

Appendix 1

THE METHOD OF DRAMATISATION

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[SYNOPSIS]

M. Gilles Deleuze, teacher in the Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences at Lyon, proposes to develop before the members of the French Society of Philosophy the following arguments:

It is not certain that the question *what is?* is a good question in order to discover the essence or the Idea. It is possible that questions of the type: *who?*, *how much?*, *how?*, *where?*, *when?* are better—as much for discovering essence as for determining something more important concerning the Idea.

Spatio-temporal dynamisms have several properties: 1) they create particular spaces and times; 2) they form a rule of specification for concepts, which would otherwise remain incapable of logically dividing themselves; 3) they determine the double aspect of *differenciation*, qualitative and quantitative (qualities and extensions, species and parts); 4) they comprise or designate a subject, but a “larval” or “embryonic” subject; 5) they constitute a special theatre; 6) they express ideas.—Under all of these aspects they outline the movement of dramatisation.

Under dramatisation, the Idea incarnates or actualises itself, *differenciates* itself. Thus the Idea must already present characteristics, in its own content, which correspond to the two aspects of differenciation. It is, in effect, in itself a system of

differential relations, and a distribution of the remarkable or singular points which result from them (ideal events). Which is to say: the Idea is fully *differentiated* in itself, before *differenciating* itself in the actual. This status of the Idea accounts for its logical value, which is not the clear-and-distinct, but, as foreseen by Leibniz, the distinct-obscure. The method of dramatisation in its entirety is represented in the complex concept of different/ciation, which must give a sense to the questions that formed our point of departure.

REPORT OF THE SESSION

The session opened at 4.30pm, at the Sorbonne, Michelet Amphitheatre, presided over by M. Jean Wahl, President of the Society.

M. Jean Wahl: I will not introduce M. Gilles Deleuze: you know his books, on Hume as well as on Nietzsche and Proust, and you also know his great talent. I give him the stand immediately.

M. Gilles Deleuze: The Idea, the discovery of the Idea, is inseparable from a certain type of question. The Idea is in the first place an “objectivity” [*objectité*] which, as such, corresponds to a way of posing questions. It only responds to the call of certain questions. It is in Platonism that the question of the Idea is determined under the form: *What is...?* This noble question is supposed to concern the essence, and is opposed to vulgar questions which only refer to the example or the accident. Thus you do not ask *who* is beautiful, but what is the Beautiful. Not *where* and *when* there is justice, but what is the Just. Not *how* “two” is obtained, but what is the dyad. Not *how much*, but what... All of Platonism thus seems to oppose a major question, always taken up again and repeated by Socrates as that of the essence or the Idea, to minor questions of opinion which only express confused ways of thinking, whether in old men or awkward children, or in sophists and over-skillful orators.

And yet this privilege of the *What is...?* is itself revealed to be confused and dubious, even in Platonism and the Platonic tradition. For the question *What is?* in the end only animates the so-called aporetic dialogues. Is it possible that the question of essence is that of contradiction, and that it itself throws us into inextricable contradictions? As soon as the Platonic dialectic becomes a serious and positive thing, we see it take other forms: *who?* in the Politics, *how much?* in the Philebus, *where and when* in the Sophist, in what case in the Parmenides. As if the Idea was only positively

determinable as a function of a transcendental typology, topology, posology, and casuistic. What the sophists are reproached for, then, is less to have used forms of questions which are inferior in themselves, than not to have known how to determine the conditions in which they take on their ideal scope and meaning. And if we consider the whole of the history of philosophy, we seek in vain the philosopher who was able to proceed using the question “what is?”. Aristotle—above all not Aristotle. Perhaps Hegel, perhaps there is only Hegel, precisely because his dialectic, being that of the empty and abstract essence, is inseparable from the movement of contradiction. The question What is? prejudices the Idea as the simplicity of essence; it then becomes obligatory that the simple essence comprehends the inessential, and comprehends it *in essence*, thus contradicting itself. A quite different procedure (the outline of which is found in the philosophy of Leibniz), must be wholly distinguished from contradiction: in this case, it is the inessential which comprehends the essential, and which comprehends it only *in the case*. Subsuming under “the case” forms an original language of properties and events. We should call *vice-diction* this quite different procedure to contradiction. It consists in traversing the Idea as a multiplicity. The question is no longer of knowing whether the Idea is one or multiple, or even both at the same time. “Multiplicity”, used substantively, designates a domain where the Idea, of its own accord, is much closer to the accident than to the abstract essence, and can only be determined with the questions who? how? how much? where and when? in what case?—all forms which trace its true spatio-temporal coordinates.

We ask in the first instance: what is the characteristic or distinctive trait of a thing in general? Such a trait is double: the quality or qualities that it possesses, the extended space [*l'étendue*] that it occupies. Even when one cannot distinguish actual divisible parts, one distinguishes remarkable points and regions; and one must not only consider the internal space, but the way in which the thing determines and differentiates a whole exterior space, as in the hunting ground of an animal. In short, every thing is at the intersection of a double synthesis: of qualification or specification, and of distribution, composition or organisation. There is no quality without an extension that underlies it, and in which it

is diffused, no species without organic points or parts. The parts are the number of the species, just as the species is the quality of the parts. Such are the two correlated aspects of *differenciatio*: species and parts, specification and organisation. They constitute the condition of the representation of things in general.

But if differentiation thus has two complementary forms, what is the agent of this distinction and this complementarity? Beneath organisation, as also beneath specification, we find nothing other than spatio-temporal dynamisms: which is to say agitations of space, pockets of time, pure syntheses of speeds, directions and rhythms. Already the most general characteristics of division, of order and class, including generic and specific characters, depend on such dynamisms or such directions of development. And simultaneously, beneath the separating phenomena of cellular division, we again find dynamic instances, cellular migrations, foldings, invaginations, stretches, which constitute an entire “dynamic of the egg”. In this respect the entire world is an egg. No concept would receive a logical division in representation, if this division was not determined by sub-representative dynamisms: we see it clearly in the Platonic process of division, which only operates in function of the two directions of right and left, and, as in the example of line-fishing, with the aid of determinations of the type “surround-strike”, “strike from up downwards—from below upwards”.

