with the Labor Party, in Hughes' words, offering 'no wild cat scheme for making an imaginably heaven upon earth'.[141]

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141. S.M.H., 9 April 1910.

After winning the election, the Labor Party was faced with the task of carrying out the scheme of compulsory military training bequeathed by Alfred Deakin. Neither Pearce, nor Hughes, the Attorney General, experienced difficulty in persuading their fellow Labor parliamentarians to accept the recommendations in Lord Kitchener's report. The Defence Bill extended military training to the twenty-fifth year, with one compulsory muster inspection parade in the twenty-sixth year. As well, the adult soldiers from 20 to 25 years of age were required to attend an annual eight day camp.[142] Pearce expected that a force of 127,000 fighting men would be available by 1919-20 under compulsory military training. The Defence Act of 1910 also provided for the establishment of a military college. The Labor government rejected Kitchener's idea of fees and insisted upon entrance by competitive examination. Graduates from the Royal Military College were destined to fill the vacancies in the commissioned ranks of the regular troops, and to secure appointment as area officers.[143]

At central headquarters, Melbourne, the military staff was faced with the reorganisation of the Commonwealth Military Forces for the purpose of compulsory military training.[144] Major-General Hoad, Chief of the General Staff, schemed successfully to have the arrangements in connection with the introduction of universal training placed in the Department of the Chief of the General Staff as soon as the Fusion government decided to accept Lord Kitchener's report.[145] Legge wrote to Bridges on 1 March and told him that he had no intention of watching Hoad 'mess it [compulsory military training] to

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142. Defence Act of 1910, No.37 of 1910, pp.98-102.

143. Lieut.-Col. J.G. Legge, 'Australia and Universal Training Law', Army Review, vol. IV (Jan-April 1913), p.85.

144. H.C. Chauvel, An Autobiography (n.d.; n.p.), pp.27-28, in the papers of Lieut.-General Sir H. Chauvel, AWM.

145. 'Memorandum from Legge to the Secretary, Department of Defence, 12 November 1910, A B197, file no.1804/1/7; Letter, Legge to Bridges, 1 March 1910, Bridges Papers - uncatalogued papers in the possession of Bridges'Maxwell.

blazes', and he informed the Secretary of Defence, S. Petherbridge, of the difficulty he would have working with Hoad. Despite his protest, Legge consented to an appointment as Director of Operations in the Department of the Chief of the General Staff to continue his work with universal training, in addition to the position of Quartermaster-General which he held on the Military Board. The Minister of Defence assured Legge that he would be able to express his opinions on universal training at Military Board meetings if he dissented from the submissions by the Chief of the General Staff. Of course, the responsibility of two important jobs at central headquarters was large. Legge admitted to Bridges in a letter on 23 February 1910 that 'I have had my first hints from nature that I was burning my candle very fast'.[146] General Bruche, in the 1950s, remembered the worn appearance of Legge at that time.[147]

According to Chauvel, the debate at central headquarters about the implementation of Lord Kitchener's recommendations concentrated on the role of the militia in assisting the development of compulsory military training. The new Inspector-General, Brigadier-General George Kirkpatrick, who had assisted Kitchener on his tour of Australia, held a high opinion of the militia, and wished to use them as the framework of the new military organisation.[148] He had no desire to abolish the militia immediately like some members of the Military Board who favoured 'floating a new army altogether'.[149] In pressing his view, Kirkpatrick was

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146. Letter, Legge to Bridges, 23 February 1910, Bridges MS, in possession of Bridges-Maxwell.

147. C. Coulthard-Clark, A Heritage of Spirit (Melbourne, 1979), p.76.

148. Chauvel, An Autobiography, pp.27-28, Chauvel Papers MS, AWM; See biographical details about General Sir George Kirkpatrick. (There are no Kirkpatrick Papers registered at the National Register of Archives, Chancery Lane, London.)

149. Ibid.

assisted by an inexperienced minister, Pearce, who broke down in July 1910, an ill Chief of the General Staff, Hoad, and two Adjutant Generals, Wallack and Chauvel. Wallack was Adjutant General from 1 January to 31 September 1911, when he was succeeded by Chauvel who owed his appointment to Kirkpatrick.[150] The militia units were used as the basis of the new units under the scheme of compulsory military training when the first of the 18 year old cadets transferred to the citizen forces on 1 July 1912.

Kirkpatrick's dominance of military affairs was felt keenly by Legge, who was not in favour of abolishing the militia until compulsory military training was in operation. However, Legge regarded the militia and volunteers as inefficient and a waste of money.[151] Kirkpatrick interfered with the administration of the scheme and came to regard Legge as an Australian with narrow loyalties who required exposure to the Imperial dimension. On 9 November 1910, Pearce, the Minister of Defence, asked Legge to submit his instructions on universal training to the Inspector-General. Legge was indignant, and asked the minister to relieve him of his duties as Director of Operations.[152] In a memorandum to the Secretary, Department of Defence, he espoused the need to promote 'Australia for Australians'. Legge objected to the interference of the Inspector-General in the work of those officers responsible for compulsory military training. He pointed out that the directive of the minister displayed a lack of confidence in his efforts although he had spent three years drafting regulations and legislation for the new defence scheme. The most important point of the memorandum was his concern that governments in Australia had favoured Imperial officers in making senior

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150. Wallack was Adjutant General, T/apptd, 1-1-11 to 1-10-11; Chauvel was Adjutant-General, 1-10-11 to 31-7-14.

151. J.G. Legge, Universal Training in the Naval or Military Forces: Notes of Lectures by the Quartermaster-General (Melbourne, 1911), pp.37-38.

152. AA B197, file no. 1864/1/7.

appointments. He was convinced of the need to rid Australia of 'the self-deprecatory sentiment' which stressed the inferiority of the 'locally manufactured article' against the imported officer. With reference to universal training, Legge pointed out that he had written the proposals for the scheme before Kitchener wrote his report. Furthermore, he highlighted the different military experiences of himself, and the Inspector-General, and emphasised the need for local knowledge in the preparation of the Australian citizen army:

> My military experience is as long as Colonel Kirkpatrick's, part was certainly in the Militia for I rose from the ranks of an Australian regiment, but during that time I was as close a student of military work as if a regular officer, I have had as much and as varied a Staff experience, and more service in command of fighting troops in the field. I am three years older than he, have in earlier years been employed at manual labour, a teacher for some years, gained three degrees at an Australian university, passed and practised at the Bar in Australia, know intimately the country and conditions of the people, and have sons bred in Australia who will be Australian soldiers.
>
> Against this the Inspector-General certainly has passed through the Imperial Staff college, which I have not. It does not follow, however, that I have not by study acquired the same information.... Furthermore, war has shown that the most successful commanders and administrators have <u>not always</u> been graduates of the staff college ... some having proved complete failures.
>
> I said nothing of this when Colonel Kirkpatrick was appointed Inspector-General, because we have much work to do in Australia...
>
> When, however, it comes to inferference in work where special local knowledge is most necessary, where the methods of a Regular Army have to be modified to suit one composed of Citizens and where the class prejudices and sentiments of the Englishman must give place to the practical commonsense and "judge a man on his merits" policy of good Australians, then I protest against the practical supersession.

> I have never tried to claim for myself the credit of working out Universal Training, and have always been satisfied for the responsibility to rest with the Military Board as a whole but as an Australian I do protest against the credit going to an Englishman who has done nothing practically of it. [153]

The Minister of Defence responded to Legge's application to be relieved of his duties as Director of Operations by asking him to withdraw the memorandum because the contents criticised the administration and policy of the Department of Defence. According to Pearce, no officer had the right to challenge government policy in an application for resignation. Legge was instructed to withdraw the memorandum before the minister dealt with the matter of the Director of Operations. On the recommendation of the Minister, Legge withdrew the memorandum in December 1910. Four months later, Colonel E.T. Wallack, the Adjutant-General assumed control of universal training which he disliked, and in June, Major F.A. Wilson, another Imperial officer was appointed Director of Operations.[154]

The appointment of Imperial officers to fill Australian positions was a reflection of the reliance by the Australian government on the Imperial connection for advice and training. The implementation of the scheme revealed once again the possibility of Australians serving in brigade formations scattered throughout the British army in an overseas expeditionary force as had been the case with the colonies in the Boer War. Kitchener's report made no mention of how the Australian army formed staffs and divisions from the brigade areas. Hoad pointed to the omission in Lord Kitchener's report in May 1910, but no action was taken.[155] His Director of Operations, Legge, showed that Kitchener's force provided for seven divisions and seven brigades of Light Horse. At a lower

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153. Ibid.

154. See biographical details, Major F.A. Wilson.

155. AA MP 84/1, file no., 1902/2/15.

level, in the battalion areas, the problem was how to provide the citizen officers and area officers.

Prior to the inception of compulsory military training, extensive efforts were made to ensure its successful operation. The Commonwealth of Australia was divided into six military districts (each district was based on a State), and then subdivided into 93 battalion areas, containing equal populations adequate for the purposes of training which were called Battalion Areas. The 93 battalion areas were subdivided into 219 training areas. Each battalion area supported a battalion of infantry with one or more arms of the service. The battalion areas were grouped by fours into Brigade Areas each providing an Infantry Brigade of four battalions and a staff, and a number of troops of other arms. Light Horse regiments were brigaded with the infantry, but the brigades were not identical with the brigade areas. Each battalion was expected to support an infantry battalion of about 922 adults, of 18 years and under 25 years; with a quota of 75 engineers, army service corps, and army medical corps. (See Appendix D).

To Kitchener, the key to the success of the scheme was the provision of 219 adequately trained area officers capable of imparting military knowledge to the junior and senior cadets as well as to the recruit members of the new National Guard.[156] Until the military college produced sufficient graduates, the scheme relied on the temporary appointment of militia officers and school teachers as area officers. A temporary area officers was paid Sterling £150 per year. As well, the area officers were supported by an Administrative and Instructional Staff Corps with a number of warrant officers, sergeants and corporals who had the task of training and administering the militia and senior cadets, and supporting the area officers. The special school of instruction for Area Officers and Staff Instructors was held at Albury from mid July to 31 December 1910,[157] in preparation for the commencement of the scheme

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156. 'Memorandum ... Kitchener', pp.3-4.

157. AA MP 84/1, file no. 2028/1/297.

on 1 July 1911. One of the key lecturers was Legge. The importance of the camp was indicated by the two visits paid by Pearce, the Minister of Defence. On his second visit, he addressed the future Area officers and spoke about the reason for developing compulsory military training.

> Australia, all will admit, is a country worth having. Yet it is the only Continent owned by one people, and has never been stained by bloodshed in war. If we mark on a map of the world all the countries stained with blood, Australia will be the only white spot. It has been our privilege singularly among all people of the world, that we have been exempt from the horrors of war. What guarantee is there that this will continue...?
>
> While we believe the teaching of Christianity, that arbitration is the proper means of settling disputes, we must remember that the two parties must first agree to arbitrate. Are we prepared to arbitrate on a White Australia? ... Of course not. If then, we are not prepared to arbitrate, the only logical alternative is to be prepared for war ...
>
> Australia has had differences of opinion, but this camp typifies Australia actually united. The area officers will on Thursday be dispersed to all parts of Australia, and in January the young men will record their names for military service, and will realise that there is something more serious in life than cricket and football ...
>
> I appeal to you as parents and citizens of Australia to use your influence and give your best assistance in making our scheme a success. [158]

Pearce made clear that compulsory military training was designed to defence 'White Australia'.

After the preparation of regulations and the training of Area Officers and Staff Instructors at Albury, the next step was the registration, inspection and medical examination of

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158. J.G. Legge, Universal Training in the Naval or Military Forces (Melbourne, 1911), pp.7-8.

youths for senior cadets born in the years 1894, 1895, 1896, 1897, and the exemption of those who were medically unfit and resident in remote areas of Australia, as well as the medical examination of the quotas of Junior cadets born in 1898 and 1899. In the first year, the registration of youths liable for service under universal military training was successful.[159] In May 1911, Colonel Wallack reckoned that 110,000 senior cadets were likely to start training in July 1911. During the period from 1 July 1911 to 30 June 1912 when the 1898 quota of senior cadets had to register, the registrations fell below the average of the quotas recorded for the year 1894 to 1897. In mid 1912, the number of prosecutions was increased and by the end of the year the registrations had reached 31,000 which was 7,000 below the average of 38,000 per quota in 1911. Of course, the scheme was new, and area officers had to adjust to the problems of their areas which might include for example, the lack of drill halls.

The second part of the national defence scheme was the organisation of the new militia forces, which marked an end to the system of volunteer and militia units in the Commonwealth. Under the training regulations of the Defence Act, sweeping changes to the old units of militia were contemplated. In July 1912, the first of the 18 year old cadets transferred to the citizen forces. The Adjutant-General, Chauvel, decided to allot each of the existing infantry battalions in the militia to a brigade, and divide each brigade into the nuclei of two battalions so that the new militia recruits had the benefit of experience from older soldiers.[160] They hoped to maintain the name and traditions of metropolitan regiments because in the metropolitan area the units were practically self-contained. The scheme created 45 new battalions and included the University of Sydney Scouts, the Melbourne University Rifles and three new infantry brigades. The radical change to

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159. J. Barrett, Falling In, Australians and 'Boy Conscription' 1911-1915 (Sydney, 1979), pp.128-169.

160. Chauvel, An Autobiography, p.28; Chauvel Papers, AWM.

the old militia reflected the government policy not to re-engage its members, except for NCO's who wished to continue their service.[161] Another important aspect of the new militia was the method of promotion by examination. Under compulsory military training, there was every possibility of winning a commission by passing examinations through stages from corporal to officer. The old way of promotion in the militia gave the commanding officer of a unit considerable influence over appointments. Under the new scheme, the commanding officer submitted his suggestions to a selection board. After selection, a candidate accepted a provisional commission and then sat examinations to confirm his appointment. This system was thought to encourage only the 'best brains for promotion' and reflected Legge's remarks made in 1905 on the needs of a modern army.

The introduction of the new militia units was also used by the government to carry into effect the recommendation of the Sub Conference on Imperial Defence, 1909, that the organisation of the British regular army be the model for the Dominion armies. In 1912, the army was organised on a brigade basis although the division was the approved military organisation of the Empire. Late in 1913, the Military Board decided to ask the Chief of the General Staff and the Adjutant-General to provide a scheme for utilising the existing staff to form permanent divisional commands with the small regular army staff as the nucleus for the war establishment headquarters of divisions and district administrative staffs. As well, the Light Horse Brigades were limited to three squadrons instead of four.

In early 1914, the new defence scheme based on a Pacific centred strategic analysis was examined by General Sir Ian Hamilton, the Inspector-General of Overseas Forces.[162]

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161. Argus, 16 May 1912.

162. The Australian and New Zealand Governments agreed to pay two thirds of the travelling expenses of his tour, while the remaining third was borne by the Imperial Government - Letter, Brade to Hamilton, October 1913, Papers of General Sir Ian Hamilton, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, University of London, 14/1/1.

Hamilton was a keen soldier who was fully aware that 'Each part of the Empire [had] its own dangers and its own problems'.[163] Indeed, he told Kirkpatrick that universal service was an admirable scheme for an island washed by the waters of the Pacific.[164] His report supported the scheme of compulsory military training and expressed admiration for the esprit de corps of the militia.[165]

Hamilton's tour and his report were completed with remarkable rapidity. In eleven weeks, beginning in February 1914, he inspected the units of the Australian army and performed the nightly speech making duty expected from a distinguished Imperial visitor.[166] The preparations to assist his tour even included a set of notes on the senior Australian officers.[167] In his 'Special Note', made during the tour, Hamilton gave a hint of a matter which was occupying the attention of Imperial defence planners in Whitehall in the

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163. Letter, Hamilton to Kirkpatrick, 3 October 1913, Hamilton Papers, 14/1/1.

164. Ibid.

165. 'These Notes are not to be Quoted or Referred To in Any Way as Emanating from Sir Ian Hamilton OR From His Staff', n.d., Hamilton Papers, 14/1/3.

166. Letter, Ellison to Kirkpatrick, 9 March 1914, Hamilton Papers, 14/1/3.

167. There is no reference extant about who drafted the notes. The source is the Hamilton Papers, 14/1/3.
'Australia - Notes of Individuals - GORDON, G.G.S..... A Very shrewd man and general: He mixes up politics. A great talker and a schemer. Has natural capacity for command. Not popular with forces, Drinks at night. Due to retire for age in May. Should on no account get promotion to Maj.-General [Gordon was never promoted to Major-General]: CHAUVEL, C.M.G. - Adjutant-General: Delightful; reliable, honest, slow, just. Best A.G. Commonwealth had had. Sound on the Imperial connection. Gets his own way on the Army Board. An Old Man: SELLHEIM, Q.M.G. (Also an Old Man): LEGGE - clever, rather slow, prejudiced, has faith in Imperial officer; is trying to organise Q.M.G.'s branch properly, good business man. Has a managing and rather mischievous wife to whom he tells everything.'

face of a threatening situation in Europe. He made a note to talk to White about an Overseas force but there was no mention about its size or purpose.

The report by Sir Ian Hamilton was far more comprehensive than the one made by his predecessor, Lord Kitchener.[168] He pointed out that the peace organisation of the Australian Army in 1919-20 would provide 6 Divisions, 3 Light Horse brigades, 2 mixed forces (in the 5th and 6th Districts) and 1 Infantry Brigade. In the development of the militia army, he urged that the peace system should coincide with the war organisation to prevent the growth of ideas inapplicable to operations in war. As well, he suggested the formation of technical units such as telegraph and postal corps.

Of far greater importance was Hamilton's recommendation about the need to plan for the operation of the areas in war time. He pointed out that the area adjutant, in time of war, would accompany his militia battalion, and thus dislocate the work of his training area. Hamilton endorsed the Military Board decision to appoint permanent regular officers as area adjutants. Furthermore, he thought great benefit came from a system where the authority of the militia battalion commanding officer was supreme in his area. Hamilton proposed that the 'area', the former 'battalion area' subdivided into training areas, and the appointment of permanent non-commissioned officers as instructors provided the best means of training. The subdivision placed the instructional, clerical and administrative staffs under the authority of the battalion commanding officer, and placed him in a position to prevent a clash of interests between Militia and Cadets. Hamilton was most anxious for the battalion commander to show concern for the efficiency of his cadets, the bulk of whom would join his battalion, as well as for his own battalion. Under his scheme,

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168. I. Hamilton, 'Report on ... Military Forces ...', C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 1914 Session, vol.2; AA MP 133/2, file no. 212-13-173.

the Militia commanding officer allotted functions to the adjutant and area officer. The adjutant attended to instructional work while the area officer dealt with territorial subjects such as the registration of cadets, their medical examination and their transfer to the militia.[169] In general, Hamilton thought compulsory military training was standing the test of experience, although the standard of instruction and uniformity varied from unit to unit, especially in the cadets. The scheme was young, instruction staff too few, and the recruited officers were inexperienced. Hamilton predicted that the difficulties would decrease each year. The scheme was working, but before it developed further, World War 1 consumed the nation's attention.

By World War 1, the Australian nation had devised a scheme of military defence to protect its security, in the face of the emergence of Japan as the greatest power in East Asia. After Alfred Deakin had identified the rise of Japan in 1905, as the central problem for Australian security, he had to pursue the implementation of a defence scheme without the close support of his senior military advisers. He had sought advice from the Committee of Imperial Defence, and had asked his senior military officers to assess that advice in the light of Australia's peculiar geographical circumstances. After receiving their reports, he committed Australia to the introduction of compulsory military training. Although Deakin lost office before he could implement the scheme, its introduction was assured by the decision of the Labor Party in 1908 to support universal training for the defence of Australia. In 1909, a defence act was passed which introduced compulsory military training. In 1911, the new military system had accepted its first intake of youths and by 1914, its fourth. The scheme's principles were endorsed on two occasions by Imperial officers, by Lord Kitchener in 1910 and by General Sir Ian Hamilton in 1914. More importantly, British officers supported the Pacific centred strategic basis for the Australian defence initiative.

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169. AA MP 133/2, file no. 212/13/173.

CHAPTER III

THE CREATION OF AN AUSTRALIAN GENERAL STAFF*

From 1905 to 1914, defence planning followed the Pacific centred strategic analysis outlined by Alfred Deakin and led to the introduction of compulsory military training. At the heart of the analysis was the fear of a Japanese invasion of Australia and this fear caused successive Australian governments to focus their attention on defence schemes. The problems that the government had to face in creating a new defence organisation for this purpose were compounded in the army by the unsatisfactory relationship between the defence ministers and their military advisers from 1905 to 1909.

Political leaders normally require the services of able and sympathetic naval and military officers in order to carry out their defence policies. Deakin, in his efforts to introduce defence plans based on the Pacific centred strategic analysis, ignored the Military Board and turned to Legge for assistance, and committed the Australian government in 1907 to the introduction of a General Staff. In implementing his defence plans, Deakin also ignored the Council of Defence because the rivalry between naval and military advisers prevented the coordination of defence policy.

In November 1904, Colonel J.W. McCay, the Minister of Defence in the Reid-McLean government who was himself a militia officer from Victoria, had steered a bill to establish a Council of Defence, a Naval Board, and a Military Board through Parliament. In April 1905, McCay made preparations for the first meeting of the Council of Defence. He explained the delay between the setting up of the Council of Defence and

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* For a discussion of the history of the General Staff, see, R. Parkinson, Encyclopedia of Modern War (London, 1977), pp 155-156.

its first meeting as a consequence of the small number of matters for discussion.[1]

On 25 April, McCay sent a 'skeletal Minute' to the members of the Council for their information which he hoped to replace by 'a full Minute' before the meeting on the 'llth or 12th' approximately.[2] Both the 'skeletal Minute' and the 'full Minute' stated that Australia relied on the Royal Navy for protection because it was not an independent nation. Until Australia was able to expand her defence capacity, there was every need to maintain the existing military strength, without promoting expensive naval development. McCay's bias for military defence was founded more on his own militia background and desire for economy rather than a solid strategic analysis. The army had the responsibility to defend Australia's 'industrial and territorial existence' with forces capable of mobilisation within a few hours of attack to meet the invading force. McCay expressed the hope that adequate defence measures might promote 'a feeling of security in the public and in all investments in Australia.'[3] To achieve a state of defence preparedness, McCay outlined a number of proposals in his 'full Minute' to the Council of Defence. In order, they were the establishment and equipment of land forces and fixed defences to protect the strategic points in each State, the development of auxiliary services to aid fixed defences, and the protection of seaborne trade by Australian naval vessels.

The meeting of the Council of Defence on 12 May 1905 was dominated by the contentious issue of naval development in Australian defence which was raised by Captain W.R. Creswell, Director of Naval Forces. Creswell was a propagandist for an Australian naval force with little time for short sighted

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1. Minutes of the Meeting of the Council of Defence, 12 May 1905 (Secret), AA MP 729/2, file no. 05/5018 and AA B173, file no. 05/66.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

defence ministers and the overbearing Admiralty.[4] He was adamant that Australia was in a favourable position to participate in the maintenance of British sea supremacy, especially in view of her geographical proximity to the Far East, which was 'regarded as the most probable war centre.'[5] He argued that Australian effort was required to assist the Royal Navy not only in the East but wherever it was required. However, it must be said that Creswell did not outline the responsibilities of a local naval force and the relationship between the Admiralty and an Australian navy in peace and war. On the subject of finance for an Australian navy, Creswell's proposals contained the implication that the government discontinue the army's field force to pay for the ships. Creswell's views had the tacit support of the Treasurer, Sir George Turner, who thought military defence provided a false security.[6] Turner was unable to understand how a large number of troops might land in Australia, although McCay reminded him immediately that military security was a pre-requisite for investment in Australia.

Creswell's views about the need for an Australian navy were criticised by Bridges, the Chief of Intelligence, and by McCay. Two days before the meeting, Bridges addressed himself to the problem of what constituted an adequate defence.[7] The Chief of Intelligence postulated that, in the event of war, it was vital to defend ports containing coal and other strategic stores until the command of the sea was recovered. He thought that naval bases, coaling ports, commercial harbours and safe anchorages would need to increase their defence twofold if the command of the sea was lost. His defence of strategic ports took account of a possible tactical

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4. Letter from Captain Creswell to Lord Tennyson, Governor-General of Australia, 25 June 1904, Papers of Lord Tennyson, (NLA), MS 1963/41.

5. Minutes of the First Meeting of the Council of Defence, 12 May 1905 (Secret), AA MP 729/2, file no. 05/5018.

6. Ibid.

7. Untitled Paper, 10 May 1905, in Minutes of the First Meeting of the Council of Defence, 12 May 1905 (Secret), AA MP 729/2, file no. 05/5018.

reverse to Australian naval vessels which might prove inferior to the raiding vessels. During a war, harbours and safe anchorages were essential if Australian sea-borne trade were to continue and the most likely attacks on Australia would combine sea and land operations. The defence of strategic points consisted of fixed defences to keep raiding ships from the coast and a mobile armed force to meet enemy troops if they were landed. In his plans, Bridges placed great reliance on a mobile field force to prevent the enemy from landing on the coast. The strongest threat that he envisaged was a raid by four cruisers. This assessment of threat was based on advice from Imperial authorities in Whitehall.[8]

At the meeting on 12 May, Bridges exhibited a cool detachment towards Creswell's ideas. At the end of the meeting, he asked Creswell to answer four questions: (1) how much money was to be transferred from the military vote to finance the navy?, (2) what was the relationship between the Australian Navy and the Royal Navy?, (3) was the commander of the Australian Navy the Australian Government or the British Naval Commander-in-Chief?; and (4) how was the Australian Navy to be deployed in war?[9] Bridges in turn was asked by Turner, the Federal Treasurer, to supply the Council with details about the effectiveness of Australia's military defences.[10] McCay's criticisms of Creswell added little to the debate about the role of a navy in Australian defence. Neither Bridges nor McCay was supported by Major-General Finn, the Inspector General, who was silent during the discussion.

The Council of Defence decided to leave any attempt to resolve the differences between Creswell and Bridges until after the naval and military experts had submitted their

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8. See Colonial Defence Committee 40 R, 'Remarks on Proposed Organisation of the Military Forces of the Australasian Colonies, 16 May 1890', PRO, Cab 9/1.

9. Minutes of the Meeting of the Council of Defence, 12 May 1905 (Secret), AA MP 729/2, file no. 05/5018.

10. Ibid.

replies and reports to the Minister of Defence. In the meantime, however, the swift changes of government made it impossible to give complete attention to defence policy. When the replies by Creswell and Bridges were submitted in June 1905, the minority government of Reid-McLean was assembling to commence a parliamentary session after a six month recess. On 30 June, the Reid-McLean government was defeated by forty-two votes to twenty-eight votes and a meeting of the Council of Defence awaited the formation of a new government.

The new Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, who assumed office in July 1905, paid little attention to the administrative structure for formulating defence policy. As Chapter II showed, he was preoccupied continuously with the questions of naval and military defence from 1905 to 1910 when he was able to achieve the foundation of the Royal Australian Navy and the introduction of compulsory military training. His defence aims were best served by ignoring and circumventing the rivalry between the Australian naval and army offices.

Through Melbourne newspapers, the Argus and the Age, the differences between ministers and military advisers in the government gained a public hearing in a discussion about the Council of Defence and the Military Board. On 6 January 1906, the Argus questioned the efficiency of the Defence Department's administrative structures. The progress of the Council of Defence was described 'like that of a glacier' while the army was accused of lacking the effective leadership which had existed under General Hutton from 1902 to 1904. The article reminded readers that the Council of Defence had an important role in the defence structure, if it operated with the assistance of the defence minister. The new Minister of Defence, Thomas Playford, was reported as saying that he saw no use for the Council of Defence, and the desultory discussion at the first meeting had failed to inspire confidence in the Council's future. With reference to the position of the Inspector-General, the paper noted that Major-General Finn had no executive or administrative

authority, and no control over the State commandants who were responsible to the Minister, or if the Minister wished, to the Military Board. Major-General Finn was described as nothing more than a 'critical clerk.'[11]

Two days later, on 8 January, the Age attacked the criticisms, replying that the Argus defended the defence management set up under the 1904 Defence Act. The Age made plain that the 'disloyal movement amongst some officers' was designed to restore the Office of General Officer Commanding and give the State commandants their former independence and power.[12] The Argus was accused of 'petty spitefulness' and inaccuracy, especially in view of the achievements by the naval and military boards. In one year, the Military Board had revised the general regulations, planned a cadet scheme, placed orders for ammunition, sent officers to England for specialised training, founded a chair of military studies at the University of Sydney, redirected the training of the Tasmanian forces to the attainment of adequate military standards, executed the recommendations of the Inspector-General and filled routine vacancies. According to the Age, the 'disloyal' elements in the army hoped to increase the powers of the Inspector-General by giving him the power of veto over administrative actions. This would enable the Inspector-General to act as administrator and critic at the same time and recreate the powers of the General Officer Commanding. The introduction of a veto-power would destroy the impartiality of the Inspector-General's office. Anyhow, the Inspector-General had the opportunity to inform the country in his annual report to parliament if the Military Board failed to heed his criticisms.

The exchange of views in the Age and the Argus was the subject of a discussion by the Military Board at a meeting on 31 January 1906. Any suggestion that State commandants had provided the Age with information and views about the administrative structures was denied by the members of the

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11. Argus, 6 January 1906.
12. Age, 8 January 1906.

Military Board. The Board noted the protest by Brigadier-General Gordon that he was not associated in any way with the article in the Age on 8 January 1906. In response to the newspaper discussion, the Board decided to inform the State commandants that their example inspired confidence in the administrative structure.[13]

The newspaper criticism had no effect on Deakin or his defence minister Playford.[14] Playford's successor, Thomas Ewing, was a firm supporter of universal military training and displayed a lively concern in the affairs of his department. Given the hostility of some senior military officers, and the conflict between the government's naval and military advisers, he made no effort to revive the Council of Defence. This was not seen by the Deakin government as a means for achieving their ambitious defence programme. During the Labor ministry, from 13 November 1908 to 29 April 1910, defence policy followed the directions outlined by Alfred Deakin from 1905 to 1908.

The Military Board then, in preparing plans and administering the army, followed directives from the government and the Minister of Defence, and not the Council of Defence.

From 1905 to 1909, the most important member of the Military Board was the Chief of Intelligence who was designated the Chief of the General Staff in 1908. The duties of the Chief of Intelligence corresponded with those of the Chief of the General Staff on the British Army Council.[15] The Army Council was established in February 1904 after the Esher Committee had recommended the reconstitution of the War

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13. AA CRS A2653, Military Board Minutes, vol. I (1905-January 1907), 31 January 1906.

14. 'Memorandum by T. Playford, on relinquishing office as Minister for Defence, 1 October 1907,' AA MP367, file no. 534/1/514.

15. Military Board Minutes, vol. II, 19 December 1908, AA CRS 2653; J. Gooch, 'The Creation of the British General Staff, 1904-1914,' Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. 16 (1971), pp. 50-53; J. Gooch, The Plans of War (London, 1974), p. 156 and B. Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (London, 1972), pp. 214-243.

Office to assist strategic planning.[16] The General Staff recommended by the Esher Report was composed of the Directorates of Military Operations, Staff Duties, and Military Training. Its members, who were treated as an elite, had the prospect of quick promotion to the highest commands in the army. It is important to note that in Australia the General Staff was a later development, and that the First Military Member of the Military Board, the Chief of Intelligence, was never termed Chief of the General Staff from 1904 to 1908.[17] Although the Chief of Intelligence performed general staff duties comparable to those of the Chief of the British General Staff, the retention in Australia of the different title from 1904-1908 was a matter of bureaucratic convenience.

The duties of the Chief of Intelligence, the first Member of the Military Board, included war preparation, defence schemes, mobilisation, organisation, intelligence, topography, co-operation of naval and military forces, regulation of traffic in defended ports, staff rides and schemes and staff duties.[18] From 1905 to 1908, the office of the First Member was under the direction of Colonel Bridges.

An initial difficulty for Bridges was the lack of trained staff in the intelligence section. Bridges notified the Minister of Defence, J.W. McCay, who was also a colonel in the militia, and complained that the small staff was unable to cope with the wide range of tasks. A decision on the complaint was held over when the Reid-McLean ministry fell from power in July 1905. The new minister, Thomas Playford, considered McCay's minute and decided to create the additional post of Director in the office of the Chief of Intelligence, which was filled by Captain J.H. Bruche.[19] In the working of the office, Bruche noted Bridges' rigid personality and the

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16. J.K. Dunlop, The Development of the British Army (London, 1938), p. 208.

17. J. Gooch, The Plans of War, p. 156.

18. 'Dawson Report', Hutton Papers, add. ms. 50084, vol. VII, p. 377.

19. AA MP 84/1, file no. 1856/4/4; AA Military Board Minutes, vol. I, 24 July 1905, AA CRS 2653.

clerks experienced his pedantry in corrections to their letters and almost everything they wrote.[20]

An immediate task which faced the office of the First Military Member and proved problematical, was the preparation of a defence scheme for the Commonwealth of Australia. The evolution of the defence scheme was slow and pragmatic. It revealed the important tole occupied by army intelligence in strategic policy, the significance of a clash between the Chief of Intelligence as strategic adviser and the defence minister, Ewing, and the effort by Deakin to formulate an independent strategic policy.[21]

As far as the government was concerned, the low status accorded to army intelligence in strategic decision-making was the result of the military officers' lack of sympathy for the ministers' views about the nature of the threat facing Australia. Bridges thought that the printed and official foreign sources provided sufficient information for Australian requirements, and as we have seen, he relied on advice from Whitehall about threats to Australian security. Attempts were made to obtain information about developments in the Far East, but they had been unsuccessful. The War Office did provide handbooks on British territories in the Far East, but they were of limited value in understanding Japanese intentions in the Pacific region.[22] A request for the reports of the British naval and military attachés to the Japanese and

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20. Evidence of Lady Dorothy Bruche, 2 September 1971, in C.D. Coulthard-Clark, A Heritage of Spirit (Melbourne, 1979), p. 76; A.H. Von Stranbenzee, 'No 25 Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges, K.C.B., C.M.G.', Royal Military College of Canada Review (1946), p. 91.

21. On the need for an independent assessment capability and strategic formulation capacity see R. Babbage, 'Australia's Strategic Reorientation - Some Important Implications', in R. O'Neill (ed.), The Defence of Australia - fundamental new aspects (Canberra, 1976), p. 7 and D. Ball, 'Allied Intelligence Cooperation Involving Australia during World War II', Australian Outlook, vol. 32 (December 1978), p. 309.

22. L.D. Atkinson, Australian Defence Policy: a study of empire and nation, 1897-1910 (Ph.D. thesis, A.N.U., 1964), p. 231.

Russian armies in November 1905 was refused.[23] The Colonial Office made clear that it was not its practice to send such reports to Colonial Officials, and never to an Imperial Officer below the rank of commanding officer.[24] There is no other information extant on Australian army efforts to obtain a greater knowledge of Japanese policy in the Far East and Pacific from 1905 to 1909.

Closer to Australia in Papua, Bridges was anxious to monitor German defence preparations. He used his overseas visit in 1906 to investigate the activities of the Germans in Papua although his brief was to inspect and report on defence planning and systems in Great Britain, Switzerland and Canada. On 11 December 1905, he wrote to Playford, the defence Minister, and suggested that he (Bridges) visit the German naval base at Simonshafen (Rabaul), during his forthcoming journey to London.[25] In support of his suggestion, he mentioned his previous intelligence assignments to New Guinea, New Caledonia and Samoa.[26] His offer was disregarded by the minister, but he tried again to visit Simonshafen. Six days after he left London to return to Australia via Canada on 27 September 1906, he wrote to the M.O.2 in the Intelligence Section, Whitehall Gardens, and informed them that the Commonwealth of Australia had authorised him to visit Simonshafen if it were in the interests of Imperial defence.[27]

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23. Admiralty to Colonial Office, 18 November 1905, PRO CO 418/41.

24. Ibid.

25. Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges to Minister of Defence, 11 December 1905, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1856/2/13.

26. Ibid.; Bridges had visited Samoa in 1896. C.D. Coulthard-Clark has suggested that the visit to Samoa was 'for information gathering activities', C.D. Coulthard-Clark, The Citizen General Staff: the Australian Intelligence Corps 1907-1914 (Canberra, 1976), p. 10.

27. Letter from Lieut.-Colonel Bridges, R.A.A., to M.O.2, 27 September 1906, Intelligence Reports, Papers of Major R. Travers (Mitchell Library), Uncatalogued MS 15.

Colonel Robertson, the Director of Military Intelligence, agreed to Bridges' request.[28] As well, the War Office asked him to view 'certain foreign ports' after he visited Hong Kong.[29] Bridges attended Japanese army manoeuvres where he was well treated. However, he left no record of his Far Eastern tour and it is unknown if he visited Simonshafen after he departed from Hong Kong in mid-December 1905. Another way of gaining information for intelligence purposes was to use accounts from Australian and British travellers, and residents in other countries, but the process was not helpful.[30]

The lack of information about Australia's strategic environment and the need to establish an apparatus for the co-ordination of intelligence data made the planning for politicians and military officers difficult.

In August 1905, Brigadier-General J.M. Gordon stated publicly that he had prepared a defence scheme for Australia, but he did not reveal its nature or details. The Military Board asked him to submit the scheme for consideration, and in October Bridges reported to the Board that the scheme was inadequate, and not suitable for Australian military needs.[31] His comments revealed nothing about the defence scheme, except that Gordon wanted to return to the system of command exercised by General Hutton.

> The paper concludes with a proposed system of control of the Military Forces, in which it is advocated that the system under which the officer who is responsible for the training of the Forces is also charged with inspecting them should be returned to, thus practically reporting on himself, and secondly, to divorce the Civil Administration from the Military Administration, which it was one of the objects of the present system to abolish.[32]

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28. Note from Colonel Robertson to Lieut.-Colonel Bridges, 3 August 1906 (Intelligence Reports), Travers Papers.
29. C.E.W. Bean, Two Men I Knew (Sydney, 1957), p. 13.
30. Atkinson, Australian Defence Policy: a study of empire and nation, 1897-1910, p. 231.
31. AA CRS A2653, Military Board Minutes, vol. I, 24 August 1905.
32. Ibid., 24 November 1905.

Furthermore, Gordon had implied that the proceedings of the Military Board were illegal. On 24 November, the Board accepted Bridges' report as its judgment. The Board reprimanded Gordon, stating that

> It seems to the Board that the commandant of NSW before undertaking to prepare a Defence Scheme for Australia should complete a scheme for NSW based on facts ...[33]

With the coming to office of the Deakin government in July 1905, the prospects for drawing up a defence scheme improved. The new defence minister, Senator Thomas Playford, concurred in his predecessor's decision to send Bridges to London to gather information about an Australian defence scheme from the War Office, and to Switzerland, to attend army manoeuvres in 1906. However, the Prime Minister was aware of the differences between Creswell and Bridges about the role of naval power in Australian defence. In response to their differences, he sought professional advice from the Committee of Imperial Defence,[34] and his naval and military advisers. Bridges, of course, took no part in the deliberations of the senior Australian officers because he was overseas. When he returned to Australia in December 1906 he reviewed the reports of the senior military officers based on the advice from the Committee of Imperial Defence, and criticised them in a letter to the defence minister on 29 January 1907.[35] His report coincided with the replacement of Senator Playford by Thomas Ewing, five days earlier, as defence minister, and so provided Bridges with an excellent opportunity to influence the new minister about the problems of army planning.

Bridges told the minister that the advice he received from the committees to consider the report from the Committee of Imperial Defence on Australian defence was unsound. The greater part of Bridges' criticisms were directed towards the committee of officers chaired by Hoad. Bridges pointed out

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33. Ibid.
34. See Chapter II, pp. 50-59.
35. Letter from Bridges to Ewing, 29 January 1907, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1843/1/52.

the failure of Hoad's committee to consult the War Establishment tables which he had compiled in London with the help of the War Office. According to Bridges, it was impossible for the committee to furnish a complete scheme of organisation without the tables. Further, he noted the lack of comprehension displayed by Hoad's committee in disposing of some recommendations by the Committee of Imperial Defence. An excellent example was the suggestion by the Committee of Imperial Defence to abolish submarine mines. Nowhere in Hoad's report was there dissent from this view or criticism of its faults. Yet, submarine mining companies were still included in the allotment of troops. To Bridges, the great danger in the report was the way it might mislead politicians who believed that the advice by the Hoad committee was complete and adequate. On the subject of mobilisation, Hoad's committee had said that it could be achieved at short notice, but Bridges retorted by pointing out that no mobilisation scheme or the necessary stores and tables were in existence. In fact, Hoad did not understand the principle of drawing up organisational schemes before mobilisation schemes. Bridges also pointed to the misuse of the term 'division', as understood in the British sense, where the same conditions did not prevail as in Australia. A division by definition was usually a lieutenant-general's command of 12,000 men made up of two brigades with divisional troops. The tables in Parts II, IV and V of the report showed that no two divisions were alike in numbers or units. Another aspect of the question was the command of units in war time. In Queensland, an infantry officer was appointed to command garrisons largely composed of artillery and two defended ports more than 1,400 miles apart. Bridges concluded his report by proposing a course of action which would place the organisation of the military forces on a sound basis. The government had to state the objects for which the armed forces were maintained. This involved a judgment on the strength of a probable attack. And then, on the basis of those decisions, the army would be able to draw up tables of War Establishments and the necessary finance could then be determined.

Bridges' comments seemed to push Ewing towards resolving the defence scheme problem. In February, the defence minister asked Bridges to outline the nature of an attack on Australia.[36] Bridges failed to furnish such an opinion and instead pressed Ewing on 22 February 1907 to agree to reorganise the central administration of the army. In mid-March, Ewing asked Bridges to prepare a defence scheme for all contingencies which included the possibility of invasion as well as a raid by four unarmoured cruisers and 1,000 men.[37] Bridges refused to advise about the nature of the threat because he regarded the matter as 'policy', and threw the question back at the minister, stating the need for the government to make a decision on the question before a defence scheme was prepared. Nevertheless, the defence minister hoped that the Chief of Intelligence would produce a scheme. Furthermore, he was amazed that 'pressing matters' such as map-making and the preparation of a mobilisation scheme were not being addressed as quickly as possible.

Bridges told Ewing that the military authorities were not to blame for the state of affairs in defence planning.[38] He claimed that they had to await decisions on defence policy questions over which they exerted no control. Bridges added that the task of preparing a defence scheme commensurate with the needs of the Commonwealth would require the services of a General Staff of nine or ten officers. In the face of the comments by the Chief of Intelligence, the defence minister agreed to use Whitehall's threat assessment of four unarmoured cruisers and 1,000 men as a guideline for a defence scheme.[39]

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36. Letter from Bridges to Ewing, 12 February 1907, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1856/4/1.

37. Letter from Ewing to Bridges, 13 March 1907, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1856/4/1.

38. G.F. Pearce, From Carpenter to Cabinet (London, 1957), p. 77.

39. C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 1906 Session, vol. II, 'Report of the Committee of Imperial Defence, upon a General Scheme of Defence for Australia,' pp. 65-70.

The exchange between Ewing and Bridges about a scheme of military defence for Australia highlighted the unsatisfactory nature of the strategic planning process. From the military side, Bridges was adamant that a General Staff was necessary to formulate sound defence schemes. A General Staff had the capacity to organise, sift, and collate facts on systematic lines, which was a task beyond the small resources of the Chief of Intelligence. From 1907 to 1909, Bridges directed his efforts towards the creation of a General Staff. The establishment of the General Staff in January 1909 was in part a result of his pressure on Ewing to form the Australian Intelligence Corps but even more the result of the Colonial Conference decision in April 1907 to establish an Imperial General Staff.

The efforts by Bridges to improve the collection of information for military planning was prompted not only by the difficulty of obtaining details on events in the Far East and the Pacific but also by the lack of knowledge about Australia. In his annual report in 1906, the Inspector-General, Major-General Harry Finn, criticised the lack of maps suitable for use with the movement of troops. Two militia officers, Colonel Kenneth Mackay and Lieut.-Colonel David Miller, had exercised their minds on the problem, and in May 1906 they proposed the formation of a Corps of Guides.[40] The Corps would consist of 344 surveyors with the task of collecting topographical information. Brigadier-General J.M. Gordon, the Commandant of the Second Military District, endorsed the suggestion.[41] On 22 May 1906, the Military Board recommended that Senator Playford, the defence minister, set aside £3,000 in the 1906-1907 estimates for a Corps of Guides. Playford thought the recommendation was of minor importance compared with the impending military changes in 1907 and wanted to postpone the allocation of funds for

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40. Letter from Mackay to Brigadier-General J.M. Gordon, Commandant of NSW, 7 May 1906, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1849/2/8.

41. Letter from Brigadier-General J.M. Gordon to S.A. Pethebridge, Secretary, Department of Defence, 15 May 1906, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1849/2/8.

the expenditure in the forthcoming year.[42] The defence minister's decision was reversed after Mackay enlisted the support of Deakin, the Prime Minister, and W.J. Lyne, the Minister for Trade and Customs. The defence estimates for 1906-1907 included £1,000 for the initial expense of raising the corps.[43] On 11 August 1906, the Military Board discussed the Corps of Guides again after Mackay submitted a memorandum about his ideas. At the meeting Le Mesurier, the Chief of Ordnance and a confidant of Bridges, was successful in persuading the Board to refer the proposal to Colonel Bridges when he returned from England.[44] Bridges met Mackay and Miller in Melbourne on 23 April 1907 with a directive from the minister to plan the development of the corps. At the meeting, Bridges criticised the proposal and Mackay and Miller reacted by thinking that the army staff had no time for the Corps.[45]

Bridges' criticisms derived from his plan to establish an intelligence section on the British model. His criticisms were designed to expand the role of the Guides to include liaison with the police and the collection of information about territories near Australia.[46] He was most anxious to have settled whether the Corps would consist of civilians and military personnel and the rank of its members.[47] Furthermore, he was adamant that the appointment of an area officer

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42. Military Board Minutes, vol. I, 22 May 1906, AA CRS 2653.
43. C of A, Parliamentary Papers, General Session, 1907-1908, vol. II, Estimates, pp. 329-416.
44. Letter from Le Mesurier to Pethebridge, 7 August 1906, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1894/2/8.
45. Letter from Mackay to Ewing, Minister of State for Defence, 25 April 1907, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1894/2/8.
46. Letter from Bridges, Chief of Intelligence, to Ewing, Minister of State for Defence, 24 April 1907, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1894/2/8.
47. Letter from Bridges, Chief of Intelligence, to Ewing, Minister of State for Defence, 1 May 1907, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1894/2/08.

in charge of intelligence at headquarters was essential to effect the collation of information for military planning. Ewing, however, who was a keen advocate of the citizen-soldier, was not deterred by the difficulties pointed out to him by the First Military Member,[48] even though he needed the support of the Chief of Intelligence for the introduction of the Corps of Guides. Miller and Mackay, who were aware of the need for Bridges' support, surrendered the scheme to the Chief of Intelligence, by agreeing that government departments were capable of performing the main function of a Corps of Guides, that of compiling topographical and statistical data.[49] The defence minister expressed his thanks to Miller and Mackay and his hope that the introduction of their scheme would eventually lead to the establishment of a Corps of Guides.[50] Bridges, however, persisted in his efforts to expand the role of the Corps of Guides. On 7 November 1907, he sent a minute to Ewing outlining a proposal for an Intelligence Corps.[51] The proposed corps had the tasks of preparing military maps, teaching field intelligence, gathering and sifting information about Australia's military capacity and potential bases in neighbouring countries for operations against Australia. The sixty militia officers in the corps would consist of surveyors from state governments, shire engineers, road constructors, country doctors and station agents, as well as officers from various Federal government departments. In the future, the Corps would enlist drovers and various country residents with expert knowledge of their district as local intelligence agents. The proposal included the duties of the Corps of Guides outlined by Mackay and Miller, and provided Bridges with the opportunity to increase

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48. Note on file dated 22 May 1907, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1894/2/8.

