Identity and Interests

Understanding the Meltdown in Israeli-Turkish Relations

2002-2012

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Acknowledgements and Declaration

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This work is substantially my own, and where any part of this work is not my own, I have indicated this by acknowledging the source of that part or those parts of the work.

Signed

Katherine Cook

10th October 2012
Abstract

The recent deterioration of the strong bilateral alliance between Israel and Turkey has significant affects on the balance of power within the Middle East. As such, it is important that scholars determine why this meltdown has occurred. This thesis sought to explain the deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey and overcome gaps in the existing literature concerned with this meltdown of bilateral relations by taking a fresh look into the role of identity and the interests it creates. Hence, the framework of Wendtian constructivism was applied in order to examine the social origins and impacts of identity and interests on alliance formation and deterioration. In this thesis, I suggested that Israel’s identity has changed slowly over the past decade and as such, should be perceived as ‘relatively’ stable. Conversely, however, Turkey’s national identity changed sharply, drifting away from the Ataturk agenda of Westernisation and secularism towards an Islamic heritage. In order to strengthen my argument that this shift in Turkish identity has primarily accounted for the deterioration of its relations with Israel, I analysed Turkish attitudes towards foreign policies other than its bilateral relationship with Israel, as well as its newly defined interests. Thus, whereas Israel’s relatively stable national identity and domestic policies were matched by its relatively stable foreign interests over the past decade, deep changes to Turkey’s national identity redirected its domestic policies under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government. Consequently, Turkey has employed a number of political tensions and events as pretexts in order to unilaterally disengage from its relations with Israel so that it can further new foreign policies and interests. Identity matters, and for better or worse, identity changes precede foreign policy change, a lesson we must not forget.
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<tr>
<td>AICE</td>
<td>American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise</td>
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<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development (Adalet ve Kalkınma) Party (Also JDP)</td>
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<td>CBS</td>
<td>Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<td>FP</td>
<td>Felicity (Saadet) Party</td>
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<td>GDF</td>
<td>General Directorate for Foundations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>\textit{Harakat al-Muqawamah al-‘Isla'miyyah} (Islamic Resistance Movement)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ICBS</td>
<td>Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHH:</td>
<td>\textit{İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsanı Yardım Vakfı} (The Foundation for Human Rights, Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (also AKP)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>oPt</td>
<td>occupied Palestinian territory</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Virtue (Fazilet) Party</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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**NOTE:**  All Figures quoted in United States Dollars ($US
Introduction: The Meltdown

Israel and Turkey share the commonality of being both democratic and non-Arab states situated in the Middle Eastern region of Arab dominated countries. Dissimilarly though, Israel and Turkey do not identify themselves through common religious affiliations. That is, 75.3% of Israel’s population self-identify as being Jewish, whilst 99.8% of Turkey’s population currently identify themselves as Muslims (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2012a and; Central Intelligence Agency 2012a). Despite this cultural disparity, both states have enjoyed a relatively strong diplomatic, military and economic partnership since 1949. This alliance has encompassed various land, sea, air and intelligence agreements as well as an economic trade boom in the 21st Century, reaching a peak trade market of $4.4 billion in 2011 (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 2012b). However, since 2011 tensions have mounted to the point that a significant deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey has occurred.

Since the 2002 inception of Turkey’s Justice and Development (Adalet ve Kalkınma, AK) Party under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, relations between Israel and Turkey have increasingly deteriorated. This deterioration in relations was made official by a series of immediate responses to the polemical Mavi Marmara flotilla incident of May 2010. The responses included the immediate freezing of 16 defense contracts and training exercises such as the ‘Anatolian Eagle’ in 2010, followed by the subsequent and mutual withdrawal of diplomats in 2011. The significance of this bilateral relationship is crucial given the volatile nature of the
region, as it contributes to maintaining a distribution of power within the international arena. This paper adopts a social means of inquiry into the identity and interests of each of these states, respectively, in order to better understand this breakdown in relations. In order to do this, the dependent variables of identity and interests will be tested in the case of each state so as to identify any change in these over the past decade. The results will then be used to demonstrate why this recent meltdown in relations between Israel and Turkey has occurred. To borrow the words of Wendt, “Power and interests are important factors in international life, but since their effects are a function of culturally constituted ideas the latter should be our starting point” (1999: 41). This examination will provide an understanding of Turkey’s role in unilaterally disengaging from its relations with Israel, which I argue is the result of a change in Turkey’s national identity and state interests.

TURNING POINTS

In March 1949, Turkey became the first state within the region of the Middle East to formerly recognise the state of Israel. This initiated a bilateral relationship between Israel and Turkey, which allowed for and encouraged cooperation when it came to concerns of regional instabilities. For instance, in August 1958, then Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes established a partnership, known as the “Peripheral Pact”, which outlined joint public relations ventures and an exchange of intelligence data (Nachmani 1987: 75). Whilst Israel and Turkey have disagreed in the past over the issue of Palestine, particularly with regards to Israel’s gains from the Six-Day War in 1967, the bilateral partnership remained resilient during this period, assured by Turkey’s abstention from joining the Arab initiated reference to Israel as an “aggressor state” (Dahl and Slutzky 2006: 1).
Furthermore, at the 1969 Organisation of the Islamic Conference held in Morocco, Turkey again opposed calls to relinquish diplomatic relations with Israel (Dahl and Slutzky 2006: 1).

Although during the 1980s relations experienced a period of tension, the extent of the pressures don’t compare to the diplomatic stagnation of present. Rather, after Yasser Arafat opened the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Ankara during October 1979, Turkey downgraded its diplomatic ties with Israel to a level of second secretary in December 1980, a change that was upheld on a reciprocal basis by Israel (Roberson 1998: 168). Turkey claimed the cause for this change was Israel’s unconciliatory policy towards Middle Eastern issues, specifically, the issue of Palestine (Dahl and Slutzky 2006: 1). Notwithstanding these symbolic changes however, each state maintained a presence of charge d’affaires in the other, and by 1988 relations had warmed up again. This claim is supported by the Turkish decision to deny diplomatic status to PLO representatives in Ankara throughout 1988 in response to Israeli demands (Burris 2003). A full restoration of ambassadorial relations between Israel and Turkey were returned by December 1991 (Inbar 2010: 28). This restoration was reinstated by the signing of new principles for cooperation between the two states’ defense ministries in April 1992 and by the establishment of the Turkish-Israeli Business Council in March 1993 (Dahl and Slutzky 2006: 2-3). Relations remained relatively stable throughout the rest of this decade, and a free trade agreement was reached in March 1996, to take effect from May 1997 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy 2012).
Militarily, ties also remained strong through the turn of the century with Israel’s signing of a $75 million contract to upgrade forty-eight Turkish F-5 aircrafts in 1998 worth $900 million. This military collaboration was extended to include the upgrading of 170 Turkish M60A1 tanks at a cost of $687, Turkey’s purchase of Popeye-11 surface-to-air missiles worth $150 million, and 10 Israeli Heron unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) costing Turkey another $183 million (Nachmani 1998 and Katz 2011). In addition to these sales, agreements were made for the exchange of pilots eight times per year and Israel granted permission for Turkish pilots to train at Israel’s computerised firing range at the Nevatim airfield (Nachmani 1998). Other joint military exercises included the Reliant Mermaid III, IV and V, which took place from early 2001 to December 2002 (and Dahl and Slutzky 2006: 6-7). These agreements indicate not only strong diplomatic connections, but also too the strength of military and economic relations between Israel and Turkey during the early 2000s. However, as a result of the meltdown in relations between these two states, all military agreements between Israel and Turkey have remained suspended since September of 2011.

A PARTY OF PROBLEMS

With the inception of turkey’s AK party in 2002, relations between Israel and Turkey have been somewhat hostile due to the change in Turkish national identity. I will argue that a number of events such as, but not limited to, the cancellation of various joint military exercises including Operations Cast Lead and Anatolian Eagle; the Gaza war and; the Flotilla incident of 2010 are pretexts used by Turkey in order to redirect its foreign interests and furthermore, that scholars, such as Brayer, Cowell and the international media in general, have unwisely attributed too much causal power to
these events (Brayer 2010; Cowell 2011; Keinon 2012). Nonetheless, these events, and others, have resulted in the suspension of diplomatic and military collaborations such as Turkey’s previously stated freezing of 16 defense contracts with Israel (Friedman and Fraser 2011). Notwithstanding this, what makes this recent deterioration of bilateral relations different to past tensions is that they are not explicitly identified by either state as being reactionary to the Palestine problem alone, which has historically been at the heart of tensions between these two states. Instead, the demise in relations has occurred at the culmination of various events, which will be discussed in Chapter Two of this paper and be referred to as ‘pretexts’ arguably used by Turkey in order to unilaterally disengage from its relations with Israel.

ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

This paper examines the national identity and state interests of Israel and Turkey, respectively, over the past decade. Israel’s identity is tested by means of examining domestic policies in order to demonstrate that its national identity has remained ‘relatively’ stable, where relative stability infers a slow pace of change under interchanging governments, but no sharp changes to its national identity. Contrastingly, an analysis of Turkey’s identity indicates that deep changes to domestic policies have resulted in a sharp redefinition of Turkey’s national identity. To demonstrate that this change in identity was not just reflected in Turkey’s relations with Israel, I examined two case studies as testing mechanisms of Israel and Turkey’s foreign policies and interests, respectively. These findings indicated that Israel’s foreign policies and national interests have remained relatively stable over the past decade, like its national identity. However, the examination of Turkey’s foreign
policies indicated that like its national identity, Turkey’s interests had been sharply
redirected under the current AKP government. Thus, because of this redirection of its
interests, Turkey has unilaterally disengaged from its relations with Israel, using a
series of political tensions and events as pretexts.

AVAILABLE ANSWERS
Since Turkey became the first Middle Eastern state to recognise the state of Israel in
1949, the relationship between these two states strengthened so much so that many
scholars described it as a “strategic alliance” (Kosebalaban 2010 and; Oguzlu 2010). However, since the AKP gained electoral success within the Turkish parliament in
November 2002, relations between these two states have suffered. Whilst there has
been an abundance of literature on the relationship between Israel and Turkey in years
gone by, the contemporary nature of the sudden deterioration of relations at late 2011
has somewhat limited the quantity of published academic sources, often rendering one
to rely heavily on the media’s portrayal of events. Nonetheless, when assessing what
sources we do have, there is much conjecture over the causation of the breakdown in
relations, although three main arguments emerge.

The first approach to this topic largely attributes the cause of the breakdown to
be concerned with the historic problems associated with Palestine and other events
that have shaped change. Scholars of this argument, particularly Brayer and Cowell,
attribute the ultimate cause in the downgrade of relations to the 2010 event of the
Mavi Marmara flotilla raid, which they argue occurred at the culmination of other
tensions such as the Gaza War of 2008-2009 and political tensions pertaining to the
December 2009 television scandal of “The Separation” episode aired in 2010 (Brayer
The international media has contributed to this line of thought, particularly after the findings of the United Nations (UN) inquiry into the blockade of the flotilla from entering Gaza, chaired by Geoffrey Palmer and released in September 2011. The report indicated that actions taken by Israel in the incident were done so within the boundaries of international law and for the purposes of national interest and security, however, it did also identify that Israel had used a “disproportionate” measure of force and “an unacceptable level of brutality” through the use of smoke grenades and rounds fired from helicopters (Palmer et al 2011: 4). Notwithstanding this though, the report also questioned the motives of the flotilla, stating it raised, “serious questions about the conduct, true nature and objectives of the flotilla organisers, particularly the IHH”.¹ (Palmer et al 2011: 4). According to Time magazine, Turkish Prime Minster, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s reaction to the Palmer report’s findings led to the recall of Turkey’s ambassador to Israel and the cancellation of various joint military exercises in addition to ordering Israel’s ambassador, Gabby Levy, to leave Turkey by Wednesday 7 September 2011 (Vick 2011). Conversely to this view though, this paper seeks to explore a means of inquiry other than the notion of event driven change.

Second, are the realist and hegemonic explanations that are concerned with the changes in the balance of power based upon notion of Turkey’s plight to emerge as hegemon of the Middle Eastern region. Scholars such as Ogurlu and Candar have argued this theory substantially and make many points concerning Turkey’s realignment of power with its Middle Eastern neighbours including Iran and Egypt

¹ IHH: İnsan Hak ve Hüriyetleri ve İnsanı Yardımcı Vakfı, is a Turkish based non-governmental, humanitarian relief foundation pronounced in English as The Foundation for Human Rights, Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief
However, this theory is contingent upon the Arab Spring and its contribution to Turkey’s emergence as a regional hegemon. What is more, this theory of inquiry does not provide an adequate variable testing mechanism for which we can isolate the relations between Israel and Turkey specifically.

The third debate, with which this essay extends upon, is that of a social inquiry into the role of identity and interests in alliance formation and deterioration. This theory, focused on identity and interests, provides a deeper argument that acknowledges the contribution of events and changes to the balance of power, but asserts that these have occurred as the result of changes in identity. Accordingly, scholars from this field have argued that a change in Turkey’s identity has occurred, thus indicating that its interests potentially no longer align with Israel’s (Dincer and Karal 2011 and; Johansson-Nogués and Jonasson 2011). However, the paucity of socially constructed arguments of identity and interests and their contribution to the recent deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey has resulted in gaps in the literature. This is particularly concerning due to the volatile nature of the region and the significant implications that a breakdown in relations between these two states could have on the balance of power within not only this region, but the greater international arena as well.

A NEW APPROACH
Starting from constructivist assumptions, this paper bridges gaps in the literature by examining the role played by identity and interests in the recent meltdown in relations between Israel and Turkey. The lens of Wendtian constructivism is applied in order to
theoretically explain and link between changes in national identity and changed state interests. It will be offered that this change in identity, viewed as a turning point in Turkish politics under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s tenure from 2002, has been the leading cause of the deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey. Hereafter, the role of this paper will therefore be to address this recent breakdown in relations between Israel and Turkey from a social means of inquiry so as to articulate a better understanding of why the breakdown has occurred. As such, the aim of this research paper is *not* to assess the causal aspects of how the breakdown has occurred; rather, the focus is on providing an *understanding of why* it has occurred. For this reason, it is logical that a constructivist approach be taken in order to examine the question. The justification for this will be outlined in Chapter One.

**ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS**

The purpose of this paper is to provide an understanding of why there has been a recent change in the bilateral relations between Israel and Turkey. In order to do so, Chapter One will be concerned with providing the theoretical framework of the constructivist lens through which this essay is structured. This chapter will address the specific reasoning behind utilising Wendtian constructivism, which then provides the means for which claims can be substantiated when arguing that changes in identity are intertwined with changes in interests. As Wendt terms it, “identities are the basis of interests” (1992: 398). This theoretical positioning of the paper will then allow for an understanding of the logical order this paper proceeds in.

Both Chapter Two and Chapter Three apply the Wendtian constructivist framework, outlined in Chapter One, to the states of Israel and Turkey, respectively,
in order to examine the social change and possible changes in identity to provide an understanding of whether such a change has occurred or not. Chapter Two applies testing mechanisms in order to assess the social construction of Israel’s identity by examining domestic policies. Two two case studies are then applied in order to test the continuity of Israel’s national interests over this past decade and to indicate whether the relative stability of its national identity is reflected by the state’s foreign policies and interests. The two case studies employed are Israel’s relations with the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Israel’s relations with the US. This examination demonstrates that over the past decade, Israel has not endured a significant change in its state interests. For this reason, it is justifiable to assume that Israel's foreign policies towards Turkey remained constant, given the relative stability of its domestic and foreign interests. These findings will indicate that the deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey might therefore be reflective of some change to Turkey’s identity and interests.

Chapter Three assesses the Turkish account for the breakdown in relations. In this chapter I apply the theoretical framework of Wendtian constructivism again in order to understand the construction of contemporary Turkish identity. I demonstrate that Turkey has undergone a deep change in its national identity under the sharp redirection of domestic policies under the current AKP government, which has in turn redefined Turkey’s state interests thereby resulting in a changed attitude towards Turkey’s relations with Israel.

The final segment of this thesis highlights the findings of this research. Firstly, that Israel’s identity, and therefore interests, remained relatively stable over the past
decade, whereas the sharp change in Turkey’s national identity has resulted in deep changes to Turkey’s interests. This change has resulted in Turkey’s national interests no longer aligning with those of Israel’s. Thus, for this reason, Turkey has less reason to cooperate with Israel and vice versa because their interests are experiencing a period of misalignment. The implications of this are identified as having the potential to have significant consequences in the balance of power both within the region and within the international arena. It is hoped that through an understanding of why this breakdown in relations has occurred, readers can better understand the affects of identities and interests to alliances within the international arena.
Chapter One:  
*A Social Inquiry*

This thesis argues that we can better understand the meltdown in relations between Israel and Turkey by taking the Wendtian constructivist approach of examining their respective national identities and state interests. However, before testing these dependent variables, it is important to understand the purpose of doing so. As such, this chapter examines why Wendtian constructivism is the best theoretical explanation for why relations between Israel and Turkey have deteriorated recently. In doing so, it is established that a change in national identity can result in a change of state interests, which in this case led to the deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey.

The discipline of International Relations (IR), since its inception post World War I, has been consumed by the study of the causes of war with the stated aim of which to explain how states can avoid such conflicts into the future (Dickinson 1917: v). However, with the emergence of the Cold War in 1947 it became apparent that preexisting schools of IR were inadequate in explaining some conflicts, such as the Cold War, which continued as an unresolved conflict until 1991. In response, scholars emerged with new theories of IR such as poststructuralism, critical theory, feminism and constructivism, each of which explore both causal and non-causal aspects of IR, challenging the mainstream ‘positivist’ methods of preexisting theories.
Robert Keohane has described these newly emerged theories as ‘reflectivist’, a notion referring to their rejection of purely scientific approaches, instead proposing methods of social enquiry (1988: 384). In this way, the defining difference between these pre and post Cold War schools of thought are their plight to either explain IR through causal analysis or to understand IR by means of inquiry into the reasons for events (Hollis and Smith 1990: 3). With the emergence of these new approaches to political science, aspects of inter-state affairs, not limited to conflict, have become of interest. For example, scholars have sought to understand and determine the causes of democracy, globalisation, terrorism and global inequalities (Kurki 2008: 1). However, what this paper is concerned with understanding are the reasons for the downgrade in bilateral relations between Israel and Turkey.

DEFINING IDENTITY

The concept of identity comes from social psychology and refers to “the images of individuality and distinctiveness ‘selfhood’ held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant ‘others’” (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 21). In other words, identity refers to the mutually constructed and evolving image of self and other. Accordingly, Hopf asserts that the first core assumption of identity formation is its reliance upon social construction (Hopf 2002: 2). This social construction comes about by the influences of both international and domestic environments (Wendt 1987 and Neumann 1992).

Identity functions as the connecting link between environmental structures and interests. As such, the notion of a ‘national identity’ is formed out of the construction of community boundaries based upon shared language, socially meaningful cultural
symbols and imagery or ‘frames’, and national history of the nation’s formation (Shafique 2011). For the purposes of this thesis, religion is the focal form of identity construction within the states of Israel and Turkey. This form of national identity will be demonstrated as contributing significantly to the interests and foreign policies of each state respectively. The second core assumption relevant to identity is that of relational comparisons. This dictates identities are incomplete without an understanding of one’s self in relation to others (Barnett 1999: 9). That is, there is always an internal-external dynamic to identity formation in that collective identities do not just emerge from internal group processes (Shafique 2011). Lastly, is the assumption that identities are not natural, fixed or stable entities (Shafique 2011). This is because, according to Katzenstein, identities both generate and shape interests (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 21). In this way we can better understand bilateral relationships between states as the perception of one’s self-identity in relation to the perceived identity of another, and what common interests these states might share which draw them closer together. Thus, relating back to the case studies within this thesis, I argue that the socially constructed identity of Israel and the changes to that of Turkey’s has resulted in the deterioration of relations between these two states.

UNPICKING WENDT

When enquiring into the nature of relations between Israel and Turkey, the concern is founded upon understanding the tensions between this historically strong bilateral alliance. In this way, this paper is a non-causal form of inquiry which challenges the dominant 20th Century discourse of neorealism by allowing for non-causal contributing factors (Hollis and Smith 1990: 3). These are used to show that structure
is given meaning by states according to their socially derived understandings. In the words of Alexander Wendt, “Identities are the basis of interests” (1992: 398). Accordingly, interests presuppose identities because, according to Wendt, an actor cannot know what it wants before it knows who it is (1999: 231). In this way, the ontological concern of constructivism is the social construction of the social world (Guzzini 2000: 174). For this reason, the significance of the Wendtian approach is in its emphasis on justifying empirical studies that may then be used to understand events as opposed to explaining their causation. As Colin Wight has synthesised, “Conceptual inquiry is a necessary prerequisite to empirical research” (Wight 2006: 290). Moreover, in conjunction with Wendt and Jepperson, Katzenstein argues that agency and environment are mutually constitutive (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 11).

