

Deliberation and the Norm of Participation

By Aimee McBride

Dr. Craig Browne, Supervisor

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of

Bachelor of Arts with Honours

The Department of Sociology and Social Policy

The University of Sydney, 2010

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to my parents Barbara and Grant for their encouragement and support. To my brothers William, Edward, Leonard and Ignatius, and my sister Emma, thank you for your lively discussion and reflections. The generosity and kindness extended by my brother Nicholas during the course of this year is deeply appreciated. Special thanks are also made to my readers Amy Yang, Vani Guapta and Deborah Challinor for their invaluable contributions. The arguments developed in my thesis were made possible by the knowledge and guidance of Craig Browne. Finally, my thesis is dedicated to my niece Isabel Grace on the occasion of her sixth birthday.

Contents

Acknowledgements

Abstract

Introduction	1
Chapter 1: Why Participation?	8
Chapter 2: A Forum to Participate	21
Chapter 3: Deliberation and Democracy	31
Conclusion: The Norm of Participation	44
References	52

Introduction

Participation is a term that by its own nature reflects the desire to be a part of something that is greater than the individual experience. In modern societies, the desire to socialise is most often positioned within the political borders of democracy. The rise of representative democracy, beginning in the seventeenth century and exerting its political power with increasing force in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, formalised what was originally a socially-held demand for participation. In light of this tradition, citizen-participation has for many years been considered a means of connecting the elected government with the wider social community. Mechanisms such as voting have been designed to communicate the interest of the public to their representatives. In recent years, citizens' failure to engage with these mechanisms has generated a growing body of literature on declining levels of participation. This failure has also led to the inability of liberal democracies to legitimise their own authority.

In response to this dilemma, new democratic innovations emphasising the importance of participation to democracy have been developed. From the 1980s onwards, the theory of deliberative democracy has come to the forefront of debates over the legitimacy of representative government and the idea of consensus politics. It has also coincided with a renewed interest in the relationship between social and economic rights and political emancipation. My thesis will examine participation with a view of understanding: its perceived fairness, shortcomings and future directions. The expositions in this study are guided by an overarching analysis of deliberative democracy and political emancipation in order to determine the importance of citizen-participation to modern societies. This approach is facilitated by Nancy Frasers' (1991) theory of participatory parity:

‘Participatory parity is essential to a democratic public sphere and that rough socio-economic equality is a precondition of participatory parity ... laissez-fair capitalism does

not foster socio-economic quality and ... some form of politically regulated economic reorganisation and redistribution is need to achieve that end' (Fraser 1991, p. 74).

Fraser's theory of 'participatory parity' performs the role of a critical barometer when analysing notions of citizen participation within the strictures of this dissertation. The theory of 'participatory parity' is based on the principles of redistribution and recognition. In this theory, Fraser conceptualises political, social and economic rights as inter-reliant, mutually securing individual and collective emancipation (Fraser, 1991 p. 65). The idea of a standard for participation is an important development at a time when participants in contemporary democracies are often disengaged from the political process. The feelings of disempowerment and the desire to participate are discussed in the following chapters.

In Chapter 1: I begin with a discussion on the modes of social life that have come to define contemporary democracies. The writing of Charles Taylor (2004) and Cornelius Castoriadis (1997) are used to identify the features of modernity. They define this period in relation to popular sovereignty (democracy), the public sphere and the economy. In his introduction to the theory of the modern social imaginary, Taylor (2004) explains modernity to mean:

'... the historically unprecedented amalgam of new practices and institutional forms (science, technology, industrial production, urbanisation), of new ways of living (individualism, secularism, instrumental rationality); and of new forms of malaise (alienation, meaninglessness, a sense of impending social dissolution' (Taylor 2004, p.1).

Modernity refers to the social practices that came to define Renaissance Europe and continue to influence Western democracies (Powell 2008, p.51). The problem of citizen-participation is situated within the legacy of this period. Ancient and Modern ideas of liberty and the limitations these contrasting approaches place on participation are discussed in this section. The argument that there is a demand for participation is brought about by the comparison of Athenian democracy and modern liberalisms. This demand is exemplified by new democratic innovations that include participatory democracy, new social movements, participatory budgeting, intimacy as democracy and deliberation. These developments are important to contemporary discussions on participation and political emancipation.

Following the discussion it will be suggested that in modernity alternative ways of thinking have lead to a paradoxical situation that poses problems for democracy. Simultaneously, an ideological discourse on political emancipation has occurred, which expounds the idea of ‘individual freedom’. Emphasising individualism arguably diminishes the importance of solidarity, the liberty which typified Athenian democracy, to contemporary democracies (Wagner 2008, p. 37; Castoriadis 1997). This dualism is further explored in the theories of participation expounded in the political liberalisms of elite (representative) and participatory democracy.

In the Weberian theory of elite democracy, citizens’ participation is limited to voting in democratic elections. The possible problems of this definition of participation will be analysed in relation to the ability to secure political rights and the foundations of political emancipation in participation. The contradictory character of these competing ideas places modern notions of participation in a precarious position, questioning the extent to which contemporary theories of citizen-participation are in fact participatory. The empirical studies of Joseph Schumpeter (2003), Robert Michels (1962) and Seymour Lipset (1964) are used to examine the inadvertent limits placed on individuals by a restricted concept of liberty. The writing of the aforementioned political sociologists drew mostly negative conclusions about citizen-participation, interpreting low voting turn-outs as symptomatic of apathy.

In Chapter 2: The spatial borders of democratic participation are discussed with relation to physical setting that foster social action. The notion of an autonomous public space is important to both ancient and modern democracies (Mouffe 2000). The public spaces of civil society are thought to comprise this space and they are explored for their potential to oversee citizen-participation. This section is broken into two main sections: civil society and the public sphere. Civil society is increasingly thought of as, ‘a mediating space between the private and public spheres in a pluralist democracy’ (Powell 2008, p. 50). This version of civil society is rooted in classical liberalism and more recent considerations of the influence of communication technologies on everyday life.

The philosophical traditions of Max Weber, Karl Marx and Jean Rousseau lay the foundations of this investigation into participation. In contemporary accounts of participation, the influence of these philosophers can be seen in the political systems of representative democracy; in the

questions over conditions that foster individual and collective emancipation; and in moves to extend democratic practices beyond the bureaucratic arm of the nation-state. They are also emblematic of the modern liberal, Marxist and participatory political traditions as well as distinct portrayals of civil society. The different depictions of civil society are also discussed in relation to their social roles. This includes a setting for participants to debate ideas and take part in the decision-making processes of self-government (Keane, 2009).

Constituting this arena are the public spaces where individuals meet to form collectives: spaces such as parks, town halls, schools, community centres and the public institutions that represent citizen concerns (Barber 1984, p. 228). More recently, the virtual commons of the internet have also been theorised as constituting a public sphere (Castells, 2008). The public sphere can be pictured as a discursive arena that exists within the communication networks in civil society. It is the writing of Jurgen Habermas (1996) that informs the definition and exposition of the public sphere. He positions the communication networks that constitute this space within civil society and links participation in this arena to political emancipation. Habermas (1996) argues the only way to overcome social and economic inequalities is through the discourse principle and rights of communicative action which are exercised in civil society. Habermas states that in order to realise individual liberty:

‘... the sought-for internal connection between popular sovereignty and human rights lies in the normative content of the very mode of exercising political autonomy, a mode that is not secured simply through the grammatical form of general laws but only through the communicative form of the discursive processes of opinion- and will-formation’ (Habermas 1996, p. 103-4).

The connections between the modern concept of emancipation, the public sphere, civil society and deliberation further outline the dimensions for evaluating participation. It is at this point that the theories of Cornelius Castoriadis, Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser and Jurgen Habermas overlap in a bridge between the first and second chapters. They further outline social and economic rights that can foster citizens’ participation and strengthen modern democracies. The analysis of deliberation takes place in the following chapter and tied to this theory is the notion that civil society could act as a forum for deliberation.

In Chapter 3: An exposition of the deliberation theories of Jurgen Habermas (1996), John Rawls (1993) and Joshua Cohen (1993) are used to define deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy reinterprets citizen-participation as an involvement in an open dialogue built upon the normative foundations of the discourse principle. Participation in deliberative versions of democracy requires citizens to engage in a reasoned debate and deliberate over a range of possible outcomes, building consensus in the process. It is based upon three distinct forms of reason: “communicative reason”, “overlapping pluralism” and “reasonable pluralism” (Habermas 1996; Rawls 1993; Cohen 1999). The legitimacy of deliberative democracy is based on the normative grounds of the discourse principle: ‘Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in a rational discourse’ (Habermas 1996, p. 107).

Deliberative democracy positions the legitimacy of representative government on normative grounds and presents a procedure for testing those norms. The content of the norms in question are not defined, and their moral integrity is based on the public reason of participants (Bevir 2010, p. 519). The deliberation process opens political discussions to the general public and invests in their ability to reconcile differences as well as make informed decisions. The major criticism of this model of democracy is not so much the procedural approach it employs but the failure of this theory to take into consideration the reality of political, social and economic inequality (Mouffe 1999; Elderman 1998; Kalyvas 2003).

It is difficult to measure the success or failure of deliberation for the simple reason that there are relatively few large-scale or longitudinal studies possible on a relatively new development. In its current expression, deliberative democracy is most often thought of as a mechanism for sporadic forms of political engagement. The “mechanisms” facilitating this interaction range from forums, to citizen juries, polls, mediated online discussion as well as televised voting (Carson, 2001). These approaches attempt to connect the government with participants during the entire term of their governance. At this point in time, it is unclear whether these deliberative forums lead to greater government accountability or if they are still building public awareness of different issues. It has been found that in many deliberative forums, participation is limited to middle income and university educated citizens (Polletta and Lee, 2006).

In the Conclusion: An analysis of the deliberation and participation in modern societies will take place. In this section it is Nancy Fraser and her theory of participatory parity that frame debate on the principles of deliberation. The norms offered by both advocates of deliberative democracy and their critics create an evaluative framework for discerning the extent to which deliberation fulfils its claim to socialise democracy. Alternatively, its implementation as a mechanism may further isolate already marginalised citizens. It is suggested that the success of deliberative democracy is directly tied to the ability of participants to effectively communicate their concerns and transform their desire to influence the structure and character of society into a meaningful expression of advocacy. The normative principles of participation, including discourse, parity and autonomy, are important to modern democracies. At a time when the autonomy of public arenas that were designed to facilitate participation is being discredited by economic and political systems, the protection of individual liberties is also at stake.

The introduction of new standards of participation, and therefore, a normative criterion of legitimacy can change the perception of citizens. It can move away from the notion of an apathetic public towards a more positive account of the coming together of social beings to pursue a better way of life. The methodologies of critical theory used in this thesis emphasises the importance of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of society. As Horkheimer illustrates, the aim of critical theory is ‘to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them’ (Horkheimer 1982, p. 244). It is believed that democracy provides the ideal setting for counterbalancing the social inequalities produced by unfettered entrepreneurship, and opens the notion of universal consensus to ever-extending audiences (Horkheimer 1982, p. 249-50; Habermas 1989, p.).

Johann Arnason (1990) argues that incompatible models of self-government have been constructed as a direct result of the over-interpretation and under-theorisation of democracy in social theory. This comes at a time when a sophisticated theory of democracy is needed to fulfil the aspirations of political emancipation (Arnason 1990, p.20). He states:

‘... classical models of theorising are probably better understood as different attempts to clarify the relationship between capitalism and industrialisation... these two dimensions of modernity were much more extensively thematised and systematically explored than the

problematic of democracy. Democracy remained, in other words, an under-theorised component of modernity' (Arnason 1990, p.26).

My thesis on citizen-participation explores the possibilities of emancipatory politics. It examines the social and economic constraints placed on the ideas of participation and deliberation in modern society. The aforementioned philosophers, political scientists and sociologists are representative of a variety of literature reflecting both complementary and conflicting worldviews. However, each discourse emphasises the importance of political freedom to the human experience and ties this concept to the idea of democracy. Their contributions are important to the themes of liberty and political emancipation, civil society and the public sphere, and deliberation. They also help inform the thesis that although dialogue and reasoned debate are attractive ideals, their ability to be associated with political emancipation is restricted by economic inequality. Finally, it is hoped that my analysis in the pages of this thesis will contribute to a deeper understanding of democracy within social and political theory.

Why Participation?

My thesis begins with a detailed discussion on citizen- participative in relation to what might be stated as the first feature of modernity: the notion of popular sovereignty. In this chapter, three main approaches to theorising participation are examined within the cultural setting of modernity. They include approaches that prioritise the modern political value of liberty, analyses of the institutional forms of liberal democracy and citizens' participation, and democratic innovations that represent new standards of participation. The political value of liberty is examined in terms of both positive liberty and negative liberty, whose combined social significance is explained in a comparison of ancient and modern democratic cultures. The negative accounts of participation that characterised sociological studies of democracy in the mid-twentieth are also discussed as are the conclusions drawn from these studies. Finally, the new ways of imagining participation are analysed in relation to alternate models of participatory democracy, including those that reference participatory budgeting and new social movements. It should be noted that the Habermasian idea of communicative action, which theorises citizen participation as a dialogue, will be investigated in the next chapter.

What is typically meant by democratic participation? Peter Wagner (2008) defines participation as those types of action that occur in defined spatial boundaries and that are concerned with active involvement in processes of democratic will-formation and decision-making (Wagner 2008, p. 27-28). In this thesis, following Wagner, it is the spatial boundaries of democracy, both real and imagined, that inform the setting for social action. Participation refers to engagement with the overriding principles of equality and solidarity that shape modern democracies. According to Charles Taylor (2004), democracy can be pictured as a type of common, whereby a shared purpose allows otherwise disconnected social beings to congregate (Taylor 2004, p. 85). I argue that the ability to converge in the social setting of democracy requires the support of specific norms that encourage certain behaviours while quietening others. The moral order of democracy steers individual and collective action within the cultural horizons of popular sovereignty. This chapter will emphasise then the ways in which individuals come to personally identify with the social significations of democracy and later reinforce this self-image at an institutional level.

