THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY

Greenwashing: Regulatory Enforcement, Prevention and Detection

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STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

This is to certify that the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted for any other degree or purpose. Part of this thesis has been submitted to SSRN for pre-publication:

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I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, and that all assistance received in preparing this thesis and all sources have been acknowledged.

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AUTHORSHIP ATTRIBUTION STATEMENT

This thesis contains a published journal article as:

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This material appears in Chapter 5 and is partially discussed in Chapters 1 – 3. I designed the study, collected the data, analysed the data and wrote the drafts of the manuscript.

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This material appears in Chapter 4 and is partially discussed in Chapters 1 – 3. I designed the study, collected the data, analysed the data and wrote the drafts of the manuscript.

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As supervisor for the candidature upon which this thesis is based, I can confirm that the authorship attribution statements above are correct.

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GENERATIVE AI ATTRIBUTION STATEMENT

During the preparation of this thesis, the author used GPT-5 for copy-editing, including sentence structure, spelling, and grammar check, and for supporting the methodology development of Chapter 6 (full details in the appendix). In text citations have been utilised to show where generative AI was used throughout the Thesis, with all uses listed in an appendix. The author confirms that where text was modified by generative AI, the content was reviewed for possible errors, inaccuracies, and bias. The author takes full responsibility for the submitted thesis, confirms the work is their own, and has used generative AI in accordance with University guidelines and policies.

Appendix A.

A.1 Copy Editing (Thesis-wide)

Generative AI (ChatGPT) was used to assist with copy-editing. Generative AI was employed to improve clarity, structure, and grammar. The prompt was: “Please rewrite this paragraph to improve clarity while retaining the original meaning.”

A.2 Methodology Development (Chapter 6)

Generative AI (OpenAI GPT-5-mini) was used to assist with developing and testing prompt configurations for the LLM-based greenwashing detection framework. Generative AI was employed to explore the potential application of LLMs in detecting greenwashing. The prompt was: “You are a sustainability disclosure analyst trained in identifying greenwashing practices using regulatory guidance. Analyse the following claim and classify it as either Greenwashing (1) or Non-Greenwashing (0).”

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ABSTRACT

The prevalence of sustainability disclosures is rapidly increasing, with many such disclosures becoming mandatory across major jurisdictions. At the same time, greenwashing – defined as misleading sustainability claims exaggerating or misrepresenting environmental or other sustainability performance – has proliferated. This has attracted intensified global regulatory scrutiny. Despite academic interest, there is limited knowledge about how regulators identify, assess, and sanction greenwashing claims in practice.

The thesis addresses this gap, examining greenwashing through a regulatory lens. In so doing, unique greenwashing datasets are systematically constructed, including a dataset of global greenwashing regulatory enforcement cases between 2015-2024, as well as a greenwashing taxonomy consolidated from eight regulatory guidelines. These datasets provide the thesis' conceptual and empirical foundation, clarifying how greenwashing is characterised in academic research and regulatory action.

Building on this foundation, the thesis comprises three interconnected studies investigating: (1) how regulators define, interpret, and act against greenwashing; (2) whether sustainability assurance potentially reduces greenwashing by addressing regulator-relevant subject matters; and (3) how generative large language models (LLMs) can support large-scale automated detection of greenwashing based on regulatory indicators.

Study One develops a theoretical framework, which explains how market regulators in Australia enable the regulation of greenwashing. Drawing on publications issued by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), complemented by six semi-structured interviews, this study shows how regulators legitimate intervention by framing greenwashing as misleading or deceptive conduct within existing consumer and investor protection mandates. It also shows how regulators manage evidentiary challenges arising from vague, technical, and forward-looking claims by aligning greenwashing with established legal prohibitions, deploying a portfolio of tools including surveillance, guidance, infringement notices, and litigation. The analysis reveals that regulatory action is necessarily selective. Resource constraints and technical complexity lead regulators to adopt a risk-based strategy prioritising clearer cases. Regulatory actions also gradually shape what "greenwashing" means in enforceable terms, augmenting environmental-only claims to include environmental, social, and governance dimensions, also shifting emphasis from managerial intent to the likelihood of misleading disclosure.

Motivated by the limitations of regulatory enforcement in address greenwashing, Study Two examines whether sustainability assurance functions can act as a preventive mechanism addressing greenwashing-related subject matters targeted by regulators. Using a sample of Australian and New Zealand listed companies that obtained sustainability assurance in 2023, this study assesses the alignment between assurance and greenwashing-related subject matters identified by regulatory guidance and sanction cases. Our findings reveal that while 49.5% of assurance engagements directly address at least one greenwashing-related subject matter – primarily, historical and quantitative disclosures, such as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions – significant gaps persist. These gaps relate to forward-looking sustainability commitments such as net zero, end of life treatment of sold products, and potential sustainability-related fraud. Regression evidence indicates higher relevance when audit engagements are conducted at a reasonable level of assurance, performed by higher-market-share providers or undertaken in

industries more exposed to greenwashing scrutiny. Relevance declines when firms rely on internally developed reporting criteria rather than established frameworks. Overall, the findings of Study Two suggest assurance can mitigate some greenwashing risks, however, current practices cannot address all greenwashing subject matters.

Study Three examines potential applications of scalable greenwashing detection. This is done by developing a taxonomy of regulatory indicators from global guidelines and evaluating whether a taxonomy-guided large language model (LLM), such as GPT-5-mini, can reproduce regulators' greenwashing assessments. Focusing on language-based indicators (e.g., vagueness, overstated compliance, confusing language, unclear scope, and unclear conditions), the model is trained and tested using educational examples from regulatory guidance, with further evaluation using out-of-sample, real-world materials, including Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) rulings and third-party reviewed sustainability reports. The results show strong performance when reproducing regulators' binary greenwashing or not decisions using in-sample guideline examples. However, performance declines when using out-of-sample contexts where claims are more ambiguous. Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting, requiring indicator-by-indicator assessment before making the final greenwashing or not decision, increases false positives, producing high recall (that is, a strong ability to identify greenwashing as greenwashing) but low precision (where the model frequently misclassifies non-greenwashing as greenwashing). The study concludes that generative LLMs can be utilised as early-stage screening tools flagging potentially misleading claims for human review, while being prone to over-identifying non-greenwashing as greenwashing.

Overall, this thesis provides a comprehensive understanding of greenwashing from a regulatory perspective. By integrating evidence from regulatory enforcement, assurance practice, and LLM applications, it demonstrates how greenwashing can be defined, assessed, prevented, and detected from a regulatory lens. Findings offer timely insights for regulators encountering an evolving and fluid greenwashing landscape, standard setters developing more robust assurance frameworks (such as International Standard on Sustainability Assurance [ISSA] 5000), and firms seeking to reduce greenwashing risk through clear, well-substantiated, and credible sustainability communications.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AASB	Australian Accounting Standards Board
ABDC	Australian Business Deans Council
ACCC	Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
ACL	Australian Consumer Law
ACM	Authority for Consumers and Markets
AGCM	Italian Competition Authority
AI	Artificial Intelligence
AICPA	Association of International Certified Professional Accountants
ASA	Advertising Standards Authority
ASIC	Australian Securities and Investments Commission
ASX	Australian Securities Exchange
AUASB	Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards Board
BERT	Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers
CMA	Competition and Markets Authority
CoT	Chain-of-Thought
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CSRD	Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive
DL	Deep Learning
EC	European Commission
ESG	Environmental, Social and Governance
ESMA	European Securities and Markets Authority
EU	European Union
FTC	Federal Trade Commission
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GRI	Global Reporting Initiative

IAASB	International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board
ICPEN	International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network
IESBA	International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants
IFAC	International Federation of Accountants
IFRS	International Financial Reporting Standards
IOSCO	International Organization of Securities Commissions
ISSA	International Standard on Sustainability Assurance
ISSB	International Sustainability Standards Board
JSON	JavaScript Object Notation
KLD	Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics
LLM	Large Language Model
ML	Machine Learning
NFRD	Non-Financial Reporting Directive
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NLP	Natural Language Processing
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PCAOB	Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
RIAA	Responsible Investment Association Australasia
SASB	Sustainability Accounting Standards Board
SEC	Securities and Exchange Commission
TCFD	Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
VIFs	Variance Inflation Factors

I INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation and Research Objectives

The prevalence of sustainability disclosures has expanded rapidly, particularly as sustainability disclosures become mandatory across major jurisdictions (e.g., European Parliament and Council of the EU, 2022; Australian Accounting Standards Board [AASB], 2024a). As sustainability information becomes an integral component of corporate reporting, ensuring its credibility and reliability is now a central regulatory priority.

Against this context, greenwashing has emerged as a critical threat to credible sustainability disclosures. Greenwashing refers to the exaggeration or misrepresentation of sustainability performance. By overstating environmental or social commitments, firms can mislead stakeholders and weaken confidence in reporting frameworks designed to promote sustainable decision-making. In response, regulators around the world have intensified their scrutiny since 2021. In Australia, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has led a national anti-greenwashing campaign, issuing nineteen infringement notices totalling more than AUD $260,000 by July 2024 and, in April 2024, commencing court proceedings for overstated environmental claims (ASIC, 2024a). The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has conducted nationwide internet sweeps of environmental statements, released detailed environmental claims guidance in 2023, and accepted a court-enforceable undertaking in November 2023 (ACCC, 2023a, 2023b, 2024). In the European Union (EU), the European Commission (EC) (2023) proposed the Green Claims Directive in March 2023 to harmonise the substantiation and verification of environmental claims. In 2024, the EU also adopted Directive 2024/825 to strengthen consumer protection against misleading environmental claims (EC, 2024). Similarly, in the United States (US), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has pursued enforcement actions against investment funds and issuers for misleading Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG)-related marketing (SEC, 2022a).

These regulatory developments motivate the thesis, which focuses on (1) how regulators conceptualise greenwashing, (2) the effectiveness of existing prevention mechanisms, particularly assurance, in addressing greenwashing, and (3) how regulators' definitions and assessment approaches can be translated into criteria enabling large-scale, automated greenwashing detection. Using hand-collected regulatory enforcement cases and related guidelines, this thesis examines greenwashing through a regulatory lens in three

interconnected studies. *Study One* considers how the regulation of greenwashing is made possible. *Study Two* examines whether sustainability assurance practices address greenwashing concerns of regulators and *Study Three* considers how greenwashing detection can be automated using a large language model (LLM) employing indicators from regulatory guidelines.

As greenwashing can be manifested in many forms, it lacks a universally accepted definition. The academic literature generally conceptualises it as a selective disclosure (Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Fan et al., 2021; Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Parguel et al., 2011), decoupling symbolic communication and substantive performance (Bowen & Aragon-Correa, 2014; Walker & Wan, 2012), or a type of misleading statement (Tateishi, 2018). Most existing empirical measurements of greenwashing are indirect, relying on tone (Sauerwald & Su, 2019), dictionary counts (van der Waal & Thijssens, 2020), or ESG disclosure-performance rating differences (e.g. Chen et al., 2024; Eliwa et al., 2021; García-Sánchez et al., 2021; Zhang, 2022). These approaches rarely capture whether a statement would mislead a reasonable investor or consumer in the context of regulatory standards. As a result, there is a gap between how scholars measure greenwashing and how regulators identify and sanction it in practice. Therefore, Study One is a qualitative study exploring the regulatory landscape of greenwashing in Australia. It analyses a novel dataset of publications issued by Australian regulators, complemented by six semi-structured interviews, to study how the regulation of greenwashing is made possible. Attention is paid to how regulators define greenwashing, assert their legitimacy when addressing greenwashing, demonstrate their possession of necessary regulatory tools for this, take actions against greenwashing, and show their preparedness to respond to challenges arising from such interventions. Thus, Study One aims to shed light on broader questions concerning how regulators place certain issues on the regulatory agenda and justify their capacity to address them, especially when such issues are ambiguously defined for regulatory purposes. The evidence generated through this analysis establishes the conceptual foundation for the subsequent studies, clarifying the types, drivers, and challenges of taking various levels of regulatory actions.

Next, sustainability assurance, which is intended to enhance disclosure credibility through independent verification, has become a topical and potential solution to reducing greenwashing. However, unlike mandated financial statement audits, sustainability assurance engagements vary widely in scope, provider expertise, and evaluation criteria. Therefore, it remains unclear whether current assurance practices effectively mitigate the types of

greenwashing regulators target. Correspondingly, Study Two is a quantitative archival study, which examines whether sustainability assurance effectively addresses the types of greenwashing topics regulators prioritise. Using a hand-collected dataset of 140 assurance reports from 105 listed companies in Australia and New Zealand from 2023, this study develops a relevance score. This score examines the alignment between assurance subject matters and greenwashing topics identified in regulatory enforcement cases and guidance. In doing so, Study Two provides timely evidence on both the potential and the limitations of assurance as a mechanism for addressing greenwashing risk, thereby informing future regulatory enhancements to sustainability assurance standards.

Nonetheless, regulators face practical difficulties detecting greenwashing, especially as sustainability reporting and the volume of narrative disclosures expands, making manual monitoring increasingly inefficient and difficult. To explore the potential of applying automated tools (e.g., LLMs) to greenwashing detection processes, Study Three collects and synthesises global, regulatory greenwashing guidelines into a detection taxonomy, which is used to evaluate a LLM's performance given various training strategies. Specifically, the LLM is trained and tested using educational examples derived from global regulatory guidelines. Additional tests are conducted applying real-world cases, including Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) rulings and third-party reviewed sustainability reports.

Collectively, these studies aim to enhance our understanding of how greenwashing may be defined, detected, and prevented from a regulatory perspective. Given this, the thesis has three overall objectives: (1) to develop a theoretical framework explaining how regulators define, interpret, and act against greenwashing; (2) to examine whether sustainability assurance serves as a preventive mechanism helping reduce greenwashing when targeting the same subject matters as regulators; and (3) to assess the effectiveness of LLM-based greenwashing detection and potential ways to enhance it.

1.2 Key Findings

1.2.1 Study One - Regulating Greenwashing

The literature review in Chapter 2 reveals that greenwashing is an umbrella term, which is inherently ambiguous and encompasses a wide range of potentially misleading claims. Nonetheless, regulators are actively targeting it. This raises an important question. How do regulators turn the weakly defined, conceptually fluid problem of greenwashing into a concept that they can identify, assess, and enforce in practice? Study One, therefore, develops a

theoretical framework for understanding how market regulators in Australia regulate greenwashing. Drawing on publicly available materials issued by the ACCC and ASIC (press releases, case studies, regulatory guidelines, rules, and speeches), along with six interviews with key stakeholders, this study examines how regulators define, justify, and act against greenwashing.

The analysis shows that regulators legitimise their interventions by framing greenwashing as "misleading" or "deceptive" conduct, which falls within the ambit of their obligations to protect consumers and investors. Such framing becomes especially important as global net-zero commitments grow and mandatory sustainability reporting expands, accompanied by increasing expectations for credible sustainability disclosures. Yet, regulators encounter significant challenges because of the vague, technical, and forward-looking nature of sustainability claims, creating evidentiary burdens in establishing wrongdoing. Regulators manage these challenges by leveraging existing legal frameworks, aligning greenwashing with established prohibitions and enacting enforcement through tools involving surveillance, guidance, infringement notices, and court proceedings. Accordingly, regulatory actions not only respond to greenwashing but also shape the object of their intervention. Through repeated enforcement and guidance, the definition of greenwashing has expanded from environmental claims only to now include environmental, social, and governance dimensions, with the emphasis shifting from managerial intention to whether a claim is misleading in substance.

However, market regulators are not all-powerful in regulating greenwashing. They are limited by resource constraints and unable pursue every misleading claim. They also face a trade-off between acting quickly and pursuing technically complex cases requiring expert evidence, time, and specialist capability. Therefore, they make strategic choices about which cases to investigate, adopting a calculated, risk-based approach prioritising clearer, more straightforward cases where the likelihood of securing a successful outcome is higher. As a result, while regulators focus on selective, misleading, and deceptive sustainability and climate-related disclosures, their enforcement actions are necessarily selective.

These findings raise two key questions. First, if regulatory intervention is necessarily selective, can other mechanisms, such as sustainability assurance, help reduce greenwashing by addressing types of claims that regulators prioritise but cannot always pursue? This is the motivation for Study Two, which examines whether sustainability assurance practices cover greenwashing-related subject matters most frequently targeted in regulatory enforcement. Second, the selective nature of regulatory action also highlights a need for scalable tools capable of screening large volumes of sustainability disclosures for potential greenwashing.

Thus, Study Three evaluates the feasibility of large-scale greenwashing detection using generative LLMs. Further, given that Study One accomplishes the systematic collection and organisation of greenwashing enforcement cases and regulatory guidelines in a database, this database is leveraged as the overall methodological framework presented in Chapter 3. In turn, this database underpins the empirical analyses in Studies Two and Three.

1.2.2 Study Two - Greenwashing and Sustainability Assurance

Study One shows that regulatory greenwashing enforcement concentrates on limited recurring subject matters, such as ESG policy implementation and net-zero targets. These issues form the focus of regulatory scrutiny and represent the types of claims most likely to mislead consumers and investors. Motivated by these insights, a database, comprising global greenwashing enforcement cases from 2015-2024 and related regulatory guidelines, has been manually and systematically compiled. This database identifies the specific subject matters that regulators prioritise when pursuing greenwashing. The case database is presented in Chapter 3 and represents the overall methodology.

Building on greenwashing subject matters identified in the case database, Study Two examines whether sustainability assurance practices address the types of greenwashing-related subject matters most frequently targeted by regulatory enforcement. The findings show that 49.5% of companies' assurance engagements cover at least one topic linked to regulatory concerns, yet significant gaps persist. Assurance practices are well suited to historical and quantitative metrics, such as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, energy consumption, and water usage. However, assurance practices rarely extend to forward-looking commitments (including net-zero targets and end-of-life product treatment), product-level environmental claims, or sustainability-related fraud. While some of these omissions reflect the inherent limitations of assurance particularly when verifying forward-looking information, the analysis identifies further opportunities where assurance could assume a more preventative role, such as verifying the robustness of safety systems rather than merely attesting to historical injury rates. Having said this, several companies have undertaken assurance in relation to progress toward carbon neutrality, indicating emerging efforts to validate forward-looking commitments. Regression analyses further show that assurance is more relevant when engagements are conducted at a reasonable level of assurance, undertaken by providers with higher market share or performed in industries with greater exposure to greenwashing sanctions. In contrast, the relevance of assurance declines when firms rely on internally developed reporting criteria rather than established frameworks. These findings suggest that while sustainability assurance can play a

meaningful role in mitigating greenwashing risks, it has inherent limitations – particularly stemming from the difficulty of assuring forward-looking statements. Hence, Study Two provides evidence to help users form realistic expectations concerning what assurance can and cannot achieve in mitigating greenwashing risks.

1.2.3 Study Three - Detecting Greenwashing with LLMs

The analysis of regulatory publications included in Study One reveals that regulators typically assess greenwashing claims using a set of identifiable indicators, such as vagueness or lack of supporting evidence. Drawing on such insights, this thesis develops a greenwashing taxonomy based on global regulatory guidelines as part of its overall methodology, with this being presented in Chapter 3. This taxonomy shows that greenwashing may arise from two types of indicators: (1) language-based indicators, arising from how information is communicated (e.g., the use of vague words such as "conscious choice"); and (2) evidence-based indicators, which occur when a claim contradicts or is unsupported by external evidence (e.g., where an ESG fund does not perform ESG screening). Given that supporting evidence underlying claims is often not publicly available, Study Three focuses on language-based indicators. These are used to evaluate whether generative LLMs (using GPT-5-mini as a case in point) can detect potential greenwashing using language-based indicators from regulatory guidelines.

This test uses a multi-source dataset of sustainability claims manually collected from (1) educational examples contained in regulatory guidelines, (2) ASA rulings, and (3) awarded/assured sustainability reports. Generally, the model is required to produce a binary classification of greenwashing or not, with this being the outcome of interest. The study then examines the model's performance across several other prompt configurations, which vary according to whether chain-of-thought (CoT)[1] reasoning is required and whether in-context examples are provided. In CoT settings, the model is additionally required to assess a claim against each of the five language-related indicators in the taxonomy before generating a final decision. The study finds that GPT-5-mini can effectively reproduce regulators' binary decisions of greenwashing or not, when evaluating educational examples within regulatory guidelines. In these in-sample settings, the model achieves high F1 scores, demonstrating a

[1] The study tests four CoT settings instructing the model to produce intermediate reasoning steps before giving a final answer (Wei et al., 2022). CoT prompting improves interpretability and logical consistency, allowing the model to break down complex problems into sequential reasoning steps (Jung et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2022). It demonstrates strong performance in arithmetic reasoning, symbolic problem-solving, and other structured reasoning tasks (Kojima et al., 2022; Shao et al., 2023). More details about the CoT settings are provided in Chapter 6.

strong ability to identify misleading statements. However, when required to assess each potential indicator through CoT reasoning, the model tends to over-classify non-greenwashing claims as greenwashing. The model's performance declines further when applied to out-of-sample, real-world disclosures, where claims are more ambiguous. Although recall remains high (with strong performance identifying greenwashing as greenwashing), precision drops as the model more frequently misclassifies non-greenwashing claims as greenwashing. These results suggest that GPT-5-mini functions more reliably as an early-stage screening tool to flag statements warranting closer scrutiny, rather than as a definitive classifier of greenwashing. Effective use, therefore, requires human evaluation, contextual information, and supporting evidence.

1.3 Contribution

This thesis contributes to sustainability accounting research, regulatory practice, and professional standards in several interrelated ways. Theoretically, it advances our understanding of greenwashing from a regulatory perspective. While the term greenwashing is not universally defined (Seele & Gatti, 2017), this thesis reveals that regulators frame greenwashing as misleading or deceptive conduct under existing mandates, broadening its scope to include environmental, social, and governance claims, shifting emphasis from intent to the accuracy of disclosure. Hence, the analytical component of this thesis refines the "dictionary" of greenwashing, providing a structured and regulator-grounded interpretation enhancing its conceptual clarity for scholars, regulators, companies, and other stakeholders in Australia and beyond.

Methodologically, the thesis explores the use of taxonomy-guided LLMs to perform regulatory reasoning in assessing greenwashing. It demonstrates how AI can conduct text-based disclosure analysis using regulatory logic to identify vagueness, overstated compliance, confusing language, unclear scope, and ambiguous conditions. This provides early evidence of how LLMs can serve as textual analysis tools facilitating the scalable detection of potentially misleading claims. That said, this thesis also indicates the limitations of LLMs, arising from their potential to over-identify with greenwashing. Further, this research contributes to the growing methodological debate about how AI and computational tools can supplement expert professional judgment.

From a practice perspective, the thesis provides actionable insights for policymakers, standard setters, and practitioners. For regulators, it identifies the categories of greenwashing

most frequently subject to enforcement and illustrates how automated detection can help prioritise high-risk cases. For companies, it clarifies the types of disclosures most likely to attract scrutiny and suggests that transparency and evidence-based claims can reduce enforcement risk. For assurance providers and standard setters, it provides timely evidence about both the potential and limitations of assurance as a mechanism to mitigate greenwashing risk. These insights are capable of informing future regulatory and standard-setting developments, such as the International Standard on Sustainability Assurance (ISSA) 5000.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is organised into seven chapters. The following chapter, Chapter 2, reviews literature pertaining to the global trend toward mandatory sustainability disclosures, definitions and measurements of greenwashing, the role of enforcement in improving disclosure quality, and the emerging application of artificial intelligence (AI) in accounting research. Chapter 3 outlines the methodological approaches common to the three empirical studies, as well as an overview of the data collected on global greenwashing enforcement actions and the taxonomy derived from regulatory guidelines. Chapter 4 presents Study One, which examines regulatory enforcement actions to delineate how regulators define and respond to greenwashing. Chapter 5 presents Study Two, investigating whether sustainability assurance addresses the same greenwashing concerns identified by regulators, determining assurance relevance. Chapter 6 presents Study Three, which applies a taxonomy-guided LLM detection framework to test the feasibility of automated greenwashing evaluation of sustainability claims. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.

II LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides a literature review to establish background on sustainability disclosure and its move toward mandates, regulatory enforcement against greenwashing, greenwashing definitions and measurement, the applications of AI as new opportunities for evaluating sustainability disclosure.

Section 2.1 reviews the global trend toward mandating sustainability disclosure and the expanding role of regulatory bodies that supervise such reporting. It then documents the existence and persistence of greenwashing, despite mandates, and summarizes recent regulatory actions by market regulators. Section 2.2 clarifies what is meant by greenwashing. It synthesizes academic and regulatory definitions, then systematically reviews measurement approaches and proxies used in archival research. Section 2.3 examines regulatory enforcement. Drawing on evidence from financial reporting oversight (e.g., SEC reviews and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB] inspections), this subsection shows how credible enforcement can improve disclosure quality while imposing real costs, and motivates the study of how similar tools are being applied to sustainability disclosure and greenwashing. Section 2.4 reviews studies on sustainability assurance, focusing on its role in enhancing the credibility of sustainability disclosures and its potential contribution to mitigating greenwashing risk. Section 2.5 reviews the use of AI in accounting research. It first summarizes applications of machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) to prediction and text analysis, then turns to recent work that uses or evaluates LLMs in accounting settings. Finally, it considers the potential of LLMs for sustainability disclosure and greenwashing.

2.1 Background

2.1.1 Global Trend of Mandating Sustainability Disclosures

The global shift toward mandatory sustainability disclosure has occurred alongside rising investor demand for reliable sustainability information (Cohen et al., 2015; Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim, 2018), given that ESG factors have become increasingly central to investment decision-making (Krueger et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2021).

Despite this information demand, investors continue to express concern that firm-level ESG disclosures remain inadequate for informed decision-making (Ilhan et al., 2023). Firms may approach sustainability reporting strategically, using it to manage impressions, sustain legitimacy, or signal superior performance to investors, which diminishes the disclosure quality (Comyns & Figge, 2015; Deegan et al., 2002). In many cases, organisations engage in symbolic

management, presenting an image aligned with societal expectations without making substantive changes to underlying practices (Hrasky, 2012). Such symbolic disclosures can "thicken the corporate veil," reducing transparency and limiting stakeholder scrutiny (Hopwood, 2009, p. 437). Such poor-quality or overly symbolic ESG information can distort the decision-making of ESG-oriented stakeholders and lead to the misallocation of capital by socially responsible investors (Baker et al., 2024). As a result, uncertainty regarding a firm's true ESG performance significantly impacts asset flows and market valuations (Avramov et al., 2022; Serafeim & Yoon, 2022).

To address these concerns, several organisations have developed voluntary reporting standards, such as the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) Standards and Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), to improve and harmonise ESG reporting practices (Christensen et al., 2021). In 2023, the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Foundation and the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) jointly introduced the International Standards for Sustainability-related Disclosures (S1) and Climate-related Disclosures (S2), which came into effect on 1 January 2024 (IFRS, 2023). In line with this trend, numerous jurisdictions around the world, such as the EU, the US, and Australia, have announced plans to adopt or align with the new standards through local regulations, reporting frameworks, or legislative instruments (Amel-Zadeh & Tang, 2025; Christensen et al., 2021; Greenstone et al., 2023; Krueger et al., 2024). Between 2002 and 2020, 38 countries introduced mandatory ESG disclosure regulations, marking a global shift toward regulatory intervention in sustainability reporting (Krueger et al., 2024). A summary of the regulatory developments in sustainability disclosure across key jurisdictions is provided in Table II-1.

Table II-1 Regulatory Developments Toward Mandatory Sustainability Disclosure

Panel A: Global Trends Toward Mandatory Sustainability Disclosure			
Region / Jurisdiction	**Key Regulation / Standards**	**Scope / Requirements**	**Status / Recent Developments**
Global	Voluntary frameworks: SASB, GRI; ISSB S1 & S2 (effective 1 Jan 2024)	Aim to improve and harmonise sustainability and climate disclosure practices	Many jurisdictions are moving to adopt or align with ISSB standards
EU	NFRD (2017) to CSRD (2024 onwards); ESRS reporting	NFRD introduced non-financial reporting and double materiality; CSRD expands firm coverage, requires detailed reporting and external assurance.	2025 Omnibus Package narrows scope, postpones implementation for newly covered firms to reduce reporting burdens
U.S.	SEC Climate Disclosure Rule (Mar 2022); Proposed ESG disclosure rule (Jun 2022)	Would require Scope 1 & 2 GHG emissions, climate risk financial impacts, governance; Introduce rule for advisers and investment companies on ESG disclosures	Climate rule challenged when mandated in Mar 2024; SEC ended defence in Mar 2025. ESG adviser rule also withdrawn in Jun 2025
Australia	AASB S1 (voluntary) and AASB S2 (mandatory climate-related disclosures)	Disclosures on governance, strategy, risk management, metrics and targets	Applies to identified entities for reporting periods beginning on or after 1 Jan 2025 through amendments to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
New Zealand	NS CS 1; NZ CS 2; NZ CS 3	Governance, strategy, risk management, metrics and targets.	Applies to around 200 climate reporting entities, including listed equity and debt issuers, to prepare climate-related disclosures for reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2023

Development of Mandated Sustainability Disclosure Rules in the EU

The European Union introduced Directive 2014/95/EU (the Corporate Social Responsibility [CSR] Directive or the Non-Financial Reporting Directive [NFRD]), which requires large listed EU firms to prepare annual non-financial reports beginning in the 2017 fiscal year (European Parliament and Council of the EU, 2014). This directive mandates disclosure of policies, risks, and outcomes related to environmental, social and employee matters, human rights, anti-corruption, and diversity issues (Doni et al. 2020, Fiechter et al., 2022). The NFRD adopts a double materiality perspective, requiring firms to report not only how sustainability issues affect them but also how their activities impact society and the environment (Christensen et al., 2021).

In November 2022, the EU adopted the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), which replaces the NFRD from the 2024 financial year onwards (European Parliament and Council of the EU, 2022). The CSRD significantly expands the number of firms subject to mandatory sustainability reporting and introduces more detailed requirements. These include reporting in accordance with the European Sustainability Reporting Standards, integrating sustainability information into the management report, obtaining external assurance, and applying digital tagging to the disclosed information (Hummel & Jobst, 2024).

In February 2025, the EC introduced a programme of simplification aimed at narrowing the scope of firms subject to the CSRD, reducing reporting burdens, and postponing implementation for newly covered undertakings through the Omnibus Package (EC, 2025). This initiative slows down EU's pace toward mandate but reflects the EU's commitment to ensuring regulatory proportionality and promoting a pragmatic, phased implementation that supports the long-term effectiveness and feasibility of sustainability disclosure obligations (Nicolo et al., 2025).

Development of Mandated Sustainability Disclosure Rules in the US

The US SEC has proposed several rules to mandate sustainability-related disclosures, but many have subsequently been delayed or withdrawn. In March 2022, the SEC proposed a rule to enhance and standardize climate-related disclosures, requiring firms to report key information such as Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions, financial impacts of climate risks, and governance structures overseeing climate-related issues (SEC, 2022b). However, the rule faced immediate legal challenges when mandated comes in March 2024 (Frankel et al., 2025). Twenty-five states filed a lawsuit before the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,

arguing that the SEC had exceeded its regulatory authority (Frankel et al., 2025). In March 2025, the SEC voted to end its defence of the rule (SEC, 2025a).

Another rule proposed by the SEC in June 2022 was intended to require registered investment advisers, certain exempt advisers, registered investment companies, and business development companies to disclose additional information about how ESG factors influence their investment decisions (SEC, 2022c). Similarly, this proposal was later withdrawn by the SEC in June 2025 (SEC, 2025b).

Development of Mandated Sustainability Disclosure Rules in Australia

In Australia, the government confirmed its intention to mandate climate-related disclosures, beginning with the largest and most carbon-intensive entities, and released draft legislation for this major reform to financial reporting in January 2024 (Treasury, 2024). This mandate is governed by revised corporate laws concerning financial reporting obligations through amendments to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) and related legislation (Amel-Zadeh and Tang, 2025).

In September 2024, the AASB, which is responsible for developing sustainability reporting standards, approved AASB S1 General Requirements for Disclosure of Sustainability-related Financial Information (voluntary) and AASB S2 Climate-related Disclosures, incorporating IFRS S1 and IFRS S2, respectively (AASB, 2024a, 2024b). Both standards are effective for reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2025. Under AASB S2, certain entities are required to disclose climate-related risks and opportunities, including information relating to governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets (AASB, 2024a).

This reform positions Australia as one of the early movers toward mandatory sustainability reporting. Prior to 1 January 2025, climate-related disclosures in annual reports were voluntary unless such risks were deemed material to an entity's financial performance. For the first group of identified entities, climate-related disclosures became mandatory for reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2025.

Development of Mandated Sustainability Disclosure Rules in New Zealand

New Zealand was one of the first jurisdictions to mandate climate-related disclosures. The Financial Sector (Climate-related Disclosures and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2021 requires around 200 climate reporting entities, including listed equity and debt issuers, to prepare climate-related disclosures for reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2023

(Ministry for the Environment, 2023). While the regime initially focuses on large financial market participants, it is expected to shape broader climate-reporting practice (Ehalaiye et al., 2024).

These disclosures are required to be prepared in accordance with the standards issued by the External Reporting Board (XRB), which is responsible for setting climate reporting standards in New Zealand. In December 2022, the XRB issued the final Aotearoa New Zealand Climate Standards, which include NZ CS 1 Climate-related Disclosures, NZ CS 2 Adoption of Aotearoa New Zealand Climate Standards, and NZ CS 3 General Requirements for Climate-related Disclosures (External Reporting Board, 2022).

2.1.2 Regulatory Bodies Enforcing Sustainability Disclosure

The growing volume of both voluntary and mandatory sustainability disclosures has expanded the responsibility of regulators to maintain market confidence and public trust. Effective enforcement is essential to the successful implementation of financial regulation and accounting standards (Christensen et al., 2021; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). Without adequate oversight, mandatory ESG disclosure requirements are unlikely to improve transparency or reporting quality (Krueger et al., 2024). As sustainability reporting becomes embedded within corporate and financial reporting frameworks, financial market regulators have assumed a central role in its supervision. At the same time, when sustainability disclosures are directed at consumers through environmental or ethical marketing, oversight responsibilities extend to consumer protection authorities.

In the EU, enforcement and oversight of sustainability reporting fall primarily under investor-focused regulators. Member states must establish mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance with the NFRD, while the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) coordinates and harmonises enforcement across the Union (Fiechter et al., 2022). In the US, capital market regulators such as the SEC play a key role in protecting investors and ensuring market transparency (Frankel et al., 2025), while the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) oversees environmental marketing and addresses unsubstantiated or misleading environmental claims directed at consumers (Rotman et al., 2020).

In Australia, mandatory sustainability and climate-related disclosures are incorporated into existing financial reporting and governance laws. Under Chapter 2M of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the ASIC enforces these sustainability reporting obligations as part of its broader mandate to uphold market integrity and investor protection (ASIC, 2024b). As the

consumer market regulator, the ACCC also plays an important role by regulating sustainability-related marketing and issuing guidance to help prevent misleading or deceptive green claims (ACCC, 2023a).

2.1.3 The Existence of Greenwashing

Despite the ongoing development of mandatory reporting regimes for sustainability and climate-related information, greenwashing persists. Prior research shows that firms often engage in strategic disclosures (Bingler et al., 2024; Ferguson et al., 2016; Xue et al., 2024), symbolic communication with limited substantive actions (Brandon et al., 2022; Hrasky, 2012), and decoupling between rhetoric and actual practices (Baker et al., 2024; Basu et al., 2022; Reitmaier et al., 2024).