These dynamisms always presuppose a field in which they are produced, outside of which they would not be produced. This field is intensive, which is to say it implies a distribution in depth of differences in intensity. Although experience always places us in the presence of already-developed intensities in extended space, already covered by qualities, we must conceive, precisely as a condition of experience, pure intensities enveloped in a depth, in an intensive *spatium* which pre-exists any quality and any extension. Depth is the power of the pure spatium without extension; intensity is only the power of difference or the unequal in itself, and each intensity is already difference, of the type E—E', where E refers in turn to e—e' and e, to e—e', etc. Such an intensive field constitutes a milieu of individuation. This is why it is not enough to remind ourselves that individuation operates neither by prolonging specification (*species infima*), nor by the composition or division of parts (*pars ultima*). It is not enough to discover a difference in nature between individuation on the one hand, and, on the other hand, specification

or division. For in addition to this, individuation is the prior condition under which specification, and division or composition, operate in a system. Individuation is intensive, and is presupposed by all qualities and species, by all the extensions and parts which come to fill or develop the system.

Intensity being difference, we still need differences of intensity to communicate with each other. We need something like a “differentiator” of difference, which relates the different to the different. This role is played by what is called the dark precursor. Lightning shoots between different intensities, but it is preceded by a *dark precursor*, invisible, imperceptible, which in advance determines path, hollowed out in an inverse relation, because it is in the first place the agent of communication of series of differences. If it is true that any system is an intensive field of individuation constructed on bordering series which are heterogenous or disparate, the putting into communication of series, under the action of the dark precursor, induces the phenomena of *coupling* between the series, of *internal resonance* in the system, and of a *forced movement* in the form of an amplitude which overflows the starting series themselves. It is under all of these conditions that a system is filled with qualities and is developed in extension. For a quality is always a sign or an event which emerges from the depths, which flashes between different intensities, and which endures the time required for the annulment of its constitutive difference. In the first place and above all, it is the set of these conditions which determines the spatio-temporal dynamisms, themselves generative of these qualities and these extensions.

Dynamisms are not absolutely without a subject. Yet their subjects can only be partial [*ébauches*], not yet qualified or composed, patients rather than agents, alone able to bear the pressure of an internal resonance or the amplitude of a forced movement. A composed, qualified adult would perish therein. The truth of embryology, already, is that there are movements which only the embryo can bear: here, no other subject than a larval one. The nightmare itself is perhaps one of these movements that neither the awake man, *nor even the dreamer*, can bear, but only the dreamless sleeper, the sleeper of deep sleep. And thought, considered as the specific dynamism of the philosophical system, belongs perhaps in turn to these terrible movements which are irreconcilable with a formed, qualified and composed subject like that of the Cogito in representation. “Regression” is poorly understood as long as we do not see in it the activation of a larval

subject, the only patient able to support to requirements of a systematic dynamism.

This set of determinations—field of individuation, series of intensive differences, dark precursor, coupling, resonance and forced movement, larval subjects, spatio-temporal dynamisms—these outline the multiple coordinates which correspond to the questions, How much? Who? How? Where and when?, and which give them a transcendental scope, beyond empirical examples. This set of determinations, in effect, is in no way bound to such or such an example borrowed from a physical, or biological, system, but provides the categories of any system in general. No less than a physical experiment, psychical experiments of the Proustian type imply the communication of disparate series, the intervention of a dark precursor, the resonances and forced movements which follow. It happens all the time that dynamisms, qualified in a certain way in one domain, are taken up again in a completely different mode in another domain. The geographical dynamism of the island (island through rupture with the continent and island through emerging out of the water) is taken up again in the mythical dynamism of the man on a desert island (secondary rupture and original recommencement). Ferenczi showed, in sexual life, how the physical dynamism of cellular elements is taken up again in the biological dynamism of organs and even in the psychical dynamism of people.

It's that dynamisms, and their concomitants, work beneath all the qualified forms and extensions of representation, and constitute, rather than an outline, a set of abstract lines coming out of an unextended and informal depth. A strange theatre made of pure determinations, activating space and time, acting directly on the soul, having larvae as actors—and for which Artaud chose the word “cruelty”. These abstract lines form a drama which corresponds to such or such a concept, and which directs both its specification and division. Scientific knowledge, but also the dream, and also things in themselves, dramatise. A concept being given, we can always seek the drama, and *the concept would never divide or specify itself* in the world of representation without the dramatic dynamisms which determine it in this way in a material system beneath all possible representation. Take the concept of truth: it is not enough to ask the abstract question “what is the true?”. Once we ask “who wants the truth, when and where, how and how much?”,

our task is to assign larval subjects (the jealous person, for example), and pure spatio-temporal dynamisms (either to make the “thing” emerge in person, at a certain time, in a certain place; or to accumulate clues and signs, from moment to moment and following an endless path). When we then learn that the concept of truth in representation is divided into two directions, one according to which the true emerges in person and in an intuition, the other according to which the true is always inferred from something else, concluded from clues as that which is not there, we have no trouble in finding beneath these traditional theories of intuition and induction the dynamisms of the inquisition or the confession, of the accusation or the enquiry, which work in silence and dramatically, such that it determines the theoretical division of the concept.

What we call drama particularly resembles the Kantian schema. For the schema according to Kant is indeed an *a priori* determination of space and time corresponding to a concept: *the shortest* is the drama, the dream or rather the nightmare of the straight line. It is precisely the dynamism which divides the concept of line into straight and curved, and which, moreover, in the Archimedean conception of limits, allows the measurement of the curve as a function of the straight line. Only what remains quite mysterious is how the schema has this power in relation to the concept. In a certain way, the whole of post-Kantianism attempted to elucidate the mystery of this hidden art, according to which the dynamic spatio-temporal dynamisms truly have the power to dramatise a concept, even though they are of a completely different nature.

The answer is perhaps in the direction indicated by certain post-Kantians: pure spatio-temporal dynamisms have the power to dramatise *concepts*, because in the first place they actualise or incarnate *Ideas*. We possess a point of departure in order to prove this hypothesis: if it is true that the dynamisms order the two inseparable aspects of differentiation—specification and division, qualification of a species and organisation of an extension—it would be necessary for the Idea to present in turn two aspects, from which these are derived in a certain way. We must thus question the nature of the Idea, on its difference in nature to the concept.

An Idea has two principal characteristics. On the one hand, it consists

in a set of differential relations between elements without any sensible form or function, which only exist through their reciprocal determination. Such relations are of the type dy/dx (although the question of the infinitely small does not at all have to be introduced here). In the most diverse cases, we can ask if we indeed find ourselves before *ideal elements*, which is to say without figure and without function, but reciprocally determinable in a network of differential relations: do phonemes fall into this category? And certain physical particles? And biological genes? We must in each case follow our enquiry until we obtain these differentials, which neither exist nor are determined except in relation to each other. We thus invoke a principle, called reciprocal determination, as the first aspect of sufficient reason. On the other hand, differential relations correspond to distributions of “singularities”, distributions of remarkable and ordinary points, such that a remarkable point engenders a series which can be prolonged along all the ordinary points to the neighbourhood of another singularity. Singularities are *ideal events*. It is possible that the notions of singular and regular, of remarkable and ordinary, have a much greater ontological and epistemological importance for philosophy itself than those of true and false; for *sense* depends on the distinction and the distribution of these brilliant points in the Idea. We conceive that a complete determination of the Idea, or of the thing in its Ideal form, is effected in this way, constituting the second aspect of sufficient reason. The Idea thus appears as a multiplicity which must be traversed in two directions, from the point of view of the variation of differential relations, and from the point of view of the distribution of singularities which correspond to certain values of these relations. What we were calling before a procedure of *vice-diction* merges with this double traversal or this double determination, reciprocal and complete.

