PART II.

MIDDLES:
PUTTING THINGS TOGETHER
CHAPTER 1:

THE SENSE OF THE PROBLEM

The last section gave some indication of the importance of the problem and question for Deleuze, as foundational structures of a critical thought. One of the traits of the dogmatic image of thought was the priority it accorded to the proposition as the ultimate “sense” of the question or problem (in the form of an answer or resolution), which Deleuze counters by locating the sense of the proposition in the question or problem from which it derives. As a general formula, however, this reversal is a more or less familiar philosophical adage, which can be accommodated within a ‘commonsensical’ conception of thought, as Deleuze himself notes:

everybody ‘recognises’ after a fashion that problems are the most important thing. Yet it is not enough to recognise this in fact, as if the problems were only provisional and contingent movements destined to disappear in the formation of knowledge, which owed their importance only to the negative empirical conditions imposed upon the knowing subject. On the contrary, this discovery must be raised to the transcendental level, problems must be considered not as ‘givens’ (data), but as ideal ‘objecticities’ \[objectités\] possessing their own sufficiency and implying acts of constitution and investment acts in their respective symbolic fields.

Deleuze seeks to give a transcendental status to the problem, in order to redress its negative and instrumental status in the dogmatic image of thought, and distance it from a more commonplace understanding. The context of critique already provides a more determinate and positive sense of the problem than in its ordinary meaning. When Kant attaches himself to the questions and problems posed by reason, independently of their results, he means that he is engaged in an enquiry into the terms and conditions of our thought, whose sense must be founded prior to an evaluation of its assertions. Deleuze reaffirms this principle, and in addition produces a notion of the problem, which both derives from its geometrical sense and the sense of the ‘problematic’ in Kant’s philosophy. In this chapter we will examine not only the ‘sense’ of the problem in terms of its definition and role in geometry and philosophy, but how, in so doing, we grasp the problem as precisely a generator of sense in its integration logic and existence.
The problem in geometry and philosophy

The history of the notion of the problem in geometry and philosophy forms a backdrop to Deleuze's development of this notion, and is useful for considering the specificity of Kant's own critical methodology. The word “problem” comes from the Greek πρόβλημα, which literally means something thrown or put forward, hence the sense it has acquired of being a proposed task, question or difficulty to be resolved. This derivation aligns with its original sense in geometry, most simply rendered by the Concise Oxford: “a proposition in which something has to be done.” This property of the problem in geometry, where “something has to be done”, distinguishes it from its closest geometrical counterpart, the theorem, which is defined as “a proposition to be proved by a chain of reasoning.” Both problems and theorems are propositions that follow from first principles (axioms, postulates and hypotheses) and demonstrate properties of geometrical figures. Their difference lies in the mode of this ‘following' and manner of demonstration. The theorem proceeds by a theoretical process of deduction that derives essential properties of a figure from its conceptual definition. The problem requires a material process of construction or transformation, in the course of which properties of a figure come to light which cannot be deduced from its concept.

The principal source for the discussion of the status of the problem in ancient geometry, which is drawn on by Deleuze, is the commentary by the neo-Platonist Proclus (412-484) on Euclid’s *Elements*. The distinction between the problem and the theorem is a recurrent topic in this work, the main points of which are summarised in Table 1 on page 76. The majority of these points simply represent an elaboration of what is more or less implicit in the contemporary conception of the distinction between the theorem and the problem. The difference is rather the great amount of attention paid to the significance of each term and their relationship to each other that is evident from Proclus' work, an issue capable of dividing schools of thinkers. In a context where there is such an overlap of the boundaries of knowledge and science, philosophy and mathematics, the meaning of the theorem and the problem bears directly on the nature of truth and the epistemological status of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE THEOREM</th>
<th>THE PROBLEM</th>
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<tr>
<td>Announces that some truth is to be discovered and demonstrated (81)</td>
<td>Announces something that is to be done (81)</td>
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<td>“What is it?” = the definition and notion of the thing (including what sort of thing) (201-202)</td>
<td>“What is it?” = is it the case? (does the object exist as defined &amp; under what conditions?) (201-202)</td>
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<td>Is allied grammatically to the declarative form (80)</td>
<td>Is allied grammatically with the interrogative form (80)</td>
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<td>Concerns conceptual &amp; intrinsic properties</td>
<td>Concerns existential and extrinsic properties</td>
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<td>“[propositions] whose purpose is to see, identify, and demonstrate the existence or non-existence of an attribute... [they] endeavour to grasp firmly and bind fast by demonstration the attributes and inherent properties belonging to the objects that are the subject matter of geometry.” (201)</td>
<td>“those propositions whose aim is to produce, bring into view, or construct what in a sense does not exist... [they] require us to construct a figure, or set it at a place, or apply it to another, or inscribe it in or circumscribe it about another, or fit it upon or bring it into contact with another, and the like.” (201)</td>
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<td>Admits only a given attribute, not its antithesis also (79)</td>
<td>Admits the possibility of antithetical predicates in its matter—the attribute sought as well as its opposite (79)</td>
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<td>(Example: constructing a right-angle inside a semi-circle)</td>
<td>(Example: constructing an equilateral inside a circle—possible not to)</td>
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<td>Distinguished according to truth and falsehood (330)</td>
<td>Distinguished as to their “determinateness” or “indeterminateness”—their manifest possibility or impossibility &amp; the number of possible solutions (330)</td>
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the proposition *per se*. It is also for this reason that it provides such an instructional framework for the examination of the “problematic” in Kant and Deleuze. The ‘problem’ with the problem, as it emerges in Proclus’ discussion, is that it intrudes on an ideal model of truth, as eternal by right and implicitly contained within a conceptual essence, removed from the changeability of matter and linked to other truths in a continuous and self-contained deductive flow. Problems appear to actually bring truths into existence, and can only do so by adjoining a material process to the concept, thus succeeding where purely intellectual methods fail, in a domain of practice that is scientifically opaque. The relative worth of the problem in relation to the theorem is closely connected to the arguments that can be made regarding its affiliation with the “mechanical” arts. The lesser worth of these in relation to the speculative sciences is in turn allied with the understanding of the nature of truth as eternal.

Proclus recounts that one school of thought, the followers of Speusippus and Amphinomus, refuses to recognise the existence of problems at all, insisting that all geometrical propositions be called theorems, and that the apparent “making” in problems be treated as simply a species of understanding, a sort of ‘acting out’ of the understanding, or even a ‘play acting’, which treats eternal things “as if” they were in the process of coming to be. It is an engineer, Carpus of Antioch, who makes a claim for the priority of the problem over the theorem, for the reason that if the theorem studies the nature of a thing, the problem must first determine the subject to be investigated. He argues that the order of presentation in Euclid’s *Elements* itself, which begins with problems, indicates this precedence, and that even the first theorem “is completely dependent on the clear judgement of sense perception”, which is to say, a non-conceptual process. Using a similar line of argument, the school of Maenaechmus considers all processes of investigation to be problems, with one sort (the problematic ‘proper’) providing the object to be investigated, and the other (‘theorematic’) investigating the qualities of the provided object.

These defences of the problems however are at odds with the prevailing *episteme*, at least as it is presented by Proclus. The problem in geometry is inevitably compromised by its affiliation, if only by “analogy”, with the lesser practical and mechanical arts. One of Proclus’ first remarks with respect to the
Problem is: “as the productive sciences have some theory in them, so the theoretical ones take on problems in a way analogous to production.” While Proclus understands problems and theorems to genuinely differ in nature, there is no question in his mind concerning the superior rank and scope of the theorem. It is the more general term in geometry than the problem, because “every problem has some theory in it, but the reverse is not true”, and “demonstrations in general are the product of theory.” If the formal processes of thought, might be “plausibly said to resemble acts of production”, even in the case of discovering theorems, these take place in the imagination alone (and not in the changeable world), and “the contents of our understanding all stand fixed, without any generation or change.” If problems precede theorems in Euclid’s order of presentation, this sequence is a procession from the lower in worth to the higher: “where [geometry] borders on the highest science it rises by way of theorems from problems to theorems, from secondary to primary things, from the more practical arts to the more scientific insights.”

French historian of philosophy Émile Bréhier addresses the transition from the technical sense of the problem to its philosophical sense in his article on “The notion of the problem in philosophy.” Though evidently an object of philosophical reflection in the context of geometry, the term “problem” was rarely used in philosophical discourse proper in antiquity. In Aristotle’s Problems (a title not given by Aristotle himself), the problem emerges in relation to biology and morality, as well as mathematics, but has only a restricted sense, referring to “a concrete, limited and defined question, whose very posing assumes the pre-existence of the science within which it is posed, the science which will provide the means to resolve it.” It appears in its more philosophical sense however in Aristotle’s Topics, where the problem orients a discussion by designating the subject matter of the argument, reformulating a proposition as a kind of open-ended question:

The difference between a problem and a proposition is a difference in the turn of the phrase. For if it be put in this way, “An animal that walks on two feet” is the definition of man, is it not? or “Animal” is the genus of man, is it not? the result is a proposition: but if thus, “Is “animal that walks on two feet” a definition of man or no?” [or “Is “animal” his genus or no?”] the result is a problem. This is the source, according to Bréhier, of an essential relationship between the problem and a dialectic process: “the proposition only considers a thesis which demands to be accepted, while the problem considers the antithesis of
the proposed thesis as also a possibility, and calls for the examination of both arguments for and against.” While dialectics in general refers to the art of discussion and argument, for the ancient philosopher it more specifically concerns the determination of essential principles and truthful ideas through the testing of opinions and classification of concepts. It is in this way that the philosophical dialectic distinguishes itself from the sophistic dialectic, considered as the virtuoso manipulation of theses and arguments for pure effect. If there is an affiliation of the theorem with the classic question of essence (”what is…?”), the question of right (*quid juris?*) engages the question of how a truth or an essence is legitimately determined as such in the first place, regardless of its internal nature once determined, hence its affiliation with the problem-form.

