The Republic of South Africa: the Southern African Regional Hegemon

Analysing the ‘irresponsible’ leadership of a regional Southern African hegemon; post-apartheid, through case studies of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.

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This work is substantially my own, and where any part of this work is not my own, I have indicated this by acknowledging the source of that part or those parts of the work.
Abstract

Numerous informal regional leaders exist all around the world. These include Japan in South East Asia, the United Kingdom (UK), France and Germany in Europe, and the United States (US) in North America. However, southern Africa as a region and the question of South African regional leadership is an area that remains uncertain, and under researched. This thesis examines the issues that arise when there is an irresponsible informal leader of a region of states, through a focus on South Africa’s role in the southern African region, with an in-depth look at its relationship with Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Further, a working theory has not been formulated for the role of a hegemon on the southern African region, and indeed there is not a fully applicable theory that can be used to theorize about a host of post-colonial states that are at such different levels of development, and have a wide variety of cultures, languages, and social dynamics. As such, this thesis uses South Africa’s current relationships with a select few states to form an analysis of the role of the hegemon, and develop a set of objectives for the South African government to turn around its leadership to become beneficial and effective to the development of the region as a whole. During the apartheid era South Africa played the role of a “regional surrogate”, and now it is time for South Africa to shake off this colonial image and become a responsible regional leader (Conteh-Morgan, 1997:55).
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<td>AEO</td>
<td>African Economic Outlook</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CIBD</td>
<td>Coercion Intimidation Beating Displacement</td>
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<td>CDS</td>
<td>Communicable Diseases</td>
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<td>CMA</td>
<td>Common Monetary Area</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EIU</td>
<td>Economist Intelligence Unit</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>Global political Agreement</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFIC</td>
<td>Iran Foreign Investment Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<td>MDC-M</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara</td>
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<td>MDC-T</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangarai</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<td>NCACC</td>
<td>National Conventional Arms Control Committee</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>RTA</td>
<td>Regional Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
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<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>STAE</td>
<td>Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Treatment Action Campaign</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>US</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
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<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
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Note: All figures are quoted in US Dollars ($USD).
Introduction

POsing the problem

Since the early 1900’s mining booms South Africa has, to an extent, taken on the role of regional leader in southern Africa, however this role has been inconsistent and at times irresponsible. Whilst this thesis has a clear vision of South Africa as the southern African regional leader, its inconsistency does raise questions of state capacity and responsibility of the South African state to both the international and regional community in assuming the role of a [responsible] regional leader. As such, changes in the South African government’s behaviour towards, and relations with, other states in the region need to be made, therefore this thesis will propose a set of goals at the end of each case study, based on the relationship between each states analysed and South Africa. These goals will be cumulated in the conclusion, wherein the capacity of the South African state to carry out such a proposed responsible regional leadership will be assessed. There is a lack of comparative literature on South Africa’s relations with its neighbours, along with its role and impacts on the region in general, after apartheid as the regional leader that it is today. In addition, a working theory has not been formulated for the role of a hegemon in the southern African region. In fact, there is not a fully applicable theory of regional leadership that can be applied to a host of post-colonial states that are at such different levels of development, have a wide variety of cultures, languages and social dynamics. This is truly a region, and a continent, that demands a unique approach. What’s more, the impact of the differing levels of South Africa’s involvement with its neighbours has not been addressed, and this thesis will seek to address these gaps in the literature.

Due to the nature of the states in southern Africa’s historical past, a new regionalist approach that moves beyond simply the states’ economic relations would appear to have more promise for the region. Regional integration in political and cultural matters would then be more meaningful.
However, the emphasis continues to be on the economic, as “[l]ed by South Africa, southern Africa instead appears bent on pursuit of full integration into the world economy” (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:343; see also Taylor, 2002; Taylor and Nel, 2002). Therefore, this thesis points to the actions South Africa could take in order to help socially/ culturally, politically, and economically in each state assessed, in order to provide a blueprint of goals for the South African leader to address. In doing so, South Africa has the potential to become an effective regional leader.

THE ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS

Chapter 1 lays the conceptual and analytical foundations for my study. It provides a clear justification for the description of South Africa as the southern African regional hegemon and reviews existing explanations regarding South Africa’s role in the region since the apartheid. Further, it analyses the overall concept of regionalism, in order to then grasp the narrower and indeed unique context of the southern African region.

The chapter also presents (and justifies the choice of) the four states analysed in this thesis; namely Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, in conjunction with South Africa in order to grasp South Africa’s influence in the region on the national level, whilst using theories of hegemony and power in order to understand why South Africa has thus far failed to provide the necessary support for its historically closest neighbours in the region.

The following five chapters analyse each case study through the lens of the South Africa-as-flawed- regional-hegemon theory.

Chapter 2 examines South African relations with Angola. It reveals how current economic and political relations between the states are affecting Angola and South Africa’s potential to lead in the region. Chapter 3 describes the South Africa- Mozambique relations from just before the end
of the apartheid to grasp the influential recent history between the two states, through to current state relations. Chapter 4 depicts South Africa’s relations with Namibia since the end of the apartheid and indeed the independence of Namibia from South Africa’s colonial rule of the state. It demonstrates how South Africa’s post-colonial relations with Namibia are still somewhat shaped by their turbulent past relations in terms of trade. Chapter 5 then outlines one of the most prominent and discussed alliances in the region to date, namely that of South Africa’s and Zimbabwe’s. It highlights the difficulties South Africa has faced with such a power in the region, as well as its poor track record of influence on Zimbabwe in terms of politics and weapons trading. While chapters 2, 3 and 4 each highlight a specific trajectory to South Africa’s flawed regional leadership and influence, they nevertheless all explain how several common causes precipitated South Africa’s [current] regional hegemonic failure by acting out conflicting ideologies; in terms of self-interest and greed on the one hand, and attempting to fulfil the popular idealist stance in the ‘New South Africa’ of human rights and notions of sovereignty outlined by the United Nations (UN) Charter.

The conclusion to this study draws comparisons across all four case studies of individual state relations with South Africa, along with its role within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). A working theory should contribute to policy and practice in the southern African region, providing instructions for development practitioners who wish to help southern Africa escape its multitude of crises’, along with lessons for core leaders of the SADC to improve its function, extend its reach, and strengthen its legitimacy, as well as South Africa’s own legitimacy as the regional hegemon.

**Chapter One**
South Africa the Regional Hegemon

Numerous definitions of hegemony have been offered by scholars over time; Bach (1983:602) contends that “respect for the autonomy of coalition partners distinguished hegemonia from imperial domination based on the use of coercive methods, and ultimately, territorial control…” Hegemonia represents a system of leadership where power is based on domination as much as cooptation”, whilst Evans and Newnham (1990:153) argued that hegemony means “primacy or leadership. In an international system this leadership would be exercised by a ‘hegemon’, a state possessing sufficient capability to fulfil this role.” More than just leadership, Myers (1991:5) posits that hegemonic states are those “states which possess power sufficient to dominate subordinate state systems”. Similarly writing in terms of power, Adebajo and Landsberg (2003:173) termed it “the holding by one state of a preponderance of power in the international system or regional subsystem, so that it can single-handedly dominate the rules and arrangements by which international and regional political and economic relations are conducted”, and more simply Stewart Patrick (1995:18) posits that the hegemon is the “legitimate single-power domination and coordination of the foreign security, political, and economic relations of sovereign states in international society”.

Using these descriptions of hegemony to gain insight into South Africa’s potential as an effective hegemon, it is clear that South Africa’s role must involve its superior capabilities to that of other states in the region. As well as holding a legitimate amount of power, South Africa should have the ability to coordinate beneficial political, economic, and social, as well as security relations with states in the region.

Ever since the end of the apartheid following the elections of April 1994 in South Africa the world has been watching how the new South Africa would cope and develop. Dubow sums up the apartheid in South Africa as entailing:
“an economic program intended to advance the interests of Afrikaners [white settlers of mainly Dutch descent], undergirded by hypernationalism, maintained by a system of repression, and rationalized by strict Calvinist religious convictions and a belief that the Afrikaners were ‘God’s chosen people’” (Dubow, 1995:258-260; in Bauer and Taylor, 2005:243).

The peaceful transitions, however surprising, ensured a responsibility of the state to uphold a certain stance on democracy and human rights, something which it was assumed to carry in to the southern African region as a whole, along with a general leadership in the region. Such a regional leadership was going to see the development of the region politically and economically, however, it is questionable how far the new South Africa has managed to progress the region in the post-apartheid era. No longer an extension of the ideals of the North, the new South Africa has attempted in certain respects to be a strong leader in the region in its own right, with mixed success and failures. This thesis explores these with regards to its neighbouring states in the region; namely Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.

**South Africa’s Political Influence in the Region**

South Africa’s colonial past has ensured a cloud has been lingering over its ability to be a true regional leader. During the apartheid the Group Areas Act of 1950 “outlawed interracial communities and created racially defined residential areas” which arguably still remains somewhat today (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:243). Further, the Population Registration Act of 1950 defined categories of race in South Africa, which still exist today; namely white, black, Asian, and ‘coloured’ (or mixed race). The negative connotations carried with being the leader, and as such condoning a sort of hierarchical structure that was so apparent in the apartheid era; make for an uneasy relationship with the state. However, to see any real change and indeed
improvement in the region South Africa must attempt to leave this uneasiness behind and use a sense of objectivity with its foreign relations post-apartheid.

Discussed extensively over the following pages is the concept of ‘irresponsibility’ (grouped with notions such as flawed) on the part of South Africa as a regional leader. The measures for such accusations are discussed in this thesis, however for clarity it should be noted that they involve South Africa’s inability to promote democracy in the region, as well as its lack of a formulation of a security protocol for the region, along with its selfish trade policies. Whilst I do not purport to the ideological idea that regional leaders/hegemons are not flawed and irresponsible; it does however point to the reasons why they should work harder towards certain goals in order to be more responsible in their actions towards their regional communities.

It is the argument of this author that should South Africa follow the goals outlined at the end of each case study it will become a more effective leader. Further, the goals are in South Africa’s interests to meet, as they will promote stability in the region, as well as foreign investment to all states, and indeed to South Africa itself (which will seem more prosperous as a result). Moreover, they will reduce the risk of conflict in the region, as well as reduce the risk of a rise of extremist individual leaders in states that may threaten South Africa’s power in the region. Further, credibility and respect around the world can be gained by the promotion of ‘good’ and democratic governance. Mirroring this intent, the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation website (Feb, 2004) states that:

“Although national governments remain the principal guarantors of the security and well-being of Africa’s people, South Africa is of the firm view that governments must hold each other accountable for good conduct in both domestic and foreign affairs.”
One of the key roles South Africa must carry out includes ensuring free and fair elections in the region according to its own monitoring bodies. Combining the use of the terms election monitoring and election observation (for it is not the terminology which matters according to Bjornlund (2004:40), but the way the actions are carried out), he clearly states that:

"International election observation is the purposeful gathering of information about an electoral process and public assessment of that process against universal standards for democratic elections by responsible foreign or international organizations committed to neutrality and to the democratic process for the purpose of building an international confidence about the election's integrity or documenting and exposing the ways in which the process falls short".

Despite some scholars dissatisfaction with the timing of such monitoring systems (see Elklit, 1999; Bjornlund, 2004) as monitoring polling itself may leave out crucial previous aspects of elections, it ensures pressure is placed on regimes undergoing elections. This pressure is amplified by agendas such as the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) ‘good governance’ promotion and criteria, as well as the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF, 2006) and World Bank’s (WB, 2005) encouragement of improving accountability and transparency through its technical support of a state aligning them with international practices and standards. These may lead to increased democracy as international ‘shaming’ may be too great a cost (Risse and Sikkink, 1999).

Simply, Carothers (2002) argues that elections are a crucial aspect of democratization, due to the nature of its enabled involvement of the masses, and along with this increased participation, accountability of the elites ensues. Further, Carothers (2002) contends that over time democracy will deepen and reforms made to ensure its survival if elections are present. Moreover, Elklit
(1999) argues that it is not solely elections, but elections with democratic intent, and a high level of electoral quality that aids democracy, as Elklit (1999:47-48) stresses that democracy (its intent, seriousness, and indeed quality) must largely come from within the country going through elections if it is to last.