At the disclosure level, companies may use linguistic strategies to shape perceptions and maintain legitimacy rather than to demonstrate genuine accountability (Ferguson et al., 2016). Such disclosure strategies have been evidenced in research. For example, Bingler et al. (2024) found that firms frequently engage in "cheap talk" and rhetorical commitments, with such communication associated with increased negative media coverage and higher emissions. Xue et al. (2024) further report that firms facing economic policy uncertainty tend to repeat past CSR disclosures instead of providing new information, reflecting symbolic rather than substantive reporting. Similarly, Pesci et al. (2015) show that firms may comply only superficially with disclosure requirements, producing simplistic or repetitive information, and Haji et al. (2022) find that firms selectively report information to present a favourable image.

Several studies also examine the relationship between sustainability disclosure and actual corporate behaviour, and find limited or even inconsistent real action relative to their claims. Hrasky (2012) finds that while carbon-intensive sectors tend to pursue moral legitimation strategies supported by substantive actions, less carbon-intensive sectors rely more heavily on symbolic disclosure in Australia. Similarly, Brandon et al. (2022) show that although non-US signatories to the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) hold higher ESG portfolios, US signatories do not improve the ESG performance of their portfolio companies, suggesting limited substantive impact. Reitmaier et al. (2024) further find that firms issuing CSR reports often exhibit higher levels of misconduct both before and after reporting, indicating that CSR disclosure frequently serves impression management purposes rather than demonstrating genuine responsible conduct.

In the social dimension, greenwashing is also evident. Baker et al. (2024) identify significant discrepancies between companies' public commitments to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) and their actual hiring practices. In the banking sector, Basu et al. (2022) find that high-ESG banks are more likely than low-ESG banks to reject mortgage loans in poorer neighbourhoods, reflecting a form of social washing in which banks adopt prosocial rhetoric and symbolic actions without aligning their behaviour with their stated social responsibilities.

Overall, this body of evidence indicates the existence of different forms of greenwashing in current corporate disclosure. Table II-4, presented in Section 2.2.2, shows the diverse proxies used by prior literature to capture greenwashing behaviours. Consequently, mandatory reporting regimes alone may be insufficient to ensure fair and efficient markets. Robust and continuous regulatory enforcement is essential to sustain market integrity and public trust (ASIC, 2024c).

2.1.4 Recent Regulatory Actions Against Greenwashing

The prevalence of greenwashing has recently drawn attention from regulators around the world. While regulatory interventions against greenwashing have been attempted since 2008, clustered legal and regulatory actions at a global scale have only emerged more recently. Regulators worldwide have increasingly taken proactive measures, including establishing dedicated task forces, issuing regulatory guidance, implementing corrective actions, and pursuing enforcement proceedings against greenwashing practices.

In the US, the SEC has increasingly prioritized oversight of ESG-related disclosures and claims since 2021. In March 2021, the SEC established a Climate and ESG Task Force within its Division of Enforcement to identify potential ESG-related misconduct, including material omissions or misstatements in climate risk disclosures and fund-level ESG strategies (SEC, 2021). Among its notable actions, the SEC has pursued enforcement against asset managers for misleading ESG marketing or failing to implement stated ESG policies, including cases involving Goldman Sachs Asset Management in 2022 (SEC, 2022a).

In parallel, the FTC plays a key role in regulating greenwashing in consumer markets. Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices," the FTC enforces its Green Guides to ensure that environmental marketing claims, such as "recyclable," "biodegradable," or "eco-friendly", are truthful, substantiated, and not misleading (Rotman et al., 2020). Recently, the FTC imposed civil penalties in 2022 against

Kohl's Inc. and Walmart US for deceptively marketing rayon textile products as bamboo (FTC, 2022).

In Europe, the EC coordinated a sweep of online "green" claims in 2020, revealing that around 42% of examined environmental claims were exaggerated, false, or deceptive (EC, 2021). Building on these findings, the EU introduced a new consumer protection framework in March 2024 through Directive (EU) 2024/825 on Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition, which strengthens safeguards against misleading environmental and sustainability-related marketing (EC, 2024). This directive complements the proposed 2023 Green Claims Directive, which aims to establish detailed requirements for substantiating and verifying environmental claims (EC, 2023). National regulators in EU member states have also begun taking enforcement actions. In the Netherlands, the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) deemed the "Conscious" sustainability claims by H&M to be vague or insufficiently substantiated, prompting H&M to revise those claims and donate €500,000 to sustainable activities (ACM, 2022). In Italy, the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) fined Shein €1 million for misleading environmental claims disseminated through its product promotions and website, ruling that many claims were vague, omissive, or overstated (AGCM, 2025).

In Australia, greenwashing has become a central focus for both corporate and consumer market regulators. The ASIC has intensified enforcement activity since 2021. Between April 2023 and June 2024, ASIC reported 47 regulatory interventions, including 8 infringement notices, 37 corrective disclosure outcomes, and two new civil penalty proceedings against Active Super and Vanguard Investments Australia (ASIC, 2023a). In support of its enforcement work, ASIC released Information Sheet 271: How to avoid greenwashing when offering or promoting sustainability-related products (ASIC, 2023b), outlining key practices for financial institutions to ensure that sustainability statements are accurate and substantiated.

Parallel to ASIC's corporate-market oversight, the ACCC has targeted misleading environmental claims in consumer markets. Following its 2022 internet sweep of 247 business websites, the ACCC published draft guidance in 2023 on environmental and sustainability claims and initiated several enforcement actions, including proceedings against Clorox Australia for overstating product benefits (ACCC, 2024). It also accepted a court-enforceable undertaking from MOO Premium Foods in November 2023 for misleading ocean plastic statements. Most recently, the ACCC launched Federal Court proceedings against Australian Gas Networks Limited, alleging that its "Love Gas" TV and digital advertising campaign made

false and misleading environmental representations about the climate impact of gas (ACCC, 2025).

At a federal level, a Senate Inquiry into Greenwashing commenced in 2023 to examine the adequacy of Australia's consumer protection and corporate disclosure frameworks. The inquiry received 126 submissions from industry, academia, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), followed by two public hearings in April and May 2024. A summary of the key regulators enforcing greenwashing in different jurisdictions[2] is provided in Table II-2.

[2] New Zealand is not presented in this summary because regulators have initiated relatively limited greenwashing enforcement actions.

Table II-2 Regulatory Bodies Responsible for Supervision and Their Enforcement Actions Against Greenwashing

Region / Jurisdiction	Financial Market Regulation		Consumer Market Regulation	
	Regulators	**Examples of enforcement actions**	**Regulators**	**Examples of enforcement actions**
EU	ESMA that coordinates national enforcers' oversight of sustainability reporting under NFRD/CSRD	N/A	EC for coordination; National regulators such as ACM (Netherlands) and AGCM (Italy) for enforcement	EC's 2020 sweep found 42% of online green claims exaggerated, false, or deceptive. At national level, H&M required to revise "Conscious" claims and donate €500,000 by ACM in 2022; Shein fined €1 million for misleading environmental claims by AGCM in 2025
U.S.	SEC	Enforcement actions against BNY Mellon Investment Adviser and Goldman Sachs Asset Management in 2022 for misleading ESG marketing or failing to implement stated ESG policies	FTC	2022 civil penalties imposed on Kohl's Inc. and Walmart U.S. for deceptively marketing rayon textile products as bamboo
Australia	ASIC	47 interventions, including 8 infringement notices, 37 corrective disclosures, and civil penalty proceedings against Active Super and Vanguard Investments Australia between April 2023 and June 2024	ACCC	Enforcement actions including Clorox Australia matter; MOO Premium Foods enforceable undertaking for misleading ocean plastic statements in 2023; Federal Court proceedings against Australian Gas Networks Limited for misleading climate impact claims in the "Love Gas" campaign in 2025

Collectively, these actions show that the emergence of mandatory disclosure frameworks alone does not eliminate greenwashing. Appendix 1, developed in Chapter 3, provides a full list of recent regulatory greenwashing enforcement cases and shows that greenwashing remains prevalent. This persistence may stem from the diverse form and complex nature of green claims, which differ in type (e.g., environmental or social), source of disclosure (e.g., sustainability reports or online advertisements), and reasons for greenwashing (e.g., selective disclosure or rhetorical "cheap talk"). These variations complicate detection and enforcement, making ongoing regulatory scrutiny essential to safeguarding market integrity, investor confidence, and consumer trust.

2.2 Greenwashing Conceptualisation

2.2.1 Academic and Regulatory Greenwashing Definitions

Although there is no universally accepted definition of greenwashing (Seele & Gatti, 2017), the concept is widely recognised as an umbrella term encompassing different forms of misleading sustainability communication. The term first appeared in academic research in the late twentieth century, where it was used to describe corporations that publicly promoted environmental responsibility to customers while continuing to engage in environmentally harmful practices (Greer & Bruno, 1996). Over time, its meaning has expanded beyond marketing to include broader corporate communications, sustainability disclosure, and reporting (Huang et al., 2025).

Academic definitions of greenwashing generally centre around three core dimensions. The first is selective disclosure, referring to the selective presentation of positive environmental information to create an overly favourable corporate image while concealing negative aspects of performance (Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Fan et al., 2021; Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Parguel et al., 2011). For example, Lyon and Maxwell (2011, p. 9) define greenwashing as "the selective disclosure of positive information about a company's environmental or social performance without full disclosure of negative information on these dimensions, so as to create an overly positive corporate image." The second is decoupling, which highlights the discrepancy between a company's sustainability statements ("green talk") and its actual practices ("green walk") (Bowen & Aragon-Correa, 2014; Walker & Wan, 2012). For example, Walker and Wan (2012, p. 231) describe greenwashing as "symbolic information emanating from within an organization without substantive actions." The third dimension is misleading communication, which involves obscuring negative information while exaggerating or

highlighting positive sustainability claims (Tateishi, 2018). As defined by Tateishi (2018, p.3), greenwashing is "communication that misleads people regarding environmental performance or benefits by disclosing negative information and disseminating positive information about an organization, service, or product." A summary of greenwashing definitions in the literature is provided in Panel A of Table II-3.

While greenwashing can occur in any form of corporate communication, accounting scholars have examined this issue in the context of CSR, sustainability, and/or ESG disclosures produced by companies. Scholars have long been concerned about the reliability and transparency of such disclosures, even before the term "greenwashing" gained popularity in the early 2010s. Specifically, greenwashing has been framed as a behavioural issue associated with sustainability reporting, drawing on terminology such as "symbolic actions" (Rodrigue, 2014; Neu et al., 1998), "impression management" (Cho et al., 2010; Mahoney et al., 2013; Neu et al., 1998), "decoupling" (Fernández Chulián et al., 2025), "bias" (Cho et al., 2010; Cho et al., 2015; Mahoney et al., 2013; Rodrigue, 2014), "optimism" (Cho et al., 2010), "selective disclosure" (Mahoney et al., 2013; Neu et al., 1998), "strategic accountability" (Archel et al., 2009; Cho, 2009; Rodrigue, 2014; Tregidga et al., 2014), and "lack of completeness" (Adams, 2004). Irrespective of the terminology used, accounting scholars have highlighted a misalignment between sustainability disclosures and actual practices, pointing to a practice of "greenwashing".

For regulators, greenwashing is recognised as involving "misleading", "misrepresentative", "exaggerated", and "deceptive" claims about the environmental or the sustainable nature of products, services, investment strategies, or enterprises. ASIC (2023a) defines it as "the practice of misrepresenting the extent to which a financial product or investment strategy is environmentally friendly, sustainable or ethical," while the ACCC (2023a) refers to it more generally as "false or misleading environmental claims." Such claims may be made not only in CSR reports or other forms of corporate filings, but also in product factsheets and advertising (ACCC, 2023a; ASIC, 2023a; EC, 2024). Currently, regulatory sanctions on greenwashing have focused on ESG investment products in the asset management sector (ASIC, 2023a; SEC, 2022a), "net-zero" claims in the energy sector (ASIC, 2023a), and "eco-friendly" advertising in the consumer goods industry (ACCC, 2023a; ACM, 2022), while also addressing cases in corporate filings (e.g., Fertoz in Australia and Vale in the US). In asset management, for example, greenwashing often involves financial products failing to meet ESG screening criteria, such as excluding investments in high-risk sectors like fossil fuels and

tobacco. Regulators focus on inconsistencies between screening criteria and actual investment activities. Over time, regulators' definitions of greenwashing have evolved with industry practices and court cases. What constitutes greenwashing is subject to interpretation and transformation, as evident by recent regulatory interventions by market regulators. A summary of greenwashing definitions by regulators is provided in Panel B of Table II-3.

Table II-3 Summary of Commonly Used Greenwashing Definitions

Panel A: Commonly Cited Greenwashing Definition in Academic Literature		
Definition	**Author**	**Year**
"Greenwashing is disinformation disseminated by an organization so as to present an environmentally responsible public image".	10th edition of the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (commonly used in literature)	2001
"Selective disclosure of positive information about a company's environmental or social performance without full disclosure of negative information on these dimensions, so as to create an overly positive corporate image".	Lyon and Maxwell	2011
"The intersection of two firm behaviours: poor environmental performance and positive communication about environmental performance"	Delmas and Burbano	2011
"The act of misleading consumers regarding the environmental practices of a company or the environmental benefits of a product or service".	Parguel et al.	2011
"Symbolic information emanating from within an organization without substantive actions". (discrepancy between the green talk and green walk)	Walker and Wan	2012
"A specific subset of symbolic corporate environmentalism in which the changes are both 'merely symbolic' and deliberately so".	Bowen and Aragon-Correa	2014
"Communication that misleads people regarding environmental performance/benefits by disclosing negative information and disseminating positive information about an organization, service, or product."	Tateishi (p.3)	2018
Panel B: Greenwashing Definition by Regulators		
Definition	**Regulator**	**Year**
"Greenwashing" is a term used to describe false or misleading environmental claims.	ACCC	2023
Greenwashing is the practice of misrepresenting the extent to which a financial product or investment strategy is environmentally friendly, sustainable or ethical.	ASIC	2023
Greenwashing is the act of exaggerating the extent to which products or services take into account environmental and sustainability factors	SEC	2022
information that is not true or presented in a confusing or misleading way to give the inaccurate impression that a product or enterprise is more environmentally sound	EC	2023

2.2.2 Greenwashing Measurement and Proxies

Given that the measurement of greenwashing is central to quantitative research on sustainability disclosure, we conduct a systematic review of empirical studies in accounting, finance, and management to examine how greenwashing has been conceptualised and operationalised in the literature. We searched Scopus and Web of Science from the earliest available coverage through to August 2024 using a comprehensive keyword strategy designed to capture both explicit and implicit references to greenwashing. As discussed in the definitions section, the greenwashing literature extends beyond the explicit use of the term "greenwashing" to include related concepts such as "selective disclosure" and "decoupling." Accordingly, our search query included variations of "greenwashing" (e.g., greenwash, green-washing, greenwashed) as well as terms commonly associated with the misalignment between sustainability claims and actions, such as selective disclosure, decoupling, misleading, cheap talk, and symbolic communication, combined with sustainability-related terms including ESG, environment, sustainability, CSR, climate, and greenhouse gas.

To ensure credibility and disciplinary relevance, we restricted the search to A and A* journals (Australian Business Deans Council [ABDC] Journal Quality List) in Accounting (3501), Finance (3502), and Management (3507). After removing duplicates, we screened article titles and abstracts to determine whether greenwashing was clearly defined and empirically measured as a substantive construct rather than being used only in a descriptive or rhetorical manner. This search process resulted in 978 articles (213 A* and 765 A; 3501 = 117; 3502 = 93; 3507 = 768).

Following this, each article's abstract was reviewed to assess its substantive focus. We retained only studies in which greenwashing (or an equivalent form of sustainability-related misrepresentation) was central to the theoretical argument and where the study employed a quantitative archival research design with an explicit operationalisation or proxy for greenwashing. Conceptual papers, qualitative case studies, and studies that mentioned greenwashing without providing a measurable indicator were excluded. This screening resulted in a final set of 194 articles for in-depth analysis.

Our review shows that studies measure greenwashing in several broad ways. These approaches can be grouped into four main categories: (1) decoupling between communication and performance, (2) selective disclosure, (3) disclosure strategy features (e.g. tone, similarity over time) and (4) external lists of greenwashing accusations. The following sections describe

each group in more detail. Table II-4 provides a consolidated summary of these commonly used measurements and is referenced in Section 2.1.3 to illustrate the diverse forms of greenwashing behaviours. This summary also represents a key contribution of the thesis, as prior research has not systematically collected, mapped, and summarised greenwashing measurements across the literature.

Decoupling Between Communication and Performance

A large group of studies defines greenwashing as the gap between what firms say and what they actually do. These studies differ in how much they rely on external databases, how many indicators they use, and whether they use external evidence as proxies for real CSR performance (for example, emissions data, penalties, or spending).

The largest part of this literature identifies greenwashing by comparing a disclosure score with a performance score, both from external databases (e.g. Chen et al., 2024; Eliwa et al., 2021; García-Sánchez et al., 2021; Zhang, 2022). Greenwashing occurs when disclosure is high but performance is low. A smaller group of studies uses a single score that already reflects reporting substantiveness. For example, Marquis and Qian (2014) use the RKS reporting substantiveness score, where lower values mean symbolic disclosure. A related method estimates an expected CSR score and interprets the residual as the signal: a negative residual suggests symbolic disclosure and therefore greenwashing (Yang et al., 2025).

Other work reconstructs symbolic and substantive CSR at the item level (using item-level indicators from external databases) by defining their own criteria for separating disclosure elements into symbolic and substantive categories. Hawn and Ioannou (2016), for example, classify ASSET4 indicators into symbolic and substantive groups, and this approach is widely followed in later studies (e.g., Abweny et al., 2024; Bothello et al., 2023). Combs et al. (2023) use principal components from Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) strengths and concerns to form symbolic and substantive factors. Kassinis et al. (2022) focus on the product domain and calculate a policy minus implementation gap to capture when communication outpaces real action.

Another group of works combines content analysis with performance ratings. Tashman et al. (2019) build a 25-item disclosure index and subtract an MSCI ESG performance rating with larger positive gaps indicate greenwashing. Sauerwald and Su (2019) measure optimistic tone (using the Loughran and McDonald dictionary) and contrast it with KLD performance to

detect inflated messaging. Wang et al. (2024a) pair Hexun CSR scores with Word2Vec-based abnormal disclosure content and treat mismatches as evidence of greenwashing.

Other studies proxy CSR performance as actual environmental outcomes, most commonly rely on emissions, environmental penalties, and environmental expenditures. Coen et al. (2022) compare the intensity of climate communication with realized emissions reductions. Kim and Lyon (2015) measure the difference between reported and actual emissions cuts to identify overstatement. Studies also compare Carbon Disclosure Project climate disclosure scores with GHG emission intensity (Bui et al., 2022; Mateo-Márquez et al., 2022). Some use environmental penalties as the performance signal, treating high green rhetoric and penalties as greenwashing (Hu et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2024b). Another approach checks environmental expenditures, where claims not backed by spending indicate symbolic reporting (Zhou & Wang, 2024).

A related finance literature evaluates public sustainability commitments. Kim and Yoon (2023) examine PRI signatories and test whether investment behaviour changes. Liang et al. (2022) test similar ideas for funds. Li and Wu (2020) assess whether firms reduce negative incidents after joining the United Nations Global Compact. Li et al. (2019) compare United Nations Global Compact participation with GRI adoption and label firms that commit publicly but do not follow through as symbolic.

Selective Disclosure

A second main approach focuses on the selective disclosure behaviour. Marquis et al., (2016) measure selective disclosure by comparing an absolute disclosure ratio with a cost-weighted disclosure ratio using Trucost data. Larger gaps indicate that firms report more on low-cost, less damaging environmental indicators while avoiding costly or harmful ones. This approach has been widely applied in later studies (Arouri et al., 2021; Marquis et al., 2016; Pope et al., 2024).

Other studies detect selective disclosure directly from text. Xie et al. (2023) code eighteen disclosure items, identify both omissions and symbolic expressive language, and combine these into a greenwashing measure. Roszkowska-Menkes et al. (2024) compare how firms discuss controversies versus how they promote their positive sustainability claims, and treat the masking of negative information alongside positive messaging as selective disclosure.

Disclosure Strategy Features

A third research stream examines the structure and style of disclosure itself, without directly comparing communication to performance outcomes. These studies primarily use content analysis, either through manual coding or natural language processing (NLP) methods. Khan et al. (2021) build an eleven-item disclosure quality score; low relevance and reliability indicate symbolic reporting. Li et al. (2023) construct separate indices for green communication and green practices and treat their gap as a greenwashing signal. Earlier work also distinguished symbolic and substantive practices through manual coding (Walker & Wan, 2012).

Other studies in this stream examine specific stylistic patterns that signal symbolic disclosure. Xue et al. (2024) show that high similarity across a firm's CSR reports over time suggests boilerplate text and a higher greenwashing risk. Van der Waal and Thijssens (2020) find that frequent mentions of Sustainable Development Goals without corresponding detail indicate symbolic engagement.

More recent work applies ML methods and trains classifiers to label disclosure sentences as symbolic or substantive. Wang et al. (2024c) and Xing et al. (2024) use naive Bayes models and compute greenwashing as the difference between shares of symbolic and substantive sentences. Zhou et al. (2024) use recurrent neural networks to detect rising disclosure volume combined with falling substantive detail. Bingler et al. (2022; 2024) use language models such as ClimateBERT to show that firms emphasize governance and risk management language while providing little strategy or metrics, indicating cherry-picking in climate disclosure.

External Greenwashing List

A small but practically relevant stream directly identifies greenwashing through third party assessments. These studies rely on third-party evaluations or media investigations rather than constructing their own measures. For example, Teti et al. (2024) classify firms listed in the Corporate Climate Responsibility Monitor as greenwashing cases, and Du (2015) draws on investigative media reports (South Weekend) in China to identify firms accused of misleading environmental claims. These datasets make it possible to examine high-profile and salient cases, but they are constrained by selective coverage and do not represent an official standard of what constitutes greenwashing.

2.2.3 Limitations with Current Measurements

Overall, research identify greenwashing primarily through (1) differences across disclosure and performance scores, or comparisons between disclosure content and outcomes such as emissions, penalties, or spending, (2) selective disclosure behaviour, (3) linguistic signals such as vagueness or boilerplate repetition, and (4) external lists that publicly name cases. Taken together, the literature shows that firms may strategically use sustainability communication in ways that create a more favourable impression than what is supported by their underlying actions.

However, these approaches also have important limitations. Most of these measures capture only a single dimension of greenwashing (for example, selective disclosure or repeated boilerplate language) rather than providing an overall assessment of whether a disclosure may mislead users. Many approaches also rely on third-party ratings or performance databases that were not originally designed to define greenwashing. For example, a firm with high disclosure and low performance is not necessarily misleading, as some firms may be reporting long-term goals or operating in sectors where improvements take time. Measures based on vague or repetitive language mainly capture communication style, rather than the real misleading effect. External case lists draw attention to high-profile examples, but they generally represent accused greenwashing rather than real greenwashing.

For these reasons, this study adopts a regulatory perspective. Rather than inferring greenwashing through proxies, we examine how regulators and enforcement bodies assess greenwashing in practice. This perspective provides direct insight into which types of statements are considered misleading under what conditions. Based on this, we construct a greenwashing taxonomy grounded in regulatory guidance, rulings, and enforcement actions. We then collect and analyse regulatory cases to understand how particular claims lead to findings of misleading conduct. This regulatory approach offers a clearer understanding of the features and signals associated with greenwashing, and it guides the design of the detection framework developed in the following chapters.

Table II-4 Summary of Commonly Used Greenwashing Measurements

Greenwashing Definition	Method Applied	Measurement	Examples of Papers
Decoupling between communication and performance	Single CSR reporting score	CSR reporting substantiveness score (RKS): lower scores = symbolic disclosure (greenwashing); higher scores = substantive disclosure.	Marquis, C; Qian, CL (2014)
	Expected vs. actual CSR score	This measure treats the residual from a CSR rating model as an indicator of whether CSR is substantive or symbolic.; Negative residual (actual < expected) indicates symbolic CSR (greenwashing); Positive residual indicates substantive CSR.	Yang, YP; Li, SS; Yang, J (2025)
	Compare disclosure score and performance score across databases	Comparing two third-party ESG scores from databases. One capturing ESG disclosure and the other capturing ESG performance. Larger positive gap indicates symbolic ESG disclosure (greenwashing).	Zhang, DY (2022); Chen L.; Ma Y.; Feng G.-F.; Chang C.-P. (2024); Eliwa, Y., Aboud, A., & Saleh, A (2021); Qu, S (2024); Wang, YX; Hu, FJ; Wang, YY (2024); Wang, SY; Lai, YC; Zhang, SA (2024); García-Sánchez, IM; Hussain, N; Khan, SA; Martínez-Ferrero, J (2021)
	Item-level Symbolic vs substantive CSR	Greenwashing is measured as the smbolic - substantive CSR distinction, where Substantive_CSR is constructed from 21 ASSET4 indicators reflecting implemented CSR practices and Symbolic_CSR is constructed from 24 ASSET4 indicators reflecting disclosure-focused CSR communication .	Hawn & Ioannou (2016); Bothello, J; Ioannou, I; Porumb, VA; Zengin-Karaibrahimoglu, Y (2023); Abweny, M; Afrifa, GA; Iqbal, A (2024)
		PCA-based symbolic CSR score derived from KLD strengths and concerns. Higher symbolic score indicates greenwashing; higher substantive score indicates authentic CSR.	Combs, JG; Jaskiewicz, P; Ravi, R; Walls, JL (2023)
		ASSET4 policy–implementation gap in Product Innovation and Product Responsibility (Policy Score − Implementation Score), averaged across product-related (product innovation and product responsibility) categories. Higher gap indicates greenwashing.	Kassinis, GI; Kay, AA; Papagiannakis, G; Vlachos, PA (2022)
	Content analysis and performance score	CSR reporting–performance gap: Substantive CSR disclosure index (25 items) minus MSCI ESG performance rating. Higher gap indicates greenwashing.	Tashman, P; Marano, V; Kostova, T (2019)
		Tone–performance gap: CSR report optimistic tone (Loughran–McDonald) minus KLD performance (strengths − concerns), both standardized. Higher gap indicates greenwashing.	Sauerwald, S; Su, W (2019)
		Greenwashing is proxied by the misalignment between real CSR performance (Hexun SCORE) and abnormal CSR disclosure content (Word2Vec CONTENT residuals)	Wang, Q; Ma, Z; Zhao, JY; Shu, G (2024)
	Disclosure vs Actual	The mismatch between climate communication intensity (dictionary frequency) and actual emissions reductions (emissions intensity)	Coen, D; Herman, K; Pegram, T (2022)

	Performance (e.g. emissions, penalties)	The difference between reported and actual emissions reductions, normalized by the firm's level of reported reductions	Kim, EH; Lyon, TP (2015)
		The decoupling between disclosed climate transparency (CDP climate change score) and actual climate performance (GHG emissions intensity), where high disclosure combined with poor emissions outcomes indicates symbolic climate reporting.	Bui, B; Chelli, M; Houqe, MN (2022); Mateo-Márquez A.J.; González-González J.M.; Zamora-Ramírez C. (2022)
		The decoupling between environmental rhetoric (measured via greenness-related term frequency in corporate disclosures) and actual environmental performance (proxied by whether the firm received environmental penalties), where high talk combined with poor performance indicates greenwashing.	Hu, XW; Hua, RH; Liu, QF; Wang, CJ (2023); Wang, JY; Ke, YB; Sun, LX; Liu, HF (2024)
		The decoupling between environmental claims in MD&A and the absence of corresponding environmental expenditures, where claims without spending indicate symbolic disclosure.	Zhou, B; Wang, QW (2024)
	Initiative membership vs behavioural change (e.g. ESG investment) [frequent in finance]	PRI signatories do not make investments in funds/stocks with high ESG scores	Kim, S; Yoon, A (2023); Liang, H; Sun, L; Teo, M (2022)
		Examining whether firms reduce their negative ESG incidents after joining the UN Global Compact program. Insignificant reduction in incidents after participation are considered symbolic rather than substantive CSR actions	Li, J; Wu, D (2020)
		The decoupling between symbolic CSR commitment (UNGC membership) and substantive CSR practice (GRI-based CSR reporting), where commitment without GRI adherence indicates symbolic CSR behaviour.	Li, JL; Haider, ZA; Jin, XZ; Yuan, WL (2019)
Selective Disclosure	score-based	Selective disclosure magnitude is calculated as the gap between broad reporting (absolute disclosure ratio) and the disclosure of environmentally costly impacts (weighted disclosure ratio) based on Trucost.	Marquis, C; Toffel, MW; Zhou, YH (2016); Pope, S; Peillex, J; El Ouadghiri, I; Gomes, M (2024); Arouri, M; El Ghoul, S; Gomes, M (2021)
	content analysis	Content analysis of environmental disclosure across 18 items, where selective omission of required information and symbolic expressive emphasis are quantified and combined using a geometric mean to yield a firm-level greenwashing degree	Xie, JY; Chen, L; Liu, Y; Wang, SN (2023)
		Coding the transparency level of ESG controversy disclosure and comparing it to the communication on positive sustainability practices in the same issue areas; greenwashing is present when firms obscure controversies but highlight positive ESG achievements.	Roszkowska-Menkes, M; Aluchna, M; Kaminski, B (2024)
disclosure strategy e.g. board wording, tone, similarity over years	content analysis	constructing an 11-item content-analysis-based sustainability disclosure quality score; low relevance and reliability of disclosure imply symbolic sustainability communication rather than substantive practice.	Khan, HZ; Bose, S; Mollik, A; Harun, H (2021)
		Using content analysis to construct separate indices for green communication and green practices, and defines greenwashing as the extent to which communication exceeds actual environmental practices.	Li, W; Li, WN; Seppänen, V; Koivumäki, T (2023)

		measure greenwashing as the extent to which firms engage in symbolic environmental communication without corresponding substantive actions, quantified as the difference between manually coded symbolic and substantive action scores.	Walker, K; Wan, F (2012)
		symbolic CSR communication, proxied by the degree of within-firm textual similarity in CSR reports over time, where higher similarity reflects boilerplate disclosure and therefore greater greenwashing risk.	Xue X.; Wang L.; Hu N. (2024)
		comparing the frequency of SDG references in sustainability reports with the degree of substantive detail provided; high mention frequency combined with vague, generic disclosure indicates symbolic SDG engagement	van der Waal J.W.H.; Thijssens T. (2020)
	Machine based text analysis	Building a cheap talk index by using BERT (deep learning tool) to analyze 1) Climate vs non-climate 2) Sentiment analysis. 3) Commitments and actions 4) Specificity	Bingler, JA; Kraus, M; Leippold, M; Webersinke, N (2024)
		Trains a naïve Bayesian classifier to distinguish substantial (concrete, data-based) from symbolic (vague, promotional) environmental disclosure based on manually labeled sentences. A firm's greenwashing score is calculated as the difference between the share of symbolic and substantial sentences in its disclosures.	Wang, Y; Xing, C; Zhang, L (2024); Xing, C; Zhang, XY; Zhang, YM; Zhang, LX (2024)
		Using an RNN classification model to distinguish substantive from symbolic disclosure, greenwashing identified when there is increase the volume of environmental disclosure while simultaneously reducing the substantive content.	Zhou, K; Qu, Z; Liang, JY; Tao, YQ; Zhu, MT (2024)
		Using ClimateBERT to classify TCFD-related climate disclosures, Bingler et al. (2022) show that firms often emphasize high-level governance and risk management language while providing little strategy- or metrics-based information, indicating cherry-picked and symbolic climate disclosure.	Bingler, JA; Kraus, M; Leippold, M; Webersinke, N (2022)
External list of flagged cases	External case list	GWASH = 1 if listed in Corporate Climate Responsibility Monitor.	Teti, E; Etro, LL; Pausini, L (2024)
		GREENWASH = 1 if listed as greenwashing in *South Weekend* media investigation.	Du, X (2015)

2.3 Regulatory Enforcement

Regulatory enforcement is a central component of the institutional framework that is essential for high-quality financial reporting (Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2019). The enforcement mechanisms are critical to capital market functioning and, in some cases, may be even more important than the accounting standards themselves (Ball et al., 2000; Christensen et al., 2013).

Literature on financial reporting regulation demonstrates that credible enforcement can improve disclosure quality and discipline reporting behaviour. For example, Daske et al. (2008) show that the capital-market benefits of mandatory IFRS adoption arise only in jurisdictions with strong incentives for transparency and robust legal enforcement. Brown et al. (2018) further find that SEC review processes generate spillover effects, with firms not receiving comment letters also increasing the specificity of their risk disclosures when peers are reviewed, thereby reducing their likelihood of future scrutiny.

A substantial body of research also examines the effects of enforcement through audit oversight, particularly the PCAOB inspection regime. Studies exploiting variation in PCAOB inspection access in both US and international contexts consistently document improvements in audit quality (Aobdia and Shroff, 2017; DeFond and Lennox, 2017; Lamoreaux, 2016; Lamoreaux et al., 2020). At the enforcement-action level, Dharmasiri et al. (2021) employ responsive regulation theory and document the types of violations that lead to PCAOB sanctions, in which regulators tailor the severity of sanctions to the seriousness of non-compliance (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992).

However, these benefits may be accompanied by economic and operational costs. Christensen et al. (2017) show that increases in enforcement intensity by the United Kingdom (UK) Financial Reporting Review Panel reduced shareholder wealth, while Florou et al. (2018) find that stronger enforcement increased audit effort, audit risk, and fees. Leng et al. (2011) further show that SEC Accounting and Enforcement Releases can have long-lasting negative effects on firm performance and stock returns. Overall, this body of evidence shows that regulatory enforcement is essential for the effective functioning of financial regulation and disclosure standards. At the same time, enforcement is not uniform in its effects. Its outcomes depend on the nature of the misconduct, the regulatory tools applied, and the institutional context.

While similar enforcement mechanisms are now being introduced for sustainability and climate-related disclosure (Christensen et al., 2021), academic evidence on how enforcement

operates in the greenwashing context remains limited. Section 2.1 has shown that regulators increasingly issue guidance, corrective disclosures, infringement notices, and penalties to address misleading sustainability claims. However, there is currently no systematic framework that explains how different types of sustainability claims are assessed, which types of statements are most likely to trigger regulatory concern, and under what conditions such claims are deemed misleading. This leaves both a conceptual gap (what constitutes greenwashing under enforcement standards) and an empirical gap (limited structured data linking claim characteristics to enforcement outcomes). Addressing these gaps motivates the development of a regulator-grounded greenwashing taxonomy and greenwashing enforcement dataset in this thesis.

2.4 Sustainability Assurance

External assurance is viewed by stakeholders as a mechanism to enhance the credibility and trustworthiness of reported information (Krasodomska et al., 2021). A McKinsey survey (2019) reports that 97% of investors believe that sustainability disclosures should be assured. PwC's Global Investor Survey (2022) reveals that 87% of surveyed investors suspect that corporate disclosures contain some greenwashing, thereby viewing assurance as an important mechanism to increase their confidence in sustainability reporting (PwC, 2022).