In this context, the backdrop to the philosophical problem—what Bréhier calls the “metaproblematic”—is not, as in science, a defined set of propositions, but the “doxa” of “more or less probable opinion.” As a body of competing assertions, none of which have unquestionable certainty, these provide the material for the dialectic and the point of departure for its arguments, but do not of themselves provide a means to move beyond the alternative of for and against, of forcing the problem, and indeed risk sinking the dialectic into aporia or scepticism. In this sense, Bréhier argues, the essential element of a philosophical problem, beneath any given alternative in a particular problem, is the alternative between the alternatives posed by the *doxa* itself, and the decisive instance that allows thought to move beyond this alternative. It is for this reason that Bréhier considers the lesson of the Socratic dialectic exemplary and perhaps instrumental in its method for moving beyond the problematic impasse: “Philosophy would perhaps never have moved beyond this [aporetic] situation without Socrates.” The crucial element of the Socratic method for Bréhier is that it *interiorises* the dialectic within the person of the interlocutor, such that the struggle between competing points of view is not between two people, but between the subject and himself, who thus finds the contradiction a painful and personally intolerable experience.

What the Socratic example shows is that the perspective from which a problem is addressed forms a key to the problem itself. Bréhier marks the
difference between the problem in mathematics, whose resolution presupposes an already given set of material, and the problem in philosophy whose very posing is only possible in the light of the correct metaproblematic, the problem in turn shedding further light on this latter, in a progressive, reciprocal movement—precisely dialectical. The correct identification of the appropriate “metaproblematic” is a decisive factor in resolving a philosophical problem—thus, in the example given by Bréhier, the importance of Kant, who reformulates the problem of morality by reassigning its domain of resolution from the theoretical to the practical. In doing so, he at the same time resolves, or dissolves, a former problem, designates a new “metaproblematic”, poses a new problem, and does so in a way that it contains its own resolution. Hence Bréhier’s affirmation of Bergson’s saying: “In philosophy, a well-posed problem is a problem resolved.” Other examples that Bréhier cites, as similarly decisive philosophical instances, are the Platonic vision of the Good, Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas, the dialectic of spirit in Hegel, and Bergsonian intuition. These cases resemble each other in that they both offer means of resolution to a problem, and more profoundly represent the perspective by which a false problem is transformed into a true one, from a false set of alternatives, external to each other and to their solution, to a true alternation which internalises its dialectic and its solution.

**Logic and existence: the problematic orientation of critique**

The critical force of the problem in philosophy lies in its polemical relationship to an image of thought based on the concept of identity. In geometry, the problem intervenes at the point where the possibilities provided by conceptual knowledge of an object alone are exhausted. It also, in both geometry and philosophy, precedes the concept in the sense of determining the object under investigation. In both cases the problem attaches the truth to a process that engages non-conceptual parameters in thought: space, time and the orientation of the subject. The problem modifies the traditional question of the philosophical weight of the sensible or non-eternal, the duality of the essential and non-essential. It sets up a contrast not between the eternity of essence beneath changing appearances, but raises rather the question of the
relationship of truth to the process which gives rise to it, and whether this relationship is itself essential or inessential. From a ‘theorematic’ bias, the operations involved in the problem can be considered as secondary with respect to their results, which once obtained, can be considered as having ‘already’ existed in a virtual fashion within the concept, and are hence independent of their coming to light. From a ‘problematic’ bias, the concept appears inadequate in itself as a ground for truth, having on the one hand to be first assigned as a legitimate topic of inquiry, and on the other to be further determined with regard to its existential value.

In a general sense, Kant treats the concept as the sign of a problem: something which calls for an investigation into its conditions of possibility with respect to experience, as well as its source and function with respect to our cognitive apparatus. The ‘temptation’ of the concept, for Kant, is its superiority with respect to logical values such as necessity, universality, and self-sufficiency. It thus directly satisfies the demands of reason and the understanding for unconditioned principles and strict laws, in relation to which the partial and variable character of experience appears impoverished. The ‘deficiency’ of the concept is that it remains valueless except in reference to the experience and interest that gives it meaning. The concept is in the first place the expression of a internal tendency or need of reason rather than the object of an insight, to which no reality is obliged to correspond. It is in this sense that reason cannot but ask questions that it is incapable of answering, but it is also in this sense that the solution consists in the correct position of the problem.

In a global sense, then, the ‘problematic’ nature of Kant’s critique can first be approached in terms of its project of a philosophy whose judgements are both *a priori* and *synthetic*. A ‘theorematic’ attitude to philosophy is represented by ‘dogmatism’ for Kant, which represents one of the principal targets of the critical project. Dogmatism, for Kant, is the attempt to arrive at certain philosophical truth in a manner which models itself on what it takes to be a mathematical method: by defining and analysing *a priori* concepts and establishing the necessary relations between them. In order for dogmatism to present an analytic method as a form of knowledge, which is to say as ‘objective’ (relating to an object), it must assume that the nature of reality itself is
continuous with conceptual necessity, such as when sense perception is considered to be a ‘confused’ form of intelligible reality, or a ‘supreme’ concept is deemed to include its existence. Such an assumption is for Kant entirely unfounded, and also impossible to found: if we look to our ideas, we find necessity, but such ideas are only a product of reason itself, and if we look to the content of our experience, we do not find anything that is necessary or universal. The ‘knowledge’ gained by reason through the analysis of its concepts is thus a knowledge only of itself, analytic in the tautological sense, and at best a “preparatory” stage for “metaphysics proper.” If conceptual analysis cannot claim to yield knowledge of any object, all philosophical knowledge must be not analytic but synthetic, which is to say necessarily related to experience. At the same time, Kant does not relinquish the demand for necessity and universality in our philosophical knowledge, hence the project of seeking the grounds of possibility of judgements which are both synthetic and a priori. These grounds are found in the a priori conditions of our experience: the categories of the understanding and the forms of space and time with respect to intuition.

Kant’s critique thus transforms the notion of the ‘conditional’ within philosophy. In attempting to go beyond the conditions of experience and grasp an unconditioned principle that would be their source, reason posits an unconditioned idea as what is first and highest in a logical order of being. From a critical perspective, such an idea is not only what in fact comes last in this movement of reason, but its unconditioned status translates as a state of complete indeterminacy, so low as an idea that it raises the question of whether it is even a ‘thought’:

The expedient of removing all those conditions which the understanding indispensably requires in order to regard something as necessary, simply through the introduction of the word unconditioned, is very far from sufficing to show whether I am still thinking anything in the concept of the unconditionally necessary, or perhaps rather nothing at all. Logic alone has no power to positively determine an object with respect to its existence according to Kant: its role in thought is wholly negative—a “cathartic” for the understanding in removing contradictions, but “far from being sufficient to determine the material (objective) truth of knowledge.” To “determine”, in this sense, is not to ‘cause’ (as in “determinism”), but to assign a ground, to specify or classify. The “determination” of an empirical concept is
the sense it acquires through its specification in experience, just as the particulars of experience receive determination through being assigned a concept.

The backdrop to Kant’s refutation of dogmatism, in both a positive and a negative sense, is the rationalist philosophy of Leibniz. Kant’s ‘pre-critical’ work was influenced by the Leibnizian philosopher Wolff, “the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers.”22 The difference between the negative function of logic or the general concept and the positive determination of existence in the particular is crucial to Leibniz’s methodology and ontology. While Leibniz’s philosophy represents in some respects the summit of rationalist dogmatism by submitting all truth to a strictly analytic model, it can only do this by transforming the traditional nature of the concept, and by supplementing the rationalist model with principles that are not logical in nature. All true predications of a subject, for Leibniz, are to be understood according to the model of analytic truth, where the predicate is contained within the notion of the subject. He distinguishes, however, two modes of “inclusion”, according to whether the predicate is “logical” or “existential.” Logical predicates are those that are analytic in the traditional sense: propositions of identity whose negation implies a contradiction. These form the basis for the first principle of our reasonings on nature: the principle of non-contradiction. Existential predicates are those whose negation does not imply a contradiction, such as what ‘happens’ to a subject and the fact of its existence itself. These predicates are to be considered in the light of the principle of sufficient reason, according to which “nothing ever happens without there being a cause or at least a determining reason, which is to say that can serve to provide an a priori reason why something exists rather than not and why it is in such a way rather than another.”23 The principle of non-contradiction is only a negative principle of our reasonings: it eliminates the impossible, and hence sanctions a range of possibilities, but is unable to positively account for the fact that only one of those possibilities is actual. The fact that existential predicates admit their negation without contradiction testifies to the insufficiency of the principle of contradiction alone to determine existence. The principle of sufficient reason is thus introduced as a supplement to the principle of contradiction: not in order to absorb the deficiencies in our powers of understanding, but in order to supplement the limitations of logic alone.
On a methodological level, the principle of sufficient reason provides a framework for judging and in some cases foreseeing explanations of natural phenomena, according to principles of simplicity and continuity, and incorporates the notion of ends or finality into the study of nature. Its metaphysical underpinning is the notion that, given the range of equally possible worlds from a logical perspective, God has selected the "best" of these, which is to say, the one which achieves the greatest total good while satisfying the economic principles of unity, continuity, simplicity etc. It is thus the creative act of God which at the same time gives actuality to a logical possibility and renders necessary what appears to be contingent, such that all aspects of an individual existence are contained within its concept. The contingency of this world relative to logical necessity in effect remains, even for God, but it is absolutely necessary 'sub judiciae' (in Leibniz' terms, "hypothetically" necessary), from the perspective of its optimal goodness, the full evidence of which is clear only to a divine understanding. We use general concepts, or "incomplete notions" through expediency, because our powers of understanding are insufficient to pursue the analysis of a concept to the level of the individual, this nevertheless being the heuristic model for our understanding.