For the previously stated reasons, Wendtian constructivism is the best theoretical approach to take in order to understand the deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey. Similar cases studies have also employed this theoretical framework in order to better understand changes in state interests. For example, Dingding examined the recent change in China’s foreign policy and argues that this came about as a result of China’s redefined identity as a ‘modern socialist’ state and its increased connection with the international human rights community (Dingding 2009: 339). Likewise, Shafique took a constructivist approach in order to understand the enduring conflict between India and Pakistan, concluding that the relationship can only be understood by examining each state’s identity as shaping its interests (Shafique 2011).
DECONSTRUCTING CONSTRUCTIVISM

It is important to highlight and recognise any limitations of constructivism in order to challenge these criticisms. Scholars, such as Kurki, have challenged that constructivism does not conceptualise causation beyond the assumptions of Humeanism\(^2\) which can result in “reductionist tendencies” (2008: 125). Additionally, Kurki posits that constructivists make claims that appear causal, however cannot be so, due to the Humean conception of what ‘causal’ means (2008: 125). In order to overcome these perceived flaws of constructivism, this paper will employ Alexander Wendt’s school of constructivism, specifically, so as to understand the current downturn in relations between Israel and Turkey. In doing so, a conscious acknowledgment of these perceived flaws to constructivism are refuted for the following reasons. Firstly, the claim that constructivism does not conceptualise causation beyond the Humean sense is not the concern faced by constructivists, rather, it is in ascertaining that international relations are socially constructed and “imbued with social values, norms and assumptions” (Fierke: 2007: 168). Secondly, Wendtian constructivism, by definition, does not seek to obtain the causal explanation for an event, as has been previously highlighted. Therefore, the claim by Kurki that infers constructivism makes causal claims yet they cannot be termed causal because of the Humean conception of this term is inconsequential to scholars of constructivism. This is because the focus of constructivism is on the social construction of understanding events and as such it accepts the Humean assumptions regarding causation.

\(^2\) Here, Humeanism refers to the work of David Hume (1711-1776), a Scottish philosopher known for his work on empiricism and skepticism.
Notwithstanding this, it is equally significant to highlight the role of constructivism in addressing the inadequacies of Kenneth Waltz’ neorealism, which established itself as a formal theory of IR throughout the persistent Cold War. Constructivism contests the neorealist assumption that state egoism in anarchy begets self-help (Waltz 1979 and; Mercer 1995: 229). Furthermore, constructivism posits that structures of international relations are social, not material as neorealism offers, and that these structures shape actors’ identities and interests (Bozdaglıoglu 2003: 3). Hence, if we accept these constructivist statements as true, then we cannot use any theory of realism since it necessarily dictates that states are identical, which prevents the social analysis of individual states (Hopf: 1998). Katzenstein supported this notion when he claimed that “cultural environments affect not only the incentives for different kinds of state behaviour but also the basic character of state ‘identity’” (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 8). Katzenstein juxtaposes this theoretical assumption with that of neorealists and neoliberals alike who argue that “the defining actor properties are intrinsic to state, that is, ‘essential’ to actors (rather than socially contingent), and exogenous to the environment” (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 8). Thus, the theories of neoliberalism and neorealism are not compatible with theories of constructivism and as such, prevailing assumptions of the former must be replaced by a social analysis of identity and interests.

AGENCY AND STRUCTURE

Kenneth Waltz’ theory on international politics prescribes that “a system is composed of a structure and of interacting units,” where it is assumed that states are the units within this decentralised and hierarchical international system (1986: 70). In this scenario, the actions of these units compose the structure, with anarchy as the
ordering principle (Palan 2000: 576). Thus, stemming from this notion evolves the concept of ‘self-help’ as the ordering principle of action within this anarchic system of states (Waltz 1979: 62). However, the application of the concept of self-help necessarily entails a measurement of the material capabilities of one state to perform tasks, relative to another state. Whilst neorealism dictates that instances of cooperation or conflict which occur within this system of self-help are the result of rational calculations of costs and benefits by each state respectively, constructivist thought asserts, conversely, that situations of cooperation or conflict depend on the social identities of the relevant actors (Waltz 1979: 95). In other words, constructivism debates “the extent to which state action is influenced by ‘structure’ (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus ‘process’ (interaction and learning) and institutions” (Wendt 1992: 391).

Thus, the essence of the constructivist argument is that structures of international relations are social and not material. For this reason, the process by which the interests and identities of actors are shaped by structure is referred to as their ‘socialisation’ (Bozdaglioglu 2007: 130). That is, meaningful behaviour can only be achieved by agents (states) through an understanding of global norms (structures) and practices which produce an intersubjective social context (Bozdaglioglu 2003: 16). Additionally, norms provide agents with understandings of their interests which are, it is argued by Wendt, shaped by institutions such as sovereignty (1992: 413). To breakdown this concept, Wendtian constructivism argues that the actions of agents are meaningless without the social context of the norms and practices that have shaped that choice of action. This understanding of a ‘social context’ prescribes that actors perceive situations differently, depending on their respective intersubjective
understandings and practices (Hopf 1998). For this reason, concepts such as cooperation might have varying meanings to various actors, thus shaping their decision to act in a certain way, as Figure 1, below, illustrates, where State A might be applied in order to represent Israel and State B, as Turkey, for the purpose of this research paper.

**Diagram 1: Wendt’s codetermination of institutions and processes**

![Diagram 1: Wendt’s codetermination of institutions and processes](image)


In this way, it is evident that the social construction of events as interpreted by each state, respectively, influence both State A’s interests, and in turn, the interests of State B.
SOCIAL STRUCTURES

Henceforth, having established that social contexts are pertinent to demonstrating how the identity of states justifies particular state interests, the term ‘social structure’ must be defined. According to constructivist reasoning, social structure within the context of international relations is composed of three interrelated facets including, shared knowledge, material resources and practices (Wendt 1995: 73). In this way, Bozdaglioglu infers that material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the shared knowledge in which they are embedded (2003: 17).

Accordingly, states act in certain ways towards different actors, depending on the understanding they have of their material capabilities. That is, a state will act differently towards states it perceives as an enemy as opposed to a state it perceives as a friend, even if the latter has greater material capabilities than the former. Thus, according to Wendt, the neorealist doctrine lacks the ability to predict state behaviour and “does not predict whether two states will be friends or foes (or) will recognise each other’s sovereignty...these factors, which are fundamentally intersubjective, affect states’ security interests and thus the character of their interaction under anarchy” (1992: 396). Walt, in his revision of Waltz’ theory, acknowledges this limitation of neorealism, arguing that the balance of threats, not the balance of power is what determines state actions, whereby threats are socially constructed (Walt 1987). Therefore, unlike neorealism, which isolates the causal role of power by holding interests and identities constant, constructivism applies a social examination in order to show how structures influence the way actors define themselves (Copeland 2000). This then provides an understanding for why actors act in certain ways within the international system, that is, in cooperation or anarchy.
CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the principles of constructivism and argued why Wendtian constructivism is the most suitable theoretical framework to apply in order to understand why the change in bilateral relations between Israel and Turkey has occurred. With an understanding that identity is formed by both international and domestic sources of influence it was argued that identity is not stable and can be altered by social constructions that then result in changes to state interests. This framework provides the structure for which the following two chapters will proceed by testing the continuity of Israel and Turkey’s identities, respectively, in order to determine whether a change in identity might have occurred, resulting in changed state interests and thus the meltdown in relations between these two states.
Chapter Two:

An examination of Israel’s Identity and Interests

Through an understanding of identity based state interests, this chapter will now examine the role played by Israel’s national identity and state interests in contributing to the deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey. Israel is a non-Arabic, democratic State of Jewish majority located in the region of the Middle Eastern. It is a small state sized roughly 22,070 square kilometers, surrounded by its counterparts of Arabic states, often of Islamic identity (Nation Master 2012a). As such, Israel can be described as a small state representing a minority within its region, indicative of its relatively meager population of seven and a half million compared to that of its neighbouring Egyptian population of eighty-two million and Syria’s twenty-two million population (Nation Master 2012a). Since the declaration of Israel as a state independent from the British mandate of Palestine in 1948, Israel has experienced conflict with many of its neighbouring states, including Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan who have at various times sought to emancipate the pre-1948 Palestinian occupants of Israel by denouncing the state of Israel (Brenner and Frisch 2003: 184).

After three decades of war and conflict, peace treaties with both Egypt and Jordan were reached and signed in 1979 and 1994, respectively. However, uncertainty remains with regards to peace along Israel’s remaining borders as the Israeli-Palestine conflict remains unresolved. For this reason, the state of Israel has incessantly been challenged by the dilemma of how to maintain the Jewish national identity of the majority, despite its regional placement as a minority amongst its neighbouring
Arabic and Islamic states who have historically denied the legitimacy of Zionism and the state of Israel. So what is the significance of this to Israel’s deteriorated foreign relations with Turkey?

In this chapter, I argue that Israel’s identity has remained relatively stable over the past decade, the common stance of previous Israeli governments having been a focus on the security and stability of Israel as a Jewish state. Having established this, the second part to this chapter will focus on determining the continuity of Israel’s foreign interests over the past decade. After proving that both Israel’s identity and interests have remained relatively stable over the past decade, this will then go towards giving credibility to the third and final section of this chapter which argues that Turkey has unilaterally disengaged from its relations with Israel using a series of pretexts. Henceforth, through the application of the social constructivist means of inquiry, this chapter will argue that both Israel’s identity and interests have remained relatively constant, calling on the need for inquiry to be made into that of Turkey in the next chapter.

In order to get to this point, this chapter will establish that Israel’s Jewish national identity refers to a combination of both religiosity and nationality. This will then allow for an examination of the continuity of this national identification over the past decade. Having established that the first dependent variable of Israel’s identity proves reasonably constant, the dependent variable of Israel’s state interests will be tested by means of two case studies. The purpose of applying two case studies in addition to the study of Israel’s relations with Turkey is to demonstrate that the deterioration of this bilateral relationship is not representative of a change in Israel’s
foreign policy altogether, but of a change in the international environment. Moreover, by examining case studies other than Israel’s relations with Turkey, it will be demonstrated that Israel’s foreign policy has remained relatively stable.

The first case study will examine Israel’s policies towards the Palestinian occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the second will examine Israel’s foreign relations with the United States over the past decade. These case studies will provide the testing mechanisms with which to prove that Israel’s state interests, like its national identity, have remained relatively constant over the past decade. This will demonstrate that the theory of Wendtian constructivism holds true in this case, insomuch as it dictates that identity and interests are inextricably linked therefore any change in state interests would have been presupposed by a change in national identity. To again borrow the words of Wendt, “identities are the basis of interests” (1992: 398). Lastly, the final component of this chapter will analyse a series of political tensions and events leading up to the recent deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey. This will then provide the means for which the following chapter will proceed by arguing how we can better understand this deterioration of relations through an examination of Turkey’s shifting national identity and state interests.

**ISLAM AND THE JEWISH STATE OF ISRAEL**

Since the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel in 1948, Israel has fought to maintain its existence as a sovereign state with many of its Islamist neighbours, such as Palestine and Iran, who have refused to recognise the Jewish state of Israel. Iran has furthered this refusal with frequent threats alluding to its nuclear ability to “wipe
Israel off the face of the earth” (Torbati 2012 and Indyk 2012). Moreover, in the ensuing war of Israel’s establishment, the Palestinian inhabitants of the nascent state largely either fled Israel or were expelled as refugees to the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza strip or other neighbouring states such as Jordan (“Identity Crisis: Israel and its Arab citizens 2004: 7). The state of Israel then encouraged the immigration of Jews from around the world, so long as ‘Jewishness’ could be proven, in order to increase Jewish citizenry of Israel (“Identity Crisis: Israel and its Arab citizens” 2004: 34). However, the dilemma for Israel persists. How does the Jewish state of Israel endure its existence within a region that predominantly identifies itself as being either Arab or Islamist, especially when a large proportion of the non-Jewish Israeli population identify with Islam?

This has become of particular significance since the recent uprising of the Arab Spring, which has brought increased uncertainty for Israel within the already volatile region of the Middle East (Indyk 2012). Since the Arab Spring, Israel’s strategic posture within the region has come under question. The 2011 Egyptian revolution, which led to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood forging stronger ties to Palestine’s Hamas3, increased uncertainty regarding the continuation of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty of 1979 (Black 2011). Despite the continued commitment to the treaty by newly elected Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi in June 2012, increased terrorist activity in the Sinai Peninsula, particularly the border attack of 5 August 2012, poses problems for the future of this peace treaty (Blomfield 2012). In addition to this border attack, there have been 15 other bombings along this peninsula targeting

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3 Hamas refers by acronym to the Palestinian Harakat al-Muqāwamah al-’Islāmiyyah (Islamic Resistance Movement) political party of Islamist ideologies.
gas pipelines since the 2011 Egyptian revolution and subsequent inception of the Muslim Brotherhood (Harb 2012).

Israeli sanguinity in its peace treaty with Jordan has also become the subject of question since the strengthening of ties between Jordan and Hamas. In 2011, King Abdullah II was quoted when directing a speech to Palestine’s Hamas leader, stating, “Jordan will continue to support you politically and economically during the next stage until reaching the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on Palestinian national soil” (Kahn 2011). This comment symbolises a significant turning point in relations between Jordan and the Palestinians given the historic tensions after King Hussein’s slaughter of Palestinians challenging his sovereignty in September of 1971. This strengthening of ties between Jordan and Hamas has resulted in Israel’s more cautious approach to relations with Jordan. In this way it is evident that Israel’s security as both a state and in its Jewish identity is an ongoing plight, which perhaps consequently, has resulted in Israel’s development of arguably the strongest and most technologically advanced military force in the Middle East (Indyk 2012). The necessity of this military force is evident given Israel’s constant battle to secure its national identity, which will be defined under the following section which tests this dependent variable of Israel’s Jewish identity.

**DEFINITIONAL DILEMMAS**

Having thus far established that Israel seeks to validate its identity as a Jewish state located within a region dominated by volatile Islamic states such as Iran, Egypt, Syria and the Palestinian entities of Gaza and the West Bank, it is essential that this chapter define specifically what is meant by reference to ‘Jewish’ identity. Additionally, this
chapter will demonstrate through data analysis, that Israel’s occupancy is comprised of predominantly Jewish identifying citizens. Although the Zionist movement initially sought to limit the term ‘Jewish’ to a reference of territorial-political nationality, it was unsuccessful and the term is commonly used at present to reference both one’s national and religious affiliations (Abramov 1976: 323). I argue later in this chapter that this extension of the meaning of Jewishness has enabled Israel to establish a stronger connection to the US and its some six million populaces who identify themselves as being Jewish, if only by religious affiliation (DellaPergola 2010: 16).

**ISRAEL'S JEWISH IDENTITY**

Complexities have arisen to who classifies as a Jew, that is, the differentiation of Jewish nationality from religious affiliations and ethnicity. Accordingly, the criteria of being a ‘Jewish’ citizen lies in one’s ability to prove firstly, the extent of their religiosity and secondly, their residency and identification with the secular national concept of political membership (Glenn and Sokoloff 2010:34). In this way, Jewish citizenship relies on both objective, transnational criteria as well as more local, subjective criteria (Glenn and Sokoloff 2010:35). Thus, in contemporary times, ‘Jewishness’ can be surmised as being a complex identity, encompassing both one’s religious affiliations with Judaism, as well as one’s nationality, presuming this individual fulfills the criteria of an Israeli citizen.

Discourse pertaining to Israeli citizenship consists of three superimposed layers according to Peled. An ethno-nationalist discourse of inclusion and exclusion, a republican discourse of community goals and civic virtue, and a liberal discourse of civil, political and social rights (Peled 2007: 335). The first layer, with which this
chapter is concerned with, distinguishes Israel’s Jewish citizens from its Palestinian non-citizens, suggesting that the national identity of Israel, according to citizenship rights, is Jewish. Thus, the purpose of this section is to establish that the majority of Israel’s population identify themselves as being Jewish. You might then ask, but what is the significance of Israel’s identity to the deterioration of foreign relations between Israel and Turkey in recent years? By demonstrating the Israel’s domestic policies have remained relatively constant thereby resulting a slow pace of change and relative stability in the state’s national identity, it suggests that Israel’s interests should have remained relatively stable as well.

In 1950, the ‘Law of Return’ was legislated into Israeli law, dictating that all Jews have the right to return and settle in Israel, and obtain citizenship (AICE 2012). The purpose of this law was to further the Zionist movement and to increase Israel’s Jewish citizenry. Of significance to this chapter, are the eligibility requirements of Jewish citizenship, outlined by this Law. The Law of Return initially stipulated, in accordance with the Halakha4, that a person is ‘Jewish’ if his or her mother is Jewish, or if they convert to Judaism (AICE 2012). In 1970 this criteria was amended to include the children and grandchildren of a Jew, and the spouses of the children or grandchildren of a Jew (AICE 2012). Limitations to the Law of Return outlined that those who were previously a Jew but who voluntarily changed their religion could not re-seek Jewish citizenship (AICE 2012). As such, the following data has been collated in accordance with these stipulations.

4 The Halakha is the collective body of religious and biblical laws for Jews
The following data has been triangulated in order to provide a mean for the percentile of Israel’s Jewish occupation both prior to this current decade and at present, to demonstrate that the identity of Israel has remained relatively constant over the past decade. The following Figure 2.1 illustrates the percentage of Israel’s citizens from 1997-1999 who are Jewish in identity as accounting for nearly 80% of the total population.

**Figure 2.1: Percentage of Israel’s population nominally Jewish 1997-1999**

![](image)

**Source:** AICE (1999); ICBS (1999) and; CIA (1999)

This figure is compared purposefully to that of 2012 figures in order to demonstrate that within this period of scope almost 80% of Israel’s population have continued to identify themselves as being Jewish. Figure 2.2 below, demonstrates that similarly to Figure 2.1, approximately 76% of Israel’s population identified themselves as being Jewish.
Although there is a slight decline in the figures represented from Figure 2.1 compared to Figure 2.2, this has been accounted for by the overall decline in the birth rate of Jewish citizens within Israel from 1999 to 2012. Statistics indicate that this disparity in growth rates is reflected by a Jewish population growth rate of 1.7% in the 1990s compared to the 2.6% growth rate of the Arab population in Israel, of whom account for roughly 20.5% of Israel’s total population (CBS 2009). However, it should be acknowledged that there seems to be a recent upturn in the trends of Jewish growth rates, calculated to have increased by 0.2% to 1.9% in 2010 (CBS 2011). Interestingly, Guttman Institute polls carried out in 1993, indicated that of Israel’s Jewish population, only 13% were religiously unobservant (Elazar 1993). Thus, it was demonstrated that, through the use of data, there has been a continuity of Israel’s self identification as being Jewish both a decade ago and at present.
ISRAEL’S WESTERN ORIGINS

Unlike other states within this region, with the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel in 1948 came an influx of peoples from Europe who identified themselves as being Jewish and as such, sought to settle in the newly established Jewish state of Israel. Within the first decade of Israel’s establishment, 936,082 immigrants were recorded as having arrived the European states of Germany, Austria, Italy, and British settlers from Cyprus (MFA 1998 and; Kaplan 2012). At this time, this accounted for nearly half of the total population of Israel, which at 1958 stood at 2,032,000 (MFA 1998). This data indicates that the cultural heritage of a large proportion of Israel’s current population has stemmed from European roots. Moreover, whilst it was established above that almost 80% of Israel’s population identify themselves as being Jewish, this figure equates to approximately 5,687,250 individuals which is in fact less than the estimated 6,039,600 individuals [as of 2012] who identify themselves as being Jewish citizens residing within the US (DellaPergola 2010: 16). This foreshadows the strong connection between Israel and the US which is discussed below.

In 1992, then Presidential candidate Bill Clinton reiterated Israel’s connection to the US and, inadvertently the West, when he stated, “our relationship would never vary from its allegiance to the shared values, the shared religious heritage, the shared democratic politics which have made the relationship between the United States and Israel a special- even on occasion a wonderful- relationship” (US House of Congress 1994: 118). This contributes to linking Israel and the US and further goes towards proving the claim of Israel’s strong connection to the West through both the European
heritage of almost half of the population at its establishment as well as through the large number of Jews living within the US.

DOMESTIC POLICIES

Israel, unlike many of its theocratic neighbours within its Middle Eastern region, is a parliamentary democracy. In 2007 Shimon Peres was elected as President of Israel and in 2009 Benjamin Netanyahu achieved electoral success and became Prime Minister. Netanyahu’s joint deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman shares with Netanyahu a reliance upon nationalist and religious, right-wing voters to maintain his position in power (Norlen 2012). It is important to recognise that current Prime Minister Netanyahu reclaimed his position as Prime Minister in the 2009 election after several losses since his last term in office from 1996-1999. Although a mild change in Israel’s identity might be attributed to Netanyahu’s domestic policies of conservatism and less pragmatism than perhaps the government hard base, this does not suggest a significant change in Israel’s interests or foreign policies. On the contrary, it has meant that this government has been reluctant to repeal Israel’s strategic operations or alliances, thus achieving relative stability in Israel’s identity and interests.

Perhaps due to this conservatism and simultaneous reluctance to relinquish its stance on certain foreign policy issues, Israel is an isolated Jewish state within its Middle Eastern region. Israel has actively furthered this isolation, rendering it a violation of Israeli law for citizens to visit many neighbouring states without Ministerial permission from the Interior (Dolev 2001: 147). These states, referenced as ‘enemy states’, include Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Yemen, several of
which share common borders with Israel. As such, the objective of the following section is to demonstrate that in addition to Israel’s national identity, its state interests have remained relatively stable over the past decade due to the slow pace of change between governments.

FOREIGN POLICIES

Having established that a substantial majority of Israel’s population identify themselves as being Jewish, both prior to and throughout the period of scope of this thesis, the next step is to argue that, similarly, Israel’s state interests have remained relatively constant. To do so, the first case study employed will be that of Israel’s relations with and approaches towards the Palestinian occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza. This section will argue that Israel’s foreign policies towards the West Bank and Gaza, respectively, have remained relatively unchanged. Once evidenced, this suggests that a change in Turkish national identity and state interests must be a contributing factor to the demise in relations between Israel and Turkey. Nonetheless, the second case study of Israel’s relations with the United States will be used in order to demonstrate Israel’s ability to maintain continuity of its relations with the United States, representative of Israel’s connectedness to the West.