The ‘electoral fallacy’, as described by Elklit (1999) and Diamond et al (1996) is a problem in new democracies in that it lends legitimacy to somewhat illegitimate elections. The holding of elections has therefore been associated with increasing democratization of states, which may not be so, as is evident in Zimbabwe and in the past in Mozambique and Angola. Further, Diamond et al (1996) pose three different types of democracies, namely pseudo-democracies, electoral democracies, and liberal democracies. Electoral democracies have a minimal level of civil freedoms to allow for somewhat meaningful elections. Pseudo-democracies, however, have an unfair arena in which to carry out the elections. Simply, the ruling power is highly unlikely to be voted out of power in the elections within a pseudo democracy (Diamond et al, 1996; Elklit, 1999:29).

**South Africa’s Influence: Elites and Civil Society**

Scholars have argued that essential in democracies is the separation of state and society (Munro, 1997:117; see also Putnam, 1993; Pierre, 2000; Shils, 1991). Further, a democratic state is one in which the civil society is able to express itself, and struggles of class, ethnicity, and so forth, are separate from the state (Labuschagne, 2003:9). Whilst South Africa’s civil society is ever evolving, the same is not so in surrounding states whose freedom levels are below international standards. This can be addressed and changed by South Africa in numerous ways. Civil society is defined by Bratton as “a sphere of social interaction between the household and the state which is manifest in norms of community cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks of public communication” (Bratton, 1994:2).
Comparatively, there are different roles between elites and civil society in the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. Elites tend to take a leading role in the shift away from the incumbent regime, and the civil society, which is based on trust and reciprocity, plays a supporting role wherein it provides popular pressure on the elite to transition towards democracy (Putnam, 1993; Bernhard, 1993; Gibson, 2001; Bratton, 1994). These both have the chance to generate social capital (Putnam, 1993). Social capital, according to Putnam (1993) is derived from social trust and social networks. These in turn affect and lead to civic engagement, which leads to ensured accountability in a representative democracy and this leads to political trust and better policy outcomes.

Playing a more centralized role than civil society, elites, along with their own values and interests, steer transitions toward democracy, and play a part in sustaining it (see DiPalma, 1990; Higley and Gunther, 1992; O’Donnell et al., 1986; Kullberg and Zimmerman, 1999; Rivera, 1999). Elites in the southern African states can also be pressured by more powerful elites in the region with the most leverage such as those in South Africa, however both civil society in a state and the actions of elites are crucial. Moore (1966) further argues that it is the division of elites that sees democracies succeed in the long term. This is simply due to what Huntington (1991) described as increased political choice, which is inherent in the very nature of democracy (Bunce, 2000:707-708). A level playing field for fractions within elites in the form of opposition political party leaders tends to allow for criticism of other elites, which may in turn lead to transparency and accountability (Bunce, 2000:708; see also Bermeo, 1997; Bunce, 1998; Bunce, 1999; Ekiert, 1996; Ekiert and Kubik, 1998; Fishman, 1990; Tarrow, 1995; Tarrow, 1996). Hence, South Africa’s role in encouraging multiparty elections in the region is vital for democracy in the region. Simply, elite actions are the result of larger social forces within civil society, as “elites are seen as summarizers of long-term developments and as well-positioned representatives of larger social forces” (Bunce, 2000:708).
The Southern African Region

So as not to restrict the concept of region, the UN Charter offers a definition voted down during the 1945 San Francisco Conference that posits that:

“There shall be considered, as regional arrangements, organizations of a permanent nature grouping in a given geographical area several countries which, by reason of their proximity, community of interests or cultural, linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities make themselves jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise … as well as for the safeguarding of their interests and the development of their economic and cultural relations” (cited in Russett, 1967: 4).

Richard Higgot posits that regionalisation has the power to “manage, retard, control, regulate or mitigate market globalization” (Higging, 2001:128). Further, regionalisation has enabled the ‘bringing back of elements’ that globalization has to a degree superseded, such as territory and geography, which are used as sites for regional governance. Regional groups have an advantage of closeness over other groups, in that there can be greater accountability due to the increased potential for transparency. Along with this, problems have a better chance of being solved at the regional level. What’s more, alliances can be more effectively made at the regional level due to the propensity for dependence. It is this type of functional interdependence which promotes a sense of common identity or even community among members of a region, and indeed assures the prevention of inter-state conflict among members of a regional group.

However, “hyper globalists and some defenders of the multilateral order see regionalisation as revealing a shrinking of ambition” (Cooper-Hughes and de Lombaerde, 2008:3). This is due to the inward-looking nature of regional relations as opposed to international relations. Further, regions may be too restrictive in its exclusive approach, through its narrow gauge of who
belongs and who does not based on geography, compared to other more inclusive, larger state organizations such as the African Union (AU), the G20, and of course the UN. What's more, regionalisation is often driven by economic motivations, which may in fact blind greater powers within the region from promoting other benefits of regionalisation such as social and political harmony within the region. Simply, South Africa’s expansion into various markets and business interests is cementing this role as less of a benign regional leader, and more of a powerful hegemon asserting itself across the region (Alden and Soko, 2005:368). However, the South African government needs to ensure that it carries out more than just its own economic interests to see development across the region.

**Regional Trade**

Regional Trade Agreements (RTA’s) are supposedly “conceived as springboards for their members’ global competitiveness by way of regionalism” (de Lombaerde et al, 2008: 2). They are purported to promote intra-regional liberalization, along with regional transportation networks and common institutions. This in turn promotes social cohesion among regional member states, whilst enhancing members’ adherence to product standards, and stability and development. However, many RTA’s such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) arguably “have failed to live up to their liberalizing and welfare-enhancing potential” due to “incomplete implementation of the common integration commitments” (World Bank, 2005). This is where de Lombaerde et al (2008:2) emphasise the notion of “getting governance right” in the region. This central tenet can be carried out by the regional leader, or at the very least organized in some sense by it. In order to do this, intense monitoring and scrutinizing of RTA members needs to take place. Hence, the tactic of shaming governments into compliance may be the key to seeing RTA’s reaching their potential for being springboards for competitiveness (Risse and Sikkink, 1999; de Lombaerde et al, 2008:2-3).
South Africa’s businesses and corporations are increasingly buying out local organisations and businesses in the region, which is ensuring the displacement of its neighbours’ commerce whilst diminishing any outright advantage they might have had. In this expansion of South African business and investment into its neighbouring economies, South Africa has ensured the competitive advantages that it has is used to exploit local business, such as in the use of its abundant investment capital, marketing and superior technological know-how in the region, advanced public infrastructure, and indeed human resources (Daniel et al. 2003:368–90; Alden and Soko, 2005: 369). This trade has been bolstered by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which rewards good governance and the reduction of corruption and conflicts with increased aid and investment, along with increasing trade barrier reduction with South Africa (Alden and Soko, 2005:369).

In order to achieve this aim, South Africa has actively sought to ease capital controls. This has been done through increasing the limit in November 2002 “from $79 million to $216 million – on domestic companies wishing to invest in other African countries or seeking to extend existing operations” (Alden and Soko, 2005:370; Alden & le Pere 2003). This limit was increased further to $331 million in 2003 (Games 2003: 14–15). However, with South Africa pushing for a neo-liberal model for trade in the area, Alden and Soko have argued that South Africa’s role as a regional hegemon will “see the onset of a new era of exploitation in ascendance Africa” (Alden and Soko, 2005: 369). Despite this claim, several African leaders actually believe that South Africa’s expansion into trade and investment in Africa could save the region and indeed continent, as South Africa could act “as the continent’s last best economic hope” (Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan 2001:74).

What’s more, South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry’s ‘butterfly strategy’, similar to Japan’s ‘lead goose’ strategy, highlights the importance of the African region to post-apartheid
South Africa’s future foreign economic policy. Japan solidified its status as a regional leader through its establishment of an East Asian production network in the form of the steel industry through passing on industries to the second-tier and then third-tier geese (states) around it (Furuoka, 2005). Simply, Japan’s Asia policy has ensured a prosperous region booming after WWII (Furuoka, 2005; Peng, 2000). In the ‘butterfly strategy’ outlook, South Africa is placed at the head of the butterfly, with the rest of the continent following at the body (Alden and Soko, 2005:369). This is intended “to open up South Africa’s trading wings from Africa to North and South America and East Asia” (Vickers 2003: 29).

However, South Africa needs to ensure it does not leave its region behind in pursuit of individual state economic gains in the international arena should it want the region as a whole to develop. Further, Gibb (2000:457-81) argued that reciprocal trade relationships between the developed and developing world may potentially quash attempts at powerful regional integrations such as in southern Africa. What’s more, regional solidarity; and within that trust and social relations within southern Africa, may be hindered should individual states look elsewhere for trade relations, and indeed leadership and alliances. Should the region not bind together as a strong structure, it may undermine its own bargaining power in global negotiations such as those in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Alden and Soko, 2005: 378).
The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

A key regional organisation in the southern African region is the SADC, which grew out of the original Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1992. The SADCC was founded in order to promote equality in the region, along with the reduction of dependence on South Africa in general. It originally consisted of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, as it was created during the apartheid era in South Africa (Crawford and Klotz, 1999:254).

However, it was a weak organisation, as with many organisations without the backing of the most powerful in the region. Nevertheless, it was reinvigorated with the membership of South Africa post-apartheid in 1994. This new organisation, the SADC, was now mainly focused on RTA’s. As Meyns (1997:167) describes, the SADC was established on an agenda for cooperation:

“which provides for … deeper economic cooperation and integration, on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit, providing for cross-border investment and trade, and freer movement of factors of production, goods and services across national borders.”

The SADC has since expanded and is now made up of Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, it is clear that there is inherent in the SADC economies the existence of great inequalities as in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) economies. South Africa alone produces a disproportionate gross domestic product (GDP) in southern Africa of about 80%, as “South Africa’s overall economic output (estimated at about US $160 billion) far exceeds that of its neighbours: the other 13 SADC member states jointly produce only about US $33 billion” (Alden and Soko, 2005: 374). This has inevitably
lead to an imbalanced trade relationship between South Africa and its SADC counterparts. Further, increases in bilateral trade between SADC states and South Africa has been criticised on the grounds that South African business may be putting local business and manufacturers under strain (Grobbelaar 2004: 98; Alden and Soko, 2005:376).

Consequently, South Africa has sought to reduce these inequalities through the enforcement of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in the SADC Trade Protocol of 1996 which came into force in 2000 (SADC, 2008a). This ensures the reduction of tariffs in industries such as the clothing and textile industries to allow other SADC members to have a comparative advantage. Furthermore, there has been an allowance given to infant industries for ‘extended grace periods’ in which the aforementioned tariff and subsidies reduction can be limited to allow for growth for a certain period of time (SADC, 2008a).

However, the SADC faces difficulties in the form of its managerial issues, as its lack of expertise to tackle regional integration is weakening the organisation (Marais, 1998:119). Further, the concept of sovereignty may diminish the legitimacy of the organisation. The sheer absence of good governance and indeed democracy in several member states may undermine integration, and South Africa’s inability to deal with this issue may further weaken its leadership due to increased strain on the government’s resources and capabilities.

Moreover, differences in the SACU and SADC constitutions have ensured a slower regional integration due to the lack of trust and reciprocity among the different members. Concessions for non-SADC SACU members are withheld, whilst the non-SADC SACU members seek expansion in the customs union rather than full regional integration (Marais, 1998:119). These cleavages need to be filled and South Africa should be the one to seize this opportunity.
EXISTING LITERATURE ON SOUTH AFRICA AS A REGIONAL LEADER

Abass (2004:25) defines a region as “a notion encompassing entities, which may, but do not necessarily, belong to a geographically determinable area, having either common or disparate attributes and values, but which seek the accomplishment of common goals”. Although useful, this review seeks a different definition. Arguably the southern African region is one which is defined by the membership of neighbouring states, with differing values, norms and identities, and common economic goals.

