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WRITING ABOUT ART:

a linguistic consideration

of art history

and related genres

Volume : 1

by

Alena Rada

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR of PHILOSOPHY

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March, 1989
This thesis is an investigation of the language of art history, and of other types of writing about art (technology of art, aesthetics, and art criticism), in modern English. The writer of the thesis is a teacher of the history of art, who has found that her students (and also she herself) faced difficulties in understanding texts of this nature.

The aim was to use the methods of linguistic analysis to characterize these texts in terms of their grammar and lexicon, and try to identify which features were mainly responsible for the difficulty of interpretation. The methods used are those of systemic-functional grammar, as presented in Halliday's Introduction to Functional Grammar and other works of systemic theory.

Chapter 1 introduces the different kinds of writing about art in a historical perspective, and identifies the three art forms (painting, sculpture, architecture) that chiefly figure in discussions of western art. In Chapter 2, the problems faced by students of art history are shown to be, in significant measure, linguistic problems, and examples are given from key items of the vocabulary.
Chapter 3 discusses the evolution of the disciplines that write about art from classical times, and the diatypical variation that is found in contemporary texts according to the discipline, the art form, and the period of history. In Chapter 4 the linguistic approach is outlined, with detailed analysis of short specimen texts.

Chapter 5, 6 and 7 present the findings about the language of (respectively) history of art, technology of art, and aesthetics and art criticism. Passages of text are commented on and interpreted in terms of their vocabulary and grammar (syntax). There is a short account of 'portable art' texts in Chapter 8.

Chapter 9 discussed the use of a theory of language as a model for a semiotics of art, with special reference to L.M.O’Toole’s work in this area. A brief conclusion is given in Chapter 10, followed by a bibliography.

In order to provide an adequate sample of the various kinds of writing about art discussed in the thesis, a selection of longer extracts is presented as a separate volume (Volume 2).
Acknowledgments

My very special thanks go to three people - Professor Michael Halliday, my mother and my son.

My debt to Professor Halliday goes beyond the contribution his theoretical work has made to my thesis. It is not an exaggeration to say, that without his helpfulness, understanding, patience, inspiration and critical comments, this thesis would never have been completed.

I also wish to thank my mother for helping me with the tedious task of photocopying enumerable pages of notes, and my son, who will now, at the age of fifteen, find out what it means to have a mother.
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PREFACE

It was the need I had as a teacher of the history of art, the need to interpret works of art, that made me interested in semiotics. It seemed to me that if semiotics was taken seriously, it had a potential not only to penetrate but also to reshape traditional disciplines that are concerned with art, including aesthetics, art history and art criticism.

As a teacher of art, I was involved in all the above disciplines and I have become aware of some of the specific problems associated with each of them. The students I was dealing with were all adults of different ages; of different professional, economic and ethnic backgrounds; all of them sharing an interest in art. Despite the great differences between the individual groups of students (the program I have been responsible for was a part of the so-called Discussion Groups scheme, a scheme based on correspondence courses taken by individual groups of students who were meeting fortnightly to discuss the set lessons and give written answers to set questions. I have noticed that all of them - almost without exception - found some sections of art study very simple while there were others they found extremely difficult to follow. It may be helpful to mention here briefly both the areas that seemed to cause considerable problems and those that did not.

It could be said that there were two types of courses included in the syllabus: the art history courses and the art appreciation courses. As the title suggests, the subject matter of art history courses was to discuss art in terms of its history, and sometimes its technology, while the subject matter of art appreciation courses was to look at individual works of art and make some evaluative comments about them, comments that were of a purely aesthetic nature and so did
not include either historical or technological considerations.

The students did not seem to have any problems with the first type of courses. Provided they had read the lecture notes and other recommended literature, they found the subject matter easy to follow. Provided they had done their ‘homework’, i.e. they had familiarized themselves with the historical or technological facts presented, they had no difficulties in writing about them or answering the required questions. However, the situation was quite different with the other type of courses.

As ‘why’ one type of the art courses was more difficult than the other, both the students and myself agreed at first that it was the subject matter - to discuss art in historical terms is easy; to say whether it is good or bad is not so easy. Though there were indications there already that "talking" about one area of art was more difficult than "talking" about another area, and so it was not just the subject matter but the language used to talk about it that could contribute to the problems faced by the students, the difficulties were not interpreted in that sense till much later.

There were four basic tasks I had to perform as an art teacher: (a) I had to write art courses; (b) I had to teach my own courses, as well as those written by other tutors who were no longer with the department; (c) I had to correct the written answers of the students; and (d) I had to visit each group to clarify whatever needed to be clarified. Compared to usual teaching practices, it is not usual for a teacher to provide the students with his own lecture notes which take the form of a text-book. The most a teacher has to do is to produce handouts which are connected with an based on the recommended texts written by someone else. However,
because of the format required for the purposes of a discussion, a special type of lecture notes had to be produced by the department. What was different about those notes was the 'conversation' mood of the text. The notes had to be written in such a way that after certain facts were stated, there was a question or questions arising from the text which students were expected to answer.

It was this 'additional' duty - to write my own texts and to correct texts written by my students - that made me realize that maybe it was not just the subject matter that made one type of courses more difficult than the other, but the way the language was used to talk or write about it.

As a student, teacher and writer of the art history courses I faced no difficulty at all. It was easy to follow a text written by someone else; it was simple to write my own lecture notes and it was no more difficult to ask 'meaningful' questions my students could understand and answer. On the other hand, to study or teach art courses of the second type caused quite a few problems, and when it came to writing them, there were times when I could not think of sensible questions, apart from the typical ones such as: do you like this picture? is this picture more appealing than the other one?, and so on.

However, an interesting point was that while the art appreciation courses written by myself (though writing them was more difficult than writing the other type) were more or less 'comprehensible' to me as their writer, they were no more 'comprehensible' to my students than art appreciation courses written by other lecturers. They were as cryptic to them as art appreciation texts written by someone else than myself were often cryptic to me. It was at that stage that I came to realize that when I write the two types of courses, I do adjust the language I use. Why I do that was not clear.
then, and even today I wonder whether the adjustments are
dictated by convention or whether they are purely linguistic
in nature. Whatever the case may be, it was at that stage
that I realized that the difficulties experienced by both
the students and myself were - if not entirely, then largely
- linguistic problems. They were closely related to how
language is used to talk about the history of art as
compared to how it is used to evaluate art or to discuss the
abstract concepts behind it. It was then that I made a
decision to study what is written about art, i.e. to study
the language of art writing. Halliday's Systemic-Functional
Grammar, which was constructed for purposes of text
interpretation, was used as the basis for this intended
linguistic analysis.

As will be shown in this thesis, the above grammar was used
both to analyse art texts and to attempt to analyse works of
art as types of 'visual' texts. In other words, while it was
used for its intended purposes - 'to say sensible and useful
things about any text, spoken or written, in modern English'
(Halliday, 1985:xv) - it was also used to say sensible and
useful things about visual texts which are traditionally
believed to be "universal" (anybody who can see can
understand them). The grammar was also looked at as a
possible model for the semiotics of art; or rather a bridge
between language as a semiotic system and other semiotic
codes - painting in our case. But the major concentration
has been on the language in which discourse about art is
traditionally, and typically, written.
CHAPTER 1 WRITING ABOUT ART: the perception of art that it represent

1.1 The traditional disciplines of art study

As suggested in the Preface, the history of art, aesthetics and art criticism are the three approaches to art recognized in the art curriculum. The majority of university programs include all three approaches, though there may be considerable variations in the emphasis on one or the other. For instance, a program designed for undergraduate students is mostly art-history oriented, which means that art is discussed in terms of the historical periods it is associated with, rather than in terms of its appearance and impact or in terms of the meaning it carries. The students enrolled in the honours part of the program are - in addition to the above - usually expected to study aesthetics, or the philosophy of art, and so apart from describing individual works of art in historical and possibly technical terms, they are also expected to argue, in a more or less philosophical manner about the abstract concepts of art, e.g. beauty, creativity, aesthetic perception, and so on - as well as to present their own argument supporting their personal evaluation of a work of art.

As the two terms describe and argue suggest, art history and aesthetics/art criticism put the student in different situations. In each situation they are given different tasks to accomplish, each of them requiring a different type of approach to art, and each of them realized by a different type of activity as well as by a different type of language. While the art-history discussion is based on a recapitulation of historical and technical facts and on a description of what one can see, the art-philosophy
discussion is in its nature an argument about abstract issues where the aim is to win the argument.

While a student involved in an art-history discussion states facts and either does or does not know them, it seems that the mastery of argumentation lies in how one can handle language so as to win the argument. There is nothing an art history student can win, because there is nothing to win or lose. If the discussion is about Gothic paintings, for instance, and the student gives the 19th century as their location in time, no argument can make him right. However, since art philosophy as well as art criticism are not based on historical or technical facts, but are rather associated with philosophical and personal ideas, a clever argument can make the speaker/writer the winner in the eyes of the listener/reader.

The two activities - to describe and to argue - mentioned above could be seen as the line between the two types of courses described briefly in the Preface: art history courses and the appreciation courses. It is to be expected that the two types of courses are associated with two types of discourse and that is exactly what our initial analyses proved. As a matter of fact, we have been able to recognize not two types, but four types of writing about art. As we shall discuss in more detail in chapter 4 and 5, the art history discourse - though it includes many other sub-registers - consists mainly of a history-like register and a technology-like register. Then there is the discourse of the aesthetics associated with the philosophy-like register, and the discourse of art criticism associated with a register very much like that of literary criticism.

Apart from the four registers: (1) art history; (2) art technology; (3) aesthetics; and (4) art criticism, we have been able to recognize another register which we will call
in this thesis the register of portable art. This register is representative of the texts written for permanent and portable exhibitions of which it is a necessary part.

As suggested above, the two approaches which are included in art history courses - history and technology - do not cause problems either to the student or to the teacher of art. It is the the other two approaches, aesthetics and art criticism, that do. These are also the two that would probably be mentioned as characteristic and representative of art study. Art history as such is usually seen as a school subject similar to that of history, rather than the study of art. A little survey I have done proved this point quite clearly. When I asked the beginners what they thought was the object of the study of art, they all referred to the treatment which is characteristic of either the philosophy of art or art criticism. This is probably why our discussion of the theoretical background in theory of art is limited to this area.

Any theory of art must and does begin with the question "WHAT IS ART?" Richard Wollheim in his book Art and its objects (1968) asks this question and says that:

"Art is the sum or totality of works of art".
"What is a work of art?" "A work of art is a poem, a painting, a piece of music, a sculpture, a novel....." "What is a poem? a painting? a piece of music? a sculpture? a novel?....." "A poem is....., a painting is....., a piece of music is....., a sculpture is....., a novel is....."

'It would be natural to assume,' he says, 'that if only we could fill in the gaps in the last line of this dialogue, we should have an answer to one of the most elusive of the traditional problems of human culture: the nature of art.'

However, he continues, 'it might be objected that, even if we could succeed in filling in the gaps on which this dialogue ends, we should still not have an answer to the
traditional question because that question has always been a
demand for a unitary answer, an answer of the form "Art
is....."; whereas the best we could now hope for is a
plurality of answers, as many as the arts or media that we
initially distinguish.

In other words, if we think of Art as being explicable in
terms of different kinds of works of art or different arts,
our conception of art will be highly complex - which is what
characterizes the traditional approach to art that is
prevailing in our own culture. We are hoping for a unitary
answer while we keep looking for it amongst the many
different kinds of works which have been produced with
different functions and different values in mind.

The term function is a key word which might help us to find
an answer to the question "WHAT IS ART?" Meanwhile we
should look at aesthetics, which is the area that gives us
the theoretical conception to the present theory of art.

1.2 Art as aesthetic object

"There would be no problem of aesthetics....if no
one ever talked about works of art. So long as we
enjoy a movie, a story, or a song, in silence -
except perhaps for occasional grunts or groans,
murmurs of annoyance or satisfaction - there is no
call for philosophy. But as soon as we utter
a statement about the work, various sorts of
question can arise."

This is how Monroe C. Beardsley opens the Introduction to
his Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism
(1958). Those who read 'in between' his lines will see that
he considers language as an interference in art evaluation.
From Plato onwards philosophers have discussed works of art and their place in human experience, raising problems related both the object of aesthetics, which is supposed to be art, and to the definition of aesthetics as a term, and as a discipline. Aesthetics as a discipline is not something we shall concern ourselves with in this thesis; but we will look later at the three stages in the history of aesthetics the difference between which is one of the problems faced by present students of art. Our first concern, however, is with the concept of a work of art as an aesthetic object.

Art as the object of aesthetics and art as an aesthetical object

We have said that "art" is the object of aesthetics, but there is another point of view where art is defined as an aesthetical object, which does not mean the same thing. In the first case art is the object of a discipline called aesthetics, while in the second case everything that is considered to be a work of art has the quality of 'being aesthetics', i.e. pleasing to our senses. In the first the term 'art' refers to art as a phenomenon (which is what I understand to be the object of the philosophy of art); in the second, it means a work of art (which is what I understand to be the object of art criticism).

One of the major linguistic problems faced by students is connected with the above concept of a work of art as an aesthetic object, something perceived by our senses as being "aesthetic". If the criterion is that of "our senses", we move out of the area of objective judgment into a largely subjective evaluation. But then, if we take the function of the artifacts into consideration, will it follow that works of art are not objects of aesthetic perception because they have always been created for this, that or the other practical reason?
We said above that the term ‘function’ could be a key word in the discussion. If the function of works of art was considered together with their appearance, then we should be able to distinguish between judgements about the excellence of a work of art and judgements about its importance as a vehicle for cultural or other values. It is the ‘excellence’ that is one source of the problems faced by art students. What we call ‘excellence’ has to do with taste; and since taste is a matter of personal likes and dislikes, it is unlikely that all people discussing works of art in these terms would reach the same conclusion. We will return to this point in chapter 4 and 5 when talking about Classifiers and experiential and attitudinal Epithets.

The next difficulty is connected with the way we think about art, seeing it as a ‘universal language’. If art had been seriously compared to natural language, and natural language used as a possible model for art, this problem, would have been avoided.

Nobody questions that the many languages spoken in the world differ in their grammar and lexis; and that in order to understand a language, we must understand its rules. An art form such as painting, on the other hand, while it is recognized to be a form of communication (with ‘language’ as a metaphor for it), is nevertheless assumed to be international, and so universally understood by all those who can see. Though we are not seen as possessors of all the linguistic knowledge there is, in the last two or three decades we have become inheritors of the art of all times and all peoples. We are supposed to enjoy the surviving art objects of all ages although the cultural purposes which they were created to serve are sunk in oblivion. We do not know and are not really trying to know why the paleolithic cave-drawings were made. We are not researching the motives behind Egyptian, African or any other ‘exotic’ art. Instead
we are looking at works of art that for the lack of our knowledge cannot possibly "speak to us", but we pretend that they do and use a particular type of language to camouflage our ignorance. This camouflage may be penetrated by a linguist interested in an analysis of the texts of art philosophy or art criticism; but it is taken seriously by the art student, who accepts the personal evaluative comments as universal evaluations. If there is a difference between these comments and what the student thinks, it will be the student who will blame himself for not seeing what is obviously there.

The three problems mentioned so far will be discussed again from a more linguistic point of view in chapters 3, 8 and 9. There is one further problem which has to do with the status of art as such and with whose concern it is - the artist's, the critic's or the viewer's.

In his discussion of artists and art objects, Plato questioned both the meaning of aesthetic terms in common use and common sense beliefs about the arts. One of his most influential concepts is that of mimesis or imitation: an art object is an imitation. The identification of imitation as the essential character of an art object is maintained in Aristotle's Poetics, which is explicitly an examination of the nature of a particular class of art objects. This idea of an art object as imitation forms the central conception of classical aesthetics, in which the work of art was the central element in the aesthetic complex. The work of art was the focal point, with artist and audience being only subordinate objects of concern.

The second major concept which originated in the classical period is that of beauty. The term 'beauty' confirms that the work of art was the central element in classical aesthetics, because its primary use was to describe a
characteristic of objects. 'What is beauty?' was the central aesthetic question inherited from the classical period; and it remained central to the philosophy of art through to the time of the Renaissance.

In 18th century England, however, the orientation changed. The term that recurs most frequently in the title of 18th century essays is taste - referring to audience rather than art object or artist. The pleasure of visual perception, i.e. the pleasure of the viewer, the audience, becomes the primary concern of 18th century aesthetics. The observer, the audience, now holds the centre of the stage. Critics berate "imitation" as an inadequate aesthetic notion and replace it with "imagination" as the central theoretical term, reflecting further the extent to which the art object has become subordinate within the 18th century view of the aesthetic complex. Attention shifts from the work of art to the experience and response of the viewer. The art object is treated as instrumental to this response.

As Sesonske says in his introduction to What is art (1965), there were two secondary strands of thought running through 18th century writings in aesthetics: the repeated discussion of "the beautiful and sublime", and a growing concern with the question of genius. The first of these strands is the one that replaces the classical concern with the qualities of art objects by the new orientation in which the aesthetic observer is regarded as central. It is no longer the quality of a work of art that is examined, but our ideas of the beautiful and sublime. The discussion of genius, on the other hand, constitutes a further departure from the original 18th century orientation. The concern here is with the artist, not the audience or the art object.

The distinction of beautiful and sublime marks the beginning of another important change in terminology. The term
"beauty" must now share its primary role with "sublime" - the pair soon to be joined by a third, "picturesque". The decline of "beauty" as the primary and fundamental aesthetic term was slow but inevitable and by the mid-20th century it has nearly disappeared from serious discussions of the arts, though students of both art history and aesthetics are still exposed to it. The terms "sublime" and "picturesque" have faded too.

A new terminology appeared in late 18th century writings, a terminology related to the second major strand of concern with genius. The term is "expression". With this term it is the artist who becomes the most interesting component of the aesthetic complex, and discussions of aesthetic questions now revolve around him.

As a result of this shift of emphasis from the work of art in the classical period to the spectator and finally the artist in the 18th century, in today's aesthetics the emphasis can be on any of the three components of the aesthetic complex. The problem for students of art is to sort out these different conceptions of the field and discern where the writer of art texts or the teacher is putting his emphasis.

What is missing from all these assumptions behind the traditional theory of art is a view of art as a social product. This is the orientation that I tend to adopt in my teaching and that guided me in the present research. Without attempting to discuss this in detail, I should like to summarize some of the relevant issues tracing the steps (as I took them myself) from a more or less philosophy-like approach as represented by Susanne Langer, to Novitz's position which is somewhere between art theory and linguistics, to structural linguistics as represented by the ideas of the Prague School in general and those of
Mukarovsky in particular. This in turn relates to functional linguistics as formulated in the work of M.A.K. Halliday.

1.3 Art as meaningful object

All human behavior originates in the use of symbols. Art, religion, language and other systems involves their use. However, although people in the past were aware of symbols, the way they thought about them was different. It was in the area of logic and scientific language that the existence of symbolic modes was first noticed, while it was much later that this awareness shifted to the non-scientific and artistic area as well.

It was Langer's idea of symbolization as the key to "knowing" as well as that of symbolization as one of the "inborn" urges of human beings, that I used as the starting point of a journey from the more traditional ideas about art to those that derive from the concepts of semiotics, where it is the meaning rather than the aesthetic impact of a work of art that is of the primary importance.

The concept of "knowing" or "knowledge" is not a simple one since it extends to all things knowable, to all kinds of knowers, to all modes of knowledge, and all methods of knowing. But from whatever standpoint one approaches questions of knowing and knowledge, the problem arises of how knowledge is communicated. Language on the one hand, and art on the other, can be interpreted as modes of communication of knowledge. In Langer's view, however, there is a basic difference between language and art. All language has a form which requires us to string out our ideas in linear arrangement even though their objects rest one within the other, 'as pieces of clothing that are actually worn one over the other but have to be strung side by side on the clothesline' (Langer, 1942). This property of verbal
symbolism is known as discursiveness; by reason of it, only thoughts which can be arranged in this peculiar order can be spoken at all; any idea which does not lend itself to this "projection" is ineffable, incommunicable by means of words."

She further claims that it is only because of the existing beliefs of logicians that we are convinced that nothing that cannot be "projected" in discursive forms is accessible to the human mind, and that the knowable is only what can be expressed in language, while 'outside of language is the inexpressible realm of feeling, of formless desires and satisfactions, immediate experience, forever incognito and incommunicado. This sphere outside language is nothing but nonsense; and it will remain like that because language, our only possible semantic, will not clothe experiences that elude the discursive form (ibid., 95). Langer rejected this view, expressing the conviction that there is an unexplored possibility of genuine semantics beyond the limits of discursive language.

In this view, the world that actually meets our sense is not a world of "things", about which we are invited to discover facts as soon as we have codified the necessary logical language to do so. It is a world of pure sensation, highly complex, from which our sense-organs must select certain predominant forms if they are to make report of "things". The eye and the ear must have their logic - their own categories of understanding.

This means that visual forms - lines, colours, proportions, etc. - are just as capable of articulation, of forming complex combinations, as words are; but the laws that govern this sort of articulation are altogether different from the laws of syntax that govern language. They do not present their constituents successively, but simultaneously, so the
relations determining a visual structure are grasped in one vision. Their complexity, consequently, is not limited, as the complexity of discourse is limited, by what the mind can retain from the beginning of an perceptive act to the end of it' (ibid., 99).

So when one compares the different rules that govern language and a picture, one may consider Langer's view:

* Every language has a vocabulary and a syntax. Its elements are words with fixed meanings. Out of these one can construct, according to the rules of the syntax, composite symbols with resultant new meanings.

* In a language, some words are equivalent to whole combinations of other words, so that most meanings can be expressed in several different ways. This makes it possible to define the meanings of the ultimate single words, i.e. to construct a dictionary.

* There may be alternative words for the same meaning. The two people systematically use different words for almost everything, they are said to speak different languages. But the two languages are roughly equivalent; with a little artifice, an occasional substitution of a phrase for a single word, etc. the propositions enunciated by one person, in his system, may be translated into the convention system of the other (ibid., 100).

Like language, a picture is composed of elements that represent various respective constituents in the object; but these elements are not units with independent meanings. As an example, the areas of light and shade that constitute a portrait have no significance by themselves. In isolation they appear to be blotches of colors. As Langer says,

'yet they are faithful representatives of visual elements composing the visual object. However, they do not represent, item by item, those elements which have names; there is not one blotch for the nose, one for the mouth, etc.; their shapes, in quite indescribable combinations, convey a total picture in which nameable features may be pointed. The gradation of light and shade cannot be enumerated. They cannot be correlated, one by one, with parts or characteristics by means of which we might describe the person who posed for the portrait. The "elements" that the camera represents are not the "elements" that language represents. They are a thousand times more numerous...Clearly, a symbolism with so many elements, such myriad relationships, cannot be broken up into basic units.'
Consequently, it is impossible to find the smallest independent symbol; therefore paintings have no vocabulary and though there are laws that govern the techniques used, they cannot be called "syntax". There is not a pictorial grammar analogous to the surface grammar of a natural language. There are no nouns and pronouns, no pictorial verbs, no pictorial tenses, no syntax. One cannot translate sentences into pictures, at least not in the same way as we translate German sentences into English ones.

Since there are no words, there can be no dictionary of meanings for lines, shadings, or other elements of pictorial techniques. The only possible dictionaries are those of symbolic meaning, which is the interpretation of art as a system of symbols; but dictionaries of this type are not dictionaries in the linguistic sense.

Is there then a possibility of a painting functioning as a speech act? As just illustrated, pictures represent a different type of system; they refer to reality in a different way. This reality is not different from that referred to by language; but it is feasible to think that pictures may reflect different aspects of the same reality that language represents and comments on. At this point we may turn to Novitz (1977), whose work enables us to formulate these considerations in more linguistic terms.

The first step taken in this direction (cf. Chapter 9 below) was to consider a picture as corresponding to a sentence, for instance:

"A cow is in the field"

Novitz points out that it would be quite difficult to decide whether the picture should visually "read" as "a cow" (a member of the class) or "the cow" (an individual). It would
be impossible to translate the picture into language with any criteria for deciding that the translation is correct. For instance, the above example of 'a cow in the field' picture. What would be its correct translation? "A cow is in the field", or "This is a cow in profile" or "A cow is eating clover"? The number of possible readings is almost endless.

Following Novitz's argument (ibid.,68), we could ask why not translate the picture as "The field has a cow in it?" One cannot be sure from looking at a picture why it is a cow that is regarded as the subject of the sentence. This means that one of the great differences between language and a picture is that pictures do not have subject and predicate expressions which occupy distinctive positions as is the case of natural languages. Consequently to speak of pictures as being used to refer or to predicate would be a little dubious.

But if we cannot speak of pictures in terms of reference or predication, we may be able to speak of them as being used to indicate or to attribute. Novitz claims that all instances of reference and predication fall within the scope of the terms "indication" and "attribution". To indicate, whether pictorially or linguistically, is to use a device in a way which enables an audience to single out, or to identify, a potential subject of attribution. To attribute, by contrast, is to use a device in order to ascribe certain qualities, properties, relations, actions, states or dispositions to some or other subject (ibid., 89).

What about a picture as a proposition? Novitz suggests that whenever two locutionary acts indicate the same object, and attribute the same relations, actions, dispositions and so on to it, the same proposition is being expressed. This may well be the case; but how do we distinguish between a
proposition and a description? If for instance a picture is of a particular person with a money-bag in his hand, the meaning of a picture can either be a simple description or a proposition. I agree with Novitz that the difference between the two is the presence of an illocutionary act in the second case, while not in the first one. In other words, the expression of a proposition, although not identical with an illocutionary act, does not occur apart from it. Consequently, it seems feasible that since a picture can be used to indicate a subject and to attribute something or other to it, it is possible to use pictures to express propositions; and this is probably one respect in which pictures play an analogous role to sentences.

However, in order to use a sentence as a proposition, one must intend to do so. The question then arises whether this intention on the part of the artist is recognized by the viewer, because for the proposition to be effective in this way, the viewer must recognize that what the artist is doing is 'saying' something about an object rather than just describing it. This is where the difficulty arises. Despite the similarities between a verbal and visual illocutionary act aiming at making a proposition, there are differences when this is seen from the viewer's point of view. While a verbal illocutionary act provides us with certain syntactical clues as to its propositional content, these are lacking in the case of pictorial illocutionary acts. When a sentence is used in an illocutionary act, a set of elements in the syntactical structure of the sentence can be used to clarify the illocutionary force of the act. One such device might be a verb in the first person present indicative (e.g. "I warn" or "I promise") and another may be the word order (cf. Novitz, p.91; Searle: Speech acts, p.30-1).

Unfortunately, while sentences do furnish us with syntactical elements, pictures do not. They do not have
subject and predicate expressions which are given distinctive position within the picture, they have no definite or indefinite articles, no nouns, no verbs, no pronouns, no adjectives. To follow Novitz, if we suggest that pictures can be used to express propositions, we cannot do so by appealing to grammatical similarities between sentences and pictures. Instead, one has to explain under what conditions a picture can be said to express a proposition (Novitz, 1977:92).

The answer to this must be sought in its context. It is the context that gives the clue to how a picture is intended to function: what illocutionary act it is being used to perform, and what proposition it is made to express. Without some awareness of the environment in which it belongs, we shall not be able to distinguish between using a picture as a proposition and representing something pictorially. We may find ourselves imposing the propositional function on a picture which was not intended to make a statement, but which was intended by the painter as a pictorial representation. A teacher’s questions such as "Let’s discuss what the artist was trying to say" takes for granted the issue that needs to be raised first: whether or not the artist was "trying to say" anything.

Novitz distinguishes between instances where pictures are used to explain and clarify written passages and instances where written passages are used to explain a picture (Ibid., p.99). In this thesis I am interested in those of the second kind - when a picture is explained or described verbally by an expert on art. Taking the Mona Lisa as an example, Novits supposes that a book is published offering a formalist analysis of the picture; we can assume that the written pages explain the picture, and not the other way around. However, anyone who has read a book of this nature will know that in order to understand the text, he is forced, from time
to time, to refer to the picture. In other words, the picture is both explained by, and explains aspects of, the text. The artist may be interested in how a picture draws the viewer's attention to features of an object, while the writer's interest is in how the written explanation draws the attention of the viewer to features of the picture.

As far as the first of these is concerned, one may safely assume that it is the social and cultural background of the individual viewer, together with his characteristics as an individual, that make him react to certain features of a picture while neglecting or not even noticing others. But our interest here is in how a writer draws a viewer's attention to the picture. This takes us away from purely art-based considerations to the register of art criticism and other forms of writing about art (which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 below).
1.4 Art as social object

In the section 1.2 we talked briefly about traditional aesthetics. A major departure from the above tradition was the structural aesthetics developed by Mukarovsky (see especially the introduction to Structure, Sign, and Function, a book of essays by Jan Mukarovsky (translated and edited by John Burbank and Peter Steiner).

Mukarovsky's structural aesthetics derived from the structural linguistics of the Prague School, which was itself derivative from the linguistics theory developed by the Swiss scholar Ferdinand de Saussure. In his 'Course in General Linguistics' (1974) Saussure includes the study of language within semiology, the science that studies signs. Language as a social institution, with features that set it apart from other social institutions, political, legal and so on; it is a system of signs that express ideas, and so it is comparable to a system of writing, the alphabet of deaf-mutes, symbolic rites, polite formulas, military signals, etc. Hence in semiology what is studied is the life of signs in society, and Saussure emphasizes the social function of the sign.

The term Structuralism (coined in 1929 by Roman Jakobson, then vice-chairman of the Prague Linguistic Circle, in his newspaper report on the First International Slavic Congress held in Prague that year) was initially used to refer to work in linguistics and poetics; it was soon extended, however, to describe methods of interpretation which appeared in fields as diverse as literary criticism, anthropology and sociology. In conceiving a 'structural aesthetics' Mukarovsky was insisting that the traditional, two-component aesthetics, concerned with the object of aesthetic experience and the experiencing subject, left out a vital factor - the paradigm of socially existing aesthetic
norms which condition and determine any subject-object interaction which is to be considered aesthetic.

It was Mukarovsky's concept of the artistic sign as communicative that marked the new approach in his structuralism. As Steiner and Burbank say, just as a structural linguist cannot properly analyse the linguistic sign without taking into account the code which makes it understandable to the members of a given collectivity, the structuralist aesthetician cannot study the work of art in separation or isolation from the code which makes it (in Mukarovsky's terms) a social fact. Just as the key to the meaning of a word does not rest in its sensory aspect but in the relation of this aspect to the code, the key to the understanding of the work of art must be sought not in its internal organization but in the relation of this organization to the underlying code. From this point of view, the organization of the work has only a relative permanence. It is the aesthetic code, the immediate aesthetic tradition against whose background the work is perceived, which determines its actual appearance (Steiner and Burbank, 1978:xvi). They quote Mukarovsky in this connection as saying:

On the basis of a single work, several different structures with different dominants and hierarchies of components can be gradually realized in different periods (or milieux). The work therefore is not an unambiguous structure. It becomes unambiguous only if it is perceived against the background of a particular immediate tradition from which the work deviates and against which it is reflected. (Ibid.,xvi)

While Mukarovsky's structuralist theory of art was based on the concept of structure, his idea of "structure" was slightly different from the previous traditional understanding of the concept - according to which a structure is defined as a whole, the parts of which acquire a special character by entering it, the whole being more
than the sum of the parts of which it is composed. Mukarovsky considered the above definition too broad, because it included not only structures in the literal sense of the word, but also configurations (Gestalten). He preferred to see a work of art as a sign more special than the mere correlation of a whole and its parts. He saw as the specific property of structure of art "interrelations among the components - relations dynamic in their very essence" (ibid., 29). "According to our conception", he said, "we can consider as a structure only such a set of elements, the internal equilibrium of which is constantly disturbed and restored anew and the unity of which thus appears to us as a set of dialectic contradictions. That which endures is only the identity of a structure in the course of time, whereas its internal composition - the correlation of its components - changes continually" (ibid., 30).

According to Mukarovsky, a structure in art is first of all each individual work of art in itself. If an individual work of art is to be understood as a structure, however, it must be perceived against its socio-cultural background - or to use his terminology "against the background of certain artistic conventions (formulae) provided by the artistic tradition that is lodged in the consciousness of both the artist and the perceiver." (ibid., 31). Mukarovsky claims that it is precisely because of its involuntary confrontation with artistic conquests of the past, which have already become common property and have therefore become arrested, immutable, the work of art, in contradistinction to them, can appear as an unstable equilibrium of constantly shifting forces, hence as a structure. Partly by conforming to the artistic conventions of the past and partly by clashing with them, the structure of the work prevents the artist from being in conflict with the most current reality and with the current state of both the social consciousness and his own consciousness. The
connection of a work with the artistic conventions of the past prevents it from becoming unintelligible to the perceiver.

A structure, is not, however, only a single, isolated work of art. Not only what has precede it but also what will follow it is part of its relevant environment. According to Mukarovsky, the fact that the structure of a given work palpably differs from tradition always means that at the same time an appeal is directed to future creation. "Every work of art, even the most 'original', thus becomes part of a continuous stream passing through time. There is no work of art that is no part of this stream, even if some works seem quite unexpected in relation to it." (ibid,31). To Mukarovsky, a work of art is a sign, and as a sign it consists of three components: a material vehicle (the work-thing), a meaning (the "aesthetic object" lodged in collective consciousness), and a relation to the thing signified.

But he sees the work of art as an autonomous sign, and as such it "cannot be identified, as psychological aesthetics has wished, with its author's state of mind or with any of the states of mind which it evokes in perceiving subjects." He argues that each state of subjective consciousness has something individual and momentary that "renders it ungraspable and incommunicable it its totality", whereas the work of art is designed to serve "as an intermediate between its author and a collectivity.

Mukarovsky points out that the "thing" representing the work of art in the sensory world is unrestrictedly accessible to the perception of everyone, but under no circumstances should the work of art be reduced to this "work-thing (in Czech diló-vec) since "the work-thing happens to change completely in appearance and internal structure through
temporal or spatial shifts." (ibid., 26). He compares this situation to changes that become obvious when we try to compare several consecutive translations of a single literary work. The work-thing functions, then, "only as an external symbol (the signifiant according to Saussure's terminology) to which corresponds in the social consciousness a meaning (sometimes called the aesthetic object) consisting of what the subjective states of consciousness evoked in the members of a certain collectivity have in common." (ibid., 27)

As far as 'pleasure' as a necessary part of perception of every work of art is concerned, by refusing to identify the work of art with a subjective psychic state, Mukarovsky rejects hedonistic aesthetic theories. "For the pleasure evoked by a work of art can", he says, "at most, attain an indirect objectification as potential 'accessory meaning.' We would be wrong to affirm that pleasure is a necessary part of the perception of every work of art. There are periods in art which tend to arouse it; there are others which are indifferent to it or even seek its opposite."

Mukarovsky discusses the sign as a sensory reality relating to another reality that it is supposed to evoke and asks what this other reality replaced by the work of art is. The answer is "the total context of so-called social phenomena - for example, philosophy, politics, religion and economics". According to him the above is the reason why art is more capable of characterizing and representing the given 'epoch' than any other social phenomenon. However, he does not want us to conclude that if the work of art refers to the context of social phenomena, it "necessarily coincides with this context in such a way that, without qualification, we could take it for a direct testimony or a passive reflection. Like every sign, the work of art can have an indirect relation, for example, metaphoric or otherwise oblique, to the thing
signified without thereby ceasing to refer to it. From the
semiotic nature of art it follows that a work of art should
never be exploited as a historical or sociological document
without a preliminary interpretation of its documentary
value, that is, the quality of its relation to the given

In any objective study of the phenomenon of art, the work of
art must be regarded as a sign composed of (1) a sensory
symbol created by the artist, (2) a meaning (=aesthetic
object) lodged in the social consciousness, and (3) a
relation to the thing signified - a relation that refers to
the entire context of social phenomena. Hence, besides its
function as autonomous sign, a work of art has another
function, that of communicative sign. As Mukarovsky
suggests, a literary work functions not only as a work of
art but also and simultaneously as 'parole' expressing a
state of mind, thoughts, emotions, and so forth. He then
continues and distinguishes between arts in which this
communicative function is very apparent (literature,
painting, sculpture), and others in which it is veiled
(dance) or even invisible (music, architecture). The
communicative function of works of art has to do with their
having or not having a subject matter, i.e. with them being
or not being about something.

Mukarovsky does not dwell on those arts where the
communicative element is absent, but concentrates on those
in which the functioning of the work as a communicative sign
is beyond doubt. These are arts with a "subject" (=theme,
content) in which the subject seems at first glance to
function as the communicative meaning of the work. He
believes that each of the components of a work of art, even
the most formal, has its own communicative value independent
of the subject. "Thus the colors and lines of a painting
signify "something", even in the absence of any subject. It
is in this virtual semiotic character of the "formal" components that the "diffuse" communicative power of arts without a subject lies. To be precise, then, we must say that it is the entire structure which functions as the meaning, even the communicative meaning, of the work of art. The subject of the work simply plays the role of an axis of crystallization in relation to this meaning which, without it, would remain vague. The work of art therefore has two semiotic functions, autonomous and communicative, the second of which is reserved especially for arts with a subject.

We said earlier that to Mukarovsky, a work of art is a sign, and as a sign it consists of three components: a material vehicle (the work-thing), a meaning (the "aesthetic object" lodged in collective consciousness), and a relation to the thing signified. His structuralist ideology also consisted of three components: function, norm and value. He defined them in a university lecture he gave in 1935 as follows (Steiner and Burbank, 1978:xxii).

By function we understand an active relation between an object and the goal for which this object is used. The value then is the utility of this object for such a goal. The norm is the rule or set of rules which regulate the sphere of a particular kind or category of value.

The notion of function means that we commonly use the object which is its vehicle for such and such a purpose. Custom, repeated usage, is a necessary precondition of a function. This term is not appropriate for a single and unique use of a thing. But not even the subjective customariness of a certain usage of a given object, a customariness limited to an individual, comprises a function in the proper sense of the word. Furthermore there must be a social consensus about the purpose which the object serves. A particular mode of using a given object must be spontaneously comprehensible to every member of a given collectivity.

This very brief outline of Mukarovsky's structuralist aesthetics and his definition of a work of art is intended to suggest how, in Mukarovsky's work, we may find a point of departure from which to build a bridge between the theory of
art and the theory of language. Art is a social fact, and a
work of art is a social object which was made in order to
satisfy specific needs of the society or the group for who
it was made. To understand its function one has to see a
work of art against its socio-cultural background. This
socio-cultural background, in turn, is related to
Malinowski's concept of the context of culture, and context
of situation, concepts which take us closer to the kind of
social linguistics represented in Halliday's work. Two
aspects of this are relevant here. Halliday's Language as
social semiotic enables language to be related to other
semiotic systems, while Introduction to Functional Grammar
provides concepts and methods from the analysis of language
itself. The two combined suggest an approach to the
semiotics of art which will be briefly introduced in chapter
9. But our main concern throughout this thesis will be with
language in the usual sense - "natural language", "verbal
language" - and with the use of language in the disciplines
that write about art.

1.5 Kinds of writing about art

In Section 1.1 we mentioned briefly the five registers of
art we have been able to recognize as types of writing about
art. We pointed out that in general two of these - art
history and art technology - cause no difficulty to the
student, while the other two - aesthetics and art criticism
- do; and we noted the difference between the activities the
students have to perform in the first two as compared to the
other two. While in art history and art technology courses
the student has to be familiar with historical or
technological facts, in courses dealing with aesthetics or
art criticism he has to be able to argue about abstract
facts which may be either of a more general or of a more
personal nature.
The problems the students were experiencing are familiar to teachers of art, but they would not associate these problems with the language,—with how language is used in the problem areas. They would see them as an expression of difficulties of subject matter: the topics of aesthetic and art criticism are more difficult than those of art history and art technology. We shall see in the next chapter that comment made by the students themselves may suggest that there are also linguistic reasons for their difficulties. If there was a difficulty in the area of art history or art technology, it was a matter of historical or technological data to which they did not have access; it was not that they could not understand what the textbook said. However, it was the language they commented on in the area of aesthetics and art criticism. Texts in aesthetics were "too abstract", so that they were not sure what the topic of the text was; whereas with art critiques they knew what the topic was but did not understand what the writer was saying about it. A small minority could not agree with what he was saying; but this was rare. Most adopted the attitude of "the Emperor's new clothes": the language of art criticism was considered prestigious and consequently the topic was prestigious and if there was a problem of understanding the writer or agreeing with what he wrote, it was the student's own inadequacy that should be blamed. It is assumed that, as an expert, the teacher understands this type of text, but few students will ask—as individuals—for assistance: they do not want to be perceived as inadequate by the others. However, in the discussion group situation, where they do not have to ask as individuals, but the questions are presented as a problem of the whole group, they more readily add personal comments or ask additional questions. We shall see in Chapter 2 that these often have to do either with the meaning of the text or with evaluative comments by the writer that they do not agree with.
structures associated with them - tend to be greatest when the subject matter is architecture, and least when the subject matter is painting.

This difference is most noticeable, of course, in technical and historical writings; what it implies is that most writing about architecture is, in fact, in the register of art history and technology, whereas art criticism concerns itself primarily with painting, secondarily with sculpture, and with architecture hardly at all. Aesthetic writings are, in principle, about 'art in general'; but in so far as any one art form is taken as criterial it is painting that comes to the fore.

The language of aesthetics, however, inevitably embodies within itself the historical evolution of ideas about art in the west. Considerations such as those outlined in sections 1.2 and 1.3 above - the shift of focus from the art object to the artist and to the viewer; the conception of the art object as 'beautiful' or 'meaningful', and so on - are all present; but not, usually, as explicit topics for discussion. They are taken for granted, as part of the reader's own intellectual formation. But whereas in, let us say, theoretical physics it is clear what kind of knowledge is required before the reader can hope to understand the language of the text, in aesthetics it is not. The knowledge required is a knowledge of previous texts in aesthetics, a trail that does not stop until it has led one back in time at least to Plato.

In art criticism, the situation is more complex still. While aesthetic writing is in principle public, in the sense of being accessible to those who have the background knowledge (subject, of course, to its structural accessibility: cf. Chapter 7 below), art criticism is essentially a private discipline, in which each writer is free to construct his
From the perspective of the present chapter, these different types of writing about art perform significantly different functions. Writings in aesthetics, the 'philosophy of art', supply the theoretical and conceptual foundation, while writings in art criticism concern themselves, with particular works of art and their evaluation. Art history writings provide a historical account of the development of art works, their styles and changes through time; those in art technology offer further information about the methods and techniques used to produce works of art. The subject matter of writings in art history and technology is presented as a 'content' in the form of facts: facts which may be different from each other in the two cases (art history facts being 'perishable facts' while those of art technology are more tangible), but nevertheless, both are facts. Aesthetics and art critical writings, on the other hand, appear as based not on facts of any kind, but on ideas; they have to be understood in terms of their overall conceptual framework and in the context of current ideologies about art and its place in society.

The content areas of all these types of writing about art (provided we are considering only western art) are essentially the three art forms of painting, sculpture and architecture. Naturally therefore this will be reflected in the language. There are different types of artistic product, and it requires different forms - different words and expressions - to describe them. The difference turns out to be not merely a matter of the vocabulary, however; there is also a difference in the level of technicality associated with each. Writing about architecture is typically very much 'more technical' than writing about painting, with writing about sculpture falling somewhere in between. The problems faced by the reader, therefore, are rather different according to the art form. Difficulties caused by technical language - not only technical terms but the expressions and
own symbols and his own conventions. This makes a different kind of demand on the reader; it appears as the language of an 'in group' which may be found daunting and even threatening by an 'outsider' who is trying to understand.

Most writing in both aesthetics and art criticism reflects some combination of the 'classical' or 'traditional' view of the work of art as an aesthetic object, discussed in terms of its beauty, and the 'modern' view of it as a semiotic object, discussed in terms of what it means or what it communicates. There is relatively little reference to the social function of a work of art or to locating it within its cultural context, unless it is somehow exotic in time or place.

Our approach to the language of art, by contrast, will stress the latter perspective. We shall suggest that in order to interpret the language used in these various kinds of writing about art, it will be helpful (to say the least) if we attempt to place them in their socio-cultural context, taking account of the functions that such writings have in contemporary western societies. At the same time our main strategy will be to engage with the lexicogrammatical patterns that make up the language of such texts. In the next chapter we shall cross the frontiers into language, using some of the comments made by art students as a signpost to the way in.
2.1 Some student responses

Though there are many other difficulties which became clear and obvious after the linguistic analysis was done, there were two that were clear in discussions with students from the start. One has to do with the vocabulary and the other with the comments made by the critic or the aesthetician.

It is to be expected that vocabulary is the first thing a student has to "work" with, and as we shall illustrate, the vocabulary connected with the two main problem areas under discussion (aesthetics and art criticism) appears to them as not very clear and precise. As far as the comments made by the experts are concerned, the problem is in the seeming generality of statements which - when unpacked really turn out to be the personal views of the writer. Combining these two, a term which is taken by the reader to be general, and in some way technical or field specific, turns out to represent be a personal view of the critic or the philosopher of art.

One need not enrol in an art course to have views about art. Everybody has some view of art, and when the statements made by people from all walks of life were analysed in more detail, they suggested that there is something like "folk aesthetics", folk beliefs based on what we know as traditional aesthetics. The students whose comments appear here were adults of different ages, and different ethnic, economic, educational and professional backgrounds. Some were total beginners in the study of art, others had some previous knowledge. Since the name of the group they were members of indicates where they come from, i.e. country or city; west, east, south or north, the texts not only provide linguistic information about how language is used to talk
about art, but also show how for people who differ from each other in all these respects share common forms of expression.

The groups represented are as follows:

**Group: West Pennant Hills 3**
Description: 8 women
Occupation: 4 Home duties
   3 teachers
   1 nurse
Education: 1 S.C.
   1 H.S.C
   1 Technical college diploma
   3 B.A.
   1 B.Sc
   1 M.Sc
Art background: beginners
------------------------

**Group: Tuross Head 1**
Description: 15 women
Occupation: Home duties
Education: 8 S.C.
   7 H.S.C.
Art background: beginners
------------------------

**Group: Beecroft 14**
Description: 11 women - young mothers
Occupation: Home duties
Education: 5 Post secondary diplomas
   6 B.A. and Dip.Ed.
Art Background: intermediate
------------------------

**Group: Goulburn 17**
Description: 9 women and 1 man
Occupation: 7 Home duties
    2 teachers
    1 clerical

Education: 3 H.S.C.
    1 Post secondary diploma
    4 B.A.
    1 B.Sc
    1 teaching diploma

Art background: beginners

(a) What follows is an example of the answers to the question WHAT IS ART? This question, which appears in almost every course in the art syllabus, was put to the students before they had been given any text to read. The answers record the discussions that have taken place in the group and are presented to the teacher in writing. They are reproduced here complete and unabridged.

What is art?

West Pennant Hills 3

Art is (1) expression and (2) technique. Commercial art is purely a technique whereas children's art is an expression and both together can make a good picture.

Tuross Head 1

Some difficulty in finding the right words to describe this abstraction led to the following ideas and descriptions: Works of art are among the things of highest value in our lives. They should hold our fullest and most concentrated attention. All parts belong together and harmoniously. This is the aesthetic experience - uplifting and refreshing and felt deeply. This value marks the difference between great art and simple entertainment. A work that is fairly easy to
understand and appreciate takes little effort on our part, and in spite of giving us pleasure, it does not involve our emotions or out attention at a deep level. A work of art is a spiritually enriching experience of vital and orderly design.

Beecroft 14

Art is what pleases us.

Goulburn 17

A work of art is what is created by a creative, talented and skilled draftsman.

(b) Those that follow are answers to the same question as above, but in this case the students had been given a specific text to read before the discussion (What is Art All About? by Desiderius Orban). The question was also slightly reformulated, as: What is your definition of art? Details of each group are given together with the extract.

Group: Merrylands 1 (metropolitan Sydney)
Description: 8 middle-aged women
Occupation: Home duties
Education: 4 S.C
4 H.S.C.
Art background: beginners

"The general opinions of our group was that art attempted to express the artists' feelings and emotions. It reflected the mood of the moment. In previous times it was used to record history. Now it has perhaps a more decorative purpose. Art is what appeals to the observer."

Group: Dubbo 19
Description: 15 women - mixed ages
Occupation: 11 home duties
1 nurse
2 clerical
Art background: beginners

"Art was felt to be an expression of human creativity revealed by some medium. Ann thought art expressed the infinite number of moods of man, created by an original creative mind, compelled by some inner force. Pat agreed, feeling art reflects the tensions of the time. Eleanor felt it must appeal to an aesthetic sense in the observer and Jane thought that art's role was to have a definite emotional effect. Unlike architecture, art does not have to be functional. It is very subjective. The discussion also centred around monetary influences and values of art."

Group: Penrith 3
Description: 7 women - mixed ages
Occupation: Home duties
Education: all S.C.
Art background: intermediate

"Art is self expression and self appreciation. Skill and originality. Art is from inside - honesty. We agreed that painting of a child is not art, in the true sense, but then said that even "rubbish" is art so I feel we were a bit mixed up here. Art is very personal so the age of the person painting should be taken into account as in a book being written e.g. "Brave New World" being written in 1920's and long before it was thought possible to divide cells. The painting of an 80 year old half blind person could be remarkable!

Group: Rose Bay 8
Description: 10 middle aged women of European background
Occupation: 6 Home duties
   1 nurse
   2 teachers
   1 clerical
Education: 1 S.C.
   1 H.S.C.
   2 B.A.
   2 B.Pharm
   2 teaching diplomas
   2 no information
Art background: no information

"Art is a visual expression of one or more people depending on how many have been involved in the "creation" of the art work; whether it be a ballet, play, musical piece, a mural, painting or a sculpture it is a creative work which has no limits."

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Group: Vaucluse 7
Description: 7 women mixed ages
Occupation: Home duties
Education: 2 S.C.
   2 H.S.C.
   2 post secondary diploma
   1 B.A.
Art background: intermediate

"Based on Orban's book, our definition of art must be that it is a creative form which rejects the over-riding stress of theoretical principles and contains pictorial elements of shape, colour, and space. These are not representational but are subject to the artist's vision of relationships between them. In the final analysis, as the painting progresses, the painting dictates the outcome to the artist."
Group: Epping 18
Description: 9 women of mixed ages
Occupation: Home duties
Education: 5 S.C.
  3 H.S.C.
  1 B.Sc

"Art is an idea in an artist's mind, reproduced in visible form. Art is expression, and artists form of expression. It is expression of feeling in invisible form. Any way a human can express his feelings and vision visibly. It is expression of feeling and emotion but no necessarily visibly. It is an avenue for self expression. Art is what appeals to you. Art is an expression by anyone to show and/or tell what they consider to be beautiful. Art is a form of self fulfilment.

(c) The following are replies given by individual students.

1. Art is what pleases us.
2. Art is (1) expression and (2) technique.
3. Art is the aesthetic experience
4. Art is what is created by a creative, talented and skilled draftsman.
5. Art is the artists' feelings and emotions.
6. Art is what appeals to the observer."
7. Art is an expression of human creativity revealed by some medium.
8. Art expressed the infinite number of moods of man, created by an original creative mind, compelled by some inner force.
9. Art reflects feeling.
10. Art must appeal to an aesthetic sense in the observer.
11. Art's role was to have a definite emotional effect.
12. Art does not have to be functional.
13. Art is very subjective.
15. Art is skill and originality.
16. Painting of a child is not art, in the true sense, but even "rubbish" is art so I feel we were a bit mixed up here.
17. Art is very personal so the age of the person painting should be taken into account as in a book being written e.g. "Brave New World" being written in 1920's and long before it was thought possible to divide cells. The painting of an 80 year old half blind person could be remarkable!
18. Art is a visual expression of one or more people depending on how many have been involved in the "creation" of the art work.
19. Art is a creative form which rejects the over-riding stress of theoretical principles and contains pictorial elements of shape, colour, and space.
20. Art is an idea in an artist's mind, reproduced in visible form.
21. Art is expression, an artist's form of expression.
22. Art is expression of feeling in a visible form.
23. Art is any way a human can express his feelings and vision visibly.
24. Art is expression of feeling and emotion but no necessarily visibly.
25. Art is an avenue for self expression.
26. Art is what appeals to you.
27. Art is an expression by anyone to show and/or tell what they consider to be beautiful.
28. Art is a form of self fulfilment.

The answers are extremely varied; there is little similarity among them. In general, however, they could be divided into categories according to (1) what art is, (2) what art does.
and (3) who is the one art does it to. The majority of students use the terminology of traditional aesthetics or present some form of evaluative criticism. They seem to be familiar with the jargon and trying to copy it, the terminology they use is not what one should classify as the language of 'daily use'. The wording is is mainly characteristic of discourse of aesthetics, although some of the terms can also be found in 'art criticism' discourse, e.g. 'creative,' 'originality', and so on.

Discussions I have had with art students over many years suggest that terms such as 'aesthetic experience', 'expression of feeling', 'expression of human emotion', 'creative forms', etc. do not mean much to them. The terms are a part of the vocabulary (or 'technical jargon') the students have to learn in order to be able to read and write on art. According to the students themselves, those terms are employed (a) because they are associated with that type of discourse and (b) because they seem to guarantee our 'membership' in the 'professional art club'. Their use is probably also considered necessary for passing the prescribed examinations.

2.2 Problems connected with art vocabulary

Above we have singled out two types of problem, one associated with the lexicon itself and the other with how it is used by the expert. (In linguistic terms: the lexical items, and their function in the nominal group.)

As far as the lexicon is concerned, broadly speaking in any form of discourse there are general terms and technical or field specific-terms. What is a technical term in art history and art technology is usually quite clear (cf. Chapter 4 and 6). This is not so easy to establish in the fields of aesthetics and art criticism; yet it is critical
that the reader should know the difference. A technical term has to be interpreted in its context in a technical construct.

But there is another category of terms in both above areas that seem to cause additional problems; not from any inherent difficulty if understanding but because of how they are used. These terms could be grouped together under the heading "evaluative". These evaluative terms place a work of art on a scale of "value"; but they are unspecific and usually taken from common language. Examples are beautiful, pretty, good, excellent, great, impressive, striking, magnificent, powerful, forceful, appealing, graceful, satisfying, bold, imaginative, etc.

It is noticeable that most of these terms carry a positive evaluation. While it is not at all difficult to think up terms carrying a negative evaluation - ugly, ineffective, weak, unsatisfying and so on (there are no doubt as many words for 'bad' as there are for 'good') - such terms appear much less frequently in aesthetic and critical writings. It is as if anything that is judged to have undesirable characteristics is excluded from the domain of writing about art; perhaps even from the category of art itself.

That this may be so appears from the interpretation that has been taken on by the word art, which now clearly implies a positive judgment. This problem has been discussed by the American School of Morphology (T. Munro, D.W. Gotshalk and S.C. Pepper in Volek, 1968). They would like to see the term "art" losing its evaluative character and being used only in a technical sense. In other words, anything that satisfies certain material and shape conditions, irrespective of whether it is 'good' or 'bad', would be able to be called art. This would mean that 'kitch', and also works of total beginners, would receive membership in the
class called 'art'. If the term art lost its evaluative meaning or character, art in general would become less labile because its definition would no longer depend on the subjective views of those who evaluate it - views which are changeable from one individual to another as well as from that of different cultures or historical periods.

An interesting point is that terms used for different art forms or genres, i.e. music, literature, architecture, dance, poem, symphony, etc., are not evaluative terms. When I say something is a 'symphony' I am not saying anything about its quality. However, when it comes to the term 'art', it has in itself a positively evaluative sense. In other words, when we say art, or even work of art, the assumption is that we are referring to something that is valuable. Since anything that finds its way in an art gallery is automatically considered to be a work of art and since any work of art must be beautiful or in some way worthy of praise, we are forced into praising all works whether we we consider them pleasing or not.

On the other hand, there are words which have a negative evaluation when used outside the realm of art, but function in the context of art discourse in a way that is purely technical, without any evaluative sense. For instance, the term "deformation" has no evaluative meaning in the area of art. A certain kind of deformation is necessary in art in order to represent reality, so the term is precise from the cognitive point of view. Its exact interpretation depends, of course, on the type of deformation and what is being deformed - whether it is the surface of things, their structure, their essence or the situation itself; whether the deformation is a source of information about the subject, about the environment and the period of the artist, or whether it is a result of his lack of technical skills or lack of maturity.
Finally there are terms which slide between evaluative and non-evaluative interpretations, typically words which have been the topic of discussion and argumentation over a long period. The term 'realism' is one of those terms. It need not carry any loading other than its technical sense; but because it is something that has always aroused strong feelings 'for' and 'against' it is rarely used without evaluative connotations of some kind.

Terms such as art and realism require detailed historical analysis both internal and external: internal in the sense of what phenomena fall within their domain - what are the things that come within the 'realm' or 'sphere of art'; external in the sense of what other phenomena are the being contrasted with - what are the things that are not art though they are similar to art in some respect.

In the internal sense, the word "art" (Greek, tekhnē; Latin, ars) was the name given to any skill in a socially beautiful activity that was governed by rules. Art was that which could be taught, and as such did not include activities governed by instinct or intuition. So, for example, music and poetry were not at first numbered amongst the arts as they were considered the products of divine inspiration. With, however, the elaboration of a mathematics of pitch and harmony (Pythagoras), and of poetics (Aristotle), music and poetry took their place amongst the 'arts' - alongside logic and shoemaking. The only generally-held principle of differentiation between the various skilled activities constituting 'arts' in the ancient world was whether the art in question was considered primarily a manual or an intellectual form of work.

This implicitly social class-based division of the arts survived into the Middle Ages in the distinction between 'mechanical arts' and 'liberal arts', the latter now
specified in terms of the 'trivium' (grammar, logic, rhetoric) and 'quadrivium' (arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, music). These 'liberal arts' formed part of the medieval university curriculum; whereas the teaching of 'painting' and 'sculpture' was undertaken in the artisans' guilds ('sculpture' had, then, no distinct existence outside of the general field of responsibilities of the mason, while a painter's responsibilities ranged from the decoration of furniture to advice to women on the application of cosmetics). When, in the early Renaissance, painting became elevated to the rank of 'liberal' arts it was as a result of the argument that painting had ceased to be simply a manual skill and had become, de facto, a learned occupation. It was to take almost another century before sculpture was to be similarly elevated in status.

The emergence, in the latter half of the 17th century, of what we would today call 'experimental science' created a further division of the field of 'arts' - with a result roughly corresponding to the modern distribution of 'arts', 'crafts' and 'science'. The problem of the purpose of such things as music and decorative art, which had vexed Plato in the Republic, resurfaced in the form of the question of what, if anything, the liberal arts (which were not experimental) and the sciences had in common. An answer which gained broad assent was provided by the Abbé Charles Batteaux in his book Les beaux arts Reduits a un Meme Principe (1747). Batteaux listed seven 'fine arts' (echoing the late-antiquity number of seven 'liberal arts'): architecture, dance, music, oratory, painting, poetry and sculpture. The single principle to which these arts could be 'reduced' was that of the selective imitation of nature to provide that which is BEAUTIFUL, and this is where a second group of internal definitions has its roots.
Batteaux’s appellation ‘fine arts’ has survived into the present, as has his definition. Of the seven beaux arts on his original list, two – oratory and poetry – very soon became grouped separately as belles lettres; in the 19th century dance and music lost their membership, to leave only the three ‘visual’ arts – architecture, painting and sculpture – to enjoy the title beaux arts. Towards the end of the 19th century these three simply became "Art" – a restricted, capitalised use of the term hitherto unknown in English. Today we could notice the emergence of another division into art and architecture; and in many people’s usage the term ‘art’ has become simply synonymous with painting.

When we turn to the external meaning of the word, we find, interestingly, that there are many forms of activity that are not classified as art – with which are in the senses above is contrasted – which nevertheless are referred to by the use of the same term; e.g. art of cooking, art of communication, art of living. The term is also used to describe certain professions, providing a pointer to the social status of such professions in a certain society or at a certain historical period. As a comparative example, in the Czech language during the earlier part of this century we find the expressions art of government, art of politics, art of rapid orientation, art of decision making, art of convincing, art of tact, art of agitation, art of war, art of strategy, art of shooting, art of horse-riding, art of ball-catching, art of chess, art of obstetrics, art of driving, art of navigating. The way of thinking of today is different from that of ‘yesterday’. While today we may call ‘art’ such high-status professions as law, medicine, and acting, it is not so long ago that other professions such as carpentry, watch-making, shoe-making, and dress-making, were referred to by the name of arts.
Thus once one moves out of the domain of technology of art there are numerous terms having a central role in art discourse whose status is problematic. It may not be clear whether such terms are being used in a technical sense or not, and if not, whether they carry with them some objectively recognizable correlate or are the expression of the writer's personal judgment and evaluation.

In each of the next two sections we shall select one key lexical item and examine a little more slowly its occurrence in writing about art.

2.3. **Specific terms (1): aesthetic**

The answers to questions about art cited in section 2.1. above included two instances of the term *aesthetic*, in the collocations *aesthetic experience*, *aesthetic sense*. In standard dictionaries the words is defined as having to do with the sense of beauty; e.g. the Macquarie Dictionary 1) pertaining to the sense of the beautiful or the science of aesthetics; 2) having a sense of beautiful; characterized by a love of beauty. For Mukarovsky, on the other hand, the term relates to the aesthetic attitude. In other words, there are two possible meanings, one characterizing the object it modifies and the other related to the attitude the subject adopts towards the object perceived. In the first instance the adjective 'aesthetic' being interpreted like any other adjectives functioning as Epithet. When we say that something is red, hot, sweet we refer to a particular attribute of an object. In 'the red house', *red* limits the meaning of *house*; it is an attribute of house. But when we say "aesthetic", the meaning will vary considerably according to what kind of noun it is being used to modify.
The term is discussed by Monroe Beardsley in an article called "The Aesthetic Point of View" (Margolis, 1978 :6). Beardsley says that there has been a persistent effort to discover the uniquely 'aesthetic' component, aspect, or ingredient in whatever is experienced; unlike some other philosophical quarries, the object of this chase has not proved as elusive as the snark, the Holy Grail, or Judge Crater - but the hunters have returned not empty-handed, but overburdened. They have found a rich array of candidates for the basically and essentially aesthetic:

- aesthetic experience
- aesthetic value
- aesthetic enjoyment
- aesthetic satisfaction

- aesthetic objects
- aesthetic concepts
- aesthetic situations

Confronted with "such trophies", we cannot doubt that there is something aesthetic to be found in our world and our experience, but its exact location and its status remain in question.

Beardsley's 'aesthetic point of view' seems to be similar to Mukarovsky's notion of the 'aesthetic attitude' which Mukarovsky sees as one of the basic attitudes man adopts toward reality. Both explain their notion of the aesthetic point of view and the aesthetic attitude by comparing it with other attitudes and other points of view: in order to understand any particular point of view or any particular attitude we must look at the alternatives, because unless there is more than one point of view or attitude we may adopt towards reality, any discussion of 'point of view' or 'attitude' would be meaningless.

Beardsley recognizes three: the aesthetic point of view, the practical point of view and the engineering point of view. The first two points of view are identical with Mukarovsky's aesthetic and practical attitudes. (The engineering point of
view would probably also fall within Mykydovsky's practical attitude, since it is defined as our wish to alter reality in some way by means of our intervention.)

If my interpretation of Beardsley is correct, than 'experience, value, enjoyment, satisfaction, objects, concepts, situations' become "aesthetic" as a result of the 'aesthetic point of view'. However, he appears to confuse the issue a little by considering the aesthetic point of view as something the observer can have towards an object or a situation, while 'aesthetic' is also an attribute of the thing observed.

Beardsley illustrates what he means by 'the aesthetic point of view' by reference to architecture: what does it mean to say that something is a 'good building'? He cites the classic criteria of 'good architecture' as outlined by Vitruvius. Vitruvius' six fundamental principles - Order, Arrangement, Eurythmy, Symmetry, Propriety and Economy - were re-worded by Sir Henry Wotton, an English poet, connoisseur and diplomat in his book *The Elements of Architecture* (written in 1624 and quoted in Geoffrey Scott's book *The Architecture of Humanism*, 1954:15) as Commodity, Firmness and Delight. Commodity is function: that it makes a good church or house or school. Firmness is construction: that the building holds itself up. Delight is self-explanatory. Suppose we were comparing a number of buildings to see how well built they are, according to these three "conditions", we would find according to Beardsley, some 'that are functionally effective, structurally sound, and visually attractive. However, we would find others that are pretty poor in each of these departments. But also we would find that the characteristics vary independently over a wide range; that some extremely solid old bank buildings have Firmness without much Commodity or Delight, that some
highly delightful buildings are functionally hopeless, that some convenient bridges collapse' (Margolis, 1962:7)

Invited to say whether something is a good building, we might say that it is well built because it is strong; or else that its ugliness and inconvenience make it very poor. Scott (1954:15) suggests that to lump those conditions together is to force on architecture an unreal unity of aim; Beardsley concludes that for clarity in architectural discussion we might separate the three criteria, and say that they arise in connection with his three different points of view — the practical, the engineering, and the aesthetic. In this way, the notion of a point of view is introduced to break up a dispute into segments that seem likely to be more manageable. Instead of asking one question — whether this is a good building — we divide it into three. Considering the building from the aesthetic point of view, we ask whether it is a good work of architecture; from the engineering point of view, whether it is a good structure; and from the practical point of view, whether it is a good machine for living.

Now, doing the above would suggest our awareness of two other things apart from the aesthetic consideration. When discussing a building in terms of its being or not being a good work of architecture we would actually be talking about its intended function, e.g. a school being functionally good to satisfy the requirements of a building used as a school. When talking about the structure of a building we would be considering the ‘internal’ structure by which it holds itself up. (I would suggest that if this approach could be used in the area of painting then many of our lexical-semantic problems might be removed.)

To summarize, in Beardsley’s discussion of the term, ‘aesthetic’ is taken to be an attribute of a point of view.
Let us see how he himself uses the term in his various definitions of it:

'To adopt the aesthetic point of view with regard to X is to take an interest in whatever aesthetic value X may possess.'

'To adopt an aesthetic point of view with regard to X is to take an interest in whatever aesthetic value that X may possess or that is obtainable by means of X.'

'To judge X from the aesthetic point of view is to estimate the aesthetic value of X.'

'The aesthetic value of an object is the value it possess in virtue of its capacity to provide aesthetic gratification.'

'Gratification is aesthetic when it is obtained primarily from attention to the formal unity or to the regional qualities of a complex whole, and when its magnitude is a function of the degree of formal unity and/or the intensity of regional quality.'

'The amount of aesthetic value possessed by an object is a function of the degree of aesthetic gratification it is capable of providing in a particular experience of it.'

'The aesthetic value of X is the value that X possesses in virtue of the capacity to provide aesthetic gratification when correctly experienced.'

'The aesthetic value of X is the value that X possesses in virtue of its capacity to provide aesthetic gratification when correctly and completely experienced.'

'A consideration about an object is relevant to the aesthetic point of view if and only if it is a fact about the object that affects the degree to which the marks of aesthetic gratification (formal unity and intensity of regional quality) are present in the object.' (Margolis, 1962: 9-23)

The above suggests that in fact the viewer has little to do with the aesthetic point of view. His contribution is to evaluate the amount of the aesthetic value an object has; but the aesthetic value itself is located in the object, measured by the amount of aesthetic gratification it can provide. For Mukarovsky on the other hand, 'aesthetic' is not an attribute of a work of art; it is our 'aesthetic attitude' that gives rise to expressions such as those quoted above.
Now, can linguistics help us in any way here? Can a linguistic analysis support our view that, though the adjective 'aesthetic' is seemingly an attribute of the noun it modifies, this is not really the case? Let us repeat Beardsley's examples, adding three more which occur later on in his article:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>aesthetic experience</th>
<th>aesthetic objects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aesthetic value</td>
<td>aesthetic concepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aesthetic enjoyment</td>
<td>aesthetic situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aesthetic satisfactions</td>
<td>aesthetic view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aesthetic gratification</td>
<td>aesthetic attitude</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What we have here are 10 different nominal groups with the adjective 'aesthetic' modifying different nouns. 'Adjective' and 'noun' are class labels. We could have used functional labels and call 'aesthetic' Modifier and all the nouns Head. Labelling in general means putting names on things, and so it is a way of specifying what these elements are. There are two significant ways of labelling a linguistic unit. One is to assign a word to a class; the other is to assign a function to it. A class is a set of items that are alike in some respect; but the class label indicates nothing of what the item is doing in a given instance. Function refers to the relationships within the grammatical structure. The purpose of functional labelling is to provide a means of interpreting grammatical structure, in such a way as to relate any given instance to the system of the language as a whole (Halliday, 1985:31-33).

Let us now discuss the structure of these nominal groups. Each one contains a noun ('experience, value, enjoyment, satisfaction, gratification, objects, concepts, situations, view, attitude') preceded by an adjective 'aesthetic'. This structure has the function of specifying (1) a class of
things, and (ii) some category of membership within this class. Halliday uses the functional label THING for the element expressing the class. Membership within the class is typically expressed by one or more of the functional elements Deictic, Numerative, Epithet and Classifier. Let us briefly characterize each of these in turn.

1) DEICTIC - the Deictic element indicates whether or not some specific subset of the THING is intended; and if so, which. It is either (specific) or (ii) non-specific. The specific Deictic can be either Demonstrative or Possessive and these in turn can be either Determinative or Interrogative.

As Halliday says, the subset in question is specified by one of two possible Deictic features: either (i) demonstratively, i.e. by reference to some kind of PROXIMITY to the speaker, or (ii) by possession, i.e. by reference to PERSON as defined from the standpoint of the speaker; together with the possibility of an interrogative in both these categories. All these have the function of identifying a particular subset of the 'thing' that is being referred to.

There is one other item in this class, namely the. The word the is a specific determinative Deictic of a peculiar kind: it means 'the subset in question is identifiable; but this will not tell you how to identify it - the information is somewhere around, where you can recover it.' (ibid., 161). Halliday says that the is usually accompanied by some other element which supplies the information required. If there is no such information supplied, the subset in question will either be obvious from the situation, or else will have been referred to already in the discourse.
The non-specific Deictics convey the sense of all, or none, or some unspecified subset.

The Deictic then opens up the choice of Number in the English nominal group. There are two different systems of Number in English, one associated with each of the two kinds of Deictics.

(i) With specific Deictics, the number is 'non-plural/plural': mass nouns are grouped together with singular, in a category of 'non-plural'.

(ii) With non-specific Deictics, the system is 'singular/non-singular': mass nouns are grouped together with plural, in a category of 'non-singular'.

If there is no Deictic element, the nominal group is non-specific and, within that, non-singular.

2) NUMERATIVE - the numerative element indicates some numerical feature of the subset: either quantity or order, either exact or inexact. (This category will be of less importance here.)

3) EPITHET - the Epithet indicates some quality of the subset. This may be an objective property of the thing itself, e.g. blue, long, old; or it may be an expression of the speaker's subjective attitude towards it, e.g. splendid, silly, fantastic. Halliday suggests that there is no hard and fast line between these two; but the former are experiential in function, whereas the latter represent an interpersonal element in the meaning of the nominal group. This distinction is reflected in the grammar in various ways. The principal difference between the two is that experiential Epithets are potentially defining, whereas interpersonal ones are not. In general, the same word may
set as either experiential or interpersonal Epithet; there are very few words in English that serve only an attitudinal function.

4) CLASSIFIER - the Classifier indicates a particular subclass of the thing in question. Sometimes the same word may function either as Epithet or as Classifier. The line between the two is not a very sharp one, but there are significant differences. Classifiers do not accept degrees of comparison or intensity and they tend to be organized in mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets. According to Halliday, the range of semantic relations that may be embodied in a set of items functioning as Classifiers is very broad: it includes material, scale and scope, purpose and function, status and rank, origin, mode of operation - more or less any feature that may serve to classify a set of things into a system of smaller sets.

Halliday concludes by saying that the classes of word which most typically realize the above functions are:

Deictic - determiner
Numerative - numeral
Epithet - adjective
Classifier - adjective
Thing - noun

5) The element Halliday calls "THING" is the semantic core of the nominal group. It can be common noun, proper noun or (personal) pronoun. In our particular case we deal with common nouns:

EXPERIENCE, VALUE, ENJOYMENT, SATISFACTION,
GRATIFICATION, OBJECTS, CONCEPTS, SITUATIONS,
VIEW, ATTITUDE

A general definition of the class 'noun' involves both grammatical and semantic considerations, with some of the
grammatical features having an overt manifestation and others not:

**Grammatical**: a noun is either count or mass:
\begin{itemize}
  \item if count, may be either singular or plural,
  \item plural usually inflected with -s; can be made possessive, adding -'s/-s'; can take the in front; can be Subject in a clause, etc.
\end{itemize}

**Semantic**: expresses a person, other animate being, inanimate object or abstraction, bounded or unbounded, etc.

Common nouns are typically accompanied by a Deictic and often other elements as well. As already said, they name classes of persons, other living things, objects, collectives, and institutions; as well as, by grammatical metaphor, phenomena that would typically appear as adjectives (qualities) or as verbs (processes and relations). These metaphorical 'things' often occur without further specification, since their referents cannot be said to have members in the usual sense.

6) QUALIFIER: Following the Thing there may be a further element, in the form of a phrase or a clause, which also adds specificity to the class represented by the noun; usually defining it in such a way as to evaluate all others, e.g. the day of judgment, ten days that shock the world. (This category also is not represented in our examples.)

\begin{itemize}
  \item aesthetic experience
  \item aesthetic value
  \item aesthetic enjoyment
  \item aesthetic satisfaction
  \item aesthetic gratification
  \item aesthetic objects
  \item aesthetic concepts
  \item aesthetic situations
  \item aesthetic view
  \item aesthetic attitude
\end{itemize}
Some of the above nouns are countable; others are not. Object, concept and situation obviously are, since they are plural here; enjoyment, satisfaction and gratification are not countable. View, attitude, experience and value are problematic: all four readily exist in the plural, but the sense may be different. For example, are aesthetic values the same things as aesthetic value? Is aesthetic experience countable (as aesthetic experience, two aesthetic experiences, and so on) or not? None of these nouns expresses a person or other animate being. 'Object' refers to an inanimate item, and the rest refer to abstractions. Probably

aesthetic enjoyment
aesthetic satisfaction
aesthetic gratification

should be seen as grammatical metaphors. They are phenomena that would typically appear as verbs - to enjoy, to satisfy, to gratify.

To summarize, the adjective 'aesthetic' never modifies persons or other animate beings. Only inanimate objects or abstractions can be aesthetic. We must now have a look at the type of inanimate objects and abstractions that can be called "aesthetic".

If we follow the ideology of traditional aesthetic and art criticism, then any work of art is aesthetic because its aesthetic value or quality is what makes it a work of art. "Aesthetic" is an attribute of an object which belongs in the realm of art. If we follow Mukarovsky, then it is our attitude that is aesthetic; but anything towards which we adopt the aesthetic attitude can be extension called aesthetic. In this sense any inanimate object and any situation can be seen or considered as aesthetic.
Of the above expressions, four, namely 'aesthetic experience', 'aesthetic enjoyment', 'aesthetic satisfaction', 'aesthetic gratification' reflect the specific view of 18th century aesthetics according to which the place of a work of art is to offer enjoyment, satisfaction and gratification. Since the nouns themselves already refer to something pleasing and gratifying it seems almost unnecessary to modify them further.

As far as the elements expressing membership within the class are concerned, on their own all the nouns can be preceded by all four elements - Deictic, Numerative, Epithet and Classifier, but as soon as they get modified by the adjective "aesthetic" they lose this potential. As far as the Deictic is concerned the only specific Deictic I have found preceding the above nominal groups is 'the'. I have never found them being specified either demonstratively or by possession, e.g. this aesthetic attitude; her aesthetic satisfaction; their aesthetic enjoyment. If it is the object which is supposed to have the aesthetic quality this could be the reason why we do not find references to 'her aesthetic attitude,' or 'their aesthetic enjoyment'.

However, enjoyment, satisfaction, enjoyment or gratification is not something that what an inanimate object (the only item modified by the term 'aesthetic') could experience. It is not obvious why such entities are never personalized.

We do find the word the, which we referred to earlier as a specific determinative Deictic of a peculiar kind: it means 'the subset in question is identifiable; but this will not tell you how to identify it - the information is somewhere around, where you can recover it'. The is usually accompanied by some other element which functions to supply the information required.
This is often an Epithet or Classifier in the nominal group: for example the red house ‘the house which you can identify by its being red’. In all our examples aesthetic occupies this position, and in principle therefore could supply the information needed to identify the experience, value, etc. in question. The question is whether it does or not.

In order to answer this question we need to ask whether the nominal groups in question can be preceded by non-specific Deictic and Numerals. Some of them can be preceded by such non-specific Deictics as ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘every’, e.g. some aesthetic objects, all aesthetic values, etc. This applies to all these that can be pluralized (cf. above). Of these, however, only ‘aesthetic objects’, ‘aesthetic concepts’, and ‘aesthetic situations’ can be two or three or several or many or few. However, the meanings are different. When we say ‘two aesthetic objects’ or ‘two aesthetic situations’ we are referring to the aesthetic quality of the objects and situations themselves; whereas when we say ‘two aesthetic concepts’ we mean two concepts connected with the philosophy of art, e.g. the notion of beauty and taste are two aesthetic concepts.

Now, what is "aesthetic" here? Is it the Epithet or the Classifier? According to Halliday’s definition, the Epithet indicates some quality of the subset. This may be an objective property of the Thing itself or it may be an expression of the speaker’s subjective attitude. In the first case, we have an experiential Epithet, which is potentially defining; it may therefore serve to identify, exclusively, a subset defined by that property, as in the red house above. In the second case the Epithet represents an interpersonal element in the meaning of the nominal groups, and as such it is not defining: if I say the dear little puppy I am not identifying the puppy in contrast to other which are not dear or little. The Classifier, on
the other hand, indicates a particular sub-class of the
'Thing' represented by the nominal group: this is one of a
(potentially) closed set of classes and the membership is
decidable: either it belong to this class or to that.

It seems likely that, in the above two examples, aesthetic
is functioning as Classifier in aesthetic concept (concept
belonging to aesthetics as opposed to some other
discipline); and also probably in aesthetic experience,
attitude, value and view, in all of which it contrasts with
practical (experience, attitude, value, view), religious
(experience, attitude, value, view) and some others. With
enjoyment, satisfaction and gratification, on the other hand,
it appears to function as an Epithet; these are kinds of
enjoyment, but cannot be said to form one of a set of
classes. (We could perhaps say very aesthetic satisfaction,
but probably not very aesthetic value; and certainly not
very aesthetic concept.) But since, as already suggested,
these three examples are nominalizations of processes, the
defining function of the Epithet is considerably weakened.
Finally in aesthetic situations and aesthetic objects,
aesthetic is presumably again Epithet; in aesthetic objects
it clearly refers to a property of some thing (there is no
grammatical metaphor there) whereas in aesthetic situations
there is presumable a grammatical metaphor of a different
kind (situations in which aesthetic experience may take
place).

If we test these lurches by substituting the word beauty,
further uncertainty is revealed:

    aesthetic concepts : concepts of (to do with) beauty

    aesthetic experience : experience of beauty
    " attitude : attitude towards beauty(?)
    " value : value in terms of beauty
aesthetic enjoyment : enjoying beautiful things
aesthetic satisfaction : being satisfied by (having one's sense of beauty satisfied?)

aesthetic gratification: being gratified by things

aesthetic objects : beautiful objects
aesthetic situations : situations in which beauty can be experienced

What the grammatical analysis reveals is that more than one interpretation is possible. We cannot be certain that these are 'correct', because in fact there is no unique solution. Apart from aesthetic concepts, which is clearly at one end, and aesthetic objects, which is clearly at the other, all these examples have multiple interpretations. They may be Epithet or Classifier; if Epithet they may or may not have an 'interpersonal' connotation (of attitude); both Classifier and Epithet may express a number of different semantic relationships; and there may be grammatical metaphor involved.

It is not enough to discuss words like aesthetics as if they were items listed in a dictionary, only when we place them in their grammatical environment do we see the potential for ambiguity that they display.

2.4 Specific terms (2): creative

In the list of answers cited in 2.1 above we can find seven occurrences of the terms creative, creativity, create and creation:
- Art is what is created by a creative, talented, and skilled draftsman.

- Art is an expression of human creativity revealed by some medium.

- Art expresses the infinite number of moods of man, created by an original creative mind, compelled by some inner force.

- Art is a visual expression of one or more people depending on how many have been involved in the creation of the art work.

- Art is a creative form which rejects the over-riding stress of theoretical principles and contains pictorial elements of shape, color, and space.

The most obvious difference between creative and aesthetic is that, while aesthetic occurred only in that form (the only morphological variants are aesthetics, used only as the name of the discipline, and aesthete which does not figure in writing about art), creative is one of a scatter of such variants: creative (adjective), create (verb), creativity and creation (nouns). All four occur in this little sample.

In two instances, two of them co-occur; in both it is the verb create, as a material process, in the passive, with an Agent in the form of a nominal group having creative as Epithet:

created by a creative...draftsman
created by a...creative mind

In both examples, moreover, we find other Epithets collocated with creative:

a creative, talented and skilled draftsman
an original, creative mind
There is no doubt here that creative is an Epithet; it modifies a human being - either a kind of human being (draftsman) or a part of one (mind); and the collocations suggest that it is interpersonally loaded as 'good'.

The other example of creative is in a definition of art: [art is] a creative form. It is not quite clear whether form means a kind of thing (like object in aesthetic object) or a kind of activity; and the Qualifier which rejects the overriding stress of theoretical principles... contains too much grammatical metaphor to enable us to decide.

Apart from create and creative we have creativity 'quality of being creative, ability to create', ascribed to humankind; and creation 'art of creating' in which one or more people may be involved. Creating, then, is something which human beings can do; some of them (or their minds) do; under duress (compelled by some inner force) but also in a spirit of rebellion.

It seems likely that these forms of expression reflect the writings about art that the students have been reading. Let us therefore give a few examples of the use of the term creative by a professional writer on art, Desiderius Orban (from What is Art All About?):

- Even if art is presented in textbook form, the freedom to discover the real meaning of creativeness through individual reaction should be implicit.
- Very simply stated, I would like to help you enter the world of creativeness, to separate, in your mind, the painter from the artist.
- Without making this separation, it is impossible to see what creative art means.
- The statement that creativeness equals art should be the foundation of all efforts to establish any kind of concept about art.
- Looking into a creative work is like dwelling in a strange way.
- I would like to make it clear that no effort is needed to enter the artist's world of creativeness.

- Creativeness in art started to live its own life, apart from the story, only when it became clear to the artist that form, colour, space and their relationship can have an aesthetic fascination regardless of the story.

- If the laymen were stimulated by his discovery of the creative artist's world, if he were willing to surrender to the artist's ability to separate his creative world from life's routine experiences, he would have no difficulty in enjoying the new experience and sensation of creativeness.

- Creative-minded people find ways to avoid monotony even if they work routinely.

- Although I have discussed this point at length before, I am forced to repeat it because I do not know a better way to exemplify the significant difference between workmanship and creativeness.

- Creativeness is the basis of artistic achievement.

These examples are closer to the illustrate the way the writer has foregrounded the term creative. Many of them are functioning as definitions; hence the additional variant creativeness, as in the real meaning of creativeness. creativeness equals... creativeness is... (nouns are more easily set up as defined terms; cf Chapter 6 bellow). Creativeness occurs eight times, seven of them as a nominal group on its own, without either pre- or post-modifier; the one exception is creativeness in art. In the definitions, creativeness equals art and is the basis of artistic achievement; in the other examples it is also tied to the artist, e.g. the artist's world of creativeness, and used to contrast the artist with the painter. The total effect is to foreground the term very strongly as a thing in itself, and then make the two, creativeness and art define each other. It is noticeable that the grammar of an example such as creativeness equals art does not make explicit which term is defining which. (In grammatical terms, although the Token + Values structure is clear, the Identified + Identifier structure is not; cf. Chapter 4 below.)

The adjectival form creative appears in creative art, creative artist, creative work and creative world; and also
In the complex premodifier *creative-minded*. If creativeness equals art, then presumably in the first two of these examples it is merely descriptive, not defining, since all art, and every artist must be creative; whereas *creative work* would contrast with *non-creative work*, or *workmanship*. In such instances *creative* is an Epithet, with an interpersonal connotation of ‘good’. *Creative world* is equivalent to world of creativeness; *here create* is probably Classifier, ‘type of milieu in which creativity takes place’.

For purposes of comparison, here is the complete nominal group list of environments in which the terms *creative, creativity, creativeness* and *creation* appear in Orban’s book.

1. Creative

- creative art
- a creative work
- every creative work
- the creative artist
- the creative artist’s world
- the creative element
- a creative mind
- creative responsibility
- the artist’s creative instinct
- his own creative instinct
- the artist’s creative personality
- creative imagination
- their creative similarity
- the child’s creative imagination
- a creative imagination
- his creative imagination
- the creative freedom of the artist
- the painter’s creative instinct
- the original creative instinct
- the creative process
- the creative artistic quality
- the creative content
- creative content
- the new creative unity
- a creative masterpiece
- the artist’s creative power
- their creative power [of works of art]
- his creative power
- the creative power [of the artist]
- the creative convincing power
- creative convincing power
- the creative quality of a work
- their artistic creative meaning [of works of art]
- creative originality
- the creative meaning
- an artistic creative urge
- one’s inborn creative ability
2. Creativeness

- the real meaning of creativeness
- the meaning of creativeness
- the world of creativeness
- the statement that creativeness equals art
- the artist's world of creativeness
- creativeness in art started to live its own life
- the new experience and sensation of creativeness
- creativeness is the basis of artistic achievement
- their lack of creativeness
- the spirituality of creativeness
- visual creativeness
- the freedom of creativeness
- the wonderful freedom of creativeness
- the wonderful responsibility of creativeness
- the child's inborn instinct of creativeness
- the exciting experience of creativeness
- the urge of creativeness
- the power of creativeness
- the quality of creativeness
- his creativeness
- the laws of artistic creativeness
- the fundamental properties of creativeness
- a feeling of creativeness
- the field of creativeness
- the common denominator of creativeness
- art creativeness
- the everlasting bastion of creativeness
- the problem of creativeness
- their creativeness
- the full responsibility of creativeness
- the balls element of creativeness
- your inborn creativeness

3. Creativity

- the foundation of all artistic creativity
- the nature of creativity
- the spontaneous creativity
- the field of creativity

4. Creation

- the artist's creation

In the previous section we had looked at examples of nominal groups with the adjective aesthetic modifying different kinds of Thing. It is interesting to consider Orban's use of creative from the same point of view. Specifically in the light of what we found in the case of aesthetic, we may ask whether creative functions as Epithet or Classifier (and
whether or not it is possible to decide; what kinds of
Thing (Head nouns) occur with it; and what Deictic elements
typically accompany it.

To return briefly to Halliday's discussion of Epithet and
Classifier: Halliday points out (1985:164) that when the
same word functions as Epithet and Classifier there will be
a difference in meaning between the two. His example is fast
trains: if fast is Epithet in means 'trains that go fast',
while if fast is Classifier it means 'express trains' (i.e.
trains classified as expresses). The Epithet indicates a
quality, experiential (presented as objective) or
attitudinal (presented as subjective); the Classifier
indicates a sub-class. We saw with aesthetic, however, that
the difference was not always clear; some instances were
clearly one or the other, with different meanings, while
with others it was hard to decide - typically because some
kind of grammatical metaphor was involved.

The examples with creative are no less varied. We may
subdivide them as follows:

(a) characterizing a work (Epithet)
    art work masterpiece
(b) characterizing a person (Epithet)
    artist
(c) characterizing an attribute of a person (Epithet)
    mind instinct personality imagination
    urge(?) spirit(?)
(d) characterizing 'ability' (Epithet ?)
    ability power originality (?)
(e) characterizing an activity (Epithet ?)
(f) characterizing an aspect or part of a work (Epithet ?)
content element meaning
(g) specifying 'in respect of...' (Classifier ?)
similarity unity freedom
(h) specifying 'type of...' (Classifier)
world quality

As with aesthetic, but to an even greater extent (because of the greater variety), these examples place a considerable burden on the reader: first, because the semantic relationship between 'creative' and the noun it modifies is immensely variable; secondly, because, even if we can identify it in such detail as the above we have still not made it fully explicit; and thirdly, many instances could in fact be interpreted in more than one way (e.g. creative freedom may be 'freedom to create' as suggested here; but it might be more like creative instinct or creative power). Added to this is the fourth point, made earlier, that it is difficult to separate the element of objective description embodied in the term from that of subjective evaluation. Thus an expression such as creative power may be interpreted as experiential Epithet 'power that is creative (that creates ...)', as attitudinal Epithet 'power that is highly valued (because it can create)', or as Classifier 'power to create (contrasted with destructive power)'; all embody some grammatical metaphor, but it is a different metaphor in each case.

Of the above expressions, those with instinct, imagination, ability and power occur with personal possessive Deictic (his, the artist's, etc.). Element, meaning, and similarity also occurs with possessive Deictic, but here the
'possessor' is the work of art. Other nouns which occur with a specific Deictic but not a possessive, are 'artist', 'content', 'unity', 'process', 'freedom', and 'world': all these are preceded by the, and again the question arises of whether they are to be understood as defining in function—that is, whether the quality of being 'creative' is being used to define a subset of 'artist', 'content', etc., in contrast to others which are not creative. In most instances it is not easy to decide; but it does affect the interpretation, because if the Epithet (or Classifier) is not being used as defining, then there must be some other source of information for identifying the kind of 'artist', the kind of 'content', etc. being referred to. (This is shown unambiguously in the 'the'.) Either the referent is known to be unique (e.g. all artists are creative), or the information is somewhere else in the text, or it is to be supplied from the reader's prior knowledge. In one way or another, the reader is supposed to know, or at least to know how to find out.

If we compare some of the nominal groups used by Orban with those in the replies written by the students, there are some that could have been an attempt to paraphrase Orban (the book was a set text on the course):

**Orban**

1) - the creative freedom of the artist
2) - the creative process
3) - the artist's creative power
4) - his creative power
5) - an artistic creative ability
6) - the creative convincing power (of works of art)
7) - his creative imagination

**Students**

1) The modern artist is free to create.
2) Cezanne was involved in a process of creating a new terminology of painting.

3) You can say that an artist is creative because he has a special power to create.

4) It is his power to create that makes Gauguin a very interesting artist to look at.

5) It is only the modern artist who has the ability to create. Those artists who imitate do not have this ability to create.

6) As Orban says, creative works can be characterized by their convincing power to create.

7) Gogh's imagination helps him to create.

The students' texts reveal some of the difficulties referred to above. Is the artist's power itself creative, or is it his power that helps him 'to create'? 'The creative freedom of the artist' could suggest that it is the artist's freedom that is creative, but it has been taken to mean 'the artist's freedom to create.' Is Cezanne's 'process of creating' a process that is 'creative', or is the creative process just a 'process of creating something'? And what is the relation between Orban's creative convincing power and the student's convincing power to create?

Orban's use of 'creativity' presents a different problem again. Most of the instances are like those in the text examples cited above: 'creativity' forms a nominal group in its own, usually functioning in the Qualifier of another nominal group (e.g. the real meaning of creativity, the basic element of creativity). This structure is itself highly ambiguous: 'the of' may signal 'which is' as in the quality of creativity, 'which consists of' as in the urge of creativity, 'which accompanies' as in the responsibility of creativity, 'which is a part of' as in the element of creativity, 'which is a property of' as in the spirituality of creativity, and various other things.
besides (cf. field, fashion, sensation of creativeness). Creativity, which he uses much more rarely, has a similar semantic potential.

The grammatical analysis of these terms and expressions reveals how much ambiguity is present in the various structures in which they occur. Such ambiguity is a normal feature of language. It causes little difficulty in everyday life, because the reader (or listener) typically rejects the inappropriate interpretations without even noticing that they are possible. In unfamiliar types of discourse, however, the reader often does not possess the necessary knowledge and experience to enable him to do this. He may be aware that there is a problem, but not know how to solve it; more often, however, he settles on one particular interpretation — the wrong one — without becoming aware that he is heading in the wrong direction. It is this characteristic of art discourse — that the reader may take the wrong turning without even realizing that there were alternative readings — that makes the student's task a formidable one to undertake.
2.5 The use of vocabulary in aesthetics and art criticism

In the previous sections we discussed two terms that are frequently used in the aesthetic discourse and the discourse of art criticism. Two points could be made at this stage. One is that it is helpful to consider key terms such as aesthetics and creative in their paradigmatic context, along with their variants (not all of which will be adjectives) and other words with which they contrast. The other is that, when they are considered in their syntagmatic context, it is important to provide a grammatical (syntactic) analysis of the structures in which they occur.

Many of the familiar terms used to characterize works of art, as well as other terms used in art discourse, have been critically examined in relation to their conditions of use, although they have not (as far as I am aware) been subjected to linguistic analysis in terms of a theoretical model of grammar. One of the most important treatments of this question is that by Frank Sibley in his article Aesthetic Concepts (Margolis, 1962:64). Sibley distinguishes two kinds of terms that are used to characterize works of art: descriptive, and aesthetic. This distinction relates to the distinction we have been making in this chapter between descriptive Epithets and attitudinal Epithets - which is based on the general grammatical distinction between the experiential and the interpersonal functions of language.

According to Sibley, when a word or expression is such that taste or perceptiveness is required in order to apply it, the term may be classified as 'aesthetic'. Aesthetic terms span a great range of meanings and could be grouped into various types characteristic of their use in aesthetic discourse and the discourse of art criticism.
Sibley offers a list of 'aesthetic' terms that are used frequently in these two types of discourse: unified, balanced, integrated, lifeless, serene, sombre, dynamic, powerful, vivid, delicate, moving, trite, sentimental, tragic. The list is not limited to adjectives; it includes expressions like telling contrast, sets up a tension, conveys a sense of, holds it together. Some of these expressions are used in artistic contexts by both laymen and critics alike; others are mainly used by professional critics and other art specialists. Some occur also outside the context of art discourse, in everyday discourse as well; such expressions have both an aesthetic use and some other use that is unconnected with aesthetic judgment or taste. Words which function only, or at least predominantly, as aesthetic terms but may occur either in professional or in informal discourse, may be exemplified by graceful, delicate, daintily, handsome, elegant, garish. These may be contrasted with other terms which are seldom used in an aesthetic sense, for instance: red, noisy, clammy, square, docile, curved, evanescent, intelligent, faithful, derelict, tardy, freakish, etc.

Sibley points out that words employed as aesthetic terms often involve metaphors; words have been pressed into service which do not primarily function in this manner, by some kind of metaphorical transference. This is so with terms like dynamic, melancholy, balanced, tightly-knit, etc. which except in artistic and critical writings are not normally aesthetic terms. But aesthetic vocabulary is not wholly metaphorical. Many words, including the most common (lovely, pretty, beautiful, elegant) are certainly not being used metaphorically when employed as aesthetic terms: this is their primary or only use. With others like dynamic, balanced, although they have come by a metaphorical shift to be aesthetic terms, their use in art criticism is now
quasi—metaphorical rather than metaphorical, in the sense that they are now standard vocabulary in that language.

Although aesthetic terms figure largely in everyday discourse, there is often much dispute over how they are applied and interpreted. Sibley is inclined to explain this by saying that relatively few people have the necessary taste and sensibility. My own view would be that it is the application of aesthetic terms, rather than a lack of sensitivity on the part of the perceiver, that is responsible for the majority of problems of understanding.

Critics often try to guard against misunderstanding by offering an explanation; Sibley offers three examples:

- "it has an extraordinary vitality because of its free and vigorous style of drawing;"
- "graceful in the smooth flow of its lines;"
- "dainty because of the delicacy and harmony of its colouring."

But here all that is happening is that one aesthetic epithet is being 'explained' by other epithets of the same general type: e.g., intelligent by ingenious, inventive, acute, etc. (Margolis, p.66). It is more helpful to the reader to explain them by referring to features which are not aesthetic in character, and do not depend for their recognitions upon an exercise of taste (ibid., 66):

- "delicate because of its pastel shades and curving lines;"
- "it lacks balance because one group of figures is so far off to the left and is so brightly illuminated."

The problem is, however, as Sibley points out, that although there are various relationships between aesthetic qualities and non-aesthetic features, there are no non-aesthetic features which serve in any circumstances as logically sufficient conditions for applying aesthetic terms.
Aesthetic or taste concepts are not in this respect condition-governed at all. Whereas for a word like square we can specify a set of necessary and sufficient conditions in virtue of which it can be applied (four equal sides and four right angles), the same aesthetic term may apply to widely varied objects. There is no single set of features that ensure that something is graceful or vital.

A weaker model, now recognized by philosophers as applying to many everyday concepts, is that of a number of relevant features, such that the presence of some group or combination of these features is sufficient for the application of the concept. The list of relevant features may be an open one, but when judging an object or situation we can tell which are the ones that suffice. But aesthetic concepts cannot be captured even in this way. There are no non-aesthetic features such that the presence of some set or number of them will beyond question warrant the application of an aesthetic term. As Sibley points out, it is impossible to make any statements corresponding to those we can make for condition-governed words. We are able to say: "If it is true he can do this, and that, and the other, then one just cannot deny that he is intelligent." But we cannot say that "If the vase is pale pink, somewhat curving, lightly mottled, and so forth, it will be delicate."

Yet Sibley himself admits that there are some respects in which aesthetic terms are governed by conditions or rules. For instance, it may be impossible that a thing should be garish if all its colours are pale pastels, or flamboyant if all its lines are straight. Descriptions of this kind may make certain aesthetic terms inapplicable or inappropriate: and if one uses such words, in such contexts, this might be taken as showing a failure to understand them. If we can at least specify what is not graceful, or not vital, this will go some way towards making such terms explicit.
But whatever view we take of the faculty of aesthetic judgment, there is an important respect in which it differs from the use of the five senses: namely, in the way we support those judgements in which aesthetic concepts are employed. As Sibley suggests, although we use these concepts without rules and conditions, we do defend our judgements, and seek to convince others of their rightness, by talking. The critic's talk aims at explaining works of art in terms which will support his own judgment; and it assumed that he can do this by pointing out the features upon which that judgment depends. The issue then becomes: — what words does the critic have to use in order to justify the words he is using? In other words, both the aesthetic judgment and the justification for it are linguistic phenomena; the relationship is between one verbal event and another.

It is usually said that the aim of the critic's talk is to bring people to see the aesthetic qualities of a work of art. In other words, the critic is helping us to see what there is to be seen. However, since there are no criterical features for 'what there is to be seen' what we are told is what the critic sees. His talk is not a scientific explanation of what "is there", but an argued support for his own view. But the question still remains - how does a critic do it? How is it that by talking about features of the work the critic can affect our perception of it? As Sibley asks: "What sort of endowment is this which talking can modify?"

Clearly, "discussion does not improve eyesight and hearing" (Macdonald, 1954: pp.19-120). But we do succeed in applying aesthetic terms, and we do succeed by talking in bringing others to see what we see. According to Sibley we should not be puzzled about this. Our puzzlement over the "esoteric" character of aesthetic qualities arises from bearing in mind inappropriate philosophical models. "When someone is unable
to see that the book on the table is brown, we cannot get him to see that and consequently it seems puzzling that we might get someone to see that the vase is graceful by talking. If we are to dispel this puzzlement and recognize aesthetic concepts and qualities for what they are, we must abandon unsuitable models and investigate how we actually employ these concepts (ibid., 77).

Stuart Hampshire considers that in order to bring us to see aesthetic qualities the critic employs "an unnatural use of words in description"; "the common vocabulary, being created for practical purposes, obstructs any disinterested perception of things"; and so these qualities "are normally described metaphorically by some transference of terms from the common vocabulary." Sibley however denies that there is any necessity of wrestling the "common vocabulary" from its "natural" uses to serve an aesthetic purpose, or of building a new, metaphorical vocabulary in opposition to the normal tendencies of the language. To suggest that there is something unnatural about using words like forceful, dynamic or tightly-knit in art criticism misrepresents both the character of aesthetic qualities and aesthetic language. We might add that it also misrepresents the character of language in general. There is nothing obstructive about common vocabulary, and nothing unnatural in the use of metaphor in everyday discourse.

Sibley himself is an art critic, and in the last section of his article he identifies seven linguistic means which critics use to induce others to see a work of art as they see it.

1) A critic may mention non-aesthetic features, e.g. 'notice these flecks of color, that dark mass there, those lines', thus drawing the spectator's attention to certain easily
discernible features which he claims make the painting *luminous* or *warm*, etc. grasping or seeing something else.

2) On the other hand, a critic may simply mention the aesthetic qualities he wants people to see, e.g. ‘notice how nervous and delicate the drawing is’.

