The Law of the Ruler?

Nicholas Cowdery

Introduction

The title of this article arises out of the misunderstanding that so long as there is a law, so long as the ruler (even a democratic one) has made valid law, then the rule of law operates. The question mark is intended to prompt consideration of whether or not, at least in New South Wales (NSW), the criminal law has truly become the law of the ruler—without proper consideration of the requirements of the just rule of law, the separation of powers in our democratic system of government, the independence of the judiciary and the protection of human rights. I would like to make some observations on those requirements drawn from my own experience.

Purposes of the Law: Crime and Punishment

The overall purpose of the criminal law must surely be the protection of the community. As Crispin (2010:54) states:

> The role of law is not to impose a particular moral or political agenda, but to maintain order, facilitate government, and protect human rights. [G]overned by the ‘harm principle’ ... [t]he system of justice should be fair, and ... responses should not exceed those reasonably necessary to protect the community and its members.

> Crime is created by rules that are imposed upon the community with its agreement (in a democratic system). Human nature being what it is, there will still be those who break the rules. We need to find ways of dealing with breaches that will be broadly consistent with the values, aims and desires of the community in whose name the criminal justice system operates and, of course, consistent with the broad principles of human rights. This requires balancing apparently conflicting considerations.

> Weatherburn (2004) describes the hallmarks of a rational approach to crime control as:
> - Adequate investment in the measurement and monitoring of crime and offending;
> - Open access to crime and justice information;
> - Reliance on evidence in the development of policy;
> - Commitment to rigorous evaluation; and
> - A flexible and eclectic approach to control.

> He also describes how Australia is falling short on all those indicators. We can do better, especially in NSW.

> One standout area in which our present approaches have proven to be inadequate and inappropriate is the prohibition of illicit drugs. To quote Crispin again:

> Crime and punishment remains one of the very few areas of public policy that is largely uninfluenced by careful consideration of the causes of the problems or how those causes might be effectively addressed. (2010:163)

> In relation to laws against drugs Crispin says:

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1 Nicholas Cowdery AM QC is Director of Public Prosecutions NSW and Past President of the International Association of Prosecutors.
In blindly adhering to our present policies, we are trampling on people’s rights, endangering lives, and causing untold misery and hardship. This is making the problem worse rather than better. It is also morally unsustainable. (2010:217)

Yet what hope is there of persuading any politician in power to alter course and move towards the licensing and regulation of illicit drugs by treating drugs as the health and social problem they are, rather than a law and order issue?2

Gittins (2010) noted that:

Modern politicians have become so adept at monitoring public opinion that they’ve developed a preference for wanting to be seen fixing problems rather than to actually fix them. They purport to fix problems by doing whatever the punters and media commentators imagine should be done rather than what the experts say is worth doing.

Gittins argued that the media gives an exaggerated impression of the extent of crime and voters respond by demanding that government do something about it.

The most common political response to real and imagined criminal threats to society is ‘tougher enforcement’—arrangements made for more police to arrest more people and for judges and magistrates to lock them away for longer. Figures from the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research have shown that the rates for most crimes have been steadily falling or remaining constant for years. But the rate of imprisonment—numbers of persons sentenced and lengths of sentences—has been steadily increasing. Politicians say that increased incarceration rates cause criminal offending to fall—but do they?

In NSW, a group called the Crime and Justice Reform Committee maintains that not only is prison a bad experience for all concerned, it is less cost-effective than other options that would reduce crime rates even more. The Committee cites the denial of bail and longer sentences, but also the breakdowns in NSW in managing mental health, early childhood intervention, infrastructure development and consequent job growth, public housing and so on, as contributing to the gaol population. It advocates the greater use of alternatives to imprisonment, such as expansion of the Drug Court, for more cost-effective reduction of offending.

Rights

Human rights cannot be and are not ignored in the criminal justice system. There are some documentary imperatives for this.

The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) requires it. The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) details it (especially Article 14).

The International Association of Prosecutors (IAP) Standards give it more immediate legitimacy and force. In addition, the IAP has published the Human Rights Manual for Prosecutors (Myjer et al 2009) and its Human Rights Training Package has recently been finalised. The IAP is also a body with consultative status with the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action noted that:

The administration of justice, including law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies and, specially, an independent judiciary and legal profession in full conformity with applicable standards contained in international human rights instruments, are essential to the full and non-discriminatory realisation of human rights and indispensable to the process of democracy and sustainable development. (United Nations 1993)

In 1994, following on the Vienna conference, the UN General Assembly prepared a Plan of Action for the UN Decade for Human Rights Education (1995–2004), calling for special attention to be given to:

2 For a blueprint for regulation of drugs, see Transform Drug Policy Foundation (2009).

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the training of police, prison officials, lawyers, judges ... and other groups which are in a particular position to effect the realisation of human rights.