Within this study, analysis will be carried out on South Africa’s ability to bring about democratization, security, and economic cohesion in a unique regional space marred by painful memories of colonialism and sentiments of anti-imperialism. It may be applied to a region wherein states are undergoing intense change in a multitude of aspects in their societies within an ever globalizing world, and in which there is a clear, however somewhat risky and irresponsible, hegemon to guide them. What’s more, the impact of the different levels of South Africa’s involvement with its neighbours has not been fully addressed in the literature, and as such this thesis will address these gaps in the knowledge.

Simply, the question for regional politics and South African leadership within the region is to what extent southern Africa is being ‘South-Africanised’? On this question, Baregu and Landsberg (2003:187) note that “Pretoria’s African Renaissance agenda of enlarging democracy and ‘good governance’ through multiparty political pluralism and civil society participation threatens the postliberation movement, one-party dominant systems that are legacies of those struggles.” Hence, South Africa is indeed changing the face of the region in a multitude of ways through its powerful influence (Baker et al, 1994; Maasdorp 1996; Mills, Begg and Van Nieuwkerk, 1995).
The experience of the late 1990s to the present in southern African politics has led analysts to assert that South Africa is an economically and politically strong regional leader its region (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan 2001; Franke, 2009). The 1994 democratic elections in South Africa changed South African politics tremendously, ensuring that changes were made in its outlook towards the region, particularly in terms of its push for democracy, development, and human rights. These new changes were made under the vision of cooperation instead of the confrontation that had previously described the South African apartheid regime. However, the extent to which this moralistic view of regional cooperation has been upheld since is particularly questionable.

**South Africa in the Southern African Development Community**

The southern African region is described as those 15 states which form the SADC; namely Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

GDPs in the community range from $11,290 in South Africa, whose industrialized economy dwarfs all of the others, to $570 in Malawi (UNDP, 2003). Transforming from the SADCC in the 1990s, the SADC is now an organisation cored by South Africa as the most crucial member missing from the SADCC. However, South Africa’s economic power has been contentious in that there is the possibility of the government acting purely in terms of selfish national interests, with Alden and Soko (2005:368) going so far as to term South Africa’s current regional leadership as the “era of exploitation”. In addition, Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan (2001) argue that South Africa’s infiltration of business into other SADC member-states has been at the expense of their local markets and produce.

The SADC is currently viewed as the leading regional economic organisation in Africa (McCarthy, 1994; 1999). What’s more, the SADC symbolizes for some an organisation of
regional integration and cooperation on a wider variety of issues such as politics and health as well as social and logistical issues around the region (Bauer and Taylor, 2005). However, there are many divisions in the SADC and the southern African region in general that may destabilize it (Tapfumaneyi, 1999:70; Baker and Maeresera, 2010:108-9). The divergent nature of South African political relations in the region in time of crisis displays the fractions and cleavages, evident in relations with Angola in times of civil war and Zimbabwe in civil unrest. It is these divisions that undermine the SADC’s peacekeeping abilities, as military divisions such as those during the DRC conflict have revealed a stumbling block for action, and indeed the consequences of non-aligned foreign policies in the region (Neethling, 2009).

**Reshaping the Region after the Cold War**

States of southern Africa such as Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, and Angola, all share very common histories. Although liberalizing at different stages in the past few decades, they each fought white minority rule, resorting to the use of force in their liberation movements (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:4). Under colonial rule for longer than any other African region, these states have lasting ‘regional bonds’, with their now ruling parties cooperating pre-liberation in protecting exiles and freedom fighters (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:5). These common past experiences should see the region move towards a shared future to ensure peace and security (Baker and Maeresera, 2009:108; Nathan, 2004:6). Relations in the region in the past could not be separated from the Cold War politics, and it is the past and present relations between South Africa and its neighbours that may destabilize this goal, and indeed the region (Söderbaum, 2003).

Describing this possibility in greater detail, ‘regiosceptics’ argue that the geographical proximities such as those with southern Africa do not always develop cooperation (Powell, 2005). Instead, sceptics maintain the nature of close regional geographies may cause divisions,
hierarchies, and indeed interstate tensions (Ibok, 2000:7; Dorne, 1998:1; Ghebremeskel, 2002:21). What’s more, ‘regiosceptics’ discuss the possibility of state selfishness in times of regional need. They argue that “the coloured glasses of narrow national self-interest” will push the regional hegemonic states such as South Africa to seek their own gains before acting as a regional unit (Ghebremeskel, 2002:9, Dorne, 1998). Even when the hegemon does act for the region there is the possibility for dependency when there is a richer state providing the majority of resources in times of conflict.

The consequences for this are twofold. First, the hegemon is able to shape and manipulate their agendas into the regional policies. Second, should the powerful state be involved in any regional conflict, the subordinate states may have difficulties in responding and acting in the interests of international law (Adebajo, 2003). South Africa’s military spending for 2007 was around $8,578,200,000, whilst Mozambique spent $161,520,000, and Zimbabwe spent $158,118,000 (Global Security, 2011). In this way, South African leaders ensure its military-might will shape the conditions in southern Africa, and thus South Africa’s hold on the balance of power next to its neighbours with far inferior military spending, as South Africa’s military capabilities are transparent to ensure deterrence and coercion is successful (Griffiths, 1996:481; Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1985).

However, contrary to this Franke (2006:5) argues that narrow national interest that has hindered regional peacekeeping is true of the past- but not present, nor future, of regional relations. Opposed to “regiosceptics” such as Dorne (1998), Franke (2009) holds out hope that such regions can see peace and stability in Africa, without the perceived state selfishness holding it back as realists predict (see: Keohane and Nye, 1989; Krasner, 1978; Waltz, 1979; and Walt, 1985). Further, Sandra MacLean observes, “regions are almost always more than geopolitical divisions; they are also ‘social constructions,’ i.e., processes based on shared interests and intersubjective understanding” (Maclean, 1999:947). Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s “Agenda for
Peace” further cemented the importance of regions such as the southern African region to ensure the burden for peacekeeping is somewhat eased off the UN, with the possibility of being more effective by their very nature (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Mirroring these hopes, former South African President Thabo Mbeki called for “Africans to do everything [they] can to rely on their own capacities to secure their continent’s renaissance” (Mbeki, 2003, quoted in: Neethling, 2005). It is South Africa in the region that states will inevitably rely on should it fulfil its hegemonic role; however South Africa’s capacity to do so will be crucial for its status regionally as well as internationally.

Kornegay and Chesterman (2000) discuss the consequences of a regional hegemonic status as putting restraints on action for the powerful. This is due to the increased responsibility, and thus greater number of states, institutions, and actors to answer to. Simply, hegemons should be more accountable and thus less free to act in their own interests (Kornegay and Chesterman, 2000:13). Further, the creation of institutions such as the African Peer Review Mechanism through the AU to ensure the accountability of the regional hegemons in Africa- such as South Africa and Nigeria, are underway (Franke, 2007:47, Kornegay and Chestermann, 2000:14). However, as of the moment this self-monitoring mechanism is voluntary.

Before reviewing the applicable theory for this thesis, these next four sections review literature around the case studies carried out; namely on Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, in order to grasp the availability of the literature, and indeed gain an insight into current analysis on each state.
**Angola**

Angola has experienced decades of war following its independence during the Cold War. This meant it was wedged between changing African politics and the bipolar politics of the Cold War at the time (Bender, 1978:3). South Africa’s involvement in the state through US preferences ensured the opposition movement National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was supported, and Bauer and Taylor (2005:6) maintain that South Africa’s ability to cause unrest in the state continued until the death of its leader in 2002; whereby political and economic transition could finally be made. Griffiths (1996:474) describes UNITA’s hold on Angola’s political stalemate as “the Savimbi option, that is, UNITA’s resumption of civil war following its electoral loss.” As such, Griffiths (1996) emphasized the need for a rapid demobilisation of such forces by outside states. However, the opposite was seen in Angola, ensuring civil wars ravished the post-colonial state for some decades (Griffiths, 1996:474-5). Moreover, Southall argues that the South African government’s involvement in Angola’s civil war ensured that Angolans fell prey to South African mercenaries, illegal arms traders and diamond smugglers, which saw the exasperation and prolonging of the conflict (Southall, 2006:5). Further, South Africa’s withdrawal from the country and subsequent lack of guidance in terms of political reform ensured slow development for decades (Carbone, 2003:1).

**Mozambique**

Involving itself once again in the politics of another neighbour, the South African government financially backed Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) in Mozambique, the main political opposition, over Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), despite the constant political battles between the two (Weinstein, 2002). Due to US encouragement at the time the apartheid government effectively spurred on a civil war in Mozambique. Despite being one of the world’s fastest growing economies, Mozambique is still far from developed, with
growing economic polarities and civil unrest. During the apartheid in South Africa, FRELIMO offered a safe haven to several African liberation movements, including the African National Congress (ANC) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). (Weinstein, 2002) This still shows consequences today, as even now South Africa tends to support southern Mozambique more so than the North. The South is home to the majority of FRELIMO supporters, whilst the North encompasses the RENAMO support; which is dramatically underdeveloped in comparison (Weinstein, 2002; Carbone, 2003).

Namibia

Gaining and subsequently quasi-colonising Namibia after World War I from Germany through Britain, South Africa imposed apartheid laws on the state which it treated as more of a province than a separate entity. Cuban troops and Angolan forces were involved in the battles for Namibian independence from South Africa, which fed into the Cold War politics of the time (Franke, 2007). Due to this tied history Namibia is still largely economically attached to South Africa since its independence in 1990 (Wren, 1990). As such, South Africa’s regional hegemonic role ensures a monopoly over successful businesses in Namibia, particularly the mining industries. What’s more, South Africa’s current trade relations with Namibia show the unbalanced relationship these two states have. However, Namibia is experiencing a uranium mining boom after emerging from the recent global financial crisis, and consequently there are worries in the international community about Namibia’s potentially trading of uranium with rogue states (Charbonneau, 2010; see also Walt, 2010). This could be South Africa’s opportunity to push for a regional security agreement in the form of a protocol.

Zimbabwe

The prospect of a peace-inducing regional leader in South Africa is somewhat in question due to its post-apartheid relations with Zimbabwe- which is described as “not free” by Freedom House
data (Freedom House, 2011a). Bauer and Taylor depict how President Robert Mugabe has used violent strategies to remain in power and stifle his opposition since the 80’s (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:6). What’s more, recent data from the Afrobarometer (2008-2009) shows that there are high levels of perceived corruption and low levels of trust in government from the public in Zimbabwe (Armah-Attoh et al, 2007:10; Chikwana, et al, 2004). Despite this, South Africa shows open support for the state and its leader, evident in the defending of Zimbabwe by South Africa when it was suspended from the Commonwealth in 2003 (Phimister and Raftopoulos, 2004:394). In crude terms, the ANC may feel that its debt to the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic front (ZANU-PF) has yet to be paid in full, as ZANU-PF supported the anti-apartheid movement of the ANC and accommodated many of its members throughout the time of the apartheid regime.

The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is the leading opposition party in Zimbabwe, and South Africa has in the past been called upon as a mediator between the two parties, (Bauer and Taylor, 2005). However, due to accusations of dishonesty from the MDC towards the South African brokers, unrest between the ZANU-PF and the MDC has ensued. “Even worse, the MDC has announced that it is cutting all links with the South African government… claiming that the South Africans were not honest brokers. This has created a situation that further reduces the possibility of a regionally led initiative to solve the crisis,” and indeed is causing some embarrassment to the regional leader (Maroleng, 2005:89; Matlosa, 2002:129).

The danger of this, according to Matlosa (2002), is the potential for the global hegemons to become involved and then undermine the sovereignty of the SADC states; thus monitoring should be done from within the region itself. She argues that “election observation undertaken by these groups [from within the region] during the 2000 Parliamentary election [in Zimbabwe] was extremely constructive/transformative and not confrontational/ judgmental as was the case with the EU observation mission” (Matlosa, 2002:131). However, what she does not point to are the
biases that arise from relying upon regional friends or foes for monitoring purposes. Instead of losing political independence and sovereignty as Matlosa (2002) asserts would occur from the involvement of Western hegemonic states, Zimbabwe may be losing democratic principles altogether through South Africa’s bias towards the ZANU-PF party, and as such South Africa’s openly one-sided support for the leading party has to stop to ensure its effective leadership.

