Coalition Unionism: 

Exploring how and when coalitions contribute to union renewal in Sydney, Toronto and Chicago

By Amanda Tattersall

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Declaration

I declare that the work contained in this thesis is the result of original research and has not been submitted for a higher degree at any other university institution.

Signed: ..............................................
Date:    20-11-07
For Charles, my soul mate.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACORN</td>
<td>Association for Community Organisations for Reform Now</td>
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<td>ACTU</td>
<td>Australian Council of Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSCME</td>
<td>American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (United States)</td>
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<td>AEU</td>
<td>Australian Education Union</td>
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<td>ALP</td>
<td>Australian Labor Party</td>
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<td>BHC</td>
<td>Brampton Health Coalition</td>
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<td>BPNC</td>
<td>Brighton Park Neighbourhood Council</td>
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<td>CAW</td>
<td>Canadian Auto Workers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFL</td>
<td>Chicago Federation of Labor</td>
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<td>CCH</td>
<td>Chicago Coalition for the Homeless</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Council of Canadians</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions (South Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DET</td>
<td>Department of Education and Training (NSW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOSCO</td>
<td>Federation of School Community Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHC</td>
<td>Illinois Hunger Coalition</td>
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IRC  NSW Industrial Relations Commission
GTA  Greater Toronto Area
KHC  Kingston Health Coalition
LINS  Local Health Integration Networks
MPP  Member of Provincial Parliament (Canada)
NDP  New Democratic Party (Canada)
NHC  Niagara Health Coalition
NGOs  Non-Government Organisations
NLRB  National Labor Relations Board (United States)
NSW  New South Wales
NSWTF  New South Wales Teachers Federation (Australia)
OFL  Ontario Federation of Labour (central labour council for the Province of Ontario, Canada)
OCHU-CUPE  Ontario Council of Hospital Unions (CUPE) (Canada)
OHC  Ontario Health Coalition
OPSEU  Ontario Public Sector Employees Union, Canada
OCSC  Ontario Coalition of Senior Citizens
ONA  Ontario Nurses Association
P3  Public-private-partnerships
P&C  Federation of Parents and Citizens (Australia)
PEA  Public Education Alliance
PPA  Primary Principals Association
PSPF  Primary School Principals Forum
SEIU  Service Employees International Union
SPC  Secondary Principals Council
UFCW  United Food and Commercial Workers (United States)
ULU  United Labor Union (United States)
US  United States
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Abstract

Coalition unionism occurs when unions and community organisations form coalitions. This study develops three frameworks to improve analysis of coalition unionism. The purpose is to sharpen scholarly approaches, and to focus attention on how coalitions relate to union practice.

The approach builds from a new definition of community as organisations, common interest/identity and place. This definition underpins the three frameworks developed. The first framework identifies three elements of coalition unionism that determine coalition success – inter-organisational relationships, common concern and scale. These elements also categorise three models of coalition unionism: agenda-driven coalition unionism, relationship-driven coalition unionism and mobilising coalition unionism. The second framework identifies three types of collaborative union power that make unions more powerful – relational collaborative power, class movement power, and place-based power. The third framework identifies opportunities and choices that suggest when a union is likely to engage in a coalition. Coalition success is defined by achieving outcomes, supporting a change in the political climate, sustaining relationships between organisations and increasing the capacity of participating organisations.

These frameworks are explored through three case studies of long-term coalitions located in Sydney, Toronto and Chicago – three global cities, operating within liberal market economies. The Sydney-based Public Education Coalition is an example of agenda-driven coalition unionism, where strong common
concern and scale combine with weak inter-organisational relationships to produce a union-dominated coalition that achieved significant policy outcomes, political climate change and member engagement while struggling to sustain organisational relationships. Most successfully, it enhanced the class movement power of the New South Wales Teachers Federation by increasing the political awareness of its membership and its ability to set an agenda. The Toronto-based Ontario Health Coalition is an example of relationship-driven coalition unionism, where strong inter-organisational relationships and scale produced an independent coalition structure that sustained long-term relationships and drove two major canvassing campaigns with a strong volunteer base. When it shifted to an issue of mutual interest it also engaged the Canadian Union of Public Employees in a coalition relationship that enhanced its place-based power, increasing its campaigning and strategic capacity through learning from and with coalition partners. Chicago's Grassroots Collaborative is an example of mobilising coalition unionism, where strong inter-organisational relationships and common concern produced a trusting, accountable coalition managed by a coordinator. These relationships shifted the political climate in Chicago, facilitating an independent campaign by Service Employees International Union Local 880 that won collective bargaining rights and living wages for its homecare and childcare members, and the Grassroots Collaborative's campaign to require large retail stores to pay living wages in Chicago. The interdependence of these relationships provided the union with relational collaborative power, by increasing its available resources through strong relationships with community organisations.
The thesis builds a theory for understanding how coalition unionism is successful, and how and when coalitions contribute to union renewal by enhancing a union's collaborative power.
Chapter One

Introduction

Unions have always built relationships with other organisations and groups. Central labour councils, labour-management partnerships and labour parties all evolved alongside unions. There are numerous stories of unions joining forces with community organisations to advance shared interests. The 1930s Back of the Yards Neighbourhood Council in Chicago spread the new organising of the Congress of Industrial Organisation that spurred the New Deal. In the 1970s, alliances between resident action groups and the Builders Labour Federation in New South Wales, Australia, produced ‘Green Bans’ and gave birth to the first labour-environmental alliance. The Action Canada Coalition in the 1980s organised some of the first responses to economic liberalisation in the industrialised world, where unions and community organisations mobilised against a free trade agreement with the United States. Collaboration is one of many union strategies used to represent union members and improve their lives at work.

Union preferences for collaborative strategies shift, and the pressure for unions to collaborate with community organisations has intensified as the size and influence of unions has fallen. The decline in union density in English-speaking countries has been widely documented: the United States, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Australia have all experienced significant reductions in union membership (Peetz 1998; Fairbrother and Yates 2003; Frege and Kelly 2004a; Frege 2006). The magnitude of the decline varies between countries. In the United States, unions have fallen from representing 35% of the workforce in
1953 to representing 12% of employees in 2007; Australia has fallen from 61% in 1951 to 20% in 2006; and Canada has fallen less sharply from a high point of 37.2% in 1984 to 30% in 2006 (Peetz 1998; Visser 2003; Jackson 2006, pp. 381-2; ABS 2007; BLS 2007).

At the same time as union membership has been falling, capital has become increasingly mobile and more powerful. The trend of governments deregulating capital flows and privatising state infrastructure have been caused by, and have contributed to, a resurgence in the power of business (Streeck and Hassel 2003). Since the 1980s, Australian, Canadian and United States union negotiations have increasingly featured concession bargaining, where unions bargain for reduced wages and conditions in return for retaining employer recognition (Western 1995). Industrial relations has decentralised, where business strategies such as privatisation, outsourcing and enterprise-based employment regulation have reduced unions' ability to reduce wage competition amongst workers (Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986; Peetz 2006a). Additionally, labour parties have distanced themselves from unions, undermining the role of unions as representatives of working people, further constricting unions' political power (Wills 2002; Frege 2006, p. 233).

These shifts in the economic and political context have contributed to the breakdown in traditional institutional support for unions. Baccaro, Hamann and Turner argue that the challenges that unions now face in gaining employer recognition in the economic sphere have provoked unions to revitalise their internal operation and their external relationships, shifting from strategies that focus on 'the enterprise' to those that focus on 'the community', including the
practice of coalitions, to rebuild forms of institutional support (Baccaro, Hamann and Turner 2003, p. 121).

The purpose of this thesis is to identify a concrete framework for understanding what this study terms 'coalition unionism', the strategy of unions working in coalition with community organisations. It investigates if, how and when coalition unionism may rebuild union capacity and help unions achieve policy outcomes and a supportive political climate. This thesis explores coalition unionism through an international comparison of three case studies of long-term coalitions in Australia, Canada and the United States.

This study of coalitions makes theoretical and empirical contributions. For research on union renewal, the thesis develops a framework for analysing the success of coalitions, identifying common elements of coalitions. To do so, the thesis defines the relationship between terms such as community unionism and coalition unionism. It also embarks on an a reframing of existing theories of union collaborative power, suggesting how industrial relations scholarship can better understand the conditions under which union collaboration with community organisations may increase union power to win outcomes, shift the political climate, sustain relationships with other organisations and enhance member engage in union activity. Empirically, the thesis uses a qualitative, internationally comparative analysis of coalitions.

This study of coalitions seeks to contribute to the analysis of coalitions in union renewal literature. Scholarship on union renewal has increased in response to the decline in union density and influence and it now documents different strategies undertaken by unions to revitalise their structure, leadership,
membership, relationships and institutional support (Cooper 2001; Fairbrother and Yates 2003; Behrens, Hamann and Hurd 2004; Frege and Kelly 2004a; Kumar and Schenk 2006). In the early 1990s, an 'organising model' was proposed as the preferred strategy for renewing unionism (Conrow 1991), leading to programs of reorganisation in union movements across the United States, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (Heery, Simms, Delbridge et al. 2000; Cooper 2001; Carter and Cooper 2002). The organising model advocated that unions should focus on growth, through strategies that included strategic industry planning, organising outside of the workplace, member leadership development and internal restructuring of unions to shift staff organising time from servicing and grievance handling to new member organising (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998; Cooper 2001).

However, preferred strategies varied and there was some resistance to the organising model. Debates developed, dividing scholarship and practice into two broad streams (Wills and Simms 2004, p. 59). On the one hand, unions were encouraged to renew the 'movement' features of unions. Thus, the term 'social movement unionism' included strategies such as rank and file mobilisation, coalition building, political action, new member organising and union education (Bronfenbrenner, Freidman, Hurd et al. 1998; Kelly 1998; Nissen 2003; Behrens, Hamann and Hurd 2004; Milkman and Voss 2004). Conversely, there was a focus on rebuilding institutional support for unions – labelled 'social partnership' and including improving legal avenues for recognition, labour-management partnerships and political relationships (Baccaro, Hamann and Turner 2003). Yet as Hurd, Milkman and Turner argue, these strategies are connected. For instance, social movement unionism strategies have often developed where institutional support was weak, with the aim of building a
movement to institutionalise gains for workers through legislation and employer recognition (Hurd, Milkman and Turner 2003).

Amongst these strategies, coalition building was seen as a potential path for union renewal. Yet while the study of coalitions has increased since the early 1990s, there remains a conceptual ambiguity about what makes coalitions work. Indeed, the question of how coalitions rebuild the ability of unions to win outcomes or increase union power was underdeveloped. Union rhetoric may embrace the concept of coalitions with phrases such as 'solidarity forever', yet the process of building and sustaining long-term organisational relationships has proved much more of a challenge.

Since the 1980s, coalitions between unions and community organisations have become a feature of union renewal debates in the United States (Nissen 2004b). Early scholarship focused on the local coalitions that emerged in response to the decline of manufacturing and plant closures (Haines and Klein 1982; Craypo and Nissen 1993; Nissen 1995). In 1990, Brecher and Costello’s Building Bridges documented both coalition practice and theory (Brecher and Costello 1990a), soon followed by several editions of Labor Research Review, which published some of the first practitioner reflections on coalition experience (Banks 1992; Dean 1996; Sneiderman 1996; Nissen 2004b).

United States coalition research and practice accelerated after the ascendancy of John Sweeney at the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organisation (AFL-CIO) in 1995, and the rise of the Union Cities program that advocated for the mainstreaming of coalition practice as a part of the role of central labour councils (Nissen 1999; Kriesky 2001; Ness and Eimer 2001;
Milkman and Voss 2004; Reynolds 2004b; Reynolds and Ness 2004). Similarly, the Service Employees International Union’s Justice for Janitors campaign strengthened the potential usefulness of coalitions for unions by showing how community organisations could provide support for organising new members (Savage 1998). In the United States, the development of national movements around living wages (Reynolds and Kern 2002; Fine 2004; Luce 2005), and unusual alliances such as those between environmentalists and labour have sustained interest in coalitions amongst academics and practitioners alike (Rose 2000; Obach 2004; Turner 2006).

While the largest contribution to coalition research comes from the United States, scholarship on coalitions developed in other industrialised countries from the mid-1990s. In Australia in the 1990s, concern for coalitions increased in parallel to debates on union renewal (ACTU 1999; Cutcher 2004; Heery and Frege 2006). Contributions, mainly from outside the US, have introduced labour geography coalitions research (cf Herod 1998; Jonas 1998; Savage 1998; Lopez 2004). For instance, Tufts documented how the fixed location of tourism allowed hotel workers to build coalitions in Canada (Tufts 1998). Ellem and Rainnie led analysis on successful community relationships in regional towns in Australia (Ellem 2003; Ellem and Shields 2004; Rainnie and Drummond forthcoming; Rainnie and Ellem forthcoming). Wills’s work on The East London Community Organisation (TELCO) and London Citizens also connected coalition practice to the importance of place (Wills 2003; Wills 2004).

Although coalitions have become a mainstream focus of union renewal scholarship, their role is contested. At one end, the potential of coalitions is seen as broad. Turner argues that social movement unionism and union renewal can
be understood by the presence or absence of coalition practice (Turner 2001; Baccaro, Hamann and Turner 2003, p. 122; Hurd, Milkman and Turner 2003, p. 106; Frege, Heery and Turner 2004). Conversely, there is a more modest analysis of coalitions. Bronfenbrenner and Juavich see coalitions as one tactic in a union renewal toolbox called comprehensive campaigning (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998, p. 21; Jarley 2005).

While a consensus about the importance of coalitions has developed, the contribution that coalitions actually make to union renewal remains little understood. Moreover, coalition scholarship has lacked descriptive typologies that can interpret coalition practice and explain when it is likely to be successful. While Heery, Frege and Turner (2004) and Obach (2004) each produce different coalition frameworks, these theories are ideal types. They do not identify common variables that are similar to all coalition practices that describe how and when coalitions are likely to be successful or support unions.

This thesis seeks to redress these gaps. This study aims to develop a theory of how and when coalitions between unions and community organisations are successful in a climate where coalition practice is increasingly common. The thesis seeks to clarify some of the concepts used in coalition scholarship and practice. Coalitions are described in many different ways. The term 'community' is frequently invoked, where coalitions are seen as a method for building 'community support'. Coalitions are also described as an example of 'community unionism' (Banks 1992; Tufts 1998). Yet the terms community and community unionism are not concretely defined in industrial relations or union renewal research. This thesis develops working definitions of these terms in order to explain their relationship to coalition unionism and union practice.
This study also seeks to contribute to the discipline of industrial relations by reframing the discipline's approach to union collaborative power. Most scholars who examine the issue at all assume that coalitions are a useful strategy for unions, rather than demonstrate that they are useful. Chapter Three and the case studies rethink traditional industrial relations scholarship, which often isolates unions as 'special actors' rather than emphasising how union relationships with community organisations may build union power and potentially change unions themselves. The present approach uses the multi-disciplinary nature of industrial relations, by applying insights from labour geography and social movement theory (Hyman 1994). This rethinking of union collaborative power, as Kelly (1998) encourages, seeks to understand how union power operates in order to explore how it can be enhanced.

Empirically, this thesis brings an international and comparative dimension to research on coalition unionism. Comparative studies on coalition unionism are all too rare in industrial relations scholarship. With the noteworthy exception of Turner and Cornfield's Labor in the New Urban Battlegrounds, internationally comparative study of coalition practice has been limited (Turner and Cornfield 2007). When international comparison does occur, it tends to compare across the Atlantic rather than between the similar liberal market economies of Australia, Canada and the United States (Hall and Soskice 2001; Frege and Kelly 2004b; Turner and Cornfield 2007). Yet it is in these three nations - amongst liberal market economies - that coalitions between unions and community organisations are most widely apparent. Additionally, coalitions in these three

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1 Frege, Heery and Turner (2004) do build a framework of coalitions based on five countries, but their study does not document cross-national case studies.
countries are significantly diverse, providing a rich site for comparison. Coalitions in the United States were born of crisis, whereas the longer history of social justice coalition work in Canada has a strong contemporary tradition of coalitions beyond wages and conditions issues (Bleyer 1992; Maioni 1998). In Australia, coalition unionism has often flourished in regional areas, (Ellem 2003; Markey and Nixon 2004), as well as shifting to issues beyond union and workplace concerns (Tattersall 2006a; Tattersall forthcoming a).

To help control for difference born of location, the thesis selects three global cities within these countries. International comparison enables an exploration of whether and how national political and regulatory differences dialectically affect the agency of coalitions, while also identifying common features of coalition strategy that operate across national boundaries. It also allows the thesis to contribute to the global cities literature, by exploring if and how coalitions can help redress the inequality of global cities (Sassen 1994; Fainstein 2001).

The research presented in this thesis explores coalition unionism as a particular strategy within the broad debates around union renewal, union collaboration and community unionism. It fills a theoretical and analytical gap between the prevalence of coalition unionism and an understanding of how that work can support union renewal and create successful coalitions. Furthermore, in investigating coalitions, the methodology provides a new way to build frameworks that can help evaluate if, when and how coalition unionism is likely to enhance union power.
To analyse coalition unionism, this study addresses three interrelated questions:

1. How and when is coalition unionism successful?
2. How and why does coalition unionism increase a union's power?
3. When is an individual union likely to engage in coalition unionism?

To answer these questions, this thesis develops three frameworks for understanding coalitions. These frameworks are conceptually grounded in a new approach to community outlined in Chapter Two, where community is defined as organisations, common interest or identity and place. The study builds an understanding of coalition unionism as a specific form of community unionism. However, my focus is not simply to define concepts such as community unionism, but to establish an analytical foundation for the narrower term – coalition unionism – around which the contribution of coalitions to unions can be explored.

The first framework uses this definition of community to establish three elements of coalitions. Chapter Two argues that these three elements define how coalitions vary and produce coalition success. The elements of inter-organisational relationships, common concern and scale are described as key analytical components of all coalitions. The three coalition elements are explored against four benchmarks of coalition success. This study's approach to coalition success allows for an investigation of the concepts of 'power' and 'capacity'. In this thesis, the terms power and capacity are understood through a four-part framework of coalition success. Coalition success is defined, firstly, as achieving outcomes, such as winning or resisting policy decisions by government or
bargaining outcomes against an employer. Secondly, success is understood as a shift in the political climate, where coalition activity produces attitudinal or political change that makes future coalition campaigning easier. Thirdly, coalition success is understood as sustaining relationships between unions and community organisations. Finally, coalition success is understood as increasing the capacity of participating organisations, where coalitions not only support external outcomes but enhance the ability of unions and community organisations to win outcomes in the future.

Additionally, the study argues that combinations of these elements present three 'coalition models' that describe different but common types of coalition practice. Following Hyman’s analysis of union identity that builds three ideal types of union identity out of the concepts of market, class and society (Hyman 2001), this study presents three models of long-term coalition unionism. Firstly, agenda-driven coalition unionism, which has strong common concern and scale, with weak inter-organisational relationships; secondly, relationship-driven coalition unionism, which has strong inter-organisational relationships and scale, with weak common concern; and thirdly, mobilising coalition unionism, which has strong common concern and inter-organisational relationship, with weak scale. The usefulness of these coalition elements and models is explored in the case studies.

The second framework, outlined in Chapter Three, considers how and why coalition unionism may increase a union’s power. It narrows the discussion of coalition success to focus on unions in particular and argues that coalitions between unions and community organisations potentially offer unions three sources of collaborative power. Firstly, coalitions can provide a relational
collaborative power, where unions increase their capacity to win outcomes by sharing power with community organisations through sustained relationships. Secondly, coalitions can provide unions with class movement collaborative power, which increases the class consciousness of union members and the capacity of unions to set an agenda. Thirdly, coalitions can provide unions with place-based power, which increases the capacity of unions by teaching leaders new ways of organising, and enhancing the campaigning skills of union members.

The third framework is also outlined in Chapter Three, and considers when unions are likely to engage in long-term coalition unionism. It explores how unions develop strategies like coalitions in response to the dialectics of opportunity and choice. It examines the role of opportunities such as political and economic context, union identity and existing organisational characteristics, as well as the process of union choice such as the role of issue selection, who decides to collaborate and how that decision activates the internal scale of the union.

This thesis tests a hypothesis that coalition unionism under certain circumstances produces successful coalitions and enhances union collaborative power. The three case studies are located in three global cities in liberal market economies to provide a similar contextual setting for comparison, in order to draw out common features about coalition practice. The case studies focus on three long-term coalitions, and their relationships with one key public sector union. The choice of public sector unions was in part driven by practical necessity – the vast majority of long-term, reciprocal coalitions in industrialised nations operate in the public sector rather than the private sector. It is not surprising that longer-
term coalitions have developed in the public sector, as there is a logical common interest between public service users and workers, and state services have been a key target of contemporary policies such as privatisation (Johnston 1994; Tattersall 2006a) In choosing similar public sector unions, the case studies control for union diversity, enhancing the focus on the dynamics of union and coalition strategies, how they interrelate, affect and change each other. The conclusion of each case study does however draw on published case studies of private sector coalition unionism in order to demonstrate how coalition strategies may have a broader potential in the private sector, and how common interests can be found beyond the public sector.

The aim of this study is to develop a theoretical framework for understanding how coalition unionism is a useful strategy for union renewal, by demonstrating how coalitions enhance the ability of unions to achieve victories and increase their internal capacity. The research seeks to refine academic understandings of this practice, to create a concrete framework for understanding coalitions and the usefulness of union collaborative strategies.

This thesis is structured into nine chapters,

Chapter One is the Introduction

Chapter Two uses the term ‘community’ to define the terms community unionism and coalition unionism. It analyses and categorises the literature on coalitions into three coalition elements – inter-organisational relationships, common concern and scale – and corresponding measures that shape coalition success. It also identifies three different models of long-term coalitions.
Chapter Three reviews and reframes the literature on union collaboration with community organisations, exploring its relational, movement and geographic dimensions. It then assesses when unions are likely to engage in collaboration with community organisations, considering the opportunities and choices that make coalition unionism likely. The conclusion brings together the frameworks set out in Chapters Two and Three.

Chapter Four outlines the methodological approach, including the choice of liberal market economies and global cities. It explains why this approach chose to select three case studies and what they seek to compare.

Chapter Five documents the first case study, the Public Education Coalition, based in Sydney, Australia. It is an example of agenda-driven coalition unionism involving the New South Wales Teachers Federation (NSWTF). The study examines the coalitions from 2001 till 2004.

Chapter Six explores the second case study focused on the Ontario Health Coalition (OHC), based in Toronto, Canada. It is an example of relationship-driven coalition unionism and focuses on the involvement of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) (the OHC featured seven unions in total). The study examines the activities of the coalition from 2001 to 2006.

Chapter Seven investigates the third case study focused on the Grassroots Collaborative, based in Chicago, United States. It is an example of mobilising coalition unionism and focuses on and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 880. The study examines coalition practice from 2002 to 2006.
Chapter Eight uses the theoretical frameworks established in Chapter Three to interpret my findings, through a comparative review of the cases taken together.

Chapter Nine is the conclusion, which explores how the findings in this study have implications for research approaches to union renewal, global cities, and union strategy and practice in a time of union crisis.
Chapter Two
Community and Coalition Unionism

The concept of coalition unionism is based on the idea that union relationships with community organisations build successful campaigns and successful unions. This chapter builds a framework that seeks to understand how and why this may occur, with the aim of building a conceptual foundation for the term coalition unionism. It begins with a term more commonly associated with coalitions in the literature – community unionism. The chapter firstly defines the term ‘community’, and then uses it to define ‘community unionism’ and ‘coalition unionism’. Then, it analyse literature on union renewal, social movement theory and labour geography to build a framework to help explain how and when coalition unionism is successful. The chapter identifies the elements and measures that describe how coalition unionism can create successful coalitions that support union renewal. These processes are then explored through the case studies.

This chapter begins with the term community because, though problematic, it is the more commonly used phrase to categorise coalitions. Since the 1990s, the term labour-community coalitions has been used to describe coalitions in the literature (Brecher and Costello 1990a; Nissen 1995; Nissen 2004a). Alternatively, the term community unionism is sometimes used to refer to coalitions between unions and community organisations (Banks 1992, p. 324; Tufts 1998; Cutcher 2004; Tattersall 2006a).
1.0 What is Community?

Community is a troublesome 'keyword' of sociology. It is almost always invoked positively, a panacea for social ills, conjuring up ideas of generalised public support (Williams 1976; Tattersall 2005).

Union practice and scholarship fall victim to this definitional ambiguity. Community is often used as a populist silver bullet that can magically enhance the power of unions. The term has recently flourished amongst union renewal writers, invoked in concepts such as union-community coalitions, community unionism and social movement unionism. The term community is also used to describe a variety of strategies and practices beyond coalitions. For instance, community is used to identify an alternative space for union organising beyond the enterprise (Baccaro, Hamann and Turner 2003; Fine 2003). In a different vein, community is used to describe a space for union action beyond wages and conditions, where a union's purpose is broadened to include so-called community issues such as health care, education and social justice (Gindin 1995, pp. 197, 266; Robinson 2000a). Community is also used to describe a complex array of social networks, whether based on place, identity, culture or common feeling (Crow and Allen 1994; Massey 1994; Patmore 1994; Thornwaite 1997; Wills and Simms 2004).

The multi-purposed use of the term community has not served union renewal literature well. As Moody observes, community is a vague concept (Moody 1990). There are few attempts in industrial relations literature to define or reconcile these interpretations of the term community (cf Taksa 2000). Consequently, community has no fixed or settled meaning in the literature. This
has led to significant debate about the meaning of the term community unionism itself (ACREW 2006; Cranford, Das Gupta, Ladd et al. 2006; McBride and Greenwood 2006; Unions NSW 2006; Tattersall 2006a; McBride and Greenwood forthcoming).

Although there are competing uses for the term community, it is possible to isolate three different meanings across the union renewal literature: community as organisation, common interest/identity or place (Tattersall 2006a).

Firstly and most commonly, the term community is used to substitute for the phrase (community) organisation. This slippage is built into the term labour-community coalition to describe joint action between unions and community organisations (Craft 1990; Brecher and Costello 1990a; Patmore 1997; Estabrook, Siqueira and Paes Machado 2000). The concept of organisation is important. Community organisations vary in type, issue and membership, which affects the success of any relationship between a community organisation and a union. Unfortunately, the nostalgic, positive connotations of community often brush over how community organisations differ from one another and whether or not they are likely to be supportive of or hostile to unions (Macintyre 1980; Williams 1976; Taksa 2000).

Secondly, community is frequently used to describe people who have a set of common interests or identities, such as a religious community or a community of women (Heckscher 1988; Taksa 2000, p. 11). Fine defines community unions as community-based organisations of low wage workers, where the term community underscores the importance of common identities such as race, ethnicity and gender as a principal means of recruitment and solidarity (Fine
2005a, p. 155). Similarly, Cranford and Ladd (2003) use the term community to describe organising strategies amongst precarious workers with marginalised identities (see also Needleman 1998b; Milkman 2000; Cranford, Das Gupta, Ladd et al. 2006). Conversely, Gindin (1995), Eisenscher (1999) and Cornfield and Hudson (1998) use the term community to describe the common class interests of workers beyond the workplace, to include issues such as housing and health care (Fitzgerald 1991; Taksa 2000). Using community in this way emphasises the subjective, tactile, personal, and potentially transformative role of community as a set of bonds created over shared values.

Thirdly, community is used to describe a place, such as a local neighbourhood or village (Williams 1976; Miles 1989; Wial 1993; Patmore 1994). Labour geographers use this definition to emphasise the role of geography in understanding social and economic relations (Massey 1984; Herod 1998; Savage 1998; Ellem 2003). Some geographers link the term ‘place’ to locality and the local scale (Peck 1996; Jonas 1998; Wills 2002; Fine 2005a). For instance, Agnew argues that place refers to physical location, the physical area for everyday life and the locus of identity (Agnew 1987). Others consider how place constitutes and is constituted by the relationships within and around it, and consider place as interpenetrated by multiple scales (Massey 1993; Herod 1997, p. 155; Hudson 2001; Sadler and Fagan 2004; Ellem 2005).

These three alternative meanings of community allow us to understand community’s multiple dynamics. Combining the concepts of organisation, common identity/interest and place as intertwined and connected opens the way for a richer analysis. While the concept of community is used in three different ways, in practice, community operates as the combination of each of these
different meanings. Thus, these three definitions of community are not mutually exclusive; they are reinforcing and connected. Understanding community in this way helps us to understand community unionism.

Figure 2.1: Three interpretations of community

2.0 What is Community Unionism?

Given that the term community is used by union renewal writers to describe organisation, common interest/identity and place, then one way of conceiving of community unionism is as a descriptive term that refers to the broad set of strategies that interconnect unions with organisations, common interest/identity and place (Tattersall 2006e). This approach tries to settle the term community unionism, which has a long and cross-purposed history.

The term was coined by O'Connor in 1964 (O'Connor 1964a; O'Connor 1964b). It was soon appropriated by the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) as part of their commitment to build an 'interracial movement of the poor' (Frost 2001). The SDS's Economic Research Action Project between 1964 and 1967 aimed to organise the urban poor through geographic communities as opposed to
workplaces (Frost 2001, pp. 1, 27, 37). They called several of their community organising projects ‘community unions’ (O'Connor 1964a; Frost 2001, p. 46). The United Auto Workers in the US also adopted the term community union. They defined community unions as a strategy for organising the urban poor, piloting organising projects such as the Watts Labor Community Action Council (Fine 2003, p. 308).

These organising programs were inspired by the social movements of the 1960s. Community-based worker organising surged with Chavez’s farm worker strikes (Frost 2001; Fine 2005a), which also inspired a ‘new kind of unionism’ organised by the civil rights movement (Flug 1990, p. 328; Frost 2001, p. 46; Korstad 2003). The civil rights experiments organised workers by focusing on issues such as housing, a common African-American identity and ‘community’ support through consumer boycotts and protest (quoted in Flug 1990p. 329).

These experiments in community unions were weakened by tense relationships with labour (Bok and Dunlop 1970, p. 342; Flug 1990). Furthermore, the ‘localness’ of community unions may have opened them to individual participation, but it left a large membership base out of reach and confined their political influence to the local scale (Fine 2003).

The terminology of community unionism re-emerged in 1992 in a different context and a radically new form, at a time when US labour fortunes were in decline. Banks, a former SDS activist, used the term community unionism to argue for alliances to help meet labour’s challenge for renewal (Banks 1992). Similarly, Tufts defined coalitions that acted with mutuality and reciprocity as community unionism (Tufts 1998). This interpretation of community unionism
became common in Australia (Lipsig-Mumme 2003; Cutcher 2004; Tattersall 2004; Tattersall 2006a).

Labour geographers also adapted the term community unionism, with the aim of 'drawing together' the literature on alliances with an understanding of labour geography (Ellem 2003, p. 424). For Wills, Ellem and Rainnie, community unionism is a form of unionism that combines union alliances with community organisations and union work with 'local communities' to achieve social change (Ellem 2003p. 426-7; Rainnie and Ellem forthcoming). Their focus on geography emphasises a place-based approach to community unionism. However, Ellem emphasises that it is multi-scaled activity – action-at the local as well as at a national and international scale – that shapes how community unionism can rebuild union power (Ellem and Shields 2004; Ellem 2005).

In the late 1990s in the US, the term community unionism was again used to describe community-based organising strategies by community organisations or unions. Fine argued that unlike craft or industrial unions, community unions focused on common ethnic, gender and place identities of workers to recruit and build commitment (Fine 1998; Fine 2003; Fine 2004; Fine 2005a; Fine 2005b). Similar to Fine's work, a definition of community unionism developed in Canada and Japan (Black 2005), where community-based organisations that organised workers on the periphery of state regulation were labelled community unions (Cranford and Ladd 2003, p. 46; Urano and Stewart 2005).

The term community unionism is now applied concurrently to alliances, organising strategies based on place and identity and union strategies to re-exert strategic control over place. These interpretations are often seen as distinct, and
there is some debate over which interpretation of community unionism is more 'correct' (Black 2005). This discussion of community unionism parallels the definitions of community, where definitions are also contested.

Yet this research has shown that there is an interconnection among the three different strategies of alliances, organising and place in the practice of and analysis of community unionism. Bringing together the scholarship on community unionism and the above definition of community, community unionism can be defined as an all-encompassing descriptive term that includes three specific, different types of organising strategies:

- Coalitions between unions and community organisations (relating to community as organisation)
- Organising workers on the basis of identity (relating to community as common identity/interest)
- Place-based union strategies (relating to community as place).

Firstly, then, community unionism describes when unions reach out to other organisations and form coalitions; what I call coalition unionism (Banks 1992; Tufts 1998; Lipsig-Mumme 2003). This is community unionism as the interconnection between unions and community organisations.

Secondly, community unionism also refers to an organising strategy, when unions or community organisations seek to organise workers on the basis of their common identity or interests. This may include organising women or immigrants (Cranford and Ladd 2003; Fine 2003; Cranford, Das Gupta, Ladd et al. 2006). Community unionism may also refer to Gindin’s suggestion that unions should campaign on issues beyond the workplace (Gindin 1995). This
community-based form of workplace organising is community unionism as the interconnection between unions and common interest/identity.

Thirdly, community unionism encompasses place-based strategies, such as the desire for unions to act globally or locally (Ellem 2003). Community unionism thus describes the local organising practices of some mining unions (Ellem 2003). It also describes city-scaled strategies, such as the AFL-CIO's Union Cities program that sought to improve the ability of union movements to collectively shape the local environment for unionisation (Colburn 2004; Ellem and Shields 2004; Reynolds and Ness 2004; Wills and Simms 2004; Rhee and Sadler 2007). Community unionism may also describe the desire for unions to go global and increase their ability to act across the global community (Tattersall 2007b).

Figure 2.2: Defining community unionism

Coalition Unionism

Community-based Workplace Organising

Place-based Organising Strategies

This conceptualisation of community unionism is distinct from the different definitions of the term in current use. Yet, this approach does not seek to contradict the specific interpretations of community unionism in existing literature, but rather to organise them. A fixed and more certain definition of community unionism allows us to evaluate a more pressing question for this
thesis – what are the dynamics of one form of community unionism – coalition unionism?

2.1 Coalition unionism
Within the broad definition of community unionism sits the more specific strategy of coalition unionism. This study uses the term coalition unionism to refer to a specific type of coalition – coalitions between unions and community organisations. While it is hoped that this thesis can contribute to analysis of community unionism broadly, the narrow focus of the empirical research is on coalition unionism as a specific example of community unionism.

The term community can be used to identify key elements of coalitions, to categorise how coalitions vary and understand when they may be successful. Coalition unionism has three distinct elements:

- Inter-organisational relationships
- Common concern
- Scale.

The first element of coalition unionism derives from the ‘organisation’ definition of community and refers to a coalition’s inter-organisational relationships. The second element of coalition unionism is that these relationships are based on the existence of a common concern, derived from the definition of community as either common interest or identity. The third element of coalition unionism is scale, and derives from the dialectical relationship that coalitions have with the external world.
These elements describe the practice of all coalitions. Firstly, coalitions are about organisations coming together. Necessarily all coalitions will be defined by the ways in which they seek to structure how the organisations relate to each other, whether through formal meetings or one-off exchanges.

Secondly, coalitions are about organisations coming together over something they agree on – a common concern. Coalitions come together around different concerns, from a short-term concern for a rally to a long-term project such as health care reform.

Finally, coalitions operate at particular geographic scales. Scale refers to a particular geographic level, such as the local or the national (Brenner 2001). Because coalitions seek to shape the decisions of employers or politicians, they are organised and take action at different scales in order to contest, construct and shape decision-making processes (Agnew 1987; Jonas 1998).
These elements are not only descriptive. They are used to categorise the scholarship on coalition unionism, and to explore how current literature understands the operation, variation and success of coalition unionism.

For the purpose of this thesis, an investigation of coalition unionism requires an investigation of two distinct areas of scholarship. Firstly, it considers the literature that analyses coalitions as a joint strategy between unions and community organisations. The rest of this chapter investigates scholarship on how and why coalitions are likely to be successful, and on finding measures that might indicate success. Secondly, in order to investigate how coalitions can contribute to union renewal, this study analyses literature on union collaboration specifically. The analysis of unions is in Chapter Three.

To explore when and how coalitions are likely to be successful requires a definition of what success actually means. This study uses four criteria to describe coalition success: two external variables and two internal variables.

Success can be defined by external outcomes – if a policy victory is achieved. Yet simply relying on outcomes as a measure of success is ahistorical and abstracted from the goals of coalition participants. Organisations are historical entities, and their campaigns, struggles and activity not only achieve discrete outcomes but affect the broader political climate. A coalition’s activities may not win a specific victory, but they may make winning future victories easier. Thus, my understanding of success includes two external criteria – whether outcomes are achieved and whether the political climate is changed by coalition action (Fine 2003).
However, reducing coalitions to external events disguises an understanding of the mechanisms by which coalitions can build strong organisations, strong relationships and sustainable power over the long term (Levesque and Murray 2002; Fine 2003). After all, if achieving a political victory reduces the internal capacity of an organisation (for instance, by reducing the number of union members), it would be misleading to call that coalition successful based simply on external criteria, as the coalition has reduced the ability of its participating organisations to achieve victories in the future. Thus success is defined not only to mean achieving outcomes but also in terms of building sustainable and powerful relationships and organisations. Consequently, the literature review considers how and when coalition unionism is likely to produce successful campaigns in this broader sense; the elements are broken down by how they potentially contribute to these four separate criteria.

The next three sections undertake a literature review of coalition unionism with the purpose of establishing measures for successful coalition unionism practice. There are two major weaknesses in the current scholarship that require a robust examination. There is a tendency in coalition scholarship to describe current coalition practice rather than evaluate that practice. For instance, scholars often identify the importance of ‘long-term coalitions’ or describe who participates in different labour-community coalitions without analysing how long-term coalitions are created or if the type of organisational involvement varies coalition success. There is also a tendency to choose case studies that exemplify best practice in an attempt to stimulate better existing coalition practice, rather than conceptualising the key variables of coalitions and how they affect success. The literature is empirically focused and lacks a comprehensive analytical framework. This means that there is a dearth of explanatory measures or
frameworks to help us understand when, why and how coalition practice is successful.

The literature review responds to these gaps by developing categories of coalition unionism using the three elements of coalition unionism noted above, and identifies measures that shape the dynamics of coalition unionism. It begins with a discussion of the inter-organisational relationships that support successful coalition unionism. Secondly, it analyses the content of coalitions – conceptualised as the common concern of a coalition (Brecher and Costello 1990a). Finally, it considers how coalition success relates to scale.

3.0 Inter-organisational Relationships

Coalitions are defined by their structure. How organisations choose to engage with each other is often a ‘measure of their persistence’ (Rose 2000, p. 31). This section reviews the literature on how coalition success relates to four measures of inter-organisational relationships: firstly, the capacity and commitment of the participating organisations, secondly, the structure of the coalition, third the type of decision making, and finally, the organisational culture and role of bridge builders in coalition unionism.

3.1 Organisational capacity and commitment

Coalitions vary depending on the capacity and commitment of the participating unions and community organisations. Neither unions nor community organisations are homogenous. Yet the literature only deals in passing with differences between organisations. Coalitions are labelled differently, as in a
'labour-environmental alliance' or a 'labour-religious alliance', but it is uncommon for the resources or commitment of community organisations to be treated as a factor that influences coalition success (Craft 1990; Brecher and Costello 1990a; Scipes 1991; Robinson 2000a; Reynolds 2004b). 2

Organisational capacity is multi-dimensional. As noted in the definition of coalition success, organisational capacity refers to an organisation's resources. These may refer to the organisation's membership, such as the number of members, the willingness of members or delegates to take action, member and delegate skills. It may also refer to an organisation's financial resources or the quality of its external relationships. Organisational capacity varies depending on an organisation's goals, how it achieves those goals and its structure. An organisation's purpose and its range of interests, what Obach refers to as 'organisational range', shape whether an organisation is likely to engage in a coalition (Obach 2004). Obach argues the broader an organisation's range or vision, the more likely that an organisation will establish a common interest with other organisations and form coalitions (Obach 2004, p. 53).

Secondly, organisational capacity is defined by how an organisation works to fulfil its goals. This may include whether an organisation recruits members, provides services, speaks in the media or lobbies. Fine and Cranford compare organisations based on whether they practise 'community organising' (Cranford and Ladd 2003; Fine 2003; Cranford, Das Gupta, Ladd et al. 2006). Community organising is a complex measure of capacity that focuses on the quality of an organisation's membership. It considers the extent to which members take

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2 Chapter Three considers how questions of commitment and capacity relate to unions.
collective action, what issues they take action on and the education and training processes used to develop rank and file leaders (Cranford and Ladd 2003; Fine 2003). The degree to which an organisation practises community organising affects its capacity to mobilise in support of coalition goals (Nissen 2000).

Thirdly, organisational capacity refers to an organisation's structure. There are four relevant organisational structural attributes that affect capacity, including leadership, history of coalition practice, external relationships and sources of funding. Firstly, leaders play a key role in selecting issues, choosing to commit to coalitions and engage members in particular campaigns (Lee 1990; Rose 2000, p. 136; Obach 2004). Leadership is especially critical for community organisations, because as Rose notes, many value-based organisations have a fluid membership structure which vests power and authority in the leadership (Rose 2000, pp. 58-9). Secondly, if an organisation has a history of coalition relationships, it is more likely to engage in them in the future, as coalitions are a familiar 'repertoire of contention' for the organisation (Tarrow 1994; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Thirdly, external relationships may also be a part of an organisation's capacity, as supportive relationships outside of a coalition, with the state or other organisations, may be able to be mobilised by a coalition partner (Jonas 1998; Jarley 2005; Tattersall 2007b). Fourthly, the capacity of a community organisation also depends on its sources of funding. Community organisations can be funded by membership dues, the state or foundation grants, each of which shapes organisational capacity (Fine 2005b). Membership dues provide an independent funding source while potentially providing limited resources. State funding often makes campaigns against the state difficult.

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3 A repertoire of contention are common forms of activity, for a union this may mean industrial action.
Foundation funding can narrow community organisation activity to external criteria rather than membership concerns (Gottlieb 1993; Fine 2005b).

For the purposes of international comparison, community organisation capacity is important because the types of community organisations vary greatly between countries. Even within the relatively similar liberal market economies of the USA, Australia and Canada, community organisations have different historical traditions in terms of community organising style, funding sources and membership bases. In the USA there is a history of 'community organising' following the practices of Saul Alinsky, with a variety of large, member-based organisations which assist community members to mobilise and take direct action in defence of community interests (Alinsky 1971; Delgado 1986; Osterman 2002; Obach 2004). These organisations are often funded through membership dues, and supplemented by foundation funding. Consequently the US has a large number of voluntary membership-based organisations, with relatively high levels of participation (Tocqueville 1990; Putnam 2000). At the opposite extreme, community organisations in Australia receive most of their funding from the state (Hamilton and Maddison 2007). While many Australian community organisations were formed through political movements (such as the women's movement), they tend to have a small membership base. Their work is advocacy and client service-focused rather than built around direct action. Canada sits in between, with strong service and advocacy organisations for women, seniors, immigrant groups and national identity (Council of Canadians), who have also engaged in social movements around fair trade and left nationalism (Bleyer 1992; Panitch and Swartz 2003).
Successful coalition practice requires an organisation's capacity to be made available to a coalition through organisational commitment. Organisational commitment occurs as a consequence of interest connection and structural ownership; it is a product of coalition success. However, there are two distinct features.

Firstly, union commitment is considered a critical element of successful coalition practice. Nissen and Obach argue that because unions are resource rich, gaining and maintaining their commitment to a coalition is vital for success (Nissen 2000; Obach 2004). Union commitment is important because of unions' independent financial base through membership dues, their relatively large membership size and their relatively large number of strong external relationships (Fine 2003; Nissen 2003; Obach 2004).

Secondly, there is also a series of generic measures for organisational commitment. Organisational commitment is evidenced by the seniority of officers sent to coalition meetings, the level of resource commitment and the existence of dedicated 'contact points' — people in union or community organisations who are a point of contact for a coalition (Nissen 2000; Krinsky and Resse 2006).

### 3.2 The structure of the coalition

Coalitions vary according to the degree of formality in the structure of the relationships between their organisational participants. This structure is shaped by the organisations that form the coalition, whether a formal decision-making structure exists and the degree of organisational ownership across the coalition.
A coalition's structure is influenced by the initiating party, particularly in short-term relationships (Tattersall 2005). Fine argues coalitions are either union-initiated or community organisation-initiated, and that coalition formation shapes the structure of organisational relationships, participation and decision making (Fine 2003; Fine 2005a). While union domination is a commonly cited problem in coalition practice (Sciacchitano 1998; Eisenscher 1999a), the examples cited tend to be short-term, single issue coalitions rather than long-term, mutual interest coalitions. Rather than seeing all coalitions as having fixed identities determined by their birth, coalitions can instead be seen as moving from single organisational dominance to more plural spaces for organisational participation (Frege, Heery and Turner 2004; Obach 2004; Tattersall 2005).

Unfortunately, there is limited examination of whether or how coalitions can overcome organisational dominance. Some of the early social movement unionism writers made vague suggestions that coalitions should be 'democratic and participatory' (Waterman 1991; Moody 1997). They documented the problem of union dominance but did not explain strategies for overcoming that dominance. This approach idealises the practices of social movement decision making as 'more correct' because social movements are more 'open' and less 'hierarchical' than the realities of formal decision making in unions (Lynd 1990; Hecksher and Palmer 1993; Lynd 1996; Waterman 1999). Moreover, romanticising best practice often disguises the realities of actual existing practice – where the ideals of equality and participatory democracy are modified by the realities of informal power and influence.
More concretely, it is suggested that coalition participation is shaped by the type of interest engagement in the coalition. Obach and Frege, Heery and Turner argue that common cause coalitions are more likely to share decision making than vanguard coalitions where the coalition issue is in the interests of a single party (Frege, Heery and Turner 2004; Obach 2004). Yet interest engagement is a transitory mechanism for a coalition structure. As the political economy changes, so do the issues that organisations prioritise. If coalition structure is reduced to organisational concerns, then the sustainability of relationships is contingent upon the issues and interests held in common.

Outside the coalition literature, Hyman makes a useful contribution to understanding coalition structure, suggesting that organisational solidarity is produced by two competing impulses. It is influenced, firstly, by organisational engagement in the coalition demands, what he calls a commitment to coalition 'unity', but secondly and simultaneously, it is influenced by whether the relationship is able to respect 'organisational autonomy' and the discrete needs of individual organisations (Hyman 1975; Hyman 1989).

Using Hyman, coalition relationships are more likely to be sustainable if they are structured to balance the dialectic of organisational autonomy and solidarity (Hyman 1975; Tattersall 2006a). For unions, this negotiated balance between coalition unity and organisational autonomy is crucial, because unions are accountable firstly to union members through internal decision-making structures as well as being accountable to joint coalition structures (Clawson 2003). Coalitions function best when they simultaneously recognise the constraints of organisational members in the context of decision making between organisations. Obach labels this tension the 'coalition contradiction', stressing
that organisational leaders sit within a tension between the causes they seek to campaign on and maintaining their organisation (Zald and Ash 1966; Zald and McCarthy 1980; Obach 2004, pp. 107, 129).

If a successful coalition structure is based on interdependence, then it may benefit from a centralisation of resources that supports the balancing of unity and organisational autonomy. Thus, it is suggested that locating staff in separate coalition offices may help balance interdependence by collectively sharing the burden for meeting planning and information sharing (Lipsig-Mumme 1998; Bobo, Kendall and Max 2001; Reynolds and Kern 2002; Fine 2003; Reynolds 2004a). By providing resources for coalition activities separate and above the participant organisations, these coalition offices signal a way for coalitions and participant organisations to flourish simultaneously.

Managing the tension between coalition unity and organisational autonomy may be easier if coalitions have a more limited, narrow organisational membership. A large number of organisational participants loosens a coalition's structure. As Bleyer suggests, a large number of partners can turn coalition consensus into decision making that reaches to the lowest common denominator solutions (Bleyer 1992). Coalition unity may be easier to negotiate when there is a smaller degree of organisational autonomy to negotiate and where the commitment of participating organisations is high. Consequently, a coalition might be most effective when the organisations at the table have a certain level of capacity and commitment, rather than simply inviting anyone who will come.

The pressures for a narrow number of organisational partners may also require a coalition to build supplementary external relationships with outside
organisations to maximise support. While a small number of committed organisations make a coalition structure manageable, it may be necessary to work with additional organisations to increase leverage and achieve outcomes. This may also be a useful way to build relationships with organisations that have a high degree of influence against a coalition's target, but which have conflicting values or goals with the coalition (Bobo, Kendall and Max 2001; Lofy 2005).

3.3 Types of decision making
Coalition relations are more likely to be sustained if organisational ownership is shared in coalition decision making. Ownership is most likely to be shared when the coalition collectively undertakes long-term planning, cultivates informal as well as formal relationships between partners and creates a space for reciprocity and learning between organisations. (Brecher and Costello 1990c; Banks 1992; Tuffs 1998; Reynolds and Kern 2002).

The sustainability of a coalition varies depending on whether decision making is shared or if it is dominated by one organisation. At one extreme, unions and community organisations can operate in ad hoc episodic relationships without establishing a formal decision-making structure. Here, the relationships are based on requests rather than joint meetings (Lipsig-Mumme 2003; Frege, Heery and Turner 2004, pp. 141-2). These 'ad hoc coalitions' are the most common form of union-community relationships. They can be tactically powerful, but are the least sustainable form of relationship (Tattersall 2007a). Ad hoc coalitions assist as a reactive form of leverage or support (Frege, Heery and Turner 2004), and they build relationships between organisations, creating familiarity that may lead to further solidarity (Hathaway and Meyer 1997; Tattersall 2005). Without a
space to share decision making, it is difficult for the parties to share control over the tactics and strategies pursued in coalition; these coalition forms remain dominated by the organisation — union or community — that initiated them (Fine 2003).

Relationships last longer if a formal decision-making process develops. Coalitions tend to operate with some form of consensus decision making, where the organisational participants are treated as equals, providing organisations a stake in decision making (Tuffs 1998, p. 232; Johnston 2000). If organisational ownership is not shared, then coalitions are less likely to build commitment to taking action. The alternative to consensus — majority votes — tends to institutionalise opposition (Tattersall 2007a).

Informal relationships and learning between organisations also enhance organisational ownership and coalition sustainability. The networks of individual relationships within a coalition are important for building trust between organisations (Chambers 2003). Individual relationships can create a learning environment that can help break down stereotypical assumptions and distrust between groups, and expose organisations to contrasting perspectives and structures (Richards 1990; Rose 1997, p. 184; Obach 2004).

Shared decision making breeds reciprocity and trust between coalition partners (Craft 1990; Tuffs 1998). Reciprocity is absent when the relationship is merely one-sided solidarity (Frege, Heery and Turner 2004). Reciprocity can take the form of a transactional exchange — a quid pro quo arrangement — where organisations mutually pledge solidarity because they know they will get something in return (Craft 1990, p. 153; Brecher, Costello and Smith 2000, p. 47;
of values and identities, and have open membership structures (Touraine 1981). In contrast, unions are seen as hierarchical and bureaucratic organisations based on interests. Fine notes that ideological, structural and cultural differences explain much of the conflict between worker centres and unions (Fine forthcoming). Rose argues that there is a fundamental class difference between unions and new social movements, suggesting that distinctive decision-making processes, membership structure and goals have their roots in the contrasting 'identities' of middle class and working class organisations (Rose 2000). Resource mobilisation theorists argue that organisations may prefer different types of action, what they call 'repertoires of contention', which may produce conflict over tactics in coalitions (Tilly 1978; Dreiling 1998).

Cultural differences between organisations need not be a permanent obstacle to coalition practice. Rose argues that organisational difference can be mitigated if there are informal ties between organisations through people who can help bridge cultural gaps (Rose 2000). People with experience in both unions and social movements can be cultural translators, or bridge builders, in coalitions (Rose 2000). Their cross-movement experience allows them to interpret organisational concerns across different cultural environments (Estabrook, Siqueira and Paes Machado 2000).

Rose suggests that if a coalition is faced with conflicts over cultural differences and is able to overcome them, then it is a sign of coalition strength. Coalitions provide organisations with the opportunity to learn about issues, values and strategies. Rose suggests that a combination of organisations with cultural differences can create hybrid organising strategies that can enhance the resources and success of a movement (Rose 2000, p. 196). He argues that coalitions that
bridge across diverse values are likely to develop a clearer vision of an alternative society (Rose 2000, p. 199). Obach calls these coalitions learning coalitions, arguing that they are examples of strong cultural interrelationships (Obach 2004).

3.5 Bringing the question of inter-organisational relationships together

A coalition’s inter-organisational relationships vary, depending on the capacity and commitment of the organisational partners, the structure of the relationships, its decision-making processes and its ability to manage cultural differences between organisations. These four measures contribute differently to coalition success in the ways in which they help a coalition win outcomes, support changes to the political climate, sustain relationships and build the capacity of participating organisations.

The capacity and commitment of coalition participants affects coalition success, at they shape the resources a coalition can deploy to achieve political outcomes against an employer or a government. If the participant organisations have members or external relationships they can mobilise, then the coalition’s campaign can be enhanced. The participation of high-capacity and high-commitment organisations in a coalition increases the likelihood that a coalition can be capable of changing the political climate as well as winning specific outcomes.

The structure of a coalition helps a coalition to sustain its relationships by allowing organisations to balance their coalition commitments with individual organisational needs. By balancing the dual needs of organisational unity and
autonomy, coalition relationships may be more likely to shape the political climate as well as win outcomes, as they can undertake longer-term strategic campaigns. Interdependence is assisted when a coalition commits resources to undertake collective work, such as hiring staff and a coalition office. Interdependence may be easier to establish if there is a narrow number of organisational parties. However, this narrowness may be complemented by the coalition also reaching out to a broader set of allies beyond the coalition. A broader range of coalition allies may increase the ability of a coalition to influence its targets.

Organisational ownership can be shared through practices such as formal structures, consensus decision making, informal relationships and the practice of reciprocity. In turn, sharing organisational ownership may increase the capacity of a coalition to win outcomes, as organisations are more likely to commit to a coalition’s campaigns if they have an ownership over them. It may also make coalition relationships more sustainable as the parties are treated equally and mutually benefit from reciprocity.

Coalitions must also overcome any cultural barriers between the organisational partners, particularly between unions and community organisations. This is vital for coalition relationships to be sustained in the long term. Overcoming cultural barriers may also help coalitions maximise their power by helping a diverse set of organisations with different types of resources to work together. This is most effectively done by either choosing similar partners or supporting bridge builders to translate across the different movement experiences.
These four measures of inter-organisational relationships are connected to the four different types of coalition success in Table 2.1 below. The correlations between success and the inter-organisational relationships are outlined so they can be examined in the case studies.

Table 2.1: Coalition success and inter-organisational relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Winning outcomes</th>
<th>Organisational capacity and commitment</th>
<th>The structure of the coalition</th>
<th>Forms of decision making</th>
<th>Organisational culture and bridge builders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does organisational capacity of coalition participants increase the ability of the coalition shift government?</td>
<td>Do external relationships beyond the coalition help a coalition make bridge builders?</td>
<td>Does joint planning increase coalition commitment?</td>
<td>Can a strategy for overcoming cultural differences help bring organisations with different types of power together?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supportive political climate</td>
<td>Can engaging strong organisations in coalitions change the climate as well as achieve outcomes?</td>
<td>Connection is not claimed in the literature</td>
<td>Connection is not claimed in the literature</td>
<td>Do bridge builders help a coalition change the political climate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustaining relationships</td>
<td>Connection is not claimed in the literature</td>
<td>How do coalition resources such as staff and offices help coalitions sustain relationships?</td>
<td>How does consensus decision making work in practice to sustain relationships?</td>
<td>How do bridge builders overcome conflict and translate difference?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building the capacity of participating organisations</td>
<td>Connection is not claimed in the literature</td>
<td>Connection is not claimed in the literature</td>
<td>Can coalitions generate learning across organisations?</td>
<td>Can bridge builders help organisations learn new practices?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While inter-organisational relationships highlight how the internal organisation of a coalition is critical to success, so do the types of issues that a coalition campaigns on. These are a coalition's common concern.

4.0 Common Concern

At the heart of coalition unionism is a bond of common concern between organisations (Craft 1990; Tuffs 1998; Tattersall 2005). This section explores three key measures of common concern – inter-organisational commitment, member commitment and public commitment. While all coalitions have a common goal or common concern, the type of concern held in common varies. Yet coalition scholarship commonly uses catch-all phrases such as common interest or common issue to describe the solidarity that exists between organisations in coalitions (Childs 1990; Brecher and Costello 1990a; Altemose and McCarty 2001; Fine 2003). These descriptions are limited because singular phrases such as 'common interest' inadvertently skim over possible variations in common concern, from basic and fleeting joint concern for an event, to a deeply shared set of common values.

However, common concern not only varies between coalitions, it varies within a coalition. It shapes a coalition's inter-organisational relationships, the degree of member commitment and participation and the social frame of a coalition. This section isolates these three measures of common concern in order to understand how the issue underpinning a coalition relationship affects coalition success.
4.1 Inter-organisational commitment

Coalition engagement is premised on organisational engagement. Coalitions vary depending on the narrowness or mutuality of interest in the coalition’s purpose that draws organisations into coalition work. Inter-organisational relationships develop when union or community organisation leaders, and/or their internal democratic processes, make a decision to work in coalition. This section discusses the different types of common concern, and then discusses how organisational relationships differ depending on whether the issue at the heart of the relationship is in the interests of, or valued by, of one or both of the partners.

While coalitions form when organisations share something in common, the type of common concern varies. Common concern is at its most episodic and fleeting in ad hoc coalitions where organisations come together to support an issue through a joint event or activity, such as information pickets or forums (Brecher and Costello 1990b; Russo 1996; Lipsig-Mumme 2003; Tattersall 2005).

Joint concern lasts longer when unions and community organisations come together to plan a campaign around an issue (Brecher and Costello 1990b). Coalitions may form around an issue that represents a shared threat or conversely around a more positive proactive issue-based agenda. A shared threat may be an easier base to form a short-term alliance, whereas a positive issue agenda once agreed upon may have the capacity to provide a longer-term relationship (Brecher and Costello 1990c; Rose 2000, p. 23). The breadth and interconnection of issues may be a measure of success. Reynolds for instance, suggests that if coalitions shift from single to multiple issues, this broader agenda may be more powerful (Reynolds 1999; Reynolds 2004a).
If an organisation has an interest in an issue, then it is likely to have a strong commitment to a coalition formed on that issue. Interest refers to the stake that an organisation has in an issue. If an organisation has an interest in a coalition’s strategy or goals, then it is more likely to support that coalition, because supporting that coalition also supports the organisation’s own needs (Childs 1990; Brecher and Costello 1990a).

An organisation’s commitment to a coalition is likely to be longer term, and strengthened, if the partners share values and a coalition is formed around an issue which they have an interest in. The Marxist tradition emphasises the importance of a common ideology for inter-organisational relationships, when that common ideology reflects shared class interests and values (Capasin and Yates 1997; Mantsios 1998; Estabrook, Siqueira and Paes Machado 2000). Carroll argues this type of coalition symbolises Gramsci’s counter-hegemonic historic bloc, where the working class in coalition with other class interests creates an alternative program for how society should be run, while agitating on specific issues (Carroll 1992). For Marxists, values are an extension of interest. As Moody argues, these values reach out ‘from the starting point of self-interest to embrace a broader, more inclusive class interest’ (Moody 1999, p. 113). In contrast, new social movement theory distinguishes values from interests in making a distinction between ‘old’ interest-based, class-based union movements and value-based ‘new’ social movements like environmentalism (Melucci 1980; Touraine 1981; Boggs 1986; Larana, Johnston and Gusfield 1994; Boggs 1995; Touraine 1995). They claim that there is an inherent tension between value-based new social movements and interest-based working class movements (Obach 2004, p. 121-2).
These different organisational expressions of solidarity come together in various combinations to create coalitions. There is some debate amongst the theorists as to the different combinations of common concern.

Some link the question of organisational self-interest to coalition formation. Fine identifies two types of coalitions: community-initiated, community dominated coalitions and union-initiated, union dominated coalitions, suggesting that coalitions are always dominated by one organisation's self-interest and issues (Fine 2003). Similarly, Obach proposes that a frequent coalition form is instrumental cooperation, where the pursuit of an organisation's core goals is directly enhanced and converges with the activity of a coalition, leading to domination (Rudy 2001; Obach 2004, p. 132).

Others suggest that a coalition that is based on mutual self-interest provides a way to combat and overcome organisational dominance. Frege, Heery and Turner use the term 'common cause coalitions' to describe the possibility of unions and community organisations working in coalition on separate but associated interests (Frege, Heery and Turner 2004).

Beyond mutual self-interest coalitions, Obach argues that compromise and learning can operate alongside mutual interest engagement. He uses the term compromise cooperation, where unions and community organisations agree to diverge from stated individual organisational agendas in order to accommodate the concerns of their potential partner (Obach 2004, p. 132-3). He speculates that deep, trusting relationships involve a process of enlightened engagement, where organisations open their self-interest to the perspectives of others, expanding
their issue range beyond their immediate self-interest (Rose 2000; Obach 2004). Similarly, Frege, Heery and Turner suggest there can be integrative coalitions, where unions take over non-union social objectives and accept them as their own (Frege, Heery and Turner 2004).

If organisations are likely to move away from their self-interest and embrace a broader communal indirect interest, it suggests that so-called 'integrative' or 'compromise' coalitions can involve the interconnection of interests and values. Indeed, several of the scholars who argue the merits of mutual interest coalitions suggest that a mutual interest relationship is strengthened if, in addition to an interest alignment, there is also a value alignment, as a value-based connection may overcome the potential instability which may arise if distinct interests shift over time (cf Rose 2000, p. 31; cf Frege, Heery and Turner 2004, p. 143).

As was noted, new and old social movements debate whether unions are driven by values in addition to interests. Several theorists have explored whether unions and community organisations are likely to work together on a combination of interests and values. Rose, while agreeing that there is a difference between the participants in new social movements and unions, argues that coalitions can work across interest and value-based movements (Rose 2000). More strongly, Burgmann argues that most so-called 'new social movements' consist of both working class and middle class activists (Burgmann and Burgmann 1998; Burgmann 2003). Moody and Carroll stress that 'class' is both an interest and value-based concept: while class position might create an objective 'class-in-itself' the idea of 'class-of-itself' encompasses material interest as well indirect, value-based social concerns (Thompson 1963; Carroll 1992; Thompson 1995; Moody 1997; Clawson 2003, p. 98). Similarly, Rose and Obach
suggest that successful coalitions embody a synthesis of interests and values which strengthen the common bonds between organisations (Obach 1999; Rose 2000; Obach 2004).

Thus coalitions vary depending on whether their common concern is based on issues, or a combination of issues, and organisational interest and values. This suggests that for organisations to have longer relationships, they need to have a stronger common concern (through a strong overlap of issues, interests and values in common). Without shared interests and values, as Bleyer argues, a large number of organisations coming together can end up producing a common concern which is merely an aggregation of group concern – a lowest common denominator rather than a multi-issue agenda (Bleyer 1992).

Different types of common concern, and the presence or absence of common values or interests also raises the issue of conflict within a coalition. Craft argues that conflict breaks down common interest (Craft 1990). Patmore emphasises that not all community organisations are potential allies for unions; irrevocable conflict over values may impede joint work on issues (Patmore 1994). Rose suggests strategies for dealing with conflict, for instance ‘agreeing to disagree’, where coalitions focus on the interests and issues that are common and overlook those that are in conflict (Rose 2000, pp. 135, 144). Estabrook et al optimistically suggest that conflict between organisations can be overcome through dialogue, mutual respect and understanding, thus suggesting that conflict does not necessarily break down a coalition, but the capacity to deal with conflict is a measure of the strength of a coalition's relationships (Estabrook, Siqueira and Paes Machado 2000). Obach and Rose also argue that organisations learn from their differences, and thus if a coalition can manage conflict through strong
internal practice, it may strengthen the learning between the organisations and so strengthen the coalition (Rose 2000, Obach 2004). The mutual presence of common values and interests may provide an incentive to sustain relationships, whereas an absence of common values beyond common interests or a common issue may make relationships more likely to end if conflict arises.

Reconciling interest and value alignment is a challenge. Instrumental concern may create the greatest level of organisational buy-in from a single organisation, but unless other organisations can also perceive a direct interest in the coalition, then it may not produce a powerful coalition as a whole. Similarly a 'compromise' coalition may strengthen the agenda of two organisations by broadening common concern and creating a strong agenda for change, or it may produce a lowest common denominator issue that reduces each organisation's commitment (Bleyer 1992, Obach 2004). An 'enlightened' coalition, if framed abstractly and formed rapidly, may fail to generate mass member participation, but if it is a culmination of a campaign that began at the level of interest and extended to values it may generate significant engagement (Moody 1997, Burgmann and Burgmann 1998, Obach 2004).

In stark contrast to Obach's concern for organisational autonomy, Clawson argues that the most effective form of common concern is when the concerns of both new social movements and union movements are fused into a joint agenda (Clawson 2003). He argues that joint action must develop to the point where the distinctions between these movements are abolished (Clawson 2003, p. 194). Fusion calls for more than just alliances, it seeks to join organisational agendas to the point that it is 'no longer clear what is a labour issue and what is a women's issue' (Clawson 2003, p. 194). In contrast to Obach, Clawson is focused on a
radical reformulation and widening of coalition issues where organisations internalise each other’s concerns, incorporating them into their culture and practice (Clawson 2003, p. 195).