We all (especially prosecutors) need to be alert to threats to and erosion of rights, often as a result of media and political agitation, and be proactive in preventing them. This is particularly so when the community, rightly or not, feels itself under threat from particular forms of usually transient offending. Efforts need to be made to ensure that the right balance between community protection and the protection of individual rights mentioned above has been struck.

In 2000, the Hon Arthur Chaskalson, National Director of the Legal Resources Centres in South Africa and inaugural President of the Constitutional Court of that country, addressed a Public Interest Advocacy Centre dinner in Sydney. He said:

… [F]irst incursions into the protection of human rights are often the most dangerous, for they begin a process of erosion which is difficult to stop once it has begun.

… [T]he erosion of the power and independence of courts, and the lack of vigilance by lawyers, judges, and organs of civil society, permit those who should be held accountable for their conduct, to go free. (Chaskalson 2000)

At the end of her term as President of the NSW Bar Association in 2001, Ruth McColl SC (now a Judge of Appeal in NSW) sounded a timely warning for us all. In her final column in the Bar’s monthly newsletter she wrote:

Lawyers tend to take these core values [i.e. the rule of law and democratic principles] for granted. We work with the Rule of Law every day. We should not lose sight of the fact that the Rule of Law is not as concrete and ever-present a phenomenon to some members of the community as it is to us. At times, the transient, but regrettably politically significant influence of opinion polls can push the Rule of Law to one side and allow pragmatism to prevail over principle. (McColl 2001)

The corrupting force may not be just responses to opinion polls. These influences may be exerted openly or covertly by politicians, the media or rulers and policy makers of all kinds for many reasons.

It matters not that the motives of the urgers or policy makers may be honourable. This is not a new challenge; many years ago, in 1928, Justice Brandeis warned in Olmstead v United States:

Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficent … The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. (277 US 438,479)

It is our obligation to assist them towards that understanding.

Politicisation of Lawmaking

It is not overstating the situation to say that on occasions lawmakers have taken their drafting instructions from the most prominent rantings of the tabloid media. For example, when legislation was being introduced for standard non-parole periods (Division 1A, Part 4 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)), a report of a particularly nasty case appeared the same day on the front page of the Daily Telegraph in October 2002 with a complaint about the leniency of the sentence imposed. That is how subsections 61M(1) and (2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) came to be included in the Table of Standard Non-Parole Periods (numbered as 9A and 9B at the last moment)

Sometimes legislation is the product of the most informal of procedures. Section 51B of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) relating to police pursuits was inserted this year (2010) and became

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3 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 61M(1)–(2) defines when indecent assault becomes aggravated indecent assault. Section 61M(1) requires circumstances of aggravation listed in section 61M(3). Alternatively, if the victim of indecent assault is less than 16 years of age, the charge becomes aggravated.

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It was driven by Police Association representations to the Attorney General and calls upon the Premier to act in response to an individual (and tragic) case. Direct consultations by the Attorney General, fortunately, resulted in legislation that can be effective (and has been used). This is an instance of lawmaking with minimal consultation and in great haste.

Sometimes the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, NSW, is not consulted at all about planned criminal legislation. At other times, however, we have been able to have substantial input into criminal legislation and I suggest that we have a proper role to play in that process.

In his valedictory speech in the Legislative Assembly on 23 November 2006, the former Attorney General, Bob Debus, boasted of the 258 legal bills passed through the Parliament in the previous six years, being one third of all bills passed. The pace has not slackened under the present Attorney General. Much of this legislation, at least so far as criminal law is concerned, has been to tinker at the margins of substance and procedure in an ad hoc fashion, often (as with changes to bail laws) in response to unusual and atypical situations and to appease the latest demand for ever more punitive measures to be applied in the criminal justice system.

**Punitiveness**

The trend in lawmaking and in political commentary in NSW has been towards greater punitiveness—the prescription of more restrictive procedures to apply to accused persons, of more and harsher penalties for criminal conduct and of the extension of punishment beyond the sentences imposed by trial judges.