ISRAELI – PALESTINIAN RELATIONS

Migdalovitz suggests that the turning point in relations between Israel and Turkey became clear after Hamas’ electoral success in 2006 (2010: 13). For this reason, it is of particular importance that an examination of Israel’s relations with Palestinian occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza be conducted. At the conclusion of the Six-Day War, despite the 1947 UN partition plan for two states, Israel obtained
control over the West bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights. Since this time, Israel has occupied the West Bank region but prevents Palestinians from applying for Israeli citizenship. Contrastingly, the Gaza strip has been left independent of Israeli occupation since 2005, although its airspace and waters are controlled by Israel militarily, according to findings of the UN’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2004 (ICJ 2004). Nonetheless, the occupants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip are largely Arab Palestinians who gained refugee status following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, whereby Israel emerged as a sovereign state of Jewish majority. Since then, tensions have remained unresolved between the state of Israel and its Palestinian counterparts.

Since Hamas’ electoral success in 2006, Turkey’s AK party has demonstrated increasing support for Palestine over Israel. At the 2012 World Economic Forum, Erdoğan stated that the Palestinian issue was very important to Turkey “because the Palestinians are our brothers” (Ahren 2012). He furthered that Israel’s treatment of this Palestinian issue was like keeping people “in the largest open-air prison in the world”, additionally accusing the Jewish state of “killing innocent people, children, babies, women and the elderly in masses” (Ahren 2012). This furthered from statements made at the 2009 World Economic Forum where Erdoğan accused President Peres, in reference to Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, of “knowing how to kill well” (Ahren 2012). The irony is not lost on Israel, however, who brings to point Turkey’s paradoxical treatment of its stateless minority, the Kurds (Tisdall, 2011).
When comparing the previous and current governmental policies of Israel towards the West Bank and Gaza over the past decade, it is evident that Israel’s policies over this issue have remained relatively constant. As Netanyahu is quoted in *The Economist*, “the root of the conflict was and remains the (Palestinian) refusal to recognise the right of the Jewish People to a state of their own in their historic homeland” (“Israel’s Jewish identity 2011). Over the past decade it will be demonstrated that Israel’s objective has been to establish a Jewish state that is recognised as that by the Palestinians and the wider Arab and Islamic region. In order to secure itself as this sovereign state, Israel has claimed the necessity of barriers, such as the West Bank barrier along the historic 1949 Armistice line, often referred to as the ‘Green Line’ between Israel and the Palestinian territory which commenced construction in 2000 (See appendix A).

This wall has formed a vital part of Israel’s foreign policy of securing itself as a Jewish state within the Middle Eastern region and was described by then Prime Minister Ehud Barak as also being “essential to the Palestinian nation in order to foster its national identity and independence without being dependent on the State of Israel” (Makovsky 2004). The construction of this eight metre high concrete barrier to the West Bank has continued throughout the terms of Barak’s successors, both Ariel Sharon [2001-2006], acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert [2006-2009] and current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu [2006-present]. Thus, in this way, the Israeli approach towards its relations with the Palestinian territory of the West Bank has seen little change over the past decade or more, with the continued refusal on the part of Palestinian officials to recognise the Jewish State of Israel.
Additionally, on Israel’s policies towards the Gaza Strip, it is evident that Israel’s interests lie similarly in the acquiring of its recognition as a sovereign state, which the occupants of the Gaza Strip refuse to do. As such, Israeli policies towards the Gaza Strip to a large extent have remained congruent with its policies towards the West Bank, with the main anomaly being Prime Minister Sharon’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005 (Walker 2009: 144). However, the extent to which Israel has disengaged from this region is often questioned as Israel still maintains control over the land and sea borders into Gaza as well as the Gazan airspace (Tocci 2007: 109). This control has continued since the official disengagement of 2005 and has further encompassed the Israeli imposed blockade of the Gaza Strip since the electoral success of Palestine’s Hamas party in 2006. This blockade, which subsequently led to the infamous 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla incident, has been accorded with playing a significant role as a pretext for Turkey to sharply reduce its relations with Israel (Brayer 2010; Cowell 2011; Keinon 2012).

Moreover, following the electoral success of the Hamas government in 2006, historic tensions between Israel and Gaza, dating back to the 1967 Six-Day War, were reignited. The inception of Hamas instigated Israel to implement strict economic sanctions over the Gazan region, despite its most recent 2005 policy of unilateral disengagement (Sharp 2009). Since then, tensions have continued to mount, and resulted in ‘Operation Cast Lead’, or the Gaza War of 2008-2009 (Ben-David 2009). This military assault resulted in Israel’s continued and current economic blockade of the Gaza strip. The effects of this economic blockade have led to high unemployment, reduced incomes, inflated food prices, and a shortage of all food types, a source of fuel for further increased tensions (FAO with WFP 2007: 48 and; WFP 2007: 4).
Many within the international community, including the US and the EU, have supported a two-state solution which would consist of the division of current Israeli territory into two sovereign states, one being Israel and the other Palestine (Associated Press “EU backs Obama” 2011).

However, Israeli governments throughout the past and at present are opposed to doing so for two reasons. Firstly, because the Palestinians refuse to recognise Israel officially as a Jewish state and as such don’t feel secure in giving Palestine sovereignty. Secondly, because of disagreement over the exact divisions of land, borders and the future security concerns this border problem poses (Yaar 2007 and Touval 2011). Through the examination of this case study, it was demonstrated that Israel’s foreign policy towards the West Bank and Gaza Strip has remained relatively constant, although this might come of no surprise given we are reminded that this decade of government began and ended under the return to office of Prime Minister Netanyahu in February 2009. Given the case has been made for Israel’s continuity of its interests in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the second case study of Israel’s foreign relations with the US will now be tested.

**ISRAELI – UNITED STATES RELATIONS**

Israel’s relations with the United States of America were officially initiated when the US, under President Truman, became the first state in 1948, jointly with the then Soviet Union, to declare the official recognition of the Jewish State of Israel. Since then, Israel has been described as an important and strategic partner to the US, given their “common democratic values, religious affinities, and security interests” (Zanotti 2012: 24). Reflective of this bilateral partnership are the multifarious military,
economic, scientific, and trade agreements shared by the two countries, and the continuity of this bilateral relationship under the previous Republican governments of the United States, as well as the current Democratic administration of Obama (Addis 2011: 25 and Indyk 2012). Economically, for example, Israel was the largest recipient of American aid from 1976 to 2004, totaling close to $3 billion in annual grants during this period (Sharp 2010).

The significance of this relationship between Israel and the US has been reaffirmed by a long list of Presidents. For instance, then President J. F. Kennedy remarked that the US has continued a tradition of friendship with Israel since the time of President Woodrow Wilson (Bard 2012). Lyndon Johnson furthered this stating, “the United States and Israel share many common objectives”, a notion supported by succeeding Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan whom, endorsed, respectively, the US’ commitment to its strategic “friendship” with Israel (Bard 2012). The relationship was officially categorised as an alliance by President Bush when he announced, “the friendship, the alliance between the United States and Israel is strong and solid, built upon shared democratic values, of shared history and heritage…” (Bard and Schwartz 2005: 157). These statements are significant in their reflection of the ongoing Israeli-US relations since the inception of the Jewish State in 1948.

Moreover, Obama reaffirmed the stability of this bilateral partnership in a 2009 interview when he stated, “Israel is a strong ally to the United States” (Migdalovitz 2009: 7). Despite this, critics have been quick to criticise the Israeli-U.S alliance of experiencing periods of ‘ups and downs’ (Mark 2002 and; Zaher 2012). For example, disagreement over Israel’s policies with regards to its Palestinian
problem caused turmoil for relations between the governments of President Clinton and Prime Minister Netanyahu in the 1990s, yet under the Bush Administration and the term of Prime Minister Sharon, relations were restored (Mark 2002). Notwithstanding the misunderstandings pertaining to the perceived US demands of Obama to Israel in the way of restoring pre-1967 borders for a two-state negotiation in 2011, this bilateral relationship has remained strong under these respective current governments (Zaher 2012). The particular significance of this bilateral relationship for this chapter lies in the ability of these two states to maintain their diverging views on particular policies, without allowing this to affect their bilateral relationship to the point of deterioration.

In furtherance to the previous section, Israel’s domestic policies have not permitted its foreign relations, such as that with the US, to dictate changes in its foreign policies. Rather, the evidence suggests that over the past decade, Israel’s relations with the US have maintained continuity, despite Israel’s relentlessness in continuing its policies of blockading the Gaza Strip and the barrier between itself and the West Bank. This speaks volumes for the strength of Israel’s relations with the US given Israel has not conceded to America’s policy urges under the Obama administration (Zaher 2012). Despite this, proponents to the strength and stability of Israeli-US relations have used this aforementioned 2011 foreign policy speech by Obama as an example of the weakening relations between Israel and the US (Zaher 2012). However, Obama refuted these claims by putting his reference to the pre-1967 borders into context, stating that these must be taken into consideration in order to form mutually-agreed upon land swaps which should act as the basis for negotiations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specifically, he stated, “by definition, (this) means
that the parties themselves - Israelis and Palestinians - will negotiate a border that is different than the one that existed on June 4, 1967”, concluding with a remark to critics of his speech that “if there’s a controversy, then it’s not based in substance” (Rabinovich 2011: 202). Through the use of this deposition, Obama refuted the circulating negative claims towards his government’s attitude towards relations with Israel, reaffirming the strength of the Israeli-US alliance (Bradley 2011).

Nonetheless, in defense of Israel’s foreign policies towards the occupied Palestinian territories, Prime Minister Netanyahu in 2009 demanded the Palestinians officially recognise Israel as a sovereign state of the Jewish people and that the Palestinian state be demilitarised in order for peace negotiations to be enabled (Addis 2011: 26-27). Palestine has thus far declined, resulting in the ongoing failure of border and peace negotiations. Despite this failure to agree on a peaceful resolution, and perhaps symbolic of the strong Israeli-US alliance is that this failure has been of little consequence to Israeli-US relations. Mark suggests that this is because the US relies on relations with Israel to bolster its Middle Eastern policy of balancing competing interests within the region (2002). Whatever the reason, the significance lays in the strength of Israeli – US relations, regardless.

Moreover, evidence of the military and economic strength of this alliance was indicated in 2009 when the US, under the Obama administration, facilitated Israel with the sale of over 55 GBU-28 bunker-buster bombs, an invaluable source of deterrence for Israel with the impending threat of Iran’s nuclear facilities (Borger 2011 and; Zaher 2012). Additionally, despite America’s apparent plea for Israel to negotiate peace with Palestine, the US has explicitly defended Israel against UN
human rights abuse claims pertaining to their treatment of the Palestinians. The US has also contributed significantly to the financing of a short range (up to 40km) Israeli anti-rocket system, known as the ‘Iron Dome’, which is expected to cost approximately $215 million in development (Sharp 2009: 7-8).

**ISRAEL, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE WEST**

In order to connect the significance of this Israeli-US relationship to the deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey, it must be accepted that the former reflects Israel’s connection to the West (Bard 2012). The purpose of establishing this connection of Israel’s identity as a Jewish state of Western affinity contributes to explaining possible Turkish motives for disengaging from its relations with Israel. This is because, as the following chapter suggests, Turkey’s identity has been redirected away from the Atatürk agenda of Westernising Turkey, back to its Islamic origins.

The significance of establishing Israel’s state interests as having remained relatively stable over the past decade is that it goes towards providing an understanding of the deteriorated relations between Israel and Turkey. Thus far, this chapter has been concerned with arguing that Israel’s national identity has remained relatively unchanged over the past decade. Likewise, Israel’s national interests have remained relatively constant. This was illustrated by the above case studies of both Israel’s relations with Palestine and Israel’s relations with the US, respectively. Having evidenced that Israel’s identity and interests have not altered in a way, which mandated its withdrawal or downgrade in relations with Turkey, the following section will analyse a series of events and political tensions which will be referred to as
‘pretexts’. In this section I will argue that Turkey used these pretexts as a means to unilaterally disengage itself from relations with Israel.

A DECADE OF PRETEXTS

Warning and Kardas supported the notion that Turkey’s relations with Israel were representative of its Western identity when they stated, “Turkey’s Western commitment was underlined…by its relations with Israel” (2011: 124). With an understanding that Turkey’s bilateral relations with Israel were somewhat symbolic of Turkey’s connection to and affinity with the West, the breakdown in relations between Israel and Turkey can be viewed as indicative of Turkey’s redirection of its interests away from its Western affiliations and further towards its Middle Eastern heritage.

Over the past decade, tensions between Israel and Turkey have mounted over a series of events that have during this period. Particularly since 2008, Turkey has exploited these events in a bid to distance itself from Israel, but why? In line with Wendtian constructivist thought, this section seeks to foreshadow Turkey’s AK party as having redirected Turkey’s national identity increasingly away from the West and further towards the Middle East. In 2003, tensions between Israel and Turkey arose due to Turkey’s refusal to support the US-led war on Iraq, which was in contrast, strongly supported by Israel (Giannotta 2012; Mallev et al. 2012; Zalewski 2011: 99 and; Freedman 2010). Additionally, the 2004 Israeli assassination of the Gazan, Hamas’ spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and his successor, Abdulaziz al-Rantisi, were significant events insomuch as they marked the second instance used by Turkey to evade its relations with Israel and inadvertently further distance itself from
the West (Kosebalaban 2010). The event was received in Turkey with grave negativity, spurring Erdoğan to describe Israel as a “terrorist state” (Ma’Oz 2012: 173). This arguably led to Turkey’s support of Gaza throughout the Gaza War of 2008-2009 (Alpay 2009). As a result, this incident allowed the state of Turkey, under its AKP leadership, to forge stronger ties with its Islamic neighbours as evidenced again by Erdoğan who stated, “the Palestinians are our brothers” (Ahren 2012; Khoury 2012 and; “Turkish PM Erdoğan pushes Palestinian statehood” 2011).

Furthermore, Israel’s refusal of Turkish MPs to enter Gaza via Israel in September 2010 led to Turkey cancelling Israel’s participation in the multinational “Anatolian Eagle” air exercises, to be held that October (Inbar 2011 and; Freedman 2010). Subsequently, in furthering their Gazan cause, Turkey’s Erdoğan publicly accused Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, of “knowing how to kill children well” (Aydintasbas 2009). This statement was made in reference to Israel’s military offenses against Palestine and was reiterated by Turkey again cancelling Israel’s participation in military exercises, this time the ‘Reliant Mermaid Operation’, stating that Israel “is the greatest threat to peace in the Middle East” (“Turkey PM: Israel is the main threat to Mideast peace” 2010).

Moreover, as was discussed in the introduction, many scholars have argued that the culmination of these events mounted to the controversial May 2010 Mavi Marmara Flotilla raid. Scholarly research dictates that this Israeli raid marked the turning point in which Turkey ultimately disengaged its diplomatic ties with Israel (Ravid 2010; Lynch 2010; Cowell 2011; Batty 2011 and; Buck 2011). This deterioration of bilateral ties is again indicative of Turkey’s changing interests as it
evidences Turkey’s turn away from Israel and its realignment of foreign interests with other neighbouring Islamic states and entities such as Iran and Gaza (Warning and Kardas 2011: 124). We can better understand this severing of ties through the adoption of the following reasoning. Prior to the change in relations, Israel and Turkey had common enemies. However, with Turkey’s increasingly Islamic affinities, Israel’s enemies became defined as Turkey’s allies, weakening the rationale for a Turkish-Israeli alliance (Rubin 2012). For this reason, and by means of this series of pretext events, Turkey has successfully disengaged from its relations with Israel at present, so that it can further its Middle Eastern interests (Burris 2003 and; de Soto 2011).

CONCLUSION
Throughout this chapter it has been established that Israel has maintained continuity of its Jewish national identity, representing approximately 76% of the current population. It was then demonstrated that Israel’s interests have similarly remained relatively constant, evidenced by the examination of two case studies, other than that of Israel’s relations with Turkey. It was evidenced that despite international pressures, such as the US’ pressure for Israel to make concessions towards Palestine in order to come to a peaceful solution, Israel has maintained its foreign policies as appropriate for its national interests and reflective of its identity. I then suggested that Israel’s connection to the West, through both its relations with the US and through the European heritage of its citizens, has had increasing ramifications on its relations with Turkey as Turkey furthers its interests with Islamic states. I proposed that this was due to a change in Turkey’s national identity, a view that is advanced in the following chapter.
Chapter Three:

An examination of Turkey’s Identity and Interests

Whilst Israel’s national identity and state interests may have remained relatively stable over the past decade, the same cannot be said for that of Turkey. Through an understanding of the change to Turkey’s national identity and state interests, we can better understand the recent deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey. Thus, the purpose of this chapter will be to demonstrate through a social means of inquiry that Turkey’s state interests have changed as the result of a change in its national identity. It will be demonstrated that a change in Turkey’s national identity has occurred domestically under the leadership of the AKP’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

This will be achieved by comparing Turkey’s national identity prior to the inception of the AKP to that of Turkey’s national identity since the inception of this party in November 2002. Having established that there has been a deep change in Turkey’s identity this chapter will then examine Turkey’s foreign policy in two cases other than its relations with Israel in order to suggest that this change in foreign interests is not just bilateral, but part of a major shift owing to a change in Turkey’s identity. The first case study will analyse Turkey’s forging of stronger ties with Iran, a state that it had limited interaction with particularly throughout the 1980s and 1990s whilst still operating largely within the ideology of Kemalism. The second examines Turkey’s increasing divergence from the Western institution of the European Union (EU). These two case studies will demonstrate that Turkey’s national identity has undergone a sharp change and that due to this change, so too have Turkey’s national
interests. This will then allow for a discussion of the implications of these changes upon the Turkish-Israeli relationship currently. The results will conclude that Turkey’s increasingly Islamic identity has resulted in the distancing of itself from its historic endeavor to be seen as a Western democracy.

CRITICS

Despite the strong evidential support for Turkey’s change in identity, Huntington’s counter argument must be addressed and its weaknesses highlighted. Huntington’s ‘failed civilisational shift’ questions whether Turkey ever managed to align itself with the West, thus implying that Turkish identity has always been Islamic (Huntington 1996 and; Kardas 2009). In refute of this claim, Hale states that Turkey “ideologically separated itself from the Middle East after the establishment of the Republic in 1923” (Hale 1992: 681 and; Park 2007: 42). On this point, Kaplan contributes that Westernisation emerged as the “main ideological position for Turkey”, a notion furthered by Millman, who argues that this position was not only a model to guide Turkey’s development, but also an identity for Turkish foreign policy (Kaplan 2011: 2 and; Millman 1995: 490). From these notions stems the following section which demonstrates Turkey’s deep shift in identity from Kemalist notions of westernisation and secularism to an Islamic heritage under the domestic reforms of the AKP.

IDENTITY CONFUSION: DOMESTIC POLICIES

Academics, such as Warning and Kardas, have examined Turkey’s move away from its links to the Western ‘world’ and further towards its links with the Middle East (2011: 133). However, where the sources are lacking is in bridging this notion of changed identity as causing a change in state interests. Thus, the purpose of this
chapter is to build upon the existing literature by offering a strong argument utilising case studies to show how a change in Turkey’s national identity has led to changes in its foreign policy, resulting in stronger ties with its Middle Eastern and Islamic neighbours. As Turkish author Taniz describes, Turkish politics under Erdoğan’s AKP has had a “moderate change, you could say neo-Ottoman” (Interview 5/7/12). Furthermore, Taniz describes the current identity crisis of Turkey as centering on this Islamist approach encouraged by Erdoğan’s popularly received anti-semitic discourse (Interview, 5/7/12).

Constructivism prescribes that the identities of pluralistic societies emerge as the result of domestic struggles between various groups (Bozdaglioglu 2003: 26). This notion foreshadows the identity dilemma of Turkey which can be categorised as a pluralistic society insofar as it is a politically declared secular state, with a Muslim-majority population, run by an Islamic dominated, albeit secular, AKP (Onis 1995: 50). Furthermore, according to Turkey’s foreign minister, Davutoğlu, Turkey is a “Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black sea country” (Davutoğlu 2008: 79). For this reason, the state of Turkey has been plagued by identity confusion. The implication of this dilemma is synthesised best by Bozdaglioglu, who notes that the “basic decisions regarding Turkey’s foreign policy (defense and national security) became inextricably intertwined with the national identity of Turkey” (2003: 7). In this way, the Islamic identity of Turkey prescribes that Turkey should align itself with other Islamic countries within its

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5 Within this context, the term anti-semitism refers to discrimination, hostility or prejudice directed at Jews as a religious, racial, or ethnic group. In 2005 the US government defined anti-Semitism as “hatred toward Jews-individually and as a group-that can be attributed to the Jewish religion and/or ethnicity” US Department of State 2005)
region because Turkey’s interests are inextricably intertwined with this Islamic identity. This concept paves a social understanding for why Turkey is now concerned with forging stronger ties with its Middle Eastern neighbour, Iran, which in turn substantiates the claim that Turkey has undergone a fundamental reassessment of its identity as a secular state, but with a Muslim majority population.

As such, the thesis of this paper, that Turkey’s state interests have changed, relies on the precondition that Turkish national identity has experienced some change or shift. To demonstrate this, it will firstly be shown that the identity of Turkey has undergone deep structural shift through sharp changes to domestic policies. Secondly, it will be argued that Turkey has actively changed its foreign policy as a result of this re-identification with Islam under the AKP. In order to demonstrate the former, the following section will establish that although the AKP claims to be secular, it is not.

