HUSSERL'S LATER THINKING
CONVERGING INTO
A
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
OR
THE THEME OF HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN HUSSERL'S
LATER WRITINGS
ESPECIALLY
IN
THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES

by
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Dedication

to My Wife
Adriana Sri D. Sutosandjojo
Acknowledgement

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ABSTRACT

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is most well known as a mathematician, or a logician, and then famed as the initiator of a phenomenological movement. He has been accused of promoting transcendental idealism to the point of solipsism. His focus on pure consciousness has been received as a method which operates above its historical context and straight to the 'seeing essences.' This is partly because of his problematic wording in his earlier writings.

However, his last published (yet unfinished) work, The Crisis of European Sciences (Belgrade, 1936), is certainly a very different introduction to his phenomenology. In this publication he struggles with the issue of Life-world, the world we live in, before it gets to be described abstractly, in a scientific way. One aspect of our experience in this Life-world is our consciousness of internal time (not the clock-time, not even a simple measuring of duration). This investigation into the consciousness of internal time, impinges his definition of pure consciousness. Consciousness is embedded in internal-time-consciousness. Consciousness cannot operate "outside" time. In this line of thinking Husserl almost "by accident" came to formulate his philosophy of history, for which is so far much less known.

Husserl's 'Philosophy of History' is his last contribution as a philosopher who had failed to systematize his teaching, as in his Erste Philosophie mss. of 1923-'24., and again in Cartesianische Meditationen, mss. 1929. which he has kept revising and ultimately dropping. Just as well in the latter case, since tempora mutantur and nos mutamus in illis, and so, as I will contend, his new concerns with history emerged.

This is my thesis presented here, and it is my own original research, that Husserl's philosophy of history is not only worthy of reconstruction but a very significant aspect of his mature phenomenology.
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Husserl's Later Thinking Converging into a Philosophy of History, or
The Theme of Historical Consciousness in Husserl's Later Writings Especially in the *Crisis of European Sciences*

Introduction

**Chapter One. Profiling Edmund Husserl, the Man and the Thinker**

1 Husserl's Basic Biography

2 Husserl's Achievements and the Reason of his Fame.
   2.1 Husserl came only later in his writings to appreciate History and he was against Historicism, more particularly that of W. Dilthey.

   2.2 Husserl was famous on

      (1) Transcendental Logic, (2) Intentionality, (3) and the Theory of Reduction, before the *Crisis* texts.

3 The problem of approaching Husserl as a Philosopher of History

4 The Complexity of Husserl's diverse streams of thinking focused on

      (1) Pure Consciousness, (2) Consciousness of Internal Time, and both converging into his discovery of (3) History

**Chapter Two. Pure Consciousness**

The object of 'phenomenological science' is described as the activity of the consciousness explored in a pure phenomenological reflection, focussing on the essential structure of that activity.

1 1913. *Ideen 1 Buch*, published by Husserl in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*’ Bd. I.

   1950. *Ideen 1 Buch*, published in the series Husserliana (abbrev. Hua) III.


2 1950. *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, in Hua I.
Chapter Three. Consciousness of Internal Time

Every Now of a mental process has its necessary horizon of an After. The stream of mental processes is an infinite unity and the stream-form, which necessarily comprises all mental processes, is pertaining to the pure ego.

1. 1928. Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins
   published by Heidegger in the Jahrbuch Bd. IX.
2. 1966. with the Supplementary texts, in Hua X

Chapter Four. A Totally New Introduction to Phenomenology.

Husserl came to be dissatisfied with his introduction to Phenomenology as he had done in The Ideas I, the Cartesian Meditations and even in the Formal and Transcendental Logic. After his successful lectures in Vienna and Prague, and in the midst of his personal crises in Germany itself, he introduced a new way into Phenomenology, which was first published in Belgrade.

1  History-bound Consciousness
2  1933-37. The situation of German Academics
3  1935. Vienna and Prague Lectures
5  1954 'Krisis,' (part I, II, and III) in Hua VI, (henceforth "Krisis I")
   1993 'Krisis' (Nachlass) in Hua XXIX. (henceforth "Krisis II")

Chapter Five. Toward a Philosophy of History

Husserl's "conversion" toward history.

The meditation on history, is now seen as one way of doing phenomenology. In this chapter the meditations on the Pure Consciousness and the meditations on the Internal-Time Consciousness can be seen to converge.

He speaks further about the two levels of historicity.
Chapter Six. *The Phenomenological Philosophy of History*

The *History of European people* is a constant human effort to focus on a telos. And in Husserl's interpretation of history, this telos is what he sees as a constantly bursting out of human thinking, on the surface of chronological time. Thus we have philosophers and even philosophies.

1. Beyond Husserl's texts
2. How to read history philosophically
3. Doing History as doing Phenomenology

Chapter Seven. *Meditation on History*

Husserl's Philosophy of History, is best to be approached from a different or distinct perspective: it is not to be categorized as a substantive or speculative philosophy of history or as a critical or analytic philosophy of history. Two categories usually used in this case.

Husserl's approach to *History* has emerged from his *Life-world* meditations, and his meditations on *Pure Consciousness* and *Consciousness of internal Time.*
"Uns gilt es, die Teleologie in dem geschichtlichen Werden der Philosophie, insbesondere der neuzeitlichen, verständlich zu machen, und in eins damit, uns über selbst Klarheit zu verschaffen, als ihre Träger, in unserer persönlichen Willentlichkeit ihre Mitvollzieher" (Husserl, 1936).

(Our task is to make comprehensible the teleology in the historical becoming of philosophy, especially modern philosophy, and at the same time to achieve clarity about ourselves, who are the bearers of this teleology, who take part in carrying it out through our personal intention).  

Introduction

What had motivated Husserl's thinking around the Vienna and Prague lectures and eventually the publication of the Krisis text in 1936 in a great haste? What motivated him afterwards to constantly revise its third part, which was published posthumously in 1954? I can say in one word, the crisis itself. Husserl experienced this urgency of the crisis in threefold paths,

- Crisis in foundation of mathematics and logic,
- Crisis in the understanding of 'reason',
- Crisis in meaning,

Certainly he also experienced crisis in his own life, just around that time.

This study will concentrate on the third perceived understanding of crisis, which means that it will inevitably involve the second yet only tangently be concerned with the first. In the spirit of Husserl, meanwhile the crisis in his own life will provide its context.

In Husserl's perception, the Western culture was progressively losing its capacity to propose a meaning
for our striving, a meaning for our life. Culture, as the preservation and development of meaning, which had given power to act, was losing precisely this power.

Meaning however, is not "something absolute and solid" it has always been fluctuating, and all the more so with the post Renaissance developments in Western philosophical circles, there is no philosophia perennis anymore, there is only a philosophia perenniter valida (i.e., a tradition that the West are the bearers of true thinking). Husserl's solution in the quest for Truth in the early twentieth-century context was phenomenology.

Husserl's Ideas, book I (1913), and Cartesian Meditations (in French 1931), are both subtitled "an introduction to phenomenology," and the Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929) has been referred by Husserl himself also as an "Emporleitung zur transzendentalen Phänomenologie," as reported by Fink in his lecture at Freiburg University on July 3, 1959.

Now The Crisis is also subtitled An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, an introduction with a difference.

In the earlier stages of his writings Husserl did not give history a prominent part and worthy attention, but in his last unfinished work, The Crisis, history has become one way of introducing and doing Phenomenology. History is treated in the context of his treatment of the Lebenswelt. I will capitalize on this new "turn" of Husserl and I will develop a Philosophy of History based on Husserl texts. While not totally leaving his Ideas I, and Cartesian Meditations, altogether, this will be substantially based on Husserl's Crisis, the published texts of 1936 and the later editions/ publications of Walter Biemel (1954) and Reinhold N. Smid (1993)

As a philosopher Husserl participated intensely in his world. As he saw fit, his world was in a crisis. He attributed this crisis to a deeper crisis of the European Mensch, since the European method of thinking had become fragmented. The thinker and the object thought had become separated, and this separation was paradoxically hailed as good as, "objective, scientific." Husserl raised his voice, declaring that the origin of human thinking is one's personal engagement with one's world while being fully aware both of this world and one's process of thinking. By taking this orientation Husserl (as if) discovers the historical dimension of our thinking process. One is always a beginner in thinking,  

operating in a world of issues, processing, often altering. Husserl can be said to have developed a history and his own notion of the philosophy of history. This indeed will be the convergence of this thesis.

How does this Husserlian thinking (esp. the Crisis) have consequences for the history of ideas in Husserl's own time and ours? How is it approached after Husserl's time? In answer, I intend to go on to explicate Husserl's special contribution, to the Philosophy of History, against the background of the Phenomenological movement and its further development.

Husserl voices the call of the philosopher to demand that consciousness, thinking in the broad sense, is humanizing whatever we are conscious of. To always be aware of the origin of human awareness, however, is not the same as to analyse the brain-matrix. In our common parlance today, many still believe that human thinking is only a case of grey-matter. I will have to deal with this issue.

This thesis is deliberately short, tautly tied around a specific problem-package of Husserlian thought that has never been satisfactorily unpacked or picked through in the way I do here. I proceed on the assumption that many other aspects of Husserl's thought have been more adequately interpreted and need no complete accounts in this thesis here. In terms of disciplines applied in this thesis the exegetical approach involves first and foremost the history of ideas, but in the end the author of this thesis allows Husserl to start teaching him how to philosophize about history. The main task has been to make clear and represent accurately Husserl's difficult thinking, often explicating highly dense German philosophical discourse in which terminology is often fluid.

In the concluding part of the thesis I will use especially Husserl's later writings to argue how, first in his new, a philosophy of consciousness in its historical context could unfold. In other words, that a Philosophy of History is ultimately a philosophy of history of human consciousnessss in its most active engagement with(in) the world. Hereby the definition of Consciousness has also been added one more dimension, that of history, which in Husserl's earlier writings had been overlooked. I will then go on to ask, in this light, how can we ourselves now truly become philosophers by studying Husserl's writings?

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3 E. Husserl. *Ideen Buch I*, Hua III / 1 § 66 and §84
Chapter One. Profiling Edmund Husserl, the Man and the Thinker

1 Husserl's Basic Biography
2 Husserl's Achievements and the Reason of his Fame.
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       Historicism, more particularly that of W. Dilthey.
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       texts.
3 The problem of approaching Husserl as a Philosopher of History
4 The Complexity of Husserl's diverse streams of thinking focussed on
   (1) Pure Consciousness, (2) Consciousness of Internal Time, and both converging into his
   discovery of (3) History

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1 Husserl's basic biography
Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl, was born on April 8, 1859 in Prostejov/Prossnitz, Moravia/
Mähren, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was an area later to become part of the Czech
Republic. Thus Husserl was an Austrian by birth. His family had been there for generations. He was
son to Adolf Abraham Husserl (1827-1884) and his wife Julie Selinger (1834-1917), Edmund was the
second son, his elder brother Heindrich was born in 1857 and after him Helen, born 1863, and Emil,
1869.

The family religion was Judaism but with a very liberal outlook, even to indifference. Edmund's
childhood was uneventful, and he was average at school.

Husserl started his university study in Leipzig, in 1876, with the intention of becoming an
astronomer. He subsequently attended the Friedrich Wilhelm University of Berlin, in 1878, where he
met Leopold Kronecker, Ernst Kummer and Karl Weierstrass, who all introduced him to a rigorous and
disciplined way of thinking, through the study of mathematics. Lectures from Friedrich Paulsen also
influenced him greatly. In 1881 Husserl transferred to the University of Vienna, and where he took up
his doctoral studies under the supervision of the Mathematician, Dr. Leo Königsberger. He was
promoted doctor with the dissertation entitled Beiträge zur Theorie der Variationsrechnung (Contributions
to the Theory of the Calculus of Variations) in 1883.

Weierstrass then called him back to Berlin, to work as his assistant, but because Weierstrass
fell ill and was not able to lecture, Husserl decided to return to Vienna. For the next two years he
attended the lectures of Franz Brentano. It was Brentano who introduced him to the notion of
'intentionality,' which in Husserl's later altered reaplication would receive a central place in his own
phenomenology. Through Brentano Husserl studied Bernhard Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre and the
logic of Rudolf Hermann Lotze. It was Brentano who suggested Husserl to become assistant to Carl
Stumpf, at the University of Halle, and thus to obtain a thorough training in psychology. In 1886
Husserl completed his Habilitationsschrift entitled Über den Begriff der Zahl: Psychologischen
Analysen (On the Concept of Number: Psychological Analyses). And on Oct 24 1887 he presented his
inaugural lecture entitled Die Ziele und Aufgaben der Metaphysik (The Aims and Tasks of
Metaphysics). He taught beside Stumpf, at Halle starting as a Privatdozent, and he stayed in there until
1901.

During the year he received his Habilitation Husserl was baptized into the Evangelical Lutheran
Church (Aug. 1, 1886) and a week later he married Malvina Charlotte Steinschneider, the daughter of
Sigismund Steinschneider and Antoine Simon. They had two sons, Wolfgang and Gerhart.

When we consider Husserl's university career as a Philosophy Professor, it is sensible to divide
it into three periods:
1887-1901 Halle as *Privatdozent*
1901- 1916 Göttingen as *Extraordinarius* Professor
1916-1928 Freiburg as *Ordinarius* Professor

In his Halle period 1887-1901, Husserl gave lectures in theory of knowledge, metaphysics, logic, ethics, philosophy of mathematics and psychology.

The first publications by which he established himself as a philosopher among his peer, come from this period:

*Philosophie der Arithmetik* (1891),
*Logische Untersuchungen* (I Teil 1900)
*Logische Untersuchungen* (II Teil 1901)

In his Göttingen period 1901-1916, he was first installed as *Extraordinarius* Professor, "on the ground that he lacks 'scientific distinction'," but by 1906 he was made an *Ordinarius*, since the Prussian Minister of Education overruled the decision of the Faculty. Husserl gave extra lectures and commented critically on the philosophies of Locke, Hume, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Bolzano and Ernst Mach. He wrote extensively in this period and his important step was that it was in Göttingen where Husserl first lectured on 'phenomenology'.

His publication of *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (*Philosophy as Rigorous Science*) appeared in 1911. The following year he founded a *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* and published his *Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie* (1 Buch) in this *Jahrbuch* in 1913.

By January 1916, on the recommendation by Heinrich Rickert, upon the latter's retirement, Husserl was appointed to succeed him in Freiburg am Breisgau as full professor (from April 1916).

In the twelve years of his Freiburg period (1916-28) Husserl was academically very productive yet at the same time suffering personally. Sad times came with the death of his son Wolfgang in 1916 near Verdun, and the wounding of his other son, Gerhart in 1917 at Speyer. During July 1917, moreover, Husserl's mother Julie Husserl-Selinger passed away.

Husserl's inaugural lecture in Freiburg (delivered in May 1917) was entitled *Die reine Phänomenologie, ihr Forschungsgebiet und ihre Methode* (*The Pure Phenomenology Its Research Area and Its Method*). From then on he was exposed to a wider public audience. In November 1917 for instance, he gave public lectures on *Fichte's Ideal of Humanity* for war-participants which were then repeated for the Academic Staff of the Philosophy Faculty.

After World War I, he delivered public lectures abroad at the University College in London titled *Phänomenologische Methode und phänomenologische Philosophie* (*Phenomenological Method and Phenomenological philosophy*) (June 1922).

Between 1919-23 Martin Heidegger was working as Husserl's assistant, an important time that ended in a deep disappointment for both men. When Heidegger presented Husserl his copy of 'Sein und Zeit' in 1926, Husserl invited him to co-operate in his article on Phenomenology for the *Encyclopedia Britannica* but the co-operation stalled and failed in the end.

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Before Husserl's entrance into Emeritus professorship in 1928, his lectures, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* (Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time) were published by Heidegger in the 'Jahrbuch'. Although officially retired, Husserl's philosophical activities continued with a series of lectures in Amsterdam, on *Phänomenologie und Psychologie: Transzendentale Phänomenologie* (Phenomenology and Psychology: Transcendental Phenomenology) (1928), and Husserl's own publication of *Formale und transzendentale Logik* (Formal and Transcendental Logic) (1929). It was in the latter year that he gave phenomenology lectures in Paris, at the 300th anniversary of Descartes' *Meditations on the First Philosophy*. This is what later would become the famous *Cartesian Meditations*. It was soon translated and published in French in 1931 by E. Levinas and G. Peiffer, and long before it eventually would be taken up in the first of the *Husserliana* series in German, which would be published posthumously by S. Strasser, in 1950. By the time the *Meditations* were out in French, Husserl had already published a *Postscript* to his *Ideas I*, of 1913 on the occasion of the English translation of his work by W. R. Boyce Gibson in 1931. Then the situation became more and more difficult for him as a Jew by birth. Out of anxiety during the mid thirties there were plans to transfer all his manuscripts to Prague, but these plans never materialized. In 1935 Husserl gave two very important lecture series: one in Vienna in May on *Philosophy in the Crisis of European Humanity*; and the other in Prague in November on *The Crisis of European Sciences and Psychology*.

It was at the end of this year that his teaching licence was withdrawn. Nonetheless, using his two last lectures, he put together his work *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, and he was still able to send two parts of the manuscript off to Prague to be published in the first issue of 'Philosophia,' a new journal edited by Arthur Liebert in Belgrade.

Deprived from all academic contacts, and left alone by virtually all his student-disciples, Edmund Husserl died on April 27, 1938 at the age of 79. After his death he left a massive amount of writings, which were smuggled out of Germany to avoid the Nazi-censorship. Cooperating in this were Rev. Herman Van Breda OFM., who was at that time preparing his Ph.D. in the Phenomenology of Husserl and with Mrs. Malvina Husserl, the great man's widow. The collections took many detours until they eventually came to be housed in the Institute of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium. By (the northern) Autumn 1938 one can speak of the founding of the Husserl Archives.

2 Husserl's Achievements and the Reason of his Fame

2.1 Husserl was not famous in his appreciation of history and he was against historicism. After 1900-01 the publication of his *Logical Investigations*, theorist of history Wilhelm Dilthey, held a seminar in 1904 on this newly published works, and the following year Dilthey praised Husserl's works as 'epochal', in his own presentation to the the Berlin Academy. But Husserl himself had a rather reserved appreciation of Dilthey's history-based philosophy, and in 1911 when publishing his attack on 'historicism' in *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* he obviously doubted whether such scholars as Dilthey (he did not mention Dilthey explicitly, though) could refute historical scepticism after abandoning metaphysics, in view of the conflict of historical systems. Dilthey's fondness of historical flux and of flexibility principles built into an historical outlook, was simply not compatible in Husserl's term (at least at this stage) with a rigorous logic and the best scientific principles.

2.2 Husserl was famous for his work on three elements of philosophical analysis: transcendental logic, intentionality and reduction theory out of which his method of phenomenological investigations results. I will make very short notes of each one of them, while the longer notes will be saved to the later convergence of Husserl's streams of thinking into his philisophy of history.

(1) Transcendental Logic. The achievement of such a logic was the aim of the early writings of Husserl, his labours culminating in the publication of Formale und transzendentale Logik in 1929. For Husserl at that stage, the 'evidence' of logical and mathematical truths is stronger and more compelling than that of the fallible evidences of empirical sciences. The laws of Logic are formal laws and principles in the technical sense: in which temporal causal existence is neither co-given nor presupposed. There must be logically no interdependence between the objectivity of the known fact and the subjectivity of the knowing subject. With his Formale und transzendentale Logik, Husserl wants to give an intentional explication of the proper sense of formal logic. This conviction stays with Husserl for a long time, at least until in 1935, when suddenly in one of his Forschungsmanuskript, we find a statement, declaring that "Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous science: the dream is over." This turn around, this self-correction, and the implications of it for his later writings, is for me the most exciting in Husserlian thinking. Upon reading of the Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (1936) (Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology), which is also subtitled An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, we are confronted with an introduction to Phenomenology of a totally different kind than in all his previous writings. While the publications of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy first book, (1913) and Cartesian Meditations (1931/ 1950) both have also subtitles of "General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology" and "An Introduction to Phenomenology" respectively, still the Crisis gives Phenomenology a new "key". In it we find the emerging theme of 'Lebenswelt' (lifeworld), which has never been thematised before, presents itself. What was indeed new was the inclusion of 'tradition' and 'history' in the foundation of Phenomenology itself. We will get back to this later, in the chapter on the 'History-bound consciousness' in the Crisis, in chapter 4 of this thesis.

(2) Intentionality. From Brentano (and ultimately from Suarez) Husserl inherits the concept of 'intentionality'. This means, according to Husserl in one of his more mature formulations, that "each cogito, each conscious process, we may say 'means' something or other and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum". At that time the thought of history has not as

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6 For the sake of its completeness, Husserl's works in Logic, with exceptions of reports and articles, comprise: Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891), Logische Untersuchungen (1900, reworked into 3 volumes in the 2nd edition 1913, the 3rd and 4th editions unaltered, in 1922 and 1928).


9 The life-world (Lebenswelt) plays a major role in Husserl's analysis of pre-predicative experience as the Umwelt (surrounding-world) in Ideas II, a manuscript of 1912, that Husserl has kept revising and finally dropped in 1928 and he did not publish it.


yet adjudged important for the investigation of this concept of intentionality. Yet then again Husserl
comes to shift his position, and in his mss of 1935 Husserl criticizes his own prior opinion by
contending that, concerning intentionality, "we should be engrossed in historical considerations if we
are to be able to understand ourselves as philosophers and understand what philosophy is to become
through us." We can spot here a similar turn to the one pertaining to transcendental logic. In other
words, we find here another self correction peculiarly Husserlian.

(3) Epoché and Theory of Reduction

Epoché is a method of making the transition from natural attitude, our more normal way of considering
consciousness and the world, to the properly phenomenological way of considering them. Epoché
(suspension) refers to the institution of the goal of phenomenological research as operative in the
consciousness of the researcher, who must 'bracket' her or his preconceptions and prejudices and grasp
phenomena as what is presented to the perceiver, 'such as they are' (als solches) in an eidetic vision.
This entails a natural reduction, as the focus of attention on what is basic or essential to grasp. When
Husserl's shift of position occurred in the mid 1930s the epoché and reduction principles remained
important for his approach to history, but apparently at the beginning it only applied to acts of
philosophical perception independent of any specific historical contexts.

These two principles combined to bring the world-constituting dimension of consciousness into the
purview of reflective intuition so that the manner of consciousness' functioning can be elucidated
through constitutive analysis.

3 The problem of approaching Husserl as a Philosopher of History. It is very interesting
to see that Husserl eventually incorporated history in his phenomenology. If as late as in 1925, in his
Erste Philosophie, he was still explicitly renouncing 'tradition', "the emergence of history at a later
stage might strike one as strange indeed." We have to understand, however, that the 'history-element'
in the later Husserl writings emerged in the context-horizon of his own awareness of 'the crisis' of
European culture, which he had to admit had been brought about by modern science and philosophy.
But the shift also came about by Husserl's own latecoming dialogue with history. This dialogue was
somehow forced upon him when he had 'to make sense' (Besinnung) of being required to leave
Freiburg University as a prominent thinker and in his emeritus status through the actions of the new
rector, his former assistant Martin Heidegger, as well as of the Nazi State. These circumstances bring
out a remarkable change in Husserl's interpretation of the sense of philosophy. It is no longer solely
matter of intellectual life being a 'pure living' out of a theoretical interest, but philosophical work had to
become a life-shaping and a world changing praxis as well. Once philosophy enters into praxis then the
dimension and intuited direction of history is never neutral anymore. In this light, I would argue,
Husserl can be regarded as a Philosopher of History since in the collection of Crisis-texts, dated
between 1934 and 1937, he is struggling to make sense of himself being a philosopher in that particular
historical period. He is also struggling to make sense of that period of history itself, and of his
generation as bearers of that concrete historical transition. This will be fleshed out in the following
chapters, to lay bare the historical side to Husserl's thought.

