Japan be Number One

Internationalism and History of Japanese Diplomacy, 1853-2006

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Abstract

This thesis engages with two bodies of scholarship: Japanese diplomacy and internationalism. Japan’s interaction with the international community and how it started and developed in the course of history is analysed. It is argued that Japanese leaders had strived to grant Japan a just place in the world. Their path, however, was not a straightforward one. The problems caused by identity issues, a West-centric world order, and the concept of ‘honour’ muddled the Japanese attempt. The words and practices of key figures were examined to illustrate the comprehensive development of Japanese diplomacy and internationalism between 1853 and 2006.
Acknowledgements

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I would also like to thank all of my friends in Australia, China, the Philippines and Japan, for their humour and friendship. To the staff at the Fisher Library, the Law Library, the Wentworth Learning Hub, and the Fisher Coffee Cart, I thank you for your hospitality and assistance.

Last but not the least, my thanks go to my parents (and my brothers) and Man Yan Ma, for their precious caring and support.
### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Afro-Asian</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>ICIC</td>
<td>International Committee on International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEXT</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (of Japan)</td>
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<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>PPC</td>
<td>Paris Peace Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defence Force (of Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAI</td>
<td>International Union of Academics (<em>Union Academique Internationale</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific, Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Operation</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War One</td>
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About Japanese and Chinese Names

I have rendered Japanese and Chinese names in their original style, with the family name preceding the given name – except for the ones in which the Western order is more frequently used in the discipline (e.g. Akira Iriye).

About the Translations

All translations from Japanese primary and secondary sources are my own otherwise footnoted.

Chronological Note

Modern Japanese imperial era names:

Meiji (1868-1912)
Taisho (1912-1926)
Showa (1926-1989)
Heisei (1989-present)

Emperor of Japan in reign:
Mutsuhito / Emperor Meiji (1867-1912)
Yoshihito / Emperor Taisho (1912-26)
Hirohito / Emperor Showa (1926-89)
Akihito (1989-present)
“An understanding of the importance of the desire for recognition as the motor of history allows us to reinterpret many phenomena that are otherwise seemingly unfair to us, such as culture, religion, work, nationalism and war.”

Francis Fukuyama

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Chapter 1: Introduction to Japanese Internationalism

“It is one of the unwritten rules of history that civilizations have made their greatest leap forward after having come into contact with other, different civilizations.”

– Nakasone Yasuhiro (Former Prime Minister of Japan, 1982-87)

The nineteenth century saw the acceleration of globalization. The worldwide expansion of Euro-American empires, development of technologies and interdependence of economic activities brought peoples from different cultural backgrounds to interact with each other. This interchange of different civilizations built a transnational network that urged policymakers and intellectuals to generate the concept of “internationalism” to describe and explain the dynamics of the international community.

It is important to address the question of the definition of internationalism since there are many schools of thought. Political historians such as Philip W. Jones propose that

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5 Jessamyn Reich Abel, "Warring Internationalisms: Multilateral Thinking in Japan, 1933 - 1964" (Columbia University, 2004), 4.
internationalism is constituted of “national sovereignty” and “international order.”  
6 This school of thought maintains that the locomotive of international community is the national interests of countries that ‘interlink’ states for both coexistent and self-benefitting purposes.  
7 The Second World War (WWII) is often employed as a case study. The Great Powers formed alliances and waged aggression across the globe for the expansion of their national interests. On the other hand, historians like John G. Ruggie point out the importance of economic interdependence.  
8 They argue that interdependence created the transnational network called “world economy” that urged peoples of many countries to actively interact with each other for profit-making activities.  
9 Ruggie claims that this dynamics of economic interdependence is the determinant that has coloured the nature of international community.

While historians of different specializations have generated their own definition of internationalism, a general consensus is noticeable. That is to regard, as the scholar Carten Holbraad has pointed out, the “bonds” that interlink states, inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and non-state actors as the chief dynamic of international relations.  
10 Politics and economy do have different impacts on defining the character of interstate relations, yet they have both acted as a “bond” that connects states and peoples

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7 See, also: Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Berkeley: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979). 105; Kjell Goldmann, The Logic of Internationalism: Coercion and Accommodation (New York: Routledge, 1994). Goldmann highlights that “coexistent purposes” include diplomatic interchanges such as the formation of alliances, holding of conferences and establishment of regional/international coalitions. In this sort of internationalism, the main objective of the participating countries is to work for the prosperity of everyone in the concert. On the contrary, “self-benefitting purposes” are ones in which countries strive only for their own benefits – such as wars and secret diplomacies. For example, Hitler’s Nazi Germany was a great example of the self-benefitting internationalism in which the Third Reich invaded European nations one after another for its own development. Yet, as Goldmann notes, both the coexistent and self-benefitting interactions do bring nations of the world ‘together’ in the sense that interstate relations are indeed in existence.
9 Waltz, Theory of International Politics: 105-06.
together. Consequently, Holbraad’s definition that internationalism is “the ideology of international bonding” is used in this thesis.\textsuperscript{11}

The theme of Japanese diplomacy has been explored by many historians including Thomas W. Burkman, Kenneth B. Pyle and Akira Iriye.\textsuperscript{12} They have provided thorough analysis on Japanese foreign policy and Japan’s international relations. The historians have generally examined Japanese relations with key strategic partners by investigating the key incidents, causes and effects, international climate and domestic opinion in history. For example, Pyle’s \textit{The Making of Modern Japan} analyzes the history of Japanese political economy in the post-1945 years.\textsuperscript{13} Similarly, Iriye’s \textit{Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897 – 1911} investigates Japan-US relations in the era of expansionism and imperialism.\textsuperscript{14}

These published works have mostly concentrated on Japan’s political, economic and/or military relations with America and/or China as their main theme of investigation. For the long history of interactions, the historians maintain that Washington and Beijing occupy an important place in Tokyo’s foreign policy agenda.\textsuperscript{15} A clear tendency of popularity is also

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} See, Iriye, \textit{Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897 – 1911}
\textsuperscript{14} See, Iriye, \textit{Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897 – 1911}
noticeable in the case studies the historians have chosen to analyse. The Meiji Restoration (the late 1860s), the Second World War (1941-45) and the post-war economic miracle (1950s-80s) are three of the most referenced incidents. They are often treated as the “turning points” in the history of Japanese diplomacy as important development and changes in the foreign policies were seen in these periods. For example, Japanese leaders in the years of WWII practiced an expansionist and militarist strategy and criticized the principles of pro-Western foreign policy which had been the national consensus since the Meiji Restoration in 1860s.

There are yet two major unsolved problems in the discipline preventing a clear understanding of Japanese diplomacy. First, the subject of the connections between Japan and diplomatic ideology is an undeveloped field of study. In other words, historians have investigated what happened in the past and how it occurred mostly from political, military and economic perspectives. This means that the historians have not examined the dynamics of the ideological drives behind the diplomatic decisions, however. Only rarely do historians make a conscious use of topics such as: how Japanese policymakers and intellectuals saw Japan’s

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place and role in the world; how Japan could (and should) construct international bonds; and what diplomatic goals they must regard as the grand strategy of the Japanese nation. These themes are important in understanding Japan’s diplomatic ideology since they shape the “core values” of Japanese interaction with the world – which is going to be discussed later.

Second, little work has been done to illustrate the comprehensive development of Japanese diplomacy. As maintained earlier, many of the published works have tended to focus on a certain period of historical importance. This is unfortunate because historians have neglected to analyse the consistency, causal relationships and changes seen in Japanese diplomacy between the historically important period of the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries. In this era, the form of diplomacy saw dramatic changes. While bilateral and mono-cultural diplomacy were the mainstream form of international relations prior to the nineteenth century, multilateral diplomacy then emerged as the leading practice particularly from the twentieth century. As seen in the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920,

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19 Kenneth B. Pyle’s Profound Forces in the Making of Modern Japan and Gilbert Rozman’s Internationalism and Asianism in Japanese Strategic Thought from Meiji to Heisei are two of the few works that have taken the longue durée approach in writing Japanese history. These works are useful in tracing how professional intellectuals have written history in an overview. However, their scope of sight is limited. While Pyle has only looked at post-1945 years, Rozman only compared Japanese history in the 1880s to 1970s. In this regard, I must say there is not many works done on writing Japanese diplomatic history in longue durée has been done in the discipline. For Pyle’s and Rozman’s works, see Pyle, "Profound Forces in the Making of Modern Japan."; and Gilbert Rozman, "Internationalism and Asianism in Japanese Strategic Thought from Meiji to Heisei," Japanese Journal of Political Science 9, no. 2 (2008).
20 Micheline R. Ishay, Internationalism and its Betrayal: Contradictions of Modernity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995). xvi-xxi. Ishay comments: “Internationalism is not a static concept, but rather a ‘process’ sui generis… Internationalism has changed over time, but the core concept can be identified throughout history. Internationalism, unlike realism which international relations is conceived as a global system of relationship between monolithic states, guidelines describing social relations between states and within states. Internationalism assumes a dynamic between the global and the domestic social arrangement.” Thus, I examine both the constants and variables, so that, what the “core value” and the “values that change depending on the international climate” could be distinguished.
22 I define “bilateral diplomacy” as an interstate relation in which two countries are involved (e.g. the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902). “Mono-cultural diplomacy” refers to an interstate relation where countries of similar (or the same) civilizational backgrounds are involved (e.g. the Napoleonic Wars, the Sino-Japanese War
countries of different civilizational backgrounds had then begun to interact with each other more than ever before.\textsuperscript{23} It is a concern, therefore, that historians have yet to identify how the changing climate in the international community had affected the character of Japanese diplomatic thought and \textit{vice versa}.\textsuperscript{24}

This thesis thus aims to reinvestigate the history of Japanese diplomacy. It examines how the Japanese perception of international politics had developed between 1853 and 2006 by exploring the two unfinished problems, as discussed above. I analyse the key incidents in the history of Japanese diplomacy as a chain of events that causally constituted this ideology called “Japanese internationalism” – or the Japanese perception of international bonding.

The investigation into the two unfinished problems is important because it would reveal the “core values” and the “situational values” of Japanese diplomacy. I define the former phrase as the consistency seen in the series of diplomatic policymaking process or as the sense of importance that authorities in history had traditionally understood as the national consensus of 1894-95, and the Triple Alliance of 1882). Lastly, multilateral diplomacy refers to an interstate relation where more than two countries of different civilizational backgrounds are involved (e.g. the League of Nations of 1920, the United Nations of 1945, and UNESCO of 1945). For more on types of diplomacy, see: Seven B. Gareis and Johannes Varwick, \textit{The United Nations: An Introduction} (London: Palgrave, 2003).


\textsuperscript{24} Zara Steiner, “On writing International History: Chaps, Maps and Much More,” \textit{International Affairs} 73 no. 3 (1997): 533-34. The historian Paul Kennedy’s \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 until 2000} is a good example of study in which history is written in \textit{longue duree} with the purpose to investigate the determinant that has defined the rise and fall of the Great Powers in history. Based on his research on 500 years of world history, Kennedy argues that economics and military are not the definite determinants of the rise of fall of powers, nevertheless definitely serves as the “reason for the success and failure of each nation.” (p.xxiv) In other words, Kennedy highlights economy and military strengths as the core value of national development that vitally influenced the rise and fall of the Great Powers. I aim to do the same in this thesis. Through looking at Japanese history between 1853 and 2006, I purpose to figure out what the factor that has coloured the diplomatic behaviour and thoughts of the Japanese policymakers and intellectuals. For more, see: Paul Kennedy, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 until 2000} (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
of the Japanese state. The latter phrase refers to the values that changed accordingly to the demands of the international climate and community at the time. Especial focus of this research is made on the core values. This thesis argues that if there were any principles that remained unchanged throughout the centuries of dramatic upheavals, it would indicate that they were the “exceptional principles” of Japanese diplomacy. They were not the ideas that were easily influenced by external forces which historians at times have favoured to describe as “gaiatsu.” That is, the unchanged principles were the most important creed of the Japanese state. They have constituted the “core” of Japanese internationalism and have historically driven the nature of Japanese international interaction.

This thesis has a second aim. While internationalism is an ideology of international bonding, ironically, many of the present studies on internationalism are not truly international. Most of the existing researches done are West-centric. In other words, they have only looked at Euro-American figures, incidents and philosophy as their case studies. In fact, historians

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25 This idea was referenced from: Pyle, "Profound Forces in the Making of Modern Japan." Pyle has examined the ‘profound forces’ (referenced from A.J.P. Taylor) of Japanese diplomatic behaviour between 1945 and the 1980s. Pyle points out WWII, the Occupation period (1945-1952), constructivism, and the international environment (especially America and China) as the main factors that have been shaping Japan’s international thoughts. The weakness of Pyle’s study is that he had only analysed the post-1945 era and not the Japanese history in longue duree. This thesis aims to do the unfinished task and supplement Pyle’s investigation.

26 Pyle, "Japan’s Historic Change of Course," 278.

27 The word Gaiatsu, literally “foreign pressure” or connotatively “pressures from outside” is often used by scholars to describe how Japan’s diplomacy has been passive and reactive only to foreign pressure. For more details, see, Yoichi Funabashi, ed. Japan's International Agenda (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 8-9. And; Mayumi Itoh, Globalization of Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and U.S. Efforts to Open Japan (New York: St. Martin’s Place, 1998). 5-11.


29 Akira Iriye, “Global History,” in Palgrave Advances in International History, ed. Patrick Finney (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 320. Akira Iriye defines international history as “the history of international relations … [international history] studies how nations (both governments and citizens), presumably concerned with their ‘national interests,’ behave toward one another. The international arena tends to be seen as a stage for the interaction of particularly powerful countries, or the great powers.” Thus, based on his words, international history is not either European history or Euro-American history. Yet, at the same time, ones could argue that the
have tended to study the philosophical thought of figures such as Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, Karl Marx and Woodrow Wilson.\(^{30}\) Similarly, the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 and the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920 and the United Nations in 1945 are the well-referenced incidents.\(^{31}\) This trend connotes that the contributions from non-Western countries, including the ones from the Asia-Pacific, have not been given much attention, however. Evidently, the facts that five Asian countries had attended the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and that Japanese officials played critical roles in the development of the League and UN frameworks have been largely disregarded from many of the published studies.\(^{32}\) I aim to therefore examine the history of internationalism as a \textit{truly} international development by examining the Japanese view on the world as a non-Western example.

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word ‘international’ does not mean “West-East relations” or “West’s relations with non-West countries,” of course. Literally, the word ‘international’ means “connected with or involving two or more countries” according to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. However, I argue that, in the world of active globalization, the employment of the word “international” to refer to “Euro-American” relations is out-of-date. Especially since the twentieth century, the world has seen active interactions of countries of different civilizational background. The ‘Great Powers’ of the international community are no longer only the Western powers. Thus, I say the word ‘international’ must be used only when a study has studied the relation amongst countries of different civilizational background. If an author only employs Euro-American case studies, it is not “international relations” but merely “Western relations.” For the dictionary’s publication detail, see: Oxford University, in \textit{Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary} (Oxford University Press, 2000).

\(^{30}\) Jeremy Bentham is often referenced for his coining of the term ‘international’ in 1780 to describe the relation between states. Immanuel Kant is famous for his book \textit{Toward Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History} in which he developed the idea of “unsociable sociability” of states and the need of ‘world republican’ governing body. Karl Marx employed the word ‘internationalism’ to describe the movement and struggle of working class on the international basis in 1850. Woodrow Wilson was the father of League of Nations in 1920 which was the best example of political internationalism. These notes are from: Glenda Sluga, Lecture given at the University of Sydney, February - June 2011.

\(^{31}\) Ibid. The Westphalia Treaty is understood to have created the norms on legal sovereignty and developed the thought on ‘universal peace’ for the first time in history. The League of Nations was the world’s first multinational organization that was created to oversee international relations and realize world peace. The UN was the successor of the League whose membership had become larger than the one of the League, is present today. In addition to them, the Congress of Vienna (1814-15), the Conference of Berlin (1884-85), and The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 are also popular case studies. In most cases, the Congress of Vienna is said to have outlined the “balance of power” order in Europe, regulated state relationships and significantly gave birth to the idea of ‘nation.’ At the Conference of Berlin, international law was developed as the ‘rule of the game.’ Lastly, the Hague Conferences were when countries of America, Europe and Asia first met and had discussions on war regulations.

\(^{32}\) Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga, “New Histories of the United Nations,” \textit{Journal of World History} 19, no. 3 (2008): 253-54. The history of the League of Nations tends to focus on the words and practices of the US President Woodrow Wilson and the British Secretary-General of the League Secretariat Sir Eric James Drummond. Furthermore, as the historians Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga point out, the history of the UN has often been written with a Eurocentric focus as well. The popular figures include the US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his wife Eleanor, the British zoologist Julian Huxley, the British scientist Joseph Needham, the French jurist Rene Cassin and the French anthropologist Alfred Metraux.
I have categorized the history of Japanese internationalism into three periods: 1853-1919, 1919-1945 and 1945-2006. Each era starts and ends with a historically important event that marked certain changes in the essence of Japanese internationalism. The chapters below investigate the key incidents and figures in the respective period that played influential roles.

Chapter 2 examines the years of Japan’s opening to and interaction with the international community between 1853 and 1919. I investigate case studies such as the Meiji Restoration of 1868, The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the First World War of 1914-19. These incidents are analysed with respect to the words of the Meiji theorist Fukuzawa.

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33 There are overlaps in the years of categorization simply because historical incidents did not happen accordingly to the years. For example, Chapter 3 examines 1919-1945 and Chapter 4 looks at 1945-2006. This is since the Second World War ended in August 1945. Between January and August 1945 is an important period of investigation in Chapter 3 as it is the ending months of the Pacific War, when Japan was undergoing social and diplomatic changes. Similarly, the period between August and December 1945 is also a significant era, as the US occupation of Japan started.

34 The following is the list of main primary sources. Japanese diplomacy is analysed based on the Diplomatic Bluebook the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which has been annually publishing since 1947. It outlines the basic keynotes of Japanese foreign policy and its problems, achievements and prospects. Diplomatic materials are available furthermore on the online database of the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia of the University of Tokyo. It has the manuscripts of the key treaties, speeches and such since the mid-eighteenth century. The journal articles and books written by the key figures – mainly Fukuzawa Yukichi, Nitobe Inazo and Yoshida Shigeru – are useful in tracing their worldviews. The series of online databases the UN, UNESCO, the Japan Broadcasting Company, the National Diet Library, and the Ministry of Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) are useful in tracing the respective voices too. Further details are written in the footnotes of the opening section of each chapter and the bibliography in the end of the thesis.

35 The opening is often termed “the end of the Sakoku policy” in many texts. The term ‘Sakoku’ literally means ‘chained-nation’ which refers to the isolationist policy that began under the Tokugawa regime began in 1633. The conservative government illegalized any contact with foreign influences. It banned religious activities, trading, and immigration of any kind because they saw foreign influences were ruining Japanese social order and traditions. The Tokugawa regime cut off its relations especially with Britain, Spain and France for their religious purposes to spread Christianity in Japan in which the government saw the potential of eradicating Shintoism as Japan’s national religion. The Dutch and Chinese were the only foreigners to be allowed to have contact with the Japanese yet only for trading under governmental supervision as they were said to have no religious ambitions. The Sakoku policy isolated the Japanese society from the external world until 1853 when the American commodore Matthew Perry’s “black ships” arrived at Japanese waters and forced the Tokugawa regime to open the country. For the historical study of Japan under the Sakoku policy, see: Itoh, Globalization of Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and U.S. Efforts to Open Japan ; Itoh, “Economic Myths Explained: Japan’s Abiding Sakoku Mentality.”; Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman, eds., Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
Yukichi, who proposed the *Datsu-A Nyu-O* (leave Asia, enter West) strategy as the national creed in the 1880s.\(^{36}\)

In Chapter 3, a series of diplomatic incidents between the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919 and the Japanese defeat in August 1945 is investigated. I examine how the leaders and intellectuals perceived the ideal of Japanese internationalism by looking at two themes: (1) the Japan-League relations; and (2) the words and practices of Nitobe Inazo, who was the Under-Secretary General of the League of Nations Secretariat between 1920 and 1926. An examination of Nitobe’s careers reveals how he, who stood in between the West and the East, struggled to grant Japan the just role in the international community of Euro-American centrism.

Chapter 4 looks at the post-1945 era. Through experiencing the traumatizing years of WWII, Japanese people were determined to revive the national creed with pacifist principles. The politician Yoshida Shigeru was the leading figure in this movement. As the Prime Minister of Japan in the immediate post-war era, his words and thoughts show how Japan as a state tried to redefine its place in the international community. I take the Japan-UN relation as a case study because the organization played a key role in the cultivation of the so-called Yoshida Doctrine which gave the sense of direction to the post-war Japanese statesmen.

The Conclusion states the comprehensive implication of the history of Japanese internationalism from each chapter in regard to the aims of this thesis. It also discusses what

this Japanese case could say about the development of internationalism as a thought in the international community and its future prospects.
Chapter 2: The Making of Early Japanese Internationalism, 1853 - 1919

“Here I take antagonism to mean the unsociable sociability of human beings, that is, their tendency to enter into society, a tendency connected, however, with a constant resistance that continually threatens to break up this society.”