The conceptual vocabularies of Cornelius Castoriadis (1997) and Charles Taylor (2004) set out a new grammar for theorising the problematic of democracy. In their discourses, the term imaginary refers to the formation of customs and rules by people attempting to make sense of social life. The concept of an imaginary also implies that the social norms being created are continuously changing and exist to the extent that they are mentally and physically embodied in the thoughts and actions of individuals, as well as the wider social community. Castoriadis describes the political imaginary in the following terms:

‘... society constitutes a system of norms, institutions in the broadest sense of the term, values orientations and goals of collective life as well as individual life. At their core are to be found ... social imaginary significations, which are also created by each society and embodied in its institutions’ (Castoriadis 1997, p. 84).

The concept of democracy is, in the words of Castoriadis, an imaginary signification comprised of social institutions that depending on the period in question are either features of antiquity (participatory democracy) or modernity (representative democracy). Castoriadis argues that only participatory democracy actually warrants the label. However, the idea of democracy as an imaginary signification means, to put it another way, that democracy is ‘the political manifestation of some basic commitment that we all share’ (Talisse 2009, p. 80).

A commitment to democracy has serious implications for citizens’ participation at both the personal and institutional level. Taylor’s theory of a modern social imaginary is primarily concerned with the ways ordinary people understand their own social worlds (Taylor 2004, p. 30). In his writing on the subject of imaginaries, Taylor identifies the economy, the public sphere and popular sovereignty as the substantive features of modernity (Taylor 2004, p. 69). According to this line of argumentation, the basic characteristics of modernity are unified by political values that influence the ways people go about daily life. Modern democracy, for Taylor, is then founded on the positive evaluation of participation in ordinary life and the spheres of civil society.

Benjamin Constant (1988) first used the expression the liberties of the ancients and moderns in his writing on the spirit of modern societies (Constant 1988). Constant (1988) argues that the liberty of the ancients is the ‘active and constant participation in collective power’ while the

liberty of the moderns is 'individual liberty', that is, where the political values of liberal democracy guarantee personal freedom (Constant 1988, p. 316, 323). Taylor (2004) contends that the idea of self-interested economic activity provided the new ethical basis for these political values. He suggests that liberty "is no longer simply belonging to the sovereign people, but personal independence" (Taylor 2004, p. 151). Isaiah Berlin (1971) defines negative liberty as self-protection and separates the concept from notions of fraternity or solidarity (Berlin 1971). In general, the theorists of negative liberty tend to accept liberalism's assumption that political representation is a key feature of democracy and that there need to be constraints on popular sovereignty or collective participation in the general will.

According to Constant, a significant difference between ancient and modern political values is the way that personal experience is visualised. The Ancient republican esteem for collectivist action comes into direct contradistinction with the modern liberal discourse of individual rights (Constant 1988). In its simplest form, classical republicanism or positive liberty sees the role of citizens primarily as contributors to a collective form of social action which is tied to the idea of the public good. While modern liberalism's idea of negative liberty is concerned with the individuals' protection from the power of majorities, whether these majorities exist in the form of governments, an overarching ideology, religious dogmatism or other forms of domination that may stifle personal expression (Berlin 1971, p. 126-7). In effect, these images of positive and negative liberty constitute diverging conceptions of participation and my analysis demonstrates the extent to which they continue to shape contemporary understandings of democracy. These two theories or imaginaries link social action to some image of the common good and personal emancipation, although positive liberty tends to be more oriented to the former, while negative liberty prioritises the latter and interprets it in terms of private right.

The notion of self-government, rather than just government, involves a more demanding idea of citizens' participation in decision-making processes. Democratic societies are supposedly distinctive in their adherence to the principle that the laws are made by the people and represent the will of the people. Of course, this standard of citizens' participation has been enacted in different ways and this has led to the construction of disparate political forms, even to the extent of democracy being defined in elite terms, which contradicts its original meaning as the rule of the people, the masses or the *demos*. The history of democracy begins with the study of the

political societies that came to characterise ancient Greece in the years between 500-300 BCE (Dunn 1992). The Athenian city-state model continues to inform the modern understanding of democracy and influences contemporary perspectives of citizen-participation (Tilly 2007).

The institutional framework of Athens was comprised of popular assemblies, law courts and an active citizenry united by a political order that was set on the foundations of self-governance and full citizen participation (Hornblower in Dunn 1992, p. 6). These features of Athenian democracy were developed in a time of aristocratic or oppressive political regimes as well as widespread tyranny (Keane 2003). The institutional forms of democracy were built on the political values of classical republicanism, otherwise termed as a commitment to ancient notions of justice, freedom, equality and solidarity (Aristotle 1981, p. 196-7; Held 1996, p. 23). The political signification of Athenian democracy imagined citizens as deliberative actors able to communicate differences and listen to contrary views; a feature of democracy that enables its continued relevance in times of social and cultural change (Castoriadis 1997, p. 87). According to this model, participation meant a process whereby an active citizen engaged with his contemporaries in a democratic polis (Held 1996, p. 36). As Aristotle states, ‘... what effectively distinguishes the citizen proper from all others is his participation in giving judgement and in holding office’ (Aristotle 1981, p. 169).

Aristotle may not have been a strong advocate of democracy, however, his account of citizens’ participation is important (Castoriadis 1997, p. 88-89). Aristotle’s writing on democracy describes Athenian ideas of citizens’ participation as man’s collective actions based firmly on the principles of dialogue and deliberation (Castoriadis 1997, p. 90). Participation in an open public space for discussion was seen as a practical way to further the social goals of citizens which were steered by the Aristotelian conception of the ‘good life’ and pursuit of happiness (Farrar in Dunn 1992, p. 17; Aristotle 1981, p. 196). During this period the notion of citizenship rights and responsibilities was fostered by a general deference of personal aspiration to the collective will (Tilly 2007, p.27; Constant 1988). The right to participate in ‘giving judgement and in holding office’ were guided principles of equality and solidarity that are antithetical to the type of individualism common to modern democracy. Direct democracy was a defining feature of the Athenian model and the implementation of this political system was closely aligned with a legal system that was supportive of broad political participation (Castoriadis 1997, p. 91).

The idea of the 'good life' and pursuit of this social objective via collective action lead to participation being viewed as a virtue in and of itself. The education of citizens regarding political virtues was integral to the maintenance of the republican democratic culture and participation in collective law making, holding office and the public provision of laws in settings and language that was accessible to all citizens (Castoriadis 1997). However, The Athenian model of a participatory democracy was limited in terms of its definition of citizenship and its exclusionary practices. Those who participated were a minority of male elites. Slaves, who Tilly considers comprised the majority of the population in the narrow jurisdiction of the city-state, were excluded from the social imaginary of democracy (Tilly 2007, p. 26; Castoriadis 1997; Held 1996, p. 23). Democracy at this time was, to quote David Held, an 'adult male culture' which excluded women, children, foreigners and slaves (Held 1996, p. 23). It also included practices that could be considered at odds with democracy's egalitarian ethos, most notably popular elections for certain roles which were for the Athenians an aristocratic principle (Castoriadis 1997). It could also be noted that popular assemblies were also a feature of the ancient Sumerian, Mycenaean and Phoenician societies, even though the extent to which they met the criteria of democracy can be questioned (Keane 2003, p.xi Hornblower in Dunn 1992, p. 1-2).

The scale and complexity of modern societies are typically seen as problems for direct democracy and citizen's participation. While this thesis is certainly not a history of occidental Europe, it is important to acknowledge that the notions of popular sovereignty and representative democracy came to prominence during the period in which the nation-state became the dominant political entity and market capitalism expanded. These two aspects of modern democracy can also be traced to the emergence of the public sphere and, as the next chapter highlights, civil society (Habermas 1989). As such, this section looks in greater detail at the political values that shaped democratic societies in modern times. It is also shown that the way liberty is defined has a direct impact of the types of participation that are considered possible. The comparison of Athenian democracy and modern liberalism represent contrasting ideas about society. They also present dissimilar accounts of the way society should be structured. It will be shown that the modern interpretation of participation is at odds with democracy.

During the early twentieth century Max Weber developed a theory of political legitimacy, which became the basis of an elite theory of democracy and later political sociologies of citizen-participation (Weber 1968). Weber was writing in response to two features of the institutional make up of modernity: mass parliamentary democracy and bureaucratic organisation (Arnason 1990, p. 24). Weber's sociological conception of democracy is opposed to ideas of direct democracy and contradicts the latter's claim that democracy is intrinsically anti-authoritarian. Instead, Weber emphasised the importance of rationality to modern democracy. Weber's justification of elite democracy, which is based on a representative system of governance, was that it is the best political model for social stability and prosperity. In this model of democracy, citizen-participation is primarily thought of as voting in democratic elections (Held 1996). Weber's treatment of democracy informs the writings of political sociologists Joseph Schumpeter, Robert Michels and Seymour Lipset, who studied citizen-participation in relation to the apparatus of the nation-state, as well as the character and organisation of political movements and parties.

During the 1950s and 1960s studies of elite democracy sought to explain the prosperity and stability of capitalist societies by uncovering the circumstances that fostered democracy (Lipset 1963). Schumpeter (2003) argued in a similar vein to Weber in his writing on socialism and democracy. According to Schumpeter the majority of participants in democracies are self-motivated and ill-informed making participation beyond voting undesirable. Rather, the Weberian notion of rotating élites is theorised as the most attractive model of democracy (Schumpeter 2003, p. 250-283). In contrast to this position, Michels' (1962) is highly critical of the elitist structure of democracy. Michels' research into the organisational structure of democracy found that the democratic values of equality, or belief in the greater good that were thought to characterise public institutions, were undermined by a tendency of these organisations to form oligarchies. The empirical studies *Agrarian Socialism* and *Union Democracy* by Lipset built upon Michels' earlier work, and while both authors observe similar trends, they drew very different conclusions from these studies (Lipset 1950, 1994; Lipset, Trow and Coleman 1956). Lipset found that the organisations in democracy functioned democratically and situated this argument within broader studies on the social factors that enhance democracy (Lipset 1950; Lipset et al 1956). Political sociologies narrow definition of participation, voting and

membership of a trade union or political party in many ways fails to examine the range of activities participants engage in to promote democracy.

The empirical approaches of political sociology conceptualise democracy as a process of ongoing conflict, within and between, organisations in a battle for political power (Lipset in Michels 1962, p. 36). The definition of democracy as a contest inevitably leads to a fairly restricted notion of citizens' participation: labour unions and the fight for workers rights, political parties and winning popular elections, voting and the promotion of private interests. The studies of Michels, Weber and Lipset each focus on distinct aspects of the political process and present different interpretations of the interactions at play in political procedures. Yet, their studies are similar in emphasise and highlight the importance of the nation-state to modern democracies and voting as a mechanism for both widespread engagement with this institution and the legitimisation of its authority. Nonetheless, I believe that the shortcomings of participation that they found are actually a result of their limited definition of citizens' engagement and their failure to consider alternate forms of political participation, such as forms of protest and involvement in public discussions.

Robert Putnam is often considered to have modified these earlier political sociologies by emphasising the importance of participation, however, I argue that Putnam presents a vision of declining participation and that his research could be interpreted as providing empirical support for elite democracy. Putnam's (1993; 1998) studies on civic traditions in Italy, and later focus on volunteering in America, arguably share greater commonality with these earlier political sociologies than with the ideas of participatory democracy. In his writing on democracy, Putnam is mostly concerned with the themes of association, reciprocity and volunteerism. Putnam (1993) suggests that civic associations enhance rather than restrain the ability of public institutions to uphold democratic ideals. In *Making Democracy Work* the author presents his theory of social capital as the social and economic valuing of civic engagement:

'... horizontal networks of civic engagement, bolsters the performance of the polity and the economy, rather than the reverse: Strong society, strong economy: strong society, strong state' (Putnam 1993, p.126).

Theories of social capital focus on the importance of participation to democracy and are dissimilar to earlier studies on political liberalism and citizen-participation in that they position political action within the broader framework of civil society. Putman is also influenced by liberal economy views of society and the writing of Mark Granovetter (1973;1974) whose study of social networks makes causal links between individuals and broader structural change. Criticism of Putman's studies into democracy come in two forms: the first suggests that his arguments are tautological and therefore fail to draw valid conclusions about the circumstances that foster democracy (Portes 1998) while, the second argues that declining memberships of cultural associations can also reflect more inclusive social attitudes depending on the type of clubs or societies examined (Kaufman 2002).

Despite differences in approach, the findings of political sociologies and more recent studies on associations consistently point to the formation of oligarchies and declining levels of participation. Although, it has been argued that the many of the conclusions drawn from research in these areas are distorted by employing narrow definitions of participation, the legitimacy of liberal democracies is inherently tied to a political process which classifies citizen-participation as voting or to a lesser extent membership of an association. The so called 'crisis' of liberal democracies is subsequently their inability to self-legitimise (Talisso 2009). In response to this situation democratic innovations that represent new standards of participation are emerging and combine issues of legitimacy and private and public autonomy. Developments in this area include writing on participatory democracy, new social movements, participatory budgeting, intimacy as democracy and also deliberative democracy. At the centre of these models of democracy is a concern for the social and economic conditions that combine to secure political rights.

The scale of modern democracies is used to justify representative systems of government and as an argument against direct democracy (Castoriadis 1997; Dahl, p. 279). If we agree that the size of society places limits on citizens' participation then the difficulties facing liberal democracies and their legitimacy changes to a question of accountability. Liberal democracies are built upon capitalist markets and guided by a discourse on freedom that positions both aspects of society in an inter-dependent relationship (Constant 1988). Robert Dahl (1995) suggests that the irregularities produced by market capitalism generate social and economic inequalities which are

in need of rectifying to improve the political rights of citizens' (Dahl 1995, p. 391). He also argues that the scale of the nation-state leads to a sense of powerlessness which is felt by citizens who feel disenfranchised by mass parliamentary democracy (Dahl 1997, p. 279).

