PART III:

EXTREMITIES: GROUND ZERO
CHAPTER 1:

THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT AND THE IMAGE OF NATURE (1)

Introduction to the problem

The relationship between Deleuze and Kant’s philosophy culminates in the ideas and themes of Kant’s Critique of Judgement. The third critique not only contains, from Deleuze’s perspective, the ultimate ground of the previous two critiques, and thus the critical project as a whole, but also addresses some of the limitations that in Deleuze’s view compromise the impact of Kant’s philosophy. The third critique directly confronts the problem of the ‘gap’ between the *a priori* conditions of possibility of knowledge and morality, and their relationship with actual experience as encountered *a posteriori*. It is thus of particular interest to Deleuze’s project of developing critique beyond thought’s “conditions of possibility” to its “conditions of actuality.” Part of this development consists in the elaboration of a thought that is independent from the concept of identity as condition of knowledge, as outlined in the last section, instead taking the Idea as a focal point for the construction of problems. The aesthetic experience, in which the activity of the imagination enters into a “free” relationship with the understanding, without the direction of a determinate concept, forms in many ways the model of this new image of thought. Deleuze frequently attributes aesthetic capabilities to the philosopher ‘type’, whether in terms of the creativity of the philosopher-artist or the philosopher as one endowed with a heightened “taste”—the fine judgement of the diagnostician. As in Kant’s critique, these capacities are allied with a vital attention to the contingent in experience, and a thought whose substance is its event rather than its object or subject.

On a broader level, the Critique of Judgement is directly concerned with the question of the viability of the critical philosophy as a whole, in several senses: the coherence of its different parts, the ‘worldview’ it bequeaths us, and finally in the literal sense of the ‘feeling of life’ itself. For Deleuze, as for Kant,
the ‘nature’ of the Nature produced by a philosophy reflects its *ethos*—the “mode of existence” it implies, in Deleuze’s case, and the orientation of our moral destiny, for Kant. In both cases, it is the question of an accord between the subject of knowledge and morality and empirical nature which is the focus of the ethical problem. It is the notion of “formal purposiveness” in the third critique, as the transcendental principle of judgement, which forms the focus of this problem of reconciliation. In aesthetic judgements, this principle is expressed in the relationship of a presentation upon the subject, which engages or enlivens the faculties in an indeterminate fashion. In teleological judgements, purposiveness is invoked as a principle of reflection for the study of natural phenomena that manifest a principle of organisation. While aesthetic judgements represent the only pure manifestation of the transcendental principle of judgement, it is the teleological model of nature that seems to most directly speak to the problem of ‘mediating’ between the realm of nature and freedom. The image of an organised nature, an ordered whole whose parts also function as quasi-autonomous wholes in a hierarchy of ends or purposes, is a notion which uniquely synthesises scientific credibility and moral edification. It is indeed indispensable to the study of living things to introduce the notion of purpose and specification, and the ingenuity of living systems is considered by Kant to be the strongest of all arguments for the existence of a Supreme Being.

In contrast, the integrity and intelligibility of aesthetic judgements suffers from being formulated in largely negative and paradoxical terms: by the absence of a determinate concept or Idea, the absence of any theoretical or moral interest or purpose, ‘purposiveness without a purpose’, ‘lawfulness without a law’, singular and yet universal. Kant himself indicates that the phenomenon of aesthetic judgements involves a certain “obscurity” that is “not altogether avoidable” due to its lack of a concept, a problem that does not affect “the second part of this work.”

The question of the relationship between the two parts of the *Critique of Judgement*, and of both to the critical oeuvre as a whole, is a recurrent one when addressing this work. This question is of particular interest when it comes to the relationship between Deleuze and Kant, for several reasons. In the first place, as already mentioned, Deleuze presents aesthetic judgements as the cornerstone of the integrity of the transcendental apparatus and hence fundamental to the unity of the critical system. In addition to this, we find in
his work the basis for establishing a clear difference in nature between an aesthetic and a teleological ‘worldview’. While Deleuze makes claims to being a “vitalist” thinker, he emphasises the non-organic quality of his conception of life. The development of this distinction between the vitality of organic and non-organic life is most evident in his work with Guattari: one of their signature concepts is the “body-without-organs.” Its elements, however, are present throughout Deleuze’s work. It forms part of his philosophy of difference that attempts to construct a coherent account of the thinkability and communicability of singular or individual differences that exist outside of the concept, against the regime of specific and generic differences which rely on conceptual division. Above all it forms part of his denunciation of the notion of cosmos in philosophy: the hierarchical distribution of identity and difference within an organised whole. Deleuze affirms the ‘modernity’ of Kant in terms of his rupture with this notion, which is expressed both in Kant’s contestation of transcendent principles of foundation, and in the subordination of bodies to space and time as independent parameters. For Deleuze, Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgements represents the continuation and exacerbation of this rupture rather than a compensatory gesture.

For both Kant and Deleuze then, the problems that govern the Critique of Judgement form a nexus of epistemological, methodological, cosmological and ethical concerns. Each part of the third critique resonates on several of these levels as well as reviving questions arising from the previous critiques. This chapter will thus address the philosophical implications of the different forms of ‘nature’ in Kant’s critique, and the relationship between them, and conversely the impact of the critical position on the image of the natural world. A starting point for this position is the revolution in thought that constituted modern science.

**Critique and the scientific revolution**

The scientific revolution is customarily presented through the contrast between the ancient and modern understanding of movement, dated from the work of Galileo. The shift in thinking is inadequately represented as a shift in the seat of knowledge from an extra-worldly domain of eternal essences to the
intra-worldly machinations of nature: it is rather the redistribution of the meaningful coordinates of this knowledge. A summary description of the shift would be that the intelligibility of nature is no longer grasped through identifying the specific place of things within an overall order but through identifying the \textit{laws} that regulate events. Galileo’s work was directed against the Aristotelian conception of movement which considers movement to be a departure from the natural resting state of a body, and hence in need of explanation. Movement is classified by Aristotle as either “natural” or “violent” according to whether it follows a path back to a body’s natural place or is diverted from this trajectory. By contrast, on Galileo’s model, which forms the initial outline of the laws of inertia, movement is understood as a state rather than a process and does not represent any intrinsic modification of a body nor require explanation in itself. Movement and rest are no longer pertinent or inherent ontological qualifications regarding the state of a body (along moreover with all other non-quantifiable attributes). What is pertinent is only the \textit{change} (of speed or direction) in the movement of a body, whether moving or at rest, this change signaling the presence of a causal relation. The categories of “natural” and “unnatural” or “violent” cannot be applied to causal change, any more than they apply to movement or rest in this model.

At first glance, the Aristotelian formulation of the principle of movement—“each body, if not impeded, moves to its own place”—seems to express a similar idea to the Cartesian formulation of the principle of inertia—“that each thing as far as in it lies, continues always in the same state.” Aristotle’s formula, however, is the expression of his notion of movement as the actualisation of an inherent potential of a body, different according to its type, and defined by the place to which it naturally tends: the inherent nature of fire, for example, is to move upwards, of earth to move downwards, and up and down are absolute and independently existing coordinates of nature. The possibility of an external impediment—producing a “forced” movement—is secondary and uninformative in relation to the natural movement whose explanation is internal to and reflective of the nature of things and places. By contrast, the “change” referred to in Descartes’ formula is the only informative aspect of movement. Because change is defined as a change in either the direction or speed of a movement (or both), movement \textit{per se}, apart from its change, is of necessity and by default both a state and constant, uniform and
rectilinear in nature, in which respects it is indistinguishable from an unmoving body. The change expresses an external relation of causality between two unspecified bodies, the paradigm of which, in Descartes' model of mechanism, is “shock”.

Part of the motivation and inspiration for the *Critique of Pure Reason* was this revolution in science, exemplified by the physics of Newton. The influence of the new experimental methodology and its conceptualisation of nature in terms of basic laws applied to matter can already be seen in the structure and operation of Kant’s transcendental apparatus of cognition, as well as in the nature thereby constituted. The autonomy of space and time with respect to a conceptual order, for example, correlates with their independence as variables in the physics of mechanism. In addition, the unity and nature of the world is only contingent upon its legislation through the understanding, rather than being presupposed as a given totality. Emile Bréhier describes the concordance between Kant’s philosophy and the physical principles of the new science in his *History of Philosophy*:

> We saw that Newton had freed physics from the notion of universe, by considering, instead of the total system of things, the elementary law connecting the different parts of matter; the position and motion of a particle at a given moment are determined, not by a detail in the general design, but by the relation, according to the law of attraction, between it and all other particles; thus the elementary law suffices for as much matter as one wishes to provide for it. We also saw that Kant had pushed to the limit the type of knowledge assumed by Newtonian physics: transcendental apperception introduces unity and connections in the manifold which is indefinitely supplied by sensibility.9

In Kant’s synthesis, as in the modern laws of movement, it is the points of conjunction that yield meaningful information, rather than the identification of an internal directing principle. The coherence of the nature of modern physics is of a different kind to its pre-modern conception: the lawfulness of bodies and their relationships is a matter of necessity rather than ordained in a normative manner.

It is this contrast between the ancient and modern conceptions of movement that Deleuze takes up in the first of his two books on cinema. Deleuze’s analysis reflects the way he develops an aesthetic principle from elements of the new model of nature. There, Deleuze gives his own account of the difference, and how they find expression in philosophical concepts.10 In antiquity, movement is referred to a series of ideal moments or ‘poses’ which
express an intelligible form or potential, the intermediary moments or departures from this ordered trajectory being without interest. This conception corresponds to the philosophical interest in the eternal as a formal ideal transcendent to its incarnation in matter. In modern science, on the other hand, the analysis of movement into equidistant points means that the basic element of movement is no longer a “privileged instant”, but any moment sampled from its trajectory (l’instant quelconque—’any-instant-whatever’):

“[movement] is no longer recomposed using formal transcendent elements (poses), but immanent material elements (sections).”

In tracing the path of a body through equidistant points, we may distinguish between regular and singular points, according to whether they mark a continuation or a change in direction and/or speed. This dichotomy differs, however, from that of the ‘privileged’ and the ‘non-privileged’ moment, as it does not represent the expression of an internal principle, but an intersection with an external element regulated by an independent law. The philosophical interest of this conception for Deleuze is the role it accords to contingency. The neutrality of the mechanistic analysis of movement is at the same time what allows for the production of a remarkable event at any given moment:

When one relates movement any-moment-whatevers (des moments quelconques), one must be capable of thinking the production of the new, that is, the remarkable and the singular, at any one of these moments: this is a complete conversion of philosophy.

The critical attitude already presents us with a notion of being which is indeterminate outside of its determination within the framework of knowledge or practice. What Deleuze’s analysis of aesthetic experience will focus on is a dialectic between the determinate and indeterminate narrowed down to the impact of a singular event against a background of disinterestedness.

The analogy between the modern conception of movement and Kant’s philosophical revolution in particular is also noted by Deleuze. Deleuze argues in the conclusion to Difference and Repetition that the history of the problem of foundation in philosophy relies on the notion of an ideal, substantial or conceptual ‘backbone’ to the universe, which guides and structures its development. In a first sense, the foundation is located in the Idea, understood as a principle of identity or essence, which serves as the authenticating or organising principle for a series of “claimants.” This is a model of the foundation as logos, inspired by ancient philosophy, which
inaugurates the world of representation, and which sorts ‘true’ from ‘false’ claimants according to the faithfulness of their reproduction of the principle of identity. In a second sense, the operation of foundation is not one of selection between claims, but rather itself makes a claim on an infinity of possible forms in a process of convergence or “mono-centring”, such that all differences can be traced back to a central principle. This model of the foundation as “sufficient reason”, exemplified by the systems of Leibniz and Hegel, seeks to render the regime of representation infinite, such that it incorporates the smallest and the greatest differences with respect to a central identity. What both discourses share on Deleuze’s account is an underlying cosmology in which everything has its moment, its place and time according to its distance or proximity to a central principle. The rhythm of space and time is dictated by an ideal order, as the expression, unfolding or externalisation of the concept. What is repressed, or excluded, in either case, is the indeterminate: the informal, divergent, or singular.