49. Letter from Miller and Mackay to Ewing, 27 June 1907, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1894/2/8.

50. Acting Secretary, Department of Defence, to Mackay and Miller, 13 September 1907, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1849/2/8.

51. Letter from Bridges, Chief of Intelligence, to Ewing, Minister of State for Defence, 7 November 1907, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1849/2/18.

his small and overworked staff. The corps' organisation consisted of a commanding officer at headquarters, with the designation Director of Intelligence, and six district sections based on the six military districts of the Commonwealth. The Director of Intelligence was to be responsible to Bridges as Chief of Intelligence. It is worth noting that the duties of the proposed intelligence corps were similar to those of a General Staff. Less than four weeks later, on 2 December, Ewing told Bridges that the formation of an intelligence corps was sanctioned without alteration. Bridges was asked by the minister to appoint the commanding officer of the intelligence corps as soon as possible. He chose Lieut.-Col. J.W. McCay, a former minister, and commanding officer of the Eighth Australian Infantry Regiment for the post.[52] Bridges' nomination was approved by the Military Board on 6 December 1907.[53]

The creation of the Australian Intelligence Corps on 6 December 1907, coincided with the announcement by Alfred Deakin a week later, on 13 December 1907, that the government intended to establish an Australian General Staff. As we saw earlier, the British General Staff had its origins in the Intelligence Section of the War Office, and Bridges had established a link between the Australian Intelligence Corps and any future development in the direction of a general staff. The intelligence section of the First Military Member's department and the Australian Intelligence Corps was the forerunner of the Australian General Staff.

The impulse for the establishment of an Australian General Staff came from the British at the Colonial Conference held in London in April 1907. British strategic thinkers in politics and government in the eight years before World War I were conscious of the need to utilise the military resources

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52. Letter from Ewing to Bridges, 2 December 1907, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1849/2/18.

53. AA MP 84/1, file no. 1849/2/18; Military Orders, 305/1907, dated 6 December 1907; Military Board Minutes, vol. I, 6 December 1907, AA CRS A2653.

of the Empire for the defence of Great Britain in the face of a military threat from Germany. However, the efforts made by Great Britain to secure the co-operation of the dominions in a military alliance foundered on the issue of control. The dominions were unwilling to submit their forces to a supreme military authority with headquarters in Whitehall. At the Colonial Conference in 1902, the proposal for an imperial reserve force was criticised by the colonial representatives because they feared that they might be committed to an unpopular war.[54] In 1906, the Secretary of State for War, Lord Haldane, devoted his time to extending the British General Staff in the colonies.[55] He had, as a guide to future policy, a paper by Major-General J.M. Grierson, Deputy of Military Operations, War Office, which outlined possible major wars, the most likely one being a war with Germany in Alliance with France. According to Grierson, Canada, Australia, and even South Africa, were under no threat.[56] Another suggestion came from Sir George Clarke, the secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, who wished to inform the 'colonies' that military aid was sought chiefly for a continental war.[57] The colonies would be obliged to assist

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54. The previous year, 1901, Lieut.-Col. Altham of the Military Intelligence Department stated that in a war with one or a combination of European powers the Empire would stand or fall. He stressed the need to know the military resources of the Empire and the strength of a central military authority for directing colonial armies: see, 'The Organisation of Colonial Troops for Imperial Service, 25 November 1901', PRO Cab 8/3/293, and 'Colonial Troops for Imperial Service in War, 13 June 1902', PRO Cab 8/3/293.

55. See the Papers of Viscount Haldane of Cloan, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, MS 5906-5909 and MS 6108-6109. They contain references to the establishment of the British General Staff; R.B. Haldane, An Autobiography (London, 1929), pp. 277-283 discussed the commitment of British troops from 1906-1914 to a war in Europe: see also M. Howard, The Continental Commitment (London, 1972).

56. 'Memorandum upon the Military Forces required for Overseas Warfare, 4 January 1906', in the papers of Field-Marshal Sir W. Robertson, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, University of London.

57. Letter from Clarke to Campbell-Bannerman, 24 January 1907, Papers of Campbell-Bannerman, B.M. add. MS. 41213.

in war 'involving vital Imperial interests', but they also had to retain forces for self defence if they were threatened in a war. Haldane was sympathetic to Clarke's suggestion but he decided that the proposal for an Imperial General Staff was sufficient for the Colonial Conference.[58]

On 20 April 1907, the Colonial Conference met to discuss military matters, the most important of which was the strategic appreciation by the Chief of the General Staff. The appreciation outlined the British concern with war in Europe. It admitted that sea supremacy was the first principle of Imperial defence but the Royal Navy faced serious challenges to that supremacy. General The Hon. Sir Neville Lyttelton, the Chief of the General Staff, reiterated one lesson from the Russo-Japanese War which was to know beforehand the strength and organisation of forces available for duty in the field.[59] He also argued for uniform standards of training, equipment and organisation in the imperial forces.[60] He also reminded the colonial premiers that irregular troops, such as those used in South Africa, were not effective in offensive operations. There was, therefore, a need for a common school of military thought throughout the Empire.

In the introductory speech to the conference, Haldane tried to allay any dominion fears about threats to their sovereignty in a centralised military Empire.[61] In the military sphere, he proposed an Imperial General Staff to train Imperial officers with the same principles and theory

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58. Letter from Ellison to Clarke, 19 April 1907, enclosing both resolutions, PRO Cab 17/77.

59. Cd. 3524. 'Papers laid before the Colonial Conference 1907. The Strategical Conditions of the Empire from the Military Point of View 14 April 1907,' p. 18.

60. Cd. 3524. 'Papers laid before the Colonial Conference 1907. The Possibility of Assimilating War Organisation throughout the Empire, 14 April 1907,' p. 24; the other papers looked at the need for common patterns in guns and ammunition.

61. Diary of Major-General Spencer Ewart, 19 April 1907, Papers of Major-General Spencer Ewart (National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh), RH 84/3. Vols. 125-126.

which would enhance military co-operation in war.[62]

The initial reaction by the dominion premiers reflected their respective domestic stands on Imperial co-operation. The Canadian Minister for Militia, Sir Frederick Borden, made it plain that limitations were attached to Canadian aid. Furthermore, he asked if it was intended that the Imperial General Staff at the centre of the Empire was to have an independent power to transcend colonial and dominion boundaries in military matters.[63] Deakin, along with Borden and Laurier, feared that Haldane sought British control through an Imperial General Staff which had its headquarters in London and branches in the Dominions. In contrast, Sir Joseph Ward, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, accepted Haldane's proposal.[64] When a final draft of Haldane's opening speech was agreed to on 23 April, it was obvious that the Dominions' representatives, including Deakin, wished to prevent placing their countries under central military control.[65] Accordingly, they resolved

> That this Conference welcomes and cordially approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War, and, without wishing to commit any of the Governments represented, recognises and affirms the need of developing for the service of the Empire a General Staff, selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole, which shall study military Science in all its branches, shall collect and disseminate to the various Governments military information and intelligence, shall undertake the preparation of schemes of defence as a common principle, and, without in the least interfering in questions connected with command and administration

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62. Cd. 3523. 'Minutes of Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1907. Fourth Day, 20 April 1907,' pp. 95-110.

63. J.F. Kendle, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences, 1887-1911: A Study in Imperial Organisation (London, 1907, p. 91.

64. Cd.3523. 'Minutes of Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1907. Fourth Day, 20 April 1907,' p. 109.

65. R.A. Preston, Canada and Imperial Defence (Durham, North Caroline, 1967), pp. 360-361; Cd. 3523 - Minutes of Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1907, pp. v-vi.

> shall, at the request of the respective Governments, advise as to the training, education, and war organisation of the Military Forces of the Crown in every part of the Empire.[66]

This decision of the Colonial Conference was implemented rapidly in Australia. In his address to parliament on 13 December 1907, Deakin proposed the establishment of an Australian General Staff to deal with defence problems peculiar to the Pacific.[67] To give effect to the proposal, Deakin despatched Hoad to London in late 1908 to help with the establishment of an Imperial General Staff.[68] Both Colonel Bridges, the Chief of Intelligence, and Colonel Foster, the Director of Military Science at the University of Sydney, were critical of the appointment in private.[69] Bridges, in particular, who was a keen rival of Hoad's, did not wish his trip to London to be successful for fear he might return with an increase in influence and a knighthood from the War Office.[70]

During his stay in England from September 1908 until February 1909, Hoad discussed military matters with most of the senior officers in the War Office. He also participated in a staff tour in October 1908 and a staff conference in January 1909.[71] On the question of the Imperial General Staff, he had discussions with Haldane on 7 December, and two days

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66. Third Resolution of the Imperial Conference held in London, April 1907, AA MP 84, file no. 1894/5/45.

67. Argus, 14 December 1907; C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 1907-1908 Session, vol. III, 'Colonial Conference, 1907. Minutes of Proceedings, pp. 103-105 - Speech by Alfred Deakin, 20 April 1907'.

68. Memorandum by Department of Defence, 3 August 1908, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1894/6/104.

69. Letter from Hubert Foster to Hutton, 17 August 1908 and Letter from Bridges to Hutton, 29 September 1908, Hutton Papers, add. MS 50089, vol. XII.

70. Ibid.

71. Diary of Major-General Sir Spencer Ewart, 21 September 1908, Papers of Major-General Sir Spencer Ewart (National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh), RH/84/3, vols. 126-128; Letter from Hoad to Secretary, Department of Defence, 22 April 1909, AA MP 84, Series 1, file no. 1894/6/104.

later at lunch he met Haldane again with Sir Frederick Borden from Canada, Lieut.-General Sir William Nicholson, the Chief of the General Staff, and Major-General Sir Douglas Haig, who was responsible as Director of Staff Duties for planning the Imperial General Staff. According to Ewart, 'useful results' came from the lunch.[72] On 15 December, Haig discussed his paper on the Imperial General Staff with Sir Frederick Borden, and two days later he sent copies to Australia and New Zealand.[73]

The document drafted by Haig, which appeared under Nicholson's authority, was an attempt to control the development of the colonial and dominion general staffs without raising fears about the possible use of their troops in the defence of Great Britain in Europe. National defence was divided into local and Imperial defence.[74] The object of local defence was the attainment of sufficient military strength to deter 'the most probable and feasible form of attack.'[75] In short, the War Office wanted each division of the Empire to cope with initial contingencies. On Imperial defence, the paper stated that offence was the best defence, and dominion and colonial armies might need to concentrate some of their troops in other parts of the Empire. The logical measure to ensure co-operation and unity of thought and action was the introduction of common principles of

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72. Diary of Major-General Sir Spencer Ewart, 9 December 1908, Ewart Papers, RH 84/3. On 19 December 1908, Major-General Hoad held a party at the United Service Club for 30 guests. Haldane, Nicholson, and Hoad spoke well according to Ewart, and after dinner, Colonel Marshall gave recitations from Rudyard Kipling (Ewart Diary, 19 December 1908).

73. Ewart Diary, 18 December 1908; Haig had given the Chief of the General Staff his paper on the Imperial General Staff on 1 August, and on 4 November, the Chief of the General Staff agreed to print and send his paper to the colonies and dominions. Diary, 5 November 1908, Papers of Field Marshal the Earl Haig (National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh), H2L.

74. 'Defence-Imperial General Staff - Correspondence Relating to Proposed Formation', AA MP 84, file no. 1894/5/59.

75. The Imperial General Staff - Introductory Remarks by W.G. Nicholson, Chief of the General Staff, 7 December 1908, in Defence - Imperial General Staff, AA MP 84, file no. 1894/5/59.

military organisation and thought throughout the Empire. The vehicle for building military units was the Imperial General Staff:

> ... in peace and war, the General Staff must be regarded as a large organisation, consisting of a central body, with branches stretching out to all the various units of an army. If it is to carry out the duties allotted to it efficiently, and to act as the guiding and directing spirit - the brain - of the whole army, it is evident not only that all its members must be highly educated and trained, but that its work must be carried out on common principles in all parts of the Empire. It is therefore, a necessity that the Imperial General Staff should have one recognised head to ensure uniformity of method and purpose. The head can only be the Chief of the General Staff in London, who must become the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, if we are to have a really efficient organisation.[76]

The Imperial General Staff consisted of local sections abroad, each with its own Chief, who was the head of all General Staff Officers and adviser to his own government. In London, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had the task of informing the local sections about the principles of imperial defence but he was unable to give orders to the local sections. To keep close relations between the central headquarters and the local sections, a number of schemes were listed. They were staff training at Camberley and Quetta, periodical interchanges between staff officers in different parts of the Empire, and occasional general conferences. The object of common education and training for staff officers was the prevention of divergent opinion which might be fatal to military operations.[77]

In response to the memorandum by Haig, Hoad had written draft proposals for the Australian Section of the Imperial General Staff,[78] which were discussed at the Staff Conference

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76. Ibid., p. 8. 77. Ibid., p. 9.

78. Hoad to the Secretary, Department of Defence, 22 April 1909, AA MP 84, Series I, file no. 1894/6/104 and 'Major-General Hoad's proposals with regard to an Australian Section of the Imperial General Staff, with the Memorandum of the Chief of the General Staff thereon' in Defence, Imperial General Staff, AA MP 84, file no. 1895/5/59.

in January 1909. Although he made plain that the military forces of the Commonwealth were maintained to protect Australia from attack, he saw great advantage accruing to Australia through membership of the Imperial General Staff. He also contemplated co-operation in more extensive military undertakings in other parts of the Empire. For Australia, Hoad suggested the establishment of a General Staff with the Chief of the Commonwealth Section of the Imperial General Staff becoming the first Military Member of the Military Board and chief adviser to the Minister of Defence. The functions of the General Staff at Headquarters and in the commands were separated from those of the administration. The organisation of the General Staff in his scheme consisted of a headquarters section and the general staff in districts. At headquarters, tasks were allotted to three directorates - military operations, war organisation of the forces of the Empire, and military training. The first two directorates dealt with topics of an Imperial nature such as the strategical disposition of the Army in the Empire, the collection of military intelligence and the preparation of schemes of defence and offence. In the district headquarters, Hoad suggested that they should consist of two directorates, the defence organisation directorate and the military training directorate. (See Appendix H). Hoad also asked that an Australian officer be attached to the Imperial General Staff in London.

On 3 February, he sent the proposals for the establishment of the Imperial General Staff in Australia to General Nicholson, the Chief of the General Staff, for comment.[79] General Nicholson was careful to limit his remarks to the principles of Imperial military defence. In general, Nicholson was in agreement with Hoad's suggestions, but he warned against the rapid appointment of General Staff Officers in Commands until well qualified staff officers were available. Nicholson's pleasant reception of Hoad's proposals was in marked contrast to his previous opinion of the antipodean officer. Previously, Nicholson had thought Hoad was an

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79. Ibid.

officer of limited military capacity and education. In 1909, Hoad was described as tactful, well balanced, and in touch with the political leaders in Australia.[80]

Although Deakin, the Prime Minister, realised the advantage of participation in the Imperial General Staff, his government made an effort to prevent the infiltration of British control over local defence matters. The Australian government established the local General Staff before the Commonwealth Section, Imperial General Staff, to emphasise local control. The Military Board executed the government's policy for the Australian General Staff to remain distinct from, although amalgamated, with the Imperial General Staff. On 24 December 1907, Bridges pointed out to the Military Board that the post of Chief of Intelligence was a General Staff appointment.[81] The Board accepted his view, and throughout 1908 the members discussed the distribution of their duties, with the result that any divergence between their peace and wartime roles was minimised.[82] On 23 July 1908, the Board unanimously recommended that the title Chief of Intelligence be changed to Chief of the General Staff.[83] Bridges also persuaded the Military Board to organise the district headquarters staff as far as possible with the respective duties of each military member. Furthermore, the Board expressed a wish that the duties in connection with war training, defence schemes, and intelligence correspond with those laid down for the Chief of the General Staff. On 19 December 1908, Bridges' title was altered to Chief of the General Staff and on 1 January 1909, he became the first Chief of the General Staff of the Commonwealth Section of the Imperial General Staff.[84]

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80. Letter from Nicholson to the British Ambassador at Tokyo, 24 September 1904, PRO CO 418/42 and R.A. Preston, Canada and Imperial Defence (Durham, North Carolina, 1962), pp. 405-406.

81. AA CRS A2653, Military Board Minutes, vol. II (1907-1908), 24 December 1907.

82. Ibid., 13, 20, 21, 23 July 1918.

83. Ibid., 23 July 1918.

84. AA CRS A2653, Military Board Minute, vol. II (1907-1908), 19 December 1908; Military Orders, 414/1908, 1 January 1909.

The appointment of Colonel Bridges as the first Chief of the General Staff marked the ascendancy of Hutton's protegé under the Labour defence administration of Senator George Pearce. To Pearce, Bridges was the leading Australian army officer, and not 'an impossible man' as he was warned by his predecessor as defence minister, Thomas Ewing.[85] Amongst the officers, Major Brudenell White, also a Hutton protegé, who was serving with the British Army, applauded the appointment of Bridges. White had reported to Bridges about Hoad's visit to the War Office with reference to the establishment of the General Staff in Australia.[86] In a discreet letter to Bridges on 15 January 1909, White said that Hoad had not 'quite grasped' the purpose of a General Staff.[87] On the subject of the personal rivalry between Bridges and Hoad, White was convinced that Deakin's favourite military adviser wanted the position of Chief of the General Staff.

> I have not the least doubt to my mind that the ... means to be C.G.S. I am wondering what then is to be your fate? I cannot imagine you as a Director of such a C.G.S.; nor can I see how you are to be got out of the way ...[88]

He told Bridges that he was unable to enlist the aid of the War Office in a personal fight between two officers in a dominion section of the Imperial General Staff. The War Office was intent upon the propagation of its broad principles for the Imperial General Staff in the empire, and therefore, White emphasised, was unwilling to allow a minor personal matter to interrupt the execution of its policy. Bridges was asked how he would react if he was offered an appointment

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85. G.F. Pearce, Carpenter to Cabinet (London, 1951), p. 77.
86. Letter from White to Bridges, 22 January 1909, Papers of General Sir W.T. Bridges, Bridges Memorial Library, Royal Military College, Duntroon.
87. Letter from White to Bridges, 15 January 1909, Bridges Papers, uncatalogued papers in the possession of Bridges-Maxwell.
88. Letter from White to Bridges, 22 January 1909, Papers of General Sir W.T. Bridges, Bridges Memorial Library, Duntroon.

in the War Office. The advice White offered to Bridges was based on an opinion of Hoad as an officer who lacked thorough professional training, and seemed to reiterate the low assessment of his capabilities made by General Hutton. Bridges was told to let Hoad 'work out his own salvation' and wait for the results of his first term as C.G.S. A judgment of Hoad, however, must be weighed in the light of the opinion held in 1909 by General Nicholson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who regarded him as a personable officer. As well, the memorandum written by Hoad on the establishment of the Commonwealth Section, Imperial General Staff, showed that he understood the need to provide for the security of his nation against all probable contingencies, including the possibility of co-operation in Imperial defence.

The prospect of Hoad becoming Chief of the General Staff was contemplated by Brudenell White in the letter to Bridges on 22 January 1909.[89] In the previous week, White had learnt about Bridges' appointment, and he thought that any effort to replace him required expert tactics. One month later, in a letter to Bridges dated 19 February, White indicated that he realised how the efforts by Deakin to form a fusion party in the Federal parliament favoured the aspirations of Hoad.[90] White was 'praying hard that the Labor ministry may remain.'[91]

In March 1909, the Dreadnought crisis threatened to embarrass the efforts by the Labor government to develop Australia's defence capacity. The revelations that Germany's naval programme was a threat to Great Britain alarmed public and official opinion in Australia. As we saw in Chapter II, the Labor government refused to succumb to the emotional appeal for naval assistance to the Mother Country. The Prime Minister, Andrew Fisher, reminded the Australian people that the nation would support Great Britain in a crisis. A more

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89. Ibid.

90. Letter from White to Bridges, 19 February 1909, Papers of General Sir W.T. Bridges, Bridges Memorial Library, Duntroon.

91. Ibid.

serious problem for Fisher was the move by Liberal and Protectionist parliamentarians in early 1909 to form an alliance.[92] The negotiations between Deakin, Cook and Forrest bore fruit, and a Fusion Party was formed in late May 1909. On 2 June, Deakin became Prime Minister once more.

The return to power of Alfred Deakin posed no problems for Bridges' future. A week before Deakin became Prime Minister Pearce announced that the Chief of the General Staff was accepting a post in London as the Commonwealth military representative on the Imperial General Staff. Bridges was promised the post of Chief of the General Staff by Pearce when he returned to Australia from London[93] and the defence minister, at Bridges' request, put the promise in writing. With the departure of Bridges, the way was clear for the elevation of Hoad, and, in due course, he was made Chief of the General Staff on 1 July 1909.[94]

The deep concern held by Bridges about the fate of the General Staff under Hoad's direction prompted him to write a letter to the Secretary of Defence, 17 June 1909, in which he set out guidelines for staff work in Australia.[95] His remarks were a blueprint of action for the General Staff. In his view, the most urgent work was the completion of defence schemes and the improvement of officer education in Australia.[96] The letter from Bridges to the Secretary of Defence was considered by the Military Board which decided to send a copy to each member of the Board for his comments. Predictably, Hoad was very critical of Bridges' letter and asked if the former C.G.S. was requested to write to the Secretary of Defence.[97] The comments by Hoad were only a hint of the deep

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92. C.D. Coulthard-Clark, A Heritage of Spirit (Melbourne, 1979), p. 81.

93. Letter from Bridges to Pearce, 21 June and 27 August 1909, Papers of Senator Sir G.F. Pearce (Australian War Memorial), Bundle 6, Item 13.

94. Military Orders, 209/1909 and 324/1909.

95. Letter from Bridges to T. Griffiths, Secretary, Department of Defence, 17 June 1909, AA MP 84/1, File no. 1804/2/81.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid. The remarks by Hoad were scribbled on the letter.

personal rivalry between the two men. To Bridges, Hoad carried out a personal vendetta to dismantle his work as Chief of the General Staff. For example, in defence planning Hoad vetoed the directions given by Bridges on the defence scheme for South Australia.

The creation of a General Staff in the Commonwealth Military Forces was designed to expedite army planning and carry into effect the Pacific centred strategic analysis. In the five years preceding World War I, Australian military planning faced the problem of building an adequate defence in the Pacific and the demands by the War Office officials in Whitehall for closer co-operation in Imperial defence.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN GENERAL STAFF 1909-1911

The creation of the Australian General Staff and the establishment of the Commonwealth Section, Imperial General Staff, coincided with the introduction of compulsory military training in Australian defence policy. The task facing the General Staff in Australia was how to provide better organisation and planning in strategic matters and accommodate the demands made by Imperial defence upon the attainment of self-sufficiency in local defence. After the Imperial Conference of 1909, military planners waited for the visit of Lord Kitchener to inspect and report on the development of Australia's military forces. Following the visit by Lord Kitchener, and his favourable report on Australian defence preparations, the General Staff officers dealt with the problem of building an effective Australian defence. The threat of war with Germany and the military strength of Japan made defence policy an urgent matter.

The central issue before the General Staff and Australian political leaders in 1909 was the question of the relation between Imperial and Australian defence. In response to the military threat from Germany in 1908 and early 1909, the War Office devoted attention to the possibility of a sudden war, the need to send an expeditionary force to Europe, and the critical matter of reassuring the French about the value of an alliance with Britain. The War Office, and in particular Major-General Sir Douglas Haig, the Director of Military Operations, felt that the Imperial General Staff proposed at the 1907 Colonial Conference must function and devise a scheme of Imperial defence. Haig hoped to enlist the aid of the Dominion military forces for operations against Germany in the event of war, and thereby eliminate the doubts of the French about the viability and effectiveness of the Imperial General Staff, and ensure an

adequate supply of reserves for a British Expeditionary Force in Europe.[1]

The Australian government treated the British request for aid with studied caution, and in general, the Dominions were conscious of the need to preserve their autonomy against the approaches made by the Imperial authorities in Whitehall. To achieve and maintain an adequate local defence, the Commonwealth government would not relinquish control of the Commonwealth Military Forces.

> The Commonwealth Government desires to state specifically that its assent to the general principles mentioned above is not to be considered as binding it to raise and equip any force or designate any existing troops for employment outside the Commonwealth or territories under the control of the Commonwealth ...[2]

Further discussion between the Dominions and the British government about Imperial defence and the threat posed by Germany was scheduled for a Colonial Conference in London during July 1909. Haig's successor at the War Office as Director of Military Operations, Major-General Sir Spencer Ewart, wrote in his diary two months before the conference that unless the 'colonies' reached agreement about military matters, 'they will be too late to help the Mother Country in her hour of need.'[3]

The Commonwealth government was well prepared for the Colonial Conference in London which met in late July. Its

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1 'The Value to a Foreign Power of an Alliance with the British Empire', March 1909, p.9, PRO W.O. 101/45/E11; for a detailed analysis of the Imperial Conference 1909, see J. Gooch, The Plans of War (London, 1972), pp.131-164.

2 'Further Correspondence relating to the Proposed Formation of an Imperial General Staff, no.10, 8 April 1909, p.11', PRO CO 886/2/14.

3 Diary of Major-General Sir Spencer Ewart, 5 May 1909 (National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh), RH 84/3, vols. 125-126.

decision to retain control over the Commonwealth Military Forces showed perspicacity about British intentions to use colonial and dominion armies in Europe. In a letter to Kitchener on 8 July 1909, Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, spelt out the direction of War Office planning with reference to the forthcoming conference.

> The government proposes, in development of the conception of an Imperial General Staff, and of the other propositions which were accepted in principle by the Colonial Conference in 1907, to ask the self-governing Dominions and the other parts of the Empire, to co-operate in fashioning common plans, not only for the organisation of their own local forces ... but for possible concentration in a period of great emergency. At present, there is no general scheme providing for the mobilisation of the 200,000 trained or partially trained officers and men in the Empire ...[4]

A week later, on 15 July, five senior military officers at the War Office, namely Haig, Nicholson, Ewart, Laker and Adge, worked on a paper to be laid before the delegates to the Imperial Conference on behalf of the Imperial General Staff, British Army. Spencer Ewart recorded in his diary after the discussions in the morning that 'our worthy colonists' were sensitive about the issue of autonomy in military matters and 'one cannot be too cautious.'[5] At the conference, Haldane presented the delegates with proposals to expedite effective co-operation in war between the members of the Empire.[6] General Nicholson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, added emphasis to Haldane's proposals when he spelt out in clear terms the fear held by the War

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[4] Letter from Haldane to Lord Kitchener, 8 July 1909, Papers of Viscount Haldane of Cloan (National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh) MS 5908, 131-133.

[5] Diary of Major-General Sir Spencer Ewart, 15 July 1909, Papers of Major-General Spencer Ewart (National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh), RH 84/3, vols. 125-126.

[6] 'Proposals for re Organising the Military Forces of the Empire as to Ensure their effective co-operation in the Event of War, 7 July 1909', PRO W.O. 106/43/Impl. 10.

Office about the possibility of a European war.[7] The British General Staff wanted the dominions and colonies to sent their troops to Europe in the event of war.[8]

The Australian military representative at the Conference, Colonel Bridges, held the view that the Australian government had to decide on its defence policy before a commitment was made to schemes of Imperial Defence.[9] In his report to Foxton, the Minister without Portfolio in the Fusion cabinet, who represented Australia at the Imperial Conference, Bridges indicated that the Commonwealth of Australia was not bound to participate in the general defence of the Empire. He told Foxton that the general principle of standardisation in arms and training to enable united action by the Empire in defence was written in such a general way by the Conference to avoid compulsory commitment in Imperial defence by the dominions and colonies.

> ... In connection with this paper, it may be observed that it was stated at the Conference that the Dominions are not asked to organise their Forces, so that, on the outbreak of war, existing units should be sent abroad, which in the case of the Commonwealth is practically impossible.[10]

Foxton sent the report by Bridges to Deakin on 3 September 1909. In addition to the agreement to standardise Imperial Defence, the conference decided that

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7 Ibid., D'Egville Howard, 'Notes on Imperial Co-operation', United Service Magazine, vol.39 (April-Sept. 1909), pp.98-99.

8 Ibid., letter from Lieutenant-General Sir W. Nicholson to Haldane, 23 August 1909, Papers of Viscount Haldane of Cloan (National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh), MS 5908, 131-133; it is worth noting that as a result of the conference, Sir W. Nicholson adopted the title Chief of the Imperial General Staff - Army Order 314, 1909.

9 C. Coulthard-Clark, A Heritage of Spirit (Melbourne, 1979), p.83. For the naval report on the conference see AA B197, file no.1894/6/131.

10 Letter from Foxton to Deakin, 3 September 1909. Deakin Papers (NLA), MS 1540/1/2639.

General Staff Officers in the Empire were members of the Imperial General Staff. As a result of the conference, the Australian General Staff was amalgamated with the Imperial General Staff, and Major-General Hoad became Chief of the Commonwealth Section. In order to promote closer co-operation in Imperial defence, the Commonwealth appointed Colonel Bridges as the London representative of the Commonwealth Section, Imperial General Staff. It is worth noting that Australia was the only Dominion to appoint a military representative in London.

After the Imperial Conference, Bridges remained in Britain to take up his duties at the War Office.[11] He quickly discovered that Whitehall had not defined the functions and status of dominion representatives on the Imperial General Staff and that the War Office's failure to outline his duties was a result of a disagreement with the Australian government. Deakin, who was in favour of officer interchange in the Empire, had requested a senior British officer in exchange for Bridges, to hold the position Director of Training in Australia, and that Bridges be simultaneously employed in a staff position of equivalent grade in the War Office.[12] The British, with an eye on their self-interest, refused the request because the arrangement favoured Australia.[13] Legge, who was vigilant in guarding Australia's interest, wrote to Bridges on 25 August 1909 and informed him about the negotiations between Deakin and the War Office.

> Two days ago a wire arrived from Collins to the effect that the Imperial Government would not agree to exchange another officer with you, on the ground that you were there to represent the Commonwealth. They offered to lend an officer, quoting the rates of pay, for duty in the local section. I think that you are

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11 Letter from Bridges to Senator Pearce, Minister for Defence, 20 June 1910, AA MP 84, file no. 1987/2/11.

12 C. Coulthard-Clark, A Heritage of Spirit (Melbourne, 1979), pp.84-85.

13 Letter from R.H. Brade, Under-Secretary of State, 20 August 1909, Military Board Papers of Historical Interest, vol.II, AA CRS A 2653.

> probably aware of this, but thought it better to tell you in case you were not. Has there been any underhand business going on?[14]

Without regard for Bridges' opinion, and in response to the Colonial Office reply, Deakin suggested that the appointment of a London representative was an indication of Australia's willingness to shoulder her imperial responsibility and initiate the 'principle of assimilating war organisation(s) and making the General Staff an entity throughout the empire.'[15] Deakin also stepped down from his initial position and offered the War Office carte blanche on defining the conditions of Bridges' post. In characteristic fashion, Bridges set out to alter the terms of his appointment. He wrote to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Nicholson, and set out his ideas about the function of a dominion representative.[16] Bridges argued that dominion representatives had the task of integrating the policies of the War Office and the dominions in Imperial Defence. Furthermore, they required access to British documents to assist them in informing their respective governments about Imperial policy.[17]

Bridges' efforts to promote Australian interests in Imperial defence led him to criticise the War Office. At a conference of General Staff Officers in January 1910, at which his fellow Australian Officer Captain C.B.B. White was present, Bridges complained that the Field Service Regulations in British Training Manuals took no notice of the Australian citizen officers who were largely self-instructed.[18] The

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[14] Letter from Legge to Bridges, 25 August 1909, Bridges Papers - uncatalogued papers in the possession of Bridges-Maxwell.

[15] Draft letter by S.A. Pethebridge to Colonial Office, 27 August 1909, Military Board Papers of Historical Interest, vol. II, AA CRS A2653.

[16] R.A. Preston, Canada and Imperial Defence (Durham, 1967), p. 408.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Report of a Conference of General Staff Officers at the Staff College, 17-20 January 1910, in Report of the Conferences of the General Staff Officers at the Staff College, 1909-1914, AA A1194, file no. 4408/12.24/

Training Manuals, in his opinion, had become more obtuse with each edition:

> ... That is well enough for the Regular Officer; it is of no use to the citizen officer. For instance, the principle is laid down that the commander of a detached party, such as an advanced guard or a flank guard, is responsible for maintaining the proper distance from the main body. This is a principle easy to understand, and when the reason is given it is not difficult to remember; but it is of no more use for the citizen officer to learn and remember unless he knows how to apply it than it is to learn the characters of a Babylonian brick ...[19]

He felt that the War Office needed to know the differences between Australian and British conditions and requirements. As well, he understood the seriousness of Australian co-operation in Imperial defence. At the War Office he campaigned for the organisation of the Australian army into divisions to prevent the dismemberment and dispersion of national units in British formations, as occurred in the Boer War, in the event of Australian participation in an Imperial expeditionary force. Furthermore, Bridges was adamant that Australian officers serving in British overseas formations in the future must discipline their own troops under the British Army Act, with the added provision that serious offenders would be shipped to Australia for punishment.[20]

The frustration felt by Bridges at the War Office arose from the view held by the War Office that dominion representatives were sent for training. Bridges, of course, held a different view of his role in Whitehall, but he also suffered from his personal rivalry with Hoad, and the inefficiency of the Australian General Staff. Hoad, as Chief of the General Staff, did not accord Bridges the respect due to the military representative of the

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19 Ibid., pp.51-54; letter from Bridges to Pearce, 20 April 1910, Papers of Senator Sir G.F. Pearce (AWM), Item 13, Bundle 6.

20 Atkinson, Australia's Defence Policy, p. 381.

Commonwealth government on the Imperial General Staff and, as a result, Bridges was unable to perform as effectively as he might have wished in advising the War Office on Australian defence.[21] Before he left Australia, Bridges approved one of the six State defence schemes in preparation, and laid down guidelines for the others. Under Hoad's direction, the six State defence schemes departed from the guidelines prepared by Bridges in terms of numbers and organisation. More to the point, Bridges was not informed when the State defence schemes were sent to London.[22] Hoad's action took no notice of the request made by Bridges before he left Australia that he wanted to stay abreast of local military developments. In his response to this shabby treatment by Hoad, Bridges wrote to the defence minister on 20 August and pointed out that in a discussion with the Colonial Defence Committee about the State defence schemes, the British 'General Staff could not have been blamed if they had formed the opinion that he did not possess the confidence' of his own General Staff.[23] On another occasion, Bridges transferred a request from the War Office to the Australian government, which asked for a list of suggested amendments to the training manuals. The Department of Defence failed to reply. Bridges pointed out that as it was the first request from the War Office under the direction of the Imperial General Staff, the Australian General Staff would be wise to reply.[24] He was sent the Agenda and Decisions of the Military Board at regular intervals, and Intelligence Diaries prepared by the General Staff from time to time. In May 1910, Bridges left England to return to Australia.

Despite the limitations placed on his function as the London representative of the Commonwealth Section, Imperial General Staff, Bridges believed that the scheme of dominion

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21 Coulthard-Clarke, A Heritage of Spirit, pp. 84-87.

22 Ibid.

23 Letter from Bridges to Pearce, 20 June 1910, pp. 3-4, AA MP 84, file no. 1987/2/11.

24 Ibid.

representation was useful for Imperial defence. He wrote to Pearce and set out how to improve the appointment.

> My experience has confirmed me in the opinion that the benefit to the Dominions and the Empire fully justifies the appointment of representatives of the former to the Imperial General Staff ... provided that first they are kept acquainted with what takes place in their respective Dominions and the objects in view, so that they may be able to express not their personal opinions only but the official views of the Departments, and secondly, that they secure the confidence of the General Staff when making an appointment ...[25]

Bridges wanted the next appointee to join the Colonial Defence Committee as Australia's representative, and communicate with the Departments of the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, and the General Staff, British Army.

The faith held by Bridges in the scheme of dominion military representatives at the Imperial General Staff was not shared by the Australian government. When Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, asked in July 1910 if there was a replacement for Bridges, he was told that no officer would be sent at that time.[26] The energies of every available Australian officer were needed for the implementation of compulsory military training and the development of the Australian General Staff.

Despite the unsatisfactory nature of Bridges' appointment in London, the Australian government continued to participate in the loan, attachment, and interchange of

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25 Ibid.

26 Preston, Canada and Imperial Defence, p. 409; Lord Crewe to Lord Dudley, Governor-General, Commonwealth of Australia, 15 July 1910, Military Board Papers of Historical Interest, vol. II, AA CRS A2653.

officers with the British Army and other dominions.[27] The exchange of officers was viewed as increasing Australia's military expertise. In 1909, Bruche, Reade, and Forsyth were selected as exchange officers to go to England, Canada and India respectively. At the sub-conference on military defence at the Imperial Conference in August 1909, provision was made for the interchange of staff officers under the auspices of the Imperial General Staff. Further attention was given to the subject of exchanging officers between the British and dominion armies in a memorandum written by General Sir William Nicholson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, on 30 August 1910.

> Coming to more recent years, the system of sending officers abroad for instructions hitherto confined to the permanent forces of the overseas Dominions has been extended to those belonging to the citizen forces, a number of whom have been sent from Australia to India for instruction during the drill season.
>
> The latest development has been the initiation of the Imperial General Staff. The arrangements, which have gradually been evolved, have become so complex and the negotiations connected therewith have become so frequent that, with a fuller realisation of the needs of the Mother Country and of the overseas Dominions in military matters, the necessity has arisen of reviewing these arrangements, and of attempting to systematize them.[28]

Nicholson pointed out that the cost of officers on loan and attachment was the responsibility of the dominion government.

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27 'Memorandum on the subject of Loans, Attachments and Interchanges of and between officers of the Regular Army and officers of the Overseas Dominions', by W.G. Nicholson (C.I.G.S.), 31 August 1910, and Minute Paper from J.C. Hoad, C.G.S., to Secretary, Department of Defence, 15 December 1910, AA MP 153/10 and 11, Series 11. Copies of Briefs relating to Imperial Conference, 1911, file no. W.O.B.

28 'Memorandum of the subject of LOANS, ATTACHMENT, AND INTERCHANGES of and between OFFICERS of the REGULAR ARMY and OFFICERS of the FORCES of the OVERSEAS DOMINIONS', by General W. Nicholson, 3 August 1910, AA MP 153/10 and 11, file W.O.B.

With reference to the attachment of representatives from local sections of the Imperial General Staff, Nicholson proposed the creation of a Dominion Section, attached to the Directorate of Staff Duties in the War Office, and stressed that the dominion representatives must be well-informed about the military progress of their government. Their rank should be below Major or above Colonel. On the question of finance, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff laid down that the expenses of pay and transport for a dominion representative were to be shouldered by the respective dominion government. Furthermore, Nicholson claimed that staff training throughout the Empire was uneven and therefore, strict reciprocity in the interchange of staff officers was not possible, except in selected cases. In Australia, Senator Pearce, the defence minister in 1910, asked the Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Hoad, to comment on the memorandum from the War Office. Hoad concurred in the proposals put forward by Nicholson which awaited further discussion at the next Imperial Conference in 1911.[29]

From the Imperial Conference in August 1909 until Lord Kitchener's report on Australian defence, the Australian General Staff was occupied by routine work, compulsory military training, and the endemic squabbles which beset the formulation of military policy by a small elite group. In particular, there was intense personal and professional rivalry between Hoad and Legge. For Legge, who was determined to ensure that the Australian nation was served by his efforts, it was important to select officers of the highest calibre for promotion and staff work. At a meeting of the Military Board on 9 August 1909, the Adjutant General, Colonel E. Wallack, put forward a list of officers who were eligible for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.[30] Legge asked the officers present, the Chief of the General

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29 Ibid.

30 Letter from Legge to Bridges, 16 August 1909, Bridges Papers - uncatalogued papers in the possession of Bridges-Maxwell.

Staff, Hoad, the Adjutant-General, and the Military Secretary, to postpone the agenda item until a full meeting of the Military Board. Hoad negatived Legge's proposal and the promotions were awarded to Chauvel, Lee, Sellheim and Irving. Legge spoke against the promotions except that of Irving who had been appointed Military Commandant of the First Military District by the Military Board. He was adamant about the need to recruit the most able and brightest officers to the General Staff.[31] In a letter to Bridges on 16 August 1909, Legge stated with reference to promotion to a General Staff, that 'the only successful method in the future was to promote by selection.' The letter referred to Lee, Chauvel, Sellheim and Irving.

> On 13.8.09, I saw the minister with the papers in the presence of the A.G. [Adjustant-General]. I told him that the promotion of G. Lee, Chauvel, Sellheim, and Irving on the ground that they were decent fellows with nothing against them on the record, and the SENIORS was following the principle or rather want of it that had done so much harm already ...[32]

The outcome of the promotion question was that the Minister of Defence, George Pearce, postponed the promotions until all the members of the Military Board discussed the matter. For Legge, the problem of making an efficient staff did not stop with the issue of promotions to the General Staff. He criticised Hoad for failing to use his funds as Chief of the General Staff in the best possible way, and threatened to strike out a grant of money to the United Service Institution in the estimates for 1910-1911. As well, Legge fought against efforts by the Director of the Australian Intelligence Corps, Colonel J. McCay, a former defence minister in the Reid-McLean ministry, to use political influence to gain an appointment to the General Staff.[33]

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[31] Ibid. [32] Ibid.

[33] Letter from J.W. McCay to Bridges, 25 December 1909, ibid.

McCay was made Director of the Australian Intelligence Corps when it was created in December 1907. Under his directorship, the Corps expanded in size, and trained its members in an effort to overcome the serious deficiencies in topographical information about Australia and the activities of Japan in the Pacific. At the same time, McCay's personal manner, which was abrasive, and his desire to expand the influence of his Corps, led him to create unnecessary problems with his superior officers. In early 1909, McCay set out to test the strength of his Corps in the new arrangements under the General Staff. He issued a corps order which stated that the commanding officer of the Intelligence Corps in a military district had direct access to the District Commandant on all matters. Bridges, the Chief of the General Staff at the time, who was anxious to establish the supremacy of the General Staff in military planning, submitted the corps order to the Military Board for discussion. The Military Board decided that the commanding officer of the Intelligence Corps in a district might go direct to the District Commandant, but, for the most part, he was to liaise with the senior staff officer in the relevant section of the District Headquarters.[34]

The decision by the Military Board to restrict the access of the district sections, Australian Intelligence Corps, to the District Commandants, was an indication that the General Staff had superseded the Australian Intelligence Corps as the military planning section of the Commonwealth Military Forces. Recognising the subsidiary role of the Corps, McCay tried to join the General Staff. Legge noticed in August 1909 that McCay was pulling a lot of strings with the new minister but Legge was unable to discover his ultimate object.[35] However, he did not discount the possibility that McCay might attempt to join the General Staff as a permanent officer.[36] On 1 July 1909, McCay was appointed Director of Intelligence, Commonwealth Section, Imperial General Staff,

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[34] Military Board Minutes, 22 March 1909, AA CRS A2653.

[35] Letter from Legge to Bridges, 1 March, 1910, ibid.

[36] Ibid.

in addition to his command of the Australian Intelligence Corps. The post, Director of Intelligence, carried a salary of £150, and was a citizen soldier appointment. McCay was not a permanent member of the General Staff.[37] He wrote to Bridges on 25 November 1909 to tell him about his appointment.

> As you know, I am now on the General Staff. As I told Kirkpatrick yesterday, I took the appointment when offered (for I was offered it by J.C.) very promptly, though I did not consider myself qualified, for the reason that I wanted to be able to speak officially on all projects coming forward ...[38]

As Director of Intelligence, McCay conveyed to Bridges his satisfaction in dealing with 'big matters', and his personal association with the Chief of the General Staff, Hoad. In his efforts to become a permanent member of the General Staff, McCay incurred the disapproval of Legge who was concerned about the appointment of officers to the General Staff for political reasons. Legge told Bridges in March 1910 that McCay did nothing as Director of Intelligence.[39] On the question of compulsory military training, Legge discovered that McCay was attempting to persuade Hoad, but with no effect, 'to go against the scheme' outlined by Kitchener, and he told Bridges that the Director of Intelligence was a 'champion double-dealer.'[40] The explanation put forward by Legge about McCay's opinion on compulsory military training was that his chances of joining the General Staff were fading, and as a result, he was indulging in spitefulness. At the beginning of March 1910, Legge told Pethebridge, the Secretary, Department of Defence, that he saw through McCay's game and would resign if he joined the General Staff.[41]

The campaign by Legge to raise the quality and

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[37] Ibid.

[38] Letter from McCay to Bridges, 25 November 1909, ibid.

[39] Letter from Legge to Bridges, 1 March 1910, ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

standards of the General Staff had led to an intense personal struggle with Hoad. In August 1909, Hoad fell ill with heart problems and during the second week of that month, he conducted his work from a sofa.[42] In September, Hoad and Legge were battling once again. Wallack, in a letter written to Bridges on 29 September 1909, mentioned how Hoad was affected by the strain of the personal rivalry with Legge.