Several consequences follow. In the first place, the Idea thus defined possesses no actuality. It is virtual, it is pure virtuality. All the differential relations, in virtue of the reciprocal determination, and all the distributions of singularities in virtue of the complete determination, coexist in the virtual multiplicity of Ideas. The Idea is only actualised precisely to the extent that its differential relations are incarnated in separate species or qualities, and that the concomitant singularities are incarnated in an extension which corresponds to this

quality. A species is made up of differential relations between genes, as organic parts are made up of incarnated singularities (cf. the “*loci*”). We must however emphasise the absolute condition of non-resemblance: the species or quality does not resemble the differential relations that they incarnate, no more than the singularities resemble the organised extension which actualises them.

If it is true that qualification and distribution constitute the two aspects of differentiation, we will say that the Idea actualises itself through differentiation. For the Idea, to actualise itself is to differentiate itself. In itself and in its virtuality, it is thus entirely *undifferentiated*. Yet it is in no way indeterminate. We must attach the greatest importance to the difference of the two operations, marked by the *distinctive trait t/c*, differentiate and differentiate. The Idea in itself, or the thing in its Ideal form, is not at all differentiated, since it lacks the necessary qualities and parts. But it is fully and completely differentiated, since it possesses relations and singularities which will actualise themselves in qualities and parts, without resembling them. It seems that every thing, then, has, so to speak, two uneven, dissimilar and dissymmetrical “halves”, each one of these halves itself divided into two: *an ideal half*, plunging into the virtual, and constituted both by differential relations and concomitant singularities; an actual half, constituted both by the qualities incarnating these relations, and the parts incarnating these singularities. The question of the “*ens omni modo determinatum*” must thus be posed in this way: a thing in its Ideal form can be completely determined (differentiated), and yet lack the determinations which constitute actual existence (it is undifferentiated). If we call *distinct* the state of the fully differentiated Idea, and *clear* the state of the actualised Idea, which is to say differentiated, we must break with the rule of proportionality of the clear and the distinct: the Idea in itself is not clear and distinct, but on the contrary *distinct and obscure*. It is even in this sense that the Idea is Dionysian, in this zone of obscure distinction that it conserves in itself, in this differentiation which is nevertheless perfectly determined: its intoxication.

We must finally specify the conditions under which the word “virtual” can be rigorously used (the way in which Bergson for example used it not long ago by distinguishing virtual and actual multiplicities, or the way in which M. Ruyer uses it today). Virtual is not opposed to real; what is opposed to the real is the possible. Virtual is opposed to actual, and, in this sense, possesses

a full reality. We have seen that this reality of the virtual is constituted by differential relations and distributions of singularities. The virtual corresponds in all respects to the formula by which Proust defined his states of experience: “real without being actual, ideal without being abstract”. The virtual and the possible are opposed in multiple ways. On the one hand, the possible is such that the real is constructed in its image [à sa ressemblance]. This is even why, in function of this original flaw, we can never cleanse it of the suspicion of being retrospective or retroactive, which is to say constructed after the fact, in the image of the real that it is supposed to precede. It is also why, when we ask what *more* there is in the real, we can ascribe nothing except “the same” thing as posited outside of representation. The possible is only the concept as principle of the representation of the thing, under the categories of the identity of what represents, and the resemblance of what is represented. The virtual, by contrast, belongs to the Idea, and does not resemble the actual, no more than the actual resembles it. The Idea is an image without resemblance; the virtual does not actualise itself through resemblance, but through divergence and differentiation. Differentiation or actualisation is always creative in relation to what they actualise, whereas realisation is always reproductive or limiting. The difference between the virtual and the actual is no longer that of the Same in so far as it is posited in one instance within representation, in another instance outside of representation, but that of the Other, in so far as appears in one instance in the Idea and the other instance, completely differently, in the process of actualisation of the Idea.

The extraordinary Leibnizian world puts us in the presence of an *ideal continuum*. This continuity, according to Leibniz, is not at all defined by homogeneity, but by the coexistence of all the variations of differential relations, and the distributions of singularities which correspond to them. The state of this world is well expressed in the image of the murmur, of the ocean, of the water mill, of the swoon or even of drunkenness, which bears witness to a Dionysian ground rumbling beneath this apparently Apollonian philosophy. It is often asked what the notions of “compossible”, of “impossible” consist in, and what exactly their difference is to the possible and the impossible. The reply is perhaps difficult to give, because the whole of Leibniz’ philosophy shows a certain hesitation between a clear conception of the possible and the obscure conception of the virtual. In truth the impossible and the compossible have nothing to do with the contradictory and the non-contradictory. It is a matter of something else entirely: of divergence and convergence. What defines the compossibility of a world is the convergence of series, each one of which is constructed in the neighbourhood

of a singularity, to the neighbourhood of another singularity. The impossibility of worlds, by contrast, emerges at the moment that the obtained series would diverge. The best of worlds is thus the one which comprehends a maximum of relations and singularities, under the condition of continuity, which is to say under the condition of a maximum of convergence of series. We can understand, given this, how, in such a world, individual essences or nomads are formed. Leibniz says both that the world does not exist outside of the monads which express it, and yet that God created the world rather than the monads (God did not create the sinning Adam, but the world in which Adam sinned). It's that the singularities of the world serve as a principle for the constitution of individualities: each individual envelops a certain number of singularities, and clearly expresses their relations *in relation to* its own body. Such that the expressed world virtually pre-exists expressive individualities, but does not actually exist outside of these individualities which express it from proximity to proximity [*de proche en proche*]. And it is this process of individuation which determines the relations and the singularities of the ideal world to be incarnated in the qualities and extensions which effectively fill the intervals between individuals. The traversal of the "ground" as populated by relations and singularities, the constitution of individual essences which flows on from this, the subsequent determination of qualities and extensions, form the whole of a method of vice-diction, which constitutes a theory of multiplicities and which always consists in subsuming "under the case".