There is a tension in this scholarship between the idea of coalition unity and organisational autonomy. Clawson, for instance, analyses the coalition as a whole and emphasises the importance of common cause and values, whereas Obach stresses organisational participation and emphasises organisational interest. Yet these two interpretations are not necessarily in opposition. Again we can refer to Hyman’s argument about union solidarity, that suggests sectionalism and solidarity are dialectic relations (Hyman 1975; Hyman 1989). The simultaneous presence of shared concern and sectional concern indicates the importance of organisational interdependence for understanding the mutuality in common concern. Interdependence suggests the importance of an organisation’s self-interest, while noting that the coalition’s operation is greater than the sum of its parts, potentially consisting of values as well as interest alignment. Levels of commitment are evident first through issue-based commitment, then value-based commitment, and finally and more strongly through the mutuality of value and interest-based commitment.

Thus, this thesis considers how the interrelationships of issue, interest and values vary the commitment of organisations and the bonds between coalition partners. It will consider how inter-organisational commitment influences the sustainability of coalition relationships, the capacity of participating organisations, and the ability for those relationships to achieve outcomes and changes in political climate.
4.2 *Member commitment*

A coalition’s common concern also affects the degree to which union and community organisation members commit to coalition activity. A common criticism of coalitions is that they often substitute cross-organisational relationships for deep, internal organisational engagement (Robinson 2000a; Clawson 2003). Both Robinson and Clawson argue that powerful social movement unionism is distinguished from social unionism or coalition practice by whether there is member engagement or not. These concerns echo a radical critique of coalitions that surfaced particularly in the US in the 1990s that stressed that rank and file members are the engine of coalition (and working class) power (Lynd 1990; Gapasin and Yates 1997; Moody 1997; Eisenscher 1999b). They argued that coalition success occurs when coalitions dialectically provide a space for developing member class consciousness (Waterman 1991; Moody 1997; Bernard 1998). This criticism echoed the union democracy debates in British industrial relations, where scholars debated the importance of member engagement in union decision making as a mark of union democracy (Flanders 1970). Yet a weakness of this analysis is that it categorises coalition practice simplistically, contrasting the ‘evils’ of leaders, bureaucracy and hierarchy and the panacea of democratic engagement (Tillman and Cummings 1999). It overstates the role of the ‘movement’ at the expense of ‘organisation’, rather than seeing movement and organisation as equally important aspects of coalition success (von Holdt 2002).

A useful approach to the role of member commitment comes from social movement theory, which explores how individuals engage with social movements. The term ‘collective action frame’ is used to explain how issues can
be articulated to generate member commitment (Snow, Rocheford, Worden et al. 1986; Tarrow 1994; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Zald 1996). Collective action frames suggest that member engagement occurs through a dialectical process of engagement and transformation. For Gamson, the likelihood of an individual participating in a social movement relates to the proximity of an issue: that is, the degree to which it has a direct and immediate consequence for one's personal life (Gamson 1992, p. 163). A collective action frame begins with this personal identity, then through a process of struggle opens an individual's awareness by intersecting that personal identity with a collective identity that broadens consciousness, strengthens solidarity and stimulates political participation (Fantasia 1988; Kelly 1998; Clawson 2003, p. 98). Collective action frames enable a coalition to agitate members by conveying a rhetoric of change (Gamson and Meyer 1996, pp. 285-6). These messages are more successful when they express urgency and/or agency, as it assists to counterweigh a rhetoric of reaction, of jeopardy, apathy or futility (Hirschman 1991). The concept of collective action frame shows how values or ideology create a framework for movement building by providing a collective explanation for individual experience, providing a vehicle for collective action (Carroll 1992).

Rose suggests that the development of collective identity operates differently in new social movements and the union movement. Like new social movement theorists, he argues that political engagement in new social movements begins with values (such as opposition to racism), and later shifts to a concern for interest (what interests are denied by racism) (Melucci 1980; Touraine 1981; Rose 2000). Conversely, for unions, he argues political consciousness is based in private interest, such as the need for improvements in working conditions, which broadens to the question of values, such as class and social concern (Rose 2000).
As with the debate over values and interest, many disagree with this dichotomy, preferring a synthesis by which solidarity is seen as a mutually reinforcing process of interconnecting values and interests across unions or social movements (Fantasia 1988; Carroll 1992). Fantasia, Kelley, Clawson and Fitzgerald, amongst others, emphasise that union member commitment may derive from opposition to racism or sexism as much as it may come from anger around workplace conditions (Lynd 1983; Fantasia 1988; Fitzgerald 1991; Kelley 1997, 98-72; Kelly 1998; Clawson 2003).

Common concern can successfully enhance member commitment to the degree that it engages both the interests and values of members. Member interests and values are engaged when a coalition's common concern touches their day-to-day experiences and deeply held beliefs (Gamson 1992, p. 8). As Kelley argues, the politicisation and engagement of people comes when local concerns are contextualised in a broader system of causes (Kelley 1997). Carroll similarly argues that member engagement and mobilisation must be actively sought and won through ideological struggle (Carroll 1992, p. 12). This ideological struggle must be sensitive to the generalised values and specific interests of all its constituents (Bleyer 1992). Moreover, the process of member commitment not only can politicise, but it is also a process of self-development and empowerment for movement participants (Freire 1972; Melucci 1980).

Thus a coalition's common concern is increasingly effective at generating member commitment and movement building to the extent that it touches not simply the interests or values of members in a single organisation, but also engages the interests or values of many different organisation members. This
thesis takes the insights of social movement theorists and union renewal scholars on member commitment to explore how the common concerns of a coalition can vary member participation, and particularly whether member participation in a coalition shapes coalition outcomes and the capacity of the participating organisations.

4.3 Public commitment

Separate to organisational engagement and movement building, a coalition’s common concern also communicates a public social frame to the wider population and the coalition’s targets. The term social frame is normally not used in reference to coalitions, but is important for understanding how coalitions generate public support, media interest and social pressure against employers and particularly politicians (Gitlin 1980; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gamson 1992; Snow and Benford 1992; Lakoff 2005).

A frame is a way of thinking about the world – how people make sense of the world (Goffman 1974); it simplifies the world by selectively encoding experiences, events and facts with one’s present or past environment, and established values (Goffman 1974; Snow and Benford 1992, p. 137). Therefore frames shape what people consider to be common sense (Lakoff 2006).

A public social frame is the messages and values that communicate a coalition’s purpose. As Snow and Benford argue, a social frame is an attempt to produce meaning – it is a coalition’s story about what it is campaigning for and why (Snow and Benford 1992, p. 136). Public social frames seek to legitimise the claims of a coalition, shift social opinion and influence coalition targets (i.e.
employers or government). However, social movements sometimes do not distinguish between social frame and collective action frame (Snow, Rocheford, Worden et al. 1986; Gamson and Meyer 1996). This study uses the term public social frame to distinguish the 'public' messages of a coalition; a coalition’s common concern in the form of a public social frame shapes how a coalition expresses its broad social goals to the public at large.

Public social frames are contested. A coalition’s public messages enter a public struggle for meaning in the process of trying to influence public policy, contesting opponents’ attempts to define the problem at hand (McCarthy, Smith and Zald 1996).

Public social frames are said to be more effective if they are ‘elaborated’ rather than ‘restricted’ (Bernstein 1970; Bernstein 1971; Snow and Benford 1992). A restricted closed frame tends to organise a narrow set of ideas in a tightly interconnected fashion for a defined audience. For example, the term ‘nuclear freeze’ which created a defined, narrow solution to the broad problem of nuclear proliferation – ‘freezing’ nuclear production (Snow and Benford 1992, p. 140). An elaborated frame instead organises a wide range of ideas; it is inclusive and ‘allows numerous aggrieved groups to tap it and elaborate their grievances in terms of its basic problem-solving schema’ (Snow and Benford 1992, p. 140). Examples include the term civil rights or living wage, which can be used to express grievances for a wide variety of politically or economically disenfranchised constituencies.

Public social frames are powerful if they conjure the values of injustice. Gamson argues powerful social frames describe moral indignation – hot cognition –
where the message is laden with emotion (Gamson 1992). Snow calls this process frame alignment, where social values are connected to coalition goals (Snow, Rocheford, Worden et al. 1986). Similarly, Lakoff argues that public social frames based on values, rather than issues, convey moral weight (Lakoff 2005; Lakoff 2006). Moreover, public social frames can be supported if they are imbued with cultural meaning; if they have cultural resonance (Zald 1996). Metaphors that resonate with cultural narrations – stories, myths or folk tales – help a message connect to a broader political culture and help build support (Snow and Benford 1988).

Public social frames also must be remedial; they must respond to the instance of injustice with a call for action and for change. Without an adversary, the political target remains an abstraction – such as hunger, rather than the cause of that hunger (Gamson 1992, p. 7). Similarly, a social frame is effective if it identifies a collective actor with the legitimate power to remedy the problem. In this way public social frames legitimate collective action as a solution to injustice (Gitlin 1980, p. 291; McCarthy, Smith and Zald 1996).

The messenger is as important as the message for establishing the credibility of a public social frame (Lakoff 2006, p. 36). The person or organisations that carry the message in public can reinforce or detract from the articulated frame, creating or mitigating legitimacy (Snow and Benford 1988; Snow and Benford 1992). Similarly, as McAdam argues, actions do speak louder than words and coalition tactics are a method of framing and producing a social crisis (McAdam 1996).

Lakoff, a cognitive linguist, also analyses the role of positive and negative social frames. He argues that positive messages are more successful than negative
messages for shifting the political climate (Lakoff 2005). He argues that negative or reactive public messages such as 'no' or 'against', often reinforce the messages of opponents. Amongst the array of positive messages, the most powerful are those that are 'strategic'; that is, they articulate a transformation of the organisation and allocation of social resources (Lakoff 2005). Lakoff suggests an example of a conservative strategic frame is 'tax relief', which seeks to reorganise social opinion against taxation. Alongside strategic frames are 'domino' frames, which if passed make similar more radical demands easier. For example, demands against 'partial birth abortion' make a broader anti-abortion claim easier (Lakoff 2006).

Furthermore, within a broad social frame message are 'surface' or specific demands (Lakoff 2006). The interconnection of a specific demand with a strategic or transformative agenda builds support for a powerful social frame by connecting a broad agenda to incremental steps (Pastor 2001).

Social movement theories about social or master frames are reinforced by claims by union renewal writers. Fine argues that part of the power of workers' centres is that the organisations frame issues broadly as a general or social interest as opposed to a narrow special interest (Fine 1998, p. 159). This echoes Flanders, who argues that a union's 'sword of justice' is a vital ingredient for exercising public pressure and social power (Flanders 1970). Carroll uses Gramsci's concept of counter-hegemony to emphasise that a powerful common interest symbolically establishes an alternative agenda to how society is organised, creating an alternative set of progressive values that speak to 'the working class' as a whole (Gramsci 1971; Carroll 1992).
These claims by sociologists and union renewal writers have not been applied to the specific practice of coalitions. This thesis considers how the public messages and the public social frame of a coalition impacts on its ability to win outcomes and affect the political climate.

4.4 Bringing the question of common concern together

This discussion identified three measures that shape the success of a coalition's common concern: inter-organisational commitment, member commitment and public commitment. These three measures were investigated to see how they may affect the success of a coalition.

Inter-organisational commitment varies from a fleeting common concern for an event to joint concern over a program for change. Organisational interest in a coalition increases commitment. If more organisational interest is shared across the coalition, the greater are the resources the coalition has to rely on for achieving outcomes. Sharing interests often relies on compromise and organisational learning. Shared values can strengthen longer and more sustainable relationships.

Member commitment is dependent upon whether a coalition's common concern engages member support and participation. Concepts such as collective action frame, direct interest and class consciousness attempt to capture the processes of member political development. Participation is enhanced when there is a connection to the day-to-day experiences, interests and values of organisation members. Strong member commitment enables a coalition to mobilise a mass movement to pressure for coalition outcomes and political climate change.
Member engagement may also allow a coalition to politicise rank and file members.

The degree to which a coalition gains support from the public relates to the degree to which a coalition’s public messages engage with and strike a mutual interest with the ‘general public at large’ by presenting positive messages and values to convey a coalition’s common cause. The public social frame shapes coalition participation in public debate, and thus affects its ability to shape the political climate and win outcomes.

The relationship between the three common concern measures and coalition success is explored in the case studies. The claims in this literature review are summarised in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Coalition success and common concern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Winning outcomes</th>
<th>Supportive political climate</th>
<th>Sustaining relationships</th>
<th>Building the capacity of participating organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-organisational commitment</td>
<td>Member commitment</td>
<td>Public commitment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does an overlap of interest and value concern support hard to win battles?</td>
<td>• Does overlapping interest and value concern help sustain relationships?</td>
<td>• Does organisational commitment help a coalition take collective action to win outcomes?</td>
<td>• Connection is not claimed in the literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do the combination of value and interest connections support climate change by allowing for long-term relationships to build an alternative political agenda around an issue?</td>
<td>• Do overlapping interest and value concern help sustain relationships?</td>
<td>• Does organisational dominance weaken relationships, does mutual interest overcome organisational dominance?</td>
<td>• Connection is not claimed in the literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Connection is not claimed in the literature</td>
<td>• Does the number of organisational participants or the openness of coalition participation affect the sustainability of relationships?</td>
<td>• Connection is not claimed in the literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Connection is not claimed in the literature</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Connection is not claimed in the literature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Common concern defines a coalition’s purpose. Coalition success depends not only upon internal and relational factors but also on how a coalition is able to
interact and shape the world around it. This final element of coalition success is understood here in terms of scale.

5.0 Scale

While coalitions are strategic actors and can make their own history, that history is not always of their choosing. The scale or scales that coalition unionism operates at affects its ability to achieve outcomes against employers or government, and shapes the degree to which a coalition can increase the capacity of its participating organisations.

Firstly, scale is measured by the available opportunity structure. Secondly, a coalition’s ability to shape employer or political decisions is affected by the scales of power at which these decision makers operate and the scales at which the coalition operates, whether locally, nationally, internationally or at multiple scales. Finally, the most important scale for member engagement and development is the local scale, which can be engaged most effectively if a coalition establishes and builds relationships with local broker organisations.

5.1 Opportunity structure

The availability of external structural opportunities affects the success and sustainability of coalitions. US social movement theorists developed the term opportunity structure, also called political opportunity. Its core idea is that political space opens and closes in different contexts, times and places (Gamson and Meyer 1996, p. 277). It suggests that the structures of the external world, such as election cycles, ruling class cleavages and the relative openness of the
state, affect social movement formation and victory (Tarrow 1994; Jenkins 1995; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).

Political opportunities begin with national political context and intervening institutional variables (Gamson and Meyer 1996, p. 273). Factors such as the openness of the state, the prevailing cultural climate, types of political parties, or activity in civil society, vary between countries and may contribute to international variations in coalition unionism (Tilly 1978; Brand 1990). Additionally, some political opportunities are common across liberal market economies and remained fixed and beyond the control of coalitions, such as the timelines of public elections (Rucht 1990, 196; Tarrow 1994, p. 277; Gamson and Meyer 1996).

Many other political opportunities are matters of contention. Opportunities may be shaped by government or employer adversaries such as a legislative timetables or the scheduled closure of a plant. Yet, opportunity structure is also dynamic, able to be shaped by coalition action, for instance where coalitions cultivate allies in the state, change the political discourse, change public policy or shift elite alignment (Jenkins 1985; Tarrow 1993; Gamson and Meyer 1996). These dynamic opportunities provide strategic choices for coalitions, where decisions about institutional and extra-institutional action can be jointly or selectively made (Gamson and Meyer 1996, p. 284). It is the dialectical combination of available external opportunities, combined with social movement readiness and strategic choice, that enables a coalition to increase its chance of victory in the face of opportunities (McAdam 1982; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996, p. 1633; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2006).
Yet the process by which a coalition is most likely to create opportunities is under-theorised. In some of the best-practice literature in the United States, the work of successful central labour councils is said to create an agenda for progressive policy (Rudy 2001; Reynolds and Ness 2004). These conclusions do not draw out general lessons about how coalitions can build a supportive opportunity structure. It can be speculated that a sustained coalition may be necessary for a long-term campaign to create an agenda. This is not confirmed by coalition theory, but is certainly worthy of further analysis in this thesis.

Political opportunities make coalition campaigns winnable, and as Pastor suggests, short-term victories are critical for sustaining a coalition’s momentum, reinforcing the utility of collective action and enhancing long-term organisational commitment (see also Neidhart and Rucht 1991; Pastor 2001).

The opportunity structure can also shape media and public support for coalitions. As Von Holdt emphasises, the ‘contentious challenge’ of an issue or event can be critical for mobilising and energising not simply an organisation but a mass movement (von Holdt 2002). A supportive political opportunity can create a large, deep mobilisation even without a coalition structure to support it (Tattersall 2004). Social contention raises media attention, and by creating wide and broad public awareness of an issue can open opportunities for coalition success (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). If harnessed well, opportunities can magnify the organised power of a coalition. Weaker, ad hoc coalitions can still achieve objective political outcomes if a timely reaction generates widespread contention as a symbol of community anger (Tattersall 2005; Tattersall forthcoming a).
5.2 Multi-scalar decision makers and multi-scalar coalitions

Social movement scholarship has recently turned to human geography, arguing that structural opportunities cannot be understood in a geographic vacuum. This is because the full interaction between social movements and the external world has both social and spatial dimensions (Martin and Miller 2003). Any opportunity structure is affected by the space and scale in which it operates; it is socially and spatially contested (Massey 1993). As Martin and Miller argue:

Space constitutes and structures relationships and networks; situates a social and cultural life, influencing repertoires of contention, is integral to the attribution of threats and opportunities, is implicit in many types of category formation and is central to jumping scale strategies (Martin and Miller 2003, p. 144).

If scale is socially constructed, then different scales such as the local or the national vary significantly. For instance the local scale, as Taksa and Wills stress, is where people live, where social relations take shape and where participation and memory are rich (Wills 1998; Taksa 2000; Wills 2001). Across the local scale, local spaces are distinct, with distinct identities and place consciousness (Castree, Coe, Ward et al. 2004; Ellem 2005). Yet the local is not isolated from other scales; social relations interpenetrate scales (Agnew 1987; Ellem 2005). As scale shifts up, organisations become increasingly important as media for coordinating action and influencing decision makers.

At one level, coalitions are defined by their scale. They can operate at different scales – at the local, city, state, national or global (Tattersall 2005). Theorists dispute whether the scale of a coalition varies its power or likely success. Some emphasise the importance of the local as a scale for coalition action. Jonas argues that local coalitions usefully connect political influence to member involvement.
(Jonas 1998). Patmore argues that the local scale, particularly in smaller regional cities, is powerful because of the close proximity between where people live and work (Patmore 1997; Patmore 2004). Indeed, Taksa affirms this, arguing that the perception of mutual interests based on shared experience of everyday activity is a 'much more likely and solid foundation for collective action than the mere existence of common interests or common identity' (Taksa 2000).

Others suggest that the city is a powerful space for coalition activity. Walsh notes that city-wide activity, in the US in particular, enables coalitions to shape city regulation – for example through living wage ordinances (Walsh 2000). Pastor, and Turner and Cornfield agree that coalition activity can affect policy change when acting at the scale of a regional economy (Pastor 2001; Turner and Cornfield 2007). Much of the US work on central labour councils affirms that strong coalitions at the city-scale can achieve strong sustainable policy reform (Luce and Nelson 2004; Reynolds and Ness 2004; Rhee and Sadler 2007).

Coalition success is best seen as contingent on the scales at which the coalition's adversaries operate. Coalition unionism requires different organisational resources depending on the scale at which decision makers operate. But power is rarely contested at a single scale (Smith 1999; Martin and Miller 2003, p. 101). Political power, for instance, is multi-scalar, operating at and among the local, city, state, national and international. Governments consist of locally elected officials representing a small, defined local area, who then act as representatives at a city, state or national scale (Martin and Miller 2003). Creating influence over political representatives can occur at either the local electorate or the scale of government, or at both simultaneously. Similarly, the functions of government, education, health care, housing, also operate at more than one scale as they are
locally delivered and centrally funded (Taylor and Flint 2000, p. 316). Capital is similarly multi-scaled. Depending on the scale of the industry, capital may rely on local production (as in mining), consumption (for example, ‘care’ services, like education, childcare or health) or investment (such as government subsidies) (Savage 1998; Ellem 2005). Consequently, the success of coalition unionism may be enhanced to the extent that a coalition can mobilise, resource and sustain multi-scaled action and organisation.

To understand multi-scaled coalitions, we can return to social movement theorists. They introduce the concept of ‘brokers’ to understand how a movement can operate at a variety of scales (Martin and Miller 2003, p. 152). ‘Brokerage’ is a:

Specific set of linking mechanisms defined as the linking of two or more currently unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relation with each other and/or with yet another social site (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, p. 142).

For these theorists, brokers refer to single persons (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). However, the term can be expanded to cover organisations. The role of the brokers is to mediate scale, paralleling the concept of bridge builders who mediate cultural differences. Adapting this concept to coalitions, coalitions may form broker organisations that operate at different scales to enable a coalition to act at multiple scales.

This study uses the term broker to describe coalition activity and new organisational forms established by coalitions that enable a coalition to exercise power at additional scales. These may be episodic, as in a strategy to act locally
or nationally. A coalition may form relationships between state-scaled organisations that facilitate a national coalition capacity, or mobilise state-scaled volunteers to take action in local areas. Conversely, it may be a more permanent organisational form, what I call a broker organisation, where a coalition establishes a permanent structure at a particular scale to manage coalition activity at that scale (Tattersall 2006a; Tattersall 2006b; Tattersall 2006c). Thus multi-scaled coalition activity may be based on multi-scaled 'mobilisation' or on multi-scaled 'organisation' (Flanders 1970; Eisenscher 1999b).

The idea of multi-scaled coalition activity and broker organisations is not sufficiently addressed in existing literature. This thesis will investigate how multi-scaled capacity affects a coalition’s ability to achieve outcomes against employers or government.

5.3 Local broker organisations
Aside from the need to influence outcomes, the local scale is critically important for coalitions as it is the space at which individuals can participate and be decision makers. As Jonas and Patmore note, local coalitions are important because they connect the political influence of a coalition to member involvement. This is reinforced by recent research based in Australia, that suggests that it is in regional areas where union relationships with community organisations have been most advanced and most successful (Markey and Nixon 2004; Rainnie and Ellem forthcoming).

More centrally scaled coalitions at a city or national level can harness the advantages of local activity through local coalition broker organisations.
Coalitions are often criticised for substituting member engagement and participation for horizontal relationships between organisations (Clawson 2003). A local broker organisation provides a specific mechanism that allows a coalition to go deep as well as broad.

The establishment of local broker organisations may provide a coalition with a local resource base. Yet this concept of broker organisations is new. It is uncertain under what circumstances local broker organisations are likely to be effective. The concept of local broker organisations raises important questions for this thesis. For instance, do local resources, the space for local planning, involvement in central decision making, and the ability to shape a campaign responsive to place-based idiosyncrasies affect the success of a local broker organisation? If so, how do successful broker organisations shape coalition success? Ideally, it appears that local broker organisations could be a space for rank and file union and community organisation members to participate in coalition decision making. The effectiveness of this space for organisational change will be investigated in the case studies. This is possible because broker organisations developed in two of the case studies, allowing for a comparison of their activities over time.

5.4 **Bringing together scale**

This discussion of opportunity structure and scale identifies some measures for understanding successful coalitions.

Firstly, coalitions can enhance their success if they link their activity with available political opportunities. Whether or not a coalition can take advantage
of employer or government decisions may help a coalition achieve victories. It also may support member engagement in coalition activities by raising awareness of the importance of political action.

Secondly, a coalition's ability to shape employer or political decisions, or the broader political climate, is affected by the scales of power at which these decision makers operate. Coalitions therefore may enhance their ability to achieve external victories if they can mobilise or establish organisation at multiple scales.

Finally, the most important scale for enhancing member participation, engagement and development is the local scale. Whether a coalition establishes local structures and the degree to which those local structures are connected to coalition planning and are adequately resourced, will also shape coalition success. Local broker organisations enhance a coalition's ability to influence locally scaled decision makers and provide a space for members to be decision makers in a coalition campaign.

Overall, a coalition will increase its chance of success if it can harness opportunities and take action at multiple scales. The connection between scale and coalition success is outlined in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Coalition success and scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Winning outcomes</th>
<th>Opportunity structure</th>
<th>Multi-scaled coalitions</th>
<th>Local broker organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Use opportunities to maximise influence and participation</td>
<td>• Activity at multiple scales can increase coalition influence</td>
<td>• Local broker organisations can sustain local influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supportive political climate</td>
<td>• Connection is not claimed in the literature</td>
<td>• Acting at multiple scales can intensify or broaden support for a broad set of values or agenda</td>
<td>• Local broker organisations can provide a base for future progressive campaigning and agenda-setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustaining relationships</td>
<td>• Connection is not claimed in the literature</td>
<td>• Relationships are easiest to build across the same scale – more scales = more opportunity for sustaining relationships</td>
<td>• Connection is not claimed in the literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building the capacity of participating organisations</td>
<td>• Opportunities create winnable campaigns, and can help engage organisation members</td>
<td>• Connection is not claimed in the literature</td>
<td>• Local broker organisations can provide opportunities for building member organising capacity and politicisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.0 Conclusion: Research Questions on Coalition Unionism
This chapter builds an analytical framework of elements and measures that attempt to understand when coalitions might be successful. It defines success as not merely achieving political outcomes, but also creating sustainable relationships and organisational capacity; it examines three cornerstones of coalition unionism, borrowing from the definition of community established at the beginning of the chapter.
This literature review identifies a series of measures that may explain the different elements of coalitions. This thesis tests the viability of these measures by exploring them through three long-term case studies of coalitions by assessing how and whether these elements shape coalition unionism success.

The case studies will examine whether the different elements not only categorise coalition variation but also can be used to identify different types of coalition practice. They consider if certain combinations of the elements are likely over time. For instance, Hyman (2001) not only identified three competing union identities – market, class and society – but argued that the combination of these identities defined different types of union practice in England, Germany and Italy (Hyman 2001). The case studies will therefore explore if, and how, the elements operate in combination, to produce different types of coalition unionism.

Like Hyman, this study explores whether combinations of these elements effectively describe different ideal types, or models, of coalition unionism. Hyman builds his ideal types from three axes of union identity (Hyman 2001). Following this, it explores the utility of breaking down the coalition elements into models of coalition unionism.
First, is the combination of strong common concern and multi-scalar contextual capacity, without strong inter-organisational relationships. This study calls this ‘agenda-driven’ coalition unionism, where there is a strong institutional base for membership participation in the coalition, with an incomplete structural form supporting inter-organisational relationships. Ultimately this form of coalition unionism has strength in its purpose and strategy but weakness in its inter-organisational relationships.

Second, is the combination of strong multi-scalar contextual capacity and inter-organisational relationships, but weak common concern. This study calls this ‘relationship-driven’ coalition unionism, where there is a strong set of inter-organisational relationships and a strong participatory process capable of acting with multiple scales, but a weak common concern that limits interest buy-in from organisations. Ultimately this form of coalition unionism has structural and
strategic strength, but weakness in how it frames and engages organisations in its purpose.

Third, is the combination of strong inter-organisational relationships and common concern but weak contextual capacity to act at multiple scales. This study defines this as 'mobilising' coalition unionism, where there are strong inter-organisational relationships and a strong framework for negotiating common concern, but a weak capacity for multi-scaled activity due to a lack of broker organisations and/or means for developing local decision making amongst the rank and file. Ultimately this coalition form has strength in structure and purpose, but a weakness in its strategic multi-scalar engagement with the external world.

These three models of coalition unionism are an attempt to categorise different coalition practice according to the strengths and weaknesses of the coalition elements they sustain over the long term. Thes research undertaken in this thesis explores if these categories are useful to describe coalitions, and I consider why these elements might exist in partial contradiction. After all, underpinning these three ideal types is the suggestion that there is a tension between the elements that inhibits the realisation of all three elements acting with strength. The case studies explore how these different coalition forms operate and how these differences contribute to variations in practice and success.

Accordingly, this chapter has reframed a definition of community to create a framework for structuring the literature on coalition unionism in order to identify elements and measures of when and how coalitions are likely to be successful. This review has focused on coalitions between unions and
community organisations. But, as argued earlier, a critical element of coalition unionism is the question of unions themselves. The next chapter specifically investigates unions. Using literature within industrial relations, as well as several multi-disciplinary areas that have recently branched into labour studies, Chapter Three considers how union collaboration is considered to be effective and also considers when it is likely for unions to engage in long-term coalitions.
Chapter Three
Unions and Coalition Unionism

This chapter narrows the analysis of coalition unionism to the central role of unions. Too often the scholarship on coalitions assumes that coalitions are powerful and useful for unions, without exploring the dynamics of successful coalition unionism from a union perspective. Moreover, when coalitions are viewed from the position of unions, coalitions are frequently seen as an instrumental, vanguard source of power 'for unions' (Frege, Heery and Turner 2004; Nissen 2004a, p. 437), instead of exploring the potential power that can arise from a longer term, reciprocal alignment between community organisations and unions. Whereas the previous chapter considered successful coalition practice, this chapter explores (i) how and when coalitions support union collaborative power, and (ii) when unions are likely to engage in coalitions.

In focusing on the specific role of unions, this chapter moves into the industrial relations discipline. It considers theoretical analysis of union collaboration as a specific example of union power, and within that, analyses coalitions with community organisations as one specific form of collaboration. In this study, union power is understood by building off the definition of coalition success established earlier. Unions are thus considered to be increasingly powerful to the degree to which they can achieve outcomes, shift the political climate, sustain relationships with allied community organisations and increase their internal capacity, in particular the ability of their members to participate in the union. However, as this chapter uncovers, the question of union collaboration with community organisations receives little attention in industrial relations scholarship. This is despite a convergence of radical and traditional industrial
relations scholars calling for research work on union collaboration with community organisations (Hyman 2001, p. 174; Kochan 2005, p. xi). To take up this challenge, this study draws on a broad range of multi-disciplinary scholarship on union collaboration to develop a framework of how, why and when collaboration between unions and community organisations is likely and powerful for unions.

1.0 How and When do Coalitions Increase the Power of Unions?
Different perspectives on the role and importance of union collaboration arise from the various theoretical and ideological understandings of union purpose across industrial relations literature. Yet the contradictory ideological values that underpin liberal ‘pluralist’ and Marxian ‘radical’ perspectives have resulted in a parallel, bifurcated analysis of collaboration. Debate is deadlocked, with theorists tending to send shots across the bow, accusing each other of supporting ‘partnership’, lacking ‘power’ or believing in ‘class warfare’ (Taylor and Mathers 2002; Turner 2004). There is not a synthesised approach that attempts to derive lessons from across these different perspectives. Consequently, analysis of how and why collaboration is powerful for unions is limited.

This section attempts to build a framework for understanding one form of successful union collaboration – collaboration with community organisations. It does this by reviewing a broad spectrum of traditional, radical and more recent cross-disciplinary approaches. It presents a synthesised view of union collaborative strategies (Turner 2004; Frege and Kelly 2004b). This approach follows the recent revival in industrial relations scholarship evidenced by Ackers’s neo-pluralism, interest in ‘new actors’ in industrial relations (Jones 2002;
Heery and Frege 2006; Osterman 2006), and Hyman and Kelly's radicalism (Kelly 1998; Hyman 2001; Ackers 2002). This section considers three areas of industrial relations research: pluralism, radical theory and labour geography. It identifies different forms of power that collaboration with community organisations may provide unions. These forms of power build off the definition of success developed in the previous chapter. The section considers not only how coalitions can help unions achieve outcomes and a supportive political climate, but build sustainable relationships and internal union capacity that advance a union's purpose.

1.1 Pluralist industrial relations theory
In traditional approaches, UK pluralists and American systems theorists argue that unions may collaborate with employers and the state to advance wages and conditions (Bean 1994, p. 2). Until recently, these theories have tended to ignore community organisations (Heery and Frege 2006). However, their relational focus, while weakened by a narrow economic frame and a cursory analysis of power, builds an understanding of relational power that operates as a cornerstone of union collaborative power.5

Pluralists consider collaboration a key form of union power, but narrow their focus to economic and employment-based collaborative relationships with industrial actors, such as employers and the state (Dunlop 1958). Unions collaborate with employers and the state to achieve their perceived purpose.

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4 Current interest is highlighted by two symposiums on 'new actors', one by the British Journal of Industrial Relations in 2005 and in Sydney by the University of Sydney in November 2006. There was also a special edition on new actors in the British Journal of Industrial Relations, (2006) 44, 4.

5 While Ackers acknowledges the important role of 'community' and social partnership, he analyses the partnerships between business and the community rather than unions and community groups (Ackers 2002, p 18).
which is the economic advancement of union members through bargaining and the social regulation of work through the state (Chamberlain 1951; Dunlop 1958, p. 7; Flanders 1970, pp. 41-3).

Pluralists' focus on interdependent economic relationships has an obvious weakness for understanding coalition unionism in that it excludes 'outsiders' like community organisations from the unit of analysis (Patmore 1997). This narrow frame of reference precludes an explicit analysis of the effect that potentially supportive organisations may have on union interactions with the external world (Patmore 1997, p. 243).

This theoretical blindness has been criticised by Dabscheck in Australia and Piore in the US (Dabscheck 1994; Dabscheck 1995; Piore 1995), and has led to a formative theory of community industrial relations that seeks to incorporate the role of community (inter)actors (Bellemare 2000; Jones 2002). Dabscheck suggests that industrial relations theory should include 'interactors' – any 'individual, group or organisation involved in real-world industrial relations', including 'women's feminist, Aboriginal, immigrant, ethnic, youth, church, religious and other groups' (Dabscheck 1994, p. 11). Beyond descriptively suggesting the importance of community organisations (Michelson and Westcott 2001; Dabscheck 2002), Bellemare and Jones argue that actors, such as service users or the wives of unionists, can measurably affect industrial relations outcomes, and thus must be incorporated into industrial relations theory (Bellemare 2000; Jones 2002). Paralleling the idea of mutual self-interest, Jones suggests that employee relationships with community organisations or identity-based groups, like women's organisations, can enhance union activity by

While usefully introducing the role of community organisations, these new actor theories still beg the question of how this new variable of 'community actor' affects industrial relations, and in particular what types of relationships vary the impact of these actors. Additionally, they tend to measure the utility of these relationships according to industrial outcomes (Bellemare 2000, pp. 398-9; Dabscheck 2002, p.141), rather than more subjective understandings of success such as union capacity or the sustainability of those relationships.

However, we can adapt the insights of pluralists themselves to help fill this gap. As Walton and McKersie envisaged in 1965, the behavioural theory of labour negotiation could be used to help explain 'all forms of social negotiations' (Kochan 1974; Walton and McKersie 1991, p. 281). Despite this potential, these theories have not been applied to social movement forms, and in particular have not been applied to relationships between coalition actors.

Despite pluralists' tendency to segregate collaborative relationships from the social context of power imbalances between workers and employers (Hyman 1978, p. 35), they develop useful and comprehensive theories of collaboration that explore patterns of negotiation and relational collaborative power (Dunlop 1958). The behavioural theory of labour negotiation is the most detailed analysis of the mechanisms of negotiation and decision-making processes (Kochan 1992), which may have useful implications for understanding union collaboration with community organisations.
However, behavioural theories of bargaining have had limited application. While dominant in the USA, these theories have not had widespread use in the UK, Canada or Australia. While influencing industrial relations from a labour-management perspective, they have rarely been used by writers examining industrial relations from a union perspective (Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986; Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld and McKersie 1994; Fells 1998a; Fells and Skeffington 1998b; Fells 1998b; Heery and Frege 2006).

Behavioural theory can be used to make important contributions to understanding the variables within coalition relationships, specifically to their decision-making processes. Usefully, unions and community organisations, even where they contain members from different social classes, have the capacity to overcome difference and collaborate on issues of common concern (Rose 2000). There are common features of the ‘collaborative process’ between the issues which Walton and McKersie examine in labour-management relationships and the questions this study examines in coalition practice. Behavioural theories can be used to broaden our understanding of how relational collaborative power varies between unions and community organisations.

Behavioural theory recognises that relationships between collaborative partners operate along a continuum of two extremes of distributive and integrative bargaining (Walton and McKersie 1991). This continuum reflects the diversity of decision-making processes across coalition relationships from conflict to consensus. Distributive bargaining is based on conflict, and more usefully for

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6 The major exception is Fells, whose application of the behavioral theory of bargaining to Australia has been published in UK, Canadian and Australian journals (Fells 1998a, Fells 1998b, Fells 1998b). See also Smith (1981) for an application to New Zealand. These are amongst the few international applications.
our purpose, integrative bargaining is based on forging a consensus (Walton and McKersie 1991; Fells 1998b). Integrative bargaining, like the analysis of coalitions in Chapter Two, is underpinned by the assumption that parties act on their self-interest but are capable of acting beyond it to serve effective negotiations (Walton and McKersie 1965). Integrative bargaining requires parties to recognise their interdependence and their capacity to work together to create mutual gains. Like effective coalition practice, integrative bargaining is supported by a shared understanding of information and interests, frequent interaction and a strong sense of trust and respect between the parties (Walton and McKersie 1965; Peterson and Tracy 1977, p. 43; Smith and Turkington 1981).

The objective of integrative bargaining is the establishment of positive-sum ‘win-win’ negotiation outcomes, where each party achieves organisational victories simultaneously in its own interests and the other party’s interests (Walton and McKersie 1965). It is speculated that integrative bargaining is perhaps easier on ‘soft questions’ like workplace conditions rather than wages, whose costs are less quantifiable, where benefits may be indirectly felt by multiple parties and where negotiation may be easier (Walton and McKersie 1965; Tracy 1974; Peterson and Tracy 1977).

Behavioural theory also recognises that personal relationships and the organisational leadership of the parties, described as attitudinal structuring, affect negotiation processes (Peterson and Tracy 1977, p. 35; Walton and McKersie 1991, p. 5, 185). These theorists emphasise the importance of context, as well as the individuals doing the negotiation, including their personality, level of planning and social belief, as elements that shape relationship longevity and capacity for consensus (Walton and McKersie 1965; Tracy and Peterson 1986;
Fells 1998a, pp. 190-9). They connect attitudinal alignment to the need for organisational leaders to have a self-oriented understanding of their needs and behaviour, warning of the importance of cooperation rather than collusion. Cooperation brings parties together through a recognition of their own interests, whereas collusion brings parties together to the exclusion of their own interests (Walton and McKersie 1965, pp. 188, 263). While their work focuses on the role of leaders, some scholars acknowledge the role of internal organisational pressures. Internal pressures include factional disputes and the imperative to ‘manage’ disputes down into the rank and file, with their use of the concept of inter-organisational bargaining (Walton and McKersie 1991; Fells 1998a).

Behavioural theorists also identify strategies to support attitudinal alignment, which extends the discussion of organisational relations introduced in Chapter Two. These include an understanding of other organisations’ interests, identifying points in common, de-emphasising differences, using a similar language, sharing views of outsiders and evaluating practice based on mutual success (Walton and McKersie 1965; Smith and Turkington 1981, pp. 225-9).

Pluralists’ concentration on the relational nature of collaboration offers a valuable insight into how union collaboration with community organisations can be successful. Their major weakness, framing union collaboration as a narrow activity concentrated within a finite set of industrial relations abstracted from the social distribution of power, can be turned into a positive for understanding coalitions. As in bargaining relationships, coalitions bring together differently interested organisations to maximise organisational strength for common purposes.
Pluralists identify a range of behaviours that are common to union collaboration with community organisations, and help explain when they might be sustainable and mutual. These factors include the importance of common interest, the role of leaders in coalition decision making, the importance of forming relationships outside of specific campaigns to identify mutual 'problems' and forge trust, and their categorisation of the range of bargaining relationships, from distributive to integrative forms of bargaining. Importantly, pluralists suggest that integrative 'win-win' bargaining with community organisations is more likely to result in sustainable relationships than distributive bargaining. The implication is that deeper, trusting relationships may offer greater potential for lasting union power than a short-term instrumental relationship with a community organisation. That is, a long-term, positive-sum relationship may be more likely to enable a union to not only achieve outcomes and build sustainable organisational relationships, but also achieve political climate change and enhance internal organisational capacity.

Despite the weakness of 'power analysis' in pluralist approaches, their approach to relational negotiation is useful for understanding when and how union collaboration with community organisations may provide a relational form of collaborative power.

1.2 Radical industrial relations
Radical theorists deal sparingly with how union power – that is, a union’s ability to achieve outcomes, climate change, sustain relationships or build internal capacity – is enhanced by collaboration with community organisations. However, lessons can be drawn from their insights about the difficulties imposed
by the external pressures of capitalism, the importance of coalitions for class consciousness, the challenges of coalition sustainability for unions, and how coalitions can assist unions to broaden their agenda. There are two contemporary waves of radical industrial relations theory; a 1970s Marxist perspective and more recent work connecting Marxism and social movement theory.

Firstly, radical theorists diverge from pluralists by focusing on the effect of class relations, arguing that the potential for collaboration is informed by whether relations are inter or intra-class-based. Radicals insist that all social relations are class relations, shaping institutions such as the state towards the interests of those who are dominant in society. For them, the state is shaped by capitalism, the influence of the ruling class and the historical patterns of class struggle (Marx and Engels 1967; Gramsci 1971, pp. 237-9). Radicals suggest that relationships solely with employers or the state are inherently limited because of the conflict of interest created by class. Unions may be able to have negotiated outcomes with employers or the state but class conflict cannot be permanently resolved; relationships with the state or employers are more transient, shaped by a union’s internal collective strength, including the participation of its members and their willingness to take action.

Radicals argue that coalitions potentially contribute to union capacity in four ways: by broadening union identity and enhancing internal solidarity and class movement consciousness; by creating trusting and powerful external relational solidarity that assists unions to challenge and make gains against contradictory class forces – particularly employers and the state; by potentially acting as a change agent for unions; and finally by providing a capacity to create an agenda-
setting power for unions that can integrate economic and political concerns (Levesque and Murray 2002).

Radicals argue that coalitions can expand a union's internal class movement capacity by expanding the social and class identity of unions and the consciousness of union members. While most radicals argue that unions generally do not act as agents of class power, some suggest that under certain circumstances unions can be class-based organisations (Hyman 1971; Hyman 1975; Hyman 2001).

At a leadership level, coalitions may expand a union's organisational identity. Hyman argues that union identity is derived from three social forces: the market, society and class (Hyman 2001). Yet today union identities are 'adrift', suffering 'ideological disorientation' (Hyman 2001, p. 173). In this vacuum, coalitions can be seen as a medium for recapturing a social vision and class capacity; in Hyman's terms coalitions may support new union 'utopias' (Hyman 2001, pp. 173, 176). This is because coalitions provide a vehicle for opening the organisational range of unions, allowing them to form common interests with other organisations and broaden their basis for solidarity (Hyman 1997; Rose 2000; Levesque and Murray 2002; Obach 2004, pp. 184-5).

Yet radicals also insist that union identity and solidarity cannot be 'manufactured from above', suggesting that union member engagement is critical to strategies for horizontal coalition solidarity (Hyman 1975, p. 65; Hyman 1994; Taylor and Mathers 2002; Clawson 2003). Connecting union members to coalition campaigns is essential for expanding coalition capacity (Kelly 1998, p. 174; Hyman 2001; Levesque and Murray 2002; Clawson 2003).
Coalitions potentially have the capacity to act as agents for deepening and broadening union identity by increasing the political consciousness and engagement of union members. This may not always be the case; some coalitions, like many unions, focus on sectional union concerns like wage claims (Nissen 2004a). However, when a coalition engages with the mutual interests of other organisations or operates with a broadening social frame, the engagement of the union in the coalition may open up the class consciousness of union members to a broader set of social concerns. A qualitative understanding of union power is important here, as radicals emphasise that it is not simply the numerical presence of union members that creates union power, but the extent to which they are willing to take different forms of action and the extent to which they are willing to take action on a multiplicity of (class) issues (Hyman 2001).

Radicals use the concept of class consciousness to argue that internal union solidarity helps union members perceive that their individual interests are connected to the broader interests of the working class. This is not an automatic process; while union members exist as a sectional ‘class-of-itself’, part of the working class commonly oppressed by capital, class consciousness is the process that sees the working class unite into a ‘class-for-itself’ willing to take action ‘in defence of class interests’ (Marx 1963, p. 15; Fantasia 1988, pp. 8-10).

While radicals argue that class consciousness is important, how a union’s class consciousness is broadened and whether coalitional unionism may affect this process is uncertain (Fantasia 1988). Hyman argues that politicisation is not an ‘abstraction’, but rather begins with ‘localised sympathies’ growing out of the ‘imaginative extension of what is directly experienced’ (Hyman 1975, p. 178).
Similarly, Fantasia's work on working class solidarity suggests that workplace mobilisation can be a space for broadening class consciousness, through the 'lived process' of struggle, organisation and contention (Fantasia 1988). Yet, whether these processes of 'imaginative extension' of direct experience or struggle are enhanced by coalition unionism is not explored.

Separately from the Marxist tradition, social movement theorists suggest that an integration of pre-existing community identities with the union may also support the expansion of class consciousness. Like Hyman's emphasis on 'lived experience', Clawson and Kelley suggest that pre-existing collective identities such as race, ethnicity, location or gender may enhance class consciousness if they are connected to workplace experiences (Kelley 1997, p. 91; Hyman 2001; Clawson 2003). This analysis has its roots in new social movement theory. Touraine argues that 'post-industrial identities' beyond the workplace can assist the development of class consciousness (Touraine 1981, pp. 33-4; Touraine 1995; Hyman 2001). The importance of interlinking identities is evident in the secondary literature. For example, the SEIU's Justice for Janitors campaign aims to connect the identity of workers as migrants to the union's capacity to act as an agent for migrant workers while campaigning for collective bargaining rights (Savage 1998; Clawson 2003). As Fraser argues, this integration of the politics of recognition and redistribution increases worker commitment to the union by integrating non-union and union identities and expanding the concerns of the union from simple economic concerns for wages to the social recognition of immigrants (Fraser 1997).

Coalitions may play a similar role in increasing the class movement power of union members. However, when coalitions are able to do this most effectively
remains uncertain. While union renewal theorists examined in Chapter Two speculate about the importance of mutual self-interest coalitions or the operation of a broad social frame for creating effective coalitions, there is not a detailed exploration by radical theorists that connects the process of union engagement in coalitions with how coalition practice may or may not enhance engagement or class consciousness of union members. This thesis will explore this gap, considering when and how coalitions may provide a mechanism for broadening class consciousness and thus the class movement power of unions.

Radical theorists also provide an insight into when coalitions are likely to enhance a union's relational power and be sustainable for unions. Productive horizontal solidarity is not automatic, and clichés such as 'solidarity forever' disguise the possibilities and difficulties for collaborative relationships between unions and community organisations (Ackers 2002; Ellem and Shields 2004, p. 5). For instance, while the term 'united front' asserts the importance of collaboration between the organisations of the working class, middle class and working class parties, more recent industrial relations theorists have not explored under what conditions united front relationships are likely to be effective, or contribute to renewal.

Indirectly, radical scholarship provides some lessons about the circumstances under which coalitions may support sustainable relationships for unions, in their work on union-to-union collaboration. Hyman emphasises the permanent dialectic of unity and sectionalism, recognising that a negotiated tension between organisational unity and organisational sectionalism is the conceptual foundation for robust, successful collaboration (Hyman 1975; Hyman 1989). Unions are autonomous, forced to respond to sectional concerns created by
industrial location, leadership and member concerns and democratic processes. Yet between unions there are common concerns that create the need for unity. As Hyman argues, ‘solidarity implies the perception of commonalities of interest and purpose which extend, but do not abolish, consciousness of distinct and particularistic circumstances’ (Hyman 2001, p. 170). These simultaneous tensions cannot be overcome, but rather are permanently balanced; and thus Hyman argues that collaboration must:

respect differentiations of circumstances and interests ... the alignment and integration of diverse interests is a complex difficult task which requires continuous processes of negotiation: real solidarity cannot be imposed (Hyman 2001, p. 174).

This thesis aims to extend this insight about union-to-union collaboration to union collaboration with community organisations. It considers what practices can help balance the permanent tension of unity and sectionalism in coalitions to support relational collaborative power for unions.

Thirdly, radicals suggest that in certain circumstances external organisations, and by extension coalitions, can act as change agents for unions themselves. Deriving from Lenin’s claim about the social transformative role of the Communist Party (Lenin 1970), Marxists envisage the possibility of outside organisations widening the vision and mobilisation capacity of unions (Hyman 1971; Hyman 2001). Similarly, new social movement theorists and union renewal writers in the social movement tradition argue that new social movements have the capacity to radicalise ‘old’ social movements such as unions (Touraine 1981). This claim is supported abstractly in the union renewal literature, which suggests that community organisations can cause unions to change (Waterman 1991; Moody 1997; Rose 2000; Clawson 2003). Yet neither radicals, new social movement nor
union renewal writers document the factors that explain how these movements can change unions. This thesis will seek to describe under what conditions a coalition structure may facilitate change in unions.

Finally, radical theorists argue that collaboration also has the capacity to deliver agenda-setting power. Agenda-setting power is widely used in political science and communications theory to refer to the ability for political parties, the media, institutions or civil society organisations to shape the political agenda (Dahl 1957; Cobb and Elder 1971; Lukes 1974). Associated with pluralism, ‘agenda-setting’ power is viewed from the perspective of political outcomes, and is commonly used to focus on how a political agenda is exercised and reproduced within representative democracy (through political parties and the media) (Layer and Budge 1992; Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2005). In contrast, radicals, including social movement and Marxist theorists, consider how civil society organisations can shape the public agenda through crisis and counter-hegemonic alternatives (Gamson 1968; Gramsci 1971). Hyman argues that a key resource for unions is the ability to create an agenda that influences the ‘attitudes and perceptions of employers, governments, the general public and their own members so as to create a favourable ideological climate’ (Hyman 1994, p. 127). Hyman argues that the unions that have greatest success in achieving this social ‘mobilisation of bias’ are those:

which have helped generate broad definitions of membership interests, formulated and propagated an extensive agenda, and cultivated alliances with social movements whose concerns overlap with theirs (Hyman 1994, p. 131).
Coalitions may be capable of supporting a 'bottom up' agenda-setting power with a counter-hegemonic quality that challenges the power of the ruling class by presenting an alternative, legitimate plan in the interests of society at large (Gramsci 1971).

Coalition agenda setting creates a counter-hegemonic form of union power by intervening into the disorganising tendencies of capitalism. Capitalism is assumed to be based on the formal separation of the economic and the political. According to radicals, this separation is real but illusory (Holloway and Picciotto 1977, p. 80; Holloway and Picciotto 1978, pp. 17-8, 78; Meiksins Wood 1995). The capitalist state may appear distinct from the capitalist class, yet the social power of large firms allows capital to shape the practices of the capitalist state (Miliband 1973; Poulantzas 1973; Holloway and Picciotto 1978; Jessop 1982). To limit the power of the ruling class, radicals argue that union demands must traverse the economic and political because the joining of political and economic struggles confronts the tendency of capitalists and the capitalist state to separate them (Hyman 1971, p. 8; Hyman 2001, p. 20). Coalitions provide a vehicle for connecting economic struggles to political struggles by potentially connecting the economic power of the workplace to political action against the state.

Radical theory usefully demonstrates that coalition power is shaped by class relations. It suggests that coalitions may be able to broaden the economistic tendencies of unions, creating organisations that act with broader class interests. Radicals argue that the common interests of the working class can become a vehicle for building class movement union power, a second form of union collaborative power. Yet the means by which coalitions broaden union identity, politicise union members, create sustainable relations and create agenda-setting
power is less clearly outlined. A key aim of this thesis is to understand the mechanisms behind these abstracted, sometimes overly theoretical claims of radical theorists, by identifying the change processes through empirical studies of coalitions.

1.3 Labour geography
A union's external struggle indicates whether it will use collaborative strategies, and if so, what type. However, industrial relations theorists have often been blind to one critical aspect of this context – the spatial dimensions of industrial relations. This section, like Chapter Two, uses labour geography to explore how space, scale and place shape the possibilities for union collaboration. Here the focus is explicitly on how the geography of industrial relations shapes collaboration with community organisations to support the place-based power of unions.

Geographers argue that the changing context of work challenges the possibilities and context of union practice, and thus the potential for powerful coalition unionism. In industrialised countries, the workplace and work regulation have decentralised as employers seek to replace the union-dominated industrial conditions that evolved under Keynesianism's nationally scaled regulation with non-union enterprise-based, individualised workplaces (Savage 1998; Walsh 2000; Hudson 2001). Yet power is rarely unipolar and geographers note another contradiction in work regulation: while capital has the potential to flow globally, in re-regulating work environments 'place matters' (Massey 1984; Visser 2003). The fact that workers are relatively tied to place because of social reproduction, and are organised through multi-scaled union structures, creates a base upon
which powerful union action, and union collaboration, can emerge (Amin 1999, p. 42; Castree, Coe, Ward et al. 2004, p. 96; Ellem 2005).

Labour geography makes several important contributions to understanding how coalitions are powerful for unions. Firstly it emphasises the scalar attributes of coalition unionism. Secondly it emphasises the potential of the local scale for coalitions, and, in given industrial and political contexts, a union's internal organisational scales and the importance of union member engagement. Thirdly it points to the importance of 'place consciousness'.

The multi-scaled form of industrial and political relations requires coalitions to operate with new kinds of articulation at multiple levels. Geographers emphasise that collaboration is a process of multi-scalar exchange, where mobilisation and capacity at one scale or level affect outcomes at other scales (Massey 1984, p. 337; Levesque and Murray 2002; Castree, Coe, Ward et al. 2004; Ellem 2005). Geographers emphasise the relational nature of power between scales and thus the importance of harnessing union action and collaborative action at multiple scales (Sadler 2004; Ellem 2005). Yet it is unresolved whether coalition unionism is more powerful at particular scales or if coalition unionism is most powerful when the coalitions themselves are multi-scaled. While Herod argues that no scale is primary (Herod 2001), it may be the case that in certain contexts, coalition unionism at particular scales may be more powerful or more likely (Jonas 1998; Rainnie and Ellem forthcoming). This raises two important issues for when collaboration might be powerful for unions: how does the industrial and political context of a union vary the power of collaboration for unions? Secondly, how does the organisational structure and scale of a union vary the potential power of coalition unionism?
A union's industrial context may provide opportunities for coalitions to directly enhance a union's place-based power, particularly at the local scale. Geographers argue that the apparent mobility of capital is somewhat illusory (Harvey 1982; Herod 1997; Hudson 2001). The needs for capital investment from the state and local government, the need for proximity of service provision to consumers, and the fixed form of primary industries, for instance, create spatial constraints to the mobility of capital in certain industries — tying it to place (Walsh 2000; Hudson 2001; Ellem 2005). In industries with a spatial tie, locally focused action has significant power over capital (Harvey 1982). Ellem, in analysing resource extraction in mining towns, and Savage in analysing low-paid service work such as cleaning, argue that unions may increase their control of space through union collaboration with community organisations (Savage 1998; Ellem 2003; Ellem 2005). Consequently, union collaboration may be particularly powerful for unions in industries where capital has ties to place.

Similarly, coalitions can enhance union political power, as coalitions could be used to leverage political power to defend and regulate union and community concerns (Walsh 2000). Government is a multi-scaled decision-making body, operating at the scale of a city council, state or nation, but also at a local scale — at the scale of local electoral districts (Taylor and Flint 2000). Political power has historically been an important form of relational power for unions, yet arguably this form of power has declined as unions have become less capable of securing work regulation that supports the interests of unions or working people (Hudson 2001; Tattersall 2006a). Coalitions could provide a mechanism for unions to rebuild political influence by advocating for political regulation to act as a 'spatial fix' that defends the collective interests of labour against the
decentralising and competitive interests of capital (Herod 1995; Walsh 2000). This might not simply be at the national scale, but perhaps could be more successful at local metropolitan and municipal government (Walsh 2000; Pike, O'Brien and Tomaney 2004). Furthermore, because much public sector work is provided to a local consumer market and is considered socially valuable, there might be consumer or community organisation allies available for coalition work (Johnston 1994; Walsh 2000; Tattersall 2006a).

Public sector unions in particular reveal these intersections among human service work, fixed sources of public investment and the importance of political power for union power. This thesis focuses specifically on public sector union coalitions because they allow for a detailed examination of how scale, both locally and at multiple scales of government, affects the usefulness of coalitions for union strategy. However, while public sector unionism is a key research interest in this thesis, it is not the exclusive research focus. The findings in this thesis may extend beyond public sector union coalitions. This is because the fortunes of public sector union coalitions are produced in part by the public sector's multi-scalar nature rather than simply because of its public sector location.

Yet the ability for multi-scaled coalition action to deliver for unions also relates to the internal organisational scale(s) and capacity of unions themselves. It is argued that there is often a spatial gap between unions and community organisations. Community organisations tend to be based at the local scale whereas unions tend to be organised (and have vested authority and resources) with a leadership based at a state or national level (Wial 1993; Wills 2002; Pike, O'Brien and Tomaney 2004; Fine forthcoming). This question of the space of
union organisation has received limited attention from labour geographers, who tend to focus on the possibilities of scaling up union action to the global scale, often assuming that unions are powerful at the local scale (Harvey 1993, pp. 430-1; Peck 1996, p. 257; Castree, Coe, Ward et al. 2004, p. 209). This spatial gap may create difficulties for building strong coalitions at the local level. A union’s capacity, or ‘internal solidarity’, varies depending on the types of delegate and communication structures, and whether unions have decentralised branches which allow union rank and file members a space to participate in decision making (Levesque and Murray 2002; Pike, O’Brien and Tomaney 2004). Yet the relationship between multi-scalar union structures and coalitions is a gap in the coalition literature. In investigating the effect of union scale, this study also assesses the degree to which decentralised union structures affect the place-based power of union collaboration.

Labour geographers also suggest that the local in general may be a powerful site for union engagement in coalition unionism, because of the power of local social networks and ‘place consciousness’. It is at the local where workers live, reproduce their labour power, retain a memory of social action and where participation in coalitions is accessible (Harvey 1989; Martin, Sunley and Wills 1993; Hudson 2001; Wills 2004). The local scale is not an isolated space; geographers insist that it is shaped by and shapes social relations at other scales. However, the local retains an importance for coalitions because it is the space for participation and engagement in coalitions by union members and with

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7 Those who focus on ‘up-scaling’ to combat global capital often go so far as to deride the ‘militant particularism of labour struggle’. They firstly assume militant labour struggle exists (when arguably it is in crisis) and further assumes that local action is not sufficiently powerful to challenge employer or government decision making.
community organisations, and because the location of coalition action may be supported by place consciousness (Rainnie and Ellem forthcoming).

Place consciousness may also enhance union power and the possibilities of coalition unionism. Ellem uses the term place consciousness to argue that places can hold memories of struggle and experience, conditioning and affecting future actions (Ellem 2005).8 The local scale is a space of both workplace and non-workplace identities, and economic production and social reproduction (Savage 1998). It is where the membership base of community organisations such as religious organisations or immigrant organisations overlap with union membership (Wial 1993; Clawson 2003; Wills 2004). Similarly a history of struggle, particularly union struggle, may support future union and coalition organising. Conversely, but less studied empirically, a place may have a hostile place consciousness, where individuals from a particular location have a history of exclusion from unions or are anti-union (Patmore 1997). Within a multi-scaled or a locally-scaled coalition strategy, the power of coalition unionism may be impacted if staged at a local scale because of supportive or hostile place consciousness.

Labour geographers' insights about the importance of scale in industrial relations extend to coalition unionism. They open up questions about how the scalar nature of coalitions, the geography of industry and politics, the multi-scaled nature of unions and the role of the local scale and place consciousness shape the potential power coalitions can provide unions.

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8 Similarly Castree, Coe, Ward et al. use the term 'place identities' (Castree, Coe, Ward et al. 2004: p. 71).
1.4 *Rethinking powerful union collaboration*

This review of collaborative literature highlights the need for industrial relations to broaden its analysis to include community organisations. Furthermore, it identifies three discrete types of union collaborative power with community organisations that are suggestive of a new framework of collaboration. Drawn from three different literatures, this study argues that collaborative power operates as three distinct types: as relational power from the pluralists, class movement power from the radical theorists, and place-based power from the geographers. These types of collaborative power may provide vehicles for a renewal of union power.

These three types have similarities with the definitions of community and coalition set out in Chapter Two. Relational power connects to the 'organisational' definition of community and the 'inter-organisational relationships' element of coalitions; class movement power connects to the 'common interest/identity' definition of community and the 'common concern' element of coalitions; and place-based power connects to the 'place' definition of community and the 'scale' element of coalitions.

Bringing these three concepts together and connecting them with the theoretical project of the thesis overall, this section points to a new conceptual framework of union collaboration with community organisations, that builds on my definition of community. This is laid out in Figure 3.1.
Firstly, is the potential for relational power arising from union collaboration with community organisations. Pluralists emphasise the possibilities of ‘win-win’ relationships in collaboration, which are most likely when there is a mutuality of interest and trusting close behavioural relations between the parties. Radicals emphasise the perpetual contradiction between the competing needs of organisational autonomy and unity. Together, relational collaborative power can be measured to the extent to which a coalition manages the contradiction of unity and autonomy, builds organisational trust and works off identified interests in the pursuit of positive-sum collaborative relationships. Thus, coalitions can contribute to union renewal by changing the horizontal relational power available to unions.

Secondly, is the possibility of class movement power from union collaboration with community organisations. Pluralists suggest this form of power is a ‘legitimising form of power’, where coalitions enable unions to publicly act with
a ‘sword of justice’ rather than just vested interest (Flanders 1970; Frege, Heery and Turner 2004). Radicals take this further, suggesting that sustained coalitions can enhance the likelihood of union members to take political action, to expand their class consciousness and open a union’s organisational range. Indeed, coalitions can create an agenda-setting form of power if they integrate economic and political struggle, and link workplace struggle to the community; coalitions can contribute to union renewal by changing a union’s internal capacity.

Finally, coalitions offer unions the possibility of place-based collaborative power. Radicals note that multiple scales of union engagement are critical for powerful coalitions. For geographers, place-based power has two dimensions. First, place-based power is enhanced when unions can maximise the number of scales at which they operate – particularly at the local scale. Secondly, place-based power has a contextual element, where a union’s collaborative power varies depending on factors such as industrial location, whether the work of union members has direct impact on a definable (organised) public, and whether union coalition work is occurring in a site that has broader place consciousness that supports coalition or union action. Coalitions can contribute to union renewal by strategically enhancing how unions engage with their multi-scalar context.

This reworking of industrial relations theory creates a three-part framework, with types and measures of union collaborative power, that is explored through the thesis. The goal of this framework is to explore how collaboration can enhance the power of unions, and in particular help support union renewal. This moves beyond more instrumentalist conceptions of industrial relations theory, which seek to explore how collaboration can support union victories (Dabscheck 2002; Jones 2002). While victories are critically important, a renewal of union
organisational resources including sustainable horizontal relationships, building union agendas, enhanced member engagement and strategic responses to union context are also vital goals as they represent the bedrock of union power resources (Levesque and Murray 2002; Frege, Heery and Turner 2004).

The framework can be organised into three types of collaborative power – relational, class movement and place-based power. These can be broken up into measures identified by the three theories, and are outlined in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Types and measures of union collaborative power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pluralism</th>
<th>Radical</th>
<th>Labour geography</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relational power</strong></td>
<td>• Win-win relationships</td>
<td>• Relationships are strongest across the same scale</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Identifying self-interest</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Behavioural trust</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Class movement power</strong></td>
<td>• Legitimising power</td>
<td>• Organising across work and non-work identities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Opening up the organisational range of the union</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coalitions ‘changing’ unions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Broadening class consciousness of members’ engagement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Creating agenda-setting power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place-based power</strong></td>
<td>• Pluralism does not explicitly deal with the geography of unionism</td>
<td>• Union location: capital fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coalition strength is enhanced by member participation in coalition decision making and mobilisation</td>
<td>• Enhancing union political power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Multi-scalar articulation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Place consciousness</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Underpinning this framework is the question of how a 'positive-sum' form of union collaboration with community organisations is possible. Too often union (and community organisation) perceptions of external relations are that there are 'no permanent friends and no permanent enemies' (Osterman 2002), leaving coalitions to be a 'tactic' as part of a comprehensive campaign (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998). This thesis, by building an adaptive theory of collaboration, seeks to explore in the case studies the measures that make positive-sum collaborative relationships possible. It explores when and how these types of collaborative relationships can support union renewal, by simultaneously supporting powerful outcomes and enhancing the organisational capacity for unions.

2.0 When are Unions Likely to Engage in Coalition Unionism?
Union strategies, including coalition unionism, rarely develop evenly across national or international union movements. Rather, there are many internal and environmental factors that influence when these strategies are used. Yet there is little theoretical work or empirical study that seeks to track this variation and help explain why, for instance, coalition unionism appears more prevalent in the United States compared to the UK, or in the service industry rather than traditional blue-collar industries (Frege and Kelly 2004a; Tattersall forthcoming b). This section explores literature on union renewal, labour geography and social movement theory to develop a framework for understanding when unions are likely to engage in sustained collaboration with community organisations.

