EU Influence and the Politics of Memory

Postwar Croatia & Serbia in a Comparative Perspective

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Honours IV 2012
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Word Count: 19,723
Student ID: 309187303
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Abstract

This thesis argues that the EU has indirectly influenced domestic perceptions of the past in postwar Croatia and Serbia through these states’ desire for EU membership. Informed by EU conditionality criteria, which include democratic policies, regional cooperation, and issue-linkage with the ICTY, political elites have tailored new discourses that confront past atrocities to improve EU trajectory. However, the depth of this process—called “the politics of memory,” has differed in both states primarily because Serbia was unable to extradite their war criminals at the pace of Croatia. This was the result of negative patterns that stemmed from the dynamics of regime transition, and the strength of old regime spoilers and nationalist parties who have perpetuated myths and discourses of victimisation in the new regime. In addition, desire for EU membership itself has fluctuated because of greater contest at the elite level between reformist and nationalist politicians.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central-East European States</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Democratic Party (Serbia)</td>
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<td>DSS</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Serbia</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica)</td>
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<td>HV</td>
<td>Croatian Army (Hrvatska vojska)</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ICTJ</td>
<td>International Centre for Transitional Justice</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Republika Srpska (in Bosnia)</td>
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<td>RSK</td>
<td>Republika Srpska Krajina</td>
</tr>
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<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Agreement</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democrat Party (Croatia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEE</td>
<td>South-East European States</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFRY</td>
<td>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Serbian Progressive Party</td>
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<td>SPS</td>
<td>Socialist Party of Serbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
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Memory is said to play a central role in the very foundation and stabilisation of the modern, spatially differentiated international system (Bell 2006). For example, the memory of Nazi atrocities has become a defining part of the structure of European politics since 1945, and the September 11 terrorist attacks have only intensified the interest in memory in the twenty-first century (Langenbacher 2010). Yet, it is not the ongoing process of social memory-making that is of critical importance to scholars. Rather these aforementioned moments in history have in common their propensity for being seen as traumatic events. In particular, people who experience traumatic events, such as war, rely on collective memory to come to terms with their or their nation’s past. An honest and contrite confrontation with past atrocities is argued to help the reduction of threat perceptions abroad, re-establish the rule of law, and improve confidence and societal trust (Langenbacher 2010, 38).

The Yugoslav War in the 1990s was one such war that left a great burden of past atrocities on the backs of the young independent states, Croatia and Serbia. The burden includes indictments of crimes against humanity, violation of the laws or customs of war, and genocide. Although the indictments are against individuals, these crimes were committed in the name of the nation, and collective memory of the War subsequently made heroes and villains out of every ethnicity involved in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Yet, during the second half of the 1990s, there was no serious confrontation of the past. Instead, narratives of victimisation emerged in national consciousnesses as ethnic hatred persisted in the authoritarian societies of Croatia and Serbia.
In the meantime, an emerging actor in the Western Balkans, the EU, opened a pathway that would see these states recover from the economic disasters of war and provide them with a secure future under the umbrella of EU membership. Since the democratic transition of both states in 2000, the desire for EU entry has been a defining feature of Croatian and Serbian domestic politics. Yet, by becoming “potential candidates,” these states had also entered into a period of post-authoritarian social memory-making, called “the politics of memory,” where a state interprets and appropriates its past in a post-authoritarian context—a process that is qualitatively different to the social memory-making that occurs in times of peace and normality (Barahona de Brito 2010, 359-60).

The concept of the politics of memory has been applied mostly to transitional justice literature to broaden the effect of the past on transitional societies beyond the narrow limits of the field. International relations literature that has incorporated studies of memory focus their attention on postwar Germany, September 11, and the numerous countries that have been affected by atrocities. Yet, the politics of memory as a concept, and memory politics in general, have surprisingly not been employed in detail in the Western Balkan region. Where relevant, only references to Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina have been made. Another gap that exists is ignorance over the role of supranational organisations in the politics of memory. This is unfortunate considering an increasingly globalising world attests that political influence on national elites is multilayered despite the pre-eminence of the nation-state. For this reason, the question this thesis asks is, how has Croatia and Serbia’s desire for EU membership affected their domestic perceptions of the past, particularly in how narratives of the Yugoslav War have been tailored in light of the desire for entry?

Accordingly, by answering this question, the thesis will fulfil its aim, which is to provide a detailed study of how the politics of memory has been enacted in the specific
contexts of postwar Croatia and Serbia by tracing the change in the narratives of the past, from the end of the Yugoslav War, to the present day, accounting for the reasons why these changes occurred, and analysing the obstacles to these changes. The significance of this body of work is that it necessarily combines the interdisciplinary nature of memory politics with post-authoritarian studies, nationalism, democratic transition studies, Europeanisation literature, transitional justice literature, and the domestic politics of Croatia and Serbia, as a means for understanding the complexity of Western Balkan politics. It is also a timely study considering the probable accession of Croatia to the EU in July 2013.

Argument
This thesis argues that the EU has indirectly influenced domestic perceptions of the past in postwar Croatia and Serbia through these states’ desire for EU membership. Informed by EU conditionality criteria, which include democratic policies, regional cooperation, and issue-linkage with the ICTY, political elites have tailored new discourses that confront past atrocities to improve EU trajectory. However, the depth of this process—called “the politics of memory,” has differed in both states primarily because Serbia was unable to extradite their war criminals at the pace of Croatia. This was the result of negative patterns that stemmed from the dynamics of regime transition, and the strength of old regime spoilers and nationalist parties who have perpetuated myths and discourses of victimisation in the new regime. In addition, desire for EU membership itself has fluctuated because of greater contest at the elite level between reformist and nationalist politicians.

Outline of Thesis
The first chapter offers a brief review of the relevant literature on memory politics, Europeanisation, and transitional justice. Chapter Two traces how the indirect influence of the EU has moved perceptions of the past in Croatia from a discourse of victimisation, to the
individualisation of war crimes, and finally, to a ‘normalisation’ of the country, made possible because of an Europeanised Croatian identity. Chapter Three examines the changing perceptions of the past in postwar Serbia, emphasising the importance of the arrest of Serbia’s high-profile war criminals who act as measurable indicators to the EU that Serbia is coming to terms with its past. The chapter also exposes the difficulties impeding narrative change beyond the democratic transition in 2000. Chapter Four compares Croatia and Serbia to reflect on the similarities and differences concerning the process and depth of the politics of memory. The thesis then concludes by identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for outworking the politics of memory in transitional states.
Chapter One

Masterminding the Past: Understanding EU Influence & the Politics of Memory

This chapter provides an overview of the relevant literature needed to understand the main thrust of the thesis, which explores how the desire for EU membership has indirectly influenced domestic perceptions of the past in postwar Croatia and Serbia. For this reason, literature and debates surrounding memory studies, national identity and “the politics of memory” are discussed. Furthermore, an understanding of Europeanisation literature and EU conditionality criteria is provided, along with the theory and practice of transitional justice. Finally, comments on the methodology of the thesis will be made.

Memory Studies

There are definitional challenges that underpin the study of memory, which explains why it has not been well-theorised and applied within the discipline of international relations. One challenge concerns disagreement over the proper distinction between history and memory. Academics who seek to clarify this distinction (Hodgkin & Radstone 2003; Bell 2006) define memory similarly: the capacity or faculty of retaining and reviving facts, events or impressions, or of recalling or recognising previous experiences. It is what keeps the past—or at least a highly selective image of it—alive in the present, whereas history is simply what happened before (Bell 2006, 2). This does not have to be a verifiable or accurate account: memory is knowledge from the past; It is not necessarily knowledge about the past (Bell 2006, 2). This is a defining factor that differentiates memory from history, if indeed there exists a completely objective history—a debate in itself.
Disagreement over the feasibility of studying ‘collective memory’ is yet another challenge for scholars. Simply put, collective memory is defined as a group of peoples’ widely shared perceptions of the past (Bell 2006, 2). It forms the story that groups of people tell about themselves, connecting past, present and future in a simplified narrative (Bell 2006, 2). Some academics contest that it is impossible to have collective memory when memories are ultimately subjective, in that they are lodged in an individuals mind. However, James Wertsch (2002) calls collective memories “mediated narratives” that are determined publicly. Likewise, Alexandra Barahona de Brito (2010) argues that, although remembering is a process that is only undertaken by individuals, memories can also be socially communicated, as well as socially and historically embedded, and it is because of this we can speak of collective memory.

Scholars have acknowledged that the rise of constructivism in international relations provides a promising opportunity for integrating the influence of collective memory (Bell 2006; Langenbacher 2010, 21). Critics of constructivism argue that it only provides a protracted critique of realism and liberalism, which favour the notion of objectivity and remain close to the natural sciences. However, constructivism is important because it views behaviour as socially constructed, historically determined and culturally contingent (Langenbacher 2010). This is because it is identity (a socially constructed meaning), and not fixed interests, that is crucial to agency (Horelt & Renner and Renner 2008, 9). In other words, it is the image actors hold about themselves and about others that matters, because an actor can know what he can do, only if he knows who he is (Horelt & Renner 2008, 9). Accordingly, memory studies scholars have found that collective memory is a major influence upon constructing identities and values within different mnemonic communities, particularly the nation-state, which will be explained below.
National Identity

Memory is most readily applied to an understanding of the construction, reproduction and contestation of national identities. National identity, in the dominant and widely accepted Western usage, concerns itself with the cultural aspect of the nation, whose members feel a sense of unity and homogeneity fostered by common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions (Smith 1991, 11). In this case, memory is the proof and the record of the self’s existence, and the struggle over memory is the struggle over the self’s most valued possession (Bell 2006, 5). Anthony Smith (1996, 383) says, “No memory, no identity, no identity, no nation.” According to Schwartz (2000, 17) memory is a “meaning-making apparatus,” but it is also a “membership-making apparatus” at the centre of the creation of “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991).

Identity is realised practically in a variety of ways. Horelt & Renner (2008) argue that identities are constructed through ‘constitutive stories,’ which rely on a narrative process. Therefore, one must identify the narrative of a collective political history, the discursive construction of a common culture, the discursive construction of a collective present and future, and the discursive construction of a ‘national body,’ amongst other things, to understand how identity is outworked (De Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak 1999). The identities can be articulated in written, symbolic, and oral mediums. Moreover, each mnemonic communities’ memory will be connected to “places, ruins, landscapes, monuments and urban architecture” (Misztal 2003, 16).

Memories can furthermore assign an actor a historical position of villain, victim, or liberator, allowing for the framing of international issues and negotiations (Langenbacher & Shain 2010). Problems can ensue when competing historical positions and narratives of the past emerge, because they will shape conflicting identities, which can complicate the state’s
interests and the subsequent actions they take. Croatia and Serbia are excellent empirical cases when studying the presence of conflicting identities given their history is a complex mix of independence, war, and cultural milieu from the influence of past empires under which they were subsumed.

For example, Horelt & Renner (2008), identify four conflicting narrative identities found in Croatia. The first is Croatia seeing itself as the heroic nation that stood up against Serbian aggression in the Yugoslav War. This would mean that Croatia presents itself as self-confident and autonomous. Second, Croatia is framed as an innocent nation, which individualises guilt upon the “black sheep” who committed atrocities for Croatian independence. The third and fourth can be seen as two sides of the same coin; viewing Croatia as a Western nation, or as a Balkan nation. These four identities are said to exist simultaneously and compete with each other, so that one or another might gain dominance in certain points in time.

The authors who have studied Serbia (Lazic 2003; Ristic 2007; Konitzer 2011), have commented on the country’s political life being between the East (Russia) and the West (EU). Andrew Konitzer (2011) explores the “historical friendship” between Serbia and Russia and uses a discourse analysis of the rhetoric of different political elites in Serbia and in Russia to understand how they frame their relationship. Furthermore, survey data and opinion poll results show how attitudes towards the EU and Russia prove not just that Serbian elites are in-between, but that the Serbian public is too. Another proponent of this view, Irena Ristic (2007, 185), describes Serbia as an “unfinished state” with an “undefined nation.” Ristic (2007, 185) argues that formulating a clearly defined national identity would facilitate Serbia’s accession to the EU, which implies that, depending on which identity Serbian elites construct and enact, it could effectively influence EU trajectory.
The Politics of Memory

For Croatia and Serbia, the Yugoslav War eventually brought sovereignty and peace, but it was only in their democratic transitions that serious questions were asked over their communist and authoritarian pasts, which included human rights abuses. War, in particular, is a definite cultural “time marker” in a state, as societies understand their history in three segments: before the war, during the war, and after the war (Goulding & Domic 2009, 89). In the aftermath of war, memory very clearly serves to either legitimate previous regimes (by confronting or hiding crimes), or it forges new claims to political legitimacy. This form of social memory-making has been conceptualised by Barahona de Brito (2010) as the politics of memory:

The ‘politics of memory’ refers to the various ways that political elites, social groups and institutions reinterpret the past and the breakdown of civility and propagate new interpretative narratives about the ‘what happened’ to legitimate a new political dispensation and develop a new vision of the future for the polity. In contrast with transitional justice, which consists of policies and actions with relatively clearly defined outlines and that are more temporally limited, the politics of memory is connected with much broader processes of socialisation and identity formation. The politics of memory involves important shifts in the way societies view their past.