The notion of different/iation does not only express a mathematico-biological complex, but the very condition of all cosmology, as the two halves of the object. Differentiation expresses the nature of a pre-individual ground, which is in no way reducible to an abstract universal, but which comprises relations and singularities characterising the virtual multiplicities or Ideas. Differentiation expresses the actualisation of these relations and singularities in qualities and extensions, species and parts as objects of representation. The two aspects of differentiation thus correspond to the two aspects of differentiation, but do not resemble them:

a third thing is necessary to determine the Idea to actualise itself, to incarnate itself in this way. We have attempted to show how the intensive fields of individuation—with the precursors which placed them in a state of activity, with the larval subjects which constituted themselves around singularities, with the dynamisms which filled the system—effectively had this role. The complete notion is that of: indi-different/iation. It is the spatio-temporal dynamisms at the heart of fields of individuation which determine the Ideas to actualise themselves in the differentiated aspects of the object. A concept being given in representation, we know nothing yet. We only learn to the extent that we discover the Idea which operates beneath this concept, the field or fields of individuation, the system or systems which envelop the Idea, the dynamisms which determine it to incarnate itself; it is only under these conditions that we can penetrate the mystery of the division of the concept. It is all these conditions which define dramatisation, and its trail of questions: in which case, who, how, how much? *The shortest* is only the schema of the concept of the straight line because it is firstly the drama of the Idea of line, the differential of the straight line and the curve, the dynamism which operates in silence. The clear and the distinct is the claim of the concept in the Apollonian world of representation; but beneath representation there is always the Idea and its distinct-obscure ground, a “drama” beneath all logos.

[DISCUSSION]

M. Jean Wahl: We warmly thank you for all your words. Rarely have we been in the presence of such an attempt—I will not say at a system—but at a vision through differentiation, written twice, of a world described perhaps quadruply. But I will stop, for the role of the President is to be silent and let others speak.

M. P.-M. Schuhl: I will ask Deleuze a question. I would like to know how, in his way of seeing things, the opposition is figured between the natural and the artificial, which is not spontaneously dynamised, but which one can dynamise through auto-regulation.

M. G. Deleuze: Is it not because artifice implies specific dynamisms which have no equivalent in nature? You have yourself often shown the importance of the categories of natural and artificial, notably in Greek thought. Are these categories not precisely differentiated

in function of dynamisms—in function of trajectories [*parcours*], places and directions? But in artifices as much as natural systems, there are intensive organisations, precursors, partial-subjects [*sujets-ébauches*], a whole kind of vitality, a vital character, although in a different mode...

M. P.-M. Schuhl: That becomes very Nervalian.

M. G. Deleuze: Effectively, I would wish it so.

M. P.-M. Schuhl: In the *Philebus*, in 64b, Socrates says that we have managed to create an abstract order that will be able to animate itself independently. The spiritual domain goes of its own accord. There remains this immense domain of matter...

M. G. Deleuze: We would have to classify the different systems of intensity. From that point of view, the regulatory procedures you alluded to a moment ago would be of decisive importance.

M. P.-M. Schuhl: I would like to add a simple anecdote, in relation to the reference that Deleuze made to the different ways of conceiving fishing in the *Sophist*. M. Leroi-Gourhan published a few years ago a work on technology which exactly matches the Platonic distinctions. I asked him if he had been thinking of the *Sophist*, he replied that he had given it any attention. This confirms the permanence of certain divisions that you have underlined.

M. N. Mouloud: I will not go with M. Deleuze into the ontological depth of his conception of the idea. This approach to the problem overwhelms my own habits of thinking. What interested me very much in M. Deleuze's paper is this conception of art. It is certain that the artist takes up a non-serial temporality, which is not yet organised, or a spatiality or a multiplicity of spatialities which are lived and pre-categorical, and that through his artifice, in fact, he brings them to a certain language, to a certain syntax [*syntactique*]. His style or his personal re-creation consists in imposing, as objective, structures which are borrowed from a non-objective stage. Ultimately, there we have a significant part of the dynamism of art.

I would like to ask some questions on the points which bother me a little. Understood as such, how can we apply this conception

of a priority of spatiality or temporality to science, for example. In a certain way, we can invoke space, time or the dynamism as the opposite of the concept, which is to say as that which introduces variety into a concept which tends towards stability. But there is the opposing view: space and time, at least in the way they are accessible to our intuition, tend towards a certain stability, a certain immobility. The first physics and chemistry began with a mechanics which leaned heavily on the idea of spatial continuities or the composition of elements in a composite. Or the first biology began with a sort of intuition of duration, of becoming, as a continuous unfolding which linked apparent forms together and transcended their separation. And it seems to me that mathematicisation introduced on its side a second dramatisation. In this latter case, dramatisation comes from the concept, it doesn't come so much from intuition. Thus, when chemistry comes to the stage of electronic analysis, there are no longer from its perspective any veritable substances or valencies, there are functions of liaison which are created to the extent that the process is developed and which are comprehended in succession. We have a process which is only able to be analysed by a mathematics of the electron. And to the extent that chemistry becomes quantic, or wave-like, a combination can absolutely no longer be conceived as a simple and necessary transition. It is a probability which results from an energy-based calculus where you have for example to take into account the rotational [*spinorielle*] symmetry or dissymmetry of electrons, or the overlapping of two wave-fields which creates a particular energy, etc. The energetic evaluation can only be done by the algebraist, and not by the geometer. In a somewhat similar fashion, modern biology began when the combinatory possibilities [*la combinatoire*] of genetic elements were introduced, or when we investigated which chemical or radioactive effects could affect the development of genes, and create mutations. Thus the first intuition of biologists, who believed in a continuous evolution, was in a way destroyed and then reinvented by a more mathematical and operative science. I wanted to indicate my feeling that the most dramatic aspects of conceptualisation, if you like, in any case the most dialectical aspects, are brought about, not by the imagination, but by the work of rationalisation.

Overall, I don't really see how the development of concepts, in the mathematical sciences, can be compared to a biological development, to the "growth of an egg". The

development is more of a clear-cut dialectical sort: systems are constructed in a coherent manner, and sometimes they must be broken in order to reconstruct them. But I don't want to prolong my comment too much.

M. G. Deleuze: I share your opinion. Isn't our difference above all terminological? it seems to me that concepts less lead dramatisation than undergo it. Concepts are differentiated by procedures which are not exactly conceptual, which refer rather to Ideas. A notion like the one that you allude to, of "non-localisable linkage", transcends the field of representation and the localisation of concepts in this field. They are "ideal" linkages.

