THE PROBLEM OF THE ‘BORDERLINE STATES’
IN REGIONALISM: ‘RATIONALIST’ AND
‘IDEATIONAL’ APPROACHES

by

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

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Declaration

This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted previously, either in its entirety or substantially, for a higher degree or qualification at any other University or institute of higher learning. I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources has been acknowledged.

Christian Fjäder
Abstract

This thesis deals with the theoretical and methodological development of the study of Regionalism in International Relations. It rests on the assumption of a dichotomy in Regionalism studies between Rationalist and Ideational approaches, hampering the understanding of the motives for and nature of Regionalism. The “Rationalist” approach focuses on material interdependency as the main driving force behind integration. Thus, Regionalism is seen as a consequence of rational calculations and bargains by rational agents. In contrast, the “Ideational”, or Social Constructivist approach, emphasizes shared regional identity and culture as driving forces that produce levels of “cognitive interdependence”.

As will be demonstrated, however, neither approach alone provides a satisfactory explanation to the motives for and nature of Regionalism, including the process of enlargement. This thesis thus, aims to test, challenge and further develop explanatory models in the theory of Regionalism. In particular the thesis aims to add to the understanding of the process of enlargement, as well as its motives, through deploying those models to the problem of the ‘borderline states’.

The problem of the ”borderline states” is demonstrated by the means of two case studies: Australia and Turkey in the context of their relationship with their respective regions - European Union and emerging Regionalism in East Asia, and in particular their position in European and East Asian Regionalism. They are labelled ‘borderline states’ not for their geographical properties, but for the permanent partiality of their inclusion within their regions. Such states are in constant flux, varying their degree of belonging depending on the criteria of enclosure

As this thesis demonstrates, Rationalist approach has a particular strength in analysing the process of enlargement, whilst Ideational approach is required for analysing the motives of enlargement. Moreover, it argues that a potential point of converge between the two approaches is analysing the stability of enlargement. It then further argues that analytical eclecticism can be useful in terms of identifying and framing problems that are significant, but for ontological and epistemological reasons have a tendency to be ignored by the paradigmatic approaches.
Finally, the thesis proposes new definitions of *region* and *Regionalism* to accommodate a more eclectic understanding of what constitutes a region, what drives Regionalism and in particular how a region’s membership is determined.
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Part I
Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis addresses the theoretical and methodological development of the study of Regionalism in International Relations. It pivots on the assumption of a dichotomy in Regionalism studies between Rationalist and Ideational approaches, hampering the understanding of the motives for and nature of Regionalism. The “Rationalist” approach focuses on material interdependency as the main driving force behind integration. Regionalism is thus understood as a consequence of rational calculations and bargains by rational agents. In contrast, the “Ideational”, or Social Constructivist approach, emphasizes shared regional identity and culture as driving forces that produce levels of “cognitive interdependence”. As will be demonstrated, however, neither approach alone provides a satisfactory explanation to the motives for and nature of Regionalism, including the process of enlargement. This thesis, therefore, aims to test, challenge, and further develop, explanatory models in the theory of Regionalism. Specifically, this thesis aims to add to the understanding of the process of enlargement, as well as its motives, through deploying those models to the problem of the ‘borderline states’. The problem of the “borderline states” is demonstrated by the presentation of two case studies: Australia and Turkey. They are examined in the context of their relationship with their respective regions – the European Union and emerging Regionalism in East Asia, and in particular their position in European and East Asian Regionalism. They are labelled ‘borderline states’ not for their geographical properties, but for the permanent partiality of their inclusion within their regions. Such states are in constant flux, varying their degree of belonging depending on the criteria of enclosure. The following sections will present the motives, justification and aims for this research, as well as its claim for originality.

Why focus on Regionalism and Enlargement?

Even though the existing literature of Regionalism is no less than enormous in quantity, this thesis argues that the definitions related to Regionalism still remain contested, and that no single theory or approach, Rationalist or Ideational, adequately explains Regionalism. This is particularly relevant to particular aspects of enlargement, such as the motives for states to join regional institutions, and the formation of criteria for membership and thus the factors of inclu-
sion/exclusion. Finally, it establishes the need to empirically test and combine these approaches in order to expand upon our understanding of Regionalism.

As Chapter 2 will demonstrate, the majority of the Regionalism literature focuses on the phenomenon of Regionalism in the global context, and particularly the economic context. Essentially this can be explained as how and why regional integration projects are implemented in the international system. Moreover, European integration has traditionally dominated the studies of integration and comparisons to other regions have usually been considered weak because of the highly institutionalised nature of the European Union (EU). Finally, this thesis argues that there is a shortage of systematic work on the issue of enlargement. The majority of the literature in this field is comprised of descriptive accounts of individual enlargement projects, principally those of past enlargements of the EU. The gap in the Regionalism literature in terms of enlargement and relations with ‘borderline states’ and the absence of workable definitions of a ‘region’ in relation to enlargement reinstates the question; how do we define a ‘region’ and how do we decide who belongs to the region and who does not?

Why Australia and Turkey?

The significance of the “borderline states” for the study of Regionalism

The impulse for my decision to focus on Australia and Turkey owes its intellectual premise to Michael Wesley’s article “The politics of exclusion: Australia, Turkey and definitions of Regionalism” (Wesley, 1997). Wesley argued that definitions of membership in regional organisations reflect competing political visions for the region, in which Turkey and Australia were becoming candidates for a second-tier membership due to a perception of lacking in regionness but simultaneously being accepted as strategic partners. Wesley furthermore suggested that “Turkey’s present exclusion from EU membership and Australia’s possible future exclusion


2 Wesley (1997), p. 523
from a future East Asian bloc show intriguing similarities in terms of how their candidacies have been advanced and rejected."

This has also been evident in Turkey’s and Australia’s response to fear of exclusion, in Australia’s case motivated by its exclusion from ASEM and in Turkey’s case by the rejection of its first membership application. Both countries, commonly perceiving a deep economic dependency on their respective regions, have chosen to emphasise economic interdependence as the predominant criteria for membership. The equally deep and shared perception of the regions as their primary security environment, on the other hand, have resulted in an advancement of geographical credentials as a justification for inclusion; in Australia’s case this peaked in the advocacy for an “East Asian hemisphere” concept, whilst Turkey has emphasised its European geography based on its territory on the Western banks of the Bosporus. These aspects will be explained in more detail in chapters 5 and 7.

Wesley also pointed out that regions and their criteria for membership and exclusion are seldom natural or obvious, a claim that since been supported by other scholars such as Peter J. Katzenstein and T.J. Pempel among others. As such, both countries can be seen as test cases for the idea of Regionalism in their respective regions, as well as for the outer boundaries of these regions;

“...both Turkey’s and Australia’s relations with their adjacent regions can be seen in terms of a debate over the defining criteria of the region. Both countries contend their engagement and eligibility by defining the region in economic and geographical terms, but are countered by cultural definitions of Europe and East Asia”.

3 Wesley (1997), p. 525
4 Wesley (1997), p. 527
5 Wesley (1997), p. 525
6 See Chapter 2 for more details on this aspect to Regionalism
7 Wesley (1997), p. 524
INTRODUCTION

Turkey has fulfilled the criteria of a “borderline state” for modern European Regionalism since its inception in the 1950s, whilst Australia (and New Zealand) stands as an example of a borderline state for the competing definitions of the region: “East Asia” and “Asia-Pacific”.

Moreover, although a decade has passed since Wesley’s article, the examination of Turkey’s and Australia’s position in European and East Asian Regionalism is an even more compelling case to examine now that Turkey is an official candidate for full membership of the EU, and Australia has gained access to the East Asia Summit and is likely to become a member of ASEM. These new developments notwithstanding, the challenges described by Wesley still remain. Despite its official candidacy Turkey still faces suggestions of being granted with a “Privileged Partnership” instead of full membership and its “accession” to the EU may still be stopped by potentially negative results of national referendums that are to be carried out in incumbent member states. In Australia’s case access to Regionalism appears to have been advanced, but its position in East Asian Regionalism may still be determined by how the “idea” for the East Asian Community develops. Thus, the two countries are still ideal vehicles in efforts to test the limits of these regions. The analysis of enlargement, within the context of the borderline states, can also tell us much about the expected and required levels of cohesion in regional institutions and the stability of enlargement with the increased heterogeneity, resulting from attempt to absorb such “borderline states”.

Contribution to Regionalism Theory

As aforementioned, this thesis seeks to demonstrate that paradigmatic approaches do not provide satisfactory understanding of Regionalism, by testing these approaches within the problematic context of the borderline states in Regionalism. It also argues that enlargement essentially defines the region by distinguishing between ‘the core’ and ‘the boundaries’, thus revealing what the predominant “idea” of the region is as it is perceived by the incumbent members. Thus analysis of enlargement provides a good test as to what really constitutes a region, and whether they are driven by “material interdependency” or “cognitive interdependency”, or more likely a combination of both. If confirmed, this assumption has potential implications for the broader discipline of International Research, in terms of revealing additional information about the interplay between interests, identity and structure. Regardless of the outcome, however, as Peter
Katzenstein has argued, paradigmatic research not only fails to understand the nature of Regionalism properly, but carries costs for the discipline of international relations;

“Beyond a certain point, however, such research traditions have clear costs for the entire discipline of international relations. They compartmentalize knowledge, overlook questions and causal mechanisms that do not fit comfortably into their analytical priors, and often lead to a degree of specialization that makes academic scholarship irrelevant to the concerns of a broader policy community”.

Thus, testing the boundaries of paradigmatic research should expand and improve our knowledge of international relations. Whilst, perhaps controversial to those who subscribe to these paradigmatic approaches, as Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein illustrate, pushing these boundaries is both possible and necessary:

“Up to a point, abstract debates can be useful in elucidating ontological, epistemological, and methodological controversies. But it is the identification of empirical anomalies and the construction of disciplined, theoretically informed explanations with particular attention to the specification of causal mechanisms and multiple methods that pushes outward the boundaries of knowledge”.

However, whilst arguing that an improved understanding of Regionalism can be achieved by the application of both Rationalist and Ideational approaches according to their individual strengths, this thesis does not seek to establish a theoretical synthesis, but rather it aims to contribute towards the development of a methodological "third-way" – an idea advanced by Peter J. Katzenstein’s analytical eclecticism. This argues for identifying the strengths and weaknesses, as

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well as points of intersection, of Rationalist and Ideational approaches, that can be used towards such “problem rather than approach-driven style of analysis.”

**Analytical Eclecticism as a possible “third-way”**

“Analytical eclecticism takes components of different research traditions and combines them to produce new analytical frameworks.”

Analytical eclecticism, advanced by Peter Katzenstein among others, focuses on solving specific complex problems, where paradigmatic research produces incomplete results, "by examining a broad range of plausible causal mechanisms drawn from competing research traditions." Significantly, Katzenstein has argued that ideas of Rationalism and Constructivism, which do not have moral implications, can be combined. Katzenstein himself combines Constructivism with liberalism and thus, for instance *A World of Regions* "operates within three definitions of regions – material, Ideational and behavioural" to analyse the different regional orders in Europe and Asia. Analytical eclecticism, however, does not seek to establish a new master theory by creating a synthesis of competing theories. It does not aim to solve multiple problems under one paradigm, but instead it aims to provide an alternative for pragmatic research. The approach has, however, been criticised for an alleged tendency to sacrifice analytical parsimony, as there is no clear definition of "dependent" variables and thus, it appears an unsystematic ad hoc approach. Katzenstein, however, has responded to the concern over parsimony versus empirical vigour by stating that:

10 Hemmer, Christopher and Peter J. Katzenstein (2002), p. 600
11 Katzenstein (2007), p. 397
12 Katzenstein (2007), p. 398
13 Katzenstein (2007), p. 397
“Analytical eclectisms thus can be helpful in detaching particular concepts, causal mechanisms, explanations, and prescriptions from particular research traditions and combining them in novel frameworks to capture a more nuanced understanding of a complex world. The potential benefits of analytical eclecticism are clear: more experimentation, better communication, and the promise of a consensus that may capture the attention of policymakers.”\(^{15}\)

Thus, in the language of analytical eclecticism, this thesis is focused towards a specific problem of the borderline states in Regionalism, aiming to establish what enlargement is informative on the motives and processes of Regionalism in Europe and East Asia. Moreover, it does so by means of examining the outcomes of Rationalist and Ideational analysis on the problem, in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses, as well as potential points of intersection that could be used for the purposes of eclectic analysis. In this regard it could be considered as analytical eclecticism.

I do, however, recognise that analytical eclecticism has been criticised for lacking clarity and tightness of argument, as well as functioning as an exercise of triangulation. This is why I have chosen to conduct empirical testing of Rationalist and Ideational approaches in their own terms in order to test their explanatory power and subsequently use analytical eclecticism to report the findings. I hope this will contribute towards advancing the method, and simultaneously advance a more systematic application of analytical eclecticism, as well as add to the development of the tested approaches. Finally, chapter 8 will provide a suggestion for a new definition of region/regionness and thus suggest potential new areas of research for analytical eclecticism.

**The Structure of the Thesis**

This dissertation is divided into four parts, which are organised in the following manner; Part I, consisting of chapters 2 and 3, establishes the theoretical and methodological framework for the thesis. Parts II and III discuss the empirical research in relation to the two cases; Part II, consist-

\(^{15}\) Katzenstein (2007), p. 398
ing of chapters 4 and 5, focuses on Turkey’s position in the European Regionalism and its membership prospects in the European Union, Chapter 4 from a *Rationalist* perspective and Chapter 5 from an *Ideational* perspective. Part III, in a similar manner to Part II, focuses on Australia’s position in the emerging East Asian Regionalism, Chapter 6 providing a *Rationalist* analysis and Chapter 7 an *Ideational* analysis of this complex relationship. Finally, Part IV provides a discussion of the findings, and argues the respective strengths and weaknesses of the *Rationalist* and *Ideational* approaches and where they possibly intersect. It also provides a suggestion for a new definition of region/regionness and potential new areas of analysis suitable for *analytical eclecticism*. The following section presents a brief review of the chapters and their aims.

**Review of the Chapters**

The objective of Chapter 2 – *Regionalism in International Relations Theory* is to review and analyse the theoretical literature on Regionalism in the context of International Relations (IR) theory, and in particular the body of literature that is relevant to the problem of “borderline states” and the dichotomy between the so-called “Rationalist” and “Ideational” approaches to Regionalism. The first section of the chapter consequently explores the development of Regionalism in the field of IR, establishes the dichotomy between the “Rationalist” and “Ideational” approaches to Regionalism, and analyses the various definitions of “region”, “Regionalism” and “regionness.” It then goes on to argue that the definitions related to Regionalism still remain contested, and that no single theory or approach, Rationalist or Ideational, adequately explains Regionalism; neither does it adequately explain particular aspects of enlargement, such as the motives for states to join regional institutions, and the formation of criteria for membership and thus the factors of inclusion/exclusion. Finally, it establishes the need to empirically test and combine these approaches, as *analytical eclecticism* suggests, in order to expand upon our understanding of Regionalism.

The second section provides a closer analysis of the Rationalist and Ideational theories that are most relevant to the research problem. These are Neoliberal Institutionalism and Neofunctionalism in the Rationalist approaches, and Social Constructivism (the power of ideas) and “Culturalist” (identity, culture and religion) approaches - including Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”
- in the Ideational approaches respectively. Finally, the section explores possibilities to combine Rationalist and Ideational approaches towards establishing a multicausal framework for explaining Regionalism.

The third and final section reviews and analyses the contemporary literature on European integration, emerging Regionalism in East Asia (comprising North and Southeast Asia), and regional enlargement, specific to Turkey-EU and Australia-East Asia relations. It consequently argues that the literature on enlargement is still underdeveloped and mainly consists of descriptive accounts of individual enlargement projects, rather than providing systematic analysis of the issues. Similarly, the literature on Australia’s relationship with East Asia is descriptive and largely outdated as it mainly focuses on the late-1980s and early 1990s. Finally, whilst the literature on the Turkey-EU relationship has been expanding recently, its primary focus remains the provision of descriptive accounts that cover various areas of the relationship. Systematic studies are almost entirely non-existent. This section therefore establishes the need for further study in this area.

Chapter 3 – Methodology and Research Design - presents the research methodology and design chosen in order to best achieve the goal of the thesis. It also states the rationale and techniques for the methodologies used for data analysis, limitations and delimitations of research and the selection of data sources and material. Chapter 3 is organised into two main sections. The first section introduces the research design, including; research questions, hypotheses, variables, justification for cases and the selection of data sources. The second section introduces the methodology used in the chapters, starting with those utilised in the Rationalist and Ideational chapters used in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, as well as a variant of Discourse Analysis: Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis (FPDA), which is utilised in ‘Ideational’ chapters 5 and 7.

Chapter 4 - Rationalist Analysis of Turkey’s EU Accession Prospects - as the title suggests, is focused towards applying Rationalist approaches to the Turkey-European Union relationship, and particularly Turkey’s prospects of acceding to full EU membership. The Rationalist analysis on Turkish membership prospects in the EU tends to emphasise almost exclusively the material
aspects of the process, in particular the perceived material costs and benefits of membership for the EU and Turkey.\textsuperscript{16} Hence, much of the analysis concentrates on determining whether Turkey fulfils the economic and political criteria as defined by the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, which states the political and economic criteria for prospective candidate countries (“the Copenhagen criteria”).\textsuperscript{17} The strict Rationalist thinking on Turkey’s EU prospects correspond with the official line of the EU: Turkey has been an official candidate since the 1999 Helsinki Summit and the December 2004 Copenhagen European Council decided to begin official negotiations towards accession with Turkey, following a positive assessment by the European Commission. As long as Turkey fulfils the requirements set out in the Copenhagen Criteria and the Accession Partnership it will eventually become a full member of the EU. Disagreement amongst Rationalists pivots on whether Turkey meets the set political and economic criteria.

Another central theme in Rationalist analysis is the, often highly speculative, cost/benefit calculations modelled on Mattli’s logic of integration or the economic “club theory”. The most common topics for such analysis are assessments of the impact of Turkey’s membership on economic integration, trade, the EU budget, working of regional institutions, common foreign and security policy, and migration. This chapter aims to provide an analysis of these areas central to the Rationalist approach in order to estimate the potential costs and benefits of Turkey’s accession; since the Rationalist approach dictates that accession will only take place if benefits are higher than costs, this chapter also includes consideration of a successful accession. The basic assumption of this argument is that the EU (and its member states) is a rational agent and thus, as long as the benefits of the Turkish accession are perceived to override the cost, Turkey will be permitted entry to the Union. The debate about Turkey’s “Europeanness” and its conformity to European values is considered to be of secondary value in Rationalist analysis and is not given significant attention beyond questions such as democracy and human rights, which are part of the membership criteria.

\textsuperscript{16} The power of ideas is often recognised as playing a role in regional integration but is generally treated as a secondary factor, not as an independent causal factor

\textsuperscript{17} The Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 was created in particular to accommodate the accession process of the former Eastern Bloc countries in Central and Eastern Europe
Chapter 5 – *Ideational Analysis of Turkey’s EU Membership Prospects* - challenges the Rationalist approaches by arguing that Rationalist analysis does not entirely explain the opposition, or the motive for, Turkey’s membership due to the fact that it does not account for “hidden agenda”. It has been argued that in the case of CEEC-10 enlargement material concerns were obscured by a “kinship based duty” to “reunify” these countries with Europe following a four decade long separation imposed by the Cold War. Much like in the CEEC-10 case Turkey’s membership is being justified by perceived Ideational benefits. It has also been argued that Turkey’s membership would constitute “a Bridge between Civilisations”, i.e. Europe/the West and the Middle East/Islamic world, and prove that democracy and Islam are compatible and thus, prevent a looming “Clash of Civilisations”. On the other hand, it has been argued that the EU must honour its word and allow Turkey’s accession or else it risks “losing” Turkey to nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. Significantly, unlike the CEEC-10 enlargement, Turkey’s “Europeanness” is contested, and consequently much of the opposition is Ideationally motivated. According to a 2005 Eurobarometer survey 48% of Europeans would not permit Turkey’s entry even if it meets the Copenhagen Criteria and 55% feel that the cultural differences are too great to permit accession.\(^\text{18}\) Thus Chapter 5 argues that this is largely due to a process of “othering”, in which Turkey has become “Europe’s” significant “other”. Moreover, Huntington’s “Clash of Civilisations” has assumed a central role in the accession discourse and has explicitly served as an inspiration for arguments for and against Turkey’s membership, in particular for widely used catchphrases “Bridge between Civilisations” and “losing Turkey”. The fact that Turkey’s culture, identity, values and religion are seen as divergent is a serious hurdle for Turkey’s membership aspirations. The negative public opinion, as well as partially elite opinion, may hinder Turkey’s entry as each enlargement treaty has to be ratified by each incumbent member state; these will subject to national referendums in countries like France and possibly others. Just one negative vote can thus prevent Turkey’s accession. Finally this chapter argues that the “othering” is part of EU’s soul-seeking process which, motivated by the prospect of Turkey’s membership, has produced a debate regarding the EU’s ultimate borders and its regional identity. This chapter seeks to analyse Turkey’s “Europeanness” and the discourse around it in the context of this debate.

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Part III commences with Chapter 6 – *Rationalist Analysis of Australia – East Asia Relations* - which examines Australia’s economic, security and diplomatic relations with East Asia. The chapter argues that Australia has long-established and deep material interdependency with East Asia. This applies particularly to economic interdependency; since the early 1990s Australia has been more dependent on Asia trade than any other OECD country and in 2007 two-thirds of Australia’s total external trade was with East Asia. Moreover, two-way trade with East Asia has been constantly increasing and the economically vibrant East Asian states have increasingly high demand for natural resources in order to sustain their continuous economic growth, especially for those minerals and agricultural resources that Australia offers in plenty.

In terms of security interests the two situations are not unalike; arguably Australia has higher stakes in regional security than perhaps any other non-member country, a notion reflected in its security and defence policies. Australia’s security has historically depended on regional stability and when this stability has faltered Australia has felt obliged to intervene through military means in order to protect its security interests.

Chapter 6 concludes, therefore, that Australia not only has extensive levels of material interdependency with East Asia, but it has also played an active, even a pioneering, role in regional institution building. Moreover, the benefits of further integration into the region would appear to override the costs, for both Australia and East Asia; it is important to recognise, however, that predicting the costs and benefits of enlargement and deeper integration are always somewhat speculative by nature. Nonetheless, a Rationalist analysis would support Australia’s inclusion in the region beyond the extent that is the case currently, and certainly does not reveal any significant reasons for Australia’s exclusion from regional institutions. Yet, this chapter also establishes that the path has not always run smoothly, and it illustrates how Australia has encountered significant opposition to its inclusion in regional institutions and cooperation by a number of regional countries, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia. Some of this opposition can be explained by political differences and conflicting strategic interests between Australia and the two

neighbours, but a significant amount of this opposition has cultural and ethical motivations that argue that Australia is not an Asian country and is thus ethnically unfit to be “genuinely of region”. It would thus appear that the “Rationalist” approaches serve well for establishing the motives for inclusion, but that “Ideational” approaches may serve better for revealing the motives for exclusion.

As in Part II, the Rationalist analysis is challenged by Ideational analysis. Chapter 7 – *Ideational Analysis of Australia – East Asia Relations* - argues that just as Turkey has been represented as forming a bridge between Europe and the Islamic civilisation, Australia has been presented as an example of forming a bridge between Asia and the West. Moreover, the main argument being used against their inclusion is Ideational: that they are not “genuinely of region”. In Australia’s case this has meant that it has been recognised as a valuable partner for material reasons, but not as a genuinely regional state for reasons of not being “Asian”.

The objective of Chapter 7 is thus to provide an Ideational analysis of the main elements of Australia’s engagement with the region and the challenges it faces with regards to its inclusion in East Asian Regionalism. The analysis covers topics such as cognitive mapping, which has involved cultural geography, geopolitical positioning and cognitive mapping by the regional states and Australia itself in regards to Australia’s geographic position. It reaches a general conclusion that Australia is not considered Asian. Australia on the other hand has referred to the region as the “Asia Pacific” and the “East Asian Hemisphere” in an effort to justify its *region-ness* without claiming to be Asian. Hence, in geographic terms, Australia is close but not quite there and thus, should be characterised as a “borderline state”.

In cultural terms Australia also fulfils the criteria of the definition of a “borderline state”. An immigrant country by origin and nature, immigration was dominated by British and European settlers until the 1970s when Australia ended its racially based immigration program under the “White Australia policy” and replaced it with multiculturalism. Nonetheless, regardless of subsequent increased Asian immigration and multiculturalism, Australia still remains overwhelmingly European and Christian in terms of heritage, ethnicity and culture. Moreover, due to anti-immigration debate created by the Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party phenomena, and the allegedly racially motivated attacks against Asian students more recently, the image of “White
Australia” has persisted in the region, contributing to resistance to Australia’s inclusion in the region. Finally, the Howard government was accused of sacrificing Australia’s relations with Asia in preference of its alliance with the United States, and rapidly earned a reputation of the “US Deputy Sheriff” in the region.

Other central topics in Chapter 7 include an analysis of the relevance of immigration, people-to-people contacts, education, identity and values and Regionalism discourses in East Asia and Australia, to Australia’s regionness. Education, for example, in addition to immigration and increasing people-to-people contacts, has been often referred to as one of the major vehicles for increasing Australia’s regionness, in particular through increasing Asian students studying and living in Australia and through a curriculum emphasis on Asian studies. The Australian government has again promoted itself as an ‘Asian-Literate’ country, seeing this action as providing a competitive advantage for the Keating government, as well as further evidence that Australia could act as a ‘bridge’ between Asia and the West. Yet another significant factor in terms of Australia’s engagement with the region has been the issue of Australian values and identity, in particular in comparison to the allegedly universal ‘Asian values’. Whilst the ‘Asian values’ debate has been somewhat controversial, heavily contested and subject to considerable over generalisation, it has nonetheless been used as an argument against Australia’s regionness. However, Chapter 7 also considers the differences in political cultures as potentially a more significant challenge than questions over identity and values. Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of Regionalism discourses in East Asia and Australia in order to determine whether Australia is perceived as a regional state, and it assesses the importance of, and place in, Regionalism of both areas. In terms of the Australian discourses, the chapter argues that support for Regionalism in Australia is high, but a battle in approaches (Rationalist versus Ideational) is evident in the context of “comprehensive engagement” and “pragmatic Regionalism” discourses.

In its conclusion Chapter 7 argues that the main weakness of the Ideational approaches is that it downplays the rational (pragmatic) nature of Regionalism in East Asia and perhaps over-emphasises the significance of elite opinion, which in terms of opposition to Australia’s regionness is limited to a handful of Asian patriarchs in the media, and the “Asian values” debate - both of which have now mostly retracted into the pages of history. Moreover, the analysis does not support a trend towards exclusive Regionalism and the so-called “Asian values” as being particu-
larly prominent in the East Asian Regionalism discourse. In fact, the core of East Asian Regionalism has been, and still continues to be, largely based on a rational choice, in that the primary motivation of Regionalism is an overarching objective to raise the levels of socio-economic development and maximise the benefits from trade, as well as to maintain peace and security in the region. Furthermore, EU-style civilizational project (uniting European peoples under the flag of shared identity and values) has thus far not materialised in East Asia. Instead, the civilizational, “Asians only” Regionalism promoted by Mahathir appears to have failed, as demonstrated by Australia’s admission into the EAS. Furthermore, Australia has also been regarded as a valuable partner in East Asian Regionalism, despite the fact that Australian identity and values derive from British and European heritage, and that the apparent differences in political cultures remain embedded. Moreover, public opinion in East Asia and Australia does not appear to support the view that cultural differences between East Asia and Australia would prevent future cooperation. Thus, rational choice as evidenced in the pursuit to maximise material interests appears to override questions of identity and culture. In terms of public opinion in Australia, the region’s importance is now rarely contested, and the anxiety referred to by Renouf20 seems now mostly dissipated. On the contrary, Australians appear to harbour relatively warm feelings and trust towards regional states. This sentiment is extends to the point that Singapore and Japan attract warmer feelings than the United States. Even China’s rise causes little anxiety in the minds of Australians, in comparison to the Western world in general, and even in comparison to some other regional states.

However, past exercises of “othering”, within which context Australia has been presented as a “misplaced European country”, a ”deputy sheriff” of the United States and has been blamed for colonial attitudes in its regional conduct, have arguably hindered and slowed Australia’s access to regional decision-making and institutions. In this regard Ideational analysis has contributed to a more holistic understanding of the research topic, as Rationalist analysis tends to neglect such aspects. Moreover, Australian Regionalism discourses have emphasised, to sometimes opposing ends, a dilemma between the country’s geography and history, particularly in reference to its British and European heritage and the culture and values that it derived from this heritage. The

20 Renouf, Alan (1979), The Frightened Country, Macmillan, Melbourne
result has been a battle between material interdependency with East Asia and an emotional connection with Europe and the United States; this battle has moved beyond rhetorical boundaries and these speech acts have had real implications on foreign and trade policy towards the region. Moreover, the analysis here has shown that the focus on values appears to be increasing as integration deepens.

Ideational analysis is also helpful in terms of assessing the importance and impact of “soft” aspects, such as immigration, people-to-people contacts, and education, on Australia’s acceptance as a regional state that deserves a seat in regional institutions. Australia’s Asia literacy, i.e. the understanding of Asian politics, business, cultures and languages, has also been acknowledged as important to Australia’s *regionness* by its East Asian partners. Finally, the application of Ideational approaches is absolutely necessary for a holistic understanding of the nature of Regionalism in East Asia and Australia’s place in it. The significance of Ideational approaches also increases as the nature of East Asian Regionalism evolves towards political integration and community-building based on regional identity, values and norms. Thus, Ideational approaches can produce valuable insight into policy-making by providing a more holistic and realistic evaluation of the importance and impact of norms, values and culture on Australia’s access to regional decision-making.

Finally, Part IV, consisting of Chapter 8 – *Discussion of Findings* - provides a discussion of the findings, establishes the respective strengths and weaknesses of the Rationalist and Ideational approaches, and where they possibly intersect. It also suggests a new definition of a region and potential new areas of analysis suitable for *analytical eclecticism*. 
Chapter 2: Regionalism in International Relations Theory

2.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to review and analyse the theoretical literature on Regionalism in the context of International Relations (IR) theory, and in particular the body of literature that is relevant to the problem of ‘borderline states’ and the dichotomy between the so-called “Rationalist” and “Ideational” approaches to Regionalism. The first section of this chapter consequently explores the development of Regionalism in the field of IR, establishes the dichotomy between the “Rationalist” and “Ideational” approaches to Regionalism, analyses the various definitions of “region”, “Regionalism” and “regionness.” It then goes on to argue that the definitions related to Regionalism still remain contested, and that no single theory or approach, Rationalist or Ideational, adequately explains Regionalism, and in particular aspects of enlargement, such as the motives for states to join regional institutions, and the formation of criteria for membership and thus the factors of inclusion/exclusion. Finally, it establishes the need to empirically test and combine these approaches in order to expand upon our understanding of Regionalism.

The second section provides a closer analysis of the Rationalist and Ideational theories that are the most relevant to the research problem. These are Neoliberal Institutionalism and Neofunctionalism in the Rationalist approaches and Social Constructivism (the power of ideas) and “Culturalist” (identity, culture and religion) in the Ideational approaches. Finally, the section explores the possibilities to combine Rationalist and Ideational approaches towards establishing a multicausal framework for explaining Regionalism.

The third and final section reviews and analyses the contemporary literature on European integration, emerging Regionalism in East Asia (comprising North and Southeast Asia), regional enlargement, specific to Turkey-EU and Australia-East Asia relations. It consequently argues that the literature on enlargement is still underdeveloped and mainly consists of descriptive accounts of individual enlargement projects, rather than providing systematic analysis of the issue. Similarly, the literature on Australia’s relationship with East Asia is descriptive and
largely out of date as it mainly focuses on the late-1980s and early 1990s. Finally, whilst the literature on the Turkey-EU relationship has been expanding recently, it also mainly focuses on providing descriptive accounts that cover various areas of the relationship, but systematic studies are almost entirely non-existent. Thus, it also establishes the need for further study in this area.

2.2 International Relations Theories of Regionalism

This section analyses the historical and current debates in the field of Regionalism in IR theory and establishes the dichotomy in the contemporary debate between the so-called “Rationalist” and “Ideational” approaches to Regionalism. It will then establish the prevailing divergence in defining key-concepts such as “Regionalism” (what the area of research is and how it is researched), “region” (what is being studied) and argue that no single definition or theory alone sufficiently explains the problem of ‘borderline states’. The majority of the Regionalism literature is focused on the phenomenon of Regionalism in the global context, and in particular the economic context, in other words how and why regional integration projects are implemented in the international system. Moreover, European integration has traditionally dominated the studies of integration and comparisons to other regions have usually been considered weak because of the highly institutionalised nature of the European Union (EU). Finally, this section argues that there is a shortage of systematic work on the issue of enlargement. The majority of the literature in this field is comprised of descriptive accounts of individual enlargement projects, principally those of past enlargements of the EU. The gap in the Regionalism literature in terms of enlargement and relations with ‘borderline states’ and the absence of workable definitions of a ‘region’ in relation to enlargement reimposes the question; how do we define a ‘region’ and how do we decide who belongs to the region and who does not?
2.2.1 Theorising Regionalism: Beyond Europe

“As it developed though the 1960s and early 1970s this form of integration theory became a model of impeccable Rationalist social science.”

The focus on Regionalism in IR theory started gathering force after the Second World War when the early stages of European integration inspired the development of Neofunctionalism by Ernst B. Haas. Haas based much of his early work on his personal involvement in the European Coal and Steel Community with the founding fathers of the early stages of European integration, as well as David Mitrany’s Functionalist theory. The sub-discipline then experienced a crisis in the 1970s following the political crisis in the EC in the mid-1960s, and following the realisation by Ernst Haas and Philippe Schmitter that the European experiences of integration were not being successfully replicated elsewhere. Haas subsequently announced the failure of the theory and noted that the monopolisation of regional integration studies by the European experience and the limited applicability elsewhere rendered the theory obsolete. The revival of Regionalism, however, followed relatively soon with the global spread of what became known as a wave of “new Regionalism” starting from the 1980s, and the deepening integration in Europe. The spread of regional projects around the globe soon included NAFTA in North America, MERCOSUR and the Andean Pact in South America, APEC and ASEAN in Asia and many others such as the African Union. As a testimony for the resurgence of Regionalism in the 1990s, it should be noted that the World Trade Organization (WTO) has received 130 Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) notifications since its inception in 1995. In fact, a majority of the countries in the world are somehow engaged in regional cooperation, for instance the Regional Integration database main-

tained by the United Nations University’s Comparative Regional Integration Studies unit listed 54 regional groupings with a total of membership of 188 countries in 2005.  

As a direct result of the resurgence of Regionalism the theoretical field expanded and diversified rapidly. The rapid resurgence of Neofunctionalism and emergence of other integration theories, such as Intergovernmentalism, a set of domestic theories and numerous economic theories has resulted to an enormous stock of theoretical literature on Regionalism. Besides large in quantity, Regionalism literature is also very fragmented due to the division to competing theoretical or conceptual models. Andrew Hurrell has pointed out that due to this divergence the literature is uneven and fragmented, and consequently the theoretical contributions have been relatively modest. Moreover, the debate has returned no consensus on definitions of key terms, such as “Regionalism” and “region”. This issue will be further examined in the “definitions of Regionalism” section.

The diversity of approaches has meant that Regionalism projects have been analysed and assessed based on a considerable number of variables, such as the degree of social, economic, political or organisational cohesiveness, “with the majority of efforts having focused on intra-regional economic and political integration,” “less attention has been paid to the larger historical and geopolitical contexts within which regional processes have occurred.” As Mark Beeson has argued, “most mainstream analysis on ‘new Regionalism’ has focused on economic aspects and in particular the effects of increased regional trade and economic integration, whilst much...
fewer analysts have focused on the origins of regional processes especially outside the European Union.\(^{29}\)

The numerous approaches to Regionalism have been categorised in an equally diverse manner. Andrew Hurrell for instance makes a distinction between what he calls as ‘systemic theories’, ‘regional theories’ and ‘domestic theories’. Systemic, or structural, theories refer to approaches that focus on ‘the broader political and economic structures within which regionalist schemes are embedded and the impact of outside pressure working on the region.’\(^{30}\) Hence, within the context of these ‘outside-in’ approaches, Regionalism is mainly seen as a reaction to external security, economic and geopolitical threats and incentives. The main variants of structural theories according to Hurrell are: Neorealism, structural interdependence and globalization.\(^{31}\) These theories, however, are principally interested in explaining Regionalism as a phenomena in the “global economic and political structures within which regions are embedded”,\(^{32}\) and are consequently less interested in the internal workings of the region or enlargement processes. Regional theories, on the other hand, are theories that directly focus on Regionalism and emphasise the close link between Regionalism and regional interdependence (traditionally material, but increasingly also cognitive). These include: Neofunctionalism, Neoliberal Institutionalism and Constructivism.\(^{33}\) The majority of these efforts are based on the observations on European integration, but there is also a growing stock of literature on East and in particular Southeast Asian Regionalism. These theories will be analysed in depth in the Rationalist theories section of this chapter. Finally, the third category of theories Hurrell categorises as domestic theories that emphasise the ’shared domestic attributes or characteristics’, which can be commonalities in for instance in values, regime type and political systems.\(^{34}\) The domestic approaches have suffered from the fact that most regional projects are quite diverse (also) in terms of regime types and

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29 Beeson (2005), p. 970
34 Hurrell (1995), pp. 66-71
political systems, for example ASEAN which compasses a variety of these ranging from democratic participatory systems to communist and authoritarian systems. However, it is also worth noting that the EU is an increasingly homogenous body in this respect due to the process of enlargement.

Finally, Mattli (1999) has divided Regionalism theories into two main variants; political science approaches (functionalism, Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism) and economic approaches (customs union theory, optimal currency area and fiscal federalism). In effect his approach, comparative regional integration analysis, would be the basis for the third variant.35

The variety of economic approaches on Regionalism are mainly based on the logic of Balassa Bela’s (1962) work that regional integration follows a linear increase in the level of regional economic interdependence and proceeds through a stage process that begins with a preferential trading area and develops further to a free trade area, followed by a customs union, common market, economic union and ultimately may develop into a political union.36 Much of the literature on economic integration, however, has mainly focused on technical aspects of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), customs unions, Free Trade Areas (FTAs) and common markets and in particular on whether PTAs hinder or create trade,37 rather than what drives Regionalism and enlargement.

Moreover, the “new wave” has largely been born because of the United States’ decision to engage in a regional arrangement (NAFTA) in the 1980s following fears of waning economic power and the failure of multinational arrangements in trade (i.e. GATT).38

35 Tavares (2004), p.11
37 Jaqdish Bhagwati coined the term “stumbling blocks” or “building blocks” to investigate whether regional trading blocs are trade diverting or trade creating. Bhagwati as a staunch defender of free trade Bhagwati has argued in his enormous pool of work that PTAs are “stumbling blocks” or “termites” of free trade and consequently favours multilateralism over Regionalism. See for instance: Bhagwati, Jaqdish (1991), The World Trading System at Risk, Princeton, N.J, Princeton University Press, or; Bhagwati, Jaqdish (1992), “Regionalism versus Multilateralism”, World Economy, Vol. 15, Issue 5, pp. 535-556
of integration are largely seen as consequences or supporting economic integration and regionalization and thus get relative little attention. Finally, it is hardly a surprise that the economic integration theories view enlargement processes largely determined by rational calculations of economic benefits/costs of inclusion/exclusion, as for instance in the so-called “Club theory”. Club theory argues that being left out of the ‘club’ entails costs due to lack of access to public goods (or Club goods), including economic, security and information resources.  

A similar type of argument has been put forward by liberal theorists, for instance Mattli, which will be examined further in the corresponding section later in this chapter.

Although categorising the various approaches to Regionalism under broad theoretical schools may help in conceptualising the Regionalism debate, this is also inherently superficial to a point and tends to become a process of rearranging the theoretical approaches under ‘brand names’ that serve the individual preferences and/or research agenda of the particular researcher.

Moreover, in which ever way we prefer to categorise the variety of schools of thought, the majority of the literature in the Regionalism debate within IR, relevant to this thesis, has been traditionally dominated by what could be labelled as the ‘mainstream’ theories and a battle between competing IR schools. Much of the theoretical ‘battle’, which was a battle of competing IR schools in general rather than Regionalism per se, was dominated by the neo-neo-neo (neo-liberalism, Neorealism and Neofunctionalism) debate. Neorealism, tends to be very sceptical of Regionalism and largely sees meaningful regional projects as some form or the other of alliance building and argues that regional groupings are predominantly formed by states in response to an external security threat. As such Neorealism is not of critical relevance to this study. Neorealism, however, produced a regionalist offspring, Intergovernmentalism, an integration theory that assumes that states are in control of the process and regional institutions merely

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40 That is until Constructivism challenged the ‘Rationalist’ mainstream theories by claiming the middle ground between them and the radical schools. This dichotomy will be covered in detail in the next section.

41 Mansfield and Milner (1999), p. 592

facilitate regional cooperation and decision-making and argues that the process of integration is driven by top policy elites that engage in high-level political bargains aimed at maximizing national power.\textsuperscript{43} Hence, Intergovernmentalism sees Regionalism as a direct result of “state driven cooperative projects that emerge as a result of intergovernmental dialogue and treaties”,\textsuperscript{44} and regional integration as the most advanced manifestation of this. Moreover, these processes are considered mostly economic; the removal of barriers to trade, services, capital and people that produce a shift of policy-making from the national to the supranational level.\textsuperscript{45} It is worth noting, and relevant to the technical aspects of Turkey’s EU accession, that Intergovernmentalism offers a rather limited framework towards the understanding of the phenomena of Regionalism, what drives it and in particular what drives enlargement and how membership criteria are set (i.e. “the problem of borderline states”). This is particularly evident in comparison to other Rationalist integration theories, such as Neoliberal Institutionalism or Neofunctionalism. Moreover, it also totally ignores the relevant Ideational factors that appear to play a significant role in the research problem.

The competing liberal approaches emphasise the effects of a perceived increased interdependency, and see international regimes or institutions as a necessary response to the economic interdependency in the age of ‘globalization’, which has been accompanied by an information technology revolution that has caused a spread of ideas and increased contacts, essentially providing a material infrastructure for societal interdependence.\textsuperscript{46} Hence, these approaches claim that globalization creates ‘demand’ for international institutions, including regional institutions.

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\textsuperscript{43} Classical Intergovernmentalism was inspired by the work of Stanley Hoffmann (1966). Andrew Moravesik (1991, 1997, 1999) developed a liberal approach to Intergovernmentalism attempting to explain why sovereign states choose to transfer power to supranational regional organisations, linking the issue to domestic preference formation (mainly economic).


\textsuperscript{46} Hurrell (1995), pp. 54-5
Within this school of thought, liberal institutionalism is particularly interested in why states turn to institutions in order to solve cooperation problems.\(^{47}\)

Also, the development of Regionalism theory has been largely based on the study of European Regionalism. Many of the most respected theorists of Regionalism, such as Haas, Lindberg, Schmitter and Joseph Nye have used the European experience as the basis for the production of generalisations about the prospects for regional integration in other regions.\(^{48}\) Yet, as Schmitter has pointed out no single theory can possibly explain the dynamics and predict the final outcome of the European Union (EU).\(^{49}\) Hence, as long as the attempts are modelled on the European experience, it is not very plausible that one single theory could succeed in explaining regional integration on a more general level. Or as Moravcsik has stated: “….any general explanation of integration cannot rest on a single theory, …, but must rest on a multicausal framework that orders a series of more narrowly focused theories’.\(^{50}\)

In a similar spirit, an increasing number of Regionalism theorists point out to a need to carry out comparative work that goes beyond Europe and that can provide a path to methodological convergence and synthesis. For instance, a special edition of the International Organization edited by Alastair Ian Johnston urges the discipline to move beyond Europe and to compare regional institutions in Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East in order to discover similarities and differences, as well as taking the thrust towards mid-range theories.\(^{51}\) In the conclusion of the special edition, he argues that not only strict rational or Ideational approaches should be utilised, but also strategic “thin Rationalist” behaviour should be examined.\(^{52}\) In order

\(^{47}\) The two most recognised theorists in this regard are Keohane (1984) and Ruggie (1998)

\(^{48}\) Breslin, Higgott and Rosamond (2002), p.6


\(^{52}\) Johnston (2005), p. 1013
to initiate such a new thrust he suggests a number of dependent variables for empirical testing that include: foreign policies of states, the quantity and quality of interstate cooperation and integration in some functional areas and the variation of regional organisational/normative structures around the globe. Moreover, he points out that particularly Asia should receive more attention, as “the systematic study of institutions and socialization in the Asia-Pacific has been underdeveloped.” Thus, comparing the positions of Turkey in European Regionalism to that of Australia in the emerging East Asian Regionalism utilising a framework that goes beyond the constrains of the traditional paradigms may prove useful towards an enhanced understanding of Regionalism in general and in particular with regard to the limits of Regionalism.

The next section will establish the dichotomy between the “Rationalist” and “Ideational” approaches to Regionalism and argues that this is the most suitable manner to categorise the literature relevant to the research problem.

2.2.2 The Dichotomy between “Rationalist” and “Ideational” approaches in Regionalism Studies

The Dichotomy Emerges: Challenge to the Rationalist Paradigm

“No longer were realism and liberalism ‘incommensurable’ – on the contrary they shared a ‘Rationalist’ research programme, a conception of science, a shared willingness to operate on the premise of anarchy (Waltz) and investigate the evolution of cooperation and whether institutions matter (Keohane).”

This section argues that the current mainstream literature on Regionalism can be divided into two rough categories: “Rationalist” and “Ideational”. The “Rationalist” approach focuses on material interdependency as the main driving force behind integration. Thus, Regionalism is seen as a

53 Johnston (2005), pp. 1028-1029
54 Johnston (2005), p.1037
consequence of rational calculations and bargains by rational agents. In contrast, the “Ideational”, or Social Constructivist approach, emphasises shared regional identity and culture as driving forces that produce levels of “cognitive interdependence”. Similar to the constructivist line (in conception if not intention) are the various “culturalist” approaches, in particular Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, which stresses the cultural differences between various “civilizations” as a source for conflict rather than cooperation. Other researchers have chosen to focus on cultural aspect such as identity, culture and religion instead of civilizations.

The dichotomy in International Relations between Rationalist and Ideational schools ‘officially’ started when Robert Keohane in a 1988 conference acknowledged the rise of a new approach that he at the time called ‘reflective’ and challenged the discipline dominated by the Rationalist approaches to reinvigorate itself and engage in ‘a vigorous program of empirical research’. In 1999 Keohane, Katzenstein and Krasner acknowledged that Constructivism and Rationalism were the focal points of the future debate in the discipline.

"Rationalist” and “Ideational” Approaches to Regionalism

Within the context of this dichotomy, the Rationalists base their core assumptions on rational choice theory of agent behaviour, which states that agents choose a course of action that produces the best conceived result, mainly in terms of material security and/or wealth. Wendt identifies the most fundamental material forces in IR for Rationalists: the nature and organisation


59 This assumes that agents correctly anticipate the results of their actions, or because a selective process ensures that only rational behaviour will be rewarded. See: Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane (1993), "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework", in Goldstein, Judith and Robert O Keohane (Eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, p. 4
of material forces, natural resources, forces of production and destruction.\(^{60}\)

In terms of Regionalism, this has meant that Rationalists have tended to view Regionalism as a result of bargaining by calculating self-interested state actors that in the name of raison d’état and balance of power thinking attempt to maximize material gains within the regional institutional setting.\(^{61}\)

Hence, European integration is largely seen in the light of scepticism after the two devastating and traumatic world wars, experiences that highlighted the importance of material and power gains.\(^{62}\)

In this spirit, the Neofunctional model assumes that integration is basically (but not exclusively) a rational process whereby actors calculate anticipated returns from various alternative strategies of participation in regional cooperation and decision-making, but at the same time conceding that shared values, culture and history may strengthen the process. This has been called the “soft rationality” assumption by Ernst B. Haas”.\(^{63}\)

Neorealists and Neoliberal Institutionalists, on the other hand, see state interests as exogenous and argue that their behaviour depends ultimately on systemic variables.\(^{64}\)

The “Ideational” approaches, on the other hand, emphasise the impact of ideas rather than material forces and how identities and interests are perceived.\(^{65}\) Social Constructivists see International Relations as “socially constructed” (Wendt 1999) and emphasise; "how political actors define themselves and their interests, and thus modify their behaviour”.\(^{66}\)

It rejects the idea of international relations being based on rational individual agents acting on purely material inter-


\(^{62}\) The counter-argument for this view would be that precisely due to those traumatic experiences, the Europeans wanted integration to remove the material incentives for war, which would make it essentially an idealistic act. Kahler (1998), p. 920

\(^{63}\) Breslin, Higgott and Rosamond (2002), p. 12

\(^{64}\) Wendt (2006), p. 412


\(^{66}\) Ibid
THE PROBLEM OF THE ‘BORDERLINE STATES’ IN REGIONALISM

ests and that institutions are a simple collective sum of individual interests.\(^{67}\) Regional cooperation is thus seen rather driven by “cognitive interdependence” than material interdependence.\(^{68}\) Hence, regional awareness and regional identity have a central role in how regional cooperation is shaped. Finally, Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington 1996) thesis stresses the differences between various “civilizations” as a source for conflict rather than cooperation. For example, Huntington has stated about Turkey’s relationship with the West that: “Turkey’s ties to NATO must inevitably weaken because the historic ‘civilization’ is Islamic rather than Western”.\(^{69}\) In a similar vein he accused that the “push into Asia” particularly under the Paul Keating’s ALP government in the earlier half of the 1990s (1991-1996) constituted an attempt by Australia to ‘defect’ its ‘true’ civilization motivated by a ‘short-sighted political ploy’.\(^{70}\) Whilst Huntington’s views are largely rejected by Regionalism theorists, it has arguably inspired many to focus on aspects of identity, culture and religion as variables in researching regions.

2.3 Rational and Ideational Theories of Regionalism

The previous section established the prevailing dichotomy in the IR approaches to Regionalism between the “Rationalist” and “Ideational” approaches. This section will follow-up on that task and provide a closer look at the theories in each approach that I argue are the most relevant to the problem of “borderline states”. These theories are Neoliberal Institutionalism and Neofunctionalism within the Rationalist framework, and Social Constructivism and “culturalist” approaches within the ideation list framework, mainly represented by Samuel P. Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis.

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\(^{67}\) Kahler (1998), p. 936

\(^{68}\) Hurrell (1995), pp. 64-65

\(^{69}\) Bozdağlioğlu, Y. (2003), Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach, New York, Routledge, p. 82

2.3.1 Rational Theories of Regionalism

“Rationalist” theories here refer to a broad set of theories that are not in agreement on a variety of aspects of International Relations (and hence, Regionalism), but nonetheless share some fundamental assumptions about the nature of international and regional cooperation. These theories can be labelled ‘Rationalist’ because they share a notion of agents (states, international institutions) in International Relations as being rational actors that engage in rational decision-making and bargaining for some form of material gains (economic principally, but also security and political). The relevant mainstream theories in this group include Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, Neofunctionalism and International Political Economy (IPE). Neorealism is not covered in detail here because of its dismissal of ‘Regionalism’ as an independent phenomenon. According to Neorealism states only participate in regional integration to avoid relative losses that result from shifts in the global distribution of power. Moreover, it asserts that international cooperation is extremely hard to achieve simply because states are too preoccupied with survival and relative gains and hence, it does not concern itself with attempting to explain the problem of this investigation. Furthermore, IPE and other economic approaches have been for the purpose of this study incorporated in the larger category of ‘Rationalist’ approaches. This section consequently investigates the main Rationalist approaches to Regionalism, namely Neoliberal Institutionalism and Neofunctionalism.

**Neoliberal Institutionalism**

Neoliberal Institutionalism in general accepts the basic assumptions of Neorealism on the nature and agency of the international system. Like Neorealism, it considers the international system as being characterised by anarchy, i.e. lacking ‘an authoritative government that can enact and enforce rules of behaviour”. Moreover, it also considers nation-states as the most important actors in the international system. Finally, like Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism is utilitar-

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71 Essentially corresponding to the “rational choice” theory in political science and even to game theory approach in the most extreme format
ian and Rationalistic in its reasoning. Hence, it prioritises material over Ideational structures and borrows the concepts of wealth and power creation from neo-realists, whilst conceding that ‘ideas do matter’.  

The core of the neoliberal institutionalist thesis is that international institutions/regimes mitigate the effects of international anarchy and reduce incentives to cheat by reducing the transaction costs of cooperation, and thus help states to address collective problems and achieve collective gains. From the neoliberal institutionalist point of view states are concerned about absolute rather than relative gains, aiming at mutually beneficial cooperation in specific areas thus creating more demand for cooperation.

International institutions/regimes help states in dealing with collective problems in at least three ways:

1. By creating a sense of legal liability

John Ruggie (1975) defined a regime as “a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states”. Stephen Krasner on the other hand emphasised norms, rules and procedures in his definition of a regime: “International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area”. Hence, regimes create rules of behaviour that de-

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74 Keohane (1984), pp. 18-21
75 Keohane and Martin (1995), p. 44
77 Hurrell (1995), pp. 61-2
78 Keohane, (1984), p. 57
fine what principles and behaviour are acceptable in international relations, making cooperation more desirable.

2. By reducing transactions costs

International institutions/regimes facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation by reducing the costs of making and enforcing agreements and by linking issues and providing focal points for cooperation.

3. By providing transparency

International institutions/regimes provide information about the distribution of gains by a principle of open disclosure of gains that alleviates the fears of unequal gains. This could entail for example the disclosure of military expenditures and capabilities.

**Neoliberal Institutionalism and Regionalism**

According to neoliberal institutionalists Regionalism essentially boils down to material interdependence, the most important issue areas being the economy and security. Consequently regional integration is seen as mainly driven by regionalization that leads to economic integration. Regional states consequently cooperate in these areas when collective regional problems emerge. This in turn spills over to other areas and regional institutions created to deal with these problems create and further develop regional cohesion. The technical processes of regional cooperation, however, are, on the other hand, seen as being driven by the most powerful states who aim at satisfying their self-interest through bargaining, rather than through the institutions themselves (as institutions are seen primarily as tools for states, where as states remain the principal actors). The EU is seen as an example where cooperation has developed from specific areas (coal and steel) and spilled over into other areas.

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81 Ibid.

82 Hurrel (1995), p. 63
Walter Mattli in the Logic of Regional Integration (1999) attempted to establish a ‘logical’ framework for the analysis of Regionalism by combining aspects from economic and international relations theory. In his work Mattli attempts to establish the main driving force behind regional integration and argues that neither the economic nor IR theories alone can fully explain the phenomenon of regional integration. Instead he constructs a model that takes into consideration the primacy of market factors as the main rationale for regional integration but also considers institutional factors. Mattli blames Neofunctionalism for neglecting the power of market forces, economic theory for neglecting the role of institutions, and Intergovernmentalism for discounting the impact of ‘defining events’ that “precede or follow interstate bargains.”

Despite being considered as failing to reach his ultimate goal, Mattli established himself as one of the primary academics addressing widely neglected aspects of regional integration; the phenomena of enlargement. According to Mattli, successful regional integration effects the external environment by turning positive (economic) gains for the ‘insiders’ into negative ones for ‘outsiders’. As rational actors the ‘outsiders’ will seek to avoid these costs by either attempting to become ‘insiders’ or alternatively establishing a new regional organisation. Following the same logic, enlargement takes place only when it produces tangible gains for the integration process and current members (again this mainly refers to economic gains). This in turn assumes that the membership candidates are on a comparable economic and socio-economic level with the existing member states.

The decision, then, whether to permit the entry of new members would be based on a rational cost-benefit calculation; \(a-b=x\), where “\(a\)” signifies economic benefits of enlargement, “\(b\)” economic costs and “\(x\)” the sum total. If \(x>0\), i.e. if economic gains are larger than costs, the enlargement process gets a green light. However, in some cases even if the \(x<0\) enlargement can still be deemed necessary if ‘negative externalities’, such as economic mismanagement, political instability or social unrest threaten the “stability, security and prosperity” of

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84 Mattli (1999), p. 41
85 Mattli (1999), p. 10
86 Mattli (1999), p. 61
87 Mattli (1999), p. 95
the regional organisation. According to Mattli such calculations may have played a role in the EU’s Eastern enlargement decision\(^8\) (probably due to the fact that the inclusion of Eastern European states into the union would not otherwise fit into Mattli’s logic). Mattli’s approach to regional integration, whilst mainly focusing on rather restricted economic aspects of integration, nonetheless remains one of the few serious attempts to explain the phenomena of enlargement (as opposed to analysing individual enlargement events in an ad hoc manner). Mattli’s ‘integration logic’ is also very representative of the “Rationalist” approaches where only utility matters and abstract deliberation about identity and legitimacy do not play any serious role in integration processes.

An important offspring of Neoliberal Institutionalism is the Multi-Level Governance framework; “MLG can be defined as an arrangement for making binding decisions that engages a multiplicity of politically independent but otherwise interdependent actors – private and public – at different levels of territorial aggregation in more-or-less continuous negotiation/deliberation/implementation, and that does not assign exclusive policy competence or assert a stable hierarchy of political authority to any of these levels”.\(^9\) MLG is useful for analysing the contemporary EU due to the poly-centric nature of its institutional structure. Philippe Schmitter has stated that Poly-Centric Governance, or PCG provides a useful insight into EU institutions: “A PCG can be defined as an arrangement for making binding decisions over a multiplicity of actors that delegates authority over functional tasks to a set of dispersed and relatively autonomous agencies that are not controlled – de jure or de facto – by a single collective institution”.\(^9\)

\(^8\) Mattli (1999), pp. 95-96
\(^9\) Schmitter (2007), p. 49
\(^9\) Ibid
Neofunctionalism builds on the work of David Mitrany’s Functional theory\textsuperscript{91} and the works of Ernst B. Haas.\textsuperscript{92} Functionalism was developed as the “grand theory” of European integration largely inspired by Haas’ work in the European Coal and Steel Community with the European founding fathers Monnet and Schuman. Its grand goal was to explain the dynamics of European integration and to draw conclusions on how and why a political community was developing in Western Europe following the 1957 Treaty of Rome that established the European Community.\textsuperscript{93}

Haas observed a political community developing out of a process of political integration in Europe. He argued that the integration process was all about welfare maximization, not about regional high politics. In his view the process of political integration was an inevitable and self-sustaining process. The main actors in the process were states, interest groups and political parties below them, and supranational regional institutions above;\textsuperscript{94} “the process whereby actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new centre whose institutions posses or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states”\textsuperscript{95}

Neofunctionalism represents a revised and upgraded version of Functionalism. It accepts Functionalism’s main assumptions, but shifts the emphasis from explaining integration on a global level (using the European model as the model) to more specifically explaining the phenomena of European integration \textit{per se}.\textsuperscript{96} Moreover, it is essentially a utilitarian version of Functionalism

\textsuperscript{91} Mitrany, David (1975), \textit{Functional Theory of Politics}, London, [Published on behalf of] London School of Economics & Political Science [by] M. Robertson

\textsuperscript{92} Haas, Ernst B. (1965), Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press


\textsuperscript{94} Mattli (1999), p. 24

\textsuperscript{95} Haas quoted in Hurrell (1995), p. 60

\textsuperscript{96} Mattli (1999), p. 23
whereby states are completely self-interested rational actors that seek to integrate only when it is profitable and when the use of supranational institutions maximizes welfare creation.\(^{97}\)

The theory attempts to explain European integration as a result of high and rising levels of interdependence that led to an ongoing process of cooperation culminating in political integration.\(^{98}\) The process begins with low-key technical and non-controversial issues, spilling over to higher realms. Moreover, the process is seen as a self-sustaining phenomena; the cost of maintaining national rules and policies acts as an additional incentive to increase supranationalism.\(^{99}\)

The concept of “spillovers” entail two kinds of variations; 1) Functional spillover, which assumes that small integration steps create new problems leading to demand for further integration, and 2) Political spillover “whereby the existence of supranational institutions would set in motion a self-reinforcing process of institution building.”\(^{100}\) Supranational institutions and technocrats are seen as superior to Intergovernmentalism in managing the complex interdependencies.\(^{101}\)

Whilst Neofunctionalism has been credited as the ‘grand theory’ of (European) integration it has also attracted its fair share of criticism. In particular following the crisis in EC in the mid-1960s onwards, the theory was widely criticised for failing to take into account the effects of nationalism and the states’ sensitivity over sovereignty. It was suggested that whilst member states were happy to surrender the control of ‘low politics’ issues to regional technocrats, they jealously guarded their control over issues of ‘high politics’ (as demonstrated by the 1965 ‘empty chair

\(^{97}\) Mattli (1999), p. 25

\(^{98}\) Hurrell (1995), p. 59

\(^{99}\) Breslin, Shaun, Higgott, Richard and Rosamond, Ben (2002), Regions in Comparative Perspective, Center for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick, Working Paper No. 107/02, p. 4

\(^{100}\) Hurrell (1995), p. 59

\(^{101}\) Ibid.
Neofunctionalism was also blamed for ignoring a number of intervening externalities in economic, political and security fields.

Schmitter in his 1976 “A Revised theory of Regional Integration”, published in *International Organization*, called integration theory a failure and admitted that he and Haas had failed in providing an adequate account of the integration process, and consequently suggested an overhaul of the theory. Haas himself denounced Neofunctionalism in "The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory" (1975), but regained his faith a year later in an article in the same journal, in which he stressed the paramount importance of interdependency over ‘functional policy linkages’.

The theory experienced resurgence in the 1980s and 1990s with the development of the single market and later the monetary union.

Nonetheless, Neofunctionalism’s obsession with the European experience, which has still not been copied elsewhere, despite the alleged supremacy of supranationalism, still renders the theory only marginally applicable elsewhere, especially in the case of ASEAN. As a technocratic integration theory, Neofunctionalism is not interested in enlargement, the role of identity or bilateral relations between a region and outsiders in general and in relations between countries that are closely associated but not members (‘borderline states’) and the regional grouping. In a similar way to other ‘Rationalist’ theories, Neofunctionalism approaches the problem by addressing it as a technical process of economic and political integration driven by rational actors.

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103 Ibid.


2.3.2 Ideational Theories of Regionalism

As opposed to “Rationalist” theories, which as it has been established give minimal attention to regional identity and culture, the so-called “Ideational” theories emphasise the effect of ‘Ideational’ forces over material factors. On the positive side of the spectrum Social Constructivism emphasises a shared regional identity as a positive factor in regional cohesion, whereas the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis and various cultural approaches stress cultural differences as a source of conflict and separation. Of these two Social Constructivism has gained wide respect in explaining Regionalism, whereas the “clash’ is prominent in political rhetoric in the media, in politically motivated proposals such as the “privileged relationship’, and in particular recently also in religious dialogue.

The inclusion of Ideational approaches in this analysis is vital because as Risse and Wiener have argued “material interests are really just our ideas about our material interests”. Moreover, they argue that it is possible to test whether actors are principally motivated by principled beliefs or norms of appropriate behaviour or simply engaged in instrumental search for power and material resources. Finally, it has been argued that the Rationalist theories have had considerable problems in explaining the EU’s “Eastern” enlargement, which brought in ten new Eastern and Central European countries that were (and mostly still are) well below the EU average in their levels of economic and social development, but nonetheless were invited by the considerably richer EU-15 countries into the Union despite the cost of power sharing and the direct and indirect financial costs involved. Whilst it was foreseen that the enlargement process would produce long-term material benefits, the process nonetheless makes only a small amount of sense from a rational perspective. Hence, it is very likely that Ideational factors, namely the idealist urge to unite the continent after the decades of segregation during the Cold War probably played a critical role in the decision to spread the EU towards the East.

108 Risse and Wiener (1999), p. 779
109 Risse and Wiener (1999), p. 779
Social Constructivism’s one major contribution to Regionalism and IR in general has been that it has provided a credible and sustainable challenge to rational theories. The notion that regional integration is not primarily driven by rational/material interdependency or technical processes, but rather by a perception of collective identity that uses institutions as social vehicles and framework in which rational action takes place, is a powerful argument in ASEAN’s case in particular where institutions are ‘soft’, but also in European case where integration has reached such an advanced state that mere economic or institutional rationales may well prove short of acting as sufficient motivations for further integration (and enlargement). As Stephen M. Walt has argued; “It matters if political identity in Europe continues to shift from the nation-state to more local regions or a broader sense of European identity, just as it matters if nationalism is gradually supplanted by the sort of ‘civilizational’ affinities emphasized by Huntington”

The European Commission officials and the supporters of Turkey’s EU membership have on many occasions referred to the country’s membership representing a “bridge between civilizations”. According to this argument a successful accession to full membership by Turkey would serve as a positive example for cooperation between the “West”(Christian) and the Islamic world in particular, but also as countering the threat of “clash of civilizations” by proving that two distinct civilizations can work together and can be integrated into a new polity. In a more normative context, it would also allow the EU to expand the “sphere of peace, democracy and stability” in the wider “region”.

As for the passionately contested and criticised ‘Clash’ thesis, both regions have seen their share of political rhetoric that either directly refers to it, or at least could be argued as reflecting such notions. In terms of political rhetoric, there have been a number of examples supporting caution in disregarding the possibility of the ‘clash’ as a viable explanation for some of the problems experience by ‘borderline states’.

110 Breslin, Higgott and Rosamond (2002), p. 11
For instance, Nicolas Sarkozy, the chairman of France’s ruling centre right Union for Popular Movement and a possible presidential candidate in the 2007 elections said he did not “want to see an Asian nation as part of the EU”.\textsuperscript{112} This emerging ”Euro-nationalism” has arguably inspired a number of European politicians, such as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel who has called for a ”privileged partnership” for Turkey as an alternative for full membership. In terms of religious rhetoric, Pope Benedict XVI, whilst still a Cardinal, spoke against granting Turkey membership in the EU arguing it “would be a mistake”, because “Europe is a cultural and not a geographic continent”.\textsuperscript{113} Moreover, his recent marks about Islam have sparked violent riots and openly hostile comments by Turkish leaders referring his comments being a sign of revival of the Crusades. Although such comments may in the end prove to be only political rhetoric, and in the end prove not to play a significant role in the relations between ‘borderline states’ and their respective regions, they nonetheless are a growing phenomena and may be acting as a motivation for denying membership.

\textbf{Social Constructivism}

Social Constructivism could be categorized as a social theory rather than a formative International Relations theory. It challenges the ontological and epistemological foundations of “Rationalist” theories\textsuperscript{114}, whilst simultaneously claiming to occupy a ‘middle ground’ between Rationalist and radical theories.\textsuperscript{115} One major motive and justification for Constructivism came with the end of Cold War that Rationalist theory could not explain according to the constructivists. They argued that the changes that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the


\textsuperscript{113} Schilling, Timothy P. (2005), “Turkey & the EU: how inclusive can Europe afford to be?, Commonweal, 132/16 September 23, 2005, p. 8

\textsuperscript{114} Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett (2005), “Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective”, in Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett (Eds.), Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations, New York, Routledge, p.92, see also p. 94

\textsuperscript{115} Zehfuss, Maja (2002), Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 5
THE PROBLEM OF THE ‘BORDERLINE STATES’ IN REGIONALISM

subsequent ending of the Cold War took place in the political and normative environment before those in material environment. Examples of this were the Helsinki process and the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE).\(^{116}\)

Nicholas Onuf is largely credited for introducing the term “Constructivism” to international relations in his book “World of our Making” (1989). Onuf’s work, however, concentrated mainly on the fairly limited aspect of Constructivism by emphasizing aspects of international law, and in particular the role of rules and their impact on how actors behave and how their behaviour evolves.\(^{117}\) Alexander Wendt, on the other hand, has been credited for popularizing the approach in the wider field of international relations.

Although there is no absolute definition of what Constructivism is exactly, the variety of approaches has much in common. They are knowledge-based theories (or approaches) that are interested in how Ideational factors, such as language, religion, moral norms and identity, influence social behaviour in international life.\(^{118}\) Or as John Ruggie puts it: “Constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life”.\(^ {119}\) Alexander Wendt, on the other hand, argues that whatever the chosen particular emphasis different constructivist approaches may have, the all share the two basic tenets of Constructivism: “1) that the structure of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and 2) that the identities and interest of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature”.\(^ {120}\)

It is worth noticing in terms of this study that much of the constructivist work does concentrate on offering an alternative to “Rationalist” approaches. Wendt in particular makes this point

\(^{116}\) Adler (2005), p. 109 See also: Wendt (1999), p.4

\(^{117}\) Zehfuss (2002), pp. 20-21


\(^{119}\) Ruggie (1998), p. 856

several times emphasizing the ontological and epistemological differences between the “Rationalist” and constructivist approaches;

“Perhaps the most common interpretation of the dispute between Rationalist and constructivists is about ontology, about what kind of ‘stuff’ the international system is made of. It also concerns how we should think about ‘what’s going on when actors interact, and in particular what it means to take identities and interests as ‘given’.”

Wendt specifically opposes the neo-realist approach which argues that actors’ (states’) interests are based on the material structure of anarchy and its neglect of identity. He, however, also places together the ‘Rationalist’ approaches as theories that “are interested in how incentives in the environment affect the price of behaviour” and criticizes the treatment of interests as a given. By contrast the constructivist approach of finding how identities and interests shape actors’ behaviour and vice versa, is incapable of producing a balanced and accurate account on how the international system works (Wendt also subscribes to the structural approach to IR, only emphasizing the role of identity and its social nature instead of material). Moreover, the neoliberal institutional approach that sees institutions as states’ tools for managing and mitigating anarchy is criticized by Wendt, who argues that international institutions are social constructs that are based on shared ideas, rather than technical vehicles of states’ material interests. Instead, Wendt argues that it is not the material forces of structure that primarily influence the actors’ behaviour but rather the ‘intersubjective’ structures that are constituted by collective understanding and meanings. Actors then form identities that stem from these collective meanings. Finally, identities are subsequently refined in the process of intersubjective interactions. Interactions on the other hand are shaped by identities of actors, thus enabling change in the international system.


122 Wendt (1999b), p. 412

123 Ibid.

124 Wendt (1999a), pp. 21, 231
Identities are hard to change but may be refined in order to manipulate the situation through repositioning. The overall emphasis on identity and its importance on how interactions and interests develop in international relations characterizes Wendt’s approach throughout his work; “interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is….” Moreover, since material factors acquire meaning through a social process, identity becomes a central variable in how the international system works: “the daily life of international politics is an on-going process of states taking identities in relation to others, casting them into corresponding counter-identities and playing out the result”.  

Finally, Wendt agrees with Adler that rather than being (or even aiming at being) a theory of International Relations per se, it is rather an approach that emphasizes how structure relates to agents, what the structure is made of and how those identities are constructed. The theory of International Relations is nonetheless systemic in the sense that it makes the international system either the dependent or independent variable, depending on the problem at hand and point of view.

John Ruggie’s work on collective consciousness, or a ‘we-feeling’, in what he titles as ‘security communities’ (mainly NATO) and the European Union relies heavily on concepts adopted from the Sociology of Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and Anthony Giddens. Like Wendt, he builds much of his work in opposition to the neo-realists’, in particular Kenneth Waltz’s material Rationalist approach that emphasizes power and anarchy and defends the approach which considers “Ideational factors that shape actors’ outlooks and behaviour, ranging from culture and ideology to aspirations and principled beliefs, onto cause-effect knowledge of specific policy

125 Wendt (1999a), p. 21. Australia’s “push into Asia” could be considered an attempt of such a repositioning
126 Wendt (1999a), p. 231
128 Wendt (1999a), p. 7
129 Wendt (1999a), p. 11
problems”. He argues that whilst an emerging “we-feeling”, or aspirations for a united Europe, have not caused European integration as such, they explain the reasons for causal factors that have done so. In further criticism toward the neo-realist approach he asks why NATO has not collapsed due its irrelevance since the end of the Cold War, as some neo-realists would have expected, and argues that NATO has acted as a vehicle for an affirmation of “western” identity for Eastern European states (which explains its revival through enlarged membership that included the Eastern and Central European States).

Emanuel Adler argues that focusing on ‘social epistemology’ i.e. the role of collective knowledge in international relations, help to explain the origins of international relations and institutions, as well as the formation of “communities of the like-minded”. He defines Constructivism as an approach that sees international reality as “the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world”. Material reality depends on what meaning individuals and social actors attach to it, hence, international relations consist of human facts and that these are facts only by human agreement. As opposed to “Rationalist” theories Constructivists see a structure that is both normative and material, i.e. consists of rules and resources. The main value-added contribution by Constructivism then is that it challenges the “Rationalist” ontology and epistemology through its ”emphasis on the ontological reality of


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131 Ruggie (1998), p. 879
132 Ruggie (1998), 869
133 Ruggie (1998), p. 877
134 Why would this not apply to Turkey as well? As a long-standing member of NATO, Turkey should have gone through a similar ‘socialization’ process towards a ‘Western’ identity
135 Adler (2005), p. 3
136 Adler (2005), p. 92
137 Adler (2005), p. 92
intersubjective knowledge and on the epistemological and methodological implications of this reality".  

In his work with Michael Barnett on “security communities” Adler and Barnett depict ’cognitive regions’ for which borders are defined by where shared understandings and common identities end. In these “transnational regions” where people “imagine sharing a common destiny and identity” there would be a convergence of Ideational forces with economic interdependency, institutions and security that would enable the exceeding of territorial space. Following this logic he sees the United States and the European Union as inhabiting the same cognitive space, which also includes Australia and Canada. Security communities, imagined by Adler and Barnett, are social communities based on shared values, norms and symbols that create social identity where this feeling of ‘we-ness’ combined with societal interactions and convergence of long-term interests create a mutual and dependable environment of trust.

**Social Constructivism on Regionalism: Amitav Acharya on Southeast Asian Regionalism**

Constructivist approaches to Regionalism in general focus on the development of a regional awareness that leads to the formation of a ‘regional identity’, or a shared feeling of ’we-ness’, often is titled as ‘cognitive Regionalism’. According to this view regional cohesion relies on ‘cognitive interdependence’ rather than ‘material interdependence’.

One of the most relevant accounts of Constructivism on the subject of Regionalism comes from Amitav Acharya’s work on ASEAN and its “soft and normative Regionalism” which the “Ra-
tionalist” theories have had trouble explaining (Acharya 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2005). Acharya responds, like many Constructivists, to what he sees as the neo-realist neglect of identity and institutions as independent actors in Regionalism and the exclusivity of material forces in international relations.  

Instead he argues that the examination of the process whereby regional identity is built and fostered offers the best chance to ascertain what is going on in a particular region. He asserts that “ignoring identity as an analytical tool also leads to undue neglect of long-term historical processes that go into the making of international and regional orders”. Whilst norms and identity are not the only variables that matter (thus also acknowledging material and institutional forces), they have played an especially important role in Southeast Asian Regionalism and the development of ASEAN as a regional institution. He argues that ASEAN elites have deliberately formed norms and identity, aiming to build a regional ASEAN identity, and that “region-building is a social and political act; like nationalism and nation-states, regions may be ‘imagined and constructed’.” As evidence for this he demonstrates how the ASEAN elite engaged in a process of socialization within an institutional context (ASEAN) and that in this process they ‘imagined’ themselves to be part of a distinctive group.”  

“As a direct result of this self-conscious regional identity building exercise “ASEAN has rejected request for membership by countries such as Sri Lanka, especially under president Jayawardane, and the possibility of membership by India and Australia on the grounds of their lack of belonging to the Southeast Asia region”. Sri Lanka was invited in 1967 during the formation of ASEAN, but was not interested at the time. Later it reversed this

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147 Acharya (2005), p. 106
148 Acharya (2005), p. 98
149 Acharya (2005), pp. 102-103
150 Acharya (2005), p. 103
151 Acharya (2005), p. 104
152 Acharya (2005), p. 104
policy but its application was turned down.\textsuperscript{153} Moreover, he notes that whilst ASEAN has not as of yet achieved any permanent identity, it is attempting to build one.\textsuperscript{154} Hence, Acharya emphasizes the importance of differences in identity as an empirical fact and as an analytical tool in the study of Regionalism.

Throughout his work Acharya emphasises the role of Ideational factors (norms and identity in particular) and instigates the analysis of how local actors as agents and the transformation of Regionalism through socialization and institution building shape Regionalism. In this regard, Acharya’s work on norms diffusion, investigating how transnational norms have transformed regional institutions in Southeast Asia,\textsuperscript{155} makes a significant contribution to the understanding of Regionalism. Finally, Archarya’s work on security communities has made a significant contribution to the study of regional security. In particular his study of ASEAN as a security community, and the relative success of the ASEAN way of conflict management, promoting cooperative behaviour through socialisation instead of a sanctions based system, practically established Constructivism as the dominant framework for the study of security communities.\textsuperscript{156}

Critics of the Constructivist approach to Regionalism argue that it is not sufficient to address the problem “what is a region?” Van Langenhove (2003) argues this point for two main reasons: “One, because it is not enough to state that a region is a social construct and that therefore different actors will produce different “definitions” of a region. Secondly, because the social constructivist approach in regional integration is really nothing more than some-lip-service paid to an approach that is now well developed in other fields such as sociology, psychology and linguistics.”\textsuperscript{157} Moreover, he argues that whilst Constructivism is no more an approach than a theory, a Social Constructivist theory is nonetheless required. More interestingly he also advo-

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\item \textsuperscript{153} Acharya (2005), p. 105
\item \textsuperscript{154} Acharya (2005), pp. 104-106
\item \textsuperscript{157} Van Langenhove (2003), pp. 2-3
\end{itemize}
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cates a theory that would combine the two aspects; “physical” [material, rational] and identity [Ideational].

**Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ and the Rise of Culturalism**

In his 1993 Foreign Affairs article "The Clash of Civilizations?" Huntington introduced a thesis instigating a paradigm that could be categorised as “cultural realism”. His work almost immediately caused a flood of criticism, which perhaps unintentionally made it one of the most cited articles in the Foreign Affairs in recent times\(^\text{159}\), as well as prominent in a number of other academic journals. He later refined his thesis in a subsequent 1996 book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” that became a worldwide best seller. Huntington subscribes to the core realist assumptions of international relations being driven by states as the main actors in a system characterised by anarchy and considerations of power, but at the same time he introduces culture as a new variable. Huntington argues that states are, and must be, interested in power, but culture and values define their interests in the long run.\(^\text{160}\) In this regard his emphasis on culture and identity bears some resemblance to Constructivism, but presents the other side of the coin by making culture and identity negative variables as a source of conflict and separation rather than sources of cohesion.

The core of Huntington’s argument was that with the ending of the Cold War global politics would be redefined along cultural lines as people started redefining their identities after the removal of the bipolar overlay that had dominated world politics. He argued that the main emerging threat to international peace would be a looming clash of civilizations. Throughout his book Huntington builds his case for the “clash” by establishing the importance of cultural identity, and how this ultimately leads into a world divided along civilizational lines. He argues that people are mainly concerned about answering the question “who are we?” in order to define their

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\(^\text{158}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{160}\) Huntington,(1996), p. 36
place in the world. He goes on to argue that people associate themselves with tribes, ethnic
groups, religion and nations in immediate terms, but at the broadest level their primary reference
group is civilizations. This cultural association is partly defined by ancestry, religion, language,
values, customs and institutions but ultimately self-identification requires enemies; “We know
who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are
against”.\textsuperscript{161} Hence the most dangerous conflicts would occur at the fault lines of civilizations,
where two or more major civilizations meet and compete for power and control in a particular
area.\textsuperscript{162} Huntington even argues that Sydney won against Beijing in the 2000 Olympics bid
because voting was conducted “almost entirely along civilizational lines”\textsuperscript{163}

In terms of the new “civilizational order”, Huntington argues that the world is, or is going to be,
constructed around seven or eight major civilizations around one or more core states: Sinic,
Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, Latin American and possibly African (sub-
Saharan Africa with South Africa as the core state).\textsuperscript{164} Most countries in the world (with some
few minor exceptions) would belong to one of these major civilizations and shifting from one to
another would be dangerous and destined to fail.\textsuperscript{165}

Huntington’s contributions to the study of Regionalism are few and mainly dismissive. He
begins with a statement that “Regions are geographic not political or cultural entities”.\textsuperscript{166} How-
ever, interestingly he also asserts that countries with similar cultures cooperate economically and
politically and groups with most cultural cohesiveness are the most successful (EU the most,
ASEAN among the least).\textsuperscript{167} Whilst acknowledging that political and economic alignments are
not always aligned according to cultural and civilizational alignments, cooperation nonetheless

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[	extsuperscript{161}] Huntington, (1996), p. 21
\item[	extsuperscript{162}] Huntington (1996), p. 20
\item[	extsuperscript{163}] Huntington, Samuel P. (1993), “ If Not Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World”, \textit{Foreign
Affairs}, 72:5, November-December 1993, p. 188
\item[	extsuperscript{164}] Huntington (1996), pp. 45-47
\item[	extsuperscript{165}] Huntington (1996), p. 20
\item[	extsuperscript{166}] Huntington (1996), p. 130
\item[	extsuperscript{167}] Huntington (1996), p. 28
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
requires trust and real trust can only be established based on similar culture and values. Moreover, he blames ASEAN’s (alleged) failure to establish effective regional cooperation and institutions to its “multicivilizational” construct, reinstating that commonalities bring advanced cooperation and that a causal relationship exists between cultural commonality and successful economic cooperation. Depending on the depth of cultural communality countries (and regions) can achieve four different levels of economic cooperation ordered from least to most advanced; 1) Free trade area, 2) Customs union, 3) common market, and 4) economic union. The European Union, being the most advanced regional grouping supposedly demonstrates this point. Perhaps anticipating a plausible counter-argument underlining Turkey’s custom union with the European Union, Huntington dismisses this as a product of US pressure on the EU and nothing more.