3) He may make observations which specifically link the aesthetic and non-aesthetic features.

4) He may use similes and metaphors, e.g. ‘as though he had thrown on the paint violently and in anger,’ ‘the light shimmers, the lines dance, everything is air’, ‘his canvasses are fires, they crackle, burn, and blaze.’

5) A critic may use contrasts, comparisons, and reminiscences, e.g. "Supposed he had made that a lighter yellow, moved it to the right, how flat it would have been," "Don’t you think it has something of the quality of a Rembrandt?, "Hasn’t it the same serenity, peace, and quality of light of those summer evenings in Norfolk?"

6) He may often repeat and reiterate, coming back time and again to the same point, drawing attention to the same lines and shapes, repeating the same words or the same similes and metaphors - or else supplementing them with more talk of the same kind.

7) Finally, a critic may adopt particular prosodic and paralinguistic features in his speech: tones of voice, facial expressions, and gestures.

No doubt this is an accurate statement about critical writing in general. But, as is suggested by the examples studied in Chapters 4 - 7 below (and the longer passages included in the Appendix), only some of these features may
be present in any one text. In particular, observations of type 3), where an explicit link is made between aesthetic and non-aesthetic 'features' (which we would see as a link between aesthetic and non-aesthetic language), seem not to be very common; and even explicit reference to the non-aesthetic features - Sibley's type 1) is often lacking.

Since 5) and 7) are largely features of spoken discourse, in written art criticism there seems to be a predominance of 2) and 4): 'descriptions' of a work of art in terms of its 'aesthetic' qualities, backed up by a variety of similes and metaphors. As we have agreed, there is nothing 'unnatural' or problematic in the use of metaphors as such; Sibley is right in saying that it is a natural human tendency to relate certain experiences to others, and everyday language is no less metaphorical in this respect (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors we live by*; Rada:1979). Sibley draws attention to the way children become familiar with metaphors from a very early age. But it is clear from accounts of child language that as children build up what Phillips, in his study of this process (1984), calls the language of comparisons and contrasts, there is a rich environment of linguistic and contextual information available to them. For the student reading texts in art criticism, on the other hand, while the work of art under discussion is (in principle, at least) available, the clues that relate the metaphors to it are lacking. Instead he is presented with a contraction of metaphors that are largely personal to the critic who is writing. They may be reiterated and elaborated, as in Sibley's type 6); but they tend to form a closed semantic pattern, which remains private to the writer and from which all but the small circle of his associates remain excluded.

It is not impossible to gain access to these forms of discourse. With a few exceptions, perhaps, there is no
reason why writing about art, including its more 'difficult' forms, aesthetics and art criticism, cannot be penetrated by students who are willing to try. But in order to read such writings with understanding and to gain insight from them certain things have to be learnt. One is, in my view, what Mukarovsky called the aesthetic attitude: that 'aesthetic' is not so much an objective property of an object as a way of looking at it. But the other conditions are linguistic ones. We have to understand how language is used in writings about art. This includes the terminology: technical terms, 'aesthetic' terms, and the metaphors (in the usual sense of lexical metaphor) that these involve. But as we saw in the earlier sections of this chapter, even to understand the vocabulary it is important to put it in its grammatical environment; and for the discourse as a whole the grammar is an essential component. Words are more options than grammatical structures, so it is useful to begin with the vocabulary; but it is the grammar - or rather the lexicogrammar as a whole, in systemic terms - that constructs the meaning of the text and interprets the 'reality' to which that meaning relates. And the grammar constructs metaphors of its own (Halliday's grammatical metaphor already referred to). In the chapters that follow, after first discussing how the language of art discourse evolved, we shall attempt to characterize this discourse largely in grammatical terms; having in mind, as we do so, the needs of students of art history, and their teachers, who may find it helpful to become more aware of how this form of language - or rather these various forms of language - will typically be constructed.
CHAPTER 3  Writing about Art: diachronic and diatypic variation

In this chapter we shall examine the the category of "art discourse" and raise the question whether it constitutes a single, more or less uniform variety, or whether it is possible to recognize systematically distinct sub-varieties. We shall show that there are in fact four rather distinct sub-varieties of art discourse: (1) the discourse of art history; (2) the discourse of art technology; (3) the discourse of art philosophy or aesthetics; (4) the discourse of art criticism; together with perhaps a fifth which I shall refer to as "portable art".

Each of the above categories represents a different approach to art and each of them is represented linguistically by a different register, i.e. by a recognizably different functional variety of language - variety according to the use (Halliday, 1978: 35). Register can be defined as a "typical" combination of linguistic features that is associated with a configuration of situation features, i.e. particular values of the FIELD, MODE AND TENOR.

As a matter of personal history, I first became aware of the existence of these different art-related registers when as a teacher of art I had to resolve particular difficulties my students had been experiencing - which I recognized to be the same types of difficulties I had experienced myself as a student.

3.A. The four basic approaches to art: historical perspective

Aesthetics (or philosophy of art), art history, art criticism and art technology represent four different
approaches to art. Aesthetics deals with the general concepts of art, art history looks at art from the historical point of view, art criticism looks at particular works of art and evaluates them, and art technology explains and describes the various artistic methods and techniques.

These four approaches to art, and the registers associated with them, maybe considered first of all from a historical and functional perspective.

The historical perspective is the "when", "where", and "who by" of writings on art; the functional perspective is that of "why", and "who for". We may leave aside the "how", to refer to the linguistic features of these various texts (see Ch.7). This is not to suggest, of course, that any clear line can be drawn between 'what is said' and 'how it is said' (Hasan, 1980); the difference lies in our own techniques of interpretation and analysis. We also have to take account of the fact that, while the four kinds of approach to art have remained more or less the same since classical times, the registers associated with them were and are changeable and changing entities.

3.A.1 Greece: Origins of writing about art

Like so many other forms of discourse, the tradition of "writing about art", as this became established in western culture, begins with Plato and Aristotle (Plato: Protagoras, Phaedrus, Ion, Symposium, Gorgias, Republic, Statesman, Philebus, Laws, Timaeus, Cratylus, Sophist, Euthydemus, Apology, Meno, Parmenides, Theaetetus, Seventh Letter, Lysis, Critias; Aristotle: Physics, Metaphysics, Parts of Animals, Ethics, Politics, Rhetorics, Posterior Analytics, Generation and Corruption, Meteorology, Generation of Animals, Poetics, Prior Analytics, Topics, Sophistical Refutations). If we were to characterize these
works in very general terms, using Halliday's (1978) field, tenor and mode to describe their context of situation, we would probably say that these writings were structured rhetorical arguments in the form of dialogues or treatises (mode) addressed to students and other educated readers (tenor) aiming to answer general questions about art and to develop a theory of art and theory of beauty (field). The dialogues (between two philosophers or philosopher and disciple) were the form preferred by Plato and they often included reports on what other men of importance (poets, for instance) had said on the subject. From a historical point of view, we may say that these writings represent the way of thinking about art that was prevalent in Greece of the 5th century B.C.

At the time of Plato and Aristotle there was no writing that we could consider to be art history or art criticism. The reasons for this are fairly clear. On the one hand, history can not be conceived of without the control of a theory which serves to choose and interpret the facts which need to be expounded, and to discard the infinity of facts which are of no importance. And on the other hand, critical comments can only be based on general philosophical criteria which, taken together form a critical theory, and it was precisely such a theory that Plato and Aristotle were trying to construct.

The fact that art criticism depends on a prior philosophical theory (aesthetics being the modern term for this theory) is well illustrated by the fact that art criticism did emerge in Greece during the fourth and the beginning of the third centuries B.C., since by this time the work of Plato and Aristotle had established the necessary theoretical foundation.
The critical judgements on Greek artists reached us through Pliny the Elder in his "Natural History" (written in Latin and completed in AD 77, book 34 and 35; Jex-Blake, 1896). These judgements were taken from the treatises on painting and sculpture written by Xenocrates of Sikyon, a sculptor of the school of Lysippos, and by Antigonos of Karystos, both of whom lived in the first half of the 3rd century B.C. Since it is difficult to know to which of them to attribute the judgements referred to, scholars have the habit of grouping them both under the name of Xenocrates. So it is usually said that Xenocrates, a sculptor, wrote a treatise dedicated to painters and sculptors in order to give advice and formulate general principles. But it was not a purely abstract treatise. Xenocrates tried to establish a relationship between his own artistic principles, as categories of artistic judgement, and some specific artistic personalities. Since art criticism could be defined as a relationship between principles of judgement and the evaluation of a work of art or of an artistic personality, Xenocrates was the first person who could be called an art critic.

As well as being considered to be the first art critic in the western world, Xenocrates could also be seen as the predecessor of the future art historians. As far as artistic criticism is concerned, he had before him as an example the thought of Plato and Aristotle. His historical perspective derived from Aristotle and from the first Peripatetics (quoted Venturi, 1964:38). In Aristotle's book on Poetry, there were many references to the history of poetry and the Peripatetics made use of genealogical tables in order to show the development of the artistic schools, as they had done for the philosophical schools, and recounted anecdotes and sayings of the individual artists.
A similar interest in the lives and doings of the artists is shown by Duris of Samos who lived in the second half of the 4th century B.C. (Venturi, 1964:38). Unlike Xenocrates, however, Duris made no reference to their specific works.

To summarize: of the registers of art discourse that we can recognize today the first to emerge was the philosophy of art, or aesthetics, in the works of Plato and Aristotle. This was followed by art criticism, which had a dual origin in the work of Duris of Samos whose criticism arose from describing the lives of the artists, and Xenocrates whose criticism arose from the kind of treatise where a general artistic law is applied to a particular artist or to a particular work of art. This type of criticism, with its double orientation continued, with rare exceptions, until the 18th century.

There are two further points to be made about the early evolution of art criticism in ancient Greece.

3.A.2 No separate concept of 'art history' in Greek scholarship

I suggested earlier that art criticism needs a philosophical theory to build on; and since Plato and Aristotle made such a theory available, Greek thought was the context in which art criticism first developed. But it developed along the lines that they had laid down. On the one hand, the earliest art criticism was philosophical and theoretical in its character; but on the other hand, it failed to reconcile the key concepts of representation and beauty. The aesthetic doctrines of Plato and Aristotle vacillated between the theory of beauty and the theory of art, but the two theories never coincided. Art was "mimesis", i.e. imitation or representation of nature and "beauty" had either a moral character identified with the good or a mathematical
character identified with geometrical proportions (Venturi, 1964:40).

Plato writings are rich in analogies; and if one of his favourite sources of analogy is language, another is certainly art. Artistic analogies frequently occur in Phaedrus, Protagoras, Ion and Cratylus, especially connected with moral issues. For instance in Ion, he compares a general with a rhapsode and asks what does it mean to be a "good" rhapsode and a "good" general (Ion, Great Books of the Western World, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1980:Vol.7:147, 148) or in Cratylus he talks about the principle of beauty suggesting that "mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works which we recognize and speak of as beautiful" (Cratylus, Great Books, 1980:Vol.7:101-102). This is because Plato conceives of beauty as having a moral character and so identifies it with the good. With Aristotle, on the other hand, we find a concept of 'beauty' as being mathematical in character and so identified with geometrical proportions; and this is what reflects Aristotle's general preoccupation with rules. A good example is his discussion of excellences and defects each of which exist in virtue of a particular relation (Physics, Book VII, Ch.2-3, Great Books, Vol: 8, p.329-330) or his discussion of wisdom, knowledge and understanding (Metaphysics, Book 1, Great Books, 1980,Vol.8, p.499).

Since art was to the Greeks 'imitation or representation of nature' and the earliest art criticism was inevitably concerned with how works of art were able to imitate nature, and also to idealise nature according to these two concepts of beauty: physical beauty based on mathematical proportions and spiritual beauty based on morality.

The concept of art as "mimesis" had another effect. Plato's and Aristotle's commentaries are solely related to sculpture
and painting; architecture is entirely left out. When we come to Xenocrates' treatise, or Duris' recounts of the lives of the artists, the concern is again with painting and sculpture, and painters and sculptors. Though the surviving examples of Greek art make us conclude that the artistic grandeur of Greece during the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. gave the impression of an exceptional civilisation in which painting, sculpture and architecture were three important art forms, the surviving texts suggest that only two of them - painting and sculpture - were "complete" disciplines, with fixed doctrines. On the principle of mimesis, that art is the imitation or representation of nature, architecture has no significance as an art form. It remains firmly in the background.

As between painting and sculpture, it is painting that is more highly valued. Firstly, if art was an imitation or representation of nature, then there were three considerations that were relevant: (i) that of the technical competence of the imitation; (ii) that of the abstract form, and (iii) that of the moral content. When comparing painting with sculpture it is clear that painting has a greater potential for all three: to imitate nature; to use abstract forms, and to express moral contents. Secondly, painting is better able to tell a story whatever the content, including the moral content; it is its fundamental characteristic to use abstract forms; and when it comes to imitating nature, it is enough to think of a sculpture of a mountain or of a fly to see that sculpture would not compare with painting as a medium for this type of imitation. Hence in the writings of both Xenocrates and Duris painting and painters figure much more prominently than sculpture and sculptors (Venturi, 1964:40-41). The text makes it clear which of the two was the more important topic in that particular era.
Venturi says (Venturi, 1964:38) that the limits of the early art criticism lay in its being bounded by the experience of Greek art in the 5th and 4th century B.C. This suggests that the Greeks were not interested in art of other cultures, that they were not interested in the development of art, but that they were interested only in the 'here and now'.

It is indeed likely that the ancient Greeks were not interested in the historical development of universal human values, either in art or in science; rather they tried to determine the phenomena that occurred, to explain these phenomena by their immediate causes, and then to use them as standards. If this is true, we have an explanation why there was no such thing as 'art history' in the ancient Greece. On the other hand, Aristotle's book Poetics contains many references to the history of poetry, to its origins and to the contributions to it by different poets (Poetics, Great Books, Vol. 9, p. 686-695). This suggests that it is wrong to say that the ancient Greeks were not interested in history in general. The point is rather that visual art in that period had not as yet reached the status of poetry, and so did not "deserve" or require a history-based evaluation or commentary.

We said earlier that Greek art criticism was philosophical rather than practical, dealing with general concepts rather than their interpretation by individual artists. This suggests another explanation of why there was no art history. Art history implies a knowledge of the historical elements inherent in the work of art of the individual artist who tries to relate the universal ideas to the norms and values of his historical period, the norms and values being interpreted into visual forms through his intuition which "adjusts" the universal to what is acceptable in the light of his own time and culture.
Of the kinds of texts that were concerned with art, the philosophical-aesthetic and the biographical-critical, it is clear that the former had the higher status as texts. They were produced by philosophers, with Plato and Aristotle as the authorities; while the critical writings were produced by other people whose profession - except for Xenocrates who was a sculptor - is not known. From the fact that their profession is not mentioned, we can assume that they did not have a profession at standing that would classify them as art critics. We can also assume that their status was not very high. The names and achievements not only of of Plato Aristotle but also of many other philosophers are well known and were well known in their time; whereas Xenocrates and Duris are mentioned only very rarely.

3.A.3 Rome: the emergence of technical writing about art

Serious consideration of architecture began in the 1st century B.C. when Vitruvius, Roman architect and engineer, and author of a treatise on Roman architecture, discussed his experience and related it to what he knew of Greek architecture (Vitruvius, Ten books on architecture, translated by Morris H. Morgan, Dover Publications, New York, 1960). This treatise, which consists of ten books, was a kind of handbook for Roman architects; it covers almost every aspect of architecture but places special emphasis on training in construction and on the science of mathematical proportions.

Vitruvius was a Roman and it is not surprising that Roman society was more interested in architecture than Greek society had been. The need to build more cities required the formulation of principles not only for architecture but also for city planning, building materials, temple construction, private buildings and a range of other topics. But because
Greek thought and achievements were available to Romans and were highly influential in their own development. Vitruvius had available to him both the philosophical theory and the judgements of art. Indeed his comments combine the practical, economic aspect of architecture with the vaguely aesthetic considerations; and the two are juxtaposed in such a way that the interpretation is sometimes rather uncertain.

Looking at the Greek art of the "past" (as it was from the Roman point of view), Vitruvius had an opportunity to appreciate the art of architecture from the developmental standpoint, which is the first step towards what we could call "the historical perspective". This in turn is the prerequisite of what we understand by 'art history', and Vitruvius can be thought of as the precursor of the art historians of a later era.

Though Vitruvius' ideas on architecture were less sophisticated than those of Greek art critics on painting and sculpture, because of the technical information he offered his handbook can be considered as the first "technical" or "scientific" text connected with art in the western world.

The fact that Vitruvius was well known to his contemporaries - and not just because, as Pliny tells us, he wished 'that his name would be honoured by posterity' (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol.23, p. 90, 1970) - suggests that his technical approach to art accorded well with the educational needs and historical attitudes of the time.

It is interesting to note that, while architecture had gained considerably in importance, architects did not become popular heroes in the way that the painters and sculptors of the previous era had done.
Thus while Greece of the 5th century B.C. was the home of the philosophy of art and Greece of the 4th and 3rd centuries B.C. gave rise to art criticism, it was the Roman society of the 1st century B.C. that marked the beginning of the technical or perhaps semi-technical approach to art (specifically architecture) and of the approach that was the predecessor of art history. It is still semi-technical because technical explanations are not yet seen as clearly distinct from aesthetic comments. And it is not yet ‘art history’, partly because it includes only one art form—architecture, but more importantly because it consisted of the history of the three orders: Doric, Ionic and Corinthian which was not a historical classification, but Vitruvius’ own terminology. As Venturi says, ‘such a history was a pure legend’ (Venturi, 1964:50).

The philosophical approach to art, with which serious discourse about art had originated, declined in importance in Roman society.

Art criticism, on the other hand, was taken up and developed in the writings of two great Roman scholars: Cicero (106-43 B.C.), statesman, barrister, scholar and writer and Quintilian (c.35-100 A.D.), whose work on rhetoric is one of the most valuable contributions of the ancient world to educational theory and to literary criticism.

Cicero distinguished between the universal idea of art and different artistic styles (De oratore, 111,7). This concept changed both the role of art in society and the status of the artist: the latter was now more free to develop his own style instead of being concerned with an abstract artistic perfection towards which he was bound to strive.

Both Cicero and Quintilian formulated canons of great artists (De Oratore, 111,7 and Quintilian, Institutions oratoriae, Liber XII, 10) but their judgements were
testimonies to the opinions of their contemporaries rather than evaluations of their own.

When we examine the language of the earliest 'art criticism' we notice that its dominant mode is philosophical, rather than literary as art criticism is today. There is a discontinuity here in the ancient tradition of art-critical discourse. By the late classical period the 'literary' mode comes to predominate; and this 'modern' variety turns out, surprisingly, to have the earliest origin of all. Ultimately this type of art criticism, which is closer to a literary description than it is to a philosophical commentary, was modelled on Homer's description of the shield of Achilles, 'and was cherished by the later poets of the Anthology, and became fashionable as it gave pleasure of competing by words with forms and colours' (Venturi, 1964: 50).

Statius (c.45-96 A.D.), one of the principal epic and lyric poets, and a court poet to the emperor Domitian; Martial (c.40-104 A.D.), Roman epigrammatist; Pliny the Younger (c.61-113 A.D.), Roman author and administrator; Apuleius (2nd century A.D.), Platonic philosopher, rhetorician and poet; and Philostratus "the Lemnian" (c.190 A.D.), the author of the first series of the Imagines (two books which came to be important sources of knowledge of Hellenistic art, discussing 65 real or imaginary paintings on mythological themes), all followed and elaborated this fashion of writing. This was the first time when the critic, instead of being was 'a philosopher added to an artist', became rather 'an artist added to an artist'. The result was a description which might be in itself 'a work of art', but which was not necessarily an important critical achievement.
3.A.4 The evolution of the modern forms of art writing

It is clear from this brief survey that the various approaches to art and the registers associated with them, emerged in response to specific needs in a particular social and cultural environment, and that the same conditions would not necessarily be present in later periods and other cultures. So for instance, the type of art criticism that was characteristic of the Greek and Roman societies was not practised in the Middle Ages. For nearly ten centuries, up to the 14th century, a characterisation of artists or of works of art, such as classical antiquity was able to produce, was completely lacking. This is not to say that art was no longer discussed. Art was discussed; but the perspective had moved from an emphasis on philosophy and on the life of artists to an emphasis on service to God. The men of the Middle Ages were too involved in serving God to be interested in such earthly things as the characteristics of particular works of art and the personalities of the artist. Art monuments were the churches and cathedrals with their stonework, statuary and glass; they were constructed to celebrate God, and those that wrote about them were those closest to: monks and other churchmen, church librarians, and ecclesiastical chroniclers.

Theophilus was one such man. He lived at some time in the 10th century, joined the Benedictine Order and became a monk. His "Schedula" is the most important art book in the early medieval period. It describes the techniques and practices of the ecclesiastical arts of the time. Another writer on techniques of architecture was Leo of Ostia, who also joined the Benedictine Order and received his education at the celebrated Benedictine Monastery of Monte Cassino where the abbot Desiderius had gathered a group of important churchmen and scholars and turned the monastery into a major center of learning of the time. Leo became the librarian and

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archivist for the convent’s great library. His *Chronicle of Monte Cassino* (1070–1975) deals with the building activities of Desiderius and explains how churches and monasteries should be constructed to satisfy the demands of the Church. Because the Chronicle is so well organized and historically reliable, it is considered to be one of the the earliest documents that could be classified as ‘real’ history (Holt, 1957: I,9).

Not surprisingly the majority of texts from the Middle Ages deal with technical aspects of architecture. It was after all the monumentality of churches and cathedrals that expressed people’s attitude towards God and the way they wanted to serve him. The writings were either handbooks giving the architects professional advice or descriptive reports of progress in the construction of religious edifices. Furthermore the liberation of art from its dependence on nature, a process which started at the end of antiquity with Plotinus (Venturi, 1964:59), was now virtually complete. The two other art forms which had been so dominant in the Greek period — painting and sculpture — did not disappear. But they lost the autonomy they had enjoyed during the classical period. They became an extension of architecture, and when discussed in writing this was the context in which they were described (Holt, 1957:22-27).

In was during the early Renaissance that the status of artists, especially of the painters, began to be re-established. Thenceforth for the next two or three hundred years, until some time in the 18th century, the great majority of writings about art were produced by the artists themselves. Though their chief business has always been the making of their art, they have written and talked a great deal about it — about what painting and sculpture, and painters and sculptors, are and ought to be. Some of their
writings have been strictly private, intended only for themselves or their friends; some have been professional, directed to other artists in so far as they represented the same art form. A great deal has been addressed to the prospective patrons and buyers, or to society in general; and sometimes it has been written for posterity. Thus a variety of different registers evolved in writing about art, differing in response to these differences of field, tenor and mode: as the audience varied, the artist's subject matter and the tone of his writings changed too. He discussed business with his patron and his dealer; technique and aesthetics with his fellow artists; the moral, material, and psychological difficulties with himself and with society at large.

It was during the Renaissance that 'art history' was born, with Giorgio Vasari who is usually considered to be the first art historian (Ventur, 1964: 99-103). Vasari was a painter and architect, and his Lives of the Most Eminent Painters, Sculptors, and Architects, published first in 1550, served as a model for such writing for two centuries. But, it was not until the times of Wickelmann (1717-1768) that the history of art came to be conceived of not merely as a sequence of anecdotes and accounts of the artists' lives, but as a distinct aspect of the general evolution of human thought. Wickelmann studied theology and worked as librarian to Count Henrich von Notenitz. In this office he was able to further his studies in the art and literature of the ancient world. Through his patron, Cardinal Albani, Winckelmann was able to publish his History of Ancient Art (1764) which was extremely influential in the 18th and 19th centuries (Holt, 1958:II,336). Thus art history in the modern sense is a product of the 18th century. Here for the first time the works of art themselves were used as a basis for determining qualities of style, and it for the first time that the term "style" was applied not
only to the personal manner of individual artists but to the art of an entire period, which was thought of as reflecting the philosophical outlook of the period and the general tenor of its civilization.

The discussion of art history was no longer, as in Renaissance Italy, the prerogative of the artists themselves. Winckelmann was not an artist but a theologian interested in art. Winckelmann was followed by two other German intellectual leaders, Lessing and Goethe, who were everything else but artists. Lessing studied theology, medicine and archaeology and then turned to the field of letters and worked as a poet, dramatist, critic, essayist, novelist and religious reformer. Goethe was a poet, dramatist and novelist, and he was also outstanding as a scientist in the fields of physics. He was a philosopher, historian, biographer, and historian of literature and of art.

It has been said that the emphasis on art history that was started in the 18th century in Germany became the keynote for 19th century Europe. Elizabeth Gilmore Holt in her book From the Classicists to the Impressionists summarizes the role of the artist as follows:

During the 19th century institutions and attitudes gave way to new forms and relationships. Traditions in governmental and social institutions, traditions in social behaviour and processes of production, traditions in methods and materials of construction in architecture and in modes of representation in the visual arts were discarded.

The nineteenth-century artists were therefore called upon to devise forms that would be expressive of European life, which was transforming itself into the industrial and technological age of the twentieth century. Throughout the century new expressions were sought for cultural concepts, the products of a freedom unfettered by conventional conformity. Architecture acquired new social functions in the changed society, and the architect was called to meet the requirements of various groups of citizens. Painters and sculptors reached behind
the screen of traditional art to bring forward new symbols and emblems to satisfy their own "inner necessity" and that of their culture.

This search, carried on throughout the century, produced a constant tension between the academic, official, and conventional members of society and society's creative artists, who were compelled by their genius to be thus engaged. The first group was determined to maintain a status quo. The second was bound to discover means and methods to represent the concepts that were emerging from the cultural heritage. These periods of transformation called for the critic both to defend the accepted and the known and to explain the new gestation to eyes fixed on traditional images. The patron, to whom both parties addressed their case with the aid of the critic, was now the public, rather than the connoisseur.

Romanticism dominated the entire century. Styles of the past were used for their sentimental association rather than for aesthetic qualities, and in architecture, archaeological exactitude and historical re-construction became the disciplining factor rather than taste.

It was the century of historicism. History was seen as the key to the problems of "the brave new world." A sense of history impregnated all visions and concepts. The nineteenth century historian and artist shared the same aim, the present the unsystematic diversity of peoples, cultures, customs, and myths in a process of evolutionary transformation, that was to be comprehended by feeling. The artist must bring back to life the spirit of the past "to show only what really happened," as Leopold von Ranke, the great nineteenth-century German historian, expressed it." (Holt, 1966:v-vi).

Meanwhile the other component of medieval writing about art, that where the concern was primarily technical, evolved simultaneously along different lines. In the 15th century the craftsman's handbook, explaining how the various processes were to be carried out, became transformed so as to accomodate the new elements required by Renaissance cultural values. One was a concern with perspective and modelling as methods for accurately representing the natural world. Second was the new assumption that each case need not to be treated as a separate instance for which a rule of thumb has been found and a formula accepted, but that the rule discovered can, because it conforms to a law of nature, be made to cover all instances. Another was the "scientific"
viewpoint derived from a study of principles of antiquity and classical aesthetic theory. This is of course the "scientific" attitude most familiar to us in the story of Uccello in love with the study of perspective. The third new interest likewise implies a "scientific" viewpoint which derived from a study of the principles of antique art and classic aesthetic theory (Goldwater and Treves, 1981:12-13).

The later 16th century continues this emphasis on theory, but a new method of argument and demonstration has crept in - that of reference to the ideal models established by the great masters of the beginning of the century, whose works have now been added to the antique as examples of perfection. This idea lies behind the aesthetics of Vasari, and this discussion of art in terms of ideal examples runs through the 17t, 18th, and well into the 19th century. There is, however, a difference. While the 16th century is still imbued with a sense of progress in the arts, the common theme of later centuries is how art has fallen off from its former glorious days. The recipient is different too. The writings are now intended for a new public, the enlightened amateur, and consequently the tone and manner must be different from the one designed for the professionals.

While this type of writing continues, a new form appears in the seventeenth century: the discourse of the academy. The beginnings of this type of address, like the academy itself, date back two centuries before, but like the academy, it became dominant only in the 17th century, and it is in France, where the academy reached its fullest development, that the discourse delivered to its assembled members has the greatest significance. It was heard by the artists and the academy students (Goldwater and Treves, 1981, p.14).

This tradition of formal discussion is carried on in the 18th century, but after 1750 it is only in England, where
the academy was slower in developing, that it had any real freshness and contemporaneity. In both England and France it is the artist himself who gets heavily involved in this type of writing. But he now begins to express himself in a less didactic and more individual way and becomes reluctant to attach his art and his aesthetics to any universally acceptable truth, because he wishes to give more personal expression to his feelings. It is at this point that the personal letter as a form of art writing begins to come into its own. As a whole, there is very little artistic writing from the first three quarters of the 18th century, that is to say, before the advent of the neoclassical style. In this period both the formal treatise and the technical handbook disappear, except where they are directed exclusively to the student and the beginning amateur. Otherwise, the typical forms are the letter and - new at this time - the journal. The writer is again the artist, and the characteristic type of writing is either personal polemic or some other personalised forms of discourse (Goldwater and Treves, 1981:12-13).

At the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century a new development took place: art became involved with politics, and both art itself and writing about art were used as political instruments. This movement appears first in the work of J.J. David (Goldwater and Treves, 1981: p.204-210). It was also at this period that the artist felt the need to defend and explain his work to the public. However, as the 19th century advanced, the progressive artists grew more isolated and consequently it became harder for them to address the public. As a result, the characteristic writing of the period of impressionism is once again personal - and now private. Even the journal disappears, and the typical form of the period is the letter from one artist to another, or to the patron who is also a friend (Goldwater and Treves, 1981:16).
For a while, there was no analytical writing on art; the dominant motif was the romantic legend of art as the product of an immediate inspiration. As Goethe said: "Artist, create, do not talk" (ibid., 16).

However, toward the end of the 19th century this situation changed in several ways. A new view of nature as reflected in the styles of the late 19th century expressed required verbal reasoning which again became part of the artist's method of work. But there is now a new and close association between painters and literary men, particularly the poets and playwrights. Consequently, the painter looks with less suspicion upon literature about art. Programs for art, like those of Seurat and Signac, are good examples (ibid., 374-378). This is the context in which art criticism - as we understand it today - first came into prominence (ibid., 1981:17).

3.B  **The four basic approaches to art: functional perspective**

In the previous section (3.A) we have attempted to illustrate the constant cultural and social changes which have been reflected in the varying configurations of field, mode and tenor that gave rise to writing about art. An analysis of texts from any of these contexts would show characteristics particular to the historical period and the culture that produced the text. Every culture and every historical period has different ideas about art, each valuing different art forms and each favouring a different approach to art. Consequently, the writings about art are also different from each other.

At the same time, a historical perspective reveals not only what changes but also what persists. We see the essential continuities that link our own art forms, and the writing
associated with them, with those of renaissance, medieval and classical times.

We shall not here attempt to analyse any of the texts from the past, although it should be stressed that this would add an invaluable extra dimension to a study such as the present one. The analysis will be limited to modern texts, and to texts that are written in English. It is not suggested that there is a total uniformity in writing about art across the different English-speaking cultures. It is enough to read through some of the textbooks or reviews of art written in England, U.S.A., Canada and Australia to conclude that considerable differences exist. But they are clearly part of a common tradition and for our present purposes such differences can be ignored.

3.B.1 General characteristics of the four registers

"Register" was defined earlier as a variety of language 'according to the use'. At the beginning of the chapter we recognized that there is not one "language of art", but that there are at least four different registers of writing about art, each of them associated with a different situation, i.e. a different configuration of the three contextual categories: FIELD, MODE AND TENOR. The four categories were defined as:

a) "art history", i.e. a report on art, with interpretation from the historical point of view;
b) "aesthetics" or the philosophy of art, i.e. a presentation of and argumentation about the universal concepts of art;
c) "art criticism", i.e. a critical evaluation of a particular work or works of art;
d) "art technology", i.e. a description and explanation of the known art methods and techniques.

This definition of the four approaches suggests that the language is being used in four rather different ways:
(a) to "report (and interpret)" history
(b) to "present and argue" about general concepts
(c) to "evaluate (critically)" particular works of art
(d) to "describe and explain" technical procedures

Regarding the differences between (b) and (c): since (b) deals with general concepts the arguments are likely to be objective and impersonal, whereas in (c) we may expect them to be more personal in nature. For illustration of this point see Chapters 4 and 7 below.

The fifth category (e) which was introduced is perhaps not a distinct register but rather a sub-variety of any of the four register; this is what I have called "portable art". It includes catalogues and critiques of permanent and temporary exhibitions; not as texts in isolation but as functioning in their context of situation - hence including the "atmosphere" of the exhibition hall itself. The physical presence of art works seems to add a dimension to the discourse, something that books and other written materials cannot offer. It is not simply that we can come back to the work as many times as we need to - we can do that also when looking at photographs in a book; but that we can approach the work dynamically, moving closer or further away and varying our angle of vision. The text then acts as an interpreter in this complex process of interaction.

But considered purely as verbal artefacts, the texts in such catalogues range from something like art-history to something like art criticism; hence it is difficult to decide whether they should be classified as a different and independent category, or whether each should be seen as a sub-category of the register it is closest to, with the additional features of being contextualized together with the work of art. One obvious factor is that catalogue texts differ from other texts in their length; and since this is something that is enforced on the writer by the context, the language reflects this feature systematically, but in the
way it moves from one topic to the next, and in the way it organizes its information.

3.B.2 The registers of art education

It was not as a student of art, nor as an art historian, that I became aware of the existence of the different registers of writing about art. It was as an art teacher that I came to recognize the problems and difficulties experienced by my students, and that these arose in some but not all areas of their art studies. And it was finally as a linguist that I realized that the questions being asked by the students were of a linguistic rather than a topic-related nature. These questions were usually of the type "what does the writer mean when he says that...?" They occurred very frequently with some texts and hardly at all with others; yet the difference was not determined by the topic, in the sense of what particular work or works of art was or were being discussed.

Nor did the students have any difficulties in recognizing what the topic was; their questions were never of the type "what is this passage about?" This is largely a function of the grammar and discourse structure of English. Each clause typically begins with a Theme (Halliday, 1985: Chapter 3), and the cumulative clause Themes serve to carry forward the topical development of the text (Fries, 1983, in Micro and Macro Connexity of Texts, Janos S. Petofi and Emel Sozer, Eds. Hamburg, Helmut Buske Verlag, 1983); furthermore the paragraphs usually begins with a 'topic sentence' (cf.Chrstenses:1966) However, when it comes to saying things about the topic of a paragraph or the Theme of a clause, there is a great deal of room for ambiguity; and here some texts were found to be more ambiguous than others.
While in a typical art education programme texts of all the four registers (a) – (d) above will have a place, it is not unusual to find that a particular course will have one or other of the possible examples. The major emphasis will be either on information or on evaluation. Courses that are primarily designed to supply information will not offer critical comments or expect students to evaluate, while courses in "art appreciation", while they do contain certain information about works of art, select and present this information in order to make critical and evaluative comments about them.

While courses of the the first type offer impersonal and more or less objective information, which the students are expected to accept, remember as accurate, and repeat later for purposes of testing, those of the second type offer a more personal and subjective evaluation of particular works of art. Students are expected to consider this and then to express personal views based on their individual likes and dislikes. Looked at on the surface, texts associated with this second type seem to give the students complete freedom to express their personal views, no matter how different these may be from the view of the expert who is the writer.

My experience as a teacher, however, led me to recognize that the underlying function of the text was rather different. The expert is not merely expressing a view; he is actively seeking to convince the student that his view is the correct one should be accepted as such. For further discussion of this point see below, Chapter 7.

An example of an evaluative comment that reflects the attitude of the writer while appearing to relate solely to the quality of what is being discussed is the following.

"In all these pictures - views, still-lifes, nudes - the light gains resonance from the terracotta
tonality, ebbs and flows in the handling, sizzles and showers like a hailstorm of pomegranate seeds. It is an eruption of burning matter, or a sheet of trembling transapercy. The surface of the painting is as warm and thick as bread just out of the oven, as fragile and crumbling as an antique tapestry. The vision, the enchanted eye of this ever-young old man plucks elements from the spectacle of everyday life; a circus horse, domestic animals, a figure moving through the rooms of a house the tiles of a bathroom, a bowl of fruit. Everything is both here and elsewhere exists in both memory and fantasy. The miracle is born from analysis and the mirror records it. Bonnard sees all and tells all from his hidden position; he does not seem to intervene, but, with the genius born of the meeting between knowledge and recognition, is always there to give it form. He fills a corner of the canvas in such a way that the improvised scale creates an ecstatic space, giving us a glimpse of the actual process of creation in all its aspects.

(Excerpts from Franco Russoli, Pierre Bonnard, Furnell & Sons Limited, 1967)

The above text is about Pierre Bonnard and series of nudes, of interiors and of meals on the terrace. Let me now highlight a couple of terms and phrases many of the readers may find a little difficult.

In all these pictures - views, still-lifes, nudes - the LIGHT GAINS RESONANCE from the terracotta tonality, EBBS and FLOWS in the handling, SIZZLES and SHOWERS like a HAILSTORM OF POMEGRANATE SEEDS. It is an ERUPTION OF BURNING MATTER, or a sheet of trembling transapercy. The surface of the painting is as WARM and THICK as bread just out of the oven, as FRAGILE and CRUMBLING as an antique tapestry.

The text is full of analogies, but there is nothing to suggest that they are very personal, and consequently subjective rather than universal, and consequently objective analogies. The grammar of English allows for both interpretations; but since the art critic has a rather prestigious position in our society, as well as the status of authority derived from having written the book, the objective interpretation will be preferred and a student who does not find "light gaining resonance", or the surface of the painting "warm and thick as bread just out of the oven" and "as fragile and crumbling as an antique tapestry"
must conclude that he is not well equipped to see what the expert says is there. Some take the approach of the populace to the Emperor's new clothes and pretend they "see" something they don't see or don't agree with. Only very few openly express their disagreement and challenge the judgment of the critic. From the linguistic point of view, the first category of students "acknowledges", without arguing, something that is meant to be argued about, and treat the text simply as a source of information. Students in this group typically repeat the statements in almost the same form they were given by the expert. A much smaller group of students argue about what has been said; but though they may show courage in exercising that right to do so, they rarely control the linguistic resources that are needed for them to argue with.

It would have been quite possible for the writer to have attached modality indicating that he was expressing his personal point of view: I think, in my opinion, as I see it and so on. For example, these painting seems to me to contain light that....... 

In actual teaching situations such modalities tend to appear in the secondary text, spoken or written, that are given in response to student's questions. For example, in one particular correspondence course, where the tutor was also the author of the text being used, the topic under consideration was a particular period of Picasso painting. The tutor had written:

'All Picasso's painting done between 1906-1908 are beautiful, magic, symbolic and exciting.'

The student's written responses (which usually appear in a mode that is intermediate between their natural speech and the type of written text they are responding to) showed that this was being taken as an objective evaluation. But one
particular group decided that they were unable to share this evaluation; so they added to their answer a request that the tutor should explain. The tutor's reply was "I just like that type of thing". (This group was one I 'inherited' and tutored immediately after they had finished the course about Picasso and the above is what what I was told during our meeting.)

For the students, then, the problem has been to recognize the type of text they were dealing with and then to interpret and respond to it appropriately. As remarked above, a course would usually foreground one or other of the broad varieties, according to whether its primary aim was to inform or to evaluate. Courses of the first type are organized around historical and/or technical information, and hence the texts used are typically drawn from the registers of art history and art technology (types (a) and (d) above). Such texts deal with concrete rather than abstract issues and rarely incorporate the personal view of the writer. Courses of the second type deal with general concepts of art or with particular works of art; the texts used are therefore those of aesthetics and art criticism (types (b) and (c) above). These texts are not concerned with factual information of a historical or technical kind but with abstract thought constructions or judgments of value.

It is instructive to examine the strategies adopted by the students in coping with these two broad categories of text. With these of the first type, they learn how to dig out from them the relevant historical or technical facts, and to supplement these from their own reading in the university of locality library; they then present these facts in the form of a report, or sometimes a narrative (Martin&Rothery, or Martin). There is no argumentation, because there is nothing to argue about (to quote one student "There was no way to bullshit art history or art technology"). To understand and
answer questions on technology they face the additional requirement of technical field-specific grammar and vocabulary. Thus the two components of these courses bear a close resemblance to the two forms of texts studied by Wignell, Martin and Eggins (Writing Papers in Linguistics, No.5, 1987) : the discourse of history, and the discourse of geography (these will be discussed in greater detail below). The main problem for the student in responding to questions in these areas is to know how to "put things in their own words" : on the one hand, to do so is generally considered meritorious, but on the other hand it is hard to write history more effectively than a professional historian, and in a technical field the opportunities for rewording what the writer has presented, using specialized expressions and terminology, are very limited indeed.

In courses based on texts of the second type, students find they are expected to "think like", and to "sound like", philosophers or art critics. To do this they have to learn to use the language not to describe concrete situations as constructs of historical or technical facts, but to argue about abstract concepts, or elaborate their personal opinions, in an objective-sounding and rhetorically convincing manner.

My own observation showed that the majority of students feel inadequate to cope with this particular task, but do not know how to diagnose the nature of their inadequacy. They see it as a lack of understanding of the subject-matter; but what is required of the is a different approach to art, and with this a different orientation in their use of language. Instead of classifying works of art, according to their place on the historical ladder or their physical properties - what kind of art form they represent (sculpture, painting, etc.) or what kind of media they are examples of (wood, metal, oil on canvas, etc.) the students must learn to
interpret and evaluate works of art, and to do this without presenting (and even without possessing) information about their historical and cultural background or the physical and technical properties which reflect and contribute to that background. The question of this "isolationism" will be taken up in the next section, where I shall try to look at the student's problems from a more linguistic point of view.
3.8.3 Student's problems in writing about art: a linguistic interpretation

The students' performance in response to these different tasks, and the comments they made on them, showed that they clearly sensed that to be a successful art critic was largely a matter of mastering the language. Whereas when they were asked to write about art history or art technology the emphasis was on the accuracy of the factual information being offered, when preparing an essay in aesthetics, or an art critique, they felt that the emphasis was on the language to be used. Thus the language itself was functioning in two different ways: in the first instance it was being used to inform, while in the second the language was there for its own sake — if they had been aware of Jakobson's (1960) theory of language functions they would have concluded that an essay in aesthetics or criticism was in fact being judged as a work of literature.

In order to test the validity of the student's perceptions I conducted an informal folk-linguistic experiment. As speakers of English (or any other language) we know when a text is a history text, a scientific text, a philosophical text or an art critique. However, if we are asked to say what it is that characterizes those four types of text it is not always equally easy to answer. The answer is more problematic in some cases than in others. I took a group of 48 subjects from different walks of life but none specialists in the area of art, and asked them to read two paragraphs from each of four; I then asked them, first, to tell me what they thought the writings about, and secondly, to tell me why they thought the texts were about what they claimed they were about. The answers they gave could be summed up as follows.
(1) The subjects could clearly identify art history texts, and they reported that they were doing so on the basis of the historical data included. (2) They could clearly identify texts in art technology, and here their explanations referred to the technical terminology characteristic of them. (3) The subjects could also identify texts of the other two types as not being about history or technology. But they were not always accurate in distinguishing between texts relating to the philosophy of art and those relating to art criticism. They preferred to assign them to the category of art criticism; and their explanations were significantly different from those given in (1) and (2). They referred not to the field of discourse but to the tenor. Typical expressions used were "the writing sounds pompous", "I found it beyond me", "too educated", and "it is made to seem important". They had identified these texts on the basis of what they "sounded like", but they gave no indication of being aware of any topic.

Thus my early experience as a teacher (which recalled for me the conclusion we had reached as students) was that aesthetics and art criticism must be two areas of art that are extremely difficult to understand and that consequently can be "conquered" only by real experts. But my students' complaints about certain recommended books they found "incomprehensible", and about sections of my own writings they found difficult while having no difficulties with the rest; their clear preference for topics connected with 'art history' or 'art technology', and their tendency to avoid questions connected with aesthetics or art criticism, made me look at the problem from a different angle. My attention shifted from the subject-matter to the language of the texts. If some areas are learnable while others remain more or less impenetrable the reason might lie in the way that language was being used.
The first observation I made was a naive distinction into "simple language" of art and "cryptic language" of art. This was not yet a serious linguistic evaluation, but rather a metaphorical statement based more or less on what my students were saying themselves. It was they who talked about 'simple' and 'cryptic' books; and embodied the distinction in their study practices, not only in their choice of examination questions but also in their borrowing activities. The book-box which was provided by the university included all kinds of art books and textbooks; but the borrowing record showed that the students made almost no attempt to borrow books about aesthetics or art criticism while the rest were always in intense demand. Furthermore, so that we could assess the value of the book-boxes, the students were asked to make comments about the books supplied by the university. Over a set of some 400 groups' reports, their comments fall into two broad categories, one discussing the content of the books and the other discussing the text. Books that were classified as art histories or commentaries on art techniques and methods were evaluated in terms of how much ground they covered - the extent and accuracy of their factual information; while books dealing with aesthetics and the art critiques were evaluated in terms of the language that they used.

The students' study habits, and their evaluations of the texts, showed that for them the salient feature of aesthetic and critical writings was their cryptic language. Clearly one possible explanation for this might be that they are difficult subjects to write about. In other words, it is quite conceivable that the subject-matter itself could cause, or at least contribute to the crypticity of the language. Here however my experience as a writer and that of other tutors who wrote material for art courses, had to be taken into consideration. Our texts were edited by a professional editor who stated that they needed to be made
"more academic". The changes that were made I would have
summarized then by saying that the number of sentences was
reduced - what we had said in more sentences was now
presented in fewer; and there were many more abstract terms.
What had in fact happened, when interpreted in terms of a
functional grammar, was that the number of "ranking" (as
opposed to embedded) clauses had been sharply reduced; and
this had been achieved by a more extensive use of
grammatical metaphor and by a greater lexical density. These
features, in turn meant that a great many verbs and
adjectives, expressing events, states and qualities, had
been reworded as abstract nouns.

The concept of grammatical metaphor is introduced by
Halliday (1985: Chapter 10) Halliday points out that if
something is said to be metaphorical, there must also be
something that is not; and the assumption is that to any
metaphorical expression corresponds another, or perhaps more
than one, that is 'literal' - or, as he calls it, congruent.
In other words, for any given semantic configuration there
is at least one congruent realization in the lexicogrammar
and there may then be others that are in some respect
metaphorical.

What the editor was doing amounted in very many instances to
replacing a more congruent mode of expression with a more
metaphorical one. The effect was to make the language "sound
more academic" rather than to make it easy for the reader to
follow. It is not only junior lecturers and tutors who have
their text reworded in this fashion. Desiderius Orban, one
of whose texts we shall be considering in Chapter 7, had a
similar experience with his editor, who kept "translating"
what Orban said to what he thought sounded more like the
language of an art expert. Some of the students on the
course, who had heard Orban lectures and understood him
well, asked him personally why he sometimes used such
difficult terms and expressions in his writing. His answer was that it was his editor who had inserted them, on the grounds that they made the text sound more authoritative. But what mattered was that they should occur with sufficient frequency, rather than in any consistent fashion; this explained why on some occasions the simpler writing had been retained.

The question that arises is why this less congruent and apparently more cryptic mode of writing should be preferred. In a recent article (1988), Halliday has suggested that one of the contexts in which grammatical metaphor evolved, in English, was that of the language of the physical sciences; and that in this context it was clearly functional, in that it permitted the construction of step-by-step logical argument. This is not, however, what it is doing in the language of art criticism which does not proceed by logical argument. So what is its function here?

Eggins, Wignell and Martin in their study of the language of history textbooks (1987:83), have concluded that in many instances metaphorical modes of expression are preferred simply because they have come to carry greater prestige. It was certainly noticeable to me as an art teacher that those students who did master aesthetic and critical discourse, and who could reproduce it in their writings so that they sounded like art critics, were accorded a higher social status within the student body! But we have to be careful with the concept of prestige: writers of the different registers of art discourse themselves tend to enjoy different social status, with art critics being "higher up the ladder" than art historians or art scientists, and we do not want to be drawn into an unreal argument about which causes which - the use of high prestige discourse has to be understood as part of a complex semiotic package. And in any case grammatical metaphor is also found in the language of
both historical and technical writings about art. We may need to distinguish different kinds of prestige, in order to use this concept helpfully here; I will return to this in the final section of this Chapter (see 3.B.5 below). Meanwhile I wish to raise one more aspect of the difficulties experienced by students in reading, and writing, the discourse of art; namely that which arises from the "isolationist-contextualist" debate.

3.B.4 "Isolationism" and "contextualism"

Being presented with any work of art, we face the questions of interpreting it and evaluating it: understanding what it means, and assessing how good it is. Works of art are often difficult to interpret, and the question arises what factors should guide an efforts at interpretation.

The issue is often polarized as one of "isolationism" versus "contextualism". A contextualist approach follows the method developed by the Viennese school of art history, which evolved toward the end of the 19th century within the Austrian Institute of Historical Research at the University of Vienna. This approach in which the object of study has been viewed in relation to its ideological environment has been anticipated in both art history and aesthetics. Alois Riegl, Franz Wickhoff, and Max Dvorak, three important art historians working at the above Institute, considered art and theories of art to be part of the larger whole of cultural history, and they thought that both might often be influenced and even determined by wholly nonartistic events. They saw art in relation to a social and cultural context and their work opened the way for the study of non-Western and exotic arts, such as African, Oceanic, folk, etc. (Chipp, 1973:3). An 'isolationist' view (a term deriving from 'isolationism', a policy of seeking political or national isolation) is one which ignores the background both
of the artist and of the work of art itself, with the expectation that a constant re-exposure to the work is the way to appreciate it best. The 'contextualism' approach holds that the work of art should always be apprehended in its historical and cultural context, and that it will be more richly appreciated if it is approached with the benefit of this knowledge.

According to a strictly isolationist view, a knowledge of the artist's biography, historical background, and other cultural and sociological factors is irrelevant to an appreciation of the work of art; and may even be harmful because it tends to get in the way of the true understanding of a work of art. If a work of art is not understood on first acquaintance, it should be seen (or heard, or read) again and again. Constant re-exposure to it, so that the recipient is totally absorbed in and permeated by it, is the way to maximum appreciation.

In a contextualist perspective, to understand a work of art we need to know the general cultural context of the age and of those ideas and theories of interest to the artist; we need to be familiar with the medium through which the ideas were transmitted; and we should also know something about his personal qualification, education and experience. In other words, we should try to became familiar with the specific ideological milieu in which the artist formulated his ideas and thoughts.

Perhaps the most effective proponent of this approach was Mukarovsky, who writing in 1934 referred to the pitfalls awaiting the art theorist with no grasp of semiology, among them "the temptation to treat the work of art as a purely formal construction." (Jan Mukarovsky, L'Art comme fait semiologique, Actes du huitieme congres internationale de philosophie a Prague 2-7 September 1934, Prague, 1933.)
Mukarovsky insisted that artistic theory should grasp the development of art as an immanent movement having a constant dialectical relation to the development of the other domains of culture - a requirement that still today remains largely unfulfilled.

Clearly both art history and art technology are 'contextual' by definition. Their entire domain is that of the historical and cultural context within which the works of art have been produced. Art criticism, on the other hand, may be located anywhere between the contextualist and isolationist poles. What we refer to as the 'appreciation' of a work of art may be based on any combination of factual knowledge and personal likes and dislikes "what one knows" about a work of art while the latter determine "how one feels" about it. Since knowledge of the background context may and usually does influence the way one feels about a work, from any position other than an extreme isolationist one, "appreciating" is not synonymous with "liking": one may appreciate why Picasso distorted his subject-matter without liking the result. Only in an extreme isolationist perspective can appreciating be synonymous with liking.

The verb appreciate is thus ambiguous, and its ambiguity is clearly shown up in its grammar. It is a verb of a mental process; but it may be either cognitive of affective: cognitive in I appreciate what you mean (agnate to know, understand), affective in I (don't) appreciate your attitude (agnate to like). In art history or art technology texts, where there is little room for mental processes of affection, appreciation will be likely to function cognitively. But in aesthetics, and even more in art criticism, there is a broad scope for ambiguity: appreciate will often be used by a writer affectively, yet understood by the reader as a process of cognition. The writer may even be trading unconsciously on the ambiguity. Thus an
expression such as to appreciate the beauty of this painting allows a slippage between the sense of 'in order to be able to like it or its (subjective quality of) beauty' and 'in order to be able to understand that it is (objectively) beautiful'.

Since much art criticism is in fact written from a rather strongly isolationist point of view, there is considerable potential for misunderstanding. In the first place students accustomed to reading the informative registers of art history and technology, which are contextualist in character, will tend to give objective interpretations to the aesthetic and critical texts as well. In the second place, the grammatical ambiguity of words such as appreciate or beautiful in

The painting we are discussing here is the most beautiful representation of the woman as the classical subject-matter. The picture is highly emotional and full of symbols.

mean that such texts can often be interpreted as objective even if the writer's stance was in fact a subjective one. Now, since a sense of "beauty" is something quite personal—though flavoured and influenced by the norms and values of a particular society or a social group—it is quite possible that many of the readers will not recognize the beauty. However, since there is nothing in the text that suggests that "beautiful" is not an experiential Epithet, representing an objective property of the thing itself, it is likely to be understood by the reader as such, rather than as an attitudinal Epithet expressing the attitude of the writer. The misunderstanding is then perpetuated because the student does not recognize that he has misunderstood.

A linguistic analysis will show, then, that in the writing of art critiques personal views are presented in writings which may be understood as objective and impersonal.
statements about the quality and function of works of art under discussion. The impression is given that the writer is offering objective information based on observation and knowledge of the experiential world rather than a subjective evaluation and interpretation of what he sees. There are various linguistic means whereby this happens. We will be suggesting these can be expressed in the generalization that it is the interpersonal level of language that is of primary importance to the writer while it is the ideational level that is foregrounded through the patterns of language selected (see the section on "metafunctiona metaphor", 7 below).

The same difficulties arise for the student who is asked to write critical comments about particular works of art. The ideology of isolationism means that he is expected make out a case for something he feels about a work of art rather than state something he knows about it. If the student lacks the necessary information about the function and meaning of a work of art he faces a difficult enough task in giving a personal view based on his perception of it. It becomes even more difficult if he has to present his views as an impersonal evaluation or a statement about objective qualities of the work. To do this takes not only courage, but also considerable linguistic knowledge and skill.

Thus both in reading and in writing in the aesthetic and critical mode, students are disadvantaged in two ways: they are not supplied with the relevant factual knowledge, which (in an isolationist model) is believed to be unnecessary for appreciating works of art, and they are not trained to use language to argue a case without knowing the facts they are arguing about. The analysis of some philosophical and critical writings written by experts will suggest that mastery of the language is at least as important as knowledge of the particular subject-matter.
3.8.5 **Two categories of art texts**

I have suggested in the previous two sections that if we consider the register of writing about art from the standpoint of how such texts function in art education, a broad distinction can be drawn into two categories: those that are primarily used to inform, and those that are primarily used to evaluate (and convince the learner that the evaluation is sound). The former are texts in the history and technology of art, the latter are those in art criticism and aesthetics.

But although we can categorize them in this way when they are being considered as 'learner texts' (cf. what was said about students' reactions and responses to them), when considered as 'writings about art' in a more general sense they fall into the four types referred to at the beginning of the chapter: (a) art history, (b) art technology, (c) aesthetics, and (d) art criticism. Each of these four registers has characteristics of its own.

(a) In art history, the content is based on relevant historical data which have been collected, accumulated and presented as a series of statements forming a report or a narrative. Because of the nature of the field, the writer has some limited opportunity to vary the choice of discourse features and adopt his own individual style; but difference in style is less important than treatment of the facts. If one art history book is judged better than another this relates to its accuracy and coverage of the topic.

(b) Writings on the technology of art are, like those on art history, largely factual. But instead of being a narrative of events they are a discipline of techniques; hence technical taxonomies, and also implication sequences (Eggins, Wignell and Martin, 1987:53), play a central part.
Like art history, technical discourse presents works of art without evaluative comments; it succeeds if it documents the facts about art techniques in a way that is clear and systematic. There is very little scope for the writer to introduce variations of individual style.

(c) The task of the aestheticians is to provide conceptual foundations for arriving at valid conclusions about art, aesthetic value, expression and other concepts that belong in his field. While the critic says that a work of art is beautiful, the aesthetician asks what is meant by saying that a work of art is beautiful and how one determines whether it is nor not. In judging an aesthetic text we are likely to ask how effectively these concepts have been explored; for example, in dealing with the question of the universality of the concepts developed in classical philosophy of art. If "beauty" is presented as something universally acceptable, how far does "beauty" man the same thing to all cultures or all individuals?

(d) The art critic is concerned with the analysis and evaluation of particular works of art. Critical activity may be primarily historical, as when a lecture is given on the conventions of a particular historical period. It may be primarily analytical, as when a certain painting is separated into its elements and its meaning is explained in relation to the individual parts. Or it may be primarily evaluative, as when reasons are being given for saying that a work of art is good or bad. The aim of art criticism is — presumably — to achieve and increase understanding or enjoyment of a work of art or a group of works of art. Assuming this is so, the success of a piece of art criticism could be judged according to whether it has increased one's understanding or one's enjoyment of the work of art in question. The art critic is building on the concepts which
the aestheticians have worked over and defined. His writing presupposes answers to the questions they have formulated.

The four registers thus differ along a dimension that could be characterized as impersonal-personal, or objective-subjective or public-private. These are not, in principle, synonymous; the first is concerned with presentation, the second with judgement, the third with criteria. But each will tend to presuppose the others; thus if a writer's presentation is more personal, it is likely that his judgement is more subjective and his criteria more private.