M. N. Mouloud: To be honest, I am not trying to defend the notion of the concept, which is an ambiguous one, over-saturated by philosophical traditions: we think of the Aristotelian concept as a model of stability. I would define the scientific concept by the work of an essentially mathematical thought. It is this that constantly ruptures the pre-established orders of our intuition. And I am thinking, on the other hand, of the ambiguous use which could be made of the term idea, if it is over-likened, as in the case of Bergson, to an organising schema, with its bases in a profound intuition of some biological kind. The development of the sciences, and even the life sciences, has not followed the direction of such schemas. Or, if they have begun with this, they have been put into question by mathematical and experimental models.

M. Jean Wahl: There again I see a possible agreement, and a difference in language rather than a difference in conception.

M. F. Alquié: I very much admired the presentation of our friend Deleuze. The question that I would like to put to him is quite simple, and bears on the beginning of his paper. Deleuze condemned, from the start, the question "What is?", and he didn't come back to it again. I accept what he said afterwards, and I can glimpse of the extreme richness of the other questions he wished to pose. But I regret the somewhat rapid rejection of the question "What is?", and I don't know how to accept what he told us, in a slightly intimidating manner, at the beginning, namely that no philosopher had asked himself this question, except Hegel. I must say, this stuns me a little: in effect I

know many philosophers who asked themselves the question “what is?”. Leibniz certainly asked himself “what is a subject?” or “what is a monad?”. Berkeley certainly asked himself “what is being?”, “what is the essence and the signification of the word being?”. Kant himself certainly asked himself “what is an object?”. One could cite so many other examples that no one will raise any objections on this, I hope. It thus seemed to me that Deleuze, in what followed, had above all wanted to orient philosophy towards other problems, problems which are perhaps not specifically its own, or rather, that he reproached classical philosophy—not without cause, for that matter—for not providing us with concepts that are adaptable precisely enough to science, or to psychological analysis, or to historical analysis. Which seems to me to be perfectly true, and, in this sense, I cannot praise too much what he has said. And yet, what struck me is that all the examples which he gave were not properly philosophical examples. He spoke to us about the straight line, which is a mathematical example, about the egg, which is a physiological example, about genes, which is a biological example. When he came to the truth, I said to myself: finally, here is a philosophical example! But this example quickly turned bad, for Deleuze said to us that we had to ask ourselves: who wants the truth? why does one want the truth? is it the jealous person who wants the truth? etc., very interesting questions without any doubt, but which do not concern the very essence of truth, which are thus not perhaps strictly philosophical questions. Or rather, they are the questions of a philosopher looking towards psychological, psychoanalytic, etc, problems. Such that I would simply like to ask, in turn, the following question: I have understood very well that M. Deleuze reproaches philosophy for having made a conception of the idea such that it is not adaptable, as he would like it to be, to scientific, psychological, historical problems. But I think that, beside these problems, remain classically philosophical problems, namely problems of essence. It doesn’t seem to me, in any case, that we can say, like Deleuze, that the great philosophers never posed such problems to themselves.

M. G. Deleuze: It is very true, Monsieur, that a great number of philosophers have asked themselves the question “what is?” But is this not, for them, a convenient way of expressing themselves? Kant certainly asks himself “what is an object?”, but he asks it within the context of a deeper question,

of a How whose sense renewed: “How is it possible?” What seems most important to me is this new way in which Kant interprets the question “how?”. And Leibniz, when he contents himself with asking “what is?”, does he obtain anything other than definitions which he himself calls nominal? When he comes to real definitions, by contrast, is it not thanks to questions like “how?”, “from what point of view?”, “in which case?”. There is in him a whole topology, a whole casuistic which is notably expressed in his interest in law. But in all these respects, I was too quick.

Your other reproach touches me still more. For I believe completely in the specificity of philosophy, and this conviction is one I receive from you yourself. You say, however, that the method that I describe borrows its applications from all over the place, from different sciences, but very little from philosophy. And that the only philosophical example that I brought up, that of truth, turned bad rather, since it consisted in dissolving the concept of truth into psychological or psychoanalytical determinations. If this is the case, it is a failure. For the Idea, as virtual-real, must not be described in terms which are solely scientific, even if science necessarily intervenes in its process of actualisation. Even concepts like singular and regular, remarkable and ordinary, are not exhausted by mathematics. I will invoke the theses of Lautman: a theory of systems must show how the movement of scientific concepts participates in a dialectic which transcends them. Nor, moreover, can dynamisms be reduced to psychological determinations (and when I cited the jealous man as a “type” of the seeker of truth, it was not as a psychological character, but as a complex of space and time, as a “figure” belonging to the very notion of truth). It seems to me that not only is the theory of systems philosophical, but that this theory forms a system of a very particular type—the philosophical system, having its dynamisms, its precursors, its larval subjects, its philosophers, which are quite specific. At least, it is only under these conditions that this method would be meaningful.

M. de Gandillac: Behind your suggestive and poetic language, I espy, as always, a solid and profound thought, but I would like, I admit, some supplementary clarifications on the theme of dramatisation, which figures in your title and which you have not considered necessary to define, as if it

was a matter of a commonly understood concept which goes without saying. When we talk of dramatising, in everyday life, it is in general in a somewhat pejorative way, in order to reproach our interlocutor for giving an over-theatrical aspect to some small incident (as one says, in a more popular language, “Don’t be melodramatic!” [“*Ne faites pas votre cinéma!*”]). Etymologically, a drama is an action, but staged, stylised, presented to an audience. I have difficulty however imagining a situation of this type in relation to these phantomatic subjects which you have just evoked, these embryos, these larvae, these undifferentiated differentiated beings which are also dynamic schemas, for you have used rather vague terms, which are in a way all-purpose philosophical words and are only valid within their context. More precisely, while you refuse the question *ti* (in so far as it aims at an *ousia*), you seem to admit the *tiV*, as subject of a *doing* (:iV *poiei*). But can we speak of a subject which does something at the level of larvae?

My second question concerns the relation between dramatic and tragic. Does the drama you are thinking of refer, like tragedy, to a conflict, insoluble of itself, between two uneven halves which encounter two other uneven halves, in a very subtle disharmonious harmony? Your allusion to Artaud and to the theatre of cruelty shows well enough that you are not an optimistic philosopher, or that, if you are, it’s somewhat in the style of Leibniz, whose vision of the world is ultimately one of the cruellest conceivable. Would your dramatisation be that of a *Theodicy*, only this time situated, not in the celestial palaces evoked by Sextus’ famous apology, but on the level of the lemurs [*lemuriens*] of the second *Faust*?