> You should hear Hoad and Legge fight on the Board!!! The former is done as his heart has gone seriously wrong. Any exertion or strain might kill him.[43]

Despite his ill health, Hoad clung to the task of implementing the defence scheme as amended by Lord Kitchener. According to Senator Pearce, the Labor defence minister, Hoad clung to his interest in compulsory military training for too long.[44] Legge, on the other hand, dispensed with politeness, and told Bridges that Hoad wanted 'all the honour and glory' for compulsory military training.[45]

The creation of the Imperial General Staff brought immediate opportunities for the Australian army to draw upon the resources of the British Indian Army. On 9 June 1910, Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig, Chief of the General Staff in India, wrote to Hoad and gave him a general account of military affairs in India.[46] In particular, he spoke about the development of the Imperial General Staff through the interchange of staff officers and training officers at the Staff College, Quetta. Under the organisation of the

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42 Letter from Legge to Bridges, 25 August 1909, ibid.

43 Letter from Wallack to Bridges, 29 September 1909, ibid.

44 The Age, 9 October 1911, p. 10.

45 Letter from Legge to Bridges, 1 March 1910, Bridges Papers - uncatalogued papers in the possession of Bridges-Maxwell.

46 Letter from Hoad to Haig, 9 June 1910, AA MP 153/10, file 10, no. W.O.S.

Imperial General Staff, the Commonwealth Military Forces and the British Indian Army had arranged an exchange of staff officers for the first time. Major Forsythe (later a Major-General in the A.I.F.) Instructional Staff, was attached to the staff in India and in February 1910, he took up duties as Brigade Major to the Ambala cavalry brigade. Haig hoped that Major Maxwell, the Brigade Major of the Ambala cavalry brigade,would take over Forsythe's work in Australia when he arrived there. He also noted that Lieutenant Harrison from Australia had joined the staff college course at Quetta.[47] It is worth noting that a Lieutenant Blamey succeeded Harrison as the next Australian staff college candidate in India.[48] In his case, the experience at Quetta proved useful for his career in the Australian army. Hoad replied to Haig on 7 September 1910 and asked if Australian officers on exchange in India might serve with 'smaller units' to gain regimental experience.[49] At that time, Captain Brand, a future Chief of the General Staff, was proceeding to India on exchange and five Australian officers of the citizen forces were due to participate in the Drill Season.

Another measure which was designed to assist with the military education of officers was the publication of the Commonwealth Military Journal.[50] On his return to Australia in 1909, Major-General Sir Charles Hoad suggested that a journal was essential to inform officers in urban and especially country areas about modern military developments.[51]

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47 Letter from Hoad to Haig, 6 and 24 August 1910, AA MP 153/10, file no. W.O.S.

48 Report on Lieutenant Blamey, Staff College, Quetta, Papers of Field-Marshal Sir T. Blamey, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

49 Letter from Hoad to Haig, 7 September 1910, AA MP 153/10, file no. W.O.S.

50 F.A. Wilson, 'Introductory', Commonwealth Military Journal, vol. 1 (1911), pp. iii-iv.

51 The United Service Institutions were established in capital cities, and catered to the largest group of officers, those serving in metropolitan areas. It was hoped that a journal would serve officers in rural centres, and eliminate the need for them to subscribe to British military journals.

His proposal was endorsed by Lord Kitchener when he visited Australia. In due course, permission was obtained from a number of service magazines and journals by the Australian General Staff to republish articles for the information of the Australian army.[52] The Commonwealth Military Journal was designed to aid officers studying the military profession by republishing articles of interest from overseas journals and encouraging overseas journals to submit articles to the journal for discussion. The journal was issued monthly, free of charge, to serving officers and those on the Unattached List of the Commonwealth Military Forces. To encourage officers to contribute articles, the defence minister, Senator George Pearce, offered a gold medal as an annual prize for the best essay written on a subject selected by the General Staff. The first issue of the Commonwealth Military Journal was published in April 1911.

The creation of an Australian General Staff, and the formation of the Imperial General Staff, highlighted the need to train officers for staff duties. One way of training officers for staff duties and gaining military experience, apart from the scheme of loan, attachment and interchange which was considered by Australian governments was the creation of a local military college. In 1906, Major-General Harry Finn, the Inspector-General, noted that there was a need for a military college.[53] The next year, Alfred Deakin explained to the Colonial Conference that a college was unnecessary because Australia's forces were too small to

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[52] The journals were: Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, The Cavalry Journal, Journal of the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers' Journal, Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps, National Defence Magazine, United Service Magazine, Arms and Explosives, Journal of the United Institution of India, Journal of the United States Artillery, Journal of the Military Service Institute of the United States.

[53] C.D. Coulthard-Clark, 'Genesis of the Royal Military College, Duntroon', Sabretache, Volume XIX (January 1979), p. 72; C.D. Coulthard-Clark, 'Duntroon and the Australian Army: A Study of the Royal Military College of Australia and its Place in the Australian Army, 1911-1979' (M.A. Thesis, 1980), University of N.S.W.

employ graduates from such an institution. In contrast, the graduates of R.M.C. Kingston, Canada, were allowed to take appointments in the British Army or the Civil Service if they were unable to find positions with the Canadian Military Forces. However, Australia was unwilling to follow the Canadian practice.

In 1908, the New Zealand government asked the Australian government if action would be taken to establish a military college. Bridges, the Chief of Intelligence, compiled a report for Deakin on the feasibility of a military college, in which he pointed out that the problems of employing graduates would remain.[54] Further consideration was given to the question when Hoad visited West Point during a tour of America and Europe in 1908-1909. He reported to the government that he wanted a military school to train officers in the permanent and citizen forces, conduct promotion courses, and give higher instruction for warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers. Bridges, who was asked to comment on Hoad's scheme by Cook, the defence minister, thought that a military college based on the model of West Point or Kingston was necessary. The advantage of the West Point or Kingston model was that the 'First appointments to the permanent forces would then be made for young men who had for some years been under strict discipline, and some military instruction.' He paid little attention to the specific points of Hoad's scheme. When Hoad became Chief of the General Staff in May 1909, he put forward his scheme to the Fusion ministry.[55]

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54 Report by Bridges sent to Pearce, 28 November 1908, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1862/7/102.

55 'Memorandum on the Establishment of Military College in Australia', by J.C. Hoad, C.G.S., 25 June 1908. AA MP 84/1, file no. 1862/4/6; 'Extracts from Report submitted to the Honorable the Minister of State for Defence by J.C. Hoad, Inspector-General, Commonwealth Military Forces, in connection with Tour of Duty in the United Kingdom and the United States of America, 1908-1909', AA A119, file no. 7610/20.10; see AA MP 133/2, file no. 92/1/26.

In addition to his original scheme, he also suggested three cadetships per year for young men who wished to join the permanent forces as officers. The cadetship officers would be required to train at the college for a year, and then serve for seven years. The teaching staff at the college under his scheme totalled six and included a Chief Instructor, who was a Major from the British Army. Hoad pressed his scheme once more in November when parliament discussed the Defence Bill to introduce compulsory military training.[56] Knowing that the Director of the College needed to be appointed as soon as possible in order to settle 'the force and character of the instruction for which the College is to be responsible', Hoad nominated Colonel Foster, the Director of Military Science at the University of Sydney, for the appointment. He mentioned that Foster was offered the appointment, Commandant, R.M.C. Kingston, Canada in 1901 to support his case. However, Hoad did not state that the Canadian government rejected Foster because he was regarded as a poor disciplinarian. Foster was not deterred by his Canadian experience, and he wrote to Bridges on 7 October 1909 about his ambition to lead the military college.

> I wish they would think of asking me to start their Military College here. I have views as to what it could do ...[57]

He stated his case in public when he published an article in the Argus on 13 November 1909.[58] The article outlined his concept for the military college which was identical with the ideas in Hoad's minutes to the Commonwealth Government. The fate of the college directorship, however, hinged on the report by Lord Kitchener.

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56 Letter from Hoad to J. Cook, Minister for Defence, 10 November 1909, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1862/4/6.

57 Letter from Foster to Bridges, 7 October 1909, Papers of Major-General Sir W.T. Bridges, Bridges Memorial Library, Royal Military College, Duntroon.

58 Argus, 13 November 1909.

Alfred Deakin had invited Kitchener to Australia to comment and report on the defence arrangements made by the Commonwealth Government. The Fusion government took the opportunity presented by his visit to settle the style and purpose of the military college by asking him to adjudicate between the different views of Hoad and Bridges. Kitchener knew something about Bridges' views on Australian defence through Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick, a future Inspector-General of the Commonwealth Military Forces, 1911-1913. Kirkpatrick, a friend of Bridges, who served on Kitchener's staff in India, had told Bridges about the forthcoming visit to Australia.[59] In reply Bridges had written to Kirkpatrick from Ceylon about the 1909 Imperial Conference and the proposals for the Imperial General Staff. In return, Kirkpatrick wrote to Bridges and told him that he had acquainted Kitchener with the views expressed in his letter. Furthermore, he was told that Lord Kitchener wanted Bridges to inform him about the Imperial General Staff.[60] The importance of the contact with Kitchener for Bridges was demonstrated in his Australian visit, especially as Kirkpatrick was the Field-Marshal's staff officer.

Kitchener was well aware of the need to establish a high class primarily military educational system for officers in Australia. He set to work on the military college proposal early in his visit and recommended Bridges as 'the only Australian to fill the bill' for Director. Legge told Bridges in a letter on 1 March 1910 about his nomination by Kitchener.

> ... Then, that he (Kitchener) told Cook right off he was going to recommend a College, not on the same lines as that included in the Act of 1909, that Cook accepted it, and asked him to recommend someone as Director, that he then, on what he knows of you, suggested you. Keeping in his own mind the fact that he should only recommend an Australian ... I was at the time working out a rough

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[59] Letter from Kirkpatrick to Bridges, 15 July 1909, Papers of Major-General Sir W.T. Bridges, Royal Military College, Duntroon.

> estimate of the cost of the College for K, and mentioning one day to him that we should require an Imperial Colonel for Director, he said, no, put down 'Brigadier-General at £1,200, and leave out the Imperial'.[61]

Cook followed Kitchener's recommendation. Bridges received a cable on 19 January asking him to return to Australia to direct and supervise the formation and development of a military college based on the West Point model.[62] Although Bridges agreed with the West Point model as the example for a local military college, he suggested the appointment of an Imperial Officer as Director.[63] Cook, however, was not swayed by Bridges' deference to the British Army, and asked him on 26 January to return to Australia 'by way of America if you wish.'[64] Bridges was reluctant to leave London because he thought that the position of Dominion Representative, Imperial General Staff, was valuable for Australian defence. He accepted Cook's offer and visited Sandhurst and Woolwich to acquire information about the functioning of a military college. He also visited West Point in America.

Legge, who was the chief author of the scheme of compulsory military training, urged Bridges to make 'provisional regulations' for the college before he reached Australia 'because it is most important to make a practical start if possible in July next.' On a personal note, Legge told Bridges not to have misgivings about his departure from London.

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60 Ibid.

61 Letter from Legge to Bridges, 1 March 1910, Bridges Papers - uncatalogued papers in the possession of Bridges-Maxwell.

62 Cable to Colonel Bridges, 15 January 1910, AA MP 133/2, file 0.92/1/26.

63 Ibid.

64 Military Board Papers of Historical Interest, vol. II, AA CRS A2653.

> ... The [one] you are coming to is the grandest any man could wish. Think of it. In fifty years, the spirit of the Australian army will be what you put into the students of the first ten years. Good directors may follow you, but you are going to lay down the lines, from which they must diverge ...[65]

Bridges planned to leave London for Australia in March.

Bridges' departure was delayed by political events in Australia. The prospect of a change in government in the first half of 1910, as Coulthard-Clark has suggested, kept Bridges in London with an expectation that a Labor government under Fisher might review his situation.[66] The Fusion Defence Minister, Cook, asked the secretary of his department if Bridges had left London at the end of March. The reply was that no cables had been received from London. When Labor returned to power on 29 April 1910, the defence minister, Senator Pearce, set about clarifying the situation with Bridges. On 30 April 1910, Pearce sent a cable to the High Commissioner in London, Sir George Reid, and asked Bridges to send his views about the prospect of staying in England.[67] Unfortunately for Bridges, his boat had sailed for Marseilles the day before. He resented his recall to Australia and his War Office friend, Colonel Kiggell, made the Melbourne officials aware that in Bridges' case, it was a pity that 'Pearce did not get into office a fortnight sooner.'[68]

The Royal Military College, Duntroon, was designed by Bridges to follow the examples of West Point and R.M.C. Kingston, where graduate officers studied the technical subject of their profession as well as civil subjects such as English and History. He wanted the military college to

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65 Letter from Legge to Bridges, 1 March 1910, Bridges Papers - uncatalogued papers in the possession of Bridges-Maxwell.

66 Coulthard-Clark, A Heritage of Spirit, p. 93.

67 Ibid.

68 Letter from Kiggell to Bridges, 22 July 1910, Papers of Major-General Sir W.T. Bridges, Royal Military College, Duntroon.

mould the character of the cadets 'by means of strict, consistent and continuous discipline.' In plumping for a general and thorough military education system at the college, Bridges was aware of the need to prepare officer cadets for their duties in the Staff Corps as area officers under the scheme of compulsory military training. Unlike the graduates of West Point, Woolwich and Sandhurst, the Duntroon graduates had no opportunity of obtaining regimental experience unless they served with a British regiment in England or India.[69] The appointment as an area officer was the first rung in the ladder of promotion for graduates from Duntroon. Bridges insisted on Imperial Military staff for the college and teachers from the universities of Sydney and Melbourne for the civil subjects. Pearce, the defence minister, was in favour of recruiting Australian officers as military instructors, but acquiesced in Bridges' selection of Imperial officers, especially as the best teachers were needed for the college. The four Imperial officers were Lieut.-Colonel C. Gwynn, Director of Military Art, Lieut.-Colonel E.G. Sinclair-Maclagan, Director of Drill, Captain R. Walla, Instructor in Military Engineering, and Instructor in Mounted Drill and Riding, the Hon. Lieut. J. Lloyd-Evans. The college was opened on 27 June 1911 by the Governor-General, the Earl of Dudley. Hoad, who was too ill to attend the opening, wrote a speech which was read by Lieut.-Colonel J.G. Legge, a future commandant of the college.

> Absent though I am, through causes beyond my control, from this memorable event in the military history of Australia, I bid God-speed to the College. Australians, first of all the British race, have seriously considered the necessity of universal training ... The aim of true Australians has always been to have a military force, officered and trained by Australians, supplied with arms and equipment made in Australia, and ready to lay down their lives for the defence of Australia. For this reason has the

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68 Letter from Kiggell to Bridges, 22 July 1910, Papers of Major-General Sir W.T. Bridges, Royal Military College, Duntroon.

> Military College of Australia been called into being to take those young Australians who have already shown their ability in examination contest, and make of them skilled instructors who will train the future officers and men of our citizen army.[70]

Hoad died later that year on 6 October.

During his illness, the acting Chief of the General Staff was Major Wilson, a British officer, who was a Staff College graduate of Camberley.[71] Wilson carried out routine work until he was replaced by Gordon.

The new Chief of the General Staff, Gordon, faced the problem of preparing Australia's army for conflict in an unsettled international environment. In dealing with Australia's defence, the General Staff was aided by the fact that the Pacific centred strategic analysis had become settled policy by 1911.

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70 Commonwealth Military Journal, vol. I (1911), pp. 652-653.

71 J.M. Gordon, The Chronicles of A Gay Gordon (London, 1921), p. 381.

CHAPTER V

AUSTRALIAN AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE, 1911 - 1914

In the three years before World War I, the Australian General Staff sought to carry out Lord Kitchener's programme which was aimed at providing military defence against Japan, and drew up war plans to deal with an unsettled Pacific region in the event of the mother country being involved in European war.[1] Australia was, in the words of George Foster Pearce, the 'sentinel of the Pacific'[2] maintaining the grandeur of British power. At the same time, Australia faced the possibility that Japan would take decisive action against British interests in the Pacific following the outbreak of an Anglo-German war.[3]

STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Australian fears about Japan and the Pacific were not fully understood by War Office planners in their preparations for the Imperial Conference of 1911. Major-General L.E. Kiggell, Director of Staff Duties at the War Office, noted that Australia was likely to ask about the expected contingencies in military affairs involving the Empire before 1915, the expiry year of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. As well, Australia might enquire about requests for support from the British government in the event of an

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1 Argus, 13 June 1911; Meaney, op. cit., p. 214; 'Memorandum on a possible solution of the question as to the retention of the Dominions to the Home Government, 12 June 1911, p. 2', Papers of H.H. Asquith, 1st Earl of Oxford and Asquith, Bodleian Library, Oxford University, MS 24; 'Home Defence: Memorandum on the principles governing the Defence of the United Kingdom, 23 April 1911, pp. 3-4', PRO WO 33/515.

2 Argus, 15 December 1911.

3 Argus, 2 July 1912; see the article by J.A. Hogue, a former Minister for Education in New South Wales in the journal Nineteenth Century, July 1912, about the growing power of Japan in the Pacific.

Imperial military crisis.[4] The Director of Military Operations, Major-General Sir Henry Wilson, later Field Marshal and Chief of the Imperial General Staff during World War I, commenting on Kiggell's remarks stated that an exact description of expected contingencies before 1915 was out of the question. He believed that Dominion troops should, in principle, 'be placed under the orders of the C.I.G.S. and made available for service in any part of the world.'[5] Wilson omitted any reference to operations in Europe.[6]

The concern by the War Office not to arouse Australian suspicions about the ultimate object of Imperial defence planning paid dividends at the meeting of the Military Sub-Committee of the Imperial Conference on 14 and 17 June 1911. Pearce asked for information about the views of the Imperial General Staff on the 'sphere of operations' for Australian troops. Sir Frederick Borden, the Defence Minister of Canada, countered Pearce immediately, and reminded the delegates that local force development was essential if the Imperial General staff was to assist the Dominions and colonies. He wondered in what situations Great Britain would aid Canada and the other members of the Empire. Bordern was content with the broad statements of the Imperial Conference, 1909. Lieutenant-General Sir William Nicholson, however, was unable to answer Borden about the question of aid by Great Britain to the Dominions and colonies. In contrast to Borden, Pearce stated that in the case of New Zealand, sections of the population were likely to volunteer in the likelihood of a war involving the mother country. He was, by implication, also suggesting that Australian volunteer support would be forthcoming, and urged the local General

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4 J. Gooch, 'The Myth of Imperial Defence', RHC/72/7/ Institute of Commonwealth Studies Papers, University of London.

5 Minute by Director of Military Operations, 10 April 1911, PRO WO 106/43/Imp. C. 10.

6 PRO Cab 5/2/2/F6 C.

Staffs to prepare schemes of mobilisation for co-operation in war. Nicholson ended his remarks by telling the delegates that 'England' had a scheme for the deployment of Dominion troops overseas but he refused to provide details.[7] He thought that the Dominions had the duty to make up plans for contributing military aid in an Imperial war.

After the Imperial Conference, no progress was made on the formulation of war plans by an Imperial General Staff with Dominion participation. Australia chose to continue sending an officer as the Dominion military representative on the Imperial General Staff. Bridges was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel J.G. Legge who took up duty at the War Office in July 1912. Legge's successor was Colonel H. Chauvel who arrived in London during July 1914. The duties and tasks of the Dominion representative on the Imperial General Staff were restricted, and Legge and Chauvel like Bridges found that they were mere observers at the War Office. The plan by the War Office to include the Dominion armies in Imperial defence planning, especially in the preparation of war plans for an Anglo-German crisis, had come to nought.[8] For the Australian General Staff, the most important task in 1911 after the need to develop the scheme of compulsory military training was the preparation of general and local schemes of defence.[9]

The officer chosen by Senator George Pearce, the defence minister, to direct and oversee the formulation of a general scheme of Australian defence was Brigadier-General J.M. Gordon. On 10 October 1911, Gordon, who was commandant of the Second Military District, wrote to Commander Pethebridge, Secretary, Department of Defence, and asked him to submit the details of his service to Pearce.

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[7] Proceedings of the Defence (Military) Committee of the Imperial Conference, 1911, pp. 3-22, PRO WO 106/32/Imp. C. 10.

[8] See Governor-General's Office, General Correspondence - 'General Staff', 23.1.1912 to 17.8.1914. AA CP/22 Item 1912/77; Argus, 30 May 1911.

[9] J.M. Gordon, The Chronicles of a Gay Gordon (London, 1921), pp. 308-309.

> In view of the fact of the appointment of Chief of the General Staff having become vacant, I forward herewith a copy of Remarks, submitted early in this year for the information of the Minister for Defence. It is requested that the same may be brought to the notice of the Minister, as early as possible, seeing that reports have appeared in the Daily Press to the effect that 'an officer' who is wrongly stated to be senior to myself, but who is my junior, is expected to be offered the appointment.[10]

In particular, Gordon drew attention to his speech on 7 August 1905 to the Royal Society in Sydney. The speech referred to Japan as a potential enemy and called for the introduction of Universal Training.[11] In conclusion, Gordon stated that he had proved his qualifications for leadership of the General Staff on the battlefield during the Boer War. Pearce, like Gordon, was alive to the impact made by Japan on the geopolitical environment of the Pacific after the Russo-Japanese War. At the conclusion of the Imperial Conference 1911, he had, out of interest, decided to travel through Russia by the Trans-Siberian Railway to Japan on his way to Australia.[12] The visit to Japan confirmed his anxiety about Japanese aspirations in the Pacific and he chose Gordon, who saw Japan as a potential enemy, as Chief of the General Staff. He was appointed on 11 May 1912.[13] His first request to Pearce was the recall of Captain

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10 Letter from Brigadier-General J.M. Gordon to the Secretary, Department of Defence, 10 October 1911, AA MP84, file no. 1828/2/214.

11 SMH, 8 August 1905; Age, 8 August 1905; Daily Telegraph, 8 and 9 August 1905; 'Papers on the Scheme of Defence, 4 September 1905, prepared by Brigadier-General Gordon', AA B133, file no. 05/181. The other speakers at the Royal Society meeting who supported Gordon were Sir N. MacLaurin, Chancellor of the University of Sydney, Lieutenant-Colonel J.M. Orstow (Mounted Rifles), Lieutenant-Colonel W.C. Vernon (Lancers) and Major J.G. Legge. See Chapter II, pp. 69-78.

12 P. Heydon, Quiet Decision - A Study of George Foster Pearce (Melbourne, 1965), p. 24.

13 Argus, 24 April 1912.

Brudenell White, who was serving in the War Office, to assist with the general Australian defence scheme. By 1912, White had established a solid reputation as a staff officer of considerable ability, temper and tact.[14] On his return to Australia, he was made Director of Military Operations. The former Acting Chief of the General Staff, Wilson, became Director of Military Training, and was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel.

The appointment of Brigadier-General Gordon strengthened the ascendancy of the Pacific centred strategic analysis in military planning as preparations were made for the defence of Australia from 1911 to 1914. Under the Fisher Labor government from 29 April 1910 to 24 June 1913, the Council of Defence was revitalised and given the responsibility of dealing with the preparation of a general scheme of defence for Australia.[15] At the meeting of the Council of Defence on 8 July 1912, Brigadier-General Gordon undertook to draft a memorandum on two papers by the Colonial Defence Committee. The papers were 'Australia - Scale of Attack under existing conditions', and 'Australia and New Zealand - Strategic situation in the event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance being determined.'[16] In the paper on the possible scale of attack under existing conditions, the Colonial Defence Committee had concluded that Australia needed to prepare for a raiding

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14 Memorandum from Colonel G.S. Adye to D.M.O., War Office, 5 October 1910, AA MP84, file no. 1894/5/39.

15 'Minutes of the meeting, 8 July 1912', Department of Defence (III), Council of Defence Minutes - Council of Defence Meetings, 12.5.1905 to 26.2.1915, AA CRs A2032/XR Item Whole Series.

16 'Minutes of the meeting, 8 July 1912', Department of Defence (III), Council of Defence Minutes - Council of Defence Meetings, 12.5.1905 to 26.2.1915, AA CRs A2032/XR Item Whole Series; 'Secret - Australia: Scale of Attack under Existing Conditions, 24 February 1911. Memorandum by C.D.C.', no. 429m. PRO Cab 8/5; 'Secret - Australia and New Zealand: Strategic situation in the event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance being Determined, 3 May 1911', no. 442m. PRO Cab 8/5.

attack by three or four unarmoured cruisers carrying small landing forces. The advice to the Australian government was based on the assumption that France, Germany, the Philippines, the United States or Japan were unlikely to mount a large scale invasion against Australia. With reference to Japan, the Colonial Defence Committee stated that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance relieved the British from considering the scale of attack 'that modern Japan could bring to bear on British possessions in the Pacific.'

> For, so long as the Japanese alliance remains operative, not only is the risk of attack by Japan excluded from the category of reasonable probabilities to be provided against, but British naval requirements are held to be adequately met if the combined British and Japanese forces in the Eastern seas are superior to the forces of any probable combination of two naval powers.[17]

At the end of the paper, however, a qualification was added about the need for a reassessment of the scale of attack in the event of the Anglo-Japanese alliance being 'determined' which appealed to Australian susceptibilities about Japan. The second paper on the strategic situation in the event of the Anglo-Japanese alliance being 'determined' postulated that the local command of the Pacific on the outbreak of war might be with Japan.[18] Furthermore, it was possible for Japan during that period to convey a large military force to Australia or New Zealand. The Colonial Defence Committee commented that Japan would need to make certain that British power was worsted before a large scale invasion of Australia or New Zealand was attempted. The paper also considered a raid on Australia by Japan in combination with a European naval power. The probability of a combination raid by Japan and a European power depended on the efficiency of the local

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17 'Secret - Australia: Scale of Attack under Existing Conditions, 24 February 1911', no. 492m. PRO Cab. 8/5.

18 'Secret - Australia and New Zealand: Strategic Situation in the event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance being Determined, 3 May 1911', no. 442m. PRO Cab. 8/5.

naval and military forces of the Dominions and their contribution to the naval forces of the Empire. A British Pacific fleet larger than the Japanese fleet would make raids by Japan a hazardous operation. In Australia, the compulsory military training scheme was capable of meeting such raids.[19]

Brigadier-General Gordon drafted his memorandum on 'Strategical Considerations', and sent a copy to the Secretary, Department of Defence, on 2 August 1912.

The memorandum dealt with the relative weakness of British sea power in the Pacific.

> ... as in the past, national considerations may require the concentration of British naval forces in one or other theatre of operations. It follows that, in seas remote from such a concentration, the British naval forces may find themselves for the moment inferior in force to an actual and potential enemy. In such a situation although the Empire's ultimate superiority at sea might not be a matter of doubt, some time might elapse before such command of the sea was definitely assured in the Australian waters.
>
> In considering the scale and nature of overseas attack that the temporary possession of the local command of the Pacific would enable an Eastern Power to bring to bear on Australia,... During the period that the local command of the Pacific rested with an Eastern Power the despatch of a raiding force across the sea against British possessions in that region would be a practical operation of war for that Power.[20]

Gordon argued that strong and efficient naval and military forces in Australia would force an enemy to

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19 Ibid.

20 'Scheme of Defence - Mobile Forces of Australia: Strategical Considerations', attached to a letter from Brigadier-General Gordon to Secretary, Department of Defence, 2 August 1912, AA B197, file no. 1856/4/156.

> determine whether the probable result of an attempt by a raiding force to effect serious damage before being destroyed or compelled to surrender would be commensurate with the risks incurred in the enterprise.[21]

He also recognised that the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would force Australia to consider other attacks besides a raid by battle cruisers. In order to deal with raids by cruisers or larger attacks, Gordon recommended a land force of 100,000 men, divided into a mobile expeditionary force and units to defend naval bases and auxiliary harbours. The mobile expeditionary force was designed to defend the Northern Territory and Western Australia. The Chief of the General Staff also suggested that Australian war plans must include schemes for the occupation of possible hostile bases in French New Caledonia, the German and Dutch possessions in the Bismarck Archipelago, New Guinea, Java and the Flores Seas. He insisted that plans of military operations provided for the despatch of Australian troops overseas as an extension of the requirements for home defence. In the covering letter to his memorandum, Gordon asked the Secretary of the defence department to tell the War Office that the General Staff had almost finished schemes outlining the duties of headquarters staff for the mobilisation and concentration of troops in the field army and defended ports.

The operation of the mobile expeditionary force and the call by Gordon for Australia to draw plans for the occupation of possible hostile bases in the Pacific was advanced further by the efforts of the Australian and New Zealand governments in 1912 and 1913 to co-operate in defence. Andrew Fisher, who was Prime Minister from 29 April 1910 to 24 June 1913, supported closer defence links with New Zealand and sponsored a resolution to that effect at the Fifth Commonwealth Conference of the ALP in January 1912, which was

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21 Ibid., J.O. Langtry and D.J. Ball, Controlling Australia's Threat Environment (Canberra, 1979), pp. 1-33.

passed unanimously.[22] When the Reform Party was elected to government in New Zealand in August 1912, he called again for closer defence and trade links with New Zealand.[23] One month later, in September, Colonel J.R. Allen, the New Zealand defence minister, showed interest in Fisher's ideas for close co-operation. With the encouragement of Admiral Sir George King-Hall, the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian squadron, Australia started discussions with the New Zealand government on Pacific defence. King-Hall wanted Australia and New Zealand to form a Pacific Division of the Imperial Fleet and pointed to the danger of an alliance between Germany and Japan.[24]

In the military sphere, Gordon took the initiative and urged Pearce, the defence minister, to negotiate with New Zealand about mutual co-operation.

> The situation in Europe is of the gravest ... (and) if war ensues it is impossible to say what complications may result. Australia and New Zealand stand alone in the Southern pacific ... (and) depend upon mutual assistance. The Chief of the General Staff considers the situation so grave that he respectfully submits that negotiations between the Commonwealth and Dominion Governments should be initiated at the earliest moment. The Chief of the General Staff is prepared at once to submit proposals for giving effect to any action the Government may consider desirable.[25]

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22 Official Report of the Fifth Commonwealth Conference of the ALP, 8 to 12 January 1912.

23 Argus, 19 August 1912.

24 SMH, 11 November 1912; Despatch from Admiral Sir George King-Hall to Lord Denman, Governor-General, Commonwealth of Australia, 13 September 1912, AA CP 78/64/. Colonel Allen, who was present when King-Hall called for closer co-operation between the Pacific dominions on 10 November 1912, agreed to discuss the proposal with the Council of Defence before he went to London in December 1912.

25 Minute from Chief of the Commonwealth Section, Imperial General Staff to the Secretary for Defence, 4 October 1912, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1856/1/33.

Pearce followed Gordon's suggestion and asked the New Zealand government to give General Godley, General Officer commanding, New Zealand Forces authorisation to discuss 'any proposed scheme of mutual assistance' when he visited Australia in November 1912. The discussions between Gordon and Godley were held on 18 November 1912. Pearce attended the meeting and made the opening remarks. The point made by Pearce was the Australian problem of mounting an Imperial expeditionary Force when 'there is no power to employ the respective forces overseas unless they voluntarily agree so to serve.'[26] He added that the calculation of a quota of troops for an Imperial expeditionary force was difficult. After making these comments, he withdrew and left Godley and Gordon to seek ways of co-operation.

The discussions between Godley and Gordon examined co-operation between Australia and New Zealand in the Empire and more specifically in the Pacific. On the question of a military contribution to the Empire, they agreed the creation of an Australasian unit to be desirable in order to avoid the despatch of 'fragmented organisations.'[27] In suggesting the formation of an Australasian division, Godley and Gordon realised that the Dominion governments were not committed to action by such a plan. They also noted that other means were available for the procurement of troops besides voluntary enlistment. One way was the creation of an extra-territorial force from trainees which was separate from the home defence organisations. Another was the formation of a unit through invitations to every regiment, battalion and battery to register the names of a number of individuals for service overseas. However, they realised that the question was the responsibility of the respective Dominion governments. The other avenue of co-operation,

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26 Proceedings of the Conference between Major-General A.J. Godley, C.B., Commanding New Zealand Military Forces, and Brigadier-General J.M. Gordon, C.N., Chief of the General Staff, C.M. Forces, 18 November 1912, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1856/1/33.

27 See table of their alternative proposals. Ibid.

apart from a contribution to an Imperial expeditionary force, discussed by Godley and Gordon, was the conduct of operations in the East Indian Archipelago or the Pacific. They defined the respective spheres of responsibility for Australia and New Zealand. Australia had responsibility for all foreign and other possessions west of the 170th degree longitude while the remainder was allotted to New Zealand. They also recommended that New Zealand place orders for ammunition with the Australian government.[28] As well, they urged that the respective members of the New Zealand and Australian General Staffs correspond on the collection and distribution of intelligence and war preparations. Both the Australian and New Zealand governments concurred in the remarks by Godley. In a letter to Andrew Fisher on 27 February 1913, Prime Minister Massey stated that New Zealand would need 3,000 rifles and bayonets, 4,000 rifle barrels and 12 tons of cordite. Further discussion about Pacific defence between Australia and New Zealand was held in Melbourne on 23 December 1912 when Colonel J. Allen, the New Zealand defence minister, attended a meeting of the Council of Defence. No detailed minutes of the meeting were kept. However, the meeting was more important than the brief minutes suggest. The Australian government decided not to proceed with the formulation of plans for military co-operation with New Zealand until Colonel Allen returned from England.

The concern held by Australia about the future of geo-politics in the Pacific was pushed aside by the British military planners. In a secret memorandum on the preparation of local defence schemes for Australia on 2 April 1913, the Overseas Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence urged the Australian government not to concentrate exclusively on local operations to the detriment of Imperial interest.

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28 Ibid.

> In a great war in which the British Empire is involved the ultimate fate of the component parts of that Empire will not, as a rule, depend on local operations, but on the final issues of the main struggle at the decisive point ... in the case of a prolonged struggle it is reasonably probable that even forces so widely separated will be able to reach the theatre of operations in time for effective action. Although, therefore, it may be desirable that all the details should be worked out to enable the immediate assumption of the offensive against foreign territory in Australasian waters, yet it should at the same time be borne in mind that a strategical situation may arise when the ultimate fate of the British Empire and of Australia herself may well depend on the employment at the decisive point of all the available naval and military forces of the Empire.[29]

The planners in Whitehall wanted Australian defence plans to contemplate the despatch of troops overseas 'as may from time to time be deemed necessary.' However, Australian attention, especially that of the senior naval and military officers, was focussed directly on the Pacific and Japan.

In 1913, Brigadier-General Gordon, Chief of the General Staff, Commander Thring and Captain Hughes-Onslow, produced documents on the strategic situation facing Australia in the Pacific and the Far East which amounted to a strongly argued case for the Pacific oriented strategy in Australian defence. The assessments made by the officers were based on their visit to Papua, Thursday Island and the Northern Territory earlier in the year. The purpose of their visit to the northern littoral of Australia was to report on the future of Thursday Island as a fortified base and to site a high-powered wireless station. According to Commander Thring, the officers had, 'whilst at sea, time to study and discuss, from the point of view of both arms, the general and

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29 'Memorandum - Secret - on the preparation of defence Schemes for Australia, by the Overseas Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 2 April 1913', PRO Cab 38/23/15.

strategical questions connected with the defence of Australia.'[30]

In his report on 16 June 1913, Brigadier-General Gordon stated that Australia was unable to rely upon British warships despatched from the North Sea or the Mediterranean in the event of war. Australia had to contend with Japanese naval power in the South Pacific, especially in the absence of a strong 'American fleet on the West Coast of the United States.'[31] Japan had two possible routes to Australia, (a) from Japan to the Philippines, the Celebes Sea and Timor or (b) from Japan to Jamestown - Solomon Islands or the New Hebrides. Gordon thought that a Canadian Pacific Squadron acting with an American Pacific Squadron would deter Japan from moving outside its home waters. As well, Japan was unlikely to risk attack on its line of communications on the Manila route while a Canadian-American squadron operated in the Pacific.[32]

The weakness of his scenario was the absence of a Canadian-American squadron in the Pacific and the failure of New Zealand to outline a naval policy. The important question on naval policy was the disposal of the Australian fleet unit to meet a Japanese attack made in force or operations designed to restrict the trade relations of Australia and the Empire. With reference to naval and military operations against Japan, Gordon urged a study of the communications and population of the Australian northern littoral from Broome to Cardwell, and the relation of harbours to the trade routes of Australian commerce.[33] He agreed with the conclusion of the naval members that there was an urgent need to select harbours for the operation of

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30 'Secret Report on the Naval Defence of Australia' by Commander W.H. Thring, 5 July 1913, AA MP 1049/1, file no. 15/054.

31 'A Review of General Naval and Military Considerations Affecting the Defence of the Commonwealth', by Brigadier-General Gordon, 16 June 1913, AA B197, file no. 855/1/6.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

the Australian Fleet unit in the north of Australia.

> The strategical considerations point to the Northern Pacific from the North West Corner - Port Darwin - Torres Straits (Thursday Island) - Papua and Solomon Islands, being the vulnerable littoral from an attack by Japan.[34]

The concern held by the naval and military officers about the northern littoral of Australia was simple. The General Staff, like the senior naval officers, believed that in the event of war in Europe, an Eastern power with command of the sea might transport 40,000 to 50,000 troops to Australia with the object of occupying territory, and securing it.

> ... If this is correct then it appears that a substantial raiding force which could occupy territory out of the reach of molestation by local forces would achieve as much at far less risk and expense as an invading army ... The General Staff are at present engaged upon a careful study from which it is hoped subsequently to deduce data upon which opinion can be based as to the strength of the forces of an enemy which might by its own exertions, maintain itself in the northern littoral of Australia ... it would appear that the north-western territory of Western Australia, the Northern Territory proper, and the northern coast of Queensland are all localities capable of maintaining at least 10,000 men. If this opinion proves to be correct, it must be pointed out that without railway communication it is not possible for the land forces of Australia to depose a force established in any one of these territories.[35]

Gordon discarded the possibility of Australia raising a 'large Fleet Unit' to carry an Expeditionary Force to the

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34 Ibid.

35 'Secret Memorandum by the Chief of the General Staff on the Northern Territory of Australia and its Effect on Local Naval and Military Preparations', by Brigadier-General J.M. Gordon, 16 June 1913, AA B197, file no. 1855/1/6.

North because there were inadequate resources for its supply and support. The limited military action available to Australia was the establishment of permanent garrisons, naval bases, and wireless stations.[36] He also noted that under compulsory military training, Australia would not have a 'virile and young army' until 1919, when the trainees reached the age of 25. The logic of the military planners about the potential danger of Japan was made clear from information sent from Colonel Legge, the Dominion Representative on the Imperial General Staff, to Major Brudenell White, Director of Military Operations, in a letter of 25 July 1913.[37] According to Legge, the distance from Yokohama to Sydney for Japanese transport vessels, was 4,316 'naval' miles. At a maximum speed of 12 knots, the time of the journey for the Japanese vessels would be fourteen and a half days. Legge stated that Japanese divisions were able to mobilise within seven days of an order, and embark for action in two weeks. With reference to the transportation of troops, the information in the letter said that a Japanese division required 120,000 tons of transport but only in ships of 3,000 tons and upwards. The statistics available on Japanese shipping enabled Legge to calculate that Japan had sufficient resources for the transportation of six divisions overseas. He calculated that Japan possessed the ability and capacity to send three divisions to Australia in under four weeks from the date of mobilisation. More to the point, Legge said 'the Japs could, if they chose, do it without giving us even indirect information of more than 7 to 14 days.'[38]

In view of the threat posed by Japan in the Pacific and the relative weakness of Australian military defence, Gordon recommended a conference of the British Pacific Dominions to discuss local naval and military preparations. He also called for a detailed study of the northern littoral of

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36 Meaney, op. cit., pp. 120-159.

37 Letter from Colonel J.G. Legge to Major C.B.B. White, 25 July 1913, AA MP 826 Box I.

38 Ibid.

Australia with reference to naval and military defence. The minister, George Pearce, on 20 June 1913, noted the papers by Gordon and recommended that each member of the Council of Defence receive copies. The fate of the report by Gordon is unknown. The Council of Defence did not meet from 5 February 1913 until 9 February 1915, and on 24 June 1913, the Labor government led by Andrew Fisher lost power and Joseph Cook, the leader of the Liberal Party, became Prime Minister.

The change of government in June 1913, however, did not affect the planning for military co-operation with New Zealand. In anticipation of the return of Colonel Allen from London, Gordon told Senator Edward Millen, the new defence minister, on 2 July 1913, that Pearce had authorised the preparation of plans for the employment of Australian troops overseas and a scheme of co-operation with New Zealand.[39] Indeed, Colonel Allen discussed with the British Army Council in August 1913 a plan for an expeditionary force to aid the Empire in war. Three months later, on 14 November 1914, Major Brudenell White presented Millen with the composition of an Australasian division for despatch overseas in time of war. The proposed division was 18,000 strong with 12,000 troops from Australia and 6,000 from New Zealand. There is no record extant that Millen agreed to the scheme of co-operation presented by White. However, the plan of an Australasian division as an expeditionary force drawn up by White provided Australia with the option of assisting with the defence of the Empire in Europe.

DEFENCE PLANS

The details worked out by Major White for military co-operation with New Zealand in an Imperial Expeditionary Force provided Australia with a contingency plan to defend

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[39] Minute from Gordon to Secretary, Department of Defence, 2 July 1913, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1856/1/33.

her interests 'elsewhere than in Australia.'[40] However, the scheme of military co-operation did not commit the Australian government to automatic assistance of the Imperial cause in the event of war. Brigadier-General Gordon suggested that the Australian government inform the Imperial authorities about the limitations on the service of Australian troops overseas, especially in the case of the proposed Imperial Expeditionary Force by New Zealand and Australia.[41] He also wanted the War Office to comment on the composition of the expeditionary force. The British did not make any suggestions on the expeditionary force until the outbreak of World War I.

The caution which was exercised by the General Staff in avoiding an automatic commitment to assist Great Britain in the event of war reflected the general fear about Japanese intentions in the Pacific. At the national political level, the Liberal Prime Minister, Joseph Cook, faced the dilemma of Australian and Imperial defence in the reversal by the British government of its commitments to the 1909 scheme of Pacific naval defence. On 17 March 1914, Winston Churchill asked whether it was necessary for Dominion navies or their capital ships to remain in local waters.[42] He wanted the Dominion navies under Admiralty control and available for service against the German naval challenge. More to the point, Churchill stated that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was sound and therefore there was no need for Dominion battle cruisers to stay in the Pacific. Joseph Cook who believed that local Australian naval defence was just as important as the general defence of the Empire, could not accept the reliance placed by Churchill on the Anglo-Japanese alliance for the security of the Pacific.[43] Senator E.D. Millen

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40 'Secret - Defence Scheme for the Commonwealth of Australia - Chapter I - 2nd Proof', AA MP 1049/1, file no. 14/0188.

41 Minute from Brigadier-General Gordon to Secretary, Department of Defence, 2 July 1913 (initialled also by White), AA MP 84/1, file no. 1856/1/33.

42 Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), vol. LIX, 17 March 1914, pp. 1931-1935.

43 SMH, 26 March 1914.

commented that the Australian government would not transfer its ships to British waters.[44] The Labor leader, Andrew Fisher, also supported the views held by Cook and Millen.[45]

The resolution of the dilemma about Australian and Imperial defence in early 1914 was decided in favour of the Pacific centred strategic analysis. However, the direction of Australian defence policy in the event of an Imperial war was still to be determined.

PREPARATION OF LOCAL DEFENCE

The section of the General Staff Department which was responsible for the development of a general scheme of defence was the Directorate of Military Operations.[46] Under Major Brudenell White the Directorate had the task of implementing the broad strategical considerations outlined by the Chief of the General Staff.

A major problem facing the military planners was the need to provide for the mobility of the Field Army. During the two years preceding World War I, emphasis was placed on strategic railways. Previously, little attention was focussed on the military value of railways. Although the Australian constitution made provision for military railways in sub-section 32 of section 51, it was not until Alfred Deakin and Thomas Ewing stressed the need for a system of defence in harmony with national responsibility that the confused railway networks were subjected to criticisms

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44 SMH, 19 March 1914.

45 For an incisive analysis of the speech by Churchill, see the article by Frederick Eggleston, the Commonwealth correspondent for the Round-Table Movement, in the Argus, 31 March 1914. See Meaney, op. cit., p. 251, for a detailed discussion of the Eggleston analysis.

46 'Allotment of Duties in Chief of General Staff Department', AA MP 84, file no. 1894/5/86.

describing them as the main barrier to strategic mobility.[47] They were further criticised by Lord Kitchener in his report on the defence of Australia in 1910 in which he recommended the establishment of a War Railway Council.

> Preparation for mobilisation is primarily the task of the General Staff, who recommend the lines to be followed and advise where, and in what quantities the munitions of war of the various units should be stored. Concentration can only be satisfactorily effected when the railway and military authorities are in the closest touch and work in absolute harmony. To this co-operation, I advise that a War Railway Council be formed, as in the United Kingdom, composed of the Chief Railway Commissioners, from each state, under the Presidency of the Quartermaster General of the citizen forces, and with an officer of the headquarters staff as secretary.[48]

His concern with the defence aspects of the Australian railway systems reflected an Australian perception of mounting international tension in the Pacific region and the need for a co-ordinated defence capacity commensurate with the continent's vast distances. In December 1911, regulations for the establishment of a War Railway Council were issued by the Commonwealth government. The Council consisted of the Quartermaster-General, a senior officer of the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps from the Commonwealth Railway system, two representatives from the naval and military staffs, and a majority of representatives from the States. The rank granted to the officer from each State was honorary.[49] At the first meeting of the War Railway Council

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47 Lieutenant-Colonel H. Pope, 'Australian War Railway Organisation', Commonwealth Military Journal, vol. V (1914), pp. 500-511. See also E.J.G. Prince, 'Towards National Railway Planning by the Commonwealth Government: Defence Considerations and the Constitutional Referenda of 1911 and 1913', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 16 (1971), pp. 62-68. Prince does not mention the efforts in late 1908 by the Commonwealth to open negotiations with the State governments for the formation of a War Railway Council.