This gives a scale with the four registers arranged as follows:

```
   Impersonal    objective    technology of art
      \       |          |
        \     |          |
          \  |          |
            \|          |
              \|          |
                \|          |
                private  subjective

public

In their analysis of the language of geography texts (1987), Eggins, Wignell and Martin point out that the linguistic system makes provisions for using any wording in a language and turning it into a "technical" expression. They show how these resources were used to construct technical taxonomies, a taxonomy being defined as ordered, systematic classification of some phenomena based on the fundamental principles of "superordination" (where something is a type of or kind of something else) or "composition" (where something is a part of something else). The discourse of art technology makes considerable use of taxonomies of this kind.

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This is reflected in the publication of art dictionaries. These form one category among the many specialist technical dictionaries that are on the market today. If we relate dictionaries of art to the four registers, we find that they contain entries from only two of them. There are technical terms from art technology, and these are usually organized in taxonomies. There are other, usually non-taxonomic, technical entries from art history (e.g. names of historical periods: Romanesque, Baroque, etc.). But there are no dictionaries for aesthetics or art criticism.

In other words, no dictionary offers a definition of terms that are used for evaluative and critical purposes. If we were to hypothesize about why there are no such dictionaries, or no such entries in existing dictionaries, it would probably be the ‘private’ nature of art criticism that makes it impossible to write dictionaries giving all the various meanings and uses of a particular term. Thus in the register of art criticism, not only are there no taxonomies, there appear to be no generally recognized technical terms. When art is discussed in personal and subjective terms it is not a phenomenon that can be defined and classified as it can be when discussed in the more objective and impersonal registers.

We can relate this to the explanation given by Eggins, Wignell and Martin (1987:25). The primary task of the geographer is to look for "order and meaning in the world", and the procedures for uncovering this order and meaning are first, to ‘observe and describe’; then, ‘to group and classify’, and finally ‘to analyse and explain’. It is through taxonomies of technical terms that language can be used to observe and order the experiential world.

The same goals are being pursued, though in a different domain, by the art technician; and related goals are being
pursued by the art historian, and even the art philosopher —
though his "observation" and "ordering" of the experiential
world is of a much more abstract level. What the art critic
does, however, is to observe and order according to his own
private and personal views; and so taxonomies that were
constructed would also have to be of private nature.

Linguistically there is not reason why the discourse of art
criticism should not construct its own technical taxonomies;
it is written in the same language, with the same semantic
resources. But two considerations militate against this. One
is its private nature, just remarked upon; meanings cannot
be created by individuals (or only ‘virtual’ meanings, not
‘actual’ ones) unless in the process they become public:
that is shared by others engaged in interpreting of shared
body of experience.

Even where the critic "dresses up" a private comment
linguistically so as to look like a technical and public
one, the terms remain private and personal; the meanings
they reflect are not field-specific meanings but
critic-specific ones.

The other consideration relates to choice. I said earlier
that there was little scope for individual stylistic choice
in the registers of art technology and art history. In other
words, the register that is the most objective and public is
also the one that is the most limited in the range of choice
available in the selection of meanings. By contrast, the
register that is the most subjective and private offers a
much wider range of choice to the writer in what he can
mean. That is to say, the contextual configuration of field,
tenor and mode gets relatively little constraint on the
meanings to be expressed in aesthetics and especially in art
criticism. In this respect also these registers are
therefore closer to literature; cf. Hasan (1975:54) ['The
place of stylistics in the study of verbal art' H. Ringborn
(ed), Style and Text: studies presented to Nils Erik Elkvist, Stockholm: Skriptor) "...of all the varieties of a language, literature is the one which makes the most tenuous contact with the contextual construct".

This point clearly relates to the interpretability of the text. Other things being equal (i.e. the overall level of complexity of the language used), the greater the "semantic space" within which the writer is operating - his range of lexical, topical and thematic options - the more difficult the text will be to interpret (cf. Halliday, 1978: 200 "...it is an essential of successful learning that the pupil should at any given moment be able to predict a large part of what the teacher is going to say next.") Texts in art criticism are essentially unpredictable; and this also makes them difficult to comprehend, especially for a learner in the field.

It seems likely, therefore, that these factors in the language of art criticism - that it is relatively private (while yet giving the appearance of being public), and that it is relatively unpredictable - contribute towards making it difficult for the reader to interpret. As we reported in the previous section, students find it the most 'cryptic' of the forms of art discourse. At the same time, it is clear that, despite being found cryptic, it is not lacking in prestige. I have not attempted to measure the prestige of the various registers; but the impression I have gained as a teacher is that art criticism is the most highly valued of the four.

The concept of prestige, as applied to dialectal or diatopic varieties of a language, is a complex and difficult issue; (Hudson, 1980) it is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to treat it systematically. But prestige is a significant factor in the way the languages of art function.
In present-day society, so I shall make a brief reference to it here. In the case of diatypic varieties, or registers (Gregory, 1967: 'Aspects of varieties differentiation' Journal of Linguistics 3), the value accorded to them tends to be attached (without writer or readers being explicitly aware of this) to the 'wordings', the vocabulary and syntax that such texts typically display. Since people are more readily aware of vocabulary that of grammar, the features that would be identified first would be the lexical items; any esoteric terminology may add value to the text. But grammatical features, though more hidden from view, are no less significant in this respect: nominalizations, and other forms of grammatical metaphor, tend to carry considerable prestige.

It may be, however, that in relation to writing about art we need to distinguish between two different kinds of prestige. Texts in art history and technology are valued for their academic content; they carry the prestige of authority, in the sense of specialist knowledge: the writer is an 'authority' on his subject matter, and his writing is based on scientific research which can be checked and verified. Text in art criticism, on the other hand, carry prestige of a rather different kind. Art criticism is in this respect more like art; it is a profession in itself. The prestige of the text is really that of the writer of the text: it is social rather than academic, reflecting the value that is placed on this profession by society.

Hence the text does not need to be objectively verifiable, or even intelligible. Indeed it may gain value precisely by being cryptic and oracular; we may be reminded of W.S. Gilbert's characterization of the aesthete from Patience, "If this young man expresses himself in terms too deep for me, why, what a very singularly deep young man this deep young man must be!" It does appear at times as if the writer
has been at pains to "get up all the germs of the transcendental terms and plant them everywhere" (ibid.). The question that this raises for the present study is this: can our linguistic analysis of the texts display the difference among the various registry of art writing? And, in the light of this final point, can it reveal anything of the wordings that carry these two different types of prestige? There will obviously be a great deal in common to all writing about art, reflecting common features of both the field (the subject matter of art) and the mode (the written presentation of material at an academic level). But, as we have seen in this chapter, there are also significant differences among the four. In the next chapter we shall attempt to say something about these texts in linguistic terms.
CHAPTER 4 OUTLINE AND SPECIMENS OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

4.A.1 Unity or diversity of art texts

The growing number of textbooks on art, the monographs on artists, the general and specific art histories, the essays on techniques and art methods, the technical and cultural reviews for both connoisseurs and the general public, the books and articles dealing with the general concepts of art, the reproductions of art works, the catalogues for permanent and portable art exhibitions, would suggest that the last 80 years or so have been marked by a rapidly growing interest in art. The enormous number of texts on art would also suggest that there is more than enough material available to those who wish to study art either for both professional and personal reasons. However, when trying to establish what is it all these works have in common, we soon realize that we are dealing with an area that could be at present described as being "chaotic" rather than "unified". Even in the field of the art history, the field that is based on historical facts and consequently is the most likely to offer objective and impersonal rather than subjective and personal information, a unity is the last thing we find. When comparing art history curricula, for instance, we reach a conclusion that some traditions are more chronological, some more topical, some more personal which means that the approach to art history and the teaching of it is not uniform as one may have expected.

The situation becomes even more difficult and chaotic when we move from the field of art history, which offers a more or less objective and impersonal information, to the area of art criticism, which aims at evaluation of individual art works according to the aesthetic judgements of the critic. Why this is the case, why 'giving/offering evaluation' is
more difficult and 'chaotic' than 'giving/ offering information' is a good question and it is here where we can get some answers, or at least clues, from the grammar. When analysing art history texts and texts in art criticism we see that the two types differ in the type of processes used. While in art history the majority of processes are \textit{material} processes, art criticism employs \textit{mental} processes. Now mental processes are interpretable in many different ways which reflect the specific "interpretation" given to them by an individual. It seems then that it is the mental processes that create difficulties in 'unification' of the message of the text of art criticism. When we talk about mental processes we talk about processes of feeling, thinking and perceiving, which by nature relate to subjective and personal rather than objective and impersonal evaluation of a phenomenon under discussion. Now, since we are talking about processes, we have a reason to look at the problem from the grammatical point of view, which is what we are intending in this thesis.

Going back to the point of unity and difficulty, it could be said that the \textit{disunity} created by the personal and private meaning of mental processes is responsible for the difficulty of 'interpretation' as well as of 'classification' of the text of art criticism (something that will be discussed in Chapter 7).

4.A.2 \textbf{Levels and goals of analysis}

As said in the first part of this chapter, in any piece of discourse analysis, there are always two possible levels of achievement to aim at: one being a contribution to the understanding of the text, the other being a contribution to the evaluation of the text. In the first case the linguistic analysis enables one to show how, and why, the text means what it does. This lower of the two levels of achievement is
the one that reveals multiple meaning, alternatives, ambiguities, metaphors and so on, but it is the one that should always be attainable provided the analysis is such as to relate the text to the general features of the language.

The higher of the two levels is not as easily attainable as the lower one because it requires us to go beyond the text itself. It assumes an interpretation not only of the environment of the text, but also of how the linguistic features of the text relate systematically to the features of its environment. In this case the linguistic analysis may tell us where the text is, or is not, an effective text for its own purposes. This can be related to the goals of the present thesis.

As said earlier in a different context, there are two goals that are envisaged in this thesis. One is to examine the different registers of art and compare them in the light of their internal structures and lexis; this is at the lower level of achievement. The other is to see how language is used to teach art in general and different aspects of art in particular; this inevitably involves evaluating the texts — how effective they are for the learner — and is thus related to the higher level of achievement.

The analysis of selected texts in grammatical terms will thus be the first step. The grammatical analysis will then be followed by some further commentary referring both to the text itself and the system above the text, i.e. to its context of situation and of culture.

A text can be a highly complex phenomenon, the product of a highly complex ideational and interpersonal environment. Consequently, to understand the meaning of a text often requires that we move from the language into interpretation of other semiotic realms. But it is important to recognize
that every step in the analysis, the grammatical analysis included, is a work of interpretation. A text is a semantic unit; its unity is a unity of meaning. But meanings are realized through wordings; hence a theory of wordings, i.e., a grammar, is necessary for any interpretation of the meaning of a text. It must be a grammar that is functional and semantic in its orientation, with the grammatical categories explained as the realization of semantic patterns. Hence our choice of systemic-functional grammar as appropriate to the present task.

4.A.3 The strategy employed

The analysis will take the clause as the basic unit of lexicogrammatical organization in language, and the clause complex as its extension. The clause complexes will be discussed in terms of the interdependencies and logical-semantic relations that exist between the clauses that make up clause complexes.

In his 'Dimensions of discourse analysis: grammar', Halliday suggests ten movements in the grammatical analysis of a text:

1. transcription and analysis of intonation and rhythm
2. analysis into clauses and clause complexes, showing interdependencies and logical-semantic relations
3. analysis of clauses, and clause complexes, for thematic (Theme-Rheme) structure
4. comparison of clauses and information units, and analysis of the latter for information (Given-New) structure
5. analysis of finite clauses for mood, showing Subject and Finite
6. analysis of all clauses for transitivity, showing process type and participant and circumstantial functions
4. analysis of groups and phrases (verbal group, nominal group, adverbial group, propositional phrase)
8. analysis of grammatical and lexical cohesion
9. identification, rewording and reanalysis of grammatical
metaphors

10. A description of context of situation, and correlation with features of the text

In the terms of Halliday (1985), apart from looking at the clause and discuss it (a) as message [the textual level of language]; (b) as exchange [the interpersonal level of language]; and (c) as representation [the ideational level of language], we will look "above the clause" (i.e. at the clause complexes and the types of relationships that exist between clauses); "beside the clause" (i.e. at the nature of information unit and the meaning of Given and New); "around the clause" (i.e. the cohesion in a text); and "beyond the clause" (the metaphorical modes of expression).

Apart from looking at a text and analysing it according to the above, we will move away from the text and language itself into other semiotic realms to be able to describe and analyse a text in the light of its context of situation and the context of culture.

I haven not followed exactly the ten steps listed above, discussion of texts will be based on those headings. In the next section we make a brief comment about the categories and concepts associated with each.

4.A.4 Concepts behind the grammatical categories

1) CLAUSE

The Functional Grammar treats a clause as a unit in which meanings of three different kinds are combined. There are three distinct structures, mapped on to one another to produce a single wording, each of them expressing a different kind of semantic organization.
One of the structures known as THEMATIC structure gives the clause its character as a message; the second one known as the MOOD structure gives the clause its character as exchange, the third one known as the TRANSITIVITY structure gives the clause its character as representation.

(a) Thematic structure

A message consists of a Theme combined with a Rheme; the Theme being the element which serves as the point of departure of the message; it is that with which the clause is concerned. The remainder of the message, the part in which the Theme is developed, is called the Rheme. As a general rule, the Theme can be identified as that element which comes in first position in the clause. The Theme can be either a nominal group, an adverbial group or a prepositional phrase; together with conjunctive or modal adjuncts and conjunctions or relatives. If we were asked what is the element that is typically chosen as Theme in an English clause, the answer to that question would depend on the choice of mood.

(b) Mood structure

Every independent Major clause selects for mood and is either indicative or imperative. If it is indicative, it is either declarative or interrogative; if it is interrogative, it is either polar interrogative (‘yes/no’ type) or content interrogative (‘WH-’ type).

The Mood element consists of two parts: (a) the Subject, which is a nominal group, and (b) the Finite element, which is part of a verbal group. The Subject may be any nominal group, the Finite element is one of a small number of verbal operators expressing either tense or modality. The Mood
element realizes the selection of mood in the clause; the remainder of the clause is called the Residue.

The presence of the Mood element, consisting of Subject plus Finite, realizes the features 'indicative'. Within the indicative, the order of Subject and Finite is what is significant. The order Subject before Finite realizes 'declarative'; the order Finite before Subject realizes 'yes/no interrogative'. In a 'WH-interrogative', if the WH-element is the Subject, then Subject comes before Finite. In all the other cases finite comes before Subject.

The Finite element has the function of making the proposition finite, and this can be done in one of two ways. One is by reference to the time of speaking; the other is by reference to the opinion of judgement of the speaker. In the first case the Finite expresses the primary tense, in the second case the Finite expresses the modality

Primary tense means past, present or future at the moment of speaking; it is time relative to 'now'. Modality means the speaker's judgement of the probabilities, or the obligations involved in what he is saying.

As far as the Residue is concerned, it consists of functional elements of three kinds: Predicactor, Complement and Adjunct. There can be only one Predicactor, one or two Complements, and an indefinite number of Adjuncts up to about seven.

The Predicactor is realized by a verbal group minus the temporal or modal operator and consequently it is non-finite in itself. As for its function, (a) it specifies time reference other than reference to the time of the speech event, i.e. 'secondary' tense: past, present or future relative to the primary tense; (b) it specifies various
other aspects and phases like seeming, hoping, trying, etc.; (c) it specifies the voice: active or passive; (d) it specifies the process (material, mental, relational, behavioural, etc.) that is predicated of the Subject.

A Complement is an element within the Residue that has the potential of being Subject but is not. It is typically realized by a nominal group.

An Adjunct is an element that has not got the potential of being Subject and it is typically realized by an adverbial group or a prepositional phrase. Adjuncts can be of three types: 1) circumstantial adjuncts; 2) modal adjuncts; 3) conjunctive adjuncts. Modal adjuncts can further be divided into 'mood' adjuncts and 'comment adjuncts'.

Going back to the question of what element is the one that is typically selected as Theme, we said that the answer to that question would depend on the choice of mood. In declarative clauses Theme is usually conflated with Subject; this is known as an 'unmarked' declarative Theme. The Theme in interrogative clauses is either (i) polar interrogative: the element that embodies the expression of polarity, namely the finite verb, or (ii) non-polar, 'content' interrogative: the WH-element. As far as imperative clauses are concerned, the basic message of such a clause is 'I want you to do something', or 'I want us to do something' and consequently the Theme in such sentences is either "you" or "let's".

(c) Transitivity structure

We said above that a clause functions as a message and as such consists of a Theme combined with a Rheme; it also functions as an exchange, and as such it consists of Mood combined with Residue. When a clause is seen in its function
as representation, then it is realized by a specific configuration of process, participants and circumstances. This is the domain of TRANSITIVITY, which specifies the different types of process that are recognized in the language, and the structures by which they are expressed.

As already indicated, the basic semantic framework for the representation of a process consists of three components: 1) the process itself; 2) participants in the process; 3) circumstances associated with the process. These provide the frame of reference for interpreting our experience of what goes on around us and inside of us. These different 'goings-on' are sorted out in the semantic system of the language and are expressed through the grammar of the clause.

Systemic-Functional Grammar recognizes MATERIAL PROCESSES, which can be of action or event; BEHAVIOURAL PROCESSES, MENTAL PROCESSES, which can be of perception, affection or cognition; VERBAL PROCESSES; RELATIONAL PROCESSES which can be of attribution or identification; and EXISTENTIAL PROCESSES.

The general category meaning of the material processes is "doing", further subdivided into 'doing' represented by the material processes expressing actions and 'happening' represented by the material processes expressing events. The category meaning of behavioural processes is 'behaving'. The general category meaning of mental processes is 'sensing', further subdivided into 'seeing' expressed by processes of perception, 'feeling' represented by processes of affection and 'thinking' expressed by processes of cognition. The category meaning of verbal processes is 'saying'. The general category meaning of relational processes is 'being', further subdivided into 'attributing' in the case of processes of attribution and 'identifying' in the case of
processes of identification. The category meaning of existential processes is 'existing'.

The key participants of the six types of processes are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process type</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>material:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>action</td>
<td>Actor, Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>event</td>
<td>Behaver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>behavioural</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mental:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perception</td>
<td>Senser, Phenomenon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cognition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verbal</td>
<td>Sayer, Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relational:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attribution</td>
<td>Token, Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identification</td>
<td>Carrier, Attribute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>existential</td>
<td>Existent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Actor, Goal, Behaver, Senser, Phenomenon, Sayer, Target, Token, Value, Carrier, Attribute, Identified, Identifier and Existent are not class labels, but function labels. All those listed here are participants directly involved in the process: the one that does, behaves, senses, says, is or exists, together with the complementary function where there is one - the one that is done to, sensed, etc. From the grammatical point of view, these are the elements that typically relate directly to the verb, without a preposition as intermediary. Apart from these, there are other participant functions in the English clause, also specific to each particular process type, but these can be grouped together into two general functions common to all clauses. They are the Beneficiary, and the Range.

Beneficiary and Range are the oblique or 'indirect' participants, which in earlier English used to require an oblique case and/or a preposition. Unlike the direct
participants they could not conflate with the Subject function in the mood system.

Beneficiary is the one to whom or for whom the process is said to take place. It appears in material and verbal processes, and occasionally in relational processes.

In a material process, the Beneficiary is either Recipient or Client. The Recipient is one that goods are given to; the Client is one that services are done for.

In a verbal process, the Beneficiary is the one who is being addressed and his role is that of the Receiver.

A Beneficiary also appear in a few relational processes of attribution.

Range is the element that specifies the range or scope of the process. A range may occur in material, behavioural, mental and verbal processes.

In a material process, the Range either expresses the domain over which the process takes place or expresses the process itself.

In a mental process the Range is not an additional element, but provides a way of interpreting an element we have already met.

In a verbal process, the Range is the element expressing the class, quality or quantity of what is said.

In a behavioural process, the Range is the expression of the behaviour.
Finally, there are also circumstantial elements in English: Extent and Location in time and space; Manner (means, quality and comparison); Cause (reason, purpose and behalf); Accompaniment; Matter; Role. These feature in processes of all types but with some combinations less likely than other. It is less likely to get locatives with mental processes, for example.

To summarize, there are three meanings expressed by the clause: the textual meaning (the clause as message); the interpersonal meaning (the clause as exchange) and the ideational meaning (the clause as representation). Of these, it would seem, that the analysis for transitivity, showing process type, participant and circumstantial functions, will be the most important to us. Usually when people talk about what a word or a sentence 'means', they refer to meaning in the sense of content, i.e. the meaning of the clause as representation. Systemic-functional grammar, however, gives no overall priority to any of the three, and predicts that they will be differentially important in different registers. It may be that the different registers of art discourse will differ in the relative foregrounding given to these three components.

2.1 CLAUSE COMPLEX

The clause complex belongs in the area "above the clause". A clause complex consists of a an initiating or a Head clause and other clauses that are structurally related to it. The relationship between clauses is interpreted in terms of the 'logical' component of the linguistic system: the functional-semantic relations that make up the logic of natural language. There are two dimensions in the interpretation: one is the system of interdependence, or 'tactic' system, parataxis and hypotaxis; the other is the logico-semantic system of expansion and projection, which is
specifically an inter-clausal relation. These two provide the functional framework for describing the clause complex.

As far as hypotaxis and parataxis is concerned, the term hypotaxis refers to the relation between a dependent element and its dominant, the element on which it is dependent. The term parataxis refers to the relation between two like elements of equal status, one initiating and the other continuing.

As far as logico-semantic relation is concerned, there is a wide range of different logico-semantic relations any of which may hold between a primary and a secondary member of a clause complex. The Functional Grammar groups these into a small number of general types, based on the two fundamental relationships of (a) EXPANSION and (b) PROJECTION. 'Expansion' means that the secondary clause expands the primary clause by (i) elaborating it, (ii) extending it or (iii) enhancing it. 'Elaborating' is the relationship of 'that is to say', 'for example', 'in other words'; 'Extending' is the relationship of 'and', 'or', 'but (on the other hand)'; 'Enhancing' is the relationship of 'than (time)', 'so', 'then (condition)', 'thus', 'but (despite that)' and so on. Projection' means that the secondary clause is projected through the primary clause, which instates it as (a) a locution or (b) an idea. It thus corresponds to the concepts of direct or indirect speech and thought.

31 GROUPS AND PHRASES

There are three main classes of group: nominal group, verbal group and adverbial group. Apart from these there are preposition and conjunction groups.

(a) "Nominal group"
As far as the nominal group is concerned, Systemic-Functional Grammar distinguishes two structures of the nominal group: the experiential structure and the logical structure. The experiential structure has the function of specifying (a) a class of things and (b) some category of membership within this class. The logical structure represents the modifying relationship in the nominal group: its organization as a Head with pre- and post-modifying elements.

The element expressing the class is called Thing. The Thing is the semantic core of the nominal group and it can be common noun, proper noun or personal pronoun. Membership within the class is expressed by one or more of the functional elements Deictic, Numerative, Epithet and Classifier.

The Deictic element indicates whether or not some specific subset of the Thing is intended; and if so, then which one. It can thus be either specific or non-specific. If there is no Deictic element, the nominal group is non-specific. There may be a second Deictic element in the nominal group, one which adds further information to the identification of the subset in question. This second deictic is referred to as Post-Deictic, or Deictic 2.

The Numerative element indicates some numerical features of the subset: either quantity or order, either exact or inexact.

The Epithet indicates some quality of the subset and can be either experiential or interpersonal/attitudinal.

The Classifier indicates a particular subclass of the thing in question.
The experiential structure embodies the experiential pattern in nominal group structure. Proceeding from left to right we progress from the kind of element that has the greatest specifying potential to that which has the least. We progress from the immediate context, the identification of the item in terms of the here-and-now, to quantitative features, to qualitative features and last of all to class membership.

As said earlier, the Thing is the semantic core of the nominal group and the elements which precede the Thing have the potential for identifying it more explicitly and they are mainly single words. The Qualifier is a term used for what follows the Thing; unlike the elements that precede the Thing, which are words, the Qualifier is either a phrase or a clause. With only rare exceptions, all Qualifiers are embedded.

The logical structure offers a complementary point of view, showing how the nominal group embodies the generalized logical-semantic relations that are encoded in natural languages. The one that is important in this instance is that of MODIFICATION. The logical structure shows the nominal group as a recursive subcategorization; the core of the logical structure is called the Head, and this is modified both regressively (Premodifier) or progressively (Postmodifier).

(b) "Verbal group"

The verbal group is the constituent that functions as Finite plus Predicator, or as Predicator alone if there is no Finite element, in the mood structure; and as Process is the transitivility structure. A verbal group is the expansion of a verb and it consists of a sequence of words of the primary class 'verb'. The ordering of the words can be expressed as an experiential and as a logical structure.
The experiential structure of the finite verbal group is Finite plus Event, with one or more optional Auxiliary. The class of word functioning as Event is the lexical verb. The logical structure of the verbal group realizes the system of voice and tense being ordered recursively as 'present', 'past in present', 'present in past in present' and so on.

(c) "Adverbial group"

The adverbial group has an adverb as Head, which may or may not be accompanied by modifying elements. As in the nominal group, postmodifying elements are typically embedded.

(d) "Prepositional phrase"

Preposition and nominal group functioning as elements in a minor predication/minor process. Like a non-finite clause but further reduced so that functions as circumstantial element attached to creative process.

4) THE INFORMATION UNIT

The information unit is what its name implies: a unit of information. Information is a process of interaction between what is already known or predictable and what is new or unpredictable. It is the interplay of new and not new and consequently the information unit is a structure made up of two functions, the New and the Given.

An information unit does not correspond exactly to any unit in the clause grammar, so it has to be set up as a constituent in its own right.

Information presented by the speaker to the listener can be either recoverable or not recoverable. If it is recoverable, this means that it is functioning as GIVEN; if not
recoverable then functioning as 'NEW' - the orientation being that of the listener. When we say that something is GIVEN it can either mean that it has been mentioned before or that it is being presented as GIVEN by the speaker for rhetorical purposes. The meaning is: this is not news. What is considered as NEW can either be something that has never been mentioned before, or something unexpected; or again, something that is being presented as 'to be attended to'.

There is a close semantic relationship between information structure and thematic structure, i.e. between Given + New and Theme + Rheme, but this does not mean that they are the same thing. Though typically a speaker will choose the Theme from within what is Given and locate the focus of the New somewhere within the Rheme, there is a basic difference between the two. Theme + Rheme is speaker/writer-oriented, while Given + New is listener/reader-oriented. (Both of course are speaker/reader-selected.)

Another difference is that Theme + Rheme is a system of the clause, while the Given and New is not a system of the clause. As said above it has its own domain, the information unit, which typically corresponds to a clause but does not always have to. A clause may be broken into two or more information units; or two or more clauses combined so as to form one.

Theme and information together constitute the internal resources for structuring the discourse as a message, but in order that a sequence of clauses, or clause complexes, should constitute a text, it is necessary to do more than give them an appropriate internal structure. It is necessary also to make explicit the external relationship between them, and to do so in a way which is not dependent on grammatical structure. To do that we have to establish additional relations within the text that are not limited to
structural factors. These relations are discussed under the heading of COHESION.

6) COHESION

There are five ways by which cohesion is created in English: by reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction, and lexical organization.

The concept of cohesion concerns the textual organization of the clause and Systemic-Functional Grammar deals with it when describing the situation "around the clause".

a) Reference

There are certain items in every language which have the property of reference, i.e. instead of being semantically in their own right, they make reference to something else for their interpretation (Halliday and Hasan, Cohesion in English, Longman, London, 1985, p.31). In English these items are personals, demonstratives and comparatives. These are directives indicating that information is to be retrieved from elsewhere - which is what they have in common with all cohesive elements. However, what is characteristic of this particular type of cohesion is the specific nature of the information that is signalled for retrieval. In the case of reference the information to be retrieved is the referential meaning, the identity of the particular thing or class of things that is being referred to; and the cohesion lies in the continuity of reference, whereby the same thing enters into the discourse a second time.

Reference items may be exophoric (referring to a thing as identified in the context of situation) or endophoric (referring to a thing as identified in the surrounding text). If they are endophoric, i.e. 'textual', then the may
be either anaphoric (referring to preceding text) or cataphoric (referring to following text).

There are three types of reference: personal, demonstrative, and comparative. Personal reference is reference by means of function in the speech situation, through the category of PERSON; demonstrative reference is reference by means of location, on a scale of PROXIMITY; and comparative reference is indirect reference by means of IDENTITY or SIMILARITY (Halliday and Hasan, 1946, p.34).

b) Substitution and ellipsis

Substitution and ellipsis are another type of cohesive relation. They are processes within the text: substitution being the replacement of one item by another, and ellipsis being the omission of an item. Essentially the two are the same process: ellipsis can be interpreted as that form of substitution in which the item is replaced by nothing.

The distinction between substitution and reference is that substitution is a relation in the wording rather than in the meaning and since substitution is a grammatical relation, the different types of substitution are defined grammatically rather than semantically. The criterion is the grammatical function of the substitute item. In English, the substitute may function as a noun, as a verb, or as a clause. To these correspond the three types of substitution: nominal, verbal, and clausal.

When we talk of ellipsis, we are referring to sentences, clauses, etc. whose structure is such as to presuppose some preceding item, which then serves as the source of the missing information. An elliptic item is one which leaves specific structural slot to be filled from elsewhere. There are three types of ellipsis: nominal, verbal, and clausal.
c) Conjunction

Conjunction, another type of cohesive relation is rather different in nature from the other cohesive relations. It is not simply an anaphoric relation. Conjunctive elements are cohesive not in themselves but indirectly, by virtue of their specific meanings; they are not primarily devices for reaching out into the preceding or following text, but they express certain meanings which presuppose the presence of other components in the discourse.

Halliday and Hasan (1946, p.238) use a scheme of four categories of conjunctions: additive, adversative, causal, and temporal.

d) Lexical organization/cohesion

While reference, substitution and ellipsis, and conjunction are types of grammatical cohesion, the cohesive effect achieved by the selection of vocabulary is called lexical cohesion. There are two types of lexical cohesion: reiteration and collocation.

i) reiteration is a form of lexical cohesion which involves the repetition of a lexical item, at one end of the scale; the use of a general word to refer back to a lexical item, at the other end of the scale; and a number of things in between - the use of a synonym, near-synonym, or superordinate.

ii) collocation is a type of lexical cohesion achieved through the association of lexical items that regularly co-occur.
These are metaphors in the sense of grammatical metaphors: they are referred to by Halliday (1985) on "beyond the clause" Halliday distinguishes ideational metaphors and interpersonal metaphors. (Later on I shall suggest introducing a third category, that of metafunctional metaphors; see chapter 7 below).

Since "grammatical metaphor" is a difficult concept, not found in traditional and formal grammars, I shall discuss it here at length.

Metaphor

In my B.A.Honours dissertation Toward a theory of metaphor, (Rada, 1949) I divided the writings on metaphor and the definitions that have been given, into two main categories: the philosophical and the linguistic.

As I said in the preface to my dissertation, it has often been suggested that the study of metaphor falls outside the scope of an analysis of language proper, although I myself rejected this view. In his inaugural lecture at University College London, Halliday distinguished between the philosophical-logical view of language, according to which linguistics is part of philosophy and grammar is part of logic; and the descriptive-ethnographic view, according to which linguistics is part of anthropology and grammar is part of culture. As Halliday explains:
"The former view stresses analogy; is prescriptive, or normative, in orientation; and concerned with meaning in relation to truth. The latter stresses anomaly; is descriptive in orientation; and concerned with meaning in relation to rhetorical function. The former sees language as thought, the latter sees language as action. The former represents language as rules; its stresses the formal analysis of sentences, and uses for purposes of idealisation (for deciding what falls within or outside its scope) the criterion of grammaticality (what is, or is not, according to the rule). The latter represents language as choices, as a resource; it stresses the semantic interpretation of discourse, and uses for idealisation purposes the criterion of acceptability or usage (what occurs or could be envisaged to occur)." (Halliday, 1944: 34)

It is clear that, from an ethnographic viewpoint, the study of metaphor cannot fall outside the scope of an analysis of language proper. The same would be true, by analogy, of metaphors in any other semiotic system, such as art. It seems likely that metaphors are part of all systems of human behavior (i.e. all semiotic systems), and that they came about because of some specific need, for some specific reason. In other words, metaphor must have a definite social function; and its form, which is implicit rather than explicit in the surface structure of the systems, has not developed because of some strange tendency to be 'ambiguous' or to produce 'decorative' statements for the sake of decoration. Rather, there are social-functional reasons why metaphor was born, and why it remains an essential part both of language and of human behavior in general.

The recognition and analysis of metaphor began in the history of Western thought with Aristotle. There are two main places where Aristotle speaks about metaphor: in Rhetoric and Poetics. In Poetics Aristotle discusses what he considers are the rules for a good poem, and concludes that "...the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learned from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity
in dissimilars" (Great Books of the Western World, Vol.9, p.694).

This suggests that metaphors can be mastered only by a genius, and that a text where metaphors appear is of superior quality.

Later on Aristotle defines metaphors in these terms:

"Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to species, or on ground of analogy" (p.695).

Here Aristotle limits himself to discussing metaphor from the idea-content point of view, with no reference to its function in the text; and others who followed him have usually analysed metaphor in this particular way.

In her book A Grammar of Metaphor (1958, p.43) Christine Brooke-Rose points out that the most studies of metaphor, from Aristotle to the present day, have been concerned with idea-content rather than with the mental processes involved in calling one thing another. I would add that it would be helpful to know not only what kind of mental processes are involved in its formation but also what social function it has.

In evolutionary terms, metaphor is a consequence of the evolution of the human species from what is called pre-language (cf. Halliday, 1945 on 'protolanguage' in the history of the individual) to language proper (c.f. Gurney, 1943), a step whereby signs and signals are replaced by symbols. Man thus becomes then became a symbolic animal; and the symbols are organised into a semiotic structure that we call language. The development of language enabled him to 'metaphorise', i.e. to put different objects together and give them a single class name. This, then makes it possible to create taxonomies, which provide
an ordered and systematic classification of the experiential world.

Contrary to the traditional assumption that a name in origin has only one meaning, the development of language depends on the potential of every word to have different ranges of meaning, dependent on its context of situation. Linguistic symbolisation enabled man to ‘manipulate’ his environment in imagination. Objects and events could be juxtaposed linguistically despite different locations in time and space; past events could be compared with these of the present; objects which were not present, and objects and events which had never occurred and in fact could not have occur, could all be described and interpreted.

But not all symbols are linguistic ones; there are also symbolic forms of art, and while not all art forms may be able to do these things, at least painting has some of the same facility. And it is in the same sense that we can speak of metaphor in painting.

A symbol is that which means; it is a relatively stable and repeatable element of perceptual experience, standing for some larger meaning or set of meanings which cannot be given, or not fully given, in perceptual experience itself. The forms of a language — words, and grammatical structures — have established the status of symbols. Such symbols may differ in their power to mean — in their potential for communicative dynamics (Flirbas, 195); and this difference may relate to their potential for metaphorical shift.

Metaphorical shift is said to go through three stages (Raca, 1949:15). The first stage is when a mental image is employed as a metaphor for the first time, as just a unique flash of insight. It is not yet functioning symbolically. Only when it occurs again, and is recognized, can it be considered as a symbol. This is the second stage. The third stage is reached when the symbol loses its power and is used as some kind of arbitrary sign. It is
at this stage that we talk about a 'dead' metaphor. This, may not even be the last stage, since there are instances when metaphors have been revived — metaphors are not static but rather are dynamic entities, and along with the rest of language they adjust themselves itself to the needs of changing society. These observations were, of course, applied to lexical metaphors. Here however we are concerned with grammatical metaphors, where it is the meaning of grammatical categories that is in question.

In introducing the concept of grammatical metaphor, Halliday said (1985, Chap.10) that this is metaphor in the same sense as lexical metaphor, but that it is being interpreted from the other end: not as one form having different meanings, but as one meaning having different forms for its expression. If some wording is said to be metaphorical, there must also be another one that is not; the assumption is that to any metaphorical expression corresponds another that is 'literal' — or, as he prefers to call it, congruent. In other words, for any given semantic configuration there is at least one congruent realization in the lexicogrammar. However, there may then be others that are in some respect transferred, or metaphorical.

The congruent realizations are not considered to be better then the metaphorical ones and they are not more frequent than the metaphorical ones either. The selection of metaphor is in itself a meaningful choice, and it adds further semantic features: the metaphorical wording is not, in fact, synonymous with the congruent one, precisely because of the additional feature of being metaphorical.

It may seem at first sight that the meaning added by grammatical metaphors is of a stylistic rather than an ideational character. But when one begins to reword some of the grammatical metaphors in more congruent form, it becomes clear that it is not just a stylistic device but one that affects the ideational content.
Halliday recognises two main types of grammatical metaphor in the clause:

a) metaphors of transitivity
b) metaphors of mood (including modality)

In the light of Halliday's model of semantic functions, these are, respectively, ideational metaphors and interpersonal metaphors.

_Ideational metaphors_

In Chapter 5 of his Introduction to Functional Grammar Halliday suggests a framework for interpreting the clause as the representation of a process, i.e. the clause in its ideational function. The three steps involved were:

(i) selection of process type: material, mental, relational, behavioural, verbal, existential;
REALIZED AS

(ii) configuration of transitivity functions: Actor, Goal, Sensor, Manner, etc. representing the process, its participants, and any circumstantial elements;
REALIZED IN TURN AS

(iii) sequence of group/phrase classes: verbal group, nominal group, adverbial group, prepositional phrase, and their various sub-classes.

This framework, which leads from the meaning to the wording, suggests - as Halliday points out - that we assume there are typical ways of saying things, i.e. that there is a systematic relationship among steps (i), (ii) and (iii) such that for any selection in meaning there will be a natural sequence of steps leading toward its realization. Halliday comments that in an important sense this assumption is true. We only start thinking of these as 'congruent' when incongruent ones develop alongside them. But we cannot know whether language evolved initially along these lines, beginning with congruent modes of representation and gradually elaborating them. It is possible, as he says, that metaphors have been inherent in the nature of language from the beginning. This seems to me highly probable.
Ideational metaphors are metaphors of transitivity, in which a process of one type is represented as if it was another. For example, a mental process of perception (to see) as in Mary saw something wonderful, becomes a material process in Mary came upon a wonderful sight; while the perception has been turned into a ‘participant’ a sight (1985:322). A great deal of modern scientific and other highly valued forms of written English are based on metaphors of this general type (Halliday, 1984; Raveelli, 1986).

**Interpersonal metaphors**

The other type of metaphors — interpersonal metaphors — are connected with expressions of mood and modality. As Halliday says, metaphors of modality are a very common type of interpersonal metaphor, based in the semantic relationship of projection. In this type the speaker’s opinion regarding the probability that his observation is valid is coded not as a modal element within the clause, which would be its congruent realization, but as a separate, projecting clause in a hypotactic clause complex. To the congruent form it probably is so corresponds the metaphorical variant I think it is so with I think as the primary or ‘alpha’ clause.

The other main type of interpersonal metaphor is that associated with mood. Mood expresses the speech function, with the exchange system as the underlying pattern of organization. This exchange system — giving or demanding information or goods-&-services — determines the four basic speech functions of statement, question, offer and command. However, this is only the bare bones of the system, and there is a vast range of rhetorical modes in every language representing various metaphorical transferences. Examples from English are familiar in the literature of speech act theory: e.g. interrogative can you help me? by the side of (congruent) imperative help me (please)! (But not examples like
It’s cold in here for close the window, which Halliday treats as metaphor at a higher semantic level.

It is clear that these grammatical metaphors are not simply stylistic variants required by register conventions but that they embody systematic alternations in meaning. For example, a metaphor of modality not only alters the thematic structure but also represents the speaker’s opinion as a substantive process, having transitivity features of its own and giving the other primary process the status of a projection. Likewise any one of the four patterns of organization underlying the mood system can be ‘dressed up’ in many rhetorical modes, which certainly affect the meaning of the text.

Grammatical metaphor, especially that of the ideational kind, is an important and recurring feature of language about art. Some grammatical metaphor is present in all the registers we have identified for discussion; but there are differences in the kinds of metaphor used, in their density in the text, and in their discourse function. Grammatical metaphor is not the be thought of as a phenomenon in isolation; it is part of the overall organization of the text, and its significance can be judged only in relation to the other features with which it co-occurs. In the analysis which follows, grammatical metaphor is taken into account, where relevant, in the context of the linguistic interpretation as a whole.
4.8.2 Basic form of analysis, using specimen text

TEXT Jacopo Robusti, called Tintoretto (1512 - 1594), was one of the creators of Baroque art. A pupil of Titian, his eyes were opened by Michelangelo's works in Rome. (Bazin, A concise history of art, p.292).

Text showing grammatical units

|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|-- |--|
Text showing intonation units

//4 Jacopo Robusti //4 called Tintoretto//4 fifteen
twelve to fifteen nine-four //1 was one of the creators of
Baroque art //3 a pupil of Titian // his eyes were opened
by Michelangelo's works in Rome//

(Unmarked reading throughout: one clause=one tone group,
information focus on final element. No rhythm shown, since
texts are entirely written.)

SYMBOLS:

// tone group boundary

(underlined) focal element

(culmination of New: location of tonic prominence)

1 tone 1 (typically stating)
2 tone 2 (" asking)
3 tone 3 (" dependent)
4 tone 4 (" reserved)
5 tone 5 (" insistent)
Clause complex analysis

α

1

= β

+2

β

1

α

Jacopo Robusti was one of the creators of Baroque art 1512-1594 called Tintoretto a pupil of Titian his eyes were opened by Michelangelo's works in Rome

α = β1 β +2

(Interpretation: 'who was called Tintoretto, and who lived from 1512 to 1594')

Symbol:...

SYMBOLS:

α, β clauses in hypotactic relation (dependent on )

1, 2 clauses in paratactic relation (2 follows 1 )

= expansion: elaborating ('i.e. ')

+ expansion: extending ('and, or')

x expansion: enhancing ('so, then' &.)

' projection: idea ('thinks: ')

" projections: locution ('says: ')

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Clause analysis: Theme (other examples added for comparison)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>topical</th>
<th>Theme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rheme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(No Theme in remaining clauses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>topical</th>
<th>Theme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rheme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clause analysis: Mood (other example added for comparison)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Finite</th>
<th>Complement</th>
<th>Mood</th>
<th>Residue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Finite</th>
<th>Predicator</th>
<th>Adjuncts</th>
<th>Mood</th>
<th>Residue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

called Tintoretto

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicator</th>
<th>Complement</th>
<th>Residue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(No mood in remaining clauses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complement</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Finite</th>
<th>Predicator</th>
<th>past</th>
<th>'do'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-due</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

160
Clause analysis: Transitivity

Jacopo Robusti was one of the creators of Baroque art
called Tintoretto a pupil of Titian
his eyes were opened by Michelangelo's works in Rome

Halliday's summary of the transitivity system of English is as follows (1985: Chapter 5):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process type</th>
<th>Category meaning</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>material action</td>
<td>'doing', 'doing',</td>
<td>Actor, Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>event</td>
<td>'happening'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>behavioural</td>
<td>'behaving'</td>
<td>Behaver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mental perception</td>
<td>'sensing', 'seeing',</td>
<td>Senser, Phenomenon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affection</td>
<td>'feeling',</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cognition</td>
<td>'thinking'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verbal</td>
<td>'saying'</td>
<td>Sayer, Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relational attribution</td>
<td>'attributing', 'identifying'</td>
<td>Carrier, Attribute Identified, Identifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identification</td>
<td>'existing'</td>
<td>Existent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cohesion

Jacopo Robusti, called Tintoretto (1512? - 1594), was one of the creators of Baroque art. A pupil of Titian, his eyes were opened by Michelangelo's works in Rome.

(Distance in sentences of nearest previous mention of lexical items and proper names (ibid pp.288-291):

Tintoretto 23 artist 11 Titian 24
creating 24 art 14 Michelangelo 4
Baroque 14 pupil 13 Rome 9

Note 24 sentences earlier Ponderrone...was creating Baroque.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohesive categories</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>reference</td>
<td>personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>demonstrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>comparative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>substitutions</td>
<td>clausal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>verbal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>nominal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ellipsis</td>
<td>clausal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>verbal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>nominal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conjunction</td>
<td>additive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>appositive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>causal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>concessive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>conditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>temporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lexical</td>
<td>collocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>repetition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>synonymy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>antonymy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>hyponymy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>meronymy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Halliday, 1985: Chapter 9)
Phrases & Groups

(a) prepositional phrases

by Michelangelo's works in Rome

minor
Process/

minor
Range/Complement

- minor
Pro/Pred

Range/Comp

(b) verbal groups

was opened

Finite/Event
past

Finite
past

event

past

passive

(c) nominal groups

one of the creators of Baroque art

Numerative

Thing

Qualifier

Head

Postmodifier

Michelangelo's works in Rome

Deltic

Thing

Qualifier

Premodifier

Head

Postmodifier

(The second line in the group analysis (b) and (c)
represents the 'logical' structure, which is an interactive
structure of a hypotactic kind. For the sake of simplicity
such structures will be 'boxed' as if they were constituent
structures.)

Grammatical metaphor

The only grammatical metaphor in the specimen text is the
nominalization was one of the creators of where the more
congruent form would be was one of those who created: but
this is so well-established as a typical wording that it is
hardly perceived to be metaphorical. Note that this eyes
were opened by Michelangelo's works involves lexical but not
grammatical metaphor.
The preceding sentence (shortened) is

His [Calliri's] gay colouring.....expresses all the generosity of the senses and the taste for material luxury for which Venice was noted.

A more congruent re-writing might be:

By using gay colours he expresses the fact that Venetians (Venetian painters?) were generous in their feelings (?sensed [things] generously) and enjoyed living luxuriously, something for which they are noted.

Here the metaphor is almost entirely grammatical.

The sentence following the specimen text embodies both grammatical and lexical metaphor:

His [Tintoretto's] tormented genius and creative frenzy poured themselves out...in his huge compositions...

A more congruent re-wording might be:

He composed huge [works] and in this way demonstrated that he was a tormented genius, and created [things] with frenzy.

or perhaps

He was a tormented genius, and (so?) he created [things] with frenzy; thus he was able to (?had to) compose huge [works].

- depending on the interpretation of poured themselves out in.

Since these are ideational metaphors, the clause can be multiply analysed for transitivity in order to bring out the range of meaning covered by the metaphorical wording. For
example, the following two descriptions define the semantic space within which this clause has its experiential meaning:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carrier</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Manner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>rel/attrib</td>
<td>Range</td>
<td></td>
<td>material</td>
<td></td>
<td>quality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

he was a tormented genius and creative franzcy he created things with genius thus he was able to compose huge works

- the second being a clause complex with structure 1+2*2.

I shall not be presenting the complete grammatical analysis of the texts under study, for obvious reasons. But all observations made about the language throughout this chapter are based on descriptions of this kind, in terms of systemic-functional grammar as set out in Halliday (1985).

**Lexical density**

14 lexical items : 4 clauses = 3.5
This most ancient of human cultures was the most recently discovered by amateurs and by accident. In 1849, near Santander in northern Spain, Marcelino de Sautuola, a local resident interested in the antiquity of man, was exploring the Altamira caves on his estate, in which he had already found specimens of flint and carved bone. With his was his little daughter.

Clause complex analysis:

Sentence 1 - $\alpha^\beta$
Sentence 2 - $\alpha^\beta$
Sentence 3 - $\alpha_1$

The first sentence would most naturally be interpreted as a single clause, with two circumstantial elements in a zeugmatic relation (by amateurs Agents, by accident Manner). However, this requires that was discovered should be a material Process; and that is contradicted by the most recently, which forces the interpretation 'was the one most recently discovered', with the most recently discovered as a nominal group, and was as relational Process. So the whole must be described as a clause complex, the second clause being non-finite: 'having been
discovered by amateurs and by accident. Since neither by amateurs nor by accident is logically either an elaboration of most recently discovered or an explanation of it, we have to interpret it simply as extending, structure $\alpha^+\beta$.

The second sentence also consists of two clauses, the second being a hypotactic elaboration (non-definint relative) clause. The order of these two clauses is the reverse of the order in which the events they describe took place.

The thematic element in the three independent clauses (clause 1, 3 and 5) is as follows:

clause 1 this most ancient of all human cultures
clause 3 in 1849, near Santander in northern Spain
clause 5 with him

All these are topical Themes; there are no textual or interpersonal components with thematic status. The Theme in clause 1 is unmarked (i.e. it is also Subject); it refers anaphorically to the title of the section Cave Art (it may seem strange to characterize cave art as one of the human 'cultures', and even more as the 'most ancient one; but there is no other possible referent for the this). The theme of clause 3 is a circumstance of Location, setting the scene of the discovery in both time and space; the key participant, de Sautuola, is then introduced in the Rheme. In clause 5 de Sautuola now appears anaphorically as him) in the Theme; this is a circumstance of Accompaniment, and again the clause introduces a participant, this time the real discovered of the paintings, in the Rheme.

The pattern that emerges is one of those identified by Danes (1944:118-9, cf.Fries,1983:121 ff.), (Franzishek Danes (1944)'Functional sentence perspective and the organization of the text, F.Danes (ed.), Papers on Functional Sentence Perspective, The Hague, Mouton) that in which 'the theme of each successive
sentence derives from the theme of the previous sentence’ (Fries, 1983:123):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Rheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>clause 1</td>
<td>cave art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clause 3</td>
<td>recently discovered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clause 5</td>
<td>In 1849 de Sautuola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>his daughter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and this is continued in the next independent clause it was the child who..., where the Theme is the child, i.e. de Sautuola’s daughter (for these 'predicted Themes' see Halliday, 1985:59-60).

The transitivity structure of the first sentence may be represented as follows:

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The most ancient of all human cultures was</th>
<th>the most recently discovered by amateurs and by accident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Token</td>
<td>Process: relational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>identifying</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

This (first) clause sets up the expectation that it will be structured as Value^Token, e.g. the most ancient of all human cultures was that of the Old Stone Age, as would be appropriate for its strongly topical position in the paragraph, and indeed in the chapter. It turns out, however, to be Token^Value. This is already discontinuing enough; the reader is even more taken aback by having to reinterpret the nominalization the most recently discovered as a verbal group, perhaps retiring (?) the earlier was to help out. Finally the grammatical pun on by in by amateur and by accident also destroys the expected pattern set up by the co-ordination. The effect is certainly striking, but perhaps somewhat disruptive at such a prominent place in the discourse.

In the second sentence the process type switches to material:
in 1879 near Santander in northern Spain was exploring the Altamira caves on his estate
Marcelino de S., a local resident interested in the antiquity of man

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Process:</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temporal</td>
<td>Spatial</td>
<td>he</td>
<td>had ...... found specimens of flint and carved bone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial</td>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>Process:</td>
<td>relational:</td>
<td>Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>material</td>
<td>intensive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This marks the move into historical narrative following the introductory summary (cf. Wignell, Martin and Egging, 1985:43). The third sentence brings in a nother actor on the historical scene by means of a circumstantial relational process:

with him was his little daughter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute/Circ: Accompaniment</th>
<th>Process: relational:</th>
<th>Carrier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>process: relational: intensive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is little or no grammatical metaphor; perhaps the only instance is the nominalization of quality (‘ancient’) in the antiquity of man. Like many other such grammatical metaphors, this one is ambiguous: does it mean ‘interested in the question how old mankind is’, or does it mean ‘interested in the early history of mankind’? The nominal groups show some pre- and post-modification, with embedded phrases and clauses in postmodifying function:
It is noticeable that in both nominal groups in the first sentence the mark between the experiential structure (shown in the first line of the analysis) and the logical structure (shown in the second line) is untypical: the Head is something other than the Thing.

The verbal groups all select some feature of past tense: past in past had found, present in past was exploring or simple past was. The verbal group in the first clause is also simple past, and may be passive:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finite/Event</th>
<th>Finite/Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>past</td>
<td>past</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As remarked above, we have to allow both these interpretations; the first interpretation has to be replaced by the second in order to allow for an Agent in the structure.

The pattern of tense selection is, obviously, such as would be predicted for a historical text.

Finally, the cohesive organization of these three sentences is as follows:

This most ancient of human cultures was the most recently discovered — by amateurs and by accident. In 1849, near Santander in northern Spain, Marcelino de Sautuola, a local resident interested in the antiquity of man, was exploring the Altamira Caves on his estate in which he had already found specimens of flint and carved bone. With him was his little daughter.

Apart from the initial this, all anaphoric reference is personal, forming a participant chain from Marcelino de Sautuola. (All occurrences of the are cataphoric.) The main source of cohesion is lexical by collocation, synonymy and antonymy; the motifs that are chained lexically in this way are those of 'human', 'discover', and 'ancient'. (There is also the repetition of the word cave from the title.) Thus the cohesive patterning reveals in microcosm of the semantic 'flavour' of this short introduction into art history.
4.B.2.2. ART TECHNOLOGY - from Greek Art by M.A. Ritchie, (1964:306)

After the decoration was completed and the vases had become bone dry, they were placed in the kiln and fired. The procedure was dictated by the nature of the glaze. It was a single fire, but had three successive stages - at first oxidizing (with air admitted), then reducing (with smoke introduced), and lastly reoxidizing.

Sentence 1 - $x \beta_1 \beta^2 \alpha_1 \alpha^2$
Sentence 2 - $\alpha_1$
Sentence 3 - $1^2 \alpha_2 = \beta_1 \alpha_2 \beta_1 \alpha^2 \beta^2 + 2 \alpha_2 \beta_2 \alpha \beta^3 \beta + 3$

The first sentence uses a combination of parataxis and hypotaxis to present four processes in temporal sequence. The second sentence provides an explanation, in the form of a single clause; the third then uses a more complex structure to give further detail about the final process, the firing.

Here the pattern is:

(a) paratactic extension, finite, for introducing the three stages;

(b) hypotactic elaboration, by non-finite (V-ing), for specifying what the stages are;

(c) paratactic extension, by a sequence of such non-finites, for enumerating the three stages in order;

(d) hypotactic enhancement, by non-finite (V-en), for
defining the process at each of the (first two) stages.

Cohesive relations (including those within the sentence) are shown in the following:

After the decoration was completed and the vases had become bone dry, they were placed in the kiln and fired. The procedure was dictated by the nature of the glaze. It was a single fire, but had three successive stages - at first oxidizing (with air admitted), then reducing (with smoke introducing), and lastly reoxidizing.

A noticeable feature is the anaphoric use of the definite article to show that the following noun, as Thing in the nominal group, is co-referential with a preceding occurrence: the decoration, the vases, the glaze (all items which had occurred in the preceding paragraph); and similarly the procedure, where the noun is functioning as a 'general word' (Halliday & Hasan, 1946:248) superordinate to the firing in the previous sentence. What the the does is to show that the lexical repetition is to be interpreted as reference to the same phenomenon (same entity, process, etc.); we may contrast this with the lexical repetition in the art
criticism example (see 4.8.2.4 below), which does not signal identity of reference.

The other noticeable feature is the use of conjunction to build an explicit logical sequence of events related in time: at first, then, and lastly. Thus the cohesive and structural effects reinforce each other; compare the temporal organization set up by the hypotactic sequence after, and also the causal organization set up by the sequence (with). The systematic presentation of these patterns in the grammar, through a combination of structural and cohesive resources, creates a form of discourse that imposes a regular and explicit order on the phenomena under discussion.

The thematic structure of the clauses in these three sentences shows the interplay of textual and topical Themes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>clause no.</th>
<th>textual</th>
<th>topical</th>
<th>status of clause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>after</td>
<td>the decoration</td>
<td>dependent finite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>and</td>
<td>the vases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>and</td>
<td>they (&quot;&quot;&quot;)</td>
<td>independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;&quot; ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>the procedure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>[&quot;&quot; ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>but</td>
<td>[&quot;&quot; ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>and first</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>dependent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

non-finite  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>with</th>
<th>air</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>then</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>with</td>
<td>smoke</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>and last</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (""") shows reference of pronominal Theme. [""""] shows presupposition of Theme by ellipsis.

This shows up the strong conjunctive organization already referred to, together with a pattern of movement in the topical Themes as different aspects of the technique under consideration—that of 'glazing' in Athenian pottery between 550 and 300 B.C. are being described. In this short passage the Theme moves from the decoration to the vases and then to the general noun the procedure, with air
and smoke appearing briefly as Themes of non-finite clauses at considerable depth in the structure. This mobility of topical Themes is continued throughout the paragraph, from the body of the vase and the glaze, through the initial wash, to the red accessory colour and the white accessory colour; while the textual (conjunctive) Themes continue to appear throughout.

Analysis of the transitivity shows a preponderance of material processes, interspersed with one or two relational attributive:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>clause</th>
<th>MEDIUM</th>
<th>PROCESS</th>
<th>PROCESS TYPE</th>
<th>VOICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>the decoration</td>
<td>was completed</td>
<td>material: abstract</td>
<td>passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>the vases</td>
<td>had become</td>
<td>relational:attributive</td>
<td>middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>the vases</td>
<td>were placed</td>
<td>material:dispositive</td>
<td>passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>the vases</td>
<td>were fired</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>the procedure</td>
<td>was dictated</td>
<td>relational:attributive</td>
<td>middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>the procedure</td>
<td>was</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>the procedure</td>
<td>had</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>air</td>
<td>oxidizing</td>
<td>material: dispositive</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>admitted</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>reducing</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>smoke</td>
<td>introduced</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>smoke</td>
<td>reoxidizing</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The attributive clauses describe the state that is reached, either by the object under construction (the vases had become bone dry) or by the construction process itself (the procedure was a single fire). The material processes are either concrete actions performed on the object or some other component (the vases were fired, air was admitted), or abstract processes summing up or generalizing some aspect of the total procedure (the decoration was completed, the procedure was dictated by...). Many of these are passive, resulting from the choice of Theme (cf. Halliday, 1985:44): the decoration was completed is preferred over (they) completed the decoration (1) because the decoration is required to be thematic and unmarked (and therefore Subject), and (2) because the Actor is not required to be made explicit. The remaining three I have considered as
middle: no Medium is specified, and the verbs (oxidizing, reducing, reoxidizing) are simply labelling the different parts of the total process of firing.

There is not a great deal of grammatical metaphor, although one clause stands out in this respect: the procedure was dictated by the nature of the glaze. Congruently this might be reworded as they had to proceed in this way because the glaze was as it was (or, less extremely, because of the nature of the glaze). What the grammatical metaphor does is to signal the shift from a concrete to an abstract form of statement, having summative function (cf. the minor grammatical metaphor in the first clause the decoration was completed, as against they had finished decorating). The impression is of a sequence of congruent representations of specific, concrete processes, 'punctuated', as it were, by generalizations and summaries expressed in more metaphorical form (grammatical metaphor only, not lexical).

The final point that should be made about this example is that the structure of the clauses, groups and phrases is regular and rather simple. The groups typically consist of one or two words only (the decoration, was completed; the only longer ones are those with a Numerative element a single fire, three successive stages). There is no clause embedding; and the only nominal group with an embedded phrase as Qualifier is the nature of the glaze, which occurs in the clause that is characterized by grammatical metaphor. The clauses themselves (which are all declarative in mood) have just one, two or three elements: the Process, one nominal group functioning as Medium, and either an Agent, and Attribute or a circumstance of Location. This, together with the lack of metaphorical expressions, makes the passage readily accessible as a piece of technical discourse.
4.3.2.3 AESTHETICS - from Aesthetic Judgment
by David Prall (Hooper, 1969: 49)

Discriminating perception [focused upon an object as it appears directly to sense] without ulterior interest to direct that perception inward to an understanding of the actual forces or underlying structure [giving rise to this appearance], or forward to the purposes [to which the object may be turned] or the events [its presence and movement may presage], or outward to its relations [in the general structure and the moving flux] - = such free attentive activity may <fairly> be said to mark the situation [in which beauty is felt].

This sentence, which is the first sentence of a chapter in the book from which it is taken (David W. Prall, Aesthetic Judgement, written in 1929), consists of a single clause. The clause, in turn, consists of three elements: nominal group complex + verbal group complex + nominal group. The nominal group complex consists of two nominal groups in a paratactic elaborating relation (in apposition), the first consisting of 69 words (discriminating.....flux) and the second of 4 words (such free attentive activity).

In the constituent boundary notation, I have shown the boundaries of the embedded clauses, phrases and groups; and also of ranking (i.e. non-embedded) phrases and groups except where these enter into complexes (this would have
required an additional vertical bar before every and and or).

The first nominal group, down to moving flux, functions as the Theme of the clause. Given that this clause is the initial clause of the chapter, it will be expected also to give some indication of the direction that the chapter will take; in this function it will be read in conjunction with the title of the chapter, Aesthetic surface. Sometimes, such chapter-initial clauses explicitly acknowledge this function, with expressions such as in this chapter we shall be concerned with..., where the topic of the chapter is then foregrounded as New information. If this is not done, then the Theme of the initial clause is typically ‘thematic’ for the chapter as a whole.

Here this clause Theme is extremely complicated. It consists of a Head word perception, functioning as Thing; a premodifying Epithet discriminating, and a 64-word embedded postmodifier. Within this postmodifying element there is considerable structural ambiguity. For example (note that in presenting the following examples I have show only as much constituent structure as is necessary to display the difference among the various interpretations):

focused upon an object as it appears directly to sense

(1) What is the relationship of as it appears directly to sense to what precedes?

(a) If the meaning is ‘an object as it appears directly to sense has to be focussed on’, where it is the quality of the object that is in question, then as it appears to sense is an embedded clause functioning as Qualifier to object:
(b) If the meaning is 'an object has to be focussed on as it appears directly to sense', where the quality of the focussing on the object is being referred to, then we have a hypotactic relationship between the two clauses (as shown in the constituent analysis above):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[focussed upon an object]} & \text{[as it appears directly to sense]} \\
\alpha & \times \beta
\end{align*}
\]

It is also uncertain whether the as means 'in the way that' (Manner) or 'when' (Time).

(2) Secondly, the prepositional phrase without ulterior interest...the moving flux may have any one of three possible domains. (a) It may qualify perception, meaning 'to perceive without directing one's perception...'; in this case it is not part of the preceding clause but opens a new embedded phrase modifying the Head word perception:

\[
\text{perception [focussed......to sense] [without...flux]}
\]

This is the interpretation shown in the constituent analysis.

(b) It may be a circumstance of Manner in the clause beginning with focussed, meaning 'to focus upon an object without directing one's perception...'; in which case the grammatical pattern is

\[
\text{[focussed upon an object... | without....flux]}
\]
It may qualify *sense*, meaning ‘as an object appears to senses that do not direct perception...’; in which case it is Qualifier in a nominal group having *sense* as Thing:

\[
[...to\ sense\ [\text{without}....\text{flux}]\]
\]

Thirdly, the prepositional phrase *without*....*flux* contains a long embedded clause as Qualifier to *interest*, and this in turn contains a long paratactic adverbial group complex of extension (‘and/or’):

\[
[[\text{to direct that perception} \\
\uparrow\text{inward to}....\text{appearance} \\
\uparrow\text{or forward to}....\text{presage} \\
\uparrow\text{or outward to}....\text{flux}]]
\]

Since the clause qualifies *interest*, which is Complement to *without*, these *or* have a negative environment: the sense is ‘not looking inwards, and not looking forwards, and not looking outwards’. Within these are further *or* constructions, but with the constituents rather less clear: for example,

an understanding of the actual forces or underlying structures giving rise to this appearance

Does *giving rise to this appearance* qualify both *forces* and *structure*, or only *structure*?

Here another problem arises from the fact that this *or* is still dominated by the negative. The distinction between the two categories of extension: addition (‘and’), and variation (‘or’) is neutralized in a negative environment; the sense is ‘not a and not b’.
In this instance however the negative dominates only indirectly, and the or could be interpreted either in a negative or in a positive sense: either 'ignore the forces and the structure - both of which give rise to this appearance', or 'ignore either the forces or the structure - whichever it is that gives rise to this appearance'.

Given the complexity of its internal structure, and the added problems presented by such ambiguities as these, this nominal is not easy to interpret; yet its thematic function makes it particularly important that it should be properly understood. The second nominal group, such free attentive activity, is helpful in that it serves as an elaboration of it, this relationship being signalled by the such: we know that everything that has gone before amounts to (a kind of) free attentive activity.

The structure of this second nominal is presumably as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delictic</th>
<th>Epithet</th>
<th>Classifier</th>
<th>Thing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

-such attentive activity means 'the ability of attending (to something)', not 'activity which is attentive'; whereas free means 'activity which is free' (alternatively, free might be part of the Classifier, = 'freely attending').

The nominal group complex consisting of these two groups then functions as Subject in the clause. The mood structure is:

discriminating may fairly be said to mark the situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Finite</th>
<th>Adjunct</th>
<th>Predicator</th>
<th>Complement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mood</td>
<td>Residue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As far as transitivity is concerned, this clause is a relational process of the 'intensive/intensifying' kind.

Within the general category of 'relational' processes:

If the clause is **intensive** - the relationship between the two terms is one of sameness: the one is the other;

and if it is **identifying** - (i) the two terms are distinct entities, one that is to be identified and another that identifies it; (ii) the Identifier fixed the identity of the target element

- either (a) by specifying its form, i.e. how it is valued
- or (b) by specifying its form, i.e. how it is recognized

This variable defines another pair of grammatical functions - Token and Value. In any identifying clause, one element will be the **Value** (meaning, referent, function, status, role) and the other will be the **Token** (sign, name, holder). These functions are then conflated with those of **Identified** and **Identifier**; and the conflation can go either way: either

(a) Token/Identified = Value/Identifier  
(b) Value/Identified = Token/Identifier

Since the 'Identified' element is typically something already given, and the 'Identifier' something that is New,
the favoured sequence is that in which the Identified comes first.

Token and Value are analogous to the Actor and Goal of a material process, in that they are associated with the voice of the clause: in an active clause, the Token is Subject.

The present clause is active (perception.....marks the situation, not perception is marked by the situation); hence the Subject is Token, and the Complement is Value. This would suggest the following analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>discriminating perception</th>
<th>may...mark</th>
<th>the situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>attentive activity</td>
<td></td>
<td>beauty is felt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified/Token</td>
<td></td>
<td>Identified/Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process:</td>
<td>relational:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>intensive/identifying</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But this gives the interpretation 'Why look at things without analysing them? - so you can feel their beauty'. It seems more plausible, however, that the intended message is 'How can you feel the beauty of things? - by looking at them without analysing them': in other words the quest of beauty is the given (it is after all what the book is about), while the route to be followed is the new. Hence the clause must have the much rarer structure in which the Identifier comes first:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>discriminating perception</th>
<th>may...mark</th>
<th>the situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>attentive activity</td>
<td></td>
<td>beauty is felt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifier/Token</td>
<td></td>
<td>Identified/Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process:</td>
<td>relational:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>intensive/identifying</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is now recognizable as a well-known tenet of romantic theory.
The relational Process is realized by a hypotactic verbal group complex *may...be said to mark*, with *fairly* as an included modal Adjunct. The structure is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>may</th>
<th>be</th>
<th>said</th>
<th>to</th>
<th>mark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>α</td>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finite</td>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td></td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here the process *mark* is hedged around by a modalized impersonal projection *may fairly be said*, the modalization taking the 'implicit subjective' form (modal operator, here *may*). The sense is 'I think that it would be fair for people to say that...'. The writer is disclaiming responsibility for making the observation but is prepared to admit the justice of it if others make it.

There is a considerable amount of grammatical metaphor in this clause. It would take a very long discussion to construct a more congruent form of wording for the whole; but we may note some particular instances:

(1) *discriminating perception...marks...the situation in which beauty is felt*

    when we perceive [things] in a discriminating fashion we [can] feel beauty (?=if/that they are beautiful)

(2) *without ulterior interest to direct that perception inward...*

    without at the same time being interested in perceiving what is inside [them] (?=without being surreptitiously interested in...)

(3) *...to an understanding of...the underlying structure giving rise to this appearance...*  

    ...so as to understand the underlying structure which makes them appear like this

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, the language makes a provision to turn any word into a technical term. Terms such as *discriminating* in *discriminating perception* or *ulterior* in *ulterior interest* may easily be taken for
technical terms, while in reality they are nothing else but gentler words.
4.B.2.4 ART CRITICISM - from 'Manifest destinies'
by Donal B. Kuspit
(Art in America, May 1983)

Built of void, Shapiro’s images lose their customary meaning, no longer work as signs of actual objects, no longer refer to the familiar world of chairs, houses, figures. They are truly "abstracted" - more fully so by hovering on the border between pure, non-referential object and sign than if they had been purely non-objective to begin with. They can be viewed as idiomatic - idiosyncratic? - Constructivism, making it more colloquial and more dramatic.

Sentence 1 - $\gamma \beta \alpha_1 \alpha_{+2} \alpha_{+3}$
Sentence 2 - $\alpha \doteq \beta \alpha \beta \gamma \beta$
Sentence 3 - $\alpha \gamma \beta$

The three sentences in this sample consist of paratactic and hypotactic clause sequences; the clauses themselves are rather short, and there is very little embedding. (The one clause shown as embedded here is a clause of comparison, functioning as Qualifier after more fully [abstracted]. By comparison with the example taken from the text in aesthetics, the sentence structure in this example is more like that of spoken English: organized by taxis rather than embedding, with no long nominal constructions, and with a significantly lower lexical density. It has to be established, of course, whether or not this is typical of the difference between the two registers.

While the tactic relationship between the primary and secondary clauses is very clear, the logical-semantic relationship is often problematical. For example:
built of void $\beta$ S.'s images lose their customary meaning $\alpha$

Does this mean 'because they are built of void', or simply 'as well as being built of void'?

[they are] more fully [abstracted] by hovering on the border $\alpha$ between...object and sign $\beta$

Does this mean 'in that they hover' or 'because they hover'? - in other words, is hovering on the border the cause of their being abstracted, or is it the form that their abstractness takes?

they can be viewed as idiomatic...Constructivism $\alpha$ making it more colloquial and more dramatic $\beta$

Does this mean 'and this [being idiomatic] makes it [Constructivism] more colloquial and dramatic'; or 'and they [the images] make it [Constructivism] more colloquial and dramatic'; or 'and they [the images] make it [idiomatic Constructivism] more colloquial and dramatic'?

This sort of ambiguity is characteristic of the whole passage; later in the same paragraph we find

It is as though a privately meaningful object was constituted by the artist's very detachment from it, transforming it into a type.

What transforms what into a type? And also,

This "duplicity" makes the object all the more stubbornly there - all the more compelling for the emptiness that surrounds it.....

What is the meaning of for here: 'as a result of', as in 'all the more effective for its refurbishing'; 'for the purpose of', as in 'all the more effective for its
environment'; 'in respect of', as in 'all the more impressive for its performance'; or 'in view of', as in 'all the more impressive for its price'? It is noticeable that the clauses that display this type of ambiguity are all non-finite clauses (cf. Halliday, 1985:218).

In their thematic structure, the clauses in this extract relate consistently to the work that is under discussion. The non-finite clauses have no Theme of their own; but if we track the Themes of the finite clauses throughout the paragraph we find:

Shapiro's images
they
they
a privately meaningful object
this "duality"
Shapiro's objects
Shapiro

- and in some of the non-finite clauses (e.g. in the first sentence) the Theme of Shapiro's images is maintained implicitly by ellipsis. In this paragraph, at least, it is clear that the work of art under discussion constitutes the 'method of development' of the text; it clearly predominates as the grammatical Theme of the independent finite clauses.

The transitivity structure of the clauses in this passage is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>built</th>
<th>of void</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Process: material</td>
<td>Manner: means</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shapiro's images lose their customary meaning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Token</th>
<th>Process: relational: possessive</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
no longer work as signs of actual objects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Token</th>
<th>Process: relational intensive</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

no longer refer to the familiar world of chairs, houses, figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Token</th>
<th>Process: relational intensive</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

they are truly abstracted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carrier</th>
<th>Process: relational intensive</th>
<th>Attribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

[they are] more fully [abstracted]

by hovering on the border between...object and sign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process: relational: circumstantial</th>
<th>Attribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

if they had been purely non-objective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carrier</th>
<th>Process: relational intensive</th>
<th>Attribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

they can be viewed as idiomatic...Constructivism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Token</th>
<th>Process: relational intensive</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

making it more colloquial and more dramatic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process: relational intensive</th>
<th>Carrier</th>
<th>Attribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Apart from the first, non-finite clause, all these processes are relational. A number of them, however, hover on the border between relational and material: for example *lose, work, abstract, hover*; and this makes the meaning, if not ambiguous at least indeterminate. For example, if *lose* is interpreted relationally (as the form of the present tense indicates that it should be), the sense is 'do not possess': Shapiro's images do not have the meaning that they usually
have (presumably 'that such images usually have'). If it is interpreted as a material process the sense is more like 'discard': Shapiro's images discard the meaning that they customarily have (in which case the 'they' in their customary meaning could be strictly co-referential with its antecedent). Similarly with they are truly 'abstracted', where again the tense suggests that the clause is relational (otherwise it would be they have been abstracted, with abstracted as Event in the verbal group); and once again what follows suggests the other interpretation, since if abstracted was material the by hovering...could be interpreted as a circumstance of Manner (cf. they were saved by keeping still). Thus in general there is an indeterminacy between the relational and the material, with some of the co-text suggesting one interpretation and some the other. A similar indeterminacy appears with the verb turn in the sub-heading of the article:

By making absence resonate, the sculptures of Joel Shapiro, seen in a traveling retrospective, turn small-scale and obdurate materiality to paradoxically monumental ends.

When we reach turn small-scale and obdurate materiality we expect into..., which would be relational, with sense 'make become'; but what follows suggests an abstract material process, with the sense of 'use for a purpose'.

Apart from the referential cohesion already referred to (Shapiro's images...they...they...they), and the intrasentential ellipsis and substitution, even within this short passage there is considerable lexical repetition. The following shows all cohesive ties, including those within the sentence; and including those that target the one preceding paragraph (the sentences analysed are taken from the second paragraph of the text):
Built of void, Shapiro's images lose their customary meaning, no longer work as signs of actual objects, no longer refer to the familiar world of chairs, houses, figures. They are truly "abstracted"—by hovering on the border between pure, non-referential object and sign than if they had been purely objective to begin with. (They can be viewed as idiomatic - idiosyncratic? - dramatic.)

There are no explicit conjunctive relations between the sentences; the first occurrence of a conjunction in the text is in the 22nd sentence, which begins with But. On the other hand the lexical repetition rate is high; of the 34 lexical items in the passage analysed, 14 are in their second (or subsequent) occurrence, and a similar pattern is already established within the first paragraph. (There are 26 lexical repetitions in the first paragraph, as well as other instances of lexical cohesion such as antonymy: absence...presence and so on. See below, 8, for the treatment of a more extended passage of this text.) Thus the passage constructs its meaning by dense repetition of lexical material rather than by progression of logical argument; in this way the critical text becomes a metaphor for (the critic's interpretation of) the work of art the critic is writing about. Note however that this lexical repetition does not, in general, involve identity of
reference: meaning, object, sign & do not refer to the
same entity as was being referred to when they occurred
previously (hence they are not accompanied by an anaphoric
definite article the sign etc.). This contrasts with the
function of lexical repetition in the technical text
(4.B.2.2. above).

The nominal groups are not very complex but display a
variety of different patterns: embedded (possessing Deictic
Shapiro’s images, Deictic + post Deictic in their customary
meaning, other premodifying elements idiomatic -
idiosyncratic? - Constructivisim and a number of embedded
phrases as Qualifier, eg. the familiar world of chairs,
houses, figures. There is one long qualifying embedded
clause, in more fully so (=abstracted) than if they had been
purely non-objective, separated from its substitute Head so
by an enclosed dependent clause.

The text does not display a great deal of grammatical
metaphor, and what there is is not very far removed from the
agnate congruent form: so lose their customary meaning may
be reworded as no longer mean what [such images] customary
mean. Similarly hovering on the border between object and
sign, where the metaphor is lexical rather than (or as well
as) grammatical, could be reworded as being Indeterminate
(or Intermediate) between objects and signs. Re-wording the
metaphor does not however make the text easier to interpret;
the reader’s problems are not so much of unpacking
grammatical metaphor as of recognizing and accepting
ambiguity (cf. the discussion above), of decoding particular
expressions such as build of void, and perhaps most of all
that of penetrating the private world view of the writer by
constructing some semantic representation of the whole.
4.8.2.5 Portable art — from Berlin Gallery

The Mother of God sits on a richly ornate throne with the Child in her lap, a sceptre and imperial orb in her left hand. From a baldachin behind an angel leans over and places a crown on the Virgin's head. The throne, 'the lower parts of which imitate Gothic church architecture' has a most unusual shape and looks almost two-dimensional.

Sentence 1: $\alpha + \beta_1 \beta_2$
Sentence 2: $1 + 2$
Sentence 3: $\alpha_1 = \beta \alpha_2$

The clause complex structures of parataxis and hypotaxis have a clearly identifiable function: that of linking together the various parts of the description of the work of art. These may be given equal prominence, by parataxis, e.g. and angel leans over and places a crown on the Virgin's head; or one made dependent on another, by hypotaxis, e.g. The Mother of the God sits on a richly ornate throne with the Child in her lap. The logical-semantic relation between the two parts of the description is usually extending, as in these two examples (where with is agnate to and has, having) the one is added on to the other. Alternatively, it may be elaborating, as in the enclosed non-defining relative clause the lower parts of which imitate Gothic church architecture (I have interpreted this as an elaboration of the throne has a most unusual shape ('in that its lower parts imitate Gothic church architecture')). Such clauses may however also be extending (Halliday, 1985: 206), and it might be that this is to be taken as an additional observation about the throne rather than as a clarification of the one that follows: i.e. 'the throne has a most unusual
shape and furthermore its lower parts imitate Gothic architecture.

The theme of each of the independent clauses is as might be expected, some component of the painting; this functions either as a participant in the tableau being described (the Mother of God, the throne) or as a location (from a baldachin behind). Thus the Theme shifts, from one sentence to the next, as the attention of the reader, who is assumed to be alternatively reading the text and looking at the painting, is directed from one part of the composition to another. There are also Themes in the dependent clauses (the Child, a sceptre and imperial orb, the lower parts of [the throne]); it is interesting to note how the grammar in this way assigns a stronger thematic status to certain elements rather than to others. The method of development of the text is clearly based on (the writer's interpretation of) the composition of the work; significant features appear as Theme in the clauses and priority is given to certain features over others both by linear ordering (the Mother of God is mentioned before the throne) and by hypotaxis (the Child is mentioned in a dependent relation to the Mother). The angel is displaced from thematic status by the object (the baldachin) with which it is framed.

In the first two sentences, the tense is simple present, in commentary style (sits, leans, places); these are material processes of movement and posture, with either Actor only (the Mother of God sits, an angel leans over) or Actor and Goal ([the angel places a crown]), and often with a locative element (Location/Spatial) in the clause (on the Virgin's head, on a richly ornate throne). The dependent clauses are relational attributive, the Attribute being an object in a Location defined relative to the Carrier: [she has] the Child in her lap, [she has] a sceptre and imperial orb in her left hand. The third sentence, however, moves into a
different type of relational attributive process; of the two independent clauses, one is intensive (*looks almost two-dimensional*), and the other, although in fact possessive, would be intensive in its congruent form (*is most unusually shaped*). This signals a move into a more judgmental mode of commentary, in which the writer introduces evaluative motifs into the lexical meanings expressed (*unusual, almost two-dimensional; cf. in the following sentence ...is in striking contrast to...*).

The nominal groups are rather simple in structure. There are almost no postmodifying elements and no embedded clauses at all. In premodifying position we find some Epithets with descriptive function (*a richly ornate throne, a most unusual shape*), and some Classifiers (*imperial orb, Gothic church architecture*) expressing more or less technical sub-categories. There is one embedded possessive Deictic identifying a body part (*the Virgin's head*). The lexical density of the passage is 31.8, or almost 4.

The cohesion is shown in the following:

The Mother of God sits on a richly ornate throne with
Ridem $\equiv$
the Child in her lap, a sceptre and Imperial orb in
Ridem L: Ripers
her left hand. From a baldachin behind $\equiv$, an angel
Ripers $\equiv$
leans over and places a crown on the Virgin's head.
C: add
Ridem L: rep
The throne, the lower parts of which imitate Gothic
Ridem L: rep
church architecture, has a most unusual shape and looks
C: add
almost two-dimensional.

Apart from sentence-internal conjunction, the cohesion is mainly anaphoric reference to features already referred to, accompanied by lexical repetition (including reference to the title of the work). Note however that in this register,
unlike in all the others we have been examining, there is also exophoric reference: every occurrence of *the her* and most of the lexical items refer outside the text to the painting that is assumed to be present (and a photograph of which is reproduced on the facing page of the catalogue). That is to say, the painting forms part of the context of situation in which the text is enacted, in a way that is not the case with the other varieties of art texts. (Alternatively, we might say that in the register of portable art the painting, or other work of art, is actually part of the text, whereas with the other registers it is part of the context of situation. This point is taken up in Chapter 7 below.)

There is practically no grammatical metaphor in the passage being analysed here. The *has a most unusual shape* referred to earlier, while metaphorical in origin (has a ... shape, congruently *is shaped* plus expression of Manner), is now the most typical form of wording used with this sense; and there are no other .... The grammar thus 'tracks' the structure of the painting in a wholly congruent fashion.

4.C LEXICOGRAMMATICAL PROFILE

In Section 4.B.1 I presented the basic form of the linguistic analysis that has been used in this study: a systemic-functional analysis as presented in Halliday's (1985) *Introduction to Functional Grammar* and more specifically as applied to the interpretation of a text in his (1985a) 'Dimensions of discourse analysis: grammar'. The sentences analysed in 4.B.1 were chosen purely to display the categories and notational conventions of the grammar.

In 4.B.2 I selected five short passages for detailed analysis: one from each of the five registers of art history, art technology, aesthetics (art philosophy), art criticism and portable art. These were chosen with a
different purpose. The purpose of the analysis in 4.2 was to see whether, and if so in what respects, such short specimens of text would turn out to reveal significant linguistic differences among the five varieties. Even if they do, of course, it remains to be shown that these particular text specimens can be taken as typical of their registers. But if the linguistic differences that they display seem to correlate in some meaningful way with what we have been able to establish about these registers on other grounds, then they will at least serve as predictors as hypotheses about the language of which these registers are typically constructed.

In the following sub-sections (a) - (h) I shall attempt to summarize the main differences revealed by the short passages analysed in 4.2. These are then summarized in a table at the end of the chapter (Table 4 -val2).

4.C.(a) The clause complex (written sentence)

Art technology: - fairly "long" clause complexes i.e. in number of clauses (up to 7); paratactic and hypotactic

- logical semantic relation varied; includes temporal and causal relations expressing technological concerns (e.g. sequences of events, explanations)

- many short non-finite clauses

Aesthetics: - other extreme: one sentence of only one clause (but that clause had 86 words) <see below on embedding>

Art history: - clause complexes fairly simple
(1-2 clauses)
- all clauses finite

Art criticism: - a little more complex: 3-4 clauses, mainly hypotactic
- logical-semantic relations often unclear; especially status of non-finite clauses ambiguous

Portable art: - 2-3 clauses, mixed paratactic and hypotactic; some non-finite
- logical-semantic relation in extending or elaborating; no time, cause or other enhancing relations

Typical pattern of elements in ranking clause:

Art technology: 2 - 3 N + V (+N/A)
Aesthetics: 3 N + V + N
Art history: 4 - 5
Art criticism: 4 - 5
Portable Art: 2 - 4 N + V (+N/+A)

N = nominal group
V = verbal group
A = adverbial group or prepositional phrase

4.C.(b) Nominal group structure and embedding

Aesthetics: - very complex. Subject/Theme consists of one nominal group complex, consisting of two nominal groups, the first of which has 69 words, 67 of them in post-modifying function - multiple embedding of both clauses (including clause complexes) and
Art criticism: fairly complex, with varied structures; some elements of doubtful status, e.g. (viewed as) idiomático - idiosincrático? - Constructivismo is idiomático a

Classifier, technical term for a particular kind of constructivism? or an Epithet, functioning to describe it in the writer's opinion?

Art history: somewhat varied, with pre- and post-modification (end embedding, esp. of phrases); most complex example is this most ancient of all human cultures. 

Portable art and technology: both rather simple, with little or no embedding; those in Art technology especially regular in their structure

4.C.(c) Grammatical metaphor and lexical density

Aesthetics: a great deal of grammatical metaphor in the embedded clause complexes, some leading to ambiguity

Art history and Art technology: both have some grammatical metaphor; in Art technology the concrete processes are not metaphorical, while the one generalized explanation is.

Art criticism: has very little
Portable art: - has none at all

**Lexical density scale:**

- Aesthetics: 40
- Art history: 6
- Art criticism: 4
- Portable Art: 4
- Art technology: 2

(Lexical density and grammatical metaphor tend to vary together, in larger samples; cf. Halliday 1985, Ravelli 1986)

4.C.(a) **Theme**

(i) discourse patterning of topical Themes

- **Portable art:** - different Theme for each clause, as the description moves around the work of art
- **Art technology:** - same Theme retained for short sequence of clauses; then shifts
- **Art history:** - 'stepping' pattern: Rheme of clause 1 becomes Theme of clause 2, etc.
- **Art criticism:** - mixed; some instances of same Theme retained
- **Aesthetics:** - no pattern observable (because only 1 clause)

(ii) non-topical Theme

- only A.T. has textual (conjunctive) Themes
- no interpersonal Themes in any of these texts

(iii) selection of topical Themes:

Art technology: - participant (objects and techniques)

Portable art: - participant (component of work of art) or circumstance of location (position in work of art)

Art history: - participant (human) or circumstance of location in time or place

Art criticism: - very mixed: critical concept in form of abstract entity, simile, judgment; usually 'participant', also dependent clause as Theme

Aesthetics: - one massive complex nominal

4.C.(f) Transitivity

Art technology: - mainly material processes of change, consisting of Process only (active) or Process + Goal (passive); some abstract processes, also passive (+Actor). Some relative: attributive (describing a process)

Art history: - mainly material processes of movement, active with Range or Goal, + mixed circumstantialss, mainly Location (time and space). Some relational: identifying
Portable art: mainly material processes of location or posture; Actor, some with Goal; and usually a circumstance of Location (space). Some relational: attributive (describing a feature in terms of quality or value)

Art criticism: mainly relational: identifying or attributive; but with undertone of material process leading to some indeterminacy in interpretation

Aesthetics: relational: identifying (but with Identifier coming first, and consisting of 79 words)

4. C.(g) Cohesion

Art history: mainly reference: personal, plus lexical cohesion by synonymy - co-referential

Art technology: reference, demonstrative and personal (incl. anaphoric the); lexical (repetition and hyponymy - co-referential; also conjunction

Portable art: reference, mainly demonstrative (incl. anaphoric the); lexical repetition - co-referential. Reference also exophoric: work of art present

Aesthetics: intra-sentence reference: personal it and demonstrative the, that; lexical repetition

203
Art criticism: - lexical repetition without co-referentiality; some clausal ellipsis

4.C.(h) Mood and modality

All declarative in mood.
All non-modalized except:

Art criticism (can be viewed)
Aesthetics (may be turned, may fairly be said)

4.C.(i) Tense

Portable Art: - simple present even in material processes ('commentary' style)

Art technology: - simple past (past in past in temporal sequences); tenseless non-finites

Art history: - varied past tenses: simple past, past in past, present in past

Aesthetic: - simple present

Art criticism: - simple present (except sequent had been in unfulfilled condition); note simple present with verbs lose, work (as) leads to their being interpreted as relational

In the light of these analyses, can we say anything about how accessible texts form these registers are likely to be to a reader?
From these examples, the two texts that seem most problematic are those of aesthetics and art criticism. This takes into account the following factors:

1. Both passages (aesthetics and art criticism) display great ambiguity, without enough information to show how it is to be resolved.

2. The aesthetics passage includes highly complex nominalization, with multiple embedding.

3. The aesthetics passage contains extensive grammatical metaphor, not motivated by the flow of information in the discourse.

4. The art criticism text contains a great deal of repetition of lexical items, but repeated items are not co-referential.

5. The art criticism passage includes many non-finite clauses, whose logical-semantic status in the clause complex is not clear.

6. Neither passage displays a clear thematic pattern, and the semantic motifs chosen as Theme are difficult to interpret.

7. Both passages consist almost exclusively of relational processes, which are the most abstract and most potentially ambiguous of all the process types.

If, therefore, the passages analysed in this chapter turn out to be typical of their registers, we should expect that readers, especially those who are relatively new to the discipline, will have greater difficulty with texts in aesthetics and art criticism than with those in art history, art technology or portable art. In the next three chapters we shall attempt an overview of the language used in these different varieties of art discourse.
CHAPTER 5 ART HISTORY - GENERAL COMMENTS

5.1.1. "ART HISTORY" and "HISTORY"

In their paper The Discourse of History (1957:66), Eggnins, Wignell and Martin quote the N.S.W. Secondary Schools Board syllabus from 1950 where "history" is defined as "the story of people". The discipline of history involves "a systematic study of the past" in which the goal of the historian is to take "not a set of unrelated facts, but a selection of facts, arranged, interpreted and generalized to be meaningful".

As far as the teaching of history is concerned, it requires the inculcating in the student of a "historical perspective" which is defined as:

Historical perspective involves a sense of time, a sense of cause/effect relationship, an understanding of the interaction of past and present, and an understanding that history is a dynamic relationship of people, place and time in which some events can be judged to be more significant than others.

As for the historian, his task is to make "the story of people" meaningful by selecting, interpreting and generalizing from facts of the recoverable past.

Since two of their sample texts - one about Michelangelo and the other about art and architecture - are what I would have associated with and classified as "art history" rather than simply "history", my first conclusion was that there could be no difference between the two: that art history is a kind of history. The N.S.W. art syllabus explains and interprets art works in the visual rather than the historical sense, and contains no reference to art history. Art historians themselves, however, interpret their field in a variety of ways, sometimes rather differently from a kind, or branch, of history.
H.W. Janson (1972) writes in his preface that the title of his book *A history of art* has a dual meaning. It refers both to the events that make the history of art, and to the scholarly discipline that deals with these events. In other words, the word *history* means both 'history' and 'historiography', and this is true for art history as well.

As far as the task of the art historian is concerned, Janson says that there are no "plain facts" in the history of art—or in the history of anything else. There are only degrees of plausibility. Every statement, no matter how fully documented, is subject to doubt, and remains a "fact" only so long as nobody questions it. 'To doubt what has been taken for granted, and to find a more plausible interpretation of the evidence, is every scholar's task' (Janson:1957, Preface). In other words, the task of the art historian is to "interpret the evidence" in such a way that it establishes and supports a view of the historical facts. Thus in Janson's view, art history is a kind of history.

On the other hand, H. Gardner in the introduction to her book *Art through the Ages* (1970:2) says that 'the goal of art history is the discerning appreciation and enjoyment of art, from whatever time and place it may have come, by whatever hands made.' She continues: 'Outside the academic world the terms *art* and *history* are not often so juxtaposed. People tend to think of history as the record and interpretation of past (particularly political) human actions, and art—quite correctly—as something present to the eye, and touch, which, of course, the vanished human events that make up history are not. The fact is that a work of art, visible and tangible as it is, is a kind of persisting event. It was made at a particular time and place by a particular person, even if we do not always know just when, where, and by whom. Though it is the creation of the past, it continues to exist in the present, long surviving its times.' For Gardner, therefore, art history is very different from history in general.
It is clear that this difference is an important one. While 'history' deals with vanished human events - which we might call "perishables" - 'art history' deals with the interpretation of "tangibles": works of art which are visible and tangible, which are a 'kind of persisting event' in Gardner's terms. So while the historian's task is to interpret events which have already vanished, the art historian's task is to interpret events whose product continues to exist. It is to be expected that this will lead to significant differences between history and art history in the forms of discourse which they are written.

5.1.2. VARIETIES OF "HISTORY" WRITINGS

In their paper on the discourse of history Eggins, Wignell and Martin classify history texts into four types: Narrative, or 'story-like'; Report; Argument; Summary (generalized report) (1957:73-52 - the authors do not in fact name the last of these four types).

They comment on these as follows:

(1) A typical story-like text is one dealing with part of the biography of a famous individual (73).

(2) Reports typically take a subject and present information about its various aspects or components parts (76).

(3) [In an Argument] a proposition is set forth and arguments either for or against are discussed, leading to a conclusion which sums up the argument (77).

(4) [The Summary] is also generically a report, [but] instead of serving as a source of facts it forecasts what is going to be taken up in greater detail later (52).

Presumably the Summary may not only introduce a theme in this way but also generalize from one that has already been presented.
When discussing how language is being used to represent and teach history (which was the aim of their analysis), Eggins, Wignell and Martin concluded that 'far from being a dynamic account of people and events, when history gets written down it is neither a story nor is it about people. In the process of arranging, interpreting and generalising from recoverable facts, people are effaced, actions become things, and sequence in time is replaced by frozen setting in time. Thus, far from bringing the recoverable past "to life", the discourse of history seeks to maximize the distance between what people actually did and how it gets written about' (ibid:66).

As for the "tool" the language uses to achieve the above, they claim that the principal linguistic resource in this process of distancing is that of grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor, and particularly nominalization, is usually associated with the notions of "abstraction" and "distance"; and as said earlier, a high degree of grammatical metaphor lends prestige to a text in our culture.

In their discussion of the four types of texts Eggins et al. examine the density of grammatical metaphor in each type. They find that the story-like texts have the smallest number of grammatical metaphors, that the nominalization increases in the report-like texts, and that the argument-like texts are the most highly nominalized.

5.1.3. VARIETIES OF "ART HISTORY" WRITING

As a teacher I recognized two types of art history text: the biographical (biographies of famous artists) and the historical. The former were 'story-like', like Eggins et al. 's narrative texts; the latter had the form of 'report'. However, it is also true that both their 'argument' type and their 'summary' type will be found in the writing of art history.
There is a similar distribution of nominalization and grammatical metaphor among these types, as we shall see below. But in art history there is a further dimension to the 'distancing' effect that Eggins at al refer to. When art history is written down, it often seems that it is also removed from 'history proper', in that historical events are used only as a detached background, rather than as something giving a work of art the socio-cultural context without which its meaning is unrecoverable. Instead of returning the 'tangible evidence' of the past back into its proper historical setting, the discourse of art history seems to maximize the distance between the evidence we have (the existing work of art) and the social and cultural conditions that brought it into being.

We shall return below (5. 2.1. b ) to the discussion of these categories (narrative, report, argument, and summary) as they are manifested in the writing of art history. Meanwhile we need to set up a broad taxonomy of art history texts as a framework for the present chapter.

Generally speaking, art history texts could be divided into two broad categories:

```
Art History
  /  \ general history specific history
```

Figure 5.1

However, because of present attitudes towards art, we also need to subdivide art history into:
Theoretically speaking, one would expect that both histories of western art and histories of non-western art could be divided into general and specific categories. In the broadest sense this is true, and I shall adopt this as a basis for the discussion:

But in fact the difference in content between histories of Western and those non-Western art is vast, and the significance of the distinction between "general" and "specific" is therefore quite different in the two cases. In order to understand this, we need to move aside for a moment from taxonomies of art history and examine the taxonomic structure of art itself. In the next section we shall present some of the principal taxonomic schemata of the arts that have been influential in determining the way that art history has been written over the past hundred years and more.

5.1.4 TAXONOMIES OF ART

As we said earlier, a taxonomy is an ordered, systematic classification of some set of phenomena based on the fundamental principles of superordination (where something is a type of or
kind of something else or composition (where something is a part of something else). While these concepts themselves are very simple, if the phenomena being classified are complex then the classification will not be an easy task. This is obviously the case with art; indeed Croce wrote (1922:456) that "any attempt at classification of the arts is absurd".

However, there are various purposes for which a taxonomy of art is needed, ranging from the practical to the philosophical; and since no one schema will suit all purposes, what we find is a variety of very different taxonomies that have been devised, or have evolved, in different social and intellectual contexts.

The training of art historians, art critics, art technicians, aestheticians and prospective artists requires an educational organization which in turn depends on a clear and systematic classification of the arts: not only for the curricula of the art schools, but also for the cataloguing of books and journals, the organization of art museums and art libraries, and so on. For example, library science has concerned itself with the problem of classifying books on art so that librarians can decide where to put a new book, and readers can predict where to find it. Their classification may differ from that adopted by an art museum; and those concerned with teaching art may prefer something different again. For instance, while the classification in an art museum may include headings such as: painting, prints, textiles, classical art, and so on, teachers may prefer a classification based on a chronological basis, or a geographical basis, or on a basis of abstract types such as classic and romantic. All such verbal systems of classification emerge out of practical experience and need.

At the more philosophical end of the scale, the task of working out a systematic classification or division of the arts has been a recognized problem of aesthetics since the 15th century. Here the aim is to achieve a taxonomy that is not merely superficial,
by which things are classified geographically or chronologically, 
but one based on fundamental resemblances and differences among 
the phenomena themselves, as in biological classifications of 
plants and animals. At the same time attempts may be made to 
define the individual arts in terms of their supposed aims and 
limits, their methods and types of product.

I have reproduced here a few examples of art classification as 
attempted by philosophers (Kant; Hegel), psychologists (Oswald 
Kulpe and R.F.Piper), art theoreticians (Sydney Colvin; Urries y 
Azara; Leo Adler; Etienne Souriau) and aestheticians (Max 
Dessoir). They are taken from Thomas Munro, The Arts and their 
Interrelations, The Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1951, 
The above classifications were devised for philosophical reasons: to satisfy a desire for intellectual order rather than to meet a practical need. Such classifications tend to be logical and systematic, but at the same time, they often become artificial and remote from the concrete facts of art. People who deal directly with artefacts usually have to work out classifications of their own. These classifications are more informal; as already mentioned, examples can be found in the field of museum, library or art school organization. To illustrate, let us notice briefly the classifications that are used at a few leading museums in the English-speaking world:

The British Museum

- British and medieval antiquities and ethnography
- Ceramics and ethnography
- Coins and medals
- Egyptian and Assyrian antiquities
- Greek and Roman antiquities
- Manuscripts
- Printed books
- Prints and drawings
- Scientific and industrial research
- Oriental printed books and manuscripts
- Oriental antiquities and ethnography

The Victoria and Albert Museum, London

- Engraving, illustration and design
- Architecture and sculpture
- Ceramics
- Paintings
- Metalwork
- Textiles
- Woodwork
- India Museum

The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York

- Egyptian art
- Greek and Roman art
- Near Eastern art
- Far Eastern art
- Renaissance and Modern art
- American wing
- Paintings
- Armor
The Museum of Modern Art, New York

Curatorial: Research in Painting and Sculpture
Architecture
Dance and Theatre Design
Film Library
Industrial Design
Manual Industry
Painting and Sculpture
Photography

Program: Exhibition
Publications
Circulating Exhibitions
Educational Program
Library

Libraries use a wide range of classificatory criteria including chronological, technological and geographical classification, classification according to the form, the material, the producer, and many others. It is perhaps not necessary to cite any of these here.

The above examples illustrate how difficult it would be to construct a simple taxonomy of art acceptable for all purposes. There is no reason, in fact, why such an idealized construction should be expected to exist, since the criteria for arriving at it conflict. But there are two points that need to be made. One is that, for a historian writing about art, it is necessary to impose some conceptual order on the text; the question is to what extent this order (as embodied in the division of a book into chapters, sections and sub-sections) is 'given' by any one or more of the taxonomic systems just examined. I shall turn to this question in the next section.

The other point to be made is that, while these are taxonomies of art, not of writing about art, they are themselves linguistic constructs. Thus in Kant's system (in its English translation), aesthetic is opposed to mechanical as a system of terms functioning as Classifier of a nominal group having art as Thing; the taxonomic relationship is made explicit in the structure. At the next level we find Epithet - Thing structures fine or beautiful Art, agreeable or pleasant Art; here the wording does
KANT'S SYSTEM OF THE ARTS

Nature       Science       Art        Paid Handicraft
               |
               Aesthetic Art       Mechanical Art
               |
Fine or Beautiful Art       Agreeable or Pleasant Art
               |
Arts of Speech       Shaping Arts       Arts of Beautiful Play of Sensations
               |
Rhetoric       Eloquence
               |
Plastic Art       Painting
               |
Sculpture       Architecture       Painting Proper
               |
Of Buildings       Of Useful Furniture and Utensils

5b

FINE OR BEAUTIFUL ART

1st div.         SYMBOLIC

2nd div.         CLASSICAL

3rd div.         ROMANTIC

The following diagram would allow distributing the arts in different categories:

FINE OR BEAUTIFUL ART

Art most adequate for the symbolic type: architecture.
Art most adequate for the classical type: sculpture.
Art most adequate for the romantic type: painting, music, poetry.

HEGEL'S SYSTEM OF THE ARTS
I. Optic arts (appealing to the sense of sight):
   A. Surface arts, producing works on surfaces:
      1. Uncolored or monochrome: Drawing [Graphic Arts, Photograph]
      2. Polychrome: Painting, Tapestry, [Stained Glass, Mosaic];
   B. Solid [or three-dimensional] arts, producing plastic works:
      1. Semi-solid: Relief and Intaglio;
      2. Completely solid: Sculpture, [Ceramic Arts];
   C. Aggregate arts: combining surface and solid effects:
      1. Tectonic Arts;

II. Acoustic arts (appealing to the sense of hearing):
   A. Of tones: Music;
   B. Of words: Poetry, [all Literature, Speech Arts];
   C. Aggregate arts: of tones and words: Song, Melodrama (recitation with music).

III. Optic-acoustic arts, appealing to both the higher senses: [often with costumes and architectural settings]:
   A. Of gestures and tones: Choreographic Art (dance with music);
   B. Of gestures, words, scenery: Drama, [Puppetry];
   C. Of gestures, words, tones, scenery: [Pageants], Opera.

THE ARTS AND THEIR INTERRELATIONS

Colvin proposes three principal modes of classification, which can be summarized as follows:

FIRST MODE OF DIVISION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHAPING ARTS</th>
<th>MOVING ARTS</th>
<th>SPEAKING ARTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Stationary, Manual, Space Arts)</td>
<td>(Space and Time, Arts)</td>
<td>(Transitory, Vocal, Time Arts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>Acting</td>
<td>Music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sculpture</td>
<td>Dancing</td>
<td>Poetry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painting</td>
<td>Eloquence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECOND MODE OF DIVISION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMITATIVE ARTS</th>
<th>NON-IMITATIVE ARTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sculpture</td>
<td>Music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painting</td>
<td>Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poetry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIRD MODE OF DIVISION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICEABLE ARTS</th>
<th>NON-SERVICEABLE ARTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>Sculpture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesser shaping arts</td>
<td>Painting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(weaving, joining, pottery, etc.)</td>
<td>Music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poetry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DESSOIR’S SYSTEM OF THE ARTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Space Arts (Arts of rest and of coexistence)</th>
<th>Time Arts (Arts of movement and of succession)</th>
<th>Plastic Arts (Affective means-spatial image)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sculpture</td>
<td>Mimicry</td>
<td>Poetic Arts (Affective means-audible gesture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painting</td>
<td>Poetry</td>
<td>(Laut-Gebärde)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Free arts of indefinite associations and unreal forms (irreale Formen)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PLASTIC ARTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Two-dimensional (Objective (imitative))</th>
<th>Three-dimensional with inside space</th>
<th>Solid bodies (SCULPTURE)</th>
<th>Optical (Pantomime)</th>
<th>Optical-acoustic (Drama)</th>
<th>Acoustic (Musical Epic)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAINTING</td>
<td>Graphics</td>
<td>SCULPTURE</td>
<td>Pantomime</td>
<td>Drama</td>
<td>Musical Epic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MUSICAL ARTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>of performance</th>
<th>of words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Optical</td>
<td>Acoustic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pantomime</td>
<td>Drama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musical Epic</td>
<td>Lyric</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SPACE ARTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective (free) (Surface decoration)</th>
<th>Architectural (Monumental arts)</th>
<th>Smaller arts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARCHITECTURE</td>
<td>Dance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPACE ARTS</td>
<td>Absolute music</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TIME-SPACE ARTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time-space Arts</th>
<th>Time Arts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concrete in their Expression</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### URRIES Y AZARA’S SYSTEM OF THE ARTS

5f
L. Adler's System of the Arts

1, Lines; 2, Volumes; 3, Colors; 4, Luminosities; 5, Movements; 6, Articulated sounds; 7, Musical sounds.
not make explicit that these are kinds of aesthetic Art (it could do, in the nominal group fine or beautiful aesthetic Art), but the text informs us that this is the case and that fine or beautiful and agreeable or pleasant are also to be interpreted as mutually exclusive Classifiers - a work can belong to one class or the other but not both. It is important to recognize that these schemata derive their meaning from the lexicogrammatical resources of natural language (cf. Wignell at al, 1957: 47-51, on technical taxonomies).

5.1.5. SUBDIVISIONS OF ART HISTORY AS REVEALED BY ART HISTORY TEXTS.

It was pointed out in 5.1.3 that art history can be divided into western and non-western art history, and that both these categories can be further divided into general and specific. What this means is that if we examine how the literature of art history is organized - the topics covered in books, in articles, and in the parts and chapters of books - we find these principles lying behind the treatment of the subject.

Within the 'specific' category, there are at least eight different types of 'specificity':

a) life stories (biographies) of a particular artist
b) histories of a country (e.g. a history of French art)
c) histories of a style (e.g. a history of Gothic style)
d) histories of an art form (e.g. a history of painting)
e) histories of a a type of art form (e.g. portrait)
f) histories of an art technique (e.g. oil painting)
g) histories of "cultures" (e.g. oceanic art, Christian art)
h) histories of art movement (e.g. surrealism)

But if we study relevant texts representing both the history of western art and the history of non-western art, we find that the two types differ from each other both in content and in the language used. Thus in respect of d), while western art histories deal exclusively with the three art forms of painting, sculpture and architecture, non-western art histories discuss other art forms as well, e.g. baskets, swords, flower arrangements.
pottery, wall-hangings, jewellery, and so on - items which by western standards would be considered examples of craft rather than art. So while the content of western art histories is rather uniform in terms of the art forms included, the content of non-western art histories differs from one culture to another. On the other hand, if we consider the categories a) - h) as a whole, whereas histories of western art cover all the above categories, non-western art histories (which are of course very few in comparison) cover only some of these categories, particularly b), d), e), g).

As far as the language is concerned, as the specific examples will illustrate (see 5.3.1 and 5.3.2), non-western art histories "read" more like anthropological or sociological texts than like histories. Western-art histories, on the other hand, "read" more like history. However, the latter are not consistent in this respect; they vary according to distance in time from the present. Those texts that deal with pre-historical art include elements that resemble texts on sociology, anthropology, geography, and climatology, and this makes them more similar to texts on art in non-western cultures. The closer to our own age, the more art history comes to read like art criticism. Since the pre-history of our own culture, like the history of most non-western cultures, is not based on chronology, there must be other factors that are being used to describe and classify the art of those cultures. Consequently, the art historian dealing with those two categories tends to behave as an anthropologist who interprets works of art according to their function in that particular society. Instead of a background consisting of historical events, a description of the life conditions is used instead.

We can now replace Figure 5.3 with a more accurate representation of the taxonomy of art-historical texts (Fig.5.4):
The list of items belonging in the category of 'others' is open-ended; and this reflects a kind of "double standard" on the part of western writers. When books on non-western art are written by those who are not "native speakers" they are inclined to classify everything they find as 'art'. So while a basket produced by a Trobriand Islander is a work of art, a basket produced by a westerner is not considered as a work of art at all. Not surprisingly, therefore, there is much less uniformity in the general classifications of art history adopted by historians of non-western art.

5.2. HISTORY OF WESTERN ART - General comments

As said above, histories of western art are uniform in two different ways: [a] with only a few exceptions (works which are closer to an encyclopaedia than an art history), they all limit
their discussion to the three art forms mentioned above, and [b] they classify the history of western art by using the same taxonomic arrangement. Though there may be slight variations in the wording, the headings refer to the same thing. Compare the following two tables of contents (Gardner:1970 and Janson:1972).

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We noted earlier that, as the theme moves from the pre-history to the modern world, the language changes from reading like anthropology and sociology to reading like history. As it approaches the present day it moves closer to aesthetics and finally comes to resemble the discourse of art criticism. For the pre-history of art, in the absence of historical data, other means are found to interpret the tangible evidence available to us. When historical data become available the art historian adopts the approach of a historian. When coming to the modern era, however, there is a tendency to mix art history with philosophy, an approach which allows one to argue about the works of art rather than just state what they are and where they belong in terms of time and place. Texts dealing with the art of the last hundred years often reflect a further move from art philosophy, arguing about general issues in a more or less objective way, towards art criticism, expressing the art historian's personal likes and dislikes.

Somewhat outside this tradition is a type of art history which is still very rare — a social history of art, which approaches western art from a point of view comparable to that of anthropology and sociology, and in this sense is similar to the non-western art histories under discussion. One of the few art histories of this type is Arnold Hauser (1972). The contents of the four volumes of his book *The social history of art* are very different (see Appendix) from the two reproduced above (Janson and Gardner). Though some of Hauser's categories are similar or identical to those found in Janson and Gardner, the majority of them are his own classifications based not on history as such but on the social and cultural changes that were happening at the time. Historical events provide the chronological background against which the social and cultural changes take place: the emphasis is not on what happened and when so much as on why it happened and why it happened the way it did. In a social history of art, art is explained in terms of its function in society.
rather than of the forms in which it appears. Hence social histories of art are more consistent in their language; the text does not move stylistically from anthropology through history to philosophy and art criticism.

5.2.1.a HISTORY OF ART: from anthropology to philosophical and personal evaluation

Typically in a general history of western art different periods are treated in different ways and this difference is reflected in a shift from one type of discourse to another. The effect is that the history of western art is constructed, by the discourse, into five distinct sections:

1) The Art of prehistoric man
2) The Ancient world
3) The Middle ages
4) The Renaissance
5) The Modern world

Examination of Janson and Gardner (and other general art history books) suggests that the discourse of the art of prehistoric man is similar to that of pre-history and anthropology. Since there is no chronological ladder available to the writer, other data, such as social and cultural beliefs, magical rites, kinship systems and so on, are taken into consideration, together with archaeological evidence and features of the natural environment. A heading such as the ancient world usually refers to Egypt, the Ancient Near East, Greece, and early Rome. With the growing number of historical facts available to the writer, the discourse becomes less like anthropology and more like that of history. The Middle Ages is the period that is treated most straight forwardly in historical terms; here the discourse is very much like that of history. The Renaissance period begins to show a shift away from the discourse of history towards the more philosophy-like discourse of aesthetics. Finally in the modern world the dependence on history is entirely lost and the discourse becomes more like that of philosophy or even that of art criticism. Thus the shift in the topic is - as said above - reflected in the
type of discourse used, and hence the difference can be represented in grammatical terms.

There is a sense, then, in which general art history books are really mixtures of the four types of art discourse that we have identified: art history, art technology, aesthetics and art criticism. At the same time, it is the historical discourse that is the primary one, the one that provides the point of reference for the other three.

Sample texts:

1) The art of prehistoric man

The physical environment of the cave people during the long thousands of years would not, one imagines, be favourable to the creation of an art of quality and sophistication; we do not ordinarily associate high art with any but temperate climates. Though the Aurignacian period began between the early and main advances of the last glacier and for a while was temperate, it grew cold towards its end. The Solutrean period saw the reign of arctic weather. The great ice sheet advanced south from Scandinavia over the plains of north Central Europe, and glaciers spread down from the Alps and other mountain ranges to produce climatic conditions very much like those of Greenland today. With the Magdalenian period began the final recession of the ice and onset of temperate weather. (Climatically, we are still in the postglacial or, according to some, and interglacial period.) In the cold periods, man, the hunter and the food-gatherer, took refuge in caves, and it was here that Cro-Magnon man, who first appeared during the Aurignacian period, replacing
Neanderthal man, took the remarkable turn that made him not simply a fabricator of rudimentary stone tools, but an artist.

(Gardner, 1970:14) [my underlining]

The underlined words are field-specific terms for four different disciplines: geography [glacier, Scandinavia, Central Europe, Greenland], climatology [temperate climates, arctic weather, postglacial, interglacial], prehistory [the Aurignacian period, the Solutrean period, the Magdalenian period], and anthropology [Cro-Magnon man, Neanderthal man]. One would find this type of text in the books dealing with pre-history or anthropology (rather than with geography or climatology, because the topical emphasis is on man: note the first and last sentences of the paragraph).

2) The Ancient world

According to one view, the area we know today as the Near East - Egypt, Israel, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey - dried out into desert and semidesert after the last retreat of the glaciers, compelling the inhabitants to move to the fertile alluvial valleys of the Nile in Egypt and the Tigris and Euphrates in Mesopotamia. But this view is perhaps too simple and may no longer be tenable in light of recent archaeological findings. The oldest settled communities are found not in the river valleys but in the grassy uplands bordering them. These regions provided the necessary preconditions for the development of agriculture. Species of native plants like wild wheat and barley were plentiful, as were as were herds of animals - like goats, sheep and pigs...
By 7000 B.C. agriculture was well established in at least three Near Eastern regions: Jordan, Iran and Anatolia.

Although no remains of domestic cereal grains have been found that can be dated before 7000 B.C., the advanced state of agriculture at that time presupposes a long development; indeed, the very existence of a town like Jericho gives strong support to this assumption...

Around 7000 B.C. the site was abandoned by its original inhabitants, but the new settlers arrived in the early seventh millennium. They built rectangular mudbrick houses on stone foundations and carefully plastered and painted their floors and walls. Several of the excavated buildings seem to have served as shrines...These settlers fashioned statuettes of a mother goddess and of animals associated with a fertility cult. Most striking is a group of human skulls on which the features have been "reconstructed" in plaster. Subtly modeled, the eyes inlaid sea shells, and the hair painted (a painted mustache has been preserved on one specimen), they present a strikingly lifelike appearance. Since the skulls were detached from the bodies before burial and displayed above ground, they may have been regarded as "spirit traps," implying a well-developed belief in survival after the death of the body.

(Gardner, 1970:31).

The two first paragraphs sound again more like a text in anthropology or pre-history than a history text, but they include some historical information, as symbolized by the dates (e.g. by 7000 B.C.). The last paragraph deals with
what could be classified as 'art': while it discusses the appearance of buildings and statuettes, it is their function that is emphasised. This text is from the beginning of the 'ancient world' section; the discourse becomes more historical as the chapter progresses.

3) The Middle ages

The evolution of our concept of Gothic art suggests the way the new style actually grew: it began with architecture, and for about a century—from c.1150 to 1250, during the Age of the Great Cathedrals—architecture retained its dominant role. Gothic sculpture, at first severely architectural in spirit, tended to become less and less so after 1200; its greatest achievements are between the years 1220 and 1420. Painting in turn, reached a climax of creative endeavour between 1300 and 1350 in central Italy. North of the Alps, it became the leading art form from 1400 on. We thus find, in surveying the Gothic era as a whole, a gradual shift of emphasis from architecture to painting or, better perhaps, from architectural to pictorial qualities (characteristically enough, Early Gothic sculpture and painting both reflect the discipline of their monumental setting, while Late Gothic architecture and sculpture strive for "picturesque" effects rather than clarity and or firmness). (Janson, 1972:229).

This text is organized as historical discourse with a chronological framework and a grammar of processes taking place in time (grew, became, reached a climax, a gradual shift, etc.) Art works are no longer discussed in terms of their social function, but rather in terms of their place on the historical ladder. There is some description of their
appearance (e.g. pictorial), but this is not explained in any functional terms.

4) The Renaissance

This quality of festive animation reappears in many of Titian’s religious paintings, such as the Madonna with Members of the Pesaro Family. Although we recognize the composition as a variant of the Sacra Conversazione, Titian has thoroughly transformed it by replacing the familiar frontal view with an oblique one. The Virgin is now enthroned in a great barrel-vaulted hall open on either side, a High Renaissance counterpart of the architecture in Bellini’s Madonna and Saints in S.Zaccaria; because the view is diagonal, open sky now fills most of the background. Except for the kneeling donors, every figure is in motion — turning, leaning, gesturing; the officer with the flag seems almost to lead a charge up the steps. Yet the design remains harmoniously self-contained despite the strong element of drama. Brilliant sunlight makes every color and texture sparkle, in keeping with the joyous spirit of the altar. The only hint of tragedy is the cross of the Passion held by two angel-putti, hidden by clouds from the participants in the Sacra Conversazione but not from us — a tiny note adding poignancy to the scene (Jonson, p.372).

The historical background is now taken for granted rather than being presented in explicit terms. Art works are discussed in terms of their appearance — of what is immediately visible by both the layman and the expert; and
there are numerous expressions of a general theoretical kind, e.g. background, texture, composition, oblique, diagonal, design. For the first time in art history, evaluative comments are made; e.g. harmoniously, self-contained, adding poignancy, joyous spirit.

5) The Modern world

By contrast, Edgar Degas (1834-1917) makes us look steadily at the disenchanted pair in his cafe scene, but, so to speak, out of the corner of our eye. The design of this picture, at first glance, seems as unstudied as a snapshot, yet the longer we look the more we realize that everything has been made to dovetail precisely - that the zigzag of empty tables between us and the luckless couple reinforces their brooding loneliness (Jonson, 1972:494).

Here the writer of the text not only describes the appearance of what is visible but interprets it - not, however, in theoretical terms but by expressing his own views. The Epithets such as disenchanted in the disenchanted pair and brooding in their brooding loneliness are Attitudinal ones, expressing the view or attitude of the writer rather than some objective feature of the object being described. We are told how to look at and appreciate the picture: at first glance it will seem to be just as unstudied as a snapshot, but we are advised to give it another look and promised what we are going to realize if we do.

The above samples illustrate our observation that in general treatments of the history of western art the language shifts across a number of discourse modes, from reading like
anthropology to sounding like the personal evaluation of a particular work of art.

In the next section we shall discuss some of the main features of the discourse of history as outlined by Eggins, Wighell and Martin (1957:65-73), showing how they relate to the more strictly historical mode that we have found in the writing of art history.
5.2.1.b CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISCOURSE OF HISTORY

Eggins at al identify a number of 'general characteristics of the discourse of history' which they find in the texts they have studied. In introducing these they comment that history is often thought of "as a kind of story. People are born, live their lives and die; while alive they do things, often to other people and things. However, in the process of writing history down, grammatical metaphor is used in a number of ways to remove people, turn actions into things, and turn sequence into setting" (ibid:68). This transformation takes place, they suggest, in eight steps as follows:

1) Nominalizing actions
2) Giving Things existence
3) Making Things act
4) Setting in time
5) Phase
6) Doings acting
7) Doings acted on
8) People as Actors in history

We find all of these steps in the writing of art history. The first step is to turn actions and events into things. For example, instead of saying

Artists in the Renaissance revived the cultures of Greece and Rome.

where "artists" are Actors in the process of reviving the cultures of Greece and Rome, we have the following sentence

The art of the Renaissance was a revival of the cultures of Greece and Rome. (Eisen, 1962:128)

Here there are no people, and the process is represented as a Thing, by the noun revival.
As Halliday pointed out in *Grammar, Society and the Noun* (1968:23 ff), turning doings into things allows us to use all the grammatical resources available to nouns in English ("nominality means freedom of movement", p.24). These include, according to Eggins at al., "to quantify, qualify, classify, act, be acted upon, cause, have attributes and be equated with other things."

The second step is giving things existence. "Once Actors have been eliminated, and doings have become Things, it is possible to simply posit their existence"; for example

> There was a turning away from many of the medieval concepts of art which were replaced by those learned from the art of the two ancient civilizations. (Fleming:182)

The nominalized process now exists as a thing in its own right, a turning away. It need not be related either to any Actor or to other nominalized Processes.

The third step - making Things Act - means that "once we have posited the existence of things, we can talk about them in more 'material' terms"; they happen, but they may also do things. For example,

> These small variations of age-old formulas heralded a short but violent upheaval in Egyptian art, the only major break in the continuity of its long tradition. (Gardner:81)

Here, instead of saying that Age-old formulas have been varied", the verbal process heralded suggests action on the part of some things called variations.

The fourth step has to do with setting events in time. As Eggins, Wignell and Martin say, "in what we typically think of as a "story", we usually find events sequenced temporally and recorded in the order in which they occurred in real
time. However, in turning stories into history this temporal sequence becomes setting in time. The past is divided up into a number of periods, eras or years. Compare the art history headings The Ancient World, The Middle Ages, The Renaissance, etc. "These periods represent almost the only kind of taxonomizing that goes on in history and provide the organizing principle for the text book as a whole" (ibid., 70). The two tables of contents given earlier provide many examples of what is being discussed here.

They continue: "Instead of talking about events occurring one after another, it is now possible to situate an event as occurring within a particular period. Events are now set in time. This is usually accomplished through the use of marked Themes." Examples from history of art texts:

By 7000 B.C. agriculture was well established in at least three Near Eastern regions: Jordan, Iraq, and Anatolia.

At about 2300 B.C. that loose group of cities we know as Sumer (where the tremendous change from prehistory to civilization had begun) came under the domination of a great ruler, Sargon of Akkad.

In 1687 the cellar was being used as an ammunition dump by the Turks, who were then at war with the Venetians. (Gardner, 1970:30)

One effect of this setting in time, as Eggins at al. point out, is that events can be discussed independently of the order in which they happened in reality.

The fifth step - phase - concerns time itself being turned into a thing. As Eggins, Wignell and Martin say, once time has been turned into a thing it can then be treated almost as if it had a life of its own. A permeating feature of the
discourse of history is the way it imposes a life-cycle metaphor on periods of time: they are born, grow and die.

*birth* The Renaissance began/came into existence
*growth* The Renaissance spread/reached its heights
*death* The Renaissance declined/came to an end

If events are no longer sequenced in the order in which they really happened, this life-cycle metaphor provides a way of imposing a flow of time throughout a period" (ibid, p.71).

For instance:

In addition, Florence, with the early work of Leonardo da Vinci, had already become the source of sixteenth-century style and later shared with Rome the beginnings and growth of Manerrism, a style that was to dominate western Europe during much of the 16th century. (Gardner, 1970:449)

The sixth and seventh steps are those of doings acting and being acted upon. "We said above that one advantage of treating actions as things is that they can be made to do anything nouns can do in the grammar. Once doings have been turned into Things, they can now act and be acted upon."

Examples from art history:

The cultural achievements of his reign, in contrast, have proved far more lasting.

Soon after the middle of the twelfth century, an important change of style begins to make itself felt in Romanesque painting on either side of the English Channel (ibid., 320)

In these two examples, what is congruently a process (achieving, changing style) is represented as a participant in another process of a different kind (prove, make itself felt).
Artists of the proto-Renaissance, like Duccio and the Lorenzetti brothers, had several devices for giving effects of distance, but the artists of the Early Renaissance, following the discovery of "true" linear perspective by Brunelleschi, had found a way to make the illusion of distance mathematical and certain. (ibid., 407).

What are the Goals in this clause would in the congruent version be presented as actions.

The eighth and final step is the gradual removal of people as Actors, as they come to be replaced first by generic classes of participants and finally by nominalized Processes.

As Eggins, Wignell and Martin say, "nominalizing actions tends to lead to the removal of people as Actors in the texts. This operates on a cline. In the most story-like passages... we do find individual people doing things and having things done to them." (ibid:72). Examples from art history:

In 1122 he (Abbot Suger) was elected abbot of St. Denis and within fifteen years was at work rebuilding the old monastery which had been in use for 300 years. (Gardner:331)

"However, as history becomes less like a story individuals are replaced by generic classes of participants: " Examples:

The situation of the Flemish painters had a close parallel in the field of music.

This cult of genius had a profound effect on the artists of the High Renaissance.
"The final step is to reduce the number of generic participants as Actors and to increase the number of nominalized Processes as Actors:"

His revolution did not outlast his reign, anc... the old religions and artistic forms were re-established.

What new contributions did [the Renaissance] add to the growth of mankind?

As a result of these various steps, it is possible for historians (and thus also for art historians) to "insert themselves into the text. They are always encoded as either Agents or Actors, even when left implicit": Examples from art history:

Behind these mistaken conclusions we find a true and important premise - that works of art exist in order to be liked rather than to be debated.

Baroque has been the term used by art historians for almost a century to designate the dominant style of the period.

It is impossible [for art historians] to say whether he painted this picture before his trip to Milan or after his return. (Janson: 1972)

Egging, Wignell and Martin conclude that "the cumulative effect of these various forms of nominalization is to remove the story from history." The effect of this on the writing of art history is that, perhaps even more than other forms of history, it is decomposed into distinct periods, such that in each period works of art have been produced which are similar to each other and which differ from works that
have been produced in previous or later periods. However, the historical changes which transform one period into the next are not usually discussed, either in connection with the works of art produced in one particular period or in connection with the artist who is their "executor". Rather, art history makes us believe that it is the work of art that is responsible for all the changes. It is as if the work of art is a "thinking" and "doing" entity independent of its time or the ones responsible for it.

By and large, general histories of art constitute a clearly defined register, having the features referred to in 8.2.1.(a) and (b) above. That is, their mode of discourse changes as they move from one period to another; but the treatment of any given period (e.g. "the middle ages") is strikingly consistent. And to the extent that their discourse is the discourse of history it displays the characteristics identified by Eggins at al. in their discussion of history texts. At the same time, there is not, obviously, complete uniformity across different works. In the section that follows we present four treatments of one topic within art history, showing the kinds of difference that arise between one art history text and another within the same topic area (cave art).

5.2.1.C VARIATIONS ON A THEME: four 'cave art' texts

Below we cite four passages from different art history texts all introducing the topic of cave art within the 'ancient world' component of the history of 'western' art. The texts are taken from

H. Gardner: Art through the ages (p.15)
H.W. Janson: A History of Art (p.18)
G. Bazin: A concise history of art (p.13,14)
(1) from Gardner – Cave Art

1. This most ancient of all human cultures was the most recently discovered by amateurs and by accident.

2. In 1879, near Santander in northern Spain, Marcelino de Sautuola, a local resident interested in the antiquity of man, was exploring the Altamira Caves on his estate, in which he had already found specimens of flint and carved bones.

3. With him was his little daughter.

4. Since the ceiling of the debris-filled cavern was only a few inches above the father’s head, it was the child who was first able to discern, from her lower vantage point, the shadowy forms of painted beasts on the cave roofs.

5. De Sautuola was the first modern man to explore this cave and he was certain that these paintings dated back to prehistoric times.

6. Archaeologists, however, were highly dubious of their authenticity, and at the Lisbon Congress on Prehistoric Archaeology in 1880 the Altamira paintings were officially dismissed as forgeries.

7. But in 1896, at Pair-non-Pair in the Gironde district of France, paintings were discovered partially covered by calcareous deposits that would have taken thousands of years to accumulate; these paintings were the first recognized as authentic by experts.

8. The conviction grew that these remarkable works were of an antiquity far greater than man had ever dreamed.

9. In 1901 Abbe Breuil, dean of archaeologists of the
prehistoric, discovered and verified the cave art of Font-de-Gaume in Dordogne, France.

10 The skeptics were finally convinced.

The first two clauses were discussed in detail in Chapter 4; the above extract includes the remainder of the paragraph. It continues in the same vein. The clause complexes are of two clauses only, but varied both in 'tactic' relation (paratactic/hypotactic) and in logical-semantic relation; the structures are

\[
\begin{align*}
\alpha & + \beta \\
\alpha & = \beta \\
\alpha & \times \beta \\
1 & + 2 \\
1 & + 2 \\
\alpha & \cdot \beta \\
\alpha & \\
\end{align*}
\]

Ranking clauses are finite. There is a limited amount of clause embedding, e.g. greater than man had ever dreamed; calcareous deposits that would have taken thousands of years to accumulate. Apart from would have taken, all tenses are simple present.

The processes types are also very varied; many are attributive, but there are also material, mental and verbal processes. The participants include individual humans, collective humans (archaeologists, sceptics), inanimate objects (paintings, ceiling, etc.) and abstractions. All these, as well as circumstantialis of temporal location, may

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figure as topical Theme. The progression of topical Themes in the primary clauses is as follows:

1. This most ancient of all human cultures
2. In 1879, near Santander in northern Spain
3. With him
4. The child
5. De Sautuola
6. Archaeologists
8. The conviction
9. In 1901
10. The sceptics

The topical themes generally follow the 'stepping' pattern, whereby some item from the previous clause becomes Theme of the next clause. If it was not for the title itself: Cave Art, the reader would not know from the beginning that cave art was the topic of this text. It seems strange that cave art should be discussed in terms of 'This most ancient of all human cultures' which is the topic of the first clause.

As said earlier (5.1.2. above), the number of grammatical metaphors increases when we move from story-like texts to argument-like texts. The above is an example of a story-like text and consequently is largely without metaphors. The only grammatical metaphors are non-technical nominalizations such as the conviction grew, were dubious of their authenticity, and these remarkable works were of an antiquity.

(2) from Janson - Old Stone Age

1. When did man start creating works of art?
2. What prompted him to do so?

3. What did these earliest works of art look like?

4. Every history of art must begin with these questions—and with the admission that we cannot answer them.

5. Our earliest ancestors began to walk the earth on two feet about a million years ago, but how they were then using their hands remains unknown to us.

6. Not until some 600,000 years later do we meet the earliest traces of man the toolmaker.

7. He must have been using tools all along; after all, even apes will pick up a stick to knock down a banana, or a stone to throw at an enemy.

8. The making of tools is a more complex matter.

9. It demands first of all the ability to think of sticks or stones as "fruit knockers" or "bone crackers", not only when they are needed for such purposes but at other times as well.

10. Once man was able to do that, he gradually discovered that some sticks or stones had a handler shape than others, and he put them aside for future use.

11. He selected and "appointed" certain sticks or stones as tools because he had begun to connect form and function.

12. The sticks, of course, have not survived, but a few of the stones have; they are large pebbles or chunks of rock that show the marks of repeated use for the same operation—whatever that may have been.

13. The next step was for man to try chipping away at these tools-by-appointment so as to improve their shape.

14. This is the first craft of which we have evidence, and
with it we enter a phase of human development known as the Paleolithic, or Old Stone Age.

The above is a rather different treatment of the same theme. This is not a story-like introduction like the one above, but a mixture of the two types of reports discussed in 8.1.2 above — one serving as a source of facts and the other forecasting what is going to be discussed in greater detail later in the text. The 'forecasting' effect is achieved by the interrogative mode of the first three sentences. While Gardner's text consists only of declarative sentences, Janson opens up this section on the Old Stone Age (as he does most sections in his book; see Appendix) by asking questions. In this way he seems to achieve two things. (1) By asking: 'When did man start creating works of art? What prompted him to do so? Why did these earliest works of art look like?' and then answering as follows: 'Every history of art must begin with these questions — and with the admission that we cannot answer them' — he forecasts what the text is going to be about and what it is attempting to do. This part of the text is of the type that forecasts the content of the rest. The rest of this extract is what would be in Eggins, Wignell and Martin's terminology classified as a Report. (2) By asking questions, the writer also seems to involve the reader in becoming part of the discussion — something which the majority of art history texts do not achieve.

The grammar is in many respects similar to that of Gardner. The clause complexes are of moderate length: two or three clauses with mixed parataxis and hypotaxis, the logical-semantic relations being mainly the more common types of expansion with and, but, when, because, etc. Sentences 1 - 4 are each one clause only: then:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
1 \quad +2 \\
\times \beta \quad \alpha \\
\end{array}
\]
There is a little more embedding but still not a great deal. Transitivity patterns are also very similar. Likewise there is little grammatical metaphor, and what there is is of a familiar and accessible kind: the making of tools; the ability to think; a phase of human development.

As in the previous example, the topical Theme follows the ‘stepping’ pattern, except in the first three sentences where the Theme is the WH-element that requests the missing piece of information. The progression of primary clause topical Themes in this paragraph is as follows:

1. When
2. What
3. What
4. Every history of art
5. Our earliest ancestors
6. We
7. He
8. The making of tools
9. It
10. man
11. He
12. The sticks
13. This next step
14. This
There are however certain differences between this extract and the passage from Gardner. While the first example shows no attempt on the part of the writer/art historian to insert himself into the text, there are two different examples of this here. One is the modality in sentences 4, 7 and 12 (must begin, must have been using, will pick up, have been; cf. after all, of course); and the other is insertion of the writer into the text in the use of personal we in sentences 4, 5, 6 and 14 (we cannot answer them, we meet, etc.)

The first example involves the Finite element in the clause as exchange: the small class of verbal operators expressing primary tense or modality. The Finite element has the function of making the proposition finite, so that it is something that can be argued about; this is achieved by giving it a point of reference in the 'here and now'. The finite verbal operator relates the proposition to its context in the speech event, either 1) by reference to the time of speaking, or 2) by reference to the judgement of the speaker. It is the second of these that is called MODALITY. Modality means the speaker's judgement of the probabilities, or the obligations, involved in what he is saying (Halliday, 1985:75). Here, 'must begin' and 'he must have been using' are propositions reflecting the writer's judgement of obligation and of the probability respectively.

The second example is that of the historian inserting himself into the text with a grammatical function in the clause, often as some form of Agent; sentence no. 6 - 'Not till some 600,000 years later do we meet the earliest traces of man the toolmaker'. Janson does this in two ways: impersonally, e.g. scholars have divided up the 'caverns'... (p.18), and personally with we, the latter also as Senser in a mental process (we are amazed, p.19). In perhaps we should regard... (p.20), we co-occurs with both categories of modality (probability perhaps, obligation should).
We noted earlier (8.2.1.b) Eggins et al.'s point that when stories are turned into history the temporal sequence of events becomes a setting in time. Since in pre-history we have no accurate information about the sequence of events, pre-historical time is usually divided up into a number of periods; these then provide the organizing principle for texts dealing with this era. The Paleolithic Age (or the Old Stone Age), the Mesolithic (or the Middle Stone Age) and the Neolithic (or the New Stone Age) are the three periods into which the art of prehistoric man is divided. The two texts under analysis handle this 'setting in time' in a different ways. Gardner offers a graph which precedes the written text (see Appendix), but she never refers to this taxonomy in the text itself. It is the location of the drawings, the names of particular caves, that provide the taxonomic classification used in the text, e.g. the Altamira Caves (Gardner, 1970:15), the caves at Lascaux, near Montignac; the paintings in Pair-non-Pair in the Gironde district of France; the cave at Font-de-Gaume, the caves in the Dordogne region of France, and so on.

Janson, on the other hand, uses both 'setting in time' and 'setting in place'. The taxonomies he uses are both of time and of location.
Two further points concern the technicality and the ‘metaphorical’ style of Janson’s text, which in some ways is not a typical example of art histories.

We shall discuss ‘technicality’ below in the chapter on art technology (6 below). Wignell et al. (1987) point out that the first step in the technicalizing process is to turn phenomena into named things, and the second is to set up these names as technical. One means of doing this is by signalling or marking terms which are going to be given a technical status. Many of the technical terms in art history books are explicitly marked orthographically by printing the word in italics, by capitals, bold, by marking the off by parentheses, commands, or by marking them with single or double quotes.

Janson uses three types of orthographic marking: italics, capitals and double quotes. However, his marking does not seem to be consistent. The same marking, e.g. double quotes, may be used both to mark technical terms and to add emphasis.

As an art historian I would recognize only two terms in the text (see the whole text in the Appendix) as technical terms: the caveman and an X-ray view. Janson makes it explicit that the first is a technical term (scholars have divided up the "cavemen"); while the latter one is familiar in the treatment of Australian Aboriginal art. The other terms seem rather to be marked for their metaphorical meaning (e.g. "fruit knockers", "bone crackers", "killing" the image, a "dead" image, and so on).

The second observation is that Janson’s text is untypical of art history because of its relative emphasis on the interpersonal function. This is achieved not only by the
non-declarative mood and the modality of some clauses in the text, but also by his choice of lexis, which includes evaluative comments of a personal nature. For example, 'What a vivid, lifelike picture it is! We are amazed not only by the keen observation, the assured, vigorous outlines, the subtly controlled shading that lends bulk and roundness to the forms, but even more perhaps by the power and dignity of this creature in its final agony' (p.19). These formulations are more reminiscent of art criticism than of writings on art history. By comparison, Gardner's book maintains the impersonal, more purely ideational character that art history usually implies.

Gardner and Janson are two examples of recommended art history texts. They are similar in the their content, in their progression from anthropology-like to art-criticism-like discourse, and in their treatment of history-based as compared to technology-based topics, though there is a difference in their metafunctional profile.

By way of contrast I will reproduce (without detailed comment) examples of two other possible types of general western art histories - which, however, are not usually recommended on reading lists for art courses. They are written for the general public interested in art. One comes from Germain Bazin's *A concise history of art*, the other one comes from Michael Levey's *A history of Western art*. The two books differ from each other as well as from the two discussed above.

**A sample from Bazin - The Upper Palaeolithic Period**

1. The oldest examples of art date from the first millennia of Upper Palaeolithic times, a long period of the East-West migration of Homo sapiens into Europe, where he replaced less advanced stocks.
2. His rupestral art in the naturalistic style, consisting of carvings, drawings, paintings and engravings on rock-faces, is found concentrated in the south-west of France and in northern Spain, and is therefore known as 'Franco-Cantabrian'.

3. Aurignacian invaders and settlers (named after the French site at Aurignac, Haute-Garonne) first evolved drawing, engraving and painting. In early cave-works (e.g. La Pileta cave, Malaga) animals are silhouetted in pure profile, with only one leg to represent a pair and no indications of detail.

4. Gravettian mammoth hunters from Russia and Eastern Europe (named after the rock-shelter of La Gravette, Dordogne) carved, especially out of mammoth ivory, small figures which have been found over a wide area in Eurasia.

5. Some are of women apparently suffering from the fatty degeneration known as 'steatopygia' still found among remnants of the Bushmen in South Africa.

6. While some of these statuettes tend to be representative, others are almost geometrically stylized.

7. It is not known whether this three-dimensional vision came before or after the portrayal of shapes on a flat surface.

8. In south-western France and northern Spain the Gravettians developed Aurignacian traditions of painting, their pictorial art reaching a climax in the Dordogne, discovered in 1940.

A sample from Levey’s book - From the Cave to the City

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1. The story of man's progress from living in caves to building cities is also the story of art's evolution - and evolution that does not by any means throughout imply artistic progress - from the long-hidden paintings of Lascaux and Altamira to the never-neglected monuments of imperial Rome.

2. Between intervenes a huge period of time.

3. But myths and a sense of magic lie behind much of the resulting works of art.

4. Art has a definite ritual use, whether it suggests vitality or positively aims at giving an individual immortality.

5. Magically, it extends the limits of ordinary experience: making appear on the cave walls creatures that are not present, and giving posthumous life forever to the Divine Titus, son of the Divine Vespasian, on an arch inscribed with his name and dedicated to him by the Senate and People of Rome.

6. That was put up nearly nineteen hundred years ago, but may be claimed as a very recent artifact when we start to descend to the murky prehistoric times of cave art to seek the origins of Western art.

7. These origins are themselves isolated, a largely Northern European prologue which gives us art without civilization long before there took place the main Mediterranean drama of art and civilization which culminates in Greece.

Bazin is similar in content (except that, unusually, he includes sections on non-western art); but the title of his book, A Concise History of Art, suggests the difference - it is in some way concise. Levey, on the other hand, uses a
different taxonomic arrangement: the book is not divided according to the usual periods and art forms, but instead large 'chunks' of history are discussed under headings such as 'From the Cave to the City' which covers everything from cave painting to the end of the Roman era.

While Janson and Gardner were art historians, Bazin was a conservateur of art and a museologist, and Levey worked as Keeper of the National Gallery in London and became famous as the author of catalogues and catalogue-like art books.

Bazin looks at art as a social historian would and discusses it in the context of its culture and situation: he is interested in the function of an art work rather than its appearance only. The text is thus rather consistent in register, with neither prehistorical nor philosophical-critical variations; it is mainly straightforward art history, with some technical features. The art history is mostly of the Report type; being 'concise' the text cannot accommodate the narrative register, even where it deals with individual artists. For example:

The Englishman Alfred Sisley (1839-1899) was less remote from the traditional vision in his paintings of skies and rivers of the Ile-de-France region. Camille Pissaro (1830-1903) gave Impressionism the atmosphere of a French village; Berthe Morisot (1841-1895) tried to render the human figure in the plein-airiste manner, like her brother-in-law Manet. After his experiments with the light-magic created by the Impressionist school Pierre-Auguste Renoir (1841-1919) tried to pass beyond it. After his Impressionist phase he imposed a stricter discipline on himself; in order to regain a sense of form and volume, going so far as to seek his inspiration in Ingres and even a bas-relief by Girardon (p.411-12).
The above text looks more like a text in an encyclopaedia than a text one would expect to find in typical western art histories. The theme is different in every clause, and there are instances of two different and unrelated themes appearing in one clause complex.

Bazin is closer to the traditional art histories, but the brevity of his text makes it often difficult to follow the writer’s train of thought. He seems to be jumping too quickly from one theme to the next without linking them properly. Considering that Bazin wrote the book for the ‘uninitiated reader, this section is not one the uninitiated reader could easily follow. The language is difficult to understand mainly because of the way in which new facts are being presented, with many separate points compressed into a single paragraph and even a single sentence.

Levey is much further away from the traditional art histories. He does not follow the traditional taxonomical division but instead discusses a particular topic by making comments about many different cultures. While his book is called *A history of Western art* it is a history only because the text discusses cultures long gone.

As far as the two texts are concerned, the first one is difficult to follow because of the large number of topics the reader is expected to absorb in a very short time; the second because of not being systematic in the way the traditional art histories usually are.
5.2.1.c - ARCHITECTURE

**General comments**

We pointed out in 8.1 that general histories of western art concentrate on the three main art forms of architecture, painting and sculpture.

Such general histories of art largely consist of two types of discourse: the discourse of history, and the discourse of technology. Though we also find instances of other kinds of discourse, particularly the discourse of anthropology and the discourse of art criticism, all of those are ancillary to and contextualized, by the two major types. Within any one text, depending on the topic, and secondly on the preference of the writer, either history or technology may predominate.

Where students have problems with art history texts, these usually arise from a lack of systematic knowledge of history, or a lack of knowledge of specific technical terminology. The grammar presents relatively few problems. The sentential (clause complex) structure seems clear; there is little grammatical metaphor in representing processes; and the attitudinal epithets, which cause some ambiguity in art criticism and aesthetics (see chapter....below), are rarely found in art history texts. We shall see below that these are perhaps the three main areas of difficulties connected with non-art-history texts: (a) the complexity of the internal structure of the clauses and clause complexes; (b) transitivity, especially the use of certain processes in a metaphorical sense; (c) and the comments realized in grammar through epithets, comments that are probably attitudinal but are taken by the reader as experiential.
Within general art history, the texts that lie at the most technological end of the scale are texts dealing with architecture. To illustrate this point, we have selected three samples: one from Janson, representing an approach to architecture which is least technological in its orientation; one from Gardner, representing an intermediate approach; and one from Fletcher, representing the most purely technological approach one can find in art history books dealing specifically with architecture.

Sample 1 — Janson, Egyptian architecture

1. When we speak of the Egyptian's attitude toward death and afterlife as expressed in their tombs, we must be careful to make it clear that we do not mean the attitude of the average Egyptian but only that of the small aristocratic caste clustered around the royal court.

2. The tombs of the members of this class of high officials (who were often relatives of the royal family) are usually found in the immediate neighbourhood of the Pharaohs' tombs, and their shape and contents reflect, or are related to, the funerary monuments of the divine kings.

3. We still have a great deal to learn about the origin and significance of Egyptian tombs, but there is reason to believe that the concept of afterlife we find in the so-called private tombs did not apply to ordinary mortals but only to the privileged few because of their association with the immortal Pharaohs.

4. The standard form of these tombs was the mastaba, a squarish mound faced with brick or
stone, above the burial chamber, which was deep underground and linked to the mound by a shaft.

5. Inside the mastaba is a chapel for offerings to the ka and a secret cubicle for the statue of the deceased.

6. Royal mastabas grew to conspicuous size as early as the First Dynasty, and their exteriors could be elaborated to resemble a royal palace.

7. During the Third Dynasty, they developed into step pyramids; the best known (and probably the first) is that of King Zoser, built over a traditional mastaba.

8. The pyramid itself, unlike later examples, is a completely solid structure whose only purpose seems to have been to serve as a great landmark.

As in the previous text from Janson (above), there are many instances where the writer inserts 'us' - art historians, or perhaps "you (the reader) and I" - into the text. Most of these are metadiscursive comments: 'we have had occasion to mention', 'we still have a great deal to learn about', 'we have discussed'; and some simply present the information as a projection, 'it is at this point that we find the pace of events shifting'. The interpersonal flavour is further enhanced by the modulations that are associated with some of the 'us' forms, e.g.

When we speak of..., we must be careful to make it clear that we do not mean...
- a very complex formulation of the restriction 'not all Egyptians, but only the aristocracy'; compare - We must not make the mistake of concluding that... In addition there are many expressions which, while not necessarily containing a personal pronoun, clearly acknowledge that what is being said is the writer's opinion, cf. there is reason to believe that..., whose only purpose seems to to have been...; compare

Perhaps it is merely a matter of perspective - things that are near to us look larger - but I do not think so. (p.33)

And as in the earlier section on Cave art Janson uses interrogative clauses to introduce the topic:

First of all, how valid is the distinction between 'prehistoric' and 'historic'? Does it merely reflect a difference in our knowledge of the past (etc.) (p.33).

It is noticeable that such questions are not really connected with the topic of the section as a whole. Here they relate to the invention of writing as the marker of a distinction between "prehistoric" and "historic" periods; and the answers he offers first take us back to prehistory before they go on to suggest where the writer is taking us.

When we look at the structure of the clause complexes, they are moderately simple, and more like those found in our art history sample than those found in our art technology sample. There is little grammatical metaphor, and what there is is mainly confined to single abstract nouns, such as association, origin and significance. The most complex
example in the passage quoted is the concept of afterlife...did not apply to ordinary mortals; this is somewhat ambiguous, but presumably means that ordinary mortals were not thought to have any life after death. Otherwise, while the process types are varied - verbal, relational (identifying, attributive), material and mental - they are used in their congruent meaning, and do not cause problems of interpretation.

The structure of the nominal groups is rather simple. As far as the technicality of the text is concerned, although Janson uses field-specific terms, e.g. tomb, funerary monuments, so-called private tombs, Pharaohs, the shaft, a chapel, the mastaba, step pyramid, most of the terms are only semi-technical, i.e. they are part of everyday language. The only exception is probably the term 'mastaba' which Janson goes on to explain in a rather non-technical way: 'the mastaba, a squarish mound faced with brick or stone'. The term 'squarish' is more a term of daily rather than technical use, by contrast with 'rectangular'; it suggests the meaning of an approximation rather than that of precise measurement.

Thus although texts dealing with architecture are usually quite technical in nature, Janson's text is not. Generally speaking, the text is something between a story and a report. Janson's interest is more in the history and the function of the tomb than in its architectonic structure. The tomb is discussed in terms of the Egyptian attitude toward death and afterlife, the theme outlined in the first paragraph of the section. Janson's text is not only less technical than one would expect it to be, but there is an air of colloquiality about it.
It is not that Janson never writes about architecture using technical language; compare the following passage on Gothic architecture (ibid, p.230).

Sample 2 – Janson, p.230 – Gothic art

1. Looking at the plan, we recognize the familiar elements of the Romanesque pilgrimage choir – an arcaded apse surrounded by an ambulatory and radiating chapels.

2. Yet these elements have been integrated in strikingly novel fashion; the chapels, instead of remaining separate entities, are merged so as to form, in effect, a second ambulatory, and ribbed groined vaulting based on the pointed arch is employed throughout (in the Romanesque pilgrimage choir, only the ambulatory had been groin vaulted).

3. As a result, the entire plan is held together by a new kind of geometric order: it consists of seven identical wedge-shaped units fanning out from the center of the apse.

4. We experience this double ambulatory not as a series of separate compartments but as a continuous (through articulated) space, whose shape is outlined for us by the network of slender arches, ribs, and columns that sustains the vaults.

5. What distinguishes this interior immediately from its predecessors is its lightness, in both senses; the architectural forms seem graceful, almost weightless as against the massive solidity of the Romanesque, and the windows have been
enlarged to the point that they are no longer openings cut into a wall - they fill the entire wall area, so that they themselves become translucent walls.

Here because of the topic Janson's writing has become much closer to art technology. But the impression given is that, where the subject matter permits he seems to prefer a less technical approach than is typical of the treatment of architecture in this type of a book.

The discourse pattern of the sample paragraph is fairly mixed. The Theme of the clauses in the first sentence is simply we, with the Egyptians' attitude towards death and afterlife brought in as Rheme; embedded in this nominal group we find the tombs, which then become the Theme of the next sentence. Then, after a brief return to the we Theme, this pattern (of Rheme to Theme) is repeated twice, first with the mastaba and then with pyramids. It is noticeable that each one of these topics, the tombs, the mastaba and the step pyramid, is discussed not so much in terms of its architectonic structure, but in terms of its functions. This then determines the type of process, and other elements of the structure of the clauses: objects and their parts, attributes, and circumstances of time, place and purpose.

Sample 2 - Gardner, Architecture (Egyptian), p.58

1. Similar principles of permanence and regularity appear in the design of the Egyptian tomb, that symbol of the timeless, the silent house of the dead.

2. We find its standard shape in the mastaba.
3. The mastaba (Arabic for "heap") is a rectangular brick or stone structure with battered (sloping) sides erected over a subterranean tomb chamber that was connected with the outside by a shaft.

4. The form was probably developed from mounds of earth or stone that covered earlier tombs.

5. It is significant that in Mesopotamia there was relative indifference to the cult of burial and to the permanence of the tomb, while in Egypt such matters are considered to be of the first importance.

6. About 2750 B.C. the Stepped Pyramid of King Zoser of the Third Dynasty was raised at Saqqara, the ancient necropolis (city of the dead) of Memphis.

7. Possibly Egypt's oldest stone building, it was the first monumental royal tomb.

8. In form a kind of compromise between the mastaba and the later "true" pyramids at Gizeh, it is in fact a piling mastaba of diminishing size one upon another, forming a structure resembling the great ziggurats of Mesopotamia.

9. Unlike them, Zoser's pyramid is a tomb, not a temple, and is elevated above the funerary city arranged around it.

10. A tomb such as Zoser's had a dual function: to protect the mummified king and his possessions and to symbolize by its gigantic presence his absolute, godlike power.

11. This pyramid-like structure, with its surrounding complex of chambered terraces, a great
courtyard, and temples, was the work of Imhotep, the first artist of recorded history.

12. Imhotep was grand vezir to King Zoser and a man of legendary powers.

13. He was celebrated in the ancient world not only as an architect but as a wise man, wizard, physician ("the father of medicine"), priest, and scribe - a kind of universal genius who later came to be worshiped as a deity.

The second example is much closer to what we would consider a technical text. The interest of the writer is more in the technical than in the historical aspect of the mastaba. Though the patterning of topical Themes is so varied as to be almost chaotic (sometimes there is a different theme for each clause, sometimes a 'stepping' (RHEME -> THEME) pattern, sometimes a particular theme is retained for two clauses), in so far as any thematic motif appears it has to do with the technical aspect of the architecture (e.g. the form, in form this pyramid-like structure). The technical description then appears in the Rheme.

The text consists mainly of single-clause sentences: there are one or two simple clause complexes, related by extension (parataxis and, and hypotaxis while). The nominal groups, on the other hand, are considerably more complex, with a certain amount of embedding by phrases and clauses. The most striking feature, however, is the amount of apposition (paratactic elaboration) forming nominal group complexes: e.g. in 5.1 the Egyptian tomb, that symbol of the time-ess, the silent house of the dead. Compare Saqqara, the ancient necropolis...: and examples in each of the remaining sentences 7 - 13. This reflects the combination of history and technology that is characteristic of this sub-register:
on the one hand the identification of a person or place (Imhotep, the first artist...), on the other hand explanation of the meaning of a technical or semi-technical term e.g. The mastaba (Arabic for "bench"); Zoser's pyramid is a tomb, not a temple, and so on.

There are two main types of process in this text, material and relational; the relational one predominates because it is the one used here for the purposes of general explanation and definition, e.g. sentences 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13.

The mood of all clauses is declarative and there is no modality expressed in the text. In this it contrasts strongly with the sample from Janson examined above. The tenses are all simple present or simple past.

The text has various grammatical metaphors, some of which involve whole clauses: e.g. principles of permanence and regularity appear in the design of the Egyptian tomb; vital function [was] to symbolize by its gigantic presence his absolute, godlike power. Others are single nouns such as indifference, permanence, compromise. Note that these are not, in general, abstractions of a technical nature.

We said earlier that the task of the art historian is to present historical facts about works of art as correctly and accurately as possible, but without offering the historian's personal opinion of their effectiveness or aesthetic value. Gardner's text is a good example of the above. Janson, on the other hand, differs from Gardner and from the majority of typical art history texts. The difference between the two could perhaps be explained in terms of the two metafunctions: the ideational and the interpersonal. In the Gardner text there is a clear foregrounding of the ideational metafunction, while in Janson this is leavened with features of the interpersonal function which make a
distinctive contribution to the text. In this respect the Janson text is more like a spoken text, and may in fact have originated in a series of lectures.

It is not only the modality and the mood structure in Janson that reminds us of verbally delivered lectures, but the much smaller number of grammatical metaphors, which are characteristic of written text. This has consequences for the phenomenon referred to earlier: the shift in the language of art history from the discourse of anthropology to the discourse of art criticism. Because Gardner seems to put emphasis on the ideational function, his text is more typical of general histories of western art in that the language changes following the shift from one topic to the other. With Janson, on the other hand, since his presentation of the history of western art is more personal, the language he uses is more uniform (allowing of course, for the difference in the domain of the subject matter) than that of Gardner. Here is a section from Gardner dealing with Gothic architecture:

Gardner, p.332 - Gothic architecture

1. Although the crypt of St. Denis served as a foundation for the choir above it, a comparison of their plans and the structure of each reveals the major difference between Romanesque and Gothic building.

2. The thick walls of the crypt create a series of separate volumes - careful Romanesque "partitioning" into units - whereas the absence of walls in the choir above produce a unified space.

3. The crypt is essentially a wall construction, and it is covered with groit vaults; the choir, on
the other hand, is a skeletal construction, and its vaults are Gothic rib vault.

4. The ancestors of the Gothic rib vault (at Caen and Durham) were discussed above. A rib vault is easily identified by the presence of crossed, or diagonal, arches under the groins of a vault.

5. These arches form the armature, which serves as the framework for the Gothic skeletal construction.

6. The Gothic vault may be distinguished from other rib or arched vaults by its use of the pointed, or broken, arch as an integral part of the skeletal armature; by the presence of thinly vaulted webs, or severies, between the arches and by the fact that, regardless of the space to be vaulted, all the arches have their crowns at approximately the same level—something the Romanesque architects could not achieve with their semicircular arches.

Sample 3 - A History of Architecture, B. Fletcher, p. 25

(a)

1. By the First Dynasty, the more elaborate graves had come to simulate house plans of several small rooms, a central containing the sarcophagus and others surrounding it to receive the abundant funerary offerings.

2. The whole was constructed in a broad pit below ground, the wooden roof being supported by timber posts or crude brick pillars and the entire area covered by a rectangular, flat-topped mound of
the spoil from the excavation, retained in place by very thick brick walls.

3. The outer faces were either serrated with alternate buttress-like projections and narrow recesses - the so-called 'palace facade' arrangement, derived from timber panelling - or plain, and sloped backwards at an angle of about 75 degrees.

4. Such tombs are nowadays known as mastabas, from their resemblance to the low benches built outside the Egyptian modern house.

5. Closely surrounding them was an enclosure wall.

6. Typical of the Second and Third Dynasties is the 'stairways mastaba, the tomb chamber, with its attendant magazines, having been sunk much deeper and cut in the rock below.

7. Normally, the main axis of the tomb lay north and south, and steps and ramps led from the north end of the top of the mastaba to connect with a shaft which descended to the level of the tomb chamber.

8. After the burial, heavy stone portcullises were dropped across the approach from slots built to receive them, and this was then filled in and all surface traces removed.

9. Externally, the imitation of panelling was usually abandoned in favour of the plain battered sides, except that there were two well-shaped recesses on the east long side.

10. This was the front towards the Nile.
12. The southernmost of the two recesses was a false door, allowing the spirit of the deceased to enter or leave at will, and in front of it was a table for the daily offerings of fresh food...

(b)

13. The Step Pyramid of Zoser, Sakkara (2778 B.C., beginning of Third Dynasty) is remarkable as being the world's first large-scale monument in stone.

14. King Zoser's architect, Imhotep, was greatly revered both in his own and later times, and in the Twenty-sixth Dynasty was deified.

15. The pyramid itself shows no less than five changes of plan in the course of building.

16. It began as a complete mastaba, 26ft high, unusual in having a square plan, of 207 ft side.

17. It was then twice extended, first by a regular addition of 14 ft to each of its sloping sides and next by an extension eastwards of 28ft.

18. At this stage the whole was used as a basis for a four stepped pyramid, made up of layers inclined against a steep-sided core, and again enlarged at the same time so that its plan became a rectangle of about 272 ft by 244 ft.

This sample has been taken from a history devoted to a specific art form, i.e. a history of architecture.

As the longer section reprinted in the Appendix shows, this text is more technical than either of the two previous ones (compare also the complexity of the illustrations). After a rather long section dealing with the character of ancient
Egyptian architecture, the writer discusses individual examples of tombs of different kinds: mastabas, royal pyramids, and rock-cut tombs. To allow for comparison with the preceding samples, this extract has been taken from two different paragraphs, one dealing with mastabas belonging to the First Dynasty, the other with the Step Pyramid of Zoser of the Third Dynasty (p. 27).

Generally speaking, though there are references made to history, the emphasis is on the technical features of architecture. The technicality is obvious both from the terminology used and from the grammar, which shows most of the linguistic features of art technology mentioned in Table 7. The clause complexes are more descriptive, the main logical-semantic relation being that of extension; but there is a similar use of non-finite clauses, e.g. the wooden roof being supported by timber posts... cf. sentences 6, 11, 16, 18. There is very little grammatical metaphor, and the nominal groups, though they have more embedding than there is in the pottery text (because the structures being described are more complex), present no problem of interpretation. The selection of Theme is fairly varied, but the dominant pattern has the same referent (the pyramid itself...it...it) or some...of it (the whole...the outer faces). The participants are mainly objects and techniques; the majority of processes are material processes and relational processes of attribution.

As a whole, the text is accessible to the reader, provided the reader is familiar with the field-specific terminology. The writer makes it quite clear which terms are to be taken as technical, e.g. in sentence 3: the so-called 'palace facade' arrangement; in sentence 4: such tombs are nowadays known as mastabas; sentence 6: typical of the 2nd and 3rd dynasties is the 'stairway mastaba', and so on. A sample from Fletcher's account of Gothic architecture, for purposes
of comparison, will be found in the Appendix (Gothic vaulting, p.371).

Of texts dealing with one or other of the three 'specific' art forms, those dealing with architecture are, predictably, the most technical. There are of course varying degrees of technicality among them. Those from books concerned only with the history of architecture are, as can be expected, the most technical in character; while those taken from general art histories lie somewhere along a cline from more 'history-like' to more 'technology-like'. The texts looked at in this section illustrate the varying degree of technicality found in the treatment of architecture in both general and specific histories of art.

There is one last point we should make here, one referring to the organization of the text. We said earlier that the names of historical periods are the only taxonomies occurring in art history texts. As the long text in the Appendix illustrates, Gardner subdivides these into sections dealing with architecture, painting and sculpture, while Janson keeps them all together. Though following Janson does not create any real problems, Gardner's classification does make his text more systematic and easier to follow. Janson, on the other hand, because of his orientation towards a more interpersonal mode of meaning, gives the reader more of a feeling of involvement and a comforting sense that not everything in art history is totally cut and dried.
General comments

Writing about sculpture is rather different from writing about architecture. It is also much more varied. Why should this be so? A plausible reason is that the place of architecture in the history of western art has remained fairly constant; therefore the way it is discussed remains fairly constant. The discussion of architecture is always a mixture of history and technology. In the discussion of sculpture and painting, on the other hand, the text may vary from minimal accounts of a particular ‘period’ to elaborate critical commentaries on one artist and his work. Thus in the treatment of sculpture (and also of painting), there seems to be a greater variety of registers employed than there is in the case of architecture. While the discourse of architecture ranges along a continuum between the two poles of the historical and the technical, the discourse of sculpture and painting, while it is rarely very technical (except for specific art histories dealing with techniques and methods) can on the other hand be anything within the range described by Eggnis at al (5.2.1.b above) and other things besides.

One hypothesis why this so is that while architecture has a limited number of specific and often prescribed functions, painting and sculpture can (and did in the past) serve either the same functions as architecture or else a number of specific functions of their own, which are more varied and more numerous than those served by architecture. While architecture is either of religious, ceremonial or domestic kind, and so is - roughly speaking - either a church, a hall or a house, a sculpture can illustrate a story and a painting can tell a story. If we imagine the number of stories a work of art can illustrate or the number of
story it can tell, we get some idea of how many different functions a sculpture, and even more a painting, can have.

Of the two, a sculpture is easier to describe. It does not 'tell a story' in the way a painting does, and here it is often discussed in terms of what is 'obvious'. For instance, while discussing pre-historic sculptures known as 'Venus' figures (a term developed by archaeologists), art historians describe what they see, i.e. a figurine of a woman that is composed of a cluster of almost ball-like shapes (Gardner, p.22); ...one of several such female fertility figurines, has a bulbous roundness of form that recalls an egg-shaped "sacred pebble" (Janson, 21).

Expressions such as almost ball-like shapes, a bulbous roundness of form, are typical of the descriptions and analogies that writers use to represent their perceptions by means of language. Striking features are emphasized, especially those that conflict with current conventions, e.g. when Sumerian sculptures are discussed, every art historian puts emphasis on their eyes which are disproportionately large, followed by speculations about the possible reason. The fact that the significance of a work may not be known is no reason for not discussing it, e.g.

'The subject is unknown (goddess, priestess, queen?), but our ignorance of it and of the history of the head does not diminish our appreciation of its exquisite refinement of feature and expression, despite the mutilations of time and accident (Gardner, p.38).

In the history of sculpture, a sense of the different kinds of importance that sculptures had in each individual period of course influences the type of language historians use to describe it. While the earliest eras (e.g. the cavemen
period) are usually described in a register closer to anthropology, when we reach, for instance, Greek sculpture, the register is somewhere between history and technology:

Trends in the development of sculpture in Greece are just as visible and describable as those we have traced in vase painting. The earliest pieces go back to the beginning of the ninth century B.C. and consist of small-scale representations of animals (horses, oxen, deer, birds) and of human figures in various material: cooper, bronze, lead, ivory, and terra-cotta. Some of these were ornaments on larger objects like vases and bronze tripods; others were separate votive offerings that have been found near ancient sanctuaries. (Richter, 1967:47)

In Rome (two of our samples represent that period) sculpture has a special importance. It was the best form to represent the Emperor and his status, something that could not have been done by either architecture or painting. Huge statues placed all over the city were a better symbol of emperors’ power than paintings inside of buildings would have been. At that time sculpture as an art form enjoyed a rather high status. In the Early Christian period, when sculpture served the aims and purposes of architecture (the most important art form of the time), sculpture lost the independence and the status it had enjoyed in Roman times and became no more than a craft. The language used to discuss it has to adjust to this change. So instead of discussing the meaning of a sculpture (as illustrated in our samples), the writer concerned with this period discusses the method used and the visual effects it has.

The Good Shepherd Sarcophagus has a thick, spaceless surface that is perforated rather than carved, producing a kind of hard lacing of flat darks and lights. (Molesworth, 1965: 90)

The first definite relation of architecture and sculpture appears in the Romanesque period, when sculpture, confined for centuries to small art, flowers again in the new Romanesque church. Though the Romanesque artists turned for inspiration to surviving Roman sculpture, they developed their own attitude toward ornamental design and its relation
to architecture. At first this relation was somewhat random and haphazard, but later we can recognize various distinct styles. Consequently, a discussion of the sculpture of this period is that of stylistic differences. The register used here is of a more technical than historical character. From the Renaissance onwards, the history of sculpture is the history of individuals; even though we are aware of various styles or movements, these are usually presented as life stories of the individual artists and accounts of their achievements.

We commented earlier (5.2.1.c) that there is a difference between the ways architecture is discussed in general and in specific histories of art, a difference in the degree of technicality. This does not seem to apply to sculpture. While architecture is discussed in terms of the techniques and methods associated with a particular style of period, sculpture (like painting) is not usually discussed in terms of the technique used, but in terms of its final appearance. Though brief comments are occasionally made about the medium, e.g. stone, wood, metal, no further information is usually given about the particular method associated with any of the above or about the limitations each of the different media imposes. From the student's point of view, this is not a very helpful approach. For instance, knowing that a particular work is a bronze sculpture does not help the student to understand and evaluate it. He needs to know more about the medium as such to compare it with another one in terms of appearance or manageability, for instance.

**Texts about sculpture**

Of the four texts selected as samples here, two deal with Roman sculpture and two with the sculpture of the 19th century, as discussed by Janson and Gardner.
1. Sculpture in the empire begins under the influence of Augustan Rome's admiration of Hellenic culture and of the emperor's apparent determination to base a cultural renewal of Rome on it.

2. That the Hellenized glorification of the empire was politically motivated is doubtless true; we have seen in architecture how building was molded to the end of manifesting the Imperial authority.

3. But the imperial motivation had the esthetic consequence that work of the highest quality in all the arts was produced bearing the seal, as it were, of the Hellenic spirit.

4. The *Augustus of Prima Porta*, about 20 B.C., no less than the *Aeneid* of Vergil, is an example of the sedate, idealizing manner we recognize as "Augustan".

5. The statue, which once stood in front of the imperial villa in Prima Porta, about ten miles north of Rome, represents Augustus proclaiming a diplomatic victory to the people.

6. The work is of the highest quality and is very likely by a Greek artist.

7. At first glance it might appear to be in the realistic mode of Republican statues, but at the second we find it strongly idealized, made according to the Polykleitan proportions and even reminiscent of the *Doryphoros*, especially the walking pose.

8. The reliefs on the emperor's breast plate are Roman in subject and refer to contemporaneous events - at least in the central theme: A Parthian returns a Roman standard to a Roman soldier.

9. But these historical references are enframed by mythological
and allegorical figures representing the sky god, the earth
goddess, and the pacified provinces of Spain and Gaul.

10. Together the figures symbolize blessings of the new Golden
Age expected to come with the Augustan peace.

11. They also place side by side the idealizing and realistic
tendencies in Roman art that will alternate and intermingle
throughout imperial times.

Sample 2 - Janson - Roman sculpture - p.141

1. As we approach the reign of the Emperor Augustus (27 B.C.-
14 A.D.), we find a new trend in Roman portraiture that
reaches its climax in the images of Augustus himself,
as for example, in the splendid statue from Primaporta.

2. At first glance we may well be uncertain whether it
represents a god or human being, and this doubt is
entirely appropriate, for the figure is meant to be both.

3. Here, on Roman soil, we meet a concept familiar to us from
Egypt and the Ancient Near East: that of the divine ruler.

4. It had entered the Greek world in the fourth century;
Alexander the Great had made it his own, and so did his
successors who modelled themselves after him.

5. The latter, in turn, transmitted it to Julius Caesar and the
Roman emperors, who at first encouraged the worship of
themselves only in the eastern provinces, where belief in
the divine ruler was the long established tradition.

6. The idea of attributing superhuman stature to the emperor,
and thus enhancing his authority, soon became official
policy, and while Augustus did not carry it as far as his
successors, the Primaporta statue clearly shows him
enveloped in an air of divinity.
7. Still, despite its heroic, idealized body, the statue has an unmistakably Roman flavour; the Emperor's gesture is familiar to us from Aulus Metellus, and the costume, including the rich allegorical program on the breast plate, has a concreteness of surface texture that conveys the actual touch of cloth, metal, and leather.

8. The head, too, is idealized, or, better perhaps, "Hellenized"; small physiognomic details are suppressed and the focusing of attention on the eyes gives it something of the "Inspired" look we find in portraits of Alexander the Great.

9. Nevertheless, the face is a definite likeness, elevated but clearly individual, as we can determine by comparison with the numerous other portraits of Augustus.

Whereas in the case of architecture we were able to show a consistent difference between the Gardner passage and the Janson passage, the former being noticeably more technical, here it would be hard to find a general formulation of the difference between the two, which is more a matter of a number of specific points of difference that do not amount to any general pattern. For example, in the choice of theme, Gardner moves from a stepping pattern in the general introduction of the topic (sentences 1 - 3), to a retention pattern when a particular work is being described (4 - 8), and back to stepping in the interpretation (9 - 10). Janson's thematic structure is more variable; sometimes the theme is retained for a short sequence of clauses, sometimes it is taken from a previous Rheme, and sometimes there is a new Theme not having appeared before. But the function of these patterns is similar in both; for example the sequence in sentences 6 - 9 (the statue in the Rheme, followed by Themes body, head and face).
The structure of the clause complexes is in both cases typical of art history discourse. They are not very elaborate; they accommodate both parataxis and hypotaxis (the double hypotactic elaboration ‘..., who..., where...’ in Janson’s sentence 5 is perhaps the only untypical feature); and there are few non-finite clauses. One noticeable difference between the two is in the extent of nominalization and grammatical metaphor. The passage from Gardner includes some fairly complex nominal groups, with a considerable amount of embedding and a high density of grammatical metaphor, especially at the beginning; cf.

under the influence of Augustan Rome’s admiration of Hellenic culture

the emperor’s apparent determination to base a cultural renewal of Rome on it

that the Hellenized glorification of the empire was politically motivated

the imperial motivation had the aesthetic consequence that work of the highest quality...was produced...

There is some of this in the Janson passage but not nearly so much. The effect is that the Gardner extract appears rather more formal than that on architecture, and certainly than his story-like cave art text quoted in 5.2.1.c. There is a greater distance created between writer and reader, and between writer and subject matter.

The passage from Janson is perhaps also a little more ‘distant’ in these respects; but it still retains something of his interpersonal flavouring; cf. we may well be uncertain, the Emperor’s gesture is familiar to us, something of the "inspired" look we find... In other respects - transitivity, tense, mood - the two are not significantly different, and both can be said to be characteristic of what is written about the sculpture from that particular period in European history.
It is interesting to compare these passages with the same author's writing about the sculpture of the 19th century. After its decline in the 5th and 9th centuries of our era, sculpture regained its status in the late Renaissance, when sculptors won a position equal to that of painters. It was from this period that the history of sculpture came to be a history of individual artists. The situation has not changed up to the present day. Here are two further passages from Gardner and Janson:

Sample 3 - 19th century sculpture - Gardner

1. As in architecture, there are several Romantic styles in nineteenth-century sculpture, but their sequence and character are naturally closer to those of painting.

2. A romantic classicism is strongly determinative of the work of ANTONIO CANOVA (1757-1522). His reclining portrait-figure of Pauline Borghese as the victorious Venus shows him to be learned in the traits of classicism - drapery, pose, form, and feature.

3. That he adroitly draws the likeness of his subject within the almost standard outlines of a classical statue shows him not slavishly bound by Neoclassical doctrine.

4. At the same time, with quite remarkable discretion, he creates a daring image of seductive charm that is generalized enough to personify the goddess of love rather than exhibit the living person.

5. Both the voluptuousness and the tact with which he veils it recall the earlier Rococo, when esteemed ladies were often represented as seminude goddesses; the realism of the couch and its drapery, however, almost betray Canova into a too graphic presentation.

6. Despite a lingering Rococo charm and realistic accessories,
the sculptor is firmly Neoclassic in his approach.

7. Considered the greatest sculptor of his time, Canova has suffered greatly in reputation since.

5. Present criticism has restored it a little, though he still carries, as the most typical of Neoclassicists, something of the burden of negative criticism laid upon that often doctrinaire and artificial style.

Sample 4 - 19th century sculpture - Janson

1. These representations were not unusual among younger, more doctrinaire Neoclassic sculptors: the most famous of them, Antonio Canova (1757-1822), produced a colossal nude statue of Napoleon, inspired by portraits of ancient rulers whose nudity indicates their status as divinities.

2. Not to be outdone, Napoleon’s sister Pauline Borghese permitted Canova to sculpt her as a reclining Venus.

3. The statue is so obviously idealized as to still any gossip.

4. We recognize it as a precursor, more classically proportioned, of Ingres’ Odalisque.

5. Strange to say, Pauline Borghese seems the less three-dimensional of the two; she is designed like a “relief in the round,” for front and back view only, and her very considerable charm comes almost entirely from the fluid grace of her outlines.

6. Here we also encounter the problem of representation versus duplication, not in the figure itself but in the pillow, mattress, and couch.

Although the topic is the sculpture of the 19th century, both these texts present it as the story of one particular
artist. Each passage turns into a kind of narrative, concerned with an individual human Actor performing actions, e.g. drawing, creating, veiling, sculpting, and so on. Thus taken as it stands the text is about an individual; but those familiar with the sculpture of that period would agree that the writer makes certain general comments which would fit other artists of the period, and that it is by the convention of the way such history is written that one of them, Canova, is selected as a prototypical representative of the classical style. This approach tends to make the student believe that there were "giants" in the area of sculpture who were totally responsible, as individuals, for its development — a very misleading view.

We have already noted, however, that as the subject matter of art history writing approaches closer to the present day, the language becomes more like that of art criticism. These texts display this tendency rather clearly. Four features will serve to illustrate this point. First, there are the mixed motifs of the topical Themes, including Judgments, critical concepts, abstractions, similes and so on:

with quite remarkable discretion, both the voluptuousness and the tact with which he veils it, strange to say, not to be outdone, despite a lingering Rococo charm and realistic accessories, present criticism, a romantic classicism and so on.

Secondly there is the indeterminacy between the Classifier and the (attitudinal) Epithet in the nominal group, e.g. more doctrinaire, colossal, romantic, realistic, artificial, fluid; cf. a daring image of seductive charm. Thirdly there is the choice of relational processes as a favoured type (indicates, seems, [we] recognize [it] as, considered, shows [him] to be, etc.); including some with alternative interpretation as relational or material, e.g. is designed,
bound [by...doctrine], veils [the voluptuousness...with tact], laid upon, restored, betray. Fourthly there is the repetition of lexical items without co-referentiality, e.g. (Janson) representation, status; (Gardner) charm, drapery, criticism (more examples will be found in the longer extracts given in the Appendix). These co-occur with narrative features (e.g. Janson, sentences 1 & 2; Gardner, sentences 6 - 5) in a way that is typical of art history discourse dealing with more modern topics in western art.
8.2.1.e - PAINTING

General comments

The history of painting is, if anything, still more uneven than that of sculpture. There were periods of western history when painting almost disappeared, e.g. during the 8th and 9th centuries, when it became the subject of a violent "Iconoclastic Controversy" over the propriety of religious imagery. It is to be expected that the texts dealing with painting that appear in general histories of western art will differ in what they discuss, how much they discuss, and how they discuss it.

In order to illustrate this variety, we will present a number of different texts from a single author, H. Gardner. As we have said, Gardner's work is representative of writing about the history of art in general, and we have already made use of it in the discussion of architecture and sculpture. The sample includes six different texts, each dealing with a different period, and each representing a different attitude towards painting. We shall see that, as a consequence, each text adopts a slight difference of register. The first four texts take us as far as the period of the Early Renaissance, the point at which the history of painting started to be the history of individual artists.

These texts may be compared with two further passages, dealing with Leonardo and Marc Chagall. These two deal with the period after the history of painting became a history of individual painters; but they display a further development in the type of discourse used. In this period there is a shift of emphasis from (i) discussing only the painter's work (the Early Renaissance) to (ii) including his life and his character as well (the High Renaissance), to (iii) incorporating the views of the writer as centrally as the
work and the character of the artist (end of 19th and the 20th century). In a way, this shift could be described as a shift from art history, to the philosophy of art, to art criticism. These changing perspectives can be seen in Gardner’s treatment of Duccio, Leonardo da Vinci and Chagall. (Her discussion of Duccio, as well as additional extracts from the earlier periods may be found reproduced in the Appendix.)

Text (a) is a discussion of the rock-shelter paintings from eastern Spain:

**Rock-shelter painting**

1. As the ice of the Paleolithic period melted in the increasing warmth, the reindeer migrated north, the wooly mammoth and rhinoceros disappeared, and the hunters left their caves.

2. The Ice Age gave way to a transition period known as the Mesolithic, when Europe became climatically, geographically, and biologically much as it is today.

3. During this time there flourished a culture whose art complements that of the caves, from which, indeed, it may partially have originated.

4. Since 1903, diminutive, extraordinarily lively paintings of animals and men in scenes of the hunt, battle, ritual dance, and harvest have been discovered on the stone walls of shallow rock shelters among the barren hills of the eastern coast of Spain (the Spanish Levant).

5. The artists show the same masterful skill in depicting the animal figure as their predecessors of the caves, and it may be that we have here
specimens of a lingering tradition or long-persisting habit of vision and representation of animals.

6. But what is strikingly new is the appearance of the human figure, not only singly, but in large, coherent groups, with wide variety of pose, subject, and setting.

7. We have seen that in cave art the human figure almost never appears; the falling or fallen man of the well scene at Lascaux is quite exceptional.

8. In the rock-shelter paintings the new sentiment for human themes and concerns and the emphasis on action in which man dominates the animal are central.

9. The new vocabulary of forms may have migrated across the Mediterranean from North Africa, where many paintings similar to those in the Spanish Levant have been found.

10. There has been much learned debate about the dating of the whole development, and there is now some agreement that its beginnings were around 8000 B.C. and that the style may have lasted (with many variations) until about 3000 B.C.

This text is like that of 'cave art' (5.2.1.c above); the treatment of early art is reminiscent of texts in anthropology and pre-history, where art is discussed as a part of the culture. In terms of Eggins, Wignell, and Martin's evaluation, it is somewhere between a story and a report; and the field-specific terminology is not characteristic of just one field, but is a combination of geography, prehistory and anthropology with some elements of sociological and art writings. This can be partially
illustrated by the Themes of the ranking clauses, which move from the prehistorical and geographical environment, via time reference to ‘then’ and ‘now’, to the artists, the paintings, and how they differ from what came before:

Sentence 1. as the ice of the Paleolithic period; the reindeer, the wooly mammoth and rhinoceros; the hunters
Sentence 2. the ice age; when Europe
Sentence 3. during this time there; from which
Sentence 4. since 1903
Sentence 5. the artists; in depicting; and it may be that we
Sentence 6. but what is new
Sentence 7. we; in cave art; the falling or fallen man of the wall scene in Lascaux
Sentence 8. in the rock-shelter paintings
Sentence 9. the new vocabulary of forms; where
Sentence 10. there; and there

In terms of our five registers of writing about art this is clearly a text of art history. The structure of the clause complexes is fairly simple, with no more than three clauses (except in the first sentence, which has $x^1 + 2 + 3$); the tactic and logical-semantic relationships are varied, but present no ambiguities or problems of understanding. There is only one non-finite found (sentence 5: [The artists show... skill] in depicting...).

When the topical Themes move to art and the artists, the text starts to become nominalized, with grammatical metaphors such as a lingering tradition...of...representation of animals, the appearance of the human figure (= ‘the fact that it appears’); the new sentiment for human themes; the emphasis on action, the dating of the whole development; these occur in relational processes such as we love..., ...are central, ...is exceptional, ...have been found.
Apart from these, the processes we find in the text are varied: material (e.g. give, migrate, discover); mental (e.g. know, see); verbal (e.g. show); relational of attribution (e.g. become); relational of existence (e.g. be, appear). The tenses are: simple past, past in present, and simple present. The mood is declarative, with two modalities expressing uncertainty (it may be that..., the new vocabulary of forms may have migrated...).

As far as the text's accessibility to the reader is concerned, it is not difficult to follow.

Text (b) is concerned with Egyptian painting.

**Egyptian painting**

1. The scenes in painted limestone relief that decorate the walls of the tomb of an Old Kingdom official, Ti, typify the subjects favoured by the patrons; most often they are agriculture and hunting activities that represent the fundamental human concern with nature and that are associated with the provisioning of the ka in the hereafter.

2. Ti, his men, and his boats move slowly through the marshes, hunting hippopotamuses, in a dense growth of towering papyrus.

3. The slender, reedy stems of the plants are delineated with repeated fine grooves that fan out gracefully at the top into a commotion of frightened birds and stalking beasts.

4. Beneath the boats, the water, signified by a pattern of wavy lines, is crowded with hippopotamuses and other aquatic fauna.
5. Ti's men seem frantically busy with their spears, while Ti himself, looming twice their size, stands impassive and all of in the formal stance that we have seen in the figure of Resire.

6. The outsize and ideal proportions bespeak Ti's rank, as does the conventional pose, which contrasts with the realistically rendered activity of his diminutive servants and particularly with the precisely observed figures of the birds and animals among the papyrus buds.

7. A rare and fine example of Old Kingdom painting is the frieze called the Geese of Medum.

8. In the prehistoric art of the caves, the rock paintings, and the art of Mesopotamia, we admired the peculiar sensitivity of early artists to the animal figure.

9. They seem to have had empathy with the nonhuman creatures, what Keats called negative capability - the power almost to share the being of the animal and to feel as it feels.

The language of this text shows that we know much more about Egyptian painting and Egyptian art in general. The writer no longer takes an anthropological or prehistoric stance; he assumes both a historical and an ideological understanding of the art of Egypt, its content and its function.

In many respects the text is similar to the preceding. But it includes historical information (about the Old Kingdom), which enables the writer to discuss the painting against its historical background; the discussion is thus more specific than that of cave painting which was based on
generalizations from what could be observed. However, not everything in the text is derived from historical data. Many of the writer's comments come from observation of the paintings which is then skillfully turned into a description. For instance, knowing that the painting comes from the tomb of an Old Kingdom official, Ti, the writer assumes he would not have selected for his tomb subjects he did not like; so, making an educated guess, Gardner says that: 'the scenes on the walls of the tomb typify the subjects favoured by the patrons'. She then goes on to describe the scene: 'Ti, his men, and his boats move slowly through the marshes, hunting hippopotamuses, in a dense growth of towering papyrus.' Anybody looking at the painting would see what the art historian sees, but the language suggests there is more to the story than meets the eye. Descriptive terms such as slowly, dense, towering, remove the discussion slightly away from reality. It is hard to say whether the people in the picture (which does not move) are moving slowly or fast; and though we can see that the papyrus in the painting is tall, the term 'towering' adds a poetic dimension to its tallness. The reader feels that there is something the writer knows that he does not. Another example is a commotion of frightened birds, where frightened is an assumption that is made for dramatic effect.

We said earlier that the seeds of art criticism were planted in the very early history of art, and that it was in painting that they were able to take hold. The latter part of the first paragraph (sentences 3 - 6) exemplifies this very clearly, starting with 'The slender, reedy stems of the plants are delineated with repeated fine grooves that fan out gracefully...'. It is not that this and the subsequent observation is false or inaccurate, but that it expresses - not in the form of additional comment, but as an integral part of the description - the writer's own personal
evaluation of what he sees. Terms such as those underlined would not figure in a description of architecture or sculpture. It is in painting, as an art form, that the occasion arises for the writer to be 'poetic' and to present his own interpretation and evaluation.

As this text moves towards the discourse of art criticism certain grammatical resources come to the fore. We have already noted the key role played by the Epithet and Classifier functions in the premodifier of the nominal group. Words such as diminutive, slender, stalking, outsize and ideal are pivotal, since they may be interpreted purely experientially, as Classifier (e.g. ideal, outsize, stalking) or descriptive Epithet (e.g. diminutive, slender); but at the same time they also have an interpersonal reading, expressing various orders of positive or negative evaluation. The effect on the reader is to associate the writer's opinion with a semantic component of objectivity.

A second feature is that of relational processes of the 'intensive/identifying' kind expression a symbolic relation between Token and Value; for example the outsize and ideal proportions bespeak Ti's rank. Compare also typify, signified by, represent and an example of...is. All these establish the status of a painting as something that has to be interpreted, because what it 'stands for' (or what its component parts stand for) is something other than what the 'naive' observer can see - and thus, by implication, they establish the status of the writer as one who provides the interpretation.

Thirdly, there is the nominalization that is used to characterize features of the painting; for example (sentence 6)

the outsize and ideal proportions
the conventional pose
the realistically rendered activity of
his diminutive servants
the precisely observed figures of the
birds and animals among the papyrus buds

Note here the exophoric the, which makes sense only if the reader can also see the painting being described (cf. what was said in 8 below on portable art); and the nouns used as Thing/Head, i.e. proportional, pose, activity, figures, which from their place in the grammar of the text derive a special status as 'technical' terms, yet do not have the precise definition that such terms have in a discourse such as that of art technology.

Further differences appear if we move on to consider Gardner's treatment of other times and traditions. Her discussion of Cretan art is more archaeological in character, and her own judgment is brought in only to distinguish the style of one period from that of another (see Appendix). The section on Roman painting is the most architectural; there is little on the context of the paintings, but considerable technical detail together with information about their location in certain parts of the house.

When we reach Early Christian painting, Gardner's approach is to select a particular work of art and discuss it as a representative of the period as a whole. A similar strategy is adopted in the treatment of the Italian Byzantine art. This is illustrated in the following texts (c) and (d):

Text (c) - Early Christian painting

1. An eleventh-century crucifixion scene on the wall of the monastery church at Daphne in Greece shows the simplicity, dignity, and grace of
classicism fully assimilated by the Byzantine artist in a perfect synthesis with Byzantine piety and pathos.

2. Christ is represented on the cross, flanked by the Virgin and St. John.

3. A skull at the foot of the cross indicates Golgotha, the "place of skulls."

4. Nothing is needed to complete the tableau.

5. In quiet sorrow and resignation, the Virgin and St. John point to Christ as if to indicate the meaning of the cross.

6. Symmetry and closed space produce an effect of the motionless and unchanging aspect of the deepest mystery of the Christian religion; and the timeless presence is, as it were, beheld in unbroken silence.

7. The picture is not a narrative of the historical event of the Crucifixion but a devotional object, a thing sacramental in itself, to be viewed by the monks in silent contemplation of the mystery of the Sacrifice.

8. Although elongated, these figures from the Second Golden Age of Byzantine art have regained their organic structure to a surprising degree, particularly as compared with those of the Justinian period.

9. The style is a masterful adaptation of Greek statuesque qualities to the linear Byzantine style.

Text (d) - Italian Byzantine painting
1. Throughout the Middle Ages Italian painting was dominated by the Byzantine style.

2. The Italian Byzantine style, or maniera bizantina, shows in an altarpiece that represents St. Francis and is a descendant of those tall, aloof, austere figures that people the world of Byzantine art.

3. The saint, wearing the cinctured canonicals of the Franciscan order, holds a large book and displays on his hands and feet the stigmata, the wounds of Christ imprinted upon him as a sign of Heavenly favour.

4. The saint is flanked by two very Byzantine angels and by scenes from his life, the latter very much suggesting that their source is in Byzantine manuscripts.

5. A detail of the altarpiece represents St. Francis preaching to the birds.

6. The figures of St. Francis and his two attendants are carefully aligned against a shallow stage-property tower and wall, a stylized symbol of town or city from Early Christian times.

7. In front of the saint is another stage-scenery image of nested, wooded hills populated by alert and sprightly birds and twinkling plants.

8. The strict formality of the composition - relieved somewhat by the sharply observed birds and the lively stippling of the plants - the shallow space, and the linear flatness in the rendering of the forms are all familiar traits of a long and august tradition, now suddenly and dramatically to be replaced.
9. Bonaventura Berlinghieri, artist of the St. Francis altarpiece, was one of a family of painters in the Tuscan city of Lucca.

In each case the painting is being taken as an example: an eleventh-century crucifixion scene...shows the simplicity...of classicism...; this Italian Byzantine style...is shown in an altar piece.... The texts then proceed with description and interpretation, with the author's evaluation incorporated into it as in the Egyptian art passage: in silent contemplation of the mystery; have regained their organic structure to a surprising degree; alert and sprightly birds and twinkling plants, etc.

In the first of the two, text (c), the Themes of the ranking clauses begin with the work and its parts (an eleventh-century crucifixion scene on the wall of the monastery church at Daphne in Greece; Christ; a skull at the floor of the cross); then, after a bridging Theme nothing, they move on to personal description (in quiet sorrow and resignation) and interpretation (symmetry and closed space). This last is from sentence 6, which is entirely in the discourse of art criticism and is not at all easy to understand.

Symmetry and closed space produce an effect of the motionless and unchanging aspect of the deepest mystery of the Christian religion; and the timeless presence is, as it were, beheld in unbroken silence.

The Theme is an abstract critical concept which also functions as Actor in a material process (produce); what is produced, the Goal, is another abstract participant. This should probably be interpreted as a grammatical metaphor of
the type discussed in detail in Halliday (1988), where two processes linked by a causal relation 'a happens, so x happens' are represented metaphorically as 'happening a causes happening x'; but it is still not very clear what the two components mean. There is then a second clause linked paratactically to the first by a logico-semantic relationship of 'and'; this presumably represents 'extension; addition', but it is not obvious whether this is in fact adding something new or restating what has gone before. The remainder of the paragraph gradually returns to a less abstract and more comprehensible mode, ending with a summary of the author's view of the style in question.

The second extract (text d, Italian Byzantine painting), is similar in that one picture is selected as a vehicle for general comments about the Byzantine style of Italian art.

The difference between this and the previous sample is in the attitude adopted towards the painting. While in the previous sample the meaning of the work was given predominance, in this passage we are given a straightforward description of what the participants in the painting are doing, without an explanation of why they are doing it or what is the symbolic significance of their action 1a. The text is more like the language of 'portable art' in the way it discusses details of the painting; note the Themes the saint; the saint; a detail of the altarpiece; the figure of St. Francis and his two attendants; in front of the saint. Only in the final sentence of the paragraph does it move towards a more art-critical stance, and even then the generalization made is historical: are all familiar traits of a long and august tradition rather than interpretative. The overall effect is of a report, a commentary on what can be seen 'if one looks'. It could be argued that the main function of European painting from Byzantine times up to Realism is its 'symbolism'; Gardner, however, like the
majority of art historians, tends to avoid iconography. The impression given is that the story the painting is trying to tell is not an important issue. From the teacher’s point of view, although this may make the text easier to follow, it leaves the student of art history without any clear sense of the content and function of a large body of artistic work. Thus whereas in (c) the emphasis was on the ideology behind the painting, in (d) the emphasis is on a straightforward description; and it is noteworthy that with the latter for the first time the writer moves on to an account of the painter, now identified as an individual. The last sentence of the passage quoted (which is in fact the first sentence of the succeeding paragraph) now has as its Theme Bonaventura Berlinghieri, artist of the St. Francis altarpiece.

When the individual painter first enters on the scene as subject matter of art history, it is his art that takes the centre of the stage. The discourse is ‘story-like’; but it is a story about paintings. This can be illustrated from Gardner’s treatment of Duccio (see Appendix) which contains the sentence: These little pictures, which show Duccio’s power of narration, were dismantled in the sixteenth century and are now scattered through the museums of the world.

By the time we reach Leonardo da Vinci, the story has become the story of the man himself. Here is a part of Gardner’s account of Leonardo (text e):

1. Leonardo’s great ambition, in his painting as well as in his scientific endeavors, was to discover the laws underlying the flux and processes of nature.
2. With this end in mind he also studied man and contributed immeasurably to our knowledge of physiology and psychology.

3. Leonardo believed that reality in an absolute sense is inaccessible to man and that we can know it only through its changing images.

4. Thus, he considered the eyes to be man's most vital organs, and sight his most essential function, since through these man can grasp the images of reality most directly and profoundly.

5. Hence, one may understand Leonardo's insistence, stated many times in his notes, that all his scientific investigations were merely aimed at making himself a better painter.

6. Leonardo was born near Florence and was trained in the studio of Verrocchio.

7. But he left Florence in 1481, offering his services to Ludovico Sforza, Duke of Milan.

8. The political situation in Florence was uncertain, and the neo-Platonism of Lorenzo de' Medici and his brilliant circle may have proved uncongenial to the empirical and pragmatic Leonardo.

9. It may be, also, that Leonardo felt that the artistic scene in Milan would be less competitive.

In the Leonardo text, it is the man himself who is the main theme. Leonardo is presented as a genius whose art was only one of the things he was interested in; while this may be a true evaluation, it takes the reader away from the history of art towards the history of philosophy.
In the following instances, Leonardo is Sensor in a clause of mental process: [Leonardo's ambition was] to discover; Leonardo studied; Leonardo believed; he considered; Leonardo felt (sentences 1, 2, 3, 4, 9). Through these processes, by projection, the writer presents what Leonardo thought and felt: that reality in an absolute sense is inaccessible; [that] the eyes [are] man's most vital organs; and (hedged with the modality 'it may be') that the artistic scene in Milan would be less competitive [than in Florence]. His character is described by Epithets: the empirical and pragmatic Leonardo; and he functions as metaphorical Possessor in Leonardo's great ambition, Leonardo's insistence. His life is then summed up in two sentences in the middle of the passage (sentences 6 and 7).

Of course, these particular features are specific to Leonardo; other painters have their lives described in different terms. What is common is the focus on the painter as an individual with his own biography and his own personality; and this begins, in writings on art history, with the 'High Renaissance'. It is not surprising that this should be so, since this is the point when achievements in all fields come to be ascribed to individual performers; the way art history is written simply reflects this change. But it has significant consequences for the form of discourse. As one further example: If we compare the textual status of Leonardo with that of Duccio we find that in the Duccio passage of sixteen sentences, after his introduction in the first sentence Duccio never once functions as Theme in a primary clause; whereas Leonardo is Theme in about half of all such instances, and other Themes include his mind and personality, Leonardo's unquestionable curiosity and the colossal outlines of Leonardo's nature (see Appendix).

Our final example here is a passage in which Gardner deals with a contemporary painter, March Chagall (Text f):
1. Thus Surrealist art almost inevitably presented feelings so private that communication with the audience became difficult if not impossible, except when the artist, through his choice of familiar symbols, describes experience common to groups of people.

2. Such a broadened use of symbol and fantasy occurs in the work of March Chagall, who was born in 1887 in Russia and studied and worked in Paris, Berlin, and New York.

3. Although he accepted many aspects of the most sophisticated theories and practices of the times — Expressionism, Cubism, Fauvist colour — Chagall never forgot his early life in an obscure Russian village.

4. Themes from his childhood return in dreams and memories; some gay and fanciful, suggest the simplest pleasures of folk-life; others, somber and even tragic, recall the trials and persecutions of the Jewish people.

5. In his Crucifixion the terror of wars and pogroms is suggested by the pitiful little figures and the village in the background, while resignation and hope are expressed in the flying angel, the Torah scroll, and the rabbi-Christ figure on the cross.

6. The work is a moving portrayal of the artist's feeling that faith is important in a world of war and brutality.

7. Although the very free, floating composition with unexpected juxtapositions of the actual and the unearthly is Surrealistic in the sense that it perpetuates the fantastic content of a dream, the
individual symbols refer to much more than Chagall's personal psychic life.

8. A comparison of Chagall's interpretation of war with Picasso's in the Guernica illuminates the broad scale of expressive emotion upon which art can play.

As with Duccio and Leonardo, the focus of attention is on the painter; but whereas with Duccio it was directed towards his work and with Leonardo towards his ideas and his characteristics as an individual, with Chagall the writer adopts a more psychoanalytic approach, using his own assessment of what is relevant information about him.

Very little now remains of the discourse of history in the narrative sense; even the two clauses summing up Chagall's life are dependent clauses, functioning merely as elaboration of a primary clause in which his name is mentioned for the first time (sentence 2). The language is closer to that of aesthetics and of art criticism. There is a long nominal group with extensive embedding (sentence 1 - feelings so private that communication with the audience of any appreciable size became difficult if not impossible, except when the artist, through his choice of familiar symbols, describes experience common to groups of people); and others which, although not of this complexity, present highly abstract concepts in terms of elaborate grammatical metaphor (e.g. sentence 7 - the very free, flowing composition with unexpected juxtaposition of the actual and the unearthly). Here the processes are relational identifying, with verbs such as presented, is suggested by, are expressed in, is (a moving portrayal of), refer to, illuminates; the two nominal groups are thus related as Token and Value, and although the voice of the verb makes it clear which is which the import of the final sentence
remains somewhat obscure (a comparison...illuminates the broad scale of expressive emotion upon which art can play). Interspersed with these are observations about the artist's inner life, with mental processes expressed congruently ("Chagall never forgot his early life in an obscure Russian village") or metaphorically ("Themes from his childhood return in dreams and memories"; "the artist's feeling that faith is important in a world of war and brutality"). The writer's personal evaluation is conveyed in the epithets used to describe the works: "a moving portrayal"; "very free, flowing composition"; "a broadened use of symbol and fantasy"; "unexpected juxtaposition".

**The modes of discourse in art history texts**

These extracts, together with the longer passages included in the Appendix, give an indication of the range of different modes of discourse that are to be found in an art history text. There are three points to be made by way of summary.

One is that it is in painting, not in sculpture or architecture, that this range of variations occurs. While writing about architecture tends to move between the two poles of history and technology, and writing about sculpture remain, more or less in the area of art history, writing about painting may move across the whole range of discourse types that we have identified. What is the explanation of the difference?

This seems to be a matter partly of form and partly of function. By its nature, architecture depends on technique, and the most obvious feature of the architecture of any historical period is the technique associated with it. Within those limits, the form of architecture is primarily dependent on its function. Since it does not tell a story,
stories cannot be told about it. Consequently, unless the writer limits himself to taking a purely historical approach, the language associated with writing about architecture is bound to be largely technical.

Sculpture is much less dependent on technique, and so is not usually discussed in technical terms. It is not dominated by functional considerations: but it has had a limited range of contexts, usually in association with other art forms, and for much of its history it does not get treated as an independent art form created for purposes of visual enjoyment. In the way it is written about sculpture stands between architecture and painting.

Painting as an art form gives the writer more freedom than he has either with architecture or with sculpture. It gives the writer the opportunity to tell 'stories' about it (since it tells stories itself), to move from impersonal description to personal comments and so to 'insert himself' in the text, without the reader being aware of it. And since it is not explicitly tied to particular functions it is possible to ignore its social dimensions altogether and interpret it from a wide variety of different theoretical standpoints.

The remaining points can be briefly made. The second is that, because of the different knowledge we have - not only of different extent, but also different kinds of knowledge - about the painting of different historical periods from cave art to the present day, it is almost inevitable that 'the history of western painting', considered as a single theme, will call for very different forms of discourse; hence the movement from 'prehistory-like' to 'art-criticism-like' writing that we described at the beginning of the chapter. However - the third point - the writer is not in fact trapped in this uniform progression from one form of
discourse to another. We saw that the personal, 'art-critical' mode could be adopted already in the description of Egyptian art; while on the other hand one can discuss technique in relation to painting from any period of history. Hence, while certain periods and styles are likely to favour one kind of discourse or another, it is possible to introduce quite different discourses within the discussion of a single topic. It is not unusual that one sentence in a text fits the category of art history while the next one is a typical example of art criticism. It seems that this frequent shift from one register to another may be one of the greatest difficulties experienced by readers of art history texts, quite apart from the inherent difficulty they may find with the less 'purely historical' registers that find their place in histories of painting.
5.2.2. OTHER TYPES OF ART HISTORIES

General comments

For the remainder of this chapter we shall present specimens of other types of art history writing, with brief comments but without further linguistic analysis. The aim is to show minor variation within the general register of art history writing, and how this is associated with particular concerns: specific histories, social histories and histories of non-western art. We might have expected important differences reflecting these particular concerns through the language, but as this section will illustrate, the three types of specific art histories do not differ materially from general histories of art. If there is a difference, it is a difference in the relative quantity, i.e. the preference for one register rather than the other, rather than the type of language used.

Specific histories of art

Generally speaking, specific histories of art are not much different from general histories of art. The difference may be (1) in the amount of geographical facts (in histories dealing with a particular country); (2) in the amount of personal data (in histories dealing with work of an individual artist); (3) in the degree of technicality (for instance the histories of architecture, or histories of a particular method or technique); (4) in the amount of theoretical discussion (in histories discussing particular art styles or movements); (5) in the amount of historical data (in histories of a particular period); (6) in the amount of general data (histories of a particular culture, including historical, geographical, social, anthropological, ideological and other information). Considering the large
number of books which belong in this category rather than that of general history of art, this kind of information would be useful for new students and 'lovers' of art, who might benefit from knowing the difference in the likely content of the individual types of art texts.

The specific histories all fall within the overall register of histories of western art as described above. The difference is in the selection of one or more particular sub-registers: which one(s) and how they are displayed. On the whole, specific histories of art are more unified in the language used; as a result they seem more 'monotonous' compared to general histories of art, this monotony being caused by long sections written in the same register.

5.2.2.a Histories of art of a country

The difference between the history of the art of a particular country as presented in general histories and as presented in specific histories is that in the latter there is (i) more geographical and historical data of a country, and (ii) more information about the art production, which is not usually limited the three art forms dealt with in general histories of western art.

Our samples are from two different books about Greek art, one written for the general public (John Boardman, Greek art, Thames and Hudeon, London, 1964) the other written for university students (G.M.A. Richter, Greek art, Phaidon Press, London, 1967). The second provides more detail and is written in a more technical language.

Greece is a poor country. Its mineral resources are slight and its farmland neither extensive nor very fertile. In the eighth century B.C. the growing population had to look overseas for the
materials to satisfy the new appetite, and eventually even for new homes for their families whose own lands had become too small or uncomfortable for them. (Boardman: 41)

Long before the coming of the Greeks into Greece other peoples had dominated the Aegean world and had produced a civilizations of high standing. Through archaeological research this 'prehistoric' age is gradually unfolding itself. Traces of palaeolithic habitation have been found in various places; and abundant remains of the neolithic or Late Stone Age have come to light on the Greek mainland and on the islands, dating from the sixth to the fourth millennium B.C. It is not yet known from where these Neolithic people came. (Richter: 3)

It is clear that these two writers have two different readerships in mind. The two texts differ markedly in the technicality of the language used, in lexical density and grammatical metaphor, and in the presence of specific as compared to general information. The first text is one that would probably cater for the needs of high school students and the general public, while the second text assumes the reader to have a more detailed knowledge of the topic or a specific reason to gain that knowledge.

As said above, specific histories of art do not limit their discussion to the three major art forms, but offer information about other types of artistic production. Boardman includes information about metalwork, clay figurines, and coins, but again the discussion is of a general rather than technical nature:

The Greeks brought back with them metals, and consumer goods, including works decorated in styles utterly foreign to the conventions of Greek Geometric art. We find especially bronze bowls decorated in low relief with animals and figure scenes, and ivory plaques carved in low relief as fittings to furniture or toilet articles.

This is art history rather than art technology text, as becomes obvious if we compare it with a text by Richter:

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The chief metal used by the Greeks for their decorative work were bronze (in different alloys), silver and gold. When the Romans brought back works of art from Greek lands, embossed metalwork formed an important part of the loot... Enough examples remain to give an idea of the variety of excellence of this branch of Greek art. The decorations are in relief, or incised, or in the round.

Thought the same topic is being discussed, the approach to it is more technical and the language more sophisticated.

Generally speaking, books intended for the general public are more history oriented while those for tertiary students are more technology oriented. Two further samples have been included for the purposes of comparison (see Appendix).

5.2.2.b Histories of Individual Artists

A second type of specific art history is that dealing with an individual artist. More personal data are included, and the register typically used is the 'story-like' one we identified in general histories of art.

We said in earlier, that from the Renaissance onwards the history of sculpture and painting is conceived of as a history of individuals, and consequently the topic of painting and sculpture is typically presented in the context of individual biographies. This suggests that specific histories of individual artists are not very different from entries in general histories of art. The difference lies in the amount of personal data the writer can include, which often means that there is not much room left for anything else and consequently the text becomes a biography far removed from the practical achievements of the artist under discussion. While the writer of general histories has to concentrate on the most important events and works representative of the life and work of an individual artist, the writer of the specific history of an individual can