M. G. Deleuze: I will try to define dramatisation more rigorously: they are dynamisms, dynamic spatio-temporal determinations, pre-qualitative and pre-extensive, taking “place” in intensive systems in which differences in depth are distributed, having partial subjects [*sujets-ébauches*] as their “patients”, having the actualisation of Ideas as their function...

M. de Gandillac: But, in order to translate all of that (which I grasp only in a slightly confused way), why this term dramatisation?

M. G. Deleuze: When you make such a system of spatio-temporal determinations correspond to a concept, it seems to me that you substitute a “drama” for a logos, you

establish the drama of this logos. You mentioned for example: a family drama [*on dramatiser en famille*]. Some psychoanalysts employ this word, I think, in order to designate the movement by which logical thought is dissolved into pure spatio-temporal determinations, as in sleep. And it is not so far from the famous experiments of the Wurtzburg school. Take a case of obsessional neurosis, where the subject constantly cuts things into smaller pieces: handkerchiefs and towels are perpetually cut, first into two, then the two halves are cut again, a bell-cord in the dining room is regularly shortened, the cord getting closer to the ceiling, everything is whittled down, miniaturised, put in boxes. It is indeed a drama, to the extent that the patient simultaneously organises a space, manipulates a space, and expresses in this space an unconscious Idea. An anger is a dramatisation, which stages larval subjects. You then would like to ask whether dramatisation in general is linked to the tragic or not. There isn't, it seems to me, any privileged reference. Tragic and comic are still categories of representation. There would be a fundamental link rather between dramatisation and a certain world of terror, which can comprise a maximum amount of buffoonery, of the grotesque... You say yourself that the world of Leibniz is, ultimately, at bottom, the cruellest of worlds.

M. de Gandillac: Buffoonery, the grotesque, the snigger [*le ricanement*] belong, I believe, to the realm of tragedy. Your conclusion evoked Nietzschean themes, ultimately more Dionysian than Apollonian.

M. Jean Wahl: I think the reply that Deleuze could have made is the question "When", because there are moments where all of that becomes tragic and there are moments when it becomes...

M. G. Deleuze: Yes, exactly.

M. M. Souriau: It's a question on references that I would like to present.

M. Deleuze has cited some philosophers, not many, but in any case some, and there is one whose accent I thought I heard, but that he did not cite, namely Malebranche. There are several things in Malebranche which are foreign to you, for example, the vision in God: in your case it would rather be a matter of a

sort of “vision in Mephistopheles”. But there is also the Malebranche of the *intelligible extension*. When you spoke of this becoming of ideas which is in the first place obscure and in any case dynamic, and of this extension which is not quite spatial, but tends to become so, it was indeed a matter of Malebranche’s intelligible extension.

M. G. Deleuze: I didn’t have this connection in mind. Effectively, in intelligible extension, there is indeed a sort of pure, pre-extensive *spatium*. As also in the Leibnizian distinction between *spatium* and *extensio*.

Mme Prenant: My question follows on from M. Souriau’s. What you call obscure and distinct, would this not be what Leibniz would call intelligible and non-imaginable? Non-imaginable corresponding to obscure—to what you call obscure. For Leibniz, the obscure is thought not being able to determine its object—in the *Meditationes* for example: a fleeting memory in the form of an image [*un souvenir fuyant d’image*]. By contrast, the knowledge that metal-testers have of gold constitutes the law of a series of properties: it is not an object of the senses, it does not take the form of an image, and consequently I think he would translate it not by “obscure”, I don’t think he would have liked the word, but by unimaginable, in opposition to clear. And that can even go to include what he called blind thought—not in all conditions since it can lead to verbalism and error, as he says in his critique of the ontological proof. But it can correspond to certain forms of blind thought; for example, to typical features—to rigorously constructed forms.

But must not these “distinct and blind” ideas of Leibniz precisely rest in the final instance on “distinct visions”? Leibniz sees that a straight line must be able to be prolonged to infinity because he sees the reason for this: the similarity of the segments. It is thus in the end necessary to come back to “primitive notions” which “serve as their own signs” [*sont à elles-mêmes leur propres marques*], and to the alphabet of human thought. In other words, I do not think that thought can remain “obscure” in its entirety—in M. Deleuze’s sense—from one end of its path to the other. It must at least “see a reason”, grasp a law.

M. G. Deleuze: I am struck by your remarks on the rigour of Leibnizian terminology. But is it not true, Madame, that “distinct” has many senses in Leibniz. The

texts on the sea insist on this: the little perceptions contain distinguished elements, which is to say remarkable points, which determine, through their combination with the remarkable points of our bodies, a threshold of awareness, of conscious perception. This conscious perception for its part is clear and confused (non-distinct), but the differential elements that it actualises are themselves distinct and obscure. It is true that it is then a case of a ground, which in a certain way perhaps goes beyond sufficient reason itself..

Mme Prenant: I think in any case that when a simple substance “expresses” the universe, it does not always express it through an image; it expresses it necessarily through some quality—conscious or not (at the most partially conscious for the finite activity of a created substance), which corresponds to a system of variable relations according to the “point of view”. God alone can think the totality of these virtualities with a perfect distinction—which cancels any need for him of a calculation of probabilities...

But I want to ask you a second question. Isn't this virtuality which claims to correspond to existence a problem for the scientist who is searching for a classification and who encounters “contaminated” samples [*“sales” échantillons*], which oblige him to rearrange his species? In other words, is it anything but a progressive and mobile expression?

M. G. Deleuze: It seems to me that virtuality can never correspond to the actual as essence does to existence. This would be to confuse the virtual with the possible. In any case the virtual and the actual correspond, but do not resemble each other. This is why the search for actual concepts can be infinite, there is always an excess of virtual Ideas which animate them.

M. Ullmo: I am a little overwhelmed by such a purely philosophical presentation, that I admired very much, in the first place for its form, unquestionably, and its poetic value, but also for this feeling—but is it a feeling?—that I constantly while listening, that, despite my specifically philosophical ignorance, my naïveté with respect to the concepts, the methods, the references that you used, I had the impression that I understood you, or rather that I could try at each point to translate you into a much more humble language, the language of epistemology, the language from which I could extract a scientific reflection which bears now on quite a few

years and quite a few experiences. Of course, these two domains do not completely overlap, and at certain points I lost my footing. But from the questions which have been posed I have also understood why I lost my footing, for there were precise allusions to philosophical domains that I have no knowledge of. But that being said, I think that almost all that you have said can be translated into the language of modern epistemology and I think in effect that this project you have pursued to give philosophical concepts a genetic bearing, a progressive or evolutionary [*evolutive*] bearing, this sort of internal differentiation allowing them to adapt to the domain of science and the domain of history, to the domain of biology also in admitting that this domain is more evolved than that of the science of matter that dominates us to the present day, I think that this project is very interesting and that you have contributed an advance.