48 Lord Kitchener, 'Defence of Australia, 12 February 1910', pp. 84-85.

49 'War Railway Council', Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. I (1912), pp. 444-445.

on 15 February 1911, the Commonwealth and State representatives agreed to the creation of an Engineer and Railway Staff Corps with an establishment of fifty-eight officers.[50] The Federal Executive Council approved the establishment of the War Railway Council and Engineer and Railway Staff Corps.[51]

The War Railway Council concentrated on procedural matters connected with the preparation of plans for mobilisation. After White became Director of Military Operations, much of the technical work of the Council was delegated to Railway Council Sub-Committees in the military districts of the Commonwealth.[52] For example, the Quarter-master-General, Lieutenant-Colonel V. Sellheim and Major White visited Brisbane on 5 September 1913 to 'ascertain the military carrying capacity of certain types of available rolling stock.'[53] Other tests were carried out in Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide. As well, the sub-committees inspected the efficiency of military units in embarking and detraining from rolling stock vehicles. The performances of military units were measured against the standards set forth in the manuals of European armies. With the information about the capacity of rolling stock to carry troops, horses and vehicles, and the average time for units to entrain and detrain from railway vehicles, the General Staff were able to prepare timetables for the movements of troops from their peace localities to the places where they concentrated to join higher formations such as brigades and divisions. By the fourth meeting of the War Railway Council on 15 August 1913, the General Staff had decided to allot

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50 C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 'Report of the First Meeting of the War Railway Council', vol. 2, no. 19 (1911), pp. 1-8; 'War Railway Council', AA MP 133/2, file no. 394/3/55; SMH, 22 February 1911.

51 Argus, 19 December 1912.

52 For example, see the 'Proceedings of the Third Meeting of the Sub-Committee, War Railway Council, First Military District Brisbane, 5 September 1913', AA B197, file no. 1957/7/113.

53 Ibid.

certain troops raised in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Military Districts to the Field Army, so that on the order for mobilisation, they would move to points of concentration, namely Enoggera, Liverpool and Essendon military camps. After grouping at the military camps, the Field Army would then move to meet the enemy. The timetables prepared by the War Railway Council fitted local defence schemes for each military district and the general scheme of defence for the Commonwealth. By March 1913, the General Staff had completed the defence schemes for the six military districts. The military district defence schemes consisted of two parts: (a) a District Headquarters Defence Scheme, and (b) a Defence Scheme for Each Defended Port,[54] which was due for revision in July 1914.

With reference to the lack of strategic railways in the north of Australia from Broome to Cardwell, the General Staff placed importance on the small citizen forces, permanent garrisons, and extended naval bases as the best means of defence. On the recommendation of Gordon, the Chief of the General Staff, the Northern Littoral of Australia was formed into a separate Military District which also included the islands of the Northern Pacific.[55]

The schemes for mobilisation in the Military Districts of the permanent and citizen soldiers were contained in the 'Commonwealth Defence Scheme' which was updated with the respective defence schemes of each Military District. On 4 March 1913, the Governor-General sent copies of the defence schemes for the six military districts of the Commonwealth to the Secretary of State for Colonies for submission to the

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54 Letter from the Governor-General, Commonwealth of Australia, Lord Denman, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 4 March 1913, AA B197, file no. 1856/4/214.

55 Meetings of the Military Board, 16 December 1912 and 29 July 1913, AA MP 84/1, file no. 1828/2/1; and 'A Review of General Naval and Military Considerations Affecting the Defence of the Commonwealth', by Brigadier-General Gordon, 16 June 1913, AA B197, file no. 1855/1/6.

Overseas Defence Committee.[56] Sixteen months later, on 18 July 1914, Harcourt, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote to Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson, Governor-General, about the defence schemes.

> I have referred the despatch to the Overseas Defence Committee, and should be glad if Your Excellency would inform your ministers that the Committee state that they note that steps are being taken ... and that they learn with satisfaction that a General Defence Scheme, for the Commonwealth, which is to include a 'War Book' for Australia, is nearing completion.[57]

The outstanding task for the military planners was the completion of a War Book.

The War Book was designed to expedite Australian and Imperial defence preparations in the event of war.[58] The General Staff, at the request of the Committee of Imperial Defence, made Chapters VI and VII of the Commonwealth Defence Scheme the War Book, which provided for action by the civil authorities. The subjects covered were the censorship of cable communications, the connection of the main telegraph system to the Department of Defence, press censorship, the treatment of enemy and neutral merchant ships, the notification of preparations for war via cypher telegrams from the Secretary of State for the Colonies.[59] The Commonwealth Naval Board also drafted a War Book.[60] By the outbreak of World War I, military plans were available for the mobilisation of Australia's permanent and citizen forces.

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56 Lord Denman, Governor-General, Commonwealth of Australia, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 4 March 1913, AA B197, file no. 1856/4/214.

57 Secret Letter from Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor-General, Commonwealth of Australia, 18 July 1914, AA B197, file no. 1856/4/338.

58 F.A. Johnson, Defence by Committee (London, 1960), p. 125.

59 'War Book - Copy No. 3 - Chapter VI', AA MP 826/1 file item 3.

60 'Draft of War Book. Commonwealth Naval Board', AA MP 1049/1, file no. 14/0188.

In military training, the General Staff attempted to familiarise officers with the requirements of Australian defence. At a Staff Tour the officers were asked to draw up a defence scheme for Australia which included the sending of an overseas force to Port Darwin, the defence of the Commonwealth Military districts, and the formation of a field army. The object of the exercise, which was possibly designed by White, was to force the officers to think about the strategical considerations affecting Australian defence. The officers on Tour were told clearly that passive defence was sure to fail, and that Australian military organisation must contemplate the maintenance of a force able to operate in any theatre of war. For the General Staff, the critical factor was the control of local waters if a military force needed to travel to defend Port Darwin.

> ... If Western Australia or the Northern Territory were threatened by an enemy then we are bound to suppose that with that enemy rests the command of local waters, and the despatch of any part of the Commonwealth forces to either of those places will be impracticable. Or again, if it is desired to despatch contingents to cooperate in an Imperial undertaking, unless the command of all waters through which transports must pass rests with the Imperial navy, the force must remain impotent in Australia, be the Imperial spirit never so high.[61]

The comment about the need to control the local Australian waters only highlighted the lack of communication which would confront military units attempting to travel across the continent to the Northern Territory. The General Staff recommended a force consisting of infantry and artillery drawn from the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th military districts. The approximate calculation for the embarkation of the expeditionary force was four to six weeks.

By the outbreak of World War I, Australian military planners had drafted plans for operations to defend Australia

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[61] Ibid.

in the Pacific and to participate in an Imperial expeditionary force. It remained for the government in power in the event of war to decide whether to send Australian troops overseas for Imperial service. The important questions about the command and control of an expeditionary force were not raised before World War I. When the war came as a 'tropical cloudburst', in the words of Brudenell White, the Australian military experiment was put on trial.

CHAPTER VI

MAINTAINING AN AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE

For Australia, World War I showed the advantages and disadvantages of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Assistance was given by Japan to protect the Australian expeditionary force across the Indian Ocean in 1914, and the Japanese navy patrolled the waters of the Pacific as part of the allied war effort. At the same time, the activities of Japan in Asia and her expansionist ambitions in the northern Pacific created apprehension in Australia which was based on pre-war fears about Japan's ultimate goal in the Pacific. The advantage of Japanese assistance for the British Empire was immediate, but Australia ran the risk of facing a difficult situation in a prospective peace settlement about the Pacific with a power from which it had most to fear.

THE COMMONWEALTH MILITARY FORCES AND JAPAN

The outbreak of World War I in the Pacific Ocean, which brought Australia and Japan face to face, focussed the attention of the military staff on the islands north of Australia. On 6 August, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, asked the Commonwealth government to seize the German wireless stations north of Australia in order to undermine the operations of the German fleet units in the Pacific.[1] Four days later, on 10 August, His Majesty's government was informed that an expeditionary force consisting of 1,500 armed men and a merchant cruiser armed with four 4.7 guns was planned for embarkation. The Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (ANMEF) was

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[1] C.D. Rowley, The Australians in New Guinea (Melbourne, 1958), p.2; C.D. Rowley, 'The Occupation of German New Guinea, 1914-1921', in W.J. Hudson (ed.), Australia and Papua New Guinea (Sydney, 1971), pp.57-58; A.W. Jose, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918: The Royal Australian Navy (Sydney, 1928), vol.IX, p.47; AA MP 1049/1, file no. 14/030, decode of cypher message from Secretary of State dated London, 6 August, 8.00 pm - Prime Minister's Department, 6 August 1914.

the first force sent overseas in World War I which required Australian soldiers to swear obedience to serve the King anywhere, on land or sea, for an unspecified period of time. However, the period of service in the ANMEF was limited to six months by the government the day before embarkation. The Commonwealth of Australia recognised the utility of exercising the power to send her troops wherever her interests required them.

The plan for military operations against the German colonies was evolved by Colonel J.G. Legge, the new Chief of the General Staff, with the assistance of the General Staff, in three days from 8 to 10 August. Legge appointed Colonel William Holmes, a keen militia officer, as commander of the ANMEF on 10 August.[2] The instructions issued by Legge to Holmes setting out the objective of the ANMEF made clear that Australia wanted to deny Germany bases, and pre-empt Japanese ambitions by occupying all the German colonies in the Pacific. Holmes was warned by Legge of the rumour 'that Japan is desirous of immediately seizing all German possessions in the Pacific', and urged to occupy all German territory as quickly as possible.[3] The expedition embarked during 18 August on the Berrima which sailed out of Sydney Harbour the next day and headed north.

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[2] The ANMEF was voluntary, and combined six companies of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve drawn from Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia, a signal section, two machine gun sections, and a unit of the Australian Army Medical Corps, and a battalion of infantry at war strength from New South Wales.

[3] Instructions to Colonel Holmes, D.S.O., V.D., Commanding Australian Naval and Military Expedition, n.d., Folder: Instructions to Brigadier from H.Q. Melbourne, Papers of Lieutenant-Colonel Reginald Travers, Mitchell Library, Sydney, uncatalogued MS 15, set 15, item 2.

On 25 November 1914, Legge wrote to Holmes about the need to prepare Australian defence for an uncertain post-war world:

> The end of the war is not in sight yet, and the settlement may mean another war with parties redivided - how? So we must push in Australia's preparation. We have the rifle, cordite, Ammunition and leather factories all working their hardest ...

(Letter from Legge to Holmes, 25 November 1914, Papers of Lieutenant-Colonel R. Travers, Mitchell Library, uncatalogued MS 15, item 2).

Despite the swift mobilisation of the ANMEF, the success of Colonel Holmes' mission hinged on efforts by the British government to make concessions to Japan in return for military assistance. In response to an opinion from Kato, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, that Japan was combined to the protection of shipping lanes in the Pacific, the Foreign Secretary, on the advice of the Committee of Imperial Defence, sent a cable to the Governor-General on 19 August, which suggested that the expeditionary force occupy Rabaul as a base before proceeding to Nauru, Yap, and Anguar.[4] Another cable from the Secretary of State was sent to the expeditionary force on 21 August via the Naval Board in Melbourne. The cable was designed to elicit Australian views and enable Great Britain to influence the settlement of the German colonies in the Pacific in the light of Japanese intentions.[5]

The delay of the ANMEF at Palm Island, north Queensland, from 24 August to 2 September, raises two questions about British policy towards Australian interests in the Pacific:

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[4] AA CRS A981, 5, Cable from the Secretary of State to the Governor-General, 19 August 1914.

The cable originated from the Committee of Imperial Defence, and coincided with a private opinion from Kato, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Conyngham Greene, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, which was telegrammed to Sir Edward Grey on 19 August, that Japan was unable to agree with the geographical limitations outlined in the Press Bureau statement made in London on 17 August. The Press Bureau statement confined Japanese activity in the Pacific to the protection of shipping lanes in the China Sea. (See A.S. Jose, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, vol.IX, p.129; Sir E. Grey to Sir C. Greene, 18 August 1914, PRO FO 371/2017; Sir C. Greene to Sir E. Grey, 19 August 1914, and Sir E. Grey to Sir C. Greene, 20 August 1914, PRO FO 371/2017,. and I.H. Nish, Alliance in Decline: a study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-1923 (London, 1972), pp.115-126.

[5] Secret. From Naval Board, Melbourne, to Commanding Officer, H.M.A.S. Berrima, Date 21 August 1914; Folder: Instruction to Brigadier from Head Quarters, Melbourne, Papers of Lieut.-Col. R. Travers, Mitchell Library, Sydney, uncatalogued MS 15, set 15, item 2.

(1) was the delay an accidental interruption of plans to occupy the North Pacific Islands? or (2) did the British wish to avoid offending the Japanese by detaining the ANMEF at Palm Island? On 22 August 1914, Sir Edward Grey informed the Japanese ambassador in London that Australia and New Zealand had despatched expeditionary forces to occupy the German-Pacific islands.[6] Two days later, the ANMEF called at Palm Island, and remained there until 2 September, while Admiral Patey, a Royal Navy Officer and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Australian Naval Fleet, took the Sydney and her convoy to escort the New Zealand expeditionary force to Samoa. When the Berrima left Palm Island on 2 September, the Japanese navy had at British request commenced operations to find and destroy the German naval squadron led by the Emden under the command of Admiral von Spee.[7] Although the commencement of Japanese naval operations against the German Pacific fleet coincided with the detention of the ANMEF at Palm Island, it is uncertain that the plans of the ANMEF were interrupted to prevent any offence to Japan. Japanese naval assistance extended to the Pacific and reflected the change in the balance of power in her favour in the Far East. Furthermore, Britain was no longer in a position to oppose Japanese power in the S.W. Pacific.

At the official level, Australian anxieties about Japanese intentions were repeated after the mobilisation of Japanese naval forces in pursuit of German ships in the Pacific. When Admiral Jerram, the Commander-in-Chief of the China station, took the precautionary step of asking

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6 Grey to Greene, 22 August 1914, PRO FO 371/20/7.

7 The Admiralty needed Japanese naval assistance to deal with the German Pacific Fleet, especially in the Far East. For a discussion of the way Britain handled the German Pacific Fleet in 1914 see I.H. Nish, 'Admiral Jerram and the German Pacific Fleet, 1913-1915', Mariners Mirror, vol.56, no.4 (November 1970), pp.411-421.

For a discussion on the relative strengths of British and Japanese naval power see D.K. Dignan, 'Australia and British Relations with Japan, 1914-1921', Australian Outlook, vol.XXI (1967), pp.144-146, and Peter Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, 1911-1915 (London, 1969), pp.216-217.

Melbourne if there was any objection to Japanese vessels sailing in waters adjacent to Australia, Joseph Cook, the Prime Minister, sought the opinion of the Colonial Office to confirm his assumption that Japanese ambitions were limited to the 'Continent Eastern Asia.'[8] Harcourt, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, replied to the Governor-General that Japan had given 'private assurances' not to occupy territory beyond the China Seas and stressed the need for the Australian political leaders to refrain from making a public announcement on the question.[9]

On 10 September, the Australian government was informed that the Japanese navy was hunting the German ships and likely to cruise near the Marianne and Caroline Islands.[10] The next day, the ANMEF landed on New Britain and by 17 September, the Acting Governor of German New Guinea capitulated to Colonel Holmes. The ANMEF then concentrated on occupying Madang and New Ireland rather than travelling north to take the other German colonies, especially as escort ships were not available.

The newly elected Labor government led by Andrew Fisher, which came to office on 17 September, inherited a problem concerning the German Pacific colonies north of the equator. Whitehall informed Australia that Japan had designs on the Pacific islands, but there was every intention on the part of the British government to use Australian resources, to its advantage in the Pacific. An expeditionary force was sent to occupy German territory, but the object of occupying German territory north of the equator was subject to British efforts to obtain Japanese support in the allied

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8 AA CRS A981. Marshall and Caroline Is., 1/6 Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, to Official Secretary to Governor-General, for transmission to Secretary of State, 25 August 1914 (draft cable); Colonial Office to Foreign Office, with enclosures, 24 and 25 August 1914, PRO FO 371/2017.

9 AA CRS A981, Marshall and Caroline Islands, 1/7, Official Secretary Governor-General to the Prime Minister, 26 August 1914, enclosing cable from Secretary of State to the Governor-General, 25 August 1914.

10 AA CRS A981, F, Secretary of State to Governor-General, 10 September 1914 (cable).

war operations in Europe. In gaining Japanese support, the British government set out to minimise any friction arising from a conflict between Australian interests and Japanese aspirations and intentions over the German Pacific colonies. In the settlement of the problem of the German colonies, Australia was a dispensable proxy. Prime Minister Fisher was well aware that Australia's Pacific interests were not a primary concern for the British government. He had experienced British betrayal over Pacific naval defence when he was Prime Minister from 1911 to 1913.[11] Furthermore, he supported the 'Commonwealth Crisis' based on the racial threat posed by Japan.[12] Once more in his political career, Fisher experienced a British volte-face about Australian interests in the Pacific toward the German colonies north of the equator. As we have seen, the plan of the ANMEF to proceed north of the equator depended on the availability of escort ships and negotiations between the British and Japanese governments. Admiral Patey kept his ships for the important task of destroying von Spee's squadron, with the result that the ANMEF was hamstrung in the implementation of its mission. While the lack of escort ships was critical for Holmes' success, the negotiations between Britain and Japan settled the fate of the north Pacific German islands.

After a ship of the Imperial navy destroyed the resurrected German wireless station at Yap in early October, the Japanese government raised the question of the occupation of the island with Great Britain. In Tokyo, the Ministry of Marine recommended the occupation of Yap by a British or Japanese force.[13] The British ambassador in Tokyo, Conyngham Greene, recommended that Japan be allowed to acquire the islands north of the equator.[14] The Foreign Office

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11 Meaney, op. cit., pp.196-242.

12 Ibid., p.175; CPD, 1908 Session, 17 December 1908, vol.XLVII, p.131.

13 P. Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, 1911-15 (London, 1969), pp.201-219; Greene to Grey, 10 October 1914, and Admiralty to Foreign Office, 11 October 1914, PRO FO 371/2017; Greene to Grey, 12 October 1914, PRO FO 371/2017.

14 Greene to Grey, 12 October 1914, PRO FO 371/2017.

was unenthusiastic about Greene's suggestion and the Colonial Office opposed the idea because America, Australia and New Zealand did not favour the expansion of Japan's sphere of influence in the Pacific.[15] Harcourt, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on behalf of the British government, telegramed the Governor-General, Munro-Ferguson, urging the Australian government to send the expedition to Yap as quickly as possible.[16] The British government was looking after Australian interests vis-a-vis Japan, and to some degree, placating U.S. opinion.

The telegram from the Secretary of State on 13 October brought an immediate response from the military and naval advisers in Melbourne. Legge, the Chief of the General Staff, and main military adviser, alerted the commandants of the military districts on 15 October, that there was a possibility of sending a company of infantry, with two machine guns, to occupy an island in the tropics. He stipulated that service in the company was for the duration of the war, and men up to fifty years of age were eligible for enlistment.[17] On the direction of Pearce, the defence minister, Legge met Creswell and Thring, the two senior naval advisers, on 26 October to plan an expedition to Yap. They all agreed that the islands north of the equator were important for the future defence of Australia. The officers, therefore, planned two courses of action. One was the occupation of Yap at an early date by either ordering the gunboat Protector at Townsville to convoy and transport the force from Rabaul or despatching immediately a force of sixty officers and men for Rabaul on a captured German steamer. When the naval authorities discovered on 28 October that there was no coal

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15 Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 13 October 1914, PRO FO 371/2017.

16 Cypher telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General of Australia, 13 October 1914, in S.S. McKenzie, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18. The Australians at Rabaul, vol.X (Sydney, 1927), p.149.

17 Ibid.

at Rabaul, the plan to occupy Yap was aborted.[18] The second plan, which was accepted by the government, was more ambitious, and designed to deny the Japanese occupation of the north Pacific German islands. To occupy Yap and the other northern islands, the Carolines, Marshalls, Pelew island, and the Marianne islands, the military and naval advisers suggested a volunteer expeditionary force of 200 men, with attached representatives from the Departments of Trade, Customs, and External Affairs.[19]

Although the 200-strong expeditionary force was mobilised rapidly, its ability to carry out its task hinged on Anglo-Japanese relations.[20] On 23 November 1914, Grey, the Foreign Secretary, wrote to Harcourt and told him that he saw the chance of a clash between Australia and Japan in the Pacific, especially as both wished to occupy Angaur.

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18 AA, CRS A2585. XR Item UCL 2, 'Minutes of the Naval Board Meeting, 22 October 1914', in CA 88 Naval Board of Administration Minute Book, 1914-1918; Lowe, op. cit., p.204; Letter from Churchill to Harcourt, 18 October 1914, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Papers of Viscount Harcourt; S.J. McKenzie, The Australians at Rabaul, p.151.

19 AA, CRS A2585. XR Item UCL 2, Meeting of the Naval Board, 23 October 1914; A.W. Jose, Royal Australian Navy, 1914-1918, pp.132-133; S.J. McKenzie, op. cit., pp.151-153.

20 Grey to Harcourt, PRO FO 800/91. The 200-strong expeditionary force consisted of four companies known as the 'Tropical Force' or the third battalion of the Naval and Military Expeditionary Force. The government tried to recruit troops with previous experience in the tropics, and a large number of them were former South African War Veterans who were rejected for service in the A.I.F. (One of the medical doctors, Dr. Martell, had extensive experience in Samoa, and at Thursday Island: Argus, 20 November 1914. The Third Battalion received the appellation 'The Druids', because of the presence of Boer War veterans, while Holmes' force was known as 'The Kindergartens'). The leader of the expedition was Commander Samuel Pethebridge, a native of Townsville, who was Secretary of the Department of Defence. Before he joined the Commonwealth Public Service in 1901, Pethebridge was Secretary of the Marine Department in Queensland where he developed a close association with the Queensland Navy. His organisational experience ensured that the expedition was ready to sail by mid-November. Pethebridge's instructions from the Minister of Defence on 14 November were 'to occupy the islands recently held by Germany north of the Equator' (S.S. McKenzie, op. cit., pp.155-157).

[Continued p.184]

Therefore, Harcourt, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, asked Australia to direct the expedition away from Angaur, and as a precaution against a clash between Japan and Australia he asked the Australian government to delay the departure of the expedition.

Disturbed by the change in British policy, Pethebridge visited the Japanese Consul-General, Shimizu, in Sydney, and discovered that there was a misunderstanding about the object of the North West Pacific Expeditionary Force (NWPEF).[21] The Australian government then sent an inquiry to the Secretary of State for the Colonies asking for clarification about the places mentioned in his cablegram on 13 October.[22]

The cable from Australia coincided with a cable from London carrying the most important, if simple, message that 'We think it desirable for the present the expedition to occupy German islands should not proceed to any islands north of the Equator.'[23] On 25 November, Pethebridge received a 'very urgent' message from Melbourne to delay the embarkation of the expedition to the north Pacific islands.[24] That same

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Fn. 20 continued.
The Colonial Office was informed that the expeditionary force was due for embarkation on 26 November 'to relieve Japanese now occupying Yap and other islands north equator.' (AA, CRS A981, Sec. Prime Minister to Official Secretary, Governor-General, 16 November 1914; Sec. P.M. for Official Secretary, Governor-General, 21 November 1914).

21 S.S. McKenzie, op. cit., p.158.

22 Ibid.; AA CRS A981, 27-8, A/Sec. Defence to P.M., 24 November 1914; Sec. Prime Minister's Department to the Official Secretary, Governor-General, 24 November 1914; Secretary of State to Governor-General, 24 November 1914.

23 Ibid. See L. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger, 1914-1952 (Sydney, 1979), pp.155-156; P. Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, 1911-1915, pp.205-207; Ian Nish, Alliance in Decline, pp.144-146 on the attitude of the Japanese government and its relations with Great Britain about the German Pacific Colonies north of the equator.

24 S.S. McKenzie, op. cit., pp.159-160.

day, the Australian government asked Whitehall to give 'definite information as to what is now desired.'[25] On 3 December, the Australian government was told that the Japanese had occupied the islands north of the equator and furthermore, that the final disposition of the former German Pacific colonies was an issue for the post-bellum world.[26] The Australian government, in recognition of its military weakness in the Pacific, accepted the situation and confined its attention to the German possessions south of the equator.

In the light of the volte-face of the British government over the German Pacific colonies north of the equator the Australian Prime Minister, Fisher, recognised the need to secure the defence of the nation. Fisher's efforts to arrange a common defence system with New Zealand, as well as his decision to gather information about Japanese activities in the Pacific, highlighted the awareness which the naval and military advisers exhibited towards the problem of maintaining an adequate home defence while Australian troops fought for the British Empire in the Middle East.

Fisher had promoted the idea of establishing a common defence arrangement with New Zealand during the visit of Colonel Allen, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, to Melbourne in December 1912.[27] The issue of greatest concern to the South Pacific Dominions at that time was the construction of a Pacific division of the Imperial fleet. In December 1914 Fisher, carrying forward these pre-war concerns,

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25 AA CRS A981, 30-31, Governor-General of Australia to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 November 1914, draft cable.

26 S.S. McKenzie, op. cit., p.160.

27 Letter from Colonel J. Allen to G.F. Pearce, 14 November 1912, Australian War Memorial (AWM), Papers of Senator Sir G.F. Pearce, 5/19; AA CRS A2032 (9), Minutes of the Meeting of the Council of Defence, 23 December 1912; C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1915, vol.I, The Story of Anzac (Sydney, 1940), pp.27-28. For the views of Colonel Allen see New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 1913 Session, vol.167, October 1913, p.465. On the concern of New Zealand about the failure to build a

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hoped to persuade public opinion in Australia to support common defence arrangements with New Zealand.[28] He had high expectations about his visit to New Zealand in late December.[29] On his arrival in New Zealand on 29 December, Fisher announced that the destinies of Australia and New Zealand were linked together and he repeated the policy of self-sufficiency advocated by Australian governments since the advent of the Commonwealth crisis.[30] He returned to the theme of the Australian reaction to the 'Commonwealth Crisis' in late January when he stated that efforts to secure Australia from attack in the Pacific did not imply a diminution of support for the Mother Country.[31] The reliance of Australia and New Zealand on British race patriotism was their greatest resource in responding to an international situation fraught with peril, especially as Japan had occupied the German islands north of the equator.

> We, in Australia, have been handed over the greatest resources of that continent, and you in New Zealand have obtained possession of these beautiful islands. We boast of their production, we boast of the capacity for a higher standard of comfort than is obtainable in any other parts of the world. Are we as manly men and womanly women, to ask the Mother Country to provide for our own defence, and also to help provide for your defence? Surely we belong to a race and land capable of doing for ourselves what our forefathers have done in the Mother Country.[32]

Fn. 27 continued.
British Far Eastern Fleet in the Pacific see John H. Allen, A Naval Policy for New Zealand (Dunedin, 1912) and T.H. Laby, New Zealand's Naval Policy (Wellington, 1913); B.K. Gordon, New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power (Chicago, 1960), pp.34-38.

28 Letter from the Governor-General, Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lewis Harcourt, 24 December 1914, Papers of Viscount Harcourt, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford, B479/22.

29 Ibid. The Governor-General told him not to expect to influence New Zealand in joining an agreement on defence.

30 Argus, 29 and 30 December 1914; 'Conversation with Mr. Massey at Auckland, 31 December 1914', (NLA), Fisher Papers, 2919/6/163-164.

31 Argus, 28 January 1914.

32 Ibid.

Although Fisher exerted himself in promoting Australian security interests in the Pacific, he was unable to persuade New Zealand to join a common defence arrangement.

The unsuccessful effort to formalise a defence arrangement with New Zealand did not deter the Australian government from making preparations for defence against attack in the Pacific. The determination of the Australian government in that direction was illustrated by the significant decision of the Council of Defence on 9 February to keep new units raised for the war effort in Australia 'at all events for present.'[33] Furthermore, the Council of Defence showed that in the face of an Imperial crisis, the Australian government was prepared to assist the Mother Country without making Australian defences ineffective. It is noteworthy that the members of the Council, the Defence Minister, Pearce, the Treasurer, Andrew Fisher, the First Naval Member, Creswell, and the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Legge, reached a unanimous decision.[34] The Council of Defence was not prepared to denude the home army of trained and experienced commanders. However, the Council of Defence was prepared to contemplate the despatch of newly raised units to support the First Division overseas despite the fact that Australian fears of Japan did not subside.

The Australian concern about the islands north of the equator, and Japanese intentions in the Pacific, also promoted a search for sources of information about Japan, which was essential for policy planning.[35] Fisher, the Prime Minister, in early February, read a letter sent from Creswell to Pearce on 31 December 1914, in which the First Naval Member set out his fears about Japan and the

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33 'Minutes of the Council of Defence Meeting, 11 February 1915', AA CRS A2043/XR, Item Whole Series, Department of Defence III. Council of Defence Minutes. 'Council of Defence Meetings, 12/5/1905 to 26/2/1915.'

34 Ibid.

35 Dr. Meaney outlined the significance of sources of information for policy planning on Japan in a Staff/Postgraduate Seminar in 1978. In the Seminar, he discussed the role of J.B. Suttor (the New South Wales Commercial Commissioner in the East), during WWI.

strategically important islands north of the equator. On the strength of Creswell's views, Fisher recognised the need to gain information about Japanese policy towards the islands, and he asked M.L. Shepherd, his private secretary, to gather information about Japan and the German Pacific Islands.[36] Shepherd asked Atlee Hunt, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, for information on Japan, and then he requested assistance from George Steward, the Governor-General's Secretary.[37] The investigation showed that there was a lack of information about Japan and, more importantly, the Australian government had no guarantee that British policy towards the Pacific island situation was identical with its interests. The Prime Minister was alive to the possibility of a British ruse which would ensure support for Japan's occupation of the north Pacific islands in a post-war settlement in return for her greater participation in the war effort. In reply to a question from Fisher about the existence of an agreement between Britain and Japan about the future trading rights in the ex-German Pacific.islands, Harcourt, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated that the settlement of the island issue awaited the conclusion of war,[38] and that there was no agreement between Japan and Great Britain. Privately,

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[36] Letter from the First Naval Member to Minister of Defence, 30 December 1914, AA A 1/20/7685; Memoirs of M.L. Shepherd, 1873-1936. AA CRB A 1632: I Vol. Whole Series. For an examination of the career of J.B. Suttor see G. Walsh, 'John Bligh Suttor - the New South Wales Commercial Agency in the East', (B.A. Hons Thesis, University of Sydney, 1979).

[37] Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, to Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 17 February 1915 and Secretary, Governor-General, 18 February 1915, AA A1/20/7685. For a discussion of George Steward see Richard Hall, The Secret State - Australia's Spy Industry (Melbourne, 1978), pp.13 and 14, and C. Coulthard Clark, The Citizen General Staff (Canberra, 1976). Richard Hall is in error for failing to realise that the Governor-General's Secretary was called Steward, and not Stewart.

[38] Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Colonies, 18 February 1915 and Secretary of State for Colonies to Prime Minister, 23 February 1915, (NLA), Fisher Papers, MS 2919/6/149; AA A981 55, Governor-General to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31 January 1915, Secretary of

[Continued p.189]

Fisher was exercised by the Japanese occupation of the islands. The Governor-General, relying on the call of Imperial patriotism, told him that discussion of the question in public or with Great Britain would not assist the war effort.

Rather than disrupt the Imperial war effort, Fisher followed a suggestion from Atlee Hunt to obtain information about Japanese policy. Hunt informed the Prime Minister, and Shepherd, of his proposal to ask for reports on Japanese affairs from the British Ambassador in Tokyo, Conyngham Greene, and J.B. Suttor, the New South Wales Commercial Commissioner at Kobe.[39] With two channels of information, Australia was likely to cover all matters of importance in Japanese affairs. Fisher contacted the New South Wales Premier, Holman, for permission to use Suttor while Steward contacted Harcourt, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to obtain reports from Greene in Tokyo.[40] The Australian government wanted translated press reports from Japan and an assessment of their importance. Holman and Harcourt agreed to the proposal. Greene sent his reports to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Governor-General in Australia, while Suttor communicated with the Premier of New South Wales who forwarded his information to the Prime Minister.[41] The reports from Greene and Suttor were circulated to the Departments of External Affairs, Defence, Trade and Customs after arrival in the Prime Minister's Department. Consequently, the Directorate of Military Intelligence of the Australian General Staff had access to reports about Japanese

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Fn. 38 continued.
State for the Colonies to the Governor-General, 10 February 1915; A911 38, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor-General, 23 February 1915.

39 Secretary, Department of External Affairs, to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 22 February 1915, AA A1/20/7685; G. Walsh, op. cit., pp.42-50.

40 Prime Minister to NSW Premier, 24 February 1915, and Secretary, Governor-General, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 February 1915, AA A1/20/7685.

41 Greene to Governor-General, 10 March 1915, and Premier of NSW to the Prime Minister, 4 March 1915, AA A1/20/7685.

affairs. The important question about the reports is whether or not they influenced strategic assessments and military plans during and after the war. Greene sent material in March 1915 and Suttor, whose reports were larger than those of the British Ambassador, submitted them to Holman in August 1915.[42] As we will see, the reports were used by the Department of Defence, and opinions based on them guided Australian policy towards the German Pacific islands north of the equator.

The importance of the Australian reaction to Japanese policy in the Pacific for Anglo-Japanese relations was underlined by the request from Harcourt to Munro-Ferguson, the Governor-General, to prepare his ministers for the possible transfer of the German Pacific islands north of the equator to Japan at the end of the war.[43] In reply, Legge, the Chief of the General Staff, and Fisher, accepted the fait accompli with Japan in the Pacific.[44] Legge, who was regarded by the Governor-General as the 'best of our military organisers', held to the view of September-October 1914 that no advantage would accrue to Australia if it held Yap and the French islands[45] and, moreover, the administration of the islands south of the equator would involve considerable expenditure. Fisher rationalised the situation by stating to the Governor-General that Australia had enormous responsibilities south of the equator, and any addition of territory imposed impossible requests on the resources of the

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42 Walsh, op. cit., pp.45-46.

43 Letter from Harcourt to Munro-Ferguson, 6 December 1914, (NLA), Papers of Lord Novar, 696/13-6-9.

44 Letter from Munro-Ferguson to Harcourt, 18 February 1915, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Papers of Sir Lewis Harcourt, B479, and Sir John Anderson, the Permanent Under Secretary to the Secretary of State, thought Australia would not accept the Japanese expansion - Minute by Sir J. Anderson, 7 December 1914, about letter from Harcourt to Munro-Ferguson, 6 December 1914, Harcourt Papers, B468/248.

45 For a discussion of Australian policy towards the French possessions in the Pacific, see R.C. Thompson, Australian Imperialism in the Pacific, 1820-1920 (Melbourne, 1980), pp.203-221.

Australian government.[46]

Harcourt congratulated Munro-Ferguson on his handling of Fisher and Legge, and so removing the possibility of antagonism between England and Japan over the northern German Pacific islands.[47] However, Harcourt's supportive remarks to the Governor-General were not well deserved when they are placed in the face of an unsettled Pacific region during the war. Indeed, the Governor-General was well aware of Australian feelings about Japan. Colonel Holmes, the commander of the expeditionary force to Rabaul, was critical of Australian acquiescence in the Japanese takeover of the German colonies and made his view known to government officials, who informed the Governor-General.[48] Six days later on 18 February 1915, Munro Ferguson set out the position of the Australian government on Japan for Harcourt.

> I have heard nothing to lead me to modify my opinion that my government is likely to view with equanimity, or at any rate without serious protest, a continental occupation of these possessions by Japan should that be found expedient at the Peace Conference.[49]

A further indication of Australian concern about the Japanese was the reaction by Andrew Fisher to the ultimatum from Japan in May 1915 that China accept her twenty-one demands.[50] Fisher was agitated by the Japanese action in China and the

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46 Letter from Munro-Ferguson to L. Harcourt, 18 February 1918, Novar Papers, 696/656-60.

47 Letter from Harcourt to Munro-Ferguson, 27 March 1915, Harcourt Papers, B479/22.

48 Letter from Munro-Ferguson to Harcourt, 24 February 1915, Harcourt Papers, B479/22.

49 Ibid.

50 The demands were originally presented in January 1915, and designed to make China a protectorate of Japan. On 7 May 1915, the Chinese Premier, Yuen, accepted a number of the demands. The Japanese were given divers rights in South Manchuria, and Eastern Inner Mongolia, extended contracts for Port Arthur, South Manchurian and Antung-Mukden railways, and control of iron and coal sites in the Yangtze Valley, and the transfer of German rights in Shantung.

possibility of expansion southwards towards Australia, but the Governor-General referred him to Colonel Legge for a discussion about the strategic value of the northern islands. Legge, who made a virtue out of necessity in response to Japanese activities in the north Pacific, told the Governor-General that 'if they [the Japanese] are there at least we will know where they move.'[51] Furthermore, he said that the islands north of the equator had no strategic value for Australia, and their commercial value was minimal.[52]

The problem of the northern Pacific islands, and the policy of the Japanese government towards the Pacific, received close attention from the naval and military advisers after Hughes succeeded Fisher as Prime Minister in October 1915.[53] Hughes accepted a well-defined policy from Fisher in which Australia assisted the Empire with troops overseas and avoided doing anything which might disturb the delicate relationship between Great Britain and Japan in the Pacific, while at the same time monitoring Japanese policy and activities in the Pacific.

In the military sphere, the Australian concern about Japan was responsible for the introduction of Japanese language studies for army officers, and a secret mission to the Far East by Lieut.-Colonel Sands. The Department of Defence took the initiative in June 1916 and suggested the appointment of a lecturer in Japanese to provide language courses for selected army staff cadets from the Royal Military College who might undertake special service duties after graduation.[54] The University of Sydney was notified in the same month that the Department of Defence intended

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51 Letter from Munro-Ferguson to Harcourt, 1 May 1915, Munro-Ferguson to Harcourt, 13 May 1915 and Munro-Ferguson to Harcourt, 6 April 1915. Harcourt Papers, B479/22.

52 Ibid.

53 For a general outline, see L. Fitzhardinge, op. cit., pp.147-171.

54 See 'Japanese - A Study of Language in Australia', AA CP 78/22, file no.1916/65.

to establish and fund a lectureship in Japanese. The Australian government then approached the British Embassy in Tokyo about the appointment of a lecturer.[55] Australian government officials stipulated that the appointee would be attached to either Sydney or Melbourne University, with the primary task of teaching at the Royal Military College, Duntroon. As well, the government wanted the lecturer to translate Japanese documents for the censor from time to time. The candidate chosen for the appointment to lecture at Duntroon was James Murdoch, a British expert on Japan who was looking for a position at the time.[56] Murdoch started teaching Japanese in March 1917. Eight of the fifty-three cadets who entered Duntroon in 1917 were selected for courses in Japanese language.[57] The government agreed to provide special facilities for further study to the army experts in Japanese language after their graduation from Duntroon.

In May 1917, the Senate of the University of Sydney followed a suggestion from the Sydney Chamber of Commerce to engage James Murdoch as a lecturer in Japanese.[58] With the active encouragement of Legge, the Chief of the General Staff, on behalf of the Commonwealth government, Murdoch was accorded the status of Professor of Oriental Studies at the University of Sydney in 1919.[59]

A more spectacular consequence of Australian military apprehension about Japan was the secret mission of Lieut.-Colonel Robert Sands to Batavia, Singapore, China and Japan in mid-1916. The mission was undertaken with the knowledge

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55 Greene to Grey, 6 June 1916, FO 371/2693.

56 Murdoch had met Morrison of Peking in March 1900 - see the 'Diary of Morrison', 4 March 1900, Morrison Papers, Mitchell Library, Sydney, MP 312/60.

57 Annual Report of the Royal Military College, 1917.

58 'James Murdoch and the Chair of Oriental Studies', BIOG 291, Archives, University of Sydney - the lectureship was to improve commercial relations between Australia and the Far East by equipping students with Japanese language: Calendar, University of Sydney, 1918 (Sydney), pp.615-616.

59 Extract of Senate Minutes, University of Sydney, 19 August 1918, Archives, University of Sydney.

of the Australian Prime Minister, but according to Davis, a Colonial Office official, it was 'primarily to collect information for the personal use of the Governor-General.'[60] However, the close association between Hughes and Sands over the mission, and the need for the Governor-General to gain permission to use an Australian officer for his own purposes which were an extension of British government policy, suggest that the mission was a joint project by the Prime Minister and the Governor-General. Sands was asked to report on the 'Aims and aspirations of Japan relative to Australia and Pacific Dependencies', and the appointment of Australian commercial representatives at Batavia, Shanghai and Tokyo.[61] Lieut.-Colonel Sands was a chairman of the Directors of John Sands Ltd., and commandant of the German concentration camps in Australia during the war. Hughes interviewed Sands before he left Australia and warned him about Japanese agents covering his activities.[62] The report by Lieut.-Colonel Sands was submitted to the Colonial Office in February 1917, and was read by the Foreign Office, and the India Office. Although there is no evidence that the Australian government received the report, it seems unlikely, in the light of Prime Minister Hughes' views about Japan, that he did not view the report, especially as Sands reported on Australian trade representation in the East.[63]

Sands visited Japan, Korea, Manchuria, China, the Federated Malay States and the Dutch East Indies. Colonel Sands' report was a broad examination of Japanese aspirations in the Far East and the Pacific. The subjects in the report included Japanese politics, immigration, naval and military forces, German prisoners of war in Japan, and the

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60 'Australia's relations with Japan and the East Indies', PRO CO 418/157.

61 'Australia's relations with Japan and the East Indies', PRO CO 418/157/226-227.

62 PRO CO 418/157/236.

63 PRO CO 418/157/226-231.

representation of Australia in the Far East. Sands' views on Australia's relations with Japan and the Far East were based on his own observations and the expert knowledge of British and Japanese officials as well as business men in the Far East. Although the quality of the report was uneven, Colonel Sands left no doubt about Japanese aspirations towards Australia.

> ... Few Australians have up to the present realised the fact that nearly every move in the Far East affects in some degree the security or otherwise of the freedom they now enjoy. The man in the street knows that Japan is ever knocking at Australia's door, but up to the present, he has not turned his mind to seriously consider the why or wherefore of the case. He knows there is a danger but he does not realise the clutching yellow hand which is just at the present moment not mailed but which is busy gradually placing stepping stones for its countless millions to walk over when the time is propitious. The united opinion of all the leading diplomats and business men in Japan today is that Australia, because of the policy she is adopting towards Japan, will soon feel in some way, the effect of the discrimination practised between the Japanese and European nations ...[64]

In his opinion, the Japanese government had every intention of extracting concessions from the Imperial authorities for its services to the allied cause during the war. The retention of the former German colonies in the north Pacific was listed as a concession. As well, the report mentioned that the officers of the Japanese army were pro-German,[65] and that some newspapers were 'poisonous' about Great Britain. Sands' suspicion about Japan was supported by evidence of Japanese activities in south-east Asia which, he felt, only confirmed his case. In the Federated Malay States, the Japanese were told to use cars and carriages

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64 PRO CO 418/157/241-242.

65 The Japanese army was subject to Prussian influence after the appointment of General Meckel in 1885, as Military Adviser. For 32 years, the Japanese army had followed text-books, and organisation guidelines written by the German General Staff. A number of Japanese officers were trained in Germany.

instead of rickshaws to demonstrate their equality with Europeans. The presence of a fishing boat in the Malay straits manned by Japanese naval personnel in disguise, who were taking 'soundings', pointed in the direction of information useful for a military invasion. On the subject of immigration, the report argued that Japanese immigrants at a steady rate would head for Singapore and the adjacent islands.

An important aspect of the report was the question of Australian trade representation in the Far East. Sands was critical of the failure by the Commonwealth government to establish a national trade representative in Japan. He praised 'up-to-date' Australian firms who had shown initiative in the commercial sphere by looking for overseas markets. The British Commercial Attache had informed Sands that Japanese ignorance of Australian products was a drawback in the development of trade between the two nations. Canada, for example, benefited from trade representation in Japan. Sands also spoke to Suttor, the New South Wales Commercial Agent in the East.[66] Therefore, he suggested that Australia send a trade representative to the British Embassy in Tokyo. His suggestion was endorsed by the British Embassy and the Australian Governor-General. He also thought it important that Australia should have trade representation in China, especially at Shanghai, a major trade centre. The execution of Sands' recommendations in the sphere of trade relations and the representation of Australia in the Far East had to await a decision from the Commonwealth Government to approach the Foreign Office.[67]

The 'stepping stones' to Australia in Sands' report were the islands north of Australia. From the outbreak of

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66 PRO CO 418/157/237: the Governor-General thought that Suttor was 'a very undesirable representative', but he did not give his reasons to the Secretary of State - see letter from the Governor-General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 February 1917, CO 418/157/232-233.

67 Australia's relations with Japan and the East Indies - Opinion of Mr. Davis', PRO CO 418/157/226.

war until May 1917, the Australian army had not produced a formal strategic assessment of the northern islands. Its attention and resources had been focussed on the raising and training of troops for overseas service and internal matters which included the maintenance of home defence. In early 1917, the acting Chief of the General Staff, Hubert Foster, wrote a paper on the northern islands for the Council of Defence.

The Associated Chambers of Commerce at its fourteenth annual meeting in March 1917 asked the government to prevent the return of the islands to Germany at the end of the war.[68] Pearce, the defence minister, directed Brigadier-General Foster to comment on the strategic value of the German Pacific colonies, and distinguish in his report between the islands north and south of the equator.[69] Foster submitted his report on 23 May 1917.[70]

Hubert Foster, who was an Imperial officer seconded to Australia (who had taught military studies at the University of Sydney), examined the military significance of the New Guinea Protectorate and Nauru, and concluded that it was desirable for German possessions south of the equator to remain under British control. With reference to the German possessions north of the equator, he mentioned that the significance of the Caroline Islands, the Marshall Islands, and the Ladrones lay in the number of potential sites on their shores for naval bases, coaling stations and cable landing places. For Australia, the Caroline Islands and New

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68 Letter from J.W. Vasey, President Associated Chambers of Commerce, to the Prime Minister of Australia, 5 April 1917, AA B197, file no. 1851/2/81.

69 M.L. Shepherd to Acting Secretary, Department of Defence, 30 April 1917, and Pearce to Secretary, Department of Defence, 10 May 1917, AA B197, file no. 1851/2/81.

70 Report of No.1 Standing Committee (Operations), Council of Defence, relative to Brigadier-General H. Foster's report in regard to German Possessions in the Pacific, 27 November 1918, AA B197, file no. 1851/2/81.

Guinea were important because they were on the direct route from Japan to Sydney.[71] Rabaul was listed as an ideal site for a Japanese naval base if Australia faced attack from a naval and military expedition. Furthermore, the Caroline Islands, the Marshall Islands, and German New Guinea were suitable for wireless stations, and would provide any hostile power which controlled them with the ability to communicate with its warships in Australian waters. On the subject of air attack, the report argued that the distance of the islands from Australia precluded their use as air bases. In the conclusion, Foster showed that he had not really understood the problem. After mentioning that the Caroline Islands lay on a direct route to Australia, he stated that Japanese retention of those islands, as well as the Ladrones and the Marshall Islands, was not a military danger to Australia, because they did not add to the strength of Japan. To substantiate his point, Foster referred the minister to his academic work, War and the Empire, to show that defended naval stations did not increase naval power and were not essential for the operations of a fleet unit. He did not speculate about Japanese policy which was essential to a discussion of the balance of power in the Pacific, and military threats to Australia. The paper by Foster indicated that the C.G.S. had a general picture of the strategic importance of the islands north of Australia for national defence. The rampart of islands south of the equator was regarded as essential for defence.