afford to spend more time on details which though interesting are not always essential. To give an analogy, the difference between the general and the special history of an individual painter or sculptor is the difference between a curriculum vitae and a diary.

When it comes to the history of architecture, the 'individual' specific history is lacking. This may be because, while the author of a sculpture or a painting is usually only one person (except when the background, for instance, is finished or coloured by apprentices, as was sometimes done during the Renaissance), many people participate in the construction of a building. However, even today, when architecture also has its 'giants', it is the building, its structure and the method used rather than the life story of the architect that is in focus; and while there are innumerable books about individual painters, and still many (though fewer) about sculptors, there are few books written about architects.

Of the three samples of individual history in this section, one deals with an architect, the second with a sculptor and the last with a painter (see Appendix).

Sample 1 - Mies van der Rohe, by Werner Blaser

The two pages reproduced in the appendix are all that is said about the architect himself. The text, of which this is the introduction, is partially a report and partially a critique of his work, as is suggested by the thematic development. From Mies van der Rohe as a Theme of the first clause we move to this book. The Rheme of the clause with this book as Theme, i.e. a clearly recognized structure which is the basis of his construction is being raised to the level of an art, becomes Theme of the following sentence. Then we return back to Mies van der Rohe as Theme
It [the idea that construction must be the basis of the new architecture] → It → For Viollet-le-Duc → Mies van der Rohe → It [a clear and simple structure] → He → From the very outset → It was in the Barcelona Pavilion → With it → Material, structure, space and the restless need for metaphysical security → The interplay of closed and open spaces → the layman → The refinement of the connection between column and roof-slab in the New National Gallery in West Berlin →...The theme shifts between the architect and a variety of critical concepts used to describe his work, the latter involving abstract terms and also some grammatical metaphor (e.g. the refinement of the connection between column and roof-slab). The first sentence is fairly typical of the language of art critiques:

'Mies van der Rohe evolved his ideas from the basic principles of construction; hence the form of his buildings is the expression of their structure.'

The first clause is a comment about his knowledge of architectural principles; but the second clause, which is said to follow from it ('hence'), does not seem entirely clear. If we unpack the metaphor in the second clause we will end up with something like: the structure of his buildings determines the form they end up with, i.e. their final appearance. The organization of this sentence sets the tone for the text as a whole: the topic is an individual, but the focus of attention is entirely on a critical appraisal of his work. Contrast this with the treatment of a painter and a sculptor.

Sample 2 — Goya, by J.F. Chabrun (see Appendix)

This is a typical example of writings about individual painters. It is a narrative consisting mainly of
biographical and historical data. Goya's art is discussed in its relation to his life story; the occasion on which he painted a particular painting takes precedence over discussing the painting in detail (see p.33, 62, 195, 223).

Sample 3 - The World of Rodin, by W.H. Hale (see Appendix)

As in the previous sample, these pages (which were also selected at random) illustrate that a specific history about a sculptor is a biography where the discussion of works is minimal and the emphasis on personal data takes over.

§.2.2.c Histories of the individual art forms

As already said, the histories of painting and sculpture are the stories of individual artists - at least from the period of the Early Renaissance (in the case of painting) and the High Renaissance (in the case of sculpture).

The registers connected with the above have already been discussed in detail under the heading of general histories of art; these samples show that there is no difference in the language used to describe the three art form in general and in specific art histories, the only difference being that here the book concentrates on one art form only.

The three texts come from A history of architecture by Fletcher, A history of Painting by Valery and A history of Sculpture by Molesworth (see Appendix). Each is typical of the history of the individual art form in question.
5.2.2.d Histories of a particular method, style or period

There are very few histories dealing with a particular method or technique. Even a text that purports to do this usually in fact discusses particular works of art that exemplify the technique in question. Details of technique and method are not generally considered to belong in the area of art history; it is rather students of the specific disciplines of architecture, sculpture and painting who are presented with technical literature about their discipline; hence it is not written from a historical standpoint. We include one example, from the chapter 'Fresco in the history of painting' of a book discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 below.

Likewise, the history of a style associated with architecture, sculpture or painting is usually discussed in terms of individual examples of the particular art form. It is not necessary to present samples.

Typically, a book dealing with a specific style such as impressionism would start with a short section defining the meaning of the term, followed by a more detailed discussion of the representative artists and their work - Manet, Renoir, and so on. The language used, as we have shown, would depend on the art form. If the topic was a style associated with painting or sculpture, then the language would be story-like, a discussion of the individual artists, with variations depending on the style and its place in time. The closer to our present era, the more the discourse would be that of art criticism. A style connected with architecture will be presented in a language somewhere between art history and art technology, depending on the aim of the writer and the audience he had in mind.
Books dealing with particular periods tend to read like longer versions of the chapters we find in general histories of western art. For instance, a book dealing with the Baroque period will start with a historical outline of the period, after which individual samples of works of art will be discussed in terms already outlined. The language follows the same pattern, varying according to the historical location and the art form. There are many books dealing with art periods; we may mention just one - Germain Bazin's *Baroque and Rococo* (Thames & Hudson, London, 1964).

§.3 Social histories of art

There are not many studies in the history of western art that would qualify as "social" histories of art. One of the few books in this category is Arnold Hauser's *The Social History of Art*.

We shall not attempt to characterize the language of this text. Naturally it has many characteristics of sociological writings; and this accounts for the feature that is noteworthy about it in relation to art history. We drew attention earlier to the shift of register that takes place in general art histories from the pre-history-like treatment of the 'origins' of art, through historical and 'history of ideas' to more art-critical forms of discourse. In Hauser this shift does not take place; the register remains constant throughout. This reflects the writer's sociological approach: the language used is uniform because the approach to the topic is uniform.

The samples of the text included in the appendix deal with the Old Stone Age, Egypt, the Renaissance, Impressionism, and the Film Age. They illustrate the fact that, despite the great historical and cultural distances, the language used does not need to differ. The art is seen as a social
product, and its development as a reflection of sociological changes; it is interpreted with those conditions and those changes in mind, and the language maintains this consistently sociological orientation.

Histories including western and non-western art

Germain Bazin's *A concise history of art* is one of the few that include non-western cultures. What is interesting about his book is not only the fact that he discusses Indian, Islamic and Chinese art, but that he considers that to do so requires different kinds of research, and a different approach to art, from what is needed for the discussion of western art. He acknowledges in the Preface that, while in the case of Western civilization a coverage of the historical background was all that was needed, in the case of non-western culture it was essential to give an account of the religions of the countries concerned, because without it it would have been difficult to understand the artistic works of races whose outlook is so unlike our own. In other words, western art can be treated from the purely historical perspective, while in the case of non-western art the socio-cultural aspects have to be taken into consideration with religion as the foundation.

To discuss Bazin's text dealing with a non-western culture would be beyond our present scope; but a sample of his text about Indian art is included in the Appendix. It will be seen that Bazin's work forms a bridge between general and social histories of art. It is not a social history of art, though there are elements of sociology in it. The language is the same as that of western histories of art, the only difference being that another topic – religion – is included. This topic, however, is still treated from the historical rather than the ideological point of view.
5.4 HISTORIES OF NON-WESTERN ART

We have not attempted to bring histories of non-western art into our analysis, because they are at present written according to rather different conventions from those governing the history of western art.

Firstly, knowledge of non-western art among art historians lags far behind their knowledge of western art. While there are many non-western cultures whose art we are 'visually' familiar with - we can recognize examples of Chinese, Japanese, or African art and assign them to their proper cultures - when it comes to their intended meanings, we know hardly anything about them.

Secondly, for some cultures, i.e. African or Oceanic cultures, because of the lack of historical facts available the books dealing with their art can hardly be called 'histories'. Instead the approach to their art is usually based on the findings of anthropologists, and the language used is more that of anthropology and sociology than that of art history. The emphasis is on the social life of these cultures, of which art is one of the representations; and this approach usually offers precisely what is missing in histories of western art, i.e. a discussion and explanation of the function or functions that art has in the particular culture. As a general rule this will apply to traditionally non-written cultures, not to those such as China and Japan. There the historical knowledge seems to take over and discussion of the functions of their art is omitted in the same way as it is in histories of western art.

Thirdly, as a consequence of the first two, while general histories of western art limit themselves to a discussion of the three art forms, in general histories of non-western art and other books on non-western art which are not 'histories'
in the terms explained above, many more art forms are included. Those 'other' forms are characteristic of each particular culture and consequently in our taxonomy (5.1.1) it was impossible to set up a schema that would include them all. As an illustration, we include in the Appendix three tables of contents, one taken from a book about African art, one from a book about Oceanic art, and one from a book on Japanese art. The approach to African art is illustrated by the names of the chapters: Unity of Life; The artist and society; Forms of religion; Ancestor Cult; Polytheism and Images of Gods; Fetishism and the Fetish (a chapter which deals with social issues rather than with art history.) As regards what is considered an art form, there are objects such as masks, items of ornamentation and a number of everyday objects which would never be classified as works of art elsewhere. The content associated with African art could never be used for anything else but African art. The list associated with Oceanic art is, of course, quite different from the previous one; while the last list, from a book about Japanese art, is different again. Each one is specific to the culture that is being described.

There are very few specific histories of non-western art. Those that exist deal with the great written cultures of Asia: for Japan, for example, we find histories of particular art forms such as wall hangings, or personal histories of individual artists such as Hokusai. No such specific histories can be found in the area of Oceanic art.

There is an interesting consequence, for the student, of the cultural distance separating us from non-western artistic traditions. Because so much needs to be explained, and so few likely readers have the background knowledge, the writer cannot treat his readership as an 'in-group' in the way that he can when writing about western art. To understand, for example, Japanese Tantric art of the Heian period, we need
to know something of Esoteric Buddhism - a knowledge which few western readers possess. This therefore has to be presented and made intelligible, rather than taken for granted as a set of shared experiences, assumptions and values. So writings about non-western art tend, paradoxically, to be more accessible to the student than writings about the art of the culture in which he himself grew up. This will appear from the brief samples given in the Appendix.
CHAPTER 6  ART TECHNOLOGY

6.1 General comments

We described a specimen of the discourse of art technology in Chapter 4; and in the last chapter we showed that, within writing about art history, some parts of the text were of a technical nature and represented elements of art technology discourse incorporated within an overall historical context. The move into this art-technology discourse depended on a number of factors, the most important of which were the art form (writing about architecture tends to be more technical than writing about sculpture or painting, and sculpture slightly more than painting), and the historical-geographical context (the writing may be more technical were the technique is unfamiliar to a contemporary western readership; and especially with art forms outside the major triad, e.g. medieval stained glass, Chinese porcelain).

In this chapter we consider some further examples, this time chosen as representative of writing that is explicitly presented as writing about the technology of a particular art form. One deals with pottery, one with sculpture and one with etching. The first sample is from G.M.A.Richter’s book Greek Art (Phaidon Press, 1667), from a chapter dealing with the technique of Attic pottery. The second sample is from Studies in conservation (Vol.31, No.4, Nov. 1686) from an article called ‘Construction of a Fudo-Myoo Sculpture. The third example is from The Oxford Companion to Art, from an entry under the heading of Etching.

Sample 1 (Richter, 1667: 305)

1. Though the following account applies specifically to Attica,
much of what is said applies to the other wares.

2. The clay is plastique, tough, and, when well levigated, very smooth.

3. It contains a high percentage of iron, and so fires pink.

4. In modern Athenian potteries white clay is mixed with the red, and this may also have been the ancient practice.

5. The pots are thrown and turned on the wheel, except for the relatively few moulded and built ones.

6. The smaller vases were thrown in one piece, the larger in sections.

7. The sections were mostly made at the structural point, between neck and body, or body and foot, and to conceal them thin coils of clay were added on the outsides, whereas on the insides the joins are often visible.

8. After the marks of the turning tools had been removed—probably with scrapers and moist sponges as nowadays—the handles were attached.

6. These were all separately made by hand, not moulded.

10. The nature of the black medium used in the decoration had long been a puzzle, and only recently has it been successfully analysed and reproduced.

11. It is not a glaze in the modern sense, for it contains insufficient alkali to render it fusible at a definite temperature.

12. It is rather a liquid clay, peptized, that is, with the heavier particles eliminated by means of protective colloid.

13. Since the clay out of which it was made contained iron, the colour of the glaze changed from red to black or brown according to the nature of the firing.
This text shows many of the linguistic features suggested earlier as typical of art technology (cf. Table 4). One example is the thematic pattern of the discourse.

There are some instances of the same theme being retained for two or more clauses (e.g. 2 and 3; 10,11 and 12) the repetition takes the form of an anaphoric process it. Elsewhere the pattern is mixed; after the clay we move to in modern Athenian potteries, followed by two co-hyponyms the pots and the smaller vases (the superordinate term pottery 'earthenware products' has not occurred in the immediately preceding text; but its variant potteries 'place where pottery is made' may be taken to serve that function). There are 'steps' from Rheme to Theme (6 -> 7; 6 -> 6); and some 'leaps' into new motifs, sometimes in the form of a thematic hypotactic clause (4, 8, 10), but all having some cohesive relation to what has gone before, e.g. Attica-> Athenian, turned -> the turning [tools], and perhaps pots -> vases -> the decoration.

The sentences are clause complexes of two to four clauses, mixing parataxis and hypotaxis and including all types of expansion (elaborating, extending, enhancing). The longest example (sentence 7) has structure

\[ 1 +2αβ \quad 2αα \quad 2 +β \]

The 'enhancing' clauses express temporal sequences (8: after the marks...had been removed) or causal explanations, purpose (7: to conceal them) and reason (13: since the clay...contained iron); also sometimes paratactically as in 3 (and so fires pink) and 11 (for it contains...).

All the logical-semantic relations are made quite explicit, whether as clauses or as prepositional phrases; including
the elaborating that is marking the definition of peptized in 12.

The clauses contain, typically, one participant (concrete, inanimate: clay, vase, section, medium, tools, etc.) and one circumstance (location, manner); many are 'agentless' passives (were made, had been removed, were attached, etc.) The nominal groups expressing the participant, in the clause or the phrase, contain little premodific, and what there is is very regular (Delictic plus one other Epithet or Classifier, at most); but include some embedded Qualifiers, the most complex being in 10 the nature of the black medium used in the decoration. Despite such nominal groups the lexical density is not high: a little over 3.5 in the passage quoted (26 clauses, 108 lexical words).

The tense switches mainly between simple past and simple present; this is partly because, although the topic is ancient Greek pottery, the text makes reference to 'modern Athenian potteries' (where white clay is mixed...), but also because some parts of the account of ancient practices are also given in the present tense (2, 3, 5(?), 10, 11, 12). The mood is declarative, with almost no modality (only one statement is hedged with probably).

As far as the process types are concerned, the majority of clauses (18 out of 26) are material processes, mainly concrete actions (mix, throw and turn, remove, make, attack, charge, etc.). The remainder are relational processes; mostly attributive with be, apply to or contain, together with two identifying (in sentences 4 and 10), both with be.

There is fairly dense lexico-referential cohesion (lexical repetition with co-reference, e.g. clay 12 -> 13, glaze 11 -> 13, sections 6 -> 7); hyponymy and meronymy, mainly
within the sentence, and anaphoric it, the, these throughout). There is some non-coreferential repetition, e.g. clay 2 -> 7 -> 12, iron 3 -> 13; but these are mass nouns and so this kind of repetition causes no problem of interpretation. There is in fact hardly any ambiguity (almost the only indeterminate point is the shift from present to past time reference in 4 - 6, referred to above), and very little grammatical metaphor. The rhetorical mode is that of description. As far as the technicality of the text is concerned, there are not many field-specific terms and those that are found in the text are followed by an explanation, e.g. the term 'structural point' (7) is followed by the description of its location (cf. peptized in 12). The text is simple to follow, accessible to the reader both part by part and as a whole.

Sample 2 (Studies in conservation, Vol.31, No.4,p.185)

1. Japanese Shingon Buddhist wooden sculptures were constructed using either a single wood-block technique (ichiboku-zukuri) or a multiple wood block technique (yoseki-zukuri).

2. In the single-block technique, characteristic of early Heian sculpture (764-867), the entire object was carved from a single block of wood so that the head and body were one unit.

3. This technique was also used in conjunction with the yoseki-shiki-ichiboku-zukuri method in which the arms and occasionally a leg, or a part of it, were added to the main block as separate pieces.

4. The carving of this type of sculpture was usually done by one artist and in situ.

5. According to the multiple-block technique, the main part of the figure is constructed from more than two pieces of
6. No written record exists of this ancient method of construction.

7. However, according to Okada and Tsujimoto, observations made during the restoration of such works suggest the following practice.

8. Drawings of the image are prepared and presented to the patron, or the patron himself may supply them.

6. A schematic drawing is prepared.

10. The center log is cut into a rectangular shape.

11. The head and body are roughly carved from a center block, and other blocks are joined to it by means of clamps and/or a peg system.

12. Depending on which of several approaches is used, the figure is split from head to foot and opened.

13. The open halves or sections are hollowed out to a thickness of two or three centimeters.

14. The pieces are rejoined permanently and final carving is completed.

15. Final modelling and finishing are followed by a coat of lacquer, and coloring and gilding are added.

The above text is about two types of wood-block techniques used in the production of Shingon Buddhist wooden sculptures. This is one version of the Tantric art referred to briefly at the end of the last chapter. It is highly symbolic: every feature—its size, attitude, gestures, jewels, garments, the Sanskrit letters decorating it, its location and orientation within the temple—is a messages
directed at the beholder. The above text (see the appendix) does not offer this type of information. What it gives us is a stylistic analysis of the sculpture, the technique associated with its production, and its technical analysis. Our sample deals with the technique.

This text falls into two parts: a general description (1-7), followed by a detailed step-by-step account (8-15). If we consider the latter first, it is similar in many respects to the preceding text, but represents a more explicit and more consistent variant of the register. The steps are 'itemized'; they are all finite clauses either singly or in paratactic complexes; almost all are passive, with structure Goal/Medium + material Process (+ circumstance of Manner or Location); the tense is simple present throughout; and the order of the clauses is iconic (that is, matches the sequence in which the steps are to be taken). This part of the text could be read off and used as a set of instructions by a would-be carver of Shingon sculptures.

At the same time, it contains one or two problematic points: the unnecessary grammatical metaphor in 15, the indeterminacy in 12 (the first part depending on which is used suggests that what follows will include alternatives, but it does not - there is no possible interpretation that satisfies both parts) and the inconsistent grammar of 1 (why are the two clauses not kept parallel, e.g. ... or (may be) supplied by the patron himself?). These features reduce the overall effectiveness of 8-15 as a descriptive-procedural text.

The general summary (1-7) also has a certain amount of grammatical metaphor, e.g. (7) observations...suggest the following practice, (4) the carving of this type...was...done by one artist; again it appears unmotivated, since it does not embody any kind of technical
explanation or generalization. Apart from these two nominal groups there are no embedded postmodifiers of any length; but the premodifying structures become fairly complex, e.g. (1) Japanese Shingon Buddhism wooden sculptures; a multiple wood-block technique; (3) the yoseki-shiki-iciboku-zukuri method. Other possible sources of difficulty for the reader are the coordination of one artist and in situ in (4), and the ambiguity of this in (6): does it refer back to (5) (the multiple block technique only) or to (1) (both techniques)? Thus while there is no difficult technical terminology in this text, and indeed the overall impression is that the passage is reasonably accessible to the reader, the grammar does display one or two instances of the difficulties that are characteristic of technical discourse outside the field of technology of art.

Sample 3 (The Oxford Companion to Art, p.384)

Etching

1. A method of engraving in which the design is bitten into the plate with acid.

2. A plate of polished copper, as used in the various other intaglio processes, is first coated with a substance that will resist the action of acid.

3. This acid resist or 'etching ground' is usually compounded of beeswax, bitumen, and resin and is applied by melting a solid lump on to the heated plate, rolling the mixture flat with a leather roller, and blackening it with the soot of burning tapers.

4. The etcher then draws his design upon the grounded place with a steel etching needle which he holds lightly in his hand like a pen, allowing the point to cut through the dark ground and expose the bright metal beneath.
5. After covering the back and edges of the plate with an acid-resisting varnish called 'stopping-out varnish', he immerses it in a bath of dilute acid, commonly nitric, which bites into the metal whenever the ground has been pierced by the needle.

6. If any parts of the design are to remain lighter than the rest they may be 'stopped out', i.e. painted over with varnish, after which the plate is again immersed in the acid and the remainder of the design bitten to a greater depth.

7. This process of graduated biting by means of 'stopping out' may be repeated any number of times if the etcher wishes to introduce several tones into his design.

8. Finally, when all is bitten as required, the ground is cleaned off and the plate is inked and printed according to the intaglio method described in the article on Prints.

6. Etching is frequently combined with other processes, particularly Drypoint, both because by this means additional work may be done on the plate after proofing and without re-laying the ground and because the drypoint lines provide a convenient method of adding strong black access to the design.

This is a classic example of an art technology text. It is clearly written at a 'more technical' level that the previous two. Most obviously, it contains a number of field-specific technical terms and expressions; some are technical uses of everyday words such as bite, resist, ground, while other exist only in this sense, e.g. intaglio, stopping-out varnish and also etching itself. But it also displays characteristic grammatical features, such as the discourse use of nominalization described by Halliday (1988) in his account of scientific English, e.g.
(5) [the acid] bites into the metal

(6) parts...may be 'stopped out'...
   and the remainder...bitten to a
greater depth

(7) this process of graduated biting
   by means of 'stopping out' may
   be repeated...

- where the grammatical metaphor in (7) is motivated not by
  the technicality but by the fact that at this point in the
  discourse it is necessary to 'package' the whole of 5 and 6
  so that it can function as Theme of the clause that is to
  follow. But since the technical terms are explained or made
  clear from the context, and the grammatical metaphor is
  demanded by the structure of the discourse, they do not
  present problems of understanding.

In other respects this text is not unlike the others
discussed above. The lexical density is somewhat higher,
because the clauses generally contain more lexical
information; but it is not excessively high (about 4.5, 142
lexical words, 31 clauses) and if the text seems to be more
dense than Sample 1 this is because the lexical items are of
lower frequency in the language rather than because they
are very tightly packed into clauses. The clauses in fact
are not excessively long, and there is not a great deal of
clausal embedding in the nominal groups - provided it is
recognized that the clauses beginning with which in 4, 5 and
6 are hypotactic extensions, not embedded relative clauses.
(That is to say, the steel etching needle in 4 is not
defined by being held lightly in the hand; the sense is
'...with a steel etching needle; this he holds lightly...', -
likewise in 5 and 6).
The clause complexes average rather more clauses (31 clauses, 6 sentences); this is not because any are excessively long, but because (apart from the first, which is a single 'absolute' nominal group) none is very short either. It may be of interest to state the structures of each of the remainder:

\[
\begin{align*}
2 & \quad \alpha \quad \langle< x \beta \quad \rangle \\
3 & \quad 1 \quad +2\alpha \quad 2\beta 1 \quad 2\beta +2 \quad 2\beta +3 \\
4 & \quad \alpha \beta +\alpha \quad \beta + \beta 1 \quad \beta \beta +2 \\
5 & \quad x\beta \quad \alpha \alpha \quad \alpha +\beta \alpha \quad \alpha \beta X\beta \\
6 & \quad \alpha x\beta \quad \alpha \alpha 1 \quad \alpha \alpha =2 \quad +\beta 1 \beta +2 \\
7 & \quad \alpha \quad x\beta \\
8 & \quad \alpha 1 \quad \langle< x \beta \quad \rangle \quad \alpha +2 \\
9 & \quad \alpha \quad x\beta 1\alpha \quad \beta 1\beta 1 \quad .\beta 1\beta +2 \quad \beta +2
\end{align*}
\]

This shows the variety of tactic and logical-semantic relationships, the latter including temporals, causals and conditionals.

The reader has to work at this text, because its lexicogrammar contains a lot of information. But it is not inaccessible. The thematic organization is shifting, as it tends to be in technical texts; but the Themes themselves are not inappropriate to the task. And the passage displays a recognizable discourse structure: a heading, a sequence of descriptions correspondings fairly closely to the sequence of processes, and a conclusion relating the topic to it context in terms of other processes.

Up to now we have taken it for granted that 'technicality' is a recognizable feature of language. We should however
raise the question of what it is that constitutes technical discourse.

6.2. Making language technical

In chapter 4 we made extensive use of a study of the discourse of history by Eggins, Wignell and Martin. The same three authors (but in a different order: Wignell, Martin and Eggins, henceforth 'Wignell et al.') undertook an analysis of the language of geography, based also on high school texts. While this is less relevant as a whole to our present concern, it contains one section that is of central importance: namely a discussion of technical terms and taxonomies as constructed in the language of technology and science.

The paper is called The Discourse of Geography: Ordering and explaining the experiential world by Wignell, Martin and Eggins (1687) the relevant portion is on pp. 25 ff. The following section is based on their account.

In Wignell et al.'s definition 'A taxonomy is an ordered, systematic classification of some phenomena based on the fundamental principles of superordination, where something is a type of or a kind of something else) or composition (where something is a part of something else)... Taxonomizing itself is not restricted to the natural sciences or even to science. It is characteristic of all fields, including everyday or non-technical ones, that they order the parts of the world that concern them into taxonomies (27-28). They recognize three types of taxonomies: a lay person's taxonomies, folk, or vernacular, taxonomies, and scientific taxonomies; these they consider to be ranged along a cline of "needing to know". The lay person knows the names of a few classes of some phenomenon (their example is birds); the person with an amateur's interest in that phenomenon needs
to know more about them, and hence to classify them in a
different way; while the professional in the field needs to
know even more. The professional, or "technical",
classification will be based on principles different from
both the first two.

Nevertheless, as Wignell et al. point out, phenomena
classified in a formal, technical way often already have
vernacular names and vernacular classifications. 'Much
scientific taxonomizing, then, is a process of RENAMING in
order to RECLASSIFY the vernacular' (ibid:33). Not all, of
course, is renaming an existing class; in some cases a new
class will be formed, which has not previously been
recognized, and this will need an entirely new name. But in
either case, setting up a taxonomy involves classifying
things and naming the classes. Both of these are things that
happen in everyday language, so every language possesses the
necessary resources; but where new names are required there
are three principal means for creating them: (1) using an
existing word and changing its sense; (2) borrowing a word
from another language, and (3) creating a new term in the
language itself.

For ordering and classifying the phenomena of the
experiential world in some field specific way, therefore, it
is necessary not only to observe the relevant phenomena, but
also to rename them. 'Observation may be an empirical and
non-linguistic activity, but the record of observation is a
linguistic one: it involves giving things names...When names
are given field-specific meanings in this way they become
what we call TECHNICAL TERMS. TECHNICALITY refers to the use
of terms or expressions...with a FIELD-SPECIFIC meaning' (ibid:35).

A term which functions in this way thus has two properties:
it not only names something, but it does so in a special
way, in that it takes on privileged status as a technical term. As said above, it may already have existed in a non-technical sense (e.g. art, ground, tone); such words may continue to occur in both contexts, and may therefore be misunderstood. Other terms are largely restricted to technical usage but may occur in more than one field, like dissolution, pigment, contour. Some are specific to one particular field; for example chiaroscuro, architrave, oil painting.

Wignell et al. point out that ‘most technical terms are nominal group constituents, usually Things or Classifier plus Thing compounds...This is obviously not accidental, for in order to classify and organize with language we need first of all to turn phenomena into Things or nouns. The grammar has extensive resources within the clause and nominal group structure for organizing Things, but very limited resources for organizing Processes’ (ibid, 37). The texts examined above show the predominance of nominals as technical terms, including complex Classifier + Thing structures such as multiple wood block technique, intaglio processes, acid resist. There are also semi-technical art technical verbs, such as firing, peptized, bite. Various orthographic devices are used for signalling a technical term when it occurs in the text the first time, such as underlining, italics, bold, marking off by commas, parentheses. But a technical term on its first occurrence is usually accompanied by some kind of definition or explanation. Note examples of this above:

.peptized, that is, with the heavier particles eliminated...
.in the single-block technique, the entire object was carved from a single block of wood...
.This acid resist or ‘etching-ground’
.they may be ‘stopped out’, i.e. painted over
with varnish,

and also the use of the structure of a 'companion' entry:

**Etching.** A method of engraving in which the design is bitten into the plate with acid.

As in the text examined by Wignell at al., we find in art technology that the three grammatical resources of projection, elaboration and enhancement (Halliday, 1685: Chapter 7) provide the principal means of assigning a field-specific meaning to new technical terms that are introduced. Thus *i.e.*, that *is*, and or all mark paratactic elaboration in the nominal group (note that or here is elaborating not extending; it is the names that are alternatives). In the single-block technique is a circumstance of Matter ('in the case of') standing in a relation of enhancement to the remainder of the clause (Halliday, 1685: Table 9 (3), p.307). Projection is used in examples such as:

...a brush, known as a 'fresco striper', made of pigs' bristles...

...we have come to speak of any wall painting as a fresco

...the whole intonaco, as the Italians called the built-up thickness of plaster...

taken from the text discussed in 6.3 below.

The other linguistic device for introducing technical terms is that of definition through an identifying clause, as in

...Technically fresco is the name of a medium...

...The hydria was the jar in which the water was carried from the fountain...
I use the word plaster to mean a coating of lime and sand...

The two entities that are linked in the 'identifying relationship are those of Token and Value, with the technical term as Token and its definition functioning as Value. The order of identification can proceed either way — either the Token 'is, stands for, represents, means' the Value, or the Value 'is, is represented by, is called' the Token. The three examples above are all Token ^ Value structures. Value ^ Token structures also occur in definitions, although they seem to be not common in art technology texts. But the following example is Value ^ Token:

A characteristic of etching... is a spontaneity of line which comes from drawing in the same direct way as with pen or pencil on paper.

This is not strictly a definition, but it is part of the entry in the Oxford Companion to Art which functions as a whole to establish the characteristics of etching as an art form. Compare another Value ^ Token example:

The basis of tempera painting is egg, either the yolk or the white or both together,...

Rather oddly, this is the first mention of tempera painting in the text.

By being name and defined in this way a term comes to be recognized as 'technical' in a particular register. But as Wignell et al. emphasize, technical terms do not function as single items; they function in some kind of taxonomic hierarchy. What the above example is actually doing is creating a taxonomy with the following structure: (Gardner Hale, p.3)
There are various lexicogrammatical resources in English for establishing taxonomic relationships of this kind (superordination and composition). The definition of *fresco* cited earlier (*fresco is the name of a medium*, was in fact a taxonomizing definition: *fresco* was defined as a name of something, but in the context this meant 'is (the name of) one kind of medium'; and it continued like *oils* or *water colour*, thus establishing that oils and water colour are also the names of media. In the process, *medium* is also established as a technical term, and *medium* is then defined in its turn:

A medium is a binding material which makes the colour adhere to the ground of canvas, paper...

Whereas *a is a (kind of) x* expressed superordination (hyponymy), composition (meronymy) is expresses by *b is a part of v*, or by a possessive or circumstantial clause *v has a b*, *v includes b*, etc. Other resources include lexical items like *category*, *component*, *element*; and certain specific nominal group structures, typically (a) Classifier ^ Thing structures (realizing superordination); (b) possessive Deictic ^ Thing structures (realizing composition).

An Example of (a) is provided in the taxonomy given above: the Classifier ^ Thing structure in *size painting*, *glue painting*, *wax painting* shows that these are all kinds of painting.
Wignell at all,'s discussion of technical terms and technical taxonomies has a direct bearing on our understanding of the language of technology. Technical terminology in itself is not a major source of difficulties; but it often happens that the taxonomic relationships among a set of technical terms are not made clear. This is precisely the problem that Wignell et al. found in their analysis of texts used in science education in high schools.

6.3. An untypical art technology text

In general we have concentrated our investigations on texts that are typical of their register. This selection did not include books which are written more for practitioners than for art students. However we do propose to look here at one of the very few works which has been written for both — one that is addressed both to the artist and to the student of art interested in art techniques. This is The Technique of Fresco Painting written by Gardner Hale; who was an artist, not an art historian or a theoretician in another art-related area. It is a very short book (66 pp.) consisting of twelve chapters, the shortest of which ("Brushes and Tools") is just one page in length.

The format of the book is presented in the table of contents, which has four parts: definition, technique, history and future. Apart from one page from the beginning of Part I, 'definition', our samples come from Part II dealing with 'technique'. The extract includes short samples of each of the chapters in this Part to illustrate the different degrees of technicality one finds there.

Generally speaking, the language is that that we found with art technology, and the text is not difficult to follow. The clause complexes move along rapidly and often have up to five or six short clauses in them. The structure of the nominal groups is fairly simple and there is not much
lengthy embedding. The technical terms are introduced in one of the ways described earlier, with definition and classifications; e.g. "fresco is the name of a medium"; "I use the the word plaster to mean a coating of lime and sand or cement and sand as the term is commonly employed in America and England..."; "There are two general types of lime, the 'fat' or 'quick' lime and the hydraulic"; "the ordinary brush of the 'Rubens' type"; and so on. (Note however that although each of the definitions and classifications given in "Chapter 1" of the book (p.3) is clear in itself, the total effect is confusing since every one takes a different form: the reader has to construct a taxonomy out of nine separate kinds of definition statement.) The processes used are, in the majority, either material or relational (attributive). The function of grammatical metaphors found in the text is typically that of general explanation (e.g. In oils the colors are ground in linseed oil and the drying of this substance attaches the colour.)

Most of the clauses are declarative in mood; but since the text includes a great deal of instruction many contain modulations (must, should, etc; it is advisable that, it is necessary to) and attitudinal Epithets (many fine paintings, excellent foundation, or ideal moment). There are also warnings in the form of conditional clauses (if you have not already completely painted it in your head, you will fail) and more imperatives (if there is saltpetre, refuse to work on the wall; try grinding some facing your cartoon). In general, the semantic orientation is strongly towards the reader; the interpersonal element is foregrounded, and the frequent use of you as Subject (personalized rather than generalized you) seems to counterbalance the technicality of the content (e.g. you will have a boy in your studio to do the grinding and pricking).
What is interesting about this book is the grading in technicality. The section which functions as a definition of the term 'fresco' is technically quite simple. We are given the basic and very elementary information about what the term means, and we are introduced to a range of technical terms such as a medium which is then explained to mean a binding material which makes the color adhere to the surface to be painted on. The medium in fresco paintings, as we are told later, is the fresh plaster, plaster being defined as a coating of lime and sand or cement and sand. This set of field-specific terms is all that is technical about this particular section.

Chapters II - X deal with the method itself. This part is no longer just naming, but a description and explanation of the technical process which starts with preparing the wall for the fresco and ends removing the fresco from the wall. That the text is in fact a manual to be used by the practitioner interested in this particular method becomes clear from its interpersonal orientation. Thus in Chapter II, which deals with the preparation of the wall, after giving general information about the ground suitable for fresco painting, e.g. brick, stone, concrete, hollow tile, and wire lath, which, as he points out, rather than explains, are the types of material 'on which a lime or cement plaster can be securely laid', the writer moves straight in to giving advice to the artist: 'Determine whether the wall is sound; look it over carefully, and if you see any dark, moist-looking stains or any salty efflorescence, scratch the spot to the depth of a quarter of an inch or more and take this dust to a chemist to be analysed for potassium nitrate (KN03)', warning him that: 'If there is saltpetre, refuse to work on the wall as it stands.' He even tells the artist what will happen if his advice is not taken into consideration: 'Your painting is doomed on such a ground no matter what the medium.' As pointed out above, in the
comment on mood, these imperatives clauses and conditional warnings foreground interpersonal meanings and create solidarity between writer and reader.

The rest of the text in this section has the character of the manual offering information about the treatment of the wall. There are only two field-specific terms, or what are apparently field-specific terms: to be "trued up" and "scratched coat". But these terms do not figure in technical dictionaries (g.g. Illustrated dictionary of art terms by Marly Lee Elsepass does not include them) and the text does not make their meaning clear. The first term is not explained at all, so the student practitioner or reader does not know what "trued up" means. The second term is obscured by a grammatical ambiguity in the word or, referred to earlier. The text has Over this a rough or so-called 'scratched' coat of plaster is laid.... We cannot tell from the grammar whether scratched is being defined in this way (or as elaborating: 'so-called'), or whether a rough coat and a scratched coat are alternative procedures (or as extending: 'either this or that'), in which case the term 'scratched' is not explained.

The next section deals with the plaster, as the medium for fresco painting; and it starts again with a piece of advice: 'This wall must now receive one or more coats of plaster before it is ready for the fresco painter.' The clause complex, with its rather confusing metaphorical use of before (either so that it is ready or before it is painted would have been more congruent), is marked as an instruction by the high-value modal operator must.

The technical term, or what we assumed was a technical term, scratched in the scratched coat, is now clarified in more detail. From the reader's point of view this is the wrong place to be given the information; we expect the explanation
follow its first mention in the text rather than being presented in a subsequent chapter. Moreover, the explanation is again a little ambiguous. We are told that Good American specifications call for two preparatory coats, the "scratched" and the "brown" coat; this suggests that our initial interpretation, that 'rough' and 'scratched' meant two different types of coats, was incorrect and that 'scratched' is another term for 'rough'. But when we come to the composition of the two coats — the brown and the scratched — we are told that 'these coats should be made of lime and sand, or lime, cement and sand, in the general proportion of one part of lime, or lime and cement, to two parts of sand'. The only way to decode the meaning of the text correctly, and understand that the writer is talking about two different types of composition, each characteristic of one of the two different types of coat, is to deduce it from their place in the text (the "scratched" coat being mentioned first and the "brown" coat being mentioned second) and from the punctuation of the clause beginning 'these coats should be made...', where first lime and sand are grouped together and then lime, cement and sand are grouped together. We will then conclude that the scratched coat is a composition of lime and sand in the general proportion of one part of lime to two parts of sand and the brown coat is a composition of lime, cement and sand in the general proportion of one part of lime and cement and two parts of sand. After having finally decoded the meaning in the way suggested, we are then told that the writer likes his 'brown' coat slightly scratched. Does this mean that he adds a bit of cement in it, and if so, how much? A more professional technical text would offer this kind of explanation.

There are very few field-specific terms in this section. With chapter IV, we enter a field which is more technical in character; and the language used reflects this change. The
first two pages deal with colour technology and are similar in some respects to a text dealing with chemistry. At the same time, however, the emphasis on the interpersonal function is not diminished, and in one way it is increased. We saw earlier that, when giving advice concerning the preparation of the wall, the writer addresses the students either directly, e.g. refuse to work on the wall; if you see any dark spot; your painting is doomed, or indirectly, e.g. but the artist usually has little choice; what he must determine; from now on the artist must watch. In this section, however, for the first time the writer inserts himself explicitly into the text: I have been enormously interested; I have had chemists assist me; I believe the ancora legend, and so on. This section makes the text read less like a manual than like a story or a report on the writer's personal experience.

Chapter VI is different again: it gives advice on what types of brush should be used, but also serves as a promotion of those who make them. The few technical terms that are used are descriptive terms for particular types of brushes.

Chapter VII is more like a typical technical text, where the logico-semantic relationships have to do with temporal sequence, i.e. 'after you do this, you must do that'; and with causal-conditional relations, i.e. 'when you do this, such and such is going to happen'.

In a way, the text functions like a recipe book; but the style is quite different. Consider the first two paragraphs (see Appendix, p.28 of the text). If we re-wrote these in a way more characteristic of a recipe we might end up with something like this:
Trace a line a few inches beyond the edge of the piece which you plan to paint giving it a clean cut. Then lay the plaster first thing in the morning following that line you have traced. Start at the upper left hand corner of your wall; left, because if you use a mahstick it will rest on the unpainted brown coat; at the top, so that the water will not run over the finished work when you want the brown coat for your next piece and stain it.

Arrange your colours in the glasses at the back of a large table, the way they would be arranged on a palette. It is a good idea to tack a little thin edging about the sides of the table to keep them from falling off. Also get about two dozen small jelly glasses in which you will mix your colours. This is none too many as all your tones must be made in them. You should also put on the table a small pitcher with clean water to add to the colours, and place within reach a pailful of water to rinse the brushes.

The above represents the sequence of events as they would take place in reality. The reader is instructed to put things in a certain place instead of being informed that they are there already. A wording such as your ground colours are arranged..., you have begun at the upper left hand corner... is a kind of elaborate interpersonal metaphor for the direct imperative form of instructional text.

There are many other respects in which this little book differs from a typical technical text. Perhaps the most extreme example occurs in the third paragraph on page 26:

Now I must leave you to your own devices with a blessing and a prayer that you may finish the piece before dark.

The personal valediction I must leave you, the modalities must and may and the message of goodwill with a blessing and a prayer are hardly typical of a technical text. A technical rewrite of this clause would be something like:

Make sure that you finish the piece before dark.
The Chapter VIII returns to a more technical mode; the predominant function is ideational rather than interpersonal. The writer abandons his previous personal talk with the painter and limits his discussion to general statements; instead of saying: 'Don't ever retouch your fresco' he says: 'There really should be no retouching in fresco'. There is still an interpersonal flavour in the modal adjunct 'really' attached to the high-value obligation 'should'; but the 'you' and 'I' have disappeared. The following chapter, headed 'Removing and Re-locating Frescoes' is a combination of the two orientations.

This work is quite untypical of writing about art. If we were to characterize the text of this book in terms of the registers used, it would have some component of art history - because of a number of historical facts it gives - but fall mainly within art technology. What distinguishes it from all the varieties we have identified, however, is the way the writer has introduced into the discourse of technology a semantic style that is oriented towards interpersonal meanings; and that he has done so, not constantly throughout, but to an extent that varies in different portions of the text. The result is somewhat quaint; but it does lessen the distance between the reader on the one hand and the subject-matter, with the writer as the expert, on the other.
CHAPTER 7 AESTHETIC AND ART CRITICISM

7.1 General comments

With this chapter we come to the type of text which seems to cause the most problems to the reader.

There seem to be two sides to the problem. One is that of abstract language and grammatical ambiguity, the other that of the metaphorical nature of the language. In aesthetics (philosophy of art), it is not the lexical items that confuse the reader, but the complexity and often ambiguity of the grammatical presentation. On the other hand, in art critiques, it is not the grammatical presentation that is troublesome, but the choice of lexical items and their metaphorical rather than congruent meaning. One could almost say that if the lexical items in art critiques were replaced and more congruent ones were used instead, the structural side of the language would not create problems to the reader. On the other hand, the language used with art philosophy would have to be simplified in its grammatical structure, particularly the nominalizations with their large amount of embedding.

Halliday (1985 b; 1985 b, Chap.10) introduced the concept of grammatical metaphor, distinguishing between ideational metaphors and interpersonal metaphors in the grammar. The nominalization of processes (events, actions, mental processes, relations) and attributes (qualities, states) is explained in terms of ideational metaphor: a process that would congruently be realized as a verb is realized instead as a noun, or embedded inside a nominalization. This was illustrated in the analysis of the 'aesthetic'text in Chapter 4. In interpersonal metaphors are typically those of mood and modality, common in speech, but less typical of
writing; they occurred however in the art technology text discussed at the end of the previous chapter.

In attempting to understand the language of aesthetics and art criticism, I have found it useful to introduce a third type of grammatical metaphor, in which there is metaphoric transfer across the metafunctions: something that would congruently be represented as an interpersonal meaning is presented instead as ideational (or the other way around). It is difficult to know how to refer to this, but I have called it by the (admittedly rather awkward) term of 'metafunctional metaphor'. This is relevant in relation to the present chapter.

We have suggested that the aim of the philosophy of art is to present the abstract concepts that lie behind art, concepts that are of general application and are not invoked to express of the views of an individual writer (in the sense of his artistic judgments and preferences).

On the other hand, the aim of art criticism is to discuss a particular work, or works, of art, as evaluated by an expert, an art critic who is expressing his views as an individual.

One major difference between the two approaches, therefore, is their emphasis on one of the two metafunctions, the ideational or the interpersonal function. In the simplest terms, one way of conceiving the difference between these two functions is in the role of the speaker/writer. While the ideational function of language is 'being about something', the interpersonal function includes presenting the social status and the personal view of the writer. (We refer here simply to the writer, since we have confined our study to the treatment of written texts.)
Given this difference, if we approach these two registers of art, we should expect that art philosophy would show an orientation towards the ideational function of language, while art criticism, by its nature, offers a choice in which the writer can explicitly become a participant in the discussion. However, the reality turns out to be different. The texts associated with art philosophy read as if they included general and totally impersonal statements, whereas the linguistic analysis suggests that many of the statements, especially those describing certain concepts, both abstract and concrete, are not general, but personal views of the writer. In the art critiques, on the other hand, though the freedom to express one’s personal view is assumed, as a feature of the cultural context of such texts, the statements, especially those of evaluation, are made to appear as if they were statements of general validity.

Below we give examples of writing in aesthetics and art criticism. As in the last two chapters, we are not here presenting a detailed linguistic analysis, but rather highlighting those features which are of significance to the reader, especially the student reader, who is using these texts as a source of information and insight. Our comments, however, derive from an interpretation of the grammar in linguistic terms.

**Texts of art philosophy - 7.1.2**

There are four samples in this section. The first two are longer sections from the text of which we analysed the first sentence in Chapter 4, David W. Prall’s ‘Aesthetic surface’. The other two texts were written by two other aestheticians: one by Clive Bell and one by R. Meager.

The texts were selected for the following reasons. Prall’s text is a typical and classic example of philosophical
writing where something (presumably objective) is being argued about but it is not very clear what this 'something' is. Bell's text is different from this and from the majority of philosophical texts in the writer's admission that it is him who is making the statements and that the way in which some of the questions are answered is his own personal approach. The last text has been selected to entertain the reader. While its theme is the crypticity of the language of aesthetics, the text itself is so cryptic that one wonders whether the aim of the writer was to illustrate the difficulty he is talking about by reference to his own text.

Sample 1 - David W. Prall - Aesthetic surface, second para, p. 60

1. As we pass from the perceptually discriminating quality, taken as sensed, to the intuited beauty immediately felt, we pass from terms like bright and clear and red, to warmly red, pleasantly bright, charmingly clear, or to attractive or lovely and fascinating.

2. As the aesthetic nature of the judgment is more and more unambiguously expressive of beauty as against ugliness, the terms used to describe it more and more definitely asset the relation to the perceiving subject which is attracted or interested or fascinated by it, or who finds it lovely as he loves it.

3. Not that all qualities are not found in a relation to a subject who finds them, but that strictly aesthetic qualities involve not merely this finding, but such quality as is found, such quality as is perhaps only constituted at all, when the feelings of the subject are involved in its relation to the object.

4. But the range of possibilities for delightful or ugly color, for example, bears some relation to the range of possible variations intrinsic to color as perceived; and
If we are to know what we mean when we assert that colors are beautiful or ugly, we should know first a little about colour itself.

The first thing that suggests itself as a topic of discussion is the accessibility of this text to the reader. In our detailed analysis of the first clause in this article we presented certain conclusions about its structure, lexical density, cohesion, theme, transitivity, mood and tense. In these characteristics the longer sample does not differ significantly from the initiating clause. The structure of the clause complexes is not very complex, while the structure of nominal groups is much more so, involving considerable embedding, and a certain amount of grammatical metaphor. Sentences 1, 2 and 3 have just two clauses each: \( \times \beta \alpha \times \beta \alpha \); 1 +2. Only sentence 4 becomes more 'clausal', after the semi-colon; its structure is

\[
1 +2 \times \beta \alpha \ 2 \beta \beta \times \beta \alpha \ 2 \beta \beta \beta \ ' \beta \ 2 \alpha
\]

(the complexity comes from if we are to know what we mean when we assert that...). However, the logical-semantic relationship between the clauses in the clause complex is not very clear:

(1) as we pass from..., we pass from...

(2) as the...judgment is..., the terms used to describe it are...

(3) not that all qualities are not found..., but that strictly aesthetic qualities involve...
What is as in sentences 1 and 2: temporal, causal or comparative? (Note the multiple negation in sentence 3; we return to this feature below.)

The nominal groups are fairly long (e.g. that in sentence 3, not merely...the object, has 33 words in it; and here again there is some ambiguity in the relationships within the clause complexes (in this case embedded ones). e.g. the perceiving subject which is attracted...by it, or who finds it lovely as he loves it). There is also ambiguity in the premodifying elements, caused by the grammatical metaphor: the perceptually discriminating quality, taken as sensed.

As far as the theme of the text is concerned, it does not seem clear what it is. The text is one paragraph and it could be assumed that, to a certain extent, it can stand by itself and that the thematic structure of the clauses would suggest its theme; but this does not seem to be the case. What prompted our attention to this paragraph was actually one of the sentences in the previous paragraph (paragraph 2 in the complete text). After reading the first paragraph (see Appendix), which seems to him rather ambiguous, the reader expects that the following paragraph may, and probably will, explain the opening one. The title the chapter is Aesthetic surface, and it seems from the first paragraph that the main theme is going to be that of "aesthetic judgement"; if this interpretation is right, the writer is suggesting that only those qualities that capture our attention are part of "the situation in which beauty is felt" (what that means will also perhaps be made clear).

However, in the second half of the first paragraph the emphasis shifts from the general question to a much more particular one: a particular aspect of painting, namely colour. This continues to be the subject of a discussion in
paragraph two; and here is the critical sentence of that paragraph:

Not that the number of possible variations in colour, for example, is the number of the possible beauties of colour, for the beauty of color is not simply its specific hue or shade or tint or intensity or saturation, but that specific colors as upon an object, and not merely as distinguished there by vision, or noted in passing or for further reference as the color it appears to be, but also as appreciated, as felt to be delightful or the reverse to the perceiving subject.

The sentence seems to be suggesting that the beauty of a color is not just its specific characteristics as defined in terms of hues, tints, and so on, but its quality in terms of the judgement of the perceiving subject, i.e. the viewer. But the internal structure of this clause complex, and specifically of the second half following but that, makes it difficult to know with any certainty that this is what is its meaning. The reader therefore turns to the third paragraph for clarification. The following is an informal account of my own experience in working through this paragraph.

The reader now becomes part of the discussion in which he is led by the expert and told what will be a result or consequence of the process. Whether the process being discussed is the process of aesthetic judgement or the process of shifting from perception to "feeling" is not very clear. In the first two clauses the reader, guided by the writer as expert, passes from the perceptually discriminating quality, which is something connected with our senses, to the intuited beauty, which is something not sensed, but felt; and this is, we learn, what makes one
distinguish between something that is just red or just clear
and something that is warmly red, pleasantly bright,
charmingly clear, and so on. It appears at this point that
it is this shift in the grammar of the nominal group, with a
possibility of extended submodification, that expresses the
difference between the two types of processes, although it
is not clear from the text whether the collocations such as
warmly red, pleasantly bright and charmingly clear are being
offered as taxonomic concepts (hyponyms - 'kinds of red,
bright', etc.) or as interpersonal glosses ('red - and I
like it').

The second sentence is also not structurally difficult, but
(as already pointed out) it is highly ambiguous. We take it
that the theme of the clause complex is everything from As
the aesthetic nature.....against ugliness. Apart from the
problem with as, it is also not clear whether the it, in the
terms used to describe it refers to the aesthetic nature of
the judgement or to beauty and ugliness. The rest of the
clause does not help, because both the judgment, in general
terms, and my personal view of what is ugly or beautiful
relate to me, the perceiving subject. It is only the second
it (fascinated by it) that clarifies this point, and the
reader can now assume that it refers to beauty and ugliness.
It is also not clear why when the writer refers to the
perceiving subject in the embedded clause complex he uses
which in the first case and who in the second. The last
clause who finds it lovely as he loves it is very ambiguous
and I am not certain what it intends. Though there is a
connection between lovely and to love, it has no obvious
significance here.

The third sentence - when the metaphor is unpacked -
suggests what it is that the previous paragraph has outlined:
i.e. that the aesthetic quality of an object is not in what
we perceive, but in how we feel about it. What it appears to
say is that both types of qualities can be found by the subject (if that is what in relation to a subject means), but only one type is what we call 'aesthetic' qualities. The negative approach to this observation, it, i.e. not that all qualities are not found is somewhat confusing, and one wonders what particular meaning the negative is meant to convey. The contrast between qualities...in a relation to a subject and feelings of the subject in its relation to the object is also problematic.

The last sentence of the paragraph goes back to what was said earlier and suggests that though the beauty of a colour is not in its tints, hues, and so on, the range of possible variations intrinsic to color as perceived must be taken into consideration, and in order to be able to do this we must know something about colour. The theme in the paragraph thus seems to follow a 'circular' pattern; but the thematic structure of the individual clauses and clause complexes gives very little clue to this progression.

Through these devices, and especially the ambiguities in the modifies and the logical-semantic relations, the reader is persuaded that these concepts, which are actually of a personal nature, are in fact universal. The language presents the view of the writer as if it was an objective, 'given' thing.

Sample 2 - the same text, p.51, second paragraph

1. It is not that they [the sense qualities] are unworthy because they are so close to our bodies.

2. The palate is no more internal than the ear, and the taste of strawberries is no more a function of the human body than their color or their shape.

3. It would be a very determined esoteric theorist indeed
who should deny that the fragrance of roses or gardens or orchards or perfumes was not merely no part of their visual beauty but no part of their beauty at all, even as its richness.

4. And it is not their intimated connection with our vital bodily processes and motions that makes tastes less characteristically aesthetic than sounds or colors or shapes.

5. Part of the appreciation of form itself, as in jars or vases, is without questions incipient motions or motor tendencies in our own bodies, and the beauty of the morning is in part the freshness of our vital functioning as well as of our perceptive faculties.

6. We cannot rule out the specific character of tastes and of bodily feelings and of smells from the material of genuine aesthetic experience on any clear ground.

We shall not devote much space to discussing this passage, which is from the same text as the preceding (first part of the fifth paragraph). The main reason for including it is to show that the same strategy is continued, of involving the reader in the argument of the text in such a way that he cannot question it or disagree with it; note for example

it would be a very determined esoteric theorist indeed who should deny that...

part of the appreciation... is without question...
tendencies in our own bodies

The continued use of negation is an important lexicogrammatical resource in this respect. There are ten negatives in the first four sentences (it is not that; unworthy; no more internal; no more a function; deny; not merely; no part of their visual beauty; no part of their
beauty at all; it is not, *merely...aesthetic*. Four of these are in sentence 3, which is almost impossible to decode, especially since the introductory clause carries yet a further semantic prosody of negation (equivalent to 'nobody would deny that...'): we have to construe 'there is not such a person as would *not* say that the fragrance of roses is *not* merely *not* part of their visual beauty but *not* part of their beauty at all'. Compare section 6, *we cannot rule out...on any clear ground*. This is not just unnecessary syntactic complexity; it is a way of hammering the reader so that he submits to being convinced, rather than offering an argument that can be pondered and then accepted or rejected.

Sample 3 – Significant form, by Clive Bell

1. The starting-point for all systems of aesthetics must be the personal experience of a peculiar emotion.

2. The objects that provoke this emotion we call works of art.

3. All sensitive people agree that there is a peculiar emotion provoked by works of art.

4. I do not mean, of course, that all works provoke the same emotion.

5. On the contrary, every work produces a different emotion.

6. But all these emotions are recognizably the same in kind – so far, at any rate, the best opinion is on my side.

7. That there is a particular kind of emotion provoked by works of visual art, and that this emotion is provoked by every kind of visual art, by pictures, sculptures, buildings, pots, carvings, textiles, etc. is not disputed, I think, by any one capable of feeling it.

8. This emotion is called the AESTHETIC emotion; and if we
can discover some quality common and peculiar to all the objects that provoke it, we shall have solved what I take to be the central problem of aesthetics.

9. We shall have discovered the essential quality in a work of art, the quality that distinguishes works of art from all other classes of objects.

With this example we have selected a text from the other end of the scale of aesthetic writing.

As far as its accessibility to the reader is concerned, this is a very simple text to follow. In addition it is made clear in the text that what is being expressed is a point of view: a personalised view of the writer (‘I think...’) that he claims is generally held (‘the best opinion is on my side’). There is very little ambiguity and only rather simple, ‘highly coded’ examples of grammatical metaphor (such as the personal experience of a peculiar emotion).

Without wanting to be critical, however, we may note that even here there is a certain amount of difficulty for the reader – or perhaps duplicity of the part of the writer. The ‘I think’ is dressed up in interpersonal metaphor (all sensitive people agree that...), and in a curious form of circularity: that there is a particular kind of emotion...is not disputed...by any one capable of feeling it. If you are capable of feeling something, how can you dispute that it exists? This is a clear example of the reader being ‘put down’: the implication is, the only person who might dispute that there is a particular kind of emotion provoked by works of visual art is someone who is not capable of feeling it (which is tautological), and that such a person’s opinion is not to be taken seriously. This puts the reader totally on the defensive: he now has to demonstrate that (unlike the
rest of the class) he, at least, is privy to the aesthetic emotion.

This is not a fanciful interpretation, because the initial hurdle has been erected in the very first sentence. This is a relational identifying clause with the structure Value ^ Token; it says how we are to identify the starting-point of all systems of aesthetics, and that the Token – the outward sign – of this is the personal experience of a peculiar emotion. The reader already begins to tremble in his shoes: suppose I have never had this personal experience? We then proceed (via all sensitive people) to all these emotions are recognizably the same in kind, a relational attributive clause in which the Attribute the same in kind is bonded to the Carrier by the word recognizably, meaning ‘anyone can recognize them as being the same’; and this whole argument is then parcelled up by the so far, at any rate into something that must be accepted before the real business of aesthetics can even start. So by the time he reaches sentence 7 the reader has already been told that he must have had a particular kind of personal experience, that it must have been provoked by works of art, and that he must be able to recognize ‘it’ as a series of unique experiences, all different from each other but still sufficiently alike to be different from all other experiences. This is quite a lot to demand.

(All the above samples come from J. Hosper, Introductory Reading in Aesthetics, the Free Press, London 1969.)

Samples 4 - from Aesthetics in the Modern world, Thames & Hudson, 1969

The Sublime and the Obscene by R. Meager

1. To the devotee of ordinary-language metaphysics, if his
ordinary language is English, the aesthetic categories present extraordinary difficulties.

2. Such is the established power of the Anglo-Saxon religion of inarticulacy, such are the complex and opaque veils with which the aesthetic language-dance wreathes them about, that rarely, rarely do the big words appear in paradigm-case nudity.

3. 'Beauty' perhaps is not so elusive.

4. Some things there are to which this concept must apply if it is to be a concept of beauty at all.

5. The class of beautiful things must, for example, include among its members the deft late cut between the slips and the sweet smooth cast whereby the fly is brought to float gently on to the dancing surface at the end of the thirty-foot line.

6. But the case of the sublime is hopeless.

7. There is as good as no primary use of this concept at all.

8. The only use a self-respectingly inarticulate Angle or Saxon can allow himself is one safely beyond the serious pale, where his (gentle, Anglo-Saxon) humor leads him to speak of sublime, say innocence or ignorance, or impudence, of unselfconsciousness of one sort or another.

9. Yet there is, I think, a primary unironic concept brooding away inside the veils of our reluctance to mention it.

No comment necessary.

If there is a comment to be made about this last passage, I suggest it is to be found in the immediately following sentence from the same text:
It is a concept, or perhaps only a vague ideal, which seems to me to animate much of F.R. Leavis' demands of poetry, for example.

Just as a work of literary theory becomes itself a work of literature, so perhaps a work devoted to the theory of aesthetics has the status of an 'aesthetic object'. (Compare the discussion of this term in Chapter 2 above.)

**Texts of art criticism - 7.13**

While 'aesthetics' is concerned with the abstract concepts of art, art criticism is concerned with the analysis and evaluation of particular works of art. As mentioned earlier, critical activity may be either historical (when we discuss a particular historical period); analytical (when a work of art is analysed into its elements and its meaning is discussed in terms of these elements); or evaluative (when a work of art is discussed in terms of its value or appearance). We also said that the aim of art criticism is, supposedly, to achieve an increased understanding or enjoyment of the work under discussion, and its statements are supposedly designed to achieve this end. The test of the success should be an easy one. All we need to do is to ask the reader whether, after reading a critique of a particular work of art, his understanding and appreciation of that work increased or not.

We referred above to metaphoric transformation between the two metafunctions, the ideational and the interpersonal. Since art critiques are, generally speaking, the personal views of individual experts, the art critics, the texts should be expected to foreground the interpersonal rather than, or as much as, the ideational function of language. We saw in the art philosophy texts that the relation between the two was complex: the language was, on the face of it,
ideational in orientation, but a range of indeterminacies in
the grammar, ambiguities and blends of various kinds, tend
to disguise a strongly interpersonal comment made up of the
writer's opinions and preferences. The language of art
criticism shows both similarities and differences.

There are four samples in this section. The complete text of
each is included in the appendix. The first sample is from a
critique by Donald B. Kuspit which appeared in Art in
America (May, 1983) and which deals with the sculpture of
Joel Shapiro. A short passage from this text was analysed in
detail in Chapter 4. The second example is a critique by
Klaus Kertess which comes from Artforum (January, 1983). The
last two come from Australian Biennale 1988 (The Biennale of
Sydney and The Australian Broadcasting Corporation, May
1988) and both deal with painting.

Sample 1 - Joel Shapiro's sculpture

1. The power of Joel Shapiro's sculpture comes from the
absence that pervades it, that gives it full presence.

2. The object - "positive space" - is only half the
sculpture for Shapiro; the other half is empty space.

3. For Shapiro, "controlling negative space is a critical
 issue in sculpture."

4. (All quotations from the artist are drawn from his
statements in the exhibition catalogue of his recent
retrospective.)

5. The object exists to give such control, to throw
negative space into relief, to make it "positive...
the perceptual space of the piece, the present, the
important thing."

6. Like embalming fluid, negative space seeps into
Shapiro's objects, works the miracle of making them
look imperturbable, immutable - dense as though beyond
the reach of decay.

7. Shapiro's is an Egyptian art; his chairs, houses,
figures are like tomb sculptures, buried in the
unmoving, absolute space of psychic pyramid, to
serve the artist in some afterlife in which their -
and his - full meaning will unfold.

8. Shapiro has made these objects to accompany him in the
void; they summarize it, compact it, implode it -
concentrate it until it seems fate incarnate.

9. His objects have the fated look of finalized forms,
as pure as the void itself.

This sample consists of two parts: (1) the first paragraph
and (2) the second last paragraph, of Kuspit's critique of
Shapiro's sculpture. The two short texts were selected to
compare how the two metafunctions can be realized in a text
and what difference they make to the reader.

Unlike the texts in aesthetics, this art-critical text has a
clearly enunciated theme - clearly enunciated, that is, by
the Themes of the constituent clauses. In the first
paragraph we find:

1 the power of Joel Shapiro's sculpture
2 the object - "positive space"
   the other half
3 for Shapiro
4 all quotations from the artist
5 the object
6 like embalming fluid
7 Shapiro's
   his chairs, houses, figures
8 Shapiro
   they
9 his objects
Thus apart from the simile like embalming fluid (which obviously involves a shift, since it is a comparison with something else), the Theme of every ranking clause is either the artist or one of his sculptures. This provides the reader with a clear profile of the text; and the transition form one Theme to another is not hard to follow. The grammatical structure is not particularly complex; the clause complexes are of average length, there are no very extensive nominal groups (the longest runs to only sixteen words, and most are no more than four or five), and there is only a very moderate amount of embedding. The lexical density is around 4.5 (22 clauses, 102 lexical words); and the lexical items themselves are not particularly technical. From the lexicogrammatical point of view (the structure of complexes, clauses and nominal groups, and the individual lexical items) this is a rather simple text. Why then is it such a difficult one to follow?

There are in fact some problems with the grammar. The writer uses many paratactic sequences, of clauses and nominal groups, without signalling what the semantic relationship among them is. Here are some examples:

[the absence] that pervades it, that gives it full presence

[the object exists] to give such control, to throw space into relief, to make it "positive...."

[to make it] "positive..........the perceptual space of the piece, the present, the important thing"

[negative space] seeps into Shapiro’s objects, works the miracle of making them look imperturbable...

[making them look] imperturbable, immutable - dense as though beyond the reach of decay
[his] chairs, houses, figures

[they] summarize it, compact it, implode it - concentrate it until it seems fate incarnate

Usually in English such sequences are elaborating: that is, the second is a restatement, exemplification or clarification of the first. Extending ('and/or' type) sequences are marked at least between the final pair (a, b, and g). Here it is not at all clear which of these two relationships is intended.

There seems no reason why the writer should not have written and, if such sequences were in fact extensions; so we could interpret them as elaborations - except that presumably chairs, houses, figures is extending....... not elaborating; these are not different terms for the same object. So we become suspicious about all the rest; maybe he is playing the same game? The result, in any case, is ambiguous.

Another source of difficulty is one that was referred to in the discussion of the paragraph from the text analysed in Chapter 4: that although many of the lexical items are repeated, it is not clear what the semantic relationship is, if any, between one occurrence and another. Examples here are:

- object  (sentences 2,5,6,8,9)
- space    (sentences 2,3,5,6,7)

The contexts in which these occur do not tell us whether they are co-referential or not; with object, there is a specific Deictic with all the non-initial occurrences (the object, Shapiro's objects, these objects, his objects), but we still cannot tell whether they are the same set of objects or not; and in any case there was a specific Deictic with the first occurrence also (the object), for which we
had no possible prior referent. Space, on the other hand, occurs without a Delicate; instead there is positive space, empty space, negative space and absolute space, and again we cannot tell what the relationship of one to the other is intended to be. Thus both grammar and lexis present a considerable number of uncertainties.

But even without these, the whole text confronts us as a kind of puzzle, a metaphor that we need to decode. Consider

buried in the unmoving, absolute space
of a psychic pyramid
they [these objects] summarize it [the void]
compact it, implode it - concentrate it until
it seems fate incarnate
negative space works the miracle of making them
[Shapiro’s objects] look imperturbable

What we have here is an elaborately constructed metaphor; but because it is a personal metaphor, there is not much chance that we shall be able to interpret it - and if we do, we have no means of knowing that it will be a correct interpretation. Everything is a symbol, everything refers to something else; but it is a purely private symbol. Shapiro’s sculpture is ‘powerful’ because of the absence that pervades it, that gives it full presence.

It is not that there are no clues to help us. The term absence, for instance, clearly contrasts with presence. But by itself this does not seem to suggest that the writer is talking about empty space as compared to space that is filled in. That he is talking about this is not clear even after reading the second clause:

The object - "positive space" - is only half the sculpture for Shapiro; the other half is empty space.
Here the term empty space stands in contrast to positive space, while one would expect pairs like positive/negative or empty/full. The terms positive space and negative space are terms used by the artist himself in the exhibition catalogue of his works; but although the writer is familiar with Shapiro's formulations, he introduces his own term empty space as well. This in turn sets up an opposition between full (in full presence) and empty (in empty space,) which is a further source of possible confusion.

One further example is sentence 6 starting with Like embalming fluid... The only clue we get from the text is that it is commenting on something that should be common knowledge to anyone who looks at Shapiro's work; but it does not seem too likely that many readers would compare it to Egyptian art. The sentence reads: 'Like embalming fluid, negative space seeps into Shapiro's objects, works the miracle of making them look imperturbable, immutable - dense as though beyond the reach of decay.' Here again, it is not the complexity of language that is the problem, but the metaphorical meaning of the clause. The reader will not be able to see the point unless he realizes from the start that this is the writer's individual and personal view rather than something that the reader himself should be able to see. It is not only the sentences as a whole that have these personal metaphorical meanings. They are present also in individual words, e.g. the term summarize (in summarize the void) is not a very congruent way of saying what the writer seems to be saying.

The final paragraphs (second part of the text, see Appendix), are similar: the lexicogrammatical structure is even more simple, at least until the final sentence, and again the text is an extended personal metaphor. What is different about it is the writer's admission of his own interpersonal intentions. 'Shapiro's drawings don't seem to
me as significant as his sculptures, because they seem to me to start...'; 'I think Shapiro uses it to reinforce...'. Together with the more informal tenor of the discourse, this allows the reader to relax, because the text suggests that what is being said is the view of the writer and if we do not see the work in this way, with the drawings being ontic and the sculptures ontological, this is not just because we are stupid. (The final sentence, however, does seem to defy grammatical analysis. Perhaps, like Shapiro's sculpture, its power comes from the absence that pervades it.)

Sample 2 (Barry Le Va's sculpture)

1. Like most mystery novels, Barry Le Va's sculpture presents a superimposition of two interdependent sequences of time - an action performed in the past, and an investigation of that action gradually unfolding in the present to explain the past; a real event (a "crime," a configuration in space) for which the motivation is not initially self-evident, and an analysis of that event, deducing and discovering its missing links.

2. Le Va's work is about more than meets the eye - about an absence.

3. "Clue" is very important word in Le Va's vocabulary.

4. The reader of a mystery novel passively observes the narrator retracing the steps of the plot.

5. The narrator is a surrogate for the writer, explaining the writer's construction.

6. The viewer of a Le Va sculpture is invited to become the narrator, and to retrace the artist's actions from the work's material back to the motivation for it.

7. The conditions that facilitate the viewer's
participation are remarkably similar to the dictates of most mystery novels: a general structure simultaneously ambiguous and transparent; suppression of superfluous detail; plainness and clarity - any strong image or significant form hinders the progress of the investigations.

8. While Le Va has occasionally incorporated violence into his work and has once or twice indulged in sexy material (red iron oxide, mineral oil), nothing even as mildly picturesque as an excess of whisky or a flashy convertible intrudes upon his work.

9. His continuous use of materials with a minimum of art reference (felt, flour, wooden dowels, particle board) achieves the same elegant deadpan so crucial to the pared down prose of such writer as Dashiell Hammett and Raymond Chandler.

What we said about the first sample could be, to some extent, said about this sample as well. The writer compares Barry Le Va's sculpture to a narrative genre and this is understood - as the main theme - from the start. The first clause has this as its Theme: like most mystery novels; and from then on, the reader can follow the thematic development of the discourse without any difficulty as it alternates between the two motifs of the mystery novel and Le Va's work. The clause complexes, though some of them are fairly long (e.g. sentences 1 and 7), are not really problematic; and unlike the previous text the logical-semantic relationships are largely explicit and unambiguous. Neither the embedded clauses, nor the nominal groups in which they occur, are particularly lengthy or elaborate.

Unlike Kuspit's critique, which had a number of clauses where the process was a blend of the relational and the material, Kertess depends much more on 'straight' relational
processes; the verbs in the ranking clauses are present, is (about), is, observes, is, explaining, (is invited to) become, are, has incorporated, (has) indulged, intrudes, achieves. The participants in these processes are almost all abstract nominalizations; even the one material process has violence as its Goal, and the list of nouns functioning as Head in the nominal groups that relate directly to these processes includes the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>word</th>
<th>surrogate construction</th>
<th>action : conditions</th>
<th>participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>structure</td>
<td>suppressions</td>
<td>plainness</td>
<td>clarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>form</td>
<td>progress</td>
<td>material</td>
<td>use</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many of these are nominalizations of processes and attributes; in origin they are grammatical metaphors, but they are now fully coded and figure naturally in even moderately formal written discourse. This sample is, in fact, moderately formal, with wordings like

the conditions that facilitate the viewer’s participation

his continuous use of materials with a minimum of art references

Barry La Va’s sculpture presents a superimposition of...

an investigation of that action gradually unfolding in the present

This is a level of formality, and a kind of discourse, that is typical of technical and semi-technical writing, including (as we have seen) technical writing about art. It is in no way remarkable and it might not seem worth while pointing it out — except that this is not, in fact, technical writing but art criticism.
Here we come back to the issue of 'metafunctional metaphor'. The text represents the personal view of the writer; yet it is being presented in language which suggests it is something the reader should accept as known fact. Although the word *clue* is so strongly foregrounded, there are no clues in the text to suggest that it too is "about more than meets the eye". The reader, as viewer, is "invited to become the narrator" and explain the artist's intention. It is enough to read the first clause to realise that the artist's intentions are not very obvious. We are told that:

Like most mystery novels, Barry le Va's sculpture presents a superimposition of the independent sequences of time - an action performed in the past, and an investigation of that action gradually unfolding in the present to explain the past; a real event (a "crime," a configuration in space) for which the motivation is not initially self-evident, and an analysis of that event, deducing and discovering its missing links.

We wonder how many observers, when looking at Le Va's sculptures (see Appendix), would come to the same conclusion. Yet the way the text is written gives no hint that this is the writer's personal opinion. On the contrary, in this example the writer has taken as his modal a form of discourse that clearly suggests he is presenting objective and generally accepted facts.

**Sample 3** - by Dorothee Baurlee

Very often, though not always, the title of a painting or a sculpture offers the clue the observer needs. The painting we are to observe here is called "Untitled", which means that this vital clue is missing. This is a situation in which the art critic could really help, by explaining
something about the work. Here is the one-sentence text which was selected by the organizers of the Australian Biennale 1988 to accompany the painting (catalogue p.59):

Space, the aura of a specific place and her personal psychogram entwine themselves into a new experience of space, which makes it possible to experience the always daring boundaries of inner and outer, experience and actuality, the expressible and that which cannot be put into words.

The structure of this clause compiles is $\alpha = \beta$; the second clause is a hypotactic 'non-defining relative' clause. It is presumably extending, rather than elaborating (i.e. which = 'and this'); but it is not at all clear what its antecedent is: space, a new experience of space or the whole of the preceding clause. The plural form of the verb entwine suggests that the whole of the first line is a nominal group complex functioning as Subject/Theme; this seems to be in conflict with the following circumstantial element into a new experience of space - how can space entwine itself (with other entities) into a new experience of itself? The always daring boundaries seem to separate two pairs of opposites: inner and outer, the expressible and that which cannot be put into words; but it is hard to see what is daring about such boundaries - it seems a rather cautious stance to take. Experience and actuality, on the other hand, would not be taken as apposites unless construed as such by analogy with inner and outer; perhaps this is where the boundaries become daring, but if so why do these occupy the middle position among the three dyads?

The other feature that is grammatically confusing is the her, in the first clause, which presumably refers to the artist. This at least shows that the painting referred to is
by a woman. Otherwise, there seems no reason why this passage should not accompany any one of the more than two hundred works reproduced within the covers of the book.

Sample 4 - by Urszula Szulakowska

1. At the circumference of the rounded, domestic forms of the central structure are the jagged planes and slivers of non-continuous spaces, parallel layers of erotic life and the dried bones of the dead, of the impassioned and the desolate, of meeting-points and recent absences, of the loss of something else which still waits on, urging after itself from the memory of the past to the long ellipses of moment extended.

2. Tom Arthur's work demystifies the Other of desire and of fear by following through the imperatives set by desire itself.

3. At the end of the process, the Other is found to be neither illusion, nor alien, nor mystic, but oneself is displaced in the reflections of opaque and translucent mirrors, re-echoed in light-wells, or disjointed across the walls and ceilings of half-lit rooms whose customary cuboids are neutralised by parallels of light from a slowly-opened door.

4. All such recurring motifs in his work indicate a quicksilver surface of entry to yet another track, another possibility for change and for unending movement from oneself to oneself.

This text consists of two very long sentences, each of which is followed by a considerably shorter one. The structure of these, as clause complexes, is rather simple: the first consists of one clause only, the second of two clauses is hypotactic relationship; the third seems to consist of two clauses in paratactic relationship, but there is then
considerable ambiguity in its structure - it is not clear whether what is re-echoed in light-wells, or disjointed...is oneself or the translucent mirrors (if the latter, then the whole of the rest is embedded; otherwise, there are two more ranking clauses). The final sentence again consists of just one clause.

The clause making up the first sentence is multiply ambiguous; there are some hundred or so possible structural interpretations (bracketings) of the nominal complex beginning with the jagged planes and silvers and lasting up to the end of the clause. Similar ambiguities occur throughout, we have already mentioned those in sentence 3, and in sentence 4 the last nominal beginning another possibility for change can be attached in either of two places to what precedes it. Again the favourite strategy for creating ambiguity is the same as we have seen above: stringing together paratactic sequences of clauses or nominal groups in which both the tactic arrangement (the bracketing) and the logical-semantic relations are left obscure. Even if the only alternative considered is that of elaborating ('that is') versus extending ('and/or'), this doubles the number of possible interpretations of each such bracket; such figures do not mean very much (and would be tedious to demonstrate), but it is not exaggerated to say that simply in its clause complex and group complex structure this passage would allow varying interpretations that run into the thousands.

More interesting, perhaps, is the problem of who is the Other? There is a rather ambiguous and coy 'explanation' given in the following clause, where the writer continues talking about the Other and oneself. But despite the occasional life line of this kind, the reader ends up by drowning in the swamp of verbiage: the whole text does not seem to make any sense. In the previous cases the theme -
that of the first clause, and its development in the subsequent clauses - was of some use; but here each clause has its own Theme which seems unrelated to anything that has been discussed before. For instance, at the end of the process which is the Theme of the third clause; does this refer back to the process of demystifying the Other?

Given a text such as this one, if we were to answer the question which we asked at the beginning of this section - whether the critical text helped us to understand and appreciate better the work under discussion, the answer would have to be no. Rather the contrary, in fact: the text by itself is largely unintelligible, but given the picture as an accompaniment to it we can make some attempt at understanding what it means.

We said at the beginning of this chapter that many of the problems encountered with the language of aesthetics and art criticism have to do with metaphor of one kind or another. On the one hand there are the lexical metaphors, metaphors in the traditional sense, which are problematic on two counts: they tend to be highly elaborate and highly personalized. On the other hand there are the grammatical metaphors, some interpersonal but more especially the ideational ones, that are particularly characteristic of aesthetic language and cause problems because they are often unmotivated by discourse considerations - they function as ritual markers of high prestige prose rather than to carry forward a systematic argument (as in scientific discourse; cf. Halliday, 1988). Finally we have recognized a kind of metaphor that is in some sense at a higher level, a 'metafunctional metaphor' whereby meanings of one metafunction are presented in the form of selections made in the other - interpersonal meanings conveyed as if they were ideational, in the typical case.
There are both similarities and differences, in this respect, between art philosophy and art criticism. We could say that, in the broadest sense, the two have a common aim: to present an argument, either about art in general or about particular works of art. But there is an important difference between them, in the authority for the arguments offered.

In art philosophy this is impersonal, while in art criticism it is personal (art philosophy: 'this is how it is'; art criticism: 'this is what I think it is like'). The language used, however, tends to suggest something 'given' and impersonal in both cases. In the case of art philosophy the statements made are often in fact personal opinions; but, as we saw, the language is 'dressed up' to look as if its function, beyond any doubt, was ideational. In the case of art criticism, on the other hand, the language is again made to look as if its only function was the ideational one, although here the writer has the freedom to include himself in the text without being criticised for it. So when we speak about 'metafunctional metaphor', we are referring to this shift in orientation whereby the ideational component is made to predominate - even where there is apparently no reason to disguise the interpersonal element. Perhaps the art critic feels safer if his statement is made to look as if it was not his own personal view; not only will it carry more weight, but he will not be attacked, as an individual, by the reader who does not agree with what has been said.

The effect is achieved by the language in rather different ways. The language of art philosophy appears very precise, and seemingly simple, and so there is no tendency to question the role or the intention of the writer. The language of art criticism is too cryptic for the reader to ask questions as all. This difference is well illustrated by the comments made by the students. In art philosophy texts it is the subject matter they consider beyond their
capability, while it is the meaning of the lexical items they worry about when reading art critiques. In other words, it is the theme that causes problems in art philosophy, whereas it is what is said about the theme which is the main source of difficulty in art criticism.

The linguistic analysis and interpretation of writings on aesthetics and art criticism has enabled us to gain a reasonably clear impression of what lexicogrammatical features are characteristic of these registers. Much of the pattern had already emerged when we considered the field of art history, since art history texts turned out to include forms of writing from all the registers we had identified. At the same time, as it art technology, so also in aesthetics and art criticism, since these constitute distinct disciplines in the study of art, there are many texts that remain within the patterns of the one register; and while these are less widely used in art education programmes it is certainly important to study them in their own right.

We have also tried to suggest, in these comments on the language of the texts, how their various special linguistic characteristics are brought about by the functional requirements that language has to meet. A great deal more remains to be done in that area. There is always the temptation to think that, if we find linguistic features becoming conventionalized, and even ritualized, in a particular discourse register, they never had any other function in the text. But, as Halliday has said about grammatical metaphor in scientific English, such features never evolve purely as ritual; they must be functional in the first place in order to gain the social value from which they derive their status. This is probably also true of the langauge of art - although it must be said that when one reads some of the material that is written in the two fields
discussed in the present chapter it is not easy to see how some of the features it displays could ever have served any serious communicative purpose.
CHAPTER 8 - Portable art

General comments - 8.1

The last two examples in the previous chapter taken from the work of the Australian Biennale 1988 are on the borderline between art criticism and what we have called the language of 'portable art'; the texts that accompany works of art in catalogues of collections and exhibitions. Since this has (perhaps regrettably) no place in the usual programmes of art education, and also since it cannot really be interpreted except in conjunction with an interpretation of the works of art themselves, we are not attempting any linguistic analysis of these texts here. This chapter merely gives an overview of the kinds of text that will be found with portable art, together with a number of typical specimens (see Appendix).

While in the writings about art discussed up to now what we have investigated has been just one small part of a text, when we turn to 'portable' art it is necessary to look at the whole text - which is, however, usually rather short. The register connected with 'portable art', i.e. exhibition catalogues, has something in common with most of the other registers. Some parts of the text can be very much like art history or art technology, while the similarity between art criticism and portable art is in their need to have the work under discussion present there when the text is being read. The only register which is not found in texts dealing with portable art is that of art philosophy.

Where portable art texts resemble art technology, the discussion is usually a general one related to a group of objects rather than just one. Where they resemble art history, the discussion is something between historical report and a commentary on the quality or appearance that a
particular work of art shares with certain others. Where
they resemble art criticism, the resemblance is in part
determined, as said above, by the assumption that the work
of art is present and thus in some sense forms part of the
'text'. But the resemblance often goes deeper: with many
portable art texts, their language is strikingly similar to
that of art criticism. This has some relation to the work of
art under consideration. Inspection of a large number of
catalogues and gallery guides suggests that what is
characteristic of general art histories, is a feature of
this category as well: the closer the work to our present
era, and particularly in the area of painting, the more the
language of the catalogue sounds like that of art criticism.

Though texts in the area of portable art deal with the art
of earlier periods, may include some personal comments of the
writer, they rarely emerge as the expression of purely
personal views. In such texts the language does not shift to
the point where it would sound like art criticism. Texts of
portable art come to resemble art criticism only when the
deal with painting of the last eighty or ninety years.

One further distinction between portable art and
art-critical texts is in their recognition of authorship. A
work of criticism is known and remembered by the name of the
art critic. As we have suggested, such works are treated
almost as if they themselves were works of art.

No catalogue that I am aware of, among those dealing with
the art of the past centuries or with modern sculpture or
architecture, has the text accompanied by the name of the
writer. The names of the contributors may appear in the
preface or the appendix, but never at the end of each entry.
With modern painting, on the other hand, the text may signal
its authorship, as in the catalogue of Modern Masters, Manet
to Matisse from which come some of our samples.
Samples of texts

There are six texts which come from different catalogues. The first four (Cimabue [The Louvre]; Durer [Berlin Gallery]; Uccello and Canaletto [the National Gallery of London] have been written for a permanent exhibition, while the last two (Raphael [Albertina Gallery, Vienna] and Caravaggio [The Hermitage, Leningrad] have been written for exhibitions that move from place to place.

The above texts are what we consider to be typical examples of the register of 'portable art. Despite the fact they have been written by different people and for different galleries, they still have much in common.

Following these texts we will present a number of texts which we consider to be 'atypical' examples of portable art. They are all signed by their authors and there is not much similarity between them, even though all were written for one catalogue (for an exhibition which travelled around Australia in 1975, its 'home' being the Museum of Modern Art, New York).

Typical texts - 8.2

Sample 1 - Cimabue

The text starts in a way that is typical for an entry in a catalogue, i.e. by giving information about the artist (if he is known), his date of birth and death (if they are known), the title of the work (if it is known), the measurements (which are always known), and sometimes the inventory number. Very often there is also information about the medium: oil, tempera, and so on.
The first paragraph is also typical of the writing of gallery catalogues, giving information about how the picture came to the gallery. The register is not quite that of art history, but is a 'story-like' account of the history of the painting in terms of its present location.

The second paragraph, which is again typical of gallery texts, presents an argument about its authorship. Even if a picture is signed, there will be argument about the authenticity of the signature. The last two paragraphs, again in typical fashion, give a brief discussion of the artist and of the condition of the work.

It is notable — an again notably typical — that nothing is said about the story the picture is trying to tell. Even though this example represents a topic of common knowledge, there are many things that could be mentioned: the symbolism of the colour, the meaning of the the pose of the child's fingers, the two dimensionality of the figures, and so on.

As far as the accessibility of the text to a reader is concerned, there are no linguistic problems. The few field-specific terms, e.g. altarpiece, oeuvre, incised pattern, are likely to be generally known.

Sample 2 — Durer

The first paragraph is characteristic of art history writings, such as can be found in any general history of western art. The symbolic meaning is again left out.

The second paragraph describes in some detail the origin and precursors of the picture, while the third paragraph is a 'story-like' account of the artist's work at the time. The last paragraph — as in the previous sample — discusses the
picture's journey to the gallery. This is a more or less constant feature of the 'portable art'.

Sample 3 - Uccello

This and the following sample have been selected for the purposes of comparison. In both cases we have two different writers writing about the same picture.

The text in this section is about Uccello's famous painting of the Battle of San Romano. Though the texts differ from each other in the kind and amount of information they offer, concerning the painting, they both fit the category of gallery texts. The first one reminds us of a text from general histories of art; it gives a rather detailed description of what we can see for ourselves, but offers little explanation of the story the picture represents. The second presents one additional fact (that 'the Florentines claimed to have defended the Sienese in the battle depicted'), but does not explain the relevance of this to how it is represented.

Sample 4 - Canaletto

This sample again shows the difference in the approach of two writers to the same painting. Though Canaletto is far from being called a 'modern' master, he is closer to our time than Uccello and the simplicity of the subject offers the writer a better opportunity to say more about it that he could about works distant both in time and topic. Both texts - though the first one more than the second - include evaluative comments by the writer.

Sample 5 - Raphael

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This text is very similar to one we could find in specific histories or general histories of art.

**Sample 6 - Caravaggio**

This text is very different from the previous ones. Generally speaking, the text is very much like art history text, except for the paragraph discussing the interpretation of the picture, a topic which is not found very often in this type of texts. Though descriptions are found there, interpretations are very rare.

**Atypical texts - 8.3**

When we say 'atypical' we mean atypical for this type of writing, but they are typical of art critiques.

The samples could be divided into two broad categories, one closer to what one may find in catalogues for exhibitions, and the other closer to what one may find in art critiques.

We have three writers in the first category, and two in another. The first category is marked by certain uniformity both in the presentation and the language. The second category shows certain freedom of both presentation and expression.

Cooper, Penrose and W.S.L. belong to the first category and if we look at their writings, they are consistent both as individuals and as contributors in this catalogue. Except for one instance, all the text open with a date (in 1904, in 1922, in 1936, and so on) as the point of departure. The one exception is when the text starts with the location (in Berlin).
Generally speaking, the texts are something between a narrative story about the artist, a more or less detailed description of his work and a critique of his work. They are accessible to the reader both from the linguistic and topical point of view. Since they present more or less factual information, rather than personal evaluation of the work, they do not cause any problem. It is the second group or type that does.

In the second category we have two writers, Stuart Preston and Susan Leval. While the topic is introduced in a subtle way in Leval’s texts (this remarkable picture; by 1910; Gauguin’s Man...), the texts are very personal both in the presentation or rather evaluation of the topic and in the language Leval uses. It is enough to look at the second last and the third last paragraph in the text about Dali, for instance.

As far as Preston’s texts are concerned, they are not difficult internally, but their dramatic beginnings seem to be out of place in this type of writings.

Generally speaking, as these example show, texts accompanying portable art do not present particular linguistic features of their own. Rather, they share certain characteristics with the other registers we have been examining, and their grammar and vocabulary reflects some combination of art history, art technology and art criticism. There is considerable variation among portable art texts in the extent to which they derive from one or other of those sources, or present a mixture of two of them or even of all three. To the extent that they present difficulties to the reader these are of the kind that we have already identified - especially those associated with the language of art criticism (the most difficult of the portable art texts being those that owe most to the language of this register).
The most interesting feature of these texts, and the one respect in which they are (most nearly) unique, is their relation to the work of art they are describing. This again is something that, as we have pointed out, is extremely varied: some provide a viewer's guide to the details of the painting, others describe its provenance and subsequent history, others again give a biography of the artist. Very few, on the other hand, offer an explanation of the subject-matter or any indication of the sociocultural context and function that the work was designed to serve.

A proper account of the language of portable art would require all these things to be brought in focus of attention. But this would take us beyond linguistics, into a semiotics that transcended the boundary between language and art. This does not yet exist although similarities have been pointed out from time to time (Langer, Mukarovsky and others). The next move in this direction — one which is still a little way, but not impossibly far, in the future — will be to analyse a painting together with its catalogue description as a single 'text'. In our next, and final, chapter we will discuss an important step taken toward such a goal by a linguist with a considerable knowledge of art, Michael O'Toole.
CHAPTER 9 A SYSTEMIC-FUNCTIONAL SEMIOTIC OF ART

General comments

This thesis has been concerned with the language used in writing about art, not about art as itself a kind of language. But this later question - or, in more modern terms, art as a semiotic system - is one that is inevitably raised by a discussion of this kind. There is no possibility here of an adequate general treatment of the topic; but in this final chapter I should like to consider one specific theoretical proposal that has been put forward for a semiotic of art, that contained in Michael O'Toole's unpublished preprint 'A systemic-functional semiotic of art'. I am concentration on this one article for two reasons: one, that it is important as an explicit model for the general interpretation of a work of art, and specifically of painting, in semiotic terms; and two, that the linguistic basis of O'Toole's semiotic is the same as that adopted in this thesis for the analysis of art language, namely Halliday's systemic-functional linguistic theory.

O'Toole's background is that of a linguistic, and literary scholar, who became interested and knowledgable in the area of art; his thoughts on the application of Halliday's systemic-functional linguistic to works of art may be said to originate from a concern with language. The writer of this thesis, on the other hand, has been involved in the study of art for at least a decade longer than she has been involved in linguistics; and though she has made a constant attempt to balance the two disciplines, thoughts on the application of Halliday's grammar start from here concern with art rather than from language or linguistic.
9.1. O'Toole's thesis

As he says himself, O'Toole thesis is quite simple: Michael Halliday's systemic-functional linguistics offers a powerful and flexible model for the study of other semiotic codes besides natural language and its universality may be of particular value in evolving new discourse about art (O'Toole, p:1). O'Toole considers that Halliday's model as he presents it in his paper can significantly improve:

[a] how we perceive art
[b] how we talk about art
[c] how we teach art

He claims that the above will have 'both theoretical and practical implications for epistemological, psychological, social, art-historical, aesthetic and pedagogical theories of art (ibid.).

O'Toole's model (when the paper was written) was, as he said, at a provisional and exploratory stage, and he was inviting readers to share their responses and ideas, for 'a proper semiotics of art will only grow out of a large body of analysis, description, interpretation and theory by people with a range of orientations' (ibid.). This is what this chapter sets out to offer.

2.2. O'Toole's model

Like O'Toole, I consider that Halliday's systemic-functional grammar can be used as a model for the study of other semiotic codes; but that each of those 'other' semiotic codes would probably draw on a different section of the grammar. For instance, while some codes could be discussed in terms of the three metafunctions, it is not likely that architecture, as a semiotic system, could be discussed in
these terms, at least not in terms of the interpersonal function in its linguistic sense. There have been very few buildings in the past where one individual architect would be expressing his personal view.

Like O’Toole, I consider, that the adaptation of Halliday’s model could improve how we perceive art, how we talk about it and how we teach it (as the main body of this thesis makes clear); but while O’Toole intends his model to be a ‘sceptical’ alternative (to use his own terminology) to art history and evaluative criticism, we see it as complementary to art history and evaluative criticism.

To explain these differences, we need to look at some of the concepts discussed in O’Toole’s paper, and then outline his model in a little more detail.

§ 3 Concepts developed in O’Toole’s model

There are two sets of concepts we need to mention here. One set is associated with Halliday’s levels and his grammatical rank-scale, and the other with Halliday’s three metafunctions.

As a grounding for his more theoretical discussion, O’Toole analyses a single painting to illustrate the range of systemic choices available at each rank and function. As an art historian, I admire his choice of an abstract picture – Frank Hinder’s Flight into Egypt – which, would be the most difficult style to discuss.

O’Toole adapts Halliday’s chart of ranks and functions (Halliday, 1973:141) and draws a table for ranks and functions in painting. He summarizes the functions by saying that, the ideational function incorporates referential
Frank Hinder: Flight into Egypt 1952 tempera with oil glazes on hardboard 96.5 x 73.5 cm
collection of the Art Gallery of Western Australia
meanings (about the real world, 'out there' or in our minds) into language forms; the interpersonal function incorporates meanings about the interaction between speaker and hearer, including the speaker's view of the real world, into language forms; and the textual function structures the ideational and interpersonal meanings into coherent texts. Then he modifies Halliday's functions: ideational, interpersonal and textual into representational, modal and compositional.

As O'Toole stresses, the major strength of Halliday's model is that 'meaning-making is involved every time we choose an option from the available system: semantics is not some separate level of abstract "interpretation" beyond syntax and phonology' (ibid., p.2). As he says, 'the key word here is "realization": social meanings to do with our categorization of objects and events in the real world and of the relationship between speaker and hearer are "realized" through the systems of transitivity, mood, theme, etc., and these systems are "realized" as particular syntactic forms, which are themselves "realized" as phonologically appropriate strings of sound or graphologically as strings of letters' (ibid.).

O'Toole's realization is an equally powerful mechanism for describing how meanings are made in other semiotic systems, including visual arts. He selects, as an example, Botticelli's Primavera and says that certain neo-Platonist concepts of "humanitas" are realized in the figures of Venus and Mercury and in the metamorphoses of Earth into Flowers and Love into Beauty. These in turn are realized in a particular manner of representation, with a particular modality of address to the viewer and 'involving a complex network of compositional relationships. These in turn are realized in particular lines and planes on the painted surface involving chromatically appropriate colours, rhythms
and degrees of illumination' (ibid., p.2). This makes him conclude that the scale of realization from semiotic systems to graphological form and substance in painting is analogous to that for language. To be able to challenge this view or express an agreement, we need to look at the two tables in more detail.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>IDEATIONAL</th>
<th>INTERPERSONAL</th>
<th>TEXTUAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLAUSE</td>
<td>TRANSPERSITY types of process participants &amp; circumstances (identity clauses) (things, facts &amp; reports)</td>
<td>MOOD types of speech function modality (the Wf-function)</td>
<td>THEME types of message (identity as text relation) (identification, predication, reference, substitution)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>condition addition report</td>
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<td></td>
<td>POLARITY cationation secondary tense</td>
<td>PERSON (marked’ options)</td>
<td>VOICE (’contrastive’ options)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nominal GROUP</td>
<td>MODIFICATION epithet function enumeration (noun classes) (adjective classes)</td>
<td>ATITUDE attitudinal modifiers intensifiers</td>
<td>DEIXIS determiners phoric’ elements (qualities) (definite article)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>classification sub-modification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adverbial (incl. prepositional) GROUP</td>
<td>MINOR PROCESSES prepositional relations (classes of circumstantial adjunct)</td>
<td>narrowing sub-modification</td>
<td>COMMENT (classes of comment adjunct)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORD (incl. lexical item)</td>
<td>LEXICAL ‘CONTENT’ (taxonomic organization of vocabulary)</td>
<td>compounding derivation</td>
<td>LEXICAL ‘REGISTER’ (expansive words) (stylistic organization of vocabulary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORMATION UNIT</td>
<td>INFORMATION distribution &amp; focus</td>
<td>TONE intonation systems</td>
<td>Table 1. Function and rank in language (from Halliday,1973:141)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functions</td>
<td>Representational</td>
<td>Modal</td>
<td>Compositional</td>
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<td>School/Genre</td>
<td>Typical themes</td>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td>Baroque - Impressionism - Expressionism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>to Reality</td>
<td>Constructivism - Surrealism - Cubism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>and Style</td>
<td>Op Art - Pop Art - Installation &amp; Performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Picture</td>
<td></td>
<td>Focus: Perspective</td>
<td>Gestalt: Framing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Actions, events</td>
<td>Clarity</td>
<td>Horizontals</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Agents, patients, goals</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Verticals</td>
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<td>Scenes, settings, features</td>
<td>Colour</td>
<td>Diagonals</td>
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<td>Portrayals, sitters</td>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>Proportion</td>
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<td>authenticy</td>
<td>'Theme'</td>
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<td>Volume</td>
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<td>Rhythm</td>
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<td>Omission</td>
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<td>Intertextuality</td>
<td>Colour cohesion</td>
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<td>Episode</td>
<td>Groups and sub-actions, scenes, portrayals</td>
<td>Scale to whole</td>
<td>Relative position in Gestalt</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Side-sequences</td>
<td>Centrality to whole</td>
<td>and to each other</td>
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<td>Interplay of actions</td>
<td>Relative prominence</td>
<td>Alignment</td>
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<td>Interplay of modalities</td>
<td>Coherence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Figure</td>
<td>Character</td>
<td>Characterization</td>
<td>Relative position in Gestalt, in episode and to each other</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Act</td>
<td>Relation to viewer</td>
<td>Parallelism and opposition</td>
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<td>Stance</td>
<td>Gaze</td>
<td>Subframing</td>
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<td>Gesture</td>
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<td>Contrasts &amp; Conflict: Colour</td>
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<td>Line</td>
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<td>Member</td>
<td>Basic physical forms: Parts of body</td>
<td>Stylistisation</td>
<td>Cohesion: Reference</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Objects</td>
<td>Attenuation</td>
<td>Parallelism</td>
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<td>Natural forms</td>
<td>Chiaroscuro</td>
<td>Contrast</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Components</td>
<td>Synecdoche</td>
<td>Rhythm</td>
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<td>Irony</td>
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Table 2. Function and rank in painting (from Thool).
The concepts of "rank" and "level" in painting.

[Al The concept of the "rank-scale" (to parallel with [B])

For Halliday the grammatical "rank scale" consists of the hierarchical units: Sentence, Clause, Group, Word and Morpheme. For O'Toole's the rank scale for paintings consists of: Picture, Episode, Figure, Member and Plane. He justifies the insertion of Episode between Picture and Figure by saying that 'many pictures are made up of several distinct episodes just as sentences are composed of clauses' (Ibid., p.3). Though it is a fact that sentences (clause complexes) are composed of clauses, there are two things which seem a little ambiguous.

Firstly, if a picture can consist of several distinct episodes in the same way as a sentence (clause complex in our present terminology) can consist of a number of clauses, then the category Picture corresponds not to Halliday's clause, but to the category above the clause, i.e. the clause complex. The term 'Episode' then becomes comparable with the clause. In O'Toole's account, however, the 'typical themes' of picture and episode suggest rather a comparison with clause and group. It seems unnecessary to press the analogy so far as to set up any rank-to-rank correspondence. Secondly, however, it is uncertain whether O'Toole wishes to retain Halliday's systemic distinction between multivariate structures (like that of clause consisting of groups) and univariate structures (like that of a clause complex, which Halliday sees as being much less a matter of constituency). This is something that needs to be further clarified.

More important, however, is what kind of analogy there is between a picture and a grammatical unit, whether like a
clause or a clause complex in any case. To me the category 'Picture' stands for a picture and there are very few pictures that could be compared to a clause. It might be said that a portrait of a person could be seen as a clause saying: 'This is John Brown'; but this would not agree with O'Toole's model where a portrait is taken to be 'a single figure' and so of a lower rank than Picture. (O'Toole's system allows for 'singulary branching'; that is a picture may consist of a single episode (e.g. Cezanne's Card Players), or a single figure (most portraits), or a single member (a leg by Leonardo), or a single plane (Malewich's White Square). If anything, however, I would feel that a picture is very much more than a clause; and that a better analogy would be with a semantic unit - a text.
Rather than trying to offer an improved version of O'Toole's table, let me admit to what O'Toole expected art students and semioticians to say, i.e. that his rank-scale of units is over-schematic. As an art historian, or rather an 'iconographer', I would need more freedom and definitely more space. O'Toole himself says that 'surely a reading of a painting involves a rapid and largely untraceable shuttling between larger and smaller units, and the semantic interest - the "real meaning" - is in the boundaries themselves, or indeed in the very movement across the hierarchy' (ibid., p.4); and he compares this to our comprehension of meanings in sentences of verbal language. Again there are two observations I would make.

Firstly, I do not think the "real meaning" in a painting is in the boundaries between smaller and larger units or in the movement across the hierarchy. Even if we spend many days in front of a picture having a theme that is totally unknown to us, unless we obtain information about the story behind it we cannot really decode the meaning the picture is trying to communicate. All we can do is to describe what we see and how much we like or dislike it. There are, of course, genres, e.g. landscape paintings, still-life paintings, portraits, and others, where the function of a work is to offer a description of an object or a human being, and in that case we can more successfully discuss the painting as such. However, in this case it is not its meaning we are concerned about; we shall be commenting on its function in society (because its very existence is its function) or discussing it in terms of its composition or the method used. For instance, a landscape was not acceptable as a subject-matter of painting till the late Renaissance, but since then it has been one of the most popular topic; one could discuss its development and the difference in the techniques used at that time then and today. Such a
discussion however, would again, would have to include more than just personal comments; otherwise the question behind the exercise would not be 'what is the meaning of this painting?', but 'what do you, as an individual, think about this painting?', which is a very different matter. Thus there is a difference between a description and an interpretation; and by looking at the boundaries, or by moving our eye across the hierarchy of smaller and larger units, I do not think we would be able to decode the meaning of the majority of pictures.

Secondly, I do not think the meaning is derived from a painting in the same way as it is from a text in a language. On the one hand, if we divide the systems of communication into two broad groups, spatial and temporal, in 'temporal' systems, the parts do not appear together but appear one by one successively in time (language is one of such systems, music another); whereas in 'spatial' systems, the entire unit is presented simultaneously, although attention to the parts is successive since it is not possible to concentrate on the whole at one time (painting is one of such systems). However, there is not usually a prescribed order telling us which part to look at first and which last. On the other hand, there is a difference between verbal and non-verbal systems. A verbal system is a system of symbols which have meanings assigned to them. A word is not just a noise or a mark on a printed page; it is a sign whose content is an integral part. However, a non-verbal system, such as a system of shapes, colours or tones, is a system of symbols which do not have meanings 'permanently' assigned to them. This is not to say they do not have meanings at all, but that their meanings are established and apprehended in a very different way.

It is true that both systems have to be learned. As speakers of a language we are taught through the process of
socialization the meanings expressed in our mother tongue; and if we wish to understand the meanings of a language we are not native speakers of, we have to learn those meanings. The same applies to non-verbal systems. If we are natives of a culture where the colour black is a symbol of death, we are given the meaning of the colour through the process of socialization, both verbally and by observation; and if we are not, we have to be taught it. (It is perhaps important to stress this point here: that just as many of us are monolingual (to start with) in the linguistic sense, so we are also typically brought up "monolingual" as "readers" of non-verbal texts.) However, the word black (or its equivalents schwarze, černé etc.) has not existence except as the expression of its content; whereas the colour black exists independently and is only secondarily pressed into service as the expression part of a sign. Hence the meaning is learnt in a different way and 'read' in a different way from the painted text. (It might be added also that, whereas every human being (barring accident) learns a verbal system, many do not learn a non-verbal system such as painting at all.)

Related to this is the question of the number of levels (strata, not ranks) in the system. In his discussion of Botticelli's Primavera, O'Toole recognized three levels or realization, parallel to phonology, lexico-grammar and semantics.
But if there are no assigned meanings to lines and planes and colours, which are the equivalents of the phonological level of language, nothing can be realized with certainty on the other two levels. And if we start from the top and discuss the semantic level first, we come to the same conclusion. Even if we look at the middle level, which in O'Toole’s system is that of a network of compositional relationships, the situation will not be any different.

There is however, a more complex argument that leads me to question O'Toole’s conception of ‘levels’ in the system of painting, or other non-verbal system. Let me illustrate by reference to what O'Toole says about transitivity in the painting he has selected for this discussion which has the Flight into Egypt as its theme. As he suggests, what is presented here as the whole story could have been presented as an episode in a canvas of a larger size, or, alternatively, the story could have been reduced, presenting only one figure, or a fleeting foot which would be there as a symbol for the whole, in a kind of a visual synecdoche. This suggests that, as in language, so in painting one (the artist) has a choice of how to represent the subject; and in each case the paradigm of choice would be different. In the first case the system lying behind the picture, as it is presented by Hinder, includes the “transitivity” of agents (e.g. Joseph, Mary, shepherds, and so on) acting on (e.g. following, bearing gifts to) other people, or patients (e.g. the Infant) or goals (e.g. a start). If the picture had included only one Figure, then the focus would be on character (sanctity, piety), or stance (e.g. stepping in flight) or gesture (e.g. gaze of fear). If the story was represented by a single Member, the concentration would have to be on the character, gesture and transitivity of a single part of the body or object (see Table 2).
It is important here to keep in mind the distinction between descriptions, (i.e. "this is a picture which describes Mary, John, the infant and a donkey running to Egypt") and interpretation, (i.e. the 'remaking of the picture's meaning). O'Toole says that in scanning the picture - in remaking its meaning - the viewer has all the above options. But this is true only if the viewer is familiar with the story. Almost everybody in our culture is familiar with the above story, and so whichever way it is being presented, it will be understood; but that does not affect the general point at issue.

As with language, when we interpret a picture, we aim to be as accurate as possible. We try to find out what the picture is 'telling' us, or rather what is the artist telling us through the picture; it is a 'misreading' if we construe ______ less than there is in the story or more (we may 'read too much into it'). In a verbal text, too, there is a possibility of missing some information or adding something that is not there. But there are two significant differences. One is that the context available to the reader gives at least some of the necessary clues to enable him to reach the correct conclusion; whereas most paintings are viewed out of their context, either because of the gap in time, i.e. they were painted for people of a different historical period; because of the location, i.e. they were painted for a church and now they are in a gallery; or because of the recipients, i.e. they were painted to inspire the believer and the 20th century viewer is far less religious than his 15th century counterpart. This means that while a verbal text is enveloped in its context (and if we are given only a paragraph, we have the rest of the text available to us), there is nothing 'next to the painting' that can give the same type of assistance. If the viewer is trying to 'remake the meaning' of the picture, he needs to know the 'story' - all the relevant features of the context...
of culture and situation. Otherwise it is as if he was given a paragraph to look at without being told where the text came from and what brought it about.

According to O'Toole, most paintings represent some recognisable and describable subject. But being able to recognise them and describe them in visual terms is not the same as knowing what meanings to attach to them. There is a difference between description and interpretation and this leads on to the second difference referred to just above.

Even if we are presented with a verbal text without any context of situation or of culture, we can go along way towards constructing the context from the language. I may know nothing about Japanese society; but if I need a history of Japan I can construe the society simply from the words on the page. I cannot do this from a series of paintings no matter how many and how elaborate they are.

If much of the study of art remains little more than a 'naming game', with description but no interpretation, this may be because we assume that a painting is like a text. We expect the picture to answer all the questions we may have about it, while in fact the answers are available only if we go above and outside the visual text itself. Without a good knowledge of the context of situation and the context of culture, which, though reflected in the picture, are located above and outside it, we cannot hope to move from a pure description to an interpretation of a work. In other words, to analyse a picture, we have first to go outside of it to be able to put it back into its appropriate context, and it is only then that we can hope to get more information from the picture itself. Without this we will achieve no more than a description of the work in visual terms and our personal view of its composition and of what we think is its theme. And we may miss the point. A picture can be a metaphor; for