It is in light of this model that Deleuze considers Kant’s introduction of space and time into thought as independent conditions to be revolutionary, not because it confines knowledge to the realm of ‘appearances’, but because the ‘liberation’ of space and in particular time disrupts the cosmological model that subtends the discourse of foundation. This is the “fracture” examined in the last section, which subordinates the subject and object of a determination in thought to its form of determinability in space and time. The formal conditions of space and time represent for Deleuze not a limitation of the possibilities of thought, but rather a new form of sufficient reason for the actualisation of thought in the concrete, and the direct engagement of thought with indeterminacy. Deleuze takes Shakespeare’s expression from Hamlet that “Time is out of joint”, as a “poetic formula” for this aberration from a cosmic model in Kant, but it is also the reflection of a scientific revolution in which space and time are no longer conditioned by the movement which takes place within them, but instead form its condition. On a metaphysical level, the categories of substance and totality, for example, which defined the pre-modern universe, are now dependent on their determination as schemas of time:

Time is no longer related to the movement it measures, but rather movement to the time that conditions it. Thus movement is no longer a
determination of the object, but the description of a space, a space we must abstract from in order to discover time as the condition of action. Time thus becomes unilinear and rectilinear... insofar as it imposes the succession of its determinations on all possible movement... Kant's historical situation allows him to grasp the full implication of this reversal: time is no longer the cosmic time of an original celestial movement, nor is it the rural time of derived meteorological movements. It has become the time of the city and nothing else, the pure order of time. 15

Critique and teleology

This physical field of bodies in causal interaction is the nature constituted through the categories in a priori synthetic judgements. It is not because Kant is overly attached to Newtonian mechanism that this is how nature is determined a priori, but rather the reverse: it is only as a mechanical nature that sensibility is able to be anticipated a priori, as the minimum condition of possible experience. There are features of nature indispensable to its study, however, which can only be appreciated a posteriori. The first is the apprehension of nature as a system: which is to say, comprising classes and subclasses of phenomena. A mechanical nature does not exclude the possibility of an “absurd” nature in which each body is the only example of its kind, but as a matter of fact nature appears to organise itself into different types of object.16 More specific to the question of nature as a teleological system is the structure and interaction of living beings. Living organisms pose a problem for a mechanical model because their actions are endowed with a sense that refers them to centres of activity and ends that evoke a different model of causality than a mechanical one. In living organisms, we seem to perceive a relationship between the whole and its parts such that each exists for the other as a function of an overall purpose.

The limitations of the nature constituted through pure reason alone represent a scientific concern, but there are also clear moral interests in the representation of nature as a purposeful whole. Kant’s critique of practical reason constitutes the domain of morality through the concept of freedom, which represents the self-legislation of the supersensible self as cause expressed through the categorical imperative. The suprasensible domain of morality and the sensible domain of nature that is the object of knowledge are
incommensurable. Freedom does not liberate the subject from the causality of nature, *qua* empirical being, but neither is the subject influenced by nature, *qua* moral being: the legislations of pure and practical reason concern, or constitute, entirely separate domains. They are, however, constantly confronted through their “effects”, of particular concern in the case of the expression of freedom in moral actions. While a moral action may claim a free subject as its cause, it can only be expressed in the natural world whose causality bears no relationship to morality. The problem here is not that a natural world *excludes* the possibility of freedom but that it is essentially *indifferent* to the moral aims of freedom. The free subject can find no reflection of or aid to his or her moral endeavours in external nature, which goes against the grain of reason’s goal of the highest good or *summum bonum*: the reconciliation of virtue and happiness, or our natural and moral being.

Part of the aim of the *Critique of Judgement* is thus to address the “gaps” between our *a priori* concepts of nature and actual experience, and our *a priori* concepts of morality and the sensible world. At the same time, any real or objective mediation would imply a unity or continuity between the domains of the sensible and the supersensible, the rejection of which forms a point of departure for the critical system. The notion of a totality which unites the sensible and the supersensible, the possible and the contingent, is the preserve of the Idea. The necessity of the *thought* of such a totality, following the demands of reason, alongside the impossibility of it being *known*, is the central disjunction that forms the basis of the critical project. In the previous critiques, this disjunction is attenuated by the regulative status accorded to Ideas. Thus, in the first critique, the problematic ideal of complete determination serves as a regulative model for the systematic unity of our concepts of nature: the horizon of an indefinite process of unification and specification. In the second critique, the ideal of a complete determination of existence through the concept of freedom, as expressed in the idea of a *summum bonum*, is similarly postulated as a regulative principle which places our moral efforts within the perspective of an infinite approximation and subtends the thesis of the immortality of the soul. In both cases, the horizon of the ideal is what founds the positive sense of knowledge and morality rather than being an expression of their limitations. It is the disjunction between concept and existence that gives sense to the judgements of our synthetic cognitive apparatus, just as it is through the
discrepancy between the moral law and our natural inclinations that we realise the significance of morality.

The distinction, and discrepancy, between possible and actual experience is for Kant a function of the structure of our cognitive faculty: the separation between the understanding, which produces concepts, and sensibility, which provides intuitions. The independence of our intuitions from our concepts, whether by exceeding their purview or falling short, is what constitutes our experience of nature as contingent. We are aware of this independence because we can conceive of a concept that meets no correlative intuition, and an experience for which we have no concept. This distinction is also operative for practical reason: while the faculty of desire posits a causal relationship between its representations and an actual reality, the possibilities we posit as desires frequently outstrip our capacities as subject to natural causality. We may, however, imagine an understanding for whom this distinction did not exist: an ‘intuitive’ understanding for which all objects would be actual, and which would thus have no sense of the notion of contingency:

An understanding to which this distinction did not apply would mean:
All objects cognized by me are (exist); such a being could have no presentation whatever of the possibility that some objects might not exist after all, i.e., of the contingency of those that do exist…

It is reason which prompts us to posit such an understanding, which transcends the conditions of our own cognition, and corresponds with its assumption “that the original basis of nature has unconditioned necessity.” It demands a similar unity from a practical point of view, where the distinction between the possible and the actual translates into the discrepancy between obligation and action. Combined, they form an image of “an intelligible world in which everything would be actual because it is (both good and) possible.”

This ideal of reason is not presented in order to serve as a regulative model after the fashion of the first two critiques, but rather forms a ‘spur’ for the understanding to develop the notion of “purposiveness” as the transcendental principle of the faculty of judgement. In the first critique, the principles of the systematisation of our concepts of nature were presented as analogons of the sensible schema: rules of production that governed relations between concepts rather than presentations. Here, “purposiveness” is instead something like an ‘analogon of the Idea’: the interpretation of the
understanding, according to its own limits, of an ideal of Reason. The peculiar difficulty of the understanding in grasping the notion of an “intuitive” intellect, is that it can only present such an understanding to itself as an image or possibility, which is precisely the character that differentiates our intellect (an ‘intellectus ectypus’) from a non-discursive understanding (an ‘intellectus archetypus’). In such cases, “where cognising certain objects is beyond the ability of our understanding”, we must “think them in accordance with the subjective conditions for exercising our powers.” Thus, reason conceives of an understanding for which there is no distinction between the necessary and the contingent, the universal and the particular, and thus no need to produce an accord between the one and the other. The understanding, however, can only conceive, by analogy, of a contingent harmony between nature and our understanding, a “lawfulness of the contingent” which is expressed in the notion of “purposiveness.” And while reason conceives of an understanding which would intuitively grasp the whole of nature in a determinate fashion, with no distinction between its possibility and actuality, the analogy for the understanding is “having the presentation of the whole contain the basis that makes possible the form of that whole as well as the connection of the parts required to make this form possible.” This form of causality through a presentation of the whole is how Kant defines a (natural) purpose.

The notions of purpose and purposiveness feature in various interrelated senses in the critique of teleological judgement. The idea of the purposiveness of nature for our understanding clearly serves a moral interest in the idea of a divine creator, as well as being a subjective regulative principle for our study of nature: in these ways it resembles Leibniz’s notion of natural finality. The notion of purpose, as an organising concept relating parts to each other under the auspices of a whole, serves alternatively as a methodological principle for the organisation of our knowledge, a principle for the classification of nature into species and genera, and a biological principle for the understanding of the functioning of living organisms. The key in each case is that an idea of the whole precedes and regulates the parts, which themselves can represent ‘wholes’ relative to their own parts, such that the whole forms a “system”, rather than a simple “aggregate” (where the whole is simply the addition of parts). Such an organisation is of a different order to any mechanical causality: in the introduction to the critique of teleological
judgement Kant distinguishes the “causality of purposes” (*nexus finalis*) from mechanical causality (*nexus effectivus*). Any apparent order or ‘design’ in nature can only be considered to be accidental from the perspective of the latter.

Kant’s approach to reconciling the determination of nature through causal laws and the regulative model of teleology will be addressed in the next chapter. The question of interest at this point is the relationship between ‘this’ nature and that presented in aesthetic judgements. In Kant’s terminology: what is the difference between the principle of a “logical purposiveness” in nature, or “purposiveness with a purpose” (which is to say, “purposefulness”), and that of “formal purposiveness” or “purposiveness without a purpose”? —

This is the basis for dividing the critique of judgement into that of aesthetic and that of teleological judgement. By the first I mean the power to judge formal purposiveness (sometimes also called subjective purposiveness) by the feeling of pleasure and displeasure; by the second I mean the power to judge the real (objective) purposiveness of nature by understanding and reason. The tendency in interpreting the “subjective purposiveness” experienced in aesthetic judgements is to present it negatively, as in effect an experience of the “purposefulness” of nature without the benefit of a determinate concept, on the level of feeling. Thus Werner S. Pluhar, in his introduction to the *Critique of Judgement*, states that “The difference between the concept of subjective purposiveness and the concept of a purpose is precisely that the first concept is indeterminate, the second is determinate”, and he goes on to explain the purposiveness of nature for our judgement in terms of the organisation of its laws into a hierarchical system. Another way this is expressed (again by Pluhar) is to speak of the aesthetic as an experience of the purposiveness of nature for our understanding “in general”, as opposed to the *specific* purposiveness apprehended when a particular purpose is identified. These formulations are consistent with many of Kant’s own, and satisfy an intuitive appreciation of how we experience beauty and sublimity—in natural beauty, for example, we can indeed feel “favoured” by nature in a way that is “general” or “indeterminate”, and which may encourage us in our separate scientific or moral endeavours.

However, just as Kant’s theoretical understanding proceeds on the basis of a difference in nature between sensibility and the concept, one of the
innovations of Kant’s aesthetics is to maintain that aesthetic appreciation is of a *different order* to any cognitive appreciation, and not simply a “confused” perception of a concept or in any way related to conceptual insight. This is not Pluhar’s meaning when he distinguishes aesthetic and teleological judgements on the grounds of the “determinacy” of their concept, as he himself has already given an account of this originality in Kant with respect to his predecessors. We do not proceed by degrees from an aesthetic appreciation to a teleological one; the difference is in the absence and presence of a concept. But when the absence of a determinate concept translates as the presence of an indeterminate concept, whose determinate correlate is found in teleological judgements, it becomes difficult to understand in what the independence of the aesthetic consists, both in its aconceptuality, and as claiming a principle in any way distinct from that of teleological judgements.

It is possible, however, to account for the difference and relationship between the principle of aesthetic and teleological judgements in a way that preserves the integrity and in a certain sense the priority of aesthetic judgements—given their primary position in the *Critique of Judgement* as the unique manifestation of the pure transcendental principle of judgement. The concern in the next chapter will be to determine the distinct “nature” of the aesthetic based on the different understandings of the concept of “life” raised by the third critique, and how it serves as a potential principle of integration for the different orders of reality in critical thought.
Endnotes for Part III Chapter 1

1 In NP, F86/E75, QP?, F13/E8, F74/E77, F13/E8, F74/E77.
2 Cf. p. 170.
3 See, in particular, CC, “To Have Done with Judgement”, F164/E131.
4 Eg., Chapter 6 in A Thousand Plateaus: “November 28. 1947: How Do You Make Yourself a Body Without Organs?”.
5 This account is principally drawn from Elhanan Yakira’s, La causalité de Galilée à Kant, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994.
6 Aristotle, Physics, IV.1, 208b8.
8 Physics, IV.1, 208b8.
11 Cinema 2, F13/E4, Deleuze’s emphasis.
12 Cinema 2, F17/E7.
17 Cf. §§76-§77.
18 Cf. p. 403.
19 Cf. p. 403.
20 Cf. p. 404.
21 Cf. p. 408.
22 Cf. p. 403.
23 Cf. pp. 407-408.
24 Henry Allison, for example, notes the variety of possibilities and laments their indistinction: “In particular, it is not clear whether it [the principle of logical purposiveness] concerns the possibility of unifying empirical laws into a system (theory construction), of formulating empirical laws in the first place, of forming empirical concepts, of classifying “natural forms” into genera and species, or of attributing necessity to empirical laws.”, “Is the Critique of Judgement “Post-Critical”?”, in Sedgwick, ed., The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, p. 83.
26 Cf. p. 193.
27 Cf. p. lvi-lvii.
28 Cf. p. lvii.
CHAPTER 2:

THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT AND THE IMAGE OF NATURE (2)

...individuation is the prior condition under which specification, and division or composition, operate in a system.
—Deleuze, “Method of dramatisation.”