The legitimacy of liberal democracies is tied to the idea that governments are accountable to citizens' and it is the responsibility of both parties to uphold the integrity of this relationship (Waldron 1993). Yet, the irregularities produced by capitalism and the influence of special interest groups and commercial agendas on the decision making processes of governments' is arguably diminishing political efficacy of citizens' (Barber; Habermas). In order to improve the accountability of governments' democratic innovations attempt to reconnect the wider social community with those in positions of authority as well as influence the direction of political debates in a commercial setting. The need to re-conceptualise participation past the ideas of mass parliamentary government and voting is explored in theories of industrial or participatory democracy. Barber (1984) defines participatory democracy as, 'politics in the participatory mode: literally, it is self-government by citizens rather than representative government in the name of citizens', is conceived of as a more egalitarian and therefore democratic model for civic engagement (Barber 1984, p. 151).

Critiquing liberal democracies and their seemingly uncontested equation of capitalism with freedom is the theory of participatory democracy (Macpherson 1977, p.34). Carole Pateman (1970) and C.B. Macpherson (1977) position a participatory model of democracy in opposition to elite or new conservative models (Hayek 1960; Nozick 1974). Advocates of participatory democracy sought to improve the social and economic conditions of participants by reinterpreting democracy as a concept whose discourses on equity could be extended to social settings such as the workplace. The guiding philosophy of this movement was summarised by Macpherson, 'low participation and social inequity are so bound up with each other that a more equitable and humane society requires a more participatory political system' (Macpherson 1977, p. 94). Participatory democracy was theorised as a complement to representative democracy whilst still disapproving of the political system of competing elites and the limits place on citizens', it also reinterpreted voter apathy or declining levels of participation as a direct result of this system (Macpherson 1977, p. 99).

Pateman argues that participatory democracy is 'dialectically inter-related' with the private sphere and therefore breaks with the liberal tradition of separating social life and political practice (Pateman 1975, p.464). According to Pateman, the definition of a public space is not divided by any unresolved tension between the private and public sphere, participatory democracy it is at once political and social without the need to separate these areas. The social imaginaries which underpin modern theories of participatory democracy lean on both the Athenian model and Rousseau's principle of modernity which makes causal links between the objectives of the modern project and all of society participation.

'The act of association consists of a reciprocal commitment between society and the individual, so that each person, in making a contract, as it were, with himself, finds himself doubly committed, first as a member of the sovereign body in relation to individuals, and secondly, as a member of the state [political community] in relation to the sovereign' (Rousseau 1968, p. 62 in Pateman 1975, p. 464).

The corollary position of theories of participatory democracy is the absolution of the political borders of the nation-state as the sole arbitrator on political activity in the wake of new parameters which include social life. Political participation is therefore social participation and while attempts to democratise the workplace failed the influence of participatory democracy continues to be felt in democratic innovations that associate improved government accountability with increased citizen-participation.

Participatory democracy highlights the importance of socialisation to citizens' participation in an attempt to extend Mill's idea of political education toward Rousseau's participatory institutions and Coleman's theory of society as political systems. As Pateman states, 'apart from its importance as an educative device, participation in the workplace- a political system- can be regarded as political participation in its own right' (Pateman 1970, p. 35). Participatory democracy is reinterpreted as a form of protest in new social movement theories. Developing in the 1960s, new social movements exist at the intersection of modern political values such as individualism, ideology and democratic politics. New social movements are largely issue based organisations with a focus on women's, ecological, gay and lesbian rights and peace movements

and attempt to restructure the social landscape of society through open political debate. The feature, or value, separating new social movements from other forms of participation is their emphasis on the personal-experience and individualism. Alberto Melucci writes, 'the freedom to have which characterised ... industrial societies has been replaced by the freedom to be' (Melucci 1989, p. 177-178).

Robert Inglehart (1990) looks at the values discourse of new social movements and suggests their popularity is based on widespread education and the ensuing increase in political skills that are common to modern societies (Inglehart 1990, p. 372). According to Robert Inglehart, new social movements are formed at the intersection of 'cognitive mobilisation'- the political skills needed for large scale societies- and 'values' which manifest in the form of different movements (Inglehart 1990, p. 373). Inglehart describes the agenda of new social movements as:

'the emergence of new social movements owes much to the gradually rising level of political skills among mass public, as education has become more widespread and political information more pervasive' (Inglehart 1990, p. 372).

Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007) conceptualises New Social Movements as a more recent example of participatory democracy and amplifies their role in the metaphor 'democratising democracy'. Arguing that protest participation in a global counter culture not only extends democracy past the infrastructure of the nation-state but also promotes the international idea of a more egalitarian and equitable political world order (Sousa Santos, p. ix). While Cohen and Arato, (1992) suggest, 'social movements constitute the dynamic element in the processes that might realise the positive potential of modern civil societies' (Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 492). Countering the enthusiasm for New Social Movements is a growing number of social scientists that cite inequality as a concerning feature of this form of participation. The membership is critiqued as often being exclusive (Covey 1995), while the capacity of movements to shape political progress is tempered by an inability to control how they are represented in news media communications (Tilly 1994). It is also unclear whether social movements empower the people they claim to represent or influence social policy to the advantage of politically disenfranchised groups (Offe 1985).

The themes of exclusivity and a want of political effectiveness in influencing positive social change are also limitations of Anthony Giddens (1993) intimate participation. Giddens, intimacy as democracy model for participation expounds the view that politically educated persons are able to engage with one another through reason. Democratizing the private sphere requires the personal charter of people to change in order to institute the principles of 'freedom' and 'autonomy', leading to greater gender equality. The author argues that this process is already in place the evidence of which is made apparent by the influence new social movements, and their discourse of identity politics, have had on changing the inter-personal relationships of participants in the family home, the work place and all other social spaces (Giddens 1993, Chapter 10). As part of the third way discourse, social equality projects are moved from the technocratic influence of government agencies and placed in the domain of civil society, yet given the complexities this new geography it is unclear whether 'intimacy' leads to political empowerment.

Participatory budgeting, a political model designed to broaden participation in the decision making processes of local economies to poorer and marginalised persons or groups, positions participation outside the institutional body of representative government (Nylan 2003). In her writing on Regional Budget Forums in Porto Alegre, Brazil, Rachel Abers' (2000) found that the majority of participants were already members of a community association (Abers 2000, p. 166). Similar findings were made in the research of Baiocchi (2005) who reported on the associational underpinnings of participatory budgeting, observing that the majority of participants were drawn from unions, social movements, non-government organisations (Baiocchi 2005, p. 40). Social class, levels of education and gender inequality also place limits on participation which restricts the themes of the issues discussed to a small social group (Cabannes 2004, p. 38). This narrow representation of community interests, although arguably an improvement on previous systems, highlights the difficulties participatory democracy encounters when attempting to increase levels of participation on a foundation of social and economic inequality (Sousa Santos 1998, p. 486).

Participatory budgeting and all of the aforementioned examples of participation demonstrate, firstly, that the liberal separation of private and public liberty places limits on citizen-participation. It has also been shown that there is a demand for participation that outstrips the current social model of deliberating governments and isolated participants. The need to

“reconnect” these two groups will be discussed further in the following chapters. The study of participation shows how an emphasis on individualism, while important to society, is displacing notions of solidarity at the expense of the political rights of the wider social community. The need to redefine solidarity in a way that can promote both liberal and republican ideas of liberty is needed to overcome this tension. The discussion that has taken place in this chapter, explains how the arguments used to support these restrictions such as the scale of society, the complexity of contemporary debates and inability of the wider social community to make informed decisions (see Weber and rationality), is losing traction at a time when the traditional forms of political engagement are failing to maintain their relevance.

I argued that the social and economic inequalities produced by capitalism lead to the distortion of political debates by special interest groups as well as administrative bodies and this prevented citizens’ from effectively participate in decision making processes. Missing from this discussion on participation was a more detailed account of civil society, a theme important to movements wanting to extend democracy past the bureaucratic arm of the nation-state, and toward an autonomous public setting such as civil society. In the following chapter the democratic potentials for increased participation will be discussed in relation. The communication aspects of civil society are detailed in an analysis of the public sphere and the introduction of the idea that participants can be thought of as communicative actors.

A Forum to Participate

Free and independent public spaces and the right to associate are essential features of democracy. They influence the way participation is imagined and practiced in contemporary societies. The notion of civil society, that is a sphere that is independent of the state and the market, is increasingly thought of as concept that could lead to the creation of a more participatory society. Advocates of this interpretation, desire to increase participation and extend involvement in the decision-making processes past the architecture of the nation-state. In this chapter, titled 'A Forum to Participate', classical and modern theorists of civil society are discussed in relation to their disclosure of the potential to 'democratise democracy'. These versions of civil society are compared with the Habermasian theory of the public sphere which shows the need to maintain open channels of communication for citizens to participate freely. It is then suggested that the increasingly globalised nature of society requires new modes of citizen-participation to be put in place in order to uphold individual liberty and realise the potentials of political emancipation.

In Renaissance Europe, the re-emergence of the term *civitas*, the Latin translation of 'polis', came to reflect superiority in social and cultural status, it is also the root word for contemporary and ideologically loaded expressions such as civility, civilisation and civil society (Taylor 2004, pp.35-38). Maria Markus (2001) considers civil society to be, 'composed of a rich network of various voluntary associations, movements and the channels of communication between them insofar as they serve as mediating links between the private and the political spheres under conditions of respect for (individual and group) autonomy, plurality, the rule of law and civility' (Markus 2001, p. 1013). Jurgen Habermas' (1996) understanding of civil society goes to greater lengths to emphasise the importance of communication and the problem solving capacity of the public sphere. Habermas contends that the, 'core of civil society comprises a network of associations that institutionalises problem solving discourses of questions of general interest inside the framework of organised public spheres' (Habermas 1996, p. 367).

The idea of an autonomous public space is significant to both liberal and participatory democracy (Mouffe 2000, p. 20). In Ancient Greek and Roman democracies, civil society was

conceived of as a political society linked to Aristotelian ideas of ‘the good life’ and Roman notions of ‘civic virtue’- political values defined as the ability to place collective interests before personal ambition. The Greek *‘politike koninona’* and Roman *‘societas civilis’* were titles given to autonomous public spaces that acted as the physical setting for political discussions (Kaldor 2003, p. 10-11). Yet, the exclusionary practices of these political societies led to notions of ‘civility’ being associated with citizens’ and contrasted with ‘barbarianism’, a term that applied to women, slaves and outsiders exclude from public forums (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999). The civil versus savage dichotomy, restrained egalitarianism and principles of mutual exchange comprise some of the basic characteristics of ‘civil society’ and although phrased differently notions of Euro-centrism and Western cultural superiority (Taylor 2004; Castoriadis 1997).

In modern democracies, the notion of civil society remained closely aligned with the nationalist projects that defined the political borders of the nation-state (Hegel 1991, p. 12). Modern interpretations of civil society were classified under the arbitrary headings of ‘leftist’, ‘capitalist’ and ‘nationalist’ perspectives, which outlined their position on public policy in relation to the politics of the nation-state (Walzer 1995). In classical liberalism, political equality was imagined as a social contract that in many ways secularised the Christian principle of human parity, to position citizens’ as equals before the law. The values of social equality and subjugation of political and material power to the mass polity were to become integral features of civil society. Thomas Hobbes *Leviathanian* juxtaposes a natural tendency toward violence with the peaceful character of civil society. According to Hobbes, civil society is political society charged with the responsibility to ensure the personal security of its members. The theory of the state of nature represents one of multiple viewpoints that contest the role of civil society.

Continuing in the liberal tradition, John Locke saw civil society as a public space that was distinct from others due to its protection of individual liberties from systems of government. The association between civil society and universal justice was made by Immanuel Kant, describing an avenue toward universal freedom. Thomas Paine (1969) may not have articulated a clear definition of civil society however his ability to link the right to freely associate with individual democracy, continues to influence contemporary society. Adam Ferguson first drew the important distinction between civil society and the nation-state, in what Keane refers to as, ‘the breakdown of the classical concept of civil society’ (Keane). The Enlightenment thinkers

brought new meaning to the term civil society while unfortunately maintaining some of its prejudices. These include a preference for male participation at the expense of female involvement, the euro-centric discourse of man versus savage and at times strict social-hierarchy that places individuals on a sliding scale of dignity (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999).

Offering alternative interpretations to the liberal view of civil society were Jean Rousseau (2003), Baron de Montesquieu. Rousseau outlined two purposes of civil society, peace and prosperity, fostered by the overarching principle to the general-will. Rousseau also stressed the importance of socialisation to concepts of civil society as a means to educate citizens in civic rights and responsibilities. A view shared by Baron de Montesquieu, emphasised the importance of the public sphere and collective will-formation to the protection of civil law and private interests. These republican leaning interpretations of civil society were further contrasted by Marxist ideas about public life. In his study of democracy, Hegel put forward the notion of a public space that was at once independent of the dominant political order and also guided by the values of liberty and equality.

Influenced by this critique of modern democracy, Karl Marx emphasised the economic perspective of this earlier definition and argued that in capitalist' societies- that were guided by a competition based logic and government by representation- civil society was little more than a society of bourgeoisie elites (Marx 1975). Instead, Marx imaged a 'people's democracy' that would revolutionise civil society and lead to a more egalitarian political order. The failure of communist regimes is sometimes attributed to the supposed lacuna in Marxist humanism that does not afford provisions for separate spheres that characterise the practice of civil society in liberal democracies. Although Marxism associated the development of capitalism with heightened class sensitivity and the fostering of a revolutionary consciousness the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and re-emergence of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe led to a rejection of Marx's equation of civil society and the capitalist market economy (C.B.Macpherson). Gyorgi Konrad (1984), Vaclav Havel (1985) and Adam Michnik (1985) sought to construct democratic cultures from the vestiges of fallen Marxist regimes by looking to new theories of 'civil society'.

Hannah Arendt (1968) and Claude Lefort (1986) further elevated the status of civil society in their arguments for an autonomous space within modern democracies. In recent years, the liberal tradition of separate private and public spheres continues however writing on civil society is often guided by a loose approximation of the Gramscian model, which positions civil society ‘between the market and the state’ (Kaldor 2003). According to this version of civil society, cultural institutions such as churches, school communities, voluntary associations and other social groupings perform the role of autonomous public spaces in democratic societies. By emphasising the importance of volunteerism to civil society, Gramsci was able to make direct correlations between a participatory public, autonomous public institutions and the ability of associations to self-governance by exerting societal pressure on representative governments and capitalist markets. The Gramscian concept of civil society influenced resistance movements in Eastern and Central Europe as well as Latin America, in the later setting associations spanning religious, non-government organisations and businesses worked together to overthrow dictatorial regimes (Calderon 2003; Fernando Castro 1979; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Alfred Stephen 1988; Weffort 1989).