In respect to what I have chosen to title as the problem of “borderline states”, Huntington refers to “torn countries” that, not unlike confused children, are unsure of their place in the order of civilizations and consequently are in the process of redefining their cultural identities. He argues that this is dangerous because whilst during the Cold War countries were able to remain non-aligned and impartial in the conflict, they “cannot lack identity”. Moreover, whilst he acknowledges that countries in the civilizational fault lines can in principle redefine their cultural identity and thus attempt to join a civilization that is more attractive, three requirements must be met for a “torn country” to redefine its civilizational identity: 1) political and economic elite in the country must be enthusiastic in their support for the shift, 2) public opinion must be at least tolerating the move and 3) elites in the host civilizations must approve. This, according to Huntington, is destined to become a long and painful path that until now has always failed. Huntington lists four countries that he qualifies as torn; Russia, Turkey, Mexico and Australia. Significantly two of these are part of this study. Of these “torn countries” Russia, Turkey and

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168 Huntington (1996), pp. 128-131  
169 Huntington (1996), pp. 131-132  
170 Ibid.  
172 Huntington (1996), p. 139
Mexico have attempted redefine their cultural identity to join the Western civilization, whereas Australia attempted to defect it.

Whilst Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis has been accused of being simplistic in terms of its civilizational construct and offering perhaps overtly deterministic account of the effects of culture and identity in international relations, it does offer an interesting alternative account to the “Rationalist” theories and the more optimistic account offered by Constructivists. By bringing in the possible negative effects of identity building (including regional), the “clash” thesis could provide a useful tool in investigating what drives and limits relations between ‘borderline’ states and regions, when combined with “Rationalist” and constructivist approaches. Moreover, a fair amount of political rhetoric against Turkey’s membership in the European Union by European political leaders and Asian political leaders against Australia’s inclusion in East Asian regional institutions refers to cultural and value differences, and even occasionally to the “clash of civilizations”. One example of the latter is Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s warning to European leaders that a hardening “mutual lack of respect between cultures and religions…” would threaten to create a “Clash of Civilizations” that would “throw world peace into doubt”. 173 He said that whilst criticism was acceptable, insults were not and the two parties should respect each other’s sensitivities in order to avoid such a “clash”. With an indirect reference to the cultural opposition in Europe towards Turkey’s membership he stated to Euro-Parliamentarians that “We see Islamophobia - like Anti-Semitism - as a crime against humanity”. 174 Finally, the popular resistance in particular in Europe against Turkey’s membership175, as

173 Quoted in the Euronews on 28 June, 2006
http://www.euronews.net/create_html.php?page=europa&article=366342&lng=1

174 Ibid.

175 The Eurobarometer 63 in September 2005 reported that 31% of the population in the EU-25 and 29% in the EU-15 were in favour of Turkey’s membership, whilst 55% in EU-25 and 57% in EU-15 respectively were against it. 54% in EU-25 quoted the cultural differences between the EU and Turkey too significant to allow accession. 55% in EU-25 responded that Turkey belongs to Europe in terms of geography and 42% in terms of history. Turkey also scored lowest when respondents were asked to scale potential candidate countries according to an order of preference. In Turkey, however, popular opinion was still favourable towards the European Union with 61% of Turks responding that they have a generally positive image of the EU. Moreover, 68% of the respondents agreed that their country would receive advantages from being a member. Although this rep-
well as elite resistance in East Asia against Australia’s and New Zealand’s attempts to further integrate into the region underline the fact that Huntington’s arguments at the minimum should be systematically excluded through analysis rather than dismissed at face value. On the other hand, Huntington’s thesis is clearly inadequate as the sole tool for explaining the dynamics of relations between a ‘borderline state’ and a region.

It is also worthwhile noting that whilst Australia has in the past faced resistance that could be categorised culture and value based in its rhetoric, they nonetheless have increased their participation in the regional bodies, including the EAEC. Likewise, Turkey’s membership accession process has met both popular and elite resistance, but nonetheless the accession process continues with the European Union being committed to see the process through. It is also, regardless of Huntington’s comments on Turkish NATO membership, important to note that Turkey is actively participating in a number of important and influential regional and “Western” institutions, such as NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe and OECD. Ignoring, or discounting, the economic interdependency, political interest convergence and institutional participation does not provide a sufficient explanation of the problem. Placing too much value on political rhetoric that indicates culture and values as causes of conflict may also be too limited of an approach. Lastly, why can cultural identity and values not act as drivers for inter-civilizational cooperation rather than conflict?

2.3.3 Combining Rationalist and Ideational Paradigms

Interestingly, some theorists, such as Smith, see Social Constructivists as being “perhaps more ‘Rationalist’ in character than they would like to concede.” Whilst probably true, this nonetheless does not nullify the dichotomy between it and the Rationalist theories. For instance Risse and Wiener argue that even the most uncommitted Social Constructivists do not share the “indi-

resents a decline of 5 percentage points in comparison to the previous poll, it hardly qualifies as evidence for a declining support for Turkey’s quest for “Europeanhood” as Huntington would probably expect.

individualist ontology of rational choice”.  

A perhaps more constructive approach would be to work toward a theory that accommodates assumptions from both strands. Luke Van Langenhove, for instance, calls for a theory of Regionalism that ”can be used to explain that regions are both a part of physical reality and the result of a process of social construction”.  

In political science the possibility of synthesis between positivists and interpretivist positions has lead into a vivid debate, whilst the position that a synthesis is not possible due to their ontological and epistemological differences has a strong backing.  

Mark Blyth, for instance, acknowledges the challenge of incorporating Ideational variables such as ideas into the Rationalist paradigm:  

"But then, on a fundamental level, rational choice is no longer rational choice. When ideas are allowed to give content to interests, the sparse, elegant, predictive, and parsimonious structure of rational choice theory becomes compromised since one can no longer assume transitive preferences, given interests, or a coherent methodologically individualist ontology".  

Blyth, however, nonetheless argues that ideas, norms, identity and culture should not be neglected in Rationalist approach and that Ideational approach can complement existing theories, leading into further development of political science; "for it is only through a dialectic process that the field evolves”.  

An important part of this process, he argues, is the liberty to look beyond paradigmatic approaches and compare rival ontologies; “Slavish adherence to a single

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180 Blyth, Mark (2003), "Structures do not come with an instruction sheet: Interests, ideas, and progress in Political Science", Perspectives on Politics, Volume 1, Number 4, p. 697  
181 Blyth (2003), p. 702
position is useless for understanding of an ever-changing world since it is only through comparing what rival ontologies produce that we can actually learn anything of substance”.  

Some IR theorists, such as Miles Kahler have contemplated the possibility of combining Rationalist and Ideational approaches in order to explain international cooperation such as regional integration: “Whether rationality and collective identity can be combined within a modified rational choice framework is one of the central questions posed by the recent turn toward identity and norms”. Kahler reaches the conclusion that the two are in fact not entirely incompatible and suggests that rational choice may in practice be constrained by social and cultural norms, and that the Ideational approaches are mainly concerned about what takes place prior to rational decision-making. Thus, he concludes that socially constructed identities may simply be ”an ontological issue prior to behavioural modelling along rational choice lines”. He points out that Ronald Jepperson, Peter Katzenstein and Alexander Wendt have developed two possible ways of identifying prior to interests: “states may develop interests linked to particular interests, or domestic identity politics may be reflected in foreign policy interests”. However, the pursuit of those interests may follow the rational model and on the other hand identity can cause non-rational behaviour or even interests. Hence, it is quite possible that Turkish identity and domestic identity politics may cause behaviour that may well be against its national material interests. Similarly, domestic identity politics in the EU, in member states for instance in France, Austria and Germany may override or alter the material interests of the Union. In fact, Kahler for instance argues that it is the socially constructed identities that determine the material interests, which are allegedly the main driving force behind rational choice.

183 Kahler (1998), p. 933
184 Kahler (1998), p. 936
185 Kahler (1998), p. 936
186 Ibid
187 Kahler (1998), p. 938
Goldstein and Keohane, on the other hand, postulate that the Rationalist approaches often offer a valuable starting point for analysis, but challenge their explanatory power by stating that there are "empirical anomalies that can be resolved only when ideas are taken into account",188 whilst "even the most Rationalistic analysts agree that people have incomplete information when they select strategies by which to pursue their preferred outcomes."189 Nonetheless, Goldstein and Keohane accuse the mainstream Rationalist research for ignoring the power of ideas, whilst condemning reflectionists "who assert that interests cannot be evaluated apart from ideas that constitute them" without first carrying out serious empirical evaluation. They then go on to condemn the constraints imposed by the dichotomy stating that "thus a potentially rich debate is consigned to the purgatory of incompatible epistemologies.190 Instead of confining themselves into Rationalist or Ideational paradigms, Goldstein and Keohane urge the analysts to recognise that "ideas as well as interests have causal weight in explanations of human action".191 Finally, they argue that the power of ideas in international relations "can and should be examined empirically with the tools of social science", referring to an established tradition in utilising socio-psychological approaches on group decision-making in analysing how cognitive processing affect foreign policy choices as an example.192

Breslin, Higgott and Rosamond also see ample space for the development of both Rationalist and constructivist approaches in relation to regional integration.193 As Finnemore and Sikkink have concluded that "Neither Constructivism nor rational choice provides substantive explanations or predictions of political behaviour until coupled with a more specific understanding of who the

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188 Goldstein and Keohane (1993), p. 6
190 Goldstein and Keohane (1993), p. 26
191 Goldstein and Keohane (1993), pp. 3-4
193 Breslin, Higgott and Rosamond (2002), p.11
relevant actors are, what they want, and what the content of social structures might be.\textsuperscript{194} Social Constructivism again can be useful in analysing regions and in providing counter arguments against purist Rationalist accounts and bring in identity and culture as variables to Regionalism research. Smith for instance has argued that “...the dominance of Rationalist approaches has restricted the development of the literature on European integration”, and that Ideational approaches can offer convincing alternative explanations of European integration\textsuperscript{195}. Arguing for the incompatibility of the two approaches, moreover, would imply that Ideational factors cannot be treated in Rationalist way or the role of Ideational factors cannot be compromised by material factors, which is not realistic because the real world includes both material and Ideational incentives.

Moreover, even many traditional Rationalists would concede that regional organisations can be more effective due to communalities in culture, history, values that provide a convergence of political and security interests\textsuperscript{196}. Also, as Frank Schimmelfennig points out, Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) is “itself a synthesis of traditional, realist Intergovernmentalism with a liberal theory of domestic preference formation and a functional theory of international institutions....” and thus, can be linked and synthesized with other theories considering their respective “domains of application.”\textsuperscript{197} One such areas would be enlargement, which he admits LI has trouble explaining;”...LI can also be complemented and synthesized with Ideational explanations borrowing from social Constructivism”\textsuperscript{198}

Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Eds.) in \textit{European Integration Theory} also address the question of enlargement at a point of difficulty in Regionalism studies and seek to test and compare different theoretical approaches through asking them to present best cases for explaining the

\textsuperscript{194} Finnemore and Sikkink (2001), p. 393
\textsuperscript{195} Smith (1999), pp. 684-5
\textsuperscript{196} Hurrell (1995), p. 56
\textsuperscript{197} Schimmelfennig, Frank (2007), ”Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, in Wiener Antje and Thomas Diez (Eds.), \textit{European Integration Theory}, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 92
\textsuperscript{198} Schimmelfennig (2007), p. 92
problem. The basis for such testing is the doubt of the existence of incommensurable paradigms. Wiener and Diez argue this would be the case “only because they differ in scope”;\textsuperscript{199} “Epistemologically, approaches would only be incommensurable if they claimed to have the same purpose and if they were directly related to reality”.\textsuperscript{200} However, Wiener and Diez point out that if the two approaches are assumed of having different purposes;”...then it is possible to see different approaches adding to a larger picture without being combined into a single, grand theory”.\textsuperscript{201}

Peter Katzenstein has on the other hand argued that Rationalism and Constructivism are not really paradigmatic theories but rather “content-less analytical languages dealing principally with beliefs”, whilst there nonetheless exists an interesting intellectual divide between the two.\textsuperscript{202} Thus, he argues that breaking the paradigm barriers is not only possible but also necessary;”...but I am increasingly convinced that ’analytical eclecticism’ is at this stage a superior way of doing theory because we are so paradigmatic; had we been predominantly eclectic, I would’ve said we should be a little more paradigmatic – but right now we almost work in a monoculture, which intellectually is pretty unhealthy.”\textsuperscript{203}

Following a similar line of thought, Fearon and Wendt conclude that;”....Rationalism and Constructivism are most fruitfully viewed \textit{pragmatically} as analytical tools, rather than as metaphysical positions or empirical descriptions of the world.”\textsuperscript{204}

\begin{itemize}
\item[200] Op.cit., p. 16
\item[201] Ibid
\item[203] Schouten (2008)
\end{itemize}
In this regard, Katzenstein’s *analytical eclecticism* makes a significant contribution. Katzenstein argues Rationalist and Ideational both have weaknesses but may complement each other if an eclectic approach is applied. Disagreeing with the statement that the two approaches are inconsumerable, he also refers to the possibility of combining Rationalism with Constructivism:

"You could also combine ideas of Rationalism and Constructivism which do not have moral implications. I myself combine Constructivism with liberalism, because my normative commitments are largely liberal but I think it lacks the capacity to say anything about identity." 205

Moreover, Katzenstein argues that considering the role of collective identities would also improve Rationalist theories in terms of their explanatory powers:

"Explicitly considering the role collective identities play in world politics can help advance our theoretical and empirical understanding of international relations. Collective identities matter because they help shape the definition of the actors’ interests. An eclectic stance suggests that Rationalist theories are more compelling when they are combined with constructivist insights into the importance of norms and identities, as is true of explanations focusing on great power status and the presence or absence of threat." 206

Finally, Emmanuel Adler also advocates a notion that Rationalist and Ideational approaches are complimentary, arguing that Constructivism should reconsider its approach to rationality;

205 Schouten (2008)

“Within Constructivism, a dialogue that may soon turn into a full debate has been taking about how to approach rationality. In the background is the increasing realization that Constructivism and Rationalism are complementary rather than contradictory.” 207

However, Adler, unlike many others, postulates the possibility of a new grand theory through synthesis:

“A real synthesis, in my view, would integrate Rationalism and Constructivism into a theory that ultimately transcends both”208

2.4 Definitions of “Regionalism” and “Region”

“There are no ‘natural’ regions, and definitions of ‘region’ and indicators of ‘regionness’ vary according to the particular problem of question under investigation” 209

As will be pointed out in this section, key definitions in Regionalism, such as “region”, “Regionalism”, “regionness” and “regionalization” remain, in Andrew Hurrell’s words “ambiguous and contested”. 210 Instead of having established any credible measure of consensus on the definitions of these key terms, which guide us towards what is to be investigated and how, the field continues to be characterised by multiple approaches that give varying emphasis to material, institutional and Ideational connections between the constituent parts of a “region”. However, one factor remains common to virtually all approaches: geography and geographical proximity as factors of unity/separation. Geography alone, however, helps us very little in understanding region formation. Rivers, mountains, seas and other geographical barriers do not provide accu-

rate boundaries for regions as they are subject to interpretations based on various subjective factors, such as geo-politics, history, culture, and ethnicity and politicizing. T.J. Pempel, for instance, has argued that:

“Contrary to such a largely unproblematized interpretation of regions and presumptions of geographic self-definition, the world for the most part is not, in fact, composed of ‘natural regions’. Almost no region in the world with genuine political and economic significance is so essentialist in its makeup; rarely can any be understood as delimited by simple geographic lines on a map.”

A good example of the limited explanatory power of the geographical relationship is the NATO membership of the Mediterranean countries (including Turkey). Even the most enthusiastic and determined observer would probably find it very frustrating to link these countries geographically to the North Atlantic community. At the same time, one must acknowledge that some form of geographical definition or limitation of a region is required in Regionalism research, otherwise we are essentially speaking about non-geographical "communities" (security, communities, communities of the like-minded etc). In this regard I completely agree with Andrew Hurrell, who has stated that "without some geographical limits the term ‘Regionalism’ becomes diffuse and unmanageable”.

Most of the contemporary Rationalist definitions derive from Joseph Nye’s definition of an international region: “a limited number of states linked together by a geographic relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence”. This is clearly a Rationalist definition of a region which implies that states are the main actors in Regionalism and that its borders are essentially defined by geography, material interdependence and institutional structures.

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212 Van Langenhove (2003), p. 7
213 Hurrell (1995), 38
214 Nye, Joseph (1968), International Regionalism: Readings, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, p. vii
Ideational approaches, on the other hand, tend to emphasise regional identity and cognitive interdependency instead of institutional and material factors. Social Constructivism, however, avoids strict definitions of “region”. Peter Katzenstein, for instance, drawing inspiration from Karl Deutch, has argued that regions are not “natural”, “given” or “essential” and that because they are socially constructed that are subject to “reification and relativization”. He consequently defines a region as “a set of countries markedly interdependent over a wide range of different dimension”.215 This interdependency can be characterised “by a flow of socio-economic transactions and communications and high political salience that differentiates a group of countries from others”216. T.J. Pempel, mirroring Katzenstein, also argues that regions are contested and not natural, concluding that; ” regions are fluid and complex mixtures of physical, psychological, and behavioural traits continually being re-created and redefined”.217 Hence, the Ideational approaches do not provide any fixed definitions of a “region”, but instead point out to the fluid nature of regions that essentially define themselves largely based on the Ideational connections. However, as Luk Van Langhove has pointed out this approach can be a source of confusion as if we do accept that a region is a social construct, and that different actors produce different regions, what kind of generalisations can we except to make in order to answer the question “what is a region?”218 (…and who belongs to it?).

Other attempts to define a region have attempted mixing rational and Ideational elements by focusing on the internal cohesion of a region, covering areas such as regional social linkages, political linkages and economic linkages.219 However, it is often unclear how these linkages are to be measured to a degree of reliability that is acceptable in the social sciences.

216 Ibid
217 Pempel, T.J. (2005), p. 25
218 Van Langhove (2003), p. 3
219 Tavares (2004), p.4
Tavares, on the other hand has identified four constitutive characteristics of a region: 1) geography, 2) regularity and intensity of interactions, 3) shared regional perceptions and 4) agency.\textsuperscript{220} Whilst this concept includes rational concepts, such as agency, it is essentially an Ideational one; “cognitive construction that spills over state borders, based on territoriality, with a certain degree of singularity, socially moulded by a body of different actors, and motivated by different (and sometimes contradictory) principles”.\textsuperscript{221}

Another issue of contestation is the role of \textit{Regionalism} versus that of \textit{regionalization}. \textit{Regionalism} from Rationalist point of view is mainly seen as increasing regional institutionalised cooperation among states as a feature of global politics that ultimately creates a new polity,\textsuperscript{222} whilst \textit{regionalization} refers to the growth of societal integration within a region to the often directed processes of social and economic interaction”.\textsuperscript{223}

Yet, as Rodrigo Tavares points out the Latin word \textit{regio} generally has an administrative and geographical meaning and comes from \textit{regere}, to direct, to rule.\textsuperscript{224} However, he also points out that; “The world ‘Regionalism’ contains the Greek Sufism ‘ism’, which means ‘the act, state, or theory of’. Consequently he argues that “Regionalism shall, therefore, be approached as the theory that investigates the process of regionalization”.\textsuperscript{225} This implies that it is the process of \textit{regionalization} that should be the focus of study, and that \textit{Regionalism} refers to the discipline that studies it. Another alternative approach to distinguish between “Regionalism” and “regionalization” is Paul Evan’s definition that emphasises the transactional function of \textit{regionalization} and emphasises the role of identity in the process of \textit{Regionalism}:

\textsuperscript{220} Tavares (2004), p.4  
\textsuperscript{221} Tavares (2004), pp. 5-6  
\textsuperscript{222} Christiansen, Thomas (2005), "European integration and regional cooperation”, in Baylis, John and Steve Smith (Eds.), \textit{The Globalization of World Politics}, Third Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 580  
\textsuperscript{223} Hurrell (1995), p. 39  
\textsuperscript{224} Tavares (2004), p. 4  
\textsuperscript{225} Tavares (2004), p. 7
“if regionalization is the expression of increased commercial and human transactions in a defined geographic space, Regionalism is the expression of a common sense of identity and destiny combined with the creation of institutions that express that identity and shape collective action”.226

However, Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum argue that Regionalism refers to the general phenomenon under study and regionalization to the process “that leads to patterns of cooperation, integration, complementarity and convergence within a particular cross-national geographic space, as well as introduce another concept: regionness. Regionness refers to the “degree to which a particular area in various respects constitutes a distinct entity, which can be distinguished as a relatively coherent territorial subsystem (in contrast with non-territorial subsystems) from the rest of the global system”.227 Their proposed approach, the New Regionalism Theory (NRT) seeks to evaluate this level of regionness and establishes five levels that “define a particular region in terms of regional coherence and community”.228 The first level, which they title as a “proto-region”, is defined by regional space and implies a level of regionness where “a region is firmly rooted in territorial space: a group of people living in geographically bounded community, controlling a set of natural resources and united through a certain set of cultural values and common bonds of social order forged by history”.229 The second level, which constitutes a “primitive region”, is a regional complex that implies an increased level of social contact and transactions between groups that have been previously isolated. This is a fairly limited and undeveloped region where regionness is still unstable. The third type is a regional society that constitutes a de jure or a “formal” region where regionness is widely spread and multidimensional. The fourth level is a regional community where a regional identity is developing and regional institutions are strong, absorbing an increasing amount of decision-making powers from

228 Hettne and Söderbaum (2000), p. 462
229 Ibid
the nation-states. The fifth and final level, a region state, is the most advanced and still a largely hypothetical construct that presumes the creation of a new polity where sovereignty is pooled. Under such a system decision-making is layered to multiple levels, including the supranational level. As Hettne and Söderbaum conclude: “this is basically the idea of the EU as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty”.

Luke Van Langenhove follows in similar line to Hettne and Söderbaum and introduces yet another concept in Regionalism: regionhood. His idea of regionhood has similar purposes to that the concept of regionness in that it also aims at distinguishing regions from non-regions, but differs in scope in attempting to combine Ideational and Rationalist elements: “Such a concept of regionhood can be used to explain that regions are both a part of physical reality and the result of a process of social construction”. The four-level conditioning of regionhood reflects this notion;

1. the region as a system of intentional acts in the international and national arena
2. the region as a “rational” system with statehood properties
3. the region as a reciprocal achievement
4. the region as a generator and communicator of meaning and identity

Finally, the United Nations Comparative Regional Integration Studies unit argues against attempts to provide fixed universal definitions of region, emphasises the discursive patters within the transactional practices, and argues that in fact it is the process of regionalization that ultimately defines the region:

“The fact that there is a multitude of possibilities to approach the problem of "region" suggests that the best way to define it is in an eclectic and plastic way. If it

230 Hettne and Söderbaum (2000), p. 468
231 Van Langenhove (2003), p. 6
232 Ibid
233 Van Langenhove (2003), p. 11
is crystal clear that regions necessitate a geographical dimension, the question is then, how to recognise a particular area as a region. The point is that regions define themselves; they are only identifiable post factum. There is no use in looking for one universal criterion that defines a region, nor to come up with a "catch-all" cocktail of criteria. It is the process of regionalization that eventually defines the region, or in other words regions become 'visible' by patterns of interaction, such as discursive practices occurring within geographical, historical, cultural, political and economic variables.”

In conclusion, the definitions of the key concepts in Regionalism remain contested and ultimately are determined by the chosen theoretical approach and one’s research agenda. However, it would seem that in order to accommodate both Rationalist and Ideational approaches it is necessary to acknowledge certain critical features and characteristics that determine what we consider as a region and who we consider being part of it. In my view at least the following should be accounted for:

1 A level of geographic proximity

As noted before, geographic boundaries, such as mountains, rivers, lakes and seas are subject to interpretation. As the EU’s Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn noted in a public debate event in Helsinki, Canada would most likely (as would Australia and New Zealand) meet the technical criteria of the accession process, and yet it would be hardly justifiable to include it in a European regional organisation. Hence, regional projects cannot be a collection of members across the globe and still be called regional. However, how the exact boundaries of these mainly continental or sub-continental constructs are determined depends on a number of factors. Some of these are;

2 Material interdependency

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234 United Nations University – Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS), http://www.allied-co.com/ri/index2.html
A region probably has to have some level of material interdependency and complementarity in order to become a meaningful construct. What the required levels are and whether they become before or after cognitive interdependence and linkages is a matter of disagreement and remains an issue for careful testing.

3 Cognitive interdependency

Commonalities in history, culture, values and language increase the probability and effectiveness of regional institutions. Since such ideational factors also affect the working culture and norms of the regional institutions, members that do not sufficiently share these commonalities probably would not be able to contribute or benefit effectively to/from them.

4 Agency

A regional project without some form of effective institutions is not likely to be a relevant one. Moreover, potential members that do not have the capacity to participate effectively in regional institutions are unlikely to be included. Conversely if regional institutions do not have the capacity to absorb potential members they are likely to fuel calls for rejection towards member candidates. A good example of this is the controversial “integration capacity” (a.k.a. “absorption capacity”) in the EU.

This thesis aims at producing a definition of a region that contributes to the understanding of the problem of ‘borderline states’, and thus regional enlargement. This, however, cannot be achieved prior to a careful analysis of the research and the conclusion and hence, will be addressed again in the chapter detailing the findings of the thesis.

2.5 Regionalism in Europe and East Asia: The dilemma of enlargement

This section investigates the relevant theoretical literature addressing the process of enlargement in general and in particular the relationships between Australia and East Asia and Turkey European Union. It then goes on to argue that whilst the current literature does not systematically analyse the problem of ‘borderline states’, or compare the two regions from this perspective,
some of the literature covers individual parts of the problem. A growing body of literature is forming to study the theoretical aspects of EU enlargement. Turkish membership is also attracting a growing body of literature. Likewise, some literature, albeit largely outdated, exists on Australia’s engagement with ASEAN and East Asia. Most of these accounts focus on the Australian ‘push into Asia’ in particular under the Keating government in the earlier part of the 1990s. Whilst the economic and security aspects have earned some level of coverage, this too appears to be largely outdated and/or focusing on a relatively narrow aspect of the problem. All in all, the current literature represents either “Rationalist” or “Ideational” accounts, whilst no attempts to systematically compare and incorporate both accounts on the problem exist.

**Enlargement of the European Union and the Turkish accession quest**

The current literature on EU enlargement according to Helen Wallace (2000) mainly treats the issue as a series of individual events rather than attempting a systematic study of the phenomena.\(^\text{235}\) Theoretical and technical studies specifically focusing on the issue of enlargement include the works of José Torreblanca and Philippe Schmitter (Schmitter and Torreblanca 1997; Torreblanca 1997, 2000, 2005), who mainly focus on the issue of Eastern Enlargement, its technical management, effects, motives and the historical background. Others, such as Schimmelpfennig (1999, 2001 and 2003) focus on the strategic aspects of European integration, Friis (1997 and 2000) and Friis and Murphy (1999) on the governance and bargaining process related to the Eastern Enlargement, whilst Woyke (2001) and Zielonka et al (2002) deal with the problems and consequences of EU enlargement(s). Philippe Schmitter has argued that misunderstandings about European integration are largely due to the lack of attention being given to the process of enlargement; "One reason for several of these misunderstandings was the completely "un-theorized" and, nevertheless, significant impact of enlargement to include new member-

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states whose entry inevitably imposed changes in decision-making rules and upset prevailing informal practices.”

Turkey’s EU membership is currently a hot topic and the literature on the topic is increasing constantly. The majority of the current literature, however, is generally descriptive in its nature and provides historical accounts of background of Turkey – EU relations, as well as technical analysis on various aspects of political, economical, societal and security linkages between Turkey and the EU and thus well within the Rationalist traditions. Some of the general background literature includes Akçakoca (2006), Akçakoca, Cameron and Rhein (2004), Lake et al. (2005), Oyemen and Betts et al. (2000), Morris (2005), Wood and Quaisser (2005) and Togan and Balasubramanyam et al. (2001). Other authors have explored the issues of culture and identity in Turkey and compared it to an “European’ identity; Schilling (2005), Tekin (2005) Twig, Schaefer, Austin and Parker (2005), Welfens (2004). Kosebalaban (2002) approached the cultural aspect by analysing the compatibility of security cultures, whilst Lejour and Mooij (2005) have provided economic benefits/costs analysis of a possible Turkish membership. Harun Arikan\(^{237}\) aims at providing a framework that would serve as a better option for the usual “individual costs/benefits based analysis conducted in isolation from the other factors”, which tends to be the standard in the literature on Turkey – EU relations.\(^{238}\) Whilst Arikan acknowledges that Turkey’s failure to implement the necessary policy reforms is partially to blame for the problems, he nonetheless almost exclusively concentrates on establishing the EU’s scepticism towards the country and the perception of Turkey as a ‘problematic’ and ‘different’ applicant. This has resulted in policy instruments that treat Turkey differently from other applicant countries, and that effectively mounts into a ‘containment strategy’ designed to stall its membership indefinitely.\(^ {239}\) To prove his point Arikan analyses a considerable quantity of EU official documents and carries out elite interviews to compare Turkey’s accession process to those of the Central

\(^{236}\) Schmitter (2007), p. 56


\(^{238}\) Arikan (2006), p. 1

\(^{239}\) Arikan (2006), pp. 1-2
and Eastern European countries. He argues that whilst these countries faced most of the same problems often referred to in Turkey’s case (human rights, protection of minorities in particular), the EU policy instruments had better terms and facilitated the accession process more effectively.\textsuperscript{240} In support of Arikan’s argument, the European Commission has been criticised for too being too lenient towards Romania and Bulgaria and recommending accession regardless of meeting the relevant criteria, leaving ample space for Ideational arguments.

Despite providing a thorough Rationalist analysis on accession instruments, as well as the main economic, security and political issues, Arikan’s work is nonetheless essentially represents the Turkish point of view, concentrating on proving that the accession process is not fair towards Turkey.\textsuperscript{241} Moreover, the Cyprus issue is treated as a bilateral issue between Turkey and Greece in Arikan’s analysis, which does not do justice to the issue. From the EU’s point of view the issue is considerably broader and deeper, as was demonstrated by the EU’s decision in December 2006 to freeze eight of the total of 35 negotiation chapters over the issue. From EU’s point of view the critical issue is that Turkey has not recognised the Republic of Cyprus, which is a member state, nor opened its ports as stipulated by the customs union agreement. Finally, the culture/identity based popular and elite resistance is ignored in the analysis. Nonetheless, this issue is vital because Turkey’s membership accession treaty’s ratification will be subjected to referendums in many member states.

Another topic gaining popularity is the issue of European identity and the borders of Europe reflecting the growing rhetoric using ‘civilizational’ terms such as ‘bridge between civilizations’ and ‘clash of civilizations’ in the European Union enlargement discourse. Beasley (2006), Smith (1992), Kockel (1999) and Kohli (2000) have explored various components that could be used to define European identity and the borders of the region. Jensen and Richardson (2004) explore the

\textsuperscript{240} Arikan (2006), p. 2

\textsuperscript{241} Which is not an argument entirely without base, Turkey has indeed been treated differently from other applicant countries from the onset of its candidacy, as demonstrated by the explicitly ‘open ended’ nature of Turkey’s accession process. Turkey is indeed the first candidate country that has to operate without a preset timeline and without a guarantee that the process will eventually lead into a full membership status. However, Turkey’s failure to meet the requirements to settle the Cyprus issue and carry out the reforms to satisfy the EU acquis should also be adequately covered in a balanced analysis of the Turkey – EU relations.
spatial visions and imaginations of the European integration and establish the link between integration discourse and geospatial space. These include in particular geographic, historical, cultural and linguistic aspects of what constitutes ‘Europe’. A common theme in these accounts is that there is no universal definition of Europe, but that the various definitions reflect the emphasis given to the different variables under investigation. Moreover, the ‘Clash’ thesis and its implications to Turkey – EU relations are also covered by Marfleet (2003) who investigates how wars and conflict have contributed to the shaping of Europe’s ethnic boundaries. A working paper on various aspects of the European identity commissioned by the European Commission (Jansen et al 1999) also investigates the formation of a European identity using approaches that are based on a great number of theoretical standpoints, including; history, psychology, anthropology and citizenship. The conclusion is that whilst Europe is firmly on a path toward developing a regional identity, one should expect it to be a long path in such a diverse region that encompasses various linguistic, ethnic, religious and cultural traditions and political and economic systems. Virtually all studies on the topic, however, refer to ‘something in the common experiences’ that makes a ‘European identity. How that ‘something’ is constructed, varies depending on the author’s approach. Ahmet Hahn (2004), for one makes a good point in arguing that Europe should first define this ‘European identity’ before making it an entry requirement, so that a fair assessment can be made in terms of who belongs to Europe and who does not.

European identity has also been analysed using discourse analysis, for instance by Thomas Diez (1999, 2001, 2004) who promoted the focus on discourse on European integration in his 1999 article in the Journal of European Public Policy. In his 2001 article he utilised discourse analysis to explain British European policy since World War II in order to understand the complexities of the British – EU relationship. Diez argues that the recent European identity construction process represents a return to geopolitics in terms of constructing geographic, cultural and political borders for ‘Europe’. Diez also sees the Eastern enlargement as a temporal return to

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Europe’s past that emphasised the process as one of reuniting the continent, whereas Turkey serves as the Islamic ‘other’ for Europe in the larger process of constructing Europe.\(^{244}\)

‘Othering’, is important argues Diez, because identities are ultimately constructed against the ‘other’, i.e. difference. He stipulates that identity would be unthinkable without othering and that “it would make no sense to say ‘I am European’ if this did not imply a difference from being ‘Asian’, ‘African’ or ‘American’”.\(^{245}\) Much of this ‘othering’ in the EU’s case has been against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Russia and the United States in the post Cold War era, and increasingly Islam and Turkey.\(^{246}\) This is quite curious if one takes into account that the ‘Europeanness’ of Cyprus was never questioned, although many would categorise it geographically Middle Eastern, a view enforced by its Ottoman history and a large Muslim population in the north of the island.\(^{247}\) What makes it even more curious is the fact that the European Commission has chosen to consider Turkey European as stipulated in the European Union Treaty (a.k.a. the Maastricht Treaty) that declares that all European states can join the Union.\(^{248}\) The rejection of Morocco’s application (submitted in 1987) in 1993 demonstrates that the EU is capable of turning down an applicant that is not deemed ‘European’. Hence, the fact that Turkey’s accession has been and continues to be questioned on this basis could well suggest that there are both rational and Ideational elements in the process that have affected the decision to allow Turkey to become a candidate country. Diez argues that Turkey’s accession process has been ambiguous and that the “discussion about Turkey’s membership operates on several levels.”\(^{249}\) This is to say that on one level there are serious political and economic concerns, but, on the other hand, much of the discussion concerns cultural aspects. The othering can also be temporal, as demonstrated by the case of EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, which could be seen as an attempt to overcome the Cold War division and the history of warfare

\(^{244}\) Diez (2004), p. 328

\(^{245}\) Diez (2004), p. 321

\(^{246}\) Diez (2004), p. 324

\(^{247}\) Diez (2004), p. 328

\(^{248}\) Diez (2004), p. 329

\(^{249}\) Diez (2004), p. 329
Turkey, however, as a staunch NATO member during the Cold War could be seen as being on the (Western) European side in temporal identity construction against the Soviet Union. Diez argues that these types of observations may indicate that the construction of a European identity increasingly relies on ‘geopolitical’ othering that combine elements of identity, politics and geography. Unfortunately for Turkey, the country could potentially be qualified as a suitable ‘other’ in terms of all of these elements.

Rainer Hülsse has also utilised discourse analysis to examine the Turkey – EU relations. He argues that Turkey has an image problem within the EU elite’s and public’s view and that the perceived cultural differences may well form a permanent obstacle for membership as they are much harder to overcome than political and economic (technical issues). It is notable that Hülsse emphasises perception and argues that Turkey really has an image problem rather than simply a problem of irreconcilable cultural differences with the European Union. His analyses utilise the Eurobarometer data on European public opinion and an analysis on German discourse on Turkey in both the media and the Bundestag to establish the public and elite opinion. Interestingly the study revealed that not only the Christian parties and conservatives referred to the perceived insurmountable differences in culture and viewed Turkey as Europe’s ‘other’, but the same applied to the social democrats and greens that have generally been considered more receptive towards Turkey’s membership. Moreover, the research concluded that the Central European countries were constructed as ‘us’ whereas Turkey was seen as the other, for reasons

250 Diez (2004), p. 327
251 Diez (2004), p. 331
253 Hülsse (2006), p. 310
255 Hülsse (2006), p. 312
that are not entirely clear.\(^{256}\) Besides establishing the stereotyping of Turkey, Hülsse questions why Turkey gets special attention in Eurobarometer studies regarding cultural differences, where as the other candidates are not conditioned in this manner. Hence, he raises the European Commission’s potential role in constructing the cultural gap.\(^{257}\) The same could be noted about the ‘bridge between civilizations’ rhetoric that has become prominent in public (elite in particular) discourse on Turkey’s accession, as will be shown later in this thesis. The importance of these social constructs of Turkey as the ‘other’ and the civilizational rhetoric may well amount to becoming a critical problem for the country’s EU membership. As Hülsse points out regardless how Turkey handles the accession process, the ratification of membership will ultimately be subject to referendums in member countries and if Turkey is perceived as non-European the results are likely to reflect that perception.\(^{258}\) Finally, Hülsse observes that Turkish complaints about the EU being a Christian club and emotional outbursts to problems in the process create a perception of an aggressive political culture that hinders the progress of the negotiations. Instead, Turkey should become ‘cool’ and aim at responding to Europe’s snubs with more *finesse*, as the European political culture supposedly would dictate. Whilst Hülsse’s account is certainly an interesting one and contributes to the understanding of the cultural/identity aspects of Turkey’s membership accession, it is based on a fairly limited sample of one member country, and thus can only provide clues and signposts for further research.

**Australia in East Asia: The odd man in?**

One of the most common arguments about East Asian Regionalism is that it is different from the European model. Peter Katzenstein has pointed out that it would be a great mistake to compare European "success" with Asian "failure."\(^{259}\) Unlike Europe, East Asian ‘open Regionalism’ is characterised by informality and market-based de facto Regionalism rather than supranational

\(^{256}\) Ibid

\(^{257}\) Hülsse (2006), p. 313

\(^{258}\) Hülsse (2006), p. 315

\(^{259}\) Katzenstein, (1997), p.3
institutions. Peter Katzenstein has also pointed out that Regionalism in Europe tends to be legalistic, whereas Regionalism in Asia tends to be driven by the markets. Moreover, the East Asian mode of Regionalism includes few binding regional agreements or regional institutions with decision-making mandates. Even where binding agreements are in place, no sanctions for non-compliance are implemented, but compliance is rather achieved by peer pressure. Rather, the majority of East Asian regional cooperation relies on Track II type cooperation that includes unofficial issue based ad hoc groups that are often characterised as consultative forums, aiming at informal opinion exchange and research.

In terms of defining the East Asian region, Paul Evans points out that the majority of accounts in this regard consider the increased trade and investment since the Plaza Accord in 1985 and the psychological consequences of the 1997 financial crisis as vital in the formation of the concept of “East Asia.” Evans also distinguishes between the terms “Asia Pacific” and Asia-Pacific” and argues that the hyphen is used as a “code” for defining the region based on the “Asian” component of East Asia that includes participants from outside as well. In a similar line of argument, Tsunekawa points out that the “Pacific” in the term “Asia-Pacific” was originally intended to refer to the developed “high-income” countries in the wider region, such as Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The various approaches to define the East Asian region according to Evans belong essentially in two main groups: ‘geographical’ and ‘functional definitions’. “The functional argument is inspired by a pragmatic and materialist commitment to solving practical problems and sidestepping the thorny issues of history, values

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261 Katzenstein, Peter (2005), A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Empire, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, p. 43
262 Tsunekawa (2005), p. 104
263 Ibid.
264 Evans (2005), p. 198
265 Evans (2005), p. 205
266 Tsunekawa (2005), p. 103
and identity”, and would include for instance the United States, Australia and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{267} The approaches emphasising the values and cultural perspective, on the other hand, can be divided into two main groups: 1) The “Asian values school” that emphasises the distinctive characteristics emerging from East Asia’s history and 2) “Cosmopolitan culture school” that emphasises the Asian consciousness and identity as a result of distinctive responses to globalization and other universal issues.\textsuperscript{268} The result of all this has been rather vague definitions of East Asia and its constituent parts: 1) Southeast Asia is the territory south of China and east of India (which was enforced by ASEAN’s rejection of India and Sri Lanka) and 2) East Asia is Asia-Pacific minus Japan, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (APEC comprises the Pacific Rim region, which an extension of Asia-Pacific).

A new more fixed definition of the region, however, has emerged around the ASEAN+3 (APT), which is the most advanced state driven attempt to create institutional Regionalism in East Asia.\textsuperscript{269} Whilst the process only included ASEAN countries along with China, Japan and South Korea, it has since expanded into ASEAN+6 in the form of the East Asia Summit, which includes Australia and New Zealand. Interestingly, Evans notes that APT is founded on common commitment to internationalism, Rationalism, and economic liberalism.\textsuperscript{270}

Paul Evans has also pointed out the role of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in defining the Asian component, as well as creating an Asian perspective to the process.\textsuperscript{271} Tsunekawa, on the other hand, points out that Japan attempted counter the then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed’s vision of a racially exclusive East Asia and sought to invite Australia and New Zealand to an ASEAN economic ministers’ meeting in April 1995, but this never materialised. When Mahathir later insisted on excluding the two from the newly set up Asia Europe Meeting

\textsuperscript{267} Evans (2005), pp. 207-208
\textsuperscript{268} Ibid
\textsuperscript{269} Evans (2005), p. 200
\textsuperscript{270} Evans (2005), p. 204
\textsuperscript{271} Evans (2005), pp. 205-206
(ASEM) in 1996, Japan had little interest in objecting as ASEM was inter-regional in nature.\textsuperscript{272} Hence, ASEM has kept its exclusive Asian character and consequently has promoted such a definition of the region in general. On the other hand, the Boao Forum for Asia which intends to be explicitly Asian\textsuperscript{273} includes Australia. In fact, Bob Hawke, former Prime Minister of Australia was one of its founders.\textsuperscript{274}

The work on ASEAN Identity and external relations tends to explain the emergence of the “ASEAN Way”, a type of ‘soft Regionalism’ as opposed to the more legalistic European Regionalism. The development of regional values and an emerging ASEAN regional identity have been widely covered by Acharya (1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2006), Haacke (2003), Johnston (2003), Jones (2004) and Ganesan (2000). Australia is occasionally touched upon in these studies, but the relationship between ASEAN and Australia is not specifically addressed. Terada (2003) explores the development of a regional East Asian identity that is forming through regional bodies such as ASEAN+3 and EAEC and the difficulties that in particular Australia experienced in its attempts to convince the other members that it is a regional state that should be included in the forum.

Peter Katzenstein on the other hand observes that cultural and civilizational motivations are significantly less important in East Asia than in Europe, where regional identity is grounded on such notions.\textsuperscript{275} However, he also points out to the evolving regional identity in East Asia and suggests that Australia would be an ideal point of comparison in this regard; ”Australia is a promising place to start our analysis of the evolution of Asian identities. Cultural and political similarities in relations between the United States and Australia, as well as United States and Canada, permit us to isolate differences in the effects of geographical distance”.\textsuperscript{276} Katzenstein also points out the ”borderline state” problem of Australia, albeit of course not using the term;

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{272} Tsunekawa (2005), p.132
  \item \textsuperscript{273} Evans (2005), p. 206
  \item \textsuperscript{274} See Boao Forum website: \url{http://www.boaoforum.com/Html/home-en.asp}
  \item \textsuperscript{275} Katzenstein (2005), pp. 76-77
  \item \textsuperscript{276} Katzenstein (2005), p. 78
\end{itemize}
"Think of a Canada that has been towed away from where it is, and moored off Africa, and the problem of Australia’s physical location become clear.” 277 Finally, Katzenstein observes that "comprehensive engagement” with East Asia is a difficult task to complete, as; "....Australia is struggling to articulate regional universalism and to become simultaneously post-European and post-Asian, transcending both its own European racial and cultural heritage and any racially or culturally specific Asia.”278 This notion is further investigated in Chapter 7. The literature that deals directly with Australia’s attempts to be included in Asian Regionalism mainly concentrate in describing Australia’s ‘push into Asia’ in the 1980s and in particular first half of 1990s. A vast majority of this literature refers to the problem of Australian identity as compared to the ‘Asian identity’. In particular, the identity problem and its effects on Australia’s relations with ASEAN and East Asia have been covered by Ball and Kerr (1997), Beeson and Yoshimatsu (2006), Battersby (2004), Burke (2001), Fitzgerald (1997), Goldsworthy (2001 and 2003), Mark and Smith (1998), Milner and Quilty et al. (1996), Paul (1998), Walker (1999) and Wesley (1997). Most of these accounts focus on the ‘push into Asia’ and the EAEC episode without attempting to provide a systematic account of the various aspects involved in these relationships. Finally, a PhD Thesis (published as a book in 2003) on Asian representations of Australia by Elizabeth Broinowski describes the historical and cultural dimensions of how Australians think Asians see them and how Asians really perceive Australians. Broinowski provides a historical survey of ten Asian countries and Australia in comparison and argues that a gap exists between how Asians really see Australia and how Australian opinion leaders see the country’s engagement with the region.

Australia’s foreign policy and security towards Asia has been examined by James Cotton and John Ravenhill et al. (1997) and Gurry (2001). A PhD Thesis on Australian Foreign Policy and Contemporary Asian Regionalism by John de Somer (2003) and Mcdougall (2001) examine Australia’s regional engagement from historical point of view under different governments, mainly concentrating on comparing the Hawke, Keating and Howard governments’ approach to

277 Ibid
278 Ibid
Regionalism. Former Prime Minister Paul Keating’s (2000) account on Australia’s engagement with Asia predictably represents the approach favoured by his government. Pinkstone (1992) and Smith (1998) on the other hand examine the historical development of economic interdependency and trade relations between Australia and Asia, whilst Lloyd (2001) explores the motives for further engagement with East Asia. Finally, a recent account by Paul Kelly (2006) provides an appraisal of John Howard’s decade as a Prime Minister, in particular in comparison to his predecessors Malcolm Fraser, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating. The main question that it seeks to answer is “has Howard sought to downgrade relations with Asia?” and thus radically changed the Australian Foreign Policy from the Hawke-Keating era?279 Kelly argues that despite Howard being a novice in foreign policy, his scepticism towards ALP’s “Push into Asia” and multilateralism in general, coupled with a foreign policy approach that is curious mix of realist and cultural traditionalist, he has scored some major victories in taking Australia into regional institutions. First of all, Howard’s government has taken Australia into the East Asia Summit (in 2005) after years of resistance. Secondly he has established deeper relations with China than any other Australian prime minister. Thirdly, despite the emphasis on Australian identity and values, and an explicit refusal to accept that Australia should adopt Asian ones, as well as issues such as East Timor, Australia’s relations with Japan, China and Indonesia are at their highpoint.280 Finally, Evans argues that Howard has not given up on engagement with Asia as such, he simply has very different ideas about what such engagement means.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the International Relations (IR) theories of Regionalism can be best understood as a dichotomy between the “Rationalist” and “Ideational” approaches, and that neither approach alone can sufficiently explain the problem of “borderline states” in Regionalism. Moreover, it has argued that the literature on enlargement and on the Turkey-EU and Australia and East Asia relations is even more underdeveloped and non-systematic, thus estab-


280 Evans (2006), p. 64
lishing the need for further study. Finally, it established that the “Rationalist” and “Ideational” approaches could be tested and applied to the research problem in order to establish which provides a more satisfactory answer to the research problem. The next chapter will establish the methodology for completing this task.
Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Design

3.1 Introduction

As laid out in Chapter 1 this thesis aims to test, challenge and further develop explanatory models in the theory of Regionalism. In particular the thesis aims to add to the understanding of the process of enlargement through deploying those models to the problem of the ‘borderline states’. Chapter 2 established that a dichotomy between “Rationalist” and “Ideational” exists in International Relations and Regionalism literature, as well as the lack of theoretical literature on enlargement and the need for further theory development in this field of research. Furthermore, I have argued that neither approach alone is sufficient and that consequently both approaches need to be deployed in order to provide a satisfactory answer to the research problem. Consequently, the thesis utilises an analytical eclecticism approach to accommodate for this dichotomy between the two approaches, as laid out in chapters 1 and 2. This chapter presents the research methodology and design chosen to reach that goal, as well as stating the rationale and techniques for the methodologies used for data analysis, limitations and delimitations of research, case studies and the selection of data sources and material.

This chapter is organised into two main sections. The first section introduces the research design, including: research questions, hypotheses, variables, justification for cases and the selection of data sources.

The second section introduces the methodology used in the chapters, starting with those utilised in the Rationalist and Ideational chapters used in chapters 4,5,6 and 7, as well as a variant of Discourse Analysis; Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis (FPDA), which is utilised in ‘Ideational’ chapters 5 and 7.

3.2 Research Design

This section introduces the research design for the thesis; the research questions, hypotheses, variables, justification for cases and the selection of data sources utilised.
3.2.1 Research questions and hypotheses

**Research Questions**

This thesis aims to answer the following research questions:

1. What is the current level of interdependency (material and cognitive) between the case countries and regions? How are these measured?

2. What should the level of interdependency be according to each approach (rational vs. Ideational) to accommodate further integration?

3. What are the benefits and costs of inclusion vs. exclusion in each case?

4. Which set of theories (rational vs. Ideational) provides a better explanation to the problem in terms of greater explained variance?

5. What constitutes regional identity? What impact do notions of regional identity have for the problem? How do the identities and cultures of “borderline states’ compare with those of the respective regions?

Given the results of the study, what policy and further research options should be followed?

**Hypotheses**

The following hypotheses were made in order to guide the analysis of the problem of the borderline states:

1. Material or cognitive interdependency alone cannot explain the problem

2. If material interdependency is high between the case countries and regions and the benefits from full integration are high, it would seem reasonable to assume that if such integration is not taking place then this is because of a lack of cultural similarity.

3. Emphasis on regional identity increases with further vertical (deepening) integration and successful regional identity building creates further boundaries for horizontal integration (enlargement)
The primary variables for the analysis and the rationale for these are:

1. **Dependent Variable: Borderline state – region relations**
   
   What is the nature of the relationship between Turkey and the European Union and Australia and East Asia? Are these two borderline states considered as credible candidates for a full membership in their respective regions?

2. **Independent Variables: Material Interdependence, Cognitive Interdependence**

   What is driving the above? Which one is more important for the borderline state – region relationship – material or cognitive interdependency?

3. **Other Variables: Regional institutions, Horizontal and Vertical Integration, Regime type, domestic politics, geography**

   Do other factors, such as the nature of the regional institutions, the maturity of integration (is the emphasis on deepening integration or enlargement of the region), regime type of the borderline state versus the prevailing type in the region (if there is one), domestic politics in the borderline states and/or the incumbent members or geography, have a significant impact on the relationship and Turkey’s and Australia’s inclusion in their respective regions?

**Case Studies**

This research utilises a comparative case study approach by analysing two exceptional test cases in order to discover significant differences in cases that appear similar, as well as towards comparing the utility of the Rationalist and Ideational approaches and to demonstrate the problem of the borderline states and its significance to the study of Regionalism. The utility of comparative methodology in advancing theory in political science and International Relations, in particular in establishing points of converge between competing approaches and accommodating *analytical eclecticism*, as explained in chapters 1 and 2.

The two borderline states chosen for this purpose are Turkey and Australia. While Australia and Turkey are very different countries in many respects, they share a fundamental commonality; both struggle to identify and define their place in the international system. This tension pervades
their relationship with their respective regions; ASEAN and East Asia for Australia and the European Union for Turkey. Yet, these two countries also have a long and established history of intimate strategic relations with their neighbours, examples being economic interdependency, interest convergence in political and security affairs, as well as involvement in at least some central regional institutions.

In terms of ‘Rationalist’ criteria, Australia has actively participated in regional economic relations through the AFTA-CER process, taken part in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and recently (despite fierce resistance by a number of other participants) joined the East Asia Summit. Australia is also a founding member and active participant of a wider multilateral organisation, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organisation. Turkey, on the other hand, signed an Association Agreement with the European Community (precursor to the European Union) in 1963 and began accession talks for full-membership to the European Union (EU) in October 2005. In addition, it has a customs union with the EU, and is a member of OECD, OSCE and the Council of Europe. During its long (and rocky) road to membership, Turkey has implemented numerous relatively radical economic, political and social reforms in order to satisfy the 10000 page EU membership requirements, the *acquis communitaire*.

Despite such efforts, both countries have met resistance in their attempts to gain further integration through full-membership in regional bodies; Australia in terms of ASEAN and East Asia and Turkey in terms of the European Union. Often resistance or rejection has been based on claims that these countries are not “genuinely of region”.

Opponents have put forward the argument that Australia is not “Asian” but rather a geographically displaced “European” country. In contrast, Turkey is often labelled Asiatic by Europeans. These types of arguments have been persistent and prominent in political rhetoric. They underlie politically motivated concepts such as “absorption capacity” and “privileged relationship”, and more recently, they have begun to permeate religious discourse. For the purposes of this research I have chosen to term these states ‘borderline states’. They are labelled ‘borderline states’ not for their geographical properties, but for the permanent partiality of their inclusion within their regions. Such states are in constant flux, varying their degree of belonging depending on the criteria of enclosure. These particular aspects or conditions also separate Turkey and Australia.
from other states that could be potentially also considered as borderline states within a more limited context, for example Russia. Russia, however, has no significant interest in joining the European Union, nor is it locked in state of partial inclusion in Europe.

In the larger theoretical context the cases of Turkey-EU and Australia – East Asia also represent a fundamental paradox in the study of Regionalism and this raises a number of important questions. Does material interdependency define the perception of cognitive interdependency or vice versa? Is the “of regionness” criteria defined on material or on cognitive basis? What forces, “rational” or “Ideational”, drive regional enlargement, and integration?

**Data sources**

The selection of data sources reflects the dichotomy between the two approaches deployed in separate chapters. Both primary and secondary sources were used in the main empirical chapters. In chapters 4 and 6, which are based on a "Rationalist” approach, the data sources selected reflect the preferred methods in that framework, i.e. data that facilitates cost versus benefit analysis on the economic, political and security aspects of the relationships, largely inspired by economic "Club Theory” and Mattli’s “Logic of Integration”. Consequently the main data sources for these chapters consist of trade statistics, trade documents, official texts, political treaties, reports, white papers from the governments involved and regional and international organisations and analysis and reports by third parties, such as international organisations, think tanks and academic research institutes. The main foundational texts in these chapters include official texts that establish the memberships requirements, criteria for evaluation for meeting these and the legal and institutional basis for the relations between the borderline states and the regions. These include the founding treaties of regional organisations and trade, political and security treaties.

In the Turkey-EU case the foundational texts are the founding treaties of the EU, such as the 1992 Treaty of the European Union (a.k.a. the Maastricht Treaty), the Copenhagen Criteria established by the declaration of the Copenhagen European Council of 1993, The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2001). Secondly, the agreements and treaties that regulate the relationship between Turkey and the EU are also used as founding texts; the Asso-
THE PROBLEM OF THE ‘BORDERLINE STATES’ IN REGIONALISM

ciation Agreement of 1963 (a.k.a. the Ankara Agreement), the Additional Protocol (AP) of November 1970, the Customs Union Treaty of 1995, the Declaration by the 1999 Helsinki European Council and the Accession Partnership (2001, 2003, 2005). The main sources used to assess how Turkey is meeting the relevant EU criteria are the annual Turkey Progress Reports since 1999. These are produced by the European Commission and progress reports and analysis are provided by the Turkish government, the EU and third parties.

In the Australia – ASEAN/East Asia case the foundational texts are the ASEAN and East Asia Summit founding treaties/declarations and treaties/agreements/declarations regulating the relationship between Australia and ASEAN and the East Asia Summit. The founding documents of ASEAN chosen for the purposes of this research were: the ASEAN Declaration (a.k.a. the Bangkok Declaration) of 1967, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (a.k.a. Bali Concord) of 1976, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976), ASEAN Vision 2020 (1997), the Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation (1999) and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) of 2003. These documents were chosen because they established the guiding principles for ASEAN, as well as broader regional and international cooperation in the region. In addition to these, documents directly relating to relations between ASEAN and Australia and the country’s role in the region were examined.

These included official texts relating to Australia’s Dialogue Partnership with ASEAN, the AFTA-CER Closer Economic Partnership, Australia’s participation in the ARF and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which Australia signed in 2005, the ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Partnership (1 August 2007), ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program and the guiding negotiation principles for ASEAN—Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (expected in 2007/2008). The potential implications of the planned ASEAN Charter to Australia’s relationship with ASEAN were also examined. Finally, a number of white and strategy papers by the Australian government, major academic texts and independent analysis were analysed.
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Table 1. Main Categories of Sources in “Rationalist” Analysis Chapters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Type</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foundational documents</td>
<td>Regional foundational treaties, charters and texts</td>
<td>Founding principles, Institutional framework, Code of conduct for members, Membership criteria, Accession process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade statistics</td>
<td>Trade between case countries and regions</td>
<td>The level of trade &amp; economic interdependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade agreements</td>
<td>Trade agreements and treaties between case countries and regions</td>
<td>Framework for economic relations between case countries and regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Reports</td>
<td>Reports relating to economic and political relations</td>
<td>The status of economic and political relations between case countries and regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Party Reports</td>
<td>Reports relating to economic and political relations</td>
<td>Alternative view to the status of economic and political relations between case countries and regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Papers</td>
<td>Policy challenges, objectives and solutions for bilateral relations between the case countries and regions</td>
<td>Aspirations for bilateral relations, challenges in reaching them and policy solutions to improve the situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Statements</td>
<td>Official statements by governmental and regional officials</td>
<td>Official positions regarding the status, objectives and aspirations regarding bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These sources are listed in Appendix A.

Chapters 5 and 7 investigate the research problem from the “Ideational” perspective, i.e. approaches emphasising the role of identity, culture and values in Regionalism. Much of this research adheres to the framework provided by Social Constructivism. However, Samuel P. Huntington has argued in his “Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order” that both countries are “torn”. According to Huntington both countries belong to one civilisation but
have in effect attempted to “defect” it in order to join a regional grouping that represents another. This proposition has been utilised by both the proponents and opponents of borderlines states joining their respective groupings, as will be shown in these two chapters. Whether one believes in the broader thesis of civilizational conflict or not, it is true that Turkey and Australia are perceived as not being genuinely of that region and that the civilizational – or culturally or religiously motivated opposition are real and serious hurdles in these relationships. Hence, these chapters will examine the development of emerging regional identities and their use for or against borderline states. Consequently, the question of identity and regionness are examined from a variety of viewpoints, including; geography, history, religion and public opinion. Furthermore, Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis is utilised in order to determine the role of material and Ideational factors in the dominant discourses of Turkey’s and Australia’s roles in their respective regions. Consequently the primary data for these chapters comes from texts, principally speeches, interviews and statements by officials and other authorised speakers.

Other data includes the Eurobarometer surveys since 2000, following the 1999 Helsinki European Council decision to recognise Turkey as an official candidate for full membership, combined with European Values Survey and PEW Global surveys and other public opinion polls to analyse the public opinion in the EU and Turkey regarding the support for and opposition to Turkey’s EU membership and its “Europeanness”. In the Australia – ASEAN/East Asia case the data selection is designed to identify and evaluate the compatibility of Ideational concepts such as the controversial “Asian values”, designed to bind the proposed ASEAN Community and its regional identity. This will be compared to perceived Australian values, and their relevance and impact upon the research problem will be assessed. In addition to these, discourse analysis also considers the foundational texts covered in the “Rationalist” chapters, as well as texts produced by major political figures, such as the EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn’s book Europe’s Final Frontiers and the former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating’s book Engagement. Data on public opinion was collected on Australian foreign policy priorities and Australia’s place in the region and the world, as well as Australia’s image in Asia. The primary sources included Lowy Institute Polls; Australians speak 2005: public opinion and foreign policy, The Lowy Institute Poll 2006: Australia, Indonesia and the world and Australia and the World: public opinion and foreign policy (2007). Other data included Australian Elections Study
surveys, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs’ 2006 *Chicago Council Public Opinion Survey*, PEW Global Attitudes Project and various public opinion polls. The main sources exclusively and specifically utilised in the Ideational chapters are listed in Appendix B.

*Table 2. Main Categories of Sources in “Ideational” Analysis Chapters*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Type</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rationalist texts</td>
<td>Foundational texts, official reports, white papers and official statements</td>
<td>Discourses referring to Ideational factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundational texts</td>
<td>Foundational regional treaties, declarations and visions</td>
<td>Texts constructing the idea of the region, regional identity, culture and values. Official discourses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech acts</td>
<td>Speech acts by officials and influential thinkers/thought leaders in format of speeches, statements, interviews, books and articles</td>
<td>Elite opinion in relation to the idea/purpose of regional integration, enlargement and membership. Elite discourses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion surveys</td>
<td>Public opinion surveys/polls regarding regional identity, culture and case countries</td>
<td>Regional citizens’ views regarding the idea of the region, its identity and culture. Public opinion in the case regions and countries regarding the membership of case countries. Public discourses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values surveys</td>
<td>Surveys regarding citizen’s values in regions, countries and “civilizations”</td>
<td>Compatibility of values in case regions and countries. Existence and significance of “universal values”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 **Methodology**

3.3.1 **Introduction**

This section introduces the primary methodological frameworks used throughout this thesis.

As already stated the various chapters in this investigation follow the frameworks provided by two conflicting approaches; “Rationalist” and “Ideational”. Chapters 4 and 6, which utilise the "Rationalist” approach, prioritise primary material factors as the main drivers for regional integration and hence, also for regions to integrate new members and for countries to seek membership in regional organisations. Consequently the methodology in these chapters utilise cost/benefit analysis of regional integration influenced by club theory from economics and Mattli’s logic of integration from Regionalism studies. In addition to this, chapter 4 pays additional specific attention to whether Turkey meets the requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria and the milestones set in by the formal accession process.

Chapters 5 and 7, on the other hand, employ the "Ideational” approaches to the research problem. Hence, these chapters mainly follow the Social Constructivist framework in order to establish the roles and explanatory powers of Ideational variables such as identity, culture, values, geography, history and religion. This will allow us to see the impact of such variables upon establishing a shared feeling of ”we-ness”, a sense of community and regional identity, as well as the implications of a notion of “regionness” upon the attempt of borderline states to integrate themselves into the region or at least establish a close “privileged” relationship with their respective regions. On the other hand, a counter-argument has been established by the Clash of Civilisations thesis and those arguing the prevalence of civilizational or cultural geopolitics in Turkey-EU relations.\(^{281}\) Interestingly it has also been used to support Turkey’s membership by arguing that this would significantly contribute towards avoiding such a clash and instead establish a bridge

between civilisations. Thus whilst considered controversial by many, the clash thesis is a useful tool for examining the culturally (or civilisationally) motivated opposition to the prospects of borderline states joining their respective regions. Finally, Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis is utilised to establish the presence and importance of Rationalist and Ideational factors in the dominant discourses in the two sets of cases. This method is explained in detail later in this chapter.

### 3.3.2 Discourse Analysis

Providing one universally accepted definition of Discourse Analysis is an impossible task. This is because it is not an empirical or scientific method but rather a means whereby one can think critically about a particular research problem. As such it does not aim to produce scientifically verifiable results, in either in quantitative nor qualitative sense, but rather is a tool for questioning the basic assumptions of such research. Moreover, it can be applied to any topic in virtually any field and has consequently been deployed in numerous fields with varying ontological and epistemological foundations. In this thesis the most relevant applications of Discourse Analysis have been deployed in foreign policy and Regionalism analysis. Such research is still relatively rare, but is starting to have an impact following the work by Lene Hansen, Thomas Diez, Reiner Hülssse and others. Lene Hansen established poststructuralist discourse analysis in foreign policy analysis in her 2006 book analysing Western intervention in the Balkan War, whilst Diez and Hülssse examined Turkey’s “Europeanness” and the role of “othering” in the process of constructing the European “Self”. Following the example of Hansen, Diez and Hülssse I am using discourse analysis as a tool for questioning the basic assumptions of the ”Rationalist” and “Ideational” approaches through a critical examination of what role rational (material) and Ideational concepts play in the dominant discourses. The reasoning for this is the assumption that processes

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of "othering" towards Turkey and Australia in their respective regions would appear to have a central role in the opposition whilst material interests appear to be mainly used for justifying further integration. Yet the Rationalist approaches tend to exclusively emphasise the material factors, whilst the Ideational approaches tend to argue that these material interests only have a meaning in the context of that assigned to them by the social actors involved. This thesis argues that this dichotomy between the two approaches limits a proper understanding of the problem of borderline states, and in the broader context the true nature of Regionalism. Discourse analysis is a useful tool to objectively test those assumptions and determine the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches with the hope of establishment a synthesis of the two approaches that would equip us to acquire a more complete understanding of the problem.

3.3.3 Approaches to Discourse Analysis

Discourse Analysis (DA) has become a well established practise in many social science fields of, more recently becoming also in International Relations (IR). In IR research DA is most closely associated with Social Constructivism, although its use is not limited to this framework. The framework, in the context of the dichotomy presented in this thesis, is nonetheless “Ideational”. As Thomas Diez has pointed out carrying out Discourse Analysis makes little sense “if one believes that politics is essentially about the realisation of structurally determined economic interests,” i.e. if one subscribes to the “Rationalist” framework. Social Constructivism (and DA with it), on the other hand, has gained popularity with the elevation of the importance of Ideational concepts such as culture, identity and values motivated by the emergence of new research agendas such as globalization. This has also had an impact on the study of Regionalism where Social Constructivism and DA have explored the impact of the construction of regional identities and the use of language in identity building. Discourse Analysis is an important part of this research agenda and is mainly interested in the use of language, in this case in particular

284 Diez (2001), p. 18
political language, to justify policies and advocate political ideas into practice and the building of common identities around these policies.\textsuperscript{285}

The basic assumption behind DA is that material objects do not have a meaning separate from one given to them by social actors. Social actors, on the other hand, give “things” meaning by assigning relationships and “sign systems” to them in order to make sense of them.\textsuperscript{286} Discourses then are social constructs of knowledge about a particular topic: “A discourse is a group of statements which provide a language for talking about –i.e. a way of representing – a particular kind of knowledge about the topic. When statements about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which the topic can be constructed”.\textsuperscript{287} It is thus interested in the organisation of language, used beyond a sentence, and based on the idea that language is structured according to different patterns that people use when acting in different domains of social life. Discourse Analysis is the analysis of these patterns.\textsuperscript{288} Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) propose a definition of “discourse as a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world). Thus in philosophical terms it is above all about epistemology relating to a particular topic or issue in the society”. DA is thus a useful tool for testing such assumptions.

The use of Discourse Analysis has developed into different schools. Foucauldian discourse analysis, based on the work of the French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault, has become particularly well established in research areas that concern identity, subjectivity, personal and social change and power relations in society.\textsuperscript{289} Discourse Theory by Ernesto Laclau and


\textsuperscript{289} Burr, Vivienne (2003), \textit{Social Constructivism}, New York, Routledge., p. 63
Chantal Mouffe relies on a notion that discourses construct the social world in meaning, and thus are ‘real’. Moreover, it believes in a ‘discursive struggle’ where discourses are not fixed entities, but rather discourses conflict and influence each other producing new discourses. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) on the other hand, following the work of Fairclough, Wodak, Van Dijk and others, treats discourse as only one of many aspects of social action rather than being ‘real’. Also, in terms of focus, CDA is mostly interested in change, as well as reasons and motives for social change.

To political scientists, discourse has a specific narrative in terms of signifying a public discourse about a certain political topic or theme. Hence, it is not exclusively linguistic in nature, but also implies a behavioural dimension. The use of language is an action used by social actors and such actions have consequences for the society in which they are spoken. Besides constructing problems, objects and subjects, policy discourses also need to construct solutions to them. Thus a discourse can also be seen as a form of social practice. Moreover, as Rainer Hülsse has argued, “discourse does not take place in a vacuum; it is embedded in a specific context”. Consequently, a proper understanding of the context in which discourse takes place is crucial. DA alone tells us nothing conclusive. The rationale behind the use of DA is therefore the assumption that political texts and acts of speech have at the very least some intention or objective underlying their use. Thomas Diez has argued that the history of European integration can be understood as history of speech acts, comprising an extensive collection of treaties, declarations and other speech acts aiming to establish a regional system of governance. Yet, the historical

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290 Jorgensen and Phillips (2002), p. 6
292 Hansen (2006), p. 21
293 Hülsse (1999), pp. 4-5
294 Hülsse (1999), p. 7
295 Diez (1999), p. 601
296 Diez (1999), p. 601
background of European Regionalism, as well as the changes in the international system that influenced and accelerated Regionalism in Europe from 1990s onwards have influenced the development of the EU and the discourses within, in particular in terms of enlargement, a central topic in this thesis.

### 3.3.4 Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis

The use of discourse analysis in International Relations is generally used to “illustrate how textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to describe, in specific contexts, the implications of this connection for the way we think and act in the contemporary world” 297 In the context of foreign policy making, the suggested policies are required to meaningfully construct solutions to the situation at hand and construct the topics within these policies, thus both drawing from and constructing identities, whether these are national, regional or institutional. 298 One of the main tasks of foreign policy makers is to construct foreign policies that are perceived as consistent with these identities. 299 Identity building, on the other hand, is not viable without juxtaposition against alternative identities. 300 As Thomas Diez has pointed out it makes little sense to say I am “European” unless it somehow differentiates me from someone who is “American”, “Asian” or “African”. 301 Hence, the process of “othering”, even when not articulated explicitly is a central component of identity building. Consequently, the efforts of regional identity building are problematic to ‘borderline states’ if they are perceived and constructed as the “Other”. DA can equip us with the tools to expose and objectively analyse this problem in regionalist theory.

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298 Hansen (2006), p. 6

299 Hansen (2006), p. 28

300 Hansen (2006), p. 19

301 Diez (2004), 321
Lene Hansen (2006)\(^{302}\) introduces poststructuralist discourse analysis in foreign policy research by the example of her analysis of the Balkan war and how it was constructed by the West. Her work reveals for instance how the United States constructed the discourse over Western intervention in the Balkans as primarily a European responsibility referring to the region being part of Europe’s “turf” as well arguing that the US had no available resources, thus combining material and Ideational discourses.\(^{303}\) Secondly, she shows how Slovenia was simultaneously constructed as part of Europe, and thus rightfully returned to European “Self”, whilst yet sufficiently Balkan to constitute the “Other”. Consequently, it was argued that the inclusion of Slovenia to Europe constituted a "bridge" between the two.\(^{304}\)

Hansen argues that poststructuralist discourse analysis, “built on Foucault, Derrida, Kristeva and Laclau and Mouffe, can be used to theorise the constructive relationship between representations of identity and foreign policies as suggested by heads of states, governments, opposition politicians, the media and academics”.\(^{305}\) By ‘constructive relationship’ Hansen implies that discursive constructions of identity are both constitutive and product of foreign policy at the same time.\(^{306}\) Moreover, foreign policy discourses (just as all policy discourses) are social in their nature because policymakers have to consider and address political opposition and public opinion when formulating these policies.\(^{307}\) In epistemological terms Hansen’s poststructuralist position considers the relationship between identity and policy as discursive, but not causal. She argues that it is not possible to separate material and Ideational factors in foreign policy because they are inextricably linked and analysing discourse does not provide a tool for testing explanatory powers of these. However, DA can “expand upon as well as question causal scholarship”.\(^{308}\)

Hence, whilst DA is not a tool to test the relative explanatory power of the two approaches in

\(^{302}\) Hansen, Lene (2006), Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, Routledge, London

\(^{303}\) Hansen (2006), pp. 31-32

\(^{304}\) Hansen (2006), pp. 39-40

\(^{305}\) Hansen (2006), p. xvii

\(^{306}\) Hansen (2006), p. 23

\(^{307}\) Hansen (2006), p. 28

\(^{308}\) Hansen (2006), p. 18
comparative terms, it is a suitable tool for questioning the basic assumptions of Rationalist and Ideational frameworks. Lack of causality does not mean lack of scientific rigour. Thus, DA is well-suited and contributes to the aims of this thesis as one tool in a set of methodologies through testing the two approaches from various points of view. This contributes to the process of triangulation and through that process to the goal of testing the explanatory powers of the two approaches, as well as the possibility to build a synthesis that encompasses parts of both.

In terms of methodological and epistemological focus poststructuralist DA prioritises primary texts produced by authorised speakers in foreign policy; heads of states, foreign ministers, representatives of regional institutions and other political actors with formal authority to initiate and implement foreign policy. However, echoing Hansen I argue that primary texts are the priority, specifically in the sense that they represent the official and actionable foreign policy and thus, best reflect what is going on in the ‘real world’. However, as Rainer Hülsse has argued foreign policy making does not take place in a vacuum, but rather is a product of and is itself shaping the discourses around it. Consequently I believe that primary texts should be analysed in context of the wider discursive terrain. Moreover, whilst secondary texts bring in added objectivity to the study, they can also at times become primary texts. For instance Samuel Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations* is so prominent in the Turkey-EU discourse that ignoring it would not be wise.

### 3.3.5 Research Design

My discourse analysis follows a narrative of discourses relating to the Rationalist (primarily material) and Ideational themes, conditions and criteria of Australia’s and Turkey’s participation in regional integration in their respective regions. In the Rationalist framework these are primarily references to economic, political, institutional and strategic (primarily security) conditions,

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310 Hülsse (1999), p. 7
312 Hansen (2006), pp. 82-83
criteria and above all costs and benefits in these categories. Within the context of the Ideational framework the focus of interest is in discourses built around the “regionness” of Australia and Turkey in the context of regional identities, cultural, religious and value differences. The primary texts are those produced by the authorised speakers in these topic, mainly official documents produced by the regional institutions and governments involved, as well as treaties, agreements, memorandums of understanding, evaluation reports and white and strategy papers. Secondly, the analysed material includes speech acts by authorised speakers – officials and respected commentators – in forms of speeches and statements. At this point I would like to point out that the samples are by no means exhaustive, or even particularly extensive, but also that these are analysed in the context of much more extensive secondary materials covered in the literature review and the empirical research chapters.

**FPDA Research Process**

The FPDA analysis in chapters 5 and 7 proceeds in stages, beginning with the selection of texts based on a wider reading of materials in the context of the empirical research carried out prior to FPDA, then proceeding to the identification of the dominant discourses relevant in the selected key texts. These are subsequently systematically analysed using the NVivo qualitative analysis software package utilising coding of key words and phrases, which are then identified and located in the selected primary texts and then subsequently organised into thematic nodes. The research then proceeds to testing and modelling relationships between these in order to reveal patterns within the dominant discourses. All this is done in the context of the background provided by secondary texts and empirical research. The analysis also considers the intertextuality of the primary texts, i.e. that texts never give their full meaning, but rather build on other texts through explicitly or implicitly referring to other texts through direct quotes or borrowing key concepts and catchphrases. Consequently, in order to properly accommodate for intertextuality and the nuances of the wider discursive field I have chosen to utilise analytical coding, i.e. intextuality is a concept first introduced by Julia Kristeva (1988). It relies on the notion that all texts make references to past texts, explicitly or implicitly. Hansen (2006, p. 57) points out that texts can claim legitimacy differently; some from quoting others and some from being quoted by others.

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313 Such as “Clash of Civilisations”, “avoiding a Clash of Civilisations”, “Bridge between Civilisations”, “losing Turkey”, “train wreck”, etc. Intertextuality is a concept first introduced by Julia Kristeva (1988). It relies on the notion that all texts make references to past texts, explicitly or implicitly. Hansen (2006, p. 57) points out that texts can claim legitimacy differently; some from quoting others and some from being quoted by others.
analysing the material while coding. Analytical coding equips the researcher to go beyond content analysis by not only considering the occurrence of a certain term or phrase in the material but also deconstructing the meaning of the text in the wider context. This approach will also facilitate avoiding over-coding and organising the material into thematic nodes.  

For instance the analysis of Ideational forces considers not only direct references to “clash of civilizations”, but also the broader context of cultural differences as a factor in the case country – regional relations, in particular the process of "othering", such as emphasising the importance of dialogue between cultures in the context of Turkey-EU or Australia-East Asia relations. Moreover, in addition to traditional “othering” which tends to differentiate in a negative context, in both cases discourses building ”positive othering” were examined; for instance suggesting that the case countries would be establishing a “bridge between civilizations”, e.g. implying that Turkey and Australia either belong into another civilization or that they are located along the borderlines of two intersecting civilizations. In the Turkey-EU case there is also the need to provide proof for the compatibility of Islam and democracy.

Richards, Lyn (2005), Handling Qualitative Data, SAGE Publications, London, pp. 94-95
In a similar manner the analysis of Rationalist forces, whilst focusing primarily on arguments built around the costs and benefits of enlargement in particular but also Regionalism in general, also considers extensions of the Rationalist agenda beyond the issue of “club benefits” and the process of integration by including the sometimes rather speculative arguments based on perceived long-term benefits. These long-term benefits supposedly override short-term costs and so-called negative externalities and therefore override the prevailing cost-benefit calculations altogether. Thus, in addition to the strict rational choice approach, a “thin Rationalist” approach promoted by mainly liberal and secularist actors in the regions are also accounted for. I anticipate that in this regard the rational and Ideational approaches will intersect in a variety of topics under discussion. In order to accommodate for such instances the chapters utilising FPDA (5&7), whilst distinctive in coding, have an identical structure of nodes, and in fact many free nodes are the same.
Further details regarding nodes and coding are provided in Appendices C, D, E and F.

In terms of further limitations it should be pointed out that only English language texts are utilised. This decision was made based on a judgement that texts using the same language are simply more comparable, whilst when using two or more the dangers of missing or misinterpreting nuances of meaning from one language to another are great in translating, even if the researcher is somewhat fluent in those.
3.3.6 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the research design for this thesis, as well as the rationale for the choice of a methodological mix that not only accommodates the two alternative approaches – the Rationalist and the Ideational-. Crucially it also facilitates the testing of their explanatory powers and the possibilities for establishing a synthesis of these that would enhance our ability to understand the drivers and limits of Regionalism through a critical examination of the ‘problem of borderline states’.
Part II
Chapter 4: Rationalist Analysis of Turkey’s EU Accession Prospects

4.1 Introduction

We have already shown in the course of this thesis that a clear dichotomy exists between the Rationalist and Ideational approaches to the concept of Regionalism. This also applies to the analysis of Turkey’s relationship with the European Union (EU). Whereas some of the work in this field concedes the importance of the other position, the majority of the analysis exclusively emphasises one approach. The Rationalist analysis on Turkish membership prospects in the EU tends to emphasise almost exclusively the material aspects of the process, in particular the perceived material costs and benefits of membership for the EU and Turkey. Hence, much of the analysis concentrates on determining whether Turkey fulfils the economic and political criteria as defined by the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, which states the political and economic criteria for prospective candidate countries (“the Copenhagen criteria”). The strict Rationalist thinking on Turkey’s EU prospects correspond with the official line of the EU; Turkey has been an official candidate since the 1999 Helsinki Summit and the December 2004 Copenhagen European Council decided to start official negotiations towards accession with Turkey, following a positive assessment by the European Commission. As long as Turkey fulfils the requirements set forward in the Copenhagen Criteria and the Accession Partnership it will become a full member of the EU. The disagreement amongst Rationalists is thus mainly over whether Turkey meets the set political and economic criteria.