**ISLAMIC ROOTS OF AKP**

In 2001 the Constitutional Court of Turkey shut down the Turkish political Virtue (Fazilet) Party (VP), claiming the party was incompatible with the secular character of the state (Eligur 2010: 243). At the closure of the VP party, its members divided into two groups and formed two new Islamist parties, the Felicity (Saadet) Party (FP) and the AKP (Finkel 2012: 73 and Eligur 243). This thus shrouds in doubt the AKP’s secularity. Further contesting the AKP’s secularism is the background of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the party’s founding leader. At the party’s point of creation, Erdoğan was still technically under a ban from politics due to anti-secular statements he had made during the late 1990s. Erdoğan had claimed, “democracy is not the goal but is
an instrument” and later remarked “Elhamdulillah [thank God] we are for the Sharia” (Eligur 2010: 243). These sentiments are somewhat paradoxical given the party declares itself as a mainstream liberal-conservative, democratic party, “with no religious axis” (Hale and Ozbudun 2009: 20 and; Omtzigt, P. H. et al 2012: 87).

Instead, this paper argues, in conjunction with Yavuz’ views, that the electoral win by the AKP in 2002 should be interpreted as a revival of the Islamic movement within Turkish politics (Yavuz 2003: 256). The Economist supported this view, describing the AKP as “mildly Islamist”, furthered by Reuters who refer to the AKP as “Islamist-rooted” and “Islamic-leaning” (“Turkey and Syria” 2012 and; Yackley 2012). Further contrary to the AKP’s claim of secularity was Erdoğan’s speech in 2011, whereby he said Turkey was a good example of Islam and democracy in co-existence (“Turkey’s Erdogan makes case for Islam and democracy” 2011). In the same speech, Erdoğan also stated that there is nothing to fear from the influence of Islam in politics. From these statements, it is clear that claims pertaining to the AKP’s ‘Islamist roots’ are not unjustified. More reasons why this is so will be examined below.

In order to graphically represent the establishment and Islamic roots of the AKP, Diagram 3.1 demonstrates the evolution of the Islamist AKP from the dismantled VP.

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6 Note: Sharia is the religious law of Islam
7 Note: Diagram 3.1 refers to what this paper terms the AKP, by JDP, abbreviating the English translation of Adalet ve Kalkınma (AKP) to Justice and Development Party (JDP).
Diagram 3.1 The Dynamics of Divergence and Reconsolidation (1997-2007)

Source: Adapted from Eligur 2010: 34

Through an examination of Diagram 3.1, we can see that the AKP, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, had roots stemming from an Islamist identity, despite the party’s claims of secularity. This provides the testing mechanism in order to demonstrate the social influence that agents (like Erdoğan) can have on the identity of structures (like the State of Turkey). It might additionally be suggested, that the AKP has capitalised off the failures of previous governments, such as the VP, which did not eventualise their visions of an Islamist Turkey. Arguably, the AKP has achieved this by gradually redirecting the national identity of Turkey throughout its three consecutive terms in government. The AKP has achieved increasing popularity throughout these three consecutive electoral successes, achieving 34% of votes in 2002, increasing to 47% of votes in the early general election of 2007, and then peaking at 49.8% of votes in the most recent general elections of June 2011. This chapter argues, in conjunction with Yavuz, that Erdoğan has used the popularity of his
socially Islamic, albeit secular by decree, AK party in order to restructure the political landscape and public sphere of Turkey (2003: 256).

TURKEY AND ISLAM

Historically, the Ataturk days of building the Turkish Republic under the Western-inspired reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk from 1923 sought to align Turkey with Western ideologies, detaching itself from the Middle East and formally disabling Islam as the state religion (Hale 1992: 42 and; Warning and Kardas 2011: 124). As such, Turkish foreign policy has stemmed largely from this notion of Westernisation, influenced by its membership to Western institutions such as the United Nations (UN) in 1945, the Council of Europe in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1952 and, more recently, its bid to join the EU (Millman 1995: 490 and; Cizre 2003: 228). However, since the inception of the AKP in 2002, an increased emphasis has been placed on Turkey’s national Islamic identity and the strengthening of alliances with neighbouring Islamic states. This foreign policy decision to rekindle Turkey’s Middle Eastern relationships, can be interpreted as reflecting the current increasing trend of Islam as the predominant Turkish faith, indicated by Figure 3.2 which illustrates, through the triangulation of data, that between 2007 and 2012 roughly 98.7% of Turkey’s 79,749,461 population [current at June 2012] are nominally Muslim (Central Intelligence Agency 2012 and; Bodgan and Bilken 2006).
Figure 3.2: Percentage of Turkish population nominally Muslim 2007-2012

| Source: KONDA (2007); Pew Research Centre (2011) and; CIA (2012b) |

The figures represented in Figure 3.2 highlight a significant break away from the Ataturk agenda of disabling Islam as the religion of the state, evidenced by the fact that close to 99% of the Turkish population is nominally Muslim at present. Of this 99%, research indicates that in 2007 96.8% were religiously motivated, that is, were either followers of Islam, believers of Islam or fully devout Islamists (KONDA 2007). The same study concluded that the remaining 3.2% identified themselves as agnostic or atheist, identifying with other Muslims only by culture. Thus, these figures indicate that contrary to the Ataturk policy of a religion-free state, under the AKP government, 96.8% of the Turkish population identify religiously with Islam and as a Muslim.

As such, this chapter does not argue that there has been a significant increase in the percentage of Turkey’s Muslims population before and after the inception of the AKP. Instead, I argue that there has been an increased significance and meaning attached to the concepts of ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslimism’, which has resulted in a changed national identity (Omidi 2011 and; Zalewski 2011). The AKP has been able to use
this changed attitude towards the state’s national identity and the Islamic networking that this has encouraged, as instruments of political mobilisation (Yavuz 2009: 2). Hence, it is within this period of scope, from the inception of the AKP into power at the end of 2002, which this chapter argues marks the turning point in Turkish national identity. This turning point in identity will be used as the justification of Turkey’s forging of stronger ties with neighbouring states such as Iran in recent times, as opposed to and perhaps ultimately at the cost of relations with other Western states.

Moreover, the significance placed upon religion by the AKP is underlined by their support and enforcement of compulsory religious classes focusing on Islamism within all public schools, starting from fourth grade (Yildirim 2011: 1). This is in contrast to historic regulations that allowed parents to decide on behalf of their children whether they would attend such religious education classes on an optional basis (Yildirim 2011: 2). Furthermore, spokespersons for the liberal wing of Islam, Alevi, have accused the AKP’s regulation of these religious classes as trying to assimilate students into Sunnism (“Turkish government rules out demands of Islamic sect Alevis” 2012). Additionally, contrary to Article 24 of the 1982 [current] Turkish constitutional establishment of freedom of religion, worship, and religious ideas, the AKP government has continued the role of the General Directorate for Foundations (GDF), which regulates non-Muslim religious groups and their institutions within Turkey (Constitution of Turkey 1982: article 24 and; US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2007).

Notwithstanding this view, some critics disagree with the depiction of the AKP as a Muslim focused party, employing the argument pertaining to Turkey’s ban
on wearing the Islamic hijab headscarf within universities and by civil servants in public buildings (Vojdik 2010: 661). However, such critics often fail to demonstrate that the AKP has supported amendments to the constitution that allowed for students to wear hijabs in universities and public institutions (Human Rights Watch 2008). Furthermore, the AKP supported the lifting of the ban on hijabs in many universities throughout 2010, claiming it would support students who were expelled based on their wearing of the hijab (Head 2010). However, these constitutional amendments were revoked by the Constitutional Court of Turkey which ruled that the amendments were in contradiction with the Turkish constitution’s secular principles outlined in Articles 2, 4 and 148, which ruled that citizens of Turkey could not wear religious symbols of any sort, including crosses, and not limited to headscarves, within any governmental or public institution (Vojdik 2010: 671 and “Article 2, Article 4 and Article 148 of the Turkish Constitution” 2008). Furthermore, the ruling by eleven judges indicated that a second court case could call for the banning of the AK Party within the Turkish political arena because of these “anti-secular activities” (“Court Annuls Turkish Scarf Reform” 2008).

The purpose of these observations has been to provide the connection between Turkey’s change in national identity under the new domestic policies of the AKP, and its move away from secularism and further towards an Islamic heritage. That is, in providing the foundations for the social construction of Turkey’s newly embraced Islamic identity, we can then examine the re-strengthening of relations with Iran, Turkey’s Islamic neighbour. An indication of Iran’s Islamic population is reflected by Figure 3.3 which illustrates the mean percentile of Iran’s 74,819,000 being 98.53% nominally Muslim.
Figure 3.3: Percentage of Iranian population nominally Muslim 2007-2012

Source: Pew Research Centre (2011); CIA (2012c); US Dept. of State (2006)

What the results from this figure show us is that, similarly to Turkey, Iran has a very high percentage of its population who identify themselves with being Muslim. It is this Islamic identity in which both states share that has played a significant role in the rekindling of this regional friendship.

TURKEY’S POLICY TOWARDS IRAN

Throughout Chapter One the claim was established that interests presuppose identities because presumably, an actor cannot know what it wants before it knows who it is (Wendt 1999: 231). Thus, to answer the question of this paper, it must be demonstrated that a change in Turkish identity has occurred. Whilst the former section of this chapter was dedicated to showing a revival of Islamism within Turkish domestic politics, the following section asserts that Turkey’s change in identity is discernible through an examination of its changed relations with Iran. I argue that the revival of this relationship is an indication of Turkey’s move towards re-strengthening ties with its Middle Eastern neighbours, potentially at the cost of its relations with Israel.
Since the inception of the AKP in 2003, Turkey’s foreign policy has progressed from a ‘zero problem’ policy towards its neighbours to a policy of ‘strategic-depth’, an act that demonstrates a shift towards recognising its place within the region of the Middle East (Davutoğlu 2008: 79-82 and; Bulent 2009). As Cagaptay worded it, “the AKP has shifted foreign policy away from the West (to) help catalyse a transformation of the Turkish identity towards Islamist causes” (Brinlee 2011). This act has arguably enhanced Turkey’s freedom of action and increased its regional and global leverage through the formation of new relationships with states, such as Iran, within its Middle Eastern region.

Despite the volatility that Turkish-Iranian relations have experienced during 2012 as a result of Syrian actions, relations on the whole have strengthened in recent times and under Turkey’s AK party as will be demonstrated. Turkey and Iran first initiated a “Treaty of Friendship” in April 1926 the principles of which outlined a friendship of neutrality and non-aggression (Sicker 2001: 136). Through the passing decades, this neutrality agreement was upheld and both countries signed various multilateral treaties, including the 1937 Treaty of Non-aggression, the 1955 Central Treaty Organisation and the 1964 Regional Co-operations for Development agreement. However, with the onset of the 1979 Iranian Revolution there became an imbalance of power within the Middle East and the political elites of Turkey downgraded Turkey’s ties with Iran in a bid to forge stronger Western affinities, claiming ideological and security concerns (Sinkaya 2012: 138). Turkey claimed that there existed a conflict of ideologies between Turkey and Iran after this revolution, whereby secular Turkey no longer shared commonalities with theocratic Iran (Singh 2004). Furthermore, Turkish parliamentary officials expressed concern that Iran was
involved in supporting Islamist organisations and militant groups within the Turkish state (Karmon 1997). Thus, the Turkish decision to revive relations with Iran in recent years is once more indicative of the AK party’s redirection of state interests to engage with states that similarly identify with Islam.

In response to the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, Turkey witnessed a military coup d'état during 1980, the stated aim of which was an expression of Turkish opposition to the threat against their secular ideologies and in fear for a dissemination of the Iranian revolution into Turkey (Biresselioglu 2010). There were also fears within the Turkish political arena of Iranian supported Kurdish terrorist organisations such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and other radical Islamists within Turkey (Biresselioglu 2010 and Sinkaya 2012: 139-140). The suspicion that Iran was supporting the PKK, a Kurdish guerilla movement fighting an armed struggle against the Turkish state for greater cultural and political autonomy for Kurds within Turkey, was of particular concern to the Turkish government given its violent tendencies in the past where acts of terrorism by the PKK have been the result (Tahiri 2007: 232 and Jongerden 2008: 129). Thus, Turkey’s distancing of ties with Iran during the 1980 and 1990s was seen as a decision based on security and ideology, and represented Turkey’s allegiance to its process of Westernisation.

TURKEY, IRAN, AND ISLAM

Despite this period of unease, under Turkey’s current AK party, there has been a revival of relations between Turkey and Iran, arguably because this party embraces the common religion of Islam between the two states, something that was disregarded by previous more secularly driven Turkish governments (Biresselioglu 2010). This
claim is further supported by Sinkaya, who has described the rejuvenation of Turkish relations with Iran as a divergence from the pre-AKP approach towards the West, reflective of Turkey’s new Middle Eastern interests (Sinkaya 2012: 137-138; Kardas 2010 and; Altunisik and Martin 2011). With this in mind, rapprochement with Iran was reached, both politically and economically, under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s tenure. Economic trade between the bilateral alliances has increased under the AKP from $1.2 billion in 2001 to $4.3 billion in 2005 and in 2010 Turkish-Iranian trade totaled $13 billion. This was exceeded by a $15 billion market in 2011, with Turkey’s primarily imported goods consisting of oil and natural gas, newly secured sources of energy for the state (Sinkaya 2012: 141 and; Biresselioglu 2010).

A REDIRECTION OF TURKEY’S INTERESTS
Larrabee has described this rekindling of relations with Iran as an act by Turkey to establish itself as a diplomatic actor in the Middle East with the purpose of improving its relations with the Islamic world, a departure from Turkish foreign policies aimed towards the West under previous governments (2007). It is this re-identification with Turkey’s Islamic neighbours, such as, but not limited to Iran, which is indicative of Turkey’s shift in focus away from the West and towards the Middle East, particularly since Turkey voted against its Western allies in the June 2010 vote regarding a new UN sanctions regime targeting Iran’s military operations (Larrabee 2012). Although, it should be highlighted that despite the continued strength in economic relations into 2012, political disagreement has arisen since Iran’s reaction to the Syrian crisis as the Arab Spring continues to play out this year (Vatanka 2012). Despite this divergence in attitudes, the significance of this bilateral relationship is in its contribution to
establishing Turkey as a regional player within the Middle East, one that is aspiring to expand its networks within this region (Larrabee 2012).

It has been demonstrated, through the analysis of this bilateral relationship between Turkey and Iran, that Turkey has, through the strengthening of regional alliances with Islamic neighbours, made the motions to put its historic ties with the Western world second to those with its regional relationships. To further this claim, the same case study analysis could be applied to Turkey’s relations with states such as Iraq or Egypt. For example, Turkey’s divergence from the West was evident when it sided with Iraq, or at least did not side with the US, post the September 11 2011 attacks on the US, by refusing to permit American troops transit through Turkish territory in order to gain access to Iraq during the 2003 invasion. The decision reflected public opinion polls of which 94% voted in favour of refusing American entry for this purpose (Finkel 2012: 71 and; Ugur 2004: 167). Having established thus far that Turkey is no doubt focusing on rekindling old ties to neighbouring and Islamic states within its Middle Eastern region, the second case study pertaining specifically to Turkey’s involvement with and endeavor to become a member of the EU will now be examined.

**TURKEY’S POLICY TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN UNION**

This chapter has so far demonstrated that since the inception of the AKP, Turkish national identity has been increasingly reflecting its Islamic roots as opposed to its Western affinities. This second section is concerned with a case study of the relations between Turkey and the EU, which will further highlight Turkey’s turn away from the West in favour of its Middle Eastern ties. Insofar as Turkey has ‘turned away’ from
the EU, Rabasa and Larrabee argue that this increasing interest in regional Middle Eastern alliances, such as the previously explored Iranian example, has been influenced by, “elements within the AKP whose foreign policy views are religiously motivated” (2008). Warning and Kardas further support this, claiming that Turkey’s interests have been redefined by the AKP who have, “made the strategic choice to reintegrate Turkey into the regional Arab political system” (Warning and Kardas 2011: 128 and; Abaza 2009). Turkey, under the political leadership of the AKP, accomplished this by reasserting itself within the Middle Eastern region through the strengthening of alliances with other Islamic states such as Iran and Iraq. This allowed Turkey to redefine its identity as a Middle Eastern state, rather than a Western state, which had been the focus under previous governments partial to Kemalism. Thus, with this in mind, the purpose of this section will be to further demonstrate how Turkey’s change in identity has resulted in a redirection of its foreign interests away from the West and its institutions such as the EU, instead focusing more on regional alliances, which have thereby enabled this distancing from the EU.

This chapter suggests that Turkey is distancing itself from this multilateral relationship in order that it can further pursue new foreign interests within its Middle Eastern region. Giannotta supports this claim, asserting that Turkey’s foreign interests no longer lie in obtaining the acceptance of the EU (2010). What is more, Zalewski furthers this claim again with regards to the redirection of Turkey’s foreign interests, stating that Turkey has “drifted somewhat from the West...(and) under the rule of the AKP has rediscovered its neighborhood” (2011: 98). Thus, in this way, it is clear that under the influence of the AKP, the change in Turkey’s national interests have been dictated by the rediscovered significance of its Islamic national identity.
Prior to the AK party’s inception into power, the Turkish government’s socio-political movements towards joining the EU had become intertwined with the Kemalist ideology of ‘Europeanising’ Turkey (Yavuz 2003: 255). In a bid to further their goal of acceptance into the EU, then Prime Minister Özal formally applied for full membership, reaching a package of 97,000 pages of laws and treaties obliging to a wide range of policy regulations ranging from competition policy to food safety and financial control, which he perceived would fulfill the EU’s requirements for acceptance (Findley 2010: 372 and; Finkel 2012: 89). However, in 1999 at the Helsinki summit, despite being recognised as a membership candidate, Turkey was instructed it was required to meet certain further conditions before membership talks could begin (Findley 2010: 373). This has been a long and ongoing process, with membership prospects still unknown.

**OPPOSITION TO TURKISH ACCESSION WITHIN THE EU**

Within the EU, France, Germany and Austria have remained in opposition to Turkish membership to the EU, with Greek President Karolos Papoulis joining in opposition in 2009 as a response to the Turkish occupation of Cyprus. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has made his opposition to Turkey’s possible accession into the EU well known. In 2011 he was quoted at a news conference in Armenia stating that Turkey’s “role is outside the EU. France does not see Turkey in the EU” (“Sarkozy insists” 2011). Belgian Prime Minister Van Rompuy backed this view stating, “Turkey is not a part of Europe and will never be part of Europe” (Tait 2009). Germany and Austria are similarly opposed to Turkey’s membership to the EU, offering instead that Turkey
should be given a privileged partnership of closer ties to the EU but no decision-making powers (Morelli 2011: 3).

Statistically, since the opening of membership talks with the EU in December of 2004 into 2005, there has been a decline in support for Turkish membership within the EU. Within the first twelve months of talks, a Eurobarometer survey concluded that 44% of citizens from member states were in favour of Turkey joining the EU (Eurobarometer 255, 2006: 72). However, by September-October of the same year, support had already declined to 28% whilst 59% of the EU-25 members were against Turkey joining the EU (Eurobarometer 66, 2006: 223). These figures are broken down in Figure 3.4, which illustrates the opposition from within the EU of Turkish membership.

**Figure 3.4 EU Opposition to Turkish Membership Sept-Oct 2006**

*Source: Barysch 2007: 3 and; Eurobarometer No. 66, December 2006: 223-224, 226*
Figure 3.4 illustrates the high percentage of opposition from within member states of the EU towards Turkey’s accession into the EU. Austria (AT) leads the opposition at approximately 90%, followed closely by Germany (DE) at 80%, France (FR) at 70%, and Italy (IT) at around 60% opposition. The least opposition was found in Spain (ES) with just fewer than 40% opposed to Turkey’s accession. Thus, it is evident that not only is opposition from within the EU for Turkey’s accession high, but member states, such as France and Bulgaria, have explicitly stated that Turkey does not belong to the EU, Europe, or therefore, the West.

 DECLINING DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP

Throughout the AKP’s three consecutive terms in power, there has been an obvious wane in Turkish public support of EU membership. Prior to the AK party’s leadership from 2002, polls indicated throughout the late 1990s around 75% of the Turkish population favoured Turkey’s membership to the European Union (Interview: Taniz 5/7/12). This is in contrast to polls which indicate that since mid 2006 this public support for Turkish accession into the EU has decreased to 32% with more recent polls in 2011 indicating that only 13% are in favour of Turkish cooperation with the EU (Eurobarometer poll 2006 and Zalewski 2011: 101). These figures are therefore indicative of Turkey’s increasingly declining interest towards membership to the EU and the West, redirecting this interest towards aligning itself within the Middle Eastern region with which it shares a common Islamic affiliation.

This realignment of Turkey’s interests away from the EU and, consequently, the West, is supported theoretically by constructivism, which dictates that once an identity is structured, states will institutionalise this identity at both domestic and
international levels (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 62). Thus, at the international level, Turkey is enacting its Islamic identity in interstate normative structures, such as the AKP’s regime and the state’s security, by securitising its ties with its Middle Eastern neighbours, interests that Turkey would not have explored had it maintained its secularist approach towards obtaining a ‘Western’ identity within the international arena (Bozdağlıoğlu 2007: 137).

Additionally, a sign that the AK party has done little to further its own cause for acceptance by the EU, is literally that at the exit of the Bosphorus Bridge in Istanbul, which reads, “Welcome to Asia” (emphasis added). This sign is somewhat reflective of the Turkish state, which is represented by just 3% of total land mass geographically located on the European continent. For this reason, it is not of surprise that its populates do not identify themselves as being European of Western, rather, this was perhaps a construction of identity under the Atatürk mentality (Kapucu and Palabıyık 2008: 24). This is one reason why the EU has emphasised that Turkey, in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria, will be monitored for its relations with its neighbours, settlements of border disputes, and a comprehensive Cyprus settlement before membership would be offered. This is a test that Turkey might not pass given its redirection of focus on building its Islamic identity and ties (Findley 2010: 373 and; “Negotiating Framework” 2005).