**Theory**

Structuralist theories such as neorealism suggest that it is the material capacity of the state which will determine its power in a region (see: Keohane, 1984, 1986, 1988; and Krasner, 1978, 1991, 1993, 1995/6). “In short, structural theories rely on material capacity and suggest that material attributes or endowments (whether wealth or power) determine political behaviour” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). Hence, according to such theories the less developed and economically powerful states of the southern African region are at the mercy of South Africa’s policies in regional organisations. South Africa, then, is free to endorse or ostracize states in the region as and when it’s in its interests to do so (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:8). However, Franke argues that there is actually no place given to the study of African politics in the major theories- realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, despite being holistic approaches (Franke, 2009:4). Agency-based theories tend to emphasize the role of powerful elites and individuals in policy making and regional power in southern Africa (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:9).

However, to describe the politics of southern Africa, one must eliminate the tension between the two forms of theory- bases; namely agency and structure, mending them together in an approach that can “privilege structure, state, and individual agents to inform the analysis of southern Africa’s political, social, and economic transformations” (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:11). Differing from structuralist’s, constructivists such as Wendt (1999) argue that when describing the politics of a region agency and structure cannot be separated, as “it is impossible for structures to have
effects apart from the attributes and interactions of agents” (1999, 12). As such, Bauer and Taylor (2005:9) describe the politics of southern Africa in particular as being driven by agents such as Mugabe and Mandela, as well as the structures that shape and constrain their action; as agency and structure cannot be separated when studying the complex relations of African politics. Additionally, Finnemore and Sikkink (2001:407) take a structuration approach when describing ways in which African leaders can change for the better. They pose lessons to be learnt for new leaders through strategies of comparison, reflection, and global interaction (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:11).

Finally, Wendt (1999), Adler (1997), and Adler and Barnett (1996; 1998) describe how institutional formations allow the generating of crucial elements for cooperation; namely trust, shared knowledge, common values, norms, and global identities along with reciprocity to ensure peace and security. However, a criticism of Wendt (1999) is that he fails to recognize the importance of regional and inter-state relations, as he does not separate regional form continental cooperation which has crucial differences, as such Wendt’s “unconditional reliance on a monolithic level of systemic analysis glosses over conceptually rich patterns of inter-state relations” (Franke, 2009:6).

Constructivists emphasize the social construction of southern Africa, in which norms, values and common identities are formed (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). It is unfortunately the absence of these in southern Africa which “inhibits the development of trust, institutional cohesion, common policies and unified responses to crises” (Baker and Maeresera, 2009:108; Nathan, 2004:6). Therefore, to see peace and stability in the future Franke (2009) points to South Africa as the regional hegemon to promote such integration. However, Franke could be stretching the reality of a common identity formation in southern Africa, something that may not be evident for quite some time (Williams, 2010:98). Further, Franke’s (2009:226-230) description of Africa as being ordered in terms of overlapping security communities such as the SADC and the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) under the umbrella of anarchy may actually overemphasize the role of such infant communities, whilst undermining the reality of anarchy in Africa. Anarchy may very well be what states make of it; however it’s too early in terms of African political development in the post-colonial era to tell whether there will be a reliance on regional organisations to overcome the Kant’s culture of anarchy (Wendt, 1999: 25-26, 281-282; Williams, 2010: 101).

In sum, there is extensive literature on regional cooperation and conflict, adequately describing the conditions for both, from all sides of the theoretical coins. However, there is a failure to narrowly address regions in Africa in all of this analysis. As Franke (2009:3) rightfully posits, “more than one out of seven people and one out of four nations in the world are African, the amount of IR scholarship that analyses the continent for theory-building purposes is still insignificant,” and thus it is a justifiable task for scholars to pursue.

**METHODOLOGY AND CASE SELECTION**

This study takes the form of an analysis into the role of South Africa as a hegemon in the southern African region, through a look at its relations with four states, namely Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. It is from a detailed investigation into each of these case studies that I have tested the argument that South Africa is a flawed regional hegemon. This analysis has involved a range of secondary sources of a predominantly qualitative nature. These include: historical, economic, political science, and social science-based analyses of each case study; accounts of the South Africa-state relations pertaining to each case study; and the literature on each state more generally. Where available, I have also drawn on political, economic and security data in order to illustrate certain key points. While the relatively abundant literature on Zimbabwe, Namibia, and to a certain extent Mozambique, posed no problems for my research, the literature on Angola was generally less prolific, with the Afrobarometer, a key access to primary resources used in this thesis, having no data as yet on Angola.
This thesis has made the choice of countries analysed based largely on shared historical experience. There are a multitude of rationales behind my selection of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe in particular. To delineate these, I will first depict the reasons for not choosing other states in the region; namely Malawi, Zambia, and Botswana.

Malawi and Zambia were the first to gain their independence, and their economic and political trajectories mirror more that of sub-Saharan Africa than southern Africa. Although the importance of these states in the region is undeniable, I would argue that they have moved beyond the realm of political influence from South Africa. Both have suffered oppressive regimes run by Presidents-for-life Hastings Banda and Kenneth Kaunda. Unlike the first generation liberation movements that describe the rest of the regions politics, Zambia and Malawi have now moved on to hold transition elections in 1991 (Zambia) and 1994 (Malawi) respectively, and in both cases bringing new parties and new leaders to power, although the new powerful leaders have clearly inclined towards non-democratic practices in recent years. Despite this, the political transitions have ensured that civil society and opposition movements have been able to flourish, and indeed hold their governments to account, which was particularly evident when their leaders considered extending their terms in office and failed. Their second generation liberation movements ensure that these states are less able to be influenced by South Africa, and as such will not be analysed.

Botswana too gained independence in the 1960s, and is often hailed as the success story not just of the region but of the continent as a whole (see Picard, 1987; Acemoglu et al, 2002; Beaulier, 2003; Bauer and Taylor, 2005). Simply, this state stands alone in its combination of political, economic, and societal success. Botswana has also attracted less attention from its regional leader. Gaining a relatively peaceful independence, it has enjoyed smooth leadership transitions within their main party the Botswana Democratic Party, and hold regular elections every 5 years that attract little dispute. An economic success, Botswana has reaped the benefits of its diamond
and mineral industries, ensuring it does not fall under the ‘resource curse’ of its fellow African states, and has no dependency on its regional leader as others do. Whilst it may prove to be a fruitful endeavour to analyse the future possibility of Botswana (along with a myriad of other states in the region) to become a potential rival hegemon, this would require another thesis altogether. Hence, this thesis seeks to point to the impacts of South Africa as a flawed hegemon upon the states in the region based on their shared historical experience.

The two ‘Lusophone’ states analysed; Mozambique and Angola, gained independence from Portugal in 1975, and both plunged into decades of civil war. Mozambique only emerged out of its civil war in 1992, whilst it took Angola until 2002. These wars were intensely exacerbated by South Africa’s interference, along with the Cold War politics at the time. In Zimbabwe and Namibia (as well as South Africa) independence from colonial rule was only achieved much later than its neighbours through tactics used such as armed struggle. Namibia is a clear choice to analyse, being a former de facto colony of South Africa for 75 years. Zimbabwe’s past is also tied to South Africa’s with their white minority rulers working closely together, whilst their rebel liberation movements supported each other through their struggles. Much still links them today, which is of particular interest in this thesis.
Chapter Two

ANGOLA

In April 2002 a cease-fire between Angola’s ruling party the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and its main rival opposition movement UNITA finally took place, ending 27 years of civil war in the country since its independence in 1975. The enormity of the next transition in Angola is pointed out by Tony Hodges (2004:199); who stated that there now lies “a quadruple transition: from war to peace and reconciliation; from humanitarian emergency to rehabilitation, recovery and development; from an authoritarian, one party system of governance to pluralist democracy; and from a command economy to one based on the laws of the market”.

South Africa’s involvement over the years in Angola’s civil war has been extensive, including military and economic support, as well as direct military intervention (Lockyer, 2010:19). Effectively balancing the capabilities of the ruling Cuban-supported MPLA, South Africa, with the aid and support of the US, backed the UNITA rebel movement. UNITA was founded in 1966 and has since been the second-largest political party in Angola. UNITA has since fought the MPLA in both the Angolan War for Independence and the civil war from 1975-2002. South Africa’s involvement proved extensive enough to help exacerbate and indeed prolong the war in Angola, which went on far longer after its independence than wars in any other state in the region (Lockyer, 2000:27). This tactic of supporting insurgent groups in Africa was popular among superpowers during the Cold War, and South Africa’s puppet-like behaviour for the US is but one example of this. When the US withdrew its assistance for UNITA South Africa was left with no choice but to do the same, as in 1976 the South African Prime Minister declared that he was “not prepared to fight on behalf of the free world alone” (Botha, 1976).
It took the death of Jonas Savimbi in 2002 to finally end the decades of war in Angola. UNITA eventually referred to the framework in the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, which states the clear goals of returning territory, disarming its military fraction and relinquishing arms, and committing to peace (United States Institute for Peace, 1994). However, this relatively new commitment has been able to occur only after the death of Savimbi, and as such, it will have to be monitored closely, particularly at election times. New freedoms were outlined in the 1992 constitutional laws passed, such as press freedom, right to assembly and right to strike, along with decentralisation of the state and increased local government power. However, respect for these freedoms has been weak and the government appears increasingly centralized, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (2003:14).

**Politics**

**Figure 1**


Angola has arguably seen a form of electoral authoritarianism recently, before being marred by protests against the government’s new policies effectively eliminating the prospect of electing a president. Nowadays, elections in the country have been labelled ‘unfair’ with MPLA scoring above 80% of votes whilst UNITA just scrape 10%, and as such ‘political troubles’ in the country are on the increase (see Figure 1). Because of this, Angola has received a ranking of 42 out of 48 sub-Saharan African states in the Ibrahim Index of African governance (see Figure 2). Indeed, Angola currently ranks in the top 18 most corrupt countries, according to Transparency International (Almeida, 2010).

What’s more, Angola’s new constitution has cemented its place in the authoritarian club of the south, as it has ensured that there will be no more direct presidential elections. This will increase the centralisation of power, meaning less accountability and transparency in Angola. In addition, the Vice-President is appointed by the President. The Vice-President as of February 2010 is actually the President Jose Eduardo dos Santos’ cousin, Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos. The new constitution does not count the 30-year term that the President has already served, and
since he won another term he is able to remain president until 2022, effectively enabling him 40 years of presidency in what the Angolan government purports to be an electoral democracy. Inevitably, this constitution has attracted criticism; particularly from the main opposition party, with one member Raul Danda claiming that is “a complete fraud”, and as such his party decided to wear black to parliament “because it's like going to the graveyard to bury democracy” (Redvers, 2010).

The MPLA is expected to win the next year’s election after its 2008 win with 87% of the votes, which was contested by opposition party UNITA. UNITA has since claimed that the national elections committee has been stripped of any real power it may have had. Simply, South Africa could do more to monitor the elections in Angola and ensure a fair result, and reverse the trend of a hardening of the regime in Angola (see Figure 3). This shows South Africa’s irresponsibility as a regional leader, as it is ignoring the increasing authoritarianism in its neighbour’s government, as well as the carrying out of unfair elections in Angola. It is in South Africa’s interest to see democracy in a growing oil-rich Angola, as without it internal conflicts could arise which might spread throughout the region which in turn will decrease the region’s attractiveness to foreign direct investment (FDI). Further, the rise of a more powerful leader, dos Santos, may threaten South Africa’s own leadership, leverage, and power in the region.
Economy and Trade

Decades of civil war in Angola has clearly taken its toll on the Angolan economy. However, with a vast abundance of natural resources such as minerals, oil, and diamonds, along with an enormous amount of arable land, Angola has every chance of recovering considering it does not once again fall into the trap of its resource curse (see Figure 4). Oil accounts for over 90% of Angola’s total exports, along with approximately 80% of the Angolan government’s total revenues (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:151).
Angola’s Real GDP Growth Rates 2001-2011


However, Angola’s resources have in the past enabled the prolonging of its civil war. What’s more, resources have contributed towards poor governance in the country, as the government has been able to raise money from them. This contributed to the growth of a very small rich elite, who consequently have no need to be accountable to its citizens over the years which needs to be addressed urgently. Le Billion aptly describes this relationship between conflict and natural resources in Angola:

“Rents generated by narrow and mostly foreign-dominated resource industries allow ruling groups to dispense with economic diversification and popular legitimacy, often resulting in rent-seeking, poor economic growth, and little social mobility outside politics and state patronage. . . . Indeed, quantitative analysis demonstrates that easily taxed or looted primary commodities increase the likelihood of war by providing the motivation, prize, and means of a violent contest for state or territorial control” (Le Billion, 2001:56).
Along with fuelling the wars, such great oil revenues have fostered corruption over the years, as “the highest levels of government officials allegedly embezzle part of the oil rent”, earning the leading political parties in the country the popular slogan “MPLA steals, UNITA kills” (le Billion, 2001:66). If the citizens are unable to hold their government to account, then a regional hegemon may have to apply pressure from above to see that democratic changes are made. It is in South Africa’s interest to do so to avoid any internal conflicts in Angola disrupting the region, and indeed trade relations internationally and regionally.