On 2 June 2010 Chief Judge Blanch of the District Court of NSW spoke at a conference of Legal Aid Commission lawyers. He drew comparisons between NSW and Victoria. In 2009 there were 150 people in custody (on average each day) per 100,000 in NSW and half that in Victoria. In NSW for the 2008–09 financial year, just over a billion dollars were spent on Corrective Services. If we did whatever is being done in Victoria, he said, we could spend half that amount. (And it might also be remarked that if imprisonment reduces criminal offending, then NSW’s crime rates should be significantly lower than those in Victoria—but they are not. Rates of personal assault, murder, robbery, break-ins, burglary and car theft are lower in Victoria.)

Furthermore, in NSW 25 per cent of the prison population is unsentenced—on remand. In Victoria the figure is 18 per cent (where the delays in coming to trial, however, are significantly greater than in NSW).

The Bail Act 1978 (NSW) was passed substantially to address a burgeoning number of prisoners on remand. Presumptions in favour of bail were enacted in some cases, and offences and situations stipulated where no presumption applied or a presumption against bail existed. We seem to have come full circle with the progressively legislated removal of presumptions in favour of bail and the enactment of presumptions against—often in response to individual and atypical cases that have received publicity. Many people refused bail are ultimately acquitted and many receive non-custodial dispositions of their cases. There is no recourse to compensation in such circumstances (as there is in some other countries, especially in Scandinavia).

The Bail Reform Alliance in NSW has been set up to address these issues, headed by a former magistrate.

A NSW Parliamentary Briefing Paper (Roth 2010) examines the bail issue in great detail. It concludes:

Changes to bail laws since 2002 ... have been justified on the basis that they provide greater protection for the community against the risk that such persons will commit offences while awaiting trial. However, critics have argued that the changes have largely been ad hoc responses to particular crime incidents, and that a good case has not been made out for reforms.
The Chief Judge in his paper at the 2010 Legal Aid Conference put forward as another reason for the growth in the gaol population the operation of the Standard Non-Parole Period regime. The stated objective of the scheme was limited to ‘promoting consistency and transparency in sentencing’ (Explanatory Note 2002), but the intention of its proponents must also have been to increase sentences for the offences listed. (In the absence of information about how offences were selected and how the standard non-parole periods were set—ranging from 17 to 70 per cent of the maximum penalties prescribed—it is not possible to be sure4.) While, following the decision in R v Way (2004) NSWCCA 131, judges have skillfully avoided the worst of the regime, there is no doubt that it has resulted in more and longer sentences of imprisonment. The NSW Judicial Commission has reported that:

- the use of full-time imprisonment increased, at least in respect of items 9A and 9B (from 37.3 to 59.3 per cent and from 57.1 to 81.3 per cent respectively);
- lengths of non-parole periods and full terms increased in the four items measurable, the largest being of 125 per cent and 60 per cent respectively for offences against section 33 of the Crimes Act 1900;
- uniformity and consistency of sentences improved; and
- cases in which there had been pleas of guilty (for which the scheme was not designed) also showed increases in sentences (apparently as a result of an upwards shift in sentencing patterns generally). (Judicial Commission of NSW 2010)

The editorials in the Sydney Morning Herald and The Age of 20 April 2010 referred to the ‘disappearing right of bail’ and to the matters raised above, commenting that ‘we are entitled to ask what returns in safety we are getting from our billion-dollar-a-year jail industry. On a more humane calculation, we should be asking what damage is being done to individuals and society by this pursuit of vengeance.’

As already mentioned, recidivism is a significant issue in NSW. Gittins (2010) advocated for increased offender rehabilitation efforts:

According to a big US study ... in descending order of cost-effectiveness, vocational education in prison, intensive supervision using treatment-oriented programs, primary- or secondary-level education in prison, cognitive behavioural therapy, and drug treatment in the community are particularly effective. These programs would have a cost, but they’d end up saving a lot more than they cost.

Aftermath of the Terrorist Threat

These difficulties with the modern development of familiar laws have been compounded by the creation of new laws for new applications.

Australia (and NSW) acquired anti-terrorism laws after the terrorist attacks on the USA of 11 September 2001 and the Bali bombings of 2002. I do not pause here to consider the necessity for or the appropriateness of the legislation, although anyone supportive of the just rule of law should have concerns about some aspects of it. The Clarke Report into the Haneef case (Clarke 2008) identifies many of them. However, such legislation seems to have been received as a signal for legislators to expand such measures from exceptional and clearly dangerous circumstances requiring exceptional responses, into areas of what might be described as ‘ordinary crime’—to push the envelope of measures available to law enforcement with the anti-terrorism laws as a guide. I query the desirability, effectiveness or legitimacy of such a course.