Uncharacteristic of Turkey’s historic tendency to “reform ‘for Europe’s sake’” was its turn away from the EU and further towards identifying with its new regional allies (Zalewski 2011: 97). Further suggestive of the AKP’s turn away from the EU and the West was its unwillingness to support NATO’s coalition against Saddam
Hussein in 2003 (Warning and Kardas 2011: 132 and; Zalewski 2011: 97). However, perhaps of more significance was the reaction by Germany, France, and Belgium who vetoed the US request for NATO to make plans to protect Turkey from Saddam Hussein if he launched an attack (Black 2003). Here, not only is it observable that Turkey opposed NATO on the issue of Iraq, which is in and of itself indicative of Turkey’s identification with a pro-Islamic neighbour, but it is also reflective of some significant Western states’ rejection of Turkey.

This disengagement from the West on behalf of Turkey in recent years has been encouraged by the state’s engagement with neighbouring states within its region, summarised by Raptopolous who states that, “important sections of the Arab world, due to their common Muslim faith, represent a logical outlet of solidarity to Turkey” (2004). On this point, it has been suggested that with Turkey’s further strengthening of regional ties, the point might come where it decides the EU needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the EU which could lead to Turkey’s potential rejection of any membership offer made by the EU (Finkel 2012: 103). Thus, through the analysis of this case study, it has been made clear that with Turkey’s decreased efforts towards obtaining EU membership in recent years, there has simultaneously been a decline in support for Turkey’s membership to this Western institution from member states. It is therefore now evident that through the analysis of these two case studies, Turkey has actively redirected its foreign interests away from the West and increasingly seeks its interests in the Middle East.
IMPACT ON TURKISH – ISRAELI RELATIONS

Through this examination of Turkey’s identity and interests, it was demonstrated that Turkey has decreased its ties to the West through its decreased relations with the EU whilst simultaneously strengthening its ties to Islamic neighbours such as Iran. This was suggested to have been reflective of deep changes to domestic policies, and indicative of Turkey’s sharp redirection of its state interests. Due to this redirection of Israel’s interests increasingly away from the EU and further towards Islamic neighbouring states, Turkey has unilaterally disengaged from its relations with Israel as their interests no longer align to the extent that they once did.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated, through the lens of constructivism, that Turkey’s identity has undergone a sharp redirection since the inception of the AKP. As was demonstrated, this party has encouraged the Islamic roots of Turkey to be recognised by the Turkish people, redirecting the Turkish national identity away from its Western, secular affinities, and replacing it with a national Islamic identity. Once this change in identity was established, it was demonstrated that, in accordance with Wendtian constructivist theory, a change in the national identity of a state necessitates a change in its interests. Through the analysis of two case studies, that of Turkish-Iranian relations and Turkish relations with the EU, this chapter demonstrated that this change in interests was not limited to Turkey’s bilateral relations with Israel. Rather, it was established that Turkey’s interests have been redirected away from the Ataturk agenda of Westernisation and secularity in order to allow for the forging of stronger ties with neighbouring Islamic states. This notion was supported by Kardas who stated that had the Mavi Marmara incident occurred ten to fifteen years ago, previous
Turkish governments would probably have overlooked the incident, a further indication of the change in Turkey’s foreign policy and national interests (Interview 7/7/12). Thus, Turkey’s foreign interests have evidently changed as a result of the deep changes in national identity sparked by changes in domestic policy under the leadership of Erdoğan’s AK party.
Conclusion:

*The role of Identity and Interests in the Meltdown*

**BRIDGING THE GAP: FINDINGS OF THE SOCIAL INQUIRY**

This thesis examined the role attributed to identity and interests in the recent deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey. I analysed the domestic and foreign policies of Israel and Turkey, respectively, in order to determine the stability of each state’s identities, respectively. In doing so, I suggested that over the past decade, Israel’s national identity has experienced a slow pace of change which has resulted in the relatively stability of its identity and interests. However, when examining the national identity and foreign interests of Turkey, I demonstrated that there has been a sharp redirection of Turkey’s national identity away from the Ataturk agenda of Westernisation and secularisation, which has simultaneously resulted in changing Turkish interests as well. Through an understanding of this change in Turkish identity, I suggested that Turkey has unilaterally disengaged from its relations with Israel as it now seeks to align its interests with neighbouring Islamic and Middle Eastern states.

Chapter One outlined the theoretical framework for understanding the significance of identity and interests to state alliances as a social means of inquiry. Through the deconstruction of Wendtian Constructivism it was demonstrated that “identities are the basis of interests” (Wendt 1992: 398). For this reason, the following two chapters were concerned with analysing the changes in the identities of Israel and Turkey, respectively. This was done using the definitional parameters outlined in Chapter One, which articulated three core assumptions of identity. Firstly, that
identity formation is reliant upon social construction (Hopf 2002: 2). Second is the relational comparisons argument, which dictates that identities are incomplete without an understanding of oneself in relation to others. Lastly, is that identities are not fixed or stable entities, but shape, influence, and generate interests (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 21 and; Shafique 2011). For these reasons, it was determined that both domestic and international environments must be taken into account when assessing changes in national identity. With this in mind, a critical analysis of Wendtian constructivism ensued, detailing the processes of the social inquiry that would be applied as the mechanism for analysis in the proceeding two chapters.

Chapter Two assessed the identity of Israel over the past decade, concluding that the slow change in identity was accountable to the relatively stable domestic policies of the state. Given that this relative stability was not extended to its foreign relations with Turkey, an examination of two other foreign relations of Israel was carried out, that of Israel’s policies towards Palestine and secondly, its relations with the United States. However, the findings of these studies concluded that Israel’s foreign policies in both cases had, like its identity, experienced slow change, but overall relative stability. This inferred that the deterioration of bilateral relations between Israel and Turkey was perhaps contingent not on changes to Israel’s identity or interests, but rather on those of Turkey. Lastly, I studied a series of political tensions and events over the past decade and suggested that Turkey had used these as pretexts in order to disengage from its relations with Israel.

As such, Chapter Three was concerned with ascertaining why Turkey might disengage from its relations with Israel. The same process of testing Turkey’s identity
was taken, as when testing Israel’s in the previous chapter. Through a detailed examination of the domestic policies of Turkey it was evident that sharp shifts in Turkey’s national identity had occurred over the past decade. It was demonstrated that this change was enabled and encouraged by the ruling party of the AKP, whom have held power consecutively by means of electoral success during this decade. In order to demonstrate that this change in identity was not only reflected in the deterioration of Turkey’s bilateral relationship with Israel, two other case studies were examined. The findings demonstrated that changes were not limited to this bilateral relationship, but were extended to encompass significant changes in Turkey’s interests with Iran and the EU, respectively. Thus, Turkey’s interests were argued as having been redirected away from its relations with the West and further towards securing ties with its Islamic and Middle Eastern neighbours, reflective of Turkey’s turn away from the Ataturk regime of westernisation and secularism under this AKP government.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The findings of this thesis contribute significantly to the literature surrounding the recent deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey. It bridged gaps in the literature on this topic by engaging in a social means of inquiry in order to better understand the significance of identity and interests in alliance formation and destruction. However, due to the narrow scope and research constraints of this thesis, the results presented are limited insomuch as they identify the role played by identity and interests in the case study of Israel and Turkey only. As such, this thesis provides an important framework for others to extend upon.
In this increasingly globalised world, alliances between states are often developed to further a state’s relative or absolute wealth, influence, power, and therefore survival. For this reason, the actions of State ‘A’ may be perceived by State ‘B’ as a threat against their survival, be it through material gains or increased wealth both of which equate to increased power, which then drives one of these states to increase/reduce its relations with the other accordingly. Therefore, it is the social construction of this perception that needs further attention and analysis. For this reason, the value of this thesis has been in the demonstration of a social inquiry into the meltdown in relations between Israel and Turkey as a case study to demonstrate the significance of identity and interests in alliance formation and deterioration. Since alliances within the international arena create and affect the balance of power in international relations, it is vital that we understand the social processes of alliance formation and deterioration.

* * *
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Appendix A: Map of the West Bank Barrier, 2011

Agricultural gates
Frequency of opening
- Daily *
- Seasonal **
- Seasonal Weekly ***

West Bank Barrier
- Constructed
- Under Construction
- Projected

Israel Settlements
Behind the Barrier
Area Behind the Barrier

Disclaimer:
The diagram(s) employed and the presentation of materi-
als on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion
concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city,
or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimita-
tion of its frontiers or boundaries. Reproduction and/or use of this material is only permitted with express
reference to “United Nations OCHA oPt” as the source.

Source: United Nations OCHA oPt, 2011
Appendix B:

Ethics Approval: Israel 2012, Protocol No. 14431

REF: [MF/KFG]
9 January 2012

Dr Gil Merom
Department of Government and International Relations
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Merewether Building – H04
The University of Sydney
Email: gil.merom@sydney.edu.au

Dear Dr Merom

I refer to correspondence dated 4 and 8 January 2012 addressing comments made to you by the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC).

I am pleased to inform you that with the matters now addressed your protocol entitled “An examination of the changing relations between Israel and Turkey in light of recent breakdowns in this relationship from an international relations perspective.” has been approved.

Details of the approval are as follows:

Protocol No.: 14431
Approval Date: 9 January 2012
First Annual Report Due: 31 January 2012
Authorised Personnel: Dr Gil Merom
                     Ms Katherine Cook

Documents Approved:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Version Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Participant Information Statement</td>
<td>Version 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interview Questions</td>
<td>Version 1</td>
<td>30/11/2011</td>
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HREC approval is valid for four (4) years from the approval date stated in this letter and is granted pending the following conditions being met:

Condition/s of Approval

- Continuing compliance with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans.
- Provision of an annual report on this research to the Human Research Ethics Committee from the approval date and at the completion of the study. Failure to submit reports will result in withdrawal of ethics approval for the project.
All serious and unexpected adverse events should be reported to the HREC within 72 hours.

All unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project should be reported to the HREC as soon as possible.

Any changes to the protocol including changes to research personnel must be approved by the HREC by submitting a Modification Form before the research project can proceed.

Chief Investigator / Supervisor’s responsibilities:

1. You must retain copies of all signed Consent Forms and provide these to the HREC on request.

2. It is your responsibility to provide a copy of this letter to any internal/external granting agencies if requested.

Please do not hesitate to contact Research Integrity (Human Ethics) should you require further information or clarification.

Yours sincerely

Dr Margaret Faedo
Manager, Human Ethics
On behalf of the HREC

cc. Katherine Cook
kcooky@hotmail.com; kcoo4352@uni.sydney.edu.au

This HREC is constituted and operates in accordance with the National Health and Medical Research Council’s (NHMRC) National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007), NHMRC and Universities Australia Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (2007) and the CPMP/ICH Note for Guidance on Good Clinical Practice.
Appendix B₂:

Transcript: Alon Liel Interview 10th January 2012

Location: Jerusalem, Israel  
Date: 10/01/12  
Interviewer: Katherine Cook (Y)  
Interviewee: Alon Liel (I)

Interview commenced 16:00

Y: How would you describe the current relationship between Israel and Turkey as of the Flotilla Raid?

I: Turkey has become a hostile country to Israel; the relations are bad. I would say almost non-existent when it comes to the political-diplomatic level. There are still commercial relations in a surprising volume and still some cultural and sport relations but when it comes to the political and diplomatic contact between the countries it is almost non-existent.

Y: I have read that you say the relationship between Turkey and Egypt, in light of the Arab Spring, might have influenced the relationship between Israel and Turkey. Do you think that this relationship is worsening the bilateral ties between Israel and Turkey?

I: First of all, Turkey on the bilateral level has its grievances stemming from the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts there are some bilateral problems, so the main thing is Turkey-Israel and if you want, the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the fact that we didn’t make any progress in the last three years. The situation in Egypt is just further complicating the Israeli situation in the region but I don’t see it as directly connected to the bilateral ties between Israel and Turkey as such. If this process of Islamisation of Egypt will continue then it is further isolating Israel in their region and Turkey can maybe make use of it a little bit. But I don’t see these two things necessarily strongly connected. The bilateral relations between Israel and Turkey are strongly connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not with the problems with Egypt.

Y: So you say the relationship between Israel and Turkey, politically, is ‘bad’ at the moment; the Israeli Prime Minister’s office says that Israel hopes to find a way to overcome the dispute and will continue to work towards this goal. Do you think they are doing so, successfully?

I: Israel is interested in overcoming the dispute, but I don’t think Israel is ready to do what the Turks are expecting, which is first of all an apology for the Flotilla, but also a movement on the peace process, maybe even including the Hamas and maybe removing the siege from Gaza. So, I don’t see Israel as ready to do it so I don’t see a possible breakthrough.

Y: Do you think Israel should be meeting Turkey’s demands?
I: I think, yes. But I understand the leadership of Israel’s assumption that since the chance of a breakthrough with the Palestinians is minimal the chance that Turkey will love us in the near future is very small. So, the Israeli behaviour is based on an assessment that there will be no breakthrough in the peace process. So, I understand the logic of the Israeli behaviour, but I don’t agree with it. And I don’t agree with it on the Israel and Palestinians, who are very much needed and a breakthrough would help us with Turkey too.

Y: How do you think the relationship has changed specifically under the Erdogan government since 2003?

I: First of all, definitely there was a change and Erdogan being religious and a Muslim is by definition close to the Arab world than Israel. But, I think the very, very basic principal in the Turkish foreign policy since 1967 is an indexation of the Israeli-Arab conflict to the Israeli-Arab relations, meaning until 1967 it didn’t exist because we were both in the camp of the United States in the Cold War and there was no occupation of Jerusalem. But since June 1967 when we occupied East Jerusalem, they indexed. So, when there was a period of time of troubles-wars, the relations deteriorated. When it moved, or looked like it moved, the relations improved. So, we see this pattern, this principal also during Erdogan’s period of time. For instance, during the Kemalists, I was there in the 80s and the relations were very bad and it was not Erdogan but because we have the war in Lebanon and Sabra and Shatila and with the annexation of the Golan Heights and now we are in Erdogan’s time and we also have ups and downs that were related to what happened in the conflict. 2004 was very bad because we killed the leaders of the Hamas and 2005 was very good because we withdrew from Gaza and they kind of follow what was going on. Again in 2006 it was not a good year because we had the war in Lebanon. And 2007-2008 was good because we were negotiating with the Palestinians and the Syrians and since 2009 we have nothing and its bad again. So, there is this indexation. It is true that he brought a very aggressive style, Erdogan himself, he attacked Israel in a way that maybe only Ahmadinejad did. Although people are affected by this style, content wise, this indexation is the main principal.

Y: You gave a presentation on this cycle of good then bad relations, a short while ago, do you think that the relationship is ever going to be stable, or will it always be up and down?

I: They were never stable, we have relations for 63 years and the relations were never stable.

Y: So that means the future is not going to be stable either?

I: Unless we have peace between Israel and the Arabs and even then, I’m not sure it would be stable, because Turkey has other problems in the region… Cyprus, the Kurds, Armenians. Why should it be stable, I mean it’s a Muslim country and a Jewish country. It’s not exactly the Netherlands or Denmark. It is a country in the region that has a lot of interests and the region was never
stable so why do we expect stability? There were sharp ups and downs even in the 50s and 60s before the 1967 war with a very good beginning in the 50s, and then it went down for all different kinds of reasons. I don’t foresee stability. This situation now, by the way, is stable. But, I don’t know for how long.

Y: Do you think the instability has anything to do with Turkey’s inability to be either completely Western or completely Middle Eastern; they’re sort of fighting to be both?

I: No…Israel has an attitude saying we can never do something wrong. So, if they don’t like us, there are another reasons. So they say its because they cannot get into the EU, or they say it’s to lead the Muslim world. So, Israelis like to say that this crisis is not because of the Israeli behaviour in anyway and there are other reasons. Partially, only partially there is something to it. But, the main reason was happening on the ground and it is between us and the Palestinians, and as a result, especially with the Flotilla, now between us and Turkey. So, I don’t buy it, I don’t but it that this…you know also, there is a very big change in Turkish foreign policy that is not related to Turkish foreign policy. Turkey was in a way in the pocket of the West for a few decades and now it is an all around player. A Balkan player, a Europe player, an Asian player, a player in the Middle East, you know, it sees itself playing all over, so it’s definitely a change and also there is more assertiveness. We took it from English that when there is a young guy who is ambitious, we call him a ‘wanna be’- he wants to be, and Turkey is the ‘wanna be’ of the region. They want to influence the world so it is effective and of course its policy towards Syria, Libya, Iraq, Israel, towards Egypt, they’re the regional player and they are a regional power even So, obviously, it has something to do with Israel too. But, usually if I examine the key factors, it’s the Arab-Israeli conflict and recently also the bilateral problem that is very recent. It’s very new. We never had a bilateral problem. We never killed Turks. The Israeli army never, we did once, but without knowing it was Turks in the First Lebanese War when we bombarded. We bombarded the palace in which there were Turkish workers but we didn’t know and we thought they were Lebanese fighters and so on but in the Marmara we knew they were Turks and we killed them, so it is the first direct attack bilaterally and we also don’t have a common border. And so the chance we have a territorial conflict is non existent so it is usually the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Y: So, aside from this view, where do you think Turkey belongs? The East or the West?

I: They belong to wherever they think they belong. And they think they belong to everything. Why should I think differently? For many years they have belonged to the West, with NATO and now they don’t want to belong to anyone. So, this is how they feel.

Y: Aside from economics, how important do you think the relationship is between Israel and Turkey?
I: I personally think it’s very important but there are different views. When I joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thirty years ago, and I know long before I arrived, the Israeli number one goal in our foreign policy was to legitimise ourselves in the region. This was the dream. So, when this was the dream, relations with Turkey were extremely important. But, it’s not the dream anymore; there is the feeling now that Israeli diplomacy, at least on the political level that we don’t need the Middle East. We have the United States, Europe, China, India we have Australia, we have Canada, why do we need the Middle East? The Arabs do not like us and they can go to hell. There is this attitude now, so the fact that the diplomats in my generation saw it as extremely important, doesn’t mean that this is how the politicians feel today. Also, things have changed, forty years ago, Israel was a very weak country, small, weak economically and we were always doing quite well militarily, but we were small in economy and small in population but we are a lot stronger now, especially economically. We can pave our way without the Arabs in a way. Even if we have to fight a war every several years, we can defend ourselves. We are building walls around the country along the borders and some we have already along the border with Lebanon, with Syria, and now we are building along Egypt, the Palestinians, and Jordan so Israel is much more confident of its ability to survive in the region than thirty years ago. Things have changed over the years. The Minister of today who is shaping the diplomacy towards Turkey, Lieberman, thinks if they don’t want us, we don’t need them, we’ll manage.

Y: Do you agree?

I: It is connected and goes far beyond Turkey. I disagree because I think it is very unhealthy to build a fortress here that will have nothing to do with the region. Not only security wise but also morally and psychologically. If you came to this region, why shouldn’t we be part of it? And the claim of the Arab wars…by isolating ourselves and surrounding we are proving that we are foreigners here. You know, my parents came to Israel, when it was still Palestine, my mother came in the early 40s and she was never an Israeli, she was always a German, I was the Israeli. I was the first generation of Israeli and I very much wanted to be an Israeli but now they tell us we are not Middle Eastern, we are Europeans. Why shouldn’t we go back? Why don’t we go back to Germany? Why do we have to stick together in this place if everybody hates us? It’s an observation not only on the Israeli-Turkey link but also on our role here in the region and if peace is important or not. Many people think not only that peace is not important but they also think peace is impossible. So if peace is impossible the Arabs will never like us and if they will never like us then why bother? There are six plus billion people and one plus billion people are Muslim, we still survive. Why do I need all this six billion? I disagree with it, but this is coming up especially now after the last two years when Turkey attacked us in a very brutal way. More and more people say…are giving up. Very few Israelis are going to Turkey now and are boycotting Turkey in fact on the Tourism level, not on the commercial level.

Y: Do you think Israel needs Turkey or Turkey needs Israel more?
I: It’s again coming back to the question. For many, many years, when they approached, the Israeli approach was thanks to the Turks for being ready to have diplomatic relations so we needed them much more than they needed us for many, many years. And also the fact that we had an Embassy in Turkey was something that we were very proud of and we showed the Arab world. We also had relations with Iran for twenty years. We wanted to be part of the region and it was extremely important but not so important to them. Israel was not a strong country, they had other interests and the Muslim countries were always... had more votes in the UN and connected to the third world they needed so for years it was very unbalanced and they decided if the relations would be good or bad and we accepted anything they chose. The fact that we did not apologise now means that things are more balanced. That it is not...

Y: Do you think this was Israel’s aim? To balance the powers of the region?

I: Yes. The policy of Israel before this foreign minister was another culture that we didn’t know before. He comes from the Soviet Union and grew up there, it is a different size of country, different mentality and he says he is not hiding that he thought the Israeli mentality was too apologetic and he wants a more aggressive and assertive policy. If somebody is criticising us don’t defend yourself, criticise back; he’s attacking, so attack back. So, yes, you, criticise me, I criticise you. I don’t find the need to apologise. It is a new policy.

Y: So, do you think the demise in policy is linked to the Flotilla raid or are there other things exacerbating the situation?