Another central theme in Rationalist analysis is the, often highly speculative, cost/benefit calculations modelled on Mattli’s logic of integration or the economic “club theory”. The most common topics for such analysis are assessments on the impact of Turkey’s membership on

315 The power of ideas is often recognised as playing a role in regional integration but is generally treated as a secondary factor, not as an independent causal factor.

316 The Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 was created in particular to accommodate the accession process of the former Eastern Bloc countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
economic integration, trade, the EU budget, working of regional institutions, common foreign and security policy and migration. This chapter aims at providing an analysis of these areas central to the Rationalist approach in order to estimate the potential costs and benefits of Turkey’s accession, and since the Rationalist approach dictates that accession will only take place if benefits are higher than costs\textsuperscript{317}, also the prospects for a successful accession. Again the basic assumption is that the EU (and its member states) is a rational agent and thus, as long as the benefits of the Turkish accession are perceived to override the cost Turkey will be permitted entry to the Union. The debate about Turkey’s "Europeanness" and its conformity to European values is considered to be of secondary value in Rationalist analysis and is not given significant attention beyond questions such as democracy and human rights, which are part of the membership criteria.

\section*{4.2 Turkey’s Accession to Full Membership}

Turkey’s path toward EU membership has been a long and rugged one. Turkey first expressed interest in joining the European community in the very beginning of the European integration project in the 1950s and consequently applied to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, only a year after its inception. Instead of being granted full membership Turkey was offered an association agreement and consequently ”the Ankara Agreement” was signed in 1963. After a long period of cooling relations, Turkey and the EU signed a Customs Union treaty in 1995 thus taking Turkey closer to full membership. Subsequently in 1997 Turkey again applied for full membership in the EU, which was accepted by the 1999 Helsinki European Council after a favourable assessment by the European Commission, thus making Turkey an official candidate. In December 2004 the Copenhagen European Council took the process to the next step by deciding to open membership negotiations with Turkey (negotiations officially opened in 2005).

This section focuses on examining the EU membership criteria and in particular how Turkey meets these requirements. The analysis thus covers Turkey’s progress towards meeting the

\textsuperscript{317} However, as established earlier in the thesis, Mattli argues that in some cases the existence of negative externalities resulting from turning down a candidate can override this logic even if costs are deemed higher than benefits
Copenhagen Criteria, the objectives set in the formal accession process and specific contentious issues that must be solved prior to accession, such as the thorny Cyprus issue. The data primarily used for the analysis comprises the annual progress reports by the European Commission and other EU institutions, as well as independent analysis by think tanks, international organisations, research institutes and advocacy groups.

4.2.1 The Copenhagen Criteria and the Accession Process

The EU’s criteria towards new members are best described as a three tier system. Firstly, the most basic condition for membership is stated in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht Article 49\(^{318}\), which sets the geographic and general political criteria by stating that membership is open to any European state that respects the principles of the EU. The treaty does not, however, in any detailed manner define what the borders of Europe are and what qualifies as ‘respect’ for EU’s principles. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) clarified the founding principles of the EU by stating that:”the Union is founded on the principle of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, principles which are common to the member states”\(^{319}\). Compliance criteria for the candidate states were established in the 1993 “Copenhagen Criteria”. However, as to the “Europeanness” of the candidate countries the decision is ultimately made on a case-by-case basis, based on the recommendation by the European Commission, and decided by the European Council. The results of this process, however, have been somewhat inconsistent. For instance Morocco’s membership application was turned down in 1993 after 6 years of consideration on the basis that the country was not ‘European’, where as the ‘Europeanness’ of Cyprus was never questioned, although it is widely considered Middle Eastern or Asian. Whilst Cyprus thus is not European geographically, it was nonetheless considered such due to its historical, cultural and political links with Europe. Thus, whilst arguably vague, the first tier is nonetheless important as negotiations are started only with states that fulfil


this basic condition. Turkey has passed this milestone test, in fact many times; notably, first when Council of Europe in 1949 admitted it to the organisation, thus qualifying it as a European state, and then when it was approved as a candidate country by the European Council in the December 1999 Helsinki Summit. The last major milestone was passed when on 31 October 2005 the EU officially confirmed the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey.

The second tier is slightly more specific and intended to provide a framework for more detailed membership criteria. This so-called ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ was initiated when the 1993 Copenhagen European Council decided that to join the EU, a new Member State must meet three criteria: 1) Political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 2) Economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; 3) Legislative: acceptance of the Community acquis (acquis communitaire), ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. The Council’s conclusions also established a fourth de facto condition for enlargement, i.e. The Union's capacity to absorb new members without losing the momentum of European integration. In this spirit the Council concluded that: ”The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries”.

The concept has created much debate on what this "absorption capacity” precisely means in practice and how it relates to Turkish accession. Consequently, it has raised strong suspicions that it may be used as a pretext to deny Turkey's membership, regardless whether it meets the Copenhagen Criteria and fulfils its Accession Partnership requirements. Moreover, it has also opened doors to suggestions that offering Turkey a “privileged partnership” instead of full membership would be a viable option that the EU should consider pursuing. For instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, a Christian Democrat and sceptic of Turkish membership, has been one of the most influential and vocal advocates of such an arrangement. These positions reflect a climate of

enlargement 'fatigue' and scepticism that formed after the 'big bang' CEEC-10, and was further reinforced after the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania in the Union.\textsuperscript{321}

A report by the European Parliament chaired by a Finnish member of the European Parliament Alexander Stubb in November 2006 sought to clarify what 'absorption capacity' is and recognised that the EU currently has difficulties to honour its commitments towards South-East European countries. The report goes on to argue that the EU should honour its commitments, but that it currently has trouble doing so due to the fact that the institutional, financial and policy structures of the EU are unsuitable for maintaining what it calls “integration capacity” in the EU. It reinstates the January and June 2006 resolutions of the European Parliament to have 'a period of reflection' to clarify the 'structure, subjects and context for an assessment of the debate on the European Union' and calls for the European Commission to clarify the principle on which 'absorption capacity' is based upon. Furthermore, it proposes renaming it 'integration capacity', which in its view reflects more accurately the spirit of the concept. According to the report integration capacity presupposes three major conditions: 1) The European institutions will be able to function properly and take decisions efficiently and democratically in accordance with their specific procedures, 2) the financial resources of the union will be sufficiently adequate to finance its activities, 3) the Union will be able to successfully develop its policies and attain its goals, in order to pursue its political project.\textsuperscript{322} The report proposes institutional reforms in order to attain this goal. It subsequently correctly points out that these reforms were already part of the proposed Constitutional Treaty that was rejected by the French and Dutch referendums.\textsuperscript{323}

Finally, the report stresses that ‘integration capacity’ is not a new condition for membership, but that rather the responsibility falls on the EU to maintain such capacity, not the candidates. Hence, in principal level at least integration capacity should not have adverse implications for Turkey’s


\textsuperscript{323} Consequent to this setback an amended “Reform Treaty” was proposed in June 2007, which was signed under the name The Treaty of Lisbon in the Lisbon European Council in December 2007. However, an Irish referendum in June 2008 rejected the Treaty of Lisbon thus putting its future in doubt too.
membership aspirations. The European Parliament, however, has stressed the importance of institutional and financial conditions for Turkey’s membership that need to be met before accession is allowed.

Turkey’s quest to meet the Copenhagen Criteria has been a challenging, but not impossible task. An analysis of European Commission progress reports (1998-2006)\textsuperscript{324} for Turkey reveals that meeting the economic criteria is not the primary problem, but rather the major areas of contestation are in the areas of politics and human rights. Albeit concerns remain in particular in relation to macroeconomic stability, Turkey receives a mainly positive assessment from the European Commission in terms of economic criteria. This is mainly due to the existence of the Customs Union, which has resulted in Turkey having deeper and broader trade integration than other candidates (with the exception of the 1995 enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden) in the past. Moreover, the Turkish economy has the basic characteristics of a market economy and has the potential to cope with market pressures. Turkey also remains closely aligned to the European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) framework and has actively taken part in field missions in Europe and the Middle East. However, whilst Turkey now, according to the European Commission, sufficiently meets the political criteria, major problems remain in the political aspects of the accession process that fall under the larger umbrella of Copenhagen political criteria. Hence, the main challenge in achieving successful accession for Turkey is to rectify these critical problem areas.

\textit{The Accession Process}

The third tier is the actual accession process which sets out a number of mandatory technical requirements that must be implemented prior to accession being allowed. The basic principles of the accession to EU membership were set by the Luxembourg European Council in 1997 in preparation for the CEEC-10 “Eastern enlargement”. The primary instrument for preparing candidate countries towards full membership was to be an “Accession Partnership” agreement, 

\textsuperscript{324} Regular progress reports on Turkey by the European Commission started in 1998 and they have been carried out annually since then.
which would contain a pre-accession strategy and technical and financial assistance to guide candidate countries towards membership.\textsuperscript{325} Turkey’s accession to the European Union membership is guided by an Accession Partnership originally introduced in 2001, and later consequently revised in 2003 and 2005 (entered in force in January 2006). The revised Accession Partnership (AP) sets priorities for the reform process in Turkey and the progress of these reforms is monitored and measured against implementation of the AP. This task is assigned to the European Commission, which produces regular progress reports (annual) to the European Parliament and the European Council. The main priority set for Turkey was meeting the Copenhagen criteria with short- and medium-term priorities detailed in the AP. As part of the process Turkey is expected to develop a time schedule within a given framework that sets the timeline for short-term goals to one to two years and for medium-term goals to three to four years. The short-term priorities in the current AP include democracy and the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities, civil and political rights, economic and social rights and the ability to assume the obligations of membership. The medium-term priorities are related to the economic criteria and ability to assume the obligations of membership (for instance financial services, social policy and employment).\textsuperscript{326}

In terms of comparison to other candidate countries the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, which granted Turkey candidate country status, decided that it would be treated the same as other candidates, in particular the CEEC-10 countries.\textsuperscript{327} The Helsinki European Council meeting concluded that:

\begin{quote}
"Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing Euro-
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{325} The Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 decided that Turkey would be offered an Accession Partnership (AP) to guide it towards membership.


\textsuperscript{327} Akçakoca, Amanda (2006), “EU-Turkey relations 43 years on: train crash or temporary derailment?”, ECP Issue Papers, No. 50, European Policy Centre, Brussels, p. 8
pean Strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms.\textsuperscript{328}

Harun Arikan, however, has argued that Turkey did not initially receive the same package of accession instruments as the CEEC-10 did within the context of the Europe Agreements\textsuperscript{329}, arguing that the lack of accession instruments are designed towards containment and a final goal of a “privileged relationship”, rather than granting Turkey a full membership.\textsuperscript{330} Moreover, the package of accession instruments offered to Turkey was simply inadequate for post-Maastricht integration\textsuperscript{331}, and neither Turkey nor the EU were able to meet their obligations.\textsuperscript{332}

Then again, original agreements never worked, including the Athens Agreement with Greece or Europe Agreements with the CEEC-10. However, these were upgraded to meet the demands of the candidate countries and always aimed towards a fixed accession goal of ultimate full membership.\textsuperscript{333} In Turkey’s case no such commitment exists, but instead the process is defined as "an open-ended process of accession, outcomes of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand", i.e. no guarantee of membership is given even if all conditions are met.\textsuperscript{334} As Arikan too admits, however, the instruments for Turkish accession were updated in 2005 in the revised Accession Partnership agreement to a point where the whole process now is more genuine, even though it remains open-ended.\textsuperscript{335}

In terms of tackling the chapters, Turkey has opened and closed only one so far. The first chapter, Science and Technology, was concluded in June 2006. In addition to the eight chapters that

\begin{itemize}
  \item European Commission (2003), “Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession”, Brussels, p. 4
  \item Arikan, Harun (2006), \textit{Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?}, 2nd Edition, Aldershot, Ashgate, p. 53
  \item Arikan (2006), p. 49
  \item Arikan (2006), p. 50 ; a view supported by the EP’s ”Stubb Report” on integration capacity
  \item Arikan (2006), p. 54
  \item Ibid
  \item Arikan (2006), pp. 227-228
  \item Arikan (2006), p. 238
\end{itemize}
have been frozen, it has also been impossible to open five other chapters – agriculture and rural
development, social policy and employment, economic and monetary policy, financial control,
and enterprise and industrial policy due to blocking by the Republic of Cyprus, demonstrating
the problem for Turkey deriving from the fact that opening and closing chapters requires an
unanimous agreement by all member states.\textsuperscript{336}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
1. Free movement of goods  \\
2. Freedom of movement for workers  \\
3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services  \\
4. Free movement of capital  \\
5. Public procurement  \\
6. Company law  \\
7. Intellectual property law  \\
8. Competition policy  \\
9. Financial services  \\
10. Information society and media  \\
11. Agriculture and rural development  \\
12. Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy  \\
13. Fisheries  \\
14. Transport policy  \\
15. Energy  \\
16. Taxation  \\
17. Economic and monetary policy  \\
18. Statistics  \\
19. Social policy and employment\textsuperscript{1}  \\
20. Enterprise and industrial policy  \\
21. Trans-European networks  \\
22. Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments  \\
23. Judiciary and fundamental rights  \\
24. Justice, freedom and security  \\
25. Science and research  \\
26. Education and culture  \\
27. Environment  \\
28. Consumer and health protection  \\
29. Customs union  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Chapters of Acquis Required for Turkey’s Accession}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{336} Akçakoca (2006), p. 12
In addition to this, and in support of Arikan’s argument, it appears that different priorities were given to Turkey than the CEEC-10 countries in terms of satisfying the acquis and closing chapters. The following table demonstrates that the priorities of the CEEC-10 countries were very much geared towards closing the income disparity with the EU by tackling issues that contributed to economic growth issues and integrating these countries into the common market. As already shown, Turkey’s priorities place far more emphasis upon the political criteria, in particular human rights and fundamental freedoms and the treatment of minorities. This, however, is not wrong as such, as accession strategy needs to be tailored to country specific needs in order to be successful, but nonetheless it again demonstrates that Turkey is a ‘different’ candidate with economic and other ‘rational’ benefits weighting less than political criteria, in particular issues of political culture and values. Nonetheless, as the World Bank 2006 report on Turkey has correctly pointed out, despite the different starting position Turkey has in comparison to the CEEC-10 countries, the efficient handling of the acquis is instrumental for a successful accession process.\footnote{World Bank (2006), \textit{Turkey Country Economic Memorandum (2006) – Promoting Sustained Growth and Convergence with the European Union}, pp. 13-14, available online at: \url{http://www.worldbank.org.tr/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/TURKEYEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20835932~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:361712,00.html}. Date accessed: 8 March, 2007} Moreover, given its starting position, Turkey may need to think and work beyond the acquis in terms of carrying out structural reforms if it intends to be in accession condition by 2015.\footnote{World Bank (2006), pp. 13-14}
Political Criteria

Turkey has progressively turned into a functioning democracy following a long period of reforms since the establishment of the republic. The political system in Turkey could be best described as a secular parliamentary representative system, largely similar to the Western European models in its characteristics. In fact the political system and institutions have been traditionally (in the post-Ottoman era) modelled after the French system, further strengthened by the recent reforms intended to align the political system even further with the EU. Turkey, like any young democracy, has certainly had its share of setbacks and challenges in the forms of military coups and military interference in politics, political instability and crises. Despite such political problems Turkey is not substantially different in this respect from many European countries, especially the new members from the East of Europe such as Bulgaria and Romania. Moreover,

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339 Turkey has had three coups d’états in 1960, 1971 and 1980. In 1997 the military engineered a “post-modern coup” by pressuring the Islamic government led by Necmettin Erbakan to resign.
the reform process in Turkey has sustained itself for a number of years and is likely to continue, if not intensify, towards accession. Some analysts have optimistically concluded that the political changes are too deep and broad to be reversed.\footnote{Akçakoca, Amanda, Fraser Cameron and Eberhard Rhein (2004), “Turkey – Ready for the EU?”, \textit{ECP Issue Papers}, No. 16, European Policy Centre, Brussels, p. 4} Hence, it would be reasonably safe to assume that Turkey will continue the reforms and eventually fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria. The country has certainly made considerable progress in particular over the last four years. However, whilst the European Commission concluded in its 2006 progress report that Turkey ‘sufficiently’ fulfils the political criteria\footnote{Turkey met the assessment criteria for the political criteria for the first time in 2005 following the 2004 reforms}, it is still to reach that milestone to the level required for accession due to persistent shortcomings in critical areas.

\textbf{Measuring Turkey’s Progress toward meeting the Copenhagen Criteria}

This section consists of analysis of the European Commission 2006 Turkey Progress Report, the European Parliament Turkey Progress Report 2006 and various secondary sources. The basis for this analysis, however, is the report by the European Commission, which concluded that whilst the basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, it still falls short in its efforts to uphold the rights of the individual and freedom of expression to EU standards. Moreover, there are still major shortcomings in the treatment of minorities, persistent human rights violations and civilian control over the military is not yet satisfactory.

First of all, it needs to be recognised that progress has been made in many areas of the Copenhagen political criteria, including in human rights, respect for and treatment of minorities and the respect for individual freedoms. Some of the most important reforms towards this goal include; the government has adopted a zero tolerance on torture, significantly reducing the occurrence of torture in official detention centres; the implementation of moratorium on death penalty, which has led to the abandonment of implementation of death penalty during times of peace; the ban on using other languages than Turkish in public broadcasting has now been lifted and broadcasts in Kurdish language are now permitted; the new penal code introduced in 2005 improved women’s
rights and established new controls on torture; a law for the establishment of an ombudsman was also passed; the National Security Council, traditionally beyond civilian political control, is now under civilian leadership and stripped of its executive powers, making it mainly a consultative body.\textsuperscript{342}

However, despite these positive developments, considerable shortcomings still persist in a number of critical fields, in particular concerning the practical implementation of otherwise progressive reforms. Firstly, whilst the cases of torture have been declining in detention centres, cases are still reported outside these facilities, as well as to a greater extent in the country’s troubled southeast. Secondly, the use of minority languages, primarily Kurdish, in media and education is seriously hampered by restrictions regarding length and content of broadcast, as well as technical requirements such as demanding the use of subtitles (in Turkish) in all programs except songs, thus making live broadcast cumbersome. Consequently, the use of Kurdish language in public broadcasts remains limited. Also, the private institutes teaching Kurdish language have been banned from operating. Finally, only Turkish language is allowed in political life, including accessing public services.

The treatment of minorities in general in Turkey, also remains questionable due to the government’s state of denial regarding the extent and nature of ethnic minorities in Turkey. The Turkish government has based its position on national minorities on the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, arguing that minorities in Turkey consist exclusively of non-Muslim religious communities, namely Jews, Armenians and Greeks. The minority Muslim sects, such as the Alevi and Yezidis are still not recognised, nor are other minority religious groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses. More to the point, this position, in practice, ignores Kurds that form an estimated 20% of the total Turkish population and many other minorities such as the Roma that number about 2 million in Turkey.

Thirdly, Article 301, which penalises insulting “Turkishness”, the Republic or the Turkish Grand National Assembly, continues to seriously limit the freedom of expression and the formation of a

\textsuperscript{342} Akçakoca, Cameron and Rhein (2004), p. 5
European style political culture in Turkey. According to British MEP Richard Howitt there are currently 80 cases pending for prosecution based on Article 301. The best known cases in the past have included such authors as Orhan Pamuk, 2005 Nobel Prize in Literature winning novelist who wrote about the Armenian genocide and the Kurds in Anatolia (an issue that has gained additional attention, and caused additional friction, after the French law making the denial of the Armenian genocide a crime, in 2005) and Hrant Dink, who wrote about Armenian identity. The charges against Pamuk were dropped after extensive international pressure in January 2006. Dink, on the other hand, received a six month suspended sentence, but was tragically shot dead in January 2007 by a lone gunman. Moreover, despite some progress made in comparison to previous years the freedom of the press in Turkey still remains considerably lower than in the EU-27 according to the Worldwide Press Freedom Index by the Reporters sans Frontières. Turkey ranked 98th in the 2006 index (in comparison to previous years; 98th in 2005, 113th in 2004, 115th in 2003 and 99th in 2002), whereas Poland and Romania, the worst ranking countries in EU-27, shared the 58th position. Otherwise the EU-27 countries were located in the top 40.

Fourthly, labour unions are still not able to organise themselves to an extent that would meet the ILO standards.

Finally, the military is still intervening in politics with senior officers making strong comments about domestic politics, reflecting its unwillingness to give up its traditional role as the guardians of secular Turkey. Moreover, the Chiefs of Staff maintain a special role, reporting directly to the Prime Minister instead of the Minister for Defence, and there is no civilian control of the military during times of war.

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345 Akçakoca, Cameron and Rhein (2004), p. 5
The European Parliament’s Report on Turkey’s Progress: Voices of Discontent

The European Parliament’s report on Turkey’s progress towards accession,\textsuperscript{346} which angered the Turkish government (and public), is somewhat more critical towards Turkey and the progress reported by the European Commission. Firstly, the European Parliament expresses its concerns over the new anti-terror law, which has reintroduced certain elements already removed by past reforms that undermine the progress made in fundamental rights and human rights. Some of these elements include the extension of crimes that fall under the law, creating fears that the new law could be used as a pretext to crack down on other ‘undesired’ elements.\textsuperscript{347} In the same spirit, the new Penal Code receives criticism due to articles allowing arbitrary interpretation by judges and prosecutors relating to cases of freedom of press and expression.\textsuperscript{348} In relation to torture, the report points out that whilst there may have been considerable progress on this issue, it cannot be sufficiently monitored and confirmed due to the absence of a viable and functioning independent monitoring system in the detention centres.\textsuperscript{349} The status of reforms on human rights receives an even stauncher condemnation: [The European Parliament] “Deplores the fact that only limited progress has been reported over the last year as regards fundamental rights and freedoms; condemns violations of human rights and freedoms and constraints on the exercise of those rights and freedoms”.\textsuperscript{350} The same tough line applies to the status of freedom of religions, where the European Parliament also ’deplores the absence of progress’.\textsuperscript{351} Moreover, the European Parliament has demanded that Turkey acknowledges the Armenian genocide and states that it considers such a move as a precondition for accession.\textsuperscript{352} Finally, it demands the suspension of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Op.Cit., p.5
\item Op.Cit., p.8
\item Op.Cit., p.9
\item Op.Cit., p. 10
\item Op.Cit., p. 11
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
negotiations in case of serious and persistent breaches relating to the principles of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law or the principles of international law in Turkey.353

**The Cyprus Issue**

The division of the island of Cyprus since 1974 to two isolated communities in the north and south (Turkish in the north and Greek in the south) following the occupation of the northern part of the island by Turkey has been an issue of contestation between Turkey and several EU member states for decades. However, the issue has gained further impetus since 2004 when the Republic of Cyprus (the southern Greek part of the island) joined the EU and the Greek Cypriots rejected the UN plan for reunification the same year. Moreover, whilst Turkey signed the Additional Protocol, a.k.a. the Ankara Agreement, in July 2005 in order to accommodate for the then looming official candidate status, it has since refused to ratify it, as well as acknowledge that it obligates Turkey to recognise the Republic of Cyprus.354 This refusal immediately raised strong condemnation from the EU that Turkey was in breach of the protocol and the Customs Union, which included the extension of the Customs Union to the new EU member states, now including the Republic of Cyprus. The EU sternly demanded that Turkey meet its obligations stated in the protocol in full and open its air and seaports to Greek Cypriot planes and ships by the end of the year, or risk driving the negotiations to a stalemate. Despite the attempts by the Finnish Presidency to find an acceptable compromise, including promoting a proposal to open the Turkish Cypriot port of Famagusta under EU or UN control in exchange for Turkey opening its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot traffic, the situation came into a deadlock and in December 2006 the EU suspended 8 of a total of 35 chapters. Whilst a major setback in the negotiations, at least the feared total ‘train wreck’, i.e. the suspension of accession partnership in totality as advocated by

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353 *Op. Cit*, p. 17
THE PROBLEM OF THE ‘BORDERLINE STATES’ IN REGIONALISM

the opponents of the Turkish accession, did not happen and the accession process continues, albeit with decreased speed and increased uncertainty.

A lasting settlement of the issue, however, is unlikely in the near future. This is in part due to the persistent hostilities between the parties involved, political realities and at least on the surface completely opposing understanding between Turkey and the EU on how to approach the issue. The Turkish side has alleged that the whole Cyprus issue is an excuse to deny Turkey accession and that it is the EU that has defaulted on its promises.\textsuperscript{355}\textsuperscript{355} The Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, for instance, has stated that; “It is not possible for us to accept the EU acting in a way that is contrary to the core and spirit of our relations by hiding behind various excuses such as the Cyprus issue”\textsuperscript{356}\textsuperscript{356} Ali Babacan, the Minister of State for Economy and Turkey’s Chief Negotiator with the EU, has also speculated that the real issue was EU’s preoccupation with ‘domestic’ issues such as unemployment, fading competitiveness and social problems\textsuperscript{357}\textsuperscript{357}. Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has also alleged that the EU has not done its part and has not ended the isolation of Turkish northern Cyprus. Moreover, he has stated that Turkey will not change its policy stance on Cyprus.\textsuperscript{358}\textsuperscript{358} These claims have some merit to them, at least in the sense that the problem is now decades old and Turkey’s position has certainly been well known to the EU decision-makers, and yet Turkey was granted candidate status in 1999 and accession process started officially in 2005. The sceptics would then ask why the issue then ‘suddenly’ became a deal breaker only as late as July 2006. Yet, Turkey was unequivocal about its refusal to recognise the Republic of Cyprus, a position that in 2006 became serious enough to threaten the

\textsuperscript{355} Akçakoca (2006), p. 14

\textsuperscript{356} EU Observer, “Turkey pledges to stick with pro-EU reforms”, 27.12.2006, \url{http://euobserver.com/15/23172}, date accessed: 15.01.2007


\textsuperscript{358} EU Observer, “EU unfair to Turkey, says Erdoğan”, 13.12.2006, \url{http://euobserver.com/15/23086}, date accessed: 15.10.2007
suspension of the accession partnership.\textsuperscript{359} Why the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus was not made a precondition for the accession partnership?

Whilst it is clear that the issue must be resolved prior to Turkey’s accession, the implications of the Cyprus issue on Turkey’s accession process in the short-term have apparently been somewhat exaggerated, at least the gloomy predictions of a “train wreck” or a “deadlock” did not materialize. This is also evident from the level of EU’s ‘punishment’ towards Turkey. First of all, the process is not one of negotiations but rather a process of adopting the acquis unilaterally as a given. Hence, there is actually no immediate need for EU participation in the process but instead Turkey can continue unilaterally working on reforms. Secondly, even if eight chapters concerning trade and external relations are now frozen, and as such cannot be open or closed, there are still 27 chapters that Turkey could in principal complete regardless. Hence, the ‘punishment’ placed on Turkey does not impede the continuation of reforms, nor does it necessarily even delay accession. Turkey’s chief negotiator Ali Babacan has indicated that Turkey will do just that and will continue with reforms that are of benefit to Turkey with or without EU membership.\textsuperscript{360} Moreover, judging from recent media reports, the ‘deadlock’ did not last long with the enterprise and industry chapter having been opened in March 2007 and three more chapters likely to be opened by the end of June.\textsuperscript{361} The issue, however, would by default need to be solved eventually, prior to the accession. The fact is that a country that does not recognise all member states cannot become a member itself.

\subsection*{4.3 Economy and Trade}

As noted earlier in this chapter meeting the economic criteria should not be a major hurdle for Turkey’s accession. The country in general terms has a functioning market economy and its capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union has been

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{359} Hughes (2006), p.3
\item \textsuperscript{360} Ali Babacan speech at EPC 5March 2007
\item \textsuperscript{361} BBC, “EU to re-start talks with Turkey”, 28.03.2007, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/6503869.stm}, date accessed: 28.03.2007
\end{itemize}
strengthened through economic integration with the EU, in particular through the Customs Union. Turkey’s economy, however, has historically been subject to volatility and its per capita income levels are substantially below EU averages. The opponents of Turkey’s membership have thus argued that the economic costs may be substantial due to the level of financial assistance required to stabilise and sustain economic growth in Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey’s economy has great potential and may become a source of growth and vitality for the EU. Consequently, this section will focus on examining the strengths and weaknesses of the Turkish economy, whilst the next section will more specifically address the question of financial cost of Turkey’s membership.

**Turkey’s Economy: Great Potential and Persistent Volatility**

Turkey’s economy can be characterised as a fundamentally young market economy with a history of problems, challenges and crises, but also considerable potential for sustained rapid growth. On the one hand, the volatility of the Turkish economy is high in international comparison with major endemic economic crisis taking place numerous times during the past 50 years, the last one in 2001 causing a 7.5% decrease in the GDP and inflation to reach around 70%, interest rates reaching 400% and a public debt above 90% of GDP. On the other hand, Turkey recovered rapidly from the crisis and was one of the fastest growing countries in the world in already in 2004 with annual growth reaching up to 8 percent in recent years. This recovery has been possible due to radical economic reforms that have resulted in a new more constructive policy mix that has included tight fiscal and monetary policies and the adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime. In addition, The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey that has been independent since 2001 has engaged in targeting inflation in order to lower and stabilise it.

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362 Independent Commission on Turkey, “Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?”, supported by the British Council and the Open Society Institute, September 2004 p. 36. Available online at: http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/report.html
363 World Bank (2006), p. 4
364 World Bank (2006), p. 3
365 World Bank (2006), p. 4
Assuming increasing macroeconomic stability and the continuation of the reforms Turkey could plausibly become a 'tiger' economy on par with those in East Asia. This would assume that Turkey could utilise its tremendous demographic potential of a young population towards generating economic growth, with some 30% of the total population being under the age of 15 and 20% belonging in the 15-24 age group. Some analysts have suggested that Turkey could enter a 'golden age' around 2010 if it manages to utilise this demographic potential by creating an active young population integrated in the workforce (active population as a ratio of total population). Given Turkey’s geographic location close to the markets in the Middle East and the Caucasus, as well as its large domestic market, the country certainly has great potential to do it.

The Persistent Challenges of the Turkish Economy

As stated already, in the past such sustainable growth has been held back macroeconomic and financial instability including high inflation, large public deficits, current account crises and high public debt. If Turkey wishes to utilise its potential to achieve sustainable high growth it has to break this 'boom and bust' cycle of its economy. Currently macroeconomic stability and sustainable economic growth is still a target rather than a reality due to the number of structural weaknesses in the Turkish economy.

First of all, there is a duality in force in the Turkish economy with sharp divisions existing between modern and traditional sectors in the economy and various regions of the country. The modern sector is a high-performance economy with high levels of productivity in services, construction and industry, on par with the CEEC-10 countries. However, approximately half of the working population is in effect untouched by the modern sector with approximately 33% of the total workforce being employed in the agricultural sector, which accounts for 14% of GDP, and a large additional portion of the population either engaged in the informal 'black economy' or


being unemployed. The service sector currently accounts for 48% of total employment and 57% of the GDP. The income disparity between the rich and the poor regions also represents a problem. Whilst Turkey as a whole is at about 29% of the EU-25 average in terms of income per capita, the poor regions are well below the national average, with the poorest regions producing less than one-fourth of the GDP per capita than the richer ones. For instance, East Anatolia has an income level of only 28% of the national average. In the extremely rich regions, such as Marmara (Istanbul) and Aegean income levels of 153% and 130% compared to the national average are to be found. Taking into consideration Turkey’s low level of economic development and the wide income gap between rich and poor regions, its accession would increase the income disparity in the EU. In comparison, the CEEC-10 had 44% of the average EU income in 1997 but due to rapid sustained economic growth progressed to having 50% levels in 2005.

Secondly, the active working population is still much too small with active population being only about 44% of the total working age population (compared to about 55% in the CEEC-10 countries and 64.4% in EU-15), leaving a large proportion of the population outside the formal economy, mainly women and an estimated 20-50% working primarily in the informal 'black' economy.

Thirdly, public debt and the government budget deficit are also high and well above the targets of Maastricht Criteria at 8.4% and 8.8% of GDP respectively. Moreover, the large external current account deficit also represents a threat to macroeconomic stability and growth.

370 Independent Commission on Turkey, p. 37
372 Gros (2005), p. 8
373 Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), p. 36
374 World Bank (2006), p. 8
Fourthly, whilst unemployment in Turkey is not at a particularly excessive level (10.8% in 2004), the low levels of human capital is keeping unemployment up and is hindering the productivity of the economy. The low overall level of productivity again is consequently hindering the GDP per capita growth.\(^{375}\) Currently the average level of schooling for adults in Turkey is only 4-5 years, whilst the mandatory minimum length has been now raised to eight years from five years previously.\(^{376}\) In general, Turkey has been faring poorly in international comparisons of education, in particular in terms of the quality and accessibility of primary and secondary education. The quality of private schools and higher education institutions, however, is in general relatively good, making the human capital shortage most serious in the low- and middle-levels of the labour market, whilst as a sign of the educational duality the public administration and formal sector high-end benefit from a large pool of well educated recruits.\(^{377}\) Moreover, the contribution of women in particular, but also the younger generations and workers from the poorer regions is relatively low in the economy, reflecting weak job creation in the economy’s formal sector.\(^{378}\) Integrating women, workers from the poor regions and the youth to the workforce in high-productivity sectors in the industry and services could gear the Turkish economy towards reaching the levels of the CEEC-10 countries, and eventually the EU average.

**Closing the income gap with the EU**

Whilst Turkey’s GDP per capita level is roughly similar to that of Bulgaria and Romania,\(^{379}\) it has been catching up with the EU average considerably slower than the CEEC-10 countries did in the decade (1993-2003) prior to their accession.\(^{380}\) In order to secure successful accession, Turkey needs to catch up with the EU-25 average much faster than it is doing currently. Currently the

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\(^{377}\) OECD (2006), p. 9

\(^{378}\) OECD (2006), p. 6

\(^{379}\) Gros (2005), p.1

\(^{380}\) World Bank (2006), p. 5
GDP per capita in Turkey is only 29.1% of the EU-25 average.\textsuperscript{381} This is considerably lower than the level that the CEEC-10 countries had prior to accession, but not so in comparison to Bulgaria and Romania.

The World Bank presents three growth scenarios for Turkey in its 2005 economic report on Turkey; a base-case scenario, high-case scenario and a low case scenario. According to the base-case scenario the per capita income would increase to 34.2% of the EU-25 by 2015, in high-case scenario to 40% and in low-case only to 30.1%. Assuming macroeconomic stability and the continuation of the reforms the high-case scenario should be well within Turkey's reach, even though fast population growth tends to slow down convergence of per capita GDP. The speed of convergence in high-case scenario would be 1.5, whereas only two Central and European countries had lower than that (Czech Republic 1.1 and Poland 1.4), whilst others had well above 2 and two well over 3 (Estonia and Slovenia had 3.8).\textsuperscript{382} Given Turkey’s potential for growth, the high-case scenario should thus be at least plausible to reach. However, as already pointed out, such sustainable growth requires a well-functioning legal, administrative and physical infrastructure coupled with a stable political and macroeconomic environment.\textsuperscript{383} A stable political and macroeconomic environment can only be built with continuous reforms and sound policies that will address the structural problems in the Turkish economy, government and civil society.

\textsuperscript{381} World Bank (2006), p. 10
\textsuperscript{382} World Bank (2006), p. 12
\textsuperscript{383} World Bank (2006), p. 9
**Trade with the European Union**

In General, Turkey has the benefit of both a large potential for trade, due to its large domestic market (in terms of the number of consumers and size of the workforce, less so in terms of buying potential), and a strategic location of close proximity to the markets in Middle Eastern and the Caucasus. Moreover, Turkey has a very advanced level of trade integration with the EU, owing to the Customs Union agreement with the EU, which has been in effect officially since 31 December 1995. In terms of actual trade, the EU is by far the most important trade partner for Turkey. In 2005 47.9 percent of Turkey’s total external trade was with the EU (53.6% of ex-
ports, 50.1% of imports), reaching a total value of €75 billion. In comparison, Turkey’s other important trade partners are far behind in volume; in second place is Russia (7.5%) followed by the United States (5.2%), China (3.1%) and Iran (2.1%).

The two-way trade has been growing rapidly reaching a total growth of 100% during the 1995-2002 period. Turkey’s external trade in general has also been growing, 24 percent per year but it is notable that 70% of this growth came from the growth in trade with the EU.

The Customs Union is probably the most important single factor in trade creation between Turkey and the European Union, and a clear real strategic advantage in comparison to most candidate countries in the past (with the exception of Austria, Finland and Sweden, who were European Free Trade Association members and enjoyed the benefits of EC-EFTA framework). It has been estimated that 70% of Turkish imports enter the EU free of duty and import barriers due to the Customs Union treaty. The exceptions are products that fall under protective measures as core products in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), namely products that are considered vital for farmers in the old member countries; cereals, processed cereals, sugar and sugar products, as well as dairy, meat and olive oil products. Moreover, Turkish vegetable and fruit products receive export subsidies under the current arrangement. The Customs Union treaty, however, excludes the free movement of people and services.

Nonetheless, the Customs Union treaty is an important tool for Turkey to align itself with the EU towards accession as it is not limited to bilateral and third-party liberation of industrial tariffs. Turkey also has been expected to adopt a bulk of Community legislation, to participate in the elimination of technical non-tariff barriers to trade, protection of competition and harmonisation

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386 Akçakoca, Cameron and Rhein (2004), p. 8
387 World Economic Forum / PriceWaterhouseCoopers, see table4.3.
of border procedures. In general, the Customs Union has had favourable impact on Turkey’s trade with the EU, although it has been running a constant deficit in the trade balance. Nonetheless, it has produced considerable trade creation and little trade diversion, and it has been estimated that liberalisation of industrial tariffs alone has benefited Turkey at around 1% of GDP. The Customs Union, however, is not a popular project in Turkey. It has gained a negative public perception as being unfair towards Turkey due to the constant deficit in bilateral trade. As such it has become a popular rallying point for the anti-EU camp, as well as the interconnected anti-globalisation campaign.

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390 Sinan and Zahariadis (2004), p. 5
Table 6. Turkey’s Trade Growth

Turkey’s Trade Growing An Average of 24% Per Year

70% of total growth comes from increased trade with Europe

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

Source: WEF/PWC

Turkey is also an important trading partner for the EU, albeit to a somewhat lesser degree. Turkey is currently the 7th most important trading partner for the EU, ranking 6th in exports.
However, on the down side, Turkey is not a particularly important trading partner to individual EU countries, with the exception of Greece, Bulgaria and Romania, and Turkey's exports are not as concentrated on the EU as those of the CEEC-10.\textsuperscript{392} Turkey is also less export oriented than the CEEC-10 countries, with exports accounting for 15-16\% of Turkey’s GDP, compared to 20\% for Poland (which was the least open of the CEEC-10 states).\textsuperscript{393} Turkey’s trade openness (share of exports and imports of GDP), however, increased considerably during the decade 1993-2003 from 33 \% to 59 \% to the benefit of Turkey's modern sector. Turkey also ranks relatively high in terms of trade in goods, whilst much unrealised potential remains in the services trade (excluding travel, where Turkey is already very competitive).\textsuperscript{394} Turkey’s exports are particularly strong in transportation equipment and automobile parts.\textsuperscript{395} In terms of the ability to cope with competition in the common market, Turkey could find it hard to cope in this regard in certain service sectors, particularly in banking and insurance. On the other hand, Turkey still has considerable amount of time to reform and improve its competitiveness in these sectors prior to accession. Finally, Turkey would be a prominent competitor in sectors such as textiles, apparel, cement and tourism.\textsuperscript{396}

\textit{Economic Impact of Turkey’s Membership}

Assessing the exact impact of adding Turkey’s economy to the EU in the long-term is problematic and subject to a certain degree of speculation. However, one could assert with considerable certainty that in short- and medium-term the economic gains would be mainly for Turkey rather than for the EU. Turkey would benefit in particular from increased trade resulting from unlimited access to the internal market, including sectors not covered in the Customs Union, specifically

\begin{itemize}
  \item European Commission, “Trade Statistics - Turkey”,
  \item Flam, Harry (2004), p. 179
  \item Gros, Daniel (2005), p. 4
  \item World Bank (2006), pp. 6-7
  \item World Bank (2006), p.7
  \item Akçakoca, Cameron and Rhein (2004), pp. 6-7
\end{itemize}
the agricultural products covered by CAP. This increased access to markets could potentially increase Turkey-EU trade by an additional 40 %.\textsuperscript{397} It is also very likely that the Turkish economy would grow substantially prior to accession as a result of intensifying reforms and increased investment closer to accession, and in particular immediately following accession.

In terms of the level of economic development it is worth noting that Turkey is not substantially worse off than Bulgaria and Romania, and as such should by no means be unmanageable economically for the EU to absorb. Moreover, where as Turkey’s economy corresponded to slightly less than 2% of EU-25 in 2004, it can reach approximately 4% of EU GDP by 2015, assuming that the average annual growth stabilises at about 5 % or more.\textsuperscript{398}

Considering the small size of the Turkish economy, the economic impact for the EU would be relatively small and would probably have a modest positive impact on EU GDP ranging between 0.1 % and 0.3 %.\textsuperscript{399} In comparison, a European Commission study in 2001 predicted 1.3% additional growth for the CEEC-10 countries following accession and 0.5-0.7% for the EU-15.\textsuperscript{400} These expectations were largely fulfilled, albeit with some disparity within the CEEC-10 group in particular. Moreover, the study predicted a loss of 0.1 % for the CEEC-10 if accession for some reason did not take place.\textsuperscript{401}

\section*{4.4 Impact on EU Budget – Financial cost of accession}

The opponents of Turkey’s membership in the EU frequently suggest that accession would be too costly in the form of transfers from the EU budget to Turkey. This line of argument follows closely Mattli’s logic of integration by attempting to calculate the material costs/benefits of Turkey’s accession to the EU, generally arguing that the cost would be too high. This is a concern driven mainly by the current net contributors to the EU budget, who are concerned that they

\textsuperscript{397} Independent Commission on Turkey, p. 37
\textsuperscript{398} Akçakoca, Cameron and Rhein (2004), p. 16
\textsuperscript{399} Independent Commission on Turkey, p. 37
\textsuperscript{400} European Commission, “Enlargement two years after: an economic evaluation”, p. 23
\textsuperscript{401} Ibid
may again be forced to increase their contributions. However, most calculations made by analysts do not predict a particularly high cost from Turkey’s accession, in particular in comparison to the ‘big bang’ enlargement of the CEEC-10 countries in 2004.

This section provides an overview EU financial framework and budget allocation and the types of calculations used to estimate the cost/benefits of Turkey’s accession. It is worth noting that there are no absolutely reliable means of providing accurate calculations on the cost/benefits of Turkey’s accession, simply because the accession is still at least eight years away and both the conditions in Turkey and the EU are likely change, as are the rules and policies related to the EU financial framework and budget. All estimates are thus based on factors subject to change and attempting to predict the future state of affairs is essentially speculative. Moreover, assuming that Turkey gets the green light to join in 2015 its first years of membership would be covered by a financial framework already in force and it would probably become fully integrated into the EU financial framework in the 2018-2024 period.402 The rules of accession assistance and funding for new member countries are also likely to change should there be any grave concerns over the potential costs of accession. Reflecting such concerns the European Council in Brussels in December 2004 stated that: “accession negotiations yet to be opened with candidates whose accession could have substantial financial consequences can only be concluded after the establishment of the Financial Framework for the period from 2014 together with possible consequential financial reforms”. 403 The European Parliament has also expressed considerable concern over the cost of enlargement, in particular Turkey’s accession, and has stated that is “considers it of paramount importance that the European Union puts in place the institutional and financial preconditions in due time for Turkey’s accession”.


403 European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs , p. 4
The EU Financial Framework and Budget

The financing and spending of EU activities is based on seven-year financial frameworks that provide the limits and priorities for the total spending for the period. The current financial framework covers the period of 2007-2013. The annual budgets detail the Union’s spending for the fiscal year and are confirmed separately for each year. The contributions to the EU budget are decided based on a proportional system decided primarily based on Gross National Income (GNI) to enforce a principal that rich member countries pay proportionally more to finance the development in more disadvantaged countries and regions. The system is not entirely straightforward however, and is further complicated by political negotiations that may alter the balance from time to time. The funding for the EU budget is drawn from three primary sources: VAT revenues, customs duties collected and tax related to GNP in member countries.\(^\text{404}\) However, in order of fairness the total contributions of member states are capped to 1.24% of GNP.\(^\text{405}\) The outflows of funds from the EU budgets have two major destinations: the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Structural Actions aimed at supporting disadvantaged regions (at 75% or less of EU GDP). For instance in the 2005 budget 46.23% of the funds were contributed to CAP whilst structural actions got 31.24%, e.g. the two items together took a total of 77.47% of the total budget.\(^\text{406}\) In order to safeguard a fair distribution of EU funds the Berlin European Council adopted a 4% cap of the recipient country’s GDP.\(^\text{407}\)

Cost/Benefit Calculations related to Turkey’s accession

The cost/benefit calculations attempting to estimate the net effect of Turkey’s membership to the EU’s financial framework utilise mainly one (or more in some cases) of three primary approaches: 1) how much Turkey would receive if it was a member today?, 2) what the cost would

\(^{404}\) Flam (2004), p. 191


\(^{406}\) European Commission, “Budget in Detail”

be in the like year of accession -2015 – assuming the current rules apply?, and 3) what kind of package Turkey would receive if it would be granted a similar arrangement to that of Bulgaria and Romania?

The first variety, carried out by Kemal et al is attempting to estimate how much Turkey would receive if it were a full member today (in this case 2004). The logic of this estimate is that any long-term predictions are highly speculative and thus one approach is to utilise the current rules and assume Turkey is a fully integrated member of the EU. The analysis points out, as established also in the previous section here, that the EU budget and financial framework are dominated by two items: CAP and Structural Funds (a.k.a. Structural Actions). Thus, taking into consideration that Turkey’s average annual GDP is around € 200 billion and that receipts are capped to 4 % of GDP, Turkey would receive € 8 billion annually from Structural Funds. The CAP payments are based on per hectare yields and would mount up to € 9 billion per annum. Taking into account the additional funding that Turkey would receive under other programmes it brings the total receipts to slightly under € 20 billion. Furthermore, considering that the EU member states’ contributions in 2004 were approximately 1 % of the GDP (ceiling was 1.25% at the time), Turkey’s contributions would be around €2 billion per annum. Hence, the net benefit for Turkey at current level would be approximately €16 billion per annum.  

The second variant estimates Turkey’s contributions in the likely year of accession – 2015 – using the current rules as the base for assumptions. Hence, the 4 % ceiling for Structural Funds would still apply and the variation in comparison to “Turkey in the EU today” scenario would principally result from growth in the Turkish GDP. Kemal et al again use the base assumption that the Turkish GDP would grow an average of 5 % per year and the Turkish GDP would by 2015 correspond to 4 % of EU-28 GDP. Hence, Turkey’s potential receipts from Structural Funds would amount to 0.16 % of EU-28 GDP (0.4*0.4).  

The CAP transfers, however, have to be based on a guesstimate of what the output of Turkish agriculture would be in 2015. Also, it is reasonable to assume that the current 20 % of total value maximum in CAP receipts would 

408 Ibid

continue to apply and that the share of agriculture in Turkey’s economy would probably continue declining. Kemal et al predict that the share of agriculture would be at the maximum 10 % of Turkey’s GDP by 2015. Again assuming that Turkey’s share of EU-28 GDP would be around 4 percent and that the share of agriculture would be around 10 % of this, the likely receipt from CAP would settle somewhere between 0.045 to 0.08 p%. Since it is likely that CAP substitutions are likely to fall due to the EU’s WTO commitments to cut substitution, so would Turkey’s receipts.

Thus, the total receipts Turkey would receive under Structural Funds and CAP in this scenario is estimated at 0.26 % of EU-28 GDP. Taking into consideration, again, that the EU budget has a ceiling of around 1-1.2 % of member country GDP, Turkey’s maximum contribution would be 1.2 % of its GDP. When adjusted to the proportion of Turkey’s GDP to that of the EU-28 the contribution would be probably around 0.048 % of EU GDP. The maximum net cost of Turkey’s membership for the EU would thus mount up to 0.20 % of EU GDP, e.g. approximately € 20 billion.

**Table 7. Maximum Budgetary Cost of Full Membership: Today and 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkey in today’s EU</th>
<th>Turkey 2015 in enlarged EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(in billions of current euros)</td>
<td>(as a % of EU GDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Funds</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP receipts</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total receipts</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions to EU budget</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Max) Net receipts for Turkey</td>
<td>16 (0.16% of EU GDP)</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Derviş et al. (2004), p. 4*

However, other analysts have derived at a smaller result by using equivalent assumptions. Kirsty Hughes, for instance, also assumes 5 % growth, but using 1999 prices, arrives at a result indicating that Turkey’s maximum receipts would be around 10.8 % of EU-27 budget, which she estimates at € 140 billion by 2013.410

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410 Hughes (2004), p.22
The third option is based on the assumption that Turkey is likely to get a similar package to Bulgaria and Romania. This scenario is based on the argument that the countries share similar in the level of economic development and that like Bulgaria and Romania, Turkey is likely to join in the middle of a financial framework, and thus its first few years of membership will be covered by a framework in which it did not participate. Hence, Turkey is likely to focus on Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia as benchmarks for its own accession package. Given that the proposed allocation for Bulgaria and Romania is about €15 billion, and adjusting that figure to the population size, Turkey should receive 2.3 times as much (15*2.3=35), e.g. €35 billion over the first three years, amounting to €9-12 billion net transfers per annum. This is likely to increase to €15 to 20 billion in the 2020s after Turkey becomes fully integrated into the financial framework. Kirsty Hughes arrives to a similar result for the same scenario, predicting the net receipts as €36.7 billion over three years.\textsuperscript{411}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Same as Bulgaria and Romania, CEEC-10 or a Combination}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{\€ billion} & \textbf{2015} & \textbf{2016} & \textbf{2017} & \textbf{Total} \\
\hline
A. Total if same budget per head as Bulgaria & 8.63 & 12.59 & 15.5 & 38.72 \\
& & & & \\
B. Total if same budget per head as new 10 member states & 12.37 & 15.26 & 17.50 & 45.13 \\
& & & & \\
C. Average of estimates A and B & 10.5 & 13.9 & 16.5 & 40.9 \\
& & & & \\
Estimate ‘C’ by area: & & & & \\
Agriculture & 3.72 & 4.93 & 5.85 & 14.5 \\
Structural actions & 5.77 & 7.64 & 9.07 & 22.48 \\
Other & 1.01 & 1.33 & 1.58 & 3.92 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textit{Source: Hughes (2004), p. 21}

\textsuperscript{411} Hughes (2004), p. 21
Is the cost for Turkey’s accession too high?

The estimated net budgetary cost of Turkey’s accession thus ranges somewhere from €15 to €35 billion over the first three years of membership, or around 0.20 % of EU GDP, depending on the scenario used. However, as already pointed out these estimates are all highly speculative and are thus unlikely to provide anything more than rough “ballpark” figures on what the possible costs could be. Realistically nobody can accurately predict the changing conditions in Turkey and the EU, whether the rules would change and how by 2015 It is, however, highly likely that if it should appear that Turkey would benefit “too much” from EU funding the current member countries (in particular net contributors and the opponents of Turkey’s membership) would force a change of rules to accommodate for the impact. Moreover, the EU would also benefit from a successful accession by Turkey economically, again possibly worth of somewhere between 0.1 % and 0.3 % of EU GDP. This would actually indicate that the EU money would be well spent. Furthermore, even if the maximum would match that of the “Eastern Enlargement” of the CEEC-10 countries, the financial cost of Turkey’s accession should by no means be unmanageable for the EU. The CEEC-10 experience in fact should be an encouraging experience to the EU. The transfers to the CEEC-10 countries totalled € 28 billion in a 15-year period up to 2004, reaching 2% of CEEC-10 GDP, 6.9% of EU budget in 2004 and 0.1% of EU-15 GDP the same year.\footnote{European Commission, “Enlargement two years after: an economic evaluation”, p. 31} The Financial Framework for the period 2007-2013 includes transfers to the CEEC-10 varying between1.6 to 3.3. % of their GDP.\footnote{European Commission, “Enlargement two years after: an economic evaluation”, p. 34} As the commission paper points out, this is a miniscule commitment in comparison to the Marshal Plan, which costed 1.1% of the US GDP.\footnote{European Commission, “Enlargement two years after: an economic evaluation”, p. 31} The 2007 budget includes approximately 1% of EU total GNI to CAP and Structural Funds, with a ceiling of 1.24%.\footnote{European Commission, “Financial Programming and Budget”, \url{http://ec.europa.eu/budget/index_en.htm}, \url{http://ec.europa.eu/budget/documents/multiannual_framework_en.htm}, date accessed: 20.3.2007}
4.5 **Regional Politics and Institutions: Deepening versus widening**

Turkish membership in the European Union has a variety of political implications on regional institutions, policies and political dynamics that have been raised as areas of concern in Rationalist analysis. One of the most common concerns the opponents of the Turkish membership put forward is that Turkey with its large population will gain unjustified political power in EU institutions. With a population currently over 72 million, and likely to reach 82 million by the time of the likely accession date of 2015, the country would command too much political clout in the EU, according to opponents of Turkey’s accession. Part of this resistance is connected to the wider debate on “widening versus deepening”, a common view that enlargement holds back deeper integration, and the interconnected “enlargement fatigue”, which produced the concept of ”absorption/integration capacity”. However, it is also partly resulting from internal Turkish resistance, which stems from the notion that Turkey is not European and does not share European values. For this reason it seems ludicrous to hand over considerable decision-making power to the EU. To put it simply, European decision-making is a grave concern.\(^ {416}\)

Also, taking into consideration the opposing demographic trends in Turkey compared to the EU, this situation is likely to deepen over time. Whilst the population in the ‘old’ member countries is steadily decreasing, the Turkish population will probably be around 95 million by 2050, making it by far the largest member country in terms of population size.\(^ {417}\) Moreover, traditionally economic and political powers have been lumped together as the ‘big four’ of today’s EU – Germany, France, Italy and the UK – are also the largest economies.\(^ {418}\) Should Turkey, however, become a member in the EU it would immediately have the second largest population after Germany, and probably pass it around 2020. This will mean that if there is a proportional down-scaling (as opposed to increasing the amount of MEPs) it will have the same amount of MEPs in the European Parliament and voting power in the Council as Germany, i.e. 88 MEPs (11.2 % of

\(^{416}\) The analysis here obviously intersects with Ideational analysis in this regard

\(^{417}\) Akçakoca, Cameron and Rhein (2004), p. 15

\(^{418}\) Hughes (2004), p8
the vote) and 14% of the vote in the Council. Thus, whilst it would not be able to dominate in any institution, it could theoretically block Council decisions together with three other large states by a 35% share of the votes. Furthermore, some hold fears that Turkey could become a “Trojan Horse” within the EU and block decisions that do not favour its interests, thus slowing down the deepening integration.

Whilst it is true that as long as institutional arrangements are based on population Turkey would have considerable power in regional institutions, perhaps even on par with the ‘big four’, in particular in the European Parliament, its impact is exaggerated. First of all, in the European Parliament, where Turkey’s membership would have the biggest impact, representation and voting are largely arranged along party lines, rather than along national lines. Secondly, changes in voting decided by the European Council in Nice and in effect since 2005 require a qualified majority of 74%. Had the constitutional treaty, rejected by the French and Dutch referendums, been ratified, the impact would have been moderated even further with the introduction of a double majority system that would have required 55% of membership and 65% of total EU population to pass a decision. The impact in the European Commission would be considerably lower, with Turkey under the current rules getting its own commissioner. Alternatively, the Commission is possibly facing a reform in any case as the membership increases and the possibility of establishing a smaller “mini-commission with rotating membership is still a distinctive possibility. In this case Turkey would be in the same terrain as other members, i.e. at times it would have Commissioner, at other times it would not. Hence, Turkey would not be able to dominate in any central EU institution, i.e. in the European Council, the European Parliament or the European Commission.

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419 Akçakoca, Cameron and Rhein (2004), p. 15
420 Ibid
421 Akçakoca, Cameron and Rhein (2004), p. 17
423 Hughes (2004), p. 26
However, this is not to say that Turkey’s membership would not have any major effects on EU institutions and policy making. It would probably underline and act as a motor for institutional reform, just as it has contributed to the motivation for the current “period of reflection for the future of Europe”. Much of the EU institutions are designed for the “original six” and to a point still reflect that, although the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties were designed and adopted with future enlargements in mind. However, the Treaty of Nice, which was supposed to prepare the Union for EU-25 and EU-27 has not saved the EU from the brink of paralysis and is clearly not enough to ensure the functioning of institutions and consensus decision-making in an enlarged Union, certainly not for an EU-30. As already pointed out, it is very possible that further reform will be made a precondition before the EU absorbs another large enlargement, such as Turkey. In the policy making area, Turkey would strengthen the group of big countries, would certainly have a lot of common interests with the other poorer net recipients, and as such could be seen working against the rich EU-15 or even ruining the chances of domination by for instance France (which has always been aspiring to lead the European project) and Germany (somewhat more hesitant to lead). However, assuming that some sort of institutional reform takes place to gear EU decision making towards further enlargement, Turkey’s entry would not drastically alter the balance between large and smaller member states. The largest five countries in EU-28 will have 60.3% of the vote, only 3.4 percentage points more than the “big four” in EU-25 (56.9%).

As for the policy making, and keeping the widening versus deepening concern in mind, Turkey would probably favour an Intergovernmentalism approach over a federalist one and work towards a balance between national sovereignty and supranationalism, instead of pushing the EU towards further integration. On the other hand, it might become active in foreign and defence policy and seek to play a major role, where it would contribute and conform with, but probably not push for a common foreign policy. It would perhaps be less active in economic policy, where it would likely be seeking middle ground, rather than position itself in the liberal end of the spectrum. Whilst in general it would probably seek to align itself with other larger member

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424 Hughes (2004), p. 26
states, it would more likely cooperate with the Mediterranean members in agricultural policy and in efforts to refocus EU’s attention in the south.

4.6 Impact on Common Foreign and Security Policy and Geopolitics

“Turkey is situated at a regional crossroads of strategic importance for Europe: the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean; its territory is a transit route for land and air transport with Asia, and for sea transport with Russia and the Ukraine. Its neighbours provide key energy supplies for Europe, and it has substantial water resources.”\(^{426}\)

Turkey’s membership would have a substantial impact on EU’s foreign and security policies simply due to its size, considerable military capabilities and geographical location. Like many changes, if not all, its membership presents both risks and opportunities, including in foreign and security policy making. First of all, its membership would extend the EU’s borders to a volatile neighbourhood in the Middle East and Caucasus and further increase the EU’s interests in the Black Sea region. This would mean that the EU’s new next door neighbours would include countries such as Syria, Iran and Iraq. Although these regions present security concerns to the EU even without Turkey as a member, in terms of terrorism and illegal trafficking of people, drugs and weapons (including WMD), they certainly would demand added focus from the EU. Moreover, even though Turkey is likely to stay out of the Schengen Treaty possibly for a lengthy transition period, some fear it could just as well become a bridge to illegal immigration, terrorism and other forms of transnational crime and/or drag the EU into regional conflicts. Also, Turkey might not become a bridge between civilisations as some of the more optimistic observers have argued since it has not shown any significant interest to export its secular democracy.\(^{427}\)

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\(^{426}\) European Commission, “Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective”, Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, p. 6

\(^{427}\) Akçakoca, Cameron and Rhein (2004), p. 12
In terms of opportunities, Turkish membership could bring substantial benefits to the EU’s foreign and security policy in the form of added capacity and in its ability to present itself as a truly global actor. First of all, Turkey has already been aligning its foreign policy with that of the EU and is likely to become a constructive player once a full member.\footnote{Independent Commission on Turkey(2004), p. 25} Turkey is a member of the same international organisations as most of the incumbent EU member states, such as the United Nations, OSCE, the Council of Europe, NATO, OECD Stability Pact for South-East Europe, as well as in organisations where the EU currently has no access. In particular Turkey's leadership role in the Islamic Conference Organisation and observer status in the Arab League would enhance the EU's engagement with the Islamic world. Hence, Turkey's membership in the EU would bear no foreseeable negative or limiting impact in terms of the Union's participation within international organisations. On the contrary it would probably provide added value in terms of access to new organisations.

However, it also needs to be acknowledged that Turkey has not always maintained a policy alignment with the EU on all issues, in particular in relation to the Middle East and Human Rights in Turkey. Moreover, whilst Turkey's foreign policy convergence with the EU has been considered high in general, it has nonetheless ratified fewer EU declarations than acceding countries in the past,\footnote{European Commission, “Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective”, p. 10} indicating that Turkey does not automatically follow the EU in its foreign policy. This, however, is not entirely uncommon in the conduct of the incumbent member states and thus, does not necessarily imply that Turkey would in some significant manner contribute to any further fragmentation of a common foreign policy. It is also very likely that Turkey will increase the level of convergence in this regard as well in the years leading to accession.

Turkey also does not have intentions to become a global player, but chooses to act within the context of its alliance partnerships and multilateral institutions and increasingly within the EU context.\footnote{Hughes (2004), p. 28} Hence, whilst Turkey would favour the intergovernmental approach\footnote{Hughes (2004), p. 30}, and as such

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\begin{flushright}

428 Independent Commission on Turkey(2004), p. 25

429 European Commission, “Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective”, p. 10

430 Hughes (2004), p. 28

431 Hughes (2004), p. 30

\end{flushright}
would probably not strongly promote a common foreign policy, there is little reason for concerns that Turkey would divert from the EU common policies or drag it into conflicts that it would not otherwise want to get into. On the contrary, Turkey could potentially contribute to the strengthening of the EU’s foreign policy as well as to its security capabilities and international credibility.

First of all, Turkey is an important regional player and an active foreign policy actor in the Mediterranean, Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans, all areas where the EU has serious security concerns but has been either hesitant to engage or has had trouble doing so. Most of these areas are also in the focus of the European Neighbourhood policy, which aims at establishing close relationships with neighbouring countries in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood that have no prospects of membership but that the EU wants to keep close. Given Turkey’s position between these regions and the EU it could be instrumental in promoting the European Neighbourhood strategy. Turkey would also probably inherit a central role in the European security strategy combating key security threats such as weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and illegal trafficking of drugs and people. Turkey’s better understanding of and acceptability for these regions due to cultural, religious and ethnic communalities as well as closer historical and current linkages with them (with Muslim countries in particular), would most likely significantly enhance EU’s capabilities to engage constructively with these regions. Secondly, Turkey has by far the largest NATO standing armed forces in Europe with its 793,000 military personnel that constitute approximately 27% of the forces of NATO’s European forces. Moreover, Turkey has cooperated with EU countries in a number of military and security operations, mainly in the NATO operations but also through Partnership for Peace, UN and even EU missions. Turkey’s participation in missions includes for instance several in the Balkans, Lebanon and it led the ISAF mission in Afghanistan until the end of 2002. Finally, Turkey is in general sympa-

432 Emerson, Michael and Nathalie Tocci (2004), “Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead: Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy”, EU-Turkey Working Papers, No. 1, August 2004, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels p. 9

433 Akçakoca, Cameron, Rhein (2004), p.10

434 Emerson and Tocci (2004), p.3

435 European Commission, “Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective”, p. 11
thetic towards European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and would most likely contribute considerably in its development and capabilities.436

**Turkey’s Contribution to Building a European Neighbourhood**

Turkey’s contribution to the European Neighbourhood strategy could be potentially significant due to Turkey’s active role in the regions central to the concept, in particular in regions such as the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. The following section provides a brief summary of Turkey’s involvement and potential contributions in each region.

Turkey has historically been an active player in the Balkans and has close linkages with significant Muslim communities in the region. Turkish EU membership would not only be welcomed in the region437, but it would also be likely to advance EU’s interests in the region. Turkey’s involvement in the region has been extensive. It participated in the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the NATO operations IFOR and SFOR. During the Kosovo war Turkey participated in both, the initial combat operations and later in the KFOR mission. Even more importantly, Turkey participated in the first ever EU military operation in the Republic of Macedonia in 2003 and EU police missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Republic of Macedonia.438 Turkey’s leadership in the South-East European Brigade (SEEBRIG) also indicates its commitment and willingness to lead regional security initiatives in the region.439

In the Black Sea, Turkish initiatives such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organisation and the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (Blackseafor) - are central instruments in regional cooperation440 and would as such provide the necessary instruments for the EU to build its engagement upon.

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436 Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), p. 18
437 Akçakoca, Cameron, Rhein (2004), p. 13
The Caucasus presents another opportunity that Turkish membership could further. The EU does not currently have a substantial presence in the Caucasus, but key countries in the region - Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia - are planned to be included in the framework provided by the Wider European and European Neighbourhood policy.\footnote{European Commission (2004), "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper", Brussels, p. 7 Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf, date accessed: 23.3.2007} Turkey has strong economic, political and military links with Azerbaijan and good relations with Georgia. It also takes an active part in the regional energy projects and participates for instance in the Caspian Sea energy project, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and in the project to bring a gas pipeline to Erzurum.\footnote{Emerson and Tocci (2004), p. 13} Taking into consideration that the security of its energy supply is one of the EU’s most paramount concerns these are significant initiatives. Turkey-Armenia relations, however, have been cool since Turkey closed the border in 1992 in support to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.\footnote{Akçakoca, Cameron, Rhein (2004), p. 12} This is obviously a problem Turkey would have to work hard to rectify as the EU demands good neighbourly relations from acceding countries and in general requires them to settle any conflicts with their neighbours prior to accession.

In Central Asia, Turkey has strong cultural, linguistic, religious and historical linkages with the post-Soviet states and has since the breakup of the Soviet Union charged in to re-establish close links with them,\footnote{Emerson and Tocci (2004), pp. 16-17} to the great annoyance to Russia. Turkish-Russian relations have historically been cool and Russia is not particularly happy with the competition over regional influence.\footnote{Akçakoca, Cameron, Rhein (2004), p. 13} Turkey would become an even more serious competitor in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Black Sea regions, and if it were to become an EU member this could also affect EU-Russia relations.\footnote{Emerson and Tocci (2004), p. 19} On the other hand, the relationship has also shown positive signs and both

\begin{footnotesave}
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\item \footnote{Emerson and Tocci (2004), p. 13}
\item \footnote{Akçakoca, Cameron, Rhein (2004), p. 12}
\item \footnote{This does, however, not always apply. For instance Estonia has had a potentially serious border dispute with Russia since independence, which still remains unsolved}
\item \footnote{Emerson and Tocci (2004), pp. 16-17}
\item \footnote{Akçakoca, Cameron, Rhein (2004), p. 13}
\item \footnote{Emerson and Tocci (2004), p. 19}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesave}
countries are members in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) working towards largely the same goals.\textsuperscript{448} Even more importantly, Russia and Turkey cooperate in a number of energy initiatives, including the "Blue Stream" natural gas pipeline and the Trans-Thracian oil pipeline, both potentially important for the EU’s energy and security interests.\textsuperscript{449}

In the Middle East Turkey supports the Middle-East peace processes as a non-partial party in the Arab-Israeli conflict, being the only country in the region with an ambassador in Israel and a close relationship with it. Turkish–Israeli relations are still strong, but have cooled somewhat following the rapprochement with Syria. Nonetheless, Turkey has more credibility as a non-partial player in the conflict than the EU, and as such could equip the EU to come out of the shadow behind the US and take a more active and independent role in the peace process. As for Iraq, Turkey maintains a convergent policy with the EU, and the Turkish public has a similarly negative image of the war much like in many EU member states, albeit due to the Northern Iraq Kurdish problem this may change if the situation suddenly worsens and Turkey feels the need to intervene.\textsuperscript{450} Turkey’s role in the wider Middle East is in many ways linked to its membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). In this sense Turkey could play a role of a bridge to the Middle East by acting as intermediary between OIC and the EU.\textsuperscript{451} Turkey’s relations with Iran have been cool after the 1979 Iranian revolution due to fears of Iran exporting Islamic revolution to Turkey and its support for the PKK.\textsuperscript{452} Although the relations have in recent years somewhat improved Turkey is suspicious of Iran’s nuclear intentions and supports the EU in its efforts to bring a diplomatic solution in the issue. Turkey and Iran also cooperate in the energy sector in the context of the Tabriz-Erzurum gas pipeline.\textsuperscript{453} Should the nuclear issue be resolved peacefully this would be a significant addition to the EU’s energy security efforts, as Iran is one of the world’s primary oil and natural gas suppliers.

\begin{itemize}
\item[448] Akçakoca, Cameron, Rhein (2004), p. 13
\item[449] Ibid.
\item[450] Emerson and Tocci (2004), pp. 21-22
\item[451] Emerson and Tocci (2004), p. 23
\item[452] Emerson and Tocci (2004), pp. 24-25
\item[453] Akçakoca, Cameron, Rhein (2004), p. 11
\end{itemize}
Finally, Turkey has the potential to play a positive and significant role in transatlantic relations having been a close ally of the US for over 50 years. This is still a strong alliance despite the cooling of relations after the March 2003 decision by Turkey not to allow US forces to use Turkish territory as a staging area.\textsuperscript{454} Whilst the relations did experience a temporary dip, it seems that the issue has mainly passed and could be even be interpreted as a positive signal of a more balanced relationship where Turkey does not automatically follow all US foreign policy decisions.\textsuperscript{455} This would fit quite well in the general EU line that emphasises good relations, but interprets the ability to disagree at times as part of a definition for genuinely good relations.

\section*{4.7 Migration from Turkey to the EU}

\textit{“The spectre of a massive influx of poor Anatolian migrant peasants is one of the most powerful obstacles inhibiting a rational discussion of the Turkey issue.”}\textsuperscript{456}

Whilst the concerns over migration are not entirely rational in terms of motives, and are motivated by cultural fears rather than rational cost concerns, the issue of free movement of labour within the EU is one of the most politically sensitive topics. As a result the debate of potential migration from Turkey in the event of accession has played an important part in the Rationalist analysis and a number of cost/benefit calculations attempting to forecast the future levels of migratory flows from Turkey to the EU, in particular to the EU-15 where the fear of the effects of unchecked immigration is most marked. This topic is particularly contentious in the countries with existing large Turkish immigrant communities, as well as Muslim communities in general.

The number of Turkish immigrants in the EU was estimated at approximately 3.8 million in 2004 (5 million if Bulgaria and Romania are included\textsuperscript{457}, of which 77.8\% live in Germany, 7.9\% in

\textsuperscript{454} Emerson and Tocci (2004), p. 27
\textsuperscript{455} Hughes (2004), p. 28
\textsuperscript{456} Gros, Daniel (2005), p. 1
\textsuperscript{457} Austin, Greg and Kate Parker (2005), “The Mono-cultural Delusion: Turkey and Migration Politics”, in Schaefer, Sarah, Greg Austin and Kate Parker (2005), Turks in Europe: Why are we afraid?, The Foreign Policy Centre, London, pp. 32-33
France, 4.7% in Austria and 4.4% in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{458} The UK has about 80,000 Turkish immigrants (and a very large Muslim community), of which 60,000 live in London, but the issue has not caused significant alarm there.\textsuperscript{459} However, the negative popular opinion towards Turkish migration in particular in Germany, France, Austria and the Netherlands is strongly influenced by fears that these countries would receive a disproportionate share of immigrants.

Most Turkish immigrants in the EU-15 countries had arrived as guest workers after the Second World War, and were invited to do so by the host governments in an attempt to cover for the labour shortage caused by the wars, deepening throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Migration from Turkey has since been mainly limited to family reunification and marriage, and has been relative modest overall. One potential source of the anti-immigrant sentiments in these countries was that most of the guest workers were poor unskilled workers from regions in Anatolia who found it hard to integrate to their host societies due to a radical change in their living environment.\textsuperscript{460} As a consequence of this double shock Turkish immigrants largely clung to tight communities for support. Concentrated in these ethnic enclaves, Turkish immigrants preserved their language, religious practices and culture, and consequently had limited exposure and integration into the host society. In practical terms this tended to create a vicious cycle where exclusion increases with isolation, and in consequence social networks in ethnic enclaves increasingly become safety networks against social and economic exclusion.\textsuperscript{461}

Whether these fears can be categorised as rational or not, they have inspired forecasts and estimates of potential migration flows from Turkey that follow Rationalist logic. In fact, many of these studies appear to be aimed at calming the fears with rational arguments pointing out the findings supporting the limited impact and positive aspects of migration flows. As is the case with other similar projections, for instance the budgetary cost of Turkish accession, the analysis is subject to a number of changing factors in Turkey and the EU. Some of the most important of

\textsuperscript{458} European Commission, “Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective”, p. 18
\textsuperscript{459} Austin and Parker (2005), p. 25
\textsuperscript{460} Independent Commission on Turkey(2004), pp. 31-32
\textsuperscript{461} Ibid
such factors are the demographic and economic developments in Turkey and the EU, the changes in the relative income levels between Turkey and the EU, as well as within Turkey.

Assuming that sustained economic growth in Turkey leads to increased employment opportunities within the country, migration to the EU could be partly replaced by internal migration within Turkey to high-growth areas.\textsuperscript{462} Potentially high levels of economic growth and the resulting increased employment opportunities in Turkey could potentially also lead to substantially increased return migration of Turkish migrants from the EU.\textsuperscript{463} Moreover, EU policies are also subject to change and a variety of restrictions may be placed on migration from Turkey, although it should be emphasised that under no conditions can the EU exercise a zero immigration policy\textsuperscript{464}

Indeed restrictions have been utilised in connection with past enlargements with a 7 years transitory phase applied to Spain, Portugal and Greece and later to the CEEC-10 countries. In the latter case, only the UK, Sweden and Ireland decided not to apply restrictions, whilst Finland, Greece, Spain and Portugal lifted restrictions in 2006.\textsuperscript{465} Furthermore, as the experiences of Spain, Portugal and Greece point out, reforms and the resulting economic growth tends to mitigate migration pressures, and whilst this is arguably a result of a long-term process, there is no reason why the same would not apply to Turkey.\textsuperscript{466} Finally, it is also entirely possible that by the time the restrictions on labour movement would be lifted, probably well into the 2020s, the prospect of Turkish migrants could be viewed as a blessing, or at least as a considerably more attractive option than today, rather than a threat. Whilst not a particularly popular argument in the light of today’s situation, due to the demographic trends in the incumbent EU members it is possible that the labour shortage situation would have deteriorated to a level that would require increased

\textsuperscript{462} Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), p. 33, see also: European Commission, “Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective”, p. 16
\textsuperscript{463} Independent Commission on Turkey, p.33
\textsuperscript{465} European Commission, “Enlargement two years after: an economic evaluation, p. 4
\textsuperscript{466} Erzan, Kuzubas and Yildiz (2004), p. 11
immigration to the EU in any case. In such situation the prospect of increased, in particular skilled migration, from Turkey could be welcomed in comparison to migrants from more distant lands.467

As for the estimates, a wide variety of methodologies have been utilised, including statistical inference, opinion polls, econometrics and forecasts based on past enlargements, resulting in a relatively high variance between the results reached. Some analysts have concluded that such attempts are not entirely productive and helpful due to low level of accuracy they offer.468 Daniel Gross points out that in particular the use of today’s labour market data to produce forecasts for Turkey’s case are highly speculative as free labour mobility from Turkey could be 20 years away.469 The European Commission issue paper in 2004 concluded that the forecasts of Turkish migration to the EU vary between 0.5 and 4.4 million migrants.470 In the middle-range of these estimates, one of the most referred to is by Lejour, de Mooij and Capel, which concludes that Turkish EU accession would be likely to result in 2.7 million migrants in the long-term, which would represent 4% of the total Turkish population and a meagre 0.7% of EU-15 population, in comparison to 2.9 million migrants that were estimated to result from the CEEC-10 accession.471 The study also provided an estimate of the economic impact of immigration from Turkey concluding that it would reduce GDP in Turkey by 2.2%, whilst simultaneously increasing GDP in Germany by 2.2% and in Netherlands by 0.6%. However, as the decline in Turkish GDP is lower than the outflow of people, the GDP per capita would have to increase. The opposite applies to Germany and other destination countries, albeit at a very modest level.472

467 Akçakoca, Cameron, Rhein (2004), p. 16
469 Gros, Daniel (2005), p. 8
470 European Commission, “Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective”, p. 19
472 Lejour, de Mooij and Capel (2004), p. 46
At the higher end of the estimates Henry Flam (2004) has suggested that 3.5 million Turkish migrants would reach the EU by 2030, assuming no restrictions are placed on migration.\textsuperscript{473} This, however, as Henry Flam asserts himself, is not a particularly helpful assessment as it is highly unlikely that such an assumption would apply in the Turkish case, in particular taking into consideration that restrictions have been applied in the past cases. In the lower end of the spectrum, Refik Erzan, Umut Kuzubas and Nilufer Yildiz (2004) have concluded that migration to the EU-15 between the years 2004-2030 would reach only 1-2.1 million, assuming sustained strong economic growth and freedom in labour mobility 2015 onwards.

Alternatively, assuming accession appears unlikely to take place and the absence of freedom of mobility, migration from Turkey could reach 2.7 million, i.e. the EU might face a higher level of migration if the accession prospect is lost than if accession is successful and free mobility prevails.\textsuperscript{474} Another option, the team argues, is to assess the future level of migration by comparing Turkey’s situation to the Southern “Cohesion” countries -Greece, Portugal and Spain, which had a similar situation to Turkey at the time of accession. The team concludes that migration phases out with economic growth and increased employment opportunities, a scenario ran with the same base assumption would result to less than 1 million migrants.\textsuperscript{475} The same scenario but adding the guest worker dummy raised the total to 2 million, albeit the authors believe this would be an inflated assessment of the true potential.\textsuperscript{476}

\section*{4.8 Conclusion: Strengths and Weakness of the Rationalist Approach}

The Rationalist analysis of Turkey’s EU accession prospects reveals few reasons why the project could not be successful If Turkey continues to engage in the necessary reforms there is no evidence to suggest that it cannot meet the “Copenhagen Criteria”. Moreover, assuming macro-
economic stability will be maintained Turkey should have no problems meeting the economic criteria. Whilst the exact economic impact of Turkey’s membership is impossible to assess due to the fact that even the best projections are essentially speculative and subject to a number of changing conditions in Turkey and the EU, it is quite clear that Turkey would be net beneficiary in short- to medium-term at least. Turkey would directly benefit in particular from increased trade and in receipts from EU budget funds, specifically from CAP and Structural Funds. The economic impact on the EU would likely be relatively minor, due to the relatively small size of the Turkish economy. Thus economic motives from the EU’s part have little backing in terms of factual evidence. From Turkey’s point of view, however, the economic motives are quite clearly substantiative and thus, may constitute a genuine source of motivation to join the EU as a full member.

The budgetary impact of Turkey’s accession would be significant at approximately €15 to €35 billion, but manageable in scale (maximum of 0.20% of EU-28 GDP), roughly matching the commitment made towards the "Eastern enlargement". Taking into consideration the EU’s decision to commence membership negotiations with Turkey, it is only fair to insist that in principle at least the Union has already committed itself towards Turkey’s membership and hence, the costs it will entail. Moreover, taking into consideration the high level of cost incurred by the “Eastern enlargement” it would be justifiable to argue that cost is of secondary importance at this stage and the real issue is whether the EU has intentions to assign a similar level of commitment towards Turkey’s membership as towards that of the CEEC-10. This is one of the weaknesses of the Rationalist analysis; it does not sufficiently account for the “hidden agendas” behind the "Eastern enlargement”, which were presented as an exercise in the reunification of Europe, and Turkish accession, which is presented as a "cross-civilizational” project creating a "bridge across civilizations."477

477 Which, as the next chapter will demonstrate, is evident in the discourse performed in relation to Turkey’s membership.
A similar weakness extends to assessments on the impact on EU institutions, which arguably is much more modest than feared in worst case scenarios. In fact, the EU has discovered from its past enlargement experiences that institutional reform can moderate the adverse impact of enlargement on deeper integration. Whilst the arguments based on the population size of Turkey and its proportional share of votes are arguably better analysed using a Rationalist framework, without carrying out an Ideational analysis we cannot reasonably conclude that the main concern here is a neo-functional concern over the technical functioning of institutions, rather than a concern motivated by a hidden agenda, i.e. that due its cultural (or even “civilizational”) differences Turkey would utilize its power in EU institutions in a manner not corresponding with “European values”. Moreover, whilst this “absorption” or “integration capacity” essentially is a neo-functional concept in essence, we should nonetheless concern ourselves with the motives behind using it specifically against the Turkish membership.