The International Bar Association (2003) has addressed the principles to be applied in the legal responses to the threat of terrorism in its report, International Terrorism: Legal Challenges and Responses.5

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4 It appears that the standard non-parole periods prescribed were set by reference to the median non-parole periods imposed, taken from NSW Judicial Commission statistics.

5 Recommendation 9 states: ‘States should not use the fight against terrorism as a pretext to adopt measures which unlawfully restrict the rights to freedom of expression, religion, opinion and belief, nor the rights of minorities.’ Recommendation 11 states: ‘All restrictions of
It is well possible to react in a principled and effective way while observing the tenets of the just rule of law.

However, we have seen inappropriate measures taken against asylum seekers, against Vivienne Solon and Cornelia Rau and against children in immigration detention.

We have seen the bold (but thankfully ill-fated) move of the Kable legislation in NSW (prior to 2001) (Kable v The Director of Public Prosecutions for New South Wales (1996) HCA 24) follow through to serious sex offenders (Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006), fortified by anti-terrorism measures and the High Court’s decision in Fardon (Fardon v The Attorney General for the State of Queensland (2004) HCA 46). The UN Human Rights Committee, in cases from NSW and Queensland (under The Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003), reported in March 2010 that continuing detention or extended supervision are double punishment and contrary to Article 9 of the ICCPR. The Australian Government has 180 days in which to respond. The NSW government has talked about extending such measures to serious violent offenders who do not satisfactorily participate in rehabilitation programs in gaol. The Premier was reported to have ordered Corrective Services to begin an audit of the 750 ‘worst of the worst’ prisoners in NSW. (I understand that it may be possible to identify about 20 prisoners to whom this scheme could apply.) The Council for Civil Liberties (CCL) said in response:

The rule of law requires politicians to set the framework of justice and for judges to deliver sentences away from political influence. The prison system is there to encourage prisoners to reform but, if they know they can effectively be resentenced by the government, there is no incentive to reform. (AAP, 11 April 2010)

In South Australia (Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA)), NSW and Queensland (Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld)) we have seen legislation described as laws against ‘bikie gangs’ and as ‘gang laws’. However, it is not confined in its terms to ‘outlaw motorcycle gangs’ and its potential reach is much broader. It could apply, for instance, to political parties, labour unions, religious groups or charities (among many other possibilities).

The Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW) (hereafter referred to as ‘the Act’) became law with insufficient community consultation and despite deep concerns and protests of the NSW Bar Association, the NSW Law Society, academics, the CCL and many others. My office was not consulted. While both the state government and the opposition may be right that something more needs to be done about bikie gangs and criminal groups, especially when they involve themselves in an organised manner in drug manufacture and supply, and crimes of violence, this very troubling legislation (which in NSW borrows from and seeks to ‘improve upon’ the related legislation in South Australia) is another giant leap backwards for human rights and the separation of powers—in short, the rule of law in NSW.

One questions the need for further legislation in this area at all. There is already anti-criminal-group legislation in Division 5 of Part 3A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), enacted in 2007, under which successful prosecutions have been brought (including pleas of guilty). We have successfully prosecuted members of motorcycle gangs for serious drug and other offences. There may be more a need for better enforcement, than for new legal powers.

The Act introduces a system of control orders whereby members of declared organisations can be ordered not to associate with other members subjected to control orders.

The machinery of the Act works in two stages. First, the Police Commissioner may apply to have an organisation declared under the Act by an ‘eligible’ Supreme Court judge. That judge must be satisfied (s 9(1)) that members of the organisation associate for the purpose of organising, planning, facilitating, supporting or engaging in serious criminal activity and that the organisation

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Italics indicate the names of legislation, court cases, and organisations. Quotations are used to convey direct statements made by individuals or organisations. Parenthetical references are used to cite sources. Emphasis is used to draw attention to important points. Boldface is used to highlight key terms or concepts. Underlining is not used. Italicised text is used sparingly and only to convey the specific format of a document or title. Parenthetical text is used to provide additional information or context. Emphasis is used sparingly and only to draw attention to key points. Underlining is not used. Italics are used sparingly and only to convey the specific format of a document or title. Parenthetical text is used to provide additional information or context. Emphasis is used sparingly and only to draw attention to key points. Underlining is not used.
represents a risk to public safety and order in NSW. ‘Serious criminal activity’ is defined to connect with ‘serious indictable offences’, which are offences punishable by imprisonment for five years or more.