I: I think the main thing is the Israeli-Arab conflict with a focus on the Israeli-Palestinian. Let’s say that tomorrow we sit with the Palestinians and we sign an agreement with the Fatah and the Hamas for establishing a Palestinian state. I’m almost sure that Turkey will almost forget the Flotilla and will give the blessing maybe returning the ambassador and so on. On the other hand if we would apologise for the Flotilla, even if we returned the ambassador, they would not turn the relations back to normal. Unless we move ahead with the Palestinians. So, it is connected. I see the Mavi Marmara as a bilateral issue, as a hurdle that they will be very, very happy if we can put aside. I believe that if we would apologise tomorrow, and we will not, the ambassador would come back but the love story that we had in the 90s would need to wait for a break through.

Y: Do you think the relationship is over, or that it will progress back to normal?

I: Not unless something dramatic happens.

Y: So there is nothing economically that will push the relationship?

I: Economics has nothing to do with it. There is one factor that can be important and can work both ways and this is the gas that we discovered and that Cyprus discovered. It can be a source of additional conflict but on the other hand it can also, if we play it cleverly, it can also be a tool to improve relations. There is another big issue. It is Erdogan; he is sick now. Sick and I don’t know for
how long he will be around. I don’t think he can be political into the foreseeable future, but I don’t know about his health so if Erdogan is leaving the scene then we might have another Turkish leadership which can also bring up changes and you know this region is a crazy region and politics is very dynamic and we could have another leadership here in a year that will decide to apologise or will decide to sign an agreement with the Palestinians. These are all things that can happen so I know there will be ups and downs but this I see as the key factors for the ups and downs.

Y: When Erdogan says the Flotilla raid was state terrorism, what do you say to that?

I: Look, he started using this term three days after he was elected. On the 6th November 2002, he already said the Israeli policy was state terrorism. Sharon was the Prime Minister and that Sharon was practicing state terrorism. Three days after he was elected, he repeated it very often in March and April 2004 when we killed Abdulaziz al-Rantisi. So you see, he uses this term for years now and this is how he really sees it. He thinks that what we call terrorism of the Hamas is not terrorism and that this is a legitimate party who won elections in 2006, like he won elections. He sees them as freedom fighters and not a state with terrorism and Israeli is a state that can do anything it wants and you cannot call it terrorism because it is a state so he uses the term state terrorism often, he believes in it and he’s not the only one in the world. You know we had this report on the War in Gaza three years ago that says Israel was breaking international laws and even committing war crimes and he is not the only one but usually it does not come from heads of states, definitely not heads of states that are associated with the West, usually it comes from Arab countries that have no diplomatic relations with us for media, so it is very unusual as heads of state that they are attacking Israel in such a way but this is what he believes…

There was this incident of sitting the Turkish ambassador on a lower sofa— you know what I’m speaking about?

Y: Yes…

I: This was a big thing; a very big thing and you should cover it and examine it at least a little bit. Also, you should examine more about the flotilla; I mean how did it happen that Israel couldn’t handle it without killing these people and so on. There is this report of the UN committee but the issue of insulting the Turkish ambassador was part of this policy of retaliating. Prior to it, there were television series in Turkey that were very critical of Israel so they summoned the Turkish ambassador and they wanted to humiliate him. They didn’t want to just protest, the minister felt that this was a useless type of routine (protesting) and that we were being attacked and we protest…no he wanted to retaliate. The deputy minister thought he had a very creative idea and he would insult the ambassador and it was done in a very foolish way. What we discovered was that not only our minister’s honour but also that the Turks are very sensitive when it comes to their national honour and they fired this ambassador, they took him out of here.
So the Turks, they fired him. They didn’t fire him from the ministry but they pulled him back because they said, if they insulted you in such a way, why didn’t you leave? And he said, they didn’t insult me, it was just a spiel after I left, I don’t feel insulted. But, they couldn’t keep him here because they had to do something about the pride of the Turkish nation, and this guy, by the way, is the ambassador to Thailand today or something.

Y: How closely linked do you feel the Flotilla was to this T.V soap?

I: Everything is linked. As far as I remember, the Flotilla was at the end of May 2010. When was this incident with the ambassador?

Y: It was after, in September- November 2010.

I: So obviously it is related because of the grievances.

Y: Why would you speculate that so much force was used in the Flotilla raid and what brought it about?

I: This is something…there was an intelligence fort here, because they didn’t know how determined these people were. It was very easy to know it. It was a mistake. They didn’t follow it as they should have. For instance, it was very easy to see what was going on the boat- it was the IHH site, I saw it in my home and they were not monitoring it. I think the Israeli army was so used to seeing Turkey as a threatening country they didn’t grasp how drastically things had turned around and they didn’t prepare themselves and they should have. The Israeli army could have handled it in many other ways. Many other ways.

Y: Why did they do it this way then, was it purposeful?

I: No, they probably thought this is the best unit we have in the army and these are the best soldiers we have in the IDF and probably the best in the world also. They thought they could handle it and it was something they couldn’t handle. Their position was fierce and the people were determined and they didn’t assess correctly and because with the other boats, in the Flotilla there were several, there was no problem at all. There was no opposition, violent opposition, and they thought it was going to be the same with all of them and they made a very big mistake. But, it’s not that the soldiers misbehaved. They had to do it because it would cost them their lives. They were sent on an impossible mission. The Israeli expectation was no casualties and everybody knew that if there were casualties it would be a big story. It was a mistake. The Prime Minister, by the way, was abroad, and the top military leadership were sleeping and the guy who ended it was the head of the navy, if he was awake, I don’t know. They didn’t read it as seriously as it should have been read.

Y: Why was there such a big conflict on just one of the ships? How did this come about?
I: First of all, this ship had six hundred people. The others had tens, dozens, I don’t know. It was a big ship. Also, it was the IHH, it was Islamic militants and when there are so many people and so many journalists, by the way, they couldn’t prevent the broadcasting and they wanted to kick up a show and a fight. They should have known much better and with the Israeli sophistication we do unbelievable things. For instance, in the following year we prevented the Flotilla, we blocked it when they were Cyprus, in Greece. It wasn’t dealt with as it should have been but it was not something that was done intentionally, it was not a mistake of the soldiers themselves. They tried not to shoot as much as they could but it was an intelligence fault.

Y: Thank you for your time

Interview terminated at 16:41
Appendix B

Transcript: Alex Yakobson Interview 11th January 2012

Location: Jerusalem, Israel
Date: 11/01/12
Interviewer: Katherine Cook (Y)
Interviewee: Alex Yakobson (I)

Interview commenced 15:30

Y: How would you describe the current relationship between Israel and Turkey?

I: I think that basically, my assessment is that this present government in Turkey really made a strategic decision to get out of the Turkish-Israeli alliance/friendship that existed. To put an end to it because in any case it didn’t fit their strategic and ideological worldview. It doesn’t fit into their whole system of foreign relations. Turkey is getting away form the West. It doesn’t rupture relations with the West, but it’s not any longer a close ally of the United States and the West and it positions itself as the leading force in the Muslim World, a kind of model in the Muslim World. It’s not the most radical variant of what’s going on in the Muslim world but it is certainly…it’s game is to win in the Muslim world and as a leading force and as a moral authority in the Muslim world it cannot be perceived as a close ally of Israel. That is in any case incompatible with their general posture, general stance and so relations with Israel had to be sacrificed one way or another and so I think it was a deliberate decision. It was carried out by a series of provocations by worsening of rhetoric by aggressive and very insulting rhetoric on all kinds of occasions and sure we have also contributed. We have made it easier for them on certain occasions the most notable of course is this infamous incident with the ambassador but basically I don’t think it made it easier for Erdogan to claim. He made good use of it, but I don’t think it would have made much of a difference. In any case, when someone decides to quarrel with you, it is very difficult not to contribute to the quarrel and most people know that if someone is really determined to quarrel then that’s it. That doesn’t of course excuse this incident specifically, which was a total disgrace of course, from the diplomatic point of view. By the way, I have to note that I used to work in a room in the Knesset that is like the one in which the incident took place and I can tell you that there was no…The Turkish ambassador was not put on a lower chair. This is not only the sofa in which he sat was the normal one in that room but also the table that he was facing, nothing happened. What happened was that the deputy foreign minister said to journalists, take note that he is below and I am upstairs. But of course that saying in itself was an act. A speech act. By saying that he made it into a diplomatic insult, which of course was totally wrong and stupid and so that was used but that was not a reason for anything, nor in fact was the deplorable incident with the Marmara in which there was a very deliberate Turkish provocation by the organisers and by the government, I’m quite sure. But, the whole thing was handled very poorly by the Israeli navy-unprofessionally. But, I don’t think there was any desire on anybody’s part to
kill Turks. It’s obvious when you see the pictures that the soldiers, when they started firing, when they really were in distress and were in danger. Now, it was a very silly operation plan that put them in such a situation, so they should have of course, done everything to avoid exactly this situation. Of course it made things worse when people get killed, form the viewpoint of the Turkish public opinion, including those who don’t like Erdogan at all, I mean for them, that is very significant and so that is a problem that will probably influence relations with Turkey even if there is a change in government and a change in course. But, for this government it wasn’t something that was… it was a pretext again, so they just decided to… they couldn’t… if you analyse the whole Turkish foreign policy as it is right now and you ask yourself was it feasible for Turkey to continue being friends with Israel then the answer is no, of course not. What ever the government in Israel is and whatever it does.

Y: So do you think the conflict has arisen out of Turkey’s ambition to break away from the West?

I: Not just to break away from the West, but to become a regional power, whose influence rests on the fact that it’s a Muslim power and an object of admiration of a certain section of the Muslim public opinion. Let’s say Muslim, but not fundamentalist. The Muslim brothers do not like even this type of Turkey and certainly not Ataturk’s type of Turkey. I don’t suppose they really…the Muslim brothers are too Muslim for them and the Mubarak regime was not enough Muslim for them but I’m not sure how far they will actually succeed and I don’t know if the Arab Spring is producing the kind of regimes…but maybe. For example, it is conceivable that the Muslim brothers will decide that they accept them for pragmatic reasons because it is still a Muslim government. But that was their idea.

Y: Will Israel need Turkey if it becomes a strong regional power?

I: Well, Israel always needs good relations with important regional countries and Turkey is a very important country. Interestingly, the economic relations are only improving because up to now it’s just business as usual, in the economics sphere. In the military sphere it’s not like this and Israel has just cancelled an important military order because the Israeli government is now afraid to sell sensitive military information and military equipment to Turkey for fear that it might get into the wrong hands. But strictly from the economic point of view, nothing has happened.

Y: In this way, militarily, does Turkey need Israel more than Israel needs Turkey?

I: I’m not an expert on that at all. In order to give you a serious answer you would need someone who I’m not sure would be willing to talk. But, from my superficial impression, if you ask about equipment of course Turkey needs Israel more than we need Turks, but what we need from them is I guess geography. The physical access to certain places and the space the air space. For that we are now being compensated in some way by our new allies, including those who like us precisely because we have a quarrel with the
Turks, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. So, the Israeli air force, it’s not a secret that it used to train in the Turkish air space because Israel is just too small and the Israeli air force cannot train seriously in Israel so we need this. We did it for many years above in the Turkish skies and this is off now so, but we are doing it in other European places so how or whether this is crucial, I’m not sure. But, I suspect that there should be some things that are connected with Turkey being physically close to certain sensitive places. I could guess that there could be some physical intelligence, some collection of information from Turkish territory… I wouldn’t be surprised if there were intelligence corporations between Turkey and Israel and these things are conceivable damaging to Israel.

Y: How do you speculate the relationship is going to develop over the next year to few years?

I: It depends what happens in Turkey. The Israeli government is of course wants to have, at least doesn’t want to have these relations totally ruined now, because there were threats already to break diplomatic relations and to impose economic sanctions but we haven’t seen that yet so perhaps Turkey will decide, this government will decide, that they’ve quarreled enough with us and Erdogan is not Chavez, he is not openly anti-American. So, a total break with Israel would be considered in America as a sure sign that you are a kind of going into the axis of evil almost. So, perhaps there will be some limit to, but there is no going back to the old relations unless there is a very deep change and that is not a change only of policy, I don’t believe that under government that this is in any way possible and who knows what happens in Turkey. I hear for example that the economic situation in Turkey is potentially a serious threat, and I have no idea if this is so, if there is a serious economic crisis…Turkey is a functioning democracy, an electoral democracy- the governments are elected. But, I think to have a real improvement in the relations, what it would take is a new government, a new direction.

Y: Turkey is currently demanding an apology from Israel over the Flotilla raid and the UN’s findings. Do you think that Israel owes Turkey an apology?

I: The UN findings do not justify an apology but they (Turkey) attack the UN findings. It is not often that we find ourselves to some considerable degree, justified by the UN enquiry. I think the Israeli government offered an explanation and expression of regret and compensation for families for humanitarian conservation and I think this is as far as it is willing to go and I think it is quite a reasonable position. They are not refusing all flexibility, I frankly think that if the assessment were to be Israeli sided, this is really what stands between us and the real improvement of relations then they would perhaps have been willing to go even so far as apologising, finding some creative form. Obviously I think the Israeli assessment was, and I think it was the right one, this was not about it. So, there is no need, no sense in apologising when really if there is any government that directly bears direct responsibility for this it is the Turkish government not the Israeli government. I repeat it was a badly, mismanaged military operation and the results are tragic because of the loss of life and so in a situation like that you do express
regret but the soldiers were obviously in mortal danger and I don’t think anyone attacking Turkish soldiers in this way would have got away with it. But, in some future if there is a Turkish government that is basically willing to improve relations and it has to get something because it is a matter of pride or…I think they will work out some kind of forum.

Y: What events do you believe led to the Flotilla incident? Do you think the supposed insult on the Ambassador contributed?

I: No, they had been talking about breaking the blockade of Gaza for a long time, Erdogan even threatened to go to Gaza and that was a very effective way of making their point. The UN in the meantime actually said the blockade was legal, and the whole Turkish rhetoric totally ignores the fact that Gaza is controlled by people who openly deny Israel’s right to exist and that rockets are fired before the operation of Gaza on a regular basis, now more seldom. The whole blockade thing is also crazy because actually there has never been a blockade of Gaza in the proper sense because Gaza has a border with Egypt and it is true that the Mubarak government was in itself kind of cooperating with the Israeli blockade but if I were a Muslim politician in a Muslim country and I cared about Gaza and if I wanted to make the point to my public opinion that I cared about Gaza then the logical thing is to ask the Egyptian government to allow the passing of whatever they wanted to get to Gaza. Whatever they wanted to get to Gaza it’s easier to approach the Egyptian government and other Arab and Muslim governments and say well we have these innocent, non-military things and allow us to do that. Israel doesn’t control the border between Gaza and Egypt so why not ask the Egyptians and then put pressure on them if they refuse to allow something which is dangerous in their view and sometimes there are disputes over what can be used militarily and what can’t be, but, the whole argument about what should be allowed and what should not be allowed, should have been conducted between Turkey and the government of an Arab and Muslim country that has a border with Gaza which we don’t control. The claim that Israel is occupying Gaza is crazy. There is a blockade there, a naval blockade because there is a very reasonable apprehension that things are, and I’m sure military things are getting to Gaza, but Turkey didn’t have to get into any trouble with us or any problem. They have, at least with Egypt, they had a quarrel with Egypt and so I mean if someone really wants to help the people of Gaza, the obvious thing to do, and I’m not talking about some group that takes a boat (the Mavi Marmara), I’m talking about a country that is large and strong enough to get things done and if there is a border and Egypt is controlling it then obviously there was a provocation to provoke.

Y: Do you think Egypt and the Arab Spring has influenced the demise in relations between Israel and Turkey?

I: It’s interesting- I don’t get it exactly. What is the Turkish take on the Arab Spring now? Obviously they regarded the Arab Spring as something very promising when it started. I guess, I’m not sure about it, I’m just guessing, but it wouldn’t surprise me if they thought that the Arab Spring would produce a government in Egypt and in other places that was more responsive to public
opinion and less so Muslim. Inevitably in countries like that and so they, in that sense, they were very encouraged by the Arab Spring and of course Turkey can claim to be a functioning Muslim democracy. I also wouldn’t be surprised if this thing succeeded too much because I’m not sure they bargained for a Muslim brotherhood dominated government. This also depends on who I suspect Erdogan actual is, I mean how Muslim, how Islamist is he? Some people don’t really believe there is any difference between Erdogan and the Muslim brothers but I’m not sure of that. I think he’s too Islamist for many people’s comfort, but he’s not necessarily all the way like the Muslim brothers. So maybe they are kind of disappointed, I wouldn’t be surprised if they were. In Syria, they are now helping the opposition and that is interesting because I think with Syria they improved relations with Erdogan at some point but it’s Assad’s Alawis but I think with this massacre of the Sunni’s by an Alawite regime is too much for the Turkish government and public opinion to take, so they had to…now they are supporting the opposition, they are actually in the certain sense now the enemy of our enemy because again Israel is very ambivalent on what is happening in Syria because on the one hand the Syrian regime is really very nasty and not just nasty as a regime but because of its cooperation with Iran and Hezbollah it is a very dangerous regime. On the other hand, what will come after it, I don’t know.

Y: Have you noticed any particular patterns in addition to the continuous demise in relations under the Erdogan period of reign from 2003 to now or has it been a steady decline in relations?

I: There must have been ups and downs also as long as the army had some influence obviously in the first year of Erdogan, the Turkish army still had considerable influence, so in military fields there was very intensive cooperation and I was in Turkey and someone told me it’s all a joke, everybody knows it that the Israeli air forces are training here- that base over there everyone knows. But in the mean time things happen with the Turkish army. So, I think now it seems that there was…Israeli-Turkish relations never had a chance under Erdogan.

Y: The Israeli Prime Minister’s office said they wished to restore relations but they refuse to apologise, do you think any resolution will be sought?

I: I think they stopped just short of actually apologising. They were willing to do all sorts of things that come very close to it and the reason why they didn’t go another additional step in explicitly apologising is the assessment that it wouldn’t help actually. So you just demean yourself and deliver another propaganda coup another achievement to Erdogan because he was very anxious to get it. Not because that would cause him to change it, I don’t believe that. In any case we cannot know that for sure but I suppose that was the decisive consideration and in the cabinet they would know there are different answers but I think that he (Benjamin Netanyahu) thought that it wouldn’t really change anything and I suspect he was right.

Y: After the Flotilla Raid, Erdogan described it as a form of State Terrorism on Israel’s part, what do you think of this?
I: The UN investigation said that the naval blockade of Gaza was legal because of the threat from Gaza against Israel and the actual military attacks and if you try to break a legal naval blockade then strictly speaking, as far as I know under international law, a ship that refuses to stop when it is breaking a naval blockade you are allowed to sink it. Now, I think that nobody today would dare to do such a thing and you always have to think about the loss of life and not everyone on board that ship was an Islamist activist. All kinds of useful idiots from Europe who are no reason to kill people, they are silly… but the UN again said that the investigation that the use of force itself was legal and the soldiers were in danger but they also said it was excessive force. Excessive force you could say that the bottom line is that people got killed and a sovereign state should have had the chance to find an alternative way of dealing with it. In so far as this is the criticism, I think it is a fair criticism. I think that if you ask whether the state of Israel should have found a way of dealing with it without killing people or so many people but I don’t think there was anyone who was trigger happy, when you see these pictures it’s not a matter of them being trigger happy, it’s a very badly mismanaged operation— for some reason they assumed that they were facing demonstrators and so what they came down with actually were these colour balls, those silly things which are only effective against people who are at worst they violate public order. But then if when they attack you in such a vicious way and you have your weapons with you then you use your weapons. The piracy is something else, I think. Piracy, by the way, is not when you defend yourself and use excessive force that is not piracy. Piracy is not excessive force.

Y: Overall, do you believe that Israel stands to gain more than it stands to lose if relations are restored?

I: Sure, I think that nobody in Israel wants or ever wanted to quarrel with Turkey. I mean as a matter of national interest, Israeli tradition, we don’t have any issues between Israel and Turkey. Historically, it is usually said that there is a story of relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Jewish people which are relatively benign and there is no reason, no historical reasons but above all of course, there are no political reasons to quarrel with Turkey and in any case, Israel is not in a position to initiate a quarrel with anybody, certainly not an important country and everybody understands that Turkey is a very important country. I’m sure the Israeli government would be quite happy to, even if it’s not a question of going all the way back to the old relations, which is not feasible, but to improve those relations somewhat, they would welcome that, of course.

Y: So do you think that Israel needs Turkey as a strategic alliance in the region?

I: Yes, we need Turkey in the sense that it’s useful for us to have Turkey as an ally certainly, but whether it’s disastrous for us not to have it as an ally, I don’t know. It could be worse than I know because if there are some specific military intelligence that I’m not aware of then there could be some very sensitive things which could depend on Turkish cooperation— it’s not impossible. It is not my impression that this is a disaster, but it certainly is a
set back, it’s bad for the country. I don’t think anyone doubts it. For example, the Syrian reactor, the nuclear reactor that was allegedly bombed by the Israeli air force, I don’t think there is much doubt nowadays that we did it, I think it was very…the Israeli government managed to shut up and not to brag about it, it’s very commendable but we all assume it was Israeli air force. It seems that they some how entered, on their way to Syria, they entered the Turkish airspace and I guess it wouldn’t be possible now, so that could have…at that point it was still possible but now it wouldn’t be possible, that could conceivably have very serious drawbacks. I hope we won’t have to fly in that direction any time soon, especially if Assad’s regime falls, then the next government in Syria will be busy with other things, but who knows. It could be very serious but if worst comes to worst I suppose the Israeli force could fly over Turkey but that can also have…it’s not something that anyone relishes, the prospect of such a thing so I don’t suppose there is any option for that now. That’s a problem.

Y: Thank you for your time

Interview terminated at 13:57
Appendix B₄:

Transcript: Efraim Inbar Interview, 12ᵗʰ January 2012

Location: Jerusalem, Israel
Date: 12/01/12
Interviewer: Katherine Cook (Y)
Interviewee: Efraim Inbar (I)

Interview commenced 08:10

Y: How would you describe the current relationship between Israel and Turkey?
I: Very cool.