– Immanuel Kant

Introduction

The history of Japanese internationalism begins in 1853. In this year, the American Commodore Matthew Perry entered Japanese waters and demanded the Tokugawa regime abandon isolationist policy. As a small Asian state, Japan had no choice but to open the country in front of the so-called gunboat diplomacy’s military pressure. The Tokugawa regime then signed a series of treaties with the Western powers such as America, Britain and France. The pacts established diplomatic relations and opened Japan’s ports to foreign traders. They marked Japan’s re-entry to the international community after nearly 260 years of isolation.

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Japan upon the opening was “politically immature, economically backward, and militarily impotent” in Western terms.\(^{41}\) The state was politically immature because the Tokugawa Government had basically banned any kind of contacts with foreign powers throughout the isolationist era. This policy resulted in Japanese officials to barely have diplomatic experiences for over 260 years. Japanese economy was also weak. As a state that had barely been exposed to the custom of international trading, the nation’s economic structure had no institution to incorporate foreign influences.\(^{42}\) Lastly, the military capability was impotent since Japan under the isolationist policy did not undergo any armed conflicts. Japanese soldiers thus hardly had the experience of actually fighting against foreign powers.

For these reasons, the prime task for the Meiji Government, which replaced the Tokugawa regime in 1867-68 as Japan’s centralized administrative body, was to modernize the country’s backward aspects.\(^{43}\) Through developing national capability as strong as the ones of the Western powers, the Meiji leaders believed that they could defend Japan’s independence from the menace of Euro-American gunboat diplomacy. The Meiji Government thus proposed national slogans such as “catch up with the West, overtake the West,” *Fukoku Kyohei* (rich country, strong military) and *Bunmei Kaika* (Civilization and Enlightenment) in this era.\(^{44}\) The leaders glorified the acquisition of Western knowledge and technologies as Japanese people’s absolute obligation.

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\(^{42}\) Bamba, *Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan’s China Policy, 1924-1929*: 26. The Japanese traded with the Dutch and the Chinese at Deshima, Nagasaki. But the trading was severely censored by the Tokugawa Government who did not want any foreign influences that had the potential of weakening their authoritarian governance.

\(^{43}\) Pyle, “Profound Forces in the Making of Modern Japan,” 393.

The dynamics of the pro-Western version of internationalism that emerged in Japan in this period is best exemplified in the writings of the leading Meiji theorist and educator, Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901). He was originally an intellectual who studied European philosophy of enlightenment in the 1850s. Fukuzawa then took part in both the Tokugawa and Meiji regimes as a governmental official in his late 20s, where he witnessed the transition of the Japanese state from a feudalist state to a modern empire himself. In this context, his texts generally discussed Japanese politics, governance and diplomacy. He, as a scholar, particularly explored the following two themes in his lifetime: (1) how Japan’s national development could be successfully carried out; and (2) how Japan’s independence as a sovereign state could be defended in the era of Western superiority.
Born on 10 January 1835, Fukuzawa Yukichi was brought up in a low-ranking, traditionally Japanese, samurai family in Nakatsu. He was a student of Chinese history and Confucianism in his youth, which were the most popular subjects in Tokugawa Japan. Many sources imply that he never found them consequential. Fukuzawa especially questioned the principles of Confucianism which implanted the idea of hierarchical order in Japanese society. In such a structure, social class was one of the major determinants of one’s life career and status. Prior to the opening in the 1850s, the Japanese state was a feudal and autocratic country. The royal family and the noble class had the authoritative power in governance, finance and military, and the peoples in the middle and low classes were barely given any freedom of choice. As a son of a low-class samurai, consequently, Fukuzawa underwent a series of social discriminations in his youth.

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46 Fukuzawa, The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi: 1. Nakatsu was the name given to the Osaka region of today.

47 Craig, Civilization and Enlightenment: The Early Thought of Fukuzawa Yukichi: 8.


50 Fukuzawa, The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi: 179. He reviews that “Born as I was in a family of low rank, I recall being always discontent with the things I had to endure.”
In questioning Japanese societies and traditions, Fukuzawa moved to Nasagaki in 1854 for further studies. As an ambitious individual striving to change the paradigm of Japanese society, he chose Nagasaki as his destination. The period was when the wave of Westernization was significantly flowing into Japanese societies upon Matthew Perry’s arrival in 1853. Western ideas such as democracy, enlightenment, and industrialization were introduced one after another to Japanese people. And Nagasaki was famous for the stationing of Dutch settlers and as the only place in Japan where people could be legally exposed to Western culture and knowledge under the isolationist rule. Fukuzawa studied the implications of social governance from Western perspectives at the port city.

Fukuzawa stayed in Nagasaki until 1858 and worked on writing his thesis Isshin Dokuritsu no Te-ze [The Thesis on Complete Independence]. He also worked as a translator to make a living. As a student of humanity, he was mostly responsible of translating academic books on history, economy and politics. This job brought Fukuzawa into contact with the literature from English-speaking countries such as England, Scotland and America. He particularly enjoyed examining the texts written by Scottish intellectuals who played roles in the Scottish Enlightenment movement in the 1700s – such as Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, John Millar and John H. Burton. These texts were said to have developed the sense of “modernity” in Fukuzawa’s understanding of world affairs.

52 Craig, Civilization and Enlightenment: The Early Thought of Fukuzawa Yukichi: 8.
53 Ibid.
54 Hongou, pp.152-153.
55 Craig, Civilization and Enlightenment: The Early Thought of Fukuzawa Yukichi: 3.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 11, 13, 26, 58.
In 1858, Fukuzawa moved to Edo and served the Tokugawa Government which was failing to conclude a fair treaty with the Americans.\(^{59}\) This appointment granted Fukuzawa the chance to witness Japan’s place in the world himself. The reality was harsh: he saw the Tokugawa officials occasionally backing down to the American negotiators. This was mostly because the Japanese state in the 1850s was industrially underdeveloped. It stood no chance in pushing back the Western power militarily and diplomatically.\(^{60}\) In this context, the Tokugawa regime signed a number of the so-called ‘unfair treaties’ with the West.\(^{61}\) One of the most well-known treaties was the Convention of Kanagawa in which Japan recognized American ascendency in trade and diplomacy.\(^{62}\) The frustrating outcome made Fukuzawa realize that Japan was under the immediate necessity of “modernizing” its national strength in order to defend its sovereignty.\(^{63}\) Yet, at this moment, he was still unsure of what ‘modernization’ exactly meant.

In 1862, at age twenty-seven, Fukuzawa travelled to America and Europe as an interpreter of the Tokugawa Government’s mission for the further learning of Western technologies and studies.\(^{64}\) The travel granted him the opportunity to re-organize his understanding of

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\(^{61}\) Ian Nish, *Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China and the League of Nations, 1931-1933* (Cornwall: Kegan Paul International by TJ Press, 1993). 1. The phrase “Unfair treaty” is sometimes also called as “unequal treaty” in which the more powerful state encroached upon the sovereign rights of the weaker and “reduced her [the weaker] to semi-colonial status.” Unfair treaties were often seen in the eighteenth and nineteenth century Asia where European powers used armed forces to pursue their national interests. For more on the principle of unfair treaties, see: Immanuel Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).


\(^{63}\) Fukuzawa, *The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi*: 187. He reviews that: “I disliked the bureaucratic, oppressive, conservative, anti-foreign policy of the [Tokugawa] Shogunate, and I would not side with it … the followers of the imperial cause were still more anti-foreign and more violent in their action, so I had even less sympathy with them.”

\(^{64}\) Craig, *Civilization and Enlightenment: The Early Thought of Fukuzawa Yukichi*: 83.
modernity and to re-recognize the Western superiority. In America and Europe, he witnessed the West’s advanced institutions in many fields, such as in economy, military and law. In his book *Bunmei Ron no Gairyaku* [the Outline of Theories of Civilization], for instance, he commented on Western philosophy of international law that was “loose and easily circumvented, yet it somewhat reduces the likelihood of war” and “all of these increasingly detailed and extensive regulations are conducive to a better moral order.” In addition to his studies of the West, this experience made Fukuzawa assure that Japan’s modernization campaign must be based on Western institutions. He was then certain that the Western ideas were the world’s most advanced knowledge that would make Japanese development an effective and up-to-dated mission.

Fukuzawa’s worldview is best exemplified in his *Datsu-A-Ron* article [DAR]. The text was published in the newspaper *Jiji Shimpo* [literally, Current Events] in March 1885 with the purpose to inform the need for Westernization to as many people as possible. In the article, Fukuzawa went to discuss: (1) his perception of “Japan in the world” and (2) his suggestions to the Meiji Government to adopt Westernization as Japan’s future path.

The text firstly outlined that the world was divided into three camps of civilization: Japan, the West and Asia. Simply put, the word ‘West’ in Fukuzawa’s texts was used to refer to the most advanced nations in the international community. While he did not clearly point out the

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65 Ibid.
66 Ibid. Craig referenced the quote from: Fukuzawa, *Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshu Vol.4 - Bunmeiron no Gairyaku [Outline of Theories of Civilization]*: 113.
67 Fukuzawa, *The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi*: 225. *Datsu-A-Ron* literally means “The Theory of Leaving Asia.” Some historians have translated it as “Good-bye Asia,” “de-Asianization,” “escape from Asia,” and “departure from Asia” depending on how they interpreted the Japanese word *Datsu*, which literally means “to leave,” “to escape,” “to get out of” or “to depart” but connotatively implies “good-bye” or “elusion” at times. I have referenced the English translated version of the DAR article from: Dwight Tat Wai Kwok, "A Translation of Datsu-A-Ron: Decoding a Pre-War Japanese Nationalistic Theory" (University of Toronto 2009).
countries by name, Fukuzawa yet connoted that the ‘West’ was the ideal being of nationhood that Japanese people should see as the target of their national development process: 68

My noble Japanese country men, it is our principle to recognize the need of the country over the weight of the government. Through the reliance of the Imperial Household’s dignity, we shall overthrow the old government and establish a new one. Everyone in the country shall completely adopt the modern Western civilization. (It is from doing so) Not only that Japan may strip away its old self, it will create a new axle in the entire continent of Asia … 69

Fukuzawa used the word ‘Asia’ to refer to uncivilized states. Unlike in the Western case, he clearly highlighted China and Korea by name. Despite the political, religious and traditional closeness, Fukuzawa maintained that “differences in heredity and education” existed between Japan and the two parties and that “China and Korea are more different than similar to us.” 70

He analyzed that the major causes of the Qing Dynasty’s decline in the mid-1850s were the Dynasty’s stubbornness to continue worshiping Confucianism as their national creed and denial to accept the British superiority. For Fukuzawa who especially believed in the need for modernization and review of old traditions, China and Korea therefore stood out as the most ‘uncivilized’ states.

In between these two blocs was the Japanese nation which had just opened itself to the world. He did not identify Japan with either Asia or the West. Fukuzawa in the DAR text warned that Japan would become one of the ‘Asian’ countries if the authorities and the people took no action:

68 Fukuzawa, The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi: 214-15. He wrote: “From my own observation in both Occidental and Oriental civilizations, I find that each has certain strong points and weak points bound up in its moral teachings and scientific theories. But when I compare the two in a general way as to wealth, armament, and the greatness happiness for the greatest number, I have to put the Orient below the Occident.”


It is our best strategy to leave the ranks of Asian nations and cast our lot with the civilized nations of the West. As for our approach to the treating of China and Korea, there shall be no special treatment just because they are our neighbouring countries. Simply adapt the ways of the Westerners is sufficed.\(^\text{71}\) (sic)

Fukuzawa implored that the Meiji Government must lead the country to the direction of a “catch up with the West” consensus. Through doing so, he believed that Japan could defend its sovereignty and even become one of the “Western powers.” In addition to serving as an advisor of the Meiji Government, Fukuzawa as an educator then established a number of schools in the 1880s and 1890s.\(^\text{72}\) He trained his countrymen in the ways of thinking that he believed would enable Japan to resist the foreign threat.

Fukuzawa’s pro-Western ideology was revolutionary in mid-nineteenth century Japan in two ways. First, as the historian Harold C. Hinton has commented, most Asian states, including Japan prior to the opening in the 1850s, had long seen themselves as the “vassals of the Chinese Empire.”\(^\text{73}\) For over years and centuries, the Asian states had recognized China as the center of the Asian civilization.\(^\text{74}\) Hence, Fukuzawa’s proposal that denied the historical tradition was indeed innovative. Second, the idea to follow the West as the role-model was groundbreaking as well.\(^\text{75}\) Under the Sakoku policy that had isolated the country for over 260 years, their knowledge of Western affairs was critically limited. As the existence of the word Nanbanjin back then showed, Japanese society had commonly seen Europeans and Americans


\(^{72}\) Joel Joos, "Two Japanese on Modernity: Fukuzawa Yukichi and Japanese Images of Europe and the World as Interpreted by Maruyama Masao," in The Japanese and Europe: Images and Perceptions, ed. Bert Edstrom (Midsomer Norton: Japan Library / Curzon Press, 2000), 28-29. One of the educational institutions Fukuzawa founded is the Keio University of today, which is known as one of the leading private universities in Japan. For his biography, see: Keio University, "Fukuzawa Yukichi Nenhu [The Biographical Sketch of Fukuzawa Yukichi]," Keio University, http://www.keio.ac.jp/ja/contents/fukuzawa_history/index.html.


as ‘strangers’ and/or ‘barbarians.’ Therefore, Fukuzawa’s DAR proposal implored that the Japanese state and people should follow the ‘strangers’ and abandon the ‘patron.’

For these reasons, Fukuzawa’s idea was very unprecedented, but was yet cogent as well. Without the incorporation of Western institutions, it was obvious that Japan would not be able to survive the era of imperialism, as seen in how the Qing Dynasty who tried to keep its isolation had declined following the Opium War in the early 1840s. Whether right or wrong, Fukuzawa’s Datsu-A Nyu-O suggestion had certainly convinced the Meiji Government leaders to accelerate the course of the Westernization campaign in order to defend Japan from the foreign strangers. In this regard, his doctrine marked the first turning point in the history of Japanese internationalism. The Datsu-A Nyu-O rhetoric gave the sense of direction to the Japanese state that was lost in the international community. The policy, however, had left the general public and anti-Western authorities in uncertainty.

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76 Dick Stegewerns, ed. Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan: Autonomy, Asian Brotherhood, or World Citizenship? (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 3. The word literally means ‘the barbarian from the South.’ The etymology came from how the Portuguese settlers, who were the first Europeans to land on the Japanese archipelago, arrived at the Southern island of Kyushu. For more on Japanese encounter with the West, see: L.M. Cullen, A History of Japan, 1582 - 1941: Internal and External Worlds (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Westernization then became the Japanese Empire’s national consensus of development under the Meiji Government’s leadership. The regime reformed the country’s social, economic, and military structures one after another based on Euro-American ideas. As part of the campaign, the Meiji Government abolished the feudal institution and established Western-style governance. The new order was characterized by centralization of political authority and a Prussian-style monarchical rule. Such an administrative transition was one of the processes that the Meiji leaders believed was necessary in turning Japan into a ‘civilized’ state. By establishing “modern” institutions, they believed that Japan could be “modernized,” thus national independence could be secured. This series of transitions was called the Meiji Restoration that began in 1868.

78 Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American – East Asian Relations 64-65.
81 Akita, ”The Meiji Constitution in Practice: The First Diet,” 41. And; Iriye, ”Japan's Drive to Great-Power Status,” 725. Other efforts include the modernization of “military organization, ordnance and intelligence, construction of naval battleships, and more efficient systems of communication.”
The shift was nonetheless not a straightforward process for the Meiji leaders. The greatest difficulty was the gap between their and the general public’s perception of a “nation” and “international community.” On one hand, the Meiji leaders who had travelled overseas had acknowledged the reality that “Japan” was one of the “nations” in the “international community.” They had seen “foreign nations” such as Prussia, Britain and America. The perception of the general public was nevertheless different. For the mass, the word “nation” [kuni] applied not to “Japan” but to the Han domains. The greatest cause for this consciousness of the mass was the Tokugawa regime’s isolationist policy. Under the Sakoku governance, the general public was never exposed to foreign cultures, peoples and influences. The vast majority of the mass thus had no concept of “Japan” and the “international community” in the way the government elites who had seen the “world.”

For these reasons, the Meiji government’s idea to justify Westernization as the way to defend the “Japanese nation” from “the threat of foreign menace” was not an effective idea in uniting the “Japanese people” as a national entity. The general public, in the first place, had not understood the words “West,” the “Japanese nation,” “foreign” and “menace” in the way the

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82 Joos, "Two Japanese on Modernity: Fukuzawa Yukichi and Japanese Images of Europe and the World as Interpreted by Maruyama Masao," 34. The prominent Meiji leaders of this era include Kido Takayoshi, Okubo Toshimichi, Itô Hirobumi and Yamagata Arimoto

83 Albert M. Craig, "The Central Government," in Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji, ed. Marius B. Yansen and Gilbert Rozman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 38. And; Hilary Conroy, Sandra T. W. Davis, and Wayne Patterson, Japan in Transition: Thought and Action in the Meiji Era, 1868 – 1912 (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Press, 1984). 13. The “feudal, domain system” was called the Han system in Japanese, in which the leader of Samurais was in charge of administration of that domain. Prior to the opening, the Japanese archipelago was governed under the Tokugawa Government as the central body of administration with over 270 Han states ruled under prominent Samurais. One of the Meiji leaders’ tasks was to reunify the domains and establish a more effective style of governance.

84 Takashi Fujitani, "Inventing, Forgetting, Remembering: Toward a Historical Ethnography of the Nation-State," in Cultural Nationalism in East Asia: Representation and Identity, ed. Harumi Befu (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1993), 82. Craig, "The Central Government," 38. And: Morris-Suzuki, "The Frontiers of Japanese Identity." Tessa Morris-Suzuki further adds that for pre-1853 Japan the word ‘foreigner’ largely implied the Ainu race in Hokkaido and other minorities in Southern Sakhalin, the Kurile Archipelago, the Ogasawa Islands, and the Ryukyu archipelago. Hence, for the Japanese ‘foreigners’ referred to the peoples living in different islands and did not necessarily meant different cultural, social, political and diplomatic backgrounds. The studies show the perception of “foreigners” and “Japan” was totally different between the elites and the mass.
leaders had. The first challenge for the new leaders was thus to develop the sense of national solidarity and international mind amongst the mass. This attempt was best exemplified in the Meiji elites’ drafting of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan.

Constitution was one of the factors that the Meiji leaders saw as the symbol of modernity during their missions in Europe and America. They saw that the Great Powers of the international community, such as Britain, Prussia and America, all possessed their own constitution that outlined their philosophy of nationhood and had given its people a sense of national unity. For example, the US Constitution highlighted “liberty” as its national slogan. The Meiji leaders thus saw the necessity to make a Japanese constitution that proposed national slogans, so that the sense of national unity would be cultivated in Japan as well.

With this intention, the Constitution of the Empire of Japan was issued in February 1889. It introduced a Prussian-model system of constitutional governance. The Constitution placed the Emperor as the head of state and government; and the Imperial Diet [teikoku gikai] as the head institution of administration. The politician Itoh Hirobumi was the leading figure in the

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87 Yale Law School - Lillian Goldman Law Library, “U.S. Constitution,” http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/usconst.asp. The Preamble of the US Constitution reads as follows: We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
89 Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American – East Asian Relations 67. Some historians at times called the Constitution of the Empire of Japan as the “Imperial Constitution” for short.
drafting of the constitution. He adopted the Prussian model for the many historical and political similarities the state shared with the Japanese nation. For example, both countries had a long tradition of monarchical rule with the Emperor as the head of state. Moreover, the two parties were also in the process of national transition in the 1880s. Prussia under Bismarck was seeking to unify the Germanic states in Central Europe. The Japanese state was also attempting to reorganize the feudal, domain system from the Tokugawa period. In other words, Itoh found the Prussian model a helpful example to see how the advanced country of the West was attempting to unite its peoples under a new framework of national entity.

In addition to the adoption of the Western principles, the Imperial Constitution also had outlined the creeds of Shintoism. Article 1, as reads as follows, was the best example: “The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.” One of the Shinto principles was the glorification of the Emperor as the national symbol and spiritual sovereign. The Emperor, as the historian Maruyama Masao explains, was believed to create “norms from scratch” and that “absolute values [of life] are embodied in the person of the Emperor himself.” This belief had been the absolute consensus of Japanese people, regardless of which Samurai domain (Bakufu) was in charge of national administration. In other words, the Emperor was the determinant that had unified the Japanese people as one entity throughout history. Itoh and his colleagues, while advocated

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91 Itoh Hirobumi was born on 2 September 1841 in Yamaguchi Prefecture of today. He was one of the Meiji leaders and worked along with Kido Takayoshi. He spent few years in America as part of the Government’s missions. He served the Meiji Government between 1876 until his death in October 1909. He was the Prime Minister of Japan (1885-88, 1892-96, 1900-91), Head of the Colonial Government in Taiwan (1895), and te Head of the Colonial Government in Korea (1905-09). For more, see: National Diet Library, "Itoh Hirobumi Kankei Bunsho [Documents on Itoh Hiborumi]," National Diet Library, http://navi.ndl.go.jp/kensei//entry/itouhirobumi3.php.
92 Ishida, The Introduction of Western Political Concepts into Japan 18.
96 Ishida, The Introduction of Western Political Concepts into Japan 18.
Westernization of Japanese institutions, thus decided to keep the Shinto teachings in the Constitution. This strategy had the intention to maintain the sense of ‘solidarity’ amongst Japanese society. As historians often point out, the leaders of this era were most afraid of the Japanese archipelago from splitting into many small states and losing the solidarity as one national entity. They had seen how the Qing Dynasty had begun to decline in the 1840s partially owing to its loss of national solidarity, which let the Western empires to divide the country up into many fragmented pieces. Therefore, the Imperial Constitution reflected both the traditional and Western principles in order to maintain the Japanese solidarity while urging the people to accelerate the course of Westernization.