Second, once a declaration is made against an organisation, any judge of the Supreme Court (not just an eligible judge) can, on application by the Police Commissioner, make an interim and then a final control order against a person, if the court is satisfied that the person is a member of a particular declared organisation and that ‘sufficient grounds exist for making the control order’. (The Act gives no useful guidance as to what constitute ‘sufficient grounds’.)

Section 26 of the Act makes it an offence for a controlled member of a declared organisation to associate (simpliciter) with another controlled member of the same organisation. The purpose of any such association is irrelevant to liability. A first offence is punishable with a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment; a second or subsequent offence is liable to a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment. Certain reasonable circumstances of association are exempted (for example, between ‘close family members’ or in the course of a lawful occupation, business or profession, during education courses etc.—including in lawful custody), but the onus is on the controlled person to prove that the association falls within such a reasonable exemption. The making of a final control order has the effect of revoking any authority or licence that the person had to carry on any prescribed activity (for example and from a long list, operating a pawn broking business or a tow truck, selling or repairing motor vehicles, selling liquor, possessing a firearm, acting as a security agent, operating a casino).

The legislation has a number of troubling features, including the following:

The legislation does not apply only to bikie gangs, but to any ‘particular organisation’ in respect of which the Police Commissioner chooses to make an application. Where will the line be drawn? This legislation could be applied to any, even small, informally organised group whose members the Commissioner alleges ‘associate for the purpose of organising, planning, facilitating, supporting or engaging in serious criminal activity’. These words cast a very wide net—far wider than the elements of conspiracy, one of the most broadly defined crimes in the criminal calendar.

It is curious to note that the Act does not apply to organisations organising, planning, facilitating, supporting or engaging in criminal activity that does not satisfy the definition of ‘serious criminal activity’—arguably for example, gangs of organised shoplifters or street drug dealers.

Only an ‘eligible’ Supreme Court judge can declare an organisation under the Act. (Similar officers have been described in legislation relating to anti-terrorism, covert search warrants and surveillance devices.) To be eligible a judge must first consent to being declared eligible for this purpose and then be so declared by the Attorney General, who has the power to declare (or not to declare) him or her eligible. Therefore, only judges willing to enforce the legislation and acceptable to the Attorney General become involved at that stage. (Until the original legislation was amended, the Attorney General also had the power to withdraw or qualify approval as an eligible judge.)

Whereas section 24 of the Act creates a right of appeal against the making of a control order against a person, section 35 purports, in the widest possible terms, otherwise to oust any review by the Supreme Court or any other review body (excepting investigations or proceedings under the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988) of a declaration or order made against an organisation or a person, and to deny any right of appeal or review even when there has been a breach of the rules of procedural fairness (natural justice).

An ‘eligible’ judge (in the case of an application for a declaration against an organisation) or any Supreme Court judge (in the case of an application in respect of a control order against a member of a declared organisation) hearing an application, is by section 28(3) ‘to take steps to maintain the confidentiality of information that [they consider] to be properly classified by the Commissioner as criminal intelligence, including steps to receive evidence and hear argument about the information in private in the absence of the parties to the proceedings and their
representatives and the public’. One can only wonder what ‘argument’ there can possibly be when affected parties and their legal representatives are excluded from the proceedings. Procedural fairness is not a requirement.

Part 3 of the Act empowers any judge of the Supreme Court to make control orders against an individual member or former member of an organisation. The definition of ‘member’ of an organisation in section 3 is alarmingly wide. For example, it includes a ‘prospective member (however described)’. It also includes ‘a person who is treated by the organisation or persons who belong to the organisation, in some way, as if he or she belonged to the organisation’. This is extraordinarily broad-reaching—this criterion could be fulfilled without the person having any intention of being part of the organisation and could be established without any direct evidence of that person’s actual involvement with the organisation.

Section 13 provides that the rules of evidence do not apply to hearings of applications for a declaration of an organisation. Are organisations to be declared on the basis of hearsay upon hearsay, or a police intelligence officer’s ‘hunch’, or a report of an anonymous telephone call? No limits are set.