South Africa and Angola have been trading partners for decades, with Angola being South Africa’s second largest export market. Of South Africa’s 17.5% agricultural exports in Africa Angola accounts for 4%. By contrast, South Africa’s imports from Angola account for 1% of South Africa’s total imports. Imports into Angola from South Africa to Angola include beverages, tobacco, cereals, sugars and vegetables (Daya, 2006). Imports from Angola into South Africa consist of only fish oil and palm oil (Daya, 2006). This reveals that trade between the two countries is biased in favour of South Africa. There is, however, great potential for trade exports in coffee from Angola to South Africa. Further, effective participation in the SADC may serve as a means of overcoming some of these barriers.

A different kind of export which may be valuable to Angola is the export of human capital from South Africa. This could enable access to expertise in Angola to allow it to move beyond its currently narrow export profile. Alternatively, training programs could be carried out in South Africa for Angolan migrants seeking further education in this field. What’s more, incentives could be made by the two countries to skilled migrants should they work together in this area, as the benefits of this are evident when looking at a regional leader such as Japan, which successfully lead its region to prosperity by passing on trades and expertise to its neighbours.

An illegal trade occurring in Angola is the trafficking of persons mainly for forced labour. This includes working in agriculture, mines, domestic service, construction, and the illegal sex trade.
This is particularly due to the government of Angola not fully complying with “the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking”, what’s more, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook (2011):

“The government did not demonstrate an increase in its modest anti-trafficking efforts of the previous year; no efforts were made to improve its minimal protection services provided to victims or to raise awareness of trafficking”.

This lack of effort on the part of the Angolan government goes against the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons, in which Angola agreed to facilitate in the “preventing illegal movement of persons into and within the Region” (SADC, 2008b). South Africa is a fellow signatory to Angola of this Protocol, providing the government with enough justification to act on the matter. Further, since South Africa is a destination for a proportion of such persons (CIA World Factbook, 2011a) it has an obligation to ensure that this trade stops, and if it does not it may see the spread of crime, as well as diseases throughout the region such as HIV/AIDS, which is currently undermining South Africa’s regional leadership due to its previous unwillingness to act on prevention methods.
Education and Health

The school life expectancy in Angola is extremely low at 9 years old (CIA World Factbook, 2006). The spill-over effects of this are enormous, as Angola has a workforce of 5 million; of which an estimated over 50% are unemployed. Consequently, social indicators place Angola 160 out of 177 on the Human Development Index in 2005 (UNDP, 2005a). Further, Angola has the lowest life expectancy in the world according to the CIA World Factbook (2011a) demonstrated in Table 1, which outlines the life expectancies of the worst fourteen states, with the rest of the states analysed in this thesis not far behind, and it ranks number one in death rates in the world, with 23.4/1000. With an unaccountable government these statistics are hardly surprising; however the pressure from a regional leader such as South Africa is necessary to see changes. It is particularly in South Africa’s interest to do so in order to reduce the aforementioned human trafficking, as well as illegal migration into South Africa.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Life Expectancy</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>208</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>52.19</td>
<td>2011 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>51.78</td>
<td>2011 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>51.70</td>
<td>2011 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>51.63</td>
<td>2011 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>50.40</td>
<td>2011 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>50.07</td>
<td>2011 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>49.64</td>
<td>2011 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>49.33</td>
<td>2011 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>48.70</td>
<td>2011 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>48.66</td>
<td>2011 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>48.33</td>
<td>2011 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>47.56</td>
<td>2011 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>45.02</td>
<td>2011 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>38.76</td>
<td>2011 est.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Life Expectancy Data, Source: CIA World Factbook (2011b)
Civil Society

In August 2011, Angola was criticised for its treatment of civil society leaders that it deported from the country as soon as they arrived for a conference, despite a number of them representing the SADC, which Angola is a member of. “The [civil society organization] CSO leaders were in Angola to participate in the 7th Southern Africa Civil Society Forum, which is an event held by civil society organisations annually in the SADC country that will be hosting the SADC Heads of State Summit, and for which permission had been granted by the Angolan government in this instance” (Okumu, 2011). This goes against the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons (SADC, 2008b), of which Angola is a signatory. Angola’s blatant disregard for civil society leaders, particularly those from South Africa, displays the flaws in South Africa’s regional leadership, and it needs to be addressed by South Africa as the more communication and cooperation between states in the region will lessen the likelihood for conflict, which was one of the main purposes for forming the relatively harmonious region of the EU after World War II.
South Africa-Angola Relations

Conclusion

From this analysis, it is evident that the political, economic, and social relations between South Africa and Angola are deeply flawed (Figure 5). Angola’s authoritarian rule has affected other states in the region, which means that South Africa, as a regional leader (albeit a weak one) needs to take action in the form of encouraging democracy in Angola. Angola’s treatment of civil society leaders from all over southern Africa merits attention, as it goes against the SADC protocol signed by Angola, and as such the Angolan government clearly undermines South Africa’s leadership, as well as regional cooperation.

The shockingly poor results show that Angola needs to address its poverty and indeed education levels, as the wealth the Angolan government is accumulating from its oil revenues is not being distributed evenly at all, possibly due to the aforementioned increasing authoritarianism in the government. In this regard, South Africa must aim to provide assistance in tackling corruption in
the Angolan government, through monitoring mechanisms that insist upon transparency. Moreover, the South African government can do more to address the trade imbalances that describe the country’s economic relations. This may also be beneficial to South Africa as it ensures a close oil supply, as well as possibly lessening Angola’s dependence on international actors such as China. Goals for the weak regional leader based on the above analysis of relations with Angola to date are as follows:

- South Africa must set up regional education programs to facilitate Angola’s struggling education facilities. This could include mentoring programs by educated Angolans and South Africans, as well as from other states in the region alike. Further, increasing the amount of Angolans in South African Universities could aid the spread of expertise and knowledge around the region, as well as foster and support the growth of an Angolan civil society.

- South Africa needs to work more closely with Angola in order to create regional health programs focused on AIDS awareness and prevention. This could involve building local capacity for designing and implementing communication messages about HIV/AIDS and HIV/AIDS services, as well as working to establish monitoring and evaluation systems.

- South Africa needs to aid Angola in its apparent steps towards democracy, and indeed ensuring press freedom, possibly by outlining regional goals, whilst increasing civil society involvement through the SADC.

- South Africa must apply pressure on the Angolan government to take steps toward tackling corruption in the region, through monitoring processes, as well as ensuring greater transparency in elections.

- South Africa needs to engage the government through both quiet diplomacy and public pressure on its social welfare responsibilities, particularly regarding reintegration of former UNITA combatants and internally displaced persons (IDPs). On this note South
Africa could support a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in Angola, and work closely with the Angolan government, UNITA and civil society in order to help meet the country's massive requirements for rehabilitation and reconciliation initiatives.

- South Africa should increase de-mining assistance, including through the provision of South African-made Chubby mine detection and clearance vehicles specifically suited for Angola's circumstances.
Chapter Three

MOZAMBIQUE

In 1534 Mozambique was colonized by Portugal, to be used mainly as a trading post. However, this trade from the coast was mainly unsuccessful, and consequently Mozambique became largely a transit and service-based economy from the outset (Rupiya, 1998:10; Bauer and Taylor, 2005:113). In 1901 the Mozambican workforce was made available to the South African mines in a formal agreement (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:114).

The Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was formed in 1962 as a black nationalist uprising against Mozambique’s Portuguese colonizers, and decades of fighting ensued between the two to see Mozambique independence through pressure put on the colonizers. On June 25th 1975 Mozambique officially gained its independence and power was given to FRELIMO. Democracy and development, however, was to be a distant goal for the country due to the lack of investment in human and physical infrastructure during colonial rule (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:115).

Politics

RENAMO was established in 1977 as a resistance party against FRELIMO. It was created and supported by Rhodesian and South African white minority governments to destabilize FRELIMO and its ability to support rebels’ guerrilla movements from Rhodesia and South Africa that were allowed to settle in Mozambique. The South African apartheid era history between the ANC and FRELIMO has ensured a sense that the ANC still owes a great debt to the Mozambique government which allowed them refuge during the apartheid era. This particularly serves to undermine any power that South Africa may hold against the state in terms of pushing for democracy and equal representation across the country. “Leaders like Robert Mugabe, Sam
Nujoma, and Eduardo Dos Santos feel that they preceded Mbeki in the liberation struggle and complain that the ANC-led government has not repaid the sacrifices that their countries made for the liberation of South Africa” (Baregu and Landsberg, 2003:186).

By arming and supporting RENAMO, initially a terrorist group that used tactics such as rape and mutilation on civilians in order to compel support (Manning, 2001:146), South Africa ensured the continuance of the brutal civil war in Mozambique for another decade (Rupiya, 1998:13). By exacerbating ethnic and cultural difference between North and South Mozambicans, South Africa contributed towards the social cleavages evident in the state today. Nevertheless, transitional elections were finally held in October 1994, with RENAMO gaining 112 seats to FRELIMO’s 129.

However, 2004 elections held were of such a dramatically different result to the previous elections held in 1994 and 1999 that FRELIMO and the electoral administration gained an immense amount of criticism (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:129). Moreover, difficulties arose during the elections with collection techniques, along with a “computer chaos” reported by the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) office in Maputo (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:129). To ensure this does not happen again, South Africa could prove its leadership by monitoring future elections in Mozambique, as civil society in the country has not yet developed to a level strong enough to hold the government to account.

**Geographical Divisions and Trade**

During the Cold War Mozambique was aligned politically to the Soviet Union and adopted a Marxist-Leninist political stance. However, after the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation rejected Mozambique’s membership appeal, the state was forced to pull back on its Marxist tendencies and rely on the capitalist model of South Africa and the West, beginning
liberalization measures in 1983 (Alden, 2001:8-9). What’s more, South Africa actively sought to ensure Mozambique’s dependency upon it from the 1980s.

Within Mozambique territory lays ominous divisions between the North and South regions. The South is where the main support resides for FRELIMO, and the North is where most RENAMO supporters reside. Nowadays, the division and indeed polarisation still exists, except the South African government shows greater support towards the southern regions, particularly in terms of investment. Further, FRELIMO has seemingly done little to reduce this gap since 1992, and South Africa’s focus on investments into the South of the country does not help this inequality.