The importance of the right to associate and an autonomous public space is also important to Alexis de Tocqueville (1956) and his study of the social conditions that foster democratic cultures. De Tocqueville understood political equality in terms of self-rule, marking the end of aristocratic power in modern societies (Ringen 2006, p.6). De Tocqueville defines the importance of the right to associate as, ‘If men are to remain civilised, or to become so the art of association together must grow and improve in the same relation in which the equality conditions increased’ (de Tocqueville 1956, p. 202). In a similar vein to Gramsci, and at times Montesquieu, de Tocqueville emphasises the importance of associations to democracy, the practice of associating as a form of civic education or socialisation in the culture of democracy, and by positioning associations within the public space of civil society, an independent arena separate from the interests of the mass parliament. By engaging with this discourse, de Tocqueville contributes to a broader debate on political emancipation.

The liberal, republican and Marxian critiques of civil society can be used as reference to understand the role of public spaces in contemporary democracies. The dimensions of civil society have been influenced ideas of emancipatory politics that might be stated as liberation

from kinds of traditionalism: religious, social, economic dogmatism under the auspice of social justice (Giddens 1991, p. 211). Citizen-participation is found to require individual engagement with the democratic institutions that characterise contemporary societies in order to realise the objectives of political emancipation (Giddens 1991; 1998). As Giddens states:

‘Emancipatory politics involves two main elements: the effort to the shackles of the past, thereby permitting a transformative attitude towards the future; and the aim of overcoming the individual domination of some individuals or groups by others’ (Giddens 1991, p. 211).

The late-modern ideas of emancipation break with more traditional definitions of civil society. Giddens’ states that the transnationalising affects of global politics impacts upon the individual self-image as well as the relationships forged on the basis of this interpretation of individualism. The importance of democracy as intimacy will also be discussed at a later stage in this chapter and in relation to the division between private and public autonomy. In my opinion, the emphasis on personal experience is a positive development within contemporary societies. Yet, this theory of emancipation describes a situation whereby individuals appear to be forced into a self-reflexive mood by the dominance of technology and capitalism. While some theorists highlight the notion of individual liberty to the personal experience, there is a growing discussion on the importance of social and economic equality to political emancipation, from the influence of the government and the economy (Arnason 1990, p. 21; Habermas 2006, p. 412).

In late-modern societies, social and economic inequality is thought to be undermining the autonomy of civil society. The disappearance of autonomous public spaces from democracies is increasingly attributed to effects of unrestrained capitalism (Vitale 2006). Benjamin Barber (1984) argues that citizen-participation in civil society requires autonomous public spaces. Barber claims that in increasingly urbanised and privatised societies there are insufficient arenas to participate (Barber 1984, p.). Similarly, the need to locate new settings for citizen-participation are being theorised in response to the diminishing status of the nation-state. It is argued that as commercial agendas, exemplified by political marketing and special interest groups, exert economic power over democratic procedures (Castells 2008, p. 79; Taylor 2004; Barber 1984). The growing influence of neoliberal economic agendas is contested by counter cultural movements, which are referred to using the motif ‘democratising democracy’ (Sousa

Santos 2009). In light of these developments, political emancipation is being reconceptualised as not only liberation from political systems, but also, freedom from capitalism.

Civil society is an important feature of modernity and it is closely associated with the theory that public spaces can enhance the ability of citizens' to safeguard individual liberties, an idea that links private and public autonomy (Vitale 2006; Cohen and Arato). As such, new theories are developing to answer questions concerning the ideal setting for social civic participation, the ability of citizens' to self-govern and the ability to realise the types of freedom promised by the enlightenment project. These include: the public sphere, the global public sphere and the global civil society (Habermas 1989 [1962]; Giddens 1998; Kaldor 2001; Keane 1988; Volkmer 2003; Held 2004; Fraser 2007). Apart from describing trends in fiscal markets, telecommunications and social networking, these terms are also part of a normative discussion on the ability of participants to exercise political rights (Arnason 1990; Castells 2008; Granovetter; Giddens 2001).

Jurgen Habermas' enters this debate with his theory of the public sphere which defends the need for autonomous public spaces in order to uphold the individual liberties of citizens'. The public sphere can be defined as, 'the sphere of public authority' (Habermas 1996), or to borrow an expression from Nancy Fraser, 'the sphere of private people [who] come together as a public' (Fraser 1991). Fraser describes the public sphere as, 'a theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk' (Fraser 1990; Habermas 1989, p. 18-27). The theory of the public sphere is part of the Habermasian critique of modernity. Habermas seeks to reunify the fragmented spheres of society by way of a discursive model of democracy that identifies citizens' as the central actors in modern societies (Habermas 2006; Fraser 1990). According to this theory, citizen-participation in the public sphere assumes certain social and economic rights, in order to enable both public and private autonomy. That is, the public sphere becomes central to the links of participation and deliberation (Habermas 2006, p. 412).

Although theorised at a much later point in time, the public sphere can be thought of a new interpretation of the concept of civil society, which is similarly concerned with an autonomous public space for citizen-participation (Habermas 1989, p.30; Kocka in Keane 2006, p. 38). The fall of medieval nobilities and the feudal system during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

marked the major structural transformation at the centre of a Habermasian critique of the bourgeoisie public sphere (Habermas 1989, p. 18). A defining feature of the bourgeoisie public sphere was the growing political influence of the middle classes on the political structure of society and the emergence of representative democracy during the seventeenth and eighteenth century (Habermas 1989, p.20). The evolution of the press, which coincided with the expansion of mercantile trade routes, facilitated a new mode of information distribution that unheard of in traditional feudal societies (Habermas 1989, p 20). The emergence a reading public was fostered in part by the improved economic position of the middle classes, as well as the development of the printing press, and broad dissemination of news media (Habermas 1989, p 21). This structural change also led to the re-emergence of civil society as an important aspect of everyday life in European societies and the importance of this public space to modern democracies.

Michael Mann analyses of social power and class relations undermines the historical evidence Habermas uses to support his claim of a neutral setting for the formation of public opinion and publicity (Mann 1986; 1983). Adopting a similar line of argumentation is Fraser who criticises the assumed inclusivity of civil society in her critique of the Habermasian theory of the public sphere. Fraser primarily takes issue with the notable absence of women from the public sphere during the eighteenth century, as well as the narrow definition of citizenship imposed by nation-states or representative governments, which limits the ability of tearooms, coffee houses or fraternal associations to evidence the emergence of an autonomous space (Fraser 1991). Despite its limitations the public sphere can be still be used as, to borrow an expression from Fraser, ‘a conceptual resource’, which facilitates the social critique of post-welfare state capitalist societies (Fraser 1991; Vitale 2000). According to Fraser, individual rights are directly linked to the public sphere and the autonomy of this space, ‘the public sphere ... is a theatre for debating and deliberating rather than for buying and selling’ (Fraser 1991, p. 57).

The need to democratise civil society and the bourgeoisie public sphere converge in contemporary theories of a global civil society or global public sphere (Giddens, Kaldor 2003, Castells 2008). Important to these discussions is the ‘intermediary’ signifier of communication networks. Communication networks operate at both the national and international level, and they potential represent a means of actualising the democratic potential of civil society. Castells argues that while the concept of ‘civil society’ may comprise formalised institutions these

associations are representative of social values and a mouthpiece for participants in a global society (Castells 2008).

‘The global civil society is the organised expression of the values and interests of society. The relationships between government and civil society and their interaction via the public sphere define the polity of society’ (Castells 2008, p. 78).

The political borders of nation-states are crossed by transnational communication networks comprised of social media sites, which include Web 2.0 in the form of YouTube, Facebook and MySpace. These arguably lead to the emergence of an internal discursive arena (Tremayne 2007; Castells 2008). Public sphere theories argue that the autonomy of international publics can be maintained via the implementation of the discourse principle that affords citizens communicative equality (Habermas, Fraser 2007).

Yet there has been substantial questioning of the democratic potential of the public sphere in late capitalism. Barber (1984) touches on a commonly held view within the social sciences that the role of the citizen in late-modern societies has been usurped by consumerist logic (Barber 1984). Habermas puts stronger words to this idea by outlining how the ‘lifeworld’ has been colonised by the processes of free enterprise (Barber in Giddens 2001, p. 274; Habermas 1989, p. 30). The wealth produced by capitalist enterprise should be able to aid social goals and improve social realities, despite empirical evidence to suggest the contrary (Kaldor et al 2001; Kaldor 2003; Keane 2003; Giddens 2001). John Keane (2003) supports the theory of a global civil society adopting the democratic institutions of the nation-state in order to combat the social and economic injustices of unfettered capitalism (Keane 2003, p. 66-7). Also, addressing crises of economic inequality and political inefficiency is the burgeoning construction of a cosmopolitan stage designed to embrace cultural communications and enhance civic participation (Beck 2007).

The ‘crisis’ facing civil society is theorised as the influence of international forces on public institutions and the inability of these governments to act autonomously (Beck 2006). Participation in the global civil society is described as a self-reflective process of ‘self-interpretation, self-observation, self-opening, self discovery, indeed their self-invention’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1999, p. 166). In essence, the participatory experience in late-modern societies is defined by communication exchanges and experiences that due to their correlation

with dialogical reason demand constant revision (Giddens 1998; Beck and Beck Gernsheim 1999; Habermas 1989). An international discourse reinterprets the traditional relationship between democracy and the nation-state which in turn changes the identity of citizens who become members of a global political society. The ability of national bodies to stimulate internal economic growth, foster healthy working environments and protect their public from acts of terrorism or ecological danger diminishes the effectiveness of nation governments into question (Fraser 2007).

The challenge new modes of communication and market practices pose to the nation-state is detailed in Ulrich Beck's (2006) studies into cosmopolitan democracy. Cosmopolitan democracy is principally a response to the problems postured toward contemporary democracy in a political landscape where multi-national corporations exert increasing economic power and in doing so undermine the autonomy of the nation-state (Beck 2006). An important development to emerge from the decline of public spaces in society and the development of virtual public spheres is the move towards humanitarian notions of civil society (Gilbert 2002; Beck2006). The concept of civil society is increasingly used to canvas normative ideals of and individual and collective rights (Frankenburg). A possible reason for this change in the normative content of civil society, aside from those previously mentioned, is the demise of the welfare state the bureaucratic interventions which sought to correct the social and economic inequalities produced by capitalism (Frankenburg, p. 195).

The relationship forged between concepts of civil society, the public sphere and transnational discourses on social justice is arguably based on the proposition that social and economic rights are only possible with the provision of an autonomous public space (Castells 2008). A view summarised in Frankenburg's writing on civil society and social justice:

‘Central to civil society is the concept of public freedom as practised in the public sphere, where citizens articulate their opinions, organise and bring to the fore their interests and try to shape their polity’ (Frankenburg in Keane, p. 197).

Impregnating the political borders of democracy with cultural values, specific to the Western philosophical tradition, is problematic and a thematic concern developed in the writing of contemporary democratic theorists. The major defence of such a position is arguably a pragmatic

one namely, that the reality of an international global economy requires previously isolated actors to communicate with one another in order to steer free enterprise and uphold the political rights of individuals (Anheier, Glasius, Kaldor 2001).

The process of securing social and economic rights in order to guarantee the private autonomies of a global public draws on the intermediary qualities of the public sphere to communicate between the state, the market and civil society, and is sometimes referred to as the 'democratisation of civil society' (Keane 1988, p. 26; Castells 2008). It also requires the development of public policies that redistribute some of the wealth created by capitalist enterprise in order to recognise the political efficacy of individuals whose communicative capacities are currently being stymied (Fraser 1991; 2007). An international arena calls the substantive qualities of civil society into question as such theories of the public sphere and communicative rights are normative efforts to 'civilise' or 'democratise' the contemporary concept of 'civil society'. Yet, there is need for a more detailed discussion on how capitalism as it is currently practiced will support environmental or humanitarian social movements. This is of paramount concern at a time when the integrity of media communications is in dispute and governments are attempting to restrict internet content (Castells 2008).

Aligning person and global perspectives of democracy is Giddens, whose rather broad definition of civil society, described as the 'wider social community' existing outside of the state, is realised in the coming together of smaller groups of people whose relationships are formed on individual levels and expressed on a transnational stage (Giddens 1998, p. 65). This theory of civil society corresponds with a broader study on democracy intimacy, discussed in the previous chapter, which examines the processes by which interpersonal relations are at once localised and also a part of the global communication transmissions. Communication technologies are thought to not only advance human knowledge, but also change the possibilities of inter-subjective relationships. They do so by questioning traditions and breaking down the cultural ownership of social significations which then allows for social interactions to be reconceptualised (Giddens 1998; Beck and Beck Grimsheim 1999, p. 165-6). In line with this theory, citizen-participation is at once intimate and political in a statement that dissolves the traditional divisions between private and public autonomy.

In late-modern societies, autonomous public spaces, such as civil society, are also important to notions of personal and collective emancipation (Giddens 1991). The continued importance of public spaces to citizen-participation has been discussed in relation to concepts of civil society and the communication networks of the public spheres (Fraser 2007; Castells 2008). The cogenesis of the concepts of civil society and the public sphere in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries highlights their importance to modernity as well as contemporary notions of liberty namely, self determination, and the transformative potential of society (Habermas 1989; Arnason 1990, p. 43). The once close affinity between the institutional structure of the nation-state and civil society has also been discussed with reference to public autonomy, the political economy and the physical settings that constitute the geography of civil society (Dryzek 2000, p. 115). The difficulty this relationship poses to democracy has been explored at a time when global economies are creating new social spaces and the architecture of the state is struggling to remain relevant in an international arena.