There is a gap in the literature of empirical studies comparing the Serbian and Croatian “politics of memory.” First, the two countries have been largely ignored in case studies in edited books that incorporate memory studies with transitional justice and international relations (Barahona de Brito, Gonzalez-Enriquez & Aguilar 2001; Bell 2006; Langenbacher & Shain 2010). Second, no studies have properly conceptualised the reasons why multiple or ambivalent identities or narratives exist in both states, instead, they have only explored the different foreign policy options foundational state narratives can influence. In many cases, scholars have applied the famous George Orwell (1948/1989, 32) quote to understand this idea, namely, that, “Who controls the past, controls the future; who controls the present, controls the past” (Goulding & Domic 2009; Horne 2010). However, this thesis
argues that those foundational state narratives—before they determine the direction of the state—are determined themselves by a vision of the state political elites absorb (in this case, the prospect of EU membership) to enact the politics of memory in the first place. Thus, central to the politics of memory of Croatia and Serbia is the indirect influence of an external actor, the EU, and by indirect, this simply means the Croatian and Serbian perceptions of what the EU wants. Therefore, the literature of Europeanisation and role of EU conditionality criteria is a necessary addition to the thesis and will be summarised below.

**Europeanisation and EU Conditionality Criteria**

According to Claudio Radaelli (2003, 30), Europeanisation is defined as:

> Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures, and public policies.

Radaelli (2003, 35) provides a conceptual map that elucidates the domains wherein Europeanisation can take place. First, there are domestic structures, which include political structures of institutions, public administration, intergovernmental relations, and legal structures. This also includes structures of representation cleavages, like political parties, pressure groups, and societal-cleavage structures. The second area concerns public policy—the actors, policy problems, style, instruments, and resources used. Third, there are cognitive and normative structures, such as discourse, norms and values, political legitimacy, identities, and state traditions, like the understanding of governance, policy paradigms, frames, and narratives. Although Heather Grabbe (2003) once conceded that there had been little convincing empirical work done on how the EU affects cognitive-normative structures, constructivists have taken on this task by exploring how Europeanisation affects state identities and, in reverse of the causal arrow, how state identities affect Europeanisation
When discussing the effect of Europeanisation in non-member states, EU conditionality criteria for accession becomes an important tool and indicator of this process. The standard conditionality criteria the EU set out for CEE countries is encompassed in three main documents: the Maastricht Treaty, the Copenhagen Criteria and the framework for negotiations with a particular candidate state. First, Article 49 of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty stipulated that any European country that respects the principles of the EU may apply to join (EC 2012d). Second, the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria further defined the rules that made a country eligible to join the EU. There are three aspects of the Criteria, which are summarised below (EC 2012d):

(a) Political: democracy, rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.

(b) Economic: a functioning market economy and checks that producers can handle competitive pressure and market forces within the EU.

(c) Legislative: enacting legislation to bring national law into line with European law (known as the acquis communautaire). The acquis is divided into chapters, each dealing with different policy areas.

Considering the above, the EU decides when a country is ready to become an “official candidate.” Then, the chapters of the acquis are opened after the final aspect of accession criteria—the framework for negotiations with a particular candidate—are organised. The framework monitors when and how each chapter is met, and it will signal when the EU has enough absorption capacity for a new member. Once the acquis chapters are closed, the
accession treaty is signed and candidates receive “acceding” status until the date of EU entry is reached.

However, EU conditionality criteria in SEE is more demanding than the above conditions because, after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Balkan states had more fragile economies, polities, societies, and the legacy of conflict (Anastasakis & Bechev 2003, 4). These factors produced stricter and more numerous steps in the conditionality criteria that mostly come before a country is deemed a “candidate.” Following Othon Anastasakis and Dimitar Bechev’s (2003, 7-8) outline, these additions are directed by the 1997 Regional Approach, which was replaced in 1999 by the SAP. Committing to the SAP includes:

(a) Stabilising the countries politically and encouraging their swift transition to a market economy, promoting regional cooperation, and offering eventual membership to the EU (the SAP countries become “potential candidates”).

(b) Cooperation with the ICTY.

(c) Signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) once progress has been made in meeting the SAP. The SAA produces benefits such as asymmetric trade liberalisation, economic and financial assistance, humanitarian aid for refugees and returnees, assistance for democratisation and civil society, cooperation in justice and home affairs, and the development of a political dialogue.

(d) Conditions arising out of the SAA and Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation framework.

(e) Conditions related to individual projects and the supplying of aid, grants or loans.

(f) Conditions that arise out of the peace agreements and political deals (including Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, and the Dayton, Ohrid, and Belgrade agreements).

Anastasakis and Bechev (2003, 8) claim that EU conditionality in the Balkans is “a multi-dimensional instrument geared towards reconciliation, reconstruction and reform. It is regional, sub-regional and country-specific; it is economic, political, social and security-related; it is positive and well as negative.” With a focus on reconciliation, the SAP criteria
coalesces with transitional justice theory and practice, which will inevitably challenge the deeply held narratives and perceptions of the past in postwar Croatia and Serbia.

Transitional Justice

Transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress the massive human rights abuses of the past. Judicial transitional justice mechanisms include domestic trials, international trials, and more recently, trials in front of foreign courts (based on universal jurisdiction) and hybrid trials (mixed domestic-international courts) (Subotic 2009, 17). Non-judicial measures include truth commissions, reparations to victims, lustration, museums or other sites commemorating the victims, state apologies, community initiatives, unofficial mechanisms, or amnesties (Subotic 2009, 17-18). Crossley-Frolick (2011) claims that UN efforts to facilitate transitional justice, particularly in post-conflict settings, have been analysed, but argues that the EU’s role in promoting transitional justice is largely unknown. Thus, she identifies two ways the EU primarily supports transitional justice: through the EC, and through the EU’s common foreign and security policy. In the first case, the Instrument for Pre-Accession is the EC’s financial instrument for the SAP, and it includes various resources to help countries in need. In the second case, peace-building initiatives make transitional justice concerns linked with future enlargement scenarios.

Borrowing the concept of issue-linkage from Subotic (2009), this thesis suggests that the EU is indirectly influencing perceptions of the past in Croatia and Serbia through issue-linkage with the ICTY. The ICTY was established in 1993, and its primary role is to formally indict and try war generals and political leaders who held “command responsibility” over
the atrocities of which they are accused. Crossley-Frollick (2011) does acknowledge that the ICTY and conditionality criteria are also ways in which the EU promotes transitional justice, but she selected Bosnia as a case study, with no real mention of the Croatian or Serbian cases. Her ultimate question is left unanswered, “Whether the EU is truly committed to a “justice-sensitive approach” to enlargement that more assertively promotes the need to confront the past in an effort to move forward” (Crossley-Frollick 2011, 47)? Discussing this topic links to the wider Europeanisation literature, where it will help to develop how the EU changes cognitive-normative processes in Croatia and Serbia.

There is a porous literature on how transitional justice mechanisms have been politicised by domestic elites with incomplete implementation (Horne 2010, 976). Horne (2010, 976) suggests that it is the politics of memory which focuses on the way in which the reconstruction of the past is a political act, often instrumentally controlled to meet political ends. On the one hand, this paradigm draws into the thesis the necessity to gain knowledge of the domestic political situation in Croatia and Serbia to see what domestic dynamics are producing or hindering transitional justice and changed past perceptions. On the other hand, these studies still do not ask whether EU influence on domestic elites has changed Croatian and Serbian perceptions of the past as well? Has one country received more pressure and coercion to face up to their past more than the other? Are indicted war criminals in Croatia and Serbia perceived as perpetrators more than war heroes?

**Methodology**

This body of work is a comparative study of Croatia and Serbia, which adheres to the method of difference research design. Croatia and Serbia belong within the same geographic region of the SEE, or Western Balkans. They were formerly united politically in the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from 1918-1941, and within SFRY from 1945-1991, and both
countries participated in the Yugoslav War from 1991-1995. As a result, the EU’s influence in
the states will be more controlled because the same war (making time and place constant)
can produce different perceptions of the conflict and other past events. As they are in the
same region, the way the EU co-operates with both states is more controlled, and it is clearer
to identify where their political trajectories have converged and diverged. They were also
culturally united by the Serbo-Croatian language, which has, since independence, been
separated into four different dialects.

At the same time, Croatia and Serbia present differences in their main religion and
in their EU trajectory. Croatia is an acceding country, set to formally become an EU member
state in July 2013. Conversely, Serbia has only attained official candidate status in March
2012, eight years after Croatia received official candidate status. This markedly different EU
trajectory makes these two cases worthy of comparison, particularly when considering why
it has taken Serbia longer than Croatia to arrest high-profile war criminals, and in asking,
what was the role of collective memory in this divergence of trajectory?

This thesis relies on primary and secondary data, predominantly qualitative in
nature, but where the qualitative data can be further substantiated, quantitative data shall be
utilised. Academic literature from anthropological, ethnographic, historical, political science
and social science approaches are drawn upon. Official and unofficial discourse from Croatia
and Serbia is analysed in this thesis through the constructivist method of narrative analysis.
Much of the material originally in Croatian and Serbian has been translated into English
within academic and non-academic secondary sources, with other interview material
available through English sources directly. Additionally, predominantly online journalistic
accounts and newspaper articles are gathered and they have been cross-checked before being used as a source where possible.
Chapter Two

Croatia: “The Mediterranean As It Once Was…”

This chapter examines the changing domestic perceptions of the Croatian recent past over three main periods, from the conclusion of the Yugoslav War to the present. It first traces the final half of Croatian president, Franjo Tudjman’s leadership, from 1995 to the end of 1999. It then analyses past perceptions from the beginning of EU commitment to the country in 2000, to the end of formal co-operation with the ICTY at the end of 2005. The final period encapsulates the change of past perceptions during the EU accession negotiation process, which started in 2006, until the present day, where Croatia holds acceding status. Through this analysis, it will be shown how the politics of memory in postwar Croatia has moved past perceptions from pure victimisation in the war, to the individualisation of war crimes, and finally, to a ‘normalisation’ of the country, made possible because of an Europeanised Croatian identity. It also shows how the latter two narratives and past perceptions have been indirectly influenced by the EU through conditionality criteria, including issue-linkage with the ICTY and the growth of transitional justice.

Each main section examines Croatian perceptions of the past in three ways: the first section provides a narrative analysis of official discourse that remembers the Homeland War and what the discourse achieved. The second section examines more specifically what the change in discourse meant for the status of war generals, ICTY cooperation and commemorations or apologies surrounding the Homeland War. The final section discusses EU influence and the politics of memory to determine the main causes for the changes in discourse over the three periods studied.
1995-1999: “Thousand Year Old” Dream Made Reality

Remembering the Homeland War: The Freedom Train

Croatian perceptions of the past are encapsulated within the very name for the conflict Croatia was involved in during the Yugoslav War—the “Homeland War.” The title holds connotations of victimhood, painting Croatia in a struggle to gain liberation from SFRY and the RSK, a Serb-controlled quasi state within Croatian territory. After almost five years, this liberation was achieved on 4 August 1995, with Operation Storm (henceforth Storm), a military attack on the nerve centre of the RSK—the city of Knin (See Appendix 1).

In keeping with the theme of liberation, Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia since 1991, made a speech in Knin shortly after Storm, on 26 August 1995, during his journey on “The Freedom Train,” the reopening of the rail line from Zagreb to Split which had been blocked for five years by the RSK (Tanner 2010). Tudjman (1995) stated that, “As long as Knin was under occupation, the future of the Croatian state was not assured. Since Operation Storm, since today, it is.” These words can be interpreted as legitimising Storm for security reasons, despite the apparent devastation to the Serb community it caused in its aftermath.

The importance of Franjo Tudjman in this period of Croatian history cannot be underestimated. He is said to be the main constructor of the processes of Croatian national reformation and state-building (Uzelak 1997, 449). According to Uzelak (1997), Tudjman’s understanding of the foundation of the nation is deeply rooted in historical context (shared history, historical events, battles, kings, religion and customs). This idea is evident as the speech progresses, as Tudjman (1995) recounts the importance of Knin and situates the Knin
of that day to the one centuries ago, when it was formerly the capital city of the Croatian kingdom under King Zvonimir.

In this speech, derogatory language is used to characterise Serbs as “chetniks” (Serb nationalist and monarchist paramilitaries), with Knin being described as a “den of Chetnik anti-Croatianism.” The racial rhetoric continued as Tudjman addresses Croatian citizens:

[Start the revival of Knin, so we can populate it, and not just Knin, but also Benkovac, Obrovac and all the area up to the Plitvice lakes and Sisak. We must revive and build the whole of Croatia, so it can become a country of which every Croat can be proud, and all Croats can be from today, and a country of wealth and happiness of all Croatian people.]