Y: How would you say it’s gone downhill since the Flotilla Raid?
I: I think there is no longer any military cooperation; we stopped selling weapons to them and there are a lot of anti-Israeli statements coming from Turkey. They are continuing cooperation with Iran and not participating in the international sanctions. Those are things that we do not appreciate.

Y: How do you relate this to Erdogan’s rule? Do you think this pattern would have continued if Turkey were under a different leadership?
I: No, I think that the current Islamic corporation of the government is partly responsible, or largely responsible for the anti-Israeli attitude and the courting of Iran and the courting of other Islamic groups in the Middle East, supporting the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt and Syria of course.

Y: Do you think the relationship between Israel and Turkey is important and crucial?
I: For Israel it’s a very important relationship because it’s a big loss as far as Israel’s concerned the distancing of Turkey from the West. Turkey is an important country, a strong country and it is a pity that we don’t have good relations with Turkey. We are hurt strategically.

Y: Would you say that Israel needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Israel?
I: Yes. We are a small country and they are a large one. They can afford estranging Israel, they don’t pay much of a price, even with the Americans, with a misguided foreign policy anyway. With this administration in particular so yes, the Turks get away with this type of anti-Israeli policies.

Y: Do you think that the relationship would have still deteriorated without the Flotilla Raid?
I: The Flotilla Raid was basically a Turkish provocation of Israel and we fell into the trap. We didn’t handle it right but it was probably inevitable.

Y: The UN found that Israel had acted lawfully, yet Turkey still demands an apology from Israel. Do you think that Israel owes Turkey an apology?

I: No, they owe us an apology. They put IHH people on the boat as a clear anti-Israeli, you know, it’s a group of terrorists. They should respect our right to impose a blockade on Hamas and the mere fact that they are getting close to Hamas is an anti-Israeli move.

Y: So do you think that perhaps the Flotilla was set up?

I: I don’t know the exact details of how the Flotilla happened, but it was clearly something that was planned and also by the government. It was not just an NGO operating independently of the government and it was a provocation of Israel, definitely.

Y: How do you see the relationship progressing in the near future?

I: I don’t think they are going to progress any way with this government in place, with Erdogan. If there was a different government maybe we’ll see a different policy because I think there are large parts of the Turkish establishment that wants good relations with Israel and there is sympathy for Israel in Turkish public opinion.

Y: How would you describe the pattern of relations between Turkey and Israel since 2003?

I: For a while business was as usual. In recent years the relationship deteriorated.

Y: What do you believe is Erdogan’s motive in creating such bad relations between Israel and Turkey?

I: It’s a change in the strategic environment of Turkey. Also, of course, Islamic motivation in getting closer to the Muslim world.

Y: Yes, I’ve read your articles, which argue that Turkey is trying to forge stronger ties with the Muslim world and break away from the West, why would they do this?

I: Because there is a change in government thinking. They are trying to play an important role in the Middle East, which is a departure from Turkish polices. In order to play the leadership role in this area they need to distance themselves from Israel because Israel is not very popular with the Muslims.

Y: To what extent do you think Egypt and the Arab Spring have contributed to Turkey’s actions?
I: I think that the Arab Spring has confirmed that Turkey became more Islamist because they were supporting changes against the poor Western government. They welcomed the Muslim brotherhood, they are actively supporting the Muslim brotherhood opposition in Syria because it weakens the Arabs and also it brings into power groups that have similar Islamic outlooks.

Y: With this loss of strategic alliance with Turkey, what will this mean for Israel as Egypt and Turkey rise in power?

I: It means that we are more isolated in the region and it means that we will have more security problems but we are a strong country and we will manage.

Y: How much do you believe economics has contributed to the relationship?

I: The economics so far have been insulated from the political and as long as businessmen continue to make money and profit from the bilateral relationship and as long as the government of Turkey will not interfere with the economic relationship. There was recently an increase in economic relations.

Y: So you don’t feel the political tensions will affect this economic relationship?

I: So far it hasn’t affected it and obviously Israel has no interest in allowing the political atmosphere to affect the bilateral economic relations.

Y: How much do you think Turkey needs Israel?

I: Israel is to some extent dispensable but Turkey still needs Israeli technology, Israeli connections to the US but it’s a question of trade offs, what they prefer more in the Middle East; to be seen as an anti-Israeli force and so far the price they have paid for this posture is very limited.

Y: Immediately after the Flotilla Raid, Erdogan described the event as State terrorism, what do you speculate he meant by this, was it part of the stunt?

I: Of course, it’s an attempt to denigrate Israel. We don’t tell him how to treat the Kurds and I don’t think he should tell us how to treat our enemies.

Y: Immediately after this, the Israeli Prime Minister’s office released a statement saying they hoped to find a way to overcome the disputes and will continue to work towards that goal. How would you describe the reaction; have they made an effort to restore relations?

I: Yes, I think there were attempts, particularly from the minister of defense but they were not successful. Turkish demands for an apology were impossible to meet despite the fact that we suggested several other formulas, Israel was even willing to pay compensation to the families of the people killed on the Marmara, but from my perspective, Turkey was looking for a confrontation.

Y: Why do you believe so much force was used on the Flotilla Raid?
I: It was necessary for self-defense; I don’t think there was much force used. They could have shot the whole boat and sank it. I think it was very measured force in order for self-defense after the commanders came in with paint balls. I think it’s ludicrous to accuse Israel of exaggerated use of force. It was for self-defense.

Y: Moving away from this, historically, how do you think Israel has gained from Turkey aside from being a strategic alliance?

I: I think at the economic level of course it’s a small market but still it’s a market for Israeli products. Again, Turkey is an important country and we want to have good relations with particularly Muslim countries and Turkey’s Muslim identity was important to us, to dilute the religious component of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Y: Once the Erdogan government is out, what do you think the chances are of a restored relationship?

I: It depends if his party stays in control or not. He probably wants to move to presidency and he tries to change the system into a more presidential system in Turkey and so if he stays in a different role I think there will not be much change in Israeli-Turkey relations, but, if another party comes to power we may see an improvement in Israeli-Turkish relations.

Y: Do you think that if the new power does come to power in Turkey, do you think that the conflicts in Egypt are going to influence the prospects of relations between Israel and Turkey?

I: Well, in the past, Turkey was able to have bilateral relations without the influence of the vagaries of the Arab-Israeli conflict and I see no reason why it cannot come back to bilateral relations which are insulated from the rest of the processes in the Middle East.

Y: Strategically, if Israeli is without Turkey who would you think Israeli is now likely to turn to?

I: I think we’ve done our share in forging alternative relations with Greece, Cyprus, Romani and southern Sudan, a new state. Maybe we’ll see more of an Israeli effort towards the Kurds and the Gulf states, there are other options in Saudi Arabia, which is very much against Iraq, and we’ll see a new balance of power.

Y: Do you think that is perhaps one of the mentalities in the Israeli government not apologising was to restore some sense of balance of power between Turkey and Israel?
I: No, I think, and I was to some extent involved in, with a very limited role in the process, but the issue was not national honour, it was simply a pragmatic assessment, whether and apology would indeed bring about a change in Turkish policy. I think the Israeli policy decision makers, at least most of them, reached the conclusion that an apology would be ineffective and therefore, superfluous.

Y: Thank you for your time.

Interview terminated 08:30
Appendix C:

Ethics Approval: Turkey 2012, Protocol No. 15035

RESEARCH INTEGRITY
Human Research Ethics Committee
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MF/PE
3 July 2012

Dr Gil Merom
Discipline of Government and International Relations
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Merewether Building – H04
The University of Sydney
gil.merom@sydney.edu.au

Dear Dr Merom

Thank you for your correspondence received 2 July 2012 addressing comments made to you by the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC)

I am pleased to inform you that with the matters now addressed your protocol entitled “Government and International Relations thesis regarding the international relations between Israel and Turkey: An examination of the changing relations between Israel and Turkey in light of recent breakdowns in this relationship from an international relations perspective” has been approved.

Details of the approval are as follows:

Protocol No.: 15035
Approval Date: 2 July 2012
First Annual Report Due: 31 July 2013
Authorised Personnel: Dr Gil Merom, Miss Katherine Cook

Documents Approved:

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HREC approval is valid for four (4) years from the approval date stated in this letter and is granted pending the following conditions being met:

Condition/s of Approval

- Continuing compliance with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans.
- Provision of an annual report on this research to the Human Research Ethics Committee from the approval date and at the completion of the study. Failure to submit reports will result in withdrawal of ethics approval for the project.

- All serious and unexpected adverse events should be reported to the HREC within 72 hours.

- All unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project should be reported to the HREC as soon as possible.

- Any changes to the protocol including changes to research personnel must be approved by the HREC by submitting a Modification Form before the research project can proceed.

**Chief Investigator / Supervisor’s responsibilities:**

1. You must retain copies of all signed Consent Forms and provide these to the HREC on request.

2. It is your responsibility to provide a copy of this letter to any internal/external granting agencies if requested.

Please do not hesitate to contact Research Integrity (Human Ethics) should you require further information or clarification.

Yours sincerely

Dr Margaret Faedo  
Manager, Human Ethics  
On behalf of the HREC

cc. Kate Cook  
Kcc04352@uni.sydney.edu.au

This HREC is constituted and operates in accordance with the National Health and Medical Research Council’s (NHMRC) National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007), NHMRC and Universities Australia Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (2007) and the CPMP/ICH Note for Guidance on Good Clinical Practice.
Appendix C₂:

Transcript: Denis Taniz Interview, 5th July 2012

Location: Istanbul, Turkey
Date: 05/07/12
Interviewer: Katherine Cook (Y)
Interviewee: Denis Taniz (I)

Interview commenced 17:00

Y: You are an expert on relations between Turkey and Israel, how would you describe the current relationship between Turkey and Israel?

I: First of all you must understand the general structure of Turkish-Israeli relations because it is unique. Why I say unique, for instance you can say that both of the countries have not an alliance level, but they are not enemies. Instead of allies we can say alliance because there is a triangle. This triangle’s name is Turkish-Israeli relationship and you can ask the Turkish corner of this triangle, which is of course the United States of America. The United States of America is the main determinant for the Turkish-Israeli relationship and if you focus on the Middle East, we can see many countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, they have alliances with the United States of America. But Turkey’s position is very different because it is a member of NATO also Turkey is a member of the European Council and Turkey is in the UN accession process and why Turkish-Israeli relations are very different and very separated we must understand. You are asking the current relationship of Turkish-Israeli relations. We can say that first of all in 2009 a General in Davos (Switzerland), the Turkish PM challenged David Ignatius, he was a moderator of the meeting here in Davos. There was a panel and also Israeli President Shimon Peres was there and we must analyse Turkish behaviour. For instance, in 2009, it was very interesting behaviours from Turkey to Israel. First of all, the Turkish PM challenged. Why? Israel’s operation together in this December 2008 and January 2009 in Operation Cast Lead, after Operation Cast Lead. But, Israel attacked the Palestinians or Gaza or the West Bank several times. But in 2009, and Erdogan became Prime Minister in 2003, he came to rule of Turkey in 2002 and Erdogan became Prime Minister in 2003 but he challenged in 2009. So, we must understand moderate Islam approach or the Neo-Ottoman Empire. After 2009, for instance, in October 2009, Turkey disqualified Israel from the military drill, Anatolian Eagle. It was an international military drill but after Turkey’s behaviour for instance the United Kingdom and the United Stated withdrew from the drill and it became national. After, there was a Turkish TV series, TST (Turkish State Television) about why Israel condemned Turkey because Turkish TV shot Israeli soldiers as baby killers. But, for instance in the same month in October 2009, we were in Israel, in the Turkish embassy in Tel Aviv and after, in 2010 we had a crisis. With Danny Ayalon, the Turkish ambassador he made a challenge to the Turkish ambassador but the most important problem was the Mavi Marmara. The Mavi Marmara did not belong to Turkey but Turkish citizens
were there and they were challenging about Gaza and to disqualify Israel in the Gaza strip and after this situation, Turkey-Israeli relations became even more fragile. But, first of all we must understand the process from 2009, it was a combination.

Y: So you have brought up Erdogan coming into power in 2003, do you see that there’s been a specific shift in relations under this power change since 2003?

I: For instance, he has visited Israel in 2005, there was no problem but the AKP’s rule on Turkey has had some moderate change, you could say neo-Ottoman. But we can say it is a sub-contraction for Turkey because the United States sometimes tries some, not ideological, but some doctrinal approach to the Middle East. For instance, today, Obama’s administration is trying to influence the Middle East with Aswan in Egypt, or in the moderate Sunni countries. Also, they tried Turkey as a sample, to make a model to the Middle East and if for instance the United States tries with any country, a model to the Middle East, in quotation marks, you must challenge to Israel because Israel is a very productive tool, end quotation mark, for challenging to the Middle East or being a Middle Eastern leader. Why the AKP, or ruling party, has this agenda in this moment, so why Turkey has problems, but if we get attention, like last month we do not speak on Turkish-Israeli relations, we speak generally on the Turkish-Syrian crisis. Turkish foreign policy’s agenda is parallel with the United States. So, the United States’ agenda is today Syria. You can ask that to the United States and Israel are allies or they have a strategic partnership but there is a problem with the Obama administration and the Netanyahu governments. Not a problem between the states but between the states. I think that is reflects the Turkish-Israeli relationship often.

Y: Do you believe the breakdown in relations is partly due to the AKP’s agenda to realign Turkey with the Middle East?

I: I think the main problem for the AKP is the agenda that changed rapidly. So, the AKP is trying to adapt the agenda for the current relations. Today, we can say that the main problem for the United States is Iran and Iran-Syria relations and the Lebanese situation. But, what is the distinctive point for Israel? Honestly, I can say that Turkey and Israel, today for current relations, they are not enemies but there is a very interesting relationship from 1949. Many Arab countries suppose that Turkey and Israel have problems in front of the cameras this is right. But, behind the cameras there is a very different relationship and a very different agenda for Turkey-Israeli relations, this is why I say the triangle. Erdogan’s charisma or Erdogan’s Islamic discourse needs an anti-Israel approach. The scenario sustains to which points and to which dates. It depends on the conjuncture and for instance, Israel’s administration, also, is being disturbed by Syrian dictatorship, Assad. Turkey’s challenge to Assad, when we describe international relations, we underlined the benefits, not the sustainable friendship, only the benefits. So, what’s the common benefit for Turkey and Israel, on Syria for instance, or what’s the difference for Turkish-Iranian relations and Turkish-Israeli relations. When we put the project on this relationship, I think it must be studied in the historical process.
Y: The media portrays almost the entire breakdown as resultant of the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010. Do you think that this is perhaps this realigning with relations that has caused this divergence away from Israel?

I: I think the main problem was not the foreign policy. The main problem for the AKP was about domestic policy. The AKP is constructing its hegemony in Turkey with, for instance the Mavi Marmara. The Mavi Marmara has an influence on the Turkish domestic policy and Turkish public opinion. The AKP captured the agenda with Mavi Marmara. But I can say that, for instance, none of the AKP members, MPs got on the Mavi Marmara ship. Mavi Marmara is the main point for the Turkish-Israeli relationship. I think it must be questioned because Mavi Marmara was the outcome for the short time, what I have emphasised from 2009-2010 and Turkey for instance did not support the report from the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Switzerland but Turkey received Palmer reports in the United Nations but in the Switzerland reports, Turkey had advantages about the Mavi Marmara, but with New York support, we can say that Turkey had disadvantages and the Palmer report supported Israel. Turkey withdrew because of the problem about killed Turkish citizens. Why, I do not know but it is not being declared to Turkish Public opinion. Nobody is questioning this process, this is what I think is interesting for studying Turkish foreign policy or Turkish-Israeli relations or Turkey’s approach to Israel.

Y: On this change of public opinion, do you think that Erdogan and the AKP are using a change in Turkish opinion to move away from Israel?

I: That is right because instead of Turkish national identity, Muslim identity or Sunni identity, Sunni is a sector in the Muslim religion, why? Because, this is the right point, because if we underline Gramsci’s hegemony theory, we can understand the situation. Unfortunately, in Turkey, not only the Islamist approach, some nationalist approaches have anti-semitic discourse. I think this is the main problem. Not only anti-semitics, also some approaches to Armenians or Greeks or others, but especially the last years there are many books, not scientific books, but consecratory and these consecratory books are not only on anti-semitics in Israel but Jews in Turkey, Jews in Turkey or Jews in the United States. This situation, not only about the AKP, I can underline that, nationalist discourse and Islamist discourse feeds the anti-Semitic approach and the ruling party is using this anti-Semitic approach to, unfortunately, to gain popularity. It can be very productive because in Turkey, honestly I can say that there is not an associated anti-Semitic discourse. Sometimes in Turkish political history we can see or we can face, but not a systematic anti-semitic approach. It was constructed and after this construction it was made very productive and Islamism can use the anti-Semitic approach very productively. Also, for nationalists, they are not aware of what’s going on and they also indirectly feed the anti-Semitic approach. So, when we underline Turkish-Israeli relations we do not only mention Turkey and Israel. Also, the anti-Semitic approach and hate speech, hate speech in public discourse. It is not mandatory for instance to come from the state, it is not mandatory. In newspapers, in journals, in public speech- I can give many details about it. So, anti-Semitism is the main corner of this policy and when you blame for
instance, Israel, also you can blame Jews, in Turkey or in many countries. I think the main problem is the hate speech. The hate speech, unfortunately, sometimes can determine the policy in front of the cameras, but this is not the reality.

Y: Would you agree with the statement that Turkey has realigned itself with a Middle Eastern identity and no longer with its European identity?

I: This is the very classical clash in Turkey; are you Middle Eastern or European? Officially, Turkey is a candidate for the European Union but I especially condemn Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’. I do not agree with it because, according to me, there is only one civilisation on Earth, but if he divides the world with the religions or the religions with civilisations, there could be clashes and it means there could be global conservatism or global fighting on the Earth. Turkey’s situation, Turkey is unique. Why? Because Turkey is the only secular state in the Middle East and has a Muslim majority population. The AKP calls herself not Islamists but calls it a conservative democracy, but, many of the observers underline the AKP as a moderate Islam or Islamist and so on. This clash in Turkey, I do not mean the weapons, I mean culturally, we can see the outcomes in elections in public life. For instance, we are in Taksim and there is now no problem, but some regions in Istanbul can be made very conservative, or for instance, my region, Kadikoy, is very secular but the AKP’s main agenda is Islamism plus hidden nationalism. The AKP’s main approach disqualifies [inaudible], not officially, but culturally. We can say for instance, in Turkish foreign policy on Syria, Syrian Assad’s, [inaudible] in Turkish, I do not know in English how to say it. Assad blames Erdogan as behaving as a Sunni country or emphasised sector in Islam. This is not classical Turkish foreign policy, but if you behave with your sectarian approach you are in a Middle Eastern identity. But, for the European approach you must keep the citizenship or nation state identity. This has been a very big Earthquake for Turkish people and Turkish state problems and what’s the combination of it, according to me, I prefer the European Union but there is a real divergence in Turkish public opinion. I think Turkey keeps the moderation for Islamism and for Europeanism.

Y: It’s a very contentious topic in the media though, would you say that the majority of Turkey would like to be part of the EU or not?

I: Unfortunately, the EU’s behaviour broke the approach from Turkish public opinion because ten or fifteen years ago in opinion polls we have seen 75% support Turkey’s membership to the European Union, but today you can see some outcomes in opinion polls in Turkey that are only 25%. This does not mean a cultural approach. Turkey cannot trust, or Turkish public opinion cannot trust the European Union, especially if we remember Sarkozy’s approach, or Merkel’s situation or approach which broke the supporting Turkish public opinion for the European Union but in the future the conditions can change and I hope for this. Turkey is not, for instance, a classical Middle Eastern country because Turkey is approximately a democracy but some journalists have said it’s a hybrid democracy, but officially Turkey is a democracy and Turkey has a market economy and Turkey’s main founder and
principles from Ataturk is a secular state, so, I am not pessimistic but being an optimist provides some conditions. That is a very political answer but I cannot estimate honestly.

Y: Would you attribute the breakdown in relations more so to this divergence in identity and move towards the Middle East or to incidents from 2009 like Operation Cast Lead and the Mavi Marmara?

I: I think the AKP manipulated public opinion about Gaza operation because the same ruling party did not behave. you can remember in 2006 during the second Lebanon war, Hezbollah, Israel war, there was no crisis between Turkey and Israel. So I think that we cannot structurally shift from the protestant approach or Turkey’s main secular approach. But it was manipulated by the AKP, but this manipulation is very interesting because the United States’ political investment to the AKP is very interesting because this hegemony, the regional hegemony, could be a barrier for the United States in the long term because we know many leaders were supported by the United States and they have clashed with the United States. Not today, because there is a problem between… Turkey is a very interesting country, a single party government. You can say this, but this is not true because there is a problem between Erdogan and [inaudible]. This community, there is a very big political clash and they cannot share bureaucracy or judiciary and I think that sometimes, for instance I can give an example, [inaudible] condemned the AKP about the Mavi Marmara. He has said that it was a very wrong behaviour towards Israel, and his supporters in [inaudible] have stated that there can be some [inaudible] process. If secular or leftist column writers or politicians had blamed the AKP like this, the AKP could claim you support or you’ve served Israel but supporters criticised the AKP government, and it was a surprise to me. Sometimes in Turkey there are many [inaudible] from the United States and who is the real representative for the United States in Turkey Government? If you ask me, I think the United States can work with anybody. They’re a very pragmatic country, that’s not a problem, but this representation of Turkey is very interesting because they gained power.