Kant interprets the key aspects of Leibniz's cosmology in his examination of the "transcendental ideal of pure reason." If an idea is a presentation of a pure concept, an ideal is such a concept presented as an individual thing: “By the ideal I understand the idea, not merely in concreto, but in individuo, that is, as an individual thing, determinable or even determined by the idea alone.” Kant describes the process by which we arrive at such a notion in two stages, which recapitulate Leibniz’s principles of non-contradiction and sufficient reason. An undetermined concept is subject to the formal “principle of determinability”, according to which it can only contain one of two contradictory predicates. But a thing (i.e. an existent) is in addition subject to a principle of “complete determination”, according to which it possesses not only one of a pair of contradictory predicates, but one of each pair of all possible predicates of things. This principle is not a simply logical or formal one, but a transcendental or material one, as it considers the identity of a thing in relation to the “share which it possesses in this sum of all possibilities”—the meaning of its actuality in relation to a range of
possibilities rather than its attributes in relation to their opposites. The notion of the "sum total of all possibilities" presupposes the notion of a "transcendental substrate that contains, as it were, the whole store of material from which all possible predicates of things must be taken." Such a concept is the transcendental ideal of the *ens realissimum*: "the supreme and complete material condition of all that exists." In the procedure by which reason determines the concept of a thing, this ideal forms the "major premise" of a disjunctive syllogism, whereby all possible things are considered with respect to the selection they represent (the "minor premise") of this totality.

Leibniz’s philosophy represents in some ways a middle term between a strictly logical dogmatism and Kant’s critical position. Leibniz’s philosophy anticipates Kant’s by referring the intelligibility of things to a judgement that exceeds logical analysis. The principle of sufficient reason posits a horizon of *sense* as a necessary requirement for the determination of concepts. It is only through conceiving phenomena within the framework of value and interest that Leibniz is able to integrate events into a conceptual framework and integrate concepts into the order of what happens. Despite the fact that the Leibnizian individual ‘unfolds’ in space and time in strict accordance with its concept, the deployment of this concept remains contingent upon an external decision, and its integrity is only intelligible in relation to this choice. It is such a *fiat* which not only gives existence to the thing-concept, but—which amounts to the same thing in this context—gives it *sense*, sense or inclination being what unleashes a decision by distinguishing one path among other possibilities. It has its analogy in Leibniz’s ‘positive’ theory of freedom: an act is incomprehensible in the context of a situation of complete neutrality or indifference—*something* must tip the balance for the action to arise at all. Concept and existence form the two inseparable but distinct aspects of sense, understood alternately as what grants actuality to a concept and intelligibility to an existence.

The beginning of Kant’s critical philosophy is dated from his contestation of the Leibnizian tenet that space and time are reducible to conceptual determinations. While Leibniz distinguishes existential predicates (such as would relate to space and time) from logical predicates, and changes the nature of the concept so that it corresponds to an individual thing, it
remains that spatio-temporal determinations are in principle contained within the concept, as orders of simultaneity and succession. For Leibniz, to conceive of space and time “in general”, separately from the particular distribution of spaces and times inscribed within the individual concept, is to fall into the error of “incomplete notions” and creates a margin of indifference intolerable for the principle of sufficient reason. Kant asserts the irreducibility of space and time to the concept or any substantial order, and redefines them as the formal condition of phenomena. In this way, Kant removes the ground of the internal or analytic unity of logical and existential predicates, and posits instead an external or synthetic unity of logical and existential predicates in the form of the synthesis of the concepts of the understanding with intuitions in space and time, effected in this case by the fiat issuing from the transcendental imperative of reason.

A synthetic unity implies the loss of the individuality of the philosophical concept, as concept and intuition are no longer related to each other internally via a divine creative pact, but externally through the legislation of reason. The concept here remains the sign of a possibility, which receives (or not) external confirmation or enlargement in the actuality of intuition, but it becomes general in relation to the particulars of sensible experience, and general “by right” rather than simply in fact, although open to an indefinite process of specification in relation to experience. At the same time, the epistemological status of the ideal of a complete determination changes so that it forms an ideal backdrop to the process of specification: a guide for our scientific activity, but not the object of a scientific knowledge. The next chapter of this section will examine the details of the synthetic operations which negotiate this differential between concept and intuition, experience and idea.
Endnotes for Part II Chapter 1

1 DR, F206/E159 (See endnote 39 to previous chapter on 'objectités').
3 *Commentary*, p. 64 (original pagination p. 78).
4 *Commentary*, p. 189 (original pagination p. 243).
5 *Commentary*, p. 63 (original pagination p. 77).
6 *Commentary*, p. 65 (original pagination p. 79).
7 *Commentary*, p. 64 (original pagination p. 79), my emphasis.
8 *Commentary*, p. 190 (original pagination p. 245).
10 “The notion of the problem...”, p. 2.
12 “The notion of the problem...”, pp. 2-3.
13 “The notion of the problem...” p. 4.
14 “The notion of the problem...” p. 4.
15 “The notion of the problem...”, p. 6.
16 The remaining examples: Maine de Biran’s “primitive fact” and the value of science in positivism.
17 cf. Kant’s *Prolegomena* §33, p. 69.
18 CPR, B23.
19 Mathematical knowledge itself, as will emerge later, is not based on the analysis of its concepts but their construction in intuition.
20 CPR, A593/B621.
21 CPR, A60/B55.
22 CPR, Bxxxvi.
23 *Theodicy*, I.
24 CPR, A567-583/B595-611.
25 CPR, A568/B596.
26 CPR, A572/B600.
27 CPR, A575/B603.
28 CPR, A576/B604.
29 It is worth comparing the “sense” of sense here with the linguistic notion of “value”, being the sense a word acquires through having been chosen in preference to other equally possible words.
CHAPTER 2:

THE PROBLEM AND THE PROBLEMATIC IN KANT

In geometry and philosophy, the problem is the sign of a task: on one side implying a decision and a field of deployment and on the other providing a leading thread, the following of which represents a progressive definition of the field and determination of the subject in question. Kant’s adaptation of the concept expresses these two directions, which are functions of each other: on the one hand connecting the concept to its development in intuition, and as a result, producing on the other hand the category of the Idea as the non-intuitable concept that forms the horizon of our actions. A ‘problematic’ operation features in four principal areas in Kant’s first critique:

1. The construction of the concept in a priori intuition and possible experience.
2. The application of the philosophical concept to empirical experience.
3. The problematic as a modality of judgements of experience.
4. The problematic as a modality of the Idea in the systematisation of knowledge.

The first two cases engage the operations of schematism and synthesis, the processes by which concept and intuition are integrated with each other. The second two express the sense in which the problem forms a horizon for the activity of thought. The connection between these two aspects of the problematic is suggested by Kant in the last instance, where the regulative Idea is portrayed as an “analogon” of the sensible schema.

Schematism

Kant’s claim for the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge is based in the first instance on the example of the mathematical and geometrical sciences. He challenges the notion that as models of necessary and universal knowledge,
mathematics and geometry rest on analytic principles. On the contrary, what distinguishes mathematical knowledge for Kant is that it proceeds via the construction of concepts in intuition, and that it thus rests on synthetic principles alone. By the “construction” of a concept, Kant means its exhibition in an a priori intuition, the a priori character of the intuition ensuring that it serves as a “universal representation” of the concept, even though it is a single intuition. Thus, when we construct the figure of a triangle, regardless of empirical details such as whether we do so only in imagination or on paper, or what size or type it is, this figure is, for all geometrical purposes, the concept of the triangle itself, and not simply an ‘example’ or ‘illustration’, while at the same time being irreducibly intuitive and hence synthetic. No amount of analysis of a “concept” of a triangle that has no intuitive component, such as “a three-sided enclosed figure”, will yield its specific properties, and such “concepts” are not in fact properly geometrical or mathematical at all, for Kant, but rather philosophical. In this sense, all geometrical truths are, for Kant, ‘problems’. The assumption that a necessary truth, such as a mathematical equation, is thereby analytic, is for Kant more or less a prejudice based on an abstraction of what should be the case from what actually is the case:

the question is not what we ought to join in thought to the concept, but what we actually think in it, even if only obscurely; and it is then manifest that, while the predicate is indeed necessarily attached to the concept, it is so in virtue of an intuition which must be added to the concept, not as thought in the concept itself.