Current sustainability assurance practices remain largely voluntary. Managerial discretion plays a central role in determining whether to obtain assurance and, if so, the choice of assurance provider, the scope of subject matter covered, and the level of assurance obtained (Casey & Grenier, 2015; Farooq & de Villiers, 2020; Gipper et al., 2024; Peters & Romi, 2015; Simnett et al., 2009). Current assurance practices reflect these constraints: only a relatively small share of sustainability disclosures is externally reviewed; most engagements provide limited assurance; and the scope typically focuses on established quantitative environmental indicators, such as water consumption and GHG emissions (Krasodomska et al., 2021). As a result, sustainability assurance does not function as a simple, binary guarantee of reporting credibility. Instead, its effectiveness varies considerably, creating expectation gaps and raising questions about assurance quality.

This variation in practice highlights fundamental questions about what assurance quality is and how it should be measured. Currently, no consensus has been achieved on how to define or measure assurance quality (Hummel et al., 2019; Venter & Krasodomska, 2024). Prior studies employ different indicators. For example, Hummel et al. (2019) assess assurance quality based on the depth of the assurance process and the breadth of the assurance statement;

Clarkson et al. (2019) associate quality with the scope of the engagement and the type of assurance provider; and Zaman et al. (2021) evaluate assurance quality by conducting a content analysis of assurance statements using a 12-item disclosure index. However, many of these proxies rely on researcher judgement and do not necessarily capture whether assurance actually enhances information credibility or reduces greenwashing.

Prior literature has also studied the consequences of sustainability assurance. On the positive side, studies show that sustainability assurance tends to improve the quality and reliability of ESG disclosures and is valued by capital market participants (e.g., Ballou et al., 2018; Casey & Grenier, 2015; Chen, 2024; Du & Wu, 2019; Gipper et al., 2024, 2025; Maroun, 2019; Moroney et al., 2012; Peters & Romi, 2015). For instance, Ballou et al.'s (2018) study of CSR restatements finds that assurance identifies inaccuracies in prior reports and leads to improved reporting definitions, scopes, and methodologies informing restatements for comparability. Pinnuck et al. (2021) find that firms whose ESG reports are assured are more likely to have restatements correcting previous overstatements. Gipper et al. (2025) find that assurance is associated with improved carbon accounting quality. Assurance identifies issues in a firm's carbon accounting system, leading to fewer omissions and more revisions of prior errors. Gipper et al. (2024) document a striking increase in the number of firms with ESG assurance and the number of metrics assured in the US. They find that assurance is associated with improvements in ESG disclosure quality and ESG performance ratings, likely because assurers help firms identify and mitigate environmental and social risks. Moreover, Du and Wu (2019) find that the issuance of CSR reports is not associated with a lower incidence of future CSR-related misconduct – unless accompanied by external assurance. Other studies indicate that assurance enhances investors' confidence in disclosed information (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2019; Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2017; Fuhrmann et al., 2017; Reimsbach et al., 2018; Stuart et al., 2021).

However, some studies question whether extant forms of sustainability assurance are effective in curbing greenwashing. One strand of this research shows that assurance provides little or no improvement in the quality of sustainability disclosures or the prevention of corporate misconduct (e.g., Christensen, 2016; Michelon et al., 2015; Talbot & Boiral, 2018). Additionally, research and high-profile accounting fraud scandals raise concerns about auditors' ability to uncover fraud, which is often well-concealed and rationalised (e.g., Dyck et al., 2010, 2024; Peecher et al., 2013). Further, research has documented the persistence of an "expectation gap" between what financial statement users expect an audit to provide and what

the audit profession believes it is providing in relation to fraud detection (e.g., Cohen et al., 2017; Mock et al., 2013), with these findings being potentially applicable to greenwashing as a form of fraud risk.

A second stream of research highlights challenges involved in transferring traditional audit techniques to sustainability assurance. For instance, the qualitative and multidimensional nature of ESG subject matters does not fit well with financial auditors' emphases on objective and verifiable metrics (Maroun, 2020; O'Dwyer, 2011). The backward-looking nature of auditing techniques contrasts with the forward-looking orientation of ESG reporting (Free et al., 2024). To assess materiality, financial statement auditors typically define a materiality threshold. In contrast, ESG assurers identify material topics, which can be challenging due to the diverse range of stakeholders with differing and often competing interests (Adams & Evans, 2004; Canning et al., 2019). Boiral et al. (2020) suggest that robust assurance requires multifaceted skills, yet a lack of formal training in sustainability assurance undermines its professionalisation.

Other studies raise concerns about the independence of sustainability assurance, revealing significant management control over the assurance process and minimal stakeholder involvement (Boiral et al., 2019; O'Dwyer & Owen, 2005, 2007). Essentially, managers can choose to assure only metrics indicating positive ESG performance (Adams & Evans, 2004). Perego and Kolk (2012) find that several multinational companies have projected a decoupled or symbolic image of accountability through assurance. Christensen et al. (2021) also suggest that assurance is likely to be insufficient if the goal is to determine whether firms withhold sustainability information that is financially material to investors. Thus, it is argued that sustainability assurance is often unduly influenced by management, limiting its ability to challenge the completeness or relevance of reports.

Finally, sustainability assurance has also been criticised for its inconsistent quality arising from substantial differences across assurance engagements (e.g., Boiral & Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2020; Farooq & de Villiers, 2020; Manetti & Becatti, 2009). For example, in Boiral et al.'s (2019, p. 717) analysis of over 300 assurance statements from mining and energy companies, the criteria applied by assurance providers to assess reporting quality "appears to be very heterogeneous and uncertain". A benchmark study from the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and the Association of International Certified Professional Accountants (AICPA) (2024) observes substantial variations in assurance scope, assurance provider, and criteria used, with most companies obtaining a limited level of assurance. Research suggests

that differences in wording between limited and reasonable assurance reports are so subtle that uninformed users may not detect the difference (Ackers & Eccles, 2015; Hodge et al., 2009). Bhaskar et al. (2024) find that investors fail to sufficiently adjust for the lower level of assurance provided in a limited assurance engagement, with Hodge et al. (2009) highlighting that assurance statements vary considerably in terms of scope and the standards applied, potentially contributing to the expectation gap.

Overall, while the normative forces shaping sustainability reporting are strong, making sustainability assurance an increasingly common practice or even a *de facto* requirement in enhancing the credibility of corporate disclosures (Free et al., 2024; Zhou, 2022), the question of whether assurance can address greenwashing remains far from settled. While existing literature presents conflicting evidence on the benefits and challenges of sustainability assurance, no study has specifically examined its role in addressing greenwashing in cases sanctioned by regulators or referenced in regulatory guidelines.

2.5 The Use of AI in Accounting Research

2.5.1 The Use of Machine Learning and Deep Learning in Accounting

The growing availability of large datasets and advances in computing have encouraged the application of AI techniques in accounting research. ML, a subfield of AI that learns patterns directly from data rather than relying on predefined rules, has shown strong capability in prediction and classification tasks (LeCun et al., 2015). DL further extends this capability by allowing models to learn from high-dimensional and unstructured inputs such as text, audio, and images (LeCun et al., 2015). As a result, ML and DL have become increasingly useful for analysing accounting settings in which relationships are nonlinear, interactive, or difficult to specify (Ranta et al., 2023).

A substantial body of research demonstrates that ML models often outperform traditional linear and rule-based approaches in prediction-focused accounting tasks. For example, Jones (2017) shows that a gradient boosting model can handle large predictor sets and identify non-traditional determinants of bankruptcy risk, while offering stronger out-of-sample performance than logit and discriminant analysis. Similarly, Bao et al. (2020) show that an ensemble ML model using raw accounting numbers substantially improves fraud detection relative to logistic regression and Support Vector Machine benchmarks. Ding et al. (2020) find that ML-based estimates of insurer loss reserves outperform managerial estimates in most insurance lines. In the context of misstatement detection, Bertomeu et al. (2021) demonstrate

that gradient-boosted trees meaningfully improve prediction accuracy by capturing interaction effects among accounting, audit, market, and governance variables that linear models cannot accommodate.

In parallel to prediction tasks, ML and DL methods are increasingly applied to the analysis of textual disclosures in financial reports, conference calls, analyst interactions, and media coverage. A first major application is sentiment analysis. Early studies primarily relied on dictionary-based approaches to infer tone (e.g., Loughran & McDonald, 2011), but such methods assume fixed word sentiment and therefore ignore context, negation, and semantic nuance, often resulting in systematic misclassification (Bochkay et al., 2023). To address these limitations, research has shifted toward supervised ML classifiers such as Naïve Bayes and Random Forests (Huang et al., 2014; Frankel et al., 2022) and, more recently, transformer-based language models. For example, Huang et al. (2023) fine-tune Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) on financial text (FinBERT) and report accuracy rates of approximately 88%, compared with 62% for dictionary-based measures, demonstrating the capability of domain-adapted DL models.

Second, readability was traditionally proxied by document length or FOG-based indices (e.g., Guay et al., 2016), but these measures conflate linguistic difficulty with information volume. Supervised ML methods incorporating lexical, syntactic, and discourse features improve readability assessment (Petersen & Ostendorf, 2009), while DL sequence models further enhance generalisability across document types (Martinc et al., 2021).

Third, for forward-looking statements, dictionary approaches based on future-oriented verbs (Muslu et al., 2015; Bozanic et al., 2018) tend to over-identify forward-looking content. Brown et al. (2024) demonstrate that fine-tuned DL models can distinguish specific forward-looking guidance from generic boilerplate language, achieving much higher classification accuracy.

Overall, the evidence from both prediction-oriented and textual-analysis applications demonstrates that the use of AI substantially improves the measurement and interpretation of complex accounting information. As corporate communication increasingly shifts from purely quantitative reporting toward narrative, strategic, and sustainability-oriented disclosures, the ability of ML and DL models to classify, detect, and predict subtle patterns in language becomes especially relevant. This suggests strong potential for applying these methods to the analysis of sustainability claims, where assessing whether statements are specific, verifiable,

or potentially misleading (i.e., greenwashing) requires precisely the type of context-sensitive text interpretation that modern ML and DL approaches are designed to perform.

2.5.2 The Use of Generative LLMs in Accounting Research

The first stream of accounting research examines the impact of generative LLMs, such as ChatGPT, on capital markets, managerial communication, labour productivity, and research methods. For example, Cheng et al. (2025) document the market implications of generative AI adoption by treating unexpected ChatGPT outages as exogenous shocks to investors' access to AI tools. Using eight outage events that occurred during trading hours in 2023, they show declines in trading volume, price impact, and return variance during outages. They also find that access to generative AI is positively related to long-run price informativeness, suggesting that a large number of investors use ChatGPT to support real-time information processing and trading. Similarly, Bertomeu et al. (2025) exploit Italy's sudden temporary ban (Mar 31 to Apr 28, 2023) on ChatGPT as a natural experiment and find that the ban reduces analyst forecast accuracy and market efficiency. In terms of corporate communication responses, Jia et al. (2025) analyse earnings call transcripts and show a substantial post-ChatGPT increase in managerial discussions related to generative AI, which tend to be positive and contain action initiatives. They also find that firms experience stronger market reactions when the initiative-related discussions are specific and certain.

The second stream of recent research integrates LLMs directly into empirical workflows to supplement tasks requiring text summarization and content classification. For instance, Baker et al. (2024) use ChatGPT to assign topic labels and assess the vagueness of Diversity, Equity and Inclusive-related corporate disclosures, and Breitung and Müller (2025) employ ChatGPT to generate business descriptions from corporate filings. More recently, Law and Tan (2025) have used OpenAI's GPT-4 to classify race and ethnicity based on the names of executives and directors.

The third stream of studies explicitly test the comparative performance of LLMs against established methods. Cao et al. (2025) use Google Bard (now Gemini) to generate firm peer lists and find substantial overlap with expert-identified peers and traditional peer identification systems, particularly for large firms. Niu et al. (2025) employ GPT-4 as a supplementary classifier to detect service offerings in 10-K filings and show that LLMs can replace or augment dictionary-based text mining approaches.

Overall, this evidence suggests that LLMs are becoming increasingly integrated and accepted in accounting research, with the capacity to perform or even outperform core analytical tasks previously done by supervised ML or rule-based text analysis.

2.5.3 Potential of Generative LLMs for Sustainability Disclosure and Detecting Greenwashing

Taken together, recent evidence indicates that LLMs are not merely incremental extensions of prior ML techniques but a shift toward models that can interpret disclosure content in ways closer to expert judgment. As narrative sustainability reporting expands in scope and complexity, opportunities for substantive communication grow alongside the risk that firms deploy vague or selectively framed claims to produce a "green" image. LLMs offer scalable, consistent, and context-sensitive evaluation of such claims. Crucially, they can also explain why a statement may be vague, unverifiable, or incomplete by aligning with regulatory requirements for specificity, substantiation, and clear scope and conditions. Unlike dictionary or bag-of-words methods, LLMs can assess the claims through different indicators of misleading communication (e.g., vagueness, overstated compliance, unclear boundaries, confusing or conditional claims), and draw a conclusion on the overall greenwashing risk of the claims.

However, LLMs also have recognised limitations. In particular, research documents hallucination, where models generate confident but incorrect or unfounded statements (Athaluri et al., 2023; Emsley, 2023). This indicates the need to ground LLM-based assessments in clear task definitions, domain-specific guidance, and examples to follow. In this study, to mitigate hallucination risks, we therefore construct a regulatory-based greenwashing taxonomy and manually curate a dataset of real claims and regulatory enforcement cases. This design ensures that the model operates within a constrained evaluative framework, improving reliability and alignment with how misleading sustainability claims are assessed in practice. Details about how we construct the database will be in Chapter 3.

2.6 Conclusion

Overall, prior literature shows how greenwashing can be understood, defined, measured, detected, and potentially mitigated through mechanisms such as sustainability assurance. However, it also leaves unresolved questions that motivate the three studies in this thesis.

First, while accounting scholars have examined how mandatory sustainability reporting regimes and sustainability assurance can constrain misleading sustainability disclosure,

greenwashing persists even under developing disclosure mandates, with firms able to comply superficially through repetitive or selective disclosure (e.g., Christensen et al., 2021; Haji et al., 2022; Pesci et al., 2015). At the same time, systematic research on the role of regulators in combating greenwashing remains limited. Although prior studies identify weak or uncertain enforcement as a trigger for greenwashing and propose stronger guidelines and penalties as deterrents (Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Kim & Lyon, 2015; Parguel et al., 2011; Tashman et al., 2019), there is limited understanding of how regulators themselves define greenwashing, what indicators and measures they use in interventions, and how they navigate the challenges of regulating this malleable phenomenon. This conceptual and empirical gap motivates Study One, which explores how greenwashing regulation is carried out in practice by examining the recent surge in Australian market-regulator interventions.

Second, although sustainability assurance is often viewed as a credibility-enhancing mechanism (Krasodomska et al., 2021), and evidence indicates it can improve aspects of disclosure reliability and decision usefulness, the literature remains mixed on whether assurance practices meaningfully curb greenwashing behaviour. Some studies document benefits such as identifying inaccuracies and improving reporting systems (e.g., Ballou et al., 2018; Du & Wu, 2019; Gipper et al., 2024, 2025), while others question whether assurance yields substantive improvements (e.g., Christensen, 2016; Michelon et al., 2015; Talbot & Boiral, 2018), highlighting challenges associated with subjective materiality judgments (Maroun, 2020; O'Dwyer, 2011), the forward-looking and multidimensional nature of ESG subject matters (Free et al., 2024), and managerial influence over provider choice and assurance scope (e.g., Casey & Grenier, 2015). Importantly, this debate has not been empirically examined through the lens of reducing regulatory greenwashing concerns. No study in this stream has tested whether the subject matters that are actually assured correspond to the claim-types and indicators that regulators identify in guidance and sanction cases. This gap motivates Study Two, which asks (RQ1) Does the current practice of sustainability assurance address the greenwashing concerns identified by regulatory guidance and sanction cases, and (RQ2) What types of assurance engagements and reporting companies are associated with higher relevance of assured subject matters in relation to greenwashing concerns.

Third, growing NLP research has developed systematic approaches to quantify sustainability communication and identify decoupling, symbolic disclosure, or linguistic patterns associated with potentially greenwashing communications (e.g., Bingler et al., 2024; Xing et al., 2024; Zhou et al., 2024). However, these approaches commonly rely on proxies

such as sentiment, tone, disclosure length, or firm-level disclosure-performance gaps and therefore cannot determine whether a specific claim is greenwashing under the determinative criteria applied by regulators. Moreover, despite promising capabilities of generative LLMs for contextual judgment over narrative disclosures, academic applications to greenwashing remain limited and often proof-of-concept. These limitations motivate Study Three, which grounds detection in indicators derived from regulatory guidelines (e.g., vagueness, unclear scope, unclear conditions) through a taxonomy-guided approach. It asks (RQ1) How effective are generative LLMs in detecting greenwashing based on language-based indicators in sustainability claims and (RQ2) How does the model's usefulness vary across different prompting strategies.

Taken together, these gaps motivate a regulatory perspective across the thesis. Study One clarifies how regulators construct and define greenwashing as an object of intervention. Study Two evaluates whether the credibility mechanism, sustainability assurance, reduces regulators' greenwashing concerns in practice; and Study Three tests whether generative LLMs can detect claim-level greenwashing indicators in a way that is consistent with regulators' reasoning.

III METHODOLOGY

This thesis adopts a mixed method research design that integrates both qualitative and quantitative approaches. All three studies in this thesis are developed based on a foundational dataset that contains: (1) a collection of global regulatory enforcement actions against greenwashing over the past decade (2015–2024), and (2) a greenwashing taxonomy derived from global regulatory guidelines. This chapter introduces these core datasets, explains how they are collected, and describes their role in the overall research design. Study-specific data and analytical procedures are presented within these studies in the relevant chapters.

3.1 Building A Comprehensive Dataset of Regulatory Greenwashing Cases

The first foundational dataset consists of manually collected greenwashing enforcement actions undertaken by global regulators. To systematically collect the greenwashing cases, the dataset was constructed using a two-stage search strategy. The first stage involved a Factiva search designed to identify regulators that are considered active in acting against greenwashing over the past decade (2015–2024). The search terms "Greenwashing OR Greenwash AND (regulator OR regulatory body OR watchdog) AND (fined OR sanction OR punished OR investigated)" were selected to identify instances in which sustainability-related claims were challenged by authorities.

Figure 1 presents the distribution of documents returned by this search. The number of media reports concerning regulatory action on greenwashing increased sharply from 2021 onwards, peaking in 2023.



Figure 1: Distribution of the Number of "Greenwashing Regulation" Documents Returned by the Factiva Search by Year

Table III-1 shows the descriptive statistics of the number documents by regions and regulators, as identified in the Factiva search. Panel A reports the ten regions that appear most frequently in the search results. The UK and the US dominate the sample, followed by Australia, EU countries, and Canada. Panel B lists the regulators most frequently mentioned in the Factiva dataset. As shown, several European institutions appear prominently, including the EU, the European Commission, and the ESMA. The Financial Conduct Authority in the UK and the US SEC also appear frequently. Australian regulators, including both ASIC and ACCC, appear within the top ten, reflecting Australia's rapid escalation of anti-greenwashing enforcement in recent years. The Competition Bureau Canada, and the US FTC, also appear among the top regulators identified. Consequently, these patterns support the selection of the UK, the US, the EU, Australia, and Canada as the primary jurisdictions for collecting enforcement actions. These regions not only exhibit the highest frequency of greenwashing-related media references but also host regulators that are active in investigating and acting against greenwashing.

Table III-1 Summary Statistics of Documents Identified in the Factiva Search

Panel A: Top 10 Regions Appear in the Search[3]	
Region	**Search Result Rank**
United Kingdom	1
United States	2
Australia	3
European Union Countries	4
Canada	5
Europe	6
India	7
Singapore	8
China	9
New Zealand	10
Panel B: Top 10 Regulators Appear in the Search	
Regulator*	**Search Result Rank**
European Union (EU)	1
Financial Conduct Authority (UK)	2
European Commission (EU)	3
US Securities and Exchange Commission (US)	4
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (AU)	5
Competition and Markets Authority (UK)	6
European Securities and Markets Authority (EU)	7
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (AU)	8
Competition Bureau Canada (CA)	9

[3] Factiva assigns tags algorithmically, and its regional categories are not mutually exclusive. Some regions are geographic, while others are economic or political. In the table, "European Union Countries" refers to the EU as a political/economic grouping, while "Europe" refers to a broader geographic region. The two categories may overlap.

**The regulator dataset is derived from the "Companies" statistics exported from Factiva, which represents the main subject of each document. The list of entities was reviewed, and all non-regulatory bodies were excluded.*

In the second stage, greenwashing cases were collected from each regulator's official website. Searches were conducted directly on the regulators' websites to obtain their official media releases, case summaries, or decisions against greenwashing claims[4]. For the EU, where enforcement occurs at the member-state level and no central repository exists, Factiva's aggregated coverage served as the primary means of case identification. When a document appeared relevant, the full media release was read to confirm whether it described a greenwashing enforcement action. Confirmed cases were then added to the dataset.

As a result of this process, 69 enforcement cases were identified, as shown in Appendix 1. Each case was subsequently traced back to its original media release and, where applicable, the underlying judgment or decision document to verify its accuracy. For every case, key information was systematically extracted, including the jurisdiction, regulator, date of the action, company name, industry, the sustainability claims and subject matter under investigation, and the reason for deeming the claim misleading.

Table III-2 presents descriptive statistics summarising the 69 greenwashing enforcement actions. Panel A shows the distribution of cases by region and regulator. The US accounts for the largest share of cases (39 out of 69 cases), with the combined activity of the FTC, (21 cases) and the SEC (18 cases). Australia follows with 15 cases, driven primarily by the ASIC (12 cases), and supplemented by actions from the ACCC (3 cases). Three cases originate from Hungary, all brought by the Hungarian Competition Authority. Other jurisdictions include the United Kingdom (2 cases), Norway (2 cases), the European Union (2 cases), Italy (2 cases), and the Netherlands (2 cases), Canada (1 case) and Germany (1 case). These numbers reinforce the pattern observed during the Factiva search: the US and Australia are the most active jurisdictions, followed by a cluster of European consumer-protection authorities that increasingly supervise sustainability claims.

[4] Examples of search terms include "green", "sustainability", "climate", "environment", "CSR", and "ESG". When a potentially relevant publication was identified, the full text was reviewed to verify whether it concerned a greenwashing enforcement action. A snowballing search approach is then applied to these greenwashing publications to identify any related regulatory materials referenced within. For example, if a publication stated that "earlier in the year, we also took enforcement action against XXX", the referenced case was checked to ensure it was captured in the dataset.

Panel B reports the distribution of cases across industries. Asset management is the largest category, with 21 cases, indicating the rising prominence of enforcement targeting ESG policy implementation, exclusion screens, and sustainability-labelled financial products. Consumer Goods (16 cases) and Textile and Clothing (13 cases) together form the second major cluster, driven by challenges to product-level environmental claims such as "all natural" ingredients, recyclability, recycled content, and misleading sustainability labels. Beauty-related products account for 6 cases, mostly concerning misrepresentation of natural ingredients. The remaining industries include Oil and Gas (4 cases), Transportation (5 cases), Mining (2 cases), and single case in Farming and Health.

Panel C summarises the reasons regulators identified the claims as misleading. The most common category is "false claims" (37 cases), where regulators found that real operation, internal documents, or scientific data did not support the statements made. A further 12 cases were coded as "no evidence", meaning firms failed to hold or provide adequate substantiation for environmental or ESG claims. 7 cases involved vague or overly broad sustainability statements lacking clear meaning or criteria. 4 cases constituted exaggerated claims, such as overstated energy efficiency or overstated technological readiness. Less frequent categories include false claims with unclear conditions (3 cases), invalid certification (2 cases) relating to the misuse of third-party environmental indices, deceptive manipulation (2 cases) such as emissions defeat devices, and selective disclosure (2 cases) where firms omitted negative performance or insufficient internal controls. Together, these statistics show that the majority of enforcement actions target either unsubstantiated claims or claims contradicted by internal or external evidence.

Overall, this dataset provides a comprehensive view of regulatory enforcement against greenwashing. It serves as a foundational empirical resource for the thesis by supporting the qualitative analysis of Australian enforcement actions in Study One and supplying the subject-matter lists used to examine assurance relevance in Study Two.

Table III-2 Descriptive Statistics of Greenwashing Cases

Panel A: Distribution of Greenwashing Cases by Region and Regulator	
Distribution by Region and Regulator	**Number of Cases**
U.S.	39
FTC	21
SEC	18

Australia	15
ASIC	12
ACCC	3
Hungary	3
Hungarian Competition Authority	3
U.K.	2
CMA	2
Norway	2
Norwegian Consumer Authority	2
EU	2
Consumer Protection Cooperation Network	2
Italy	2
Italian Competition Authority	2
Netherlands	2
Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM)	2
Canada	1
Competition Bureau Canada	1
German	1
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)	1
Grand Total	***69***

Panel B: Distribution of Greenwashing Cases by Industry

Distribution by Industry	**Number of Cases**
Asset Management	21
Beauty	6
Consumer Good	16
Farming	1
Health	1
Mining	2
Oil and Gas	4
Textile and Clothing	13
Transportation	5
Grand Total	***69***

Panel C: Distribution of Greenwashing Cases by Greenwashing Reasons

Greenwashing Reasons	**Number of Cases**
False Claims	37
No evidence	12
Vagueness	7
Exaggerated claim	4
False Claims, unclear condition	3
Invalid Certification	2

Deceptive manipulation	2
Selective disclosure	2
Grand Total	***69***

3.2 Building A Greenwashing Taxonomy from Global Regulatory Guidelines

In addition to undertaking enforcement actions, many regulators also publish educational materials that explain what constitutes greenwashing and how firms can avoid making misleading sustainability claims. The second foundational dataset of this thesis is a greenwashing taxonomy developed from these regulatory guidelines. The purpose of this taxonomy is to consolidate the underlying principles regulators consider when determining whether a sustainability claim may mislead a reasonable user.

To identify relevant guidelines, a search was conducted for greenwashing regulatory guidelines issued in the US, Australia, the UK, the EU, and Canada. These jurisdictions were selected because they are identified as the most active in greenwashing enforcement based on the Factiva search in Section 3.1. Then, a Google search was conducted to locate official greenwashing or environmental-claims guidelines published by regulators in these jurisdictions. Through this process, 8 regulatory guidelines were collected, issued by regulatory bodies including the ACCC (Australia), the ASIC (Australia), the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) (UK), the EC (EU) and the FTC (US). Appendix 2 shows the full list of these guidelines. These eight guidelines form the basis for constructing a comprehensive taxonomy of greenwashing indicators grounded directly in regulatory expectations.

To construct the taxonomy, all guidance documents were systematically reviewed using a two-step open coding approach. First, each guideline was reviewed in full to identify all sections that described the circumstances under which a sustainability claim may be misleading. These sections were individually recorded with respect to their headings, explanatory text, and examples. Each identified section was then summarised into a short statement describing the specific issue it addressed, such as vague wording, omission of important conditions, lack of substantiation, or unclear comparative statements. These summaries formed an initial set of indicators. Second, these initial indicators were examined across all guidelines and consolidated where different regulators used different terminology to describe the same underlying issue. For example, references to “vague,” “generic,” or “broad” environmental claims were treated as conceptually equivalent and therefore combined into a single indicator.

A similar consolidation process was applied to other issues, such as the use of absolute terms (e.g., “100% plastic-free,” “zero emissions”). This step ensured that the final taxonomy captured all recurring issues while avoiding duplication.

After consolidation, the indicators were grouped into broader categories reflecting the main areas of concern identified by regulators: (1) making green claims, (2) clarity in communication, (3) substantiating the claim, (4) specific claim types, and (5) visual aids. The taxonomy comprises twelve indicators grouped into these five broad categories. The first two categories (Making Green Claims and Clarity in Communication) capture issues related to how sustainability claims are phrased and framed, including vagueness, overstating compliance or standard features, confusing language, unclear scope, and unclear conditions. The Substantiating the Claim category covers situations where firms either lack adequate evidence or make statements that are factually incorrect. The Specific Claim Types category indicates the special claims that regulator believe are of high greenwashing risk, including future commitments, comparative claims, and absolute terms. Finally, the Visual Aids category recognises that greenwashing can also arise through misusing third-party labels or certifications and through images or design elements that create an exaggerated impression of environmental benefits. Each indicator is explicitly linked to the original sections in the ACCC, ASIC, CMA, EC and FTC guidelines to ensure that the taxonomy is firmly grounded in regulatory logic rather than researcher-defined concepts.

Table III-3 shows this greenwashing taxonomy. This taxonomy provides a structured basis for understanding and interpreting the issues regulators identify in their enforcement actions. It therefore forms a key foundation for Study Three, as it supplies the set of indicators that guide the design of the LLM-based detection framework.

Table III-3 Greenwashing Taxonomy

Broad Category	Category	Indicator	Description	Reference in the Regulatory Guidelines
Language-related Indicators	Making Green Claims	Vagueness	Greenwashing due to vagueness arise when companies use imprecise or ambiguous language to communicate their sustainability practices or products. Such claims often lack specific, measurable, or verifiable information, making it difficult for consumers to assess their validity. A claim can be flagged as vague if it fails to clearly articulate whether it addresses specific ESG benefits, what those benefits are, or how they are achieved. For example, phrases like “eco-friendly", “green", or “sustainable" are frequently used without clear definitions or standards. The potential vagueness issue has been discussed by almost all regulatory guidelines.	Vague/Generic/broad and unqualified claims (ACCC-1); Vague and unqualified claims (ACCC -2) / 'clear and unambiguous' (CMA) / General Environmental Benefit Claims (FTC); Have you used vague terminology? (ASIC)
		Overstating Compliance or Standard Features	Greenwashing due to overstating compliance or standard features arise when firms advertise compliance with mandatory sustainability regulations or features that offer no real benefit. This type of greenwashing involves exaggerating the environmental merit of a product, service, or business by highlighting compliance with basic legal requirements, industry norms, or standard features as if they were special environmental achievements. Even if technically accurate, such claims mislead consumers by suggesting that the company or product is superior in sustainability, when in fact it is merely fulfilling routine obligations.	Unmeaningful Claim (ACCC-1) /advertising benefits to consumers that are irrelevant (EC-1) / not suggest environmental benefits which are, in fact, necessary standard features (CMA)
	Clarity in Communication	Confusing Language	Greenwashing due to confusing language arises when firms use technical jargon, scientific terminology, or unclear wording that the average consumer may not easily understand. Regulators suggest companies should use clear, plain, and commonly understood language, and that any necessary qualifications or disclosures should be presented in a way that is easy for ordinary consumers to notice and comprehend. Confusing or poorly explained language can mislead consumers about the environmental benefits of a product or service.	Use clear and easy to understand language (ACCC-1) / use plain language (FTC) / meaning of all terms used in marketing must be clear (CMA)
		Unclear Scope	Greenwashing due to unclear scope arise when businesses fail to clearly define the scope of their sustainability claims, leading information users to wrongly believe that the claimed benefits apply more broadly than they actually do. It includes two common patterns: (1) omitting clarification on which life cycle stage the claim applies to (e.g., production, use, disposal) and (2) failing to specify the proportion of the product, packaging, or process to which the green attribute applies. Such practices risk misleading consumers into overestimating the sustainability performance of a product, service, or business.	Consider the full lifecycle of your product or service (ACCC-1)/scope (Omission of full disclosure of subject matter) / consider the full life cycle of the product or service (CMA) / Distinction between benefits of product, package, and service (FTC)

		Unclear Condition	Greenwashing due to unclear condition arise when businesses fail to disclose the specific conditions under which a sustainability benefit can be realised, such as the need for specialised infrastructure, proper disposal methods, or location-specific facilities. Claims like 'recyclable,' 'biodegradable,' or 'compostable' may be technically accurate in ideal (e.g., lab) conditions but are misleading if such conditions are unlikely to be met in normal consumer use or in most regions where the product is sold. For example, 'recyclable' claims would be misleading if the local recycling infrastructure is inaccessible.	Omitting important information (ACCC - 1) / omission of fact, conditions - (ACCC - 1) / selective disclosure / omit or hide important information (CMA)
Evidence-related Indicators	Substantiating the Claim	No Evidence	Greenwashing due to lack of evidence arises when businesses make sustainability claims without holding adequate, credible substantiation at the time the claim is made. Regulators expect firms to be able to demonstrate, using reliable data or scientifically sound methods, that their product, service, or investment genuinely delivers the claimed environmental benefit.	Lack/overstate the level of scientific acceptance (ACCC-1) / A lack of substantiating information (ACCC-2) / substantiated (CMA) / Qualifications and disclosures (FTC) / rely on widely recognised scientific evidence (EC-2)
		False Claims	Greenwashing due to false claims occurs when the sustainability statements made are factually incorrect, inaccurate, or inconsistent with the product's actual characteristics, the firm's practices, or verifiable performance data. This includes claims that overstate benefits, misdescribe product composition, or misrepresent the existence or effectiveness of environmental initiatives.	Incorrect/False Claim/ Inaccurate (ACCC-3) / Not 'truthful and accurate' (CMA) / Is your product true to label? (ASIC)
	Specific Claim Types	Future Commitments	Greenwashing related to future commitments arises when firms make statements about future environmental performance, long-term targets, or sustainability goals (such as net-zero pathways or phasing out certain activities) without reasonable grounds for believing those outcomes are achievable.	Representations about the future (ACCC-1)/ claims about future goals (CMA)/ future environmental performance of a product or trader (EC-1) / Do you have reasonable grounds for a stated sustainability target? (ASIC)
		Misleading Comparisons	Greenwashing through misleading comparisons occurs when business compare the sustainability performance of products, services, or practices without clearly identifying the basis of comparison. These claims often present broad statements such as "greener," "more sustainable," or "environmentally friendlier" without clarifying what is being compared, what metric is used, or which products or versions serve as the benchmark.	Not making Comparison that are transparent and fair (ACCC-1) / Use of comparisons (ACCC - 2) / compare goods or services in a fair and meaningful way (CMA) / Comparative claims (FTC)
		Absolute Terms	Greenwashing involving absolute terms arises when firms use definitive expressions such as "100% plastic-free", "zero emissions", "climate neutral", or "entirely sustainable" in circumstances where such absolutes are not strictly accurate or depend on substantial qualifications. Regulators caution that absolute	Absolute Claims (ACCC - 2) / absolute claims (CMA) / Free-Of Claims (FTC)

			environmental claims set a very high evidentiary threshold and should be used only when the firm can demonstrate the claim with strong evidence	
	Visual Aids	Misusing third-party Labels/ Certifications	Greenwashing through misusing third-party labels or certifications occurs when businesses rely on logos, seals, ratings, or sustainability indices in ways that overstate their environmental credentials or suggest independent endorsement that does not exist. Regulators emphasise that environmental labels and certifications should be accurate, up-to-date, and clearly explained so that consumers understand who issued them, what they cover, and any limitations.	Third-party labels and certifications (ACCC-1)/ Certifications and Seals of Approval (FTC) / Sustainability labels (EC-1) / environmental labels (EC-2) / Do you have any influence over the benchmark index for your sustainability-related product (ASIC)
		Deceptive Images	Greenwashing due to deceptive images arises when visual elements, such as colours, logos, nature imagery, or design motifs, are used in a way that conveys an exaggerated or inaccurate impression of sustainability benefits. Examples include packaging dominated by green hues, leaves, or natural landscapes where the underlying product has no meaningful sustainability advantage, or imagery that implies a certification or eco-label that is not actually present	Visual elements should not give the wrong impression (ACCC -1); The visual presentation of a claim (CMA)

IV STUDY ONE

4.1 Introduction

Greenwashing has long been a concern in relation to corporate sustainability disclosures (Ballan & Czarnezki, 2024; Free et a., 2024), marketing communications (Parguel et al., 2011), and investment product descriptions (Gehrig & Moreno, 2023). Moreover, greenwashing is widely regarded as an ambiguous and malleable concept, referring to selective, symbolic, deceptive, or misleading sustainability and climate-related information (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Lyon & Montgomery, 2015; Seele & Gatti, 2017). While greenwashing is not a new phenomenon (Greer & Bruno, 1996), with regulatory interventions dating back to the late 2000s,[5] regulatory actions have emerged more frequently around the globe in recent years. A Factiva media search (as done in Section 3.1) revealed 43 regulatory cases addressing greenwashing claims in corporate filings,[6] advertising, and investment product prospectuses across five jurisdictions between 2020 and 2024 – namely, Australia, Canada, the EU, the UK, and the US. During this period, regulators employed various measures to combat greenwashing, such as establishing task forces (SEC, 2021), issuing new guidelines and rules (ACCC, 2023b; ASIC, 2023a; EC, 2024), imposing fines and infringement notices (ASIC, 2024a), and conducting online sweeps (ACCC, 2023a; EC, 2021). By viewing greenwashing as a threat to market trust, recent regulatory interventions signal a growing effort to curb misleading and deceptive sustainability claims (ASIC, 2024c). These actions also align with moves toward mandatory corporate sustainability reporting and assurance (Christensen et al., 2021; Greenstone et al., 2023; Krueger et al., 2024), following the release of global baseline standards by the ISSB.