Commander Pethebridge, the Administrator of German New Guinea, and former Secretary, Department of Defence, commented on the paper and agreed that the retention of the islands south of the equator was vital.[72] He also suggested

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71 'German Possessions in the Pacific', W175/2/794 - Secret: A Report from Brigadier-General H. Foster, C.G.S., to Secretary, Department of Defence, 23 May 1917, AA B197, file no.1851/2/81.

72 Pethebridge had written a 'note on the Pacific' which examined the interests of the U.S.A., Japan, France, Britain and Australia in the region in December 1915. See AA MP 367, file no. 404/11/129. For negotiations on oil exploration in Timor and Papua see CO 418/133/185-186, CO 418/132/289, CO 418/145/320.

that the islands had a commercial value, especially as deposits of coal and oil were known to exist. The papers by Foster and Pethebridge were an advance on the private verbal opinions expressed by Legge to the Governor-General in May 1915.

Two months later, the minute by Foster was followed by a remarkable display of initiative on the part of Brigadier-General Sellheim, the Adjutant-General.[73] Sellheim addressed himself to the problem of garrisoning the British possessions in the Pacific which, he admitted, was beyond his responsibility as Adjutant-General. His plan fitted no strategic picture. Sellheim wanted Australia to garrison Singapore, and estimated that the most likely source of manpower for a garrison force was the A.I.F. He was aware that Section 31(2) of the Defence Act prohibited 'the raising of Permanent Troops' in peace, except for Adminstrative and Instructional purposes, but he knew that the act was under review by the minister. Although the minute showed perspicacity with regard to the need for Australia to look at regional defence, it also displayed an unguarded enthusiasm for the possibility of closer Imperial cooperation at the end of the war. Sellheim's minute on an Australian garrison force at Singapore was seen by Pearce, the defence minister, and later by E.L. Piesse, the Director of Military Intelligence in August 1918, when the greater part of intelligence operations was focussed on Japan, but with no result.

Further, military attention was focussed on Japan towards the end of the war, when the Prime Minister, Hughes, asked Major E.L. Piesse, the Director of Military Intelligence, to assist H.E. Jones, an officer in the Special Intelligence Bureau, to compile a summary of all information about Japan held by government departments.[74] Piesse had scrutinised reports from Japanese newspapers since 1916, but he believed that they were unable to reveal Japanese policy objectives in

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73 'Secret - Garrisoning of Possessions in Pacific Ocean, 1856-4/391', by Brigadier-General Sellheim, Adjutant-General, 9 July 1917, AA B197, file no. 1856/4/391.

74 Letter from Piesse to Latham, 22 May 1918, Papers of Major Piesse (NLA), MS 882/5/1.

the Pacific. From mid-1916 onwards, the attention of the Director of Military Intelligence was directed exclusively towards Japan.[75] Hughes even contemplated another mission for Lieutenant-Colonel Sands. Unfortunately there are no records extant on the proposed second mission. Piesse, a good friend of Sands, thought he was unsuitable for the task although he did not give reasons for his opinion. The point in favour of Sands was that he had money.[76] However, Piesse hoped that the mission would be abandoned by the government. Piesse's friend and contemporary in charge of naval intelligence, Commander Latham, R.A.N., wrote to him on 24 September 1918, two months before the end of the war, and said that he was attempting to improve Australian access to information sources in the Pacific. However, he told Piesse that his efforts were hampered by the problems of operating a secret service, but he did not explain them.[77]

During WWI, the intelligence section, General Staff, as a result of its efforts to monitor Japanese popular opinion and assess the national objectives of the Japanese government came to know Japanese intentions in the Pacific. Piesse and his officers believed that Australian interests were best protected by not antagonising the Japanese. The Prime Minister, Hughes, did not follow Piesse's advice on the subject and refused to moderate his public statements against Japan. On 31 May 1918, in a public announcement, Hughes stated that the Australian government wanted an 'Australian Monroe Doctrine in the South Pacific.' Australia looked to America for assistance and co-operation in the project at the peace conference, and if need be, on the battlefield. The speech at the Pilgrim's Club, New York, gave notice to the Japanese that Australia was intent upon defending her territorial integrity.[78]

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75 D.C.S. Sissons, 'Attitudes to Japan and Defence, 1890-1923' (M.A. thesis, University of Melbourne, 1956), p.79.

76 Letter, Piesse to Latham, 22 May 1918, Piesse Papers (NLA), MS 882/5/1.

77 Letter from Latham to Piesse, 24 September 1918, Piesse Papers (NLA), MS 882/5/3.

78 New York Times, 2 June 1918; Argus, 5 June 1918.

Apart from the task of gathering information about Japan, the military intelligence section of the General Staff was involved with the prevention of internal threats to Australian security. During the first two years of the war, the intelligence officers concentrated for the most part on watching enemy aliens and suspected foreign agents. The energy and effort expended by the General Staff intelligence officers in field operations failed to uncover threats to the national security.[79] An example was the 'Christmas Eve uprising' in Sydney, 1914. In Sydney, Colonel Kelly, and Brigadier-General Ramaciotti, had taken the word of two informants about a proposed insurrection of the German community, and mobilised troops in readiness on 24 December 1914. The insurrection did not take place, but in his report to Colonel Legge, the Chief of the General Staff, on Boxing Day, Colonel Kelly argued that an uprising might eventuate with the aid of a German ship. Kelly asked Legge to make sure that there were no German ships in the Pacific to assist an uprising in Sydney. The defence minister, Pearce, authorised the payment of £200 for the services of the informants, and authorised Legge to offer £500 to a fellow called Jackson if it was possible to verify his story that there was a German station in the proximity of New Guinea containing 300 armed Germans, two ships, and a wireless station.[80] The 'Christmas Eve uprising' was one of many reports about suspected enemy sympathisers in Australia. The intelligence officers had the task of investigating the reports, which left a good deal to the imagination. Scott mentions that a meteorite over New South Wales fuelled reports of an airship.[81]

In fact, there was no German spy system in Australia, or individual cases of hostile spying during the war. On 26 March 1917, Brigadier-General Foster, Chief of the General

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79 N.K. Meaney, 'Australia's Secret Service in World War I', Quadrant, vol.23 (July 1979), p.20.

80 AA B197, file no.2021/1/64.

81 Scott, Australia in the War, p.107.

Staff, told Pearce that Major Piesse, the Director of Military Intelligence, had stated that there had been no example of hostile spying since September 1914, the month the minister took office.[82]

The involvement of intelligence officers, General Staff, in counter-espionage activities after the first two years of the war was the subject of an enquiry by Major Steward, the head of the newly established central intelligence unit, known as the Counter Espionage Bureau (C.E.B.). The C.E.B. was created with British encouragement and made possible by a provision in the disbandment of the Australian Intelligence Corps which included the establishment of a secret service in war-time.[83] Steward, who was the Governor-General's private secretary, was a former member of the Australian Intelligence Corps, and a Special Duty Officer in the Royal Engineers from 1882 to 1892.[84] The C.E.B. was to provide a 'common focus' for the Australian intelligence services, and facilitate the interchange of information in peace and war about 'secret service agents' hostile to the British Empire.[85]

Steward discovered in New South Wales that military intelligence officers had drifted into counter-espionage with the result that no local intelligence records were kept, and many of the citizen soldiers were not suited to the work. He argued that the Military Intelligence Department needed to deal with 'purely army matters'. The report by Steward was sent to Pearce, who accepted its findings. The title of Piesse's office, M.O.3, was altered to Director of Military Intelligence on 16 March 1916.[86] From that date, counter-espionage in Australia was conducted by the C.E.B., which changed its name to Special Investigation Bureau in January 1917. Steward's successor, Major H.E. Jones, was a former

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82 AA MP 367, file no. 512/1/64.

83 AA CRS A2563, Military Board Minutes, 18-19 June 1914.

84 See biographical notes.

85 AA MP 1049/1, file no. 16/014.

86 M.O. 138/1916; letter from Steward to Naval Office, Melbourne, 15 May 1916, AA MP 1049/1, file no. 16/014.

member of the Australian Intelligence Corps, and a member of the Intelligence Section, General Staff in the 3rd Military District.

The reorganisation of the intelligence section, General Staff, as the Directorate of Military Intelligence did not end the involvement of intelligence officers in counter-espionage activities. As the war progressed, tension mounted and resentment against the warfare state focussed on anti-conscription. The anti-conscription elements including Irish Nationalists, Pacifists, Socialists, the Wobblies (I.W.W.), State Labor leagues, unions, and a majority of Labor parliamentarians, were regarded as disloyal by Hughes, and they became the subjects of surveillance. For example, the Broken Hill Miners Association was watched by Captain Borrow, the intelligence officer, Broken Hill, in December 1916 to determine the relationship between the Australian Miners Association and the I.W.W., commonly known as Wobblies. Borrow worked in conjunction with the police in Broken Hill, and followed the movements of the union leaders and their correspondence as far as was possible.[87]

The determination by the government to watch disloyal elements drew the General Staff into planning against civil unrest, which was a police function and not a military activity under the scheme drawn up by Steward. In December 1916, the defence minister Pearce, asked the General Staff to take secret precautionary measures in each military district. The measures were to cope with cases of 'sudden emergency' in capital cities, and riots or disturbances of a more serious nature which were widespread in a State.[88] Pearce sanctioned the establishment of a Reserve, in addition to the Permanent Guard allotted to defend strategic installations. The Reserve was designed to deal with disturbances in the capital

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87 Letter from Brigadier-General Irving, Commandant, 4th M.D., to Chief of the General Staff, 13 December 1916. AG B197, file no. 1997/1/130.

88 Memorandum from the Adjutant-General to the Commandants, All Military Districts, 18 December 1916, AA B197, file no. 1887/7/52.

cities[89] and it was to remain as secret as possible. A machine gun, and an adequate supply of ball cartridge were listed as essential items for each Reserve force. In Brisbane, the Permanent Guard consisted of 200 men in four platoons. The plan to quell disturbances in Victoria included the use of two aeroplanes to overawe rioters, co-operate with the artillery, and drop bombs. In December 1917, the District Commandants were asked by Sellheim, the Adjutant-General, to review their plans for civil disturbances in view of the possibility of violence occurring after the 'Reinforcement Referendum'.[90] The plans against local disturbances remained in force at least until the end of the war.

The General Staff became more deeply involved in surveillance and non-military activities with the formation of the Australian Protective League, which was modelled on the American Protective League. The Council of Defence decided at a meeting on 1 May 1918 to suggest to the minister the formation of an association, consisting of prominent citizens, who would report on cases of disloyalty, industrial disturbance, and other matters of interest to national security. Pearce approved, and a meeting of government representatives included Watt, the acting Prime Minister, Pearce, and Legge, the Chief of the General Staff. Legge told the meeting that such an organisation was necessary. The notes taken at the meeting summarised his views.

> ... He could assure them it was necessary and particularly so at the present time. We had not had to meet a crisis so far, barring a shortage of recruits. (General Legge, speaking confidentially, referred to the probable dangers, the sources from which they were likely to come, the means by which enemy propaganda was started ... The only thing to do was to get everybody to get organised and suggested that badges denoting loyalty be worn ...[91]

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89 Ibid.

90 Sellheim to All District Commandants, 30 December 1917, AA B197, file no.1887/1/52.

91 AA MP 729/2, file no.1851/2/45.

The meeting decided that a 'Citizens Bureau of Intelligence and Propaganda' was necessary, and another meeting was scheduled to implement the proposal. The Australian Protective League was disbanded after the war without performing any services for the government.

During World War I, the intelligence section of the Australian General Staff expanded its activities from analysing the activities of foreign powers in the Pacific, and strategic planning, to the problems of internal threat to Australia's national security. The association of the General Staff with counter-espionage activities did not detract from the task of assessing Japanese aspirations in the Pacific. Major E.L. Piesse, the Director of Military Intelligence, was able to combine the tasks of assessing external intelligence and counter espionage.

Maintaining an Adequate Defence

The most pressing task faced by the General Staff during the war was the training of troops for home defence to maintain an adequate level of defence preparedness in the face of the demands made by the war. During World War I, 412,066 Australians enlisted in the Australian Imperial Force, which included officers of the Australian General Staff, such as Brigadier-General W.T. Bridges and Major Brudenell White.[92] The loss of senior and junior staff officers on the outbreak of war, especially the area officers who were the linchpin of the compulsory military training scheme, and the need to reinforce the Australian Imperial Force, meant that Australia's home defence was shouldered by the few permanent officers left in Australia, citizen soldiers, rifle clubs, cadets, and the reserves. Despite the decrease in the manpower available for home defence, the local Australian General Staff continued the pre-war policy of preparing Australia against attack in the Pacific.

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[92] See Appendix G for details about the A.I.F.

With the adoption of the precautionary stage in the War Book on 2 August, the militia forces were mobilised for home defence. Citizen soldiers guarded railway bridges, munition works, cable and wirless stations, magazines and wharves, and the garrison artillery and engineer units assisted the permanent forces in manning the coastal forts, search-lights, and gun emplacements.[93] The Department of Defence decided to take advantage of active home service and called up the citizen units in turn to complete their training requirements. In December 1914, the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Legge, saw no need to use the citizen units as home guards, except on coastal defence sites, because there was no immediate naval threat to Australia, and they returned to normal training.

The immediate difficulty which faced the General Staff was how to train the home defence forces alongside the Australian Imperial Force, and maintain an adequate level of defence. The Department of Defence had given consideration to the problem of maintaining the strength of the home defence forces. On 10 September 1914, the defence minister, Pearce, called for a national reserve force to assist with the defence of Australia in the Pacific.[94] In pursuit of that objective, a special recruits branch was opened for recruits who were unable to volunteer for overseas service. Another plea for a national reserve force was made on 17 November when the Department of Defence asked Australian males unable to go overseas for service to join rifle clubs or the militia.[95] At that time, the Australian military forces for home defence numbered 3,000 permanent soldiers and 50,000 militia. By August 1915, the pressure of training the A.I.F. prompted the Adjutant-General, Colonel V.C. Sellheim, to recommend the suspension of compulsory military training. On 27 August, Sellheim recommended to Pearce, the defence minister, that a

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93 E. Scott, Australia During the War (Sydney, 1936), pp.196-198.

94 SMH, 10 September 1914.

95 Ibid., 17 November 1914.

meeting of the Military Board be held to consider the suspension of all militia and cadet training for six months.[96] The A.I.F. needed the services of militia officers, area officers, and non-commissioned officers of the Instructional Staff to train the large influx of recruits. The Board accepted the recommendation from the Adjutant-General and decided not to issue the service pattern uniform, arms, ammunition and equipment to the militia and senior cadets until 1 March 1916 as well as reducing the number of rounds to rifle clubs. Cabinet agreed to the suspension of compulsory military training for three months instead of six months. In spite of the suspension of compulsory training by Cabinet, the Military Board passed a resolution that home training for militia and senior cadets continue without relaxation for 1915. On 5 September, the Military Board reiterated its view. All vacancies in officers and other ranks on instructional or staff duties would be filled by temporary appointments.

In training the A.I.F., the home defence forces found that they were placed under strain and were unable to give undivided attention to home training. They were the subject of abuse by A.I.F. soldiers who were jealous of their authority, and accused them of failing to volunteer for the A.I.F. unless they had a commission. At the Royal Military College, Duntroon, the military staff was involved in training candidates for A.I.F. commissions at the Officer Training School in the north east corner of the college grounds. Lieut.-Colonel Harrison, the commandant, in his report for the year 1915-1916 stated that the Royal Military College existed for the training of officers in the permanent forces and not the A.I.F.[97] In the scheme of compulsory military training, Duntroon graduates were channelled to the position of area officer as the first appointment in their military career.

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96 AA CRS A2563, Military Board Minutes, 18 January 1916.

97 Report of the R.M.C., Duntroon, 1915-1916.

The question of maintaining an adequate level of defence preparedness was discussed by Cabinet on 21 June 1916.[98] As a result, Pearce was asked to direct the Military Board to prepare a paper on the organisation and measures necessary to call up members of the citizen forces for home defence. The assessment of the manpower available for home defence became critical after Hughes announced his decision to hold a referendum on conscription for overseas service. Hughes was anxious to assist the allied war effort in Europe with the expectation that Australian aid would expedite the attainment of victory. He was well aware that victory by Germany might prejudice Australian interest in the Pacific. For the military planners, a vote in favour of conscription meant that more than ever before home defence would rely on the militia and reserve forces.

At the same time, the war time efforts by the General Staff to update defence schemes, train militia and cadets, and build a national reserve force fitted the plans to prepare Australia against attack from Japan. The argument in favour of making Australia an armed camp was put forcefully by J.H. Catts, the Director-General of Recruiting in New South Wales and avowed anti-consciptionist.[99]

> ... The great war has proved a rude awakening and shows us that we must if we value our national existence be prepared at all times to defend it. We have determined and believe that in this war Germany will be beaten, and will lose her present position ... we hope that after this war we may enjoy a lasting peace. But who can guarantee it! Who can say that the interests and ambitions of the nations will not clash again - that a great war with the Southern Hemisphere as its sphere of action is not as possible in the future, near or far, as the European war raging in 1916.
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> How, then, are we to prepare for the evil day that may eventuate ... The surest way to avoid it is to be ready to meet it.

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98 AA CRS A2563, Military Board Minutes, 22 August 1916.

99 D.M. Catts, James Howard Catts (Sydney, 1958), pp.62-73.

> ... The Commonwealth is ready for great sacrifices, and a bold compulsory universal service policy based upon a well-considered statement of the parts threatening and surrounding the nation, would be enthusiastically acclaimed.[100]

For Catts, the enemy was Japan, and he was prosecuted during the second referendum campaign for making provocative statements against that power.

In 1917 and 1918, the Australian government and senior army officers were faced with the challenge of maintaining the citizen forces. War conditions had depleted the ranks of the citizen forces to the extent that many units were almost non-existent, and most of the permanent instructional officers and other ranks were fighting overseas. By June 1918, Australia had 9,215 home service troops with an establishment of 2,476 permanent soldiers. Consequently, the compulsory training units were insufficiently officered and inadequately trained. In response to the situation, the defence minister, Pearce, decided to amalgamate units of the citizen forces and enlarge the army reserve. On 8 January 1917 the Director-General, Australian Army Reserve, Colonel Mackay, a former member of the Australian Intelligence Corps, submitted amendments to the regulations for the army reserve to Pearce. Pearce accepted the amendments which divided the reserve into three classes: A - the reserve of compulsory military training; B - volunteers under fifty years of age who were retired members of the permanent forces and discharged members of the A.I.F.; and C - members of rifle clubs, and those in Class A who wished to continue in the Army Reserve. The reserve units were linked with the militia units, and territorial associations which were designated by Mackay to build a close relationship between the military authorities and local society. By February 1918, 6,000 men had joined the national reserve.

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100 Call to Arms, 10 March 1916.

Strategic Railways

The concern of the Australian government about strategic railways during World War I was a response to Australia's vulnerable strategic position in the Pacific. The General Staff gave close attention to the problem of a uniform railway gauge, and supported efforts to build railways for strategic purposes.

The Australian Prime Minister, Fisher, in an endeavour to secure his nation against attack, gave his wholehearted support to the introduction of a uniform railway gauge to facilitate the movement and transportation of troops to any part of Australia. The Prime Minister's pre-occupation with strategic railways sprang from his experience as Prime Minister from 1910 to 1913, and the belief of Legge, the Chief of the General Staff, and his advisers that a uniform railway gauge was essential for the defence of Australia.[101] The Premiers' Conference held in November 1914 considered Fisher's suggestion for a uniform railway gauge and made several proposals which reflected the conflict between the Commonwealth and State governments over strategic railways. The State governments were chary about introducing a uniform gauge in case they lost control of their railways to the central government. A referendum held in 1913 had rejected the Commonwealth proposal to introduce a uniform railway gauge.[102] The matter of a uniform gauge for Australian railways was referred to the War Railway Council for consideration with the suggestion that the existing State government railway systems deserved the most complete exploitation in the implementation of defence proposals in the light of the world situation. As well, Fisher linked the issue of a uniform railway gauge with the construction of

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101 Meaney, op. cit., pp.196-242; 'Summary of the Conference with the Premiers, 4-5 November, 1914', Victorian State Archives, P 14/4892.

102 E.J.G. Prince, 'Towards National Railway Planning by the Commonwealth Government: Defence Considerations and the Constitutional Reference of 1911 and 1913', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol.22 (1976), pp.62-73.

a railway line through the States of South Australia, New South Wales and Queensland which was suggested by the Chief of the General Staff and the Engineer-in-Chief for the Commonwealth Railways.[103] The Premiers asked the War Railway Council to examine the route of the railway from Adelaide to Brisbane and the contribution it would make to the development of the regions through which it passed. In mid-November, in Melbourne, the defence minister, Pearce, addressed the Council on the construction of a strategic railway from Port Augusta to Brisbane and reiterated the request from the Premiers' conference.

Pearce emphasised the importance of strategic railways for the defence of the Australian continent and said,

> The government felt that, in view of the world-wide struggle that is going on and in view of the possibilities that may arise out of it in which we may be involved, this question must be faced, and, in view of the warning Lord Kitchener gave us as to the vulnerability of our railways, that we need the best minds of the railway systems of Australia to advise us ... to give us a ... more effective means of transporting troops to any part of the Commonwealth. We are asking you gentlemen to report on the proposals ... placed before you not only from the military but also from the economic points of view ...[104]

The War Railway Council rejected the proposal for a railway line from Port Augusta to Brisbane, because the line did not connect Adelaide and Melbourne.[105] Instead, the Council recommended the construction of shorter railway lines to connect the railway systems of the eastern Commonwealth.[106]

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103 Argus, 25 November 1914, p.8; 'Proceedings of the War Railway Council Assembled at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, 18 and 19 November 1914, Fifth Meeting', p.4, AA MP 493/3, Item A.

104 'Proceedings of the War Railway Council ... 18 and 19 November, 1914 ...', AA MP 493/3, Item A.

105 Argus, 25 November 1914, p.8.

106 The Council recommended the construction of a railway line, 4'8½" gauge, from Port Augusta to Condobolin, via Broken Hill. The line under construction from Dubbo to Werris

[Continued on p.212]

The Commonwealth was advised to provide facilities for transhipment at Albury and Wallangarra. At the Premiers' Conference held on 30 November, Pearce argued that a uniform railway gauge was necessary to move troops to any part of Australia as quickly as possible.[107] His chief army adviser, Colonel Legge, told the Premiers that the original Commonwealth strategic railway proposed was 'more valuable for defence intrinsically',[108] than the proposal of the War Railway Council which was against the introduction of a uniform railway gauge.[109] The Prime Minister asked the State representatives if they would give the Commonwealth power to construct a railway line with a uniform gauge. In his budget speech a few days later on 3 December, the Prime Minister repeated his concern about the world situation and the urgent need for strategic railways in Australia.[110] In May 1915, the Premiers' conference recommended an immediate meeting between the military advisers and the State Railway Commissioners to discuss and report upon strategic railways. On the question of a uniform railway gauge, the Premiers suggested the appointment of a commission consisting of two leading railway experts, preferably from outside Australia, to investigate and report on the advantages of a uniform

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Fn.106 continued.
Creek would give a through connection with the Queensland lines. It was unnecessary to build a line from Condobolin to Brisbane because the same result would result from joining Moree and Goondiwindi, and building a second track from Warwick to Brisbane. For military purposes, the line from Condobolin to Broken Hill needed to connect with Melbourne. In South Australia, the three approaches to Adelaide for strategic purposes necessitated the construction of lines from Monahill to Morgan, and Salisbury to Port Augusta, to link with the trans-continental line.

107 The State governments protested against the advice of the War Railway Council - Brisbane Courier, 10 November 1914.

108 Argus, 1 December 1916, p.6.

109 'Summary of Conference, sent by P.M. to all Premiers on 7 December, 1914', Victorian State Archives, p.14/5061.

110 CPD, 1914 Session, LXXV, 3 December 1914, p.1348.

railway gauge and its implementation.[111]

The concern of the Commonwealth government for strategic railways was indicated again in August 1915 when King O'Malley, the home affairs minister, received a report on an ambitious railway scheme to link Port Augusta with Wyndham in the Northern Territory through Camooweal in Western Queensland by utilising the railway systems of South Australia, New South Wales and Queensland.[111] The proposed railway scheme answered, in part, the suggestion by the General Staff that railway communication with Western Australia and the Northern Territory was essential for continental defence.[113] In the defence scheme of the Commonwealth, the field army was responsible for acting as a mobile expeditionary force to defend the Northern Territory and Western Australia if the need arose. As well, the Department of Home Affairs was investigating future railway connections between Canberra and the eastern seaboard to improve railway communication by utilising existing railway lines and building an alternative route to Melbourne through East Gippsland. Another paper dealt with the 3'6" gauge railway from Port Augusta to Quorn in South Australia, which was regarded as common to any route between an East-West line traversing the continent.[114] A report on the gauge connection between the Kalgoorlie to Port Augusta railway line and the railway systems of the Eastern States dated 19 August was made by A. Combe, an engineer in the Commonwealth Railways, to Colonel Bell, the Engineer-in-

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111 'Report of the Resolutions, Proceedings and Debates of the Premiers' Conference, held at Sydney, May 1915, Legislative Assembly, N.S.W.', AA MP 498/3, Item B.

112 'Further Investigations and reports required in connection with Commonwealth Railway Schemes, 25 August 1915', in Strategic Railways, 1911-16, Papers of King O'Malley (NLA), MS 460, Items 1062-1063.

113 General Scheme of Defence, Commonwealth of Australia, AA MP 826, Item 3.

114 'Further investigations and reports required in connection with Commonwealth Railway Schemes, 25 August 1915', in Strategic Railways, 1911-1916, Papers of King O'Malley (NLA), MS 460, Items 1062-1063.

Chief of the Commonwealth Railways.[115] Combe suggested that a railway from Hawker to Broken Hill was the best way to join the trans-Australia railway line. (The trans-Australia line was started in September 1912). He also reported that it was possible to convert the Port Augusta-Quorn line to a 4'8" gauge to link the eastern States with the Port Augusta-Kalgoorlie line.[116] He also considered the construction of a railway line from Hay to Terowie to complete the trans-continental railway.

In October, the meeting between the military representatives, with Colonel Irving as Chief of the General Staff, and the State railway commissioners was held in Sydney to discuss strategic railways as suggested by the Premiers' conference in May 1915. The conference supported the use of existing railway lines for military purposes and rejected the construction of a military railway from Port Augusta to Brisbane.[117] As well, the conference recommended the linking of the Northern Territory with the eastern and southern States by railway. The most important improvement from a military standpoint in the opinion of the conference was the unification of the gauges of all the lines connecting the railway systems of the Commonwealth. On the question of the east-west railway, the conference stated that unless a line of 4'8" gauge was built between Port Augusta and Broken Hill, with branches of 5'3" gauges to Morgan and Terowie, then the Condobolin-Broken Hill line would be inadequate for military purposes.[118] Instead, a railway line from Hay via Wentworth and Terowie to Port Augusta was recommended to provide a direct inland line of uniform gauge from Sydney to Kalgoorlie.

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115 'Strategic Railway from Brisbane to Port Augusta, via Hay - Report on', by Mr. Combe, 1914-15-16, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, AA MP 498/3, Item B.

116 Ibid.

117 'Strategic Railways: Report of the Proceedings of the Conference of Military Advisers to the Commonwealth and Inter-State Railway Commissions, Sydney, October 1915, by Colonel Irving, AA MP 498/3, Item B.

118 Ibid.

From October 1915, when Hughes became Prime Minister, the War Railway Council and the Commonwealth concentrated on the problem of linking the trans-continental railway. On 10 March 1916, the Cabinet decided to proceed with a survey for a railway from Terowie to Port Augusta. The decision was made on the recommendation of Colonel Bell, the Engineer-in-Chief, Commonwealth Railways.[119] In his report on 19 August 1915, Bell supported the proposal by Combe to utilise the Port Pirie-Quorn line - the War Railway Council had recommended the construction of a railway line paralleling the existing line. In April 1916, O'Malley was urged by R. Rushtin, a Commonwealth railway officer, to convert the line between Quorn and Port Augusta from the 3'6" gauge to the 4'8" gauge. The conversion to the 4'8" gauge would make Port Augusta the centrepoint for the northern railway line and the east-west railway line. Rushtin added a strategic advantage to his advice, which was a bureaucratic follow up of Kitchener's proposals made in 1911.

> ... In those circumstances, you will readily perceive that it would be an economical move to carry out this as a part of your policy and get it put in hand at the earliest possible moment before the East-West Railway is opened as by converting this line would mean the first section of the strategic line which was recommended by the War Department (Lord Kitchener) and which must eventually be carried through from Quorn to Broken Hill connecting up with the New South Wales State system and that point now in construction.[120]

Despite the advice from Rushtin, the gauge was not broadened to 4'8". However, the trans-Australian railway line was opened on 22 October 1917.

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119 Strategic Railways: Untitled Paper, dated 10 March 1916, Papers of King O'Malley (NLA), MS 460, Items 1062-1063.

120 Letter from R.J. Rushtin to O'Malley, 17 April 1916, Papers of King O'Malley (NLA), MS 460, Items 1062-1063.

The problem of eliminating the delays and the cost caused by the lack of vehicular interchange between the railway systems of the Commonwealth was discussed at a meeting of the board of Commonwealth and State railway engineers on break of gauge devices, 16 August, 1918. The report of the meeting was sent to the Director of Military Operations.[121] From a military standpoint, the report advised that any break of gauge plan must apply to major railway routes as well as branch and trunk lines. The engineers rejected the 102 break of gauge devices which were submitted for consideration because they were not applicable to all classes of rolling stock, including locomotives, and not one could operate with all railway systems of Australia.

Self-Sufficiency in Ammunition

The pre-war policy of Australian governments to make the nation self-sufficient in the manufacture of ammunition for the armed forces was continued from 1914 to 1918. During the middle years of the war, the manufacture of munitions was centralised by the establishment of the Federal Munitions Committee. The efforts to build a central arsenal amazed the British government, which failed to understand Australia's desire to take advantage of the development in munitions during the war.[122] The Military Board was associated with the munitions question as well as the supply of clothing to the troops at home and overseas.

In September 1914, the Fisher government asked Whitehall for details on how to manufacture the 18 pounder-QF gun. The Army Council suggested that Australia send a deputation to England to study the process of manufacture and purchase the

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121 'Railways - Break of Gauge: Report of Board of Commonwealth and State Railway Engineers on Break of Gauge Devices (16th August, 1918), 1917/18', The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, AA MP 498/3, Item B.

122 'Secret - Report on Various Aspects of the Munitions Question', by Major S.H.E. Barraclough, 1 June 1916. P10 - Box 8. Papers of Professor Sir Henry Barraclough, Archives, University of Sydney, Sydney.

necessary mechanical plant to start production.[123] In the interim, the Commonwealth asked the British government to instruct two Australian gunnery officers, who were on duty in England, in the manufacture of the 18 pounder-QF gun. Because of the European conflict, the War Office advised the Australian High Commissioner that British experts were unable to give time for instruction. In response to the suggestion by the Army Council and the failure to obtain instruction for the gunnery officers in England, the defence minister, Pearce, asked the Assistant Manager of the Small Arms Factory, Lithgow, to make an estimate of the cost of installing a mechanical plant for 18 pounder-QF gun manufacture.

The efforts to gather information about the manufacture of the 18 pounder-QF gun by the government brought a response from Australian manufacturers who were anxious to make shells. The Sunshine agricultural machinery company offered to produce 20,000 shells at its factory in Victoria.[124] Henry Barraclough, the Assistant Professor of Mechanical Engineering at the University of Sydney, who was a member of the Australian Intelligence Corps from 1908 and the Senior Assistant Censor in the Second Military District, received a request from W.D. Arnott, the biscuit manufacturer, for an opinion on an invention to produce a 'new type of shell for large calibre guns'.[125] Barraclough advised Arnott that expenditure on the production of the new type of shell was unlikely to be a commercial success. Indeed, the manufacture of shell for weapons was difficult and subject to the rapid technical innovations and advances in weaponry arising from the war. The Commonwealth government had consulted Dr. Walter Rosenhain, a graduate of the University of Melbourne and Superintendent of the Metallurgy Department of the National

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123 E. Scott, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, vol.XI, Australia During the War (Sydney, 1936), pp.239-240.

124 Ibid., p.240.

125 Letter from H. Barraclough to W.D. Arnott, 22 May 1915, P10, B15, Papers of Professor Sir Henry Barraclough, Archives, University of Sydney.

Physical Laboratory of Great Britain, about the ability and capacity of Australia to produce steel for making rifles, ammunition for the 18 pounder-QF gun, cupro-nickel envelopes for the small-arm cartridge bullets, and the course of action by the Australian nation in local defence if supplies from Great Britain were interrupted for a period of time.[126] Dr. Rosenhain advised that the major problem was the rapid development of weaponry, and the possibility of producing equipment which was out of date. There is no evidence extant on whether or not Dr. Rosenhain suggested ways of producing local armaments in the event of an interruption to British supplies.

The expansion of defence department business, and the need to co-ordinate the manufacturing of munitions, led R.M.M. Anderson, a Sydney businessman, who investigated the business branches of the Department of Defence after the outbreak of war, to suggest the appointment of a Federal Munitions Committee[127] as a replacement for the departmental committee dealing with munitions.

The Federal Munitions Committee was created in June 1915. Its members included the Chief of Ordnance, Lieut.-Colonel Dangar, Commander Gordon Smith, the second Naval Member of the Naval Board, Captain Thring, the Director-General of Naval Ordnance, Lieut.-Colonel Owens, the Commonwealth Director-General of Works, M. Bell, chemical adviser to the defence department, W. Leitch, a business representative from Melbourne and Professor Lyle, formerly professor of Natural Philosophy in the University of Melbourne. The committee also included consulting members from the fields of science, manufacturing, and commerce. For example, Broken Hill Proprietary Company was represented by the

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126 E. Scott, Australia During the War, p.242.

127 Munitions Supply Board - First Report from 13 August 1921 to 30 June 1922 (Government Printer, Melbourne, 1923), pp.1-4.

General Manager, G. Delprat and a director of the company, H.V. McKay.[128]

The Federal Munitions Committee directed its attention to pursuing the 'self-contained policy' of the Commonwealth government.[129] When the specifications of the 18-pounder shell were sent from London by the High Commissioner, the committee consulted possible contractors for the manufacture of shell steel. The Broken Hill Proprietary Company contracted to supply 125 tons of shell steel, which were passed by the inspectors of the defence department of 31 August 1915. Tenders were then invited to produce shell from the steel made by B.H.P. Co. Offers to manufacture the shell came from all over Australia: in Victoria, the Railway Commissioners constructed a building for shell making at their Newport workshops. The Queensland government undertook to manufacture shell at its railway workshops. In New South Wales, the government.let contracts to a number of engineering businesses. At Broken Hill, the associated mining companies created the Barrier Munitions Company Proprietary Limited. Essington Lewis was given control of B.H.P.'s contract to make shells for light artillery at the Newcastle works, where he supervised the construction of a building to house American machinery.[130] Despite the efforts by Australian firms to manufacture 18 pounder-QF shells, the future of their production depended on the progress of fighting in Europe and the Middle East. In February 1916, the British Minister of Munitions telegraphed the news that the demand for 18 pounder-QF shells was not as high as it was at the beginning of the war, and therefore, the War Office would only accept the shells written in the contracts.[131]

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128 See the war diaries of G.D. Delprat, 1914-18, MS 1630/15 held by the National Library of Australia.

129 'A Real Foundation for Preparedness', The Irontrade Review (25 January 1917), pp.1-7, looks at the American experience during W.W.I.

130 G. Blainey, The Steel Master: A Life of Essington Lewis (Melbourne, 1971), p.50. The papers of Essington Lewis are held by the family, and have not been deposited in the National Library. Blainey intimated in 1971 that the papers would be deposited in the library.

131 E. Scott, Australia During the War, p.245.

In pursuit of the self-contained policy, the government decided to manufacture 4.5-inch high explosive shell. The Newport railway workshops in Victoria carried out experimental manufacture of the shell, as well as the 6-inch high explosive shell. However, in June 1916, the manufacture of shell was stopped by order of the defence minister. The High Commissioner in London had informed the government in that month that Great Britain was able to meet her munition requirements. Moreover, in the opinion of the Minister of Munitions, the difficulty for Australia to keep pace with technical changes in the manufacture and design of munitions, as a result of the distance between Australia and Great Britain, was too great to overcome. The Federal Munitions Committee ceased to function, although the government appointed a Director of Munitions.[132]

In the production of rifles for home defence and the A.I.F., the Small Arms Factory at Lithgow was at a disadvantage at the beginning of hostilities. The Factory started production in mid-1914, and expected to turn out 12,000 rifles a year.[133] The government discovered that the Small Arms Factory was unable to supply the demand for rifles created by the war. In August 1914, the British government appropriated 17,004 rifles in London that were on order for the Australian government.[134] The appropriation of the rifles in London for British troops presented a dilemma to the defence minister. The A.I.F. contingent required nearly all of the British rifles in Australia, and by early 1915, the Department of Defence realised that the demands for equipping reinforcements would take rifles from the home defence troops. In order to equip reinforcements for the A.I.F., Australia ran the risk of exhausting the supply of rifles for home defence by the end of 1915.[135]

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132 Scott, Australia During the War, p.248.

133 Ibid., p.261.

134 Letter from Munro-Ferguson to Bonar Law, 1915, Papers of Lord Novar (NLA), MS 696, Item 711; E. Scott, ibid., p.261.

135 Scott, Australia During the War, p.261.

The British government was informed in April 1915 about the difficulty facing the Australian nation in the supply of rifles for the war effort, as well as the offer of troops for service overseas. In a reply on 17 June 1915, the Colonial Secretary, Bonar Law, stressed that the War Office was unable to provide adequately for the British Army. The Secretary of State for the Colonies suggested that the Small Arms Factory at Lithgow work a double shift. Although the double shift was introduced, the output of rifles per month only rose from 1,200 to 2,000,[136] and fell short of the monthly requirement of 5,000. In July, the War Office advised that rifles for reinforcements would be available to Australia from October onwards.

The ammunition for the rifles was produced by the Colonial Ammunition Company at Saltwater River, Footscray, in Melbourne. Cordite for the ammunition was produced at a government factory, Maribyrnong, as well as at the Company plant after August 1914. During the war, the production of small arms ammunition and rifles in Australia had to take into account the changes made to the Lee Enfield rifle. The .303 ball cartridge Mk II was altered in composition and became in succession Mk VI and Mk VII.[137] The Colonial Ammunition Company produced two million rounds per month.

The problem of increasing the production at the Small Arms Factory, Lithgow, and the possibility of Australia facing a situation in which arms supplies from Britain were arrested by world conflict, made the government policy of self-sufficiency an urgent matter. In May 1915, Leighton, the manager of the government cordite factory at Maribyrnong, who was in England, told the Australian government to direct enquiries for the establishment of an arsenal to the Government of India. The British government was pre-occupied with the war effort, and failed to understand why the

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136 Letter from Munro-Ferguson to Bonar Law, 1915, Papers of Lord Novar (NLA), MS 696, Item 711.

137 The Mk VI and Mk VII were round nosed, and had different distribution of metal in the cupro-nickel bullet envelope. The MK II was flat nosed. See Military Board Minutes, 23 May 1916.

Commonwealth of Australia wanted to establish an arsenal during a war. An arsenal committee, consisting of Colonel P.T. Owen, Director-General of Works, Professor H. Payne from the University of Melbourne, Marcus Bell, chemical adviser to the Defence Department, B.T. McKay, a Queensland businessman, Major H. Gipps, Royal Australian Garrison Artillery, and T. Pearson from the Defence Department as Secretary, visited India at the end of 1915[138] to gain information on how to establish an arsenal. On their return to Australia, the committee members recommended the Australian Capital Territory as the site for a federal arsenal. The government approved a site eight miles south of Canberra next to the Murrumbidgee River, and purchased a homestead, Tuggeranong, as headquarters for the general manager and his staff.[139] Further information about munitions production and expertise was gained by Barraclough, who was asked by Pearce to talk with the Australian Arsenal Committee in India while journeying to England at the end of 1915.[140] He was also asked to gather information on the production of guns up to 4-inch calibre, and the attendant problems of standardisation and gauges.[141]

Professor Barraclough was aware of the opportunity presented to Australia by the war for the development of national resources.

> We live here in a land of illimitable material possibilities; a land with every variety of climate and soil; with a supply of fuel that the most extravagant methods could not exhaust in a thousand years ... Was there ever such a country,

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138 Colonel P. Owen, President Arsenal Committee to the Department of Defence, 25 November 1915, P10, B17, Papers of Professor Sir H. Barraclough, Archives, University of Sydney. E. Scott, Australia During the War, p.264.

139 E. Scott, Australia During the War, p.264.

140 Professor Barraclough, 'The War, Australia, and the Engineer', Proceedings of the Engineering Association of New South Wales, vol.XXX (Session, 1914-1915).

141 Letter from Trumble, Secretary, Department of Defence, to Professor Barraclough, 31 October 1915, Papers of Professor Henry Barraclough, p.10, B17.

or such an opportunity ...[142]

In England, he confined most of his attention to field guns because the manufacture of rifles in Australia was established on sound lines.[143] He suggested that the 4-5" howitzer was a useful gun in conjunction with the 18 pounder-QF gun, especially as the 18 pounder was in the British arsenal. However, Barraclough found the British unable to devote attention to the problem of establishing a Commonwealth arsenal.

> ... Putting the matter briefly, they found a difficulty in understanding why the Commonwealth should choose this particular time to build an Arsenal, or at any rate such heavy portions of it as a Gun Factory and a Gun Carriage Department. Such considerations of course were no affair of mine ...

With the British preoccupied with the war effort in Europe, Barraclough and Leighton advised the Australian government to send chemists and munition workers to England to 'acquire knowledge and training that would secure to Australia the experience necessary for munition manufacture.'[144] Canada and South Africa had already sent skilled workers to assist with the production of munitions. In response to the suggestion from Barraclough and Leighton, the Australian government despatched chemists who began to arrive at the end of 1915, and munition workers left Australia in September 1916. The chemists and munition workers were allotted to engineering and chemical establishments throughout England. For example, the Sopwith Aviation Company took 55 fitters and wood workers. By the end of the war, there were

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142 Professor Barraclough, 'The War, Australia, and the Engineer', p.3.

143 Report on Various Aspects of the Munitions Question by Major S.H.E. Barraclough, 1 June 1916 (Secret), Papers of Professor Sir Henry Barraclough, p.10, B8.

144 Leighton to Official Secretary, Commonwealth of Australia, 12 July 1918, Papers of Professor Sir H. Barraclough, P10, B1: see also Brigadier-General T. Griffiths to Official Secretary, Commonwealth of Australia, London, 18 July 1918.

more than 5,000 Australian munition workers in England,[145] consisting of 3,000 skilled workers and 2,200 labourers chosen by Australian railway authorities to assist with the heavier tasks of munition production. Barraclough was the officer-in-charge of the Australian Munitions and War Workers.

In Australia, the federal arsenal project was pursued until 1917 when it was postponed. The cost of the arsenal was included in the estimates for 1917-18, but Leighton expressed doubts about the project. He was not convinced that Canberra had sufficient potential for an industrial complex, and the cost of transporting materials from the coast was prohibitive.[146] As well, the munitions production in England was decentralised for economic, industrial and military development. Leighton's deputy in England, Major Gibson, who was the Professor of Engineering at the University of Queensland, and a former member of the Australian Intelligence Corps, returned to Australia to take charge of the federal arsenal project. Gibson agreed with Leighton that Australia should extend the government factories rather than built an arsenal. After hearing Gibson's views, the arsenal project was postponed and the government decided to extend the government factories.[147]

The drive for self-sufficiency by the Australian government in munitions was matched by the production of clothing and equipment for the Australian soldier.* The woollen, cotton, harness, saddlery and leather accoutrements factories expanded production to meet the demand created by the war. However, the accounting methods of the Department of Defence were inefficient, and therefore it is difficult to know what proportion of the troop's needs was supplied by Australia. Throughout the war, the Department of Ordnance, General Staff, dealt with the calculation of the items and

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145 The Month's Work, July 1918, p.12.

146 See Report together with Minutes of Evidence Relating to the Proposed Arsenal Railway, 7 November 1918, for the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 1917-1918, no.112.

147 E. Scott, Australia During the War, p.277.

* See Appendix N.

numbers of equipment required for the troops overseas.[148] The figures released by the defence department in November 1915, on funds spent on army equipment, which amounted to £7,591,444, show that three quarters of army expenditure was allocated to clothing. In July 1917, Littleton Groome, an Honorary Minister for Queensland, told the House of Representatives that most of the clothing, boots, and other items of equipment were supplied by Australia.[149]

Aviation

The impact made by airpower on the implementation of the Pacific oriented strategic analysis before World War I was minimal. In 1911, the Minister for Defence, G.F. Pearce, followed the decision of the Imperial Conference to study air power. On 9 August 1912, Brigadier-General J.M. Gordon, the Chief of the General Staff, put forward a proposal to the Military Board for the creation of a flying school and Corps. The Military Board accepted the proposal, and in July 1914, applications were called from army officers wishing to train as air pilots. The first training course at Point Cook commenced on 17 August, 13 days after the declaration of war by Great Britain. During the war, four squadrons of the Australian Flying Corps fought in the Middle East and France.

In Australia, the development of airpower as a means of defence was promoted by the General Staff during the war. A committee, consisting of Professor Barraclough, Captain C.S. Arnot, and Captain Harrison, Aviation Instructional Staff, was established by the government in 1916 to investigate the construction of aeroplanes in Australia.[150] The Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Irving, on 8 September 1916, asked the committee to consider a scheme for the production of

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148 Argus, 27 August 1916.