Paradoxically, while it is the solid reputation of mathematics and geometry that leads philosophers to attempt to replicate its methods in their own field—a solidity assumed to be based on its analytic character—it is precisely this synthetic basis of mathematics that for Kant both accounts for its apodeictic nature and its difference from philosophical knowledge. It is because geometry proceeds via the construction of concepts—because, in this construction, the universality and necessity of its truths are attained—that it is valid in this discipline to speak of “definitions” of concepts, “demonstrations” of truth, and “axiomatic” propositions. These notions, however, as expressions of “exactness” in mathematics, cannot be legitimately extended to philosophy. Kant distinguishes mathematics, as knowledge through the construction of concepts, from philosophy, as knowledge “according to concepts”, or “from concepts”. This is not to say that philosophical knowledge is analytic, as
opposed to the synthetic basis of mathematics, although philosophy does comprise an analytical part in the form of general logic. Philosophical knowledge is also synthetic, but its concepts yield knowledge through their application to empirical intuitions in possible experience rather than their construction in an *a priori* intuition. The material element of intuition, which is a matter of indifference in the exhibition of mathematical concepts, is essential in the case of philosophical knowledge. Kant distinguishes “mathematical” and “dynamical” principles of synthesis, according to whether the concept bears on *a priori* intuition alone, or, in addition to this, on an existence. It is because of this material element that any attempt to define a philosophical concept, except in its most general sense as the principle of the unity of sensibility, can only be provisional, as further experience may additionally determine the concept.

If there is an analogy between the construction of a mathematical concept in *a priori* intuition and the application of a philosophical concept to experience, it is that both processes pass via a “schema” of the concept. The schematisation of mathematical and geometrical concepts is relatively straightforward, being simply the rule of their construction in intuition. Even in the case of notions which (unlike the triangle) cannot be easily presented in intuition, or at all, such as large or infinite numbers, I can still present to myself their schema, which is to say the method by which I would produce them (eg. \(n + 1\)). In this sense the schema is the key to the way in which the construction of concepts in mathematics differs in nature from their ‘illustration’, and how these *a priori* intuitions differ from simple ‘images’. The difference of the schema from an image is also emphasised by Kant in its role in applying of philosophical concepts, although its precise operation in these cases is not always clear.

As a rule for the application of concepts, the section on schematism in the *Critique of Pure Reason* comes at the beginning of the Transcendental Doctrine of Judgement. What is required for the subsumption of an empirical intuition under a concept is something that is in one respect “homogenous” with the concept and in another respect “homogenous” with intuition. It is the transcendental determination of time, as both the condition of all syntheses in intuition, as well as a form of rule-governed universality, that provides the model for the schematisation of the pure concepts of the understanding, or the
categories. Kant thus analyses each of the categories in so far as they can be expressed as temporal determinations. The category of quantity is schematised as a numerical magnitude or aggregate in the form of a time-series. Quality is schematised as an intensive magnitude or “coalition”, pertaining to degrees of sensation represented as a time-content. The categories of relation—substance, causality and community—are schematised in terms of a time-order. Modality, finally, which pertains to possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence and necessity and contingency, is schematised as a time-scope, according to whether the object is determined as existing at some time, at a determinate time, or at all times. The specific characters that differentiate the philosophical concept from the geometrical one are this necessity for a temporal schematisation, and the material element of experience.

**Synthesis**

Kant’s theory of the schematism addresses the problem of rendering homogenous the heterogeneity of intuition and concept in all synthetic a priori judgements. In the judgements of mathematics and geometry, the necessity of the relationship between intuition and concepts is implicit in the construction of the object, which is at the same time the demonstration of the concept. In philosophical judgements, however, there is an element of the given which cannot be constructed, and its necessary relation to the concept thus stands in need of justification. This justification is the object of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, which seeks to establish the grounds of objective validity in the subjective conditions of thought, and specifically the a priori concept as the condition of the objective determination of experience. The basis of this possibility is the underlying unity of representations in knowledge: the unification of the sensible manifold under the general form of an object, and the unification of experience in a transcendental subject. All synthetic judgements involve a combinative schema, whether mathematical or dynamic, and imply the application of the category of unity, but these themselves presuppose a ground of unity in experience as their condition of possibility:

Combination is representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity cannot, therefore, arise out of the combination. On the contrary, it is what, by adding itself to the
representation of the manifold, first makes possible the concept of the combination.\(^5\)

It is most importantly the “I think” which must be “added” to my representations in order that they can be thought as one experience. This principle—the transcendental unity of apperception—is the supreme principle with regard to the employment of the concepts of the understanding, just as the formal conditions of space and time are “the supreme principle of all intuition in its relation to sensibility.”\(^6\)

In the version of the Deduction given in the first edition, Kant outlines three \textit{a priori} syntheses of the understanding that grant unity to the manifold. These do not replace transcendental apperception as the supreme principle of possible experience, but they account for the temporal unity of the field of experience. The first is the \textit{synthesis of apprehension in intuition}, which enables the sensible manifold to be apprehended as a single representation at any given moment. The second is the \textit{synthesis of reproduction in imagination}, which ensures the unity of a series of representations in time: their continuity from one moment to another through the reproduction of the preceding moments. The \textit{synthesis of recognition in a concept}, finally, is what allows us to consider that this series of representations are the manifestations of a single object: the pure form of an object—the object or concept=\(x\)—which is added to our representations. This recognition is inseparable from my consciousness of the unity of my act of synthesis, in other words the unitary nature of my consciousness, and hence reflects the principle of apperception as ultimate principle of objective unity.

**Modality**

The other sense of the “problematic” in Kant, as a ‘mode’ rather than a process, refers back to the category of \textit{modality}, which arose in the discussion of the temporal schematism. In traditional (Aristotelian) logic, modality refers to whether the relationship expressed in a judgement is held to be a matter of fact, of possibility (or impossibility) or necessity (or contingency). Kant retains this sense, with the critical qualification that these determinations express for him the relationship of a concept or relation to our understanding rather than
something that holds between objects or concepts in themselves. Modality, as a kind of existential determination, is an extra-conceptual qualification: it does not ‘enlarge’ the content of the concept in any way, but nevertheless signifies its value in relation to thought. Thus, possibility expresses the minimal accordance between a thing and the formal conditions of concepts and intuitions, actuality an accordance between the concept of a thing and a given particular in experience, and necessity the conformity of a relation to the universal laws that constitute experience (it is thus not things that are posited as necessary, but states).

From these follow the distinctions between the modal categories of judgements. “Problematic” judgements are those whose “affirmation or negation are admitted as only possible (optional).” They classically concern “disjunctive” propositions—propositions containing a choice of alternatives that cannot be decided by an appeal to experience, eg. “The world is either the effect of chance, or of an external cause, or of an internal necessity.” “Categorical” judgements are those where the proposition is affirmed as true or pertaining to reality, and “apodeictic” judgements those where a logical necessity is affirmed in the relationship between judgements. Kant considers these modal categories as “so many moments of thought”, if thought can be understood as passing from a problematic “moment”, where the mere possibility of something is posited, then it is affirmed as real, and finally there is the recognition of its necessary relationship with the laws of our understanding. These stages in philosophical understanding parallel the distinguished “moments” of mathematical knowledge, marked by the definition, the demonstration and the axiom.

**Ideality**

The determination of modality is a key critical function as it is this value which distinguishes what can be thought from what can be known. Kant’s use of the term “problematic” mostly arises in relation to the status of notions which by their nature are beyond any possible experience and are thus thoughts, but not objects of knowledge: the ‘thing-in-itself’, noumena and the Ideas of reason.
(God, the world, and the soul). The separation of the content of a concept from the question of its existence forms the basis of Kant's rejection of such metaphysical concepts as foundational in philosophy. In this context, "problematic" does not indicate a provisional stage that is overcome as knowledge progresses, but an absolute division between objects of possible experience, even if not yet encountered or developed in relation to this field, and objects which may or must be thought as subtending this field of experience, but which cannot be the object of knowledge. They form a background or a horizon for an enquiry rather than its object, and their epistemological status is definitively in suspense. The unity of the world, for example, while not able to be illustrated in experience, is nevertheless a regulative assumption for the science of nature, just as a God must be postulated as an Idea for the functioning of morality.

The function of the Idea in this context is not dissimilar to the role of the hypothesis of the ens realissimum as a background to the determination of concepts. An Idea of reason is by its nature not susceptible to any direct application to experience. It does however bear on experience indirectly through the concepts of the understanding in a mode analogous to the application of concepts to experience:

Reason is never in immediate relation to an object, but only to the understanding; and it is only through the understanding that it has its own [specific] empirical employment.... Just as the understanding unifies the manifold in the object by means of concepts, so reason unifies the manifold of concepts by means of ideas, positing a certain collective unity as the goal of the activities of the understanding, which otherwise are concerned solely with distributive unity. 10

This systematisation of the concepts of the understanding is expressed in three principles or rules. The first is the principle of "homogeneity" or genera, by which we seek to understand particular phenomena in nature as divisions of a more general concept. Its corollary is the principle of "variety" or specification, by which we seek to make distinctions within a general concept in the interest of the "completeness" or "extent" of a system. The third is the thread between the two: the principle of "affinity" or "continuity", which seeks to eliminate 'leaps' in the progression from species to species by presupposing a gradual evolution of forms. Unity, diversity, and continuity, and the principles on which they rest, are not for Kant derived from the observation of nature: they simply express the different directions of the interest of reason, one of whose
tendencies may be more or less emphasised in a given individual or ‘type’. Thus Kant distinguishes the more ‘empirical’ type as most interested in differentiation from the more ‘speculative’ type who seeks always to unify:

Thus one thinker may be more particularly interested in manifoldness (in accordance with the principle of specification), another thinker in unity (in accordance with the principle of aggregation). Each believes that his judgement has been arrived at through insight into the object, whereas it really rests entirely on the greater or lesser attachment to one of the two principles.