The concept of “life” is one of the notions that offers a thread of continuity between the critique of teleological judgement and aesthetic judgements, and is particularly pertinent to the relationship between Deleuze and Kant. While the principles of teleological judgement offer rules for reflection on living organisms and systems, in their difference from mechanical processes, the principles of aesthetic judgements refer to the immediate sentiment of vitality within the subject. The faculty of judgement is defined by Kant as bearing on the feeling of pleasure and pain, which expresses the effect of a representation upon the subject independently of its objective status: the pure feeling in the subject or the modification of its state, in so far as there is a ‘furthering’ or ‘inhibiting’ of its vital forces. Rudolf Makkreel has examined the evolution of the concept of life and the notion of the “feeling of life” in Kant’s work, in a way that offers clues towards the relationship, and also the differences, between ‘aesthetic’ and ‘teleological’ vitality. While Kant initially approximates the action of living things to the causality of the faculty of desire, at later points it is rather a form of ‘responsiveness’ that marks the specificity of life. We can understand how the notion of ‘responsiveness’ can be equally applied to aesthetic and teleological judgements, as perhaps its ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ form, or as a subjective feeling and an objective capacity.

What the notion of ‘responsiveness’ brings out, however, is that at the basis of any ‘harmony’ is a ‘disharmony’ or disequilibrium that is overcome. The notion of purposiveness or contingent harmony in the Critique of Judgement is already introduced as an image of mediation between the realms of the possible and the actual, but it is equally, and necessarily, not the seamless unity of the two represented by the idea of reason. A tension between
notions of accord, symmetry, regularity, and purpose and those of discord, dissymmetry, irregularity and “contra-purposiveness” recurs throughout the *Critique of Judgement*. For Deleuze, the originality of the *Critique of Judgement* is found in its notion of a ‘discordant accord’, or an accord *through* discord, which is particularly expressed in aesthetic judgements. Deleuze’s understanding of aesthetic judgements resonates with his writings on biology and empiricism, in which he distinguishes between the *modus operandi* of organised forms, and an individual form of ‘responsiveness’ to contingency whose inventiveness outstrips the capacities of the organism and is in fact presupposed by them.

**The feeling of life**

Makkreel’s study on the “feeling of life” in Kant traces the sources of this notion in Kant’s philosophy of nature and anthropology, as well as its role in the *Critique of Judgement*. In its first presentation, Kant’s definition of life forms a simple contrast to inertial movement, evoking instead the inner principle of a body that directs its course. It is “the capacity of a substance to determine itself to act from an internal principle, of a finite substance to determine itself to change, of a material substance to determine itself to motion or rest as change of its state.”⁴ The *Critique of Practical Reason* provides a more cursory definition of life as the “capacity of a being to act according to the laws of the faculty of desire.”⁵ In the *Critique of Judgement* and Kant’s anthropology, however, the conception of life is refocussed on the notion of a subjective feeling—the affective response within the subject to a presentation. In this sense, the notion of life integrates “not only the capacity to act, but also the consciousness of being acted upon.”⁶ In Kant’s final reflections on nature, these modifications of the understanding of life are incorporated into his initial framework—thus in the *Opus postumum* the initiation of movement in a subject implies at the same time an ability to “anticipate counteracting movement of matter.”⁷

As Makkreel notes, while Kant’s understanding of life is generally examined through his understanding of teleology, it is rather in the first part of the *Critique of Judgement* that the notion of life receives greater attention. The arena of aesthetic judgement is distinguished from the judgements of pure and practical reason, in that while these latter judgements engage an interest
of reason and refer presentations to an object, the former abstracts from all interest and refers representations “to the subject and to its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure and pain.” In all their forms, pleasure and pain express the experience in the subject of the enhancement or restriction of its vital forces. While Kant’s earlier writings on aesthetics refer the pleasure in the beautiful to the conformity of our presentations with our conditions of sensibility alone, in the *Critique of Judgement* aesthetic judgements engage all of the faculties in relation to the presentation and to each other. The ‘play’ of the faculties in aesthetic reflection is attached to a duration: what characterises the aesthetic imagination is that “here the presentations themselves are bases merely for preserving their own existence in the subject.” On the basis on this account, Makkreel connects aesthetic experience to Kant’s description of “interior sense” in his anthropological writings, which is distinguished from the “inner sense” presented in the first critique. “Inner sense” refers to our empirical intuition, and is presented passively as “what we undergo insofar as we are affected by the play of our own thought.” “Interior sense”, which engages pleasure and displeasure is described as a state somewhere between activity and passivity: it is “the responsiveness of subject in being determined by certain representations, either to preserve or to reject the state of the representations.”

Further reading of Kant’s anthropological analysis of pleasure and pain provides additional insight into the temporal dimension of pleasure, and the central tension between movement and rest at its heart. On the one hand, Kant defines pleasure as what drives one to maintain a state, and displeasure as what provokes one to leave it. The fact that we exist in time, however, means that we are constantly changing states, if only from one moment to the next, regardless of our desire. If pleasure is thus to be maintained over this succession of different states, the question for Kant arises as to whether the pleasure arises from leaving the present moment or from the prospect of entering the next. Although the latter case presents a more positive definition of pleasure, the directionality of time means that “only the first will happen”, and “the cause of our agreeable feeling can only be that we are compelled to leave the present, though it is not specified into what other state we shall enter—except that it is another one.” Despite what appears to be a negative definition of pleasure, it is in fact a positive theory that Kant develops. What
constitutes pleasure in the final analysis, is the stimulation that consists in an alternation of contrasting affects, of pleasure and pain. This is already implied in the nicety of the temporal analysis: if pleasure resides in the leaving of a present state, leaving a given state also always occasions pain. Kant argues that pleasure, conceived as a continuous state, would amount to either a swooning unconsciousness or inertia—vitality is only felt and maintained through a continuous change of state, and thus the intermittence of pain:

So pain must precede any enjoyment: pain always comes first. For if the vital force were continuously promoted, though it cannot be raised above a certain level, what could follow but swift death in the face of joy?

Again, no enjoyment can follow directly upon another: between one and the other, pain must intervene. Slight inhibitions of the vital force alternate with slight advancements of it, and this constitutes the state of health. We mistakenly think that in a state of health we feel continuous well being; but in fact, it consists in agreeable feelings whose succession is only intermittent (with pain always intervening between them). Pain is the spur of activity, and it is in activity, above all, that we feel our life; without pain, inertia would set in.¹⁴

Kant remarks that “(animal) life is a continual play of [the] antagonism” of pleasure and pain, but this vital stimulation is also the object of the “cultivated man”, the man “attentive to his life and to time”.¹⁵ Kant ultimately characterises the impetus which impels us to leave our present state as a “positive pain.”¹⁶

**Life and teleology**

What is the relationship between the “life” expressed in aesthetic experience and that of the teleological model? Deleuze’s earliest writings address the relationship between the institutional or ‘organised’ structures that regulate thought and action, and factors arising from individual circumstance. Deleuze’s first published volume was *Instincts et Institutions*, a collection of short textual extracts, chosen and introduced by Deleuze, the second of a series directed by Georges Canguilhem for the use of secondary school philosophy teachers and students.¹⁷ Published in the same year as his monograph on Hume (1953), it reflects many of the problems which inform this work, and which will recur throughout Deleuze’s career: the relationship between the individual and the species, between the natural and the artificial, between life and thought. Even in the quite short introduction, we can perceive the outline of a problematic which structures Deleuze’s subsequent reflections, and the choice and
disposition of the texts clearly manifest an argumentative thread, even if this impression is enhanced by the knowledge of Deleuze’s later works.

In his introduction, Deleuze draws an analogy between the function of the instinct in the animal and the institution for the human subject. Both represent “processes of satisfaction” for the needs and drives of the animal or human subject. In the first case, the animal reacts to and “extracts” elements from the external environment in order to form its “specific” instinctual world. In the second case, the human subject artificially “elaborates” an original world between its needs and the external milieu: this institutional satisfaction represents both a liberation from nature and a transformation of the initial drive. From this perspective, Deleuze writes, we can consider a specific or institutional world as presupposed, “as an a priori”, by any individual experience. The problem that arises, however, in relation to both the instinct and the institution, is “how does the synthesis between the tendency and the object which satisfies it come about?” While the need is satisfied within the instinct and institution, the particular forms of the latter are not explained by the need. In the case of the institution, for example, “The same sexual needs will never explain the multiple forms of marriage.” And in the case of the instinct, “the internal factor, even self-identical, will not explain that it gives rise to different behaviours in different species.” Institutions never satisfy needs without at the same time transforming them, such that a utilitarian explanation is never sufficient, or must be supplemented by the question, “for whom?”—“For all those who have the need? Or else for a few (privileged class), or even only to those who operate the institution (bureaucracy)?” The problem thus lies in finding this “other” instance on which the connection between the need and the means of satisfaction depends. From this perspective, it is rather individual and aesthetic factors that are presupposed by the organised form. While an established instinctual behaviour may appear inseparable from the species and resistant to analysis, an instinct in the process of being developed more readily manifests its affiliation to a variety of individual factors:

the more [an instinct] is perfectible, and thus imperfect, the more it is subject to variation, indecision, the more it can be reduced to simply the play of individual internal factors and external circumstances—the more it gives way to intelligence.
In the case of the institution the “other” instance lies in the direction of the symbolic: the ritualistic aspect of institutions which surpasses utility in order to provide a form of subjective identification or “model” for the user, in his or her relationship to society in general.

On the one hand, instincts and institutions represent a functional ‘world’ for the individual, which is in one sense the presupposition of any individual action. On the other hand, these organised worlds presuppose for their initial development, and any subsequent development, a work that can only be referred in the final instance to the contingencies of circumstance. This dialectic between a normative environment and circumstantial contingency constitutes one of the principal themes of the work of Georges Canguilhem himself, in his writings on the history and philosophy of science, and on biology and medicine in particular.

The irreducibility of the operations of living systems, and their study, to a mechanical model, is one of the central contentions of Canguilhem’s work. While a physical field is characterised by an objectivity and neutrality without any privileged centre of reference, living organisms are defined by the relationship between subject and milieu. This relationship is itself inseparable from the capacities and aspirations of the organism, which form the evaluative framework for its negotiation of the environment. The defining trait of living beings, and of life itself, for Canguilhem, is thus its “normative” nature. The movement of life is inseparable from its sense and directionality—its non-indifference:

the fact that a living being responds to a lesion, infestation, functional disorder by becoming sick expresses the fundamental fact that life is not indifferent to the conditions in which it is possible, that life is polarity and for this reason unconscious attribution of value, in short that life is in fact a normative activity.25

and shortly afterwards:

The simplest biological nutritive system of nutrition, assimilation and excretion expresses a polarity.26

If Canguilhem’s major work addresses the categories of the normal and the pathological with respect to the history of biology, this is in part because it is the concept of pathology which most clearly distinguishes a biological system from a physical one. The effect of modern science—in its difference from Aristotelian physics—is to render all movement natural: “Any medication aims at restoring certain properties to their natural type: as physical properties
never lose this type, they do not need to be restored to it. Nothing in the physical sciences corresponds to what is therapeutics in the physiological sciences.”

If there is no sense of the pathological for a physical system, for this reason it also cannot be said to be “normal.” While “normality” suggests a default or standard state of affairs, ‘all things being equal’, its essence for Canguilhem lies in its expression of a preferred state of affairs against which an existing state—by default abnormal or “anormal”—is judged. Canguilhem understands the normal as an essentially polemical concept. Its sense resides in the active and renewable process by which norms are posited, instituted, enforced and revised against a constant background of deviation. The ambivalence of the term is reflected in its etymology, which designates rectitude, the straight line. This image conflates both a passive or negative sense of the norm, as what exists in the absence of deviating influences, and an active or positive sense of a rule or a preferred path. Canguilhem emphasises the active and dynamic conception of the norm whereby there is a task of normalisation that is the rendering normal of the abnormal, rather than a state of normality opposed to its deviation. The aim of this task is to establish an equilibrium between a posited norm and an a-normal reality rather than one that exists apart from the abnormal.

Canguilhem’s insistence on the active nature of normality prepares the way for his final thesis that the highest expression of this power of normativity is the ability to construct new norms from the material of the infraction itself. It is not simply that the norm is inseparable from its infraction, but that an infraction, anomaly or pathology is inseparable from the possibility of a new norm. In this sense, the true test of “normality” is not the strength of a given norm, but the capacity of an organism to depart from a given norm when faced with a truly anomalous circumstance. Conversely, the ultimate hallmark of pathology is a rigid attachment to a conventional set of responses. It is a sign of decline or infirmity in an organism if it is limited to only a certain set of possibilities, whether internal or external. It is in this sense that the successful institution of a norm can register as a failure within the broader context of normativity: “In adaptation perfect or completed means the beginning of the end of the species.”