149 CPD, Session 1917, vol.LXXXII, 11 July 1917, p.44.

150 SMH, 1 September 1914 - a Melbourne firm, Tarrant Motors, offered to construct an aeroplane for the Department of Defence - a member of the firm was H.R. Busteed, who had applied for an honoraria commission as lieutenant in the Aviation Instructional Staff, when it was formed.

aeroplanes at the proposed federal arsenal.[151] The committee suggested the appointment of a workshop manager for aeroplane engines and body construction at the proposed federal arsenal, and the despatch of four NCOs from the Central Flying School for a period of twelve months in England to gain experience in the construction of aeroplanes. Professor Barraclough was asked by the committee to report on the Royal Aircraft Factory at Farnborough when he visited England. As well, the committee suggested that the officer responsible for the instruction of pilots visit England and France to see the latest in cameras and machine guns. The committee made plain to the government that it was necessary to plan ahead and make a decision on the number of machines required for the next two years. In the interim, the committee stated that until the federal arsenal was built in three or four years' time, the Central Flying School was capable of constructing a limited number of aeroplanes by copying imported types. On 11 October 1916, the Chief of the General Staff, Irving, was informed by the defence minister that he had approved the report on the proposed aeroplane factory, and the proposal to extend the operations of the arsenal to aeroplane manufacture.

The future of airpower for military purposes was grasped by Major-General Legge, who returned to Australia in 1917 and became the Chief of the General Staff. On 29 April 1918, he wrote a memorandum in which he called for the construction of 200 aeroplanes, 12 balloons, and an air service.[152] He argued that air power was an advantage for the defence of Australia. There was no guarantee that British sea power would be available to protect Australia in the future.[153]

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151 Brigadier-General, C.G.S., to Secretary, 8 September 1916, Papers of Professor Sir H. Barraclough, PI - DI.

152 D. Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force, 1939-1942 (Canberra, 1962), p.1; Sir R. Williams, These are Facts (Canberra, 1977), pp.1-105.

153 Report on Military Defence of Australia, 1920, 6 February 1920, Papers of Sir G.F. Pearce (NLA), MS 1827, Item 14; AA CP 754, file no. 464/401/151.

> A sufficient air force ... can go far towards breaking the strength of an attack, or increasing the value of an inferior defending force if it can master the air service of an enemy ... A thousand aeroplanes would cost less than one battle cruiser ... From our knowledge of the present war and from my own experience, I have to report that the minimum requirements of the Air Service are set out and their creation should not be delayed a day when we realise that they may be needed tomorrow.[154]

Legge called for the establishment of an air service made up of eight divisional, two army and five reserve squadrons, a factory, repair shops, aircraft parks and depots, a balloon wing, and schools of instruction. He estimated that 654 officers and 7,209 other ranks were needed for the air force. In his plan, the air force included 20 officers and 500 other ranks from the militia. Legge wanted to promote local industries in the production of equipment for the air force.[155] The Australian cabinet approved Legge's proposal to construct the engines and raw material for the air force in Australia.[156]

On 26 June 1918, the Council of Defence submitted Legge's proposal, and a scheme by Wing Commander Maguire, Royal Naval Air Service, who was attached to the Naval Board, for the development of an air service, to a committee consisting of Rear Admiral Sir W. Creswell, Captain Thring, the Director of Naval War Staff, Wing Commander Maguire, Major-General Legge, Major Harrison, officer-in-charge, Central Flying School Point Cook, and George Swinburne, chairman, Board of Business Administration, Department of Defence. The committee decided on 13 July to submit the two plans by Legge and Maguire to cabinet so the government could estimate their cost. By

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154 Memorandum by Major-General Legge, 29 April 1918, quoted in D. Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force, 1939-1942, p.1.

155 L. Wackett, Aircraft Pioneer (Sydney 1972), pp.79-113 covers immediate post-war efforts to construct aircraft in Australia.

156 Wing Commander Maguire, Royal Naval Air Service, advised the Naval Board to push for the establishment of an air service. He distrusted Japan as an ally although she was

[Continued p.228]

submitting the plans to cabinet, the committee avoided any decision at that stage over the allocation of funds between the two services. However, the cabinet authorised a minute on 13 August 1918 which asked the Council of Defence to allocate funds for the aviation programme, and thereby placed the matter in front of the service chiefs again. The cabinet allocated £3,000,000 for the naval and military programmes. In response to the Cabinet directive, the Council of Defence appointed a sub-committee which included Creswell, Legge, Maguire, Swinburne, the chairman, and Major L. Murray from the Central Flying School, to discuss the allocation of funds in October 1918. Legge wanted the committee to support his scheme because he feared that the Navy would attempt to gain a major proportion of funds, and so reduce the size of the army's air service. The air service was 'for land work', and an adjunct to the land forces.[157] In contrast to Legge, Maguire argued for a unified air service serving both the army and navy as an economic measure. The problem of co-ordinating the energies of the naval and army officers in the introduction of air power to Australian defence was not resolved by the sub-committee.[158] Swinburne, the chairman, wrote a compromise solution in a Memorandum on the deliberations of the committee members which referred the establishment of a unified air service to more committees. He suggested four proposals:

(1) the air service should have one administrative authority;
(2) an Aircraft Construction Committee was necessary to examine the task of local aircraft production;
(3) Legge's scheme deserved examination by the Military Board, and then by a conference to estimate how the navy and army might co-operate in an air service; and

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Fn. 156 continued.
fighting Germany. Maguire wanted Australia to be self-sufficient in the manufacture of aircraft.

157 Sir R. Williams, These Are Facts, p.115; 'Naval and Military Aviation: Minority Report', 30 October 1918, Naval and Military Aviation Minutes, Air Historical Branch, file 91.

158 On the inter-service rivalry hear a tape-recording of Air Marshal Sir R. Williams on the development of air-power in Australia, NLA.

(4) a Naval Aviation Service needed two stations for naval defence and training.

The resolution of the airpower question awaited the conclusion of the war, and the appointment of another sub-committee to examine the possible co-ordination of the naval and army plans.

Reform of the Council of Defence

The experience of co-ordinating and executing Australia's war efforts exposed the limited scope and powers of the Council of Defence which prevented close co-operation between the navy and army in the defence of Australia.[159] During World War I, the Council of Defence was reformed to make the co-ordination of Australian defence more effective. The Military Board agreed with the need to expand the defence council in order to utilise the resources of the Australian nation.

In early 1916, Captain Thring, a member of the Federal Munitions Committee, called for an expansion of the activities carried out by the Council of Defence. The Council of Defence, as the highest defence policy body in Australia, had fallen into disuse after two years of war.[160] In brief summary, the Federal Munitions Committee called for close co-operation between the army and navy, a definite and continuous policy appropriate for the defence of Australia which was based on more effective communication between the Council of Defence and ministers responsible for defence and foreign policy, and the development of strategies for the navy and army in accordance with the policy of the defence council. On 5 April 1916, Pearce referred the proposals of the Federal Munitions Committee to the Military Board. A month later, on 4 May, the Military Board concurred with the

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159 Memorandum from the Federal Munitions Committee to Senator Pearce, Minister for Defence, early 1916, AA B197, file no.1851/2/260.

160 Memorandum upon the Establishment of a Council of Defence by G.F. Pearce, 15 March 1918, AA CRS A1601, item D15/1.

proposed reforms of the Council of Defence.[161] Under Thring's scheme, the Council of Defence was to consist of a number of standing committees responsible for covering the tasks of defence planning. They were strategy and combined operations, intelligence, inventions for war purposes, war economics, transport, censorship, legal, and exports, imports, and manufactures. Senator Pearce followed Thring's suggestion of standing committees which was endorsed by cabinet in October 1917. On 23 April 1918, the reformed Council of Defence was established by Statutory Rule number 273. The first submission to the number one standing committee known as 'Operations' was the paper by Brigadier-General Foster on the German possessions in the Pacific. Foster's paper was considered on 26 August 1918. The committee, consisting of Creswell, Legge, Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Dangar, the Chief of Ordnance and Captain Cochrane, Royal Navy, advised the Australian government to retain the islands south of the equator, and if possible, retain the islands north of the equator or, failing that, have them placed under an international authority.[162]

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161 Military Board Minutes, 4 May 1916, Agenda No. 48/1916, AA B197, file no. 1851/2/260.

162 See Chapter 6 in S. Webster, Creswell, the Australian Novelist: A Career Biography of Vice-Admiral Sir William R. Creswell, RN, RAN, 1852-1933. (Ph.D. Thesis, Monash University, 1976).

CHAPTER VII

THE A.I.F. AND AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY, 1914-1918

The outbreak of world War I in August 1914 faced the Australian leaders and military staff with the opportunity to participate in the Imperial war effort. The immediate problem was the nature and size of the contribution to the defence of the British Empire which gave expression to the emotional response amongst Australians in favour of Australian arms in association with and in support of a British cause. At the same time, a military contribution by Australia raised questions for the political leaders and military staff about the advancement and protection of Australian interests in the British Empire. In keeping with the development of Australian defence policy from 1905 to 1914, the Australian political and military leaders were determined to maintain the identity of a national military contribution which was vital to Australia's foreign policy during the war.

The decision to offer military aid to Breat Britain was made by the Australian cabinet at a meeting in Melbourne on 3 August 1914. The Prime Minister, Joseph Cook, asked Major Brudenell White, the acting Chief of the General Staff, if plans existed for the despatch of Australian troops overseas.[1] In reply, White told Cook and cabinet that a study of military co-operation with New Zealand in the Pacific, and the Empire, was undertaken in 1912. He believed that a force of 12,000 men could be raised and sent abroad within six weeks. When he was asked about the size of the proposed force, 12,000 men, White replied that in comparison with the South African war, 'the figure was within our resources.'[2] However, Cook wanted a larger force to

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1 'Origin of A.I.F.' - Answer by Brudenell White to C.E.W. Bean on 1 October 1919, Papers of Dr C.E.W. Bean (AWM), file no.419/8/1, no.153-9/12.

2 C.E.W. Bean, Two Men I Knew (Sydney, 1957), p.93.

match the Canadian offer of 30,000 men, and to demonstrate that Australia was carrying her Imperial responsibilities. The Prime Minister then asked White if it was possible to raise a force of 20,000 men and the time needed to equip and despatch them overseas. The acting Chief of the General Staff thought that the Australian nation was able to complete the equipping and brief training of a 20,000 size force, but he could not guarantee the completion of such a project in six weeks.[3] The Australian cabinet decided to offer a force of 20,000 men and pay for the expense of sending and maintaining them abroad. White wrote the cablegram which Cook sent to the British government offering 'to dispatch an expeditionary force of 20,000 men of any suggested composition to any destination desired ... to be at complete disposal of Home Government.'[4] In response to the Australian offer of assistance, the British government was cautious, as war had not been declared. However, on 4 August, after the invasion of Belgium, Britain declared war on Germany and two days later the British government accepted the offer of 20,000 men from Australia.

The offer from the Australian government, and the support for the war effort by other Dominions, was a vindication for the advocates of Imperial defence of their belief in the tight link of British race pride in the Empire. Despite the weakness in pre-war Imperial military preparations, especially in the case of the Imperial General Staff, the Dominion governments placed their naval and military espeditionary forces under the control of the British government. Strategic planning was the responsibility of the British cabinet, and Dominion troops

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[3] Bean, in Two Men I Knew, states on page 93 that White said 'that there was a fair prospect that they would be ready to sail in six weeks'. This statement contrasts with White's recollection of his reply to Cook that 'he could not guarantee 20,000 in six weeks'.

[4] Bean, Two Men I Knew, pp.93-94.

served with large British formations and were commanded by British officers.[5] At the direction of the British government, the Dominions undertook local operations. For example, the Australian government despatched an expeditionary force to destroy German bases in the Pacific. The response by the Dominions, especially in leaving strategic control to the British government, underlined the view that common Empire interests needed protection. However, the unity displayed by the Dominions in giving military aid to Great Britain did not mean that their expeditionary forces were part of the British Army. The Dominions, while conceding strategic control to the British, wanted to protect the interests of their troops overseas. The Australian government decided to appoint Colonel Bridges, the Inspector-General, as organiser of the expeditionary force. On his return to Sydney from Brisbane on 4 August 1914, he suggested to Senator Millen, the defence minister, that the government appoint a General Officer Commanding to command Australia's military forces. When he met the minister again on 6 August in the late afternoon, Millen dispensed with his enquiry about the position of G.O.C. by showing Bridges a proposal, in the form of a draft minute, that he organise the expeditionary force.[6] Bridges accepted the task.

The notion that the Australian forces were at the disposal of the War Office and available for distribution amongst British units as they were during the Boer War was rejected by Bridges. He was determined to preserve the identity of the Australian contribution to the war. The War Office, on 7 August, suggested that Australia furnish an expeditionary force made up of two infantry brigades, one light horse brigade and one field artillery brigade. In consultation with his advisers, he drafted a reply to

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5 Col. A.F. Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-1918. Volume I (Ottawa, 1938), pp.126-127.

6 Diary of Major-General Sir W. Throsby Bridges, 6 August 1914, Bridges Papers - uncatalogued papers in the possession of Bridges-Maxwell.

the War Office which said that Australia had begun organising an infantry division, and a light horse brigade, and 'fully expected 20,000 to go' within six weeks. The War Office was asked to amend or concur in the Australian action.[7] On 10 August 1914, the War Office replied and agreed to Bridges' proposal. In its efforts to maintain the identity of the expeditionary force, the Australian government was determined to appoint an Australian general as officer-in-command. Bridges, out of deference and respect, suggested that General Hutton take command of the expeditionary force.[8] He also did not want the command because he expected to remain in Australia and train troops for overseas service and home defence. The Australian government, however, pushed aside the idea that Hutton command the overseas force and appointed Bridges on 15 August 1914. He was also promoted to the rank of Major-General. The War Office did not object to the appointment of Bridges, or his Chief of Staff, Major White, as was the case with the Canadian officers commanding the Canadian Expeditionary Force, who were replaced by British officers.[9]

The responsibility of naming the expeditionary force was taken by Bridges who had always paid deference to the advice from Whitehall about Australian defence. As a disciple of General Hutton, like his colleague Brudenell White, he never forgot the Imperial outlook, and wanted to honour the achievement of his mentor in building the foundations of the Australian army. He had already suggested Hutton as the commander of the expeditionary force. In keeping with his desire to reiterate the strategic and emotional link with the Mother Country, it is not surprising that the word Imperial appeared in the name of the expeditionary force. 'Imperial' was included in the title of

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7 C.E.W. Bean, Anzac to Amiens (Canberra, 1946), pp.20-28 and pp.40-49.

8 C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918. Vol.I. (Sydney, 1942), p.33; text of speech by Birdwood, 1920, Hutton Papers add. ms. 50089 vol.XII; 'Choice of Commander', Bean Papers (AWM), no.153-9/12.

9 R. Preston, Canada and Imperial Defence (Durham, 1967), pp.463-529.

a formation, 'Imperial Australian Force', which was put forward at the Colonial Conference of 1902 by Lieut.-Colonel E.A. Altham in his paper on Imperial defence.[10] It is possible that Bridges may have learnt of the Imperial Australian Force when he was a member of General Hutton's staff in 1902. The story presented by Bean maintained that the title Australian Imperial Force was Bridges' suggestion after he listened to various titles put forward by his staff.[11] The title Australian Imperial Force highlighted the Imperial dimension and the Australian character of the expeditionary force. A.I.F. was appropriate for the Imperial adventure.

The preparations made by Bridges for the despatch of the Australian troops overseas brought his attention to the question of how to administer Australia's fighting interests overseas, especially as the Dominion formations were serving with and not in the British Army. White, Bridges' Chief of Staff, thought that British authorities or a Commander-in-Chief would administer all A.I.F. matters.[12] He recalled in 1919 that the puzzlement about how to deal with the A.I.F. was the result of 'our narrow view.' With reference to the position, General Officer Commanding, A.I.F., Bridges feared that the weight of A.I.F. administrative duties might exclude the appointed officer from the exercise of field command. The problem of administering the A.I.F. became critical when Australian reinforcements arrived in Egypt during June and July 1915.

When the first Australian troops reached Egypt, they were placed under the fighting command of Major-General W.R. Birdwood. Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, with the agreement of the Australian and New Zealand governments, appointed Birdwood, who was a member of his staff in South Africa and India, to form an Army Corps from

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10 Meaney, op. cit., p.63.

11 Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918. Vol.I, p.36.

12 'Choice of Commander', Bean Papers (AWM), no.153-9/12.

the Australian and New Zealand contingents in the Middle East. The Army Corps was formed as follows:

Corps Headquarters (British unit);
1st Australian Division;
New Zealand and Australian Division.

In the Army Corps, Bridges was commander of the A.I.F. and the 1st Australian Division. As a field commander, Bridges wished to divest himself of the tasks as administrative commander-in-chief of the A.I.F. He had to deal with ship-loads from Australia carrying not only troops, but hospitals, equipment supplies, horses and other items. On his recommendation, an Australian base was built in Egypt, which was the start of the Administrative Headquarters of the A.I.F. Colonel V. Sellheim, a Queensland and permanent officer, and head of the administrative staff in Bridges' headquarters, took charge of the base. Under Sellheim the base relieved Bridges of dealing with routine administrative matters and developed seven departments - records, finance, ordnance, medical, reinforcement, remounts and a postal section. In creating the Australian base, Bridges made sure that it operated as part of the British Commander-in-Chief's staff in Egypt. When the base was established, he insisted on channelling administrative matters through Birdwood and General Sir J. Maxwell, the Commander-in-Chief. After he became commander of the First Australian Division on 19 February 1915, he stopped issuing A.I.F. orders and pointed out that Maxwell, in the field, had the authority to make promotions in the A.I.F. Until the Australians went to Gallipoli, Bridges submitted promotion recommendations to Birdwood for approval.

The most important task of Sellheim's base depot was the training of Australian reinforcements and convalescents.[13] Lord Kitchener, however, in the interests of training the Dominion troops, appointed a British officer, Major-General

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13 Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, vol.II, pp.145-167.

Spens, to assist Maxwell in Egypt with the training of Australian and New Zealand troops. Spens, therefore, was not under the command of Birdwood or Bridges, which was a situation the Australian government wanted to avoid. At the end of 1915, the Australian government, on the suggestion of Colonel Dodds, investigated the prospect of building a strong base command with a Quartermaster General, Adjutant-General and medical sections. Senator Pearce, the defence minister, consulted with McCay, the acting Inspector-General in Australia, and informed the British ministry on 7 November without further notice that the Australian government proposed to appoint a commander of Australian troops in Egypt. The commander would be responsible to the Australian government and had the specific duties of co-ordinating all training, administration and organisation of Australian troops. At the same time, Pearce told the British cabinet that the Australian troops were under the command of General Maxwell. Brigadier-General Irving was chosen as commander of the base,[14] Sellheim was made Deputy Adjutant-General. Colonel Neville Howse was appointed Director of Medical Services, and a Sydney businessman, Robert McAnderson, with the honorary rank of colonel, was entrusted with the task of placing the administrative practice of the base on strict business principles.

The administrative arrangement worked out by Pearce and the British cabinet was upset when the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps were evacuated from Gallipoli in December 1915. At Anzac, General Godley, a British officer and commander of the New Zealand and Australian Division, was appointed commander of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps on 16 October when Birdwood became acting commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. As commander of the ANZAC corps, he assumed responsibility for A.I.F. affairs but after the return to Egypt, Birdwood was

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[14] Letter from Pearce to Sir R. Munro-Ferguson, 25 November 1915, Papers of Sir George Foster Pearce (AWM).

recognised as controller of the A.I.F. With the concurrence of the New Zealand and Australian governments, and General Sir Archibald Murray, who succeeded as commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, Birdwood commanded temporarily the Australian and New Zealand Forces during their reorganisation. Brigadier-General Irving, who arrived in Egypt during the retraining of the A.I.F., was made 'Commandant of the A.I.F. Forces', an appointment which carried no duties. He was offered the command of the 14 Infantry Brigade after Birdwood was convinced that the base would not play a large role in A.I.F. affairs in the future. Irving accepted the command. Sellheim was reappointed commander of the base on 21 February 1915.

The question of the administrative self-government of the A.I.F. was also related to the appointment and promotion of Australian officers, which was a way of preserving the identity of the Australian Imperial Force. On 4 February 1916, Pearce wrote to Birdwood, querying his recommendations for the appointment of two British officers, Major-General Sir Herbert Cox and Major-General Herbert Lawrence, to two Australian divisions which were formed by Brudenell White during the reorganisation of the A.I.F. in Egypt.

> ... There is a general feeling of disappointment, which I share, that you have found it necessary to recommend other than Australian officers to the command of these divisions. It may be that we have taken too optimistic a view of the reports that have been made from time to time on some Australian officers, but we have formed the opinion that some of them, for instance, Chauvel, Monash, White and Holmes, would have been considered fit for these divisional commands ... I can assure you however that it will cause great disappointment if Australian officers who are fit for Brigade and Battalion commands are passed over and Imperial officers appointed to these positions; and I trust therefore that you will exercise the powers we have given you in this matter as sparingly as you can, consistently with what you

believe to be necessary for efficiency.[15]

In his reply on 24 March 1916, Birdwood pointed out to Pearce the difficulty of finding Australian officers with sufficient military experience to take 'a really big command like that of a division.'[16] He told Pearce that Chauvel was appointed commander of the ANZAC Mounted Division. With reference to Monash, Birdwood held the opinion that he had the capacity to command a division in peace time, but he had not 'shown that resolution which is really essential for a field command.'[17] He also believed that White best served the A.I.F. and the British Empire as his Chief of Staff instead of as a divisional general. However, he was anxious to see White promoted to Major-General when an Australian and New Zealand Army was formed.[18] The result of the enquiry by Pearce was that Birdwood selected McCay for a divisional command, and kept Monash in consideration for the new division being raised in Australia, which became the Third Division, A.I.F. The other division in Egypt was placed under the temporary command of Cox, who was one of Birdwood's fellow officers from India. As well, the reorganisation of the A.I.F. in Egypt provided an opportunity for the promotion of Australians at the brigade and battalion levels. For example, William Glasgow, Brudenell White's contemporary and opposite number in the Queensland National Bank in Gympie during the nineties, Duncan Glasfurd, a contemporary of White at Staff College and staff officer on the First Division, A.I.F., John Gellibrand, another friend of White from Staff College, and H.E. Elliott, became brigadiers.

In the same letter, Birdwood raised the problem of administering the A.I.F. when the divisions left Egypt for the Western Front. He asked Pearce to continue his appointment as 'commandant of the A.I.F.' and establish a head-

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15 Letter from Pearce to Birdwood, 4 February 1916, Papers of Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood (AWM), file no.417/20/17.

16 Letter from Birdwood to Pearce, 24 March 1916, Birdwood Papers (AWM), file no.419/10/7.

17 Ibid., p.3.

18 Ibid., p.4.

quarters office in London.[19] In support of his request, he mentioned that White, McCay and others were 'very emphatic that it is the only system which will ensure confidence in the forces generally.'[20] General Murray, on the other hand, suggested that in addition to establishing a London headquarters for the A.I.F., the War Office separate the active command and administrative control exercised by Birdwood. In his opinion, the combination of fighting and administrative commands was too heavy a responsibility for one person. The implication of his suggestion was that Birdwood either command one of the Anzac corps or take the appointment in London.

Both Birdwood and Godley objected to Murray's scheme which ignored the sensitive relationship between the Dominion force commander and his government. Bridges, and then Birdwood, had corresponded with the Australian government on matters which were not covered by official correspondence and acted as the military representative of the Dominion government. General Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London, on 14 March, wrote to Murray and proposed that the Anzac reinforcements and convalescents come under his command in Egypt before they joined or rejoined the Australian divisions in France. Again, Birdwood and Godley objected to the proposal since it neglected the fact that a Dominion force needed a commander responsible to the Dominion government. Birdwood, therefore, with the assistance of White, decided to send his scheme of organisation to the War Office for consideration and informed the Australian government of his action. As well, he showed the scheme and his cable messages to Murray, who forwarded the matter to the War Office for a decision.

The question of the administrative command, and the affairs of the A.I.F., were taken up by Hughes, the Australian Prime Minister, when he visited England early in 1916. On 11 March 1916, he cabled Pearce and asked for an opinion

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[19] Ibid. [20] Ibid.

about the fitness of Godley for the command of the first two Australian divisions to go to France.[21] Pearce cabled that Birdwood should command the Australians in France. The Prime Minister went and saw Robertson and campaigned for Birdwood as commander of the Australian Corps. Robertson, who was made aware of Australian sensitivity on the subject, informed Murray about Hughes' selection. The topic was eventually sent to Kitchener, Birdwood's former commanding officer in India, who as Secretary of State tipped the scales in Birdwood's favour.

The desire by the Australian government to preserve the identity of the A.I.F. also led to the idea that the formation of an Australian army was possible in view of the contribution made by the Dominion to the war effort. Hughes thought that the creation of an Australian army was logical after the Australian divisions reached the Western Front in early 1916. His idea was supported by Birdwood who had already asked the Australian government to approach the War Office on the subject. The request for an Australian army from Birdwood recognised the inward nationalism of the Australian fighting forces and advanced his career. The War Office, on 2 April, rejected the idea of an Australian and New Zealand Army, and in trying to assuage national feelings stated that there was every intention to form an Australian army, in suitable circumstances.

Hughes, who was alive to the interests of the Australian troops, wrote to Robertson on 12 April 1916, and asked whether or not there was truth in the notion he had heard at a War Committee meeting, that 'the Australian troops are to be cut up and brigaded with others.'

> ... I speak for Australia when I say that we watch the movements of our brave soldiers with eager eyes. Their glorious deeds have rung like a toxin throughout the Commonwealth drawing thousands to the colours fixed by a spirit of noble emulation and by the spectacle of self-

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21 On the administrative command of the A.I.F., see C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume II, pp.145-187.

> sacrifice lifting the whole community to a higher and noble plane. The deeds of the Australian soldier have fused the people of the Commonwealth into a nation.[22]

He urged Robertson not to diminish the identity of the Australian fighting forces, and pressed for Birdwood as the commander of an Australian army. Robertson referred the fear of the Australian Prime Minister about the break up of the Australian Corps to Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commander of the British Armies in France. On 16 April 1916 Haig told Robertson that he never intended to dismember the Australian Corps.

> ... You can therefore assure the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth that so long as I am in command in France "the Australian Corps" will not be broken up.[23]

Robertson sent Hughes a copy of Haig's letter on the subject, and also mentioned that six Australian divisions 'may be too small to form an army.'

After the first Anzac Corps arrived in France in early April 1916, Birdwood went to London for meetings with Andrew Fisher, the Australian High Commissioner, representatives of the New Zealand Government and War Office officials. At two meetings, on 21 and 28 April, all parties agreed that Birdwood should have the administrative command of the A.I.F. The meeting also decided that the administrative headquarters of the A.I.F. and training units were better placed in England than in Egypt. Hughes then took Birdwood's case for the combination of the administrative and fighting commands to Haig on 1 June 1916. Haig noted in his diary on 1 June 1916 after Hughes' visit that six divisions were not

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[22] Letter from Hughes to Robertson, 12 April 1916, Papers of Field Marshal Sir W. Robertson (Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, University of London, 1/35/51.

[23] Letter from Lieut.-Gen. Sir D. Haig to Robertson, 16 April 1916, Robertson Papers 1/35/52/1, Diary of Field Marshal the Earl Haig, 16 April 1916, Papers of Field Marshal the Earl Haig (National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh), vol.5, no.97, item 77.

sufficient for an Australian army, and again he reiterated that he had no intention of dismembering the Australian Corps.[24] There was no mention of Birdwood in the diary, although Haig acceded to the wishes of the Australian Prime Minister.[25]

The efforts by the Australian government to protect the A.I.F. and take a larger role in Imperial affairs were advanced, Hughes believed, by the transfer of administrative headquarters from Cairo to London. Hughes wanted the commander of the administrative headquarters in London to gain admission to the councils of the War Office. He chose a Sydney businessman, McAnderson, who was a militia captain in the New South Wales defence forces before Federation and a town clerk and treasurer of the City of Sydney for the position. Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, according to Hughes was amazed by the selection of McAnderson. In the book Policies and Potentates, Hughes claimed that Robertson was incredulous when he suggested McAnderson take the appointment as a civilian.[26] In his own inimitable way, Hughes then said, 'Then I will make him a general.' The story told by Hughes neglected the fact that McAnderson was the Deputy Quartermaster General at A.I.F. Headquarters in Egypt, with the honorary rank of colonel, and acquainted with the administrative matters of the A.I.F. Hughes chose McAnderson for the London appointment because he thought that he would be able to deal with the War Office. McAnderson's only superiors were the Australian High Commissioner and the Australian government at home. General Sir Newton Moore, a former Premier and Agent-General of Western Australia, was placed in command of the retraining depot in England, while Sellheim continued his command of the Australian base in Egypt.

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24 Diary of Field Marshal the Earl Haig, 1 June 1916, Haig Papers, vol.6, no.97, Item 77.

25 Ibid.

26 W.H. Hughes, Policies and Potentates (Sydney, 1950), p.156.

The establishment of the administrative self-government of the A.I.F. did not prevent attempts by British officers to take control of Australian forces. In Egypt, Brudenell White had planned the Australian Training Centre before the reorganised divisions left for France. The centre was responsible for training Australian troops in Egypt and White ensured that a semi-permanent staff for each training battalion and reserve regiment of light horse supplemented the staff appointed for the task. When Birdwood and White left Egypt, they expected reinforcements to receive training from the centre. Yet, White made Sellheim aware that Murray held different views about the training of the Australians. Murray did not respect the arrangement worked out by Birdwood and White, and on 12 April Sellheim discovered that a British staff was carrying out the training of the Australian troops at Tel-el-Kabir. The reason for the British action was the desire to improve the purely external forms of discipline amongst the Australian troops which, by War Office standards, was lacking. Sellheim protested to Murray about the usurpation of his authority and, as a result, Sellheim and the New Zealand Commander were allowed to inspect their respective troops and act as consultants on training methods.

The effort to maintain the identity of the Australian Imperial Force by the promotion of the Australian officers and control over training was part of a policy by the Australian government to look after their own forces as well as the general interest of the Empire. As was mentioned before, the common Imperial banner under which the Australians fought did not exclude development of the idea that they were Dominion units in their own right. The growth of administrative self-government in the A.I.F. was an aspect of Dominion identity. Another, and more important, influence on the emergence of a distinctive Australian fighting force was the battle experience of troops under British command.

The achievement of the Anzacs at Gallipoli had identified the Australian nation in a British cause and provided a rallying point for those sentiments of pride and distinctiveness felt by Australians.[27] After the Australian Imperial Force embarked for France, there was general discussion and agreement amongst the troops and journalists that the senior commands should go to Australians. When Senator Pearce, the defence minister, broached the subject with General Birdwood in 1916, he was told that the selection of Australian officers depended on the availability of permanent officers in the higher command, and since the number was small, it was difficult to fill the divisional commands with non-permanent officers.[28] Birdwood had bought his own staff officers from India when he took command of the A.I.F. in Egypt. The chief exception was his Chief of Staff, Brudenell White, who remained with him during the war. The experience of the Australians on the Western Front dispelled doubts about the professional competence of their high ranking officers. Furthermore, the growth of the inward nationalism of the A.I.F., a subset of British Imperial nationalism under the conditions of the Western Front, brought forth the call for an Australian Army.

The inward nationalism of the A.I.F. grew from a pride in the achievements of Australian soldiers and the comparison, which was not always favourable, with British commanders and troops. On a number of occasions during the war, Australian officers and troops were critical of the poor planning by British staffs and the unnecessary loss of Australian lives. For example, the I Anzac Corps was sent to part of the allied line south of Armentieres in April 1916. The commander of the XI British Army Corps believed that an attack on Aubers, which was near Lille on the Sugarloaf Salient, would succeed,

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27 Meaney, op. cit., pp.4-5.

28 Letter from Pearce to Birdwood, 4 February 1916, Papers of Field Marshal Lord Birdwood (AWM), file 419/10/7 and 211/2, and reply, letter from Birdwood to Pearce, 24 March 1916, file no.419/10/7, 211/3.

and he chose the 61st British Division and the Fifth Division A.I.F. for the operation. In the 27 hours of fighting, which started at 0600 hours on 19 July, the Fifth Division A.I.F. lost 5,533 men. Brudenell White, Chief of Staff at Australian Headquarters, was critical of the poor planning by the British Corps. At Pozieres, in July 1916, the Australian Second Division experienced the poor leadership of General Sir Hubert Gough in attempting to rush preparations to relieve the First Division, A.I.F. Haig, who watched the Second Division in action, made his celebrated comment to Birdwood and White that they were 'not fighting bashi-bazouks.' White told Haig that Gough had rushed Legge into action and furthermore, that the development of the battle did not follow the British plan.[29] In twelve days fighting at Pozieres, the Second Division lost 6,848 men. Poor British generalship and the bloody fighting on the Western Front brought forth a call for an Australian Army, commanded by Australians.

The move by the British to break up one of the five Australian divisions in order to maintain the other four at strength after the bloody fighting of Bullecourt, Messines and the Third Battle of Ypres, brought demands for the Australianisation of the A.I.F. command.[30] The prime mover for the appointment of an Australian to lead the A.I.F. was Keith Murdoch, a journalist and personal agent for Prime Minister Hughes in London, who participated in the protection of Australian interests in the Imperial war effort.

> ... Re troops urgently ask your immediate consideration for following important representations behalf whole A.I.F. in France stop officers men have very strong Australian feelings prize highly their distinctive Australian identity and find that Australian comradeship is a valuable moral support stop moreover several times in recent battles they

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29 See P. Firkins, The Australians in Nine Wars (New York, 1971), pp.22-126, and various volumes of the Official History for examples.

30 Cable from Keith Murdoch to W.M. Hughes, 11 July 1917, Papers of Sir Keith Murdoch (AWM).

> lost heavily owing weakness or failure support raw British troops on flank.[31]

To that time, the A.I.F. had not fought as a whole; at times the third and fourth divisions were attached to other armies with overall British command. The discussion about breaking up the divisions strengthened the view that the A.I.F. should come under Birdwood's command and senior Australian officers should command the divisions.[32] Andrew Fisher, the Australian High Commissioner in London, sent a cable to Hughes on 13 July 1917 which carried a request from Murdoch for the Australian government to bring all Australian units in France together, consider the appointment of an Australian liaison officer at the War Office, and instruct Birdwood to provide a list of British officers attached to the A.I.F. and specify which ones were replaceable.[33] Murdoch stressed that Australian troops disliked the General Headquarters Policy which recognised them 'as merely British troops.' In putting forward these requests, Fisher mentioned that he was supported by Charles Bean, a correspondent attached to the A.I.F., and senior Australian officers. Keith Murdoch wrote to Hughes on 7 August 1917 and asked him for a reply about the position of the Australian government on the amalgamation of the A.I.F. division.[34]

> I cabled to you recently about the strong feeling throughout the A.I.F. in favour of an immediate linking up of the divisions, a course which is practicable and would be very advantageous to Australian nationalism.[35]

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31 Ibid.

32 Cablegram sent to the Rt. Hon. W.M. Hughes, 13 July 1917, by Andrew Fisher, High Commissioner, for Keith Murdoch, Papers of Sir Keith Murdoch (NLA), MS 2823, folder 34. The cables were directed through Fisher by Murdoch.

33 Ibid.

34 Letter from Murdoch to Hughes, 7 August 1917, Papers of Sir Keith Murdoch (AWM).

35 Ibid.

In fact, Murdoch need not have worried about the reaction of the Australian government. A telegram was received by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 30 July 1917 which asked the Imperial government to recognise Australian national feeling by bringing the A.I.F. divisions together and employing Australian officers on divisional staffs.[36] As well, Birdwood was asked to provide a list of Imperial officers who could be replaced by Australian officers.[37] Birdwood, who enjoyed the 'Australian character', replied five days later and supported the request from the Australian government. He proposed to convert the 1st Anzac Corps to an Australian run organisation as soon as possible but he was doubtful about a similar result in the 2nd Anzac Corps because the corps included New Zealand troops.[38] In a concluding paragraph, Birdwood mentioned that eleven Imperial officers had been returned to the British Army during the previous three weeks and that only twenty Imperial officers remained with the A.I.F. staff. An undated draft cable by Birdwood pointed to the exigencies of war and not British policy as the reason for the presence of Imperial officers on Australian military staffs. At the same time, Birdwood was offering the most acceptable explanation to the Australian government. British policy was originally designed to give Field-Marshal Haig complete flexibility in moving 'colonial' units wherever he wished without regard to their feelings.

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36 Telegram from Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia to Secretary of State for the Colonies (Recvd C.O. 11.30 p.m., 30 July 1917). Papers of Field Marshal Lord Birdwood (India Office Library), MSS Eur. D. 606/75 [Additional Papers not yet listed].

37 Cable from Defence, Melbourne to Birdwood, WX 202, 4 August 1917, Confidential, Birdwood Papers (India Office Library). The Department of Defence had calculated that 90 officers under Birdwood were not Australian.

38 Cable to Defence Melbourne, CA 13/81, 9 August 1917, ibid.; Letter from Murray to Robertson, 21 March 1916, Papers of Field Marshal Sir W. Robertson (Liddle Hart Centre for Military Archives, University of London), MS 1/32/16.

> ... This dearth of qualified Australian officers was due in the first instance to our being such a young force and naturally requiring experience. Later on, during last winter, we had at one period an abnormal wastage of senior and experienced officers, when it so happened we could not lay hands on Australian officers at the time, while we could not wait for convalescent or wounded to return. As I have said, however, I do not anticipate that this is likely to occur again ...[39]

The British Army Council did not give the same sympathetic hearing to the Australian government's request to 'Australianise' the A.I.F. On 11 August the Colonial Secretary replied to Hughes pointing out that Australian officers were attached to both British and Australian formations for the purpose of future staff employment after a period of apprenticeship. Moreover he reiterated the Army Council's view that A.I.F. staff were part of 'an Imperial organisation in which officers of Dominion and British forces shall be considered interchangeable.'[40]

The Army Council did not approve the request by the Australian government for another appointment at the War Office. Murdoch, who was ever vigilant in the prosecution of Australia's fighting interests, followed the Army Council decision with an urgent request to Hughes to press for an Australian corps or force.[41] He believed that the Army Council misunderstood the Australian case. Furthermore, he pressed for the creation of an appointment at the War Office to argue the Australian position in military operations.

> ... principle seems vital that Australian Government which must inevitably accept final responsibility for its armies has

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39 Draft undated, Papers of Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood (India Office Library).

40 Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General, Commonwealth of Australia. Secret 4330/1/9, 11 August 1917. Birdwood Papers (India Office Library).

41 Cable from Keith Murdoch to W.M. Hughes, 26 August 1917, Papers of Sir Keith Murdoch (NLA), MS 2122, Folder 34.

> no representation except through Birdwood who owes absolute allegiance to Haig and is at Haig's mercy as corps commander.[42]

Birdwood, who was anxious to prevent any derogation of his authority as commander of the A.I.F., agreed with the Army Council about the undesirability of appointing a senior Australian officer for duty at the War Office.[43]

In addition to his efforts to inform the Australian government about the need to bring the A.I.F. Divisions together, Murdoch lobbied Field Marshal Haig, the British Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces on the Western Front. On 1 September 1917, Murdoch saw Haig who replied that everything was being done to keep Australian troops together.[44] Haig believed that the request for an Australian army was impossible, and committed an explanation of Australian behaviour on this point to his diary:

> ... I could not help feeling that at the back of their feeling, there is a desire to be independent of the old country ...[45]

He missed the point that the Australian nationalism of the battle-field was not a replacement for the achievement of Australian arms in a British cause, and more importantly, under British leadership. Murdoch followed up his discussions with Haig by writing a letter the next day, 2 September, to Major-General Sir R. Whigham, the Deputy-Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the War Office, in which he set out a record of the conversation with Haig. As well, he wrote

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42 Ibid.

43 Cable to Defence, Melbourne, from Birdwood, 27 August 1917, Papers of Field Marshal Lord Birdwood (India Office Library) (the records are inexact about the reference).

44 Diary, 1 September 1917, Papers of Field Marshal the Earl Haig (National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh), MS no.H97 - vol.10 (June 1914 - 31 December 1917). Letter from Murdoch to General Sir L. Kiggell, C.G.S. British Armies in France, 29 August 1917, Papers of General Sir L. Kiggell (Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives), MS V 118.

45 Ibid.

to General Sir Lancelot Kiggell, Chief of the General Staff, British Armies in France, who was also present at the discussions about the position of General Birdwood as commander of the A.I.F. He told Kiggell that Birdwood was an established leader of Australian troops, and his removal, in any reorganisation of the A.I.F. would come as a shock to 'the Government.'[46] At the same time, he reiterated the request of the Australian government.

> The Government's request or suggestion was for the grouping of the five divisions, so far as practicable, and for whatever periods are practicable, under one command, as a united and distinctively Australian striking force within the British Armies. It was based on the peculiar nationality of the Australian units, on the responsibility of our Government to a great public which is not represented at G.H.Q. or in the British government, and on strong desire that Australia's national effort should not be disintegrated any longer ...[47]

However, Murdoch, in an effort to assuage British feelings about the 'Australianisation' of the A.I.F., told Kiggell that 'we will not question the wisdom of Sir Douglas' on the matter.

Eight days later, Murdoch received a letter from General Sir Lancelot Kiggell, Chief of the General Staff, British Armies in France, which reiterated the impact of the Australian request on Haig.

> The Field-Marshal's object is to meet the wishes of the Commonwealth Government in so far as it is possible for him to do so with due regard to military requirements. I take it that this qualification is really redundant, because I am quite sure that the first of all their wishes is to meet military requirements.

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46 Letter from Murdoch to General Kiggell, Papers of General Sir L. Kiggell (Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives), MS V/118.

47 Ibid.

> What Sir Douglas said to you about possible reorganisation which he had under consideration, and which would affect General Birdwood, was based on this desire to meet Australian wishes. The project has not gone beyond consideration in his own mind, with that end in view, and you need have no anxiety whatever as to his pressing any reorganisation unless the argument is in favour of it and so strong that the Commonwealth Government will see the necessity for it.[48]

Kiggell reminded Murdoch that the question was strictly confidential and had addressed the letter care of Brudenell White. In fact, steps were taken by Haig to meet some of the Australian wishes. Murdoch informed the Australian government on 5 September that the protest by the Australian government against the dismemberment of the A.I.F. had resulted in an undertaking to return the Fourth Division to the First Anzac Corps.[49] He also suggested to Hughes that he press the question with his colleagues in the Imperial Cabinet.

The concern held by Hughes, and the Australian government, about Australian interests in the Imperial war effort forced the Army Council on 5 October 1917 to ask Haig for his opinion about the possibility of acceding to Australian wishes. In discussions with Birdwood, White and Howse, the Director of A.I.F. Medical Services, Haig put forward the idea that a corps commander was unable to manage four divisions. Birdwood, who did not want to appear to desert the A.I.F. and with his sights set on the possible command of a future Australian army on the Western Front, argued with Haig by putting the case that an army commander would accept the offer of five divisions from an ally despite the need to keep them together as a military formation. White suggested that the Fourth Division be withdrawn from

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48 Letter from General Sir L. Kiggell to Murdoch, 10 September 1917, Papers of Lieut.-General Sir L. Kiggell (Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives), MS V/123.

49 Cablegram from Andrew Fisher to W.M. Hughes, 5 September 1917, AA CP 447/3. Item SC 15(31).

the line and that the other four divisions form a corps.[50] Hughes worked away at the issue. On 18 October 1917, he asked Murdoch if the British government had answered the cable sent on 25 September.[51] Eight days later, Hughes received a cable from Fisher which conveyed information from Murdoch.

> ... Your telegram 18th October, matter not brought before Cabinet apparently because War Office prefers meet your wishes. More fully informed Milner, who will move if necessary. Haig, Kiggell, and staffs discussed question with me. I wish to bring under your notice following important facts. Haig approves War Office's objection grouping five Australian divisions, for ostensible reason that Corps would be unwieldy. Against this, urge that other Corps frequently had five Divisions. All Australian and attached Generals scorn this arrangement. Haig said he was anxious meet Australian wishes and indicated his idea that we should have two Corps, which would mean creation of another Corps Staff. He has strong fancy for Monash as Corps Commander.[52]

Murdoch was suggesting arguments to combat the desire of Haig to meet some but not all of the Australian demands in the interests of presenting and preserving a united Imperial war effort.

At the field command level, Birdwood went to see Haig and Kiggell at General Headquarters after he was told that the Australian and New Zealand troops would continue as two Anzac Corps of three divisions each. He demanded that Haig respect the Australian request and won his point. Haig

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50 In Australia, Pearce, the defence minister, drafted a cable to the Colonial Secretary on 24 September which he showed to Hughes. The cable called for the grouping of Australian troops under one or more commands staffed by Australian officers. Hughes amended the text to include Birdwood as the commander of the reorganised Australian divisions and added that he did not wish to raise the question of liaison with the War Office for the present. (Amendment to cable drafted by Pearce, 24 September 1917, AA CP 447/3, item SC 15(31).)

51 Cable from Hughes to Murdoch, 18 October 1917, Papers of Sir K. Murdoch (NLA), MS 2827, Folder 34.

52 Draft cable from Fisher to Hughes, 26 October 1917, Papers of Andrew Fisher (NLA), MS 1538, Folder 2.

realised that he had a better chance of influencing the A.I.F. if he acceded to some of the Australian wishes and Imperial unity was preserved. In a letter to Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson on 12 November 1917, Birdwood mentioned that the Australian Divisions were coming under his control on 15 November.[53] He believed that the grouping of the Australian divisions was the best way to foster 'the Imperial spirit.'[54] On 13 November, the Colonial Secretary notified the Australian government that all A.I.F. divisions would be grouped together under General Birdwood's command. As well, Long reiterated the Army Council principle, which dated to the creation of the Imperial General Staff before World War I, that the interchange of Australian and British officers on military staffs should be observed.[55] At the same time, the cable underlined in clear terms that the Australian fighting formations were not obliged to accept British officers, a point won in the administrative battle to gain recognition for Australia's contribution to the Imperial war effort.

An Australian to Command the A.I.F.

The prosecution of the case for the reorganisation of the A.I.F. by the Australian government raised speculation about the appointment of an Australian commander instead of Birdwood. Major-General McCay, Commanding A.I.F. Depots in the United Kingdom, wrote to Murdoch on 28 August 1917 and suggested the creation of the position, General Officer in Charge, A.I.F., to administer the affairs of Australian

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53 Letter from Birdwood to Sir R. Munro-Ferguson, 12 November 1917, Papers of Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood (AWM).

54 Letter from Birdwood to Sir R. Munro-Ferguson, 5 November 1917, ibid.; Birdwood also kept Murdoch informed about his discussions with Haig and Kiggell and even asked if Prime Minister Hughes could bring conscription into the need to maintain numbers to prevent the disbandment of the Reserve Division in the future (Letter from Birdwood to Murdoch, 4 November 1917, Papers of Sir K. Murdoch, AWM), folder 21.