The Meiji leaders, nonetheless, could not achieve the aim. The series of dramatic reconstruction of Japanese institutions during the years of the Meiji Restoration confused the vast majority of the public thoroughly. The new constitution, for instance, altered the Emperor’s role as the spiritual figure of Japanese society which had been the traditional dogma of the state for over six centuries. The Emperor then became, in addition to the spiritual role, the head of state with the absolute authority to lead the Diet, military, bureaucracy and justice. The reformation of the Emperor’s status puzzled the public because, as Maruyama describes, it was the “unification of administration and laws” and the “unification of the sources of dispensation and deprivation.” Most importantly, the

100 National Diet Library, "The Constitution of the Empire of Japan," http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c02.html. Article 4 states that “The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution;” Article 5 states “The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet;” Article 6 states “Article 6. The Emperor gives sanction to laws, and orders them to be promulgated and executed;” and Article 11 states “The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy.”
members of the Imperial Family were educated to become the ‘symbol of the Japanese state’ and were not trained to ‘lead’ the nation. The vast majority of them had no experience or educational background in politics, diplomacy and war.\textsuperscript{102} The gap between practicability and tradition confused the mass, especially in the sense of whom to trust for national leadership in the era of radical changes. This confusion resulted in splitting the nation into factions of different political thought, after all.

One of the factions was consisted of the people who regarded the Government’s application of Western ideas as a self-benefiting policy. The \textit{Jiyu Minken Undo} [Movement for People’s Free Rights] that began in 1874 under the leadership of Itagaki Taisuke was the most notable movement.\textsuperscript{103} This group saw that the Meiji leaders’ handling of Westernization was done only to serve the elites’ convenience. Itagaki pointed out that the Meiji Government had adopted Western thoughts such as industrialization, constitutional regime and monarchism, but did not introduce the ones for the general public’s good like democracy, civil rights and freedom of speech.\textsuperscript{104} This faction protested against the Government while the elites were drafting the Imperial Constitution in the mid-1870s.\textsuperscript{105} The movement continued until the late 1890s. In response to the uprising, the Government issued the Imperial Constitution in 1899 with the clause to open the \textit{Teikoku Gikai} [the Imperial Diet] as a place for the people from the general public to have a say in the policymaking process.\textsuperscript{106}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[102] For example, the wartime Emperor Showa (in reign 1926-89) was a biologist specializing in oceanology.
\item[105] Ibid.
\item[106] For more on this movement, see: Akita, \textit{Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, 1868-1900}.
\end{footnotes}
This era also saw a consecutive establishment of many Pan-Asianist and nationalist lobby groups. The people in this movement disliked the Government’s idealization of and obsession with the West itself. They called for the Meiji authorities to think high of regional unity and return to the traditional way of being. Thinkers such as Okakura Takeshi and Okubo Toshimichi were the leading figures in the Pan-Asian and anti-Western movements. Okakura proposed the slogan “Ajia wa Hitotsu” [literally, Asia is One] and called for Asian solidarity.\(^{107}\) Similarly, Okubo founded the Koa-Kai [the Society for Raising Asia] in 1880.\(^{108}\) An extreme figure was the Japanese journalist and historian Soho Tokutomi. He was a radical advocate of Pan-Asianism and urged the Meiji Government to declare the “Asian Monroe Doctrine” in the early 1900s.\(^{109}\) The extremist argued that “the fate of Asia must be decided by Asians” and the West should be thus expelled from Asia.\(^{110}\)

The historian Ikegami Eiko’s observation that the Japanese state in this era was trapped in the dilemma of whether to respect “practical nationhood” or “spiritual nationhood” best describes the dynamics.\(^{111}\) The pro-Western policymakers and intellectuals were certain that Westernization was in practice the most effective way to defend the nation from foreign threats from their experiences studying overseas.\(^{112}\) However, the conservatives and the mass found the pro-Western policy as a violation of Japan’s spiritual belief and historical

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107 Zhao, “Japan’s Response to the Fall and Rise of China: The Shift of Foreign Policy Mainstream Thinking,” 250.
108 Yabunaka, Kokka no Meiun [Fate of the Nation]: 48-49. And; Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann, Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (Wiltshire: Routledge, 2007). 4.
109 Saaler and Koschmann, Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders 4.
110 Ibid. Moreover, inspired by the idea of establishing the “League of Nations” in Europe in the aftermath of the First World War, Soho urged the Government to found the “Ajia Renmei” [the Asian League] as well.
112 Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period: 18.
conventions.\textsuperscript{113} This led to the consecutive outbreak of civil wars between the two blocs – such as Boshin War (1868-69) and the Satsuma Rebellion (1877).\textsuperscript{114}

Yet, interestingly, Japan did not undergo any era of national partition despite the social uncertainties and military uprisings, like America did during its civil war between 1861 and 1865. The most widely accepted explanation for this situation was the force of nationalism.\textsuperscript{115} The doctrine of nationalism was indeed a new idea for the Japanese. As discussed before, for over many centuries, Japanese people regarded themselves as the citizens of the Han domain they lived in, and not of the “nation” of Japan. Nonetheless, the rapid inflow of Western influences changed this custom. The arrival of Perry and the inflow of ‘non-Tokugawa’ and ‘non-Edo’ influences then urged Japanese society to develop the concept of “foreigners,” meaning “non-Tokugawa/Edo peoples,” for the first time in history after the 260 years of isolation.\textsuperscript{116} The idea of nationalism then rapidly developed throughout the rest of the nineteenth century. With the Meiji Government’s issuing of the Constitution of “Empire of Japan,” the mass then started to recognize itself as “Japanese” citizens and that a state called “Japan” in the “world” had existed.\textsuperscript{117} Therefore, the era between 1853 and the early 1890s was the period when the Japanese people developed the senses of “national unity” and “internationality” in Western terms. Yet, this did not mean, as this section has examined, the

\textsuperscript{113} Rozman, “Internationalism and Asianism in Japanese Strategic Thought from Meiji to Heisei,” 211.
\textsuperscript{114} The Boshin War was fought from 1868 and 1869 between the ruling Tokugawa regime and the new Meiji government. It was fought amongst the armed men and did not bring Japan into a total war or a severe civil war that result in the country in complete disaster. The war ended with Meiji’s victory and expelled all of the Tokugawa officials from the governmental sphere. After then Japan experienced no civil war in the country. For more on the Boshin War, see: Marius, J. B. (1999). The Meiji Restoration Cambridge History of Japan (Vol. 5, pp. 308-366). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The Satuma Rebellion was the last civil war fought between the Satsuma domain (the ex-Samurai faction) and the Meiji Government (i.e. Empire of Japan). Fought in 1877 in the Southern island of Kyushu, the uprising did not involve civilians and was a conventional war. It ended with complete victory of the Meiji Government. For more, see: Augustus Henry Mounsey, \textit{Satsuma Rebellion: An Episode of Modern Japanese History} (London: Murray, 1879).
\textsuperscript{115} For more on nationalism, see: Christopher Thorne, \textit{Ideology and Power: Studies in Major Ideas and Events of the Twentieth Century} (London: Collier-MacMillan, 1965).
\textsuperscript{116} Maruyama, \textit{Thoughts and Behaviours in Modern Japanese Politics}: 138.
\textsuperscript{117} Sandra Wilson, ed. \textit{Nation and Nationalism in Japan} (Chippenham: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 5.
nation was completely unified. The factions of different ideologies on Japanese state-building continued to exist and challenge the pro-Western Meiji Government.

As a Rising Empire: Japan’s Quest for Honour, 1890s – 1919

By the early 1890s, the Meiji modernization in the domestic sphere was reaching the proposed standard of development. The state’s grand strategy was hence no longer to prioritize industrialization and the “catch up with the West” campaign. In this period, the Government redefined the national objective as to “overtake the West.” Precisely, it stated the obtainment of a great power status so that they could overthrow the series of ‘unfair treaties’ the Tokugawa regime had signed in the 1850s. The leaders wanted to inform the world, especially the Western counterparts, that Japan was no longer a savage state in the Far East, but was a civilized power with modern institutions and international mind. The governmental leaders believed Japan was ready for a respected title after the intense years of modernization.

118 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 until 2000: 199-203. According to Kennedy’s research, Japan in 1890 had the world’s fifth largest population; had the eighth highest per capital levels of industrialization; had eighth largest iron/steel production capability; seventh largest energy consumption; eighth largest army and navy by personnel; and eighth largest warship tonnage. Japan was usually after countries such as Britain, America, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Russia and Italy.


This period saw many of Japan’s military and diplomatic attempts and struggles in pursuing the objective.\textsuperscript{121} The leaders especially saw that military success was “the single most important part of the standard argument that Japan had become or was becoming a great nation.”\textsuperscript{122} Seeing the Western counterparts such as Britain, France and America, had developed their national strength by winning wars, the Japanese Government believed that Japan should follow suit.\textsuperscript{123} The building of diplomatic strength was considered as an important part of modernization as well. The Japanese saw that the Great Powers of the West had reinforced their military strength by forming alliances and writing treaties that defined their diplomatic ranking in the international community.\textsuperscript{124} The leaders of Japan decided to work on them too.

The Japanese campaign began with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, in which Japan gained Taiwan as its first overseas colony in the aftermath. The war served two purposes for the Japanese. First, the victory over Asia’s power might, the Qing Dynasty, meant that the Japanese empire was then the most powerful state in the region.\textsuperscript{125} Second, the acquisition of Taiwan turned the Japanese state into a colonial empire just like how the Great Powers of the international community were.\textsuperscript{126} The Japanese Government then started to modernize Taiwan in order to show the West that Japan was modernized enough to enlighten other

\textsuperscript{121} Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period: 31.
\textsuperscript{123} Itoh, “Shisei Houshin Enzetsu [Policy Speech] - Given on 1 December 1892.”
\textsuperscript{125} Zhao, “Japan’s Response to the Fall and Rise of China: The Shift of Foreign Policy Mainstream Thinking,” 248.
peoples. The leaders wanted to emphasize that Japan could share the burden of the ‘civilized’
states along with the Western empires.  

Although historians rarely discuss the Japanese presence, the Hague Peace Conference of
1899 was the first multilateral conference attended by Japan in history. Japan was one of the
five Asian countries at the Hague conference. The Japanese delegate, being basked in the
afterglow of the triumph in 1895, headed to the Netherlands with jubilation. Government
officials back in Tokyo and the delegate both saw the Conference, where the Great Powers of
the international community all participated, as a great opportunity to elevate its international
status. The Japanese delegate’s chief objective was therefore to make contributing
suggestions and inform the Western counterparts that Japan was ready to respect the
principles of international law along with the civilized nations of the West.

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130 Frederick Pollock, The League of Nations (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1920). 48. The British jurist Frederick Pollack commented in 1920 that the promoter of the Peace Conference, Nicholas II of Russia, issued his appeals to the “civilized world through the representatives of their government.” The fact that Japan received an invitation from Nicholas II meant two significant points for the Japanese. First, Japan’s international image in 1899 amongst the Western leaders was no longer totally barbarian and was rather civilized. The victory against the sleeping giant of Qing in 1899 possibly catalyzed the West’s altered view on Japan. Second, Japan gained the access to the international community. The Conference granted the Japanese the context that Japan was no longer an isolated nation in the Far East, but a prospective member of the international community.
The Japanese representatives, however, failed to achieve the *noblesse oblige*. The Japanese delegate was in great confusion at the conference because they had been never exposed to Western-style and multilateral conventions before. The representatives spent most of their time observing how Western politics worked. They could not make meaningful suggestions that convinced the Western representatives to see Japan as a ‘modern’ power. The Japanese delegate thus had “no objection to the project of [a] convention for the mediation and arbitration as mentioned … *provided however that all the continental powers do likewise.*” Similarly, the German delegate Alexander von Siebold described the Japanese officials that they were “entering the European diplomatic concert … (as it were) through the backdoor.” The Government leaders back in Tokyo thus saw the Japanese participation in the Hague Conference with “considerable disappointment.” In fact, none of the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers in this era mentioned the Conference in their policy speeches.

The Japanese struggle at The Hague in 1889 implied that Japanese policymakers were not ready yet to incorporate multilateral bonds in their diplomatic agenda. Bilateralism was still the mainstream type of bonding the Japanese sought to develop. The Japanese involvement in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 and the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 implied such a Japanese state of affairs.

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134 Ibid. The quote is from MT 2.41.2 vol.II (emphasis added) [no further detail on publication details given]
137 There is no document related to the Hague Conferences on the leading online database for Japanese primary sources of: Akihiko Tanaka, "De-ta Be-su: Sekai to Nihon [Database: the World and Japan], “ the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, the University of Tokyo, http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/index.html.
The conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 marked the end of Japan’s diplomatic isolation in the international community. In the closing decade of the nineteenth century, the emergence of the Dual and the Triple Alliances had put the secluded Japanese (and the British) state in a disadvantageous situation. The intervention of Russia, Germany and France against Japan at the close of the Sino-Japanese War in April 1895 forced the Japanese to relinquish their interests in China. This incident alerted the Japanese to the significance of alliance in the pursuit of national interests. The alliance with Britain in 1902 was hence a remarkable phenomenon for the Japanese. The partnership did not only grant Japan a ‘first-class’ ally that strengthened its diplomatic and military position in the international community. The Japanese state under the leadership of the Prime Minister Katsura Taro also regarded that the treaty with Britain indicated that the West had finally recognized Japan as a civilized state. History had shown that the act of negotiating, signing and practicing alliances only occurred amongst the Great Powers; and never between a Great Power and an uncivilized state. Backward countries were rather the subjects for colonialism. Katsura and his successors saw the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a symbol of Western recognition that Japan had then become a civilized power.

The Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05 had an exceptional effect on the redefinition of Japanese internationalism. In addition to Japanese annexation of the Korean Peninsula, the triumph

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urged the Japanese leaders to re-think of their understanding of ‘Westernization’ and ‘modernization.’ Prior to 1905, the Japanese authorities understood two words as the same idea. This tendency reflected how the two concepts were introduced to Japanese societies in the 1850s. As we have seen in Fukuzawa’s literature, the Meiji Government regarded Western ideas as the “most modernized school of thought.” In other words, the word ‘West’ did not refer to any specific country, but to “the group of Western nations” in general as the utopian symbol of enlightenment. As a matter of fact, the key figures prior to 1905 had rarely specified which country the word “West” exactly referred to.

The victory in 1905 then slowly changed the understanding. The Japanese forces defeated the Russians (or the ‘West’) who were once believed to be so highly modernized that Japan would stand no chance of defeating. The Japanese leaders then began to distinguish the concepts of “Westernization” from “Modernization” and treat them as different perceptions for the first time in history. The figures in the post-1905 years started stating Western countries by name in their speeches. For example, Katsura who led Japan to conclude the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and achieve victory in the Russo-Japanese War gave a speech at the National Diet on 21 January 1909;

Now our diplomatic relations with the Teimei Rekkoku [the Great Powers] are becoming more friendly, especially with Britain – and through having the United States as the intervener [in concluding the Russo-Japanese War], the Russo-Japanese relations are getting better too. We aim to have no misunderstandings [with the Great Powers] and we are now even more determined to defend the Peace in the East.

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This alteration seen in the expression of world affairs implied that the Japanese authorities had slowly begun to consolidate their understanding of modernity with more vivid and concrete norms. The general term ‘West’ was no longer used as frequently as before. The more specific notions such as ‘Britain’ and ‘America’ started to occupy more spaces in the Japanese understanding of modernity. The “bonds” the diplomatic policymakers aimed to make in the coming years, thus, began to particularly concentrate on the ones with the ‘truly advanced’ countries of the West.

In 1907, Japan attended the Second Peace Conference at The Hague. The Japanese delegate was led by Tsuzuki Keiroku. At the opening session of the Conference, Tsuzuki clearly outlined Japan’s ambition to be recognized as a Great Power, particularly from the “most advanced countries” in the world. He called for the Western powers to see his country “with admirable tact and dignity” and equal to the French or the English. With the victory against Russia, Tsuzuki believed that Japan then had the right to be finally treated as a first-class citizen of the international community. For these reasons, the Japanese delegate engaged in the discussions actively and sought to make meaningful comments. Tsuzuki was determined not to repeat the mistake their predecessors made at the Convention of 1899.

149 Muntarbhorn, "The 1899 Hague Peace Conference and the Development of the Laws of War: Asia’s Contribution to the Quest for Humanitarianism?,” 113. The delegate for the 1907 convention was consisted of: Tsuzuki Keirōku (diplomat), Sato Yoshimaro (diplomat), Terauchi Masatake (General of the Japanese Imperial Army), Saito Makoto (General of the Japanese Imperial Navy, later the Prime Minister (1932-34)). Tsuzuki was born on 17 February 1861. He studied at the University of Berlin in 1882 as a student sent by the Meiji Government. He entered MOFA in 1886. He served as an assistant officer at the Japanese embassy at Russia. For more, see: National Diet Library, "Tsuzuki Keirōku kankei bunsho [Documents on Tsuzuki Keirōku],” National Diet Library, http://rnavi.ndl.go.jp/kensei/entry/tsudukikeiroku.php.
Japan then entered the First World War in Asia in August 1914. The terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 imposed upon the Japanese the responsibility to “help their ally when hostilities broke out.” As the historians Burkman and Pyle have commonly argued, the Japanese leaders had regarded the war as a great chance to pursue the obtainment of a great power status. The wartime Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu gave a speech to the National Diet on 5 September 1914, roughly after a week after the nation’s participation in the war;

… in order to protect the Perpetual Peace in the East, the [Japanese] Empire has decided to declare war on Germany. We, along with the citizens of our Allied nations, believe in sincere justice and fair attitudes … I believe that war for the maintenance of peace is our people’s common wish [that there would no disagreements]. Hence, the Government … believes in the immediate need for a military action …

As seen in Okuma’s words, the Japanese Government showed no hesitation in participating in the Great War. He even declared that the entry into WWI was what the “common wish” of Japanese society. The Japanese forces then fought the German army in Chinese cities. Through defeating another European power in a war, the Japanese authorities believed that Japan’s international status as a modernized, first-class power in the international community would be solidified furthermore.

152 John F. Howes and George Oshiro, “Who was Nitobe?,” in Nitobe Inazo: Japan's Bridge Across the Pacific, ed. John F. Howes (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 17. For the primary source of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, see: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, "Dai Ikkai Nichi-Ei Doumei Kyouyaku [The First Agreement on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance]." (Tokyo1902). The closing paragraph of the document stated: “… I [Baron Hayashi Tadasu] have the honour to inform you that the British Government recognizes that the naval forces of Great Britain should, so far as possible, act in concert with those of Japan in time of peace, and agrees that mutual facilities shall be given for the docking and coaling of vessels of war of one country in the ports of the other …”


So in the end we find ourselves possible to affirm that the Japanese state’s objective in this era was to actively engage in international politics and obtain a respected title in the world. The political leaders, diplomats and intellectuals had commonly seen the West as an ideal state of nationhood and believed that Japan, as an underdeveloped state, had to catch up with them as quickly as possible. In this regard, the international bonds the Japanese authorities purposed to establish in this period were largely West-orientated. They did not pay much attention to the rest of the world. Asia was by large considered a backward region where Japan, as a Great Power, was *obliged* to conquest, colonize and enlighten. Thus, while Japanese authorities saw the world as a tri-polar concert – the West, Asia and Japan – they clearly ranked their importance hierarchically.

to see the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919 with critical importance. The Japanese Government saw with the “Wilsonian” ideas would allow Japan to obtain recognition as a first-class citizen without any discriminative notions.

“Men live peacefully as long as their old way of life is maintained and there is no change in customs.”

– Niccolo Machiavelli

Introduction

This chapter explores the development of Japanese internationalism with primary emphasis on Japan-League relations. It argues that the idealization of the West continued to be the most fundamental drive of the Japanese diplomatic bonding. The Government strived to play contributing roles at Geneva in order to develop a great power status. Such an ambition, nonetheless, faced many difficulties. As seen in the Japanese withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, the two parties failed to cultivate corresponding interests. The rise of nationalist and Pan-Asianist leaders in the early 1930s then turned Japanese internationalism into an ultranationalist and militarist ideology. WWII in Asia then broke out in December 1941. It signified the fall of pro-Western internationalism that the Japanese figures had cultivated since 1853.

The question of national identity continued to divide Japan’s political sphere into the two opposing philosophical factions.\(^{158}\) The pro-Western figures of this era, such as Uchida Kousai and Shidehara Kijuro, believed in Fukuzawa’s *Datsu-A Nyu-O* (Leave Asia, enter West) rhetoric. They proposed peaceful coexistence with Western powers and advocated Japan’s membership in the League of Nations.\(^{159}\) On the other hand, the authorities of the Pan-Asian and nationalist bloc, led by Tanaka Giichi, Matsuoka Yosuke and Tojo Hideki, were sceptical of the pro-Western foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson’s rejection of Japan’s racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 was especially influential. They developed an anti-Western sentiment and criticized the League as a ‘manipulated’ arena that favoured the conveniences of the Western states.\(^{160}\)

For many observers, the interwar period is a byword for the League’s failure and humiliation.\(^{161}\) The organization’s inability to solve the ‘German problem’ and the outbreak of WWII in September 1939 is often exemplified.\(^{162}\) This thesis yet shows that there is another side of history. That is, the fact that intellectuals were putting the effort in the making of international peace behind the scene. Their struggles and achievements are best traceable in the practices and thoughts of the Japanese agricultural economist, author and scholar

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\(^{158}\) Stegewerns, *Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan: Autonomy, Asian Brotherhood, or World Citizenship?*, 31.