Two definitions of civil society were presented during the course of this study. The first definition referred to the network of voluntary associations that depicts the geography of civil society. This led to an exposition on different theories of civil society and the separation of private and public spheres for participation. The tension between these spheres was shown to present difficulties to liberal theories of participation. Within civil society another sphere characterised by communication channels accentuated the discursive properties of public forums. The differing accounts of civil society examined within this chapter cross between liberal and republican philosophical traditions. These different modes of thought have been able to highlight a number of political asymmetries, most notably, the juxtaposition of universal principles of equality with social exclusion. In the course of this comparison it was found that civil society has the potential to agitate for increasing participation levels. It is this latter version of civil society that is important to the following chapter on deliberation and discourse.

Deliberation and Democracy

In contemporary societies, the desire for widespread and effective citizen-participation has coincided with the development of deliberative democracy. The term ‘deliberative democracy’ refers to a variety of competing theoretical and empirical perspectives which makes it difficult to present a single definition of deliberation (Bohman and Rehg 1997). Instead, this thesis draws on the theory of discourse democracy as it is presented by Jurgen Habermas and the empirically grounded research of John Rawls and Joshua Cohen, to explore the possibilities of deliberation as a model of democracy (Habermas 1996). Deliberative democracy is important to the central question of this thesis, namely, the extent to which deliberation is in fact participatory, and the ability of new democratic innovations to satisfy the social demand for participation.

In this chapter, the model of deliberative democracy is discussed in relation to the discourse principle that introduces a new standard for participation and in terms of the limits social and economic inequalities place on the potential implementation of this new democratic innovation. At a local level, the empirical examples of deliberative democracy often include: focus groups, citizen’s juries, online discussion panels and a range of associational or council feedback committees (Carson and Gelber 2001). This “mechanism” is applied to issues of local planning as well as the politics of new social movements such as environmental discourses (Dryzek). There have also been calls to utilise the discourse and consensus building features on an international scale (Dryzek 2000), the model used to analyse these claims is often the political institutions of the European Union (James Fishkin).

In this chapter, the writing of Habermas, Rawls and Cohen are taken as disclosing the underlying features of what can be broadly termed as dialogical reason, a precept significant to contemporary theorising on the role of democracy in complex modern societies (Kalyvas 2001). The components of dialogical reason begin with competing definitions of reason described as “communicative reason”, “overlapping consensus” and “reasonable pluralism” (Habermas 1996; Rawls 1993; Cohen 1999). The deliberative accounts of reason depart from the philosophical positions of Weber and his theory of charismatic authority, which suggests that the formation of

public opinion is easily distorted by those in positions of power, as well as the perceived inability of citizens' to engage in reasoned public debates. Deliberative democracy represents a clear transition away from economic or political accounts of democracy as well reflecting the diminishing support of elite democracy (Talissee 2003). This is made apparent in the alternate imaginings of the individuals' capacity for collective decision-making and the processes involved in justifying these decisions as they are conceptualised by deliberative democrats.

For much of the twentieth century, economic and political perspectives that sought to limit the role of participation dominated democratic theory. As we saw theories in previous chapters, political sociologies drew heavily on Weberian ideas of reason to suggest members of the general public were ill equipped for the demands of decision-making (Schumpeter 2003 [1943]; Michels 1962; Weber 1978; Lipset 1956; Arnason 1990). This understating of reason influenced the writing of political sociologist Joseph Schumpeter, whose minimalist approach sought to restrict democracy to casting votes and competing in elections. Schumpeter also argued against large-scale political participation; instead favouring a type of governance upheld by ruling elites (Schumpeter 2003 [1943]). Elite democracy based its sociological and political assertions in the type of empiricism popular to political sociology of the time, which sought to make causal links between lower levels of participation in civic practices, such as volunteering, voting and associational memberships with citizen malaise (Michels 1962; Lipset 1956).

While ideas of political apathy still inform social research and policy, including Robert Putman's empirical studies of volunteerism in civic associations, the questions used to frame and later interpret societal participation in the political process have changed (Putman 1993; 1998). Significantly, it was Rawls' conceptualisation of justice and the close association that this concept has with normative ideas of fairness that have led to a reinterpretation of the relationship between democracy and participation (Rawls; Talissee; Cohen). The traditional liberal emphasis on voting and aggregation at the expense of broader studies is now negatively viewed as 'thin democracy' (Elster 1986). The theoretical limits of 'thin' democracy and its support of liberal elitism have come under the attack of many democratic theorists who argue in favour of practices aimed at 'deepening' and indeed 'democratising' the concept of democracy (Held 2007; De Sousa Santos 2009; Vitale 2006; Arnason 1990; Fraser 1991; 2007; Habermas 1996; Cohen 1989; Dryzek 2006).

The theory of deliberative democracy has its philosophical roots in American pragmatism. John Dewey suggests that democracy is established in discussion, practiced in social institutions and employed to structure social relations (Dewey 2009, p. 54). Dewey's ideal version of democracy focuses on the 'means' of political discussion and argumentation. Dewey stresses the importance of education, conceived of as an individual and collective learning process, as a transformative experience (Browne 2009). In this way democracy is more than just a political idea or regime, it is understood as a social practice and method for inquiry. By means of public discussion and participation, democracy is able to overcome differences and prejudice by bringing individuals into contact with alternate customs (Dewey 2010, p. 54). Democracy is a method for overcoming problems faced by individuals and collectives and it is imbued with the type of discussion that requires participants to consider their actions, which are based on beliefs, vis-à-vis with the views of others (Dewey 1999, ed2; Dewey 2010). In my opinion, reference to the supposed methodology of democracy transfers attention away from utopian discussions over the composition of "the good life" toward the process by which such ideals might be reached.

Dewey's focus on procedure places public discussion at the forefront of democracy. Public consultation, which encourages interactive debate and negotiation, also mirrors the 'emancipatory' nature of modernist thought. As Dewey states, 'the essential need ... is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion' (Dewey in Habermas 1998, p.304). The Habermasian version of deliberative democracy is a detailed theory of citizen-participation, which extends on Dewey's theories of dialogue and unrestrained discussion. Important to this particular theory are two concepts: "communicative action" and "communicative power" (Salam 2003). Communicative action describes a procedure concerned with the formation of public opinion or 'publicity'. This is for Habermas a highly rational process, as he states, 'communicative action *refers to* a process of argumentation in which those taking part justify their validity claims before an ideally expanded audience' (Habermas 1998, p. 322).

John Dryzek describes this change or shift in emphasis as the 'deliberative turn' (Dryzek 2001, p. 651). The 'deliberative turn' is by definition a departure from Schumpeters' idea of public apathy and Dahl's defence of polyarchy. It marks a shift of focus in normative and empirical accounts of democracy. This adjustment of how participation is viewed repositions the

responsibility for political engagement, moving away from an ‘apathetic’ individual toward a ‘participatory’ collective. It is also representative of a change in the types of reasoning being used to inform a sociological perspective of democracy. Nonetheless, questions have been posed concerning whether deliberative theories of democracy sufficiently take into account social inequalities. Social inequalities may prevent participation and it is necessary then to develop means of overcoming these obstacles.

Habermas arguably presents the most substantive account of deliberative democracy, therefore making his theory the starting point for considerations on deliberation (Mouffe 1999; Vitale 2006). The relevance of Habermas to a sociological study of the deliberative democratic model is also due to his theory of discourse democracy requiring social and economic equality within horizontal power relations (Cohen 1999 p. 388). The theory of discourse democracy outlines the structure of a discursive space that can be defined as ‘a self-organising community of free and equal citizens’ (Habermas 1996, p. 7). In *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy* (1996), Habermas presents his most complete rendering of discursive democracy. It involves his own version of participation based on the theory of communicative reason. Habermas argues that discursive democracy is able to formulate a new communication community by combining the strengths of the civic republican and liberal traditions, the two most dominant approaches in the study of democracy. The core of this theory is an attempt to harmonise republican ideas of participation, centred on collectively engaged citizens who are able to place community needs above individual concerns, and liberal institutionalism’s view that citizenship rights are most clearly represented in the legal system (Habermas 1996; Bohman 1997).

Discourse theory attempts to recast aspects of Athenian democracy, representative and participatory democracy within the ethical frame of liberalism (Dryzek 2000). The coming together of different theoretical traditions is used to emphasise the importance of both participation (conceptualised as dialogue) and law. These are seen as having equal theoretical and empirical importance to modern societies. By stressing the importance of a method for reasoned debate, Habermas draws on the writing of Dewey and attempts to instil his own principle of deliberation within a discursive theory of democracy. If acknowledged, an enhanced valuing of dialogue would effectively shift the political mood away from aggregation and contest

towards a new model that encourages an equality of points of view and a desire to build understanding rather than promote dominant opinions (Habermas 1998, p. 299). The principle of deliberation stresses the significance of ‘linguistic expression’ over any preconceived motivation the orator may have in posing certain viewpoints (Habermas 1984, p. 275). The human capacity for dialogue acts as the basis for fostering social integration and building solidarity (Habermas 1998, p. 299). And the social acceptability of validity claims made in public discussion is tied to a general rule of consensus (Bohman and Rehg in Habermas 1996).

According to Habermas, deliberative democracy maintains political liberalism’s separation of the private and public spheres. At the same time, making the provision for an open ‘discursive space’ that is independent of the economy and bureaucratic arm of the nation-state (Habermas 1996, p. 299). Habermas holds a similar position to Hannah Arendt, as both authors imagine democratic societies built upon the pillars of an autonomous public space and active citizenry (Arendt 1958, p. 198; Vitale 2010, p. 754). Within this theoretical framework, the concept of communicative action identifies the social practices of speaking and listening, or inter-subjective action, as the basic tools required to achieve compromise and build consensus (Arendt 1958). The theory of communicative action is discussed in an ideal situation whereby social and economic inequalities do not prevent equal participation (Habermas 1981, p. 275; 1996; 2006). Critics of deliberative democracy argue that it is impossible to ignore the social reality of highly stratified societies and the impacts this would inevitably have on citizens’ participation (Fraser 1991).

A discourse theory of democracy is, ‘concerned with finite embodied actors who are socialised in concrete forms of life, situated in historical time and social space, and caught up in networks of communication’ (Habermas 1998, p. 324). Habermas’ deliberative democratic model is intended to scrutinise the role of citizen and state in liberal nation-states governed in relation to capitalist ideals. Importantly, the ‘embodied actors’ at the centre of deliberative democracy are attributed dual identities, that of citizen and communicative actor (Salam 2003; Vitale 2010). The ‘inter-subjective’ communication expected of participants supposedly prevents the subordination of the individual to the general will (Rousseau in Vitale 2010, p. 754).

The second concept important to a discursive theory of democracy is communicative power. Communicative power is assigned the task of harnessing the outcomes of public deliberation and positioning them within an ethical framework of legally binding rules (Habermas 1998; Salam

2003). This follows on from the liberal tradition of legislation that views social values as embodied in customs that are later transformed into law. Placing emphasis on deliberation usurps the traditional role of custom; which can be involuntarily imposed on citizens by means of religion, gender, race or ethnicity and social class. While these categorical identities inform social realities, or what Habermas refers to as the 'lifeworld', they can – according to Habermas - also represent anachronistic views that are at times incompatible with the culmination of the modern project.

Accordingly, 'communicative actors' are those whose role it is to take part in an 'unrestrained' process of public will-formation (Habermas 1998, p. 324). This participation should form public opinion, steer political argumentation and policy directions, and ultimately enable an agreement about the norms for the governance of a politicised society. This procedural model of democracy is both the major strength and also weakness behind theories of deliberation. As well as outlining possibilities for enhancing democratic practice, the concept of deliberation aims to strengthen the autonomy of the 'lifeworld' and resist the imperialism of the system. The Habermasian idea of the 'lifeworld' can be described as, 'the background for shared meaning that provides the basis for ordinary symbolic interaction' (Salam 2003, p.64). The 'lifeworld' is also a communal space for inter-subjective communication that is located in civil society (Habermas 1985, p. 126).

In Habermas' critique of capitalism, he argues that the lifeworld is being 'colonised' by coercive economic agendas and over-extended bureaucracies (Habermas 1985). The ensuing stymieing of discussion occurs in capitalist societies when citizens only follow the logic of market rationality and make decisions to advance self-gain. Discourse theory is normative in its approach to questions of legitimacy and debates over how society 'ought' to be. Its discursive understanding of reason and democracy should lead to a questioning of the governing authority of modern liberal democracies. The discourse theory of democracy conceptualises participants as active citizens and participation as involvement in public discussions. Habermas states, 'participants in argumentation proceed on the idealising assumption of a communication community without limits in social space and historical time' (Habermas 1996, p. 322). By positioning his discursive arena for citizen-participation on the principles of social egalitarianism, Habermas indirectly defends the welfare-state by reuniting notions of private and public autonomy.

The theories of deliberative democracy introduce the normative standard of the discourse principle as foundation of political legitimacy (Bohman 1997, p. 322). Bohman understands the deliberative democratic versions of ‘legitimacy’ as implying a new principle for argumentation that can be loosely termed as public justification rooted in consensus (Bohman 1997). According to Bohman and Rehg, a deliberative version of political engagement with public issues can be defined as, ‘an ideal of political autonomy based on the practical reasoning of citizens’ (Bohman and Rehg 1997, p. ix). This definition of deliberation demarcates the political parameters for a procedural model of democracy, as stipulated in the writing of Jon Elster, Joshua Cohen, Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls (Bohman and Rehg 1997). The main thematic of these authors are discussed as notions of ‘legitimacy’, ‘rational legislation, participatory politics and civic-self governance’ (Bohman and Rehg 1997, p. ix).

A normative theory of democracy has to engage with the arguments put forward in Rousseau’s treatment of the subject of public justification. In Rousseau’s (2003) *Social Contract* the social arrangements that come to govern society are considered to be legitimate if they are the outcome of public deliberation. The justifications behind different norms, which are later used to order society, come together under the umbrella of will-formation and direct citizen involvement in any lawmaking processes. This interpretation of legitimacy is critical of elitist forms of democracy, because it subjects all citizens to popularised sovereignty, that is, the ‘general’ or agreed upon will of the majority of citizens. It also assumes a notion of social equality that views uneven distributions of wealth, property, or labour as a risk to democracy. This risk to democracy is when any or all of these inequalities reach a point that disempowers other citizens from contesting the dominance associated with the correlating economic or political power differentials (Rousseau 2003; Bohman and Rehg 1997). In essence, Rousseau argues that inequality is a product of society that can be rectified by the direct participation of citizens in law-making.