The idea that unions can change is a relatively recent focus, that contrasts to the common sense view of Michels that unions are rigid structures; victims of the
'iron law of oligarchy' (Michels 1958; Voss and Sherman 2000). Union renewal writers argue that certain structural or strategic factors can support union leaders or members to change their internal strategies. This review of research borrows from a recent approach used by Turner. Adapting resource mobilisation theory to union renewal, he categorises the pressures that generate union change as arising from both external pre-existing opportunities and choices internal to unions (Turner 2007). This formulation is embedded in sociology; Giddens's 'competent actor' is an agent confronted by conventions, constraints and social rules (Giddens 1984). It derives from Marx, who argued that the contradictions of agency and structure are a contradiction of history and present choices (Darlington 2002):

Men [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please. They do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past (Marx 1972, p. 437).

The approach taken here diverges from Turner's, as the focus in this thesis is on three different unions rather than an urban union movement. Additionally, I categorise different opportunities and choices using the definition of the term community from the Chapter Two. The aim of the review is to identify the multiple forces that affect union change, and to develop a framework capable of categorising those forces so they can be examined in the case studies.

2.1 Opportunities
A union's environmental and historical context shapes the kind of strategies that it is likely to develop. As noted in Chapter Two, the term opportunity structure, adapted from social movement theory, stresses the importance of structural and
environmental factors in social movement emergence (Tarrow 1994; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Opportunity structure is a set of signals and processes that make social movement participation possible and plausible to a wide audience (Tarrow 1994, pp. 85-9; Greer, Byrd and Fleron 2007). This section explores three key opportunities, each deriving from the definition of community. It firstly considers the political and economic context (place), then union relationships and structural features (organisation), and finally pre-existing union identities (common interest/identity).

2.1.1 Political and economic context
At an instrumental level, the sharp decline in union political and economic influence has heightened the need for collaboration with community organisations. As Hyman notes 'only when unions have been forced to come to terms with the decline in their autonomous influence have they contemplated broader alliances of this kind’ (Hyman 2001, p. 62).

Research in union renewal frequently emphasises the current hostile political and economic context as the factor that both drives down union density and creates an opportunity structure that may inspire strategic innovation and renewal in unions (Garner 1989; Bronfenbrenner, Freidman, Hurd et al. 1998; Peetz 1998; Cooper 2001; cf Darlington 2002; Crosby 2005; cf Turner and Cornfield 2007). While the sharp decline in union power is a key force in propelling collaboration, this study argues overall that it is not the only opportunity relevant for a shift to collaboration with community organisations.
The political influence of unions through political parties and quasi-judicial regulatory structures has declined, creating opportunities for new forms of political power through collaboration. 'Third way', 'new labour' parties that have spread in Australia, the United States, Canada and Britain in the 1990s, argue that state intervention into the economy should be conditioned by the needs of international economic competitiveness (Buchanan and Watson 2001). Third way advocates also argue that unions no longer represent core community interests because of declining membership. Upchurch, amongst others, suggests this creates a 'crisis of social democratic unionism', where traditional political support leads to strategic renewal, that may lead to the use of coalitions by unions as an alternative vehicle to galvanise support for union demands (Hyman 2001; Carter and Cooper 2002; Wills 2002; Wills 2003; Upchurch, Taylor and Mathers 2006). Similarly, it is suggested that the more widespread practice of coalitions in the United States than in other industrialised countries may directly relate to the relative weakness of the relationship between unions and the US Democratic Party (Moody 1997; Fine 2003).

Yet the extent to which political party relationships 'cause' coalition unionism is ambiguous. While Upchurch argues that there is a direct relationship between the 'collapse' of social democratic unionism and the growth of coalition practice, Frege and Kelly argue that the demise of labour party relations have not spurred widespread coalition unionism in the UK (Frege and Kelly 2004a; Upchurch, Taylor and Mathers 2006). While there is a consensus that shifting labour party-union relations represent a threat to union power, that shift appears to be one of many factors rather than a singular cause of coalition unionism.
Additionally, it is uncertain what impact coalitions have on union-party relationships and whether they renew union political power or create further crisis. Empirical examples from Australia suggest that where isolated unions embark on coalition strategies alone, they may face increased hostility from social democratic parties (Markey and Nixon 2004; Tattersall 2006a). In contrast, in the US, where there has been support for coalitions across the labour movement, in Los Angeles, coalition unionism has renewed and strengthened union-party relationships (Frank and Wong 2004; Markey and Nixon 2004; Hauptmeier and Turner 2007). However, coalition strategies have sometimes been a victim of their own success, as in South Africa where the success of the Congress of South African Trade Unions’ (COSATU) anti-apartheid coalitions reduced the practice of coalitions once the ANC intensified its political relationship with COSATU (von Holdt 2002). It raises the question of whether coalitions are limited, as one side of a dialectic of political power, or if coalitions can be a more comprehensive and longer-term strategy for union renewal.

Institutionally, employer-supported restrictions of quasi-judicial regulatory structures are reducing their importance for unions, potentially provoking coalition relationships. Institutions such as the Australian Industrial Relations Commission or the National Labour Relations Board in the US were a key vehicle for union recognition and dispute resolution under Keynesianism (Howard 1977; Wial 1993). Yet these institutions have been redrawn as employment law has come to reflect the interests of employers (Peetz 1998). These changes have prompted some unions to seek alternative strategies for bargaining, including comprehensive campaigning (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998; Savage 1998; Benz 2005). However, this factor, while important, is unlikely to be a singular ‘cause’ of coalition practice. As Turner notes it is not evident that hostile legal
environments produce coalition. For instance, there is no evidence to suggest that unions in US "right to work" states produce a greater likelihood of coalition practice (Turner 2007).

A union’s economic context, including falling union density and hostile economic climate, is regularly cited as a factor in likely coalition practice. Case study documentation of coalitions has coincided with the economic environment of international competition and plant closures (Haines and Klein 1982; Banks 1990; Brecher and Costello 1990a; Craypo and Nissen 1993; Robinson 2000a). In the public sector, fiscally conservative budgeting, combined with contracting out and privatisation, has been a factor in some public service unions embracing coalitions with service consumers (Johnston 1994; Carpenter 2000; Terry 2000; Cutcher 2004; Tattersall 2006a). Furthermore, the decentralisation of work and work regulation through small workplaces, out-sourcing and casualisation has required unions to search for alternatives to ‘hot-shop organising’. These have included opportunities for community-based unionism, including coalitions (Heckscher 1988; Miles 1989; Cobble 1991; Wial 1993; Savage 1998; Walsh 2000; Wills 2002; Osterman 2006).

As labour geographers argue, economic context may provide rich opportunities for coalitions for certain unions. As discussed in the previous section, spatial fixes that tie capital to place, whether through government, industry, investment or consumers, create opportunities for coalition formation in the unions that work in those industries (Herod 1998; Walsh 2000; Ellem 2003). These coalitions may act to re-regulate labour and community standards in the interests of unions. Thus local coalitions may be more likely in primary industries such as the public sector, or mining or service industries where the labour and product
market have common geographies (Johnston 1994; Savage 1998; Ellem 2003; Ellem 2003; Ellem 2005). Coalitions are still viable in other industries, such as those that formed around US plant closures in the 1980s (Haines and Klein 1982; Lynd 1983; Craypo and Nissen 1993; Nissen 1995; Swinney 1999). However, these campaigns were often unsuccessful because of the spatial competitiveness in manufacturing – work was able to be moved to a cheaper location (Nissen 1995; Walsh 2000).

Economic and political context is clearly an important factor in likely coalition development. However, other organisational and identity-based opportunities are also influential to the opportunity structure and are discussed below.

2.1.2 Organisational relationships and features

A union’s pre-existing organisational relationships and organisational structure can also support unions to engage in coalitions. This might include organisational structure and form, and the existence of union and community organisation relationships.

Internal organisational features of unions, such as decentralised member-based participatory structures and member homogeneity, may make long-term coalitions more likely. A union is more likely to foster internal commitment to coalition campaigns if it has participatory structures that can involve members in those campaigns (Levesque and Murray 2002; Peetz and Pocock 2006b). A coalition may struggle to engage union members unless there are structures which allow for member participation, initiation and mobilisation (Hyman 2001). Additionally, given that many community organisations often operate at a local
neighbourhood scale (Wial 1993, p. 698; Wills 2002), without local structures a union may limit its ability to harness and organise relationships with potential community partners. Thus unions with multiple scales of member engagement, at a workplace, community or regional level, as well as at a union's head office, may be more capable of engaging members and supporting membership engagement at the local scale and in multi-scaled coalitions (Wial 1993; Pike, O'Brien and Tomaney 2004).

The ability to cultivate common experience across the membership may also vary depending on the perceived and actual homogeneity or heterogeneity between union members (Delaney, Jarley and Fioritio 1996). Kelly argues that collective action frames are more successful where union member experiences are common, such as deriving from common workplace or occupational experiences (Kelly 1998). Where a union has a degree of industrial or occupational homogeneity, it may be more likely to cultivate a higher degree of support for an issue across the union, thus collaboration may have wider support (Tattersall 2006a).

Union relationships with peak councils or other unions may support coalition practice by cultivating community relationships that provide opportunities for coalition unionism in individual unions (Ellem and Shields 2004; Tattersall 2007a). Central labour councils in the US can be agents for change. For instance the AFL-CIO Union Cities program supported coalition practice (Heckshér and Palmer 1993; Ness and Eimer 2001; Byrd and Rhee 2004; Luce and Nelson 2004; Reynolds 2004a). Ellem and Shields argue it is central labour councils' capacity to act as agents of mobilisation that can generate coalition unionism. Terry affirms that a labour council's overarching position above the imperative of
sectional industrial concerns helps it to negotiate common concerns with community organisations (Terry 2000; Ellem and Shields 2004). Yet labour councils are not a pre-requisite to coalition formation, as Greer demonstrates (Greer and Fleron 2005). The relative affect of peak councils on individual union strategy in part relates to their influence over affiliates as a whole (Briggs 2004).

Similarly, other unions can generate opportunities for coalitions by influencing a union to change its strategy. This change process can be influenced by unions at the same scale (Heery, Simms, Delbridge et al. 2000; Cooper 2002; Obach 2004), or national unions which, for instance, make resources and support available for coalition strategies (Voss and Sherman 2000). Yet it is uncertain how a shift to coalition unionism is affected by union collaboration or competition.

Coalition unionism also requires community partners; opportunities vary depending whether unions have ready community allies (Tarrow 1994). Public sector unions may be more likely to engage in coalitions because of the availability of interested allies amongst organised users of social services (Carpenter 2000; Terry 2000). This can also extend to the private sector. For instance, morality claims against low wages or bad employers successfully mobilised faith-based community organisations as partners in the Justice for Janitors campaign (Turner 2007). Tight-knit identity-based networks, particularly amongst immigrant workers, may also help build community relationships. This is because union members who are simultaneously members of unions, community organisations and religious organisations may support coalition formation through bridge building (Rose 2000; Clawson 2003; Turner 2007).
2.1.3 Union Identities

Finally, pre-existing union identities, practices or capacity may also create opportunities for coalition unionism. Unions who are committed to campaigning across a broad range of social concerns, beyond wages and conditions, may find it easier to cultivate a common interest with community organisations (Obach 2004; Krinsky and Resse 2006). For instance, unions with a history of militancy, ideological radicalism or broad interest representation beyond wages because of the professional or industrial concerns of members, may be more likely to engage in coalitions (Hyman 1994; Waterman 1998; Robinson 2000a; Hyman 2001; von Holdt 2002; Frege, Heery and Turner 2004; Obach 2004). This may also include unions with a more socially conservative frame, such as European Catholic unions which forged strong coalitions with the churches (Hyman 2001; Streeck and Hassel 2003).

Furthermore, if coalitions are a familiar, historical tactic for a particular union, then it is more likely that they will be used again as a future strategy. Social movement theorists use the term 'repertoire of contention' to demonstrate how social movement organisations tend to engage in similar types of action over time (Tarrow 1994). Familiar tactics are also likely to be repeated by unions (Frege and Kelly 2004a). The use of ad hoc alliances with community organisations can thus provide a basis for repeated, and possibly deeper, future coalitions (Tattersall 2005).

Yet, as Hyman argues, union identity and thus the potential for coalition unionism is not fixed, but intimately connected to a union’s economic and political context (Hyman 2001). He argues that the harsh context for unions is
creating a crisis in narrow sectional union identities, which may in turn create greater opportunities for coalition unionism in traditionally non-militant unions.

Union identity can also derive from the membership base of the union and dominant non-workplace identities, such as ethnicity, faith or gender. Diversity may support strategic innovation as member support creates pressure for unions to represent interests beyond the workplace (Delaney, Jarley and Fioritio 1996; Nissen 2001). For instance, Needleman argues that female-dominated workplaces may be more likely to support campaigns that integrate work and family issues, because work and family are more connected in many women’s lives (Needleman 1998b). Similarly, ethnically or racially diverse workplaces have a direct concern for issues of racial equality and civil rights (Flug 1990; Kelley 1997; Clawson 2003; Korstad 2003).

Union identity may also be enhanced by union education programs. Union education may increase political awareness and breadth of concern, cultivate political concerns beyond wages and conditions, and create a basis of solidarity where personal interests are connected more broadly to industry, region or class (Freire 1972; Spencer 1994; Bernard 2002).

Finally, coalitions may be more likely to develop in large, resource-rich unions which have the capacity to dedicate surplus staff and money to coalition participation (Tattersall 2006a). Coalition unionism can be a resource-intensive union strategy; coalition participation often requires dedicated staff and campaign budgets (Delaney, Jarley and Fioritio 1996). In addition, pre-existing internal capacity such as internal communication structures or experience in
turning out members to events such as rallies, may provide opportunities for member engagement in coalition unionism.

2.1.4 Opportunities for long-term coalitions

This review builds a framework to explain when coalitions are likely to develop. It incorporates multiple opportunity factors, in contrast to scholarship that focuses on single causes of coalition development. The review points to an interconnection between these factors: while union identity may be a key factor in likely coalition practice, identities change in light of political context, which may cause coalition unionism to develop depending on the availability of community organisations.

Importantly, this framework connects back to the definition of community. It suggests that 'community' characteristics in a union’s opportunity structure support a shift to coalition unionism. These community orientations within unions can be categorised according to place, organisation and common interest and identity. These three sets of opportunities for collaboration are outlined in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Opportunities for collaboration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Common interest/identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political and economic context</td>
<td>Union relationships</td>
<td>Union identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• legal regulatory structure</td>
<td>• Deep union structure</td>
<td>• Wide-union identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• union-social democratic party relationships</td>
<td>• Union homogeneity</td>
<td>• Identity crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• union density</td>
<td>• Peak councils</td>
<td>• Non-work identities in membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• spatial fixes</td>
<td>• Other unions</td>
<td>• Union education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Available community organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td>• History of coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities for union collaboration with community organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Union size</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2 Choice
Opportunities aside, the development of union practice is not simply a force of nature. A union must choose to commit to coalition unionism, given the surrounding opportunities (Pocock 1998, pp. 41-2). Unions are ‘strategic actors’ (Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986), and as Turner argues, coalition unionism is a conscious strategic choice by unions amidst the opportunities in which they find themselves (Turner 2007).

Again, the definition of community is used to structure the research: firstly, considering unions as organisations and exploring how different union actors influence unions to ‘choose’ coalition unionism; secondly, considering common interest and how the selected issue agenda of a coalition affects union engagement in coalitions; thirdly, considering organisational scale, and how the choice to activate a union’s internal solidarity structures may make sustained collaboration more likely.
The purpose of this review is to demonstrate how existing research on choices suffers from similar limitations as the research on opportunities. The limitations are highlighted by the tendency to single out isolated actors as 'causes' of coalitions. The goal is to develop a dialectical approach to explain when coalitions are likely to develop.

2.2.1 Organisational actors
Specific union actors are often held out as key for choosing, or causing, coalition unionism (Hyman 1975; Delaney, Jarley and Fioritio 1996). Most commonly, leadership support is said to be critical for organisational change, including sustained coalition engagement (Nissen 2000; Voss and Sherman 2000; Cooper 2001; Frege, Heery and Turner 2004). Union leaders are the key actors responsible for responding to organisational crisis, and it is through leaders that organisational relationships tend to be first cultivated (Garner 1989; Delaney, Jarley and Fioritio 1996; Cooper 2001). Conversely, 'bottom up' democratising pressure is also suggested as a key agent for collaboration. Moody, for example, presents an idealised picture of rank and file democratic pressure as key for initiating and promoting sustained 'democratic' coalitions (Moody 1997; Moody 1999).

In addition, staff and delegate characteristics are also identified as important for actor-compelled change. Voss and Sherman suggest the importance of a social movement background for union leaders and staff (Voss and Sherman 2000). Rose argues that 'bridge building' officials or union activists with experience in social movements may use that experience to generate support for coalition
practice and help overcome initial cultural differences when working with community organisations (Rose 2000). In her study of organising, Cooper argues that union officials who support strategic change play a key role in adapting strategies and countering resistance, especially amongst staff (Cooper 2002).

In contrast to a tendency to select single primary agents of strategic change (Weinbaum and Lafer 2002), Hyman emphasises that it is the interconnection of union forces that propels change. He argues that unions contain a complex set of relations, decision-making bodies and political factions that all influence the development of strategy (Clegg 1970, p. 80; Hyman 1975, pp. 92-3; Tattersall forthcoming b). For Hyman, union change occurs through a dialectical tension between the need for 'power for' union members and leadership 'power over' union members (Hyman 1975; Hyman 1989). The effect of a union leader's decision varies significantly because of this dialectic. For instance, rank and file pressure may mean that a leader's decision 'over' members dialectically creates a strategy that is also 'for' members (Hyman 1989, p. 90). In contrast, where members are not involved in decision making, even the most benevolent leader may be making decisions that reflect a leader's 'power over' rather than 'power for' members. Thus, Hyman emphasises that greater union engagement in decision-making processes at all levels of the union creates a rich dialectic of engagement, and produces a union that has higher levels of unity over fragmentation (Hyman 1989).

Adapting Hyman's analysis of union change to the debates on union strategy provides a framework for exploring the process of coalition development in my case studies of long-term coalitions. Thus it is the existence and degree of support for coalitions amongst stewards or delegates, part-time officials, bridge
builders, leaders and factions that highly influences the likelihood of coalition unionism. Furthermore, these different paths for ‘choosing’ to engage in coalitions potentially varies the depth of union support and engagement (Tattersall 2006c; Tattersall 2006d; Tattersall forthcoming b).

While the issue of organisational support allows us to examine individual agents of change, the ability to cultivate member or leadership support is affected by the choice of issues and the capacity for multi-scaled collaboration, which are considered below.

2.2.2 Common identities and interests within the union

Engagement in collaboration is also affected by whether the issue selected for collaboration connects to union members. The connection between issue and the direct interest and experiences of the membership is relevant. As EP Thompson argues, class relations take shape through lived experience (Thompson 1963; Martin, Sunley and Wills 1993; Wills 1998), and by extension, the connection of coalition issues to the actual lived experience of union members is more likely to gain member support than abstract or distant concerns (Fantasia 1988). For instance, a teacher is likely to connect to a campaign on public education because there is a direct connection between education funding and working conditions (Johnston 1994; Tattersall 2006a). Similarly, union members are generally more likely to connect to coalitions that directly support bargaining or workplace conditions (Bramble 2001; Nissen 2004a). Membership support is more likely if the common interest at the heart of the coalition relates to the common experiences of union members.
Yet membership engagement need not always be an instrumental construction of self-interest. Pre-existing opportunities may open up a union to create a broader basis of solidarity for common concern. Union education may enhance political awareness and breadth of concern, cultivating a political consciousness beyond wages and conditions and creating a basis of solidarity where personal interests are connected more broadly to industry, region or class (Freire 1972; Spencer 1994; Bernard 2002; Nissen 2002). Furthermore, if an issue dialectically relates to a widespread non-work identity, then that issue may also receive widespread support. Yet this is not automatic, as Needleman and Nissen argue, it is necessary for the identity to be recognised and valued by the union, either through struggle, such as the work of the women’s movement in the 1970s, or being recognised by the union leadership (Needleman 1998b; Nissen 2001; Nissen 2002). This recognition process dialectically opens a union’s identity, making membership engagement in coalitions more likely.

2.2.3 Organisational scale

The ability to undertake sustainable coalition unionism and the extent to which that coalition unionism will be shallow or deep is affected by the organisational scale and capacity of the union, and the extent to which that capacity is engaged in the coalition campaign. If common interest tries to measure and predict the breadth of union support for coalition unionism, then organisational scale seeks to understand the degree to which the rank and file are engaged in the coalition campaign.

Union collaboration can originate and operate at a variety of organisational scales which dialectically interrelate with the external environment. Often
coalitions are focused at the scale of union leaders and union offices, where membership participation is minimal (Clawson 2003; Tattersall 2005). Yet for a coalition to act with any depth, the desire to engage in a coalition must extend beyond the leadership and either be driven by the membership, such as a factional grouping, or be supported by it.

Localised membership support may come from the external environment in which the union operates. Location, place consciousness and socio-economic conditions may directly contribute to member engagement in coalitions. Ellem argues that it was the geographic isolation and the union place consciousness of the Pilbara region that inspired several unions in a mining town to embrace broad coalitional strategies (Ellem 2003). Speaking broadly, scholars have privileged the local scale and regional locations as a space for participation, politicisation, place consciousness and thus coalition sustainability (Jonas 1998; Walsh 2000; Darlington 2005; Rainnie and Ellem forthcoming). Indeed, at the local scale, there is a more ready capacity to connect internal union capacity to broader coalition forms such as broker organisations, facilitating union member engagement and participation in coalition decision making and planning (Tattersall 2006c).

The capacity for a union to act locally relies in part on the pre-existing opportunity of decentralised membership structures that facilitate local member engagement and participation in the decision making, planning and tactics of coalition unionism. Yet deep coalition unionism will not happen simply because these structures exist, but only if these structures are activated. Action may arise from decision-making processes, where factions, stewards or union members are the advocates for coalition strategies (Fantasia 1988; Darlington 2002; Darlington
Conversely, coalition unionism may spread as the leadership engages members in micro-mobilisations that become opportunities for organising around the issues of the coalition, generating member support. As Kelly emphasises, it is through micro-mobilisations, at the scale of delegates and rank and file leaders, that commitment to collective action takes place (Kelly 1998). Micro-mobilisations may happen through a union creating internal tactical opportunities for engagement, such as rallies, or through external forces such as outreach by a coalition broker organisation or a harsh local socio-economic context (Tattersall 2006c). Here the relational and multi-scalar operation of coalition unionism is important. Multi-scalar capacity allows local action to feed back into multi-scalar engagement, avoiding local isolation (Terry 2000; Ellem 2005).

The effectiveness of locally scaled member engagement will also depend on the skill and capacity of local union activists. For instance, Darlington argues that ideological, radical rank and file stewards play a critical role in stimulating member activism (Darlington 2002; Darlington 2005). Union members with organisational experience outside the union, such as bridge builders, may have a strong commitment to undertake micro-mobilisations that facilitate the decentralisation of the campaign to workplaces or regional associations of delegates. Yet, as Peetz and Pocock argue, bridge builders are more powerful supporters of coalition practice inside unions if they have been trained in union organising (Peetz and Pocock 2006b).
2.2.4 Choices to collaborate

Thus, for coalition unionism to develop, a union must act as a 'strategic agent' and choose to embrace the practice of coalitions, given the available opportunity structure (Turner 2007). The types of organisational actors promoting coalition unionism, the member common interest in the coalition issues and the scale of organisational engagement all shape whether a union is likely to engage in a coalition. These variations in 'choices' for coalition unionism are outlined in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Choices for coalition unionism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Common interest/identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisational decision makers</td>
<td>Power over and power for union members, Leaders, Rank and file pressure, Bridge builders, Staff</td>
<td>Touching member experience, Practices that open union identity – education, non-work identity, past coalition practice, Homogeneity of interest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, this discussion reveals that the types of actors that support coalitions not only affect whether collaboration is likely, but condition the depth of engagement in coalition unionism. For instance, leadership support for a coalition may provoke coalition unionism. But as Hyman suggests, the coalition unionism will operate at a different quality and depth when the shift in strategy,
includes or is provoked by, a group of rank and file unionists. The link between how a coalition embraces coalition unionism and the depth of coalition unionism is an under-theorised area of research and is examined in the case studies.

2.3 When is coalition unionism likely to develop?
Analysis of when coalition unionism is likely to develop is weakened by a tendency to isolate single factors as responsible for the shifts in strategy. In contrast, this framework of opportunities and choices identifies a multiplicity of factors that may be responsible for coalition practice. The relative importance of, and relationships between, these factors and coalition practice is examined in the case studies.

The framework suggests that coalition unionism is likely to develop given the intensity of ‘community-based’ opportunities that derive from a union’s surroundings and history, as well as choices that come from internal union structure, engagement and interest. Importantly, these opportunities and choices do not act as singularly important causes, but operate as intertwined processes. For instance, an opportunity such as a major crisis that affects union members creates dialectical pressure from union members to agitate for strategic change, which may pressure a leader to embrace coalition unionism. Moreover, the different ways in which coalition unionism develops shape the kinds of coalition unionism that unions practice.

3.0 Conclusions from the Literature Review
The past two chapters explored frameworks of coalition success and when coalitions might be a powerful and likely union strategy. This chapter focused
specifically on the role of unions in coalition and relied on industrial relations and multi-disciplinary contributions to consider when coalition unionism can support union campaign outcomes and strengthen a union's horizontal and internal power resources. This question highlights a stark gap in union renewal literature. Collaboration is under-investigated by industrial relations, and thus my contribution is not only to identify this gap but to suggest a possible three-part collaborative framework that may help to fill it.

This chapter identified three elements of powerful union collaboration with community organisations, each of which contribute to union renewal. Firstly, relational power, which creates power for unions by developing powerful, intertwined trusting relationships that also respect the need for a mutual balance of unity and organisational autonomy; secondly, class movement power, which creates power for unions by broadening the vision or organisational range of unions, building class consciousness amongst union members and assisting a union to develop a counter-hegemonic agenda for union action and thirdly, place-based power, which enhances union power by helping unions access power from the context in which they operate. This may be power from a union's local environment through multi-scalar union structures or tendencies to industrial capital fixes. In parallel to the findings in Chapter Two on successful coalitions, this study found that coalition unionism is powerful for unions when unions engage with coalitions to produce mutual relationships, to forge mutual interest-based agendas and to act at multiple scales.

This chapter also investigated when unions are likely to engage in coalition unionism, finding that coalition unionism is supported by a strong dialectical connection between historical or contextual opportunities and an internal will
that supports coalitions as a particular union strategy. Coalition unionism is supported by political and economic opportunities and the choices taken at an internal organisational scale; opportunities can also come from pre-existing union identities and the choices made about the types of campaign undertaken and finally, opportunities may also derive from the organisational structural and relational context of a union as well as the kinds of organisational actors that ‘choose’ coalition unionism.

These specific theories on how coalitions can be powerful for unions directly relate back to the analysis in Chapter Two. After all, for a coalition to be powerful for unions it must also be a successful coalition form in itself.

Therefore, Chapter Two explored why and how coalition unionism is likely to be successful. Using the definition of community, it identified three elements of coalitions. Coalitions vary according to their type of common concern, inter-organisational relations, and how those relationships respond to an external context, which is defined by political opportunities and multiple scales of decision making and organisational capacity.

Underpinning this analysis was an understanding that coalitions can successfully achieve external outcomes, a supportive political climate, sustain relationships and build the capacity of participating organisations. This success can be measured using the three elements of coalitions. A coalition’s inter-organisational relations support coalition success depending on whether they supported organisational autonomy as well as organisational unity, had formal and informal connections between the organisations and engage the commitment of powerful organisations. A coalition’s common concern supports coalition
success depending on the degree to which it engages the mutual interests and values of organisational leaders, tapped into the direct interests of members and supported a positive, public social frame. A coalition’s scale supported coalition success depending on its ability to harness and create political opportunities, act at multiple scales and operate with locally scaled broker organisations.

Moreover, Chapter Two identified three possible ideal types of coalition unionism, working off the three axes of coalitions: agenda-driven coalition unionism, relationships-driven coalition unionism and mobilising coalition unionism. Agenda-driven coalition unionism has a strong common concern and strong contextual and multi-scalar capacity with weaker inter-organisational relationships. Relationship-driven coalition unionism has a strong set of inter-organisational relationships and a strong multi-scaled capacity with weaker common concern. Mobilisation coalition unionism has a strong set of inter-organisational relationships and a strong set of common concern, but a weaker contextual-multi-scaled capacity. These ideal types can be distinguished by the fact that their organisational capacity is focused on two of the three elements. This parallels Hyman’s assessment of union identities, which classifies different types of European unionism from three discrete union identities – market, class and society (Hyman 2001).

Underpinning all this theoretical work is the original conceptualisation of community that was introduced in Chapter Two. The idea that community has three discrete meanings – organisation, common concern and place – becomes a constant theme and guide for the theory of the thesis as a whole. Furthermore, the three frameworks identified in this review help to explain how and when coalitions are powerful for unions and when coalitions are likely to develop. The
synthesis of these literatures provides a testable set of questions that can be explored through the thesis's empirical studies.
Chapter Four
Methodological Approach to Coalition Unionism

This thesis explores the viability of coalition unionism as a strategy for union renewal. It develops three frameworks for understanding how coalitions contribute to union renewal. The first framework assists understanding by identifying the elements of coalition unionism that are likely to ensure coalition success. The second framework considers whether coalitions help support union renewal by increasing union collaborative power. The third framework explores when unions are likely to engage in coalitions. These frameworks, assembled from the literature review in Chapters Two and Three, go to the heart of the research questions that are the focus of this thesis.

This study also developed benchmarks for coalition success. Success is defined by four criteria: political outcomes, political climate change, sustaining relationships between coalition organisations and increasing the capacity of the participating organisations. These four outcomes refer to external achievements, for instance influencing policy decisions or achieving political climate change. Success is also defined by subjective measures, for example achieving sustainable relationships between community organisations and unions (horizontal solidarity) and increasing the internal capacity of unions (vertical solidarity) (Levesque and Murray 2002).

To address these research questions and assess coalition success, this thesis undertakes three internationally comparative case studies of coalitions in global cities located in countries with similar industrialised liberal market economies (Sassen 1991; Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor 1999; Sassen 2001; Hall and Soskice 2002).
The purpose is to explore the patterns of coalition practice and union participation over time in order to analyse the elements of coalition success and how coalition unionism can be powerful for unions.

This chapter firstly outlines the international comparative method. It considers the selection of case studies in global cities, and in liberal market economies and explains the significant similarities and differences in the case selections. The chapter explores the importance of the case study method used in the thesis, and identifies the variables analysed in the case study chapters.

1.0 Coalitions in Global Cities

The three case studies compare unions and coalitions across three countries, Australia, Canada and the USA, in three global cities, Sydney, Toronto and Chicago. As Strauss argues, by undertaking research in different national contexts, it is hoped that uniformities in coalition practice, as well as universal rules can be identified to explain the differences between the studies (Strauss 1998). By undertaking an international comparison, this thesis simultaneously considers how structure and agency shape coalition practice.

These countries and cities have been selected because of their contextual and economic similarities, while acknowledging small political and organisational differences between them (Walker 1967; Bean 1994, pp. 12-3; Wailes 1999). By combining similarity and difference, the case studies test the relative importance of political context and organisational differences as variables, while also identifying common traits of coalition unionism that operate across national boundaries.
An international comparative method was the only way this study could analyse the extent to which my coalition frameworks are generalisable. An international comparison, rather than national comparison, allows an assessment of the impact of national political context (Banks 1974; Bean 1994; Strauss 1998). The aim of the approach is to foster new insights into coalition practice by showing what is either unique about particular national arrangements or common across them (Rose 1983; Bean 1994).

While international comparative research can reveal important insights about coalition practice (Bean 1994, p. 8), this is very rare. Internationally comparative research is dominated by ‘parallel descriptors’, where renewal strategies in different countries are explored often in a single text, with studies by different authors (Strauss 1998, p. 178; Fairbrother and Yates 2003; Turner and Cornfield 2007). International comparison tends to occur through research teams, rather than as single author comparisons (Frege and Kelly 2004b; Turner 2007). While multiple author comparison is a useful approach, there are distinct advantages to a single author approach. As Whipp argues, a single author approach can uncover complex processes and hidden features of coalition practices across national contexts may become more apparent (Whipp 1998). There is far less research where a single author investigates a specific renewal strategy in different national contexts to explore an explicitly defined framework. By having a single author undertake internationally comparative qualitative research, this thesis seeks to fill this methodological gap.

When international coalition practice is analysed, comparison tends to be trans-Atlantic, comparing different types of national economic and political contexts
Trans-Atlantic research, particularly in the recent *Varieties of Unionism* study, focuses on how different economic and political contexts shape coalition practice (Hall and Soskice 2001). However, by focusing on differences, attention tends to be drawn to how national context shapes renewal strategies (Hay 2004; Hay 2005). This is because the political and economic differences between the coordinated market economies of Europe and the liberal market economies of North America are vast (Hyman 2001; Frege and Kelly 2004b).

However this study is different. It selected cases that maximise similarities. In contrast to the trans-Atlantic studies of coalitions, this work considers Australia, Canada and the US, which are compared less frequently. In doing so, this study acknowledges 'small' political difference while attempting to control for economic context (Wailes 1999). The thesis firstly, analyses if political context is an important variable in coalition practice across countries; and secondly, if the common themes of coalition practice are prevalent internationally. It has also tried to avoid the pitfalls of similar matched pairs comparison, by identifying important small differences between the liberal market economies that have been selected (Sorge 1976; Wailes 1999). The similarities and differences between the locations of the case studies are outlined below.

1.1 *Controlling for similarities: global cities in liberal market economies*

The methodology in this thesis controls for similarities in context in two ways: by firstly selecting three countries in similar liberal market economies, and secondly, selecting three similar global cities within these three liberal market economies.
Australia, Canada and the United States are said to have similar economies. In political economy, world systems theory categorises each of them as similar ‘core’ industrial countries (Wallerstein 1979; Geynne, Klak and Shaw 2003). The varieties of capitalism literature also argues that Australia, Canada and the United States are all examples of liberal market economies, one of two ‘varieties of capitalism’ in industrialised national economies (Hall and Soskice 2001). The varieties of capitalism approach is an ascendant paradigm in the comparative political economy of advanced capitalist countries (Coates 2005; Hay 2005, p. 106; Frege 2006). It is a nation-state, and firm-centric approach that suggests that capitalist economies generally develop one of two responses to problems relating to industrial relations, skills, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and employee relations (Hall and Soskice 2001, pp. 4, 6-7). Two groups of national economies are identified: liberal market economies (LME) and coordinated market economies (CME). In LME countries production is the economic activity of firms coordinated ‘primarily via hierarchies and competitive market arrangements’, whereas within CME countries, firms depend more heavily on non-market relationships to coordinate their core competencies (Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 8). The varieties of capitalism literature argues that there are fundamental similarities among Australia, Canada and the United States, that produce similar institutional state arrangements supporting the market’s management of private enterprise decisions.

While the varieties of capitalism literature is widely supported (Visser 2003; Frege and Kelly 2004b; Frege 2006), it has several limitations that this study seeks to accommodate. This thesis uses varieties of capitalism as a means of controlling for similar practices of economies in present time. It recognises that
LME's divergent histories may be significant for coalition practice (Hay 2004; Hay 2005), by identifying key political differences among Australia, Canada and the United States.

To enhance the economic similarities in the three-country comparison, this study also selected three 'global cities' in each of these countries to locate the research. Global cities are command centres in the global economy, each having a strong presence of finance capital and banking, many corporate headquarters and producer service firms that support corporate headquarters (Sassen 1991; Daly and Prichard 2000; Connell 2000b; Sassen 2004). There is a vast literature that ranges from identifying world cities or global cities by the presence of corporate headquarters, producer services (such as financing, legal firms), city infrastructure or cultural events. There is a preoccupation in global cities research to rank the cities by reference to single or combinations of, empirical attributes (Taylor 1997; Hall 2001). The purpose here is not to privilege a particular perspective, but rather to note that whether cities are categorised according to the presence of corporate headquarters (Friedmann 1986; Short, Kim, Kuss et al. 1986), advanced producer services (Sassen 1991; Friedmann 1995; Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor 1999; Sassen 1999; Sassen 2001), or even a combination of these and other factors (Connell 2000a; Taylor 2001), Sydney, Chicago and Toronto are all repeatedly identified as similar, powerful second-tier global or world cities (Todd 1998; Connell 2000b; Madigan 2004; Brenner and Keil 2006; GAWC 2006).9

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9 There are some differences amongst the frameworks, Beaverstock et al. (1999) argue that Chicago is an 'alpha' world city, while Sydney and Toronto are 'beta'. Conversely, Sassen has used the term global city to describe Sydney, Toronto and Chicago (Sassen 2001).
Analysing global cities allows this thesis to investigate the viability of coalitions in shaping the direction of regional economies, and responding to the problem of rising inequality and declining local accountability in global cities. Sassen argues that global cities 'hollow out the middle', creating class polarisation and increasing inequality (Sassen 1991, p. 245; Sassen 1995). She also suggests that there is likely to be an accountability crisis in global cities, as business interests over-determine local decision-making processes, rather than the individuals who live there (Sassen 1991, p. 334).

Heightened inequality and a potential lack of democracy in global cities is widely accepted (even if the causes are debated) (Friedmann 1986; Hamnett 1996; Baum 1997; Fainstein 2001; May, Wills, Datta et al. 2006). Yet the global cities literature has given limited attention to how inequality and a democratic deficit can be overcome (May, Wills, Datta et al. 2006). This thesis, by investigating how coalitions can achieve outcomes and shape the political climate in global cities, may contribute to this gap by exploring whether coalitions are a viable strategy for rebuilding local control and re-regulating global cities in the interests of those who live and work there.

Selecting global cities as a site for this research also allows for an interrogation of the 'city-centric' interpretations of global cities within the global economy. Sassen, for instance, particularly privileges their role, suggesting that the global city has become a primary agent of the global economy above the state (Sassen 2004, p. 32; May, Wills, Datta et al. 2006). The idea that the city is a premier scale of activity, or the only unit of effective analysis, is interrogated in this thesis (Fagan 2000). The coalitions in these case studies campaign at multiple scales, in the city and across the province or state in which those cities operate. The
coalitions regularly seek state or national regulation in addition to city-based solutions, and the relative openness of those political systems is examined as having a possible effect on coalitions. The case studies unsettle the concept of the city as a homogenous unit, and they explore the impact of scale inside and outside the global city, analysing how socio-economic status and location may affect coalition success.

More broadly, this thesis connects global city theory to social movement research. There is an acknowledged gap between these two bodies of theory (Scott 2001, p. 6). The limited scholarship on social movements and global cities tends to focus on new social movements rather than unions (Myer 2000; cf May, Wills, Datta et al. 2006), or on comparing similar social movement strategies across cities, rather than on common forms of social action, or indeed union strategy across global cities. This thesis contributes to filling this gap by connecting the union renewal literature to global cities theory.

Additionally, there are many empirical similarities among the cities of Sydney, Toronto and Chicago. Each has similar populations of approximately 4-5 million people (US Census 2005a; US Census 2005b; ABS 2006; StatCan 2007). They are capital cities of their state or province, and they are all the centre of key regional economies – Sydney and Toronto are the economic capitals of their country, and Chicago is centre of the Mid-West economy of the United States (Todd 1998; Daly and Prichard 2000; Sassen 2004). Despite the political differences between nations, each of these cities has a strong tradition of progressive politics –

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10 In June 2006, Sydney had a population of 4.29 million; in 2006 Toronto had a population of 4.75 million; in 2005 Chicago was estimated to have a population of 2.84 million in the city council area and in Cook County, which defines the area around the city (including the suburbs that surround Chicago) the population was 5.3 million.
Chicago, Toronto and Sydney have had a history of progressive government (Longworth 2004). The cities have a more similar union density than the national differences suggest, with Chicago's union density at 18.3% significantly above the United States national average of 12%, and much closer to Sydney's density of approximately 20% and Toronto's at 30% (LRA 2000; ABS 2007).

1.2 Testing differences through international comparison
The privileging of similarities cannot disguise the presence of 'small' political differences between Sydney, Chicago and Toronto (Wailes 1999). The cultural and institutional legacies of history influence the political opportunities available to today's coalitions (Hay 2004; Hay 2005). Important differences relate to the cities' and countries' political context and the capacity of their unions and community organisations. These are outlined in Table 4.1.
### Table 4.1: Differences in national context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political context</th>
<th>Organisational capacity</th>
<th>Union density *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Openness of state</td>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>Community organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>• Strong welfare state • Compulsory voting • Binding party caucuses</td>
<td>• Strong party-union ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>• Strong welfare state • Binding party caucuses • Non-compulsory voting</td>
<td>• Union-party ties through minor party (New Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>• Weak welfare state • Non-compulsory voting • Individualised party representation and executive vetos</td>
<td>• Strong union-party ties, but industrial not political focus for legislative relationship with Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: * (ABS 2007), ** (Jackson 2006), *** (LRA 2000; BLS 2007)

1.2.1 Political context: state and political parties

A coalition’s ability to achieve outcomes and shape the political climate is affected by the opportunities available from the types of state and political parties. Jenkins and Tarrow, as social movement theorists, argue that states sit on a continuum between being open and closed to social movement expression (Tarrow 1994; Jenkins 1995).
The nation states in Australia, Canada and the United States have historically had different levels of openness to social change evident in their contrasting histories of welfare state capitalism and their different political cultures (Esping-Andersen 1990; Skocpol 1992). These historical differences may shape future political opportunities (Hyman 1982, p. 108; Poole 1986, p. 9; Bean 1994, p. 11).

Australia and Canada each had relatively open, strong welfare states. These governments provided significant intervention into industrial relations, particularly in Australia through compulsory conciliation and arbitration, which established a system of industry-wide standards for wages and conditions (Howard 1977; Macintyre 2001). The Canadian system of industrial regulation was based more on enterprise level regulation, but in 1944 it institutionalised collective bargaining and in 1946 developed a system of card-check union recognition that assisted unionisation (Heron 1989, p. 12; Irving and Seager 1996; Panitch and Swartz 2003). Both countries also institutionalised universal access to social provisions such as health care, welfare and education (Hicks and Swank 1984; Irving and Seager 1996; Maioni 1998; Myles and Quadagno 2001). In the US, while the New Deal provided enterprise-scaled collective bargaining rights and social security, it did not universalise social resources such as health care (Lichtenstein 1995; Piore 2005). US collective bargaining rights were weakened by the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act which brought in processes of unfair labour practices that could litigiously slow down the process of union recognition and allowed states to introduce 'right to work' legislation that made union recognition more difficult (Abraham 1996).

The political processes of the Australian, Canadian and United States governments reinforce the levels of openness in the state. The Australian system
is the most open to political participation, with compulsory, preferential voting in contrast to the non-compulsory, first past the post elections in Canada and the United States. Australia and Canada, following the Westminster system, have centralised party cultures with binding caucuses in government, in contrast to the US system where a weak party system means that political representatives have to be individually lobbied for their support, and the executive branch (Governor, President or Mayor) has a right of veto over legislative decisions (Skocpol 1992, p. 39; Maioni 1998; Myles and Quadagno 2001).

Australia, Canada and the United States also have had historically different types of relationships between political parties and unions, providing different levels of access to state decision making that may affect coalition outcomes and the ability to shape the political climate (Esping-Andersen 1985). Union-party relationships are strongest in Australia, where a labour party, formed by the union movement in the 1890s, operates as a majority governing party, and where unions have strong formal and informal relationships with the Australian Labor Party (ALP) (Irving and Seager 1996). In Canada, the union movement participated in the formation of the socialist-worker-farmer party, called the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in 1932 (McCormak 1977; Laycock 1990). When the party turned into the New Democratic Party (NDP) in 1961, the union movement became formal voting members, yet this party remained for the most part a minority party in the Canadian Government (Chandler 1977; Panitch and Swartz 2003). In the United States, unions are not members of the Democratic Party. While unions have maintained close relations with the Democrats, the relationship tended to be limited to industrial issues rather than broader 'class' issues (Perlman 1979; Lipset and Marks 2000). While these historical differences continue to shape union-party relationships,
international social democratic trends such as 'third way' and 'new labour' show common trends in a weakening of union-party relationships (Giddens 1998; Buchanan and Watson 2001; Wills 2002; Howell 2004; Tattersall 2006a).

1.2.2 Organisational differences

Across Australia, Canada and the United States, unions and community organisations differ in size and how they operate, which may affect the organisational make-up and capacity of coalitions in the different countries.

Union density varies significantly among the countries. In 2005, union density was highest in Canada, at 30% (Jackson 2006). In Australia in 2006 20% of employees were members of unions, and in the US in 2006 union density was 12% (ABS 2007; BLS 2007). Additionally, the laws governing union jurisdiction and demarcation are different between the countries. In Australia, jurisdiction is defined and enforced by the court system, through a process of formal union registration. In Canada and the United States, jurisdictional rules and disputes are contested and debated by the unions with the central labour councils, making jurisdictional competition more common than in Australia.

The types of community organisations also vary significantly among the United States, Australia and Canada, where community organisations have very different historical traditions in terms of community organising style, funding sources and membership bases (Salamon and Anheier 1998). As noted in Chapter Two, in the United States, there is a history of membership-based, Alinsky-style 'community organising', with a variety of large, member-based organisations which assist community members to mobilise and take direct
action in defence of community interests (Alinsky 1971; Osterman 2002; Tait 2005; Osterman 2006). Consequently, the US has a large number of voluntary membership-based organisations, with relatively high levels of participation. At the opposite extreme, formal community organisations in Australia receive most of their funding from the state (Hamilton and Maddison 2007). Many contemporary Australian community organisations have a small membership base, and focus on the provision of services. Canada sits in the middle, with strong service and advocacy organisations for women, seniors, immigrant groups and national identity (such as the Council of Canadians), who have also regularly engaged in social movements around fair trade (Bleyer 1992; Ricciutelli, Larkin and O'Neil 1998).

Organisational capacity affects the type of coalition partners and the different roles of unions and community organisations in coalitions. In countries with large unions, union dominance in coalitions may be more likely. Where community organisation capacity is weak, based on service delivery rather than member organising, the task of member mobilisation may become a responsibility of the unions or require innovation in how to build a membership base for the coalition. Furthermore, union density may shape union perceptions and experiences of crisis (Pocock 1998; Cooper 2001), which may influence the spread of coalition practice across a union movement (Frege and Kelly 2004a; Kelly 2006).

1.2.3 Case study contextual differences
Cross-national difference does not prevent cross-national comparison, or the ability to build a framework of coalitions that describes coalition practice across
borders. Rather, this study intentionally acknowledges that opportunity structures and organisational capacities are independent variables that may shape how coalitions work, and coalition success. Thus the frameworks outlined in Chapters Two and Three explicitly acknowledge how these external contextual variables feed into the coalition strategies that develop in different countries. The coalition frameworks acknowledge the role of political opportunities and organisational capacity.

1.3 Similarity and difference case studies
In summary, my international comparison of coalition unionism selects similar types of global cities, with similar population sizes in similar liberal market economies, in cities with different national political contexts and organisational capacity. While it is impossible to control for all differences when undertaking international comparison (Wailes 1999), having similar size and economies at least allows for a comparison across cities of a similar scale. Furthermore, by selecting the case studies on the basis of the independent variable of global cities, ahead of selecting the specific coalition to study, the case selection minimises a perceived 'selection bias' weakness in qualitative research where case selection often occurs only based on the dependent variable (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; cf Collier, Mahoney and Seawright 2004).
2.0 Case Study Methodology
This study investigates the three frameworks of coalition unionism using three case studies. The coalitions selected were chosen because they varied according to the structure of their inter-organisational relationships, the types and depth of common concern and their scale, in order to compare and contrast the key elements of my coalition framework. Similarly, in each of these case studies the thesis focuses on one union in order to explore how and why coalition unionism helps increase the collaborative power of unions. This analysis of unions also allows for an exploration of when coalition unionism is likely to develop in unions, and the different patterns of union member engagement that occur across coalitions.

2.1 The usefulness of the case study
Case study research is the most common methodology in industrial relations research (Kitay and Callus 1998). As Yin explains, the case study method is:

An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not entirely evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin 1994).

Case studies usefully allow for an in-depth analysis of a complex social practice over time, making them particularly well suited for analysis of long-term coalitions (Ragin 2004).

Underpinning this method, this research approach derives from a social constructionist epistemology that attempts to identify analytical, generalisable
conceptual features of coalition unionism that are contingent on human action, subjective perception and experience (Crotty 1998). As Chapters Two and Three highlighted, the successful practice of coalition unionism consists of multiple variables, making it difficult to assess by quantitative measures. Analysing the process of union and community organisation interactions over time requires a methodology that is capable of interpreting not only how outcomes are achieved, but how organisational relationships are sustained or weakened, how organisational capacity is enhanced, how interests between organisations are negotiated and how the operation of a coalition interacts with the external world. A case study methodology, which seeks to identify how relationships change over time, is the most useful methodology for testing the appropriateness of the key elements and measures in my theoretical framework, and how those elements and measures change (Kitay and Callus 1998).

The thesis compares three cases, combining comparison with intensive analysis, to develop valid, generalisable findings (Shalev 1980). Additionally, this allows me to compare and contrast across the three repeated 'community-based' variables that structure the frameworks tested in this thesis. Moreover, the methodology is important because there is little comparative research on coalition practice. The tendency in coalitions research is for case studies to be examined in isolation, which has the potential to encourage 'best-practice' theorising. This is where theories of successful coalition unionism are drawn off one case study, making it difficult to determine features of coalition and union practice that may be common across a variety of contexts. Given that the purpose of this thesis is to identify a widely applicable framework of coalition practice, the choice of three case studies allows me to isolate common features of coalition unionism, while still identifying how specific variations, either
produced by context or strategic choice, contribute to coalition success and union power.

The case study approach uses a mixture of inductive and deductive analysis, attempting both to critique and create theory (Strauss and Whitfield 1998, p. 9; McKeown 2004). The study does not use a grounded methodology, but a dialectical process of adapting and reframing existing literature to identify elements of powerful coalition practice. Indeed, the dialectical approach used in my frameworks is well suited to a methodology that seeks to acknowledge and identify the common and contrasting roles of opportunity and choice in different contexts. The study of three long-term coalitions explores the interrelationships between these elements and the dynamics of successful coalition unionism. The literature review in Chapters Two and Three not only identified theoretical gaps in existing coalition research, but actively reformulated this literature into new testable frameworks about coalitions and unions. Similarly, at the conclusion of each case study, the chapter returns briefly to secondary sources to see if my findings on a particular study apply more broadly to other examples of coalition practice in the secondary literature.

2.2 Case selection
My case studies have similarities and differences in terms of the coalitions and the unions involved. The case studies are: the Public Education Coalition in Sydney and the New South Wales Teachers Federation, that campaigned on public education issues between 2001 and 2004; the Ontario Health Coalition in Toronto and the Canadian Union of Public Employees that campaigned on health care issues between 2002 and 2006 and the Grassroots Collaborative in
Chicago and the Service Employees International Union Local 880 that campaigned on living wages between 2002 and 2006.

2.2.1 Coalition form: similarities and differences
The case studies selected are similar. I explore three long-term coalition campaigns across a similar time period. Each of these case studies involves a coalition that included at least one union and several community organisation partners. The case studies campaigned around common issues, however not all of the coalitions were defined by the issues they campaigned on. In each of the case studies, regardless of how many unions were involved, the focus is on the involvement of one particular union, interviewing union officials and member leaders and monitoring the union’s shifting participation in the coalition.

In each case, this union was a public sector union that had its head office located in the global city but also operated cross the state or province. The activity of the coalitions was also similar, seeking to achieve political outcomes and affect decisions at multiple scales – at a local level, city-metropolitan level, state level and a national level. Each of the coalitions had a combination of electoral and non-electoral strategies and aimed to achieve policy and legislative changes.

The coalitions were also similar. In each case study there were pre-existing relationships between the coalition partners, while the formality, depth and reasons for formation were different among the case studies. As my definition of coalition unionism would suggest, all the coalitions studied were defined by inter-organisational relationships, common concern and scale, while having variations in the kinds of measures present. This allowed for a comparison of the
presence and absence of these measures, and how they varied within and across the different case studies.

Thus the case studies exhibited tendencies towards the different coalition models proposed in Chapter Two. The Sydney-based Public Education Coalition was union-initiated, with a relatively weak set of inter-organisational relationships but with a strong common concern and a multi-scaled coalition capacity. The Toronto-based Ontario Health Coalition had a strong set of inter-organisational relationships and a multi-scaled coalition capacity with relatively weak common concern. The Chicago-based Grassroots Collaborative was a community-initiated coalition with a very strong set of inter-organisational relationships, strong common concern but a relatively weak multi-scaled capacity operating without local broker organisations. The variations in the coalition elements are outlined in Table 4.2 below.

### 4.2: Coalition variations across the case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inter-organisational relationships</th>
<th>Common concern</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2.2.2 Unions: similarities and differences

The unions in each of the case studies had important similarities and differences. Using the pre-existing opportunity factors identified in chapter three, the unions
can be compared and contrasted in terms of their political and economic context, their union identities and their organisational features.

The unions' political and economic context varied sharply. While all three are similar public sector unions (Bean 1994, p. 14), the NSWTF organised a stable population of professional workers (teachers), CUPE organised a stable population of lower paid non-clinical workers, and the SEIU Local 880 organised a growing, precarious and decentralised workforce of low-wage homecare and home childcare workers.

The three public sector unions have similar union identities, but with some differences in origins that are explored in more detail in the three case study chapters. The NSWTF's ideological framework comes from the involvement of socialist activists and because its members are professionals. CUPE's ideology comes from its involvement with the NDP and its social movement experience. SEIU Local 880's ideology comes from its formation by a community organisation, Association of Community Organisations for Reform Now (ACORN).

The organisational features of the unions vary, with different organisational scales, capacity and relationships. CUPE and the NSWTF each operate on multiple scales beyond the workplace, including regional offices such as teacher associations or union locals, as well as state or province-wide rank and file decision-making bodies. SEIU Local 880 is different: it has a centralised scale of union participation – through city-based central meetings – either in Chicago or in regional Illinois cities. It does not have local structures with elected local rank and file representatives. The unions have different sizes and levels of
homogeneity. The NSWTF is a large union primarily consisting of school teachers. CUPE is a large heterogeneous public sector union, but it has a separate structure for health care campaigning. SEIU Local 880 has grown from a very small union to recently a very large union. It has a heterogeneous membership of homecare and home childcare workers, but organises its members and has union meetings across industries.

The union relationships with other unions and the central labour councils also vary. The NSWTF is a relatively isolated union, tending to act alone rather than having a close relationship with the state peak body, Unions NSW (interview 35: anon. union official, 2005). CUPE has a stronger web of union relationships than the NSWTF, but also has some ideological differences with the Ontario Federation of Labour, the central labour council in Ontario. SEIU 880 has the strongest set of union relationships, firstly through the SEIU State Council, secondly through the Change to Win unions and thirdly through the Chicago Federation of Labor. Similarly, the SEIU International has centralised resources and works with individual locals including SEIU Local 880.

The coalitions also had different types of union participation. The Public Education Coalition involved only one union in this coalition, the OHC had seven unions and the Grassroots Collaborative had two unions formally participating with the Living Wage Coalition involving four unions. The coalitions also ranged from the union-initiated Public Education Alliance to the community-initiated Grassroots Collaborative and the semi-independent OHC.

The similarities and differences across the unions across the case studies are outlined in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Union variations across the coalitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sydney</th>
<th>Toronto</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political and economic context</strong></td>
<td>Professional full-time workers</td>
<td>Non-clinical hospital workers</td>
<td>Home-based workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Union identity</strong></td>
<td>Progressive ideology and professional</td>
<td>Progressive, ideology, party and public sector</td>
<td>Progressive, community organisation 'community focused'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisational scale</strong></td>
<td>Decentralised Large, homogenous</td>
<td>Decentralised Large heterogeneous</td>
<td>Centralised Large (new), sectors organised together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other unions</strong></td>
<td>Weak union relationships</td>
<td>Some union relationships</td>
<td>Strong union relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Who initiated the coalition</strong></td>
<td>Union</td>
<td>Union, but semi-independent</td>
<td>Community organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.0 Case Selection: the Specific Method

To undertake a case study, a combination or triangulation of data collection methods is necessary (Yin 1994). Triangulation enables the researcher to test the reliability of the data obtained from interviews. The case studies data was collected through extensive semi-structured interviews with participants, the use of newspaper articles, internal union and coalition documents including minutes, a short questionnaire of union members, campaign materials, organisational journals and websites.

However, the research approach relied most heavily on interviews. The study of coalition relationships must intensively focus on interpersonal relationships and how they shift. Long, semi-structured interviews were the most effective method for uncovering how and why relationships formed and strengthened, and how and why conflict arose. Moreover, undertaking interviews was a personal strength, as my background allowed me to develop a close and strong rapport.
with the subjects (Whipp 1998). I have been a union organiser for four years, and a community organiser for the four years before that. This allowed me to develop trust with subjects, given my similar experience, and my knowledge of the language and practice of organising and working in coalition.

Research for the Public Education Coalition (PEC) case study used a combination of interviews, document analysis, participant observation, newspaper articles and a short survey of the 300 member NSW Teachers Federation State Council. This was the first case selected, and it was identified as a result of my experience as a full-time union official at Unions NSW. It was widely considered by union leaders and staff as a noticeably successful coalition. The study involved forty-two interviews, twenty-six with union officials, including three executive union officials, six organisers, three rank and file representatives and three retired union members. Non-participant observation was undertaken at two State Council meetings, one union training session, and two teacher association meetings (one in western Sydney and one in rural NSW). Access was granted to the NSWTF library, and I reviewed internal union correspondence, the union journal Education and newspaper articles from the period. Copies of five NSWTF Sky Channel meetings between 2001 and 2004 were reviewed; these included the Vinson Inquiry, the State Election campaign and the salaries campaign. Outside of the NSWTF interviews were undertaken with one representative from the Australian Education Union, the President of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (who was a former AEU President and NSWTF Organiser), two officials from the Public Sector Association and one additional anonymous senior union official. Interviews were undertaken with the coalition partners, including two interviews with the Secondary Principal Association, two with the Primary
Principals Council, two with the Public Schools Principals Forum, four with the Parents & Citizens Federation and two with the Federation of School Community Organisations. Two individuals who worked in the Department of Education and one former Minister of Education were also interviewed.

Research for the Ontario Health Coalition case study used a combination of interviews, document analysis, participant observation and newspaper articles. Thirty-four interviews were undertaken. The case study was identified on a visit to Canada in November 2004, where investigative interviews and meetings with different union and coalition representatives were undertaken. Across these interviews, the OHC was considered one of the more successful coalition examples in Toronto. Within the target union CUPE, fewer interviews were staged than in the NSWTF because overall there were seven participant unions rather than one. Two CUPE leaders, two full-time CUPE officials and one rank and file participant were interviewed. Interviews occurred with one representative from each of the participant unions, including Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU), SEIU, Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), Ontario Federation of Labour, Ontario Nurses Association and the United Steelworkers. Interviews were also undertaken with representatives from provincially-scaled community organisations, such as the Council of Canadians (CC), and three senior organisations. Ten interviews were undertaken with representatives from local health coalitions, two of which were also union activist bridge builders. Interviews occurred with the coordinator of the OHC and several former staff members. In addition, the research included non-participant observation of several coalition planning meetings, the OHC Assembly 2005 and the operation of the OHC office. The OHC provided access to the OHC's
archives that included the minutes from all its meetings and its campaign materials. Newspaper articles were also reviewed from 2000 to 2006.

Research for the Grassroots Collaborative Living Wage case study included interviews, document analysis, participant observation, review of internal data and a review of newspaper articles. There were forty-five interviews. The campaign was identified through discussion with several US academics, to try to identify union and community organisation contact points in Chicago. The approach started with the organisations involved in the 1995-98 Living Wage campaign, visiting Chicago in July 2005 and undertaking unstructured interviews to find a coalition campaign with significant similarities with the previous studies. Having located the Grassroots Collaborative, fifteen SEIU Local 880 representatives were interviewed, including senior staff leaders, organisers, two homecare rank and file leaders and two childcare rank and file leaders. Outside the union staff from United Food and Commerical Workers (UFCW), SEIU 73, SEIU 1 and the Chicago Federation of Labor were interviewed. Interviews were undertaken with the coordinator of the Grassroots Collaborative and representatives from four key Collaborative organisations. Interviews included key staff leaders, organisers and rank and file leaders from ACORN, which was the most active community organisation in the living wage campaign. Access was provided to all internal campaign and meeting notes from SEIU Local 880, data collected about turn out statistics and reviewed newspaper articles from the campaign period. There was also non-participant observation of a Grassroots Collaborative breakfast meeting, a Big Box Living Wage campaign meeting, a SEIU Local 880 monthly member meeting, a mass rally on July 30 2005 and a rally against the veto of the living wage on 13 September 2006.
In each of the case studies, the interviews were semi-structured. They used a pro-forma method with three sections, firstly reviewing the background of the interviewees, secondly their experience of the campaign events, and thirdly a series of evaluative questions. They used some common evaluative questions, including: what makes a campaign successful? what makes an alliance successful? and what did you learn from the campaign? Interview subjects were identified by beginning with the key coalition organisations, and used a snowball technique to identify key actors. The Public Education Coalition began with the NSWTF; the OHC began with a joint interview of the OHC convenor and a CUPE representative; and the Grassroots Collaborative began with ACORN. The interviews repeatedly asked for participant advice about other possible interviewees.

The aim of the interviews was to develop extensive data on perceptions of coalition success and union engagement, from a wide array of union and community organisation participants. The intention was to interview union representatives from across the organisation in order to understand differences among the perceptions of union leaders, organisers and rank and file representatives. In each case study, multiple unions and central labour council representatives were interviewied to investigate variations between unions and to get additional perspectives on the union under study. Interviews and secondary research were undertaken on the national affiliates of each union. Where access was granted, such as in Chicago and Sydney, government department or political adversaries were also interviewed to understand how the state representatives perceived the operation and strengths of the coalitions.
To attempt to overcome ethnocentric biases as an outsider, I sought extensive informal advice from unions, academics and community organisations in Canada and the United States about development of my research (Strauss 1998, p. 191). I also lived 'in country' for two years of this three-year study, basing myself at the Industrial and Labor Relations School at Cornell University in order to make regular and repeated field visits. I lived for two months in Chicago between July and September 2005, and one month in Toronto in June 2005. I returned twice to Toronto in November 2005 and May 2006, and once to Chicago in September 2006 to complete follow-up interviews.

4.0 Conclusion
The case study methodology controls for some contextual similarities, while focusing attention on the key variables of coalition practice, including political context and organisational capacity. The case studies have useful similarities and differences that open up an exploration of the key coalition elements identified in Chapter Two. The aim of the three case studies in Chapters Five, Six and Seven is to document the dynamics of long-term coalition unionism. The thesis assesses if these variables are capable of analysing how coalition unionism changes over time, and the extent to which differences between the case studies are a product of political context or strategic choice, and the possible relationship between the two.
Chapter Five

Agenda-Driven Coalition Unionism:
The NSWTF and the Public Education Coalition 2001-2004

On Public Education Day, May 2002, in the NSW Teachers Federation (NSWTF) Library, representatives from the Public Education Alliance (PEA) sat down for a press conference. In the room were the senior officers from the peak parent, principal and teacher organisations in NSW, flanked by Tony Vinson, the independent head of the recent Inquiry into Public Education.

On the side of the room was a visitor, President Chase, the leader of the National Education Association in the United States, the biggest union in the world. ‘He couldn’t believe his eyes’, Gavrielatos, the NSWTF Vice President recalled. It was ‘extraordinary ... the legitimacy, validation, authentication ... all of our campaign objectives articulated through this independent inquiry’ (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005).

This day was the highest point in an education campaign that delivered the most wide-reaching reform to the NSW public education system in a generation. It secured reductions in class sizes, a major increase in funding for teacher professional development and provided a launching pad for the union’s salaries campaign. It was the peak achievement of NSW Public Education Coalition (PEC) from 2001-2004.
1.0 Introduction

This chapter investigates the first of three case studies of coalition unionism. Each is a study of a long-term coalition campaigning on a common set of issues, drawing out the dynamics of successful coalitions, how coalitions are powerful for unions and when unions are likely to engage in coalition unionism.

This is a case study of a union-initiated coalition that created a broad policy agenda. It argues that it is an example of agenda-driven coalition unionism, with strong bonds of common concern and a strong multi-scaled, opportunity-based coalition, but a weak coalition structure. The agenda-driven coalition unionism provided real resources to the union, particularly enabling new forms of member engagement through multi-scaled participatory structures. It also provided a strong issue-based agenda to achieve policy changes that were in the interest of the union. However, the coalition’s weak inter-organisational relationships led to unevenness in the coalition’s structure, resulting in union dominance of the coalition.

This chapter explores the NSW PEC from 2001 to 2004. This time period marked a distinct campaign period for the NSWTF. In 2001 the NSWTF began using a new union fund that transformed its capacity to engage in positive campaigns around public education. The study ends in 2004, for in the words of the NSWTF’s President, the federal elections of 2001 and 2004 provide ‘natural bookends’ for the education campaign (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). The case study begins with an overview of the participant organisations and then explores the PEC through five distinct phases: the 2001 Federal Election campaign, the Vinson Inquiry into Public Education, the 2003 State Election
campaign, the NSWTF Salaries campaign and the 2004 Federal Election campaign.