Nitobe Inazo. 163 As an individual who had spent his youth in international environments, Nitobe knew the difficulty of developing intercultural understanding himself. He anticipated the interchange of the East (i.e. Japan) and the West (i.e. America, Britain, etc.) at Geneva would have the great potential for diplomatic turmoil. His career as the Under-Secretary General of the League Secretariat (1920-1926) was thus a challenge to construct a bridge between the parties of different civilizational background. 164

Contrasting Interests: Japan and the West at Paris and Geneva

The Japanese state was the “odd man out” in the international community of this period. 165 Japan was exceptional because, in the first place, it was identified by the West and by its own community as not a Western state. The cultural, religious and geographical Asian state’s

163 Nitobe Inazo is one of the most studied Japanese figures in terms of a Japanese individual who served the League of Nations in the early years. As a matter of fact, a number of historians have investigated his role at the League. Some of the examples include: Thomas W. Burkman, "Nitobe Inazo: From World Order to Regional Order," in Culture and Identity: Japanese Intellectuals during the Interwar Years, ed. J. Thomas Rimer (Princeton: Princeton University, 1990); Izumi Hirobe, "Kokusai Renmei Chiteki Kyouryoku Kokusai Iinkai no Sousetsu to Nitobe Inazo [The Foundation of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation at the League of Nations and Nitobe Inazo]," The Annual Report on Cultural Science 121(2007); Norihiko Ikeda, "International Development and Its Pioneer, Nitobe Inazo," Takushoku University History Review 4(2000); And; Miwa Kimitada, "Colonial Theories and Practices in Prewar Japan," in Nitobe Inazo: Japan's Bridge Across the Pacific, ed. John F. Howes (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). However, I must say, their analysis on why he was involved with what purpose was inadequate. Not many of the historians looked back at his education background and upbringing and sought to investigate what kind of experience made Nitobe the kind of internationalist he became in 1920. Moreover, most studies only focus on Nitobe and not in an overview. In other words, the historians looked solely at Nitobe and his accomplishments, and not necessarily at the relations with other institutions, the Japanese Government, and other actors in the international community at the time.

164 Nitobe was also a prominent member of the Institute of Pacific Relations (1926-1933). For more, see: Tomoko Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919-45 (New York: Routledge, 2003).

165 The expression “odd man out” was referenced from: Northedge, The League of Nations: its life and times, 1920-1946 137.
participation in the West-centric community then began to slowly challenge the West-centric perception of international politics.\textsuperscript{166}

The main objectives of the Japanese delegate at the Paris Peace Conference (PPC) were: (1) the removal of the West’s racist thoughts on non-Western peoples; and (2) the consolidation of Japan’s great power status.\textsuperscript{167} The race question was essential for the elites because, most importantly, being ‘Asian’ was not regarded as being ‘civilized’ in the international arena of this era.\textsuperscript{168} In other words, the Social Darwinist world order indicated that the Japanese empire would not be recognized as a “Great Power” for its ‘Asian’ identity. Moreover, the West’s racist worldviews, as illustrated in America’s of anti-immigration movement and the White Australia Policy that legally ratified racial discrimination, had then influenced the Japanese public to grow anti-Western sentiments.\textsuperscript{169} Baron Makino Nobuaki of the Japanese delegate thus gave a speech at Paris and called for the principle of racial equality:

\begin{quote}
The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of States members to extend League equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.\textsuperscript{170}
\end{quote}

Through this proposal, Makino aimed to ease his home country’s domestic frustration and realize Japan’s national creed of obtaining a great power status. In addition, as the leading

\textsuperscript{166} Stegewerns, “The Break with Europe: Japanese Views of the Old World after the first World War,” 40.
\textsuperscript{167} Rozman, “Internationalism and Asianism in Japanese Strategic Thought from Meiji to Heisei,” 215.
\textsuperscript{169} Shimazu, \textit{Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919}. 1. The US Immigration Act that limited the number of immigrants from Japan was passed officially in 1924. Yet historians say that the social and political movements themselves were active since this era.
\textsuperscript{170} Matsushita, \textit{Japan in the League of Nations} 15-16.
Japanese diplomat of the interwar time Ishii Kikujiro had pointed out, by the word “equality” the Japanese Government did not mean … in point of wealth, natural resources and military strength … What Japan has insisted upon, what she still insists upon, is that she shall not be made the objective of discrimination and derogatory treatment by any of the nations with whom she has relations.  

The grand objective of the Japanese Government and delegate at the Conference was thus to cultivate the consensus of sovereign equality amongst the Great Powers. The Japanese challenge, nonetheless, faced three obstacles at Paris and Geneva that prevented the Japanese desire from coming true.

First, the Western representatives declined Japan’s racial equality proposal at Paris. The American, British and Australian delegates were especially against the idea. These powers were the advocates of the Social Darwinist doctrines so to defend their national interests. For example, Woodrow Wilson justified the US colonization of the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Guam as ‘civilizing missions’ that would enlighten the indigenous populations. The West’s decline made the Japanese delegate sceptical about the Geneva order. While Wilson’s Fourteen Points stated “equality among the peoples of the world” as one of the chief

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172 Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 131. And; Glenda Sluga, The Nation, Psychology, and International Politics, 1870-1919 (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006). 19. The historian Glenda Sluga points out that the Japanese proposal of racial equality was supported by some representatives of the Council of Ten,” such as the Italian Prime Minister Orlando and the French delegate. It was largely Wilson, and followed by the national representatives of Britain and Australia, who predominantly rejected the Japanese idea.
175 Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 2. Hatakeyama and Freedman, Snow on the Pine: Japan's Quest for a Leadership Role in Asia: 53-54. According to Hatakeyama and Freedman the Prime Minister of Australia Billy Hughes was the most combative figure who rejected Japan’s racial equality proposal. He saw the Japanese suggestion a “virtual attack” on its “White Australia” policy.
principles, such an idea was only applied in Euro-American contexts in reality.\textsuperscript{176} This international climate critically disappointed the Japanese. The decline influenced the Japanese leaders to see as if the West was ganging up on Japan to undermine the non-Western power’s desire to obtain a great power status.\textsuperscript{177}

Second, the different experiences the parties underwent in WWI caused their main interests at Paris to differ.\textsuperscript{178} On one hand, the Great War was an “event unprecedented in the sheer scale of its destruction” that “extinguished millions of lives and caused untold devastations” for the vast majority of the European powers.\textsuperscript{179} The war had also collapsed the balance-of-power order that had stemmed out from the Westphalia Treaty of 1648, which was believed to have stabilized European relations until 1914. Therefore, the British and French Governments at the end of WWI were especially keen to establish new institutions that would reconsolidate regional order and guarantee their country’s security.\textsuperscript{180} The British King George V’s message to the League of Nations Union in 13 October 1919 best illustrated the ambition;

\begin{quote}
We fought to gain a lasting peace, and it is our supreme duty to take every measure to secure it.

For that nothing is more essential than a strong and enduring League of Nations.\textsuperscript{181}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{176} Woodrow Wilson, "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points" Yale Law School: Lillian Goldman Law Library, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp. In the closing paragraph, it stated “For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved … We do not wish to fight her [Germany] either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world, -- the new world in which we now live, -- instead of a place of mastery.”


The American delegate had a similar determination. Their chief objective was to establish a world order that would ensure America’s peacefulness, neutrality and isolation.\textsuperscript{182} Under the policy of the Monroe Doctrine, US Government wanted to stay out of any foreign disputes.\textsuperscript{183} The Americans thus perceived their entry into WWI as an ‘enforced participation’ against their will and the root of all evil was the European instability.\textsuperscript{184}

On the contrary, the Japanese Government perceived the Conference not in terms of peacemaking but as an opportunity to consolidate its great power status.\textsuperscript{185} Peacemaking was not the Japanese delegate’s main interest because WWI was not a hazardous experience for them.\textsuperscript{186} The Japanese state did not undergo any severe naval or land battles. Their involvement was limited to small military combats in China and the Pacific islands against the German powers.\textsuperscript{187} Yet, with the fact that Japan played roles in WWI and thus contributed to the Allied victory in 1919, the Japanese expected PPC to become a historical milestone in which Japan would be recognized as a “Great Power” with honour and dignity. They thus thought the West would revise their Social Darwinist stereotype on Japan.

\textsuperscript{182} Funao, “Japanese Attitude towards the League of Nations : A Study on a Preparatory Stage for the Paris Peace on Conference ” 22. 
\textsuperscript{184} Funao, “Japanese Attitude towards the League of Nations : A Study on a Preparatory Stage for the Paris Peace on Conference ” 21-25; Taylor, \textit{The Origins of the Second World War}: 57. As a matter of fact, the Zimmermann Telegram incident and the German attack on RMS Lusitania which resulted in over 130 American deaths were the main factors that urged the US to join WWI. For more on the Telegram, see: Joachim von zur Gathen, “Zimmerman Telegram: The Original Draft,” \textit{Cryptologia} 31, no. 1 (2007). For more on Lusitania, see: Thomas A. Bailey, “The Sinking of the Lusitania,” \textit{The American History Review} 41, no. 1 (1935). 
\textsuperscript{185} Rozman, “Internationalism and Asianism in Japanese Strategic Thought from Meiji to Heisei,” 215. 
Lastly, the geopolitics of empire was another issue at Paris. For the Japanese, one of the main interests was the China question. The colonial conquest of Chinese territories had long been one of Japan’s imperial interests.\footnote{Ibid., 17.} The Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo (in office 1898-1900), for instance, had addressed that “[t]he vastness of Manchuria and Eastern Siberia lured the island empire in search of raw materials and a safety valve for its growing population.”\footnote{Ibid.} In this context, the Japanese delegate showed the greatest interest in the discussions on the post-war settlement of German territories in China, especially the Shangdong Peninsula, which had critical geopolitical importance on the Japanese foreign agenda.\footnote{Cullen, A History of Japan, 1582 - 1941: Internal and External Worlds: 246-47.} By contrast, the Big Four’s regional agenda largely focused on Europe. The reconstruction of Central Europe and regulation of German reparation dominated their discussions.\footnote{Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anti-Colonial Nationalism: 4;} The objective of the British and French delegates was, for instance, to prevent Germany from becoming a menace again.\footnote{Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War: 49-51.} They barely discussed post-war settlement of Asia with much attention, which made the Japanese delegate to re-recognize the West’s slight on non-Western regions and peoples.

The Japanese delegate, however, did not spill out their frustration at Paris. When the debate on the European question was to the fore, the Japanese delegate rather went silent.\footnote{Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War: 49.} A British newspaper on 28 January 1919 reported that Makino and his men were reading the documents quietly and were barely listening to the Euro-American debate.\footnote{Shinohara, Kokusai Renmei: Sekai Heiwa heno Yume to Zasetsu [The League of Nations: Dreams and Difficulties towards World Peace]: 62.} The Western leaders found the Japanese delegate’s attitude extremely impolite. French and British

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item[Ibid.]Ibid., 17.
\item[Ibid.]Ibid.
\item[Cullen]Cullen, A History of Japan, 1582 - 1941: Internal and External Worlds: 246-47.
\item[Taylor]Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War: 49-51. The “Big Four” refers to the following figures: Woodrow Wilson, David L. George, Vittorio Orlando, and George Clemenceau. The historian Paul Kennedy adds that the major problems of Europe was the foundation of the so-called “successor states” such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – which were “formerly part of the Habsburg, Romanov and Hohenzollern empires.” For more on Kennedy’s explanation, see: Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 until 2000: 275.
\item[Shinohara]Shinohara, Kokusai Renmei: Sekai Heiwa heno Yume to Zasetsu [The League of Nations: Dreams and Difficulties towards World Peace]: 62.
\item[Ibid.]Ibid., 62-63.
\end{thebibliography}
newspapers in January 1919 criticized the Japanese delegates as “self-centred” people and used ironic expressions such as “silent partner” to express Japan’s uncooperative attitude.\textsuperscript{195}

There were two reasons why the Japanese delegates acted so passively. First, they wanted to avoid making ‘unnecessary’ antagonism with any Great Powers at the conference.\textsuperscript{196} Their interests at the meeting were straightforward: Chinese territory and racial equality.\textsuperscript{197} As their objectives were accomplished earlier in the Conference, the delegate saw no critical point in taking the risk to demand more from the West, which could give rise to extra ‘unnecessary’ issues. Second, the Japanese Government had told the diplomats not to rebel against the Western representatives at the Conference. The leaders back in Tokyo had insecurities regarding the Japanese diplomats’ lack of experience in multilateral diplomacy.\textsuperscript{198} Japan prior to 1919 indeed had experiences of diplomatic negotiations, but most of them were bilateral cases such as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were the only multilateral conventions they had ever attended.

For these reasons, PPC and Japan’s membership in the League did not gain much support from the Japanese general public and amongst the traditionalist and Pan-Asianist members in the Government.\textsuperscript{199} The military officials of the Kwantung Army were the leading protesting

\textsuperscript{196} Shinohara, \textit{Kokusai Renmei: Sekai Heiwa heno Yume to Zasetsu [The League of Nations: Dreams and Difficulties towards World Peace]}: 62.
\textsuperscript{198} Shinohara, \textit{Kokusai Renmei: Sekai Heiwa heno Yume to Zasetsu [The League of Nations: Dreams and Difficulties towards World Peace]}: 62.
\textsuperscript{199} Funao, “Japanese Attitude towards the League of Nations : A Study on a Preparatory Stage for the Paris Peace on Conference” 24; Taylor, \textit{The Origins of the Second World War}: 67. Taylor adds that Japan’s partnership with Britain had \textit{de facto} collapsed at the Paris Peace Conference. In 1919, Japan was at diplomatic antagonism with all France, America, Australia, Germany and Russia. Britain was also one of the countries that
faction. They were frustrated by the Government leaders for not taking enough actions to emphasize Japan’s national interests.200 The sceptical view of the West was common amongst the general public as well. According to the historian Funao Akiko, hardly any newspapers in the early 1920s published articles that praised the government’s decision to join the League.201

The ruling authorities of the Japanese Government in 1919 were mostly the successors of pro-Western Meiji leaders and hence the advocates of Fukuzawa’s Datsu-A Nyu-O rhetoric. They saw optimistically that the racial question would slowly fade if Japan, as the representative of Asia, made significant contributions to the League restlessly. The Foreign Minister Uchida Kousai gave a speech to the National Diet on 22 January 1920:

… [the League Covenant] is the Great Charter of the New World … The [Japanese] Government has always wished to live in peace and to promote the further practice of international cooperation … We believe that our international reputation will be greatly enhanced [with the establishment of the League of Nations and Japan as a permanent member] and the diplomatic relations with the Great Powers would become even more important and strong. It will also grant us the chances to participate in the operations of world peacemaking … and I believe this is our Empire’s obligation.202

The Government sent some of the most talented men, again, such as Makino, Nitobe Inazo and Ishii Kikuiro to serve the League system.203 This time the officials were not just sent as the representative of the Japanese Government. Few of them were dispatched to serve the

decayed Japan’s racial equality proposal. For the Japanese, the PPC was a total failure: it lost its tie with Britain and became an isolated power in the Far East again.
200 Richard Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894-1943 (London: The MacMillan Press, 1979). 211. The Kwantung Army was one of the military factions in the Imperial Japanese Army in the first half of the twentieth century. Its Headquarters was set in Hsinking, Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army was responsible of Japan’s successful expansion in the Chinese mainland. The phrase “Kwantung” is sometimes worded “Canton” depending on the form of English-Chinese translation system historians use.
League agencies as ‘international officials’ like Nitobe and Yoshizawa Kenkichi. This change in the form of interaction indicated that the Japanese Government was no longer satisfied with the fact that Japan participating in international frameworks. It demanded the country to actually be part of them too.\textsuperscript{204} The Japanese Government also made monetary contributions. The financial share of the 1928 budget, for example, allocated Japan about US$291,000, which was indeed “as large as that of Italy and next only to that of Great Britain, France and Germany.”\textsuperscript{205} This was despite Japan’s inferior capability in industry and economy compared to the European Powers.

These efforts reflected the Japanese Government’s commitment not to repeat the bitter experience at The Hague Conferences and PPC.\textsuperscript{206} While the result of the Paris Peace Conference was not a very welcoming outcome, the governmental consensus was yet to stay in the Geneva order and strive to develop a great power status.

\textsuperscript{204} Japan had already attended a number of international conferences – such as The Hague Conferences and the Paris Peace Conference in which the Government sent the talented men to. This time they wanted something more than just sending and discussing as part of the international community.

\textsuperscript{205} Northedge, \textit{The League of Nations: its life and times, 1920-1946} 157.

Nitobe Inazo: Between the East and the West

Nitobe Inazo (1862-1933) was one of the Japanese figures who aimed to grant Japan a just place in the international community in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{207} For many, he is well-known for being an internationalist and the world’s first non-Western official to become the Under-Secretary General of the League of Nations in 1920.\textsuperscript{208} He is also famous as a patriot for writing the book \textit{Bushido: The Soul of Japan} published in 1900. Nitobe was also a Social Darwinist.\textsuperscript{209} He believed that Japan was in the “forefront of the Civilization in the East” and justified the Japanese expansionist and colonial policies in Taiwan and Korea.\textsuperscript{210} He was therefore often reviewed as an ‘international nationalist’ who represented both particularistic and universal ideas.\textsuperscript{211}

When the Tokugawa Government was toppled in the mid-1850s, Nitobe was five years old.\textsuperscript{212} The Meiji reformation, which forced Japanese people to mingle with the international community, alerted the peoples that “no longer could individuals limit their allegiance to their local areas.”\textsuperscript{213} They had to then “think of themselves as Japanese as opposed to the peoples

\textsuperscript{207} Nitobe’s life as an internationalist is best studied by the following scholarship: Hitoshi Hanai, \textit{Kokusai Jin Nitobe Inazo: Bushido to Kirisuto Kyo [The Internationalist Nitobe Inazo: Bushido and Christianity]} (Kashiwa-Shi: Hiroike Gakuen 1994). And; John F. Howes, ed. \textit{Nitobe Inazo: Japan's Bridge across the Pacific} (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). Historians, diplomats, political scientists such as Thomas W. Burkman, Akami Tomoko, Yasaka Takaki, and Matsushita Masatoshi have also analysed Nitobe’s philosophy of internationalism as well.

\textsuperscript{208} Akami, \textit{Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919-45} 82.

\textsuperscript{209} Burkman, \textit{Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914-1938} 146-47.

\textsuperscript{210} Akami, \textit{Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919-45} 83.

\textsuperscript{211} Hanai, \textit{Kokusai Jin Nitobe Inazo: Bushido to Kirisuto Kyo [The Internationalist Nitobe Inazo: Bushido and Christianity]} 4.

\textsuperscript{212} Howes and Oshiro, “Who was Nitobe?,” 8.

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.
of many countries who began to appear among them.\textsuperscript{214} Because Nitobe grew up in this environment, he was exposed to pro-Western and modernist thoughts from this youth. Under the Meiji Government’s educational curriculum, Nitobe studied Western understanding of nationhood and modernization with society’s expectation to become a government official who would lead Japan in the future.\textsuperscript{215}

His experience studying abroad in his twenties cultivated his further sense of internationalism. He lived in America and Germany in the 1880s and studied politics, diplomacy and philosophy at the Johns Hopkins University and the University of Bonn.\textsuperscript{216} As a student in the so-called “New-Manifest-Destiny” America, Nitobe was strongly exposed to the creeds of “enlightenment,” “frontier and expansion” and “civilization.”\textsuperscript{217} He was also in the same politics classes with Woodrow Wilson – who later became the President of the United States in 1913 and establisher of the League of Nations in 1919.\textsuperscript{218} Historians commonly point out that this contact inspired Nitobe to develop the idea of so-called “Wilsonian Liberalism” that enabled him to become the Under-Secretary General of the League in 1920.\textsuperscript{219}

The experience living overseas also granted Nitobe the opportunity to realize how Japan and Japanese people were seen in Western communities. The reality was disappointing: Nitobe saw that only a few Americans could tell where Japan was on the world map, and most of

\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{215} Hanai, \textit{Kokusai Jin Nitobe Inazo: Bushido to Kirisuto Kyo [The Internationalist Nitobe Inazo: Bushido and Christianity]} 31-32.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., 149-59.
\textsuperscript{218} Hanai, \textit{Kokusai Jin Nitobe Inazo: Bushido to Kirisuto Kyo [The Internationalist Nitobe Inazo: Bushido and Christianity]} 106.
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid.
them identified “Asians” as one national entity. Nitobe perceived that this reality was problematic. Not only because Japan and China in the late nineteenth century had totally different national interests and international status, had they also had different cultural, social and religious values as well. Nitobe was certain that this improper worldview would not lead the international community to properly understand his home country’s nationhood. Subsequently, during his years in America, Nitobe perceived the need for correcting the West’s perception of the East.