In this passage, there is no mention of integrating any Croatian Serbs back into the population. As many as 200,000 Serbs left for Bosnia or Serbia by 1995, which alludes to the ethnic cleansing that was so prevalent during the War. This discourse further reveals how Storm was based on the historical context of making Knin and RSK territory “Croatian” again after years of Serb and communist oppression. By liberating the territory, Tudjman called it, “The end of the Croatian crusade.”

The narrative plot that can be reconstructed from Tudjman’s discourse is overall one overlain with historical, racial and religious allusions. Catholic Croatia was suffering through the oppression of Orthodox Serb “chetniks,” who, like “cancer” spread throughout their land for the sake of a “Greater Serbia” (Tudjman 1995). However, through the “wisdom” of Croatian decisions and leadership during Storm, the RSK disappeared in two to three days (Tudjman 1995). Storm turned Croatian victimisation into liberation, made Croatia “Croatian” again, and secured the sensationalised “thousand-year old dream” of statehood—a notion Tudjman used to rally nationalistic support from the public (Hawkesworth 2008, xxv).
War Generals, the ICTY and Official Commemorations: Croatia as Victim and Victor

War crimes were not confronted in the Croatian perceptions of the past in this period. For example, Tudjman denied that atrocities were committed by Croatian war generals against Serbs in an interview shortly after Storm (CNN World 1995). Instead, he argued there were only unavoidable “casualties” on both sides in the operations during the fighting (CNN World 1995). The murder of Croatian army officer, Milan Levar, after agreeing to be a witness for the ICTY against other Croats exemplifies the covering of Croatian war crimes in this period (Allcock 2009, 369).

Moreover, the Croatian government hesitantly co-operated with the ICTY only when pressured by the international community (Pavlakovic 2009). Even though the “Law on the Cooperation with the ICTY” was adopted by the Croatian parliament in April 1996, Tudjman’s party, the HDZ, never fully accepted the law when it was passed and other opposition parties supported their stance (Subotic 2009, 86). Croatian authorities had prevented generals from speaking to ICTY investigators, and government and military documents were withheld. Subotic (2009) says the Croatian government was among the first states to demand that the international community establish a war crimes tribunal for atrocities committed during the Yugoslav War, but they were under the impression that it would only indict and try Serbs accused of war crimes against Croatians. Importantly, Tudjman himself was never indicted by the ICTY. Tudjman died in December 1999 from cancer, which meant that, unlike Milosevic and Serbia, Croatia would never see a head-of-state tried by the Tribunal.

Wider society was largely in favour of the protection of war generals by the government. High-profile war generals who would subsequently find themselves with ICTY indictments, such as Mirko Norac and Ante Gotovina, were prominent guests at the two
most important commemorations of the Homeland War—the siege and fall of Vukovar (November 18), and the Day of Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving marking the end of Storm (August 5) (Pavlakovic 2009), both of which focused exclusively on Croatian suffering and victory.

EU Influence and The Politics of Memory: The Roadblock of Authoritarianism

Observers have described the Tudjman regime as an authoritarian one (Kearns 1998; Tanner 2010), and for this reason, it became a roadblock to developing closer relations with the EU (see Appendix 2, Period One). Tudjman’s authoritarian tendencies included his choice of personal friends and close colleagues, which indicated that he viewed the government as nothing more than the extension of his own office (Kearns 1998, 252). He also treated the Croatian parliament (henceforth, Sabor) as nothing more than a rubber stamp body (Kearns 1998, 252). However, in the public view, his party, the HDZ, were losing popular support mainly because of accusations of corruption (Kearns 1998). Given the EU conditionality criteria discussed in Chapter One (See pp. 17-18), Croatia could not be considered ready for accession talks like the other CEE states who were able to fulfil the requirements of the standard conditionality criteria.

Authoritarianism subsequently became a roadblock to confronting the past in Croatia. Studies into collective memory, inspired by democratic peace theory, suggest that there is a correlation between regime type and collective memory; democratic regimes are more likely to come to terms with the “truthful” past as opposed to dictatorships (Langenbacher 2010). This is why the politics of memory is a form of post-authoritarian social memory-making. Croatia’s victim-centered, xenophobic narrative, along with defensive attitudes to war crimes would not allow for it to occur. Tudjman and his “old regime spoilers” with their nationalistic stances made it very difficult for alternative
discourses to emerge that risked criminalising the past and the regime. Therefore, authoritarianism became the roadblock that can explain why the EU exacted little indirect influence over domestic perceptions of the past in this period in Croatia.

2000-2005: War Heroes Or Villains? The Black Sheep In The Croatian Fold

*Remembering the Homeland War: The Sabor’s Declaration*

Croatian perceptions of the past underwent change with the democratic transition in 2000. The former League of Communists of Croatia transformed into the SDP, and won the elections in 2000, ousting the disfavoured and divided HDZ. The presidential elections followed, with Croatians electing the last president of SFRY, Stipe Mesic. With these changes, a new official discourse emerged. The Declaration on the Homeland War was written by the Sabor (2000), and it can be viewed as the official state narrative over what happened from 1991 to 1995. According to paragraph two of the document:

> The Republic of Croatia led a just and legitimate, defensive and liberating war, which was not an aggressive and occupational war against anyone, in which she defended her territory from the great Serb aggressor within her internationally recognised borders.

The following plot can be reconstructed from this section: Serbia caused the war, Croatia was the victim, and was forced to defend herself as an effect of the Serbian aggression (Horelt & Renner 2008, 13). This is largely consistent with the narrative presented by Tudjman in 1995, although, there is less detail concerning the historical context of the War, and the language is less pejorative.

Yet, a discourse that would be further elaborated upon later in the period—the notion of the individualisation of crimes—emerged in this document:

> For the dignity of the Homeland War, the Croatian judiciary is obligated to process all possible cases of individual war crimes, grave breaches of humanitarian law and all other crimes committed during the aggression against
Croatia and armed uprisings [...] strictly applying the principle of individual responsibility and guilt.

This paragraph does not specify which ethnicity would be prosecuted, leaving it open to “all possible cases,” which could subtly include Croats who have committed crimes. The emphasis on the principle of “individual responsibility and guilt” absolves the state of criminal activity, and places it on “the black sheep in the Croatian fold,” (Horelt & Renner 2008).

This discourse is undoubtedly strategic in nature, because it delicately achieved two important goals: first, it allowed for co-operation with the ICTY, as has already been proved in many studies (Horelt & Renner 2008; Freyburg and Richter 2010). Unlike Tudjman, Mesic and prime minister Ivica Racan were committed to hold domestic trials and co-operate fully with the ICTY, not only over Bosnian Croat suspects, but regular Croatian army figures suspected of war crimes in Storm (Steele 2000; Tanner 2010, 310). Conversely, it preserved the legacy of the Homeland War. President Mesic stated, “The Croatian nation should not and will not be a hostage to those who bloodied their hands, bringing shame upon Croatia’s name—no matter what credits they might have otherwise,” (Subotic 2009, 94). The thought of not confronting war crimes was framed as being harmful to Croatia, which signifies deep transformation compared to the Tudjman regime and the case of Milan Levar.

This discourse was strengthened by President Mesic (2005, 2) years later when he delivered a speech to the Igman Initiative members, an organisation that fosters better regional co-operation:

The truth about the past implies both apology, admission and repentance. In a court, be it an international or a national court, both accountability and guilt can and have to be ascertained exclusively on the individual basis. Nations are not guilty. The fact is, however, that crimes were committed in the name of nations and under the cloak of the name of entire nations. It is therefore logical that expressions of apology come in the name of nations or states.
This discourse has additionally incorporated the language of transitional justice, using terms such as “apology, admission and repentance.” Yet, Mesic states that transitional justice starts with the individual, with the state implicated within the conduct of the individual, and in this way, the state has a role to play in the reconciliation process. Mesic’s speech, though for the consumption of regional elites, illustrates how Croatia is gradually accepting the past and the conduct of their war generals, which is not based on emotion, but on fair and just legal principles. Importantly, this discourse promotes regional cooperation, a feature of EU conditionality criteria, making it understandable why Croatia had already become an EU candidate country by 2005 (See Appendix 2, Period Two).

**War Generals, the ICTY and Official Commemorations: Croatia as Victim and Perpetrator**

The discourse of individualisation allowed the government to confront war crimes, but it was not without contest at the societal level. This polarisation was evident in the case of former general Mirko Norac, who was wanted for the massacre of Serb civilians in the city of Gospic during the War (Tanner 2010, 310). This produced large protests around Croatia, led by nationalists, war veterans and army generals, many of whom saw Norac as a war hero. In this case, both the EU and the ICTY were sensitive to the domestic situation, not wanting to destabilise the pro-Western Racan government (Subotic 2009, 88). This meant that the Hague did not indict Norac at this point, which diffused the situation domestically. The government told citizens that their demonstrations were hurting Croatia’s international reputation and its appeal as a destination for foreign capital and tourism (Subotic 2009, 92). This is another example of the way individualisation discourse was reframing what is beneficial or harmful to Croatia. This example illustrates that perceptions of the past were changing, and resistance to these changes were faced relatively successfully whenever a new army officer was arrested.
As a result, the Croatian government improved its cooperation with the ICTY in this period, but challenges confronting the past arose when it became more obvious that the ICTY had constructed a counter-narrative which characterised Croatia not only as a victim, but also as a perpetrator of crimes (Pavlakovic 2009). For example, in March 2005, the Croatian Memorial and Documentation Centre on the Homeland Defence War sought to correct the media and the ICTY discourse, which focused disproportionally on Croatian war crimes, not crimes against Croats. This made the centre—a transitional justice mechanism—biased (Subotic 2009, 108). Also in 2003, SDP prime minister Racan was replaced by Ivo Sanadar, who still promised to deliver EU membership to Croatia despite coming from the right-wing, nationalist HDZ. However, Sanader repeatedly declared that only Croatia can write its own history. This comment was clearly directed at the ICTY “rewriting” the narrative of the war in the 1990s (Pavlakovic 2009).

Commemorations of Storm nevertheless changed with the democratic transition in 2000. As the ICTY was able to fully investigate the Homeland War and more openly indict Croatian army generals, these national heroes, who actively attended the August 5 ceremonies, were no longer publicly visible (Pavlakovic 2009). As a result, the rhetoric at the Storm commemoration changed, with Croatian politicians acknowledging that war crimes did occur and that there were Serbian victims as well, something that would have been prohibited during the Tudjman regime (Pavlakovic 2009). Croatian politicians had to address and incorporate the issue of co-operation with the ICTY at the commemorations (Pavlakovic 2009). Due to the Racan government’s positive stance on compliance with the ICTY, Racan avoided going to Knin in 2002 and 2003, afraid that massive demonstrations would offend the symbolic place. Even Sanader’s HDZ faced counter-commemorations and protests in Knin (Pavlakovic 2009).
EU Influence and the Politics of Memory: The Double-edged Sword

Relations between the EU and Croatia had dramatically improved with the democratic transition in 2000, but the outstanding issue of capturing high-profile war indictee, Ante Gotovina, delayed the start of accession negotiations in March 2005 (See Appendix 2, Period Two). Seven months later, ICTY chief prosecutor at the time, Carla del Ponte, announced that Croatia was fully co-operating with the ICTY even though Gotovina had not been located. It was on the evening of 7 December the ICTY fugitive was arrested in the Canary Islands of Spain (OSCE 2005). The Croatian government was vindicated because they were trying to inform the ICTY that Gotovina had not been in Croatia for years (Subotic 2009, 99). The reaction within Croatia was moderate, with official statements from various political parties and war veteran associations appealing for a calm response to the news (OSCE 2005). The public were dejected, but had to accept that Gotovina’s fate was now a legal matter (OSCE 2005, 1). Gotovina’s arrest closed the final chapter of Croatia’s relationship with the ICTY, at least in the sense that the Hague was no longer an obstacle to EU accession (Subotic 2009, 99).

Overall, it can be said that Croatia’s democratic transition fostered closer relations with the EU, which allowed for the politics of memory to ensue in Croatia. As a result, a new discourse of individualisation was developed by the political elite. It allowed for greater regional cooperation, the confrontation of war crimes, and changes over how the Homeland War was commemorated. Yet, the discourse proved to be a double-edged sword, polarising political elites and society when digesting the new victim-perpetrator identity of Croatia.

2006-2012: Normalisation On The Road To The EU

Remembering the Homeland War: Unforgettable Operation Storm
With the security of EU accession negotiations underway, would Croatia alter their perceptions of the past back to that of Tudjman’s regime, or would they continue to come to terms with the past and acknowledge war crimes committed against Serbs during the Homeland War? To answer this question, it is important to realise that, in this period of Croatian recent history, the ICTY continued to affect political discourse and society. In mid-2006, the Sabor adopted a Declaration on Operation Storm, which was submitted for consideration by MP Slaven Letica because the ICTY decided to use the concept of “joint criminal enterprise” concerning Storm, trying Ante Gotovina, Milan Markac and Ivan Cermak together. It was argued that the term would negatively impact Croatia’s international reputation, national consciousness and allow Serbs to ask for reparations (Subotic 2009, 100).