The Cyprus issue, whilst not part of the accession criteria, would by default need to be solved prior to accession. The fact is that a country that does not recognise all member states cannot become a member itself. This, however, indirectly leads us to an Ideational question: why Cyprus (the southern part of the island in effect) was judged as “European”, whilst Turkey’s “Europeanness” is contested?

Finally, in relation to EU’s foreign and security policy, Turkey’s accession would most likely have principally a positive impact, whilst there is little reason to believe it would cause any significant negative change to policy coherence on these issues. The emphasis on Turkey’s military power as an asset for the EU’s ambitions to become a more “credible force” clearly stem from a Rationalist agenda, whilst the EU’s own emphasis on its "soft power” is essentially an Ideational concept. How Turkey would contribute to the EU’s “soft power” would is a question that would place the onus upon the Ideational rather than the Rationalist framework.

In general, the analysis thus far reveals the strengths and weaknesses of Rationalist analysis. The strength of the Rationalist approach clearly lies in its ability to explain the “Regionalism process”, or in this case the accession process. However, I would argue that if Rationalist analysis is strictly applied, it becomes weak in regards to motives and drivers behind EU enlargement. In the strictest possible senses of Rationalist analysis, after all, the EU-15 should have been the
maximum as the EU has been a net payer since. The 1995 enlargement of Finland, Sweden and Austria, was in fact an easy decision in both senses; nobody questioned their “Europeanness”, their level of economic development was above the EU average and their utilitarian value high as they quickly became net contributors in EU budgets. Hence, the EU-12 to EU-15 enlargement was characterised by utilitarian choice with no Ideational hang-ups to consider. The “big bang” enlargement, on the other hand, was an entirely different story. The Eastern and Central European countries were much poorer, just emerging from Soviet control and not particularly strong in their democratic credentials. Moreover, the costs were significant over a decade or so. Hence, there was speculation regarding economically beneficial in the long run, the Eastern enlargement hardly made rational sense at the time. Consequently, one could argue that it is possible that the main driver was “reunification” of the continent and costs did not play a central role in the decision. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania arguably constitutes a logical continuation of Eastern and Central European enlargement and hence, was relatively uncomplicated regardless of problems of corruption, economic development and rule of law. Turkey, however, is a much trickier case as utilitarian considerations have been given more attention because the “Europeanness” of Turkey is contested. Consequently, following Mattli’s framework Turkey should not join, unless its rejection would create ”negative externalities.” What these externalities might be, except those concerned with the “losing Turkey” thesis, which is essentially an Ideational concept, is hard to imagine. Thus the Rationalist framework applied to the Turkish case clearly leaves the door open for applications of the Ideational approach.

In conclusion, this chapter has shown that Turkey has well-established material interdependency with the EU in all the aspects analysed; economic, political and security interests. Moreover, officially Turkey will accede to full membership as long as it fulfils the Copenhagen Criteria. Thus far each and every country that has been granted an official candidate status has acceded to full membership and in that sense there is no rational reason to doubt that Turkey will become a member of the EU. However, the hidden unofficial agenda that is threatening to stop Turkey’s accession regardless of whether it meets the criteria or not reveals the constraints of the Rationalist approaches. Turkey’s ”Europeanness” and the “European identity” and “idea” it is judged against constitutes a research agenda that can only be analysed by applying the tools of the Ideational approaches. The next chapter will focus on this approach.
Chapter 5: Ideational Analysis of Turkey’s EU Membership Prospects

5.1 Introduction

“Admission of Turkey to the European Union would provide undeniable proof that Europe is not a closed ‘Christian Club’. It would confirm the Union’s nature as an inclusive and tolerant society, drawing strength from its diversity and bound together by common values of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.478 "…a multiethnic, multicultural and multifaith Europe could send a powerful message to the rest of the world that the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ is not the ineluctable destiny of mankind”479

The “Rationalist” analysis on Turkey’s EU accession prospects, as the previous chapter demonstrated, tends to prioritise the analysis of material costs versus the benefits of accession, often (but not always) to the point of completely excluding the impact of “Ideational” factors. The “Rationalist” analysis of Regionalism has been criticised for this weakness. Frank Schimmelfennig, for instance, has argued that the Rationalist framework was able to explain EU enlargement up to the point of the CEEC-10 association agreements, but not able to explain the actual accession.480 According to Schimmelfennig the Association Agreements offered optimal benefits to the EU, but full membership with its budgetary, structural and CAP funds cost was too expensive for this option to make rational sense. Social Constructivism, on the other hand, has been credited for providing a more credible explanation, according to which the driver for Eastern enlargement

479 Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), p. 16
was in fact Ideational, i.e. a kinship based duty to “reunify” the continent after over four decades of Cold War separation.⁴⁸¹

As chapter 4 has demonstrated rational (material) issues are important in terms of Turkey’s EU accession prospects. The membership criteria as dictated by the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria and in the accession itself set the framework for issues that Turkey has to fulfil in a satisfactory manner before accession is possible. The potential material costs and benefits of Turkey’s membership are either motives or barriers for Turkey’s membership, depending on whether one favours or opposes the accession. However, as chapter 4 demonstrated as long as Turkey meets the Copenhagen Criteria and settles the Cyprus question, there is little reason why the accession could not be successful. The analyses of economic cost/benefits are highly speculative. However, the most credible accounts tell us that integrating Turkey’s economy into the EU would probably be modestly beneficial to the EU, and highly beneficial to Turkey. Moreover, the budget costs of Turkey’s accession would be high, but on a similar level with what the EU had to commit into in the CEEC-10 enlargement process. Hence, if Turkey is treated as an equal with other candidates this does not constitute a valid reason to exclude Turkey (from the Rationalist point of view).

In terms of the infamous “absorption capacity” (a.k.a. “integration capacity”) the institutional impact of Turkey’s membership has been somewhat exaggerated. Turkey would strengthen the group of big countries, but would not be allowed to dominate. Since the completion of chapter 4 a double majority voting system has already been agreed upon in the June 2007 European Council and will be implemented by time of Turkey’s accession. Finally, the popular fear of mass migration from Turkey, in particular poorer regions such as Anatolia, has also been over-exaggerated. Studies show that the probable level of immigration would constitute approximately 0.7% of EU’s total population and compares well to the estimated 2.9 million migrants expected

from the CEEC-10 countries in the long-term. Temporary restrictions easily allow up to 7 years on freedom of movement from Turkey and would be most likely implemented, as has been done with past enlargements. Moreover, the level of migration may be equal or higher if the membership prospect is lost and could be a welcomed prospect by the time restrictions on free movement of labour would be lifted.

In conclusion “Rationalist” analysis does not entirely explain the opposition or the motive for, Turkey’s membership due to the fact that it does not take the “hidden agenda” into account. It has been argued that in the case of CEEC-10 enlargement material concerns were overcome by a “kinship based duty” to “reunify” these countries with Europe following a four decade long separation imposed by the Cold War. Much like in the CEEC-10 case Turkey’s membership is being justified by perceived Ideational benefits. It has been argued that Turkey’s membership would constitute “a Bridge between Civilisations”, i.e. Europe/the West and the Middle East/Islamic world and prove that democracy and Islam are compatible and thus, prevent a looming “Clash of Civilisations”. On the other hand, it has been argued that the EU must honour its word and allow Turkey’s accession or else it risks “losing” Turkey to nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. Significantly, unlike in the CEEC-10 enlargement, Turkey’s “Europeanness” is contested, and consequently much of the opposition is Ideationally motivated. According to recent Eurobarometer surveys 48% of Europeans would not permit Turkey’s entry even if it meets the Copenhagen Criteria and 55% feel that the cultural differences are too great to permit accession. This chapter argues that this is largely due to a process of “othering”, in which Turkey has become “Europe’s” significant “other”. Moreover, Huntington’s “Clash of Civilisations” has gained a central role in the accession discourse and has, explicitly served as an inspiration for arguments for and against Turkey’s membership, in particular for widely used catchphrases ”Bridge between Civilisations” and “losing Turkey”. The fact that Turkey’s culture, identity, values and religion are seen as divergent is a serious hurdle for Turkey’s membership aspirations. The negative public opinion, as well as partially elite opinion, may stop Turkey’s entry as each enlargement treaty has to be ratified by each incumbent member state, which will be subjected to national referendums in countries like France and possibly others. Just one negative vote can thus stop Turkey’s accession. Finally it is argued that the ”othering” is part of EU’s soul seeking process which, motivated by the prospect of Turkey’s membership, has produced a
debate regarding the EU’s ultimate borders and its regional identity. This chapter seeks to analyse Turkey’s “Europeanness” and the discourse around it in the context of this debate.

5.2 Defining Europe’s Borders: History and Geography or Identity and Values?

When the CEEC-10 countries joined the EU in 2004 it marked the end of a project to “reunite” those countries with Europe after four decades of separation imposed by the Cold War. Turkey, however, is a different case altogether. None of the duty of “reuniting with Europe” applies to Turkey. On the contrary, Turkey’s potential entry into the EU has raised the issue of the ultimate limits, or borders, of the European Union to the forefront of discourse on EU enlargement. This represents a grave challenge to Turkey’s membership aspirations, in particular since there is a level of vagueness about these borders. Turkey is generally considered as partially European, but is that enough? The EU has no official position as to what its final limits will be geographically, but instead states that the Union is open to all “European” states that respect its values. The “European values” criterion is fairly well defined in the Copenhagen Criteria, but what constitutes “European” is left vague. Such vagueness arguably reflects the lack of consensus on what constitutes “Europeanness”. For some the determining factors are history and geography, where as for others the experience of Renaissance and the Enlightenment defines Europe in cultural terms. Yet for some others, the Christian heritage is what defines Europe.482 Finally, the EU can be seen as primarily a political project, developing common political identity and values, as well participation in regional institutions ultimately defining the region.483

482 Avery, Graham (2007), “An ever-wider Europe? Where will the EU’s borders end?”, in Avery, Graham et al. (2007), Challenge Europe: Europe@50: back to the future, Issue 16, European Policy Centre, Brussels, p. 104

The EU’s borders can, thus, be seen at least as; geographic, institutional, civilizational, cultural, or a combination thereof. This, however, is not satisfactory, nor particularly helpful, since the EU cannot expand endlessly and some sort of geographic limits are ultimately required. Institutional limits, on the other hand, are not truly limits at all: it is ultimately a political decision how many states belong into European institutions. In principle the number participants could be endless such as in the UN, or at the least in the OSCE - which has 56 members. The Council of Europe, a pan-European organisation which has a mission to unify all European democracies which accept the principle of the rule of law and are able and willing to guarantee fundamental human rights and freedoms, has 47 member states, all considered as “European”. Finally, civilizational and cultural criteria are fine as such; the EU probably does function better if member states are unified under the broad umbrella of a “European” common identity, culture, values and political culture. However, it must be recognised that the EU in its current format of EU-27 already is a diverse multicultural, -ethnic and -religious construct with a fairly vague universal regional identity. The question therefore is, how do we settle the problem of ”borderline” cases like Turkey that are ”partially European”, have the same political system (if not the political culture), subscribe to the common European values as prescribed in the founding treaties, participate in regional institutions and have intimate economic, political and security ties with the EU? “Borderline” states such as Turkey suffer from a dilemma of being perceived as part of the region, but not “genuinely of region”. Unfortunately for Turkey it is destined to serve as a test case towards defining those borders. This section of the chapter explores the question of Turkey’s “Europeanness” with the above mentioned criteria and the debate on Europe’s ultimate borders in mind.

**Turkey as a European power: The legacy of history**

Turkey has a long shared history with Europe, and even more importantly has been a key part of European history. Moreover, it has a rich Greco-Latin and Judeo-Christian heritage in Anatolia where the Roman Eastern Empire was based in Pergamum. The foundation of Constantinople (modern Istanbul) in 330 subsequently solidified the Eastern Empire’s dominance over Rome. 

shifting the centre of power towards east roughly into the area that now comprises Turkey. Consequently, as well as being an important historic site and player in Islamic history, Turkey has also played an important role in the history and development of Christianity with central Christian figures such as Saint Peter and Saint Paul preaching there and spreading the faith beyond the lands of Judaism, as well as hosting legendary Christian sites such as Mount Arat - the site of Noah’s Ark and the capital of Eastern (Orthodox) Christianity in Constantinople.\footnote{Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), p. 10}

The interaction between the Turks and Christianity, however, has not been entirely peaceful by any means. The first Crusade carried out by the Europeans in 1097 was a response to the arrival of Islam in Anatolia with the Turkic nomadic tribes and resulted in the occupation of parts of the province. The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, became a European power through conquest and alliances, establishing the “terrible Turks” legacy in many parts of Europe. This legacy of conflict and conquest still lives in the minds of many Europeans and contributes towards Turkey’s "otherness” in the discourse of its EU membership.

The Ottoman Empire established a permanent presence in the European continent with the conquest of Gallipoli in 1354 and expanded its presence in the continent subsequently taking control over Balkans following the battle of Kosovo (“Blackbird field”) in 1389 where it defeated the Serbian forces. The defeat of the Bulgarians in 1394 further consolidated the Ottoman rule in the region.\footnote{Findley, Carter Vaughn (2005), The Turks in World History, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 114-115} Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire established itself as a major power in Europe with the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, which was subsequently renamed Istanbul and made the new capital of the Empire. The Ottomans continued to expand their presence in Europe through conquest and alliances, culminating in the siege of Vienna in 1529 that spearheaded Ottoman expansion in Central Europe. At the height of its glory under Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-66) the Ottoman Empire ruled over the Arab lands, the Balkans, most of Hungary, the Black Sea littoral and North Africa\footnote{Findley (2005), pp. 110-111}
In the 17th century the Ottomans’ final push into Europe ended with the Battle of Vienna in 1683 where the multinational European force drove the Ottomans back forcing the empire to accept the Treaty of Karloqicz in 1699, resulting in the loss of territory for the Ottomans. The Ottomans’ wars with Russia also ended in humiliation and the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk-Kaynarja forced the empire to allow Russian ships access to Ottoman waters.\footnote{Findley (2005), pp. 120-121} The decline continued and deepened throughout the 19th century and the Ottoman Empire consequently became known as the “sick man of Europe”.\footnote{Note: the denotation ”of Europe”. Whilst Turkey may not have been considered ”European” it was widely considered part of the European system of states} The first serious blow to the empire’s prestige came in 1832 when European powers forced the Ottomans to recognise Greek independence. A temporary victory, however, emerged during the 1854-56 Crimean War, in which the Ottoman Empire allied itself with France and Britain against Russia. As a member of the victorious alliance the empire became a member in the Concert of Europe in 1856 and gained its place in the European society of states.\footnote{Morris, Chris (2005), The New Turkey: The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe, Granta Publications, London, p. 26} The decline resumed, however, after the brief period of regained glory when the 1878 Treaty of Berlin made Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia independent. Soon after the completion of the treaty Britain took Cyprus, Egypt, France, Algeria and Tunisia, thus starting the carving up of the Empire from its previous might. During the turbulent period of 1909-1912 more territory was lost in the Balkan wars. Just a couple years later WWI started and the Ottomans allied themselves with the Germans, thus picking the losing side and losing even more territory.\footnote{Morris (2005), p. 28} Moreover, the 1915 genocide of Armenians in Anatolia took place during this turbulent period, an event that still is a hindrance in the relations between Turkey and the EU. The 1920 Treaty of Sèrres carved the empire up into separate spheres of influence as instigated by the victorious allies and the Ottoman Empire began its final collapse. Finally, the July 1923 Treaty of Lausanne ended WWI for the Ottomans and lead to the declaration of the Republic of
Turkey in October the same year by the Gallipoli and independence struggle hero Mustafa Kemal (later known as Atatürk, the father of Turks).\footnote{492} 

**Reforms and Modernisation**

Turkey’s quest to modernise, and in effect to Westernise itself along European lines, started early with the realisation of the decline of the Empire in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. Sultan Mahmud II assisted by the so-called Young Ottomans, initiated reforms during the 1838-1876 period that aimed at establishing a modern bureaucracy along the European lines. These *Tanzimat* (regulations) reforms were essentially an elite driven system enforcing a modern bureaucracy by copying Western institutions aimed at secularisation of the educational and legal systems, as well as weakening the influence of the Ulemma.\footnote{493} The *Tanzimat* reforms lead to a new constitution in 1876, which limited the Sultan’s powers. The constitution was abolished a year later but the reforms continued relatively uninterrupted.\footnote{494} In 1908, the “Young Turks” following the footsteps of the “young Ottomans” revitalised the constitution and launched a revolution against the Sultanate.\footnote{495} The movement, however, met its demise soon after with its mistake to engage in WWI adventurism.\footnote{496}

The establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 under *Kemalism* and the watchful eye of the father of the republic - Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – initiated a strong impetus for further reforms to modernise Turkey. Atatürk’s reforms were inspired by the French Revolution and besides the copying of French institutions, they made secularism the guiding principle for the new state, permanently abolished the sultanate, the caliphate and the Ulemma. Other major measures included replacing Sharia law with a Civil Code and the Arabic alphabet with the Roman one, as well as formally giving political rights to women for the first time. Thus the state

\footnote{492}{Morris (2005), p. 29}
\footnote{493}{Ulusoy, Kivanç (2005) “‘Saving the State’ Again: Turks Face the Challenge of European Governance”, SIGMA, Ankara , pp. 5-6, \url{http://www.sigmaweb.org/dataoecd/58/39/35371183.pdf}, Date accessed 4.4.2007}
\footnote{494}{Ulusoy (2005), p. 6}
\footnote{495}{Ulusoy (2005), p. 7}
\footnote{496}{Morris (2005), p. 16}
took over control of religion, reformed legal and educational systems and the ideology of Kemalism unified the country under one universal identity (Turkish). The ultimate goal of Atatürk was always clear: becoming a modern, if not a Western, state comparable with those in Western Europe, stating that; “the West has always been prejudiced against the Turks…but we the Turks have always consistently moved towards the west…in order to become a civilised nation, there is no alternative”. 497

**Engagement with European Institutions**

Turkey’s involvement and role in European institutions has been extensive, long-term, committed, and to an extent even pioneering. Turkey was for instance a founding member in the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation in 1948 (OECD since 1961) and among the first to join the Council of Europe a year later. The Council of Europe membership is particularly important, as it is a pan-European institution representing what are commonly perceived as core European values. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe - Terry Davis- has pledged the Council’s continuous support for Turkey in its accession quest, stating that "Turkey fully deserves these negotiations", as well as praising Turkey’s commitment to European values; "Turkey, which has been a member state of the Council of Europe since 1949, has achieved substantial progress in the fields of human rights and democracy, and has clearly demonstrated its commitment to fundamental European values". 498 Turkey’s welcomed participation in these early European institutions signalled a universal acceptance of Turkey as a European nation at the time, a state of affairs that appears to have been either forgotten or challenged recently.

In addition to the Council of Europe membership, the early Cold War years witnessed an intensified push towards the Western alliance with Turkey becoming a NATO member in 1952. Turkey also enthusiastically welcomed the early developments of European integration and consequently applied for associate membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, barely

497 Morris (2005), p. 30
two years after its establishment. More importantly, Turkey was equally welcomed by the EEC and made an associate member in 1963. The President of the Commission at the time Walter Hallstein declared after the signing of Association Agreement (a.k.a. the “Ankara Agreement”) in 1963 that: “Turkey is part of Europe today”.\textsuperscript{499} \textsuperscript{500} Turkey and the EEC also signed an Additional Protocol (AP) in November 1970 describing the details for the establishment of a Customs Union and a gradual removal of tariffs. The AP was, however, never fully implemented.\textsuperscript{501} Moreover, the positive perception and spirit had already changed by the time Turkey applied for full membership in the EEC in 1987. The occupation with Northern Cyprus in 1974, military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980, numerous economic crises and the surge of Kurdish terrorism had contributed towards the building up of a generally negative perception of Turkey in Europe.\textsuperscript{502}

Turkish decision to apply for full membership in 1987 was largely motivated by domestic political considerations and with full knowledge of poor prospects for success.\textsuperscript{503} The 1987 application was submitted under the normal provisions of the Treaty of Rome, i.e. sent to European Council which subsequently requested the European Commission for an Opinion. The Commission’s Opinion reconfirmed Turkey’s eligibility in December 1989, significantly differentiating it from Morocco as a precedent, whereby that country was considered not European. The Council subsequently gave its approval in February 1990 acknowledging that Turkey is eligible, but politely declined to start the accession process referring to EC’s own internal situation, i.e. the preparations to launch the Single Market, as well as Turkey’s economic and political situation. Nonetheless, the EC agreed to the establishment of a Customs Union until circumstances would permit Turkey’s entry and promised financial assistance to aid Turkey’s transformation. How-

\textsuperscript{499} Lake (2005), p. 21

\textsuperscript{500} As a reflection of how much things have really changed it is worthwhile noting the in the 1960s Turkey was still deemed more suitable than for instance Spain, Portugal or Greece (military dictatorships), and other potential candidates included countries such as Israel, Algeria and Iran.

\textsuperscript{501} Arik, Umut (2000), “Turkey”, European Union membership for central and eastern European countries, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey: Situation and outlook, National Europe Centre Paper No. 4, Australian National University, Canberra, p. 101

\textsuperscript{502} Morris (2005), p. 23

\textsuperscript{503} Morris (2005), p. 22
ever, the "Manutes Package" financial aid scheme never materialized due to objections by Greece.\textsuperscript{504}

The early 1990s witnessed a continuation of a downslide in Turkey-EU relations and the reinforcement of the negative image of Turkey already prevalent in the EU due to the economic crises and a "post-modern" military coup. Also, the European Parliament in particular became more critical towards Turkey’s track record on human rights and treatment of minorities and demands were made towards improvement of conditions for the Kurds and recognition of the Armenian massacre.\textsuperscript{505} Whereas the late-1980s and early 1990s were a problematic period for Turkey, a more positive turn emerged eventually in the mid-1990s and a Customs Union agreement was signed in 1995 (in effect since 1996). Encouraged by the fresh wave of positive developments Turkey applied for EU membership again in 1997. The Luxembourg European Council of 1997, however, decided that negotiations were to be started with the CEEC states and Cyprus, but not with Turkey. As an added snub the EU offered Turkey a “European Strategy” instead of an Accession Partnership, despite pledges to treat all candidates equally. Moreover, Turkey was excluded from the EU enlargement strategy at the same time in its Agenda 2000 (published in 1997), which made no reference to Turkey’s full membership prospects.\textsuperscript{506} The move seriously angered Turkey and its government quickly condemned the EU’s decision as "unjust and discriminatory". Perhaps even worse than an outright rejection, the EU thus sent mixed signals to Turkey: on the one hand it was deemed eligible, but on the other hand not wanted.\textsuperscript{507}

\textit{Becoming an “ordinary” candidate?}

The late-1990s, however, produced perhaps the most important breakthrough in Turkey’s membership quest when the 1999 Helsinki European Council recognised Turkey officially as a candidate country following a positive assessment by the European Commission. Besides finally

\textsuperscript{504} Arik (2000), p. 105
\textsuperscript{505} Arik (2000), pp. 132-136
\textsuperscript{506} See European Commission website: \url{http://ec.europa.eu/agenda2000/index_en.htm}
\textsuperscript{507} Arik (2000), p. 105
promising Turkey real prospects of full membership, the EU now offered Turkey an Accession Partnership and equal treatment:

“The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. Turkey will also have the opportunity to participate in Community programmes and agencies and in meetings between candidate States and the Union in the context of the accession process. An accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of previous European Council conclusions while containing priorities on which accession preparations must concentrate in the light of the political and economic criteria and the obligations of a Member State, combined with a national programme for the adoption of the acquis. Appropriate monitoring mechanisms will be established. With a view to intensifying the harmonisation of Turkey's legislation and practice with the acquis, the Commission is invited to prepare a process of analytical examination of the acquis. The European Council asks the Commission to present a single framework for coordinating all sources of European Union financial assistance for pre-accession.”

Perhaps even more importantly, this time the EU made good of its promises and the Accession Partnership was established in November 2000, giving Turkey a clearly defined path towards full membership for the first time. The December 2001 Laeken European Council continued the positive turn in relations and Turkey gained access to participation in the European Security and

Defence Policy and the work on the Convention on the future of Europe on equal footing with other candidates.\textsuperscript{509}

The 2002 Brussels European Council, however, declared that the EU had intentions to open negotiations with Turkey once the conditions in Turkey and the EU would so permit. Turkey did not need to wait for long. In 2004 the Copenhagen European Council, following a positive assessment by the European Commission, declared that it would begin negotiations with Turkey without delay and in October 2005 the negotiations were officially opened. Taking into consideration that in December 2006 8 chapters were frozen due to the disagreements over the Cyprus issue, one can legitimately conclude that Turkey’s accession process since its first application in July 1959 has been an extraordinarily rollercoaster-like process with plenty of ups and downs along the way. Nevertheless, the fact that Turkey’s accession process is an open ended one (i.e. no definite timeline or accession date is given), makes it relatively safe to assume that more thrills and frills are to be expected.

\textit{Table 9. Turkey’s Road to Europe}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Turkey becomes a founding member of OEEC (OECD since 1961)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Turkey becomes a member of the European Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Turkey becomes a member in NATO</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Turkey applies to join the EEC (founded 1958)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>The “Ankara Agreement” is signed (enters into force in 1964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>The Additional Protocol is signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>The European Community freezes its relations with Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Turkey applies for full membership in the EEC (rejected 1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Turkey and the EU form a Customs Union (enters force in 1996)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{509} Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Republic of Turkey, “History of Turkey – EU Relations”, \url{http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2}, Date last accessed 17.6.2007
**Geography of the EU: Constructing Turkey into versus out of Europe**

One of the most conceptually difficult questions in the EU enlargement debate is defining the geographic borders of Europe. Geography defines Europe as the westernmost peninsula of Eurasia west of Asia. Its western, northern and southern borders are well defined by clear boundaries; the Atlantic Ocean in the west, Barents Sea to the north and the Mediterranean to the south. The eastern boundaries of Europe, however, are contested. In terms of physical “natural” geographic boundaries the European continent is often said to be limited in the east by the Ural Mountains, and further down by the Caspian Sea, Caucasus Mountains, Black Sea, the Bosporus Straits, Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles. However, this definition is contested and geographers have never reached a full consensus as to Europe’s borders in the east. The European Union’s current borders on the other hand, as the Commissioner for Enlargement, Dr. Olli Rehn points out, are defined by the Treaty of Nice, the various accession treaties since then and the Withdrawal Treaty of Greenland in 1985. The borders of the EU are thus a legal concept also. The EU is thus geographically limited to Lapland in the North, the Reunion in the South, Guadeloupe in the West, Cyprus in the East. The EU’s borders to the west or north have never been an issue and there was a precedent made in regards to the southern limits when Morocco’s

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511 Rehn (2006), p.56

512 Rehn (2006), p. 56
application was turned down in 1993. This again leaves the eastern limits of the Union as an open question, strengthening the argument that Europe is an intellectual construct in essence. Also, the fact that the French overseas territories are within EU’s borders defends the view that its borders are not exclusively geographic.

Turkey’s geographical position is, open to interpretation. The territory of modern Turkey is divided between Anatolia situated geographically in south-west Asia and Thrace situated in south-east Europe. This division between the European and Asian parts of Turkey, divided by the Bosporus straits, has often been raised as a point in the discourse on Turkey’s EU accession prospects; mainly by the opponents to Turkey’s membership who point out that only 3% of its territory belongs to Europe geographically. Those more sympathetic to Turkey’s membership point out that nonetheless the country is at least partially European geographically, historically and culturally. Hence, whilst only 3% of the territory is within continental Europe, this area contains 11% of its total population and the historic, as well as economic and cultural capital Istanbul, the largest city in Turkey and one of the most populous cities in Europe. Moreover, the proponents argue that geography is not the only criteria and that Turkey’s historical, political, economic and security linkages make it European. Indeed whilst a candidate country must be a European state, Turkey was accepted as a candidate country in 2005 and participates in a number of European institutions which indicates a de facto, if not de jure, recognition of Turkey meeting that criterion. Moreover, Thierry de Montbrial points out that the opponents arguing against Turkey’s membership on the basis that the country is only partially in Europe geographically relies on a concept of Europe that intellectually derives from the Middle Age concept of the Christian world.

Sanem Baykal argues that rather than being a question of economic, political, social and other problems in Turkey, the real issue is its perceived or factual divergent identity that influences

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513 Rehn (2006), p. 57
514 Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), p. 10
Turkey-EU relations. This is because Turkey has traditionally been EU’s historical “significant other”\(^{516}\). Ernst Hirsch Ballin, a Dutch veteran politician, takes the argument even further by stating that questioning Turkey’s European vocation is in fact a symptom of EU’s own identity crisis.\(^{517}\) Hence, the real defining question will be what kind of EU will emerge during Turkey’s accession process and what kind of concept of borders it will endorse.

**What Borders for Europe?**

European institutions say nothing conclusive about the future limits of the EU, perhaps because the issue is largely considered a taboo. Nonetheless, a common position, especially in the European Commission, is that the limits of the EU are not geographic but it is rather the common values that form the ties that bind the community together.\(^{518}\) However, the criterion of values is not very conclusive either, other European institutions that are also based on values have a much broader membership. For instance the Council of Europe had 47 members in 2007 and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 56 members. Since some of the member countries are either not European, or have no interest in joining the EU, one could speculate about the potential maximum membership stock for the EU by engaging in a process of exclusion too seed out the unsuitable and unwilling candidates. First step in such a process would be to exclude the US and Canada, the Central Asian states and European micro-states that have no interest in joining. This would leave us with 17 states that are officially recognised as European but are not EU members: Balkan states, Turkey, countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia. This would imply that the outer limits of the EU could be considered EU-44.\(^{519}\) Of these the Balkan states and Turkey are currently considered as potential members. Russia is not currently interested in EU membership and possibly would

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516 Baykal, Sanem (2005), “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, Jean Monnet Working Papers, 04/05, New York University School of Law, NY, p. 3


518 Avery, (2007), p. 102

519 Avery (2007), p. 106
react unfavourably if the EU sought to include the ENP countries that it considers as being in its sphere of influence. In any case can the EU become EU-44? In the short term most likely not since many of these countries would not be able to meet the Copenhagen Criteria any time soon. However, even if they did, would they still be considered European by the incumbent member states? Graham Avery, a former European Commission official and a European Policy Centre advisor has suggested that candidate countries cannot be excluded on the basis of not being of “European” if they at the same time are members in other European institutions. However, they can be rejected based on other legitimate grounds, i.e. the Copenhagen Criteria or “absorption capacity”. 520 In other words, membership criteria should be based on “Rationalist” factors, not Ideational.

EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, argues in his recent book “Europe’s Next Borders” that it is the shared values that make the European borders, not geography alone: "The map of Europe is first and foremost defined in the minds of Europeans. Geography sets the frame, but essentially it is our common values that make the borders of Europe" 521 He also asserts that enlargement is essentially about extending the zone of these values to the candidate states, and consequently enlargement is the most effective EU soft power policy tool. 522 He also argues that European discourse is dominated by the limits and borders of Europe, constituting an ostrich attitude rather than one of openness that the EU tends to pride itself on. Consequently Rehn instigates that the issue should be of next frontiers instead. Unlike borders, that are exclusive and restrictive, frontiers are a positive, constructive concept, according to Rehn. 523 Rehn blames the opponents of enlargement as having an “ostrich attitude” and asks rhetorically what if the American founding fathers had declared in the 1787 constitution that the thirteen founding colonies will define the borders of the United States? 524 Instead of this “ostrich attitude”, as Rehn

520 Avery (2007), p. 106
521 Rehn (2006), p. 45
522 Rehn (2006), pp. 45-46
calls it, he instigates that "an intellectual interpretation that takes into consideration the political, cultural and historical relationship between Turkey and Europe” is needed.\textsuperscript{525}

Dominique Strauss-Kahn, former French finance minister, speaks of two alternate visions for the EU. One that relies on the past and thus, a geographical and historical identity for Europe, giving the EU a sacred duty to unify all countries that share this identity. Turkey does not conform to this concept, according to Strauss-Kahn. The second vision looks towards the future instead of the past. In this vision the EU’s borders cannot be based on geography and history, but rather it is a political project with a political identity unifying under the umbrella of common universal values; human rights, rule of law and democracy. Strauss-Kahn states that geography and history do not provide a satisfactory resolution to the problem of defining Europe’s borders: “these borders have been in such a state of flux in the past and are so vague in geographic terms that it appears to be impossible to make it relevant criteria to define the limits of Europe’s territory.”\textsuperscript{526}

Therefore, the determining membership criteria are the Copenhagen Criteria alone and any state that fulfils these criteria can join.\textsuperscript{527} This interpretation, however, still presents a problem: if geography is excluded why couldn’t Australia, New Zealand and Canada join? All these states could be considered “European” in all but geography. Yet, the EU is supposedly a regional organisation. How can the EU balance between openness and the reality that the EU must have some sort of outer limits? Widening versus deepening can perhaps be seen as complimentary activities (although many disagree), but how would this work in practice if there is no cap? The EU has thus far failed to agree on constitution and voting rules and is arguably facing a looming decision-making paralysis if something is not done, how would it handle 30 or more members and still be able to function? Referring to the failure of the Nice summit Strauss-Kahn has suggested that one potential end result could be a combination of two poles of a European Union and a Mediterranean Union. This would establish a zone of peace and economic integration

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Rehn (2006), p. 81
\item Straus-Kahn (2004), p. 2
\item Strauss-Kahn (2004), p. 3
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
where a core group of countries in both unions that are willing and able to may form a deeper political union.\textsuperscript{528}

In a similar way, but with a more negative connotation, Nicolas Sarkozy, the newly elected French president at the time of the writing, has on several occasions stated that he wants the European project to have some sorts of ultimate borders. As a presidential candidate he stated in his UMP party’s candidate nomination speech that: "I want to say that Europe must give itself borders, that not all countries have a vocation to become members of Europe, beginning with Turkey which has no place inside the European Union." \textsuperscript{529} The given reason for this statement was the deepening versus widening logic, the fear that the EU would risk turning into a mere enlarged free trade area: "Enlarging Europe with no limit risks destroying European political union, and that I do not accept".\textsuperscript{530} More recently, since becoming the president, Sarkozy has indicated that he wants the European Council to discuss the borders of Europe in December 2007 at the end of Portuguese presidency. Moreover, he wants a clear conclusion that Turkey is not and will not be considered as European. Instead of EU membership for Turkey, Sarkozy says that a Mediterranean Union is going to be proposed during the French EU presidency in the second half of 2008. According to Sarkozy’s vision the Mediterranean Union would eventually become a fully fledged union like the EU with its own institutions. A close cooperative relationship between the two would provide a better working solution than an EU that would comprise all the states in the two regions.\textsuperscript{531}

In conclusion, what kind of union the EU evolves into in the next 10 to 15 years determines what kind of borders it will have and how candidates are selected and treated is a question of primary interest to Turkey. Should the EU turn out to evolve into an exclusive “club” based on history and geography, Turkey should expect trouble. On the other hand, should the EU evolve into an

\textsuperscript{528} Strauss-Kahn (2004), p. 4
\textsuperscript{530} Turkish Press.com
open ended community based on a political and economic project which has room for potential candidates with “divergent identities”, Turkey has a relatively good chance of getting accepted.

5.3 Identity and Culture: Turkey’s “Europeanness” and the European Values

“The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values.”

Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

“The term ‘European’ combines geographical, historical and cultural elements which all contribute to the European identity. The shared experience of ideas, values, and historical interaction cannot be condensed into a simple timeless formula and is subject to review by each succeeding generation”

The European Commission

Samuel P. Huntington has suggested that Turkey’s chances becoming a member in the EU are slim at best because what it is trying to achieve means “defecting” from one civilization to another, a task that rarely succeeds. Moreover, having rejected Mecca and been rejected by Brussels Turkey has become a torn country between two civilizations, Huntington asserts. Whilst Huntington’s cultural realism has been vehemently criticised for being too deterministic and relying too much on rather vague concept of “civilizations”, the fears of an emerging “Clash of Civilizations” nonetheless are prominent in Turkey-EU discourse, primarily used for describing the potential consequences of “losing Turkey”. At the other end spectrum the supporters of Turkey’s membership are also claiming that Turkey’s integration into the EU would constitute, or build, a “Bridge between Civilizations”, i.e. Europe and the Islamic world. In any case, it


would be a rather futile task to attempt to deny that cultural factors are not prominent in the discourse. Turkey’s “Europeanness” is being contested by the politicians and the public in the European Union’s incumbent member states, in particular on the basis that its identity, culture and values do not correspond to the prevailing perception of what constitutes “Europeanness”. As an indication of the cultural resistance, 55% of respondents in the Eurobarometer study stated that cultural differences between Turkey and the EU are too significant for the accession to be allowed.\textsuperscript{534} However, there is a significant level of vagueness as to what exactly constitutes “Europeanness”, i.e. how the “European” identity, culture and values are defined, and crucially for future enlargement projects how the final borders of Europe are defined. Slovenia was constructed as “European”, in a similar manner to the CEEC-10 countries that joined in 2004, justifying its rightful return to “Europe”, but at the same time it was considered sufficiently “Balkan” to for a “bridge” between the two.\textsuperscript{535} To Turkey’s detriment the foundations of that particular “bridge” are not seen as equally solid, namely in the “European” end of the imaginary bridge.

What then is this concept of “Europeanness” and the universal European culture that Turkey is being judged against? First of all, it needs to be recognised that Europe is not a homogenous entity but rather extremely diverse in terms of ethnicity, religion and languages (as well as in many aspects, such as legal and political systems, living standards and level of economic development). In fact the approximately 490 million citizens of the current 27 member countries include countless national minorities, speak 23 official languages and over 60 regional or minority languages.\textsuperscript{536} In a gesture of acknowledgement of this fact the EU has launched an official motto for European integration: ”Unified in Diversity”. Many observers claim that Turkey is the ultimate test case for “unity in diversity” in that its success or failure in the quest for full memberships will determine what kind of EU will emerge in the future: an inclusive versus an exclu--

\textsuperscript{534} European Commission (2005), \textit{Standard Eurobarometer 64}, Autumn 2005, Brussels


\textsuperscript{536} European Commission, Education and Training, \url{http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/lang/languages/langmin/regmin_en.html}, date accessed: 26 April, 2007
The prevailing conventional wisdom dictates that a deepening political union requires more "unity" than "diversity", referring to the widely proclaimed "widening versus deepening" argument. As already established, Rehn calls this a false dichotomy and states that the two are compatible. Hence, following the official Commission line he proclaims that the EU is really a value community with a diverse polity unified under the banner of common universal values, and that consequently EU membership is open to all countries that respect and are committed to its values. Consequently, only not subscribing to these values stops Turkey from joining the EU. This would follow the general principle that if a candidate meets the criteria, the EU must honour its part (the *pacta sunt servanda* principle) by approving and facilitating accession. If this was the case in practice too, Turkey’s accession should not be a problem: if Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen Criteria it will be admitted. However, the opponents of Turkey’s accession refer to its divergent identity and values as impassable obstacles, a view that appears to be enforced by the European public opinion.

**European Values**

As for the universal European values, the issue should be relatively straightforward. The official values of the European Union are democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights as stipulated in the Article 49 of Treaty of the European Union, enforced by the Copenhagen Criteria. Had the Constitutional Treaty entered force, it would have further solidified and specified these universal values towards creating a political identity for the EU, but the emergence of the treaty in any significant form appears increasingly doubtful at the time of the writing. Whilst the values of the EU as a regional institution are fairly clear, nonetheless a wedge between how the EU wants to be perceived by its populations and how they perceive it still exist:

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537 Rehn (2006), p. 31
538 Rehn (2006), p. 47
539 Rehn (2006), p. 51
Table 10. Personal versus European Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top-5 Personal Values</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Top-5 European Values</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for human life</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual freedom</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>Respect for other cultures</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 66

The biggest gaps between those perceived European and personal values were in: respect for human life (personal 43%, 2nd, EU 13%, 8th); individual freedom (personal 22% 5th, EU 10% 10th); and, respect for other cultures (personal 11% 10th, EU 19% 5th). Whilst this does not mean European values are not backed by the citizens, or that there are not universal values to be found in the EU, it also indicates that the universality is not at the level where minor divergence should constitute a problem. On the contrary in a pluralistic and tolerant Europe there should be considerable leeway for personal values. Hence, the issue of values in terms of the accession process should refer only to the level of universal values in the society and the state, i.e. adherence to the Copenhagen Criteria and the founding treaties. José Torreblanca has also pointedly stated: "identities are acquired whereas values are chosen".541 In terms of the Turkish state, it would seem it has already made this choice.

Secondly, a "European identity” does not really exist independently, but rather merely as a supplementary on the side of national identities.542 A study commissioned by the European Commission to examine the emergence of a European identity from a wide variety of theoretical

541 Torreblanca, Jose (2005), “Europe’s Reasons and Turkey’s Accession”, Analysis, No. 199, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, p.2
542 Rehn (2006), p. 38
perspectives found that whilst such an identity may be forming, it still is a long way off. The Eurobarometer studies have also constantly found that EU citizens prioritise their nationality first over European identity (see: chart 5.2.), supporting the supplementarity of the European identity. Of the respondents 41% identify with their respective nationality only and 48% nationality first and European second. In comparison, national identity is the prevailing one in Turkey with 74% of Turks associating themselves with nationality only. However, how would one expect the Turks to feel more European whilst their country is not a member and arguably has faced fierce resistance to join? Should Turkey join the EU first, it is rather likely that this figure would improve somewhat. It is, on the other hand, rather unlikely that a feeling of “Euro-nationalism” would be behind the resistance to Turkey’s membership when such a phenomena arguably does not even exit. Hence, it would be justified to ask whether religion is really the bigger issue, and in fact equals culture in Turkey’s case?

Table 11. European Identity

![Image of Table 11]

Source: Eurobarometer 64, June 2006, p. 46

544 Standard Eurobarometer 64, p. 46
545 Standard Eurobarometer 64, p. 47
5.4 The Role of Religion

“As a secular republic with a predominantly Muslim population, a staunchly democratic Turkey integrated into the EU would be a powerful example against fundamentalist claims of an essential incompatibility between democracy and Islam”\textsuperscript{546}

Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement

“Therefore, especially throughout the Ottoman history, there has always been a conflict between Christianity and Islam...There is an inherent fear of Islam deep in the hearts of many European countries.” (Male, Austria)\textsuperscript{547}

The role of religion is a politically sensitive topic, but nonetheless a critical factor in Turkey’s EU accession process. Whereas the question of religion is not featured in the official discourse\textsuperscript{548}, in particular by the EU institutions, it nonetheless is quite prominently featured in the popular discourse. Besides being politically sensitive, the question of religion is also increasingly a complex one. On the one hand, many EU citizens are worried that Turkey’s accession would result in too many Muslim immigrants to the EU, and thus to a growing Islamic influence in the EU. On the other hand, the EU is worried that fundamentalism might gain ground in Turkey, in particular unless the EU avoids “losing Turkey” by integrating it into the European “zone of peace and stability”. Securing Turkey’s integration into the EU would, allegedly, prove that democracy and Islam are compatible, and thus provide an example for other Muslim states for their path to democratic reforms. This claim obviously ignores the fact that Turkey already is both democratic and Muslim, and has demonstrated little interest in exporting its secular model

\textsuperscript{546} Quoted in: Delegation of the European Commission to the United States, EUFocus, March 2007, p.7


\textsuperscript{548} The EU cannot officially refer to religion as a criteria because of the principles of secularism, religious freedom and tolerance
to the Islamic world. Moreover, the EU, again allegedly, must avoid creating an image that it is discriminating against a Muslim country, thus angering the Islamic world and losing its trust, should Turkey’s accession fail. Finally, Turkey worries that the EU is, in reality, an exclusive Christian club and that it would be consequently turned down due to its Islamic identity.

Since both, Turkey and the EU, are officially secular the question of religion should not matter. Moreover, refusing accession for Turkey on the grounds that it is a Muslim country is not acceptable if the EU intends to withhold its core values of tolerance and plurality.\(^{549}\)

Yet, as this section will demonstrate, crucial differences persist in terms perceptions on religion’s role in society. Moreover, it would seem that Turkey still has to discover how to reconcile Ataturk’s secularism and the growing political role of Islam whilst maintaining a functioning democracy, as 2007 presidential elections so drastically demonstrated. In a similar vein, the EU has to discover how to deal with an increasing Muslim population and prospects of growing Islamic identity and influence. Exclusion of Turkey on basis of its religious identity would arguably send a negative message not only to the Islamic world but also to Muslims in Europe. Furthermore, exclusion of Turkey based on such reasons would hurt the EU’s external image and would be seen as a direct violation of the core values the EU pledges to promote; religious tolerance, secularism, pluralism and human rights.\(^{550}\)

**The Role of Religion in the European Union**

The European Union is officially secular and religion is not mentioned in the founding treaties. The Berlin Declaration issued in 2007 to commemorate 50 years\(^{551}\) of European integration followed the same policy line, angering the Catholic Church and prompting the Pope to issue statements expressing his disappointment that Europe’s Christian heritage was not even men-
tioned. In a similar vein one million Europeans signed a petition in 2004 in favour of including Christianity in the Constitution. A compromise, however, was reached that refers to Europe’s spiritual heritage but does not define what that heritage includes. Consequently, the preamble of the Declaration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union reads:

“Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law.”

In general, the question of religion is no small issue; a majority of Europeans - 66.7% - considered themselves religious according to the European Values Study in 1999, although religiousness appears to be in decline in Europe with only 52% of EU-25 citizens now declaring they believe in God. The role of religion divides Europeans somewhat, but in general it is considered important. When asked whether they agree with the statement “the place of religion in our society is too important”, 48% responded they totally disagreed whilst 46% responded they totally agree.

However, according to the same survey secularism is equally strong in Europe, thus justifying the separation of religion and the state; 72.2% of the respondents strongly agreed that religious leaders should not influence government policy making. In Turkey the corresponding figure was 72.3%. Consequently, Rehn has stated that secularism is a value that unites Turkey and the

554 European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, European Values Survey 1999, p. 81
556 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 66
EU. However, whilst the EU is officially secular and most member countries are secular, secularism is not completely universal in Europe. Some of the member states have official state religions (churches); the UK (the Anglican Church), Finland (Evaneglic Lutheran Church), Denmark (Lutheran) and Greece (Greek Orthodox Church), whilst Christianity is referred to in constitutions of some of the officially secular states (e.g. the Irish Republic). Moreover, there is a rapid process of secularism that appears to be creating a post-Christian Europe with less people belonging to religious congregations. This, however, is not necessarily indicative of religion’s permanent decline in Europe as a majority of Europeans still believe in God. José Casanova calls this emerging state of affairs as “believing without belonging”. Furthermore, there have been serious attempts of a Christian revival in Europe, in particular since the reunification of Catholic Poland with Europe, a project that has reunited the territories of Medieval Christendom within the enlarged EU.

As for the spiritual heritage, whilst Islam has been a long-standing and an important element in European history, it is Christianity that has had the dominant impact on Europe’s cultural evolution. Moreover, whilst there is a significant and growing Muslim minority in Europe, a clear majority of Europeans are Christians (Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox) and identify with Christian identity. Also, despite the long interaction between Islam and Europe, as well as Turkey’s well-established tradition of secularism, Islam is still seen as the “other” for Western civilization and Western secularism from the perspective of Europe’s Judeo-Christian heritage. The perceptions of Islam as an un-European religion and the link between it and funda-

560 Casanova (2004), p. 4
562 Casanova (2004), p. 1
563 Casanova (2004), p. 4
mentalism and extremism are deeply rooted. Also, attitudes towards Islam in Europe have in general been hardening following the 9/11, “11M” Madrid bombings and 7/7 London bombings with a growing number of Europeans becoming concerned about Islamic extremism. The French ban on Muslim veils and other ostensibly religious symbols and the murder of anti-immigration politician Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands have only reinforced the polarisation between Islam and the West in Europe. The feeling of concern is worst in countries with the largest Muslim populations; 78% of Germans, 77% of Spaniards, 76% of Dutch, 73% French and 70% of British worried about Islamic extremism. The concerns over Islamic extremism were also found to be linked to the opposition to Turkey’s membership, although concerns over eroding national identity and negative views on immigration were linked even more intimately to the opposition. Nonetheless, a worrying trend seems to be emerging:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Generally good</th>
<th>Generally bad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PEW Divided World p. 29

564 Casanova (2004), pp. 7-9
566 The PEW Global Attitudes Project, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics”, July 14, 2005, p. 18
567 Ibid
The prospects of growing Islamic identity also worries Europeans with 66% of respondents in Germany, 63% in the UK, 70% in France and 60% in the Netherlands seeing a growing Islamic identity in their country. The integration of European Muslims is another problem often raised in connection with Turkey’s EU accession. A majority of Muslims in Europe tend to see themselves as Muslims first and citizens of their respective countries of residence second:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Muslims first</th>
<th>Citizens first</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PEW, Muslims in Europe, p. 9

European Christians on the other hand generally see themselves as Citizens first, whilst Christian identity is seen as secondary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Christians first</th>
<th>Citizens first</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pew, Muslims in Europe, p. 3

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The PEW Global Attitudes Project, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics”, p. 17
**Attitudes towards Muslim Immigrants in Europe**

The integration of the approximately 23 million European Muslims is a serious potential problem, as it only tends to take place in the 2nd or 3rd generation, and even then it does not always happen. In Germany for instance Muslims with German citizenship are often still considered immigrants. Moreover, only 600 000 out 3 million German Muslims have acquired citizenship. The same applies to many other EU countries. In Denmark acquiring citizenship was recently made harder for immigrants, making many of them to feel not wanted. Even more seriously, Muslims in Europe see assimilation instead of integration being the reality. A majority of respondents in European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia study do not see their values as incompatible with the host society values, yet perceptions of Islam being a threat to European values are seen as common amongst the majority populations. The sources of Islamophobia are linked to fears of the Muslim “demographic time bomb” and perceptions of Muslims being threat to law and order and terrorist sympathisers. Muslims in Europe, however, are more worried about economics and unemployment than religion or culture and in general do not see Europeans as hostile towards Islam.

Muslims in Europe continue to suffer from discrimination and marginalisation in employment, education and housing services due to stereotyping by the majority population. Some of the interviewees in the study reported stereotyping of Islamic society and culture as exotic and

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569 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2006), Perceptions of discrimination and Islamophobia - Voices from members of Muslim communities in the European Union, Vienna p. 23
571 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2006), "Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia“, Vienna, p.3
572 EUMC, “Perceptions of discrimination and Islamophobia”, p. 32
573 EUMC, “Perceptions of discrimination and Islamophobia”, pp. 36-37
574 EUMC, ”Perceptions of discrimination and Islamophobia”, pp. 37-38
575 PEW Global Attitudes Project, Muslims in Europe, p. 2
under-developed by the majority population and media. The European Values Survey reports that respondents in Denmark preferred emotionally unstable people as neighbours over Muslims (14.1% did not want emotionally unstable people as neighbours, whilst 16.3% did not want Muslims as neighbours). In general, Muslims appear more vulnerable to discrimination than non-Muslims, but at the same time religion alone does not explain their problems. Much of the problems are rather linked to a general anti-immigration sentiment rather than direct hostility towards Muslims in particular. In general Muslims do not see their host populations in Europe as hostile, with the exception of Germany where 51% of Muslims see their hosts as hostile (22% of respondents reported that most and 29% that many are hostile). Europeans are not necessarily against Muslim immigrants in particular with immigration from the Middle East and North Africa mostly still seen as positive, except in Germany, where only 34% see it as a good thing in comparison to 59% who see it as a bad thing. Finally, a five nation survey carried out in the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain by the Financial Times found that religion was not a criterion for EU membership for respondents. However, the survey found that 35% of French and Germans thought that the EU is predominantly a Christian club. Nonetheless, as Rehn states the critical task in integrating Muslims into European societies is creating European Islam, instead of Islam in Europe.

The Role of Religion in Turkey

Secularism is a long established tradition in Turkey and plays a central role in the official national ideology - Kemalism. The Ottoman Empire already exercised considerable tolerance

References:

577 EUMC, “Perceptions of discrimination and Islamophobia”. p. 43
578 EVS 1999, p. 81
580 PEW Divided World, Muslims in Europe, p. 73
581 PEW Divided World, Muslims in Europe, p. 74
582 Financial Times, "Europeans see religion as no bar to EU", December 17, 2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/7969e822-8dfe-11db-ae0e-0000779e2340.html
583 Rehn (2006), p. 96
towards religious minorities, in particular the “peoples of the book” - Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians. The principle of secularism is also one of the basic principles established in the constitution for the Turkish Republic and enjoys broad popular support in Turkey. In the 1999 European Values Survey 72.3% Turks responded that they strongly agree that religious leaders should not influence the government.

However, a certain level of growth in fundamentalism appears to be emerging in the Turkish society. In particular the gap between the different views regarding the role and importance of religion in society can lead into dangerous polarisation in Turkish society. The trend currently seems to be a growing role for Islam in politics in Turkey. According to the PEW Global Attitudes project study, 47% see a growing role for Islam in Turkish politics, whilst 32% see less. Of those seeing a growing role for Islam, 50% see it as a good thing and 39% as a bad thing. When asked if democracy can work in Turkey only 44% of Turks answered positively. In comparison 62% conceded that “Islam plays a large role in political life”. Of the countries surveyed, only Pakistanis were more sceptical about democracy – 43% versus 62% respectively. The others were more positive about democracy as a workable system, whilst Islam still plays a relatively large role in political life: Lebanon 83%-54%, Jordan 80%-30%, Morocco 83%-75% and Indonesia 77%-85%. As for the importance of Islam having an influential world role, 43% of respondents in Turkey consider it very important, 32 % somewhat important and 18% not too/not at all important.

In general Turks are very religious, more so than Europeans: 80.6% of Turks as opposed to 66.7% of Europeans consider themselves religious. Consequently, there is a very strong Islamic identity in Turkey with 29% of Turks see themselves as Turks first, whilst 43% see

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584 Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), p. 10
585 European Values Survey 1999, p. 107
587 PEW, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics”, p. 2
588 PEW, "Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics", p. 27
589 EVS 1999, p. 81
themselves as Muslims first.\textsuperscript{590} Turks also hold very negative views of Christians, even in comparison to other Muslim countries.

**Turkish views of Christians, Jews and Muslims**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favourable / Unfavourable</td>
<td>Favourable / Unfavourable</td>
<td>Favourable / Unfavourable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21% 63%</td>
<td>18% 60%</td>
<td>83% 11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Pew, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics”, p.4*

Moreover, whilst only 26% of Turks think that some religions are more violent than others, a very high number of them named Christianity as the most violent religion:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Islam</th>
<th>Judaism</th>
<th>Christianity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Pew, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics”, p. 12*

Anti-Western sentiments in Turkey are also relatively high; 79% of Turks believed that relations between the Islamic world and the West are bad and that the Westerners are mostly to be blamed.

\textsuperscript{590} PEW, "Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics", p.21
for this. In comparison the numbers in other major Muslim countries are somewhat lower: Indonesia 64%, Jordan 61%, Pakistan 60% and Egypt 56%.  

The May-June 2007 riots and the annulment of the first round of parliamentary presidential elections were an indication of growing anxiety over Islam’s role in Turkish politics, secularism, the role of the military and the state of the Turkish democracy. Many Turks are worried about the Islamic AK party and its true agenda. The AK has roots in the Islamist Welfare Party (which won the elections in 1995 and 1996 and introduced political Islam in modern Turkey) and its leader Prime Minister Erdoğan has had a past as an Islamic radical. Erdoğan, as the mayor of Istanbul sought to establish a partial ban on alcohol in the city and he openly supported establishing Sharia law. Moreover, Erdoğan was sentenced to ten months in jail in 1999 for his radical Islamism. Many Turks are now sceptical of his milder tone and policies and speculate whether he has changed or whether the goal of reforms is just to get rid of the military and take over secularist institutions. In any case, it seems that an AK prime minister, parliamentary speaker and president at the same time is too much for the Turkish public to stomach. The appointment of foreign minister Abdullah Gül from the AK government clearly was not acceptable to the Turkish public, as Mr. Erdoğan too had to concede. The office of the president is supposed to be an institution guarding secularism and Mr. Gül and Mr. Erdoğan do not fit the public’s image of men who would do this, especially since their wives wear headscarves. What direction this looming political crisis in Turkey takes, and whether the military has the patience to stay out despite its role as the traditional guardian of secularism, is going to be of paramount importance to Turkey’s image and the future of the EU membership negotiations. The AK party has thus far been very supportive of EU membership and has carried out many important reforms towards

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591 Pew, “Divided World”, p. 53
593 Although the offence was citing an Islamic poem in public and thus, not entirely convincing evidence of radicalism
that end. However, it still has to find a way to reconcile its Islamic identity and values with those of secularism and democracy, as well as find a way to keep the military at bay.

### 5.5 Public and Elite Opinion in the EU and Turkey and Official Discourse: Turkish-European Discourse

This section focuses on three separate but interconnected aspects of Turkish membership discourse; public opinion, elite opinion and official discourse. In theory at least the relationships between these discourses should be mainly linear in a sense that public opinion influences elite opinion, which in turn influences policy making and thus, shapes official discourse. However, the relationship between public and elite opinion can also be seen as dialectic, since elite opinion also shapes public opinion through “thought leadership”. The importance of the analysis of the public opinion in the EU and Turkey, in particular in terms of the levels of support towards Turkey’s membership, as well as the perceived reasons for support and opposition, is to provide clues as to what matters most; Rationalist factors, such as the costs and benefits (economic in particular); or Ideational factors, such as Turkey’s contested “Europeanness”, in particular in regards to European and Turkish identity, history, ethnicity, language and religion. From a practical point of view the importance of public opinion is also paramount as lack of adequate public support towards Turkey’s membership in Europe would most likely result in the rejection of Turkey’s accession treaty in the national referendums, thus stopping Turkey’s accession regardless of the fact that in order to have reached this stage in the accession process it would have had to meet all the requirements stated in the negotiating framework. Elite opinion, on the other hand, is important because it shapes both public and official discourses by providing ”signposts” that set the tone, direction and parameters for them. Finally, official discourse revolves around the formal requirements and
tends to be formally structured with a contractual tone whereby one party transmits requirements to another. The ultimate question, however, is whether discourses transform into “action” and how much they reflect the reality of political decision-making, or whether they are mainly “rhetorical action” as Schimmelpfennig has suggested?595

The method and sources for this section include the analysis of Eurobarometer public opinion surveys, other public opinion surveys, such as PEW Global Attitudes surveys and European Values Study 1999. FPDA was also utilised for analysing elite opinion, following an assumption that speech acts by influential individuals hold the power to formulate or influence policy making and provide signposts for the discourses. The sources for elite opinion and discourse thus included speeches and statements by European and Turkish senior officials and other senior figures. The analysis of the official discourse focuses on official documents; foundational documents, such as Turkey’s Accession Partnership and progress reports by the European Commission and the European Parliament between 2000 and 2006, as well as the Turkish government’s accession strategy paper. The research process is described in more detail in chapter 3 and more information on analytical coding of nodes in available in Appendix D.

Public Opinion and the Popular Discourse

Turkey’s real and perceived inability to conform to the European ideal and practices, combined with perceptions of cultural divergence, have been reflected in a generally negative public opinion towards Turkey’s accession. Turkey is said to have become Europe’s significant “other” replacing the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block, thus acting as the “other” in European identity construction. Consequently, Turkey’s “Europeanness” remains contested.596 Theoretically at least Turkey can fix the first problem in a relative short period of time if it chooses to do so. However, the second issue is more problematic and a long-term challenge to change. The first problem is one that Turkey can address in the short- to medium-term and that can be fixed by


adhering to the Copenhagen criteria, i.e. carrying out the political and economic reforms that are required within the context of the Accession Partnership framework. However, in practice this alone will not provide a complete solution to Turkey’s problem since the negative popular opinion it suffers from is a real hurdle on its path to the full membership, as each enlargement requires unanimous acceptance by incumbent member states before ratification of an accession treaty is possible. Moreover, referendums to consult the populations on Turkey’s accession are almost a certainty in some of the EU member states. So far France, the Netherlands and Austria have indicated that they would arrange a referendum on Turkey’s membership and in Ireland referendums on EU treaties are required by constitution. Should the result be negative in only one of these countries, Turkey’s accession becomes impossible. Hence, in some manner or other Turkey, and the European Commission as the other partner in the process, need to find ways to break the perception of “otherness” in order to facilitate Turkey’s accession to full membership. Currently 48% of Europeans would not support Turkey’s accession even if it fulfils the Copenhagen Criteria and 55% feel Turkey is culturally too different for accession to be allowed.⁵⁹⁷

Table 12. Beyond the Copenhagen Criteria

![Chart showing public opinion on Turkey's accession to the European Union]

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⁵⁹⁷ Special Eurobarometer, EBS 255, p. 70
Support for enlargement in the incumbent member states

A special Eurobarometer on enlargement, published in July 2006, found that a relative majority of Europeans are generally in favour of enlargement, but also that the population is nonetheless rather divided on the issue with 45% of respondents being generally in favour of EU enlargement and 42% opposing it. The study also found that the respondents in the new member states were in general considerably more supportive towards enlargement than those in the EU-15 countries. The highest levels of support in the new member states were found in Poland (72%) and Slovenia (73%), but support was also strong in Bulgaria (62%) and Romania (69%). In the candidate countries support was strong in Croatia (64%), but much less so in Turkey (45%). In the EU-15 states the support was even more divided between those in favour and those against. The EU-15 member states in favour of enlargement were: Greece (56%), Spain (55%) and Denmark (51%), whilst a relative majority in favour was found in Sweden (49%), Italy (48%), Portugal (47%), Ireland (45%) and the UK (44%). Opposition to EU enlargement on the other hand was strong in Germany (66%), Luxembourg (65%), France (62%), Austria (61%) and Finland (60%). The latest Eurobarometer at the time of writing, Standard Eurobarometer 65, found the same general level of support for enlargement, with support being 41% in the EU-15 in comparison to 66% in the new member states. In general the Eurobarometer studies since 2000 show a general downward trend with support for enlargement having fallen from 51% in April 2002 and 50% in March 2003 to 45% (42% against) in 2006.

Socio-demographic factors would seem to have an impact on the levels of support for enlargement with men being more likely to favour it than women, as well as younger respondents (15-

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598 Special Eurobarometer, EBS 255, p. 4
600 European Commission (2002), Standard Eurobarometer EB 56, Brussels, April 2002, p. 71
601 European Commission (2002), Standard Eurobarometer, EB58, Brussels, December 2002, p. 87
24 years old) being more supportive than older (55 or more). The level of education also matters; those with better educational level are more in favour than those with a lower level of education. The political ideology of respondents also had an impact on the level of support with respondents with left wing rather than right-wing views being more likely to support enlargement. Finally, awareness and knowledge of issues relating to enlargement was found to have an impact on the respondents’ views. Although EU citizens in general do not feel well informed about matters relating to enlargement, those who feel more informed are in general also more supportive of enlargement. However, general knowledge of the EU was found having little impact on how enlargement was viewed.\footnote{603}

**The perceived problems and benefits of enlargement**

In general, the respondents in the Eurobarometer study were slightly more aware of the perceived problems connected to enlargement rather than the benefits.\footnote{604} The major problems with enlargement were identified as; increased job transfers to countries where labour is cheap (75%), increased migration of workers from new member countries (73%), increased crime (62%), illegal immigration (60%), strain of EU budget funds (57%), increased political instability (46%) and the eroding of democracy (43%).\footnote{605} The most popular perceived benefits were: increased mobility of people (82%), enhanced cultural diversity in the EU (71%), enhanced peace and stability in the region (67%), enhancement for the EU as a global actor (67%), increased democracy (67%), development in candidate countries (66%), benefits in the war on terrorism and crime (66%), improvements in human rights and protection of minorities (65%), enhancement of the development of a political union (62%), improvements in life standards and norms in the region(61%), enhanced regional integration (57%) and benefits in trade (47%).\footnote{606}
Support for Turkey’s membership (lack thereof) in Europe

The opposition to Turkey’s membership has been consistent in Eurobarometer studies since 1999. Turkey has been the least favoured candidate since 1999, whilst Croatia is the most favoured. The countries where the popular opinion is most against Turkey’s membership are: Austria (81%), Germany (69%), Luxembourg (69%), Cyprus (68%) and Greece (67%). In the EU-25 31% of the respondents were in favour of Turkey’s membership, whilst 55% were against. 607 Moreover, there is a differing perception of the benefits for the parties: 52% of EU citizens see accession as primarily in Turkey’s interest, whilst only 20% see as mutual benefit for both and 7% primarily in the EU’s interest. Turks, however, have an opposing view: 34% perceive accession to be primarily in the EU’s interest, 30% mutual and only 13% see it as primarily in Turkey’s interests. In the EU member states where enlargement in general is least supported, respondents tend to emphasise the view that accession is primarily in Turkey’s interest, whilst the opposite applies to where Turkey’s membership is most supported. 608 Also, those who are against enlargement in general tend to oppose Turkey’s membership, whilst those generally supporting enlargement also support Turkey’s accession. 609

607 European Commission (2006), Standard Eurobarometer EB 64, June 2006, Brussels, p. 137
608 Special Eurobarometer EBS 255, p. 69
609 Special Eurobarometer EBS 255, pp. 70-71
The reasons for opposition to Turkey’s membership

What are the reasons behind the European public’s opposition to Turkey’s membership? Some have suggested the “no” in the French and Dutch referendums on Constitutional Treaty were influenced by the fear of enlargement, and Turkey’s accession in particular. Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca (2007) disagree: in France only 6% of those who voted “no” cited Turkey as the motive, whilst in the Netherlands 6% of “no” voters declared opposition to enlargement in general and 3% against Turkey in particular. The opinions that are held by the public in relation to Turkish accession are based on people’s various beliefs on Turkey and the EU, as well as life in general. The selections of alternative approaches to the question vary from utilitarian, identitarian and post-national. Depending on the chosen ontology the nature of the EU can be

610 Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca (2007), pp. 1-3
perceived as a utilitarian cost/benefit enterprise, a value based community or a post-national -
rights based union united by the pursuit of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{611}

The Eurobarometer studies indicate that people generally in opposition to enlargement also
oppose Turkey’s membership. Also, immigration from Middle East and North Africa is still
generally welcomed in Europe in similar levels to immigration from CEEC-10 countries.\textsuperscript{612}
Moreover, 9/11, the 11M Madrid bombings and the 7/7 London bombings have contributed
towards a general sentiment of concern over Islamic extremism and terrorism. The PEW study
on Muslims in Europe found links between concerns over Islamic extremism and terrorism and
opposition of Turkey’s accession. However, concerns over national identity in Europe were even
further linked to the opposition and negative views on immigration in general correlated with the
opposition as well.\textsuperscript{613}

However, Turkey also seems to be a special case. It is the least favoured candidate and majority
think that accession should not be allowed even if Turkey meets all the criteria. According to
Eurobarometer studies only Albania is similar in the level of support to its membership. Much of
the opposition is materially motivated. The top statements of people’s concerns over Turkey’s
membership were: human rights, economic development in Turkey, increased immigration,
cultural differences and geography (see: table 5.6.) Public opinion towards Turkey’s accession
may have been influenced by ”othering”, which is part of the process of building a European
identity. The theory of identity building dictates that collective identities are a result of an ongo-
ing process of identity constructions and reproduction of shared understandings of a collective
“Self”. The construction of the “Self” requires a sense of “we-ness” developed through shared
experiences, memories and myths.\textsuperscript{614} Unfortunately for Turkey such identity building requires
distinguishing the “Self” somehow from the “others”, i.e. “Europeans” from “Americans”,

\textsuperscript{611} Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca (2007), pp. 2-4
\textsuperscript{612} PEW, “Divided World”, p. 6
\textsuperscript{613} PEW, “Muslims in Europe”, p. 3
\textsuperscript{614} Hülsse, Rainer (1999), “The Discursive Construction of Identity and Difference – Turkey as Europe’s Ot-
er?” , Discussion paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop, Mannheim, 26-31 March, 1999, p. 2
“Asians”, etc. Much of the “othering” by “Europe” has been against Russia, the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but also against Asia (or collectively “East”) and Islam. The “othering” against Islam has traditionally been against the Ottoman Empire, which has served as the Muslim “other” for Europe. It would appear that Turkey still equals “Islam” to Europeans. Hence, Turkey has become Europe’s “significant other”, in particular since the Cold War. Consequently, Turkey’s “Europeanness” remains contested.

How could Turkey change this then? The answer is that it probably cannot, at least in the short to medium term. However, Turkey could influence its image in Europe, and consequently possibly improve its popularity amongst EU citizens. Rainer Hülsse has argued that Turkey reacts too harshly to the EU’s snubs, conveying an image of emotional and irrational peoples, whereas the European political culture is more discursive and less aggressive in its rhetoric. Consequently, Hülsse argues that Turkey should aim at becoming “Cool Turkey” and improve its image by acting in a more “cool”, i.e. “rational” and unemotional manner, to weather the setbacks in the accession process.

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616 Diez (2204), p. 324
617 Diez (2004), p. 328
618 Diez (2004), p. 329
Public Opinion and Discourse in Turkey

The popular support for EU membership has fallen in Turkey in recent years relatively drastically: after the 2002 elections 74% of Turks were in favour of membership, in spring 2006 only 57%. The probable reason for this downslide in popularity is frustrations over the perception that the EU always seems to come up with a way to say no, or postpone the accession. One should remember that Turkey started its path towards membership almost 50 years ago and yet there is no definite date for accession. As an indication of this sentiment, an opinion poll carried out in July 2005 found out that 66% of Turks agreed with the statement that “Western countries want to disintegrate Turkey like they disintegrated the Ottoman Empire in the past.” Moreover,

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619 Rehn (2006), p. 88
51% agreed with the statement that “the reforms required by the EU are similar to those required by the treaty of Sevres which dismembered [the] Ottoman Empire in 1919”.

Keeping that in mind, who could blame the AKP turning towards the popular opinion and slowing down the reforms until the EU appears more accommodating towards Turkey’s accession? It is quite natural to assume that every time there is a setback in the negotiations, the popularity of membership goes down in Turkey and gaining back the popularity takes longer the further down it goes. One could argue that creating an image of “cool Europe” in Turkey is rapidly becoming as necessary as the creating the image of “cool Turkey” in Europe.

**Elite Opinion and Discourse in the EU regarding Turkey’s membership**

Much of the elite opinion regarding Turkey’s membership features civilizational overtones, one way or the other. The prominent elite opinion discourse can be divided into three main approaches: 1) “Othering”, i.e. criticism over Turkey’s identity, culture or religion not being European; 2) “Bridge between civilisations”, i.e. claims that Turkey’s membership would essentially form a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world in particular, but also the developing world in general. In addition Turkey’s EU membership would allegedly provide an example to other Muslim countries that Islam and democracy are compatible. It is also sometimes argued that it would thus contribute towards avoiding a “clash of civilisations”, and 3) “losing Turkey”, i.e. arguments that rejecting Turkey will ruin Europe’s international reputation and enforce the image that it is an exclusive “Christian club”. Moreover, it would cause a rift between Europe and the Muslim world and thus contribute towards a clash of civilisations. Finally, it would act as a catalyst for the growth of nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey, thus making the European neighbourhood increasingly more unstable and dangerous.

The first argument is mainly utilised by popularistic politicians to appease a domestic audience, in particular before elections, especially in countries where Turkey’s membership is most vehemently opposed. Whilst arguably opportunistic, this type of political strategising simply makes

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620 The “Sevres trauma” continues to shape the Turkish public’s perceptions of unfair treatment by the EU See for instance: Gordon and Taspinar (2006), p. 65
sense in a system of participatory democracy. What other options are there if popular opinion is against Turkey’s membership? A savvy politician may not want to argue against popular will, as indicated by polls and opinion surveys, in particular before elections. These are, unfortunately, also essentially exercises of “othering” as the comments tend to refer to Turkey’s divergent culture and identity. Two prominent examples are leading politicians in Germany and France. German Chancellor, a Christian Democrat, Angela Merkel called for a “privileged partnership” between the EU and Turkey short of full membership, and even a petition in Germany to back such a policy. Merkel, however, executed a near-full policy reversal in December 2006, just prior to Germany took over the rotating EU presidency, by suddenly declaring she now supported Turkey’s “eventual” membership. The newly elected French president -Nicolas Sarkozy- may well be pulling the same stunt. Prior to his election it seemed his presidency would spell bad news for Turkey. Prior to the elections in May 2007 Sarkozy was categorically opposed to Turkish membership saying that Turkey is not a European country and has no place in the EU. However, in the end of May he already signalled that France would not block the membership talks, but on the premises that the EU should be honest towards Turkey and make it clear that full membership will never be a realistic option. Instead of a full EU membership Sarkozy said he will propose the establishment of a Mediterranean Union doing the French EU presidency in the second half of 2008. Moreover, other French senior politicians have also spoken against Turkey’s membership, perhaps most prominently Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the former French president and the Chairman of the European Convention that produced the draft for European constitution, who stated that Turkey could and should never be admitted as it simply

622 Deutche Welle, ”Merkel Calls For Petition Against Turkish Membership”, October 11, 2004, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1356052,00.html
623 International Herald Tribune, “Merkel signals support for Turkey’s EU membership”,
was not European, but rather an Asian country: “Its capital is not in Europe, 95% of its population live outside Europe, it is not a European country “.\textsuperscript{626} The previous president before Mr. Sarkozy, Mr. Chirac, was somewhat more conciliatory in his comments, whilst warning against a clash of civilizations:

“It’s in our political interest to have a stable, modern democratic Turkey who opted to become a secular State in 1924. A Turkey agreeing to share our goals and our values. And who, in this respect, could serve as a model for the whole region surrounding her. This prospect is without any doubt preferable to that of a Turkey who. Out of conviction, had made considerable efforts to adapt and then saw herself rejected or left out for ethnic or religious reasons. That couldn’t fail to play into the hands of all those who, today, advocate the clash of civilizations or seek to pit the West against Islam.”\textsuperscript{627}

Religious figures have also contributed to the discourse. For instance Pope Benedict XVI, when still a Cardinal, spoke against granting Turkey membership in the EU arguing it “would be a mistake”, because “Europe is a cultural and not a geographic continent”.\textsuperscript{628} Moreover, his more recent remarks in 2006 about Islam sparked violent riots and openly hostile comments by Turkish leaders referring his comments being a sign of revival of the Crusades. Since then the Pope has spoken of a rather German concept of privileged partnership, this time between the Christians and Muslims\textsuperscript{629} rather than Turkey and the EU per se, but nonetheless the message was received loud and clear.\textsuperscript{630}

\textsuperscript{626} BBC, “Turkey entry ‘would destroy EU’”, 8 November, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2420697.stm


\textsuperscript{628} Schilling, Timothy P. (2005), “Turkey & the EU: how inclusive can Europe afford to be?, Commonweal, 132/16 September 23, 2005, p. 8

\textsuperscript{629} Rehn (2006), p. 87

\textsuperscript{630} This despite the fact that the Pope later on softened his position on Turkey and attempted to distance the Catholic Church from such a political decision
Secondly, the “bridge between civilisations” argument has been mainly promoted by European Commission officials and European think tanks, primarily the pro-EU and Brussels based ones, as well as ad hoc independent bodies such as the Independent Commission for Turkey (ICT). The latter included senior European political veterans, chaired by the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari (who also was the chief negotiator in the Aceh peace process and the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo) and included senior politicians such as Michel Rocard – a former French prime minister, as well as Anthony Giddens – a well known sociologist. The ICT report stated for instance that:

“Europe could send a powerful message to the rest of the world that the “Clash of Civilisations” is not the ineluctable destiny of mankind. Presenting an alternative model to the exclusive, sectarian and closed society propagated by radical Islamists, Europe could play an inestimable role in future relations between the “West” and the Islamic world.”\(^{631}\)

The European Commission officials have tended to echo the same sentiment. The EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement, Dr. Olli Rehn, for instance has implied on numerous occasions that Turkey’s accession could set an example to the other Muslim states that Islam and democracy are compatible, as well as that Turkey would provide a bridge between Europe and the Muslim world. The following are extracts from statements and speeches made by Rehn:

Europe needs Turkey:

“... we need Turkey with us, as an anchor of stability in the most unstable and dangerous region, and as a benchmark of democracy for the wider Middle East.

The high stakes of the Cold War have been replaced by other, more complex challenges, in which Turkey remains a vital strategic partner in Europe. “632

Turkey as a model for the Islamic world:

“As a secular republic with a predominant Muslim population, a staunchly democratic Turkey integrated into the EU would be a powerful example against fundamentalist claims of an essential incompatibility between democracy and Islam. “633

Turkey needs Europe, would build a bridge:

“We also have an unparalleled opportunity to influence Turkey’s development, ensuring an open society with fundamental freedoms there and building a sturdy bridge to the Muslim world.”634

Speaking about the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, Europe’s relations with Islam and Turkey’s importance as an “anchor of stability” Rehn warns about a clash of civilisations and argues that Turkey’s membership would facilitate building bridges with moderate Islam:

“Our best response to this challenge is a combination of containment and cooperation – that is, to firmly contain Islamic fundamentalism, while cooperating and building bridges with moderate strands of Islam. The 21st century is not doomed to a clash of civilisations, as some fear and others hope: rather, the course of this century can just as well be built on dialogue and deepening interaction between them.”635

632 Speech by Mr. Olli Rehn, Member of the European Commission, responsible for Enlargement, “Turkey’s Accession Process to the EU”, the University of Helsinki, Helsinki, 27 November 2006, Speech-06-747-EN(1)
633 Ibid
634 Speech by Mr Olli Rehn, Member of the European Commission, responsible for Enlargement, “Europe’s Next Borders”, the European Policy Centre, Brussels, 10 October 2006, Speech-06-586-EN(1)
635 Rehn (2006), p. 21
Other European senior politicians have at times echoed this sentiment. For instance the Portuguese Foreign Minister Diogo Freitas do Amaral stated in October 2005 that: “The agreement to start talks with Turkey will probably displease Mr Osama bin Laden, who has done everything to prevent this moment arriving”. 636

Turkish senior officials have rather predictably promoted such sentiments. Ali Babacan, the State Minister for Economy and the Turkish government’s chief negotiator with the EU has stated that:

“Turkey’s accession to the EU will give to the Islamic world the message that democracy and Islam are not incompatible and the EU is not closed to countries of others faiths as long as they comply with the required standards.” 637

Some observers have, however, been sceptical about the claim that Turkey would set a model for the Middle East and Muslim countries around the world. They argue that Turkey is an exception set apart from the rest by its long history of secular traditions. 638 As Commissioner Rehn acknowledges too, this assumes that both civilisations agree to have Turkey as a “bridge”: “Turkey can be a bridge only if both Turkey and the EU want it to be”. 639 What is particularly striking about Rehn’s comment is the reference to two civilisations. Is Rehn inadvertently acknowledging that Turkey and Europe constitute separate civilisations? This would support the view that the Commission is in fact promoting the “othering” of Turkey through promoting a debate about whether and why Turkey must join (to avoid the “clash” and to build the “bridge”) instead of only concerning itself with the conditions in which Turkey will join the EU. 640 Moreover, as Rainer Hülssse has pointed out, the Eurobarometer studies poll the European citizens on Turkey’s


638 Rehn (2006), p. 96

639 Rehn (2006), p. 77

cultural difference, whereas this process has not been replicated with any other candidate country. If this is not an exercise of “othering”, then what is?