He saw that Western intellectuals had not developed enough understanding on the Japanese state as well. During his stay at Germany in 1887, Nitobe majored in agricultural political-economy under the supervision of the Belgian professor Émile Louis Victor de Laveleye. The following was one of the famous conversations Leveleye and Nitobe had about religious education in Japan:

“Do you mean to say,” asked the venerable professor, “that you have no religious instruction in your schools?” On my reply in the negative he suddenly halted in astonishment, and in a voice which I shall not easily forget, he repeated “No religion! How do you impart moral education?”

Jun Furuya, “Graduate Student and Quaker,” in Nitobe Inazo: Japan's Bridge across the Pacific, ed. John F. Howes (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 57. And; Hanai, Kokusai Jin Nitobe Inazo: Bushido to Kirisuto Kyo [The Internationalist Nitobe Inazo: Bushido and Christianity] 101-02. Referenced from Nitobe’s autobiography Ryugaku Dan [The Experience of Studying Overseas], Hanai gives the following dialogue Nitobe had with this American man on the train from San Francisco to Meadville as an example: the American man asks Nitobe “Where you come from? Are you Chinese?” Nitobe answers, “No, I am from Japan.” The American man gives a surprised look and asks “I have never heard of that country before, is that part of China?” “No, Japan is an island country that lies next to China.” The American nods a few times and says to Nitobe, “I see, in that case, there must be a bridge connecting Japan and China.”

Furuya, "Graduate Student and Quaker," 57.

Hanai, Kokusai Jin Nitobe Inazo: Bushido to Kirisuto Kyo [The Internationalist Nitobe Inazo: Bushido and Christianity] 123.

Since then, the idea of ‘interstate understanding’ began to develop as the key to world peace in Nitobe’s perception of international cooperation. Without knowing each other correctly and thoroughly, Nitobe believed that there could be no way countries and peoples of different cultural background develop trustful and long-lasting partnership. The culture shocks he underwent in America and Germany solidified his determination to realize his lifetime goal of becoming the “bridge across the Pacific Ocean” that would let “the ideas of the West and those of the East travel back and forth unimpeded.”

The attempt is best noticeable in his book _Bushido: The Soul of Japan_, published in English in 1900. Nitobe perceived that the Bushido teachings were the symbol and the “national timbre” of “Japanese-ness” that defined the way Japanese people and state behaved and thought. Through introducing the “timbre,” Nitobe wanted the readers of the West to develop a certain degree of understanding of the Japanese state. In describing Japanese society and history, he often compared and contrasted them with well-known figures and historical incidents of the Western world. For example, he analogized the history of Japanese feudalism with the one of Britain. Nitobe believed such a comparative technique

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224 Hanai, Kokusai Jin Nitobe Inazo: Bushido to Kirisuto Kyo [The Internationalist Nitobe Inazo: Bushido and Christianity] 130. Quoted from Nitobe Inazo Zenshu [Collection of Nitobe Inazo’s Writings], Hanai references one of the letters Nitobe wrote to one of friends back in Japan: “I am a Quaker, a citizen of Japan with an international background … I want to solve these interstate problems that splits countries and religious groups apart [and which causes wars to break out].”


228 Nitobe, _Bushido: Soul of Japan_: vii. In the Preface of the book, he wrote: “All through the discourse I have tried to illustrate whatever points I have made with parallel examples from European history and literature, believing that these will aid in bringing the subject nearer to the comprehension of foreign readers.”

229 Ibid., 6-7. Nitobe writes, “As in England the political institution of feudalism may be said to date from Norman Conquest, so we may say that in Japan its rise was simultaneous with the ascendency of [Minamotono] Yoritomo, late in the twelfth century … Again, in Japan as in Europe, when feudalism was formally inaugurated,
would provide the readers notions on the similarities and differences the state of Japan had with their countries of familiarity – and imagine what kind of a country ‘Japan’ was.

The book introduced the seven important principles of the Bushido teachings. Nitobe highlighted “honour” as the most important doctrine in the traditional Japanese thinking. The obtainment of a respected reputation (or perhaps a respected ‘recognition’) was regarded as the most praised status in Japanese societies; and the loss of honour was the most shameful status one could ever undergo. The ideology of ‘honour’ was therefore one of the earliest to be cherished in juvenile education. In the pursuit of honour, according to Nitobe, the Bushido wisdom induced Japanese people to be stoic, magnanimous, patient and forgiving. Anger and aggression were not the subjects for honour. Making a sincere effort with hard work to succeed was what Japanese society perceived as ‘respectful.’

These beliefs of Bushido were considerably different from Christian teachings, which was the “timbre” of Western societies. Nitobe thus knew that the Japanese entry into the international community would face many challenges. His task at Geneva was thus to support the Japanese delegate to find the nation’s just place in the world without getting them into diplomatic antagonism with the Western powers. In this regard, he perceived that the “bond” that had finally started to develop between the East and the West were not to be wasted.

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230 The seven creed are: Justice, Courage, Benevolence, Politeness, Truthfulness, Honor and Loyalty.
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid., 65-72.
234 Hanai, Kokusai Jin Nitobe Inazo: Bushido to Kirisuto Kyo [The Internationalist Nitobe Inazo: Bushido and Christianity] 36-37. Nitobe himself was a Quaker. He was baptized at Sapporo, Japan, in 1878. Nitobe then was a student at the Sapporo Agricultural College (Sapporo Nou Gakkou), which was well-known for its highly Westernized environment and educational curriculum.
Nitobe was a unique figure amongst the Japanese officials at Geneva. Primarily, he was not formerly a diplomat or a politician like other Japanese officials such as Yoshizawa Kenkichi and Ishii Kikuiro were. Nitobe was a professor of agriculture and agronomy and an author of Japanese culture. Furthermore, the appointment of Nitobe as the Under-Secretary General of the League Secretariat made his legal status not a member of the Japanese delegate. His noblesse oblige at Geneva was therefore not to defend Japan’s national interests in the League framework. Nitobe’s mission was to practice, realize and spread the League Covenant’s ideal. He had to urge the national representatives to regard “international interests” as essential to their “national interests,” as the Preamble of the Covenant stated. For these reasons, Nitobe never sat in the Assembly or the Council meetings as a delegate or cast a vote as a government representative during his career as an Under-Secretary General.

235 Shinohara, Kokusai Renmei: Sekai Heiwa heno Yume to Zasetsu [The League of Nations: Dreams and Difficulties towards World Peace]: 173. Yoshizawa was a member of the League Council. He was originally a diplomat specializing in Euro-American affairs; and he also served as a Japanese representative to China and Russia in the 1920s. Ishii was appointed the head representative of the Japanese delegate at the League in 1920. He was also a diplomat prior to his career at Geneva; he served several Japanese embassies in China in the 1980s and early 1900s. Some of the former politicians who were involved in the League include Saionji Kinmochi and Matsuoka Yousuke.

236 The only profession that had relevance to politics was his service at the Japanese Colonial Government (JCG) in Taiwan. He served as the technical advisor in the plotting of JCG’s agricultural policy in the island. In the early 1900s, the government in Japanese mainland was facing the problem of severe food shortage. Nitobe, as an intellectual of agronomy, was hence responsible of conducting an efficient framework of agricultural development in Taiwan. His ultimate mission was to solve his home country’s fatal issue and not to play political roles.

237 League of Nations, "The Covenant of the League of Nations," Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp. The preamble best illustrates the philosophy of the League system: In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war; by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations; by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and; by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another, Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

238 Inazo Nitobe, Japan: Some Phases of her Problems and Development (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1931). 19. Nitobe described the League must become “the meeting-place of the East and the West,” where “the nations will meet unarmed and bring into harmony the discordant notes of nations and races.”
Most importantly, the League was not “a Super-state.” The organization had no authority to dictate its member states and their international relations. The League was merely a framework of international cooperation that required spontaneous collaboration amongst the member states in order to work effectively and efficiently as a peacemaking organization.\(^{240}\) Nitobe’s job was thus to urge the member states to develop this sense of internationality so that the League would fulfil its duty.

Nitobe was an advocate of cultural internationalism in the making of world peace. This kind of internationalism maintains that “internationalism may best be fostered through cross-national cultural communication, understanding, and cooperation.”\(^{241}\) For cultural internationalist like Nitobe, the outbreak of WWI exposed the limited validity of the “Westphalian” system in peace-building.\(^{242}\) The Westphalian order that upheld international law, military settlements and diplomatic negotiations as three pillars of peacemaking could not prevent the hostility from occurring in 1914.\(^{243}\) Nitobe thus saw that the international community was caught in a vicious circle. Wars and peace conferences had been taking place one after another throughout the history of mankind, and he saw this tragic spiral must be concluded. The concept of ‘peacemaking’ the Japanese man perceived while he was in office


\(^{240}\) Rappard, *International Relations as Viewed from Geneva*: 16-17. Rappard (1883-1958) was a Swiss-American scholar, professor of economic history and public finance at the University of Geneva, member of the Permanent Mandate Commission of the League of Nations. In his book, for the greatest effectiveness of the League as a peacekeeping organization, he argued that “it was deemed advisable to seek to improve international relations by developing the habits of cooperation toward ends of common welfare and by settling through conventions many matters which, if left unregulated, might give rise to friction and conflict.” This shows that the consensus amongst the League officials (not governmental representatives) was to urge the sense of cooperation to develop amongst the member states.


\(^{242}\) Takashi Inoguchi, "National Identity and Adapting to Integration: Nationalism and Globalization in Japan,” in *Nationalism and Globalization: East and West*, ed. Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 220. Inoguchi adds that: “‘Westphalian’ is the adjective used to characterize the modern Euro-centric and state-centric world of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, named after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 which is believed to have laid the foundation of the modern inter-state system.”

at Geneva was the elimination of the mind of aggression itself from the international community. To accomplish this objective, Nitobe saw the crucial necessity to cultivate the consensus of cross-national understanding on the international basis. Nations of the world, he believed, must firstly apprehend each other’s interests, history and culture. They could then understand each other’s national interests and develop the sense of mutual appreciation.

Nitobe hence played a role in the establishment of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) in 1922. Under the slogan “the world of knowledge knows no national frontiers,” the organization proposed to practice the philosophy of cultural internationalism through acting as a channel for intellectual interchange. ICIC launched a number of programs that promoted education of intercultural understanding worldwide. It provided students, teachers, and other non-governmental people in the field of education the opportunity to have international experiences so to teach and spread the principle of cultural internationalism to the next generations.

Upon the foundation of ICIC, Nitobe played a direct hand on the publication of booklets on intellectual life in various countries. One of his brochure published in 1925 was titled “The

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246 Shinohara, Kokusai Renmei: Sekai Heiwa heno Yume to Zasetsu [The League of Nations: Dreams and Difficulties towards World Peace]: 170–71. And; Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914–1938: 154. For more on ICIC’s educational programs, see: Malcolm W. Davis, “Experiences of the Committee for International Cooperation,” Journal of Educational Sociology 20, no. 1 (1946): 49–51. In the journal article, Davis enlists the following programs as the ICIC’s major achievements: “…the improvement of relations between universities, instructions in schools on the objectives of the League and the principles of international collaboration, encouragement of exchanges among institutes and libraries and scientific societies, conventions for the regulation of broadcasting in the interest of peace and for the interchange of educational films, a declaration on the teaching of history which was adopted by the League Assembly, a conference on higher education, and the development of committees on the arts and letters, on the natural sciences, and on the social sciences.” (p.49)
Use and Study of Foreign Languages in Japan: A Study in Cultural Internationalism.”

Nitobe began with introducing how the internationalization of Japanese education was carried out between 1853 and 1925. In the closing paragraphs of the brochure, he then went to discuss his ideas on cultural internationalism. Nitobe’s opinion was that the ideas of cultural internationalism would enable “one to see things from the world point of view.” The study of the foreign cultures, approaches and thoughts, Nitobe believed, would let people “objectify and project themselves among the nations of the world and see clearly where they stand.” Additionally, he regarded that the principles of cultural internationalism was especially needed in the Japanese nation given the fact that its people had been isolated from foreign influences for over 260 years. The realization of this international climate of intercultural understanding was, Nitobe stated, the League’s ultimate objective which he often called as the “Geneva spirit.”

247 Thomas W. Burkman, “The Geneva Spirit,” in Nitobe Inazo: Japan’s Bridge Across the Pacific, ed. John F. Howes (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 191. The citation of the original source is: Inazo Nitobe, “Intellectual Life in Various Countries - Japan: The Use and Study of Foreign Languages in Japan,” (Geneva: Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, League of Nations, 1925), i. The purpose of this brochure was, as stated in the preface of the booklet, “to draw the attention to the question of organization and intellectual cooperation which arise in relation to each of the subjects dealt with.”


249 Ibid., 30.

250 Ibid.

251 Ibid., 30-31. Nitobe wrote, “Foreign languages, if they did not untie the tongue, certainly opened the eyes of the Japanese nation. Western ideas, coming in the form of literature, deeply stir the eyes of the Japanese mind and impress it with the superiority of the Occident. ‘Tis Distance, be it in time or space, “lends enchantment to the view.” The distant Past of China, with its great poets and philosophers, has a charm of its own, and the world may one day see the renaissance of her culture; but for the immediate future the East must, as at summer eve, turn “the musing eye” to the west for light and hope.” He thus interpreted Japan’s Westernization a factor that would assist in the progress of the Japanese nation. Just like once Chinese culture did, Nitobe saw it was the Western culture’s turn to be the next catalyst for the upheaval of Japanese understanding of the world.

252 Burkman, “The Geneva Spirit,” 191. Furthermore, Nitobe went to add more in his journal article Japan’s Preparedness for International Cooperation published in 1930 that “[t]his education of thinking [the ICIC’s internationalist education] in terms of internationalism requires years of training; it is not the training of one or two isolated mental faculties. It means the coordination of many powers of mind – of intellect, emotion and will. It cannot be gained from textbooks or in academic halls. It is acquired only by coming in contact with realities, and this requires decades.” (p.52) For the full text, see: Inazo Nitobe, “Japan’s Preparedness for International Cooperation,” Pacific Affairs 3, no. 1 (January 1930): 52.
Nitobe’s philosophy of cultural internationalism gained wide support at Geneva. ICIC’s prominent members in the early years included internationally prominent scholars such as Albert Einstein, Henri Bergson and Marie Curie.\textsuperscript{253} Bergson, who later became the Committee’s first chairman, was one of the most passionate members. In one of his speeches at Geneva, he maintained that ICIC’s mission was to become the League’s “soul.”\textsuperscript{254} Bergson saw that the Committee should urge diplomats and politicians to acknowledge “the deeper spirit of the League” that the Organization was not established only for political, economic and military purposes. The Geneva spirit was also to respect cultural, social, and intellectual unity amongst peoples and nations across the globe for the making of perpetual peace.\textsuperscript{255}

Nitobe and his colleagues wanted ICIC to become truly international.\textsuperscript{256} By the word ‘international’ Nitobe meant ‘non-Eurocentric.’ He did not wish to see the Committee becoming another League Assembly where the Great Powers of Europe, particularly Britain, France and Italy, were to exercise authoritative power and the voices of Asians and Africans were to be largely disregarded. ICIC hence ratified the membership of intellectuals regardless of their racial, religious, cultural and political beliefs.\textsuperscript{257} For example, the Committee

welcomed the participation of scholars from non-League nations, such as Japan after 1933, America since 1920 and colonized states including India.  

The ICIC members were also conscious of the distance between “intellectual elites and the masses” which they regarded as a “veritable danger” in pursuing world peace. Bergson told his colleagues in September 1922 that the ICIC (and the League as well) should not become a “supra-national intelligence” body. He believed the Committee must open its doors to the general public and never be “divorced from the masses of the world.” In order to avoid another WWI from breaking out, he believed that the principle of cultural internationalism must be cultivated not only in the minds of intellectuals and government officials but also in the minds of the mass too. Most of the Committee’s intellectual projects therefore involved peoples from civil sectors such as students and teachers.

ICIC’s attempt to spread of the principles of cultural internationalism was not a straightforward path, however. The historian F.P. Walters’s expression that although ICIC “rendered many useful services to intellectual workers … it failed completely to bring them into a common front against the dangers of national hatreds and national ambition” best

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260 Ibid., 38.
263 Ibid., 36.
describes the situation. There was a critical gap between the principles of internationalism the Committee and the diplomatic leaders of the Great Powers wanted to pursue.

The discord was evident as early as in 1919. Amongst the participating states of PPC, the Belgian delegate showed the most passionate attitude in promoting intellectual collaboration. One of the Belgian agents was Henri-Marie La Fontaine. The Belgian intellectual gave a speech at Paris and requested the leaders of the Great Powers to consider adding intellectual collaboration as one of the post-WWI settlement agendas. La Fontaine, like other cultural internationalists, perceived the outbreak of WWI as an example of the fatal limitation of the “Westphalian” order in regulating Europe’s stability.

However, as discussed earlier, the Big Four hardly showed interests in working on the proposal. Their primary focus was economic regulations, military expansion and diplomatic reputation. As a matter of fact, the League Covenant adopted no Acts either on intellectual collaboration or cultural exchange. Furthermore, ICIC’s legal status in the League framework was either a “League agency” or a “specialized organization” that was given certain privileges similar to the International Labour Organization as well. The Committee’s status was merely a ‘consultant body.’ This reality represented the reality in which the

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267 La Fontaine (1854-1943) was a lawyer, scholar and politician who had served the Belgian legislature and appointed the president of the International Peace Bureau in 1907. He was in office until his death in 1943. For the biography of La Fontaine, see: The Nobel Foundation, "Henri La Fontaine - Biography,” The Nobel Foundation, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1913/fontaine-bio.html.
269 Ibid.
League Assembly and Council had barely paid their attention on the concept of cultural internationalism.

This disharmony resulted in the ICIC members to face difficulties in popularizing the idea of cultural internationalism, especially in Europe. This was because the International Union of Academies (UAI), founded by La Fontaine and his colleagues in 1907, had already been practicing the role as an interstate organization responsible of managing intellectual collaboration amongst European institutions. The UAI often refused to collaborate with the League owing to La Fontaine’s unpleasant experience in Paris. This situation made Nitobe’s ideal difficult to sweep across European member states.

Another obstacle was Sir James Eric Drummond’s indifference to the idea of intellectual collaboration. The Secretary General spent most of his time working on hard-politics problems such as the German admission in 1926 and the series of wars mostly in the Balkan Peninsula. In this context, League-UAI relations saw no critical improvements in the 1920s. For instance, UAI’s Belgian official Paul M. G. Otlet (1868-1944) wrote a letter to the League Secretariat in 1920 and requested the Organization to found a university specialized

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271 Hirobe, "Kokusai Renmei Chiteki Kyouryoku Kokusai Inkai no Sousetsu to Nitobe Inazo [The Foundation of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation at the League of Nations and Nitobe Inazo]," 3. The organization is abbreviated “UAI” as it was originally in established in Belgium, and its French name was Union Academique Internationale.

272 Ibid.

273 Ibid., 6. Drummond was the League’s first Secretary General (in office 1920-26).

in peacemaking studies. Drummond was yet unwilling to spend his time on the soft-politics topic. He just handed the letter over to Nitobe the Under-Secretary General. Because the Japanese intellectual was an advocate of cultural internationalism, he praised Otlet’s request as great contribution to the realization of world peace. Drummond, nonetheless, vetoed the proposal and refused to fund the UAI, ICIC and the Secretariat for this plan. This case worsened the inter-organizational relationship furthermore.

The ICIC failed to neither resolve the Japanese Government’s situations nor satisfy its demands. For the Japanese, the 1920s was an era of confusion, adaptation and struggle. Primarily, the League, most importantly, was the first “international framework of nations” that Japan was involved in. The Japanese delegate and the Government in the early 1920s needed time to adapt to and understand the League politics. The Japanese confusion is best illustrated in the book written by the Swiss-American official of the League Permanent

Mandates Commission William E. Rappard published in 1925;

The reticence of the Japanese which is certainly their chief characteristic abroad, is open to very different interpretations. Some see in it the evidence of extreme profundity and possible evil-mindedness … I am stuck with the extreme difficulty which all Japanese experience in learning and in speaking any of our Western languages. This circumstance, as well as their moral isolation as representatives in the West of the sole power of the East, gives them a feeling of unfamiliarity and insecurity which, with their innate state of dignity, they conceal behind the screen of reticence.

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275 Hirobe, "Kokusai Renmei Chiteki Kyouryoku Kokusai linkai no Sousetsu to Nitobe Inazo [The Foundation of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation at the League of Nations and Nitobe Inazo],” 6. The UAI was keen to found a university specializing in peacemaking so that the future generation would not repeat the same mistake again.
276 Ibid.
277 Ibid.
278 Ibid.
280 Rappard, International Relations as Viewed from Geneva: 202-03.
Moreover, the Great Kanto Earthquake struck the Tokyo region on 1 September 1923.\(^{281}\) The disaster marked the end to Japan’s rapid industrialization, forcing the Japanese Government to focus on domestic reconstruction. The 1920s also saw the rise of anti-Japanese movements in China and Korea, such as the Chinese Civil War and the May Fourth Movement, had begun to threaten Japan’s national interests in the Asian mainland.\(^{282}\) Additionally, the Great Depression and the Showa Financial Crisis severely hit Japanese economy in the late 1920s.\(^{283}\) The economic crises left the Japanese society in complete disorder. Unemployment rate skyrocketed and food shortage resulted in death from starvation amongst the people.\(^{284}\) These difficulties made the Japanese Government focus predominantly on solving the domestic problems instead of thinking high of the League’s international agenda. In other words, Japan in this era needed an immediate measure that would quickly rescue the nation from turmoil. The Committee’s long-range, future-investing plan was, in practice, not in precise need.