The Declaration claims that its purpose and true objective was the liberation of occupied Croatian territory and the establishment of the constitutional and legal order of the Croatian State there, which had been under occupation for four years prior (Sabor 2006). It also says that the ultimate goal of the Serbian occupation, aggression and ethnic cleansing, was to create a “Greater Serbia,” keeping the language of Tudjman and the Declaration on the Homeland War. Operation Storm was justified as a last resort, given that they exhausted all possibilities of peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories into the constitutional, economic and social order of the Croatian State (Sabor 2006).

After describing the nature, purpose and course of action in Storm, six groups of adjectives are used to describe the event: it was “international, legal, and legitimate”, “victorious”, “anti-terrorist,” “decisive,” “unforgettable,” and “final.” The content under classing Storm as unforgettable stipulates that it is the obligation of the Croatian Parliament, Croatian expert community, Croatian scientific and educational institutions, and the media,
to not forget the battle that took place, but rather, to remember it as it becomes part of the Croatian “useful past” for future generations (Sabor 2006). However, there is a change of tone in the next paragraph, which includes a clause:

Preserving the memory of "Operation Storm" should also include the right of all scientists, journalists, human rights activists and others to substantively and freely investigate the dark side of this and all other operations: violations of war and humanitarian law, crimes, human casualties and suffering [...].

As they chose not to forget this moment in Croatian history, the concession is that all aspects of the event need to be remembered, even the loss of life. Although, the parliament may well mean Croatian loss of life, it does not specify, meaning that crimes committed against Serbs after Storm could qualify in this instance.

The narrative of Storm manifests itself in the policy issue of the treatment of minorities, particularly the return of Serb refugees. Prime Minister in 2010, Jadranka Kosor, was interviewed on Europe District (2010), a program in partnership with the EU, which aired on the French TV station, France 24, about this issue and said:

It is a fact that in the 1990s Croatia was under attack, and that part of its territory was occupied. Hundreds of thousands of Croatians were expelled by the alliance of the Serbian paramilitaries and the Yugoslavian army in Croatia. As for the Serbian minority, it is true that a number of people left. They were not forced to leave, but they left. But today, those who wish to come back to Croatia can do so. The return must happen on a voluntary basis and in safe conditions. We’re co-operating on this issue with a representative of the Serbian minority. Our action is well co-ordinated, and I’m satisfied with the results. We have already spent five billion euros on refugee return programs. I’m confident that we’re upholding all the commitments made by the government of the Republic of Croatia.

A number of breaks with the previous discourse can be identified in this speech. For example, although Kosor emphasises that Croatia was “under attack,” she does not say they were under attack by “chetniks,” nor “the Great Serb oppressors” like previous documents, but she assigns blame to the “Serbian paramilitaries and the Yugoslavian army,” an intentional choice of words. Furthermore, Kosor demonstrates how Croatia now shows an interest in the return of Serb refugees, which was unthinkable in Tudjman’s rhetoric. This is
undoubtedly down to EU influence, because along with tackling corruption and organised crime, the return of refugees is a top priority for Brussels.

Kosor’s rhetoric, however, also reflects an attempt to cover the full details of the war that harms Croatia’s reputation. For example, through the narrative of the ICTY, we know that during and after Storm, many Serbs had “left,” and Kosor emphasises this twice, but a better word might well have been “fled.” She also omits the fact that many Serbs were killed in the aftermath of Storm, mostly elderly people, who could not leave their homes. The fact she emphasises that they “were not forced to leave” suggests Croatia was in no way attempting to ethnically cleanse the region, yet according to the ICTY, the “joint criminal enterprise” is responsible for being “criminally liable for having knowingly failed to prevent or punish criminal acts or omissions of their subordinates,” given that “these crimes were a natural and foreseeable consequence of the execution of the enterprise,” including the removal of the majority Serb population from the RSK region (ICTY 2012a). The discourse of Kosor exemplifies how narratives are simplified in order to be consumed by internal and external audiences despite the constraints of the interview method (Pavlakovic 2009). Thus, Croatian defensiveness of the legitimacy of the origins of the state still remain. Interestingly, the Serb narrative of this event calls Storm an attempt at ethnic cleansing, comparable to Srebrenica, which is another version of this narrative.

*War Generals, the ICTY and Official Commemorations: Best of Both Worlds*

In this period, Croatian politicians and wider society were confronted with the trial and verdicts of their remaining war generals and leaders. On 15 April 2011, the Hague sentenced Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markac to 24 and 18 years imprisonment respectively, for crimes against humanity and the violations of the laws or customs of war (ICTY 2012a). The third man implicated within the Storm “joint criminal enterprise”, Ivan Cermak, was acquitted of
all charges laid against him. The response by the Croatian Republic at the sentencing of Gotovina in particular, produced protests in Croatia and abroad, but with less anxiety and relative quiet than previous occasions (Allcock 2009, 371).

On 11 August 2011, the President of the Republic of Croatia, Ivo Josipovic, was interviewed for Europe District (2011b) concerning this polarising issue, and he was asked whether, like some Croatians, he regarded Gotovina as a hero?:

He was a very distinguished fighter, definitely. What I have to stress is that, whether we like the verdict or not, Croatia is part of the international judicial system; Croatia must obey the verdicts of the ICTY. We are going to see what the final verdict will be because it’s now in the appeal process. Part of my policies is reconciliation. That means the ability and capability of states and nations to reconsider history and to recognise what was good and what was bad in their policies of the past years.

Josipovic does not refer to Gotovina as a “hero,” but rather, “a distinguished fighter.” His response is very diplomatic, omitting his personal opinion in favour of what seems most relevant, which is “to obey the verdicts of the ICTY.” In fact, the notion of reconsidering history is welcomed, which sets his discourse apart from Sanadar’s, who was opposed to the ICTY’s ability to “falsify history,” (Pavlakovic 2009). Josipovic, like his predecessor, uses the rhetoric of transitional justice when he speaks of “reconciliation.” His standpoint on the Gotovina case suggests Croatia is coming to terms with the past and accepting the necessary conditions to move forward. This signifies that individualisation discourse with transitional justice rhetoric has been further strengthened by Josipovic, and it encapsulates the lasting indirect influence of the EU due to issue-linkage with the ICTY.

The most recent commemoration of Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day on 5 August 2012, in Knin, included a number of milestones. According to Josipovic (Gulf Times 2012):

Croatia won the war, it is a great achievement […] but Croatia still has to battle to win in peace […]. Winning in peace means also extending a hand to our Serb
This language is very different from the presidential addresses at the former commemorations, and it shows that Croatian society is changing because it tolerates such discourse from its President. Furthermore, the 2012 commemoration in Knin was attended for the first time by an ethnic Serb official, Veljko Dzakula, who is head of the Serb Democratic Forum non-governmental organisation and a former rebel official (Gulf Times 2012). Despite some politicians, like Jadranka Kosor, being more supportive of war generals (Vukic 2012), the majority of Croatian political elites have made gestures of reconciliation with Serbia in this period: Mesic directed an apology to victims of Croatian war crimes; Josipovic visited Belgrade; and Sanadar attended a Serbian Orthodox Church for Christmas. These are signs that Croatian political elites have changed their past perceptions of the war from Tudjman’s period, and they have done so with the “best of both worlds,” by individualising crimes and maintaining the legitimacy of the Homeland War at the same time.

**EU Influence and the Politics of Memory: So similar, so different, so European**

It is unanimous, scholars, Croatian politicians, and the public, saw no other way other than acknowledging that Croatia’s future was bound to the EU. Mesic (2005) said:

> Our future does not consist of returning to the past or negating or being silent on the past but rather […] accepting the truth about the past is one of the key prerequisites for making a stride through the European gate.

There may have been polarisation over the indictment of war criminals and Storm (the past), but charting the course towards the EU (the future) meant one final narrative, the grand narrative of Croatia as a “European” state, initiated a change in Croatian domestic past perceptions (Subotic 2009, 121). After Yugoslavia’s disintegration, Croatia used its pre-Yugoslav past, where it was a member of the Central European Habsburg empire, to promote itself to the world. The Croatian National Tourist Board’s current campaign depicts Croatia
as “the Mediterranean as it once was”; forgotten is Croatia as an authoritarian aggressor state in the Yugoslav War, or a member of the former Balkan SFRY, or even the former fascist Nazi puppet regime. Rather, Croatia’s European and Catholic heritage, jewel coastlines and islands, are the collective memories that have been revived, within and outside of Croatia.

To show the extent of this return to Croatia’s European past, the EC, in February 2012, launched a video clip that challenged EU viewers’ perceptions of the SEE aiming to join the EU. The campaign aims at raising awareness and “showing another side of the region,” away from the legacy of war, strife and unrest (EC 2012a). The slogan of the campaign is “so similar, so different, so European.” This strategy of comparison is a powerful tool in grounding these states’ identities in Europe. This is done with the use of footage of locations that could be mistaken for other parts of Europe. For example, footage of a grand theatre with symphony music playing in the background is shown with the heading, “Austria?”, in the foreground. The heading then fades as a larger heading, “Croatia”, replaces it, suggesting that Croatia’s cultural capital is like that of Austria. By comparing Croatia with Austria, the EC illustrates that Croatia belongs within Central Europe. It is said that, history, especially national history, is grand narrative; History and memory shape national identity; identity shapes and reinforces the boundaries of the state (Schwandt 2001). This idea has been powerful for the politics of memory in Croatia; it is the key to normalising Croatia, which is reflected in the probability of Croatia’s accession to the EU in July 2013.

Conclusion

Through this study, domestic perceptions of the Croatian past have evidently undergone change over time. In the first period studied, the government’s xenophobic and autocratic regime emphasised Croatia purely as a “victim” of Serb aggression, and it proved to be a roadblock for a true confrontation of the past. It was not until Croatia’s democratic transition,
explored in the second period in this study, that a new discourse emerged which individualised war crimes—a process that was proven to be indirectly linked to Croatia’s closer EU relations and conditionality criteria. In the final period studied, it was argued that individualisation discourse teamed with transitional justice rhetoric was strengthened, reflected in political discourse, commemorations of Storm, and gestures of reconciliation with Serbia.

Yet, perceptions of the past in postwar Croatian society, particularly from 2000 onwards, prove also to be a double-edged sword; although an individualisation of war crimes was achieved, government rhetoric still preserved the dignity of the Homeland War, particularly in periods after international pressure was removed from the government. Presently, the policy of cementing Croatia’s identity in Europe is one way both Croatia and the EU sought to normalise the country’s identity. Analysing the period after Croatia’s accession to the EU could extend this study further, to examine whether perceptions of the past, particularly concerning war generals and Storm, remain as they are, revert back to Tudjman’s discourse, or further acknowledge Croatian wrongdoing.
Chapter Three

“If Serbia Stops…”

This chapter examines the changing domestic perceptions of the Serbian recent past through three main periods, from the conclusion of the Yugoslav War to the present. It first traces the final half of Serbian and Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic’s leadership, from 1995 to 2000. It then analyses past perceptions from the beginning of EU commitment to the country in 2001 to the signing of the SAA at the start of 2008. The final period encapsulates the change in past perceptions during the leadership of a pro-EU government, from 2008 until mid-2012. Through this analysis, several changes to the Serbian postwar narrative are identified, though, the most important changes surround the arrest and extradition of war criminals, particularly Slobodan Milosevic and Ratko Mladic. To the EU, these men were measurable indicators that Serbia was coming to terms with its past. The EU has subsequently indirectly influenced the past perceptions that have come from the arrest of these men primarily through rewards attached to conditionality, issue-linkage with the ICTY, and transitional justice. The chapter structure is identical to that of the previous chapter (See p. 23).


Remembering the Yugoslav War: Milosevic’s Diplomacy Disguise

Serbian perceptions of the past were predominantly shaped by one man during this period—Slobodan Milosevic, the president of FRY since 1997. Similar to Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman, Milosevic utilised the past in a strategic manner, attempting to create a past-present
continuum, which enabled him to present the political issues of his time in historical terms. Moens (2012) argues that this “presence of the past” aimed to turn collective memory into a political weapon. This political weapon is particularly useful for nationalists, as it is argued that almost all nationalist movements locate their contemporary political goals within a wider historical framework (Moens 2012). Milosevic successfully wielded this weapon, because his policies were supported by the majority of the Serbian public (Subotic 2009, 67).

In spite of his seemingly effortless mastery of mass demonstrations, since his rise to power, Milosevic had rarely appeared in public or on television (Djilas 1993, 4). For this reason, a narrative analysis of Milosevic’s discourse is based on an interview from the Washington Post during the Kosovo conflict in December 1998. In this interview, four perceptions of the past can be traced that made up the dominant Serbian narrative of the Yugoslav War: the notion of a “Greater Yugoslavia”; the West’s role in Yugoslavia’s disintegration; the Bosnian War as a “civil war”; and the notion of a “Greater Albania,” which caused the Kosovo conflict.