In the final analysis, it is not “normality” and “pathology”,

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in their conventional sense, that represent the decisive polarity, but rather “health” and “sickness”, understood as higher or lower levels of “normativity”: the capacity or incapacity to accommodate and produce variability. Canguilhem extends this index of health even to unsuccessful mutations insofar as they express the fundamental inventiveness of nature: an eliminated form can be considered as an “adventure” rather than a “failure” according to a wider understanding of the aspirations of life.\textsuperscript{29} There is thus a paradoxical sense in which normativity, the signature trait of life forms, taken to a theoretical extreme, emulates the \textit{modus operandi} of purely physical bodies: a path on which every inflection is immediately integrated as law, and thus for which all movements are “good”.

A normative framework of evaluation is present for Canguilhem wherever there can be said to be life: it is expressed in a variety of ways from the level of the cell to the institutions of human society. In culture, we understand the institution and application of norms in terms of an open-ended process of self-overcoming. However, while normativity is on one level coextensive with the fact of being alive, as human subjects, normative values also feature as objects within the cultural ‘imaginary’. Canguilhem analyses cultural myths of origin, which abstract and isolate the components of the process of normalisation, and situate culture in relation to an ideal of normality.\textsuperscript{30} Thus, an initial chaos, where norms are totally absent, is succeeded by a state of paradise, in which norms are unnecessary. A subsequent disruption represents both the first infraction of the norm and the necessity of introducing norms. It marks the beginning of culture and history, whose task is to put the two halves of expectation and reality back together again. Canguilhem understands the cultural endeavours of knowledge, religion and art as activities governed by the ideal of a world of perfect equilibrium and unity: “an unproblematic agreement between demands and realities, whose continuous \textit{jouissance}… would guarantee the definitive solidity of its unity.”\textsuperscript{31} The ideal of perfect equilibrium—“of normality without normalization”\textsuperscript{32}—is not only one projected back into a mythical past, but is also identified with the natural world by way of contrast to culture. Man seeks perfect harmony with his milieu, on Canguilhem’s account, not only “because he has lost it”, but “more precisely because he suspects that other beings beside him possess it.”\textsuperscript{33} We can see an analogy here with the ideal reconciliation between possibility
and actuality as posited by Kant in the *Critique of Judgement*, and indeed with “the need of reason” as subjective presupposition of our action in general.

The ideal of self-regulating natural harmony that serves as the normative inspiration for cultural activity is thus at the same time its negation. Following a similar understanding of vitality to Kant’s, Canguilhem notes that the reality of paradise is “mediocrity”: “the satisfactions there are modest—*aurea mediocritas*—because they are not a victory over an equivalent obstacle.”

This ideal of normality correlates with the static, or passive, ideal of the normal, which is expressed not only in images of natural “harmony”, but in the cultural habits that form a “second nature”. What Canguilhem’s interpretation of norms in the cultural imagination suggests is that the dialectic of normativity is not only between the normal and abnormal, but between normalisation understood as an activity, and normality as a “natural” state. If normalisation seeks to resolve the difference between an expectation and reality, any given resolution, to the extent that it is stable and persists over time, will tend to present itself as an original and “natural” state of affairs rather an interested activity maintained against constant deviation. Once again we are presented with a vital polarity with, at one end, the “perfection” of an achieved form, and at the other, the “cutting edge” of contestation and novelty.

**Noematic fields and the field of the noematic**

Alexis Philonenko writes on the different “noematic fields” which feature in the “architectonic” of Kant’s critique. Reproducing Leibniz’s “orders of reality” within a transcendental framework, Philonenko distinguishes in Kant’s critique, in ascending order, the *general phenomenon* as object of the first critique, *organisation* or the *organism* as the object of the critique of teleological judgement, *life* or the *living individual* as the object of the critique of aesthetic judgement, and the *person* as object of the critique of practical reason. The distinction between *life* and the *organism* is one that Philonenko is particularly keen to emphasise as one that is commonly overlooked: “By putting the theory of organisation in place of the theory of life, one quite simply ends up demolishing the meaning of the *Critique of Judgement*, by misrecognising its architectonic value, which is ultimately expressed in classification.” While the identity of an organism can be transferred through graft or reproduction, *life*
and the aesthetic refers to the ineffable "ipseity" of the individual, "what is most living in us, but also the least graftable, by which I mean taste." This distinction is supported by the "logical" difference between teleological and aesthetic judgements: the former deals with the specific or particular in nature, and the latter with the singular. In Kant’s architectonic, it is obviously the ethical status of the person which corresponds to the most profound order of rational being. Deleuze will argue that if the person, as end in itself, is the "highest" subject of Kant’s critique, the operation of judgement is nevertheless the "deepest" level of critique, its "secret heart", and the ultimate ground of his own, modified, architectonic: his analysis will be presented in the next section.

Because the principle of aesthetic judgements only provides a rule for the experience of the subject rather than applying to objects, it does not, for Kant, need to be reconciled with the principles of objective nature constituted in the first critique. It is rather the antinomy of teleological judgement that, as bearing on our study of nature, raises the question of the reconciliation of teleology and mechanism as principles for our reflections. If, however, we consider aesthetic judgements in vital terms, as a subjective principle for ‘responsiveness’ to indeterminacy, and as the genesis of the relationship between the faculties, there are grounds to consider the ‘nature’ it refers to and its relationship to or consistency with both teleological and mechanical nature. In critically examining the antinomy of teleological judgement, we can see the resolution to the problem it poses as producing a model of the thinking subject as ‘purely’ reflective in a way that resembles the aesthetic ‘attitude’.

In his essay on the antinomy of teleological judgement, Philonenko analyses Kant’s argument as a meditation on the specificity of judgements of reflection. The case of reflective judgements, for Philonenko, expresses the irreducible difference in Kant’s philosophy between the possible and the real. While a categorical judgement may be determining, it only determines the form of the possible: it does not construct the content of the real, and a posteriori reflection is required to bridge this gap. Thus in the critique of teleological judgement, mechanism is presented as a maxim of reflection alongside the principle of purposiveness. The ‘false problem’ raised by the antinomy, on Philonenko’s account, is that the thesis presents mechanism as a determining principle which reduces the real to the possible, and the antithesis presents
teleology as the ‘refutation’ of mechanism as a determining principle, reducing the possible to the real. Even if this antinomy can be avoided by considering mechanism and teleology as maxims of reflection rather than constitutive principles, their relationship to each other as methods still requires clarification. Kant describes the two principles as “disparate”, which is to say different rather than contrary.40 He refers them to the limitations of our faculties and postulates the identity of the two principles in the suprasensible realm. For Philonenko, however, reflection is essentially antithetical, or dialectical, insofar as it negotiates the difference between the possible and the real. It presents a case of the complementarity of different principles, rather than their disparity, which is negatively grounded in its distance from an ideal unity. Kant’s neglect of any positive and scientific sense for the dialectical process of reflection accounts, according to Philonenko, for the subsequent emergence of an ontological dialectic of contradiction in Hegel’s philosophy:

Substituting the ‘disparate’ for the ‘dialectical’, Kant introduced an unsustainable definition of thought since while demonstrating the impossibility of a purely thetic thought he revealed reflection as antithetical, without deciding to confer a positive value to the duality of the maxims.41

Canguilhem addresses the mechanistic and ‘vitalist’ model of nature in terms of the ‘antinomic’ opposition between concepts presented throughout its history, which he suggests can be understood as reflecting an essential dialectic of ‘life’ that transcends either term:

over its history, biological theory reveals itself as a divided and oscillating thought. Mechanism and Vitalism clash regarding the problem of structures and functions; Discontinuity and Continuity, regarding the problem of the succession of forms; Preformation and Epigenesis, regarding the problem of the development of the existent; Atomicity and Totality, regarding the problem of individuality… But one can, transposing the dialectical process of thought into the real, maintain that it is the object of study itself, life, which is the dialectical essence, and that thought must espouse its structure. The opposition between Mechanism and Vitalism, Preformation and Genesis, is transcended by life itself prolonging itself into the theory of life.42

Like Philonenko, Canguilhem maintains that it is unacceptable to posit two constitutive principles of nature:

There cannot be an empire within an empire, if not there is no more empire, either as container or as content… One cannot defend the originality of the biological phenomenon and consequently the originality of biology by delimiting within the physico-chemical territory, in a milieu of inertia or externally determined movements, enclaves of indetermination, zones of dissidence, foyers of heresy.43
This, however, is the classical approach of the vitalist on Canguilhem’s account: to posit its status as ‘exceptional’ with respect to the physical sciences and to maintain a strict delimitation between the methodologies and objects of the biological and physical sciences. The only possible rectification of this “philosophically inexcusable fault”44, for Canguilhem, is not to concede the ‘empire’ of the physical sciences, but rather to universalise the model of the biological sciences and understand the science of matter within the context of the activity of the living being. Rather than reduce the sense of the physical sciences and their objects, for Canguilhem such a gesture rather justifies and guarantees their place.45

If we understand the physical model of nature in the more comprehensive context of the scientific projects of the living being, however, we must also understand the teleological model within this context. As Canguilhem has indicated, both in this study and elsewhere, the category of ‘life’ or the living transcends a vitalist position, understood in its teleological sense. Vitalism and mechanism, as models of nature, have an objective scope, whether they project a model of subjectivity in order to comprehend their objects, or abstract from any centre of reference. In referring scientific claims to the context of the living being, this latter can only be understood in the narrowest sense of an immediate subjectivity: precisely the ‘feeling of life’, or the formal ‘normative’ polarity that defines life for Canguilhem. It is this minimal position that forms the point of departure for either, or any, objective claim that is subsequently made, and back to which it must be ultimately referred. The ‘pivotal’ position of a pure indeterminate reflection is suggested in Canguilhem’s ‘diagnoses’ of vitalism and mechanism as expressing contrasting ‘dispositions’ of the subject in relation to nature:

Man… can consider nature in two ways. In the first instance he can feel himself to be a child of nature and experiences in relation to it a sentiment of belonging and subordination, he sees himself in nature and he sees nature in himself. Or else he stands in the face of nature as before a foreign, indefinable object.46

An aesthetic attitude falls between these two alternatives. Like the vitalist attitude it operates on the level of ‘feeling’ and expresses, if not a ‘belonging’, then a ‘connection’. Like the second attitude it experiences nature as provocative and indefinable.
For Canguilhem, the ‘suspense’ in which this leaves the status of objective nature is entirely compatible with the scientific spirit. As he notes in his essay on cellular theory, arguing for the value of the history of science, it is most frequently the disciples of a scientist, or the demands of pedagogical instruction, that ‘dogmatise’ a scientific theory and can inhibit the insights of its more equivocal initial expression. The value of a theory is precisely in a form of hesitation in which the possible is ‘engendered’ rather than in its confirmation as necessary:

The fecundity of a scientific theory precisely lies in the way it does not impose the methodological or doctrinal choice to which it is inclined. The reasons of the choice must be sought elsewhere than in it... To know is less to confront the real than to validate a possibility in making it necessary. Given this, the genesis of the possible has as much importance as the demonstration of the necessary. The fragility of the former does not deny it the dignity which will come to the latter from its solidity. Illusion could have been a truth. Truth will reveal itself some day perhaps to be an illusion.47

The special nature of the faculty of aesthetic judgement as a “genesis of possibilities” on Deleuze’s analysis forms the subject of the next chapter. Deleuze considers the third critique to be the lynchpin of the critical project and a model for his own “image of thought”. We will examine there more closely the mechanism of aesthetic judgements as engendering thought.
Endnotes for Part III Chapter 2