Section 32 provides that ‘[a]ny question of fact to be decided in proceedings under this Act is to be decided on the balance of probabilities’ (this does not apply to proceedings for offences under the Act). Such a standard is insufficiently rigorous for the removal of a right as fundamental as the right to freedom of association. Indeed, the Act purports to remove the rights to freedom of association and expression in circumstances that do not come within the permissible exceptions described in the ICCPR—for national security, public order etc.

Section 13(2) of the Act provides that an ‘eligible’ judge is not required to provide any grounds or reasons for his or her decision in respect of a declaration against an organisation (except to the Ombudsman conducting a review under section 39). This is entirely contrary to the general practice in modern jurisprudence that judges should give public reasons for their decisions.

The placing of the burden of proof upon a controlled person to establish that an association with another controlled person falls within the exemptions under the Act (for example, close family members) is a draconian measure, reminiscent of reverse onus provisions that were in place for a time in Northern Ireland during the ‘troubles’, where extraordinary measures were considered appropriate in a time of general emergency. This is highly unusual and almost always inappropriate in the context of legislation creating potential criminal consequences.

The Act criminalises conduct other than by rules of general application in the community—another infringement of the rule of law.

Further legislation was passed targeting the recruitment of a person to be a member of a declared organisation, enabling the substitute service of notices on those subject to applications to be placed under control orders and authorising search warrants to be issued by ‘eligible’ judges upon reasonable suspicion (rather than reasonable belief)—which may be based only upon ‘criminal intelligence’.

In response to a critical article about such legislation in The Australian on 16 June 2010 the NSW Attorney General, in a letter to the Editor, affirmed that the Police Commissioner could rely on criminal intelligence in taking action under the Act. He said:

The NSW legislation defines criminal intelligence as information about criminal activity that, if disclosed, may prejudice an investigation, expose a law enforcement source or endanger someone’s life or physical safety. If a judge is not satisfied that this definition is met, the Police Commissioner can be asked to withdraw that information or make it available to the other parties. The involvement of high-level judicial scrutiny is an important safeguard in the process by which declarations and orders under the legislation can be made and a critical variation between NSW and South Australian legislation. (Hatzistergos 2010)
No applications have been made under the NSW Act yet, but I believe that one is pending. The South Australian legislation is presently the subject of proceedings before the High Court (The State of South Australia v Totani & Anor (2010)).

The APEC legislation (APEC Meeting (Police Powers) Act 2007 (NSW)) was another recent example of a response to the perceived need for extraordinary measures for public control (remember when members of the ABC satirical comedy group, The Chaser, ventured into the restricted zone in central Sydney and were arrested, but not prosecuted?). The so-called World Youth Day in Sydney in 2008 was another: when Ian Bryce rolled out his fake ‘Popemobile’ he was charged with an inappropriate offence (causing unreasonable annoyance, after an even more inappropriate traffic charge was withdrawn), which ultimately was withdrawn with the involvement and assistance of the CCL. The V8 Supercars arrangements, whereby public streets in western Sydney were appropriated and modified for a car race at public expense, are another example of the compromise by government of the rights of sections of society for political expedience. One must question the need for such action and the expansion of executive power in these ways with penal consequences.

At a time when bail laws operate to swell prison numbers in both adult and juvenile prisons (some of which are privatised and run for profit), when punishment takes priority over crime prevention in public policy and expenditure and when small scale drug possession and use remain criminal offences—and much else is not well in criminal justice in the state—it can be said that there are other things to think about.

Charter of Rights

For now, at least, Australia is not to have a national charter of rights. Instead we have pending the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Bill 2010. It seems unlikely that NSW will ‘go it alone’.

Richard Ackland wrote in the Sydney Morning Herald on 2 April 2010, after the Victorian Court of Appeal had ruled in the Momcilovic case that legislation removing the presumption of innocence was incompatible with Victoria’s Charter of Rights and Responsibilities:

We were warned the sky would fall in once unelected judges started to tinker with the handiwork of elected politicians. Just about the entire Liberal Party, various Laborites and many of the Murdoch commentators were lecturing us sternly about this. The central proposition was that a charter of rights would shift power from the Parliament to the courts. Further, in the words of one newspaper sage, this will result in a ‘transformation of Australia’s political culture’. (Let’s hope so.)

The rhetoric on this topic has been up there with the great moral panics of Australian history. Our way of life would be destroyed variously by Asian invasion, Communist invasion, Muslim rule, ‘grubs’ at Cronulla, lawlessness, fluoride and socialism. (Ackland 2010)

Let us hope that this debate has not died. A charter of rights may be the only effective defence against the law of the ruler.

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Legislation


Cases