4 The complexity of Husserl's diverse streams of thinking

12 Crisis, App. ix
14 Especially in the next chapters 4 and 5
It is well known that Husserl thought while he wrote. An example is when he wrote *Ideas I*, he said that he did it "in six weeks, without outline or source material, as if in trance"\(^{15}\) Hence we have now, a massive amount of writings he has bequeathed to us, most of which, significantly are *Forschung Manuskripte* (research manuscripts). In tracking his sense of history, I will follow his diverse streams of thinking by putting together a variety of texts, some are less well known, which all eventually converge into his philosophy of history. It is important to be reminded that Husserl did not start his study as a historian or even a philosopher. From his early interest in Astronomy he changed direction into Mathematics, and his famous Logic is a result of his rigorous mathematical mind. He had also a deep interest in the Psychology \(^{16}\) of Brentano, from whom he got his entrée into the investigation of thinking processes. As indicated above, he actually reworked Brentano's notion of Intentionality. Early in his career, as early as 1893, \(^{17}\) we find that Husserl had a manuscript investigating the notion of the *Consciousness of Internal Time*. In 1928 Heidegger published some of Husserl's lectures on the subject (the main text only). \(^{18}\) Now we have already admitted that Husserl has come rather late to take up history as his theme in philosophy, addressing history in the context of his theme on the life-world. But we need to trace back his many highlights of investigations that has finally led to this. I will approach this merging of Husserl's diverse streams of thinking, through the stages of his own investigations into Pure Consciousness, into Consciousness of Internal-time and finally into Life-world and the sub-theme of History. Here in short is an overview, followed up subsequent chapters with details.

### 4.1. Pure Consciousness

Husserl has once called his "transcendental phenomenology" a new Cartesianism. What Husserl deeply appreciate in Descartes' *method* is, that with Descartes the subject *cogitans* is given a prominent place, indeed an original place, his subjectivity. He did not have a too high regard for Descartes' (method of) *doubt*, though. We will see that Husserl does not doubt the existence of 'the world', not even methodically. It is this *cogitans* which is seen to be the *origo*, the source, of *cogito-cogitatum*. While Husserl wants to continue Descartes line of subjectivity-tradition he also wants to distance himself from Descartes by introducing "a new member" since each *cogito* bears in itself its particular *cogitatum*. This was Husserl in 1929. It is interesting, though, that from the publication of *Ideas I* in 1913 to *Cartesian Meditations* lectures in 1929 Husserl did not investigate the *cogito-cogitatum* against the background of time consciousness.

I think, at that stage Husserl was also influenced heavily by Kant's 'pure reason,' \(^{19}\) so that he did this investigation in its 'pure state,' apart from all historical conditions. Intriguingly, we find in his manuscripts from 1893 that Husserl had already an interest in investigating time-consciousness. But these two streams of investigation seemed to go in a parallel lines without intersecting one another in the earlier stages of his thought.

### 4.2. Consciousness of Internal Time

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16 When I use the word "psychology" I do not mean empirical psychology after Wundt, nor do I mean psychology as a behavioural science after Watson. In Brentano's writings and Husserl's, it is the *psychologia rationalis*, more in the line of Aristotle's *De Anima* / *Peri psyche*.
17 See Ch. 3 fn. 1 for a complete list.
One year before Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* lectures in the Sorbonne, Heidegger published his master's 1905 lectures on the *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* in which Husserl lined himself up in the tradition of Augustinian way of philosophizing. This work is less "pure reason" (in the Kantian sense) and more concretely based in the reality that a *cogitatum* is always in the *cogitans* who lives in time although he/she may not always be conscious of it. What interests me is the fact that the drafts for these lectures existed at the same time and even earlier than the *Cartesian Meditations* and *Ideas I* manuscripts, and yet in dealing with the 'pure consciousness' in *Ideas I* and *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl has completely abstracted and set aside the 'time dimension' from his consciousness investigations, and in quite a successful way. I am deducing, then Husserl's lines of thinking run as two distinct streams and it is only later when he picked up history as his theme that these two streams start merging into a new way of introducing phenomenology. This seems almost as if by "accident." The *Crisis* publication in 1936 has also the subtitle of 'An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy', as if Husserl wants to introduce phenomenology in quite a new way.

Commenting on his own work, Husserl says, "It has become a major work, and I am not yet quite finished. . . I almost think it is the most important writing of my life, one that reaches the greatest depth."²¹

4.3. *History*
When Husserl at last published *Crisis* with the subtitle of "an introduction to phenomenology", he had already published *Ideas I* and *Cartesian Meditations* (published in French by E. Levinas) and even *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, and all of them are subtitled "an introduction to phenomenology". This repetition, we may claim, simply reflects Husserl's history of attempts to introduce his program over and over again. And one could say with caution that Husserl came to see the last way of introducing phenomenology was through history. Speaking of history, in 1923-24 Husserl actually lectured on history of philosophy, he called the work *Erste Philosophie*. Beginning with Plato to Descartes, Husserl saw that Philosophy had been trying to formulate an "echte Idee einer universalen Wissenschafts-Lehre (a genuine idea of a universal doctrine of Science)", which consisted in "die gesamte Theorie eines Vernunftlebens (the overall theory of a life of reason)"²², and he further explained that overall theory as "eine universale Theorie der erkennenden, wertenden und praktischen Vernunft (a universal theory of cognition, judging and practical reason)". Here I see that Husserl is at the same time appreciating Kant's pure theory and yet also distancing himself from Kant by bringing together both the theoretical and practical reason.

We cannot take these earlier lectures, however, as a full formulation of his ideas about the philosophy of history. For start, Husserl called these lectures "Erste Philosophy (First Philosophy)", because of "nur die wortwörtliche Bedeutung (solely for the word for word meaning)" and not for the manyfold historical sediments. Although Husserl seemed to quote many philosophers before him, especially Descartes and Kant and attempting to radicalize them both, it was not until the *Crisis* manuscripts, written between 1934 and 1936, that he started to thematize 'History' as also a means to introduce Phenomenological Philosophy.
From his study of pure Consciousness, from his investigations of Time-consciousness, Husserl moved into a new awareness of history. Although this turn to the lifeworld and the inclusion of history has given phenomenology a fundamentally a new orientation, I tend to agree with Ströker, "that Husserl eventually took up the lifeworld as a theme was thus not something that occurred abruptly," because the lifeworld is basically a maturer way of understanding the subject and subjectivity in Husserl, since a philosopher or a knower/ perceiver cannot come to grips with whether he or she is doing in the mind without considering the built up of presumptions from one's life situations. The inclusion of tradition and history on the other hand "was something actually new and might strike one as strange indeed."24

Before we come to Husserl's treatment of history in depth, I will first follow more closely his probing into Consciousness and Consciousness of Internal Time, then his treatment of History in Crisis. The next two chapters will be dedicated to these two areas of investigations. We will see that in the next two chapters, the issue of history, has not taken a role at all, due to Husserl's own background in science. Hence his biography and his intention to ground sciences with a 'scientific' philosophy, which had been thought of as being 'above' all historical changes, is indeed an important part of Husserl's pre Crisis struggles.

23 cf., Ströker , op. cit., 175
24 ibid.
Chapter two  Pure Consciousness

The object of 'phenomenological science' is described as the activity of consciousness explored in a pure phenomenological reflection, focussing on the essential structure of that activity.

1 1913. *Ideen I Buch*, published by Husserl in the 'Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung' Bd. I.

1950. *Ideen I Buch*, published in the series Husserliana (abbrev. Hua) III.


2 1950. *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, in Hua I.26

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Praenotanda 1

Bewuβtsein, usually translated as 'consciousness', hence,

1) intentional act or state referring to objects

2) the stream of acts and states made up of such acts.

While the English 'conscience: con-scire: (Lat) scire, to know, an accompanying prefix, 'con', indicates a connotative 'with'. From this, conscientia (a reification), then we get two derivatives (1) consciousness and (2) conscience.

In Husserl's writings, consciousness is:

1) noematic intentionality in general. 2) the stream of subjective process as having the characteristic of


noematic intentionality. 3) the stream of "actual" subjective process, the 'ego cogito'.

While the term 'conscience' originally has no ethical bearings, in modern usage it has become a term for the mind functioning to distinguish between right and wrong, an independent source of moral insight.

**Praenotanda 2**

*Gegenstand*, what stands opposite me, before I am doing anything. The German word here is very graphic. To me, it almost loses its 'picture' when translated as 'object,' since objectum comes from *obiicere* (Lat), throwing in front of me, (from *ob+iacere*), hence it is now facing me, after I did "the throwing" of it. But in our usage *Gegenstand*, is just 'object'. The German word *Objekt* is also used for concrete real-world objects.

**Praenotanda 3**

*Geist*, spirit with all its manifold meanings. No distinction between Mind and Spirit in German, hence *Geist* is (also) Mind.

*Wissenschaft*, usually knowledge, science, 'Wissen', to know, hence *Wissenschaft*, the skill developed because of knowing.

In German the division is between *Geisteswissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft*, while in English the usual division is between Arts and Science. 'Arts' in the English tradition, however, was originally a translation of *artes liberales*.27

A *Geisteswissenschaft*, humanistic science and *Naturwissenschaft*, as natural science (David Carr28). While Dorion Cairns29 translates *Geistes-wissenschaft*, socio-cultural science, or cultural science, even moral science. Following G. Wahrig, my preference is: cultural science for *Geisteswissenschaft*, and natural science for *Naturwissenschaft*. Yet in this thesis, since I am using Carr's articles and books

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27 *Artes Liberales* is difficult to translate in English. Originally it consisted of a *quadrivium*: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music and a *trivium*: grammer, rhetoric, dialectic. It was called liberales, since historically intended for *free-men* (not for slaves, and there were no women involved).


more than that of Cairns', I have decided to follow Carr's translation.

\[ (\textit{Geisteswissenschaft}, \textit{jede Wissenschaft die sich mit einem Gebiet der Kultur befaßt}. \textit{Naturwissenschaft}, \textit{Wissenschaft von der Natur, ihren Vorgängen und deren gesetzmäßigen Zusammenhängen}. \]

Wahrig. \textit{Deutsches Wörterbuch}\textsuperscript{30}. 

Translated,
"\textit{Geisteswissenschaft}, is every knowledge which involved itself with the area of culture.\n
\textit{Naturwissenschaft}, knowledge of nature, its occurrence, its appearance and its natural-laws).\n
Another difficulty is the English word 'science' as

(1) the intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment, [and] (2) a systematically organized body of knowledge on any subject, [and] (3) (archaic) knowledge. 


For this study, certainly the first meaning listed just above, is too narrow to represent the German '\textit{Wissenschaft}', I will have to apply the second and third meaning.

1 \textit{Ideas . First book.}\n
Since this thesis is about Husserl's thinking-streams which eventually converge into his \textit{discovery} of the importance of \textit{History} while writing the \textit{Crisis} texts, (and not about 'Consciousness as such in \textit{Ideas I}, or \textit{Cartesian Meditations}), the treatment of \textit{Ideas I} (and any other Husserl's texts) will be selective and only when pertaining to the thesis.

A little more than ten years since writing \textit{Logical Investigations}\textsuperscript{31}, Husserl published his \textit{Ideas}, in his newly founded \textit{Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung}, in 1913.

At this stage of Husserl's streams of thinking, the object of 'phenomenological science' is described as the activity of consciousness explored in pure phenomenological reflection, focussing on the essential structure of that activity. \textit{Ideas I} is going to explicate just this. It has not been too long ago that Husserl had published a paper 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science,' in \textit{Logos} vol. I / 1910. His idea that Philosophy is and should be a rigorous Science is very strong in him in this contribution. Introducing his new publication of \textit{Ideas} in 1913, Husserl stated that,

\textsuperscript{30} Gerhard Wahrig. \textit{Deutsche Wörterbuch}. (Gütersloh: Bertelmann Lexicon Verlag, 1997) 
\textsuperscript{1} 1900, 1901. which launched his career as a logician.
pure phenomenology . . . we shall characterise and show to be the science fundamental to philosophy (Grundwissenschaft der Philosophie), is an essentially new science which in consequence of its most radical essential peculiarity, is remote from natural thinking and therefore only in our days presses toward development. It is called a science of phenomena.\textsuperscript{32}

It is important to note Husserl's translators use of the word "Science" (read: "Knowledge") or "Wissenschaft" for Phenomenology, and that this 'new science' is fundamental to Philosophy. Husserl wanted to give philosophy a scientific rigor and he sought to give Science a philosophically based validity. Contextually what he means by "scientific rigor" is a precision, or what Husserl states, "that an idea has validity, would mean that it is a factual construction of spirit which is held as valid and which in its contingent validity determines thought",\textsuperscript{33} that was his manifesto, two years before Ideas Book I.

In the first part of Ideas I, Husserl introduced the concepts of Essence and Eidetic Cognition, on which the whole book is focussed. Husserl maintains that essences, can be known, can be grasped and cognised. His definition of "essence" as "the what of an individuum". And he further explained that "any such 'what' can also be 'put into an idea'." This eidetic view is diametrically opposed to Kant's view concerning the issue, hence Kant's usage of the words "phenomenon" (and "noumenon") is totally different from Husserl's. In fact the usage 'phenomena' is only introduced in Ideas I, and beyond the introduction chapter the word phenomenon is rarely used, instead 'noema' and 'noesis' have taken its place. The terminology Husserl used to explicate the core of eidetic cognition is also interesting: his Anschauung is rightly translated as 'intuition', by Dorion Cairns, Fred Kersten, Joseph Kockelmans and Emmanuel Levinas,\textsuperscript{34} from the Latin 'intueor', meaning, I gaze and seeing all at once. For the essence

\textsuperscript{32} Ideas Book 1, introduction. [Note: throughout the Thesis English translations will usually be used when available, unless the German original has a special nuanced meaning. Or where several translators (e.g., fn. 7) could not agree upon the English rendering.]
E. Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl Phenomenology. Trans. Andre Orianne. (Northwestern Univ. Press, 1995). (Originally published in 1963, it is still the best commentary on Ideas I). [Note: although I am not in total agreement with the translation of 'intuition', in this thesis I am using it for lack of a better word].
being 'seen', Husserl used the word *eidos*, (almost) in the Platonic sense. Husserl says

"seeing an essence (*Wesenserschauung*) is therefore intuition  (*Anschauung*): and if it is
seeing in the pregnant sense and not a mere and vague making present, the seeing is originarily
presentive intuition, seizing upon the essence in its personal selfhood."

In other words, intuition is the theoretical act of consciousness that makes objects
present to us. This very condensed description of 'seeing essence', has to be explicated as to how it
happens, so that it can be claimed as a method and it can be shown as uniquely Husserl's.

In the second part, in § 32 we find the 'phenomenological epoche', by which Husserl explained
his method, when he says "époque in our sharply determinate and novel sense of the term, takes the
place of the Cartesian attempt to doubt universally".

What we know so far from the texts is that, Husserl does recognize Descartes' *dubium
methodicum*, but by using this new terminology Husserl also wants to distance himself from Descartes,
hence he says that his "phenomenological epoche" in his own sharply determinate and novel sense, will
take the place of Cartesian universal doubting. According to Husserl, Descartes was on the right track,
using *dubium* as the only way to achieve indubitable truth. But for Descartes, the next step after the first
one is that his own act of doubting is accepted as indubitable, while for Husserl the world that is there
for us will always remain there according to consciousness as an actuality, as a "horizon," even if we
choose to parenthesize it, and with that we shut ourselves off from any judgment of it, even the
judgment of (accepted) sciences, or traditional opinions for that matter. Being a mathematician by first
profession, it is hardly surprising that his first modelling of mind was also mathematically rigorous,
upon hindsight, after the *Crisis*, published in 1936, we can say, that it explained why historical
consideration in thinking was not entering into his scope of attention.

In § 34 of the same part of *Ideas I*, Husserl discusses 'the essence of consciousness as theme.'
Taking the Cartesian "*cogito*", as a starting point, he explains that the Cartesian *cogito* means "I
perceive, I remember, I phantasize, I judge, I feel, I desire, I will, and thus all egoical mental processes
which are at all similar to them, with their countless flowing particular formations." (Hence, the

35 *Ideas I*, 10
36 *Ideas I*, 68.
common translation of "cogito" as "I think" needs to be broadened, since the classical Latin has no one word for "I-think" in the narrow English sense).

Further, in § 56 the phenomenological reduction (phänomenologischen Reduktion), is explained. Husserl begins by arguing that "the exclusion (Ausschaltung) of Nature was for us the methodic means for initially making possible the turning of regard (Blickwendung) to transcendentally pure consciousness." By 'exclusion', he means that,

the physical and psychophysical world, all individual objectivities which become constituted by axiological and practical functionings of consciousness are excluded [. . .] Consequently, all natural sciences and cultural sciences (Natur und Geisteswissenschaften) with their total stock of cognition, undergo exclusion precisely as sciences which require the natural attitude (natürliche Einstellung).

Through this 'exclusion', the cogitans, has moved away from 'natural attitude' or naturalistic attitude and enters into the phenomenological "purity" of cogitare. What does Husserl mean by that? Husserl says that,

their explicitly stated "parenthesizings" (Einklammerungen) have the methodic function of continually reminding us that the spheres of being and cognition in question essentially lie outside the one which, as the transcendental phenomenological sphere, is to be explored, and that any intruding of premises belonging to those parenthesized spheres is an indication of countersensical confusion, a genuine metabasis.

It is worth noting that Husserl did not use the (Cartesian) word "doubting" in this case, his "exclusion" or "parenthesis" is a positive act, while not doubting at all those "things" being excluded or parenthesized do exist. They are just put "outside" the transcendental phenomenological sphere that is to be explored and in this way we are enabled to seize upon essences.

From Ideas I, in the third part, I have to underline § 84 here because it discusses 'Intentionality', which is introduced as "Principal Theme of Phenomenology". As indicated in Chapter 1 of this thesis, Husserl has taken as well as changed Brentano's notion of intentionality. For Husserl, by intentionality "we understand the own peculiarity of mental processes 'to be consciousness of something', or verbatim, "die Eigenheit von Erlebnissen 'Bewußtsein von etwas zusein'." A bit further in the same

37 Ideas I, opening sentence of §56. p 131
38 Ideas I, § 61. p 139
number, Husserl calls it a "comprehensive name for all-inclusive phenomenological structures". As he explicates,

In every actional cogito a radiating "regard" (ausstrahlender Blick) is directed from the pure ego to the "object" (Gegenstand) of the consciousness-correlate (Bewusstseinkorrelats) in question, to the physical thing, to the affair complex, etc., and effects the very different kinds of consciousness of it.  

Intentionality, then, is built into consciousness as our living acts of thinking.

2 Cartesian Meditations

One year into his emeritus, on Febr. 23. 1929, Husserl gave lectures at the Sorbonne, invited by the l'Institut d'Etude Germaniques and la Société Française de Philosophie. The lectures' exact location was in the l'amphithéâtre Descartes. The four lectures were given in German, with an introduction and a summary in French. The French translation of these lectures came very soon after but the German publication was delayed by Husserl himself, until very much later due to Husserl's dissatisfaction and repeated revisions of the text (working together with his assistant Dr. Eugen Fink). The German text was eventually published as the first of the Husserliana series in 1950 under the auspices of the Husserl-Archiv Leuven, directed by Rev. Dr. H. L. van Breda OFM. The event was a very important milestone in Husserl-research.

The Cartesian Meditations was meant as an 'introduction to phenomenology', Husserl wanted to introduce phenomenology again, originally with the French audience in mind then in the revised edition also adjusted to his German audience. When we compare it with Ideas I, the Meditations, has some deepening investigative meditations. I will start highlighting these points.

In the first Meditation § 8 Husserl says,

At this point, following Descartes, we make the great reversal that, if made in the right manner, leads to transcendent subjectivity: the turn to the ego cogito as the ultimate and apodictically certain basis for judgments, the basis on which any radical philosophy must be grounded.

39 Ideas I, § 84. p 200.
To this statement Husserl also has a marginal note which says,

It is necessary to say that the reduction has apodictic significance, since its shows apodictically that the being of the transcendental Ego is antecedent to the being of the world.\footnote{In Cartesian Meditations, (henceforth, C-Med). p. 18, ftn. 3}

In the second Mediation § 14 Husserl says concerning stream of consciousness,

To his conscious life -for example, his sensuously perceiving and imagining life, or his asserting, valuing, or willing life- the ego can at any time direct his reflective regard (seinene reflektierenden Blick); he can contemplate it and, in respect of its contents, explicate and describe it.

In spite of the important focus on consciousness that we have read in Ideas I, and C-Meditations, the qualification that Husserl himself put on these two works also needs to be taken into account. This qualification takes a very important step in Husserl's self-critique, concerning his previously published work, Ideas I (1913, 1922, 1928), and the first work Cartesian Meditations (1931) in French; there being no German publication, of it by this time. Showing his work to be in constant revision we find this critique is in the Crisis text:

I note in passing, that the much shorter way to transcendental epoché in my Ideas toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy\footnote{this translated title by D. Carr, is different than F. Kersten's title.}, which I call the "Cartesian way" (since it is thought of as being attained merely by reflectively engrossing oneself in the Cartesian epoché of the Meditations while critically purifying it of Descartes' prejudices and confusions), has a great shortcoming: While it leads to the transcendental ego in one leap, as it were, it brings this ego into view as apparently empty of content, since there can be no preparatory explication; so one is at loss at first to know what has been gained by it, much less how starting with this, a completely new sort of fundamental science, decisive for philosophy, has been attained.\footnote{E. Husserl. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Hrsg. Walter Biemel. Husserliana VI. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 2nd. ed. 1976),158. Henceforth Crisis I, to distinguish from Die Krisis, Hrsg. Reinhold N. Smid. Husserliana XXIX, as Krisis II, so far there is no English translation as yet. I am following Anthony Steinbock's reference system, in his article "The New "Crisis" Contribution". (Review of Metaphysics, 47 (March 1994), 557-584. E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Trans. David Carr. (Northwestern University Press, 1970) p. 155. Henceforth Crisis.}

Intriguingly, indeed significantly David Carr, also added his own footnote to this statement, asserting that,
It is to be remembered that the German version of *Cartesian Meditations* had never been released for publication by Husserl. These remarks support the *theory* (italics, mine) that Husserl had given up the project of a final version of the *Meditations* altogether in favor of the *Crisis* as the definitive introduction to phenomenology.  

Ronald Bruzina, in his study of the textual genesis of Husserl-Fink collaboration has also commented that,

the revision of the Cartesian Meditations came to yield to Husserl's alternative idea of composing an entirely new 'systematic work' and that at the end, both projects (Husserl's [revised] *Cartesian Meditations* and Fink's [additional] *VI Cartesian Meditation*) were displaced, (italics mine) by his turning to the *Crisis*-writings.

Husserl is now poised to put to fill the 'empty content' with the knowing subjects temporal awareness and historical rootedness. Already his consideration of *Lebenswelt* (see Ch. 1) has prepared him for the shift 

But before concentrating on the *Crisis* writings, textually and contextually, I will first "direct my reflective regard" (to quote *Cartesian Meditations*), to other collections of Lectures and *Forschung* mss. concerning the 'Consciousness of Internal Time'.

What seems to be a "guided tour" round some of the highlight of Husserl's works is necessary to explicate the streams and gradually the shift in Husserl's thought which is not linearly logical at all time.

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45 *Crisis*, 155. ft. 1
Chapter Three. Consciousness of Internal Time

Every NOW of a mental process has its necessary horizon of an AFTER. The stream of mental processes is an infinite unity and the stream-form, which necessarily comprises all mental processes, is pertaining to the pure ego.

1. 1928. Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins
   published by Heidegger in the Jahrbuch Bd. IX. 47

2. 1966. with the Supplementary texts, in Hua X

Praenotanda 1

Gegenwärtig, (adj) present, actual, current. (adv) at present, now, nowadays

Entgegenwärtigung 48, de-presenting

Gegenwärtigung, presenting, presencing, acts that intend as present what actually present in its own appearing. Be-presence.