Kant compares the Idea of the unity of reason, in its undetermined status, to the undetermined status of the understanding in the absence of the schemata of sensibility. The principles or rules for the systematisation of the understanding outlined by Kant outlines thus represent “analogon” of the sensible schemata in the progressive determination of the system of the understanding. They do not, as in the case of the sensible schema, produce knowledge of an object, but simply “indicate the procedure whereby the empirical and determinate employment of the understanding can be brought into complete harmony with itself.” Kant later designates this “ideal” or “analogical” form of schematism, “symbolisation”, in order to clearly distinguish it from its conceptual application. The case where an action must be brought into conformity with a rule recurs in the Critique of Practical Reason, except it is here the case of subsuming freedom to the law of pure practical reason in the moral interest. The closest analogy is the law of causality such as it is applied to sensible nature. Causality through freedom cannot be subsumed via a sensible schema in this way, however the process of deciding whether a possible action conforms with the moral law involves considering its viability ‘as if’ it were a natural law. We thus consider natural causality as a ‘type’ or a ‘symbol’ of the moral law, in order to apply the concept of freedom in particular cases. There are two essential differences between the schema and the symbol. Firstly, the former establishes conformity between a concept and an intuition, and the latter between an action and a rule or law. Secondly, the former is able to exhibit or determine a concept adequately and directly, and the latter can only exhibit the idea indirectly, or by analogy, and represents an essentially incomplete or provisional fulfilment of the Idea.

Deleuze’s revision of Kant can be summarised as both a reversal of the relationship of dependence between the schematic activity of combination and
the synthetic unity of the understanding that is posited by Kant, and a re-orientation of the activity of the schematism such that it directly engages Ideas. Deleuze contends that it is a schematic process of construction, as a function of Idea-problems, which is presupposed by the synthesis of recognition in a concept. This process is thus in one respect modelled on the construction of geometrical concepts, but it is also presented as a “dynamic” rather than a “mathematical” process—the determination of the Idea takes place through “spatio-temporal dynamisms.” Deleuze’s development of the problem-Idea extends his critique of what remains of the dogmatic image of thought in Kant’s philosophy: the foundation of thought in the relationship between an identical subject and object based on the model of recognition. In his lectures on Kant in the 70s, Deleuze defines the schema as following a ‘rule of production’ as distinct from the ‘rule of recognition’ that governs the synthesis.15 His conception of the schema also continues his preoccupation with the ‘territorial’ basis of thought, as through the schema we understand the concept as demarcating a ‘bloc’ of space-time:

if the synthesis operates on the manifold here and now, if the unities of synthesis or categories are continuous universals or categories which condition all possible experience, the schemata are a priori determinations of space and of time, which transport in all places and in all time, but in a discontinuous manner, real complexes of places and moments. The Kantian schema would take flight, and overcome itself towards a conception of the differential Idea, if it were not unduly subordinated to the categories which reduce it to a state of simple mediation in the world of representation.16
Endnotes for Part II Chapter 2

1 CPR, A713/B741.
3 CPR, B16.
4 CPR, A726/B754.
5 CPR, B130-131.
6 CPR, B136.
7 CPR, A227/B279-280.
8 CPR, A74-75/B100.
9 CPR, A76/B101.
10 CPR, A644-644/B671-672.
11 CPR, A655/B683.
12 CPR, A666-667/B694-695.
13 CPR, A665/B693.
14 Critique of Practical Reason, "Of the Typic of Pure Practical Judgement."
15 Fourth lesson on Kant, 4/4/78, para. 5.
16 DR, F365/E285, translation modified.
CHAPTER 3:

THE PROBLEM AND THE PROBLEMATIC IN DELEUZE

This approach to the problem overwhelms my own habits of thinking.
—N. Mouloud, in response to Deleuze’s presentation on “La Méthode de dramatisation.”

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze extends the Kantian notion of the problematic status of the Idea to the claim that Ideas are in fact problems, and that “problematic” is the proper significance of “regulative.” Deleuze’s understanding of the Idea is, in one sense, very close to Kant’s. The Idea forms a “unitary and systematic field” which gives maximum “comprehension and extension” to the concepts of the understanding and a ground of continuity for the discontinuous efforts of the understanding. It is also as such, however, that the Idea is understood to be problematic. Concepts and propositions acquire their sense and their scope once they are understood as solutions to a problem, which provides them with their ideal unity and universality:

The understanding by itself would remain stuck in fragmentary operations, a prisoner of partial empirical investigations or enquiries with regard to this or that object, never raising itself to the conception of a “problem” capable of providing a systematic unity for all its operations. Alone, the understanding would obtain results or responses, here and there, but these would never constitute a ‘solution’. For any solution presupposes a problem, which is to say the constitution of a unitary and systematic field orienting and subsuming enquiries and investigations in such a way that responses in turn precisely form cases of solution.

Deleuze’s conception of the problem involves both Kant’s conception of the special nature of mathematical and geometrical knowledge, and Proclus’ remarks on the problem: a kind of “constructivism” of the Idea, or its “dramatisation.” The analogy between the Idea-problem and the mathematical concept allows Deleuze to develop his own distinction between concepts and Ideas, and to integrate the mechanism of the schema with the “analogical” schema of the Idea. At the same time, Deleuze incorporates a material and temporal element into this process, which both founds and disrupts the synthesis of thought.
Ideal determination

The alliance of the problem with the Idea marks its difference in nature from a conceptual possibility on an epistemological level. As ideal, it serves as an element of action rather than an object of knowledge:

Questions and problems are not speculative acts, and as such completely provisional and indicative of the momentary ignorance of an empirical subject. They are living acts... destined to survive a provisional and partial state which on the contrary affects answers and solutions. By aligning the problem with the Idea, Deleuze is keen to emphasise its difference from the theoretical sense of the “problematic” as a modality of the concept, where this refers to the hypothetical status of a judgement: a simple possibility. In this context, ‘problems’ differ only formally from the concepts or propositions on which they are based, and are effaced in the light of additional knowledge that either excludes or confirms the possibilities they present. It is this model that is at the heart of various illusions concerning the role of the problem in thought for Deleuze, whereby it marks only a provisional stage or signals an obstacle for or inadequacy in the subject. It is understanding the progress of thought in general as a passage from the “hypothetical” to the “apodeictic” that Deleuze considers to be misleading, a tendency which he traces through Plato, Descartes and evidently Kant himself:

There is at least something in common: namely, the point of departure found in a ‘hypothesis’ or proposition of consciousness affected by a coefficient of uncertainty (as with Cartesian doubt), and the point of arrival found in an eminently moral apodicticity or imperative (Plato’s One-Good, the non-deceiving God of the Cartesian cogito, Leibniz’s principle of the best of all possible worlds, Kant’s categorical imperative, Fichte’s Self, Hegel’s ‘Science’). The ideal status of the problem in Deleuze, as on the one hand demarcating a field of action, is matched on the other hand by its relationship to a constructive operation, which renders it analogous to the mathematical function of the Kantian schema. The peculiarity of geometrical/mathematical knowledge was that the conceptualisation of its objects was also their construction in intuition. This already gives a unique understanding of a concept as a mode of, or rule for, occupying space, rather than a logical identity, which clearly influences Deleuze. In his “Method of Dramatisation”, for
example, Deleuze presents the distinguishing character of a thing in terms of its “remarkable points and regions”, the way in which it “determines and differentiates a whole exterior space, as in the hunting ground of an animal”, rather than in terms of its conceptual definition. A consequence of the concept being identical to its construction is that the relationship of concept to intuition in geometrical knowledge is not an external one between a general concept and a particular instance but an internal relationship, whereby the singular instance embraces the universal scope of the concept. As Kant writes:

The latter [intuition] must… be a single object, and yet none the less, as the construction of a concept (a universal representation), it must in its representation express universal validity for all possible intuitions which fall under the same concept. Deleuze similarly considers the relationship between the problem-Idea and its solution as an internal one between the universal and the singular, which he opposes to the extrinsic relationship between the general concept and particular instance. The ‘schematism’ of the Idea consists in staking out coordinates at the intersection of the ideal relationships of the problem and the field of its resolution:

the problem or the Idea is a concrete singularity no less than a true universal. Corresponding to the relations which constitute the universality of the problem is the distribution of remarkable and singular points which constitute the determination of the conditions of the problem.

While the model of problem-resolution allows Deleuze to develop a notion of thought distinct from the theoretical model based on the concept of identity, it also diverges from the simple construction of a concept in pure intuition that underlies Kant’s understanding of geometrical knowledge. The essential difference between the mathematical and philosophical methods for Kant was that the latter involved a material element that could not be determined a priori. It was also this factor that precluded the a priori definition of a concept and means that philosophical knowledge is necessarily bound up with the categorical determinations of possible experience, including those bearing on modality. Mathematical and geometrical knowledge are essentially sciences of space, being quantitative, while the schematic framework of philosophical knowledge is above all occupied with temporal determinations. Deleuze incorporates this necessary connection with an external element into his constructivist model of the problem, and in doing so refers back to the
ancient distinction between the theorem and the problem in geometry, which is effectively collapsed by Kant. The integrity of geometrical propositions relied on their referring to the conditions of pure intuition alone rather than empirical factors. Deleuze maintains this priority of the pure over the empirical in his model, while at the same time introducing a relationship to the outside, by proposing that the core of the problem is the determination of an event that is ideal rather than real or empirical in nature:

Proclus, even while maintaining the primacy of theorems over problems, rigorously defined the latter as concerning an order of events and affections… These events, however, are ideal, of another nature and more profound than the real events which they determine in the order of solutions. The specificity of the problem in this context is that its construction takes place in conjunction with a contingent element that is not determined by the concept:

the theorem develops internal relationships from principle to consequences, while the problem introduces an event from the outside—ablation, adjunction, section—which constitutes its own conditions and determines the ‘case’, or cases.