While mandatory sustainability reporting and assurance regimes are expected to reduce greenwashing by enhancing the transparency and reliability of information, regulatory enforcement remains crucial for maintaining market trust (ASIC, 2024c). Prior research has examined diverse definitions of greenwashing (Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Seele & Gatti, 2017), the limitations of mandatory disclosure and assurance in addressing greenwashing (Free et al., 2024; Haji et al., 2022), the role of sustainability ratings (Parguel et al., 2011), and the potential

[5] For example, in 2008, the SEC accused Pax World Management Corp of violating investment rules by including securities from companies involved in weapons, alcohol, tobacco, and gambling in its socially responsible mutual funds, contrary to its stated commitments.

[6] Corporate filings are official documents companies must submit to regulatory bodies to meet legal and corporate reporting obligations. These filings include various corporate reports, such as financial statements, directors' reports, auditors' reports, and sustainability disclosures.

involvement by market regulators (Dechow, 2023; Kim & Lyon, 2015). However, little is known about what these regulators do to regulate greenwashing. This paper addresses this gap by examining how the regulation of greenwashing is made possible, with particular attention paid to how regulators assert their legitimacy when addressing greenwashing, demonstrate their possession of necessary regulatory tools for this, and show their preparedness to respond to challenges arising from such interventions. Our investigation sheds light on broader questions concerning how regulators place certain issues on the regulatory agenda and justify their capacity to address them, especially when these issues are ambiguously defined for regulatory purposes. The regulation of greenwashing provides a suitable context to explore these questions, as greenwashing is often viewed as a vague, fluid, and malleable concept presenting considerable regulatory complexities.

These research questions are addressed by examining the Australian context. Australia provides a particularly suitable setting for studying recent regulatory interventions against greenwashing, as it has been one of the more active jurisdictions responding to this issue, according to the forementioned Factiva media search. Both Australia's consumer and financial market regulators, the ACCC and the ASIC, have taken multiple actions to address greenwashing, initiating legal cases, issuing guidelines, and undertaking other regulatory measures. Australia is also one of the early movers working toward mandatory sustainability reporting, with market regulators, specifically ASIC, tasked with enforcing the requirements. In comparison, the US has stalled on this front and the EU faces delays in implementation.[7]

The analysis focuses on publicly available materials from the ACCC and ASIC, including press releases, case studies, rules, regulatory guidelines, and speeches by officials, along with insights from six interviews with key stakeholders. Drawing on a social constructionist perspective of the sociology of regulation (Baudot & Cooper, 2022; Fisher, 2014; Seyfert, 2022; Young, 1994), this paper identifies four interconnected aspects of how regulators make possible the regulation of greenwashing.

First, the rise of regulatory actions against greenwashing aligns with global commitments to net zero and mandates for sustainability disclosures (Christensen et al., 2021; Greenstone et al., 2023). This has prompted regulators to view greenwashing as a problem requiring

[7] https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2025-releases/25-051mr-asic-issues-sustainability-reporting-regulatory-guide/; https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025-58; and https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20250331IPR27557/sustainability-and-due-diligence-meps-agree-to-delay-application-of-new-rules (accessed on 12/04/2025).

intervention to maintain their legitimacy (Baudot & Cooper, 2022; Baudot & Wallace, 2023; Bealing et al., 1996). Moreover, regulators need to demonstrate their appropriateness in addressing greenwashing, a process referred to "*framing regulatory appropriateness*" (Baudot & Cooper, 2022; March & Olsen, 1989; Young, 1994). Accordingly, greenwashing is seen as involving "misleading" and "deceptive" claims (ACCC, 2023a; ASIC, 2023a), aligning with regulators' mandates to protect consumers and investors relying on sustainability information (ACCC, 2023b; ASIC, 2023b). Additionally, parallel initiatives by transnational organizations, such as the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network (ICPEN) and International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), have accelerated global regulatory actions against greenwashing, further reinforcing the appropriateness of efforts by Australian market regulators.

Second, regulating greenwashing presents unique challenges. The vague, forward-looking, and technical nature of green claims places a significant burden on prosecutors to justify "misleading" or "deceptive" claims, particularly in the absence of objective benchmarks constituting greenwashing. Despite these challenges, regulators operationalize their interventions by "*developing regulatory alignment*", making their actions feasible within existing regulatory frameworks. Correspondingly, greenwashing is treated as a violation of existing laws and legislations, which can be addressed through established regulatory tools and mechanisms. However, enforcement difficulties persist, prompting regulators to consider developing legislation specifically targeting greenwashing – although it remains uncertain whether such legislation will be introduced.[8] Further, drawing on their established capacity, regulators may also adopt a pyramid-like approach to balance guidance, surveillance, and enforcement – ranging from educational initiatives to punitive measures such as infringement notices and court proceedings (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; ASIC, 2024a). The specific approach varies by regulator, market, and situation, including claim severity and entity size.

Third, we observe a phenomenon of "*shaping regulatory objects*". Regulators define the content and dimensions of greenwashing to correspond to both regulatory intentions and capabilities. Accordingly, regulatory actions not only reveal, penalize, and sanction greenwashing practices but also transform and co-produce its definition (Fisher, 2014; Seyfert, 2022). Specifically, regulatory efforts have broadened the scope of greenwashing from focusing solely on "environmental" aspects to encompassing "environmental", "social", and

[8] While Australian regulators have not introduced new legislation at this stage, their counterparts in the EU have done so and prohibit terms like "eco", "green", and "ecological", which are prone to greenwashing (EC, 2024).

"governance" dimensions. Also, there has been a shift from emphasizing "intent" to addressing "misleading" and "inaccurate" claims regardless of intention.

Finally, we observe a process we describe as "*building regulatory preparedness*". Regulatory interventions against greenwashing often have limitations and unintended consequences, prompting further regulatory attention. While regulatory actions are seen to constitute highly warranted deterrents, regulators have long been described as "toothless tigers" incapable of tackling serious violations (Mizen, 2024). Particularly, regulators often target obvious cases, impose minimal fines, and are constrained by resources – factors rendering their efforts as temporary and ineffective. Moreover, regulatory sanctions can lead to "greenhushing", another form of greenwashing undermining transparency and trust (ASIC, 2023b, 2024a). To address these problems, market regulators have articulated their willingness to collaborate with other stakeholders, including sustainability reporting standards-setters, to build their competences and regulatory preparedness.

Our paper makes three key contributions. First, drawing on insights from the sociology of regulation, we advance understanding of how regulators place ambiguously defined issues on their regulatory agenda while justifying their capacity to address them. While regulatory processes are inherently political (e.g., Baudot & Cooper, 2022; Baudot & Wallace, 2023; Young, 1994), the vague and malleable nature of greenwashing poses unique challenges for regulatory intervention. We reveal a series of efforts by regulators making possible the regulation of greenwashing, including framing this as a significant problem warranting intervention, aligning scrutiny with existing regulatory frameworks and measures, redefining greenwashing by shaping perceptions of what should be regulated, and demonstrating preparedness for new challenges arising from their actions. In doing so, our paper provides fresh insights into the complex and multi-layered "regulatory work" involved in enabling regulators to establish their relevance and capacity to address an issue that is often open to diverse and inconsistent interpretations.

Second, focusing on the Australian context, our paper is the first academic study to examine emerging regulatory actions by market regulators across various domains and regions to combat greenwashing. While existing accounting studies have highlighted the limitations of mandatory sustainability reporting and sustainability assurance in addressing greenwashing and pointed to the potential role of market regulators (Dechow, 2023; Free et al., 2024; Haji et al., 2022), systematic research on how these regulators tackle greenwashing and shape the evolving regulatory landscape of sustainability disclosures remains limited (Bebbington et al.,

2023; Laine, 2024). By investigating recent regulatory initiatives and efforts against greenwashing by two Australian market regulators, our paper provides insights into the actions and measures adopted by market regulators to shape the regulatory context in which sustainability reporting and assurance practices operate.

Finally, while prior research highlights the diverse and inconsistent interpretations of greenwashing across different fields (Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Seele & Gatti, 2017), our paper sheds fresh light on its malleable nature by revealing how regulatory processes may shape its definition. Specifically, we find that regulators align greenwashing with "misleading" or "deceptive" claims under existing regulatory mandates, expanding this to include environmental, social, and governance dimensions, while shifting the focus from intent to the accuracy of claims. These insights re(de)fine the "dictionary" of greenwashing, providing academics, regulators, companies, and other stakeholders in Australia and beyond with a more nuanced understanding of the issue to inform their decisions and actions.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the relevant literature on greenwashing underpinning our study. Section 4.3 introduces the social constructionist perspective of the sociology of regulation, which informs our empirical analysis. Section 4.4 outlines the research approach. Section 4.5 presents our empirical findings, and Section 4.6 discusses their implications before concluding the paper.

4.2 Relevant Literature

4.2.1 Defining Greenwashing

Although there is no universally accepted definition of greenwashing (Seele & Gatti, 2017), academic definitions generally focus on: (1) "selective disclosure", i.e., selectively sharing positive information, creating an overly favorable corporate image misrepresenting actual environmental performance (Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Fan et al., 2021; Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Parguel et al., 2011); (2) "decoupling" i.e., constituting discrepancies between a company's environmental statements ("green talk") and actions ("green walk") (Bowen & Aragon-Correa, 2014; Walker & Wan, 2012); and (3) "misleading", i.e., obscuring negative information, while highlighting positive aspects of environmental performance or benefits (Tateishi, 2018).

While greenwashing can occur in any form of corporate communication, accounting scholars have examined this issue in the context of CSR, sustainability, and/or ESG disclosures produced by companies. Scholars have long been concerned about the reliability and

transparency of such disclosures, even before the term "greenwashing" gained popularity in the early 2010s. Specifically, greenwashing has been framed as a behavioural issue associated with sustainability reporting, drawing on terminology such as "symbolic actions" (Rodrigue, 2014; Neu et al., 1998), "impression management" (Cho et al., 2010; Mahoney et al., 2013; Neu et al., 1998), "decoupling" (Fernández Chulián et al., 2025), "bias" (Cho et al., 2010; Cho et al., 2015; Mahoney et al., 2013; Rodrigue, 2014), "optimism" (Cho et al., 2010), "selective disclosure" (Mahoney et al., 2013; Neu et al., 1998), "strategic accountability" (Archel et al., 2009; Cho, 2009; Rodrigue, 2014; Tregidga et al., 2014), and "lack of completeness" (Adams, 2004). Irrespective of the terminology used, accounting scholars have highlighted a misalignment between sustainability disclosures and actual practices, pointing to a practice of "greenwashing".

For regulators, greenwashing is recognised as involving "misleading", "misrepresentative", "exaggerated", and "deceptive" claims about the environmental or the sustainable nature of products, services, investment strategies, or enterprises. Such claims may be made not only in CSR reports or other forms of corporate filings, but also in product factsheets and advertising (ACCC, 2023a; ASIC, 2023a; EC, 2024). Currently, regulatory sanctions on greenwashing have focused on ESG investment products in the asset management sector (ASIC, 2023a; SEC, 2022a), "net-zero" claims in the energy sector (ASIC, 2023a), and "eco-friendly" advertising in the consumer goods industry (ACCC, 2023a; ACM, 2022), while also addressing cases in corporate filings (e.g., Fertoz, in Australia and Vale in the US). In asset management, for example, greenwashing often involves financial products failing to meet ESG screening criteria, such as excluding investments in high-risk sectors like fossil fuels and tobacco. Regulators focus on inconsistencies between screening criteria and actual investment activities. Over time, regulators' definitions of greenwashing have evolved with industry practices and court cases. What constitutes greenwashing is subject to interpretation and transformation, as evident by recent regulatory interventions by market regulators.

4.2.2 Addressing Greenwashing

Mandatory Sustainability Reporting Regimes and Sustainability Assurance

While marketing and legal scholars examine how greenwashing in corporate advertising and financial institutions' investment product prospectuses can be addressed (Ballan & Czarnezki, 2024; Parguel et al., 2011), accounting academics focus on the role of mandatory sustainability reporting and sustainability assurance. To address greenwashing associated with voluntary corporate sustainability disclosures, mandatory ESG/CSR/sustainability reporting

has been proposed to provide a more objective representation of corporate social and environmental performance (Adams, 2004). Particularly, refining disclosure standards to eliminate boilerplate, vague, and generic language has been advanced as a strategy to enhance transparency and reduce greenwashing (Christensen et al., 2021). Existing research reveals that mandatory disclosure schemes offer several benefits: they increase both the volume and quality of disclosures (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2019; Tsang et al., 2023; Yang et al., 2021), incentivize firms to seek voluntary assurance and comply with reporting guidelines (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2019), stimulate more extensive CSR activities (Fiechter et al., 2022), and lead to improved environmental outcomes (Chen et al., 2018a). Several major jurisdictions including the EU, UK, US, and Australia have recently considered adopting mandatory sustainability reporting schemes to engender more standardized, comparable, and transparent disclosures on sustainability issues, with the expectation that this will reduce greenwashing (Christensen et al., 2021; Greenstone et al., 2023; Krueger et al., 2024).

Despite ongoing development of mandatory reporting regimes for sustainability and climate-related information, greenwashing persists. This highlights the limitations of current disclosure requirements and their enforcement in effectively addressing such practices (Amel-Zadeh & Tang, 2025; Haji et al., 2022). Companies may still superficially comply with legislated requirements, producing simplistic and repetitive disclosures (Pesci et al., 2015) or employing selective disclosure strategies (Haji et al., 2022). Thus, it is acknowledged that a mandatory reporting regime alone may be insufficient to support fair and efficient markets. Robust and ongoing regulatory enforcement actions are essential to maintain market trust (ASIC, 2024c).

Further, sustainability assurance has been proposed to help mitigate greenwashing (Free et al., 2024). Existing research on sustainability assurance has explored the features of firms adopting sustainability assurance (Simnett et al., 2009; Xiao & Shailer, 2022), the role of legitimacy with respect to auditors and other assurance providers and the challenges they face (Channuntapipat et al., 2019; Michelon et al., 2019; O'Dwyer, 2011), the development of assurance standards (Christensen et al., 2021; Zhou, 2022), and the impacts of sustainability assurance on capital markets (Pinnuck et al., 2021; Steinmeier & Stich, 2019). However, concerns remain about the effectiveness of sustainability assurance in addressing greenwashing, with some suggesting that sustainability assurance constitutes a form of greenwashing leading to "greenhushing" (Free et al., 2024). Also, when compared to financial auditing, sustainability assurance involves subjective interpretations of materiality, prioritizes reporting activities over

outcomes, and lacks consistent methodologies for measuring ESG performance (Morley, 2023). These complexities pose significant challenges for standard-setters and regulators when developing effective measures to effectively address greenwashing.

Regulatory Actions

Existing research on regulatory actions against greenwashing is fragmented. First, some studies identify lax and uncertain regulation as a major trigger for greenwashing (Lyon & Montgomery, 2015). Delmas and Burbano (2011) attribute the prevalence of greenwashing in the US to weak regulatory frameworks and uncertain enforcement, noting firms face minimal risk of punishment due to the rarity of sanctions. Similarly, Parguel et al. (2011) highlight the importance of government oversight in developing robust regulatory frameworks to deter greenwashing. Tashman et al. (2019) reveal that institutional voids in a company's home country can lead to CSR decoupling. Furthermore, Kim and Lyon (2015) find that greenwashing decreases with the application of external scrutiny, such as regulatory oversight and NGO pressure.

Second, other studies propose various regulatory and enforcement strategies to combat greenwashing. These include both regulatory measures and supportive policies encouraging firms to improve their environmental claims (Zhang et al., 2018). Some research suggests that clear regulatory guidelines can help shift sustainability disclosures from symbolic gestures to substantive actions (Khan et al., 2020). Another suggested approach emphasizes stricter enforcement and heavier penalties to address greenwashing and its broader implications (Lee et al., 2018). Regulatory enforcement is considered particularly necessary because it creates positive spillover effects when entities under the same regulator are targeted (de Villiers et al., 2025; Evans et al., 2018; Heyes & Kapur, 2009; Wang et al., 2024d). A regulator's reputation for toughness, established through sanctions, can act as a broader deterrent for all entities under its oversight (Rincke & Traxler, 2011; Shimshack & Ward, 2005).[9]

However, some research suggests that regulation may not always be optimal due to potential adverse effects, such as greenhushing (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Lyon & Montgomery, 2015; Nyilasy et al., 2014; Parguel et al., 2015). Regulating greenwashing might fail to significantly increase the positive environmental impact of green products due to higher additional CSR costs or the perceived insignificance of certain CSR issues (Lee et al., 2018).

[9] The deterrent effect of regulatory enforcement in other fields has been documented by Caiazza et al. (2018), who show that sanctions on some banks influenced the risk-taking behaviours of peer banks. Also, de Batz (2020) observed negative market reactions in conjunction with firms affected by others' regulatory breaches.

Yet other researchers argue that the degree of regulation is crucial (Parguel et al., 2015). Permitting a certain level of greenwashing may incentivize companies to adopt genuinely green practices, especially when informed customers and investors can identify and appreciate these efforts (Lee et al., 2018). Furthermore, formal legal approaches to tackling environmental reporting issues may be less effective in achieving "internal legitimacy of the law", which is crucial for constructing its "normativity" (Bebbington et al., 2012). Finally, government capacity to drive change can be undermined by bureaucratic inefficiencies, political motives, and corporate influence over the political system (Dechow, 2023).

To summarize, existing research reveals the ambiguous and malleable nature of greenwashing, a term describing selective, deceptive, and superficial/symbolic sustainability-related claims by corporations and financial institutions. While mandatory sustainability reporting and assurance have been proposed as solutions, extant accounting studies have identified their limitations, as well as highlighting the potential role of market regulators. However, systematic research on the role of regulators in combating greenwashing remains underdeveloped. Specifically, there is limited understanding of regulators' perceptions of greenwashing, the definitions and regulatory measures they employ in interventions, and their responses to challenges arising from such efforts. The recent surge in regulatory actions against greenwashing in Australia provides a valuable opportunity to investigate these issues. Correspondingly, this study contributes to the literature by examining how market regulators safeguard different forms of sustainability disclosures and communications. This enhances our understanding of the evolving regulatory context in which these disclosures and communications take place.

4.3 Theoretical Lens

Our analysis of the regulation of greenwashing is informed by theoretical insights from the sociology of regulation, which provides a social constructionist perspective on the regulatory process.

Determining whether an issue is placed on a regulatory agenda to be prioritized and scrutinized does not typically follow a rational decision-making process. Nor does it merely reflect the interests of regulators. Rather because of the political nature of regulatory processes, market regulators typically interpret and justify certain issues as relevant, appropriate, and legitimate for regulatory attention and action (e.g., Bozanic et al., 2012; Shapiro & Matson, 2008). Initially, a matter of concern is framed as a problem requiring a regulatory solution (Young, 1994, 2003). Thus, instead of seeing problems as simply being 'there', regulators

mobilize specific discourses and languages to construct problems that can be addressed through regulatory measures (Baudot & Cooper, 2022; Baudot & Wallace, 2023; Cortese & Andrew, 2020).

However, problem identification is insufficient to warrant a place on the regulatory agenda. Problems must also be construed as appropriate for regulatory intervention (Young, 1994). Regulators adhere to a "logic of appropriation" (March & Olsen, 1989), which involves "upholding duties and obligations" while "interpreting the situation and matching an appropriate action to the demands of this situation" (Young, 1994, pp. 87-88). Typically, "appropriateness" is tied to regulatory mandates (Ravenscroft & Williams, 2009). To justify and rationalize their interventions, regulators problematize specific issues in relation to their understanding of their regulatory mandates (Baudot & Cooper, 2022; Bozanic et al., 2012; Pelger, 2016; Ravenscroft & Williams, 2009; Young, 1996, 2006). Hence, regulators' "self-understandings of their mandates, legitimacy, and ways of operating" (Baudot & Cooper, 2022, p. 2) shape decisions regarding the appropriateness of addressing certain pressures and issues (Büthe, 2010a, 2010b).

Further, regulatory actions are often framed to align with the expectations of other market and societal actors, particularly regarding the role and purpose of regulators (Baudot et al., 2021; Young, 1994). According to Baudot and Cooper (2022, p. 2), regulatory responses depend "partly on what regulators assume are the motives and interests of those trying to influence them". Thus, the sociology of regulation emphasizes the socially and politically constructed nature of regulatory responses to pressures to address a problem (Baudot & Cooper, 2022; Young, 2014).

In addition to framing appropriate problems, subsequent processes of regulatory intervention are also socially constructed. Regulatory processes frame our perceptions of what needs to be regulated and how it should be governed. Issues are interpreted and co-produced alongside the legal structures and procedures used to regulate them (Fisher, 2014, p. 163; Czarniawska-Joerges & Sevón, 1996, 2005). As Seyfert (2022, p. 1552) suggests, regulatory processes "do not merely limit certain activities, but actively participate in the production of social reality". This social reality often centers around a "regulatory object" or "a thing that is understood by regulatory actors as the "thing" to be regulated … and … that can be governed" (Fisher 2014, p. 163). A regulatory object is often fluid, opaque, and malleable, subject to interpretation, refinement, and reframing in regulatory processes (Fisher, 2014; Seyfert, 2022). Accordingly, the object of regulatory intervention is not fixed. Instead, it is redefined and

transformed through regulatory processes, co-producing regulatory processes and the problems. Ultimately, it is through regulatory processes that certain issues, behaviours, and actions are rendered amenable to regulatory intervention. Particularly, regulatory interference "explicitly or implicitly creates demarcations and boundaries that make objects appear hazardous or harmless, safe or risky, natural or unnatural, important or unimportant" (Lidskog et al., 2011, p. 112). In this way, regulatory intervention actively constructs certain meanings and categories, shaping perceptions of what is appropriate, desirable, misleading, or dangerous.

Drawing on the theoretical insights discussed above, we analyse interventions by market regulators in response to greenwashing from a social constructionist perspective. Specifically, we examine how regulators: frame greenwashing as a problem requiring their intervention; use existing regulatory frameworks and measures to address greenwashing; construct greenwashing as a regulatory object by transforming its content and dimensions of; and build preparedness to respond to the limitations and unintended consequences arising from their regulatory actions.

4.4 Research Approach

Our study examines regulatory interventions against greenwashing by two major regulators in Australia. They are the ASIC, the financial market regulator, and the ACCC, the consumer market regulator. We adopted this research focus for two main reasons.

First, Australian regulators are at the forefront of anti-greenwashing actions. A Factiva search between 2020 and 2024 identified Australia, Canada, the EU, the UK, and the US as having the highest media coverage of regulatory actions against greenwashing.[10] Follow-up searches of regulator websites in these regions revealed 45 legal cases, with Australia and the US leading in case numbers (14 and 16 cases, respectively). Moreover, both Australian regulators have explicitly listed greenwashing as a strategic priority in recent years, a commitment reinforced by Australian government initiatives such as the Senate inquiry into greenwashing in 2023. Australia is also an early mover seeking mandatory sustainability and climate-related disclosures, with ASIC tasked with enforcing the requirements. In comparison, the US has stalled its progress and the EU faces delays in implementation.

[10] The search used the following keywords: "Greenwashing OR Greenwash AND (regulator OR regulatory body OR watchdog) AND (fined OR sanction OR punished OR investigated)". We also filtered language to "English" only. This search approach is the same as the Factiva search in Section 3.1, while only focus on the past five years to capture recent greenwashing regulation trends.

Second, ASIC and the ACCC differ in their roles, mandates, and market focus, addressing greenwashing in distinct types of sustainability disclosures. ASIC targets green claims in listed companies' corporate filings and financial institutions' fund prospectuses.[11] The ACCC focuses on sustainability claims in corporate marketing communications and advertisements (see Table IV-1).[12] These differences enable a more comprehensive analysis of how greenwashing is defined, the regulatory measures employed to tackle it, and the challenges arising from these interventions. While regulating greenwashing is a global phenomenon, investigating two Australian market regulators allows for a more focused and in-depth analysis in a shared political and regulatory framework within the same jurisdiction. However, our study also considers regulatory actions in other regions, such as those by the US SEC[13] and the EC,[14] to inform conceptualizations of developments in Australia.

[11] ASIC oversees corporate affairs and financial markets in Australia under the *ASIC Act*. Since 2021, it has escalated anti-greenwashing initiatives, issuing 19 infringement notices totaling over $260,000 by July 2024.

[12] The ACCC, responsible for promoting competition, fair trade, and product safety under the Competition and Consumer Act of 2010, including the ACL, has issued guidance and conducted an online sweep to deter greenwashing. Recently, it accepted a court-enforceable undertaking from MOO Premium Foods in November 2023 and filed a court case against Clorox Australia in April 2024.

[13] The US SEC enforces Federal Securities Laws and regulates stock and options exchanges. Since 2021, it has intensified its focus on greenwashing in ESG disclosures, establishing ESG enforcement task forces, proposing disclosure rules, and taking enforcement actions across the financial sector. However, the task force was dissolved in 2024. Given the political uncertainty regarding ESG in the US, we only use US greenwashing cases for the purpose of informing contextualization of developments in Australia.

[14] We include EC for contextualization because the EU is considered a pioneer in establishing sustainability reporting and disclosure rules, although enforcement is separately taken by the member states. The EC establishes regulatory frameworks to combat greenwashing and coordinates surveillance activities across the EU. In support of the European Green Deal's goal of a climate-neutral economy by 2050, the EC conducted online sweeping addressing greenwashing practices in 2020. In March 2024, it introduced new anti-greenwashing rules, including "A Directive to Empower Consumers for the Green Transition", which complements the 2023 "Green Claim Directive".

Table IV-1 Fourteen Cases Investigated by the ACCC and ASIC

Date of Investigation	Regulator	Company Name	Industry	Type of Sanction	Reason
2/08/2024	ASIC	Mercer Superannuation (Australia) Limited	Asset Management	Civil penalty of $11.3 million AUD	Mercer claimed that its Sustainable Plus investment options excluded investments in alcohol, gambling, and carbon intensive fossil fuels. However, these options held investments in companies involved in those industries. The claims were made on its website in relation to seven 'Sustainable Plus' investment options.
5/06/2024	ASIC	LGSS Pty Ltd (trustee of Active Super)	Asset Management	Civil penalty of $10.5 million AUD	Active Super claimed it would not invest in certain industries, such as gambling and tobacco. However, it was found to have indirect investments in these industries through pooled funds.
28/05/2024	ASIC	Fertoz Limited	Farming	Infringement notices of $37,560 AUD	Fertoz made statements about the progress and timeline of its reforestation project that were neither accurate nor achievable given its actual circumstances. The company promised outcomes (e.g., securing partners/funding and beginning planting) by the end of 2023. However, it had already ended discussions with potential partners and did not have any concrete plans or funding in place to meet these goals at the year end. These claims were made in a market update presentation published on the ASX.
18/04/2024	ACCC	Clorox Australia Pty Ltd	Consumer Good	Legal proceedings (pending)	Clorox claims that its Kitchen Tidy Bags and Garbage Bags were made from 50 per cent recycled 'ocean plastic'. However, the products were actually made from plastic collected in communities up to 50 kilometres from the shoreline, material that does not qualify as 'ocean plastic'. The claims were made on the product packaging.
28/03/2024	ASIC	Vanguard Investments Australia Ltd	Asset Management	Civil penalty of $12.9 million AUD	Vanguard claimed that investments in its 'Ethically Conscious Global Aggregate Bond Index Fund' had undergone ESG screening. In reality, approximately 74% of the securities were not evaluated against ESG criteria. This claim was made across multiple corporate disclosure and marketing platforms, including: 1) 12 product disclosure statements; 2) a media release; 3) statements published on Vanguard's website; 4) a Finance News Network interview on YouTube; and 5) a presentation at a Finance News Network Fund Manager Event, also published online.
28/02/2024	ASIC	Melbourne Securities Corporation Limited	Asset Management	Infringement notices of $13,320 AUD	Melbourne Securities claimed to avoid investments in fossil fuels. However, its actual investment strategy permitted investments in companies deriving up to 33% of their revenue from excluded activities such as fossil fuels. These claims were made in its Product Disclosure Statements.
19/12/2023	ASIC	Northern Trust Asset Management	Asset Management	Infringement notices of	Northern Trust claimed that its fund excluded companies based on specific carbon emissions and management score criteria. However, the fund included companies that

		Australia Pty Ltd		$29,820 AUD	should have been excluded under its stated scoring policy. These claims were made in its Product Disclosure Statements.
1/12/2023	ASIC	Morningstar Investment Management Australia Limited	Asset Management	Infringement notices of $29,820 AUD	Morningstar claimed that its fund had no exposure to weapons, based on research by Sustainalytics (its ESG research group). However, the fund did have such exposure through investments in an ETF that held shares in weapons manufacturers. These claims were made in: 1) its Product Disclosure Statement and 2) its ESG Policy published on the Morningstar website.
28/11/2023	ACCC	MOO Premium Foods Pty Ltd	Consumer Good	Court-enforceable undertaking	MOO claimed that its yoghurt tubs were made from '100% ocean plastic'. However, the plastic resin used in the yoghurt packaging was collected from coastal areas in Malaysia, not directly from the ocean. These claims were made on: 1) product packaging; 2) social media platforms; and 3) the company's website.
21/04/2023	ASIC	Future Super Investment Services Pty Ltd	Asset Management	Infringement notices of $13,320 AUD	Future Super claimed that it had moved nearly $400 million out of fossil fuels, an amount equal to its total holdings. This statement implied that all of its funds under management had previously been invested in fossil fuels and had then become fossil-fuel free, an implication that was baseless and unreasonable. The claim was made on the fund's Facebook page.
23/12/2022	ASIC	Diversa Trustees Limited	Asset Management	Infringement notices of $13,320 AUD	Diversa claimed that its Cruelty Free Super (CFS) option avoided investments in companies involved in intensive pollution and carbon emissions. However, these exclusions were more specific and applied on a more limited basis than suggested on the CFS website. The claim was made on the CFS superannuation product website.
20/12/2022	ASIC	Black Mountain Energy Ltd	Oil and Gas	Infringement notices of $39,960 AUD	Black Mountain Energy made statements about achieving net-zero carbon emissions and developing carbon-neutral natural gas through 'Project Valhalla'. However, it lacked concrete plans, allocated funding, emissions modelling, or feasible approaches to actually achieve these goals. The claims were made in: 1) its Investor Presentation published on the ASX; 2) its Investor Update published on the ASX; and 3) its Good Oil Conference presentation published on the ASX.
2/12/2022	ASIC	Vanguard Investments Australia Ltd	Asset Management	Infringement notices of $39,960 AUD	Vanguard claimed to use an exclusion (investment screen) to prevent investment in companies with significant business activities in tobacco sales. However, its funds could still invest in companies selling tobacco products. These claims were made in its Product Disclosure Statements.
18/10/2022	ASIC	Tlou Energy Limited	Oil and Gas	Infringement notices of $53,280 AUD	Tlou made multiple claims about carbon neutrality, solar power capacity, and low emissions without conducting the necessary research, modelling, or feasibility studies to support these claims. Specifically, they lacked the required approvals, infrastructure, and concrete plans to implement the clean energy aspects of their project as prominently presented. These claims were made in: 1) its Operational Report published on the ASX and 2) a presentation about Tlou's business operations to the ASX.

Regulators generate extensive documentation to maintain their legitimacy (Baudot & Cooper, 2022; Baudot & Wallace, 2023; Bealing et al., 1996). Regulatory documents are widely circulated in the public domain, serving as valuable resources for academics studying regulatory processes. The two focal regulators have produced a variety of publicly available archival documents detailing their interventions against greenwashing. These include regulatory rules, guidelines, proposals, comment letters, press releases, case studies, and speeches by regulatory officials. These documents provide insights into key events, regulatory mechanisms and approaches, decisions made around greenwashing cases, and references to regulatory mandates justifying those decisions. More importantly, they allow us to examine how regulators use language and discourse to articulate the rationales, motivations, and goals behind their actions (Baudot & Cooper, 2022; Phillips & Hardy, 2002; Robson, 1993), rather than merely facilitating a content analysis for patterns or trends. Altogether, these archival documents constituted the primary empirical data for our study. We sourced documents from regulators' websites and via Factiva, using search keywords such as "greenwashing", "greenwash", "greenwasher", "deceptive disclosure", "misleading disclosure", and "selective reporting", ultimately collecting 74 documents. Additionally, we gathered materials from Australia's 2023 Senate inquiry into greenwashing, including transcripts from two public hearings held in April and May in Canberra, and 127 comment letters from stakeholders. The Senate hearings featured discussions, between Senate members and representatives from the ACCC and ASIC, concerning the tension between a commitment to curbing greenwashing and the limitations faced. For comment letters, our analysis focused on identifying stakeholders' concerns about the potential consequences of current regulatory actions (see Table IV-2 for an overview).

Table IV-2 Overview of Documents

Part I: Number of Documents by Regulator	
Regulator	**Number of Documents**
ACCC	24 (Fact Sheet -1, Fined Case - 5, Guidance - 3, Media release - 4, Report - 3, Speech - 7, Submission - 1)
ASIC	50 (Article - 7, Fined Case - 16, Corporate Plan - 2, Information sheet - 1, Media release - 4, Report - 2, Speech -17, Submission - 1)
Total	***74***
Part II: Number of Documents from Australia Senate Inquiry into Greenwashing	
Comment Letters from stakeholders other than ACCC/ASIC	125 (98 from Organizations, 27 from Individuals)
Public Hearings	2 (April 2024; May 2024)
Total	***127***
Part III: Total Number of Documents by Type	
Document Type	**Number of Documents**
Fact Sheet, Information Sheet, and Articles	9
Fined Case	21
Guidance	3
Corporate Plan	2
Media Release	8
Report	5
Speech	24
Public Hearings	2
Comment letters from Regulator	2
Comment letters from other stakeholders	125
Total	***201***

We are mindful of the limitations of archival documents, particularly a tendency to neglect challenges faced by regulators when addressing greenwashing. To mitigate this limitation, we conducted six semi-structured interviews: four with representatives from regulatory bodies (IN-1, IN-3, IN-4, and IN-6), one with a member of an accounting standard-

setting body (IN-5), and one with a representative from an environmental NGO (IN-2)[15] (see Table IV-3). Each interview lasted approximately 60 minutes, with topics informed by our initial analysis of the archival documents. Our primarily focus is on the four interviews conducted in the Australia context (IN-1, IN-2, IN-4, and IN-5). The other two interviews, conducted with overseas regulators (IN-3 and IN-6), were utilized to contextualize developments in Australia. While all interviews aimed to deepen our understanding of the focal phenomenon, those with regulatory representatives specifically explored how regulators identify, assess, and address greenwashing, with particular attention paid to the challenges encountered. In contrast, interviews with the accounting standard-setter and environmental NGO focused on their perspectives on regulatory interventions, particularly their effectiveness and recommendations for further action.