Vergegenwärtigung, presentification, acts that intend as present what is not actually present. Representing.

Praenotanda 2

Protention, Retention, protention, retention

Protention, the immediate forward reach of consciousness toward the future (not active expectation). Retention, the immediate backward reach of consciousness toward the past (not active recollection).

   (2Aufl. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1980).

Consciousness of Internal Time

In the previous chapter, I have explicated Husserl's investigations and meditations concerning 'Consciousness' in general, as an introduction to Phenomenology. I have also concentrated only on the two books Ideas Book I, and Cartesian Meditations.

Though Husserl did not elaborate the problem of Time-Consciousness in these two books, yet we find that in Ideas Book I, §81 and 82 and Cartesian Meditations §37, he has hinted at the problem of 'Consciousness of internal time.' I will use these sections as links between the previous chapter and the current one.

First, in Ideas I, §81, concerning the matter of temporality Husserl says "Fortunately we can leave out of account the enigma of consciousness of time in our preliminary analyses without endangering their rigor". His own footnote here is also important, for he points out that, "the effort of the author concerning this enigma, and which were made in vain for a long time, were brought to conclusion in 1905 with respect to what is essential; the results were communicated in lectures at the University of Göttingen."49 We are now not only in possession of manuscripts of his lectures in 1905, but many other Forschungmanuskripte, which have been made available to us, and included in the Husserliana series mentioned earlier.

From the above details I will draw a couple of points: first, that Husserl calls the Time-consciousness "an enigma," and then that the 1905 lectures just mentioned are called "a conclusion." to it. But in fact the Forschung mss. (show that the sorting out of this matters, and this will have to be taken into account in future exegeses of Husserl's opera), continued until 1918.

In §82, Husserl explains what he now clearly recognizes a 'before' and 'after' experience in thought, and maintains, "every Now of mental process has its necessary horizon of After, [. . . ] The stream of mental processes is an infinite unity and the stream-form which necessarily comprises all mental processes pertaining to a pure ego." (italics and capitals Kerston's translation).

Husserl mentions the necessary connection of now-after, with the 'now' possessing an horizon of the 'after'. Even the metaphor he uses of a 'stream of mental processes' is important to contemplate, for it

could be concluded that, time consciousness experience as described here is not as a contiguous sequence of each point-of-now, but a necessary continuous flow.

In the same section Husserl says "we reserve for future expositions, already announced, of the more precise elaboration of these insights and the pointing out of their great metaphysical consequences". I assume that Husserl must have intended in this passage to refer to his constant revision of the 1905 Göttingen lectures before the event of their publication in 1928, after being textually edited by Edith Stein, and nominally edited by Martin Heidegger. By the time of the publication of Ideas Book I, in 1913, that revision was going on, which can be proven from the collection of Bernauer mss. dated 1917-18.\(^{50}\)

I will turn now to Cartesian Meditations, fourth meditation, §37, where concerning time-consciousness Husserl says,

this most universal form, which belongs to all particular forms of concrete subjective processes [...] is the form of a motivation, connecting all and governing within each single process in particular. We can call it a formal regularity pertaining to a universal genesis, which is such that past, present, and future become unitarily constituted over and over again in a certain noetic-noematic formal structure of flowing modes of givenness.

Husserl continues,

within this form, life goes on as a motivated course of particular constitutive performances with a multiplicity of particular motivations and motivational system, which, according to universal laws of genesis, produce a unity of universal genesis of the ego. The ego constitutes himself for himself in, so to speak, the unity of history.\(^{51}\)

'Time' is here described as "formal structure of flowing modes of givenness, in which past-present-future become unitarily constituted over and over again",

this in turn "producing a unity of universal genesis of the ego." Husserl puts 'motivation' central in connecting past-present-future, and when this happens in an ego then, in his understanding, history is happening. Or as Husserl had said, a bit earlier,


\(^{51}\) C. Meditations p 75.
whatever occurs in my ego, and eidetically in an ego as such [. . . ] has its temporality and, in this respect, participates in the forms that belongs to the all-inclusive temporality with which every imaginable ego, every possibility-variant of my ego constitutes himself for himself.

'Time' is described here as an overall blanketing, overwhelming presence under which, or in which, 'whatever occurs' is time-filled, all-inclusive. So it is impossible to investigate 'time' as if we are investigating a Gegenstand, what stands opposite me, or an object. In this light one shall continue by consideration of

The Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Husserl defines the problem as,

Time is fixed and yet time flows. In the flow of time, in the continuous sinking down into the past, a non-flowing, absolutely fixed, identical, objective time becomes constituted. This is the problem.

As it turns out, he has quite a modest aim what to do about the perennial conundrum. "I do not intend to offer this analysis as a final one," he writes, "it cannot be our task here to solve the most difficult of all phenomenological problem, the problem of analysis of time". Instead, he set up the situation so as to

lift the veil a little, from this world of time-consciousness, so rich in mystery, that up until now has been hidden from us. And I will to emphasize particularly the new sense of unity as opposed to multiplicity.

Beside describing the time-consciousness "so rich in mystery" [in our sense of time] and elsewhere a "wonder" Husserl also thinks that it is "perhaps the most important [issue] in the whole [of his]
phenomenology." For Husserl "time-consciousness exemplifies what Husserl took to be the universal structure of conscious life, i.e., intentionality."

I have tried here to refrain from giving a full-blown discussion on the issue of Time-consciousness as also the case concerning Pure Consciousness (Ch. 2). I have kept in mind that my thesis is to be on the convergence of the meditations on (the ego) Consciousness and (the all-enveloping) Time in the (concretely-experienced) World. It is not an exhaustive treatise concerning either of these separately.

These background explorations now allows us to proceed to Husserl's developing phenomenology, as his last attempt in The Crisis, to introduce his phenomenology as an all-inclusive method of a philosophy of history.

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Chapter Four. A Totally New Introduction to Phenomenology.

Husserl came to be dissatisfied with his introduction to Phenomenology as he had done in *The Ideas I*, the *Cartesian Meditations* and even in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. After his successful lectures in Vienna and Prague, and in the midst of his personal crises in Germany itself, he introduced a new way into Phenomenology, which was first published in Belgrade.

1 History-bound Consciousness
2 1933-37. The situation of German Academics
3 1935. Vienna and Prague Lectures
5 1954 'Krisis,' (part I, II, and III) in Hua VI, (henceforth "Krisis I")
6 1993 'Krisis' (Nachlass) in Hua XXIX. (henceforth "Krisis II")

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1 History-bound Consciousness

We have noticed that in *Ideas I* and *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl's interest in introducing the transcendental phenomenology was still bypassing history, as a possible way to fulfil it.

However, after his 1929 Paris lectures, and the French *Cartesian Meditations* was published in 1931, Husserl kept on revising and delaying to publish its German text. In the meantime several external events, needing our consideration, contributed to the shaping of the *Crisis* texts. When eventually *Crisis* was published in 1936, his project of publishing the German *Cartesian Meditations* had been put aside. *Crisis*, as we indicated earlier, was a different kind of introduction to phenomenology. Most importantly, it thematizes the *Lebens-welt* and within it, the meditation on history, their lineage together now being seen as one way of doing phenomenology. At last the meditations on (the all-enveloping) *Time* and the meditations on (the ego) *Consciousness* can be seen to converge.

Since Husserl's appreciation of history has not hitherto been great, it is strange indeed that in his last *opus* he includes history in it and places it as one of the in-roads to phenomenology. This Husserlian

61 Chapter 2 of this Thesis
meditation on history, is the heart of the thesis presented here. It will be elaborated further in the following chapters, but first I ought to contextualise it by sketching the academic situation in Germany around that time which was unfavourable for Husserl, in complete contrast to the success of his Vienna and Prague lectures, and his achievement of the original publication of part I and II of Crisis in Belgrade. The other Crisis texts of the later posthumous publications will also be consulted as I undertake the contextualization.

2 Academic Life in Germany around 1931-33

Few incidents in Germany, that were depressing for Husserl and his philosophy.

1933 May, book burning in Berlin Opera Square.

1935 Sept., 15, Nuremberg Law on Citizenship

1936 Jan., 15, Husserl's emeritus-professor status was annulled.

In contrast, few other incidents that were uplifting for Husserl and his philosophy, all happened outside Germany,

May 7 and 10, 1935 the Vienna lectures

November 14 and 15, 1935 the Prague lectures

1936 the publication of Crisis in Belgrade

I will not however, put too much emphasis on the political situation in Germany between 1933-37 in connection with Husserl's last opus, since in the Crisis texts, one finds only very few indications that he was in his philosophy much influenced by the rise of Nazism. In his private letters, on the other hand, matters are different. He was personally influenced by the changed conditions, showing that for Husserl the personal life and the professional life, of philosophical thinking, were two very distinct "regions" of his experiences. While Nazism is not specifically mentioned in the Crisis, to illustrate Husserl privately wrote to Dietrich Mahnke, in his letter May 3, 1933,

Finally in me old age, I had to experience something I had not deemed possible: the erection of a spiritual ghetto, into which I and my truly worthy and high-minded children (together with all their issue) are to be driven. By State Law to take effect hereafter and for evermore, we are no
longer to have the right to call ourselves Germans, the work of our intellects (Geisteswerke), is no longer to be included in German cultural history (Deutsche Geistesgeschichte). They are to live now on solely branded as "Jewish" . . . as a poison that German minds are to protect themselves from, that has to be extirpated. I have had much that was difficult to overcome in my long, perhaps too long life. . . , but here it touches my philosophical development, which for me, in my uncertainty, in my unclarity, was a struggle over the life and death of the mind (um geistiges Leben und geistigen Tod).

Eventually, the situation had forced the relocation of Husserl's manuscipta out of Freiburg in Germany to Belgium, to the safety of the Catholic University of Leuven, in Autumn 1938. It thereby indicated that Germany in that Nazi period was not a favourable place for any Jewish contributions at all, a travesty which culminated with the book-burning in 1933. And the whole social transformation was indirectly influencing the growth of the Phenomenology movement.

Why did such fierce anti-Jewish feelings erupt, simultaneously with the waking up of the German nationalistic feelings and the rise of the Nazi political party to power? If we put this upsurge against the background of Germany's defeat in World War I, and the creation of the Weimar Republic as a weak Government awkwardly imposed upon the German people, we can at least make some sense in the over-reactions of many in Germany, in a situation manipulated by the Nazi political protagonists to gain more ground.

On May 10, 1933 night, at the Berlin Opera Square was the notorious night of the book-burning, when some 20,000 books were torched. Books including those by Marx, Freud, Hirschfeld and Mann went up in flames. Among those who took part was Alfred Baeumler, who on that same day had been inaugurated as Rektor of the University of Berlin. Like many philosophers of that time, he was convinced that the political revolution in progress needed to be supported by a spiritual revolution in the universities. This in turn necessitated a new thinking in Philosophy, which had to be appropriate to the historic moment. So at the end of his inaugural lecture Baeumler announced to his students "You

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63 Hans Sluga. Heidegger's Crisis. (Harvard University Press, 1993), 125
64 Rektors used to be chosen by academics at a university to fulfil the function of the Head of that university as well as the executive officer, for one year. During the Nazi time a new law has been promulgated that Rektors will be chosen by the State and expected to fulfil the State duty as well as university duty and for an unspecified period.
are leaving now to burn books in which an alien spirit uses the German words to fight us," 65 and asserted that this burning was only a symbolic act against those opponents who needed engaging in ideological battle. With this contention he led them, as if a new form of philosophical leadership, to the burning of the books.

Another official was Goebels, the newly appointed Minister for Propaganda, who also came along that night, dramatically at midnight, and in his short speech declaring that this symbolic act was marking the end of "an age of exaggerated Jewish intellectualism." 66 A grand Opera indeed tragically worth a place as large as the Berlin Opera Square.

Thirteen days after the book-burning night, Ernst Krieck stood on a podium to be inaugurated Rektor of Frankfurt University. As distinct from Baeumler and his pro-Nazi political philosophy, Krieck affirmed his rectorship as "a bond between University and the workers." His ideal was that any university should be the university of the people, with a folkish political world-view. Such a world-view also calls for a new kind of philosophy, a philosophy that will be produced by the whole community working together. It will be achieved when the new university becomes "the member of the state subject to authoritative leadership." So the "liberalist age of dissolution and false freedom will be brought to an end," 67 as he put it.

Two weeks after the book-burning, it was Martin Heidegger's turn to make a public commitment as rector of Freiburg University. Like Baeumler and Krieck before him, Heidegger was motivated in his address by the thought that university needed radical reform. But it would not be sufficient to change old institutions with new ones. What was needed was the realization the a "spiritual world alone guarantees a nation greatness." Thus "the will to the historical mandate of German people, as a nation knowing itself in its state", was at the same time a will to science and hence to the essence of German university. Heidegger mentioned three bonds in the student's life: labor service, military service, and service to knowledge all as of equal ranking. Perhaps we can concede, with Hans Sluga that when Heidegger was first "allying himself politically with the victorious Nazi

65 H. Sluga, Heidegger's Crisis. (Havard University Press, 1993), 127
66 Ibid., 125
67 Ibid., 130-131
regime, he was trying to bend it to his own will." 68 Once he was in office, however, Heidegger collaborated vigorously with the Nazis in particular to replace the old system of university self-rule with one based on dictatorial leadership. One quotation that stands out in this context is his speech at the beginning of the 1933 winter semester, when he averred: "Not doctrines and ideas should be the rule of your existence. But the Führer himself and him alone is the present and the future reality and laws." 69 A dark passage indeed 'worthy' of a philosopher who dared to write that to live means "sein zum Tode"! On this occasion Husserl wrote to Ingarden, "The old German University exists no more, from now on it has a political meaning." 70

Hans Sluga has discussed the three above-mentioned philosophers as exponents of positions who were reading the signs of the time and who, trying to move with sharp political change, ended up responding each in their own way, yet although they attempted to work together for a time, the cooperation did not last for very long. These radicals had nonetheless taken a clear lead in philosophical debates in 1933, and their inaugurations and speeches were widely publicized.

The conservatives in the mean time came together for their annual conference in Magdeburg, in October of that year. Nicolai Hartmann, Bruno Bauch, Felix Krueger were the main speakers at this meeting, which had as its theme "Purpose, Meaning and Value." At Magdeburg philosophers as a group could offer in all honesty their support for Hitler and his regime, and this group, speaker after speaker, warned again and again, that a "unique historical crisis is at hand," announcing of "Germany's singular mission in the world." 71 It was also in this gathering of philosophers that Hitler sent a telegram, saying "May the force of true German Philosophy contribute to the foundation and strengthening of the German worl view." The telegram was read to the conference by Krueger and followed up by the German Anthem and the Nazi "Horst-Wesel."

Thus both the radical and the conservative groups, let it be clear, supported Hitler and his movement, the only difference being that the "radical professors" were closer to the students and

68 Ibid. p 143. Much later in an interview with Die Zeit, in 1963 Heidegger mentioned his deeper intention at the time as "dem Führer zu führen" (to lead the Leader).
69 Ibid., 144
71 Ibid., 154
supported their demand for restructuring the universities. These "radicals" trusted that the renewal of their institutions was tied up with the renewal of philosophy. The "conservatives", on the other hand, wanted to maintain the existing university structures and the philosophical ideas on which they were founded, hoping for the preservation of the great German tradition and that their own reworking of that tradition would be the basis of the Nazi world view.

One particular professor who needs mentioning here, is Hans Heyse, who was occupied the Kant Chair at Koenigsberg and who was about to become rector at this time. After a long conversation with Heidegger (in Spring 1933), he organized a public meeting in Leipzig for November of the same year. Many prominent academics attended and expressed their support for Hitler's revolution. The declaration issued on that occasion was signed by more than a thousand professors.72 I have to mention Heyse because he and Heidegger both spoke in this context of the 'crisis' and German 'mission' and the need for 'spiritual leadership' in the nation. Such was the academic atmosphere in 1933.73

There were few more incidents after all these, pertaining to Husserl personally, and to be intensely felt by him.

On March 13, 1935 Husserl, among all state employees, had to sign an acknowledgment of his having been informed, on all occasions, that the form of German greeting had to be the "German hail", "Heil Hitler!" said with the right arm held out.74

On September 15 of the same year, the Nuremberg Law on Citizenship was decreed. Article 2 (1) stated

A citizen of the Reich may be only one who is of German or kindred blood, and who, through his behaviour, shows that he is both desirous and personally fit to serve loyally the German people and the Reich.

This was followed on November 14 by a Supplementary Decree on Race, and its article 4(1) stated, "A Jew cannot be a citizen of the Reich".75 Husserl's break with the Reich was inevitable and final.

72 Ibid., 168-169
73 Hence I do not think it is fair to single out Heidegger for his mistake in supporting Hitler. The Magdeburg and Leipzig meetings were full of Hitler supporters.
74 There is a copy of this Personalakten, E. Husserl, University Archives, Freiburg.
As of January 15, 1936 Husserl's right as emeritus professor to teach at the University of Freiburg was officially annulled. Now the break with Freiburg University is also final.

3. Vienna and Prague Lectures in 1935

The Vienna lecture and its implications

On May 7, 1935 Husserl delivered a lecture entitled "Die Philosophie in der Krisis der europäischen Menschheit" in Vienna, on the invitation of the Wiener Kulturbund. The lecture was to face up to "the European crisis," which he took as a topic that has been a "frequently treated theme". The lecture was then repeated again on May 10.

The text itself is divided into three parts

Part I: Husserl's view on the situation of Europe's cultural tendency toward "objectivism", which for the sake of systematic reviewing, I will briefly summarize in several points.

Part II: To counteract Europe's cultural decline, Husserl speaks about Philosophy's infinite task, and this part introduces a clear distinction between philosophy as a fact of history, and philosophy as an actual human enterprise.

Part III: Condensation.

Part I

A Teleological sense of European humanity

Husserl begins the lecture with an example, one highlighting the difference between scientific medicine and the lore of natural cure. The former, he argues, derives from an application of the theoretical science of the human body, especially anatomy and physiology, which in turn are based on the natural sciences chemistry and physics. The latter, the love of natural cure, he sees as coming from traditional

76 A copy of the document Persoalakten E. Husserl, University Archives Freiburg Nr. A. 23.
77 Husserl's Archives Mss. (1935) M-III 5-IIa Seite 1-34, Krisis I. Hua VI (1954), Abhandlungen III. p 314 ff
78 Husserl's Archives Mss. (1935) K-34 S. Krisis II, Hua XXIX (1993), part II Nr. 10. p 103 ff
79 Krisis I, 314-348.
81 I am using the published text, in Krisis I, 314-348. Crisis, 269-299
native experiences of people. Then he turns to the area of *Geisteswissenschaften*, which are directed to humans, exclusively as persons in their personal 'life and accomplishments'. In these humanistic sciences, however, the word 'life' does not have a physiological connotation, as in natural sciences. 'Life' is taken to mean an accomplishment of a spiritual product. While there is clearly a distinction between health and sickness in medical areas (that is to say, in the areas of natural science, which sees humans solely from the perspective of anatomy and physiology, with scientific medicine being developed to maintain health and counteract sickness), there is in the areas of humanistic sciences no such "scientific medicine" being developed for people as persons. This assertion also implies that with the fragmentation of knowledge, humans are viewed as an assemblage of parts. But Husserl's major question is "But why do so richly developed humanistic disciplines fail to perform the service here that is so admirably performed by the natural sciences in their sphere (Sphäre)?"

In Husserl's observations, while mathematically-exact natural sciences encompass the infinities in their actualities and real possibilities, resulting in a true technical control of nature, the humanistic sciences are different. The humanistic sciences are limited to intuitive finitudes, because these sciences are based on the surrounding world, which is not the same as the mathematically-exact world. In Husserl's term, our 'surrounding world' is a 'spiritual structure in us', and is our historical life. This means, that our 'surrounding world' is a world perceived according to our individual sediments of experiences, or at least very much influenced by them. Hence the term "nature" in the context of our 'surrounding world' is not the "nature" of the natural sciences. When we think it through, 'natural science' is also a spiritual accomplishment, done by humans, and thus irreducible to scientific research results only, since behind all scientific researches there is always a human motivation at work. Yet because of the positivist-naturalistic tendency, the humanistic science fails to inquire after a theory of essence of 'spirit purely as spirit'. This failure has arisen through a partly blind attitude in these sciences. Husserl's "diagnosis" is that "European nations are sick. Europe itself, it is said, is in crisis". There are already many suggestions for reforms, to solve the malady, but according to Husserl none has

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82 *Geisteswissenschaft*, see beginning of Ch. 2. praenotanda 3.
84 Ibid., 270.
touched the core of the problem.

**Spiritual Europe as a problem**

A Husserlian question in this context concerns "how the spiritual shape of Europe" is to be characterized?" (Die geistige Gestalt Europas" was ist das?) This query comes with readiness to exhibit a teleology which is immanent in 'Europe'. Husserl asserts that, upon consistent and internally directed observation, there are perceptibly new peculiar interrelations and differences in Europe. Yet in spite of the differences, there is an inner kinship of spirit, which causes a feeling of a homeland, i.e., a Europe for Europeans. This is what Husserl calls 'an inborn entelechy' in the European civilization. Now in his estimation, it is with the ancient Greeks that a new human epoch begins, an epoch with its essence being the idea of reason, which the Greeks called 'philosophia'. This spiritual Europe according to Husserl has a "birthplace" in the Greek world of seventh and sixth centuries BCE. From this "birthplace" there emerges a new sort of attitude of individuals toward their surrounding world. Husserl says "In this breakthrough of philosophy . . . I see . . . the primal phenomenon of spiritual Europe". In other words, the primal phenomenon of a spiritual Europe, is 'philosophy', not mythology. It was precisely among the ancient Greeks that the philosophers were rebelling against the solely mythological explanation of the surrounding-world, and thereby risking the social reactions of the as yet mythologically-oriented people.

Husserl contends, that the spiritual 'telos' of European humanity, lies in the infinite, the infinite idea toward which the whole spiritual 'becoming' converges (ineinander strömend). Thus for Husserl this breakthrough of philosophy is uniquely European, and Europe is essentially a philosophical breakthrough of human history. In this way Husserl is doing an 'intentional history' , which means, that he is doing history but based on the development of the people's intentionality, and not just a concatenation

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85 *Crisis*, 273. Husserl's "Europe" is to denote a spiritual entity and not a geographical or a political entity. In this thesis this Husserlian use of the word 'Europe' will be maintained, unless otherwise stated.
86 Husserl seems to capitalize this notion of 'teleology', which I will be dealing later in chapter V and VI.
87 I think that Husserl would be delighted to see a new Germany leading the way of the United Europe now, although its reason might not be exactly "philosophical".
88 *Crisis*, 276.
of facts. After these first conceptions of ideas, humans have gradually become new humans. Their spiritual beings enter into the movement of advancing reconstruction. Within such movement a new sort of humanity happens, humans are living in finitude but learning toward poles of infinity, and in this way a philosophical community has been formed.

Such, for Husserl is the history of the emerging spiritual Europe. Europe, because of philosophy, has been becoming a new spirit of free critique and of a norm-giving aimed at infinite tasks. It is here we find what in Husserl's terms is called "the human spirit at work as spirit". Within European civilization philosophy has to exercise its function constantly as one which is the 'essence' for the civilization as a whole. This is obviously a very Eurocentric view of philosophy and thus a Eurocentric account of intentional-history; but it was very difficult for a European in the 1930s not to be.

As if Husserl has forgotten something, he also mentions the concept of God in this Vienna Lecture, but only in passing. In his emphasis on 'reason' Husserl has an absolute view on religion and God. When the world is thematized as a totality but lived in practical way, then we have a mythico-religious attitude. In traditions of this sort people's gods (in plural) are objects of the surrounding world, having the same reality as animals and humans.