2.0 Context for the Case Study

In 2004, the education system in Australia was regulated by both the NSW and Federal Governments, with primary responsibility for finance and curriculum resting with the NSW State Government. Since 1996, the Federal Government has been a Liberal-National Party Coalition with an economically liberal, socially conservative political ideology (Brett 2003). During the same period, the NSW Government was run by the ALP, which has a strong commitment to public education, but also a commitment to maintaining budget surpluses (O'Donnell 2000; interview 34: former Minister for Education, 2005). In Australia, there were no decentralised school boards like in those United States or Canada; rather, the NSW Department of Education and Training (DET) set standards, pay-scales and school performance indicators for the entire state (interview 40: DET, 2005). For teachers, this had the advantage of minimising wage competition, allowing the NSWTF to collectively bargain at the state scale for the wages and conditions that operate at local schools.

Before the 2001 PEC, the NSWTF and NSW-based parent and principal organisations had a history of ad hoc relationships. Principal representatives were simultaneously members of the NSWTF, and the NSWTF and parent organisations regularly met as the 'Three Federations'. This section briefly explores the background of the PEC partner organisations.
2.1 NSW Teachers Federation (NSWTF)

During the period of this case study, the NSWTF was the largest public sector union and second largest union in NSW (Unions NSW 2005). It was formed in 1918, and is registered in the NSW Industrial Relations System (O'Brien 1987, p. 1). It primarily represented teachers, as well as TAFE and other public education workers (NSWTF 2005a). In 2004, approximately 82% of all full-time equivalent teachers were union members (DET 2004; White 2004; NSWTF 2005a). Three key features shaped the NSWTF’s coalition practice. They were: its internal democratic structure, its status as a professional and public sector union and its ideologically progressive identity (Tarrow 1994).

The NSWTF had a distinctly democratic internal structure, with a culture of decentralised decision making that involved the membership (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2004; Bloch: former NSWTF, 2005). In 2004, it had an Annual Conference of over 600 delegates, a State Council of over 300 delegates that met eight times a year, and a State Executive of rank and file teachers (NSWTF 2005a). The union’s secretariat had forty-five officers, all required to be former rank and file teachers, elected by the Council for three-year terms, and three Presidential Officers elected by the entire union membership every two years (NSWTF 2005a). The NSWTF’s key local decision-making bodies were teacher associations. Teacher associations had their own executive, and represented all teachers in a local geographic area. In 2004, there were 170 teacher associations in NSW. Additionally, every one of the 2238 schools in NSW had a NSWTF representative and a women’s contact person (NSWTF 2005a). The union’s structure often meant the NSWTF worked separately from other

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11 In 2005, there were 41 000 full-time teachers, out of a total of 65 000 members, making up 63% of the NSWTF membership (NSWTF 2005a).
unions, with union leaders forced to focus on internal union business rather than horizontal union relationships (interview 24: union official, 2005).

As a professional union, the NSWTF had consistently worked on salaries and standards that support the professional status of teachers (O'Brien 1987). The union had long considered the industrial conditions of teachers intimately connected to the status of public education (Sky Channel 2001). Before WWII, this led the union to form an ad hoc group called the 'Three Federations' between the Federation of Parents & Citizens (P&C) and the Federation of School Community Organisations (FOSCO). This group did not campaign, but held bi-monthly meetings to discuss priorities and lobbying agendas (interview 9: FOSCO, 2005). It meant that making coalitions with parents was a familiar tactic for the NSWTF.

The NSWTF's interest in public education funding, and its use of industrial and coalition strategies, was also shaped by the union's location in the public sector. The State Government was both the employer and primary funding body for public education, and consequently the union repeatedly engaged in the political process and elections (interview 5: NSWTF, 2005). Teachers constantly interacted with the direct beneficiaries of education - children and parents. Similarly, the physical location of the school in local neighbourhoods connected teachers to a physical community of people. As Sue Simpson, former NSWTF President, put it 'schools are in every town and hamlet' (Sky Channel 2001). The combination of a union dedicated to public service, in close contact with local geographic and parental communities, supported a history rich of coalition action (O'Brien 1987).
Finally, the NSWTF had an ideologically progressive union identity. During the 1950s to 1970s a significant number of NSWTF officials were members of the Communist Party, creating political influence over union strategies (interview, Bloch: former NSWTF, 2005). This gave birth to its ‘united front’ strategy, where the union regularly organised alliances with education groups (O’Brien 1987). Indeed, this radical ideological vision generated leadership commitment to political issues beyond economic concerns, evidenced by the union’s support of key social justice movements during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, including support of peace and Aboriginal rights (interview, Bloch: former NSWTF Official, 2005). Notably, this progressive identity was influenced by the union’s female membership. Over 70% of union members are women, and female members have led campaigns for representation, recognition and workplace rights since the 1970s (interview, Bloch: former NSWTF, 2005; White 2004). As a NSWTF member argued in a NSWTF report, the fact that women often have to combine work and family helps them to cross traditional divides between the workplace and local external community organisations, supporting a broad union identity (Hallock 1997; White 2004). The union’s broad organisational range is enduring; the NSWTF President described the union as a ‘social justice union’ because of its commitment to social issues (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2005; Zadkovich 1999; Sky Channel 2001). This left ideological vision had drawn the NSWTF away from the ALP, and there was a high degree of distrust of the ALP amongst NSWTF officials (interviews 2, 7, 15, 16, 18: NSWTF, 2005).

12 Even before this time, groups such as the Militant Minority Movement, a communist-influenced movement within the NSWTF, focused on issues of education funding (interview 31: retired NSWTF official, 2005)
These three factors help to construct familiar modes of NSWTF activity, or what social movement theorists call repertoires of contention (Tarrow 1994). When in industrial mode, campaigning for salaries and work conditions, the most favoured form of action has been the strike, supplemented by mass stop work meetings. Additionally, the NSWTF has a history of campaigning on social issues, influenced by the convergence of the union’s professional concern for education and its radical history. These pre-existing opportunities supported its shift to sustained coalition unionism in 2001.

2.2 Parent organisations

Between 2001 and 2004, the PEC involved two organisations representing parents of children at public schools – the P&C and FOSCO. The P&C was the larger of the two parent bodies.

In 2004, the Federation of Parents and Citizens Associations (P&C) was the NSW peak body for public school parents and citizens organisations. Parents & citizens organisations are school-based clubs of parents of school children that evolved at the turn of the century as fundraisers for local schools. The P&C united these autonomous organisations into a state-based network in 1922 (P&C 2005a). The P&C’s purpose was to assist communication between school-based parent groups and centrally act as a political organisation to lobby government to improve public education in the interests of parents and their children (interview, Baker: P&C 2005). The P&C operated at state, regional, district and local levels. At a state level there was a secretariat of seven paid staff plus elected voluntary officers which included a President, Publicity Officer, Vice Presidents and Treasurer (P&C 2005b). In 2004, the P&C had both smaller
district and larger regional structures, although participation was focused at the regional scale as that mirrored the structure of the DET (interview 41: DET, 2005). The P&C had a formal relationship with government and received most of its operating budget through NSW Government grants.

The character of the P&C has been greatly influenced by the personality of its leadership (interview 45: P&C, 2005; interview 22: P&C, 2005). The President’s influence was reinforced by informal factions that developed in the 1990s. A contrast is evident in the outlook of the two past Presidents – Bev Baker and Sharyn Brownlee. Bev Baker believed that the most important relationship for the P&C was ‘not between parents and government but between parents and teachers ... if we don’t walk in their shoes and understand their pressures ... we’re lost’ (interview, Baker: P&C, 2005). In contrast, Brownlee believed that the P&Cs should privilege a close relationship with government, announcing on her election to the leadership that ‘it’s time for a change so that we’re relevant to the Education Minister and the Premier’ (Wood 2002). The centralised structure of the P&C meant that the President’s ideology and organisational priorities shaped the P&C’s agenda, influencing its relationships with the government, the DET and the NSWTF.

The Federation of School Community Organisations (FOSCO) began as a federation of mothers’ clubs focused on the early years of education, from Kindergarten to Year 2 (interview, Allen: FOSCO, 2005). FOSCO was established in 1926 with the aim of increasing ‘communication between clubs and making lobbying for better conditions easier’ (interview, Allen: FOSCO, 2005). FOSCO was a powerful organisation when there were a large number of separate infants schools (K-2), but from the 1970s the unification of infants and primary schools
caused FOSCO’s membership to fall. By 1997 the FOSCO Council was abolished because of declining attendance, replaced by a general meeting four times a year (interview, Allen: FOSCO, 2005). Between September 2001 and June 2003, FOSCO moved to dissolution. FOSCO participated in the PEC, but its engagement was limited by this internal organisational crisis.

While the two parent groups worked productively together through Three Federations meetings, both organisations acknowledged tension between them. FOSCO recognised that they sometimes competed with the P&C for legitimacy and recognition (interview 39: FOSCO, 2005). Officials in the P&C recall the lack of a truly honest and trusting relationship between the organisations, which often disagreed in public forums such as the Australian Council of State School Organisations (interview 38: P&C, 2005). However, each emphasised that when they were campaigning there was little tension between the two organisations (interview 8: P&C, 2005).

2.3 School principal organisations

The representation of school principals has been controversial in Australia. In other states, principals have formed separate industrial organisations that rival the teachers’ union. Importantly, in NSW principals are simultaneously members of the NSWTF as well as having formal separate professional representative bodies. The latter evolved with the support of the DET in the 1980s. In addition, there is the Primary Schools Principals Forum which is an independent principal organisation.
In 2004, the Secondary Principals Council (SPC) represented the 460 principals in secondary schools across NSW, with the goal of supporting principal welfare and professional development (interview, King: SPC, 2005). Structurally, the SPC had an executive of fifteen, which was expanded in 2002 to include a more hands-on role for the President, Chris Bonner, and three Deputies (interview, King: SPC, 2005). The SPC communicated using email, phone and fax bulletins to keep principals up to date (interview, King: SPC, 2005). The SPC had a formal relationship with the DET which funded half its operating costs; the remainder was funded by members. This relationship created a ‘semi-independent’ status for the SPC; it existed both ‘inside and outside the tent’ of the education bureaucracy (interview, Bonner: SPC, 2005). According to the SPC leadership, it is this ‘messy’ dual status that gave the SPC much of its power (interview, Bonner: SPC, 2005). Its stakeholder status provided influence and pressure as well as the space for criticism and distance. In the last decade, the SPC focused on the issue of public education, commissioning research called the Futures Project and appointing Judy King as a Deputy-President with responsibility for public education advocacy (interview, King: SPC, 2005).

The Primary Principals Association (PPA) was the professional association for over 1800 primary school principals, aiming to improve conditions in primary schools through lobbying government and the DET, and providing professional development for their members (interview, Scott: PPA, 2005). The PPA consisted of forty-three geographically defined councils, each with a local executive (interview, McMillian: PPA, 2005). The PPA had a central Council and annual State Conference, and was led by a President who is a media spokesperson and internal communications officers. The PPA received funding from the Department (interview, Scott: PPA, 2005).
The Public School Principals Forum (PSPF) was a very different principal organisation, calling itself an independent organisation for principals, as it was a non-funded advocacy organisation. It formed in 1995 in response to a school dispute over basic testing, where principals, mainly in south-west Sydney, called for the formation of an ‘independent voice for principals’ that was ‘separate from government funding’ (interview, McBride: PSPF; Chudleigh: PSPF, 2005). They evolved into a formally incorporated association, with the aim of ‘advocating for public education’ and to ‘safeguard the status of principals’ (interview, Chudleigh: PSPF, 2005). It had a management committee and senior officers including a Chair and Deputy Chair who had authority to make public media comments, creating a public profile (interview, Chudleigh: PSPF, 2005).

There was tension between the principal organisations. The PPA and SPC, for instance, argued about how primary principals were paid less than secondary school principals. However they agreed on their distrust of the PSPF. McBride described the relationship with PPA as ‘not happy’. She believed that the PPA saw the formation of the PSPF as a ‘huge slap in the face’ (interview, McBride: PSPF, 2005). Similarly, John McMillian described the PSPF as a ‘splinter group’ with which the PPA has ‘no association ... we don’t recognise them as an official body and would disagree with a lot of their attitudes and actions’ (interview, McMillian: PPA, 2005).

2.4 The emergence of the PEC

The Public Education Coalition grew out of a period of increasing crisis in the education sector and radical organisational changes inside the NSWTF. The
major external crisis was one of funding. The 1990s saw significant budget reductions to public education from both State and Federal Governments. At a federal level, there was a shift in funding from public to private schools (Watson 2003; Liberal Party 2004). At a state level, the policy of fiscal tightening firstly initiated a program of school restructures, including the development of collegiate schools, selective schools, specialist schools, junior high schools and school closures (Vinson 2002, pp.117-154). The school restructure program culminated in the 2001 Building the Future white paper which called for widespread school closures (DET 2001). Secondly, the fiscal tightening was also directed at reducing recurrent expenditure – the greatest being teacher wages (interview 34: former Minister for Education, 2005). Consequently, as a NSWTF official recalled, teacher salaries campaigns became ‘increasingly bitter’ during the 1990s (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). The 1999 Salaries campaign was the most hostile, both through the media and in union negotiations with government. The Daily Telegraph, the largest circulation paper in Sydney, ran articles attacking the credibility of the NSWTF and their wage claim. This culminated in a front-page article on the day of a strike that featured a cartoon of the NSWTF President who was drawn wearing a dunce’s cap with the headline ‘if the cap fits’ (Daily Telegraph 9 Feb 1999).

This funding crisis created a process of organisational change in the parent and principal organisations. The combination of restructures and increased student testing led principals in western Sydney to form the PSPF (interview, McBride: PSPF, 2005). It also led to a radicalisation of the P&Cs, resulting in what a former Minister for Education described as the ‘strong, articulate leadership of Bev Baker’ (interview, former Minister for Education, 2005).
Most profoundly, the funding crisis directly challenged the NSWTF. The Salaries campaign generated significant disquiet amongst teachers: there was a sense that teachers 'were being denigrated by talk-back radio' (interview 17: NSWTF, 2005). This despair was sometimes expressed as anger at the union, particularly that the NSWTF did not have a sufficient media presence, with motions moved at NSWTF State Council meetings calling for it to investigate more effective media strategies (NSWTF 1999a).

In the late 1990s, a group of organisers and delegates all located in south-western and western Sydney and all broadly aligned to a loose faction that supported a united front-styled campaigning, began strategising about how to shift the union's capacity. In these areas of Sydney there was strong socio-economic disadvantage and awareness that public education was a key 'antidote to inequality' (interview, McBride: PSPF, 2005). At the same time, an organiser, Gary Zadkovich, was inspired by a study trip overseas and wrote a paper calling for a series of internal reforms that would support 'social movement unionism' (Zadkovich 1999). This group became an agent of change within the union. The group proposed three key structural changes to the union's organisational capacity and relationships: firstly, a fund for public education campaigns, secondly a new strategic relationship with principal groups and thirdly the formation of local public education lobby groups.

Initially, the group proposed a public education fund and public education social frame, aimed at establishing a dedicated pool of money that could be used solely for proactive campaigns around promoting public education. Working off widespread member anger around media messaging and the inability of the union to get its 'message out' (interview 19: NSWTF, 2005), delegates from south-
west Sydney moved a motion at the 1999 Annual NSWTF Conference calling for the formation of a public education fund – a compulsory membership fee that would create a dedicated union resource for public education campaigns (NSWTF 1999b). This motion captured member interest for an improved media strategy, but allocated resources not simply to union advertising but to the ‘formation of a broad-based public education campaign agenda’ (interview 19: NSWTF, 2005). The result of the motion was that from 2001 the union reframed all its campaigns as campaigns for public education, supported by a pool of funding to resource them (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2005).

Next, the western Sydney group argued that the NSWTF needed to recast its outlook on principals as allies in public education campaigning. Previously, while principles were NSWTF members, the NSWTF did not have regular formal meetings with the principal organisations. It was in western Sydney, where the PSPF had independently initiated public advocacy on public education that NSWTF organisers and delegates ‘reformulated their understanding of principals’, believing that principals ‘needed to be seen as school leaders rather than employers’ (interview 7 and 27: NSWTF, 2005). This shifting role was accepted by the leadership through several internal debates during 1999 and 2000.

The successful repositioning of the role of principals led to a third change in the NSWTF: the formation of public education lobbies in the local federal electorates around the state. Public education lobbies were local organisations led by a locally-based parent, principal and teacher. This idea received tacit support from the leadership, but gained significant momentum after a series of local forums on public education, first in Campbelltown and Liverpool in 1999 which attracted
600 people, then in Mt Prichard in 2000 that attracted 750 people (interview 19: NSWTF, 2005). The idea was to establish local participation and advocacy for public education to supplement the centralised power of the union, so locally-based teachers, parents and principals could lobby local members of parliament.

Thus, as a consequence of a crisis in union capacity created by major funding cuts and attacks on teachers, the NSWTF realigned its relationship with principals, created a multi-scalar capacity for action on public education and built a resource base and broad social frame on which to initiate changes to the public education system from 2001. These changes deepened the union’s capacity to engage in coalition, yet were also consistent with the union’s history of pre-existing professional and ideological union identities and its familiarity with coalitions and social justice campaigns.

3.0 The PEC: 2001-2004
The PEC between 2001 and 2004 can be conceptualised as a single period of public education campaigning that had five campaign phases underpinned by a variety of coalition structures.

3.1 Federal Election campaign, February to October 2001
The PEC began with the aim of influencing the outcome of the 2001 federal election, and to do so the NSWTF initiated an informal coalition with parents and principals. The idea of campaigning around elections was ‘core business’ for the NSWTF, because as a public sector union it believed it needed to engage in politics to influence the funding base for public education (interview 5: NSWTF, 2005). In Australia, where voting is compulsory, the focus of the NSWTF’s
Election campaign was to generate public attention for public education, while also generating electoral opposition to the Liberal-National Coalition who had supported private education while in office (Watson 2003). Yet, Federal Election campaigns had always been a challenge for the NSWTF, because as a state-scaled organisation it struggled to build policy influence at a national scale.

The Federal Election campaign consisted of a series of ad hoc events at two scales: nationally and locally. It began with a national advertising campaign and an inaugural public education day festival that focused on the merits of public education, and each were funded by the NSWTF through its public education fund (Hennessy 2001; O'Halloran 2001a). The campaign extended locally as the new public education lobbies lobbied local election candidates (Richard 2001). The aim of the lobbies was to ‘sustain a continuous dialogue’ between politicians and locally-based teachers, parents and principals who told stories about education from the local area, not ‘union bureaucrats’ based in the state-scaled office (interview 7: NSWTF, 2005). As one P&C representative argued, the local place base of the lobbies generated their power: ‘the local politician couldn’t duck and weave and pretend it was someone else’s business, they had to argue the impact of the policy at that local level’ (interview, Baker: P&C, 2005).

The major activity of the campaign was a Public Education Convention on 8 September. This was a nationally scaled event, built to obtain national media coverage (Long 2001). Planning was coordinated by the NSWTF, with the principal organisations (PPA, SPC and PSPF) and the parent organisations (P&C and FOSCO) consulted in drafting a joint statement which featured all the organisations’ logos, and all the organisations were encouraged to bring people to the event (interview, King: SPC, 2005; interview 39: FOSCO, 2005).
planning process was a 'loose formation', with most of the organisation occurring through email rather than face to face meetings (interview 39: FOSCO, 2005; O'Halloran, President, 2005). The Convention was attended by over 10 000 people, in a space that fits 30 000, with the audience addressed by politicians from all the major parties.

Evaluation of the event was mixed. One NSWTF organiser described it as 'groundbreaking' and the union's journal, Education, was also positive (Long 2001). This positive evaluation was connected to the fact that the NSWTF's internal election strategy was directly linked to turn out at the convention (interview 19: NSWTF, 2005) Yet many of the principal and parent representatives who were less involved in the planning had quite modest reflections (interview 21: principal representative, 2005). The convention gained significant media attention for the issue of education (Sunday Telegraph 9 Sept 2001; Sun Herald 9 Sept 2001), however, in the end the issue of education was overshadowed. September 11, refugees and border control dominated the election and saw the conservative Liberal-National Coalition re-elected (Marr and Wilkinson 2003). With a Coalition landslide, the PEC's attention shifted to the NSW State Government with the next election campaign in March 2003.

3.2 Vinson Inquiry, April 2001 to May 2002

The PEC's most successful activity was the Vinson Inquiry, an independent public inquiry into public education. It was a multi-scaled, agenda-setting political opportunity created by the NSWTF and the P&C in response to repeated restructuring proposals from the NSW State Government.
The NSW ALP Government's *Building the Future* proposal, released in March 2001, recommended the closure of thirteen schools and was immediately opposed by inner-city communities and teachers through wildcat strikes and public meetings of up to 1000 people (DET 2001; O'Halloran 2001b). Initially, the union called for the government to review its proposal through a Government Inquiry. Then during its April state executive meeting, one rank and file representative exclaimed, 'why don’t we just do a review ourselves' (interview, Simpson: NSWTF, 2005).

Undertaking an independent inquiry was only possible because of the union’s pre-existing resources and size. The inquiry ended up costing $500 000, and the NSWTF could only ‘contemplate this review because of the public education fund’ (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005; O'Halloran 2001a).

The Vinson Inquiry was coordinated by a tight formal partnership between just two organisations, the NSWTF and the P&C. This partnership across the ‘education community’ gave the Inquiry legitimacy to comment on the future of public education (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005). As one official described, the coalition:

> Was as much for political reasons as it was based on our belief that they were partners and stakeholders in the provision of education ... if you have the NSWTF and the P&C both commissioning this, it would make it that little bit harder for our political opponents to dismiss it (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005).

A joint decision-making structure was formed, with dedicated representatives from the NSWTF and the P&C directly responsible for the Inquiry’s day-to-day operation. The representatives were senior leaders of each organisation: Maree
O'Halloran, the then Deputy Vice President of the NSWTF, and Rodney Molesworth, the then Senior Vice President of the P&C. The NSWTF found an Inquiry head, Tony Vinson, an Emeritus Education Professor at the University of Sydney who also had previous experience in reviewing government services. He established a separate structure for the Inquiry, acting as an autonomous head of a distinct organisation. He set up an office in separate premises, hired a research team and was given control over discretionary funds provided mainly by the NSWTF but also by the P&C (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005; Baker: P&C, 2005).

The Inquiry's independent status gave it authority within government and amongst the partner groups. Vinson was widely seen as a credible, independent expert, who would deliver a report based on its merits rather than just act as a creature of the NSWTF or the P&C (interview 34: former Minister for Education, 2005). To protect his credibility, Vinson independently sought out a constructive relationship with the ALP Government, the Liberal-National Leader of the Opposition and the Department of Education:

I said to them I was only going to undertake this if they were open-minded enough to realise that someone like myself would be capable of rendering an objective report. I think I took the wind out of their sails ... heads were nodded (interview, Vinson: Inquiry Head, 2005).

Although it was created by the P&C and NSWTF, the Inquiry sat above them, allowing the Inquiry to focus on their common concerns for public education and not conflicts of interest. As Vinson described it: 'the moment I started to look as though I was aligned to this group or that group it would have undermined the whole thing' (interview, Vinson: Inquiry Head, 2005).
The Inquiry resembled a formal government inquiry while acting as a tool for agenda setting and generating mass union participation. The Vinson Inquiry received submissions, held public hearing and public meetings (Vinson 2002). But it was also consciously structured to increase awareness about public education for the 2003 state election and to maximise teacher and parent participation. The union constantly used mass-based communications technology to reach a broad public audience for every stage of the Inquiry, using a social frame of the 'community' to demonstrate that it was working across the state of NSW and beyond the concerns of the NSWTF (Sky Channel 2001). Submissions were advertised in the major daily newspapers, the Inquiry was launched through a satellite 'Sky Channel' which was labelled a 'community sky channel',13 772 submissions were received and the Inquiry held twenty-eight public meetings and school visits across the state (Vinson 2002).

The Inquiry operated simultaneously at the local scale and the scale of the state while engaging union members and parents through submissions and hearings. At the local scale, the submission process required teachers to reflect on their concerns and vision for public education (interview, Rosicky: NSWTF, 2005). It directly improved people's understanding of the education system and the role of the union, while also requiring local collective organisation. As Simpson from the NSWTF described it, 'it is a more engaging collective process to write a submission compared to a strike which can be organised in an individualised way ... this was deeply collective and participatory (interview, Simpson: NSWTF, 2005).

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13 A Sky Channel is a live satellite television broadcast that plays live in over forty locations around the state, followed by local meetings of teachers and parents in those locations).
The hearings lasted over six months and provided local organising opportunities for member engagement and media attention for public education. They were school-based events, inviting teachers and parents to air their grievances and make recommendations, generating a deep level of rank and file participation. As O'Halloran commented: 'it touched the middle teacher that doesn’t get involved in their union' (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). These events were organised by regionally located NSWTF organisers working with teacher associations around the state. Vinson’s visits became a space for intense member, union delegate and organiser activation, as one organiser describes:

I contacted the schools, I contacted the media ... I picked him up, Tony we’re going over to this school, now we’re going to visit the Area News ... At 11 o’clock, you have a television interview with WIN ... And then we’re visiting another school and by the way, we have got a meeting at the RSL Club this afternoon at 6 o’clock, and we’ve invited the P&C and local parents and community groups (interview, Irving: NSWTF, 2005).

The large number of public events created a sustained media campaign at the scale of the state. The decentralisation of the education industry, with schools located at a neighbourhood level in cities and towns which required the Inquiry to move across the state. Consequently, through a combination of local, state and national media outlets, according to the union ‘there was hardly a day where there was not a story about public education’ (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005).

However, while the Vinson Inquiry was an organising opportunity, it was temporary, and the union struggled to sustain participation after the event. According to union organisers, while the Vinson visits resulted in union members participating to articulate their disaffection, it was not evident that this
participation was maintained: 'when it came to translating that anger into political effect, they dropped away' (interviews 3, 16, 18: NSWTF, 2005). This was affirmed by the result of a short questionnaire I administered at the NSW State Council in April 2005, where the 300-person State Council was asked if participation in their Teacher Association increased or stayed the same after the Vinson Inquiry.\textsuperscript{14} Out of a response rate of 196 surveys, eighty-one stated it increased while another seventy-seven stated it stayed the same. There was not a direct, consistent increase in participation evenly across the union because of the Vinson Inquiry.

However, the issue of public education was broad enough to mutually and directly engage the organisational interests of the NSWTF and the P&C during the process of the Inquiry. The P&C at the time had priority concerns in two areas, school maintenance and smaller class sizes (interview, Baker: P&C; Molesworth: P&C, 2005). The form of the Inquiry provided a space for their issues to be raised and incorporated into the Inquiry's findings as it asked parents as well as teachers to communicate their concerns about the education system. Furthermore, by asking individuals to raise specific grievances, the Inquiry engaged organisation members on their specific issues of concern. This intermixing of broad and direct interest enabled the Inquiry's concern for public education to act as a mobilising, participatory force that deeply engaged the rank and file.

The externally oriented Inquiry simultaneously shaped a conscious commitment by the NSWTF to broaden its public social frame, while providing the NSWTF

\textsuperscript{14} The survey was conducted at the March NSW Teachers Federation Council meeting. It was a two page survey of the 300 Councillors, with 196 surveys returned. The response rate was 65%.
and P&C with a research agenda. O'Halloran, the NSWTF President recalled, 'I made an effort ... of saying "parents, principals and teachers say" not just speaking as the union but as the education community' (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). The Inquiry produced a research agenda for the future of public education, synthesising the concerns of teachers, parents and principals into a vision captured as ninety-six recommendations for reform (interview, Brownlee: P&C, 2005; Vinson 2002).

The Inquiry's research findings were then released as three reports in May, July and August, 2002. These were media events involving union and parent organisations targeting major media outlets to influence the Government in the lead-up to the March 2003 State Election. The first major release on Public Education Day in May began with a lunchtime press conference at the NSWTF offices, followed by a dinner of teachers and parents in the Parliament House Dining Room. The idea was for teachers and parents to 'symbolically' reclaim Parliament House 'because the government wasn't doing their job on education' (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). The NSWTF's evaluation of these events focused on the 'legitimacy' that came from having union objectives 'articulated through this independent inquiry' (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005). For the P&C, the release of the reports reflected a growing 'genuine partnership' (interview 22: P&C, 2005). It was clear to the P&C that despite the unequal provision of resources from the NSWTF, that the 'NSWTF needed us' and together, with Vinson, the organisations had influenced public debate (interview 22: P&C, 2005).

Moreover, for the NSWTF there was a sense that Vinson gave the union a positive-issue agenda. As O'Halloran argued, the Vinson Inquiry presented a
'thesis' and forced the government to be the antithesis (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). Through the Inquiry, the parent-teacher alliance had seized 'the agenda' and the government was forced to react (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005).

Indeed, the government did react. In November 2002, as the Vinson Inquiry received increasing media attention, John Watkins was appointed as the new Education Minister. He was a former teacher and operated with a more accommodating approach, opening the ALP Government to greater advocacy. As the NSWTF noted, 'Watkins in his Ministry actually tried to do things, to the extent that they could they tried to solve things' (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). Watkins, with his preference for an open style of policy making, unsuccessfully attempted to accommodate the reform agenda of the Inquiry. In May 2003, he announced the formation of a Public Education Council, a new 'stakeholder' body that tried unsuccessfully to connect the government with the Vinson Inquiry and the public campaign around education. Yet that council did result in the NSWTF forming the Public Education Alliance soon after.

3.3 State Election campaign, May 2002 to March 2003

The NSWTF joined with the parent and principal groups to form the Public Education Alliance in July 2002 as a coordinated state-scaled coalition to win targeted reforms using the opportunity of the 2003 state election. The Public Education Alliance evolved out of the coalitions initiated during the Vinson Inquiry and the 2001 federal election, and responded to the opportunity of the state election (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). It was also a product of union leadership change that supported extended coalition practice. In January
2002 O'Halloran, Gavrielatos and Leete took over as the new union leadership team. O'Halloran had led the Vinson Inquiry within the union, and together they had staged their union election campaign on the need to create ‘agenda-setting politics ... how do we get on the front foot ... be bold enough to articulate a vision, articulate the aspirations and needs of teachers, students and public education’ (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005).

The Alliance sought to create a ‘united front ... of parents, teachers and principals speaking with a united voice’ (interview, Scott: PPA, 2005). The Alliance operated between July 2002 and March 2003 through irregular but constant meetings held at the NSWTF. These meetings were attended by the senior executive officers of all the participating organisations (interview, McBride: PSPF, 2005). The participants put aside their differences within Alliance meetings, as one representative acknowledged:

I wouldn't say we are close now as individuals, but when it comes to a public face in terms of pursuing those ideas for public education, well then we are buddies (interview 13: principal representative, 2005).

While the Alliance was relatively informal, it provided a space for negotiation, evident in how it formulated its six United Demands for the 2003 State Election campaign during July and September 2002. The NSWTF prepared the initial draft of the Demands, then ‘shopped them around’ for discussion (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). The Demands included reducing class sizes, improving school maintenance, supporting quality teachers and professional development (Carr 2002). The Demands sought to balance the specific interests of individual organisations within a broad interest frame of public education – binding organisations to the campaign through their own self-interest. Even
though the NSWTF wrote the Demands, there was a broad sense of ownership over content. As a parent representative argued, 'we always had the power to veto ... we wouldn't put our name to anything that we did not approve of as an organisation' (interview 9: FOSCO, 2005). Similarly, as one principal representative noted, 'we were all encompassed by those recommendations' (interview, King: SPC, 2005).

The major controversy in formulating these debates was how the Alliance framed its concern for salaries. The NSWTF knew it 'couldn't get away without having salaries there' in the United Demands (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). After the election, the union would move into salary negotiations. Mentioning salaries would help offset disquiet in the union's membership that the NSWTF was forgetting its core responsibilities (interview 3: NSWTF, 2005). However, the parent groups, particularly FOSCO, were equally adamant that salaries would not be mentioned, arguing it was 'inappropriate', and 'fearing that this issue would overshadow the Alliance, given the dominant role the union was already playing' (interview 9: FOSCO, 2005). Eventually the NSWTF compromised, with the United Demands calling for the 'development of strategies to attract and retain teachers in an era of teacher shortage', which was a way of expressing a need for salary justice to union members without mentioning the word salaries (Carr 2002).

This controversy reveals a limitation in how coalition unionism establishes common concern. While an alliance flourishes on issues of mutual common interest, organisations also have autonomous internal needs, such as a union's concern for salaries, which must also be satisfied. The art of coalition practice
balances these competing needs, reflecting a contradiction between organisational autonomy and coalition unity (Hyman 1989).

Amongst the list of Demands, the most important was reducing class sizes for K-2 students (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). A campaign to reduce class sizes had been a priority of the NSWTF since 2001. They had brought out Charles Achilles, a US expert, to address the 2002 NSWTF Annual Conference and to build public support for the pedagogical benefits of reducing class sizes for early childhood development (NSWTF 2002c). The NSWTF had distributed videos about small class sizes to every school, conducted parliamentary briefings and leafleted parents (NSWTF 2002a). Similarly, both FOSCO and the P&C had their own self-interest in the class sizes campaign, as it would improve the quality of education for children in the classroom (interview 9: FOSCO, 2005; Brownlee: P&C, 2005).

Once the United Demands were determined, the Alliance planned a series of joint events that led up to the state election. The events were focused at the scale of the NSW State Government and directed towards the key decision makers who set Education policy, including the State Premier (Government Leader), the Treasurer and the Education Minister. The public education lobbies did undertake local activities, displaying school signs that said ‘Public Education is the Issue’ and continued with local lobbying by parents, principals and teachers. But the momentum for the Alliance was drawn to the state-based events, including the central lobbying of key politicians and a state public education forum.
The Alliance’s lobbying activities harnessed the different capacities of the Alliance partners, each committing significant but different resources to the campaign because its outcomes supported their organisational interests. The PPA and SPC had close relationships with the Minister for Education, and separately lobbied the Minister in support of the United Demands (interview 11: principal representative, 2005). The P&C had a strong voice in the media, and were regularly quoted in the press in support of the Demands (interview, Brownlee: P&C, 2005; SBS News 2002; Totaro 2003a; interview, Brownlee: P&C, 2005; Doherty and Malking 2003b). The NSWTF had significant financial resources, paying for a background advertising campaign with slogans such as ‘The Future is Public Education’ and ‘Public Education ... it’s Time to Give it More’, and funded the distribution of a leaflet that was inserted into the Sun-Herald newspaper on Australia Day – 26 January 2003 (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2004).

While the narrow organisational mutual self-interest created significant buy-in within the Alliance, the Alliance partners did not seek broader external organisational support from unions or community organisations beyond the Alliance (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). The NSWTF believed that other unions would not be interested because the class sizes campaign was not an ‘industrial matter’, but a ‘professional and educational’ concern (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). However, in not seeking broader union support, the NSWTF succumbed to a narrow industrial definition of unions; which was a limitation given that unions are the largest member-based organisations in Australia.
The Alliance's agenda-setting power created political opportunities that divided the political parties. On 4 November 2002, the Liberal-National Party's Opposition Leader, John Brogden, endorsed the Alliance's demands over class sizes five months before the election (Totaro 2002). This escalated pressure on the NSW ALP Government. The Alliance was then offered a meeting with the Premier on 22 January, a remarkable achievement given that the NSWTF had not met with the Premier in over five years (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005).

However, the opportunity of the meeting with the Premier further exacerbated tensions between parents and teachers over the connection between salaries and the Public Education Alliance. When the Premier asked the meeting what their priorities were, O'Halloran answered 'class sizes and the Vinson 5%' as, independently of the NSWTF, Vinson had made a statement calling for an immediate five per cent raise in teacher wages (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005; Vinson 2002, p. 372). This was consistent with the NSWTF's public comments at the time which sought to connect class sizes and salaries as demands: 'it was always there, you would say class sizes were a major issue for the election and you would also mention salaries' (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). However, the NSWTF's continued advocacy on salaries 'angered' one of the parent groups, which saw it as acting against the decision of the coalition: 'when we had made it clear that we did not want it (salaries) to be part of the public education campaign' (interview 10: parent representative, 2005).

Nevertheless, the relationships across the Public Education Alliance were sustained until the state election. On March 3, three weeks before the election, the NSW Government announced a professional development program for
teachers, and on 9 March at the ALP's Election Launch, Premier Carr announced a class sizes policy consistent with the Alliance (Doherty 2003a; Totaro 2003b). Two weeks later, the ALP was re-elected. For the NSWTF, it was the broad range of voices including Vinson and ‘parents, teachers and principals’ that generated the policy victory. As O’Halloran acknowledged: ‘it was the Alliance and Vision that allowed the Premier to announce his statement on class sizes without having to look like he was conceding to the NSWTF (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2005).

3.4 Teacher Salaries campaign, May 2003 to June 2004

At the beginning of the Salaries campaign, the NSWTF stood in a strong position because of its coalition work. As one senior official argued; the election campaign ‘had created a platform from which we were able to launch into salaries’ (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005). Yet when the PEC shifted into the NSWTF’s Salaries campaign there was a rapid deterioration of the close relationships built over the last two years.

Over 2002 the NSWTF had prepared its salaries strategy, contemplating the possibility of a formal arbitration to determine its new ‘award’ (a collective bargaining contract) before the NSW Industrial Relations Commission (IRC). At the time the IRC had the power to compulsorily arbitrate wage disputes through open hearings, and independently determine a settlement. In 2002, the NSWTF surveyed members, and resolved at its 2002 Annual Conference that if the government guaranteed existing working conditions then they would have their wage claim arbitrated in the Commission (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2005; O’Halloran 2002; NSWTF 2002b). For the NSWTF, while a Commission hearing
‘wasn’t a preferred option’, the NSWTF leaders believed that an arbitration solely on the issue of wages could reverse the practice of salaries disputes in the 1990s, where the ‘initial offer’ was based on a loss of conditions or trade-offs, ‘and the campaign was spent clawing conditions back’ (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). The only other option, direct negotiations and industrial action, would potentially have more problems. As O’Halloran noted, there was ‘four years to another election’, it could be an ‘intractable fight’ which many ‘members did not want’ given the ‘brutality’ of the 1999 Teacher Salaries campaign (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2005).

The ‘solid context’ of the State Election campaign delivered the NSWTF an early meeting with the Premier and the newly appointed Education Minister, Andrew Refshauge, on 9 May 2003. At that meeting the NSWTF told the Minister that ‘we can fight for four years over salaries or perhaps you can agree that our working conditions don’t get touched and we go to the IRC’ (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). On 12 May, the NSWTF were ‘surprised’ to receive an early pay offer of a 6% wage increase over two years, and were told they could go to the Commission for more (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). This offer was significantly below the union’s goal of a 20% increase, but it was a dramatically better starting point than the concession bargaining of the 1990s. The union’s previous coalition work had delivered an improved starting point for salaries in recent memory.

Yet, unknown to the NSWTF, the government had discussed the salaries negotiations and had decided that an arbitrated decision in the Commission was its preferred option (interview 40: DET, 2005). It wanted to ‘avoid a war’ like that
in the 1990s, and wanted to use the industrial space of the Commission to control the dispute (interview 40: DET, 2005).

In preparing for the campaign, the NSWTF faced three obstacles. Firstly, the union had not secured a commitment from the government to fully fund any pay recommendation from the Commission that came in above 6%. A fear was that if the IRC awarded a pay increase above 6%, then the government would pay for that increase out of the existing public education budget – in effect cutting money from schools to pay for teacher salaries (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2005).

Secondly, the NSWTF’s relationship with the P&C had changed. In July 2002, the P&C experienced an acrimonious change in leadership. The new leader announced that she would prioritise building a stronger relationship with the Education Minister and the Premier, in effect distancing the P&C from the NSWTF (Parker 2002; interview 12: P&C, 2005; Wood 2002). This separation was compounded in April 2003 when the new Education Minister, Refshauge, initiated regular meetings with the P&C while the salaries negotiations commenced (interview 21: P&C representative, 2005). The NSWTF-P&C relationship ‘deteriorated’ to such a point during the salaries campaign that senior officials in the NSWTF and the P&C President ‘wouldn’t exchange words’ (interview 22: P&C, 2005). In addition, the fact that the NSWTF’s Commission hearings were only about the quantum of wages and not about conditions, helped separate the union from parents. Unlike the Class Sizes campaign, where the union and the Alliance were advocates on an issue that was perceived to be in the direct interests of parents and teachers, the parents saw the wage claim as the teachers’ issue only (interview, Brownlee: P&C, 2005).
Thirdly, the NSWTF campaigned on salaries alone, without the support of regular meetings with the PEC. Despite the NSWTF initially placing its concern for salaries within a broad public social frame, ‘pitching our campaign in a context that was relevant to the community’, using slogans such as ‘work value’ and ‘valuing teachers’ (interview, Gavrielatos: NSWTF, 2005), support from the coalition partners was lacking. Since the 1960s, the NSWTF had not worked with the P&C or principal organisations on salaries, believing that as the sole industrial organisation it is the only legitimate body to determine wage outcomes (interview, Baker: P&C, 2005; Simpson: NSWTF, 2005). While this ensured that its industrial power remained unified within the NSWTF, it inadvertently separated the NSWTF’s salaries campaign strategy from the other education partners. The lack of a coalition caused friction with the P&C when the NSWTF tried to speak on behalf of the community but was acting just as the union. For example, tension increased when the NSWTF produced a pamphlet about their pay claim that they circulated in Sunday newspapers, which talked about ‘parents’ without consulting the P&C first (interview 3: NSWTF, 2005; NSWTF 2003b).

However, one community-based message around teacher shortages was more successful, at least in regional and remote areas where there was a high degree of concern. One of the NSWTF’s social frames for the Salaries campaign was that it would help avoid teacher shortage (NSWTF 2003b; NSWTF 2004c). Although this message was not reported widely in the Sydney-based media, it was extensively reported in rural areas where school viability and regional education were threatened by declining teacher numbers (interview, Irving: NSWTF, 2005; 15

15 The advertisements said that ‘unless we want a teacher shortage, the government has got to pay teachers more’.
The organisational isolation of the NSWTF in the Salaries campaign was compounded by the industrial context and processes of the Commission hearings. The IRC took the NSWTF into a courtroom, separated from the public agenda it had just created. While the NSWTF brought its members to coalition hearings and included witness testimony from two principal representatives and Tony Vinson, the tactics the NSWTF used were industrially not community-based. The first rally about the salaries claim on 8 July only featured NSWTF speakers, and the second rally in September added an industrial partner, Unions NSW, but not an education partner (*Sydney Morning Herald* 18 Sept 2003).

Similarly, as the Commission began its deliberations in 2004, NSWTF media comments increasingly focused on the percentage of wage increase that was being offered. NSWTF advertisements also narrowly focused on the issue of teacher pay, rather than the link between pay and quality education (NSWTF 2003a)\(^{16}\), while the P&C leadership simultaneously distanced itself from the NSWTF industrial action (McDougall 2003).

During the hearing process, the employer-employee relationship between the NSWTF, the government and the DET weakened. The NSWTF were very angry at the ‘aggressive’ manner in which their teacher witnesses were interviewed (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). The Department was ‘shocked’ at the ‘vitriolic’ comments that the NSWTF circulated internally about Department witnesses (interview 40: DET, 2005). This compounded the isolation of the

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\(^{16}\) The NSWTF advertisement stated, ‘for many years teacher’s pay has been going backwards, increasing less than average weekly earnings’.
union; as one external union observer noted, 'the NSWTF builds so many enemies outside that it is often just left on its own' (interview 34: union official, 2005).

Further pressure on the NSWTF came in May 2004 from the government, which used unprecedented means to influence the Commission while it was determining its award (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). The Premier made a public statement on 11 May 2004 ‘warning’ the Commission ‘not to hand out unaffordable wage increases’, and then on 13 May the Minister for Industrial Relations sought to reopen the salaries case after hearings had ceased, to lodge evidence about incapacity to pay wage increases (Dixon 2004; O'Halloran 2004; Burke 2004a).

However unintentionally, the government’s perceived aggression changed the political opportunities of the Salaries campaign, shifting the issue from percentage increases in pay to the issue of fully funding the pay rise. The NSWTF leadership now believed that the greatest obstacle to a pay rise would be whether the government would fund an award made by the IRC (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). With this broader frame, the NSWTF reached out to its education partners and its members. It leafleted parents at schools on 25 May arguing that full funding was in the ‘interests of the public education community’ as it ‘protected the public education budget’ (Zadkovich 2004a), then it staged a one-day strike on 27 May. The strike’s public social frame was focused on the issue of full funding, even though many members were mobilised on the basis of needing a wage increase (interview, O'Halloran: NSWTF, 2005). According to the NSWTF, these campaign messages of salaries and full funding ‘were a complex balancing act’, but the use of salaries to generate member
commitment, combined with a powerful social frame focused on full funding created a successful teacher mobilisation, as the rally was the ‘largest protest by teachers in the Carr Government’s history’ (NSWTF 2004b).

However, the public actions did not create the desired outcome in the IRC, and on 9 June it handed down a decision awarding a 12.5% pay increase over two years, which ‘deeply disappointed’ the NSWTF (Dixon 2004). However, the IRC result did clarify the need to secure a government commitment to fully fund the difference between the 12.5% award and the initial 6% pay offer.

The campaign’s shift to full funding narrowed the campaign and changed the media commentary in support of the NSWTF. The Daily Telegraph, the same paper which five years before had run articles mocking the NSWTF, ran an opinion column written by an in-house journalist on 16 June that said ‘this is not the usual fight by teachers over money, this has become a fight for the survival of a valued and quality public education system’ (Parker 2004).

Secondly, the shift to full funding created the space for a critical vote inside the P&C in support of the NSWTF. The NSWTF had announced a strike on 25 June to escalate the demand for full funding. The weekend before the strike, the P&C had a Council meeting where a motion was moved that called on the P&C to ‘effectively support the teachers’ Salary campaign on the basis that it was no longer a salary issue, it was an education issue’ (interview 22: P&C, 2005). The motion was ‘resoundingly supported by the P&C Council’ even though it was not supported by the President (interview 22: P&C, 2005). According to one P&C official, the widespread support derived from ‘considerable concern across the Council’ about how the teachers’ dispute was affecting the education system and
the motion represented an 'opportunity' to help resolve it (interview 22: P&C, 2005). News of the motion immediately ‘hit the press’, with articles the next day talking about parents and teachers uniting against the government (Burke 2004b).

The combination of P&C support and a threat of industrial action shifted the government. It was the day after the P&C motion and the day before the threatened strike that the government committed to fully funding the salary increase. For the NSWTF, the P&C was critical. O’Halloran argued, ‘that actually kicked the balance in terms of full funding ... it was historic’ (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2004). The public social frame of the full funding debate was broad enough to legitimately allow a dissenting faction of P&C leaders to generate support for the NSWTF salaries debate. Within the union and the P&C, a group of officials acted as bridge builders to help the organisations maintain relationships, despite the tension at a leadership level, and those relationships generated the support that cemented the NSWTF’s full funding victory.

3.5 Federal Election campaign, February to October 2004

The 2004 Federal Election campaign was the final stage of the PEC, which was coordinated by the teacher, parent and principal organisations in a partial reunification of the Public Education Alliance. The NSWTF’s and Public Education Alliance’s Federal Election campaign had two distinct streams. Firstly there was a professional media campaign focused at the national scale, and secondly there was a more grassroots local campaign focused on local electorates. The campaign also had two distinct targets: to raise the issue of
education in the election, and to highlight the differences between the political parties' support of public education versus private education.

This election campaign was first and foremost a media campaign operating at a national scale, targeting major metropolitan media with the aim of raising the issue of education in the press. Nationally, the Australian Education Union (AEU) had contracted a professional media company to develop an advertising and free media publicity campaign (interview 25: AEU, 2005). In NSW, the major events were media-focused. The Public Education Alliance launched three rounds of television advertising, first in February, then in March and finally in May around the Federal Budget (Johnson 2004). The events were also media-driven, with limited rank and file participation. The first, in February, was a screening of the advertisements to parents, teachers and principals at Bourke Street Public School (NSWTF 2004a). Similarly, a new electoral alliance was launched in May called Services First, that included the NSWTF and P&C, but only had one significant public event which was a media conference in May (Ride 2004).

The campaign's second stream involved local public education lobby work pressuring local candidates in their electorates; however it struggled to build member engagement. It began in south-western Sydney in late March, where NSWTF delegates worked with the PSPF to stage a school gate protest when the Federal Education Minister, Nelson, visited Mount Annan High School in Campbelltown (Zadkovich 2004c). This event was well attended given the history of strong NSWTF and PSPF school-based activism in that area. Afterwards, the NSWTF attempted to replicate the idea of local actions, encouraging NSWTF school representatives to take on local lobbying of
candidates and protests (Irving 2003). The NSWTF, parents and principals also travelled to Canberra, the national capital, on 21 June to lobby politicians (Gavrielatos 2004). Yet here too, according to one NSWTF organiser, attendance was 'minimal', and NSWTF organisers reported that they 'struggled' to build NSW participation (interview 19: NSWTF, 2005). Moreover, the NSW delegation was by far the largest, 'overshadowing' participation from the other states (interview 17: NSWTF, 2005).

The NSWTF organisers interviewed noted that it was difficult sustaining local activity during the Federal Election campaign. The lobbying events coincided with the salaries 'strike action' which was a 'greater priority' than the Election campaign (interview 17: NSWTF, 2005). Others cited deeper problems. One believed that the activist base 'was exhausted', the years of 'constant campaigning' making it difficult to mobilise now (interview 17: NSWTF, 2005). Yet, others cited problems with the federal election target and agenda in particular. As one official commented, the federal election 'seems so abstract': it was not like salaries or class sizes, 'it is hard to see how it relates' (interview 17: NSWTF, 2005).

The national scale of the campaign made it difficult to coordinate members at a state scale. Similarly, the lack of a specific agenda or goal contributed to the difficulties that organisers faced in mobilising members for local action, as it was difficult to see the relevance or effect that local mobilisations would have on a national election.

However, an exception to this was in western Sydney where a local NSWTF school representative prepared local materials that translated the Federal
Election campaign to the local area. A leaflet was produced that described the Federal Government’s funding of private schools versus public schools by documenting the differences in funding levels for the local public and private schools in their area (interview 28: NSWTF, 2005). This leaflet created a ‘buzz’, because according to a local organiser, ‘it brought home the message’ of how the nationally-scaled policy affected the local school (interview 17: NSWTF, 2005).

In summary then, the Election campaign was mixed. The ALP Opposition took up the issue of private and public school funding and thus the NSWTF and the PEC had successfully promoted the issue of education (Yaxley 2004). However, the campaign insufficiently engaged the Alliance partners or the union membership. In the end, the conservative Liberal-National Coalition won the election, with an increased majority and control of the Senate. While the 2004 election was a success for raising the issue of education, it was not a success for public education funding as the conservatives’ policy of supporting private education continued in 2005.

4.0 Reflections and Conclusion
The PEC between 2001 and 2004 varied significantly across these five campaign phases. These changes were produced by shifting dynamics of the coalition elements: inter-organisational relationships, common concern and scale. These produced different types of coalition success, in terms of outcomes: creating a supportive political climate, sustaining relationships and building the capacity of the participating organisations. At the same time, the coalition revealed consistent features of what this study has labelled agenda-driven coalition unionism.
The coalition unionism was a product of internal crisis in the union, generating pressure to reach out and form relationships with parents and principals. The internal movement in support of the coalition strategy generated widespread union delegate and organiser commitment that was repeatedly engaged during the public education campaigns.

In the first phase, the 2001 Federal Election campaign, the inter-organisational relationships were limited to organising tactics rather than joint planning or strategising. Limited coalition planning led to union domination of the event, and the event did not influence the outcome of the federal election. However, a joint convention did create familiarity and trust between the organisations that led to stronger relationships in the future. This phase also launched a multi-scaled campaign which not only engaged rank and file teachers through their teacher association meetings but exposed them to local coalition meetings with parents and principals.

The second phase of the campaign, the Vinson Inquiry, had a dramatically closer set of inter-organisational relationships. It had a narrow partner base of just two organisations – the NSWTF and P&C – and each were required to allocate senior staff and money to coordinate the Inquiry. The Inquiry also established a separate ‘coalition office’ structure above the two parties. This ‘separate but connected’ status gave the Inquiry power in its external relationships. Inviting the participation of parents and teachers opened the common concern of the coalition.
The Inquiry was a successful coalition, building a supportive political climate for public education and engaging a new level of union members and parents. Localised events around the state produced a rolling media campaign that established the crisis in education and legitimised teachers and parents as helping to solve it. The union opened itself more readily to inter-organisational relationships, seeing itself as one of three advocates for public education. Vinson as a coordinator above the parents helped the organisations to sustain their relationships and to build a more influential role with government and the media. The local scale of activity combined with the open-ended frame for participation provided a space for collective action that drew in teachers who had previously not participated in union industrial campaigns.

The third phase of the campaign, during the 2003 state election, involved a slightly broader coalition, deeply connected through mutual self-interest and supported by a new union leadership (Voss and Sherman 2000). It was an interest-based coalition, organised through the six United Demands that simultaneously created a unified education agenda out of the discrete organisational interests of parents, principals and teachers. The campaign successfully divided the political parties at the state scale and used the opportunity of an election to achieve a policy outcome. However the campaign had less multi-scalar participation than the Vinson Inquiry, focusing instead on the scale of the state decision makers.

The State Election campaign translated the agenda-setting inquiry into political outcomes. Inter-organisational relationships were centrally coordinated, mitigating the impact that the campaign had on members. However, central coordination was critical for maximising pressure and winning outcomes against
the NSW Government. The negotiation of mutual interest demands sustained organisational engagement through organisational self-interest, and encouraged organisations to use different forms of organisational power to lobby for the United Demands.

At one level, the Salaries campaign was a tremendous victory, significantly advancing the NSWTF’s recent history of wage negotiations. This victory, that shifted the government away from concession bargaining to arbitration only over wages, was a product of the previous coalition work. Yet the Salaries campaign also unwound the mutually interested coalition relationships, as the issue of salaries was framed as an industrial campaign undertaken by the union alone. The confines of the IRC narrowed the forms of activity that members could participate in. However, when the campaign shifted to full funding, the wide social frame and previous relationships with the P&C played a critical role in shifting the media debates and provoking the government to commit to funding the salary increase.

Finally, the 2004 federal election re-established a set of formal inter-organisational relationships that built a campaign focused on media work and limited local lobbying. The campaign did not have a clear winnable common concern like class sizes. Rather, it focused broadly on issues such as private school funding. The campaign struggled to build participation as the national scale. In terms of success, it maintained awareness of the public education issue, but the coalition had limited effect on the member organisations, given the limited number of joint campaign activities.
While there was significant diversity across the campaign, overall the PEC exhibited similar features to what this study has called agenda-driven coalition unionism. This is where strong common concern and scale built an agenda, but it was limited by a set of weak inter-organisational relationships. The coalition unionism benefited the union by providing new forms of member engagement, particularly in the Vinson Inquiry and through multi-scaled public education lobbies, with member participation based on issues of union interest. However, the coalition’s weak inter-organisational relationships allowed the union to dominate the coalition. The NSWTF defined the activities of the coalition, which caused dramatic shifts in the strength of the inter-organisational relationships over time, reducing their stability.

Moreover, the case study highlights that the centralised resources of the NSWTF acted as a limitation on the possibilities of this type of coalition unionism. While the local activity in this campaign created opportunities to engage previously non-participating union members, and the union had pre-existing multi-scalar internal structures, local activity was hard to sustain. This was partly affected by the changing issues at the heart of the campaign, such as between class sizes and the Federal Election campaign. However, the centralisation of union resources and the lack of local coalition capacity limited the coalition’s ability to sustain the education campaign outside the centrally driven coalition and union strategies.

More broadly, this form of agenda-driven coalition unionism is similar to other coalitions in the secondary literature. The Justice for Janitors campaign in the United States is a union-dominated organising campaign, which seeks to organise and win collective bargaining rights for janitors at a city scale through intensive mobilisations and coalitions with immigrant organisations, faith groups
and community organisations such as ACORN (Savage 1998; Rudy 2001; Clawson 2003). It, like the PEC, is defined by a strong common concern that touches union members and provides a strong public social frame, while also providing a moral basis for coalition relationships. Additionally, the immigrant membership of SEIU supported the union’s relationships with community organisations and immigrant organisations, as janitors are often members of these organisations (Savage 1998). Workers are often organised off-site, through local meetings connected with these community organisations, providing a multi-scaled capacity (Savage 1998). The strengths and limitations of the Justice for Janitors campaign can be understood using elements of the agenda-driven coalition model. Its campaign strength is its capacity to build a supportive agenda and movement for collective bargaining for low-wage workers, however it has sometimes struggled to build sustainable relationships with its community partners beyond organising drives, because the activities of the campaign are union-dominated (Tait 2005).

The PEC was a powerful agenda-driven form of coalition unionism that privileged a common concern for public education as a simultaneous driver of organisational interest, movement building amongst union members and as a public social frame. Its use of the Vinson Inquiry, multi-scaled internal union structures and the establishment of public education lobbies facilitated a multi-scaled capacity that could build media, engage local autonomous member-driven activity and create political influence. However, the coalition’s sustainability was weakened by union-dominated inter-organisational relationships, and the union’s centralised resources sometimes limited multi-scaled campaign capacity. The union domination that was evident in this form of coalition unionism, while
still supporting a strong agenda for social change, mitigated the sustainability of class movement power or relational power during the collaboration.

The next chapter investigates a coalition from Canada with contrasting strengths and weaknesses to the PEC. Unlike the PEC, the Canadian study had strong inter-organisational relationships and strong multi-scaled capacity while struggling to build common concern.
Chapter Six
Relationship-Driven Coalition Unionism:
CUPE and the Ontario Health Coalition, 2001-2006

One evening in June 2005 in a community hall near Niagara-on-the-Lake, provincial government politicians counted the votes in a region-wide community plebiscite. It was an odd scene: the Liberal Government Members of the Provincial Parliament (MPPs) supported public-private-partnerships – yet they were counting votes that demonstrated that 13,000 voters in their electoral district opposed them.

The first of the Ontario Health Coalition’s (OHC) local community plebiscites had just ended. Though hastily organised, the local Niagara Health Coalition (NHC), led by several local unionists, had massively outstripped expectations. They had campaigned to ‘build their hospital right’ and they brought their fellow citizens along with them.

This local community had built a ‘social movement’ (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005) As one union President commented, ‘we could never have done this alone, no matter how big your union is, no matter how much power you have’ (interview, Ryan: CUPE, 2006). Through years of sustained campaigning, the OHC had drawn unions and community organisations into a centralised province-wide coalition, and into dozens of locally organised health care coalitions, and had transformed the capacity of its participant organisations through the relative autonomy of its relationship-driven coalition unionism.
1.0 Introduction

This is a case study of a coalition that acted as a provocateur and changed union strategy while campaigning to defend public health care. The coalition differs significantly from the public education campaign, where the primary strategic agent was the union, and the agenda was proactive.

This chapter explores the work of the OHC from late 2001 to early 2006. The OHC was first established in 1980 and relaunched in 1995 (OHC 1980a). Over time it came to represent seven unions with a wide variety of participant community organisations including seniors' organisations, the left-nationalist Council of Canadians and approximately thirty-five active local health coalitions based around the province. While established by the Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL), the OHC has operated at arm's length from its participant organisations. Structurally, it is unlike the Public Education Coalitions which consistently remained under the control of the NSWTF. The OHC had a separate coalition office, staff, and a large number of diverse participant organisations including locally-based health coalitions created by the OHC. It is the relative independence of the OHC's structure, and the possibilities and limitations that this offers for coalitions and unions, that is a focus of this chapter.

This case study is a strong example of a different, but successful, relationship-driven coalition unionism. The coalition elements of a formal inter-organisational structure and strong multi-scaled broker organisations, identified in Chapter Two, are central to this study. The OHC's province-wide Administrative Committee, combined with its independent coalition staff and office, enabled the OHC to act like an independent 'organisation'. Its autonomy
was enhanced by a deep multi-scalar capacity through approximately thirty-five broker organisations that built volunteer participation. This structure enabled the Coalition to build campaigns through its relationships with unions and community organisations.

This relationship-driven coalition unionism was important in two ways. Firstly, it contributed to the OHC’s success; in particular it helped create sustainable long-term relationships that built the organisational capacity of the participating organisations and achieved policy outcomes. Secondly, it allowed the OHC to be a change agent, a dialectic actor amongst the coalition partners – most particularly with CUPE, the most involved union.

This chapter firstly explores the contextual background of the OHC, then three phases of OHC campaigns. It begins with the 2002 Save Medicare campaign, the OHC’s first major campaign involving both local and central coalitions, and ends with the Plebiscite campaigns, which represented an intensification of the locally-scaled campaign work first begun in 2002. While there are seven unions in the OHC, the study focuses on CUPE. The story of this union helps explain and serves as an example of the strategic challenges and opportunities of relationship-driven coalition unionism for successful coalition practice and union power.

2.0 Context for the Case Study

National Health Care is intimately tied to Canadian national identity. Medicare was the creation of Tommy Douglas, a CCF Premier in Saskatchewan who created a universal health care system in his province in 1962. Through the
newly formed NDP, Douglas built a progressive alliance including unions that campaigned for its national adoption by the Liberal Party, through the national Medical Insurance Act on 12 July 1966 (Chandler 1977; Maioni 1998; Barlow 2002, p. 23). Universal health insurance was combined with federal funding for hospitals, with the Canada Health Act 1984 creating the foundation for the public health care system (Barlow 2002, p. 31).

Particularly since the 1980s, with pressures for free trade from the US, a left nationalism surged in Canada that embraced social institutions such as health care (Barlow 2002). In the 1990s the iconic status of universal health care was threatened by strong political lobbies pushing for privatisation. These forces included the Conservative Party, employer think-tanks and pharmaceutical and private insurance companies (Mehra 2005). The privatisation campaign began by stealth through reductions in public expenditure (Armstrong, Armstrong and Fuller 2000; Leduc Browne 2000; Department of Finance 2004). These cuts caused a well documented decline in care: in Ontario 900 acute and chronic beds were closed because of the cuts in hospital funding (Government of Ontario 1998). As Mehra from the OHC argued, the system was in crisis: 'there were huge waiting lists for surgeries, cancer treatment centres were cancelled; there was no planning for the future of the health system' (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2005). 17

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17 For instance, the Conservative Harris Government in Ontario cut $800 million from the hospital budget and delivered a 30% tax cut which reduced revenue for available care. Similarly federal budget cuts in the mid-1990s effectively halved the per capita provincial payments in the Canadian Assistance Plan, and cut the Canadian Health and Social Transfer spending by two-thirds (Leduc Browne 2000, p. 16; Department of Finance 1997).
It was from this context of crisis that the OFL resolved to re-establish the OHC (interview, Harris: OFL, 2006). The practice of the OHC between 2001 and 2006 was influenced by the types of unions and community organisations that joined the OHC and the OHC's earlier history.

2.1 Unions

The major unions involved in the Ontario Health Coalition and represented on its Administrative Committee included CUPE, the Ontario Public Sector Employees Union (OPSEU), the Ontario Nurses Association (ONA), the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), the Canadian Auto Workers Union (CAW), the United Steelworkers of America (Steelworkers), and a central labour council, which was first represented by the provincial OFL and later by the national Canadian Labour Congress (CLC). The differences among these unions can be categorised using the opportunities and choices framework developed in Chapter Three.

Firstly, the unions' external context varied, in terms of their industry location and whether they operated in the public or private sector. CUPE, OPSEU, ONA and SEIU were primarily public sector unions; in contrast the CAW and Steelworkers were predominantly private sector. The public sector unions had a strong opportunity structure that supported involvement in coalition unionism, particularly 'political' campaigns, including policy and electoral work.

Secondly, the unions' organisational capacity and pre-existing relationships influenced coalition capacity. In terms of union homogeneity or heterogeneity, ONA was exclusively a health care union, whereas the others had a mixed health
care and non-health care membership. However, internally CUPE had the Ontario Council of Hospital Unions (OCHU) that provided a dedicated health care campaign structure (interview, Hurley: CUPE-OCHU, 2006). In contrast, both the CAW and Steelworkers were more ‘general’ unions, operating in a variety of industries, from auto-parts to health care and call centres. The unions varied in terms of organisational scale. CUPE, ONA, OPSEU and the CAW were national unions, whereas the SEIU and Steelworkers were international unions with head offices based in the United States. Internally, CUPE, CAW and the Steelworkers had a nationally federated structure, where financial resources were split between the national office (or international office) and union locals, who retained between 45% of union fees. Conversely, SEIU, ONA and OPSEU were provincially-scaled with resources centralised in Ontario.

In terms of organisational relationships, all these Canadian unions had relationships with political parties, mostly with the NDP. The closeness of this relationship has varied among these unions and over time. The exceptions were ONA, which is officially non-partisan (ONA 2007) and the CAW, which over the previous five years had shifted its political relationship away from the NDP, towards the Liberal Party, particularly after the 2003 Ontario provincial election (CAW 2006).