1 MD, p. 94.
2 CJ, p. 278.
6 Makkreel, p. 87.
8 CJ, §1, cited in Makkreel, with his emphasis, p. 88.
9 CJ, p. 207” (First Introduction).
10 AP, §15, cited in Makkreel, p. 90.
11 AP, §15, cited in Makkreel, p. 90.
12 AP, §60-§61.
13 AP, p. 231.
14 AP, p. 231.
15 AP, p. 233. Kant gives a series of examples to support his contention that pleasure relies on an antagonism of forces: gambling (alternation of hope and fear), the theatre (obstacles to a goal), romantic stories (quarrels and jealousy), work (difficulty and achievement), and tobacco (unpleasant activity with pleasant side effects).
16 AP, p. 233.
17 Instincts et Institutions: textes et documents philosophiques. Deleuze was a secondary school teacher of philosophy at the Lycée d’Orléans at the time of publication, and Canguilhem the General Inspector of Public Education. The series began with Canguilhem’s own collection on the theme of “Needs and Tendencies” (Besoins et Tendances).
18 Instincts et Institutions, Appendix 3, p. viii.
19 Instincts et Institutions, p. viii.
20 Instincts et Institutions, p. x.
21 Instincts et Institutions, p. ix.
22 Instincts et Institutions, p. x.
23 Instincts et Institutions, p. ix.
24 Instincts et Institutions, p. xi.
25 Le normal et le pathologique (5th edition), F77/E70, translation modified (the English edition renders “un vivant” as “a living man”, although Canguilhem is making the point that the attribution of value is not confined to the human, to “celui qui parle, c’est-à-dire evidemment un homme”).
26 Le normal et le pathologique, F79/E71.
27 Citation of Bichat’s Anatomie générale appliqué à la physiologie et à la médecine (General Anatomy, Applied to Physiology and Medicine, trans. George Hayward, vol. 1, Boston, Richardson and Lord, 1822, pp. 20-21) in Canguilhem, Le normal et le pathologique, F78/E71.
28 Le normal et le pathologique, F197/E163.
29 La connaissance de la vie (“Le normal et le pathologique”), p. 159.
30 Le normal et le pathologique, F178-180/E147-149.
31 La connaissance de la vie (“Introduction: La pensée et le vivant”), p. 11.
32 Le normal et le pathologique, F178/E147.
33 La connaissance de la vie (“Introduction: La pensée et le vivant”), p. 11.
34 Le normal et le pathologique, F179/E148, translation modified.
35 Philomenko, “Kant et les ordres du réel” and L’architectonique de la Critique de la faculté de juger”, in Méta physique et politique chez Kant et Fichte.
36 Philomenko, Méta physique et politique chez Kant et Fichte, p. 179.
37 Philomenko, Méta physique et politique chez Kant et Fichte, p. 182.
38 Philomenko, Méta physique et politique chez Kant et Fichte, p. 181.
39 Alexis Philomenko, L’antinomie du jugement téléologique chez Kant”, Etudes Kantiennes.
40 CJ, §52.
41 “L’antinomie du jugement téléologique…” , p. 158.
42 La connaissance de la vie (“Aspects du vitalisme”), p. 85.
43 La connaissance de la vie (“Aspects du vitalisme”), p. 95.
44 La connaissance de la vie (“Aspects du vitalisme”), p. 95.
45 La connaissance de la vie (“Aspects du vitalisme”), p. 96.
46 La connaissance de la vie ("Aspects du vitalisme"), p. 88.
47 La connaissance de la vie ("Aspects du vitalisme"), p. 47.
CHAPTER 3:

THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC

Judgement and accord

The faculty of judgement holds a unique place in Kant’s critical philosophy, even outside of the developments of the third critique. Rather than producing its own concepts, ideas, or intuitions, judgement is rather what forms the connections between them. Because of the diversity of the sources of representation in Kant’s philosophy, the art of combining and applying these assumes a particular importance. Hence Kant’s contention, for example, that it is not intuitions that can be said to be false or misleading, but rather the judgements we make regarding them; and that error does not reside in our transcendent ideas, but rather in their transcendent use or application. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant defines the understanding in general as the faculty of rules, and judgement the faculty of subsuming under rules.¹ His comments on judgement are prefatory to his exposition of the schematism, as the rule of the construction or application of concepts. Judgement is central to the distinction between a general or formal logic, which deals with rules alone, and Kant’s transcendental logic, which seeks rules for the application or employment of our *a priori* concepts in experience: “Transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity that besides the rule (or rather the universal condition of rules), which is given in the pure understanding, it can also specify *a priori* the instance to which the rule is to be applied.”² Outside of this transcendental application “by means of determinate rules”, judgement appears as an opaque art: a “natural gift” or “peculiar talent” which may only be practiced and not taught.³

The appearance of the *Critique of Judgement* marks a shift in this perspective on the role of judgement in transcendental philosophy, which coincides with Kant’s decision that aesthetic judgements themselves are susceptible to a transcendental formulation. Kant defines judgement in the third critique as the operation by which a particular is deemed to be
subsumable under a universal rule or concept, but this definition now yields
two distinct types of judgement. On the one hand, where the universal is given
*a priori*, the judgement is “determining” and constitutes an objective field: that
of nature and freedom respectively for the first and second critiques. On the
other hand there is the case of “reflective” judgement, where instead of
proceeding from the universal to the particular, one begins with a particular or
singular presentation for which a universal must be sought: the particular
presentation is held up for “reflection” in relation to other presentations and
the cognitive faculty in general. In the first case, judgement has an ‘executive’
or ‘auxiliary’ role, carrying out the directions given by the understanding or
reason. A process of “reflection” may also be involved in these determinations,
but its originality emerges in those cases where it is occupied with aspects of
experience for which no determinate concept or Idea can be provided by reason
or the understanding, namely empirical diversity and aesthetic experience.¹

As judgement is the faculty of applying rules, it cannot itself be based
in a universal rule, which would in turn require another act of judgement for
its correct application. It is this character of judgement which leads Kant, in
the first critique, to observe that it can only be an object of practice rather than
instruction, outside of its determinate (transcendental) use. In the third
critique, this trait is what makes the transcendental principle of judgement
uniquely subjective, or “immanent”, and non-legislative in nature. It is not an
*autonomous* faculty, because, by definition, it produces no concepts or ideas of
its own that it can objectively prescribe to experience. As an *original* faculty,
however, which is not simply directed by the other faculties or empirical laws,
it has its own principles that it prescribes to itself. Kant uses the term
“heautonomous” to designate the unusual position of the faculty of judgement
between “autonomy” (prescribing over objects) and “heteronomy” (submitted
to external rules).² The challenge of the third critique is that it must present a
faculty whose specificity is its absence of a determinate concept or idea not
only as a self-contained ‘residence’ for the exercise of reason, but one with
claims to necessity and universality.³ It has been shown how the problems of
pure and practical reason underlying the third critique are addressed in the
previous critiques through the regulative function of an idea or ideal. If the
postulation of an ideal unity represents an attempt to resolve the problem
‘from above’, the recourse to the principles of the subjective faculty of
judgement appears rather to represent a resolution in a certain sense ‘from below’. In the pure exercise of judgement, there is no faculty which plays a determining role in relation to the object, there is rather a “free” accord of the faculties in relation to a presentation reflected by the imagination. In the absence of a determinate concept, Idea, or interest, the faculties of reason and understanding participate in aesthetic judgements as a pure ‘tendency’. Thus in the judgement of beauty, the understanding is present as a ‘lawfulness’, but without a law or an object; in judgements of the sublime, reason is present as a demand for totality, but without this demand being informed by a determinate Idea. In both judgements, imagination exercises a pure and undetermined power of presentation.

Deleuze addresses the significance of the third critique both in his book on Kant, and in a separate article published in the same year (1963) on “The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Aesthetics.” As the title suggests, aesthetic judgements present for Deleuze a dynamic in which thought is engendered or ‘awakened’. As noted in the Introduction, Deleuze avoided the term “genesis” in his earliest works, because of its association with the idea of a metaphysical or psychological ‘origin’. The freedom and spontaneity of the accord in judgement does not however signify the presence of an innate tendency or unifying principle but rather the absence of a determinate interest or concept: the “absence of presuppositions” that Deleuze had noted in his work on the image of thought as the criterion of truly beginning in philosophy. Deleuze opposes the genetic approach to thought to the discourse of the conditions of knowledge. Kant remains a dogmatic thinker for Deleuze to the extent that, on the side of the object, he starts from the ‘fact’ of science and morality and works backwards to their conditions of possibility, and, on the side of the subject, he assumes the existence of ‘ready-made’ faculties and their coordination in producing these ‘facts’: “The first two critiques invoked facts, searched for the conditions of these facts, and found them in already-formed faculties.” The limitations of this method were the object of Kant’s earliest critics: the notion of a ‘genetic’ method is present in the work of both Maimon and Fichte. The Critique of Judgement already anticipates these objections in posing the problem of a free accord between the faculties, thereby moving the critique from the perspective of the “conditioning” of possible experience to the reflection of and on real experience: “a transcendental formation, a
transcendental culture, a transcendental genesis.” There is a systematic reversal of the customary order of foundation in Deleuze’s argument, whereby a determined structure is presented as being grounded in an undetermined or “free” relation, and this in turn is located in a contingent event of genesis.

Deleuze’s position is based in the first place on the kind of relationship he sees as existing between determining and reflective judgements. In all cases, on Deleuze’s account, judgement expresses a kind of accord between the faculties. In the first two critiques this accord is determined in function of a “predominant” or determining faculty: the understanding in the case of the theoretical interest of reason, and reason in the case of the practical interest. The determinative judgement is ultimately a reflection of this determined relationship between the faculties:

Judgement is said to be determining when it expresses the accord of the faculties under a faculty which is itself determining: that is, when it determines an object in accordance with a faculty posited at the outset as legislative. The relationship between determining judgements and reflective judgements, on Deleuze’s account, is one of implication rather than being two distinct types. Even where the concept is “known”, in the abstract, reflection is required in order to apply it to a particular case: Deleuze gives the example of the doctor making a diagnosis, which recalls Kant’s own examples of empirical judgements in the first critique. On the transcendental level, the schematism itself, Deleuze notes, is already an “art” enveloped within the determining judgement which indicates the conditions for a particular to be subsumed beneath the concept. If Kant refers to the schematism as a “hidden art”, Deleuze suggests that it is this hidden art which reveals itself in the case of pure reflective judgements, and thus, conversely, that reflective judgement is the “secret” heart of all determining judgements:

In fact, determining judgement and reflective judgement are not like two species of a same genus. Reflective judgement manifests and liberates a depth which remained hidden in the other. But the other, already, was only judgement in virtue of this living depth. Reflective judgements thus express a “free” or “indeterminate” accord between the faculties, which Deleuze argues is ultimately the ground of the determinate accords between the faculties in the other two critiques:

How can a faculty, legislative in a given interest, induce the other faculties to indispensable complementary tasks, if all the faculties
together were not first of all capable of a free spontaneous accord, without legislation, with neither interest nor predominance? It is in this way that aesthetic judgements represent for Deleuze not simply a transcendental principle of judgement, but the ground of the coherence of the transcendental apparatus as a whole and a model for the “deepest” operation of thought.

If a determinate relationship between the faculties is only comprehensible on the basis of their free and indeterminate relationship in reflective judgement, this does not yet account for the origin or intelligibility of the latter. The indeterminate nature of the accord means that it can neither be affirmed categorically, which would imply its being based in a concept, nor can it be postulated as the object of a practical determination. Kant refers to the accord expressed between the faculties in aesthetic judgements as a kind of aesthetic “common sense.” But this cannot, from Deleuze’s perspective, be an occasion to invoke a ‘natural’ affinity of the faculties, and Kant himself raises the question of whether aesthetic common sense can be said to be natural or acquired:

But is there in fact such a common sense, as a constitutive principle of the possibility of experience, or is there a still higher principle of reason that makes it only a regulative principle for us, in order to bring forth for us, for higher purposes, a common sense in the first place? In other words, is taste an original and natural ability, or is taste only the idea of an ability yet to be acquired and artificial, so that a judgement of taste with its requirement for universal assent is in fact only a demand of reason to produce such an agreement in the way we sense? The hallmark of the aesthetic accord for Deleuze is its contingency: it is essentially something that comes about rather than being presupposed. The task of the Critique of Judgement is thus to show that the accord between the faculties is the object of a genesis:

How can we escape the question: where does this free and indeterminate accord of the faculties come from?... This is the only issue: to establish the genesis of aesthetic common sense, to show how the free accord of the faculties is necessarily engendered?
Genetic structure: the sublime

While the accord between the faculties expressed in aesthetic judgements is free, an element of constraint or tension is essential on Deleuze’s account for an accord to be engendered. This constraint cannot be in the form of a determination, which presupposes the activity of a faculty through a concept or Idea, but rather takes place through the purely aesthetic realm of feeling. Pure aesthetic judgements are an expression of a ‘superior’ or transcendental form of pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain express the effect of a representation upon the subject independently of its objective status: the pure feeling in the subject or the modification of its state, in so far as there is a ‘furthering’ or ‘inhibiting’ of its vital forces. Any representation may be considered under this aspect, but it is only the case of judgements of the beautiful and the sublime that we lay claim to a transcendental principle for this feeling, which is to say, claim a universality and necessity for the judgement.

Deleuze takes the experience of the sublime as the model for the mechanism of genesis. In the case of the sublime, it is the very conflict between the nature of the faculties, and the “contra-purposive” nature of a presentation that ultimately produces an attunement: we thus apprehend an accord generated from discord itself, or the production of what Deleuze calls a “discordant accord.” This is the specificity of the sublime in its difference from the beautiful, on Kant’s account. While the “liking” in the beautiful arises from an encounter with an object that “seems as it were predetermined for our power of judgement”, sublimity appears to go against our powers of judgement, being “incommensurate with our power of exhibition, and as it were violent to our imagination.” The “liking” or pleasure in the sublime thus alternates with pain: there is a “feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital forces”, followed by “an outpouring of them that is all the stronger.” While neither the beautiful nor the sublime are ‘objective’ judgements per se, the judgement of the sublime especially pertains to a feeling in the subject rather than any external referent.
Kant divides judgements of the sublime into two types, the mathematical and the dynamical, according to whether our power of presentation enters into an accord with our cognitive powers or our power of desire. The first case, mathematical sublimity, pertains to what is “absolutely large.” Largeness, as distinct from magnitude, is not a cognitive category, but a category of judgement, based on a reflection that is aesthetic and subjective. The absolute degree of magnitude is the concept of infinity, but our aesthetic appreciation of largeness is finite: while we may apprehend a successive series of presentations indefinitely, our ability to comprehend this series in a single intuition has a limit. Reason, however, “demands totality for all given magnitudes”, even in the case of an infinite series pertaining to intuition. Where the comprehension by the imagination is outstripped by apprehension, it is nevertheless inspired by reason, which “demands comprehension in one intuition, and exhibition of all the members of a progressively increasing series, and it exempts from this demand not even the infinite (space and past time).”