Rousseau contends that any legally binding rule needs community support and therefore various degrees of social equality to uphold the responsibilities of governance namely, securing the freedom of the governed (2003). The revival of social contract theories, especially the account of justification put forward by Rousseau, can be seen in the writing of a number of contemporary authors whose contributions to deliberation help to inform this democratic model. In the first

chapter I showed how participation had been interpreted in different ways and these disagreements are evident in the contrast between Republican and Liberal notions of the social contract.

John Rawls' (1971) *A Theory of Justice* outlines two principles of fairness that are considered essential to the private reasoning and public decision making of equal citizens. The first principle looks at equality in terms of protection, endowing citizens with basic rights and liberties that prevent them from the subjugation of more powerful groups in society. The second principle extends the liberal meaning of 'basic rights' to education and employment thus securing the ability of all citizens to compete for positions in public office and influence public policy. Rawls' main contribution to the deliberative model of democracy is his *Idea of Public Reason* which attempts an alternate response to Kant's essay on the Enlightenment by synthesising public reason and deliberation (Kant 1784; Rawls 1971). This fusion helps to contextualise the deliberative space in two ways; constraining public debates by imposing a deliberative standard on the content and outcome of discussions; and investing such debates with a pluralistic character common to contemporary liberal societies.

The problem of pluralism for deliberative democracy informs Rawls own dissertation of "overlapping reason". Within Rawls' deliberative model, the subject matter of public discussions is limited to concerns relating to justice and the established legal constitution (Goldfinger 2009). This version upholds traditional liberal ideals of individual privacy and views the total 'publicity' account put forward by Habermas as problematic. Even so, Rawls and Habermas are similar in outlining clear rules for participants engaging in a deliberative discussion based on consensus building practices. As far as content is concerned, Rawls limits discussion to questions important to public consideration. These are phrased as, 'who has the right to vote, or what religions are to be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity, or to hold property' (Rawls 1993, p. 214).

These types of questions are viewed as attempts to legitimise laws by opening them to public scrutiny, however they are by nature restrictive and are therefore limited in their ability to transform or dramatically alter society. Deliberations on constitutional matters are defined in terms of how society should be organised, as such queries over the role of the legislature, executive and judiciary and rules guiding the political process are questions import to a liberal

interpretation of deliberation. Public reason is also applied to matters of equality, basic rights and the liberties associated with citizenship. The application of public reason in this context attempts to guarantee the respect of personal freedoms by the majority of citizens involved in public deliberations and the legislators who represent them (Rawls 1993, p. 227).

This outline of the content and means of deliberation are guided by an overarching norm of justification referred to as consensus building. These practices compel citizens to engage in rational debates and submit their concerns to the test of public scrutiny (Bohman 1997, p.321). In theories of deliberation, the discussion process allows participants to define and later observe their own laws. The legitimacy of these rules is bound to the principal of consensus. Rawls puts forward a fairly limited interpretation of consensus and therefore a narrow definition of deliberation. As Rawls states, ‘so long as there is a firm agreement on the constitutional essentials and established political procedures are reasonably regarded as fair, willing political and social cooperation between free and equal citizens can normally be maintained (Rawls 1993, p. 230). The political analysis undertaken by Rawls downplays the influence of social inequalities on deliberation and liberty.

Rawls imposes limits on deliberation due to a concern for the practical implementation and feasibility of wide-spread deliberation within the political structure of the modern-nation state. Rawls idea of an “overlapping consensus” attempts to reconcile the type of pluralism that has come to define liberal nations with the philosophical leanings of political legitimacy (Rawls 1993, p.134). In essence, the theory of “overlapping consensus” is one answer to the question of how to uphold private autonomy in public arenas characterised by coexistence of various moral, religious and ideological doctrines (Rawls 1993; Cohen 1999; Dryzek 2006; Waldron 2004). Rawls idea of “overlapping consensus” differs from Habermas’s discourse theory of democracy. Rawls maintains a liberal ideal of society, whereas the theory presented by Habermas envisages a model for democracy based on inclusive decision making. The gaps between the two theorists are demonstrated by the writing of deliberative democrat Joshua Cohen, whose idea of “reasonable pluralism” has come to inform empirical models of public deliberation such as citizen juries, collective assemblies, polling, and public consultations.

Cohen is, like Rawls, similarly concerned with limiting the content of deliberations. Cohen’s four features of deliberation are stipulated as: (1) voluntary membership of an association, (2)

that the association is pluralistic representing a variety of doctrines, (3) the deliberative procedure is respected as the basis for any unfolding discussions legitimacy and (4) members acknowledge the equal capacity of themselves and others to deliberate (Cohen p.31). According to Cohen the above features outline a procedure for ‘the public use of reason’ which is located within the context of a deliberative forum and results in the formation of “collective choice” outcomes, thus defining his version of “pluralistic reason” (Cohen p. 36). Pluralism evidently poses problems for democrats, a consideration made clear by Zablocki’s (1980) criticism of consensus practices that disallowed dissent. Young (1996) levels similar claims at the deliberative model arguing that some normative approaches to consensus were in danger of subjugating individual autonomy to the stability provided by liberal elites (Young 1996, p. 126). The supposed neutrality of pluralism is brought to attention in the critiques of more radical pluralists (Dryzek 2006).

Theorists suggest liberal ideas of consensus are misleading given the dislocation of the liberal rhetoric of ‘freedom’ from the experiential evidence of minority voices struggling to challenge dominant social values (Mouffe 1996; 1999; Young 1996). In order for more radical versions of pluralism to take effect Mouffe (1996) argues for the rejection of ‘a substantive idea of the good life’ (Mouffe 1996, p. 246). Despite its critique of the colonisation of the lifeworld, Habermas’s idea of democratic legitimacy underestimates the power of the economic system and its control over social institutions. Elderman (1998) argues that while ‘discourse’ can be thought of as ‘emancipatory’ on a normative level, the social facts of status and self interest prevent such theories from being substantiated in complex societies (Elderman 1998, p. 10). Yet, the same criticism could also be levelled at the models for deliberation presented by Rawls and Cohen.

Elderman’s evaluation of Habermas’ discourse theory of democracy highlights underlying tensions. Tensions that include, a perceived gap between normative theory and practice, an exhaustive focus on procedure, or ‘how’ debate is undertaken, at the expense of questioning its accessibility and how best to negotiate contrasting views of citizenship and culture, as is evident in the conflict between republicanism and liberalism. Habermas, Rawls and Cohen present a process of lawmaking based on discussion and the deliberative principal of consensus building. Yet there are also sharp philosophical differences that change the overall tone of their accounts of deliberation. While Habermas takes on certain ideas from liberalism evidenced in the adoption

of civic institutions and political culture he also rejects the types of elitism inherent to such a system on the grounds that they invariably contribute to social and economic inequalities.

Fraser (1990) identifies a lacuna in the deliberative account of democracy whereby real life social and economic conditions are not taken into consideration. This is in part due to its depicting an ideal scenario. The normative grounds adopted by this theory fail to take into account the social reality of inequality or the intertwining role a wide range of participants have in steering public policy (Vitale 2006). This limits the participatory potential of deliberative democracy as it is currently practiced as well as the ability of the discourse principle to lift participants circumstances to the level needed to legitimise representative governments. Kalyvas (2001) makes a clear case against deliberation by suggesting that its platform in argument is largely undemocratic. He also draws attention to the tension between ideology and discourse, arguing that is hard to separate these two influences on the way participation is practiced (Kalyvas 2001, p.6).

At the centre of debates on deliberation is the defence of private and public autonomy; what Cohen refers to as ‘the rights of participation’ (Cohen). Arguably, Habermas goes about securing ‘the rights of participation’ by protecting a discursive arena for free participation, while Rawls and Cohen present liberal versions of deliberation that highlight the complexity of modern societies. This notion of complexity place limits on the Habermasian model. Rawls and Cohen prefer a more restrained version of deliberation. One that can be used as a mechanism for advancing the public interest without disrupting its current institutional make-up of a community based on the economic market and civic institutions.

Deliberative democracy imagines a society of active citizens’ who are informed and able to draw rational conclusions from unrestrained public discussions. The networks of communication that guide these dialogues are supported by a principle that in theory is not only plausible but also makes for a highly convincing argument in late-modern societies that are characterised by the news media. In addition to the new social geographies that are being mapped by internet users across the globe. Yet, as Mouffe and Fraser have demonstrated in their critiques of discourse and communication theories the main limit to this model of democracy is its dislocation from a serious engagement with the social and economic inequalities that influence everyday life.

The Norm of Participation

My thesis has been guided by a simple question: does deliberative democracy broaden and enhance citizen-participation? I have attempted to demonstrate a desire for participation in late-modern societies by reference to the examples of new democratic innovations and the way they imagine participants as the central actors in democracy. These innovations include participatory democracy, new social movements, participatory budgeting and deliberative democracy. An emphasis on deliberative democracy has been used to illustrate the importance of autonomous public spaces to the discourse principle and the value of unrestrained dialogue in reasoned decision making. The Weberian theory of elite democracy and the restrictions this model of democracy places on citizen-participation was contrasted with the politics of participatory democracy. These modern versions of liberalism represent different approaches to analysing participation and of popular sovereignty.

In the beginning sections of this thesis, the comparison of the liberty of the Ancients and the Moderns led to a detailed discussion on Athenian and modern democracy. The liberty of the Ancients was defined as the ‘active and constant participation in collective power’ (Constant 1988, p. 316, 323). It was then shown that in Athenian democracy the idea of liberty was closely associated with notions of collective action. This meant that citizen-participation in the decision making processes of holding office and deliberating on public issues could be defined as political emancipation. The subjugation of individual needs and aspirations to the general-will was often interpreted as a positive characteristic of society. Participation in the Athenian model of democracy also required citizens’ to respect one another as equals. At the time equality was thought of as a universal principle however any contemporary studies of this period would show a large disparity between the social status of citizens’ and others. This earlier form of political emancipation was compared with modern understandings of liberty in order to better understand the aspirations of participants in modern democracies.

The example of Athenian democracy demonstrated how the idea of positive liberty can be associated with political emancipation and collective action (Constant 1998). In its extreme form this could be seen as a major weakness of ancient Greek and Roman democracies as well as producing a valid criticism of their definition of liberation. In modern democracies, the notion of liberty was reinterpreted and came to be associated with individualism. In eighteenth century Europe the re-emergence of democracy coincided with the rise of a new mercantile class and a reading public. It also marked a period of significant structural change in the form of industrialisation and capitalism as well as the rise of liberalism. During this period liberty was thought of as individual rights such as the right to private property and the desire for protection. The liberty of the Moderns or 'individual liberty' was heavily influenced by the writing of the Enlightenment thinkers and classical liberalism (Constant 1988, p. 316, 323).

This understanding of political emancipation was closely tied to the development of the nation-state and representative government. This meant that the means to liberation were formalised in the political process of periodic elections, voting and membership of a trade labour union or political party. The modes of social life that characterised modernity led to the formation of formalised boundaries between the private and public lives of participants. It was thought that separating these two spheres would protect the individual liberties of participants. In contemporary democracies, participants are often unable to exercise the political authority that is associated with liberty to place limits on the power of representative governments and the capitalism. The separation of liberty from notions of fraternity and solidarity has led to a paradoxical situation whereby the political processes that were designed to improve the political rights of citizens' are obstructing the realisation of this desire (Wagner 2008).

The powerlessness of citizens' sits at odds with the Weberian theory of elite democracy that argued against widespread participation. Elite democracy endorses a narrow definition of participation in order to maintain the liberty of individuals'. The theory of charismatic authority, as it was presented by Weber, supported the system of rule by rotating elites due to the easy manipulation of the wider social community by those in positions of power. It was also suggested that the scale of modern nation-states made direct democracy unfeasible. These ideas were extended upon in the political sociologies of the early twentieth century and can be found in the writing of Schumpeter, Michels' and Lipset. In these studies low levels of citizen-

participation and the tendency of supposedly egalitarian organisation to form oligarchies were interpreted as evidence of a failure on the part of citizens' to participate in democracy. These findings were later reinterpreted by advocates of participatory democracy as a condemnation of the representative model of democracy and the structural aspects of society that were seen to impede participation.

The critique of liberal democracies by advocates of participatory democracy reintroduced the idea of positive liberty to discussions on citizen-participation. Pateman (1970) and Macpherson (1977) positioned the concept of a participatory model of democracy in opposition to elite or neoliberal forms of government that were occupying the political debates of the 1970s (Hayek 1960; Nozick 1974). It was thought that increasing participation would lead to the socialisation of democracy and the improved social and economic conditions of participants. This is an idea that has remained relevant and continues to inform new democratic innovations such as new social movements, participatory budgeting, democracy as intimacy and deliberative democracy.

Difficulties encountered by advocates of participatory democracy are the questions over how to extend democracy past the nation-state. There is also the need to make connections between liberation, civil society and the public sphere. The fall of Marxist-Leninism in Central and Eastern Europe during the late 1980s and rise of democracy in Latin American countries is increasingly used as evidence of the democratising potential of civil society. Civil society was defined as, 'a network of various voluntary associations, movements and the channels of communication between them insofar as they serve as mediating links between the private and the political spheres' (Markus 2001, p. 1013). The features of civil society that are important to democracy include: a public setting for participation and the right to form associations in these spaces. It was also shown that civil society is characterised by citizen-participation in the form of communication. Habermas described this aspect of civil society as the formalisation of different discourses in social institutions (Habermas 1996, p. 367).