These political relationships were also entwined and connected to ideological values, which broadly divided the unions into two groups. The first group, led by the Steelworkers and later labelled the ‘pink paper unions’, favoured a policy of supporting the NDP while in government and agitating inside the party as its
primary political strategy (Munro 1997). In contrast, CUPE and the CAW had agitated for a broader political strategy that placed greater importance on working with social movements (Robinson 2000b; Robinson 2002). While each group had supported social movement relationships, during the 1990s both CUPE and the CAW placed greater weight on social movement events, such as the Days of Action in Ontario against the Harris Government (Munro 1997). At the same time, unions such as OPSEU were also engaged in the Days of Action.

Finally, the unions' political relationships connected their union identity to campaigns beyond wages and conditions. This was particularly evident in the CAW, which defined itself as a 'social movement union' (Gindin 1985; Yates 1993). Similarly, in interviews CUPE and OPSEU officials described their unions as social unions, because they were prepared to campaign beyond 'wages and conditions' (interviews, Ryan: CUPE, 2006; interview 3: OPSEU, 2005). In contrast, SEIU in Canada had a stronger 'wages and conditions' focus, and had been less involved in health care campaigning (interview 33: SEIU, 2006). This changed in 2003, and accelerated in 2005, when the SEIU underwent an internal organisational shift that included a commitment to building community organisation relationships and health policy advocacy (interview 33: SEIU, 2006). ONA, while still a union, operates more as a professional association than as a 'wages and conditions' union. The difference is that it prioritised less confrontational strategies, such as negotiations without strikes (as nurses do not have the right to strike), and spends significant resources on grievance handling and services (interview 19: ONA, 2005).

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18 The group was called the pink paper unions because they signed a document supporting the Ontario NDP's social contract during the OFL debates which was printed on pink paper.
These different ideological values were underpinned by variations in levels of internal union education, and gender diversity. While all the unions undertake broad union education programs and political education, notably the CAW had a major, internationally recognised union delegate education program that promoted social and political awareness and engagement (Yates 1993; Spencer 2002). While many unions, such as CUPE and OPSEU also had delegate education, and SEIU had organiser training, these trainings tended to focus on skill development rather than political education (interview 33: SEIU, 2006). CUPE, amongst its hospital workers, is over 65% female, and OPSEU, SEIU and ONA all have majority female membership (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). In contrast, the mainly private sector CAW and Steelworker unions have majority male membership, with the CAW having approximately 33% female membership and the Steelworkers 20% (CAW 2005).

These variations affected union participation in the founding of the OHC. In 1995, CUPE, OPSEU, the CAW and Steelworkers were founding partners. The health care unions were primarily motivated by their industrial location, whereas the CAW and Steelworkers were involved primarily because of their leadership in either side of the NDP/social movement political debate (interview 38: union, 2005).

2.2 Community partners

There were three key community groups in the OHC – seniors’ organisations, the Council of Canadians and local health coalitions.

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19 In 1995, the CAW and Steelworkers did not have members in health care; the cross-jurisdictional organising developed later, after 2000, initially because of internal division in SEIU that led to the CAW encouraging SEIU nursing home members to join it (interview, CAW 1, 2006).
Seniors had always played a ‘prominent’ role in the OHC, and were the only patient/consumer group represented on the OHC’s Administrative Committee (interview 32: seniors’ organisation, 2006). There was a web of seniors’ groups represented on the Administrative Committee including Care Watch, which was focused on homecare, Canadian Pensioners Concerned, as well as the Ontario Coalition of Senior Citizens (OCSC) representing 130 seniors’ organisations (interview 30: seniors’ organisation, 2006). The largest seniors’ group, OCSC, had formal monthly meetings, and internal communications tools such as a newsletter. It was funded by its membership, as well as receiving government support (interview 30: seniors’ organisation, 2006). Seniors’ groups had an interest in the OHC because, as one representative put it, ‘for seniors, health care is everything, seniors are vulnerable to disease and impairment’ (interview 30: seniors’ organisation, 2006). However, seniors who participated in the coalitions tended to be people who were not ‘consumers’ because those ‘who are heavily dependent on services are not able because of frailty to take a public stand on things and voice opinions’ (interview 30: seniors’ organisation, 2006).

The Council of Canadians (CC) joined the OHC in 2001. The Council formed in 1985, to galvanise opposition to a free trade agreement with the United States and protect Canadian independence, building Canada’s largest public advocacy organisation rooted in progressive values (CC 2007). It was opposed to the economic agenda of corporate-led globalisation and policies such as privatisation (interview, Sousa: CC, 2005). The Council consisted of urban and rural chapters of volunteers, with seventy chapters across the country and eighteen in Ontario (interview, Sousa: CC, 2005). In Ontario there was a central office and field staff who supported local chapters and issue-based campaigns, such as around health
care. The Council was funded predominantly by membership dues, supplemented by foundation funding (interview, Sousa: CC, 2005).

Local health coalitions became an increasingly important constituency in the coalition, first joining the Administrative Committee in 1996 (OHC 1996). In 1995 the OHC envisaged the idea of local coalitions in its founding statement (OHC 1995b). The first local health coalitions began in Windsor, initiated by the Windsor Coalition for Social Justice, spreading through a network of local CAW activists to other union towns such as Niagara, Hamilton, Thunder Bay and Kingston (OHC 1996; OHC 1997; OHC 1998). While they were called coalitions, these local groups were run by individual volunteers and local union officials. However, they mirrored the structure of the OHC with two co-chairs, one union and one community.

2.3 Context for the OHC

The OHC was first formed in 1980, arising out of ad hoc discussions about rising health care fees amongst the Community Service Health Care Sector and the OFL Health Care Committee (interview, Harding: former Coordinator, 2005; OHC 1980b; OHC 1996). After some initial success, the OHC was temporarily disbanded, then re-formed by the OFL in December 1995 in response to the conservative Ontario Government’s proposed hospital closures.

The OHC was established as the central policy and action body for the defence of public health care in Ontario (OHC 1995a). It had one community and one union

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20 However, local health coalitions had previously existed in the 1980s, with a local health coalition affiliated to the OHC in Thunder Bay by 1987.
chair, representing an equal union-community partnership (interview, Harris, OFL, 2006). It had a paid coordinator and office. Its primary decision-making body was an open collective space where any individuals or organisations could participate. There was also a small Administrative Committee with limited power. The Coalition's funding primarily came from unions.

During the late 1990s, the OHC implemented three important decisions that set the course for later coalition practice. Firstly, in 1996 the OHC established a policy mandate, called a 'statement of vision', that defined the scope of its concerns (interview, coalition participant 4). The mandate was not a 'lowest common denominator' agenda but included a relatively radical policy calling for the 'elimination of privatisation of health care' (Bleyer 1992; OHC 1995a). The policy mandate became an ideological standard for future campaigning, even when one union raised concerns about the privatisation policy because it had union members in the private sector. The mandate allowed the Coalition to maintain a 'principled' and predictable 'policy framework' (interview 41: coalition participant, 2005).

Secondly, in May 1998 the Coalition created a representative Administrative Committee to enable 'more predictable' decision making (interview 41: coalition participant, 2005; OCSJ 1998). Up until then the open collective had created problems; as one participant from the time recalled, 'it was a disaster' because 'individuals counted as much as CUPE with a million or so members' (interview 12: coalition participant, 2005). The OHC narrowed and formalised its structure, opening up the Administrative Committee to a larger number of organisations with equal numbers of union and community organisations, and closing down the collective space (interview 41: coalition participant, 2005).
Administrative Committee operated on a consensus-based form of decision making with equal numbers of union and community representatives.

Thirdly, to ensure that the Coalition still remained open to individual participation, the OHC supported the formation of local health coalitions around the province. A model for local action began in Windsor in 1996 (OHC 1996). The expansion of local coalitions was assisted greatly by an OHC research grant in 1997-8. The grant allowed the OHC to hire an organiser to move around the state and ‘create opportunities for people to come together’ through hearings. The organiser would ‘set up local committees in each community in the hope that the momentum would be sustained’ (interview, Luppa: OHC, 2005). These local coalitions were strengthened by the 1999 provincial election which helped ‘push’ the local groups to become permanent local campaign bodies proficient in the ‘local nuances’ of their town (interview, Luppa: OHC, 2005). Initially, the local coalitions ‘were not working in a coherent strategy together’ (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2005). In 1998, to enhance coordination amongst local coalitions, the OHC allowed local coalitions to join the Administrative Committee (OHC 1998). Furthermore, when Mehra was appointed as the cross-province coordinator in September 2000, she was able to use her local coalition experience to coordinate events such as speaking tours to ‘set up an infrastructure of local organisations ... so we had a chance of winning in every area ... we would cover the whole geography’ (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2005).

21 The OHC secured a Trillium Foundation Community Development Project to research the impact of health privatisation across the province (interview, Luppa: OHC, 2005). Part of the research involved the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives in addition to hiring a researcher (Leduc Browne 2000).
Therefore, by 2001 the OHC had an Administrative Committee of over fifteen organisations, with a central coordinator and office, and twelve local health coalitions. The OHC had a predictable structure and a regularised mandate.

3.0 The OHC: 2001-2006

With a mission to defend public health care and a multi-scaled structure, the OHC coordinated several flagship campaigns between 2001 and 2006. This case study examines three distinct campaign phases: firstly the Save Medicare campaign, secondly the Public-Private-Partnership (P3) campaign and finally the Plebiscite campaign.

3.1 Romanow and the Saving Medicare campaign, April 2001 to November 2002

The Save Medicare campaign was driven by the OHC staff and coordinator, and the strong relationships between organisational representatives and local coalitions across the OHC. It featured a province-wide canvassing in support of national health insurance. The canvas capitalised on the OHC’s multi-scaled structure and strong inter-organisational relationships, while achieving limited union member engagement and having difficulties formulating common concern.

The OHC launched the Save Medicare campaign in ‘reaction’ to a national health care inquiry ‘to save universal Medicare’ (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2005; Allan: CUPE, 2005). On 4 April 2001, the Canadian Government created the ‘Romanow’ Royal Commission into the future sustainability of the public Medicare system,
led by the former NDP Premier Roy Romanow (Chrétien 2001). The Inquiry was a response to an intensive privatisation campaign (Mehra 2005). Senator Kirby, a Conservative MP and board member of the private Nursing Home Extendicare, established a Senate Inquiry in January 2001 to query the sustainability of health care (Fraser 2001; The Record 2001; Kirby and Le Breton 2002). Similarly, Ontario’s Premier Harris began publicly canvassing privatisation as an alternative to an inadequate public system (Mackie 2000; McCarten 2001; Boyle 2001a).

The OHC believed there was not widespread support for privatisation, and saw the Royal Commission as an ‘opportunity’ for a Medicare campaign (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2005; Allan: CUPE, 2005; OHC 2002b). Polling supported public health care (Brennan and Boyle 2001; Boyle 2001a), and talk of weakening Medicare conjured up images of the unpopular US private health care system (Leduc Browne 2000; Rosser 2001, p. 4). In February 2001, Mehra called a special Administrative Committee meeting and proposed that the OHC needed to do ‘something extraordinary’ to save Medicare (interview, Mehra, 2005).

CUPE led the OHC to take on a radical canvassing campaign around the Romanow Commission. The plan was the idea of Ross Sutherland, a member of the Kingston Health Coalition (KHC) and a CUPE union steward. He suggested that the OHC should go ‘door to door’ in defence of Medicare, using the ‘electoral strategies’ of lawn signs and door-knocking in a non-electoral period to

22 The Royal Commission was created by a Committee of the Privy Council on advice from the Prime Minister.
23 Similarly there were a series of provincial level health inquiries in operation, including the Advisory Council on Health Reform in Alberta, the Clair Commission in Quebec and the Fyke Commission in Saskatchewan.
get petitions signed and to ‘talk to people’ (interview, Sutherland: KHC, 2005). Sutherland was a bridge builder between the Kingston coalition and CUPE, and used his position in CUPE to meet with the CUPE President, Sid Ryan (interview, Sutherland: KHC, 2005; Ryan: CUPE, 2006; CUPE 2001). For Ryan, Sutherland’s idea was consistent with his belief that unions need to ‘build community influence’ using ‘direct strategies like door-knocking’ (interview, Ryan: CUPE, 2006). It was ‘not a difficult leap’, according to another CUPE official, given the ‘obvious connection between jobs and community services’ (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). As the President of CUPE’s hospital bargaining unit (CUPE-OCHU) explained, because CUPE is the largest health care union, it has a ‘primary interest’ in health care, ‘more so than other unions’, because the union’s future is tied to health care (interview, Hurley: CUPE-OCHU, 2006). The wages and conditions of union members are directly connected to government financing of the public health care system.

CUPE’s Health Care Council ratified the campaign proposal, then it supported the province-wide canvas at the OHC’s Administrative Committee. Other organisational representatives were broadly receptive; door to door canvassing was a familiar ‘repertoire’ for organisations used to electoral campaigning (Tarrow 1994). However, adapting an electoral tool to a non-electoral situation ‘had never been done, it was a totally new way to organise and broaden support’ (Mehra 2005).

The framing of the campaign was a challenge. While ‘Save Medicare’ had some success as a positive message, it had limitations in building member commitment and did not take on the issue of privatisation of health care delivery. Previously, the OHC’s public social frames had been negative, such as ‘opposition to
'privatisation', and this time the Administrative Committee explicitly wanted a 'positive campaign around Medicare' (OHC 2002g). The positive social frame 'Yes National Public Medicare' used the word Medicare because it was seen as 'so tangible ... Medicare touches people'; it also related to national identity and people thought it would work 'on the doors' (interview, Sutherland: KHC, 2005; Barlow 2002). Yet, while the message was positive, it was also defensive and not agenda setting. As a former coalition employee put it, Save Medicare 'projects a position of weakness and pleading instead of making a specific demand' (interview 40: coalition participant, 2005). Save Medicare did not link the campaign to the threat of hospital privatisation. The leaflets and door-knocking script did not talk about how privatisation of health care infrastructure undermines the health care system (OHC 2002h; Mehra 2005). The campaign's common concern only indirectly tapped the workplace experiences of unionised health care employees, leaving open the possibilities of a privatisation agenda.

Raising money for the campaign was a 'challenging task' because the OHC lacked an independent financial base (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). The OHC relied entirely on donations from its member organisations. Using the Administrative Committee representatives as contact points, these relationships drove a fundraising campaign where the OHC 'begged and borrowed' from the unions (interview 11: coalition participant, 2005). This money was used to pay for short-term campaign staff, lawn signs, ribbons, leaflets and petitions – costing over $100,000 (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2005). In addition, many union locals and labour councils subsidised the purchase of lawn signs for their local area (interview, Vermay: CAW, 2006). Unions also paid for several union delegates to work full-time on the campaign around the province (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2005).
The campaign plan was simultaneously locally and provincially-scaled; with the coordinated work of fifty local groups creating a province-wide campaign. The campaign plan was driven by the OHC coordinator and several employed staff. Between January and May 2002 the climax was a coordinated local canvas, launched after escalating local events including meetings, assemblies and community outreach (Mehra 2005). To 'build consensus' for this plan, a CUPE staff person proposed an 'Assembly' for December 2001 which could 'engage the local coalitions' (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2004). However, the Assembly had to address an issue around decision making, because the 2002 OHC Action Plan had been already debated and agreed to by the Administrative Committee before the Assembly (participant observation, Assembly, 2005). Consequently, the contribution from the Assembly was limited. As one participant said, 'it was so clear that everything happened outside ... I said I am wasting my time ... it might be useful to rally people, get them motivated ... but it was all really decided before' (interview 39: coalition participant, 2005). This reflected a tension between the need for the Coalition to be simultaneously accountable to the organisations funding it and to be open to the engagement of new participants. It encapsulates the dilemma of decision making across multiple scales.

The canvas campaign increased the number of local coalitions, and was driven mainly by the work of local volunteers with more limited union involvement (OHC 2002a; OHC 2002c). The local canvasses were run by volunteers, with union participation coming from union staff rather than workplace activists. The local scale of these coalitions allowed local groups to build media and publicity (Daily Mercury May 13 2002; Daily Mercury May 16 2002; Muhtadie 2002). The
local scale also created local ownership of the campaign; as a Kingston activist described it: 'Kingston is very independent ... people regularly changed campaign materials if they came from Toronto ... they really wanted to have control of the campaign' (interview 14: local coalition participant, 2005). The tactic of a canvas required building a volunteer base through ad hoc events and an open decision-making structure. Drop-in offices and sub-groups were established for organising publicity, outreach and logistics (interview, Sutherland: KHC, Mehra: OHC, 2005; interview 15: local coalition participant, 2005; OHC 2002b).

Union participation in the local canvas was somewhat limited, relying on union staff or activists to work as bridge builders. Union engagement was amplified where there were relationships to drive it, such as through bridge building from an active union co-chair or regular union participation in OHC meetings. For instance, in Durham and Kingston, rank and file bridge builders from OPSEU and CUPE connected the Coalition to workplace activists (interview, Sutherland: CUPE, Route: OPSEU, 2005). Where the coalition did not have strong union participants, as in Brampton, union engagement was extremely limited (interview 9: Brampton Health Coalition (BHC), 2005). Generally, local union support was resource-based; 'they gave us money, they put some staff on full-time release to support the canvas and union staff gave time to the local committee' (interview 37: coalition participant, 2005). However, support 'didn't go deep to union activists or members' (interview 14, interview 39, interview 37: coalition participants, 2005). Sometimes engagement was self-selecting, where 'busy union activists were unable to participate' (interview 38: union, 2005), and at other times it was blocked, for example when one Coalition volunteer was not given permission to call through a union list to find volunteers for the canvas
Union education was also important. In Kingston it was noted that amongst all the unions ‘the CAW were very good at getting their members out ...partly because of their (union) education and partly because of their centralisation in Kingston’ (interview 15: coalition participant, 2005).

Unions were more actively committed to the campaign at a national and provincial scale through two tracks, with greater commitment organised from union leaders rather than union members. Firstly, union leaders were encouraged to ‘contact major private sector employers and industry leaders to publicly support Medicare’ (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006). The Communications, Energy and Paperworkers and the CAW were key participants, with the CAW successfully lobbying the ‘Big Three’ auto parts manufacturers, General Motors, Ford and Daimler Chrysler, to publicly support Medicare (CAW 2002; Payne 2002). This campaign targeted the employers’ direct interest in national health care: a publicly funded health care system meant that health care was not an employer cost, as it was in the United States (interview, Harris: OFL, 2006; CAW 2002). In this way, union leaders used their economic power and workplace relationships to leverage a temporary ad hoc alliance with businesses to support the health campaign.

Secondly, the OHC unions undertook workplace education campaigns with limited success (interview 38: union, interview 5: union, 2005). These campaigns involved organisers and stewards distributing materials at hospitals during April and May (Linds 2002). Internal distribution depended on whether the union had interested workplace leaders (interview 3: OPSEU, interview 5: union, 2005). This was difficult because unions are structured with stewards who are responsible
for both union business, such as grievance handling, as well as coalition campaigning. For union staff, it meant that it was ‘the same people you are calling on to do union work as well as coalition work’, and ‘these professionals are overworked because of the shortage of health care workers’ making it difficult for them to find time to be active (interview 3: OPSEU, 2005).

The Medicare campaign also operated nationally, and held several province-wide events in Toronto. The Medicare campaign needed a national scope in order to influence the national Romanow Commission. The Canadian Health Coalition (CHC) provided in-principle support for a national canvas in October 2002 (CHC 2001). However, a national canvas only developed after Ontario’s campaign ‘was well underway’, built through peer to peer relationships (interview 11: coalition participant, 2005). As one organiser notes, ‘we are all on email together so people were requesting materials and designs ... it ended up being a national campaign pushed from the provinces’ (interview 11: coalition participant, 2005). The OHC used strong informal networks and a national political opportunity to upscale the campaign to the national scale. There were also province-wide events, such as rallies at the three royal commission hearings in Ontario and a National Medicare Day rally in Toronto in May. These events were ‘energising’ for participants but were quite small, and the second received little media attention (interview 6: coalition participant, 2005). This proved to be a trend, with the OHC often struggling to organise participation and media attention at Toronto-based events.

Despite these setbacks, the Save Medicare canvas was evaluated by Administrative Committee representatives as an unprecedented success. The OHC collected 170 000 signatures on the petition, door-knocked over 250 000
houses and fifty-seven Municipal councils passed supportive motions (OHC 2002d; Mehra 2005).

Romanow released his report on 28 November. To the credit of the OHC and the health care activists across Canada, the report 'created a consensus to save public health insurance' (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). However, it did not exclude a role for private providers in the public system. Consequently, CUPE and CAW, two prominent 'social unions', expressed public misgivings because by not excluding private providers the Romanow Report in effect left the door open for public-private-partnerships (Hargrove 2002; CUPE 2002).

The Romanow Report was a double-edged sword for the OHC and particularly for the health care unions. It embraced the OHC's call to 'Save Medicare', yet it did not stop the movement towards the privatisation of the health care system. The Save Medicare campaign used multi-scaled relationships to build consensus around Medicare, but its limited public social frame left the OHC struggling to build a positive agenda. As one Administrative Committee representative noted: 'we were never able to solve that forward looking question of how do we gain ground back' (interview 34: coalition participant, 2005). Consequently, by 2003 the OHC had moved off the issue of Medicare to exclusively to fight public-private-partnerships (OHC 2003d; OHC 2003f).

3.2 The P3 campaign: August 2002 to May 2004

The Public-Private-Partnership 'P3' campaign was a campaign against health care privatisation that created a close organisational relationship between CUPE and the OHC, based on a strong degree of mutual self-interest. The campaign
was managed through the central coordination of province-wide tours, in partnership with local coalitions, using union resources and the political opportunity of a provincial election.

Public-private-partnerships were first proposed in December 2001 when Ontario's Conservative Health Minister Tony Clement announced two P3 hospitals in Brampton and Ottawa (OHC 2003a). P3 hospitals are operated by for-profit providers who build the hospital and run the non-clinical services, then lease the hospital back to the public to provide clinical services (CCPPP 2007).

CUPE had learnt about P3s from the UK, where since the late 1990s they had caused a steep decline in employment standards and health care. CUPE's leadership were concerned that P3s would become the 'prototypes' for the 'new model of hospital operation ... so we always had this strong consensus that this is really where our energy gets put' (interview, Hurley: CUPE-OCHU, 2005).

CUPE was familiar with working on politics, as government policy had been used before to reduce CUPE worker conditions (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). In the 1980s in British Columbia, a piece of legislation 'destroyed collective bargaining rights, overnight ... 8000 jobs were privatised and wages and conditions were brutally slashed' (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). Similarly after 1995, the Harris Government in Ontario tried to use legislation to remove job security provisions. For CUPE, it 'showed the importance of political campaigning ... we all know that collective bargaining can only take you so far ... legislation can take away things in the blink of an eye unless you are also fighting around legislation' (interview, Ryan CUPE, 2005). It was this combination of the familiarity of political campaigns plus the threat of P3s that
led CUPE to become engaged in the P3 campaign. As one CUPE official commented:

At this point the union and OCHU became more focused on public policy and less focused, less exclusively focused on the bargaining conundrum... this [P3s] became the issue and began more of a campaigning system (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005)

CUPE’s interest in the P3 campaign overlapped with the OHC’s interest in privatisation, directly connecting CUPE’s interest in P3s to the OHC. The OHC had a mission to oppose hospital privatisation (OHC 1995a). CUPE and the OHC shared a mutual self-interest in eliminating P3s. ‘Leadership time was invested’ to jointly plan and coordinate events (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). This was in stark contrast to the Medicare campaign where logistics and strategy were independently planned by the OHC.

The campaign, simultaneously operating at two scales, took advantage of the political opportunity of the 2003 Provincial Election (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2005). Locally, it focused on the regional cities of Brampton and Ottawa, which were the sites of the first P3 hospitals. The campaign was province-wide through OHC-sponsored tours and events. This multi-scaled campaign was necessary for political influence. According to Hurley from CUPE-OCHU:

We have this theory about fighting privatisation – as much as we restricted ourselves to fighting in Brampton and Ottawa where there were P3s, we would be making a political mistake; that we should hold the government accountable across the province. So, we were continually trying to find ways to talk about the issue outside of our population centres. The health coalition is really decentralised. It is its strength, it has got chapters everywhere. So, for example, we thought that we would begin to draw public attention by doing tours (interview, Hurley: CUPE-OCHU, 2005).
The city-scaled campaigns in Brampton and Ottawa were led by local health coalitions that directly engaged the participation of CUPE's provincial leadership. CUPE leaders attended many of the early events. CUPE's President Sid Ryan attended a protest in May 2002, and then Michael Hurley from CUPE-OCHU attended a forum in August. For Doug Allan, the CUPE representative on the OHC, it was their personal involvement that generated the union leaders' ongoing commitment:

I remember with our first meeting, Michael Hurley, the President, went out to Brampton ... it was a community-sponsored event by the BHC with the assistance of the OHC and I think at that point, it really clicked to Michael that hey this is a powerful force here ... from there OCHU's involvement gelled, where they would invest resources, it just blossomed from there (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005).

City-scaled events escalated through 2002, with Brampton's larger local coalition organising higher-profile events compared to Ottawa. This was most evident at simultaneous rallies held in Brampton and Ottawa on 16 October. The Brampton rally was large, with union participation 'as its backbone' (interview 10: BHC, 2005). The BHC had a 'stable, small group' of local activists, including a CUPE organiser. Together they planned the event in consultation with the OHC, working out of an office space provided by the local labour council (interview 29: BHC; interview 28: CUPE, 2006). In Ottawa, the OHC and CUPE struggled to find local organisers to run the logistics for the campaign, and because it was 'five hours away', face to face support from the OHC was difficult (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006).
However, the Brampton campaign had its challenges, struggling against hostility from local Conservative politicians and the media. Brampton was a ‘conservative town’, with little memory of political struggle (interview 9: BHC, 2005). There was also widespread community awareness that they needed a hospital. This place consciousness was exploited by the local politicians and media. For instance, local Conservative MPPs attempted to frame the BHC as outsiders, ‘saying that we were a small group of people that were trying to block the hospital ... that we were trying to stop this badly needed hospital from coming’ (interview 9: BHC, 2005; Jeffrey 2004). Furthermore, in a place where union struggle was unfamiliar, the MPPs labelled the BHC ‘a bunch of union people’. As one BHP member argued, ‘from this bunch that’s a pretty dismissive term ... it’s derogatory’ (interview 31: BHC, 2005).

At this local scale, a key weakness for the BHC was its relationship with local unions. The conservative place consciousness complicated the relationship. Many local health coalition activists believed that a public union relationship would hurt the BHC’s ability to generate public support (interview 31: BHC, 2005). Yet, unions provided the numbers and resources that helped underpin the BHC’s activity. To the dismay of BHC activists, the BHC was often publicly represented as a union-front (BramptonGuardian 24 Sept 2003).

The union’s relationship with the BHC was through local officials, not workplace stewards. As one representative described, the BHC had formal support ‘from a core group of union officials ... but when you tried to get the large bulk of the membership involved it was very, very difficult’ (interview 37: BHC, 2005). Employers sought to exacerbate divisions between clinical and non-clinical workers; for instance, telling nurses they wouldn’t be affected by the P3.
Without a person to act as a bridge builder between the BHC and the unions, it was difficult to challenge these divisive tactics, and the BHC was unable to build sufficient trust with the local unions to organise union members directly.

The provincially-scaled campaigns were proposed and funded by CUPE, and involved a tour and a Toronto rally. The P3 tour featured Mehra from the OHC, Maude Barlow from the Council of Canadians and Hurley from CUPE-OCHU (OHC 2002e; OHC 2002f). Local tours aimed to create media opportunities, local political pressure and spread awareness about P3s in the lead-up to the election. For CUPE, financially supporting the tour made more sense than other tactics such as paid media advertisements:

In a huge media market like Ontario ... we spend a million dollars buying television ads ... and it’s gone in two weeks .... So how do you try to get media all across the province? ... in terms of what we would have had to do to get a comfortable amount of paid media advertising, the OHC activity was perfect and it allowed us to put a focus on the issues (interview, Hurley: CUPE, 2006).

These events also provided an educational opportunity for CUPE members. While CUPE members were outnumbered by community participants at these events, CUPE had the largest group of union participants. CUPE's public hospital workers had a broad union interest in the P3 campaign. As Hurley noted, 'members believe they work in a very socially useful service ... and they fight zealously to keep their work delivered as a public service ... they feel that they are positioned to defend health care. If they won't defend it, who will?' (interview, Hurley: CUPE, 2006). Additionally, Hurley argued that CUPE's decentralised local structure, combined with a centralised, dedicated health care
unit, contributed to the depth of CUPE's engagement in the local tours. He contrasted the structure of CUPE with other unions:

I think our success is partly a function of our union structure ... if you look at the other unions in the health sector like, for example SEIU, they have one local for the province ... They centralise resources ... in CUPE there is a local structure. The locals retain half the money. So they are better organised workplaces. But then on top of it, we had an illegal strike in 1981 and because of the problems with how CUPE handled that strike we created OCHU – so, we're also one of the few organisations that actually has a real health sector structure. We don't have a big budget – about a million dollars – and we spend a lot of it on campaigning ... and I think that is fairly unique (interview, Hurley: CUPE-OCHU, 2006).

Local participation in the tour also relied on pressure from CUPE's leadership. Hurley's participation in the tour helped engage CUPE's local structure, allowing the tour to be prioritised by the locals. As someone outside the union explained:

The people who get the request for everything are the local president ... often those requests go to the bottom of their pile .... Always the priority is the grievances and the direct issues, bargaining ... having Michael there meant that they actually had an organised approach to getting people out to the meetings. They organised people to phone through their list. It [the tour] rose above the noise for the local president (interview 35: coalition participant, 2006).

Local union engagement was also shaped by the presence of union bridge builders and place consciousness. As one CUPE official argued, 'highly committed activists' who 'believe in a universal system ... and are prepared to fight for it' would call around members and invite them to the event (interview 28: CUPE, 2006). CUPE officials' experience showed that when the tour was held in a town with large numbers of union members or had a hospital, the
supportive place consciousness increased member participation (interview, Hurley: CUPE-OCHU, 2006).

However, while the tour was province-wide, it was not deep. While Mehra ran ‘action plans’ with local activists during tour events (interview, Mehra: OHC 2006), participation was hard to sustain outside the directly affected P3 areas. In Kingston, for instance, it was ‘impossible to get public attention because none of our hospitals were going P3’ (interview 14: coalition participant, 2005). Additionally the centralised coordination of the tour restricted local ownerships: ‘local groups found it hard to keep people invested because ... they did not have a lot of ownership’ (interview 20: OHC, 2005). Correspondingly, several Toronto-based events after the tour had weak participation. These included a small picket in November 2002 and a rally in May 2003. They were media stunts rather than sites for collective action, with visual effects such as a two-tier bus to symbolise two-tier health care and bands (interview 24: coalition participant, 2005). However, there was not mass participation, as one participant described it: ‘it was an un-rallying rally .... with congo players, a samba band but nobody was dancing’ (interview 24: coalition participant, 2005).

The tour highlights a fundamental contradiction between leadership and participation in the OHC’s multi-scaled organising. While Mehra and Hurley acted as leaders to generate interest in the issue of P3s, there was still a gap in local participation. The lack of local coalition ownership and capacity meant that the local coalition work, while effective at generating publicity, did not sustain anti-P3 campaign work after the tour. This parallels a weakness in the Vinson Inquiry, where locally-scaled action was successful when the resources of the Alliance and NSWTF were mobilised in the local area, but not sustained beyond.
It highlights a common limitation for multi-scaled coalitions when they do not have broker organisations leading the campaign locally.

In mid-2003, with the upcoming provincial elections on 2 October, the P3 campaign broadened to make health care an election issue. A local campaign developed in the weak Conservative electoral districts ('ridings'), particularly in the Conservative ridings in Brampton. Elections in Canada include three main parties, the Conservatives, the Liberal Party and the NDP. In this election, the OHC’s challenge was to remove the pro-P3 Conservatives. The electoral campaigns were locally run, where the local coalitions planned activities such as door-knocking, community outreach and media events. The key message focused on P3s, with signs featuring the word P3 with a non-smoking sign over it (OHC 2003j). Strategic decisions were made locally, and in Brampton the coalition decided to run a candidate for the NDP. This helped the BHC get its P3 message out, but at the same time the BHC became engulfed in electoral competitiveness. Local Liberal Party activists joined the BHC and began using the BHC’s anti-P3 signs, with the Liberal Candidate also ‘falsely claiming she had the support of the BHC’ (interview 29: BHC, 2006).

At a provincial scale, the elections were an opportunity for the OHC to again engage the unions. Most of the OHC’s unions were located in the public sector with significant election budgets irrespective of their ideological identity (interview 3: OPSEU, 2005; interview 33: SEIU, 2006). As one official noted, the commitment was strong because of ‘concern in the labour movement about a third term Tory government’ (interview 5: union, 2005).
In contrast to claims in existing scholarship about political parties and coalitions, amongst the unions, whether or not a union had a pre-existing relationship with the NDP did not affect its commitment to the OHC’s election campaign. Most of the OHC’s unions were members and active supporters of the NDP. Where there was a bridge builder who could translate how the OHC could support the NDP, NDP unions were actively engaged. Political bridge builders interpreted the political utility of coalitions for unions:

Coalitions are actually useful to supporting a political party like the NDP because they help the NDP focus on particular issues and provide them with the good research and good ideas ... if you are going to make changes, progressive changes ... you need the pressures coming from a political party and you need pressures coming from bipartisan coalitions (interview 21: union, 2005).

The election campaign covered the province through tours, with CUPE providing significant union resources that gave it influence over the campaign. The tours included a video about the problems of P3s in the United Kingdom, then a ‘Trojan Horse’ tour, where a fourteen-foot wooden horse was used to expose how P3s were a Trojan horse that threatened to destroy public health care from within (CUPE 2003). Most unions provided a financial donation (OHC 2003i). However, CUPE’s financial commitment was significantly above the other unions, resulting in a high level of ‘integration’ between CUPE and the OHC’s election strategies (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006).

CUPE’s integration with the P3 election campaign produced class movement collaborative power for the union, supporting the politicisation of union members and helping CUPE to set an agenda. CUPE members were connected to the campaign through their self-interest, but their engagement extended to
their belief in the 'value' of the work they do in supporting 'universal free access to quality health care'. For Hurley, it was the interconnection of interest with values that strengthened member commitment:

They are quite prepared to say that the work that we do is valuable and it should be valued and shouldn't be privatised because that's actually less efficient. But I do not think that they like doing that as much, they have to do that, whereas the other one they feel better about because there is a social ... a social benefit from that advocacy (interview, Hurley: CUPE, 2006).

The OHC also provided CUPE with relational collaborative power. At a provincial scale, according to Hurley, 'they (the OHC) have more credibility than we do, with the public, as health employees we are seen as a bit of a vested interest' (interview, Hurley: CUPE, 2006). Having the OHC as public spokespeople for P3s provided CUPE's campaign with legitimacy.

Yet, this 'in sync' OHC-CUPE campaign led to a backlash from other OHC unions (interview 23: union, 2006). As one CUPE officer recognised, 'there was some organisational jealously as other unions or groups within the health coalition felt that CUPE was getting too much attention, or that CUPE campaign ideas were being implemented not as they liked ... that is so sensitive' (interview 23: union, 2006). Harris from the OFL argued that this practice can create a competitive culture:

Because you get every group wanting to be seen as working on an issue and be out in the forefront ... but one of the strengths was we are a group of organisations that have come to a consensus about what the issues are ... and when you start highlighting individual organisations you are saying something different (interview, Harris: OFL, 2006).
Harris argued that the close relationship between the OHC and CUPE had the potential to undermine the spirit of consensus. It limited the OHC, because 'the strength of the coalition was that we are all in this together, it was not that one was bigger or smaller or richer or poorer than the other, the strength was in the collective voice' (interview, Harris: OFL, 2006). The experience highlighted the contradiction between organisational autonomy and coalition unity inherent in consensus-based processes: how to balance campaign capacity and provide recognition on the one hand, while preventing a fragmentation of coalition unity on the other.

A strategic election issue for the OHC was 'how harsh or how pointed we should be in our criticism of the Liberals in the lead up to the election' (interview 5: union, 2005). The OHC was non-partisan; it did not endorse candidates or tell people how to vote. Instead it focused on issues. However it had to negotiate across the different political allegiances of its affiliates (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006; OHC 1995a; OHC 2003i; OHC 2003l). CUPE was suspicious of the Liberals, as they had an unclear position on P3s (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005; Ryan: CUPE, 2006). In the OHC, CUPE aired its concern, creating a majority 'not a consensus, but a feeling at the end that we had to hit them' (interview 5: union, 2005). Yet, many of the unions were more interested in 'kicking out the conservatives' than criticising the Liberals (interview, Harris: OFL, 2006). Similarly several seniors' organisations disagreed with criticising the Liberals (interview 4: seniors' organisation, 2005). However, outside the OHC, CUPE began targeting the Liberal Party. Ryan condemned the Liberals at a CUPE Convention in May, provoking the Opposition Leader, Dalton McGuinty, to make his first statement opposing P3s (Petersen 2003).
The OHC’s campaign against the Liberals created conflict within the OHC. At a joint OHC and CUPE September press conference, Mehra commented that the Liberal’s Financial Plan had ‘no financing plan for infrastructure ... they were not going to stop the P3s because if they were they would have to have money there’ (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006). This statement was immediately criticised. Harris, from the OFL ‘was upset that this Liberal critique had appeared on the newswire’ (interview 4: seniors’ organisation, 2005), and some seniors’ groups were also frustrated, one noted, ‘we were so busy saying how bad the Liberals were’ (interview 32: seniors organisation, 2006). Mehra ‘had to call an emergency meeting to respond’, where the issue was resolved through face to face discussions, with support from most of the unions (interview 4: seniors’ organisation, 2005).

The debate revealed a contradiction between the OHC’s diverse inter-organisational relationships and its common concern. The OHC’s strength was that it straddled different interests and ideologies, but here the diversity of political opinions produced disagreement. Several members did not want to upset the possibility of defeating the Conservatives, and so did not want to offend the Liberals: ‘you cannot be too rude to these people, otherwise you lose and they are not going to listen to you’ (interview 4: seniors’ organisation, 2005). Others, particularly from CUPE, wanted to use the opportunity of the election to put as much pressure as possible on the Liberals to oppose P3s: ‘you have got to be outspoken, if you are too polite, continually too polite then they don’t listen to you anyway’ (interview 6: coalition participant, 2005).

The election was a landslide against the Conservatives, but it was a short-lived victory (Quinn 2003). On 21 November the new Premier, McGuinty, announced
that the P3 hospitals in Brampton and Ottawa would go ahead (OHC 2003o). While the Liberals used ambiguous language, the substance of the proposal was that the non-clinical and construction work for these hospitals would be performed by private contractors (Lawton and Funston 2003; Office of Premier of Ontario 2003; OHC 2003r). According to the OHC, there was nothing ‘materially different’ in the deal (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). A former Conservative Minister agreed: ‘despite the doublespeak ... it looks pretty identical to the deal that [Conservative Minister] Ernie Eves announced here two months ago’ (Lawton and Funston 2003).

The ambiguity of the Liberals’ political position led most interviewees to argue that 2004 was the OHC’s ‘most difficult year’. The OHC’s Administrative Committee debated if they should ‘try to influence the government’ or campaign and ‘attack the government’ (interview 14: coalition participant, 2005). The post-election strategy was a challenge for the unions:

They were tired after fighting for so many years with the Harris government and didn’t want to fight any more. They wanted a different relationship with government. They wanted access to government. And they didn’t have a vision that they needed to provide constant pressure, no matter what government was in (interview, coalition 34: coalition participant, 2006).

CUPE was an exception. Hurley was convinced that P3s were on the rise, and that CUPE members would be directly affected (interview, Hurley: CUPE, 2006; Mehra: OHC, 2006). Yet mobilising to fight the Liberals was harder than fighting the Conservatives because of the ambiguity of the Liberals’ message:
The Tories ... have a fairly straightforward class struggle approach, we are going to kick the workers in the head ... If you don’t like it, too bad; then don’t vote for us. Whereas, these guys [Liberals] they tried to wrap themselves in the banner of public ownership. They’ll deny, deny, deny that they are privatising hospitals ... but they are actually doing the privatisation and the cutbacks quite effectively (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005).

The 2004 Privatisation campaign started off as a media campaign, and escalated to focus on the May budget. The OHC initially struggled to get agreement to take public action. The OHC used tactics that only required small numbers of participants, such as small media events in Toronto, including a sit-in at the Health Ministry that won a government commitment to policy disclosure and consultation (Boyle 2004; The Record 2004; OHC 2004a; OHC 2004b; OHC 2004c).

At a 3000-person P3 rally in April, there was a lot of conflict in the Coalition that showed the worst side of union dominance. Before OHC events there was commonly a process of ‘speakers’ hell’; a jostling amongst the unions for a prominent place on the speakers list (interview 11: coalition participant, 2006). The OHC traditionally dealt with this by pulling speakers’ names out of a hat (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006). This time, the unions lobbied the co-chairs to try to get the OHC to prioritise union speakers over community speakers, and when some of them did not get their way they criticised the OHC in their rally speeches (interview 22: coalition participant, 2006). As one community representative reflected, ‘there was a lot of ego in some of the union leaders involved’, and another noted that it was an example of ‘the salaried union people running their own agenda’ (interview 32: seniors’ organisation; interview 18, 2006).
Meanwhile, the government escalated its P3 agenda. Between February and May 2004, the government consulted on a new infrastructure policy with a discussion paper called *Building a Better Tomorrow* that supported P3s and established a Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal (Caplan 2004a; Caplan 2004b).

The OHC responded at a provincial scale through a Toronto media event and another round of cross-provincial tours. On 27 May, all the major 'social movement' organisations in Ontario held a press conference in Toronto to condemn P3s (OHC 2004e). There was also a 'relentless creating of events' with tours across the province over the spring and summer (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006). In May, there was a budget tour by economists and a P3 expert from the United Kingdom (OHC 2004d; OHC 2004f; OHC 2004i). From July to October, CUPE sponsored an unprecedented tour of the Trojan horse, visiting forty-three locations with events staged by local coalitions with media conferences and the distribution of leaflets about privatisation (Berthiaume 2004; Bradley 2004; Brown 2004; Danese 2004; De Almeida 2004; Demers 2004; Dixon 2004; *Kingston Whig-Standard* 2004; OHC 2004g).

However, the breadth of these tours left OHC resources spread very thin. The campaign was primarily resourced by the OHC and CUPE, with only a couple of committed, but small, local coalitions engaged. It was difficult to build interest in the campaign. Firstly, because it felt unwinnable – as one participant described it, 'the privatisation agenda seemed to be going ahead like a steamroller' (interview 23: coalition participant, 2006). Secondly, there was a lack of ownership over these events. As one local representative put it, the OHC 'is fairly good at manufacturing events that keep people involved, but you can only
do it so many times if it is not real, if it is not focused on action that really results in something’ (interview 36: BHC, 2006).

The OHC did experiment with some local capacity-building work in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). A Toronto-based campaign targeted the Health Minister’s riding with anti-P3 lawn signs (OHC 2004h). By employing an OHC staff person, the GTA group attempted to organise public meetings at the locations of three proposed P3 hospitals, but ended up coordinating activities as a central group because ‘it was uphill work to get people to come out to the meetings’ (interview 17: coalition participant, 2005). For the OHC, awareness-raising was more of a challenge in Toronto than in the local town. As one seniors’ representative argued, ‘it’s not easy to be visible in a big city’ because the large population required a volunteer base and capacity that was hard to build through the single Toronto local health coalition (interview 32: seniors organisation, 2006).

For the unions too, mobilising a union base in Toronto was a constant struggle. Union participation in the GTA was limited to local union leaders, not members. CUPE union officials I interviewed struggled to explain why: ‘I am not sure I have the explanation for that’ (interview 28: CUPE, 2006). Issues included the time constraints on workers, including the distance between work and home (interview, Hurley: CUPE, 2006). Also, some of the city locals did not have a strong mobilising capacity, for instance not having the home phone numbers of members (interview 34: CUPE, 2006).

As the Government’s P3s plans escalated, the OHC’s campaign faced a growing pessimism. The Government released Building a Better Tomorrow in July 2004, and building work on Brampton Hospital began on 22 October (Divell 2004;
In Brampton, a small group from the BHC protested the start of construction, but began to doubt their ability to stop the privatisation: ‘we stood out there and all these important people were inside the fence ... we got cold and tired ... we were left feeling nobody came, kind of dejected’ (interview 9: BHC, 2005). The BHC activists noted that it was hard to sustain participation in the face of campaign losses: ‘it became increasingly difficult because the hospital was going ahead ... people get burned out’ (interview 9: BHC, 2005).

During the P3 campaign the OHC undertook repeated multi-scaled activity to sustain its political influence and its local coalition capacity. Successfully, they helped drive out the Conservatives and create broad awareness about P3s. However, the campaign remained reactive ‘against’ public-private-partnerships. The wide range of centrally-directed coalition activity made it difficult to sustain local coalition capacity and engagement.

3.3 **A new strategy, January 2004 to January 2006**

In this final phase, the OHC developed a new P3 strategy that focused on the local scale, using a tactic of community-run plebiscites to demonstrate opposition to individual P3 hospitals. The OHC also broadened its issue base, including a campaign on long-term care which was of key concern to seniors’ groups. These campaigns demonstrated two distinct coalition strengths: the capacity to overcome different interests to create consensus, and the strength of a sustained localised strategy to create greater ownership, improve message development and increase union involvement.
In 2004, following requests from seniors and with the stalling of the P3 campaign, the OHC attempted to build a policy around institutional and community care. This addressed an ongoing concern of seniors, as representative noted, ‘home care had never been high on their (the OHC’s) agenda, but for seniors it has been top’ (interview 32: seniors’ organisation, 2006). The campaign was complicated because of the contradictions between union and seniors’ interests. Seniors preferred community care because it ensured independent living; yet most of the OHC unions preferred institutional care, because a centralised workplace such as a hospital made for better working conditions (interview 12: coalition participant, 2005). As one unionist put it, ‘they’re thinking about care and we’re thinking about the workers’ (interview 13: union, 2005).

Consequently, the safest space for joint union-seniors’ work was in establishing standards for long-term care institutions. Seniors were pragmatic about this, acknowledging that ‘the health care unions were very important participants in the coalition so their emphasis became more of an emphasis on the coalition’ (interview 30: seniors’ organisation, 2006). In March 2004, the OHC established a separate committee with unions and seniors to coordinate the long-term care campaign, staging fifteen hearings around the province with over 370 people attending (OHC 2004i).

Building policy consensus for long-term care required a conscious balancing of interests. For instance, in the OHC’s archives an early version of the homecare policy had a scribbled note: ‘lack of employment stuff’ (OHC 2004j). Negotiating consensus based on different interests was a conscious strategy. Seniors and
unions had a mutual self-interest in high staff radios, as they directly affect the quality of care received. As one senior representative argued:

We sided absolutely with the unions on the question of standards of care, for instance three point five hours per day of nursing care for every [nursing] home ... if you don't have that level of nursing care, then you get neglected (interview 30: seniors' organisation, 2006).

The decision to segment the OHC agenda and to campaign on long-term care separate to P3s might have usefully reconnected the OHC to seniors, but it broke down some of the collective momentum as well. In 2004, the OHC focused on multiple issues, ranging from hospitals, mental health, access to services and P3s (OHC 2004i). The lack of one clear focus demobilised the OHC's base: attendance at the 2004 Assembly was down, with 90 registrations compared to 180 the year before. Moreover, the common concern had been diluted, shifting to the 'institutions of health care' rather than health care itself. As one representative commented, 'the key message? I don't know it, I am not convinced that anything has really been working enough to excite people' (interview 21: union, 2005).

The OHC's second strategy sought to reconnect the OHC to its base and do something different to confront P3s. The OHC was well aware that despite centralised tours and election campaign, P3s were spreading. Mehra wanted the campaign to go local, so at a July 2004 strategy meeting she suggested a plebiscite strategy. She was inspired by an Australian campaign in the LaTrobe valley, which had held a referendum to stop a public-private-partnership (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2005). The idea was 'to concentrate resources' and 'like the Days of Action against the Harris Government that moved around the province', target
towns with the aim of stopping P3 hospitals ‘one by one’ (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006; Munro 1997).

There was broad support for this strategy, with local coalitions in particular arguing that it seemed like a way of taking ‘a pre-emptive strike’ and getting a discussion about P3s out across a local population (interview 8: Niagara Health Coalition (NHC), 2006). As in the Medicare campaign, CUPE’s support carried weight. President Ryan argued that the plebiscites ‘were an offshoot’ of the community-building strategy launched with the Medicare canvas’ (interview, Ryan CUPE 2006). With this support, Mehra proposed a pilot plebiscite with the NHC in Niagara for mid-2005.

Union commitment to the Niagara plebiscite was an offshoot of intense union competition between SEIU and CUPE. These two unions had just contested a recognition election at Niagara Health Systems. For CUPE, the jurisdictional competition led to ‘a motivation on the part of the local union’, who had control of local resources, to choose to engage in the plebiscite in order to be ‘prominent’ and prove itself as the better health union (interview 28: CUPE, 2006). As one official commented, the competition directly escalated engagement: ‘it kept them involved because no one wanted to be the one to walk away’ (interview 25: union, 2006).

For the SEIU, their recognition victory increased their engagement in the NHC. The SEIU ‘made a point of involving members employed in the region, especially at Niagara Health Systems’ (interview 33: SEIU, 2006), arguing that the

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24 Canada’s union jurisdictional laws are regulated by the unions not the industrial relations system, and SEIU and CUPE each had jurisdiction over non-clinical staff.
combination of a recognition battle and a health campaign drew the union in. One official commented that ‘when you win a representation vote and you are the only union representing those workers ... we had a responsibility to be involved’ (interview 33: SEIU, 2006).

The NHC’s plebiscite helped shift the unions in the local area. The place-based, multi-scaled capacity of the OHC provided an opportunity to shift the SEIU’s engagement at precisely the time when the union was seeking to establish its credibility as the recognised health care union (interview 33: SEIU, 2006).

Union engagement in the plebiscite was a function of self-interest. For SEIU and CUPE, their interest was to enhance their legitimacy as strong health care unions. But for OPSEU, who had not faced a recent recognition battle and whose clinical members would be less directly affected by a P3 hospital, there was less union involvement. This was partly because they were engaged in ‘core union activities’, with bargaining at one hospital and another hospital ‘snowed under with grievances’ (interview 3: OPSEU, 2005). This ‘day to day’ union work made it difficult for organisers: ‘I had trouble calling on people’ (interview 3: OPSEU, 2005). Without a direct interest, the plebiscite did not register as a priority for OPSEU above these core union tasks.

The NHC was able to manage the complexities of union competition because of the leadership of a local union bridge builder. The NHC’s aim was to ‘stay neutral and make sure that both parties were not just using the campaign to promote their local’ (interview 8: NHC, 2005). The key local NHC organiser, Sue Hotte, could bridge this tension as she was an executive officer in the local labour council. She worked with ‘leadership in those locals and representatives on the
ground who wanted it to work' (interview 34: CUPE, 2005). Her experience allowed the NHC 'to make sure that (the conflict) didn’t show up’ (interview 8: NHC, 2005). As a CUPE official commented, the local coalition acted ‘to keep the warring factions apart’ (interview 25: CUPE, 2006).

The NHC’s local campaign planning created a successful public social frame that focused on building the hospital right. The NHC ‘spend a lot of time carefully framing’ the campaign’s public message, because as in Brampton, the NHC knew that ‘we desperately needed a new hospital’ (interview 8: NHC, 2005). The public social frame was developed through local discussion:

We didn’t want it to come out looking like we didn’t want a hospital if it couldn’t be 100% publicly funded and administered ... we didn’t want to focus on Government and Dalton McGuinty, we just wanted to focus on building it right; we wanted to engage in the discussion and take the politics out of it and say what we want is a 100% publicly funded hospital (interview 8: NHC, 2005 – my emphasis).

The effectiveness of the ‘build it right’ frame was made clear four weeks before the plebiscite, when the government changed the name of P3s in Ontario. In ReNew Ontario released in May 2005, the government expanded the number of P3s and renamed them ‘alternative finance and procurement mechanisms’ (Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal 2005). However, because the NHC’s local message had a positive frame that did not rely on the government’s use of language, its public message was resilient.

25 It followed a similar process of name changing that occurred in Britain – where the initial term ‘private finance initiative’ was later changed to ‘public-private-partnerships’ after ridicule by the British Medical Association Journal.
Across the multi-scaled structure there was, however, a contradiction in planning goals. The OHC mentored the NHC through the plebiscite, helping to expand the ‘organising skills’ of the group while building a reproducible plebiscite model that could be taken to other towns to influence provincial policy (OHC 2005h). Yet as the NHC developed its own capacity, it found these centrally determined planning goals ‘inappropriately short’ for building local capacity: ‘you need more time to be able to develop good community ties, we didn’t really have the time to get to all the organisations ... go to their membership meetings’ (interview 27: coalition participant, 2005). There was a conflict between the local coalitions’ need for campaign sustainability and the OHC’s need to duplicate the campaign at a provincial scale.

The NHC campaign aimed to maximise volunteer participation. The NHC coordinated subgroups that helped turn interested participants into active volunteers and organisers. By the day of the plebiscite, the campaign had recruited over 400 volunteers (interview 8: NHC, 2005). The OHC supported this by hiring local staff and organising volunteers from other cities to assist (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2005).

The NHC also focused on organising inside unions. Hotte’s links with the labour council built union participation, with educational leaflets and referendum voting occurring at all the schools through the teachers union, large auto plants through the CAW and at hospitals through SEIU and CUPE (OHC 2005i). CUPE’s involvement was organised locally and relationship-driven. For instance, one local union president became an active participant, motivated by her previous volunteer work with the OHC in the Save Medicare campaign. The issue also connected to the CUPE locals beyond health care, with the anti-
privatisation message connecting to their interests as public sector workers (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005).

CUPE's Coalition engagement underwent a qualitative shift in the plebiscite campaign. CUPE locals had always been engaged in OHC activities by the central CUPE office, but in the P3 campaign central support led to local unions becoming active campaign coordinators, engaging their members as well as other locals without centralised direction. The combination of dedicated resources from CUPE's central offices, expertise and experience in the privatisation campaign, combined with the opportunity of a local plebiscite, contributed to a shift in local union participation. As Allan from CUPE noted: 'It's gone from where CUPE's involvement went through me ... now OCHU and the hospital locals also put in significant time and resources into the Coalition campaign (interview, Allan: CUPE, 2005). Union member involvement enhanced the political awareness and class movement capacity of CUPE. Hurley argued that member political awareness was expanded through local engagement with other progressives:

Where the health coalition exists in real terms on the ground in communities, they [our members] are likely to encounter progressive people, they might be retired teachers ... they are going to have an analysis about trade, they are going to have an analysis about public services ... they get to work with socially progressive people in fighting on what is really a wage issue but also about something that is happening to their district, so I think it politicises them (interview, Hurley: CUPE, 2006).

The Niagara plebiscite was successful. Over 12 400 people cast ballots and 98% voted to 'build it right', and keep the hospital public. It generated widespread
awareness and support for public hospitals in the local media (Benner 2005; Draper 2005; Herod 2005).

Plebiscites became the central strategy of the OHC with eight additional plebiscites held during 2005 and 2006. A comparison of three plebiscites – North Bay, Woodstock and Hamilton – demonstrated how place and organisational capacity contributed their success. The plebiscites in the small cities of North Bay and Woodstock achieved the highest percentage of voters on a per capita basis, much larger than the 500,000-person union city of Hamilton (interview 35: coalition participant, 2006). Between North Bay and Woodstock, Woodstock had a larger turn-out and a more stable coalition base mainly credited to ‘two experienced CAW activists, who had political experience’ and used those skills in the media and in building the campaign (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006). Hamilton was more difficult; the size of the city complicated the logistics of the referendum and there was limited campaign experience in the local coalition (interview 35: coalition participant, 2006). A government and hostile media campaign which got progressively worse over time were features of all the plebiscites (interview, Mehra: OHC, 2006).

Plebiscites became the OHC’s response to an expanded P3 agenda. The decentralisation of Coalition activity strengthened its activist base and provided a local strategy to attack the hospitals ‘one by one’. It required a large commitment of resources, and rewarded coalition and organisational capacity by building local union engagement and the depth of campaign capacity in the local coalitions.
4.0 Reflections and Conclusion

The changing fortunes of the 2001-2006 OHC campaigns can be explored using the three coalition frameworks developed in this thesis. The differences between the three campaign phrases revealed a shifting pattern of coalition elements, which produced different levels of union commitment and collaborative power. These changes varied coalition success, in terms of achieving outcomes, political climate change, sustaining relationships and building the capacity of the participating organisations.

The OHC developed slowly, through the collective work of individual union and community organisation representatives and a central coordinator. Internal restructuring, including the development of a mandate, the formalisation of an Administrative Committee and the creation of local coalitions created a foundation for the 2001-2006 coalition work. The OHC was set up with a strong foundation of familiar organisational relationships driven by individual organisational representatives and a multi-scaled capacity that produced the OHC’s key strengths.

In the first phase, the Save Medicare campaign, the OHC’s activities were multi­scaled and relied on close inter-organisational relationships and the OHC’s centralised resource base. Resources included the skills and experience of the coordinator, the capacity to centrally finance a campaign and hire staff and a Coalition office separate from organisational partners. It also harnessed the personal relationships across the Administrative Committee. However, the common concern was the campaign’s chief limitation: it had a limited public social frame.
Thus, in this first stage, the OHC successfully achieved a policy outcome and sustained relationships, but had less of an impact on the political climate and the capacity of the participating organisations. The Romanow Report supported the OHC’s main aim, which was to protect universal health insurance. However, the narrow ‘Save Medicare’ demand did not help the OHC shut down the threat of P3s. Save Medicare defended the status quo rather than proactively proposing an alternative to the crisis in the health care system. There were also strengths and weaknesses in terms of relationships. The OHC’s strong personal relationships and independent structure made the Coalition relationships sustainable and the local coalitions developed their organisational capacity through the campaign, by developing and implementing a local Medicare campaign and canvas. However, the distant union interest bred weak commitment. While engaged union staff enhanced their campaigning capacity, it did not flow through to the unions.

Indeed, the organisational distance in the Medicare campaign shaped the collaborative power it provided to unions. It provided a relational collaborative power, creating a trusting foundation for future relationships. It also built place-based power at a central scale by challenging unions to undertake a canvassing campaigning. Yet the issue of Medicare had limited class movement collaborative power. The distance between the coalition and union interest limited member commitment, restricting the campaign’s ability to expand political awareness.

In the second phase, the P3 campaign significantly changed the common concern across the OHC, engaging CUPE on its core organisational interest. The message
of the campaign was negative: 'opposition to P3s'. However, it usefully enabled the OHC to partner with CUPE and engaged sufficient union resources to allow the OHC to act at a provincial scale through P3 tours. The P3 campaign continued to rely on the OHC’s multi-scaled capacity and strong inter-organisational relationships, but with key differences to the Medicare campaign. The OHC’s engagement in the P3 campaign was initially more centralised and prioritised education events rather than local mobilisations. Locally there were some tensions between local health care volunteers and unions. In places such as Brampton, local coalitions were critical for contesting conservative place consciousness. Usefully, the OHC’s structure allowed for genuine leadership and education on a complex issue. Yet, it also often left local coalitions disengaged from the strategy.

In terms of Coalition success, the P3 campaign supported a change in political climate and enhanced the capacity of CUPE, while not achieving a change in outcomes and increasing tension between the Coalition’s relationships. However, the tendency to 'manufacture' local events rather than support local campaign plans did limit the degree to which local coalitions enhanced the Coalition’s capacity. The negative P3 message mitigated the effect of the campaign on the political climate, as it did not create an alternative policy framework to respond to P3s. Political bridge builders helped create broad union engagement in the OHC’s electoral campaign. However, the proximity of the CUPE/OHC relationship challenged the centralised inter-organisational relationships at the OHC. The OHC practised consensus where all the participants were seen as equal, for instance by drawing names out of a hat for rallies. Yet underneath this formal commitment was unequal financial support and informal union dominance. Moreover, CUPE’s increased organisational
commitment to the P3 campaign upset the OHC's balanced coalition unity and organisational autonomy, and created tension in the OHC's inter-organisational relationships.

The P3 campaign provided CUPE with several forms of collaborative power, as it directly engaged its organisational interests. The OHC acted as a change agent—shifting the capacity and power to the union. CUPE's engagement in the P3 campaign and the OHC came from the leadership. This leadership engagement enabled CUPE to plan new types of campaigns with the OHC, such as tours, that could provide a class movement educative opportunity for CUPE union members. Relational collaborative power was also produced as CUPE relied on the organisational resources of the OHC to undertake the cross-provincial tours, and in turn the OHC helped CUPE spread a credible public agenda about the problems of P3s. The tours were useful for CUPE, because union leadership engagement helped spread participation amongst union locals and members.

The third phase, the OHC's new strategies, demonstrated the OHC's capacity to renew. Firstly, it highlighted the strengths of the inter-organisational relationships and the OHC's ability to forge consensus around a long-term care campaign. Secondly, the Plebiscite campaign dramatically shifted the OHC's multi-scaled campaign method, focusing on the scale of individual local coalitions rather than the cross-provincial scale. By dedicating centralised resources into local coalitions, the plebiscites enhanced volunteer and union commitment and campaign skills. The localised strategy led to innovations in the OHC's campaign strategy, with the development of a new positive public social frame for the campaign. Moreover, the localisation of Coalition resources allowed the NHC to operate as a change agent for unions. This final stage of the
campaign demonstrated the importance of local-scaled activity for coalitions to develop the campaign capacity of participating organisations. The tactic of a plebiscite was also very effective at generating media attention and public awareness around the OHC's issues, shifting the political climate.

Overall, the OHC represented a form of relationship-driven coalition unionism. Across the phases, the campaign consistently relied on centralised inter-organisational relationships, an independent capacity through the coordinator and multi-scaled local coalitions. Yet consistently the OHC was weakened by its common concern, with it often running a negative social frame. The multi-scaled capacity of the broker organisations enhanced the reach of the coalition, engaging volunteers as well as staff, and increasing their campaign skills in the process.

The relationship-driven coalition unionism was riddled by the contradictions between common concern and inter-organisational relationships. When the OHC enhanced common interest engagement in the P3 campaign, it had a contradictory effect. While increasing CUPE's engagement, it also caused tension in the wider inter-organisational relationships. The OHC's tendency towards reactively framed campaigns was in part a consequence of the diversity of the organisations present in the OHC, as it was easier to form consensus on the basis of what the organisations commonly disagreed with rather than on a proactive policy agenda.

The themes of relationship-driven coalition unionism are not exclusive to the OHC; this coalition model also describes other coalitions in the secondary literature. For instance, the Walk against the War Coalition in NSW, that
operated between October 2002 and May 2003, had a very similar combination of coalition strengths and limitations (Tattersall 2007a; Tattersall forthcoming a). It too had a strong web of diverse organisations operating in formal coalition, with up to sixty participating organisations and several full-time coordinators. It developed a multi-scaled structure, with up to twenty-five local peace groups operating in Sydney and around NSW between January and April 2003. Similarly, its common concern, as with the OHC, was framed as a negative demand: 'stop the war, and bring the troops home'. It had far greater limitations than the OHC, in that the issue of peace was distant from the concerns of union members, particularly at a rank and file level. Also, a wide array of participating organisations made it difficult to build consensus between the organisational partners, leading to the use of a narrow range of tactics. This coalition was not sustained long-term, only lasting six months, however it was successful as a collective mobilising agent, organising the largest demonstration in Australia’s history, on 16 February 2003.

The study of the dynamics of the OHC revealed three key findings about relationship-driven coalition unionism and its relationship to union collaborative power. Firstly, when coalition unionism operates with strong inter-organisational relationships and multi-scaled capacity, it has the capacity to sustain a powerful campaign agenda. Secondly, when this campaign agenda overlaps with the mutual organisational self-interest of a union, the campaign agenda can be a powerful vehicle for union relational collaborative power. Thirdly, when the centralised resources and capacity of a coalition prioritise locally-scaled organising, they have the capacity to change unions, through the class movement education of union members and by increasing the campaign
skills and capacity of union members. Locally-scaled coalitions can transform the multi-scaled capacity of a union, enhancing its place-based power.

The final case study chapter considers a coalition from the United States which shares with the OHC a strong set of inter-organisational relationships while not operating with its multi-scaled capacity. Instead, it cultivated a strong common concern over living wages that enabled it and its key union to advance a series of collective bargaining and policy victories in a hostile union climate.
Chapter Seven
Mobilising Coalition Unionism:
SEIU Local 880 and Chicago’s Grassroots Collaborative
2002 to 2006

On 30 July 2005, packed into an overflowing inner-city downtown Chicago church were a thousand mainly low-income African American and Latino Chicago residents. Outside sat twenty yellow school buses that had ferried in the crowd. Inside was a sea of colourful T-shirts. The room was divided into blocks defined by the t-shirts – a strip of yellow on one side signifying the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless (CCH), a purple SEIU strip down the other side, a red group of ACORN leaders at the front. The noise was deafening. Voices across the hall sang to the rhythm of hand-clapping – ‘we’re fired up, won’t take it no more; we’re fired up, won’t take it no more.’ Some people were standing, others were waving their arms. It was electric.

As one speaker described it: ‘this is a gathering of the grassroots.’ The Grassroots Collaborative, a coalition of ten union and community organisations in Chicago, had turned out a thousand people to ‘take back’ Chicago. The event was not focused on a single issue but on a multiplicity of concerns; speeches ranged from non-militarised education to a living wage.