\(^{281}\) Storry, *Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894-1943*: 128.
For these reasons, the international community began to lose the sense of unity and cooperation by the late 1920s.\textsuperscript{285} Especially owing to the Street Wall Crush of 1929, the countries such as America, Britain and Japan began to build and live within their own “block of global order.” Their primary concern was the reconstruction of domestic economy, as seen in the cases such as US President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal program and Japanese Minister of Finance Takahashi Korekiyo’s Reflation policy.\textsuperscript{286}

The difficult situation in the 1930s urged the rise of ultranationalist and militarist politicians to power in the Japanese Diet. This was because they proposed invasion of Manchuria as a breakthrough to rescue the Japanese mass in chaos. The Northern Chinese territory was well-known for the richness in natural resources and for its fertile lands.\textsuperscript{287} It was obvious that the acquisition of Manchuria would get Japanese society out from the disorder.\textsuperscript{288} The general public hence supported the ultranationalists and militarists to obtain power.\textsuperscript{289} In this context,

\textsuperscript{286} Inazo Nitobe, "On the Dangers of Intolerance," Pacific Affairs 6(1933): 493-96. Nitobe criticized the situation in which the Great Powers of the international community were predominantly focusing on their domestic agenda and ignoring international cooperation in his journal article On the Dangers of Intolerance published in October 1933. He argued that; “Another dominant feature of the present-day world is the trend toward economic self-sufficiency, especially among great nations. Is not an appalling challenge to our intelligence that at the very time when we have learned to apply modern science to shorten the distances and increase the possibilities of intercourse between nations, we are arising on the pathway of trade increasing obstacles to block the free movement of goods and capitals as well as people?” And added furthermore that: “The traditional symbols of national sovereignty are also invoked, with the naval and military power as the visible support of this tendency. Without questioning the wisdom of this, may I venture to ask where will this ultimately lead? That to my mind, ladies and gentlemen, is a serious source of danger to the world.” (p.494)
\textsuperscript{287} Abel, "Warring Internationalisms: Multilateral Thinking in Japan, 1933 - 1964,” 30.
\textsuperscript{288} Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933: 35.
\textsuperscript{289} Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914-1938: 216; Peter Duus and Daniel I. Okimoto, "Fascism and the History of Pre-War Japan: The Failure of a Concept,” The Journal of Asian Studies 39, no. 1 (November 1979): 68-69. The pro-Western authorities, who had been in power since 1853,
the Cabinet in the years between 1931 and 1945 was largely dominated by the hawkish, right-wing officials and military generals, such as Saito Makoto, Konoe Fumimaro and Tojo Hideki. 290

September 1931 was a turning point in the history of the League, of Japan and of the world. 291 The Japanese Kwantung Army, which was one of the most active protestors of the Government’s pro-West policies, invaded Manchuria against the League Covenant’s principle of peaceful coexistence. 292 China appealed to the League for redress. 293 The League of Nations then imposed the Lytton Report in December 1931 and urged the Japanese to leave Manchuria immediately. The Japanese nonetheless ignored the warning and established a puppet government in February 1932. 294 The Japanese leaders then justified the invasion as a “civilizing mission” and “defence of national interests” that the Western empires were practicing in other Asian and African territories as well. 295 The Euro-American leaders regarded the Japanese aggression as a “blatant piece of expansionism” and called for an

were overthrown because their philosophy of peaceful coexistence with the West, in essence, had nothing to do with the lives of the general public who needed an immediate aid.


294 This puppet state is known as “Manchukuo” that existed between 1932 and 1945. It was de facto a colony of the Japanese Empire as Manchukuo’s head of state was controlled by the Tokyo Government. The Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro (in office 1937-39 and 1940-41) described the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the rest of the Northern Chinese territories that “North China is adjacent to Manchukuo and has inseparable relations with Japan. The maintenance of peace and order [in China] is absolute necessary [for the Japanese].” For his speech, see: C. Kuangson Young, ed. The Sino-Japanese Conflict and the League of Nations, 1937: Speeches, Documents, Press Comments (Geneva: The Press Bureau of the Chinese Delegation, 1937), 188.

Assembly at Geneva in order to discuss the case. At the League Assembly on 27 March 1933, the Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yousuke condemned the Lytton Report and announced Japan’s withdrew from the League of Nations:

Unhappily, there exists between Our Empire and the League of Nations a wide divergence of view in this regard and it has devolved upon Us to cause Our Government to take, upon mature deliberation, the necessary steps for the withdrawal of Our Empire from the League.

The Japanese withdrawal marked the total discord between Japan’s and the West-League’s principle of internationalism. It meant the Japanese Government, then run by the ultranationalists and militarists, would not respect the principles of the League Covenant anymore.

The vast majority of the Japanese mass had advocated Matsuoka’s decision. Most newspaper companies praised the Foreign Minister’s determination as an “appropriate and logical decision” that “proudly” defended Japan’s national interests in Asia. The papers commonly went to criticize the Western powers for not showing enough consideration and respect to the disastrous situation Japan was in. The Tokyo Asahi newspaper on 3 October 1933 stated, for instance, that the Lytton Report one-sidedly criticized the Japanese forces and did not provide any in-depth research of the incident itself. Similarly, on 25 November

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296 Hatakeyama and Freedman, *Snow on the Pine: Japan’s Quest for a Leadership Role in Asia*: 55. The word ‘Western’ predominantly refers to American, British, Australian and Dutch leaders. It does not include German and Italian leaders as the two parties were attempting to draft the Tokyo-Rome-Berlin Axis agreement.


300 Ibid., 109-15. Nomura adds that over 132 media firms, which was basically the vast majority of the Japanese news agencies back then, dominated their papers with right-wing contents.

301 Ibid., 109.

302 Ibid., 115. Referenced from Tokyo Asahi Shimbun published on 3 October 1933.
1933, the Yomiuri newspaper argued that the Manchurian Incident was purely an “Asian crisis” and was not the Western-dominated League of Nations’ business.  

With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, WWII in Asia broke out. The leaders of Japan redefined Japanese internationalism as a militarist, ultranationalist and Pan-Asian rhetoric, as best illustrated with Tojo’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere speech in 1943. They justified Japanese aggression as “liberation of Asia from Western empires” and “the solidification of Japan’s international status as Asia’s leader.”

However, not every Japanese authority was an advocate of the Pacific War. There were politicians and intellectuals who tried to contain the rising popularity of militarism and ease the growing Japanese-American tension. For example, the Japanese literary scholar Anesaki Masaharu joined the ICIC in 1933 and stayed in Geneva until 1939. He believed the greatest cause of the diplomatic antagonism was the lack of understanding amongst the Great Powers. He published journal articles on the Japanese issue so that Euro-American

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303 Ibid. Referenced from Yomiuri Shimbun on 25 November 1933.
304 Peter C. Chen, “World War II Database: Greater East Asian Conference, 5 November 1943 – 6 November 1943,” http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=70. Tojo’s speech opens with the following paragraph: “It is the basic principle for the establishment of world peace that the nations of the world have each its proper place, and enjoy prosperity in common through mutual aid and assistance. The United States of America and the British Empire have in seeking their own prosperity oppressed other nations and peoples. Especially in East Asia, they indulged in insatiable aggression and exploitation, and sought to satisfy their inordinate ambi... The countries of Greater East Asia, with a view to contributing to the cause of world peace, undertake to cooperate toward prosecuting the War of Greater East Asia to a successful conclusion, liberating their region from the yoke of British-American domination, and ensuring their self-existence and self-defence...” A video clip of his speech is available online at: Japan Broadcasting Corporation, “Senji Rokuon Siryou: Daitoua Kyoudou Sengen , 1943 nen 11 gatsu 6 ka [Recordings from the Wartime: Joint Declaration of the Greater East Asia Conference, 6 November 1943],” http://cgi2.nhk.or.jp/shogenarchives/sp/movie.cgi?das_id=D0001400314_00000.
authorities would understand the situation his country was in.\textsuperscript{308} In the political sphere, the Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi (in office 1931-32) and the diplomat Yoshida Shigeru were the leading figures.\textsuperscript{309} They both saw the rise of militarism and anti-Westernism amongst the mass as not a very welcoming situation. However, Japan under the militarist rule was not a place for freedom of speech. Consequently, the former was assassinated in May 1932 and the latter was imprisoned for being a \textit{hikokumin}.\textsuperscript{310}

The defeat of Japan in August 1945 did not only mean its military downfall as a Great Power.\textsuperscript{311} The historian Patrick Finney’s observation of Japanese diplomacy in this era that “the neglect of profound forces, ideological drives, and domestic political and economic structures” had “conducted at points to a narrative that emphasized contingency, blunders and misjudgements, and lost opportunities” best describes the dynamics.\textsuperscript{312} That is, Japanese internationalism in this period was so mono-cultural and uni-polarized that the foreign policy lacked flexibility. Until 1931, Japan had focused on building its international bond only with the West. Japan had heavily relied on the Western countries for its economic, political and military supplies.\textsuperscript{313} The Meiji leaders totally disregarded Asia as an ‘uncivilized’ region. In this regard, once Japan’s relation with the West deteriorated in the late 1920s, the Japanese

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{308} Ibid.
\bibitem{309} \textit{Tsuyoshi Inukai, ”Shisei Houshin Enzetsu [Policy Speech] - Given on 21 January 1932,”} (Tokyo1932). In this speech, he addressed that: “… [the next concern is] the general public’s consensus. The anxiety that stemmed out from the Great Depression is accelerating the rise of the evil thought [i.e. ultranationalism and militarism]. This is a very serious issue that we all need to be aware of.” For the role of Yoshida Shigeru, see Chapter 4. He is discussed as the main figure.
\bibitem{311} Dower, \textit{Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954}: 227. The word \textit{hikokumin} literally meant “non-citizen” and connotatively a “disloyal citizen” who did not show enough loyalty to the Government.
\bibitem{313} Finney, \textit{Remembering the Road to World War Two: International History, National Identity, Collective Memory}: 282.
\end{thebibliography}
empire found itself isolated in the international community with no reliable supply of resources to sustain the country’s strength. The only choice they had was to invade Manchuria and secure the ‘lifeline’ itself, which consequently led Japan to face the devastating defeat in August 1945. Thus, history had shown that Japanese policymakers must not uni-polarize the foreign policy. The lesson was that they must practice multilateral diplomacy so that they would not face a situation in which they find themselves completely isolated all of the sudden.

Historians often portray the years between 1931 and 1945 as a period of radical transition in the Japanese history.314 They often point out the dramatic turn the Japanese diplomacy had taken in September 1931 as the evidence, which implied that the pro-Western policies were replaced with the ultranationalist and Pan-Asian rhetoric on Japan’s foreign agenda. When viewed in a *longue duree*, however, ones could question this historical interpretation. In other words, it is possible to argue that the Pacific War was not a ‘radical’ incident that restructured Japanese diplomacy with totally new principles, but was rather part of the Japanese pursuit of honour, which had been the national consensus since 1853. It is indeed true that Japan’s diplomatic policies had dramatically changed over this period. However, the ultimate purpose of the Pacific War was the same as the one of the pro-Western figures: the search for honour that would grant Japan a respected title in the international community. The only differences were the approach taken and how the leaders in power regarded the definition of a “Great Power.” On one hand, the pro-Western figures between 1919 and 1931 selected diplomatic negotiations and cultural interchanges as their approach. They saw a “Great Power” referred to a state that possessed strong military power, respected Western nationhood, and

contributed to the development of the international community. On the other hand, the ultranationalist leaders regarded a “Great Power” as a country that respected its own national values and practice armed aggression to expel the ‘barbarians’ from its regional community. While the diplomatic policies and approaches changed over this period, we could affirm that ideologically the ultimate objective of the Japanese state remained constant.

“Diplomatic failure should be welcome, if by it you learn wisdom for future action.”

– Nitobe Inazo

Introduction

Japan in the immediate post-war era was identified by the world and by its own community as one of the defeated powers in WWII who had to compensate for the war crimes. At the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, the wartime leaders of the Japanese empire were purged and the Japanese archipelago was decided to be occupied by General Douglas MacArthur’s US forces. Japan in September 1945 lost its sovereignty and honour as one of the Great Powers in the international community.

The consensus amongst the Japanese leaders in the post-1945 era was therefore to revive the country’s international status as an independent, honourable state. The effort in the early years of the period is best noticeable from the role of the politician Yoshida Shigeru (Prime Minister, 1946-47 and 1948-54 / Foreign Minister, 1945-47 and 1948-52). The so-called Yoshida Doctrine outlined his ideas on how Japan’s great power status could be revived. The

traumatizing experience of WWII, best illustrated with the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, cultivated a consensus amongst the Japanese people that the nation’s “catch-up with the West” campaign in the post-war world must, most importantly, reject Japan to play any military role.\(^{316}\) The national consensus was hence not to repeat the tragedy again.\(^{317}\) Yoshida thus employed the principles of pacifism and multiculturalism in his doctrine in urging Japan’s re-rise to a Great Power once again.\(^{318}\)

The UN occupied a prominent place in Japan’s post-war foreign policy. In addition to the Yoshida Doctrine’s pro-UN principle, the Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (in office 1957-60) proclaimed the so-called ‘UN-centrism’ policy upon Japan’s successful admission in December 1956.\(^{319}\) He maintained that the Japanese Government would place its primary emphasis on the cultivation of a trustful, long-lasting relation with the UN.\(^{320}\) The history between 1945 and 2006 indeed shows that Japanese leaders of this period had commonly seen the Organization as the symbol of the international community in which Japan had to return to. This was despite the fact that the initial membership of the UN was largely


\(^{317}\) Abel, “Warring Internationalisms: Multilateral Thinking in Japan, 1933 - 1964,” 178; Mamoru Shigemitsu, "Price of Defeat is High," *Vital Speeches of the Day* 11, no. 22 (September 1945): 677. Shigemitsu Mamoru, the leading diplomat in the immediate post-war era, issued an article in September 1945 and addressed that: “Today, when the imperial decision had been granted, the way has become clear. There is need for renewed efforts, without any misconceptions of loyalty and treason, for the future construction of a new Japan. It goes without saying that it is necessary to change speedily our way of thinking. The price that must be paid for this defeat in battle is very high, but as the consequence of such an all-out war, that cannot be helped.”


consisted of Japan’s wartime enemies such as America, Britain and Soviet Russia. In addition to how Japanese internationalism developed in this era, I also examine what factors urged the Japanese authorities to see the organization of wartime enemies so important that Japan had to join.

The Yoshida Doctrine and the United Nations

Yoshida Shigeru (1878-1967) was one of the leaders of the Japanese Government who strived to put Japan back in track. At the end of WWII, Japan lied in ruins. The capital of Tokyo was air raided and the port cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were atomic bombed. The economy had collapsed, the industrial basis was devastated, and the social order was

322 Yasushi Akashi et al., eds., Oral History: Nihon to Kokuren no 50 nen [Oral History: the 50 Years of the Japan-UN Relations] (Kyoto Minerva Shobo, 2008), 1; Stephen Ryan, The United Nations and International Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). 9-20. As Ryan points out, the creation of the UN was largely led by America, Britain and the Soviet Union. The discussions were held mostly at the wartime Allied conferences in Moscow and Teheran in 1943.
corrupted. Most important, the nation had lost its great power status. Yoshida thus had two chief tasks as the Prime Minister of Japan: (1) the removal of the Japanese nation’s stigma as a defeated power; and (2) the revival of the honourable status.

Historians such as Michael J. Green say the Yoshida Doctrine had three objectives: close alliance with the US, minimal military rearmament, and a focus on economic recovery. But a different idea appealed when viewed from an internationalist approach. The history of Japanese internationalism outlines that the Yoshida Doctrine had two objectives. And they reflected the principles of what historians have often termed “political internationalism” and “economic internationalism.” The former refers to the idea that the application of an international organization would contribute to the pacification of interstate relations. The historian Akira Iriye comments that the League of Nations was the best example of political internationalism in this sense. Economists of the nineteenth century such as Jean-Baptiste Say and Gustave de Molinari were the fathers of economic internationalism. They maintained that the world could be connected by economic welfare and commercial interdependence. This school of thought stated that because economic development was the universal demands of every nation, the consensus of financial wealth could unite countries of different civilizational background and consequently pacify their interstate

324 Finney, Remembering the Road to World War Two: International History, National Identity, Collective Memory: 264-65. According to Finney, “With three million war dead, nine million homeless and one third of its national wealth destroyed, Japan was certainly in a parlous state at the close of hostilities. Moreover, hardships such as food shortages, mass unemployment, black marketeering, and rampant inflation persisted through much of the occupation.” (sic)


326 See: Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave, 2003).

327 Goldmann, The Logic of Internationalism: Coercion and Accommodation 5-12.

328 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order 57.


330 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order 59-60.
relations. Yoshida found these two principles useful in leading the Japanese nation to emerge as a Great Power once again.

The doctrine’s first objective was about securing Japan’s national safety. Yoshida believed that the Japanese state must put itself in a politically and militarily protected situation before moving on to the reconstruction campaign. In addition to the rise of Red China in October 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the fact that Japan had no armed force of its own urged Yoshida to emphasize such need. Evidently, an invasion on a militarily weakened Japan would destroy the country as well as the reconstruction. Thus, Yoshida wanted to solidify Japanese defence first to prevent that situation from taking place. In addition to a close alliance with America, the Prime Minister employed the idea of political internationalism and saw the UN with exceptional importance. The UN Charter stated that every member state’s national security would be guaranteed with the principle of collective security. A membership in the organization meant world powers such as America and Britain would come to safeguard Japan’s security in case of dispute. It also meant the UN would contain the potential enemies of Russia and China from invading the Japanese archipelago as well.

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331 The Marshall Plan in 1947 was one of the best examples. Washington believed economic prosperity would help stabilizing the devastated Europe in the aftermath of WWII and consequently reduce the risk of provoking further incidents.
The Japanese Government also regarded the UN as the symbol of the international community in which Japan must return.\textsuperscript{337} The Japanese leaders in the post-war years, including Yoshida, perceived that the UN membership would enable Japan state to revive its honour in three ways.\textsuperscript{338} Firstly, Japan wanted its status as a member of the world community back. Through joining the UN, the Japanese leaders aimed to convey that Japan was ready to respect the principles of the UN Charter, such as peaceful settlement, international justice, and collective security.\textsuperscript{339} Secondly, they wanted to emphasize the pacifist creeds of the new Japanese Constitution that clearly stated Japan’s rejection to play any military role.\textsuperscript{340} The Constitution clearly declared that Japan would not seek to practice any self-benefitting aggression.\textsuperscript{341} Thirdly, the Japanese Government was determined to become the “bridge between the Occident and the Orient” so to play a contribute role in the UN system.\textsuperscript{342} With its bilateral identity as a ‘Westernized Asian’ state, the Japanese officials saw Japan’s \textit{noblesse oblige} in the Organization was to represent the voices of both Asian and Western

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{337} Gerald L. Curtis, ed. \textit{Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change} (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 347.
\bibitem{342} Pan, \textit{The United Nations in Japan’s Foreign and Security Policymaking, 1945 – 1992: National Security, Party Politics, and International Status}: 57-58. The expression to describe Japan as a ‘bridge’ between the West and the East was used by a number of Japanese authorities in the early post-war era. Saburo Okita, a leading statesman of the Economic Planning Agency reviewed in his autobiographic book published in 1983 that his task in the 1950s was make Japan “bridge between Japan and the world, passing information about world problems to Japan, and information about Japan to the rest of the world.” For more, see: Saburo Okita, \textit{Japan’s Challenging Years: Reflection on my Lifetime} (North Sydney: George Allen & Unwin Australia Party 1983). 111-12. Moreover, the Prime Minister Kishi in the journal article \textit{Political Movements in Japan} published in 1965 wrote that: “The political situation in Japan will probably develop in the direction of making Japan a bridge between Asia and Europe and the US. The basic conditions for this will be that the world’s free forces have overwhelming superiority over the Communist forces … Communism, which is opposed to human nature, will either change from the inside or collapse if it is obliged to coexist long enough alongside a free society. Japan’s interest is to add to the enduring solidarity and strength of the free world; and its duty, as a nation of Asia, is by its own example to carry the conviction to the Afro-Asian peoples that the ideals of freedom and democracy will without fail win over Communism. Japan shall be the show-window in Asia of freedom and democracy.” For the full text, see: Nobusuke Kishi, “Political Movements in Japan,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 44(October 1965).
\end{thebibliography}
nations. Yoshida clarified these principles in the speech he gave at San Francisco on 7 September 1951 after signing the peace treaty with the United States.

… there has risen a new Japan. My people have been among those who suffered greatly from the destruction and devastation of the recent war. Purged by that suffering of all untoward ambition, of all desire for the path of military conquest, my people burn now with a passionate desire to live at peace with their neighbours in the Far East, and in the entire world, and to rebuild their society so that it will in ever greater fullness yield a better life for all. Japan has opened a new chapter in its history. We see in the future a new era among nations, an era of peace and harmony as described in the opening words of the Charter of the United Nations.

The national representatives of fifty-two countries attended the conference, and the vast majority of them were the members of the UN. Yoshida’s intention to use political internationalism to revive Japan’s international status was clearly noticeable.