It is in this striving that we obtain an aesthetic appreciation of absolute largeness or the sublime, an idea that “surpasses all standards of sense”, enlarges the imagination and produces the sentiment of our suprasensible vocation. The combination of the imagination of being compelled to present such an idea, and its inability to do so, produces the combination of pleasure and pain in the sublime. In the case of the dynamically sublime, which follows a similar structure, the presence of immense might in nature arouses fear, because we are aware of our relative physical impotence, while at the same time evoking the absolute rational powers we possess, which are of a different kind to the physical and place us outside of the dominion of nature.

For Deleuze, the sublime presents a case where the faculties are genuinely awakened and enter into a relationship that is not based on the representation of an identity. Imagination and reason realise their specific destiny in being confronted with their difference and their limit in a living dynamic rather than from the vantage point of a hierarchical legislation. In the sublime, according to Deleuze, Kant comes close to a “dialectical conception of the faculties”:

"[The sublime] brings the various faculties into play in such a manner that they struggle against each other like wrestlers, with one faculty pushing another to its maximum or limit, to which the second faculty reacts by pushing the first toward an inspiration it would not have had on
its own. One faculty pushes another to a limit, but they each make the one go beyond the limits of the other. The faculties enter into relationship at their deepest level, where they are most foreign to each other. They embrace each other from their greatest point of distance. This interpretation of the sublime that serves as a model for Deleuze’s presentation of the communication of the faculties faced with the problem, in the absence of a mediating identity: the crucial experience of a “thought without an image” and the rupturing of “common sense”. In the sublime, the imagination is constrained by the demand of reason, but this constraint is at the same time the urge to overcome its own limits and is thus a liberation. It thus forms the background to his account of the event of thought, which combines the notion of undergoing a violence and at the same time realising a higher freedom: we are faced with a presentation that is “too big for me”, and our capacities are expanded in response.

The hallmark of the genetic mechanism is thus the presence of an indeterminate idea which spurs the faculties to ‘overreach’ themselves in a paradoxical exercise that both constrains and liberates, and in which they realise their specificity, their relation with the other faculties and their highest vocation. While this structure is most explicit in the case of judgements of the sublime, it is a relationship that is repeated on different levels throughout the Critique of Judgement, and marks a relationship to the ideal that represents a significant development from the approach of the first two critiques. The critical convention regarding Ideas is that they are theoretically undetermined but susceptible to a practical determination. The practical determination of an idea is realised in the case of the concept of freedom, but their status otherwise is on the whole regulative. In this latter case, we have seen how principles of reason present themselves as analogons of the schemata in providing a rule for actions, and to systematise the operations of the lower faculties. It has already been indicated with respect to the concept of “purposiveness”, that in the case of the Critique of Judgement, consistent with its approach ‘from below’, it is rather as if the lower faculties attempt to present ‘analogons’ of the Idea. In the sublime as well, the imagination “strains to treat nature as a schema” for the Ideas.
The aesthetic idea and genesis in the beautiful

The clearest example of a sensible analogon of the Idea in pure aesthetic judgements, however, is Kant’s notion of the “aesthetic idea.” The aesthetic idea is first introduced with respect to beauty in fine art, particularly poetry, where a given concept is connected with an image (or a series of images) that goes beyond any determinable content of the concept and is nevertheless connected to it. The concept is ‘expanded’ indefinitely, the cognitive powers ‘quickened’ in response to a presentation that it cannot adequately account for. Kant then suggests that the aesthetic idea is also operative in natural beauty, with the difference that no concept of the object acts as a starting point. The aesthetic idea forms a ‘counterpart’ to the rational idea, designating the ‘unexpoundable presentations of the imagination’ (by concepts), which represent an inversion of the rational idea as ‘indemonstrable concepts of reason’ (in intuition). From the perspective of the artist, the ability to produce aesthetic ideas is what defines “genius.” Through aesthetic ideas, the imagination “creates, as it were, a second nature”, giving sensible expression to rational ideas “in a way which goes beyond the limits of experience, namely, with a completeness for which no example can be found in nature.” In a similar approach to that followed with regard to the two types of judgement, Deleuze argues that aesthetic and rational ideas are not two separate types of idea, but rather that the former is simply the ‘reflected image’ of the rational idea, whose indemonstrability is expressed subjectively, or immanently, on the level of the presentation, as its inexpoundability by concepts. From a creative point of view, the aesthetic idea “expresses what is inexpressible” in the rational idea, by producing the intuition “of a nature other than that which is given to us: another nature whose phenomena would be true spiritual events, and whose events of the spirit, immediate natural determinations.” The aesthetic idea takes its place alongside the sublime as a “positive, but secondary” presentation of the idea, while the sublime presentation is “direct, but negative” presentation through the projection of the infinite onto nature.

Deleuze does not consider that Kant’s account of judgements of the beautiful presents on its own the key characteristics for a true engendering of
an accord. Reason does not appear to have any direct role in judgements of taste, at least in their initial exposition, and the nexus of pleasure and pain that formed the crucial index of the “discordant accord” in the sublime appears to be absent from the beautiful. Kant presents the beautiful as “restful” in comparison to the “agitation” of the sublime, without the “rapid alternation of repulsion from, and attraction to, one and the same object” that characterises the latter. Understanding the beautiful as expression of the aesthetic idea, however, does suggest the participation of reason in judgements of taste, and however subdued the beautiful appears in relation to the sublime, it remains that by itself it just as much represents an ‘enlivening’ and ‘expansion’ of our cognitive powers in relation to a presentation that both exceeds and compels our attention. The nature of the aesthetic idea highlights a dynamism in the beautiful that may be overlooked in Kant's apparently formalist aesthetic. This in turn can be placed alongside Kant's theory in his anthropological writings concerning the essentially “oscillating” character of pleasure in order to suggest that the beautiful does in fact present the ‘genetic’ qualities outlined by Deleuze. In bringing out the analogy and complementarity between the beautiful and the sublime we can present a more balanced picture of the aesthetic underpinnings of Deleuze's image of thought. While Deleuze often presents the genesis of thought as a sublime—monstrous and overwhelming—event, it also appears, on a more “micro” level, under a more “beautiful” aspect: a spark which runs through a series of contingent fragments, precisely the “curve” drawn through singular points.

The pleasure in the beautiful arises from the reflection of a singular object in the imagination. What is reflected is the ‘form’ of the object: the object taken in abstraction from its material or sensational elements. The pleasure in the beautiful is “disinterested”, which is to say that we consider the object apart from any theoretical or moral interest, and also apart from the ‘lower’ aesthetic interest in what is “agreeable” to us. The free play of the imagination in its reflection upon the object arouses the activity of the understanding, which nevertheless cannot provide any determinate concept. In the light of Kant’s account of the aesthetic idea, we can appreciate that the absence of a determinate concept is essential in order that the activity of the faculties is extended and maintained in an indefinite ‘play’ upon the object. The ‘formality’ of beauty is thus not that of perfect geometrical shapes or strict
regularity.\textsuperscript{34} In the first place, these forms manifest a determinate concept or law (the geometric definition of the square, or mathematical measurement), but in addition such forms are ultimately ‘boring’, which is to say that they are static, or of a uniform movement, a quality which is directly attributable to their being grounded and ‘stabilised’ in a concept. Thus, as in the example given by Kant, if someone can describe the regularity of a plantation as “beautiful” after spending days in the uncultivated jungle, this is only in virtue of an immediate appreciation of a change in state: only the “extravagant diversity” of nature, however, can “nourish taste permanently.”\textsuperscript{35}

To understand “form” as a ‘snapshot’ perception of the determinate shape or structure of an object is to lose this dynamism implicit in Kant’s notion of formal purposiveness, and is to tend towards a conceptual rule of form. We have already noted that the experience of the beautiful is attached to a certain duration: the character of its presentations is the tendency to self-preservation.\textsuperscript{36} It is not only mathematical and geometrical concepts that are excluded from pure aesthetic judgements, but also the introduction of notions of purpose into aesthetic appreciation—the accord between form and function that represents the classical or teleological ideal of beauty. There is a paradox in the quality of the presentation of the beautiful, as the absence of a determinate concept entails both its singularity and its repetitive character. It is irreducibly singular, because it is endowed with an internal coherence that is nevertheless unaccountable for conceptually in a way which would identify what constitutes its singularity (and thus eliminate what is inessential). At the same time, this is also what gives rise to an indefinite succession of incomplete determinations, as the absence of a concept produces the dynamism of the presentation, the indefinite “play” of the faculties in relation to the object, which repeats the object as always different. Kant’s anthropological observations on pleasure thus appear to have a transcendental correlate in the aesthetic principles developed in the \textit{Critique of Judgement}, where presentations manifest a perpetual differentiation and renewal that does not rely on an empirical and external difference between states, but rather a state that ‘in itself’ is a change of state.

In the beautiful, the pleasure arising out of the reflection upon the object is experienced as essentially contingent. This is not a cognition of
empirical contingency, which would oppose and refer this contingency to a concept of causal necessity, but rather constitutes an aesthetic principle. We can appreciate this principle as the positive formulation of the absence of a determinate concept or idea in the beautiful. In the absence of a structuring concept, we can assign no beginning or end to the presentation, in the form of a ‘right’ or paradigmatic moment: it is grasped at ‘any moment whatever’, such that any moment is the ‘right’ one. The beautiful is experienced as purposive for our cognitive powers, despite the fact that no concept can be produced for it, and pleasure is the dominant ‘tone’ of the experience of the beautiful, because it envelops this favouring contingency which stimulates the faculties. If in the sublime the imagination projects a “negative” presentation of the idea onto nature as its supersensible substrate, the aesthetic idea of beautiful is made up a positive presentation of indeterminacy, provoked by the singular, which we could express, following a Bergsonian formula, as the “continuous creation of unpredictable novelty.”

We can suggest, then, an analogy between the relationship of reason and the imagination in the sublime, and that of reason and the understanding in the beautiful. Just as the sublime commands the imagination to exceed itself in attempting to grasp the supersensible, the imagination enjoins the understanding to exert and expand itself in attending to the aesthetic idea. The difference between the two does not pertain to the absence of discord in the beautiful but, as Kant suggests, the ‘direction’ of the accord, whether based in purposiveness, or contra-purposiveness. The paradox of the beautiful is that it presents us with the commensurability of the incommensurable: the beautiful presentation is ‘commensurate’ with our powers of understanding, without thereby being ‘understood’, and the imagination is ‘commensurate’ with the understanding without thereby being subordinated under a concept. The paradox proper to the sublime seems rather to be the incommensurability of the commensurable. The supersensible is revealed as the true ‘measure’ of nature and ‘adequate’ to it, its ultimate law, but in this gesture the imagination, and the sensible nature that it apprehends, are revealed to be inadequate to their own adequation, their own law. Supersensible nature is adequate to sensible nature, which paradoxically is not adequate to it: the incommensurability of nature and freedom is demonstrated at the same time that freedom makes itself commensurate with nature. If, in the beautiful, nature presents itself as
commensurate with our faculties, which are nevertheless unable to comprehend it, in the sublime we present our powers as commensurate with nature, which in turn cannot respond in kind. The subsistence of pain as a definite ‘note’ in sublime, rather than being indistinguishable in the oscillation of pleasure and pain that makes up the ‘feeling of life’, can be accounted for by the fact that, while the failure of the imagination is in a sense ‘compensated’ by the revelation of its supersensible destiny, it can only carry out its ‘destiny’ by representing its own failure. The pleasure in the sublime relies on a ‘humiliation’ of the activity of the imagination, whereas in the beautiful the exercise of the understanding is rather ‘suspended’: never proceeding to a determinate concept, but never having a sense of absolute failure either by virtue of the perceived purposiveness which always makes comprehension seem possible.