This event was one of many. The Collaborative and its member organisations already had a reputation as agitators in Chicago and across Illinois by repeatedly mobilising their base of member supporters in pursuit of centrally crafted strategies for living wages.
1.0 Introduction
The Grassroots Collaborative, as with the previous case studies, was a long-term coalition, and this case study analyses its work with SEIU Local 880 and their campaigns for living wages. Since the successful Living Wage campaign in Baltimore in 1994, a living wage movement had developed in the United States (Walsh 2000). Its message had its roots in the progressive era at the turn of the last century, where economic depression and burgeoning catholic and socialist unions raised demands for living wages amongst then Irish immigrant workers. The term derived from Pope Leo VIII's 1891 encyclical that called for a 'just wage' (Figart 2004, p.2; Gertner 2006).

This case study had strong contextual differences from the Canadian and Australian studies. As in Australia, this case study featured a strategic union campaign, but here the focus was on organising new members rather than policy changes. In the United States, with its very low union density, unions had to 'organise or die' (Kelleher 2005). The union itself is a further point of difference. While most of SEIU Local 880's members are in the public sector, these workers work in the home, in contrast to the formally employed teachers and hospital workers examined in the previous studies. The Collaborative was initiated by community organisations; starkly different community organisations compared to those studied in Canada and Australia, having a strong membership and mobilising capacity (Delgado 1986; Osterman 2006).

This case study exhibited a model of coalition unionism that this study calls mobilising coalition unionism. The coalition had a strong set of inter-
organisational relations that negotiated common concern and mutual self-interest, but was also categorised by a singularly-scaled, rather than multi-scaled, capacity. The limited scale derived both from the union, where there was a relatively small and centralised steward structure; and from the coalition, where leaders tended to be engaged as public advocates rather than strategic cross-organisational actors. At a local scale, there were no coalition broker organisations and there was limited space for member participation in coalition strategising. Instead, member engagement was limited to mobilisation. The name mobilising coalition unionism is appropriate because mobilisation requires a mobilising agent, which was continuously present in the Collaborative’s strong centralised inter-organisational relationships.

This chapter examines a series of living wage campaigns in Chicago between 2002 and 2006. It begins in 2002 with the Collaborative’s return to the Living Wage campaign, coinciding with SEIU Local 880’s campaign to achieve recognition and living wages for homecare and childcare workers. The study ends with the Big Box Living Wage campaign in September 2006. While all the participants insisted that ‘the campaign never ends’, it ends here because the mixture of strategies, limitations, strengths and triumphs allowed a detailed examination of the coalition’s mobilisation form, which is key to this study.

26 ‘Big box stores’ is a US term to describe large retail stores such as Target, Costco or Wal-Mart.
2.0 Context for Case Study

2.1 Unions

The two SEIU unions affiliated to the Grassroots Collaborative are predominantly public sector SEIU locals with leadership support and union identities that commit them to working in coalition (interview 7: SEIU 78, 2005; interview 13: SEIU 880, 2005). The Collaborative also worked closely with the UFCW and the Chicago Federation of Labor (CFL).

In 2006, SEIU International represented 1.8 million workers in the United States and Canada across four industries: hospital systems, long-term care, the public sector and business services (SEIU 2006b). It had an International Office in Washington DC, and over 300 locals operating through twenty-five State Councils. Over the previous ten years it had led growth strategies to organise non-union workers (SEIU 2006b). It centralised its resources, through dues to fund industry research, organiser training, new member organising and political races where collective bargaining rights could be secured (SEIU 2006d).27

SEIU Local 880, the Grassroots Collaborative’s first union partner, was an unusual union, ‘distinguished by its history of growing out of ACORN’ (interview, Kelleher: SEIU, 2005). By 2006 it was the SEIU’s fifth largest local with close to 70 000 members, yet it was also one of the youngest locals, forming as one of five United Labour Unions (ULU) founded by ACORN, affiliating with the SEIU in 1985 (Kelleher 2005; Tait 2005). These independent ULU’s adapted the community organising techniques of ACORN, such as door-knocking and

27 Local contributions to SEIU International vary depending on the income level of the unionised workers, but SEIU Local 880, for instance, sends approximately 40% of its dues income to SEIU International, and AFL-CIO state and local bodies (interview 40: SEIU 880, 2006)
leadership development, to organise low-wage workers in the service industries who had been neglected by traditional AFL-CIO unions (Kelleher 2005; Tait 2005). Consequently, SEIU 880 organised an atypical constituency of private and public homecare workers from 1983 and then home childcare workers from 1996. The union’s community organising origins created a broad political vision and union identity. As the field director outlined, ‘our vision is nothing less than redistributing power in the city, in the country, in the world ... unions need to have a larger vision of social and political change’ (interview, Glassman: SEIU, 2005). SEIU 880 was physically located in the same premises as its sister organisation, ACORN. This integration was enhanced by the close personal relationship between the two principle organisers of SEIU 880 and ACORN, as Keith Kelleher and Madeline Talbott have been married for the last twenty years.

The union is structured with separate ‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ functions. The legislature included a rank and file membership executive board, a stewards’ board, and monthly regional membership meetings open to all union members. The executive is led by Kelleher as head organiser, a field director and full-time organising staff. The union explicitly organises on the ‘basis of geography’ while targeting workers by industry, with regional organisers, lead and field organisers operating across ‘the whole membership ... to build power overall’ (interview 13: SEIU, 2005).

SEIU Local 73 joined the Collaborative in August 2004. In 2006 it represented 25,000 public sector workers across Illinois and north-west Indiana (interview 7: SEIU 73, 2005). The union was a general union until 1996, when an SEIU restructure turned it into a public service local (interview 25: SEIU, 2005). Under the leadership of Christine Boardman, a former SEIU 73 organiser, the union
sought to expand its community strength by appointing a community-labour organiser in 2003 (interview 7: SEIU 73, 2005). This organiser aimed to move away from 'one-way' community work where unions take support from the community but do not give back, to 'two-way organising' that created 'sustainable relationships beyond organising drives' (interview 7: SEIU 73, 2005). The goal was to build 'long-term systemic' relationships, rather than just ad hoc relationships. The union also saw its own workers as 'not just union members but people who live in the community', seeking to build sustainable relationships to support that broad base of experience (interview 7: SEIU 73, 2005).

In 2006, the UFCW represented 1.3 million workers in the United States and Canada, working in the retail, food and packing industries (UFCW 2006a). Chicago's UFCW Local 881 represented 37 000 members and was the largest UFCW local in the United States (UFCW 881 2006). Until recently, the UFCW was best categorised as a more traditional business union, with only limited experience in coalition work (interview 20: union, 2005). Yet changes like the union's national public campaign around Wal-Mart, and its enhanced investment in new organising initiatives since joining the Change to Win Federation in 2005, have expanded its operating model (UFCW 2006b).

In 2006, the CFL was the central labour council for Chicago and Cook County, with 320 affiliated labour unions representing around 400 000 workers.28 Historically, a key plank of the CFL's power was a 'great relationship with the City Council ... an open door ... over the last 100 years' (interview 46: union, 2006). Chicago was a city run by the Democratic Party. The Daleys, first father

28 Of note, in 2006 the Change to Win Federation unions remained affiliated to the CFL.
and then son, have had almost unbroken control of City Council politics through a centrally controlled 'political machine' (Royko 1970). However, from the mid-1990s, the machine changed, changing the political influence of the CFL. As one official noted, 'city workers didn’t have a contract for two and half years ... the Council began forging relationships with business that tipped the scales when you look at business over labour' (interview 46: union, 2006). The President of the CFL identified a 'political vacuum', particularly after the Daley Machine was publicly accused of corruption in 2004, and hired a political director with the aim of 'getting more involved politically' (interview 46: union, 2006). These political relationships also facilitated community outreach, as the political director became a bridge between community organisations and the CFL (interview 46: union, 2006).

2.2 Community organisation partners
The Grassroots Collaborative was initiated by community organisations, which is fitting as its location in Chicago is the home of United States Alinsky-styled community organising. That said, Chicago is not an anomaly, as many of these Chicago organisations are part of national community organisation networks that operate around the United States. The Collaborative’s community organisations have many similar capacities: they have leaders who prioritise organising, not service provision, and they employ dedicated organisers who develop leaders and assist members to take direct action to achieve policy outcomes. In 2006 there were ten community organisation affiliates. This section reviews four prominent members.

29 Association of Community Organisations for Reform Now (ACORN), the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), the PICO (People Improving Communities through Organising) national network and Gamaliel are national 'community organising' organisations which have affiliates across the country, including Chicago.
Since it was established in 1970, ACORN has become a national, multi-issue community organisation that builds neighbourhood chapters, coordinated by state offices, organising 'low and moderate-income people to work together to provide for each other in decisions that impact their lives' (interview, Talbott: ACORN, 2006). In 2006, ACORN Illinois was centrally funded by membership dues, fundraising, foundations and allies.\(^{30}\) Its funding pays for twelve permanent full-time organisers, who door-knock and support campaigns with the local chapters (interview 36, community organisation, 2006). Illinois ACORN had eight neighbourhood chapters, all in the Chicago metropolitan areas, and a central executive with representation from each of the chapters. While it always had a permanent coalition with SEIU 880, since the Living Wage Campaign of 1995, ACORN has become increasingly engaged in coalition work (interview 49: community organisation, 2006).

The CCH was formed in 1980 to agitate for a political response to homelessness in Chicago (interview 19: community organisation, 2005). In the 1990s, a new director, John Donahue, broadened the organisation’s focus to the ‘causes of homelessness ... lack of affordable housing, lack of living wage jobs and lack of access to services and insurance, the services people need to survive’ (interview 19: community organisation, 2005). This organisational range created opportunities for coalitions on living wages, because as the executive director noted, ‘people are homeless because they don’t have enough money and if there are strategies that work to increase the amount of money people get, we are

\(^{30}\) Households pay $10 per month in membership fees, which makes up approximately 10% of the ACORN budget (interview, Talbott: ACORN, 2006). However, there is currently discussion about bringing in provisional free membership.
interested’ (interview 19: community organisation, 2005). The CCH operated with policy and legal staff, and an expanding organising department that worked to develop member leaders (interview 19: community organisation, 2005). The CCH is funded by membership fees and foundations. It does not seek government funding so it can ‘be critical of government’ (interview 19: community organisation, 2005).

During the period of the case study, the Illinois Hunger Coalition’s (IHC) purpose was to ‘eliminate hunger by addressing its underlying causes, which are poverty, socio-economic injustice, racism and discrimination’ (interview 6: community organisation, 2005). It focused on issues of access to government food services, like food stamps (IHC 2006). Since 1998, under Dianne Doughty’s leadership, the IHC had developed an organising department and engaged in coalition work (interview 6: community organisation, 2005). Its organising work focused primarily on Latino immigrant communities based in suburban Chicago (interview 6: community organisation, 2005). IHC is primarily funded through foundation grants, with limited funding from institutional and individual members.

Metro Seniors in Action was formed, according to its executive director, to ‘organise seniors and empower them to fight for their rights’ (interview 8: community organisation, 2005). In 2006 it had a fifteen-person board with representation from across the city, and monthly delegate meetings attended by about fifty to seventy seniors. Campaigns were identified by members, with the board overseeing the activity (interview 8: community organisation, 2005). The organisation’s funding comes mainly from fundraising and foundations. Metro Seniors regularly works in coalition; members want ‘to be in the same room with
young people ... to work with a younger generation' (interview 8: community organisation, 2005). Coalition work was also enhanced by personal relationships, as the executive director, Amanda Solon, was a former SEIU 880 organiser (interview 8: community organisation, 2005).

During the period of study, the Brighton Park Neighbourhood Council (BPNC) operated as a local organisation in south-west Chicago, in an area where residents are 80% Latino. It was formed in 1997, with the support of the National Training and Information Centre, a nationally-based community organisation (BPNC 2006). Like ACORN, it was built through door-knocking and ‘bringing residents together to meetings and developing strategies around issues’ (interview, Poeter: BPNC, 2005). Yet unlike ACORN with its office in the centre of the city, the offices of BPNC are based in Brighton Park with a shop front and meeting space (participant observation, BPNC Office). As a local organisation, BPNC was still committed to multi-scaled campaigning. This was why they joined the Collaborative: ‘we wanted to tie local organising campaigns to policy campaigns so we became involved in coalitions’ (interview 9: community organisation, 2005).

2.3 Emergence of the Grassroots Collaborative

The Grassroots Collaborative was a product of the original Living Wage Ordinance campaign in Chicago between 1995 and 1998 (interview 6: community organisation, 2005). The campaign was organised by the Chicago Jobs and Living Wage Coalition, with twelve organisations on its steering committee and sixty endorsing groups (Kelleher 2005). Its goal was to pass an ordinance at the City Council that would require companies receiving taxpayer funds – for
example, as city contractors – to pay their workers a living wage of $7.60 an hour, the amount that would keep a family of four out of poverty. It was an intense campaign, involving mobilisations and door-knocking of wards, with victory coming through the Coalition’s use of a state law that required aldermanic salary rises to occur within the six months before Council Elections. The Coalition used this as a political opportunity by connecting a living wage to the City Council’s desire for a pay increase, which created unanimous City Council support for a living wage the same night it voted to give itself a pay rise (Kelleher 2005).

According to ‘legend,’ the Grassroots Collaborative began after the executive directors of the CCH, ACORN and the Interfaith Leadership Project (Cicero) were at a function at the Woods Foundation when John (Juancho) Donahue from CCH turned to the others and said, ‘why is it that we are only meeting now?’ (interview 21: community organisation, 2005). Through ACORN, SEIU 880 was invited to join the first of the Collaborative’s monthly breakfast meetings at Manny’s café, which ran ‘on a relational basis’ that ‘tried to get a deeper sense of people’s program and agenda’ (interview 21: community organisation, 2005; interview 1: community organisation, 2005).

Months of open discussions created six concrete lessons about coalition practice that would underpin the Collaborative. These lessons were: firstly, that coalition participation required organisational accountability and capacity; secondly, that unions and community organisations were distinct and equally important; thirdly, that a coordinator could relieve some of the organisational burdens of coalition work, fourthly, that timing was key for coalition success; fifthly, that relationships were more important than issues for long-term coalitions, sixthly, that Collaborative decision making become concentrated amongst full-time staff.
It was the history of previous struggle combined with time for dedicated reflection that allowed the relationships of the past to shape the future form of the Collaborative.

Firstly, the Collaborative participants had learnt that coalitions need to connect organisational involvement in decision making to a form of collective accountability. The Living Wage Campaign had an open collective decision-making structure ‘where everyone in the world was invited to the meeting’; it was ‘the biggest error’ (interview 1: community organisation, 2005). Organisations that ‘could move numbers were very tired of being in rooms with people who couldn’t, where they were carrying the load and everybody else was having opinions’ (interview, Talbott: ACORN, 2005). Thus the Collaborative developed a ‘principle about turn-out ... a transparent process about what it takes to be a real decision maker ... you would have to move numbers of people and you would have to put some money on the table’ (interview, Talbott: ACORN, 2005). While anyone could participate in coalition events, decision making was limited to organisations that made turn-out pledges.

Secondly, the Collaborative learnt that unions and community organisations were equally important, and that unions in particular were distinct. The Collaborative had proportionally more community organisations, but it recognised that unions are ‘big players ... because they have a large number of members’ (interview 1: community organisation, 2005). By restricting decision making to turn-out, the Collaborative created a space for unions that recognised their capacity. However, there was also an acknowledgment that even small unions are bigger than large community organisations, and that it is important to
balance the diversity of participation (interview 35: community organisation, 2006).

Thirdly, the Collaborative believed a coordinator could assist coalition sustainability by taking responsibility for coalition reproduction above the participants. It could help them balance coalition unity and organisational autonomy. In the Living Wage campaign, coalition unity came at the expense of participant autonomy, as one community organiser recalled:

Some organisations were being drained because such a long campaign required so much effort ... we just did not have a continual way to build our organisations as we were waging the campaign (interview, Talbott: ACORN, 2005).

Fourthly, the Living Wage campaign provided concrete lessons about ‘strategy and timing’ (interview 19: community organisation, 2005). The original Living Wage Ordinance was won because it was attached to a political opportunity. As one community organiser described it: ‘timing is really critical and being aware of timing is really crucial, kind of anticipating’ what will happen (interview 19: community organisation, 2005).

Fifthly, the Collaborative learnt that relationships were more important than issues for long-term coalitions. Up until then, there was ‘a lack of trust’, and with the new Collaborative: ‘we felt that if we could build some trust personally with each other and then get to know each other’s organisations that we would stand a better chance of making a success’ in future coalitions (interview 19: community organisation, 2005). The aim was to ‘build relationally’ between the staff (interview 1: community organisation; interview 19: community
Thus the Collaborative would not be defined by a single issue, but build issue campaigns out of negotiation and discussion at breakfast meetings and day long retreats. Aside from Living Wage campaigns, the Collaborative coordinated a large Kidcare demonstration in May 2000, an immigrant amnesty rally in September 2000 and an immigrant driver’s licence campaign in 2001.

Sixthly, Collaborative planning involved full-time staff, not the rank and file, of the participating organisations. Organisers openly acknowledged the limitations of only having staff participation, one recognising ‘it violates all the rules of community organising that says you can’t hold power for people and that they need to make decisions’ (interview 18: community organisation, 2005). However, despite the contradiction, this form of organising became practically necessary, helping the Collaborative to ‘build trust ... sustain relationships’, ‘create quick decisions’ and have effective decision-making structures for long-term relationships outside of crisis (interview 18: community organisation, 2005). The organisers themselves noted the need to confront the difficulties of staff-led organising, and ‘felt its way’ in experimenting with engaging the rank and file, ensuring for instance, that they were speakers at Collaborative events (interview 18: community organisation, 2005).

Thus the Collaborative would be defined by a narrow set of inter-organisational relationships, based on strong levels of trust between the staff of organisations with strong turn-out capacity, and operating as a multi-issue coalition that renegotiated issue priorities over time. However, while the coalition structure facilitated tight relationships between staff, organisational members would play a more distant role. They would be consulted and mobilised in Collaborative
campaigns through the participant organisations, but not through ongoing localised coalition bodies (broker organisations) across the rank and file of the organisations.

3.0 The Living Wage Campaigns: 2002-2006

The Living Wage campaigns had a dual strategy, using two arms of social power: an organising strategy to win collective bargaining rights and a coalition strategy focused on social policy. These campaigns built on the Collaborative’s foundations of relational bonds and inter-organisational trust to create a new type of coalition capacity, well suited to the hostile US climate.

The case study is divided into two sections. It firstly focuses on organising for a living wage and SEIU 880’s strategies for organising state-subsidised homecare and childcare workers. Secondly, it analyses the Living Wage campaign for workers in ‘big box’ retail stores which developed out of a difficult campaign against Wal-Mart in Chicago.

3.1 Organising for living wages

The living wage campaigns for homecare and childcare workers were developed and run by SEIU 880. While formally separate from the Collaborative, SEIU 880’s campaign directly connected to the Collaborative’s living wage agenda – borrowing and adapting the original living wage message to support its organising goals. Similarly, the organising campaign and its ad hoc coalitions exhibited the mobilising coalition unionism model, with a centrally directed organising strategy that activated union members on a broad range of issues but did not create local structures that handed over control for decentralised decision
making. The organising campaigns are presented in three sections, firstly exploring the origins of the SEIU's organising model, secondly the Living Wage campaign for homecare workers and finally the Living Wage campaign for childcare workers.

3.1.1 The Origins of SEIU Local 880's Organising Strategy
Since the mid-1980s, SEIU 880 had developed an integrated organising and political strategy to represent and bargain for homecare workers. While a combined political and organising strategy was commonplace in countries with histories of labour parties (such as the United Kingdom or Australia), it was unusual for the United States, where bargaining focused on the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and not on the political arena. This new political organising strategy created an enduring capacity for SEIU 880 to engage in ad hoc alliance work with community allies that were connected to its organisational self-interest and the interests of its partners. At the same time, the strategy was state-scaled and relied heavily on full-time staff organisers.

SEIU 880 began organising low-wage service workers in the 'homecare industry' (Kelleher 2005). Homecare grew in the late 1970s as health care de-institutionalised through a combination of reductions in publicly funded nursing homes and hospitals, and federal policies such as Medicaid Waivers, which allowed people to claim for care in their home (Feldman, Sapienza and Kane 1990; Kelleher 2005; BLS 2006; Shirk 2006). This prompted states to establish 'in-home' care programs. In Illinois, the largest number of workers operated as
public homecare providers funded by the Illinois Department of Rehabilitation (Kelleher 2005; Shirk 2006).31

The challenges of organising public homecare workers, combined with the SEIU 880’s unusual history, saw the union develop a distinct organising model focused simultaneously on new member organising and political action. Political action was necessary because the employer was the state. Yet public homecare workers were not classified as employees according to NLRB, thus state intervention was required to enable collective bargaining.32 The union’s status changed during different Illinois State Administrations. Limited recognition was won in 1994 but withdrawn in 1997 (Kelleher 2005, p. 47). To organise the industry, SEIU 880 developed an inside/outside organising strategy – working ‘inside’ to build the union by using organisers to build density while working ‘outside’ against the state and with the community to increase wages and win recognition rights.

This inside/outside strategy created space for ad hoc alliance work with community partners and other unions. Alliances provided a source of influence. As one organiser described it: ‘it helps you with the politicians who see you working together with the consumers, it gets them a little nervous’ (interview 40: SEIU 880, 2006). The union developed a variety of ‘consumer’ relationships, including with ADAPT (American Disabled for Attendant and Programs Today),

31 There were two types of homecare workers. Firstly, a state-based public model, where seniors with a disability hired homecare workers and the state financed the cost of care and worker wages. Secondly, a private sector model, where the city council or state subcontracted homecare services to private companies who made a bid on the work then hired, trained and assigned workers who provided the services – usually on an hourly basis.
32 The State Labor Relations Board made a determination in 1985 that because the work of homecare workers was directed by the client/consumer on many of the day to day supervisory tasks, that the state was merely a ‘co-employee’ of the worker, and thus the worker was not afforded the protections and collective bargaining rights of the State Labor Act.
Metro Seniors in Action and the Jane Adams Senior Caucus (interview 40, SEIU 880, 2006). These consumer organisations similarly described their union relationships as 'a natural alignment ... so many seniors are in touch with homecare workers' (interview 43: community organisation, 2006). The relationships went beyond instrumental need; they were about sustaining trust over time. As one union official described it: the campaigns 'sometimes had to do with homecare consumer issues but other activity had nothing to do with homecare at all' (interview 40: SEIU 880, 2006). The union was willing to engage in broad relationships related to the union's vision. 'The union has always believed in multi-issue ... it's not just about wages and conditions' (interview 40: SEIU 880, 2006).

Engaging in ad hoc alliances and taking political action required growing the capacity of an internal membership to anchor coalition work. The union undertook regular lobbying trips to Springfield (Illinois's capital) with dual goals: to win political victories while 'empowering' member leaders (interview 40: SEIU 880, 2006). Similarly, the alliances hinged off an organising model that relied on trained staff organisers to grow the number of union members rapidly, in a growing industry with high worker turnover (Kelleher 2005). Organisers predominantly came from outside the union, particularly amongst progressive college students (interview 5: community organisation, 2005; interview 10: SEIU, 2005). Using employee lists obtained from the state, non-union workers were identified by zipcode, and organisers had targets of recruiting between thirty and fifty new members per month through cold-call door-knocking, using a standard organising script (interview 2: union, 2005; interview 10: union, 2005).

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30 Even by 1990, there were 7000 publicly funded Department of Rehabilitation Service workers.
Organisers were then responsible for leadership development through zipcode-based neighbourhood meetings, where members were encouraged to do phone-banking and door-knocking (interview 15: SEIU 880, 2005). Additionally, the union organised regular ‘workers organising workers’ (WOW) training sessions for members on door-knocking and lobbying (interview 33: SEIU 880, 2006).

The mutually reinforcing, centrally-scaled political-community organising strategy created wage outcomes and growth during the 1990s (SEIU 880 1994; Kelleher 2005).\(^{34}\) Political successes reinforced state-scale organising when the union won the right to representation, dues check-off (which allowed the union to collect union fees through workers’ pay cheques), and a system of ‘fair share’ where the union could charge non-union members a fee that was the ‘fair share’ of the costs of representation incurred by the union. A limitation of this strategy was demonstrated in 1998 when the union lost its fair share agreement. Membership fell by 4000 members in two months (Kelleher 2005).

Internal union solidarity was also shaped by union member’s relatively similar identity and the isolated work they performed in people’s homes. Most of the union members were women, most identifying as Christian, and over 55% were African American. The union created collective experiences that built off this identity. Union meetings began with a prayer, and were punctuated by chanting and singing (participant observation, member meeting Sept 2005). Member leaders confirmed the importance of faith to their union commitment; one stated ‘SEIU are here to deliver us, honestly’, and ‘the people in this union are blessed’

\(^{34}\) From 1990 to 1994, after organiser targets were introduced, the union grew by 5000 net new public homecare members, which escalated further between 1994 to 1997 with limited union recognition by the state.
The collective experience of the union was highly valued by people who work alone, as another rank and file leader expressed: 'you don’t have anyone to talk to who has the same problems as you and I didn’t know that there were so many women that were going through this ... I needed to know that I was not alone' (interview 33: SEIU 880, 2006).

3.1.2 Living Wages for Homecare Workers

To win collective bargaining rights and a living wage for homecare workers, the SEIU 880 engaged in a two-pronged coalition campaign. Firstly, an electoral political campaign in coalition with the other SEIU locals, and, secondly, a community lobbying strategy in coalition with its community partners in the Grassroots Collaborative.

SEIU Local 880's participation in a comprehensive political campaign to win collective bargaining rights developed in response to a weak Republican administration in Illinois and an SEIU restructure. At the request of SEIU International, the Illinois SEIU State Council was completing a major restructure (interview 25: SEIU, 2006). It had supported its locals to shift to five industry unions, and now moved to increase the political capacity of the union ‘to create some economies of scale’ about ‘how to do politics’ (interview 25: SEIU, 2006). The State Council hired a team of ‘political campaign professionals’ to enhance the political capacity of the union in running its electoral strategy (interview 24: SEIU, 2005). These professionals became political bridge builders, developing a union political campaign while using personal relationships to support SEIU’s political influence.
The State Council’s restructure, led by its new President Tom Balanoff, gave the SEIU Council the political capacity to do what SEIU 880 had ‘pioneered’ (interview 34: SEIU, 2006). A key element of the political strategy was the involvement of members, taking it away from what one SEIU 880 person described as:

"The insiders’ game ... the business unionist practice of ‘I am now a respected union leader, I can wear a nice suit and we can talk rationally with the politicians as opposed to member mass action’ (interview 40: SEIU 880, 2006)."

The centralisation of financial resources created a union coalition capable of influencing the 2002 election. The State Council had always existed, but its focus dramatically shifted. It increased the per capitation fee from 25 cents per member per month to $2. It changed its meeting style, to be ‘more wide open, more discussion, more debate on the issues ... of course, if there were big issues someone preps you beforehand, but it was no more “all in favour, yes”’ (interview 51: union, 2006).

Over December 2001 and January 2002, the State Council began coordinating its State Election campaign by asking locals to prioritise their election issues, with all candidates in the Democratic primary asked to complete questionnaires. The only candidate to support the SEIU’s questionnaire in full was Rod Blagojevich. The most far-reaching demands came from SEIU 880, and included executive orders for homecare and childcare workers that would recognise the union as a collective bargaining agent. This was broadly supported, firstly by the State Council and then by the internal decision-making bodies of the locals (SEIU 880 2002a). It was in keeping with the Council’s goals – as one SEIU 880 official noted: ‘growing the union was considered the biggest priority’ – but it did result
in differing levels of SEIU local commitment to the campaign (interview 10, SEIU 880, 2005). As an official from one local described ‘a State Council is a function of the pieces ... if a local can’t build consensus or support, it plays out in how much they contribute to the campaign’ (interview 34: SEIU, 2006).

In early 2002, the SEIU’s primary campaign was directed by the new political professionals and operated at a centralised state-scale. The Council’s campaign was closely ‘integrated’ with the Blagojevich campaign (interview 24: SEIU, 2005). The goal was to maximise internal union support for Blagojevich by turning out union members to vote in the primary. The strategy required the union to build member commitment for Blagojevich’s candidacy, then develop an organisational capacity to turn out members.

Building support for Blagojevich required the union to negotiate the competing interests of union, class and racial identity. According to one official, some locals faced ‘resistance to Blagojevich primarily based on race’ (interview 34: SEIU, 2006). This was difficult, according to another official, when ‘there was an African American running, and a lot of our members are African American’ (interview 25: SEIU, 2005). However, the union put to its members that when the ‘African American candidate had been the Attorney General, he had resisted unionisation while in office’ (interview 25: SEIU, 2005). The SEIU argued that a candidate’s union commitment was more important than a candidate’s racial identity. It was effective. As one rank and file African American leader put it: ‘Blagojevich was a man for working families and homecare which is more than just a person who is black’ (interview 38: SEIU 880, 2006).
The March primary campaign required the mobilisation of SEIU members to vote for Blagojevich in the primary. The strategy had two arms, a centralised communications centre (call centre) which contacted members, and a door-knocking strategy. The centralisation of the strategy required all voters to be quantified; it involved contacting union members and 'converting' them into supporters (interview 24: SEIU, 2005).

SEIU 880 was very involved at a staff and membership level, using the election to increase its number of member leaders. It appointed an organiser to coordinate the SEIU State Council's door-knocking canvas on the South Side, where SEIU has about 10-15000 members, and SEIU 880 had around 2000 members (interview 14: SEIU 880, 2005). Additionally, member leaders volunteered, with SEIU 880 providing 'probably 150 members that were regularly going out door-knocking and doing phone calls during the week and every weekend during the campaign' (interview 11: SEIU 880, 2005).

The primary campaign was a success, both for Blagojevich, who won narrowly, and for SEIU. SEIU believed its contribution was decisive: 'he was elected by 20000 votes and we delivered 25000 ... we delivered more votes for Blagojevich than any political organisation' (interview 24: SEIU, 2005). State-scaled integration between the Blagojevich campaign and the SEIU State Council continued through the November general election which focused on the population at large, with the political bridge builders directing the tactics that maximised the recognition and responsibility of the SEIU within the Blagojevich campaign.
The November election shifted the political target to the broad public instead of union members. In turn, it reduced the SEIU’s capacity for member development by introducing the ‘slash and burn’ techniques that are familiar to political campaigning (interview 36: SEIU, 2005). For instance, the union provided members for weekly media events ‘when we got a call for say fifty bodies’, staged solely for the media, not for member development (interview 24: SEIU, 2005). Additionally, SEIU ran the entire Blagojevich campaign in a congressional district. However, just because the campaign work was local, it did not necessarily enhance member control over the activity. Volunteers played a key role in contacting voters, but what they did and when they did it was centrally controlled (interview 24, SEIU, 2005). The shifting of the target to the general public also required less effort and political engagement by member volunteers. As one organiser said: ‘you are giving somebody a two-minute rap on the candidate and then you are rolling on’ (interview 34: SEIU, 2006).

The activities of phone-banking and door-knocking were used together with differing effect. As one organiser compared them, ‘house calling is the most effective tool we have for building leadership, but it can be a futile event because people are often not home ... if you work the phones you talk to a lot more people’, for political effectiveness ‘the two work well together’ (interview 34: SEIU, 2006). However, for member development the greatest power was in the face to face contact. As one steward described it ‘you are looking into their face and you can see the despair in their eyes, you can see the need’ (interview 33: SEIU 880, 2006). Door-knocking also helped remedy a lack of confidence, as another noted, ‘doing the visiting ... I wasn’t shy any more, it’s like a graduation and now I want to create leaders from others ... that’s how I felt’ (interview 32: SEIU 880, 2006).
During 2001 and 2002, alongside the political campaign that elected Blagojevich, SEIU Local 880 continued to engage in alliances with the Collaborative and consumer partners to escalate political influence, media awareness and internal union growth to win living wages for homecare workers. Yet, as the relationships became increasingly tied to the SEIU’s core concerns for organising rights, the coalition activity became increasingly union-led.

SEIU 880’s alliance work focused on political lobbying work around homecare rights and regulating the homecare industry. SEIU 880 initiated a homecare Bill of Rights, where allies endorsed SEIU 880 demands and supported lobby days (SEIU 880 2001a; SEIU 880 2001b). The union’s message focused on living wages because, as one organiser put it: living wages ‘had become very entrenched in the minds of the members and the idea of a living wage, the righteousness of the idea was so broad’ (interview 10: union, 2005). SEIU 880 also joined the industry-wide Community Care Alliance in 2002, along with Metro Seniors, the Jane Adams Seniors Caucus, Progress Centre for Independent Living, Access Living and ADAPT (interview 43: community organisation, 2006). This alliance lobbied for better conditions for the consumers, and indirectly improved conditions of workers. As one community organiser noted, the alliance supported ‘more jobs for homecare workers’ (interview 43: community organisation, 2006).

SEIU 880 also worked on two broader issue-based coalitions. Firstly, in 2002 in coalition with the ACORN-led Coalition for Jobs and Living Wages, it campaigned for an annual cost of living adjustment for the 1998 Living Wage Ordinance. SEIU 880 supported rallies throughout the year, and in August along with the SEIU State Council it led successful negotiations with the City Council.
Secondly, it worked with the Collaborative on a campaign around the State Budget that culminated in a 5000-person rally in Springfield. The Budget campaign was a Collaborative initiative, designed as a multi-issue event focused on the common theme of a 'people's budget' (interview 6: community organisation, 2005). The diversity of the issues at the rally, according to one organiser, provided 'a good way to educate about other people's issues', while committing organisations to the event via their organisational self-interest (interview 21: community organisation, 2006).

As the election approached, SEIU 880's coalition work became more focused on its own needs. Within the Collaborative this was treated 'pragmatically', as the requests were based on years of trust and strong personal relationships. As one organisation member commented:

The SEIU had the most strength, so the rest of the Collaborative members, we had to support that, and when the SEIU needed something from us – and I remember getting calls saying can you guys come to a demonstration or some meeting ... we would bring a couple of people along ... we would try to participate at critical points .. but they were really the heavy lifters (interview 8: community organisation, 2005).

Organisational interest in the homecare Living Wage campaign directly shaped the decision-making process. This was an SEIU 880-led Living Wage campaign where the SEIU 880 was decision maker. This did not exclude other ad hoc alliance work, such as the 'people's budget rally' but when the union was campaigning on its issues, it led the decision making.

The combined political and community campaigns elected Governor Blagojevich, translating SEIU's electoral campaign into political power. According to the
State Council, the key to translating electoral activity into political power was the integration of the SEIU with the Blagojevich campaign team, because this allowed them to ‘directly impact the race ... the Blagojevich people know what we did for them on a daily basis’ (interview 24: SEIU, 2005). This proximity came from a shared scale of operation and the presence of union political bridge builders, where the SEIU’s professional staff and the Governor’s team worked across the same space, using similar methods and ‘spoke the same language’ (interview 24: SEIU, 2005). Consequently SEIU’s political power grew. As one official commented, SEIU became the ‘single strongest political operation in Illinois’ (interview 25: SEIU, 2005).

More liveable wages for homecare workers followed. SEIU 880 won collective bargaining rights in February 2003 (interview 5: community organisation, 2005). It formed a bargaining committee of homecare leaders and successfully won its first contract.

Overall, while the union’s centralised political campaign created political and organising outcomes, there were limitations in member development and decision making given the short-term electoral priorities. The strengths and limitations of the staff-directed, centrally-run political strategy intensified as SEIU 880 shifted to its collective bargaining campaign for childcare workers.

3.1.2 Living Wage for Home Childcare Workers
Building on its past success, SEIU 880 ran a Living Wage campaign for home childcare workers. SEIU 880 had been organising home childcare workers since 1996, and the 2002 electoral victory created an opportunity for childcare
collective bargaining rights. Despite the remarkable achievement of winning recognition rights for 49,000 childcare workers in 2005, there were limitations in this campaign. Victory delivered only weak rank and file structures amongst the home childcare members. While paid staff were crucial for organising the large numbers of union members, a dependence on staff limited member development during the campaign.

SEIU 880's childcare organising began well before the 2005 recognition election. In 1996 the union deployed its first home childcare organiser. Home childcare was a growing industry that expanded as the Clinton Administration's federal welfare reform program pushed welfare recipients into work, and the State of Illinois began subsidising home childcare for working parents (LUC 1998; Anderson and Ramsburg 2003; Kelleher 2005).³⁵ Work was based in the home, with pay as low as $9.48 per day (interview 11: SEIU 880, 2005). There were two classifications for home childcare providers: the more stable and regulated 'licensed' providers, and the more temporary 'license-exempt' providers (IDHS 2004). Unlicensed providers made up approximately 43,000 of the 49,000 workers and were highly mobile and insecure, with between 50-70% of the workers moving out of the industry every year (Kelleher 2005). The work was also demanding, with many providers working twelve-hour days during the week and during the weekend (interview 33: SEIU 880, 2006).

³⁵ Home childcare evolved out of federal welfare reform in 1996 which pushed welfare recipients into work, thus creating a widespread demand for inexpensive childcare. The State of Illinois allocated childcare funding as part of its welfare budget in 1997 in a policy called Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF). This policy replaced a program of welfare which was just payment-based, without 'mutual responsibility', called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
The organising strategy included coalition building, initially focusing on provider associations and relationships with parents. Some providers were already organised into provider associations, such as Latina Childcare Providers in Action. However, within these organisations there was a suspicion of unions. As one member put it, 'I was worried about the mafia' (interview 50: SEIU 880, 2006). However, once one to one organising produced union supporters, SEIU used the provider organisations as a base for recruitment (interview 32: SEIU 880, 2006). The workers also had close relationships with the parents, who were regularly mobilised to support the union at lobby events (interview 33: SEIU 880, 2006).

In 2004, the alliance campaign moved public with the aim of winning food subsidies for unlicensed childcare. SEIU 880 formed a coalition with the IHC, an organisation it had met through the Grassroots Collaborative (interview 11: SEIU 880, 2005). The alliance worked because, from the SEIU’s perspective, the IHC brought ‘their connections to the government, the relationships and the policy’, and the union brought ‘the pressure ... the visible population that was going to be affected ... that we could move’ (interview 11: SEIU 880, 2005).

However, the primary element of the organising strategy was, as SEIU 880 organisers described, an unprecedented, escalating, staff-led new member contact plan (interviews 10, 11, 14, 15: SEIU 880, 2005). Between 1996 and 2003 organising moved slowly, and the union focused on building a core group of home childcare activists who took on door-knocking and phone-calling other providers about the union and lobbying in Springfield (Lasslo 2005). However, after the 2003 election, with the possibility of an executive order and collective bargaining rights for childcare workers, the union’s focus turned to getting new
members to sign union authorisation cards rather than to member development. Before February 2005, when the Governor signed an executive order and a recognition election was called, SEIU 880 needed an ‘interest showing’ at the State Labor Election board, requiring the union to demonstrate that a proportion of the membership wanted to join the union. To do this, SEIU needed union authorisation cards from 10% of the 50 000 person workforce (Kelleher 2005). The authorisation cards strategy was run by staff, involving seven senior staff managing over fifty new organisers and twenty college student interns, joined by dozens of rank and file volunteers (interview 11: SEIU 880, 2005).

Compounding SEIU 880’s organising challenge, in February 2005, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), another large public sector union, decided to also seek union recognition. AFSCME acknowledged in a hearing before the AFL-CIO that their organising work amongst childcare providers ‘did not commence in earnest’ until after the executive order had been made (Williams 2005). AFSCME ‘spent a lot of resources’ to get on the recognition ballot, (interview 16: AFSMCE, 2005). AFSCME represented childcare workers in other states, and argued that they had a right to representation (Williams 2005). But, for SEIU 880, the AFSCME recognition contest was a union raid (interview 2: SEIU 880, 2005).

Union competition had some traction in home childcare, given the challenges involved in organising these workers. Unlicensed childcare workers moved quickly in and out of work and the long work hours were often undertaken alone. Consequently, home childcare workers were difficult to organise into a sustained union relationship. While many new members between 1996 and 2003 were developed into a core group of union activists and participated in union
campaigns and member meetings, new member development was a secondary priority after 2003. The organising strategy focused on a single contact with potential members at their homes, and a lack of permanent local rank and file union structures meant that new members had to attend centrally coordinated monthly meetings in order to participate. The focus on new authorisation cards limited member development during the Recognition campaign. Thus, in July 2005, three months after the Recognition campaign had ended, there were less than twenty stewards amongst the childcare activists, and no more than fifty childcare workers who regularly attended union monthly meetings (interview 55: SEIU 880, 2005). This combination of factors limited union engagement amongst new union members, making space for AFSCME to challenge for jurisdiction.

The 2005 Recognition campaign was one of the most intense staff-driven union election campaigns in United States union history. SEIU Local 880, with support from the SEIU International, overwhelmed the AFSCME challenge. SEIU International organised for fifty SEIU locals from around the United States to pledge a total of 600 organisers for the election, combined with another 100 organisers from the Change to Win Federation partners in Illinois and ACORN (Kelleher 2005). As one childcare worker described it: 'it was like a platoon', as from mid-March to 6 April, these organisers went door to door from 8am to 9pm; on some days, the union knocked on over 20 000 doors and visited 4000 providers (Kelleher 2005; interview 10: SEIU 880, 2005). AFSCME was forced to withdraw before the election was completed because of a ruling by the AFL-CIO (Franklin 2005; Knowles 2005b). This withdrawal, in combination with the SEIU's intense door-knocking campaign, saw it win recognition. SEIU's victory was
significant with 87% voting in favour of SEIU. Yet given the intensity of member contacting, a surprising small number of people voted: 16 000 out of 50 000.

In one of the larger union recognition victories in the United States, SEIU 880 won union representation for 49 000 workers. However, the campaign did not deliver a strong base of stewards. Indeed, in interviews held in July 2005, organisers noted that they had only 'about thirty stewards' amongst 50 000 providers (interview 14: SEIU 880, 2005). Home childcare worker participation in the monthly meetings was significantly smaller than amongst the homecare worker population (participant observation September 2005; interview 55: SEIU 880, 2005). The rapid increase in the number of SEIU 880's union members delivered a weakened capacity to mobilise its member base: the union has struggled to keep up its high levels of turn-out (which amount to between 7 and 10% of union members per year) (interview 56: SEIU 880, 2006). Despite these difficulties, between May and December 2005, a bargaining committee of around fifty childcare providers was formed, which consulted members, then led negotiations with the state. Home childcare workers received their first contract, a step closer to a living wage, in December 2005 (interview 33: SEIU 880, 2006).

3.2 Policy routes to living wages

Alongside SEIU 880, the Grassroots Collaborative undertook campaigns for living wages between 2002 and 2006. As organisations representing the low-wage, working poor and homeless, the Collaborative campaigned for legislative

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36 Over the last five years, internal SEIU 880 statistics on member turn-out reveal that in 2002 the union mobilised approximately 10% of the union membership, falling to 7% in 2006. The statistic for 2006 only includes full members, and not fair share members. This makes the proportion of turn-out significantly lower if all new union representees are included.
changes that would affect the entire population. SEIU 880 was an active participant in these campaigns, a practical application of its testament to its identity and ideological belief in ‘redistributing power ... by not just doing our campaigns, but campaigning for everybody’ (interview 13: SEIU 880, 2005).

The focus of this section is on two campaigns initiated after Wal-Mart’s proposed entry into Chicago. Firstly, the Collaborative supported a UFCW campaign of ‘site fights’ to block zoning changes that would allow Wal-Mart to build in Chicago. Secondly, after this did not stop Wal-Mart, it launched a Living Wage Ordinance for all big box workers, that proposed a minimum standard for large retailers in the City of Chicago (New York Times Editorial 2006).

These campaigns were rooted in the established strategy of living wage activism created by the 1995-8 Living Wage campaign, and sustained through ACORN-led campaigns in 2002 and 2003 around living wages and a state minimum wage. The cost of living indexation campaign in 2002 was ‘played smarter’ than the first campaign, harnessing the importance of timing and staging it in an election year (interview 18: community organisation, 2005). The minimum wage campaign was won through a combination of supportive relationships with organised labour and direct action by ACORN in the Illinois House.

This section discusses the No Wal-Mart campaign and the ‘big box’ Living Wage campaign. They are discussed together because they are linked, as many of the weaknesses identified by organisers in the Wal-Mart site fights led to strengths in the Living Wage campaign.
3.2.1 No Wal-Mart in Chicago, June 2003 to May 2004

As almost all coalition participants openly acknowledged, and later strove to correct, there were weaknesses in the campaign against Wal-Mart. It was organised using a weak set of inter-organisational relationships that hamstrung planning and message development. The centralised organisation of the campaign limited its locally-scaled capacity. The lack of locally-based opposition to Wal-Mart allowed Wal-Mart to divide the community on issues of race, and successfully gain approval for one Wal-Mart store in Chicago.

When Wal-Mart announced that it was planning a mega-store in the City of Chicago, it created a widespread crisis and potential opportunity for the key retail union – the UFCW (Alexander 2003; Yue 2003; New York Times Editorial 2006). The crisis was inspired by the magnitude of the threat that Wal-Mart posed to the union. Unlike under Keynesianism, where the largest employer was the unionised General Motors, in 2004 Wal-Mart was the largest employer in the US and a ‘template business’ setting standards for non-union employment (Lichtenstein 2006a, p. 4). Wal-Mart’s strident opposition to unions threatened the very viability of the UFCW: in 2003 and 2005 it shut down stores in Texas and Quebec when unions won recognition (Greenhouse 2003; Austen 2005; Rathke 2006). Yet as one UFCW organiser described, the crisis, while severe also created an opportunity: ‘we are now faced with the biggest threat ever ... we either do this or we start putting our resumes together and help our members to change careers’ (interview 66: UFCW, 2006).

From the start, the UFCW’s campaign against Wal-Mart reacted to Wal-Mart’s proactive agenda. Since 2000, Wal-Mart’s growth strategy was to enter ‘blue’
(liberal Democrat) areas, and build stores within city limits rather than just in the suburbs (Olivo 2004; Yersk 2004). In 2003, Wal-Mart pre-emptively pinpointed the location of its main site and its necessary political allies (Yue 2003; Coates 2005). Wal-Mart had a 'place-specific strategy': selecting a site on the West Side of Chicago in an economically depressed area, with high unemployment amongst a largely poor African American community to which it could 'bring economic development' (Olivo 2004). Alderman Mitts, the local representative, was approached by Wal-Mart in early 2003 about a Wal-Mart in the area, and from the outset she was a champion of the development (Coates 2005).

Nationally, the UFCW had been engaged in ad hoc campaigns against Wal-Mart since 2002, when it held its first anti-Wal-Mart rally (AFL-CIO 2002). The UFCW was aware that Wal-Mart's entry into Chicago would directly affect it; in California, Wal-Mart's presence eventually triggered the 2003 aborted retail strike where Wal-Mart's low standards drove down health care standards and wages across the unionised parts of the industry (Lichtenstein 2006a; interview 20: union, 2005). When Wal-Mart announced its Chicago plans in July 2003, the UFCW Local 881 immediately responded in opposition. However, as a more traditional business union, relatively inexperienced with broad coalition campaigns, the UFCW was unprepared. As one official said: 'honestly, we thought we would put up a fight and see where it takes us' (interview 20: union, 2005).

37 The 'suburbs' has a different meaning in the US than in Australia, because the suburbs are defined as the areas outside the 'city limits', that is outside the City of Chicago Council area. In 2006, the 'City' of Chicago had a population of approximately 2.7 million (2.8 million including Cook County). But, when combined with the 'suburbs' the population of the Chicago metropolitan area was 5.3 million. Over the last 30 years, businesses have sought to develop in the suburbs to 'escape' city taxes, contributing to the problem of hollowed out cities (LeRoy 1997).
The UFCW developed a reactive strategy. The goal was to fight Wal-Mart through the City Council, calling on aldermen to vote against a zoning proposal that would allow Wal-Mart to build its store. Similarly, the public message was of opposition: ‘we just wanted to stop them and hold on to our market share in Chicago’, which evolved into messages on placards that said ‘No Wal-Mart in Chicago’, used at all the rallies and events during the Wal-Mart site fight campaign (Franklin 2004; Mihalopoulos 2004; interview 20: union, 2005; Rathke 2006).

The combination of Wal-Mart as an iconic ‘bad employer’ and the initial magnitude of UFCW’s fight did allow the UFCW to cultivate some allies. The union recognised it ‘could not do it on our own ... even if we could have 10 000 members down at the City Council it would not make a difference’ (interview 20: union, 2005). The union called on everyone it could find – sending out broadcast emails inviting organisations to open ‘coalition’ meetings. These hard to manage meetings did produce a long list of organisational supporters for the campaign, but failed to translate into a commitment of hard numbers of protestors at rallies. This prompted the union to target a few partner organisations for more concrete support. One such organisation was ACORN, who had a relationship with the UFCW from the 1995-1998 Living Wage campaign (interview 49: community organisation, 2006). Building off this ad hoc connection, UFCW 881’s President asked ACORN to support their fight against Wal-Mart.

Most ACORN members were initially opposed to campaigning against Wal-Mart, and the leadership had to build a constituency against the company by educating members about Wal-Mart’s anti-social practices. The low-wage
membership of ACORN ‘went to Wal-Mart, people loved Wal-Mart because they had low prices’ (interview 49: community organisation, 2006; interview 36: community organisation, 2006). ACORN staff and leaders began a member education campaign focused on Wal-Mart’s anti-social behaviour. Leaders educated each other about Wal-Mart’s social wrongs such as ‘its discrimination against women’ and ‘the persecution of immigrants when immigrant workers were locked in a store’ (interview 49: community organisation, 2006).

In early 2004, arising out of ACORN’s reports to the Collaborative about Wal-Mart, a Collaborative retreat decided to join the UFCW’s campaign (interview 8: community organisation, 2005). Strategically, Collaborative members believed Wal-Mart provided ‘a real opportunity to solidify our relationships with some unions because they were already engaged’ (interview 8: community organisation, 2005):

UFCW’s alliance with the Collaborative broadened the UFCW’s capacity and legitimacy. For the UFCW, the Collaborative provided ‘a broad base of support, unions are not the most progressive organisations and the Collaborative brought a lot of credibility amongst a wider segment of the population’ (interview 20: union, 2005).

However, member commitment to the campaign needed to be built, requiring internal education campaigns. Aside from ACORN, the strongest education campaigns were amongst the unions, where the anti-union threat of Wal-Mart provided an organisational connection (interview 40: SEIU 880, 2006). These education campaigns attempted to build a constituency of opposition to Wal-Mart through workplace meetings and education sessions. UFCW engaged its
members by getting them to write to local aldermen. Workplace organisers, who normally focused on contract negotiations, briefly became political campaigners. As one organiser noted:

We sent our stewards and our union representatives out to the stores with a pad of notebook paper and asked members to write letters ... Saying I work and live in X ward and I think Wal-Mart will hurt my job. And that was one of the most effective things that we did (interview 20: union, 2005).

SEIU 880 undertook a program of awareness-raising through education at member meetings. Several SEIU 880 members had formerly worked in retail and, as one staff person noted: 'made good spokespeople on the issue' (interview 40: SEIU 880, 2006). At Saturday meetings, education 'focused on what's bad with Wal-Mart', before 'door-knocking around Wal-Mart in the wards' (interview 40: SEIU 880, 2006). However, a gap remained that paralleled the homecare and childcare campaign, and contrasts with the Canadian and Australian coalitions. While members were engaged through education and volunteer work, no decentralised, rank and file decision-making structures were established for members to take control in planning the localised parts of the campaign.

Among the organisations, campaign planning was weak. By the time the Collaborative entered the campaign, the building blocks of the strategy had been assembled by the UFCW. By February 2004, the terrain changed slightly, with a Council hearing uncovering that there were now two Wal-Marts proposed for Chicago, one on the South Side in addition to the West Side proposal. However, as one Collaborative member recalled: the Collaborative 'pretty much bought into the UFCW idea of fighting against the location of two Wal-Marts' (interview

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There was a lack of central coordination; as one union observer observed: 'there was no one leading, there was no coordinated effort whatsoever' (interview 54: union, 2006). Without centralised planning, the campaign was left moving from event to event, aiming to attract media attention (interview 28: community organisation, 2005).

The lack of planning led to two key weaknesses – a weak message and little multi-scaled capacity. Organisers reflected on the limitation of the 'No-Wal-Mart' message as a 'negative, reactive message' that did not explain why Wal-Mart was harmful, which was a problem because Wal-Mart's bargains made them popular (interview 36: community organisation, 2006). The message was particularly weak in the socio-economically depressed areas where the Wal-Marts were proposed. As one organiser argued, 'the message we were using was that Wal-Mart brings bad jobs, but people weren't interested in fighting Wal-Mart because they were from communities without any jobs' (interview 4: community organisation, 2005).

As several community organisers emphasised, compounding this message weakness was that the primary messengers were white union officials (interview 29, community organisation, 2005). Inadvertently this supported Wal-Mart's key message, which, as one community organiser commented, sought to 'portray opposition to their stores as coming from racist trade unions who were trying to protect their jobs at the expense of jobs for the low-income black community' (interview 4: community organisation, 2005). The idea of racist trade unions had traction within Chicago's African American community who had felt excluded from construction jobs by some of the building trades unions (Coates 2005). The No Wal-Mart message and messengers reinforced a public image that the
campaign was ‘white labour versus the black community’ (interview 27: union, 2005).

In May 2004, the City Council’s decision on the two Wal-Mart stores was split, with the West Side Wal-Mart approved and the South Side blocked (Mihalopoulos 2004). Aside from the internal campaign weaknesses, the interviews consistently explained the contrasting outcomes as a result of campaign differences at two political scales. Firstly because of different levels of political support at the scale of the Council; and secondly, because of differences in the Collaborative’s local organisational capacity (interview 4: community organisation; interview 14: union; interview 22: alderman; interview 23: alderman, 2005).

At the Council level, the zoning proposal for the West Side Wal-Mart had stronger aldermanic support than on the South Side. As one alderman confirmed, Council practice is usually for aldermen to ‘unanimously approve zoning proposals by their colleagues’ (interview 23: alderman, 2005). While the Wal-Mart campaign sought to upset this precedent, aldermen had the ability to organise support across the Council based on aldermanic prerogative. As observers noted, Alderman Mitts on the West Side was better organised: ‘she did her homework, she talked to her fellow members on the Council’, attracting support on the basis that her area needed local economic development (interview 20, union, 2005; interview 23: alderman, 2005; Napolitano 2004; Sluris 2004). In contrast, as one alderman put it, Brookins on the South Side ‘didn’t lobby his colleagues ahead of time,’ and he was not upfront about the nature of the Wal-Mart development (interview 23: alderman, 2005). Publicly, aldermen said they voted against the South Side proposal ‘to teach him a harsh lesson ... for lacking
respect for more senior Council members' (Mihalopoulos 2004). Consequently several aldermen on the South Side voted for the West Side but not the South Side (interview 23: alderman, 2005).

Added to this, at a local scale the Collaborative had a significantly different organisational capacity between the West Side and South Side. Collaborative affiliates such as ACORN, SEIU 880 and the BPNC had their membership base on the South Side, not the West Side. This capacity gap made opposition easier to mobilise on the South Side. As one organiser reflected: there was 'a lot more neighbourhood opposition to the South Side store' (interview 4: community organisation, 2005). Similarly, door-knocking and a public hearing organised by Jobs with Justice were all on the South Side (interview 36: community organisation, 2006; interview 12: community organisation, 2005). Outreach to local organisations was also only undertaken on the South Side, with BPNC targeting small businesses (interview 9: community organisation, 2005).

In general, a key weakness in the No Wal-Mart campaign was insufficient locally-scaled campaigning in the wards. Door-knocking, as a tactic, targeted individuals, not local organisations, and did *not* build an organisational constituency of local groups that opposed Wal-Mart. Moreover, the goals of the door-knocking were about awareness-raising, not building sustainable broker organisations. As one organiser explained: 'we didn't organise them, it was mainly doing it for information to get the people aware of that it was coming (interview 14: SEIU 880, 2005). Consequently, as one community organiser reflected: 'not many local neighbourhood organisations were involved' (interview 4: community organisation, 2005). The BPNC did attempt to build a local constituency amongst the small business community, which, as it turned
out, was very influential. According to one Councillor, the business organising
was decisive: 'a lot of aldermen on the South Side said they were being lobbied
by their business owners in their neighbourhoods who felt that the Wal-Mart
would pose a threat to their livelihood' (interview 23: alderman, 2005).

The Collaborative’s organising can be contrasted to the locally-scaled
'strategically grounded work of Wal-Mart' on the West Side (interview 27: union,
2005). As one union organiser observed, through the support of Alderman Mitts,
Wal-Mart 'built a huge coalition of powerful West Side ministers'; Wal-Mart
'went to individual churches and known leaders on the West Side and offered
them money ... they said “Reverend we are here to identify some needs in the
church” and wave a cheque at them' (interview 29: community organisation,
2005). The media also described Wal-Mart’s work as a ‘grassroots campaign’,
where Wal-Mart representatives attended and hosted many community
meetings about its local hiring policy and commitment to jobs and economic
development (Olivo 2004).

Despite the weaknesses of the No Wal-Mart campaign, the political opportunity
of a weak alderman on the South Side, combined with the Collaborative’s
stronger organisational presence on the West Side, tipped the balance in the vote,
preventing the South Side Wal-Mart gaining approval (interview 23: alderman,
2005; Washburn 2004). However, even with this partial victory, evaluation of the
'No Wal-Mart' result was welcome, but reserved. While the UFCW and others
were pleased at the result, it was widely felt that the campaign had been reactive
and that the Collaborative needed a new strategy where it ‘didn’t just fight Wal-
Mart’ (interview 28: community organisation, 2005). This desire for a 'next step'
led to the idea of proposing a Living Wage Ordinance for all big box stores, including Wal-Mart in Chicago (interview 4: community organisation, 2005).

3.2.2 Living Wage for Big-Box Workers, May 2004 to September 2006

The Big Box Living Wage campaign, while a product of the No Wal-Mart campaign, was not against Wal-Mart per se. It aimed to pass an ordinance that required all big box stores in the city limits to pay their workers a living wage.

The idea of the Living Wage Ordinance sought to generalise the highest standard of big box employment in Chicago. The idea came from Talbott from ACORN, and sought to set Costco’s employment standards as city-wide big box standards, including a $10 starting wage and health benefits. The Collaborative members and UFCW quickly endorsed the idea because it provided the Wal-Mart campaign with a next step where they could set the agenda, rather than being attacked for opposing Wal-Mart (interview 49: community organisation, 2006). Moreover, it overcame many of the misgivings amongst the Collaborative about the No Wal-Mart campaign, providing a new direction that built off past experience in living wage campaigning.

A Living Wage Ordinance addressed two key weaknesses in the anti-Wal-Mart campaign; its message and its scale. The Living Wage Ordinance shifted from a message about ‘good jobs and bad jobs’, to creating pressure for ‘all jobs to be living wage jobs’ (interview 4: community organisation, 2005). This was simultaneously more effective at building member and public commitment. As an organising tool, the living wage language was familiar to Collaborative members, particularly ACORN and SEIU 880: ‘our history on living wages, our
members knew what a living wage job was ... there was deep support for a living wage' (interview 18: community organisation, 2005). The public message about living wages also was 'a positive, popular' public social frame, 'about jobs with benefits' creating rights and 'safeguards' (interview 36: community organisation, 2005; interview 23: alderman, 2005). It helped the Collaborative put retailers on the defensive (New York Times Editorial 2006), and its positive enfranchising moral claim made aldermanic opposition difficult (interview 4: community organisation, 2005).

In terms of scale, a city-wide ordinance broadened the campaign from a reactive fight against individual locally-scaled stores to setting standards about all big box stores in Chicago. It provided a way to effectively fight Wal-Mart's incremental strategy of bringing in stores one by one. As one Collaborative organiser described:

It's city-wide, if Wal-Mart wants to bring ten stores into the city, it's going to be a tough to fight to win ten times basically on turf that Wal-Mart and their friendly aldermen pitch ... it would be starting out against us ... so the great thing about the Living Wage Ordinance is ... it's city-wide so it's strategically better for us (interview 4: community organisation, 2005).

The Living Wage Ordinance changed the scale of the key decision makers, from individual aldermen to the council as a whole. As most of the Collaborative's organisations are city-wide, that broader scale provided a more ready space to build influence. Additionally, the scale shift reinforced the public social frame, from being against a company to being for standards in employment (interview 12: community organisation, 2005).
The scale shift changed the timetable for the campaign. While there was 'a sense of energy' coming out of the site fight, those with previous living wage experience were more cautious. Madeline Talbott emphasised lessons about timing, 'we discussed having to wait until election year ... we had done it wrong before' (interview, Talbott: ACORN, 2006).

A long lead time created opportunities for slowly building strong organisational relationships beyond the Collaborative that could leverage political power in the wards. To do this, the Collaborative undertook four structural reforms: firstly, hiring a new coordinator; secondly, developing new ad hoc relationships with community organisations and unions; thirdly, mapping supportive, neutral and hostile aldermen across the City Council and fourthly, creating a new issue-based coalition called the Living Wage Coalition.

In late 2004, the Collaborative hired a new coordinator, which created space for strategic reflection, capacity building and a new campaign strategy. The new coordinator, solely dedicated to coalition work, identified the scale and message weaknesses of the previous campaign. Internally, the Collaborative developed its base by running a series of speaker trainings with (rank and file) leaders from its affiliate organisations 'around our new message' who could present a more diverse public face for the Living Wage campaign' (interview 4: community organisation, 2005).

Then, in early 2005 the Collaborative actively worked to build its support base amongst local neighbourhood organisations and unions. This was the work of the new coordinator, Ken Synder:
When I started I did a lot of work going out to the local neighbourhood organisations ... I identified consistencies in their neighbourhoods and talked to them about the Living Wage Ordinance and found out their level of interest (interview 4: community organisation, 2005).

This mapping exercise was then tested using the tool of a low intensity multi-scaled postcard campaign. For a six-month period, supportive organisations were asked to get their members to get postcards signed. Postcards included address details, and could be used to map signatories by ward (participant observation, 2005). It simultaneously engaged members while developing pressure for lobbying aldermen. As one community organiser described it:

'It was a critical step in transitioning the campaign from the planning stages .... it went from where a pastor was interested to a place where the whole congregation could show their support (interview 35: community organisation, 2006).

Between August 2005 and February 2006 the Collaborative collected 10 000 cards, which helped galvanise the support of allies, particularly amongst organised labour: 'because they understood that if they moved on this there would be broad community support' (interview 35: community organisation, 2006).

The postcard campaign directly fed into a strategic targeting of the Council. The Living Wage campaign moved away from the 'media' focus of the anti-Wal-Mart campaign to 'plotting out the fifty aldermen and who is on board, and a strategy for how to influence those who are not' (interview 4: community organisation, 2005). It was a downward shift of scale, where political leverage would be built through a 'constituency of supporters' in local wards. As one community organiser observed: 'so we can go to an alderman and say 'look you've got 356
postcards from your community that say they want you to support the Living Wage Ordinance” (interview 4: community organisation, 2005).

Finally, the growth in ad hoc organisational support required the Collaborative to broaden its coalition, forming the Living Wage Coalition in mid-2005 (participant observation 2005; interview 35: community organisation, 2005). The new temporary coalition was led by the Collaborative, which was vital, as one union representative commented:

Having a good facilitator is critically important because if you don’t have a centralised person or organisation who can really take charge of the housekeeping, contacting, its never going to happen ... Ken kept us on track and produced output for all of us (interview 46: union, 2006).

However, while there were more organisations, the Coalition participants were all full-time staff, not rank and file leaders, maintaining the Collaborative’s centrally-scaled, staff-led decision-making practices.

The new coalition structure allowed the Collaborative to formalise its wider net of relationships, while underpinning the more temporary Living Wage Coalition with lessons from the Collaborative. New unions, such as the UFCW, SEIU Local 1 and the CFL joined, along with new community partners. Collaborative practices around turn-out became Coalition practices, but some of the Collaborative’s golden rules were revised. Collaborative representatives recognised that a new form of power was essential; organised labour’s political relationships and in-kind support offered the Coalition a different form of power:
How many people you can put into a room is important ... but there was some valuable stuff being added that didn't have anything to do with that ... SEIU letting us use their phone-bank, the CFL's lifelong relationships with some of these alderman ... it isn’t about putting people in a room ... but they were probably responsible for a dozen aldermen that they were keeping on board ... it is power in the form of relationships rather than numbers or money (interview 35: community organisation, 2006).

This relationship power was effective because of the 'context of a campaign ... it can’t be done in isolation', but as an element of Coalition success it was critical (interview 35: community organisation, 2006).

In March, a new Living Wage Ordinance was introduced into the City Council with thirty-three co-sponsors. The campaign then moved public, promoting select constituencies at monthly council meetings, with the aim of demonstrating a diversity of support (interview 30: union, 2006; interview 35: community organisation, 2006). In March, it was the community organisations who turned out and helped move the Coalition away from the 'organised labour versus Wal-Mart' debate that surfaced during the no Wal-Mart campaign. In April, it was the unions, whose public and private support remained critical for maintaining the backing of the labour aldermen. In April, the Collaborative organised for the immigration movement to speak to the Latino aldermen (the March 10 Coalition had organised two rallies with over 300 000 people during this period) (interview 37, UFCW, 2006). Then in June it was religious leaders.