instance, it is clear from Van Gogh's letters to his brother and other people that the sunflowers in his famous painting were symbols representing himself and his friends. Consequently, though we can make adequate comments about the visual appeal of the flowers, we cannot construct from the the 'meaning' of the picture.

This has implications for the concept of 'levels' in painting. If we confine our analysis to looking at the "inside" of a picture, a description of the obvious together with our personal view is the best we can hope for. The 'phonological' level of painting, i.e. lines and shapes or the lexico-grammatical level of painting, i.e. networks of compositional elements cannot give us the clue, because as we said earlier, in non-verbal systems specific meanings are not attached to the symbols that make up the system. Consequently, it may be a little misleading to discuss the system of painting along these lines. I feel, myself, that the system of painting is not three-stratal as language is, and that it may be misleading represent it in these terms.

This in turn reflects back on the rank scale. I referred earlier to the concepts of 'picture' and 'episode', where my concern was with their appropriateness as ranks. With figure, member and plane, the problem is more one of levels. They become problematic because of my doubt about the tri-stratal nature of the system of painting. Hence I am not convinced that the concept of grammatical rank-scale is one of the concepts that can be of benefit to an 'art grammarian'.

If we now consider together the concepts of rank and level, the question is whether there could be a 'grammar of art' incorporating both of these concepts in the same way that a grammar of language does. I myself am doubtful whether one could write a grammar of art (a grammar in the linguistic
sense) at all. Though an artist has a large number of choices when selecting his topic and when deciding what he wants to say about it, just as a speaker has, the selection on one level does not affect the selection on another level in the way that it does in the case of language. In other words, the notion of realization, as central to the system of language, may have to be very much modified when applied to a non-verbal semiotic such as painting.

O'Toole is certainly aware of this, and has made it clear that the rather rigid-looking grid of the chart is not designed to constrain or over-determine our interpretation of a painting's meaning (ibid., p.6). It is rather a map of the semiotic space created by the work within which our perceptions and conceptions are negotiated. The semiotic space involves all three functional dimensions of meaning: representational, modal and compositional. It is here, I think, that Halliday's system is of the greatest importance to the semiotics of art. This will take us to the next section dealing with metafunctions in painting.

[B] The concept of "metafunctions" in painting

As O'Toole points out (ibid., p.6), it is a crucial advantage for linguistics that Halliday's model does not give special weight to the referential, "ideational" function of language. It often seems obvious to start with this, but it should have no priority over the interpersonal and textual function. Similarly, in the analysis of a painting, he says, 'our craven need to recognize what is being represented tends to push us into discussing options in the representational function first' (ibid.). However, O'Tool believes that there are considerable advantages to be gained in approaching the modal systems first because, (1) 'hermeneutically' they probably determine our first immediate engagement with the work; (2) 'heuristically' the
adequate description should counteract the form/content dichotomy to which critics and art historians are prone; and (3) 'pedagogically' recognizing them and having words to describe them may well offer learners and lovers of painting a more direct access to what we actually see, as opposed to what art historians think we ought to know before we start looking. O’Toole argues that a firmer recognition of, and a clearer language for describing, the modal function in art would do more to change the quality and the politics of art appreciation and education than any other single change. In his words: 'give people the words to describe how and why they engage with a painting, and you may release them from their abject bondage to art historians and teachers of composition. To put it bluntly, the main function of our functional semiotics may be to clarify and share around the discourse' (Ibid.).

Some of these comments I would dispute, while I would agree with many others. Primarily, however, I question whether the modal consideration could replace the representational one in terms of which one comes first. This, of course, would depend on what we think is the general function of art. If the function of a work of art seen from the artist's point of view, rather than from the viewer's point of view (i.e. we discuss what the subject matter is the artist is discussing, what it is he is saying about it and how he does it, rather then what we think the subject matter is, what we think the artist is saying about it, how we as individuals feel about the subject matter and about what we think is being said about it, and what we think about the way selected by the artist chose to talk about the subject matter) it probably would not matter which of the functions (or its realizations) was discussed first. We could start by saying that the artist is telling the public that he does not like violence (as opposed to him making general statements about violence as a philosophical and rather
abstract issue), which would be the expression of modal meaning. Then we might go on to discuss the representational or the compositional level of the work. However, if the aim of a discussion is our immediate engagement with and reaction to the work, then I feel it is desirable to start with the ideational level, even if this means to going outside of the work first. If we do not know what a work is about or what its function is, our comments about it will hardly be ‘sensible’, even if they do express our first reactions. To put this another way, the Theme and Rheme of a painting (i.e. the artist’s perspective) should precede the Given and New (the viewer’s perspective). It seems appropriate that the first step in an art analysis should be to understand a visual text and then evaluate it in terms of its intended aims and objectives before one discusses “what it does to me as an individual (for whom it was not written/painted in the first place)”. The only benefit of reversing the process would be to see how different viewer perspectives effect the interpretation of a work.

As a footnote to the above, it should be admitted that there are works of art which, instead of ‘telling a particular story’ which is to be understood by the viewer, are intended by the artist to give the viewer a freedom to react to them according to his/her own emotions and experiences. But, this would not apply to painting before the modern era. Earlier, a painting was a visual “text” that was to be "read" by a viewer in the way it was "written" by the artist. The message of such works was quite precise and there was no room for a personal interpretation.

As an example of what can happen if the ideational function is ignored, the following summarizes the reactions of a student who was asked to describe a painting by the pre-Early Renaissance painter Cimabue, The Madonna Enthroned with Angels. The student said that she didn’t like the
picture because the subject matter did not appeal to her and
she could not live with it hung in her living room (ignoring
the fact that it was not painted for that particular
reason). She did not like the presentation of the picture
because the participants in the picture - the Madonna, the
infant and the angels - did not have 'bodies' (i.e. they were
not painted realistically, in three-dimensions - unaware
that the concept of three-dimensionality, as expressed on a
two-dimensional background, was not known until the period
of the High Renaissance, and that the body-less figures of
the saints agreed better with the religious philosophy of
that time). The student found the Madonna too large compared
to the rest of the figures (the lack of ability of the
artist - not recognizing that the difference in size is a
symbol of the Madonna's status); and the colours not as
beautiful as she found in some of the great oil paintings.
She was wondering why Cimabue didn't use oil as the medium
for his paintings ('which would have brightened up the
composition' - not realizing that oil paints were invented
many centuries later. I would suggest that familiarity with
the function and content of a painting is important to the
viewer, and may be seen as complementary rather than
'contradicting' to his personal view of a painting.

Putting this together with what was said above in relation
to the levels, or 'strata' of a painting, I would defend the
art historian's view that in order to understand and
evaluate a painting, we must always go outside of it before
we can understand and evaluate what is in it. By looking at
a picture, all we can do is to describe it - provided the
objects in it are familiar to us. If they are not, we cannot
even describe the picture accurately. A written text in an
unknown foreign language could only be described in visual
terms: e.g. 'there are five sentences: some are long and some
are short; all are statements because there are no question
or exclamation marks'. There are no further clues about its ideational or interpersonal meanings.

When it comes to a visual text, i.e. a painting, the only clue we have is the title of a picture—provided it was the artist who gave it a title, and provided the title is not something like "Untitled". For many years paintings were not supplied with a title, but because their topic was familiar to the viewer, e.g. Christ on the cross, there was no need. However, the further removed we are from the period and society for which a painting was painted, the harder it is for us to know what is the subject matter of a painting and what it is that is being said about it. Here are some examples of the kind of difficulty that may arise (Fig.1 - 22).
Though the so-called Old Masters usually give some clues as to who the people are (the way they are dressed, or undressed), modern versions of the old theme may cause a problem, e.g. (1) - (3).
(1) is a 16th century version by Mabuse which has all the clues we need in order to know who the two people are. (2) which was painted by Max Slevgnot around 1928 has fewer clues and the posture of the man is very non-Adam-like. (3) is an advertisement with the theme of Adam and Eve as a background and this can be even more difficult to interpret.
The nine paintings (4)–(12) deal with topics which are clear, and there is usually nothing metaphorical about them. They are portraits of people and "portraits" of things. We might not be able to describe the sitter in the portrait by his name; but in fact in all the above pictures the title supplies the necessary information: (4) Descartes by Frans Hals, (5) Court Fool by Diego Velasquez, (6) Dona Tadea Aira de Enriquez by Francisco Goya, (7) Woman in kitchen by Pierre Chardin, (8) Mad Kidnamper by Theodore Gericault, (9 – 12) Still life paintings by Chardin, Goya, Jean Oudry and Jan Fyt). The meaning of the pictures can be taken to be what one can see. With (13)–(16) the theme is familiar to us, e.g. (13) The Crucifixion [by Andrea Mantegna], (14) the Annunciation [by Sandro Botticelli], (15) the Last Supper [by Leonardo da Vinci], (16) Pieta [by Botticelli]. The problem starts when we are to talk about pictures with themes which are no longer familiar to us (or never have been, such as paintings of non-western cultures). In (17)–(19) the title is available to us, in all three cases: (17) is Rubens' 'Judgement of Paris', (18) is Bronzino's 'Allegory of Time and Love' and (19) is Leonardo's 'Leda and the Swan'. Yet, without knowing the story, we can only describe the pictures in terms of what is visible: e.g. 'the picture shows a naked lady playing with a big swan'; or 'there are at least four participants in this picture – a young woman, two boys and one old man, one of the boys kisses the woman, the other one is watching them for reasons unknown to me and the old man in the background seems annoyed'. Of course this is naive; but it has to be accepted as a valid description if we are to depend solely on (out personal view) what we see.

The reason for this discrepancy takes us back to the point made earlier: that painting is not like language because the forms available to the artist do not have specific meaning
attached to them. Furthermore, the medium of visual art does not have the potential to distinguish ideational concepts such as those which in language are realized by adverbs and prepositions, by the tense system, or by the greater part of the lexicon. (Compare the point raised in 5 where we questioned whether the boat was 'moving fast' and asked how that could be obvious from a painting which was stationary.)

As a final illustration of the difference between telling the story verbally and visually; let us consider one of western painting's most famous themes, the Last Supper. To anyone in our own culture the topic is quite clear, so there is no question about the identity of the 13 men in the picture; but it is hard, if not impossible to say what stage of the dinner a picture represents. There are is versions by Domenico del Ghirlandaio (20) and Andrea del Castagno (21) where Judas is placed alone on the other side of the table, so the picture tells us at least which one Judas is. However, there is nothing in those two versions that would tell us the stage of the dinner. Does the picture represents the moment before the Apostles have been told, or after they were told?
It is only in Leonardo’s version (22) that this is indicated. Leonardo sits his Judas on the same side of the table with the others, but the expression on Judas’ face as well as that on the other faces, indicates that they have already been told. We know which Judas is because, while all the others argue and claim that they could not and would not betray Christ, Judas just sits there and says nothing, but watches the reaction of the other eleven men. The composition as presented by Leonardo tells us both: which who Judas is, and that the picture represents the moment just after Christ has made the statement about the betrayal. And if we have a deep knowledge of the scripture, such as today only a few people have, we will be able to identify all the rest.

So while with O’Toole’s application of the concepts of rank and level my query concerned the model itself, with that of metafunction I agree with his interpretation and question only the conclusion he draws from it, namely that the ideational aspect of the meaning of a painting should not be given priority. As a teacher of art, I feel that providing a student with information about the ideational meaning and cultural background of a painting is not constraining him, as O’Toole seems to imply, but rather freeing him by creating an environment in which his own viewing of the work is illuminated and enriched. Without this he is like someone expected to read a work of literature in a language he only partially knows; his access to the work is not only restricted but restricted in ways that are accidental and irrelevant to the issue.

To return to O’Toole’s discussion of the metafunctions, he says of the Modal Function that it is realized by a number of systems of options that determine both how the artist views the reality represented in the painting and how he or
The Systems of Focus

Realizations in
'Flight into Egypt'

Perspective
- 1-point
- 2-point
- multiple
- inverse
  \rightarrow Cubist refractions of multiple planes and movement

Clarity
- Clear
- Vague
- Blurred
  \rightarrow Mary as clearest depiction

Light
- Bright
- Partial
- Dim
- Dark
  \rightarrow Infant as centre of luminosity

Colour
- Concentrated - blue for Virgin's robes white for infant
- Juxtaposed - brown/russet/violet around white
- Graded - grading of blue, brown, pink

Scale and Volume
- Dominant
- Medial
- Minor
  \rightarrow Joseph, Mary and donkey

Relation to Golden Section
she seeks to engage our involvement with the work through various formal devices. This is entirely valid; I would merely comment that it was not always the artist's view that was presented in a painting, but often the view of the patron. Note also that, while we may talk of 'modality' here, we will not find a regular, systematic expression for it as we do in the case of language. A picture of a landscape can mean: this is a landscape near my home; I like this landscape; I like drawing landscapes: do you like this landscape? and so on; but the light and the colour and the location of trees will not give us any clue to which of the above is the intended message.

O'Toole then offers a partial "grammar" of the system of the modal function in painting, and shows which options from the available systems Hinder has chosen to engage our attention (Figure 3). This is an excellent summary of the features constituting the concept of focal point in art. My only comments as an art teacher is that through both painter and viewer could share a 'language' of potentials for meaning that can be described and discussed systematically, like the system of Mood in the interpersonal function of verbal language, this is something that has to be learnt, and that a teacher has to teach. A viewer has a potential to understand the language of the artist, but this does not come naturally as it would in the case of two speakers of a verbal language which has specific meanings attached to specific symbols. A viewer depends on the assistance of a 'translator' - whether a semiotician of painting, an art teacher, a gallery guide - because only very few of the meanings which are realized through the 'compositional' level are accessible by intuition. Nor will a student come to understand them simply by looking at the picture.

While O'Toole's network satisfies the conditions found in the picture under discussion, we cannot be sure that it has
a universal application even for pictures of the same style and period, which in a metaphorical sense should share the same grammar. It might be that we would have to modify such networks over and over again to account for the different internal situation in different works of art. A paintings is not like a written text which can be analysed in terms of a grammar. The question that needs to be explored is whether this is merely because up to now we have had no such grammar available to us, or whether it is inherently impossible to write such a grammar - either because painting is a semiotic system of a different kind, or because it varies over time, space and genre in ways that make any such generalizations invalid.

O'Toole has demonstrated convincingly that Halliday's systemic-functional linguistics can offer a model for the study of other semiotic codes. My concern here is to suggest that there are, however, certain areas in non-linguist semiotic systems that can not benefit from the application of a model which is essentially linguistic in character. We said earlier in this thesis, that because of its potential to tell stories, to move forward and backward in time, to use metaphors and synecdoches (but not metonymy), to talk about what is real and what is not, and so on, painting is probably the semiotic system closest to language. However, this does not mean that it is exactly like language. Let me summarize those linguistic concepts which seem to me not readily applicable to to painting as a semiotic system.

1) A painting is only rarely a parallel to a clause; so it is not very helpful to discuss a picture in terms of concepts analogous to phrase and groups. While there are ambiguities in this area even in the language about painting, e.g. in the area of Epithet versus Classifier and experiential Epithet versus attitudinal Epithet, painting itself does not offer any information about the content of
the experiential or logical structure of the 'nominal' groups we can recognize in the visual text. For instance, given a picture of a brown horse, we can be certain about the functional elements called Numerative and Thing, i.e. one horse; we can also assume that the horse was 'brown' and that brown is an experiential rather than an attitudinal epithet. But as far as the rest of the nominal group is concerned, there is no way of telling that the nominal group reads a brown horse rather than this brown horse or my brown horse; or whether there are other epithets or classifiers the artist had in mind: 'this is my old favourite brown horse', and so on.

2. Similarly with regards to Finite and Predicator: the Finite element has the function of making the proposition finite, and it does it by reference to the time of the speaking or by reference to the judgement of the speaker. There is nothing like that in the system of painting. For instance, a painting of a horse jumping over a hurdle could equally mean: This particular horse jumps like this; horses (in general) jump over hurdles like this: a horse jumped over a hurdle in this way; a horse is just about to jump like this; a horse is jumping over a hurdle.

3. Apart from the problem of Picture and Episode (whether Picture is equivalent to Clause, and whether Episode refers to a unit bigger than a clause), there is the problem of the relationship analogous to that between the clauses in a clause complex. I am not aware of any painting that would help us discuss the relationship between the individual episodes (or whatever term we may use for this smaller unit) in a picture. It would be almost impossible to say which 'episode' modifies which and which types of logico-semantic relationship there exist between the episodes.
The above considerations suggest that a model for the semiotics of painting, if it is derived from language, would not reach much below the clause, and would avoid some of the concepts, like those mentioned above, which do not seem to apply to painting as a semiotic system. On the other hand, the three metafunctions would form the central part of the model. We agree that all paintings can usefully be discussed in terms of the ideational, interpersonal and compositional meanings they realize (keeping the terms ‘ideational’ and ‘interpersonal’, while the term ‘compositional’ seems more appropriate for the ‘textual’ system). However, we would not interpret these functions in terms of three levels, because we do not consider that painting is a tri-stratal system in the way that language is.

If we were to summarize where and how can Halliday’s systemic-functional model assist, the answer would be that it can do so in two ways. Firstly, it can help in the analysis of art discourse, which is what this thesis was trying to outline. Secondly, it can help teachers and art students to look at art from a functional perspective, and in this way to shift from art description to art interpretation. In other words, Halliday’s model can help both in the linguistic and in the artistic sense. In the linguistic sense, his grammar, which was designed to analyse any text, both spoken and written, in modern English, could help us to analyse art text and say not only what is the usual way of talking about the different aspects of art, but what are the problems associated with it. In this connection it is worth recalling that Halliday talks about two levels of achievement to aim at: one is a contribution to the understanding of the text, and the other is a contribution to the evaluation of the text. In the first case the linguistic analysis enables one to show how, and why, the text means what it does; this level is always attainable provided that analysis relates the text to general features
of the language. In the second case, the linguistic analysis may enable one to say why the text is, or is not, an effective text for its own purpose; this goal is much harder to achieve, because it assumes an interpretation not only of the environment of the text, but also of how the linguistic features of a text relate systematically to the features of its environment, including the intentions of those involved in its production. It seems that a linguistic analysis of this kind, especially if it can attain the higher of the two goals, could also help those who are seriously involved in teaching and writing about art. If these writers were aware of some of the problems students have to face, they may be willing to simplify and clarify their verbal expression so that their students could more easily understand them rather than depending on educated guesses about what the text might be saying. In this sense, Halliday's linguistic model could help to improve the teaching of art on all levels from the primary to the tertiary.

In the artistic sense, Halliday's model can assist in the area of art perception. The functional perspective behind it can easily be adopted and adapted to the semiotics of painting; in my own teaching I have been using concepts 'borrowed' from Halliday's in this way.

I agree with O'Toole that a clearer language for describing art is necessary; and, as this chapter has shown, it seems to me that Halliday's grammar, which was developed for the purposes of text analysis, is relevant in this connection. A painting is a visual text that we are trying to read, and interpret in terms of the message it carries. Whether in this process a semiotic of painting based on language can make any contribution towards the more difficult goal of evaluation is something far beyond what can be considered at this stage. The evaluation of a work of art is almost
inaccessible, because in the majority of cases we simply cannot tell whether a painting is effective for its own purpose; we cannot go back in history and evaluate what effect a religious painting had on the believer in a 13th century church, even if we may be familiar with the intentions of those involved in its production. But there is no need to press this point any further. What I have tried to suggest in this chapter is that O'Toole's approach, despite my particular reservations about it, clearly demonstrates that it is valuable to explore the possibilities of systemic-functional linguistics as a way into a semiotics of art. Meanwhile, the other application of the theory, in the analysis, interpretation and evaluation of writing about art (the values of which I hope to have shown in the central part of this thesis), is something that can be undertaken here and now by anyone who is willing to work simultaneously in the artistic and the linguistic field.
CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION

Looking back over the research presented here, from when it was first considered to when it had been finally written up, we may ask the following questions:

1) Had the linguistic analysis helped us in any way to understand the nature of art discourse?

2) Had the linguistic analysis helped us to single out some of linguistic problems associated with the discourse of aesthetics and art criticism?

3) Had the linguistic analysis helped us to construct a bridge between the two systems of communication, language and art?

4) Had we learnt anything about art as a semiotic system?

5) Had we learnt anything about how to make art texts more accessible to students?

Halliday's Systemic-Functional Grammar was constructed for the purposes of text analysis, 'to make it possible to say sensible and useful things about any text in Modern English'. The texts discussed in Chapters 4 to 7 are texts of a rather distinctive kind, written with a particular purpose and particular readership in view; and some of them present problems of understanding, not only to a layman (including one who may be a linguist) but even to the expert for whom they are intended.

Halliday suggests that, in any activity of discourse analysis, there are always two possible levels of achievement to aim at. One is a contribution to the understanding of the text; the other is a contribution to the evaluation of the text. The first one remains, so to
speak, inside the realm of language; while the other takes us above and outside language to the contextual configuration (in Hasan's sense), within which the text functions and so can be judged to be more, or less, selective.

It is hoped that the analysis presented in this thesis proved that it is capable of achieving both. We have been able to relate the texts to general features of the language, to the lexicogrammar of English. The analysis confirmed our view that there are different registers within the language of 'writing about art', corresponding to the four varieties (plus the fifth one of 'portable art') that we identified while tracing the course of their development. It showed, however, that these varieties are not all distinct one from another; one of them, art history, turns out to encompass all the others, because of the shift of perspective on art, and on the artist, from pre-classical times to the present day.

The analysis also suggested why it is that two of the registers, art criticism and aesthetics, cause special problems of understanding to the reader. We were able to show what particular linguistic difficulties arise in texts of this type; especially problems arising from structural ambiguity and grammatical metaphor.

Thus the study confirmed, in a rather systematic way, a feeling people have about art history, art technology, aesthetics and art criticism. But it also took us outside and above language, to consider the present status of writing about art in relation to the functions that such writing is called on to perform. In understanding why the texts mean what they do, we also understand how it is that we understand them (or how it is that we cannot understand them); and in this way we are able to evaluate texts about
art, at least in respect of their accessibility to those who read them. What we have been attempting could be said to be a kind of 'critical linguistics', in the sense of the concepts developed by Roger Fowler in his *Literature as Social Discourse* (1981). Fowler developed his approach in relation to literature; I am not a literary specialist, but I became aware of a similarity between 'writing about literature' and 'writing about art'.

As far as the third question is concerned, it does seem that the analysis has helped us to understand both the similarities and the differences between language as a system of communication and art as a system of communication. We hope we have been able to show where and how Halliday's model can be of use both to students and teachers of art and to writers about art. On the other hand, the linguistic analysis showed where the model can not be used; not because it is not capable of saying sensible things about art, but because the two systems - despite the many similarities between them - are different in many aspects. We suggested that it was mainly the functional aspects of the model that were applicable to art; and in this sense it can be said to form a bridge, or at least to make it possible for a bridge to be built between the two systems. Whether in doing so we learn anything new about art as a semiotic system must remain an open question. I have not tried to pursue this question beyond a critical appraisal of O'Toole's work in the area. In this respect the relation between art itself and writing about art is obviously very different from that between literature and writing about literature (where both are made of language). Art is not made of language. But if we think of language as analogy, then the present study suggests that it will be a semantically-oriented functional interpretation of language such as that adopted here which will have most to offer.
As a teacher of art appreciation and art history, I hope that it will be possible to use the insights gained from this analysis to make the discourse of art more accessible to my students. I think, in fact, that I have already begun to do so, by being able to diagnose the problems they have as essentially linguistic problems, and showing them how to engage with language they find difficult (while reassuring them about their own 'deficiencies' in the matter). Whether it could be suggested to those who write in these areas, specially the two more problematic ones, that they might reflect on their own linguistic usage from the point of view of those who find themselves struggling to understand, is a question that must lie beyond our present consideration.

It is clear that much further research is needed, both along the same lines as we have attempted to follow here and in further directions in the semantics and semiotics of art discourse. Meanwhile I hope that this study will have shown both the theoretical interest and the practical value of explorations of this kind.
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WRITING ABOUT ART:

a linguistic consideration

of art history

and related genres

Volume : 2

by

Alena Rada

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR of PHILOSOPHY

Department of Linguistic University of Sydney

March, 1989
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3.A
SAMPLES OF WRITINGS ABOUT ART: Historical perspective

THE GREEKS AND ROMANS

PLATO [428-348 B.C.]

Ion - persons of dialogue: Socrates and Ion

Socrates

I have often envied the profession of a rhapsode, Ion; for it is apart of your art to wear fine clothes and to look as beautiful as you can, while at the same time you are obliged to be continually in the company of many good poets, and especially of Homer, who is the best and most divine of them, and to understand his mind, and not merely learn his words by rote; all this is a thing greatly to be envied. I am sure that no man can become a good rhapsode who does not understand the meaning of the poet. For the rhapsode ought to interpret the mind of the poet to his hearers, but how can he interpret him well unless he knows what he means? All this is much to be envied, I repeat.

Ion

Very true, Socrates; interpretation has certainly been the most laborious part of my art; and I believe myself able to speak about Homer better than any man; and that neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbroclus of Thasos, nor Glaucon, nor anyone else who ever was, had as good ideas about Homer as I have, or as many.

(Sesonske, 1965:3)

ARISTOTLE [384-322 B.C.]

On Poetic Art

1. It is on poetic art itself that we propose to talk, and also on the forms it takes - what effectiveness each has; and how plots should be put together if the composition is to be good - also, then, of what parts a composition is in terms of quantity and quality; and on any other matters as well which belong to this particular investigation, beginning in the natural order first with the things which are first.

2. Epic, as I here define it, and the composing of tragedy - comedy, too, of course - and the art of dithyrambic composition, and most of the other arts which use the flute and lyre, all are found to be forms of imitation generically. 3. But they differ from one another in three respects; that is, in imitating either in other media, or other objects, or otherwise - not in the same way.
4. For, as some men, either by art or by practice, imitate many sorts of things making likeness both in colors and in shapes — while others imitate with the voice — so it is in the arts named: as a group, they make their imitation in rhythm and language and tone. But these they may use either separately or in combination; for example, tone and rhythm, when the arts of the flute and the lyre use only them, and perhaps there are other arts which may be found similar in what they can do, such as that of the panpipes.

(Sesonske, 1965:51)

Insert Xenocrates and Durs

Insert Cicero and Quintilian

VITRUVIUS [1st century B.C.]

The Ten Books on Architecture

The Education of the Architect — Book 1, Chapter 1

1. The architect should be equipped with knowledge of many branches of study and varied kinds of learning, for it is by his judgement that all work done by the other arts is put to test. This knowledge is the child of practice and theory. Practice is the continuous and regular exercise of employment where manual work is done with any necessary material according to the design of drawing. Theory, on the other hand, is the ability to demonstrate and explain the productions of dexterity on the principles of proportion.

2. It follows, therefore, that architects who have aimed at acquiring manual skill without scholarship have never been able to reach a position of authority to correspond to their pains, while those who relied only upon theories and scholarship were obviously hunting the shadow, not the substance. But those who have a thorough knowledge of both, like men armed at all points, have the sooner attained their object and carried authority with them.
Classification of Temples - Book 3, Chapter 2

1. There are certain elementary forms on which the general aspect of a temple depends. First there is the temple in antis; then the prostyle, amphiprostyle, peripteral, pseudodipteral, dipteral, and hypaetral. These different forms may be described as follows.

2. It will be a temple in antis when it has antae carried out in from of the walls which enclose the cella, and in the middle, between the antae, two columns, and over them the pediment constructed in the symmetrical proportions to be described later in this work. An example will be found at the Three Fortunes, in that one of the three which is nearest the Colline gate.

The origins of the three orders, and the proportions of the corinthian capital - Book 4, Chapter 1

3. ....To the forms of their columns are due the names of the three orders, Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian, or which the Doric was the first to arise, and in early times. For Dorus, the son of Hellen and the nymph Phthia, was king of Achaea and all the Peloponnesus, and he built a fane, which chanced to be of this order, in the precinct of Juno at Argolis, a very ancient city, and subsequently others of the same order in the other cities of Achaea, although the rules of symmetry were not yet in existence.

4. Later, the Athenians, in obedience to oracles of the Delphic Apollo, and with the general agreement of all Hellas, despatched thirteen colonies at one time to Asia Minor, appointing leaders for each colony and giving the command-in-chief to Ionm sone of Xuthus and Creusa (whom further Apollo at Delphi in the oracles had acknowledged as his son). Ion conducted those colonies to Asia Minor, took possession of the land of Caria, and there founded the grand cities of Ephesus, Miletus, Myrus (long ago engulfed by the water, and its sacred rites and suffrage handed over by the Ionians to the Milesians), Priene, Samos, Teos, Colophon, Chius, Erythrae, Phocaea, Clazomenae, Lebedos, and Melite. This Melite, on account of the arronace of its citizens, was destroyed by the other cities in a war declared by general agreement, and in its place, through the kindness of King Attalus and Arsinoe, the city of the Smyrnaeans was admitted among the Ionians.

PLOTINUS [A.D. 204-269]

From The Enneads - 1st Ennead, 6th Tractate: Beauty

Beauty addresses itself chiefly to sight; but there is a beauty for the hearing too, as in certain combinations of words and in all kinds of music, for melodies and cadences are beautiful; and minds that lift themselves above the realm of sense to a higher order are aware of beauty in the conduct of life, in actions, in character, in the pursuit of the intellect; and there is the beauty of the virtues. What loftier beauty there may be, yet, our argument will bring to light.

What, then, is it that gives comeliness to material forms and draws the ear to the sweetness perceived in sounds, and what is the secret of the beauty there is in all that derives from Soul?

Is there some One Principle from which all take their grace, or is there a beauty peculiar to the embodied and another for the bodiless? Finally, one or many, what would such a Principle be?

Consider that some things, material shapes for instance, are gracious not by anything inherent but by something communicated, while others are lovely of themselves, as, for example, Virtue.

The same bodies appear sometimes beautiful, sometimes not; so that there is a good deal between being body and being beautiful.

(Sesonske, 1965:79)
THE MIDDLE AGES

THEOPHILUS [10th century A.D.]

An Essay Upon Various Arts - Books 1

I. Theophilus, an humble priest, servant of the servants of God, unworthy of the name and profession of a monk, to all wishing to overcome or avoid sloth of the mind or wantering of the soul, by useful manual occupation and delightful contemplation of novelties, send recompense of heaheavy price....

Wherefore, gentle son, whom God rendered perfectly happy in this respect, that those things are offered to three gratis which many, ploughing the sea-waves with the greatest danger to life, consumed by the hardship of hunger and cold, or subjected to the wary servitude of teachers, and altogether worn out by the desire of learning, yet acquire with intolerable labour, covet with greedy looks this "BOOK OF VARIOUS ARTS," read it through with a tenacious memory, embrace it with an ardent love.

Of Gold Leaf - Book 1, Ch.XXXIV

Take Greek parchment (that is, paper), which is made from linen cloth, and you will rub it on both sides with a red colour which is burned from sinope, that is ochre, very finely ground and dry, and polish it with a beaver's tooth, or that of a bear or a wild boar, very carefully, until it becomes shining, and that the colour may adhere through friction. Then cut up this parchment with scissors, into square pieces, to the size of four fingers, equally broad and long. Afterward make a kind of purse of vellum parchment, of the same dimension and strongly sewed, ample enough that you may fill into it many pieces of reddened parchment. Which being done, take pure gold and make it very thin with a hammer upon an even anvil, very carefully, so that there be no fracture in it, and cut it into four parts to the measure of two fingers.

(Holt, 1957: Vol.1,p.2-3)
LEO OF OSTIA

The Chronicla of Monte Cassino - Book III.

In all happiness and peacefulness, through the merits of the Holy Father Benedict, God installed the venerable abbot Desiderius. He was held in such great honor by everyone around that not only all the people of modest origin, but even their princes and dukes eagerly rendered him the same obedience and ready response to this wishes that they rendered their sires or lords. Thus, not without divine inspiration, Desiderius planned the demolition of the old church and the construction of a new, more beautiful and august one.....

An since the old church had been built on the very top of the mountain, and had been exposed in every direction to the violent buffeting of the winds, and as it had often been hit by lighting. Desiderius decided to destroy the ridge of stone with fire and steel, to level a space sufficient for the foundations of the basilica, and to make a deep excavation where the foundations would be laid......

Then he levelled with great difficulty the space for the entire basilica, except for the sanctuary, procured all the necessary materials, hired highly experienced workmen, and laid the foundations in the name of Jesus Christ, and started the construction of the basilica.

It was one hundred and five cubits long, forty-three cubits wide, and twenty-eight cubits high. On each side he erected on bases ten columns nine cubits high. In the upper part he opened rather large windows: twenty-one in the nave, six long ones and four round ones in the choir, and two in the central apse. He erected the walls of the two aisles to a height of fifteen cubits and provided each aisle with ten windows.

(Holt, 1957:9-11)
CENNINO CENNINI [c.1370 - c.1440] - a painter and a writer on art; his Libro dell'arte (The Craftsman's Handbook) stands between the medieval and modern periods and contains elements of both.

Here begins the craftsman’s handbook, made and composed by Cennino of Colle, in the reverence of God, and of the Virgin Mary, and of Saint Eustace, and of Saint Francis, and of Saint John Baptist, and of Saint Anthony of Padua, and, in general, of all the Saints of God; and in the reverence of Giotto, of Taddeo and of Agnolo, Cennino’s master; and for the use of good and profit of anyone who wants to enter this profession.

Chapter IV. How the Schedule Shows You into how Many Sections and Branches the Occupations are Divided. The basis of the profession, the very beginning of all these manual operations, is drawing and painting. These two sections call for a knowledge of the following: how to work up or grind, how to apply size, to put on cloth, to gesso, to scrape the gessos and smooth them down, to model with gesso, to lay bole, to guild, to burnish; to temper, to lay in; to pounce, to scrape through, to stamp or punch; to mark out, to paint, to embellish, and to varnish, on panel or ancona. To work on a wall you have to wet down, to plaster, to true up, to smooth off, to draw, to paint in fresco. To carry to completion in secco: to temper, to embellish, to finish on the wall. And let this be the schedule of the aforesaid stages which I, with what little knowledge I have acquired, will expound, section by section.

(Holt, 1957:136-139)
THE RENAISSANCE

LEON BATTISTA ALBERTI [c.1404-1472] - the famous sculptor

On Painting - to Filippo Di Ser Brunellesco

Book I. In writing these very short remarks on painting, to make what I say quite clear I shall first take from mathematicians those things that have to do with my there, and having become familiar with them, I shall, as far as my faculties permit, discuss painting as it is derived from fundamental principles of nature.

But in all my talking I urge strongly that I may be thought of as writing of these things as a painter, not a mathematician. The latter measure to form of things with the understanding alone, apart from all concrete matter. We, because we wish to make things visible, shall for this purpose use a grosser method, as they say. I shall be very grateful if the reader somehow understand this matter, which is certainly difficult and has never been described by any other writer so far as I know. So I beg that my words be interpreted as those of a painter.

It appears to me obvious that colors vary according to lights, since very color, when placed in shadow, seems not to be the same one that it is in brightness. Shadow makes color dark; light makes color bright where it strikes. The philosophers say that nothing can be seen which is not lighted and colored.

So there is a close relation between colors and lights with respect to seeing. As to how close this is, consider that when light is lacking, colors are lacking; when light returns, colors return.

(Holt, 1957: 206-7)
LEONARDO DA VINCI (1452-1519)

Painting and Poetry. The Difference Between Painting and Poetry. Painting is poetry which is seen and not hear, and poetry is a painting which is heard but not seen. These two arts, you may call the both either poetry or painting, have here interchanged the senses by which they penetrate to the intellect. Whatever is painted must pass by the eye, which is the nobler sense, and whatever is poetry must pass through a less noble sense, namely, the ear, to the understanding. Therefore, let the painting be judged by a man born deaf, and the poem by one born blind.

Prolegomena and General Introduction to the Book on Painting. On the Sections of Painting. The first thing in painting is that the objects it represents should appear in relief, and that the grounds surrounding them at different distances should appear to extend (three dimensionally) right into the wall on which they are painted, with the help of the three branches of perspective, which are: the diminution of the forms of the object; the diminution in their magnitude; and the diminution in their colour. And of these three classes of perspective the first results from (the structure of) the eye, while the other two are caused by the atmosphere which intervenes between the eye and the objects seen by it. The second essential in painting is appropriate action and a due variety in the figures, so that the men may not all look like brothers, etc.

(Holt, 1957: p.277-279)
ALBRECH DURER [1472-1528]

On painting

He that would be a painter must have a natural turn thereto.

Love and delight are better teachers of the Art of Painting that compulsion is.

If a man is to become a really great Painter hemust be educated thereto from his very earlist years.

He must copy much of the work of good artists until he attains a free hand.

What is painting?

To paint is to be able to portray upon a flat surface any one - whichever he chooses of all visible things, whatsoever they may be.

It is well for everyone, by way of first instruction, to divide and reduce to measure a human figure, before one learns anything else.

A letter to Jacob Heller, August 24, 1508

Dear Herr Jacob, I have safely received your letter, that is to say, the last but one, and I gather from it that you wish me to execute your panel well, which is just what I myself have in mind to do. In addition, you shall know how far it has got on; the wings have been painted in stone colors on the outside, but they are not yet varished, inside they are wholly underpainted, so that (the assistants) can begin to carry them out.

The middle panel I have outlined with the greatest care and at cost of much time; it is also coated with two very good colors upon which I can begin to underpaint it. For I intend, so soon as I hear you approve, to underpaint it some four, five, or six times over, for clearness and durability’s sake, also to use the very best ultramarine for the painting that I can get.

(Holt, 1957: p. 310, 333)
MICHELANGELO BUONARROTI (1475-1564)

A reply to Benedetto Varchi, a historian, who in 1546 sent a questionnaire to a number of artists asking them their views on the time-honored question of the pre-eminence of the arts.

Relative Merits of Painting and Sculpture - Rome 1549

So it may be clear that I have received your little book, which duly reached me, I will make such a reply as to what you ask, although I am very ignorant on the subject. In my opinion painting should be considered excellent in proportion as it approaches the effect of relief, while relief should be considered bad in proportion as it approaches the effect of painting.

I used to consider that sculpture was the lantern of painting and that between the two things there was the same difference as that between the sun and the moon. But now that I have read your book, in which, speaking as a philosopher, you say that things which have the same end are themselves the same, I have changed my opinion; and I now consider that painting and sculpture are one and the same thing, unless greater nobility be imparted by the necessity for a better judgment, greater difficulties of execution, strict limitations and harder work. And if this be the case no painter ought to think less of sculpture than of painting and no sculptor less of painting than of sculpture. By sculpture I mean the sort that is executed by cutting away from the block: the sort that is executed by building up resembles painting.

(Goldwater and Trevers, 1981:65-66)
GIORGIO VASARI [1511-1574]

Lives of the most eminent painters, sculptors, and architects.

Preface to the Third Part. Truly great was the advancement conferred on the arts of architecture, painting, and sculpture by those excellent masters of whom we have written hitherto, in the Second Part of these Lives, for to the achievements of the early masters they added rule, order, proportion, draughtsmanship, and manner, not, indeed in complete perfection, but with so near an approach to the truth that the masters of the third age, of whom we are henceforward to speak, were enabled, by means of their light, to aspire still higher and attain to that supreme celebrated of our modern works......

Rule, then, in architecture, was the process of taking measurements from antiquities and studying the groundpains of ancient edifices for the construction of modern buildings. Order was the separating of one style from another, so that each body should receive its proper members, with no more interchanging between Doric, Ionic, Corinthian, and Tuscan. Proportion was the universal law applying both to architecture and to sculpture, that all bodies should be made correct and true with the members in proper harmony.

THE BAROQUE

GIOVANNI PIETRO BELLORI (1615-1696) - a painter and a writer

The lives of modern painters, sculptors and architects

The idea of the painter, the sculptor, and the architect chosen from the higher natural beauties of nature. When that high and eternal intellect, the creator of nature, made his marvelous works by reflecting deeply, within himself, he established the first forms called Ideas. Each species was derived from that first Idea, and so was formed the admirable web of created things. The celestial bodies above the moon, not being subject to change, remained forever beautiful and in harmony; and because of their measured spheres and because of the splendor of their appearance we recognize them to be in all eternity of the highest perfection and beauty. On the other hand, sublunar bodies are subject to change and to ugliness and, although nature always means to produce excellence in its workings, nevertheless forms are altered through the inequality of matter, and human beauty in particular is muddled, as we see from the countless deformities and disproportions that are in us....

The idea of the painter and sculptor is that perfect and excellent exemplar in the mind, with an imagined form, which by imitation, the things that appear to human sight resemble; such is the definition of Cicero in the Book of the Orator for Brutus: "Vt igitur in formis, et figuris est aliquid pervectum et excellens, cuius ad excogitatem speciem imitando referuntur ea quae sub oculis ipse cadunt, sic perfectae eloquentiae speciem animo videmus, effigiem auribus quaeque visum est." ("Accordingly, as there is something perfect and surpassing in the case of sculpture and painting - an intellectual ideal by reference to which the artist represents those objects which themselves appear to the eye - so with our minds we conceive the idea of perfect eloquence, but with our ears we catch only the copy.")

(Holt, 1958: 94-95)
NICOLAS POUSSIN [1594-1665] - a painter

Observations on painting

On the Example of the Greater Masters. Even if instruction in practical methods is subsequently added to theory, even then the precepts do not leave in the mind that habit of working which should be the result of effective knowledge, unless they are confirmed by authority; and unless the efficient guide of good examples points out to the student shorter methods and more concrete aims, (those precepts) lead the young student by long and devious paths, and seldom do they achieve their final goal.

Definition of Painting and on the Manner of Imitation. Painting is nothing else than the imitation of those human actions which are imitable actions in a proper sense. The other actions are not intrinsically but accidentally capable of reproduction, and not as principal parts but as accessory ones. In this fashion one may also imitate not only the actions of animals, but all natural objects.

How Art Surpasses Nature. Art is not something different from nature, nor can it pass the bounds of nature. For that light of instruction which by a natural gift is scattered here and there, and appears in different men, in different places, and (at different) times, is gathered together by art; and all of this light, or (even) the greater part of it, can never be found in one single individual.

(Holt, 1958: 142-143)
PETER PAUL RUBENS [1577-1640]

A letter to Sir Dudley Carleton, Antwerp, May, 1618

Most Excellent Sir: I have given all the correct measurements of the whole of the pictures to that Man of Y.E.'s who came to take them by order of Y.E. to have the frames made, although you had not mentioned this to me in your letter. For some time I have not given a single stroke of brush, unless it be for the service of Y.E., so that all the pictures, even the Hunt and the Susanna, together with that sketch which closes our account, as well as those of our first agreement, will by divine aid be finished on the precise day of the 28th inst., agreeable to my promise. I hope you will be content with these works of mine, both as regards the variety of the subjects, and for the love and desire which urge me to serve Y.E. with so much zeal. I doubt not in the least that the Hunt and the Susanna will appear amongst the originals. The third is painted in panel, about three feet and a half in length, by two feet and a half in width, altogether original. It is a subject as it were neither sacred or profane, although taken from Holy Writ; namely, Sarah in the act of scolding Hagar, who, pregnant, is leaving the house in a feminine and graceful manner, with the assistance of the Patriarch Abraham.

(Holt, 1958: 194)

REMBRANDT VAN RIJN [1606-1669]

A letter to Huygens, February, 1636

My Lord: Because of the great joy and devotion which filled me in doing well the two works which His Excellency ordered me to make, the one where the dead body of Christ is put into the grave, and the other where Christ rises from the dead to the great alarm of the guards, these same two pieces are now finished through studious diligence, so that I am now inclined to deliver them to His Excellency in an effort to please him. In both these (paintings) I have concentrated on expressing the greatest inward emotion and that is then the chief reason why these pictures have remained so long under my hands.
Therefore I ask Your Lordship if you will be so kind as to tell His Excellency about it, and if you will agree that I should send these two pictures first to your house, as I did before. But before I do this, I await an answer by letter.

(Holt, 1958:201)

SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS [1723-1792]

Discourses: The Third Discourse...The first endeavours of a young Painter, as I have remarked in a former discourse, must be employed in the attainment of mechanical dexterity, and confined to the mere imitation of the object before him. Those who have advanced beyond the rudiments, may, perhaps find advantage in reflecting on the advice which I have likewise given them, when I recommended the diligent study of the works of our great predecessors; but I at the same time endeavoured to guard them against an implicit submission to the authority of any one master however excellent: or by a strict imitation of his manner, precluding themselves from the abundance and variety of Nature. I will now add that Nature herself is not to be too closely copied. There are excellencies in the art of painting beyond what is commonly called the imitation of nature: and these excellencies I wish to point out. The students who, having passed through the initiatory exercises, are more advanced in the art, and who, sure of their hand, have leisure to exert their understanding, must now be told, that a mere copier of nature can never produce anything great; can never raise and enlarge the conceptions, or warm the heart of the spectator.

The wish of the genuine painter must be more extensive: instead of endeavouring to amuse mankind with the minute neatness of his imitations, he must endeavour to improve them by the grandeur of his ideas; instead of seeking praise, be deceiving the superficial sense of the spectator, he must strive for fame by captivating the imagination.

(Holt, 1958:273-274)
JOHANN J. WINCKELMANN [1717-1768]

Thoughts on the Imitation of Greek Art in Painting and Sculpture.

Good taste, which is spreading more and more throughout the world, had its beginning under a Greek sky. Minerva, so legend goes, assigned to the Greeks this land, which because of its moderate climate would be likely to produce a people of intelligence. Thus the Greeks, although they received the seeds of inventions from other nations, gave them an entirely new character....

To take the ancients for models is our only way to become great, yes, unsurpassable if we can. As someone has said of Homer: he who learns to admire him, learns to understand him; the same is true of the art works of the ancients, especially the Greeks. One must become acquainted with them as with a friend in order to realize that the Laocoon is as superb as Homer....

Michelangelo, Raphael, and Poussin have looked at the works of the ancients with the eyes of Nicomachus. They studied good taste at its source and, in the case of Raphael, even in its native country. He is known to have sent young artists to Greece to sketch for him the remains of antiquity.

(Holt, 1958: 336-337)

GOTTHOLD EMMPRAIM LESSING [1729-1781]

Laocoon

...Among the lost works of Sophocles was a Laocoon. If fate had but spared it to us! From the slight references to the piece in some of the old grammarians, we cannot determine how the poet treated his subject. Of one thing I am convinced—that he would not havemade his Laocoon more of a Stoic than Philoctetes and Hercules. Everything stoical is untheatrical. Our sympathy is always proportionate with the suffering expressed by the object or our interest. If we behold him bearing his misery with magnanimity, our admiration is excited; but admiration is a cold sentiment, wherein barren wonder excludes not only every warmer emotion, but all vivid personal conception of the suffering.
I come now to my conclusion. If it be true that a cry, as an expression of bodily pain, is not inconsistent with nobility of soul, especially according to the views of the ancient Greeks, then the desire to express such a soul cannot be the reason why the artist has refused to imitate this cry in his marble. He must have had some other reason for deviating in this respect from his rival, the poet, who expresses it with deliberate intention.

(Holt, 1958:455)

JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOethe [1749-1832]

On German Architecture

...When I went to the minster the first time, my head was full of the general knowledge of good taste. By hearsay, I honored the harmony of mass, the purity of form, and was a sworn enemy of the confused capriciousness of Gothic decorations. Under the heading Gothic, as an article in an dictionary, I accumulated all the synonymous misunderstandings which had ever passed through my head of the undefined, the disorderly, the unnatural, the stuck-together, the plastered-upon, and the overladen. No cleverer than a people which calls barbaric the entire unknown world, I called everything Gothic that did not fit into my system, from the turned, colorful dolls and paintings with which our bourgeois nobility dressed up their houses to the stern remains of the older German architecture, over which, because of certain bizarre scrolls, I agreed with the common chant, "Completely smothered by ornament!" And therefore as I went I shuddered as before the sight of a misshapen, curly-bristled monster.

With what unexpected emotion did the sight surprise me as I stepped before it. A complete and total impression filled my soul, which, since it was composed of a thousand harmonizing details, I could easily relish and enjoy, but could by no means comprehend and explain. They say it is thus with the joys of heaven. And how often did I return to enjoy this heavenly-earthly joy, to embrace the gigantic spirit of our older brothers in their works! How often did I return from all sides, from all distances, in every light of the day, to gaze at its dignity and splendor! It is hard form man's spirit when his brother's work is so exalted that he must only bow and worship.

(Holt, 1958:365)
JACQUES-LOUIS DAVID [1748-1825] - a painter

Observation on the Painting - Journal de Paris

The ruling custom of the arts has changed, or, rather, there in no longer any system for the arts. Brought back once more to their true goal by the imitation of nature, supported by the study of antique models, they turn once more to moral and political preoccupations. In perpetuating the traits of heroism and virtue, even during the storms of the Revolution, they have ventured on a new flight, and all proclaim that this movement toward a state of greatness should gain in strength and that they should receive from the new order of things a real and permanent lustre.

The artist themselves have begun this valuable work of regeneration: it is for the government to carry it on. It should be convinced that these arts, so useless in the eyes of cold and superficial politicians, will have a powerful influence on every branch of industry and consequently upon the national glory and prosperity. What can the lovers of fine arts not look for from an honourable peace, the outcome of which cannot be doubted?

We have said that the artists have united all their efforts for the regeneration of the arts. One of these artists, long distinguished in the most flattering manner by the public, has one more renewed a custom which in the happy days of Greece assured to painters and sculptors a fortune worthy of their talents - a noble independence, lasting celebrity, and above all, the means of offering as gifts to their country the masterpieces which made them famous.

It was the public exhibition of their works that the med of the ancient world owed their most brilliant success. One among the moderns who emulates them, the author of the painting of the Sabines, has cause to boast. He has imitated crowds to admire his work, and the material gain which he will acquire by this exhibition will be the least of his rewards. The appreciation of the public is a more worthy object of his ambition.

(Holt, 1966: 12,13)
CHARLES BAUDELAIRE [1821-1867] - a poet and critic

The Salon of 1846

What is the good of criticism?

What is the good? - A vast and terrible question-mark which seizes the critic by the throat from his very first step in the first chapter that he sits down to write.

At once the artist reproaches the critic with being unable to teach anything to the bourgeois, who wants neither to paint nor to write verses - nor even to art itself, since it is from the womb of art that criticism was born.

And yet how many artists today owe to the critics alone their sad little fame! It is there perhaps that the real reproach lies....

I sincerely believe that the best criticism is that which is both amusing and poetic: not a cold, mathematical criticism which, on the pretext of explaining everything, has neither lover nor hate, and voluntarily strips itself of every shred of temperament. But, seeing that a fine picture is nature reflected by an artist, the criticism which I approve will be that picture reflected by an intelligent and sensitive mind. Thus the best account of a picture may well be a sonnet or an elegy.

But this kind of criticism is destined for anthology and readers of poetry. As for criticism properly so-called, I hope that the philosophers will understand what I am going to say. To be just, that is to say, to justify its existence, criticism should be partial, passionate, and political, that is to say, written from an exclusive point of view that opens up the widest horizons.

(Holt: 1966:175)
EDGAR DEGAS [1834-1917]

SHOP-TALK

Museums are there to teach the history of art and something more as well, for, if they stimulate in the weak a desire to imitate, they furnish the strong with the means of their emancipation.

The (Florentine) painters of the fifteen century are the true, the only guides. If you are thoroughly imbued with them and if you ceaselessly perfect your means of expression by the study of nature you are bound to achieve something.

It is all very well to copy what you see; it is much better to draw what you see only in memory. There is a transformation during which the imagination works in conjunction with the memory. You put down only what made an impression on you, that is to say the essential. Then your memory and your invention are freed from the dominating influence of nature. That is why pictures made by a man with a trained memory who knows thoroughly both the masters and his own craft are almost always remarkable works; for instance; Delacroix.

(Holt, 1966:401)

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GEORGE SEURAT [1859-1891]

Excerpt of letter to Maurice Beaubourg - August, 1890

"In closing I will give you the note on esthetic and technique which finishes my work on Monsieur Christophe, and which is my own. I have modified it somewhat, it not having been well understood by the printers."
Esthetic

Art is harmony.

Harmony is the analogy of opposites, the analogy of similar elements, of value, hue, and line, considered according to their dominants, and under the influence of lighting, in gay, calm, or sad combinations.

The opposites are:

For value, a more (luminous) for a darker one.

(light)

For hue, the complementsaries, i.e., a certain red opposed to its complementary, etc.

(red-green
orange-blue
yellow-violet

For line, those forming a right angle.

Gaiety of value is the light dominant; of hue, the warm dominants; of line, lines above the horizontal.

Calmness of value is the equality of dark and light; of hue, of warm and cool; and the horizontal for line.

Sadness of value is the dark dominant; of hue, the cool dominant; and of line, downward directions.

(Holt, 1966:470)

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VINCENT VAN GOGH [1853-90]

A letter to his brother Theo - Dec 1883

Dear Theo,

By the same mail you will receive a number of copies of the lithograph. Please give Mr. Portier as many as he wants. And I enclose a letter for him, which I am afraid you will think rather long, and, consequently, unbusinesslike. But I thought that what I had to say couldn’t be expressed more concisely and that the main thing is to give his arguments for his own instinctive feelings. And in fact, I also say to you what I write to him.
There is a school - I believe - of impressionists. But I know very little about it. But I do know who the original and most important masters are around whom - as around an axis - the landscape and peasant painters will revolve. Delacroix, Corot, Millet and the rest. That is my own opinion, not properly formulated.

I mean there are (rather than persons) rules or principles or fundamental truths for drawing, as well as for colour, which one proves to fall back, when one finds out an actual truth.

In drawing, for instance - that question of drawing the figure beginning with the circle - that is to say using elliptical planes as a foundation. A thing which the ancient Greek already knew, and which will remain till the end of the world. As to colours, those everlasting problems, for instance, that first question Corot addressed to Francais, when Francais (who already had a reputation) asked Corot (who then had nothing but a negative or rather bad reputation) when he (F.) came to Corot, to get some information: "Qu'est-ce que c'est un ton rompu? Qu'est-ce que c'est un ton neutre?"

Which can be shown better on the palette than expressed in words.

(Holt, 1966: 478)
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THE MIDDLE STONE AGE
(MESOLITHIC)

Rock-shelter Paintings

As the ice of the Paleolithic period melted in the increasing warmth, the reindeer migrated north, the woolly mammoth and rhinoceros disappeared, and the hunters left their caves. The Ice Age gave way to a transition period known as the Mesolithic, when Europe became climatically, geographically, and biologically much as it is today. During this time there flourished a culture whose art complements that of the caves, from which, indeed, it may partially have originated. Since 1903, diminutive, extraordinarily lively paintings of animals and men in scenes of the hunt, battle, ritual dance, and harvest have been discovered on the stone walls of shallow rock shelters among the barren hills of the eastern coast of Spain (the Spanish Levant). The artists show the same masterful skill in depicting the animal figure as their predecessors of the caves, and it may be that we have here specimens of a lingering tradition or long-persisting habit of vision and representation of animals. But what is strikingly new is the appearance of the human figure, not only singly, but in large, coherent groups, with wide variety of pose, subject, and setting. We have seen that in cave art the human figure almost never appears, the falling or fallen man of the well scene (fig. 1-6) at Lascaux is quite exceptional. In the rock shelter paintings the new sentiment for human themes and concerns and the emphasis on action in which man dominates the animal are central. The new vocabulary of forms may have migrated across the Mediterranean from North Africa, where many paintings similar to those in the Spanish Levant have been found. There has been much learned debate about the dating of the whole development, and there is now some agreement that its beginnings were around 8000 B.C. and that the style may have lasted (with many variations) until about 3000 B.C.

Some characteristic features of the rock paintings appear in an energetic group of five warriors (fig. 1-12) found in the Goura Gorge. The group, only about nine inches in width, shows a customary tense exaggeration of movement, a rhythmic repetition of basic shape, and in general a sacrifice of naturalistic appearance to narrative and to unity of action. Even so, we can distinguish details that are economically described—bows, arrows, and the feathered headdress of the leader. The widely splayed legs read as a leaping stride, perhaps a march to battle or a ritual dance.

Other such paintings show an even greater uniformity of basic shape, and a nervous, sharp angularity, which suggest the pictographic —as we have proposed—even the phonetic hieroglyph. And over the millennia the rock painting styles do indeed become more abstract and schematic, more symbol than picture, and it is likely that they record a step in the evolution of the symbolic from the pictorial, an evolution that, in the Near East, culminates in the invention of writing.
cut into the pyramid by ancient grave robbers. Unable to locate the carefully sealed and hidden entrance, they started some forty feet above the base and tunneled into the structure until they intercepted the ascending corridor. Many royal tombs were plundered almost as soon as the funeral ceremonies had ended; the very conspicuousness of the pyramid was an invitation to despoilment. The hard lesson was learned by the successors of the Old Kingdom pyramid-builders; they built few pyramids, and those were relatively small and inconspicuous.

From the remains around the middle pyramid at Gizeh, that of Khafre, we can reconstruct an entire pyramid complex (fig. 3-9). This consisted of the pyramid itself, within or below which was the burial chamber; the chapel, adjoining the pyramid on the east side, where offerings were made and ceremonies performed and where were stored cloth, food, and ceremonial vessels; the covered causeway leading down to the valley; and the valley temple, or vestibule of the causeway. Beside the causeway and dominating the temple of Khafre rose the Great Sphinx, carved from a spur of rock to commemorate the pharaoh. The head is often referred to as a portrait of Khafre, although the features are so generalized that little individuality can be discerned. In size it is unique in ancient sculpture.

The valley temple of the Pyramid of Khafre (fig. 3-10) was built on the post-and-lintel system—upright supports, or posts, with horizontal beams, or lintels, resting on them. Both posts and lintels were huge, rectangular, red-granite monoliths, finely proportioned, skillfully cut and polished, and devoid of decoration. Alabaster slabs covered the floor, and seated statues, the only embellishments of the temple, were ranged along the wall. The interior was lighted by a few slanting rays filtering in from above. Although the Egyptians knew the arch and the vault and had used them occasionally in predynastic tombs, they rarely used them again after about 3000 B.C., the beginning of the dynastic period. Egyptian architects preferred the static forms of the post-and-lintel system, which, if cast into the heavy, massive shapes of the Khafre temple, express perhaps better than any other architectural style the changeless and eternal.

Sculpture
We have already noted that in the tombs sculpture in the round served the important function of creating an image of the deceased that could serve as an abode for the ka should the mummy be destroyed. For this reason an interest in portrait likenesses developed early in Egypt. Hence, too, permanence of style and material were essential. Though wood, clay, and bronze were used, mostly for images of those not of the royal or noble classes, stone was the primary material: limestone and sandstone from the Nile cliffs, granite from the quarries of the Upper Nile, and diorite from the desert.

A seated statue of Khafre (fig. 3-11) was one of a series of similar statues carved for Khafre's temple of the Sphinx. These statues, the only organic forms in the geometric severity of the temple structure, with its flat-planed posts and lintels, must have created a striking atmosphere of solemn majesty. Khafre is seated on a throne on the base of which is carved the intertwined lotus and papyrus, symbol of united Egypt. Sheltering his head are the protective wings of the hawk, symbol of the sun, indicating Khafre's divine status as son of Re. He wears the simple kilt of the Old Kingdom and a linen headdress that covers his forehead and falls in pleated folds over his shoulders. The portrait of the king is strongly individualized yet permeated with an imperturbable calm, reflecting the enduring power of the pharaoh and of kingship in general. This effect, common to royal statues of the ka, is achieved by devices of form and technique that we can still admire. The figure has great compactness and solidity, with few projecting, breakable parts; the form manifests the purpose—to last for eternity. The body is attached to a back slab, the arms are held close to the torso and thighs, the legs are close together and attached to the throne by stonewebs. Like Mesopotamian statues, the pose is frontal, rigid, and biomemetric. This repeatable scheme arranges the parts of the body so that they are presented in a totally frontal projection or entirely in profile. As Panofsky remarked:

we can recognize from many unfinished pieces that even in sculpture the final form is always...
THE FOURTH CENTURY AND THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD

The Late Classical Period

The disastrous Peloponnesian War, which ended in 404 B.C. with the complete defeat of Athens, left Greece drained of its strength. Sparta and then Thebes took the leadership of Greece, both unsuccessfully. In the latter half of the fourth century B.C., the Greek states lost their liberty to Philip of Macedon. Athens lost its preeminence. The whole structure of life changed; the traditional balance between the city-state and the individual was lost. The serene idealism of the fifth century, born of a simple, robust concept of mind and matter, of man and the state, gave way to chronic civil war, social and political unrest, skepticism, and cynicism.

The Apollonian command "Know thyself," which Socrates taught as he spoke with the people in their daily gathering places, inevitably changed the Greek point of view to a more individualistic one. Euripides, too, seems to regard the individual as paramount, and his dramas depict a whole spectrum of human passions and crises. Aristophanes, however, ridiculed both Socrates and Euripides for their apparent departures from the good old Classical ways and customs and especially for their emphasis upon the role and value of the individual. The disasters of the fourth century B.C. man's intellectual independance was firmly established by Plato — however much he himself regretted the passing of the old ways — whose doctrine of eternal forms such as "virtue," "justice," and "courage" could serve as the rational models upon which the individual could construct his life. Aristotle, perhaps the most versatile of all thinkers, formulated the operations of reason in the science we call logic, converting reason into an instrument applicable to all human experience. Aristotle turned his attention systematically on just about everything that could be of interest to man, and among his fundamental contributions is the outline of the science of nature.

Thus, gradually separating himself from the old assurances — the gods, their oracles, and time-honored customs — and supreme interpreters of the meaning of life, the Greek carried on his search to know himself and to achieve knowledge of the world and life through observant experience. His dependence upon the city-state lessened, until he boasted with Diogenes: "I am a citizen of the world." Knowing the real, for whatever purpose, becomes the conspicuously Greek faculty and value. In the midst of political disaster, Greece, in the fourth century, enacted a daring drama of human discovery.

Sculpture

The humanizing tendency that had been gathering force throughout the fifth century achieved characteristic expression in the sculpture of the fourth century; though themes lose something of the earlier, solemn grandeur and representations of the greater gods give place to those of the lesser, the naturalistic view of the human figure is fully focused. The Hermes and Dionysos attributed to Praxiteles (nras. 5-55 and 5-56) is a work of such high quality that some authorities insist it must be by Praxiteles himself and not a mere Roman copy. The god is represented standing, with a shift in weight from the left arm (supporting the upper body) to the right leg, so that there is a double distribution of the weight, giving the pose, with its fluid axis, the form of a sinuous, shallow S-curve that becomes a manner with Praxiteles. On his arm Hermes holds the infant Dionysos, who reaches for something (probably a bunch of grapes) Hermes held in his right hand. Hermes is looking off into space with a dreamy expression, half smiling. The whole figure, particularly the head, seems in deep reverie, the god withdrawn in self-admiration. The modeling is deliberately smooth and noble, producing soft shadows that follow the planes as they flow almost imperceptibly one into another. The delicacy of the features is enhanced by the rough, impressionistic way in which the hair is indicated, and the deep folds of the realistic drapery are sharply contrasted with the flow and gloss of the languidly graceful figure. It needs but a comparative glance at Polykleitos' Doryphoros to see how broad a change in artistic attitude and intent took place from the mid-fifth to the mid-fourth century. Majestic strength and rationalizing design are replaced by sensuous languor and an order of beauty appealing more to the eye than the mind. Praxiteles' esthetic of the human nude, with its emphasis on the exquisitely smooth modeling that reproduces the tones of resilient flesh, naturally led him to become the inventor of the nude female statue. His Aphrodite

5-56 Praxiteles, Head of Hermes, detail of no. 5-55.

5-55 Praxiteles, Hermes and Dionysos, c. 340 B.C. Marble, approx. 7 high. Museum, Olympia.

The Art of Greece
gallery by suppressing the rosettes of the triforium. This, in turn, required that the gallery roof be lowered and redesigned. The solution, a pitched roof with one of its slopes inclined toward the nave wall, created a difficult drainage problem that was solved only in the nineteenth century, when Viollet-le-Duc designed a single-slope roof that threw the water outward.

Like the interior, the façade seems to waver between the old and the new (fig. 10-9). Began after the Laon façade had been completed, it appears much more conservative and, in the preservation of its “mural presence,” more closely related to Romanesque than to High Gothic façades. From the modern observer’s point of view, this may be one of its great assets. Less perforated and more orderly than Laon’s, Notre Dame’s façade exudes a sense of strength and permanence that is lacking in many contemporary and later designs. Careful balancing of vertical against horizontal elements has achieved a quality of restful stability that makes this façade one of the most satisfying and memorable in Gothic architecture.

system is combined with Early Gothic six-part nave vaulting. The original transept was short and did not project beyond the outer aisles. The original nave wall was four-part, in the Early Gothic manner, with a triforium in the form of a series of rosettes.

Barely completed, the building was extensively modified. Between 1225 and 1250, chapels were built into the spaces between buttresses, and in 1250 the transept arms were lengthened. At the same time, perhaps as the result of a fire (according to Viollet-le-Duc, the cathedral’s nineteenth-century restorer), but probably to admit more light into the nave, changes were made in the nave wall, although the bays adjacent to the crossing were left in their original form (fig. 10-12).

By this time the nave of the cathedral of Chartres had been completed (see below) and had rendered Early Gothic galleries and four-level wall elevations obsolete. Since the galleries had already been built at Paris, the “modernization” of the nave had to be a compromise. The clerestory windows were lowered to the top of the

Sculpture

Gothic sculpture first makes its appearance in the Île-de-France and its environs with the same dramatic suddenness as Gothic architecture, and, it is likely, in the very same place, the abbey church of St. Denis. Almost nothing of the sculpture of the west façade of St. Denis remains to be studied, but it was there that sculpture emerged completely from the interior of the church and dominated the western entrances, which were regarded as the “gateways to Heavenly Jerusalem” and as the “royal portals.” These royal portals, so called because of the statues of kings and queens on the embrasures flanking the doorways, are typified by the west portals of the cathedral of Chartres (fig. 10-13), carved between 1145 and 1170. This west façade and its portals are the only surviving parts of an Early Gothic cathedral that was destroyed in a disastrous fire in 1194 before it had been completed. The cathedral was reconstructed immediately, but in the High
Gothic style (see below). The portals, however, constitute the most complete and impressive corpus of Early Gothic sculpture.

The three west portals of Chartres, treated as a unit, proclaim the majesty and omnipotence of Christ. His birth, the Presentation at the Temple, and Christ in Majesty with his Virgin Mother are shown on the right portal, and his Ascension into heaven on the left. Scenes from his life and from the passion are vividly carved on the capitals, which continue as a frieze from one portal to the next. On the central portal is depicted the Second Coming, surrounded by the symbols of the four Evangelists, with the apostles below, seated as representatives of the corporate body of the Christian Church. The Second Coming, in essence the Last Judgment theme, remains, as in the Romanesque works we have seen (and which are only some twenty years older than the west portals of Chartres), centrally important. Here, however, it has become a symbol of salvation rather than damnation. It is, moreover, combined with other scenes and symbolic figures as part of a larger theme rather than as symbol of the dogma itself.

In the archivolts of the right portal are shown the seven liberal arts, the core of Medieval learning, and therefore symbolic of man's knowledge, which will lead him to the true faith. The signs of the zodiac and scenes representing the various labors of the months of the year are carved into the left-portal archivolts as symbols of the cosmic and of the terrestrial worlds; and around the central tympanum are the twenty-four elders of the Apocalypse, accompanying the Second Coming. Decorating the multiple jambs flanking each doorway are the most striking figures, the great statues of the kings and queens of the Old Testament, the royal ancestors of Christ (9c. 10-14). It is almost certain that the medieval observer also regarded them as the figures of the kings and queens of France, symbols of secular as well as of biblical authority. The unity of the triple portal in its message and composition complements the unity of the cathedral itself, which, in its fluent, unbroken, vast and soaring space compounded earth and heaven in a symbol of the spiritual perfected universe to come.

The jamb statues are among the few original forms of architectural sculpture to have appeared in any age. At first glance they seem—in their disregard of normal proportions and their rigid adherence to an architectural frame—to follow many of the precepts of Romanesque architectural sculpture. Yet the differences are striking and important. The statues stand out from the plane of the wall; they are not cut back into it. They are conceived and treated as three-dimensional volumes. They move into the space of the observer and participate in it with him. Most significant of all is the first trace of a new naturalism; draperies, folds, are no longer calligraphic exercises translated into stone; they now either fall vertically or radiate naturally from their points of suspension. Although carefully arranged in regular patterns, these folds suggest that the artist is no longer copying painted images, but that actual models have become his guides. This is true particularly of the figures flanking the central doorway (left foreground in no. 10-14), which are the work of the anonymous Headmaster, the artist in charge of the overall design and decoration of the portals. The advanced nature of his style becomes particularly noticeable when his figures are compared with those on the outside jamb of the lateral portal (right background in no. 10-14), which evidently were carved by a different, perhaps older, certainly more conservative artist. The latter's approach is still deeply rooted in the Romanesque tradition. His figures seem more agitated, their silhouettes curvilinear and broken. The drapery folds are treated decoratively and, here and there, continue to rotate in abstract swirls. Only the wind-blown lower garment edges, characteristic of much Romanesque sculpture, have come to rest—reluctantly it seems and, perhaps, at the Headmaster's insistence. Even so, the figures fail to adjust themselves as neatly and consequently to their architectural setting as do the Headmaster's. The latter's statues, although they have stepped out of the wall and have some corporeal, are severely disciplined and have been rigorously subordinated to their architectural background. Seen from a distance, they appear to be little more than vertical decorative accents within the larger designs of portals and façade. And yet, within and despite its architectural strait jacket, the incipient naturalism has softened the appearance of the figures. This is particularly noticeable in their faces, in which the masklike features of the Romanesque are being converted into human likenesses. Here is the faint beginning of a personalizing naturalism that will become transformed first into idealized portraits of the perfect Christian and finally into the portrait of specific individuals.

At this time, the early twelfth century, great changes were taking place. It is the man's view of himself, especially with respect to the relation of body and soul. Previously, the old Augustinian view had prevailed: that the essence of the soul is completely unlike that of the body, the soul being spiritual and immortal, the body material and subject to corruption. With the rediscovery of the main works of Aristotle, it came to be gradually believed that the soul and the body were closely interrelated, that the soul had the form of the body, and that, therefore, the body was no longer to be despised as merely the corruptible prison of the soul from which the latter is released when the body dies. One scholastic philosopher saw the soul and the body as meeting, and the combination as responsible for the personality of the individual. Another saw...
beauty of natural things, the handiwork of God—it is natural that his successors should end by inspecting nature more closely and with a curiosity that would lead to scientific inquiry. St. Francis' independence and his critical posture toward the religious establishment were passed down to many Franciscans, the more radical of whom were often accused by the Church of association with outright "heretics." The Franciscans—especially William of Ockham—challenged the papacy itself, especially its claim of secular lordship over all Christendom. In these challenges there already rings the rebelliousness that will take mature shape in the Protestant Reformation.

What might be called Franciscan radicalism, then, stresses the primacy of personal experience, the individual's right to know by experiment, the fertility of formal philosophy, and the beauty and value of things in the external world. It was in the stimulating intellectual and social environment created in part by the Franciscans that the painters and sculptors of the proto-Renaissance began a new epoch—an epoch in which the carved and painted image took its shape from the authority of the optical world and what could be found of that authority in the classical antique. The individual artist, breaking with the formal traditions of a thousand years, now came to depend on his own inspection of the world before his eyes. Applying the Baconian principle of personal discovery through experience—in the artist's case, the experiment of seeing—he began to project in paint and sculpture the infinitely complex and shifting optical rectum that we experience as the world.

SCULPTURE

One may encounter many limitations of the art of classical antiquity—during the Carolingian and Ottonian periods, in the Romanesque, and in French Gothic as well. The statues of the Tavola group on the west façade of Reims (nos. 10–12) show an unmitigatedly interest in the Roman sculpture, even though the modeling of the faces reveals their Gothic origin. However, the thirteenth-century sculpture of Nicola Pisano, contemporary with the Reims statues, exhibits an interest in the forms of the classical antique unlike that of his predecessors. This may have been due partly to the humanistic culture of Sicily under its brilliant king, Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II, who for his many intellectual gifts and many other talents was known in his own time as "the wonder of the world." Frederick's nostalgia for the grandeur that was Rome fostered a revival of Roman sculpture and decoration in Sicily and southern Italy before the mid-century. It may have been in this environment—that there is now some doubt on this point—that Nicola received his early training. After Frederick's death in 1250, Nicola traveled northward and eventually settled in Pisa, which was then at the height of its political and economic power and a place where a proficient artist could hope to find rich commissions. In typically Italian fashion Nicola's sculpture was not applied in the decoration of great portals in close harmony with the architecture of which they were a part; thus they are quite unlike French sculpture of the period. Nicola carved marble reliefs and ornament for large pulpits, the first of which he completed in 1260 for the baptistry of the cathedral of Pisa (nos. 11-1). Some of the elements of the pulpit's design carry on Medieval traditions (for example, the lions supporting some of the columns and the trilobe arches), but Nicola is evidently trying to retranslate into classical terms a Medieval type of structure. The large, bushy capitals are a Gothic variation of the Corinthian; the arches are round rather than ogival; and the large, rectangular relief panels, if their proportions were slightly altered, could have come from the sides of Roman sarcophagi. The densely packed large-scale figures of the individual panels seem also to derive from the compositions found on late Roman sarcophagi. One of these panels represents the Annunciation and the Nativity (nos. 11-2). The Virgin of
Michelangelo

Michelangelo Buonarroti (1475–1564) is a far more complex personality than Raphael, and his art is not nearly so typical of the High Renaissance as Raphael’s. Frequently irascible, Michelangelo was as impatient with the shortcomings of others as with his own. This was true of Raphael, his dislike of Leonardo, and his almost continuous difficulties with his patrons are all well known. Perhaps these personal problems arose out of his strong and stern devotion to his art, for he was always totally absorbed in the work at hand. He identified himself with the task of artistic creation completely, and his reactions to his rivals were often irascible and antagonistic. In this respect Michelangelo’s character has often been compared with Beethoven’s. But the personal letters of both reveal a deep sympathy and concern for those close to them, and profound understanding of humanity informs their work. What we now realize is that the very nature of character; Michelangelo’s career realizes all those Renaissance ideals that we conceptualize as “inspired genius” and “universal man.” His work has the authority of greatest, as defined in the discussion of Donatello. His confidence in his genius was unbounded; its demands determined his choices absolutely, often in opposition to the demands of his patrons. His belief that nothing worth preserving could be done without genius was attended by the conviction that nothing could be done without preserving study. Although he was architect, sculptor, painter, poet, and engineer, he thought of himself as first a sculptor, regarding as calling as superior to that of a painter, since the sculptor shares in something like the divine power to “make man.” In true Platonic fashion, Michelangelo believed that the image produced by the artist’s hand must come from the Idea in his mind; the Idea is the reality that has to be brought forth by the genius of the artist. But the artist is not the creator of the Idea he conceives: rather he finds them in the natural world, reflecting the abstract forms which, for the artist, is Beauty. In this way, the strongly Platonic strain makes the Renaissance theory of the imitation of nature a revelation of the high truths hidden within nature. The theory that guided Michelangelo’s hands, though never complete or entirely consistent, appears in his poetry:

> Every beauty which is seen here below by persons of perception resembles more than anything else that celestial source from which we all are come...

> My eyes longing for beautiful things together with my soul longing for salvation have no other power to ascend to heaven than the contemplation of beautiful things.

One of the best-known observations by Michelangelo is that the artist must proceed by finding the Idea, the image, locked in the stone, as it were, so that by removing the excess stone he

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As a youth, Michelangelo was apprenticed to the painter Gherlandino, whom he left before completing his training. He soon came under the protection of Lorenzo di Medici and must have been a young and thoughtful member of the famous neo-Platonic circle. He studied sculpture under one of Lorenzo’s favorite artists, Bertoldo, a former collaborator of Donatello who specialized in small-scale bronzes. When the Medici fell in 1492, Michelangelo fled to Bologna, where he executed a work for the church of San Pietro in Montorio and a statue of David for the Basilica della Quercia (sc. 12–15). Beside his study of Della Quercia—although he claimed that in his art he owed nothing to anyone—Michelangelo made studious drawings after the great Fontaines, Giotto and Masaccio, and it is very likely that his consuming interest in representation of the male nude both in sculpture and painting was much stimulated by Signorelli.

Michelangelo’s wanderings took him to Rome, whence he returned to Florence in 1501, partly because of the possibility that the city would permit him to work a great block of marble, called the Gigantic, that no other sculptor had been able to use. With his sure insight into the nature of stone and a pronounced sense that he could perceive its “Idea,” Michelangelo added to his already great reputation by carving his David (sc. 11–18), still the marvel it was then. The colossal figure takes upon itself the theme that Donatello and Verrocchio had used successfully but reflects Michelangelo’s own highly original interpretation. David is represented not after the victory, with the head of Goliath at his feet, but rather, turning his head to his left, sternly watchful of the approaching foe. His whole muscular body, as well as his face, is tense with gathering power. The pondered pose, suggesting the body at ease, is misleading until we read in the tightening sinews and deep brown sumps. Here is an example of that characteristic representation of energy in reserve that gives the tension of the coiled spring to Michelangelo’s figures. The anatomy plays an important part in this prelude to action. The rugged torso and limbs of the young David, the large hands and feet giving promise of the giant strength to come, are not composed simply of inert muscle groups, nor are they idealized by simplification into broad masses.

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One of the best-known observations by Michelangelo is that the artist must proceed by finding the Idea, the image, locked in the stone, as it were, so that by removing the excess stone he

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\[\text{The High Renaissance} \]
Everything moves, nothing is distinct, light dissolves firmness, and the effect is visionary. The vision asserts the triumph of Christianiety and the papal claim to doctrinal supremacy.

Much of Bernini's prolific career was given to the adornment of St. Peter's, where his works combine sculpture with architecture. Although Bernini was a great and influential architect, his fame rests primarily upon his sculpture, which, like his architecture, expresses the Baroque spirit to perfection. It is expansive and dramatic, and the element of time usually plays an important role in it. Unlike the states of rest or tension that one finds in the Davids of Donatello (figs. 12-13), Verrocchio (figs. 12-49), and Michelangelo (figs. 13-18), Bernini's version (figs. 15-10) aims at catching the split-second action. His muscular legs widely and firmly planted, David is beginning the violent, pivoting motion that will soon launch the stone from his sling. A moment before his body was in one position, the next moment it will be in a completely different one. Bernini selects the most dramatic of an implied sequence of poses, so that the observer has to think simultaneously of the continuum and of this tiny fraction of it. The implied continuum imparts a dynamic quality to the statue that suggests a bursting forth of the energy one sees pent in Michelangelo's figures. And as the figure seems to be moving through time, so does it through space. This is not the kind of statue that can be inscribed in a cylinder or confined to a niche; its implied action demands space around it. Nor is it self-sufficient in the Renaissance sense, as its pose and attitude direct the observer's attention beyond itself and to its surroundings, in this case toward an unseen Goliath. For the first time since the Hellenistic era, a sculptured figure moves out into a space around itself and its observer. The expansive quality of Baroque art and its disdain to limit itself to firmly defined spatial settings are encountered again in the Ecstasy of St. Theresa in the Cornaro Chapel of the church of Santa Maria della Vittoria (figs. 15-11). In this chapel Bernini draws upon the full resources of architecture, sculpture, and painting to charge the entire area with crosscurrents of dramatic tension. St. Theresa was a nun of the Carmelites, and one of the great mystical saints of the Spanish Counter Reformation. Her conversion took place after the death of her father, when she fell into a series of trances, saw visions, and heard voices. Feeling a persistent pain in her side, she came to believe that its cause was the fire-tipped dart of Divine love, which an angel had thrust into her bosom and which she described as making her swoon in delightful anguish. The whole chapel becomes a theater for the production of this mystical drama. The niche in which it takes place is a prosenium crowned with a broken Baroque pediment and ornamented with polychrome marble. On either side of the chapel are sculptured opera boxes in which portraits of the Cornaro family represent an audience watching with intent piracy the denouement of the heavenly drama. Bernini shows the saint in ecstasy, unmistakably a mingling of spiritual and physical passion, swooning back upon clouds, while the smiling angel aims his arrow (fig. 15-12). The group is of white marble, and the artist goes to extremes of virtuosity in his management of textures: the clouds, rough monk's clotl, gauzy material, smooth flesh, feathery wings—all carefully differentiated and yet harmonized in an effect visual and visionary. Light from a hidden window pours down bronze rays that are meant to be seen as bursting forth from a painting of Heaven in the vault. Several tons of marble seem to float in a haze of light, the winds of heaven buffeting draperies as the cloud ascends. The remote mysteries of religion, taking on recognizable form, descend to meet the world of man halfway, within the conventions of Baroque art and theater. Bernini had much to do with the establishment of the principles of visual illusion that guided both. The evident desire of the time to install designs with dynamic qualities finds expressive release in the design of monumental fountains. The challenge of working with an element that actually is motion fascinated Baroque artists, and it may not be too surprising to find that Bernini was one of the most inventive and most widely imitated designers in this field. It is
this inspiration he was able to make, in exquisite line and color, pictorial records of his own sensitive and perceptive reflection to the modern world. His very whimsy uses strangely delineated figures of men, animals, and fantastic creatures as commentary upon human weakness and folly, though his tone is almost always gentle and his irony subdued. Although his paintings and drawings are usually very small, and although they would seem at first to be the most private of visual communications, they are charged with meaning that gradually becomes clearer to the imaginative spectator. His Twitting Machine (no. 17-19), in its title and execution, compels at first a smile. Primitive, whimsy bird “mechanisms” a stand on or are attached to an equally flimsy crankshaft. We assume that the shaft can be turned and that, when it is, the “birds” twitter. Here we have most effectively the cooperative tension of title and design. One does not usually think of machines and birds in association or of machines as ludicrous hand-driven works made of bent picture wire. Out of these forced associations and absurdities there seems to emerge a new entity that slyly spoofs the machine age. Although the device “works,” it has no real purpose, unless it is to twitter, and birds do this much better. It has recently been suggested that the sly humor of the work may conceal a morbid comment on man’s mortality. The heads of the creatures, each carefully distinguished as one of the four temperaments, resemble metallic lures capable of trapping real birds. Below them is a rectangular trough on short legs—perhaps a death trap. The lures and death trap can symbolize the entrapment of all of us by existence. Perhaps no other artist of the century matches the subtlety of Klee as he adroitly plays with sense, making an artistic means of ambiguity and understatement.

Klee shared the widespread modern apprehension concerning the rationalism behind a technological civilization that could be as destructive as it was constructive. As some psychologists, he sought clues to man’s deeper nature in primitive shapes and symbols; like his compatriot, the psychologist Jung, Klee seems to have accepted the existence of a collective unconscious that reveals itself in archaic signs and patterns going back to prehistoric times and everywhere evident in the art of primitives. This Fire and Death (PLATE 17-19) manifests his interest in the ideogram—the simple, picturesque sign filled with implicit meaning. A white death’s-head, heavily outlined, rises from a glowing sun and seems to balance a round object like a shot. From the right strides a man with a staff; three bars precede him. The features of the skull could be letters. It has been suggested that the cool blue-green, so definitely harmonized with the chords of red, could suggest the element of water reconciled with fire in the ever changing alternation of life and death. The eerie color, the primitive starkness of the images, and the mysterious arrangement itself convey a sense of awe almost religious, as if there were the presence of a totem having magical powers. Enigmatic as the subject is, we feel its sources in the religious experience, an experience probably as old as human history.

By the end of the first third of the century the results of the main artistic experiments were available to artists to use as they pleased and whenever convenient. The Mexican painter David Alfaro Siqueiros (b. 1898), one of the brilliant muralists who made the Mexican school of international importance in the 1920’s, makes a violent antiwar protest of his Echo of a Scream (no. 17-20). The amplification of the infant’s cry is made unrealistically by duplicating and augmenting dreadfully the pathetic head. Realistic and Expressionist techniques combine in the rendering of the shattered landscape heaped with the wreckage of war. Again, a comparison with the Guernica, painted in the same year, emphasizes the variety of expressive means opening to the artist who wants to comment upon his times. In a quite different subject and mood the American painter Ben Shahn (1898-1969), just two years later, shows a pronounced—if, perhaps, unconscious—eclecticism in his Handball (no. 17-21). Shahn fused his various borrowings into a sharply expressive personal style. The painting recalls the geometry of Cubism; the haunted space of Surrealism, with its weird vacancy; the still perspectives of Italian painting in the fifteenth century; and the quick, accidental poses and changes of scale of the candid photograph.

Siqueiros and Shahn are only two of the large number of significant painters on both sides of the Atlantic who worked out the possibilities of the revolutionary new styles of modern art. World War II was to provide a kind of dividing line within the century, concentrating and channeling stylistic experiment and bringing America to a conspicuous, forward place in the process. In the later century the artistic initiative seems to have passed from Paris to New York, after more than a century and a half in the former.

SCULPTURE BEFORE WORLD WAR II

Rodin: From Impressionism to Expressionism

Sculpture, like painting, had come through the nineteenth century borrowing the historical styles and toying with the kind of saga Realism found in Degas’s Dr. Artaud (no. 10-15). It took an artist of supreme talent, Auguste Rodin (1840-1917), to restore sculpture to its traditional eminence and to make of it again a powerfully expressive medium. Essentially, Rodin did for
sculpture what Impressionism did for painting. Respecting it for the three-dimensional art it is, Rodin refused to make it a source of wax-museum images appropriate to the photograph or the stage. Instead he studied anew its peculiar properties of material and form, learning (from the works of Michelangelo) to appreciate its unique possibilities for expressive bodily pose and gesture. As a contemporary of the Impressionists Rodin’s aesthetics was based upon a similar acceptance of the world of appearances revealed through light upon surface. A marvel of soft material rather than a carver of hard, Rodin could work his surfaces with fingers sensitive to the subtlest variations of plane, catching the fugitive play of living motion as it changes fluidly under light. His touch is analogous to that of the deft Impressionist brushstroke. But, although Rodin’s technique and formal sense aligned him with Impressionism, his subjects were still in the Romantic vein, and his Realism strongly bent toward Expressionism as he searched for new forms in which to cast his Romantic themes. Without resorting to the repertory of historical styles, he found for his subjects fitting and powerful forms out of his own exercise of an “Impressionist realism.” A splendid example is the group of life-size figures, the Burghers of Calais (1884), commemorating a heroic episode of the Hundred Years’ War, when seven leading citizens of Calais, which had been taken by the English, offered their lives in return for those of all their fellow citizens. Each of the individual figures is a convincing study of despair, resignation, or quiet defiance. The psychic effects of the technical management, achieved through the movement of a few simplified planes whose rugged surfaces catch and disperse the light. But moving though the work is, it is difficult to believe that Rodin visualized the group as a unit; indeed the separate figures were conceived as individual pieces and then shifted about until their relationship was considered satisfactory.

Rodin’s mastery of dramatic gesture, so evident in the eloquent pantomime of the Burghers, finds expression in a very different theme in The Kiss (1882). Intended to be only one of a number of groups composing the monumental Gates of Hell, which was never finished, The Kiss is a subtle, if explicit, essay in a contrast of ardent approach and clumly shy response, the attitude of the figures suiting perfectly the artist’s poetic conception of the event. The group was meant to represent sensual love absorbed in self and rooted in matter. The artist may have carried in his mind a memory of Michelangelo’s Temptation of Adam and Eve, one of the masterpieces of the Sistine Ceiling. Rodin, who declared that his encounter with the art of Michelangelo had been decisive in the formation of his style, was struck by that master’s many uncompleted sculptures and admired the half-finished figures left in the rough block, as here. The lovers’ figures are modeled to a smoothness that suggests the nubile surfaces and texture of living bodies. We recall the Enameled Correggio, which melts all harshness and angularity and which here contrasts with the rugged stone from which the figures emerge. Incompleteness of figure becomes both means and end for Rodin. Most of his projects remained unfinished, or were deliberate fragments. Seeing the aesthetic and expressive virtue of lost, modern sculpture has taken this mannerism from Rodin. The half-completed, the fragment, the vignette lifted out of context, the sketch—all have the

power of suggestion and understatement. Rodin’s Balzac (now 17-22) reveals the method most successfully. Features are not carved but are only suggested by indefinite surfaces that varigate the light and dark in deft blurs and smudges with an entirely sketchlike effect. Contours melt away; volumes are not permitted to assert themselves. The great novelist, who surveyed mankind in his La Comedie Humaine (The Human Comedy), draws himself up to a towering height. Wrapped in what seems to be an enormous cloak he surveys again, from the lofty standpoint of immortality, the listlessness of man. It is characteristic of Rodin’s art that, though we feel its power, we cannot quite describe what traits make us feel it. His Impressionistic methods, through daring emphasis and distortions, achieve an overwhelmingly Expressionistic effect.

Rodin’s personal passage from Impressionism to Expressionism marks the historical one.
While he was still living, sculpture was firmly set upon the base he had constructed. Rodin was the greatest sculptor of the century, an artist whose international reputation rivaled that of Michelangelo and Bernini; he was also a great teacher. His reputation brought to his studio in Paris as pupils or admires many of those of the younger generation who were to develop new kinds of sculpture, either influenced by Rodin or in reaction against him. The Expressionistic element proved most sympathetic to the young German sculptor Wilhelm Lehmbruck (1881-1919). Lehmbruck, preferring in Rodin's later work the possibilities of distortion, developed an impressionistic style of his own that he based on elongation and attenuation of human dimensions. His Standing Youth (no. 17-25), elegantly slender and tall, poses in solemn reverie, making a slow, deliberate, and eloquent gesture, as if participating in some grave ritual. Without specific subject or historical reference, Lehmbruck's figure "tells" by pose and gesture alone, its mood entirely a function of its form. The extreme proportions recall Gothic and even Mannerist attenuation and announce a new freedom to interpret the human figure quite without regard for the measure of it established in antiquity and in the Renaissance.

The French sculptor Aristide Maillol (1861-1944) turned from Rodin's evanescent effects of light and broken planes to a style simple and weighty. He began his career as a painter, executing broadly decorative designs in the manner of Gauguin, and was also known as a graphic artist through his book illustrations. About 1900 he turned to sculpture and, until the end of his life, scarcely deviated from his chosen subject—the female figure—which he interpreted in massive planes and volumes devoid of historical stylization or literary anecdote. One of his first and most important works was the seated figure Mediterranean (no. 17-76). It is conceived as an organization of almost abstract volumes simplified from the endless complexity of the human figure. It has the weight and solidity that are inherent in stone (though there are versions of it in bronze), and the largely unbroken surfaces of the simply modeled masses take the light evenly and quietly. The respect Maillol shows for the stone itself, refusing to torment its surfaces to create pictorial effects, is to become a part of the esthetics of modern art. "Truth to materials" is a modern dedication, and part of the modern positivist insistence that, after all, the material is the form. Yet Maillol intends here not simply an abstract composition but a symbolic form expressing his conception of the inherited cultures of the Mediterranean lands in terms of a settled, eternal, and harmonious repose. In this use of the figure for purposes of symbolic communication Maillol shows a kinship with the Symbolist painters and poets of the 1890's like Gauguin and Mallarmé and many of those younger sculptors like Lehmbruck, who were to make figures without symbolic reference or literary overtones.

Gaston Lachaise (1882-1935), of French descent but active most of his life in the United States, treated the female figure with a similar breadth and abundant vital energy, yet in a way strikingly contrasting with Maillol's types. His life-size Standing Woman (nos. 17-27) is as broadly modeled as Maillol's but with a more sensuous treatment of the anatomy. The strongly felt movement swells rapidly upward from the lightly poised, delicate feet to the large rounding hips; thence, after a sharp accent in the angle of the waist, again swells into the broad shoulders and bent arms. There is an elastic, abstract rhythm both of volume and contour and a beautiful union of weight and grace. Bronze is peculiarly suitable for this purpose; marble would be hardly imaginable. If we compare Lehmbruck's Standing Youth with Lachaise's figure, we can appreciate how widely varied the formal and expressive results can be where the sculptor experimenting with proportions.

The Expressionist sculptor could find in Medieval art both unsophisticated and intense spirituality and abstract forms as yet uncomplicated by Realism. Although the sculptors discovered Romanesque and Gothic art, much later than did the architects, they made of their borrowing from it something far more genuine. A German sculptor much influenced by Medieval carving was Ernst Barlach (1870-1938), whose work combines sharp, smoothly planed lines with intense action and keen expression. His war memorial for Glatzow Cathedral (nos. 17-28 and 17-30) is...
5.2.1.b
Gothic was first used as a term of derision by Renaissance critics who scorned the lack of conformity of Gothic art to the standards of classical Greece and Rome: "May he who invented it be cursed," wrote one of them. Mistakenly, they thought the style had originated with the Goths, who thus were responsible for the destruction of the good and true classical style. The men of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, however, referred to the Gothic cathedrals as opus modernum (modern work) or opus francigenum (Frankish work). They recognized in these structures that towered over their towns a style of building and of decoration that was original. It was with confidence in their own faith that they regarded their cathedrals as the
real image of the City of God, the Heavenly Jerusalem, which they were privileged to build on earth.

There are strong contrasts between the Gothic and the Romanesque environment and point of view. Romanesque society was dominated by the uncertainties inherent in the anarchical tendencies of feudalism. The great barons of the countryside and the great abbeys enjoyed an almost total independence, and the conflict of their claims to privilege led to constant warfare. Gothic society was also feudal, but it was a comparatively ordered feudalism. Here and there powerful barons had been able to make themselves kings, and monarchy, especially in England and France, asserted itself strongly to limit the independence of lesser lords and the Church. Centralized government was established, and law and order instilled confidence in people of all walks of life. The cities, entirely new or built on the foundations of old Roman ones, began to thrive and become strong; allied for common defense, they were very often powerful enough to defy kings and emperors. Within their walls men who had escaped from the land could find freedom: "The air of the city is the breath of freedom," one slogan had it. City life took on a complex yet ordered form; craft guilds, resembling strong unions, were formed to give protection and profit to artisans of the same specialties. A middle class, made up of the craftsmen, merchants, and professionals (lawyers, doctors, teachers, and many others) came to constitute a new and puissant force to check and balance the feudal aristocracy. The fear and insecurity that pervaded the Romanesque world was mitigated by the new alignment of economic and social forces, and the Gothic world emerged.

Romanesque society had been dominated by men. In Gothic society women took on a new importance. Wandering minstrels sang less of the great deeds of heroes in war and more of love, beauty, and springtime. Eleanor of Aquitaine, wife to Louis VII of France and Henry II Plantagenet of England and mother of Richard the Lion-heart and John, was one of the first to rule over a "court of love," where respect for the lady was prerequisite and from which was to emanate the code of chivalry that so decided social relations in the later Middle Ages. The monastic prejudice against women no longer determined the representation of them in art. In the twelfth century luxuria, sensual pleasure, is represented at Moissac as a woman with serpents at her breasts; in the thirteenth century it is represented as a pretty girl looking into a mirror. It is almost with relief that the Gothic upper classes turn from the chansons de geste to the new amourous songs and romances, in which the lover adores his lady and in which such immortal lovers as Tristan and Isolde are celebrated. Marie de France, herself a noblewoman, introduced this tale, along with many others of the new Arthurian legends, to northern French feudal society. The poetry of the times nicely illustrates the contrast between Romanesque and Gothic taste and mood: While in the Romanesque Song of Roland the dying hero waxes rhapsodic over his sword, the German minnesinger of the Gothic period, dreaming in a swooning ecstasy of his lady, is "woven round with delight."

The love of woman, celebrated in art and formalized in life, received spiritual sanction in the cult of the Virgin Mary, who, as the Mother of Heaven and of Christ and in the form of Mother Church, loved all her children. It was Mary who stood compassionately between the judgment seat and the horrors of hell, interceding for all her faithful. The later twelfth and thirteenth centuries sang hymns to her, put her image everywhere, and dedicated great cathedrals to her. Her image was carried on banners into battle, and her name sounded in the battle cry of the king of France: "Sainte Marie... Saint Denis... Montjoie!" Thus, Mary became the spiritual lady of chivalry, and the Christian knight dedicated his life to her. The severity of Romanesque themes stressing the Last Judgment yields to the gentleness of the Gothic, in which Mary is represented crowned by Christ in Heaven.

It was not alone the new position of women, the lyrical and spiritual exaltation of love, or the cult of the Virgin that softened barbarous manners. In concert with the new mood was the influence of one remarkable man, St. Francis of Assisi, who saw Christ not as the remote and terrible Judge but as the loving Savior who had walked among and had himself been one of the
5.2.1.c
3-5 Plan and section of a mastaba.

44. Group of Mastabas (after A. Badawy). 4th Dynasty

3-9 Reconstruction of the Pyramids of Khufu and Khafre. (After Hoelscher.)
indigenous architecture maintained that solemn dignity so suited to the immense stretches of surrounding desert.

**ARCHITECTURAL CHARACTER**

Ancient Egyptian architecture was carried on, as far as the historical period is concerned, from about 3000 B.C. to the first century of the Christian Era.

The primitive architecture in the valley of the Nile consisted of readily-available tractable materials like reeds, papyrus (now practically extinct) and palm-branch ribs, plastered over with clay. With bundles of stems placed vertically side by side and lashed to a bundle placed horizontally near the top, walls or fences could be made. Alternate pairs of hollow Fibs were planted in the ground at short intervals, with others laced in a diagonal network across them and secured to a horizontal member near the top, the whole being daubed with mud afterwards. Buildings with circular plans could have domical coverings of similar construction, or, if rectangular, could have a tunnel-shaped covering or a flat roof. The pressure of the flat reed-and-mud roofs against the tops of the wall reeds may have produced the characteristic Egyptian 'gorge' cornice (p. 551), while the 'kheker' cresting less frequently appearing in later architecture may have originated in the terminal tufts of a papyrus-stalk wall (p. 550). The horizontal binders and angle bundles survived in the recesses of stone cornices and wall angles of the historicizing and (p. 551). A type of pavilion or kiosk which came to have a special religious significance in connection with the 'Heb-sed' or jubilee festivals of the Pharaohs—though originally commonly used on Nile boats as well as on land—consisted of a light, rectangular structure, open-fronted and with a porch carried on two slender angle-shafts and having a slab-like roof arching from the back to the front. In the Heb-sed ceremony, held at definite intervals of years in the king's reign, the Pharaoh seated himself on a throne beneath such an awning, raised on a high podium and approached by a flight of steps at the front. Timber, once quite plentiful, also was used for the better buildings, in square, heavy vertical plates, lapping one in front of the other and producing an effect of composite buttresses joined at the head and enframing narrow panels, in the upper parts of which window-vents might occur. Palm logs, rounded on the underside, were sometimes used for roofs. All these various forms of construction produced their effects on matured art and architecture, and apart from timber, which had become scarce by dynastic times, never entirely went out of use. Stone was not much employed before the Third Dynasty, except as rubble and as a stiffening or foundation to mud solid walls. Sun-dried mud-brick walling never ceased to be employed, for it was only for the finer buildings of religious character that cut stone became normal. Even palaces remained always relatively frail, for it was the after-life and not the present which dominated Egyptian contemplation. Made of Nile mud and mixed with chopped straw or sand, and thoroughly matured by exposure to the sun, the mud bricks were very lasting. They were large, approximating to 14 ins long by 7 ins wide and 4 ins thick. For stability, walls diminished course by course towards the top, chiefly because of the alternate shrinkage and expansion of the soil caused by the annual inundation. As the inner face of the walls had to be vertical for ordinary convenience, it was the outer face only which showed this inward inclination, or 'batter', which remained throughout one of the principal characteristics of Egyptian architecture whether in brick or stone. Sometimes fibre or reed mats were placed between the brick courses
5.2.1.e
CAVE PAINTING

As the ice of the Paleolithic period melted in the increasing warmth, the reindeer migrated north, the woolly mammoth and rhinoceros disappeared, and the hunters left their caves. The Ice Age gave way to a transition period known as the Mesolithic, when Europe became climatically, geographically, and biologically much as it is today. During this time there flourished a culture whose art complements that of the caves, from which, indeed, it may partially have originated. Since 1903, diminutive, extraordinary, lively paintings of animals and men in scenes of the hunt, battle, ritual dance, and harvest have been discovered on the stone walls of shallow rock shelters among the barren hills of the eastern coast of Spain (the Spanish Levant). The artists show the same masterful skill in depicting the animal figure as their predecessors of the caves, and it may be that we have here specimen of a lingering tradition or long-persisting habit of vision and representation of animals. But what is strikingly new is the appearance of the human figure, not only singly, but in large, coherent groups, with wide variety of pose, subject, and setting. We have seen that in cave art the human figure almost never appears: the falling or fallen man of the well scene (Pic. 1-8) at Lascaux is quite exceptional. In the rock-shelter paintings the new sentiment for human themes and concerns and the emphasis on action in which man dominates the animal are central. The new vocabulary of forms may have migrated across the Mediterranean from North Africa, where many paintings similar to those in the Spanish Levant have been found. There has been much learned debate about the dating of the whole development, and there is now some agreement that its beginnings were around 6000 B.C. and that the style may have lasted (with many variations) until about 3000 B.C.

EGYPTIAN PAINTING

The scenes in painted limestone relief that decorate the walls of the tomb of an Old Kingdom official, Ti, typify the subjects favored by the patrons; most often they are of agriculture and hunting (Pic. 3-14), activities that represent the fundamental human concern with nature and that are associated with the provisioning of the ka in the hereafter. Ti, his men, and his boats move slowly through the marshes, hunting hippopotamuses, in a dense growth of towering papyrus. The slender, reedy stems of the plants are delineated with repeated fine grooves that fan out gracefully at the top into a commotion of frightened birds and strolling beasts. Beneath the boats, the water, signified by a pattern of wavy lines, is crowded with hippopotami and other aquatic fauna. Ti's men seem frantically busy with their spears, while Thimmis, looming twice their size, stands impassive and aloof in the formal stance that we have seen in the figure of Nesire (Pic. 3-2). The outer dress and ideal proportions bespeak Ti's rank, as does the conventional pose, which contrasts with the realistically rendered activity of his diminutive servants and particularly with the precisely observed figures of the birds and animals among the papyrus buds.

A rare and fine example of Old Kingdom painting is the frieze called the Great of Medum (Pic. 3-13). In the prehistoric art of the caves, the rock paintings, and the art of Mesopotamia, we admired the peculiar sensitivity of early artists to the animal figure. They seem to have had empathy with the nonhuman creature, what Keats called negative capability—the power almost to share the being of the animal and to feel as it feels.

AEGEAN PAINTING

A view into the Queen's Megaron, with its pillared hall and light well (Pic. 4-9), shows the typically elaborate wall decoration of the more important rooms at Knossos. Here plastered walls were painted with frescoes, which, together with the red- or blue-shaded columns, must have provided an extraordinarily rich effect. The frescoes depicted many aspects of Cretean life (bullfighting, processions, and ceremonies) and of nature (birds, animals, flowers and—as heromarine life with dolphins frolicking among other fauna of the sea).

One of the most memorable figures from the art of Crete is the Cupbearer from the procession fresco of the South Propylon at Knossos (Pic. 4-10). It is the only one preserved from a sequence, shown in two registers, that may have contained over 500 figures—if those from the Corridor of the Procession are included. The ceremonial kylix (vessel for pouring ritual libations) carried by the youth has a typically Minoan shape, found nowhere else except as a Minoan import. And the figure itself is unmistakably Minoan. The youth has long curly hair, wears an elaborately embroidered tunic and a silver-mounted girdle, and has ornaments on his arms, neck, ankles, and wrist. Although the profile pose with the full view eye was a familiar convention in Egypt and Mesopotamia, the elegance of the Cretan figure, with its pinched waist, proud, self-confident bearing, and free movement, distinguishes it from all other early figure styles.

The angularity of the older styles is typically modified in the curving line that suggests the elasticity of the living and moving being.
ROMAN PAINTING

The interiorizing design, with its open and independent arrangement of units, guaranteed complete privacy. Because of the small number of doors and windows, it also offered considerable stretches of wall space suitable for decoration, as the atrium of the House of the Silver Wedding in Pompeii (no. 6-53) clearly shows. The decoration commonly used varied between types that emphasized the wall as a barrier and others that visually opened the wall and enhanced the space of the room. The colors were sometimes delicate greens and tans, sometimes striking reds and black (to throw the panels or figures into relief), and there was rich creamy white in the borders. The Romans obtained a certain brilliance of surface by a careful preparation of the wall. After the plaster, which was specially compounded with marble dust, was laid on in several layers, it was beaten with a smooth trowel until it became very dense; it was then polished to a marblelike finish.

The progression from flat to spatial wall decoration in Pompeii and Herculaneum has been divided, somewhat arbitrarily, into four successive but overlapping styles. The first style (about 200-60 B.C.), called incrustation, divided the wall into bright polychrome panels of solid colors with occasional schematically rendered textural contrasts (no. 6-2a). This style is a continuation of Hellenistic practice, and examples of it have been found in houses at Priene and on the island of Delos. A wall painting from a villa in Boscoreale, near Pompeii (no. 6-33), shows the second, or architectural, style (about 60-30 B.C.), in which the decoration is no longer restricted to a single visual plane. The space of the room is made to look as if it extended beyond the room itself by the representation of architectural forms in a visually convincing but not really systematic perspective. Columns, pilasters, and window frames painted on the wall served as enframements of distant views of cities and landscape. In the herringbone perspective used, the orthogonals, or lines of perspective projection, do not converge on a single vanishing point on the horizon (as in Renaissance perspective), but tend to converge on an axis that runs vertically through the center of the panel. Though this method is not consistently employed, it does give a somewhat convincing illusion of objects receding in space.

EARLY CHRISTIAN

An eleventh-century crucifixion scene on the wall of the monastery church at Daphne in Greece (no. 7-44) shows the simplicity, dignity, and grace of classicism fully assimilated by the Byzantine artist in a perfect synthesis with Byzantine pity and pathos. Christ is represented on the cross, flanked by the Virgin and St. John. A skull at the foot of the cross indicates Golgotha, the "place of skulls." Nothing is needed to complete the tableau. In quiet sorrow and resignation, the Virgin and St. John point to Christ as if to indicate the meaning of the cross. Symmetry and closed space produce an effect of the motionless and unchanging aspect of the deepest mystery of the Christian religion; and the timeless presence of Christ, as it were, beheld in unbroken silence. The picture is not a narrative of the historical event of the Crucifixion but a devotional object, a thing sacramental in itself, to be viewed by the monks in silent contemplation of the mystery of the Sacrifice. Although elongated, these figures from the Second Golden Age of Byzantine art have regained their organic structure to a surprising degree, particularly as compared with those of the Justinian period (compare nos. 7-30 and 7-31). The style is a masterful adaptation of Greek statuesque qualities to the linear Byzantine style.

The elongation of saintly figures to stress their noncorporeal, spiritual essence, found in the Ravenna mosaics, becomes a typical "marmerism" of late Byzantine art. A striking example is the solemn, majestic Virgin in the apse mosaic of the cathedral of Torcello, an outlying island of Venice (no. 7-45). Tall, slender, small-headed, she stands utterly and triumphantly alone in a golden Heaven, pointing to the Christ child she carries, elevated above the twelve apostles and above all mankind. The mystery of the Theotokos ("Mother of God") is made visible in her commanding image. One remembers the great gods-esses of the ancient world, their awesome stature and superhuman powers; the Virgin here represented is a spiritual descendant, purged of all dross of matter, a near-hymnic apparition.

The hieratic style we have been forming in the Age of Justinian and earlier has here reached a peak of expression.

BYZANTINE

Throughout the Middle Ages Italian painting was dominated by the Byzantine style. This Italian Byzantine style, or maniera bizantina, is shown an altarpiece that represents St. Francis (no. 11) and is a descendant of those tall, aloof, austere figures that people the world of Byzantine art. The saint, wearing the censer and cowl of the Franciscan order, holds a large book as displays on his hands and feet the signs of papacy. A relief on the right depicts scenes from the life of Christ Impressed upon him as a sign of Heavenly favor. The saint is flanked by two very Byzantine angels, and by scenes from life, the latter very much suggesting that the scene is in Byzantine illustrated manuscripts.

A detail of the altarpiece represents St. Francis preaching to the birds (no. 11-7). The figures St. Francis and his two attendants are carefully modeled against a shallow stage-property and wall, a stylized symbol of town or city for Early Christian times. In front of the saint another stage-scenery image of nested, wood, hilltop population by alert and sprightly birds are twinkle to plants—the shallow space, and the linear fitness in the rendering of the forms are all familiar traits of a long and august tradition, as suddenly and dramatically to be replaced.

Bonaventura Berlinghieri, artist of the Franciscan altarpiece, was one of a family of painters in the Tuscan city of Lucca. It was largely in the busy cities of Tuscany—Lucca, Pisa, Sienna, Florence—that the stirrings of the new artistic movement began. It was Florence that was destined to lead the great development toward the pictorial manner of the Renaissance, just politically it gradually absorbed the other city of Tuscany to make the Florentine republic, it during the fourteenth century, its defiant civil strife, which long and stubbornly resisted the encroachment of Florence, was the seat of splendid school of painting of its own.
LEONARDO DA VINCI

A man who is the epitome of the artist-genius as well as of the "universal man," Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) has become a kind of wonder of the modern world, standing at the beginning of a new epoch like a prophet and a sage, mapping the courses that art and science would take. The scope and depth of his interests were without precedent, so great as to frustrate any hope he might have had of realizing all that his feverishly inventive imagination could conceive. We still look with awe upon his achievement and, even more, upon his unfulfilled promise. His mind and personality seem to us superhuman, the man himself mysterious and remote, as Jacob Burckhardt writes: "The colossal outlines of Leonardo's nature can never be more than dimly and distantly conceived."

Although we are here concerned primarily with Leonardo as an artist, we can scarcely hope to do his art credit in isolation from his science, since his scientific drawings are themselves works of art, as well as models for that exact delineation of nature that is one of the aims of science. Leonardo's unapproachable originality is best revealed in his voluminous notes, liberally interspersed with sketches dealing with matters of botany, geology, zoology, hydrodynamics, military engineering, animal lore, anatomy, and aspects of physical science including mechanics, perspective, light and shade, and color. Leonardo believed that reality in an absolute sense is inaccessible to man and that we can know it only through its changing images. Thus, he considered the eyes to be man's most vital organs, and aught his most essential function, since through these man can grasp the images of reality most directly and profoundly. Hence, one may understand Leonardo's insistence, stated many times in his notes, that all his scientific investigations were merely aimed at making himself a better painter.

Leonardo was born near Florence and was trained in the studio of Verrocchio. But he left Florence in 1481, offering his services to Ludovico Sforza, Duke of Milan. The political situation in Florence was uncertain, and the new-Patrician of Lorenzo de' Medici and his brilliant circle may have proved unenlightened to the empirical and pragmatic Leonardo. It may be, also, that Leonardo felt that the artistic scene in Milan would be less competitive. He devoted most of a letter to the Duke of Milan to advertising his competence and his qualifications as a military engineer, mentioning only at the end his supremacy as a painter and sculptor:

And in short, according to the variety of cases, I can converse various and endless means of offence and defence.... In time of peace I believe I can give perfect satisfaction and to the equal of any other in architecture and the composition of buildings, public and private; and in guiding water from one place to another.... I can carve out sculpture in marble, bronze, or clay, and also I can do in painting whatever may be done, as well as any other, be he whom he may.