Table IV-3 Interview Information*

Date	Organization	Jurisdiction	Interview ID
04 May 2023	Regulator I	Australia	IN-1
04 May 2023	NGOs I	Australia	IN-2
08 May 2023	Regulator II	Overseas	IN-3
08 June 2023	Regulator III	Australia	IN-4
19 Dec 2023	Standard Setter I	Australia	IN-5
06 Aug 2024	Regulator IV	Overseas	IN-6

**The duration of interviews averaged 57 minutes and varied between 50 minutes and 70 minutes. All the interviewees agreed to be audio recorded.*

Analysis of the empirical data was carried out in two main stages. First, we analysed various archival documents to understand the timeline of regulatory interventions against greenwashing by the ACCC and ASIC. We sought to find out when, why, and how each regulator began to identify, assess, and penalize greenwashing. The analysis involved tracing key events and regulatory actions, mapping the sequence and trajectory of developments, and understanding each regulator's approach to defining and tackling greenwashing. We also cross-

[15] This NGO is at the forefront of combating greenwashing through legal action. It has both filed lawsuits to the court and lodged complaints with market regulators in the past few years. NGOs and activist groups play a crucial role in informally monitoring, exposing, and holding firms accountable for greenwashing, especially in the case of limited and inconsistent formal regulation (Delmas & Burbano, 2011).

checked our document analysis with interview data to verify information and gain further insights. Overall, this initial stage of data analysis allowed us to grasp the urgency and significance of regulatory interventions against greenwashing, the different definitions of greenwashing utilized by regulators, the various regulatory tools and mechanisms employed to address it, and the challenges they faced.

Second, we further analysed the empirical material using an abductive approach to theorizing (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014), developing theoretical categories directly from the data and informed by the sociology of regulation discussed earlier. To operationalize this approach, we employed the "constant comparative method" (Flick, 2009; cf. Glaser, 1969), comparing issues discussed in archival documents from each regulator, across different regulators, and in relation to the interview data. This helped to develop an overarching theoretical explanation for the phenomenon under investigation, going beyond merely identifying similarities or differences in regulators' efforts. Accordingly, we identified theoretical categories related to regulators' claims of appropriateness and legitimacy in addressing greenwashing, their justifications for employing established regulatory mechanisms and procedures, their definitions and re-definitions of greenwashing, and their preparedness for tackling challenges and unintended consequences arising from their regulatory actions. We iteratively moved between the data, interpretation, and theoretical perspective until four broad themes emerged. These themes constitute four aspects of an overarching narrative about how regulators make possible the regulation of greenwashing, which is being detailed in the following section. While empirical material related to the two Australian regulators is used to illustrate these themes, specific quotes from archival documents and interviews have been selected to amplify theoretical points of relevance.

4.5 Findings

The four sub-sections below outline how regulators make possible the regulation of greenwashing. Themes informing these respective sub-sections are entitled: "framing regulatory appropriateness" (see 5.1); "developing regulatory alignment" (see 5.2); "shaping regulatory object" (see 5.3); and "building regulatory preparedness" (see 5.4).

4.5.1 Framing Regulatory Appropriateness

Curbing Greenwashing as A Regulatory Mandate in the Transition to A Low-Carbon Economy

Since the late 2000s and early 2010s, market regulators have acted against misleading green claims with limited success.[16] In recent years, renewed regulatory attention to greenwashing has emerged alongside a broader shift towards a low-carbon economy. To signal their contributions to this transition, many companies and financial institutions have increasingly used terms such as "net zero", "carbon neutral", "clean", and "green" in public filings and disclosures (ASIC, 2023b). Recently, Australia moved to mandatory sustainability and climate-related disclosures, with ASIC being responsible for administering and enforcing these sustainability requirements under Chapter 2M of the Corporations Act 2001.[17] However, it is not clear whether mandatory reporting alone will improve disclosure quality or effectively mitigate biased and misleading information. Recognising the growing urgency of combatting greenwashing in various forms of sustainability disclosures and communications, both ASIC and the ACCC have taken a more active stance through targeted regulatory interventions. Accordingly, a national commitment to a low-carbon economy and sustainable goals has fueled renewed regulatory focus on greenwashing. As such, regulatory action against misleading or exaggerated green claims has become not only relevant but essential. As ASIC Chair Joe Longo emphasized in his keynote speech at the Responsible Investment Association Australasia (RIAA) Conference Australia in 2024:

> Yes, introducing a climate reporting regime can be expected to reduce greenwashing – through more standardized, consistent, and comparable climate-related information. But other initiatives proposed under the Government's draft sustainable finance strategy will also contribute – such as the development of an Australian sustainable finance taxonomy, and a labelling system for investment products marketed as 'sustainable'. These are other important parts of the whole picture. ASIC supports these measures; and will work with the Government, and our partner agencies in the Council of Financial Regulators, as the strategy is implemented. We also regularly engage with other agencies, such as the ACCC and

[16] For example, the ACCC issued its first guidance on greenwashing, titled "Green Marketing and the Australian Consumer Law", in 2011. Since 2016, it has taken legal action against companies for greenwashing, including cases against Kimberly-Clark and Woolworths. In 2016, Kimberly-Clark was accused of misleading consumers by marketing its personal hygiene wipes as "flushable". In 2018, Woolworths faced allegations over its "W Select eco" brand, labelled as "Biodegradable and Compostable". However, the ACCC lost both course cases. The Kimberly-Clark case failed because consumer complaints were considered insufficient to prove harm from potentially false green claims. Although the wipes had inferior breakdown properties compared to toilet paper, posing a potential risk, the court found no evidence of actual harm. The ACCC argued that Woolworths' labels implied that the products would biodegrade and compost within a reasonable timeframe in domestic compost bins or conventional landfills. The court dismissed the case, stating that Woolworths' claims referred to the inherent characteristics of the products rather than future outcomes.

[17] https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2025-releases/25-051mr-asic-issues-sustainability-reporting-regulatory-guide/ (accessed on 12/04/2025).

> the clean energy regulator, to share insights about potential greenwashing misconduct.[18]

Similarly, an ACCC submission to the Treasury Competition Review outlined:

> For markets to deliver environmental objectives such as net zero, biodiversity and a circular economy, consumers need to be able to make informed purchasing decisions. We need to empower consumers to drive competition, yet there are barriers to achieving this because of greenwashing, difficulty in comparing products, or the potential for anti-competitive conduct and market concentration.[19]

As such, regulators need to establish that greenwashing is a problem requiring intervention and that they are the appropriate authorities to do so (Baudot & Cooper, 2022; Ravenscroft & Williams, 2009). In other words, they need to assert that investigating greenwashing falls within their mandate. For instance, in recent years, ASIC has imposed regulatory sanctions on sustainability-related claims that are deemed "false", "misleading", or constituting "misrepresentation". ASIC fined Tlou Energy Limited $53,280 for making a misleading carbon neutrality claim regarding its Lesedi project in an operational report submitted to the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) in October 2021. ASIC's infringement notice stated that Tlou had no reasonable basis for its claim and outlined specific deficiencies, including the lack of substantive modeling and a meaningful investigation into the project's feasibility.

Given its mandate to promote integrity and enhance investor protection in the Australian capital market, ASIC has a responsibility to address misleading corporate information, such as that provided by Tlou. As investor demand for sustainable and responsible corporate behaviour grows, ensuring the accuracy and reliability of ESG claims has become increasingly crucial. Accordingly, companies or financial institutions misrepresenting or exaggerating their environmental performance, pose a risk to market transparency, investor confidence, and fair competition. As such, greenwashing falls squarely within ASIC's regulatory mandate to maintain trust in financial markets (Baudot & Cooper, 2022; Ravenscroft & Williams, 2009). In its Information Sheet titled 'How to Avoid Greenwashing When Offering or Promoting

[18] https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/speeches/greenwashing-a-view-from-the-regulator/ (accessed on 12/04/2025).
[19] https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/CompetitionReview-ACCCsubmission13February2024.pdf (accessed on 13/03/2025)

Sustainability-Related Products', ASIC explains why it is imperative that it addresses greenwashing practices among financial institutions:

> Greenwashing distorts relevant information that a current or prospective investor might require in order to make informed investment decisions. It can erode investor confidence in the market for sustainability-related products and poses a threat to a fair and efficient financial system.[20]

Likewise, the ACCC's website states:

> If a business breaks the rules about environmental or sustainability claims, we can investigate. We may take some form of compliance or enforcement action.[21]

The above statement makes it clear that the ACCC views misleading or deceptive environmental or sustainability claims (i.e., greenwashing) as a potential breach of existing consumer protection legislation. And the ACCC sees itself as both authorized and obligated to intervene in such cases. Accordingly, it is appropriate and legitimate for this regulator to "investigate … and take some form of compliance or enforcement action" in response to greenwashing.

Influences by Overseas Regulators

While ASIC and the ACCC have been addressing greenwashing for some time, their counterparts in other geographical jurisdictions acted similarly. Recognising that "no regulator is an island",[22] Australian market regulators closely monitor the progress of their international peers, drawing on international efforts to justify and legitimize their actions.

ASIC has closely monitored initiatives by its US counterpart, the SEC, particularly the establishment of a specialized task force, as well as the EU's effort to introduce a taxonomy for sustainable activities. As ASIC acknowledged in its publication entitled 'What is Greenwashing and What are its Potential Threats?':

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[20] https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/how-to-avoid-greenwashing-when-offering-or-promoting-sustainability-related-products/ (accessed on 20/10/2024).
[21] https://www.accc.gov.au/business/advertising-and-promotions/environmental-and-sustainability-claims (accessed on 12/04/2025).
[22] https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/speeches/asic-and-greenwashing-antidotes/ (accessed on 09/01/2024).

> The European Union recently adopted a legal framework introducing a taxonomy that seeks to define which investments or economic activities can be considered sustainable or climate friendly. The US Securities and Exchange Commission has also announced a task force to identify gaps or misstatements in ESG disclosures, as well as compliance issues relating to the ESG strategies of funds.[23]

Further, regulatory bodies are increasingly collaborating through transnational organizations such as the ICPEN and IOSCO. Such affiliations serve as important global channels for regulators to share information, develop more consistent regulatory approaches, and collectively address common challenges like greenwashing. As the ACCC Commissioner *Catriona Lowe* noted, the ACCC's initiatives to tackle greenwashing are inspired by these transnational organizations*:*

> ICPEN plays a key role in exploring how we can deal with these problems on a global level. [A] key example of this is the 2020 ICPEN sweep into misleading environmental claims which brought together ICPEN members to analyze over 500 websites across the world ...The findings of this sweep and further discussions with our ICPEN colleagues encouraged the ACCC to look more seriously at the issue, including conducting our own sweep.[24]

Despite operating in different regulatory domains, both the ACCC and ASIC have identified greenwashing as a problem requiring regulatory intervention. They justify their actions as aligned with their mandates, asserting their appropriateness to regulate greenwashing. Moreover, the fact that regulators in other regions are also tackling greenwashing reinforces the legitimacy of their interventions and strengthens their commitment to regulatory action. Nevertheless, merely placing an issue on the regulatory agenda does not guarantee that interventions will become feasible. Regulators also need to justify their capacity for regulation, demonstrating they possess necessary tools and mechanisms – as we discuss below.

4.5.2 Developing Regulatory Alignment

Challenges in Regulating Greenwashing

Regulators typically view greenwashing as a practice that "misleads", "misrepresents", "exaggerates", or "deceives" in relation to environmental or sustainability claims. This is

[23] https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/articles/what-is-greenwashing-and-what-are-its-potential-threats/ (accessed on 09/01/2024).
[24] https://www.accc.gov.au/about-us/news/speeches/official-australian-presidency-welcome-speech-at-icpen-conference#:~:text=We're%20increasingly%20living%20and,exploring%20this%20in%20more%20detail. (accessed on 13/03/2025).

categorized as a violation under their regulatory mandates. However, while greenwashing is widely recognised as a serious issue, demonstrating the problematic nature of such claims presents distinct challenges to regulators.

First, greenwashing is widespread and can take various forms.[25] According to a speech by Ms. Delia Rickard, Deputy Chair of the ACCC, at the Sydney Morning Herald Sustainability Summit:

> Sustainability covers a broad range of issues which are often incredibly complex, so this is easier said than done. For example, sustainability initiatives can cover reduced materials usage, lower emissions, improved disposal, and increased circularity. Each of these benefits are very different and have their own unique impact on the environment. This can make it challenging for consumers, businesses, and regulators to navigate and solve problems relating to sustainability.[26]

One of our interviewees based in Australia highlighted similar complications, particularly the challenges of defining greenwashing, determining its scope, identifying its various forms, and addressing its widespread presence across industries and contexts:

> … greenwashing isn't confined to investment products. It can be any business. And so I'm not sure what the right definition is because it also isn't necessarily confined to climate. They have different terms in different areas. That's a complication. (IN-5)

Given the proliferation of sustainability claims, it is impractical for regulators to penalize all offenders. As Karen Chester, ASIC Deputy Chair, reflected at the RI Australia 2023 annual conference:

> Over the long-term, case-by-case intervention is not a cost-effective nor comprehensive antidote to greenwashing. We are therefore active in supporting Treasury in these policy developments to support increased transparency and trust across the system.[27]

[25] This originates from the heterogeneity of concepts and definitions surrounding sustainability (e.g., ESG, CSR) (see Stolowy & Paugam, 2023).
[26] https://www.accc.gov.au/about-us/news/speeches/speech-to-sydney-morning-herald-sustainability-summit (accessed on 13/03/2025).
[27] https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/speeches/asic-and-greenwashing-antidotes/ (accessed on 20/10/2024).

A similar view was expressed by an interviewee affiliated with an Australian regulatory body:

> We recognise that – I mean, it seems to me very obvious that it's difficult to in a comprehensive way check every single potential claim for greenwashing across the entire internet. (IN-1)

As can be seen, market regulators in Australia recognise the limitations of case-by-case regulatory intervention against greenwashing. Given the sheer volume of claims, particularly those made online, relying on individual investigations is neither cost-effective nor feasible. Instead, regulators have emphasized the need for a more systematic, sustainable, and proactive approach to tackling greenwashing.

Second, greenwashing places a significant burden on prosecutors to prove that certain green claims are "misleading" or "deceptive". Since these claims are often vague and open to interpretation, establishing their misleading or deceptive nature becomes challenging. Interviewees affiliated with Australian regulatory bodies offered useful insights:

> … the key thing is, 'Is it misleading for consumers?' So being vague, it can be misleading. So if you say your product is green, 'This is a new green product' and you have a little picture of a leaf next to it or something, I mean, I'm just making this up, so customers could have the impression that they're buying this and it's good for the environment when in fact that isn't the case. So that would be misleading. When I talk about having more specific claims, I'm thinking of specifically reading in court that something is misleading. So, it's much easier to specifically say, 'This very detailed claim is clearly incorrect because it's not made of….' (IN-1)

> … one particular area of high priority are the vague and general claims but it's infinitely easier to win a Court case when it's a very narrow detailed claim that you can easily prove to be false without the need to bring in expert evidence around how consumers might interpret the claim. (IN-4)

The above interviewees highlight the inherent ambiguity surrounding sustainability or green claims and the challenges confronting regulators in proving that these claims are biased, misleading, or deceptive. More importantly, they characterize green claims that are "narrow", "specific", and "detailed" as being "easier to win a court case", effectively addressing

greenwashing through legal means. However, this ideal is difficult to achieve in practice. As a result, regulating greenwashing remains a challenge for regulators.

Third, green claims are often future-oriented and qualitative. This makes it difficult to distinguish between genuine intentions and greenwashing, and legal and fraudulent behaviour. Regulators face challenges in determining what constitutes reasonable grounds or solid evidence for future claims. The ACCC raised this concern in its submission to the Senate inquiry into greenwashing in Australia in 2023:

> While the *Australian Consumer Law* can provide a remedy where there are no reasonable grounds for making a representation with respect to a future matter, what constitutes 'reasonable grounds' in the context of future claims relating to emissions is yet to be tested.[28]

One interviewee further explained:

> 'We plan to do this net zero commitment.' Or, 'We have decided to do this.' Or, 'We are in the process of doing this or that.' This is when you go like, 'Is this greenwashing or not greenwashing? … what if you actually then say, 'Oh, but we're starting to do this and this and this.' - and you're not really. Is that greenwashing? It's gonna be very challenging for entities and auditors around this. … Because if you're saying you're green now when you're not - Then that's an obvious fraud. But if you're saying you are going to go green …, you are moving towards that. Well, then maybe …. (IN-5)

Finally, proving that certain claims are 'misleading' or 'deceptive' can be challenging when they are framed in highly technical terms, such as net-zero claims involving complex scientific terminology. Regulators have noted that a lack of technical knowledge and expertise in ESG issues presents a barrier, making it difficult to thoroughly assess and interpret environmental disclosures. For instance, the ACCC highlighted this in its response to the Senate hearing on the regulation of carbon emission and offset claims. Mr. Rami Greiss, Executive General Manager of the Consumer and Fair Trading Division, ACCC, acknowledged that such technical methodologies currently fall outside the ACCC's "area of responsibility":

[28] https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/ACCC%20submission%20-%20Senate%20inquiry%20into%20Greenwashing%20-%2022%20June%202023.pdf (accessed on 21/10/2024).

> We propose to release guidance later this year on emissions claims, but our focus will be more on the nature of business claims rather than anything to do with underlying methodologies or accounting techniques. It's not our area of responsibility. We are interested in ensuring businesses marketing to consumers are as clear, transparent and upfront as they can be about all aspects of their business, and that includes any claims about emissions or offsets.[29]

The complexity of obtaining scientific evidence to substantiate greenwashing claims was highlighted in our interview with an NGO involved in anti-greenwashing cases:

> … if we're looking at a claim, we would go and look at what the companies relied on and then look at sources and scientific literature, sometimes our science team might help with that, and they might find articles. (IN-2)

In short, regulating greenwashing is challenging. However, through recent regulatory interventions, regulators have demonstrated their capacity to tackle it. Specifically, Australian regulators have employed two key strategies when addressing greenwashing. First, they interpret greenwashing within existing regulatory frameworks and adapt these frameworks to make greenwashing actionable by leveraging established legal rules and regulatory procedures. Second, regulators deploy a variety of enforcement tools, ranging from educational initiatives to punitive measures adapted from other fields, to address the broad and diverse nature of greenwashing claims. These strategies, referred to as "regulatory alignment", are discussed in detail in the next two sub-sections.

Treating Greenwashing as A Violation of the Law

To enforce actions against greenwashing, regulators explicitly identify specific laws violated in each case. In the asset management industry, greenwashing is typically considered a violation of certain Investment Acts, such as the Australia's ASIC Act of 2001. In the consumer sector, violations usually fall under consumer protection laws, like the Australian Consumer Act 2010. This approach emphasizes the use of existing legal frameworks as benchmarks to evaluate whether certain disclosures made by companies and financial institutions constitute greenwashing. In other words, interventions against greenwashing align with these regulatory frameworks, with violations categorized as greenwashing. For instance, Joe Longo, the Chair of ASIC, remarked:

[29] https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Environment_and_Communications/Greenwashing/Public_Hearings (accessed on 14/03/2025).

> In simple terms, ASIC considers greenwashing to be 'the practice of misrepresenting the extent to which a financial product or investment strategy is environmentally friendly, sustainable or ethical.' So to be clear, misleading and deceptive conduct has never been acceptable – and has long been the subject of prohibitions under the law. Greenwashing is simply a recent manifestation of this.[30]

By aligning greenwashing with a violation of existing laws and regulations, regulators have sought to demonstrate that it can be "regulated" within current legal and regulatory frameworks. This approach provides a practical means to intervene in the absence of specific regulations tailored to greenwashing, bridging the gap until more targeted laws and policies are introduced.

Nevertheless, addressing greenwashing based on current legal frameworks remains challenging. Existing laws and regulations are not specifically designed to regulate green claims and lack clear criteria for defining greenwashing. As a result, distinguishing between legitimate green claims and greenwashing, particularly in court cases, is difficult. For example, while the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) broadly prohibits misleading and deceptive conduct, it does not explicitly define what constitutes such behaviour. This lack of clarity creates considerable challenges for regulators, especially those overseeing claims related to consumer goods. In a public hearing for the Senate's greenwashing inquiry, Mr. Rami Greiss from the ACCC highlighted a key limitation of existing laws – legal interpretations often depend heavily on the specific contexts of each case:

> Certainly, you'll get no argument from me about that particular case, but the way the law operates turns very much on circumstances. In other contexts, we've been extremely successful in our cases and our interpretation of the representations. It's very hard to take one case, even one we think is very disappointing, and extrapolate from there. It's the nature of the law of general application; it does require an evaluative judgement.[31]

Mr. Greiss also illustrated these practical challenges with an example of a failed ACCC court case.[32] He explained that while the ACCC assesses greenwashing based on how

[30] https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/speeches/greenwashing-a-view-from-the-regulator/ (accessed on 04/01/2025).
[31] https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Environment_and_Communications/Greenwashing/Public_Hearings (Accessed 14/03/2025).
[32] Refer to footnote 14 above.

consumers are likely to interpret such claims, courts may take a narrower approach and focus on the literal meaning of the words used:

> This is the issue about our 'misleading and deceptive' law. There are implied representations you can allege are made when someone says something. We said in the context of those claims the implied representation an ordinary consumer would understand was that it's compostable in a home environment. It wasn't. The judge said, 'No, the only representation was it was biodegradable and compostable. They are the inherent properties of the product, and as a result there is nothing misleading and deceptive about the claim'.[33]

As a result, regulators encounter prolonged legal disputes and incur significant costs, indicating the need for more targeted regulations. One interviewee observed:

> The Court cases are hugely, hugely time intensive and expert intensive and costly. (IN-2)

Nonetheless, legal actions aligned with existing regulatory frameworks have helped raise public awareness of greenwashing. However, regulators have recognised a need to revise and update laws and regulations to reduce ambiguity and improve the identification of greenwashing. While neither ASIC nor the ACCC has amended its legislation, both have considered this option and are closely monitoring international regulatory developments, such as the EU's proposed amendments to its legislation.[34] The possibility of legislative change also became a topic of discussion during the Senate hearings. However, Australian regulators have carefully weighted the pros and cons, expressing concerns about the potential burden new legislation could place on smaller businesses. When asked whether new legislation specifically targeting greenwashing would make the ACCC's job easier, Mr. Greiss responded:

[33] https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Environment_and_Communications/Greenwashing/Public_Hearings (Accessed 14/03/2025).

[34] The EC has proposed two key pieces of legislation to address misleading green claims. First, the Green Claim Directive, introduced in March 2023, supplements existing regulations by establishing minimum requirements for substantiating and communicating green claims. Second, the Directive on Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition, adopted in February 2024, introduces detailed rules prohibiting generic environmental claims such as "eco-friendly", "eco", "green", "nature's friend", "ecological" and "environmentally correct", as well as uncertified sustainability labels. These laws lay the groundwork for regulating green disclosures by clarifying what constitutes greenwashing within the EU.

> As I understand it the European green directive, while passed, hasn't been implemented in member states, so we're yet to see how it plays out. As a reflection, the prescriptive nature of it may mean smaller enterprises won't have the ability to do the work necessary to back up the claims according to the law, and if that were to happen it might skew the playing field in favour of larger, better resourced companies, which would be unfortunate. It's certainly quite clear that consumers are making purchasing decisions often based on green credentials. While I'm not saying it's a good or a bad thing, we'd have to think very carefully before we implemented very specific rules. Of course we have the power to compel corporations to back up their claims.[35]

Overall, while the existing legal framework provides a foundation for addressing greenwashing, its limitations highlight the ongoing challenges regulators face in effectively enforcing actions against misleading claims. A lack of clear definitions and legal precedent creates uncertainties in both enforcement and judicial interpretation, leading to resource-intensive legal battles. As international regulatory developments continue to evolve, Australian regulators remain attentive, seeking to carefully balance a need for clarity with the potential burden placed on businesses. In other words, while the ACCC and ASIC currently rely on existing laws and regulations to intervene against greenwashing, this regulatory capacity is far from ideal and could be strengthened through regulations specifically targeting greenwashing.

Tackling Greenwashing Through a Pyramid of Regulatory Measures

To address the challenges of regulating greenwashing, regulators leverage their existing regulatory capacities developed in other fields to undertake actions aligned with established regulatory measures. These actions range from educational initiatives to punitive measures, aiming to balance guidance, surveillance, and enforcement (ASIC, 2024a). Specific mechanisms include issuing guidance, delivering public speeches and announcements, conducting online monitoring, issuing administrative resolutions and infringement notices, imposing fines, and initiating legal proceedings. This approach typically follows the hierarchical escalation strategy outlined in Ayres and Braithwaite's (1992) theory of responsive regulation, starting with persuasion and escalating to penalties, license suspension, and ultimately license revocation for persistent non-compliance. Widely recognised and frequently employed by regulators to address other issues, this strategy balances punitive and persuasive tactics, acknowledging that no single approach is universally effective (Ford, 2013). As one Australian regulator interviewee outlined:

[35] https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Environment_and_Communications/Greenwashing/Public_Hearings (Accessed 14/03/2025).

> We use very much an integrated strategy so it begins with understanding the nature of the problem, followed by guidance to business, and then it's the enforcement action, so it's very much Braithwaite and Ayres, really a pyramid, so speaking softly whilst carrying a big stick. (IN-4)

Specifically, at the base of the enforcement pyramid is administrative resolution, which involves issuing warnings and requesting businesses to correct minor misstatements. This level of action is typically employed for less serious contraventions, aiming to achieve compliance through cooperation and dialogue. For example, ASIC has issued over 60 corrective notices, requiring funds to amend their Product Disclosure Statements and fund names when unclear ESG considerations were identified in the investment selection process (ASIC, 2024b).

As regulators escalate to the penalty phase, enforcement actions are determined based on the severity of the misleading claim, the potential harm to the public, the complexity of justifying the greenwashing case, and the size of the offending company. As one interviewee indicated:

> If it's a large trader, a national trader, there's much more likely to be widespread consumer harm, they've got much greater capability to have avoided breaching the law. So, we'd be more likely to take enforcement action against larger traders. (IN-4)

In this phase, monetary sanctions, such as infringement notices and administrative proceedings, serve as middle-tier enforcement mechanisms. They are typically issued for minor or moderate violations and involve fines or penalties. These monetary sanctions create a deterrent effect against non-compliance, while being less resource-intensive than court proceedings. As a result, Australian regulators have widely adopted monetary sanctions to combat greenwashing. For instance, between 2022 to 2024, ASIC issued 19 infringement notices, including two issued to Fertoz Limited for false or misleading statements about its Reforestation Project in the Philippines, published in a presentation on the ASX, and three to Black Mountain Energy Limited for alleged false or misleading sustainability-related statements to the ASX.[36]

[36] https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2024-releases/24-133mr-asx-listed-company-pays-two-infringement-notices-for-greenwashing-in-market-announcements/ and https://asic.gov.au/about-

At the top of the enforcement pyramid are court cases, which are reserved for the most serious violations, such as those posing significant risks to the public or involving deliberate or reckless misconduct. Both ASIC and ACCC have pursued court cases related to greenwashing claims. While regulators have sometimes secured victories – for example, in March 2024, ASIC won its first greenwashing court case against Vanguard for overstating its ESG exclusionary screen criteria, delivering a strong warning to potential offenders – the distinct nature of green claims makes court proceedings both resource intensive and difficult to win. As an interviewee indicated:

> They [i.e., the vague and general claims] are the harder cases to win in Court, it's so much easier to succeed or just to issue an infringement notice for a technical false claim. (IN-4)

The enforcement pyramid depicted by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) helps manage the costs of regulatory interventions, while not only addressing but also deterring greenwashing. As Joe Longo, ASIC Chair, indicated in the keynote speech at the RIAA Conference Australia in 2024:

> As with any new regime, ASIC will take a pragmatic approach to enforcement – we will continue to focus on what support and practical guidance we can give, to help entities meet their obligations … And when we select matters for enforcement action, we also consider which of them are most likely to have a broad reach – that is, a deterrent effect beyond the specific issue we are prosecuting, that will send a wider compliance message to the market.[37]

Accordingly, regulators seek to balance their enforcement approach to maintain public legitimacy. Imposing overly punitive measures may lead to regulators being seen as heavy-handed and unfair. Conversely, relying primarily on preliminary measures, such as online monitoring and warnings, may be seen as ineffective, potentially prompting criticism from the

asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2023-releases/23-001mr-asic-issues-infringement-notices-to-energy-company-for-greenwashing/ (accessed on 12/04/2025).

[37] https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/speeches/greenwashing-a-view-from-the-regulator/ (accessed on 12/04/2025).

public and media, labelling regulators as "toothless tigers" incapable of tackling serious violations.[38]

To summarize, greenwashing poses unique regulatory challenges that regulators seek to address by relying on existing legal frameworks and adapting measures from other contexts. While this involves minimal innovation, regulators leverage established expertise to make greenwashing actionable through a process of "regulatory alignment". This regulatory strategy is both feasible and "appropriate" (March and Olsen 1989; Young 1994), as greenwashing breaches existing laws and standalone regulations targeting it remain absent.

4.5.3 Shaping Regulatory Objects

Expanding the Boundary: From "E" Only to "E", "S", and "G"

Regulatory interventions typically aim not only to scrutinize and prevent certain behaviours, but to also create and refine "demarcations and boundaries" (Lidskog et al., 2011, p. 112). Thus, regulators continuously adjust and redraw regulatory boundaries, making explicit distinctions between what is legal and compliant and what constitutes a violation, strengthening their capacity to intervene (Zarhin at al., 2018). When seeking to regulate greenwashing, boundary demarcation is crucial because this helps determine whether green or ESG claims are true or false, accurate or misleading, and honest or deceptive. Accordingly, the regulatory process frames perceptions of what is and what should be regulated, transforming the inherently fluid, ambiguous, and malleable concept of greenwashing as part of the process (Fisher, 2014; Seyfert, 2022).

While academic studies typically limit greenwashing to environmental issues (Bowen & Aragon-Correa, 2014; Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Parguel et al., 2011; Tateishi, 2018; Walker & Wan, 2012), regulators have broadened its boundary to include not only environmental ("E") but also social ("S") and governance ("G") dimensions. This broader perspective is particularly significant in the asset management sector, where fund managers often make "ESG" claims rather than focusing solely on environmental concerns. Correspondingly, regulatory enforcement actions reflect this expanded view. For example,

[38] For example, the Australian Senate initiated an inquiry into ASIC's capacity and capability to undertake proportionate investigations and enforcement actions in response to reports of alleged misconduct. The final report expressed concerns about the ineffective enforcement actions of ASIC: 'However, ASIC's approach to investigation and enforcement has been continually criticized over many years … At various times, ASIC has been labelled a "toothless tiger" for failing to hold those who break Australia's corporate laws to account'. Available at: https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/reportsen/RB000117/toc_pdf/AustralianSecuritiesandInvestmentsCommissioninvestigationandenforcement.pdf (accessed on 04/01/2025).

ASIC penalized Vanguard for greenwashing due to misleading statements about excluding investments in tobacco, a social issue. Similarly, Active Super was sanctioned for claiming to exclude investments in socially contentious areas such as tobacco production, oil tar sands, and gambling. This broader conception highlights that greenwashing extends beyond environmental claims to encompass concerns about the sustainability and ethicality of products and investments. In a speech at the Australian Institute of Company Directors' Australian Governance Summit on March 2, 2023, ASIC Chairman Joe Longo emphasized that regulators now take a wider view of greenwashing, scrutinizing ethical representations alongside environmental ones:

> It is worth noting that greenwashing is not just about environmental claims. It also includes statements about the extent to which products are sustainable or ethical. … For example, last year we issued three infringement notices against investment management firm Vanguard Investments for misleading statements about the extent to which their funds applied investment exclusions for tobacco-related investments.[39]

The Reduced Emphasis on Intent

Traditionally, intent has typically been an essential element in identifying greenwashing behaviour (e.g., Mitchell & Ramey, 2011; Nyilasy et al., 2014). However, as part of their interventions against greenwashing, regulatory bodies have gradually shifted the focus away from intent. They argue that the true measure of greenwashing lies in the misleading impression that sustainability disclosures leave on consumers and the market at large, regardless of intent. This redefinition of greenwashing by regulators emphasizes the importance of the accuracy of environmental or social claims rather than the motivations behind them. For example, the guidance issued by the ACCC in 2023, Environmental and Sustainability Claims - Draft Guidance for Business, stated that intent is not important in justifying greenwashing as a violation of the ACL:

> The ACL makes it unlawful for businesses to engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. It is also unlawful for a business to make false or misleading claims about specific aspects of goods or services. The

[39] https://www.investordaily.com.au/regulation/52967-longo-warns-more-action-to-come-after-asic-launches-first-greenwashing-court-case (accessed on 09/01/2024).

> law applies even if you did not intend to mislead anyone, or no one has suffered any loss or damage.[40]

In summary, regulating greenwashing requires clearly delineating what falls within the scope of intervention and what does not. In this process, regulators reshape the concept of greenwashing in two main ways. First, the scope of greenwashing has been broadened beyond environmental concerns to encompass social and governance dimensions. Second, rather than focusing solely on deliberate deception, regulators now emphasize the accuracy of claims and their broader impacts on markets. Ultimately, these regulatory efforts are redefining the boundaries between legitimate sustainability claims and greenwashing, making regulating greenwashing possible.

4.5.4 Building Regulatory Preparedness

One key benefit of regulatory interventions against greenwashing is their potential deterrence from spill-over effects. By targeting specific companies or financial institutions for misleading or deceptive claims, regulators send a warning signal to others, signaling that similar practices may also come under scrutiny, thereby discouraging such behaviour. As one interviewee from an Australian regulatory body commented:

> … firstly, because misleading claims by those (biggest) companies affect the most customers potentially and, secondly, because taking action against those big companies has a very big effect on other companies. If they say, 'Well, if they take on this big company, we shouldn't do that either. We could get into trouble. (IN-1)

Given the perceived benefits of regulatory interventions against greenwashing, stakeholder support is evident, further legitimizing these actions. For example, accounting professional bodies have highlighted the importance of oversight and enforcement by market regulators to ensure the reliability and integrity of corporate sustainability-related disclosures. This was reflected in the submission of 2023 by Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (CAANZ) and CPA Australia to Australia's Senate inquiry into greenwashing:

[40] https://www.accc.gov.au/about-us/publications/environmental-and-sustainability-claims-draft-guidance-for-business (accessed on 09/01/2024).

> Sustainability disclosure standards provide a comprehensive framework for sustainability reporting, but regulatory oversight and enforcement are critical to reinforce the integrity of sustainability-related disclosures. (Submission No. 64)

The above quote reveals the distinct yet complementary roles played by sustainability reporting standards setters and market regulators in governing sustainability disclosure and addressing greenwashing. While standard-setters create frameworks and guidelines to ensure consistency and comparability of disclosures, regulators enforce compliance and address misleading claims. Accordingly, collective effort is considered necessary to improve disclosure quality and reduce the possibility of greenwashing.