The “losing Turkey” argument, again rather predictably, has been mainly put forward by Turkish officials, but also backed by EU officials and pro-EU think tanks. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for instance, has warned that the negotiations are beginning to display a “mutual lack of respect between cultures and religions”, which "would create a “Clash of Civilisations” that would “throw world peace into doubt”. He said that whilst criticism was acceptable, insults were not and the two parties should respect each other’s sensitivities in order to avoid such a “clash”. With an indirect reference to the cultural opposition in Europe towards Turkey’s membership he stated to Euro-Parliamentarians that “We see Islamophobia - like Anti-Semitism - as a crime against humanity”. Ali Babacan has also emphasised the benefits of Turkey’s eventual membership to the region, the Muslim world, the EU and the world as a whole, as well as pointing out that failure of the accession would be catastrophic for the world:

“Turkish future membership to the EU or even the accession process, the negotiation process itself will be very crucial to the Middle East, Central Asia, North Africa, even Russia. Because when we prove that a country like Turkey which has a Muslim population but also a country which has a fully functioning democratic system and if this country fulfils all the criteria and proves that it shares common values and ideals of The EU. Then it is going to mean a lot to the rest of the countries and the region. “

Babacan also delivered a staunch warning to avoid a “Clash of Civilisations”:

“Furthermore, Turkey’s membership in the European Union will surely be a symbol of harmonious co-existence of cultures, and enriching the spiritual fabric of

642 Ibid.
643 Opening statement by the Turkish State Minister Ali Babacan in the 5th European Union – Turkey Annual Conference, Madrid, 19 May 2005
the European Union. If the EU gives the impression that it is a Christian Club, this will give a pretext to the fundamentalist organizations to claim that the EU excludes non-Christians and that the world is divided on the basis of the religious fault lines. Such a scenario will look like a reconfirmation of the theory of the Clash of the Civilizations developed by Huntington. I believe that this theory is detrimental to peace and stability in the world. Experience of 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq suggests that the Clash of the Civilizations does not make the world more secure.”

The Independent Commission on Turkey also argued that Turkey needs Europe for its modernisation and peaceful development as the accession process is the main motive for reforms. Moreover, the threat would be growing instability in Turkey:

“If Turkish hopes are disappointed, an advance of ultranationalist as well as Islamist currents should be expected and a revival of violence in the Kurdish populated regions would be likely leading to increased instability and the return of the military establishment to a more assertive role.”

“For Turkey, EU accession would be the ultimate confirmation that its century-old orientation towards the West was the right choice, and that it is finally accepted by Europe. EU membership would also ensure that the country’s transformation into a modern democratic society has become irreversible, enabling Turkey to fully exploit its rich human and economic resources. A failure of the Turkish accession process would not only mean the loss of important opportunities for both sides. It could result in a serious crisis of identity in Turkey, leading to political upheaval and instability at the Union’s doorstep.”

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644 Speech by Ali Babacan, 5 September 2006
645 Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), p. 23
646 Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), p. 43
The logic has been replicated by European officials, as well as academics. The general argument is that the EU is the main motive for reforms and that the civilisational dimension has become more important following the rise of Islamic terrorism and fundamentalism, making integrating the majority Muslim Turkey into Europe even more important than before. Thus, although Turkey is indeed a special case in the Islamic world, it could still provide an inspiration to others and prove the Clash of Civilizations thesis wrong. Hence, the EU should support the AKP against rising nationalism and political Islam in order not to “lose Turkey”. In a similar vein, Commissioner Rehn has warned that the promotion and debate on the “privileged partnership” plays into the hands of the nationalists in Turkey that wish to call off the membership talks, nullify the Customs Union, and wants to re-examine Turkey’s NATO membership and relations with the US. For the Turks, he argues, “privileged” spells out “prejudiced”.

**Official Discourse: The Language of Accession**

This section focuses on reporting the results of a discourse analysis on official documents related to Turkey’s accession. The analysis was carried out utilising analytical coding of the texts based on predetermined nodes that were designed to represent the central Rationalist and Ideational topics. The sources can be roughly divided into two primary categories; 1) foundational documents detailing the criteria and terms, as well as the process for Turkey’s membership, such as the Accession Partnership, the negotiation framework and European Commission’s enlargement strategy documents, and 2) progress reports by the European Commission (from 2000 to 2006) and the European Parliament (2006), detailing the process of assessing Turkey’s ability to meet the membership criteria.

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650 Gordon and Taspinar (2006), p. 69

651 Rehn (2006), pp. 88-89
As expected the dominant official discourse is prominently Rationalist in spirit and the language contractual in nature. Moreover, the power relations in the discourse are clear: the EU is presenting the terms and measuring Turkey’s progress towards meeting these terms. Turkey’s role is simply to provide evidence of meeting such terms.

The foundational texts nonetheless also featured Ideational components in terms of referring to the components of the ”European idea” and European values, i.e. democracy, human rights and rule of law as values that unite EU member states.

Significantly, enlargement is primarily seen as an important tool in spreading these values and expanding the European zone of peace and as such an important part of the “European project” from the very beginning. The European Commission’s Enlargement Strategy, however, recognises the challenge of diminishing popular support for enlargement and consequently stresses a rigorous but fair accession process to ensure not only successful accession but also the maintenance of the EU’s absorption capacity. Finally, the foundational texts stress the importance of the formal membership criteria – “the Copenhagen Criteria”652, defining the ”European standards”, which Turkey and other candidates must meet in order to gain membership. As the Commission’s enlargement strategy document states these two aspects set the foundation for further enlargement:

“Enlargement policy is defined by Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, which states that any European State which respects the EU’s fundamental democratic principles may apply to become a member of the Union. The EU has set political and economic criteria for membership, as well as criteria related to the obligations of membership and the administrative capacity to implement and enforce the EU’s laws and policies”653

Whilst the references to “European standards” and “European vocation” are also present in the Accession Partnership and the European Commission’s progress reports, the emphasis is on the

652 Sometimes popularly referred to as the ”Sevres Criteria” in Turkey
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Copenhagen Criteria and the ability to meet the requirements of membership by implementing the *acquis communautaire*. In this context the language is almost equivalent to a typical service level agreement between two companies in a contractual relationship, detailing in a technical manner the milestones that must be met in order to the contract to be fulfilled in a satisfactory manner. Consequently the majority of the progress reports are dedicated to the accession process and in particular the 35 chapters required for accession, as well as the prioritization for the implementation of these.

Other topics that occupy the majority of the remaining text are mostly linked to political criteria EU’s values (in this regard; democracy, human rights and rule of law), protection of minorities, civilian control of military, torture and corruption. The tone of the assessments, however, is balanced between praise for progress and providing guidance for closing the perceived gaps in implementation. Moreover, the Turkish government is praised, encouraged and guided in regards to its reforms, rather than overtly criticised for its shortcomings.

Other topics of relevance include the relatively frequent emphases on absorption capacity and the open-ended nature of Turkey’s accession process, both in terms of time and end results. Ideational concepts, such as “Europeanness”, “European values and standards”, as well as Turkey forming a “bridge between civilizations” are also featured in the texts but not prominently, suggesting that Turkey’s “European vocation” is not automatically acknowledged.

The Cyprus issue also features relatively prominently and is referred to in all of the progress reports. The Cyprus issue is, however, mainly linked to the accession process as an issue that must be solved prior to Turkey’s accession to full membership, but the tone is overwhelmingly positive, reporting progress rather than advocating the halting of negotiations.

There is also a notable trend in the European Commission progress reports in terms of a change in emphasis over time from economic to political criteria and hence, towards European values. In the 2000 report the emphasis changes from Copenhagen Criteria towards the *acquis communautaire*, reflecting Turkey’s newly earned status as an official candidate. The focus then turns to issues in connection to political criteria, until the 2004 report concludes that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political criteria and recommends that membership negotiations with Turkey can
The problem of the ‘borderline states’ in regionalism

begin. Once the membership negotiations begin in 2005, the emphasis on the *acquis* increases sharply to the point that the 2006 report is to a significant extent dedicated to accessing Turkey’s progress towards them. Theoretically, as long as the accession is a rational process, the further Turkey progresses towards meeting the Copenhagen Criteria the more the reports should emphasise on reporting progress towards the acquis, and once Turkey meets the political criteria in full the report should be clearly dominated by these. The shift in emphasis between 1999 and 2006 at least appears to be supporting exactly that.

*Table 15. Top 10 Coded Nodes – EC Turkey Progress Report 2000*

![Graph showing top 10 coded nodes for EC Turkey Progress Report 2000]

*Table 16. Top 10 Coded Nodes – EC Turkey Progress Report 2006*

![Graph showing top 10 coded nodes for EC Turkey Progress Report 2006]
In general the tone and style of the European Commission’s reports is technical and non-emotional focusing on providing “matter of fact” evaluations of Turkey’s implementation of the requirements stemming primarily from the Copenhagen Criteria. Moreover, the texts appear to construct a partnership between Turkey and the EU rather than a relationship driven by unilateral compliance by Turkey towards the EU.

However, in contrast to the European Commission’s generally respectful and non-emotional assessments, the European Parliament 2006 report on Turkey’s progress, in addition to being more critical in general features, features entirely different tones of address. Whereas the European Commission’s language is mostly that of an objective audit, the European Parliament uses language that resembles more a school master-student disciplinary session with heavy usage of phrases such as; “deplores the lack of progress”, “regrets that”, “condemns”, “strongly condemns”, “reiterates”, “reminds Turkey”, ”insists that”, ”urges Turkey”, ”is deeply concerned about” and ”expresses its disappointment”. Two particular focus areas of the European Parliament report are human rights and protection of minorities:

“Deplores the fact that only limited progress has been reported over the last year as regards fundamental rights and freedoms; condemns violations of human rights and freedoms and constraints on the exercise of those rights and freedoms”.

The topic of civilizations also features somewhat more than in the European Commission’s reports, albeit mostly in the context of suggesting Turkey’s accession would create a “bridge between civilizations”:

“Whereas Turkey’s cultural and historical background puts the country in a position to act as a bridge-builder between Europe and the Islamic world”.

“Reaffirms its belief that a modern, democratic and secular Turkey, whilst progressively aligning itself with the policies of the EU Member States, could play a constructive and stabilising role in promoting understanding between civilisations and between the European Union and countries in the region surrounding Turkey, particularly in the Middle East...”

**The Nature and Significance of Dominant Discourses for Turkey’s Accession**

In conclusion, whilst popular discourses, both in terms of public and elite opinion, feature cultural and civilizational overtones relatively prominently, the official discourse is mainly Rationalist in nature, utilising the language of a contractual partnership and mostly focusing on the process of Turkey’s accession to membership through the implementation of the negotiation framework. References to different civilizations, whether in the context of a ‘clash’ or ‘bridge’, are present but not prominent in the official discourse. In this sense Ideational analysis can offer little value, except in revealing those limited but yet potentially revealing nuances that may reflect the power of Ideational factors in the overall positions of the negotiating parties. The significance of popular discourses, on the other hand, is paramount as public and elite opinion may well over-ride the process of accession, regardless of how well Turkey fairs in terms of meeting the formal membership criteria. Moreover, public discourses, both in terms of public and elite opinion feature prominently as themes related to the ”Clash of Civilizations” thesis, both directly and in a reverse manner through the concept of ”Bridge between Civilizations”.

The European Commission, though mostly emphasising the process of enlargement, also contributes to the ‘clash’ discourse through testing the perceptions of Turkey’s cultural divergence in the Eurobarometer studies, and in particular through the frequent emphasis on a “dialogue between civilizations” and suggestions that Turkey’s membership in the EU would create a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world. Whilst the intentions may be benign in this regard,

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they nonetheless could easily be argued to be counterproductive, if the genuine intention is to promote Turkey’s membership to the public.

Finally, one important question is whether discourses- popular (public & elite) discourses and official discourse, turn into action within the context of political decision-making. The most straightforward one of these is the official discourse, which is directly tied into the accession process and based on the official policy position that Turkey is officially a candidate country and on a path to EU membership, regardless of its perceived cultural divergence. If we accept this, we can argue that popular discourses revolving around Turkey’s cultural divergence are merely political rhetoric that will not determine the end result of the negotiation process, as this is in effect a political decision made at a higher level. The immediate weakness with this line of argument is that the end result of the negotiations has been purposefully left open and that thus, the official discourse has little importance with regard to the end result, whilst if the results of referendums are to be carried out in the incumbent member states that are negative because the general populations in the EU feel that Turkey is not a European country and consequently has no place in the EU. As it has been pointed out earlier, this would simply stop Turkey’s accession. Thus the public discourse revolving around Turkey’s cultural divergence may well have a major impact on Turkey’s EU membership aspirations.

Besides the potential long-term political impacts, the public discourses have also had a more immediate effect. The French President Nicolas Sarkozy for instance has proposed the formation of a Mediterranean Union, which would form a separate union of the Mediterranean countries that are not considered “European” but have close ties to the EU. It is hardly a big secret that the main motivation for this proposal is to find an alternative for Turkey’s membership in the EU and that the main motivation for opposition to Turkey’s membership is indeed cultural divergence. On the other hand, the Mediterranean Union proposal has attracted relatively little backing in the EU and has been left in the shadow of other European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) initiatives, in particular the efforts to extend ENP to the former Soviet states in Eastern Europe and Caucasus; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Moreover, Sarkozy has not blocked the Turkish accession process, despite his threats to do so during his election campaign. More or less the same applies to Turkey where there has been a significant drop in the popular backing for EU membership and an increase in anti-EU rhetoric. Whilst
Turkey has under the AKP government increasingly focused towards its traditional areas of influence in the Caucasus and aligning Turkey increasingly with the Islamic world, no radical turn away from Europe is apparent and the government still appears to be committed to EU membership. Turkish officials have also on their behalf contributed to the "bridge between civilizations” discourse and utilised it as an argument for Turkey’s membership.

**Constructing Rational Choice: Where Rationalist meet Ideational**

As stated earlier, the purpose of carrying out FPDA here was to provide an additional method of testing the relevance of Rationalist and Ideational assumptions to the process of enlargement and specifically in the context of Turkey’s ‘accession’ to EU membership. As has been established the process of accession mainly follows the logic of rational choice, at least in a sense that it is build on a pre-determined criteria (mostly material) and focused towards objectively measuring Turkey’s progress against this criteria. Thus, it appears that the rational approaches have a particular strength in terms of analysing the process of enlargement. The Ideational approaches, however, can contribute in the analysis of the process, and whilst the official discourse is mainly Rationalist in nature, it nonetheless has Ideational overtones, in particular where the analysis extends to evaluating whether Turkey adheres to "European values” or has a "European vocation”. Moreover, as it has been already pointed out the public discourse in the Turkey-EU case carries a paramount importance, not only in terms of public opinion having the potential to stop the accession process from being completed, but also because the examination of the motives for support and opposition towards Turkey’s accession reveals important clues as to what the primary motives for enlargement may be. This is particularly important given the Rationalists’ failure to explain the CEEC-10 enlargement, where is could be argued that the value of the European idea surpassed the considerations of material cost and institutional challenges enlargement created. In Turkey’s case it is equally plausible that the European idea would override the strategic interests of the EU that Turkey’s accession could bring it. However, even more importantly, the possibility that a strategic decision to enlarge or include a certain new member is constructed in a manner that the idea determines how decision-making elites see the material/strategic interests. An example of this is the long-term material benefits that Eastern Enlargement was seen as producing. Regardless of whether there are argued as having material-
ised, or that they will, there was no means of measurability at the time the decision was made to prove they would. In this context it would be possible to argue that these future benefits were constructed to support the European idea that was the primary motive behind Eastern Enlarge-
ment, whereas in Turkey’s case equally speculative costs may be constructed to protect that European idea against a candidate that is not seem to fit in terms of its identity and culture, despite the possibility of producing strategic benefits. Thus, these two cases could be seen as Ideational motives presented in a rational choice arguments. In conclusion, providing tools for the analysis of motives of enlargement not only is the key strength of Ideational approaches, but it absolutely requires their application.

However, in addition to this potential division of labour it would appear that the Rationalist and Ideational approaches intersect and can be converged. One of these areas of convergence is the undefined future benefits or costs that cannot be quantified in any entirely reliable manner, but are nonetheless utilised in both approaches as arguments for and against Turkey’s membership. Typically these essentially speculative projections of future levels, as well as costs and benefits that Turkey’s membership would create in integration topics such as immigration, financial budgets and political decision-making. Arguably the analysis of these topics, since reliable projections are not possible, and the determination as to whether the results are positive or negative may very well be significantly influenced by the analyst’s Ideational motivation, i.e. his/her ideological position in regards to as what the idea of the region is, as well as the analyst’s position in regards to whether Turkey fits that idea. Hence, the analysts applying such cost-benefit analyses are not necessarily exclusively utilitarian but may either subscribe to or be influence to/by identitarian or post-national ontology. The second point of convergence, and a closely related one, is Mattli’s concept of 'negative externalities', which is apparent in for instance the "losing Turkey" argument. This is arguably an exercise of supporting rational choice with an Ideational argument where Rationalism wears thin. It is thus also an example that rational choice can involve both Rationalist and Ideational elements, and that the two intersect. Moreover, since Turkey now is an official candidate, the question of stability of enlargement could present another point of convergence between the Rationalist and Ideational approaches by incorporating the challenge of integrating candidates that are not perceived as cognitively compa-

bly (thus increasing the heterogeneity of the organisation, potentially weakening its cohe-
sion), in addition to the material and institutional concern of integration capacity in the research agenda of European integration.

Finally, the Ideational camp also uses arguments based on material benefits, as well as promotes them, with arguments about a common future and benefits from bridge between civilizations and spreading democracy and European values to the neighbourhood thus creating a zone of peace, stability and prosperity in and around the region. Consequently the possibility of a dialectic relationship between Rationalist and Ideational forces should be investigated further.

5.6 Conclusion: Strengths and Weakness of the Ideational Approaches

Whilst main strength of the Rationalist approaches lies in explaining the ”process” of enlargement, including Turkey’s accession process, the main strength of the Ideational approaches hits at the area where Rationalist approaches are at their very weakest: explaining the underlining motives for enlargement, and thus also Regionalism in general. In this specific case explaining the opposition to Turkey’s membership in Europe that may well override the process of enlargement and stop Turkey’s accession, regardless of how well it meets the formal membership criteria and implements the requirements of the accession process. Explaining the prospects of Turkey’s membership in the EU is not possible without analysis of the impact of factors such as history, culture, geography, religion, values and identity. Moreover, the prospect of Turkey’s potential membership has clearly prompted a process of self-examination of the European project, in particular in terms of what an “European identity” entails and what the ”final” borders or boundaries of the European Union will be. Significantly Turkey’s membership has become if not a focal point, then at least a vehicle for the process of defining these borders/boundaries, both geographically and mentally. Geographically the outcome of Turkey’s membership negotiations will significantly contribute towards determining the EU’s eastern boundaries, and mentally the boundaries of the idea of the “European project”, where aspects of culture, values and identity are considered the glue that tie the “European” nations together. As such providing credible explanations for Turkey-EU relations is simply not possible without Ideational analysis. The
Rationalist approach, on the other hand, is more appropriate for analysing the “process of enlargement”, or specifically in this context the accession process.

The Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis (FPDA) would appear to support the previous findings regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Rationalist and Ideational approaches, i.e. that the Rationalist approaches are more appropriate for explaining the process of enlargement (and the accession process in this particular case) and Ideational approaches in terms of explaining the underlying motives of enlargement.

The analysis of the official discourse is mainly Rationalist in spirit and emphasises the accession process and the *acquis communautaire*, as well as Turkey’s progress in terms of implementing the formal criteria. The official discourse would thus suggest that as long as Turkey meets these “contractual” terms of this rational process it would accede to full membership in the European Union.

The dominant popular discourse, however, embedded in public and elite opinion, reveals an entirely different dimension, in particular in reference to the underlying motives behind the opposition to Turkey’s membership, but also behind the support as well. Within the context of the opposition the perceived cultural divergence of Turkey is a strong and visible source of motivation and has direct and indirect links to the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis. The support for Turkey’s accession, on the other hand, is like mirror image of the clash thesis with ”Bridge between Civilizations” and ”losing Turkey” utilised by the European Commission and European thought-leaders as an argument for justifying Turkey’s membership. Interestingly this is based on Turkey’s perceived cultural divergence just as much as the ‘clash’ thesis that is utilised by opponents. In the context of popular discourse Turkey’s memberships is thus seen as a cross-civilizations project regardless of whether the agents in the discourse are opponents or supporters of Turkey’s membership. Moreover, it could be argued that the ”Bridge between Civilizations” concept provides fuel for the “Clash of Civilizations” discourse and has a negative impact on Turkey’s membership prospects. Suggestions by the political elite that Turkey’s membership in the EU would create a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world, as EU public opinion suggests is a bridge too far for many Europeans. In this sense the nature of the discourse may well be a sign of what is coming, not only in the context of Turkey’s membership prospects, but
also within the context of the internal battle of values within the EU that is being fought over. The question concerns what will be the core of European identity: a Judeo-Christian value community or an interest community based on liberalism and an ideological drive to extend the European zone of peace, democracy and prosperity to the whole region.
Part III
Chapter 6: Rationalist Analysis of Australia – East Asia Relations

6.1 Introduction

“Globalisation and the economic rise of East Asia will be the two most profound influences on Australia’s external environment over the next fifteen years.”

“In the National Interest”, Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper - 1997

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a Rationalist analysis of Australia’s relations with East Asia and its position in East Asian Regionalism in a similar manner as in Chapter 4 Turkey – EU case; by providing an empirical analysis of Australia’s and East Asia’s economic, political and security relations. According to the chosen theoretical frameworks - Mattli’s “logic of integration” and the “club theory” if levels of material interdependency are high and material benefits from inclusion in regional integration override the costs associated with them, Australia should seek deeper integration in regional institutions and further cooperation. Whereas Mattli’s theory operates on the level of a pure cost-benefit calculation for justifying enlargement and deepening integration from the regional organisation’s point of view, the ”club theory” seeks an optimal level of cooperation for an individual member: “…from the point of view of an individual country, the optimum amount of cooperation in reached where the ratio of the share of its benefits in the club to the share of the cost time the marginal benefits for the group as a whole equals

657 The definition of East Asia adopted here is the one used by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) that East Asia consists of North Asia (China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan) and Southeast Asia, comprising the ASEAN-10 (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) and East Timor.
the club’s marginal costs. Thus, each member seeks to maximise its own expected net gain, which is the difference between individual benefits and individual costs from membership.

As this chapter will demonstrate Australia has a long-established and deep material interdependency in East Asia. This applies in particular to economic interdependency; since the early 1990s Australia has been more dependent on Asian trade than any other OECD country and in 2007 two-thirds of Australia’s total external trade was with East Asia. Moreover, two-way trade with East Asia has been constantly increasing and the economically vibrant East Asian states have increasingly high demand for natural resources in order to sustain their continuous economic growth, in particular for the minerals and agricultural resources that Australia offers.

Australia’s security has historically depended on regional stability and when it has faltered Australia has felt obliged to intervene through military means in order to protect its security interests. In fact Australia has taken part in most major regional conflicts, from the Korean War to Vietnam War in the Cold War era to the East Timor crisis in the post-Cold War era. Since the end of the Cold War, Australian security and defence analysts have argued that an "arc of instability" has formed around the country. In addition to actively deploying military and security forces to trouble spots in the region, Australia has also maintained a particularly active role in the establishment of multilateral regional institutions, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organisation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Australia has also engaged in active bilateral diplomacy with East Asian states, establishing a web of bilateral memorandums of understanding and treaties for economic, political, security and cultural cooperation with a significant number of regional states.

This chapter will argue that Australia not only has strong economic, political and security links with the region but also that it has significant levels of material interdependency with the East Asian region. Research shows that despite these high levels of material interdependency, Austr-


lia is the ‘odd man out’ and that its exclusion from the regional institutions has been largely culturally and ethnically motivated, rather than being on the basis of Rationalist reasoning.

6.2 Economy, Trade and Investment

*Early History of Trade Relations with Asia*

Australia’s trade relations with Asia have a long history and can be traced back to the establishment of European settlements. The early contacts, however, were limited to incidental encounters between the settlers and their Asian neighbours, rather than signifying any coordinated efforts towards establishing formal foreign or trade relations with them. The British authorities in early 19th century consequently established trade settlements in Fort Dundas and Port Essington, attempting to capture some of the Southeast Asian trade from its Dutch and French rivals. Matthew Flinders, whilst circumnavigating Australia on his famous journey, met a *Macassan* trading fleet near Darwin, an encounter that led to the establishment of the Melville Island and Coburg Peninsula settlements. However, whilst the British intended Port Essington to develop into a major trading post on par with Singapore, the trading settlements became short-lived experiments due to the shortage of skilled labour and supplies. Australian commercial vessels also occasionally ventured to Asian ports. The first significant contact with Japan, for instance, took place when an Australian whaling ship sailed into the Hamanaka port in Hokkaido in 1831. This fairly low key event, and largely an accidental one, resulted in the formation of trade relations between Australia and Japan. Trade relations with Japan following these early contacts, however, were nonetheless conducted within the framework of the Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty.


of 1894.\textsuperscript{662} Despite these incidental events of early economic contacts with Asia, Australia’s trade relations with Asia, however, remained limited and largely confined within the context of the British Far Eastern policy\textsuperscript{663} until the earlier part of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, despite the formation of the Federation in 1901. However, whilst the 1931 Statute of Westminster granted Australia formal sovereignty along with other British overseas dominions, nonetheless trade relations continued to be conducted by and on behalf of the British Empire until WWII. Again, the issue was not necessarily a lack of interest towards Asia, on the contrary the potential for a growing significance of Asia for Australia was already widely debated within Australian policy-making circles\textsuperscript{664}, but the primary motivation of such an arrangement was the strong belief in the Commonwealth as the best guardian of Australia’s interests through imperial preferences, great power diplomacy and military might. The first sign of an independent trade policy with Asia emerged when Canberra sent trade commissioners to Tokyo, Shanghai and Batavia (Jakarta) in 1935.\textsuperscript{665}

\textit{Post WWII Era Trade Relations}

The immediate post-WWII era witnessed a rapid expansion of Australia’s economic interests in Asia led by the post-war economic recovery of a resource hungry Japan. Japan rapidly became Australia’s most important export destination. At the same time Australia was losing commit-

\textsuperscript{662} Tweedie, Sandra (1994), \textit{Trading Partners: Australia & Asia 1790-1993}, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney p. 27


ment to imperial preferences, a system that regulated preferential trade within the Commonwealth.666

The depth and extent of Australia’s trade relations with East Asia were steadily increasing as Australia entered a long period of economic boom from the mid-1960s onwards. In general terms the post WWII resource boom had been particularly kind to Australia’s resource-oriented economy, a state of affairs that earned Australia ‘the lucky country’ title.667 In particular the growing hunger for minerals and other raw materials by Japan fuelled the expanding and diversifying trade within Asia. Other factors were also important. First of all, the boom took place at the same time as ASEAN countries and Japan had entered a period of rapid industrial growth. On the other hand Australia’s traditional markets were threatening to spiral into decline with prospects of the UK joining the EEC. Inspired by the threat of losing a major market and abandonment of the imperial preferences, Australia established a generalised system of preferences in 1966. Although the system was highly selective and excluded the major ‘competitive’ products, ASEAN countries benefited significantly nonetheless and trade with Australia boomed.668

The second major shift in Australia’s trade policy completed the gradual move towards an independent foreign and trade policy under the Whitlam and Fraser governments; First, In 1972 Australia recognised the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and then in 1973 Australia implemented a 25% tariff cut towards ASEAN products. The positive impact of these measures, however, was reduced by the 1974 currency devaluation of the Australian dollar and the decision to implement quotas on textiles, clothing and footwear, all important ASEAN exports. Consequently trade growth slowed down again and much of the expected gains did not materialise.669 Trade with China, however, picked up again following the economic reforms there from 1978

667 Ravenhill (1997), p.3
668 Ravenhill (1997), pp. 11-12
669 Tweedie (1994), p. 195
onwards, in particular in regards to minerals, for which Australia soon became a preferred supplier.

The Rise of the “Tigers”: From 1980s to 1990s

In the early 1980s a global economic recession caused commodity prices to collapse, a development that motivated a program of rapid economic liberalisation in Australia.670 One of the first major consequences was an influx of Japanese investment in Australia, despite the still prevailing negative public opinion towards increasing Japanese influence in Australia.671 More importantly, Australia’s positioning in the region was influenced by three major developments taking place almost simultaneously; First of all, the fear of traditional markets disappearing gathered support as the impact of the UK’s EEC membership on bilateral trade was threatened to be complicated by the Single European Act, which was signed in 1986 and aimed at creating a single market by 1992; secondly, the threat of losing the traditional UK market was combined with a recession in the United States in 1987 that hit the world economy hard, but in particular economies that had a close economic relationship with it, such as Australia; thirdly, the East Asian “Tiger” economies were booming in the 1980s and 1990s, offering enormous potential for growth and promoting the idea that the region was the key to Australia’s future economic success.672 The Australian response to these factors was twofold. Firstly, the ALP government under Bob Hawke (1983-1991) decided to end Australia’s economic protectionism by implementing further tariff cuts. The cuts were the most radical in Australian history and the trade-weighted average of Australian tariffs were reduced from 9.2% in September 1986 to 6% in November 1992. As ASEAN also implemented tariff cuts at the same time, trade intensified once again further enforcing the notion of dependence on Asia.673 Secondly, the notion of dependency on

672 Wesley (1997), p. 528
673 Tweedie (1994), p. 197
Asia caused Australia to adopt a policy of "Facing North" and seeking engagement with Asia during the 1991-1996 Paul Keating ALP government.

**1990s: “Facing North”**

*Figure 2. Australia’s Two-Way Trade 1990-2006*

Source: Malik (2006a) p. 589

The rapid growth of manufacturing and the adoption of export oriented economic policies in the East Asian “Tiger” economies in the 1990s offered new opportunities and a rapid growth in intra-industry trade boosted the economic relationship further. By 1991, ASEAN had passed the EEC and the US as a trade partner and by 1994 ASEAN had become the largest market for merchandise exports, even overtaking New Zealand. The reorientation of Australia’s trade could have hardly been much more drastic. For instance, between 1992 and 1996 the two-way trade with ASEAN in machinery, mechanical appliances and electrical equipment tripled in value to $US 3 billion. The economic relationship with East Asia in general also boomed, to

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674 Ravenhill (1997), p. 15
675 Ravenhill (1997), p. 3
676 Ravenhill (1997), p. 15
the extent that in 1995 65% of Australian exports went to East Asia and 42% of imports originated from East Asia.\footnote{Wesley (1997), p. 528}

Table 17. *Australia's Major Trading Partners (Exports + Imports)*

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<td>1</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
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<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
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</table>

Source: DFAT trade and economic data

The Keating government launched an intense process of engagement with Asia, dubbed the "push into Asia". The process of engagement entailed securing access to regional institutions, as well as playing an active role in creating new ones. In the context of economic relations, Australia was instrumental in the formation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989. Whilst APEC was initially seen as a competitor to ASEAN, the February 1990 Kuching meeting

\footnote{Wesley (1997), p. 528}
produced an agreement on the conditions for ASEAN participation in APEC, thus linking South-east Asia with broader Asia Pacific Regionalism that included Australia’s other major trading partners, in particular the United States.\textsuperscript{678} Moreover, the creation of APEC positioned Australia right in the middle of the broader Asia-Pacific region that covered a great majority of its most important trade partners. The success to link ASEAN into the APEC framework and ASEAN’s endorsement of “open Regionalism” principle also alleviated fears of exclusive Regionalism taking hold in Southeast Asia. The decision in 1992 Singapore Summit to create ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in fifteen years on the other hand amplified the motivation to seek inclusion in ASEAN. With little or no chances of ASEAN membership Australia, together with New Zealand, promptly begun negotiations to establish a free trade agreement with ASEAN. The AFTA-CER Linkage was established in 1995 paving the way for the decision in October 1999 to establish an AFTA-CER FTA. Australia also played an instrumental role in the founding of the regional security forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994.

Whilst securing inclusion in regional economic integration was a priority for Australia during the Hawke and Keating governments, it was ideologically driven by an un-wavered commitment to multilateralism. Paul Keating in particular believed that bilateralism was not a viable choice for securing Australia’s continuous prosperity.\textsuperscript{679}

\textbf{2000-2007: From Multilateralism to Bilateralism}

The third major shift in Australian foreign and trade policy took place under the leadership of John Howard and his Foreign Minister Alexander Downer (1996-2007); this time from multilateralism towards bilateralism in the form of a surge of bilateral trade and security agreements signed and pursued with East Asian countries. The first bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in the region, however, was the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZ CERTA) in 1983. The ANZ CERTA, however, was still an exceptional development in Australia’s trade policy and was followed by an era of multilateralism in Australia’s foreign

\textsuperscript{678} Ravenhill (1997), p. 16

\textsuperscript{679} Ravenhill (2007), p. 198
and trade policies. The philosophical basis of Australia’s foreign and trade policy under the leadership of John Howard and Alexander Downer subscribed to what has been titled as “positive realism”, in comparison to the liberal internationalist outlook of the previous ALP governments. The shift from what the Liberals had criticised as an ‘idealistic’ approach to a ‘pragmatic’, arguably interests based, approach aimed at maximising national interest was the ideological motive behind the shift to bilateralism in trade and foreign policy. Despite its opposition to American unilateralism during the Keating governments reign, even the liberal internationalist ALP government felt the pressure to hedge multilateralism with at least some bilateral arrangements. What is clear, however, is that the Howard government reacted to the changing trade and policy environment from its own ideological perspective.

The first impetus for came in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Whereas multilateralism and non-discriminatory trade liberalisation dominated the economic policies in the region prior to the crisis, post-crisis Asia turned towards discriminatory bilateral and regional trade agreements. If intra-ASEAN FTAs are counted in there are currently 17 FTAs in force and an additional 60 in the pipeline in Southeast Asia, China and India. This combined with the loss of markets, also due to the crisis, offered a strong impetus for Australia to follow suit. Secondly, the WTO Seattle meeting that had ended in a gridlock in December 1999 was signal-

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680 The concept of “positive realism” in the context of Australia’s position translated into an approach emphasising “pragmatic Regionalism” based on “mutual respect and shared interests,” instead of what Howard and Downer labelled as “emotional Regionalism”, based on similarities in culture and identity. Taking into consideration that Australia’s attempts to integrate had been rejected based on the perceived differences between “Australian values” and “Asian values”; the open recognition of the difference was arguably truly pragmatic. However, the new emphasis on Australian values and identity soon became to signify a rather radical repositioning linking Australia more firmly to the culturally similar Anglo-Saxon countries.


683 Sally (2006), p. 5
ling problems emerging in the multilateral trade system. The problems arising in the WTO rounds further enforced the Howard government’s increasing scepticism towards global trade talks and encouraged it to engage in bilateralism, even if it agreed that these agreements should be consistent with WTO provisions. Thirdly, when ASEAN economic ministers decided to downgrade the AFTA-CER negotiations in Chiang Mai in October 2000 it appeared that regional trade talks could falter as well. Interestingly, the AFTA-CER talks revealed a division within ASEAN whereby the resistance to the arrangement was driven by Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia whilst Singapore, Thailand and Brunei backed it and the Indochinese members remained largely indifferent. Moreover, the meeting actually decided that AFTA-CER was both desirable and feasible, whilst Malaysia practically vetoed the decision nonetheless and suggested a lighter version with no tariff reductions under a Closer Economic Partnership (CEP). 

Rapidly losing its faith in the multilateral talks Australia started FTA negotiations with Singapore two months later. Finally, it is important to note that the motives for FTAs are often not solely economic, but governments tend also view them as means to solidify political and security links with strategically important partners.

The FTA with Singapore was a logical starting point. Not only was Singapore the most important ASEAN partner for Australia, accounting for one third of trade in goods, almost half of trade in services, 32% of outward and 61% of inward FDI, but it also had minimal tariffs. Hence, negotiating the removal of remaining tariffs was a relatively easy task. The Australia-Singapore FTA talks were soon followed by a spate of bilateral FTA talks and joint studies with a number of major trading partners. In a short amount of time Australia entered talks to establish bilateral

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686 Sally (2006), p. 5

687 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade(1994a), ASEAN Free Trade Area: Trading Bloc or Building Block?, East Asia Analytic Unit, Canberra, p.81
FTAs with Thailand in April 2001, Indonesia in July 2003, China in October 2003, Malaysia in July 2004 and Japan February 2005. The shift to bilateralism has more recently reached a level where most of Australia’s major trading relations either already operate within FTA frameworks or such arrangements are being currently negotiated. Australia currently has FTA’s with four of its top trading partners: the United States, Singapore, New Zealand and Thailand. Negotiations towards establishing FTAs are under way with ASEAN (together with New Zealand) and Malaysia, and Australia is pursuing negotiations with Japan, the Gulf Cooperation Council and Chile. Finally, Australia is engaged in carrying out joint studies exploring the potential for FTAs with South Korea and Mexico. Should all these FTAs materialise, DFAT has estimated that they would cover 60% of Australia’s total two way trade in goods and services. As a sign of commitment to completing the FTA negotiations Australia with its most important trading partner, the government granted market economy status to China in 2005.

Whilst the shift from multilateral to bilateral constituted the most dramatic change in the country’s trade policy since the abandonment of imperial preferences in the early 1950s, it has been argued that the move did not secure significant gains for Australia. This also corresponds with the view positing that bilateral agreements do not usually produce significant gains as their value erodes as the number of agreements increases covering more and more partners, in turn increasing the cost of managing the agreements. In the Australia-Singapore FTA case Singapore already had zero tariffs for most products, with few exceptions such as beer and stout, leading the establishment of a FTA offering little direct trade benefits to Australia. The other FTA that has been criticised for not producing adequate returns was the Australia-United States FTA that entered force in January 2005. The US in general gives few and seeks extensive concessions in FTAs and as a major player it tends to get what it wants. This also applied to the FTAs signed

688 Wesley (2007b), p. 56
689 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2007), Trade Statement 2007, Canberra, p. 12
691 Ravenhill (2007), p. 200
with Singapore and Australia. In the Australia-US FTA case the US held to its principle of seeking ‘asymmetric reciprocity’, ferociously protecting the interest of US exporters whilst offering minimal concessions to the Australians. It has been argued that the ‘dependent ally’ allowance did not materialise in conditions, except perhaps in getting FTA through Congress.

It has been argued that FTA would have been genuinely advantageous only if the US fully liberalised its trade with Australia, which it did not. Exceptions remained in particular in relation to trade in pharmaceuticals, but also in sugar and agricultural products in general. Apparently Trade Minister Vaile and his team were ready to walk out of the negotiations due to this deadlock, but John Howard ordered Vaile to take the deal, allegedly motivated by the upcoming 2004 elections. The benefits from FTAs in general have been said to be doubtful due to the fact that Australian merchandise exports continue to be dominated by primary commodities that already enjoy free access to foreign markets. Even if bilateral FTAs were more effective between two partners, what kind of returns would such FTAs produce in comparison to multilateral arrangements?

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692 Sally (2006), p. 6
Asymmetry in Trade Relations: Interdependency or just Dependency?

Figure 3. Australia’s Exports by Region

Source: DFAT

There can be no doubt that East Asia is critically important for Australia’s economy and prosperity. For instance, between 2004 and 2005 East Asia accounted for 56% of Australia’s total merchandise exports. In 2006 East Asia’s share of Australia’s total external trade in goods and services had declined to 50%, but on the other hand trade with China had been Australia’s most rapidly growing trade relationship and China overtook the US as a trading partner the same year. In 2007 the share of East Asia had increased to almost two-thirds of Australia’s total external trade, valuing AUD 200 out of the total of AUD 350 billion. ASEAN, on the other hand, accounted for 32% of the total two way trade with East Asia with its share of Australia’s total

696 Ravenhill (2007), p. 194
697 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2007), Australia’s Trade with East Asia, Market Information and Analysis Section, Canberra, p.2
698 Stephen Smith, Minister for Foreign Affairs, speech at the Lowy Institute, 18 July 2008
exports doubling in 30 years. In 2006 alone the bilateral trade grew by 20% year-on-year. Japan, Australia’s largest trading partner, as well largest market for exports of goods and services since 1966 is responsible for 13% of Australia’s total external trade.

However, whilst Asia’s importance to Australia became more visible each year the development of trade relations with Asia were also becoming increasingly uneven. At the same time as Asia’s importance to Australian economy was steadily growing, Australia’s importance to ASEAN was simultaneously diminishing both as a market and a source for investment, producing an increasingly asymmetrical relationship.

Table 18. Australia’s Ranking and Share of Exports and Imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade Partner</th>
<th>Export Destination</th>
<th>Source of Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Share (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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699 Ravenhill (1997), p. 4
700 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2007), p.2
702 Ravenhill (1997), p. 23
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Export Destination</th>
<th>Source of Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>14 1.3%</td>
<td>8 2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>7 3.4%</td>
<td>11 2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: DFAT Country Fact Sheets*

Whilst the region has been steadily becoming more important to Australia, its share of trade in the region has been simultaneously decreasing as a percentage of total external trade.\(^{703}\) Subsequently, whereas the East Asian countries feature prominently in ranking of Australia’s trade partners, Australia is considerably less important as a partner for East Asian countries. This, of course is not unexpected given the sizes of the respective economies, but even proportionally speaking it should be acknowledged that Australia is clearly more dependent on East Asia than vice versa. Whilst Australia’s abundant natural resources are in high demand in the region, in the context of total trade, Australia does not rank especially high. For example, Australia’s share of imports for ASEAN was 2.9% in 2006, only 0.6% for Hong Kong, 1.8% for Malaysia and 1.6% for Singapore. In exports a similar situation applies to some of the major partners: China 1.4%, Indonesia 2.7%, South Korea 1.4% and Taiwan 1.3%. As a relatively small market with historical patterns of trade directed to Europe and United States Australia is not a priority to regional states in their foreign trade and investment relations.\(^{704}\) Finally, Australia runs a relatively large balance of payments deficit with major trading partners in the region. The total value of this deficit in 2006 was approximately AUD 12.5 billion, of which AUD 5.2 billion was with China and AUD 16.4 billion with ASEAN\(^{705}\)

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\(^{703}\) Ravenhill (1997), p. 4  
THE PROBLEM OF THE ‘BORDERLINE STATES’ IN REGIONALISM

Figure 4. Australia’s Top 10 Export Markets 2006

Top 10 Export Markets 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>AS Billion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Source:** DFAT Trade Statement 2007

Investment: The Missing Link

Source: DFAT and ABS
Whilst Australia’s trade with East Asia has steadily increased, the investment record with the region has been more mixed. Australian Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in East Asia shrunk considerably in the late 1970s after a somewhat promising start and moved to more familiar markets in Britain and the United States.  

\[706\] Ravenhill (1997), p. 7

**Figure 5. Direction of Australian Investment - 1992 and 2003**

Source: DFAT and ABS

In the 1980s Australia turned the other way again, encouraged by a major disinvestment in Southeast Asia reducing the region’s share from 39% of total outward investment to less than 5% by the end of the decade. DFAT suggested that outdated perceptions of poor profitability and difficulty in repatriating profits were at least partly to blame. As DFAT pointed out “it was during the latter half of the 1980s that the main ASEAN economies flourished. Ironically, Australian investors seemed to be among the least interested in the profound economic transform-
tions occurring so close to home". Moreover, as the DFAT’s report pointed out the relationship between investment and trade is relatively strong; "investment in the region should be more of a component of Australia’s trade strategies for the region. It can lock us into regional production plans, drive exports and promote access to the most cost-effective imported inputs and consumer goods". In the early 1990s signs of recovery and reinvigorated interest in investing in South-East Asia emerged again, but the recovery ended abruptly with the 1997 financial crisis causing a major disinvestment from the region again in 1998.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top Sources of FDI</th>
<th>AUD Billion</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$362.8</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$352.7</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>$51.4</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>$38.5</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>$35.3</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>$32.4</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>$26.9</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: US, UK, NZ 51% of total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top Destinations of FDI</th>
<th>AUD Billion</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$320.80</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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708 DFAT (1994b)
### Top Destinations of FDI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top Destinations of FDI</th>
<th>AUD Billion</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$133.30</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>$65.30</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>$39.80</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>$31.20</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: US, UK, NZ 62% of total

Source: ABS 53520 International Investment Position, Australia, supplementary data

From 2000 onwards, investment relations with China and Japan were growing substantially. The levels of two-way FDI, however, still were no match for the levels of growth experienced in the trade of goods and services. In general, statistics clearly support the view that Australians prefer investing in more familiar markets, primarily in English speaking markets and the European Union.

As a testimony to this trend, Australia’s top investment partners in 2005 were the United States, Britain, Japan, New Zealand and the EU. The United States was by far the most important partner, accounting for 25% of the total inward FDI flows to Australia and an astonishing 45% of outward FDI from Australia. Britain, the traditional source of FDI accounted for 18% of the total inward flows, worth AUD 51.3 billion. Britain was also major destination for Australian FDI, worth a total of AUD 42.4 billion. The investment relations with Japan were rapidly growing, but also highly asymmetric. Whilst Japan was Australia’s 3rd most important investment partner it is mainly in the inward flow, totalling AUD 23.8 billion, the levels of Australian investment outflows to Japan were conspicuously low.

### 6.3 Political and Diplomatic Engagement with East Asia:
Australia in East Asian Regionalism

Australia’s diplomatic relations with Asia, when most regional states were still colonies of Britain, the Netherlands, France or the United States, were naturally conducted within the
framework of Britain’s Far Eastern Policy.\textsuperscript{709} Even when Australia became a federation in 1901 by an act of the British Parliament, this state of affairs did not alter dramatically.

The Statute of Westminster in 1931 granted formal sovereignty to Australia amongst other British dominions, which motivated the formation of an independent foreign policy. In general the focus of the newly found Australian foreign policy was focused towards economic rather than political relations and Canberra had little interest in establishing formal diplomatic relations before WWII.\textsuperscript{710} When in 1939 Australia finally established its own diplomatic missions in Northeast Asia, the development was soon to be disrupted by the outbreak of the Pacific War. Through the experiences of the Pacific War, however, Australia discovered a newly invigorated interest in the near region and foreign policy focus started gradually shifting away from the interests of the British Empire towards dealing increasingly independently with the region.\textsuperscript{711}

The Post-WWII era produced the golden years of Australian foreign policy with an emerging independent position under the custodianship of legendary E.V. “Doc” Evatt, Minister for External Affairs 1941-49. Evatt’s internationalist outlook and small and middle power advocacy produced a foreign policy characterised by active diplomacy, including in Asia, although “engagement” with the region was hardly on the agenda. On the other hand new geopolitical realities in the region were emerging when the civil war in China ended with Mao’s communist forces forcing the Kuomintang to take refuge in Formosa in 1949. Australia recognised the Republic of China (ROC) rather than the newly formed People’s Republic of China (PRC) following the lead of the United States. The emergence of a communist China was viewed as a major concern in Australia with fear over the threat of communism spreading in the region largely taking the primacy in foreign and defence policy making.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{709} Pitty (2004), p. 1
\item \textsuperscript{710} Beeson, Mark (2001), “Australia and Asia: The Years of Living Aimlessly”, in Daljit, Singh and Anthony Smith (Eds.) (2001), \textit{Southeast Asian Affairs 2001}, Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, p. 45 (pp. 44-55)
\item \textsuperscript{711} Wesley (2007a), p. 6
\end{itemize}
In the 1950s and 1960s Australia’s foreign relations with Asian countries in general were restrained by the intensifying Cold War and the increasing fear of communism spreading in the region, resulting into Australia engaging in a number of Western alliances, e.g. SEATO, Five Power Defence agreement and ANZUS, in order to contain the threat. The number of Cold War conflicts over the two decades, e.g. Malayan Emergency, Korean War and Vietnam War, drove the country into conflict with its regional neighbours and the relations with a number of regional states consequently remained tense, although officially Australia pursued healthy relations with pro-Western and non-aligned countries. In practice though, Australia’s main partners in South-east Asia were Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand. Australia’s partnerships in Northeast Asia on the other hand were mostly limited to South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, which had by now converted from an enemy to a valued ally, whilst China and North Korea remained major threats.\footnote{This was in particular due to the experiences from the Korean War, in which Australia participated with approximately 17 000 troops}


Australia was also becoming increasingly active in development assistance to the region. When the Commonwealth foreign ministers’ meeting in Colombo in January 1950 established ”the Colombo Plan”- Australia immediately became one of the major donors of development assistance, education and training provided within the framework of the plan.\footnote{Gifford, Peter (2002), “The Cold War across Asia”, in Goldsworthy, David (Ed.) (2002), Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia – Vol.1: 1901 to 1970s, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, p. 175}
The Tiger Economies Emerge: Building Comprehensive Engagement with the Region

By the 1970s a markedly different region was developing. The formerly impoverished, and in many cases unstable countries, were emerging as developed states poised to become export oriented economic powerhouses. Moreover, by the mid-1970s regional conflicts were largely over, the Vietnam War having ended. Consequently the Whitlam government begun a reorientation towards the region, recognising the PRC in 1972 and thus, taking the first independent stance toward the region.\footnote{Beeson (2001), p. 46} Moreover, Whitlam decisively modernised attitudes and policies towards Asia, as well as domestic politics by ending the White Australia policy in 1973.\footnote{Goldsworthy, David (2003), “Introduction”, p. 6} Relations with Southeast Asia under the Whitlam government, however, were less than cordial. Part of the reason may have been that the focus was mainly on political and security interests and supporting the emergence of a stable Southeast Asia and thus, although the style had changed the substance remained relatively unchanged from the Menzies years. Moreover, Australia’s economic interests in Southeast Asia were still relatively insignificant in real terms and the approach in these matters tended to be focused towards development assistance.\footnote{Goldsworthy, David, David Dutton, Peter Gifford and Roderic Pitty (2002), “Reorientation”, in Goldsworthy, David (Ed.) (2002), Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia – Volume 1: 1901 to 1970s, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, p. 347} As John Ravenhill has suggested, Australia consequently tended to subscribe to, and in particular project an image of, paternalistic attitudes towards the region.\footnote{Ravenhill, John (1997), “From Paternalism to Partnership: Australia’s Relations with ASEAN”, Working Papers, 1997/8, Australian National University – Department of International Relations} Economic relations, however, started to show considerable potential and indeed expanded considerably during the 1970s\footnote{Goldsworthy, David, David Dutton, Peter Gifford and Roderic Pitty (2002), p. 348} and consequently economic issues received more attention from the late 1970s onwards.\footnote{Goldsworthy, David, David Dutton, Peter Gifford and Roderic Pitty (2002), p. 352}
Following the successive electoral victories by consecutive ALP governments in the 1980s and early 1990s, Australia’s diplomatic approach towards the region changed considerably towards seeking to engage Asia systematically. First of all the Hawke government deepened the process started by Whitlam and pioneered Asia Pacific Regionalism through the foundation of APEC. Secondly, Bob Hawke’s foreign ministers Bill Hayden and Gareth Evans carried out reforms in Australian foreign policy. Consequently Australia also played a prominent role, at times even a pioneering one, in the foundation of regional institutions, in particular in the creation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organisation in 1989 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. The Paul Keating ALP government (1991 to 1996), expanding Hawke’s agenda, launched a programme of “comprehensive engagement” with Asia as a primary strategic objective of the Australian government.\footnote{Beeson (2001), p. 46} Gareth Evans, who continued as the Foreign Minister, was in the forefront of these efforts with a barrage of institutional initiatives and regional diplomatic activity. The focus of Evans’ activity in engaging with Asia was primarily on Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, but also with Northeast Asia through the concept of "East Asian Hemisphere", which Evans actively promoted in order to link Australia to the wider East Asia, whilst including North America and the United States in particular, in this regional design. Keating, on the other hand, adopted APEC as his brainchild and pushed the concept of the Asia-Pacific to the regional leaders, as well as to the United States, at times making ASEAN leaders apprehensive about APEC undermining ASEAN’s importance and influence in regional politics. Keating, with his straight-talking and sometimes controversial style angered regional leaders on more than one occasion.

\textbf{“The Howard Paradox”}

The John Howard era from March 1996 until November 2007 produced at times contradicting policies and mixed results in regional engagement. When elected into office in 1996 the Howard Coalition government pledged to continue with the established policies towards the region. However, soon after Howard and his Foreign Minister Alexander Downer remarked that, whilst they intended to continue to place great importance to regional relations, they would do so in the
context of "pragmatic Regionalism", seeking to maximise the Australian national interest, instead of doing so at any cost, as the "Asia first" policies of the ALP had allegedly done. This would be achieved through interests based engagement without the rhetoric of Hawke and Keating and without compromising Australian identity.

In terms of foreign policy focus in practical though, the focus was largely on bilateral relations with major partners, through the establishment of FTAs and other bilateral treaties. Moreover, the Howard government was particularly keen to achieve an especially close relationship with the United States, arguing that shared values and culture constitute a much more reliable base for close cooperation than "fleeting material interests". Howard or Downer, however, never questioned the importance of the region to Australia’s economy and security, rather arguing that these interests need to be looked after in a pragmatic manner whilst it would not be worth sacrificing Australia’s national culture and identity. In other words, the Coalition government wanted to differentiate itself from the preceding ALP governments, who allegedly wanted to make Australia an Asian country in order to gain access to regional institutions. Howard and Downer, on the other hand, argued that there was no need to pretend being Asian, but instead being proudly Australian whilst working closely with its regional partners. Or as Howard famously claimed Australia should not be forced to "choose between its geography and history".

Nonetheless, the common perception was that a bilateral relationship with the United States was taking precedence in the Howard agenda. The problem with this approach was the image of a “deputy sheriff” conveyed to the region, enforcing the view in Asia that Australia was geographically dislocated Western bastion that fit ill into the region. This seemed to correspond to what Keating predicted that Asian leaders would not meet, or deal on equal basis, with Howard. Nonetheless, Howard did what Keating had not been able to achieve, and despite the verbal hostility from Asian leader, did eventually access to ASEAN Plus Three (ATP) Summit in Vientiane in 2004 and the inaugural East Asia Summit in 2005. This paradox of a government that was perceived of being almost exclusively US minded and even hostile to Asia, but nonetheless gained unprecedented access to regional institutions, prompted Michael Wesley call it "the Howard Paradox";

722 Wesley (2007a), p. 10
This is the Howard paradox. How has a government that has been so rhetorically uncompromising in its relations with its neighbours, that has done so many things that critics have claimed would damage Australia’s relations with its region, managed to build such strong links with Asian countries?\(^{723}\)

Whilst there have been many reasons for this paradox to materialise, one reason may have been that after the 1997 financial crisis the value of rhetoric declined whilst the value of Australia’s pragmatic economic policies increased and were generally warmly welcomed in the region as a stabilising factor.\(^{724}\) The Howard government focused primarily on bilateral relationships as the cornerstone of Australia’s foreign policy.\(^{725}\)

**Australia and Southeast Asian Regionalism**

The pivotal moment in Southeast Asian Regionalism was the foundation of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in August 1967, after failed attempts with SEATO\(^{726}\), the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA)\(^{727}\) and Maphilindo.\(^{728}\) The foundation of ASEAN was welcomed by Australia, albeit perhaps mistakably, as a bulwark against communism in the region. Contrary to Australia’s expectations, however, ASEAN was never meant to become a defence or a regional security

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\(^{723}\) Wesley (2007a), p. 24

\(^{724}\) Wesley (2007a), p. 35


\(^{726}\) The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), created by the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (“the Manila Pact”) in 1955, was planned to become an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but was dissolved as defunct in 1977.

\(^{727}\) ASA was formed by Thailand, the Philippines and the Federation of Malaya in 1961. Although ASA remained dormant through regional conflicts, and paralysed during the Konfrontasi, it provided a basis for the foundation of ASEAN in 1967.

\(^{728}\) Maphilindo was an attempt to create a non-political confederation of Malay races, involving Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines in 1963. Maphilindo, however, was scrapped due to political infighting between the newly created Malaysian Federation and Indonesia that eventually led into the Konfrontasi.
organisation. On the contrary, ASEAN countries agreed to stay outside the super-power rivalry as much as possible, as later explicitly spelled out in the declaration of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971. Australia did not openly oppose ZOPFAN, but worried it would undermine US presence in the region. Moreover, Indonesia, the leading country in the organisation, became a leader also in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), thus adding to the anxiety. Whitlam, on the other hand, ignored this apprehension and endorsed ZOPFAM in 1972.729

Despite the initial anxiety of concerns over ASEAN’s perceived non-commitment towards anti-communism, Australia endorsed ASEAN unlike any other state. In 1974 Australia became the first country to recognise ASEAN formally as a multilateral organisation, as well as becoming ASEAN’s first dialogue partner, making it a pioneer in relations with the regional group. Endorsement also came in form of dollars, with Australia launching an economic assistance program in the context of the ASEAN-Australian Economic Partnership Program.730 In yet another first, in 1978 it became the first country to establish a formal consultative structure on trade matters with ASEAN; within the context of ASEAN – Australia Forum from 1977731(The ASEAN Australia Consultative Meetings from 1978 onwards).732 The Fraser Coalition government (1975-1983), however, won elections riding on the public’s detestation of Whitlam’s reforms and tariff cuts, of which concessions to ASEAN formed a considerable component. Consequently the Fraser government adopted a far less accommodating approach to the region and adhered to a policy of not granting new trade concession. The price for this position, on the other hand, was that consequently Fraser got rebutted from attempting access to ASEAN meetings.733

729 Ravenhill (1997), p. 10
730 Ravenhill (1997), pp. 8-9
731 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2004), ASEAN and Australia Celebrating 30 years, Canberra, p. 6
732 Ravenhill (1997), p. 9
The Hawke Labour government, elected into power in 1983, on the other hand implemented a complete reorientation towards the region. Gareth Evans, Hawke’s Foreign Minister since 1988, was particularly instrumental in launching policies designed to engage Asia to an extent and depth not seen before. Launching the new policy line Evans announced in 1989 the government’s decision to seek “comprehensive engagement” with the region, thus formalising what had been a practice since 1983 when the Hawke government assumed power. The “engagement” policy produced a surge of activity towards the region, including a plethora of proposals for regional institutions. One of these was the proposal to establish a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) in 1990, modelled after the European confidence-building organisation the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later enforced into an organisation and renamed OSCE).

Evans was also pushing multilateral security talks within the context of APEC, but ASEAN states worried their organisation could be undermined and argued ASEAN PMC meetings were adequate for achieving the same function. Moreover, Tokyo and Washington were not enthusiastic about a new regional security initiative and after rounds of bargaining the ASEAN ministerial meeting in Singapore in July 1993 decided on establishing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), incorporating much of Evans’ ideas in it. ARF came into being in 1994 and included the ASEAN member states, China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos, PNG and ASEAN dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the United States). Evans was nonetheless still pushing his agenda on regional security and suggested institutionalisation of non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), transparency of military doctrines and preventive diplomacy. Whilst these were not met with considerable enthusiasms, Evans did in number of ways nonetheless contribute to the improving regional security environment, e.g. by being active in mediating the Cambodia peace agreement and promoting CSPAC and other Track II diplomacy forums.

734 Ravenhill (1997), p. 19
737 Pitty (2003), “Strategic Engagement”, p. 69
When in 1996 John Howard’s Coalition government settled into the office, it initially pledged to continue engaging Asia. Alexander Downer, the coalition government’s Foreign Minister made a point of emphasising in one of his early speeches that “engagement with Asia was still the most important component of Australia’s foreign policy.” However, soon after scepticism within Australian policy-making circles over ASEAN’s utility was settling in, in particular following the 1997 financial crisis, leading into a reluctance to adopt, or at times at least even to respect, the ‘ASEAN Way’ of doing things. Also, differences in entangling the East Timor problem provided another instance where ASEAN’s passiveness became a major disappointment for the Australian government. Alexander Downer, clearly frustrated over this and other differences in approach, started referring to ASEAN being emotional and avoiding problems, not solving them. Moreover, he stated that there is two types of Regionalism: “practical” and ”cultural”; and that Australia would engage only in “practical” aspects of Regionalism “as enduring cultural differences between Australia and ‘Asia’ mean that Australia was inevitably prevented from developing closer ties [with Asian regional organisations].”

Part of the reason for this frustration was that Australia also continued to face fierce resistance towards its attempts joining regional institutions. In particular Australia’s role in East Timor, whilst perhaps boosting Australia’s confidence as a regional power, greatly angered Indonesia and Malaysia, who blocked Australia’s attempt to join e.g. ASEAN+3 (ATP). Moreover, no member state was actually willing to actively support Australia in this matter, albeit some remained sympathetic.

The Howard government’s approach to East Asian Regionalism provides another reason. John Howard rejected the opposition from the region, noting that “Australia does not have to choose

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739 Wesley (2007b), p. 66
740 Beeson (2001), p. 48
741 Wesley (2007a), p. 10
between its history and geography”. Downer, on the other hand, took the argument even further by stating that Australia has a stake in a stable and prosperous Southeast Asia, and that Australia will support Regionalism, as long as it does not become exclusive in nature. Moreover, he clearly resented the culturally motivated opposition in the region by stating that Australia would not be interested in “emotional Regionalism”, but would instead be willing to promote “pragmatic” Regionalism:

“If we describe Regionalism on basis of what you might broadly describe as an emotional community of interests, then Australia doesn’t have those types of emotional associations with the region, and ethnic and cultural associations, very obviously...For us, Regionalism is always going to be practical Regionalism looking at ways that we can work with our region to secure our own economic and security objectives.”

However, despite these bitter statements and an emphasis on bilateralism, the Howard government continued the push to join regional institutions. For instance, the DFAT 2003 foreign and trade policy whitepaper Advancing the National Interest nonetheless clearly indicated that Australia was very interested in joining ATP, despite the frustrating rejection by regional leaders.

From 2001 onwards, as Michael Wesley put it, ASEAN “entered a period of reduced cohesion and clarity”. Firstly, Indonesia had lost its leadership position as a result of the 1997 regional financial crisis and 1998 domestic economic and political crisis, and no replacement could be found. Secondly, the enlargement from six to ten members in the latter part of the 1990s produced ASEAN its version of deepening versus widening crisis, the efforts directed to integrat-

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742 Wesley (2007a), p. 10
743 Wesley (2007b) p. 65
744 Quoted in Wesley (2007b), p. 66
745 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2003), “Advancing the National Interest”, Canberra, pp. 84-5
746 Wesley (2007a), pp. 102-3
747 Wesley (2007b), p. 66
ing the new members distracting attention away from institutional development. Finally the East Timor crisis exposed the weakness of ASEAN in dealing with regional problems with regional institutions bypassed by bilateral agreements in economic relations and security taking over. Consequently the Howard government’s emphasis on bilateralism received increasingly positive response in the region. As a testimony to this approach, Australia completed a number of bilateral agreements with regional countries between 2001 and 2005. In addition to a number of FTAs, these included Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, India and Fiji in counter-terrorism. Australia also cooperated with Indonesia in launching the “Bali processes”, by jointly arranging a conference on illegal immigration in February 2002 in Bali and then in December 2002 a conference on combating money laundering and terrorism financing.

However, despite the scepticism of how effectively ASEAN institutions operate, Australia supported the efforts to build regional institutions with considerable enthusiasm, culminating in the ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program (AADCP) launched in 2002, and valued at 45 million dollars over six years and directed towards aiding regional projects.

Moreover, in the latter part of the Howard government an emerging generation of new leaders took over in major Southeast Asian states in 2004 and 2005, turning the tide in Australia’s regional relations. The pragmatic Abdullah Badawi replaced the main opponent of Australia’s engagement with Asia - Dr. Mahathir in Malaysia in 2005, Lee Hsieng Loon replaced Goh Chok Tong in Singapore in August 2004 and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (popularly known as SBY) was elected president in Indonesia in 2004.

Yet another reason for the turning tide was probably China’s ASEAN ‘surge’, a policy of active diplomacy to increase China’s influence in Southeast Asia. Worrying of China’s rapidly increasing influence ASEAN states have engaged in counter-balancing by increasing engagement with

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748 Howard (2007a), pp. 102-103
749 Howard (2007a), p. 191
750 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2004), ASEAN and Australia Celebrating 30 years, Canberra, p. 24
751 Wesley (2007b), p. 61
the US, Australia and New Zealand. As a consequence John Howard was invited into ASEAN leaders’ summit in Vientiane in November 2004, materialising a major breakthrough towards gaining access to the East Asia Summit and ATP.\textsuperscript{752} Howard, however, refused to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which was considered a prerequisite for joining the EAS (and which New Zealand immediately signed), quoting concerns that it would conflict with the obligations of Australia - US alliance. The refusal immediately angered ASEAN states and derailed Australia’s East Asia Summit access. In mid-2005, however, Howard and Downer had a change of heart and signed TAC without further references to the earlier motives for the initial refusal to do so. Consequently EAS doors opened again and Howard got his invitation to the inaugural summit.\textsuperscript{753} The China card could not have played for Australia’s advantage again, as China did not appear very keen to admit Australia and India.

Finally, however, contrary to Howard’s and Downer’s preferences for “pragmatic Regionalism”, it should be noted that ASEAN is becoming more “exclusive” in terms of moving towards enhanced community building based on shared values and culture. The ASEAN Vision 2020, adopted in December 1997 in ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, envisioned an ASEAN Community that was outward looking and united by pursuit for peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic economic development and in a community of caring societies. Moreover, in October 2003 the ASEAN leaders agreed to adopt the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) announcing the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2020 to be based on three pillars: ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.\textsuperscript{754} The ASEAN Concord II is an important development in ASEAN’s evolution in the sense of elevating political and socio-cultural aspects on par with economic matters as basis for further integration. The strategic objective of ASEAN Concord II was to achieve deeper integration and accelerate regional identity building.

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\textsuperscript{752} Wesley (2007b), p. 68
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\textsuperscript{753} Ibid
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\textsuperscript{754} ASEAN Secretariat (1997), Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), available online: http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm, date last accessed: 01.08.2008
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Australia and Asia-Pacific Regionalism

The development of Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific, as well as Australia’s role in this process, has been a long road paved with a series of proposals for regional institutions. The beginning of this journey started in the early 1960s when the Japan Economic Research Center (JERC) began to explore the opportunities for regional integration. Its first report “Economic Cooperation in the Pacific Area” argued that there was indeed sufficient potential in the region to promote regional cooperation and proposed the establishment of annual ministerial meetings between Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States. Based on these findings, Japanese economist Kiyoshi Kojima first sketched an idea of a Pacific Community in 1966. The idea was taken further by the Japan-Australia Business Cooperation Committee that established the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in 1967 to promote study and discussion regarding regional trade and investment, as well as to promote public – private sector cooperation in economic matters. Whilst this did not result into the establishment of regional institutions as such, the idea of Asia-Pacific Regionalism had been born.

The idea of Asia-Pacific Regionalism was taken significantly further by the creation of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1980, initiated by Japan’s Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira and Australia’s Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser. PECC was much broader in membership and involved twenty Asia Pacific nations in national member committees. The most significant contribution of PECC, however, was paving the way for the establishment of the first genuine regional institution in the Asia-Pacific: the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

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756 Soesastro (1994), p. 80


758 The twenty national member committees were: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan (under the name Chinese Taipei), Thailand, the United States and the Pacific Islands nations.
(APEC) organisation in 1989. The role of Australia in the establishment of APEC was significant and culminated in an inaugural meeting in Canberra at the initiative of Australia’s Prime Minister Bob Hawke.

The major breakthrough with APEC, however, was reached only when in early 1990 ASEAN Economic Ministers adopted the “Kuching Consensus”, which produced an agreement on the terms of ASEAN’s participation in APEC and thus, making the organisation truly region-wide in reach. APEC’s membership also expanded to cover a total of 21 member economies after four waves of enlargement in 1991 (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan), 1993 (Mexico, and Papua New Guinea), 1994 (Chile) and 1998 (Peru, Russia and Vietnam).

As with prior initiatives, economic cooperation was the key motive and mission for the foundation of APEC and it was at least partly a response to the perceived need to promote a rules based non-discriminatory international trading system and to lack of regional institutions in the Asia Pacific, thus promoting the principles of "open Regionalism". The basic guiding principles of open Regionalism for the organisation, on the other hand, were accordingly set out in the 1991 Seoul APEC Declaration, whilst the 1994 Bogor meeting clarified APEC’s objectives as to “strengthen the open multilateral system; achieve free and open trade and investment in the Asia Pacific region by a process of facilitation and liberalisation; and intensify development coopera-

759 Pitty (2003), “Regional Economic Co-operation”, p. 41
760 The term “member economies” was adopted to emphasise the economic and non-political nature of APEC. APEC’s 21 Member Economies are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, The Republic of the Philippines, The Russian Federation, Singapore, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Thailand, the United States of America and Viet Nam. Source: APEC Secretariat, http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec.html. Date last accessed 29 September 2008
Moreover, the leaders attending the Bogor meeting agreed on the removal of barriers for trade and investment in the region by 2020.

Institutional development of APEC, however, was a commonly perceived weakness until it took a new dimension following the 1993 Seattle summit as a consequence of the Clinton administration’s endorsement of APEC in general and a push for a transformation of APEC from a purely consultative body into an international organisation with a small secretariat in Singapore. The 1995 Osaka Summit, on the other hand, produced the "Osaka Action Agenda", detailing how APEC as an organisation and its member economies planned to reach these targets and support the non-discriminatory trading system. In the Manila 1996 Summit the leaders agreed on the Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA), reaffirming the organisation’s commitment to trade liberalisation and facilitation through following "the principles of open Regionalism", signifying that APEC was to be open to any economy with strong economic linkages to the region and a demonstrated will to adhere to shared principles.

The 1997 Asian financial crisis, in particular the speed and extend of the contagion spread in the region, reminded the regional states of their interdependency and the weakness of cooperation between them. The crisis, as unfortunate as it was, produced a major turning point in APEC’s development. As Naoko Munakata has suggested the opportunity to fill the perceived gap offered a major opportunity to APEC and following the crisis "APEC became the primary vehicle for regional cooperation". Boosted by the newly found enthusiasm towards APEC, The Eminent Persons Group was tasked to produce a new vision for APEC that included APEC FTA

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762 Drysdale and Elk (1997), p. 45
763 2010 for developed and 2020 for developing economies
764 Pitty (2003), “Regional Economic Co-operation”, p. 34
765 Also referred to as "new Regionalism" or as Drysdale has titled it "Open Economic Association"
766 Drysdale and Elk (1997), p. 42
PAFTA, however, failed to attract widespread support and the APEC leaders decided instead to stick to the Bogor principles of voluntary liberalisation and peer pressure. Another setback was a decisive attempt by ASEAN to increase its influence in the region through the establishment of the ASEAN Plus Three (ATP), involving ASEAN and the major East Asian powers China, Japan, and South Korea. Nonetheless, pioneering a regional organisation that involves 21 countries, covering approximately 41% of the world’s population, 49% of world’s GDP and 49% of world trade, is solid proof that Australia can play a major role in regional institution building and integration.

**Australia and East Asian Regionalism**

Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohammad, Malaysia’s long-serving Prime Minister, concerned about the poor progress made in the GATT Uruguay Round for multilateral trade liberalisation, as well as the increasing discriminatory Regionalism in the EU and NAFTA, proposed in late 1990 an Asian economic block - East Asian Economic Group - comprising ASEAN, Indo-China, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Japan. Mahathir’s intention was that the new block would be exclusively an “Asians only” grouping to counterbalance the “Western” blocks. Moreover, Mahathir was vehemently opposed to Australia’s and New Zealand’s membership in any Asian regional institutions because of their position as “proxies to the United States” and because they were “ethnically and culturally unfit to be part of an Asian community”. Japan, however, immediately vehemently opposed the notion of an exclusively Asian block. The United States and ASEAN also were hostile towards the idea; United States because it would have been totally excluded and ASEAN because it was concerned for losing its centrality in East Asian Regionalism.

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768 Munakata (2006), p. 143  
769 Munakata (2006), p. 143  
770 Munakata (2006), p. 147  
771 Munakata (2006), p. 142  
Due to the fierce opposition a more informal version of the EAEG, the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) was put forward in 1991. EAEC, however, was soon dubbed as the "caucus without Caucasians" and was dismissed due to opposition by Japan since it would have excluded Australia and New Zealand. When Mahathir was replaced by Abdullah Badawi in 2003, the new Prime Minister began rapidly repairing ruptured bilateral relations with Singapore, the United States and Australia. Badawi also resurrected the idea of East Asian Regionalism and suggested the establishment of an East Asian Summit in 2004 ATP meeting. The major East Asian powers, however, were still not unified in what kind of Regionalism they wanted to promote. For instance, China wanted exclusive form of Regionalism and was strongly opposed to India’s and Australia’s membership, whilst Japan preferred a more inclusive approach supporting the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in particular. Being confronted with strong support for Australia’s and New Zealand’s inclusion by Japan, China then demanded that ATP forms the basis for East Asian region building within the context of emerging East Asian Community (EAC). The Badawi proposal nonetheless took wind under its wings in the ASEAN+3 Leaders’ Summit in November 2004, which decided on the establishment of an “East Asian Community” along the lines of a report by the East Asia Vision Group issued in 2001. The report envisioned the formation of the East Asian Community with ASEAN as the core and the enlargement of the ATP process to include more countries, including Australia. In this spirit the report made a number of far-reaching recommendations in economic, financial, political and security, environmental, social and cultural and institutional cooperation in East Asia, including:

- Establishment of an East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and faster liberalisation of trade well ahead of APEC Bogor goals
- Formation of a East Asia Business Council to stimulate private enterprise activity in the region

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773 Pitty (2003), p. 31
775 Malik (2006a), p. 208
● Expansion of the Framework Agreement on an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) to all of East Asia and East Asian Investment Information Network to stimulate intra-regional investment

● Financial cooperation to include intra-regional lending arrangements with the most far-reaching goal being the establishment of an East Asian Monetary Fund, as well as regional exchange rate coordination

● Code of Conduct in lines with UN Charter and ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)

● Promotion of development and technological cooperation among regional countries, to provide assistance to less developed countries;

● Realisation of a knowledge-based “New Economy” and establishment of a future-oriented economic structure throughout the region

● The evolution of the annual summit meetings of ASEAN+3 into the East Asian Summit

Australia’s responses to attempts to promote East Asian Regionalism have been somewhat cool in general. The ALP government of Paul Keating and Gareth Evans mainly responded to Mahathir’s initiatives by promoting APEC as the building block for Regionalism and mobilising the rest of ASEAN, as well as China, Japan and the United States, behind it. Even Evans’ vision of Australia as part of the rather mythical “East Asian Hemisphere”, designed to tie Australia geographically to East Asia, was designed to provide a counterweight to definitions of the region that sought to exclude it.

The Coalition government tended to follow the bipartisan commitment to APEC. Even Koizumi’s vision of EAS that included Australia failed to raise the government’s enthusiasm and Howard remained reserved to the point of at times downplaying the importance of EAS and instead emphasising APEC’s centrality in the regional architecture. Nonetheless the 2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper “Advancing the National Interest” declared Australia’s

interest in joining the ATP. Following Japan’s initiative in November 2004 Howard was invited to ASEAN Leaders’ Summit in Vientiane, the first time Australia participated in such an event, to discuss Australia’s participation in EAS. The condition for participation was set to be signing the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Howard, however, refused signing TAC referring to the concern that it could contradict Australia’s ANZUS obligations. The refusal, infuriating many regional leaders, derailed Australia’s EAS access until in mid-2005 Howard changed his mind, signed TAC and the doors opened again and Howard was promptly invited in to the EAS inaugural summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 and later on in the second summit in Cebu (the Philippines) in January 2007.

The East Asian regional architecture is likely to continue to consist of multiple institutional arrangements for the foreseeable future. ASEAN, however, is likely to remain a core in most of region building projects. For instance the emerging ASEAN Economic Community is likely to form the centre of East Asian economic integration and EAS is in equal to ASEAN+6 in terms of membership (ASEAN + Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand). The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) again is likely to remain the dominant regional security institution. Whatever the exact institutional architecture of the emerging EAC will be, it will cover approximately half of the world’s population, a combined GDP greater than the EU and a trading volume larger than NAFTA. Consequently it is essential for Australia’s future to secure participation in the evolving East Asian Community.

Bilateral Relations with Major East Asian Powers

The previous sections have analysed Australia’s relations with the predominant regional organisations and its participation in regional institutions. This section will focus on Australia’s rela-

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777 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1997), Advancing the National Interest, Canberra, pp. 84-85
779 Kawai and Wignaraja (2007), p. 11
tionship with the major East Asian powers. Due to the immense diversity of the region, relations with major powers that dominate and shape the regional cooperation and integration initiatives is a critical factor in Australia’s integration with the region.

**Australia’s testy relationships with Indonesia**

Australia’s relationship with independent Indonesia has been a cycle of highs and lows, ranging from cordial to serious tension.

Jamie Mackie has suggested that the history of relations between Australia and independent Indonesia could be seen within the context of four distinct phases: 1945-49, 1950-66, 1966-1998 and 1999-2007. 781

The early independence years from 1945 to 1949 were mostly characterised by cordial relations between the two countries. Australia had supported Indonesian independence and the formation of an Indonesian state. The second period, on the other hand, was one of increasingly tense relations. The two leaders, Sukarno and Menzies, had conflicting personalities and the conservatism of Menzies, including his sense of threat from the region, did add to the dangerous mix in this period of communism spreading in Southeast Asia, culminating in the Malayan Emergency. More importantly, the 1962-63 dispute over West New Guinea (a.k.a. West Irian or Irian Jaya) was resolved in accordance with Jakarta’s wishes and thus, another source of potential conflict was averted. The policy of confrontation with Malaysia produced a period of open hostilities – the *Konfrontasi* (1963-66) - between Indonesia and Malaysia over control of the Kalimantan in the island of Borneo created real potential for wider hostilities between the two countries. This particular period created possibly the worst potential for open conflict between the two, when Australian troops stationed in Kalimantan during the Malayan Emergency occasionally entered into sporadic exchanges of gunfire with Indonesian troops. The diplomatic efforts, however,

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781 Mackie (2007), p. 44
continued during the conflict and eventually cool heads prevailed. Sukarno in particular assumed a conciliatory position and a major conflict between the two countries was averted.\textsuperscript{782}

The period from 1966 to 1998 represented another high in Australia-Indonesia relations. With the exception of Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1974-75, the period of these Suharto years were an era of cordial, or even exceptionally good, relations between the two countries. One reason for the cordiality was that in the Australian foreign policy elite Indonesia was largely seen as a bulwark against communism in the region.\textsuperscript{783} Moreover, the contentious issue of control over off-shore oil fields to the east of Timor in the Timor Sea was settled for a 40 years period in Timor Gap negotiations of 1989 between foreign ministers Gareth Evans and Ali Alatas.\textsuperscript{784}

In the 1990s a regional economic boom and the policies of the Paul Keating government (1991-1996) focusing on “engagement” with Asia produced the heydays of Australia – Indonesia relations in the mid-1990s. During this period of “engagement” Australian foreign policy priority was to consolidate a partnership with Indonesia in order to facilitate Australia’s engagement with ASEAN.\textsuperscript{785} The Keating – Suharto personal relationship was also warm and Keating visited Indonesia on numerous occasions, as a welcomed and respected partner he was given quarters in the presidential palace during his stay.

In terms of bilateral treaties completed during this period, the 1995 Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS), signed by Keating and Suharto, was a particularly significant achievement, being the first ever bilateral agreement with an Asian country and first of its kind for Indonesia.\textsuperscript{786}

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\textsuperscript{782} Mackie (2007), p. 5
\textsuperscript{783} Ayson (2007), p. 218
\textsuperscript{784} Mackie (2007), p. 34
\textsuperscript{785} Chalk, Peter (2001), Australia and Indonesia: Rebuilding Relations After East Timor\textsuperscript{76}, \textit{Contemporary Southeast Asia}, Volume 23, Number 2, p. 234
\textsuperscript{786} Pitty (2003), “Strategic Engagement”, p. 76
During its first two years the John Howard government continued roughly on the same policy lines established by the previous ALP government. The Howard government also promptly completed the negotiations for the Maritime Delimitation Treaty (DMT) Arafura and Timor seas and eastern Indian Ocean in 1997. When the Suharto regime fell in 1998 amidst economic, social and political turmoil, a new era in Australia-Indonesia relations quickly unravelled.

The 1999 to 2007 period produced an exceptional roller coaster of highs and lows. The period begun with the East Timor crisis and Australia’s leadership role in the international intervention force (INTERFET), which regardless of being officially endorsed by Jakarta, nonetheless became a major test to the relationship. The AMS, for instance, was terminated as a result of the crisis, Indonesian officials citing Australia’s actions in relation to the crisis being inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the agreement as a reason. Moreover, the East Timor crisis left a lingering suspicion amongst Indonesians that Australia would intervene in other break away provinces, such as Aceh and West Papua (Irian Jaya), allegedly motivated by a wish to break Indonesia into smaller more manageable parts.

This period of negative relations continued with the 2002 Bali bombings, where 88 Australians died. Moreover, the targeting of Australian interests in Indonesia continued by a suicide bombing against the Australian embassy in 2004 and a popular bar frequently populated by Australians in Bali in 2005. Whilst Jakarta collaborated with Australian officials, primarily from the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the treatment of suspects and the lenient treatment of the alleged mastermind behind the bombings, Abu Bakar Bashir created negative and increasingly hostile feelings towards Indonesia amidst the Australian public. The bad publicity continued with the Schapelle Corby case, a Gold Coast beautician convicted of drug smuggling in Bali, based on charges not entirely convincing to the Australian public and her treatment that did not adhere to Australian standards of justice.