First, the notion of a “Greater Yugoslavia” was used by Milosevic to disguise the nationalist rhetoric he incited in the public consciousness. It is well known that Serbia’s political elite attempted to hold on to the Yugoslav federation and provide (armed) support to Serbian minorities in the other republics (Moens 2012). According to Moens (2012), this was presented as a new episode in a much older “Greater Serbia” ideal, rooted in the mid-nineteenth century struggle for independence from Ottoman rule. Moreover, as early as 1994, a UN report recognised there was a Serb policy of “ethnic cleansing” and “Greater Serbia,” which was created through nationalism, fear and repression (Bassiouni 1994). Interestingly, when Milosevic (1998) was asked whether he had a Greater Serbia program in mind, he diplomatically explained his support for a “Greater Yugoslavia”:
We considered that Yugoslavia was a good solution for the national interest of the Serbs, because in the former Yugoslavia all Serbs lived in one state in different republics. But they were in one state. The Muslims were also in one state in former Yugoslavia. The Croats were in one state and Macedonians and others. That was the interest of all, not only of the Serbs.

Interestingly, in contrast to Tudjman’s rhetoric, Milosevic never openly acted against anyone who attacked him by using derogatory language; he never publicly attacked or insulted Albanians or Croats or Bosnian Muslims in his speeches, and only a few of his remarks could be considered as incitements to war (Djilas 1993, 5).

The second past perception relates to how the break-up of Yugoslavia was caused by the West, instigated by Germany who essentially wanted Croatia to be independent (Milosevic 1998). This narrative contributed to skepticism over Euro-Atlantic structures in Serbia. Third, Milosevic (1998) framed the Bosnian War was a “civil war,” where Serbia only helped out their “relatives” in the RS. Serbians did not commit atrocities, nor was Serbia an aggressor state, but rather, “If Serbia was not so engaged and if I had not been so engaged in the search of a peaceful solution, Dayton wouldn’t have been possible” (Milosevic 1998). This discourse contradicts ICTY jurisprudence, which had unequivocally stated that the Bosnian war was an international conflict with significant involvement from the Serbian state’s security, police and military apparatus (Subotic 2009, 60-61).

Finally, Milosevic’s (1998) discourse on Kosovo is framed not as a matter of human rights or democracy, but a matter of geopolitics. In his mind, Milosevic blames Mussolini for creating a “Greater Albania” that placed Albanians in parts Kosovo, Macedonia and Greece (Milosevic 1998). Thus, Kosovo is a “separatist movement” according to Milosevic (1998), comparable to cases in Northern Ireland, on Corsica, and the Basque region in Spain, except that, as opposed to Northern Ireland, Serbia “did not occupy northern Albania. Kosovo is a part of Serbia.”
War Generals and the ICTY: Serbia as Victim

No high-profile war generals were arrested in this period, although, shortly after the establishment of the ICTY, many Serbs were indicted, including the main suspects responsible for the massacre at Srebrenica, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. The Law on the Cooperation with the ICTY was blocked in parliament, and Serbia refused to acknowledge the ICTY, even when the prosecutors wanted to investigate crimes committed against Serb civilians (Subotic 2009, 39). The narrative responsible for this non-compliance stance was simply that Milosevic (1998) was unaware of their whereabouts, and furthermore, that it was strictly prohibited by the Serbian Constitution, claiming that he could not extradite his citizens.

Another reason for non-compliance with the ICTY was the notion that Serbs are victims who are treated differently and unfairly by the ICTY. This is evident in Milosevic’s (1998) rhetoric, when he says, “The Serbs are the victims of the latest holocaust in this century, there is no doubt about that […]. The use of “Holocaust” seems like an exaggeration, but it usefully demonstrates the deeply felt sense of victimisation that pervaded the Serbian consciousness at the time. Furthermore, Serbian people, since Milosevic came to power, have been socialised into believing that their nation is a victim of vast outside conspiracies that want to subjugate or destroy it (Subotic 2009, 69). Information evidenced in the 1994 UN Report stipulated that, more than any other nation of the former Yugoslavia, Serbians are fully convinced that history has treated them unfairly because their collective historic memory recounts domination by the European powers, conquest by the Ottoman Turks, occupation by the Axis powers during the Second World War, betrayal by their fellow Slavs of the Croatian Ustasa regime, and discrimination under President Tito's communist government (Bassiouni 1994).
EU Influence and The Politics of Memory: Bombs and Bills Damage Roadblock of Authoritarianism

Similarly to Croatia, the Milosevic regime has been classed as authoritarian by many observers (Hall 1999; Pribicevic 2008; Judah 2009), which is a roadblock to developing closer relations with the EU. For example, Serbian opposition parties complained about the election process; the rules for candidates, the level of media access, the actual conduct of elections, and the overall treatment of opposition leaders (Hall 1999, 242). Furthermore, many opponents of the Milosevic regime did not survive assassination attempts. By the time the Kosovo crisis had escalated, the public became disenchanted with the manipulation and bias of the state media (Judah 2009, 308). It was only the gravity of the NATO bombings as a result of the conflict in 1999 that brought home the reality of war, shocking Serbian society (Judah 2009, 338).

As discussed in the previous chapter, the presence of an authoritarian regime is less likely to enact the politics of memory and come to terms with the “truthful” past (Langenbacher 2010). The man who held the most power in Yugoslavia was also the primary constructor of narratives and perceptions of the past, but to many international observers, he was to blame for Yugoslavia’s disintegration (Silber & Little 1995; Thornett & Ryan 2006; CNN World 2006). Yet, unlike Croatia, where death made way for a reformist government, it was the West’s financial rewards offered to Serbia for ousting him that enabled change. A Serbian politician at the time, Maja Tasic, blatantly said that, until then, the Americans had bombed them with bombs; “now we are going to be bombed with money” (Judah 2009, 339). The US spent 77 million dollars, and the EC spent 8.8 million euros in heating fuel during the winter to opposition-controlled municipalities (Judah 2009, 340). When Milosevic called for early presidential elections in October 2000, Vojislav Kostunica ran against Milosevic, and he was successful, with 50.24 per cent of citizens voting for him (Judah 2009, 343). When
Milosevic refused to accept the result, massive protests organised by Zoran Djindjic, who would soon become Prime Minister, finally led to Milosevic’s defeat on 5 October 2000. As long as the biggest “old regime spoiler” was still in power, alternative discourses that risked criminalising the past and the regime could not emerge.

2001-2008: The Turbulent Ride Consolidating Democracy

*Remembering the Yugoslav War: Confronting Conspiracies, Milosevic and Kosovo*

There was a radical change in the official discourse over what happened in the Yugoslav War with the arrival of Zoran Djindjic as Prime Minister. He was not publicly popular like the new Yugoslav President, Vojislav Kostunica, yet, he did not rely on popularity to initiate reforms. His rhetoric resembled a motivational speaker who talked directly into the problems facing Serbian society. He often used the nouns “reforms” and “future,” and he did not frame his speeches in a historical continuum like Milosevic. Rather, he tried to break from the past to focus on the present and future, making him a pragmatist. He was against nostalgia for the former regimes, and he tried to inspire a change in the Serbian mentality of defeatism and victimhood. During a political tour, Djindjic (2002) addressed the idea of a global conspiracy against Serbia, calling it “nonsense.”

Djindjic (2002) also tried to change domestic past perceptions concerning the Yugoslav War and who was to blame for it:

> From my historical experience I can tell you that the 90s will never happen again. We are ten years older, poorer and more ruined and that is the price of our stupidity and irresponsibility [...] We paid the price of being infatuated in 89’ by that man, believing that he was to be the one to take us to the future, that he was the best among us. We paid a price for that.

This discourse does not contain any justification of a “Greater Yugoslavia” nor an assigning of blame to the West. Rather, Djindjic was able to agree with Western commentators (Silber &
Little 1995; Thornett & Ryan 2006; CNN World 2006), who saw Milosevic as the architect of the break-up—which is, on its own, a discourse of individualisation. Djindjic was assassinated in 2003 by the Zemun Gang, and in response to his death, a documentary of his speeches was compiled and distributed, titled, “If Serbia Stops” (Ako Srbija stane), which purposed to make sure Serbia would continue reforms and move towards Europe in a speedy and pragmatic fashion. Yet, the ideal, in some ways, died with him.

A discourse that did not change regardless of which party was in power in this period was that over the status of Kosovo. Kostunica (2008) addressed Kosovo’s independence on Statehood Day, where he asked:

What is Kosovo? Where is Kosovo? Whose is Kosovo? Is there anyone among us who is not from Kosovo? Is there anyone among us who thinks that Kosovo does not belong to us? Kosovo—that’s Serbia’s first name. Kosovo belongs to Serbia. Kosovo belongs to the Serbian people. That is how it has been forever. There is no force, no threat, and no punishment big and hideous enough for any Serb, at any time, to say anything different but Kosovo is Serbia!

The use of the phrase “Kosovo is Serbia” is similar to that of Milosevic’s rhetoric a decade earlier. In this sense, Serbian identity and collective memory over Kosovo can be understood as fixed in this period, in keeping with the narrative that separatist terrorist movements should not be rewarded with independence by the international community (Judah 2009, 358). Additionally, countries that did not accept Kosovo’s independence, such as Russia, questioned where the line would be drawn for other volatile regions, citing the example of Georgia, Spain and other areas (Judah 2009, 358).

**War Generals, the ICTY and Official Commemorations: Serbia as Victim and Perpetrator**

The arrest and extradition of Slobodan Milosevic in 2001 became a measurable indicator to the EU that Serbia had begun to deal with its past. Although, for the Serbian public, it was viewed as more of a business transaction than a matter of justice because the government acted for the sake of prestige, for avoiding the consequences of more sanctions, for the future
of their children, and, most importantly, for financial aid. Some members of the government said bluntly, “We wanted American money, we wanted EU money,” (Subotic 2009, 46-47). Djindjic himself explained his motives behind why he went against the Constitutional Court and Kostunica (as he wanted to offer Milosevic amnesty) to arrest him:

[Milosevic] had to end up in The Hague because it was inevitable. If he had not, he would have been tried in the [national] court and acquitted; and the court would have had me sentenced and put to jail, the same court operating presently. There was no chance whatsoever for us to stand up proud before the world and say: we will try him in our country and we will do that, we are proud people. No, we could have only embarrassed ourselves and have him acquitted like a hero because of the lack of evidence.

However, Djindjic’s pragmatism did not permeate down to a majority of the population. According to opinion polls, 42 per cent of those asked gave Milosevic five out of five for defending himself at the Hague Tribunal (Ash 2002). Furthermore, more than two-thirds said the tribunal was biased against Serbia, and more than half could not—or would not—name a single place where Serbs committed war crimes (Ash 2002). According to commentator Timothy Garton Ash (2002), “This is a nation in denial, locked in a narrative of its own victimhood.” Sabrina Ramet (2007) diagnoses Serbian political culture as having a “denial syndrome” because of an unwillingness to confront the role played by Serbia as the primary aggressor in the 1990s. Instead, blame is shifted onto non-Serbs, while victimised heroes are exalted, like Karadzic and Mladic (Kajfes 2011).

Djindjic also challenged Serbia’s incomplete compliance with the ICTY with figurative language to better relate to politically interested Serbian public:

There are certain conditions and standards that in cooperation with the international community we have to follow the same way we have to pay tolls at the highway. Otherwise we have to use the local road. One of those conditions is to cooperate with The Hague Tribunal. Not because someone particularly likes that Tribunal, not because that tribunal is just or not, but simply because that is one of the conditions that all the countries, wishing to become a part of the club, will have to fulfil [...].
This discourse demonstrates how the acceptance of the authority of the ICTY is the first step towards joining “club” Europe (the EU). However, because the motivation to comply is predominantly financial, the discourse lacks the rhetoric of transitional justice.

Much like the effect of the ICTY victim-perpetrator counter-narrative in Croatia, domestic transitional justice mechanisms were biased in Serbia. For example, the Serbian Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established in 2002 but it was disbanded after one year (USIP 2011). It had a poor composition because Kostunica appointed mostly nationalist conservative academics who held a strongly pro-Serbian interpretation of the wars, and an anti-internationalist inclination (Subotic 2009, 54). The commission’s mandate was to create a comprehensive historical narrative of how the former Yugoslavia had broken up and who was to blame rather than doing the practical work of truth commissions—to conduct hearings with witnesses and survivors of human rights abuses (Subotic 2009, 54-55). Clearly, Kostunica felt threatened by the ICTY’s role as historian, as he claimed, “History is being written in the Hague […] and the Serbs must intervene to make sure it is written right,” (Ash 2002).

Later in the period, the EU’s issue-linkage with the ICTY did affect past perceptions in Serbia, at least at an official level, through video footage that exposed Serbian war criminals. The Srebrenica Tape was shown during the cross-examination of former Serbian assistant interior minister Obrad Stevanovic in 2005, who testified in Slobodan Milosevic’s defence case at the Hague. The tape documented the execution of six Bosniak men by members of a notorious paramilitary unit who operated under the control of the Serbian secret service (Uzelac 2005). Later that evening, a number of Serbian TV stations rebroadcast the tape, which shocked Serbian society, and it had a number of aftereffects (Uzelac 2005). First, it improved Serbia’s reputation as international praise was given to Serbia for their
immediate reaction to this incident when they arrested the perpetrators involved in the crime (Subotic 2009, 63). Second, the footage challenged the narrative of the Bosnian War being a “civil war” because it was one of the more significant pieces of evidence proving Belgrade’s direct involvement in the Srebrenica massacres (Uzelac 2005). Third, the discourse of individualisation of crimes emerged, as the Serbian defence minister stated that, “The entire case indicates only the responsibility of individuals and not the people and the state” (Subotic 2009, 64). In wider society, however, only 32 per cent of citizens thought the video was authentic, and for those who actually saw it, only 45 per cent believed its authenticity. Arguably, some Serbs interpreted the tape as another way to destroy Serbia’s reputation and make them feel collective guilt (Subotic 2009, 64).