The religious leaders were a key constituency, as previously Wal-Mart had support from key African American Ministers. This time, the Collaborative organised early, assisted by two religious bridge builders, Reverend Robin Hood from ACORN and a representative from Protestants for the Common Good who
built an interfaith alliance organising over forty-five clergy to sign a public letter (*Chicago Sun Times* 24 July 2006). The living wage frame assisted church-based organising. As one community organiser described it: ‘the living wage, Catholic social teaching calls it a just wage ... we knew it would have immediate appeal’ (interview 35: community organisation, 2006). Having religious organisers inside the coalition ‘was critical’ to ‘know who to call’ and to establish ‘credibility’ (interview 44: community organisation, 2006).

Organisational engagement in the campaign was uneven, and related to organisational identity. As one community organiser put it: ‘I don’t think people looked at this campaign from the point of view of self-interest’ (interview 35: community organisation, 2006). ACORN contributed most to turn-out, because ‘ACORN had built its name around living wages ... and have a mobilised constituency that understands it and is willing to fight around it’ (interview 35: community organisation, 2006). ACORN also brought in SEIU 880, which ‘had a history of fighting for living wages for their own members ... they understood it, it’s a value that they share’ (interview 49: community organisation, 2006).

However, for SEIU 880 to successfully turn out members, they needed to connect the living wage concept to the direct concerns of their membership. In March, SEIU 880 field staff ‘tried a general rap [phone call script] about living wages for the city and nobody came, they didn’t care enough’ (interview 47, SEIU 880, 2006). Rank and file leaders were not involved in coalition decision making, and because these leaders were ‘so busy’, staff believed that mobilisation messages needed to be ‘more connected’ (interview 33, interview 47: SEIU 880, 2006). The rap changed. It began with questions about current workplace campaigns, then linked their identity as low-wage workers to the Living Wage Ordinance,
arguing: 'if we can set a standard that big box workers should earn $10 a hour, then it will make it easier to push wages up in our industry' (interview 47: SEIU 880, 2006). For the staff, the results were immediate: 'we went from a handful to thirty, forty, fifty members turning up' (interview 47: SEIU 880, 2006). Mobilisation increased because members' fates were tied to the success of the Ordinance.

Across the Coalition, organisational commitment increased after a series of aggressive City Council hearings in May. Early on, organisers lamented that the Ordinance was not 'taken seriously' by the aldermen, making it hard to organise: 'it doesn't really feel like a campaign if there is no opposition' (interview 35: community organisation, 2006). This changed at a May Council hearing, when retailers attacked the Coalition:

People left feeling pretty screwed, there was a lot of anger ... but it was a change, people bought in, it took an event like that to get them to say, okay this is now when we have to decide whether we are going to dedicate the staff, money and resources necessary to win a campaign (interview 35: community organisation, 2006).

After the hearing, several community organisers described the campaign as taking on 'a movement feel' (interview 35: community organisation, interview 49: community organisation, 2006). Meetings became more regular and resources immediately increased when several unions committed to fund an ACORN-led, Chicago-wide field operation throughout the wards.

Aldermanic targeting involved a dual-scaled strategy, at the scale of the ward and also of the city through the media and labour's aldermanic relationships. Timing also varied, with some organisations building public awareness slowly in
individual wards, while the field operation and phone-banking rapidly moved across twenty-five aldermanic wards.

To target wards, organisations selected one to three aldermen on the simultaneous basis of their own organisational priorities and the living wage targets. Then: ‘we divided up the list and figured out who had relationships with which alderman and let them go after their aldermen’ (interview 35: community organisation, 2006). For example, Metro Seniors targeted three aldermen they had a relationship with, put paid organisers in the field, organised constituency meetings and lobbied (interview 43: community organisation, 2006).

Beyond individual organisations, in one South Side ward a local coalition was established. Moises Zavala from the UFCW used his South Side organising experience to set up the only local broker organisation in the campaign; a ‘team’ of six member-based organisations in one ward. From May until July, this group coordinated ‘door-knocking, a lot of phone-banking, talking to members in church and a press conference’, focused on local issues (interview 37, UFCW, 2006). Part of the local coalition’s power was that the locally-scaled organisations ‘were not going to go away’ (interview 37, UFCW, 2006). Despite the alderman in the ward being ‘very close to Daley’, the local coalition organised sufficient pressure to keep the alderman’s support for all the City Council votes on the living wage (interview 37, UFCW, 2006).

Above the ward strategy, the CFL, UFCW and SEIU State Council operated as ‘the closest thing we had to lobbyists’, meeting with the aldermen. The Coalition had the personal relationships of the CFL President Dennis Gannon, and the ‘expertise’ of the UFCW, who had ‘credibility’ as the retail union (interview 35:
They also had SEIU, who were recognised as a powerful electoral force after the 2002 Governor's race.

Across the wards, the field campaign and phone-banking worked at the same pace as the lobbyists. The field campaign was Talbott's idea. She had learnt that moving constituents in the ward was the key weapon in shifting aldermen:

I went up to [a wavering alderman] before the hearing and I said ... we are going to have a meeting in your ward ... and he looked terrified. He took a position in the hearing ... just the threat of going into his ward moved him over to our side (interview, Talbott: ACORN, 2006).

The field plan was run by ACORN, who hired a team of organisers who would go into twenty-five wards, a mobile unit deployable across swinging wards. It door-knocked voters, then passed mobile phones to supporters to call their alderman and register their opposition. The breadth was significant; ACORN knocked on over 26 000 doors and directly contacted 9837 people in the eight weeks before the vote (interview 49: community organisation, 2006). In parallel, the Collaborative organised volunteers to use the SEIU State Council phone-bank to call constituents in targeted wards to organise voters to contact their aldermen. The speed of the field operation and phone-banking was able to keep pace with the lobbyists. As Talbott observed:

We had the union guys on the phones calling the aldermen and as soon as they heard someone was weak, they would call us and say ... go to [this ward], or we have to send more into [that ward], and we would change the walk sheets and move that day (interview, Talbott: ACORN, 2006).

The ward operations and labour lobbying went from June until 26 July, with the field operation enhancing the pressure exerted by the union relationships. As one
organiser commented, it was the combination of 'dinner conversations' and 'moving numbers in the field' that eventually moved the Ordinance out of committee and into the Council meeting for a vote (interview 49: community organisation, 2006; interview 46: union, 2006).

The media had been dominated by the retailers, but just before the vote the Collaborative developed a media intervention team (Rose 2006). Wal-Mart and the retailers could afford mass advertising, targeting black radio arguing that the Ordinance would take jobs out of Chicago (Washburn 2006; Spielman 2006a; Spielman 2006b). According to one organiser, 'it was impossible to fight', so the Coalition 'just tried to hold our own, trying to make sure that, when they had events that our side was covered' (interview 35: community organisation, 2006). The media team of rank and file leaders saw the Coalition become visible in the media, as the issue grew into a Chicago, then national, media story (Eckholm 2006).

Yet as the stakes rose, tensions between relationship-based organising and more aggressive militant organising surfaced between the CFL and the SEIU. Two weeks before the Council vote and separate from the Coalition, SEIU State Council advertised three aldermanic trainings for candidates interested in standing in the 2007 elections. It sent shock waves through the council; from an SEIU perspective 'it set fire on the aldermen ... it shook them up' (interview 53: union, 2006). However, it upset the CFL, who had stretched the political capital of its aldermanic relationships (interview 52, union, 2006). The SEIU's tactics 'were a different way of doing politics' that 'looked like a threat', which, from the CFL's perspective put at risk the relationships the CFL had built for the Coalition.
The tension reflected the potential conflict between aggressive militant organising and relationship-based power.

Just before the vote, Mayor Daley came out against the Ordinance, but this had a limited effect. The Daley Machine had been in trouble over the past year some of its participants exposed as corrupt (Mihalopoulos 2006a). According to one organiser, where disobedience to the Mayor used to result in losing your seat, the ward-based campaign ‘made it hard to vote against the living wage, it would be political suicide’ (interview 35: community organisation, 2006).

With local and centralised pressure and the opportunities of a weak Daley Machine and an upcoming election, on 26 July the Living Wage Ordinance was supported by thirty-five Councillors (Eckholm 2006). The night before and the day of the vote exhibited a pinnacle of social movement activity, with a prayer vigil sleep-over in the downtown First United Methodist Church, a dawn prayer service and continuous rallies all day (interview 36: community organisation, interview 43: community organisation, 2006).

But the campaign was not over. After the vote, the Mayor could exercise a veto, which would require at least one third of the aldermen to vote in support. Immediately retailers swung into a counter-mobilisation, demanding a veto, and in August and September the retailers led a mass media campaign, threatening a retail withdrawal from Chicago (Chicago Sun Times 1 August 2006; Mihalopoulos and Washburn 2006; Spielman 2006c; Spielman 2006d). This placed considerable pressure on aldermen who had Development Applications for retail stores underway (Davey and Barbaro 2006), even though it did not significantly sway popular opinion which remained supportive of the Ordinance (Fornek 2006).
Mayor Daley also argued that the big box campaign was against the interests of African Americans, reclaiming the 'race-card' first used in the 'No-Wal-Mart campaign (Ciokajilo 2006; Hussain 2006).

In response the Coalition 'kept doing what it was already doing', but as organisers noted, there were signs of strain – it was becoming 'difficult to sustain' the campaign (interview 49: community organisation, 2006). The reliance on a multi-ward field operation, rather than permanent locally-scaled coalition broker organisations, made it difficult to keep up the pressure over a long period of time. Supervisors of the field campaign saw limitations, particularly that the organisations were being drained of resources (interview 49: community organisation, 2006).

On 11 September 2006 Daley announced he would veto the Ordinance, and on 13 September there was a Council vote that protected his veto, with three councillors shifting their votes (Davey and Barbaro 2006). It was a loss, but it occurred in the context of a victorious campaign, as one community organiser said, 'we won the vote', and it was the first time that Daley had been forced to a veto in seventeen years (interview 36: community organisation, 2006). Subsequently, the Coalition successfully pushed for a minimum wage raise in November 2006 (Sander 2006; Spielman 2006e). Politics changed in Chicago in February 2007, when the elections were used by the unions and the Collaborative to successfully challenge a series of hostile councillors (Mihalopoulos and Pearson 2007). The Ordinance vote may have been vetoed, but the political climate was altered by the political momentum built by the Living Wage campaign.
Internally the campaign was an unprecedented success. As one community organiser put it: ‘this is it in Chicago in terms of community-labour coalitions – this is the one, this is the one that’s got the broadest labour participation and the broadest community participation, and highest profile issue’ (interview 35: community organisation, 2006).

4.0 Conclusion
The five years of living wage campaigns between SEIU 880 and the Collaborative generated some remarkable political successes at the same time as developing a singularly-scaled, value-based coalition structure with long-term sustainability. These organising and policy living wage campaigns operated simultaneously, underscoring the importance of balancing internal union priorities for growth with alliance work in the hostile political context of the United States.

SEIU 880’s organising campaigns around homecare and childcare workers exhibited similar themes. In terms of coalition success, the combination of a hostile context and strong inter-organisational structure pressured the union to combine politics and coalition practice to achieve significant new organising victories, while less successfully sustaining widespread member development. The driving force behind the union’s strategy, and most of its alliance work, was union staff. While this led to remarkable organising victories, it also led to a moderate decline in member participation across the union. Between 2000 and 2006, during the period of rapid union growth, monthly member meetings remained consistent at around seventy-five to 100 participants, and member turnout declined from 10% to 7%, even while remaining an impressive figure overall (interview 56: SEIU 880, 2006, participant observation 2005). Unlike the
Australian or Canadian case studies, this alliance-based strategy was not supported by expanding rank and file steward structures, or locally run sub-city steward networks that created space for member decision making and development during Coalition campaigns.

In terms of coalition success, the case study revealed a contradiction between outcomes and capacity building. While SEIU 880’s centralised political organising effectively delivered significant increases in union membership and political power, as one SEIU interview noted in commenting on the Governor’s electoral campaign, this process potentially ‘slashes and burns’ active rank and file volunteers (interview 24: SEIU, 2005). Moreover, the strategy limits member ownership and participation about how the campaign is run because coordination is singularly-scaled. This mitigated the opportunity of turning rank and file leaders into coalition strategists. For instance, in the Governor’s election and childcare campaigns, rank and file leaders tended to describe their development personally rather than collectively, producing ‘confidence’ rather than the capacity to organise autonomously with other leaders.

The Collaborative’s living wage policy campaigns evolved out of close inter-organisational relationships. These relationships were distinctly structured beyond specific issues, harnessing informal relationships and an employed coordinator to create an interdependent sustainable structure. The Collaborative joined the UFCW’s site fight campaign as part of its strategy to expand its relationships with unions. As participants openly acknowledged, the campaign had weaknesses. It had significant limitations in its coalition planning and messages. It was also weakened by a lack of decentralised capacity in the wards, which made political influence difficult to build.
However, many of these weaknesses were overcome in the Living Wage Ordinance campaign, where the strong inter-organisational relationships of the Collaborative became central to the newly formed Living Wage Coalition. The living wage message supported public and member commitment, particularly when explicitly linked to the interests of low-wage workers. While organisational commitment was based on values more than interest, the hostility of opposition and the connection of the issue to low-wage workers were sufficient to expand organisational commitment in the lead-up to the vote.

Yet while the Collaborative and the Living Wage Coalition effectively acted at local and city-scales, organisationally, the coalitions were single, not multi-scaled. Member participation in the coalitions was based on mobilisation rather than decision making. Rank and file participation was separate from the strategising that happened amongst staff. Key organisers acknowledged the ‘irony’ of the Collaborative’s structure was that it was run by staff, not rank and file leaders (interview 18, community organisation, 2005). This gap between rank and file mobilisation and decision-making structures often created a ‘disconnect’ between rank and file media spokespeople and the strategy. According to one organisers this could have been overcome: ‘if the members had been more full participants they could have been more ready to handle the media’ (interview 49, union, 2006). The decentralised strategies of the coalitions tended to be based on mobilisation, where door-knocking or phone-banking pushed people to take action rather than join locally-scaled organisations. Those activities also often relied on staff and individual organisations, which made sustainability difficult and could have led to organisational competition. Moreover, the relative success of the South Side coalition ‘team’ demonstrated that local coalitions might have
produced a more sustainable multi-scaled coalition structure. This broker organisation was able to sustain local pressure against an alderman that other Living Wage Coalition partners thought would falter and support Daley. Without coalition-wide broker organisations, an organising strategy that sought to recruit new members would have been difficult— as one community organiser noted, ‘some people were mad that ACORN were raising money off this’; group competitiveness would have made a local recruitment strategy that benefited only one organisation untenable (interview 49: community organisation, 2006).

While the Chicago coalition achieved success, like all the coalitions studied the types of success it achieved was uneven. It was primarily driven by external outcomes, such as collective bargaining victories, policy changes or political climate change over internal member development and decision making. The structure of the coalition also delivered sustainable relationships. In a sense, the structure and strategy of the coalition were well suited to, and dialectically informed by, the hostile political climate. The coalition delivered its participating organisations much-needed political outcomes while securing a permanent structure for powerful inter-organisational relationships. By harnessing aggressive political and electoral activity, the coalitions institutionalised gains like collective bargaining rights or living wage policies in the context of reshaping the political climate. However, those successes did have the weakness of providing limited member development. This, in part, limited the degree to which long-term membership capacity developed in these organisations over time. Additionally, the absence of local coalition organisation left the Collaborative open to being labelled as outsiders on the hostile West Side during the Wal-Mart campaign, and made it difficult to sustain multi-scaled political influence across the wards.
Overall, while the coalition elements varied across the campaigns, the consistent features of strong centralised inter-organisational relationships and a strong living wage common concern can be described as an example of mobilising coalition unionism. The Collaborative was a hub for interdependent inter-organisational relationships, where a coordinator, strong informal relationships and regular meetings balanced coalition coordination with the autonomous needs of organisational participants. This open space for strategic negotiation led to innovations in common concern, in particular with the adaptation of the Living Wage Ordinance. Yet, without a multi-scaled structure, the inter-organisational relationships remained staff-led, with member volunteers mobilised in support of these centrally-scaled strategies. Local coalition broker organisations were not formed as in Australia and Canada.

In terms of union collaborative power, the Collaborative, more than the other case studies, provided the most powerful example of relational collaborative power. Its strong relationships balanced coalition unity and organisational autonomy by requiring all coalition participants to have the capacity to turn out members. The Collaborative also disconnected coalition participation from specific shared issues or interests, basing participation on values, thus facilitating longer-term relationships. Additionally the public social frame of living wages enhanced the unions' political agendas, regulating standards for public and private sector workers by emphasising the unions' 'sword of justice' (Flanders 1970; Gertner 2006). Internally, the living wage message crossed class, religious and racial boundaries, supporting a broadening of member class consciousness. However, the case study revealed the difficulties of building place-based power in small workplaces without establishing locally-based decision making and
horizontal communication structures (for instance permanent, rather than temporary neighbourhood-based broker organisations). The value of locally-based steward structures is acknowledged and debated inside SEIU Local 880, with the union having experimented before with local union offices on the South Side of Chicago and regional delegate networks in its 2006 homecare organising drives in Indiana (interview 13: SEIU 880, 2006).

Finally, this case study demonstrated that public and private sector unions can be drawn to coalition strategies. While SEIU 880, like the NSWTF and CUPE, also had a progressive union identity and public sector status that supported alliance work, the UFCW, with its very limited coalition experience, was drawn into coalition work through a crisis, and the opportunity of building on a previous ad hoc relationship with ACORN. The study highlighted that while coalition practice may be most widespread in the public sector, it is not exclusively a strategy for public sector unions.

The mobilising coalition unionism in this study has similarities to coalitions described in secondary literature, exhibiting similar features to the activities of union-to-union coalitions that exist in central labour councils (Ness and Eimer 2001; Ellem and Shields 2004; Reynolds and Ness 2004). The purpose of inter-organisational relationships in a peak council is based on a broad strategic commitment to unionism, not a specific issue, and its internal decision-making processes allow it to renegotiate priorities while sustaining relationships. Peak councils, like the Collaborative, tends to have strong centres yet a more limited capacity to develop the rank and file, as their only contact with the rank and file is through individual union affiliates rather than through localised cross-union coalition structures. While some successful labour councils in the United States
have, through trust, built databases of union members, this is rare, and when it occurs it tend to be for the centralised mobilisation of union members. The singular, staff-based form of peak councils, like the Collaborative, is characterised by a lack of multi-scalar structural and strategic capacity.

The Collaborative and SEIU 880's coalition strategies responded to the harsh political climate of the United States with a singularly-scaled set of strong inter-organisational relationships orientated towards achieving political outcomes and political climate change. The successes of their coalition work were not only the remarkable collective bargaining victories and the push for regulating private sector work conditions through a Living Wage Ordinance, but also the development of a coalition structure that could be sustained beyond specific issues. Yet, without also building locally-scaled broker organisations or union steward structures that provided a space for decentralised member decision making, these successes had a more limited impact on the development of union and community organisation members' capacity to campaign.

The next chapter considers the three case studies together, and tries to draw out the key dynamics of coalition unionism, union collaborative power and likely coalition unionism.
Chapter Eight
Comparing Coalition Unionism

Through three internationally comparative case studies this thesis has tested three frameworks that explore how coalitions contribute to union renewal. This chapter brings together the empirical findings under the conceptual themes developed in Chapters Two and Three. The aim is to test the usefulness of the frameworks, and to explore how the case studies expand, confirm or challenge these findings.

The chapter is structured into two broad sections, firstly dealing with the theory on successful coalitions discussed in Chapter Two, and then dealing with the union-centred theory developed in Chapter Three.

1.0 Successful Coalitions
Chapter Two identified three elements of coalitions. It argued that inter-organisational relationships, common concern and scale had internal measures that shaped coalition variation and success. Using those elements, the chapter identified three models of coalitions, suggesting that different combinations of these elements described three ideal types of coalition unionism – agenda-driven coalition unionism, relationship-driven coalition unionism and mobilising coalition unionism. The three case studies tested these frameworks.

The first major argument of this thesis was that coalitions as a union strategy vary over time – a dynamic product of shifting elements and measures. The study argued that three elements are present in all coalitions and their respective
measures help explain when coalitions are successful. Coalition success was defined as winning outcomes, changing the political climate, sustaining relationships and building the capacity of participating organisations.

1.1 *Inter-organisational relationships*

Chapter Two suggested that a coalition’s inter-organisational relationships are defined by four measures:

- Organisational capacity and commitment
- Structure of the coalition
- Forms of decision making
- Organisational culture and bridge builders.

**Organisational Capacity and Commitment**

The capacity of the participating unions and community organisations shaped the available resources of the coalitions, affecting how they could win outcomes and change the political climate.

Features of organisational capacity included the size of an organisation’s membership, its ability to mobilise that membership, organisational leadership and relationships with government or employers. For instance, changes in leadership affected the P&C’s engagement with the PEC. The leadership skills of ACORN were a driving force behind the living wage strategy and its field campaign. For the CFL, it was capacity in the form of powerful aldermanic relationships that increased the political leverage of the Living Wage Coalition at the City Council.
In the different countries, the capacity of community organisations varied significantly. In the US, community organisations drove the coalition’s strategy and they were capable of significant turn out commitments, whereas in Australia, unions were primarily responsible for turn-out and the community organisations’ role was as media spokespeople and activating their relationships with government and the Department of Education. In Canada, despite the seniors who undertook regular turn out, the participating community organisations had a limited turn-out capacity.

Differences in organisational capacity across the countries shaped the relative dominance of unions or community groups in the coalitions. However, the coalitions simultaneously adapted their internal organising strategies to build mobilising power from alternative forces, where a mobilising capacity did not previously exist. The broker organisations in Australia and Canada, which relied on union activists or community activists respectively, responded to a lack of centralised community organising power.

Community organisation commitment was affected by interest links to the respective coalitions, but also shaped by the identity and values of the participating organisations. Service users were common across the coalitions. Parents were a key public education ally, and seniors were important health care and homecare allies. However, organisations with broader identity connections also joined the coalitions. The Council of Canadians joined the OHC because of their value-based opposition to privatisation. Similarly, ACORN’s connection to the Collaborative’s Living Wage campaign was based on its identity as a low-income organisation. Thus while interest was a key motivator for community
organisation commitment, an organisation's values and identity were also important motivators for participation.

Union commitment contributed to coalition capacity in each of the case studies. Unions drove the Australian coalition, and financially supported the Canadian coalition. Union participation qualitatively shaped and created the resource base for their powerful coalition practice. In the US, union participation was not necessary in order for the coalition to operate, but it was important because of the political influence it provided. It was the participation of SEIU 880 that helped attract close relationships with other unions, such as SEIU 73, the CFL and the SEIU State Council. It was the unions' political relationships and electoral capacity that were necessary to win the living wage vote. Union participation was a conscious strategy amongst the Collaborative; unions were recognised as having proportionally larger financial resources than community organisations, and some, such as SEIU 880, had the capacity to mobilise a large membership base.

Additionally, across the case studies, the number of unions in the coalition shaped but did not determine the success of the coalition. As Nissen pointed out, union commitment was critically important for coalition power, as in each case the unions were the key financial supporters (Nissen 2000). Yet the number of unions engaged in the coalition did not directly shape coalition success. The Australian coalition was arguably more successful at achieving outcomes with only one union, compared to the Canadian coalition with seven unions. Rather, it was the willingness to share financial resources and commit to the coalition as a strategic priority that shaped coalition success. Thus, in the P3 campaign in Canada and in the Vinson Inquiry in Australia, union commitment directly
correlated with political outcomes and internal capacity-building because of a mutual self-interest between the coalition and the union.

1.1.1 Structure of the Coalition

Coalition structure includes analysing how a coalition is formed, its membership, external relationships and the presence of a separate coalition office. A coalition's structure may help it to win outcomes, particularly when a coalition's external relationships can help it harness the resources of powerful allies. Staff and offices may help a coalition successfully sustain relationships between unions and community organisations. As Chapter Two identified, narrow membership and a separate coalition office can enhance the capacity of a coalition to build coalition unity and balance autonomous organisational interest. When a coalition builds external relationships with other organisations, it can overcome the limitations of organisational narrowness by ensuring that the coalition also identifies and targets powerful allies.

Chapter Two questioned the importance of whether a coalition is formed by a union or community organisation. This was a key variable across the case studies, with the union-initiated Sydney coalition, the community-initiated Chicago coalition and the union-initiated but strongly independent Toronto coalition. In both Sydney and Toronto, union dominance in union-initiated coalitions occurred, as would be predicted from by literature. However, in Chicago there was a strong mutuality amongst the union and community partners despite it being community-initiated. Categorising coalitions only by reference to how they were formed is too simplistic a portrayal of the complex dynamics of organisational participation in the coalitions, as it suggests that the coalitions are strictly informed by certain parties when in fact the practices of
these coalitions over time reveal significant variation. As suggested in Chapter Two, mutuality of interest and the role of self-interest more accurately explain CUPE’s ‘dominance’ of the P3 campaign than the suggestion that because the OFL formed the coalition it must ipso facto have inherently more influence. Indeed, organisational dominance was mitigated by whether the coalition was able to balance the competing need for coalition unity with the simultaneous pressures for organisational autonomy.

Coalition unity and organisational autonomy were balanced by the coalitions restricting organisational membership. In Sydney and Toronto, coalition membership was limited to organisations with a direct interest in either public education or health care. In Chicago, the Collaborative invitation to participants to join was not based on interest but their turn-out capacity and their willingness to contribute to collective financial resources. Selecting organisational partners helped the coalition collectively negotiate campaign priorities and commitments, assisting it to negotiate a unity of purpose across diverse organisations.

For the Toronto and Chicago coalitions, building external relationships beyond the coalition supported coalition success. The OHC’s influence over the Romanow Royal Commission was enhanced after the CAW organised the auto companies to support the Medicare campaign. Similarly, local broker organisations regularly reached out to locally-based consumer organisations and unions, enhancing the level of popular and organisational support. The broadest external relationships were built by the Grassroots Collaborative, which established a temporary living wage coalition to solidify its relationships with unions and targeted community organisations, bringing in powerful labour
unions and religious organisations. In contrast, the Sydney coalition did not focus on relationships with unions or community organisations beyond the PEC.

The Sydney and Chicago coalitions both achieved outcomes while operating with different types of external relationships. The structural differences were driven partly by their different political contexts. In Sydney, a favourable political context created by relatively strong relationships with the DET and the ALP Government, combined with the opportunity of an election, created space for coalition policy influence that did not require the PEC to reach out to external allies in order to achieve policy outcomes. In contrast, the Chicago coalition needed to build external relationships in order to build majority support for the living wage. But beyond outcomes, the Chicago coalition’s cultivation of external relationships also enabled its organisational partners to build a broader network of sustainable relationships among community organisations and unions for the long term, supporting their organisational capacity as well as their external success.

Across the studies, the coalitions that hired staff and established coalition offices were more able to balance the competing demands of coalition unity and organisational autonomy, and thus more successfully sustained organisational relationships. Separate coalition structures helped the Toronto and Chicago coalitions by creating a disinterested facilitator to manage the coalition relationships. Coalition staff reproduced the coalitions, calling meetings and managing business, allowing participating organisations to simultaneously focus on their own needs and coalition activities. Between these two coalitions, the balance of unity and autonomy was different. In Chicago there was greater reliance on organisations because the coalition did not have a separate mobilising
power of its own. Coalition unity was therefore strongly dependent on organisational autonomy at all times. In Toronto, there was a greater reliance on organisational autonomy, because the coalition had independent resources with its broker organisations. While campaigns were developed in consultation, the OHC had sufficient resources to run a campaign without all the organisations committing to it. The effect of structural dependence or independence affected the degree of organisational commitment, with the Toronto campaign often struggling harder to maintain organisational interest than the Chicago coalition, which was dependent on it.

An independent coalition structure was absent in the Public Education Coalition, and this contributed to a high degree of informal control by the NSWTF. This changed over time, as the Vinson Inquiry briefly operated with a separate research unit. However, the lack of a separate structure meant that the NSWTF's disproportionate control of resources allowed it to direct most of the campaign. Without a separate body that could help moderate conflict and manage different interests, the relationships were more unstable and transient, falling away during the salaries campaign.

1.1.2 Types of Decision Making
Each of the coalitions operated with a consensus-based form of decision making managed through formal meetings. Yet, their decision-making processes differed to the degree they shared planning, built formal and informal relationships and balanced organisational interests and coalition consensus in the decision-making processes.
Regular meetings combining informal and informal relationships helped build organisational trust. The Chicago coalition relied on an intense horizontal relationships among the coalition members, where organisations allocated significant time to regular breakfast meetings and retreats. Similarly, the practice of regular monthly coalition meetings sustained organisational participation in the OHC and built strong personal relationships between individual participants. This was different to the public education coalition, where the meetings were often ad hoc and tended to be initiated by the NSWTF.

Consensus decision making was shaped by informal union power in both Sydney and Toronto, where union resources impacted upon campaign decisions. The availability of CUPE and NSWTF resources shaped coalition strategy. In contrast, in Chicago the presence of unions actively committed to ‘two-way’ coalitions helped share control over decision making between the organisations. The Chicago coalition created minimum standards that defined what organisations brought to the coalition table. The coalition’s practice was to acknowledge and account for different levels of commitment rather than to rely on informal dominance by resource-rich organisations. That said, in Chicago, ‘certain voices carried more weight’ whether because of experience, skills or commitment to the particular campaign. However, the Chicago experience was significantly different from Toronto’s, where the enhanced commitment of CUPE caused some organisational backlash. The more focused ‘consensus-based’ form of decision making in the OHC made it difficult to accommodate enhanced organisational commitment by one organisation, leading to tension between the parties.
The lesson is that for consensus decision making to succeed, the challenge is not to pretend that everyone is equal, but to balance the competing needs of unity and organisational commitment in the decision-making process. For instance, in the Living Wage campaign it was the discrete organisational skills of ACORN in the field, labour ‘doing politics’ and the Collaborative collectively mobilising and ‘doing media’ that enabled the coalition to be successful. It was an interdependence born of specialisation and mutual respect for difference.

1.1.3 Organisational Culture

Common organisational culture and the presence of bridge builders helped sustain organisational relationships and led to innovative coalition strategies, particularly in Toronto and Chicago. In Chicago, almost all the organisational staff representatives in the Collaborative were former SEIU 880 or ACORN organisers. Coalition planning and strategising was enhanced by a common language of organising that came from their common organisational experiences. Common experience made it easy to share and debate strategies – for instance, it was a community organiser sympathetic to the plight of unions who adapted the strategy of a Living Wage Ordinance to regulate the conditions of retail workers. In Toronto, unionists with community organising experience built bridges that encouraged the unions to use new campaign tactics, firstly the Medicare canvas and later the plebiscite. Mehra, a community organiser with experience in working with unions, expanded the OHC’s broker organisations and built connections between those organisations and union locals. Even in Sydney, local connections between teachers and principals in south-west Sydney created the relationships that led to the union’s Public Education Coalition strategy.
Individual relationships and past campaign experience created a space for building organisational trust. In Sydney, a strong history of relationships supported coalition building. The Three Federations bred strong parent-teacher relations, and principals were members of the NSWTF. In Toronto, the long history of the OHC allowed organisational participants to build trust over time. In Chicago, the experience of the 1995-1998 Living Wage campaign created a common experience for building the Grassroots Collaborative.

Moreover, a commitment to balancing cultural differences was important for coalitions that had a diverse membership. Diverse coalitions had the potential to share different kinds of power. Chicago’s Living Wage Coalition was the most diverse coalition. It bridged across labour, religious and community organisations. This alignment of different organisations was necessary for political power, combining the political relationships of the CFL, the work of religious bridge builders, the field capacity of ACORN and coordinated mobilisations of the Coalition. This diverse group of organisations successfully enabled the Coalition to pass the Ordinance. It also shifted the political climate in the city by demonstrating that the Coalition had the capacity to impact voters in the wards and make living wages in Chicago a national issue.

Beyond their common histories, it was the combination of organisations with different interests that also allowed the coalitions to be a site for learning and organisational change. Repeatedly, in Chicago, participation in the Collaborative gave organisations the opportunity to campaign outside their direct interests; for example, Metro Seniors and SEIU 73’s participation in the Living Wage campaign. These opportunities became sites for organisational learning, as organisations expanded the range of issues they campaigned on and engaged in
member education. Similarly, there was significant organisational learning in Toronto. Learning occurred firstly around issues; for instance when seniors and unions debated home and long-term care policies. Secondly, learning occurred around campaign tactics as the Coalition challenged unions to move to support canvassing and plebiscites. A feedback loop of organisational learning occurred when CUPE taught the Coalition about the power of provincial tours as a source of media attention and mobilisation. Yet in Australia, organisational difference did not sufficiently translate into organisational learning. Instead, when conflict arose, the inter-organisational relationships did not have sufficient levels of trust to sustain learning, nor did they 'agree to disagree', but rather they pulled apart. This occurred because the issue of salaries was perceived to only be in the interests of the NSWTF, and the NSWTF did not seek to engage the P&C in the salaries campaign, preferring to run it as an industrial campaign.

1.1.4 Conclusion

A coalition’s inter-organisational relationships create a basis for rich dialectical exchange. When these relationships harness the interdependence of both coalition unity and organisational autonomy they can support coalition outcomes and assist organisations to sustain their relationships. The success of the inter-organisational relationships varied between the coalitions. Chicago’s relationships were the most sustainable. This was partly produced by Chicago’s context, with its strong community organisations, and partly a product of active reflection on previous coalition experience.

Across the coalitions, key measures of inter-organisational relationships delivered coalition success. Measures of success included a narrow organisational membership, the presence of coalition staff, a familiarity with
organisational culture, and decision-making processes that respected organisational diversity while sharing participation across all the parties. Conversely, when inter-organisational relationships were weak, as in Sydney, there was a tendency towards union dominance of the coalition. The relationships became more difficult to sustain as there was not an independent arbiter able to broker organisational difference. Consequently, in Sydney, compared to Chicago and Toronto, the degree of shared planning across the coalition changed significantly, varying between a highly collective independent inquiry and a highly autonomous salaries campaign. In contrast, the coalition staff in Chicago and Toronto balanced coalition unity, where organisations pursued sectional concerns separate from the coalition.

1.2 Common concern
Chapter Two established that common concern can define coalitions and operate as a multi-levelled variable that affects coalition success. Coalitions are most commonly defined by the issues they campaign on, like the public education or health coalitions. However, as the Grassroots Collaborative demonstrated, coalitions can also be defined by common values.

Chapter Two established that common concern operates in three discrete ways within a coalition. Firstly, it measures organisational commitment; secondly, it shapes member commitment; thirdly, it shapes the general public's commitment to the coalition. The success of a coalition can be measured according to whether a coalition's common concern successfully engages these three different measures.
1.2.1 Organisational Commitment

The first measure of common concern addresses the participant organisations and their organisational interest in a coalition's common concern. Organisations are more likely to commit resources to a coalition if a coalition's strategy and purpose directly overlaps with the organisation's own strategic interests. The concept of mutual self-interest is a measure of organisational interest in a coalition: the greater the overlapping interest between organisations within a coalition, the more powerful the coalition's common concern and likely success. Additionally, organisational commitment is likely to be enhanced if a coalition's purpose also connects to an organisation's values. Overlapping concern between interests and values strengthens organisational commitment.

The link between organisational interest and issues was strongly identified in the case studies. The presence or absence of organisational interest affected the sustainability of the coalitions and the depth of organisational engagement. The Public Education Coalition had the strongest form of organisational interest when it campaigned on the six United Demands during the 2003 State Election. All the organisations had a direct interest in the outcome of the campaign because the issues, like class sizes, were constructed as sufficiently open to facilitate mutual engagement. Indeed, the class sizes issue integrated interest and value concerns, particularly for the NSWTF, as it simultaneously offered union members measurable improvements to workplace conditions as well as improving the professional standards of the education system. In contrast, organisational interest was highly variable within the OHC. Save Medicare was an abstract, broadly-framed demand. Consequently the Medicare campaign was not prioritised ahead of immediate needs such as contract bargaining. The importance of organisational interest was also evident in the NSWTF's salaries
campaign. When issues are not shared by the participant organisations, coalitions can fall away.

Organisational interest relies on the support for organisational leadership. When the leadership of the P&C changed during the PEC, so did its organisational engagement in the coalition. Conversely, Hurley’s direct engagement in the P3 campaign intensified CUPE’s commitment. Additionally, organisational commitment in the Living Wage campaign was enhanced by the close relationships between staff that had already been built by the Grassroots Collaborative.

Indeed, organisational commitment to the Grassroots Collaborative was sustained through relational ties and a common set of values more than by the presence of organisational interest. Aside from the UFCW, most of the participants had a distant organisational interest in the campaign. For ACORN and SEIU 880, there was a strong value commitment, arising out of their history of living wage campaigning. For other Collaborative participants, what was absent in self-interest-based commitment was slowly built through strong relational ties between the leaders of the organisations. Commitment to the campaign slowly built within organisations like Metro Seniors, SEIU 73 and SEIU Local 1 out of a conjunction of the possibility of victory and political opportunity that underpinned the Living Wage campaign after May 2006. This broad base of organisational participation enhanced the resources of the Living Wage Coalition, enhancing its ability to win the Ordinance.

Reflecting on the case studies, we can reconceptualise the often deadlocked theoretical debates between ‘interest’ and ‘identity/values’ reviewed in Chapter
Two. In contrast to there being an inherent conflict between unions and community organisations, the case studies suggest that values and interests are fluid and responsible for generating organisational engagement by both unions and community organisations. The experience of Canada and Australia confirms the importance of organisational mutual interest as an element of union engagement in coalitions, while the Living Wage campaign demonstrates that a reductive, instrumentalist understanding of interest alone cannot sufficiently explain the engagement of SEIU 880 or even more traditional unions such as SEIU 73, the CFL and SEIU 1. Organisational identity and values led to ACORN and SEIU 880’s engagement in the Living Wage campaign.

The overlap between values and interests reinforced a change in the political climate in Sydney and Chicago. The independent inquiry into public education and the class sizes campaign, which connected to parent and teacher interests and value for quality education, led to the broadest set of public education reforms in a generation. Similarly, it was the interconnection of the UFCW’s direct interests in the Living Wage Ordinance, the union’s desires to change how it did politics in Chicago and the Collaborative’s value-based commitment to living wages that led to a national debate over living wages in Chicago.

The simultaneous importance of interest and values reinforces the point that organisational commitment is negotiated in the process of sustaining relationships. Organisational interest is a compromise between coalition unity and organisational autonomy. There was no evidence that sustained coalitions represented a fusion of organisational interests as Clawson suggests (Clawson 2003). Rather, organisations were motivated to participate in the coalitions depending on their discrete organisational interests. It was parents’ concerns for
quality education for their children and teachers' concerns for improved classroom conditions that generated their mutual engagement in the class-sizes campaign. Similarly, it was the BHC's concern for hospital services in the local town and CUPE's concern that public-private-partnerships could harm the conditions of union members that led to their participation in the P3 campaign.

The negotiation of organisational commitment also led to conflict, which sometimes threatened the sustainability of the relationships. Conflict occurred over issues and strategies. Where the inter-organisational relationships were strong, and supported by coalition staff, conflict over issues led the coalition to 'agree to disagree', shifting the coalition to different issues (Rose 2000). Thus, in the OHC, when unions and seniors could not agree on a policy for homecare, they shifted to develop a policy over long-term care. Sometimes issues of conflict were ignored, for instance when the CFL and SEIU disagreed over strategies for influencing the aldermen in the Living Wage Campaign. The depth of relationships already built enabled the Coalition to continue despite the conflict; however it did cause some resentment between the parties. Similarly, the PEC did not include salaries in its United Demands because it could not build consensus with the parent groups, a decision that later caused problems for the PEC. Where inter-organisational relationships were weak, conflict over issues caused the coalition to fall away, as in the salaries campaign in the PEC (Craft 1990).

1.2.2 Member Commitment
The second measure of common concern relates the commitment of organisational members to coalition practice. For a coalition to have an effective common concern, the issues at the heart of the coalition also need to support
coalition movement building (Snow, Rocheford, Worden et al. 1986; Tarrow 1994). Social movement theory suggests that member commitment is enhanced when an issue is proximate to member experience (Gamson 1992), and develops when members believe collective action will achieve meaningful change on that issue (Fantasia 1988) and when interests are connected to a broader set of values (Carroll 1992). The focus is on how common concern is capable of building a movement to influence coalition outcomes and the political climate, while the process of member engagement may also increase member political consciousness.

Member commitment across the case studies suggests that interest and identity interact to produce strong member commitment. In the NSWTF for instance, engagement in the PEC grew out of self-interest. Widespread participation in the Vinson Inquiry stemmed in part from the problem in the 1999 salaries campaign. The NSWTF salaries rallies in 2003 and 2004 were attended by over 15,000 teachers. The Vinson Inquiry, however, did not only tap into the interests of union members. The Inquiry asked members their views on the education system and invited them to make constructive suggestions for improving the system; the Inquiry made teacher and parent experience its central concern, and appealed to teachers’ professional identity as well as their interests. By privileging teacher and parent experience, the Inquiry created a medium for engaging a new layer of members, and as the NSWTF President described it ‘engaging the middle teacher who normally doesn’t get involved in the union’ (interview, O’Halloran: NSWTF, 2004).

The Chicago campaign operated in reverse. An identity-based commitment to living wages first drew the SEIU 880 and ACORN into the big box campaign.
However, in order to successfully build member commitment and turn out, the SEIU had to connect the union's identity around living wages to members' interests as low-wage workers in order to produce a successful mobilisation strategy.

What is revealed is that member commitment is not a static concept that can be read off a particular issue. Rather, education and low level campaign engagement can create a constituency of people who can be engaged when campaign opportunities arise. While tapping into interest concerns is an important mechanism for generating member commitment, as the PEC shows, it is not the only mechanism for creating issue support amongst a membership.

Indeed, it is possible to build a constituency of support for issues through member education programs. In Chicago, member education about Wal-Mart's employment practices was necessary to create a constituency of ACORN members that wanted to participate in the UFCW's No Wal-Mart campaign. Similarly, in Canada, one local coalition representative observed that the CAW frequently provided coalition participants. As the CAW noted, these rank and file participants probably had participated in their ideologically-driven paid education program, which has sustained high degrees of coalition interest amongst the CAW rank and file (interview 27: CAW, 2006).

Additionally, campaign exposure helped to slowly generate member engagement. In Chicago, many of the organisations, including Metro Seniors, were drawn into the Living Wage campaign by slowly building a constituency of support amongst organisation members through low-intensity activities like the postcard campaign. These low-intensity programs created a proximity to the
campaign, building awareness, which was then able to be activated when the campaign increased in intensity.

1.2.3 Public Commitment

Finally, a coalition's common concern seeks to engage the public at large. A coalition's public social frame supports coalition outcomes and its ability to shape the political climate. The concept of public commitment derives from the social movement literature on social frames, and was applied to coalitions in the case studies.

Public commitment was strongest when the coalition presented a positive, consistent message. Positive messages were most successful when articulating a proactive agenda which laid claim to an underlying moral framework and captured a broad agenda-setting capacity while still fighting on a specific issue. The Medicare and the living wage social frames were each based on national, religious and historical values that helped the coalitions stake moral claims. The strength of the public education message lay in its use of consistent, positive language. Additionally, the PEC was able to link this underlying agenda for public education to surface demands such as class sizes or salaries (Lakoff 1996). This enabled the PEC to build a public education agenda through achieving specific victories, assisting the Coalition to build both outcomes and a political climate favourable to public education (Pastor 2001).

Similarly, the Living Wage campaign's repeated use of the language of living wages, from 1995, helped build a political climate supportive of living wages. Using Snow and Benford's terminology, the living wage frame was an elaborated frame, able to be used by different constituencies, by SEIU 880 and the
Collaborative, each expressing their grievances in terms of its problem-solving schema (Snow and Benford 1992, p. 140).

The OHC’s privatisation frame demonstrated the weakness of a negative public social frame. The P3 campaign was defined in reaction to a government agenda, reliant on the language of that agenda. While it was able to make a clear ideological claim against privatisation it did not articulate or argue for a positive vision (Lakoff 2005). The anti-privatisation frame was what Snow and Benford describe as a restricted closed frame, as it did not allow the coalition to present a broad solution to the problem of privatisation (Snow and Benford 1992). Thus, the OHC was able to be portrayed as against the building of a new hospital in Brampton.

Yet public social frames are fluid, and there were several examples of coalitions shifting from negative public messages to positive ones. The NHC’s ‘build the hospital right’ message emerged from the weaknesses of the Brampton hospital campaign. The positive ‘living wage frame’ came from reflections about the limitations of the No Wal-mart campaign. The public education campaign developed out of rank and file reflections on the limitation of public messages about salaries. These positive proactive frames developed through a process of active reflection by coalition participants.

Additionally, as suggested by social movement theorists, public commitment is also shaped by the messenger as well as the message (McAdam 1996). While the OHC’s P3 message was negative, it was still useful for CUPE as it enabled the union to have its demands articulated by the OHC, a ‘more legitimate’ non-union constituency. Conversely, the No Wal-Mart campaign was limited when its key
spokespeople were white trade unionists. The Vinson Inquiry was lauded by the NSWTF because it allowed a neutral academic to speak for the union and the coalition. Having spokespeople separate from the union was a source of strength. This independent messenger generated public commitment for the union's issues, building media attention and a supportive political climate in the lead-up to the 2003 State Election.

1.2.4 Conclusion

The case studies affirm that there are three separate, discrete measures for a coalition's common concern: organisational commitment, member commitment and public commitment. These three elements derive from the three audiences of coalitions - organisations, members and the public. To effectively articulate these three forms of common concern, coalitions need to be strategic. While establishing a direct union interest may build organisational and member commitment to a coalition's campaign, public interest will be less successfully engaged if the campaign appears to be based on the 'vested interests' of unions.

Identifying three separate categories of common concern clarifies one of the key ambiguities in coalition literature. Often coalition theorists argue for coalitions that are framed as broad social justice frames. Yet unless these coalitions also tap into an organisation's and members' values and interests, they will not effectively gain the commitment of a union's organisational resources or engage union members.

This three-part framework links these three different measures of common concern to success. A broad public social frame is likely to help a coalition to achieve outcomes and a supportive political climate. Expressing the objectives of
the coalition as proximate to the interests, values and experiences of organisation members is likely to enhance a coalition’s ability to build a mass movement in support of outcomes and politicise union members. Finally, expressing and negotiating the objectives of a coalition as simultaneously engaging the organisational interests and values of unions or community organisations is likely to increase the level of resources an organisation provides to a coalition, and to sustain a coalition’s relationships.

1.3 Scale
The international comparative approach in this thesis allowed for an exploration of how context and scale shaped coalition success. Factors included harnessing and creating political opportunities, building multi-scaled coalition capacity and in particular building local broker organisations.

1.3.1 Political Opportunities
A coalition’s political opportunities are shaped by national differences such as political openness and union-party relations, as well as by strategic decisions made by the coalition, such as whether it harnessed electoral, policy or legislative opportunities in its relationship with government. Using social movement theory, Chapter Two speculated that ‘creating’ opportunities represented a height of coalition success. Certainly the Vinson Inquiry and the Living Wage campaigns affirm that creating political opportunities helps coalitions achieve policy outcomes.

The coalitions used electoral opportunities across the case studies. For both the Sydney class sizes campaign and the Chicago Living Wage campaign, elections
enhanced pressure on elected officials to achieve outcomes. In Chicago’s homecare campaign, the SEIU’s participation in the election and its relationship with the gubernatorial candidate was critical for securing collective bargaining rights. Yet elections were not always an ingredient for policy outcomes; the OHC’s intervention into the 2003 Provincial Election did not successfully end P3s, nor did the PEC’s Federal Election campaigns lead to policy outcomes. In both those cases the coalitions had insufficient capacity; the P3 campaign had uneven locally-scaled participation at the scale of electoral districts, and in Sydney, the state-scaled PEA did not have necessary support across other states to impact the nationally-scaled election.

Policy victories occurred, or failed, in each case based on whether the coalition was capable of dividing the major political parties or political representatives, to enable the coalition to insert an alternative policy agenda. In Australia, it was the support of the Liberal Opposition in the lead-up to the State Election that enhanced pressure on the ALP Government to support the education demands. Similarly, in Chicago the coalition initially passed the Living Wage Ordinance despite hostility from the Mayor, because its campaigning capacity and targeted political relationships threatened the electoral prospects of individual aldermen. However, in Toronto the activities of the coalition around P3s did not successfully divide the Liberal Party, a necessary step towards building an alternative policy (Tarrow 1994).

Beyond the presence or absence of political opportunities, the relative effect of national political context across these three countries did not appear to significantly affect outcomes. Each of the coalitions was able to achieve policy victories - stopping the privatisation of Medicare (if not hospitals), winning
smaller class sizes, and achieving collective bargaining rights and a living wage (albeit briefly). These victories came despite differences between the countries, such as contrasting histories as welfare states, the culture of political representation or the type of party relationships. Even where there were contextual advantages, as in Australia with the ALP, the coalitions all undertook mass mobilisations over a period of months prior to victory.

Rather than political context shaping success, it instead created a dialectical context that shaped the organising strategies of the coalitions in different ways. In NSW where there are centralised party caucuses, the PEC focused on lobbying key ministers and government leaders. In Chicago, where there were not central caucuses, political lobbying focused on individual aldermen. To influence elections, all the coalitions focused on ‘swing’ electoral districts. In Australia, with compulsory voting and in the OHC’s non-partisan P3 electoral campaign, the coalitions focused on publicising issues. In contrast, the SEIU focused on actively running an election campaign and not only influencing the issues but turning our supportive voters in the polls.

Across the studies, the relationships among unions, coalitions and political parties varied. What was important for coalition success was that the coalition built influential relationships with governing political parties, rather than whether the unions had historically strong relationships with those parties. In Australia, the union’s relationship with the coalition partners was a substitute for weak relationships with the ALP. The NSWTF used the strategy of building coalition relationships with the P&C and principal organisations as a mechanism for building a stronger political relationship with government. Yet, in Chicago, almost the opposite was true. The SEIU’s coalition strategies ran parallel to a
union campaign to rebuild electoral and political influence. Union political influence was critical for coalition victories, whether it was the SEIU at a state scale or the CFL at a City Council scale. In Toronto, union-party relationships did not significantly affect policy outcomes, because of the minority party status of the NDP. While the NDP created a supportive public voice, it did not have sufficient electoral influence to impact the P3 policies of the Liberal Government.

To build political relationships, the unions and coalitions did have common strategies. In Toronto and Chicago in particular, there were political bridge builders who helped increase political influence. In Chicago, the new political professionals in the State Council enhanced the SEIU’s legitimacy as a political actor. Similarly, the CFL’s President Gannon’s personal bridge building relationships with aldermen was a critical point of coalition power. In Toronto, while the NDP was less politically powerful in terms of achieving outcomes, coalition members affiliated with unions and the NDP helped build collaborative relationships and mitigated conflict between the OHC and the NDP.

It has been argued that coalitions can be a threat to social democratic parties, particularly if they threaten to usurp the ‘political role’ of the industrial-political split that historically defined union relationships with labour parties. The case studies suggest political bridge builders may help manage this conflict by translating how coalitions may be useful for social democratic party agendas, helping to forge constructive rather than competitive relations.

1.3.2 Multi-scaled Coalitions

All the coalitions studied sought to act at multiple scales in order to mirror the political scale of their targets. For instance, the OHC produced a multi-scaled
campaign to save Medicare. It built a local capacity in order to have a presence in local media markets and create political awareness. It also jumped to the national scale, by building relationships with other provincial health coalitions in order to influence the nationally-scaled Romanow Commission.

However, a coalition’s capacity to successful jump scales required building external relationships at different scales and in different places. Thus, in Australia, the PEC and the NSWTF did not successfully influence the Federal Election as they did not have sufficient political partners in other states.

The Chicago coalition demonstrated how coalition success can depend on being strategic about the choice of scale, and privileging action at a scale where the coalition has most power. Thus, the coalition made a strategic decision not to contest Wal-Mart directly or at the scale of individual stores. To increase their leverage, the coalition sought to regulate the behaviour of Wal-Mart and other big box retailers where they had the most leverage, at the City Council. The Collaborative’s experience not only helped it to win, but by taking action so close to an election, it enabled the collaborative to shift the political climate of the Council and later elect more supportive aldermen. Similarly, the SEIU’s decision to shape gubernatorial politics in Illinois elected a governor who supported collective bargaining rights for the union and an increase in the state minimum wage.

Additionally, the Collaborative demonstrated that a state-scaled organisation can mobilise political influence at other scales by undertaking a ward-scaled field and phone-banking operation to influence voters. This campaign influenced alderman in the lead-up to the vote by threatening their voting constituency.
However, it was difficult to sustain as it involved staff being brought into local wards rather than local residents being organised to take action where they lived. Indeed, the most powerful way for a coalition to take action at a local scale is to build local broker organisations.

1.3.3 Local Broker Organisations

A major variable across the Chicago, Sydney and Toronto coalitions was the presence of multi-scaled coalition structures, or what this study called local broker organisations. Most markedly in Toronto and to a lesser degree in Sydney, the coalitions operated at two scales simultaneously. In Toronto, this occurred through local health coalitions in regional cities around Ontario, and in Sydney there were public education lobbies. These local structures were critical for allowing the coalitions to develop local spaces for member participation and decision making, and to sustain multi-scaled political influence.

In terms of participation, local coalitions created an open space for rank and file unionists and community volunteers to come together and develop a parallel campaign strategy at a local level. These local organisations were linked to the issues and concerns of the central group through, for instance, the Administrative Committee and assemblies of the OHC. Dedicated coalition resources were important for sustaining these local groups; the OHC’s staff contributed to the sustainability of the Ontario coalitions whereas the public education lobbies declined after the Vinson Inquiry. These groups had the ability to plan their own strategy, suitable for their local environment. The broker organisations increased the number of people involved in coalition activities, and shifted organisation members from passive participants to local coalition ‘strategists’. They spread ownership over the coalition to organisation
members, and particularly in the OHC, they built long-term volunteer commitment from a small core group of activists around the province.

Locally-scaled broker organisations increased the capacity of participating organisations by enhancing the skills of organisation members in two ways. Firstly, they provided opportunities for union and community organisation members to be exposed to coalition campaigns, offering the potential to expand member political consciousness. Secondly, the local broker organisations provided a space for rank and file members to expand their organising and strategising skills. Members developed as they were brought into relationships with different organisations, and were responsible for developing plans for social action. In the OHC, member development was most pronounced when local coalition activity required a sustained campaign plan, such as in the Medicare and Plebiscite campaigns. In contrast, where strategies were centrally developed, local participation was more difficult to sustain.

Local broker organisations also enhanced a coalition’s local political influence. Multi-scaled coalitions are necessary when taking action against politicians, as politicians are simultaneously elected by a local electoral district while making decisions that affect a city, state or national political agenda. Local broker organisations not only allow a coalition to take action at multiple scales, as with the Chicago field campaign, but they enable a coalition to simultaneously undertake locally and centrally-directed activity, intensifying political influence. In Sydney and Toronto, local broker organisations coordinated local forums, organised local residents to lobby candidates and generated media attention, building electoral support.
Similarly in Sydney and Toronto, locally-scaled coalitions allowed the central coalition to tap into supportive political consciousness in the surrounding area. The local coalitions adapted to place-specific conditions to maximise their own capacity. Broker organisations were particularly successful at mobilising support for public education in south-western Sydney, evidenced by a succession of large forums, because this area has pronounced socio-economic disadvantage. Broker organisations in union towns, such as Kingston, were able to build support from local union activists through bridge builders. Place consciousness also detracted from a coalition's power, with the conservative town of Brampton hostile to coalition activists. Yet local coalitions at least provided a mechanism for challenging this hostile context. In contrast, without locally-scaled broker organisations, hostile place consciousness was a major weakness in Chicago, where on the West Side the anti Wal-Mart coalition was accused of being outsiders, interlopers, without an understanding of local concerns.

The Chicago coalition's key weakness was its lack of local broker organisations. This limited the impact that coalition participation had on the capacity of organisational members. The coalition did not turn active organisational leaders into campaign strategists for the sub-city area, relying on staff from city-scaled organisations to plan local campaign work. The Chicago coalition was centralised, including only staff representatives, which meant that organisational members were linked to the coalition only through their organisations. The Collaborative actively organised for members to be volunteers and spokespeople, but it did not provide members with a space to make campaign decisions. This was also the case in the SEIU's election strategy, which even when it was localised. It did not expose union members to decision making.
As a consequence, the Living Wage Coalition's political influence was singularly-scaled making it difficult to sustain over time and mitigating its impact on the aldermen. The coalition did act at multiple scales, but this action was undertaken by centrally directed staff, not through building local ward organisations, with the result that ACORN organisers noted that the campaign drained its resources. Moreover, building local broker organisations would have provided the Coalition with greater political influence. For instance, the local coalition established by the UFCW organiser sustained the support of its target alderman in part because it engaged with the alderman about economic development issues in that area. The local organisation could harness place-based concerns for jobs as a source of political influence. Yet without a permanent local ward presence, after the initial vote, the Mayor was able to convince three aldermen to support his veto of the Ordinance.

The Living Wage Coalition tried to compensate for a lack of broker organisations by encouraging participating organisations to act locally, however, while important, this was not sufficient. For instance, the BPNC was a neighbourhood organisation that took local action and Metro Seniors and ACORN stopped events in particular wards in the lead-up to the living wage vote. However, a single organisation could not substitute for the breadth of a coalition. They were only able to organise a single constituency, for instance Metro Seniors organised seniors. These local organisations did not reach out to local union stewards in that same area.

1.3.4 Conclusion
Political opportunities, multi-scaled coalition action and local broker organisations shaped coalition success in all the case studies. While national
context influenced the degree of available political opportunities, coalitions regularly adapted to that context and built new political relationships or undertook more sustained movement action to increase their influence against the state. Multi-scaled coalition action was a vital ingredient for political influence. Political influence repeatedly required the coalitions to mobilise allies at local, city, state and national scales to exercise influence against decision makers and achieve outcomes.

Locally-scaled broker organisations also enabled the coalitions to develop the capacity of participating organisations by developing the consciousness and organising skills of rank and file members. Moreover, the sustainability of local broker organisations also meant that they could sustain multi-scaled electoral and political influence and social awareness more effectively than a singularly scaled coalition.

2.0 Coalition Models
Chapter Two argued that not only do the coalition unionism elements explain variation within a coalition, but they also help to describe different coalition models. The chapter argued that particular alignments of the coalition elements created different types of coalition unionism. Three models were identified:

- **Agenda-driven coalition unionism** had strong common concern and scale and a weak set of inter-organisational relationships. In the case study, the PEC was union-initiated and union-driven, where a union crisis caused it to reach out with a broad social agenda to new allies, and to deploy
significant union resources to achieve campaign goals and more deeply activate its union base.

- **Relationship-driven coalition unionism** had a strong set of inter-organisational relationships and scale, with a weak common concern. In the case study, it was initiated and funded by unions and engaged community groups to respond to a broad social crisis. The coalition developed a quasi-independent structure that gave it the capacity to act with independence, and over time deepened the scale of union participation.

- **Mobilising coalition unionism** had a strong set of inter-organisational relationships and common concern with weak scale. In the case study, it was initiated by community organisations. It built relationships of mutual trust across unions and community organisations that supported strategic planning and reflection, at a single scale. The coalition worked collectively on campaigns that combined the interests of some groups and the values of all. Its open structure enabled the union to independently pursue new member organising while still engaging in coalition activities.

The conclusions to the case studies emphasised that these coalition unionism models also described coalitions commonly analysed in the literature. Agenda-driven coalition unionism described the Justice for Janitors campaigns in the US. Relationship-driven coalition unionism outlined many of the features of the Walk against the War Coalition in Sydney (Tattersall 2007a; Tattersall forthcoming a). Finally, mobilising coalition unionism parallels union-to-union coalitions in
central labour councils, where relationships and reliance on union affiliates is strong, but singularly-scaled.

These models do not necessarily represent a perfect match. The OHC had difficulties harnessing and creating political opportunities from the state, and despite a lack of broker organisations, the Grassroots Collaborative still acted with multi-scaled capacity and was able to respond to political opportunities. Rather, as general trends, the coalition models seek to generalise coalition strengths and weaknesses in order to develop an analytical model that not only is capable of identifying different types of coalition practice, but also identifying the strengths and weaknesses of that practice and considering how it might be possible to enhance coalition success.

In identifying the models, the case studies revealed that a recurring feature of long-term coalition unionism is that the coalition elements work in partial contradiction. In the case studies, each of the examples of coalition unionism had a strong presence of two elements that created difficulties and tensions for the realisation of the third element.

Agenda-driven coalition unionism built a strong issue-based agenda-driven by the NSWTF, and pulled together coalition relationships with parents and school principal organisations that had an interest in that agenda. But the organisational dominance of the union, which drove turn-out at rallies and the multi-scaled campaign activity, was also its weakness as it made the inter-organisational relationships relatively unstable and vulnerable to collapse.
In the public education case study, the participants attempted to overcome this weakness by establishing a separate coalition office during the Vinson Inquiry to mitigate the imbalance between the inter-organisational relationships. This was partly successful in that it allowed for a more effective negotiation between the parties. However, the NSWTF's disproportionate human and financial resources saw imbalance return once the Inquiry disbanded. Without a dedicated decision by the union to build the independent capacity of its community organisation partners, this imbalance would continue to categorise the coalition's inter-organisational relationships.

The relationship-driven coalition unionism of the OHC built a loose set of organisational relationships through a coalition that possessed independent capacity brought together by a common health care threat. This issue was in the interests of all the organisations but not the number one issue for any of them. The coalition built organisational commitment through the participation of organisational representatives and volunteers who acted at a local scale. The coalition's strength was that it brought different organisations together in common cause, activating unions on issues they may have not necessarily acted on if they were alone. However because the coalition's issues were not the number one interest of any group, it was difficult to build organisational commitment. Yet while this was a weakness, it also created a sense of equilibrium that sustained the coalition, as it produced a relative equality across the partners and their diversity.

In the OHC case study, the relationship-driven coalition unionism did have an opportunity to overcome its indirect common concern when it shifted to the P3 campaign, an issue that CUPE prioritised more strongly than Medicare. While it
drew CUPE more directly into the coalition and was able to engage more union members and union locals in the OHC, it also emphasised the tension between balancing the breadth of relationships and deep organisational buy-in – as it caused tensions with other coalition parties. Without the union being willing to forgo credit for its commitment and without the coalition being able build a stronger constituency of participants among organisational members, unequal engagement led to coalition tension.

**Mobilising coalition unionism** brought together relationships across a group of organisations with a high degree of relational connection and trust that allowed it to negotiate strong issue-based campaigns. The intensity of the relationships was driven by personal relationships and past campaign experience. While this space was vital for building and enacting strategy, and drawing organisations into campaigns on the basis of value commitments and not just interest, the coalition excluded organisation members from the process. Furthermore the need to achieve victories acted against incentives to build more local decentralised structures that engaged members in decision making and strategising.

In the Living Wage case study, the coalition did undertake multi-scaled activity. However, most of it was singularly-scaled, and did not establish local sustainable coalition structures. Similarly, in the union organising campaigns, while union members were engaged in contract decisions, local member-based structures were not maintained as part of the organising campaign. Separate to the Living Wage Coalition, a broker organisation was established, highlighting that local organisations can operate in tandem with a centrally-driven coalition. Coordination across scales was possible, but a challenge when the central group
is a tight, exclusive, group and the coalition has to make strategic decisions based on outcomes as well as capacity building.

While it is conceptually possible that the most 'powerful' form of coalition unionism would have strong common concern, strong inter-organisational relationships and strong multi-scaled capacity, the empirical evidence demonstrates that coalition perfection is elusive. As the case studies reveal, there are practical contradictions between the elements when they come together.

Yet, the dream of a more perfect coalition is not impossible. In each of the case studies, the coalitions attempted to mitigate their weaknesses. However, overcoming these weaknesses would have required active intervention and reorganisation to build capacity in parallel to campaigning. For instance, to overcome the organisational dominance of agenda-driven coalition unionism, the stronger partner may need to play a role in building the capacity of the weaker partners. To overcome the common concern weaknesses of the relationship-driven coalition unionism the coalition may need to help in cultivating member organisational engagement through education work. To overcome the scale weaknesses of mobilising coalition unionism, the coalition may need to actively establish locally-scaled organisations through training, mentorship and education work. It is not impossible to build a coalition that functions powerfully on all elements, but it takes resources and a commitment to prioritising capacity-building in parallel to winning outcomes.
3.0 Coalitions in Different Countries

Finally, the international comparative dimensions of the three case studies raise questions about what is similar and different between coalitions across national borders. At one level, this study attempted to build an explanation for coalitions that translates practice across borders. The model incorporates many of the national, political and organisational variables that influence coalition practice in different countries. The 'scale' element recognises that political context and opportunities shape coalition capacity, thus the more favourable context of a labour party or a welfare state is acknowledged. Similarly, the 'inter-organisational relationships element' recognises the role of organisational capacity and thus differences among the United States, Canadian and Australian community organisations.

Moreover, while there are contextual differences between coalitions in different countries, the coalitions exhibited many common themes. The elements, even when working in tension, did vary the coalitions in similar ways. Positive social frames improved the capacity for the coalition to engage supporters and shift the political climate. The opportunities of elections provided spaces for the coalitions to win policy outcomes – particularly in the Living Wage and Public Education campaigns, where the policy recommendations were positively framed.