787 Chalk (2001), p. 234
789 Wesley (2007b), p. 62
The years of 2004 and 2005 produced a slightly more positive environment for bilateral relations. The first, a celebrated positive change, came in late-2004 when Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (popularly known as SBY), a pragmatic Western educated career soldier was elected as the President of the Republic of Indonesia. Following his acute political instincts, John Howard sensed an opportunity to mend relations with Indonesia, as well as score some points in domestic politics against pundits criticising his government for ruining Australia’s relations with the region, and consequently made a point to attend the inauguration of SBY in Jakarta. Australia and Indonesia co-chaired an inter-faith dialogue conference arranged in Jakarta in December 2004.  

The tragic events that followed soon, the Boxing Day Tsunami in 2004 in Aceh, had a positive impact on Australia – Indonesia relations. Australia rapidly emerged as the largest donor announcing an AUD 1 billion aid package and thus, setting an example to the ASEAN countries and the international community in general, earning a bounty of goodwill in exchange.

The good fortunes continued for awhile with close and frequent contact between Canberra and Jakarta, culminating to SBY’s 2005 visit to Australia, which some celebrated as “the most successful ever undertaken by an Indonesian head of state”. Consequent to these positive developments in bilateral relations, the two signed an “Australia-Indonesia Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership” on 2 April 2005, re-establishing security relations between the two and broadening economic and technical cooperation and people-to-people links.

In January 2006 43 Papuan asylum seekers arrived in Australia receiving wide publicity and citing the brutality of the Indonesian administration there as their motive for fleeing Papua. When 42 of them were granted temporary protection visas, the Indonesians reacted furiously and

790 Wesley (2007b), p. 61
called the move a violation of Indonesian sovereignty and politically motivated favourable treatment. The actions taken in response by Jakarta were extreme. First SBY withdrew Indonesia’s ambassador from Canberra and then announced a critical review of all aspects of cooperation with Australia.\textsuperscript{793} The close bilateral relationship that had been recovering surprisingly well from the dent caused by the East Timor crisis, was suddenly put into jeopardy again. Moreover, previously considered as voice of reason, SBY disappointingly embarked on using strong nationalist rhetoric, suggesting that he aspired to make Indonesia so strong politically, economically and militarily that its neighbours would hold it in awe and would not dare to “play” with Indonesian sovereignty, such as Australia had done in the case of the Papuan refugees.\textsuperscript{794}

In May the already complex situation was made worse by intensifying fighting between the military and the police in East Timor and riots in Dili, causing yet another political and security crisis in East Timor in May-June 2006. Once again Australia took an active role and swiftly deployed 2600 military personnel to support the government in upholding law and order. Australia also contributed to the United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT) in order to secure preparations for elections in East Timor.\textsuperscript{795} In June yet another issue of contestation emerged when Jemaah Islamiyah leader Abu Bakar Bashir, the suspected mastermind behind Bali bombings, who had been charged on immigration rather than terrorism offences, was released after serving only 30 months of his sentence.

However, once again the bilateral relationship bounced back and towards the end of the year turned towards cordial once again, signing the “Comprehensive Partnership” declaration in April 2005. One of the major achievements was the new security agreement to replace the previous scrapped in the aftermath of the East Timor crisis: \textsuperscript{796} “Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation”, signed in Lombok in

\textsuperscript{793} Frost, Frank (2006), “Perspectives on Australian foreign policy 2006”, \textit{Australian Journal of International Affairs}, 61:3, p. 408 (pp. 403-426)

\textsuperscript{794} Ward (2007), p. 13

\textsuperscript{795} Frost (2006), p. 411

\textsuperscript{796} Frost (2006), p. 409
November (and consequently also known as the “Lombok Treaty”) and reaffirming “mutual respect and support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unity and political independence of each other, and also non-interference in the internal affairs of one another”. It also established cooperation in defence, law enforcement, counter-terrorism, maritime security, emergency response and intelligence sharing.\(^{797}\)

*The China Factor*

Australia’s relationship with the communist China since its inception in 1949 has evolved from outright hostility towards a constructive and strategic partnership. Australia’s response to the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 was a denial of granting diplomatic recognition to the PRC and instead, following the US policy line, Canberra recognising the Kuomintang in Taipei as the legitimate government for all of China. The UK, on the other hand, followed a more conciliatory approach and recognised the PRC in 1950.\(^{798}\)

Trade, however, did not follow the pattern established in political relations and Australia has been a main supplier of agricultural commodities exports to China from the early 1950s, primarily in wheat, wool and sugar. When the Nixon administration begun its diplomatic engagement with the PRC in a spirit of détente, Australia reacted by switching diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1972,\(^{799}\) although the United States did not formally recognise the PRC until 1979\(^{800}\) This represented a significant change in Australian foreign policy towards China as a formal commitment towards a "One China" policy recognising the PRC as the sole legal government of China and Taiwan a province of the PRC. The shift in diplomatic recognition also initiated the beginning of a very substantial relationship between the two countries. This time


\(^{798}\) Frost, Frank (2005), “Directions in China’s foreign relations – implications for East Asia and Australia”, Research Briefs, Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services, Canberra, p. 54


\(^{800}\) Frost (2005), p. 54
also trade did follow politics and exports to China grew considerably over the following years, in particular following the economic reforms from 1978 onwards Australia was expected to become a trusted supplier for mineral resources.\textsuperscript{801}

In general since 1972 the bilateral relationship advanced rapidly towards a constructive strategic relationship through the conduct of frequent high-level visits, cooperation in multilateral institutions (e.g. APEC and ARF) and rapidly multiplying two-way trade. The exception to the rule was provided by two major crises that caused rifts in the relationship. The first crisis was created by the violent suppression of demonstrations in June 1989 at Tiananmen Square by Chinese security forces that caused the loss of hundreds of lives. Australia, like most of the world, expressed its shock and disappointment of the conduct of the Chinese government and its security forces. The second crisis emerged when in reaction to the 1996 Taiwan presidential elections the Chinese government responded by military manoeuvres and firing missiles in the Taiwan Strait in close proximity to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{802}

Whilst Australia followed the United States in its policy towards China in the early years of the PRC, a different approach to China has emerged since the late 1990s in particular. In general, Australia has differences in approach with its Western allies, being perhaps more accommodating towards China than the United States in particular. For example, Australia refrained from condemning China in the UN Commission on Human Rights, lifted the Tiananmen arms embargo early in comparison to some others and imposed a moratorium on ministerial level visits to Taiwan. All these policy decisions were aimed towards avoiding Beijing gaining the perception that Australia is party in the US and Japan led multilateral containment of China together with other regional states, such as India.\textsuperscript{803} Australia also continued the sale of uranium to China, satisfied with guarantees that it would not be used towards manufacturing of nuclear weapons. Why then did Australia implement all these policy decisions despite Beijing’s attempts to block


\textsuperscript{802} Frost (2005), pp. 55-6

\textsuperscript{803} Kapisthalam (2006), pp. 370- 371
Australia, India and New Zealand from the East Asia Summit and other regional organisations? The basis for this accommodating aspect of Australia’s relations with China is the somewhat different perception of the nature of the rise of China and in particular the ever increasing economic importance of China to Australia. In contrast to the views held by its main allies, particularly the United States, Australia appears to be a firm believer in a “peaceful rise doctrine. China also happens to have an enormous booming economy and the matching demand for energy and mineral resources. Consequently the economic relationship achieved phenomenal growth within a decade from 1993 to 2003 and China was elevated from tenth most important partner for Australia in merchandise trade to third. The economic relationship was further strengthened when the two countries entered negotiations for FTA in May 2005.

The Howard government, whilst being often accused of acting as a vassal of the United States, placed particular importance to China in its foreign policy making. Its first white paper in 1997, for instance, made China a foreign policy priority, whilst the second white paper in 2003 elevated the Australia-China relations to strategic level. China too values Australia highly in its foreign relations priorities, probably due to the economic relationship and Australia’s role as a key US ally in the region. As a testimony to Australia’s strategic importance to China, it ranked sixth after the United States, Japan, Russia, European Union and ASEAN. Consistent with its policy of positive engagement with China, Canberra supported China’s WTO membership and 2008 Olympics bids, albeit probably motivated by trade aspirations, in particular the potential LNG contract to supply the Guangdong Province. In terms of high-level visits, Howard’s frequent visits to China were followed by a historic visit to Canberra by President Hu, during

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804 Kapisthalam (2006), p. 374
805 Kapisthalam (2006), p. 369
806 Zhang (2007), p. 89
808 Zhang (2007), p. 94
809 Zhang (2007), pp. 95-7
which he became the first non-elected leader to address to the Parliament just a day after President Bush had done the same.\textsuperscript{810}

The Howard government’s engagement with China, however, was not entirely unproblematic. The issues of Tibet, Dalai Lama’s visits to Australia and the Falun Gong continued to place a strain on the relationship. Moreover, the defection of Chen Yoglin, the first secretary for political affairs in Chinese Consulate-General in Sydney in June 2005, was a major embarrassment for both governments, in particular after mounting public pressure the Howard government had to consider his case and eventually granted him a protection visa in July. However, whilst Beijing protested strongly, nonetheless the bilateral relationship suffered only a minor blow.\textsuperscript{811}

In terms of strategic interests, Australia faces a challenge of balancing its relations with China and the United States. The differences between the US and Australia over perceptions of China and its future regional and global conduct is potentially the most important issue (and one of the very few) that separates the two allies, as well as one that has the greatest potential for a conflict of interests to emerge. Where as in the US the administration sees China as strategic competitor and a future challenger for hegemony, in Australia the belief in China’s “peaceful rise” is the norm. The most serious source of potential problems, however, is the US commitment to defend Taiwan. Should a war emerge between PRC and ROC it would present a real nightmare for Australia. Such a conflict would essentially force Australia to choose sides between joining the US in military action against China in line with its ANZUS treaty obligations or attempt to stay neutral. Given the potential impact on Australia’s economy and security the government has attempted to argue the latter approach. In August 2004 Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer commented that ANZUS treaty would not apply to the event and that consequently there would be no obligation to join the US in military action against China. The US State Department reacted angrily and stated that Articles IV and V clearly state that this was exactly what was expected within the context of the alliance obligations. Having been confronted with such a

\textsuperscript{810} Zhang (2007), p. 99

\textsuperscript{811} Zhang (2007), p. 100
strong response Downer needed to take back his words.\textsuperscript{812} Arguably Howard and Downer were proverbially “bending over backwards” to cover both its alliance commitments to the United States and relations with its most important trading partner. With Japan also concerned about China’s rise Australia is increasingly in a tough spot, having to concern itself about a second triangle of relations in addition to the Australia-China-United States one. The pressure has certainly been mounting with Condoleezza Rice indicating that the United States would like Canberra to coordinate its China policy with Tokyo and Washington.\textsuperscript{813} The challenge this creates, however, is how the Australia-Japan-China and the Australia-US-China triangles can be balanced in practice. Taking into consideration the animosity that prevails in China-Japan relations and the champion versus contender nature of Beijing-Washington relationship, the question how Australia can remain friends with these three countries that may become enemies is a significant challenge to cope with.\textsuperscript{814} In particular should China further challenge the US hegemony in the region, Australia will be in serious trouble.\textsuperscript{815}

\textit{Australia’s relations with Japan}

Japan, the former arch enemy, particularly during WWII has rapidly become one of Australia’s most important trading partners and allies. Since the Australia-Japan peace treaty in 1952 and a commerce treaty in 1957, the relationship has grown and matured to a level of mutual strategic importance. Bulk of the importance is of course in the economic realm, but the political and security aspects of the relationship have also grown deeper and more extensive over the years.

\textsuperscript{812} Malik (2006b), pp. 588-589
\textsuperscript{813} Malik (2006b), pp. 594-5
\textsuperscript{815} Wesley (2007b), p. 70
In terms of the economics of the relationship, Japan became Australia’s most important export destination already in 1957, a position that it retained in 2004-05. In the same period approximately 450 000 Australian jobs were directly linked to trade with Japan.\textsuperscript{816}

In the political context bilateral relations have been conducted within the framework of annual prime ministerial meetings initiated by Prime Ministers John Howard and Ryutaro Hashimoto in 1997.\textsuperscript{817} Moreover, from 2001 to 2005 much of the activity was conducted within the context of Howard-Koizumi Prime Ministerial diplomacy.\textsuperscript{818} The Howard government in general placed significant foreign policy attention on Japan, the Prime Minister stating in his speech at the Lowy Institute; “Australia has no greater friend in Asia than Japan.”\textsuperscript{819} Whereas John Howard visited Japan six times over a ten year period, only two Japanese prime ministers visited Australia.\textsuperscript{820} Australia, moreover, did not rank particularly high in the Japanese agenda and Howard’s visits to Japan attracted little media attention, mostly in context of Australia’s burgeoning relationship with China and its implications for Japan.\textsuperscript{821} Since 2002, however, the bilateral relationship accelerated to "frantic” activity; culminating in three inter-governmental conferences that were arranged in 2001, 2002 and 2005 to enhance cooperation in economic, security, cultural affairs.\textsuperscript{822} The issues raised in inter-governmental conferences, as well as a number of other issues, were also followed up in frequent Track II discussions.\textsuperscript{823} The most important of these recent numerous initiatives for increased bilateral cooperation was the Sydney Declaration on Australia – Japan Creative Partnership in November 2002, reaffirming;


\textsuperscript{817} Walton, David (2006). “Future directions in Australia – Japan relations: an Australian perspective”, \textit{Australian Journal of International Affairs}. Vol. 60, No. 4, p. 599 (pp. 598-605)

\textsuperscript{818} Walton (2007), p. 76

\textsuperscript{819} Quoted in Walton (2007), p. 77

\textsuperscript{820} Walton (2006), p. 600

\textsuperscript{821} Walton (2007), p. 77

\textsuperscript{822} Walton (2007), p. 72

\textsuperscript{823} Walton (2007), p. 82
THE PROBLEM OF THE ‘BORDERLINE STATES’ IN REGIONALISM

- Cooperation in counter-terrorism and shared commitment to support Afghanistan
- Australia’s strong support for Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council
- Australia’s support for Koizumi’s vision of a “community that acts together and advances together” for East Asia that includes Australia
- Cooperation to support East Timor’s transition to independence
- Expansion of bilateral security dialogue and direct defence links
- Enhancement of economic cooperation in East Asia through FTAs
- Continuation of annual Prime Ministerial meetings

In terms of regional institutions, Japan has supported Australia’s EAC membership, along the lines of Koizumi’s speech in Singapore in January 2002, where he launched his vision for an inclusive East Asian Community (EAC) in which Australia was to be included as a natural ally, despite Malaysian wholesale opposition to Australia’s membership. Howard, however, initially remained half-hearted towards the concept and did not proceed towards membership due to concerns about signing the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which was considered as a prerequisite to membership, allegedly potentially violating or contradicting Australia’s alliance commitments, specifically ANZUS. The Japanese had thought that Australia had been unnecessarily aggressive towards Indonesia in East Timor crisis, and that in general it lacked substance and style in its regional diplomacy. This added to reasons for Koizumi turning lukewarm to Australia’s proposal for Australia-Japan FTA, despite the fact that economic modelling carried out in both countries supported the assumption that full bilateral liberalisation would produce additional GDP gains worth of AUD $ 39 billion for Australia and AUD $ 27 billion for Japan over 20 years. Nonetheless, instead of committing to the FTA Japan only agreed

825 Walton (2007), p. 73
826 Walton (2007), p 81
to a joint two-year feasibility study. The most likely reason for these differences lies in economic policy, not political; whilst the most pressing issue for Australia is to eliminate or lower trade barriers for agricultural products, the Japanese agricultural lobby wants to exclude these from the proposed FTA.\(^{827}\)

Since 9/11 in particular the relationship has had a growing security emphasis with cooperation in counter-terrorism and regional security considerably enhanced between the two countries. Much of this cooperation, however, is a direct consequence of Japan’s growing role in security in general. The new role for the Japanese Self Defence Forces (SDF) has now produced its first overseas deployments since WWII, SDF participating in a number of UN missions and the Coalition operations in Iraq. The cooperation between Australian and Japanese armed forces has consequently also now been established also in an operational sense. Concrete examples of this new form of cooperation includes the deployment of SDF engineers to East Timor to participate in INTERFER, and in 2005 when the ADF was assigned to protect SDF engineers in Al-Muthanna Province in Iraq from April 2005 onwards.\(^{828}\) As stated in the previous section though, the greatest challenge to Australia in its relations is in the trilateral security dialogue between Australia, Japan and the United States and in finding ways to balance the relationship between China and Japan.\(^{829}\)

### 6.4 Australia’s Regional Security Interests and Engagement

**The Potentially Hostile Seas**

As John Ravenhill has pointed out, Australia’s relations with the region have been traditionally dominated by attitudes of paternalism and patronage, Australian policy-makers primarily focusing on the issues of security, defence and aid in the conduct of relations with the region.\(^{830}\) Much

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\(^{827}\) Walton (2007), pp. 78-80

\(^{828}\) Walton (2007), p. 76

\(^{829}\) Walton (2007), p. 84

\(^{830}\) Ravenhill (1997), p. 1
of this defence and security focused view towards the region derived from historical experiences, in particular from World War II, and created a deeply rooted discomfort with the region. This was certainly true up until the Post-Cold War era from the late 1980s onwards, whilst economic preoccupations dominated the following era until 9/11 and the events following it. From 9/11 onwards Australian regional policy-making and thinking again took a turn towards a defence and regional security focused model.

Australia’s defence thinking in the post-WWII era was largely shaped by the dramatic events of the Pacific War, in particular the traumatic year of 1942. First the ‘invincible’ Singapore was taken by the Japanese in eight days in February, then the Battle of the Coral Sea in May the same year and the Kokoda Track campaign in New Guinea from July onwards, brought the Imperial Japanese forces uncomfortably close to the Australian shores, representing the first major direct threat to the country. These events combined with direct attacks on the Australian territory, such as the bombing of Darwin in February 1942 and the Japanese submarine incursions to Australian waters, including to Sydney harbour, left a deep sense of insecurity in the Australian psyche.831

In the early post WWII era Australia welcomed the independence of the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon and supported the Indonesian independence struggle against the Dutch.832 The emergence of the Cold War in the region, however, and the fear of Southeast Asian states falling to communism one-by-one, as envisioned by the ‘Domino Theory’, drove Australia to seek security in alliances with likeminded powers, in particular with the United States. The defence treaty between the United States, Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) signed in 1951 soon dominated Australia’s defence planning.833 Moreover, following the lessons of WWII and the realities of Australia’s strategic geography the basic assumption of Australia’s defence doctrine was that the enemies must be defeated before they reach its shores, prompting

831 Ravenhill (1997), p. 9
832 Goldsworthy (2003), “introduction”, p.3
the adoption of the concept of "forward defence" as its primary defence doctrine.\(^{834}\) The creation of the People’s Republic of China as a result of the Chinese civil war in 1949 stimulated the spread of Communism in the region, eventually in form of Chinese backed up insurgencies in Southeast Asia. As a consequence of the heightened threat of Communism and the forward defence doctrine, Australian troops were engaged in a number of major conflicts in the region; the Korean War (1950-53), the Malay Emergency (1950-60), the Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia (1963-66) and the Vietnam War (1962-72).

In the latter part of the 1960s the regional security environment again took a radical turn to worse following the British disengagement from the region beginning with the decision to withdraw from east of Suez in 1968. The message was further reinforced when in July 1969 Nixon declared the ‘Guam doctrine’, entailing the principle that the US would avoid entanglement in Asia and that the allies in the region should take care of their own security. The prospect of the UK and the US limiting military commitments in the region signified to Australia that it could not rely on great and powerful friends for its defence, but would rather need to fend for itself. This signified a radical readjustment as the continuous reliance on a ”great and powerful friend” based on a common heritage, history, language, shared strategic interests and political values has traditionally been central to Australia’s security doctrine.\(^{835}\)

**Australia’s position in Southeast Asia’s regional security environment**

Southeast Asia was mainly seen through a Cold War prism by Australia during this period of bilateral power balancing. Influenced by the ’domino theory’ the region was seen as a source of insecurity if not direct threat. ASEAN’s formation in 1967 was welcomed by Australia in the Cold War context as an anti-communist bloc that could provide an arc of stability in the near region. In addition to ANZUS Australia entered all anti-communist security alliances in the region, including SEATO, ASPAC and the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA). When it became clear that the non-aligned component in ASEAN was becoming dominating and the

\(^{834}\) Goldsworthy (2003), “Introduction”, p. 3

\(^{835}\) Malik, (2006b), p. 587
group with the establishment of the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ), Australia quickly became concerned that such efforts would threaten to undermine US presence in the region.\textsuperscript{836} When the Gough Whitlam government came into power in 1972, however, a change of direction took effect. First Whitlam initiated a pullout from Vietnam and established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He then went on to realign Australia’s defence thinking by distancing the country from SEATO and ASPAC, whilst simultaneously endorsing ZOPFAM and seeking to engage ASEAN.\textsuperscript{837} Moreover, the Indochinese states were under communist rule but the non-communist states appeared secure with little tangible evidence of domino theory being realised. Consequently Australia began building good relations also with the non-aligned countries signifying a reorientation in attitudes towards the region, emphasising engagement instead of confrontation.\textsuperscript{838} This engagement became concrete when Australia became ASEAN’s first dialogue partner in 1974.

However, Australia was also rapidly building independent military capabilities and defence spending increased considerably. A defence whitepaper -"Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities (“the Dibb Report 1986-87”) - recommended a doctrine of “self-reliance” as essential for Australia’s future security.\textsuperscript{839} A 1987 Whitepaper -\textit{The Defence of Australia} followed on the same lines, whilst the 1989 DFAT security whitepaper “Australia’s Regional Security” underlined that Australia’s primary security interest were to be found in the stability of the near-regions Southeast Asia, South Pacific and the eastern parts of the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{840}

With such underlining assumptions in mind Australian foreign and security policy under Gareth Evans took a major turn towards multilateralism. In the context of foreign and security policy it came to signify an independent security strategy from the US and a strategy of ’comprehensive

\textsuperscript{836} Ravenhill (1997), p. 10  
\textsuperscript{837} Ravenhill (1997), p. 10  
\textsuperscript{838} Goldsworthy (2003), “Introduction”, p. 5  
\textsuperscript{839} Pitty (2003), “Strategic Engagement”, p. 52  
\textsuperscript{840} Ravenhill and McAllister (1998), p. 122
engagement’ with the region. Moreover, Evans envisioned a regional security community based on shared interests being formed in Southeast Asia and proposed the founding of a Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), inspired by the CSCE (now OSCE) in Europe, in order to facilitate the development of such a community.\footnote{Ravenhill (1997), pp 19-20} Whilst ASEAN was initially cool towards the idea and argued that the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences were adequate venue for regional security talks, the ASEAN-PMC security element transferred into ARF in 1994, which incorporated much of Evan’s original ideas. Also, military cooperation with ASEAN countries started growing rapidly by the early 1990s. In fact, ASEAN national defence forces were by this time carrying out more joint exercises with Australia than with each other.\footnote{Ravenhill (1997), p. 20} The Australian Defence Forces (ADF) again was conducting more joint exercises with ASEAN forces than with the US forces.\footnote{Pitty (2003), “Strategic Engagement”, p. 73} The relationship with the Indonesian military has also been long running. Military aid to Indonesia was suspended in 1986, but military links were re-established in 1993 when ADF Special Forces organised counter-terrorism exercises with Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus), despite the concerns over its human rights abuses in East Timor and Aceh, of which in particular the Kopassus were suspected of.\footnote{Pitty (2003), “Strategic Engagement”, pp. 72-3} The Australian-Indonesian security agreement, “Agreement on Maintaining Security’, signed in 1995, however, was suspended following the 1999 East Timor crisis.\footnote{Pitty (2003), “Strategic Engagement”, p. 77} 

“\textit{The Arc of Instability}”

If there has been a prevailing concept in Australian strategic discourse in the post-Cold War era, it probably is "the arc of instability”. The “arc” concept became into the fore to reflect the radical and rapid changes in the strategic outlook of the region in the early post-Cold War that arguably

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\footnote{Ravenhill (1997), pp 19-20}
\footnote{Ravenhill (1997), p. 20}
\footnote{Pitty (2003), “Strategic Engagement”, p. 73}
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\footnote{Pitty (2003), “Strategic Engagement”, p. 77}
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continue shaping Australia’s strategic environment.\textsuperscript{846} The Asian region’s fast moving Tiger economies were predicted to surpass Europe, and even the United States, in GDP per capita income levels. Whilst some of the enthusiasm has since dissipated somewhat, the rapid economic growth, accompanied by relatively rapid social development, arguably produced encouraging levels of stability in the region and with regional and international cooperation booming throughout the 1980s and early 1990s the outlook was generally positive. The 1997 Asian financial crisis, however, hit the region so hard that all this seemed to become in a sudden halt. The financial crisis, whilst extending throughout the region, and in fact impacting the global economy, caused an economic meltdown in Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea in particular. Out of the so-called "Tiger" economies only Singapore escaped the crisis relatively unscathed in Southeast Asia, whilst Hong Kong and Taiwan also remained relatively strong throughout. The perhaps most drastic impact from the crisis was the social and political instability it triggered in Indonesia. The following breakdown of social order in form of riots and widespread violence caused a chain of events that brought and abrupt end to the thirty two years of uninterrupted rule by the Suharto “New Order” regime. The rapid changes in the country’s political and social fabric and the emergence of the weak interim administration lead by B.J. Habibie caused concerns over the survivability of the Indonesian state at large. The spreading ethnic and religious violence in the Moluccas, Lombok, Kalimantan and elsewhere across the Indonesian archipelago, combined with secessionist aspirations in Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor, caused widespread concern over the possibility of an "balkanised" Indonesia, threatening to spread the violence into Australia’s near neighbourhood. Consequently some observers have suggested that the “arc of instability” in a reality should be considered "a polite way of talking about Indonesia”\textsuperscript{847}

Although the immediate region, in particular Indonesia and the Southern Pacific were the primary source of concern, many observers thought the region at large seemed to be getting less

\textsuperscript{846} Ayson, Robert (2007), "The 'arc of instability' and Australia’s strategic policy", \textit{Australian Journal of International Affairs}, Vol. 61, No.2 , p. 217 (pp. 215-231)

\textsuperscript{847} Ayson (2007), p. 218
The development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by India, Pakistan and North Korea and the tensions in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea influenced Australian defence analysts and planners to conclude that dramatic changes in the strategic outlook in the region were potentially forming an "Arc of Instability" around Australia.\textsuperscript{848} In this spirit, defence strategy experts, e.g. Paul Dibb, David Hale and Peter Price ominously declared in 1999 that the "Asian century" had given away to Asian insecurity.\textsuperscript{849} The ALP opposition used to argue that the Howard government was neglecting Australia’s immediate region at the cost of a deployment to Iraq, whereas the real priority should have been establishing stability in the immediate neighbourhood, the Southwest Pacific.\textsuperscript{850} The former ALP opposition foreign affairs shadow minister, now Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, interestingly was one of the most enthusiastic spokespersons for the ‘arc’, and largely influenced the “Dibb report” 1986 defence review that inspired the "Regional School" in strategic analysis in Australia.\textsuperscript{851}

The argument was that there was a string of weak states, and potentially “failed states”, to the north and east of Australia. Some analysts were also suggesting that Indonesia was possibly about to break up and thus, becoming “Balkanised”. Moreover, the potential conflict over Papua and a militarily increasingly weak New Zealand arguably added to the strategic pressure to Australia.\textsuperscript{852} Interestingly New Zealand was at the same time far less pessimistic about the immediate neighbourhood, potentially due to being a genuine Pacific country and feeling less “different” and isolated from the region than Australia did.\textsuperscript{853} In a broader strategic context, however, the ‘arc of instability’ was also argued to exist along the southern rim of Eurasia/from the Balkans to the Caucasus and Central Asia and maybe even the Persian Gulf as well’, backing the Howard government’s decision to deploy troops to Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{854} Regardless of

\textsuperscript{848} Dibb, Paul, David Hale and Peter Prince (1999), “Asia’s Insecurity”, \textit{Survival}, Vol. 41, No. 3, p. 18 (pp. 5-20)
\textsuperscript{849} Dibb, Hale and Prince (1999), p.5
\textsuperscript{850} Ayson(2007), p. 215
\textsuperscript{851} Ayson (2007), p. 225
\textsuperscript{852} Ayson (2007), p. 220
\textsuperscript{853} Ayson (2007), p. 221
\textsuperscript{854} Ayson (2007), p. 221
the scope of the ‘arc’ one subscribes to, it reflects continuation of the strategic perception that the threat to Australia emanates from the region surrounding it.

The ALP line of criticism, however, dissipated somewhat with the government’s interventions in the South Pacific and East Timor in 2003.\textsuperscript{855} The action was a result of a strategic policy change, formulated in the 2000 Defence White Paper, following the 1999 East Timor crisis, and raising the possibility of increasing instability in neighbouring countries one of Australia’s strategic policy priorities.\textsuperscript{856} Consequently the government sent military and police forces to the region on several occasions, e.g. the 2003 Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and Enhanced Cooperation Program in Papua New Guinea, followed by deployments to East Timor, Solomon Islands and Tonga in 2006.\textsuperscript{857} The government also imposed sanctions on Fiji after a military coup in 2006.\textsuperscript{858}

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  \item \textsuperscript{855} Ayson (2007), p. 215
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The East Timor Crisis

One of Australia’s most serious foreign policy issues in the Post-Cold War era was the East Timor crisis from 1999 onwards. East Timor, a former Portuguese colony had been occupied by Indonesia in 1975 after an independence minded FRENTIL group had won control there. Australia was appalled by the Indonesian invasion to the same extent as the international society in general, but wanted to maintain its strong bilateral relationship with its most important regional neighbour. In general, Australia remained critical towards the means of annexation whilst remaining careful not to antagonise Indonesia.\textsuperscript{860} Even the so-called “Balibo Five” affair, when five Australian journalists were killed during the Indonesian invasion, and the negative affect it had on the public opinion, did not alter the course of policy-making, although the matter contin-


ues to haunt Australia’s relationship with Indonesia. The concern not to antagonise Indonesia materialised in foreign policy to the extent that Australia voted against United Nations General Assembly resolutions supporting the East Timorese right for self-determination.\(^\text{861}\) Australia also adopted a policy of *de facto* recognition, like much of the international community, immediately following the invasion. Australia, however, “slipped into” *de jure* recognition in 1978.\(^\text{862}\) The UN, in comparison, never formally recognised the annexing of East Timor.

The decision to accept the “irreversible truth” of the Indonesian occupation, however, did not initially have a domestic consensus behind it. The Australian Labour Party (ALP), in opposition at the time (1977-1983), vehemently opposed the recognition of the Indonesian rule and supported the right to self-determination for the East Timorese.

Once the Hawke ALP government was elected in 1983, however, the ALP started signalling a change in its position, instigated by Hawke’s first foreign minister Bill Hayden. In August 1985 the ALP national conference approved a policy change and Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor was recognised as a fact of life that was not going to change, particularly though antagonising Indonesia.\(^\text{863}\) The new foreign minister Gareth Evans stated in 1988 that Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor was "non-reversible" and that the question of human rights in East Timor, as well as elsewhere in Indonesia, would be easier and more effective to promote if Australia had a good and consultative relationship with Jakarta. It was also thought that antagonising the gigantic neighbour of more than 200 million in population over a relatively minor piece of territory would not be prudent.\(^\text{864}\)

The prelude to the 1999 crisis took place within the context of dramatic events in Indonesia and the region. The 1997 Asian financial crisis had hit the country particularly hard causing the economy to stagnate to a point of practically ending a period of 30 years of rapid economic growth and development. The economic crisis was promptly followed by a political crisis and

\(^{861}\) Goldsworthy (2003), “East Timor”, p. 219  
\(^{863}\) Goldsworthy (2003), “East Timor”, p. 219  
\(^{864}\) Goldsworthy (2003), “East Timor”, p. 219
started testing the credibility of the Suharto’s New Order regime. In May 1998 amidst economic, social and political turmoil resulting from the double crisis, Suharto was forced to step down. His successor the interim president B.J. Habibie, a veteran of the ruling Golkar party, turned the tide of Jakarta’s tight grip on the provinces by implying his willingness to consider granting autonomy to East Timor.  

These new developments in Indonesia offered new opportunities for a new future for East Timor and for the Australian government to play a new role. This re-activation also brought a new policy approach with it. The first major sign of a policy change came in the form of “the Howard letter” in December 1998 softly pushing the autonomy option to the Indonesian government. The suggestion was to follow the example of “the Matignon Accords” settling the long-running dispute between the indigenous and the French population in New Caledonia. Habibie, however, remained initially non-committed until January 1999 when he suddenly conceded that East Timor would be offered autonomy within Indonesia and possibly even independence. The true concession, however, was offering the East Timorese to choose the future of their country in a “popular consultation” (Jakarta vehemently opposed the term “referendum”).

In the early months of 1999 the province plunged into a cycle of escalating violence between pro-independence FALINTIL forces and the Indonesian military and militias supported by it, prompting urgent need for action if a peaceful solution was to be found. In particular the April massacres in Dili, and the rumoured Kopassus (Indonesian Special Forces) involvement suggested Jakarta’s sponsorship for the violence, or at the minimum indifference to it. The violence in any case grasped the attention of public opinion in Australia with large public demonstrations taking place in major cities. Consequently, the ALP started pressing the government to intervene and press for the deployment of UN peacekeepers. John Howard reacted to the pressure by

866 Goldsworthy (2003), “East Timor”, p. 228
867 Chalk (2001), p. 235
869 Goldsworthy (2003), “East Timor”, p. 239
stating that East Timor represented Australia’s most serious foreign policy crisis since the 1960s and pledged to act accordingly.\(^{870}\) Consequently, in the Bali conference on 2 April 1999 John Howard asked Habibie whether he would accept an international peacekeeping force in East Timor in order to stabilise the situation. Habibie’s response was an unequivocal no.\(^{871}\)

Already in May, however, Indonesia and Portugal agreed to a UN administered popular consultation on East Timor’s future. Consequently, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) opened its headquarters in Dili in early June.\(^{872}\) The popular consultation, however, originally planned for June was postponed until August due to violence initiated by pro-Indonesian militias frustrated by the increasing prospects of the province declaring independence.

The 30 August 1999 “popular consultation” produced an unequivocal majority decision. When the results were released on 4 September it turned out that only 21.5% of voters supported the autonomy option, whilst 78.5% voted against it. Since the “popular consultation” was set in such a manner that a vote against autonomy translated into a vote for independence, the East Timorese had clearly chosen to become an independent country. Rather predictably this sent the pro-Jakarta militias into frenzy and extreme violence broke out once again. Whilst the responsibility for law and order was with the Indonesian military (TNI), it was clearly unable, or rather unwilling, to uphold order, a fact that increased the pressure for international intervention.\(^{873}\)

It has been argued that geopolitically Australia had more at stake than any other country than Indonesia.\(^{874}\) In line with this argument, it appeared that the Howard government was not able to stand by and do nothing.\(^{875}\) Whilst the domestic pressure was certainly an important factor driving the government into action, external conditions also contributed. First of all, there was no

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\(^{870}\) Wesley (2007a), p. 41


\(^{873}\) Goldsworthy (2003), “East Timor”, p. 244

\(^{874}\) Goldsworthy (2003), “East Timor”, p. 231

\(^{875}\) Chalk (2001), p. 237
clear leadership from ASEAN, most member countries in fact preferring to remain passive in order to avoid antagonising Indonesia and adhering to the organisation’s principles of absolute sovereignty and non-interference in internal matters of other members. Secondly, the United States remained relatively passive being preoccupied with the Kosovo conflict. The Clinton administration indicated that escalating violence in East Timor was a concern to it, but would not contribute military forces in forms of combat troops, pledging logistic support only.\(^ {876}\) The combination of such domestic and external conditions created the pressure and opportunity for Australian leadership in the crisis that proved too hard for the Howard government to pass on. Hence, the government continued its efforts to press for international intervention in East Timor, but strictly under an explicit UN mandate.

The mandate for international intervention came in the form of UN Security Council resolution 1264 on East Timor on 15 September 1999, clearing the way for establishment of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) with Australia in the leadership and as the largest single contributor providing 5500 troops of the total of 9900.\(^ {877}\) However, it was felt that a UN mandate alone was not enough and Australia in particular set a precondition to deployment that Indonesia endorses the mission. Consequent to such Indonesian endorsement INTERFET led by Major-General Peter Cosgrove was deployed on 20 September 1999 with a landing of Australian Defence Forces (ADF), New Zealand and Ghurkha units in Dili. The fear that INTERFET could be drawn into confrontation with the Indonesian forces, did not fortunately materialise and the mission proved largely a success. The Howard government was triumphant and declared that the mission was clear evidence for Australia’s capability in leading a regional intervention force and "the role that Australia is capable of playing in a regionally based coalition".\(^ {878}\) One could of course argue that perhaps the mission was successful due to the minimal participation by ASEAN member states’ forces. Moreover, the Howard government did not present the Austra-


lian-led intervention as “good international citizenship”, but rather as a “projection of Australian values”, a statement that was hardly pleasing to the ASEAN partners.\(^{879}\)

The INTERFET operation ended with the handover of control to United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on 23 February 2000. Australia, however, continued its pivotal role in the country contributing personnel and funds to subsequent UN missions (UNMISET, UNOTIL and UNMIT) to support the independent East Timor, as well as further military deployments in 2006 to provide stability ahead of elections.\(^{880}\)

Following the East Timor crisis, a major dispute between Australia and East Timor emerged (2002–2006) over seabed boundary in the Timor Sea. The dispute emerged over the fact that East Timor did not recognise the boundary that was agreed between Indonesia and Australia prior to East Timorese independence and the area contained rich in oil and natural gas reserves. A settlement for the next 50 years was reached in January 2006 to East Timor’s benefit.\(^{881}\)

**“The Deputy Sheriff” in the Post-911 Era**

The 9/11 attacks produced rapid and drastic changes in Australia’s foreign and defence policies. Prime Minister John Howard, who was in Washington at the time of the attacks to participate in the 50\(^{th}\) anniversary of the ANZUS treaty, announced days after returning to Canberra that ANZUS treaty mechanisms would be activated for the first time since it was signed in 1951, signifying that the attack against the US was now considered equal to an attack against Australia.\(^{882}\) The pledge to stand by its big and powerful friend was not confined to words and Australian troops were soon deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq under the auspices of the ’coalition of the willing’ in the newly declared ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT). Australia also became a stern supporter of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and numerous other American lead initiatives, prompting allegations by the critics that the Howard government was turning Austra-

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\(^{879}\) McDougall (2007), p. 874  
\(^{880}\) McDougall (2007), p. 878  
\(^{881}\) McDougall (2007), p. 880  
\(^{882}\) Malik (2006b), p. 587
lia into a US satellite or a "client state". Consequently the new approach signified a return to “forward defence” through adopting a pre-emptive doctrine increasing Australia’s military involvement to the highest levels since the 1960s.

The new security doctrine of the post-911 world produced a somewhat confused approach by Australia towards regional security in Southeast Asia. On the one hand, Australia intensified its efforts to secure cooperation from its regional members, in particular Indonesia which had been the site of direct attacks against Australians and Australian interests. As a result of intensified efforts, a number of bilateral Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) in counter-terrorism were signed, including with Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, East Timor and Cambodia. A joint Australian-Indonesian initiative - Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation- was established in 2004 for training regional police forces in combating transnational crime and counter-terrorism. The Australian government supported the centre by donating AUD$ 36.8 million for the development and operational costs until 2009. On the other hand Australia also started showing signs of becoming an interventionist power, sending military and police forces to East Timor, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. Moreover, in late-2002 John Howard implied he would consider launching pre-emptive strikes against terrorist targets in the soil of foreign countries if that was necessary to prevent a terrorist strike against Australians. The statement angered Malaysia in particular and Prime Minister Mahathir retorted angrily that any such attack on Malaysian soil would be considered an act of war. Malaysia and the Philippines also threatened to pull out from bilateral counter-terrorism agreements. The Howard government also stepped up the deployment of representatives of Australian security agencies in the region, e.g. from the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Department of Immigration Multicultural Affairs (DIMIA), as well as sent military aid to the Philippines to combat MILF and the Abu Sayeef Group in Mindanao.

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883 Malik (2006b), p. 588
884 Wesley (2007b), p. 58
885 Wesley (2007b), p. 59
886 Wesley (2007b), p. 65
Such approaches earned Australia to be considered the “deputy sheriff” to the US in the region and caused a drastic change in its policy towards regional security. Whereas in the 1990s Australia emphasised multilateral cooperation in regional security, the post-911 regional security outlook was dominated by transnational threats, primarily terrorism and illegal immigration, as well as a notion of “weak states” in Southeast Asia that together constituted an “arc of instability” around Australia. However, the government did not entirely drop the ball in multilateral cooperation, contrary to some of the harshest criticism, but in fact was relatively active in promoting regional security cooperation in Southeast Asia in particular, albeit arguably in rather limited and self-interest serving fields such as counter-terrorism and illegal immigration. The most notable of these efforts were the so-called ‘Bali Processes’ established when Australia co-chaired with Indonesia a Regional Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime in Bali in 2002.

6.5 To be or not to be? Costs and Benefits of Exclusion versus Inclusion

The objective of this section, much like the equivalent in Chapter 4, is to provide an assessment of the costs and benefits of further integration to regional institutions by Australia. Unlike in the case of Turkey – EU, for instance budgetary considerations do not exist as a level of analysis in East Asia, nor do the issues with voting and decision-making as decisions in East Asian institutions are mainly made on consensual basis, nor is there an established formal membership criterion such as the “Copenhagen Criteria” in Europe. Nonetheless, according to Rationalist approaches the logic is the same: Australia would be inclined to join and would be accepted as an equal member in East Asian institutions based on whether the benefits override the costs of such a venture, for both Australia and the region. This again usually implies well established levels of material interdependency between a region and the country in question. Consequently, much like in the Turkey-EU case the scope of the analysis would be primarily whether an adequate level of interdependency exists, and as Mattli’s “logic of integration” would dictate what

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887 Wesley (2007b), p. 62
the costs and benefits of exclusion versus inclusion would be in terms of economics, politics and security. Finally, according to the so-called “Club Theory” exclusion from a regional organisation would result in exclusion from “Club goods” (common goods exclusive to members). 888

Currently Australia’s participation in regional institutions and agreements is mixed, as is the case with Turkey, i.e. Australia is accepted in some whilst excluded from others. The significant regional institutions where Australia is included are APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), which is forming the basis for an emerging East Asian Community (EAC). Australia is also an ASEAN dialogue partner and has been negotiating an AANZFTA agreement with ASEAN, which would directly link Australia and New Zealand to regional economic cooperation. Whilst the region’s attitude towards Australia’s inclusion in regional institutions has varied somewhat over the decades since ASEAN’s establishment in 1967, Australia’s position towards Regionalism has also varied depending on the ideological position of each individual government in power. The ALP governments, generally internationalist in nature, have tended to emphasise the importance of Asia and have argued that economic and security related benefits from participating in regional institutions would justify realignment of policy emphasis from traditional culturally similar partners to the near region. The governments ran by Liberal – National parties coalition have tended to use the rhetoric of ”pragmatic” approach towards Regionalism, whilst simultaneously emphasising Australia’s cultural difference from its neighbours and similarity with Britain and the United States. Consequently, the latest Coalition government in particular has emphasised bilateral treaties, in both economics and security, in its relations with the region.

Costs and Benefits of Further Economic Integration

As already pointed out, East Asian Regionalism differs from its European counterpart rather significantly. Unlike in Europe where a single regional organisation dominates regional cooperation, in East Asia a myriad of organisations and proposals exist. Consequently, in particular in

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888 According to Michele Fratianni and John Pattison (2001) a “Club” can only justify its existence if it can exclude non-members from the benefit of the club good; otherwise members are not willing to pay the tax that the club charges to maintain these club goods.
the field of economic cooperation a ”noodle bowl” of preferential trading agreements, bothegional and bilateral, complicates the architecture of regional economic cooperation. Moreover,
formation of a customs union in the lines established in European integration, where members
would have the same tariff and commercial policy towards non-members, is not on the agenda of
the Vientiane Action Programme. Subsequently, even if ASEAN’S conception of an Economic
Community is realised, Australian goods will continue to face different duties for the same good
in each ASEAN country”. ⁸⁸⁹ In terms of access to markets, Australia currently enjoys ‘most
favoured nation’ treatment in most ASEAN markets, whereas in case of Singapore and Thailand
better than MFN status through bilateral FTAs.⁸⁹⁰

Another difference to Turkey is that Australia has sought to compensate its exclusion from the
region by pursuing a number of bilateral agreements with regional countries, as well as empha-
sising traditional markets in Europe and the United States in particular. Economic relations with
East Asian states on the other hand have been conducted increasingly under the umbrella of
bilateral FTAs, specifically under the eleven-year reign of the Howard government, whereas
multilateral cooperation was used as a supportive secondary strategy. Hence, given that majority
of its trade relations with the region are governed within the context of bilateral FTAs, the
critical question becomes what would Australia gain from increased integration to regional
multilateral economic cooperation? Given this specific background, a comparison between costs
and benefits to Australia from bilateralism versus multilateralism as a prevailing strategy towards
managing relationships with East Asia would probably best serve the efforts to estimate whether
Australia would benefit from closer integration with the region.

⁸⁸⁹ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2006), ASEAN Building an Economic Community, East Asia
Analytic Unit, Canberra, p. 80

⁸⁹⁰ Ibid
**Bilateralism versus Multilateralism in managing relations with East Asia**

As John Ravenhill has pointed out: "In a world in which barriers to trade in manufactured goods have been substantially reduced, bilateral trade agreements would be expected *a priori* to generate at best modest benefits for the participants"\(^{891}\) However, it needs to be recognised that in comparison to regional FTAs bilateral FTAs tend to go beyond trade extending to issues relating to ‘deeper’ integration; investment, intellectual property rights and services trade.\(^{892}\) He also argues that the real economic impact of such agreements is particularly difficult to measure and that estimating the direct economic impact "through economic modelling have served largely to demonstrate that everything depends on the initial assumptions that modellers make."\(^{893}\) Rather than being determined by economic modelling for success, Ravenhill argues that the success or failure of such an agreement depends on how private firms and investors react to the opportunities created by a FTA.\(^{894}\) Such FTAs tend to be sought after for other than pure economic benefits, namely to advance political, both domestic and foreign policy, as well as security objectives.\(^{895}\)

Why then would Australia seek inclusion in regional FTAs if it already either has or is negotiating a bilateral FTA with most of its main trading partners in the region? One line of argument is that the benefits from PTA’s are in general relatively limited and disappear with the increase in number of bilateral agreements.\(^{896}\) In support of this line of argument it has been established that "cost-benefit calculations faced by countries increasingly tilt from bilateral to multilateral

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\(^{891}\) Ravenhill (2007), p. 205  
\(^{892}\) Ravenhill (2007), p. 205  
\(^{893}\) Ravenhill (2007), pp. 205-206  
\(^{894}\) Ravenhill (2007), p. 206  
agreements as the number of bilateral agreements expands”, as benefits from exclusivity disappear the more participants are involved.\(^ {897}\) Moreover, the cost of maintaining multiple agreements are relatively high, as these are not one-time affairs, but rather have to be constantly monitored, adjusted and eventually renegotiated when they expire. Finally, even if the cost-benefit ratio of an individual agreement can be proven to be positive in general, bilateral FTAs can have negative implications; "Besides the direct economic impact of the agreements themselves, any assessment of costs and benefits must raise broader issues relating to the opportunity costs of the agreements for other dimensions of foreign economic relations, particularly for negotiations at the regional and global levels”. \(^ {898}\) Consequently, it could be argued that AUSFTA has had a negative impact on Australia’s trade relations with Asia, if not otherwise at least through sending a negative message to trade partners in East Asia about Australia’s priorities.\(^ {899}\)

The economic benefits from increased access to the regional markets, on the other hand, would primarily derive from the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, restrictions on investment and from services trade. Currently Australian companies face a range of trade and investment restrictions in ASEAN markets, in services sectors in particular, and tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, investment, services and labour are still in place.\(^ {900}\) In many cases Australian firms and investors face stringent foreign equity limits, employment restrictions, requirements for joint ventures, restrictions for foreigners from practising professions, non-recognition of Australian qualifications and bans on land ownership by foreigners.\(^ {901}\) Also, in addition to trade in goods, services trade is increasingly important. Currently in services trade sense ASEAN still consists of ten separate markets, whereas deeper integration with the development of ASEAN Economic Community would create one regional market, in which Australia’s inclusion could

\(^ {897}\) Petri (2007), p. 10  
\(^ {898}\) Ravenhill (2007), p. 206  
\(^ {899}\) Ravenhill (2007), p. 207  
\(^ {900}\) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2006), ASEAN Building an Economic Community, East Asia Analytical Unit, p. 70  
\(^ {901}\) Op.cit. p. 81
produce significant gains in these sectors. Centre for International Economics estimated in its report in 2000 that AFTA-CER FTA (AANZFTA) would create gains equal to 0.27% of the combined GDP (US$ 25.6 billion) for ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) countries by 2010 and 0.25% of GDP (US$ 19.1 billion) for Australia and New Zealand, as well as additional capital inflows worth of US$ 7.7 billion in the same period.\(^{902}\) In comparison a broader East Asian Summit based FTA would boost Australia’s annual GDP by an estimated 1.4%.\(^{903}\)

Within the broader context of the debate and estimating the costs and benefits from Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) one of the most basic topics of contention is over the efficiency of RTAs in comparison to multilateral trade liberalisation in general.\(^{904}\) The critics argue that RTAs have sidelined global trade liberalization in East Asia and questioned whether such agreements facilitate global trade and genuinely produce benefits to the economies participating and their trading partners more efficiently than liberalised multilateral trade. Ultimately, however, the cost-benefit balance of such agreements depends on whether the agreements predominantly result into trade creation or trade diversion.\(^{905}\) According to some economists this depends on whether the participating countries are “natural trading partners” or not. The argument is that Preferential Trading Agreements (PTAs) consisting of “natural trading partners” are more likely to be predominantly trade creating. The geographic distance makes particular difference when trade volumes are high, as geographically distant partners pay higher transportation costs, which diverts trade from comparatively lower cost trade partners that are geographically closer. Natural

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902 Davis, Lee, Warwick McKibbin and Andrew Stoeckel (2000), Economic benefits from an AFTA-CER free trade area, Centre for International Economics, Canberra, pp. 22-24


904 RTAs are Preferential Trading Agreements (PTA) that tend to discriminate against parties external to the agreement by posing common tariffs towards external trading partners

905 Lee, Jong-Wha and Shin, Kwanho (2006), Does Regionalism lead to more global trade integration in East Asia?”, *North American Journal of Economics and Finance*, Issue 17, p. 284 (pp. 283-301)
trading partners often also share a land border and a common language. However, even if trade increases between member countries following a formation of a RTA, it does not necessarily mean this is because the RTA has enhanced the efficiency of bilateral trade between RTA partners. Moreover, trade creation can increase at the expense of decrease in imports from trading partners not party to the RTA, creating essentially a form of an opportunity cost through trade diversion.

Using a gravity model, data from 175 countries between 1948 and 1999 and examining 17 RTAs in their research Lee and Shin (2006) suggest that if the RTA partner are natural trading partners the effects would be primarily trade creating and would not divert trade from other trading partners. Based on the above criteria Lee and Shin (2006) conclude that East Asian economies are indeed natural trading partners. The crucial question in the context of this research, however, is whether Australia and East Asian countries are natural trading partners? Historically Australia’s trade and investment was linked to the Commonwealth, in particular the United Kingdom until it joined the EEC, and the United States, supporting an argument that a cultural divide existed in Australia’s external trade. More recently, however, the direction of Australia’s external trade has taken a major turn towards East Asia to the extent that in 2007 two-thirds of its total foreign trade was with East Asia and the region accounts for approximately 60% of Australia’s total exports. Consequently, it can with a fair amount of confidence be argued that currently there is no cultural divide in trade in Australia’s external trade. In terms of geographical distance, however, a particular characteristic of Australia is that it is quite remote from most of its current and potential trade partners, whilst only the Pacific Islands, Indonesia and New Zealand are relatively close. On the other hand it is even more removed from culturally similar countries: the United States, United Kingdom and Europe, New Zealand being the only exception to the rule. Consequently, in relative terms Australia is closer to the East Asian markets than its “traditional” markets in Europe and North America, making trade with East Asia relatively more efficient that with those markets, despite the fact that Australia has no land border with its partners. Moreover,
the composition of Australia’s economy and trade is focused towards raw materials, e.g. aluminium, copper, crude petroleum, gold and dairy products, products that are in high demand in East Asia and for which Australia is a natural supplier.

In conclusion, the choice between bilateral versus multilateral approaches to manage economic relations with the region is not as yet entirely clear. The bilateral approach has been a logical path to follow in the situation where no regional arrangement that covers the whole East Asia is in effect and where East Asian trading partners have been implementing bilateral FTAs with each other and external trading partners. As John Ravenhill has commented, what choice did Australia really have under these circumstances? Moreover, the web of bilateral FTAs that Australia has negotiated, or is in the process of doing so, will soon cover most of the region and most of Australia’s major trading partners in the region. Why would Australia then choose to change direction and seek multilateral solutions instead of merely extending the web of bilateral FTAs?

One potential consideration is that the bilateral strategy will most likely run its course due to the cost of maintaining such a web of agreements, in comparison to maintaining one regional agreement that has also has a wider coverage of trade partners and sectors. Moreover, the web of bilateral FTAs will most likely lose its utility in not so distant future and may not be required for much longer. Taking into consideration that ASEAN is negotiating a number of “plurilateral” FTAs with major East Asian partners and India (AFTA-India by 2008, AFTA – China by 2010 and AFTA – Japan by 2012) the formation of AANZFTA would in practical terms link Australia into much more coherent regional infrastructure than what exists now. In such environment some of the bilateral FTAs will become unnecessary as a regional agreement would most likely produce improved benefits from “deeper integration” to issues such as investment and intellectual property. Moreover, when the East Asian Free Trade Area becomes in effect the benefits will surely surpass those of bilateral agreements.

909 Ravenhill (2007), p. 207
In terms of the risks involved with signing up to a regional agreement, the critical question would be whether doing so would endanger trade relations with external trading partners, e.g. the United States and the European Union? Currently it would seem that such a risk is quite remote as the planned regional agreements pledge to follow the principles of “open Regionalism”, and are thus supportive of multilateral trade liberalisation, yet another benefit in comparison to bilateral FTAs.

**Political and Security Costs and Benefits**

Estimating the costs and benefits for Australia from closer political integration with the region is harder and less precise than in Turkey’s case, simply due to the fact that it involves a greater amount of speculation, in particular considering the fact that the regional architecture is less rigid and still evolving. The reality is that regional institutions in East Asia are very different from their European counterparts. In fact, East Asian regional infrastructure does not even aim at creating European style deep integration that would require institutions such as the European Commission or the European Parliament. Consequently the existing and planned institutions in East Asia are in fact not political at all but rather “soft” informal institutions that are designed to facilitate voluntary cooperation and at the most coordination of efforts. Moreover, decision-making is based on consultation and consensus (*mushawara* and *mufakat*) instead of formalised procedures and complicated voting rules. The existing secretariats, both in ASEAN and APEC, are small and perform the role of a coordination office rather than that of a regional rule-making and enforcing bureaucracy. Finally, in terms of security there is no equivalent to NATO, and consequently no unified military command to facilitate joint deployment of national forces in regional operations or operations conducted in cooperation with regional partners outside the region. Correspondingly there is no regional foreign and security policy but the political and security architecture in East Asia is rather composed of a number of separate alliances that divides major regional states. Consequently the region is characterised by lack of coherence and even animosity between major regional powers. Regional institutions, such as the ARF and ATP in particular, however, are already useful initiatives and hold great promise of developing political and security cohesion and interdependency in the region as a whole. In conclusion, a similar cost-benefit calculation to the Turkey – EU case in this area is not possible. Instead, estimating
the security and political gains and the associated cost for Australia involves a great deal of speculation.

What is clear is that the outdated Cold War alliance arrangements such as the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) and attitudes of paternalism and patronage are simply not adequate any longer. Moreover, ANZUS, whilst still important to Australia’s strategic interests, can potentially draw Australia once again into regional conflicts in opposing side to its major regional partner – China. On the contrary, the fact of the matter is that Australia gains little from playing the role of a US “deputy sheriff” and it is detrimental to the security and stability in Australia’s near region in Southeast Asia and potentially also in Northeast Asia. Moreover, it is possible to argue that there is no viable military solution to the ”arc of instability” problem and that rather stability needs to be created through other means and in close cooperation with regional partners. Whilst bilateralism can be a useful vehicle towards creating a base for regional cooperation and serves as an adequate short- to medium-term solution, it is running its course as a useful strategy as Regionalism advances in East Asia. Consequently, in the long-term integrating into a regional approach based on shared security interests and interdependency rather than relying on short-term bilateral and “flying solo” through the means of unilateral intervention, would probably serve Australia’s strategic interests better. This applies in particular to pacifying regional hot spots such as the “South China Sea triangle” where tri-party China, Japan and the United States dominated approach could really get Australia into grave trouble, in particular taking into account that China is one of the major recipients of Australian exports. Consequently Australia’s strategic policy making should aim towards advancing deeper regional integration based on deeper interdependency not just in economics, but in political and security realms as well. This would create a strategic environment with less security and defence concerns and more stability.

In order to maximise the benefits from regional multilateral security cooperation, besides continuing with active participation in the ARF, Australia should support East Asian Community and both instigate and influence the establishment of a regional code of conduct in East Asia in the lines of TAC. It should also seek to address the ”arc of instability” together with ASEAN, China, Japan and New Zealand, assuming a leading role in bringing an end to the “arc”. Moreover, the objective of Australia’s security and foreign policy in the region should be moulding
the evolution of the regional multilateral security cooperation, if not towards a common foreign and security policy, then at least through strengthening the ARF and supporting a code of conduct that would rule out the use of force in regional disputes, perhaps evolving into an East Asian OSCE.

Hence, the evolving regional architecture represents not a problem but instead a rare opportunity to influence the shape of regional institutions, community building and principles of regional decision-making. However, this can only be achieved if Australia is fully integrated into the regional institutional structure as a fully fledged regional power. Kevin Rudd’s Asia Pacific community (APc) proposal is a good example of this, albeit also carries the risk of being seen as an attempt by Australia to define the region to suit its interests, rather than doing so for the common good.

As for the potential costs that deeper involvement in regional political and security integration could incur, the most plausible and serious would be any adverse impact on the Australia-US alliance. Recognising that the United States plays a major role in the region as the only global hegemony and has an instrumental role in maintaining stability in the region, especially in Northeast Asia, ANZUS is still of paramount importance to Australia. Assuming a more independent role in the region would benefit Australia in gaining independent credibility in the eyes of the regional states, which would be required for accommodating closer integration to the region, but it could also have an adverse impact on Australia – US alliance by threatening the credibility of Australia’s commitment to its ANZUS obligations. However, given the paramount importance of the region and regional stability to Australia, it could be argued that it would be worth the risk. Finally, securing Australia’s inclusion in ASEM would solidify its position as a regional state, as it would signal a formal acceptance of Australia as an East Asian state by both the regional states and the outside world. In fact this could benefit Australia by improving its position towards two regions, not only East Asia but also Europe through inclusion in inter-regional policy-making, potentially cementing Australia’s negotiation position towards the European Union in multilateral discussions.
6.6 Conclusion: Strengths and Weaknesses of Rationalist Approaches

As this chapter has established, Australia does indeed enjoy high levels of material interdependence with East Asia. The region as a collective is by far the most important trading partner for Australia accounting for two-thirds of Australia’s total external trade. The regional states on the other hand require the abundant natural resources that Australia offers for their continuous economic growth. Australia not only has the goods in demand, but also is a natural trading partner for East Asian states. Hence, although not a particularly important export destination for East Asian states, a sense of deep economic interdependence prevails between Australia and East Asia.

The same sense of interdependence also applies to regional security. Australia’s security is highly dependent on regional stability in East Asia and Australia is largely a respected partner in regional security cooperation. Consequently the region has played a central role in Australia’s strategic decision-making, resulting into active multi- and bilateral security cooperation with East Asian states. Australia has also contributed in regional institution building and played an instrumental role in the establishment of regional institutions, e.g. APEC and the ARF. The security agreement between Indonesia and Australia and the fact that two fundamentally different societies choose to cooperate also in sensitive areas of security and defence supports the credibility of a rational approach to international relations and the Howard government’s notion of ”pragmatic Regionalism”.

The conclusion of this chapter is thus that Australia not only has extensive levels of material interdependence with East Asia, but it has also played an active, even a pioneering role in regional institution building. Moreover, the benefits of further integration into the region would appear to override the costs, for both Australia and East Asia, albeit predicting what the costs and benefits from enlargement and deeper integration are always somewhat speculative. Nonetheless, a Rationalist analysis would support Australia’s inclusion into the region beyond the extent that

is the case currently, and certainly does not reveal any significant reasons for excluding Australia from regional institutions. Yet, it has been established that Australia has encountered significant opposition to its inclusion in regional institutions and cooperation by a number of regional countries, but in particular by Malaysia and Indonesia. Some of this opposition can be explained by political differences and conflicting strategic interests between Australia and the two neighbours, but a significant amount of this opposition has also been openly culturally and ethnically motivated, claiming that Australia is not an Asian country and thus is ethnically unfit to be “genuinely of region”. It would thus appear that the “Rationalist” approaches serve well for establishing the motives for inclusion, but that “Ideational” approaches may serve better for revealing the motives for exclusion.
Chapter 7: Ideational Analysis of Australia – East Asia Relations

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Since European settlement Australia has experienced a tension between its European origins and its geographical position.\(^{911}\)

As the previous chapter demonstrated, much like Turkey, Australia has deep and extensive economic, political and security interests in the neighbouring East Asian region. Both also participate in regional institutions and have a status of a “strategic partner. In Australia’s case this is undeniable: 2/3 of Australia’s trade is with the region, it is clearly dependent on the region in terms of its national security and it has been an active partner to and member in regional institutions, for instance becoming ASEAN’s first Dialogue Partner in 1974, was one of the founding members of the ASEAN Regional Forum, was a founding member of APEC and was accepted as a member of the East Asia Summit in 2005. Clearly both have a special relationship with their respective regions\(^{912}\) that profoundly differentiates them from states external to the region. Yet, in Turkey’s case formal membership application has been met with considerable opposition, whilst Australia has not submitted any such application, but has nonetheless faced significant opposition towards its attempts to acquire recognition as a genuine member of the region through a program of “comprehensive engagement” Moreover, the main argument being used against their inclusion is Ideational; that they are not “genuinely of region”. In Australia’s case this has meant that it has been recognised as a valuable partner, but not as a genuinely regional state for reasons of not being “Asian”.

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The relationship with Asia has also been problematic for Australia domestically, caught in a proverbial crossfire in a search for a unique Australian identity, a process that has been a balancing act between its geographical position in the periphery of Asia and its British and European cultural heritage. From the 1980s onwards, however, the Asia Pacific region has been a focus area, indeed in the 1990s the primary focus area, of Australian foreign and trade policy, motivated by the "East Asian ascendancy" and the widely accepted notion that Australia’s economic future was dependent on its relationship with Asia. Consequently, the Hawke and Keating Labour governments in particular made "comprehensive engagement" with the region their first priority. The Liberal-National Party coalition government under the leadership of John Howard (1996-2007), however, was widely criticised for sacrificing Australia’s relationship with Asia for the sake of an ever closer alliance with the United States. Howard maintained that Australia does not have to choose between its geography and history that its alliance with the United States did not come at a cost of its relations with Asia. The Howard government also insisted that Australian identity and values and national interest were the primary drivers for foreign and trade policy and bilateralism the primary strategy for maximizing Australia’s national interests. Consequently, the Howard government’s position towards East Asian Regionalism was that Australia would have a role in "pragmatic Regionalism" built around advancing shared interests, but not in "emotional Regionalism" built around regional identity, culture and values. Yet, the Howard government, whilst widely considered as even hostile to Asia, secured membership in the East Asia Summit thus gaining access to emerging East Asian Regionalism, a paradox that Michael Wesley has called the Howard Paradox”.

The objective of this chapter is to provide an Ideational analysis of Australia’s engagement with the region and the challenges for its inclusion in East Asia. The analysis thus covers topics such as cognitive mapping, which has involved cultural geography, geopolitical positioning and cognitive mapping by regional states.

In cultural terms Australia meets the definition of a "borderline state". Whilst an immigrant country by origin and nature, immigration was dominated by British and European settlers until the 1970s when Australia ended its racially based immigration program under the “White Australia policy”. Nonetheless, regardless of increased Asian immigration and multiculturalism since, Australia still remains overwhelmingly European and Christian in terms of heritage,
ethnicity and culture. Moreover, due to anti-immigration debate created by the Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party phenomena and the allegedly racially motivated attacks against Asian students more recently, the image of “White Australia” has persisted in the region, contributing towards the resistance for Australia’s inclusion in the region. Finally, the Howard government was accused of sacrificing Australia’s relations with Asia with the focus on its alliance with the United States and rapidly earning a reputation of the “US Deputy Sheriff” in the region.

Other central topics in this chapter include the analysis of the relevance of immigration, people-to-people contacts, education, identity and values and Regionalism discourses in East Asia and Australia. Education, for instance, in addition to immigration and increasing people-to-people contacts, has been often referred to as one of the major vehicles for increasing Australia’s regionness, in particular through increasing Asian students studying and living in Australia. Governments have also promoted making Australia an “Asian literate” due to seeing it as a competitive advantage. Yet another significant factor in terms of Australia’s engagement with the region has been the issue of Australian values and identity. Whilst the “Asian values” debate has been somewhat controversial, heavily contested and subject to considerable over generalisation, it has nonetheless been used as an argument against Australia’s regionness. However, this chapter also considers the differences in political cultures as a potentially more significant challenge than the questions over identity and values. Finally, the chapter will conclude with an analysis of Regionalism discourses in East Asia and Australia in order to determine whether Australia is perceived as a regional state. In terms of Australian discourses, the chapter argues that support for Regionalism in Australia is high, but a battle in approaches (Rationalist versus Ideational) is evident in the context of "comprehensive engagement” and “pragmatic Regionalism” discourses.

7.2 “Cognitive Mapping” of East Asia: Is there space for Australia?

“Rarely can any region be understood as delimited by simple geographic or political lines on a map. Instead, regions are fluid and complex mixtures of physical,
psychological, and behavioural traits continually being re-created and re-defined”913

“The outer boundaries of any “East Asian” region have been fuzzy”....Because they are on the periphery, the republics of central Asia, Mongolia, the DPRK, Myanmar, Australia and New Zealand are periodically “in” but just as often “out” of East Asian institutions and networks”914

As stated in Chapter 2: Regionalism in International Relations Theory, there are no natural regions. In this regard East Asia is no exception; definitions of East Asia are numerous, and continue to be contested.915 Perhaps the most imprecise, but also one of the most common, definitions of “East Asia” is that it is the geographical area “south of China and east of India”. Another similar, but even more imprecise definition is that “East Asia” is “larger than Southeast Asia but smaller than all of Asia”.916 The problem with definitions such as these is that they are so vague that they leave massive room for interpretation and political manipulation. In particular, such definitions are problematic to countries such as Australia, India, Russia and New Zealand, all which have expressed interest in being treated as regional countries.917 As a consequence of this vagueness these countries are sometimes treated as being part of the region and at other times are not. In many ways this ambiguity is a reflection of the fact that East Asia lacks a single unifying regional architecture and consequently the geographical definition is adapted based on the focus and intensity of cooperation. As a Japanese scholar has suggested the geographical definitions are so varied and weak in justification that East Asia in practice” is more a functional

914 Pempel (2005), p. 265
915 Pempel (2005), p. 25
916 The definition of East Asia adopted here is the one used by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) that East Asia consists of North Asia (China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan) and Southeast Asia, comprising the ASEAN-10 (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) and East Timor.
917 Pempel (2005), p. 26
concept than a geographical one...its geographical scope may be expanded or narrowed, depending upon the intensity of interactions in a specific issue area”.

Map: CIA World Book

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For East Asian region-building purposes, in their current form and function, the three most vigorously competing definitions are aligned with or based on either 1) ASEAN Plus Three (ATP), comprising the ten ASEAN member states and China, Japan and South Korea, or 2) ASEAN +6, which also includes Australia, India and New Zealand. These two, however, are mainly focused on economic cooperation aspects of Regionalism and to a degree ignore the third relevant aspect of regional security. Should regional security aspects influence the definition, it becomes increasingly problematic to exclude the United States. The third definition is that of “Asia-Pacific”, which is institutionalised in APEC and covers North and South American Pacific Basin countries in addition to East Asia and Oceania.

The Pacific Basin countries, however, are not members in the East Asia Summit and thus “Asia-Pacific” is beyond the scope of the emerging East Asian Community.

As Alison Broinowski has stated: "in the cognitive mapping process of these Asian societies, Australia has long been constructed as either absent, unknown or distant." Such “othering” has often resulted into a complete denial of Australia’s geographic position in the region. Prime Minister Mahathir for instance has stated that geographically “Australia forms a continent on its own” and later in 2004 that "I don’t know whether Australia is Asia, but it may change the geography. Actually they are Europeans, they cannot be Asians" The same sentiment has been echoed also by other Malaysian officials. For instance, Malaysia’s foreign minister commented

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919 the ASEAN Regional Forum is supra-regional in a sense that includes extra-regional states and entities, such as the United States and the European Union

920 Pempel (2005), p. 26

921 "Asia-Pacific" is generally considered to comprise East Asia and the Pacific Rim countries. In Japanese academia the common notion has been that the “Pacific” is code for the liberal countries of the Pacific Rim, specifically Australia, United States and New Zealand

922 Broinowski, Alison (2003), About Face: Asian Accounts of Australia, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, p. 41

923 Broinowski (2003), p. 35

on Gareth Evans’ “East Asian Hemisphere” map in 1995 by stating that ”if I look at a map I will immediately say that Australia is not part of Asia”.925

On the other hand, at times Australia is considered as being geographically located in Asia, but is not “of” Asia.926 For instance within the context of the Japanese WWII concept of ”Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere” Australia was considered as a valuable treasure house of natural resources required for its war efforts and its vision, and which by right belonged to the Asian people, due to its location in the periphery of Asia.927

The implication to Australia of such a “cognitive mapping” process in East Asian Regionalism has been that Australia’s position is in a constant state of flux where it sometimes is the ”odd man in” and other times the “significant other”. The general statement about Australia’s place in the region tends to be along the lines of ”Australia should belong in Asia but Australians do not qualify.” 928


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925 Speech by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans to CEDA Asian Region International Association of Cooperating Organisations (ARIACO) Roundtable, Melbourne, 11 September 1995


927 Broinowski (2003), p. 41

928 Broinowski (2003), p. 33
The most common geographical definitions for Australia’s location are *Australasia* and *Oceania*. According to the Webster online dictionary, *Australasia* refers to “Australia, New Zealand and the neighbouring islands in the South Pacific” and *Oceania* to “A large group of islands in the south Pacific including Melanesia and Micronesia and Polynesia (and sometimes Australasia and the Malay Archipelago).”

929 Webster Online Dictionary
According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) East Asia comprises Northeast and Southeast Asia, and consequently excludes Australia. However, Australia’s ‘regionness’ in Australia has in the past been occasionally argued in geographical terms, whilst the region is increasingly defined in terms of culture and identity. The most radical attempt to ‘write’ Australia into the region was by the former Hawke and Keating governments’ Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, who invented Australia as ‘an East Asian Hemisphere nation’. Evan’s argument that Australia is geographically part of the ”East Asian Hemisphere” and shares the time zone with East Asia, makes it a fully fledged member of the region,\textsuperscript{930} did not receive particularly wide support from regional leaders. Speaking to ASEAN leaders at the ASEAN PMC 7+1 in August 1995 Evans argued Australia’s place in East Asia in the context of East Asian Hemisphere by stating that:

\begin{quote}
"The second relevant concept is that of the "East Asian hemisphere". We are all familiar with the expression "American Hemisphere" or "Western Hemisphere" to describe North and South America together, even though these continents do not stretch literally half way around the globe: the segment of the earth's sphere stretching from longitudes west of China to east of New Zealand is a similarly large slice of the globe. And there are similarly strong ties binding Australia together with North and Southeast Asia, notwithstanding all the obvious differences between our various countries."
\end{quote}

Australia has also been described as a “South Asian country”, “Pacific Ocean country”, “Pacific country in the East Asian region”, “Southern Asian continent”\textsuperscript{932}, as well as part of an ”Asiatic Mediterranean”, “part of Asia”, ”an Asian country” and finally, a country forming ”a bridge to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{930} Wesley (1997), p. 532
\item \textsuperscript{931} Statement by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans to ASEAN PMC 7+1, Bandar Seri Bagawan, 2 August 1995, http://www.aseansec.org/4377.htm, Date accessed: 4.6.2009
\item \textsuperscript{932} Broinowski (2003), pp. 72-74
\end{itemize}
Asia”. Most commonly, however, Australia has referred itself to as “an Asia-Pacific country”, perhaps because "Asia-Pacific” appears to be more marketable in Australia and Asia than the somewhat artificial "East Asian Hemisphere country”. Finally, the Howard government, critical of the efforts to redefine Australia’s place in the region, declared an end to the process of self-examination about the perceived dichotomy between the country’s geographical location and its identity in 1997 by stating that ”Australia does not need to choose between its history and its geography.”

How should Australia define itself in relation to the region? If Australia was inhabited by Asians, its inclusion in the region would hardly be contested in the first place. Consequently, as Stephen FitzGerald observed in 1997 "Australia should not define the region, the region should define it”, or alternatively Alison Broinowski formulated the same argument “it is the region that will define us, not us it”. One possible way of facilitating a positive notion in the region in relation to Australia’s place in it is through genuine and extensive participation in regional cooperation. As the previous chapter demonstrated Australia has managed to establish a reasonable track-record in this regard. The other option is, in the spirit of the “comprehensive engagement” program, to create a sense of belonging through utilising the multicultural nature of the Australian society as an argument towards regionness, as well as the active people-to-people contacts, education and Australia’s Asia literacy as sources of convergence. The following sections will examine the main elements of such “comprehensive engagement” and their impact on Australia’s regionness.

933 Broinowski (2003), p. 219
934 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1997), In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy, White Paper, Canberra, p. iv
935 Broinowski (2003), p. 219
7.3 Immigration, Multiculturalism and Ethnicity

It has been said that out of all the factors involved immigration is the one that has had the most profound impact on “engagement”. The impact of immigration and the emergence of multiculturalism policy have indeed had a significant impact on the ethnic and cultural make-up of the country, essentially transforming Australia from what still in the 1970s could have been described as predominantly “white, protestant and British”, to a country with one of the largest immigrant populations in the world with approximately 24% of the total population having born overseas and hailing to over 100 ethnic backgrounds. Moreover, the proportion of the Asian population has steadily grown from 276,000 in 1981 to well over a million in 2000 comprising approximately 6% of the total population, making it proportionally one of the largest Asian-born migrant populations in the world, although greater numbers of people who were born in Asia are found in countries such as the USA and Canada. Whilst the main driver for their share of the total population has been immigration, Asian-born Australians are also demographically one of the most rapidly growing ethnic groups in Australia. Nonetheless, the ethnic “Asianness” of Australia is still quite far from Mahathir’s benchmark of “perhaps at least 75% Asian”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Of total population</th>
<th>Of immigrant population</th>
<th>Total Asian-born '000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>1077.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>1562.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>117.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Australian Bureau of Statistics (2007), ABS 1301.0 Yearbook Australia 2007, Canberra


ABS 4102.0 p. 6
The Problem of the ‘Borderline States’ in Regionalism

### Country Of total population Of immigrant population Total Asian-born '000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Of total population</th>
<th>Of immigrant population</th>
<th>Total Asian-born '000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>4979.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>490.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>227.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>225.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ABS4102.0 Australian Social Trends 2001

History of Immigration to Australia: Policy of Isolation from 1880s to 1960s

Australia, in its modern form, is essentially a product of waves of settlers. The influx of settlers has moulded the society, culture and economy of Australia since the founding of the colonies, but in particular since at the end of World War II, when Australia’s population was still around only 7 million and 90% of the inhabitants were born in Australia. Since the beginning of mass immigration programs from 1945 onwards 6.8 million new settlers have arrived and the country’s population has multiplied to over 21 million, transforming Australian society and culture radically. Consequently, modern Australia is a multicultural settler society on par with the United States and Canada with almost a quarter of its population having been born overseas.

The Discovery of a Nation: Convicts and Free Settlers

Prior to the arrival of European settlers, Australia was inhabited by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, who arrived approximately 40,000 to 50,000 years ago via the islands of the Malay Archipelago and New Guinea. European settlement in Australia began soon after 1770

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when Captain James Cook arrived and claimed Australia for the British Crown. The first settlers from Britain, approximately 1500 people, half of them convicts, arrived in Sydney Harbour on 26 January 1788 on board the 11 ships of the First Fleet. More convicts and free migrants, altogether 160 000 men and women, arrived between 1788 and 1868 in the duration of the penal transportation program, almost exclusively from the British Isles.\(^{941}\)

Following the penal transportation program the convicts were rapidly replaced by free settlers and Australia increasingly earned an image as a land of opportunity. The social upheavals of industrialisation in Britain further motivated settlers to seek better life in Australia. The Gold Rush of 1851 to 1860 was also a major driver for migration and produced the peak in settler arrivals, up to 50,000 per year. Significantly, the Gold Rush also altered the ethnic composition of settler arrivals, albeit temporarily, making Chinese immigrants the largest ethnic group after the British.\(^{942}\)

With the exception of the Gold Rush era, however, majority of settlers prior to 1960s had a European background. The convicts, who represented a bulk of the early settlers to Australia, were almost exclusively from the British Isles followed by free settlers who were largely British, arriving as part of the official assisted immigration programs from 1831 to 1982. Moreover, from 1880s to 1970s Australia adhered to a policy that deliberately isolated itself from the geographical region surrounding it, motivated by theories and ideology of racial superiority.

**The White Australia Era**

This ideology of racial supremacy lead into the creation of the *Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act of 1901*, popularly known as ”the White Australia Policy”, soon after the creation of the Federation. The “While Australia Policy” was specifically intended to protect Australia

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from non-European immigration, and specifically towards restricting Asian immigration motivated by the growing presence of Chinese workers in the gold fields. Its ultimate aim was creating an ethnically homogenous society: white, protestant and British. The Aboriginal population was expected to die out relatively fast paving way for this vision. As a consequence of these laws non-European population was barred from obtaining citizenship, own property and practice certain occupations. Moreover, these laws were allegedly specifically targeted against Chinese Australians. The racial justification of excluding non-European races from migrating to Australia was based on concerns over social harmony and the inability of non-European migrants to integrate into Australian society. The Deputy Prime Minister Alfred Deakin vocalised this sentiment by stating that Australians and non-Europeans were divided by a “gulf which we cannot bridge”, and that they "do not and cannot blend with us, we do not, cannot and ought not to blend with them". The first minister for immigration - Alfred Caldwell – mirrored this spirit by declaring that for each “foreigner” (signifying non-British) at least ten British migrants would be "recruited". As a consequence of the “White Australia Policy”, Australia remained almost exclusively British and Irish until 1947, although the “Nordic cousins” - Germans and Scandinavians – were also favoured from 1870s to 1914, and then subsequently almost exclusively European until well into the 1970s.

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945 Australians were British subjects until the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, which created a separate Australian citizenship. In theory the new act applied to the indigenous Australians as well, but in practice they were offered citizenship only on selected basis. In the May 27, 1967 referendum Australians overwhelmingly voted to finally grant indigenous Australians citizenship rights in their own country.