Mozambican government statistics show that Sofala, Tete, and Niassa, which are in the centre and North of the country (see Map 1), have four fifths of its population beneath the poverty line, whilst Gaza and Maputo Province, which are located in the south, have less than two-thirds of its population living below the poverty line. This favouritism toward the southern region by South Africa in terms of FDI exacerbates the historical support of the southern regions of Mozambique by its former colonizer Portugal, which ensured greater transport networks and an agricultural infrastructure developed in the region, which has seen little rectification over recent years. Simply, this behaviour shows South Africa’s irresponsible leadership and needs to stop in order to reduce the risk of internal conflict in Mozambique which may disrupt the region, and which could see an increase in illegal immigrants into South Africa, overwhelming its already insufficient urban structures.
The low levels of education across the country, particularly concentrated in the North, ensure a lack of critical citizenship by the Mozambican population (Mattes and Shenga, 2007). This has in turn meant that there is a dire need for an active civil society to develop in the state to ensure that the Mozambican government is made to account. Interestingly, the international community has declared that the 2009 elections in Mozambique appeared to be unfair, yet the rural population seem to perceive the Mozambican democracy as working and are very/fairly satisfied (58.8%) than those of the population living in urban areas- where most of the main party (FRELIMO) supporters reside, and 63.1% of whom are not satisfied with Mozambican
democracy (see Table 2). Further, 64.2% of the urban population compared to 79.2% of the rural population in a 2008-2009 Afrobarometer poll (see Table 3) feel that elections in Mozambique reflect the voters. This may be due to a lack of awareness in rural areas as education is below the levels of those in urban areas.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q43. Satisfaction with democracy</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>0.1 %</td>
<td>0.1 %</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a democracy</td>
<td>1.6 %</td>
<td>1.6 %</td>
<td>2.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all satisfied</td>
<td>16.0 %</td>
<td>16.0 %</td>
<td>22.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very satisfied</td>
<td>30.7 %</td>
<td>30.7 %</td>
<td>38.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly satisfied</td>
<td>14.3 %</td>
<td>14.3 %</td>
<td>11.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>37.3 %</td>
<td>37.3 %</td>
<td>25.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1065 (100%)</td>
<td>1065 (100%)</td>
<td>350 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>BASE=823</td>
<td>Urban or Rural Primary</td>
<td>Sampling Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all well</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very well</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very well</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>282 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elections Ensure Parliament Reflects Voters


The concept of a flawed South African hegemon becomes apparent again when analysing its role in deepening the gap between rich and poor in Mozambique. What’s more, though, is that trade between the two countries has been biased towards South Africa. Despite such regionally specific FDI between South Africa and Mozambique, moves have been made by the two states to enhance cooperation in their economic relations. On the 20th July 1994 South Africa and Mozambique entered into the Agreement for a Joint Permanent Commission for Cooperation. In addition, a Heads of State Economic Bilateral Forum was created in 1997 between the two states; ensuring quarterly meetings are held and chaired by the Presidents of the two countries in order to promote cooperation, which has seen a degree of success, and in recent years Mozambique’s GDP has been growing following the global financial crisis (see Figure 6).
Migration and Health

A move towards greater integration between South Africa and Mozambique involves the resettlement of white farmers on Mozambique land, and as of November 2010 800 South African farmers had signed land deals with Mozambique (the Times, 2010). According to Agri SA deputy president De Jager (quoted in the Times, 2010), South African “borders are fading out...Integrated Africa is a reality,” however it is questionable whether this arrangement is benefitting Mozambique as much as it is South Africa.

Nevertheless, South Africa has the potential to positively affect the development of a Mozambican civil society, along with the development of union groups in the state. It is in South Africa’s interests to do so in order increase its attractiveness for FDI. This opportunity arises from the great numbers of Mozambican migrant workers residing in South Africa. South Africa’s mines have long been a destination for Mozambican workers seeking work in South Africa. Over the years this has been fine tuned to ensure that the remittances are substantial. Indeed, the majority of the wages earned in a system of payments, that allows only 40% of
earnings to be accessed by the Mozambican workers after the first year of working in the South African mines, formed a valuable source of income for the Mozambican economy. However, South Africa now has the responsibility to instil in the Mozambican workers the liberal ideas of human rights and government accountability, which can then be brought back and further developed in the Mozambican populations’ mentality.

However, the South African government has thus far done little to quash the negative effects of migration from Mozambican workers, such as the increasing ‘feminization of migration’. With this expanding trend comes an increased number of poor, unskilled female migrant workers often resorting to prostitution. A proportionate amount of HIV/AIDS infected women carry out this type of work in South Africa in order to seek health care away from their communities and their subsequent stigmatization. South Africa has the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS out of the entire region. The South African government’s stance on AIDS has been widely documented over the years, and the most striking example of its neglect of the seriousness of the disease, and indeed the governments ignorance of it in general can be seen in the former health minister Tshabalala-Msimang’s actions, when she purposefully stalled the introduction of a government antiretroviral program, in order to support the then president “Thabo Mbeki, who publicly expressed doubts about whether HIV caused AIDS” (PlusNews, 2009). Her actions caused the country international humiliation, which has affected its legitimacy as a regional leader. This concern is echoed further in this PlusNews (2009) article excerpt:

“Her approach to HIV/AIDS drew widespread international condemnation, which came to a head at the 2006 International AIDS Conference in Toronto, when she insisted that garlic, lemon and beetroot be displayed in South Africa's exhibition booth. After the conference, 65 HIV/AIDS scientists put their names to a letter to Mbeki requesting that she be dismissed.”
Tshabalala-Msimang was only replaced in 2008 when Mbeki was stepped down, however it is fair to suggest that within the ANC there still lingers doubt (Harding, 2010). Jacob Zuma, the current President of South Africa, famously admitted telling a judge at his rape trial that “he had a shower after sex to prevent HIV transmission and believed that a healthy man was unlikely to catch HIV from a woman” (BBC, 2006). Years of such ignorance and denial contributed towards the lack of education on HIV/AIDS in the poorest of the population, as well as the poor under-educated migrant workers seeking genuine help. Hence, the South African government should take steps toward changing its obviously flawed stance on the disease in order to increase its international respect and legitimacy, and thus power in its own region, as well as reverse the escalating HIV/AIDS numbers in the region.

Figure 7

South Africa-Mozambique Relations
Conclusion

From this examination into South Africa’s economic, political and social relations with Mozambique the weaknesses in South Africa’s leadership are all too apparent, shown in Figure 7. South Africa’s geographically specific trade with Mozambique is hindering the states equal development, and indeed nurturing the polarity of wealth in Mozambique which needs to be addressed. Further, South Africa needs to let go its fears of becoming another imperialist force in Mozambique if it is to see any real progress regarding the possibly destructive divisions between FRELIMO and RENAMO. Education in Mozambique is severely flawed and unequal which needs to be addressed, and South Africa can work with Mozambique to see this goal realised, through such programs as mentoring workshops and setting up educational facilities in Mozambique. Given the large numbers of Mozambican workers in South Africa, the regional leader has an obligation to ensure the safety and indeed health of a proportion of the Mozambican workers. The responsibility of the South African government to stop the spread of HIV/AIDS has never been more apparent. Clearly, South Africa needs to improve upon its own statistics in order to help the region, and in the Namibia chapter below this is further addressed. Goals for the irresponsible regional leader based on the above analysis of relations with Mozambique to date are as follows:

- To ensure Mozambique’s move toward and indeed long-term democracy, South Africa should monitor Mozambique’s elections.
- South Africa needs to urgently address its geographically unequal trade with Mozambique.
- South Africa needs to work more closely with Mozambican migrants in order to create health programs focused on AIDS awareness and prevention. This could involve designing and implementing communication messages about HIV/AIDS and HIV/AIDS
services, as well as providing basic health care services to migrants based on a regional understanding, which could be outlined in an SADC protocol.

- Further, South Africa must provide greater social support for Mozambican migrant workers in general, through various programs such as economic management, health services available, and if necessary psychological support.

- On a similar token, the South African government should provide optional vocational training to migrant workers which can be paid for by their own wages.

- Further, South Africa and its civil society networks could use the opportunity for such close relations with Mozambican migrants to help foster Mozambican civil society, by supporting the creation of NGO groups and media outlets.
Chapter Four

NAMIBIA

Namibia was colonised by South Africa after its independence from the Germans following World War I. the Treaty of Versailles outlined the transfer of all German colonies to Britain in 1919, which by de facto entrusted the colony of South West Africa (now Namibia) to South Africa by the League of Nations in 1920. South Africa effectively incorporated Namibian territory into its own during this period, until Namibia’s independence in 1990. After the end of the apartheid rule in South Africa the remaining territory (Walvis Bay) was returned officially to Namibia. Namibia saw a relatively peaceful democratic transition and is thus far deemed a success (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997).

During Namibia’s time under colonial rule, the black population’s rights were severely diminished, not only politically, but also socially and economically. Power was predominantly in the hands of white settlers, as they “reproduced functioning democracies within their own microcosmic enclaves, with features like elections, leadership turnover, loyal opposition, independent courts, and some press freedom, all reserved exclusively for whites”, whilst the executive was appointed in South Africa (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997:81).

Politics

In order to move forward peacefully following its colonial rule, Namibia turned to a policy of national reconciliation similar to that of South Africa’s. In this regard the first post-independence President (who is still the current president) Sam Nujoma (2001:357) stated that:

“if we are accused of ill-treating detainees, this was very little compared to the killing, cruel torture and brutal treatment the apartheid South African regime
inflicted on our people over so many years,” and adds “we prefer to leave that sad history behind us and concentrate on national reconciliation .”

However, a truth commission was not carried out in Namibia as in South Africa, and as such no investigations were carried out on the multitude of young SWAPO member’s disappearances. This strategy was taken up by the government to bury political history and indeed ensure the “moving away from the unpleasant memories of the past and instead focusing on what was postulated as the building of a unified nation” (Erasmus, 2000:78).

Despite the utilization of the politics of memory by the Namibian government, tensions have been mounting over the years between black and white in Namibia. The Namibian government has become increasingly outspoken against whites in the country, who they see as interfering with internal affairs. Further, “Nujoma publicly castigated foreign (European) donors” suggesting that Namibia does not need aid from those sources based on race (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:230). In order to ensure Namibia does not turn into the next Zimbabwe in the region, as well as reducing the risk of internal conflict and its spill-over effects in the region, South Africa needs to stand up to its neighbour and discourage such behaviour.

**Education**

Decades-long exclusion of the black Namibian population from most aspects in Namibia still has its repercussions today, most poignantly, when looking at education. This issue of an undereducated black population has ensured an unemployment rate of around 51% in Namibia (CIA World Factbook, 2011). Further, the school life expectancy is just 12 years old (CIA World Factbook, 2011). This is exacerbated by the fact that the country cannot accommodate for learners in further education programs, and only about 2000 people are enrolled in each of the two highest education providers in Namibia (CIA World Factbook, 2011). Along with this, the
UNDP’s 2005 Human Development Report indicated that 55.8% of Namibians live below the poverty line (UNDP, 2005b).

In order to see the reversal of these trends South Africa could enable an increased amount of Namibian students to enter into its universities, as well as set up a mentoring program available for Namibian students. This type of program would be beneficial to both Namibia and South Africa, as their economies are so closely linked, and thus it would ensure economic prosperity for the regional leader. The Namibian dollar is pegged one-to-one with the South African rand. Along with Swaziland and Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa are both members of the Common Monetary Area (CMA), which somewhat limits Namibia’s freedom in monetary policy, and the South African central bank is a big influence on the Bank of Namibia. Namibia depends heavily on South Africa as a trading partner, with over 80% of its exports being South African.

**Health**

Map 2
Namibia struggles similarly to South Africa, (who has the most people living with AIDS and the most deaths resulting from AIDS in the world) in that Namibia’s AIDS crisis (around 13.1% of the population) has earned the country a life expectancy rate of just 52 years, ranking Namibia 208 in a country comparison to the world (see Map 2) (CIA World Factbook, 2011). Namibia is actually showing up the regional leader in the strides it’s making against the disease. Leading the way in the region, along with expanding the access to antiretroviral drugs across the country, Namibia- not South Africa, is producing cheaper generic versions of the anti-retroviral drugs, as well as making available drugs to pregnant women in order to avoid the transfer of the virus to unborn babies (WHO, 2009). South Africa was lagging far behind its neighbour in this regard, especially until the South African government was pressured by the Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), which took its fight against the government to the international level. This action successfully humiliated the South African government into changing its stance on its HIV/AIDS problem, and it highlighted the irresponsible nature of South Africa’s regional leadership to the international community, which in turn diminished its respect in scientific communities around the globe. With South Africa having the most people in the world with the virus, clearly more needs to be done, and more needs to be learnt from Namibia on the regional level.
Trade and Security- Uranium

Figure 8

Real GDP Growth Rates 2001-2011

Source: African Economic Outlook (AEO) (2011c).