However, there are limitations with respect to current regulatory interventions against greenwashing (Shanor & Light, 2022). First, regulators tend to focus on quick and easy targets, making them less likely to take on significant offenders by engaging in costly and lengthy court proceedings associated with the most serious and challenging cases. Second, regulators may face constraints in allocating resources to regulate greenwashing, which normally requires significant manpower to investigate and substantiate each case. They recognise that it is impractical to act against all companies suspected of making misleading green claims. Finally, regulatory priorities shift. While greenwashing is currently an enforcement priority and government funding is available in Australia, these actions may have no lasting impact once funding diminishes and priorities change.[41]

More fundamentally, concerns have been raised about whether market regulators' interventions against greenwashing will ultimately enhance the quality and reliability of ESG claims or instead lead to new challenges, such as "greenhushing". Greenhushing refers to the behavioural trend of withholding green information, which can be seen as either a counterpart or a byproduct of greenwashing (Font et al., 2017). It may arise from over-deterrence and is characterized by under-disclosure or complete omission of sustainability efforts by companies or financial institutions. This stems from fears of violating regulations or attracting closer scrutiny and public backlash for perceived unsustainable practices.

[41] See 'Inherent Limits on Regulatory Excellence – What we don't talk about' by Luke Woodward at 2017 ACCC/AER Regulatory Conference. The speech points to the inherent constraints that regulators as government agencies face in their efforts to promote the long-term interests of information users. Available at: https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/L%20Woodward%2C%20%20Inherent%20Limits%20on%20Regulatory%20Excellence%20-%20What%20we%20don%27t%20talk%20about.pdf (accessed on 21/11/2024).

Australian market regulators have identified greenhushing as an emerging problem, viewing it as another form of greenwashing. According to ASIC:

> Now, in response to ASIC's scrutiny of greenwashing, some companies may be tempted to cease all voluntary disclosure, chasing greenwashing with a little 'greenhushing'. Last year, for example, the Swiss carbon finance consultancy, South Pole, released an international report that found nearly a quarter of the 1,200 companies surveyed have decided not to talk about their net-zero commitments at all. South Pole's report sparked an intense discussion globally, with many condemning the policy of keeping quiet as simply another form of greenwashing. … Domestically, we've observed some commentators and firms saying, in effect, 'we have such a good ESG policy, but we can't say anything about it because the regulators won't let us'. The reality is the critics are right: this kind of response is just another form of greenwashing; an attempt to garner a 'green halo' effect without having to do the work.[42]

Greenhushing is increasingly recognised as a problem because it hinders transparency and innovation. To address greenhushing, commentators emphasize a need to manage tension and restore equilibrium. For instance, in relation to the potential rise of greenhushing in corporate sustainability disclosures, it is suggested that market regulators and sustainability reporting standards setters collaborate to provide companies with clearer guidance on green disclosures, alleviating the risk of being accused of greenwashing. ASIC has set out its approach to working with sustainability and climate reporting standard-setters under the new mandatory reporting regime in a bid to tackle greenwashing. It has proposed a "pragmatic and proportionate" approach to overseeing future climate-related financial disclosures:

> ASIC acknowledges the significant changes ahead with the proposed introduction of mandatory climate-related financial disclosure requirements for large businesses and financial institutions ... ASIC will take a pragmatic and proportionate approach to the supervision and enforcement of this new regime. We will engage closely with industry as we develop appropriate guidance to help it build the capability required to meet the new obligations.[43]

Opinions on regulators' efforts to combat greenwashing are mixed. Moreover, regulators need to be prepared to address how their interventions have contributed to issues like

[42] https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/speeches/asic-chair-s-afr-esg-summit-speech/ (accessed on 02/02/2024).
[43] https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/speeches/start-preparing-now-early-asic-guidance-on-the-mandatory-climate-disclosure-regime/ (accessed on 05/01/2025).

greenhushing. One proposed solution is to refine the regulatory framework to deter greenwashing while encouraging transparent sustainability reporting and communication. This balanced approach, which requires collaboration between market regulators and other stakeholders, including standard-setters, would help companies and financial institutions pursue environmental initiatives without discouraging disclosure or enabling misleading claims.

4.6 Discussion and Conclusions

In recent years, market regulators across various domains and jurisdictions have prioritized greenwashing, launching interventions to address this issue. Our paper examines the regulatory efforts of two Australian regulators – the ACCC and ASIC. By analyzing publicly available textual materials and six interviews with key stakeholders, drawing on theoretical insights from the sociology of regulation, our paper generates insights into how regulators make regulating greenwashing possible. First, greenwashing is framed not only as a problem but also as a domain appropriate for regulatory intervention (*framing regulatory appropriateness*). Second, despite challenges, to operationalize interventions, an alignment is established between regulatory actions against greenwashing and existing regulatory frameworks and measures (*developing regulatory alignment*). Third, the concept of greenwashing is refined and modified through regulatory processes, reshaping its scope and emphasis (*shaping regulatory objects*). Fourth, these interventions have limitations and unintended consequences, prompting regulators to develop their preparedness for emerging challenges (*building regulatory preparedness*).

Our paper is the first academic study to examine emerging regulatory actions by market regulators against greenwashing. In Australia, the focal empirical setting of this study, the ACCC and ASIC have thus far identified and intervened in greenwashing cases primarily involving misleading and deceptive ESG and climate-related claims in certain types of corporate filings, corporate marketing communications (e.g., advertising), and investment product prospectuses issued by financial institutions. While no legal cases have yet been brought specifically in relation to greenwashing in corporate sustainability disclosures in Australia, ASIC has clearly placed this issue on its regulatory agenda. Moreover, in other jurisdictions, financial market regulators have identified and scrutinized false or misleading information in corporate sustainability reports, imposing penalties on offending companies.[44]

[44] The US SEC fined Vale $55.9 million for false claims about the safety of its dams in its 2016 and 2017 sustainability reports, which stated that all its dam structures, including the Brumadinho dam, were stable and had

Indeed, greenwashing in corporate sustainability reporting has been observed under both voluntary and mandatory regimes (Adams, 2004; Khan et al., 2020; Rodrigue, 2014). Existing research suggests that mandatory sustainability reporting and sustainability assurance alone may not be sufficient to mitigate greenwashing (Andrew & Baker, 2020; Bebbington et al., 2012; Dechow, 2023; Free et al., 2024; Haji et al., 2022; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2019; Krueger et al., 2024; Morley, 2023; Senn & Giordano-Spring, 2020). While the literature highlights the potential role of regulatory interventions, how market regulators legitimize their actions and build regulatory capacity to address deceptive and misleading sustainability claims and combat greenwashing remains underexplored. Our study takes an initial step in addressing this gap by investigating the regulatory actions of Australian market regulators, which target greenwashing in both corporate disclosures and product descriptions and advertising.

Greenwashing is a concept with varied and inconsistent interpretations across different fields, including corporate sustainability disclosures, corporate marketing communications, and investment product prospectuses issued by financial institutions. Recent regulatory interventions have allowed market regulators to redefine and reframe the concept of greenwashing, enabling regulatory action to be taken. Specifically, as demonstrated, ASIC and the ACCC have framed greenwashing as involving "misleading" and "deceptive" claims, positioning it within their regulatory mandates and focusing on claims that can be addressed using established regulatory measures. Concomitantly, these regulators have broadened the scope of greenwashing beyond environmental aspects to include social and governance dimensions. They have also shifted their focus from the intent behind misleading or deceptive claims to their (in)accuracy. Through enforcement cases and regulatory guidelines, regulators have redrawn the boundary between legitimate disclosure and communication versus greenwashing, effectively remaking the definition of greenwashing. In doing so, they have modified the existing "dictionary" of greenwashing, which was previously shaped by academic research and business practices. This evolving regulatory definition has important implications, enabling regulators to justify further actions while guiding companies and financial institutions to align their sustainability claims with emerging norms.

Indeed, regulators have actively sought to transform greenwashing from a vague, fluid, and malleable concept into one that can be addressed through regulatory means. As we have

passed external safety audits. These statements were later revealed by the SEC to be materially false and misleading, as the stability declarations were based on falsified dam safety data and manipulated safety audit results. The SEC's investigation revealed a significant discrepancy between Vale's claims and their actual practices, indicating a deliberate misrepresentation of dam safety and regulatory compliance.

demonstrated, they have taken "purposive actions" to make greenwashing amenable to intervention (Lawrence et al., 2009). Specifically, ASIC and the ACCC have interpreted greenwashing as a significant problem: regulatory interventions are considered necessary and appropriate (Baudot & Cooper, 2022; Ravenscroft & Williams, 2009; Young, 1994, 1996, 2006). ASIC and the ACCC have sought to align the regulatory scrutiny of greenwashing with established regulatory frameworks and measures typically used to address other forms of misconduct. They have modified the concept of greenwashing to shape perceptions of what should be regulated (Fisher, 2014; Lidskog et al., 2011; Seyfert, 2022). ASIC and the ACCC have also been attentive to the unintended consequences of their interventions, seeking to enhance regulatory capacity to address emerging challenges. While both bodies hold the status of market watchdogs in Australia, their "regulatory work" – placing greenwashing on the regulatory agenda and making its regulation possible – is indispensable. This is particularly so given the complexities of defining greenwashing, ensuring consistent interpretation, and substantiating "misleading" and "deceptive" claims. Further, Australian regulators do not act in isolation. Instead, they monitor and learn from the efforts of their counterparts in other jurisdictions, reinforcing the appropriateness and feasibility of tackling greenwashing.

Our paper serves as a starting point and has important implications for future scholarly work examining greenwashing from a regulatory perspective. First, as regulatory interventions against greenwashing continue to evolve, future research could examine how the concept of greenwashing might be further modified through regulatory processes. This modification could potentially reduce ambiguity, enabling more effective regulatory efforts to prevent greenwashing. Second, with the recent global release and subsequent implementation of sustainability and climate-related disclosure standards, future research could further explore how market regulators and independent and private-sector standard-setting bodies, such as the ISSB, Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), and GRI, may coordinate and collaborate to combat greenwashing and greenhushing. This collective effort can be significant in helping tackle grand challenges related to sustainability and climate change (George et al., 2016; George et al., 2024). Third, while this paper focuses on the interventions of Australian regulators, recent regulatory efforts to address greenwashing are a global, multi-regime phenomenon. Comparative studies could be conducted in the future, examining how regulatory legitimacy is established, what regulatory mechanisms and strategies are employed, and which aspects of greenwashing are scrutinized across jurisdictions with different legal and institutional frameworks. Future research could also explore the potential mutual influence

among regulatory regimes as they respond to emerging forms of greenwashing. Finally, as regulatory interventions against greenwashing continue to develop and more data become available, future research could investigate the effectiveness of these interventions, particularly whether they prevent greenwashing and whether they inadvertently trigger greenhushing. The continuously evolving pyramid of enforcement measures adopted by regulators may also provide rich empirical data to examine the varying impacts of these different regulatory mechanisms on greenwashing.

While future research in these areas is important, our paper takes an initial step in exploring how regulators make possible the regulation of greenwashing. Our findings offer important insights into the various ways regulators place ambiguously defined issues on the regulatory agenda and justify their capacity to intervene. As regulatory interventions continue to evolve, greenwashing may not only become possible to regulate but also more readily regulatable. Alternatively, regulators might remain limited in their power – "toothless tigers". The regulation of greenwashing is likely to become a critical area of focus for policymakers, corporations, financial institutions, sustainability professionals, and academics in the years ahead.

V STUDY TWO

5.1 Introduction

Greenwashing has emerged as a critical contemporary regulatory concern, with increasing enforcement actions in the forms of sanctions, fines, court proceedings, and regulatory guidance (e.g., ACCC, 2023a; ASIC, 2024a; EC, 2024). In Australia, for example, the ASIC has escalated anti-greenwashing initiatives since 2021, having issued 19 infringement notices totalling over $260,000 by July 2024 (ASIC, 2024a). Similarly, the ACCC has issued guidance and conducted online sweeping to deter greenwashing (ACCC, 2023a; 2023b). More recently, the ACCC accepted a court-enforceable undertaking in November 2023, filing a court case in April 2024 against an Australian company for greenwashing claims overstating the environmental attributes of its manufacturing processes and products (ACCC, 2024).

Pertinently, assurance engagements are expected to strengthen reporting integrity and prevent misleading sustainability claims. In Australia, 28 out of 126 submissions received from the Senate inquiry into greenwashing specifically discussed the role of "assurance" (Parliament of Australia, 2023). The newly issued ISSA 5000 and the International Ethics Standards for Sustainability Assurance both explicitly aim to mitigate the risk of fraud, including greenwashing (International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board [IAASB] & International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants [IESBA], 2025).

The extent to which sustainability assurance addresses greenwashing warranting regulatory enforcement remains unclear. While some studies suggest that assurance improves ESG disclosure quality and investor confidence (Du & Wu, 2019; Gipper et al., 2024, 2025), others highlight its limitations – including inconsistencies in assurance scope, limited independence, and challenges in applying traditional audit techniques to ESG matters (Christensen, 2016; O'Dwyer, 2011; Talbot & Boiral, 2018). Additionally, an "expectation gap" persists between what financial statement users expect an audit to provide and what audit professionals believe they are providing in relation to fraud detection (e.g., Cohen et al., 2017; Mock et al., 2013). In the sustainability assurance context, a similar gap may arise if users interpret an assurance conclusion as indicating that the company is free from greenwashing, even though assurance is usually limited to selected subject matters.

Our study provides empirical evidence on whether current sustainability assurance practices address greenwashing concerns identified by regulators. We focus on assurance engagements from Australia and New Zealand because both jurisdictions are among the earliest

movers toward mandatory climate-related disclosures and assurance. It creates a setting where greenwashing risk and the role of assurance are of special concern. Thus, our study seeks to generate evidence that can inform regulators in these jurisdictions, particularly as they develop evidence-based policymaking in the context of the emerging mandatory disclosure and assurance regime. Although grounded in the Australian and New Zealand context, our findings can be extrapolated to other jurisdictions, given the global trend toward mandating sustainability reporting and assurance.

Using a sample of 105 publicly listed Australian and New Zealand companies engaged in sustainability assurance in 2023, we examine the alignment between assurance subject matters and greenwashing topics identified in regulatory enforcement cases and guidance. To quantify this alignment (assurance relevance), we manually collect assurance subject matters from sample companies' assurance reports. These are used to develop a relevance score capturing the extent to which each company's assurance covers key greenwashing areas (such as net-zero claims and ESG policy implementation) scrutinised by regulators. Additionally, we explore firm- and assurance-related factors influencing assurance relevance, such as provider market share, level of assurance, industry greenwashing risk exposure, and the use of self-developed reporting criteria.

Our findings show that while 49.5% of companies' assurance engagements cover at least one greenwashing-related subject matter, significant gaps remain. Assurance is particularly suited to verifying historical and quantitative disclosures (e.g., GHG emissions, energy consumption, and water usage) but rarely addresses forward-looking commitments (such as net zero targets, end of life treatment of sold products), product-level claims, or sustainability-related fraud. Nonetheless, we identify examples where assurance engagements can play a stronger role in preventing forward-looking risks. For example, while most safety-related assurances focus on historical injury and fatality rates, a more preventative approach could involve verifying the existence and robustness of safety systems. Having said this, some companies have assured their progress toward carbon neutrality, demonstrating an effort to validate forward-looking commitments such as being net zero. Regression analyses indicate that assurance engagements (a) using a higher level of assurance (i.e., reasonable level of assurance), (b) conducted by assurance providers with a high market share, and (c) involving firms operating in industries more exposed to greenwashing sanctions, tend to have a higher level of relevance in terms of assuring greenwashing-related subject matters. In contrast,

assurance practices in companies developing their own reporting criteria are less likely to cover greenwashing-related subject matters.

Our study contributes to the discussion on sustainability assurance and greenwashing in four main ways. First, while the newly issued ISSA 5000 emphasises a need to address fraud risks, including greenwashing, the term "greenwashing" is not included in the main text of the standard. Instead, it is mentioned in an accompanying explanatory memorandum. This cautious approach raises questions about whether assurance practices are well-placed to address claims susceptible to greenwashing. Our findings provide timely evidence on both the potential and the challenges of assurance as a mechanism to address greenwashing risk, thereby informing future regulatory enhancements in sustainability assurance standards. Moreover, our study identifies key factors influencing the likelihood of sustainability assurance covering greenwashing-related subject matters, offering insights for companies, assurance providers, and standard setters.

Second, our study introduces a new dimension of sustainability assurance by focusing on the relevance of assurance engagements to subject matters associated with the greenwashing concerns identified by regulators. Unlike financial statement audits where scope is standardised, subject matters to be assured in ESG disclosures are at the discretion of companies and vary widely across companies (Gipper et al., 2024). This makes the relevance of assured subject matters an important dimension for investigation. Prior literature on sustainability assurance focuses mainly on the content of assurance statements, examining the intensity of the assurance process and the comprehensiveness of assurance elements as presented in the assurance report (Hummel et al., 2019; Perego & Kolk, 2012; Zorio et al., 2013). While some studies have explored assurance scope, they primarily measure assurance scope in binary terms (e.g., full report vs partial assurance in Clarkson et al., 2019), across three levels (e.g., full report or either/both qualitative and quantitative information in Hummel et al., 2019), or by categorizing broad topics assured (e.g., the 11 metrics in Gipper et al., 2024). In contrast, our study drills down to much finer levels of assurance subject matters (238 subject matters) so they can be directly mapped to greenwashing-related subject matters identified by regulators.

Third, greenwashing has risen in prominence to become an acute contemporary corporate risk, particularly as regulators intensify their scrutiny of misleading green claims. Much of the research to date relies on hypothetical or presumed cases, measuring greenwashing through perception measures or by comparing disclosure and performance indices (e.g., Chen & Chang, 2013; Kim & Lyon, 2015; Marquis et al., 2016). There is very limited research using

regulatory sanctions on greenwashing as a measure/definition of greenwashing. Our study identifies a list of greenwashing-related subject matters through an analysis of 69 global regulatory greenwashing cases in the past 10 years (i.e., from 2015-2024), providing initial empirical evidence of the extent to which sustainability assurance addresses greenwashing in cases attracting regulatory action.

Fourth and finally, our study adds to the literature on the expectation gap, a longstanding concern among academics and standard setters regarding auditors' ability to detect and report financial statement fraud (e.g., IAASB, 2020; Mock et al. 2013). The concept of the expectation gap in auditing can also be applied in the context of sustainability assurance. Limited research has examined how the expectation gap may arise in the context of sustainability reporting due to the inherent features of such reporting and variations in assurance engagements (Ackers & Eccles, 2015; Bhaskar et al., 2024; Green & Li, 2011; Hodge et al., 2009). While there is increasing expectation that assurance should play a role in addressing greenwashing (Parliament of Australia, 2023; IAASB & IESBA, 2025), assurance is not specifically engaged to address suspected greenwashing. We thus provide evidence to help users form realistic expectations concerning what assurance can and cannot achieve in mitigating greenwashing risks.

The remainder of our study is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the literature and presents the research questions. Section 5.3 describes the sample selection, research method, and variable measurement. Section 5.4 presents descriptive statistics, and Section 5.5 discusses our findings. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes the study.

5.2 Literature Review and Research Questions

5.2.1 Greenwashing

The concept of greenwashing is used to describe situations where there is a discrepancy between a company's communication and its actual performance/efforts on environmental and social issues, with a view to improving its image and social legitimacy (Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Boiral et al., 2020). With the expansion of consumer and capital markets for green products and services, greenwashing has become more prevalent as firms attempt to capitalise on this growing demand. Greenwashing is portrayed in the literature as a multifaceted phenomenon (Pizzetti et al., 2021), occurring at the firm and product/service levels in a variety of forms. These forms include misleading communications (Chen & Chang, 2013), selective disclosures of positive information (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Marquis et al., 2016), deceptive manipulations (Siano et al., 2017), and decoupling (Guo et al., 2017). Firms can therefore

strategically utilise ESG reports – selectively disclosing positive information presenting them in the best light (Deegan et al., 2002; Holder-Webb et al., 2009), omitting material negative information (e.g., Deegan & Rankin, 1996), and using vague language (Cho et al., 2010) – legitimising concerns for environmental and social issues in a way that misleads users (Hay et al., 2024; Mahoney et al., 2013).

Correspondingly, greenwashing has emerged as a primary contemporary corporate risk (Free et al., 2024). Extant studies have highlighted several important consequences of greenwashing for corporations. Greenwashing damages brand reputation and trust (Guo et al., 2018; Jahdi & Acikdilli, 2009), leads to increased scrutiny from non-governmental organisations (Berrone et al., 2017), and is associated with adverse results, including both lower financial performance (Walker & Wan, 2012) and cumulative abnormal returns (Du, 2015). With growing concerns over greenwashing, one literary strand has explored how regulatory and institutional mechanisms curb these practices (e.g., Marquis et al., 2016; Mateo-Márquez et al., 2022; Sun & Zhang, 2019). Mateo-Márquez et al. (2022) show that more stringent climate-related regulations limit greenwashing practices used by companies, while Sun and Zhang (2019) suggest that government-imposed penalties deter greenwashing practices.

As accusations of greenwashing increase, consequent regulatory scrutiny is intensifying (KPMG, 2024). Moreover, greenwashing has not only attracted increasing attention from regulatory bodies (e.g., ACCC, 2023a; ASIC, 2024a), but also from standard setters in auditing and assurance. The ISSA 5000 Implementation Guidance (IAASB, 2025a, p. 50) describes greenwashing as "practices aimed to mislead investors or to give them a false impression about how well an investment is aligned with its sustainability goals". The guidance suggests that greenwashing in sustainability disclosures may stem from the management bias inherent in subjective decisions and may be fraudulent when there is an intention to mislead users. Accordingly, greenwashing can be viewed as a subset of non-financial misstatements, typically involving the overstatement of ESG performance. A related stream of ESG literature examines non-financial information restatements. Ballou et al. (2018) view such restatements as a positive step toward improving ESG reporting and part of the maturation process, while Pinnuck et al. (2021) find bias in the direction of these revisions – correcting overstatement but with no evidence of intentional opportunistic reporting based on overstatement magnitude. In contrast, our study focuses on greenwashing cases identified through regulatory guidance and sanction cases. These are instances that regulators have deemed as being materially misleading,

offering a setting to examine whether sustainability assurance covers areas of heightened regulatory risk, thus providing insight into its role in responding to greenwashing concerns.

5.2.2 The Role of Sustainability Assurance in Addressing Greenwashing

Sustainability assurance is expected to play a vital role in combating greenwashing. A McKinsey survey (2019) reports that 97% of investors believe that sustainability disclosures should be assured. PwC's Global Investor Survey (2022) reveals that 87% of surveyed investors suspect that corporate disclosures contain some greenwashing, thereby viewing assurance as an important mechanism to increase their confidence in sustainability reporting (PwC, 2022). However, given the voluntary context of sustainability assurance, managerial decisions shape the selection of assurance providers, the scope of assurance, and the level of assurance (Casey & Grenier, 2015; Farooq & de Villiers, 2020; Gipper et al., 2024; Peters & Romi, 2015; Simnett et al., 2009). Studies examining how these factors influence assurance quality suggest that the expertise and global networks of assurance providers contribute to assurance quality (Bentley-Goode et al., 2025; Ge et al., 2024; Lu et al., 2023; Pham et al., 2024; Zhou, 2022). Thus, sustainability assurance is not a simple, binary guarantee of reporting credibility, rather its quality varies, leading to expectation gaps and questions about its role in addressing greenwashing concerns.

On a positive note, research suggests that sustainability assurance tends to improve the quality and reliability of ESG disclosures and is valued by capital market participants (e.g., Ballou et al., 2018; Casey & Grenier, 2015; Chen, 2024; Du & Wu, 2019; Gipper et al., 2024, 2025; Maroun, 2019; Moroney et al., 2012; Peters & Romi, 2015). For instance, Ballou et al.'s (2018) study of CSR restatements finds that assurance identifies inaccuracies in prior reports and leads to improved reporting definitions, scopes, and methodologies informing restatements for comparability. Pinnuck et al. (2021) find that firms whose ESG reports are assured are more likely to have restatements correcting previous overstatements. Gipper et al. (2025) find that assurance is associated with improved carbon accounting quality. Assurance identifies issues in a firm's carbon accounting system, leading to fewer omissions and more revisions of prior errors. Gipper et al. (2024) document a striking increase in the number of firms with ESG assurance and the number of metrics assured in the US. They find that assurance is associated with improvements in ESG disclosure quality and ESG performance ratings, likely because assurors help firms identify and mitigate environmental and social risks. Moreover, Du and Wu (2019) find that the issuance of CSR reports is not associated with a lower incidence of future CSR-related misconduct – unless accompanied by external assurance. Other studies indicate

that assurance enhances investors' confidence in disclosed information (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2019; Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2017; Fuhrmann et al., 2017; Reimsbach et al., 2018; Stuart et al., 2021).

However, some studies question whether extant forms of sustainability assurance are effective in curbing greenwashing. One strand of this research shows that assurance provides little or no improvement in the quality of sustainability disclosures or the prevention of corporate misconduct (e.g., Christensen, 2016; Michelon et al., 2015; Talbot & Boiral, 2018). Additionally, research and high-profile accounting fraud scandals raise concerns about auditors' ability to uncover fraud, which is often well-concealed and rationalised (e.g., Dyck et al., 2010, 2024; Peecher et al., 2013). Further, research has documented the persistence of an "expectation gap" between what financial statement users expect an audit to provide and what the audit profession believes it is providing in relation to fraud detection (e.g., Cohen et al., 2017; Mock et al., 2013), with these findings being potentially applicable to greenwashing as a form of fraud risk.

A second stream of research highlights challenges involved in transferring traditional audit techniques to sustainability assurance. For instance, the qualitative and multidimensional natures of ESG subject matters do not fit well with financial auditors' emphases on objective and verifiable metrics (Maroun, 2020; O'Dwyer, 2011). The backward-looking nature of auditing techniques contrasts with the forward-looking orientation of ESG reporting (Free et al., 2024). To assess materiality, financial statement auditors typically define a materiality threshold. In contrast, ESG assurers identify material topics, which can be challenging due to the diverse range of stakeholders with differing and often competing interests (Adams & Evans, 2004; Canning et al., 2019). Boiral et al. (2020) suggest that robust assurance requires multifaceted skills, yet a lack of formal training in sustainability assurance undermines its professionalisation.

Other studies raise concerns about the independence of sustainability assurance, revealing significant management control over the assurance process and minimal stakeholder involvement (Boiral et al., 2019; O'Dwyer & Owen, 2005, 2007). Essentially, managers can choose to assure only metrics indicating positive ESG performance (Adams & Evans, 2004). Perego and Kolk (2012) find that several multinational companies have projected a decoupled or symbolic image of accountability through assurance. Christensen et al. (2021) also suggest that assurance is likely to be insufficient if the goal is to determine whether firms withhold sustainability information that is financially material to investors. Thus, it is argued that

sustainability assurance is often unduly influenced by management, limiting its ability to challenge the completeness or relevance of reports.

Finally, sustainability assurance has also been criticised for its inconsistent quality arising from substantial differences across assurance engagements (e.g., Boiral & Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2020; Farooq & de Villiers, 2020; Manetti & Becatti, 2009). For example, in Boiral et al.'s (2019, p.717) analysis of over 300 assurance statements from mining and energy companies, the criteria applied by assurance providers to assess reporting quality "appears to be very heterogeneous and uncertain". A benchmark study from the IFAC and the AICPA (2024) observes substantial variations in assurance scope, assurance provider, and criteria used, with most companies obtaining a limited level of assurance. Research suggests that differences in wording between limited and reasonable assurance reports are so subtle that uninformed users may not detect the difference (Ackers & Eccles, 2015; Hodge et al., 2009). Bhaskar et al. (2024) find that investors fail to sufficiently adjust for the lower level of assurance provided in a limited assurance engagement, with Hodge et al. (2009) highlighting that assurance statements vary considerably in terms of scope and the standards applied, potentially contributing to the expectation gap.

In sum, while the normative forces shaping sustainability reporting are strong, making sustainability assurance an increasingly common practice or even a *de facto* requirement in enhancing the credibility of corporate disclosures (Free et al., 2024; Zhou, 2022), the question of whether assurance can address greenwashing remains far from settled. While existing literature presents conflicting evidence on the benefits and challenges of sustainability assurance, no study has specifically examined its role in addressing greenwashing in cases sanctioned by regulators or referenced in regulatory guidelines.

Adding to these conflicting literary views, ISSA 5000, released by the IAASB (2025b), acknowledges greenwashing as a relevant concern. However, the term "greenwashing" is not included in the main text of the standard. It is referenced in the accompanying implementation guide under the topic of fraud. During the exposure draft phase, some respondents suggested that the term "greenwashing" should be defined (IAASB, 2024). However, the IAASB (2025a) reaffirmed its position not to define or describe "greenwashing" in ISSA 5000.

This cautious stance raises an important question, should sustainability assurance cover claims that may be prone to greenwashing, and is it capable of doing so? Thus, we pose the following research questions:

RQ1: Does the current practice of sustainability assurance address the greenwashing concerns identified by regulatory guidance and sanction cases?

RQ2: What types of assurance engagements and reporting companies are associated with higher relevance of assured subject matters in relation to greenwashing concerns?

5.3 Research Design

5.3.1 Sample and Data

Our initial sample consists of all ASX- and NZSE-listed companies in Australia and New Zealand for the fiscal year 2023. We manually reviewed sustainability-related disclosures to identify firms engaged in sustainability assurance, collecting their sustainability assurance reports from annual reports, sustainability reports, Climate Transition Action Plans, or GHG Emissions Inventory Reports, etc. All reports were sourced from publicly available information on company websites. After excluding companies without sustainability assurance, we obtained a sample of 116 listed companies in Australia (90 companies) and New Zealand (26 companies), with a total of 152 sustainability assurance reports. This constitutes our sample for the descriptive analysis of assurance practices, as reported in Table V-1 Panel A.

Table V-1 Sample Selection Table

	No. of Companies	No. of Assurance Reports
Panel A: Sample for the analysis of assurance practices		
Australian Companies	90	123
New Zealand Companies	26	29
Sample Size for 2023 Assurance Practice Descriptive Statistics	116	152
Panel B: Sample for the descriptive analysis of RQ1		
No. of Companies Obtaining Assurance	116	
Less: Companies assuring the entire sustainability report	(11)	
Sample Size for RQ1 (descriptive)	105	
Panel C: Sample for regression analysis of RQ2		
Sample Size for RQ1 (descriptive)	105	
Less: Companies missing financial fundamental/ESG information	(12)	
Sample Size for RQ2 (regression)	93	

Notes: Table V-1 presents the sample selection of sustainability assurance reports collected for this study. Panel A describes the initial sample of 116 companies listed in Australia and New Zealand that engaged in sustainability assurance during the 2023 fiscal year. Panel B shows the 105 companies for which subject matters of assurance could be identified, as the basis for descriptive analysis related to RQ1 on greenwashing-related subject matters. Panel C outlines the sample of 93 observations used in the regression analysis for RQ2

Among the 116 companies with sustainability assurance, 11 did not list the specific assured subject matters in their assurance report but instead assured the entire report. These

were excluded due to difficulties in determining the assured subject matters. The underlying disclosures contain largely qualitative and forward-looking statements concerning targets and future goals. Many disclosures also relied on boilerplate language (e.g., "We continue to focus on building resilience within our safety systems and processes"), creating further ambiguity as to what was assured. This created challenges applying the methodology used for the other 105 companies where assurance subject matters were clearly laid out in the assurance reports that we mapped. This compromises comparability and adds noise to the analyses.

Among these 11 cases, ten provided assurances over an entire sustainability-related report (e.g., a full ESG or GHG report) containing predominantly qualitative disclosures. Specifically, seven companies in New Zealand assured their entire GHG reports. Three Australian companies assured broader ESG reports: ANZ assured its entire ESG supplement; BHP assured the sustainability section of its annual report; and EQT assured its full sustainability report. The remaining cases involved a company that stated its assurance covered disclosures listed in a GRI index. However, this index was located outside the report containing the assurance statement and we couldn't identify the exact GRI index referenced. As this precluded us from verifying the specific GRI disclosures[45] assured, this company was excluded from the sample.

Consequently, the remaining 105 companies with a total of 140 assurance reports, form the basis of the descriptive analysis of the extent to which sustainability assurance addresses greenwashing concerns identified by regulators in RQ1 (Table V-1 Panel B).

In addressing RQ2, we merge the hand-collected assurance data with financial fundamentals from Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium, Compustat, and SIRCA, as well as ESG performance data from Refinitiv. During the process, 12 observations were excluded due to missing financial or ESG data. At the end of this process, as reported in Table V-1 Panel C, we are left with 93 observations for our regression analysis.[46]

[45] In our analysis, when the GRI index is listed as the subject matter, we trace the company's GRI index to extract and map each disclosure in the index to our framework of 238 subject matters. By contrast, when the GRI Standards are used merely as a reporting framework, we do not record them as subject matters, as they are not directly assured.

[46] We conducted sensitivity analyses for RQ2 by including the 11 companies that engaged assurance for the entire report (i.e., assured subject matters unidentifiable from the assurance report). Specifically, companies with assurance on the entire report are assigned a relevance score corresponding to the 90th, 95th, and 99thpercentile. The results remain robust.

5.3.2 Measurement of the Dependent Variable

To measure the extent to which assurance engagements address greenwashing-related subject matters, we first compiled: (1) a list of 238 assurance subject matters extracted from assurance reports (See Appendix 3), and (2) a list of 13 greenwashing-related subject matters based on regulatory guidance and sanctioned cases.[47]

The list of 238 unique assurance subject matters was developed based on manual extraction from the subject matter or the scope of assurance section within assurance reports. This process involved reading the assurance report and identifying each distinct item listed as an assurance subject matter. Whenever a new or clearly distinguishable item appeared, such as biodiversity, land management, or NOx emissions, it was recorded as a new subject matter. In contrast, where multiple reports referred to similar or overlapping content using different wording (e.g., 'GHG emission intensity' and 'intensity of greenhouse gas emissions'), we treated them as the same subject matter for consistency. To organise these subject matters for descriptive analysis, we further categorised them under 19 broader topics, such as GHG emissions, Energy, and Water. These categories were developed inductively, based on recurring themes observed across assurance reports and informed by recognised ESG frameworks such as GRI and SASB. To enhance reliability, the authors also independently reviewed these categorisations, with discrepancies being discussed and resolved through consensus. While we acknowledge some potential conceptual overlap across categories, this structured classification facilitates consistent and replicable coding across companies.

The list of 13 greenwashing-related subject matters is derived from an analysis of 69 greenwashing enforcement cases from 2015 to 2024 across five jurisdictions with the highest media coverage and regulatory activity: the US, UK, European Union (EU), Australia, and Canada – according to searches of greenwashing cases from Factiva.

We further searched within each major regulator's website in these jurisdictions including the ACCC, ASIC, US SEC, and FTC. Our search yielded 69 regulatory cases, which were manually reviewed by examining official media releases or case summaries published by the respective regulators. For each case, we identified the focal point of the enforcement action by analysing key terms used in media releases describing the specific type of sustainability claim alleged to be misleading. As a result, we developed a list of 13 greenwashing-related

[47] These are water consumption, waste management, ESG policy implementation, recyclability, consumer satisfaction, safety, carbon neutral, energy efficiency, reforestation, clarity of ESG policy, net zero, material used in production, and sustainability related management fraud (see Study Two, Table V-5).

subject matters, each representing a thematic area commonly identified in regulatory actions, such as carbon neutrality, safety, or recyclability. We note many overlapping greenwashing concerns across jurisdictions and regulators, including net zero claims and ESG policy implementation, because regulators are learning from each other (as discussed in Chapter 4).