The themes of communication and association are important to new democratic innovations. The desire to influence the structure of society and social relationships are motivations that inform the discourses of new social movements. Cohen and Arato (1992) define new social movements as, 'the dynamic element in the processes that might realise the positive potential of modern civil societies' (Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 492). Sousa Santos (2007) conceptualised new social

movements as a more recent example of participatory democracy and amplified their role in his theory of 'democratising democracy' (Sousa Santos, p. ix). In a different vein, Inglehart (1990) examined the cognitive values of new social movements while also suggesting that their burgeoning popularity was based on higher levels of education and an increase in the political skills of citizens' (Inglehart 1990, p. 372). The way these movements interpret liberty is of real interest and an important measure for evaluating deliberative democracy. The feminist, gay and lesbian, ecological and social justice discourses of these movements redefine liberty and the definition of political emancipation. My analysis suggests that there is a tension between the liberal understanding of deliberation and the demands of these movements for participation.

'Intimacy as democracy' develops a new theory of liberty and collapses the divide between private and public spheres within a global society. According to Giddens (1991) the influence of new social movements and identity politics can be felt in the interpersonal relationships that characterise domestic life. He argues that family dynamics are increasingly egalitarian while intimate relationships based on dialogue and open channels of communication foster this new expression of social equality. Across the other side of the globe examples of participatory democracy have been manifesting in the form of participatory budgeting. In Latin America and most notably Porto Alegre, Brazil, networks of community organisations are working to increase citizen-participation in the public spending initiatives of local municipalities. Participatory budgeting has theoretical ties to representative democracy and civil society concepts of association. It represents a wide departure from democracy as intimacy however the motif of broadening democracy combines these otherwise disparate traditions.

Deliberative democracy represents another expression of participatory democracy and attempt to extend democracy. The procedural model of democracy shares little in common with the writing of C.B. Macpherson or Pateman however it continues in their tradition of encouraging citizens' to be more active. From the 1980s onwards deliberative democracy and its discourse principle have been important features of social, legal and political theory. The discourse principle was defined as: 'Only those [legal] statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent ... of all citizens in the discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted' (Habermas 1996, p. 110). It is based on dialogue and the ability of participants' to engage in reasoned debates. Three definitions of reason were presented in this exposition: communicative

reason (Habermas 1996), overlapping consensus (Rawls 1993) and reasonable pluralism (Cohen 1999). The later two theories reflect a move toward a definition of deliberation that is more in line with political liberalism.

The characteristics of deliberative democracy are summarised by Dryzek (1990), 'discursive democracy is woven ... from threads supplied by a classical (Aristotelian) model of politics, participatory democracy, communicative action, practical reason and critical theory' (Dryzek 1990, p. ix). This is for the most part an accurate description of deliberative democracy however it fails to mention the roots of this idea in American pragmatism (Dewey 2010). The more substantive argument is that deliberation is increasingly thought of as a standard of democratic legitimacy. This an important aspect of the writing of proponents of deliberative democracy and it calls into question the authority of liberal democracies. The procedural model of citizen-participation as it is presented by Habermas (1996) is deontological (Bevir 2010, p. 591). It argues that legitimacy is grounded on norms but it does not articulate the content of those norms. I feel that this is major weakness of the deliberative approach.

Rawls argues that legitimate forms of deliberation can only take place amongst free and equal citizens' (Rawls 1993, p. 230). Cohen puts forward a detailed account of how to conduct a deliberative forum however his primary concerns are that participation is voluntary and that the participants represent a cross section of the community in questions social demographics. Participants are not necessarily equals but are obliged to respect the rights of others to take part in public discussions (Cohen, p.31). This means that along with the problems of pluralism, sovereignty and consensus theories of deliberative democracy are also limited by their refusal to effectively outline a normative criteria that would enable citizens' to participate as equals. Deliberative theories of democracy endeavour to overcome inequality through democratic discussion. Yet, this type of dialogue is based on the full participation of equal citizens. In this thesis, the circularity of this argument has been articulated as a serious dilemma for participation.

Fraser's and Held's conclusions introduce new standards of participation. Fraser's theory of participatory parity is based on a critique of the Habermasian idea of the public sphere and identifies the structural inequalities that place limits on participation. The precondition of participatory parity was defined as 'rough socio-economic equality' (Fraser 1991, p. 74). Her writing on redistribution and recognition extends on this theme and argues in favour of welfare-

type policy initiatives. This is an argument that few theorists are making at a time when social democracy and the welfare state is associated with the technocratic agendas of bureaucrats and passive form of citizen-participation (Sousa Santos 2009). Fraser's studies lack a deeper engagement with issues of sovereignty and pluralism as it concerns modern liberalisms¹. Fraser argues that participation is purely liberal: 'Participatory parity, then, is the emergent historical "truth" of the liberal norm of the equal autonomy and moral worth of human beings' (Fraser 2003, p. 232). My thesis demonstrates the limitations of Fraser's approach. I have shown that participation is common to both modern liberalisms and republican ideas of participatory democracy.

Held holds a similar view of participation, however where Fraser critiques the public sphere, he examines Cohen's version of deliberation to develop his own principle of participation. He defines the moral content of this norm as, 'the equal rights to enjoy the conditions for effective participation' (Held 1996, p. 318). If the 'conditions for effective participation' is interpreted to mean 'rough socio-economic equality' then it would appear logical to suggest that the participatory credentials of deliberative democracy are highly limited. In his writing on the modern principle of autonomy, Held positions deliberation and political emancipation as interdependent.

This thesis has been positioned within modernity and it is important to close with a comment on the Weberian theory of modernity and the Habermasian reply. The Weberian theory of modernity is characterised by a process rationalisation that separates society into separate cultural spheres of value. They include the arts, sciences and religion as well as the private and public sphere. And, it is the fragmentation of cultural meaning or the breakdown in communication that led to a feeling of disenchantment. Habermas supports this theory to a point however he suggests that any divisions between the different spheres can be overcome by the discourse principle.

I have shown the weaknesses of the discourse principle and deliberative democracy are a failure to engage with inequality. It is suggested that applying the Weberian theory of charismatic authority to the deliberative process would further undermine the association between

¹ Critics of Fraser: 'Reframing Justice in a Globalising World', in Fraser, N. and Honneth, A.(eds.) (2008) *Adding Insult to Injury*, Verso, New York

deliberative democracy and political emancipation. This is due to the easy distortion of information by those in positions of authority as well as the irregularities produced by capitalism which provide some participants with greater access to the public sphere than others. This does not diminish the future applications of deliberation however it does reinforce the theory that without rough social and economic equality the procedures of deliberative democracy are vulnerable to manipulation. This argument is of course important to contemporary democracies experiencing the impacts of extreme capitalism.

The problems of consensus politics pose for participation go beyond the economic but these have not been exploredⁱ. I have emphasised the positive aspects of citizen-participation and presented a hopeful picture of the benefits of extending participation past voting. The normative and empirical accounts of democracy and the features of modernity have been discussed in relation to citizen-participation. A great deal of time was taken to explain the causal links between different thematic concerns. These included the importance of liberty to citizen-participation, the connection between civil society and the public sphere as well as the ideas tethering public sphere theories to deliberative democracy.

My thesis has focused on the themes of liberty and political emancipation, civil society, associations, the public sphere, deliberation and reason in order to present the argument that there is a widening gap between notions of deliberation and liberation that is based on economic inequality. The expositions that were undertaken in the body of this thesis were limited in their ability to examine a range of questions that are important to modern democracies. It is the conclusion of this study that deliberative democracy is an exciting innovation that should continue to be explored from a wide range of perspectives. The importance of communication networks to contemporary societies should not be underestimated. This model of democracy presents new ways to legitimise democracy and citizen-participation.

In conclusion deliberation is a necessary feature of democracy despite its restrictions and the analyses of my thesis support this argument. The loss of legitimacy felt in modern democracies led to a discussion on alternative settings for social action. It was found that the communication networks of the public sphere located within civil society can accommodate participation and have the potential to extend this practice past the nation-state. It was also found that participation has a long and well documented history evidenced in both liberal and republican democracies.

The norm of participation is therefore intrinsic to democracy, irrespective of the model of popular sovereignty. It is my closing thesis that these democratic traditions show a demand for participation by citizens' that outstrips: representative systems of government and limits placed on participation by capitalism and deliberation. It is for this reason that a norm of participation is an integral feature of democracy.

Reference List

- Anheier. H, Kaldor. M, Glasius. M and Albrow. M (2007) *Global Civil Society 2006/7*, Sage Publications, London
- Anheier. H and Seibel. W (2001) *The Non-Profit Sector in Germany*, Manchester University, Manchester
- Archambault. E (1997) *The Non-Profit Sector in France*, Manchester University, Manchester
- Arendt. H (1958) *The Human Condition*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago
- Aristotle (1981) *Posterior Analytics*, Peripatetic Press
- Arnason. J (1990) 'The Theory of Modernity and The Problematic of Democracy' in *Thesis Eleven* Vol 26 pp 20-45
- Baiocchi. G (2005) *Militant and Citizens: The Politics of Participatory Democracy in Porte Alegre*, Stanford University Press, California
- Barber. Z (2008) 'A Name for a Stray Dog- Global Civil Society' in *International Sociology* Vol 23 (2) Sage Publications pp 237-245
- Barber. B (2009) 'An American civic forum: Civil Society between Market Individuals and the Political Community' in *Contemporary Political Theory* Vol 8 (2) Palgrave Macmillan pp 224-236
- Barber. B (1996) 'Does Democracy Need Foundations?' in Benhabib. S (Ed.) *Democracy and Difference. Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey
- Barber. B (2001) 'How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong' in Giddens. A (ed.) *The Global Third Way Debate*, Polity Press, United Kingdom pp 269-279
- Barber. B (1984) *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age*, University of California Press Berkley and Los Angeles, California
- Beck. U (2007) *The Cosmopolitan Condition: Why Methodological Nationalism Fails. Theory, Culture Society* 24 Vol (7-8), Sage Publications, pp 286-289.

- Beck. U and Beck-Gernsheim. E (1999) *Individualisation: Institutionalised Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences* (Published in association with *Theory, Culture and Society*) Sage Publications, London
- Bell. D (1973) ‘Who will Rule? Politicians and Technocrats in Post –Industrial Society’ in *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*, Basic Books, New York pp 339-367
- Berlin. I (1969) *Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Black. D (1948) ‘On the Rationale of Group Decision-making’ in *Journal of Political Economy* Vol 56 (1) pp 23-34
- Bohman. J (1998) ‘The Coming of age of Deliberative Democracy’ in *Journal of Political Philosophy* Vol 6 (4) pp 400-425
- Bohman. J and Rehg. W (1997) *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics*, MIT Press, Massachusetts
- Bourdieu. P (2000) *Pascalian Mediations*, Stanford University Press
- Bourdieu. P (1985) ‘The Forms of Capital’ in Richardson. J (Ed.) *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, Greenwood, New York pp 241-258
- Boutang. Y (2007) ‘Comment on Nancy Fraser’s ‘Transnationalising the Public Sphere’ in *Theory, Culture Society* Vol 24 pp 71-72
- Browne. C (2002) *Deliberative Democracy and late modernity* APSA 50 Jubilee conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association, Canberra pp 1-17
- Browne. C (2009) ‘Democracy, Religion and Revolution’ in *Thesis Eleven*, Number 99, Sage Publications pp 43-58
- Brown. C (2010) ‘Democratic Justice as Intersubjective Freedoms in Thesis Eleven No. 101, Sage Publications
- Browne. C (2006) ‘Democratic Paradigms and the Horizon of Democratization in *Contretemps: An Online Journal of Philosophy* pp 43-58
- Browne. C (2009) ‘Pragmatism and Radical Democracy’ in *Critical Horizon: A Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory* Vol 10 (1) Acumen Publishing, pp 54-75
- Byrne. P (1997) *Social Movements in Britain*, Routledge, London.

- Cabannes. Y (2004) 'Participatory budgeting: A significant contribution to Participatory Democracy' in *Environment and Urbanization* Vol 16(1), Sage Publications pp 27-46
- Castoriadis. C (1997a) *World in fragments* (Trans. Curtis. D) Stanford University Press, Stanford.
- Castoriadis. C (1997) 'The Greek and the Modern Political Imaginary' in World in Curtis. D (Ed.) *Fragments Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis and the Imagination* (Trans. Curtis. D), Stanford University Press, Stanford, California pp 85-107
- Castells. M (2008) The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks and Global Governance in *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 pp 78-93
- Cohen. M (1995) 'Rooted Cosmopolitanism' in Walzer.M (Ed.) *Toward a Global Civil Society* Berghahn Books, USA pp 7-28
- Cohen. J (1998) Democracy and Liberty in Elster. J (Ed.) *Deliberative Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge pp 185-231
- Cohen. J (1997) 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy' in Bohman. J and Rehg. W (Eds.) *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics*, MIT Press, Massachusetts
- Cohen. J (1995) 'Interpreting the notion of civil society' in Walzer. M (Ed.) *Toward a Global Civil Society* Berghahn Books, USA pp 35-41
- Cohen. J (1999) 'Reflections on Habermas on Democracy' in *Ration Juris* Vol 12(4), Blackwell Publishers, USA pp 385-416
- Cohen. J (1989) The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy in *Social Philosophy and Policy* Vol 6 (2) pp 25-50
- Coleman. S (1988a) 'Social Capital in the creation of human capital' in *American Journal of Sociology* Vol 94 pp 95-121
- Chen. J and Arato. A (1992) *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
- Comaroff. J and Comaroff. J (1999) *Civil Society and Political Imagination in Africa: A Critical Perspective*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago
- Constant. B (1988) *Political Writings* (Trans. Fontana. B) Cambridge University Press, Great Britain