M. G. Bouligand: I would simply like to make a small remark in relation to the “contaminated samples” raised by Mme Prenant. I recall that for the mathematician, such samples are counter-examples. A researcher who, in good faith, examines a theme, draws from it a prospective view, in accordance with given examples which “induce him” towards a claimed “theorem q”. A colleague that he consults soon puts it to the test of a “counter-example”. Whence, for the prospector, a “psychological shock”, sometimes brutal, but quickly dominated by the one who ultimately calculates the implications of the case which he set aside “for practical reasons” in the first instance, by considering them “strange”! A frequent phenomenon in fact: this is what happens when tentatives are made around a point h of a surface S —with normal vertical in h —in order to justify a “minimum of side” in h under these hypotheses: all verticals encounter S in a single point; in addition, the minimum would be produced in h for all lines from S , obtained as the intersection of S and an arbitrary vertical plane containing the h vertical. The return to a clear view of things is sometimes difficult: it is a matter, in effect, starting from more or less subjective impressions, of rediscovering what fully accords with logical rigour.

M. J. Merleau-Ponty: You spoke at several points in your presentation of spatio-temporal dynamisms and it is obvious that this plays a very important role, which I think I have partly understood. However, and no doubt this can be done, it would be pertinent to distinguish what is spatial and what is temporal in these dynamisms. The comparison of two of the

images that you used makes me think that it would perhaps be important to clarify this point. You used the image of lightning; I don't know if you found it in Leibniz or if you discovered it on your own, it doesn't matter. But it is clear that in this case we are dealing with what you call the intensive, which would in this case be the potential. We are dealing with an instantaneous and purely spatial dispersion. We have the movement of electrical charges, the sound wave, etc. You then took the image of the embryo; but it is evident that in this case, the temporal aspect is closely associated with the spatial aspect, the differentiation in time being ordered as rigorously as in space. So I would like to know if you have any detail to add on this point, for, in the end, my thought is this: I found, and was not very surprised to find, a certain Bergsonian resonance in your presentation, but lightning, precisely, is not Bergsonian at all, because in Bergson there is no rupture of time, or at least I do not see any.

M. G. Deleuze: Your question is very important. It would be necessary to distinguish what belongs to space and what belongs to time in these dynamisms, and in each case the particular space-time combination. Each time an Idea actualises itself, there is a space and a time of actualisation. The combinations are certainly variable. On the one hand, if it is true that an Idea has two aspects, differential relations and singular points, the time of actualisation refers to the first, the space of actualisation to the second. On the other hand, if we consider the two aspects of the actual, qualities and extensions, the qualities result above all from the time of actualisation: the specificity of qualities is to endure, and to endure just time enough for an intensive system to maintain and communicate its constitutive differences. As for extensions, they result, for their part, from the space of actualisation or from the movement by which the singularities incarnate themselves. We can see well in biology how differential rhythms determine the organisation of the body and its temporal specification.

M. J. Merleau-Ponty: In relation to this question, I think of an image that you did not use in your presentation, the image of lineage. In a paper that you gave on Proust a few years ago, you spoke of lineage, the two lineages which emerge from the great hermaphrodite, etc...

Couldn't this image have also been suitable in your paper today?

M. G. Deleuze: Yes, dynamisms determine "lineages" in this very way. I spoke today of abstract lines, and of the ground from which these lines emerged.

M. Beaufret: I would like to ask a question, but not on the presentation itself, on one of Deleuze's replies to M. de Gandillac, the last one. At the end of your dialogue Apollo and Dionysos were raised, and it ended with this: the opposition is unsurmountable. Did I understand this correctly?

M. G. Deleuze: Yes, I think so.

M. Beaufret: Then I will pose the question: by whom? to what point? How? where? when? By whom can it be surmounted? I suppose or I feel that...

M. G. Deleuze: By whom could it be surmounted? Surely not by Dionysos himself, who has no interest in doing so. Dionysos ensures that what is distinct remains obscure. He has no reason and no advantage, he cannot bear the idea of reconciliation. He cannot bear the clear-and-distinct. He has taken the distinct for himself and he desires that this distinct be forever obscure. It's his own will, I suppose... But who wants to surmount this opposition? I can well see that the dream of a reconciliation of the clear and the distinct can only be explained from the side of clarity. It is Apollo who wants to surmount the opposition. It is he who elicits the reconciliation of the clear and the distinct, and it is he who inspires the artisan of this reconciliation: the tragic artist. I come back to M. de Gandillac's theme, there are several instants. The tragic is the effort of reconciliation, which necessarily comes from Apollo. But in Dionysus there is always something which withdraws and repudiates, something which wants to maintain the obscurity of the distinct...

M. Beaufret: I think we satisfy ourselves a little quickly with this Dionysus-Apollo opposition, which, certainly, appears very clear-cut in the Birth of Tragedy. But it seems to me more and more that there is a third character, if I may say, who appears in Nietzsche and who he tends more and more to name Alcyon. I don't know what he is doing, but what strikes me is

that this *Alkyonische*, as he says, who is more and more the sky of Nice, is like a dimension which is neither precisely identified with the Dionysian dimension nor the Apollonian dimension. And at the end of *Beyond Good and Evil* he speaks of his encounter with Dionysos and says that the god replied to him “with his Alcyonian smile”. I wondered what exactly the “Alcyonian smile” of Dionysos meant? This is why, in any case, I think that Nietzsche is perhaps more reticent than you have been. I think that it is a late discovery.

M. G. Deleuze: Certainly, the significance of Alcyon remains a great problem in Nietzsche’s last writings.

R. P. Breton: The question: *what is?*, certainly, does not get me very far in the discovery of the essence or the idea. But it seems to me to have an indispensable *regulative function*. It opens a space of research which only those questions with a *heuristic function*—Who? how? etc.—can fill. Far from being able to be a substitute for it, these questions thus seem to me to require it. They constitute the indispensable mediation. It is in order to answer the question *what is?* that I ask myself the other questions. The two types of questions are thus heterogenous and complementary.

Moreover, these questions seem to me to be grounded in a prior idea of the “thing”, an idea which already responds, in a global way, to the question *what is?* They presuppose a “larval” subject which deploys itself in an *interval of realisation*, made concrete by the spatio-temporal dynamisms.

As such, in virtue of what has been called the conversion of substance into subject, essence is less *what is* already there than a *to ti en einai* (what is to be). Hegel will speak in this regard of a *Bestimmtheit* which becomes *Bestimmung*. The determination of the thing would be the past of its “dramatisation”. *Esse sequitur operari* (instead of *operari sequitur esse*). Traditional ontology would only be the logical approximation of an ontogeny, whose centre would be the *causa sui* or else the Auqupostaton Proclus speaks of.