Y: So do you think the AKP thinks it no longer needs Israel or do you think the relationship is important and will go back to how it was before 2006?

I: I think there will be a reformation process between Turkey and Israel, or the Turkish-Israel relations because the United States needs it. The United States does not prefer a broken relationship between Turkey and Israel, but it is not very easy. First of all, Turkey has some expectations from Israel, apologise, compensation and ending the blockade of the Gaza strip. Israel can do it or not it depends on the government, the Netanyahu government stays in until February 2013 then there will be an election, but in Israel, you know there can be no single party governments because the election system is very interesting. Two parties, three parties, four parties, and marginal parties can determine Israel’s main policy, or Israel’s foreign policy. For instance we know of Lieberman, but Lieberman is only a symbol of many marginal parties in Israel. I think this problem is not only about Turkey, in both of the countries there is a real conservatism, but this conservatism is not like European conservatism.
How can I say it… fundamentalism conservatism has produced a few terms for the Middle East. Why we can understand Turkish-Israel relationship, both of the so-called conservative governments determine the relationship in the short term, but in the long term, the big brother does. But for better relations, the United States supports it, because the United States’ real strategic partner of Israel, and the United states cannot give up on Israel or on Turkey. Why? It is very important.

Y: Do you think that Israel is important to Turkey’s state interests?

I: Sure, because Israel is an ally of the United States of America and also both of the countries have democracies, and both of the countries have market economies. For instance, Turkish-Israeli foreign trade portfolio is at about is $3.5 billion and it would be better, and Israel especially works on high technology. Turkey has many interests from Israel. Also to influence the Middle East, in foreign policy issues, but we know the Middle East’s main approach to Israel, there is a strong condemnation of Israel. But in spite of it, Turkish-Israel relationship must be progressed. Because Turkey is a member of the Western system and also Israel’s administration we know that modernity and other [inaudible] has many interests in Turkey, and also Israel, because Israel is very lonely in the Middle East and Israel needs Turkey’s main non-violent approach to the Middle East and so this relationship must be progressed. But, politicians are the main barriers, because there are many Jews in Turkey. Also today, approximately I think there are 30,000 Jews who live in Turkey, especially in the economy which they are attracted to. Also Jews in Turkey are fond of Turkish nationalism. Do you know [inaudible] He is one of the founders of Turkish nationalism. So I think in the last years or last quarter you can say, from the 1960’s, especially Arab approaches and Islamic approaches influenced Turkish public opinion.

Y: Lastly, how long do you think until Israeli-Turkish relations are restored?

I: Estimations are difficult, first of all you must see the 2013 elections in Israel. In Turkey there are many elections. For instance, in 2014 local elections, in 2015 parliamentary elections, and also in 2014, the Presidency elections. But we do not know yet the presidency systems presidency elections or parliamentary systems presidency elections. We must wait until 2015.

Y: So you think it will take a change of government for relations to return to how they were?

I: I think, I can be wrong, but I think AKP government will sustain in the new elections, this is the reality. But I think governments can be pragmatic. Also in Israel, Netanyahu’s situation, I do not think that Netanyahu will lose these next election because it was a surprise for me that the Kadima party integrated into the coalition government, but Kadima was a real alternative for the Netanyahu government, but I do not know, they must have preferred to integrate the government. So I think the main administrations or main governments will sustain if there is no surprise and there are normal conditions. But this so-called conservative government changed approach to
each other in conjunction because in the Middle East we will see many changes in Syria and Iraq. In Iraq and the Middle East, I think the real issue is Kurdistan because Kurdistan is being founded in northern Iraq, for instance, and it would be a real progress country its another Arab country right and its important. Israel has many political and economic investments in the Kurdistan region and also Turkey. So, besides the Syrian approach for Turkish relationship, for instance, one more common approach is of the Kurdistan regional government. Also Israel’s effort and Israel’s approach to Azerbaijan. Israel’s-Azerbaijan relations are very interesting because Israel’s has many economic investments and political investments. For instance, telecommunication system, medical system in general belongs to Israel is Azerbaijan. I think this relationship is very important because there will be more common points for a Turkish-Israeli relationship.

**Y:** One last thing. Why do you think Israel refuses to apologise for the Mavi Marmara?

**I:** I think it’s about the current domestic policies. The Netanyahu government thinks that if he apologises to Turkey then…well, it’s about the elections. For pragmatism we can say that in February 2013, after the Israeli federal elections that there could be an apology, but this is only an estimation and I could be wrong. Also, Erdogan’s behaviour towards Israel could change. Politics is not sustainable in terms of hostility and friendship.

**Y:** Thank you so much for your time Mr. Taniz

Interview terminated 17:50
Appendix C₃:

Transcript: Tuncay Kardas Interview, 7th July 2012

Location: Istanbul, Turkey
Date: 07/07/12
Interviewer: Katherine Cook (Y)
Interviewee: Tuncay Kardas (I)

Interview commenced 16:00

Y: How would you describe the current relationship between Turkey and Israel?

I: I think it’s really bad in terms of not just the diplomacy level but also the social and political fields, if you like. International relations is never simply just international relations its also how people connect, react and in the media age, you can’t just escape from events like that. If you know the Marmara incident, if this event had happened say ten or fifteen years ago, I think no one would have noticed it for two reasons. First, people would not be aware of it because this one you know was televised, live. I was awake; it was in the early hours of the morning because the day before, I knew that thing were going to go wrong and unfortunately it happened in that way. The second reason, government would have turned a blind eye to it, had it happened say fifteen years ago because it’s never an easy topic to deal with, Israel and in front of the live audience, international and national and I would say even this government would have turned a blind eye had it happened years ago. But now, it was never able to turn a blind eye to it because of the media coverage and second the runner up process to the event was built in international scenes in such a hyped mediatic way and so they cornered themselves into an abyss. If you look at it from this perspective, things were…I mean it was obvious from the start that things were really badly going to go wrong but there were also some structural reasons to it like as I said, the position of the media, the early discourses of the government on the topic. When I say early discourses I mean the processes like Davos’ speech of Erdogan three or four years ago. The Gaza Operation of Israel in 2006. All of these built up to such a huge reaction from Turkey. I’ve been living in this country for the rest of my life except for six years when I did my PhD in Britain, but I have never seen a reaction of this sort. It was huge, it exploded and it’s interesting to me.

Y: Do you think the AKP meant for this reaction? That they paved the way for this?

I: My hunch is that no, at least not to that level. This foreign minister is a clever guy and he knows what he’s speaking and what he’s doing. He’s a very good strategist. He used to be my professor, I know him in person and my hunch is that it’s not what it meant to be. They wanted to have, I guess, an escalation, but they never guessed that Israel would react so harshly. So my answer is no, they didn’t envisage such a huge reaction.
Y: Would you say that Turkish-Israeli relations have continuously spiraled since 2003?

I: I don’t think so. I think Israel was always an easy target for Islamists in the country and it’s like a pet target really. Islamists of Turkey are always conscious and complaining about Israel’s acts in the past and even in our time. But it was, at least in the initial fazes of the AKP government, it was not something they wanted to have…trouble. Initially they had this problem of legitimacy in the eyes of international and national cover centres so it was simply unthinkable to have a fallout of this sort with Israel in 2003 because they already had this headache of Iraq with American intervention and Turkey didn’t know whether or not to get involved. The Prime Minister wanted to get involved and act with the US but my hunch is that many members of his party and the Turkish public did not. So, initially, no.

Y: What would you attribute the breakdown to specifically, which events?

I: If you have a chance to have a look at the article I gave you, we tried to explain the breakdown to the discursive level of securitisation. I think that securitisation was a very big factor in the building of relations in the 90s. When you have the chance to speak out you can reverse the situation by speaking in different terms, non-security terms. When Islamists of this country had the chance to speak out against powers of the establishment in the military they had the chance to reconfigure and re represent this situation to the public in such a way that they sort of stole the show from the military. They were able to do this. In the 90s it was the military who stole the show by invading the stages of televisions, I assume you are familiar with this. It was very much publicised as well in the 90s so it was mostly something that agreed, not in an agreements, but the representation of that agreement in the 90s and re-representation of this agreement in the 2000s would give you a sense that things happen in this country, in the last twenty years, much thanks to the discursive interaction and in fighting, so it’s effective. I would boil it down to the factors at the level of civil and military relations but also the effect of the inclusion of different societal influences, such as the Islamists, like right winged television stations. These lobbying groups were really effective in reversing what has happened and in re-representing what is going on and especially in 2006 when again people were reacting to the events in Gaza, Operation Lead, afterwards. All of these gave the sense to the Turkish people that Turkey, as it stands, powerful, increasingly powerful, should react to this and obviously officials did tap into this new avenue. It was only natural…if you are a politician you know that this wave is coming from the deep levels of civil society for you to do something against the values you have help dearly, for such a long time, then it was only normal and natural to see that happen.

Y: Do you think the identity of Turkey has changed and that this has played any role? Do you see Turkey as identifying itself more with the Middle East now that Europe?

I: Martina Warning and I were saying that this is another very popular topic to talk about in international media and I think that one should be really careful
not to overstate and over emphasise the role of the changing identity, to the extent that when people with strong identities come into power today or tomorrow in one way or another they would like to showcase their identity in different manners in international politics and national politics. One reason is this identity orientation, but I would say my reservation and dislike of this identity argument is that they treat identities as so strong and already built and materialised an already there and not in any way getting shaped. No, identities are in the process of getting shaped every time and in every occasion. Not every day, obviously, but different occasions do build identities. I would say that yes it has an effect but you should not over emphasise its effect because it’s subtle and the same Turkey with the same identity would react to the events with Israel through the Mavi Marmara or Gaza or general Palestinian question, but the same Turkey would not react to events in another place with the similar sort of identity dynamics. This gives me the reason to reconsider my assumptions about how identities come to effect, and I know this is very theoretical, it’s not easy to grasp initially. My dislike of this identity argument is that you can’t treat people like cultural dopes, they are not stupids, they are not like row boats, they obviously have an identity but with this identity comes different material and different calculations, rational reactions and so they would go so far as to issue a warning to Israel or to the breakdown of relations but this would not lead to the breakdown in relations with the US. Even though you know deep down that it’s the US that gives the green light to so many things that Israel does. You see my point? You are saying yes to the United States and their foreign policy. Obviously you have problems with them too, but, at the end of the day you know your limits, everything. But, with Israel, you step up your ideas and your reactions in such ways that cater to the internal public but also to the Arab audience. I assume you are familiar with the latest events and when the AKP reacts to Israel it is not just because of identity reasons but also out of a strategic calculation, which is in built with identity, yes, no question, but also mixed with other seriously material, strategic calculations. So it is a mixture, a clever mixture. It’s not a mash up, not a pot, it’s a clever this amount of identity, but this amount of realpolitik as well. They would say I’m reacting to Israel, maybe one of the strongest reactions, but don’t forget, this reaction is not meant to come from my internal Muslim identity, no. There is a growing Arab market, not simply a material market, but a belief market so Pandora’s box is open and everything is out to offer. You can’t just say here is my own vision, my own strategy for the Middle East. This was a signal to the Arab audience, the internal audience, plus to the internal old guard, military, saying that I have the upper hand now. With one stone, you can kill so many birds. It was not a headless, irrational act of identity.

Y: Would you agree that the AKP, under Erdogan’s leadership, has had an agenda to disengage its alliance with Israel in order to further its Muslim identity or hegemony in the Middle East?

I: The AKP would love to see the Palestinian problem come to an end so the AKP to my reading would not have any trouble with Israel signing a peace agreement with Palestine, on equal terms. It would not disagree necessarily with Israel, even if Eastern Jerusalem is now the Capital of the new Palestinian state. It is ready to concede so many things to Israel, but on the condition that
Israel would behave, that it would come to acceptable borders of international law and it would not behave like a bully. Yes, it wants to build its own hegemony, if you like, but this does not mean that it would go into a conflict head on with Israel. It doesn’t want that, obviously. It would try to establish a hub; a network of friendly states but this isn’t as strong as some seem to argue. It’s not a united front of Muslim states or anything like that. Gulf states have a lot of money, they invest a lot and in Turkey, different parts of Turkey. Turkey’s economy is increasingly dependent on this so it’s hegemony but deep down the economic motives play a huge role, but they are never articulated simply in economic terms, they would be articulated in identity terms and maybe in a discourse which would resemble old Ottoman bravado or something like that. It doesn’t mean that Turkey would try to build its hegemony no matter what.

Y: Do you think that possibly Israel feels threatened by this and that’s why they refuse to apologise over the Flotilla incident?

I: Yes, it might be.

Y: If they were to apologise, do you think that relations would return to how they were?

I: It would not return to normal. I think it’s a little too late for getting back to normal, but it would be a good way to come to a reasonable level where both sides to the conflict would realise that their interest is not in perpetrating this conflict, but going back to normal would take years because it is so fresh in the minds of so many. These people who were killed, it was in front of the eyes of the people and this is what makes it so dramatic and so difficult for governments to bounce back because its going to lose faith from so many different fronts like I mentioned earlier, such as the Arab front, the domestic front and internal power centres because the military was the primary actor who initiated the strategic alliance with Israel out of the blue. It is difficult to go back to normal but it’s never impossible to get to the level where sides would be like okay neighbours.

Y: Do you think the relationship is important?

I: Yes, of course it is important. A peace without Israel is not in sight and I don’t think you can react to the Palestinian conflict in any terms that would give the hopes of a Jew free Middle East. There are some Mavericks who would, anti-Zionists like Ahmadinejad or the clique around him but I think the Turkish foreign policy making style is no Iranian style so I don’t think they would bare the burden of simply dismissing Israel out of hand. Israel is a strong state, an important state, not to mention its connections with the United States and not to mention the Saudi factor, which doesn’t want radicals to rule in the Middle East. It’s obvious for observers that Turkey would see Israel as an important state in the Middle East.

Y: Do you think Turkey needs Israel more than Israel needs Turkey?
I: Not any more. In the 90s, well even in the 90s this would be difficult to suggest, but let’s assume that because of the internal power game, the domestic power struggle, let’s assume that so many different power centres in Turkey needed Israel’s help. Not necessarily state help but lobbying help, not simply lobbying against the Armenian issue in the United States but Israel has had a strong presence in so many different countries through so many different methods of power. Ideological power, economic power, you are familiar with this, so in the past, when Turkey’s economy was weak and when Turkey needed strongly to buy new weapons for itself and when it was dependent on the US in the 90s, but less so now because of predictable reasons, like the economy growing at an incredible 6% rate. Basic economics never disappoint harshly the people of Turkey. So, in this way, power strands give Turkey the feeling that Israel should apologise and never forget that Turkey has, the government has, with the help of a civil society organisation, i.e. the Gülen Movement, perhaps you are not familiar with this, it is a religious movement in Turkey, a strong religious missionary. They are strong. They have some problems now with the government but they are strong, they are the architects of so many new things in Turkey. Anyway, despite drawbacks with the government, they along with the government managed to reach power in the judiciary. They have prosecutors, judges, which are not a member of this clandestine, secret organisation but sort of sympathising with us. They have a strong presence in judiciary and in the government itself. It is also very much against the power of the military so in today’s world who do you need? Military is siding with you, civil society is siding with you and international environments are also not hostile, as it used to be. So, Turkey would say it’s Israel who should apologise.

Y: Do you think that the Muslim identity of Turkey is affecting its plight to join the EU? Do you believe the AKP still wants to be part of the EU?

I: What do you think? Do you think Turkey’s Muslim identity is an obstacle to joining any Western organisation?

Y: No, personally I think that if Erdogan was offered a place in the EU he would take it but the media that we receive at home says this is not the case, we are told that Turkey doesn’t want or need the EU.

I: Yes, I think it would be wrong to think that Turkey has turned its back. It’s the other way around actually. It’s the German and French governments who are strongly opposed. The good old Sarkozy never wanted Turkish membership so they are doing their best to put obstacles which went right in the early 2000s. I don’t think Muslim identity is a big, huge challenge. The importance of this theory of securitisation once again is apparent and it’s the European media centres and obviously right winged governments that capitalise on economic difficulties and hardships and re-represent Turkish membership as security and they are quite good at it. I don’t know if you’re familiar with it but I’m going to present a paper on it in Manchester, precisely on this topic, talking about how visual re-representation of the Muslim identity if contributing to the establishment of negative public reactions. Print and visual media plays a huge part in misrepresenting what is at stake in the membership with Turkey. Look
at the cartoon crisis, Prophet Mohammed cartoon crisis, six years ago in Denmark. It was a huge blow to any positive images of a Muslim and obviously the minarets referendum in Switzerland which was again three years ago. There were huge banners in the public places of Switzerland. Showing the pictures of a minaret as a missile, so this is visual securitisation. There are plenty of such examples and obviously if you are a politician, especially if you are a right winged politician, you would capitalise on such a receptive, already built in identity, so I don’t see any natural conflict between Turkish or European sides. All are artificially built and artificially there.

Y: Do you think that Turkey would accept and invitation to join the EU if it were asked today?

I: Yes, of course, no question about it. These are overly exaggerated, those news coverage that you have just mentioned, saying that Turkey doesn’t want that, Turkey does everything in its power, almost everything, except a few things such as the new penal code which has caused so many journalists and so on to go to jail but I don’t think it’s a huge blow to the Turkish freedom of speech, freedom of expression. Obviously, it is a drawback, I would not deny that, but it’s not as serious as some seem to imply. Give the green light that Turkey would be a member and overnight Turkey would change its penal codes. It’s a little bit of a give and take issue. Disappointment would obviously, naturally slow down your reform process. Reluctance from the EU side is what I mean. The Turkish side would say what have you given me, nothing, so why should I be overly giving in return? No big deal in Turkish reactions to the EU.

Y: How long do you think until Turkey and Israel return to past relations?

I: What is your guess?

Y: Until a change of government on both sides perhaps.

I: Okay, what kind of government change do you think would give the green light?

Y: I don’t think the Israeli government wants to be seen as weak and they feel, in realist terms, that if they succumb to Turkish demands and apologise, they’ll be seen as weak and lose the next elections. Perhaps not even a change in government but after their next election, that could spur an apology.

I: So you think a change in government in Israel. I definitely agree with that. The onus is on the Israeli side now. A less right winged, less chauvinistic government would definitely, I’m sure, contribute to the betterment of the relationship either by apologising or maybe even a rough apology would do. I don’t think Turkey would stick to it’s early harsh, ‘no, no’ position. As you say, it takes a government to change.

Y: Or perhaps just a change in the media.
Yes, that’s true and I have to say that people generally do not see how this new vision, re-order of thinking of the people inside. People are now more self-confident more assertive, so it’s very difficult for the government, the Turkish government, to back down from it’s initial positions, so it would be disastrous for it to bounce back because this is how you have built your own image, inside and outside. It is because of this reason that it’s also difficult for Turkey to act like nothing has happened and to withdraw its demand for an apology. No, it’s difficult. Think about the difficult situation the US finds itself in in the Middle East. It’s in huge trouble, look Pakistan, look at Afghanistan, look at Iraq. It does need Turkey, more than it needs Israel. This is the trick which Israel does not see. It assumes that no matter what, good old US support would continue forever. No, the US needs Turkey, even if that Turkey is a pompous Turkey. Increasingly it’s acting like a child saying it wants this and that. Even in this, the US would need Turkey’s help, where? In Iraq. A militarily assertive Turkey would be of great help to the US in the Iraqi war front, in Afghanistan, in putting order in the Middle Eastern, huge, new chaotic situation. You do need the domestic political experiences of Turkey when it comes to establishing a new regime in Egypt, for instance. Look at Egypt, the new Muslim brotherhood government looks in the eyes of Turkey, they are very much drawn to Turkey, they would not necessarily disagree with Turkey. Syria is a different case, there is the Russian factor and Chinese support which is a different story. Egypt is very difficult; it is very difficult to convince Muslim brothers if you are Russia, if you are not nationalist, if you are secularist and if you are a Christian country. I don’t like this term, Joseph Nye used it, ‘soft power’, but since everyone uses it I use it reluctantly. I would say that Turkey’s soft power portfolio is way stronger than any state’s in the Middle East. You know, Tunisia, Egypt and now Syria, when you look at this and given the incredible successful economic parameters, it’s very difficult to see Turkey stepping down or bouncing back in the near future. Of course, you should never say never. One more thing though which would bring down this new vision of foreign policy in Turkey, either be it towards Israel or in any part, would be, I think, a war with Syria or a high level casualty resulting from a military incursion in either Iraq or Syria. No matter what is the position of Israel on this, a war would be disastrous for new Turkish foreign policy. I would say the government is very careful not to escalate this situation to a war type confrontation. They are very careful and obviously they do say some harsh words, exchanging threats maybe even, but I think it would be extremely difficult for Turkey to regain once it loses its face in the Middle East and in internal politics and so on and so forth. This is why, like so many provocations, the government holds itself from reacting too much to the downing of this Turkish jet in Syria. As I said, I assume one of the downfalls of the new Turkish foreign policy and government, one of them would be a war or a strong military adventure, if you like, in Iraq or in any place. I’m sure you are familiar with the latest peace initiative of the government, the AKP with the Kurdish rebels, the newest one. It seems that they are this time quite serious to sit down and discuss and negotiate a peace plan for both sides and I think why? Why now? The reason is, I think, is the international environment is very receptive to this peace plan as well. The US wants it, the US wants stronger presents of Turkey in Iraq because it wants to have a state which is roughly in its control. Obviously, I say this is mutual, but
of which would be replacing, in the mid term, the face of the US in Iraq or in Afghanistan and so they are pushing the Kurdish rebels to come to the table as well.

Y: Thank you for your time Mr. Kardas

Interview terminated 16:55