Namibia is currently the fourth largest supplier of uranium in the world, with new mines opening in the next couple of years (Duddy, 2011). This industry is the main cause of Namibia’s positive growth rates recently (see Figure 8). However, this booming industry in Namibia, uranium mining, is currently under the microscope due to the fact that the Iranian government holds a 15% stake in the Rössing Uranium Mine. The mine is majority-owned by Australian company Rio Tinto. Despite Iran owning this stake since 1975, the issue has once again been brought to light due to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929 adopted in June 2010. The resolution is “on measures against Iran in connection with its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development” (S/RES/1929, 2010). The Namibian government may in the near future find itself in a difficult position should it not resolve this matter and find a way to release the Iranian government of its 15% stake, as it is outlined clearly in the 1929 resolution in point number [7] that the UNSC decides that:
“Iran shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1, in particular uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, all heavy-water activities or technology related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and further decides that all States shall prohibit such investment in territories under their jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them” (S/RES/1929, 2010).

The strength South Africa needs to display is evident in its role in an arms control treaty in the southern African region; which at this moment in time is still materialising. Difficulties that this rears are immense, such as in the possibility of Namibia allowing Iran to gain access to its rich supply of uranium. These fears are not without merit, due to the Iran Foreign Investment Company (IFIC) currently holding 15 per cent of the shares in Rössing Uranium. Without a strong regional leader in South Africa to help resolve the issue on the national level, international involvement in Namibia’s mining industry will be eminent:

"Embassies London and Canberra are requested to approach UK and Australian counterparts to suggest that they approach the Namibian Government and Rio Tinto, the mining company that owns a controlling share of the Rössing Uranium mine in Namibia, to press strongly for both to reject any Iranian attempt to acquire Namibian uranium" (Duddy, 2011).
Instead of a leadership role played by South Africa on this issue earlier this year, the US, British and Australian governments have instead applied pressure on the Namibian government to ensure this does not take place. Having such international powers take the leadership role may indeed affect the legitimacy of the regional leader, proving it has yet to gain an amount of effective control on its neighbours. Whilst Namibia may be attempting to earn some easy FDI, South Africa needs to ensure its neighbour does not succumb to temptation, possibly through a regional security agreement, to ensure cooperation and eliminate the chance of conflict in the region.

According to the UN, the collective efforts in the region have been slow, however the SADC is moving forward in that it has recognized that there are divisions at the national and regional levels with regards to the illegal arms trade, and the SADC has worked with the Nairobi Secretariat to eradicate the problem. However, without a clear monitoring system and nationally legally-binding obligations it is not clear whether such collaborations will be beneficial. South Africa itself has recently come under fire for setting a bad example for the whole region, as it has been caught selling arms to UN blacklisted nations. Baldauf (2010) claims that:

“South Africa sold weapons to 58 countries between 2002 and 2009 that failed to meet the criteria of South African law in one way or another, including Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. But the lion’s share went to five countries- India, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Colombia, and Saudi Arabia- that either have ongoing internal conflicts, poor human rights records, or poor control over their purchased arms”

This type of trade highlights the difficulty of a state re-building itself based on a ‘rights’ rhetoric, and indeed one that premises the idea of state sovereignty (Mutua, 1997). Further, it clearly show South Africa’s irresponsibility as a regional leader, as it is increasing the chance of conflict in its own region, which could see the onset of after-effects such as the need to take in refugees and
migrants, as well as increasing illegal immigration around the region. Further, FDI will suffer should the region become a conflict zone.

Figure 9

South Africa-Namibia Relations

Conclusion

From this analysis, it is evident that the three pillars that South African leadership rests upon (economic, political, and social) are weak which is shown in Figure 9. South Africa’s own polarity of wealth at home between black and white do not provide hope to its former colonized neighbour Namibia. Even though Namibia’s democracy record is less shocking than its neighbours, immense disparities exist amongst its population due to its past, and the Namibian government’s inability to overcome this is mirrored in its regional leader’s failure to do the same. The knock on effects of this is evident in the lack of success the government has had in its education and employment. Despite South Africa’s late leadership in attempting to fight against HIV/AIDS in its own country, Namibia has been successfully implementing ways to do so, and
remains a beacon of hope in the region which the leader can learn from. Finally, Namibia’s mining boom may see a reduction in poverty in the state; however it needs to be watched closely by the South African government to ensure that Iran’s stake in the uranium mine does not hinder development, and indeed to ensure international actors do not have to become further involved. Goals for the weak regional leader based on the above analysis of relations with Namibia to date are as follows:

- South Africa needs to give up on its tactic of “quiet diplomacy” on Zimbabwe, as it may be sending the wrong message to the Namibian government that the South African government’s support for such treatment of whites is acceptable, and that human rights are not as important now as they were to the government in 1994.

- South Africa must set up regional education programs to facilitate Namibia’s struggling further education facilities. This could include mentoring programs by educated Namibians and South Africans, as well as from other states in the region alike. Further, increasing the amount of Namibians in South African Universities could aid the spread of expertise and knowledge around the region.

- South Africa needs to work more closely with, and indeed learn from Namibia in order to create regional health programs focused on AIDS awareness and prevention. This could involve building local capacity for designing and implementing communication messages about HIV/AIDS and HIV/AIDS services, as well as working to establish monitoring and evaluation systems.

- South Africa needs to address its arms trading with other countries to set a better regional example, and not one which is hypocritical.
Further, South Africa needs to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security and stabilization issues, which could commence by heading a conference on regional security issues.
Chapter Five

ZIMBABWE

After full independence from British rule in 1980, Zimbabwe was the breadbasket of Africa. However, the country has since the 1990’s been experiencing a multitude of crises’, from economic to social and political. In 1890 Zimbabwe, formerly known as Southern Rhodesia, was established as British territory as part of the British South Africa Company. In 1965, despite the resistance from most settlers, Southern Rhodesia gained independence from Britain. In reaction to this, Republican Front Premier Ian Smith vowed to never allow the state to be under majority rule (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:175). Nevertheless, 1972 marked the guerrilla wars against the Rhodesian army sparked by African nationalist groups ZANU and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), who were pushing for full independence (Stedman, 1991:37-39). When they won their independence in 1980 ZANU became political party ZANU-PF, headed by Robert Mugabe, who, by fusing together ZANU-PF with smaller opposition party ZAPU, ensured less room for competition (Darnolf and Laakso, 2003: 18-19).

It is what the ‘new elites’ in Zimbabwe did with its apparent democracy that ensured their success or failure to retain it; described by Bunce as “sustainers” or “underminers” (Bunce, 2000:709). In this way, sustainers (such as the ANC party in South Africa) set up institutions and constrained their own personal powers. Underminers, such as ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, ensured less constraint on their own personal power when setting up such institutions, enabling personal interests and values to become paramount in their leadership styles, which contributed to the demise of democracy in Zimbabwe (Bunce, 2000:709; O’Donnell, 1994, 1996). This is also evident in Afrobarometer data which suggests that over 80% of respondents agree that Zimbabwe is run on a few big interests (Afrobarometer, 2008-2009).
This new elite system also comprised of military and intelligence agencies elites, along with police officials. Consequently, oppressive features of Zimbabwe’s previous regime were retained for the support of a new regime in the form of a security apparatus (Weitzer, 1990). Mugabe divided what could have been a civil society in Zimbabwe, into those who supported the conservatives, and indeed the Shona tribe, and those who did not, and thus who were not represented. This deficit of representation ensured a weakness in democracy (Battera, 2004:10). These elites further ensured the oppression of any civil society that may provide popular pressure on the regime, disabling them from bringing elites to account (Bunce, 2000:708; see also: Bermeo, 1997; Bunce, 1999; Ekiert, 1996; Ekiert and Kubik, 1998; Fishman, 1990; Tarrow, 1995; Tarrow, 1996). In this way, “a sort of blank cheque to rule without any balance” was given to Mugabe without the commitment of a civil society to democracy (Battera, 2004:9).

Politics

Involvement in elections is a telling factor of civic engagement, which is derived from social capital according to Putnam (1993). Afrobarometer (2008-2009) data suggests that 45.5% of Zimbabwean respondents voted in their last elections. However, the data shows that 21% of Zimbabwean respondents were unable to vote, which could be down to logistical reasons, as well as political oppression, as Afrobarometer (2008-2009) data suggests that many Zimbabweans are careful about what they say about politics. Afrobarometer data also shows that Zimbabweans have relatively little trust in the electoral commission, which may impact their decision to vote. This low political trust shows the basis of civic engagement is not being realized in Zimbabwe. Simply, Zimbabweans will not vote if they do not trust the political process, nor will they generate norms of engagement without social networks, inevitably leading to a failed democracy (Elklit, 1999).
Zimbabwean ‘Political Troubles’ (shown on the ‘Y’ axis) over 12 year period: 1996-2008


Zimbabwe falls into the category of ‘not free’ in Freedom House’s assessments as compared to South Africa, with a ranking of ‘free’ (Freedom House, 2011b, Freedom House, 2011b). However, to see the end of the increasing ‘political troubles’ (see Figure 10), elections in Zimbabwe, along with pressure on Mugabe from the South African government into a power-sharing agreement, may actually bring about a change and enable the growth of a civil society with stronger social capital, and within that social trust and networks of communication. Emerging elites in the form of opposition parties such as the MDC, headed by Morgan Tszangarai, are arguably the centralized voice of a dissatisfied mass population that may be too afraid to unite against the government. Simply, elites with a true desire for democracy are “summarizers of long-term developments and as well-positioned representatives of larger social forces” (Bunce, 2000:708).

However, for the moment, in Zimbabwe real change seems distant, as in the 2008 elections Mugabe was defeated by Morgan Tsvangarai; however he refused to accept the result, deciding
instead to agree to a power-sharing arrangement. Mugabe has been accused of using intimidation and vote rigging to stay in power so long, and the denouncement of the election results were apparently accompanied by the military operation under the code name CIBD (Coercion Intimidation Beating Displacement) (Timberg, 2008). It is questionable, however, how long institutional bases will be able to support his rule. The Zimbabwean regimes “war on democracy” arose through its measures to quash the opposition movements such as MDC, through use of tactics such as violence, oppression and suppression (see Figure 11), as well as politicizing the one last democratic institution in Zimbabwe- the judicial system (Darnolf and Laakso, 2003:30). It has been irresponsible for South Africa to allow the prolonging of this type of individual power, as it may affect its own power in the region, as well as legitimacy internationally.

Figure 11

‘Hardening’ of the Regime: Zimbabwe (shown on ‘Y’ axis) of the regime over 12 year period: 1996-2008


In a statement endorsed by members of the South African and Zimbabwean civil society concern was expressed over the lack of reforms in Zimbabwe outlined in the Global Political Agreement
(GPA), particularly in democracy and in its human rights record (Okumu, 2011). This agreement involves the main parties in Zimbabwe ZANU-PF, MDC-T (Tsvangarai), and MDC-M (Mutambara) and their joint attempt in addressing the multitude of issues facing Zimbabwe at the moment, including economic stability, human rights, democracy, and the land question. In particular, the increasing level of violence and arrests on human rights defenders is of particular concern. On this, Zimbabwean civil society point to the lack of accountability and the weakness of the rule of law in Zimbabwe as the main culprits.

Figure 12

Cumulative Share of Zimbabwean Political Party Breaches

Source: Sokwanele (2010)

Figure 13

Total Breaches by Party: Zimbabwe

Source: Sokwanele (2010)
Jacob Zuma has recently been pushing for the readmission of Zimbabwe into the Commonwealth after its withdrawal in 2003 for its electoral and land reform policies, along with its myriad of human rights violations. In the upcoming October Commonwealth meeting to be held in Australia Zuma will supposedly make his opinion heard (Muzulu, 2011). However, Zuma may have trouble convincing the members of the Commonwealth as Zimbabwe has yet to fully implement the GPA (See Figure’s 12 & 13). Zuma has taken a different approach to Mbeki, his predecessor who favoured the quiet diplomacy approach, which may see his international legitimacy questioned, and thus regional leadership diminished (Cooke et al, 2003).

**Economic Relations**

South Africa’s recent economic relations have been identified as protectionist, with Dieter (1997:221) describing South Africa as resorting to “a mercantilist policy vis-à-vis the other countries in the region”. This has apparently been most evident through its policies towards Zimbabwe. The Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) between Zimbabwe and South Africa dating back to 1964, which benefitted the growing textile industry in Zimbabwe, expired in 1992. Since then tariffs have been raised on textiles from 15% to a staggering 75%. However, due to a rapid influx of cheap goods from East Asian markets, South Africa lowered tariffs to 30%, and then again to 20% in 2000 (Maasdorp 1998:94).