Second, for each assured subject matter, we assess its relevance to greenwashing subject matter using a scoring system. A score of 2 indicates a direct match, representing the highest level of relevance. A score of 1 reflects high relevance but not a direct match, while a score of 0 indicates low or no relevance.[48] Panel A in Table V-2 illustrate how the scores are constructed. Taking "carbon neutral", one of the most identified greenwashing subject matters, as an example: if the assured subject matter is "carbon neutral," it receives a score of 2, and relevant subject matters, such as "GHG emission reduction," receive a score of 1. The scoring process was necessarily interpretive, for example, determining the relevance between assured subject matters and greenwashing-related topics. This was especially the case when distinguishing between a score of 1 (high relevance but not a direct match) and a score of 0 (low or no relevance). To mitigate this subjectivity, any ambiguity or uncertainty raised during the scoring process was discussed and resolved through discussion among the authors. In addition, the scoring system was reviewed repeatedly following its initial construction to ensure that the definition of "relevance" was applied consistently.

[48] We also conducted a sensitivity test using an alternative scoring systems, with a score of 3 for a direct match, 2 for high relevance, 1 for low relevance, and 0 for no relevance. The result remains largely consistent except *RiskyIndustry* becomes statistically insignificant.

Table V-2 Measurement of the Dependent Variable - Relevance Score

Panel A: Relevance Scoring System and Current Assurance Practice to Address Greenwashing

Greenwashing Subject Matters	Example of Directly matched topics (score 2)	Example of Highly relevant topics (score 1)
Water Consumption	Water Consumption	Water efficiency
Waste management	Waste Management	Waste Going to Landfill
ESG Policy Implementation	Climate Bond-funded Project's Evaluation and Selection Process	Completion of Environment-related Review
Recyclability	Recyclable Packaging	Cardboard Waste
Consumer satisfaction	Number of Customer Complaint	Number of Customers in Customer Care Program
Safety	Health Safety and Environment Risk Control	Employee or/and Contractor injuries/injury rate/work-related ill health
Carbon neutral	Carbon Neutrality	Reduction of GHG emissions (GRI 305-5)
Energy efficiency	Energy efficiency	Renewable Energy Consumption
Reforestation	Afforestation/Tree (Re)planting	Carbon Footprint
Clarity of ESG Policy	Climate Bonds Proceeds' Management Policy and Procedure	N/A
Net Zero	N/A	GHG Emission Intensity
Material used in production	N/A	Sustainable Raw Material/Material Sourcing
Management Fraud	N/A	Business Integrity

Panel B: Industry-level Weighting Adjustment

GICS Sector	Net zero	Carbon neutral	Energy efficiency	Reforestation	Material used in production	Recyclability	Waste management	Water Consumption	ESG Policy Implementation	Management Fraud	Clarity of ESG Policy	Safety	Consumer satisfaction
Energy	1.25	1.25	1.25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.25	1
Materials	1	1	1	1.25	1.25	1	1.25	1	1	1	1	1.25	1
Industrials	1.25	1.25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.25	1.25	1	1
Consumer Discretionary	1	1	1.2	1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1	1.2	1	1	1	1
Consumer Staples	1	1	1.25	1	1.25	1.25	1.25	1	1	1	1	1	1

Health Care	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
Financials	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.5	1.5	1	1	1
Information Technology	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Communication Services	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Utilities	1.33	1.33	1.33	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Real Estate	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Notes: Table V-2 outlines the construction of the relevance score (dependent variable) used to assess the extent to which sustainability assurance engagements address greenwashing-related subject matters. Panel A describes examples of the scoring framework and how each assurance subject matter is assigned a score based on its relevance. Panel B presents the adjusted weighting applied to greenwashing subject matters based on the focused area of regulatory sanctions within each sector.

Third, since greenwashing as identified by regulators tends to cluster within industries (as discussed in Chapter 4), we adjust the relevance score by assigning higher weights to greenwashing-related subject matters sanctioned by regulators in a given industry. For example, additional weight[49] is assigned to the greenwashing-related subject matter "carbon neutral" in the Energy, Industrial, and Utilities sectors. The adjusted weighting of the various greenwashing-related subject matters is shown in Panel B of Table V-2. We apply this industry-specific weighting because certain types of greenwashing claims are more material and more frequently scrutinised in some industries than others. For example, in the Energy sector, carbon neutrality is a frequently targeted greenwashing claim by regulators. In contrast, in the Financials sector, regulators have focused more on misleading claims related to ESG investment policies and screening practices. While the assignment of these weights involves researcher judgment, we minimise potential bias by grounding the weighting decisions in patterns observed in regulatory enforcement data. By incorporating these industry-specific differences, weightings help ensure that the relevance score more accurately reflects whether companies are assuring the most contextually important greenwashing subject matters.

Lastly, for each company, we calculate a total relevance score ($RelevanceScore_i$) for its sustainability assurance engagements. This is done by aggregating the relevance scores across all assured subject matters.

5.3.3 Research Models

We use descriptive evidence for RQ1 to reveal the extent of sustainability assurance practices addressing the greenwashing concerns of regulators.[50] For RQ2, we employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine the characteristics of assurance engagements and reporting companies that are more likely to have higher relevance of assured subject matters in relation to greenwashing concerns. Since engagements with broader assurance scopes are inherently more likely to have higher relevance scores, we account for this mechanical

[49] The additional weight is calculated as follows: an additional 100% bonus weight is distributed equally among greenwashing subject matters sanctioned at least once in the past 10 years in this industry. Mathematically, the additional weight is calculated as 100% / number of sanctioned greenwashing-related subject matters in this industry. For example, in the Energy sector, four subject matters have been involved in regulatory sanctions, i.e., Net zero, carbon neutral, energy efficiency, and safety. These four subject matters are assigned an additional weight of 25% (100% / 4) for their high level of relevance to address greenwashing risks in the Energy sector.

[50] Our analysis is based on a matrix that matches 238 distinct assurance subject matters against 13 greenwashing-related topics identified from global regulatory enforcement actions and guidance. Each company's assurance disclosures were reviewed to determine whether any of the 238 subject matters directly align (i.e. score of 2) with greenwashing concerns. We then calculate the number of companies whose assurance engagements address at least one such topic. The result provides an overview of how existing assurance practices align with each greenwashing topic under regulation.

relationship by using a two-step regression approach. First, we regress the total relevance score on the total number of various subject matters assured:

$$RelevanceScore_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 NumSubjectMatterAssured_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where $Relevance\ Score_i$ represents the total relevance score for company *i* as defined above. $NumSubjectMatterAssured_i$ represents the total number of subject matters assured. ϵ_i is the residual, which captures the variation in the relevance score not explained by the number of subject matters assured.

We save the residual ϵ_i from model (1) as $RelevanceScore\_Res_i$ and employ it as the dependent variable to examine RQ2. This approach allows us to control for the mechanical impact of the number of assured subject matters on the relevance score.[51] We use the following model:

$$RelevanceScore\_Res_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LevAssur_i + \beta_2 ProviderMarketShare_i + \beta_3 CriteriaOwn_i + +\beta_4 RiskyIndustry_i + \beta_5 ESGScore_i + \beta_6 Size_i + \beta_7 ROA_i + \beta_8 GrowthAsset_i + \beta_9 Lev_i + \beta_{10} InstitOwnership_i + \beta_{11} Country\_dummy_i + \gamma \quad (2)$$

In terms of characteristics of the assurance engagement, we include the following variables. $LevAssur_i$ is a binary variable that equals 1 if the assurance provided is entirely reasonable, and 0 otherwise. While most sustainability assurance is provided at a limited level (Manetti and Becatti, 2009; O'Dwyer and Owen, 2005, 2007), experimental evidence suggests that assurance level influences materiality judgments (e.g., Doxey and Sealy, 2024). Doxey and Sealy (2024) found that auditors are more likely to judge the same information as material under a reasonable assurance engagement compared to a limited one. Similarly, Chen (2024) provides empirical evidence that reasonable assurance is more strongly associated with the materiality and verifiability of reported ESG information.

$ProviderMarketShare_i$ is defined as the number of sustainability assurance reports issued by the assurance provider across Australia and New Zealand in FY2023 over the total number of assurance reports issued in FY2023. When multiple providers are involved, the maximum value is used. This variable draws on the financial audit literature proxying auditor

[51] Using the residual from a first-stage regression is a common approach in accounting research to isolate the discretionary component of a variable (e.g., Naughton et al., 2019; Blankespoor, 2019). Following Chen et al. (2018b), we also use the single stage model where the raw relevance score is the dependent variable, and the total number of subject matters assured is included as a control variable. We obtain qualitatively similar results with this alternative model, which is reported in the sensitivity analyses. An alternative approach is to scale the relevance score by the number of subject matters assured. However, this approach disproportionately inflates the scaled variable when the number of subject matters assured is small.

expertise via market share (e.g., Craswell et al., 1995; Francis, 2004), with the concept also being applied in the sustainability assurance context (Lu et al., 2023). Prior research finds that accountants provide higher-quality assurance than non-accountants (Ballou et al., 2018; Casey & Grenier, 2015; Bentley-Goode et al., 2025), and that provider experience enhances assurance quality (Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2018). Thus, we use *ProviderMarketShare* as a more nuanced measure of the expertise of the assurance provider.[52]

$CriteriaOwn_i$is a binary variable that equals 1 if the applied criteria include company self-developed reporting criteria, and 0 otherwise. Recent studies (e.g., Chen, 2024, Gipper et al., 2024) show that the use of external ESG reporting frameworks (e.g., GRI, SASB) influences firms' assurance decisions. Gipper et al. (2024) argue that externally developed frameworks both enhance the credibility of ESG disclosures and reduce assurance costs by providing clearer benchmarks. Assurers, who are expected to possess ESG reporting expertise (Cohen & Simnett, 2015; Simnett et al., 2009), may find it easier to engage when such frameworks are used. Therefore, we use *CriteriaOwn* to capture whether the criteria applied are solely external reporting frameworks or incorporate internally developed criteria, examining how this choice relates to the assurance of greenwashing subject matters.

In terms of the characteristics of reporting companies, we include $RiskyIndustry_i$, which is a binary variable that equals 1 if the sector experienced more than one greenwashing case in the past three years (between 01/01/2022 and 31/12/2024), and 0 otherwise. The risky sectors identified are Financials, Energy, Consumer Staples, and Materials. This variable captures sector-specific exposure to greenwashing risk. Prior research shows that the demand for sustainability assurance is higher in industries with higher environmental and social risks such as mining, finance, and utilities (Simnett et al., 2009). More recently, Chen (2024) finds that firms in consumer-facing industries, which are highly sensitive to negative ESG news, are more likely to seek assurance. Given that our study focuses on greenwashing, we define industry risk based on recent greenwashing sanctions within each sector. This variable enables us to capture the perceived greenwashing risk of the company, which may influence the strategic use of assurance in mitigating greenwashing concerns.

We also include the following company-level characteristics, which may influence sustainability assurance decisions given prior literature (e.g., Casey & Grenier, 2015; Clarkson et al., 2019; Gipper et al., 2024; Hummel et al., 2019; Simnett et al., 2009; Simnett et al., 2025):

[52] This variable is highly correlated with the use of Big 4 providers (correlation coefficient = 0.8698).

1) ESG score ($ESGScore_i$) from Refinitiv, a company-level score based on environmental, social, and governance disclosures; 2) company size ($Size_i$), measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; 3) asset growth ($GrowthAsset_i$), measured as the percentage change in total assets in one year; 4) profitability (ROA_i), measured as earnings before interest scaled by total assets less outside equity interests; 5) leverage ratio (Lev_i), measured as total liabilities divided by total assets; and 6) institutional ownership ($InstitOwnership_i$), the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors. Last, we control for $Country\_dummy_i$, a binary variable equal to 1 if the company is primarily listed in Australia and 0 if the company is primarily listed in New Zealand. Variable definitions can be found in Appendix 4.

5.4 Descriptive Statistics

5.4.1 Current Assurance Practices in Australia and New Zealand

Table V-3 provides an overview of the assurance practices of Australian and New Zealand companies in 2023. Panel A presents an industry breakdown of the sustainability assurance practices of the 116 sample companies. Companies in Materials, Financials, and Industrials were more likely to engage in sustainability assurance, whereas those in the IT and Communication Services sectors had the fewest engagements.

Panel B of Table V-3 presents the level of assurance obtained by these companies. 25 companies (22%) obtained reasonable assurance for at least some subject matters and three (3%) obtained reasonable assurance for their entire assurance engagement.[53]

Panel C of Table V-3 presents the engagement of different assurance providers, 99 companies (85%) engaged accounting firms with 95 (82%) of these being the Big 4 firms. Popular non-accounting providers are Toitu (n = 5, 4%) and Bureau Veritas (n = 4, 3%). This suggests that, while accounting firms dominate the sustainability assurance market, non-accounting providers continue to play a role in areas requiring specialist technical expertise, such as greenhouse gas emissions measurement.

Panel D of Table V-3 presents the reporting criteria used in assurance engagements. With the (forthcoming) mandate for climate-related disclosures in New Zealand and Australia,

[53] Three companies in our sample obtained reasonable assurance for their entire assurance engagement. Their scope of assurance was generally limited to GHG-related information, such as specific emissions categories or the full GHG statement. Specifically, CSR Limited obtained reasonable assurance over Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions, energy consumption, and energy production from Deloitte; NPH-NZ obtained reasonable assurance over its GHG emissions under Categories 1 to 4 under ISO 14064-1:2018 from Toitu; and VCT-NZ obtained reasonable assurance over its full GHG emissions statement for the 2022–2023 reporting period from KPMG. It should be noted that only one of these companies is retained in the regression analysis due to either missing financial data or because the scope of assurance covers their entire report.

the majority of companies (n = 89, 77%) adopted climate-related frameworks (e.g., TCFD and GHG Protocol). 50 companies (43%) applied broad ESG reporting frameworks, such as the GRI. We also observed the use of industry-specific criteria (e.g., Responsible Gold Mining Principles, n = 11, 9%), specific social and governance reporting criteria (e.g., Australian Government's Workplace Gender Equality Agency, n = 9, 8%), and green financing-related reporting criteria (e.g., Green Bond Principles by the International Capital Markets Association, n = 7, 6%). 66 companies (57%) opted to use their internally developed criteria for assurance engagements, representing the second most used reporting criteria.[54]

Panel E of Table V-3 presents the assurance standards specified in assurance reports.[55] The most applied standard is ASAE/ISAE 3000 (n = 100, 86%), followed by ASAE/ISAE 3410 (n = 72, 62%). Other standards, including ASAE/ISAE 3100 and ASAE 3450[56], are also applied, though much less commonly.

Panel F of Table V-3 presents assurance conclusions. Most companies (n = 114, 98%) received an unmodified conclusion. However, the tensions and limitations of sustainability assurance are reflected in assurance providers' narratives, including emphasis of matter sections (n = 8, 7%) and other matter sections (n = 33, 28%). These sections commonly note issues such as estimation uncertainty in selected Scope 3 emissions, or clarify that assurance procedures did not cover prior-period information, future performance plans, website information, internal controls, or IT systems. One company (1%) received a qualified conclusion on its definition of the reporting boundary as it did not align with the requirements of the GHG Protocol. Another company did not have an assurance conclusion in its assurance report.[57]

[54] These percentages add to more than 100% as companies commonly refer to more than one reporting criteria.
[55] It should be noted that some assurance statements reference multiple reporting criteria and multiple assurance standards.
[56] ASAE3450: *Assurance Engagements involving Corporate Fundraisings and/or Prospective Financial Information.* This standard is applied in the assurance of the Sustainability and Climate Report for an energy company.
[57] We remove this company from the analyses as a sensitivity analysis. This does not change the results.

Table V-3 Assurance Practices of Australian and New Zealand Companies in 2023

Panel A: Industrial Distribution of Assurance Engagements in 2023		
GICS Sector	**Total Sample**	
Materials	26	
Financials	18	
Industrials	16	
Consumer Staples	15	
Real Estate	9	
Utilities	8	
Consumer Discretionary	7	
Energy	6	
Health Care	6	
Communication Services	4	
Information Technology	1	
Total	116	
Panel B: Level of Assurance		
Entirely Limited	91	
Mixed (both limited and reasonable)	22	
Entirely Reasonable	3	
Total	116	
Panel C: Assurance Providers		
Firms Using Accounting Provider	99	
Big 4 Provider	95	
Non-big 4 Accounting Provider (BDO; PKF; GPP; Apex)	4	
Firms Not Using Accounting Provider	17	
Toitu	5	
Bureau Veritas	4	
Other Non-accounting Providers	8	
Total	116	
Panel D: Reporting Criteria		
Type of Reporting Criteria	**No. (%)**	**Examples**
Climate-related Reporting Criteria	89 (77%)	NGER/NGERA; TCFD
Company's Own Criteria	66 (57%)	Entity Specific Criteria
ESG Reporting Criteria	50 (43%)	GRI; SASB; UN SDGs
Industry-specific Reporting Criteria	11 (9%)	Responsible Gold Mining Principles (RGMPs)
Social and Governance Reporting Criteria	9 (8%)	Australian Government's Workplace Gender Equality Agency (WGEA)
Financing-related Reporting Criteria	7 (6%)	Net Zero Banking Alliance
Total	116[1]	
Panel E: Assurance Standard Used		

Assurance Standard	No. (%)
ASAE/ISAE3000	100 (86%)
ASAE/ISAE3410	72 (62%)
ASAE/SAE3100	3 (3%)
ASAE3450[2]	1 (1%)
Total	116

[1] *One company may engage multiple reporting criteria and assurance standards.*

[2] *Santos: Assurance on the Sustainability and Climate Report*

Panel F: Assurance Conclusions

Conclusion	No. (%)	Examples of Explanatory Paragraphs or Reasons for Qualified Conclusions
Unmodified without explanatory paragraph	73 (63%)	
Unmodified with Emphasis of Matter	8 (7%)	Estimation of 'Selected Scope 3 emissions'
Unmodified with Other Matters/Information	33 (28%)	Not performed assurance procedures in respect of any information relating to prior reporting periods, future performance plans, websites information, internal control/IT systems
Qualified conclusion[3]	1 (1%)	Definition of the reporting boundary does not align with the requirements of the GHG Protocol
No conclusion provided	1 (1%)	
Total	116	

[3] *NUF received a qualified conclusion on its reporting boundary at the limited level. All other reasonable or limited assurance received unmodified conclusion.*

Notes: Table V-3 provides an overview of sustainability assurance practices of Australian and New Zealand listed companies in 2023. Panel A reports the industry distribution of companies that engaged sustainability assurance. Panel B presents the levels of assurance obtained. Panel C describes the types of assurance providers engaged. Panel D shows the reporting criteria adopted in assurance engagements. Panel E summarises the assurance standards applied in the assurance engagements. Panel F shows an overview of their assurance conclusions.

5.4.2 Assurance and Greenwashing Subject Matters

Assurance Subject Matters

Table V-4 Panel A reports the subject matter topics assured by 105 companies,[58] which include 19 categories of topics from the 238 distinct subject matters collected from the assurance reports (in Appendix 3). GHG emissions are the most assured subject matter, with 100 (95%) companies including them in their assurance scope. This is unsurprising given the forthcoming mandate for assurance engagements of GHG disclosures (for certain groups) in New Zealand from 2024 and Australia from 2025. We observed no assurance engagements in

[58] As outlined in Section 5.3.1, of the 116 companies with sustainability assurance, 11 engaged assurances for their entire report comprised of mainly qualitative and forward-looking information, making specific assured subject matters unidentifiable from the assurance report. This means we cannot apply the same method to the other companies.

our sample explicitly assuring Scope 3 category 12, that is, end of life treatment of sold products. Other frequently assured topics include employee engagement, diversity, and inclusion (n = 60), energy (n = 58), and employee safety (n = 50).

Panel B presents further examination of GHG emissions assurance. Among the 100 companies with assured GHG emissions, nearly all (n = 99) include assurance for both Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions, with the only exception being a winemaking company providing assurance exclusively for Scope 3 emissions. Additionally, some companies have specific aspects assured such as carbon-related information (n = 13)[59] or variations in GHG emissions, including reduction targets (n = 10) and intensity measures (n = 27). Regarding reporting frameworks, 95 companies use the GHG Protocol, while 5 companies apply ISO 14064-1.

Panel C reports the subject matters assured with a reasonable level of assurance. Scope 1 (22 out of 25) and Scope 2 (22 out of 25) emissions are the most frequently assured subject matters with a reasonable level of assurance. This is followed by Scope 3 emissions (8 out of 25) and energy consumption (7 out of 25). Reasonable assurance engagements are predominantly conducted by Big 4 firms and Toitū, a New Zealand-based certification provider specialising in GHG information assurance. This pattern suggests that reasonable assurance is more commonly applied to quantitative and historical environmental metrics, where supporting standards and regulatory requirements are more developed.

Table V-4 Assurance Subject Matters

Panel A: Assured Topics by AU and NZ Companies [105 Companies[1]]	
Topic	**No. of Companies**
GHG Emissions	100 (95%)
Employee Engagement, Diversity & Inclusion	60 (57%)
Energy	58 (55%)
Employee Safety	50 (48%)
Waste, Recycling, & Materials	37 (35%)
Community	34 (32%)
Water	32 (30%)
Supplier	20 (19%)
Green Investment and Initiatives	18 (17%)

[59] The assurance of carbon-related information is in addition to Scope 1/2/3 Emissions. Specifically, carbon-related assurance topics include carbon offset and credit, carbon neutrality, carbon footprint, carbon intensity, and decarbonisation.

Customer	16 (15%)
Regulatory Compliance and Business Risk	12 (11%)
Environmental Incidents	8 (8%)
Data Security and Privacy	7 (7%)
Business Ethics	8 (8%)
Land and Biodiversity	7 (7%)
Others	5 (5%)
Economic and Financing	5 (5%)
Product Safety	3 (3%)
Other Emissions	1 (1%)

[1] *The sample size is 105, excluding 11 companies that assured the entire report without explicitly identifying their subject matters in the document assured.*

Panel B: GHG Emission-related Subject Matters [100 Companies]

GHG Topic	Subject Matters	No. of Companies
Scope 1/2/3	Scope 1 Emission	99[2]
	Scope 2 Emission	99
	Scope 3 Emission	56
Other GHG-related topics	Carbon[3]	13
	Reduction of GHG emissions (GRI 305-5)	10
	Emission Intensity	27

[2] *The only company did not assured Scope 1/2, while assured Scope 3 is TWE 'Treasury Wine Estates Ltd'*
[3] *Carbon-related topics include Carbon offset & credit, Carbon neutrality, Carbon footprint, Carbon intensity, Decarbonisation.*

Panel C: Reasonable Assurance Subject Matters/Topics [25 Companies] [4]

Reasonable Assurance Subject Matter/Topic	No. of Companies
Scope 1	22 (88%)
Scope 2	22 (88%)
Scope 3	8 (32%)
Energy consumption	7 (28%)
Energy production	5 (20%)
Entire GHG report	3 (12%)
Water	3 (12%)
Diversity	2 (8%)
Waste	2 (8%)
Employee	2 (8%)
GHG Emission intensity	1 (4%)
Green bond	1 (4%)

[4] *The following assurance providers provided a reasonable level assurance: KPMG (7), Deloitte (6), Toitu (5), EY (4), PwC (2), GPP (1)*

Notes: Table V-4 presents descriptive statistics on the subject matters covered in sustainability assurance engagements. Panel A reports the frequency and percentage of 19 subject matter topics assured by 105 companies. Panel B reports the frequency of GHG emission-related subject matters assured by 100 companies. Panel C shows the frequency and percentage of subject matters/topics assured at a reasonable level of assurance.

Greenwashing Subject Matters

Table V-5 shows the list of 13 greenwashing-related subject matters, identified through an analysis of 69 global regulatory greenwashing cases in the past 10 years (i.e., from 2015-2024). Panel A indicates that the greenwashing areas most frequently identified by regulators are ESG policy implementation (18 cases), materials used in production (17 cases), and net zero or carbon neutrality claims (8 cases). Panel B shows the particular industries most commonly subject to greenwashing enforcement are asset management (21 cases), consumer goods (16 cases), and textiles and clothing (13 cases).

Table V-5 Greenwashing Subject Matters

Panel A: Greenwashing Subject Matters Investigated by Global Regulators

Greenwashing Subject Matter	No. of Cases	Industry	Country
ESG Policy Implementation	18	Asset Management, Textile and Clothing	AU, EU, U.S.
Material Used in Production	17 (3 bulk investigation)	Beauty, Textile and Clothing; Consumer Good	U.S.
Net Zero, Carbon Neutral[1]	8	Oil and Gas; Transportation	AU, EU, U.S.
Waste Management	8	Consumer Good; Textile and Clothing; Mining	AU, EU, U.S.
Clarity of ESG Policy	7	Textile and Clothing	EU, UK
Management Fraud	6	Asset Management; Transportation	AU, U.S.
Recyclability	5	Consumer Good; Textile and Clothing	CA, EU, U.K., U.S.
Safety	2	Mining; Oil and Gas	U.S.
Energy Efficiency	1	Consumer Good	U.S.
Reforestation	1	Farming	AU
Consumer Satisfaction	1	Health	U.S.
Water Consumption	A key greenwashing topic highlighted in multiple regulatory guidelines, despite no case.		
Total	74[2]		

Panel B: Greenwashing Regulatory Cases by Industry between 2015-2024

Industry	No. of Greenwashing Cases
Asset Management	21
Consumer Good	16
Textile and Clothing	13
Beauty	6
Transportation	5
Oil and Gas	4
Mining	2

Farming	1
Health	1
Total	69

[1] *In this table, 'net zero' and 'carbon neutral' are combined into one category to highlight the overall regulatory attention to this area. However, given the scope of GHG emissions associate with 'net zero' and 'carbon neutral' differs, we treat them as separate greenwashing subject matters in our analysis.*
[2] *The total number of cases in Panel A is 74 (compared to 69 cases in Panel B) because some cases involve multiple greenwashing subject matters. For example, one case may include an accusation regarding an unclear ESG policy as well as an accusation regarding claims about product recyclability in advertising.*

Notes: Table V-5 presents the greenwashing-related subject matters identified from a review of 69 global regulatory enforcement cases between 2015 and 2024. Panel A summarises the key greenwashing subject matters that have been the focus of regulatory actions. Panel B reports the industry distribution of greenwashing enforcement.

5.4.3 Descriptive Statistics for the Regression Analysis

Table V-6 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our regression analysis. The mean (median) of the raw *RelevanceScore* is 19.020 (16.400), with values ranging from 0 to 80, suggesting that the overlap between subject matters covered in assurance engagements and those sanctioned by regulators for greenwashing is, on average, small. *RelevanceScore_Res* has a mean (median) of -0.174 (-0.046), with a minimum of –18.019 and a maximum of 32.048, indicating variation in unexplained relevance scores after accounting for the mechanical impact of assurance scope. With respect to assurance coverage, *LnNumSubjectMatterAssured* has a mean (median) of 2.220 (2.398), while the untransformed *NumSubjectMatterAssured* averages 11.785 (11.000), ranging from 1 to 43 subject matters covered in an assurance engagement.

The mean (median) of *LevAssur* is 0.011 (0.000) with only 1 company[60] in the regression sample providing a reasonable level of assurance on all assured subject matters. *ProviderMarketShare* has a mean (median) of 0.191 (0.257), with values ranging from 0.007 to 0.276. *CriteriaOwn* has a mean (median) of 0.624 (1.000), implying that approximately 62.4% of companies use self-developed reporting criteria. *RiskyIndustry* has a mean (median) of 0.495 (0.000), suggesting that 49.5% of companies operating in the Financials, Energy, Consumer Staples, or Materials sectors have faced more than one greenwashing sanction in the past three years and, therefore, are more exposed to greenwashing risks.

[60] Although three companies provided reasonable assurance on all subject matters in the descriptive sample (Table V-3, Panel B), two were excluded from the regression sample due to missing control variables required for regression analyses or because its scope of assurance covered the entire report.

Table V-6 Descriptive Statistics for Regression Analysis

	N	Mean	Median	Min	Max	SD
RelevanceScore	93	19.020	16.400	0.000	80.000	13.989
RelevanceScore_Res	93	-0.174	-0.046	-18.019	32.048	7.140
LevAssur	93	0.011	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.104
ProviderMarketShare	93	0.191	0.257	0.007	0.276	0.097
CriteriaOwn	93	0.624	1.000	0.000	1.000	0.487
RiskyIndustry	93	0.495	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.503
LnNumSubjectMatterAssured	93	2.220	2.398	0.000	3.761	0.753
NumSubjectMatterAssured	93	11.785	11.000	1.000	43.000	8.046
ESGScore	93	62.884	65.735	18.178	88.914	15.346
Size (raw, in $million)	93	54268.399	8044.700	47.304	1252845.000	200479.500
Size (ln)	93	22.836	22.808	18.598	27.731	1.649
ROA	93	0.049	0.047	-0.121	0.177	0.050
GrowthAsset	93	0.027	0.016	-0.211	0.581	0.112
Lev	93	0.548	0.531	0.112	0.943	0.208
InstitOwnership	93	0.292	0.293	0.031	0.487	0.117
Country dummy	93	0.828	1.000	0.000	1.000	0.379
Crosslist	93	0.161	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.370

Notes: Table V-6 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our regression analysis.

Table V-7 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in our regression analysis. The correlations among independent variables do not exhibit unexpectedly high values indicating multicollinearity concerns. The variance inflation factors (VIF) of each variable in the model are within acceptable limits, with the highest value being 1.99. $RelevanceScore\_Res$ is significantly and positively correlated with *ProviderMarketShare.* The correlation coefficient between *LevAssur*, *CriteriaOwn, as* well as *RiskyIndustry* and $RelevanceScore\_Res$, are insignificantly different from zero. Notwithstanding, our inferences are based on the multivariate analysis outlined in the following section.

Table V-7 Correlation Matrix

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(1) RelevanceScore_Res	1.000											
(2) LevAssur	0.039	1.000										
	(0.713)											
(3) ProviderMarketShare	0.199*	-0.172*	1.000									
	(0.056)	(0.100)										
(4) CriteriaOwn	-0.098	-0.134	0.271***	1.000								
	(0.349)	(0.200)	(0.009)									
(5) RiskyIndustry	0.165	-0.103	-0.139	0.147	1.000							
	(0.114)	(0.325)	(0.183)	(0.160)								
(6) ESGScore	0.087	-0.138	0.072	0.311***	0.072	1.000						
	(0.404)	(0.186)	(0.493)	(0.002)	(0.491)							
(7) Size	0.242**	-0.175*	0.172*	0.284***	0.109	0.531***	1.000					
	(0.019)	(0.093)	(0.099)	(0.006)	(0.298)	(0.000)						
(8) ROA	-0.055	-0.022	0.136	0.265**	0.105	0.124	-0.056	1.000				
	(0.600)	(0.831)	(0.194)	(0.010)	(0.317)	(0.237)	(0.593)					
(9) GrowthAsset	-0.084	-0.021	-0.035	-0.113	0.134	-0.131	-0.113	0.111	1.000			
	(0.423)	(0.840)	(0.740)	(0.281)	(0.200)	(0.211)	(0.280)	(0.291)				
(10) Lev	0.209**	-0.126	0.078	0.270***	0.052	0.162	0.486***	-0.129	-0.020	1.000		
	(0.045)	(0.230)	(0.459)	(0.009)	(0.621)	(0.120)	(0.000)	(0.217)	(0.851)			
(11) InstitOwnership	-0.018	-0.233**	0.162	0.256**	0.016	0.473***	0.275***	0.065	-0.124	-0.204**	1.000	
	(0.867)	(0.024)	(0.121)	(0.013)	(0.881)	(0.000)	(0.008)	(0.533)	(0.237)	(0.050)		
(12) Country_dummy	-0.085	-0.229**	-0.028	0.528***	0.280***	0.464***	0.328***	0.191*	-0.064	0.082	0.374***	1.000
	(0.419)	(0.027)	(0.792)	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.066)	(0.541)	(0.435)	(0.000)	

Notes: Table V-7 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in our regression analysis. * indicate statistical significance at 10% level, ** indicate statistical significance at 5% level, *** indicate statistical significance at 1% level. See Appendix 4 for variable definitions.

5.5 Findings

5.5.1 Extent of Current Assurance Practice to Address Greenwashing Concerns (RQ1)

To evaluate whether current assurance practices address the greenwashing concerns of regulators, our study examines the extent to which various subject matters identified in regulatory guidance and sanctioned cases are covered in sustainability assurance engagements. The results are presented in Table V-8.

Panel A provides the number of companies directly assuring each greenwashing subject matter and examples of how these disclosures are assured in practice. We found the assurance engagements of 49.5% of sample companies (i.e. 52 out of 105 companies) directly cover at least one greenwashing subject matter identified in regulatory guidance or sanctioned cases. This supports the usefulness of sustainability assurance in addressing certain greenwashing concerns identified by regulators. Sustainability assurance is particularly well suited to cover potential greenwashing areas such as water consumption (n = 28), waste management (n = 12), ESG policy implementation (n = 10), and consumer satisfaction (n = 7), as these areas typically involve historical and quantitative data. This makes them a natural fit with financial auditors' emphases on objective and verifiable metrics.

In contrast, we do not find any sustainability assurance in our sample directly covering future commitments, sustainability-related fraud [61], or product-level claims. Future commitments, such as net zero targets, present challenges for assurers who traditionally focus more on historical data. However, two companies in our sample assured their progress toward carbon neutrality, demonstrating their effort to validate forward-looking commitments. Similarly, while almost all categories of Scope 3 have been assured in some assurance engagements, we find no assurance engagements explicitly covering category 12 of Scope 3 emissions, being end of life treatment of sold products. Sustainability-related fraud, which contributes to the expectation gap, is also difficult to assure directly. No company in our sample explicitly assured this area.

[61] In this context, sustainability-related fraud generally refers to management fraud involving sustainability-related information, such as the misappropriation of green investments.