The letter illustrates the new relation of the artist with his patron, as well as Leonardo's breadth of competence. That he should select the military engineering and design to interest a patron is an index, in addition of the dangerousness of the times. Weaponry had now been developed to the point, especially in northern Europe, where the siege cannon was a threat to the feudal castles of those attempting to resist the west and aggressive new monarchs. When in 1585 Charles VIII of France invaded Italy, his easy annihilation the fortifications of the Italian princes; and by the turn of the century, Italy's liberties and unity were being transmuted by the aspiring kingdoms of Europe, not just soldiers and architects, but artists and humanists were deeply concerned with the problem of signing a new system of fortifications that withstand the terrible new weapon.

MARC CHAGALL

harmless to others. Thus, Surrealism art an inevitable presented feelings so private that com- munication with an audience of any appreci- ation became difficult if not impossible ex- when the artist, through his choice of art symbols, described experiences common groups of people. Such a broadened use of symbols and fantasy occurs in the work of Marc Chagall who was born in 1888 in Russia and studied worked in Paris, Berlin, and New York. Altho- he accepted many aspects of the most sophisti- cated theories and practices of the times— abstractionism, Cubism, Faustian color—he never forgot his early life in an obscure Russian village. Themes from his childhood return in dreams and memories; some, gay and fantasies suggest the simpler pleasures of folk life; others, somber and even tragic, recall the trials and persecutions of the Jewish people. In his novel (nos. 12-18) the terror of wars and pog- is suggested by the pitiful little figures in village in the background. The religious imagery hope are expressed by the flying angel, the Scroll, and the rabbi-Christ figure on the

The work is a moving portrayal of the act- ing that faith is important in a world of ad- brutality. Although the very free, in- composition with unexpected juxtapositions the actual and the unearthly is Surrealistic in essence that it perpetuates the fantastic con- a dream, the individual symbols refer to no more than Chagall's personal psychic life. A comparison of Chagall's interpretation of with Picasso's in the Guernica illuminates broad scale of expressive emotion upon art can play.
Even the layman can feel the perfect artistry with which Mies van der Rohe handled the surface plane and the structural elements in his buildings, and can appreciate how, by his work and teaching, he has enabled us to understand those building systems of the past, such as the Doric order, which have created their own structural order. The refinement of the connection between column and roof-slab in the New National Gallery (1963–68) in West Berlin helps us — by the very fact of its being different — to understand the structures of past epochs.

Mies van der Rohe believed that architecture was bound neither to the cay nor to eternity, but to the epoch. Only a genuine historical movement makes it what it is. Architecture is the interpretation of a happening in history, the genuine consummation of its inner movement, the fulfillment and expression of its essential nature. In his buildings he sought to express the significant driving forces of our era: the economic order in which we live, the discoveries of science and technology, the existence of the mass society.

In the skeleton-type skyscraper with its glass skin, the curtain wall is raised to the highest level of art and expressed down to the smallest structural detail. The structure in Mies van der Rohe’s work determines the entirely flexible arrangement of the plan; and its refinement and classicism are most clearly expressed in the spacious column-free interiors of these one-room buildings where every kind of function can be accommodated.

Mies van der Rohe’s final aim was order and truth, a practical beauty which serves mankind. This spiritual order was defined by Thomas Aquinas as adequatio rei et intellectus. It was precisely this truth which was so firmly rooted in the mind of Mies van der Rohe and in every detail of his work. To appreciate this fully takes time; it presupposes that we are ready to penetrate to the heart of solutions which have been distilled to the ultimate in simplicity. Mies van der Rohe performed the meritorious service of redirecting architecture along the path to a deeper spiritual plane and thus to an ultimate unity. Through his work we are able to recognize the spiritual nature of architectural problems and find ever new solutions for them in creative freedom.
Glass skyscraper on a polygonal plan, project 1920–21

Studies of light reflections on a glass model led to a polygonal plan being adopted. The curves followed by the glass walls were determined by the lighting needs of the interior, by the appearance of the building mass when seen against the existing buildings in the street and by the play of reflections it was desired to achieve. The two glass skyscrapers were experiments which matured out of one and the same thought process: to exploit the potentialities of the materials and technology of a new age and to create something meaningful out of them.

Reinforced-concrete building, project 1922

In this project for an office building the floors are formed by cantilevered concrete slabs which are turned up and around at the edges. The niches thus formed around the periphery of the building are two metres in height and are used as storage cabinets, thus leaving the interior free and uncluttered. As the ribbon window running round the perimeter is flush with the front of these cabinets, it appears set well back from the façade when viewed from outside. The columns of the concrete skeleton are located four metres back from the façade on all sides. Since each floor is a space, great flexibility is possible in the layout of offices.

Charcoal drawing: Glass skyscraper on a Polygonal plan
Brick villa, project 1923

The garden is divided by three long straight walls of brick. The villa itself crystallizes around their meeting point. The load-bearing brick walls are set out as the floor plan requires and connect the interior and exterior. The various living areas in the interior are screened from one another and yet there is an easy flow of space from one room to the next. There are no corridors. The flat roof rests on walls in which no openings are cut. Simple means have been used to banish the image of the conventional villa. The plan of the brick villa is a good example of the way in which Mies van der Rohe developed the art of structure from the very beginning. The structure of a brick wall begins with the smallest unit into which the whole can be divided: the brick. The dimensions are calculated in terms of the brick as the basic unit.

There has been no essential change in the bonding of a brick wall for centuries. Mies' discovery was to recognize the fundamental law and logic of the material and to unify the walls in a well-proportioned interplay of volumes and open spaces both inside and outside.
Voyages of Discovery

The house at No. 3 Rue de l’Arbalète, where François Auguste René Rodin was born on November 12, 1840, was a warren of families of meager means. The flaking building still stands, and the little street itself, narrow and dank, remains one of those pockets of Left Bank Paris that so far have defied change. The district was grubby even in Rodin’s childhood. Still, it was not just another nondescript slum. With its cobbled alleys climbing the slope known as the Montagne-Sainte-Geneviève, it was one of the oldest and most colorful sections of the city. Many an artist has been reared in grimmer surroundings.

Since early medieval times the quarter had seen students from the Sorbonne rubbing shoulders with every sort of artisan and worker. It had housed poets in poverty, witnessed upheavals at the university, and echoed to the mingled sounds of convent bells, craftsmen’s hammers and peddlers’ cries. The Montagne-Sainte-Geneviève itself gleamed with the Gothic tracery of the shrines of Sainte-Geneviève and Saint-Séverin, the flamboyant Renaissance façade of Saint-Étienne-du-Mont, the pomp of the high dome of the Panthéon—the monument to France’s great. By the time of Rodin’s youth, the part of the quarter in which he lived, known to its inhabitants as “the Mouffetard,” after its main street, the Rue Mouffetard, had become an enclave of small storekeepers and junk dealers. Yet all that Rodin saw around him helped provide an education—the shopkeepers’ stalls no less than the monuments, the pulse of the city along with the aura of history. The vibrant world of his native Paris gave him, as he once remarked, “millions de pensées”—millions of thoughts.

Rodin’s parents were recent arrivals in a migration from the provinces that was continually changing the character of Paris. They were above workingman status, although not quite bourgeois. The father, Jean-Baptiste, the son of a cotton seller, had come from a small town in Normandy to advance his fortunes, but all he achieved was a clerkship in the Paris police department, followed by a minor post at a Paris prison. Eventually he was promoted to the rank of inspector, only to be pensioned off soon thereafter at half pay at the age of 59. When Auguste,
in one of his first attempts at portraiture, painted his father the year be-
fore his retirement, the canvas showed a deep-browed face with an al-
most patrician nose. Rodin evidently indulged in some filial flattery; ac-
actually his father appears to have been a hard-bitten countryman of lim-
ited intelligence. Whatever qualities Auguste inherited from his paternal
side seem to have consisted chiefly of a handsome brow, a hearty phys-
ique and an urge for money.

Rodin’s maternal forebears were industrious peasant folk from Lor-
rain, on the Franco-German border. (Their name, Cheffer, suggests a
French variation of the German Schaefer.) Some of them prospered in
Paris; one Cheffer became an engraver, another a designer, a third the
head of a printing shop. Marie Cheffer Rodin herself was doomed to a life-
time of struggle; her husband’s pay of 1,800 francs a year was barely
enough to cover the family needs. Auguste’s older sister, Maria, had to
take in sewing and on occasion hire herself out as a domestic.

The Cheffers and the Rodins grew into a tightly knit clan whose
bonds were strengthened by religion. Jean-Baptiste served as a lay bro-
er of the Order of the Christian Doctrine, while his wife and her sister
Thérèse were also ardent Roman Catholics. The family’s devotional
bent required Catholic schooling for young Auguste. But in three years
of primary education at the hands of monks he learned little of spelling
or the intricacies of French syntax, with which he was to wrestle ever
after. He did learn something else on his own. “As far back as I can re-
member,” he recalled, “I drew.” A grocer at whose shop his mother tradi-
ted wrapped purchases in pages torn from illustrated journals; the
pictures, which Auguste copied at home, were his first subjects. At 10
he was packed off to the city of Beauvais, where his father’s brother
ran a small intermediate school. He hated the routine (“I always felt
that I was being held a prisoner”) and at 13 returned to his home, a drop-
out interested only in drawing.

Rodin’s frustration and failure to adjust at school may have been
caused in part by a physical handicap of which he was not then aware.
He was seriously nearsighted and probably found it difficult to see the
blackboard. His faulty eyesight may also have influenced his choice of
the field of sculpture, in which he could work with the tactile, the plas-
tic, the near at hand.

Beauvais was his last contact with formal schooling. His family was
short on resources, higher education was out of the question, and it
was decided that he should take up a trade. His father was opposed to
his ambition to become an artisan in the field of design, but relented
when Auguste’s sister Maria pleaded his cause. He was entered in the
government’s vocational school for applied arts and decoration—the Pe-
tite École, as it was called, in contrast to the Grande École, the higher
school of the fine arts. The Petite École was chiefly a training ground
for commercial draftsmen and participiens—cutters and finishers of work
in stone. It was there, from 14 to 17, that Rodin obtained “the only in-
struction of my life.”

At the Petite École, students spent their time copying the work of
18th Century decorators and ornamental painters—among them the cel-
A village in Aragón

The mule-path leading from Zaragoza to Fuendetodos is still as muddy or rutted, according to place and time of year, as it was in the days when Francisco Goya trotted along it with the unflagging energy of a headstrong child. Several miles from the Aragonese capital the white cottages of the village still cluster round the wind-swept belfry. The red and yellow ochre mountains still stand silhouetted against the blue of the sky, and no changes have been made in the house inhabited by the Goya family when Francisco first saw the light of day on 30 March 1746, in the reign of Philip V.

A low, dark doorway leads directly off the narrow street into a sunken kitchen, an old-style room dominated by an immense fireplace. In front of the fireplace stand two stone benches which were presumably spread with animal hides on winter evenings to provide a warm sleeping-place. Eugenio d'Ors tells us that he spent a long time there before embarking on his Life of Goya: 'Like an eskimo's igloo, the kitchen has no aperture but its chimney. The wood that burns there disperses not only its heat but a good part of its smoke and almost all the delightful fragrance of evaporating resin between the rough walls and low ceiling, which might have been hewn out of a cave. If a bunch of rosemary is kept there it will scent the confined air for more than a month. If fat melts in the hearth it impregnates stone, brick, furniture, tongue - even hands...'

'Savouring the inertia, the oblivion, the prehistory of the place, like someone savouring a hot bread soup', Eugenio d'Ors stood lost in thought before the trough 'where Goya's mother with her rough hands and rolled-up sleeves must have panted as she kneaded the good flour that stilled her child's hunger'.

'But this hunger', the writer goes on, 'was such that the family's bread could not assuage it for long. And so, breaking away, the child went off to rend the world with his wolfish teeth and devour it like a one-pound loaf'.

In fact, Francisco never dreamed of 'devouring the world like a one-pound loaf', neither at Fuendetodos nor in Zaragoza, where he settled with his family when he was about fourteen, nor in Madrid, where he arrived at the age of eighteen. Instead, he was content to cut off a slice and eat it with the resigned dignity that characterizes a Spanish peasant of good stock.

'A race like a vine, scorched by sun and tanned by frosts; a sober race, the product of a long selective
process governed by the cold of harsh winters and by periodic famines; a race inured to inclement skies and a life of deprivation. The Spanish peasant is serene in his gestures, poised and grave in his conversation, reminiscent of a dethroned monarch…’

Miguel de Unamuno’s description probably applies more closely to the basturro, or Aragonese peasant, than to any other, and Francisco Goya, the dethroned monarch, was one such.

His father, José Goya, was not exactly a peasant. The son of a notary and a gilder by trade, he was prompted by lack of success to interrupt his professional activities and cultivate a few acres of land at Fuendetodos in order to feed his daughter and three sons until they were of an age to earn their own living.

Tending goats and pigs in all weathers, carrying heavy two-handled tubs of precious water in glaring sunlight or icy winds, rambling through the countryside, sling in hand – such were the childhood activities of the four Goya children: Rita, the daughter, Tomás, who was training to be a gilder like his father, Camillo, destined for the priesthood, and Francisco, the painter-to-be. There seems little reason why, when he resumed work as a master-gilder at 12 Calle de la Moreria, Zaragoza, in about 1760, José Goya should have been averse to the idea that his son Francisco wanted to become a painter. Painting was not an ‘artistic’ profession at this period, but a skilled trade like any other. It was no more socially discreditable to gild church retables or the panelled walls of country houses than it was to measure the extent of a property on behalf of a notary. The only difference between a painter and a gilder or surveyor was that the painter was allowed to put something on the interior of premises (pious allegories in churches and genre scenes in country houses) and that, instead of measuring land, he reproduced as faithfully as he could the physiognomy of those who owned it.

Goya’s mother was a realist. When he left for Madrid she slipped into his pocket a small notebook in which she had carefully recorded the genealogies of prominent families, especially those of Aragonese origin. This notebook was to be her son’s order book. It contained the names of all the people who in our day would have attracted the attention of a budding society photographer anxious to sell pictures of personalities in the public eye to popular magazines.

The existence of this little notebook proves that Francisco de Goya y Lucientes had big ideas when he embarked on his career. He aimed to become a ‘painter of the great’ and does not seem to have been over-awed by the fame of his first master, José de Luján y Martínez.

Luján was not a negligible figure at this period. A court painter at the age of thirty, he had studied in Naples and painted with extreme meticulousness in the syrupy and stereotyped style which Italy had imposed upon the whole of Europe for almost a century. In Zaragoza, where Luján lived in affluence, he commanded universal respect. The Inquisition greatly esteemed his talent for adding drapery to medieval or Renaissance paintings so as to conceal the expanses of flesh that sprawled shame-
The Second and Third of May - six years later

Yet another event contributed to Goya’s isolation during these troubled years. His wife Josefa died in June 1812. This severed the last link with the ambitious young painter he had once been, and the distress he felt impelled him to take stock of himself. His bereavement seemed as great a threat as the uncertainty of the events which were unfolding around him.

He decided to give his son Javier some of his own paintings which he had retained because, Javier wrote later, 'he preferred them in that they had been painted in complete freedom, as his spirit willed'. It is interesting to note which pictures were involved. Among those which may be quoted with certainty are The Colossus, or Panic, the scenes depicting the career of the bandit Maragoto, some genre pictures, twelve illustrations of the horrors of war and the Majas on the Balcony - probably the one painted in 1810. (Goya often returned to this theme - two women leaning over a balcony with the silhouettes of men in sombreros in the background - and by 1820 his handling of the subject had acquired unrivalled freedom and mastery.) Foremost among the pictures which the painter kept in his possession were Portrait of Pedro Romero and his portrait of the Duchess of Alba wearing a ring inscribed with his own name.

In January 1812, while Napoleon was mustering his armies for the Russian campaign, the future Duke of Wellington launched an offensive aimed at Madrid. Joseph Bonaparte left there in August, before the arrival of the English forces. Wellington remained in the capital barely long enough to hear the delirious crowds chanting 'Y viva la Nación! Y viva Velinton!' to watch a parade by guerrilleros such as El Empecinado and El Medico - whose appearance perturbed him a little - and to have his portrait painted by Goya. It was by now a firmly established tradition that, whatever changes occurred in the government or political situation, Goya always made a portrait of the victor of the moment.

Joseph, who was quickly reinstalled in his palace by Soult's counter-offensive, did not enlist Goya's services
In the field of art, creation tends to take place without regard to nature, that is to say in spite of or against nature's example. Whereas Hindu art is a figure, Chinese art is a stylization. The hidden source of the Chinese soul is to be found in the art of the ancient period, in the bronze cauldrons which are drawn from the bowels of the earth, still charged with the magic potentialities of the rites they will be used for. The plastic form of that primitive art writhes with a satanic rhythm; it is the source of that bristling, jagged, cruel style which was to obsess China even in its works of architecture right through its long history.

The wealth of Chinese civilization lies in its many contradictions. The gust of naturalism that came from steppe art and from Indian art, the sense of the divine which was brought in by the Buddhist missionaries of the 'Great Vehicle' (Mahayana), these came into conflict with their obsession with the chimera. When they came into contact with Buddhism, the Chinese, who had naturally little sense of the divine, yet managed to express its sublime spirituality even better than India itself had done. India, overwhelmed by naturalism, sought to translate the inner life of the Buddha by taking from Greco-Buddhist art a formalism which resulted in the somewhat conventional works of Gupta art. The Chinese stripped the Yün-kang and Lü-men statues of their fleshly, earthly attributes so that they convey with the utmost dignity the Bodhisattvas' inward contemplation or compassion. But the warlike China of the T'ang period turned away from these holy images and gave themselves to a brutal realism fraught with the more pragmatic element in Chinese civilization. And to complete the gamut of human expression, the Sung period produced works full of the philosophical reverie, fundamentally aesthetic, typical of decadent periods in which strength is ousted by an elegant, intellectual scepticism.

Because the Chinese had an attitude of independence towards nature, they had more than any other race an exalted sense of essential form, and language cannot describe something which is as far from nature as it is from abstraction. Those naked objects, those archaic jades and Sung ceramics are addressed to the aesthetic sense in all its purity, so that once again the object becomes symbolic — a symbol of the absolute.

1. INDIAN ART

Historical Background

A peninsula of over two and a half million square miles, India is cut off from direct communication with Central Asia by the huge ranges of the Himalayas and the Hindu Kush. Its great gateway is the Indus valley, which brings it into contact with Iran and what is now Afghanistan. Through this gate the Mesopotamian civilizations penetrated in the protohistoric period, and in the historical period came the Hellenistic influences of the Greco-Iranian kingdoms, brought in by Alexander's invasion. The link with China leaves Kashmir to join the Iranian highways of the Oxus valley, passing through the Turkestan oases; it was by this route that Buddhism made its impact on Chinese civilization. Buddhism also spread eastwards through Burma, into Siam, Cambodia and Annam, and by sea along the Coromandel coast towards the Indian Archipelago and Java. This eastern region was the real colonial province of Indian art: Buddhism flourished there after its introduction in the third and fourth centuries, and continued to do so after it was driven out of India in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Excavations have shown that the Indus valley (Mohenjo-Daro, Harappa) had a civilization that depended on Mesopotamia. It is dif-
ficult to date (perhaps 2000 B.C.) and its relationship to the native civilizations of which works have survived is obscure. The latter are relatively recent and are confined to a fairly short era (second century B.C. to seventeenth century A.D.). The Muslim invasion which swept into India in the eleventh century and penetrated deeply into the subcontinent in the following centuries, sterilized and gradually impoverished the native art, though it managed to retain all its spirit in the miniatures of the Rajput, Sikh and Delahani schools. A most surprising fact about India is that no trace remains of the period when the Indian mentality was formed, no doubt because monuments and other works were then made of timber. Between 1500 and 800 B.C. an Ar, an invasion filtered into the peninsula via the Indus, driving the Dravidian natives down to the southern tip. These invaders gave India its earliest religion, Vedicism, which is not unlike the other Iranian religions such as that of Persia. Vedicism later took on more marked native characteristics and developed into Brahmanism. This religion is essentially based on the belief in a universal soul (Brahman) in which all individual souls find their fulfillment. But in order to rejoin the primordial Being the individual soul is condemned to move upwards through the scale of creatures by means of transmigration of souls (samsara) until it has attained the way of salvation and broken the chain of rebirths, when a final disincarnation ensures its identification with God.

The Aryans brought a language with them, Sanskrit, which shares a common origin with the languages of the other Aryan peoples who invaded Europe. These make up the Indo-European language group (Sanskrit, Persian, Greek, Latin and Germanic). Treatises were composed in Sanskrit which serve as the basis of the Indian religions. These are the Vedas, composed between about 1500 and 1000 B.C. and written down in about the sixth century B.C., then metaphysical speculations (Brahma, Upanishads), precepts (Sutras), and finally two great epic poems, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana. Perhaps the reason why Vedicism left no form of art was that, like the religion of the Persians, it must have been highly spiritual and opposed to the making of images. Vedicism was later paganized to some degree, in the stage known as Hinduism, and on the contrary began to represent gods who were formerly conceptual but were now personified. The main gods are Brahma, the least individualized and the least often portrayed. Vishnu, a messianic god who returns to the earth in successive incarnations (avatara) and Siva, a cosmic deity who is both creative and destructive, the god of life and death whose mystic dance created the world and whose most famous representation shows him as lord of the dance (pl. 578).

Meanwhile, when Brahmanism with its polytheistic pantheism was being developed, another religion, Buddhism, which began as no more than a moral teaching, was founded in the sixth century B.C. by the son of a rajah of Nepal (eastern basin of the Ganges), Prince Siddhartha, known as the Buddha or Enlightened One. He believed that the way of salvation lay in the suppression of the desire or thirst for existence, so that the soul might break free of its predestined transmigrations, effacing itself in the state of Nirvana. Legend gives every detail of the life of Prince Siddhartha, from his previous incarnations (jatakas), his noble
birth, his youthful sensuality which he renounced in order to become a monk, when he took the name of ‘Sakyamuni’. After attaining wisdom (Buddhi or Enlightenment), in spite of the attacks of the demon Mara, he went about preaching the truth until he died after achieving Nirvana. His ashes were distributed in eight funerary monuments or stupas. Buddha’s disciples set up monasteries, where they followed an ascetic life according to their rule. In the first or second century A.D. a doctrinal schism arose and the religion split into two branches, the Hinayana (or Theravada), meaning Little Vehicle of Salvation, and the Mahayana or Great Vehicle. The Hinayana conforms to the basic doctrine of the Buddha, regarding him as a superman but not as a god; it seeks personal salvation through the exercises leading to Nirvana. The Mahayana deifies Buddha and is a religion of redemption and love, comparable with Christianity; it brought hope and appealed to millions all over Asia. The redeeming divinities of Mahayana are the Bodhisattvas, or future Buddhas who are so touched by compassion for human suffering that they renounce Nirvana until all the other beings in the world are saved.

India has had a strange destiny, for after creating in Buddhism the most spiritual of Eastern religions, she lost sight of it in the eighth and ninth centuries, falling into the paganism of an idolatrous renewal of Brahmanism, in the form of Hinduism. After reaching China in the sixth century, Buddhism found its strongest hold in the cultural colonies of India, that is to say Indo-China and the East Indies.

Evolution of Indian Art

The early history of India is complicated by the fact that the country was always divided into a number of kingdoms or principalities, except in one or two periods when political unity was more marked (Maurya Empire, about third century B.C. and Gupta Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D.). In spite of these divisions India’s artistic civilization shows a genuine unity because of the common cultural outlook imposed by the Aryans and the consistency of the tropical climate.

The first Indian art was of Buddhist inspiration, for primitive Vedism and Brahmanism left few works, or at least few have survived. It was the Maurya dynasty which helped this early art to spread all over India. In the third century B.C. the Emperor Asoka, who has been called the Constantine of Buddhism, built memorial columns in the Ganges valley (at Sarnath) and stupas in the places associated with events in Buddha’s life, and his example was followed by his successors.

If we set aside India’s protohistoric civilization, which has no obvious connection with what followed, the artistic history of the country may be divided into the following periods:

1. Primitive period and introduction of Buddhist art. Third century B.C. to first century A.D.

The kings of the Maurya and Sunga dynasties built memorials (Sarnath) and stupas (Bharhut, Sanchi) in the Ganges valley, which show the life of the Buddha in form and with lavish naturalism though he himself was never represented in person (pl. 580). The stupa is a stone version of an older timber construction, and shows belief in the Achaemenian influence in its ornament. The same features are to be found in sanctuaries and convenes carved in the rock in central India, in the Deccan (Nasik, Karli, pl. 582, Bhaja).

2. Buddhist art. Early Christian era to fifth century A.D.

Indian art now developed on three different planes:

a) In the north-west provinces, bordering Iran, and in Gandhara (province of Peshawat) and Kapisa in what is now Afghanistan (sites excavated at Hadda, Bamiyan, Kapisa), an art called ‘Greco-Buddhist’ appeared under the Kushan dynasty between the first and fifth centuries, and is so called because it shows the application of Hellenistic principles to Buddhist statuary. Large numbers of sculptures in blue schist or slate as well as in stucco have been found in the small stupas in the Hadda monasteries (pl. 570). There the Buddha was shown in person for the first time, dressed in a Grecian type of mantle or pallium with clinging folds or swags, and in various symbolic postures which became typical of Buddhist iconography. The idealized face is that of the Apollo type, although with some Indian traits: the shortening of the ear-lobe, the arna or ‘third eye’ between the brows, the ushnisha or cranial protuberance disguised as a top-knot resembling that of the Greek sun-god (pl. 579). Demons and genii are also to be found in this highly figurative iconography.

b) Parallel with Greco-Buddhist art, the native naturalistic aesthetic that had appeared earlier developed between the first and third centuries A.D. in the form of the Mathura or pre-Gupta style, representing the Buddha, and perhaps with some influence from the Greco-Buddhist idealist manner which gradually affected it. The architecture of central-Indian caves showed the same features as in the preceding period.

579 Head of the Buddha. Greco-Buddhist Art of Gandhara, Paris
c) In the south of India between the first and fourth centuries, that is to say in the Deccan, at Amaravati, in the Krishna valley, a sculptural style developed which, perhaps owing to Greco-Buddhist influence, lost something of the naive, naturalistic heaviness and sought to portray movement; the figures became more elongated, while the ritual tribhanga pose of the body, moving in three ways simultaneously—a pose introduced in the Sanchi period—found a graceful suppleness.

3. Gupta period. Fourth to sixth century A.D.

The Gupta period saw the triumph of idealism over the naturalism and vitalism of the previous periods. In the sculptures in the round of the Ganges valley, and in the frescoes and bas-reliefs of the Ajanta caves in central India, artists sought to express a divine serenity, detachment and mystic love through forms that have a great classical poise and that have a precise canon behind them. Buddhist iconography was now fixed into several types which spread to overseas Indian territories. Rock architecture was still carried on, but there were some outdoor temples, too.

4. Post-Gupta period. Seventh and eighth centuries A.D.

The academic impoverishment of Buddhist sculpture in the post-Gupta period was made up for by a revival of Brahmanism, resulting in a renewed native taste for a wealth of forms, and a new tendency to the colossal in an effort to express the greatness of the deities. Artists had the courage to carve enormous rocks (Descent of the Ganges, Mamallapuram, in the south-east, pl. 569; Cave Temple of Siva at Elephanta.

Deccan, eight century). Sometimes they gave these blocks an architectural form (Rathas or Shriners, Mamallapuram, seventh century, pl. 581), and did not shrink before tremendous labours of excavation (Kailasanath Temple, sculpted in the eighth century from a single block excavated at Ellura). This period begins to show examples of open-air architecture (as distinct from caves) executed in durable materials. Starting from the elements of timber-construction showing Iranian characteristics, architecture now became more and more Indianized.

5. Development of Brahmanic art.

While the Indus and Ganges regions were invaded by Islam and ceased being the great creative centre, the Indian spirit survived in the north east (Bengal and Orissa) and the Deccan. Cut off from the external influences which might have been profitable, Indian art became self-centred and quickly exhausted its creative potential. This period saw the development of temples from simple cella into structures of a more complex plan. In the north, the cella was given height, becoming a bulb-shaped sikōra (Lingaraja Temple in Orissa; Khajuraho, about 1000), while in the south it became the pyramidal vimana (Tanjore, eleventh century). Multiplied in the form of gopura or porch-towers, with concentric halls (pl. 585) this pyramidal type of structure gave the design of the great Temple of Siva at Tanjore which later, in the fourteenth
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First published in two volumes 1951
Reprinted 1952
This edition
Published in four volumes 1962
by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., Broadway House
68/74 Carter Lane, London EC4V 5EL
Reprinted 1968, 1973
Text printed in Great Britain
by Photolithography
Unwin Brothers Limited
The Gresham Press, Old Woking, Surrey, England
A member of the Staples Printing Group
Plates printed in Great Britain
by Headley Bros. Ltd., Ashford, Kent

Translated in collaboration
with the Author by
Stanley Godman

ISBN 0 7100 6266 4 (c)
ISBN 0 7100 4631 6 (p)

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CHAPTER I

PREHISTORIC TIMES

I. OLD STONE AGE

MAGIC AND NATURALISM

The legend of the Golden Age is very old. We do not exactly know the sociological reason for reverence for the past; it may be rooted in tribal and family solidarity or in the endeavour of the privileged classes to base their privileges on heredity. However that may be, the feeling that what is old must be better is still so strong that art historians and archaeologists do not shrink even from historical falsification when attempting to prove that the style of art which appeals to them most is also the oldest. Some of them declare the art based on strictly formal principles, on the stylization and idealization of life, others that based on the reproduction and preservation of the natural life of things, to be the earliest evidence of artistic activity, according to whether they see in art a means of dominating and subjugating reality, or experience it as an instrument of self-surrender to nature. In other words, corresponding to their particular autocratic and conservative or liberal and progressive views, they revere either the geometrically ornamental art forms or the naturalistically imitative forms of expression as the older.¹

The monuments of primitive art that survive suggest quite clearly, anyhow, and with ever increasing force as research progresses, that naturalism has the prior claim, so that it is becoming more and more difficult to maintain the theory of the primacy of an art remote from life and nature.²

But the most remarkable thing about prehistoric naturalism is not that it is older than the geometric style, which makes so much more of a primitive impression, but that it already reveals 1
all the typical phases of development through which art has passed in modern times and is not in any sense the merely instinctive, static, a-historical phenomenon which scholars obsessed with geometric and rigorously formal art declare it to be. This is an art which advances from a linear faithfulness to nature, in which individual forms are still shaped somewhat rigidly and laboriously, to a more nimble and sparkling, almost impressionistic technique. It is a process which shows a growing understanding of how to give the final optical impression an increasingly pictorial, instantaneous and apparently spontaneous form. The accuracy of the drawing rises to a level of virtuosity which takes it upon itself to master increasingly difficult attitudes and aspects, increasingly fleeting movements and gestures, increasingly bold foreshortenings and intersections. This naturalism is by no means a fixed, stationary formula, but a mobile and living form, which tackles the rendering of reality with the most varied means of expression and performs its task sometimes with lesser, sometimes with greater skill. The indiscriminately instinctive state of nature has long been left behind, but there is still a far journey yet to that state of culture in which rigid artistic formulae are created.

We are the more perplexed by what is probably the strangest phenomenon in the whole history of art, because there are no parallels whatever between this prehistoric art and child art or the art of most of the more recent primitive races. Children’s drawings and the artistic production of contemporary primitive races are rationalistic, not sensory: they show what the child and the primitive artist know, not what they actually see; they give a theoretically synthetic, not an optically organic picture of the object. They combine the front-view with the side-view or the view from above, leave nothing out of what they consider worth knowing about the object, increase the scale of the biologically and practically important, but neglect everything, however impressive in itself, which plays no direct part in the context of the object. The peculiar thing about the naturalistic drawings of the Old Stone Age is, on the other hand, that they give the visual impression in such a direct, unmixed form, free from all intellectual trimmings or restrictions, that we have to wait until modern impressionism to find any parallels in later art. We discover motion studies which already remind us of modern instantaneous photographs, the like of which we do not find again until we come to the pictures of a Degas or a Toulouse-Lautrec, so that for the eye unschooled by impressionism there must appear to be something badly drawn and unintelligible about these pictures. The painters of the Palaeolithic age were still able to see delicate shades with the naked eye which modern man is able to discover only with the help of complicated scientific instruments. Such ability had already gone by the time of the New Stone Age when the directness of sensations had been replaced to some extent by the inflexibility and stability of conceptualism. But the Palaeolithic artist still paints what he actually sees, and nothing more than he can take in in one definite moment and in one definite sight of the object. He still knows nothing about the optical heterogeneity of the various elements of the picture and rationalistic methods of composition, stylistic characteristics with which we are so familiar from children’s drawings and the art of primitive races, nor does he know above all about the technique of composing a face from the silhouette in profile and the eyes en face. Palaeolithic art apparently takes possession without a fight of the unity of visual perception achieved by modern art only after a century-long struggle; it certainly improves its methods, but does not change them, and the dualism of the visible and the invisible, of the seen and the merely known, remains absolutely foreign to it.

What was the reason and purpose behind this art? Was it the expression of a joy of life, in a constant and repeated? Or the satisfaction of the play-instinct and delight in embellishment—of the urge to cover empty surfaces with lines and forms, patterns and ornament? Was it the fruit of leisure or had it some definite practical purpose? Have we to see in it a playing, or a tool, an opiate and a luxury or a weapon in the struggle for a livelihood? We know that it was the art of primitive hunters living on an unproductive, parasitic economic level, who had to gather or capture their food rather than produce it themselves; men who to all appearances still lived at the stage of primitive individualism, in unstable, almost entirely unorganized social patterns, in small isolated hordes, and who believed in no gods,
in no world and life beyond death. In this age of purely practical
life everything obviously still turned around the bare earning of
a livelihood and there is nothing to justify us in assuming that
art served any other purpose than a means to the procuring of
food. All the indications point rather to the fact that it was the
instrument of a magical technique and as such had a thoroughly
pragmatic function aimed entirely at direct economic objectives.
This magic apparently had nothing in common with what we
understand by religion; it knew no prayers, revered no sacred
powers and was connected with no other-worldly spiritual beings
by any kind of faith, and therefore failed to fulfill what has been
described as the minimum condition of an authentic religion.
It was a technique without mystery, a matter-of-fact procedure,
the objective application of methods which had as little to do with
mysticism and esoterism as when we set mouse-traps, manure the
ground or take a drug. The pictures were part of the technical
apparatus of this magic; they were the ‘trap’ into which the game
had to go, or rather they were the trap where the already captured
animal—for the picture was both representation and the things
represented, both wish and wish-fulfillment at one and the same
time. The Palaeolithic hunter and painter thought he was in
possession of the thing itself in the picture, thought he had
acquired power over the object in the portrayal of the object. He
believed the real animal actually suffered the killing of the
animal portrayed in the picture. The pictorial representation was
to his mind nothing but the anticipation of the desired effect; the
real event had inevitably to follow the magical sample-action, or
rather to be already contained within it, as both were separated
from each other merely by the supposedly unreal medium of
space and time. It was, therefore, by no means a question of
symbolical surrogatory functions but of really purposive action.
It was not the thought that killed, not the faith that achieved the
miracle, but the actual deed, the pictorial representation, the
shooting at the picture, that effected the magic.

When the Palaeolithic artist painted an animal on the rock,
he produced a real animal. For him the world of fiction and
pictures, the sphere of art and mere imitation, was not yet a
special province of its own, different and separate from empirical

reality; he did not as yet confront the two different spheres, but
saw in one the direct, undifferentiated continuation of the other.
He will have had the same attitude to art as Lévy-Bruhl’s Sioux
Red Indian, who said of a research worker whom he saw preparing
sketches: ‘I know that this man has put many of our bison
into his book. I was there when he did it, and since then we have
had no bison.’ The conception of this sphere of art as a direct
continuation of ordinary reality never disappears completely
despite the later predominance of a conception of art as some-
thing opposed to reality. The legend of Pygmalion, who falls in
love with the statue which he has created, comes from this
attitude of mind. There is evidence of a similar approach when
the Chinese or Japanese artist paints a branch or a flower and the
picture is not intended to be a summary and idealization, a re-
duction or correction of life, like the works of Western art, but
simply one branch or blossom more on the tree of reality. Chinese
anecdotes and fairy tales about artists’ relation to their works and
the relationship between picture and reality, appearance and
being, fiction and life, convey the same idea—fairy tales in which
it is related, for example, how the figures in a picture walk out
through a gate into a real landscape, into real life. In all these
examples the frontiers between art and reality are blurred, only
in the art of historical times the continuity of the two provinces
is a fiction within the fiction, whilst in the painting of the Old
Store Age it is a simple fact and a proof that art is still entirely
in the service of life.

Any other explanation of Palaeolithic art, as, for example,
decorative or expressive form, is untenable. A whole series of
indications argues against such an interpretation, above all the
fact that the paintings are often completely hidden in inaccessible,
absolutely unillumination corners of the caves where they would
have been quite impossible as ‘decorations’. Their palimpsest-like
superposition, destroying any decorative effect from the very
outset, also argues against such explanations. After all, the
painters were not forced to paint their pictures one over the
other. They had space enough. This very superposition of one
picture over another points to the fact that the pictures were not
created with any intention of providing the eye with aesthetic
CHAPTER II
ANCIENT-ORIENTAL URBAN CULTURES

1. STATIC AND DYNAMIC ELEMENTS IN ANCIENT-ORIENTAL ART

The end of the Neolithic age betokens almost as universal a re-orientation of life, almost as profound a revolution of economy and society, as its beginning. Then the break was marked by the transition from mere consumption to production, from primitive individualism to co-operation, now it is marked by the beginning of independent trade and handicrafts, the rise of cities and markets, and the agglomeration and differentiation of the population. In both cases we see before us a picture of complete change, although in both cases it takes place more as a gradual alteration than as a sudden subversion. In most of the institutions and customs of the Ancient-Oriental world, the autocratic forms of government, the partial maintenance of a natural economy, the permeation of daily life by religious cults and the rigorously formalistic trend of art, Neolithic customs and traditions continue side by side with the new urban way of life. In Egypt and Mesopotamia the peasantry continues its own traditionally defined existence, independent of the restless bustle of the cities, in its village settlements, within the framework of its domestic economy, and even though its influence is constantly on the decline, the spirit of its traditions is still discernible even in the latest and most advanced manifestations of the highly differentiated city cultures of these countries.

The decisive change in the new way of life is expressed above all in the fact that primary production is no longer the leading, historically most progressive occupation, but that it now enters...
ment could only be expressed in terms of millennia, one becomes aware of stylistic phenomena, whose differences one from another are often overlooked merely as a result of their foreignness, which makes it more difficult to differentiate their distinct characteristics. But to attempt to derive this art from one single principle and to disregard the fact that it bears within itself the polarity of static and dynamic, conservative and progressive, strictly formal and form-destroying tendencies, is to falsify its very essence. In order to understand it properly, one must feel the living forces of experimenting individualism and expansive naturalism behind the rigid traditional forms, forces which flow from the urban outlook on life and destroy the stationary culture of the Neolithic age; but one must not on any account allow oneself to be led by this impression to underestimate the spirit of conservatism at work in the history of the ancient East. For apart from the fact that the schematic formalism of the Neolithic peasant culture not only continues to exert an influence but produces constantly new variants of the old pattern, at least in the early stages of the Ancient-Oriental epoch, the leading social forces, above all the royal house and the priesthood, contribute to the preservation of the status quo and the traditional forms of art and worship as far as possible.

The compulsion under which the artist has to work in this society is so relentless that according to the theories of modern liberalistic aesthetics all genuine cultural achievement should have been fundamentally impossible from the outset. And yet some of the most magnificent works of art originated precisely here in the Ancient Orient under the most dire pressure imaginable. They prove that there is no direct relationship between the personal freedom of the artist and the aesthetic quality of his works. For it is a fact that every intention of an artist has to make its way through the meshes of a closely entwined net; every work of art is produced by the tension between a series of aims and a series of resistances to their achievement—resistances represented by inadmissible motifs, social prejudices and faulty powers of judgment of the public, and aims which have either already assimilated these resistances or stand openly and irreconcilably opposed to them. If the resistances in one direction are impossible to overcome, then the artist's invention and powers of expression turn to a goal the way to which is not obstructed, and it is very unusual for him even to be aware of the fact that his achievement is a substitute for the real thing. Even in the most liberal democracy the artist does not move with perfect freedom and restraint; even there he is restricted by innumerable considerations foreign to his art. The different measure of freedom may be of the greatest importance for him personally but in principle there is no difference between the dictates of a despot and the conventions if he himself were contrary to the spirit of art, perfect works of art could arise only in a state of complete anarchy. But in reality the presuppositions on which the aesthetic quality of a work depends lie beyond the alternative presented by political freedom and compulsion. Therefore the other extreme, namely, the assumption that the ties which restrict the artist's freedom of movement are profitable and fruitful in themselves, that the freedom of the modern artist is consequently responsible for the inadequacies of modern art and that compulsion and restrictions could and should be produced artificially as the supposed guarantees of true 'style',—such an assumption is just as wrong as the anarchist point of view.

2. THE STATUS OF THE ARTIST AND THE ORGANIZATION OF ARTISTIC PRODUCTION

The first and for a long time the only employers of artists were priests and princes and their most important workshops during the whole period of Ancient-Oriental culture were in temple and palace households. In the workshops of these households they worked either as voluntary or compulsory employees, as labourers able to move about freely or as lifelong slaves. Here far the greatest and most valuable part of the artistic production of the time was accomplished. The first accumulation of land fell into the hands of warriors and robbers, conquerors and oppressors, chieftains and princes; the first rationally administered property may well have been the temple estates, that is to say, the properties of the gods founded by the princes and managed by the
priests. Therefore, it is highly probable that the priests were the first regular employers of artists, the first to give them commissions; the kings merely have followed their example. Ancient-Oriental art was restricted in the first place, apart from domestic industry, to the carrying out of the tasks set by these patrons. Its creations consisted for the most part in votive gifts to the gods and royal memorials, in the requisites of either the cult of the gods or the ruler, in instruments of propaganda designed to serve either the fame of the immortals or the posthumous fame of their earthly representatives. Both the priesthood and the royal house were part of the same hieratic system, and the tasks which they set the artist, of securing their spiritual salvation and endowing them with lasting fame, were united in the foundation of all primitive religion, the cult of the dead. Both demanded that the artist should provide solemn, stately and lofty representations, both encouraged the artist to remain static in his outlook and subjected him to the service of their own conservative aims. Both did all they could to prevent innovations in art, as well as any kind of reform, since they feared any alteration in the prevailing order of things and declared the traditional rules of art to be just as sacred and inviolable as the traditional religious creeds and forms of worship. The priests allowed the kings to be regarded as gods so as to draw them into their own sphere of authority and the kings allowed temples to be built for the gods and priests so as to increase their own fame. Each wanted to profit from the prestige of the other; each sought to enlist the help of the artist in the fight for the preservation of royal and priestly power. Under such circumstances there could be no more question of an autonomous art, created from purely aesthetic motives and for purely aesthetic purposes, than under those of the prehistoric era. The great works of art, of monumental sculpture and wall-painting, were not created for their own sake and their own beauty. Sculptures were not commissioned in order to be set up in front of temples and on the market place—as in classical antiquity or the Renaissance; most of them stood in the dark interior of the sanctuary and in the depth of the sepulchre.

The demand for pictorial representations, for works of sepulchral art in particular, was so great in Egypt from the very beginning, that one must assume the profession of the artist to have become distinct and self-supporting at a fairly early date. But the rôle of art as a subordinate servant was emphasized so strongly and its absorption in practical tasks was so complete that the person of the artist himself disappeared almost entirely behind his work. The painter and sculptor remained anonymous craftsmen, in no way obtruding their own personalities. We know only very few names of artists from Egypt and as the masters did not sign their works it is impossible to connect even these few names with any definite body of work. We possess, it is true, pictures of sculptors' workshops, above all from El Amarna, and even that of a sculptor working at an identifiable portrait of the Queen Tiy, but the person of the artist and the attribution of the extant works of art is doubtful in every case. If the wall-decoration of a tomb occasionally represents a painter or sculptor and gives his name, we may assume that the artist intended to immortalize himself, but this is neither wholly certain, nor can we derive much benefit from the information in view of the scarcity of other details of the history of Egyptian art. It is impossible to form any clear outline of the personality of these artists. These self-portraits do not even give any satisfactory information about what the artist in question thought about himself and the value of his work. It is difficult to say whether we must interpret them simply as an attempt by the artist to record his everyday routine or whether, driven, like the kings and the great ones of the kingdom, by the urge to secure immortal fame for himself, in the shadow of their fame, he wished to set up a monument which would allow him to survive for ever in the memory of man.

It is true that we are acquainted with the names of master-builders and master-sculptors in Egypt, and special social honours will have been bestowed on them as high court officials, but on the whole the artist remains an undistinguished craftsman, esteemed at the most as such, and not as a personality in himself. An idea like Lessing's notion of a 'Raphael without hands' would have been quite inconceivable. Only in the case of the master-builder is it possible to speak of a dividing-line between intellectual and manual work; the sculptor and the painter are
RENAISSANCE, MANNERISM, BAROQUE

1. THE CONCEPT OF THE RENAISSANCE

How arbitrary the usual distinction between the Middle Ages and the modern age is and how fluid the concept of the ‘Renaissance’ is best shown by the difficulty there is in assigning such personalities as Petrarch and Boccaccio, Gentile da Fabriano and Pisanello, Jean Fouquet and Jan van Eyck, to one or other of these categories. If one likes, one can even consider Dante and Giotto as belonging to the Renaissance and Shakespeare and Molière to the Middle Ages. In any case, the idea that the real turning-point does not occur until the eighteenth century and that the modern age really begins with the enlightenment, with the idea of progress and with industrialization, is not to be lightly dismissed. 1 But it will probably be best to place the crucial dividing-line between the first and second half of the Middle Ages, that is to say, at the end of the twelfth century, when money economy comes to life again, the new towns arise and the modern middle class first acquires its distinctive characteristics—it would be quite wrong to place it in the fifteenth century, in which, it is true, a number of things come to fruition but as good as nothing absolutely new begins. Our naturalistic and scientific conception of the world is certainly in essentials a creation of the Renaissance, but it was medieval nominalism that first inspired the new direction of thought in which this conception of the world has its origin. The interest in the individual object, the search for natural law, the sense of fidelity to nature in art and literature—these things do not by any means begin only with the Renaissance. The naturalism of the fifteenth century is merely the continuation of the naturalism of the Gothic period
in which the individual conception of individual things already begins to be clearly manifest. And if those who sing the praises of the Renaissance profess to see in all the spontaneous, progressive and personalist tendencies of the Middle Ages a heralding or a proto-form of the Renaissance, if for Burckhardt even the songs of the wandering scholars are proto-Renaissance and Walter Pater sees an expression of the Renaissance spirit in such an absolutely medieval creation as the chante-fable ‘Aucassin and Nicolette’, then this conception only sheds light on the same state of affairs, the same continuity between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, from the opposite angle.

In his description of the Renaissance, Burckhardt laid the greatest stress on the naturalism of the period, and represented the turning to empirical reality, ‘the discovery of the world and of man’, as the most fundamental factor in the ‘rebirth’. In so doing, he, like most of his successors, failed to see that in the art of the Renaissance not naturalism in itself but merely the scientific, methodical, totalitarian character of naturalism was new, and that not the observation and analysis of reality, but merely the conscious deliberation and consistency with which the criteria of reality were registered and analysed were in advance of medieval conceptions—that the remarkable thing about the Renaissance was, to put it briefly, not the fact that the artist became an observer of nature, but that the work of art became a ‘study of nature’. The naturalism of the Gothic period began when pictures and sculpture ceased being exclusively symbols, and began to acquire purpose and value as mere reproductions of the things of this world, apart from their connection with transcendental reality. The sculptures of Chartres and Rheims, obvious as their supernatural relationships are, differ from the art of the Romanesque period by reason of their immanent purpose, which is separable from their metaphysical significance. On the other hand, the real change brought about by the Renaissance is that metaphysical symbolism loses its strength and the artist’s aim is limited more and more definitely and consciously to the representation of the empirical world. The more society and economic life emancipate themselves from the fetters of ecclesiastical dogma the more freely does art turn to the consideration of immediate reality; but naturalism is no more a new creation of the Renaissance than the acquisitive economy.

The Renaissance discovery of nature was an invention of nineteenth-century liberalism which played off the Renaissance delight in nature against the Middle Ages, in order to strike a blow at the romantic philosophy of history. For when Burckhardt says that the ‘discovery of the world and of man’ was an achievement of the Renaissance, this thesis is, at the same time, an attack on romantic reaction and an attempt to ward off the propaganda designed to spread the romantic view of medieval culture. The doctrine of the spontaneous naturalism of the Renaissance comes from the same source as the theory that the spirit of the age and culture, the spirit of authority and hierarchy, the ideal of freedom of thought, of freedom of conscience, emancipation of the individual and the principle of democracy, are achievements of the fifteenth century. In all this the light of the modern age is contrasted with the darkness of the Middle Ages.

The connection between the concept of the Renaissance and the ideology of liberalism is even more striking in the work of Michelet, who coined the slogan of the ‘découverte du monde et de l’homme’, than in that of Burckhardt. Even the way he chooses his heroes, and brings together Rabelais, Montaigne, Shakespeare and Cervantes with Columbus, Copernicus, Luther and Calvin, his characterization of Brunelleschi, for instance, as the destroyer of the Gothic and his conception of the Renaissance in general as the beginning of a development which finally secures the victory for the idea of freedom and reason, shows that the main interest in his analysis is to establish the genealogy of liberalism. He is concerned with the same struggle against clericalism and intellectual authoritarianism which made the enlightened philosophers of the eighteenth century conscious of their opposition to the Middle Ages and of their affinity with the Renaissance. For both Bayle (Dict. hist. et crit., IV) as well as Voltaire (Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations, chap. 121) the irreligious character of the Renaissance was a foregone conclusion, and the Renaissance has remained encumbered with this feature until our own day, although it was in reality merely anti-clerical, anti-scholastic and anti-ascetic, but in no sense sceptical. The ideas about salva-
tion, the other world, redemption and original sin, which filled the whole spiritual life of medieval man, became, it is true, merely ‘secondary ideas’, but there can be no question of an absence of all religious feeling in the Renaissance. For if, as Ernst Walser remarks, ‘one tries to inquire into the life and thought of the leading personalities of the Quattrocento, a Coluccio Salutati, Poggio Bracciolini, Leonardo Bruni, Lorenzo Valla, Lorenzo Magnifico or Luigi Pulci, inductively, then the result will always be that, strangely enough, the established characteristics of scepticism are absolutely inapplicable to them. . . .’ The Renaissance was not even so hostile to authority as the enlightenment and liberalism asserted. Clerics were attacked, but the Church as an institution was spared, and as its authority diminished it was replaced by that of classical antiquity.

The radicalism of the eighteenth-century rationalist conception of the Renaissance was markedly intensified by the spirit of the fight for freedom in the middle of the last century. The struggle against reaction renewed the memory of the Italian republics of the Renaissance and suggested the idea of connecting the splendour of their culture with the emancipation of their citizens. In France it was anti-Napoleonic, in Italy anti-clerical journalism which helped to give final point to and spread the liberal conception of the Renaissance, and both middle-class liberal, as well as socialist historians have adhered to this conception. Even today, the Renaissance is still celebrated in both camps as Reason’s great war of liberation and as the triumph of individualism, whereas in reality the idea of ‘free research’ was not an achievement of the Renaissance, nor was the idea of personality absolutely foreign to the Middle Ages; the individualism of the Renaissance was new only as a conscious programme, as a weapon and a war-cry, not as a phenomenon in itself.

In his definition of the Renaissance, Burckhardt combines the idea of individualism with that of sensualism, the idea of the self-determination of the personality with the emphasis on the protest against medieval asceticism, the glorification of nature with the proclamation of the gospel of the joy of life and the ‘emancipation of the flesh’. Out of this association of ideas there arises, partly under the influence of Heine’s romantic immoralism and as an anticipation of Nietzsche’s a-moral hero-worship, the well-known picture of the Renaissance as an era of unscrupulous brutes and epicures—a picture the libertine features of which are, perhaps, not directly related to the liberal conception of the Renaissance, but which would be inconceivable without the liberal trend and individualistic approach of the nineteenth century. The discomfort with the world of middle-class morality and the revolt against it produced the exuberant paganism which tried to find a substitute for pleasures beyond its grasp by depicting the excesses of the Renaissance. In this picture, the condottiere with his demonic lust for pleasure and unbridled will to power was the stock figure of the irresistible sinner, who committed, as a proxy, all the monstrosities conjured up in the middle-class day-dreams of the happy life. It has been asked, justifiably, whether this infamous brute, as described in the histories of Renaissance morals, ever existed at all in reality, and whether this ‘wicked tyrant’ was ever anything more than the result of memories derived from the classical reading of the humanists.

The sensualistic conception of the Renaissance is based more on the psychology of the nineteenth century than on that of the Renaissance itself. The aestheticism of the romantic movement was far more than a cult of the artist and of art; it led to a revaluation of all the great questions of life according to aesthetic standards. All reality became the substratum of an artistic experience and life itself a work of art, in which every element was merely a stimulus of the senses. This aesthetic philosophy characterized the alleged sinners, tyrants and villains of the Renaissance as great picturesque figures—the fitting protagonists for the colourful background of the age. The generation which, drunk with beauty and longing for disguise, wanted to die ‘with vine-leaves in the hair’ was only too ready to exalt a historical epoch which clothed itself in gold and purple, which turned life into a gorgeous feast, and in which, as this generation desired to believe, even the simple folk delighted enthusiastically in the most exquisite works of art. The historical reality was, of course, no more in accordance with this aesthete’s dream than
NATURALISM AND IMPRESSIONISM

Tolstoy’s relationship to art can only be understood as the symptom of a historic change, as the sign of a development which brings the aesthetic culture of the nineteenth century to an end and a generation to the fore that judges art once again as the mediator of ideas.106

What this generation revered in the author of War and Peace was by no means merely the great novelist, the creator of the greatest novel in the literature of the world, but above all the social reformer and the founder of a religion. Tolstoy enjoyed the fame of Voltaire, the popularity of Rousseau, the authority of Goethe and, more than that—he became a legendary figure, whose prestige was reminiscent of that of the old seers and prophets. Yasnaya Polyana became a place to which the members of all nations, social classes and cultural strata went on pilgrimage, and admired the old count in the peasant’s smock as if he were a saint. Gorky will not have been the only one to have seen him and thought ‘This man is like to God!’ a confession with which the unbeliever ends his memories of Tolstoy.107 Many will certainly have had the feeling, as did Thomas Mann, that Europe became ‘without a master’ after his death.108 But these were only feelings and moods, words of gratitude and loyalty. Tolstoy was doubtless something very much like the living conscience of Europe, the great teacher and educator, who expressed, as did no other, the moral unrest and desire for spiritual renewal of his generation, but, with his naïve Rousseauism and quietism, he would never have been able to remain—if he ever really was—the ‘master’ of Europe. For, it may well be sufficient for an artist, as Chekhov thought, to put the right questions, but a man who was to rule over his century would also have to answer them aright.

4. IMPRESSIONISM

The frontiers between naturalism and impressionism are fluid; it is impossible to make a clear-cut historical or conceptual distinction between them. The smoothness of the stylistic change corresponds to the continuity of the simultaneous economic development and the stability of social conditions. 1871 is of merely passing significance in the history of France. The predominance of the upper middle class remains essentially unchanged and the conservative Republic takes the place of the ‘liberal’ Empire—that ‘republic without republicans’,109 which is acquiesced in only because it seems to guarantee the smoothest possible solution of the political problems. But a friendly relationship is established with it only after the supporters of the Commune have been rooted out and comfort has been found in the theory of the necessity and the healing power of bleeding.110 The intelligentsia confronts events in a state of absolute helplessness. Flaubert, Gautier, the Goncourts, and with them most of the intellectual leaders of the age, indulge in wild insults and imprecations against the disturbers of the peace. From the Republic they “hope at the most for protection against clericalism, and they see in democracy merely the lesser of the two evils.”111 Financial and industrial capitalism develops consistently along the lines long since laid down; but, under the surface, important, though for the time being still unobtrusive changes are taking place. Economic life is entering the stage of high capitalism and developing from a ‘free play of forces’ into a rigidly organized and rationalized system, into a close-meshed net of spheres of interest, customs territories, fields of monopoly, cartels, trusts and syndicates. And just as it was feasible for this standardization and concentration of economic life to be called a sign of senility,112 so the marks of insecurity and the omens of dissolution can be recognized throughout middle-class society. It is true that the Commune ends with a more complete defeat for the rebels than any previous revolution, but it is the first to be sustained by an international labour movement and to be followed by a victory for the bourgeoisie associated with a feeling of acute danger.113 This mood of crisis leads to a renewal of the idealistic and mystical trends and produces, as a reaction against the prevailing pessimism, a strong tide of faith. It is only in the course of this development that impressionism loses its connection with naturalism and becomes transformed, especially in literature, into a new form of romanticism.

The enormous technical developments that take place must
not induce us to overlook the feeling of crisis that was in the air. The crisis itself must rather be seen as an incentive to new technical achievements and improvements of methods of production. Certain signs of the atmosphere of crisis make themselves felt in all the manifestations of technical activity. It is above all the furious speed of the development and the way the pace is forced that seems pathological, particularly when compared with the rate of progress in earlier periods in the history of art and culture. For the rapid development of technology not only accelerates the change of fashion, but also the shifting emphases in the criteria of aesthetic taste; it often brings about a senseless and fruitless mania for innovation, a restless striving for the new for the mere sake of novelty. Industrialists are compelled to intensify the demand for improved products by artificial means and must not allow the feeling that the new is always better to cool down, if they really want to profit from the achievements of technology. The continual and increasingly rapid replacement of old articles in everyday use by new ones leads, however, to a diminished affection for material and soon also for intellectual possessions, too, and readjusts the speed at which philosophical and artistic revaluations occur to that of changing fashion. Modern technology thus introduces an unprecedented dynamism in the whole attitude to life and it is above all this new feeling of speed and change that finds expression in impressionism.

The most striking phenomenon connected with the progress of technology is the development of cultural centres into large cities in the modern sense; these form the soil in which the new art is rooted. Impressionism is an urban art, and not only because it discovers the landscape quality of the city and brings painting back from the country into the town, but because it sees the world through the eyes of the townsman and reacts to external impressions with the overstrained nerves of modern technical man. It is an urban style, because it describes the changes, the nervous rhythm, the sudden, sharp but always ephemeral impressions of city life. And precisely as such, it implies an enormous expansion of sensual perception, a new sharpening of sensibility, a new irritability, and, with the Gothic and romanticism, it signifies one of the most important turning points in the history of Western art. In the dialectical process represented by the history of painting, the alternation of the static and the dynamic, of design and colour, abstract order and organic life, impressionism forms the climax of the development in which recognition is given to the dynamic and organic elements of experience and which completely dissolves the static world-view of the Middle Ages. A continuous line can be traced from the Gothic to impressionism comparable to the line leading from late medieval economy to high capitalism, and modern man, who regards his whole existence as a struggle and a competition, who translates all being into motion and change, for whom experience of the world increasingly becomes experience of time, is the product of this bilateral, but fundamentally uniform development.

The dominion of the moment over permanence and continuity, the feeling that every phenomenon is a fleeting and never-to-be-repeated constellation, a wave gliding away on the river of time, the river into which 'one cannot step twice', is the simplest formula to which impressionism can be reduced. The whole method of impressionism, with all its artistic expedients and tricks, is bent, above all, on giving expression to this Heraclitean outlook and on stressing that reality is not a being but a becoming, not a condition but a process. Every impressionistic picture is the deposit of a moment in the perpetuum mobile of existence, the representation of a precarious, unstable balance in the play of contending forces. The impressionistic vision transforms nature into a process of growth and decay. Everything stable and coherent is dissolved into metamorphoses and assumes the character of the unfinished and fragmentary. The reproduction of the subjective act instead of the objective substratum of seeing, with which the history of modern perspective painting begins, here achieves its culmination. The representation of light, air and atmosphere, the dissolution of the evenly coloured surface into spots and dabs of colour, the decomposition of the local colour into valeurs, into values of perspective and aspect, the play of reflected light and illuminated shadows, the quivering, trembling dots and the hasty, loose and abrupt strokes of the brush, the whole improvised technique with its rapid and rough sketching, the fleeting, seemingly careless perception of
the object and the brilliant casualness of the execution merely express, in the final analysis, that feeling of a stirring, dynamic, constantly changing reality, which began with the re-orientation of painting by the use of perspective.

A world, the phenomena of which are in a state of constant flux and transition, produces the impression of a continuum in which everything coalesces, and in which there are no other differences but the various approaches and points of view of the beholder. An art in accordance with such a world will stress not merely the momentary and transitory nature of phenomena, will not see in man simply the measure of all things, but will seek the criterion of truth in the 'hic et nunc' of the individual. It will consider chance the principle of all being, and the truth of the moment as invalidating all other truth. The primacy of the moment, of change and chance implies, in terms of aesthetics, the domination of the passing mood over the permanent qualities of life, that is to say, the prevalence of a relation to things the property of which is to be non-committal as well as changeable.

This reduction of the artistic representation to the mood of the moment is, at the same time, the expression of a fundamentally passive outlook on life, an acquiescence in the rôle of the spectator, of the receptive and contemplative subject, a standpoint of aloofness, waiting, non-involvement—in short, the aesthetic attitude purely and simply. Impressionism is the climax of self-centred aesthetic culture and signifies the ultimate consequence of the romantic renunciation of practical, active life.

Stylistically, impressionism is an extremely complex phenomenon. In some respects it represents merely the logical development of naturalism. For, if one interprets naturalism as meaning progress from the general to the particular, from the typical to the individual, from the abstract idea to the concrete, temporally and spatially conditioned experience, then the impressionistic reproduction of reality, with its emphasis on the instantaneous and the unique, is an important achievement of naturalism. The representations of impressionism are closer to sensual experience than those of naturalism in the narrower sense, and replace the object of theoretical knowledge by that of direct optical experience more completely than any earlier art. But by detaching the optical elements of experience from the conceptual and elaborating the autonomy of the visual, impressionism departs from all art as practised hitherto, and thereby from naturalism as well. Its method is peculiar in that, whilst pre-impressionist art bases its representations on a seemingly uniform but, in fact, heterogeneously composed world-view, made up of conceptual and sensual elements alike, impressionism aspires to the homogeneity of the purely visual. All earlier art is the result of a synthesis, impressionism that of an analysis. It constructs its particular subject from the bare data of the senses, it, therefore, goes back to the unconscious psychic mechanism and gives us to some extent the raw material of experience, which is further removed from our usual conception of reality than the logically organized impressions of the senses. Impressionism is less illusionistic than naturalism; instead of the illusion, it gives elements of the subject, instead of a picture of the whole, the bricks of which experience is composed. Before impressionism, art reproduced objects by signs, now it represents them through their components, through parts of the material of which they are made up.

In comparison with the older art, naturalism marked an increase in the elements of the composition, in other words, an extension of the motifs and an enrichment of the technical means. The impressionistic method, on the other hand, involves a series of reductions, a system of restrictions and simplifications. Nothing is more typical of an impressionist painting than that it must be looked at from a certain distance and that it describes things with the omissions inevitable in them when seen from a distance. The series of reductions which it carries out begins with the restriction of the elements of the representation to the purely visual and the elimination of everything of a non-optical nature or that cannot be translated into optical terms. The waiving of the so-called literary elements of the subject, the story or the anecdote, is the most striking expression of this 'recollection by painting of its own particular means'. The reduction of all motifs to landscape, still life and the portrait, or the treatment of every kind of subject as a 'landscape' and 'still life', is nothing more than a symptom of the predominance of the specifically 'painterly' principle in painting. It is the treatment of a subject
 CHAPTER II

THE FILM AGE

The ‘twentieth century’ begins after the first world war, that is to say, in the ‘twenties, just as the ‘nineteenth century’ did not begin until about 1830. But the war marks a turning point in the development only in so far as it provides an occasion for a choice between the existing possibilities. All three main trends in the art of the new century have their predecessors in the foregoing period: cubism in Cézanne and the neoclassicists, expressionism in Van Gogh and Strindberg, surrealism in Rimbaud and Lautréamont. The continuity of the artistic development corresponds to a certain steadiness in the economic and social history of the same period. Sombart limits the lifetime of high capitalism to a hundred and fifty years and makes it end with the outbreak of the war. He wants to interpret the system of cartels and trusts of the years 1895–1914 itself as a phenomenon of old age and as an omen of the impending crisis. But in the period before 1914 only the socialists speak of the collapse of capitalism, in bourgeois circles people are certainly aware of the socialist danger, but believe neither in the ‘internal contradictions’ of the capitalist economy, nor in the impossibility of overcoming its occasional crises. In these circles there is no thought of a crisis in the system itself. The generally speaking confident frame of mind even continues in the first years after the end of the war and the atmosphere in the bourgeoisie is, apart from the lower middle class, which has to struggle against fearful odds, by no means hopeless. The real economic crisis begins in 1929 with the crash in America which brings the war and post-war boom to an end and unmistakably reveals the consequences of the lack of international planning of production and distribution. Now people suddenly begin to talk everywhere about the crisis of capitalism, the failure of the free economy and liberal society, about an imminent catastrophe and the threat of revolution. The history of the ’thirties is the history of a period of social criticism, of realism and activism, of the radicalization of political attitudes and the increasingly widespread conviction that only a radical solution can be of any help, in other words, that the moderate parties have had their day. But there is nowhere a greater awareness of the crisis through which the bourgeois way of life is passing than in the bourgeoisie itself, and nowhere is there so much talk of the end of the bourgeois epoch. Fascism and bolshevism are at one in considering the bourgeoisie a living corpse and in turning with the same uncompromisingness against the principle of liberalism and parliamentarism. On the whole, the intelligentsia takes its stand alongside the authoritarian forms of government, demands order, discipline, dictatorship, is inspired with enthusiasm for a new Church, a new scholasticism and a new Byzantium. The attraction of fascism for the enervated literary stratum, confused by the vitalism of Nietzsche and Bergson, consists in its illusion of absolute, solid, unquestionable values and in the hope of being rid of the responsibility that is connected with all rationalism and individualism. From communism the intelligentsia promises itself a direct contact with the broad masses of the people and the redemption from its isolation in society.

In this precarious situation the spokesmen of the liberal bourgeoisie can think of nothing better than to stress the characteristics that fascism and bolshevism have in common, and to discredit one by the other. They point to the unscrupulous realism peculiar to both and they find in a ruthless technocracy the common denominator to which their forms of organization and government can be reduced. They wilfully neglect the ideological differences between the various authoritarian forms of government and represent them as mere ‘techniques’, that is, as the province of the party expert, the political administrator, the engineer of the social machine, in a word, of the ‘managers’. There is, no doubt, a certain analogy between the different forms of social regulation, and if one proceeds from the mere fact of
THE FILM AGE

East, against Asia and Russia. West and East are contrasted as representing order and chaos, authority and anarchy, stability and revolution, disciplined rationalism and unbridled mysticism respectively, and post-war Europe under the spell of Russian literature is emphatically warned that with its cult of Dostoevsky and its Karamazovism it is treading the path to chaos. At the time of Vogt, Russia and Russian literature were by no means 'Asiatic', they were, on the contrary, the representatives of the genuine Christianity which was set up as a model for the pagan West. At that time there was, however, still a Czar in Russia. The new crusaders do not, incidentally, really believe that the West can be saved at all and they clothe the hopelessness of their political outlook in a general shroud of pessimism. They are determined to bury the whole of Western civilization along with their political hopes and, as the genuine heirs of decadence, they accept the 'decline of the West'.

The great reactionary movement of the century takes effect in the realm of art as a rejection of impressionism—a change which, in some respects, forms a deeper incision in the history of art than all the changes of style since the Renaissance, leaving the artistic tradition of naturalism fundamentally unaffected. It is true that there had always been a swinging to and fro between formalism and anti-formalism, but the function of art being true to life and faithful to nature had never been questioned in principle since the Middle Ages. In this respect impressionism was the climax and the end of a development which had lasted more than four hundred years. Post-impressionist art is the first to renounce all illusion of reality on principle and to express its outlook on life by the deliberate deformation of natural objects. Cubism, constructivism, futurism, expressionism, dadaism and surrealism turn away with equal determination from nature-bound and reality-affirming impressionism. But impressionism itself prepares the ground for this development in so far as it does not aspire to an integrating description of reality, to a confrontation of the subject with the objective world as a whole, but marks rather the beginning of that process which has been called the 'annexation' of reality by art. Post-impressionist art can no longer be called in any sense a reproduction of nature; its rela-

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tionship to nature is one of violation. We can speak at most of a kind of magic naturalism, of the production of objects which exist alongside reality, but do not wish to take its place. Confronted with the works of Braque, Chagall, Rouault, Picasso, Henri Rousseau, Salvador Dalí, we always feel that, for all their differences, we are in a second world, a super-world which, however many features of ordinary reality it may still display, represents a form of existence surpassing and incompatible with this reality.

Modern art is, however, anti-impressionistic in yet another respect: it is a fundamentally "ugly" art, forgoing the euphony, the fascinating forms, tones and colours of impressionism. It destroys pictorial values in painting, carefully and consistently executed images in poetry and melody and tonality in music. It implies an anxious escape from everything pleasant and agreeable, everything purely decorative and ingratiating. Debussy already plays off a coldness of tone and a pure harmonic structure against the sentimentalism of German romanticism, and this anti-romanticism is intensified in Stravinsky, Schoenberg and Hindemith into an anti-expressive, which forswears all connection with the music of the sensitive nineteenth century. The intention is to write, paint and compose from the intellect, not from the emotions; stress is laid sometimes on purity of structure, at others on the ecstasy of a metaphysical vision, but there is a desire to escape at all costs from the complacent sensual aestheticism of the impressionist epoch. Impressionism itself had no doubt already been well aware of the critical situation in which modern aesthetic culture finds itself, but post-impressionist art is the first to stress the grotesqueness and mendacity of this culture. Hence the fight against all voluptuous and hedonistic feelings, hence the gloom, depression and torment in the works of Picasso, Kafka and Joyce. The aversion to the sensualism of the older art, the desire to destroy its illusions, goes so far that artists now refuse to use even its means of expression and prefer, like Rimbaud, to create an artificial language of their own. Schoenberg invents his twelve-tone system, and it has been rightly said of Picasso that he paints each of his pictures as if he were trying to discover the art of painting all over again.

The systematic fight against the use of the conventional means of expression and the consequent break up of the artistic tradition of the nineteenth century begins in 1916 with dadaism, a war-time phenomenon, a protest against the civilization that had led to the war and, therefore, a form of defeatism. The purpose of the whole movement consists in its resistance to the allurements of ready-made forms and the convenient but worthless, because worn-out, linguistic clichés, which falsify the object to be described and destroy all spontaneity of expression. Dadaism, like surrealism, which is in complete agreement with it in this respect, is a struggle for directness of expression, that is to say, it is an essentially romantic movement. The fight is aimed at that falsification of experience by forms, of which, as we know, Goethe had already been conscious and which was the decisive impulse behind the romantic revolution. Since romanticism the whole development in literature had consisted in a controversy with the traditional and conventional forms of language, so that the literary history of the last century is to some extent the history of a renewal of language itself. But whereas the nineteenth century always seeks merely for a balance between the old and the new, between traditional forms and the spontaneity of the individual, dadaism demands the complete destruction of the current and exhausted means of expression. It demands entirely spontaneous expression, and thereby bases its theory of art on a contradiction. For how is one to make oneself understood—which at any rate surrealism intends to do—and at the same time deny and destroy all means of communication?—The French critic Jean Paulhan differentiates between two distinct categories of writers, according to their relationship to language. He calls the language-destroyers, that is to say, the romantics, symbolists and surrealists, who want to eliminate the commonplace, conventional forms and ready-made clichés from language completely and who take refuge from the dangers of language in pure, virginal, original inspiration, the 'terrorists'. They fight against all consolidation and coagulation of the living, fluid, intimate life of the mind, against all externalization and institutionalization, in other words, against all 'culture'. Paulhan links them up with Bergson and establishes the influence of intuitionism and the theory of the 'élan vital' in their attempt to preserve the direct-
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6. SIGNIFICANT FORM

CLIVE BELL

The Aesthetic Hypothesis

...The starting-point for all systems of aesthetics must be the personal experience of a peculiar emotion. The objects that provoke this emotion we call works of art. All sensitive people agree that there is a peculiar emotion provoked by works of art. I do not mean, of course, that all works provoke the same emotion. On the contrary, every work produces a different emotion. But all these emotions are recognizably the same in kind—so far, at any rate, the best opinion is on my side. That there is a particular kind of emotion provoked by works of visual art, and that this emotion is provoked by every kind of visual art, by pictures, sculptures, buildings, pots, carvings, textiles, etc., is not disputed, I think, by any one capable of feeling it. This emotion is called the aesthetic emotion; and if we can discover some quality common and peculiar to all the objects that provoke it, we shall have solved what I take to be the central problem of aesthetics. We shall have discovered the essential quality in a work of art, the quality that distinguishes works of art from all other classes of objects.

For either all works of visual art have some common quality, or when we speak of “works of art” we gibber. Every one speaks of “art,” making a mental classification by which he distinguishes the class “works of art” from all other classes. What is the justification of this classification? What is the quality common and peculiar to all members of this class? Whatever it be, no doubt it is often found in company with other qualities; but they are adventitious—it is essential. There must be some one quality without which a work of art cannot exist; possessing which, in the least degree, no work is altogether worthless. What is this quality? What quality is shared by all objects that provoke...
our aesthetic emotions? What quality is common to Sta. Sophia and
the windows at Chartres, Mexican sculpture, a Persian bowl, Chinese
carpets, Giotto’s frescoes at Padua, and the masterpieces of Poussin,
Piero della Francesca, and Cezanne? Only one answer seems possible—
*significant form*. In each, lines and colors combined in a particular way,
certain forms and relations of forms, stir our aesthetic emotions. These
relations and combinations of lines and colors, these aesthetically
moving forms, I call “Significant Form” and “Significant Form” is
the one quality common to all works of visual art.

At this point it may be objected that I am making aesthetics a
purely subjective business, since my only data are personal experiences
of a particular emotion. It will be said that the objects that provoke this
emotion vary with each individual, and that therefore a system of
aesthetics can have no objective validity. It must be replied that any
system of aesthetics which pretends to be based on some objective
truth is so palpably ridiculous as to be worth discussing. We have
no other means of recognizing a work of art than our feeling for it.
The objects that provoke aesthetic emotion vary with each individual.
Aesthetic judgments are, as the saying goes, matters of taste; and about
tastes, as every one is proud to admit, there is no disputing. A good
critic may be able to make me see in a picture that had left me cold
things that I had overlooked, till at last, receiving the aesthetic emotion,
I recognize it as a work of art. To be continually pointing out those
parts, the sum or rather the combination, of which unite to produce
significant form is the function of criticism. But it is useless for a critic
to tell me that something is a work of art; he must make me feel it for
myself. This he can do only by making me see; he must get at my emo-
tions through my eyes. Unless he can make me see something that
moves me, he cannot force my emotions. I have no right to consider
anything a work of art to which I cannot react emotionally; and I have
no right to look for the essential quality in anything that I have not
felt to be a work of art. The critic can affect my aesthetic theories only
by affecting my aesthetic experience. All systems of aesthetics must be
based on personal experience—that is to say, they must be subjective.

Yet, although all aesthetic theories must be based on aesthetic
judgments, and ultimately all aesthetic judgments must be matters of
personal taste, it would be rash to assert that no theory of aesthetics
can have general validity. For, though A, B, C, D are the works that
move me, and A, D, E, F the works that move you, it may well be that
x is the only quality believed by either of us to be common to all the
works in his list. We may all agree about aesthetics, and yet differ about
particular works of art. We may differ as to the presence or absence of
the quality x. My immediate object will be to show that significant
form is the only quality common and peculiar to all the works of visual
art that move me; and I will ask those whose aesthetic experience does
not tally with mine to see whether this quality is not also, in their
judgment, common to all works that move them, and whether they can
discover any other quality of which the same can be said. . . .

“Are you forgetting about color?” someone inquires. Certainly
not; my term “significant form” included combinations of lines and of
colors. The distinction between form and color is an unreal one; you
cannot conceive a colorless line or a colorless space; neither can you
conceive a formless relation of colors. In a black and white drawing the
spaces are all white and all are bounded by black lines; in most oil
paintings the spaces are multi-colored and so are the boundaries; you
cannot imagine a boundary line without any content, or a content
without a boundary line. Therefore, when I speak of significant form,
I mean a combination of lines and colors (counting white and black as
colors) that moves me aesthetically.

Some people may be surprised at my not having called this “beauty.”
Of course to those who define beauty as “combinations of lines and
colors that provoke aesthetic emotion,” I willingly concede the right
of substituting their word for mine. But most of us, however strict we
may be, are apt to apply the epithet “beautiful” to objects that do not
provoke that peculiar emotion produced by works of art. Everyone,
I suspect, has called a butterfly or a flower beautiful. Does anyone feel
the same kind of emotion for a butterfly or a flower that he feels for a
cathedral or a picture? Surely, it is not what I call an aesthetic emotion
that most of us feel, generally, for natural beauty. I shall suggest,
later, that some people may, occasionally, see in nature what we see
in art, and feel for her an aesthetic emotion; but I am satisfied that, as a
rule, most people feel a very different kind of emotion for birds and
flowers and the wings of butterflies from that which they feel for pictures,
pots, temples, and statues. Why these beautiful things do not move us
as works of art move us is another, and not an aesthetic, question. For
our immediate purposes we have to discover only what quality is
common to objects that do move us as works of art. In the last part of
this chapter, when I try to answer the question “Why are we so pro-
foundly moved by some combinations of lines and colors?” I shall
hope to offer an acceptable explanation of why we are less profoundly
moved by others.

Since we call a quality that does not raise the characteristic aesthetic
emotion “beauty,” it would be misleading to call by the same name
the quality that does. To make “beauty” the object of the aesthetic
emotion, we must give to the word an overstrict and unfamiliar def-
inition. Every one sometimes uses “beauty” in an unesthetic sense;
most people habitually do so. To everyone, except perhaps here and
there an occasional aesthetic, the commonest sense of the word is
unesthetic. Of its grosser abuse, patent in our chatter about “beautiful
hunty’” and “beautiful shootin’,” I need not take account; it would
be open to the precious to reply that they never do so abuse it. Besides,
here there is no danger of confusion between the aesthetic and the non-
esthetic use; but when we speak of a beautiful woman there is. When
an ordinary man speaks of a beautiful woman he certainly does not
mean only that she moves him aesthetically; but when an artist calls
a withered old hag beautiful he may sometimes mean what he means
when he calls a battered torso beautiful. The ordinary man, if he be
also a man of taste, will call the battered torso beautiful, but he will
not call a withered hag beautiful because, in the matter of women, it
is not to the aesthetic quality that the hag may possess, but to some other
quality that he assigns the epithet. Indeed, most of us never dream of
going for aesthetic emotions to human beings, from whom we ask
something very different. This “something,” when we find it in a young
woman, we are apt to call “beauty.” We live in a nice age. With the
man-in-the-street “beautiful” is more often than not synonymous with
“desirable”; the word does not necessarily connote any aesthetic
reaction whatever, and I am tempted to believe that in the minds of
many the sexual flavor of the word is stronger than the aesthetic. I
have noticed a consistency in those to whom the most beautiful thing
in the world is a beautiful woman, and the next most beautiful thing
a picture of one. The confusion between aesthetic and sensual beauty is
not in their case so great as might be supposed. Perhaps there is none;
for perhaps they have never had an aesthetic emotion to confuse with
their other emotions. The art that they call “beautiful” is generally
closely related to the women. A beautiful picture is a photograph of a
pretty girl; beautiful music, the music that provides emotions similar
to those provoked by young ladies in musical farces; and beautiful
poetry, the poetry that recalls the same emotions felt, twenty years
earlier, for the rector’s daughter. Clearly the word “beauty” is used to
connote the objects of quite distinguishable emotions, and that is a reason
for not employing a term which would land me inevitably in confusions
and misunderstandings with my readers.

On the other hand, with those who judge it more exact to call these
combinations and arrangements of form that provoke our aesthetic
emotions, not “significant form,” but “significant relations of form,”
and then try to make the best of two worlds, the aesthetic and the
metaphysical, by calling these relations “rhythm,” I have no quarrel
whatever. Having made it clear that by “significant form” I mean
arrangements and combinations that move us in a particular way, I
willingly join hands with those who prefer to give a different name to the
same thing.

The hypothesis that significant form is the essential quality in a
work of art has at least one merit denied to many more famous and
more striking—it does help to explain things. We are all familiar with
pictures that interest us and excite our admiration, but do not move
us as works of art. To this class belongs what I call “Descriptive
Painting”—that is, painting in which forms are used not as objects
of emotion, but as means of suggesting emotion or conveying
information. Portraits of psychological and historical value, topographical
works, pictures that tell stories and suggest situations, illustrations of all
sorts, belong to this class. That we all recognize the distinction is clear,
for who has not said that such and such a drawing was excellent as
illustration, but as a work of art worthless? Of course many descriptive
pictures possess, amongst other qualities, formal significance, and are
therefore works of art: but many more do not. They interest us; they
may move us in a hundred different ways, but they do not move us
aesthetically. According to my hypothesis they are not works of art.
They leave untouched our aesthetic emotions because it is not their
forms but the ideas or information suggested or conveyed by their forms
that affect us.

Let no one imagine that representation is bad in itself. A realistic
form may be as significant, in its place as a part of the design, as an
abstract. But if a representative form has value, it is as form, not as
representation. The representative elements in a work of art may or
may not be harmful; always it is irrelevant. For, to appreciate a work
of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its
ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions. Art transports us
from the world of man’s activity to a world of aesthetic exaltation. For a
moment we are shut off from human interests; our anticipations and
memories are arrested; we are lifted above the stream of life. The pure
mathematician rapt in his studies knows a state of mind which I take to
be similar, if not identical. He feels an emotion for his speculations
which arises from no perceived relation between them and the lives of
men, but springs, inhuman or superhuman, from the heart of an
abstract science. I wonder, sometimes, whether the appreciators of art
and of mathematical solutions are not even more closely allied. Before
we feel an aesthetic emotion for a combination of forms, do we not
perceive intellectually the rightness and necessity of the combination?
If we do, it would explain the fact that passing rapidly through a room
we recognize a picture to be good, although we cannot say that it has
provoked much emotion. We seem to have recognized intellectually the rightness of its forms without staying to fix our attention, and collect, as it were, their emotional significance. If this were so, it would be permissible to inquire whether it was the forms themselves or our perception of their rightness and necessity that caused aesthetic emotion. But I do not think I need linger to discuss the subject here. I have been inquiring why certain combinations of forms move us; I should not have traveled by other roads had I enquired, instead, why certain combinations are perceived to be right and necessary, and why our perception of their rightness and necessity is moving. What I have to say is this: the rapt philosopher, and he who contemplates a work of art, inhabit a world with an intense and peculiar significance of its own; that significance is unrelated to the significance of life. In this world the emotions of life find no place. It is a world with emotions of its own.

To appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing but a sense of form and color and a knowledge of three-dimensional space. That bit of knowledge, I admit, is essential to the appreciation of many great works, since many of the most moving forms ever created are in three dimensions. To see a cube or a rhomboid as a flat pattern is to lower its significance, and a sense of three-dimensional space is essential to the full appreciation of most architectural forms. Pictures which would be insignificant if we saw them as flat patterns are profoundly moving because, in fact, we see them as related planes. If the representation of three-dimensional space is to be called “representation,” then I agree that there is one kind of representation which is not irrelevant. Also, I agree that along with our feeling for line and color we must bring with us our knowledge of space if we are to make the most of every kind of form. Nevertheless, there are magnificent designs to an appreciation of which this knowledge is not necessary: so, though it is not irrelevant to the appreciation of some works of art it is not essential to the appreciation of all. What we must say is that the representation of three-dimensional space is neither irrelevant nor essential to all art, and that every other sort of representation is irrelevant.

That there is an irrelevant representative or descriptive element in many great works of art is not in the least surprising. Why it is not surprising I shall try to show elsewhere. Representation is not of necessity baneful, and highly realistic forms may be extremely significant. Very often, however, representation is a sign of weakness in an artist. A painter too feeble to create forms that provide more than a little aesthetic emotion will try to eke that little out by suggesting the emotions of life. To evoke the emotions of life he must use representation. Thus a man will paint an execution, and, fearing to miss with his first barrel of significant form, will try to hit with his second by raising an emotion of fear or pity. But if in the artist an inclination to play upon the emotions of life is often the sign of a flickering inspiration, in the spectator a tendency to seek, behind form, the emotions of life is a sign of defective sensibility always. It means that his aesthetic emotions are weak or, at any rate, imperfect. Before a work of art people who feel little or no emotion for pure form find themselves at a loss. They are deaf men at a concert. They know that they are in the presence of something great, but they lack the power of apprehending it. They know that they ought to feel for it a tremendous emotion, but it happens that the particular kind of emotion it can raise is one that they can feel hardly or not at all. And so they read into the forms of the work those facts and ideas for which they are capable of feeling emotion, and feel for them the emotions that they can feel—the ordinary emotions of life. When confronted by a picture, instinctively they refer back its forms to the world from which they came. They treat created form as though it were imitated form, a picture as though it were a photograph. Instead of going out on the stream of art into a new world of aesthetic experience, they turn a sharp corner and come straight home to the world of human interests. For them the significance of a work of art depends on what they bring to it; no new thing is added to their lives, only the old material is stirred. A good work of visual art carries a person who is capable of appreciating it out of life into ecstasy; to use art as a means to the emotions of life is to use a telescope for reading the news. You will notice that people who cannot feel pure aesthetic emotions remember pictures by their subjects; whereas people who can, as often as not, have no idea what the subject of a picture is. They have never noticed the representative element, and so when they discuss pictures they talk about the shapes of forms and the relations and quantities of colors. Often they can tell by the quality of a single line whether or no a man is a good artist. They are concerned only with lines and colors, their relations and quantities and qualities, but from these they win an emotion more profound and far more sublime than any that can be given by the description of facts and ideas.

This last sentence has a very confident ring—over-confident, some may think. Perhaps I shall be able to justify it, and make my meaning clearer too, if I give an account of my own feelings about music. I am not really musical. I do not understand music well. I find musical form exceedingly difficult to apprehend, and I am sure that the profoundest subtleties of harmony and rhythm more often than not escape me. The form of a musical composition must be simple indeed if I am
to grasp it honestly. My opinion about music is not worth having. Yet, sometimes, at a concert, though my appreciation of the music is limited and humble, it is pure. Sometimes, though I have a poor understanding, I have a clean palate. Consequently, when I am feeling bright and clear and intent, at the beginning of a concert for instance, when something that I can grasp is being played, I get from music that pure aesthetic emotion that I get from visual art. It is less intense, and the rapture is evanescent; I understand music too ill for music to transport me far into the world of pure aesthetic ecstasy. But at moments I do appreciate music as pure musical form, as sounds combined according to the laws of a mysterious necessity, as pure art with a tremendous significance of its own and no relation whatever to the significance of life; and in those moments I lost myself in an infinitely sublime state of mind to which pure visual form transports me. How inferior is my normal state of mind at a concert. Tired or perplexed, I let slip my sense of form, my aesthetic emotion collapses, and I begin weaving into the harmonies, that I cannot grasp, the ideas of life. Incapable of feeling the austere emotions of art, I begin to read into the musical forms human emotions of terror and mystery, love and hate, and spend the minutes, pleasantly enough, in a world of turbid and inferior feeling. At such times, were the grossest pieces of onomatopoeic representation—the song of a bird, the galloping of horses, the cries of children, or the laughing of demons—to be introduced into the symphony, I should not be offended. Very likely I should be pleased; they would afford new points of departure for new trains of romantic feeling or heroic thought. I know very well what has happened. I have been using art as a means to the emotions of life and reading into it the ideas of life. I have been cutting blocks with a razor. I have tumbled from the superb peaks of aesthetic exaltation to the snout foothills of warm humanity. It is a jolly country. No one need be ashamed of enjoying himself there. Only no one who has ever been on the heights can help feeling a little crestfallen in the cozy valleys. And let no one imagine, because he has made merry in the warm thilt and quaint nooks of romance, that he can even guess at the austere and thrilling raptures of those who have climbed the cold, white peaks of art.

About music most people are as willing to be humble as I am. If they cannot grasp musical form and win from it a pure aesthetic emotion they confess that they understand music imperfectly or not at all. They recognize quite clearly that there is a difference between the feeling of the musician for pure music and that of the cheerful concert-goer for what music suggests. The latter enjoys his own emotions, as he has every right to do, and recognizes their inferiority. Unfor-

Clive Bell 6. SIGNIFICANT FORM

tunately, people are apt to be less modest about their powers of appreciating visual art. Everyone is inclined to believe that out of pictures at any rate, he can get all that there is to get; everyone is ready to cry "humbug" and "impostor" at those who say that more can be had. The good faith of people who feel pure aesthetic emotions is called in question by those who have never felt anything of the sort. It is the prevalence of the representative element, I suppose, that makes the man in the street so sure that he knows a good picture when he sees one. For I have noticed that in matters of architecture, pottery, textiles, etc., ignorance and ineptitude are more willing to defer to the opinions of those who have been blest with peculiar sensibility. It is a pity that cultivated and intelligent men and women cannot be induced to believe that a great gift of aesthetic appreciation is at least as rare in visual as in musical art. A comparison of my own experience in both has enabled to discriminate very clearly between pure and impure appreciation. Is it too much to ask that others should be as honest about their feelings for pictures as I have been about mine for music? For I am certain that most of those who visit galleries do feel very much what I feel at concerts. They have their moments of pure ecstasy; but the moments are short and unsure. Soon they fall back into the world of human interests and feel emotions, good no doubt, but inferior. I do not dream of saying that what they get from art is bad or nugatory; I say that they do not get the best that art can give. I do not say that they cannot understand art; rather I say that they cannot understand the state of mind of those who understand it best. I do not say that art means nothing or little to them; I say they miss its full significance. I do not suggest for one moment that their appreciation of art is a thing to be ashamed of; the majority of the charming and intelligent people with whom I am acquainted appreciate visual art impurely; and, by the way, the appreciation of almost all great writers has been impure. But provided that there be some fraction of pure aesthetic emotion, even a mixed and minor appreciation of art is, I am sure, one of the most valuable things in the world—so valuable, indeed, that in my giddier moments I have been tempted to believe that art might prove the world's salvation.

Yet, though the echoes and shadows of art enrich the life of the plains, her spirit dwells on the mountains. To him who wools, but wools impurely, she returns enriched what is brought. Like the sun, she warms the good seed in good soil and causes it to bring forth good fruit. But only to the perfect lover does she give a new strange gift—a gift beyond all price. Imperfect lovers bring to art and take away the ideas and emotions of their own age and civilization. In twelfth-century Europe a man might have been greatly moved by a Romanesque church
... It seems to me possible, though by no means certain, that created form moves us so profoundly because it expresses the emotion of its creator... If this be so, it will explain that curious but undeniable fact, to which I have already referred, that what I call material beauty (e.g. the wing of a butterfly) does not move most of us in all the same way as a work of art moves us. It is beautiful form, but it is not significant form. It moves us, but it does not move us aesthetically. It is tempting to explain the difference between "significant form" and "beauty"—that is to say, the difference between form that provokes our aesthetic emotions and form that does not—by saying that significant form conveys to us an emotion felt by its creator and that beauty conveys nothing.

For what, then, does the artist feel the emotion that he is supposed to express? Sometimes it certainly comes to him through material beauty. The contemplation of natural objects is often the immediate cause of the artist's emotion. Are we to suppose, then, that the artist feels, or sometimes feels, for material beauty what we feel for a work of art? Can it be that sometimes for the artist material beauty is somehow significant—that is, capable of provoking aesthetic emotion? And if the form that provokes aesthetic emotion be form that expresses something, can it be that material beauty is to him expressive? Does he feel something behind it as we imagine that we feel something behind the forms of a work of art?...

The emotion that the artist felt in his moment of inspiration he did not feel for objects seen as means, but for objects seen as pure forms—that is, as ends in themselves. He did not feel emotion for a chair as a means to physical well-being, nor as an object associated with the intimate life of a family, nor as the place where someone sat saying things unforgettable, nor yet as a thing bound to the lives of hundreds of men and women, dead or alive, by a hundred subtle ties; doubtless an artist does often feel emotions such as these for the things that he sees, but in the moment of aesthetic vision he sees objects, not as means shrouded in associations, but as pure forms. It is for, or at any rate through, pure form that he feels his inspired emotion.

Now to see objects as pure forms is to see them as ends in themselves. For though, of course, forms are related to each other as parts of a whole, they are related on terms of equality; they are not a means to anything except emotion. But for objects seen as ends in themselves, do we not feel a profounder and a more thrilling emotion than ever we
felt for them as means? All of us, I imagine, do, from time to time, get a vision of material objects as pure forms. We see things as ends in themselves, that is to say; and at such moments it seems possible, and even probable, that we see them with the eye of an artist. Who has not, once at least in his life, had a sudden vision of landscape as pure form? For once, instead of seeing it as fields and cottages, he has felt it as lines and colors. In that moment has he not won from material beauty a thrill indistinguishable from that which art gives? And, if this be so, is it not clear that he has won from material beauty the thrill that, generally, art alone can give, because he has contrived to see it as a pure formal combination of lines and colors? May we go on to say that, having seen it as pure form, having freed it from all casual and adventitious interest, from all that it may have acquired from its commerce with human beings, from all its significance as a means, he has felt its significance as an end in itself? . . .

But if an object considered as an end in itself moves us more profoundly (i.e. has greater significance) than the same object considered as a means to practical ends or as a thing related to human interests—and this undoubtedly is the case—we can only suppose that when we consider anything as an end in itself we become aware of that in it which is of greater moment than any qualities it may have acquired from keeping company with human beings. Instead of recognizing its accidental and conditioned importance, we become aware of its essential reality, of the God in everything, of the universal in the particular, of the all-pervading rhythm. Call it by what name you will, the thing that I am talking about is that which lies behind the appearance of all things—that which gives to all things their individual significance. . . . And if a more or less unconscious apprehension of this latent reality of material things be, indeed, the cause of that strange emotion, a passion to express which is the inspiration of many artists, it seems reasonable to suppose that those who, unaided by material objects, experience the same emotion have come by another road to the same country.

That is the metaphysical hypothesis. Are we to swallow it whole, accept a part of it, or reject it altogether? Each must decide for himself. I insist only on the rightness of my aesthetic hypothesis. And of one other thing I am sure. Be they artists or lovers of art, mystics or mathematicians, those who achieve ecstasy are those who have freed themselves from the arrogance of humanity. He who would feel the significance of art must make himself humble before it. Those who find the chief importance of art or of philosophy in its relation to conduct or its practical utility—those who cannot value things as ends in themselves—would never get from any- or, at any rate, as direct means to emotion—will never get from anything the best that it can give. Whatever the world of aesthetic contemplation may be, it is not the world of human business and passion; in it the chatter and tumult of material existence is unheard, or heard only as the echo of some more ultimate harmony.
Discriminating perception focused upon an object as it appears directly to sense, without ulterior interest to direct that perception inward to an understanding of the actual forces or underlying structure giving rise to this appearance, or forward to the purposes to which the object may be turned or the events its presence and movement may presage, or outward to its relations in the general structure and the moving flux—such free attentive activity may fairly be said to mark the situation in which beauty is felt. It is the occurrence of such activity that makes possible the records put down in what we have called aesthetic judgments. Only the red that has really caught our attention fully, and upon which the attention has actually rested, is more than merely red—bright or glaring or hard or stirring, or lovely and rich and glowing, or fresh and clear and happy, or harsh or muddy or dull or distressing, ugly or beautiful in any one of a thousand determinate and specific meanings of those words.

But though these variations are indefinitely great in number, they are after all limited, as appearing upon the aesthetic surface of our world, by the limitations of the variations in that surface itself. There is a limited range of hues to see, a limited range of sounds to hear, and even a limit to the dimensions of shapes perceived or imagined. Not that the number of possible variations in color, for example, is the number of the possible beauties of color, for the beauty of color is not simply its specific hue or shade or tint or intensity or saturation, but that specific color as upon an object, and not merely as distinguished there by vision, or noted in passing or for further reference as the color it appears to be, but also as appreciated, as felt to be delightful or the reverse to the perceiving subject. And this is plainly indicated, this relational char-
acter of the situation in which the beauty of sense elements is present, a relation involving feeling, in the long list of typical words used in describing such elements.

As we pass from the perceptually discriminated quality, taken as sensed, to the intuited beauty immediately felt, we pass from terms like bright and clear and red, to warmly red, pleasantly bright, charmingly clear, or to attractive or lovely or fascinating. As the aesthetic nature of the judgment is more and more unambiguously expressive of beauty against ugliness, the terms used to describe it more and more definitely assert the relation to the perceiving subject which is attracted or interested or fascinated by it, or who finds it lovely as he loves it. Not that all qualities are not found in a relation to a subject who finds them, but that strictly aesthetic qualities involve not merely this finding, but such quality as is found, such quality as is perhaps only constituted at all, when the feelings of the subject are involved in its relation to the object. But the range of possibilities for delightful or ugly color, for example, bears some relation to the range of possible variations intrinsic to color as perceived; and if we are to know what we mean when we assert that colors are beautiful or ugly, we should know first a little about color itself.

So of the other elements of sensuous content; so of all the materials of aesthetic experience, sounds and shapes, textures and lines, and as it would also seem, so of tastes and smells and various recognizable kinds of bodily feelings which have distinctive character of their own. But if aesthetic character is properly limited to the object of attention, which takes on as directly apparent to sense its own specific beauty, felt in intuition but felt as a quality of itself, it is clear enough that fully appreciable beauty must be that of objects upon which this beauty actually shines as their own nature when we perceive them. Now we do perceive fruits, for example, as clearly upon the palate as upon the retina, although as the rationalists would say, not so distinctly; clearly, in that the taste is present as what it seems to be, indistinctly, in that what it seems to be, what it appears as, is not in its own essential nature rationally transparent, self-explanatory, native to mind as understandable by intellect. We are using the distinction within a field where historical rationalism did not make it, but the distinction itself, as we do make it, is exactly parallel, and worth putting into these old terms to show how troublesome, though in the end fruitless, this kind of distinction has been for all thinking. In our example, the exquisite aroma and taste of rich, ripe strawberries, marked by the palate and the organs of smell, are qualities exactly parallel in perception to their visual qualities, their specific form and color and texture as discrimin-

ated by the eye. And there is no doubt either that strawberries or foaming milk, or cabbages, for that matter, have clearly characteristic savour. But these sense qualities, subtle and specific and characteristic and objective as they are, seem to lack just the possibility of giving such fully satisfying aesthetic experience as is given by colors and shapes and sounds.

It is not that they are unworthy because they are so close to our bodies. The palate is no more internal than the ear, and the taste of strawberries is no more a function of the human body than their color or their shape. It would be a very determined esoteric theorist indeed who should deny that the fragrance of roses or gardens or orchards or perfumes was not merely no part of their visual beauty but no part of their beauty at all, even as its richness. And it is not their intimate connection with our vital bodily processes and motions that makes tastes less charcteristically aesthetic than sounds or colors or shapes. Part of the appreciation of form itself, as in jars or vases, is without question incipient motions or motor tendencies in our own bodies, and the beauty of the morning is in part the freshness of our vital functioning as well as of our perceptive faculties. We cannot rule out the specific character of tastes and of bodily feelings and of smells from the materials of genuine aesthetic experience on any clear ground. Certainly the fact that we usually consume what we taste but not what we see or hear does not furnish such a ground; for we do not need to consume and absorb it in order to taste it, though, as with tobacco or incense, we sometimes appreciate its savour best by passing the smoke of its destruction intimately over the organs by which we apprehend it. Such distillations of beauty are common enough even with roses or lavender, with the resin of pines or the oil of bays. It is only accident, then, that bodily consumption is the means to the full aesthetic flavor of objects, and this without any relation, either, to biological needs or interests. Appetite is not hungry, of course, and even appetite need not precede enjoyment except as a tendency or possibility or natural disposition of the human body and its organs, scarcely different on principle from the disposition of the eyes to see or the ears to hear. Moreover, we could be nourished by our food perfectly well, though our senses were anaesthetized. And in any case the perception of tastes or odors is never as such the devouring of them. We devour the substance not the quality. And the smell of boiled cabbage, as of blooming roses, is a distinctly discriminated and easily remembered quality, eternally a quality to delight in or be offended by, were all the cabbages in the world consumed, and all the roses dead forever.

Nor does the transitoriness of smells and tastes in their occurrence
rule them out as materials of aesthetic pleasure. Nothing is more transitory than sound. And what is more transitory than beautiful expressions upon human faces, or than beautiful young human bodies themselves?

But the fact remains that we do not say of the taste of even the most subtly blended salad or the most delicately flavored ice that it is beautiful. Hence it is clear that smells and tastes and vital feelings are not the materials of beauty in the sense that colors are, or sounds or forms, or even textures, for they are obviously not the contents of typical aesthetic judgments. If they are not to be ruled out on grounds of their nearness to the body, or their destruction by consumption, which is contemporaneous with and sometimes necessary to the very act of perception, or because of their transitoriness of occurrence, or because they are associated in our minds with fulfilling biological needs, or because of any lack of objectivity or specificity of quality, we must find some other ground for the obvious fact that though they occur in delighted perception, though attention may be focused on them, as specific qualities directly apprehended in sense experience, they are not usually pronounced beautiful, do not become the content of aesthetic judgments, and thus apparently are not the characteristic materials of the aesthetic experience that such judgments record.

Now this ground is not far to seek, and when we stop to notice just what it is, it will offer us three points of clarification for general aesthetic theory. In the first place, smells and odors are unquestionably and emphatically sensuously delightful, and so far are elements of aesthetic experience, however elementary. In the second place much of the beauty of nature is made up of just such elementary sensuous materials, which also enter into complex natural beauties just as truly as other elementary materials, more commonly called beautiful. But in the third place, smells and odors do not in themselves fall into any known or felt natural order or arrangement, nor are their variations defined in and by such an intrinsic natural structure, as the variations in color and sound and shape give rise to in our minds. Hence our grasping of them, while it is aesthetic very clearly, since they may be felt as delightful, is the grasp in each case upon just the specific presented non-structural quality, which is as absolutely different, unique, simple, and unrelatable to further elements intrinsically through its own being, as anything could be. One smell does not suggest another related smell close to it in some objective and necessary order of quality or occurrence or procedure, nor does one taste so follow another. There are apparently more or less compatible and incompatible smells and tastes, but there is no clearly defined order of smells and tastes, or any structure of smells and tastes in which each has its place fixed by its own qualitative being. Our experience of these elements is always of elements properly so-called, but also aesthetically elementary, of course.

Tastes may be subtly blended, and so may odors. Cooks and perfumers are in their way refined and sensitive artists, as tea-tasters and wine-tasters are expert critical judges. But such art and such criticism have no intelligible, or at least so far discovered, structural or critical principles, simply because the elements they work with have neither intelligible structure nor apparently any discoverable order in variation. It is this lack that rules them out of the characteristically aesthetic realm, not any lack of spatial distance from the body, nor of objectivity in themselves as specific characterized elements; nor is it their admitted occurrence in the consumption of the objects of which they are qualities. Their extremely transitory occurrence only marks them as not suitable elements for aesthetic structures that are to remain long before us. They do have a degree of distance after all, as great, if measured from our minds, as the distance of any sense quality; and it is the mind or the mind-body, not the body as such to which they are present at all. They have complete and well-defined objective native character, clearly discriminable specific natures, often even very subtle and refined and exciting. If they are more fleeting in their occurrence than some other beauties, they are no more fleeting than the colors of sunset, nor than many beautiful forms, and they are just as readily reproducible or more so. No beauty is more than a little lasting, for whatever occurs at all, to present us with any quality, also by its very nature passes away.

But relations objectively clear in given orders and a defining structure of variation, tastes and odors and bodily feelings do not have, and it is for this reason that we call them not merely the bare materials of beauty—colors and sounds and shapes are also only materials of beauty—but elementary aesthetic materials. For they remain merely elements, refusing to become for us, in any kind of intelligible human arts, within relational structures or movements or processes, that is, such composed and complex and elaborated beauties as we build up out of shapes and colors and lines and sounds.
aesthetic experience recorded in aesthetic judgments. While they remain only elements in such experience, like bodily feelings, and offer no intrinsic structure or formal relations in variation or combination by which they might become the materials of conscious arts of smell and taste, they are still beauties, the elementary materials of certain limited aesthetic experiences.

They do also enter into higher, that is, less elementary, aesthetic experiences, if not of all the arts at least of some representative art, and without forcing themselves upon attention they help compose beauties definitely expressive, the recognized elements of which are forms and colors and sounds. Organ tones depend without question, for even their strictly aesthetic effect, at least in part on the feelings not due to hearing and ears, but stirred by quite other bodily processes. The beauty of flowers is enriched by fragrance, the beauty of Catholic ceremonials by the odor of incense. Thus while they are only elementary aesthetic qualities, they are in exactly the same sense as sound and shapes the materials of beauty and even of complex structural beauty. While they themselves are but elements, they are materials of more than elementary beauties. So far science and art have discovered in them no order or structural principles by which to compose with them, so that they remain either separately appreciated bare elements, or, if they go to make up beauties apprehended in the main by other senses, they enter as hidden or unconsciously employed constituents, with no apparently necessary relations to or in the structures of such non-elementary, that is composed or complex beauty.

Since tastes and smells and vital feelings reveal no principles of ordered variation, it is obvious that the compositions, into which they do as a matter of fact enter are cases of natural or representative beauty; for the beauties of art as such, being forms created by man on some principle or other, however vaguely known or crudely followed, require such objectively established relations. Human composing is doing something with elementary materials that are capable of being composed, and elements cannot be put together at all unless in themselves and by their very nature they are capable of sustaining structural relations to one another, relations of contrast, balance, rhythmic sequence, form in general. These relations must be at least dimly discerned by any artist if he is to use the materials of beauty at all. But there is no such system of smells and tastes, and what relations and contrasts we do notice in such matters seem fairly arbitrary and accidental: apples with pork perhaps, and perhaps not sour wine with sweets; certain blendings of tea and of spices, certain combinations toned into each other with sugar, or toned in general with garlic; but no structure, or any very clear general principles, though the whole matter is in all probability not so formless and accidental as it may seem, as current psychology is beginning to discover. One is indeed tempted to look for articulate principles here as elsewhere, if only to dignify to obstinately verbal minds whole realms of expert activity which seem to them too natural and domestic to be important and interesting, and too illiterate, it may be thought, to have any full moral status in the society of the arts.

What we are to point out here is that natural beauty in general is so largely of just this unprincipled sort, whether in its rank, unchaste profusion, or in its natural but unintelligible selection and composition. Nature at some places, at least, and at various times, without men's efforts, assumes lovely aspects, unintelligibly composed and unreasonably fine. In fact much of what men, artists particularly, know of color combination has been learned out not of any knowledge or perception of the orders and structures that color and line and shape inherently possess by being color and line and shape, but from the purely accidental and familiar success of such combinations as nature has exhibited to them, in rocks under sunlight, birds and flowers against trees and sky, hills beyond running streams, metals or jewels against human flesh, and the thousand other happy accidents of natural beauty. If we do not know enough of perfumes or colors or sounds to compose with all of them at once, this is not to say that all these may not in nature go to make up rare beauty, not that nature may not with impunity paint the lily with its own fragrance and add as integral elements in natural beauties the aesthetic materials of the despised senses of smell and taste.

If there is a beauty of August nights, or beauty in the rareness of a June day, or the fresh loneliness after rain, if there is ripe and languorous beauty in the mist and mellow fruitfulness of autumn, or a hard, cold beauty of glittering winter frosts, such beauty is not all for the eye and ear, and if we do not ourselves know how to blend smells and tastes with sound and form and color to compose such beauties, we need not fust our limitations upon nature. The saltiness of the breeze is as integral to the beauty of the sea as the flashing of the fish or the sweep of the gulls or the thunder of the surf or the boiling of the foam. If we know no modes of arranging smells or tastes or vital feelings or even noises in works of art, nature does not hesitate to combine the soughing of pines, the fragrance of mountain air, and the taste of mountain water or its coolness on the skin, with dazzling mountain sunlight and the forms and colors of rocks and forests, to make a beauty intense and thrilling in an unexpected purity and elevation, almost ascetic in its very complexity and richness. The greatest beauties of nature are con-
crete and full. Nature appears to have no aesthetic prejudices against any sort of elementary aesthetic materials, nor to lack insight into the principles of their combination in the greatest variety. Only human limitations may miss some of these elements and human insight fail to recognize any principles of structure or form to hold them so firmly together and make them often so transcendentally beautiful.

But what happens in nature is not, of course, art, and an artist must work with materials that have relations, degrees of qualitative difference, established orders of variation, structural principles of combination. While we must be careful to include in the materials of beauty sense elements of all sorts, since all the senses, by virtue of being senses, may take such pleasure in their specific objects as is in all rigor to be called aesthetic pleasure, we must admit that these elements of smell and taste remain mere elements, except where natural occurrences happen to combine them, and through familiarity sometimes to sanctify the combination to men and to art, on no principles intelligible or available to human beings, but as some of the richest of natural or of representative beauties. As aesthetic materials they remain for us elementary in the simple sense of being elements, specifically aesthetic in quality, but still merely elements, not amenable to composition through intrinsically established orders.