Therefore, collective memory did not truly acknowledge errors done by Serbs, making commemorations one-sided. The sites of commemoration relevant to Serbia are mostly situated within Bosnia, particularly at Srebrenica, and the neighbouring village of Bratunac—the location where crimes committed by Bosniak forces against Serb civilians and soldiers took place. For example, after the release of the Srebrenica Tape, the Srebrenica ceremony was only broadcast on a liberal TV network, whereas the Serb ceremony at Bratunac received blanket coverage over the Serbian media (Subotic 2009, 66). The newspapers inflated the number of Serb victims and included multiple historical inaccuracies and exaggerations of events during the Bosnian War (Subotic 2009, 66). However, new president, Boris Tadic, apologised to Srebrenica victims when he attended the 2005 commemoration there (AFP 2012), which was definitely a clear sign of fostering reconciliation in the region.

EU Influence and the Politics of Memory: Rewards Produce Results
Relations between the EU and Serbia had improved slowly with the democratic transition in 2000, but with the death of Milosevic during his trial in 2006, along with Serbia’s failure to locate and extradite Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, EU negotiations over Serbia’s accession were brought to a halt. The following year, relations improved (See Appendix 4, Period Two), but when Kosovo declared independence in early 2008, the government collapsed, provoking an early election (Judah 2009, 360). It was the rivalry between nationalist Kostunica, who outright wanted to abandon EU progress because many of its members recognised Kosovo, and reformist Tadic, who agreed that the EU was in the best interest of all Serbs. Interestingly, the EU was sensitive to this situation, as they wanted to ensure a united pro-EU government was elected. Therefore, the EU made a political move by signing the SAA with Serbia in April 2008 (See Appendix 4, Period Two). The successful pro-EU elected government quickly improved cooperation with the ICTY, surprising the international community and the Tribunal itself when Karadzic was arrested in Belgrade in July 2008.

Overall, this period encapsulates how official discourse changed concerning the start of the Yugoslav War, who was responsible for it, why viewing Bosnia as a “civil war” was no longer feasible, and why cooperation with the ICTY was needed. However, the numerous examples given in this period suggest that the politics of memory in Serbia was not as deep because reformist discourse and actions did not socialise wider society away from the nationalistic discourse of the Milosevic regime. Therefore, a comprehensive and cohesive facing of the past did not emerge, but a turbulent ride in consolidating democracy and reforms.

2009-2012: Lone Serbia Moving Forward
Remembering the Yugoslav War: Memorialising Srebrenica

Given Serbia’s ties with the EU were finally strengthening because of the election of a pro-EU government (See Appendix 4, Period Three), would Serbian past perceptions differ from the previous two periods where the politics of memory was non-existent or shallow? Analysing the narrative of the Yugoslav War, it has evidently undergone change across the four elements studied throughout this chapter. First, borrowing from David Binder’s (2009, 40) journal article title, it appears “Greater” has “vanished from the Balkan vocabulary,” or at least the Serbian vocabulary. Binder (2009, 47) claims that today, mention of a Greater Serbia is restricted to the chambers of the ICTY.

Following on from the discourse in Period Two, Serbian official discourse does not blame the West, nor consider Bosnia a “civil war.” These refined perceptions of the past are implied within the Serbian Parliament’s (2010) Declaration on Srebrenica—the official state apology to the Bosniak victims of the massacre. Yet, replacing the “civil war” discourse is Serbia’s conundrum over whether to acknowledge Srebrenica as an act of “genocide” or not. The fifth paragraph of the Declaration stipulates that its understanding of the event comes in line with the ruling of the ICJ in 2007, which defined the massacre as genocide. However, the term “genocide” is not used to describe the event in this Declaration, and neither is the phrase “war crime” used. Not using the term genocide can be seen as a way to avoid facing the truth about Srebrenica. What the Declaration (Serbian Parliament 2010) does offer is an acknowledgement of all victims of Yugoslavia’s violent disintegration and an apology to victims of Srebrenica specifically:

The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia most severely condemns the crime committed against the Bosniak population in Srebrenica in July 1995 in the manner established by the ruling of the International Court of Justice […] extending on the occasion condolences and apologies to the families of the victims that everything possible had not been done to prevent the tragedy.
Alternatively, these paragraphs can be seen as working to clear the Serbs’ name and reputation, particularly with the phrase, “Everything possible had not been done to prevent the tragedy.” This is consistent with the ruling of the ICJ—which found that Serbia was not directly responsible for the genocide in Bosnia, but it was responsible for not preventing the atrocity. This ruling makes it difficult to charge any Serbian war criminal with genocide in the domestic War Crimes Chambers (Subotic 2009, 61). Additionally, a discourse of victimisation still lingers as the government expects that, “The highest authorities of other states on the territory of the former Yugoslavia would also condemn the crimes committed against the members of the Serbian people in this manner” (Serbian Parliament 2010).

However, there have been changes on the level of official discourse regarding the Kosovo conflict, with political elites like Tadic and Vuk Jeremic (Serbia’s former foreign minister under Tadic), omitting the need to frame the Kosovo conflict as one of separatism. However, both agree that, “Serbia is not going to recognise Kosovo’s independence, implicitly or explicitly” (Europe District 2011c; Europe District 2012). Tadic also exclaimed that, “Kosovo is where my nation’s identity lies, where the roots of our culture are […]. Kosovo is the foundation of Serbia’s history and this is why we cannot give it up,” (Subotic 2011, 325). Only one party, Cedomir Jovanovic’s Liberal Democratic Party, argued that Serbia should recognise Kosovo and move toward EU membership by fighting domestic corruption. Nevertheless, in this period, relations with Kosovo improved, allowing Serbia to attain EU candidature in 2012 (See Appendix 4, Period Three).

War Generals, the ICTY and Official Commemorations: The Mladic Factor

In this period, the expectation of arresting Serbia’s remaining war generals was high, particularly Ratko Mladic, indicted by the Hague Tribunal in 1995 for crimes against humanity, violation of the laws or customs of war, and the genocide of around 8,000 Bosniak
men and boys at Srebrenica (ICTY 2012b). As long as Mladic was at large, he took hostage the future of Serbia’s European integration (Subotic 2009, 77). However, he was finally arrested in May 2011, on the same day that the EU’s foreign policy chief was in Belgrade to discuss Serbia’s application for EU membership (Woodsome 2011). In response to the timely arrest—which also came off the back of pressure from the ICTY prosecutor to develop a more rigorous approach to finding Mladic—Tadic said:

We are not making calculations when and how to deliver […] We are doing that because we truly believe this is in accordance with our law. This is because of our people, Serbs. This is because of moral dignity of our country and our people. But this is crucially important in terms of reconciliation between people that are living in the region of southeast Europe’s former Yugoslavia.

Tadic attempts to explain the motive of capturing Mladic as one of “moral dignity” rather than appeasing the international community, which demonstrates that Serbia can fulfil conditionality criteria without “rewards” that stem from it, whether the arrest was timely or not. This notion has been replaced by transitional justice rhetoric emphasising “reconciliation,” which is different from Djindjic’s financial and somewhat selfish motives for arresting Milosevic. Even though the handing over of indicted war generals is a polarising issue in Serbian society, scholar Ker-Lindsay, claims, “It’s not about forgetting what took place in Bosnia or, indeed, the entire Western Balkans in the 1990s […] but it’s about recognising that Serbia’s got to atone for this, pay its price and move on. And people understand that Mladic is absolutely central to that process” (Woodsome 2011). The arrest of Ratko Mladic can be seen as a measurable indicator both of Serbia’s seriousness in confronting the past, but it will also improve Serbia’s international reputation and invite the international community’s support in its reconciliation process (Woodsome 2011).

Serbian society has replaced a discourse of ICTY bias with cynicism, because, according to new President Nikolic, the realisation that the Serbs “lost the war” explained why there were more Serbs than other ethnicities facing charges from the ICTY (Borger 2012).
Nikolic did however say, “There are fewer members of other nations and their sentences are somewhat milder. So the Serb people tend to believe that justice is not equal for everyone. But we have accepted the jurisdiction of the Hague Tribunal and we therefore accept its judgements” (Borger 2012). This coming to terms with the rules of the game, knowing that Serbia’s future is most likely within the EU, shows that Serbia, though polarised, can change their domestic perceptions of the past, even if all that encompasses at this point is the arrest of Mladic and a political maturity in accepting that his fate is a legal matter.

The role of non-judicial transitional justice mechanisms, like apologies, was utilised by Tadic to foster reconciliation in the region, and demonstrates the change in the perceptions of the past coming from the top—the leader of Serbia. For example, in July 2010, Tadic again visited Bosnia to appear at a commemoration of the fifteenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre. In November of the same year, Tadic extended a personal apology to the 260 Croatian victims during the 1991 three-month siege of the Croatian town of Vukovar. Whether these positive official commemorations have indeed transcended into the minds of the general public is out of the scope of this thesis, but a change above, could indicate a process of top-down shifting of past perceptions in postwar Serbia.

EU Influence and the Politics of Memory: Balancing Europeanisation and Nationalism

Kajfes (2011) described the period of Tadic’s presidency as one of a balancing act between Europeanisation and nationalism. On Europe District (2011a), Tadic was adamant about where the future of Serbia lies:

But for Serbia, it’s very important to go towards the European Union. For Serbia, it’s very important to solve all the conflicts that exist in the Balkans. For Serbia, it’s very important to create peaceful policies, to create a different image, taking into consideration what happened in the past.

Tadic is aware of the negative stereotypes that Serbia has been given because of their recent past, but unlike Milosevic, whose rhetoric was defensive, Tadic’s rhetoric is active, in that he
recognises it is the responsibility of Serbia to actively change that reputation. One way this is occurring is through the National Tourism Organisation of Serbia (2011), which released a campaign last year entitled “SoulFood Serbia” that presented Serbian gastronomic products as an essential part of the country’s tourism offer, reminiscent of the appeal for France for many tourists. The video version even uses French words such as “bon appétit” and “bon voyage.” Interestingly, the EC’s (2012a) video campaign, “So similar, so different, so European,” has also compared Serbia to France with footage of two young women—one wearing a beret—exiting a patisserie onto a street likened to the architecture of Paris. Reasons for this comparison may stem from the fact that France, unlike Germany, was initially in favour of a combined Yugoslavia, alluding to some sort of affinity between these two states. These videos illustrate that both Serbia and the EU are beginning to highlight Serbia’s European identity through comparison.

However, the recent rise of far-right nationalists, hooliganism, homophobia, and anti-Europeanism threatens further EU progress. Groups like the SNP 1389 (the year of the Battle of Kosovo) display allegiance to Mladic and rally support to enter into the political mainstream. Additionally, Tadic was defeated by Tomislav Nikolic at the Presidential elections in May 2012, with many observers doubting Nikolic’s sincerity in re-branding himself as pro-EU, considering he used to be famous for his anti-Western rhetoric (Europe District 2012). Nikolic, from the SNS, formed a coalition with Kostunica’s party, the DSS, who are deeply held euroskeptics. He also said that Kosovo Serbs are under the threat of “genocide”—a term likened to the rhetoric of Milosevic. Overall, Serbia has engaged in the politics of memory most successfully in this period, through the presence of a united pro-EU government that has forged closer relations with the EU. Yet it is only at the beginning of the process of normalising its identity away from the legacy of war.
Conclusion

This study has shown that domestic perceptions of the Serbian past have undergone slow change over time. In the first period studied, the government’s nationalistic and autocratic regime emphasised Serbia purely as a “victim” of a global conspiracy against Serbs, of the West’s premature involvement in the Yugoslav War, and of separatist terrorists in Kosovo. This proved to be a roadblock for a true confrontation of the past that was only defeated by an internationally financed opposition. It was not until Serbia’s democratic transition, explored in the second period of this study, that a new discourse emerged which blamed Milosevic for the demise of Serbia, and where ICTY co-operation could be justified, at least for financial reasons. In the final period studied, it was argued that the politics of memory was more successful than in the second period, as effort was continued by pro-EU politicians to formally condemn war crimes committed by Serbs. These results have been achieved primarily through the arrests of Milosevic and Mladic, making then measurable indicators to the EU that Serbia was coming to terms with their past.