In a religion, that conforms to and develops with a philosophic outlook however, the concept of God-as-singular is essential for the progress of thought. God's ontic validity and God's value-validity are experienced as an absolute inner bond. This absoluteness coalesces with philosophical ideality. In other words, Husserl's 'reasoning' of God is that it must be absolute, and thus singular, and only such a God is acceptable as philosophical ideal in a Europe that has been becoming what it was meant to be.

Part II

*Philosophy as an infinite task*

According to Husserl, the European crisis has its root in a mis-guided rationalism. The mistakes of the "Enlightenment," and of its intellectualism, which loses itself in theories alienated from the world (i.e., the world as it is, and not a mathematically-constructed world) amounts to a wrong representation of 'ratio' in European philosophy.
Reason (the Latin ratio\textsuperscript{90}, in the original sense is what distinguishes humans from beasts. Philosophical reason represents a new stage of human nature and human reasoning. Speaking about philosophy, Husserl distinguishes 'philosophy' as a historical fact in a given time, resulting in philosophical systems, and he writes of 'philosophy' as the idea of an infinite task. In other words, there is a symbiosis mutualistis between philosophies and actual philosophizing. A philosophy as an idea of infinite task, Husserl contends, as an act of continuously reasoning, is necessary to counteract the crisis. This means that only through self-consciousness can philosophy fulfil its function of putting itself on the road to a realization of knowledge. Only through constant reflexivity is philosophy a universal knowledge. But philosophy has gone through its naivety, it has gone through objectivism, naturalism, and thereby a naturalization of spirit. Philosophy is seeing the world within the universe of what is. Truth is objective in this sense. Hence cosmology emerged as a science of the world's bodies. Humans and animals are of corporeal nature, and in an orientation toward the surrounding world humans and animals come to appear as 'something with bodily existence,' even if they are not merely corporeal and even though psychic occurrences (orientations in animals) have certain objectivity as well.

It is because of the reign of positivistic objectivism that an individual human gets taken as a psychophysical object. Its spiritual interrelation comes to be reduced to psychophysical causality, which then lacks a spiritual continuity. "Objectivism" in the psychic world creates "psychologism". This objectivistic attitude is similar to that of the ancient materialism and determinism. Since Socrates' days, Plato and Aristotle maintained that humans should be thematized as humans in their specifically human quality. Humans belong to the sphere of objective facts surely, but that is not all that there is, as persons, humans have goals, norms given by traditions, - in Europe after the ancient Greeks, traditions of reasoning- which are norms of truth, indeed eternal norms.

The European crisis-situation cannot be remedied as long as objectivism, rising from a naturalistic attitude toward the world, is not seen as naïve. To apply a natural science methodology to humanistic science is equally naïve. Humanistic discipline should not be placed on an equal footing with the natural science discipline. Hence it is imperative that humanistic science discover its own

\textsuperscript{90} It is a bit hair-splitting, but since in English we use the word 'ratio' also in the sense of 'proportion', I include this note to clarify that.
methodology. For Husserl, this calls for the emergence of his transcendental phenomenology.

2 The Prague lecture and its implications

On November 14 and 15, 1935 Husserl delivered a lecture entitled "Die Psychologie in der Krise der europäischen Wissenschaft" in Prague, on invitation of the deutschen Philosophischen Fakultät, and the Tschechischen Philosophischen Fakultät.

This lecture, along with the Vienna one forms the main motivation for Husserl to write the Krisis and publish it afterwards. With still a worse fate, than the Vienna lecture, this Prague lecture, was left in obscurity, it would not be published with the Krisis I text in Hua VI. but only much later in Hua XXIX in 1993.

In the lecture itself, there is much repeating of the Vienna contentions. His critique of the general trend of the sciences and his observation of the European crisis is on every page. Right from the beginning of the lecture, Husserl says: "Blosse Tatsachenwissenschaften machen blosse Tatsachenmenscehen," (naked/ merely factual knowledge is making naked/ merely factual people). And a little further, he recognizes the atmosphere of war, with its posed choice "Sinn oder Sinnlosigkeit dieses ganzen menschlichen Daseins" (meaning or meaninglessness this is the whole human Being) remains unanswered. He says,

Aber alle diese Menschheitsfragen bleiben in den positiven Wissenschaften, auch in denen, die vom Menschen in seinem geschichtlichen Dasein handeln, ausgeslossen. Ausgeslossen vermöge ihrer Einschrankung auf das, was sie "Objektiivität" nennen und was die ganze Methode ihrer Wissenschaftlichkeit bestimmt.92

(But all these humanity's questions are still in the realm of positive sciences, and also those questions that are dealing with historical human being are out of the question. This exclusion enables the limitation, which is called "objectivity". The whole scientific methodology is directed to it).

After that, though, he qualified the above-quoted assertion, when he said "Das war nicht immer so"(That has not always been that way). Then Husserl goes through the history of philosophy,

92 All the three quotations from the same page, Krisis II, p 104
beginning from the Greeks up to the "Founders of the New-time," *(Begründer der philosophischen Neuzeit)*, who according to Husserl reacted against the Scholastic philosophy, and had to discover a really final "philosophia perennis" *(eine wirklich endgültige Philosophie, eine philosophia perennis)*. Husserl observes that philosophy and sciences from the early Greek period to the Renaissance were giving answers to the general *Lebensprobleme des Menschen*. But then things changed, the intellectual atmosphere became splintered. Sciences developed in their own way and method, and philosophy was very much influenced by the split. The belief in a 'universal philosophy' had been lost. The crisis had set in.

One very different note in the Prague Lecture, when compared to the Vienna one, interestingly, is Husserl's mention of God. He said that "the Greek philosophy and the Jewish-Christian monotheism together as "sources of meaning, out of which came the European humanity in the old-time" *(den beide Sinnesquellen, aus denen daseuropäische Menschenentum im altertum entsprungen: die griechischen Philosophie und dem judisch-christlichen Monotheismus)*. Here it becomes very clear that Husserl's search for the origin of his European-ness has been answered much clearer than in any other manuscripts. When discussing the philosophy of history as such I will have to come back to this philosophical-theological teleology's origin once again in my later chapter. A little bit further on in the Prague piece, Husserl still maintains that,

_Theoretische Philosophie ist das Erste, eine überlegende Weltbetrachtung frei von den Bindungen des Mythos und Tradition, universale Welt- und Menschenerkenntnis in absoluter Vorurteilslosigkeit, schließlich in der Welt selbst die ihr innwonnende Teleologie und ihr oberste Prinzip: Gott, erkennend._

(Theoretical Philosophy is the first, the superior world-contemplation which is free of restrictions of myth and tradition. It is a knowledge of the world and humanity in an absolute presuppositionlessness. In the end it is a knowledge of teleology which is in the world itself and its

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93 The term "philosophia perennis" has been used by the Scholastics to indicate their philosophy. It started with Steuchus Eugubinus (1496-1549), in his "De Philosophia" (1540). Leibniz (1646-1716) used the term to indicate "the philosophy which has been passed on from the ancient time and has spread widely." Jaspers (1883-1969) used it to indicate "the great philosophies over the centuries." (see Georgi Schischkoff, *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*. (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1991) In the Vatican II Council (1963-65) when indicating Scholastic Philosophy for the formation of students in Theological Major Seminaries, the text says "innixi patrimonio philosophico perenniter valido". (see *Sacrosanctum Oecumenicum Concilium Vaticanum II, Constitutiones, Decreta, Declarationes*. (Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1966), 374. In the Prague lecture, Husserl might have meant either in the Leibnizian or Jaspers' sense.

94 *Krisis II*, p 109

95 Ibid., p 109-110
highest principle God).

Husserl speaks about "inwohnende Teleologie" in the above quotation. And also the "oberste Prinzip: Gott." Thus the teleology and the highest Principle God are not "things" to be accepted as mythos or tradition, but as "inwohnende," immanent teleology. Therefore, "Im Ideal ist der Antike Mensch der sich in freier Vernunft einsichtig formende". This ideal is much "bigger picture" than one presented in the post Renaissance rationalism. In this line of thinking Husserl defends Descartes' link with medieval Scholasticism. From here Husserl says there developed two streams of thinking: the Leibnizian monadology up to Kant's "Vernunftkritik" on the one hand, with the other stream being the Lockean "Verstandeskritik". From the text so far we do not know whether Husserl judges these two streams should be kept together or not.

Thus Husserl, while observing the crisis, is still in full hope of offering his transcendental philosophy as "remedy", saying

Auf dem Hintergrund des die ganze Neuzeit durchziehenden Ringens um das Selbstverständnis des Menschen in der Form der Transzendentalphilosophie und der Psychologie hat sich damit die Idee der Phänomenologie abgezeichnet. [. . . ] Und so mag nun die Phänomenologie das neue, das transzendentale Wissen um dem Menschen im alten stolzen Worte aussprechen: anthropos metron pantoon, der Mensch ist das Maß aller Dinge.

(From the background which has been through struggles to reach a humanity's selfunderstanding through transcendental philosophy and psychology, the whole new age is marked with the idea of phenomenology, [. . . ] And now phenomenology may be the new transcendental knowing, to speak proudly to humans, that human being is the measure of everything).

4 The Crisis Texts of 1936, and the context of their publication

From the Vienna and Prague lectures texts, and even during his working over of his conference papers, Husserl began to work towards a new approach to his phenomenology. A new way of introducing it slowly began to emerge for him. The writing of the Crisis texts which were written in a very critical year, gave Husserl such a new light that it resulting in a new introduction to phenomenology that superseded his Cartesian Meditations project. The German version of his Meditations, whether original or developed, were never published during his lifetime and a byproduct of the argument in our thesis is to explain why..

In the Crisis Husserl gradually picked up and thematized the idea of 'Life-world' (Lebenswelt)

96 Ibid., p 138-39
and within it the theme of history (Geschichte/Historie). Although Life-world had for a long time been a base used by Husserl for philosophizing, this is the first time he thematizes it explicitly. Since his appreciation for history has not hitherto been great, moreover, it is strange indeed that in his last opus he includes history in it and places it so high as one of the key in-roads to Phenomenology. This is clearly a new emphasis. 97 Up until his Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations Husserl investigated and explicaded Consciousness as if in vacuo, but now in the Crisis texts he wants to carry out his investigations in modo historico. He said about himself in his letter at that time that,

I cannot simply repeat old ideas and just put them together in a higher level textbook-like treatise; . . . I am drafting a substantially deeper train of historical-philosophical thinking, [emphasis, mine] but I don't want to stop with that . . . I want to work out a fundamental text on the phenomenological reduction based on my many investigation of it, and thus prove to myself and to the world that I do not belong to the past. 98

Die Krisis der europäische Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, was eventually published in Belgrade, in 1936. 99 It can be regarded as Husserl's great "Unvollendete", an opus which is excitingly new but nevertheless unfinished. 100 Arthur Liebert published part 1 and part 2 of the Crisis text, but part 3 seemed not to have reached the publisher at all in Husserl's lifetime, either because it was never sent to the publisher, 101 or because it was requested by Husserl to be brought back for revision. 102

However, since the Biemel edition, the publication of the text in the 'Husserliana' Series in 1954, 103 we now have all the three parts of Husserl's text together as was intended, and some related texts as well. 104 In this new and exciting work Husserl is found consistently promoting transcendental phenomenology as a method, to give science a thorough foundation, and to heal the whole European way of narrow

97 His very first emphasis, I detect in the Erste Philosophie, texts of 1923-24 in Hua VII (1956) and VIII (1959)
99 Philosophia Ed. Arthur Liebert, Bd. I (1936), 77-176
100 Husserl himself made this simile in his Vorwort zur Forsetzung der "Krisis", Krisis, I Beilage xiii, (mss. 1937), 435.
101 Krisis I, xiv.
103 Krisis I p. xvi.
"scientific positivistic mode of thinking." In other words Husserl sought to re-found philosophy. He had admittedly wanted to do this before, in the area of logic, especially in his later work in logic, as found in *Formale und Transzendentale Logik* (1929). But the case of the *Krisis* is different.

*In the Krisis Husserl provides not only a history of philosophy but a philosophy of history.*

The *Krisis* text, we reiterate, has a subtitle 'An introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy', and it is obvious that Husserl meant this as another 'introduction to phenomenological philosophy' after *Ideen. Buch I* (1913) and *Méditations cartésiennes* (1931), which also both carry the subtitle of 'an introduction'. What is new and important about the *Krisis* as introduction, however, is that, here for the first time the history of our philosophizing, is being investigated phenomenologically. It is not the history of philosophy, in the sense of the history of philosophical systems, beginning from the early Greeks to those in Husserl's days, but it is the history of philosophies as a collective attempt to search for a "meaning of man" (sinn des Menschen),\(^{105}\) which is here being consciously investigated. and "there is an insight that there is something in phenomenology that can be understood best through a critical historical reflection."\(^{106}\)

By investigating the history of philosophizing, by penetrating into the collective attempts to explicate the "history of modern philosophy as a struggle for the meaning of man" (die Geschichte der neuzzeitlichen Philosophie als Kampf um den Sinn des Menschen),\(^{107}\) Husserl confronts philosophy itself, which needs to go back to its own first assumptions again. Philosophy, indeed, is required to clarify its origins. Considering this, Husserl was also applying phenomenology to the core question of how to philosophize. He is re-'introducing' phenomenological philosophy and using history as his point of entry.

Husserl is doing an 'intentional history' and not just factual history, and in both parts I and II he is trying to show the difference between those two. In part I Husserl sketches the history of European philosophical "development" leading up to the crisis, and in part II gives a clarification of the origin of such a "development".

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105 *Krisis I*, 12 *Crisis*, 14.
107 the title of *Krisis / Crisis* § 6
European scientific development for Husserl has been ambivalent right from the start. He writes in his preface to the original published version:

The work that I am beginning with this present essay and shall complete in a series of further articles in *Philosophia*, makes the attempt, by way of a teleological-historical reflection upon the origins of our critical scientific and philosophical situation, to establish the unavoidable necessity of transcendental-phenomenological reorientation of philosophy. Accordingly, it becomes, in its own right, an introduction to transcendental phenomenology.¹⁰⁸

Let me explicate especially from the first two parts of this great work.

*Crisis part I*

This part expresses Husserl's main concern. It is entitled "The crisis of sciences as an expression of the radical life-crisis of European humanity." (Die Krisis der Wissenschaften als Ausdruck der radikalen Lebenskrise des europäischen Menschentum), Husserl has now equated the crisis of sciences with the life-crisis of European humanity.¹⁰⁹ He starts this part with a statement that, in the era of scientific development and scientific fad, even philosophy is almost succumbing to scepticism, irrationalism, and mysticism; at the same time, science, which is highly praised, has been reduced to mere factual science or fact finding activity. In his words, "Merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people (Bloße Tatsachenwissenschaften machen bloße Tatsachenmenschen)."¹¹⁰ According to Husserl, this is contrary to the ideal Renaissance-Mensch. It is exactly the Renaissance movement that has attempted to shape a new freedom, and as a model it has chosen the ideal of the ancient humans, whose essence is their philosophical form of existence, an existence shaped by freedom. This is the ideal existence and in Husserl's words: "Philosophy as theory frees not only the theorists [or scientists], but any philosophically educated person."¹¹¹

This type of philosophy asks questions that surpasses the world of mere facts. Positivism is simply too limited and he condemns it. Positivists "all claim a higher dignity than questions of fact, [yet] Positivism in a manner of speaking decapitates philosophy."¹¹² After depicting the failure of the

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¹⁰⁹ The crisis was also mentioned e.g., by Rudolf Panwitz. *Die Krisis der europäischen Kultur*. 1921, Oswald Spengler. "Pessimismus." in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, 1921 and Alfred Rosenberg. *Krisis und Neubau Europas*. 1934
¹¹⁰ *Crisis*, 6.
¹¹¹ Ibid., 8.
¹¹² Ibid., 9.
new science and declaring scientists as unphilosophical experts (unphilosophischen Fachmännern gewordenen Wissenschaftler), Husserl observes that there had already been a louder protest than his own from thinkers, or from "theorists who were filled with the philosophical spirit." This happened in the period from Hume to Kant, the period of a "passionate struggle for a clear, reflective understanding of the true reasons of a century-old failure (zu einem klaren Selbstverständnis der wahren Gründe dieses Jahrhundertelangen Versagens durchzudrinegn) [in philosophical thought]." We are made to remember that Hume's scepticism has caused Kant to "wake up from his dogmatic slumber," to publish his Kritik der reinen Vernunft in 1781, followed later on by the editio emendata in 1787. This Kantian Kritik wants to radicalize the Cartesian starting point "cogito," and now in a comparable spirit Husserl wants to suggest that there is a necessity to change the whole way of Western philosophical thinking, which has been and is in crisis. He seeks to apply the phenomenological method (at least part of it) to history. He says that "the history of modern philosophy is a struggle for the meaning of man (Kampf um den Sinn des Menschen)." Therefore the crisis of the meaning of the European people can be read from the crisis of philosophy, too. Hence the title of part I of the text. In Husserl's words: "The struggle (Geisteskämpfe) of European humanity as such takes the form of struggles between philosophies (Kämpfe der Philosophien)," and this basically means for him the struggle between positivism and phenomenology.

For Husserl, "the faith (Glauben) of the possibility of philosophy as a task (Aufgabe), that is, in the possibility of universal knowledge (universale Erkenntnis), is something we cannot let go." This indeed has been and will be a self-imposed task and mission for Husserl himself, which he calls his vocation. He sought to awaken his own and thereby our passion of responsibility as "functionaries of mankind," so that we may -indeed- should "inquire back into what was originally and always sought in philosophy."

113 Ibid., 11.
114 Ibid., 11.
115 Ibid., 14.
116 Ibid., 15. as it is also to be seen in Ch 4 ad 2
117 Ibid., 17.
118 Ibid., § 7
In his second part Husserl explains his new 'contextual' and 'genetic' phenomenology by giving a "Clarification of the origin of the modern opposition between physicalistic objectivism and transcendental subjectivism." To depict this opposition in the later portion of this part, Husserl would work through a clarification of origin of the thoughts of Galileo, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and finally Kant. Although his treatment of those thinkers before him, as mentioned before, was very sketchy indeed, the point of his argument is clear over the issues of the objectivity and universality of science. According to Husserl, the context of these new emerging ideas is the particular historical opposition between physicalistic objectivism and transcendental subjectivism. He has his list of philosophical thoughts with the intention to investigate how these thinkers have come to their conclusions and to learn from each one of them how not to fall into their unacknowledged prejudices. (One would not be too far from the truth to admit that this is the way chosen for later development by Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) in his labour of 'deconstructionism'). Husserl's is indeed a new procedure of doing a philosophy of history. From the philosophical and historical point of view, this kind of phenomenology is not investigating philosophy as such, or history as such, in the usual sense. With this kind of phenomenology what Husserl wants to accomplish is to allow the historicity of the subjectivity of those thinkers to become explicit, since he thinks that "every single process of consciousness has its own history, i.e., its temporal genesis." He is convinced that his method of genetic analysis will expose thinkers' contextual prejudices in their genesis. Nevertheless, for Husserl the exposure and awareness of the prejudices, as such, is only one side of the whole knowing process, the other side being that Husserl wants his own mind "to go back" to their experiences, by asking the same questions they asked all over again, such as "how is this given to my consciousness?" (whatever the object may be). It is the 'how it is given' that is important for his historical retracings. This means that he must seek an

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insight into the explicit and implicit intentionality wherein the alter ego becomes evinced and verified (bekundet und bewährt) in the realm of our transcendental ego; we must

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119 E. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (first published 1929)
discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations the sense [of the] "other ego" becomes fashioned in me (anderes Ego sich in mir gestaltet). 120

Of course it is nearly impossible to experience fully and exactly the experiences of another. The closest to this experiencing of another's experience is the possibility of 'empathy' (empatheia' Greek: em, in; pathos, suffering). 121 But for Husserl to experience 'how a given is given' to one's consciousness, even given the same context and the same condition as it is given to another's consciousness is indeed possible, and is the proper search method to uncover the origin of previous thinkers' experiences of questioning and reasoning. For him this was certainly possible.

Thus with his genetic phenomenology and his theory of subjectivity, Husserl arrives at the kernel of this investigations in the Krisis. But at this point we need to go deeper into his appropriation of the other thinkers' experiences. Since this is the profound part of Husserl's view of 'inner history', it deserves a full investigation, which will be treated in the following chapter. 122 Suffice to say here, this "inner history" is not a concatenation of facts. It is also not an ordinary historiography. It is a discerning of our European spiritual heritage "from the inside", by regarding its retrieval as a 'self-interpretation' which reveals a motivational continuity, and not just a causal series.

Husserl's first analytical reflection in this part of the Crisis is on mathematics. Mathematicians in the ancient times knew only a 'finitely closed a priori', yet it is now possible to conceive an infinite totality. 123 With this new possibility comes also the possibility of a mathematized natural science. Galileo is taken as a prototype of this trend to mathematize nature. 124 In Husserl's words:

In his view of the world from the perspective of geometry, the perspective of what appears to the senses and mathematizable, Galileo abstracts from the subjects as persons leading a personal life, he abstracts from all that is in any way spiritual, from all cultural properties which are attached to things in human praxis. The result of this abstraction is [that] the things move purely as bodies (die puren körperlichen Dinge), but these are [nonetheless] taken as concrete real objects (wie konkrete Realitäten).

In this Galilean-style of mathematically structured science, the world is an enclosed world of bodies,

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122 Chapter 5 of this thesis. 'Toward a Philosophy of history'
123 A point also discussed by Oswald Spengler (1889-1936) in Husserl's time, e.g., Der Untergang des Abendlandes (1918)
124 Cf. Crisis, 57.
125 Realität is here translated in English as 'object', by Carr, I think, the word 'reality' will do.
126 Crisis, 60.
measurable and quantifiable. This science is then regarded as an objective and universal (read: true) knowledge. In consequence, knowing the world means knowing it exactly as it is quantifiable, because this is regarded as "objective" knowledge, thus true according to the status of the object, and not according to the status of mind of the knower. In this way the world as it is experienced, as given to the perception before the quantitative abstraction is applied to it, this *Lebenswelt*, is replaced by a quantitative world. The substitution is then passed on to the following generation of scientists, and "knowledge" becomes "universal", in the sense of being accepted all over the whole scientific world as "true", since it is not a particular view of one particular scientist, but a general possession of truth by a community of scientists. From then on when people speak about the world, they mean the 'objective universally known' world. For Galileo, this "objective knowledge" of the world remained heuristic as a method, yet for successive scientists this "objective knowledge" of the world became an objective and universal truth about the world. For the common people, non-scientists, this "objective knowledge" of the world's leaders becomes the only truth possible about the world. As soon as this Galilean science moves to success, the ideas of philosophy as 'the science of the universe', in the sense of 'the science of all that is,' is transformed into "a science of all there is quantifiably."27 This transformed knowledge, when accepted as 'the truth', is what Husserl calls the "unacknowledged prejudice." But of course scientists could not always be aware that this kind of truth was originally only a methodical truth, in the sense of a working hypothesis for all their daily conscious practice of science. This is the first great crisis of European thought. Reflecting on Husserl's position, Buckley calls this unawareness "the crisis as forgetting".28

In the context of his criticism of Galileo, and the subsequent unacknowledged prejudice, Husserl turns to the world, as Galileo did. But in doing so, Husserl is showing how he presupposes the *Lebenswelt* as the source or meaning-fundament which ultimately makes scientific rationality, in Galileo's quantifiable sense, intelligible to us as an abstraction, albeit a valid one. Thus Husserl goes back to a world before its scientific description and begins to thematize what he calls the priority of the

127 We can understand how this transformation of 'knowledge' when influencing psychology, then the very notion of psyche becomes very materialistic, and 'psychology' becomes the "science of behaviour matrix"
Lebenswelt. This thematization happens for the first time in the Krisis texts (mss. 1935/1936). One must concede that the term "life-world" itself has been used by Husserl since 1917/1919 and in print since 1924\textsuperscript{129} and 1925,\textsuperscript{130} but not treated as a philosophical theme. The 'life-world', according to Husserl, is a forgotten foundation of natural science. It is forgotten because, as in Galileo's case, Galileo did not inquire into the origins of mathematical "self-evidence". For Galileo the "objective knowledge" of the world was 'a given', though for him his orientation was still a method. In Husserl's words,

\textbf{\ldots the developed method, \ldots is as method, an art (Methode, Kunst / Techne), which is handed down, but its true meaning is not necessarily handed down with it. And precisely for this reason it is that a theoretical task and achievement like that of natural science, \ldots, can only be and remain meaningful in a true and original sense if the scientist has developed in himself the ability to inquire back into the original meaning (Ursprungssinn) of all his meaning structures and methods, i.e., into the historical meaning of their primal establishment (Urstiftungssinn), and especially into the meaning of all the inherited meanings taken over unnoticed in this primal establishment, as well as those taken over later on.\textsuperscript{131}}

Husserl has discerned to his own satisfaction that, there is a basic confusion among scientists. To get to the true knowledge of the world, one becomes content to have a mathematical-knowledge of it, yet while this mathematical knowledge is useful as a method to understand the world from one particular perspective, and can serve as one method to get one perspectival understanding, the method itself needs to be understood as to how it functions as a method in the first place. Otherwise the method that functions well as a method is then taken as the aimed-for knowledge itself.