The Zimbabwean financial liberalization lead to high interest rates, which in turn lead to bankruptcies, inflation, and increased unemployment. This ensured a lack of legitimacy of the regime of concentrated power, along with a crumbling façade of a democracy in Zimbabwe, as “democracy will be undermined if it cannot deliver the goods in the economic sphere” (Elster, 1993:268; Bond, 1998). However, despite a lack of legitimacy internally, economic hardships within the state make it difficult for an emergence of a strong middle class in which a civil
society can develop, and as Nelson Mandela famously once stated, “freedom is meaningless if people cannot put food in their stomachs” (quoted in Bratton and Mattes, 2001:447).

Simply, the South African government is failing to exert any real influence and inspire transformation in the Zimbabwean government despite its current social and economic crises’ that require change (Alden and Schoeman, 2003). Therefore, despite South Africa’s material power in the region, it lacks the required deterrence capabilities and authority necessary in a hegemonic leader, perhaps due to its recent past and indeed human rights and sovereignty rhetoric (Keohane 1986: 184; Alden and Soko, 2005:388). Zimbabwe, then, shows the weakness in South Africa’s hegemony in its own counter- hegemonic power. Its use of an anti-colonial anti-imperial discourse and indeed its ability to rouse such sentiment across the region has ensured regional sceptics of its supposed hegemonic leader. In this way, Mugabe has arguably erected “a barrier of anti-imperialist solidarity around his domestic project… skilfully set[ting] the parameters of the subsequent debate” (Phimister and Raftopoulos, 2004:386).

The consequence of this is a string of cautious South African presidents since the apartheid towards Zimbabwe’s government and indeed its leader Robert Mugabe. The caution is exercised particularly towards condemnation of the government and its supporting elites. What’s more, the South African presidency has even warmly welcomed Mugabe to many gatherings, such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 2002, the AU meeting in Maputo 2004 and, most pointedly, at Mbeki’s inauguration on 27 April 2004 (Ngubentombi, 2004:155). In addition, Mbeki publicly congratulated Mugabe on his apparent electoral wins, which once again clearly displays South Africa’s irresponsible leadership (Alden and Soko, 2005:389).
Trade in Weapons

In matters of regional security, South Africa fairs no better in its leadership towards Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe purchased a large supply of weapons from China in January 2008 (Rossouw, 2008). After arriving in Durban in March 2008, South Africa’s High Court ordered an injunction on the weapons. Despite this, South Africa’s National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) approved the transfer of arms purchased by Zimbabwe from China (Kopel et al, 2010). This internal conflict has ensured an unstable hegemon for dealing with such matters of security. Industrial action was taken by the South African Transport and Allied Workers Unions who refused to unload the cargo. However, the ship made port in Angola, an ally of Zimbabwe’s, which then received enormous international pressure. It then re-routed to the DRC which unloaded the arms and flew them to Zimbabwe (Maletski, 2008). Nevertheless, South Africa’s own Arms Control Act should have prevented the transfer of such arms from the “ship of shame” to Zimbabwe in the first place (Maletski, 2008; Kopel et al, 2010). It clearly states that South Africa is to “avoid transfers of conventional arms to governments that systematically violate or suppress human rights” (Maletski, 2008). Later in 2008, South Africa, along with China, Russia, Libya and Vietnam voted against an arms embargo on Zimbabwe on the grounds of sovereignty (despite the ANC calling for an arms embargo against the apartheid regime). What’s more, the Rossouw (2008) claimed that between 2004 and 2005 (just before Zimbabwe’s violent 2005 elections):

“Armaments to the value of $237,401 were privately transferred from South Africa to Zimbabwe, according to 2004 and 2005 figures. The South African defence department donated Dakota aircraft engines worth millions to Zimbabwe, while Armscor transferred spares to get Zimbabwean military choppers flying again. Further, Zimbabwean soldiers and flying instructors
have been trained by the South African Defence Force and the South African Air Force”.

Moreover, South Africa donated 8 military aircraft to Zimbabwe in September 2005 to the Zimbabwean Air Force in September 2005. Hence, the example set by the democratic nation of South Africa is not one of a responsible hegemon dedicated to security, let alone democracy in the region. It is violating its own laws by allowing such a transfer, and thus sending a confused and weak message to the rest of the region, one which reads: if the leader is not abiding by the rules, neither should we. Further, this clear support of the South African government for ZANU-PF is in violation of its supposed neutrality between ZANU-PF and its opposition party MDC. In sum, the STRATEGYPAGE (December 2008) argued that South Africa “is guilty, at best, of a weak-kneed stance on Zimbabwe, and at worst, actively supporting Mugabe and his thugs’ diabolical behaviour,” which is irresponsible and needs to stop if South Africa is to continue being the regional leader.

**Figure 14**

South Africa-Zimbabwe Relations

- **Hegemonic South African state**
  - Economically superior to Zimbabwe
  - Militarily superior to Zimbabwe

- **South Africa’s relations with Zimbabwe**
  - South Africa’s biased level of support towards ZANU-PF
  - A perceived unfulfilled debt towards ZANU-PF for support of ANC during the apartheid era
  - International condemnation of the regime and lack of South African action
  - Inability of South African government to push for democratic change
  - South Africa enabling Zimbabwe to gain access to weapons despite international sanctions against the government

- **Ineffective leadership**
  - Diminished state capacity to lead
Conclusion

From this analysis, it is evident that once again South Africa’s leadership appears flawed due to the nature of its relations with Zimbabwe depicted in Figure 15. South Africa’s lack of strength when dealing with Zimbabwe’s multitude of political issues, and indeed unfair elections, has contributed towards the states deepening economic, political, and social woes. When the South African government is involved in Zimbabwe’s affairs, it has arguably done so in a biased manner, supporting the leading party ZANU-PF and its oppressive leader Robert Mugabe. Along with this, the illegal arms trade between South Africa and Zimbabwe, and indeed between South Africa and several other states under embargoes is not only harmful to the populations of those states, but also sets a bad example to the rest of the region that international agreements count for very little. Supporting a potentially rogue state in its actions essentially diminishes South Africa’s legitimacy as a regional leader, and leaves the danger of putting the region under intense security risks. Goals for the weak regional leader based on the above analysis of relations with Zimbabwe to date are as follows:

- To ensure Zimbabwe’s move toward and indeed long-term democracy, South Africa should neutrally monitor Zimbabwe’s elections.
- On this note, South Africa needs to aid Zimbabwe in its apparent steps towards democracy, and indeed ensuring press freedom, possibly by outlining regional goals, whilst increasing civil society involvement through the SADC.
- South Africa must apply pressure on the Zimbabwean government to take steps toward tackling corruption in the region, through monitoring processes, as well as ensuring greater transparency.
- South Africa needs to engage the government through both quiet diplomacy and public pressure on its social welfare responsibilities, particularly regarding its lack of health care and crumbling education system.
• South Africa needs to give up on its tactic of “quiet diplomacy” on Zimbabwe, as it may be sending the wrong message to the surrounding governments that the South African government’s support for such treatment of minorities is acceptable, and that human rights are not as important now as they were to the government in 1994.

• South Africa needs to address its arms trading with other countries to set a good regional example, and not one which is hypocritical.

• Further, South Africa needs to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security and stabilization issues, which could commence by heading a conference on regional security issues.
Conclusion

SOUTH AFRICA THE REGIONAL LEADER: CONCLUSION

South Africa’s regional leadership has been questioned over the past decades due to its relations with its neighbouring states. The three main pillars analysed in this thesis; namely political, economic, and social, on which South Africa’s relations with the countries in the southern African region stands, have all contributed towards the subtle yet troubling erosion of South Africa’s leadership legitimacy. Despite possessing superior economic and military power in its region, the South African government needs to ensure its regional social and political influence does not decrease to unsustainable levels, as this may see the rise of emerging extremist elites as new contenders for the regional leadership role. While the relations South Africa has had with the states examined above have displayed slight variations, the underlying dynamics and irresponsible leadership behaviours displayed have been common across all cases. Together with its social, economic, and political relations with its neighbouring states, the dwindling leadership legitimacy and lack of action to reverse this trend accounts for the irresponsible South African southern African regional leadership. This is the central conclusion which may be drawn from my study.

To date, South Africa has been unable to effectively see democratic change in its region, and as such it needs to promote it by encouraging press freedom, and by monitoring elections in an unbiased manner. Further, South Africa must apply pressure on the governments in the region to take steps toward tackling corruption. South Africa needs to give up on its tactic of “quiet diplomacy” on Zimbabwe, as it may be sending the wrong message to the governments in the region that the South African government’s support for such treatment of minorities is acceptable, and that human rights are not as important now as they were to the government in 1994. Moreover, it has been irresponsible for the government of South Africa to allow the
prolonging of extremist and authoritarian individual powers in the region, as they may affect its own power in the region, as well as legitimacy internationally.

The lack of a regional security arrangement enforced by South Africa once again diminishes its capacity to lead. South Africa needs to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security and stabilization issues, which could commence by heading a conference on regional security issues. Should the South African government not take action outside actors may become involved. In doing so, South Africa’s international respect and legitimacy will be lost, and as such its bargaining power reduced severely. What’s more, regional destabilisation could occur should a security agreement not be in place in southern Africa. This irresponsibility by South Africa may impact upon the regions attractiveness for FDI, ensuring stagnation. Hence, South Africa must promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security and stabilization issues. However, most importantly, South Africa needs to address its arms trading with other countries to set a good regional example, and not one which is hypocritical.

South Africa’s economic relations with the states analysed in this text have been irresponsible due to their bias towards South Africa, as well as towards certain regions and trades within states. True regional development will not only see prosperity and relative harmony in the region, but also more skilled workers, along with increased attractiveness to FDI for all states. As such, South Africa needs to make steps towards the balancing of trade and economic relations, such as improving all states access to the international economy, markets and capital through practical support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade Organization, and to create the framework for increased direct investment and trade in southern Africa. What’s more, African states. South Africa should provide support for agricultural development in the region, ensuring global competitiveness in different areas. Further, South Africa can be at the head of facilitation of the region’s complete self-sufficiency in food through cooperation in modern technology. Moreover, South Africa could provide technical support in
education in areas of benefit to states, whilst facilitating the region’s struggling education facilities. This could be done by supporting all populations in southern Africa to take courses, placements or degrees in areas such as civil engineering, agriculture and environmental studies, whilst supporting partnerships between Higher Education Institutions.

South Africa’s sluggish response towards the HIV/AIDS crisis meant its leadership role has been questioned, despite the fact that it is making steps to turn this around. South Africa needs to work more closely with states in the region in order to create regional health programs focused on AIDS awareness and prevention. This could involve building local capacity for designing and implementing communication messages about HIV/AIDS and HIV/AIDS services, as well as working to establish monitoring and evaluation systems. Further, South Africa needs to work with migrants in order to create health programs focused on AIDS awareness and prevention. This might encompass designing and implementing communication messages about HIV/AIDS and HIV/AIDS services, as well as providing basic health care services to migrants based on a regional understanding, which could be outlined in an SADC protocol. This may go some way towards repairing South Africa’s international respect after years of ignoring the disease. South Africa needs to engage its neighbouring governments on its social welfare responsibilities, particularly regarding reintegration of former combatants and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Further, South Africa and its civil society networks could use the opportunity for such close relations with migrants to help foster a regional civil society, by supporting the creation of NGO groups and media outlets. This will foster the image of a thriving region to the international arena, and in turn increase its attractiveness for FDI.

Questions have arisen concerning the fragility of South Africa’s own democracy, as South Africa seems to be following in Zimbabwe’s footsteps after its transition in many respects. Both had similar economic, political, and historical endowments and as there still remains major inequality and oppression in the country the South African government must be wary of not following on
the same path as Zimbabwe. To ensure South Africa does not fail as a regional leader, then, goals discussed throughout the text need to be recognised by policy makers in the South African state in order to see a positive change in its leadership style, and indeed positive changes in the region.
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