The second objective of the Doctrine was economic reconstruction. Yoshida applied the principle of economic internationalism, which was frequently called the “Economic Foreign Policy” amongst the Government officials at the time. Economic reconstruction was one of the most important issues in the immediate post-war era as mentioned before. In urging the

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344 Yoshida, “Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida's Speech at the San Francisco Peace Conference “.
346 Yoshida, "Japan and the Crisis in Asia," 18.
reconstruction campaign, the Prime Minister faced the problem that many of the Japanese leaders in the past had struggled to solve: the Japanese archipelago’s lack of raw materials and food. The amount was absolutely insufficient to sustain the population of roughly 90 million people.\textsuperscript{349} In the past, the leaders tried to overcome this issue by obtaining overseas territories. Japan’s colonization of Taiwan in 1895 was indeed for this purpose.\textsuperscript{350} Yet, imperialism was obviously no longer a rational choice in the post-1945 world. Japan was under US occupation and, most importantly, it had rejected to play any military role in the first place.

Yoshida thus developed an economic internationalist approach. He believed that Japan in the international climate of the post-war world must move on “from a position of total self-reliance to one of heavy dependence on the world.”\textsuperscript{351} This meant that Japan should not uphold any autarchic ideas, but rather become a liberal nation that has international bonds with many countries. History had indeed shown that Japan in the interwar period had dug its own grave owing to the lack of this multilateral thought. The Yoshida Doctrine thus proposed the economic reconstruction and making of a worldwide network of active trading and commerce so that Japan could consolidate its status and influence as an “economic superpower.”\textsuperscript{352} Even though Japan had no military power, the Prime Minister was yet certain that economic wealth could substitute it in the world where the value of capital was dramatically increasing. Japan under Yoshida was thus determined not to play military

\textsuperscript{349} Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, “Jinkou to Setai [Population and Households],” ed. Director-General for Policy-Planning Statistics Bureau (Tokyo2012). The Ministry’s record shows the population of Japan in 1945 was about 84 million, 1950 was about 90 million.

\textsuperscript{350} This was evident also from Nitobe’s role as the developer of Taiwanese agricultural economy during his service at the Japanese Colonial Government in Taiwan as discussed in Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{351} Robert A. Scalapino, ed. \textit{The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan} (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), 391.

roles but would practice economic campaigns that would create new businesses, fund its strategic partners and help the development of underdeveloping countries.

While Yoshida saw the UN and economic development as the two important themes in the post-war world, the UN agencies specializing in economic development were not emphasized as key actors in his paradigm. Organizations such as the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the World Bank (WB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were not given especial attention. This nature reflected the Japanese Government’s consensus in the post-war era to keep Japan’s diplomatic profile as low as possible. As discussed before, Yoshida and his colleagues saw the UN’s significance only as the place for security and status-building and not necessarily for making Japan diplomatically popular. Most importantly, the Prime Minister wanted his country to stay on the sideline of the Cold War tension both economically and militarily, so that they could focus solely on the reconstruction effort. Yoshida thus rejected any Japanese involvement in diplomatic incidents unless they exposed exceptional threat to Japan’s national security.

Yoshida’s strong fixation with the national reconstruction campaign had its origin in his career as a diplomat who had witnessed Japan’s rise and fall as a Great Power between 1906 and 1945. Yoshida entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in 1906. The period was when the Japanese empire was on its gradual rise to a Great Power in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. It was thus when the Western powers had started to see Japan as a potential menace in the East, particularly over China, where the imperial interests

354 Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: 12.
of many Great Powers had all concentrated on. In this historically significant era and place, Yoshida had served the Consulate-General in Hoten, Manchuria between the early 1920s and October 1925. He was then appointed the Administrative Vice-Minister of MOFA in the Pan-Asianist and nationalist Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi’s cabinet in 1928. Yoshida served as Tanaka’s advisor on the China question. This appointment granted Yoshida the chance to witness Realpolitik played between Japan and the Great Powers.

The authorities of MOFA and the Government yet disappointed the young diplomat’s enterprise. In early 1900s, the Japanese Cabinet was largely dominated by the pro-West politicians such as Uchida Kousai and Shidehara Kijuro. The national policy was hence to cultivate a cooperative and friendly relation with the Western powers and to avoid developing any antagonistic associations with them. In this context, the Government ordered the diplomats in China to coordinate the policies that would not overlap with the national interests of the Great Powers. A typical case was the Triple Intervention in April 1895. Japan returned the territory it gained in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War upon the joint-interference of Russia, Germany and France. Yoshida disliked the pro-Western, compromising policy. Even though the Japanese empire was still militarily, politically and economically a weak power, he argued that the nation must practice a more aggressive strategy that would defend Japan’s national interests and honour. He saw the pro-Western diplomatic approach was making Japan seem spineless to the Western rivals and putting

356 Ibid.
358 For more on the pro-Western figures and their political doctrines, see: Bamba, Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan’s China Policy, 1924-1929.
359 Wakamiya, The Post-war Conservative View of Asia: How the Political Right has delayed Japan’s Coming to terms with its History of Aggression in Asia: 61-65.
360 Yoshida, Kaisou Junen - 1 [Ten Years in Retrospect - 1]: 31.
Japan in further political backwardness. Yoshida in this context gradually developed the
determination to make Japan a powerful nation. He did not want to see his home country in a
humiliating position – just like how Fukuzawa was frustrated by the Tokugawa regime in the
1850s.

The 1930s was a decade of struggle for Yoshida again. He perceived the militarist
government’s national policy lacked objective analysis on the international climate. As seen
in Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, withdrawal from the League in 1933 and alliance
with Nazi Germany in 1940, the Japanese Government under the leadership of the
ultranationalists were preparing for a war against Britain and America in the Pacific. Yoshida
was against this decision. He did not see any benefit from waging a war against the two
parties. Most importantly, the enormous gap in industrial capability between the two blocs
clearly foreshadowed Japan’s defeat sooner or later. He also saw that the aggression would
take the Japanese nation to a diplomatically position. Yoshida had served Japanese
embassies as a diplomat in London and other Western cities. He knew that Britain and
America were the ‘big two’ of world politics and that Japan was still a ‘rising power’ which
had no capability to face them equally.

For these reasons, the main principles of the Yoshida Doctrine adopted the pro-Western,
pacifist, political internationalist and economic internationalist thoughts. From his

\[\text{Ibid.} \]
\[\text{Ibid.} \]
\[\text{Ibid.} \]
\[\text{Kita, Yoshida Shigeru no mita Yume: Dokuritsushin nakashite Kokka nasi [The Dream Yoshida Shigeru saw: No Mind of Independence, No Independent Nation]: 300.} \]
\[\text{Inoguchi, “Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its Current Phase,” 5. The governmental representatives of some countries yet criticized Yoshida and his policies as a self-benefitting, individualist, and egoistic strategy. As a matter of fact, the Yoshida Doctrine placed the primary interest on Japan’s development and reconstruction;} \]
experience as a diplomat, he learnt that foreign policymaking must be based on a pragmatic analysis of the international climate. Yoshida also saw the necessity to think high of national honour to avoid the international community from developing a negative impression of Japan. In this regard, the Yoshida Doctrine outlined the method in which Japan could gain the maximum ‘profit’ with pragmatic objectives. While the UN was indeed an organization of wartime enemies, he saw the benefit in Japan joining the coalition was greater than the degree of shame and risk his home country would undergo if it remained isolated. The history of the 1930s had proven that isolationism was an effective choice.

Liberal and Pacifist Japan: Road to UN Admission, 1945 - 56

Japan joined the list of applicants of UN membership in 1952, following the end of US occupation in 1951. However, the affiliation with the UN was not realized until December 1956 because Cold War tension had paralysed the UN system’s capability to function properly. For example, the Soviet representatives boycotted the UNSC sessions upon the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The Russian ambassador Yakob Malik used a

and barely emphasized the well-being of the international community as a whole. The French general and politician, then the President of France, Charles de Gaulle, denounced in 1958 Japan as “a ‘free rider’ who had no sense of responsibility” about world peace or international leadership.


Akiko Fukushima, Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism (London: MacMillan Press, 1999). 104-05; Goodrich, “San Francisco in Retrospect,” 247-48. The major Cold War issues in the early years include the following: Azerbaijan and the Levant; Greece; Indonesia; Palestine; Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Eastern Europe; the Korean War; Kashmir; and Guatemala.

bundle of vetoes and oppressed suggestions from the American bloc for the next few years.\textsuperscript{370} The rising tension between the Russian and American blocs over Europe and Asia turned the UN into a political arena especially with their development of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{371} The superpowers played power politics and justified their state objectives and interests using the principles of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{372} The Organization’s core principle of democracy was thus completely crippled. For these reasons, the authorities of MOFA in 1954 was “deeply upset by this trend” and mourned that its membership would not be realized soon in the “UN crisis.”\textsuperscript{373} Some officials even began to question that whether the corrupted Organization was actually worth joining.\textsuperscript{374}

The new Japanese Constitution’s Article 9 was another issue. Drafted by the Japanese Government under Yoshida’s leadership and the American Occupational Forces, the clause embodied democratization and demilitarization as Japan’s national creeds and read as follows:\textsuperscript{375}

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling

\textsuperscript{371} Ryan, The United Nations and International Politics: 36-37.
\textsuperscript{372} Kazuki Iwanaga, “Europe in Japan's Foreign Policy,” in The Japanese and Europe: Images and Perceptions, ed. Bert Edstrom (Midsomer Norton: Japan Library / Curzon Press, 2000), 212-13. The Cold War tension in Europe was one of the reasons why Yoshida did not see Japan’s relations with Europe with a primary importance. As discussed before, he wanted Japan to stay on the sideline of the Cold War and saw any thorough interaction with any European powers had the potential of dragging Japan into the conflict. However, as Iwanaga points out, Yoshida did not completely disregard Europe as an important agenda in his doctrine. He made a trip to Britain, France, West Germany and Italy in 1954 and agreed to cooperate in case of Soviet and/or Chinese aggression and economic collaborations.
\textsuperscript{374} Dore, “Japan, Internationalism and the UN,” 56-57; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 480. Morgenthau criticized the UN in this era that “the UN of the Charter is a ruin, rent asunder by the conflict between East and West.”
\textsuperscript{375} Finney, Remembering the Road to World War Two: International History, National Identity, Collective Memory: 267.
In short, Article 9 banned the Japanese nation to take military activities of any kind. Historians thus often illustrated it as the symbol of Japanese pacifism in the post-war era. The pacifist clause, on one hand, gave the Japanese authorities a moral reason to stay away from the Cold War disputes. The “idealism embodied in Article 9” justified the Yoshida Doctrine’s principle of disregarding international climate and focusing on domestic agenda. The historian Donald C. Hellmann’s analysis that Article 9 was ‘idealism’ is cogent because the Japanese pacifism was not a practical ethos in the immediate post-war era. As a matter of fact, Article 9 soon aroused grave doubts regarding “Japan’s ability, as a totally disarmed nation, to maintain its own security” in both the domestic and international spheres.

The founders of the UN, on the other hand, had acknowledged the reality that war and peacemaking were inseparable factors in international relations. They developed this consensus from the League’s experience. Despite the League’s attempts to settle down interstate disputes peacefully and cultivate international understanding, aggressions had yet

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376 League of Nations, "The Covenant of the League of Nations".
377 Pyle, "Profound Forces in the Making of Modern Japan," 413. The ban included the following: overseas deployments of troops, nuclear arms, participation in collective defence agreements, power projection capability, arms export, sharing of defence technology and military use of space under any circumstances.
never ceased to exist. The UN founders hence had acknowledged the need for writing the Charter based on the premise that war was an inescapable factor in the post-WWII era as well. They thus saw the necessity to outline a clear-cut measure in how the UN would face and sanction an ongoing aggression in the Charter.

The founders also revised the League’s principle of collective security that was believed to create and maintain world peace. Article 11 of the League Covenant outlined the original principle;

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.

Historians often highlight that the Covenant’s failure to specify the member states’ obligation in the principle of collective security was one of the League framework’s flaws. While Article 11 stated the “League shall take any action” in case of disputes, the League yet did not possess any armed forces that could impose practical measures to deter aggression and/or punish the aggressor. On the contrary, military forces had remained solely under national control of the member states and were predominantly mobilized to suit their “own tastes and

383 This determination is best illustrated in Article 39 and Article 42 of the UN Charter: Article 39 states: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Article 42 states: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. For more the primary sources, see: United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 7 – Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression " http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml.
interests” in reality.\(^{387}\) This was one of the reasons why the League could not stop the escalation of the Japanese aggression in 1931.\(^ {388}\) The drafters of the UN Charter hence ratified the use of military forces as part of the collective security approach.\(^ {389}\) As seen in the UN involvement in the Korean War (1950-52) and the Suez Crisis (1956), armed intervention by the Organization was ‘approved’ by the international community. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, however, had banned any Japanese involvement in armed conflicts. This meant that Japan would not take part in UN collective security missions. In other words, this implied that Japan would not be able to fulfil the obligation the UN Charter had stated, which made Japanese admission come to a deadlock by the late 1940s.\(^ {390}\)

Meanwhile, Japanese society sector was attempting to accelerate the course of post-war reconstruction privately by welcoming UN peacemaking agencies into the country. UNESCO was the leading institution in this movement. Its Constitution had stated in its preface that “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.”\(^ {391}\) The pacifist statement shared a great variety of commonalities with what the new Japanese Constitution and people had proposed to exercise and practice in the

\(^{387}\) Ibid., 7.


\(^{389}\) Luard, A History of the United Nations - Volume 1: The Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955: 6. The ‘teeth’ is traceable from Article 39 and Article 42 of the UN Charter:Article 39 states: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Article 42 states: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. For more the primary sources, see: United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 7 – Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression ”.


From as early as in the late 1940s, NGOs anxious to actively participate in UNESCO’s peacemaking projects were established across the Japanese archipelago. In July 1947, only a year after the founding of UNESCO, voluntary associations were founded by independent, non-governmental groups with the aim of cooperating with the Organization in Sendai city in Northern Japan. This movement then spread across the Japanese archipelago, followed by one in the Kansai region and another in Kyushu. Consequently, in November 1947, Japan’s first National Conference for UNESCO was held in Tokyo, which was indeed four years before its official membership in the Organization in 1951.

Together with UNESCO, the Japanese private sector worked on numbers of social reforms. One of the greatest achievements was in the field of education. Prior to 1945, the kokutai (national policy) was to cultivate patriotic and Shinto understandings amongst the youth. Especially between the 1860s and 1945, the so-called ‘rich country, strong military’ campaign was the governmental order. It glorified Shintoism, nationalism and imperialism as

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393 Ibid., 271-72.
394 Ibid. UNESCO was established in November 1945 as the successor of ICIC. The foundation was discussed from October 1942 when the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education first met. The French diplomat Henri Bonnet was one of the most passionate advocates. He perceived the root of all evil that led WWII to occur was "the background of cultural and intellectual destruction wrought by the Axis powers.” The Frenchman also saw that ICIC’s inability to promote cultural internationalism had lied in its limited diversity of specialization. In other words, ICIC’s failure proved that intellectual cooperation alone was insufficient to cultivate the mind of peace amongst peoples and nations. Therefore, upon the foundation of UNESCO, Bonnet and other official in the early years, such as Julian Huxley and Joseph Needham, agreed that the succeeding organization of ICIC must be "stronger and larger” than the predecessor. In this context, they broadened UNESCO’s role as an organization for the global management of not only intellectuality but also other soft-power factors, such as science, education and culture as well. For more on the history of UNESCO, see the following scholarship: Pemberton, "The Changing Shape of Intellectual Cooperation: From the League of Nations to UNESCO.”; J.P. Singh, *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): Changing Norms for a Complex World* (New York: Routledge, 2011); S. Nihal Singh, *The Rise and Fall of UNESCO* (Maryland: The Riverdale Company Publishers, 1988); Glenda Sluga, "UNESCO and the (One) World of Julian Huxley,” *Journal of World History* 21, no. 3 (2010).
396 Ibid.
397 Ibid., 273.
the right understanding of nationhood and world. The total defeat in WWII then implied such a policy was a total mistake. The disaster revealed that the objective of the patriotic education was to justify the Government’s imperialist and militarist strategy and not necessarily to urge the nation’s pure development. Thus, the private sector and UNESCO worked cooperatively in educational reform. The Government then joined the progression in the 1950s as soon as they realized its official membership in July 1951. The three parties then held a number of symposiums and founded agencies for educational improvement in the 1950s and 1960s. They also agreed to incorporate interstate and intercultural understanding and pacifism as the two pillars of Japanese education in the post-1945 era. Such effort was succeeded and developed by MOFA in the early 1970s as an official governmental policy. The Ministry established a Cultural Affairs Department for policy-making, planning and implementation of cultural exchanges and cooperation.

While not many historians mentioned the presence, the Japanese delegate attended the Bandung Conference in April 1955. At the convention, the national representatives from twenty-eight governments of Asia and Africa discussed the role of the Third World in the

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398 Ishida, The Introduction of Western Political Concepts into Japan 18.  
400 Hiratsuka, "Japan and UNESCO," 273-74. They include: The Organization of Associated Schools for Education in International Understanding (associated schools for UNESCO projects) in 1958; The Second East Asian Regional Seminar for Leaders of Youth, October 1963; Asian Conference of Experts on Youth, March 1965; The National Institute for Educational Research: the re-examination of textbooks on social studies from the UNESCO standpoint, 1958 and onwards; and Japanese-sponsored Education Ministers Conference of Asian UNESCO Member States, in April 1962 in Tokyo  
401 Kawada and Hayashi-Denis, "Cooperation between UNESCO and Japan in the Safeguarding of Cultural Heritage," 33.  
402 Kristine Dennehy, "Overcoming Colonialism at Bandung, 1955," in Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism, and Borders, ed. Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (Chippenham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 214. The Japanese delegate was led by the businessman-politician Takasaki Tatsunosuke (1885-1964). He was also the first head of the Economic Planning Agency of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (MITI) which was responsible of the Japanese post-war economic construction campaign. Takasaki was accompanied by advisers from MOFA, Kase Toshikazu, Asakai Koichiro, and Watami Eiji.
Cold War. They then agreed to form the so-called “Non-Align” bloc in which the countries decided to stay out of the Washington-Moscow antagonism. For the Japanese, Bandung served as a place to put Japan back in the Asian concert. In the post-war years, Japan’s relation with the rest of Asia was dominated by the memories of Japanese aggression in pre-war and wartime years. The MOFA thus had not restored diplomatic relation with the vast majority of Asian states. The Government under the leadership of Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro (in office 1954-55) nonetheless saw the necessity to obtain a place in the Asian community because history had shown that mono-cultural foreign policy would not make Japan a truly ‘great’ nation. In other words, the authorities were determined not to merely become an American satellite and an advocate of the UN (which was de facto a West-centric organization) but a nation has respected bonds with both the West and the East.

Hatoyama thus perceived the Bandung Conference as a great opportunity to build trustful relations with the Asian countries and reemphasize Japan’s Asian identity. In Bandung, the Japanese delegate started their speech with apologies for Japan’s wartime behaviour, a promise and friendly relations in the future, and plans for economic cooperation.
In this era, therefore, the principle of pacifism, return to Asia, and cooperation with the Western bloc were recognized as the three pillars of Japanese internationalism. The Japanese leaders were determined to make their foreign policy a multicultural doctrine in order to prepare for its UN membership and act as a bridge that connects states of different civilizational background. A country that respected world peace and showed multicultural understanding was the definition of a “Great Power” amongst the Japanese authorities in this era.

Rise and Fall of UN-Centrism, 1956-2006

Japan realized its UN membership on 18 December 1956. In his speech the Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru at UN General Assembly (UNGA) clarified Japan’s determination to make meaningful contribution to the UN system:

The people of Japan today desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationships. We have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world … We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace … The substance of Japan's political, economic and cultural life is the product of the fusion within the last century of the civilizations of the Orient and the Occident. In a way, Japan may well be regarded as a bridge between the East and the West. She is fully conscious of the great responsibilities of such a position …

Since then, the Japanese Government sent, again, some of the most talented officials to serve the UN system one after another. Prominent figures include Yasushi Akashi, Ogata Sadako,

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410 Abel, "Warring Internationalisms: Multilateral Thinking in Japan, 1933 - 1964," 196.
Matsuura Koichiro, and Owada Hisashi. However, the Japanese Government, yet again, faced three major obstacles in accomplishing the goals Shigemitsu pointed out and becoming a truly respected power: (1) Article 9; (2) Japan’s national identity; and (3) the gap between the Government and the mass. As a matter of fact, the word ‘UN-centrism’ disappeared from the preamble of the Diplomatic Bluebook by 1958 – which was only two years after the successful admission.

Primarily, Article 9 became troublesome again. The constitutional ban on the overseas deployment of Self-Defence Force (SDF) had illegalized Japanese participation in some of the UN’s key missions. One of them was the humanitarian assistance activities such as the UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) in which the member states sent their military forces as “UN peacekeepers” for the “peaceful settlement” of interstate disputes. Japan’s inability to participate in this operation limited Japan’s role at the Organization merely as a supporter of the UN fund. Some observers denounced Japan for not sharing the “blood” and “sweat” with the countries in the international community. The Japanese state had become the second largest donor of the UN fund only after the United States by the mid-1980s using the

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413 For their thoughts and practices, see: Akashi et al., Oral History: Nihon to Kokuren no 50 nen [Oral History: the 50 Years of the Japan-UN Relations] Akashi was Japan’s first official to serve the UN in 1956 and held positions as the Under-Secretary General of Public Information (1979-87) and the Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs (1987-92). Ogata, formerly a scholar of international politics, served as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees between 1991 and 2001. Matsuura was the Director-General of UNESCO between 1999 and 2009. Owada is an incumbent judge on the International Court of Justice. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: 192.