948 Ibid

Following the Second World War the policy towards immigration started changing somewhat, albeit slowly. The prevailing immigration policy, however, was not welcoming towards Asian migrants. The Japanese interned during the war were deported soon after and war refugees returned home to various parts of Asia. Moreover, Japanese and other Asian brides of Australian servicemen were treated a cold shoulder by immigration officials and effectively barred from entry until 1952.\footnote{Jupp (1995), p. 209}

One of the most drastic changes after the Second World War, however, was the significant downturn in British immigration to Australia. Yet the prevailing feeling amongst Australian policy-makers was a conviction of “populate or perish”; that the country relied on steady influx of settlers for its economic success and security and that its economic transformation from an agrarian economy with only small-scale industry to a modern industrial economy with emphasis on heavy industries required a large-scale skilled migrants program. Consequently, in order to maintain adequate inflows, mass migration programs were launched in 1947 targeting especially non-English speaking Europeans to compensate the downturn in British immigration. As a result of these programs Australia accepted a growing number of refugees and displaced persons from war-torn Europe, totalling 200,000 already by 1950.\footnote{Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2008), “Fact Sheet 4 - More than 60 Years of Post-war Migration”, \url{http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/04fifty.htm}, Date accessed: 15.1.2009} In total more than two million Europeans moved to Australia in the two decades following WWII. Significantly, a great number of these migrants were not British, but a significant amount of other Europeans and in particular Dutch, German, Italian, Greek, Turkish and Yugoslavian migrants were received during the 1950s and 1960s.\footnote{Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2008), “Fact Sheet 4 - More than 60 Years of Post-war Migration”, \url{http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/04fifty.htm}, Date accessed: 15.1.2009} Whilst the purpose of the mass immigration programs was largely to maintain the European outlook of Australia, it was soon noticed that the new migrants were nonetheless culturally different and that “assimilation” of non-British migrants into Anglo-Australians was
not realistic. Consequently, it was realised that if the ethnic homogeneity of the country could not be maintained, cultural homogeneity should be the new objective.\textsuperscript{953}

In terms of Asian migration, the only significant development in the period immediately following the World War II was the establishment of the Colombo Plan of 1951, within which context government sponsored Asian students, mainly from Malaya and Singapore, were admitted on temporary basis to study in Australia.\textsuperscript{954} In general, only selected business, educational and distinguished visitors were allowed temporary entry and these were few in numbers. Consequently, whilst the “White Australia Policy” mostly did its job in keeping Australia “White, Protestant and British” it also effectively isolated Australia from the increasingly economically vibrant region surrounding it.

\textit{From abolition of the White Australia Policy to Asian Influx}

During the 1960s and 1970s the “White Australia Policy” had run its course and was abolished as a result of this. Externally, the political elite held concerns over the “White Australia Policy” causing an international backlash from the UN and regional states. These concerns were emphasised following the 1961 UN “Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and when South Africa was forced to withdraw from the Commonwealth due to its Apartheid policy the same year.\textsuperscript{955} Consequent to this external pressure and the policy losing its support domestically, the state and federal laws were gradually revised towards banning racial discrimination, beginning with the South Australian Act of 1966. The reform of state laws was soon followed by changes in policy when the Cabinet decided in October 1967 to admit ”well qualified” non-Europeans as permanent residents on equal basis, resulting into 5000 such persons being admitted already by the end of the year.\textsuperscript{956} Finally, the Whitlam government abolished the “White Australia Policy” officially in 1973, enacted the Racial Discrimination Act and

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{953} Jupp (1995), p. 209
\bibitem{954} Jupp (1995), pp. 208-9
\bibitem{955} Jordan (2006), p. 238
\bibitem{956} Jordan (2006), p.242
\end{thebibliography}
declared Australia to be a multicultural society, declaring that; ”as an island nation of predominantly European inhabitants situated on the edge of Asia, [Australia] cannot afford the stigma of racialism”\footnote{Quoted in Jordan (2006), p. 242}. The abolition of the “White Australia Policy”, however, created a much less direct impact on migrants from Asia than was thought and no mass exodus from Asia took place, despite the “floodgates” having been opened.\footnote{Quilty, Mary (2003), “Immigration and Multiculturalism”, in Edwards, Peter and David Goldsworthy (Eds.) , Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia – Volume 2: 1970s to 2000, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, p. 302}

The impact was nonetheless significant in the medium- to long-term, starting with an influx of refugees from Asia. Among the first to arrive were 1100 Indochinese refugees from 1975 onwards, primarily from Vietnam and Cambodia. Consequently, Vietnam and Cambodia became the main source countries of Asian immigrants already by 1977-78 and by the end of 1988 approximately 120 000 refugees from Indochina had permanently settled in Australia.\footnote{Quilty (2003), p. 303}

The rapid growth in Asian immigration continued and accelerated throughout the 1980s and 1990s, increasing by 30% in the period from 1983-84 to 1999-2000. In the peak years 1990-91 to 1991-92 Asian immigration increased by over 50%.\footnote{Quilty (2003), p. 305} The proportion of Asian-born immigrants of the total migrant arrivals also increased from 24% in 1981 to 34% in 1991.\footnote{ABS 4102.0 p. 3}

By 2000 the Asian population in Australia had multiplied to approximately one million Asian-born Australians, just over half of whom were born in Southeast Asia, slightly under one-third in Northeast Asia and one-fifth in Southern Asia. The most common countries of birth amongst Asian-born Australians were Vietnam (174, 400), China (168,100) and the Philippines (123,000), together comprising 43% of the total Asian-born population and 10% of the total overseas-born populations.\footnote{ABS 4102.0 p. 3}
Table 20. Growth of Asian-born Population

Source: ABS 3412.0 Migration, Australia 2006-07
Table 21. Permanent Population by Region of Birth in 2007

Source: Author’s adaptation from ABS 3412.0 Migration, Australia 2006-07

Not Quite Asian Yet – Ethnic Composition of Australia

Regardless of the relatively rapid growth in Asian immigration, Australia is still predominantly a European nation. Whilst the proportion of immigrants born in North-West Europe has declined from 8.2% in 1997 to 7.3% in 2007 and Southern and Eastern Europe for 4.8% in 1997 to 4.0% in 2007, immigrants born in the United Kingdom are still the largest single group accounting for 5.5% of Australia’s total population. Another growing group is immigrants born in New Zealand, who account for 2.2% of the total population. The remaining two of the top five are: China (1.3%), Italy (1.1%) and India (1.0%).

963 ABS Migration 34120 2006-07 pp. 47-48
Table 22. Place of Birth by Region 1997 – 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania and Antarctica (excl. Aust.)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-West Europe</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa and the Middle East</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-East Asia</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern and Central Asia</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ABS Migration 34120, p. 48

Table 23. Top 5 Countries of Birth at 30 June 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Birth</th>
<th>Estimated Number</th>
<th>% of Overseas-born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1 140 263</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>443 606</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (excl. SARS and Taiwan )</td>
<td>259 095</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>227 344</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>185 879</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2 837 233</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Overseas-born</td>
<td>5 093 420</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Migration Australia (ABS Cat 3412.0)

Also in terms of migrant arrivals Britain, Europe and New Zealand still remain high in number. Europe still accounts for 20.6% of immigrants and Oceania for 21.2% (primarily New Zealand).
Consequently immigration from Europe and Oceania accounts for 41.8% of the total in comparison to Asian immigration, which accounts for 41% of total immigration flows.  

**Ancestry, Religion and Language**

In terms of ancestry Australia is still predominantly Anglo-Australian. In the 2006 Census a total of 270 different ancestries were registered, with up to two self-reported ancestries allowed for each individual resident. Whilst the diversity of the Australian populace is thus obviously high, most commonly people reported various combinations of “Australian”, “English”, “Irish”, or another Anglo-Celtic-Australian ancestry. The most common ancestries in the Census were: Australian (37%), English (32%), Irish (9%), Scottish (8%), Italian (4%), German (4%) and Chinese (3%).

Diversity was also high in terms of languages spoken in Australian homes with over 200 “community languages” recognised by the government in the 2006 Census, in addition to the 60 or so languages spoken by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Australians. However, only a total of 16% of the population spoke another language than English at home, top six being Italian, Greek, Arabic, Cantonese, Mandarin and Vietnamese.

In terms of religion, Australia is clearly predominantly Christian, stemming from early settlers who brought their traditional Christian churches to Australia; Anglican Church, Methodist, Catholic, etc. In more recent waves migrants have also hailed to Muslim and Buddhist religious backgrounds, but nonetheless the dominance of the various Christian churches is still firmly secured; the 2006 Census reports that 63% of Australian’s consider themselves Christian (26% Catholic, 19% Anglican, 19% other Christian denominations), 6% had non-Christian religions.

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964 ABS Migration 34120
965 ABS 1301.0
966 ABS 1301.0
967 Australian Bureau of Statistics defines *religion* as “a set of beliefs and practices, usually involving acknowledgement of a divine or higher being of power, by which people order the conduct of their lives both practically and in a morale sense”.
and 31% had no religion. Non-Christian religions, however, exhibited strong growth with a 55% increase for Hinduism, 21% for Islam and 17% for Buddhism since the 2001 Census.\textsuperscript{968}

\textbf{The Emergence of Multiculturalism}

In the 1960s and the 1970s the death of “the White Australia Policy” produced a radical change in Australian immigration policy. The racial discrimination legislation in South Australia in 1966 and by the Commonwealth in 1975 paved way for emergence of multiculturalism as the dominant policy.\textsuperscript{969} In fact, already by 1966 all major political parties had removed “White Australia” from their platforms and by mid-1970s all of them had replaced it by multiculturalism.\textsuperscript{970} Moreover, multiculturalism rapidly became a universally accepted bipartisan national policy for the governments following the Whitlam Labour government (1972-75), which officially declared Australia as a multicultural country. The subsequent governments; the Fraser coalition government (1975-83), the Hawke Labour government (1983-91) and the Keating Labour government (1991-96), all had a strong commitment to multiculturalism, as well as institutionalised and strengthened its application in Australian society. The only significant exception was the Howard coalition government (1996-2007), which was clearly less enthusiastic supporter of multiculturalism and rather had the tendency to emphasise social cohesion that entailed integration of immigrants into society, and specifically the acceptance of Australian identity and values and English language as basis for national unity. The Howard government, however, never explicitly challenged multiculturalism or suggested it should be abandoned.

\textbf{Multiculturalism as a National Policy}

The evolution of multiculturalism as a national policy was moulded by a number of government strategy and white papers, starting with the 1977 white paper “Australia as a multicultural

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{968} ABS 1301.0
\item \textsuperscript{969} Jupp (2002), From White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration, Cambridge University Press, New York, p. 127
\item \textsuperscript{970} Jupp, (2002), p. 123
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
society”, followed by the “Galbally Report” of 1978, both of which emphasised the benefits of cultural heterogeneity, in comparison to the emphasis on cultural homogeneity that had been the standard line of thinking for the much of the country’s history. In order to further stimulate the newly found interest in multiculturalism as a major contributor to Australia’s future, based on the recommendations of the Galbally Report the government established “Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs (AIMA) in 1979, tasked to enable various cultural and ethnic groups to fully participate in the Australian society by raising awareness of cultural diversity and promoting social cohesion, tolerance and understanding.971

Multiculturalism was further strengthened from 1983 onwards by Bob Hawke, who as a strong advocate of ”consensus” politics wanted to include all parts of the society in nation building and declared Australia a nation of immigrants. In 1987 Hawke took matters a notch further and replaced AIMA with the Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA) in the Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to direct the national efforts to embed multiculturalism into the Australian society.972 After two years of contemplation and consultation in 1989 OMA produced the National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia,973 setting the short- and long-term objectives for strengthening multiculturalism, including e.g. community campaigns to promote, social cohesion, expansion of multicultural television and radio programming of the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), enhancing immigrant English language teaching and increasing efficiency in the recognition of overseas qualifications.974

The passing of the Hawke government and emergence of the Paul Keating was accompanied by not only an increase in the heterogeneity of the nation and increasing public endorsement of multicultural aspects of life, but multiculturalism also genuinely became a centre piece of government focus along with the “engagement” project. Keating firmly believed that multicultural-

971 Jupp (2002), p. 89
972 Quilty (2003), p. 308
974 National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia is available online: http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/multicultural/agenda/agenda89/executiv.htm
ism was essential for political and economic engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and scrupulously promoted the country’s multicultural credentials as an argument for joining the region and proclaiming Australia as a "multicultural country in Asia”. The Keating government also established a National Multicultural Advisory Council to review and update multicultural policies and introduced quotas for ethnic minorities in public services. In 1996 the Department of Immigration was restructured into the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMIA), producing both symbolic and practical changes in immigration and multiculturalism policies.

**The Backslash to Multiculturalism and Emergence of an Anti-Immigration Debate**

The first backslash to multiculturalism came about during the mid-1980s within the context of the “Blainey debate”. Professor Geoffrey Blainey, a respected historian and the author of *The Tyranny of Distance*, delivered a controversial speech in 1984, in which he criticised "disproportionate" immigration and called multiculturalism a “sham”, “anti-British” and threatening to break Australia into a ”cluster of tribes” if allowed to continue unchecked. Blainey was particularly distressed about what he saw as a denial of Australia’s British heritage, even going to the extent of lamenting that "the department of immigration and ethnic affairs could well be called the department of immigration and anti-British affairs". Given the centrality of British heritage in Australia’s history, its identity and culture, Blainey argued that the contemporary immigration policy was unwise, a claim he expanded upon in the book *All for Australia* in 1984.

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975 Quilty (2003), p. 310
976 Quilty (2003), p. 309
977 Blainey, Geoffrey (1968), The Tyranny of Distance: How distance shaped Australia’s history, Macmillan, Melbourne
The “Blainey debate” was followed by an outrage created by the then Liberal Party opposition leader John Howard in 1988 in a speech that quickly became infamous suggested that ‘Asianisation’ and ‘multiculturality’ were causing a “cultural identity crisis”, and that he might limit Asian immigration if elected into office. According to Howard “Australia made an error in abandoning its former policy of encouraging assimilation and integration in favour of multiculturalism”.  

Howard, however, accepted no blame for racism, clarifying that he did not oppose Asian immigration directly, or specifically, but did favour a more controlled form of immigration in order to maintain "social cohesion” in the country. The episode probably had an important role in Howard’s loss of leadership in 1989, indicating that political support for multiculturalism was still strong.

The third debate was sparked by the rise of One Nation party led by a Queensland fish and chips shop owner - Pauline Hanson – who had recently become a local council member for the Liberal Party in Ipswich in 1994. Encouraged by the success of her early political career Hanson ran in federal elections as a Liberal Party candidate in 1996, but her comments about Aborigines cost her party endorsement. Nonetheless, Hanson was technically elected as a Liberal Party representative, although as a consequence of her controversial comments she was shunned from Liberal Party parliamentary group and had to become an independent representative. The hour of Hanson’s notoriety in the national arena came in her maiden speech in the House of Representatives, where she infamously declared her fear that Australia was becoming “swamped by Asians” and suggested that immigration policy had to be reviewed and multiculturalism abandoned in favour of national unity.

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980 Quilty (2003), p. 318
982 Hanson wrongly asserted that 70% of immigrants were Asians and suggested a zero-net immigration policy that would entail admitting 30,000 immigrants a year. Hanson’s idea was that intake would not be discriminatory, as long as it would not significantly alter the cultural and ethnic make-up of the country. The official justifications for One Nation’s immigration policies were not racial, but based on concerns over the environmental, budgetary and unemployment impacts of rapid population growth though immigration. See: Jupp (1995), p. 132
983 Quilty (2003), p. 318
Whilst Hanson’s and her party’s support waned almost as quickly as it appeared, there was without a doubt a certain amount of social demand for an anti-immigration platform. In the 1996 Australian Electoral Survey, for instance, a total of 64% of respondents agreed with the statement that “immigration has gone too far”. Consequently it should not have been any surprise when Hanson’s One Nation party, a populist movement with demand among socially and economically marginalised Australians, especially in rural areas, in June 1998 captured 23 % in Queensland state elections. Moreover, whilst only four months later Hanson lost her House of Representatives seat and the popularity of her party proved equally short lived, it should be acknowledged that nonetheless approximately a million Australians voted for One Nation in federal elections in October 1998, capturing 8.4% of the total vote.

### 7.4 Australian versus Asian Values and Identity

One of the most common arguments against, as well as occasionally for, Australia’s regionness is the incompatibility (compatibility) of Australian values and identity in comparison to regional counterparts. This section will examine the development and character of Australian values and identity and contrast the findings with the analysis of the “Asian values” debate, which argued for the existence of universal East Asian values. Although the existence of such universal Asian values has been credibly contested a number of times, the debate has provided a significant base for the “othering” of Australia in the region, a process that continues today despite the disappearance of the Asian values debate.

**Development of Australian Nationalism and Identity**

Since its inception and up until the 1960s Australia considered itself as an inseparable part of a community of British peoples united by blood, history, language and tradition. Following

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985 Quilty (2003), p. 320

986 Curran (2002), p. 469
WWII, however, a gradual loss of “Britishness” started to root itself into Australian society, following Britain’s withdrawal from East of Suez from the 1960s onwards, but in particular by the downturn in British immigration and the growth of non-British immigration. By 1960s the change had become so profound that it in effect caused an identity crisis and eventually systematic building of a unique Australian nationhood. One of the staunchest advocators of a separate Australian nationhood was Whitlam who symbolically replaced “God Save the Queen” with “Advance Australia Fair” as the national anthem.\textsuperscript{987} There was, however, no significant push towards an independent nationhood and Whitlam favoured ”new nationalism”, which he positioned was healthy nationalism instead of divisive and dangerous nationalism.\textsuperscript{988} Fraser, also a critic of dangerous nationalism, praised Australia’s multiculturalism as a major achievement and saw it as a healthy source for a distinctive Australian culture. Hawke, a strong supporter of multiculturalism viewed Australia as a ”nation of immigrants”, where “Australianness” was not defined by ancestry alone. However, whilst Hawke supported the existence of a uniquely Australian identity, he also pledged gratitude to Britain for heritage that included important Australian institutions such as parliamentary democracy, rule of law and system of liberal education.\textsuperscript{989} Finally, although the Australia Act of 1986 formally removed the constitutional links with Britain, Hawke emphasised that this was not a declaration of independence and that the emotional bond with Britain remains strong regardless.\textsuperscript{990}

Whilst Whitlam, Fraser and Hawke had been principally against “aggressive nationalism”, Keating practically made it his platform.\textsuperscript{991} Having been deeply disappointed of the delays in the development of a unique Australian identity, Keating actively promoted Australian self-interest over British interests.\textsuperscript{992} The Keating era also consequently produced the high point of the Australian republican movement, which entailed proposals to cut the remaining links to Britain

\textsuperscript{987} Curran (2002), p. 475
\textsuperscript{988} Curran (2002), p. 477
\textsuperscript{989} Curran (2002), p. 481
\textsuperscript{990} Curran (2002), p. 481
\textsuperscript{991} Curran (2002), p. 482
\textsuperscript{992} Curran (2002), p. 485
by appointing a President as the head of state instead of the Queen, who is represented by the Governor-General, thus creating an independent nation on par with other Western parliamentary democracies. The ties to Britain, however, proved stronger than anticipated and the Australian republic was defeated in a referendum held in November 1999.

The government led by John Howard (1996-2007) resurrected a debate around Australian nationalism, but in particular in regards to Australian identity and values as unifying national forces. Howard had already as an opposition leader in 1995 criticised that Keating had “engaged in an attempted heist of Australian identity, lamenting that it was not the government’s business to promote national identity. Moreover, Howard argued that the process of self-examination was not necessary: “We no longer navel gaze about what an Australian is. We no longer are mesmerized by the self appointed cultural dieticians who tell us that in some way they know better what an Australian ought to be”, referring to Keating and the “elites”.993

Howard, however, did it himself and emphasised Australian values and national identity constantly in domestic political discourse.994 Moreover, Howard’s Liberal Party embarked on a values-driven election campaign in 1996,995 driven by a strong belief in common values underlying an Australian identity.996 Again, however, the emphasis was on a concept of “new nationalism”, which was argued as being ”healthy nationalism”, not the kind of dangerous nationalism that caused WWII.997 Consequently, the key features of Howard’s “healthy nationalism” were basic Australian values, such as a positive view of Australian history, mateship, “fair go” and individualism.998 However, subscribing to a socially conservative version of Christianity, Howard also wanted to restore Judeo-Christian values and the Anglo-Celtic heritage as cornerstones

995 Darwall (2005), p. 64
996 Johnson (2007), p. 196
997 Curran (2002), pp. 476-7
998 Johnson (2007), p. 197
of Australian identity. Moreover, Howard believed that multiculturalism undermines common values that are the key to social cohesion was thus integration of immigrants into the Australian society based on universal Australian values and the English language.

However, whilst in rhetoric the government was aiming to create unity in diversity, the Howard era was in practice divisive and hosted a number of heated debates about controlling immigration and entry of asylum seekers, in particular following the “Tampa affair” and the “children overboard” incident, and culminating into the implementation of the ”Pacific Solution”. Finally, it also witnessed the emergence of exactly the kind of unhealthy nationalism that Howard himself warned about, producing incidents between “Australians” and “ethnic” members of the community, e.g. the Cronulla riots in December 2005, which witnessed pitch battles between the ”Anglos” and the “Wogs” over an incident at Cronulla beach. Regardless of whether such incidents would have taken place without the emphasis on Australian values and identity by the government, clearly the issue of values and identity was elevated into the forefront of political discourse, both in the domestic context, as well as in the regional context.

Every nation requires unique and shared national legends. Since the creation of the Australian nation involved no war of independence, the source of national legends had to come from other historical experiences symbolising the creation and character of the nation. One of the most fundamental of these has been the ANZAC legend, referring to the war achievements of the Australia-New Zealand Army Corps during WWI, serving as the historical turning point for

999 Johnson (2007), pp. 197-199
1001 The “Tampa affair” erupted when the Norwegian operated MV Tampa rescued a group of Afghan refugees from a distressed vessel in international waters and wanted to transport them to the Christmas Islands. The Australian government, however, refused entry to Australian waters. When the Tampa violated this ban and entered Australian waters the Howard government sent a special forces unit to intercept. The ”children overboard” affairs concerned allegations that asylum seekers were throwing their children overboard in order to secure entry to Australian waters by prompting rescue efforts. No evidence of this actually taking place was found. The ”Pacific Solution” (2001-2007) refers to the Howard government policy to transport asylum seekers to detention camps in the Pacific Ocean islands instead of those on the Australian mainland.
Australia as nation; “Australia was born on the shores of Gallipoli”.\textsuperscript{1003} In an embodiment of this spirit, practically every town in the country has a war memorial, the National War Memorial in Canberra is one of the most visited places in Australia and the country celebrates ANZAC Day as a national public holiday 25 April every year.

As such, WWI and the ANZACs had little to do with the creation of the Australian nation, but nonetheless the ANZAC legend was significant in the formation of Australian nationalism through the heroism and persistence of the “Diggers”, who were considered to represent the national character of Australia.\textsuperscript{1004}

There were little or any popular efforts to disassociate Australian identity with “Britishness”, despite the fact that the Whitlam government actively promoted a unique Australian national identity, work carried out subsequently by Bob Hawke and later on by Paul Keating, who probably had the most ambitious plans for creating a unique Australian identity. Keating not only wanted to prioritise a unique Australian identity, but also wanted to redefine Australia’s place in the world, convinced of Australia’s ”destiny as a nation in Asia and the Pacific”.\textsuperscript{1005}

\textbf{What are the Australian Values?}

“The values which Australia brings to its foreign policy are the values of a liberal democracy. These have been shaped by national experience, given vigour through cultural diversity, but reflect a predominantly European intellectual and cultural heritage. They include the rule of law, freedom of the press, the accountability of the government to an elected parliament, and a commitment to a ‘fair go’”.\textsuperscript{1006}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1003} Darwall (2005), pp. 57-58
\textsuperscript{1004} Darwall (2005), pp. 58-59
\textsuperscript{1005} Darwall (2005), p. 59
\textsuperscript{1006} Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1997), In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy, White Paper, Canberra, p.11
\end{flushleft}
Given the cultural background and heritage of the country, it is fair to ask what Australian values are and how are they unique, for instance in comparison to British values? At first glance one would conclude that Australian values are equal to typical European/Western values; egalitarianism, secularism of government and freedom of religion, parliamentary democracy and freedom of speech, respect of rule of law, freedom of assembly, with nothing obviously uniquely distinct about them. Moreover, if one examines the national holidays, three underlining themes become apparent: Christianity, British/European heritage and sports. The national holidays reflecting the first two are; Australia Day, Good Friday, Easter Sunday, Easter Monday, ANZAC Day, Queen’s Birthday, Christmas and Boxing Day, whilst the importance of sports is commemorated by e.g.: Melbourne Cup Day, Geelong Cup Day, Adelaide Cup Day and Foundation Cup Day.

Another source determining the composition of Australian values are government statements. The Howard government in particular was, in its view corresponding to public opinion of the “ordinary battlers”, active in promoting Australian identity and values through government policy. One of the significant initiatives towards this end was based on the notion that migrants must adopt Australian civic values in order to successfully integrate into the society and thus, from 2007 onwards required to pass a citizenship test of their knowledge of Australian cultural/history values and English. In addition, since 15 October 2007 all residence visa applicants 18 years and over have been required to sign a value statement pledging that they understand and respect Australian values before the visa can be granted. These values are presented in the Life in Australia booklet, which all applicants are expected to read and certify that they have understood the significance of these statements. Since it represents the government’s official definition of Australian values, the “values statement” is worth quoting in full:

I confirm that I have read, or had explained to me, information provided by the Australian Government on Australian society and values.

I understand:
Australian society values respect for the freedom and dignity of the individual, freedom of religion, commitment to the rule of law, Parliamentary democracy, equality of men and women and a spirit of egalitarianism that embraces mutual respect, tolerance, fair play and compassion for those in need and pursuit of the public good.

- Australian society values equality of opportunity for individuals, regardless of their race, religion or ethnic background.
- The English language, as the national language, is an important unifying element of Australian society.

I undertake to respect these values of Australian society during my stay in Australia and to obey the laws of Australia.

I understand that, if I should seek to become an Australian citizen:

- Australian citizenship is a shared identity, a common bond which unites all Australians while respecting their diversity.
- Australian citizenship involves reciprocal rights and responsibilities. The responsibilities of Australian Citizenship include obeying Australian laws, including those relating to voting at elections and serving on a jury.

If I meet the legal qualifications for becoming an Australian citizen and my application is approved I understand that I would have to pledge my loyalty to Australia and its people.\(^{1007}\)

Another relevant example of the official government view of Australian values is that given by the National Capital Authority, the government body overseeing planning in Canberra, has issued instructions that the capital should reflect “national values and aspirations”, which are\(^{1008}\):

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Asian Australians and Australian Identity and Values

One useful test towards determining the validity of Australian values and their conformity with the so-called Asian values that will be addressed in the next section is to examine how Asian Australians have adopted them.

A study by Juliet Clark of the 2003 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes data, examined the importance of various statements in the 2003 survey. The statements measured were: having been born in Australia, having Australian citizenship, having lived in Australia for most of one’s life, having adequate English skills, to be Christian, respecting Australian political institutions and laws, feeling Australian and having an Australian ancestry.\textsuperscript{1009} As Clark notes, in general past ”research suggests that Asian Australians tend to identify with a complex and fragmented hybrid identity” \textsuperscript{1010}, suggesting that they may only subscribe to certain statements regarding national identity whilst rejecting others. Clark, however, found that Asian Australian respondents were generally supportive of key elements of Australian identity and had a strong sense of

\begin{table}[h]
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\hline
\textbf{Australian Values and Aspirations} \\
\hline
Egalitarianism \\
Social Responsibility \\
Freedom \\
Civility \\
Humour \\
Democratic Principles \\
Civic Awareness \\
Peace \\
Order \\
Respect of the Rule of Law \\
Mateship \\
Diversity and Tolerance \\
Irreverence \\
Fairness \\
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\textsuperscript{1009} Clark (2007), p. 308
\textsuperscript{1010} Clark (2007), p. 305
belonging, whilst noting that the second generation Asian Australians were more likely to support Australian identity than the first generation.\textsuperscript{1011}

The most supported elements were citizenship, feeling Australian and respect of political institutions.\textsuperscript{1012} Also, the study found that amongst Asian Australians sport was considered the strongest source of national pride, followed by scientific achievements, whilst only 19% rated historic achievements very important.\textsuperscript{1013}

\textit{The Asian Values Debate}

“The region, furthermore, is exceptionally diverse culturally, linguistically, and religiously. It is a pastiche of Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian traditions. None provides a significantly unifying cultural-religious cohesiveness across the region, despite the efforts of many to claim the existence of certain overarching Asian values.”\textsuperscript{1014}

The other major component in the alleged cultural and social incompatibility of Australian and Asian societies is the potential existence of distinctive “Asian values” that would be in conflict with “Australian values”. The general observation regarding the existence of some form of universal values in "Asia", or "East Asia" in the context of this thesis, however, is that the region is so diversified in terms of ethnicity, religion and culture that it makes a little sense to make any serious claims regarding the existence of any such "Asian values".

The “Asian values” campaign, since its inception, largely revolved around, and was fuelled by, two Southeast Asian patriarchs; Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Mohammad Mahathir of

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{1011} Clark (2007), pp. 312-314
\textsuperscript{1012} Clark (2007), p. 309
\textsuperscript{1013} Clark (2007), p. 3112
\textsuperscript{1014} Pempel (2005), p.1
\end{flushright}
Malaysia, both of whom vigorously promoted an Asian alternative to western norms. The first thrust for the creation of “Asian values” has been credited to Lee Kuan Yew, who already in the 1960s started advocating the virtues of Confucian “social discipline”, later making it a central concept in the Singaporean nation-building project. The main component of Lee’s agenda was arguably Confucianism, which has been defined as “an ethnical system and humanistic world view that places great emphasis on forms of conduct within relationships, and on personal virtue, obedience to authority, family, loyalty, social harmony and education”. The first actual reference to universalistic “Asian values”, however, Lee made in an academic seminar in 1977 discussing Asian values and modernization, where he attributed Singapore’s success to its “Asian-Oriental- hardworking, thrifty and disciplined society”. Lee also juxtapositioned Asian and Western values, stressing the superiority of the Asian family unit and social discipline in comparison to break up of traditional values in the West, which he viewed as the negative side of modernity. Lee’s argumentation further intensified during the 1997-98 Asian financial crises towards praising the core “Asian values” of hard work and entrepreneurial spirit, ability to sacrifice for the future and respect for education and elders.

The other “grand champion” of Asian values was Malaysia’s Mohammad Mahathir. Much like Lee Kuan Yew, Mahathir had become concerned about the moral degradation that he saw as endemic in the Western societies from the 1960s onwards, and feared that these corrupting “Western values” would be an ill fit to Asia’s economic development. Within this spirit in the 1982 UMNO General Assembly he promoted the notion of more traditional Asian values and urged Malaysians to ”rid ourselves of the Western values that we have absorbed”. Mahathir’s

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1016 Katzenstein, Peter (2006), “East Asia – Beyond Japan”, in Katzenstein, Peter and Takashi Shiraishi (Eds.), Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, p. 31
1018 Barr (2002), p. 3
1019 Barr (2002), p. 3
1020 Barr (2002), p. 43
revulsion at “Western values” did not, however, end there but rather gathered strength as his conviction of the strength of “Asian values” increased as Malaysia economic development boomed. In 1995 he attacked “Western hedonism”, which in his mind was characterized by for instance homosexuality, drugs, pornography, promiscuity and civil disobedience, among other vices. He also criticized Western-style democracy and defended the virtues of more authoritarian/illiberal style democracy that would suit Asian societies better and would offer stable and strong governments that he considered a prerequisite for economic development and which would serve national interest better than the “ultra-liberal” Western approach.

**Beyond Lee and Mahathir: the Relevance of “Asian values” for East Asian Regionalism**

Whilst the “Asian values” debate was largely initiated and fuelled by the two champions Lee and Mahathir, and despite the fact that the debate was declared dead in the mid-1990s, it has held some universal credence in Asia. The 1993 “Bangkok Declaration”, which convened in preparation for the UN World Conference on Human Rights in conjunction with the caucus of Asian countries meeting in Bangkok, adopted a relativist view of human rights. The Bangkok Declaration argued that whilst universal human rights are a positive concept, their application should be considered relative to culture, history and level of economic development, basically implying that human rights do not accord with ”Asian values”. The “Western” concept of universal human rights was, it argued, ignorant in relation to state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of other states, which should not be overwritten by a concept of universal human rights. Above all, however, the Bangkok Declaration was a clear manifestation of the incompatibility of the classical Western concept of human rights, that are principally based on the rights of the individual, and ”Asian values” view to human rights, which emphasises more the importance of

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1021 Barr (2002), p. 43
1022 Barr (2002), p. 43
collective interests and individual’s responsibilities towards other members of the society, rather than individual rights.\textsuperscript{1023}

\textbf{The Impact of ‘Asian Values’ on East Asian Regionalism}

What are the implications of “Asian values” on Regionalism, and in particular in terms of inclusion/exclusion of new members? Peter Moody has argued that “the Asian values” are essentially an artificial (political) construct, since Asia is merely a geographic reference instead of a cultural collective, referring to the diversity of the region”. Instead, Moody argues, the “Asian values” may rather reflect a contrast between “modernity” (West) and “tradition” (Asia) than values per se.\textsuperscript{1024} T.J. Pempel, moreover, points out that a number of empirical studies of national and regional values have shown that East Asians differ much more in terms of the major components of culture and values that the proponents of “Asian values” would like to acknowledge.\textsuperscript{1025} As examples of this, he points out to the “allegedly Confucian commonalities, most notably anti-individualism”, that are often referred to as the universal core of “Asian values”, and argues that Japan for instance is closer to Western European countries in terms of individualism and secularism than it is to countries that are identified as Confucian (i.e. China, Taiwan and South Korea). Moreover, Southeast Asian countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia are much more traditional than the Northeast Asian countries.\textsuperscript{1026} The Philippines again is a majority Catholic country with a major Muslim minority. As such, Pempel argues, it is hard to see any universal system of values that transcends across regional boundaries.\textsuperscript{1027} In terms of pan-Asian cultural communalities, however, Pempel sees a rapid emergence of an East Asian popular culture contributing towards sorts of a shared component of regional identity, mostly being

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{1023} Moody (1996), p. 167
\item \textsuperscript{1024} Moody (1996), p. 167
\item \textsuperscript{1025} Pempel (2005), “Conclusion: Tentativeness and Tensions in the Construction of an Asian Region”, in Pempel T.J. (Ed.), Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, p. 260
\item \textsuperscript{1026} Pempel (2005), “Conclusion”, p. 260
\item \textsuperscript{1027} Pempel (2005), “Conclusion”, p. 260
\end{itemize}
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created by the spread and popularity of Japanese *Manga* cartoons, *Anime* animated movies, *Karaoke*, Korean pop music, Star television, multinational Asian pop groups and the like.\(^{1028}\)

“Throughout the world, some people also see themselves as belonging to a transnational group (such as Asian, people of Chinese ethnicity, people who speak the same language or practice the same religion). Do you identify with any transnational group?”

**Impact on Regional Institutions**

Nonetheless, “Asian values”, or perhaps more suitably- the "Asian way”, concept is clearly aimed at reaffirming the regions identity and differentiating itself from the West, thus engaging in a process of ‘othering’. The implications of this process of identity building through the process of ‘othering’ could potentially have drastic implications for Australia’s regional aspirations. The European Union, for instance, has adopted democracy, the rule of law and human rights as de jure shared regional values, and Christianity as de facto common value base. As ASEAN aims to become a more EU-style (albeit rejecting supranationalism) regional organisation, it is also moving towards defining its shared regional values, norms and identity. In fact, this project is ongoing in ASEAN and is being performed in preparation for the ASEAN Community, which includes in addition to economic and security communities a Socio-Cultural

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\(^{1028}\) Pempel (2005), “Conclusion”, p. 262
Community. Even more significantly, the organisation has embarked on a mission to codify these norms and values by establishing an ASEAN Charter. The Charter, adopted in November 2007, sets official norms for ASEAN, perhaps surprisingly exactly the same as the EU’s: democracy, the rule of law and good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Taken into consideration Australian values, as reported in the previous section, this is good news for Australia. It would seem that least officially cultural relativism should not hinder closer relations with ASEAN. Moreover, the Charter also establishes a formal admission criteria for new members, which has a geographic criteria, i.e. that the candidate states are considered geographically Southeast Asian. However, unless a fixed definition of “Southeast Asia” accompanies this criteria, its enforcement will be subjective. Moreover, should “Southeast Asia” refer to the current definition, which includes the ten ASEAN states plus East Timor, it would practically close the door from new candidates.

Table 24. ASEAN Admission Criteria

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Location in the recognised geographical region of Southeast Asia;</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Recognition by all ASEAN Member States;</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Agreement to be bound and to abide by the Charter; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of Membership</td>
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Source: ASEAN Charter, p. 9

The emerging East Asian Community is also in the process of developing a common identity and culture, as stated earlier. How much this will be based on a collection of supposedly universalistic “Asian values” and how it impacts the inclusivity and exclusivity of the regional institutions, remains to be seen as this process is still in its early stages. Nonetheless, once again, it can be postulated that a strong emphasis on Asian values or “East Asian” identity and culture would be detrimental to Australia’s quest for inclusion. However, the inclusion of Australia in the East Asian Summit would suggest that, the East Asian Community is likely to be constructed as inclusive rather than exclusive, albeit probably being limited to the current ASEAN Plus Six setup in order not to dilute the organisation any further than necessary. In this case Australia’s
THE PROBLEM OF THE ‘BORDERLINE STATES’ IN REGIONALISM

(and to a lesser extent New Zealand’s) participation could received added importance as a compensation for the exclusion of the United States.

**Differences in Political Culture as a differentiator**

Given the apparent weakness of "Asian values” in terms of forming an universalistic regional culture and identity, the importance of political values and culture may be more important for Australia’s inclusion in regional institutions. Whilst the opposition of some ASEAN members for including Australia in the regional institutions has been largely geographically or racially framed, it has been suggested that the difference in political values is the real problem.\(^{1029}\) Since political culture normally refers to a set of values and beliefs that provide a basis for a particular political system and political activity within it, this cannot be completely detached from the values debate that has just been covered. On a superficial level one could argue that the political cultures in ASEAN in particular and Australia are somewhat different. As has been suggested before, the political culture in ASEAN has resulted into a decision-making system that emphasises informality and consultation and consensus,\(^ {1030}\) constituting a distinctive political culture that is commonly referred to as the “ASEAN way”.\(^ {1031}\)

The Australian political system on the other hand is distinctively a Westminster parliamentary system accompanied by a political culture that is distinctively Western. As a result, Australian politics is characterised by process oriented and rules based decision-making, and perhaps also a more outspoken, critical and confrontational political activity.

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\(^{1029}\) Ravenhill (1997), p. 23

\(^{1030}\) The origins of *mushawara* and *mufakat* (Malay-style consultation and consensus) can be found in Javanese village societies invoking the need for a leader to seek the community’s acceptance of a given decision. The application of this is characterized by incrementalism, building on personal and political relations, saving face, avoiding arbitration mechanisms in dispute resolution, and emphasizing process over substance. For more details, see: Solingen, Ethel (2005), “East Asian Regional Institutions: Characteristics, Sources, Distinctiveness”, in Pempel, T.J. (Ed.), *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp. 32-35

\(^{1031}\) the “ASEAN way” has also in multiple occasions been credited to form the basis of a wider pan-ASIAN “Asian way”, in particular due to the indulgence of China
Political values, in East Asia and Australia have clashed on multiple occasions, most frequently over human rights in general and the death penalty in particular. The death penalty is a widely spread practice in East Asia for serious crime such as drugs smuggling and murder. Australia categorically opposes the death penalty for any reason, which has led it into conflict with Singapore and Malaysia in particular (but also with Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam). For instance, the Howard government launched an unsuccessful campaign against the execution of convicted Australian drug smuggler Nguyen Tuong Van in Singapore in 2005, going to an unusual length and angering the Singaporean government who blamed Australia for meddling in its internal affairs and the functioning of its judicial system. The ALP opposition at the same time blamed the government for ‘inconsistency’ in its policy towards death penalty in the region and in particular not condemning the executions of the Bali bombers in Indonesia, endorsing the execution of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden if caught. In comparison, the ALP pledged to pressure the 14 Asian countries where the death penalty is enforced if elected, in order to “regain Australia’s reputation as a good international citizen”\footnote{The Australian (2007), “Save Bali bombers: Labour”, Tuesday October 9, p.1}. Whether the ALP government elected into power in November 2007 will do this remains to be seen.

There is, however, a curious paradox in the different approaches of Coalition and ALP governments in dealing with Asia; the Howard government emphasised the difference of Australian culture and values from the region but also called for, and largely implemented, a policy of ‘mutual respect’, advocating non-interference in internal affairs; whilst in comparison, the ALP governments, under Hawke and Keating first, and since November 2007 onwards under Kevin Rudd, have not only exercised ‘comprehensive engagement’ in order to integrate with Asia but interestingly also advocate ‘universal values’, including criticising the Asian neighbours for their human rights violations and deficiencies.

The election of the Rudd ALP government in November 2007 indeed proved to give birth to a renewed program of comprehensive engagement with Asia as one of three pillars of Australian foreign policy, in addition to the special relationship with the United States and the emphasis on the United Nations. This was hardly surprising as Kevin Rudd had a well known and established
career as an Asian expert, having completed a Asian studies degree in the university, being a Mandarin speaker and having served as a diplomat in China. Rudd has also been an active advocate of Asian studies in Australia and increased understanding of Asia for many years before becoming the Prime Minister. Thus, when Rudd proposed the establishment of an Asia Pacific community (APc) in 2008, few observers were surprised. The APc, according to Rudd, would become a regional institution that would span the entire Asia Pacific region, including the United States, India and China, in practical terms bringing existing institutions - APEC, ASEAN and the East Asia Summit under a universal regional architecture. The APc proposal, however, received cool reception from leading ASEAN states; in particular Indonesia and Singapore, and concrete developments are yet forthcoming. APc has also once more remained us of the diversity of regional states in terms of economic and political systems, as well as culture and religion, which makes it challenging to receive adequate backing for such grand schemes. In addition to the tremendous diversity within the region, the implementation of the APc idea has been further complicated by increasing tensions between China and the United States and China and India. Thus, what, if anything, will become of the APc, remains to be seen at the time of writing.

Rudd government’s comprehensive engagement has also met some difficulties, in particular due to growing tensions with China following the Stern Hu case and the publishing of an Australian defence white paper portraying China as a potential threat.

Regardless of the APc proposal’s outcome, the Rudd government era will offer an interesting test to the balancing act of interests based drive to seek inclusion in the region, whilst adhering to the liberal-internationalist ideological base. It will also strengthen the case for comparing Australia’s position in East Asian Regionalism under different governments, i.e. Hawke-Keating ALP government, eleven years of Howard’s Coalition government and the possible continuation of “engagement” under Rudd ALP government.

7.5 People-to-People Contacts and Education in Engagement

Another aspect, and a useful tool for engagement, is the active people-to-people contacts between East Asia and Australia, in the form of tourist and business visitors from and to the region, as well as an increasing amount of Asian students attending vocational and higher-education
courses in Australia. Finally, Australia’s Asia literacy, the knowledge of Asian business practices, culture and languages has been consistently labelled as one of the most important forms of engagement, both in Australia and in the region. This section will examine the extent, nature and impact of these aspects of Australia’s regionness.

Tourism and Business

In addition to immigrants and students, people-to-people contacts with Asia have been significantly promoted by tourists and business people travelling to and from Asia. Since the 1960s in particular there has been a steady increase in people-to-people contacts between East Asians and Australians.

Inbound Asian Tourism to Australia

Whilst New Zealand and Britain have been the traditional sources of tourists, an increasing amount of inbound tourist arrivals today come from Asia, primarily from East Asia, Japan being the most important source market of international visitors to Australia.\(^{1033}\) Asian tourism in general experienced tremendous growth in the 1990s and in 1995-96 a total of 2,017,000 Asians visited Australia, accounting for approximately 50% of the total short-term visitors. In 1996-97 the position of Asia as the most important source region for tourism became further solidified with over 50% of short-term visitors originating from the region.\(^{1034}\) Japan’s share of the Asian tourism, as well as share of overall tourist arrivals, also increased further in the 1990s. Japan had already become the largest Asian source market in 1980, accounting for 35.2% of all Asian visitors, further increasing to 58.6% in the peak year of 1991, but by 1995-96 the Japanese already accounted for 20.5% of the total international arrivals.\(^{1035}\) By 2003 Japan had become the

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\(^{1035}\) Quilty and Goldsworthy (2003), p. 271
most important source market in overall, accounting for 588,000 (13%) of total international visitors and vast majority (80%) of holiday visitors.

China has become a major growth market, in particular since Australia was made an approved destination in 1998, to the extent that in 2003 it accounted for 4% of total international visitors. Indonesia, Australia’s close neighbour, is also an important market accounting for 2% of international visitors. The numbers of Indonesian visitors peaked in 2001, reaching 89,000 for the year, but have since then decreased. In 2003, for instance, the total number of arrivals was 80,000, 21% of whom were here for education.

**Outbound Australian Tourism to Asia**

Although it is hard to travel to or from Australia without at least passing through Asia, the region has not been a traditional destination for Australian tourists, who have rather traditionally merely transited via Asia to their final destinations in Europe or North America. However, when the Australian dollar was floated in 1983, the traditional destinations in Europe and North America became more expensive and Australian holiday-makers were motivated to discover Asia. Once the Australian holiday-makers had discovered Asia (Bali in particular), however, they were hooked. Correspondingly, by 1995 a total of 939,000 Australians had travelled to Asia on holidays, twice the number in comparison to 1985. By the late-1990s, the trend had become permanent; in 1997 322,000 Australians travelled to the UK, but already 311,000 chose Indonesia as their travel destination. In 1998 Indonesia (mostly Bali) already overtook the UK and the US and became the second most popular travel destinations after New Zealand.

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1036 Tourism Australia (2004), p. 3
1037 Tourism Australia (2004), p. 41
1038 Quilty and Goldsworthy (2003), p. 268
1039 Ibid
1040 Ibid
Education as Engagement: Overseas Students and Asian Studies in Australia

Asian Students in Australia

The first significant influx of student arrivals from Asia took place within the context of the 1951 Colombo Plan, in which Australia was one of the most active participants in particular in terms of educational aid, taking in thousands of Asian students.\footnote{Broinowski (2003), p. 123} Besides the humanitarian motivations, the Colombo Plan student scheme was justified by an idea of creating “ambassadors” for Australia in Asia. However, many cited discrimination, bitterness and estrangement as primary sentiments, rather than any sort of deep connection with Australia.\footnote{Quilty and Goldsworthy (2003), p. 275} Malayan, Singaporean and Indian Colombo Plan students complained that Australians did not think about Asia at all, except in demeaning stereotypes, and that Australians were condescending and ignorant about Asian countries presuming that all of them were underdeveloped.\footnote{Broinowski (2003), p. 124} At least part of the reason for the feeling of disappointment was the stereotypes the Asian students brought with them. For instance, “Indonesian students were prepared for Australia by a school history textbook, Sari Sedjarah, which emphasised Australia’s convicts, fear of Asia, restricted migration, and dependence on Western powers”.\footnote{Broinowski (2003), p. 126} Consequently, although many warm personal relationships were indeed formed between the plan students and individual Australians, the Colombo Plan did not assure Australia of the thousands of lifelong friends among well-placed alumni that it was expected to do.\footnote{Broinowski (2003), p. 129}

Moreover, where as the Colombo Plan certainly was significant in its time, the program did not remain the primary source of Asian student for long and by 1962 only 250 of the total 5000 Malayan students were actually plan students.\footnote{Quilty and Goldsworthy (2003), p. 263} Finally, the plan came to the end of its life with the restructuring of Australia’s aid program in the 1970s, within which education was made part

of developmental assistance and Asian students were largely admitted as government sponsored students in relatively small numbers.

In the 1980s Australia executed a shift from “educational aid” to “educational trade”, ending the sponsored studentship policy and establishing a full fee paying system. When the fee paying system was established many feared that establishing a fee paying system would deter overseas students from coming, but the reverse happened.\(^{1047}\) In fact the growth was rather spectacular with the number of overseas students studying in Australia growing from 9654 in 1987 to 38,011 in 1989 and 53,000 in 1996. By mid-1990s over 90% of these students originated from Asia – Malaysia, China and Japan being the largest source countries.\(^{1048}\) The reasons behind Australia’s popularity were simply its relative closeness to the main Asian source countries and competitive cost of Australian degrees: “in 1992 an Australian report found that students in 11 Asian countries were attracted by the proximity and relative cheapness of education in Australia, but were put off by the businesslike promotion of education, and by concerns about racism.”\(^{1049}\)

Following the 1997 financial crisis the overseas students numbers declined somewhat, but it proved to be temporary, Australia was still attractive in a sense that it remained relatively cheaper and closer than the UK, the US and Canada, albeit the latter were considered more prestigious destinations.\(^{1050}\) In fact, since passing of the financial crisis Asia has become the primary source of overseas students in Australia. For instance in 2007 of the total of 371,691 student visas granted, Chinese students were the largest single group, comprising 22% of all international student visas, followed by Indian (14%), Korean (7%) and high numbers of Malaysian and Indonesian students.\(^{1051}\)

\(^{1047}\) Quilty and Goldsworthy (2003), pp. 276-278

\(^{1048}\) Quilty and Goldsworthy (2003), p 276

\(^{1049}\) Broinowski (2003), p. 128

\(^{1050}\) Quilty and Goldsworthy (2003), p. 277

Table 25. Top Source Countries of Overseas Students 2004-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>2004-05</th>
<th>2005-06</th>
<th>2006-07</th>
<th>2007-08</th>
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<td>10 000</td>
<td>15 396</td>
<td>28 949</td>
<td>39 015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, People’s Republic of</td>
<td>17 506</td>
<td>15 877</td>
<td>24 915</td>
<td>31 511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
<td>9 328</td>
<td>11 657</td>
<td>12 910</td>
<td>12 013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>10 367</td>
<td>9 635</td>
<td>9 289</td>
<td>9 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>6 609</td>
<td>6 446</td>
<td>7 175</td>
<td>8 004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>4 471</td>
<td>7 879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3 118</td>
<td>4 439</td>
<td>5 223</td>
<td>6 857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>4 818</td>
<td>5 391</td>
<td>5 986</td>
<td>6 709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4 751</td>
<td>5 059</td>
<td>5 403</td>
<td>5 933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>4 838</td>
<td>4 561</td>
<td>4 609</td>
<td>5 648</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Immigration and Citizenship, [http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/50students.htm#h](http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/50students.htm#h)

The Impact of Asian Overseas Students on Engagement

How then has the influx of Asian students contributed to the process of “engagement”? Whilst a large portion of the Asian overseas students have become permanent migrants after completing their studies, the experiences have not been exclusively positive. For instance, surveys in the 1980s and 1990s amongst Chinese students in Australia not only revealed displeasure in terms of feelings of being cheated of fees, but also general negative images of Australia as underdeveloped, isolated, expensive and unwelcoming.  

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\[1052\] Broinowski (2003), p. 56
A relatively high number of graduates from Australian institutions, for instance, were in highly influential positions in Indonesian elite, e.g. Ratih Hardjono and Dewi Fortuna Anwar as advisors for presidents Habibie’s and Abdurrahman Wahid (“Gus Dur”), at the time Australia’s reputation hit the bottom. In fact, in 2002 a total of four Indonesian cabinet members were Aussie graduates, one of the worst years in the record of bilateral relations.\textsuperscript{1053}

Another fairly popular line of criticism is that the mass recruitment of Asian students has encouraged them to sticking together, living, studying, and socialising in groups with minimal contact with their Australian peers.\textsuperscript{1054} Nonetheless, it is quite hard to provide credible arguments that the time spent in Australia has not left any permanent impressions, at least some of them positive, in the minds of bright young Asian students who often become successful and influential in their respective fields in their home countries.

\textbf{Asian Studies and Study of Asian Languages in Australia}

\textit{“Australians know less about Asian than other parts of the world, yet Asia’s Role in Australia’s trade, security and culture is inescapable – and growing”}\textsuperscript{1055}

It has been suggested numerous times that creating a good level of knowledge of Asian cultures, economy, history, politics and languages in Australia is essential for closer engagement with East Asia. Reflecting this notion, in particular amongst the elites and officials, between 1969 and 1994 alone altogether sixteen officially commissioned reports urged an increase in the offering of Asian studies and languages in Australian schools and universities,\textsuperscript{1056} most of them published in the heydays of the “engagement” project in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Whilst the specific focus of these reports differed somewhat they all promoted the notion that having a more “Asia literate” population would significantly boost Australia’s economic performance and re-

\textsuperscript{1053} Broinowski (2003), p. 129
\textsuperscript{1054} Broinowski (2003), p. 128
\textsuperscript{1055} Asian Studies Association of Australia (2002), Maximizing Australia’s Asia Knowledge: Repositioning and Renewal of a National Asset, Canberra, p xv
\textsuperscript{1056} Quilty and Goldsworthy (2003), p. 280

One of the first reports linking Asian knowledge directly to Australia’s strategic interests was Ross Garnaut’s “Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy” commissioned by Prime Minister Bob Hawke in 1989. The report highlighted the need for increased understanding of Asian history, geography, economics, politics, culture and languages, suggesting that this would be more important for Australia’s future than understanding of “few countries” in Europe or having German or French as second languages. The report, however, recognised that achieving this would take time, perhaps generations and that thus, the emphasis should be on establishing a base for better understanding of Asia by promoting Asian studies in primary and secondary schools.\footnote{Garnaut, Ross (1989), *Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, p. 304} The report referred to the findings of the Asian Studies Council strategy paper indicating that 97% of university and college graduates completed their degree courses without a single unit focused on Asia and agreed with the objective of 5% of tertiary students studying Asian language by 1995. Moreover, Garnaut endorsed as “reasonable and feasible” the objectives of the council’s report suggesting that by 2000 the study of an Asian language would be considered normal in schools, Year 12 students would have an understanding of Asian cultures, geographies and economies by 2000 and that by 2010 most Australians would have a reasonable understanding of Asian culture, geography and economics.\footnote{Garnaut (1989), p. 304} Emphasising the importance of education in the efforts to capture the benefits of the East Asian economic miracle, it promoted the establishment of students exchange programs with East Asian countries, strengthening teacher training in Asian studies and taking Asia related research and teaching in tertiary education beyond languages and social sciences to other areas of study.

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\footnote{Garnaut (1989), p. 304}
By 1992 it was becoming obvious that the goals from the Garnaut report were not going to be met. In an annual Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meeting in December 1992 the state premiers and the Prime Minister representing the Commonwealth debated the need to increase the study of Asian languages and cultures in Australia, deciding to commission a high-level working group led by Kevin Rudd to draft a strategy for enhancing Asian languages and studies in Australia. The “Rudd Report” of 1994, officially known as "Asian Languages and Australia’s Economic Future”, suggested a direct link between Asian language skills and Australia’s export performance. The report promoted a strategy focusing on four priority languages in second language provision, based on their perceived economic significance to Australia; Japanese, Chinese (Mandarin), Indonesian and Korean. Perhaps the most ambitious target the report set was the objective that 15% of Year 12 students should be studying one of these priority Asian languages and an additional 10% of students studying other languages by 2006. The report and its implementation as the National Asian Languages and Studies in Australian Schools (NALSAS) Strategy, which commenced in 1995, arguably set the basis for Asian languages until the Howard government terminated the Commonwealth’s commitment to the strategy in 2002.

How well have these objectives been met? Almost as often as the reports have promoted the importance of Asian languages and knowledge, they have also conveyed a sense of frustration over the current state of affairs. Indeed, establishing Asian studies and languages in Australian schools and tertiary education has been a rocky road with varying degrees of success along the way. In the 1960s and 1970s the emphasis and interest was on Southeast Asia, probably sparked by the Vietnam War, with a particular focus on more general knowledge and social sciences programs, such as Bachelor of Arts (Asian Studies) degree programs. In 1976 the Asian Studies Association of Australia was established to promote the study of Asia in Australia.

1060 Quilty and Goldsworthy (2003) p. 280
One of the first higher-education institutes promoting Asian studies beyond social sciences was the Asian Business Research Programme in University of Melbourne established in 1979.\footnote{Quilty and Goldsworthy (2003), p. 263} A spike of initial interest in Asian studies, however, was soon turning into decline in the early 1980s, possibly due to the improving regional security situation, until the “East Asian Miracle” in the late 1980s reinvigorated at least the elites’ interest. In particular the ALP governments of Hawke and Keating were vigorously promoting Asian studies and combining them with professional and functional skills in areas such as law, commerce, engineering, etc.\footnote{Quilty and Goldsworthy (2003), p. 282} The subsequent government funding spree produced an increase in the establishment of Asian institutes in Australian universities in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the late 1980s an Asian Law Centre was established in the University of Melbourne whilst the Research Institute of Asia and the Pacific was set up in University of Sydney. In the 1990s also an Asia-Australia Institute was set up in the University of New South Wales and an Asian Business Centre in the University of Melbourne.\footnote{Quilty and Goldsworthy (2003), p. 263} Eventually by mid-1990s all self-respecting universities had established Asia institutes and/or Asian studies programs.

\textit{Asian Languages Teaching in Australia}

The development of the study of Asian languages from the 1980s to late-1990s was quite positive and already in the 1980s 2.2 \% of Year 12 students were taking an Asian language.\footnote{Quilty and Goldsworthy (2003), p. 281} The positive trend further increased in the 1990s and between 1994 and 1997 the amount of secondary school students learning Japanese increased by 50,000, Chinese by 20,000 and Indonesian by 100,000. By 1999 Japanese had become the number one foreign language in Year 12 assessments.\footnote{Quilty and Goldsworthy (2003), p. 283}
The situation of Asian languages training in institutions of higher education, however, has not been quite as encouraging. According to the report “Maximizing Australia’s Asia Knowledge”, produced by the Association of Asian Studies in Australia, fewer Asian languages were offered by fewer universities in 2001. Moreover, the languages considered as “major” Asian languages; Japanese, Chinese and Indonesian, were all available only in one university. Significantly, and in contrast to the ambitious goals of the earlier reports, the report concluded that fewer than 3% of students enrolled in Australian universities studied an Asian language. If the findings of the 2001 report were not depresssing enough, the further downturn in Asian language studies from 2001 onwards depressed the final remaining optimists. In 2007 reports about Asian language studies in Australia - Languages in Crisis: A Rescue Plan for Australia by Go8 universities and Call for Action, produced jointly by Australian Academy of Humanities, the Go8 universities, the Australian Council for State School Organisations and the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, found that 90-95% of Australian undergraduates did not undertake any language study and less than 13% completed a full Year 12 language program. Significantly, the growth of European languages was such that the number of Australian undergraduates enrolled in French and Spanish equalled the total first year enrolments in all Asian language courses. The trends in European and Asian languages, in fact, could hardly be more different: whilst there was a 12% increase in European languages in the beginner’s level between 2005 and 2007, there was a simultaneous 11% decline in Asian languages.

Moreover, undergraduate study of Asia decreased in 2001 with less than 5% of students enrolled in Asian studies programs, which was nowhere near the “Ingleson Report” target of 20% by 2000. In fact, whilst there arguably had been reasonable improvement towards the goals, it was assessed that 95% of Australian students still completed their courses without a single unit.

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1067 Asian Studies Association of Australia (2002), p. xvi
1068 Asian Studies Association of Australia (2002), p. 35
focused on Asia.\textsuperscript{1071} The expert pool was also noted to be in decline with no more than 400 “Asia specialists”, defined as ”people who have spent considerable periods of time in Asian countries, know languages, do research and write about aspects of Asia”. One particular reason for the declining numbers was that due to the good reputation of Asian studies in Australia, Asia experts were being increasingly headhunted overseas.\textsuperscript{1072}

Some positive developments, however, had also occurred, not the least in terms of course offerings in the higher education sector. Chinese language was offered in 26 institutions across Australia and between 2001 and 2005 and growth rate for enrolments reached 62% (further increasing to 711 enrolments in 2007). However, as a general trend, native speakers of Mandarin Chinese made up only half of the enrolments.\textsuperscript{1073} Japanese, on the other hand, was offered in 32 institutions, attracting a total of 2135 enrolments in 2007. Korean, the third priority language identified in the Rudd Report, was taught in 7 institutions, attracting only 158 enrolments in 2007.\textsuperscript{1074}

### 7.6 Regional Discourses: Asian Images of Australia and Australian Images of Asia

In addition to having perceived differences in values and identity and political cultures, Australia and the region have quite different discursive practices, which further complicate Australia’s inclusion in the region. Some of these discourses include "othering” within the context of political discourse, in both the region and Australia. What complicates the situation even more is that the relevant discourses in Asia are dominated by the elites, whereas in Australia there is a very lively public participation in Regionalism discourse. Also, in terms of public opinion, feelings towards Asia are polled in Australia frequently, whereas Australia’s image in Asia much less so. The fact that the onus of interest is with the Australians, is perhaps a sign of Australia being

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Asian Studies Association of Australia (2002), p. 18
\item Asian Studies Association of Australia (2002), pp. 19-20
\item Asian Studies Association of Australia (2002), p. 2
\item Asian Studies Association of Australia (2002), p. 3
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
somewhat more interested in the region than vice versa. Mutual perceptions also matter. Australia’s images in the region vary from favourable to one of a racist country and a regional bully, whilst the images of Asia in the perceptions of Australians vary from a source of threat to one of opportunity. Negative mutual perceptions could well hinder Australia’s integration into the region, whilst positive mutual perceptions would be beneficial.

Asian Views of Australia

According to Alison Broinowski Australia’s image in the region’s countries tend to fall under two rough categories: “1) a land of freedom and responsible government, a working man’s paradise of prosperity and equality and a ‘friend and neighbour to the region’, and 2) White Australia policy, racism and oppression of Aborigines.”\(^\text{1075}\) Alternatively, Australia has been perceived in the region as a distant and unknown country, attracting little interest, sometimes with a negative connotation, described as “uninteresting”, “isolated”, “distant”, “peripheral” and “innocuous”.\(^\text{1076}\) Also, in a similar spirit but with a more negative connotation, Australia has at times been characterised as “third rate Western country”, for instance by Lee Kuan Yew, probably reflecting the country’s image as a primary producer Western country without the technological or cultural sophistication of major Western counterparts.

However, whilst Australia’s image in the region is not necessarily negative in general, it is the negative images and stereotypes that arguably have hindered Australia’s engagement with the region, as well as may continue to do so in the future. Of these, two particularly negative and recurring topics are evident: 1) that of a racist Australia and the perception of discrimination against Asians in particular, and 2) a client state to the United States, playing the role of a regional deputy sheriff under the direction of a global policeman.

White Australia

\(^{1075}\) Broinowski (2003), p. 140
\(^{1076}\) Broinowski (2003), p. 58
The image of White Australia has been a historical burden for Australia’s relations with the region, as perceptions of oppression of aborigines and hostility towards Asian immigrants has been relatively common, in particular in the midst of elites. In fact, although the White Australia was officially abolished already in the 1970s, this image is not only a historical burden, but the stereotype has remained persistent also in the contemporary regional discourse on Australia. The race topic has been a particularly popular topic to the East Asian elite and thought leaders, especially to the long-serving former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, who as the minister for education in 1974 commented about student riots in Kuala Lumpur and blamed Australian influence as a source of unrest: “We don’t need any advice from them on how to run this country…..They should learn how to solve their own problems first; They solve their problems by shooting Aborigines and having a White Australia policy”.\textsuperscript{1077} Australian racism has also been occasionally in the focus of East Asian media, mainly in printed news media, but also on national TV. The Malaysian TV3 for instance aired a four-part documentary series “The Ugly Face of Australia” in 1991, which portrayed a country of racial discrimination of Aborigines and Asians.\textsuperscript{1078}

However, what really elevated the issue to the attention of the masses in Asia was the media attention revolving around Pauline Hanson’s short but intense political success and the debate it created in Australia. The Southeast Asian press in particular published series of articles about racism in Australia, generally arguing that individual Aussies were perhaps not racist, but collectively as a society Australia was.\textsuperscript{1079} The Northeast Asian media also noted the race issue and stories of racism were also published in Japanese, Chinese and Taiwanese newspapers. The South China Morning Post for instance reported that Taiwanese students were among the victims of racially motivated attacks.\textsuperscript{1080} Similarly the purportedly racially motivated attacks against

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1077} Broinowski (2003), p. 127
\textsuperscript{1078} Broinowski (2003), p. 133
\textsuperscript{1079} Broinowski (2003), p. 172
\textsuperscript{1080} South China Morning Post (1996), “Taiwanese students suffer racism in Australia”, 28 November 1996
\end{flushleft}
Singaporean soldiers attending joint exercises in Shoalwater Bay area in October 1996 received extensive media attention in the region.\(^{1081}\)

The governments of Southeast Asian countries in particular took the fear of “out of control” racism in Australia so seriously that they communicated their concerns regarding the safety of their citizens studying, working and visiting in the country in very blatant terms to the Australian government, and in some cases even calling their citizens to return home if they were discriminated against or felt threatened. Two members of the Singaporean Parliament also raised a motion for the Singaporean government to seek formal assurances from the Australian government to ensure that Singaporean citizens would be properly protected whilst in the country.\(^{1082}\) The Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong later admitted that bilateral ties between the two countries had indeed been damaged by the race row, followed by a similar assessment by the Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas.\(^{1083}\) Fearing further impact on regional relations the Australian government launched a diplomatic PR campaign to counter the impact of the race debate. Deputy Prime Minister Tim Fisher, whilst on a visit to Singapore assured the local media that Australia is very much a racially-tolerant country.\(^{1084}\)

Regardless of the Australian government’s attempts to lessen the impact of the negative media attention, Australia’s image in the region suffered and the White Australia legacy resurfaced once again. Moreover, the race debate resulted in a negative economic impact as business and investment confidence towards Australia in the region took a downturn. The Asia Pulse poll of senior Asian executives in December 1996, for instance, revealed that 67% of respondents were not satisfied with the Australian government stance and 80% of South Korean respondents believed the race debate had made Australia less attractive for Asian investment. The results were also dismal across the region; 64.7% of executives in Malaysia, 61.3% in Hong Kong,

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\(^{1082}\) Straits Times (1996), "Anti-Asian feelings in Australia – 2 MPs to raise issue in Parliament”, 1 December 1996  
\(^{1083}\) Broinowski (2003), p. 176  
\(^{1084}\) Straits Times (1996), ”Australia tries to contain damage on race issue”, 3 November 1996
53.8% in Taiwan and on average 51% of all respondents thought Australia had become less attractive for Asian investment and business. Moreover, 55.8% believed Australians were racist (70% in South Korea). In Singapore 88.2% believed Singapore treated immigrants better than Australia Asians.¹⁰⁸⁵

Whilst having been relatively dormant for the most recent years, the White Australia image was again resurfacing in 2009 due to a spike in allegedly racially motivated attacks against Asian students. The attacks not only motivated demonstrations by Asian students, but also prompted the Indian, Indonesian and Chinese governments to demand their citizens are protected whilst in Australia. Moreover, the Indian government took the manner so seriously that the Indian Prime Minister Singh took up the issue in his meeting with Kevin Rudd and the Indian High Commissioner to Australia appealed the officials to guarantee the safety of Indian students in Australia.¹⁰⁸⁶.

**Deputy Sheriff & America’s Dancing Monkey**

Another topic that has raised significant doubt regarding Australia’s *regionness* is its alliance and particularly close relationship with the United States. The Australia-US alliance has been a source of suspicion about Australia’s true intentions in particular toward China, where the rather common suspicion is that Australia is part of a US-led coalition aiming to contain China’s rise. Whilst Australia has alliance partners in Southeast Asia, the image of Australia being a client state of the United States, or in popular terms “America’s dancing monkey”¹⁰⁸⁷, is far from uncommon. Moreover, whilst a number of East Asian states are also allies of the United States, as well as Australia, at least two particular issues have reinforced the suspicions towards Australia’s intentions towards the region and its place in it.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Asia Pulse, "Asian Executives Concerned by Australian Race Debate", 9 December 1996

¹⁰⁸⁶ The High Commission of India in Australia, "High Commissioner’s remarks to press about student attacks", 10 June 2009, [http://www.hcindia-au.org/pr20090529_01.html](http://www.hcindia-au.org/pr20090529_01.html), Date accessed 18 June 2009

¹⁰⁸⁷ Broinowski (2003), p. 121
The first of these two was sparked by John Howard’s 1999 interview in the *Bulletin*, where he indicated that Australia might consider pre-emptive strikes outside of its borders. This, as has been pointed out earlier, greatly angered a number of countries in Southeast Asia, but in particular Indonesia and Malaysia.

The second was Australia’s role in the East Timor crisis. Whilst Japan officially praised Australia’s leadership in INTERFET and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan suggested that Australia should be accepted as an Asian country for its role,\(^{1088}\) many Southeast Asian states were nonetheless upset by this show of force in their region. Once again, the anti-Australian rhetoric was headed by Malaysia and in particular Indonesia, which reportedly even considered declaring war on Australia.\(^{1089}\) Whilst no drastic conflict between Australia and the regional states actually took place as a consequence of the East Timor crisis, it did nonetheless lead into what Broinowski has described as "image wars", a battle between an image of Australia as a good international citizen and Asian neighbour and that of an aggressor and a bully.\(^{1090}\)

Moreover, these "image wars" also involved the construction of "othering", essentially suggesting that as an outsider Australia should not have meddled into the affairs of a regional state. Once again Mahathir was in the frontline, arguing for Australia’s *otherness* by stating that "it was better for the peacekeeping duty to be assumed by our own kin than unrelated persons".\(^{1091}\) An Malaysian military commander, mirroring Mahathir, elaborated about Australia’s *regionness*: “it is not an accepted fact in this part of the world’…’the hearts and minds of Australians were thousands of miles away on another continent”.\(^{1092}\)

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\(^{1088}\) Broinowski (2003), p. 190

\(^{1089}\) Broinowski (2003), p. 178

\(^{1090}\) Broinowski (2003), p. 178

\(^{1091}\) Broinowski (2003), p. 188

\(^{1092}\) Broinowski (2003), p. 190
Indonesian Public Opinion towards Australia

According to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Global Views 2006 Australia is generally positively viewed in the region, albeit it is not considered particularly influential in Asia, contrary to the belief of many Australians. In fact, it would seem that in general Australia is considered rather inconsequential in the minds of Asian populations and it does not usually inspire emotional responses, unlike major powers such as the United States or Britain. The most plausible exception to this rule would be Australia’s closest neighbour Indonesia.

Perhaps somewhat surprisingly the Lowy Poll 2006 found that in general the Indonesian public opinion towards Australia is relatively positive, Indonesian respondents rating Australia at 51° in the thermometer scale. In line with the Global Views 2006 survey, Indonesians did not find Australia particularly influential in Asia, rating it at 6.1 (on a 0-10 scale), behind e.g. the European Union (6.5) and Indonesia (6.9). Nonetheless, a clear majority of Indonesian respondents agreed with the statement that ‘Indonesia benefits from having Australia as a stable and prosperous neighbour (7.4), and that ‘Australia has shown itself to be a reliable long term friend of Indonesia’ (7.0). Consequently the importance of good bilateral relations was rated quite high, 77% of respondents agreeing with the statement ‘it is very important that Australia and Indonesia work to develop a close relationship’. Finally, whilst acknowledging the cultural and other differences between the two countries, only 22% thought they were too different to cooperate and improve relations.

![Fig. 14: Statements about Australia](image)

Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2006, p. 14

1093 Global Views 2006, p. 8
However, the majority of Indonesian respondents also thought that Australia’s policy towards Indonesia is too much influenced by its alliance with the United States (6.6). Perhaps because of the East Timor crisis and the Papuan asylum seekers issue, Indonesians were also still suspicious of Australia’s intentions and conduct towards Indonesia, with the majority of the respondents agreeing with the statement "Australia has a tendency to interfere in Indonesia’s affairs too much" (6.7), and even that “Indonesia is right to worry that Australia is seeking to separate the province of West Papua from Indonesia” (6.8). Indonesians were also not too convinced that Australia had the right to be concerned about an Indonesian military threat (5.0).  

Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2006, p. 19

**Australian Views of Asia**

“For most of the two centuries since the first white settlement, Australians have been uneasy about their geography. Rather than viewing their proximity to Asia as a potential advantage, they perceived the region as a source of insecurity.”

The traditional argument is that Australians have been rather uneasy about their geographical location, and thus their neighbours, mainly seeing the region as a source of threat rather than opportunities. One of Australia’s most legendary prime ministers Sir Robert Menzies famously declared in his book published in 1970 that Australia was ‘being washed on our western and

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1095 McAllister and Ravenhill (1998), pp 119-120
northern shores by potentially hostile seas’. A former head of Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and a distinguished diplomat, Alan Renouf, critical of such notions published a book titled “The Frightened Country” in 1979, criticising that Australia was unnecessarily obsessed with a fear of invasion by its neighbours. On the other hand, the critics of Hawke’s and Keating’s policies argued that their “Asia only” policies surrendered the country’s future entirely to the mercy of its neighbours. Moreover, the argument was that the “Asia only” policies were a creation of the elites, enjoying little backing from ordinary Australians (‘battlers’).

**Australian Views on Regional Security**

It has been argued that the historical fear of the region has dominated Australian discourses and public opinion regarding East Asia and Australia’s place in the region. Historically this has arguably been the case. Immediately following WWII Japan held the questionable honour of being the greatest threat in the minds of Australians until communist China took over Japan in the 1950s and held the questionable mantle in public opinion until mid-1970s. Most likely influenced by Australian experiences of Indonesian aggression during the Malay Emergency, the Konfrontasi and the invasion of East Timor in 1975 China was replaced by Indonesia in the early 1980s as the major concern for the Australian public. However, due to the rapidly growing Japanese investment in the late 1980s Japan once again caused a public outcry and elevated fears of Japanese domination of the Australian economy. These fears, however, were mostly alleviated towards the 1990s and coinciding with the high point of the engagement project public opinion also turned more positive towards economic cooperation with the region.

McAllister and Ravenhill, in their study of data from the 1996 Australian Election Study survey, found that by 1996 perceptions of Asia in Australia had changed from a sense of threat and suspicion into admiration of the region’s economic dynamism. The sense of potential threat, as

1096 See: Menzies, R.G (1970), The Measure of the Years, Cassell Australia, Melbourne, p. 44
1097 Renouf, Alan (1979), The Frightened Country, Macmillan, Melbourne
1098 McAllister and Ravenhill (1998), p. 124
1099 McAllister and Ravenhill (1998), p. 126
suggested by the ‘frightened country’ thesis, did not receive significant backing from the study. Out of the ten countries nominated none posed a credible threat according to 64% of the respondents. Only Indonesia, China and Japan were seen ‘very likely’ to pose a threat to Australian security by more than 10% of the respondents, Indonesia and China receiving the highest ratings.\textsuperscript{1100}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Fairly Likely</th>
<th>Not Very Likely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AVS 1996 data

Moreover, the passing of the Cold War and emergence of the Post-Cold War order had apparently convinced the public that cooperation with the region was vital to Australia’s future, to the extent that 28% of the respondents indicated that Australia should cooperate with Asia rather than the United States.\textsuperscript{1101} The majority of respondents also backed the view that defence cooperation with regional states, specifically China, Indonesia and Japan, was either ‘important’ of ‘fairly important’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Fairly Important</th>
<th>Not Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>61.8%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AVS 1996 data

\textsuperscript{1100} McAllister and Ravenhill (1998), p. 124
\textsuperscript{1101} McAllister and Ravenhill (1998), p. 130
The motive behind the support for engagement was almost certainly mainly economic; 2/3 of respondents believed that Australia’s trading future lies with Asia, whilst only 9% disagreed.\textsuperscript{1102} Also, the opposition’s claim that “engagement” was exclusive an elite project received little backing, 54% of the respondents declaring that they backed the Keating government policy of engaging with Asia.\textsuperscript{1103} Yet, Keating lost the actual election in 1996 to the coalition of Liberal and National parties led by John Howard, though this may be inconsequential as domestic topics tend to have a much more importance for the outcome of elections and thus, the election result probably had very little to do with opposition to “comprehensive engagement”.

\textit{Contemporary Public Opinion: The region as a source of opportunities}

The Lowy Institute Polls (2005-2008) surveyed Australian public opinion regarding contemporary foreign policy issues, including Australia’s security. In the 2005 poll respondents were asked to rate a number of international security threats according to the level of concern ranging from ‘very worried’ to ‘not at all worried’. The number one concern for the respondents was nuclear weapons proliferation, 51% of the respondents saying they were “very worried” and 20% “fairly worried” about the issue. Nuclear proliferation was closely followed by global warming (46/24) and international terrorism (41/22) as top security concerns for Australians. Topics that were closely associated with the region, such as illegal immigration (23/21), failing states in the region (17/29) and China’s rise (16/19), were in the bottom of the list. By 2006 international terrorism had, however, become the number one threat, 73% of the respondents rating it as a critical threat, whilst nuclear proliferation (70%) and global warming (68%) were also identified as major concerns. Islamic fundamentalism (60%) also appeared on the list for the first time as a major concern. Significantly, only 25% reported that they viewed China’s rise as a critical threat to Australia’s security. The 2008 poll saw little significant changes in threat perceptions, except that water security took over the position as the number one threat, most likely driven by domestic concerns. Food shortages also emerged as a new source of threat.

\textsuperscript{1102} McAllister and Ravenhill (1998), p. 133
\textsuperscript{1103} McAllister and Ravenhill (1998), p. 134
The Lowy Polls also test the public’s feelings towards other countries, including the major regional powers. In the 2005 poll Australians unsurprisingly displayed particularly positive feelings towards New Zealand and the United Kingdom, but also towards a majority of regional states. From 2006 onwards the polls have measured feelings towards other countries in a format of a "thermometer" on the scale where above 50° corresponds to “warm” and under 50° to "cooler” feelings towards the tested countries. In 2007, again rather unsurprisingly, New Zealand (81°) and the United Kingdom (75°) once again topped the list, whilst feelings towards the United States (60°) were warm, but considerably less so. Moreover, feelings towards the United States were somewhat cooler than towards Singapore (64°) and Japan (63°). Other regional states, such as Vietnam (60°), Malaysia (58°) and China (56°) inspired mainly warm feelings amongst the respondents. Indonesia was the only East Asian country that attracted cooler (47°) feeling, doing so constantly from poll to poll. Whilst Australians were somewhat reserved towards Indonesia, the Global Views 2006 by Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs reveals that Australians are on average more positive towards China and Japan than Americans and some of the other regional states, as the following tables demonstrate.
Figure II-8 – Feelings Toward China
Average rating given to China by respondents in the following countries. One hundred-point scale, with 100 meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, 0 meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly warm or cold.

Source: Global Views 2006, p. 39

Figure II-18 – Feelings toward Japan
Average rating given to Japan by respondents in the following countries. One hundred-point scale, with 100 meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, 0 meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly warm or cold.

Source: Global Views 2006, p. 46
However, the attitudes of Australians towards China are not exclusively positive and by no means complacent. Instead, it would seem that whilst the rise of China as a phenomenon per se does not overtly concern Australians, perhaps because of economic benefits the booming Chinese economy is reaping for Australia’s mining sector in particular, a slight majority of the respondents nonetheless worried that China’s objective was to dominate Asia and that Australia should seek to cooperate with other countries to contain China. A certain level of anxiety is also evident from the Australian government’s decision to block a Chinese government owned firm from making a majority investment in the Australian resource sector. The 2009 defence white paper, which emphasised long-range power projection capabilities, prompted the Chinese government to protest that it was confrontational by identifying China as a potential major threat to Australia in the future.

Fig. 9: Attitudes towards China
Please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements: *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
<th>AGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China’s growth has been good for Australia</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States should give China a larger say in regional affairs</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China’s aim is to dominate Asia</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia should join with other countries to limit China’s influence</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia’s interests would not be harmed if China gained more power and influence</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia is doing enough to pressure China to improve human rights</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This chart combines respondents who ‘strongly agree’ with those who ‘agree’. It also combines those who ‘strongly disagree’ with those who ‘disagree’.

Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2008 p. 8

Australians are also still relatively suspicious of Indonesia. In particular issues such as the role of the military in Indonesian politics, Islamic terrorism and even persistent image of a potential military threat seem to still be major concerns for the Australian public. Moreover, few respondents in 2006 Lowy Poll were optimistic about bilateral relations, 47% indicating that they believed that relations between the two were worsening and only 19% thought they were improving. However, a majority of Australians also believe that Indonesia is an emerging democracy and that counter-terrorism cooperation between the two countries is very important for Australia.
The pessimism towards the state of bilateral relations had also somewhat alleviated by 2008, this time only 16% stating that relations were worsening and 26% that they were improving.

Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2006, p. 14

### The Importance of the Region for Australia’s Future

The economic importance of the region for Australia has been particularly topical in the political discourse, in particular in the 1980s and 1990s when the Bob Hawke and Paul Keating ALP governments made “comprehensive engagement” a central platform for foreign and trade policy. However, what has the level public support for engagement been in Australia from the 1990s onwards? In the 1996 Australian Electoral Survey the level of support was certainly strong, overwhelming majority of the respondents agreeing with the statement that Australia’s trading future lies with Asia, whilst only 9% disagreed.\(^\text{1104}\) The ALP policy of engagement also received strong backing, 54% agreeing that the policy had been ‘about right’.\(^\text{1105}\) However, as already pointed out, nonetheless the Keating ALP government lost the elections to the openly more ‘Asia sceptic’ Howard-led Coalition government, which also soon after scrapped the ‘comprehensive engagement’ policy and replaced it with a more ‘pragmatic’ policy of balancing Regionalism.