For less elementary aesthetic experience the materials are sound and shapes and color and lines. The simple distinction that marks these materials is that they present objective structural orders intrinsic to their qualitative variation, through which we have control over them to build them into the complex formal beauties characteristic of the human arts and no longer the beauties of elements alone or of merely accidental natural combinations. If nature loves tastes and smells and vital feelings as well as she does colors and sounds and shapes, we may be ready enough to appreciate the beauty both of her materials and of her compositions; but in our own human compositions we are limited to such materials as order and arrange themselves by their own intrinsic nature. And to know even a little of humanly made beauties or even of natural ones involving these intrinsically ordered elements, we must know their order and their formal variation, and learn from this the possibilities they furnish, not for mere fortuitous, if often felicitous, combinations, but for composition in which the principles of such order and form have been consciously employed or at least intuitively discerned.

The essential nature of these orders or structural principles, which are
duce rhythm into movements or spatial structure where it would not otherwise be felt. But it will be easier to grasp both the nature and the significance of this possibly all-pervasive and absolutely— even metaphysically, perhaps— fundamental character of aesthetic experience and of all objects of such experience, all manifestations in beauty, after we have surveyed those intrinsically present orders of the very materials of beauty that manifest rhythms so variously, faintly or clearly, directly or indirectly, making rhythm sometimes a primary, and sometimes scarcely even a secondary, consideration.

3

Before we pass to a detailed account of these intrinsic and unique orders in the very materials of beauty, we may here mention them briefly and then leave this general account to turn to more specific description of the separate kinds of aesthetic material in their peculiarities, their possibilities of variation on the one hand and of combination and composition on the other. It is clear at once that in color the intrinsic variation, peculiar and unique, is what we call difference in hue, so that absence of color in the rich, lively meaning, of the word means absence of hue. We contrast colored surface, colored walls, colored toys, colored glasses, colored light, with white or black or gray primarily, not with absence of all visual sensation. The colors of the rainbow are what we mean by colors, the breaking of the white radiance into the discriminably different hues from red to violet. Colors vary in other ways; of course, but it is variation in hue, and combinations and contrasts of hue, that are intrinsic to color and nowhere else to be found.

This is what is sometimes called the specificity of sensation. It is the fact that color, being color, being the specific hue that it is in any case, is just uniquely its own quality for vision; and if we apply loosely the term color to musical sounds, or mental states of depression or the reverse, or if we speak of the colors of tones or the toning of color, we go beyond what we mean by color itself, to apply terms not in their specific literal senses, but either by analogy, and often vaguely and with resulting confusion as well as the suggestiveness intended, or else by letting these terms color and tone carry as their meaning the principles of order and variation common to both but not uniquely present in either. For color or sound may vary also not in specific hue or pitch but in intensity, for example, although even here the specific intensity is in the one case brightness or darkness, in the other, loudness or softness, and these are not directly but only indirectly or even only analogously comparable.

In sound it is clear enough that pitch, differences in pitch or combi-

nations of pitch, is the uniquely ordering quality. Sounds may vary in intensity too, as we just noted, as colors also may; but as color has no pitch, so sound has no hue, and nowhere but in the aesthetic materials called sounds do we find an intrinsic order of pitch established. We may use abstract terms such as value in its technical meaning for painters, and say that as color-value is higher or lower, so pitches are higher and lower; but here the confusion of the parallel is obvious and the work mostly of words. What we mean by high in pitch depends entirely on the meaning of pitch itself, which simply is this specific way in which sounds differ from each other more or less, and in which colors do not, the way in which a high note is above a lower note, not the way in which a high color value is above a lower one of the same or another hue. For this last is a difference in what is usually, but after all ambiguously, called saturation, a way of differing peculiar to color not to pitch; so that while there is an analogy between higher and lower color value and louder and softer sounds, there is an equally good analogy, perhaps a better one, between higher and lower color-value and differences in timbre, the difference, for example, between brass and strings, and only a rather faint analogy between pitch differences and differences in color-values. Even these analogies find little but abstract words to base themselves upon, words which refer to abstracted aspects of what in reality are full concrete qualities, the abstraction being sometimes useful enough to make a comparison, and forceful and enlightening enough as indicating in both fields genuine structural possibilities, but as applied to the materials themselves and their specific intrinsic orders established by their unique qualitative specificity with which we are all so familiar, only analogies, which, since there is no common principle involved, no identity of these two structural modes of variation, but only the fact that in both cases the variations are ordered, lead almost inevitably to confusion and often to actual error.

When we come to lines and space-forms, the intrinsically ordering feature is harder to name, but is after all clear enough except that it is two-fold. We have two principles, which we may call that of simple extension or extendedness itself— shape perhaps is the best term— that of geometrical order, which permits what we call different perspectives of the same spatial configuration, such different perspectives being often not merely geographically correlated but apparent to vision as the same. While the geometrical identity may remain, however, a change in perspective may result in such great changes in the spatial appearance that for vision there is no identity recognizable, but only a difference. It will be necessary to explain the two principles and differentiate them not only from each other but from other meanings
suggested by the terms we seem forced to employ. But mathematics is, in its strictly geometrical, non-analytical methods, at least in part visually intuitive, and we have therefore to seek the intrinsic orders of the aesthetic materials of spatial form not only in obvious appearances but in the mathematical nature of spatial order. So far as we can give any clear account of all this, it is to be deferred to a later chapter. For the present we may be content with illustrations that suggest the difficulties.

A shift in perspective makes the circular elliptical, the vertical horizontal; and so on. But also the eye sometimes sees the elliptical as circular, sometimes not. Thus the character of shapes and lines may or may not vary while the strictly geometrical order remains the same, as a mathematically defined conic section may in limiting cases be a line or a point, and still possess all its geometrical order and the corresponding properties. So too lines or surfaces or solids lose none of their mathematically ordered properties by being revolved through angles or referred to a new system of coordinates or moved to greater distances or projected upon planes or solids at various angles. But for aesthetic perception such shifts are often all-important. A circle is one shape, an ellipse another. A group of horizontal parallels is one appearance, a group of vertical parallels another. Shapes and directions and sizes are absolute for our sight and not to be confounded with one another simply because geometrically they may be mere transformations in reference not affecting intrinsic mathematical order or structure.

In fact spatial form itself is one of the striking illustrations that any beauty is absolutely its unique self only in relation to the perceiving subject, his spatial orientation and habits in general, and his space location in particular. But for such a subject, so constituted and placed, the spatial characters of objects and their visible beauty are what they are uniquely and absolutely. Objects are of one specific size and shape and proportion, they lie in one direction, and the lines themselves have the direction they have and no other. Obviously the unique and intrinsic ordering quality and structural principles of spatial form are a complex and difficult matter, but we have at least seen that they are present, and their uniqueness is plain. Colors have as hues neither shape nor direction but only hue, sounds may move in space and time, but only sounds have pitch, and pitch itself has neither dimensions nor shape nor is even duration of sound its actual intrinsic quality. Thus we have marked and distinguished from one another these three orders of variations, each intrinsic to its own realm. We may now go on to treat these three different kinds of differently ordered aesthetic materials separately and in greater detail.

4. AESTHETIC DESIGN

STEPHEN C. PEPPER

Sensory Fatigue

With most of our senses, the first stimulations are the most vivid—the first taste of a pear or of maple syrup, the first odor of the sea, or of a flower, the first touch of a texture or pressure on the skin. After a period of continuous or closely repeated stimulation, the senses do not respond as strongly as they did at first, and the result is sensory fatigue. Put on a pair of blue glasses. At first everything is very blue, but in a few minutes this color change is less noticeable. The world is still blue but not nearly so intensely blue as at first. The cones of the eye, which are the organs that respond to hues, have lost some of their energy of response through continuous stimulation.

The general form of this mutation, as the example just given indicates, is exactly like that of the habit mutation described on page 23. The same diagram can symbolize it, namely:

PLEASURE

\[ + \]

NEUTRALITY

\[ 0 \]

PAIN

\[ - \]

After a little continuous stimulation a pleasant odor becomes less and less vivid and generally in consequence less and less pleasant. Similarly, an unpleasant odor becomes less and less unpleasant. After working with an unpleasant fertilizer for a few minutes one scarcely smells it. And so it is with the other senses susceptible to sensory fatigue. The color effect of a stage set is strongest when the lights first come on.

The similarity of form between the fatigue mutation and mechanized habit frequently leads to the mistaken idea that they are the same thing. But their aesthetic effects are completely different. For the fatigue

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The Sublime and the Obscene

R. MEAGER

To the devotee of ordinary-language metaphysics, if his ordinary language is English, the aesthetic categories present extraordinary difficulties. Such is the established power of the Anglo-Saxon religion of inarticulacy, such are the complex and opaque veils with which the aesthetic language-dance wreathes them about, that rarely, rarely do the big words appear in paradigm-case nudity. 'Beauty' perhaps is not so elusive. Some things there are to which this concept must apply if it is to be a concept of beauty at all. The class of beautiful things must, for example, include among its members the deft late cut between the slip and the sweet smooth cast whereby the fly is brought to float gently on to the dancing surface at the end of the thirty-foot line. But the case of the sublime is hopeless. There is as good as no primary use of this concept at all. The only use a self-respectingly inarticulate Angle or Saxon can allow himself is one safely beyond the serious pale, where his (gentle, Anglo-Saxon) humour leads him to speak of sublime, say, innocence, or ignorance, or impudence, or self-consciousness of one sort or another. Yet there is, I think, a primary unironic concept brooding away inside the veils of our reluctance to mention it. It is a concept, or perhaps only a vague ideal, which seems to me to animate much of F. R. Leavis's demands of poetry, for example. As such, it manages to make itself felt still as what Longinus took it to be, incomparably the highest excellence in literature; an excellence clearly felt where it occurs though far from clearly understood. As such, since Leavis eschews generalities except of the safely top-level 'life-enhancement' kind, I turn to Longinus for enlightenment.

To be sublime, Longinus says at once, is to have that consummate excellence and distinction in the expression of thought (if this may be accepted as a translation for logos) by which the greatest poets and historians clothe their own works, no less than their heroes' deeds, with immortality. But to be immortal one must first be alive. How can a piece of writing be alive? I think Longinus's answer is, and I am sure it ought to be: not through being an utterance of a sublime mind (sublime minds, alas, die like the rest of us); not through being the description of a sublime object (descriptions, alas, rarely measure up to their objects); but through achieving a special kind of expressive effect. The characteristic effect of sublime writing is that it does not convince or persuade or entertain us; it transports us into that state of mind in which the words we read convey not merely an isolated belief, request, exhortation, ... but a total experience. Of course, transportation by literature is not only achieved by the sublime. To a railway enthusiast, we are told, Bradshaw's tables offer transports. But his reader has to contribute an extraordinary degree of spontaneous special interest and extravagant flights of fancy to fill out the total state of mind needed if Bradshaw is to work so powerfully on him. To us poor average creatures the tables are a mystery indeed but an untransporting one. The sublime, by contrast, forces its interests and state of mind upon us. We are not presented with a description or report of a situation for our consideration and perhaps, if we are convinced, our piecemeal belief. We are not presented with an account of an action or an attitude for our consideration and perhaps, if we are persuaded, our admiration or condemnation. Our whole considering and admiring or condemnatory mind is captured, our imagination taken possession of, by the words we read or hear; they work in our mind as our own; as words we utter with a whole mind behind them, enforcing a shift of conception and value through a wide area of our own mental habits. We are not only with it, we are in what we read as we are in our own sincere utterances.

It must hastily be added, not to make an exaggerated claim, that this effect too is largely dependent on our reading in a generally receptive spirit, and with the general background of experience and acquaintance with his language and perhaps idiom that any writer presupposes in his readers. But the sublime is independent, as
powers of thought and feeling work on new principles so as to give his words their appropriate mental background of beliefs and values; and he has to do this just by presenting the words themselves; or in one famous instance just by outlining with words a silence. Even if this effect is only temporary and is dependent upon his reader’s general willingness to read appreciatively, its achievement is surely proof of consummate skill. But, as Longinus insists, it is not a matter of skill only, nor is the transportation effect a sufficient condition, though it is a necessary condition, of sublime writing. Transportation may be effected by a sensuous assault on our general response to rhythm. This is an allied power of music and to a lesser degree of word-music as well known to the ancients of Athens as to the youth of Liverpool (the Beatles are heirs to an immortal tradition). Transportation of this kind is often, perhaps always, a contributory factor in the sublime, but is not in itself sublime. The sublime has to capture us not by its brute impact on our rhythmic senses, nor yet by our independent predilection for the experiences with which it is concerned, but by the grand scale and the vivid sense of the conception it presents. The sublime is essentially a vivid and vigorous expression of some cosmic imaginative conception or of some powerful and intense emotion. The emphasis is on the power of the expression rather than on what is expressed so powerfully. ‘Power’ here is to be understood in the sense in which a mathematical formula as well as the Mersey Sound may be powerful. It is clear (if anachronistic) that Longinus drew the Croce-Collingwood line between expressing an emotion and merely venting it or stimulating it. The sublime must be attained by working through the understanding, by presenting a new live expression to be understood conceptually. The command of such expressions is a natural gift, not a technical skill that can be learnt, though skill and experience are necessary to control its exercise so that it results in the significant sublime and not in exotic nonsense.

A transporting passage, then, is only sublime if it effects a sense of significance, of sudden illumination; but a grand conception equally is only sublime if it has the capacity to move us, transport us. This moving quality of course need not be of the ordinary emotional kind; i.e. it need not depend on the expression of those familiar
universal troublemakers love, rage, scorn, ambition and the like. And the sublime expression of these, as we see from Longinus's analysis of the Sappho ode which he takes as an example of this form of the sublime, depends primarily on the imaginatively powerful, definite conception of the experienced reality of the emotion, of the modulation of awareness of the world that this brings, and only derivatively on the rhythmic, onomatopoeic or generally non-conceptual emotive reinforcements with which this is underlined. Hence though Longinus lists five 'sources' of the sublime, he himself relegates three of these to contributory status, concerned with the rhetorical and stylistic devices with which conceptions derived from the other two sources may be expressed more economically and forcefully; and his two main sources, the power of grand conception and the power of strong emotion, reduce to a single power to produce vivid expressions of new total experiences of the world or of life. What constitutes the special vividness of such expressions? Consider the general concept of suicide, and the particular conception of it expressed in the 'To be or not to be' soliloquy. The soliloquy can hardly be read without a sense of wonderfully increased and deepened understanding of the meaning of suicide, and of life as it appears from a suicidal attitude, growing within the reader. This sense of increased mastery through increased understanding enriched by total shifts of perspective in our dealings with life at large is central to Longinus's conception of the sublime itself, and brings his treatment of the notion surprisingly close to Kant's. Although Longinus is not very explicit in his general characterization of conceptions suitable for sublime expression, his many examples can be made to tie in to an extraordinary degree with Kant's treatment of the notion. Even Longinus's two main sources of the sublime can perhaps be seen to foreshadow Kant's division of the sublime into the mathematical sublime dependent on our power to conceive of the infinite as a whole as incomparably greater than any extendable process of measurement could encompass (the power of grand conception), and the dynamical sublime dependent on our power to remain spiritually unmoved in resolution by the overwhelming physical forces of nature (the power of intense and not 'lowly' emotion). This degree of community

of thought can also be seen in the similarity between what Longinus says about sublime expressions of grand conceptions and what Kant says about the 'aesthetical ideas' which it is the function of the genius in fine arts to create. There is indeed a strong Kantian ring about many of Longinus's remarks—a ring which is notably absent from the crude empiricist Burke's treatment of a notion going under the same name. Consider the following passage from Longinus's Chapter XXXV:

Nature judged man to be a lowly or ignoble creature when she brought us into this life and into the whole universe as into a great celebration, to be spectators of her whole performance and most ambitious actors. She implanted at once into our souls an invincible love for all that is great and more divine than ourselves. That is why the whole universe gives insufficient scope to man's power of contemplation and reflection, but his thoughts often pass beyond the boundaries of the surrounding world.

Worthy understanding and expression of the wonders of this spectacle may be sublime without necessarily being charged with the ordinary love/hate/rage/ambition sort of emotion, and it is because many cases of sublime writing, notably in Plato, seem to be innocent of such ordinary emotional import and because many of the ordinary emotions, such as pity and fear, however well expressed, cannot be given a mind-enlarging embodiment, that Longinus separates the two 'sources' of the sublime. But even in the case of the emotion-expressing sublime it is clear that Longinus correctly sees its sublime character to depend on its conceptual expressiveness. All the remarks in his traditional rhetorician's treatment of the special devices of figurative or emotive language hammer home the one general rule: grand words, vulgar words, smooth transitions, broken rhythms, stark economy, profusion of subordinate clauses or repetitious detail or vivid metaphor, all may have their place in reinforcing corresponding conceptually determined sense. And the command of such grand or powerful conceptions is the primary source of the sublime.

Parenthetically, I think Longinus should have argued that the special type of nobility of mind implied by and necessary to the utterance of sublime expressions is indeed simply this command of conceptions, which is plainly separable from (and often separated from) the
extra practical nobility of spirit which would lead, for example, to an actual death on a Roman cross in the cause of political independence. There is, perhaps, a practical paradox in the idea of a person who combines the power of sublime conceptions with the impotence of acrasy or the meanness of petty selfishness or cowardice; but surely it is no more than a practical paradox, and one exemplified everywhere at a less exalted level of thought and action. If it is allowed that Longinus ought to be speaking simply of the power of grand conception when he speaks of a noble mind, there need be no ambiguity in his concept of the sublime as between its being a moral concept of an excellence in people or actions and an aesthetic concept of an excellence in literary achievement. It can be understood clearly as an aesthetic concept applying primarily to expressions, derivatively to the power of producing such expressions, and by ‘family resemblance’ to people, behaviour, and natural objects providing examples susceptible of description in such expressions. If this is correct, the concept of the sublime can be seen to be an aesthetic concept though examples of the sublime may clearly have great moral importance. So Ajax, in the episode of Odysseus’s globe-trotting visit to Hades to check up on the fate of his ex-Iliad cronies, in his shade’s silence in reply to Odysseus’s inadequate attempt to patch things up, no doubt acted nobly because he was noble, or was at least cast in the giant heroic mould of the Iliad, whose shadow he here draws across the romance of the Odyssey. He became sublime, however, only by accident: by the accident which provided his invariable inarticulacy with the one context in which it could become a perfect sublime expression; the adamantine unforgiving silence to vindicate all silences of all strong silent men since time began. Morals made Ajax’s silence honourable and rightly implacable (if it was so); aesthetics made it sublime.

To revert to the special character of sublime expressiveness. We have seen that it must effectively transport us, and transport us with a sense of the amplification of our understanding of the world or of life. The other mark which Longinus continuously emphasizes is the suddenness with which this is done. The poet must somehow jump us out of our normal detached reading attitude, the critical objective attitude of ‘This fellow says...’, and out of the personal habits of thought and feeling on which this is based. To do so usually requires some linguistically unconventional shock-tactics such as those discussed by Longinus under ‘figures’ as a contributory source of the sublime, and these may easily fail to have the required effect. To leave the safe medium of ordinary objective narration or description; to switch from ordinary indirect speech suddenly without warning or introduction to direct speech—

And Hector to the Trojans called aloud
To rush the ships, let lie the bloody spoils,
If I see one of his own will hold back
I’ll see to it that he dies...

in Longinus’s example, with its sudden disappearance of the separateness of the writer from Hector, and the corresponding jolt to the reader’s separateness from both—is a dangerous project and one that will fail if the reader feels unable to accept the invitation to uncritical immersion in the expression. The result may be weird and precarious, or pompous and inflated, or turgid and a bore, or mechanical and frigid, etc. Longinus is full of the corpses of would-be sublime passages dead from such different diseases. Here of course we find the bathetic or ridiculous encamped about the confines of the sublime. But when the jump comes off, then we, the readers, get a unique experience. ‘Our soul is naturally uplifted by the truly sublime; we receive it as a joyous offering; we are filled with delight and pride as if we ourselves created what we heard.’ (Ch. VII.) Longinus’s account here is often taken to be a case of careless rapture; but I think on the contrary it is a case of careful phenomenological observation, and the key to the sublime. It depends on a delicate appreciation of the expression-situation.

There are two extreme views regarding the relation of thought to expression and Longinus avoids both. He holds neither the crude view that expression is a matter of first think your thought and then find an expression, preferably beautiful, for it; nor the profound but obscure view that thought and expression are one, that to each thought there is just one expression and the expression is the thought. Longinus’s own view treats thought and expression as a developing
process of interplay between the inner springs to expression and the possibilities of expression provided by the public medium of expression, language. This is clear from Chapter XVI, his extended examination of 'Demosthenes’s oath'. Since this well-known critical tour-de-force also brings out very clearly the mechanics of a sublime passage as he conceived them to be, I shall examine his examination at length.

The oath was one which occurred in the midst of a speech in which Demosthenes sought to turn aside the wrath of the Athenians by a defence of the policy by which he had brought them to their disastrous defeat at Chaeroneia. I quote:

Demosthenes is trying to vindicate his policies. What would have been the natural way of speaking? 'You were not wrong to take up the fight for the liberty of Greece. You have precedents for this, as they were not wrong who fought at Marathon, at Salamis, or at Platea.' But when, like a man suddenly inspired and, as it were, god-possessed, he utters that oath by the heroes of Greece: 'It cannot be that you were wrong, by those who faced death at Marathon ...', through the use of that one figure ...

What Demosthenes achieved through the use of that one figure takes Longinus the whole section to run through. First, however, it is worth noticing the implied account of the expression-situation. Longinus is suggesting that at this point language and the situation between them provided Demosthenes, as they always provide all of us, with various alternative ways of phrasing what he wanted to say. Most of us take the obvious, the 'natural' ways—the clichés—both to think our thoughts (express them to ourselves) and to express them to others. Such thoughts and such expressions meet the bare public practical needs of the situation and die with the situation which brought them into being. Genius takes a new all-round look at the situation, uses a new way of expressing it, and with sufficient command of the potentialities of language achieves a uniquely powerful effect. Longinus's analysis of this unconventional oath shows how with it Demosthenes forces upon (or indeed foists upon) the minds of his hearers a sudden wide-ranging shift in their natural understanding of their and his situation, the understanding naturally resulting from their habitual and naturally egocentric thought— and feeling-patterns. He might have offered the new look to their critical appraisal in the overt argument by analogy suggested by Longinus. But he wanted (badly) to jump them out of their natural standpoint and the critical basis this afforded them, and to persuade them to take the wider, sub specie aeternitatis standpoint from which the situation would be seen in his way. The oath, in Longinus’s view, provides exactly the shock-tactics necessary. To paraphrase his assessment of it: it as it were deifies those ancestors of his hearers who faced death at Marathon, Salamis, etc., and so recalls them to their pride in those glorious dead; it turns a weak defensive argument into a passionate, strange, imagination-firing exhortation; it has the magical incantatory effect of a paean, removing the scene to be scanned from parochial Athens to all history and heaven too, and it should transform shame and grief at a defeat into pride in the battle as the proper successor of those ancient glories of the race; finally, in it Demosthenes carefully avoids any reference which would point up the small defect in his suggested analogy, the difference between victory and defeat, by dwelling on those who faced death rather than those who won the previous victories, and by winding up with the sonorous reflection that to all such glorious dead the city had awarded a public funeral. The grand, cosmic-historic conception is there; the figure of the oath rams it home in depth into the audience's imagination. To effect this Demosthenes carefully doesn't state his analogy plainly, but it, and the congenial sentiments appropriate to its acceptance, are smuggled in as presupposed to an understanding and acceptance of this unexpected powerful oath. Whether his audience were finally taken in by it is, I think, irrelevant. We, for whom the speech has no practical importance at all and who have had its cunning carefully explained to us by Longinus, can, I think, still respond to its sublime expressiveness and feel its emotive power without changing our ordinary beliefs if any about the rights and wrongs of the case. But while we read it we surely see the matter in the light Demosthenes imposes upon us, and feel the force in our own thinking of the emotional reversal attendant on this conception.

I have been using the term 'powerful expression' very vaguely and freely but I think it can be given more precision. I have suggested
that the power of an expression of the sublime kind is at least largely
due to its inducing a sharp shift in, or a crystallization of, the habitual
somewhat empty or vague general concepts and attendant feelings
and impulses with which the reader confronts experience. The power
is heightened by the fact that the sublime expression doesn't spell
out the changes in mental habits that it requires, but packs them in as
a presupposed punch, so that they are manifest in the consciousness
of the victim rather as an unidentified sense or feeling of portentous
implications than as recognized invitations to change his modes of
thought. It is perhaps the distinguishing mark of poetic as against
prose expression that it sets out to control in this instantaneous way
not only the public, dictionary significance of the words it uses, that
which the reader would understand if he read them in their minimal
commonsense, but also such implications, conceptual, evaluative,
emotional, at all levels of awareness and feeling, as will fit the reader
at least temporarily with the total responsive attitude in which the
words will carry the full particular significance in which in this
particular instance the poet wishes them to be read. So in a prose
context an oath sworn 'by' mortal men instead of e.g. by Jove,
would be intelligible no doubt, but as either religious blasphemy or
fantastic nonsense. In the context of Demosthenes's speech, however,
the oath was skilfully placed and poetic enough in its manner and
reference to enforce the appropriate total shift in its hearers' concep-
tions, with the attendant shift of feelings that e.g. I should perhaps
regard the loss of my husband as something approaching apotheosis,
or at least as a glorious patriotic sacrifice of historic significance, and
what is the prospect of slavery for myself and subjection for the city
compared with the timeless glory we have won for Athens, home of
human freedom ..., etc.? Here we have not merely poetic expressiveness in depth but the sudden illumination of the sublime,
with the sudden vastly extended viewpoint and its attendant
emotional reversal. In this way we can understand our tendency to
treat poetic utterance, and *a fortiori* sublime utterance, as powerfully
compact with more than explicit meaning, as reaching indeterminate
depths and ranges of significant effect.
Such expressions then come to us alive with the feeling-suggestions
of the wide-ranging mental attitudes appropriate to them, and these
can be felt perhaps fighting with our own mental habits, perhaps
entirely replacing them at least temporarily. It is also these feeling-
suggestions which make up the general sense that this is an utterance
which will repay repetition and reflection. Whether this promising
sense is honoured in the event is another matter. Longinus indeed
maintains that in the true sublime it is, and perhaps there is a very
top-level sublime at which this is so. But in view of his recognition
that there was a certain important weakness in the analogy which
was the main hidden implication in Demosthenes's oath the repay-
ment can't be a matter of extended understanding of truth in any
simple way. Poetry remains poetry and *a fortiori* oratory oratory;
it may even be that a suspicion of a tension between different feeling-
intimations adds to the liveliness of an expression as a stimulus to
the imagination. However that may be, if we list the characteristics
of Demosthenes's oath, we can see why Longinus took it to be a
model of a sublime expression. It is a sudden flashing figure, its
impact independent of and undisturbed by the somewhat monotonous
hammering note which Longinus elsewhere complains of as general
in Demosthenes's style. The new conception of the situation en-
forced by it on its hearers is on the really grand scale, taking in all
history and heaven too and implying a general emotional reversal
from wretchedness to pride; it is effected in a moment by a single
simple figure though one rich with evocations of the supernatural
and the historic; its sensible effect is reinforced by a telling rhythm
and sentence structure, and all this is soberly calculated (by hindsight)
to evoke depth-support of a very determinate kind. No wonder such
an oath came to his hearers as a joyous offering, uplifting them and
filling them with delight and pride as if they themselves had created
what they heard. In effect they had, and we do, create the major
part of the effect of the sublime on us, by being induced to make the
mental shift necessary to take the words seriously as if from a full
mind, as if they were our own. The power to induce us to do this is,
surely, the highest excellence of which literature is capable (oratory
of course brings in inescapable practical ends and moral criteria);
it accounts for the peculiar intimacy and pride of possession with
which we treat such sublime passages, and also for the irresistible tendency to treat the words themselves as alive within us. Hence the immortality of the really sublime expression.

It lives again in every reading of every person who reads it. So in reading the cosmic words of God at the Creation any atheist must for the moment match those startlingly simple words with the startlingly simple yet cosmic act, the imagination and imaginative creation of light? So when we are told of the ‘still small voice’ in the heart of the rushing wind and the trackless wilderness our own imagination makes a somersault in our values, shrinking the powers and vastnesses of this world into spiritual impotence and insignificance. This could be taken as the paradigm pattern of the sublimely expressed conception. It commands us to stand back from the endless private succession of egocentric experiences which make up our own particular lives and to comprehend life itself conceptually as a whole, not with the sense of emptying out the baby and bathwater and thinking merely in empty universal words, but on the contrary with the sense of retaining a precise and emotionally live feeling for its infinite complexity and variously and endlessly particularized reality. My insertion of the ‘sense of’ and the ‘feeling of’ is vital here for a realistic appraisal of the sublime, but its power as an ideal depends as much on its pretensions as on its actual achievement. Essentially, as has no doubt been often recognized, it represents the longing, as old as human thought, to combine conceptual comprehensiveness with intuitive realization, to crystallize our conceptual thought into intuitive particularity, to produce a Creator-God’s-eye view and understanding of our universe.

Whether we ever seriously dwell on these passages in order to unpack the suggestions of meanings which they set reverberating through our feeling-levels, disturbing wide areas of our established patterns of reaction, rather than simply enjoy the reverberations and the generalized sense of power they bring, is a debatable question. Longinus takes the stern line that the truly sublime must in fact be rewarding to serious consideration, so that it can repeatedly be read by men of intelligence and never fail to stir their souls to noble thoughts; so that it will leave impressed on such minds reflections that reach beyond what was said. The truly sublime of this kind satisfies all men at all times: men of different occupations, lives, interests, generations and tongues. An immensely tall bill; the wonder is that it is ever satisfied at all. But some of the works which Longinus had in mind are with us still and still sublime, and we could perhaps even add a few more to the list.

To summarize then: what is it about the sublime that makes it incomparably the highest excellence that literature has to offer?

(1) its presenting a new, comprehensive and apparently comprehensive-enlarging way of conceiving life from some important aspect or emotional standpoint—a creative God’s-eye view;

(2) in an expression which comes actively alive in our own thinking, valuing and feeling;

(3) thereby transporting us out of our own thought-habits and concerns, compelling us to drop the ‘this fellow says...’ attitude of detached critical reading and to embrace the words we read and the experience they bring within the fictional-imaginative compass of the bare Kantian ‘I think...’ which accompanies all our own states of mind at the cost of leaving no trace of itself on any, no mark of distinctive self-awareness. Our personality is taken over, temporarily, by the sublime utterance we read.

Clearly any phenomenon which has such a power, even of a temporary kind, is up for severe moral examination, whether or not it presents itself as an instrument of moral education. Clearly also it will be used as such, however its original writers intended it, and this is the basis of Plato’s condemnation of poetry. The sublime emerges from Longinus’s treatment as the first and finest of the hidden persuaders, for (see Demosthenes) the sublime may work even if it is only as though we had been endowed with a larger vision, a more complete empathetic insight, a more vivid realization, when we hadn’t.4

Unlike the sublime, the concept of the obscene suffers from obscurity through the all too frequent use of the word for its purely evaluative force with little regard for any particular form of condemnation implicit in it other than, perhaps, a morally based abhorrence of what someone else enjoys. In his Pornography and Obscenity D. H. Lawrence seems to treat the obscene in this way and to be concerned merely to shift the application of the concept from what shocked other people to what shocked him. If there would seem to be
little connexion between such a concept and the sublime, by rather
closer examination I hope to reveal one.

Being shocked at something is not a merely passive reaction. I
am not shocked at but by a live wire unwarily clasped. To be shocked
at you I must be shocked not at you simpliciter, but at your duplicity
or turpitude or quarrelsomeness, etc., i.e. at you as falling under
some concept which I apply on the basis of my evaluational stand-
point.

But obscenity is not just shockingness. Many things, such as your
duplicity, turpitude, etc., are shocking without being obscene. And
here we do return to our discussion of the sublime. For what
differentiates the obscene from the shocking in general connects it
closely with the sublime. For properly to say of anything that it is
obscene implies, as well as an explicit reference to it as shocking,
an implicit reference not so much to other people's enjoyment of it
as to a peculiar element of enjoyment in one's own perceptual or
imaginative experience of it as shocking, thus implying a shift in one's
sense of self-commitment reminiscent of that demanded by a sublime
expression. Oddly enough I think Kant hit this nail on the head in
a remark about the portrayal of the disgusting in art (Critique of
Judgement, ¶ 48):

There is only one kind of ugliness which cannot be represented in ac-
cordance with nature without destroying all aesthetic satisfaction, and conse-
quently artificial beauty, viz. that which excites disgust. For in this singular
sensation, which rests on mere imagination, the object is represented as it
were obtruding itself for our enjoyment, while we strive against it with
all our might. And the artistic representation of the object is no longer
distinct from the nature of the object itself in our sensation, and thus it is
impossible that it can be regarded as beautiful.

Here Kant recognizes both that the response of disgust rests on
imagination and that the disgusting object as it were enters fighting
into the workings of our mind, inviting us to an enjoyment against
which we also feel compelled to strive with all our might. If the
striving is completely successful, as no doubt with Kant it would
be, we have the comparatively simple morally directed response of
disgust, in lesser mortals I think the battle may be less completely and
effortlessly won and may indeed constitute a self-sustaining imagin-
ative activity focused on the object. We may then have an object
presenting itself to us as obscene.

In order to judge an object or situation or a piece of writing or
a filthy postcard to be obscene in the primary, i.e. non-derivative,
form of this judgement one must be expressing in the judgement a
feeling of one's own perceptual or imaginative response of this
characteristic self-condemned pleasure. Of course, as in the case of
aesthetic judgements of beauty or sublimity, there are derivative,
non-expressive judgements made in the same words but based on
repeating other people's first-hand expressive judgements, or one's
own produced in a more responsive mood, or on applying to an
object one's general moral principles and general knowledge of
human nature to yield a judgement as to what will evoke from most
people with less well trained susceptibilities than one's own a genuine
expressive judgement of obscenity. It is these last judgements that
are clearly inter-personal and are at issue in the courts, and they
may well for that reason be in practice the most important judge-
ments of obscenity; but they must nevertheless be recognized as
logically derivative from the genuine, first-hand expressive judg-
ments enjoyed, according to the gentlemen of the jury, by their
maidservants and daughters.

What is it about obscene objects that evokes this special imagin-
ative experience? Like the sublime but in a different way the obscene
effects a doubling up of our sense of self-commitment. Implicit in
my regarding the tremendous Alps as sublime is a double conception
of myself as not only human, and so small in bodily size and power,
but also godlike in my indefinitely extending powers of compre-
ension and self-determination. In the obscene we also adopt or
are given a double sense of ourselves, as not only human, and so
subject to human demands for the proper treatment of ourselves
and other persons as of human dignity and worth, but also as
potentially brutish, potentially mere animal digestive and procreative
organisms, subject to inescapable physical processes and needs, and
to domination by physical force majeure. Combining these two con-
ceptions of persons, we are able in an obscene frame of mind to
think of ourselves as using, or suffering the use of, physical violence to dominate our own thoughts or other people's reactions and actions; and able to think humiliatingly of ourselves or of other persons through their bodies as inescapably corruptible, diseased and dirty by standards to which we ourselves are committed.

Characteristic of the obscene, then, is its evoking of a special, self-condemned pleasure—the fantasy pleasure of self-condemned liberation of thought and judgement from human standards of propriety in the fantasy-gratification of immediate physical urges or fantasies of domination. Under this double conception of things or persons, persons can be thought of or acted upon as if they were non-rational, usable objects or material bodies; or conversely material things or (presumably) mindless animals can be thought of or acted towards as if they were persons, while at the same time their real character is also vividly recognized, and from this double view we can derive the characteristic pleasure of the obscene, in the use (or imagined use) of bodies to force the compliance of, or bodily satisfactions to counterfeit the satisfactions of, or bodily humiliations to abase, that elusive source of action, reaction and satisfaction, the free spirit of man. Whereas the sublime at least promises to provide an eternity of significant reflection in a moment of illumination, the obscene pretends to liberate from the permanent yoke of rational standards of thought and desire and action, from the built-in demands of foresight and retrospective reflection and consideration for others implicit in our perennial concern for objective truth and for the enduringly based personal relations, to allow the irresponsible manipulation and enjoyment of bodies as stand-ins for persons in providing the desired sensations and fantasies of the moment.

Since the moral and religious assurance of the Puritan-Philistine era has melted away well-intentioned obscenity has become hard to identify and a serious aesthetic danger. If the attitudes and impulses condemned by orthodoxy are seriously held by a moral reformer to be necessary to a full and satisfying human life, the transporting obscene becomes only uneasy distinguishable from the sublime. There is in the sexual act itself a natural paradox that lies in wait for the unwary realistic novelist. For if it is to be whole-heartedly engaged in and not to provide a dangerous opportunity for power-politics, it seems likely that the sexual act must be experienced in mindless abandonment to sensation; yet it is, and must be thought of as, the vital focus of powerful emotional forces with formative influence on the outlook and personality of the participants. An experience requiring such mindless self-abandonment but of such significance in long-term personal relationships is a standing temptation to abuse. For the novelist there is a corresponding hazard. He has to draw a precarious hairline distinction between the sublime portrayal of the sexual act in its integral connexion with the human situation and the obscene portrayal which will disrupt his readers' concern with his characters while they indulge in mental masturbation if the portrayal is powerful enough or reject it as embarrassingly silly if it isn't. This line is one which Lawrence himself often failed to draw, and perhaps it cannot be drawn. But it represents an objective and not merely orthodox barrier beyond which any writing, however pure in intention, must be obscene.

If this account of the obscene is acceptable, then it emerges as an aesthetic disvalue in literature, the effect of the transporting expression (possibly from the purest motives) of what is a sub-rational conception of human beings and life, simultaneously evoking the reader's awareness of its shockiness (possibly strenuously denied to himself) and awareness of the condemned pleasure he takes in it. So, in the twentieth century after he wrote (probably), we can add to Longinus's list of the diseases to which attempts at the sublime succumb, the obscene.

REFERENCES

1 cf. e.g., his discussion of 'the tragic experience' in 'Tragedy and the Medium', The Common Pursuit, Peregrine Books, pp. 130 ff.
2 This and following translations from Longinus are taken from the Library of Liberal Arts Press edition, 1957, translated by G. M. A. Grube.
3 My attention was drawn to this point by F. N. Lee's paper published in the previous number of this Journal.
4 My understanding of Longinus was mediated, and my appreciation of him stimulated, by the Introduction and Notes to D. A. Russell's edition, which the author was kind enough to let me study in typescript.
Manifest
Densities

By making absence resonate, the sculptures of Joel Shapiro, seen in a traveling retrospective, turn small scale and obdurate materiality to paradoxically monumental ends.

BY DONALD B. KUSPIT

Space can not be form, for it is nothing... —Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness

The power of Joel Shapiro's sculpture comes from the absence that pervades it, that gives it full presence. The object—"positive space"—is only half the sculpture for Shapiro; the other half is empty space. For Shapiro, "controlling negative space is a critical issue in sculpture." (All quotations from the artist are drawn from his statements in the exhibition catalogue of his recent retrospective.) The object exists to give such control, to throw negative space into relief, to make it "positive... the perceptual space of the piece, the present, the important thing." Like embalming fluid, negative space seeps into Shapiro's objects, works the miracle of making them look imperturbable, immutable—dense as though beyond the reach of decay. Shapiro's is an Egyptian art; his chairs, houses, figures are like tomb sculptures, buried in the unmoving, absolute space of a psychic pyramid, to serve the artist, in some afterlife in which their—and his—full meaning will unfold. Shapiro has made these objects to accompany him in the void; they summarize it, compact it, implode it—concentrate it until it seems fate incarnate. His objects have the fated look of finalized forms, as pure as the void itself.

Built of void, Shapiro's images lose their customary meaning, no longer work as signs of actual objects, no longer refer to the familiar world of chairs, houses, figures. They are "truly abstracted"—more fully so by hovering on the border between pure, non-referential object and sign than if they had been purely non-objective, to begin with. (They can be viewed as idiomatic — idiosyncratic? — Constructivism, making it more colloquial and more dramatic.) By that hovering they acquire that "double reading": Shapiro is so concerned to establish, a simultaneity of reference and inaccessibility, intimacy and distance, that announces both the personal, private meaning and the autonomy of the sculpture. It is as though a privately meaningful object was constituted by the artist's very detachment from it, transforming it into a type. This "duplicity" makes the object all the more stubbornly, in turn, all the more compelling for the empathy that surrounds it, and all the more obsessively regarded for its subject abstractness. Shapiro's objects acquire an existential urgency that makes them seem absolutely intelligible, an "idea." (Shapiro remarks that he is interested in the idea of communication, "not its instrument—the idea of the thing, not the thing itself.

ART IN AMERICA
Sartre describes space as "the unique way in which beings can be revealed as having no relation." This has some bearing on Shapiro. The ambiguity of a Shapiro sculpture can be explained through the fact that the sculpture uses space to reveal its own lack of relation (and hence "abstractness"). But Shapiro also uses the object to symbolize the human desire for relation—a yearning which fills the space around his pieces, making space concrete, a containment for the objects. Shapiro chooses the most prosaically and therefore unmistakably human objects, like a table and chair or house, and even when they seem pointedly stripped of all specifics, there is almost always some disguised "human point" to them. His objects have, then, a Symbolist as well as Constructivist component. The space that surrounds them makes them seem unconsciously charged—embodiments of an unconscious desire, at once symptomatic and repressive of it.
The object—chair, house, figure—displays that unconscious desire for relation, a secret erotic tendency, in our reading of it as the memorable sign of an actual experience. The more abstract the object is—the more it moves toward pure form—the more hungry for relation it seems, and the more we invest with "meaning," i.e., establish our own meaningful relation to it, project our emotion onto it. We become caught up in a small but intense psychodrama emotionally responsive as if to the toys from a doll's house. Shapiro's objects build up primitive emotion, through the nakedness of their display in space, through their peculiar "dislocation" in space, which comes from their non-relationality. They effect a powerful transference—reveal a powerful cathexis—like all good toys of thought. I take their childlike ness seriously; it is in the best modern tradition. Shapiro's synthesis of "children's art" and non-objectivity is a special triumph, and may indeed signal that non-objectivity is the ultimate childlikeness possible in art. Shapiro has understood the search for the fundamental and profound in both the child and the contemporary artist—for a subject matter that is so fundamental that it first seems remote from our own ordinary interests, but then reveals itself as something profoundly intimate. Shapiro plays with our sense of intimacy and distance, of relation and non-relation—the independence of things and our dependence on them—in a subtle spatial drama which is not without its tragic overtones.
sculpture, the transformation never completely occurs; Shapiro's space still remains raw, a space one cannot enter, inhospitably signaling absence of relation. One experienced that point spontaneously as one moved toward his objects on the exhibition floor; close up, it was as if a boundary had been crossed, an alarm set off, the inner tension of the piece broken. The object no longer fired one's deepest memories or respect for fundamental form, and was no longer a jumping-off point into a space whose emptiness was as much psychic as physical.

Shapiro's drawings don't seem to me as significant as his sculptures, because they seem to me to start from the objectness of line rather than from pure space, as the sculptures do. They are too much about the relationships between line-objects, too little the demonstration of void, absence. At best, they are calling cards for the sculpture. They are too much about the bonding of structure, too little about the impossibility of subsuming space. The drawings are ontic, the sculpture ontological. The sculpture has a metaphysical task, displays the essentials of sculpture; the drawings take containment too much for granted.

Some of the sculptures involve color, sometimes splashed on the piece and the wall to which it is attached, bonding the two, and sometimes as a uniform sealant on the object. Color, as we know, has spatial effect, and so can be an instrument of distancing or intimacy. I think Shapiro uses it to reinforce the aloneness of his object in space. It fuses the object's parts together, so that the sculpture becomes a more onerously tratedly positive presence, more densely and integrally given. That gives it a superficial succinctness which makes it even more of a position from which one can experience space, recognize the object's isolation, and as such character as a metaphor for the nothingness of space—its power to annihilate all our relationships.


Author: Donald B. Kuspit received the College Art Association's 1982 award for art criticism.
Klaus Kertész

The murder novel has also a depressing way of mind-
ing: it's own business, solving its own problems and
answering its own questions.
—Raymond Chandler, The Simple Art of Murder

Like most mystery novels, Barry Le Va's sculpture pre-
sents a superimposition of two interdependent se-
quences of time—an action performed in the past, and
an investigation of that action gradually unfolding in
the present to explain the past; a real event (a "crime," a
configuration in space) for which the motivation is not
initially self-evident, and an analysis of that event de-
decting and discovering its missing links. Le Va's work
is about more than meeting the eye—about an
absence. "Clue" is a very important word in Le Va's
vocabulary.

The reader of a mystery novel passively observes the
narrator retracing the steps of the plot. The narrator is a
surrogate for the writer, explaining the writer's con-
struction. The viewer of a Le Va sculpture is invited to
become the narrator, and to retrace the artist's actions
from the work's material back to the motivation for it.
The conditions that facilitate the viewer's participation
are remarkably similar to the dictates of most mystery
novels: a general structure simultaneously ambiguous
and transparent; suppression of superfluous detail;
plainness and clarity—very strong image or significant
form hinders the progress of the investigation.

While Le Va has occasionally incorporated violence
into his work and has once or twice indulged in orgy
material (red iron oxide, mineral oil), nothing even as
mildly picturesque as an excess of whimsy or a flashy
convertible intrudes upon his work. His continuous use
of materials with a minimum of art references (felt, furs,
wooden dowels, particle board) achieves the same
elegant deadpan so crucial to the pared-down prose of
such writers as Dashiell Hammett and Raymond
Chandler.

The comparison to a narrative genre is made to
emphasize Le Va's persistent pursuit of the temporal
dimension. His configurations do not congeal into sta-
tic constructions, but present residues of activities that
overlap and shift in time. Le Va creates diagrams of the
untold dialogue between mind and matter; he ritual-
zizes the act of making a choice, bringing rhythm and
rhythm to the space between decision and action.

Since 1967, the activities that generate Le Va's
sculpture have shifted from simple physical interact-
ings (e.g., throwing, placing, rolling) to more complex
material interactions employing the materials as mar-
kers involved in systems of logical measure. Le Va's
most recent work engages purely visual decision-
making and moves from logic to experience; the more
conscious visual focus engenders a more pronounced
physicality and an urge to objectivity. However, this
urge is cantankerous, self-doubting, and precarious,
giving volume to flux rather than to form.

Transience, or homelessness, has been the plight of
sculpture (and almost all art) in Modernist bourgois times, sculpture needs more place than painting, and has received less. Le Va is part of the generation of sculptors that came to the fore in the late 60s, radically questioning the kitch and clutter of cocktail table and sculpture garden. This generation made transcence a trenchant partner in the making of the work, and replaced product with process. Objects dissolved into residues of activity and intent which reclaimed sculpture's architectural dependence while renouncing its permanence as object (a work's material life often being limited to the duration of the exhibition it was made for). Once-pristine exhibition spaces now appeared to be occupied by mattress manufacturers or active volcanoes. Perhaps for the first time sculptors, not painters, were pulling the stuffing out of art to see what was inside—sculptors like Le Va, Eva Hesse, Bruce Nauman, Richard Serra, et al.

Le Va's rejection and dissection of the object was arrived at quite early (1966 - 67) and independently, in Los Angeles (he moved to New York in 1970). The aspects of this dispersed felt pieces from 1967 - 69 that most readily connected him to artists in New York were their configurations—derived from simple activities which punctuated process—and their restriction to the horizontal plane of the floor. Le Va was less interested in phenomenology, process, and an active partnership with gravity, however, than such artists as Serra and Robert Morris. Serra's splashed-lead sculpture and Morris' work in hung and draped felt, both from the late '60s, present rhythimsical, continuous sequences of activities that are visually coherent materializations of the interaction between artist, material, and gravity. Although clearly generated by simple activities (cutting, tearing, placing, throwing), Le Va's layers of felt are not sequentially coherent; they reflect the zigzagging vagaries of mental process as much as the clearer dictates of material process. The disparity of clusters of tiny shreds of felt overlapping large rectangles of felt breaks up visual continuity and calls attention to
the juncture of two discontinuous but related layers of time. How are they related? What is the logic of the placement of the felt? What is the role (roll) of the ball bearings, included in most of the felt works? The viewer is given clues but no certainty of an answer—certainly and finally are not part of Le Va’s vocabulary.

The felt pieces, like most of Le Va’s works, take up the entire space they are situated in—the viewer is almost always within the piece and must (re)perform its construction to move through it. No overall view or distance is possible; no configuration is dominant, the almost intolerable profusion of units creates a field of constant shifts, junctures, and overlaps which frustrates any attempt at a unified reading. Intent is not clearly apparent; the viewer must deduce and intuit Le Va’s actions as he turned material into the nonsequential transitions in space and time that reflected his mental processes of deduction and intuition.

Formless, shapeless, structureless—clues, no conclusions. Can sculpture be purely about relations and transitions? How much responsibility should be given to the viewer? At what point does the material risk turning from being “sculpture” into becoming the vestige or trace of “performance”? Where is intent located? Le Va’s work continuously asks these questions. You must think harder than you see.

By 1970, the procedural residues of simple physical interactions with a variety of materials (glass, bricks, flour, felt, etc.) were replaced by residues of systems of measurement and sections of geometric figures. The material (wooden rods, dowels, Masonite, etc.) no longer denotes itself; it becomes more and more connotative of a set of purely mental activities. An example from this period is the “Circle Series,” 1970 – 71, which employs stone markers for the centers of circles, points of tangency, or overlapping of circles. While these works appear to have more order than the earlier pieces, they are just as resistant to any sequentially unified viewing. The units of material are fragments of figures and systems overlapping in time and space, frequently interrupting and partially erasing each other. They are not visually “logical” the way a Sol LeWitt wall drawing is.

The walls that act as passive boundaries for the felt pieces are now incorporated into the work. A 1973 work is entitled An Attempt to Fit: 16 in 4: Centerpoints Outward (walked-end-over-end, ends touch, ends cut); it is divided into four overlapping rectangles de-

gree of (re)creation required of the viewer is extreme.

While the distance between material and intent here is greater and more perplexing than before, the "Accumulated Vision" pieces have a visuality and physically common to most of Le Va's work: radical horizontal compression, denial of unified form or gestalt, and material dispersed in a large field in configurations implying movement in one or more planes and resisting any visually sequential reading. Surfaces are totally evenless—generally mat, flat, and ungluing. Because of the multiplicity of units and their refusal to congeal, the floor appears to shift constantly. The viewer is in the piece but seems to see it from above—the generally small size of the units makes them seem to float far below eye level. Le Va turns space into a rather disconcerting nowhere place, both matter-of-fact and alien, simultaneously immense and measurable. The work's openness and seeming incompleteness encourage investigation and contemplation.

Could purely visual concerns become the basis of the work? Decisions based on personal experience have been thought to becloud the clarity of intellectual intent; decisions based on objectively verifiable procedures or systems have formed much of the art of the past 25 years, including Le Va's. Many artists have sought the transparent logic of language; recently, however, more and more have come to realize that art may be weightless but it is not transparent.

In Le Va's work choices of medium, size, scale, and placement (by chance and design) are to varying degrees determined by personal experience and preference. These choices are largely responsible for the work's believability. If there were no spatial tension or suspense, what would initiate the viewer's investigation? Could the work be drained of illusion and replaced by a diagram? Could it be written?

"Illusion," "spatial tension"—these are purely visual and psychological concepts. How are visual decisions made? Can they be communicated? The realm of the visual has become the primary (rather than secondary) focus of Le Va's most recent work. He seeks to make and analyze models of visual choice-making. Since 1980 the work has been less about specific processes and more about "experience." With Expanding Foundations: Eliminating Foundations, a Partial Exterior Plan with an Interior, 1981, the action begins to move back onto the plane of the floor.

"Gyroscope Roulette" suggests random rolling and rotation on a variety of planes of choice and chance. Gyroscope Roulette: sketching a possibility is the title of a work done in the winter of 1982, in which Le Va gambles with and abandons himself to the totally visual. Like a gyroscope, the piece is simultaneously stable and revolving. The precariousness of shiny, ready-to-roll fiberglass balls on compartamentalized tracks, several sets of particle-board ellipses in staggered triplets suggesting horizontal revolution, and sections of single, variously angled ellipses that seem to slice through the floor, all at about knee height, fan endless currents of illusion—illusion totally dependent upon material, shape, and placement.

What is an ellipse? Both a specific, complete geometric figure and an incomplete geometric figure, it falls short of a circle or appears to be a perspectival projection of a circle. Its visual incompleteness seems to set it in motion. An ellipse is a perfect monogram for Le Va.

An ellipse is a lapse of time or the omission of an element that is structurally necessary but understood in context. "Ellipses" is the plural of ellipse and of ellipse. Ellipses populate and propel Le Va's recent work.

Two works done in the late spring and summer of 1982—one for Documenta 7, one for an exhibition at the DeCordova and Dana Museum in Lincoln, Mass—are more demanding in both content and configuration than Gyroscope Roulette, although all three are composed of similar elements. The DeCordova installation is the latest, and most complex and disturbing, of the three.
In photographs and at the first moment of viewing the piece seems to be a uniform, mausoleum-like structure incorporating ten spheres and two triple-tiered sets of ellipses. Barry Le Va the neo-Constructivist? Only for a second; almost immediately the structure becomes disjointed and the space uncomfortable. The paths that fill most of the room are scaled to the spheres and must be carefully stepped over or straddled—passage is awkward (as if one were at a too-miniature golf course). On inspection the maze-like structure breaks down into two separate sections: one side is made up of disconnected but parallel planks in a straight path ending in an angle, the other side of intersecting diagonals in two different scales.

The piece is entitled Revolving Standards: Past Decisions, Present Revolutions, Future Drops. The roll of a sphere is an ambiguous measure at best, and an ellipse is an incomplete one. These “standards” are far more elusive than were the knotted sticks; their placement by design seems almost as gratuitous as the placement by chance of the ball bearings in the felt pieces.

The placement and removal of the spheres and ellipses seems to have determined the structure of the paths, but the paths could as readily have determined the placement of the spheres and ellipses. Are the three different sizes and surfaces of the spheres the result of different standards, or projections of the same standard? The piece goes round and round—the drop of a sphere defines an angle, an angle defines the ability of a sphere to drop. There is no solution; only flux and an endless, cyclical reciprocity. The work seems to be a record of the mind’s erratic search for a reason to be.

The title of the Documenta piece is Perspective Slot Drop/ Delusion/ Related Consequences. This work has a simpler configuration, but also splits the room in two and builds a seemingly unified but ultimately disjointed structure. As physicality and visuality become primary rather than secondary concerns in these works, decisions are generated directly by the self rather than through systems or procedures. There is less certainty, less verifiability, more doubt (self-doubt); standards are less “accurate,” measure even more ambiguous than before. With self-doubt comes the specter of self-deception and the possibility that action is a delusion. The flux and vulnerability of much of the previous work now issue directly from the self.

Le Va would like to make an object but is painfully aware of the impossibility (?) of making a self-confident object. Perhaps the only possibility is to continue the relentless laying bare of the problematics of sculpture, picturing more clues but finding no solution.

The body of work that Le Va has created is an alarming, uncompromising. His surgical awareness of the dilemma of sculpture is hardly endearing, but is as rewarding as if it is instructive; especially at a moment when so much sculpture reverts to sheer mindlessness of material and re-upholstering of Constructivist cliches. Object lessons are still in order.
Space, the aura of a specific place and her personal psychogram entwine themselves into a new experience of space, which makes it possible to experience the always daring boundaries of inner and outer, experience and actuality, the expressible and that which cannot be put into words.

Excerpt from Dorothee Bauerle, Renate Anger: Antworten (catalogue), Künstlerhaus Bethanien, Berlin, 1987
UNTITLED, 1966
Egg tempera on cotton
Two pieces, 350 x 155
The work of Tom Arthur triggers the opening of instanced experiences, remembrances of those cleavages in sensation which tear open for one startled moment of disingenuous clarity. His installations and other sculptured works assert the possibility of transcoding memory into new constructs in order to gain many different options of personal being and doing. Yet, such proposals are grounded in the pragmatic, earth-founded human body and in its intense, yet low-keyed histories.

His installation for the Sydney Biennale is a continuation in a more minimalist mode of previous works, in particular of The Entire Contents of a Gentleman’s Room, Melbourne, 1987. He was pursuing the same intuition earlier in drawings (Nocturnal Emissions, 1974–76), encased reliefs (Love Letter... Let’s Build a House, 1986) and in earlier room constructions, such as Goodbye Carpet; Goodbye Small Door, 1983. These revealed the nature of a ‘cut’ across reality made by a peripheral subject on transversing the hierarchies of the ‘interior’.

Critics have made heavy weather of Tom Arthur’s Art, because they seem to get bogged down in an analysis of the details of the works. These details form carefully selected intensities that punctuate a vivified, living terrain, yet it is the act of the works, their kinetic quality, which is their essential experience—the quivering vibration which registers a ‘passing-through’. Although the work is intense, loaded to strike at a specific experience, it is also highly detached, de-centred off the artist in a cool analysis, leaving open a personal space for the reflections of the viewer by the removal of the emotive overloading more commonly associated with work debating passion and death.

The work does not follow the geometry of rectangularity already inscribed on the earth, but instead pursues the ellipses. It is no surrealist, juxtaposition of symbols and meanings, but a random cut through the whole: a slicing-away of the strata of the entire cultural presence—unprivileged moment, all the more poignant and intense for its elision, composed of the familiar and the remembered.

At the circumference of the rounded, domestic forms of the central structure are the jagged planes and slivers of non-continuous space, parallel layers of erotic life and the dried bones of the dead, of the implosion and the desolate, of meeting-points and recent absences, of the loss of something else which still waits on, urging after itself from the memory of the past to the long ellipses of a moment extended. Tom Arthur’s work demystifies the Other of desire and of fear by following through the imperatives set by desire itself. At the end of the process, the Other is found to be neither illusion, nor alien, nor mystic, but oneself is displaced in the reflections of opaque and transparent mirrors, re-echoed in light-wells, or disjointed across the walls and ceilings of half-fit rooms whose customary cubicles are neutralised by parallaxes of light from a slowly-opened door. All such recurring motifs in his work indicate a quicksilver surface of entry to yet another track, another possibility for change and for unending movement from oneself to oneself.

The room-installations are spaces and surfaces of desire: velas, nets, intersecting metal, lines, arrows—reflecting, displiceing, throwing out and absorbing light. No single image metaphorizes desire in the manner of traditional symbols, not even the arrows, whose extended length and attenuated fragility suggest as much the nervous, delicate string of highly-tuned mental processes as of physical sexuality. The rooms express the tearing-apart of reality which is the act of desire and, also, its own yearning.

The central concept is the sudden surprise of the breaking-into of the fabric of entity. Everything that was ‘stuck’ has been scattered. Traces of the passing have left velas sewn over the surfaces—as arrows, as light—but these are its marks only and no further interpretation is possible. However, the action that wreaked the disorder was a detached one, whose primary careers was not with the rooms themselves, but was mercifully intent as transit, devoid of polemic with the space of the motion. The disorder was not malicious and was almost made without deliberation. And, yet, it pulled the very sense out of the interiors, leaving them still quivering at its departure. These are scenes of irreprovable transformation, of the moments of de-centring and of obsession.

What complicates the reading of the installations is that they are not only witnesses to a tearing-apart, a dislocation, but filled the spaces of a fulfillment, that promise associated with the peripheral, of completion, of integration, of passion, and, therefore, of some sort of death. But, in that case, the nature of death, as Tom Arthur understands it, must be redefined. This involves the redefinition of memory. Instead of the opposition of passion and death, of life and death, there is a continuum so normal, so unremarkable, that it becomes a matter of some indifference. Death may still be melancholic, pitiful, curious, the trigger of a sense of loss, or a cause of bemusement, but, as in the many death-referents in his works, the macabre, the fearful Impurities, the incompleteness of the state of death, are absent. Instead, there is a certain dry pragmatism.

In death as a movement, an extension of passion, a natural unwinding of life, then memory, in turn, ceases to be passive, but takes on an active creative function. It becomes temporal and acts equally in the future, spinning the moment forward. Hence, the death-images in Tom Arthur’s installations present an activity, self-presence and integrity. There is a certain presence in their aspect. The dead enter our lives, but they do so because we freely invite them, and, indeed, go forward to meet them. This realisation of the continuing ability to choose changes one’s understanding of the nature of dying and the peripheral across the centre. Though it is still oddly angled and, as it is so curiously dimensioned, it is seen to be the rediscovery of what is totally familiar. What remains is poignancy, but with a certain sense of celebration.

In Tom Arthur’s use of death-symphony there is no sense that it is an agency outside oneself which is enforcing the extinction. The viewer is anchored in the familiar registrations of his own body, in those indices that register the process of dying and are always known subliminally by the psyche and the intellect. They mirror the totality of the body as both a living act and as an act of death. The works awaken the tactile sense so that the mind is not left disembodied, floating helplessly in the psyche.

From this point of view it is interesting to note the importance of the skeletal figures throughout Tom Arthur’s oeuvre. They contribute towards a more vital understanding of human sexuality than that offered by the cultural stereotypes of genital eroticism. It was the feminist writers of the early seventies who observed that the body surface was an interactive erotic membrane, highly activated in women, according to their analysis, due to the sociopolitical suppression of the female. Denied access by the patriarchy to the polarities of reason and of genital sexuality, women had been forced to activate their tactile sense over the whole body surface and to locate their experiences of eroticism within their torsos as passion and nurturing. This provides a model of eroticism of wider application.

The conceptuallist and minimalist element in Tom Arthur’s installations and other sculptural removes all the indulgent superfluities that might produce murky effects in the dominant themes. The controlled selectivity means that the elements are effective triggers of networks of connections, memories and intuitions which may not be commonly verbalised, but which are not hidden in the unconscious. His signs are hyper-conscious and the act of exploration is, in the end, an act of reclamation.

Urszula Szaławkska, University of Queensland, October, 1987
THE ENTIRE CONTENTS OF A GENTLEMAN'S ROOM, 1987
Mixed media installation
300 × 800 × 720
Collection: The University of Melbourne

(Photo) Terence Bogue/Tom Arthur
CIMABUE (CENNI DI PEPO), active 1240-1302

Madonna with Angels

Panel: 167 x 108 1/4 in. (424 x 276 cm.) Inventory: Inv. 254

This enormous altarpiece was formerly in the church of San Francesco at Pisa. In 1811 Baron Vivant-Denon, the director of the Musée Napoléon, undertook an expedition in search of Italian primitives for his museum, and selected this painting from amongst the property of the suppressed religious houses of Tuscany. It was in the Louvre in 1815, but was not on exhibition till the following year; the Florentine commission of 1815, charged with reclaiming the paintings which had been taken from Tuscany, left it in the possession of the Museum.

This work is related to two other large thirteenth-century altarpieces: the Madonna of the Uffizi in Florence, and the Roccella Madonna in Santa Maria Novella. Vasari states that all three were painted by Cimabue, but modern criticism does not accept this attribution in each case. The Uffizi Madonna is universally accepted as the work of Cimabue, but the Madonna in Santa Maria Novella is usually attributed to Duccio. With regard to the Louvre Madonna, opinions vary; many critics regard it as a late work by Cimabue, attributing it to his last years to account for the fact that it displays a greater preoccupation with form than the other two paintings. Others, however, consider it to belong to a later period than Cimabue; but Luisa Marcucci (1956) believes it to be an early work by the master. It has been pointed out, moreover, that the twenty-six medallions on the frame, depicting Christ, the Apostles, angels and saints, seem to be in a more advanced style than the picture itself.

Cimabue’s œuvre remains in fact very conjectural, for want of documents relating to the surviving works, which would provide a starting point for definite attributions. Vasari recounts that the Louvre Madonna won tremendous acclaim for the artist, who was generously rewarded for it by the Pisans.

Cimabue was rediscovered in modern times; when Vivant-Denon chose this picture for the Louvre it was among paintings confiscated from the suppressed religious houses and stored in the Campo Santo, Pisa, and was priced at 5 francs.

It is in remarkably good condition for so old a work. The gold background is covered with an incised pattern.
Albrecht Dürer, 1471-1528
The Madonna of the Siskin. Panel, 91 x 76 cm. Cat. No. 5379.
Signed and dated 1506

The Virgin, depicted here with flowing, fair hair, is seated before a red backcloth in a landscape, while two angels hold a garland of roses over her head. The Child is shown playing with a siskin and holding a sugar-caster in his right hand. The Madonna’s right hand rests on a book, and with the other she takes a spray of lily of the valley which the young Saint John is holding out to her.

On a wooden bench in the foreground lies a piece of paper bearing the painter’s signature in Latin: ‘Albrethus durer germanus fecit hujus picturae 1505’. That Dürer should here describe himself specifically as German is not surprising when one takes into account his admiration for the Italian artists. He has included quite a few Venetian touches in this picture and was obviously proud of his achievement. The type of half-length figure he has adopted for the Madonna is modelled on southern paintings and the characteristic blue and red colour-scheme is adopted from Giovanni Bellini, whom Dürer, as he wrote in a letter to Nuremberg at the time, regarded as the best of all painters. The flying cherubim, bodyless angels, were also derived from the Italian Renaissance masters. Saint John, presenting the flowers, is closely akin to the small figure in Titian’s Madonna of the Cherries in the Vienna Gallery, which was not painted until the second decade of the century. Here the Venetian master showed his respect for the German artist.

Quite a lot is known about Dürer’s visit to Venice in 1506. He received a major commission from the German merchants at the Fondaco dei Tedeschi, who later also commissioned works from Giorgione and Titian; Dürer’s work, the Festival of the Rosary, now in Prague, proved a difficult task which kept him busy and preoccupied for a long time, as he himself admitted; as a result he lost other commissions. He had only the last quarter of the year 1506 in which to complete the Madonna of the Siskin, for the following spring he returned to Nuremberg; thus it became an Italian Christmas picture, as the inscription ‘after the confinement of the Virgin’ expressly states. There are four extant studies for this painting, in which the Child, the cherubim and a piece of drapery are portrayed (Bremen, Paris, Vienna). These sketches also show how closely the creation of the Berlin panel was linked with the Festival of the Rosary.

Painted for an unknown patron, the work was probably in the palace of Rudolf II in Prague; that ‘great imperial reservoir of Dürer works’ (Friedländer), assuming that Carol van Mander’s description of 1618—‘a Madonna, over whom two angels hold a garland of roses, with which to crown her’—refers to this painting. How it came from Italy to Prague is as much a mystery as its subsequent movements. In the 1860s the panel was rediscovered in Scotland; it was in Newbattle Abbey near Edinburgh in 1892 when it was acquired for the Berlin Gallery from the Marquess of Lothian.
The modern title, *Venice: Campo S. Vidal and S. Maria della Carità*, is correctly based on the topography of the scene, which shows the Campo in the foreground separated from the Carità buildings by the Grand Canal. It is very different today. The mason’s yard, with its huts, has long been cleared away, together with the house on the left, and the Grand Canal is now spanned by a substantial wooden bridge. On the other side, the campanile of S. Maria della Carità has not been there since 1744, when it collapsed, and the old Scuola della Carità adjoining the church to the right was rebuilt not many years later to include a heavy classical façade in white stone. This is now the entrance to the Accademia. Church and Scuola were suppressed in 1807 and the buildings were handed over to the Accademia di Belle Arti, with its art school and picture gallery.

The picture is more topographical therefore than it now seems in comparison with the very large number of neat and tidy architectural views with which Canaletto recorded the appearance of Venice for the delight of the contemporary tourist and posterity. A comparatively early work, it shows already his acute perception of the character of buildings and the science and deftness with which he could reconstruct them and enhance their meaning by his rendering of light and colour. But here all the delicious details and domesticities belong to a second exploration of the picture. Innumerable re-explorations are necessary for a full appreciation of a scene which proffers first of all the grandeur of nature herself. The Venetian sky is made more brilliant by its own reflection from the sea, and noble masses of warm sun and cool shade overlie the thousands of lively little contests between light and dark.

By the time he painted this picture Canaletto’s work was already finding its way to England, and it was not long before almost the whole of his output was for the English market. He paid at least three visits to England, on the first occasion remaining more than four years. The early history of this picture is not known, however. By 1808 it belonged to Sir George Beaumont. In 1823 he had deposited it at the British Museum for the future National Gallery, founded the next year. It came here in 1828.

**CANALETTO. The Stonemason’s Yard (Venice: Campo S. Vidal and S. Maria della Carità).**

This unusual theme attracted Canaletto because it offered the interesting contrast of the stones set against a familiar topographical view, as well as a record of the work being done for the façade of the neighboring church of S. Vidal. Today the view is very different. The campanile of S. Maria della Carità across the Grand Canal was removed in 1744; the building immediately to the right of the church was rebuilt with a white façade which is now the entrance to the Accademia; and a heavy wooden bridge called the Ponte dell’Accademica now spans the canal at a point on the left in the picture. Although this is an early work, it shows Canaletto’s solid and acute perception of reality. During his trip to Rome in 1719 he probably acquired from local landscape painters the new idea of painting actual scenes rather than invented ones. The picture has an overall scenic effect; close study reveals innumerable delightful details of the Venetian environment. All are caught in the brilliant play of color, light, and shadow. (A.P.)
The Cumaean Sibyl

_Delphi point, red chalk, pen and bistre_; 279 × 173

Duke Albert (L. 174)—Albertina inv. No. 181

Alb. Cat. III. No. 72.

Wickhoff, S. R. No. 310.

O. Fischel, _Raffaels Zeichnungen_, Strasbourg 1898, No. 282.

L. Dusler, _Raffael_, Kritisches Verzeichnis der Gemälde, Wandbilder und Bildstöcke, Munich 1906, p. 103.

K. O. K. No. 38 (with bibliography)

About 1510 the rich Roman banker Agostino Chigi succeeded in commissioning the artist, who was heavily engaged in the papal service, for the decoration of his family chapel in Santa Maria della Pace. A series of drawings, including this one and the following sketch of an angel in flight, were prepared for the frescoes.

Raphael’s aim was to fit the figures harmoniously into the irregular space of the spandrels above the frontal wall of the apse and to bring the sibyls into a stimulating, animated association with each other. The sheet shows the version eventually executed—the Sibyl supports herself with both hands on the stone block which she uses as a seat and gazes intently at the tablets held by an angel. An initial design for this fresco is to be found on a drawing for the School of Athens (Oxford). The lightly undulating emphatic hatchings in this sheet closely approach the studies for _Parnassus_ in the Stanza della Segnatura and should therefore, according to Oberhuber, be dated c. 1511-12.

As the fine white lines show, the figure was at first only indicated by metal point in broad outline before being more carefully finished with red chalk and a few brief pen strokes. The use of both soft and harder red chalk for linear draughtsmanship is characteristic of Raphael’s individual studies during his later Roman period.
Caravaggio (Michelangelo Merisi da Caravaggio)

b. 1571 Caravaggio d. 1610 Porto Ercole

4 The Lute Player
Oil on canvas, 94 x 119 cm. The Hermitage, Leningrad. Inventory No 45.

Michelangelo Merisi, named Caravaggio after the place of his birth, was the founder and foremost representative of the realistic movement in painting which arose in Rome at the end of the 16th century, and spread throughout Italy and beyond its borders in the early part of the 17th century.

Caravaggio studied in Milan under Simone Peterzano (1584-9), and his development as an artist proceeded under the influence of the masters of Lombardy and Venice. He worked mainly in Rome (1593-1606), and spent some time in the Marches (1603-4), Genoa (1605) the Sabine Hills (1606), in Naples (1606-7), the Island of Malta (1608), in Syracuse (1608), Messina and Palermo (1609).

The Lute Player belongs to the artist's early period, evidently painted about 1595, when Caravaggio lived in the house of Cardinal Francesco Maria del Monte in Rome and enjoyed his patronage. He produced a series of pictures for the Cardinal, including The Concert, or The Musicians (now in the Metropolitan Museum, New York) and the Hermitage's Lute Player, about which a contemporary of Caravaggio's and biographer of Italian artists, Giovanni Baglione, wrote:

He also made a painting of a youth playing a lute which was so lifelike and realistic in appearance, with a vase of flowers filled with water in which one can easily distinguish the reflections of a window and other objects in the room, and on the flowers is fresh dew which is rendered with exquisite accuracy. And this he said was the most beautiful painting he ever made.

Various interpretations have been given to the subject of this work. In the 19th century it was considered to be an allegory of love, while at the beginning of the 20th century it was viewed purely as a genre scene. It has also been suggested that it represents Venetus. Some writers now consider that it expresses the idea of 'homo eroticus', while others emphasise its symbolic and religious content. An attempt has also been made to identify the boy depicted in the picture with a friend of Caravaggio, a Milanese musician, based on a reading of the signature on the music folio as 'Gallus' (instead of the generally accepted 'Gaues'). Perhaps the best approach would be to relate the picture's content to the poetry of the artist's age, imbued as it was with the idea of love and harmony.

Nevertheless the allegorical element is combined here with a realistic manner of depiction. It was precisely this aspect of Caravaggio's early work that laid the foundation of still-life and genre painting and their transformation into independent artistic genres in Italy. Many of the artist's successors turned subsequently to depicting musicians, card-playing scenes, fortune-telling, and so on. Although among the works of Caravaggio which have survived to our day there is only one still-life proper, nevertheless still-life is present in the majority of his early canvases as a component part of his compositions. Moreover the artist usually painted all objects from life, and we may surmise that he used musical instruments and scores from the collection of the Cardinal del Monte as models for the Hermitage picture. The artist has reproduced on one of the partbooks the beginning of a madrigal popular in the 16th century: Voi sapete ch'io v'amo, composed by Jacques Arcadelt.

The Lute Player is almost the first work of the artist to employ the effect of contrast of light and shade which was to become Caravaggio's main pictorial technique.

Prowenance: Acquired in 1805. It was purchased through Baron Henri de Conin, who was a rival of the Guillermi collection from Rome.

From the objects shown in this portrait it is evident that the sitter was anxious that not only his likeness but also something of his way of life should be presented. A Latin couplet above the merchant's head intimates how faithfully the artist has rendered every aspect of the man: 'What you see here, this picture, shows Georg's features and figure—such is his eye in real life, such is the shape of his cheeks.' Yet it is clear from the very form this couplet takes that the picture is meant to convey more than outward appearances and to underline the humanist milieu in which the merchant wished to be seen. The same mood is implicit in a Latin motto inscribed on the rear wall immediately beside a pair of scales: 'Nulla sine merore voluptas' ('No joy without sorrow').

The merchant is depicted standing in his workroom, behind a table covered with a richly embroidered cloth. Among the many objects on the table and the wall which illustrate his trade, the Venetian-glass vase, containing carnations and other flowers, clearly has a special significance; in the medieval language of symbols the carnation was a sign of betrothal.

From the shelf in the top right-hand corner several keys, signet-rings and a spherical container are hanging, the latter presumably containing string. On the table is a pewter writing-stand with goose-feathers, ink, sand, wax disks and sealing-wax. Beside it are a pair of scissors, a signet-ring and a seal. Near the table's edge, precisely placed in the centre foreground, stands a small table-clock which, together with the fragile glass vase and the perishable flowers, is a reminder of the passage of time, as was the hour-glass in earlier pictures.

The name Georg Gitzel occurs frequently and appears several times in various styles of handwriting on the documents attached to the wall. From the letter in the merchant's hand one gathers that he has been corresponding with a brother in Germany. The subject of the portrait, the son of an alderman, was born in Danzig in 1497. Holbein painted him in London in 1532. Three years later Gitzel married in Danzig, and we may assume that the portrait was commissioned in anticipation of the marriage.

The painting was in the Duke of Orleans' collection in 1727 and appeared in the inventories until 1788. The collection was exhibited at the Royal Academy in London in 1791 and put up for auction. The Swiss publisher and copper-engraver Christian von Mechel acquired the picture and tried in vain to persuade the Basle Library to buy it. For about twenty years it remained in Switzerland without finding a purchaser, until Edward Solly acquired it at a very low price. In 1821 it found its way into the Berlin Museum with the rest of the Solly Collection.
DOMENICO VENEZIANO, c. 1400/10–1461
Portrait of a Young Lady in Profile. Panel, 51 x 35 cm. Cat. No. 1614.

The painting shows a young woman wearing an exquisite brocade dress. Although at first glance a half-length portrait is suggested, the subject's posture indicates that she is sitting in the marble embrasure of a window or balcony. A bright blue sky fills almost the entire background and contrasts with the pale flesh-tint to give the picture its distinctive colour-harmony.

The painter has shown an incredibly sure touch in bringing out the essential features of the young woman's face in profile. The features are delineated with the minimum of detail. The pattern of the brocade dress, depicted in the plane, underlines the medallion-like character of the picture. The emphatic use of line and the clarity of the contrasting colour-surfaces have always been regarded as typical of the Florentine style, but opinions differ as to the identity of the master.

The attribution to Domenico Veneziano we owe to Wilhelm Bode; before he purchased the portrait it had been attributed to Piero della Francesca. Admittedly, almost nothing is known about Domenico's life-history. His name suggests Venetian extraction, yet he spent most of his working-life in Florence. Among the few works which can be safely attributed to him is the altar for S. Lucia dei Magnoli in Florence (now in the Uffizi), of which the Berlin Gallery possesses a predella panel (p. 276), but the style of painting employed there is difficult to reconcile with the chiselled lines of the Berlin portrait. Latterly, therefore, the view has gained ground that this portrait was the work of Antonio Pollaiuolo (1433–98). He was a versatile Florentine artist, who, in addition to painting, ran a goldsmith's workshop and also produced designs for embroidery.

The portrait was purchased in 1894 for the Berlin Gallery from the Earl of Ashburnham's collection.
The Virgin is shown seated with the Child on her lap before a hilly landscape. On her right stands Saint John grasping a scroll of paper, which Jesus holds in His hands. The scroll bears the words: "Ecce Agnus Dei" ("Behold the Lamb of God"). The child on the Virgin's lap is believed to be Saint James the Less, although he bears no particular identifying characteristics. In the background a hill-town can be seen.

Raphael, the son of a goldsmith, was born at Urbino. After an initial period as pupil of Timoteo Viti, he went to Perugia at the age of sixteen to continue his apprenticeship with Pietro Perugino. Two works from that period which were clearly influenced by his master are the Madonna from the Solly Collection and the Virgin and Child with two Saints (p. 298), both now in the Berlin Gallery.

In the autumn of 1504 the young painter was drawn to Florence, where the presence of Leonardo and Michelangelo had given a new stimulus to the artistic life of the city. In the next four years, until he finally settled in Rome, he worked alternately in Perugia and Florence. The work we are considering here, a painting of homely simplicity, must have been produced at the beginning of this period.

It has been said that it was only after he went to Florence that Raphael developed into the Madonna-painter we know. There he mastered the art of combining the element of 'monumentality', a quality peculiar to that city, with a quite unpretentious style of human intimacy and simplicity. The composition lacks the skill of Botticelli (see p. 151) and seems to pay scant attention to the round format of the picture. The concept of the seated woman in a landscape and her demeanour towards the children have no precedent. This rural family idyll is far removed from the divinely radiant Madonnas of earlier times; it shows her as Savonarola saw her in his sermon: "The Blessed Virgin was a woman of the people, and simply dressed."

This picture was at one time in the possession of the family of the Duke of Terranova, who had residences in Genoa and Naples; it was purchased from the family in 1834 for Berlin.
Peter Paul Rubens, 1577–1640

Saint Sebastian. Canvas, 200 x 120 cm. Cat. No. 79811.

After Sebastian had survived execution by bowmen and protested publicly against the persecution of the Christians, the Roman Emperor had him slain. The miraculous deliverance of the saint, transfixed by arrows, was regarded even in early times as a parallel to the resurrection of Christ. The figure of the martyr as portrayed by Rubens is also intended to recall the Crucifixion. Bound to a tree, his eyes turned upwards to heaven, he seems only slightly affected by the bleeding wounds. The way in which the bound man twists his body may be taken as a sign of pain but this does not lessen its beauty, which is that of a hero of antiquity.

In his Sebastian picture, which must have been painted c. 1614, Rubens realized many of the impressions he had gained during his eight years in Italy (1600–08). The sculptural, corporeal quality of the saint’s figure reminds one both of the antique and of Michelangelo’s works. The contrasting light and shade and the realistic treatment of detail were touches that Rubens had learned from Caravaggio. But in combining the statuesque figure with the atmosphere of an evening landscape, the Flemish painter surpassed his Roman master. Here the tragedy of the event finds adequate expression in the language of nature.

In a letter of 1618 to Sir Dudley Carlton, Rubens mentions a selection of his own paintings, which he had kept back in his house ‘for his own pleasure’ and which he was prepared to exchange for works of art in the possession of the English diplomat. Among the pictures included in the painter’s offer is a ‘naked Saint Sebastian by my hand’, in all probability the one now in Berlin. Subsequently all trace of it is lost and it comes to light again only in the nineteenth century (Hill auction, London 1811; Munro auction, London 1878). In 1879 the painting was purchased for the Berlin Gallery.
IN 1904 Klee worked on a series of etchings several of which are allegoric, sometimes with classical allusions. One of them, Woman and Deer, is perhaps Klee’s first reference to the legend of Diana. When studied, however, the image of the Olympian deity with a stag assumes implications not traditionally associated with the goddess of chastity.

In a few brightly colored watercolors of 1927, Klee experimented briefly with a Divisionist technique. He spent the summer on the islands of Porquerolles and Ceriana. Perhaps the shimmering, sun-drenched colors of the Mediterranean had the same effect upon Klee as they had earlier upon Signac and Matisse.

Between 1930 and 1932, Klee further developed his Divisionist technique not only in watercolor but in oil. During this period, he worked concurrently in at least two other styles. The assigned problem of the Divisionist pictures is the representation of light, intense and pulsating. In the Diane, however, the shades are darker as befits the goddess of the moon and night.

Klee was anxious that his Divisionist technique—lyric, although he called it “spots of dots”—not be confused with the scientific method of the Neo-Impressionist painter Seurat. It is impossible, however, not to compare the techniques of both artists, and, in this exhibition, other adaptations of Pointillism can be studied in paintings by Derain, Picasso, and Signac (pages 71, 118, 168).

Diane, one of Klee’s largest oils, is also one of the most beautiful. Each “dot” is placed precisely, and the juxtapositions of blue and its two complementary colors are as delicate as they are sure. The hieroglyph of Diane is posed against the sky. She is clad in a tunic and wears a cape. She stands on a wheel, an allusion to her chariot drawn by stags. As in a later watercolor entitled Diane in the Autumn Wind, her garments billow in a breeze. Her head, the focus of the picture, is partially concealed. The wrapped figure suggests, inescapably, that celestial temperatures might be chill. She is portrayed as Diane, the huntress. Above her brow is not the crescent moon but another attribute, the quivered arrow which points in the direction toward which she moves.

W.J.L.
IN BERLIN and in Cologne, immediately after the armistice of World War I, artists and writers responded to the shrill call of Dada, a revolutionary and iconoclastic attitude which in life, art, and literature mocked the status quo. In Berlin, Dada was particularly characterized by a bitter contempt for the folly of the war and by despair at the resulting economic and moral debacle. George Grosz, throughout his life a moralist, was a leader of Berlin Dada.

Subsequently, during the Weimar Republic, George Grosz won rapid and notorious fame for the savage satire of his drawings in black and white. Unfortunately, his brilliance as a draftsman, first as a Dadaist and then as a cartoonist, has obscured his considerable achievement as a painter. "Most people," he realized, "have never appreciated the artistic element in my work; they have been aware only of the subject matter and its political implications." As a painter Grosz can be ranked, if not with Daumier, certainly with Hogarth.

By 1925, when Grosz returned to painting in oil, artistic attitudes in Germany were in transition and, often, opposition. The fever of Expressionism and the anarchy of Dada had subsided. Indeed by 1922, Dada as an historical movement was dead. There were also negative responses to abstraction as well as to the philosophy and disciplines of the Bauhaus School. One of the strongest of these inevitable reactions was a new attention to realism. Grosz's painting of his friend, the poet Max Herrmann-Nilse, illustrates the "new objectivity" as it was called in Germany at the time. The portrait also captures a mood of sadness, resignation, even pessimism.

A second portrait by Grosz of Herrmann-Nilse, also painted in 1927, was purchased by the Museum at Mannheim. Later, it was confiscated by the Nazis. For them it was a perfect example of "degenerate art"! The subject was not only a Jew but a hunchback.

W.S.L.

GROSZ: Max Herrmann-Nilse. 1927.
Oil on canvas, 39½ x 28¼".
The Museum of Modern Art, New York
IN 1922 Braque began a series of monumental figure paintings. These were the first he had undertaken since The Musician of 1917, and for them too he now found a wholly surprising, new pictorial technique. Stylistically, in fact, this series of figures is quite unlike anything else in the whole of Braque's work. The first two paintings were classical in inspiration and conceived as "Decorations." They represent Canephores, young women who carried on their heads ceremonial baskets of fruit and flowers in the Panathenaic procession. As forerunners for Braque's conception of these women, one may cite the Caryatids (fifth century B.C.) supporting the entablature of the Erechtheum on the Acropolis, or a so-called Dancer in bronze (circa 30 B.C.) from Herculaneum, or various decorative figures used architecturally in Italian Renaissance villas. There is also a basket-carrying maiden by Nicolas Poussin among the figures on the extreme right of The Triumph of Flora (circa 1628). Braque was surely aware of this past history, for its influence shows in his own Canephores. Yet it is reasonable to guess that the idea for these two figures—which were quickly followed by others—was nurtured in Braque's mind by more contemporary sources. First, when Braque exhibited three paintings at the Salon d'Automne in October 1920, he saw there a commemorative exhibition of works by Renoir which included many large, fleshy nudes of his last years. Secondly, by 1920 a neoclassical reaction against revolution and fragmentation in the arts was taking hold in Paris. And thirdly, it is not unjustified to regard Braque's Canephores as being to some extent his rejoinder to the series of monumental female figures—for example, Three Women at a Spring of 1921, directly inspired by classical originals—which dominate Picasso's work between 1919 and 1922.

Nevertheless, Braque created for the representation of the human figure an idiom which was wholly personal and keyed it to the rest of his painting. The forms which Braque gave to human bodies are ample, his modeling is broad and loose. And these two factors, aided by a delectable palette of brown, creamy yellow, and lime green, endow these figures with a tactile value which stops short of surrealism. These half-exposed female figures exist on a detached plane of semireality. They appear to be presented with the opulent fullness of a Rubens nude, yet they do not exist in the round. They seem to stand out in bold relief, yet they are soft, flattened, and inseparable from their mural background. On the other hand, they communicate a sense of movement, flux, and palpitation, which is absent from Braque's contemporary still lifes, because he makes great play with free linear rhythms, which he was subsequently to develop into a graphically decorative idiom.
In 1938 Braque—then aged fifty-four—embarked once again on a succession of masterly works. These are eminently personal in conception, inventive, marvelously organized, confident in execution, subtly if not always strongly colored, richly ornamented, and once again spatially involved. Certain characteristics recur throughout: a granular fresco-like surface, a decorative pattern which in a stylization of either a bunch of grapes, a flower, or a bird, a paneled wooden dado, emphatic linear rhythms, zigzag, diamond, and serpentine motifs, and an overall surface animation. Yet, busy though they are, these are no longer flat, decorative compositions. On the contrary, objects once again have volume and are set in space. Braque claimed that by this time he had made the discovery "that ornament liberates color from form" and the workings of this dissociation are self-evident. In these pictures Braque created a richly orchestrated synthesis of free form, controlled color, and organized rhythm, which he embellished with arbitrarily disposed ornamental motifs and "rhymes." "So far as I am concerned," Braque said in an interview with Georges Charbonnier in 1950, "It is the rhyme which intervenes accidentally that gives life and spontaneity to a picture." Each of the pictorial elements functions in these pictures independently and simultaneously. But to contain so much activity Braque had to expand the pictorial space; he also introduced a more active play of light and shade.

In Still Life with Mandolin of 1936, Braque has bent the wall on the left so as to situate the console table in a shallow alcove, while the curves which are arbitrarily drawn across the background wall evoke a larger surface than the tabletop would have. These also have the effect of tilting the still life toward the spectator and making it more tangible.

Douglas Cooper
IN 1922 Braque began a series of monumental figure paintings. These were the first he had undertaken since The Musician of 1917, and for them too he now found a wholly surprising, new pictorial technique. Stylistically, in fact, this series of figures is quite unlike anything else in the whole of Braque’s work. The first two paintings were classical in inspiration and conceived as “Decorations.” They represent Cane- phorae, young women who carried on their heads ceremonial baskets of fruit and flowers in the Panathenic procession. As forerunners for Braque’s conception of these women, one may cite the Caryatids (fifth century B.C.) supporting the entablature of the Erechtheum on the Acropolis, or a so-called Dancer in bronze (circa 30 B.C.) from Herculaneum, or various decorative figures used architecturally in Italian Renaissance villas. There is also a basket-carrying maiden by Nicolas Poussin among the figures on the extreme right of The Triumph of Flora (circa 1628). Braque was surely aware of this past history, for its influence shows in his own Canephorae. Yet it is reasonable to guess that the idea for these two figures—which were quickly followed by others—was nurtured in Braque’s mind by more contemporary sources. First, when Braque exhibited three paintings at the Salon d’Automne in October 1920, he saw there a commemorative exhibition of works by Renoir which included many large, fleshy nudes of his last years. Secondly, by 1930 a neoclassical reaction against revolution and fragmentation in the arts was taking hold in Paris. And thirdly, it is not unjustified to regard Braque’s Canephorae as being to some extent his rejoinder to the series of monumental female figures—for example, Three Women at a Spring of 1921, directly inspired by classical originals—which dominate Picasso’s work between 1919 and 1922.

Nevertheless, Braque created for the representation of the human figure an idiom which was wholly personal and keyed it to the rest of his painting. The forms which Braque gave to human bodies are ample, his modeling is broad and loose. And these two factors, aided by a delectable palette of brown, creamy yellow, and lime green, endow these figures with a tactile value which stops short of sensuality. These half-exposed female figures exist on a detached plane of semireality. They appear to be presented with the opulent fullness of a Rubens nude, yet they do not exist in the round. They seem to stand out in bold relief, yet they are soft, flattened, and inseparable from their mural background. On the other hand, they communicate a sense of movement, flux, and palpitation, which is absent from Braque’s contemporary still lifes, because he makes great play with free linear rhythms, which he was subsequently to develop into a graphically decorative idiom.

Douglas Cooper
IN 1954 Picasso began a series of fifteen variations on the theme of Delacroix's masterpiece Les Femmes d'Alger. This picture had haunted his memory. He had not seen it for years, though he had only to cross the Seine and enter the Louvre to do so. Working from memory, he first painted a composition which in its essentials bore some resemblance to the picture in the Louvre. In quick succession he painted a number of variations, some in monochrome and others with brilliant color.

A suggestion of the tranquil atmosphere of the harem with its ladies seated round a hookah in decorous conversation can still be felt in the first paintings. Soon, however, the scene became more orgastic. Stripped of their silks and jewelry, the nude bodies of the women are drawn with bold curves indicating the fullness of their breasts and the roundness of their buttocks. One of the two figures in the foreground lies on her side in abandon with her entwined legs lifted in the air, while the other, in contrast richly clothed, sits erect in hieratic indifference. The discreet eroticism of Delacroix's harem has vanished. In Picasso's summary treatment of anatomy, the seduction of the female form is no longer veiled and segregated. It floods the whole picture, affecting every corner and opening up the scene from a shadowed confinement to the light of the sun. The more conventional representation of the first paintings made them easy to interpret, but as the series continued Picasso became interested in more abstract qualities of color and form which were the outcome of his former discoveries.

In the last brilliant composition to be painted, reproduced here, Picasso introduced both styles in the same picture. Instead of incongruity he succeeded in achieving an even greater unity, holding the picture together by strong overall patterns of bright color. The two different styles instead of clashing became complementary, offering different versions of the same reality. The more representational seated figure had the effect of spreading its influence over its neighbors, whose forms are less easy to interpret at first sight, humanizing their geometric severity and supplying the key to their metaphorical eroticism.

Roland Penrose
IN 1910, Picasso's paintings became increasingly "hermetic." Their colors are consistently limited to brown and grays, and the forms are organized in shallow depth over the entire surface of the picture so as to avoid sudden rifts.

The construction of the figure is composed of facets among which it is still possible to detect clues as to the subject matter, but its essential merit lies in the freedom with which forms have been reorganized in an abstract manner.

The eye travels over a continuous play of semitransparent recessions and intrusions, occasionally picking up landmarks such as a head, a breast, the line of a shoulder or arm, and in its passage it can continually enjoy moving over surfaces that are convincingly definite and that create a reality of their own. The architecture of the human form reappears as a transparent scaffolding in which the interior and exterior are both apparent.

In most Cubist paintings of this period the denial of color results in a luminosity which radiates from the painting itself. Light appears to emanate from the forms rather than be projected from an exterior source.

The breaking up of the forms of objects so as to rebuild their structure with new significance became a basic principle of Cubism between 1910 and 1912.

Roland Penrose

PICASSO. Portrait of a Woman. 1910.
Oil on canvas, 39½ x 23¼".
Collection Mrs. Gilbert W. Chapman, New York
THIS REMARKABLE picture recapitulates Dalí's interests of the last twenty-five years. He has described it as "a quasi-gray picture, which, seen close up, is abstract; seen from two meters, is Raphael's Sistine Madonna; and, seen from fifteen meters, is the ear of an angel measuring a meter and a half; a picture which is painted with antimatter, therefore with pure energy."

This homage to Raphael underscores Dalí's allegiance to the academic tradition in painting. Vermeer, Velázquez, Raphael—"the most anticlassic, the most tenderly alive, and the most futuristic of the aesthetic archetypes of all times"—these are the orthodox heroes of the unorthodox Dalí, whose avowed ambition has been to integrate the experiments of modern art with the great classical tradition.

In the fifties Dalí became fascinated with nuclear physics, especially the concept of "antimatter." Particles of matter disappear on contact with particles of antimatter, releasing tremendous energy. The Madonna offers a kind of visual play on the antimatter concept as the image "dissolves" and "reorganizes" itself, the product of Dalí's "creative energy." The myriad dots that both integrate and explode the image recall a gigantic halftone reproduction, an instrument essential to our mass-media culture.

Upon this constantly shifting "stomach" screen Dalí perversely superimposes impeccably painted trompe l'œil elements: a piece of paper and, on a string, a cherry—"the fruit of Paradise" and a symbol of heaven. The "ultra-retrograde" super-realist technique again honors academicians such as Ernest Meissonier, while adding yet another layer to the illusion of art.

Dalí's image evokes the whimsy of alchemistic transmutations and the Rabelaisian fantasy of Pantagruel's birth through the ear. It also plays mischievously on the Catholic doctrine of the virgin birth of Jesus, thought by some in medieval times to have similarly occurred by the way of the ear.

Besides, Dalí loves angels. They are, after all, the most "antimaterial" of beings. Whether small enough, as in medieval legend, to land in hosts on the head of a pin or large enough to accommodate a Madonna and Child in an ear, they are indispensable to Dalí's cosmogony, the magical stage where science and fantasy meet. "It is," he says, "with pi-mesons and the most gelatinous and indeterminate neutrinos that I want to paint the beauty of angels and of reality."

Susana Leval
BY 1910 Léger had commenced his involvement with Cubism and with pictorial compositions that "manipulate form for form's sake." He referred to his new style as "multiplicative painting"—an abstract method which brought about a period of pictorial liberation.

The key concept of Léger's new method, seen in Woman in an Armchair, was that of heightened contrast. Swiftly curving forms were violently juxtaposed with jagged, angular ones; quickly brushed patches of color were broken by brilliant white of highlights or exposed canvas. The contrasts were intensified by repetition throughout the canvas, splaying out the geometric forms in syncopated patterns. The seated figure, divested of all sensuous, indeed human, appeal, became a kaleidoscope of quasi-mechanical forms.

However, instead of the transparent, fractured planes of the Cubists, Léger's pictorial vocabulary consisted of volumetric cones and cylinders, locked into place with architectonic rigor. In Katharine Kuh's words, "His approach is more direct, his emphasis on construction." Léger himself said, "I build, I am a Norman."

The dynamism of Léger's compositions also reached beyond Cubism and Futurism. Here the abstract forms of the figure became a rotating spiral emanating from the central axis of the head, the segmented arms initiating circular rhythms which are emphasized by the dashing linear and color patterns. Yet Léger believed that the most ordinary, static subject could convey the excitement and dynamism of machines, that it was not necessary, as the Futurists had done, to seek out actual mechanical subjects.

And the many such studies of seated figures of 1912-13 prove him right. Each version, through subtle variations in the articulation of the arms, the tilt of the head, the architectural tension of the whole, attests to the consistent excellence of the solutions that Léger reached in working out the pictorial problems he posed for himself.
GAUGUIN'S Man with an Axe was painted in Tahiti shortly after his arrival in June 1891. Finding Papeete too Europeanized, he settled in the district of Mataelea, thirty miles away. After a few difficult, lonely weeks, he slowly began to make contact with the natives and to learn their language. Soon he began to work furiously, dazzled by the native colors and landscape.

Man with an Axe represents a scene Gauguin watched one day from his hut and later described in Noa Noa, his early Tahitian memoirs: "It is morning. On the sea, by the shore, I see a pirogue and in the pirogue a woman. On the shore a man almost naked ... With a harmonious and subtle gesture the man raises with his two hands a heavy axe which leaves a blue mark against the silvery sky, and—below—its incline on the dead tree ... On the purple soil, long serpentine leaves of a metallic yellow seemed to me like the written characters of a faraway Oriental language ... In the pirogue a woman was arranging some nets. The blue line of the sea was frequently broken by the green crests of the rolling surf crashing against the coral reefs."

In Man with an Axe Gauguin transformed a specific visual experience into an extraordinarily beautiful painting. The vibrant, saturated colors, freed from what he called the "timidity of expression of degenerate races," were chosen not for their descriptive value, but for their pictorial expressiveness. Gauguin previously had asserted the painter's right to create a pictorial world independent of the real world and based solely on aesthetic considerations. "How do you see those trees?" he demanded of the young painter Paul Sérusier, in 1888. "They are yellow. Well, then, put down yellow. And that shadow is rather blue. So render it with pure ultramarine. Those red leaves? Use vermilion." These new principles formed the basis of Gauguin's unquestioned leadership in the modern movement.

The composition, too, has been ordered so as to yield its highest pictorial, rather than representational, value. The entire vista from shore to horizon has been radically compressed into a single plane of waving, luminous bands. The uncompromising flatness is enhanced by the sensuous linear patterns, culminating in the sinuous forms at the lower left corner, curiously premonitions of the Art Nouveau style. The pose of the man in this picture reappears in identical fashion a year later in Matamoe, that of the bending woman, in Tahitian Fisherswomen of 1891.

Susana Leval
AESTHETIC revolutions are apt to be launched with daring manifestos. That of the Nabi movement, Vuillard’s first powerful impetus, was sounded off by the painter Maurice Denis at the age of nineteen: “Remember,” he wrote in his Définition du Néo-Traditionnisme, published in 1890, “that before it is a war-horse, a naked woman, or a trumpery anecdote, a painting is essentially a flat surface covered with colors assembled in a certain order.”

Vuillard had little interest in abstract principles per se. Although he generally agreed with this definition, he qualified it in practice with what Denis later identified as his—Vuillard’s—sensational qualities, lucidity and vigilance.

Painted in 1891, Girls Walking is an example of his Nabi style at its purest. Here we observe a bold simplification of forms, contrasting areas of flat color used for a decorative effect with little representational function, and a strong rhythmical surface design derived in part from Japanese prints. Anecdotal interest is eschewed, the banality of the subject matter suggesting little beyond itself. It must have appeared stark and crude in 1891, when pictures telling a story, preferably a touching one, were all the rage.

However, in the light of subsequent knowledge of Vuillard’s pictorial sympathies, we can now detect here a foreshadowing of the kind of intimism that he was to make so triumphantly his own. Whereas this painting may fully demonstrate Nabi theory, it conveys, too, hints of the mysterious poetic meaning in everyday life—the Symbolist “air of things,” nonspecific in feeling, not overtly sentimental but emanating sympathies with things known and cherished.

An aura of secrecy envelops a proto-Intimist painting such as this one. As André Gide wrote about them: “M. Vuillard speaks almost in a whisper—as is only right when confidences are being exchanged—and we have to bend over toward him to hear what he says.” We grasp the color pattern before we identify the elusive, apparently meaningless subject matter whose poetic significance simply exists on its own. Vuillard was well aware of the intensely private character of these little pictures. Late in life, when exhibiting them publicly for the first time, he exclaimed anxiously: “It’s dreadful, revealing all these secrets.”

Stuart Preston
ONE COULD make a fascinating anthology of uncharacteristic work by major artists, work usually done in youth when, casting about in search of a truly personal style, they would experiment with modes that appeared to be most vital at the moment. Such aesthetic adventuring was most often of brief duration, as styles temporarily adhered to soon were found wanting, or were alien to the artist's basic aesthetic character.

No such anthology should omit Dufy's short flirtation (for that it was and never a submission) with Cubism (1908-10). A Cubist Dufy! one will exclaim. What a contradiction in terms. Could his high-spirited hedonism ever have been tamed, even slightly, by the solemn, intellectual objectivity of the Cubists, whose analytical style excluded all the sensuous and witty elements that make his art so irresistibly appealing? Yet such was the case, and here is one of the rare examples of geometrical simplification in his sparkling output.

Beginning as a talented follower of the Impressionists, Dufy next became one of the most brilliant Fauves, having succumbed to Matisse's Lune, Calme et Volupté of 1905. "Studying that picture," he wrote, "I understood the essence of painting. Impressionistic realism lost all of its charm for me when contemplating that miracle of the imagination translated into design and color." But Fauvism was for him (and for most of the other Fauves) no more than an episode on the road to final self-identification. He wanted something to strengthen its simple expressiveness. For a time he found this structure in Cubism under the influence of Braque, also a former Fauve.

This harbor scene will hardly be defined by purists as a strictly Cubist picture. It sticks too much to purely visual facts, although they are somewhat geometrically simplified. "Constructed" it may be, and done in an unusually sober harmony of greens. Yet one can detect, in the liveliness of the boats, in the big spreading branches of the tree, and in the tumult of rising hills in the background, something of Dufy's essentially baroque style. He would not long persist in this ascetic diversion. Strength of draftsmanship would suffice for the constructive framework in his fully mature work.

Stuart Preston
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Stuart Preston
THOSE WHO look for consistency in an artist's work and find in it a logical progression, changing over the years but always stylistically personal and recognizable, have always been puzzled, and even dismayed, by the apparently contradictory course taken by André Derain's art. That he was a major twentieth-century French artist is undeniable. But how does one reconcile his dazzling early Fauve landscapes and his solid, Cézanne-Cubist pictures done on the eve of World War I with the delightful Corot-like landscapes and Chardin-esque still lifes of later years? The truth is that Derain's art was at the mercy of a capricious, restless intelligence, always in search of some original alliance between "modern" art and the old masters.

That he wholly succeeded in this ambition was doubted even by himself. Illuminatingly enough, he once declared that "everyone ought to find the wine that suits him; a wine exists for every palate." "Have you found yours?" he was asked. "No," he replied.

One of his most impressive paintings is the severe and majestic portrait of the Basque artist Francisco de Iruirio (1866-1924). Sober and restrained in tone, totally rejecting his earlier Fauve use of color for expressive purposes, it illustrates that by 1914 (the date of this portrait) Derain, influenced by Cézanne and Cubism, had undertaken an austere investigation of pictorial structure and human character. Nor can one miss his increasing interest in the old masters. The gaunt head may be geometrically analyzed, but the whole noble presentation of the subject recalls Tintoretto and, more closely, El Greco in the elongation of form, particularly in the strong hands and in the dramatic contrasts of light and dark.

Despite these mixed stylistic concerns, Derain does not fail to achieve a good and sympathetic likeness. Behind the motif—that is, the sitter—Derain makes us aware that he is portraying truthfully a human being for whom he cares. Daring and discipline were, as Guillaume Apollinaire observed, two of Derain's chief characteristics. Or, as the artist once himself remarked to a critic: "I am not attached to any principle—except that of liberty. But my idea of liberty is that it must be related to tradition."

Nowhere in the complex course of his art is this conviction better embodied than in the portrait of Iruirio.

Stuart Preston
THIS ASTONISHING self-portrait, done at the very end of Bonnard’s life, resembles not at all the amably inquisitive looks he had taken at himself in earlier years. If the face is the window of the human body, and more than suffices as a depiction of personality, this painting contains a stricken image, an excruciating image of self, and the rare appearance of abnormal expressive power hardly found elsewhere in his urbane, detached art. There is no self-pity in this characterization, but it does show signs of suffering.

The portrait’s date furnishes an essential clue to the presence of this latter quality. Like all sensitive Frenchmen, Bonnard had suffered deeply under the German Occupation. However, a far more catastrophic grief had been the recent death of his wife. Ever since the 1890s, she had been his closest and only real intimate. They were childless. Now, here, he is alone and old and despairing. No wonder this self-portrait is a haunting one.

There may yet be another explanation for the slight air of unreality here, for the tremendous paint handling, and for the ambiguous vagueness of the background, a sort of flickering mosaic of emotional color. All his life Bonnard had been myopic. No portrait or photograph shows him without his spectacles. But now he doffs them and gazes at himself mercilessly.

The self-portrait is a fascinating genre, providing, as Max J. Friedlander wrote, “the psychologist with an opportunity for stimulating speculation. Externally it may be recognized through the glance directed decisively at the spectator—since the painter looked at himself in a mirror—and the attention, seemingly addressed to us, was devoted to his own appearance. This entails a self-revelation, an emergence from the picture to a degree which usually is not characteristic of portraits. Man does not take up a neutral or objective attitude toward his own appearance, his participation is colored more by his ‘will’ than by his ‘idea.’ Self-portraits do not confirm the view that we know ourselves better than others. They are not in a particularly high degree ‘good likenesses,’”.

Stuart Preston
LIKE MOST new aesthetic departures encountered for the first time, Fauvism appeared to have sprung into being sui generis, or, at least, without immediately obvious stylistic antecedents. Again like most, however, it drew on many sources for its existence—sources now recognizable in the perspective of time and from fuller knowledge of the state of avant-garde painting at the turn of the century.

Derain is judged to be, and correctly, a highly eclectic artist, more susceptible than others to reflecting in his work manifold, often contradictory influences. The Red Sails, painted about the same time as the View of Collioure (page 111), is not as exclusively a Fauve picture, differing in character and in technique. Whereas View of Collioure makes a brisk, jocular, idiosyncratic statement of plain facts, The Red Sails is ambiguous, solemn, emotional, dependent intellectually on Symbolism, and owing much, technically, to van Gogh and to Signac, each of whom contributed importantly to Fauvism.

From Symbolism is derived the poetic idea, embodied here, of the material world vanishing into the unknown, in this case by the boats setting out to sea as the sun goes down. This is a literary and mystical concept clothed in sensuous visual form, of which numerous correspondences can be found both in Symbolist poetry—Mallarmé—and in late Romantic French music—in Debussy's haunting, melancholy song Beau Soir.

Technically, Derain does not employ here the staccato, telegraphic painterly style of View of Collioure. Color, which is as bright but more fervid and of greater emotional depth, is applied in small juxtaposed dabs of paint which fuse into a single radiance in the eye of the beholder. By this means—the Pointillist style, as developed by Seurat and by Signac—extraordinary luminosity is achieved. It must be noticed that pure color, as used here, is not abstract color. As Matisse, the dominant Fauve, repeatedly declared, color “must serve expression.” The Red Sails is an Expressionist painting, Pointillist in technique, and owing to van Gogh its forcefulness as well as the lovely spiraling rhythm of the main sail of the big boat in the foreground, a pattern of curves turned into a continuous movement. Altogether, The Red Sails is an untypical Derain. But then, one wonders, what painting by Derain is "typical"?

Stuart Preston
ALTHOUGH several brilliant and elaborate flower paintings date from Monet's early years, still lifes are rarely found in his later work, where he devoted himself almost exclusively to the study of the transitory effects of light and atmosphere on outdoor subjects, notably in the series representing the exotic luxuriance of his garden at Giverny (pages 47, 49).

This opalescent late still life, an overall pink-lilac-violet in color, is exceptional in Monet's expressive work of the period. For here we find comparative clarity of outline, formal definition, symmetry, and a static realization of subject matter, enveloped in even, pervasive light. Furthermore, it is a traditional representation (recalling Chardin), a rare occurrence with Monet, who had little interest in the old masters.

Finally, one may boldly suggest that its composition owes something to Cézanne, Monet's contemporary and friend, with whom he had, aesthetically, parted company many years previously. In any event, its formality challenges the critic Roger Fry's lack of sympathy with Monet's scientific and sensuous documentation of appearances. Fry considered the Water Lilies series "shockingly organized, so totally without a proper compositional skeleton." Then Fry, an honest man and not totally hidebound by theory, would add, characteristically, "And yet . . . and yet."

Such strictures delivered by the champion of "plastic values" and "significant form" cannot fairly be applied to this still life. But however classical in spirit it may be, Monet could not help approaching form in his own way. Shapes exist clearly enough yet, being bathed in semi-abstract color luminosity, all but lose individual, local color. The result is extremely beautiful in a dreamlike fashion without relapsing into trancelike vagueness. The painting embodies Monet's principles and practice at their calmest, their most delicate and visionary.

Stuart Preston

MONET, Still Life with a Basket of Eggs. c. 1910.
Oil on canvas, 20 x 16.5".
Collection Mrs. Lloyd Bruce Wescott, Rosmead, N.J.
See color plate, page 19
ALTHOUGH SHY and reserved by nature—a listener rather than a talker—Vuillard was far from being misanthropic and deeply enjoyed social life in his mild way. He depended a great deal on his friends who, as one of them wrote, "opened and closed his horizons." As a young man his closest intimates had been fellow painters, grouped together as the "Nabbs" (the Hebrew word for prophet), including, notably, Bonnard, Maurice Denis, K.-X. Roussel, and the theatrical impresario Lugné-Poë. From there he branched out into the literary and artistic circle dominated by the Nataleu family, publishers of the famous magazine La Revue Blanche which championed many of the new aesthetic movements in the air around the turn of the century, particularly those embodying the principles and practice of Symbolism.

After 1900 Vuillard ventured still further in Paris social life, entering the rich and cultivated world of the French upper bourgeoisie, a world in which Mme Arthur Fontaine, portrayed here, was a leading figure. The wife of an important industrialist, and sister-in-law of the composer Ernest Chausson, she held, in her apartment near the Invalides, musical gatherings frequented by Debussy, Glode, Valéry, Claudel, and others. A discriminating, entertaining hostess, she was one of the Egerias who, throughout his life, pushed Vuillard forward when diffidence might have held him back. In fact, one cannot understand his essentially genial art without reference to the kind of society he cultivated.

This radiant portrait, flickering with luscious, sun-drenched, ever so subtly harmonized color, takes us some distance from the narrow, doctrinaire Nabi aesthetic of Vuillard's youth. It harks back to Impressionism, in that form shimmers, quasi-dissolved in light and atmosphere, and windows look out onto the sky. Like many Vuillard portraits of this period, around 1900, it can hardly be described as a striking likeness, nor was it intended as such. Mme Fontaine stands far away from the artist, actually turning her back on him. She is a memorable figure, dressed in a pink, light, almost transparent robe, representing not so much herself as her refined ambience, opulent yet distinguished. Nonetheless the result is highly personal, one of the most delightful tributes that an artist could pay to a life of leisure and ease. "The figures are hardly necessary," wrote a critic about Vuillard's work. "We divine their presence from the surroundings. No artist has ever so suggested the soul of an interior—the sense of habitation."

Stuart Preston
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<td>general explanation</td>
<td>(ritual feature)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguity</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>little</td>
<td>much</td>
<td>much</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cohesion</strong></td>
<td>reference (personal); lexical (synonym/collocation); with co-reference</td>
<td>reference (personal); demonstrative; anaphoric (the); lexical (repetition); with co-reference</td>
<td>reference (personal); demonstrative; anaphoric (the); lexical (repetition)</td>
<td>ellipsis (clausal); lexical (repetition); no co-reference</td>
<td>reference (personal); demonstrative; anaphoric (the); lexical (repetition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theme: function in mood structure</strong></td>
<td>unmarked; marked (Adject)</td>
<td>unmarked (some passive)</td>
<td>unmarked</td>
<td>unmarked; marked (Adject)</td>
<td>unmarked; marked (Adject)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function in transitivity structure</td>
<td>Token; Time; Place; Accompaniment; human participants; time; place; Theme - Theme (Fries 1)</td>
<td>Carrier; Goal; objects; techniques</td>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>Actor, Carrier; Place parts of work (persons, places)</td>
<td>Actor, Carrier; Place parts of work (persons, places)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semantic motifs</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>no observed pattern</td>
<td>mixed</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse pattern</td>
<td>Theme - Theme (Fries 2)</td>
<td>no observed pattern</td>
<td>mixed</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-topical Themes</td>
<td>textual (conjunctive)</td>
<td>no observed pattern</td>
<td>mixed</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transitivity: process types</strong></td>
<td>material; relational (identifying); movement; location; identity</td>
<td>material; relational (attributive); change (including abstract); description</td>
<td>relational (identifying); identity (abstract)</td>
<td>relational (material undertones);</td>
<td>material; relational (attributive);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semantics motifs</td>
<td>Goal, Range; various circumstantial</td>
<td>Goal, Range; various circumstantial</td>
<td>Goal, Range; various circumstantial</td>
<td>Goal, Range; various circumstantial</td>
<td>Goal, circumstantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optional elements</td>
<td>declarative</td>
<td>declarative</td>
<td>declarative</td>
<td>declarative</td>
<td>declarative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modality</strong></td>
<td>none</td>
<td>some (may...)</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tense</strong></td>
<td>past; present in past</td>
<td>past; past in past</td>
<td>present</td>
<td>past; past in past</td>
<td>present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessibility to reader (informal estimate)</td>
<td>as parts and as whole</td>
<td>as parts and as whole</td>
<td>as whole (not as parts)</td>
<td>as parts (not as whole)</td>
<td>as parts and as whole</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>