Husserl also observes that

\textbf{\ldots the mathematician, the natural scientist, at best a brilliant technician of the method, [\ldots] is normally not at all able to carry out such reflection. In his actual sphere of inquiry and discovery he does not know at all that everything these reflections must clarify is even in need of clarification, and this for the sake of that interest which is decisive for a philosophy of science, i.e., the interest in a true knowledge of the world itself, nature itself.\textsuperscript{132}}

Thus science cannot, and should not stop at the point of scientific findings only, or else scientists will pretend that the truth has been revealed through scientific conclusions. The knowledge of the world cannot stop at a mathematical formula of it. True understanding in science not only requires a thorough

\textsuperscript{129} Hua VII, 232.
\textsuperscript{130} Hua IX, 496. Cf. H. Spiegelberg, \textit{Phenomenological Movement.} (The Hague: Kluwer 1984), 162. ft\textsuperscript{n} 137.
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Crisis,} 56.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 57.(clarifying insertion between brackets, mine.)
understanding of the world itself, including nature, but it requires also a thorough understanding of the method by which the understanding processes is accomplished. It is thus a process of understanding the object of knowing and at the same time understanding the process itself. If this double-edged act cannot be performed, then what is thought to be understood is merely registered data about the world (or more accurately, one aspect of it) in a customised formula. Husserl thinks that scientists fall short of performing the complete or valid task. This inability and part-ignorance is the most significant cause of the crisis. Husserl states

and this [true knowledge of the world itself] is precisely what has been lost through a science which is given as a tradition and which has become a techne, insofar as this interest played a determining role at all in its primal establishment.\(^\text{133}\)

Husserl then finds it necessary, for essential reasons, to investigate the origins of Galilean science. His aim in trying to understand the Galilean science is not so much to correct Galileo, but to come to the origin of Galileo's way of thinking, and to go through it once again with Galileo, so to speak, but now in full awareness (taking nothing for granted) so that he can rise from the temptation of falling back into the accepted science without being aware of its prejudices, be they mathematical, scientific or placed on any other uninvestigated ground.

Husserl's second analytical reflection in this part of the work is on the issue of dualism. Due to Galileo's mathematical attitude, and his method is over-abstractive:

he abstracts from the subjects as persons leading a personal life, he abstracts all that is in any way spiritual, from all cultural properties which are attached to things in human praxis. The result of this abstraction is that things will now be understood purely as bodies; but these are taken as concrete real objects, the totality of which makes up a world which becomes the subject matter of research. One can truly say that the idea of nature as a really self-enclosed world of bodies first emerges with Galileo.\(^\text{134}\)

Husserl observes, that "the result of this abstraction is that the things will now be "understood" purely as bodies."\(^\text{135}\) This shift in turn paved the way to the the mind (spirit)/ body dualism which appeared soon after with Descartes. According to Husserl, this dualism is unavoidable, because

\(^{133}\) Ibid., 57.  
\(^{134}\) Ibid., 60.  
\(^{135}\) Ibid., 60.
... if scientifically rational nature is a world of bodies in itself, then the world-in-itself must, in a sense unknown before, be a peculiarly split world, split into nature-in-itself (Natur an sich) and a mode of being (Seinart) which is different from this: that which exists psychically (das psychisch Seiende).  

Husserl observes, too, that from this dualism, comes the specialization of philosophy (in its earlier broad conception) into sciences. This "specialization" has a deeper meaning, exclusively related to the modern attitude. In the ancient times, even up to the late Middle Ages, any specialization occurring never caused a loss of the common basis of root disciplines of philosophical endeavour. Galileo's natural science did not arise through specialization, yet subsequent sciences did arise from his reorientation of method. From these later specializations more and more special regions of study cropped up, rationally closed to and from one another within the rational totality of the intellectual universe. Thus sciences have tended to lose their philosophical common ground and origin.

Both this dualism and subsequent splintering of disciplines came to affect all areas of research, i.e., the biophysical sciences, physics, etc. An example of resulting problems involved how to explain the position of the soul as that "...which is left over after the animal and the human bodies have been separated off, [and] as belonging inside the closed region of nature". Here a type of being is ascribed to the soul which is similar in principle to that of nature. This naturalization of the psychic comes down through John Locke to the modern psychology of Husserl's day. Locke's tabula rasa image (Husserl used the English word 'white paper') and is typical in his explanation that psychic data can come and go "here" and "there," that it is somehow ordered like the events of bodies in nature.

Even in metaphysics, where physicalistic rationalism could not be carried through, aid was sought through the use of variation of concepts. The previous Scholastic concepts are now "watered down". As a consequence we have the writings of people like Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). We also find Benedictus de Spinoza's (1632-1677) Ethica being created modo geometrico. Indeed we cannot call them Scholastics anymore. However, according to Husserl, Spinoza's Ethica (1677) was the first universal self-subsisting ontology. In the spirit of that

136 Ibid., 61.
137 Ibid., 63.
time, these authors thought that the ancient philosophy had wanted to be the comprehensive science, but did not attain it. That old ideal, however, was now thought of as a possibility to be attained for the first time, and through the newly formed mathematics and natural science(s), philosophers thought they had just done that. No doubt the new ideal of universality and rationality brought advancement in mathematics and physics, but it remains a different matter as to whether these new paradigms should be accepted as the basic paradigms of all sciences, let alone of philosophy.

When philosophy was done *modo geometrico*, the difficulty began to be felt in the new naturalistic psychology. The area of psychology, which included the rational knowing in general, claimed to bear the ultimate truth-meaning of the world. This brought on-in both Berkeley and Hume, for instance- a scepticism, first towards models of rationality then towards its basic concepts. Hume even carried through his scepticism towards the whole ideal of philosophy, and towards the whole manner in which new sciences were claimed to be "scientific". Faced with this challenge, philosophy became an *epistemology*, a theory of reason, or an *Erkenntnistheorie*, to enable us better to meet this new scepticism. Thus philosophy was on the way from *scientific objectivism* into *transcendental subjectivism*. This development took form in a continuous tension between objectivistic and transcendental philosophy. Husserl seeks to show that this tension is at the core of the life of modern philosophy, it is the sense (*Sinn*) of modern spiritual history, and this spiritual history needs to be investigated if we are to embark upon a new horizon of philosophizing through history.

In this same part II, in the midst of his historical exposé, Husserl pauses to reflect on his 'historical manner of investigation,' as he calls it. In this reflection Husserl states that his unusual historical investigation is

\[\ldots\text{ to make comprehensible the teleology in the historical becoming of philosophy, especially modern philosophy, and at the same time to achieve clarity about ourselves, who are the bearers of this teleology, who take part in carrying it out through our personal intentions.}\]

In the *Origin of Geometry*, also written in 1936, Husserl states that,

\[\ldots\text{ our considerations (of Galileo) will necessary lead to the deepest problems of}\]

138 Ibid., 70.
139 This mss. written in 1936. first edited and published and given a title by Fink, in *Revue Internationale de philosophie, I, 2 (1939)*, See also *Crisis, 353.*
meaning, problems of science and of history of science in general, and indeed in the end to problems of universal history in general; . . .

A bit further on he says, that in this way he is carrying out a

. . . self-reflections about our own present philosophical situation, in the hope that [in this way] we can finally take possession of the meaning, method, and beginning of philosophy, . . .

Two components of the one whole project are disclosed in these passages: to make the historical becoming of philosophy comprehensible through showing its teleology; and at the same time to achieve clarity about ourselves. Since this teleology is not to be comprehended in abstracto, but to be comprehended as being incarnated in us, the bearers, it makes sense that this pause is injected methodologically into the flow of this unusual historical investigation. Rhetoric aside, this reflection is not only a methodological one, but is at the same time Husserl's personal creed. This creed actually must be imbibed and applied as any investigation is being carried out. Husserl believes that history can be read in the intentions of the human bearers, since these intentions reveal who we are and while at the same time expressing the distinctive forms of the past. Thus to learn how to read history, is at the same time to learn how to be aware of our own inner consciousness in its possible and various attempts to express itself. It means that if we read history only from the observable physical concatenation of facts, we thereby ignore that human history is human-made, by thinking beings like ourselves. Therefore, the whole human-making of history needs to be addressed; and since humans are not merely physicality, it follows that a merely physical description of history will not be a truly human history.

In the next six sections Husserl speaks about Descartes - in three sections - then about Locke, Berkeley and Hume - each in one section - and then about Kant in three. His aim in doing this is not to provide a quick glance over the history of modern philosophy, but "to carry out the clarification of the unifying sense of the modern philosophy." Admittedly he offers an apparently simplistic account of each philosopher, since his focus is to highlight their common underlying intentions and struggles to express the 'search for the meaning of being-human.' But the exercise confirms his agenda to rethink the same

140 Ibid., 353
141 Ibid., 354
142 Ibid., 73
issues that have pestered philosophers for so long and be able to address them better in one's own thinking for learning how they have been approached in the past.

Husserl's summary view on Descartes, to illustrate, is that

Like all historical ideas that result in great developments, those in the new mathematics, the new natural science, and the new philosophy live in very diverse noetic modes in the consciousness of the persons who function as bearers of their development.\(^{143}\)

Philosophical knowledge, according to Descartes, is an absolutely grounded knowledge: philosophy must stand upon a foundation of immediate and apodictic knowledge whose self-evidence excludes all conceivable doubt. Husserl agrees with this, asserting that "Once in his life every philosopher must proceed in this way; if he has not done it, and even [if he] already has "his [own] philosophy" he must still do it."\(^{144}\)

This statement declares how radical Husserl wants to be, but as it turns out, not in a Cartesian way. For according to Husserl, Descartes was radically rational in principle, but he was not radical all the way through in the execution of his principle. Doing philosophy for Husserl, as for Descartes, is going back to the origins of thinking. According to Husserl the "Cartesian epoché" (or dubium methodicum, as it is known) has in truth a hitherto unheard-of radicalism, since it encompasses the whole sense experience and its correlate: the world itself. The original Cartesian motif was a passion "...that of pressing forward through the hell of an unsurpassable, quasi-sceptical epoché toward the gates of heaven of an absolute rational philosophy."\(^{145}\)

As far as a rational philosophy is concerned, Husserl fully agrees with Descartes. How is this ratio-based philosophy to be accomplished? How does this happen? In Husserl's reading of Descartes, he says:

If I refrain from taking [a] position on the being or non-being of the world, ... I the ego, carrying the epoché, [as I] am not included in its realm of objects but rather am excluded in principle. ... It is precisely herein that I find just the apodictic ground I was seeking, ... Thus during the universal epoché, the absolutely self evident "I am" is at my disposal.\(^{146}\)

I, the ego performing the epoché, am the only thing that is absolutely indubitable.\(^{147}\)

\(^{143}\) Ibid., 74.
\(^{144}\) Ibid., 76. few words added, to clarify Carr's translation
\(^{145}\) Ibid., 77.
\(^{146}\) Ibid., 77
\(^{147}\) Ibid., 78.
In other words, Descartes' radicality, has still an I, as a beginning point of the philosophizing process. I might paraphrase, "Even when I doubt, I still have my doubting-I as my base from which to philosophize."

So far Husserl has only praise for Descartes. But his sharp critique is that Descartes "does not actually carry through the original radicalism of ideas." Husserl says that

\[\ldots\text{in spite of the radicalism of the presuppositionlessness he demands, [he] has, in advance, a goal in relation to which the breakthrough to this "ego" is supposed to be the means. He does not see that, by being convinced of the possibility of the goal and of his, he has already left this radicalism behind.}\]

Descartes' "goal" and "means" are too clear for Husserl as not altogether 'presuppositionless' for they reveal hidden presuppositions. According to Husserl, Descartes cannot pretend not to have a goal, while saying that he is investigating such a goal with the I as a starting point of thinking. In any case, already his "I-starting-point" means that he is not so totally presuppositionless as he claims. Descartes cannot pretend not to have a means, while saying that he is investigating it, i.e., the means being the doubt, since he 'knows' (without doubt) that he is doubting. Thus his principles turn out to be self-contradictory, at least, in their philosophic execution.

Also, in Husserl's reading, "Descartes himself really believes he is able to establish the dualism of finite substances by way of inferences to what transcends his own soul, mediated through the first inference to the transcendence of God." Since, according to Descartes, one substance is measurable, and the other substance is non-measurable, the only way out for Descartes to put these two together is through the primal inference that God is accepted as infallibly true or that, as far as substances go, "God wants it that way". On the other hand Descartes

\[\ldots\text{thinks he is solving the problem of how the rational structures engendered in my reason can claim an objectively "true" metaphysical validity.}\] Thus, in truth, there begins with Descartes a completely new manner of philosophizing which seeks its ultimate foundations in the subjective.

This is a total break from the mediaeval traditional philosophy where the ultimate foundations were
sought in the 'objective,' and where a deep respect is shown to the Tradition.

One element in Descartes which is 'highly significant', according to Husserl, is the concept of 'intentionality,' or in other words his 'cogitatio', of having something consciously in mind, *etwas bewußthaben*. In Descartes there is no question of a true presentation and treatment of the subject of intentionality. On the other hand, the whole supposed founding of the new universal philosophy of the ego must be characterized as a "theory of knowledge", a theory of how the ego in the intentionality of its reason, brings about the objective knowledge.

From Descartes, Husserl observes, there are two lines developing in the history of subsequent thinkers: the rationalists and the empiricists. The first is, the "rationalism" of Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), G. W. Leibniz, Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). According to Husserl this first line develops rationalism enthusiastically and, based on a *mos geometricus*, these thinkers were convinced that the absolute knowledge of the world was obtainable, accepting it as a realization of the transcendent 'in-itself'.

The second is the line of "sceptical empiricism," which had been present before Descartes, in Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), later in John Locke (1632-1704), and then from Berkeley (1685-1753) to Hume (1711-1776). Like the Sceptics in the ancient times, the second line of post-Cartesian thinkers developed a scepticism against the rationalism of the first line. Husserl had a personal interest as to how this second line later developed and affected psychology and the theory of knowledge.

Now, according to Husserl, both these trajectories of philosophy were valid heirs of Descartes' work, and on the former's reading they are developing certain thought-elements already to be found in Descartes. Concerning the second trajectory, Husserl makes important observations on Locke. In Husserl's reading, "Locke senses nothing of the depth of the Cartesian epoché, he simply takes over the ego as 'soul,' which becomes acquainted with its inner states, acts and capacities." This is all "happening" in the self-evidence of self-experience. And "... only what inner self-experience shows, only our own "ideas" (*Ideen*) are immediately, self-evidently given. Everything in the external world is

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152 the word 'objective' has a different connotations in the modern and mediaeval scholastic philosophies.
153 *Crisis*, 84.
This, then, according to Husserl, is scepticism. In Locke's system, the soul is an "isolated space, a writing tablet", on which psychic data come and go. In Husserl's opinion this kind of data-sensationalism has influenced psychology up to his own day. What Locke has missed in his perception theory, however, is that although we speak of a perception of things, yet "... in the experiences of consciousness themselves, that of which we are conscious is included as such -- that perception is in itself a perception of something..." Husserl judges Locke by saying, "Locke's naïvités and inconsistencies lead to a rapid further development of his empiricism, which pushes toward a paradoxical idealism and finally end in a consummated absurdity", i.e., Locke's empiricism limits the possibilities of knowledge, especially in regard to the great traditional themes of metaphysics. With him there begins the distrust of cognitive faculty, which is to culminate in Hume's total scepticism. This judgment though, is not as fair as it could be to Locke's intentions in his context. Locke sought to write an empirical description of perception phenomena, while Husserl expected him to have a comprehensive theory of perception. Yet it is from this Lockean foundation of 'sensationalism' nonetheless that George Berkeley builds on Locke's own theories.

Berkeley reduces bodily things which appear in the natural experience to complexes of sense-data. David Hume, according to Husserl, "goes on in this very direction to the end", hence all categories of objectivity are fictions. In this way Husserl pictures Hume as saying that, "... the world in general, nature, the universe of identical bodies, the world of identical persons, and accordingly also objective science, which knows these in their objective truth, are transformed into fiction".

In Husserl's reading, Descartes provided the parting of the ways. Descartes, with his goal of grounding an absolutely new philosophical rationalism, has made possible the immense force of discovery in mathematics and natural science. On the other hand the empiricist sceptic brings to light what was already present and not worked out, i.e., that all knowledge of the world, prescientific and scientific, is an enormous enigma (ungeheures Rätsel). Why? Because the knowledge of the world as

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154  Ibid., 86.  
155  Ibid., 85.  
156  Ibid., 86.  
157  Cf. Crisis , 87.  
158  Ibid., 87.  
159  Cf. Crisis , 89.
we live in it, *die Lebenswelt*, is greater than the knowledge as only captured or obtained by the mathematized and rationalized knowledge of the same world.

To know the world 'methodically', according to the standard of a mathematized knowable world, is not incompatible with the fact that we still have to investigate the ontology of 'knowing' itself. Hence what scientists and mathematicians were doing and what empiricist sceptics were saying, occasioned by Descartes' philosophy, is in my reading attributable to Descartes' greater success in his methodology when compared to his ontology. Husserl was close to apprehending this.

After having investigated the British empiricist-sceptics, Husserl turns to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). In Husserl's reading, Kant uproots the dogmatism of his days. Kant's crucial question is how the truths of reason (*Vernunftwahrheiten*) could really guarantee the knowledge of things (*Dingerkenntnis*), since between these two there remains a gulf of incomprehensibility. In Kant's system, this question is to be "solved" in a regressive procedure, in Husserl's words: "... if common experience is really to be (an) experience of objects of nature, [...] then the intuitively appearing world must already be a construct of the faculties that express themselves in explicit thinking in mathematics and logic".¹⁶⁰

Husserl summed up the Kantian 'reason' (*Vernunft*) as possessing a twofold way of functioning.

One way is its systematic self-exposition, self-revelation in free and pure mathematizing[ ...] The other way is that of reason constantly functioning in concealment, reason ceaselessly rationalizing sense-data and always having them as already rationalized.¹⁶¹

Husserl elaborates further, that

the intuited world of bodies - this includes the whole world of natural science - is a subjective construct of our intellect (*subjektives Gebilde unseres Intellekt*). Only the material of the sense-data arises from a transcendent affection (*transzendenten Affektion*) of 'things themselves'.¹⁶²

What interests Husserl is that

Kant, [while] reacting against the data-positivism of Hume, - as he understands it,-¹⁶³ outlines a great, systematically constructed, and *in a new way* still scientific philosophy in which the Cartesian turn to conscious

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 94.
¹⁶¹ Ibid., 94.
¹⁶² Ibid., 95
¹⁶³ Husserl is of the opinion, that Hume as understood by Kant, is not the real Hume. See Crisis, 95.
subjectivity works itself out in the form of a transcendental subjectivism.\textsuperscript{164}

This transcendental subjectivism, amounts to a "scientific philosophy for the first time since Descartes."\textsuperscript{165}

It is a philosophy which in opposition to prescientific and scientific objectivism, goes back to knowing subjectivity \textit{(erkennende Subjektivität)} as the primal locus \textit{(Urstätte)} of all objective formations of sense \textit{(objektiven Sinnbildungen)} and ontic validities \textit{(Seinsgeltungen)}.\textsuperscript{166}

In this way we undertake to understand the existing world as a structure of sense \textit{(Sinngebilde)} bearing its own validity \textit{(Geltungsgebilde)}.

It seems to be, according to Husserl, that it is Kant who best understood Descartes, and continued his new way of philosophising. Yet Kant's transcendental subjectivism, in Husserl's opinion, has not gone far enough in continuing the Cartesian way. In analysing Kant, Husserl himself hopes to clarify the transcendental idealism which has proceeded from Kant's style of philosophising. Husserl is convinced that through this style the teleological unity of meaning in the modern philosophy can be explicated. In consequence he holds he can then make progress in his self-understanding as recreator of this particular part of history of philosophers.

His explication on Kant, though, was cut off suddenly; and the two parts of the \textit{Krisis} text was published in 1936 in great haste. The intended part three was delayed, and later posthumously published. This part three has its own history as we shall soon discover.

\textit{The implications}

What are the implications of this history-sensitive exercise thus far? Husserl's intention to discover the teleology of the history of modern philosophy runs through analyses of thinkers, especially from Galileo, through Descartes to Kant, while other thinkers he merely mentions non-descriptively. We can see that he is very selective (but not injudicious) in his choice of the "historical figures" on whom to build his claims.

In Galileo, Husserl sees a prototype of a quantitative thinking. The original quantifying method

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Crisis}, 95.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 97.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 97.
had become 'the truth' for later scientists. Science then developed accordingly. Thus scientific truth, accepted to be the truth becomes equated with quantifiableness. Subsequently, it is accepted among most scientists and people in general, without questions about the origin of its assumptions.

In Descartes, Husserl sees the pioneer of radicalism in philosophical principle of inquiry, even though Descartes himself did not fulfil his own ambition. For Descartes' system, the goal and the method were pre-given and were accepted as such, and this inconsistency contradicted his own radicality. Husserl pointed out this oversight in Descartes. When Descartes stated the 'doubting-I' as his beginning to reason, and that 'doubting' was his method, for Husserl this was a compromise of Descartes' own stated principle of 'inquiry-ab-ovo'.

In Kant, Husserl sees the continuation of Descartes' radicalism. But it was not a continuation of the vast depth of the Cartesian totality of all science, and in developing his transcendental philosophy Kant could not give therefore the ultimate grounding to his own system.

In Husserl's *Krisis* text, admittedly, other philosophers did rate some mention, as already noted, but they were given minor roles, more especially around those three main thinkers, Galileo, Descartes and Kant. According to Husserl, it is in those three main thinkers that the spirit of Europe is to be found: the spirit of radical inquiry towards the subjective thinking in its original form. Apart from their success or failure in their expression of the spirit of radical inquiry, they are for Husserl still worthwhile to investigate. When this rigorous method of thinking is abandoned, then Europe is in crisis, and the human thinking in general is in crisis. Husserl is convinced that Europe has a telos and, that the European philosophy has a telos. He is accusing scientists and the thinking circle of his days of losing sight of this telos, hence European humanity has indulged in the mere accumulation of facts and in accepting them as 'knowledge', (scientia). Even the British empiricists and sceptics are actually searching for this telos though, since they have been reacting against Descartes, and thus they are still to be considered heirs of Descartes and so contributing to a greater task.

In general, Husserl reads the history of European philosophers as a history of thinkers searching for the same telos. But in his time, he was aware that the exaggerated enthusiasm for the mathematized,

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167 *Ab-ovo* (Latin), meaning from the very beginning, literally "from the egg".
quantifiable world was causing the crisis in philosophy. This was a crisis in the European search for the telos, yet if it was as if Europe had lost its telos, it had really only lost its 'reason' (Vernunft). His publication of the *Krisis* text in 1936 was his cry in the wilderness, his unfinished mission and expression of this vision.