By situating your reflections within this ontological horizon, I am not claiming to diminish either their interest or their scope. I am trying to better understand them. There is in any case a prior question. To what exactly does your method of dramatisation apply? In what precise horizon of reality do you pose the “topical” questions of *Quis?* of *quomodo?* etc. Do these only have a sense in the world of men? Or else do they apply

to the “things” of common or scientific experience? Spatio-temporal dynamisms are objects of research in dynamic psychology and in microphysics. What relations of analogy are there between these spatiotemporal dynamisms which are so different? Can we imagine a process of differentiation as reconnecting them?

M. G. Deleuze: I am not sure that the two types of question can be reconciled. You say that the question: What is? precedes and directs the posing of the others. And that inversely these others allow us to give an answer to it. Is there not rather cause to fear that, if we begin with What is?, we may no longer be able to get to the other questions? The question: What is? prejudices the result of the enquiry, it presupposes that the answer is given in the simplicity of an essence, even if it belongs to this simple essence to duplicate or contradict itself, etc. One remains in the abstract movement, one can no longer rejoin the real movement, the one which traverses a multiplicity as such. The two types of question seem to me to imply methods which are not reconcilable. For example, when Nietzsche asks *who*, or *from what point of view*, instead of “what”, he does not claim to complete the question what is? but to denounce the form of this question and all the possible responses to this question. When I ask what is? I assume that there is an essence behind appearances, or at least something ultimate behind the masks. The other type of questions, on the contrary, always discovers other masks behind a mask, displacements behind every place, other “cases” contained within a case.

You emphasise in a profound way the presence of a temporal operation in the *to ti en einai*. But it seems to me that this operation, in Aristotle, does not depend on the question What is?, but on the contrary on the question *who?*, which Aristotle uses in order to express all of his anti-Platonism. *to ti en einai*, is “who is?” (or rather “who, the being?”).

You ask me what is the scope of dramatisation. Is it solely psychological or anthropological? I think that man has no privilege there. In any case, it is the unconscious which dramatises. All sorts of repetitions and resonances intervene between physical, biological and psychical dynamisms. Perhaps the difference between these dynamisms comes first of all from the *order* of the Idea which actualises itself. A determination of these orders of Ideas would be necessary.

M. Philonenko: I would like to ask M. Deleuze for a clarification.

You asserted to us that in the movement of actualisation, differential elements had no sensible figure, no function, no conceptual signification (which in fact seems strictly anti-Leibnizian to me, if I can express it in this way, since Leibniz accords a conceptual signification to the differential precisely because it possesses no “figure”: but that is not in any case the problem which interests me). To support your thesis, however, you alluded to the post-Kantians, in the plural. This thus implied not only a reference to Hegel, but also to Maimon, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer even. Perhaps even to Nietzsche, if you like... I would like you to clarify first of all which of the post-Kantians you were thinking of more particularly.

M. G. Deleuze: You ask me who I was thinking of: obviously of Maimon and of certain aspects of Novalis.

M. Philonenko: And the differential of consciousness?

M. G. Deleuze: That’s right...

M. Philonenko: In effect, a part of your paper seemed to me to be inspired by Maimon’s work. This clarification is important, then, for the notion of the differential of consciousness, in Maimon, is fundamental, and, in many respects, the spatio-temporal dynamisms such as you have described them, evoke to an amazing extent Maimon’s differential of consciousness. In other words, at the level of representation we have, in a certain way, integrations; but there is a sub-representative level, as you have attempted to show, and this is precisely the level on which the differential possesses a genetic significance, at least in Maimon’s view. I thus wanted this first clarification in order to properly situate the debate. However, and this is very interesting to me, in Maimon *the notion of differential, which is attached to the genetic operation of the transcendental imagination, is a sceptical principle*, a principle which leads us to consider the real to be illusory. To the very extent, in effect, that the root of spatio-temporal dynamisms is sub-representative, we have, Maimon says, no criterion at all. And that means two things: *in the first place*, we cannot discern what is produced by us and what is produced by the object; *in the second place*, we cannot

distinguish what is produced logically and what is not. What remains is simply the results of the sub-representative genesis of the transcendental imagination. It is thus necessary, according to Maimon, to develop a dialectic of the transcendental imagination, or, if you prefer, *a dialectic of the synthesis*. This would be linked again in a small way—I indeed say small—with Leibniz. Here then is the clarification I ask of you: what is the role of illusion (or of the illusory) in the movement of differential elements?

M. G. Deleuze: For me, none.

M. Philonenko: And what is it which thus allows you to say none.

M. G. Deleuze: You say to me: for Maimon there is an illusion. I understand you entirely, but my aim was not to explain Maimon. If you ask me: what is the role of illusion in the schema that you are proposing?, I reply: none. For it seems to me that we have the means to penetrate into the realm of the sub-representative, to reach right into the root of spatiotemporal dynamisms, into the Ideas which actualise themselves in them: ideal elements and events, relations and singularities, are perfectly determinable. The illusion only appears afterwards, on the side of the constituted extensions and the qualities which fill these extensions.

M. Philonenko: So the illusion only appears in the constituted?

M. G. Deleuze: That's right. In summary, we do not have the same conception of the unconscious as Leibniz or Maimon. Freud has come in between. There is thus a displacement of the illusion...

M. Philonenko: But—for I intend to remain on the plane of logic and even of transcendental logic, without getting involved in psychology—if you place all illusion on the side of the constituted, without admitting an illusion in the genesis, in the constitution, aren't you then at bottom returning (although you wanted to avoid it) to Plato for whom precisely constitution, understood from the point of view of the Idea, in so far as it can be understood, is always truthful, veridical?

M. G. Deleuze: Yes, perhaps.

M. Philonenko: In such a way that in the final instance on the side of specification and multiplicity we experience the same truth as in Plato, and we would have the same idea of the true, I mean: the simplicity of the true always equal to itself in the totality of its production?

M. G. Deleuze: It would not be that Plato. If we think of the Plato of the last dialectic, where the Ideas are a little like multiplicities which must be traversed by the questions *How? How much? In what case?*, then yes, everything that I am saying seems to me in effect to be Platonic. If it is on the contrary a matter of a Plato who subscribes to a simplicity of the essence or an ipseity of the Idea, then no.

M. Jean Wahl: If nobody else wishes to speak, I think it remains for me only to thank M. Deleuze very much and all those who were good enough to take part in the discussion.