Deleuze describes the Idea-problem as a complex entity—an objectité—which is “dramatised” through the “spatio-temporal dynamisms” that are the agents of the Idea’s actualisation. Deleuze opposes these characters of the Idea to the unitary nature of the concept, whose ‘multiplicity’ only comes extrinsically from the number of empirical examples that represent it. The Idea implies a multiplicity in an internal, and double, sense, following the two spellings—differentiation and differenciation—used by Deleuze. The differentiation of the idea refers to the virtual distribution of singularities and relations it presents in its “objective”, but “undetermined” state. These coordinates represent one ‘side’ of the problem, whose other side is provided in its differenciation: its dramatisation/resolution in an actual state of affairs. The horizon of the Idea integrates and gives an ideal scope to what would otherwise be simply empirical coordinates: precisely as a case of resolution of a problem. On the other side, while a case of resolution expresses the essence or universality of the Idea, it does so not essentially, but only as a matter of fact. It does not exhaust the Idea or thus exclude other possible resolutions: “[here] it is the inessential which comprehends the essential, and which comprehends it only in the case.”

101
In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze presents the Idea as both integrating and articulating the three moments of Kant’s regulative model of ideal determination, as outlined in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. This process, which Deleuze calls “conjugation”, combines the constructive model of the schema and the process of ideal determination. It both recapitulates the regulative role of the Idea in Kant’s critique and serves as a substitute for the “moments” of theoretical understanding as a passage from the hypothetical to the apodeictic. These stages are the indeterminacy of the Idea as an object, its “analogue” or “reciprocal” determinability in relation to the objects of possible experience, and the ideal that it represents of a complete determination. Deleuze interprets these moments of the Idea as constituting the process of learning, which he opposes to knowledge as the goal of thought. “Learning” is distinguished from knowledge, or its pursuit, in the same way that the problem is distinguished from a possibility or hypothesis. In the first instance, the Idea is in itself indeterminate, as it cannot be given or known, but nevertheless represents for Deleuze an entirely positive and objective structure, in so far as it serves as a problematic horizon for the systematisation of the objects of experience. It presents itself as a “sign” or “problematic object”, which is the object of an encounter. In the second place, there is the determination of the conditions of resolvability of a problem—“we must discover the adjunctions which complete the initial body of the problem, as such, whether varieties of multiplicity in all dimensions, fragments of an ideal future or past event which renders the problem solvable.” Finally, a solution to the problem is determined as the ‘fusion’ or ‘condensation’ between the problem and the case provided for its resolution. Deleuze uses as an illustration of this process an example inspired by Leibniz:

To learn is to enter into the universal of the relations which constitute the Idea, and into their corresponding singularities. The Idea of the sea, for example, as Leibniz showed, is a system of liaisons or differential relations between particles, and of singularities corresponding to the degrees of variation among these relations—the whole of the system being incarnated in the real movement of the waves. To learn to swim is to conjugate the remarkable points of our body with the singular points of the objective Idea in order to form a problematic field. This conjugation determines for us a threshold of consciousness on which level our real actions adjust to our perceptions of the real relations of the object, thus providing a solution of the problem.
Deleuze’s thought here strikingly resembles the meditations of John Dewey on the nature and “stages” of the problem developed in his *Logic: the theory of inquiry*. Dewey argues for the grounding of logical categories in methodological practices. We cannot separate knowledge from the purposes for which it is sought, nor the actual processes by which it is sought, which engage, beyond “reason”, the bodily apparatus and circumstance of the thinker. The starting point of an inquiry is an “indeterminate” situation, or rather a particular kind of indeterminacy that qualifies the situation as “questionable”—a completely chaotic situation would be one that would allow no hold for even the possibility of an inquiry. Indeterminacy is, for Dewey, an irreducibly temporal concept: what is indeterminate, in one way or another, is the *outcome* of the situation. While Dewey emphasises that indeterminacy is an attribute of the *situation*, it thus also necessarily refers to the interests of the subject within it. The subject of the situation is initially only engaged “existentially”, at a pre-cognitive level, which for Dewey is a necessary pre-condition of inquiry. At the point where the situation is seen as calling for an inquiry it moves from being questionable to being problematic ‘proper’, which marks the introduction of an intellectual level of engagement. The next step is to determine the problem, which firstly consists in locating the determinable “constituents” of a situation that provide the terms of the problem. A situation may be globally indeterminate, which is what first invites inquiry, but if it is capable of inquiry—if it is not absolutely chaotic—it should at least have some determinable coordinates. The example that Dewey gives is being in a crowded hall where there is a fire:

> When an alarm of fire is sounded in a crowded assembly hall, there is much that is indeterminate as regards the activities that may produce a favorable issue. One may get out safely or one may be trampled and burned. The fire is characterized, however, by some settled traits. It is, for example, located *somewhere*. Then the aisles and exits are at fixed places. Since they are settled and determined in *existence*, the first step in institution of a problem is to settle them in *observation*.16

The determination of the problem then proceeds through a temporal dialectic between the identification of constituents and possible solutions which Dewey calls “ideas.” “Facts” and “ideas” are necessarily operational terms for Dewey—a constituent of a situation is sought and located only with a view to a possible solution, and a possible solution can suggest the location of further constituents, which in turn can affect the nature of the idea. The process
described by Dewey here recalls Deleuze's description of the problem-Idea as a formula that traces a ‘curve’ through singularities. Dewey uses the term “singulars” for these constituents of a situation, which can only be defined differentially with respect to each other and to the global problem:

Singulars are named by demonstratives, such as this, that, here, now, or in some cases by proper nouns… Singular objects exist and singular events occur within a field or situation. This or that star, man, rock or whatever, is always a discrimination or selection made for a purpose, or for the sake of some objective consequence within an inclusive field. The singular has no import save as a term of differentiation and contrast. If its object is taken to be complete in itself, loss of differential force destroys all power of reference on the part of the demonstrative act. The very existence of differentiation, however, shows that the singular exists within an extensive field… It represents, at a given stage of inquiry, that which is crucial, critical, differentiatingly significant.

Similarly, an “idea” has no sense if it is understood as simply a mental impression rather than a functional element referring to the solution of a problem. In a move again recalling Deleuze, Dewey suggests that this dialectic between ideas and singularities in the “problematic situation” represents the true unity or synthesis between concept and intuition overlooked in Kant’s division.

Subjective determination

The dramatisation of an Idea constitutes the transcendental subject of thought and action. In the ‘swimming’ example, Deleuze speaks of the process of problem-resolution as “determining a threshold of consciousness”, and elsewhere refers to the problem as an “unconscious” structure. These remarks need to be understood in relation to Kant’s contention in the Transcendental Deduction that it is the unitary consciousness of the thinker and the apprehension of this unity that underwrites the possibility of all knowledge. In Kant’s Deduction, consciousness is on the one hand identified analytically with the possibility of representing the ‘I think’:

It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.

On the other hand, “That representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition”, and the analytic identity of the ‘I think’ is both
distinct but not conceivable apart from the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition:

through the ‘I’, as simple representation, nothing manifold is given; only in intuition, which is distinct from the ‘I’, can a manifold be given; and only through the combination in one consciousness can it be thought.\textsuperscript{22}

If intuition can be given “prior to all thought”, this is because it is essentially passive: simply the form of receptivity of the given, while combination and synthesis testify to the “spontaneity” of the understanding.

Deleuze also associates consciousness or selfhood with the process of synthesis or the ‘binding’ of a manifold, and unconsciousness, conversely, with a state of dispersion.\textsuperscript{23} The relationship of the ‘I think’ to the synthesis, however, is more ‘problematic’ for Deleuze, figuratively and literally: its mode of ‘accompaniment’ is presented more as the effect of a synthetic operation than a representation of its source. The notion of synthesis, in addition, has also changed, so that it follows a schematic structure of problem-resolution. Just as the ‘objective’ pole of this process is an Idea that differs in nature from the concept, its ‘subjective’ pole also differs in nature from the relation between the faculties posited in Kant’s Deduction. When seeking to encapsulate the contribution of Kant to modern philosophy, Deleuze frequently returns to the significance of the new status of space and time as the “forms of determinability” of the concept. Its challenge to the concept of identity as a foundation for philosophy is particularly apparent for Deleuze in what he calls the Kantian “cogito”, in its difference from its Cartesian counterpart. In Descartes’ meditation, the connection between thought and existence, which we know through the formula ‘I think, therefore I am’, immediately gives rise to the question: ‘what am I?’, and concludes: “I am a thing which thinks.”\textsuperscript{24} Deleuze analyses Descartes’ thesis into the components of an act of determination: an indeterminate term of being—‘I am’—is determined as thinking—‘I think’—with the resulting determination—‘I am a thing which thinks’:

Everything happens as if Descartes’ cogito operated with two logical values: determination and undetermined existence. The determination (I think) implies an indeterminate existence (I am, because ‘in order to think one must exist’) — and determines it precisely as the existence of a thinking being: I think therefore I am, I am a thing which thinks.\textsuperscript{25}

From a Kantian perspective, the problem arises not in the logical implication of being and thought as expressed in the cogito ergo sum, but at the point of its ontological extension or application: the assertion of a thinking thing. In the
Paralogisms of Pure Reason, Kant examines the qualities that Descartes attaches to the ‘I think’ which lead him to assert its existence as a separate substance—the *res cogitans*. My activity, unity, identity and distinction from all external objects are all necessarily implied in the statement, “I think”, but as such they do not express any insight into or knowledge of myself as an object, but only represent a logical analysis of the concept of myself as the subject of thought. Kant introduces a third term between the determination and the thing to be determined, namely the ‘how’ of this determination, or the form of the object’s ‘determinability’: “The ‘I think’ expresses the act of determining my existence. Existence is already given thereby, but the mode in which I am to determine this existence… is not thereby given.”