We could ask whether Husserl is not oversimplifying his historical facts about philosophers whom he uses for his analyses, or whether his scanning of historical figures is too generalised, or is his reading of each of his examples too narrowly biased. And ultimately, has Husserl really shown to Europe a dangerous way of thinking which threatens her? These questions should be kept in mind as we proceed, and to be fair in tackling these among a variety of related questions, one needs to contextualize the *Krisis* text.

I have already contended that we should take the *Krisis* text as "a cry in the wilderness." (It was in 1933-1936 Germany, when Husserl struggled). Husserl was passionate about his mission and vision, to show Europe her 'reasoning capacity. To enlighten the people of Europe about their tradition of philosophising, he goes back to the ancient days of philosophy. He reminds his fellow Europeans that being a European is to be a bearer of a great tradition, i.e., to philosophise. Philosophising for Husserl is knowing while being conscious of the process itself, and thus 'doing phenomenology' on one's own process of thinking. 'Reason' should not only take a physicalistic objectivity as the whole truth. There is much more. It is not a structured whole, the articulated moments of which can and must be investigated. For Husserl 'reason' is viewed as 'essentially becoming', a constant unfolding, and in its unfolding it is necessarily coming to itself.  

His vision is of the possibility of creating a universally accepted philosophy. But in this new light, this "philosophy" is not a body of doctrinal statements. Husserl's days are described as full of positivistic-scientism on the one side and empiricistic-scepticism on the other. Thus in this situation, creating a body of philosophical teaching (systema) is certainly not in Husserl's mind at all. Although a

168 This reminds me of Hegel's thesis in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the only difference is that Hegel substantialized 'spirit' when it comes to its own fullness. G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A. V. Miller. (Oxford University Press, 1977).
169 For example in E. Ströker. *Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology*. Trans. L. Hardy. (Stanford University Press, 1993), and
feeble attempt at it needs to be recognised too, in his *First Philosophy* I and II (1923-24), as for now, it is a matter of creating a methodology, a rigorous attitude and its execution, by which one can overcome the scientism and scepticism of his day. This creation is at the same time an admission that human enlightened knowledge through reasoning is not an absolute certain knowledge, modelled after mathematical knowledge. It means that, to reiterate, "doing philosophy" is applying the phenomenological method to our thinking processes, hence all 'results' of previous thinkers need not be accepted and repeated as 'truth', just like that, but need to be processed again in the mind of subsequent thinkers, and appropriated for the value they offer. Thus the thoughts of Galileo, Descartes and Kant who struggle to make the world intelligible need to be struggled through by us in the same way again and again. It is not doing philosophy properly, if we but repeat Galileo's, Descartes' and Kant's conclusions as if we 'understand' the world, through them. It is rather that through the process of philosophising as a compelling force within history, by using a build-up of reasoning, we 'understand' the world, since we are convinced that reason as such cannot act irrationally. Reason will decide according to its insights, hence decisions as to what to use as appropriate is also at the same time a self-realization and part of a movement toward *telos*.

To show this deep underlying human struggle Husserl has deliberately selected Galileo, Descartes and Kant and several others, in lesser roles. It seems almost like an *argumentum ad hominem*, but here is the accomplished philosopher sharing the way for others as he applies his own effective method for himself, and a method intrinsically *historical* in its grounding. And then when a personal situation affects Husserl, after he has delivered the Vienna and Prague lectures, lectures given with the same mission and passion as the writing of the *Krisis*-text, the latter work may be taken as an elaboration of this vision, written in a great haste and in a feeling of urgency.

The implication of the *Krisis* text then, is that it was not only another new way for Husserl to introduce Phenomenology, but it was also his coming to terms with history in a complete way, so that all his previous concepts now gained a new dimension, indeed a new meaning. Phenomenology has

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171 The text sent off to Prague on Jan. 24, 1936. (Husserl-Chronik, 472).
explicated the core of what thinking/reasoning is all about. It has not been done in a vacuum, but in historical settings. Phenomenology is not a debate about how to formulate thinking-theories. But it has observed how thinking processes are emerging in particular historical moments, within particular intentional scopes. Hence, Husserl cited Galileo, Descartes and Kant as key examples of those historical moments to clarify his own insights about the underlying process. He also tried to describe them as examples of human intentions, rather than their thinking results, that have either as failed or succeeded in the systems-building of philosophy. Husserl, we must acknowledge more clearly, did not come to terms with history easily. We have an entire series of manuscripts K III from the archives, in which Husserl asks himself why philosophy should need history, and they reveal how hard for him the question was. But he faced up to what he realized was a pressing necessity.

Judging from the urgency of his mission and vision, his way of scanning for meaning throughout the history of philosophical struggles begins to make sense. His scanning was not to give a full detailed philosophical panorama, but to spotlight the points of important philosophical struggle. Husserl's own struggle had been brought on by his attempt to understand how it was possible for science to have fallen into such a critical stage that it offers an imposing and very useful knowledge of nature but fails to know humans, i.e., ourselves. Indeed the ancient European 'know thyself' principle had been betrayed.

5 The Other Crisis Texts from the Nachlass

-Husserliana VI, edited by Walter Biemel, 1954, part 3 edited in 2 parts


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174 Not all the texts concerning the issues of crisis have been published in Husserliana VI and XXIX. After Biemel edition, Smid published these other texts while avoiding possible repetitions, selected from the K III and M III collections.

175 Biemel's Krisis texts (1954), Krisis I, and Smid's Krisis texts (1993) Krisis II.
Husserl's intention to publish the whole three parts of the *Krisis texts* in a sequence of instalments, was postponed, and only the first two parts were published, in 1936 as mentioned above. With the publication of Husserliana VI. in 1954, however, we now have all the three parts of the *Krisis* texts, as it was intended to be published by Husserl himself. Biemel's inclusion of part III, needs to be more comprehensively contextualised after Smid's publication of *Krisis II*, in Husserliana XXIX, in 1993.

Husserliana VI as we now have it though, also contains many supplementary texts: three *Abhandlungen* and 29 *Beilagen*. Two of the *Abhandlungen* are Husserl's early attempts to work out ideas to be found later in the *Krisis*. The third one, is the famous *Vienna Lecture*. The other *Beilagen* texts that have been included in this edition are "*Forschungsmanuskripte*" (*research mss*), never intended to be published. Husserl's later corrections and revisions therein need to be taken into account to supplement the unsatisfying part III of *Krisis I* of the Biemel edition.

Furthermore, after the publication of *Krisis II*, in Husserliana XXIX, we are now in the position to expand our contextual understanding of the crisis issues, as Husserl saw it. In other words, Husserl's *Krisis* texts from both Husserliana VI and XXIX can and need to be read as one opus, and in my opinion the published text has more of an authenticity of Husserl's opinion at that particular stage, than the research manuscripts in which Husserl had a habit 'to think while writing.' As we see, Husserliana XXIX, contains supplementary texts around the European crisis issues, the texts themselves being taken mainly from the K III and M III documents of the Husserl Archives. Reinhold N. Smid has edited these texts and they are understood by him to be specifically written by Husserl with the intention to be published in *Philosophia* following the *Krisis* part I and II in 1936 Smid placing them in the right chronological order.

As an introduction to a new systematic philosophical method, this collection of texts remains an unfinished work in the sense that it has never satisfied the author himself. Due to the limited focus of my thesis, the relevant *Krisis* texts which have been investigated in depth here are only those that could be regarded as a source of a philosophy of history.

176 I am following A. Steinbock, to call Hua VI, *Krisis I* and Hua XXIX, *Krisis II*.
177 *Krisis II*, 556.
178 ibid. p xii
Smid edited this collection of texts and divided them in four divisions in chronological order.

The first division (written between August 1934-November 1935) are the texts pertaining the geo-social-historical becoming issues. According to Steinbock, they would have belonged to the intended part 4 and 5 of the incomplete *Krisis* if, as he thinks we ought to follow Fink's suggestion.

The second division (written between November 1935-Summer 1936), with the exception of the Prague lecture, (nr.10) is a collection of drafts, appendices, and emendations which were meant to prepare the publication of part 3 of *Krisis I*.

The third division (written in Summer 1936) contains writings designated for the reworking of part III of *Krisis I*. These writings are somewhat similar to the second division mentioned above.

The fourth division (written between January 1937-Summer 1937) is Husserl's lengthy treatment of the notion of teleology in the history of philosophy. We need to come back to some of Husserl's ponderings here when discussing the 'Inner History from Crisis' (Ch. 5. section 5).

**The implications**

For Husserl this crisis issue must be overcome once and for all. This cannot be done by substituting any given philosophical system with his system, in fact he has no system as such, in spite of his attempt in the 1920s to systematize his thinking. The *Erste Philosophie* lectures of 1923-24 were the result of that period. But it did not come to fruition. Although no clearly defined system has been created, and yet a style of doing philosophy that Husserl calls transcendental phenomenology, has been a very persistent feature of his philosophy.

In 1927 Husserl published an article in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, in which his idea about a philosophical 'system' has become clear. He says,

180 *Krisis I*, 514-516.
181 I have to leave this section aside, until Ch. 5 section 5
Demnach fordert die Phänomenologie vom Phänomenologen, für sich dem Ideal eines philosophischen Systems zu entsagen und doch als bescheidener Arbeiter in Gemeinschaft mit anderen für eine philosophia perennis zu leben.

(Accordingly, phenomenology demands that the phenomenologist foreswear the ideal of a philosophic system and yet as a humble worker in community with others, live for a perennial philosophy).

Ströker, commented on Husserl's later work that,

... the wide range of themes and the many repetitions in Husserl's later research. It also explains Husserl's failure to order them systematically, a lapse that seems odd in that Husserl spared nothing by way of systematic rigor in details of analysis. What nevertheless held these highly disparate investigations of manifold themes together and fitted them into an organised unity, was Husserl's goal of a phenomenological grounding of science.

One dissonant opinion whether or not Husserl had a philosophical system is, that of David Woodruff Smith in his publication Husserl, he stated

Of the great thinkers in the West, the greatest systematic philosophers were arguably first Aristotle and then Kant. Husserl joins these two. I submit, on a short list of greatest systematic philosophers, those who produced a truly wide-ranging system of philosophy and worked out exceedingly careful details through the system. There are other systematic thinkers of great stature - Aquinas, Hegel, Whitehead. But my thesis here is that the greatest systematic philosophers are Aristotle, Kant and Husserl - not least because each system in this sequence can be seen as a successor system that radically changes and improves on its predecessor.

Husserl's works from The Logical Investigations (1901/1913) to Ideas I (1913), and further to Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929) and we may include the Cartesian Meditations (in its French translation 1931), could indeed still be defended as 'systematic' in their content. But since 1934 when the revisions to create a German text of the Meditations was dropped, and the writing of the Crisis started, it is convincing that we could not speak of any system anymore.

Specifically in the Crisis I text, the transcendental phenomenology has an 'entry point', which is...
the history of our own philosophising. Not only mathematics and sciences need to be brought back to their origin, but history and our human-historicising-existence needs to be brought back to its origin too. In other words, the essence our consciousness, which is being conscious of our world, in its constant temporal changing givenness, needs to be explicated to ourselves. This is ultimately Husserl's phenomenology of his own phenomenologising of the history of western-philosophy.

Husserl has a deep appreciation for Galileo, Descartes and Kant in a special way, since especially these three thinkers are attempting to radicalise western thinking processes. Or at least these three thinkers are excellent examples of how to highlight European enterprise in philosophy in the modern time. By the same token Husserl has his sharp criticisms against these three thinkers. For Galileo it is that he has not always been aware that his method is but a method and not the whole truth about the world. For Descartes it is that he is not aware that he is not radical enough by excluding the ego, in the ego cogito, hence did not begin philosophy ab ovo. For Kant it is that, in his pure subjectivity, this representation (of the objects perceived) has been dislodged from the objects outside, hence it does not give guarantee that through it the world "out there" can be known anymore.

But in spite of all this, we European thinkers, are able to radicalise ourselves (going back to our radix, root), which quality has tended to disappear in Husserl's imaging of his own days. This European ability is inherited as our European human-essence (as long as we do not understand 'essence' as an 'entity' outside our historical being-in-the-world). In Husserl's time especially around 1933, there were radical demands (of students, backed up by their professors) to restructure the universities with even those who still believed in the Humboldt-style university -whom Sluga called 'conservatives' also wanting "to adjust" philosophy to "the need of time,"as expressed in Magdeburg and Leipzig meetings of that year. Husserl sees such strange new promises as a sign of the disappearing of universally valid philosophy and hence of European humanity falling into crisis. What is worth noting in the Krisis text is that History and the reflection (Besinnung) of history needs to be "purified." Husserl certainly heard of and read the support of the philosophers to the Nazi regime, since Heidegger's Rektors Rede and others' inaugural speeches and let alone the Magdeburg and Leipzig meetings, were widely public; and

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186 Alex von Humbolt (1769-1859) and Wilhelm von Humbolt (1767-1835) both very influential in Berlin University at that time.
yet without responding specifically to these events at all, Husserl saw a deeper need to 'correct' the historical thinking of his time. \(^{187}\) I am convinced that Husserl's Philosophy of History, not uninfluenced by Hegel's model of Philosophy of History, and also Dilthey's works \(^ {188}\) (as it will be elaborated in Chapter Six) was a purer philosophical response to his situation: hence we can justifiably write of his conversion to history and going back to the root his reason of the ancient Greeks, with an unexpectedly reorientation of phenomenology \(^ {189}\).

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\(^{187}\) see nr. 4 of this Chapter


\(^{189}\) Husserl had given up the project of a final version of the *Cartesian Meditations* altogether, in favour of the *Crisis,* as his final definitive introduction to phenomenology.
Chapter Five. Toward a Philosophy of History

Husserl's "conversion" toward history.

The meditation on history, is now seen as one way of doing phenomenology. In this chapter the meditations on the Pure Consciousness and the meditations on the Internal-Time Consciousness can be seen to converge. He speaks further about the two levels of historicity.

1 A short overall view
3 1959. Erste Philosophie zweiter Teil (mss 1923-24). Hua VIII,
4 From Intersubjectivity's perspective
5 Inner history from the 'Crisis'

Praenotanda 1

Geist,

Geistesgeschichte, history of cultural knowledge (in Husserl's historical perception) is the struggle between objectivism and transcendentalism; the enfleshment of ideas.

Praenotanda 2

Geschichte,\(^{190}\) history (sometimes also Historie), geschehen, to happen, to occur.

'Historie' entered into German language via the Latin, historia, ca. thirteenth century. The original Greek historein simply means to inquire, to explore, hence 'e historia, means a written account of an inquiry.\(^{191}\) In the eighteenth century the usage was tended to be repressed by that of Geschichte, a native German word.

Geisteswissenschaft, see Praenotanda 3 of Chapter Two.

Praenotanda 3

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The English word 'mind' has no German equivalent. In German we find Gemüt, Seele, and Geist. Gemüt, originally means a totality of one's feelings. Also used for Innerlichkeitkeit, inwardness. Later in Leibniz it includes the capacity for thought, and also the capacity of understanding and willing. Seele, corresponds with psyche, anima, soul. In classical Aristotle soul means just 'principle of life' without being turned into a substance. In the classical Scholastics, soul is just a forma-substantialis, which needs a materia-prima to be able to exist. The later Scholastics started discussing about the possibility of anima-separata (the soul seperated from the body). In the New Testament anthropology psyche, pneuma, (or the translations of the Old Testament's nefesh and ruach) tend to be spoken of as if a substance.  

Later on, and since Descartes, the soul "has become" a distinct substance. Geist, carries a wide range of meanings, and was developed in Hegel, and after him. While soul-consciousness-spirit become the same entity with a different perspectives, spirit is then the the spirit-entity seen in itself.  

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1. An overall view.  
Husserl did not write an explicit philosophy of history, the way Hegel did. Up until the writing of the Krisis texts, in 1934-’37, he had not much interest in history, so it seemed. He was even against Dilthey's earlier 'historicism'. Although Dilthey had moved on from that position, in his publication of Gesammelte Schriften VII, (Leipzig 1927), Husserl was still criticising him for his 'historicism'. However, between 1921-28, we find some of Husserl's texts that involved discussing history. These are the texts in question, from three main sources:  

Erste Philosophie. Erster Teil. (Hua VII) p. 141-142 where the concept of 'inner-history' emerged.  

Erster Philosophie. Zweiter Teil, Hua VIII (Beilage III) p. 327 where Husserl renounced history, and yet in the same book (Beilage XXXII) on p. 506, he came to reconsider history in a  

different light.

**Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Zweiter Teil**, Hua XIV (Beilage XVII) p. 217-225 which contains the only passage where Husserl approached history from the aspect on intersubjectivity. The status of the first two books are such that they were 'intended to be published,' except their Beilagen, and the latter one is a Forschung Manuskript.

Then there came the publication of the *Krisis I* (part I and II, in 1936)\(^{196}\). In it Husserl meditates on history at several places, specifically in §§ 6 and 15, when we limit ourselves to the published text of 1936. I venture even to speak about Husserl's 'conversion toward history' when I base my reading of his opus on the larger collection of texts of *Krisis I*, (i.e., not only part I, II, but also included III A and B, in Hua VI, 1954, which was eventually published as was intended by Husserl himself), and the Forschung Manuskripte in the Biemel edition as Beilage esp. nr. 28, p. 508-513.

Furthermore, in his *Krisis II* (Nachlass, Hua XXIX, 1993) as indicated on p. lxiii, in Nr. 4, 40:1 - 41:14. Husserl spoke about the 'Two Levels of Historicity, and in Nr. 32, 362-413 (esp., 398-403) he wrote about 'Teleology in the History of Philosophy'. (In Chapter 4 *Krisis II*, Hua XXIX, is only mentioned in passing). If we put all these together, then we will have a collection of texts as impressive as Hegel's lectures on Philosophy of History. We will come back to this when we deal with the 'inner history'. (ad. 5 ut infra).

2. *Erste Philosophie I*, subtitled: 'Kritische Ideengeschichte'.

The years 1923-24 amount to a small period in which Husserl attempted to create a system\(^{197}\). His winter semester lectures, later prepared to be published as *Erste Philosophie*, with the subtitle, *Kritische Ideengeschichte*, indicated that Husserl sought to present his philosophy while at the same time explicate the implicit history behind it. Later in his second volume, Husserl would deal with his own specifics: 'Theorie der phänomenologische Reduktion'.\(^{198}\) The fact that somehow he did not fully

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196 The term *Krisis I* and *Krisis II*, see Ch. 2, ftn. 15
198 Schuhmann, K. Chronik p. 278.
succeed to "create and build a system", as well as publish such a book in his lifetime, is beside the point and it is not necessarily a bad thing. The name, "first philosophy" reminds us of course of Aristotle and Descartes as indeed Husserl had intended the title to do. When we read these Freiburg lectures, the first volume, where Husserl started with Plato, then Aristotle, Descartes, Locke-Berkeley-Hume they seem no different than any other courses in history of philosophy, i.e., in studying systems of thought one after another. But in fact, his procedure is more than that. In doing this historical reflection Husserl discovered, that "history of philosophy [presents] not as a more or less fortuitous succession of philosophical systems and theories, but rather as a polymorphic 'unity of motivation'". That was already his view in 1923. This is what I have considered mentioned earlier as his 'emerging philosophy of history' even though Husserl was not planning such a thing at all (cf., above). In Husserl's own words,

Gerade diese Quelle aber interessiert uns nach dem ganzen Gang und Sinn unserer ideengeschichtlich-kritischen Betrachtungen vor allem anderen. Denn es handelt sich uns in diesen Betrachtungen um nichts geringeres als darum, die Einheit der durch Jahrtausende hindurchgehenden Motivation bloßzulegen, welche als Entwicklungstrieb in aller Philosophie lebte. .

(But straight away these sources interest us because of the whole course and meaning of our meditations for all other people according to the critical perspective and the perspective of the history of ideas. Because in the meditations we are making explicit not less than exactly the unity of motivation through the thousand years. This unity of motivation have lived as the main spring of the development of all philosophies).

This "Einheit der Motivation welche als Entwicklungstrieb in aller Philosophie" has become a Husserlian conviction while reading and lecturing history of philosophy and of such sciences as geometry. Here we see "Husserl arrived at what is absolutely first and fundamental," and approached what he also called the hidden 'telos' of all sciences since St. Augustine. (Now we understand where the telos in Krisis originated from, even prior to Krisis, in his Prague lectures it already appeared). I will call this Husserl's 'philosophy of history', in other words, this is how Husserl's understanding of history had been shaped. This new insight became the core-dynamics of his own philosophising from then on.

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199 Husserl himself mentioned Aristotle's work which ususally is called "Metaphysics" and Descartes' Meditationes de prima philosophia, in his Erste Philosophie I, Kap.1.


See also, E. Ströker, Husserl's Transcendental Philosophy. Trans. L. Hardy. (Stanford U. P., 1993) 230

201 Ströker, ibid.
Philosophy as "the systematic result of a theoretical interest that has been freed of all other aims, of the interest in the truth solely for the sake of truth," is now given a historical dimension. History, is now understood philosophically as an polymorphic expression with a unity of motivation as its developmental drive. Thus Husserl's plan through the First Philosophy is to give his philosophy a new legitimation, and he now acknowledges in these lectures that History can be a point of entry to philosophise, a point he will be expanding in the Krisis. But here in the First Philosophy we encounter only his beginning, and after it, we do not find any further elaboration of the discovered Philosophy of History until much later. We are left until then only uncovering odd stepping-stones.


In this second book, Husserl continues reflecting on the philosophical underpinning of his First Philosophy. Regarding the philosophical reflection on History, there is one text, which says that,

\[ \text{die Geschichte is das große Faktum des absoluten Seins; und die letzten Fragen, die} \]

Nicht erforderlich ist, obschon zur empirischen Durchkämpfung nutzlich, eine durchgeführte Kritik aller historischen Erkentnistheorien mit ihrem sehr differenzierten Zufälligkeitsgehalt.

(It is not necessary, to perform a critique of all historical cognition theories with all their very subtle arbitrary by-chance meanings, although it is beneficial to struggle through them).

Here Husserl seemed to express his doubt, even his renouncing of historical cognition theories, or was Husserl in this Forschung-manuskript, just thinking aloud regarding the matter? I have alluded here to the sensitive issue regarding the status of the documents as 'ready for publication,' or as a research document. In the next chapter, I will deal with this issue more at length. Suffice to say as for now, one has to be cautioned that it is very hard to distinguish Husserl's certain opinion (at a certain stage) from any 'still tentative formulation' of his views.

For in the same collection Husserl is found saying,

\[ \text{Die Geschichte} \]


\footnotesize{204} Since we know that Husserl has a habit of thinking while writing, it follows that reading his Nachlass one needs to make a distinction (at least being aware) between manuscripts ready for publication, or even having been published and his Forschung mss. as far as the certainty of his opinion is.
I regard this statement sounds more affirming than the previous one quoted to history. This quotation, however, is from a Forschung Mss., and so the same caution applies.

At least we can deduce that in the now published Erste Philosophie I and II and (Hua VII and VIII) and their Beilagen, we are witnessing Husserl own struggle in coming to grips with the place of history in his attempt to systematize his First Philosophy.

4. From other mss., from the perpective of Intersubjectivity

Iso Kern has made 'Intersubjectivity' his theme to collect Husserl's Nachlass. He did that in three volumes. For my purpose of tracing Husserl's interest in Philosophy of History, the second volume in its Beilage XXVII is importatnt. In it Husserl approaches history from the viewpoint of intersubjectivity. Although we only have research manuscripts, and no publication, concerning this issue, the context of this group of texts, is Husserl's intention to complete his 'Cartesian Meditations', which (at the time) had not yet been published for a German audience, and by doing extra writing he had hoped to complete his goal to publish a statement on his systematic philosophy based on the prewritten manuscripts of the Cartesian Meditations plan, but by 1934 he finally dropped this plan altogether. After that decision, Husserl came to a break-through in his own thinking as announced the Krisis text.