However, the politics of memory in postwar Serbia has been perplexed because nationalist discourse has lingered in the public consciousness more so than reformist discourse. This has meant that, although past perceptions have changed within each period to question the pure victimisation of Serbs in the War, it has not been forgotten. Serbia has only just become an official EU candidate country, and no dates for accession negotiations have been set. The new leadership pair who were former ultra-nationalists, Tomislav Nikolic and Ivica Dacic, may threaten the normalisation the Serbia’s identity, and its future in Europe. “If Serbia stops”, it could be many years before Serbia can truly “atone for this [their role in the Yugoslav War], pay its price, and move on,” (Woodsome 2011). The impact of a nationalist government on EU influence in domestic past perceptions in Serbia is a welcomed extension for future research which could demonstrate whether Serbia moved quickly
towards the EU, or whether it slowed in pace; whether its relationship with Kosovo improved or worsened; and whether these factors changed past perceptions beyond the progress made by Tadic, or whether they reverted to Milosevic-era rhetoric.
Chapter Four

The Pilgrims’ Progress: Croatia and Serbia In A Comparative Perspective

This chapter assesses the similarities and differences between the politics of memory in postwar Croatia and Serbia. Concerning similarities, it argues that the desire to enter the EU has enacted the politics of memory in both states. This is evident through narrative change and improved EU relations. Concerning differences, it argues that Croatia has engaged more deeply in the politics of memory than Serbia, primarily because Serbia was unable to extradite its war criminals at the pace of Croatia. The chapter gives four reasons why this was the case: differences concerning regime transition type, old regime spoilers, the prevalence of a discourse of victimisation, and greater contest at the elite level.

Similarities in The Politics of Memory of Postwar Croatia and Serbia

Narrative Change

Chapters Two and Three have clearly shown that, in Croatia and Serbia, narratives have been tailored in light of the desire for EU entry. More specifically, though, there are three similarities in the way change was effectuated: the removal of authoritarian leaders, the use of strategic discourse, and the transformation of national identity. First, the removal of authoritarian leaders was the catalyst for confronting the past in both states. Political elites are masterminds of memory for the nation-state, and the type of regime they institute will determine what is remembered and what is forgotten. For example, at the end of the Bosnian and Croatian Wars, both states experienced authoritarianism, censorship and widespread corruption. In this environment, Tudjman and Milosevic could disseminate nationalistic
discourse and myths defending the honour of the states they were representing without challenge. Consequently, the prevalent narrative in both states was victimisation (See Appendix 5; p. 25, 43). When both states were rid of these leaders, alternative discourses could emerge that made enacting the politics of memory possible. This is because, in contrast to Tudjman and Milosevic, the democratic governments of Racan, Sanadar, and Mesic in Croatia, and Djindjic, Tadic and Cvetkovic in Serbia, possessed the legitimacy that is so central to creating an environment of transparency (Langenbacher 2010, 36), and importantly, they were responsive to EU conditionality criteria. Therefore, the discourses of victimisation gradually evolved into individualisation and Europeanisation.

Second, the use of strategic discourse enabled new governments to attain positions that were more widely accepted in the sight of the EU (which will be discussed on p. 60), without criminalising the past per se. For example, the discourse of individualisation of war crimes was a successful strategy, because it enabled cooperation with the ICTY and appeased nationalists at the same time (See Appendix 5; p. 29). It meant that the state could be absolved of blame for the wars, preserving its integrity and legitimacy (See p. 49). Furthermore, ICTY compliance in Croatia and Serbia, when it was unpopular, was framed in economic terms (See pp. 30, 47-48). Economic incentives led to creating the option of “voluntary surrender” for war generals. In Croatia, before the arrest of Gotovina, talks occurred suggesting the government had pledged full assistance and support for the general’s defence in the Hague if he surrendered voluntarily (Hedl 2005). Likewise, Serbian law stipulated that the government would guarantee voluntarily surrendered suspects the right to return to Serbia from The Hague while on bail, while their families received financial assistance (Subotic 2011, 323). Importantly, voluntary surrender was framed as a patriotic duty to the homeland in Serbia, as once voluntarily surrendered, most indictees were
congratulated by the elites given what they were doing was for the national interest (Subotic 2009).

Third, the transformation of national identity saw both states, in some ways, “Europeanise.” For example, in Period Three of both states’ history (See Appendix 5), both nations’ elites emphasised a clear EU direction for the future. This was reflected in both states’ tourism videos, and incidentally, this commitment was mirrored by the EC’s media and communications video clip comparing Croatia and Serbia with members of the EU, (See pp. 37-38, 55). These comparisons staple the Western Balkan identity within what many would consider to be mainstream “Europe.” This effort by the EU is vital to keep the appeal and desirability for EU membership thriving in these states.

**Improved EU Relations**

The tailored narratives have given Croatia and Serbia positions that are more acceptable in the sight of the EU. This is evidenced in three ways: The first is the arrest of war criminals, which are signposts, or measurable indicators to the EU that a society is coming to terms with its past (See pp. 46, 53). All Croatian and Serbian ICTY indictees have now been arrested, which fulfils the political criteria of EU conditionality. Second, the improvement in regional cooperation and efforts at reconciliation, as another feature of the EU’s conditionality criteria, has also propelled relations between the states and the EU. Additionally, the language of transitional justice appears in the discourse of both states (See pp. 30, 36, 53, 54), and points to a real outworking of the politics of memory, further demonstrating the change in discourse from the authoritarian era in both states.

The most obvious feature of improved EU relations is the change in EU trajectory in both states. From 2000 to 2012, Croatia went from a potential candidate country to an acceding country, and Serbia went from a potential candidate to an official candidate
Therefore, when comparing narrative change with EU trajectory, it can be concluded that the deeper the politics of memory, the closer the relations with the EU. Furthermore, the depth of the politics of memory enacted in a country is determined by how strong the desire to enter the EU is in the first place.

**Differences in the Politics of Memory of Postwar Croatia & Serbia**

**Regime Transition**

The differences in the dynamics of the process of regime transition can account for why Serbia was unable to extradite their war criminals at the pace of Croatia. These dynamics are overlapping yet twofold: the fact that Tudjman died but Milosevic was ousted, and the level of involvement by the West in Serbia compared to Croatia. In the first case, transitional justice theorists (Barahona de Brito 2001, 11-14) cite three different types of transitions that shift a non-democratic regime type to a democratic one:

(a) Transition by rupture, which occurs after foreign intervention, and gives total victory to the occupying forces. Ruptures can also occur when there is a revolution or civil war, a loss of legitimacy or key power and ideological resources. In some cases, defeat is partial or temporary.

(b) Transition by reform, which entails a balance of power between the old and new elite.

(c) Transition by extrication, whereby pacts are made that produce rewards if upheld.

What these scholars do not take into account are the “natural” ruptures of death of elites that can incite change in the political environment. This was the cause of transition change in Croatia when Tudjman passed away in December 1999, and left no successor comparable to himself, politically and ideologically, to continue his authoritarian regime. Although, the HDZ had already lost legitimacy in the minds of the people due to corruption and subsequent poor economic performance around the same time. Nevertheless, this sufficient rupture occurred in Croatia without intervention from external actors like the EU or the US.
Therefore, the defeat of the old regime was more complete, opening up the past and establishing truth and justice policies more quickly.

In Serbia, like the HDZ, SPS was losing legitimacy due to political and economic corruption, although Milosevic, the most powerful man in Yugoslavia, continued to be supported by a majority of the public. As a result, it took the Serbian opposition a long time to mobilise successfully to win the next elections. However, unlike Croatia, the Serbian opposition was financed by the international community (See p. 44). Offered to a war-torn, impoverished state, extrication on part of the West effectively incited a revolution to oust Milosevic. Moreover, the West’s focus on the situation in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 may have detracted Western observers from Croatia. Political pressure was also exerted on the Tudjman government to fulfil Croatia’s international obligations, (Kearns 1998, 248), but it did not compare to the West’s strategy towards Serbia—political pressure plus economic sanctions and NATO bombing raids.

The argument that can be put forward is that a transition by rupture institutes a pattern whereby constant pressure would have to be exacted upon Serbia by the EU to get Serbia to come to terms with its past and redress past atrocities. For example, negotiations into Serbia signing the SAA were postponed in 2006 for over a year because cooperation with the ICTY had not been improved. Interestingly, the EU used this tactic on Croatia in 2005, but instead of the SAA, it was negotiations for accession. Why did this tactic of withholding EU progress occur at different stages in Croatia and Serbia’s EU trajectory? Moreover, why did Croatia, contrary to popular assumptions, receive candidacy a year before the arrest of Ante Gotovina, while Serbia did not receive candidacy until after the arrest of Mladic? To answer these questions, it is important to remember that both Croatia and Serbia displayed incomplete compliance to the ICTY at various stages for reasons that cannot be elaborated
upon here but which many studies have explored (Freyburg and Richter 2010; Ozegovic 2012). The EU requested “full co-operation” with the ICTY from both states, which did not mean the countries had to arrest all the indictees at once, but they needed to offer proof that sufficient effort was being made to make arrests. This sufficient effort was clearly lacking in Serbia for a lot longer than in Croatia which explains why withholding EU progress occurred in different stages in Croatia and Serbia’s EU trajectory.

Concerning the question about candidacy, theoretically, the case of Croatia proves that the arrest of war criminals is only necessary before accession negotiations. Yet, two reasons may be offered for the difference between the states in this area: first, the Karadzic and Mladic indictments, who are currently being tried for genocide, are more serious than Gotovina’s conviction, which amounted to crimes against humanity. Genocide is the more serious crime because of its specific “intent to destroy” a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, in whole or in part, which is not the intent of a perpetrator of a crime against humanity (Aydin n.d., 7). Second, because indictments against Serbs are more serious than Croats, and because Serb indictments are more numerous than Croats, it cannot be ignored that Serbia does hold a reputation as the aggressor in the Yugoslav War. Therefore, the EU put more pressure on Serbia to arrest all war criminals before candidacy, whereas, in Croatia, this pressure was not attached to the extradition of war criminals. As the Serbian political elites and public denied the seriousness of the crimes committed by Serbs for a longer period, this can explain why the EU had to continue exerting more pressure on Serbia, and in turn, prolonged arresting these criminals, creating a cycle of resistance.

**Old Regime Spoilers**

The presence of old regime spoilers in the government of Serbia until 2008 furthermore accounts for Serbia’s inability to extradite Karadzic and Mladic earlier. According to Subotic
(2009, 69), Kostunica instrumentalised the old regime so that they would not stage a coup, and so they remained in the military, police, and secret service. For example, at the arrest of Mladic, Tadic said there would be an independent investigation concerning why it took so long to locate him, but it seems unlikely that the military was unaware of his, and Karadzic’s whereabouts—at least early in their indictment periods where Mladic was said to walk about freely in a small Serbian town. The conundrum in Serbia was, “Who does the arresting, and who does the investigating? Who are the agents of justice” (Subotic 2009, 69)? In contrast, Croatia’s Stipe Mesic retired war generals when they stepped out of line with the new reformist government (Steele 2000). Consequently, the old regime loyalists in Croatia remained vocally present but politically marginalised (Subotic 2009, 112).

Discourse of Victimisation

The prevalence of a discourse of victimisation can also account for why Serbia was unable to extradite their war criminals at the pace of Croatia. The prevalence of this discourse comes down to the strength of nationalist parties in Serbia in comparison to Croatia, because nationalist parties typically ignored Serbian fault in the War. With no desire to confront the past, the incentive to arrest war criminals was low. This explains why the EU offered the carrot of SAA membership before the elections in 2008—to incite the election of a pro-EU, reformist president and prime minister (which is explained in more depth in the next section; See p. 50), to oust Kostunica’s nationalist DSS. Although, the EU was sensitive to Croatia’s domestic political climate as well, but it only intervened to help the already reformist government appease nationalists (See p. 30). This feature of Serbian domestic politics mirrors a wider trend within European politics, where far-right parties (like the Front Nationale in France and the Lega Nord in Italy) make euro-skepticism a policy position along with patriotism and xenophobia. This is why commentators question new President Nikolic and
the genuineness of his pro-EU stance, because he refuses to confirm whether he would have handed over Karadzic or Mladic (Borger 2012).

The Kosovo issue is also important for the continuing strength of nationalist parties in Serbia. There is no such issue comparable in Croatia after the retrieval of Knin in 1995, which was testament to how sites of memory can underpin the national narrative (See p. 24). For Serbia, the “myth of Kosovo” effectively perpetuates victimisation discourse because it paints Serbia as an innocent nation who chose moral purity over military victory after defeat in the 1389 “Battle of Kosovo” against the Ottoman Turks (Anzulovic 1999). According to Mertus (2006), during the prime of Slobodan Milosevic’s political career, Kosovo became the single most important myth informing Serbian collective memory, and it remains the single most important myth determining the future direction of the Serbian nation-state (Mertus 2006). While the discourse on Kosovo by Serbian elites has not changed drastically (See p. 52), it is now balanced with a desire for EU membership more strongly than when Mertus’ article was written. Nevertheless, the politics of memory will need to penetrate both the political elite and the public consciousness deeper before Serbia accedes into the EU.

Contest at the Elite Level

The contest between reformist and nationalist elites was a lot more fierce in Serbia’s parliamentary republic than in Croatia’s, which meant that it was more difficult to arrest war criminals. The first contest was between Prime Minister Djindjic and President Kostunica. The Milosevic regime left Serbia ruined, particularly economically, with a reputation as an international pariah, and with the burden of constantly having to deal with the legacies of the Milosevic years (Judah 2009, 348). These included constant pressure from the EU and the ICTY, the status of Kosovo, the union with Montenegro, and how to purge the Serbian
system of Milosevic loyalists, which exacerbated the political stand-off between Djindjic and Kostunica—who disagreed on all the aforementioned matters (Judah 2009, 348).