The mode in which I determine my existence is the same as that which governs all intuitions in Kant’s system, namely the *a priori* forms of space and time, time being the especially pertinent form here as the condition of “inner” sense. Thus I determine myself not as a thing, but as an intuition in space and time. This intuition is necessarily accompanied by the thought of myself as the spontaneous principle of its unity, but there can be no intuition and hence no knowledge of myself as a determining subject, because I can only be given to myself as appearance. A split thus appears between the representation of myself, as an active subject in the ‘I think’, and the form under which ‘I am’ as appearance, which both nevertheless refer to one another and are inseparable. This constitutes the “paradox of inner sense”: time is both the mode under which I determine my existence and reason why I am only an appearance to myself.

For Deleuze, “The entire Kantian critique amounts to objecting against Descartes that it is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the indeterminate.” This “third logical value”—the form under which the indeterminate is determinable—represents the constitution of transcendental logic and the discovery of transcendental difference, “no longer as empirical difference between two determinations, but transcendental Difference between the Determination as such [*LA détermination*] and what it determines.” This difference is not one that separates or mediates, but rather represents the interiorisation of thought and being as difference rather than identity. Kant effectively reverses the rationalist order of determination such that it is not an
order of reasons that determines an order in space and time, but space and time that are the non-conceptual conditions of the determination of reason. Space and time not only wrest the privilege of foundation from the concept of identity, but ground it in an exteriority foreign to the concept. This revolution in thought on the level of conceptual determination is reproduced in the stages of ideal determination, which merge in Deleuze’s rewriting of the functionings of the transcendental apparatus. Deleuze connects the three ‘moments’ of the Kantian cogito—“the I am as indeterminate existence, time as the form under which this existence is determinable, and the I think as determination”30—with the three ‘moments’ of the Idea: “indeterminate in its object, determinable in relation to the objects of experience, bearing the ideal of an infinite determination in relation to the concepts of the understanding.”31

This ‘split’ or ‘fracture’ [fêlure] between the Idea and its complete realisation, due to its necessary relationship with the forms of space and time, is conceived by Deleuze as a positive ‘articulation’ of thought: it serves to ‘pace’ the Idea, and provides material which feeds and is fed by the Idea in the dialectic of resolution:

it must be said that Ideas swarm in the fracture, constantly emerging on its edges, ceaselessly coming out and going back, being composed in a thousand different manners. It is not, therefore, a question of filling that which cannot be filled. Nevertheless, just as difference immediately reunites and articulates that which it distinguishes, and the fracture retains what it fractures, so Ideas also contain their dismembered moments. It belongs to the Idea to interiorise the fracture and its ant-like inhabitants. There is neither identification nor confusion in the Idea, but rather an internal problematic objective unity, of the indeterminate, the determinable, and determination.32

The “mistake” of dogmatism, Deleuze writes, “is always to fill that which separates”33: this is the dream of a rational determination that would elide or reduce to the concept the spatiotemporal element in thought. The error of empiricism, on the other hand, is “to leave external what is separated”34, thus the extrinsic relationship between concept and intuition. Kant, he suggests, is still too “empirical”, in this sense, insofar as the Idea for him is still only determinable in relation to the objects of experience and the concepts of the understanding, rather than these moments being conceived as internal to the Idea. As an independent system, such as Deleuze conceives it, the Idea emerges as the central generator of thought rather than simply its horizon, and
integrates as its own moments the difference in nature between the ideal and the sensible.  

**Temporal determination**

The three ‘parts’ of the problematic structure—the event or problematic instance, the search for an ‘adjoining’ body or the determination of conditions, and the ‘condensation’ of singularities or the determination of a solution—have a particular connection for Deleuze with the formation of sensibility, memory/imagination, and thought respectively. The ‘nature’ of these faculties and the relationship between them is in the first place for Deleuze only developed *in situ*, under the auspices of a problem. At the same time, each of the faculties on Deleuze’s account result from syntheses that manifest the problematic structure in a mode specific to them. Deleuze contrasts the engagement of the faculties, in his understanding of the operation of thought or learning, to the coordination of the faculties in the act of recognition, by which the different contributions of each faculty are brought to bear on an object thereby identified as the ‘same’ for an identical subject. The encounter with a problematic instance is first experienced on the level of intuition and in fact engenders this faculty in its “transcendental exercise.” Its imperative is transmitted to the other faculties (memory, reason) in turn, in a transmission or “relay” which proceeds via the differentiation of the faculties rather than a form of identity that mediates the relationship of the faculties to an object and to each other.

Deleuze describes three principal syntheses: the two “passive” syntheses that constitute sensibility and memory/imagination, and an “active” synthesis of thought. The division clearly recapitulates Kant’s account of the relationship between the faculties in the Transcendental Deduction. As outlined in the last section, he distinguishes here the syntheses of apperception in intuition, reproduction in imagination and recognition in a concept, as the conditions of all possible experience. At the same time, this parallel implies a criticism, as the operation of these three syntheses rewrites and undermines the logic of Kant’s account. Deleuze assigns the synthesis of representation ‘proper’ to a minor role, as a derivative ‘fourth’ synthesis. In addition, just as each faculty on
Deleuze’s account has both an affinity with one ‘stage’ of the problem and manifests an internal problematic structure, the correspondence with Kant’s three syntheses is found within the dimensions of the one faculty as much as across the three faculties outlined by Deleuze. In Deleuze’s revision, the syntheses are ‘schematic’ structures that generate a complex of space-time proper to them. Each synthesis marks the genesis of a faculty, represents a particular temporality, and expresses a mode of learning.

The problem which motivates Kant’s account of the “threefold synthesis” of intuition, imagination and the understanding in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, is the idea that “if every representation were completely foreign to every other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as knowledge would ever arise.” The syntheses outlined by Kant represent three interconnected levels of the ‘binding’ of representations which form the conditions of possible experience that make knowledge possible. The first, of apprehension, is the modification of the mind in intuition such that the manifold is apprehended in a single representation. The second, of reproduction, bears on the necessary reproducibility of appearances in order for associations between representations to be established. The empirical law that “bring[s] about a transition of the mind” from one representation to the other, is based on the conformity of representations themselves to such a law: their reproducibility in the transcendental exercise of the imagination. The final synthesis, of recognition, is based on the necessary reference of experience to the transcendental unity of consciousness and the transcendental concept—x.

Deleuze’s account of the syntheses has the same point of departure as Kant’s: the independence of presentations from each other ‘in themselves’—“the state of matter as mens momentanea”—and the necessity for their synthesis in thought. His first synthesis, of sensibility, draws on the theories of Hume and Bergson regarding the retention and contraction of repeated instances in the mind, which produce a qualitative impression of a certain weight and a corresponding structure of anticipation: “When A appears, we expect B with a force corresponding to the qualitative impression of all the contracted ABs.” Deleuze thus calls this first synthesis the “empirical” synthesis of ‘habit’ or *Habitus*: it moves from an order of particularity in the repetition of cases to a general notion “extracted” from the cases, embodied in the attitude of
expectation. This synthesis corresponds to the constitution of the “living present”: a contraction marks the scope of the present understood as a variable duration. An immediate past and future appear as dimensions of this present, in the form of the retention of elements and the expectation of continuity. A form of subjectivity—a passive self of contemplation—is coextensive with this contraction.

In this passive synthesis we can see traces of all three of Kant’s syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition in ‘larval’ form (impression, retention, generality). Deleuze presents this pre-reflexive synthesis as the ground of an active synthesis of representation, wherein memory transforms the immediate past of retention into “the reflexive past of representation, of reflected and reproduced particularity”, and the understanding transforms the immediate future of anticipation into the “reflexive future of prediction, the reflected generality of the understanding”. This synthesis is not, however, Deleuze’s own active synthesis of thought, but simply the reflexive form of a structure of habit—what he calls a “derived” active synthesis.

The reflexive present of representation is based on the empirical synthesis of habit, but both have their foundation in a second “passive” synthesis, this time transcendental, of memory, or the past. In order for the reflective synthesis to reproduce the immediate past of habit as a series of distinct cases, a general form of the past is presupposed as the context and condition of their reproduction: “The past is not the former present itself but the element in which we focus upon the latter.” It is this general or pure form of the past that allows the present moment to pass: “No present would ever pass if it were not past ‘at the same time’ as it is present.” The synthesis of the past forms a totality of which the present and future appear only as its dimensions:
the present as the most contracted point of the totality of the past, and the future in the form of a destiny that echoes the past.