5. Inner History from the Crisis texts.

In Chapter 4 section 5, this particular matter could not be meditated through properly since the data of

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205 E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie II, Hua VIII, Blg XXXII, (Mss. more likely 1924) 506.
the *First Philosophy* have not been mentioned and investigated as I have just done.

I will now start examining the *Krisis* texts again, (without repeating my explications in Chapter 4 concerning the genesis of the text) and then some earlier texts, to put these *Krisis* text against their contextual background.

Indeed I will now elaborate on Husserl's *Philosophy of History*, as I see it, through detailed interpretations of his explicit statements, contextualizing then the texts to show how he has understood such a Philosophy, and how he defined it.

I will start with what Husserl was saying,

> Geschicht ist von vorherein nichts anderes als die lebendige Bewegung des Miteinander und Ineinander von Ursprünglicher Sinnbildung und Sinnsedimentierung \(^{208}\)

(History is from the start nothing but the vital movement of being-with-one-another and being-in-one-another of the original formation and sedimentation of meaning).\(^{209}\)

The context is, that "to understand geometry or any given cultural fact is to be conscious of its historicity, albeit implicitly."\(^{210}\) A kind of a historical attitude is promoted here, which is not the attitude of *Wesenanschauung* (intuition of the essence) of Ideas Book I (back then in 1913) anymore.

This is Husserl's core "definition" of history, his *philosophy of history*. He has put it succinctly for the first time. The implication being that, one 'given cultural fact' is history itself, described by Husserl here as 'the vital movement of being-with-one-another and being-in-one-another of the original formations of meaning and sedimentations of meaning.' Hence investigating this 'movement' is doing a Philosophy of History. Philosophically, to be conscious of our co-existing and our interpenetrating-existence in our original formation of meaning and sedimentation of meaning, is to be in a historising existence, to be historically existing. 'To be conscious' admittedly, is an act of 'being-conscious now' while the 'original formation of meaning' and 'original sedimentation of meaning' is a formation and sedimentation that have started in the past and will be continuing till now, and after now. Such

\(^{208}\) *Krisis I*, Hua VI, 380. *Crisis*, 371. a mss. of 1936, originally published and titled by E. Fink in 1939 as *Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentionalthistorisches Problem*, in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 1Jhrg. nr 2, 203-225.

Carr's translation modified, thereby it has become more literal. This *Beilage* was meant to be included in § 9 a. according to Carr's footnote p. 353

\(^{209}\) Carr has translated *Miteinander* and *Ineinander* as 'co-existence' and 'interweaving', I find those too far from the literal German, hence my translation.

\(^{210}\) *Crisis*, 370.
foundation is a 'movement' in time and sequence of be-ing, both being historical and calling for a history.

Speaking about a telos, a teleology, is speaking from a philosophical position concerning a shape and a meaning of the sequence of processes of thinking which we observe as unfolding and which we observe phenomenologically.

Quoting Husserl again "the whole cultural present (Kulturgegenwart), understood as a totality, implies, the whole cultural past (Kulturvergangenheit)."\(^{211}\) So he explains further, "it implies a continuity of pasts which implies one-another each in itself being a past cultural present."\(^{212}\) Although Husserl was using geometry and pushing it back to its origins (hence E. Fink's title, shortened by D. Carr in his translation: The Origin of Geometry\(^{213}\), we can apply this style of investigation to any cultural data. In this chapter, I am only explicating 'philosophy' as one cultural datum, and 'history' as another one, and so we are able to see how the Husserlian Philosophy of History has taken shape.

In the previous chapter, I have examined those Krisis texts where Husserl had treated the scientific developments and reflected their impacts on the history of Europe. By doing what he did, his Philosophy of History has emerged. I used the word "emerge," since for Husserl there had been so far no obvious planning to design a Philosophy of History, or nothing comparable to the way he planned to write a Philosophy of Arithmetic, Logical Investigations or Ideas I, and his last publication before 1936, Formal and Transcendental Logic.\(^{214}\) In all these publications Husserl has been definitely meditating on arithmetic, logic, ideas, formal and transcendental logic all of them as though they were "above history, and not influenced by history", as transcendental ideas.

The fact that the Krisis text was a new \(^{215}\) 'Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy' (indicated by the subtitle), and that it incorporated 'history' as one of its paths to do phenomenology, "][may well] strike one as strange indeed."\(^{216}\) The 'strangeness' is because in Husserl's works published

\(^{211}\) Ibid., 371.
\(^{212}\) Ibid., 371
\(^{213}\) Published by Fink for the first time in Revue internationale de philosophie vol I nr. 2 (1939)
\(^{214}\) published in 1929.
\(^{215}\) the last publication with a subtitle 'an introduction' was Husserl's french Méditations cartésiennes , Traduit par G. Peiffer et E. Levinas. (Paris: A. Colin, 1931).
during his lifetime thus far, there seemed to be very little about history, in fact nothing significant at all. Nonetheless, we have shown that considered reading of the later Husserliana Beilagen, reveals some signs of a "struggle" in Husserl's thinking to branch out into history in his own way, as evidenced in the texts of his research manuscripts, we have examined, and even before his 1936 publication of the Krisis, as we have seen above.

However, it is always important to make a clear distinction between the (ready to be, and) published texts, and all other Husserl's research manuscripts. In the next chapter, when discussing 'Philosophy of History beyond Husserl's texts', we will always have to keep that basic distinction in mind.

217 This is E. Ströker's publication of Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Schriften (in 8 volumes) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1992) "als eigene Schriften Husserls von besonderer Authentizität" (vol 1 p. v). I hereby gratefully acknowledge this clear distinction that Prof. Ströker suggested, as very helpful, in distinctione salus, as we say.
Chapter Six. The Phenomenological Philosophy of History

The History of European people is a constant human effort to focus on a telos. And in Husserl's interpretation of history, this telos is what he sees as a constantly bursting out of human thinking, on the surface of chronological time. Thus we have philosophers and even philosophies.

1 Beyond Husserl's texts
2 How to read history philosophically
3 Doing History as doing Phenomenology

1 Beyond Husserl's texts

This heading could be taken to mean 'beyond Husserl's published texts during his lifetime' or even beyond the 'archival texts which have been published continuously since the publication of the first Husserliana series in 1950.'

Husserl died in 1938, leaving us with a mass of written yet unpublished pages. As Anthony J. Steinbock has put it,

An overwhelming proportion of Husserl's writings were never intended for publication; many have the tenor of experimental investigations, often challenging the reader with repetitions, sharp transitions, laconic phrasing, and incomplete sentences. Husserl would take up a theme, develop it, consider it from different angles, relate it to other themes (sometimes irreconcilably), let it ferment for a time and pick it up even years later.218

And yet many of his disjecta membra have been published by different scholars at different times. The whole project of putting all his work to press started in 1950 with the publication of the Cartesianische Meditationen, the first production in the Husserliana series. At the time of writing this thesis, 2003-2006, the Husserliana series has reached vol. XXXVIII, published in 2004. Many of these volumes were Forschung-manuskripte (research manuscripts), never intended to be published.

Elisabeth Ströker, who wanted to present what is "als eigene Schriften Husserls von besonderer Authentizität, (as Husserl's own writings with a special authenticity)" published simply those texts

which Husserl himself had published in his lifetime, or those mss. which *had been prepared to be published*, such as the *Erste Philosophie* (1923-24), *Cartesianische Meditationen* (1929), and *Krisis* (3e Teil) included (1936/1954).

This clarifying statement is necessary to my position regarding what I call "Husserl's texts." Following Ströker, I regard all texts published by Husserl himself and also those prepared to be published, as obviously "Husserl's texts". I also regard these "*als eigene Schriften Husserls von besonderer Authentizität.*"

However, I would go further than Ströker, for I will also include all public lectures, e.g., the famous *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis*, later in Husserliana XI (1966) and *Active Syntheses*, later in Husserliana XXXI (2000), as simply Husserl's texts as well. And concerning the *Forschung Manuskripte*, usually included as *Beilagen*, and all the texts not yet published in Husserliana but already housed and classified in the Husserl Archives, they are also of course Husserl's texts in the physical sense written by him, very useful to understand his thinking, although, as Steinbock put it, some have "the tenor of experimental investigations," and thus are not always not a definitive opinion of Husserl concerning a certain matter at a certain stage of his thinking. The latter texts I hesitate at calling "Husserl's texts", but with some indications of their status of being a research mss. they still need to be mentioned, thereby recognizing their "tenor of experimental investigations."

When dealing with Husserl's texts regarding history, then, we not only have the published texts, such as the *Krisis*, but we also possess *Erste Philosophie* text, prepared to be published, as well as reasearch mss. in their *Beilagen*. I think to be sensitive to these *nuances* is very necessary in this thesis, to contextualize Husserl's opinion regarding history, and to determine as much as possible Husserl's own nuanced opinions concerning it, and perhaps Husserl's unfinished struggles to form his definitive opinion. However, while considering their degrees of certainty I will present my reading of the texts to build a philosophy of history *in the spirit* of Husserl's texts, published or otherwise. Since the history of an individual or a group also contain their struggles and not only their achievements, the historical context of Husserl's thinking concerning the issue of historicity must also include his struggles as well as his definitive achievements. This is why the research manusripts, the struggles, as well as the

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manuscripts achieving publication, all need to be recognized and explicated, although at different levels of certainty of opinion.

2 How to read history philosophically

One can read history for the purpose of gathering information. One can also read history as propaganda for certain purposes. One can also read it with a particular intention to understand the hidden dynamics of human endeavour, the human making of history (for a controversial case, e.g., to analyse how the Palestine - Israel problem arose).

As for the "how", of 'how to read history' this could mean to ask questions about how to select what will be read from the whole chronology of remembered facts/ events, and what the selection criteria should be. The "how" could also mean asking questions as to whether a given event is "just what happens" observably, quite apart from the "sources", "causes" or even "motivations" of it, or otherwise, and whether events mean something "deeper" in a larger context, in a "bigger picture" of things. Journalists often claim to present "bare facts," we note, but are there really "bare facts"?

Historiography topically puts early events first and the subsequent ones later, and so on and on. Sequence is often interpreted so as to suggest causality. When we read events after events, a less careful reader will get the impression that early events are causes, directly or indirectly, of later events. Thus for example, World War I is supposed "to have caused" the creation of the League of Nations, and the League's failure had "caused" World War II which in turn "caused" the creation of the United Nations. In the History of Philosophy, one could imagine simplistically that the collapse of the mediaeval Scholastics "caused" confusion in Descartes' perception of Scholastic philosophy, which in turn "caused" his attempts to start philosophy anew; his efforts in turn "caused" the two streams in philosophical thinking (mentioned in Husserl's Crisis): 'positivistic-rationalism' and the 'sceptical-empiricism'. As a foil to this kind of reasoning, Roman wisdom used to have it: post hoc non propter hoc, what comes after, is not because of what has gone before, at least not always.

The Crisis text of 1936 takes up the theme of the 'world' and 'history' and Husserl's approach is certainly different in it than his other earlier texts. Yet this book subtitled 'an introduction to

220 Bertrand Russerl seemed to fall into this trap in his Portraits from Memories and other Essays. London 1956.
phenomenological philosophy', is highly significant in that Husserl introduces phenomenological philosophy in this new way. As the last chapter indicates, Husserl had quite some struggle incorporating history into his phenomenology. It is only at this late stage of his life that he began to see things differently. Hence in the Crisis there is a particular interest in his allowing the philosophy of history to be included in his transcendental phenomenology. And indeed not only is the philosophy of history included in the operation of transcendental phenomenology, it has now become even its foundation. In this way, Husserl's Crisis text both promotes a different way of reading history and thus also promotes a different way of doing phenomenology.

First, the 'History of European people' according to Husserl, is a constant effort to focus on a telos. This telos is not like a blueprint drawn in advance, according to which a building is to be built. It is more of a future possibility which calls us out of our lethargy in thinking. It is the experience of having an image in one's mind, a causa exemplaris, towards which a sculptor is shaping his sculpture. To be able to take a theoretical stance is what makes it possible to understand history as a progression toward a telos, which process of progression is ultimately to raise the human community into a community motivated by a quest of truth. The theoretical stance requisite for this sense of historicity, first appeared, according to Husserl, among the ancient Greeks.

In Husserl's interpretation of history, this telos is what he sees as a constantly bursting out of human thinking on the surface in chronological time. Thus we have philosophers and even philosophies. Even when some thinkers meander, creating seemingly opposing systems of philosophies, Husserl still sees this as the selfsame urge towards the telos within the European history. For Husserl, keeping this telos in mind, is the only way of reading history, so that we Europeans, the bearers of history, are able to know 'who we are', i.e., that we are the people with history-making-existence. It means that for us, to exist as Europeans is to exist-while-making-history. This position echoes Dilthey's assertion that "we are historical beings first before we are observers of history,"

221 Although the writer is not a European by birth and blood-lineage, yet in this study, allow me to address myself as "we Europeans", for two reasons: 1/ this thesis is defending a European point of view regarding historising existence. 2/ I myself deeply intuit that humans are equipped with the power to shape history, (this rational intuition, is very European) within the ever expanding limits of the human means, esp. given the constant growth of human consciousness.

and Husserl was acquainted with Dilthey recently published Gesammelte Schriften volume VII, in 1927, through Ludwig Landgrebe and Georg Misch.

Before going further I should make some observations about Husserl's European-centred notions and cultural influences behind his teleological orientation. Two points require immediate noting about Husserl's understanding of history. His Eurocentric approach, and his deep conviction (or may be his profound understanding) of the link between truth and hope, colour his conception of history as teleological even identification of it as a telos.

Concerning his Eurocentrism, it must be recognized that the context of Husserl's Krisis text was indeed a European audience. At the same time and in the same text Husserl also claims that the telos of philosophy is universal in that it strives to attain an identical truth which is valid for all who are no longer blinded by traditions. If we would accuse Husserl as Eurocentric in a pejorative sense, then we can also include all philosophical writers, the Roman, the Greeks, and other non-Europeans, who have done the same. The only weak point of Husserl's Eurocentrism is that he did emphasize it (as in the case of Hegel and in his Philosophy of History lectures in 1830-1831) in a too explicit and convinced way, as if there were absolutely no other possibilities at all, and Husserl nowhere nods in the direction of non-Western philosophies. Qui nimis probat nihil probat. Yet Galileo, Descartes and Kant have been chosen by Husserl as examples in Crisis, to highlight this view. For Husserl it does not seem important to know each and every detail of the history of philosophers and philosophies. But he wants to give us a method by which we are 'able to read' the meaning of history, whichever part we want to read. In these three examples of Galileo, Descartes and Kant, Husserl depicts clearly history as a possibility of a "break-through" of human spirit from the burden of the non-thinking mass. In spite of their shortcomings, these men were pioneer-thinkers of their time, they happen to be Western because it was in the West where breakthroughs into modernity occurred. Husserl complains that philosophers of mathematics and sciences of his time are not there as philosophers anymore, since mathematicians and

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223 [3 footnotes]: (a) Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), his last professorial position was at Berlin University. He was the one who, in opposition to positivistic and scientistic philosophies of the time, emphasized the difference between Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft. In the former we seek causality, in the latter we seek understanding. [Cf., Husserl's Ideas II, Hrsg. Marly Biemel. Hua IV, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1952) §54-64 concerning 'Motivation.' - pto.-
scientists have become more experts technicians and less original thinkers.

Concerning the link between truth and hope, which then causes Husserl to uncover the telos in history, I would argue that it is motivated, at least implicitly, by Husserl's background in the culture of the Judaistic Torah. The text of his Prague lecture mentions,

Er müßte dabei also einsichtig werden, daß sie in ihrem radikalen Selbstverständnis den Anspruch erheben kann und muß, alle erdenklichen Seinsprobleme, vor allem die letzten und höchsten Sinnesprobleme für Welt und menschlichen Dasein, in der Systematik ihrer Arbeit zu umfangen; aber auch daß sie dabei schließlich befähigt sein wird, den beiden Sinnesquellen, aus denen das europäische Menschentum im Altertum entsprungen: die griechische Philosophie und dem jüdisch-christlichen Monotheismus die endgültige Form der teleologischen Auswirkung zu geben, in welcher sie zu einer letzten Ausgleichung kommen.

(Thus, It must be understood that they in their radical self-understanding can and must above all raise the demand that embraces in the systematic of their work, all the conceivable problems of being, the last and the highest problems of meaning, for the world and for the humane human-being; but also that they will also be extremely capable to raise both sources of meaning, scil., out of their European humanity in its ancient heritage: the Greek philosophy and the Jewish-Christian monotheism, which give the conclusive form of the teleological solution, in which they will come toward their last reconciliation).

The Greek philosophy and Jewish-Christian monotheism, are singled out to be as the origin of meaning of teleology, in which the last reconciliation will come. In the Torah, especially in the second Book, *We'elleh Semot*, the *Exodus*, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is depicted as "walking in front of the people" and thereby eventually leading them into the land, as promised. In the Christian tradition it is the Letter to the Romans, and the Apocalypse that speak about the last reconciliation most clearly. (It is better not to specify, since Husserl himself did not specify which part of the Jewish-Christian heritage he actually meant when he wrote this piece). Nevertheless, here we see the truth, and the hope, go hand in hand to shape the, for lack of a better word, the destiny, or the telos. It is clear from the

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224 (b) Ludwig Landgrebe (1902-1991), Husserl's professorial assistant 1923-1930, who helped him editing *Formale und transzendentale Logik* (published by Husserl in 1929), and he himself published *Erfahrung und Urteil* (1939, as an example of their collaboration).

(c) George Misch, who due to his concentration on logic, had appropriated it to the phenomenology as a whole. (Husserl's Briefwechsel Vi. Hrsg. Karl Schuhmann. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994) 282-283. Misch had been a more a student of Dithey, and according to Husserl he misunderstood phenomenology. He published *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie* (1929).

*Krisis II, Hua xxix, Prager Vorträge*, 109
Vienna and especially the Prague lectures how Husserl's reading of history, has come together. Hence it is not a "directionalism" in the sense of a dialectic outcome at the end of an historical process. Husserl's teleology is an option chosen by going back to the origin of our European thinking.

In his Vienna lectures Husserl depicted a history in the tradition of the Greek thinkers. The human spirit burst out into its concrete expressions in history so that history can be "read" and interpreted as human spirit taking concrete forms. For Husserl the ideal outburst of the human spirit happened with the ancient Greek philosophers. By asking the question 'why are the things the way they are?' these thinkers were pioneer as to how to philosophize.

In his Prague lectures, while Husserl described history in the tradition of both the Greeks and the Jews, he also underscores his praise of the Greeks as pioneers of European thinking, while adding the Jewish-Christian tradition as another source of the European 'critical thinking attitude.'

In *Krisis* 1936

As we know already, Galileo, Descartes and Kant, are chosen to highlight the concrete forms of European thinking, but at the same time criticized as falling short from the ideal. But there is a smaller text of relevance here, also a text from 1936, included as *Beilage* iii in the Biemel edition of the *Krisis I* known as *The Origin of Geometry*. First published by E. Fink in 1939, we can use it to penetrate deeper into Husserl's question into history via his quest into the origin of geometry. According to Husserl this quest "surely never occurred in Galileo." Husserl wants to go further back into the origin, while according to him Galileo only wanted to use the tradition of geometry to do his work. Though small, *The Origin* still neatly illustrate the formation of Husserl's approach to history.

For Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), we may note *en passant*, this text has become his starting point of his deconstructive critique of Phenomenology. Following Husserl, Derrida explores the philosophical roots and the tradition of geometry as a kind of history. In other words, Derrida uses *The Origin* as

225 Ch. 4, ad 3 of this thesis: The Vienna and Prague lectures and Husserl's situation in Freiburg and the newly promulgated laws against Jews, these all contribute directly to Husserl's *Crisis* publication in haste.

226 Appendix 6 in David Carr's translation.

227 in *Revue internationale de philosophie* vol 1 no 2

228 *Crisis*, 353 / *Krisis I*, 365
significant model for Philosophising about History.  

But let us get back to Husserl's own words concerning history, first in the *Krisis I* then in the *Krisis II* collections of texts, that impinge on history.

In *Krisis I* (HUA VI) # 6, we read "Philosophy and Science would accordingly be the historical movement through which universal reason "inborn" in humanity as such, is revealed."

Husserl is saying that, reason inborn in humanity (*dem Menschentum als solchen eingeborenen Vernunft*) is revealed through historical movement, and this historical movement is not a sequence of events that we in common parlance call "history," but specifically Philosophy and Science. How Philosophy and Science have been done, practised and theorized, is in itself a historical movement. In this movement the inborn reason in humanity is revealed, showing in other words, that inborn reason in humanity is indeed there in action.

In HUA VI # 15 we find Husserl desiring,

> to make comprehensible the teleology in the historical becoming of philosophy [. . ] and at the same time to achieve clarity about ourselves,[. . ] the bearer of this teleology. . .

And what is this teleology and clarity about ourselves? Husserl explains:

> It (=history) has spiritual unity through the unity and driving force of the task which, in the historical process,. . . seeks to move through the various stages of obscurty toward satisfying clarity until it finally works its way though to perfect insight.

The telos is to be the perfect insight, in the final stage, when humanity (*Menschentum*), through various obscure stages, moves towards a clearer critical understanding, here again, either in philosophy and/ or in science. Husserl calls this a "critical understanding of the total unity of history." Husserl accepts that this unity of history could be understood critically, simply because of its very basic foundation lies in human reason, and in its movement in stages, we must be able to graps it, with the same human reason. This is the same as saying, that we humans are reasoning and with the same reason we are grasping of our reasoning. That is why, when we understand philosophy and science, we understand ourselves as humanly reasoning beings, the bearers of this teleology through philosophy and science.

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230 see this thesis, chapter 4 Fnt. 1 and 3
Husserl keeps clarifying that,

it is to make vital again in its concealed historical meaning, the sedimented conceptual system which, as taken for granted, serves as the ground of his [i.e., the knowing subject] private and non-historical work.

since the sedimented conceptual system indeed conceals the historical meaning. Sedimentation, which is a taken-for-granted prejudice (*Vorurteil*, pre-judgement, the translation, prejudice, is commonly used in a pejorative sense), stops the thinker to think for him and herself, or prevent making vital again the concealed historical meaning.

Therefore Husserl continues:

if he is to be one who thinks for himself, an autonomous philosopher with the will to liberate himself from all prejudices, he must have the insight that all the things he takes for granted are prejudices, that all prejudices are obscurities arising out of a sedimentation of tradition.

Due to the sedimentation of tradition being encountered at all times in our philosophical endeavour, it is imperative to go to the deepest kind of self-reflection, to do a backward reflection, Husserl argues, then, that

a historical, backward reflection of the sort under discussion is thus actually the deepest kind of self-reflection aimed at a self-understanding in terms of what we are truly seeking as the historical beings we are

[. . .] 'the point of it' ultimately was, in the hidden unity of intentional inwardness which alone constitutes the unity of history.

[. . .] This truth is established only in the self evidence of a critical over-all view which brings to light [. . .] a meaningful, final harmony.

In Husserl's programme of doing philosophy through history or doing science through history, we see that history is a kind of a window through which we can see the philosophy-as-a-discipline, ultimately a discipline in which humanity is reasoning, or making use of his or her reason, which will lay bare, will reveal, what we are, as reasoning beings.

Here Husserl is, on the one hand, following the trend of philosophy of history, since Voltaire

231 *Crises*, 71
232 Ibid., 72
233 Ibid., 72
234 Ibid., 73
(1694-1778) or perhaps more accurately since Jean Bodin (1530-1595). On the other hand, he is doing a philosophy of history in a different sense.