\(^{1104}\) McAllister and Ravenhill (2006), p. 133

\(^{1105}\) McAllister and Ravenhill (2006), p. 134
with a policy of bilateral trade agreements with major trading partners, led by an agreement with the United States.

Did popular opinion, however, change to correspond with the policy shift? Judging from the Lowy Institute Poll 2005 *Australians Speak* results, it did not. When asked to rate the importance of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) under negotiation with the United States and China, majority of the respondents rated the FTA with China as more important than that with the United States. In fact only 35% thought the FTA with the United States was good for Australia, in comparison to 51% that thought one with China was. Moreover, 32% of the respondents thought a FTA with the United States was bad for Australia, whilst only 20% thought the same about one with China.\(^{1106}\)

![Graph showing survey results](image)

*Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2005, p. 21*

However, when the same question was tested in the 2007 Lowy Institute Poll, the popular support for a FTA with China had dropped significantly to 38%, whilst 27% thought it was actually bad for Australia. On the other hand, 47% of the respondents thought a FTA with Japan was a good idea, whilst only 15% considered it bad.\(^{1107}\) The importance of East Asia for Australia’s future also still received popular backing; when questioned about the economic importance of


five major powers to Australia on a scale 0-10, China (7.17) came on top, ahead of the United States (6.99) and the European Union (6.09). Japan (6.91) was third. However, the growing importance of East Asia became apparent when the respondents were asked which countries would be the five most important economic partners 25 years from now. Again China (7.76) was the number one, this time with a larger margin, Japan second (7.01) and the United States third (6.72).

Whilst popular opinion does not seem to support a cultural divide in Australia’s foreign trade, the respondents were much more ambivalent towards foreign investment in Australia in the 2008 Lowy Institute Poll. Moreover, the respondents were clearly negative towards investment from East Asia, whilst somewhat more receptive towards investment originating from Great Britain and the United States than from Singapore, Japan or China.

Fig. 6: Foreign investment in Australia by country

If a company, bank or investment fund controlled by a foreign government was trying to buy a controlling stake in a major Australian company, please say whether you would be strongly in favour, in favour, opposed, strongly opposed or you don’t know, if the foreign government was the government of: *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>In Favour</th>
<th>Opposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This chart combines respondents "strongly in favour" with those "in favour". It also combines respondents "strongly opposed" with those "opposed".

Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2008, p. 6

**America’s Deputy Sheriff?**

As it has been established, Australia’s image in the region is that of an America’s deputy sheriff. However, public opinion in Australia does not support a foreign policy that is so tied into the United States that it would support such an image. First of all, the Lowy Institute polls show that

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1108 Lowy Institute Poll 2007, p. 13
1109 Lowy Institute Poll 2007, p. 13
Australians have warmer feelings towards Japan and Singapore than the United States, and towards China are almost equally warm. Secondly, in the 2005 poll US foreign policy was ranked a threat to Australia by 32% of the respondents, ahead of the ‘Arc of Instability’ (17%) and China’s rise (16%).\textsuperscript{1110} Thirdly, the polls constantly show that Australians agree that the United States has too great of an influence on Australia’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{1111}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{influence.png}
\caption{Influence on Australian foreign policy}
\end{figure}

\textit{Thinking about how much notice Australia takes of the views of the United States in our foreign policy, on the whole do you think we take too much, too little or the right amount of notice?}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
2008 & 31 & 69 \\
2006 & 27 & 73 \\
2005 & 39 & 61 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textit{Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2008, p. 4}

Fourthly, the trust on the United States to act responsibly was certainly not unequivocal, the majority of respondents seeing Japan as the most trustworthy (73%), followed by India (68%) and China (60%) at par with the United States. Moreover, the United States attracted the largest proportion distrust, 39% of the respondents indicating that they trusted it ‘not very much’ or ‘not at all’.\textsuperscript{1112}

\textsuperscript{1110} Lowy Institute Poll 2005, p. 13
\textsuperscript{1111} Lowy Institute Poll 2008, p. 4
\textsuperscript{1112} Lowy Institute Poll 2006, p. 8
Finally, the respondents were ambivalent about the prospects of lessening American power, a slight majority of respondents thought decreasing American political power in the world would be mainly a positive development, whilst an equally slight majority thought that decreasing economic power would be mainly a negative development.\footnote{Lowy Institute Poll 2007, p. 14}

However, when asked how powerful selected major powers should be, the United States was ranked second, behind the European Union, but closely trailed by China and Japan.\footnote{Lowy Institute Poll 2006, p. 8}
Nonetheless, despite the views Australians hold towards US foreign policy and its influence on Australia’s own, the ANZUS alliance has been consistently rated as important for Australia’s security. It would seem that whilst Australians tend to value multilateralism and be quite critical of other aspects of US influence and power, they continue to value the security guarantees the alliance with the United States provides to the country.

Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2006, p. 8

Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2008, p. 11
Regionalism Discourse in East Asia and Australia

Regionalism Discourse in East Asia

The scope of analysis here is that of East Asian Regionalism discourse, specifically in relation to nature of Regionalism in ASEAN and the emerging East Asian Community that is evolving around the Southeast Asian core, as well as the position of Australia in East Asian Regionalism.

Firstly, the analysis shows that ASEAN has combined a Rationalist core of advancing the benefits from material interests; interdependency with an Ideational core of common ideas, identity, culture and values. The organisation, however, has also experienced an evolution from advancing the level of socio-economic development in the region to seeking deeper integration not only through institution building but also through a process of community building, aiming at establishing a unique regional identity held together by common values and norms, embodied in the discourse from the Bangkok Declaration in 1967 to the ASEAN Charter over three decades later.

The Bangkok Declaration (1967), the foundational document of ASEAN, envisioned interest based regional cooperation, acknowledging the existence of interdependency between Southeast Asian states:

“MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation”1115

However, the Bangkok Declaration also envisioned a community brought together by common ideas and norms, as well as historical and cultural ties:

“CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering good understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation

1115 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), Bangkok 8 August 1967
among the countries of the region already bound together by ties of history and culture”1116

The evolution of ASEAN was envisioned in the Bali Concord II with a stated objective to achieve deepening integration and further community building:

“ASEAN shall continue its efforts to ensure closer and mutually beneficial integration among its member states and among their peoples, and to promote regional peace and stability, security, development and prosperity with a view to realizing an ASEAN Community that is open, dynamic and resilient”1117

The Bali Concord II also established a further focus towards the creation of common socio-political values and regional norms as basis for regional cooperation:

“ASEAN shall nurture common values, such as habit of consultation to discuss political issues and the willingness to share information on matters of common concern, such as environmental degradation, maritime security cooperation, the enhancement of defence cooperation among ASEAN countries, develop a set of socio-political values and principles, and resolve to settle long-standing disputes through peaceful means.”1118

Community building and Ideational aspects of Regionalism, however, were given central focus only in the ASEAN Charter, introduced in November 2007, with a firm commitment towards promoting shared regional identity, values and norms as major forces in regional integration:

1116 Ibid
1117 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), Bali 7 October 2003
1118 Ibid
“Mindful of the existence of mutual interests and interdependence among the peoples and Member States of ASEAN which are bound by geography, common objectives and shared destiny”\(^{1119}\)

“Respecting the fundamental importance of amity and cooperation, and the principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, consensus and unity in diversity”\(^{1120}\)

Moreover, the Charter for the first time defined the shared regional values as democracy, rule of law and human rights. The decision to add human rights as a regional value is particularly significant, as it signals an acceptance of universal human rights, a major shift from the earlier opposition to such a concept:

“Adhering to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms”\(^{1121}\)

Finally, the extensive cultural diversity of Southeast Asia is acknowledged in the Charter, but not seen as excluding the possibility to have common values, quoting a EU-style commitment to "unity in diversity":

“Respect for the different cultures, languages and religions of the peoples of ASEAN, while emphasising their common values in the spirit of unity in diversity”\(^{1122}\)

The spirit of the Charter also promoted a further building of ASEAN symbols, that thus far include e.g. a flag, English as working language, a motto, an emblem and ASEAN Day celebrated on 8 August each year, as well as a commitment to come up with a ASEAN anthem in the near future.

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\(^{1119}\) ASEAN Secretariat, The ASEAN Charter, Jakarta, January 2008, p. 1

\(^{1120}\) ASEAN Charter (2008), p. 2

\(^{1121}\) ASEAN Charter (2008), p. 2

\(^{1122}\) ASEAN Charter (2008), p. 7
In summary, the evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism has progressed from focus on interest interdependency to a quest towards achieving deeper integration that involves emphasis on shared socio-political values. This community building exercise involving focus on regional identity, values and norms is increasingly seen as a necessary precondition to deepening integration, which also includes (modest) political integration. Whilst this could be seen as a sign of ASEAN becoming more exclusive by nature, in fact the development is good news for Australia, as ASEAN is establishing political values that are shared with Australia. In addition to the emphasis on democracy, rule of law and human rights, ASEAN’s "unity in diversity” approach is an open acknowledgement that cultural diversity does not make the establishment of shared identity, values and norms impossible, but on the contrary more necessary.

The discourse relating to the evolving East Asian Community follows mostly identical path with that of ASEAN. The East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) final report proposed the formation of an East Asian Community of peace, prosperity and raising the socio-economic standards in the region, thus referring to the same interest interdependency as ASEAN. However, in addition to common interests, the formation of a unique regional identity was also seen as necessary in order to “expedite genuine regional cooperation” in East Asia. How the East Asian Community will turn out exactly is still obviously somewhat of an open question, but it is very likely that it will closely follow the principles of ASEAN in its architecture and approach to Regionalism, thus considering interest interdependency as the core motivation for Regionalism, but necessarily augmented by more Ideational aspects in order to establish deeper integration and moving beyond economic regional cooperation.

**Australia’s Place in the Region**

As it has already been established, the opposition to Australia’s *regionness* has mainly emanated from elite opinion, which has for most of the time been personalised in a few Southeast Asian patriarchs, in particular the Malaysia’s former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed, clearly the most dedicated opponent of Australia’s *regionness*. Mahathir not only attempted to block the

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establishment of APEC, but he managed to block Australia’s membership in ASEM and promoted exclusively Asian form of Regionalism for East Asia that by default would also exclude.

Singapore’s patriarch Lee Kuan Yew, who is also well-known of being critical of Australia, has nonetheless been in fact also encouraging Australia to seek inclusion in the region. In particular Australia’s role in the East Timor crisis and its leadership in the INTEFET forces impressed Lee so much that he said Australia passed a defining test of its *regionness* as a result. Moreover, Lee also indicated that Australia does not have to become culturally Asian to be accepted in the region. Instead the excellent level of Asian literacy, understanding the region’s business practices, cultures and languages were enough to prove its *regionness*. Finally, Lee has indicated that the acceptance of Australia’s *regionness* in Asia was growing constantly; implying that in the long-term Australia could be seen as being genuinely of region.

Also other Southeast Asian members of the political elite, in particular in Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia, have been supportive of Australia’s inclusion in the region. The foremost promoter of Australia’s inclusion in regional institutions, however, has been the former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, also a very active promoter of East Asian Regionalism:

“Finally, let me turn to how cooperation between Japan and ASEAN should be linked to cooperation with all of East Asia. I believe that East Asia’s whole can be greater than the sum of its parts.”

“Through this cooperation, I expect that the countries of ASEAN, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand will be core members of such a community.”

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1124 Lee Kuan Yew interview on ABC’s 7.30 program, 20 November 2000. Transcript available online: http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/stories/s214903.htm, Date accessed: 9 July, 2009

1125 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the luncheon hosted by the Prime Minister of Australia in Canberra on 15 April 1986

1126 Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi, “Japan and ASEAN in East Asia - A Sincere and Open Partnership”, Singapore, January 14 2002
As established earlier, the opposition to Australia’s *regionness* has been said to be Ideationally based. However, the regional discourse in the region does not appear to be particularly focused on Ideational aspects, rather it appears to mix a strong rational core of material interdependency with a focus on common values and identity as integration deepens. Moreover, despite the increasing focus on regional identity and values, the discourses portray an open and inclusive form of Regionalism that acknowledges the considerable regional diversity in cultures, ethnicity and religion. Finally, the Regionalism discourse in East Asia actually appears to be becoming more open to Australia’s involvement, as the regional values are identical to the universal European values - democracy, rule of law and human rights – values that are the core of Australian values.

**Regionalism Discourse in Australia**

Whilst the motivation or need to establish and maintain a close relationship with the region is now rarely contested, the approach and depth of this cooperation have become the dominating focus of Regionalism discourse in Australia. This contemporary Regionalism discourse has involved two competing, but also converging, sub-discourses: 1) one promoted by Keating and Evans, promoting “comprehensive engagement” with the region that goes beyond Rationalist, mainly economic cooperation, extending to arguing Australia’s *regionness* in Ideational terms, aiming at earning recognition as a genuine member of a regional community, and 2) another promoted by Howard and Downer, still arguing for commitment to the region, but on different terms, arguing for pragmatic regional cooperation that aims at maximising national interest, promoting Regionalism that is largely in line with the "club theory", but yet contributing to the “othering” by emphasising Australian "self” by promoting unique values and identity that derives from the British heritage, ANZUS alliance and Judeo-Christian traditions.

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1127 Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi, “Japan and ASEAN in East Asia - A Sincere and Open Partnership”, Singapore, January 14 2002
“Comprehensive Engagement” as the Dominant Discourse

The first dominant discourse, is that of “comprehensive engagement” with the region, or sometimes alternatively titled as “enmeshment” with the region. Since the highpoint of the “engagement” discourse coincided with the era of the Keating ALP government (1991-1996), this section focuses specifically on the construction of the discourse by its two primary advocates; Prime Minister Paul Keating and Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

The first element of the discourse was to argue Australia’s regionness in geographical terms, arguing that whilst Australia was not exactly Asian geographically, it was part of a broader concept of the “East Asian Hemisphere”. The core motivation of the argument was probably not to rewrite geography, but rather to profoundly change Australia’s international standing by constructing a reorientation in thinking away from considering Australia’s geographical position as a burden, broadly based on a notion of Australia being a Western society detached from its peers and displaced in the midst of a turbulent region comprised of societies radically different from its own, as dictated by the “tyranny of distance” thesis. Moreover, rather than being based on only an Ideational notion, or as the opponents claimed – idealistic notion, the argument had a distinctively rational choice core which argued that “comprehensive engagement” was required for not only accepting the geographic reality, but essentially reversing the “tyranny of distance” by embracing Australia’s geographical position as an advantage. Consequently it argued that it was in the country’s interest to reorientate its foreign and trade policy to match this reality, removing the burden of history and heritage and the notion of thinking of the geographical position as a source of threat. This line of thought was made explicit in a speech by Gareth Evans in 1995:

“Partly it is a matter of geography: we may not be part of the Asian land mass geologically, but we are closer to it than anyone else, and longitudinally we share broadly the same time zones as East Asia. As the centre of world economic action shifts to East Asia, we find ourselves physically closer to the action than we have
ever been: it has become a cliché now that the tyranny of distance for Australia has become the advantage of proximity.”

The second element of the discourse’s core was culture. Whilst Evans explicitly recognised that in cultural terms Australia was categorically not Asian, he also argued this would not hinder Australia’s engagement with the region. Moreover, he argued that “engagement” would not entail Australia denying its history and heritage, but rather it would simply have to become more independent and adhere to a unique Australian identity that corresponded better with its multicultural society than to one based on British heritage. This way the Australian identity would not be in conflict with the region. Finally, as a multicultural nation Australia would be a good fit with the region;

“The old preconceptions or paradigms, based on "Asian" and "European" identities, are losing their utility. Australia may not be an "Asian" country anymore than it is "European" or "North American", but it is definitely part of the East Asian Hemisphere. Our culture and society are uniquely Australian, but they encompass qualities which are increasingly influenced by the cultures of our near neighbours. These influences will inevitably grow as economic, defence and people-to-people contacts accelerate the interaction between us. The term "East Asian Hemisphere" captures not only the geographical reality, but a good deal of this culture and social flavour as well.”

Paul Keating, however, constructed “engagement” beyond rational choice stemming from the East Asian ascendancy as the main motivation, arguing that it was not driven by only material interests and interdependency with the region, but also needed to extend to a more Ideational goal of reaching a measure of genuine regionness:

1128 Speech to the CEDA Asian Region International Association of Cooperating Organisations (ARIACO) Roundtable by Senator the Hon Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs, “Australia’s Role in East Asia’s Future”, Melbourne, 11 September 1995
“But our engagement with the region around us is not just commercial. And is not just the result of some crude economic determinism. It goes - and must go - much deeper than that. It goes to a genuine desire for partnership and real involvement.”  

In fact, advocating such genuine regionness, Keating went as far as arguing that Australian and Asian values had points of convergence, in particular in that the typical Aussie value of mateship in fact was a communitarian value in line with the regional concept;

“In many - perhaps most - respects, the values I believe in and most Australians believe in are precisely those that are often referred to in this debate as "Asian". The importance of family, the benefit of education, the need for order and public accountability, the inherent value of work - most Australians I know would describe these as Australian values. Indeed the word most Australians would very likely choose to describe as the core Australian value is 'mateship' - and 'mateship' expresses an ethic of communitarianism and mutual obligation which in other contexts is called ‘Asian’.”

In effect it was this type of value laden approach that provided the opposition with a basis for criticism that Keating was in fact aiming at turning Australia into an Asian country. Instead, in his view Australian history had elements that contributed towards its regionness, rather than hindered it;

“I have never believed that Australians should describe themselves as Asians or that Australia is or can become part of Asia. We are the only nation in the world to inhabit a continent of our own. I have said more than once before, we can't be Asian any more than we can be European or North American or African. We can only be Australian and can only relate to our neighbours as Australians. Our history, including the 40,000 year history of our indigenous people and the

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1130 Speech by Prime Minister Paul Keating at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, “Australia, Asia and the New Regionalism”, Singapore, 17 January, 1996

1131 Speech by Prime Minister Paul Keating at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, “Australia, Asia and the New Regionalism”, Singapore, 17 January, 1996
histories of the 150 different cultures from which Australians derive, make us unique in the world. Our somewhat unlikely history and geography should not change this fundamental conviction and this irrevocable commitment - that Australia is and must always be an integral part of the region around us.”

The primacy of “comprehensive engagement”, as has been demonstrated earlier in this thesis, was also evident in the making and execution of the Australian foreign and trade policy. Thus, instead of having been mere rhetoric, the Keating government was transforming the discourse into action – from language to social change.

**Howard and Downer: Pragmatic Regionalism in terms of Australian national interest, values and identity**

The other significant sub-discourse about Regionalism and Australia’s place in it was mainly constructed by the Liberal-National Party coalition, initially firmly within the framework of the “engagement” discourse during the time spent in opposition and the first year in office, and focusing on attacking “comprehensive engagement” as a betrayal of Australia’s heritage and values. The Coalition, however, soon embarked on constructing its own discourse, which could be titled as "pragmatic Regionalism”, mainly advocated by John Howard and Alexander Downer.

The initial attack against “comprehensive engagement” was launched by John Howard as the opposition leader, arguing that Australia should not seek inclusion by pretending to be Asian. Howard postulated that this honesty would earn the respect of the region and would thus work better than futile “Asianisation” of the country. Finally, he attacked republicanism, both in principle and specifically as a tool for engagement:

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1132 Speech by Prime Minister Paul Keating at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, “Australia, Asia and the New Regionalism”, Singapore, 17 January, 1996
“Australia must meet the regional challenges of the future, in Asia and elsewhere, with the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances but with pride in our history, our values and our institutions. The dynamically successful economies of East Asia have done precisely that in terms of their own national histories, values and institutions. Once we start disavowing our history, or disowning our values or changing our institutions simply because we think regional countries will respect us more for doing so, then we will be badly mistaken. Future constitutional arrangements or national symbols are exclusively a matter for Australians. It both trivialises relations with the region and is an unwarranted act of national self-abasement to believe particular changes can win or lose friends in the region.”

Nonetheless, Howard also acknowledged the fundamental importance of the East Asian ascendancy to Australia and consequently, much like the ALP government, pledged reversing the tyranny of distance:

“Third, a Coalition Government will work to ensure that the tyranny of distance works in reverse -- in favour of our national interests.”

However, soon after elected into office the Howard government began constructing its own alternative discourse around ”pragmatic Regionalism”, in the spirit of Rationalism revolving around maximizing the benefits to Australia’s national interests from regional cooperation. Moreover, the “pragmatic Regionalism” discourse constructed a different ”self” for the country in comparison to “comprehensive engagement” by arguing that Australia should act in agreement with its unique identity and values in the conduct of its foreign and trade policy. This ideological position was first made explicit in Australia’s first foreign and trade policy white paper In the National Interest (1997):

1133 The Fifth Asialink Lecture by John Howard, “Australia’s Links with Asia: Realising opportunities in our region”, Melbourne, 12 April 1995

1134 The Fifth Asialink Lecture by John Howard, “Australia’s Links with Asia: Realising opportunities in our region”, Melbourne, 12 April 1995
“A country’s perception of its national interests is shaped by its geography, history, strategic circumstances and economic profile, as well as by its values. In Australia’s case these elements combine in a distinctive way”

Another Rationalist aspect, in addition to the maximization of national interest, was the linking foreign policy to domestic politics:

“In a democracy, governments must also act to give expression to the aspirations and values of their national communities in foreign policy as much as in other areas of government”

Although “pragmatic Regionalism” clearly had a Rationalist core, it had a distinct Ideational core as well, one revolving around culture, identity and values as fundamental forces in policy-making, and arguing that Australia was by nature a Western country and as such should take pride in its European intellectual and cultural heritage, which has given it liberal democracy and economy:

“The values which Australia brings to its foreign policy are the values of a liberal democracy. These have been shaped by national experience, given vigour through cultural diversity, but reflect a predominantly European intellectual and cultural heritage”.

Howard and Downer also introduced an ideological approach to foreign policy arguing that Australia’s relationship with the region was not a zero sum game, as it did not come at the expense of Australia’s relations with the United States or vice versa. Moreover, due to the considerable level of regional diversity, Howard and Downer argued that Regionalism should be based on interdependence and common interests to work properly. Thus Australia could also

1135 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1997), In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy, White Paper, Canberra, p. 1
1136 In the National Interest, p. 11
1137 Ibid
seek a role in interest based “pragmatic” Regionalism without compromising its values by attempting to “Asianise” the country:

“Australia’s values strengthen its foreign and trade policies. They enable Australia both to sustain traditional links to Europe and North America and to forge stronger ones with Asia. The pursuit of Australia’s interests in the Asia Pacific does not require a surrendering of Australia’s core values. The ethnic, religious, historical and cultural diversity of the Asia Pacific region shows that differences in values do not preclude the effective pursuit of common interests.”

Howard and Downer also steered a departure from a bipartisan foreign policy tradition of multilateralism and middle-power advocacy towards a special emphasis on the alliance with the United States and bilateralism, as well as a stronger emphasis on forming issues based coalitions with “likeminded states”, arguing that the only correct objective of foreign and trade policy was to maximize national interests:

“Over the next fifteen years, Australia’s trade strategies will continue to draw on bilateral, regional and multilateral means. Each has a contribution to make. None offers the only way ahead. All three will be needed if Australia is to improve its trade performance and thereby increase the living standards of Australians.”

However, foreign and trade policy was not to be exclusively bilateral, but rather bilateralism was supposed to complement regional and multilateral policies:

“Effective bilateral relationships are the building block for Australia’s foreign and trade policies. They contribute to and complement regional and multilateral efforts.”

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1138 Ibid
1139 In the National Interest, p. 41
1140 In the National Interest, p. 53
Nonetheless, the government set its objective to join ASEM. This, however, was not intended as a reflection of identity, but rather as recognition that Australia’s interests were intimately tied into those of the region:

“Active participation in APEC and other regional institutions demonstrates Australia’s recognition that its future is inextricably linked to the future of the Asia Pacific region. It reflects the government’s commitment to being closely involved – from the inside – in shaping the region’s future. Over the next fifteen years, Australia’s already extensive regional links, especially to countries of East Asia, will grow even further. As they do, the Government will seek even closer links to regional groups and institutions. Australia’s interest in participating in the Asia-Europe summit process (ASEM) should be seen in this light”\textsuperscript{1141}

The Howard government also judged that bilateralism was a necessary strategy due to the East Asian cultural diversity and to counter the potential evolution to a more exclusive form of Regionalism:

"The growing strength of Regionalism means in turn that Australia’s bilateral partners will increasingly view issues through a regional prism, and with an eye to regional solidarity. This has certainly been the pattern among member states of the European Union, and it is likely to become more of a feature of Australia’s relations with the members of ASEAN"\textsuperscript{1142}

Alexander Downer reiterated the government’s commitment to the Asia Pacific region, whilst again emphasising that the government’s main motivation to do so was to maximise Australia’s national interests, not for any idealistic reasons:

“We said unequivocally that closer engagement with Asia would be our highest foreign policy priority. The Asia Pacific region is our highest foreign policy pri-
ority for one very simple and enduring reason: It is the vital sphere of our economic and strategic interests. The Government has ensured that Australia’s national interest is advanced in an ambitious yet pragmatic and clear-minded fashion. Because if we don’t…no one else will. To borrow the words of English realist Martin Wight, ‘A foreign minister is chosen and paid to look after the interests of his country, and not to delegate for the human race.’  

Speaking at the launch of the second foreign and trade policy white paper Advancing the National Interest in 2003, Downer again responded to the growing criticism that the government was neglecting relations with Asia at the expense of its focus on the alliance with the United States by stating that the government was still committed to the region’s primacy in its foreign policy, but that it had an Asia first approach instead of an Asia only approach that the Keating government had:

“The big lie perpetrated by some about our Government is that somehow we have not paid enough attention to the Asia Pacific region. The fact is that since 1997 we sought to restore some of the balance in our foreign policy and to get away from an Asia-only focus to an Asia-first focus. We have achieved this objective without any erosion of our core interests in the region.”

Moreover, Downer also conveyed the government’s belief that international relations were not a zero sum game and thus, Australia’s relations with the United States did not come at the expense of its relations with Asia, or vice versa:

“In pursuing relations with Asia, we must continue to find the right balance and interplay between Australia’s engagement with Asia and our broader interna-

1143 Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Alexander Downer at the National Press Club, Canberra, 7 May 2002

1144 Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Alexander Downer at the National Press Club, Canberra, 7 May 2002
Finally, Downer emphasised Australia’s European heritage over its geography, portraying Australia as a Western country that just happened to be geographically located in the Asia-Pacific region. The same notion was also central theme in the white paper:

“Australia’s interests are global in scope and not solely defined by geography. Australia is a Western country located in the Asia-Pacific region with close ties and affinities with North America and Europe and a history of active engagement throughout Asia.”

Thus in summary, Regionalism discourses in Australia display a continuous commitment towards the Asia Pacific region as a priority for foreign and trade policy, albeit the Keating and Howard governments held differing views with regard to Australia’s place and role in East Asian Regionalism and thus, also implemented different policy approaches. In any case, the Keating government’s “comprehensive engagement” principally took into account the material interests and focused on seeking to earn Australia recognition as being "genuinely of region”, whereas the Howard government stood for a realist understanding of international relations, emphasised the maximisation of national interest but also interestingly also promoting Australian identity and values as the primary mission of the government. Consequently, the Howard government displayed little or no interest in "emotional Regionalism” and whether Australia was considered “of region” or not.

Also, East Asia and Australia have had differences in discursive practices over time, emphasising different aspects of Regionalism much of the time. The Keating government perhaps emphasised the Ideational aspects somewhat early whilst ASEAN was focused on material interests and pragmatism, whilst the Howard displayed hostility towards “emotional Regionalism” when

1145 Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Alexander Downer at the National Press Club, Canberra, 7 May 2002

1146 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2003), Advancing the National Interest, Canberra, p. viii
regional identity, values and norms were becoming focus areas in the region. However, it would appear that East Asia and Australia are drawing closer to each other again, in particular since the emerging regional values are same as Australia’s, as well as the “unity in diversity” approach that should leave adequate room for Australia despite its perceived cultural divergence from the regional mainstream. Thus, most likely Australia will gradually “slip into” the region, despite fears by the Howard government that the increasing focus on “emotional Regionalism” may lead into Australia’s exclusion.

Finally, the conclusion of the Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis (FPDA with regard to the nature of Regionalism and Australia’s place is that it does not appear to support a notion that the nature of Regionalism in East Asia would be particularly Ideational. On the contrary, the analysis of East Asian discourses revealed that Regionalism in Australia seems to have a persistent rational core, specifically to establish practical regional cooperation towards raising the socio-economic levels in the region through economic cooperation and securing regional peace and security through both practical cooperation and shared norms. In fact a clear majority of the coding references in sources both in the region and Australia were Rationalist.

Moreover, out of the top 10 nodes, in terms of references covered, only one (values) was Ideational, whilst the top nodes were related to economy, trade and security topics. The focus on values, however, seems to be on increase, probably corresponding to the efforts to establish deeper integration, in particular in ASEAN.
Much of the same applied to Australian discourses. The phenomena of "East Asian ascendancy” has clearly resulted in a widely accepted realisation that Australia’s economic future and national security is dependent on the region, to the point that this has been taken for granted and is rarely contested. The differences, however, relate to the terms of Australia’s inclusion in the region, in particular to whether Australia would end up sacrifying its European cultural heritage and values on behalf of gaining a status of “genuinely being of region” and whether such regionness is at all necessary for participation in East Asian Regionalism. Judging from the nature of East Asian discourses, it is quite possible this is not necessary, as long as Australia subscribes to regional norms, which Australia clearly does. The unknown factor, however, is how the nature of Regionalism will develop in East Asia following ASEAN’s deeper integration, which increasingly emphasises the necessity of regional identity and values, as well as the evolutionary course the emerging East Asian Community will take. Ideational approaches could still prove to be indispensable.
7.7 Conclusion: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Ideational Approaches

In conclusion, the main weakness of the Ideational approaches is downplaying the rational (pragmatic) nature of Regionalism in East Asia and perhaps over-emphasising the significance of elite opinion, which in terms of opposition to Australia’s regionness has in fact been mostly personalised to a handful of Asian patriarchs in the media, and the “Asian values” debate. Moreover, the analysis does not support a trend towards exclusive Regionalism and so-called Asian values as being particularly prominent in the East Asian Regionalism discourse. In fact, the core of East Asian Regionalism has been, and still continues to be, largely based on a rational choice in the sense that Regionalism appears to be primarily motivated by an overarching objective to raise the levels of socio-economic development and maximising the benefits from trade, as well as to maintain peace and security in the region. Furthermore, so far at least, EU-style civilizational project (uniting European peoples under the flag of shared identity and values) has not materialised in East Asia. Instead, the civilizational, “Asians only” Regionalism promoted by Mahathir appears to have lost, as demonstrated by Australia’s admission into the EAS. Furthermore, Australia has also been generally seen as a valuable partner in East Asian Regionalism, despite the fact that Australian identity and values derive from British and European heritage and despite the apparent differences in political cultures. Moreover, public opinion in East Asia and Australia does not appear to support the view that cultural differences between East Asia and Australia would be too great for cooperation to be possible, differentiating it somewhat from Turkey’s position. Thus, rational choice in form of pursuit to maximise material interests appears to override questions of identity and culture. In terms of public opinion in Australia, the region’s importance is now rarely contested and the anxiety referred to by Renouf seems to have mostly dissipated. Australians appear to harbour quite warm feelings and trust towards regional states, to the point that Singapore and Japan attract warmer feelings than even the United States. Even China’s rise causes little anxiety in the minds of Australians, in comparison to the Western world in general and even in comparison to some other regional states.

However, much like in Turkey’s case, resistance to Australia’s regionness has been primarily motivated by the perceived differences in identity, culture and values (as well as ethnicity).
between East Asia and Australia. This has also resulted in exercises of "othering", within which context Australia has been seen as a “misplaced European country”, a "deputy sheriff" of the United States and blamed for colonial attitudes in its regional conduct. In this regard Ideational analysis has contributed to a more holistic understanding of the research topic, whilst Rationalist analysis tends to neglect such aspects. Yet, this process of “othering” has arguably hindered and slowed down Australia’s access to regional decision-making, although it is not quite as prominent as in the Turkey – EU case. Moreover, Australian Regionalism discourses have emphasised, a dilemma between the country’s geography and history, in particular in reference to its British and European heritage and the culture and values deriving from this heritage. The result has been a battle between material interdependency with East Asia and an emotional connection with Europe and the United States. Moreover, the analysis here has shown that the focus on values appears to be increasing as integration deepens.

Ideational analysis is also very helpful in terms of assessing the importance and impact of “soft” aspects, such as immigration, people-to-people contacts and education to Australia’s acceptance as a regional state that deserves a seat in regional institutions. Australia’s Asian literacy, i.e. the understanding of Asian politics, business, cultures and languages, has also been referred to as important to Australia’s regionness by its East Asian partners. Finally, the application of Ideational approaches is necessary for a holistic understanding of the nature of Regionalism in East Asia and Australia’s place within it, much like in the Turkey – EU case. The significance of Ideational approaches also increases as the nature of East Asian Regionalism evolves towards political integration and community building based on regional identity, values and norms. Thus, Ideational approaches can produce valuable insight into policy-making through providing a more holistic and realistic evaluation of the importance and impact of norms, values and culture to Australia’s access to regional decision-making.

In any regard, if one considers the results of both Rationalist and Ideational analysis, it would seem that the famous "push into Asia" is no longer necessary, but will likely be replaced by a “pull into Asia” as over time, perhaps in the next 10-15 years, Australia’s regionness becomes considered natural as interests interdependency ensures not only policy convergence between Australia and East Asia but probably also a gradual convergence in terms of norms and values. Australia’s further integration into the region seems likely, in particular since Australia will also
be joining the ASEM on the Asian side of the table at the next Summit (ASEM 8) in Brussels in 2010, which could well be considered as a major breakthrough in Australia’s quest to be considered “genuinely of region”. It still remains to be seen how Kevin Rudd’s APc proposal will shape Australia’s place in the region.
Part IV
Chapter 8: Discussion of Findings

8.1 Introduction

As promised in Chapter 1, the objectives of this chapter are to provide a discussion of the findings, establish the respective strengths and weaknesses of the Rationalist and Ideational approaches and where they possibly intersect. It also provides a suggestion for a new definition of a region and potential new areas of analysis suitable for analytical eclecticism.

As stated in Chapter 1, the objectives of this thesis are to test, challenge and further develop explanatory models in the theory of Regionalism. In particular the thesis aims to add to the understanding of the process of enlargement, as well as its motives, by applying those models to the problem of the ‘borderline states’. The problem of the ”borderline states” is illustrated by two case studies: Australia and Turkey, in the context of their relationship to their respective regions – the European Union and emerging Regionalism in East Asia, and in particular their position in European and East Asian Regionalism. They are labelled ‘borderline states’ not for their geographical properties, but for the permanent partiality of their inclusion within their regions. Such states are in constant flux, varying their degree of belonging depending on the criteria of enclosure.

As stated in Chapter 2, even though there exists a plethora of literature on Regionalism, this thesis argues that the definitions related to Regionalism still remain contested, and that no single theory or approach, Rationalist or Ideational, adequately explains Regionalism, and particular aspects of enlargement; these aspects include motives for states to join regional institutions, and the formation of criteria for membership, and thus the overarching factors involved in inclusion/exclusion. Furthermore, the chapter demonstrated that the majority of the Regionalism literature focuses on the phenomenon of Regionalism in the global context, and particularly the economic context. This can be further elucidated as how and why regional integration projects are implemented in the international system. Moreover, European integration has traditionally dominated the studies of integration. Comparisons to other regions have usually been considered
THE PROBLEM OF THE ‘BORDERLINE STATES’ IN REGIONALISM

weak because of the highly institutionalised nature of the European Union (EU). Finally, it was argued that there is a shortage of systematic work on the issue of enlargement.

8.2 Findings: Answers to the Research Questions

This section presents answers to the research questions based on the empirical research carried out in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.

As indicated in Chapter 3, the following assumptions were made about the research topic:

1 Material or cognitive interdependency alone cannot explain the problem

2 If material interdependency between the case countries and regions is high, and the benefits from full integration are high, it would seem reasonable to assume that if such integration is not taking place then this is because of a lack of cultural similarity

3 Emphasis on regional identity increases with further vertical (deepening) integration and successful regional identity building creates further boundaries for horizontal integration (enlargement)

With these assumptions in mind, and considering the original research questions of the thesis, the following conclusions were reached:

1 What is the current level of interdependency (material and cognitive) between the case countries and regions? How are these measured?

In both case studies the case countries and regions have well-established and extensive material interdependency, which tends to be mutually acknowledged by both the case countries and the case regions. This interdependency is particularly obvious in terms of economy and trade, but also in terms of security and political issues, a fact that is demonstrated by Turkey’s and Australia’s long-term participation in regional institutions. The perceived importance of access to
energy and raw material resources that both countries offer to their respective regions comple-
ments this.

Both countries also have a deep sense of commitment towards the region, even though the terms of their inclusion have been subject to domestic debates, and given different levels of attention in policy-making by different governments in office along the way. Moreover, the source of this commitment appears to be principally materially motivated in both cases, albeit in Turkey’s case “Europeanization”\textsuperscript{1147} has been a stated objective since the establishment of the republic.

However, as hypothesised in the beginning of the research, both have indeed been excluded on the same basis: Turkey and Australia are generally not considered as being “genuinely of re-
gion”. The opposition to their membership has thus been framed in the context that Turkey is not a “European” state and Australia is not “Asian”. Consequently, the two are still kept arms length, having been allowed higher levels of integration than states external to region but nonetheless kept short of full membership. This is particularly evident in Turkey’s case, in which, unlike in the CEEC-10 enlargement, Turkey’s “Europeanness” is contested, and consequently much of the opposition is Ideationally motivated. Moreover, it was argued that the “othering” is part of EU’s soul-seeking process which, motivated by the prospect of Turkey’s membership, has produced a debate regarding the EU’s ultimate borders and its regional identity.

Whilst in the Australia-East Asia case the influence of rational choice based decision-making was found more significant than in the Turkey-EU case, as demonstrated by Australia’s access to the East Asia Summit and potentially to ASEAM, nonetheless Australia’s access to regional institutions has been in the past hindered by perceptions of Australia as a “misplaced European country” (and thus being perceived as “non-Asian” state), as well as negative public and elite perceptions of Australia’s image in the region. Moreover, it was established that the dilemma between the country’s geography and history, particularly in reference to its British and Euro-

\footnote{\textsuperscript{1147} “Europeanization” and ”modernization” would appear to be treated as synonymous in this respect}
emotional connection with Europe and the United States, as the guiding principles for making of foreign policy.

Measurements of interdependency, both material and cognitive, reflect the dichotomy between Rationalist and Ideational approaches. Measurement of material interdependency is monopolised by Rationalist approaches, which focus on measuring economic, political and security aspects of the problem, unified by rational choice based basic ontology. The Turkey-EU case is a primary example of this. The strict Rationalist thinking on Turkey’s EU prospects correspond with the official line of the EU: Turkey has been an official candidate since the 1999 Helsinki Summit and the December 2004 Copenhagen European Council decided to begin official negotiations towards accession with Turkey, following a positive assessment by the European Commission. As long as Turkey fulfils the requirements set out in the Copenhagen Criteria and the Accession Partnership it will eventually become a full member of the EU. Disagreement amongst Rationalists is pivots on whether Turkey meets the set political and economic criteria.

Another central theme in Rationalist analysis is the, often highly speculative, cost/benefit calculations modelled on Mattli’s logic of integration or the economic “club theory”. The most common topics for such analysis are assessments of the impact of Turkey’s membership on economic integration, trade, the EU budget, working of regional institutions, common foreign and security policy and migration. In general, the Rationalist approach dictates that accession will only occur if benefits are higher than costs; this criterion also dictates the prospects for a successful accession. Again the basic assumption is that the EU (and its member states) is a rational agent and thus, so long as the benefits of the Turkish accession are perceived to override the cost, Turkey will be permitted entry to the Union. The debate about Turkey’s ”Europeanness” and its conformity to European values is considered to be of secondary value in Rationalist analysis and is not given significant attention beyond questions such as democracy and human rights, which are part of the membership criteria.

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However, as established earlier in the thesis, Mattli argues that in some cases the existence of negative externalities resulting from turning down a candidate can override this logic even if costs are deemed higher than benefits.
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In the Australia – East Asia case, a similar research agenda prevails. Rationalist approaches focus on economic, security and strategic choices as primary topics for research. The focus on institutional analysis is largely absent, however, due to the different regional architecture and nature of Regionalism in East Asian compared to Europe. The cost/benefit analyses are a similarly popular topic in this research area, albeit even more speculative in nature due to the lower level of integration in East Asia in comparison to Europe. Comparisons between the costs and benefits of bilateralism versus Regionalism are also a distinct feature that does not present itself in the Turkey-Europe research agenda.

Cognitive interdependency, on the other hand, is measured by establishing whether a sense of “we-ness”, or notion of a shared destiny, exists between the members of a regional organisation and thus, whether Regionalism is driven by a shared “idea” of the region rather than material interests alone. As such, Ideational analysis is particularly interested in the potential for shared regional identity and values, as well as the processes by which these are “constructed”. The existence of similarity, however, necessarily entails difference in comparison to others; construction of “self” requires a process of “othering” against which the “self” is constructed. Thus, the analysis of regional identity is interested in whether and why Turkey and Australia serve as the regions’ “others” in the process of building a regional identity in Europe and East Asia; this posits questions of whether these elucidations would explain their positions as “borderline states”. Thus comparisons of “Asian values” against “Australian values” and “European values” against “Islamic values” have received increasing attention in Ideational analysis.

Consequently, Ideational approaches focus on qualitative analysis of factors contributing towards convergence between the case countries’ identity and culture and those of the region, such as geography, history, culture, values and people-to-people contacts. The investigation of “othering” is increasingly encapsulated within discourse analysis.

2 What should the level of interdependency be according to each approach (rational vs. Ideational) to accommodate further integration?

The levels of material interdependency in both cases arguably meet the required benchmarks in terms of economy, although these benchmarks lack specification. Nonetheless, economic inter-
dependency is not generally disputed in either the case countries or wider region. In the Turkey-EU case, however, the *Copenhagen Criteria* sets the specific economic, political and institutional requirements for membership (in particular with regards to democracy, rule of law, and protection of minorities) and the Accession Process, in the form of the *acquis communautaire* - the formal criteria for the implementation of community legislation. The primary question from a *Rationalist* point of view is thus whether Turkey meets these official criteria.

The level of cognitive interdependency is, in both cases, albeit to a different degree, perceived as problematic by the incumbent membership, as demonstrated by elite and popular opinion, as well as Regionalism discourses in each of the regions. Thus, the fact that that Turkey is not popularly perceived as a European state, despite the fact that its candidacy status is at least *de facto*, if not *de jure*, illustrates a distinct lack of acknowledgment of its “Europeanness”. In this sense the much criticised “Clash of Civilizations” thesis by Huntington earns a level of credibility. It would indeed appear that elites and the population in the “host civilization” are not receptive to these ideas, whilst popular backing in Turkey for EU membership has also simultaneously declined. Based on this research it is justifiable to argue that a clear majority of EU citizens and the elite would need to perceive Turkey as “European” for accession to be guaranteed. Explanations of how exactly this could be achieved is problematic, as Turkey’s “Europeanness” appears to be tied to process of constructing the European identity in which Turkey plays the role of Europe’s “other”. The nature of European Regionalism also displays some signs of a civilizational project: uniting the European peoples under a common set of values and identity. The possible fast-tracking of financially bankrupt Iceland’s membership application is another development which strengthens this assumption.

Australia has faced identical rejection as a result of not being “Asian” and external perception that it is not “genuinely of region”, despite the widely acknowledged material interdependency between Australia and East Asia. However, recent developments would suggest that the significance of *regionness* has declined in value, due to Australia’s admission to the East Asia Summit in 2005 and especially its possible admission to ASEM in the Asian side of the table. Should this happen, it would suggest that the emerging East Asian Regionalism project (aiming towards an East Asian Community) is not exclusive by nature and is based more on rational choice than hypothesised. Thus, it would seem that building a regional identity in East Asia appears to
accommodate a greater variance of culture, ethnicity, religion and political systems than the European project. Nonetheless, in order to ensure further integration Australia will have to continue to reduce its negative image and role as the “other” for certain regional states. As long as Australia is significantly perceived as the ‘US deputy sheriff’ and until it truly manages to rid itself of the ”White Australia” image, it will not be fully accepted as an independent regional actor that has genuine commitment to common interests with its regional neighbours.

3 What are the benefits and costs of inclusion vs. exclusion in each case?

In both cases there is little doubt that the case countries would be the primary beneficiaries, whilst the regions would benefit marginally.

Whilst the exact economic impact of Turkey’s membership is impossible to assess due to the fact that even the best projections are essentially speculative and subject to a number of changing conditions in Turkey and the EU, it is quite clear that Turkey would be the net beneficiary in short- to medium-term at least. Turkey would directly benefit from increased trade and in receipts from EU budget funds, specifically from CAP and Structural Funds. The economic impact on the EU would likely be relatively minor, due to the relatively small size of the Turkish economy. From the perspective of the EU, economic motives from therefore have little backing in terms of factual evidence. From Turkey’s point of view, however, the economic motives are quite clearly substantiative and thus are likely to constitute a genuine – and significant - source of motivation to join the EU as a full member.

The budgetary impact of Turkey’s accession would be significant at approximately €15 to €35 billion, but manageable in scale (maximum of 0.20% of EU-28 GDP), roughly matching the commitment made towards the “Eastern enlargement”. Considering the EU’s decision to commence membership negotiations with Turkey, it is only fair to assume that - in principle at least - the Union has already committed itself to Turkey’s membership and hence, the costs it will entail.

Unlike in the case of Turkey /EU debate budgetary considerations do not exist as a similar level of necessary analysis in East Asia; similarly issues surrounding voting and decision-making are
less problematic as decisions in East Asian institutions are mainly made on consensual basis. In the case of East Asia, neither does there exist an established formal membership criterion such as the “Copenhagen Criteria” in Europe. As also pointed out, East Asian Regionalism differs from its European counterpart rather significantly. Unlike Europe where a single regional organisation dominates regional cooperation, East Asia displays a myriad of organisations and proposals. Consequently, in particular in the field of economic cooperation a complex tangle of preferential trading agreements, both regional and bilateral, complicates the architecture of regional economic cooperation. Moreover, formation of a customs union along the lines of those established in European integration, where members have the same tariff and commercial policy towards non-members, is not on the agenda of the Vientiane Action Programme. Subsequently, even if ASEAN’S conception of an Economic Community is realised, Australian goods will continue to face different duties for the same good in each ASEAN country.\textsuperscript{1149} In terms of access to markets, Australia currently enjoys ‘most favoured nation’ treatment in most ASEAN markets, and in case of Singapore and Thailand it enjoys better than MFN status through bilateral FTAs.\textsuperscript{1150}

A further difference with Turkey is that Australia has sought to compensate its exclusion from the region by pursuing a number of bilateral agreements with regional countries, as well as simultaneously emphasising traditional markets in Europe and the United States. Economic relations with East Asian states on the other hand have been conducted increasingly under the umbrella of bilateral FTAs, specifically under the eleven-year reign of the Howard government, during which multilateral cooperation was used as a supportive secondary strategy. Hence, given that a majority of its trade relations with the region are governed within the context of bilateral FTAs, the critical question becomes what would Australia gain from increased integration to regional multilateral economic cooperation? Given this specific background, a comparison between costs and benefits Australia would incur from bilateralism versus those incurred if a strategy of multilateralism was pursued as a prevailing strategy towards managing relationships.

\textsuperscript{1149} Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2006), ASEAN Building an Economic Community, East Asia Analytic Unit, Canberra, p. 80

\textsuperscript{1150} Ibid
with East Asia, would best serve as good estimation of whether Australia would benefit from closer integration with the region.

The economic benefits from increased access to the regional markets would primarily derive from the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, restrictions on investment and from services trade. Currently Australian companies face a range of trade and investment restrictions in ASEAN markets, in services sectors in particular; tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, investment, services and labour are, for example, still in place. In many cases Australian firms and investors face stringent foreign equity limits, employment restrictions, requirements for joint ventures, restrictions on foreigners practising certain professions, non-recognition of Australian qualifications, and bans on land ownership by foreigners. Also, in addition to trade in goods, services trade is increasingly important. Currently in the areas of services trade ASEAN still consists of ten separate markets; deeper integration with the development of ASEAN Economic Community would create one regional market, in which Australia’s inclusion could produce significant gains. The Centre for International Economics estimated in its 2000 report that AFTA-CER FTA (AANZFTA) would create gains equal to 0.27% of the combined GDP (US$ 25.6 billion) for ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) countries by 2010 and 0.25% of GDP (US$ 19.1 billion) for Australia and New Zealand, as well as additional capital inflows worth of US$ 7.7 billion in the same period. In comparison, a broader East Asian Summit based FTA would boost Australia’s annual GDP by an estimated 1.4%.

In terms of the risks involved with signing up to a regional agreement, the critical question would be whether doing so would endanger trade relations with external trading partners, e.g. the

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1151 Op.cit. p. 70
1152 Op.cit. p. 81
1153 Davis, Lee, Warwick McKibbin and Andrew Stoeckel (2000), Economic benefits from an AFTA-CER free trade area, Centre for International Economics, Canberra, pp. 22-24
United States and the European Union? Currently it would seem that such a risk is remote as the planned regional agreements pledge to follow the principles of “open Regionalism”, and are thus supportive of multilateral trade liberalisation - yet another benefit in comparison to bilateral FTAs.

4 Which set of theories (rational vs. Ideational) provides a better explanation for the problem in terms of greater explained variance?

First of all, it needs to be acknowledged that any direct comparison between the approaches is difficult due to their different focus in terms of research topics, stemming from ontological and epistemological differences. The “Rationalist” approach focuses on material interdependency as the main driving force behind integration. Thus, Regionalism is seen as a consequence of rational calculations and bargains by rational agents. In contrast, the “Ideational”, or Social Constructivist approach, emphasizes shared regional identity and culture as the main driving forces that produce levels of “cognitive interdependence”. Hence, testing the explanatory powers of the two approaches is difficult due to their inherited ontological and epistemological differences. This difficulty, however, does vary according to context and it is possible to make observations on how well the two approaches explain a particular puzzle, or a complex problem, such as the problem of the borderline states in Regionalism. Whilst the main strength of the Rationalist approaches lies in explaining the “process” of enlargement, including Turkey’s accession process, the main strength of the Ideational approaches attacks the area where Rationalist approaches are at their very weakest: explaining the underlining motives for enlargement, and thus also Regionalism in general.

Firstly, the Rationalist approaches have a particular strength in explaining the process of integration, as well as providing valuable input in terms of motivation for Regionalism. Material benefits are, after all, commonly used as primary justification for regional integration towards domestic polities, albeit Ideational motives also feature prominently. One failure of the

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\text{For instance in the EU Eastern Enlargement the reunification of Europe and the European peoples was prominently used as a justification for enlargement}
Rationalist approach, however, is in explaining the opposition to, and thus the EU’s motives for, Turkey’s membership. In either case, whether we are interested in the EU’s motives for realising Turkey as a candidate or in the opposition to its full membership, material interests and rational choice models have very limited explanatory power.

Another major weakness of the Rationalist approach in analysing Turkey’s position in European Regionalism is that it does not sufficiently account for the “hidden agendas” behind the “Eastern enlargement”. These “agendas” were evident in the reunification of Europe and Turkish accession, and effectively function as a “cross-civilizational” project creating a “bridge across civilizations.” A similar weakness extends to assessments on the impact on EU institutions, which arguably is much more modest than feared in worst case scenarios. In fact, the EU has discovered from its past enlargement experiences that institutional reform can moderate the adverse impact of enlargement on deeper integration. Whilst the arguments based on the population size of Turkey and its proportional share of votes are arguably better analysed using a Rationalist framework, without carrying out an Ideational analysis we cannot reasonably conclude that the main concern in this context is a neo-functional concern over the technical functioning of institutions, rather than a concern motivated by a hidden agenda, i.e. that due its cultural (or even “civilizational”) differences Turkey would utilize its power in EU institutions in a manner not corresponding with “European values”.

Explaining the prospects of Turkey’s membership in the EU is not possible without analysis of the impact of factors such as history, culture, geography, religion, values and identity. Moreover, the prospect of Turkey’s potential membership has clearly prompted a process of self-examination of the European project, in particular in terms of what a “European identity” entails and what will comprise the “final” borders or boundaries of the European Union. Significantly Turkey’s membership has become, if not a focal point, then at least a vehicle for the process of defining these borders/boundaries, both geographically and mentally. Geographically the outcome of Turkey’s membership negotiations will significantly contribute towards determining the EU’s eastern boundaries; mentally the outcome will circumscribe the boundaries of the idea of the “European project”, where aspects of culture, values and identity are considered the glue that tie the “European” nations together. It therefore becomes evident that providing credible explanations for Turkey-EU relations is simply not possible without Ideational analysis.
The assumption that the financial/economic benefits of Turkey’s accession must be higher than the associated costs is seriously discredited by the CEEC-10 enlargement. Claiming that this needs to be the case in Turkey’s accession, therefore, is neither sustainable, nor does it withstand empirical testing. In this respect Rationalist approaches fail in their own regard. The fact that Turkey stands as an official candidate already poses a serious challenge to Rationalists, but should Turkey not be permitted to accede the credibility of rational choice based on cost/benefit approaches would be all but crushed.

The security agreement between Indonesia and Australia and its repercussive implication that two fundamentally different societies choose to cooperate in sensitive areas of security and defence supports the credibility of a rational approach to international relations and the Howard government’s notion of “pragmatic Regionalism”. Furthermore, Australia has is also generally regarded as a valuable partner in East Asian Regionalism, despite the fact that Australian identity and values derive from British and European heritage, and despite the apparent differences between the two political cultures. Moreover, public opinion in East Asia and Australia does not appear to support the view that cultural differences between East Asia and Australia would be too great for cooperation to be possible. Thus, rational choice as a pursuit to maximise material interests appears to override questions of identity and culture.

Yet, it has been established that Australia has encountered significant opposition to its inclusion in regional institutions and cooperation by a number of regional countries, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia. Some of this opposition can be explained by political differences and conflicting strategic interests between Australia and the two neighbours, but a significant amount of this opposition has cultural and ethical motivations that claim that Australia is not an Asian country and thus is ethnically unfit to be “genuinely of region”. Ideational analysis was also found helpful in assessing the importance and impact of “soft” aspects, such as immigration, people-to-people contacts and education on Australia’s acceptance as a regional state that deserves a seat in regional institutions. Australia’s Asian literacy, i.e. the understanding of Asian politics, business, cultures and languages, has also been referred to as important to Australia’s regionness by its

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East Asian partners. Finally, it was established that the application of Ideational approaches is necessary for a holistic understanding of the nature of Regionalism in East Asia and Australia’s place within it. The significance of Ideational approaches also arguably may increase as the nature of East Asian Regionalism evolves towards political integration and community building based on regional identity, values and norms. Thus, analysis concludes that Ideational approaches can produce valuable insight into policy-making through providing a more holistic and realistic evaluation of the importance and impact of norms, values and culture to Australia’s access to regional decision-making and its role in regional institutions.

In conclusion, rational approaches have a particular strength in terms of analysing the process of enlargement. This is particularly relevant to the Turkey-EU case, where the process of accession is in accordance with the logic of rational choice, being built on pre-determined criteria (albeit partly Ideational). Consequently, a Rationalist approach is better equipped and more appropriately focused towards objectively measuring Turkey’s progress against these criteria. However, in theory at least, Turkey is now “an ordinary candidate”, officially destined to become a full member in the EU, albeit with an indefinite timeline. Nonetheless, each and every country that has presented as an official candidate has become a full member. From a Rationalist perspective there is no reason to expect this will alter in the case of Turkey, unless it fails to meet the above mentioned criteria.

With regards to the cost/benefit research agenda, it seems justifiable to argue that this was important until the Accession Partnership (with the earlier mentioned caveat about their accuracy in mind), but perhaps not subsequently. In fact, it would appear that cost/benefit analyses are now of little use, as according to a Rationalist ontological point, view, cost/benefit ratios should by now have little or no bearing on the result of Turkey’s accession process.

However, the Turkey-EU case is also a powerful demonstration of how enlargement decisions are disconnected from rational choice, and operate under clear Ideational motives. It should therefore be recognized that not only is the opposition to Turkey’s membership Ideational in nature, but also the justification for enlargement as a process is directly connected to the idea of the European project. Thus, it matters immensely that the process of construction of European identity involves Turkey as Europe’s “significant other”. Yet, Rationalist approach is unable to
allow for this in its ontology, which also makes it somewhat ignorant for its implications, and lacking in holistic consideration. The significance of this weakness is paramount; evidence illustrates that even if Turkey fulfils the specified official criteria there is no guarantee of success as only one vote, motivated by “othering” can prevent the accession process. This can be argued as partly an institutional weakness in EU’s enlargement process, as accession requires full consensus and is not based on majority voting as other issues are. This also reveals a policy option; a majority vote for accession could at least partially override the Ideational concerns and therefore make the process a more rational choice in nature.

Nonetheless, one significant factor can be revealed only by Ideational analysis: Turkey’s accession is directly linked to the battle for the European idea. For some Turkey’s accession would complete the European project, whilst for others it would ruin it. Thus Turkey’s accession cannot be credibly analysed in isolation and must be considered alongside the European idea and identity building process, which are both particularly strong points of Ideational approach. An Ideational approach should be considered as the primary tool for analysis of motives of enlargement; no explanation of Turkey’s position in European Regionalism can be complete without the investigation of variables such as values, culture and identity. Moreover, Ideational approaches, specifically Social Constructivism, also contribute to the investigation of the process of enlargement, particularly with regards to whether Turkey adheres to “European values” or has a “European vocation”. Finally, albeit the evolving Regionalism in East Asia appears to be less Ideational in nature, motivations for opposition to Australia’s participation are clearly a case for Ideational analysis; this approach is especially relevant in terms of why this opposition emerged and why it appears to be in withdrawal now. Theoretically there are at least two options to consider in this regards: either the idea that “Asians only” Regionalism was never considered important in the region, or that the regional states made a rational choice to cooperate with Australia regardless of its divergent identity and culture. Perhaps ironically, this implied that rational choice was a driving force in East Asian Regionalism and was confirmed by Ideational research.

As for other potential points of convergence, this thesis argues that the stability of enlargement is a topic worthy of further investigation. Doing so, however, as this research would suggest involves both motives and a process. It would require a synthesis, or evolution of at least one of
the approaches to incorporate variables from the other. Alternatively, it would require a “third way” such as analytical eclecticism. Nonetheless, it is evident that such an investigation would have policy relevance for the candidate countries and host regions. The process, in the case of the EU, would involve two aspects, first of which is integration capacity, referring to the institutional and financial capacity of the EU to absorb new members. This would necessitate application of rational choice, Neo-Liberal Institutionalism and perhaps Neofunctionalism, towards measuring the economic, financial and institutional impacts of accession in order to establish a more reliable cost/benefit assessment of enlargement. However, judging on the basis of Turkey’s accession, one could easily argue that enlargement decision also involves a hidden agenda of cognitive capacity, referring to the EU’s capability to socially integrate new members, whilst dealing with a shift from homogeneity to heterogeneity. I would once again stress the importance of adding this to the research agenda; even if we argue that this topic came to the fore due to institutional challenges experienced as a result of the Eastern enlargement, the fact that integration capacity was not a major concern when the decision was taken to include the Central and Eastern European states into the EU (or at least it was made regardless of such concerns), enforces the proposition that enlargement has a strong Ideational base. Furthermore it suggests that enlargement can have significant impact on the idea of the region. In order to gain an improved understanding of the interplay between such considerations, we should consider this a potential case for analytical eclecticism.

5 What constitutes regional identity? What impact do notions of regional identity have on the problem? How do the identities and cultures of “borderline states” compare with those of the respective regions?

As Chapter 5 argued a “European identity” does not really exist independently, but rather as supplementary to national identities. Moreover, a study commissioned by the European Commission which examined the emergence of a European identity from a wide variety of theoretical perspectives found that whilst such an identity may be forming, it is still far from

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1157 Rehn, Olli (2006), Europe’s Next Borders, Nomos, Baden-Baden, p. 38
coherent.\textsuperscript{1158} The Eurobarometer studies have also consistently found that EU citizens prioritise their own nationality over European identity, thus supporting the idea that European identity functions as a supplement.

Whilst a common European identity shared by its citizens is still under construction, the regional identity of the EU is, by some commentators, arguably constituted through European values, suggesting the existence of a value community united by common ideas of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. One such commentator is the EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, who argues in his recent book “Europe’s Next Borders” that it is the shared values that make the European borders, not geography alone: "The map of Europe is first and foremost defined in the minds of Europeans. Geography sets the frame, but essentially it is our common values that make the borders of Europe."\textsuperscript{1159} Others, however, as Chapter 5 demonstrated, consider geography and history as the primary determinants, and define European culture by the experience of Renaissance and Enlightenment and its Judeo-Christian heritage.

Regardless of which of the aforementioned criteria dominates, Turkey’s real and perceived inability to conform to the European ideal and practices, combined with perceptions of cultural divergence, have been reflected in a generally negative public opinion towards Turkey’s accession. As such Turkey is said to have become Europe’s significant “other” replacing the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block, thus acting as the “other” in European identity construction.

Identity and culture are, therefore, clearly very important variables in determining Turkey’s fate and for gaining a better understanding of enlargement; the type of union into which the EU evolves over the next 10 to 15 years determines the type of borders it will have and how candidates are selected and treated. This is an area of primary interest to Turkey. Should the EU evolve into an exclusive “club” based on history and geography, Turkey should expect trouble. On the other hand, should the EU evolve into an open ended community based on a political and


\textsuperscript{1159} Rehn (2006), p. 45
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economic project which has room for potential candidates with “divergent identities”, Turkey has a relatively good chance of being accepted.

In comparison to Europe, the building of a regional identity in East Asia is clearly less advanced, has received less attention and (currently) has lesser importance to the regional project. Moreover, the region is perhaps even more diverse in terms of culture, ethnicity, religion and values than Europe. Consequently, despite a vibrant “Asian values” debate in the past, a universal East Asian identity has not thus far emerged. In the absence of universal Asian values, Australia’s values tend to be compared to Confucianism, which has been defined as “an ethnical system and humanistic world view that places great emphasis on forms of conduct within relationships, and on personal virtue, obedience to authority, family, loyalty, social harmony and education.”

Australia’s identity in the region is on the other hand perceived as a typically Western identity, characterised by egalitarianism, secularism of government and freedom of religion, parliamentary democracy and freedom of speech, respect of rule of law, and freedom of assembly. In contrast to the Australian identity which is seen as individualistic, East Asian societies are perceived as communitarian.

Whilst there is no clear independent regional identity as such, the emerging East Asian Community is, however, in the process of developing a common identity and culture. How far this will be based on a collection of supposedly universalistic “Asian values”, and how it impacts on the inclusivity and exclusivity of the regional institutions, remains to be seen as this process is still in its early stages. The adoption of democracy, rule of law and human rights by ASEAN Charter, however, may lead to the development of a regional identity that is compatible with Australia’s Western identity.

8.3 Eclectic Analysis of the Problem of the Borderline States: Why are Turkey and Australia in the borderlines of European and East Asian Regionalism?

The question arises of how analytical eclecticism can contribute towards a better understanding of Regionalism? The first contribution I would argue, is its topic; the Rationalist approach is focused towards material factors and a rational choice-based pursuit of economic, security and political gains with little or no interest towards identity and culture as variable; interests are a priori to identity whilst the Ideational approach assumes the opposite. Thus neither approach is especially contributory in assessing “the problem of the borderline states in Regionalism”, where material interests and identity are arguably complimentary rather than conflicting. Moreover, as this thesis has shown, neither approach can actually explain the problem, even if they focus on it. Thus, analytical eclecticism can be useful in terms of identifying and framing problems that are significant, but for ontological and epistemological reasons have a tendency to be ignored by the paradigmatic approaches. Secondly, “the problem of the borderline states” has clear policy relevance; Turkey and Australia have for decades sought ways to gain full access to their respective regions, but have failed to do so regardless of their high level of material interdependency and the lack of any official criteria in regards to identity and culture. Thus, it would appear that neither strictly Rationalist nor Ideational analyses can provide sufficient guidance for strategic decision-making. Opting between applying “pragmatic” policies and strategies supporting Europeanization/Asianization in serration has obviously not had an optimal outcome for either country.

Thirdly, a more holistic view of the problem can help identify the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches objectively and thus, contribute to the development of Rationalist and Ideational approaches as well. Undertaking comparisons by applying eclecticism can also assist in the clarification of the research agenda in terms of Regionalism studies. As this thesis has demonstrated, for instance, the Rationalist approach has a particular strength in analysing the process of enlargement, whilst an Ideational approach is required for analysing the motives of enlargement. Moreover, a potential point of convergence between the two approaches is in analysing the stability of enlargement: the Rationalist approach contributes to the analysis of integration...
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capacity, whilst the Ideational approach contributes to the analysis of cognitive capacity. They function together to establish the need and means to integrate and socialise new members in regional institutions and their compatibility in regards to the decision-making culture and mode of operation of the regional organisation. This would not necessarily require a synthesis between the two, but rather establishing a division of labour and mode of cooperation in a shared research agenda. As Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein have argued, the relationship between various causal factors and the order of sequence in which variables interact need not be the same in all situations:

“Furthermore, analytical eclecticism leaves room for disagreement about the shape of particular causal arguments and the sequence in which variables interact. While instrumental rationality and identity as well as material and social factors are intertwined, the particular combination of these factors in various concrete situations need not be the same. In the aggregate, these explanations are complementary rather than mutually exclusive, may be hard to distinguish empirically, and in some cases there might not even be any fact of the matter to distinguish at all.”

Thus, the primacy of Rationalist or Ideational causalities and variables may vary according to the nature of the problem under investigation.

Finally, how can analytical eclecticism assist in understanding Turkey’s and Australia’s position as “borderline states” in European and East Asian Regionalism? One example would be to investigate how material interests and perceptions of strategic interests shape the focus of regional cooperation and membership of regional institutions, and how these are shaped by the agents’ identity and culture, including political culture and culture of strategic decision-making.

Katzenstein’s example of the decision to include Portugal and Italy in NATO are a case in point:

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“Italy’s inclusion among NATO’s founding members, along with that of undemocratic Portugal (given the strategic importance of the Azores), underscore the importance of eclectic explanations that encompass both strategic calculations and regional identities. In these two cases, the geographically defined region and the sense of identification with fellow democracies proved less decisive than strategic calculations in determining membership.”

Essentially the same could be argued about Australia and Turkey, which could be considered as contemporary examples of this type of compromise between strategic importance based on rational choice and identity. After all, Australia is an important partner in the US alliance with Asia, and for the global war on terrorism, whilst Turkey is an important NATO member and US ally with significant influence in the Middle East, Caucasus, the Black Sea region and the Balkans. Thus, both are important players in the strategic environment of their respective regions. Such strategic importance in combination with economic interests could explain why elites in the region may be pushing the inclusion of such countries despite historical animosity and perceived cultural divergence. However, just as strategic interests can override identity and culture, the strategic importance of Australia and Turkey can also be overtaken by concerns over identity and culture.

One possible explanation for the ongoing conflicts in explanations and for resolutions is the role of elites versus popular opinion. It should not be taken as given that strategic interests are obvious to the masses or that popularity necessarily follows a rational explanation of these strategies. This may be particularly significant in East Asian Regionalism as political elites have the monopoly over regional decision-making; in contrast, in Europe popular opinion significantly constrains elite decision-making. This observation is not a criticism of participatory democracy and transparency in regional decision-making; it ignores, for example, that East Asia too has participatory democracies (e.g. Japan, Thailand and the Philippines). Rather, this observation adds another aspect to the differences in regional projects between the two regions. Nonetheless it can be argued with a reasonable confidence that the "bridge" argument is neither convincing

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nor helpful when it implies civilizational divisions. The strategic value of Turkey and Australia does not override the perceived damage to regional cohesion caused by increased heterogeneity. If nothing else, this type of discourse opens up the possibility that the two should/could remain on the other side of the bridge, as strategic/privileged partners, which could ensure maintenance of strategic benefits whilst not sacrificing cohesion. Thus, the “bridge” argument is not a credible justification for full membership.

In conclusion, an eclectic analysis of Turkey’s and Australia’s position as “borderline states” is helpful for testing ontologically different approaches, in identifying variables and causalities that Rationalist and Ideational approaches miss, and thus contribute to development of theory within these approaches. Alternatively analytical eclecticism could develop its own loose empirical approach, applying compatible parts of the two approaches in parallel if not in synthesis.

8.4 Defining “Regionalism” and “Regions”

It firstly needs to be recognized that the challenge of suggesting a definition that encompasses both Rationalist and Ideational is daunting due to ontological and epistemological divergence. The following definition may thus be criticized for this weakness. However, as stated earlier, the main motive for suggesting a new definition is to accommodate a more eclectic understanding of what constitutes a region, what drives Regionalism and in particular how a region’s membership is determined.

As stated in Chapter 2, a definition of a region should encompass at least: 1) geographic proximity; 2) material interdependency; 3) cognitive interdependency; 4) agency. Thus, I would suggest the following definition, which attempts to capture these elements to a relevant degree:

“International regions are institutionalized manifestations of interest communities, based on mutually shared perceptions of common geography or geographic proximity, history, cultural affinity and material interdependence. Region building assumes the willingness to pool resources and decision-making powers into regional institutions, which develop regional norms, values and rules that govern policy- and decision-making at least in economic, political and security areas and
thus, effectively govern the intra- and inter-regional interactions in these issue areas. Ultimately such interest convergence leads into a regional identity, constituted by a shared idea of the region and a shared collective destiny. Institutionally such cognitive interdependency should lead into the pooling of sovereignty, advancing from Intergovernmentalism into supranationalism as regional institutions and identity mature."

Thus, Regionalism as a research area focuses on the phenomena of regional cooperation and should include the analysis of both material and Ideational interests that act as drivers to varying degrees in different phases of a Regionalism project. Rationalist and Ideational approaches should thus cooperate under a shared research agenda to understand and explain the process of regionalization in an attempt to reach the desired outcome of forming an international region meeting the abovementioned criteria. Such cooperation is not only possible, but necessary if we recognize that the emphasis on Rationalist and Ideational factors may vary in different phases of region-building and between regions that have a different idea, which then determines the balance between material and cognitive factors.

8.5 Suggestions for Future Research

This thesis has argued that more systematic research of enlargement and comparative work of the nature of Regionalism in different regions should be carried out in order to discover, test and discover variables and causalities that would otherwise go unnoticed. It has also argued the importance of searching for other new research topics that would further challenge the paradigmatic approaches and highlight the importance of eclecticism.

As argued earlier the stability of enlargement should be further investigated, in particular under the conditions of increased heterogeneity. One good candidate would be NATO, which has long since passed its geographical limits and has lost its “significant other” that was the justification for its formation. Yet NATO has managed to reinvent itself as a value community – an alliance of democracies – and a crisis management organization instead of a collective defence organization. This gives rise to the question of whether NATO can survive without a significant “other”, which terrorism arguably is not, whilst maintaining cohesion of the organisation. Moreover,
many democracies in the world are not members of NATO, so one could quite justifiably ask for clarification of the membership criteria and what the balance between strategic benefits and costs and identity and values (democratic states) is when determining membership. In this regards, Georgia and the Ukraine could be interesting as potential “borderline states” by weighting their strategic importance and cost, and assessing how they match the identity and values of NATO. After all, the United States is advocating for Georgia’s NATO membership despite the potential cost of deeply angering Russia, a risk that the (Western) European members are not willing to take. Yet NATO denies that Russia is, or could be, NATO’s significant “other”. Thus, it should be investigated whether including them would make rational sense, or what Ideational motives are behind advocating and opposing their membership respectively. Another interesting aspect, and linked to the EU, is that not all EU members and “European” countries are NATO members. Finally, if both are primarily organisations of democratic states, why is it that Turkey is a valued NATO member, but its democratic credentials for EU membership are challenged? This may be seen as raising doubt assumptions that NATO is a value community. On the other hand, if NATO is just a military alliance, it begs the question “against whom”? Thus investigating the Rationalist and Ideational aspects of NATO could reveal interesting information about these factors and their roles in international organisations.

Secondly, risking criticism of triangulation, it could be useful to assess Australia’s compatibility to EU membership criteria, removing geography and culture as variables, and then compare it to Turkey’s accession case to test Peter Katzenstein’s argument that regions are not fixed in geography.¹¹⁶³

Finally, the role of elite opinion and in particular their perception of strategic interests versus identity and culture as determinants for membership or partnership should be further investigated. In order to establish the decision-making determinants for the elites, public opinion should be removed as a variable in order to avoid deceptive political correctness in the responses. The best available method for achieving this is the Delphi method.

¹¹⁶³ Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002), p. 575
The Delphi Method was originally developed in the RAND Corporation during the early years of the Cold War in the 1950s after a request of the US military to “systematically solicit” the views of a selected group of experts in order to generate scenarios and forecasts in “controversial socio-political areas of discourse”.\footnote{Spinelli, Teri (1983), “The Delphi Decision-Making Process”, \textit{Journal of Psychology}, Vol. 113, Issue 1, p. 73} This - \textit{Project Delphi} – as it became known as - mainly involved pooling expert opinion to produce long-range forecasts on the development of Soviet military technology and war strategy.

Whilst the first Delphis were limited to forecasting future military strategy, technology and the economic and social impact of technological change, the applications of Delphi have since spread into numerous fields, covering areas as disparate as scientific inquiry, such as public health management (HIV/AIDS etc.), education (curriculum design, etc), business management (strategy, sales forecasting, human resources management, etc.), political risk, public policy making and foreign policy. Moreover, the use of the Delphi method is no longer limited to producing forecasts but is now widely also used to develop, identify and validate variables and discover new ones, as well as to validate research areas, hypotheses and test emerging research themes.

Moreover, Delphi has also undergone significant methodological development since its inception. The Policy Delphi was developed by Murray Turoff in the 1970s in order to facilitate decision analysis. Unlike the original Delphi, which focused on reaching a consensus amongst a homogenous group of experts on the most likely and desirable future, the Policy Delphi rests on the assumption that in policy-making decision-makers are more interested in alternative viable solutions to a major policy problem rather than reaching a consensus on one exclusive direction or option. On the contrary, Policy Delphi is used to “generate the strongest possible opposing views on the potential resolutions of a major policy issue”, which enables the positioning of experts and advocates in opposing positions.\footnote{Steyaert, Stef and Hervé Lisoir (eds.) (2005), “Participatory Method Toolkit: A Practitioner’s Manual”, a joint publication of the King Baudouin Foundation and the Flemish Institute for Science and Technology Assessment (viWTA), Brussels, p. 114} Moreover, Turoff argues that in policy issues
“there are no experts, only informed advocates and referees”. Other new methods of Delphi include the Argument Delphi and the Disaggregative Policy Delphi (DPD). The Argument Delphi was developed by Osmo Kuusi in 1999 and focuses on identifying the most relevant arguments and their merits, rather than focusing on creating a consensus around any particular argument. Hence the quality of the argument is what matters, not the outcome. The Disaggregative Policy Delphi developed by Petri Tapio utilises cluster analysis as a systematic tool to produce relevant future scenarios, separating the probable and the preferable scenarios proposed by the expert panel.

The four key features of Delphi studies are anonymity, iteration, controlled feedback and the statistical aggregation of group responses. In practical terms this means that Delphi studies are conducted under conditions of anonymity of the panellists in order to avoid the typical problems associated with working in groups or conducting focus groups. These problems are: group think (falsified consensus), dominant personalities that hijack the process; and fears of challenging superiors or ‘eminent persons’. Secondly, it means that each questionnaire that takes place after the first round is based on the results of the analysis of the previous questionnaire. Hence, a system of continuous feedback presenting the moderator’s anonymised summary analysis of responses and arguments, often statistically summarised, encourages the panellists to confirm or modify their positions and arguments by giving them an opportunity to consider other positions and to defend or change their earlier positions. It also allows them the option of pre-
senting new arguments for consideration. This process continues until the research question has been answered or a sufficient amount of information has been gathered with little or no prospects of any new significant discoveries.\textsuperscript{1172}

In the line of the ethos of this thesis, it is my firm belief that the quest to seek new puzzles and identifying the best ways for explaining these without the unnecessary constraints of paradigmatic approaches, whilst still maintaining empirical vigour is the most effective way of enhancing our understanding and explaining social life in international context. Such a quest requires systematic analytical testing a great variety of methods, even those that are not mainstream methods, such at the Delphi Method. Enabling this analytical freedom of eclecticism is probably the most significant contribution of \textit{analytical eclecticism} towards further development of the study of Regionalism and international relations.

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Appendices
Appendix A: List of Data Sources – Chapters 4 & 6

Chapter 4: Main Sources

The foundational texts and main data sources analysed for Chapter 4 were as follows.

Foundational Texts

The following foundational texts establishing and regulating relationship between Turkey and the European Union were analysed:

Association Agreement of 1963 (”Ankara Agreement”)

The Additional Protocol (AP) of 1970

The Treaty of the European Union (”Maastricht Treaty”) of 1992

The Declaration of the Copenhagen European Council of 1993

The Customs Union Treaty of 1995

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**European Union Official Documents**

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European Commission Turkey progress reports (1998-2006)


The European Parliament (2006), Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, Brussels

**Reports by International Organisations**


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Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index
Chapter 6: Main Sources

The foundational texts and main data sources analysed for Chapter 6 were as follows.

**Foundational Texts**

The following foundational texts establishing and regulating relationship between Australia and East Asian regional organisations were analysed:

- The ASEAN Declaration ("Bangkok Declaration") of 1967
- The Declaration of ASEAN Concord ("Bali Concord") of 1976
- The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia of 1976
- ASEAN Vision 2020 of 1997
- The Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation of 1999
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Appendix B: List of Data Sources – Chapters 5 & 7

This appendix lists the data sources utilised in Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis (FPDA) carried out in chapters 5 and 7. Appendices C, D, E and F provide summaries of nodes, coding structure and coding statistics for the FPDA carried out in these chapters.

**Chapter 5: Main Sources**

Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey (signed at Ankara, 12 September 1963)

**Speeches and statements**

Keynote Address by Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gül, at the Symposium "Turkey and the EU-Looking Beyond Prejudice", Maastricht, 4-5 April 2004

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European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Perceptions of discrimination and Islamophobia - Voices from members of Muslim communities in the European Union, Vienna

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Global Views 2006 survey by Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs
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Australian Broadcasting Company (ABC)

The Australian

South China Morning Post

Straits Times

Sydney Morning Herald
Appendix C: Node Summary Report – Chapter 5
Ideational Nodes
### Borders

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### Ethnicity

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**Description:**

| Description | All aspects of being European |

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### Fairness

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**Node Summary Report**

*Page 4 of 9*
### Freedom of expression

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Users 1
Cases 0

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Military

Description Turkish military's control over political institutions and life

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Appendix D: Node Summary Report – Chapter 5

Rationalist Nodes
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**Modified On**
11.8.2009 21:59

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**Cases**
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**Modified On**
11.8.2009 22:04

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**Cases**
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11.8.2009 22:04

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**Cases**
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**Modified On**
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Energy

Description

The EU mainly benefitting from Turkey's accession

EU's benefit

Description

Strategic gateway, hub etc. to other regions

Geopolitics

Description

Participation in European institutions

Institutions

Description
**Kurds**

*Description*
Explicit references to the treatment of Kurds as a precondition

*Created On* 11.8.2009 22:31  
*By* O

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*By* O

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**Mutual benefit**

*Description*
Both the EU and Turkey would equally benefit

*Created On* 11.8.2009 22:34  
*Modified On* 11.8.2009 22:34  
*By* O

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**NATO**

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All references to Turkey's NATO membership as a justification

*Created On* 11.8.2009 22:36  
*Modified On* 11.8.2009 22:36  
*By* O

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Primarily accession partnership, but also references to the EU and Turkey being partners

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Users: 1
Cases: 1

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Cases: 0

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Appendix E: Node Summary Report – Chapter 7

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