55 Cable from Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General, 13 November 1917, Papers of W.M. Hughes (NLA), MS 950, box 3, folder 42.

troops in England, which was independent of field command. He felt that any action by him on the matter might appear 'like pushing my own barrow.' In fact, Birdwood thought McCay wanted to take his position as Commander of the Australian Corps. For Murdoch, the prospect of the appointment of an Australian as commander was an opportunity to advance the programme to Australianise the staffs of the A.I.F. On 24 October 1917, he asked Birdwood if he was likely to succeed Gough as commander of the British Fifth Army. Birdwood replied immediately and squashed the possibility of a story to that effect at the time. However, speculation about Birdwood's future as commander of a British Army was raised again when he commanded the British 2nd Army from December 1917 to March 1918.[56] On 18 March 1918, he wrote to Pearce and mentioned that he hoped to remain with the Australian Corps. At the same time, he raised the possibility of General Monash as commander of the corps if he had 'to give up the command', while he remained G.O.C., A.I.F.[57]

The opportunity for Birdwood to assume an army command arose after the spring offensive by the Germans in 1918. The British cabinet, in the search for a scapegoat after the German advance to the outskirts of Amiens, dismissed General Hubert Gough, commander of the British Fifth Army, formerly known as the Second Army,[58] and in May, British General Headquarters asked Birdwood to take command of the Fifth Army with Brudenell White as his Chief of Staff.[59]

In his discussions with Lieutenant-General Lawrence, Chief of the General Staff, H.G.Q., about the command of the

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56 Field Marshal Lord Birdwood, Khaki and Gown (London, 1941), p.320.

57 Letter from Birdwood to Pearce, 16 October 1917, Papers of Field Marshal Lord Birdwood (AWM), 419/10/7.

58 C. Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970 (Harmondsworth, 1970), p.407.

59 C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Vol.VI. The A.I.F. in France in 1918 (Sydney, 1942), p.189.

Fifth Army, Birdwood stressed that he was ready to remain with the Anzac Corps and give up the opportunity for promotion. Birdwood asked if the Anzac Corps might be sent to his army. He was informed that the Fifth Army would include the 1st Australian Division and two British Corps, with the Anzac Corps to join later.[60]

The question of Birdwood's move to the Fifth Army immediately brought forward the consideration of Australian interests in the command of the A.I.F. Birdwood felt that he was capable of carrying the administrative command of the A.I.F. (which he had held since 1915) as well as the command of the Fifth Army. By moving Birdwood, Haig had brought to the forefront the issue of the appointment of an Australian as commander of the Australian Corps and could contemplate the option of controlling A.I.F. affairs through the possible appointment of Birdwood as administrative commander of the A.I.F.

By May 1918, Monash had proven himself as a divisional commander in the Messines and Third Ypres battles. Bean, however, included a wry comment on Monash in the Official History.

> Monash is very full of the idea that he is absolutely under G.H.Q. - he must not consider Australian demands - once he is under G.H.Q., G.H.Q. is all that he has to consider: a simple rule.[61]

At the highest level, Haig was not prepared to contemplate the preference of the Australian correspondents, Charles Bean and Keith Murdoch, for Brudenell White as commander of the Australian corps. White, who was an outstanding staff officer, passed up the opportunity for divisional command after the evacuation from Gallipoli when he took the decision to remain as Birdwood's Chief of Staff. In July

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60 Ibid.

61 Ibid., p.187. The reference in Bean refers to 'a private but completely reliable diary.'

1917, Haig remarked to White that he should be commanding a corps. White replied that Birdwood's position in the A.I.F. was invaluable and that his reputation depended on the retention of his fighting command. Haig, who was unimpressed by White's comments, turned away, and in the opinion of Bean, 'has been very short with White' since that time.[62]

When Bean was told by Birdwood on 16 May of the new arrangement for the command of the A.I.F., he immediately consulted the Australian war correspondents and war artists at the Brewery Farm, Quebiron.[63] He told Dyson, Wilkes and Cutlack what might be done about White who did not campaign for higher positions, and Monash who was adept at intrigue.[64] In the discussion about the command, Cutlack mentioned that he did not understand why White allowed Birdwood to 'overshadow him.' He thought that something was 'wanting in White.' Will Dyson, a war artist, thought White was displaying weakness about his position and career prospects in the A.I.F. but added that 'the Jew will always get there.'[65] The outcome of the discussion was that Bean would see Murdoch in London and argue that Birdwood ought not continue as administrative commander of the A.I.F.[66] and that the command of the Australian Corps should be given to White instead of Monash.

Two days later, Bean and Dyson visited London and drew up a statement on 19 May for Murdoch about the command question.[67] White, who was aware of the visit by Bean, opposed the lobbying on his behalf in order to prevent further criticism of Birdwood. His action did not impress

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62 Ibid.

63 Ibid., p.196, Diary of C.E.W. Bean, 16 May 1918, no.111, Papers of Dr C.E.W. Bean (AWM), file no.419/8/1.

64 Diary of C.E.W. Bean, 16 May 1918, no.111, Bean Papers, and R. McMullin, 'Will Dyson: War Artist', Sabretache, vol.XXI, no.4 (Oct.-Dec. 1980), pp.19-26.

65 16 May 1918, Diary of C.E.W. Bean, no.111.

66 Ibid.

67 19 May 1918, Diary of C.E.W. Bean, no.111.

Murdoch who thought that he was anti-Australian.[68] As a result of the meeting with Murdoch, the Brewery Farm group were able to forestall events for a short time. Murdoch cabled Hughes in America and urged him to make the appointment temporary until he reached London.

In the A.I.F., the prospect of changes in the command of A.I.F. Divisions following the proposed appointment of Monash brought further problems over the issue of Australian identity at the Divisional level.[69] When Brigadier-General H.E. Elliott was informed by White that Gellibrand would supersede him and take command of a division, despite their equivalent seniority, he asked if he might appeal to Pearce under the Defence Act.[70] White told Elliott that he was not sure what Birdwood might do, but he would most likely insist that he retire from his command pending the minister's decision. In a letter to Elliott on 22 May 1918, White told Elliott that Gellibrand was an Australian and not a British officer as he mistakenly thought, and that the appeal to political intervention from Pearce was a hasty action.

> ... But let me say this, if the decision rested with me I should send you off to Australia without the least hesitation ...
>
> I am not showing your letter to the General until I have seen you as I will endeavour to tomorrow. And as I refuse to allow you to cast off friends I subscribe myself as of old ...[71]

The brief reprieve of White did nothing to allay Elliott's resentment about his supersession by Gellibrand. In a Private Memorandum, written on 25 May 1918, which was not to

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68 Ibid.

69 For a complete documentation of Maj.-Gen. Elliott's views on the A.I.F., see the papers of Brigadier-General H.E. Elliott (AWM), boxes 36-38.

70 Letter from White to Elliott, 22 May and 13 June 1918, Papers of Major-General Elliott (AWM), box 38.

71 Letter from White to Elliott, 22 May 1911, ibid.

be opened without his permission or until he was killed in action, Elliott stated that White was biased against him.[72] On Australian soldiers, he gave a version of White's explanation to him.

> ... He suggested to me that the cause was the greater reliability and higher standard of honour prevailing on the average amongst British officers - that there was more of the 'Public School Spirit' amongst the British officers.[73]

With reference to Gellibrand, Elliott said that he was 'well lacquered by his experience in the British Army.'[74] He was even more biting with White. According to Elliott you had to toady to White to succeed in the A.I.F.

Colonel Dodds, who was D.A.G., A.I.F., cabled the Australian government about the detrimental effect of the delay in making the appointments in the A.I.F. On 21 May, the Australian Cabinet approved the appointment of Birdwood as administrative commander of the A.I.F. and the orders to that effect were made on 23 May. The next day, 24 May, Pearce received a cable from Hughes asking that the appointment of Monash and Birdwood 'be held over until our arrival in London.'[75] He was assured that the appointments were temporary. As well, a cable from Birdwood was received by Pearce which said that his command of the Fifth Army was temporary on the order of the Army Council.[76] Bean suggests that Murdoch may have used his influence with Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to achieve the Army Council directive.[77] By 30 May, Bean

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72 Private Memoranda by Brigadier-General H.E. Elliott, 25 May 1918, ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Letter from Elliott to W. Massey-Greene, 24 February 1922, ibid.

75 Bean, The A.I.F. in France, 1918, Cable from Watt to Hughes, 24 May 1918, and cable from Hughes to Watt, 3 June 1918, AA CP 360/9.

76 Bean, The A.I.F. in France, 1918, p.198.

77 30 May 1918, Diary of C.E.W. Bean, no.113.

noted in his diary that the efforts to alter the command arrangements were too late. Both he and Dodds felt that White never thought about his own interests. Bean, in fact, regarded White as the de facto G.O.C., A.I.F., who made the difficult decisions while Birdwood took the credit for them. He was also convinced that Monash had worked for the command of the corps through 'all sorts of clever well hidden subterranean channels.'[78] On 31 May, Monash was promoted to lieutenant-general as commander of the Australian Corps, with Blamey as his Chief of Staff, and Birdwood and White left for the Fifth Army.

Despite the promotions of Monash and Birdwood, Murdoch persisted in his efforts to oppose the command arrangements of the A.I.F.[79] Both he and Bean wanted White as G.O.C. Corps, a field command, and Monash as G.O.C., A.I.F., an administrative command. However, White had already made clear to Murdoch that he did not intend to upset the new appointment. Bean noted this in his diary on 10 June.

> ... There is, I believe, going to be a big fight over this question. White - with Birdwood, loyal chap that he is, up to the neck. He wrote to Murdoch and s. same: I have often told you that I fear that some day you would oppose me. I daresay you will beat me, but I warn you, I shall make a fight before I die.[80]

According to Bean, White, who would have preferred the corps command, had a sound professional relationship with Monash, and saw the machinations of Murdoch as detrimental to the operations of the A.I.F.[81] In a letter to the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, Sir Ronald Munro-

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78 Ibid.; see G. Serle, John Monash (Melbourne, 1982), pp.319, 328, and chapter 13, pp.375-403.

79 5, 6, 7 June, Diary of C.E.W. Bean, no.114.

80 10 June, Diary of C.E.W. Bean, no.114.

81 Ibid.

Ferguson, on 15 June, Birdwood mentioned that the Murdoch clique wished to make White G.O.C., A.I.F., and replace Monash. According to Birdwood, Monash thought the new system of command was in Australia's interests and in anticipation of Murdoch's actions, had said that he would return to Australia instead of taking an administrative appointment.[82] On the same day, Birdwood wrote to Pearce and told him that the senior officers supported Monash's appointment of G.O.C., A.I.F. He hoped that Hughes would solve the problem when he visited London.

Hughes arrived in London on 15 June and confronted the position of Birdwood as G.O.C., A.I.F. On 16 June, he asked Bean, in the presence of Murdoch, for his opinion of Birdwood.[83] Although Bean did not record his reply, his diary states that Hughes believed Birdwood relied on the 'social art' as well as his letter writing instead of his intellect for his achievements. In Hughes' opinion, Birdwood had to choose between the A.I.F. or the Fifth Army. The argument that Birdwood was unable to execute two jobs, and that Australians must be commanded by Australians, was written in a Memorandum by Bean on 25 June.

The interaction by Murdoch and Bean in the command question arose from their concern about Australian interests in the Imperial war effort and their personal support for White. In making the case for a reversal of the command arrangements, they took up the personal case of Brudenell White, whose loss, they believed, could be ill afforded by the A.I.F. Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, told Hughes at a dinner at the Ritz Hotel on

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82 Letter from Birdwood to Sir R. Munro-Ferguson, 15 June 1918, Papers of Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood (AWM).

83 16 June 1918, Diary of C.E.W. Bean, no.115. Another opinion of Birdwood was put to Elliott by Fichley. Fichley was an Acting Premier of Queensland during Birdwood's postwar tour of Australia. '... He is just one of those conceited grown up puppies who imagines that the Australian forces were made for his benefit and he used Pearce and Hughes on every occasion - as they used him ...' (Papers of Major-General Elliott (AWM), box 38.

10 June that White had acted as 'Birdwood's brains all along.'[84] When Hughes visited France in early July at the invitation of Monash, he spoke to White about the position of Birdwood as G.O.C., A.I.F. White, along with other senior A.I.F. generals, told them that they favoured Birdwood's administrative command as G.O.C., A.I.F. and field command of the Fifth Army. At a dinner given by Monash for Hughes on 7 July, Blamey told Bean to keep the command question above personalities.[85]

> ... to make it a question of the interest of the A.I.F. simply and shun all suspicion of intrigue by playing with all the cards on the table. He has an exceedingly great respect for White's character - a noble character he said. I know what he meant. White, because he was such a valuable officer was passed over, and because Birdwood did not like him at one time, was kept a Staff Officer. It was G.H.Q. that kept him there finally, I believe when Birdie wanted him Brigadier.[86]

Birdwood was alive to this charge about his treatment of White, and rationalised the state of affairs by referring to the great advantage for Australia in the future with the services of White, who was a former Chief Staff Officer of an army. He also thought that White was the most able staff officer in the British Armies in France. The prospect of White replacing Monash as commander receded further after the Battle of Hamel. The success of the Australian troops was seen as a success for Monash as corps commander and dampened any efforts to remove him. Blamey, however, told Bean that too much emphasis was placed on the victory at Hamel by Monash. In his opinion, the victory was due to the

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84 18 June 1918, Diary of C.E.W. Bean, no.116. Bean, A.I.F. in France 1918, pp.212-215; letter from J. Monash to Birdwood, 2 July 1918, and G.M. Long to Birdwood, 3 July 1918, Birdwood Papers (AWM).

85 White argued with Murdoch at Fifth Army HQ about the interference with the command arrangements of the A.I.F. Nevertheless, they parted on good terms. See C.E.W. Bean, Two Men I Knew, p.173.

86 Diary of C.E.W. Bean, 7 July 1918, no.116.

isolated example of tanks operating successfully with infantry.[87]

Australian defence policy in World War I protected the interests of the nation and her forces on the battlefield. In the Imperial war effort, the Australian government aimed to gain recognition for its contribution. The army high command, which expanded as a result of the war, followed the directions of their political leaders to protect the A.I.F. The War Office viewed the A.I.F. as an Imperial unit with little regard for Australian sensitivities about the use and identity of its national force.

The growth of the inward nationalism of the A.I.F. during the war brought forth the call for the appointment of an Australian commander. In response to the demand from the Australian government, the Imperial authorities sought to meet Australian wishes and thereby hold together the image of Imperial unity and facilitate military operations with the A.I.F. The appointment of John Monash as Corps commander of the A.I.F. in 1918 was the culmination of Australian efforts.

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67 Ibid. On the Battle of Hamel, see Bean, The A.I.F. in France 1918, pp.242-335.

CONCLUSION

The response by the senior military advisers to the changed strategic circumstances in the Pacific after the Russo-Japanese War highlighted the different emphases placed by officers like Bridges on the deference due to Imperial defence policy and those like Legge, who favoured a more Australian centred approach to the question of Australian defence. From 1914 to 1918, the gap between the lines of thought represented by Bridges and Legge closed and the Pacific centred strategic analysis was installed as a keystone in the military high command's approach to Australian and Imperial defence. In 1920, the report of the conference of senior military officers on the defence of Australia stated that Japan was the only 'potential and probable enemy.'[1]

The separation of the spheres of politics and strategy during the last years of the Federation movement and during the early years of the Commonwealth when Australian forces were commanded by Major-General Sir Edward Hutton was reinforced by the reaction of Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, Chief of Intelligence from 1905 to 1908, to the strategic implications of the Russo-Japanese War for Australia and his differences with Alfred Deakin about the significance of the war for Australian defence. Alfred Deakin, the Prime Minister, viewed the Japanese victory in the war as posing a new and dangerous threat to Australian security, and disagreed with Bridges that the policy of the Colonial Defence Committee was an adequate basis for Australian defence. In a bold move, Deakin committed Australia to the introduction of compulsory military training with the aid of Legge. The rift between the policy of successive governments from 1905 to 1911 about the Pacific centred strategic analysis and the views of their

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[1] Report on the Military Defence of Australia, 6 February 1920, by Generals Chauvel, Monash, McCay, Hobbs, White and Legge, in the Pearce Papers, MS 1827 (NLA), Series I.

military advisers was only healed in 1911 when Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener put his imprimatur on the scheme of compulsory military training as the basis for Australia's defence. From 1911 to 1914, strategic plans were drawn up for the defence of Australia in the Pacific which included cooperation with New Zealand. The professional expertise for the execution of the Pacific centred strategic analysis in military plans was provided initially by the Australian Intelligence Corps and then the Australian General Staff. Alfred Deakin, on 13 December 1907, introduced in parliament plans for a General Staff to assist with the operation of compulsory military training. His aim was to establish an Australian General Staff along British lines which would lead Australian troops and develop Australia's defence capabilities and capacity. From 1909 to 1914, the Australian General Staff participated in the planning for Australia's defence in the Pacific through the preparation of war mobilisation tables and through staff and troop training.

The Australian General Staff also participated in the Imperial General Staff which was created after the Colonial Conference of 1907. Although the Australian General Staff was a section of the Imperial General Staff, it was not subject to the direction of the War Office. Australian governments insisted that the Australian section of the Imperial General Staff should be subject to Australian control.

The question of Australian participation in an Imperial expeditionary force was faced by Australia's political leaders on the outbreak of World War I. The decision to offer assistance to Great Britain found the Australian military leadership ready to prosecute Australia's dual war aims. In a short time, the Australian forces were mobilised for action in the Pacific and the Middle East.

The despatch of an expeditionary force to capture German possessions in the Pacific was part of a policy

designed to prevent Japan from expanding her influence in the Pacific. During the war, the General Staff in Australia had the responsibility of maintaining the defence of the continent with limited resources and manpower. The enormity of the tasks involved during the war on the homefront did not prevent the General Staff from assessing Japanese intentions in the Pacific. Abroad on the battle-fields in the Middle East and Western Front, the senior A.I.F. officers tackled successfully the problem of protecting the interests of Australian troops in combined operations with Imperial forces. As the war progressed, the Australian government, as a matter of national pride and policy, wanted due recognition from Whitehall of the service given by her troops.

The protection of Australia's national interest in the A.I.F. had its antecedents in the decision by the Australian parliament to control the service of her troops which was written into the Defence Act of 1903, and the decision by Bridges, the commander of the First Division, A.I.F., to prevent the dismemberment of Australian units amongst British formations. The contribution by Australian troops to the Imperial War effort also brought calls from Australia for the creation of an Australian army commanded by an Australian and the employment of Australian officers in the senior posts of the A.I.F. Although there were not sufficient numbers of troops to form an Australian army, General Sir John Monash was appointed commander of the Australian Corps and Australians came to fill all senior positions in the A.I.F.

In the light of Australia's experience in World War I, the defence minister, Pearce, turned to his senior military advisers in early 1920 for advice about Australia's post-war defence. From 22 January until 6 February 1920, Generals Chauvel, Monash, McCay, Hobbs, White and Legge met at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, to discuss and prepare a report on Australia's post-war defence. The report by the senior officers analysed Australia's strategic situation

and emphasised the need for Australia to provide for her defence in the Pacific, especially as Japan was the only potential and probable enemy. To meet a probable Japanese attack, the report called for an increase in Imperial naval strength in the Pacific and an Australian army of 180,000 men comprising 2 cavalry divisions and 4 infantry divisions.

Upon receipt of the report, Pearce asked Hughes, as President of the Council of Defence, to call a meeting to discuss and formulate a scheme of defence. On 12 April 1920, the Council of Defence passed a resolution that Japan was the only potential and probable enemy, and that the foundation of Australia's defence was her security in the Pacific.

BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS

A Select List of Officers

The biographical entries are designed to assist the reader with reference to the period 1901 to 1918.

BARRACLOUGH, Professor Sir H.: b. 1874; ed. University of Sydney - graduated with B.E.; lecturer in mechanical engineering, University of Sydney in 1897; made Assistant Professor 1908; transferred (from Corps of Australian Engineers) to the Australian Intelligence Corps (N.S.W.) in 1908; Senior Assistant Censor, Second Military District, 1914-1915; officer in charge of Australian munition workers, United Kingdom, 1916-1920; P.N. Russell Professor of Mechanical Engineering, University of Sydney, 1915-1942; died 1958.

BIRDWOOD, Field-Marshal Baron: b. Poona, India, 1865; ed. Clifton College, England, and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst; served on North-West Frontier, India, 1897-1898; Boer War, 1899-1902; employed as Persian interpreter to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, 1902-1904, and secretary to Lord Kitchener, India, 1905; Quartermaster-General, India, 1912-1914; General Officer Commanding Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, 1914-1916; First Anzac Corps, 1916-1917, Australian Corps, 1917-1918; Commander-in-Chief Fifth (British) Army, 1918-1919; Commander-in-Chief, India, 1925-1903; Master of Peterhouse College, Cambridge University, 1931-1938; died 1951.

BLAMEY, Field-Marshal Sir T.: b. 1894; Chief of Staff, Australian Corps, 1918; commanded 6th Division, second Australian Imperial Force, 1st Corps and Anzac Corps, 1939-1941; Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land Forces, South-West Pacific, 1942-1945; died 1951.

BRIDGES, Major-General Sir W.T.: b. 1861; ed. Ryde; Royal Naval School, Greenwich; Royal Military College, Kingston, Canada, 1877-1897; joined the Department of Roads and Bridges, New South Wales; joined the Permanent Forces, New South Wales, in 1885; served in the Boer War; served on headquarters staff of General Sir Edward Hutton, 1902-1904; Chief of Intelligence, 1905-1908; appointed Australia's first Chief of the General Staff 1909; Commonwealth Representative, Imperial General Staff, 1909-1910; Commandant, Royal Military College, Duntroon, 1910-1914; Inspector-General 1914; commanded First Australian Division and the Australian Imperial Force, 1914-1915; died 1915.

CHAUVEL, General Sir H.: b. Tabulam, New South Wales, 1865; ed. Sydney and Toowoomba Grammar Schools; commissioned in New South Wales Military Forces in 1886 and transferred to the Queensland Mounted Infantry, 1890; served in the Boer War, 1899-1902; promoted to Lieut.-Col. in 1909, and colonel in 1913; Commonwealth Representative, Imperial General Staff, London, 1914; commanded Desert Mounted Corps, 1917-1919, and General Officer Commanding, Australian Imperial Force, Egypt, 1916-1919; Chief of the General Staff, 1923-1930; died 1945.

DODDS, Major-General T.H.: b. Gateshead on Tyne, England, 1873; ed. Brisbane Grammar School; Lieutenant, Queensland Volunteers, 1899; served in the Boer War 1901-1902; made a Captain in the Reserve of Officers, 1904; joined the permanent military forces in 1906; secretary, War Railway Council, 1911-1912; secretary, Headquarters Mobilisation Committee, 1912-1913; secretary, Establishments Committee for the Permanent Forces, 1913-1914; Adjutant-General, 1914-1916; Military Secretary, Headquarters, 1916-1917; appointed Deputy Adjutant-General, Australian Imperial Force, 1917; Commandant Australian Imperial Force, Headquarters, London, 1918; Adjutant-General 1929-1934; died 1943.

ELLIOTT, Major-General H.: b. Victoria, 1878; commanded 15th Infantry Brigade, 1916-1919; member of the Australian Senate, 1919-1931; solicitor by profession, died 1931.

FINN, Major-General Sir H.: b. Kent, England, 1952; joined the 9th Lancers in 1871; served in the Afghan War in 1878-1880 as an n.c.o.; at the battle of Omdurman in 1898; Commandant of the Queensland Military Forces, 1900-1901; Commandant of New South Wales, 1902-1904; first Inspector-General, 1905-1907; secretary to the Walter and Eliza Hall Trust in 1912; died 1924.

FOSTER, Brigadier-General H.J.: b. 1855; ed. Harrow School and Royal Military Academy at Woolwich; commissioned in the Royal Engineers in 1875; saw active service in the Egyptian War of 1882; served in the Intelligence Directorate, War Office, 1890 to 1895; Quartermaster-General, Canada, 1898 to 1901; Military Attaché, British Embassy, Washington,

1903-1906; Challis Director of Military Science, University of Sydney, 1906-1915; Acting Chief of the Australian General Staff, January 1916-October 1917; Director of Military Art, R.M.C. Duntroon, October 1917-October 1918; died at Cooma in 1919.

GLASGOW, Major-General Hon. Sir Thomas W.: b. 1876, Blackmount, Queensland; ed. Maryborough Grammar School; worked in a bank in Gympie - his opposite number was Brudenell White; served in the Queensland contingent, Mounted Infantry, to the Boer War, 1899-1900; 2nd in Command, 2nd Aust. Light Horse Regiment, 19 August 1914 to 14 September 1915; commanded 2nd Light Horse Regiment, 14 September 1915-21 February 1916, the 13th Australian Infantry Brigade, 21 February 1916-4 February 1918, and 5 March 1918-28 June 1918; commanded 4th Australian Division, 4 February 1918-5 March 1918; commanded 1st Australian Division, 28 June 1918-22 March 1919; Senator for Queensland, 1920-32; Honorary Minister, 1923-1926; Minister for Home and Territories, 1926-1927 and Minister for Defence, 1927-1929. High Commissioner, Canada, 1939-1945; died 1955.

GODLEY, General Sir A.J.: b. 1867; General-Officer-Commanding, New Zealand Forces, 1910-1914; commanded New Zealand Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918; Commander-in-Chief British Army of the Rhine, 1922-1924; Governor of Gibraltar, 1928-1933; died 1957.

GORDON, Brigadier-General J.M.: b. Aberdeenshire, Scotland, 1956; ed. The Oratory, Edgbaston and Beaumont

near Windsor; joined the Royal Artillery as a lieutenant in 1875; resigned and went to South Australia - joined the South Australian Permanent Military Forces in 1882; promoted to Major and commanding Permanent Artillery, South Australia, 1885; acting Commandant of South Australian Forces, 1888-1892 and Commandant, 1892-1902; special service officer in South Africa, 1900-1901; Commandant of the Commonwealth Forces in Victoria, 1902-1905; Commandant of New South Wales, 1905-1911; Chief of the General Staff, 1912-1914; Commander 92 Bde (UK), 1914-1915 and 10 Res Div (UK), 1915-1916; Chief Inspector Scottish Filling Factories, 1916-1917; Army of Occupation, Cologne, Germany, 1919; died 1929.

HOAD, Major-General Sir J.C.: b. Goulburn, 1856; ed. State school and trained as a school teacher; Lieutenant in Victorian Permanent Forces, 1886; served in the Boer War, 1899-1900; member of General Hutton's staff, 1902-1903; Chief of the General Staff, 1908-1911; died 1911.

HOBBS, Lieut.-General Sir J.T.: b. Chelsea, London, 1864; ed. Merton College, England; joined the 1st Cinque Ports Artillary Volunteers rising to the rank of Corporal while at Merton; commanded 1st Australian Division Artillery, 1914-18 December 1916; commanded 5th Australian Division, 18 December 1916-28 November 1918; commanded the Australian Corps, 28 November 1918-31 May 1919; died 1938.

HUTTON, General Sir E.: b. 1848; joined the King's Royal Rifles, 1867, and was Adjutant of the 4th Battalion, 1874-1877; saw active service in the Zulu War of 1879, and the

South African War of 1880-1881, the Egyptian War of 1882, and the Sudan Campaign of 1884-1885; Commandant of the military forces, New South Wales, 1893-1896, and Commandant of the Canadian Armed Forces, 1898-1900; fought in the Boer War, 1900; Commanding Officer of the Commonwealth Military Forces, 1902-1904; commanded 3rd Division, Aldershot, 1905-1906; commanded 21st Division, 1914-1915; died 1923.

KIGGELL, Lieutenant-General Sir Lawrence: b. 1862; Director of Staff Duties, War Office, 1909-1913; Commandant, Staff College, Camberley, 1913-1914; Chief of the General Staff to the British Armies in France, 1915-1918; died 1954.

KIRKPATRICK, General Sir George: b. 1866; ed. Trinity College School, Port Hope, and Royal Military College, Kingston, Canada; Inspector-General, Commonwealth Military Forces, 1910-1914; Chief of the General Staff, India, 1916-1920; died 1950.

LEGGE, Major-General J.G.: b. London, 1863; ed. Cranleigh School Surrey, England, Sydney Grammar School, 1879-1881, University of Sydney 1881-1887; graduated with M.A., LL.B.; regular soldier, Quartermaster-General, 1909-1912; commanded First Australian Division, 1915; Chief of the General Staff, 1912-1914, and 1917-1920; commanded Second Australian Division, 1915-1916; Commandant, Royal Military College, Duntroon, 1920-1922; died 1947.

MACKAY, Major-General Hon. James: b. 1859; served in the Boer War; Member of the Legislative Assembly, New South Wales, 1895-1899; Director-General, Australian Army Reserve 1916; died 1935.

MAXWELL, General Sir John: b. 1859; commanded British Forces, Egypt, 1908-1912 and 1914-1916; Commander-in-Chief, Ireland, 1916, and Northern Command, Great Britain, 1916-1919; died 1929.

McANDERSON, Brigadier-General Sir R.M.M.: b. 1867; Sydney businessman; Commandant A.I.F. Administrative Headquarters, United Kingdom, 1916-1917; died 1940.

McCAY, Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir J.: b. Ballymore, Ireland, 1864; ed. Scotch College, Melbourne, and the University of Melbourne: graduated with M.A., LL.M.; barrister; joined the Victorian Militia with the rank of Lieutenant in 1886; Deputy Judge Advocate-General, Victorian Military Forces, 1896-1900; Officer-in-Charge, Australian Intelligence Corps, 1907-1913; Minister for Defence, 1904-1905; commanded 2nd Bde, 1914-1915, Fifth Australian Division, 1916; General-Officer-in-Charge A.I.F. Depots, United Kingdom, 1917-1919; died 1930.

MONASH, General Sir John: b. Melbourne, 1865; ed. Scotch College and University of Melbourne where he graduated in Arts, Law and Engineering; Garrison Artillery, 1887-1908; joined Australian Intelligence Corps (Victoria) with rank of Lieut.-Col. in 1908; took command of 13th Infantry Brigade in 1913; commanded 4th Infantry Brigade, 1914-1916, Third Division, Australian Imperial Force 1916-1918;

Australian Corps, 1918; Director-General of Repatriation and Demobilisation, Australian Imperial Force, 1918-1919; Vice-Chancellor, University of Melbourne, 1929-1931; Chairman, Victorian State Electricity Commission, 1920-1931; died 1931.

MURRAY, General Sir A.J.: b. 1860; Director Military Training, British Army, 1907-1912; Inspector of Infantry, 1912-1914; Chief of the General Staff, British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1915; Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1915; Commander-in-Chief, Egypt, 1916-1917; General Officer Commander-in-Chief, Aldershot, 1917-1919; died 1945.

NICHOLSON, Field Marshal Lord William: b. ——; Director-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence at the War Office, 1901-1904; Chief British Military Attaché with the Japanese Army in Manchuria, 1904-1905; Chief of the British General Staff, 1908-1912; died ——.

PIESSE, E.L.: b. Hobart, 1880; ed. Friends' High School, Hobart, University of Tasmania, where he graduated with a B.Sc., and an LL.B., and Cambridge University where he studied mathematics; made a provisional Lieutenant in the Australian Intelligence Corps, Tasmania, 1909; made an Honorary Major 1915; Director of Military Intelligence, Army Headquarters, Melbourne, 1916-1919; Director, Pacific Branch, Prime Minister's Department, 1919-1923; President of the Victorian Law Institute, 1943-1944; wrote *Japan and the Defence of Australia*, 1935; died 1947.

SELLHEIM, Major-General V.C.: b. 1866; ed. Brisbane Grammar School; served in the Boer War, 1899-1900; Adjutant-General, 1914; Commandant, Australian Imperial Force, Headquarters, Egypt, 1915-1916, and London, 1916; Adjutant-General, 1917-1924; Administrator, Norfolk Island, 1926-1928; died 1928.

STEWARD, Sir G.: b. Scotland, 1866; joined the Royal Engineers in 1882; moved to Tasmania and joined the Department of Education in 1892; moved to the Commonwealth civil service in 1901 and became Secretary to Federal Executive Council and Official Secretary to the Governor-General, 1902-1919; member of the 10th Australian Light Horse (Victorian Mounted Rifles); promoted major 1908 and joined the Headquarters Staff, Australian Intelligence Corps; in and out of Australian Intelligence Corps (Victoria) from 1908 to 1914 - remained on the Unattached List when he was not with AIC (Victoria); Head, Counter Espionage Bureau, 1916-1919; Chief Commissioner of Police in Victoria, 1919; died 1920.

WALLACK, Major-General E.T.: b. 9 August, 1857; joined 4th Battalion Middlesex Regiment as a Second Lieutenant in 1880; appointed Adjutant of the Tasmanian Reserve Forces in 1885; promoted to Lieut.-Colonel, District Headquarters Staff, Tasmania; served in the Boer War, 1900-1901; Commandant 4 Military District, 1904-1906; Adjutant-General, 1908; Commandant 2 Military District, 1912-1915; age retirement extended for two years in 1915; 1916, retired list as Hon. Brigadier-General - 18 December 1917, from retired list to active list as temporary Inspector Home

Service troops; 1918, retired list as Hon. Major-General; died ____.

WHITE, General Sir Cyril Brudenell Bingham: b. 1876, son of John Warren White, at St. Arnaud, Victoria, on 23 September; ed. Hendra State School, Brisbane, and at the Eton School, Nundah, Brisbane; 1892-1899, a member of the Australian Joint Stock Bank - transferred to Gympie and then Charters Towers; in 1897, he was commissioned in the Wide Bay Infantry Regiment with the rank of Lieutenant; the following year, he competed successfully in examinations for a place in the Queensland Permanent Artillery and rose to the rank of Captain; served on Thursday Island from 6 January 1900 to 12 March 1901; in Melbourne for the celebrations marking the inauguration of the Commonwealth; served in the First Australian Contingent during the Boer War, 17 March to 2 June 1902; Aide-de-Camp to Major-General Hutton, 1902-1904; British Staff College, Camberley, England, from 1905 to January 1908; February to May 1908 he acted as Director of Military Operations under Colonel Bridges, Chief of Intelligence; in October 1908, White sailed for England for a four year appointment with the British Army; he was recalled to Australia in August 1911 to develop the Kitchener scheme; returned with the rank of Major and, as Director of Military Operations, was the chief assistant to the Chief of the General Staff, Brigadier-General Joseph Maria Gordon; when General Gordon left for England on 26 July 1914, White was made Acting Chief of the General Staff; chosen by Brigadier-General Bridges to be his Chief of Staff; left for Egypt 21 October

1914 and arrived in Cairo on 9 January 1915; with Generals Bridges, Birdwood and Sheen, White was responsible for the orders governing the landing at Gaba Tepe in Gallipoli, 25 April; after the death of Bridges on 15 May and the departure of the New Zealand Commander, Godley, due to typhoid fever, White became Chief-of-Staff, ANZAC, and drew up the plans for the evacuation of troops from Gallipoli; the evacuation took place on 8 January 1916; White assisted Birdwood, temporarily given administrative command of the Australian and New Zealand forces in Egypt, to remake the A.I.F. into one mounted division and five infantry divisions; White was appointed Birdwood's Chief-of-Staff until May 1918 when he went with him to the Fifth British Army; returned to Melbourne on 7 June 1919; working on plans for a Citizen Army from 1919 to 1923; in June 1920, White was made Chief of the General Staff as successor to Major-General J.G. Legge; in 1923 he resigned from the army to become Chairman of the Commonwealth Public Service Commission from 1924 to 1927. Recalled on outbreak of World War II; died tragically in an air crash in 1940.

WILSON, Major-General R.: b. 1875; member of the Royal Field Artillery; made acting Chief of the General Staff between Hoad's death in October 1911 and the appointment of Gordon as C.G.S. in May 1912; rose to the rank of Major-General; d. 1954.

WOODCOCK, Captain C.F.: b. 1874; friend of Brudenell White; made a provisional Lieutenant in the Queensland

Military Forces, 7 March, 1895; staff officer for Artillery, Headquarters Adelaide, South Australia, 1 November 1903; made a Captain in the Royal Australian Artillery Regiment, 1907; left the Australian army in 1908; died ———.

APPENDIX A

I NUMBER OF TROOPS AVAILABLE IN EACH STATE*

ENGINEERS

State	Mounted Troops	Artillery Field	Artillery Garrison	Staff, Field Electric Companies	Sub-marine Miners	Infantry	Staff and Departmental Corps	Total	Field Guns	Remarks
N.S.W.	1,806	240	925	254	119	5,733	655	9,732	12	3 4-gun batteries
Victoria	1,137	269	1,156	76	139	3,459	217	6,452	18	3 6-gun batteries
Queensland	1,194	154	427	-	78	3,069	258	5,180	10	2 4-gun batteries and one section
S.A.	741	101	240	-	-	1,849	70	3,001	6	1 battery
W.A.	480	180	121	1	-	1,320	88	2,190	8	2 4-gun batteries
Tasmania	369	94	229	49	21	2,164	90	3,016	6	2 field, 2 mounted and 2 seige guns
	5,727	1,038	3,098	379	357	17,594	1,370	29,571	60	

* These tables are drawn from C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 1901-1902 Session, Vol. II, 'Military Forces of the Commonwealth: Minute Upon the Defence of Australia by Major-General Hutton, 7 April 1902,' pp.3-4. It is assumed that these tables are dated 7 April 1902.

PROPOSED DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF MILITARY BOARDS OF ADMINISTRATION*

1st Military Member	2nd Military Member	3rd Military Member	4th Military Member	Finance Member
War Preparation	Personnel	Departments	Armaments	Finance
Defence Schemes	Appointment, Promotion and Retirement of Officers	Transport	Artillery	See Treasury requirements and complied with
Co-operation of Naval and Military Forces	Returns	Supplies	Armaments Equipment	Financial Regulations
Regulation of Traffic in Defended Ports	Regulations	Clothing	Gunnery Training	Keep accounts of Forces
Mobilization	Ceremonial Matters	Equipment	Inspection of Ordnance	Supervise receipts and disbursements
Organization	Medals	Ordnance Dept. Stores	(Technical (Administration (Permanent Artillery	Examine Expenditure
Intelligence	Discipline	Army Service Corps	Ordnance Artificers	Frame Estimates
Topography	Interior Economy	Army Medical Corps	Engineers	Financial advice
Allotment of Instructional Staff	Cadets	Veterinary Dept.	Fortifications (Maintenance of)	Contracts
Staff Ridos and schemes	Rifle Clubs		Construction	Lands
Staff Duties	Chaplains		Submarine Miners and Equipment	Claims
	Military Law and Courts Martial		Ranges Construction	
	Promotion Examinations			
	Rifle Ranges			

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

Secretariat and interior economy of Office
Correspondence (External)
Parliamentary Questions; Gazette Notices
Orders in Council; Publication Regulations

* C of A, Parliamentary Papers, vol. II, no. 58. 'Memorandum by a Committee in regard to the Administration of Military and Naval Forces together with Memoranda by Senator the Hon. A. Dawson and Major-General Sir E.T.M. Hutton.

DIVISION OF CONTROL OF THE DEFENCE FORCES*



* C of A, Parliamentary Papers etc.

APPENDIX B

COUNCIL OF DEFENCE

1905

Minister of State for Defence:	J.W. McCay
Treasurer:	Sir G. Turner
Inspector-General:	Major-General H. Finn
Director of Naval Forces:	Captain W.R. Creswell
Chief of Intelligence:	Lieut.-Colonel W.T. Bridges
Secretary:	Captain R. Muirhead Collins, Retired Commonwealth Naval Forces

1906

Minister of State for Defence:	Senator T. Playford
Treasurer:	Sir John Forrest
Inspector-General:	Major-General H. Finn
Director of Naval Forces:	Captain W.R. Creswell
Chief of Intelligence:	Lieut.-Colonel Bridges
Secretary:	Captain R. Muirhead Collins

1907

Minister of State for Defence:	T.T. Ewing
Treasurer:	Sir John Forrest
Inspector-General:	Major-General J.C. Hoad
Director of Naval Forces:	Captain W.R. Creswell
Chief of Intelligence:	Colonel W.T. Bridges
Secretary:	Captain R. Muirhead Collins

1908

Minister of State for Defence:	T.T. Ewing
Treasurer:	Sir William Lyne
Inspector-General:	Major-General J.C. Hoad
Director of Naval Forces:	Captain W.R. Creswell
Chief of Intelligence:	Colonel W.T. Bridges
Secretary:	Captain R. Muirhead Collins

1909

Minister of State for Defence:	J. Cook
Treasurer:	Sir J. Forrest
Inspector-General:	———
Director of Naval Forces:	Captain R. Creswell
Chief of the General Staff:	Major-General J.C. Hoad
Secretary:	Captain R. Muirhead Collins

1910

Minister of State for Defence:	Senator G.F. Pearce
Treasurer:	A. Fisher
Inspector-General:	Major-General G. Kirkpatrick
Director of Naval Forces:	Captain W.R. Creswell
Chief of the General Staff:	Major-General J.C. Hoad
Secretary:	Commander S.A. Pethebridge, Retired Commonwealth Naval Forces

1911

Not listed for the year 1911.

1912

Minister of State for Defence:	Senator G.F. Pearce
Treasurer:	A. Fisher
Inspector-General:	Major-General G. Kirkpatrick
First Naval Member:	Rear-Admiral Sir W.R. Creswell
Second Naval Member:	Captain B.M. Chambers
Chief of the General Staff:	Lieut.-Colonel F. Wilson (Acting)
Consulting Military Engineer:	Lieut.-Colonel P. Owen
Secretary:	Commander S.A. Pethebridge

1913

Minister of State for Defence:	Senator G.F. Pearce
Treasurer:	A. Fisher
First Naval Member:	Rear-Admiral Sir W.R. Creswell
Second Naval Member:	Captain C.H. Hughes-Onslow
Inspector-General:	Major-General G. Kirkpatrick
Chief of the General Staff:	Brigadier-General J.M. Gordon
Consulting Military Engineer:	Lieut.-Colonel P. Owen

1914

Minister of State for Defence:	Senator E.D. Millen
Treasurer:	Sir John Forrest
First Naval Member:	Rear-Admiral Sir W.R. Creswell
Second Naval Member:	Captain A.G. Smith, R.N.
Inspector-General:	Brigadier-General W.T. Bridges
Chief of the General Staff:	Colonel J.G. Legge
Consulting Military Engineer:	Lieut.-Colonel P.T. Owen
Secretary:	Commander S.A. Pethebridge

1915

Minister of State for Defence:	Senator G.F. Pearce
Treasurer:	A. Fisher
First Naval Member:	Rear-Admiral Sir W.R. Creswell
Second Naval Member:	Captain A.G. Smith
Inspector-General:	———
Chief of the General Staff:	Colonel J.G. Legge (A.I.F.)
	Colonel G. Irving (temp.)
Consulting Military Engineer:	Lieut.-Colonel P. Owen
Secretary:	Commander S.A. Pethebridge (Colonel, N. and M.E.F.)

1916

Minister of State for Defence:	Senator G.F. Pearce
Treasurer:	W.G. Higgs
First Naval Member:	Rear-Admiral Sir W.R. Creswell
Second Naval Member:	Commodore A.G. Smith
Inspector-General:	———
Chief of the General Staff:	Colonel J.G. Legge (A.I.F.)
	Colonel (temp. Brig.-Gen.) H.J. Foster, R.E., p.s.c. (temp.)
Consulting Military Engineer:	Colonel P. Owen
Secretary:	Commander S.A. Pethebridge (Brig.-Gen., N. and M.E.F.)
	T. Trumble (Acting)

1917

Minister of State for Defence:	Senator G. Pearce
Treasurer:	Sir John Forrest
First Naval Member:	Rear-Admiral Sir W.R. Creswell
Second Naval Member:	Commodore A.G. Smith
Inspector-General:	Colonel (temp. Major-General) J.G. Legge (temp.)
Chief of the General Staff:	Colonel J.G. Legge (A.I.F.)
	Colonel (temp. Brig.-Gen.) H. Foster (temp.)
Consulting Military Engineer:	Colonel P.T. Owen
Secretary:	T. Trumble (Acting)

1918

Not listed for the year 1918

Source: Military Forces List of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1906-1912; Officers List of the Australian Military Forces, 1913-1921; Staff and Regimental Lists of the Australian Military Forces, 1919-1922.

APPENDIX C

DETAILS OF ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE

	1st Year	2nd Year	3rd Year	Estimates 1907/8
Central Administration	23,000	23,000	23,000	23,000
Head-quarters of Military Districts	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,254
Ordnance Departments	22,000	22,000	22,000	21,452
Permanent Troops	85,000	65,000	50,000	105,793
Instructional Staff	46,000	46,000	46,000	46,388
Accounts and Pay Department	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,198
Rifle Range Staff	3,000	3,000	3,000	2,654
TOTAL - Permanent Services	200,000	180,000	165,000	220,000
National Guard - Training - Pay, including Militia retained	93,000	80,000	90,000	115,489
Clothing & c.	90,000	90,000	90,000	64,197
Camps and Schools of Instruction	39,000	68,000	85,000	30,460
Central School	5,000	5,000	5,000	-
Ammunition annually expended	20,000	40,000	60,000	32,203*
TOTAL	247,000	283,000	330,000	242,349
Arms	100,000	100,000	100,000	)
Accoutrements & c.	75,000	75,000	75,000	)106,433
Stores, general contingencies & c	32,000	28,000	24,000	36,226
Field Artillery, guns and reserve ammunition	50,000	50,000	50,000	- **
Ammunition, reserve for rifles	30,000	30,000	30,000	- +
Works and buildings	29,000	29,000	29,000	59,000
Repairs, maintenance and rents	26,000	21,000	16,000	31,668
TOTAL	342,000	333,000	324,000	233,327
Grand Total, excluding Rifle Clubs and Cadets	789,000	796,000	819,000	696,415

Note* 32,203 includes annual expenditure on Gun and Rifle Ammunication and Reserve Rifle Ammunition.

Note** Guns are included in arms.

Note+ See note*.

Source: CPD, 1907-1908 Session, 13 December 1907, p.7534.

APPENDIX D

OUTLINE OF ORGANIZATION FOR UNIVERSAL TRAINING.

NOTES ON BATTALION AREAS.

1. Each Battalion Area is required to furnish one battalion of Infantry, and every four of such areas (supplying one brigade) to furnish also one Company of Engineers, one Company Army Service Corps, and one Field Ambulance.

In addition, Light Horse and Field Artillery units will be furnished by some of the areas. These are shown in the tables.