Since Bodin's and Voltaire's books, philosophy of history replaced the theology of history, as Bodin and Voltaire protested against the accepted sediment of tradition (to use Husserl's expression) up to that time, even if theology is the foundation of history in the sense that the telos of history is human redemption/salvation as accepted and reflected in theology. In this light there is nothing particularly original of Husserl to do a philosophy of history instead of doing a theology of history, for with the rise of the Renaissance it was fashionable to protest against anything traditional, e.g., Catholic Church teachings, theology and traditional Scholastic philosophy.

But this thesis will highlight Husserl's claim, which seems contrary to his own previous stages of philosophizing, that phenomenology as a philosophical method that is enhanced by the discovery, the uncovering, of history as way into a deeper understanding of the presence and the different layers of the sediments of tradition(s), and thereby in the end to a deeper understanding of who we are as bearer of the tradition(s).

Husserl, then, can be seen as a philosopher who promotes the investigation of 'who we are' through his study of history, but then a history as a driving force of the task which seeks to move through the various stages of obscurity toward satisfying clarity until finally it works its way through to a perfect insight. This is a map of the struggle (Kampf) of human consciousness (Husserl's use of the word 'Kampf' in 1936 was emotionally loaded). In fact, human consciousness has been Husserl's interest since his earlier years. It has been a key object of his study since the Logical Investigations, (1900) and maturing in understanding very much in Ideas Book I, (1913), but always in an a-historical way. I can almost call it in a "mathematical laboratory" when Husserl called Philosophy, a rigorous Science (1911), he had his earlier mode of investigation in mind.

In Crisis (1936) however, history comes to take part in defining human consciousness and thereby helps better to define philosophy as a conscious human act.

We can conclude this part by quoting Husserl again, from Hua VI, § 59

I can thematically pursue history, society's memory, so to speak -- but all such reflection remains within transcendental naïvité; it is the performance of the world-apperception which is, so to speak, ready-made, while the transcendental correlate -- i.e., the (immediately active or sedimented) functioning intentionality, which is the universal apperception, constitutive of all particular apperceptions, giving them the ontic sense of 'psychic experience (Erlebnisse) of this and that human being' -- remains completely hidden.

This is where Husserl suggests that to transcend the historical naïvité of historians, and enter into its transcendental correlate, of a philosopher who is philosophizing within history and through history, using functioning intentionality, which is the universal apperception, can give the thinker the ontic sense of psychic experience. This is a crucial text indeed. This text is not saying that we read history and histories and then make a kind of a comparative reflection between a certain period and another period, between a certain people's characteristics compared with other people's. Essentially this is what Hegel did in his Philosophy of History lectures, but Husserl's approach is different.

What I have gathered so far are from Husserl's published work. (I am including part 3 of Krisis I, as intended to be published.)

Now we enter into his Forschung-manuskripte, which is an extraordinary collection of texts. But since they are personal notes, and in Husserl's habit, he was wont to think while writing notes, we have to keep this fact in mind in using those notes/ texts. There is bound to be some repetitions and perhaps even some inconsistencies and ambiguities in these materials.

In Beilage xxviii, of Biemel edition or Appendix ix of Carr's translation, we have a note of summer 1935, which is titled "Denial of Scientific Philosophy. Necessity of Reflection. The Reflection [must be] Historical. How is History required?" a rather curious title and we will see what it holds.

This note starts with a sweeping statement of "Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous, science, the dream is over. [italics, Carr]"

In this crucial text we read that

Man is capable only arriving, by starting from his own position, from his horizons of knowledge, and feeling, at certain conjectures and thereby of forming for himself certain ways of believing which, as his world-view, offer him a personal evidence for conjectures and norms of action

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Crisis, 209

Summer 1935
under guidance of the conjecturally believed absolute.

The starting point is acknowledged as "from his own position" but the learning subject's 'own position' is not a blank-start, as if a neutral position. It is "from his own [ultimately subjective] horizon of knowledge". This is a definitively a position different then in Husserl's previous position where he stressed the 'rigorous scientific' (in his sense of 1911 article) position even in philosophy. If Philosophy is to be a "rigorous science' as his position in 1911, then the starting point from "one's own horizon of knowledge" cannot be defended. But if Philosophy in this new style of Phenomenology is starting from the author's own position and horizon of knowledge, then 'the dream of philosophy as a rigorous science' (in the 1911 sense) is indeed over.

The phrase "from his own position" though, must not be interpreted as if each philosopher is an isolated person thinking solely from his own position. Husserl himself recognized the function of a "revitalized content of the traditional systems."

In the same manuscript Husserl says about "the evident consciousness of a project,"

now history is after all not before us like a warehouse containing its assembled wares[ . . .](a philosopher) he reads and naturally he understands what he reads from a standpoint of his own thoughts, [. . .] on the basis of the 'perception' of his already developed concepts, methods, convictions. Through this apperception he gains something new, further developing himself as a philosopher.

Or in other words, he says that,

only by engrossing ourselves in the revitalized content of the traditional systems can we feel this evidence (of the consciousness of a project) and if we penetrate them, interrogate them, the sense of the task of philosophy can become clear.

Therefore,

we must engross ourselves in historical considerations and understand ourselves as philosophers and understand what philosophy is to become through us.

Husserl proclaims now that Philosophy is not a Science in the way people understands science in his days. Philosophy is still rigorous in its discipline with a rigor of a thinker who "penetrates and interrogates the revitalized content of traditional systems" and nothing is accepted for granted or on anyone's authority, and exactly by penetrating and interrogating the content of traditional systems
philosophy becomes clearer as a human historical project, fulfilling itself and its notion towards telos through us, the thinkers, and not as an abstract evidence as if we are but witnesses of The Truth qua spectacle. The words "through us" in his phrase "what philosophy is to become through us" turns out to be a crucial definition of philosophy as well as a definition of history.

Philosophy is a becoming of a thinking process and this process is a historical process since the thinker is a historically conscious being and in dialogue with the content of his/ her traditional systems of thinking before and contemporary to him / herself. This dialogue with and within the tradition is what makes the content of traditional systems become revitalized never to be fossilized. This 'letting of the process of thinking' be a 'letting of the process of history' unfold, we can call a phenomenology of history

This Phenomenology of History, based on Husserl's texts, can be carried beyond Husserl. With this now looming in my own mind, though, I am not in the business of constructing what could have been part 4 and part 5 of the *Krisis* texts, which was attempted by E. Fink. I have set myself a different task and a different hope than Dr. E. Fink's. In this chapter, I am also not engaged in a debate as to whether part 3 of *Krisis* did really belong to the intended completed published material or not. But I am interested in asking the question, whether from the texts available, a Husserlian philosophical phenomenology of history could be brought into its own, and if so, how.

If Husserl's phenomenology, before the *Krisis* text, is very focused on consciousness, and the consciousness of individuals, how is a macro-history or general approach to historical materials supposed to be done based on this kind of phenomenology?

Is it enough to to assume a collectivity of individuals as the subject of history?

When a phenomenologist reads history, it is implied that s/he will read it phenomenologically. What does it mean?

Does Husserl redefine 'phenomenology' in the *Krisis* texts? In my reading he does, since what is given,
is experienced, hence the world as a givenness, is experienced as given to us before even we try to grasp it, let alone thematize it. Thus there is a certain passivity in our act of perceiving and knowing and understanding the world. Phenomenologically, the question of "what happens in the world-history?" so that we can understand it, could it be translated into "what happens in the world of thinking," or "what happens in our reasoning regarding the world?"

In his earlier writings, Husserl did mention the words 'history' 'historical' and 'historicity' only in the context of an awareness of a flow of events. We might say he was still in his 'natural attitude' regarding the matter at that stage.

In Ideas I. (1913) Husserl made a listing of Wissenschaften (sciences) in which he placed History within the group of Geisteswissenschaften.(socio-cultural sciences / Humanistic sciences). Also in his early lectures in 1923-1924. Erste Philosophie, ready for print at that time, but only eventually published in HUA VII .VIII in 1954 and 1959 respectively, Husserl's notion of history was conceived by him to be nothing more than a sequence of events. But then that was in 1923-1924.

In Cartesian Meditations (French edition 1931, the first German edition, 1950) and Formal and Transcendental Logic, (1929), Husserl mentioned 'History' and explain what he meant by that, without making it in any sense a theme of his philosophical phenomenology. In the Cartesian Meditations, though he mentioned that "the ego constitutes himself and for himself in, so to speak, the unity of 'history'." in the context of the chapter in the meditations on "Time as the universal form of all egological genesis". In another chapter, on "Survey of our intentional explication of experiencing someone else" Husserl also mentions that "phenomenological explication does nothing but explicate the sense (den Sinn auslegen) this world has for us all, prior to any philosophizing." At least the first statement quoted gives us a clue by which to enter into our investigation i.e, through the issue of 'Time', temporality.

In the Krisis documents, and from the later years of his life, in contrast Husserl explained

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242 Krisis II, 1993
and thematized his concept of history, it being my reading and thus the very core of my thesis that this is an explicit new development in Husserl's way of philosophizing.

I will present the texts, especially from the Krisis documents, but now together with notes and writings from the later years of his life, that point towards Husserl's concept of history and philosophical orientation towards it in a more complete form.

There are especially three chapters in the Krisis (HUA VI, 1954) which deal with history in a philosophical way, chapters 6, 7, and 15. Chapter 6 is titled "The history of modern philosophy as a struggle for the meaning of man (Kampf um den Sinn des Menschen)". An interesting observation is that Husserl is using the word "Kampf" in the context of historical popularity of Hitler's book 'Mein Kampf' (1925) at that time. In this chapter Husserl is very clear when he says,

The true struggles of our time, the only ones which are significant, are struggles between humanity which has already collapsed (zusammengebrochenen Menschentum) and humanity which still has roots but is struggling to keep them or find new ones. The genuine spiritual struggles of European humanity (Geisteskämpfe des europäischen Menschentums) as such take the form of struggles between the philosophies.

This statement is placing philosophies not only in the realm of a sequence of ideas or events, i.e., one idea replaced or followed by another idea, or one event followed and thereby replaced by the next event, but that of a continuous struggle, that the ideas are competing to claim their validities, and the concatenation of events (a natural concept of history) are seen as expressions of human struggles to define a meaning of genuine humanity. With this statement Husserl has started a new approach to history not found before the Krisis texts were in preparation. This was the time in Husserl's life when the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) came apart and was replaced by the Third Reich (1933-1945), and when in 1933 he got a suspension from the new Government from all philosophical activities. It was in Aug. 30, 1934 that he made a public statement concerning 'The present task of philosophy' addressed to the Prague Congress of Philosophers. I am putting three chapters of Krisis under consideration into

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243 Carr translation 1970. as above, 14-16
their historico-critical context, showing that while academically Husserl was on the decline, he reads
his history in the context of a bigger picture of the struggle of philosophies.

Hence we can understand why he says in *Krisis* chapter 7

> The faith of the possibility of philosophy as a task, that is, in the possibility of universal knowledge, is something we cannot let go (*Den Glauben an die Möglichkeit der Philosophie als Aufgabe, also an die Möglichkeit einer universalen Erkenntnis, können wir nicht fahren lassen*).

And why, a little further he affirms

> In our philosophizing, then - how can we avoid it - we are functionaries of mankind. The quite personal responsibility of our own true being as philosophers, our inner personal vocation, bears within itself at the same time the responsibility for the true being of mankind; the latter is, necessarily, being toward a telos and can only come to realization, if at all, through philosophy - through us, if we are philosophers in all seriousness.

Nowhere in his writings before the preparation of the *Krisis* texts has Husserl so passionately stated that philosophy is a personal vocation on behalf of the humankind, and with such a strong historical mindedness for Husserl significantly adds,

> What is clearly necessary (what else could be of help here?) is that we reflect back in a thorough historical and critical fashion in order to provide, before all decisions, for a radical self-understanding. . .

In chapter 15 the third of the *Krisis* chapters we are examining, Husserl states that

> Our task is to make comprehensible the teleology in the historical becoming of philosophy, especially modern philosophy, and at the same time to achieve clarity about ourselves, who are the bearers of this teleology, who take part in carrying it out through our personal intentions.

In this statement Husserl explains that the 'historical becoming of philosophy' has to be explicated and in so doing we as 'bearers of this teleology' will be more conscious of who we are. Hence to 'do philosophy ' is intimately linked with the quest 'to be seriously human'. It is for Husserl clear that in the 'Greek primal establishment lies the teleological beginning, the true birth of the European spirit as such', which is the spirit of inquiry leading towards 'a critical understanding of the total unity of history, our history', and not only through a critique of some present or handed down system, of some scientific or prescientific *Weltanschauung*. Only in this way "we have a task which is truly our own" he avers in

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244  Carr (1970) 16-17
245  Carr (1970) 70-73
the same chapter. Again Husserl connects doing philosophy with being seriously human, he states,

If he is to be the one who thinks for himself, an autonomous philosopher with the will to liberate himself from all prejudices (Vor-Urteil) he must have the insight that all the things he takes for granted are prejudices, and that all prejudices are obscurities arising out of a sedimentation of tradition, -- not merely judgments whose truth is as yet undecided -- and that this is true even of the great task and idea which is called "philosophy".

For Husserl as for most philosophers, and not for followers of a certain system of philosophy, who call themselves philosophers, philosophy as a handed-down style or system of thinking needs to be rethought-through and re-vitalized. For Husserl 'history' (Geschichte) is seen from this perspective of humans doing philosophy in the sense of 'making sense of history' as a 'field of competing efforts at self-disclosure'. Since history is a critical understanding of an unfolding of humanity. Here we find Husserl is insisting on the necessity of historical reflections in order to discern the very business of philosophy itself.

3 Doing History as Doing Phenomenology.

The Phenomenology of History, presented here is not simply a phenomenology as a method, which is then applied to one's writing on history. In Chapter 4 we have seen how Husserl defined history in his later works. We have also seen how in the Crisis texts, published in 1936 Husserl introduced Phenomenology once again for the last time in historical terms.

Why did he do that? Are the Introductions in Ideas I, and Cartesian Meditations not enough? No. They were not enough for the later Husserl.

In Ideas I, as well as Cartesian Meditations, Husserl introduces his phenomenology, or his main concern in it, namely, how knowledge of the world or of "transcendental objects" is possible, by giving a theory that consciousness "constitutes" the world.

In my reading of the Krisis texts there now comes a new development in Husserl's understanding of knowing and reflecting. Here he introduced 'history' as a point of entry into phenomenology, since history is none other than history of human consciousness (which constitutes the world), in its concrete context. In other words consciousness in this new development, is not analysed

246 first published in 1913, by Husserl himself; first Husserliana series 1950, then 1976
247 first German publication in Hua series 1950 (the French translation had been published in 1931)
as an object of analysis in vacuo, or in abstracto, but in its concrete time-space operation, in its day-to-day decision making and choices in life. In Husserl's case this fact is now more outstanding because before the Crisis texts he did not pay too much attention to history, even if this is not to say that he had been against history, as he had understood it at the time.

If in his former phenomenology he has looked upon consciousness and temporal experience, as if in vacuo, now his later phenomenology takes history very seriously, the investigating of history being taken as also simultaneously doing-history-being-history. As he earlier saw in the cases of consciousness and temporality, we humans cannot cancel our consciousness, our living consciously, and our temporality, our living in time, unless we do ourselves violence, so now we cannot deny our being-in-history, our historicising. By linking our history and our being we know who we are, while we do what we are to-be-(come), in other words, we are doing what we are to become, since that is what we are. Agere sequitur esse (doing follows being, that is to say what is being done follows the nature of the do-er).
Chapter Seven. Meditation on History

Husserl's Philosophy of History, is best to be approached from a different or distinct perspective: it is not to be categorized as a substantive or speculative philosophy of history or as a critical or analytic philosophy of history. Two categories usually used in this case.

Husserl's approach to History has emerged from his Life-world meditations, and his meditations on Pure Consciousness and Consciousness of Internal Time.

Meditation on History

Husserl's approach to History in the Krisis, has emerged against the background horizon of his thematic Life-world meditations and the merging into one of his twofold meditations on Pure Consciousness and Consciousness of Internal Time, although these twofold meditations were never very clearly separated or worked on in a clear sequence. It was not planned at all preoccupations would eventually converge. Husserl also did not deliberately plan to write on the Philosophy of History, which is why in this thesis I bypass the temptation to categorize Husserl's Philosophy of History as either a speculative (or substantive) or an analytical (or critical) Philosophy of History as it has been traditionally conceived in the discipline of historical study. Concerning the thematic Life-world meditations, Husserl has always regarded lifeworld as "the place" from which to launch his meditations, but in Krisis he thematized it for the first time very succinctly.

I will begin this meditation with Husserl's own statement, and other quotations to provide its background.

Geschichte ist von vorherein nichts anderes als die lebendige Bewegung des Miteinander und Ineinander von Ursprünglicher Sinnbildung und Sinnsedimentierung

(History is from the start nothing but the vital movement of being-with-one-another and being-in-one-another of the original formation and sedimentation of meaning).

248 This thesis Ch. 2 and 3.
Maurice Mandelbaum. The Problem of Historical Knowledge. (New York: Liveright, 1938)
250 Krisis I, Hua VI, 380
251 Carr has translated Miteinander and Ineinander as co-existence and interweaving, I find those less fortunate, I have to modify them.
As to the background horizon, other quotations,

The historical world is always there, and the individual not only observes it from the outside but is intertwined with it (Carr quoting Dilthey). It means that we are in history as we in the world. It serves as the horizon and background for our everyday experience (Carr).\(^{252}\)

The world, then, phenomenologically explicated as the horizon of horizons for all experiential actuality-in-appearing, the one "Something" always already there for any attribution to be possible, is the first "product" of constitutive origination wherein any meaning can be given on the phenomenological "Absolute" (Bruzina).\(^{253}\)

. . . what determines the sui generis 'Singularity' and 'Factuality' of the world determines the meaning history can have in regard to both the matters investigated in phenomenology and the nature of phenomenology itself (Bruzina).\(^{254}\)

As a phenomenologist looking at history, as a 'given' revealing itself, Husserl describes his activity as 'a vital movement being-with one-another and being-in-one-another of original meaning formation and of original meaning sedimentations.'

This places history immediately in a community-based setting, be it as small as two people. History is not an individual, solipsistic monad, doing its own thing by itself. Husserl's efforts to overcome the possibility of a solipsistic tendency in philosophy, due to his emphasis of the transcendental ego, started already in the 5th Meditation of Cartesian Meditations, where Husserl treated 'the transcendental being as monadological intersubjectivity.'

A second point is related to this is that the 'miteinander und ineinander lebendige Bewegung' is geared toward a 'Sinnbildung und Sinnsedimentierung,' thus the meaning-formation and meaning-sedimentation happen in that vital being-with-one-another and being-in-one-another.\(^{255}\)

Husserl's radical phenomenological observation observes only people being with and in-one-another (as he put it), making meaning happen and hence sedimenting meaning for the next generation of people. Tradition is so formed. Intersubjectivity is thus not an abstract entity. There is no


\(^{254}\) Bruzina 2004, 432

\(^{255}\) I find Carr's translation of mit-einander with co-existence, less satisfying. During the "Cold-war" we talk about co-existence too, not in the sense of mit-einander.
substantialization of "history," history is just a person with another person making a meaningful meeting. There is no "holy tradition" either. Tradition is just *id quod tradiri* (that which is passed on) from one generation to the next, and it should be treated as such. This *lebendige Bewegung*, this vital movement, goes on and on. History is created again and again. This core definition will prevent us from fossilizing even historic-tradition. This creation, this history, is not happening in one's mind either. It is happening between people and between peoples in this (what we call) world. In this world is the possibility of happenings, events, meetings with one-another being-in-one-another. Hence this world is a world of people and peoples. A peopled-world. There is no need to postulate anything else to make history happening in the world.

But as we say people, person, meeting, making meaning happen, it all implies that people are reasoning, that people are conscious. That reasoning together makes meaning happen. The being-with-one-another and being-in-one-another is not only just at a pure physical level (as if this is possible). It is a human level, with all human attributes. The sedimentation of meaning too, is at a human level. The passing on of meaning sedimented happens from one to other person or generation. The meaning making and meaning passing-on does happen, sometimes smoothly, oftentimes violently. Sometimes implicitly often explicitly. Thus we make war and peace, to mention just two clearly opposing categories of meaning making, and there are countless others in between. And all these then is history in the world. So the history makers are also simultaneously the history observers. And what is observed is also what is being made at the same time. This is history at the first instance. This first-instance history, when all the participants are moving on, or gone, it still can live in the memory of those to whom the sedimented meaning has been passed on, whom the tradition has been given to keep. This is then the-second instance history.

About this second instance history there are many, too many difficulties, as to how to keep the sedimented meaning-making "original," "pure." It is almost impossible to avoid sceptical attitudes with regard to such 'original' meaning. I am using "almost" as an operative word. Hence in the course of our human history we "have invented" some argumentative "tools", e.g., exegesis, hermeneutics and the

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256 Be it noted, just as I am re-editing this very page, the SBS-TV News is broadcasting the memorial service to remember the Final solution, Holocaust, in the Great Synagogue in Berlin.
likes, in philosophical circles, while in other areas, e.g., Religion, of Government Policy, usually some kind of hierarchy is created which claims to allow the right interpretation (e.g., in a totalitarian Government, or Inquisition !). An example will illustrate the case: the "fact" of Berlin-Wall being knocked-down, what is the meaning of it? The victory of the "western" against the "eastern" system of government in Germany at that time? or was it Gorbachev bowing to the demand to Ronald Reagan hence (the famous broadcasted TV, "Mr. Gorbachev, tear this wall down!")? or perhaps an ultimate victory symbol of John-Paul II in knocking down the Communists?

Our world is full of possibilities of interpretative meanings at the second- (and third and so forth) instances of history.

As we have seen even in the first-instance history the intersubjective interaction, with-one-another, and in-one-another, history happens 'in' the world but it also happen 'in' time, in a flowing-duration. Since we do not experience 'time' and 'space' (world) in vacuo, we experience them 'via' the marks, time-events land-marks. Concerning 'time,' consciousness, Husserl famously struggles through many manuscripts, and the manuscripts so far published are only those up to 1918. But he made his own special progress concerning our historical dimension, which this thesis acknowledges.

**Phenomenology's limitation**

Husserl's main "difficulty" according to Eugen Fink is that "he does not allow the problem of 'being' (des Seienden, that-which-is) really come forward at all." "That-which-is," "that which is in being (Seiendes)" is accordingly "the correlate of acts 'that give something as it-self.'" This is the junction in which Husserl and Heidegger parted in ways of their phenomenology of history. Fink however, has made other suggestions again, that would be a topic for another thesis.

Suffice to say that after *Ideen I (1913)*, when Husserl's analysis of 'seeing [the] essences' is still close to

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258 Bruzina 2004. 427
the late Scholastics. (I have in mind the Suarezian).\footnote{Francisco Suarez SJ. De Entibus Rationis. (On Beings Of Reason) Trans. John Doyle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995)}

and when in the *Méditations cartesiennes* (1929/31) intersubjectivity has entered the scene, Husserl himself has taken some distance from the late Scholastics. The revision and re-working of the *Méditations* text for the German public has taken Husserl a considerable time eventually given up in 1934. Suddenly when the writing of *Krisis* started, he then handled feverishly the Philosophy of History, in the midst of his own personal and academic difficulties.

Piecing all these materials together, we can grasp the relationship between Husserl's insight into the philosophy of history and his own historical time.\footnote{Ch. 4 this thesis.} Given the totalitarian Government of the Nazi-Germany, which fossilized the German Aryan-superiority myth and the lesser thinking of many of his philosophers-colleagues, esp. Heidegger and Freiburg Faculty of Philosophy, Husserl last *opus*, an unfinished work, has voiced again the trust and hope, that a pure consciousness perceiving in time the landmarks of history, will sediment this for the generations to come, the vision that when humans have left the (Greek, Jewish and German) capacity to think through history, calamity will happen.

*Sic transit gloria mundi.*
a reserved page
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