Later in this period, Prime Minister Kostunica and President Tadic’s ideologies concerning the future of Serbia—and indeed the desire for EU entry—clashed with the independence of Kosovo in 2008, provoking the collapse of the government. During their election campaigns, Tadic said EU integration was in the best interests of the Serbian people to continue the Battle of Kosovo, whilst Kostunica wanted Serbia to abandon its ambition to join the EU at least while most of its members recognised Kosovo, (Judah 2009, 360). He pointed colleagues to the fact that Mikhail Saakashvili’s Georgia was being backed by the US as a way of pursuing American interests in the Caucasus, and that Serbia could do likewise for Russia in Europe (Judah 2009, 360). With added EU support through the signing of the SAA earlier that year, the election of the reformist government of Tadic and Cvetkovic occurred. There was no contest at the elite level, which made enacting the politics of memory more successful in Serbia (See p. 55), and eventually led to the arrest of both Karadzic and Mladic—measurable indicators to the EU that Serbia was coming to terms with its past. This is no coincidence, as the whole thesis has pointed to the fact that the desire for EU entry was the catalyst for enacting the politics of memory in postwar Croatia and Serbia.

**Conclusion**

This study has shown that Croatian and Serbian domestic perceptions of the past have undergone change. This change is a result of the removal of authoritarian elites, the wielding of strategic discourse and the transformation of national identity. Narrative change brought about an improved position in the sight of the EU involving transitional justice mechanisms, and an improved EU trajectory, confirming that indirect EU influence enacted the politics of memory in these states.
However, over time, Croatia managed to engage more deeply in the politics of memory than Serbia, which is evidenced by Croatia’s acceding status in comparison to Serbia’s recent official candidate status. The reasons for this difference lie in answering the question of why Serbia was unable to arrest its war criminals at the pace of Croatia. The first reason given suggested that Serbia’s regime transition type instituted a pattern of EU political pressure and resistance, whereas Croatia had a more thorough transition from authoritarianism, putting less pressure on the government. Second, Serbia did not prioritise the removal of “old regime spoilers,” unlike Croatia, who effectively mitigated the threat they posed. Third, a prevalent discourse of victimisation made the incentive to arrest war criminals low due to the strength of nationalist parties and the issue of Kosovo. Finally, contest at the elite level in Serbian politics meant Serbia was not able to fully commit to Europe until 2008, which allowed for a confrontation of the past indicated by the eventual arrest of Karadzic and Mladic. Overall, the long process towards the EU is a pilgrimage, and the EU has indirectly influenced these nation-states to open up their past through a desire for EU membership.
Conclusion

Given the recent nature of the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia, along with the prospect of EU membership and its subsequent conditionality criteria, Croatia and Serbia have entered into a period of post-authoritarian social memory-making called “the politics of memory.” Using this concept, this thesis has argued that Croatia and Serbia’s desire for EU membership has affected their domestic perceptions of the past, particularly in how narratives of the Yugoslav War have been tailored in light of the desire for entry.

The narrative of the Homeland War in Croatia has been reconstructed across several issues. Originally, the Tudjman regime portrayed a purely defensive war against “chetnik anti-Croatianism.” In Period Two, the Homeland War was still defensive in nature, but it was fought against the less pejorative “great Serb aggressors.” In the most recent period of the Croatian narrative, the war was conceded to be a “last resort offensive” (concerning Storm) against the “Serb paramilitaries and the Yugoslav army in Croatia.” Concerning war crimes, the narrative began with no admission that the Croatian army committed atrocities, and cooperation with the ICTY was minimal. In Period Two, the discourse changed to account for the “war crimes” committed by “individuals,” and all those who were indicted were subsequently arrested or voluntarily surrendered to the Hague. Croatians understood that they were victims, but internationally seen also as perpetrators, which somewhat polarised Croatian society. Adding to the discourse of individualisation, the final period acknowledged Serb victims in commemorations. Croatia is able to accept the legal jurisdiction of the ICTY concerning the sentencing of war generals, who are perceived as “distinguished fighters” more than heroes. Overall, Croatian national identity went from not just what it was no longer—Balkan and Yugoslav—but to what it had always been—European—normalising its past and present.
The narrative of the Yugoslav War in Serbia has also been reconstructed across several issues. Milosevic portrayed the government of Serbia as defenders of the territorial sovereignty of “Greater Yugoslavia,” not what he was accused of pursuing—a “Greater Serbia.” The Kosovo Conflict was framed as a problem of separatism, and Kosovo Serbs were victims of a new “Holocaust.” In Periods Two and Three, “Greater” was no longer a part of the Serb vocabulary, and political elites agreed that Milosevic’s flawed political philosophies were to blame for the Yugoslav War. Relations with Kosovo improved slightly, but newly elected nationalist politicians again say Kosovo Serbs are threatened with “genocide.” Regarding war crimes, Milosevic never admitted that Serbia committed atrocities in Bosnia because he framed the Bosnian War as a civil war. War indictees like Karadzic and Mladic were venerated, and the discourse of victimisation proliferated during the 90s. Cooperation with the ICTY was expectantly weak, as the Court was seen as illegitimate and biased against the Serbs. In Period Two, individualisation discourse and economic incentives were used to justify the arrest of Serbs, but denial and victimisation was still strong in the public consciousness. By Period Three, the narrative changed to acknowledge war crimes committed in Bosnia by Serbia, and with a united pro-EU government, Mladic and Karadzic were both arrested, seen as measurable indicators that Serbia was coming to terms with its past. Largely accepting the tribunal’s legal jurisdiction, the discourse of bias had been replaced by cynicism. Overall, Serbia, in many ways deeply European, continued to experience some ambivalence in its identity because of the presence of xenophobia and resentment due to the legacy of Western involvement in the War.

The similarities found concerning narrative change were the removal of authoritarian leaders, strategic discourse, and closer identification with the EU. The thesis has confirmed the theory of transitional justice scholars, that a necessary condition to opening up the past is the removal of authoritarian leadership. Furthermore, Croatia and
Serbia were able to secure positions that were more acceptable in the sight of the EU concerning matters of transitional justice, and as a result, their EU trajectory improved.

However, as this thesis has utilised a prevailing method of difference research design, it has found that the necessary conditions that affect the depth of the politics of memory are regime transition type and the presence of old regime spoilers, which prevented a complete democratic transition in Serbia, along with the perpetuation of a discourse of victimisation, and contest at the elite level. These conditions are overlapping and multifaceted, yet they underscore why the arrest of high-profile war criminals, Karadzic and Mladic, were not conducted at the pace of Croatia. To prove that regime transition type, old regime spoilers, victimisation discourse, and contest at the elite level are sufficient conditions, the examination of other states that have suffered past atrocities is needed, such as Russia, Spain and Argentina, which this thesis recommends as a future research avenue.
Appendix 1

Map of Croatia

N.B. The shaded area belonged to the RSK from 1991-95

Map courtesy of Google Images
Appendix 2

EU-Croatia Relations Timeline (EC 2012c).

Period One: 1995-1999

1997 The EU adopts a Regional Approach to Western Balkan countries
June 1997 The EU decides not to invite Croatia to start membership talks
The reason for no invitation is that they EU was critical of the
Tudjman regime’s authoritarian tendencies.
26 May 1999 The SAP proposed to replace the 1996 Regional Approach

Period Two: 2000-2005

November 2000 Zagreb Summit launches the SAP
29 October 2001 SAA signed
21 February 2003 Croatia applies for EU membership
June 2003 Thessaloniki summit
This confirmed an accession perspective for Western Balkans
countries, including Croatia.
June 2004 European Council confirms Croatia as candidate country
December 2004 European Council sets starting date for negotiations
This date was the 17 March 2005, and it was conditional upon full
coopération with the ICTY.
1 February 2005 Stabilisation and Association Agreement comes into force
16 March 2005 EU postpones start of accession negotiations
These negotiations were postponed due to a lack of cooperation with
the ICTY, but the EU adopts a framework for negotiations with
Croatia nonetheless.
3 October 2005 Croatia is now fully cooperating with the ICTY
The European Council concludes that the last remaining condition
for starting negotiations has been met. Accession negotiations are
launched the same day.
20 October 2005 Beginning of the screening process
Furthermore, an analytical overview and review of the degree of
harmonisation of Croatian legislation with the *acquis communautaire* is made.

Period Three: 2006-2012

October 2006 Screening finalised
November 2006 EU gives Progress Report on Croatia
The EU criticised Croatian institutions and the legal system.
Improvements were needed in the treatment of minorities, and to
tackle the problems of corruption and organised crime.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>EU announced Croatia could possibly accede in 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tougher action against corruption and organised crime needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Slovenia vetoes Croatia EU accession negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A border dispute in Croatia’s region of Istria was the concern.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 2011</td>
<td>The meeting of the Accession Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia at the Ministerial level closed negotiations on the remaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>four chapters of the acquis, thus closing the accession negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with Croatia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 December 2011</td>
<td>European Parliament gave a green light for Croatia’s EU accession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 December 2011</td>
<td>Croatia signs Accession Treaty with the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 January 2012</td>
<td>Referendum on Croatian EU membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66.27 per cent of voters said YES for the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 March 2012</td>
<td>Croatian Parliament Ratifies Croatia’s Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3

Map of FRY

Conflict and Territorial Change in Yugoslavia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>INDEPENDENCE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1991 | Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia | • Ten Day War in Slovenia  
• Croatian War of Independence (1991-95) |
| 1992 | Bosnia-Herzegovina | • Bosnian War (1992-95)  
• SFRY becomes FRY |
| 1995 | | • Dayton Agreement signed to end the War |
| 1998 | | • Kosovo Conflict (1998-99) |
| 2003 | | • FRY replaced by the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro |
| 2006 | Montenegro | • Union becomes Republic of Serbia |
| 2008 | Kosovo | |

Map courtesy of Google Images
Appendix 4

EU-Serbia Relations Timeline (EC 2012b)

Period One: 1995-2000

1997 Regional Approach
The EU Council of Ministers establishes political and economic conditionality for the development of bilateral relations.

1999 The EU proposes SAP

October 2000 Fall of the Milosevic regime
November 2000 Autonomous Trade Preferences from the EU given to Serbia

Period Two: 2001-2008

June 2001 Feira European Council
States that all the SAP countries are “potential candidates” for EU membership.

June 2003 Thessaloniki Summit
The SAP is confirmed as the EU policy for the Western Balkans. The EU perspective for these countries is confirmed.

October 2005 Launching the negotiations for a SAA

3 May 2006 SAA negotiations called off
Serbia failed to locate and extradite Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, the latter who was believed to have been protected by the Serbian military.

13 June 2007 EU resumes SAA negotiations with Serbia
This is providing a clear commitment is made to achieve full cooperation with the ICTY, by searching for Karadzic and Mladic.

1 November 2007 The SAA with Serbia is initialed

17 February 2008 Assembly of Kosovo declares independence

29 April 2008 Serbia and EU sign the SAA and Interim Agreement
The EU said it was done to send a clear message to Serbia that, “We care about them,” and it was successful, as it was a tangible sign to the citizens of Serbia that EU membership was a real possibility in the future, instigating the election of a pro-EU government.

21 July 2008 Arrest of war crime indictee Radovan Karadzic

9 September 2008 SAA and IA ratified by National Assembly of Serbia

Period Three: 2009-2012

22 December 2009 Serbia officially applied for membership in the EU

12 October 2011 EC recommends Serbia to become a candidate country
Serbia will be ready to start accession negotiations as soon as further good progress is made in one key area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 May 2011</td>
<td>Former Bosnian Serb war general Ratko Mladic arrested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 July 2011</td>
<td>Last war general, Croatian Serb Goran Hadzic was arrested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 December 2011</td>
<td>The European Council delays Serbia’s candidacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 2012</td>
<td>The European Council granted Serbia candidate status</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Candidacy came off the back of concessions made concerning telecommunications, electricity and identity documents concerning Kosovo, which reflects the diplomacy that will have to be used if a compromise is to be reached between Belgrade and Pristina in the future.
## Appendix 5

The Change in Official Discourse and EU Status from 1995-2012 in Croatia and Serbia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods in Croatia/Serbia</th>
<th>Croatian Narrative</th>
<th>Serbian Narrative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Accession Status in 2000</td>
<td>Potential Candidate</td>
<td>Potential Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Period 1 until 1999/2000</strong></td>
<td>Victimisation</td>
<td>Victimisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Period 2 until 2005/2008</strong></td>
<td>Economic reasons for compliance and Individualisation</td>
<td>Victimisation, Economic reasons for compliance and Individualisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Period 3 from 2006/2009</strong></td>
<td>Europeanisation and Normalisation</td>
<td>Victimisation, Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present EU Accession Status</td>
<td>Acceding Country</td>
<td>Candidate Country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