This chapter has focused on how aesthetic judgements can be said to engender thought. The next and last chapter will address the broader issue of aesthetic experience as a model for thought. Throughout his work, Deleuze incorporates aesthetic elements in his accounts of the operation of thought: in its “event”, but also in its mode of communication with others and way of inhabiting the world. The viability of such an approach is already raised by Kant, forming the central problem of the antinomy of aesthetic judgements. The spur of the aesthetic is ultimately the element which both singularises and universalises our expressions of thought: the drama and beatitude of life on the “plane.”
Endnotes for Part III Chapter 3

1 CPR, A132-136/B171-175.
2 CPR, A135/B174.
3 CPR, A133/B172.
4 CJ, 213' (First introduction). Kant gives an account of the determination of nature in its universality, where judgement "not only reflects but also determines", but requires "no special principle" for this reflection.
5 CJ, p. 185.
10 PCK, F85/E59.
11 This is also an argument of Béatrice Longuenesse, in her *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*.
12 CPR, A134/B173, "A physician, a judge, or a ruler may have at command many excellent pathological, legal, or political rules, even to the degree that he may become a profound teacher of them, and yet, nonetheless, may easily stumble in their application."
13 PCK, F87/E60.
14 "The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Aesthetics", p. 60.
15 PCK, F72/E50, Deleuze’s italics.
16 CJ, p. 238.
17 CJ, p. 240.
19 CJ, p. 278.
20 CJ, p. 245.
21 CJ, p. 245.
22 CJ, p. 254.
24 "On Four Poetic Formulas That Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy", CC, F48-49E34, translation modified.
25 CJ, p. 265.
26 CJ, p. 315.
27 CJ, p. 320.
28 CJ, p. 342-344.
29 CJ, p. 314.
30 PCK, F82/E57.
31 PCK, F82/E56-57, referring to CJ, §49.
32 PCK, F83/E57.
33 CJ, p. 258.
34 CJ, pp. 242-243.
36 CJ, 207' (First Introduction).
37 CJ, p. 191.
38 "The possible and the real", *La pensée et le mouvant, Oeuvres*, F1344 (scholarly pagination 115)/E125, translation modified.
CHAPTER 4:

‘A’ TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC

The interest of aesthetic judgements for Deleuze is that they further the critical project by providing a model for the viability of a thought that does not rely on a transcendent ground of identity, a “free” schematism whose affiliation is rather with the Idea than with the concept. It is in the beautiful and the sublime that we directly apprehend the positive dimension of the disorientation that this implies. Kant mediates the discrepancy between the realms of nature and freedom by projecting an underlying unity of the sensible and supersensible, as regulative ideal in the second critique through the notion of the immortality of the soul, and as principle of reflection in the third critique through the notion of natural purposiveness. Deleuze, by contrast, seeks the sense of the discrepancy between nature and freedom in the immediate experience of the aesthetic, where discord is itself the principle of an accord. It is at the limit of the possibilities of the experience of nature—the effect on the subject of a presentation that exceeds it—that Deleuze discerns the foundation of the relationship of thought and nature. Having analysed the functioning of aesthetic judgements on their own account and with respect to Kant’s critique, we can provide an overview of the way in which elements of the aesthetic experience are integrated into Deleuze’s conception of thought. This is first reflected on the level of the experience of thought as an event, inseparable from the contingencies of “life”. In the second place we can examine how this conception of thought is “translatable” in the light of its extreme singularity, thus referring to Kant’s antinomy of aesthetic judgements and his theory of artistic expression.
The aesthetic image of thought

Apart from his analysis of the “genetic” function of aesthetic judgements in Kant’s critique, Deleuze has always referred the ultimate sense of thought in his own philosophy to the provocative impact of a contingent encounter which divests the subject of her habitual frames of reference. Deleuze perhaps most succinctly expresses the essential elements of this conception and their relationship to each other in a passage from his work on Proust, in which art communicates through “signs” capable of arousing the pure power of thought:

What forces us to think is the sign. The sign is the object of an encounter; but it is precisely the contingency of the encounter which guarantees the necessity of what it leads us to think. The act of thinking does not proceed from a simple natural possibility; on the contrary, it is the only true creation. Creation is the genesis of the act of thinking within thought itself. This genesis implies something that does violence to thought, which wrests it from its natural stupor and its merely abstract possibilities.

It is this configuration of thought in terms of its event that is both opposed to the dogmatic image of “common sense” and which evokes Kant’s aesthetic experience. It is this event, in the form of a “problematic instance” which formed the point of departure for the determination of Ideas in the previous section, displacing the operation of concepts. It also forms one side of a dichotomy that opposes the “normative” elements of thought in its established form to the conditions of the initiation of thought. Reprising these terms of his work on Proust, one of the recurring themes of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition is the necessity for thought to undergo a “violence” in order to be awakened from its “natural stupor”, “so much is it the case that there is no thought but involuntary thought, solicited in a constrained form within thought, all the more absolutely necessary for being born, illegitimately, from the fortuitous in the world.”

This position is reflected throughout Deleuze’s work on critique. In his book on Hume, for example, Deleuze sets up an opposition between the laws of association which account for the “habits of thought, everyday notions of good sense, current ideas, and complexes of ideas which correspond to the most general and most constant needs common to all minds…” and the affective force of circumstance, which alone can account for “the singular content, the profound and the particular”: “Circumstance gives the relation its sufficient reason.” There is in
Hume, according to Deleuze, a dialectic between, on the one hand, the principles of association that “provide[e] the subject with its necessary form”, and on the other hand the principles of the passions that, reflected in the imagination, have a selective role as a principle of individuation, and “provide[e] it with its singular content.”6 As well as justifying the particular form of a relation, the conjunction of circumstance and the affective response of the subject determine the direction of the relation of thought, its irreversibility, which is the condition of the practical constitution of the subject.

Deleuze’s work on Nietzsche continues this thread of the necessary encounter with an outside element to provide the “sufficient reason” of thought. Against the image of thought which posits an internal power of thought to realise itself, we must introduce “the forces or power that determine it to think, and to think this rather than that”: “any thinkable or thought sense is only brought into effect insofar as the forces that correspond to it in thought also take hold of something, appropriate something, outside thought.”7 Deleuze again describes a dialectic, this time Nietzschean, whereby life serves to render thought “active”, which in turn serves to render life “affirmative”.8 As in Deleuze’s account of the sublime, undoubtedly inspired by Nietzsche, this relationship is a dynamic one in which each term obliges the other to exceed itself and the other:

Life would be the active force of thought, but thought would be the affirmative power of life. Both would go in the same direction, carrying each other along, smashing restrictions, matching each other step for step, in a burst of unparalleled creativity.9

This affinity between thought and life emerges as “the essence of art”.10 Art is a “stimulant” to the will to power: the will to power posits its affirmation of the active forces of life in the work of art and the work of creation. The work of art elevates the powers of the false against the ideal of the true and the real, creating a “second nature” and tracing paths of “new possibilities of life”: “For the artist, appearance no longer means the negation of the real in this world, but this kind of selection, correction, duplication, affirmation.”11
The aesthetic community of thinkers

Insofar as Deleuze seeks to make aesthetic experience a model for the foundation of thought, one of the principal challenges he faces is to show how the singularity of aesthetic experience is reconcilable with some form of communicability. In the terms of Kant’s analysis, this is the problem of reconciling the singularity of the aesthetic judgement with its universality, as aesthetic judgements imply a demand for, or the necessary possibility of, universal assent. The apparent contradiction in these qualities of aesthetic judgements provides the terms of the antinomy of taste in the third critique. The nature of this universality is essentially problematic: empirical agreement between subjects on the subject of the beautiful not only cannot be the basis for such a sense of universality, they cannot even be said to themselves derive from any objective principle of universality at the basis of a judgement of taste, such as would be represented by an objective concept. The absence of a concept for judgement is why judgement—judgement as taste, and judgement in its general sense—can neither be taught or learned, hence Kant’s reference to judgement in the first critique as “the specific quality of so-called mother-wit”, whose “lack no school can make good.”

In this respect, taste resembles the capacity to make beautiful objects. For art to be the object of an aesthetic judgement, there must also be no determinate rule of its production. Art is thus the product of “genius”, understood as the “innate mental disposition (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art.” This rule is indeterminate and unable to be analysed or communicated scientifically (through concepts) by the artist. The relationship between artist or instructor and pupil is one where the teaching is done by example, however much may be learned from acquiring ‘academic’ skills. The aim is not to imitate the works produced by past masters, it is rather the “spirit” of the masterpiece which is to be emulated. The ‘community’ between artists, and between artworks, does not involve any similarity or underlying identity, but rather the opposite—“originality” is required of works of fine art. It is for this reason that art, unlike science, does not ‘progress’, but also for this reason that it is never ‘complete’, having no determinate rule that can be
passed on and built upon or established once and for all (which is why the artwork is an “example”, but not an “archetype”). Genius is nevertheless a talent of communication: of expressing aesthetic ideas in such a way that they arouse the audience, and send a form of message to geniuses to come. The new genius naturally does not reproduce or imitate but renews the principle expressed in the original:

the product of a genius… is an example that is meant not to be imitated, but to be followed by another genius….The other genius, who follows the example, is aroused by it to a feeling of his own originality, which allows him to exercise in art his freedom from the constraint of rules, and to do so in such a way that art itself acquires a new rule by this

In the case of the universal assent to aesthetic judgements as well, Kant emphasises that we cannot simply ‘imitate’ other’s judgements of taste, but must recreate them anew for ourselves. This is to suggest that the true ‘agreement’ between judgements of taste is not an empirical one where the ‘same’ object is judged to be beautiful by different people, but that between different judgements (whether of the ‘same’ object or not), insofar as they lay claim to the same principle. It is the existence of a principle for aesthetic judgements which can endow them with an ‘internal’ (“subjective”) universality and necessity which is important for Kant, over and above any empirical agreement or disagreement between subjects. Understanding the universality of aesthetic common sense on the same model as genius, as exemplary in nature rather than determinate, explains the ambiguous status of aesthetic common sense, as both presupposed and ideal. In concrete terms, the character of the example is that it refers outside of itself: to the student, to the future genius. If Kant defines pleasure as “the way in which we are instantly obliged to leave the present, without it being determined into what other present we will enter, apart from it being at least a quite other present”, we can understand the sense of universality in aesthetic judgements as the felt obligation to refer the experience to an indeterminate future which would form the virtual thread linking actual cases of the beautiful.

Deleuze’s model of the communicability of thought resembles this interpretation of the universality, or “transmissibility”, of aesthetic judgement in several respects. It also reproduced his notion of the communication between the faculties of thought as a communication ‘at the limit’, rather than an accord based on a concept of identity. The principal feature is that
communication does not take place on the basis of a common denominator, but rather through a form of relay where the injunction is to repeat what cannot be represented, and (thus) repeat as different. Deleuze begins his *Difference and Repetition* with the definition of repetition as the only possible response to “something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent… Not to add a second and a third time to the first, but to raise the first time to the ‘nth’ power.” Deleuze’s model of the thinker is analogous to Kant’s figure of the “genius”, a position also influenced by Nietzsche. In *Dialogues*, Deleuze speaks of the “great health” of the philosopher, which is not the physical health of the organism, but expresses a positive and aesthetic aberration of nature. He cites here Nietzsche on Schopenhauer:

> It sometimes seems as though the artist, and the philosopher in particular, is only a chance in his time… nature, which never makes a leap, has made its one leap in creating them, and a leap of joy moreover, for nature then feels that for the first time it has reached its goal—where it realises it has to unlearn having goals and that it has played the game of life with too high stakes. This knowledge transfigures nature, and a gentle evening-weariness, that which men call ‘beauty’, reposes on its face.

In his book on Kant, Deleuze describes the genius as “a call thrown out to another genius; but taste becomes a sort of medium between the two, allowing for the waiting period if the other genius is not yet born.” In his book on Nietzsche, Deleuze takes up Nietzsche’s image of the philosopher as a “comet”, whose “fantastic paths” we must rediscover:

> The succession of philosophers is not an eternal sequence of sages, still less a historical sequence, but a broken succession, a succession of comets. Their discontinuity and repetition do not amount to the eternity of the sky which they cross, nor to the historicity of the earth which they fly over.

The essential feature of this communication is that each instance is animated by the “spirit” of the first, from a wholly different position, and at the same time refers to a future from which another will arise. This repetition expresses a “disjointed” temporality, which is neither eternal nor historical, but that of the “untimely”, following Nietzsche’s imperative to “act in an untimely manner, thus against the time, and in this way on the time, in favour (I hope) of a time to come.”

Deleuze in fact repudiates the communicative ideal in philosophy of “discussion” or “democratic conversation” based on a shared understanding of meaning: “Every philosopher runs away when he or she hears someone say:
‘Let’s discuss this.’ Where communication arises in philosophy, it is not through a pooling of common interests and problems, but precisely through a tangential relationship where a component of one problem becomes a component of a new, and necessarily different, problem. In one sense, this means thought is a necessarily solitary activity—“When you work, you are necessarily in absolute solitude.” On the other hand, this solitude is, according to Deleuze, “extremely crowded.” The crowd consists of “encounters”, and the elements of an encounter are the opposite for Deleuze of an object of “recognition”: it is rather a merging of “movements, ideas, events, entities.” Just as Deleuze seeks to undermine the notion that the basic structure of experience is the representation of an object by a subject, by uncovering the engagement of “larval subjects” and “fragmentary objects” conjugated in function of a problem, he also challenges a particular configuration of the relationship of the subject to the Other as ground of communication.