414 Ho Won Jeong, ed. The New Agenda for Peace Research (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 1999), 22. Gilson, “Building Peace or Following the Leader? Japan’s Peace Consolidation Diplomacy,” 28. As Gilson adds, the phrase “humanitarian assistance” in UN terms has been frequently associated with a military presence, “coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.” The UN intervention in the Korean War and the Suez Crisis in 1956 was two of the best examples in which the UN force used military force to stop the hostility. In this case, the Japanese SDF could not take part in UNPKO.

wealth it earned during the economic miracle in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet, the fact that representatives of some countries continued to criticize Japanese contribution as “check-book diplomacy” or the “automatic teller machine of the UN” critically showed how Japan was not winning true respect from the international community.

The Prime Minister Sato Eisaku (in office 1964-72) reinforced the Japanese Government’s determination to stay out of international disputes furthermore in 1967. He was one of the so-called Yoshida protégés who believed the Yoshida Doctrine as Japan’s absolute national creed. Sato enunciated the Three Non-Nuclear Principles at the National Diet and outlined that Japan should neither possess nor manufacture nuclear weapons, nor should it permit their introduction into Japanese territory. The Prime Minister also formulated an act that banned weapons exports of any kind in the same year, constraining defence expenditure to less than one per cent of the GNP. These policies clearly indicated the Yoshida Doctrine’s chief principles were the solid consensus amongst Japanese authorities.

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417 Yabunaka, *Kokka no Meiun [Fate of the Nation]*: 48-49. For the UN funding, see: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, "2010-2012 Kokuren Tsujou Yosan Buntanritsu/Buntankin [2010-2012: The Regular Budget of the United Nations]." In the 2010-12 term, Japan still remains as the world’s second largest donor, funding 12.53% of the total UN budget.


420 Ibid. The former Foreign Minister Miki Takeo (in office 1966-68) gave a speech at the 22nd UNGA in 1969 as a Japanese representative that the eradication of any possibility that would lead to the outbreak of World War III must be done – and of nuclear weapons was indeed part of it. He maintained the superpowers must give up their nuclear bombs so that diplomatic negotiations could be taken peacefully. For more, see: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, "Gaiko Seisho: Kokusai Rengou Dai-22 kai Soukai [Diplomatic Bluebook: The 22nd UN General Assembly]," (Tokyo1968).

The international community yet demanded more than the monetary contribution from the Japanese state.\textsuperscript{422} Countries of both the North and the South did not perceive such effort as enough endeavours that could fulfil Japan’s obligation as a member of the international community and the UN framework.\textsuperscript{423} Primarily, Euro-American leaders requested the Japanese Government as a member of the ‘Great Powers’ to play more roles in the assistance of underdeveloping countries, especially after Japan was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 1958.\textsuperscript{424} This also led some leaders of the West to request the Japanese Government to revise Article 9 in order to send the SDF to overseas destinations as part of UNPKO forces.\textsuperscript{425}

The countries of the South criticized Japan for not playing an effective role as the “bridge between the Occident and the Orient.”\textsuperscript{426} In the 1970s especially, decolonization began to steadily change the international climate. Because the UNGA’s main principle was majority rule, the South’s large number had become one of the determinants of UN decision-making

\textsuperscript{422} Gilson, "Building Peace or Following the Leader? Japan's Peace Consolidation Diplomacy," 27.
\textsuperscript{423} David M. Malone and Lotta Hagman, "The North-South Divide at the United Nations: Fading at Last?,” \textit{Security Dialogue} 33(2002). As Malone and Hagman have described, the word ‘North’ is usually used to refer to the industrialized, wealthy and developed countries. It in most cases includes countries such as America, Britain, Japan and France. Some historians use the word to refer to the former colonial empires, while others use it to indicate the countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which is basically consisted of the most industrialized countries in the world. On the other hand, the world ‘South’ is often used to refer to the less developed countries. The vast majority of them are former colonies of Euro-American and/or Japanese empire in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
\textsuperscript{425} Fukushima, \textit{Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism}: 60.
processes. The new states were weak economies, however. Most of them had an unstable economic basis and were unable to run their economy without the neo-colonial ‘assistance’ of the North. This nature forced the South to obey the North’s decisions at the UN. The AA Group thus announced the New International Economic Order (NIEO) at UNGA in 1972. The underdeveloped countries of especially Asia and Africa demanded a more well-balanced economic structure that would restrain the North’s exploitation of the South.

Japan as an ‘Asian industrialized state’ therefore stood in between the two opposing blocs. By the early 1980s, the AA Group yet started to identity the Japanese state as a “North colossus” in Asia and decided to de facto ousted Japan from the South bloc. This was largely because the post-1945 economic growth had made Japan’s international status more of a state that belonged to the North rather than to the South. The Japanese economic power was so influential, as Japan had become the world’s second largest economies by the 1980s. The Japanese delegate at the UN system then started to become the “odd man out”

428 Kazuji Nagasu, "The Super-Illusions of an Economic Superpower," in The Silent Power: Japan's Identity and World Role ed. Japan Center for International Exchange (Tokyo: The Simul Press, 1967), 218-20. As Nagasu points out, in the 1970s, on average, the North occupied around 18% of the world population but consumed over 63% of the world’s energy. By contrast, 50% of the world’s people dwelled in the developing countries (i.e. the South) but they used only 9% of the world’s energy. The gap between the North and South was large.
431 Richard P. Cronin, Japan, the United States, and Prospects for the Asia-Pacific Century: Three Scenarios for the Future (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Kin Keong Publishing, Co. Pte. Ltd, 1992). 16. And: Hans H. Haerwald, "Japan," in Asia and the International System, ed. Wayne Wilcox, Leo E. Rose, and Gavin Boyd (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers, 1972), 33-34. Harwald adds that Japan’s admission to the Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD, established in 1948) in 1964 decisively remarked the fact that the Japanese state was a member of the ‘North’ in the eyes of the South’s leaders. The OECD is an organization that supervises economic progress and international trading; and the vast majority of the member states are the most advanced industries of the world – the member countries in 1964 were: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Great Britain and the US. In other words, the OECD was constituted of the ‘North’ countries that the South saw as the obstacle to their economic progress.
432 Yabunaka, Kokka no Meiun [Fate of the Nation]: 48-49.
Denounced from both the North and the South, the Japanese leaders started to question the significance of the UN again.434

The discord between the Japanese Government and the UN continued to intensify until Fukuda Takeo became the Prime Minister in December 1976.435 Fukuda saw that Japan’s lack of humanitarian assistance was revisable as it did not necessarily need the SDF to participate in armed conflicts.436 To start with, Fukuda decided to take part in the UNPKO mission in the Cambodian Crisis which had broken out in 1970.437 The Japanese Government accepted to welcome over ten thousand refugees from Indochina to temporarily stay in Japan from the late 1970s.438 This immigration policy was the first attempt in the post-1945

433 This was despite the fact that Japan in the 1970s joined with the less developed countries to uphold the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people, accept the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the UN, and support of other Arab causes during the era of NIEO. For more, see: Mingst and Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century: 63-64.

434 Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993). 8; Ryan, The United Nations and International Politics: 2-3. As these scholars have pointed out in the texts, we should “not lead us to believe that the organization (i.e. the UN) has a single voice and a common purpose. It is more accurate to refer to the UN as a system, which like governments, consists of executive legislative, administrative, and judicial agencies at its centre and numerous specialized agencies in the field that are relatively autonomous of its central organs.” The quote is referenced from Ryan’s scholarship.


436 Takeo Fukuda, "Speech by Prime Minister Fukuda at Manila (Fukuda Doctrine Speech) - Given on 18 August 1977," (1977); in the so-called Fukuda Doctrine speech, Fukuda addressed three pillars of Japanese foreign policy towards Southeast Asia, and one of them was: “our nation would respect peace and reject the role of a military power.” The Diplomatic Bluebook of this year also stated that: “… calls are increasingly being heard for Japan to play a larger role within the organization [i.e. the United Nations] commensurate with its national capabilities. Fully aware of such voices, it is a basic tenet of Japan's foreign policy to actively participate in and cooperate with the activities of the United Nations aimed at promoting international cooperation in the above fields.” For the primary source, see: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, "Diplomatic Bluebook: Japan's Diplomatic Activities - Section 4. Cooperation in United Nations Activities," (Tokyo1976). The practice of “Humanitarian Assistance” was revisable because it was often illustrated as “material relief assistance and services” that purposed to save and maintain human lives. It included assistance campaigns such as “emergency food aid,” “relief coordination (protection and support services),” “reconstruction relief and rehabilitation” and “disaster prevention and preparedness.” In other words, it could involve military activities, but not military combats. For the definitions of humanitarian assistance, see: 436 Kerry Smith, "Japan Country Profile,” (Somerset: Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2010).

437 The Cambodian Crisis (as also known as The Cambodian Civil War) was a military conflict in which the Cambodian Communist Party and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) waged aggression against the Governmental Forces of Cambodia. The Cambodian Government was supported by the US forces. The war started in 1970 and continued until 1975. For more, see: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, "Diplomatic Bluebook: Japan's Diplomatic Activities - Chapter 1: Major International Development in 1979." (Tokyo, 1980).

Japanese history that the Government allowed refugees to enter the Japanese territory. It was also one of the few cases in which the Japanese Government practiced international cooperation not in monetary form in the post-war era.\textsuperscript{439}

The next turning point to Japanese foreign policy came in 1990.\textsuperscript{440} The Gulf War broke out and the UN member states agreed to send their military force to stop the escalation of the Middle Eastern hostility. While countries such as America, France and Britain were organizing the “UN force” to be sent to the Gulf, Japan was “left out” from the core of decision-making processes.\textsuperscript{441} As a result of the factors explained above, the Western powers upon the outbreak of the Gulf War perceived Japan, again, merely as an “automatic teller machine” of the international community who would just dish “the money out” without taking part in any humanitarian mission.\textsuperscript{442} The Japanese Government under the leadership of Kaifu Toshiki (in office 1989-91) then began to realize that Article 9 needed an immediate and thorough revision.\textsuperscript{443} They agreed that with the constitutional restriction Japan would never be able to obtain a truly respected title from the international community.


\textsuperscript{440} Funabashi, Japan's International Agenda, 2-3.


\textsuperscript{443} For more on Japan’s diplomacy in the years of the Gulf War, see: Kent E. Calder, "Japan in 1991: Uncertain Quest for a Global Role," Asian Survey 32, no. 1 (1992).
The Diet passed the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCW) in June 1992.\textsuperscript{444} This act legalized SDF’s foreign deployment only when it served under UNPKO supervision.\textsuperscript{445} The law thus enabled the Japanese to practice humanitarian assistance activities overseas without major legal restrictions (military actions were still against the constitution). The SDF’s first involvement took place in 1994.\textsuperscript{446} The Government sent the defence force to the UN Angola Verification Mission II in the aftermath of the Rwandan Civil War which forcefully displaced thousands of refugees in Angola and Zaire.\textsuperscript{447} The Japanese participation did not only mark the nation’s first intervention in an international settlement mission after August 1945, but also granted the SDF and governmental officials the opportunity to witness and experience how UNPKO worked in the real world.\textsuperscript{448} The frequency of Japanese involvement in the UN mission then started to increase from the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{449}

While the IPCW can be said as the symbol of Japan’s changing perception of international cooperation, equally important is the fact that the mass did not truly support the ratification of the Act. As Inoguchi points out, not many of the general public advocated SDF’s involvements in the Afghan War (2003) and the Iraq War (2006).\textsuperscript{450} Although the Japanese force’s role was limited to fuel the American, British and Pakistani military aircrafts and

\textsuperscript{445} Itoh, Globalization of Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and U.S. Efforts to Open Japan 161. And: Some scholars call the passing of “International Peace Cooperation Law” as an achievement by the Japanese, in which, they sacrificed the principle of Article 9 for the greater well-being of the international community. On the other hand, historians such as Michael J. Green imply the international community did not necessarily praise Japan’s action; but was rather mad at the Japanese Government for passing such Act not until 1992.
\textsuperscript{446} Akiko Fukushima, “Japan’s Perspectives on Asian Regionalism,” in Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition and the Search for Community ed. Michael J. Green and Bates Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 73.
\textsuperscript{447} Higashino, Ogata Sadako - Nanmin Shien no Genba kara [Ogata Sadako - From the Scene of Refugee Assistance]: 147.
\textsuperscript{448} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{450} Inoguchi, “Political Culture,” 175; Immerman, “Japan in the United Nations,” 185.
rejected to play military roles, the overseas deployment of SDF itself was not understood by the mass as a positive practice.\textsuperscript{451} This situation indicated, just like in the previous eras of Japanese internationalism, that the gap between the Government and the public was growing again – which is indeed one of the ongoing problems of Japanese society of today.

Unlike the military question, cultural internationalism saw no crucial problems in becoming the national consensus in both the private and public sectors. This is noticeable from the Japanese Government’s and the mass’s increasing interactions with UNESCO.\textsuperscript{452} In addition to MOFA’s establishment of the Cultural Affairs Department in the 1970s, the Japanese Government also founded the United Nations University in 1976 with the UN Secretary-General U Thant’s support with the purpose to:

\begin{quote}
... contribute, through collaborative research and education, dissemination, and advisory services, to efforts to resolve the pressing global problems of human survival, development and welfare that are the concern of the United Nations, its Peoples and Member States.\textsuperscript{453}
\end{quote}

The policy of cultural internationalism was strengthened furthermore in 1988, when the Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru announced in London that “cultural exchange would henceforth be one of the pillars of Japanese foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{454} One of its efforts was to take

\textsuperscript{451} Kyouji Yanagisawa, “Kokueki no Kanten kara Zieitai Iraku Haken no Igi wo Kangaeru [Considering the Self-Defence Force’s Dispatch to Iraq from the Point of View of the National Interests],” ed. Ministry of Defence (Tokyo: Ministry of Defence, 2003). 1. According to the Ministry of Defence’s survey, in 2003, over 55% of the population was “against” the SDF’s dispatch, while over 64% “did not see the need to send the SDF” to Iraq.


\textsuperscript{453} United Nations University, "About the United Nations University,” http://unu.edu/about.

\textsuperscript{454} Pan, The United Nations in Japan’s Foreign and Security Policymaking, 1945 – 1992: National Security, Party Politics, and International Status: 121-25. This policy was called the “Takeshi Initiative” in which the Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru (in office 1987-89) announced at the Manison House in London that the three
part in UNESCO’s Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage mission in Cambodia in 1995. A team of 650 architects, archaeologists, geologists, stone experts, conservators and measurement specialists from both private and public sectors was sent to the Temple of Bayon, the Royal Plaza of the Walled City of Angkor Thom and the Angkor Wat. The “large-scale intervention in Cambodia, undertaken through UNESCO” symbolized the country’s determination to contribute to the international community through using their highly developed degree of “scientific and technical work.”

Japan’s tie with UNESCO saw further development when the Japanese diplomat Matsuura Koichiro was elected the Director-General of UNESCO in 1999. His appointment caused two great changes in Japan’s UN policy. The first was that the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) began to launch a number of joint programs with UNESCO from the early 2000s. As seen in the rising number of Japanese involvement in the Organization’s scientific missions, Matsuura attempted to utilize the high standard of Japanese technology for the better of the international community. Secondly, the number of Japanese officials in UNESCO rapidly increased while Matsuura was in office. By 2009, 

456 Ibid.
457 For the list of missions Japan is involved, see: Ministry of Education Culture Sports Science and Technology – Japan, "UNESCO no Kyouiku Bunya ni okeru Waga Koku no Kyouryoku [Japan’s Contribution to the UNESCO in the field of Education],” http://www.mext.go.jp/unesco/004/002.htm.; And Ministry of Education Culture Sports Science and Technology – Japan, "UNESCO no Kagaku Bunya ni okeru Waga Koku no Kyouryoku [Japan’s Contribution to the UNESCO in the field of Science and Technology],” http://www.mext.go.jp/unesco/005/003.htm.; examples include: such as: Education for All (EFA), Asia-Pacific Program of Education for All (APPEAL), Education for Sustainable Development (ESD), International Tsunami Information System (ITSU), International Oceanographic Commission (ICO), and the Education of Information Technology (ICT).
458 For more on his thoughts, see the chapter on Matsuura in: Akashi et al., Oral History: Nihon to Kokuren no 50 nen [Oral History: the 50 Years of the Japan-UN Relations] 93-124.
Japan became the second largest national group after the French.\textsuperscript{459} This nature reflected the Japanese Government’s intention to grant young Japanese officials the opportunity to actually experience multilateral situations. In doing so, Japan was supplementing its overall lack of international experience which was comparatively lower to their Euro-American counterparts.\textsuperscript{460}

This period hence saw active interactions between the UN system and the Japanese private and public sectors. The rise of the humanitarian and cultural efforts indicated, to a large extent, that Japanese understanding of internationalism was no longer military-orientated or solely finance-orientated.\textsuperscript{461} By the late 1990s, cultural internationalism started to occupy an important place in Japanese foreign policy. These developments evidenced the rise of a national creed amongst the Japanese authorities that Japan’s bond with the world must not only be multilateral but also multifaceted in pursing the goal to become an honourable member of the international community. That is, the nation (both private and public) must practice all economic, political, diplomatic and humanitarian roles for the “greatest happiness of the greatest number.”\textsuperscript{462} Yet, as mentioned above, the Government must not disregard the general public’s discontent with the decision to play ‘humanitarian’ role that involved SDF to be sent to warzones worldwide. History has shown Japanese internationalism saw negative developments when the gap between the Government and the mass had enlarged.

\textsuperscript{459} Ibid., 110.  
\textsuperscript{460} Ibid., 111-12.  
\textsuperscript{461} Ibid., 351.  
\textsuperscript{462} This was noticeable from the fact that the Diplomatic Bluebook from 1993 started to have a subhead. In 1993, the subtitle was “Striving for a more secure and humane world.” For the original source, see: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, "Diplomatic Bluebook: Striving for a More Secure and Humane World," (Tokyo1993).
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Future Prospects

“Man differs fundamentally from the animals, however, because in addition he desires the desire of other men, that is, he wants to be “recognized.””

- Francis Fukuyama

The study of Japanese diplomatic ideology and the comprehensive illustration of Japanese diplomacy were the unidentified theme in the discipline. In order to reveal the themes, the turning points in the history of Japanese internationalism have revisited, with the hope of resurrecting the undiscovered features which once surrounded it.

The core value of Japan’s diplomatic ideology was the ambition to make Japan a respected power in the international community. Honour and dignity were what the Japanese authorities had striven to obtain throughout history. Between the 1850s and late 1920s, Westernization was the national creed to make Japan a “Great Power.” The adoption of the world’s most advanced technologies and thoughts was believed to turn the Japanese empire into one of the most “respected” countries in the international community. In the post-1945 world, Yoshida and his protégés proposed economism as the national consensus. They attempted to revive Japan’s international status through urging the Japanese state to become an economic superpower. The British sociologist Ronald Dore comments that this dynamics might be

463 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man: xvi.
possible to explain in terms of Bushido the Japanese national character. As Nitobe had described, Samurai wisdom had developed the “shame culture” amongst Japanese society that regarded honour as the greatest reputation a person could possibly get.

The Japanese definition of a “Great Power” had dramatically changed in the course of history. In the first era, Westernization was considered as the most fundamental element that made a state a “Great Power” and not a “savage state.” Incorporation of Euro-American standards, such as industrialization, imperialism and colonialism, was glorified as the symbol of modernity amongst the elites in this period. The deteriorating relation between Japan and the West in the late 1920s yet changed this consensus. With the radical outburst of Pan-Asianism and nationalism, the Japanese concept of “Great Power” was redefined. The ultranationalists reconceptualised a ‘Great Power’ as an empire that could defend its regional brotherhood (i.e. Asia) and expel strangers (i.e. the Euro-American empires) from its sphere of influence The Pacific War was the best example that illustrated this thought.

With the devastating defeat in August 1945, nonetheless, the policymakers faced the need to reorganize the definition again. For the post-war leaders, history had shown that aggression was not the right choice. Yoshida and his protégés thus proposed the pacifist doctrine. They urged Japan to re-rise as an economic superpower that would assist the wellbeing of the international community as the new form of a “Great Power” that Japanese people must aim to become. This changing perception of honour was the situational value of Japanese

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466 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Reading: Free Press, 1996). 40-41. As Huntington points out, the consensus amongst the “Great Powers” in this era was “To be civilized was good, to be uncivilized was bad.” The history of Japanese internationalism has shown that Japan was not an exception.
467 Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America 5.
diplomacy. The Japanese leaders redefined the idea of a “Great Power” in accordance with the changing climate of the international community and demands of the general public. So in the end, there is a strong view that ideology is one of the bonds that constitute the dynamics of international community. In addition to political influence and economic wealth, the Japanese case has shown that the conceptual desire to obtain respect from the members of the world was also a significant factor.

The future of Japanese diplomacy will depend to a great extent on how policymakers and intellectuals respond to the international climate and perceive Japan’s status as a “Great Power.” The world of today is witnessing a great variety of international issues, from poverty to AIDS to drugs and to terrorism. The Japanese challenge, as this thesis has explored, is the necessity of multi-polarizing the diplomatic thought. In order to obtain a truly respected title in the international community, Japanese authorities need to find the just balance of internationalism that would satisfy both its quest to honour and the demands of the international community.

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