Kant’s syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition in a concept appear here as secondary to more fundamental syntheses which constitute ‘problematic’ fields: “if we reconsider the active syntheses themselves in the light of this basis which they presuppose, we see that they signify rather the constitution of problematic fields in relation to questions.” Deleuze refers in the context of the first synthesis to “the question-problem complex as this appears in the living present (the urgency of life).” The moments of the problem appear in the initial indeterminacy of dispersion, the constitution of a field of determinability in the scope of the contraction, and the production of a ‘solution’ in the constituted habit. Thus we can consider Deleuze’s example of learning to swim in this context as engendering a sensibility whose field would be the ‘living present’ and which would lend itself to becoming a habit. We can see within this process the structure of problem-resolution as Deleuze describes it, but also—in so far as the habit is not yet acquired—the shadow of the other syntheses: the work of memory, imagination and thought. In the second synthesis of memory, he refers to the “echoing” of presents on the different levels of the past as forming “a persistent question, which is developed in representation as the field of a problem, with the rigorous imperative to respond, to resolve.” Here it is the pure past which is in itself indeterminate, but which emerges, in a Proustian manner, as potentially determinable in relation to a present with which it resonates. “Learning”, here, is expressed in the modes of reminiscence and love (Mnemosyne and Eros): it is exemplified by the functions of Eros and reminiscence in Plato’s dialogues which Deleuze sees as “dramatisations” and catalysts for learning. The significance of this introduction of time into thought is lost, however, in so far as the past is reduced to a former present and the Idea to a concept or object of knowledge rather than the instigation of a personal quest—“a task to fulfil, an enigma to resolve.”

Deleuze posits a third synthesis, of thought, which is active, and concerns the future, or the “pure and empty form” of time. This synthesis both englobes and undermines the first two: it represents the ‘ungrounding’ (éffondement) of the terrain of the present and the past. Deleuze introduces this
synthesis with the comparison of the Cartesian and the Kantian *cogito*, as outlined above, where the determination of the Idea implies the rift of time as form of determinability. Deleuze’s explication of the third synthesis of time returns him to the language of Kant’s schematism. In Deleuze’s case, the challenge is not the application of the concept or category, but the enactment of the Idea, or resolution of the problem. The crux of Deleuze’s account is the “image of the action”, which has a double sense here. A schema can itself be defined as an “image of the action” that guides the construction of a concept. Here, the need for a schematism issues from the imperative to act: the action itself must be schematised. The time of the third synthesis is a “time out of joint”, as it is no longer measured by what takes place in it but rather imposes itself as the law of the event that distinguishes only a “before” and “after”:

“[Time] ceases to be cardinal and becomes ordinal, a pure order of time. Hölderlin said that it no longer ‘rhymed’, because it was distributed unequally on both sides of a ‘caesura’, as a result of which beginning and end no longer coincided… Having abjured its empirical content, having overturned its own foundation, time is not only defined by an empty and formal order, but also by a *scope* and a *series*.50

Deleuze presents the order of time as determined by the “caesura” or ‘cut’ that divides past and present into unequal parts. He then moves to the determination of temporal *scope* (in French: *ensemble*), in which the action is symbolised as adequate to the “whole of time”:

the idea of temporal scope corresponds to this: that the given caesura must be determined in the image of an action, of a unique and formidable event, adequate to the whole of time. This image itself exists in a riven form, in two unequal portions; and yet in this way it gathers together the scope of time.51

The symbolisation of the action paves the way for the *series* of time, which determines the distribution of a transcendental past, present and future. Deleuze uses the stories of Hamlet and Oedipus as models of this structure. The past, or the “before”, is defined as the time “where the action in its image is posited as ‘too big for me.’”52 The present corresponds to the time of the caesura, in which the self is metamorphosed and becomes equal to the action through “the projection of an ideal self into the image of the action.”53 The defining moment is that of the future, in which the action reveals an independent coherence, which excludes the agent and disperses the self: “turning against the self which became equal to it, projecting him into a
thousand pieces as if the gestator of the new world was carried away and dispersed by the force of what he gives birth to."

Deleuze uses the motif of death, or *Thanatos*, for this synthesis, for a variety of reasons. Following Blanchot (and the Stoics) Deleuze considers death to be the paradigm of an event in the sense that it is both what concerns me most intimately and what is most beyond 'me', and this character is replicated in the highest 'thought'. In direct contrast to Kant’s model of recognition, the object of thought in Deleuze’s third synthesis, or “the work”, presents itself as what is most alien to me, in the sense that the work of art has a life independent of its creator. This is also the way that the first and second syntheses are both present in the third synthesis and undermined by it:

in the third synthesis, however, the present is no more than an actor, an author, an agent destined to be effaced; while the past is only a condition operating by default. The synthesis of time here constitutes a future which affirms at once both the unconditioned character of the product in relation to the conditions of its production, and the independence of the work in relation to its author or actor.55

The main model of the third synthesis used here is the revolutionary action or event: it is the source of what is most dramatic and transformational over all the syntheses and all “learning”: all that relegates the present and past to merely dimensions of the future. While Deleuze refers to historical revolutions and theatrical action, it is not external or empirical criteria that determine the scale of an event: “Underneath the large noisy events lie the small events of silence, just as under the natural light there are the little glimmers of the Idea.”56 It is also connected to Deleuze’s idea of the “dice-throw” as “divine game”, through which Deleuze expresses the imperative of the question, the affirmation of contingency and the nature of the problem-Idea as an object of faith rather than knowledge.57

In Deleuze’s third synthesis of time, which both grounds and ‘ungrounds’ thought, we can see elements of Kant’s aesthetic judgements—the sublime in particular—which form the topic of the next section. These are apparent firstly in its structure: the confrontation with an event that is “too big for me”, and which yet involves a metamorphosis in order to become “equal to the event”. In the second place, the role of the third synthesis corresponds to Deleuze’s understanding of the function of aesthetic judgements in Kant’s critique, not only as the ultimate ground of the possibility of all judgements,
but also what “frees” thought from its pre-determined structures and attaches it to what is most contingent. In analysing Kant’s aesthetic and Deleuze’s understanding of its function, we return to the heart of the problematic model of thought: the encounter with a “problematic object” or “sign” which “awakens” thought. At the same time as following the thread of Deleuze’s philosophy to this most singular notion of foundation, we can consider its broader implications as reflecting an ‘image of nature’ or ‘being’. Kant’s third critique is especially engaged with the kinds of “nature” constituted by reason and the relationship between them—its legislative domains of operation as well as the possibility of forming more ‘minor’ territories. It is thus the possibility of assigning a foundational role to the aesthetic qua “mode of existence”, as well as category of judgement, which will form the topics of the last section.
Endnotes for Part II Chapter 3

1 MD, p. 102.
2 DR, F218/E168.
4 DR, F219/E168, translation modified.
5 DR, F141/E106, translation modified (reading “survivre à” as the transitive form of the verb “survive” rather than “to survive in”—English edition renders “destiné à survivre à l’état provisoire et partiel qui affecte au contraire les réponses et les solutions” as “destined to survive in the provisional and partial state characteristic of answers and solutions”).
6 DR, F254/E197.
7 MD, p. 92. It is also in this sense that Deleuze and Guattari, in What is Philosophy?, present the concept as made of ‘distinctive points’ that mark out a territory or “neighbourhood”: “The concept of a bird is not its genre or species but in the composition of its postures, its colours and its songs…”, QP?, F25/E20.
8 CPR, A13/B741.
9 DR, F211/E163, translation modified. See also QP?, F27/E22, in which Deleuze and Guattari develop their theory of the creation—the construction—of concepts: “Constructivism unites the relative and the absolute.”
10 DR, F211-212/E163, translation modified.
11 Cinema 2: The Time-Image, F227/E174, translation modified. See also The Logic of Sense, F69/E54.
12 DR, F219-220/E169.
13 MD, p. 98.
14 DR, F246/E190, translation modified.
15 DR, F214/E165, translation modified.
17 See, eg., Foucault, F85-86/E79.
20 CPR, B131-132.
21 CPR, B132.
22 CPR, B135.
23 See, for example, DR F128/E96. Deleuze understands the meaning of the “Id”—in French, le Ça—within the context of the expression “ça et là”—“here and there”.
25 DR, F116/E85, translation modified.
26 CPR, B158, my emphasis.
27 CPR, B158.
28 DR, F116/E85, translation modified.
29 DR, F116/E86, translation modified.
30 DR, F220/E169.
31 DR, F220/E169, translation modified.
33 DR, F221/E170.
34 DR, F221/E170.
35 This theme is further pursued below with regard to Deleuze’s “third” synthesis of time (this chapter, p. 151), and with regard to Deleuze’s ‘cosmological’, or ‘anti-cosmological’ theory of ‘time out of joint’ in the next chapter, p. 167.
36 CPR, A97.
37 DR, F96/E70, translation modified.
38 DR, F97/E70.
39 DR, F98/E71.
40 DR, F109/E80.
41 DR, F108/E79.
42 DR, F110/E81.
43 DR, F109/E80.
44 DR, F111/E81.
45 DR, F107/E78.
46 DR, F107/E78.
47 DR, F115/E85.
48 DR, F88/E63, translation modified.

49 DR, F117/E87.

50 DR, F120/E89, translation modified, Deleuze’s emphasis. In order to clarify the Kantian reference, I have used the terms used in the standard English translation for Kant’s objects of temporal schemata.

51 DR, F120/E89, translation modified.

52 DR, F120/E89, translation modified.

53 DR, F121/E89, translation modified.

54 DR, F121/E89-90, translation modified.

55 DR, F125/E94.

56 DR, F212/E163.

57 DR, F363-4/E284.