It is not necessary to have taken aesthetic experience as a model of thought in order for it to raise issues of the communicability of what appears to be the most singular phenomenon. Philonenko analyses Kant’s antinomy of aesthetic judgement as posing the problem of communication with “concrete” others: aesthetic pleasure, like love, is precisely what most demands to be communicated and which is least susceptible in principle to formulation in a concept. He presents the antinomy in terms of a “tragic” choice between an empirical position involving the renunciation of the possibility of communication, given the fundamental “ipseity” of the self, or a dogmatic renunciation of the concrete self in favour of a solely rational communication through the concept, which reduces the “ipseity” of both self and other. The resolution of the antinomy bears on issues concerning the whole of critique, as its basis is the problem of reconciling form and content, the universal and the particular. In this sense, the Critique of Judgement, for Philonenko as well, engages the stakes of the entire critical project. For Philonenko, the antinomy confronts us with what he calls, following Fichte, a “necessary circle.” The critical process that could yield a solution to the antinomy of aesthetic judgement—which precisely raises the possibility of critique—presupposes that the logical principles of communication in which critique is founded are already given. But “if I don’t presuppose the laws of general logic, I can no longer even think, nor think with others.” This necessary circle on the part of
human thought to presuppose itself and the other is the inevitable character of a “finite reason” for whom concept and laws are tools, rather identical with its being or masters of its existence.

We can consider this circle at which Philonenko considers it necessary to stop as in some respects the point of departure for Deleuze. Deleuze’s analysis of aesthetic judgements as a process of genesis is ultimately based on defying the postulated necessity for critique to “presuppose itself.” If we consider Deleuze’s understanding of communication and the role he accords to “Otherness”, his tendency in the final instance is to develop a thought which operates in the absence of the other, in any ordinary sense—as also without a conventional subject. The “nature” of this world without self or other, moreover, is precisely aesthetic. Deleuze analyses the concept of “Otherness” (autrui) in his reading of Michel Tournier’s Vendredi, ou les limbes du Pacifique. The crucial significance of the Other, for Deleuze, is not in its status as an object or another subject within our perceptual or ethical field, but as a structuring principle for the field of our experience as a whole. It is the presence of the Other—as a principle if not as a fact—which provides a virtual “margin” around all objects of my experience, mental or physical, so that I not only perceive them in the immediate aspect which presents itself to my perspective, but also sense, however indeterminately, their relationship with respect to other points of view: “The part of the object that I do not see I posit as visible to Others... the objects behind my back, I sense them coming together and forming a world, precisely because they are visible to, and are seen by, Others.” The principle of the Other represents what is possible in my own field of experience, and actual Others express the principle of a possible world outside of my experience. It is thus a condition of the constitution of objects and ‘worldness’, per se, and in this sense there is some agreement between Deleuze and Philonenko on the necessity of the category of the Other for the formal constitution of my thought:

We have tried to show in this sense how the Other conditions the entire perceptual field, the application to this field of the categories of the perceived object and the perceiving subject, and finally the distribution of concrete Others in each field. In effect, perceptual laws affecting the constitution of objects (form-background etc), the temporal determination of the subject, and the successive development of worlds, seemed to us to depend on the possible as structure-Other.
If the Other, in this respect, functions as a condition of possibility of the 'world' as we know it, in other respects it represents a limitation. In Deleuze’s reading of Tournier’s novel, which is a rewriting of the story of Robinson Crusoe, the loss of the Other is first felt as a pain: the experience of objects and the self is no longer cushioned or mediated by the intervening principle of the perspective of the other, and becomes sharp and confronting,

...there reigns alone the brutal opposition of sun and earth, of an unbearable light and an obscure abyss: the “summary law of all or nothing”. The known and the unknown, the perceived and unperceived confront each other absolutely in a battle without nuance. Over time, however, the experience of Crusoe reorganises itself along other lines, or rather, it ‘disorganises’ itself in a manner which is nevertheless viable and which reveals “another” nature. Nature without the Other is expressed as an “elemental” nature, by which Deleuze does not mean a fundamental nature, but rather the opposite: the world as pure surface or “Image”. From this perspective, the principle of the Other is not enabling, but “imprisoning”: it is the “Other” who “has imprisoned the elements within the limits of bodies”, while “hiding” the “pure surface.” There is no hostility or “negation” of the Other in this process: in his book on Nietzsche and later works with Guattari, Deleuze will argue that it is precisely the structure of Otherness that generates ressentiment toward the other and inhibits desire. It is rather that, for Deleuze, true communication, and in fact true love and desire, pass via the conjugation of fragments or “elementary fields” rather than on the level of subject and object. In love, Deleuze writes in Dialogues, it is a matter of “extracting the pure event which unites me to those whom I love… when they enter a room they are not persons, characters or subjects, they are an atmospheric variation, a change of hue, an imperceptible molecule, a discrete population, a fog or a cloud of droplets.” And in the conclusion to Difference and Repetition, Deleuze locates the field of thought as ultimately beyond the structure of the other as well as the self, “where singularities are free to be deployed and distributed within pure Ideas.”
Life and thought on the plane

There are cases where old age gives, not an eternal youth, but a sovereign freedom, a pure necessity where one delights in a moment of grace between life and death, and where all of the pieces of the machine come together in order to send into the future a gesture [trait] which traverses the ages…. Kant’s Critique of Judgement…

—Deleuze, “Thus the question…”, What is Philosophy?

A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete force [puissance] and beatitude. Between one’s life and death, there is a moment that is no longer anything but a life playing with death.

—Deleuze, “L’immanence: une vie…”

The last of Deleuze’s works to be published during his lifetime returns to the question of how we define the “transcendental field.” The piece unites elements of what we have understood to be the pre-philosophical terrain, or plane ‘of right’, with the ‘ground-zero’ of aesthetic awareness. It is a meditation that seems to span and contract all the moments of Deleuze’s philosophy, “all the names in history”, where we precisely glimpse the “crowd” that inhabits Deleuze’s solitary thought. This is no doubt intentional: what a transcendental field is, for Deleuze, is that “pure plane of immanence” populated by singularities which go to make up “A LIFE.” The indefinite article, ‘a’, is the “index” of the transcendental: what is not, or not yet, attributed to or actualised in the transcendent figures of subject or object, Being or Act. Deleuze invokes a series of proper names—as singular as the indefinite—in order to express this field: Sartre (on the transcendence of the ego), James (on the flux of consciousness), Spinoza (the immanence of substance), Fichte (the intuition of activity). The vitality and “beatitude” of “a life” is as opposed to the purpose and definition of an organism as it is to the life of a subject. It is a signature trait of “very small children”, who “all resemble each other and have hardly any individuality; but they have singularities, a smile, a gesture, a frown, events which are not subjective characters” as well as the dying, in which “the life of the individual has given way to an impersonal life, and yet singular, which extracts a pure event liberated from the accidents of internal and external life.” It is characterised by what is essentially “in-between”: the “passage” from one moment to another, the hovering between life and death, a
transcendental "determinability" which presents "the immensity of empty time where one sees the event still to come and already arrived".\textsuperscript{13}

The transcendental plane is that ‘from which’ we come to philosophy, and it is appropriately from within this perspective of the “liberty” of old age that Deleuze writes his earlier piece on “what is philosophy?”, before retreating to the beatitude of his transcendental pastures.\textsuperscript{43} The later piece on “a life” works only with the opposition between the singularities of the pure plane of immanence and the forms of transcendence which subjectify and reify them: in this earlier piece we see how it is possible to “inhabit” this field, and its relation to the activity of thought. Here, the plane is understood as sheltering the “seeds” of the concept and the “conceptual personae” who create the concept. Deleuze uses “concept” here in the same way as he earlier understood the Idea: as that which gives ideal unity to a collection of singularities. In this way, it is also a form of schematism: the creation of the concept is its construction, which presupposes the transcendental plane as source of singularities and guarantor of the autonomy of the concept:

the following definition of philosophy can be taken as being decisive: knowledge through pure concepts. But there is no reason to oppose knowledge through concepts, and through construction of concepts in possible experience or intuition. For, according to the Nietzschean verdict, you will know nothing through concepts unless you have first created them—that is, constructed them in an intuition specific to them: a field, a plane, and a ground that must not be confused with them but that shelters their seeds and the personae who cultivate them.\textsuperscript{45}

The creativity of thought is opposed to its image as discovery, representation, contemplation or communication. The creation of concepts consists in tracing a line through the singularities of the plane and thus redistributing its coordinates. As created, the concept refers necessarily to the persona of the thinker, and her “taste”. As a creation, however, the concept also posits itself as independent of the “artist”:

the concept is not given, it is created, or to be created; it is not formed, it posits itself in itself, auto-position. The two imply each other, since what is truly created, from the living thing to the work of art, enjoys by that token an auto-position of itself, or an auto-poetic character which distinguishes it. The more the concept is created, the more it posits itself. What depends on a free creative activity is also what posits itself in itself, independently and necessarily.\textsuperscript{16}

Deleuze notes that we find such an attention to, and respect of, the “philosophical reality” of the concept in the post-Kantians: Schelling and Hegel
in particular. But this is at the price, according to Deleuze, of “an indeterminate extension of philosophy” over other disciplines, the reintroduction of universals, and the reduction of the creators of the concept to “ghostly puppets.” To this “universal encyclopaedia of the concept, that attributed concept creation to a pure subjectivity”, Deleuze proposes for philosophy a more modest task: “a pedagogy of the concept, which would have to analyze the conditions of creation as factors of always singular moments.” Against the backdrop of the question—“what is…?”, “what is philosophy?”—which encompasses the swarming host of all the names in history, the task of the response is not to “match” the question, in positing an essence or gathering an image of the whole, but to “determine its moment, an occasion and circumstances, its landscapes and personae, its conditions and unknowns.”
Endnotes for Part III Chapter 4

1 Proust and signs, F105-106/E86.
2 Proust and signs, F118-119/E97, translation modified.
3 DR, F181/E139, translation modified.
4 ES, F115/E103, Deleuze’s italics.
5 ES, F115/E103, Deleuze’s italics.
6 ES, F116-117/E104.
7 NP, F118/E104, my italics.
8 NP, F116/E101.
9 NP, F115/E101. Both Deleuze’s account of the sublime and his account of the relationship between life and thought here is no doubt influenced by Nietzsche’s own aesthetic which posits a dialectic between the ‘Dionysian’ and ‘Apollonian’ impulses.
10 NP, F116/E101.
11 NP, F117/E103, translation modified.
12 CPR, A133/B172.
13 CI, p. 307.
14 CI, pp. 172-178.
15 CI, p. 318.
16 CI, p. 79.
17 AP, §60.
18 DR, F1-2/E1, translation modified.
19 Dialogues, F12/E6.
20 PCK, F82-83/E57.
21 NP, F121/E106.
23 NP, F122/E107, translation modified.
25 Dialogues, F13/E6.
26 Dialogues, F13/E6, translation modified.
27 Dialogues, F13/E6.
31 The Logic of Sense, F355/E305.
32 The Logic of Sense, F370/E318.
33 The Logic of Sense, F355/306, translation modified (English gives “battle with nuances” rather than “without nuances”, for “combat sans nuances”).
34 The Logic of Sense, F363/E312, F366/E315.
35 Dialogues, F81/E66.
36 DR, F361/E282.
37 QP?, F7-8/E1-2.
38 “L’immanence: une vie…”, Philosophie, p. 4, p. 5.
39 “L’immanence: une vie…”, Philosophie.
40 “L’immanence: une vie…”, pp.3-4, p. 4.
42 “L’immanence: une vie…”, p. 5.
44 Introduction to QP?, “The Question Then…”. Deleuze published an earlier form of this piece as “The Conditions of the question: what is philosophy?” in 1990, before it was incorporated into his 1991 book with Guattari. I am treating it here as “Deleuze’s” piece.
45 QP?, F12/E7, translation modified. The English edition renders the crucial sentence, “Mais il n’y a pas lieu d’opposer la connaissance par concepts et par construction de concepts dans l’expérience possible ou l’intuition.” as: “But there is no reason to oppose knowledge through pure concepts and the construction of concepts within possible experience on the one hand and through intuition on the other.” This seems not only to be a grammatically awkward or even impossible reading (or ‘division’) of the sentence (you oppose one thing and another, you don’t oppose one thing or another) but shows an unawareness of the Kantian distinction between
“knowledge through concepts” and (knowledge through) “construction of concepts”, and that concepts are precisely constructed either in “possible experience” or “intuition.”

46 QP?, p. 16.
47 QP?, F16-17/E12.
48 QP?, F17/E12.
49 QP?, F8/E2.