2. The Battalion Areas have been worked out so as to contain a sufficient population to supply the numbers required for the units above mentioned. An allowance of 35 per cent. has been made for rejections on the ground of medical unfitness in large cities, and 25 per cent. in country areas.

3. Every Battalion Area will have in training—

1 Battalion Infantry	922
Quota towards Engineer, Army Service Corps, and Army Medical Corps	75
Total	997

The average annual contingent of recruits will therefore be about 155 for each Battalion Area, plus such additions as are required for Light Horse and Field Artillery units raised therein. The exact numbers to be supplied annually to all units will be embodied in establishments, to be issued later. The figures shown in the following tables are only approximate. They include recruits (18–19 years) but not the 25–26-year men.

4. *Personnel* for Artillery and Engineers for fixed defences will eventually be supplied by the areas nearest to such localities.

OUTLINE OF ORGANIZATION FOR UNIVERSAL TRAINING.

ALLOTMENT OF UNITS TO BRIGADE, BATTALION, AND TRAINING AREAS.

QUEENSLAND.

Brigade Areas.	Battalion Areas.								Training Areas.	
	Number of Battalion.	Containing undermentioned Centres of Population.	Providing the undermentioned Units.						Number.	Places of Residence of Area Officers.
			1 Battalion of Infy. and proportion of Engineers, A.S.C., and A.M.C.	Light Horse.		Field Artillery.		Total Numbers in Training in Area.		
			Numbers.	Squadrons.	Numbers.	Batteries.	Numbers.			
I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.	VI.	VII.	VIII.	IX.	X.	XI.
1st Brigade (North and Central)	1	Townsville, Cairns, Bowen, Mackay	997	2	225	..	..	1,222	3	Townsville (*a*), Cairns (*b*) Mackay (*c*)
	2	Charters Towers, Hughenden	997	2	224	..	..	1,221	2	Charters Towers (*a*) and (
	3	Rockhampton, Mount Morgan, Clermont	997	2	225	..	..	1,222	3	Rockhampton (*a*) and (*b* Mount Morgan (*c*)
	4	Bundaberg, Maryborough, Gympie	997	2	224	..	..	1,221	3	Bundaberg (*a*), Mary borough (*b*), Gympie (*c*
2nd Brigade (Brisbane)	5	Brisbane (Northern Suburbs)	997	1	112	1	161	1,270	2	Albion (*a*), Sandgate (*b*)
	6	Brisbane (Western Suburbs)	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Toowong (*a*), Ashgrove (
	7	Brisbane North ..	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	North Brisbane (*a*) and (
	8	Brisbane South ..	997	..	..	2	322	1,319	3	South Brisbane (*a*) and (*b* East Brisbane (*c*)
	9	Brisbane (Southern Suburbs)	997	1	112	2	322	1,431*	3	Fairfield (*a*), Manly (*b* Yeronga (*c*)
3rd Brigade (South)	10	Ipswich	997	2	225	..	..	1,222	2	Ipswich (*a*) and (*b*).
	11	Toowoomba, Warwick, Dalby, Roma	997	4	449	..	..	1,446	3	Toowoomba (*a*) and (*b* Warwick (*c*)
	12	*Richmond and Clarence Rivers*†	997	4	449	..	..	1,446	3	*Grafton, Lismore, Casino*
		Totals	10,967	16 (4 Rgts.)	1,796	7	1,127	13,890	28	

* Also Garrison Artillery (79) and Engineers (13) for Lytton.——† Attached to 3rd Brigade, Queensland, from New South Wales.

NEW SOUTH WALES.

Brigade Areas.	Battalion Areas.								Training Areas.	
	Number of Battalion.	Containing undermentioned Centres of Population.	Providing the undermentioned Units.						Number.	Places of Residence of Area Officers.
			1 Battalion of Infy. and Proportion of Engineers, A.S.C., and A.M.C.	Light Horse.		Field Artillery.		Total Numbers in Training in Area.		
			Numbers.	Squadrons.	Numbers.	Batteries.	Numbers.			
I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.	VI.	VII.	VIII.	IX.	X.	XI.
Attached to 3rd Brigade, Q'ld.	12	Richmond and Clarence Rivers	997	4	449	..	..	1,446	3	Lismore (*a*), Casino (*b*), Grafton (*c*)
4th Brigade (North)	13	New England	997	4	449	..	..	1,446	3	Armidale (*a*), Inverell (*b*), Tamworth (*c*)
	14	Hunter River	997	2	225	..	..	1,222	3	Singleton (*a*), East Maitland (*b*), West Maitland (*c*)
	15	Newcastle (Western Suburbs)	997	1	112	1	161	1,270	2	Wickham (*a*), Wallsend (*b*)
	16	Newcastle and Southern Suburbs	997	1	112	2	322	1,431*	3	Newcastle (*a*), Hamilton (*b*), Merewether (*c*)
5th Brigade (North Sydney)	17	North Sydney, Manly ..	997	1	112	1	161	1,270†	2	Mosman (*a*), Neutral Bay (*b*)
	18	Northern Suburbs ..	997	2	225	2	322	1,544	2	North Sydney (*a*), Chatswood (*b*)
	19	Lane Cove River ..	997	1	112	..	..	1,109	2	Hunter's Hill (*a*), Hornsby (*b*)
	20	Parramatta, Granville ..	997	2	225	..	..	1,222	2	Granville (*a*), Parramatta (*b*)

	21	South Head, Woollahra ..	997	1	112	..	..	1,109†	2	Woollahra (*a*), Double Bay (*b*)
6th Brigade (East Sydney)	22	Bondi, Randwick ..	997	1	112	1	161	1,270	2	Bondi (*a*), Randwick (*b*)
	23	South Sydney	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Waterloo (*a*), North Botany (*b*)
	24	East Sydney	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Rushcutter's Bay (*a*), Paddington (*b*)
	25	Sydney	997	..	..	..	..	997	2	Sydney (*a*), Darlinghurst (*b*)
7th Brigade (Sydney)	26	Surry Hills	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Surry Hills (*a*) and (*b*)
	27	Darling Harbor	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Sydney (*a*), Pyrmont (*b*)
	28	Redfern	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Redfern (*a*), Darlington (*b*)
	29	Glebe	997	..	..	..	..	997	2	Glebe (*a*), Forest Lodge (*b*)
8th Brigade (West Sydney)	30	Balmain	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	East Balmain (*a*), Rozelle (*b*)
	31	Annandale, Leichhardt ..	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Annandale (*a*), Leichhardt (*b*)
	32	Drummoyne, Leichhardt	997	..	..	..	..	997	2	Haberfield (*a*), Drummoyne (*b*)
	33	Camperdown	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Camperdown (*a*), Darlington (*b*)
9th Brigade (Western Suburbs)	34	Newtown	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Enmore (*a*), Newtown (*b*)
	35	Marrickville	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Marrickville (*a*), St. Peters (*b*)
	36	Petersham	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Petersham (*a*) and (*b*)
	37	Illawarra District ..	997	4	449	..	..	1,446	3	Bulli (*a*), Wollongong (*b*), Nowra (*c*)
10th Brigade (South)	38	Rockdale, Kogarah ..	997	1	112	..	..	1,109	2	Rockdale (*a*), Kogarah (*b*)
	39	Ashfield, Canterbury ..	997	1	112	..	..	1,109	2	Ashfield (*a*), Canterbury (*b*)
	40	Burwood, Homebush ..	997	..	..	..	..	997	2	Burwood (*a*), Strathfield (*b*)
	41	Bathurst, Lithgow, Windsor	997	2	225	..	..	1,222	3	Penrith (*a*), Lithgow (*b*), Bathurst (*c*)
	42	Western District ..	997	4	449	..	..	1,446	3	Orange (*a*), Parkes (*b*), Dubbo (*c*)
11th Brigade (Central)	43	Southern District ..	997	4	449	..	..	1,446	3	Liverpool (*a*), Goulburn (*b*), Goulburn South (*c*)
	44	Riverina	997	4	449	2	322	1,768	3	Cootamundra (*a*), Wagga Wagga (*b*), Albury (*c*)
		Totals	32,901	40 (10 Rgts.)	4,490	20	3,220	40,611§	75	

Broken Hill forms part of Battalion No. 82, allotted to South Australia.

* Also 162 Artillery and 54 Engineers for forts.——† Also 214 Artillery and 74 Engineers for forts.——‡ Also 167 Artillery and 95 Engineers for forts.——§ Also 700 for forts.

VICTORIA.

Brigade Areas.	Battalion Areas.								Training Areas.	
	Number of Battalion.	Containing undermentioned Centres of Population.	Providing the undermentioned Units.						Number.	Places of Residence of Area Officers.
			1 Battalion of Infy. and Proportion of Engineers, A.S.C., and A.M.C.	Light Horse.		Field Artillery.		Total Numbers in Training in Area.		
			Numbers.	Squadrons.	Numbers.	Batteries.	Numbers.			
I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.	VI.	VII.	VIII.	IX.	X.	XI.
	45	Gippsland	997	4	449	..	..	1,446	3	Oakleigh (*a*), Salo (*b*), Caulfield (*c*)
12th Brigade (East)	46	Brighton, Elsternwick, Balaclava	997	2	225	1	161	1,383	2	Balaclava (*a*), Brighton (*b*)
	47	Toorak, Armadale, Malvern	997	1	112	1	161	1,270	2	Toorak (*a*), Armadale (*b*)
	48	Malvern, Camberwell, Auburn	997	2	224	1	161	1,382	2	Auburn (*a*), Camberwell (*b*)
	49	South Yarra, Prahran ..	997	1	112	1	161	1,270	2	South Yarra (*a*), Prahran (*b*)
13th Brigade (Melbourne South)	50	St. Kilda, Middle Park ..	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	St. Kilda West (*a*), St. Kilda East (*b*)
	51	South Melbourne, Albert Park	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	South Melbourne (*a*), Albert Park (*b*)
	52	Port Melbourne, South Melbourne	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	South Melbourne (*a*), Port Melbourne (*b*)

14th Brigade (Melbourne East)	53	Glenferrie, Hawthorn, Kew	997	1	113	1	161	1,271	2	Kew (*a*), Glenferrie (*b*)
	54	Fitzroy North, Clifton Hill, Northcote	997	2	224	1	161	1,382	2	Northcote (*a*), Fitzroy North (*b*)
	55	North Richmond, Abbotsford, Clifton Hill	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Abbotsford (*a*), North Richmond (*b*)
	56	Richmond, South Richmond	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Richmond (*a*), South Richmond (*b*)
15th Brigade (North-East)	57	North-Eastern Railway District	997	4	449	..	..	1,446	3	Shepparton (*a*), Wangaratta (*b*), Seymour (*c*)
	58	Essendon, Moonee Ponds, Ascot Vale	997	1	112	1	161	1,270	2	Moonee Ponds (*a*), Ascot Vale (*b*)
	59	Coburg	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Coburg (*a*) and (*b*)
	60	Carlton, North Carlton ..	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Carlton (*a*), North Carlton (*b*)
16th Brigade (Melbourne)	61	Newmarket, North Melbourne	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Newmarket (*a*), North Melbourne (*b*)
	62	South Carlton, Fitzroy ..	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	South Carlton (*a*), Fitzroy (*b*)
	63	Fitzroy, Collingwood ..	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Collingwood (*a*), Fitzroy (*b*)
	64	Melbourne, East Melbourne	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Melbourne (*a*), East Melbourne (*b*)
17th Brigade (North)	65	Footscray	997	1	112	..	..	1,109	2	Footscray (*a*), Footscray North (*b*)
	66	Castlemaine, Maldon, Daylesford	997	2	225	..	..	1,222	3	Castlemaine (*a*) and (*c*), Kyneton (*b*)
	67	Bendigo	997	..	..	..	..	997	2	Bendigo (*a*) and (*b*)
	68	Bendigo, Eaglehawk, Echuca	997	4	449	..	..	1,446	3	Bendigo (*a*), and (*c*), Echuca (*b*)
18th Brigade (Western)	69	Geelong, Williamstown, Newport	997	1	112	1	161	1,270*	3	Williamstown (*a*), Geelong (*b*) and (*c*)
	70	Ballarat and S. E. Suburbs	997	1	113	..	..	1,110	2	Ballarat (*a*) and (*b*)
	71	Ballarat, Beaufort, Clunes	997	1	112	..	..	1,109	2	Ballarat (*a*) and (*b*)
	72	Portland, Hamilton, Warrnambool, Colac	997	4	449	..	..	1,446	3	Hamilton (*a*), Warrnambool (*b*), Colac (*c*)
(North - West) attached to 18th Brigade	73	Maryborough, Amrat, Stawell, St. Arnaud	997	4	449	..	..	1,446	3	Horsham (*a*), Maryborough (*b*), Stawell (*c*)
		Totals	28,913	36 (9 Rgts.)	4,041	19	3,059	36,013*	65	

* Also 327 Artillery and 227 Engineers at Geelong and Queenscliff for forts.

SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

Brigade Areas.	Battalion Areas.								Training Areas.	
	Number of Battalion.	Containing undermentioned Centres of Population.	Providing the undermentioned Units.						Number.	Places of Residence of Area Officers.
			1 Battalion of Inf., and Proportion of Engrs., A.S.C., and A.M.C.	Light Horse.		Field Artillery.		Total Numbers in Training in Area.		
			Numbers.	Squadrons.	Numbers.	Batteries.	Numbers.			
I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.	VI.	VII.	VIII.	IX.	X.	XI.
19th Brigade (South)	74	Adelaide (Unley), Mt. Barker, Mt. Gambier	997	2	225	1	161	1,383	3	Unley (*a*), Mt. Barker (*b*), Mt. Gambier (*c*)
	75	Glenelg, Mitcham, Brighton	997	2	224	..	..	1,221	3	Goodwood (*a*), Glenelg, (*b*), Yankalilla (*c*)
	76	West Adelaide, Thebarton	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Hindmarsh (*a*), West Adelaide (*b*)
Attached to 19th Brigade	77	Port Adelaide	997	..	..	..	..	997*	2	Woodville (*a*), Port Adelaide (*b*)
	78	East Adelaide, St. Peters	997	..	..	..	..	997	2	Maylands (*a*), Hackney (*b*)
20th Brigade (North)	79	Norwood, St. Peters East	997	2	225	1	161	1,383	3	Payneham (*a*), Norwood (*b*), Magill (*c*)
	80	North Adelaide, Hindmarsh, Prospect, Kapunda	997	2	224	1	161	1,382	3	North Adelaide (*a*), Prospect (*b*), Gawler (*c*)
	81	Kadina, Moonta, Wallaroo, Port Pirie	997	2	225	1	161	1,383	3	Wallaroo (*a*), Kadina (*b*), Port Pirie (*c*)
	82	Broken Hill (N.S.W.), Petersburg, Port Augusta, Burra	997	2	224	..	..	1,221	3	Broken Hill (*a*) and (*b*), Petersburg (*c*)
		Totals	8,973	12 (3 Rgts.)	1,347	5	805	11,125	24	

* Also 80 Artillery for forts.

WESTERN AUSTRALIA.

Brigade Areas.	Battalion Areas.								Training Areas.	
	Number of Battalion.	Containing undermentioned Centres of Population.	Providing the undermentioned units.						Number.	Places of Residence of Area Officers.
			1 Battalion of Inft. and Proportion of Engineers, A.S.C., and A.M.C.	Light Horse.		Field Artillery.		Total Numbers in Training in Area.		
			Numbers.	Squadrons.	Numbers.	Batteries.	Numbers.			
I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.	VI.	VII.	VIII.	IX.	X.	XI.
21st Brigade (East)	83	Kalgoorlie, Kanowna, Menzies, Kookynie	997	..	..	..	..	997	3	Kalgoorlie (*a*) and (*b*), Malcolm (*c*)
	84	Boulder, Coolgardie, Southern Cross	997	..	..	..	..	997	3	Boulder (*a*) and (*b*), Coolgardie (*c*)
	85	Albany, Narrogin, Northam	997	1	112	..	..	1,110	3	Albany (*a*), Narrogin (*b*), Northam (*c*)
22nd Brigade (West)	86	Fremantle, Armadale, Bunbury, Collie	997	1	112	1	161	1,270*	3	Fremantle (*a*), Armadale (*b*), Bunbury (*c*)
	87	Cottesloe, Subiaco ..	997	..	..	1	161	1,158	2	Cottesloe (*a*), Subiaco (*b*)
	88	Perth, North Perth, East Perth	997	1	112	1	161	1,270	3	Perth (*a*), North Perth (*b*), East Perth (*c*)
	89	Guildford, Geraldton, Cue	997	1	112	..	..	1,109	3	Guildford (*a*), Geraldton (*b*), Mt. Magnet (*c*)
		Totals	6,979	4 (1 Regt.)	449	3	483	7,911*	20	

* Also 156 Artillery and 32 Engineers for forts.

TASMANIA.

Brigade Areas.	Battalion Areas.								Training Areas.	
	Number of Battalion.	Containing undermentioned Centres of Population.	Providing the undermentioned Units.						Number.	Places of Residence of Area Officers.
			1 Battalion of Inft. and Proportion of Engineers, A.S.C., and A.M.C.	Light Horse.		Field Artillery.		Total Numbers in Training in Area.		
			Numbers.	Squadrons.	Numbers.	Batteries.	Numbers.			
I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.	VI.	VII.	VIII.	IX.	X.	XI.
23rd Brigade	90	Queenstown, Zeehan, Waratah	997	..	..	..	..	997	3	Queenstown (*a*), Zeehan (*b*), Waratah (*c*)
	91	Burnie, Devonport, Deloraine	997	2	225	..	..	1,222	3	Burnie (*a*), Devonport (*b*), Deloraine (*c*)
	92	Beaconsfield, Launceston, Longford	997	1	112	1	161	1,270	3	Beaconsfield (*a*), Launceston (*b*) and (*c*)
	93	New Norfolk, Hobart, Huon	997	1	112	1	161	1,270*	3	Hobart (*a*) and (*b*), Huonville (*c*)
		Totals	3,988	4 (1 Regt.)	449	2	322	4,759	12	

* Also 86 Artillery and 32 Engineers for forts.

APPENDIX E

A SELECTION OF MINISTERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, 1901-1918

Barton Administration

(1 January 1901 to 24 September 1903)

Prime Minister and External Affairs:	Edmund Barton
Defence:	Sir John Forrest (17 January 1901 to 10 August 1903)

Deakin Administration

(24 September 1903 to 27 April 1904)

Prime Minister and External Affairs:	Alfred Deakin

Watson Administration

(27 April 1904 to 17 August 1904)

Prime Minister:	John Watson
External Affairs:	William Morris Hughes

Reid-McLean Administration

(18 August 1904 to 5 July 1905)

Prime Minister and External Affairs:	George Reid
Defence:	James McCay

Deakin Administration

(5 July 1905 to 13 November 1908)

Prime Minister and External Affairs:	Alfred Deakin
Defence:	Sen. Thomas Playford (to 24 January 1907)
	Thomas Thomson Ewing (from 25 January 1907)

Fisher Administration

(13 November 1908 to 2 June 1909)

Prime Minister and Treasurer:	Andrew Fisher
External Affairs:	Egerton Lee Batchelor
Defence:	Sen. George Foster Pearce

Deakin Administration

(2 June 1909 to 29 April 1910)

Prime Minister:	Alfred Deakin
Defence:	Joseph Cook
External Affairs:	Littleton Ernest Groom

Fisher Administration

(29 April 1910 to 24 June 1913)

Prime Minister:	Andrew Fisher
Defence:	Sen. George Foster Pearce
External Affairs:	E.L. Batchelor (to 8 October 1911)
	Josiah Thomas (from 14 October 1911)

Cook Administration

(24 June 1913 to 17 September 1914)

Prime Minister:	Joseph Cook
Defence:	Sen. Edward Davis
External Affairs:	Patrick McMahon Glynn

Fisher Administration

(17 September to 27 October 1915)

Prime Minister:	Andrew Fisher
Defence:	Sen. George Foster Pearce

Fisher Administration (cont.)

External Affairs: John Andrew Arthur
(to 9 December 1914)

Hugh Mahon
(from 14 December 1914)

Navy: Jens August Jensen
(from 12 July 1915)

Hughes Administration

(27 October 1915 to 14 November 1916)

Prime Minister and Attorney-General: William Morris Hughes

Defence: Sen. George Foster Pearce

External Affairs: Hugh Mahon

Navy: Jens August Jensen

Hughes Administration

(14 November 1916 to 17 February 1917)

Prime Minister and Attorney-General: William Morris Hughes

Defence: Sen. George Foster Pearce

Navy: Jens August Jensen

Hughes Administration

(17 February 1917 to 10 January 1918)

Prime Minister and Attorney-General: William Morris Hughes

Navy: Joseph Cook

Defence: Sen. George Foster Pearce

Home and Territories: Patrick McMahon Glynn

APPENDIX F

MILITARY BOARD, 1905-1918

1905

Minister: Senator J.W. McCay

Deputy Adjutant-General: Colonel J.C. Hoad

Chief of Intelligence: Major W.T. Bridges

Chief of Ordnance: Major and Hon. Lieut.-Col. H. Le Mesurier

Finance Member: J.A. Thompson

1906

Minister: Senator T. Playford

Deputy Adjutant-General: Colonel J.C. Hoad

Chief of Intelligence: Major W.T. Bridges

Chief of Ordnance: Major and Hon. Lieut.-Col. H. Le Mesurier

Finance Member: J.A. Thompson

1907

Minister: T.T. Ewing

Deputy Adjutant-General: Colonel E.T. Wallack

Chief of Intelligence: Colonel W.T. Bridges

Chief of Ordnance: Colonel J. Stanley

Finance Member: J.A. Thompson

1908

Minister: T.T. Ewing

Deputy Adjutant-General: Colonel E.T. Wallack

Chief of Intelligence: Colonel W.T. Bridges

Chief of Ordnance: Lieut.-Col. J.W. Parnell

Finance Member: J.A. Thompson

1909

Minister:	J. Cook
Chief of the General Staff:	Major-General J.C. Hoad
Adjutant-General:	Colonel E.T. Wallack
Quartermaster-General:	Major J.G. Legge
Chief of Ordnance:	Lieut.-Col. J.W. Parnell
Finance Member:	J.A. Thompson
Civil Member:	Commander S.A. Pethebridge

1910

Minister:	Senator G.F. Pearce
Chief of the General Staff:	Major-General J.C. Hoad
Adjutant-General:	Colonel E.T. Wallack
Quartermaster-General:	Lieut.-Col. J.G. Legge
Chief of Ordnance:	Lieut.-Col. R. Wallace
Finance Member:	J.B. Laing
Civil Member:	Commander S.A. Pethebridge

1911

Minister:	Senator G.F. Pearce
Chief of the General Staff:	Lieut.-Col. F.A. Wilson (Acting)
Adjutant-General:	Lieut.-Col. H. Chauvel
Quartermaster-General:	Lieut.-Col. J.G. Legge
Chief of Ordnance:	Colonel R. Wallace
Finance Member:	J.B. Laing

1912

Minister:	Senator G.F. Pearce
Chief of the General Staff:	Major F.A. Wilson (Acting)
Adjutant-General:	Lieut.-Col. H. Chauvel
Quartermaster-General:	Lieut.-Col. J.G. Legge
Chief of Ordnance:	Colonel R. Wallace
Finance Member:	J.B. Laing

1913

Minister:	Senator G.F. Pearce
Chief of the General Staff:	Brigadier-General J.M. Gordon
Adjutant-General:	Lieut.-Col. H. Chauvel
Quartermaster-General:	Lieut.-Col. V.C. Sellheim
Chief of Ordnance:	Colonel R. Wallace
Finance Member:	J.B. Laing

1914

Minister:	Senator E.D. Millen
Chief of the General Staff:	Colonel J.G. Legge
Adjutant-General:	Colonel V.C. Sellheim
Quartermaster-General:	Lieut.-Col. J.K. Forsyth
Chief of Ordnance:	Lieut.-Col. H.W. Dangar
Finance Member:	J.B. Laing

1915

Minister:	Senator G.F. Pearce
Chief of the General Staff:	Colonel J.G. Legge
Adjutant-General:	Colonel V.C. Sellheim
Quartermaster-General:	Lieut.-Col. J.K. Forsyth
Chief of Ordnance:	Lieut.-Col. H.W. Dangar
Finance Member:	Lieut.-Col. T.J. Thomas

1916

Minister: Senator G.F. Pearce

Chief of the General Staff: Colonel H.J. Foster

Adjutant-General: Colonel V.C.M. Sellheim

Colonel T.H. Dodds (temp.)

Quartermaster-General: Lieut.-Col. J.K. Forsyth (temp.)

Chief of Ordnance: Brevet Colonel H.W. Dangar

Finance Member: Lieut.-Col. T.J. Thomas

1917

Minister: Senator G.F. Pearce

Chief of the General Staff: Major-General J.G. Legge and Colonel H. Foster (temp.)

Adjutant-General: Colonel V.C. Sellheim

Quartermaster-General: Colonel J. Stanley

Chief of Ordnance: Brevet Colonel H.W. Dangar

Finance Member: Colonel T.J. Thomas

1918

Minister: Senator G.F. Pearce

Chief of the General Staff: Major-General J.G. Legge

Adjutant-General: Colonel V.C. Sellheim

Chief of Ordnance: Brevet Colonel H.W. Dangar

Civil Member: G. Swinburne

APPENDIX G

CHIEFS OF THE AUSTRALIAN GENERAL STAFF

1909	Colonel W.T. Bridges
1909-1911	Major-General J.C. Hoad
1911-1912	Lieut.-Colonel F.A. Wilson
1912-1914	Brigadier-General J.M. Gordon
1914-1915	Colonel J.G. Legge
1915	Colonel G.G.H. Irving (temporary)
1916-1917	Colonel H.J. Foster (temporary)
1917-1920	Major-General J.G. Legge

APPENDIX H

SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR WAR, 1900-1924

1900 Nov. 12	Rt Hon. W. St John Brodrick
1903 Oct. 12	Rt Hon. H.O. Arnold Forster
1905 Dec. 11	Rt Hon. R.B. Haldane (afterwards Viscount Haldane of Cloan)
1912 June 14	Col. the Rt Hon. J.E.B. Seely, D.S.O.
1914 Mar. 31	Rt Hon. H.H. Asquith (afterwards Earl of Oxford and Asquith)
1914 Aug. 6	Field Marshal the Rt Hon. Horatio Herbert, Earl Kitchener of Khartoum
1916 July 7	Rt Hon. D. Lloyd George
1916 Dec. 11	Rt Hon. Edward G. Villiers, Earl of Derby
1918 Apr. 20	Rt Hon. Alfred, Viscount Milner
1919 Jan. 14	Rt Hon. W.C. Spencer-Churchill
1921 Feb. 14	Rt Hon. Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, Bt

Source: War Office List, 1900-1922

APPENDIX I

CHIEFS OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF

1904	Lieut.-General Sir N.G. Lyttelton
1905	General Sir W.G. Nicholson
1912	General Sir J. French
1914	General Sir C. Douglas
1915	Lieut.-General Sir A. Murray
	Lieut.-General Sir W. Robertson
1918	Lieut.-General H. Wilson
1922	General the Earl of Cavan

Source: War Office List, 1903-1925

APPENDIX J

TABLE SHOWING ENLISTMENTS PER MONTH FROM EACH STATE

	Q'ld.	N.S.W.	Vic.	S.A.	W.A.	Tas.	Total
1914							
August	1,481		6,326	2,012		981	
		20,761			4,096		
September	1,556	Figures by months not	2,929	921	Figures by months not	487	
October	1,386	available	2,512	493	available	167	52,561
November	673		1,366	658		163	
December	1,054		1,714	728		97	
1915							
January	1,937	3,969	2,478	1,364	206	271	10,225
February	1,248	4,108	2,013	594	142	265	8,370
March	1,248	3,957	2,041	658	1,018	185	8,913
April	772	3,482	1,201	360	208	227	6,250
May	1,069	5,654	1,735	1,062	689	317	10,526
June	1,267	5,279	3,381	1,394	806	378	12,505
July	2,197	8,961	21,698	1,453	1,485	781	36,575
August	3,013	12,991	3,983	2,705	1,903	1,119	25,714
September	3,569	6,911	2,331	1,651	1,385	724	16,571
October	2,417	3,797	1,531	1,020	785	364	9,914
November	2,017	5,880	1,429	607	961	336	11,230
December	1,943	4,364	1,291	729	642	150	9,119

APPENDIX J Cont'd.

	Q'ld.	N.S.W.	Vic.	S.A.	W.A.	Tas.	Total
1916							
January	3,886	8,753	5,043	1,981	1,933	505	22,101
February	2,835	4,240	7,536	1,386	1,978	533	18,508
March	2,059	4,230	5,585	1,011	1,743	879	15,507
April	1,600	3,218	2,571	890	1,078	519	9,876
May	1,404	4,187	2,887	870	910	398	10,659
June	1,083	2,275	1,581	430	872	341	6,582
July	864	2,405	1,302	469	872	258	6,170
August	744	2,780	1,247	690	604	280	6,345
September	1,719	3,195	2,331	1,009	661	410	9,325
October	2,238	3,656	2,481	938	1,195	1,012	11,520
November	911	2,039	750	182	738	435	5,055
December	402	1,100	564	187	261	103	2,617
1917							
January	716	1,858	1,048	353	448	116	4,575
February	703	1,657	1,499	502	393	170	4,924
March	728	1,842	1,159	505	582	173	4,989
April	636	1,927	1,014	406	527	136	4,646
May	587	1,746	1,139	401	548	155	4,576
June	452	1,459	888	358	422	100	3,679
July	461	1,906	960	379	354	95	4,155
August	518	1,123	879	415	208	131	3,274

	Q'ld.	N.S.W.	Vic.	S.A.	W.A.	Tas.	Total
1917 cont'd.							
September	312	1,026	619	278	141	84	2,460
October	326	1,092	771	251	172	149	2,761
November	300	1,349	704	234	101	127	2,815
December	326	918	610	216	93	84	2,247
1918							
January	283	932	730	134	148	117	2,344
February	265	753	534	159	108	99	1,918
March	169	613	457	142	56	81	1,518
April	269	1,501	624	206	68	113	2,781
May	432	2,614	1,206	405	119	112	4,888
June	294	1,374	459	212	80	121	2,540
July	295	1,260	800	179	87	120	2,741
August	325	1,467	688	203	106	170	2,959
September	289	1,122	644	176	96	124	2,451
October	458	1,707	902	288	137	127	3,019
November	163	502	192	105	66	96	1,124
Totals	57,705	164,030	112,399	34,959	32,231	15,485	416,809

Source: E. Scott, The Official History of Australia in World War I, vol. XI, Australia During the War (Sydney, 1939), pp. 871-872.

APPENDIX K

DUTIES OF HEADQUARTERS, COMMONWEALTH SECTION IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF

Organisation and Duties of the Commonwealth Section

14. The Commonwealth Section of the Imperial General Staff should comprise -

(a) The Headquarters Section

(b) The General Staff in Districts

It is considered that the Headquarters Section should in the first instance consist of two Directorates, which would assist the Chief of the Commonwealth Section of the Imperial General Staff in the details of his responsible duties. The suggested nomenclature for these Directorates is -

(1) Defence Organisation Directorate

(2) Military Training Directorate

18. An establishment for these is suggested in Appendix B while the duties to be allotted to the Headquarters Section are given below -

Chief of Imperial General Staff

(Commonwealth Section)

Organisation of war. Plans of concentration of war

Intelligence concerning the Commonwealth. Preparation and maintenance of Defence Scheme. Training and instruction. Supervision and inspection of training at camps, manoeuvres. Education, examination and promotion of officers. Recommendation for appointment to and promotion of officers

of Commonwealth Section of Imperial General Staff. Appointments to and supervision of work of the Instructional Staff.

Field operations and promulgation of operation orders. Schemes for manoeuvres and staff rides. Drill books and training manuals.

General Staff libraries. Preparation of maps.

Advice upon raising and disbanding of units. Censorship in time of war.

Director of Defence Organisation .

Organisation and plans of concentration for war. Defence Schemes for the Commonwealth. Intelligence, strategical and tactical reconnaissances. Preparation and issue of maps. Headquarters library.

Director of Military Training

Training and instruction of all arms. Education and examination for promotion of officers. Arrangement of classes of instruction. Conduct of examination of officers for Staff College, and for appointment to Permanent Forces. Allotment and supervision of the Instructional Staff.

Schemes for manoeuvres and staff rides. Drill books and training manuals. Advice upon the acquisition of training grounds and ranges. Advice upon the allotment of funds for training and manoeuvres.

Source: AA MP 84, file no. 1894/5/59.

APPENDIX L

Part I

TOTAL ENLISTMENTS INCLUSIVE OF NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPEDITIONARY FOCE TO PACIFIC

Naval	Military	Total
3,856	412,953	416,809

A.I.F. EMBARKATIONS FROM AUSTRALIA BY RELIGIONS

Church of England	Presbyterian	Roman Catholic	Methodist	Jews	Other Denominations	Total
162,774	49,631	63,705	33,706	1,214	20,751	331,781

EMBARKATIONS FROM AUSTRALIA ACCORDING TO PLACES OF BIRTH

Vic.	N.S.W.	Q'ld.	S.A.	W.A.	Tas.	U.K.	New Zealand	Other British Countries	Foreign Countries	Total
92,553	88,250	28,253	27,761	8,042	13,104	64,221	4,214	2,246	3,137	331,781

ENLISTMENTS IN THE AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE ACCORDING TO STATES TO 1/9/18

N.S.W.	Vic.	Q'ld.	S.A.	W.A.	Tas.	Total
161,821	111,305	57,084	34,566	32,028	15,262	412,066

EMBARKATIONS FROM AUSTRALIA BY ARMS

Infantry	210,981
Machine Guns	4,476
Tunnellers	3,970
Artillery	23,887
A.A.M.C.	12,945
A.A.S.C.	9,735
Engineers	9,950
Light Horse	30,365
Veterinary	378
Flying Corps	2,275
Wireless	434
Cyclists	570
Trench Mortars	1,218
Chaplains	386
Transport Officers	531
A.A.N.S.	2,054
General Reinforcements	15,071
Miscellaneous Arms returned to Australia	2,555
TOTAL	331,781

Source: Australian Imperial Forces, 1914-1920, Data, Published by Military Historical Society of Australia, A.C.T. Branch, 1972

Part II

LIST OF IMPORTANT BATTLES IN WHICH THE A.I.F. FOUGHT

EXCLUDING THE CAMPAIGNS IN PALESTONE

1915

The Landing at Anzac, 25 April
Kaba Tepe, 4 May
Helles, 8 May
Turkish Attack on Anzac, 19 May
The Sorties, 4 and 29 June
Quinn's Post, 2, 9, 13 and 29 May and other dates
Turkish Attack at the Nek, 29 June
Leane's Trench, 31 July and 6 August
Lone Pine and the Nek, 6 to 10 August
The night attack and fighting on Sari, 6 to 10 August
Hill 60, 21, 22 and 27 August
The Evacuation, 18 and 20 December

1916

Fromelles, 19 July
Posieres, 22 July to August
Mouquet Fram, 14 August, 5 September
Flers, 4 and 16 November
The Somme Winter, October 1916 to February 1917

1917

Stormy Trench, 1 to 22 February
Le Barque, Thilloy and Sunray Trench, 25 February to 2 March
Malt Trench, 25 February to 2 March
Advance through Grevillers, 13 March, and Bapaume, 17 March
Beaumetz, 21 to 25 March
Lagnicourt, 26 March
Doignes and Loureral, 2 April
Boursies, Demicourt and Hermies, 9 April
Bullecourt, 11 April
German attack through Lagnicourt, 15 April

1917 (cont.)

Bullecourt, 3 to 23 May

Messines, 7 June

Third Battle of Ypres (Australian Artly with British from 31 July)

The Windmill, 31 July

The Menin Road, 20 September

Polygon Wood, Zonnebeke, 26 September

Broodescinde, 4 October

The First Battle of Passchendaele, 9 October

The Second Battle of Passchendaele, November

1918

Dernancourt, 27 March to 5 April

Morlancourt, 27 March to end of July

Defence of Villers Bretonneux, 4 April

Action before Hazebrouck, 13 to 17 April, and Strazeele

Counter attack at Villers Bretonneux, 24 and 25 April

Monument Wood (Villers Bretonneux), 3 May

Ville-Sur-Ancre (6th Brigade), 19 May

Hamel, 4 July

Patrol actions before Merris and Meteren, 11 July and other dates

Taking of Merris (10th Brigade), 12.15 a.m., 13 July

The Offensive before Amiens, 8 August

Vauvillers, 9 August

Lihons, 9, 10 and 11 August

Action near Ethinhem (13th Brigade). Two attacks:-

(a) Village, night, 10/11 August;

(b) Spur, night, 12/13 August

First attack on Provart (37th Battalion), 12 August

Battles of Bray, 22 August and later

Battle of Proyart and Herleville, 23 August

Battle of Barleux, 29 September

Battle of Clery (10th Brigade), night, 29/30 August

Mont St Quentin, 31 August and 1 and 2 September

Peronne, 1 and 2 September

Action near Templeux, 10 September

Battle of Hindenburg Outpost Line, Le Verquier Hargicourt

Joancourt, 18 September

1918 (cont.)

Battle of Hindenburg Line, 29 and 30 September
Battle of Beauvoir Line, 3 October
Mont Brabain, 5 October
Battle of Bohain, 8 October, Australian Artly with Americans
Battle of Landrecies, 4 November, Australian Artly with Americans

Part III

CAMPAIGNS WHICH THE A.I.F. FOUGHT IN PALESTINE AND SYRIA

OPERATIONS IN SINAI

From 22 April 1916 to 9 January 1917 including:	ROMANI	4 - 9 Aug. 1916
	Occupation of EL ARISH	21 Dec. 1916
	MAGDHARA	23 Dec. 1916
	RAFA	9 Jan. 1917
Operations in neighbourhood of GAZA	26 and 27 March 1917	
	19 April 1917	

OPERATIONS IN PALESTINE

includng capture of:	BEERSHEBA	31 Oct. 1917
	KHUWEILFEH	1-3 Nov. 1917
	SHERIA	7 Nov. 1917
	HUJ	8 Nov. 1917
	JUNCTION STATION	13 & 14 Nov. 1917
	AYUN KARA	14 Nov. 1917
	RAMLEH	16 Nov. 1917
	LUDD	16 Nov. 1917
	JAFFA	16 Nov. 1917
	NAHR EL AUJA	24 & 25 Nov. 1917
	JERUSALEM	9 Dec. 1917
Occupation of the JORDAN VALLEY from 2 April 1918 to 23 Sept. 1918 including:	CAPTURE OF JERICHO	21 Feb. 1918
	THORANIYEH	11 April 1918
	ABU TELLUL	14 July 1918
Operations in MOAB HILLS	Raid on HEDJAZ Railway at AMMAN	21 March - 2 April 1918
	ES SALT Raid	30 April - 4 May 1918

OPERATIONS IN SYRIA

by Aust. Mounted Division including:	Battle of SHARON	19 Sept. 1918
	Battle of MOUNT EPHRAIM	19-20 Sept. 1918
And actions at:	TULKERAM	19 Sept. 1918
	JENNON	20 Sept. 1918
	SEMAKH	25 Sept. 1918
	TIBERIAS	25 Sept. 1918
	JISR BENAT YAKUB	27 Sept. 1918

OPERATIONS IN SYRIA cont.

And actions at:	SASA	29/30 Sept. 1918
	KAUKAB	30 Sept. 1918
	CAPTURE OF DAMASCUS	1 Oct. 1918
	CAPTURE OF BAALBEK	13 Oct. 1918
	CAPTURE OF HOMS	16 Oct. 1918
	" " ALEPPO	26 Oct. 1918

Operations in JORDAN VALLEY and JOAB HILLS by Aust. and New Zealand Mounted Division including capture of:	JISR ED DAMIEH	22 Sept. 1918
	ES SALT	23 Sept. 1918
	AMMAN	25 Sept. 1918

Source: Australian Imperial Forces, 1914-1920, Data, published by Military Historical Society of Australia, A.C.T. Branch, 1972

APPENDIX M

The basic items of clothing worn by the Australian infantrymen during the 1914-1918 War were:

1) A uniform tunic known as the 'jacket service dress' worn with khaki cord breeches.

2) A soft grey flannel shirt without collar.

3) Underclothes consisting of a vest and drawers. These were regarded as a major rampart against skin disease.

4) Puttees which covered the leg from ankle to knee with a spiral of woollen cloth, commencing from the inner side of the ankle, and winding forward and upward.

5) Pair of tan ankle-boots.

6) Pair of socks, either woollen or cotton.

7) Khaki woollen greatcoat, the soldier's chief protection against cold and wet, and often his only bedding.

8) The khaki felt slouch hat.

THE UNIFORM

The following comments apply only to the Australian Service Dress uniform which was issued to all ranks of the A.I.F., was the uniform most widely worn, and was distinctively Australia.

The khaki Service Dress tunic was made from Australian wool and was devised as a result of consultations between medical and physiological advisers and officers of the Department of Defence. It provided the soldier with a garment which was comfortable, serviceable, and hygienic. Unlike the British Army tunic the Australian issue was loose fitting, to allow circulation of air. At the back it was pleated to provide a double thickness of cloth down the spine. It had two pockets on the chest, two larger ones in the skirt and another on the inside to hold the first-field-dressing packet.

The tunic buttoned at the neck and wrists and had a stand-and-fall collar. Regimental buttons were not worn. Buttons were made of a plastic like composition, leather, or oxidised copper. The latter bore a design featuring a crown above the map of Australia with the words, 'Australian Military Forces'.

The Service Dress jacket was worn with khaki cord breeches of riding pattern. There was a little difference between the breeches worn by infantry and those worn by

mounted troops. Breeches were laced below the knees, and worn with either woollen puttees or leather leggings. During the 1939-45 War the Australian tunic was retained but the breeches were replaced by trousers which were more practical for dismounted troops.

The main weakness of the uniform adopted for the A.I.F. was the puttees, widely worn by many armies during the 1914-18 War. Soldiers considered them awkward and restrictive, and they bound the legs too tightly and prevented proper circulation of blood. They are considered to have largely contributed to the cause of a complaint known as 'Trench Foot'. Mounted troops wore leather leggings instead.

For footwear the Australian soldier wore well-made tan ankle boots. The pattern of boots was criticised early in the war and the design was altered. Finally the Australian soldier considered his boots to be the equal of any worn on the Western Front.

HEAD-WEAR

The most distinctive article of clothing worn by the Australian soldier was the khaki felt slouch hat. This item of head-wear had been worn in Australia for some years before the turn of the century and was also popular elsewhere in the world. A similar hat was worn by the New Zealanders, the Canadians, the U.S. Army, the Gurkhas, and even the colonial German troops during the 1914-18 War, but it is the Australians with which it will probably always be most strongly identified.

The slouch hat was first adopted in Australia by Colonel Tom Price in 1885 as the head dress for the Victorian Mounted Rifles regiment which he commanded. Originally it was worn looped up on the right-hand side. The hat was widely worn by Australian troops during the Boer War, and in 1903 after Federation it was universally adopted for the Australian Commonwealth Army. During the 1914-18 War, the slouch hat was normally worn with a plain khaki hat band and the Australian General Service ('Rising Sun') badge on the looped up (left) side, and with a leather chin-strap.

Source: Royal Commission on Navy and Defence Administration, CPP, 1917-19, vol. IV, p. 179, C of A, Parliamentary Papers.

APPENDIX N

DESCRIPTION OF THE STAFF SYSTEM

Development progressed on two related levels: staff officers working with the regiments in the field, and a central organization on the General Staff level. As armies increased in size the commanding general could no longer deal directly with all the principal administration. Staff officers therefore became essential, handling the problems of supply organization, transmission of orders, manpower returns and general administration. On a higher level, staff officers would help prepare operational plans and could join with the commander in decision-making: the office of Chief of Staff became increasingly important. *Scharnhorst* reorganized the Institution for the Young Officers, Berlin, a military school founded in 1763 by Frederick the Great; this establishment was reopened in May 1810 as the 'Allgemeine Kriegschule' (General War School). *Clausewitz* was one of the lecturers. With common instruction, doctrines and outlook, the staff officers could be dispersed throughout the Army to provide continuity of policy. Thus the period 1813-15 saw a number of effective partnerships in the Prussian Army between chiefs of staff and their respective commanders: *Blücher* was ably assisted by Scharnhorst and then *Gneisenau*: the military reformer Hermann von Boyen worked with General Frederick von *Bülow*; Clausewitz acted as Chief of Staff to General Walmoden and then General Thielmann. Napoleon also had a Chief of Staff, with this position filled by Louis Alexandre

Berthier 1808-14 and by *Soult* in 1815, but the French leader used this officer more as a secretary than a partner. *Wellington* also took insufficient advantage of the opportunities offered: his staff work was shared amongst a Military Secretary, the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General. The Prussians continued to lead development: Helmuth von *Moltke* (Moltke the Elder) was responsible for increasing the prestige of the Chief of General Staff after he assumed this office in 1857. He trained staff officers in his own image, selecting 12 special pupils a year from the Berlin War Academy and supervising their instruction with ruthless efficiency. After training, they were dispatched to various parts of the Army; the resulting cohesion played a major part in Moltke's success in the *Franco-Prussian War*. Britain and America still hesitated to follow Prussia's example. Improvements were, however, introduced on the lower regimental or army corps level. In England, the Staff College was established at Camberley in 1858, based on the Royal Military College which had existed at Farnham since the beginning of the century. The Russian equivalent was the Nicholas General Staff Academy, St Petersburg; France's St Cyr college, founded in 1648, was gradually modernized. Developments in America followed the reorganization by *Root*: the War College was formally instituted in 1901 and the General Staff was created by the Dick Act of 1903. The creation of a high-level British General Staff came after the recommendations of the *Esher* Committee, January 1904. The post of Chief of the

General Staff - Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) after 1907 - was established; at the same time the old post of Commander-in-Chief of the Army, traditionally closely linked to the monarch, was abolished, the last incumbent being *Roberts*. The Second World War saw the dramatic growth in importance of the British *Chiefs of Staff* Committee and the US *Joint Chiefs of Staff*.

Source: R. Parkinson, Encyclopedia of Modern War (London, 1977), pp. 155-156.

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The preparation of the thesis encountered a major problem in gaining access to the Minutes of the Military Board for the period 1905-1918. It took two years to transfer the Minutes from the Department of Defence (Central) to the Australian Archives. I would like to thank the Australian Archives for supporting my application to gain access to the Military Board Minutes, and to transfer them to the Archives for use by civilian researchers.

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D. Interviews

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