Consequently, while these three models of coalition unionism were built out of case studies from different national contexts, there was not a direct correlation between those strategies and national context. Certainly, not all Australian coalitions are agenda-driven; we can see agenda-driven coalition unionism in the
US Justice for Janitors coalitions. Rather, coalition unionism models categorise the possibilities and limitations of coalition unionism more broadly.

That said, coalitions are clearly not immune from national context. National context shaped strategic decisions and opportunities in all the case studies. In the United States, the need to combine coalition work with union organising made the mobilising coalition unionism model a useful strategic choice. In Australia, the opportunities of an ALP government and a strong public school system made the NSWTF’s decision to engage in policy-directed agenda-driven coalition unionism a useful strategy. The history and popularity of Medicare in Canada meant that building a constituency of individuals committed to Medicare campaigning was possible. Context and history clearly shape coalition choices.

Similarly, organisational capacity shaped coalition practice. The fact that union density is relatively strong in Australia (20%) and Canada (30%) made unions important partners for social change and coalition resources (Jackson 2006; ABS 2007). Unions are much larger and richer than any other community organisations in those countries. But, even in the United States where unions have much smaller density (12%), unions continue to be the richest organisations with the largest membership base (BLS 2007). Comparatively, the United States history of community organising, where member-led community organisations have consistently struggled for services for low-income people without a strong welfare state, has provided a strong resource for contemporary coalitions. Mobilising coalition unionism was able to develop because of a strong network of powerful community organisations in the United States context.
Coalition victories and improvements to the political climate were achieved in all the case studies. The PEC had the most successful policy achievements, winning reforms on class sizes and professional development. This however, was not simply a function of the existence of a labour party and welfare state, but equally related to the strategic decision to define 'public education' as consisting of smaller winnable reforms. The Chicago Living Wage Coalition, even in the harsh economic climate of the US, took on the largest retailers in the world and won, briefly. Yet even when this policy victory was vetoed, what remained was a political climate victory, as the February 2007 elections resulted in a more coalition-friendly council. The OHC effectively achieved a climate change through its Medicare campaign, yet its ambitious policy goal of blocking all public-private-partnerships was difficult to win. That said, its work eventually led to backdowns by the Ontario Government around the practice of P3s in 2007. In each case, coalition work led to outcome and political climate gains.

There were, however, significant differences in the capacity building across the coalitions. The ability to build ongoing capacity was often a product of the national context. The harsher political climate in the US necessitated strategic decisions where the coalition decided to prioritise achieving outcomes and sustaining strong relationships. In Australia, the decision to focus exclusively on education policy narrowed the type of coalition partners, and the relatively open political climate also allowed the coalition to rely on the member turn-out of the NSWTF to win. The size and population spread of Ontario compelled the OHC to build a multi-scaled structure that could develop volunteers and connect to local unions. The coalitions were strategic agents, capable of identifying strengths and weaknesses and innovating in response to structural obstacles or
opportunities to change their fortunes. Circumstance was a mother of innovation.

The ability to generalise the coalition elements underscores how many of these local innovations are tools that can be adapted to different political contexts. The idea of multi-scaled coalition structures was initiated in both Australia and Canada, and even in the US the coalition actively worked at two scales to build political influence. The idea of independent coalition staff, finances and an office was initiated in both Canada and the US, and the Australian coalition would have benefited from a mediator that could have helped balance the inter-organisational relationships.

Beyond the conditions of national difference, these three case studies taken from three global cities, establish the benefits of coalitions as strategic agents in global cities. In each case, whether through re-regulating public education, the improving the conditions of health care or retail work, coalitions between unions and community organisations were viable strategies for re-regulating global cities to respond to inequality and the concerns of residents.

Importantly, the studies demonstrate that global cities themselves are multi-scaled – affected not only by the global scale of capital but by variations between neighbourhoods and communities inside and around the cities. The capacity to re-regulate health care in Toronto required action at a national and provincial scale in order to shift the policy framework for city-based public health care. Coalitions could change the city by acting at a city scale when there was a set of city-based decision makers to influence, such as in Chicago. But even there, multi-scaled action – action across the city and within the wards – was necessary.
to build political pressure to achieve change. Furthermore, the coalition's ability to act in certain areas of the city was influenced by whether city-scaled organisations had members in that area, the socio-economic status of that area and past experiences of those people.

The study highlighted that while global cities may have similar attributes conditioned by the operation of capital, the cities themselves are not homogenous or porous. Building a successful political movement inside a global city requires building coalitions across the city while also engaging organisational members and building local organisation inside the city.

The research undertaken in this thesis found that coalitions are one commonly useful strategy for social change that can successfully shape power relations, political outcomes and the political climate in global cities.

4.0 How and When Coalitions Support Union Collaborative Power

Beyond the operation of successful coalitions, this thesis has also investigated how coalitions can support union renewal. This question has been explored through two interrelated questions: firstly, when are coalitions powerful for unions and secondly when are unions likely to engage in long-term coalitions?

4.1 When are coalitions powerful for unions?

This question has already, in part, been addressed by the discussion in section 1.0, because built into the investigation of successful coalitions was that coalitions need to enhance the capacity of participating organisations. However, to focus specifically on when coalitions are powerful for unions, this section explicitly
identifies structural features of coalitions and unions that contribute to making coalitions powerful for unions. The section revisits the framework developed in Chapter Three, and investigates three forms of collaborative power that coalitions may provide to unions: relational power, class movement power and place-based power.

4.1.1 Relational Power
Pluralist and radical industrial relations theorists' insights about the potential of union relationships usefully help explain when coalitions can be powerful for unions. Hyman's argument about the permanent dialectic of coalition unity and organisational autonomy, as well as pluralists' insights into the practices of distributive bargaining and behavioural practices, can be combined into a theory of relational collaborative power.

The claim that horizontal relationships with community organisations enhance a union's ability to challenge employers and the state was evident in the case studies (Hyman 1975; Dabscheck 1993; Levesque and Murray 2002). Coalition relationships repeatedly coincided with policy and collective bargaining victories for unions. This was evident in the P&C's ad hoc solidarity that supported the NSWTF's salaries negotiation; the Independent Inquiry that supported the NSWTF class sizes campaign; the Collaborative's door-knocking campaign that helped the UFCW block the South Side Wal-Mart; and the OHC's provincial tours that enhanced CUPE's opposition to P3s. In each case, the union's agenda was 'legitimated' by coalition and community organisations providing support, through member mobilisation (such as in Chicago), media and lobbying (in Sydney) or building local education events and public awareness (in Toronto).
However, relational power is more complex than an instrumental exchange of resources. The dialectic of coalition unity and organisational autonomy demonstrates the transient and dynamic nature of powerful coalition relationships for unions. Using the coalition elements as a guide, relational power is a question, firstly, of common interest and, secondly, inter-organisational relations.

Firstly, to provide relational power for unions, a coalition's agenda must simultaneously overlap with the strategic goals of the participating union. The extent of interest overlap between the coalition and the union shapes the degree of union relational power provided by the coalition. This changes over time. The OHC was less powerful for CUPE when campaigning on Medicare, compared to P3s, as the interest overlap between the organisations was stronger on P3s. Similarly, the NSWTF class sizes campaign or SEIU's homecare alliance with seniors were powerful for the unions because of the integration of union and community organisation interest. Indeed, pluralists use the term distributive bargaining to describe the process when shared concerns can be jointly pursued across a coalition. 'Consumer'/union relationships are a good example of the way increasing the quality of services can support improvements in working conditions.

Secondly, union relational power is also shaped by a coalition's inter-organisational relationships. The PEC was most effective at achieving policy changes when decision making was shared, during the State Election campaign, rather than when the NSWTF dominated the coalition, such as during the 2001 Federal Election campaign. Strong inter-organisational structures can create
more power for unions as community organisations are more likely to share power when they play a role in decision making. Thus, by enfranchising equal numbers of union and community organisations, the OHC attempted to share organisational ownership and participation. These findings are supported by pluralists' insights about conducting negotiations, where decisions are made most easily when organisational leaders are present (as in Sydney and Chicago) and the relationships are familiar (as was the case in all the case studies).

The coalition that most effectively delivered union relational power was the mobilising coalition unionism of the Grassroots Collaborative. After all, mobilising coalition unionism is defined by strong inter-organisational relationships and common concern. In terms of inter-organisational relationships, the Collaborative's standards for decision making allowed the significant capacity that a union brings to the table to be respected by other organisational participants, as all organisations had a capacity that could be reciprocated. This created a condition within the coalition where organisations were, in the words of one participant, 'willing to share power' with each other (interview 49: community organisation, 2006). In terms of common concern, the Collaborative's decision to build a coalition based not on an alignment of interests but on strong relationships and shared values, overcame the so-called 'interest' trap of coalitions, where the natural life span of a coalition often only lasts as long as a specific issue is in contention. The Collaborative sustained relationships building on shared values and a common belief in an organising strategy.

Overall, these findings dispel reductionist analysis of when union collaboration is powerful. While union domination over coalition relationships can enhance
the resources available to unions, the most powerful forms of collaboration developed when the relationships were mutual and positive-sum. Positive-sum relationships move beyond zero-sum instrumentalism if inter-organisational relationships help share organisational ownership, and where common concern is negotiated to be in the mutual interests of the union and community organisations. When this occurred, collaboration increased the power of all the participating organisations, increasing the likelihood of community organisations committing to joint activities and sharing resources, while achieving outcomes that mutually benefit the union.

4.1.2 Class Movement Power
Radical theorists suggest that the alignment of community organisations and unions can help broaden the scope of issues on which unions and union members are prepared to take action. Furthermore, by broadening a union agenda, coalitions can help build an agenda-setting power in unions.

The degree to which coalitions deliver class movement power to unions is primarily a function of the type of common concern in the coalition. Additionally, the depth of member engagement and awareness-raising that arises from coalition participation relates to whether union commitment to the coalition is spread across the union’s membership. Class movement power is also shaped by the scale of union and coalition activity.

Class movement power firstly requires a coalition to be built on an issue with class content – an issue that goes beyond sectional concerns to the concerns of a wide group of people and organisations. The case studies demonstrated that to
engage in coalitions, unions repeatedly took action and dedicated resources to campaigns on issues beyond wages and conditions, such as reducing class sizes, opposing privatisation or fighting for living wages.

Class movement power had a second dimension, as coalitions may provide unions with opportunities for expanding the issue awareness and consciousness of union members. Class consciousness and member engagement relate to the second element of class movement power - scale. To effectively expand the class consciousness of union members, a coalition must not only be in the mutual interests or values of the union but, as Hyman explains, it must connect to the 'localised sympathies' of union members, where the common concern of the coalition connects to the values and experiences of union members (Hyman 1975, p. 178). When a coalition's concerns connect to localised sympathies, engagement is likely to produce an expansion in consciousness as union members have a direct interest in a set of issues that are broader than the union. Thus the PEC, and in particular the Vinson Inquiry, readily connected to the experiences of union members. They successfully engaged a new layer of union members, the 'middle teacher', that was not usually involved in their union. Similarly the class sizes campaign activated union members, not on wages and conditions, but on broader professional concerns for class sizes. This action simultaneously enfranchised teachers, parents and those who value public education.

A similar pattern developed in the other case studies. In Ontario, the privatisation campaign connected CUPE members' concerns for workplace conditions with local residents who sought to maintain local hospital services. CUPE and the OHC’s campaigns around privatisation engaged union members
by linking the way a reduction in workplace conditions would reduce the quality of health care.

A connection to localised sympathies was a vital ingredient in the SEIU 880's member engagement during the Big Box Living Wage campaign. When the union first tried to organise turn-out, it talked about the importance of living wages in the abstract and only a few members participated. However, once the union told members that a living wage of $10 for retail workers could help homecare workers increase their wage to $10, participation increased. Class consciousness and member engagement increased when the concerns of the coalition were directly translated to the experience of union members.

Class movement power may also be enhanced if political action is combined with education or the pre-existing identities of the workforce; ACORN and SEIU 880's engagement in the anti-Wal-Mart campaign was supported by education programs run at membership meetings.

Class movement power, by combining a broad social vision and deep member engagement, can help a union set an agenda. Coalitions helped unions set an agenda when they combined common concern and scale, and this was most evident in the agenda-driven coalition unionism of the PEC. It combined a positive public social frame around public education with specific winnable demands such as reduced class sizes and increased funding for professional development. Mass member engagement reinforced this broad public social frame, allowing the union to act 'with its sword of justice' and not just member interest, helping it not only win its outcome but set a platform for public education more broadly (Flanders 1970).
However, despite the success of the PEC's class movement power, the NSWTF still struggled to combine the industrial power of the workplace with the political power of social movements. The difficulties of counter-hegemonic activity are underscored by the tendency for a union to separate how it acts in coalition and how it acts in fighting for wages and conditions. The NSWTF's strategies differed significantly between the Vinson Inquiry and the salaries campaign. This separation of industrial and political tactics prevented the coalition from uniting political and economic power, breaking down the agenda it built in the State Election campaign when it came to the salaries campaign (Gramsci 1971; Holloway and Picciotto 1977; Meiksins Wood 1995).

Overall, these findings suggest that coalitions can build a union's class movement power if they effectively entwine common concern and scale. This is possible if the coalition opens the range of issues that unions campaign on and broaden the political engagement and awareness of union members. This can also expand the ability of unions to set an agenda for their own policy issues.

4.1.3 Place-based Power
One of the goals of this thesis was to connect labour geographers' place-based analysis of industrial relations to the question of how coalitions can be powerful for unions. Certainly, geographers' contention that the changing spatial context of work may enhance the possibilities for coalitions is affirmed, as in each case study unions connected to coalitions in response to crisis. These crises were born of changes to the state and shifting employment conditions that affected union members' wages and conditions, including cutting government spending in
Australia, privatisation in Canada and cost cutting to welfare and public health infrastructure in the US.

Moreover, labour geographers' analysis of the multi-scaled nature of union participation helps us to understand how coalitions can increase union capacity in the context of achieving outcomes. The type of success achieved by a coalition is a strategic decision between the competing demands for outcomes and capacity. Outcomes and capacity building can work in contradiction. The ability of a coalition to change the capacity of a union is most likely when coalition work is focused on enhancing the skills of the participants in the process of taking action, while powerful political outcomes often require centralised decision making focused on mobilisation, not skill transfer.

Consequently place-based power is the most elusive form of collaborative power. It specifically refers to the ability of a coalition to enhance the capacity of unions through the transfer of skills between organisations through coalition relationships at multiple scales. Yet in the long term, it is the most valuable form of union power produced by coalitions, as it enhances the external resources and internal capacity that a union can rely on in the future.

Place-based power is most likely to develop through the combination of strong inter-organisational relationships and scale. Strong inter-organisational relationships enable a union to learn strategies from others. As Voss and Sherman argued, unions can change; certainly coalitions were an agent for union change in the case studies (Voss and Sherman 2000). For instance, given the available opportunity of an external alliance, the OHC's union affiliates embraced a radical Medicare canvassing strategy and then a plebiscite strategy,
turning away from traditional forms of political action such as rallies. In Chicago, the UFCW learnt how to work in coalition and how to undertake a mass-based political campaign through its relationship with the Collaborative. However, strategic lessons are not permanently ‘learned’, they are negotiated, and may give way if more familiar repertoires of contention take over. Thus, once the NSWTF moved into a salaries negotiation, its coalition work during the State Election campaign fell away and was replaced by a traditional industrial relations campaign.

Yet, building organising capacity at one scale is necessary but not sufficient for building the capacity to challenge decision makers at multiple scales. Thus, a union’s place-based power also derives from a coalition’s scale. Most importantly, a coalition’s scale enhances place-based power to the degree that it builds local broker organisations that connect to rank and file union members. The goal is that when union members participate in coalitions, they enhance their organising skills. Beyond class consciousness, place-based power refers to the capacity of unions and union members to act as strategic agents. As the NSWTF identified, awareness of social concerns does not necessarily generate the skills or capacity to take action. In order for union members to shift from being passive participants to developing organising skills, the coalition needed to offer spaces for union member engagement, in particular localised broker organisations and/or decentralised union structures. The generation of these skills increases the capacity of the union in the long run, because union members can take the skills they learn in coalitions and deploy them in union organising campaigns.
Across the case studies, a coalition's ability to enhance the capacity of union members, stewards and locals varied. The factors that affected how coalitions enabled members included the degree to which:

- The union had decentralised union structures
- The union’s decentralised structures connected with local coalition structures
- The central union allocated resources to coalition work
- There were union representatives and activists who had a personal commitment to coalition work.

In Sydney and Toronto, the NSWTF and CUPE’s local and regional union structures made it possible for the union to engage in local coalition relationships, unlike the SEIU 880 in Chicago. Because of the NSWTF’s teacher associations and CUPE’s locals, CUPE local leaders could attend local coalition planning meetings and the NSWTF could initiate public education lobbies with parents and principals and locally organise the hearings for the Vinson Inquiry. However, while SEIU 880’s stewards actively participated in coalition campaigns – such as door-knocking wards – they did so as a centrally organised group, coming in buses after monthly union meetings. The problem was that these stewards were not necessarily from that local area nor did they have the added responsibility for organising the door-knock themselves, or creating a plan for building political pressure locally. The mobilisation of stewards did not lead to an autonomous organising capacity amongst the SEIU stewards.

Union member organising capacity was also more likely to develop when a union’s decentralised structures connected with established local coalition structures. Thus comparing the Australian and Canadian coalitions, the
relationship-driven OHC provided an external magnet that opened opportunities for local union engagement. The OHC's independent resource base enabled it to influence CUPE. This was different in Australia, where the local coalitions were initiated by the union. In Canada, the presence of local coalitions opened the door for local union coalition engagement across the province.

As Voss and Shearman found, union leadership commitment also encouraged the development of local union organising capacity, through the provision of financial resources, mentoring and training (Voss and Sherman 2000). CUPE's support of the OHC and their attendance at local coalition events encouraged local unions to participate in the P3 provincial tours. In Chicago, education work around Wal-Mart helped to build a union constituency around living wages for retail workers in SEIU 880. Leadership commitment to the Vinson Inquiry set a standard that meant organisers and teachers associations prioritised participation in Vinson Inquiry events.

However, in order for local coalitions to connect to local unions, unions not only required localised structures but local representatives or activists with a personal commitment to lead coalition work. In Durham and Kingston, it was union bridge builders who connected OPSEU and CUPE to the local coalition. In Niagara, a CUPE official who had previously been engaged in the Medicare campaign was again a bridge builder for the Plebiscite campaign three years later.

As was speculated in Chapter Three, place-based power may be more useful for certain kinds of unions. Geographers suggested that unions operating in industries with a capital fix may benefit more from coalitions, as coalitions
represent a strategy for building support for work that cannot be moved. Certainly for the public sector care services studied here, such as education, health care, homecare and childcare, harnessing local support was useful. For health care, it enabled hospital workers to be supported by the community, particularly in the Plebiscite campaign. Additionally, the public sector nature of this work meant that local support enhanced the union’s political leverage, thus the public education lobbies helped the NSWTF build support for education reforms from Members of Parliament, and SEIU 880’s homecare coalition made ‘politicians a little nervous’.

Place-based power may also be useful for harnessing supportive place consciousness or mitigating negative place consciousness. Again, this is particularly useful for locally-scaled industries, because the place of work is relatively fixed. For the NSWTF, the socio-economically disadvantaged area of south-western Sydney was home to a radical group of principals and a large number of union activists. Conversely, the BHC was able to take action to mitigate conservative place consciousness alongside CUPE in opposing P3s. Place consciousness, however, can weaken union support; for instance Wal-Mart played on historical divisions between the African American community and unions in the west side of Chicago to weaken the anti-Wal-Mart campaign.

The potential of place-based power is that it directly contributes to the renewal of union capacity. When a coalition can deliver place-based power, it is able to increase the organising capacity of union members and union leaders. It can increase the campaign capacity of unions, providing an opportunity for learning new strategies and enhancing the campaigning skills of members. Additionally, it provides a set of relationships, at multiple scales, that provide a foundation for
future coalition work. Place-based power represents a residual relational power, from which future coalitions may be able to be built. For the UFCW, the experience of the Living Wage campaign in 1995-1998 provided an entry point that enabled the union to contact ACORN when Wal-Mart entered Chicago in 2003.

Certain types of unions benefit the most from this type of power, including unions with internal multi-scaled structures, like the NSWTF or CUPE, unions in industries with capital fixes, or unions that want to influence the political process. Yet this form of power is the most difficult to build, as it requires a dedicated effort to build capacity. In certain circumstances, coalitions may choose to prioritise outcomes ahead of the slower process of transferring skills, in which case the potential of place-based power for unions is weakened.

4.1.4 Summary of Union Collaborative Power
As Chapter Three established, industrial relations theory neglects methods by which coalitions and community organisations can enhance union power. However, by reframing three areas of industrial relations theory, this thesis produced a framework that identified three types of collaborative power that coalitions can provide unions. The case studies affirm that coalitions can support unions. They can assist unions to build social legitimacy, a relational form of power. They can help broaden the class consciousness of union members and the ability of unions to set an agenda, a class movement form of power. They can also build the organising capacity and external support for unions, a place-based form of power.
The resources that community organisations can provide unions must be understood in broad terms. Collaboration, as pluralists note, need not be a zero-sum game. Coalitions can simultaneously build the power of community organisations and unions, if the participation and interests of the organisations are balanced between the competing demands for coalition unity and organisational autonomy.

Furthermore, coalitions can be powerful for unions because they can change unions. They can open the range of issues that unions campaign on, helping unions to set an agenda, build class consciousness and enhance union's campaigning capacity, at a leadership and membership scale.

My analysis of how coalitions can enhance the power of unions moves beyond a tendency in industrial relations literature to frame community organisation relationships as only instrumentally useful. Community organisations are regularly perceived as an additional resource to be used for short-term campaign outcomes, and then are dispensed with. However, the possibilities of positive-sum relationships, and the potential for coalitions to build the capacity of unions, reveals that coalitions can be a long-term strategically useful tool for union renewal.

4.2 When are unions likely to practise long-term coalitions?
As the previous section suggested, it may be that certain unions are more likely to practise long-term coalitions, given their external opportunities and internal choices. Chapter Three introduced six possible factors that may make coalition practice more likely. These can be reviewed in light of the case studies.
4.2.1 Opportunities for Coalition Unionism

Across the case studies, there were similar opportunity structures that led to unions embracing coalition strategies. The larger number of external opportunities, and thus the broader the 'opportunity structure' for coalition practice, the more likely unions were to engage in coalitions.

In all the studies, political and economic context was important. This included an external 'crisis' as an opportunity for promoting initial coalition engagement. The NSWTF salaries crisis, CUPE's P3 crisis and the UFCW's Wal-Mart crisis all preceded long-term coalition participation. The only exception was SEIU 880. Yet coalition practice had always been integrated into SEIU 880's organising strategy to compensate for its small size and limited ability to use industrial tactics such as the strike. Its lack of influence in the employment relationship meant that it had always relied on political and coalition relationships. Secondly, all unions in the case studies were in spatially tied service work, from the public sector unions such as NSWTF and CUPE, the mixed public and private sector SEIU 880, and the private sector UFCW. Additionally, as interviews with the unions revealed, the unions' public sector location created the need for political influence, for which coalitions were seen as a useful strategy.

All the key unions had a broad union identity and pre-existing community organisation relationships. NSWTF, CUPE and SEIU 880 each identified themselves as socially progressive unions. They each had previously campaigned on issues beyond wages and conditions and had participated in coalitions. Yet, while identity was important for those unions, it did not appear
to be a prerequisite for coalition practice. After all, the UFCW, a union with limited coalition experience, engaged in a long-term coalition once it was threatened by Wal-Mart. While a broad union identity was common across the case studies, it was not a necessary ingredient.

Organisationally, union homogeneity and size were important. For the NSWTF, the relative homogeneity of members as teachers was important for building shared common interest to the public education campaign. Similarly the size of the union meant that it had significant financial resources it could deploy. CUPE was also a large union, but it lacked homogeneity, representing a diverse mix of public sector workers. It mitigated this through a dedicated hospital bargaining unit (OCHU) that provided the union with leadership, a communications structure and resources especially for health care campaigning. SEIU 880 did not have a homogenous membership with workers in homecare and childcare. The union compensated by always focusing on common workplace and non-workplace identities to build a common union identity across the workforce. These included framing all work campaigns as living wage campaigns, emphasising homecare and childcare workers' common experience as low-wage workers, and incorporating practices associated with the workers' religious faith into union practice.

Available community relationships were a part of all the union's opportunity structure. The unions had ready community allies with public sector service users, ensuring that coalitions were possible for each of the unions. NSWTF relationships with parents, CUPE's relationship with the OHC and seniors, and SEIU 880's relationships with homecare consumers and ACORN, all preceded the case studies.
In contrast, union-to-union relationships were less important. Weak relationships between the NSWTF and other NSW unions or the national office did not affect coalition formation. While CUPE's commitment to the P3 campaign was influenced by national union research, the state leadership was the driving force to union engagement. However, jurisdictional competitiveness with SEIU did lead to a depth of coalition engagement around the plebiscite. Even for SEIU 880, while the State Council supported coalition engagement, it was SEIU 880's political organising strategy that influenced the State Council, not the Council shaping 880's practice. SEIU's union relationships enhanced SEIU 880's capacity to achieve coalition outcomes rather than influencing its coalition practice.

The unions in the case studies had significantly different internal union structures, and these differences did not affect the unions' decisions to engage in coalitions. Thus decentralised union structures in the NSWTF and CUPE and their absence in SEIU 880 did not affect whether they engaged in coalitions, it rather shaped the depth of coalition unionism practiced.

4.2.2 Choices for Coalition Unionism

Within the studies, how the union chose to engage with the coalition revealed the importance of common interest but demonstrated how coalition support from different union actors led to different levels of union support for coalition strategy.
Across all the coalitions, the issues campaigned on had a strong connection to union members. The coalitions often connected to workplace experiences, such as teachers with public education and hospital workers with health care. For SEIU 880, campaigns for living wages grew out of the workers' identity and common experience as low-wage workers.

However, across the coalitions, the decision to engage came from different union actors. Coalition engagement was pushed for by the leadership in SEIU 880, and conversely by delegates and organisers in the NSWTF. These different coalition proponents influenced the kinds of coalition unionism evident in the studies. The multi-scaled union participation in the NSWTF case study was generated in part by the fact that union delegates and organisers led the push for the long-term coalition strategy. This was in contrast to the coalition engagement by CUPE and SEIU 880 which was primarily supported by the union leadership. In the NSWTF, coalition unionism first developed as a movement inside the union that led to a change in union strategy at the annual conference, and then was consolidated in 2002 when new union leaders were elected. The pressure from union members that was ratified by union leaders resulted in alignment of 'power for' and 'power over' decision making, producing a deep member commitment to, and engagement in, coalition unionism.

In contrast, SEIU 880 became engaged with the Grassroots Collaborative through ACORN. The union's commitment to long-term coalition practice came from union leaders and staff. Union members were engaged as participants at coalition events. The leadership's decision to engage in the coalition exercised 'power over' the membership, while the coalition outcomes produced by the coalition created 'power for' the membership.
CUPE was also connected to the OHC by its leadership, but the coalition relationships changed and intensified over time, as the coalition’s concern for privatisation aligned with the union’s own strategic interests. Member engagement developed as the OHC shifted to a local scale – engaging in plebiscites in local towns. This local scale enabled CUPE’s union locals to intensify their commitment beyond individual events, playing a role in planning the local plebiscite campaign. Thus, while coalition engagement was initially a decision made by the leadership exercising ‘power over’ the membership, locally-scaled union engagement enabled members to commit to the coalition to create ‘power for’ themselves.

Across the unions, the sources of pressure for coalition unionism were different. In the NSWTF, pressure came from inside the union. For CUPE and SEIU 880, the pressure came from the relationship between the union and the coalition. For SEIU 880, it was its relationship with ACORN that introduced it to the Collaborative. For CUPE, while the union leadership led the union to work with the OHC, it was when the coalition shifted its strategy to a local scale that CUPE’s engagement deepened. This variation suggests that the pressure to engage in coalition unionism can derive from inside a union as well as from the dialectic relationships between unions and coalitions. Moreover, it suggests that the way in which unions shift to engage in coalitions can shape the degree to which members commit to and engage in coalition campaigns.

The variation across the case studies also suggests that while leadership support is a necessary ingredient for shifting to coalition unionism, it does not necessarily create deep member engagement in coalition campaigns. For deep member
engagement to occur, it was necessary for leadership support to connect to pressure from the membership, or pressure from an independently resourced, multi-scaled coalition. It was the combination of leadership support and member activity that led to deep union engagement, where 'power over' the union could align with 'power for' members demands.

4.2.3 When is Coalition Unionism Likely to Develop?
The similar and different union circumstances in the case studies suggest some common themes and potential limitations about when coalition unionism is likely to develop. A wide opportunity structure was consistently important for coalition unionism practice. External crisis in the ability for unions to protect wages and conditions preceded the NSWTF, CUPE and UFCW coalitions, and coalitions were intimately connected to SEIU 880's strategy for collective bargaining rights. Similarly, a relatively homogenous union identity, where the unions were familiar with coalition practice and where community organisations existed as available coalition partners, helped coalition practice develop.

The main differences were in the contrasting processes that provoked coalitions within the unions. The various patterns of leadership, community organisation and internal demands for union engagement in coalitions were all positively correlated to coalition practice – they did not determine whether coalition unionism developed. However, these differences in coalition formation significantly influenced the degree of member engagement in the union’s coalition practice. Local member pressure or direct locally-scaled exposure to coalitions was an essential feature of deep member coalition engagement.
5.0 Conclusion
The case studies support the utility of the descriptive typologies and the measures of success set out in Chapters Two and Three.

The coalition elements usefully categorised variation across the case studies. Despite differences in national context, the concepts of inter-organisational relationships, common concern and scale identified shifts in coalition capacity that varied coalition success. Moreover, combinations of these elements also provided three models of coalition unionism that categorised common themes in each of the case studies, highlighting that coalition unionism practice varies.

The case studies also demonstrated that coalitions can provide power for unions. This power was not simply an instrumental consequence of community organisations handing over resources to unions, but was a product of managing the combined interests of unions and community organisations over time. The forms of power included: relational power, where coalitions legitimise union demands; class movement power, where coalitions increased the class consciousness of union members and the ability for unions to set a political agenda and place-based power, where coalitions increased the campaigning capacity of unions at a leadership and membership scale.

The case studies also suggested that coalitions are likely to develop given particular opportunity structures and pressures. These included a wide union identity, union homogeneity and an external crisis that affected how a union could deliver wages and conditions for members. The studies also revealed several different routes for when unions are likely to engage in coalitions.
Coalitions can arise from internal pressure, leadership support and the dialectic agitation from external community organisations and coalitions.

Finally, this review of the case study findings also revealed the complexity of coalition success. While each of the coalitions was able to achieve political outcomes, political climate change, sustainable relationships and increase the capacity of the participating organisations, the degree to which these goals were achieved was uneven.

Certain models of coalition unionism were more likely to deliver different types of success for unions. Agenda-driven coalition unionism produced class movement power which was most successful at political climate change and increasing the capacity of participating organisations. Mobilising coalition unionism produced relational power, which supported sustainable relationships and political outcomes. Relationship-driven coalition unionism was most likely to produce place-based power through supporting sustainable relationships and increasing the capacity of the participating organisations.

The types of power and success achieved were often based in strategic decisions for the coalition participants, where building organisational capacity had to be weighed against the need for more short-term political victories. Coalition success is thus complex and uneven. It is not that one model of coalition unionism is necessarily 'more successful' than another, but rather that the different models of coalition unionism are better suited to producing particular forms of coalition success. These findings challenge much of the best practice literature on coalitions, which often suggests that coalition strategy is a simple linear progression from weak coalitions to strong coalitions. Instead, this
research argues that while it is theoretically possible to produce an ideal form of coalition, coalition success and practice is riddled with contradictions and tensions between the coalition unionism elements and the capacity of coalitions to deliver successful outcomes and improvements in capacity.

Therefore, through three case studies of long-term coalitions, this thesis has demonstrated that coalition unionism is a viable strategy for union renewal. It has found that given the particular type of coalition practices produced, a coalition's ability to produce outcomes, achieve change in the political climate, build sustainable relationships and increase the capacity of unions varies. Chapter Nine, the conclusion to the thesis, revisits the three frameworks built in this thesis, and summarises the findings from the case studies. It also identifies several implications that this research poses for scholarship on community unionism, global cities and industrial relations, and for union practice.
Chapter Nine
Successful Coalition Unionism

This thesis has developed a series of frameworks for understanding if, how and when coalitions can be powerful for union renewal. The study brought together multi-disciplinary literature, not only from union renewal scholarship and industrial relations, but labour geography and social movement theory. The approach was based upon a new, threefold definition of community as organisation, common interest/identity and place, in order to evaluate coalition practice from three perspectives. Firstly, it developed coalition elements and models that help explain when coalitions are likely to be successful. Secondly, it explored when coalitions can be powerful for unions. Thirdly, it considered when unions are likely to engage in long-term coalition unionism. These frameworks were then explored through three case studies of long-term coalitions, in order to explore how and when coalitions helped win outcomes and shift the political climate, created sustainable relationships between organisations and increased the capacity of participating organisations.

1.0 Overview and Summary

As I argued in Chapter One, this investigation is timely and important given the identified crisis that unions faces across the industrialised world. While the raw levels of union density vary (Frege and Kelly 2004b), similar conditions such as falling union density, the growth of a non-union service industry, the global consolidation of capital, decentralised industrial regulation and workplaces and shifting relationships between unions and social democratic parties, undermine
the foundations of unionism and challenge 'a certain kind of unionism' based on nationally-scaled collective bargaining and service provision (Hyman 2001).

This challenge to unionism calls for new strategies and a renewal of old ones. As Chapter One noted, included in the arguments about union renewal is a call for community unionism broadly, and coalitions more specifically. However, what these terms mean and when these practices are powerful for unions is unclear. The central aim of this thesis is to provide a conceptual foundation and analytical frameworks for understanding when, how and why coalitions are a powerful strategy for union renewal.

In light of a lack of explanatory frameworks for coalition practice in the union renewal literature, and the widespread practice of coalitions and their potential contribution to rebuilding union influence, this thesis makes theoretical and empirical contributions to understanding coalitions as a particular example of union renewal. Theoretically, its contribution was to review and reframe the literature on community unionism and coalition unionism, and to use industrial relations scholarship to understand when coalitions are a powerful form of union collaboration. Empirically, it moved beyond the common practice of national comparison to undertake an internationally comparative study of coalitions across three global cities in liberal market economies.

Chapter Two set up the first theoretical contribution, establishing an original definition of community as a foundation upon which the ambiguous term community unionism could be defined, so that the more specific strategy of coalition unionism could be explored. An investigation of coalition unionism required an analysis of coalition success and how coalitions can support unions.
Coalition practice was explored in Chapter Two, and the relationship between unions and coalitions was considered in Chapter Three.

To explore coalition practice, the definition of community was used to identify common themes about coalition practice in the literature. The study identified three key analytical elements that shaped coalition success. These elements were common concern, inter-organisational relationships and scale. Using those terms to reframe the literature on coalitions, Chapter Two identified measures that might determine how the elements contribute to coalition success. Chapter Two argued that common concern has three separate measures—organisational commitment, member commitment and public commitment. Inter-organisational relationships were broken down into four measures—organisational capacity and commitment, the structure of the coalition, types of decision making and organisational culture. Scale had three measures—the availability of political opportunities, the multi-scaled capacity of a coalition and whether it had local broker organisations.

Chapter Two also suggested that these different elements of coalition unionism may not only identify coalition success and define change in coalition practice over time, but may also be useful for defining different models of coalition unionism. In a similar manner to Hyman’s categorisation of union identities (Hyman 2001), the chapter argued that these three elements can be used to produce three models, or ideal types, of coalition unionism. Firstly, was agenda-driven coalition unionism with strong common concern and scale, but weaker inter-organisational relations. Secondly, was relationship-driven coalition unionism with strong inter-organisational relations and scale, but weak common
concern. Thirdly, was mobilising coalition unionism, with strong inter­organisational relations and common concern, but weak scale.

Chapter Three set up the second theoretical contribution. It focused on how coalitions may directly contribute to union renewal by reframing industrial relations literature on collaboration to explore, firstly, when coalitions are likely to be powerful for unions, and secondly, when unions are likely to engage in coalitions. Industrial relations theory is insufficiently engaged with the question of when collaboration with community organisations is powerful for unions. Pluralist theorists often neglect analysis of community organisations because they fall outside the employment relationship, and radical theorists, while identifying the concept of the united front, often overlook the particular circumstances that cause an alignment of unions and community organisations to be powerful. This chapter examined pluralist and radical theories, and introduced labour geography to analyse the potential of collaboration. Additionally, it adapted the definition of community in order to reframe labour geographers' contributions on collaboration into a three-part framework of relational, class movement and place-based union collaborative power that suggests when coalitions might be powerful for unions.

Secondly, Chapter Three also identified a series of measures for when unions are likely to work in long-term coalitions. It combined two approaches. Social movement theory's conceptualisation of opportunities and choices, as adapted by Turner (2007), was combined with the definition of community to identify three community-based opportunities and choices that intersect to make individual unions more likely to engage in coalition unionism. It identified opportunities such as 'place-based' political and economic context,
'organisational' features such as organisational relationship and structure, and 'identity' features such as union identity and union education. It also noted choice-based features such as the different types of organisational actors, the connection to member interest and the activation of internal union structures. The model suggested, firstly, that union collaboration is more likely to develop as the opportunity structure for coalitions broadens. Secondly, the framework identified that choice-based factors not only demonstrate when coalition unionism may happen, but also influence the degree to which union members are engaged in coalition practice.

Chapter Four set up the methodology for the thesis. The international comparative approach departed from much of the work on coalitions and union renewal, which often compared across 'different' contexts. Instead, it used two independent variables to assist in case selection, to try to control for contextual differences in international comparison. Using the varieties of capitalism literature, I chose three similar liberal market economies and, using the global cities literature, I chose three similar global cities. While acknowledging that even these similar contexts have small differences, such as community organising capacity, union-political party relations and political culture, the broadly similar contexts allowed the international comparison to focus more on similarities than differences. The case studies sought to compare coalition practice and coalition success in terms of the coalition's common concern, inter-organisational relationships and scale.

The choice of three global cities was also an original methodological contribution to the study of coalitions. Global cities, as Sassen and others argue, are key actors in the global economy: they have a concentration of multi-national firms,
they are sites of growing service provision and they are hubs of migration, travel and cultural events (Sassen 1994; Sassen 2001). However, global cities are also increasingly unequal (Fainstein 2001). By selecting case studies in three global cities, this research was also able to investigate whether coalitions may be a viable strategy for challenging the distribution of wealth and decision-making processes in global cities. The study investigated whether coalitions can be a vehicle for redressing the needs of workers and residents in global cities.

Chapter Five explored the Sydney-based PEC, which was identified as an example of agenda-driven coalition unionism. This was a union-initiated coalition, born out of an internal crisis from a salaries campaign and a member-led shift in strategy that worked with parents and principals. The nature of the coalition varied over time, due to its relatively weak inter-organisational relationships, shifting from a close partnership with parents in the Vinson Inquiry, a broader coalition with principals during the State Election, to practically no coalition during the salaries campaign and a return to a simple coalition for the 2004 federal election. The weakness of the relationships came from the dependence of the coalition on the union’s resources, and apart from the Vinson Inquiry, the coalition lacked an independent structure to support and sustain its inter-organisational relationships. The weakness of the coalition’s inter-organisational relationships typified the weakness of agenda-driven coalition unionism. Yet, despite the weakness of the relationships, the campaign was powerful in establishing mutual interest across these education partners. Similarly, the establishment of broker public education lobbies and the decentralised structure of the union, through teacher associations and regional organisers, created a strong multi-scaled capacity for the PEC’s greatest success, the Vinson Inquiry.
For the union, the PEC provided class movement collaborative power for the NSWTF by creating a multi-scaled proactive agenda for public education that was in the mutual interests of the union. The connection to parents and principals allowed the union to achieve political influence that it could not garner on its own. The coalition agenda also engaged union members in a new way, 'attracting the middle teacher' to participate in an inquiry, which engaged members with whom the union had previously struggled to connect with. Additionally, the multi-scaled structure of the union enabled it to deepen the coalition, as the rank and file activists who initiated the coalition unionism spread the public education campaign through forums, lobbying and activities at the local scale.

Chapter Six explored the Toronto-based OHC, an example of relationship-driven coalition unionism. While initiated by the OFL, the OHC built a strong independent coalition capacity early on through its large number of organisational partners, coalition office and staff, and its local broker organisations. While the coalition brought together many different parties with a stake in health care, it struggled to manage that diversity. Consequently, the OHC had a weak common concern, struggling to develop mutual interest campaigns. The Medicare campaign had a distant self-interest engagement from the unions, and the P3 campaign had uneven buy-in, with CUPE providing a much greater proportion of resources than the other union or community organisations. Additionally, the public social frame of 'opposition to privatisation' struggled to articulate positive proactive demands for health care. Its reactive message struggled to create political opportunities, particularly in challenging the Liberal Party’s support of P3s. However, the coalition had a
strong set of inter-organisational relations created through a large formal Administrative Committee and a highly respected coordinator. The OHC's greatest strength was its multi-scaled capacity, with its thirty-five local broker organisations operating as a space for volunteer engagement, local union relationships, strategic planning and responsiveness to place consciousness. These local coalitions helped the OHC act at provincial scale and spread awareness on P3s, an issue of mutual concern to CUPE and the coalition. Moreover, the local coalitions enabled the OHC to build a locally-scaled plebiscite campaign to take on P3 hospitals one at a time.

For CUPE, the OHC acted as a change agent, developing place-based power by deepening member politicisation and engagement on a social issue which also increased union members' campaigning capacity and political awareness. The multi-scaled capacity of the OHC, when aligned with CUPE's mutual interests and strong leadership engagement, decentralised coalition involvement from a leadership scale to the scale of local unions and rank and file members. This was unevenly developed across the union, being driven by bridge builders, local union competition or crisis. However, it powerfully demonstrated how a union can be changed by a coalition. Additionally, the OHC provided CUPE with a multi-scaled vehicle to campaign on an issue of vested interest with a 'sword of justice'. The OHC's voice on the issue of P3s, even with a reactive social frame, created a relational power that allowed the OHC to garner public commitment for CUPE, made possible because of mutual interests.

Chapter Seven explored the Chicago-based Grassroots Collaborative, an example of mobilising coalition unionism. This was a community-initiated coalition with a very strong set of inter-organisational relationships based on common values.
and organising capacity. Common concern for living wages was often unevenly shared across the coalition, however it remained strong as the inter-organisational relationships connected member turn-out to decision making. The chapter firstly investigated a union organising campaign for a living wage. SEIU 880’s campaign involved winning representation rights and wage increases for low-wage homecare and home childcare workers using a combination of alliances, political action and home visits. Secondly, living wages were also pursued by the Grassroots Collaborative and SEIU 880 for retail workers, after an unsuccessful campaign to stop Wal-Mart entering Chicago. Strong inter-organisational relationships were a common strength in these campaigns. Union-to-union relationships with the State Council enhanced union political power, which helped achieve collective bargaining outcomes, and deep relationships inside the Collaborative were supplemented by new union and community relationships in the temporary Living Wage Coalition. Additionally, the open inter-organisational space allowed for the negotiation of a powerful common concern, particularly evident in the shift from the No Wal-Mart campaign to the Big Box Living Wage campaign. Yet the Chicago coalition was weakened by its singularly-scaled coalition capacity. The Collaborative and SEIU 880’s campaigns were staff-led. SEIU 880 members were engaged through state-scaled member meetings. While Collaborative members were engaged as public speakers, the Living Wage Coalition also did not establish locally-scaled structures while undertaking the living wage campaign. The Collaborative did campaign at multiple scales, running a local field operation; however, the local activity was hard to sustain because it was resourced by centrally employed staff, not locally-based volunteers.
For SEIU 880, the most powerful element of the Collaborative’s mobilising coalition unionism was its relational power. The inter-organisational relationships provided a capacity to constantly renegotiate the contradictions of coalition unity and organisational autonomy, particularly over interest. Relationships were sustained beyond crises or issue-based campaigns, and there was a strong understanding between the parties of each other’s issues and concerns. Collaborative relationships fed into SEIU 880’s organising campaigns; for example, through the Springfield rally in 2002 and the IHC’s support for childcare workers in 2004. Similarly, Collaborative engagement provided a space for member politicisation around Wal-Mart in the Big Box Living Wage campaign.

Chapter Eight reorganised the findings of the three case studies under the theoretical frameworks established in Chapters Two and Three and examined the viability of my coalition unionism frameworks as a theory for understanding coalition unionism. In reconsidering the elements of coalitions, it demonstrated how these elements helped explain the patterns of success across the case studies. Additionally, while the models of coalition unionism did not perfectly correlate with existing union practice, they were useful for highlighting differences across the coalitions in the case studies and the secondary literature.

Chapter Eight also explored the different ways in which coalitions can be powerful for unions. This contributed to filling a gap in the existing literature, which often assumed rather than established how coalitions can be powerful for unions. While all the unions, to an extent, made gains through their engagement with coalitions, there was a strong alignment between the coalition models and the types of power they provided unions. As noted above, agenda-driven
coalition unionism most successfully provided class movement power. The strong mutual interest relationships and depth of union engagement in the PEC created a multi-scaled political consciousness and helped set the union’s agenda for public education. Relationship-driven coalition unionism most successfully provided place-based power. The OHC activated CUPE’s multi-scaled structures to expose the union’s leadership, locals and members to campaign tactics such as tours, and campaign planning in the plebiscites. Mobilising coalition unionism most successfully delivered relational power, where SEIU 880 was able, to simultaneously organise new members while engaging in collective coalition campaigns for living wages.

As Chapter Eight concluded, the power that coalitions can provide for unions related to strategic and contextual pressures. Across the case studies, there was no evidence to say that one type of coalition unionism was more powerful than the other, but rather that the coalitions harnessed strategic opportunities that enabled them to leverage political power and enhance their capacity. Yet these strategic decisions for coalition success often worked in contradiction. In Chicago, successful outcomes and sustainable relationships were pursued ahead of the development of rank and file participation. In Sydney, successful outcomes and union member development were pursued ahead of sustainable relationships. In Toronto, sustainable relationships and rank and file participation developed while achieving more limited political outcomes in the P3 campaign. Coalitions choose to maximise certain types of success given the available opportunity structure.

This thesis provides a conceptual map for understanding how and when coalition unionism is powerful for unions. This framework has clear value for
industrial relations by suggesting three types of collaborative power that unions can draw from coalitions. It contributes to union renewal theory by clarifying the meaning of community unionism and providing a framework for understanding how and when coalition unionism is effective. It is useful for union practitioners, as it provides an understanding of the elements of effective coalition practice at a time when coalitions have become a mainstream strategy for unions.

2.0 Implications for Theory
Furthermore, this thesis has implications beyond coalitions. The implications are firstly methodological, including the potential for future quantitative research and an approach to international comparison for union renewal. Secondly, the findings have implications for the relationship between coalitions and identity. Thirdly, the findings have implications for the global cities literature. Fourthly, the findings have implications for community unionism strategies, and in particular the importance of scale for renewing unions. Finally, the thesis has implications for how industrial relations theory recognises the role of community organisations and how it assesses the purpose of unions.

1.1 Methodology
This thesis’s qualitative research into coalition practice presents several criteria that might be useful for future quantitative research on coalitions. The coalition elements are capable of being reduced to quantitative dependent variables, which could investigate the extent to which the measures of common concern, inter-organisational relationships and scale shape the independent variable, coalition success. Similarly, the opportunities and choices factors identified in
Chapter Three could be investigated as dependent variables, to explore when any of these measures significantly correlate with, or predict coalition practice. A challenge for this kind of quantitative research is building a sufficient sample size to undertake these tests. However, research of this kind would be a useful and important supplement to the qualitative approach in this thesis as it would allow for an investigation of how the elements and frameworks identified in this study account for and explain likely and successful coalition practice across the union movement.

My finding that coalitions are strongly capable of dialectically adapting their strategies to differences in national political context has implications for how we compare international strategies for union renewal. As noted in Chapter Four, there is a tendency in industrial relations to argue either that the external political context shapes differences in union renewal strategy, or that unions are strategic agents that can overcome various structural obstacles and achieve similar outcomes in different national contexts. While the findings give weight to the idea that unions and coalitions are strategic agents, the framework developed tried to accommodate a dialectical understanding of structure and agency to interpret how unions and coalitions respond to, and shape, their external environment. After all, across the studies there were small but important differences that derived from national context, including differences in community organisation capacity, the relative role of unions and community organisations in the coalition, union-party relationships and political culture. Yet these contextual differences were not static obstacles that produced differences in coalition outcomes. Instead, coalitions responded with different strategies. The OHC established broker organisations to respond to a lack of mobilising capacity from community organisations; the Collaborative prioritised mobilisation to
achieving outcomes more than capacity building because of a more fragmented political structure (with non-compulsory voting, and non-binding party cultures); and the PEC relied on the NSWTF to undertake member mobilisation because of the union's strong multi-scaled structures and mobilising capacity. Coalitions, as strategic actors, dialectically responded to their context and were successful in different national environments. Yet their kinds of success varied.

These findings signal an alternative method for understanding and evaluating union renewal strategies. Rather than seeing context or union agency as primarily shaping union renewal outcomes, it may be possible to build a framework for analysing union renewal that accommodates the different types of practice and outcomes evident across countries. This would allow for an international comparison of union renewal practice that recognises both strengths and weaknesses in different national contexts, and could also assess how difference is a product of the pressures of national context, history, opportunity and union agency. A comparison of union renewal strategies could assess a range of practices, such as resource commitment to new organising, industry planning, the prevalence of coalition practice and the development and engagement of rank and file steward structures, against a diversity of outcomes, such as collective bargaining coverage, legislative protection, social policy outcomes and union density. Privileging the dialectical interaction between independent and dependent variables could allow for a more internationally sensitive method of international comparison of union renewal strategies.
1.2 Coalitions and identity

The three unions featured in this study of coalitions were each underpinned by several common identities. The key unions all had a history of progressive issue-based campaigning. They also had a majority of female members. The NSWTF had a professional union identity that supported its public education campaign, and SEIU 880 integrated religion to enhance member commitment to the union's campaigns. Additionally, CUPE and the NSWTF had a homogenous membership and/or homogenous union structures that facilitated the formation of common interest in the coalitions they practised. The case studies revealed a strong correlation between common identity and long-term coalition practice.

The overlap between identity and coalition practice is worthy of further research, and has broader implications for union renewal strategies. Firstly, it would be useful to further examine, using quantitative and qualitative approaches, whether common identity in a union correlates with coalition practice. Secondly, it suggests, consistent with the work of Yates, Milkman, Needleman, Fine and Savage amongst others, that coalitions and other collaborative strategies are a necessary element in strategies for organising workers with non-traditional identities (Needleman 1998b; Milkman 2000; Fine 2005a; Yates 2006, pp. 111-2). Affirming their findings that coalitions with community organisations can provide a supplementary form of leverage for strategies towards organising marginalised workers, these findings suggest that the utility of coalitions also flows from the common identity base of the workers being organised. Thirdly, it exposes a challenge for coalition and common identity organising, which is the need to balance the utility of organising sectional identities with broadening solidarity. As Nissen's work on migrant organising, amongst others, highlighted, organising workers on the basis of single common identities creates
challenges for unions when diverse workers are united in a union, or union movement (Nissen 2002; Sayce, Greene and Ackers 2006). The findings from Hyman’s dialectic of organisational autonomy and coalition unity may be useful, in that they suggest that just as in coalitions, integrating diverse identities requires the organisation and respect of difference while enabling bridge building across diversity to forge broader solidarities.

1.3 Global cities
The finding that coalitions were a successful strategy for political change and union renewal in three global cities also has implications for the global cities literature. Coalitions were consistently a viable strategy for the re-regulation of social policy in the interests of union members and residents. The global cities literature identifies that global cities are facing democratic deficits, where local residents have reduced influence over political outcomes, and face an increasing gap between rich and poor. The thesis suggests that coalitions are a viable strategy for challenging these problems of accountability and inequality.

However, these findings also challenge some of the assumptions in the global cities literature. Firstly, while success was evident in the three studies, coalition practice across the global cities was affected by ‘small differences’ in national political context. Global cities may share similar economic circumstances, but in this research, economic similarities did not overcome political historical differences, which impacted on coalition practice. Secondly, the coalitions’ strategies were not restricted to the global city as a privileged domain of social action. Rather, the strategies sought to build policy change at the scale of the state, nation and city. This contradicts the claim made by some global cities
theorists, that the significance of political scales beyond the city have declined (cf Fagan 2000; Sassen 2004, p. 32; May, Wills, Datta et al. 2006). Coalition outcomes relied on multi-scaled coalition activity beyond the city; for instance, the OHC relied on local broker organisations outside the city to supplement the challenges of mobilising union and community organisation members in Toronto. Similarly, to re-regulate global cities required political activity at scales beyond the city, as in Sydney where the Public Education Coalition achieved its greatest policy outcomes through the NSW Government. Moreover, the ‘city’ is multi-scaled, which is not emphasised in the global cities literature. Levels of inequality and place consciousness varied within the cities and shaped coalition practice. This required multi-scaled coalition capacity at a sub-city level, such as through the establishment of broker organisations.

This thesis challenges the illusion that globalisation takes us beyond the bounds of geography. The case studies demonstrate that political, coalition and union scales, inside and beyond the global city, are critical for political outcomes and building capacity. This suggests that it is vital for the global cities literature to recognise the many scales of power that operate inside and beyond these cities, as these scales all offer possibilities for challenging the inequality and lack of accountability evident in global cities.

1.4 Community unionism, scale and union renewal

The thesis also offers scholars a more concrete understanding of community unionism. In contrast to the mixed meanings of community unionism across the literature, I suggest that community unionism is a descriptive term defining three distinct union organising strategies. While the study focused on one
particular example of community unionism, it is possible that these findings about coalition unionism may have implications for understanding other community unionism strategies.

In particular, the finding about the importance of scale has direct implications for union place-based organising strategies. The thesis suggested that coalition scale was important in two ways for achieving outcomes and building organisational capacity. Firstly, coalitions were successful if they were multi-scaled and able to challenge decision makers at multiple scales. Secondly, coalitions were successful if they had local broker organisations that could be a site for rank and file union engagement and development.

The implications of these findings stressed the dual importance of multi-scaled union capacity as essential for contesting the decisions of employers and government and building union capacity. As noted in Chapter Three, there is some ambiguity in the labour geography literature about which scale of action is most important for rebuilding unionism, with theorists debating the merits of the global, the local and multi-scaled strategies. Additionally, the literature on worker centres recognises that political influence beyond the local is a challenge for locally-scaled organisations, a potential limitation of workers' centres (Fine 2003, p. 630; Osterman 2006).

These findings suggest a different way to understand the challenges of scale for union renewal. Local union capacity is important. As the worker centre scholarship and many labour geographers note, the local is where workers live, reproduce their productive capacity and can participate in decision making (Wills 2001). Renewing local union structures is critical for increasing the
capacity of union members as union strategic agents for rebuilding the place-based power unions. Indeed, a consistent obstacle for coalitions in the case studies was a lack of local union capacity. Renewing the local base of unions has the potential to improve coalition practice and union capacity. Yet local action, while necessary, is not sufficient for challenging the decision makers unions confront. Employers are increasingly global, and unions, like coalitions, need to be capable of acting at multiple scales. It was the combination of local and multi-scaled capacity that was essential for coalition success, and it is potentially this same combination of union scale that is critical for increasing the success and capacity of unions.

These findings about the importance of scale for unions are timely given the increased attention in union literature to the role of scale and local organising. For instance, interest in scale has increased recently with growing literature on, and experimentation with, global union strategies (Herod 2001; Harrod and O'Brien 2002; Bronfenbrenner 2007; Tattersall 2007b). Similarly, interest in local organising strategies is evident in the growing research on non-union workplace organising, such as worker centres or ‘community unions’ (Cranford and Ladd 2003; Fine 2005a; Fine 2005b), and in local union strategies as a way to respond to globalisation (Herod 2001; Levesque and Murray 2002; Ellem 2005; Rainnie and Ellem forthcoming). By identifying the link between coalition unionism and the broader strategies of community unionism, these findings about the importance of scale may have direct implications for these related union strategies.
1.5 Implications for industrial relations theory

Finally, the thesis has implications for industrial relations theory, by introducing a framework for understanding the role of community organisations in industrial relations and the purpose of unions. While the research work focused on the relationship between community organisations and unions, the case studies highlighted that this horizontal relationship was capable of supporting collective bargaining outcomes and a broader set of policy outcomes.

This has three implications. Firstly, the thesis proposed a framework for understanding under what circumstances community organisations can support unions. Three forms of union collaborative power were suggested – relational power, class movement power and place-based power. These may contribute to reworking industrial relations theories of union collaboration with community organisations specifically, and the importance of collaboration more broadly.

Secondly, the analysis of collaborative power may have implications for understanding other types of union collaboration. While the frameworks were based on coalitions between unions and community organisations, these frameworks may provide an insight into how and when union-to-union collaboration is likely, such as global union collaboration or in central labour councils. Indeed, I have adapted my analysis of coalitions to exploring the SEIU's global partnerships unit and its alliance with the Transport and General Workers Union. (Tattersall 2007b). This implication is useful, as union collaborative strategies are currently under review, exemplified in the trend towards stronger international union activity to confront multi-national corporations or the changes to central labour councils, evidenced by the split of the AFL-CIO and the formation of the Change to Win Federation.
Thirdly, these findings challenge traditional understandings of the role of unions. In the case studies, union members and union leaders were able to use collective strategies to shape not only their employment relationships, but to shape policy and the political environment. The effectiveness of this practice opens up the question of what is the legitimate purpose for unions. In particular, it suggests that it may be useful for unions, in a time of crisis in density, to campaign on a broader scope of demands. These findings suggest that by campaigning on a broader range of mutually interested issues, both inside and beyond the employment relationship, unions can achieve victories that affect the conditions of their members and increase their campaigning capacity. These gains are not only important in and of themselves, but can also feed back into the union's ability to contest the employment relationship.

In conclusion, this thesis has developed and explored three frameworks for understanding successful coalition unionism. It found that coalitions can support union renewal by enhancing a union's ability to win outcomes, shift the political climate, sustain union relationships with community organisations and increase the capacity of unions. It argued that coalition unionism is a diverse strategy, where long-term coalitions differ depending on the strength or weakness of their coalition elements. It argued that coalitions tend to operate with consistent themes, as the coalition elements often exist in contradiction where there is a strong presence of two elements and a weak presence of the third. These different coalition models offer different possibilities for unions, presenting contrasting forms of power and potential for union renewal. Unions are more likely to practise coalitions when presented with certain circumstances, including a crisis in bargaining capacity, a broad union identity, available
community partners and internal pressures. In these ways, coalitions can provide power for unions. By developing three frameworks of coalition unionism this thesis has developed an overall framework that explains how and when coalitions can be a powerful strategy for union renewal.
References

Interviews with the Author

The interviews are noted below, grouped by case study. Under each case study the interviews are categorised under three different headings.

Firstly, the named interviewees are listed. For these interviews, the interviewees either signed a consent form providing permission for their name to be cited in the text, or provided written consent at a later date for a particular quotation to be cited with their names. As per the human ethics agreement at the University of Sydney, the preference was to allow interviewees to be anonymous, and only when they explicitly requested for their names to be cited were they cited in the text.

Secondly, the first group of anonymous interviews are listed. In this group, I explicitly cite the organisation. For these references, the interviewees agreed in writing that these specific quotations could be cited next to the name of their organisation in the text. In Chicago and Sydney, because there was a large number of interviews from the same organisation (notably the NSWTF and the SEIU), acknowledging the name of the organisation maintained complete anonymity of the participant.

Thirdly, are anonymous interviews where the name of the organisation is not cited.
Additionally, the reporting system for the interview names includes a series of aliases. Before undertaking interviews and in discussion with interview subjects, I suggested that certain sensitive quotations could be included under separately named quotes as an alias. Where an alias is used, it has been given a separate interview number and is recorded in this list with a single asterisk at the end of the line (*).

Separate to this, I also have recorded the total number of interviews (minus aliases) in each of the categories. Finally, when an interview has a double asterisk at the end of the line (**), it signifies that an interview was undertaken but no direct quotes were used in the text of the thesis.

A final note: after the completion of the case studies, all the subjects I interviewed were shown copies of the text and confirmed the different types of citation (whether named, organisation named and/or anonymous). I did this to make absolutely certain that the system of interview citation was consented to by each of the participants.

1. Public Education Coalition: Chapter Five (42 interviews)

Interviews where interviewees gave signed permission to cite name (19):


Interviews where organisation cited but not name (21):
Interview 3 (2005). NSWTF staff person, January-May, Sydney (*).
Interview 4 (2005). NSWTF union trainer, 13 January, Sydney (**).
Interview 7 (2005). NSWTF staff person, January-May, Sydney (*).

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Interview 16 (2005). NSWTF regional organiser, 17 February, Sydney (**)。
Interview 18 (2005). NSWTF organiser, 1 March, Sydney (**).
Interview 26 (2005). NSWTF official, 4 March, Sydney (**).

Interviews where organisation and name not cited (2):
Interview 13 (2005). Principal representative, March, Sydney (*).
Interview 21 (2005). Principal representative, February, Sydney (*).
Interview 23 (2005). Education Advocate representative, 13 April, Sydney (**).
Interview 24 (2005). Non-NSWTF union official, 18 April, Sydney

2. Ontario Health Coalition: Chapter Six (33 interviews)

Interviews where interviewees gave signed permission to cite name (14):

Interviews where organisation cited but not name (10):


Interview 10 (2005). BHC participant, 7 July, Brampton.


Interview 28 (2006). CUPE-OCHU staff person, May, Toronto (*).


Interview 34 (2006). CUPE staff person, May, Toronto (*).

Interviews where organisation and name not cited (9):


Interview 7 (2005). Local coalition representative, 5 July, Toronto (**).

Interview 11 (2005). Coalition participant, June-July, Toronto (*).


Interview 16 (2005). Local coalition participant, 12 July, regional Ontario (**).

Interview 18 (2006). Seniors' organisation representative, May, Toronto (*).


Interview 22 (2006). Coalition participant, May, Toronto (*).
Interview 23 (2006). Union staff person, May, Toronto (*).
Interview 24 (2005). Coalition participant, October, Toronto (*)
Interview 27 (2005). Local coalition participant, June-July, Toronto (*).
Interview 31 (2005). Local coalition participant, June-July, Brampton (*).
Interview 35 (2005). Coalition participant, June-July, Toronto (*).
Interview 36 (2006). Local coalition participant, May, regional Ontario (*).
Interview 37 (2005). Local coalition participant, June-July, regional Ontario (*)
Interview 38 (2005). Union staff person, November, Toronto (*).
Interview 40 (2005). Coalition participant, November, Toronto (*).
Interview 41 (2005). Coalition participant, June-July, Toronto (*).

3. Grassroots Collaborative: Chapter Seven (45 interviews)

Interviews where interviewees gave signed permission to cite name (5):
Talbott, Madeline (2006). ACORN Executive Director, interview, 15 September, Chicago.

*Interviews where organisation cited but not name (18):*
Interview 2 (2005). SEIU Local 880 staff person, July-September, Chicago (*).  
Interview 7 (2005). SEIU Local 73 staff person, 1 August, Chicago.  
Interview 10 (2005). SEIU Local 880 staff person, 16 August, Chicago.  
Interview 13 (2005). SEIU Local 880 staff person, July-September, Chicago (*).  
Interview 17 (2005). SEIU Local 880 staff person, 29 August, Chicago (**).  
Interview 26 (2005). SEIU staff person, July-September, Chicago (*).  
Interview 40 (2006). SEIU 880 staff member, September, Chicago (*).  
Interview 42 (2006). SEIU senior official, 18 September, Chicago (by phone) (**).  
Interview 45 (2006). SEIU 880 staff member, 18 September, Chicago (**).

Interview 50 (2006). SEIU 880 rank and file member, September, Chicago (*).

Interview 66 (2006). UFCW staff person, 18 September, Chicago (*).

Interview 55 (2005). SEIU Local 880 staff member, September, Chicago (*).

Interview 56 (2006). SEIU Local 880 staff member, September, Chicago.

Interviews where organisation and name not cited (22):

Interview 1 (2005). Community organiser, July-September, Chicago (*).


Interview 22 (2005). City of Chicago alderman, 1 September, Chicago.


Interview 27 (2005). Union organiser, July-September, Chicago (*).

Interview 28 (2005). Community organiser, July-September, Chicago (*).

Interview 29 (2005). Community organisater, July-September, Chicago (*).


Interview 31 (2006). Union organiser, 14 September, Chicago (**).


Interview 41 (2006). Community organiser, 18 September, Chicago (**).


Interview 48 (2006). Union organiser, 20 September, Chicago (by phone) (**).

Interview 49 (2006). Union organiser, September, Chicago (*).

Interview 51 (2006). Union organiser, September, Chicago (*).

Interview 52 (2006). Union organiser, September, Chicago (*).


Interview 54 (2006). Union organiser, September, Chicago (*).

* means the interview name is an alias.

** means that the interview was undertaken but no direct quotations are included in the text of the PhD.
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