- D'Anieri. P, Ernst. C and Kier. E (1990) New social movements in historical perspective in *Comparative Politics* 22 pp 445-458
- Dahl. R (1998) 'Justifying democracy' in *Society* Vol 35 (2) Academic Research Library pp 386-392
- Dahl. R (1997) 'On Deliberative Democracy Citizen Panels and Medicare Reform' in *Dissent* Vol 44(3) Academic Research Library pp 54-58
- Dahl. R (1971) *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, Yale University Press, New Haven
- De Sousa Santos (2008) *Another Knowledge is possible*, Verso, London
- De Sousa Santos. B (2007) *Democratising Democracy*, Verso, London
- De Tocqueville. A (1956) *Democracy in America*, Mentor, New York
- De Tocqueville. A (1955) *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (Trans. Gilbert. S), Anchor Books, New York.
- Dewey. J (1986) 'Liberalism and Social Action' in John Dewey The Later Works 1925-1953 Volume 2 1935-1937 Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville pp 1-21
- Dewey. J (1984) 'The Development of American Pragmatism' in Boydston. J (Ed.) John Dewey The Later Works, Volume 2: 1925-1927 Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville pp 235-372
- Dewey. J (1927) *The Public and its Problems*, Henry Hold and Co, New York.
- Dunn. J (1992) 'Conclusion' in Dunn. J (Ed.) *Democracy the Unfinished Journey 508 BC to AD 1993*, Oxford University Press, New York pp 125-154
- Dryzek. J (1990) *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Dryzek, J (2001) 'Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy' in *Political Theory* Vol 29 (5) Sage Publications pp 651-669
- Dryzek. J and Niemeyer. S (2006) Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals in *American Journal of Political Science* Vol 50 (3) Midwestern Political Science Association, pp 634- 649

- Dryzek. J ([1997] 2005) *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses*, Oxford, Oxford University Press
- Dryzek. J and List. C (2003) ‘Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation’ in *British Journal of Political Science* Vol 33 (1) pp 1-28
- Eder. K (1993) *The New Politics of Class: Social Movements and Cultural Dynamics in Advanced Societies*, Sage Publications London
- Elderman. M (1964) *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, Urbana University of Illinois Press
- Elster. J (1998) *Deliberative Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Esping-Andersen. G (1990) *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Polity Press, Cambridge
- Etzioni. A (1993) *The Spirit of Community*, Touchstone, New York
- Etzioni, A (1995) ‘Too Many Rights, Too Few Responsibilities’ in Walzer. M (Ed.) *Toward a global civil*, Berghahn Books, Oxford pp 77-98
- Ferguson. A (2007), Heath. E (Ed.) *Selected Philosophical Writings*, Imprint Academic
- Fraser. N (1997) *Justice Interrupts: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist” Condition*, Routledge, New York
- Fraser. N (1990) ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy’ in *Social Text* Vol 25 (26), Duke University Press pp 56-80
- Fraser. N (2001) ‘Social Justice in the knowledge Society in *Redistribution, Recognition and Participation* Verso, New York pp 232-
- Fraser. N (2007) ‘Transnationalising the Public Sphere on the Legitimacy of Efficacy of Public Opinion in the Post-Westphalian World’ in *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol 24 (3) Sage Publications, pp 7-30
- Frankenberg. G (1995) ‘Civil Society and Social Justice’ in *Toward a Global Civil Society* (Ed. Walzer. M), Berghahn Books, USA pp 195-200
- Fukuyama. F (1995) *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, Hamish Hamilton, London
- Fung. A and Wright. E (2003) *Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance in Real Utopias Project* Vol IV, Verso, London

- Giddens. A (1991) 'The Contours of High Modernity' in *Modernity and Self- Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Polity Press, Cambridge English pp 10-34
- Giddens. A (1992) 'Intimacy as Democracy' in *The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies*, Polity Press, Cambridge, England pp 184-203
- Giddens. A (2001) *The Global Third Way Debate* , Polity Press, United Kingdom
- Giddens. A (1993) 'The Production and Reproduction of Social Life' in *New Rules of Sociological Method*, Polity Press, Cambridge England pp 100-135
- Goldfrank. B (2005) *Latin American Politics and Society* Vol 47 (1) Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Center for Latin American Studies, University of Miami, pp 133-138
- Graff. H (1987) 'The Origins of Western Literacy' in *The Legacies of Literacy: Continuities and Contradictions in Western Culture and Society*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington pp 15-32
- Gramsci. A (1971) *Selections from the Prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, Lawrence and Wishart, London
- Granovetter. M (1973) 'The Strength of Weak Ties' in *The American Journal of Sociology* Vol 78(6) pp 1360-1380
- Habermas. J (1997) *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge
- Habermas. J (2006) 'Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research' in *Communication Theory* Vol 16, International Communication Association pp 411-426
- Habermas. J (1993) *Justification and Application. Remarks on Discourse Ethics* (Trans Cronin. C and de Greiff. P) MIT Press, Cambridge.
- Habermas. J (1991) *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* (Trans. Lenhardt. C and NicholSEN. S). MIT Press, Cambridge
- Habermas. J (1962) *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Polity Press, Cambridge
- Habermas. J (1981) *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Beacon Press, Boston

- Habermas. J (1998) ‘Three Normative Models of Democracy’ in Cronin. C and De Greiff (Eds.) *The Inclusion of the Other Studies in Political Theory*, Polity Press, Great Britain pp 242- 251
- Held. D (1996) *Models of Democracy*, Third Edition, Stanford University Press, Stanford California
- Held. D (2001) ‘Regulating Globalization? The Reinvention of Politics’ in Giddens. A (Ed.) *The Global Third Way Debate*, Polity Press, United Kingdom pp 394-405
- Hendley. S (1998) ‘Reconsidering the Limits of Democracy with Castoriadis and Lefort’ in Langsford. L, Watson. S.H and Smith. K. A (Eds.) *Reinterpreting the Political Continental Philosophy and Political Theory*, State University of New York Press, New York
- Hoffman. T (2003) ‘The quiet desperation of Robert Dahl’s (quiet) radicalism’ in *Critical Review* Vol 15 (1) pp 87- 122, Sage Publications
- Honneth. A (1995) *The Fragmented World of the Social. Essays in Social and Political Philosophy* , State University of New York Press, New York
- Horkheimer. M (2002) *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, Continuum, New York
- Inglehart. R (1990) *Culture Shift: In Advanced Industrial Society*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey
- Inglehart. R and Welsel. C (1990) (Eds.) *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Judt. T (2007) ‘Supercapitalism’ in *New York Review of Books*, 6 December pp 22-27
- Kaldor. M (2003) *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War*, Polity Press, Cambridge
- Kalyvas. A (2001) The Politics of Autonomy and the Challenge of Deliberation: Castoriadis contra Habermas in *Thesis Eleven* No. 64 Sage Publications, pp 1-19
- Kaufman. D (2002) *Development, Democracy and the Welfare State: Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe*, Princeton University Press
- Kline. N (2007) *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, Penguin, London
- Kocka. J (2006) ‘Civil Society in Historical Perspective’ in Keane. J (Ed.) *Civil Society Berlin Perspectives*, Berghahn Books. USA p 37-50

- Leford. C (1988) *Democracy and Political Theory* (Trans. Macey. D) Polity Press, Cambridge
- Lefort. C (1986) *The Political Forms of Modern Society. Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism*, Polity Press, Cambridge
- Lefort. C (2000) *Writing and Political Theory* (Trans. Macey. D) Duke University Press, Durham
- Lipset. S et al (1956) *Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union*, Free Press, Glencoe
- Lynd. S (2002) Workers' Democracy in *Working USA* Vol 5 (4) pp 84-94
- Maier. C (1992) 'Democracy since the French Revolution' in Dunn. J (Ed.) *Democracy the Unfinished Journey 508 BC to AD 1993*, Oxford University Press, New York pp 125-154
- Manin. B (1987) 'On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation' in *Political Theory* Vol 15 (3) pp 338-368
- Marx. K (1975) *Early Writings*, Penguin Classics
- Marx. K (1973) *On Society and Social Change*, University of Chicago
- Marx. K and Engels. F (1993) *Collected Works*, International Publishers
- Melucci. A, Keane. J and Meirs, P (1989) *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs of the Contemporary Society*, Hutchinson Radius
- Michels. R (1962) *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, The Free Press: A Division of Macmillan Publishing, New York
- Mill. J.S (1963) *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill* (Ed. Robson. M) University of Toronto Press, Toronto
- Mouffe. C (1999) 'Deliberative Democracy or Agnostic Pluralism?' in *Social Research* Vol 66 (3) pp 745-758
- Mouffe. C (1996) Democracy, Power and 'The Political' in Behabib. S (Ed.) In *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, Princeton University Press, Princeton
- Mouffe. C (1995) 'Pluralism and the Left Identity' in Walzer. M (Ed.) *Toward a Global Civil Society*, Berghahn Books, USA pp 295-300

- Mouffe. C (2000) *The Democratic Paradox*, Verso, London and New York
- Mouffe. C (1993) *The Return of the Political*, Verso, London.
- Nardin. T (1995) 'Private and Public Roles in Civil Society' in Walzer. M (Ed.) *Toward a Global Civil Society*, Berghahn Books, USA pp 29-34
- Nielsen. K (1995) 'Reconceptualising civil society for now: Some somewhat Gramscian turnings' in Walzer. M (Ed.) *Toward a Global Civil Society*, Berghahn Books, USA pp 41-68
- Outhwaite. W (2009) *Habermas- A Critical Introduction* (2nd Edition), Polity Press, Cambridge
- Paine. T (1969) *The Essential Thomas Paine*, Mentor, New York
- Pateman. C (1970) *Participation and Democratic Theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Pateman. C (1975) Sublimation and Reification: Locke, Wolin and the Liberal Democratic Conception of the Political in *Politics Society* Vol 5 441-467
- Paxton. P (2002) 'Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship' in *American Sociological Review* Vol 67 (2) pp 254-277
- Polanyi. K (2001) *The Great Transformations: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time*, Beacon Press.
- Polletta. F and Lee. J (2006) 'Is Telling Stories for Democracy? Rhetoric in Public Deliberation after 9/11 in *American Sociological Review* Vol 71 (5) American Sociological Association pp 699-723
- Portes. G (1998) 'Social Capital: Origins and Applications in *Annual Review of Sociology* Vol 24 (1) pp 1-24
- Powell. F (2008) 'Civil Society, Social Policy and Participatory Democracy: Past, Present and Future in *Social Policy and Society* Vol 8 (1) pp 49-58 Cambridge University of Press, United Kingdom
- Putman. R (1998) *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, Simon and Schuster, New York pp 15-28
- Putman. R (1993) 'Social Capital and Institutional Success' in *Making Democracy Work*, Princeton University Press, Princeton pp 163-185

- Rawls. J (1971) *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford University Press, Oxford
- Rawls. J (1996) *Political Liberalism*, Columbia University Press, New York
- Ringen. S (2006) 'Built by association' *Times Literary Supplement* 1September
- Rousseau. J (1968) *The Social Contract*, (Trans. Cranston. M) Penguin Group, London
- Rousseau. J (2003) Cole. G (Ed.) *On the Social Contract*, Dover Publications
- Schmitt. C (1996) *The Concept of the Political*, Chicago University Press, Chicago
- Schumpeter. J (1942) *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Harper and Row, New York
- Salam. R (2003) 'Habermas vs. Weber on Democracy' in *Critical Review* 15 pp 59-85
- Seligman. A (1992) *The Idea of Civil Society*, Macmillan Inc. New York
- Simmel. G ([1908] 1971) On Individualist and Social Forms in Levine. D (Ed.) *Selected Writings*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago pp 251-293
- Solomon. Y, Warin. J, Lewis. C and Langford. W (2002) 'Intimate Talk between Parent and their Teenage Children: Democratic Openness or Covert Control?' in *Sociology* Vol 36 (4) Sage Publications pp 965-983,
- Talisse. R (2003) 'Can Democracy be a Way of Life? Deweyan Democracy and the Problem of Pluralism in *Transactions of Charles S Peirce Society* XXXIX (1) pp 1-21
- Talisse. R (2009) *Democracy and Moral Conflict*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom
- Talisse. R (2003) 'Rawls on Pluralism and stability' in *Critical Review* 15, pp 173-194
- Taylor. C (2004) *Modern Social Imaginaries*, Duke University Press, Durham
- Taylor. C (2009) 'Reply' in *Thesis Eleven* Number 99, Sage Publications pp 93-104
- Tirtanadi. A (2006) 'National Deliberative Democracy' in *The Good Society*, Vol 15 (2)
- Tilly. C (2007) *Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, USA
- Tilly. C (2004) 'Social Boundary Mechanisms' in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* Vol 34(2) Sage Publications, pp 211-236
- Torgerson. D (1999) *The Promise of Green Politics: Environmentalism and the Public Sphere*, Duke University Press
- Tremayne. M (2007) *Blogging, Citizenship and the future of Media*, Routledge

- Tucker. K (1998) *Anthony Giddens and Modern Social Theory*, Sage Publications, London
- Vitale. D (2006) 'Between Deliberative and Participatory Democracy: A contribution on Habermas' in *Philosophy Social Criticism* Vol 32 (6) Sage Publications pp 739-766
- Wagner. P (2008) *Modernity as Experience and Interpretation A New Sociology of Modernity*, Polity Press Cambridge
- Walzer. M (1995) 'The Concept of Civil Society' in Walzer. M (Ed.) *Toward a Global Civil Society*, Berghahn Books, USA pp 7-28
- Waldron. J (1993) *Collected Papers 1981-1991*, University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge
- Waldron. J (2004) 'Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive' in Gaus. G and Kukathas. C (Eds.) *The Handbook of Political Theory*, Sage, London pp 89-99
- Weber. M (1978) *Economy and Society*, The University of California Press, California
- Weber. M (1946) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* Gerth. H and Wright Mills. C (Eds.) Oxford University Press, New York
- Weber. M (1994) *Political Writings* in Lassman. P and Speirs. R (Eds.) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Weintraub. J and Kumar. K (1997) *Public and Private in thought and practice: Perspectives on a grand dichotomy*, The University of Chicago Press
- Williams. R (2007) 'The Languages of the Public Sphere: Religious Pluralism, Institutional Logics and Civil Society' in *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Sage Publications
- Volkmer. I (2003) 'Beyond the Global and the Local Media Systems and Journalism in the Global Network Paradigm' in Jenkins. H and Thorburn. D (Eds.) *Democracy and New Media*, MIT, Massachusetts pp 309-330
- Young. I (1996) 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy in Benhabib. S (Ed.) *Democracy and Difference. Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey.
- Zablocki. B (1980) *Alienation and Charisma: A Study of Contemporary American Communes*, Free Press, New York