Table V-8 Extent of Current Assurance Practice to Address Greenwashing Subject Matters

Panel A: Examples of assurance subject matters that directly relates to greenwashing subject matters

Greenwashing Subject Matters	No. of Companies Directly Assured[1]	Examples of Assurance Subject Matters
Water Consumption	28	CHC: Total water consumed - Potable water consumption (kL): 1,183,594 WES: Water consumption (megalitres)
Waste management	12	AMC: Waste 306:3-5 (2020) RT-CP-150a BXB: % Sites Zero Waste to Landfill; % Brambles managed sites diverting product waste from landfill 74.4%; % Third-party plant sites diverting product waste from landfill 94.2%;
ESG Policy Implementation	10	AEF: 8. % of proactive engagements followed by commitments to change: 25% BOQ: Lending to Sustainable Assets: ($279.08m)
Recyclability	8	ATM-NZ: Recyclable packaging (%) 87.1% BGA: Total packaging weight, total recycled content within packaging (%), and total recyclable packaging (%)
Consumer satisfaction	7	AGL: 1. Ombudsman complaints presented on page 19 of the 2023 Annual IAG: 1. Complaints resolved in 30 days (%)
Safety	3	BSL: HSE risk control improvement projects completed (% completed compared to plan) – 99% RIO: the existence and status of implementation of systems and approaches used to manage Health, Safety and Wellbeing
Carbon neutral	2	AMP: AMP's Carbon Neutrality Statement, including retirement of eligible carbon abatement certificates BXB: Percent Carbon Neutrality 100%
Energy efficiency	1	TCL: Achievement of Energy Efficiency Target
Reforestation	1	BXB: Number of trees replanted through certified sustainable forestry programs 3,380,000
Clarity of ESG Policy	1	CBA: The Commonwealth Bank's policies and procedures in connection with the use of proceeds raised from the issuance of the Bonds
Net Zero	0	
Material used in production	0	
Sustainability-related Management Fraud	0	

Panel B: Number of Companies Directly Assuring Greenwashing Subject Matters and Their Corresponding Assured Topics

Greenwashing Subject Matters	Assured Topics																		
	GHG Emissions	Employee Engagement, Diversity & Inclusion	Energy	Employee Safety	Waste, Recycling, & Materials	Community	Water	Supplier	Green Investment and Initiatives	Customer	Regulatory Compliance and Business Risk	Environmental Incidents	Data Security and Privacy	Business Ethics	Land and Biodiversity	Others	Economic and Financing	Product Safety	Other Emissions
Water Consumption							28												
Waste management					12														
ESG Policy Implementation									10										
Recyclability					8														
Consumer satisfaction										7									
Safety				3															
Carbon neutral	2																		
Energy efficiency			1																
Reforestation															1				
Clarity of ESG Policy									1										
Net Zero																			
Material used in production																			
Sustainability-related Management Fraud																			

Notes: Table V-8 presents the alignment between assurance subject matters and greenwashing-related subject matters. Panel A provides the number of companies directly assuring each greenwashing subject matter and examples of how these disclosures are assured in practice. Panel B presents the distribution of companies directly assuring greenwashing subject matters across different disclosure categories.

Product-level green claims are rarely subject to direct assurance, as assurance engagements typically focus on company-wide disclosures. For example, while eight companies assured recyclability, assurance covered the company's total use of recyclable packaging rather than the recyclability of single products. As such, alternative mechanisms, such as second-party opinions, may be more appropriate for verifying product-level claims.

Also, while safety is one of the most frequently reported and assured topics, assurance mainly focused on historical outcomes, such as injury or fatality rates. However, such outcomes may be less useful in preventing safety-related incidents and misleading claims – as was outlined in the case of SEC vs VALE.[62] Yet, three companies assured the existence of a safety system, adopting a more preventative approach.

Panel B presents the distribution of companies directly assuring greenwashing subject matters across different disclosure categories. Combining the descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table V-4, which shows the number of companies assuring each category of subject matter, we found that a substantial proportion of assurance engagements focus on areas that are not central to regulatory scrutiny in greenwashing enforcement. For example, while 'employee engagement, diversity, and inclusion' is one of the most frequently assured topics, this topic is rarely cited in regulatory cases.

5.5.2 Assurance and Company Characteristics Likely to Cover Greenwashing Subject Matters (RQ2)

Table V-9 presents regression results examining assurance and company characteristics associated with the likelihood of assuring greenwashing-related subject matters. We find that *LevAssur* is positively and statistically significantly associated with the $RelevanceScore\_Res$ ($p < 0.01$), suggesting that assurance engagements conducted using a reasonable level of assurance for all subject matters might be more likely to cover greenwashing-related subject matters.[63] This finding is consistent with Chen (2024), who found that companies opting for reasonable assurance compared to limited assurance, are more likely to disclose material information as defined by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB). Moreover, the coefficient on *ProviderMarketShare* is positive and statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), indicating that assurance engagements conducted by providers with a larger market share (possibly a more experienced provider) tend to have greater alignment with greenwashing-

[62] Details are available at: https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023-63

[63] Note, only one company in our regression sample applied a reasonable level of assurance across all subject matters, making it a rare case.

related subject matters identified by regulators.[64] In contrast, *CriteriaOwn* is negatively associated with $RelevanceScore\_Res$ ($p < 0.01$), suggesting that assurance engagements with self-developed reporting criteria are less likely to cover greenwashing-related subject matters. This result speaks to the findings of Gipper et al. (2024) indicating that the adoption of established reporting frameworks influences companies' decisions regarding sustainability assurance. Finally, we find that assurance engagements for firms operating in industries more exposed to greenwashing issues (*RiskyIndustry*, $p < 0.05$) are more likely to assure greenwashing-related subject matters.

Table V-9 Determinants of the Relevance of Assurance Subject Matters to Greenwashing Concerns

	RelevanceScore_Res
LevAssur	8.122***
	(2.311)
ProviderMarketShare	20.447***
	(7.393)
CriteriaOwn	-4.226***
	(1.536)
RiskyIndustry	3.745**
	(1.576)
ESGScore	0.024
	(0.057)
Size	0.67
	(0.754)
ROA	1.805
	(12.247)
GrowthAsset	-7.344
	(5.972)
Lev	6.626*
	(3.493)
InstitOwnership	1.371
	(7.528)
Country_dummy	-1.508
	(1.846)
Constant	-22.865
	(15.86)
Observations	93
R-squared	0.229

Notes: Table V-9 reports the OLS regression results on the determinants of the relevance of assurance subject matters to greenwashing concern identified by regulators. ***, **, and * denote significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). Coefficient values (robust standard errors) are shown. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.

[64] While the positive association between *ProviderMarketShare* and *RelevanceScore_Res* may reflect the broader expertise or capacity of providers with larger market share, an alternative explanation is that firms anticipating greater exposure to greenwashing risk may proactively engage more prominent assurance providers.

5.5.3 Implications for the AUASB

The findings highlight the usefulness and limitations of assurance in mitigating greenwashing identified by regulators. Around 49.5% of assurance engagements cover at least one greenwashing-related subject matter, primarily in areas involving historical and quantitative data, such as water consumption and waste management. However, significant gaps remain in relation to future commitments (e.g., net zero goals and end of life treatment of sold products), sustainability-related fraud, and product-level claims, which are more challenging to assure.

Given the complexities of addressing greenwashing, the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB) could consider supplementing ASSA 5000 with requirements and guidance for assessing and addressing such risks. Additionally, since some greenwashing issues are inherently difficult to address through assurance procedures, managing stakeholder expectations is crucial in clarifying assurance practitioners' roles in addressing greenwashing risk. Assurance engagements with a reasonable level of assurance are more likely to cover greenwashing-related concerns, supporting phasing to a reasonable level of assurance. In contrast, using internally developed reporting criteria is less likely to address greenwashing-related subject matters, emphasising a need for assurance providers to evaluate the suitability of reporting criteria before the formal engagement stage.

5.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis

Alternative Measures of Relevance Score

This study adopts two alternative approaches to constructing the dependent variable, i.e., the relevance score. First, in the main analysis, we use the residual from the first stage regression to ensure that the relevance score is not mechanically driven by the number of subject matters assured. However, as Chen et al. (2018b) suggested, two-stage approaches can generate biased coefficients if variables from the second-stage regression are correlated with the explanatory variable in the first-stage regression. Thus, we also estimate the model in a single stage, following Chen et al. (2018b). We use the raw relevance score ($RelevanceScore$) instead of the residual ($RelevanceScore\_Res$) while controlling for the natural logarithm of the number of assured subject matters. The results, presented in Column (1) of Table V-10, show that the number of assured subject matters is positively and significantly associated with the $Relevance\ Score$, as expected, due to the inherent mechanical relationship. The results remain generally consistent with the main findings.

Table V-10 Sensitivity Analysis

	(1) *RelevanceScore*	(2) *RelevanceScore_Res_NoIndustry*	(3) *RelevanceScore_Res*	(4) *RelevanceScore_Res*
LevAssur	7.666***	5.897***	8.166***	5.586
	(2.689)	(2.024)	(2.772)	(3.452)
ProviderMarketShare	27.855***	18.496***	20.469***	19.542**
	(8.216)	(6.621)	(7.478)	(8.322)
CriteriaOwn	-5.264***	-3.726***	-4.232***	-3.513**
	(1.857)	(1.374)	(1.575)	(1.684)
RiskyIndustry	5.872***	2.984**	3.748**	
	(1.79)	(1.385)	(1.582)	
ESGScore	0.061	0.025	0.024	0.072
	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.065)
Size	1.013	0.624	0.669	0.784
	(0.849)	(0.614)	(0.766)	(0.931)
ROA	-30.306**	-1.022	1.863	2.325
	(15.085)	(11.189)	(13.297)	(14.976)
GrowthAsset	-3.186	-6.455	-7.348	-0.448
	(6.472)	(5.401)	(6.035)	(6.276)
Lev	7.288*	3.802	6.621*	9.119*
	(4.23)	(3.139)	(3.498)	(4.848)
InstitOwnership	-8.946	0.443	1.351	-3.975
	(8.714)	(6.695)	(7.578)	(9.045)
Country_dummy	-3.03	-0.891	-1.459	-2.933
	(2.062)	(1.752)	(2.868)	(2.008)
LnNumSubjectMatterAssured	14.334***			
	(1.342)			
Crosslist			0.059	
			(2.563)	
Industry FE	NO	NO	NO	YES
Constant	-42.141**	-19.992	-22.899	-25.749
	(17.747)	(12.79)	(15.699)	(19.885)
Observations	93	93	93	93
R-squared	0.727	0.207	0.229	0.325

Notes: Table V-10 presents the results of sensitivity analyses. Column (1) presents the results using the raw relevance score as the dependent variable while controlling for the natural logarithm of the number of assured subject matters. Column (2) presents the results of applying the relevance score without industry adjustment. Column (3) includes *Crosslist* as an additional control variable to account for companies listed on both the Australian and New Zealand stock exchanges. Column (4) replaces *RiskyIndustry* with industry fixed effects to control for industry-level variation. ***, **, and * denote significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). Coefficient values (robust standard errors) are shown. All variables are defined in Appendix 4. For the dependent variables, *RelevanceScore* represents the total relevance score. *RelevanceScore_Res* represents the residual from the regression of the total relevance score (*RelevanceScore*) on the total number of subject matters assured. *RelevanceScore_Res_NoIndustry* represents the residual from the regression of the total relevance score (*RelevanceScore*) on the total number of subject matters assured, without applying industry-weighting adjustment.

Second, our baseline model applies industry-specific weights to greenwashing-related subject matters that regulators have sanctioned more frequently within a given industry. To assess whether our inferences depend on this choice, we re-compute the relevance score under an alternative construction with no industry adjustment. We set all multipliers to 1.0 (i.e.,

remove the industry-specific weights) and rebuild the relevance score. The results, presented in Column (2) of Table V-10, remain generally consistent with the main findings.[65]

Control for Cross-listed Companies

In our sample, 19 companies are cross listed on both the Australian and New Zealand Stock exchanges. We included *Crosslist* as a control variable in our model to control this. The results, presented in Column (3) of Table V-10, remain generally consistent with the main findings.

Inclusion of Industry Fixed Effects and an Alternative Measure of Industry Risk

Our baseline model does not include industry fixed effects to avoid multicollinearity with *RiskyIndustry*. As a sensitivity test, we replace *RiskyIndustry* with industry fixed effects to control for industry-level variation. The results, reported in Column (4) of Table V-10, remain consistent, except *LevAssur* loses statistical significance.

We also test an alternative measure of industry risk using carbon-intensive sectors, following Simnett et al. (2025). *RiskyIndustry* is replaced with a binary variable identifying firms in carbon-intensive sectors: Energy, Materials, Industrials, Utilities, Real Estate, Financials, and Consumer Staples. The results (untabulated) are largely consistent with the main results, with the exception of *LevAssur* becoming statistically insignificant. The loss of significance for *LevAssur* is likely attributable to the very small number of companies (only one) providing assurance at a reasonable level across all subject matters.

Inclusion of Companies with Assurance on Entire Reports

In the main analysis, we exclude companies that engaged assurance for entire reports. However, some of these are large companies such as ANZ and BHP. To account for their potential influence, we conducted sensitivity tests by assigning them relevance scores at the 90th, 95th, and 99th percentile thresholds, assuming high relevance. The results (untabulated) remain consistent with those from the main analysis.

[65] We also tested an alternative industrial weighting by applying double additional weights. For subject matters that regulators have sanctioned within a given industry, we double the weight multiplier used in the main analysis (e.g., a multiplier of 1.25 becomes 2.50), leaving all other multipliers unchanged. The results (untabulated) are largely consistent with the main model

5.6 Conclusion

This study examines the extent to which sustainability assurance addresses greenwashing concerns flagged by regulators. Analysing a sample of 105 listed companies in Australia and New Zealand engaging sustainability assurance in 2023, we find that while 49.5% of assurance engagements cover at least one greenwashing-related subject matter, significant gaps remain. Assurance is more commonly applied in verifying historical and quantitative disclosures, such as water consumption and waste management. However, it is rarely applied to forward-looking sustainability commitments, potential sustainability-related fraud, or product-level claims, despite these areas having been the focus of regulatory monitoring. These findings provide insights into both the potential and challenges of sustainability assurance in addressing greenwashing concerns.

Our results also highlight key factors influencing the likelihood of sustainability assurance addressing greenwashing. Assurance engagements conducted at a reasonable level for all subject matters are more likely to cover relevant greenwashing-related topics, supporting the transition to a reasonable level of assurance. Nonetheless, this conclusion is based on only one observation in our regression sample, which used reasonable assurance for all assured subject matters and should, therefore, be interpreted with caution. Additionally, companies operating in industries with greater exposure to greenwashing risks, as well as engaging assurance providers with a higher market share, are more likely to assure greenwashing-related subject matters. This suggests that exposure to regulatory sanctions/risks and assurance practitioner experience/expertise matters in elevating the relevance of assurance engagements with respect to greenwashing concerns identified by regulators. In contrast, assurance engagements using internally developed reporting criteria are less likely to address greenwashing-related subject matters. This is consistent with findings that the reporting criteria of assurance engagement matters and emphasises a need for assurance providers to evaluate the suitability of reporting criteria prior to the formal assurance engagement stage.

Our study makes several key contributions. From an academic perspective, it advances the literature on sustainability assurance and greenwashing by providing empirical evidence concerning whether assurance addresses greenwashing issues in cases subject to regulatory enforcement. It also extends the sustainability assurance literature by introducing a new dimension of assurance engagements, that is, the relevance of subject matters associated with greenwashing concerns identified by regulators.

From a practical perspective, our findings highlight the importance of assurance level, assurance provider market share, and reporting criteria when determining the relevance of sustainability assurance in addressing greenwashing concerns.

From a regulatory perspective, our study provides timely insights for standard setters and policymakers, particularly in Australia and New Zealand. Both jurisdictions are transitioning from voluntary to mandatory assurance, albeit on climate-related disclosures, and seeking to strengthen assurance requirements and practices. New Zealand's Climate-Related Disclosures regime requires large entities to obtain external assurance over GHG emissions for periods ending on or after 27 October 2024, except for scope 3 that has been extended to 31 December 2025 (External Reporting Board, 2025). Also, Australia has phased in mandatory climate-related financial disclosures from 1 January 2025, beginning with limited assurance and progressing to reasonable assurance over time (AUASB, 2025). Regulators could use these findings to refine existing frameworks and develop targeted guidance on assessing greenwashing risks, such as guidance on how sustainability assurance could assure processes seeking to mitigate and prevent future-oriented risks. Standard setters may also use this evidence to help assurance providers improve the clarity of their reporting, ensuring that investors and other stakeholders have a realistic expectation of what sustainability assurance can and cannot achieve in relation to greenwashing risks.

Nevertheless, this study has several limitations. First, our analysis is based on one year of data from Australian and New Zealand companies. This precludes time-series analyses. While assurance practices are typically sticky, and our purpose is to provide initial evidence to inform policy-making and future research, future studies could extend the analysis to international settings, enabling cross-country comparisons and broader generalisability.

Second, we do not assess whether assurance causally reduces greenwashing. Rather, our findings capture associations between assurance practices and regulatory greenwashing subject matters. However, such insights into how assurance currently aligns with regulatory concerns can assist in setting realistic expectations regarding what sustainability assurance currently achieves in relation to greenwashing risks.

Third, our focus is on greenwashing cases identified by regulators, which may reflect a risk-based targeting approach. This does not imply that other subject matters are free from greenwashing concerns or that assurance over other areas is less valuable. Instead, our study

provides a starting point for assessing whether assurance is applied to areas that regulators have deemed materially misleading to information users.

Fourth, our analysis pools company-level and product-level greenwashing concerns. While we assume that firm-level assurance may capture or reflect claims made at the product level, this alignment may not always hold. Assurance engagements are typically scoped at the entity level, whereas many regulatory greenwashing cases target product-specific claims. As such, this pooling may introduce a mechanical mismatch in evaluating whether assurance meaningfully addresses the types of sustainability claims regulators pursue.

Fifth, there are limitations inherent in the coding framework used to construct our dependent variable, the relevance score. Assessing the relevance of assurance subject matters to greenwashing topics requires interpretive judgment. Although uncertainties were mitigated through discussions among the authors, a degree of subjectivity remains. Moreover, the assignment of industry-specific weights, while guided by observed patterns in regulatory enforcement, involves researcher discretion –despite a range of sensitivity tests to validate the robustness of our approach.

Finally, our study excludes the 11 companies that assured an entire report. These companies were excluded because of the lack of specificity in their engagements made it challenging to apply the same methodology in a way that was comparable with the rest of the sample. However, some of these excluded companies are large, such as ANZ and BHP. To account for their potential influence, we conducted sensitivity tests by assigning them relevance scores at the 90^{th}, 95^{th}, and 99^{th} percentile thresholds. More broadly, these cases highlight that vague or general descriptions of subject matters in assurance reports make it difficult for users to assess the scope of the assurance engagement.

Explanatory Note on the Relevance Score

The relevance score developed in this study captures the extent to which sustainability assurance engagements cover subject matters that regulators have identified as susceptible to greenwashing through enforcement cases and regulatory guidance. The score is developed based on the content disclosed in companies' assurance reports. In this sense, the measure captures the relevance of assurance to greenwashing-risk areas.

Greenwashing-related subject matters are a subset of broader ESG subject matters. Regulators have taken enforcement action against claims in several key areas, such as emissions, carbon neutrality, recyclability, water use, and waste management, because misleading claims in these areas may have more significant consequences for information users. By contrast, other ESG areas, such as employee engagement, diversity, or community investment, have attracted less regulatory action in greenwashing enforcement, even though they may still be important ESG matters. Relatedly, a company may choose to assure many ESG-related matters, some of which are more closely related to greenwashing-risk areas, while others are less directly relevant to greenwashing enforcement.

Accordingly, a higher relevance score means that the company's assurance engagement covers subject matters that are also prominent in greenwashing enforcement. In other words, its assurance targets areas of heightened regulatory greenwashing concern. By contrast, a company with limited ESG disclosure may present a smaller target for assurance mapping, but this does not necessarily indicate lower greenwashing risk or better reporting quality.

This score is industry-relevant, which is why it is then weighted by industry. For example, an agricultural company may reasonably be expected to disclose and obtain assurance over water consumption and GHG emissions. In such a case, the relevance score reveals the fact that assurance covers areas with high greenwashing risk in that industry.

To mitigate the concern that the relevance score simply captures broader ESG disclosure or broader assurance scope, the empirical analysis accounts for the number of assured subject matters. Specifically, the study uses a residualised relevance score after controlling for the total number of assured subject matters. This approach helps distinguish assurance engagements that merely cover more subject matters from those that more specifically align with regulator-identified greenwashing-risk areas.

VI STUDY THREE

6.1 Introduction

Greenwashing is the practice of making false or misleading environmental claims in sustainability disclosures. It refers to selective, symbolic, deceptive, or misleading sustainability and climate-related information (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Lyon & Montgomery, 2015; Seele & Gatti, 2017). While some companies use it as a strategy to communicate a positive image, they risk misleading consumers and investors, undermining confidence in sustainability reporting and damaging corporate reputation when exposed (Guo et al., 2018; Walker & Wan, 2012).

Recently, the detection and enforcement of greenwashing have become critical regulatory priorities, evidenced by the growing number of sanctions, fines, court proceedings, and official guidelines issued worldwide (e.g., ACCC, 2023a; ASIC, 2024a; EC, 2024). For example, in Australia, the ASIC has intensified enforcement actions since 2021, issuing 19 infringement notices totalling over AUD 260,000 by July 2024 (ASIC, 2024a). Given the increasing prevalence of misleading environmental claims, developing effective and scalable detection methods has become both a regulatory and academic priority. One emerging regulatory approach is the use of online sweeps to identify potential greenwashing patterns. In 2020, the EC reviewed 344 sustainability claims and found that 42% were likely to be false or deceptive (EC, 2021). Similarly, the ACCC issued detailed guidelines and conducted online sweeps revealing that 57% of 247 examined environmental claims posed a risk of misleading consumers (ACCC, 2023a, 2023b). These sweep findings show that greenwashing is both widespread and difficult to monitor manually. This calls for scalable, explainable greenwashing detection methods that can support both regulatory oversight and corporate self-assessment.

Generative LLMs have been recognised as a transformative technological development since the November 2022 launch of ChatGPT, a conversational AI system (OpenAI, 2022). The capacity of LLMs to perform a broad range of language comprehension and text generation tasks has attracted widespread interest in their potential to enhance efficiency and productivity (Cheng et al., 2025). Generative LLMs show potential for analysing corporate narratives and disclosure texts in accounting and sustainability-related research (de Kok, 2025). For example, Bernard et al. (2024) use a Llama-3 model to examine 10-K footnotes to assess the complexity of firms' business activities. Likewise, Kim et al. (2024) use ChatGPT to generate automated

summaries of financial disclosures to quantify disclosure bloat. Generative LLMs can interpret and evaluate language, providing context-aware textual analysis at great scale and speed.

However, these benefits come with limitations. Generative LLMs can produce "hallucinations" or outputs that sound convincing but are factually incorrect or entirely fabricated (Athaluri et al., 2023; Emsley, 2023; Shen et al., 2023). Without domain-specific guidance or fine-tuning, such interpretations may be inconsistent or misleading (de Kok, 2025). Therefore, while generative LLMs offer potential for scalable greenwashing detection, their use must be accompanied by a transparent reasoning process to ensure that assessments are traceable and well-supported – and not influenced by hallucinated content. These challenges are particularly relevant in the task of greenwashing detection, as greenwashing is an umbrella term that aggregates diverse indicators of misleading behaviours and does not have clear, established boundaries (Lyon & Montgomery, 2015; Seele & Gatti, 2017). As a result, a granular and transparent reasoning process is essential to ensure that generative LLM-based assessments accurately reflect the interpretive logic used by regulators in assessing greenwashing.

To address these limitations, this study grounds a LLMs' evaluation of sustainability claims in a greenwashing taxonomy developed directly from regulatory guidelines. Anchoring the model in these regulatory guidelines reduces the risk of hallucinations by constraining the model's reasoning to a predefined evaluation framework, mirroring how regulators themselves determine whether claims are potentially misleading. More specifically, the design is carried out in three steps. First, this study collects and reviews eight regulatory guidelines on green claims issued by five regulators,[66] shown in the Factiva-based enforcement analysis in Chapter 3 as being among the most active in pursuing greenwashing enforcement. From these guidelines, a taxonomy is developed, categorising greenwashing as a set of indicators (such as vague wording, unclear scope, and claims lacking substantiating evidence), along with interpretive guidance for assessing each indicator. The aim of the taxonomy is to help the generative LLM to assess green claims in the same way as regulators do when judging whether a statement is potentially greenwashing. The taxonomy distinguishes two broad types of greenwashing indicators: (1) language-based indicators, which arise from how information is communicated (e.g., the use of vague words such as "conscious choice"); and (2) evidence-

[66] The five regulators are the ACCC, the ASIC, the UK CMA, the EC, and the US FTC. These regulators are selected because they have been actively involved in anti-greenwashing enforcement through the issuance of detailed regulatory guidelines and investigating greenwashing cases.

based indicators, which occur when a claim contradicts or is unsupported by external evidence (e.g., an ESG fund that does not perform an ESG screening process). Assessing evidence-based indicators typically requires access to internal or third-party documentation, which is beyond the scope and capacity of LLMs. As a result, this study focuses exclusively on language-based indicators of greenwashing, independent of whether the underlying evidence of performance is weak or strong.

Second, a dataset of greenwashing and non-greenwashing examples is compiled from three sources, encompassing: (1) educational cases embedded in the eight regulatory guidelines[67], which explicitly label claims as greenwashing or non-greenwashing; (2) ASA rulings on environmental advertising,[68] providing real-world advertising claims formally judged as either upheld (greenwashing) or not upheld (non-greenwashing); and (3) narrative disclosures from award-winning or assured sustainability reports, serving as high-quality sustainability disclosures that are less subject to greenwashing risks because they have undergone external review. These examples form the training and testing samples used in our model evaluation.

Third, this study evaluates whether OpenAI's GPT-5-mini can detect potential greenwashing in a manner aligned with regulatory reasoning. In general, the model is required to produce a binary classification of greenwashing or not, with this being the outcome of interest. The study then examines the model's performance across different prompt configurations that vary according to whether CoT[69] reasoning is required and in-context examples are provided.

[67] They are: (1) "Making environmental claims: A guide for business" (ACCC, 2023); (2) "Greenwashing by businesses in Australia – findings of ACCC's internet sweep" (ACCC, 2023); (3) "Green marketing and the Australian Consumer Law" (ACCC, 2011); (4) "Information Sheet 271 (INFO 271) – How to avoid greenwashing when offering or promoting sustainability-related products" (ASIC, 2022); (5) "Empower Consumers for the Green Transition" (EC, 2024); (6) "Green Claims Directive" (EC, 2023); (7) "CMA guidance on environmental claims on goods and services" (CMA, 2021); and (8) "Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims" (FTC, 2012). Details are contained in Appendix 1.

[68] ASA is the UK's independent self-regulatory body responsible for enforcing advertising codes, overseeing advertising across media, and handling public complaints to ensure advertisements are legal, honest, and truthful (Auxtova et al., 2021). We draw on ASA rulings as our data source because the ASA handles complaints and decides whether UK advertising practices are misleading or not. Thus, their rulings provide real-world examples of greenwashing and non-greenwashing claims.

[69] The study tested four CoT settings instructing the model to produce intermediate reasoning steps before giving a final answer (Wei et al., 2022). CoT prompting improves interpretability and logical consistency by allowing the model to break down complex problems into sequential reasoning steps (Jung et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2022). It has demonstrated strong performance in arithmetic reasoning, symbolic problem-solving, and other structured reasoning tasks (Kojima et al., 2022; Shao et al., 2023). Further details about the CoT settings are introduced in Chapter 6.

Specifically, we compare the performance of four prompting configurations that progressively provide more instructions in the prompt, including taxonomy and examples.[70] The *first* prompting configurations includes a zero-shot configuration, where the model receives only the claim, providing baseline performance without any additional information. The *second* encompasses a zero-shot CoT configuration, which adds the greenwashing taxonomy to the prompt through CoT. In this CoT configuration, the model is required to assess the claim against each greenwashing indicator in the taxonomy before producing the final decision. If the model concludes that any one of the indicators is triggered, the claim should be classified as greenwashing. Thus, this configuration allows us to examine whether the model's performance varies once the model is required to reason using each indicator before making a final decision. The *third* model is a five-shot CoT configuration, which incorporates the CoT with five examples of greenwashing claims, with these being drawn from regulatory guidelines to showcase how regulators assess greenwashing claims. Each example corresponds to one indicator category. Therefore, it assesses the performance of the model when it also learns from examples. An eight-shot CoT configuration is the *fourth* model. It provides the CoT plus five greenwashing and three[71] non-greenwashing examples, allowing us to examine whether supplying a more balanced set of examples further improves the model's ability to distinguish greenwashing from non-greenwashing cases.

Performance on the final binary classification task (i.e., greenwashing or not) is evaluated using Precision, Recall, and F1 scores. In this study, Precision is the proportion of statements the model labels as greenwashing that are, in fact, greenwashing, in relation to all statements the model labels as greenwashing. Precision decreases when the model incorrectly labels a non-greenwashing claim as greenwashing. Recall is the proportion of actual greenwashing statements that the model correctly identifies out of all the greenwashing statements in the dataset. Recall decreases when the model misclassifies a greenwashing claim as non-greenwashing. The F1 score combines Precision and Recall into a single measure of overall classification performance. These measures are widely used in LLM-based text classification tasks (e.g., de Kok, 2025; Devlin et al., 2019; Brown et al., 2020) and are suitable in settings where dataset imbalance is present (Johnson & Khoshgoftaar, 2019).

[70] The four prompt configurations are listed in Appendix 4.

[71] The numbers of greenwashing and non-greenwashing examples are not balanced. This is because only three of the five indicator categories in the regulatory dataset contained non-greenwashing examples. The remaining two categories only had greenwashing examples. Therefore, three is the maximum number of non-greenwashing examples that can be included in the prompt without providing multiple examples for a single indicator category, which could bias the model by overweighting certain indicator categories.

We report these metrics for the two test datasets – the in-sample dataset and the out-of-sample dataset. The in-sample dataset includes examples extracted from regulatory guidelines. The purpose of this test is to examine whether the model can accurately classify greenwashing when it is provided with instructions derived from the same regulatory guidelines (e.g., the taxonomy of greenwashing categories and examples of greenwashing and non-greenwashing claims). The in-sample dataset is unbalanced, containing more greenwashing examples (83) than non-greenwashing examples (18). The out-of-sample dataset consists of real-world sustainability claims made by companies, including those in ASA rulings and award-winning or assured sustainability report disclosures. This dataset is used to assess the model's ability to generalise its greenwashing identification capability to real-world green claims that are potentially less black and white. It also specifically focuses on collecting non-greenwashing examples, given the limited number of non-greenwashing examples in the in-sample dataset to test LLM performance. Consequently, this dataset is also unbalanced, but in the opposite direction. It contains more non-greenwashing examples (273) than greenwashing examples (35).

The results from the in-sample evaluation show that GPT-5-mini can closely reproduce regulatory reasoning, with all configurations achieving high F1 scores above 0.90. In this setting, the model maintains a strong balance between identifying greenwashing and avoiding misclassification of non-greenwashing claims. However, performance declines substantially in the out-of-sample evaluation (0.24-0.47), mainly driven by low Precision (0.13-0.31) due to the large number of non-greenwashing statements being incorrectly classified as greenwashing.

We also conducted two additional tests. The first analysis evaluates the model's ability to identify which specific greenwashing indicator (e.g., vagueness, unclear scope) is present in a statement, with this being the intermediate reasoning step before reaching a conclusion. In all CoT prompting configurations (Zero-shot CoT, Five-shot CoT, Eight-shot CoT), the model is instructed to first assess each indicator in the taxonomy and then produce a final decision. To evaluate the performance of identifying the correct indicator, we extract and analyse the model's indicator-level outputs. Performance on this task is limited. Even the best prompting configuration correctly identifies the relevant indicator in only around 20% of cases, with most errors arising because the model incorrectly marks greenwashing indicators as present when they are not (i.e., false positives), resulting in relatively low micro Precision (0.28-0.38).

The second additional test evaluates an alternative prompting strategy. Instead of requiring the model to systematically assess each indicator one by one, we adopt a softer

instructional tone introducing the indicators as guidance rather than mandatory steps. This adjustment aims to improve flexibility and reduce strictness in assessing these indicators. The results show that this approach improves F1 scores in the in-sample test (e.g., F1 scores rise from 0.9-0.95 to 0.95-0.97). In the out-of-sample test, it (F1 = 0.33-0.39) outperforms the CoT models (F1 = 0.24-0.26), while the zero-shot non-CoT configuration (with no instructions or examples) remains the best-performing model (F1 = 0.4685).

Our study contributes to the literature on greenwashing and the application of generative LLMs in sustainability text analysis in several ways. From an academic perspective, it introduces an annotated dataset of greenwashing and non-greenwashing examples drawn from regulatory guidelines, ASA rulings, and awarded or assured sustainability reports. This establishes a foundation for developing and testing AI-based detection models. Additionally, this study examines how including CoT reasoning and examples in the prompt influences the identification accuracy of LLMs identifying greenwashing. From a practical perspective, it demonstrates the potential of LLMs to assess whether sustainability claims contain misleading elements, offering a scalable analytical tool for evaluating the integrity of corporate communication. From a regulatory perspective, the study provides empirical evidence supporting the feasibility of using LLMs for large-scale screening of environmental claims, indicating both their potential and limitations for regulators using AI tools for greenwashing screening.

This study has several limitations suggesting potential directions for future research. First, our analysis focuses only on GPT-5-mini and does not make comparisons across different models. Future work could compare a broader range of models, such as the Gemini and LLaMA families, to assess generalisability. Second, we evaluate only prompting-based strategies. These guide reasoning but do not enable the model to learn domain-specific patterns by adjusting its parameters. Further research could explore other strategies, such as fine-tuning or reinforcement learning, to improve performance. Third, our primary dataset based on regulatory guidelines contains more greenwashing than non-greenwashing examples. Although supplemented with awarded or assured disclosures, these differ from product-level advertising claims. Future studies could broaden the dataset by including greenwashing and non-greenwashing cases from additional authoritative, product-level sources. Finally, this study focuses exclusively on language-based greenwashing and does not assess the model's ability to detect evidence-based greenwashing, which requires external factual verification. Future work could link textual claims to external information, such as documented

sustainability initiatives or the composition of ESG investment portfolios, to support the detection of evidence-based greenwashing.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the related literature on greenwashing, language models for ESG disclosures, and prior NLP-based detection studies. Section 6.3 describes the greenwashing taxonomy, data sources, and experimental design. Section 6.4 contains the main results, while Section 6.5 provides additional analyses. Section 6.6 concludes the study.

6.2 Literature Review and Related Works

6.2.1 Greenwashing

The concept of greenwashing describes situations where there is a discrepancy between a company's communication and its actual performance/efforts with respect to environmental and social issues. Such discrepancies may emerge from attempts to improve corporate image and social legitimacy (Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Boiral et al., 2020). With the expansion of consumer and capital markets to now include green products and services, greenwashing has become even more prevalent as firms attempt to capitalise on this burgeoning demand.

In the academic literature, greenwashing is portrayed as a multifaceted phenomenon (Pizzetti et al., 2021). It occurs at the firm and product/service levels in a variety of forms, including misleading communication (Chen & Chang, 2013), selective disclosure of positive information (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Marquis et al., 2016), deceptive manipulation (Siano et al., 2017), and decoupling (Guo et al., 2017). Firms can strategically utilise ESG reports, selectively disclosing positive information presenting them in the best light (Deegan et al., 2002; Holder-Webb et al., 2009), omitting material negative information (e.g., Deegan & Rankin, 1996), and using vague language (Cho et al., 2010). These stratagems legitimise concerns for environmental and social issues in ways that misleads users (Hay et al., 2024; Mahoney et al., 2013).

Correspondingly, greenwashing has emerged as one of the main contemporary corporate risks (Free et al., 2024). Extant studies highlight several important consequences of greenwashing for corporations. Greenwashing damages brand reputation and trust (Guo et al., 2018; Jahdi & Acikdilli, 2009), leads to increased scrutiny from non-governmental organisations (Berrone et al., 2017), and is associated with adverse results, including lower financial performance (Walker & Wan, 2012) and lower cumulative abnormal returns (Du,

2015). With growing concerns over greenwashing, one stream of literature explores regulatory and institutional mechanisms to curb these practices (e.g., Marquis et al., 2016; Mateo-Márquez et al., 2022; Sun & Zhang, 2019). This literary stream shows that more stringent climate-related regulations limit greenwashing practices used by companies, with Sun and Zhang (2019) suggesting that government-imposed penalties deter greenwashing practices. As a result, accusations of greenwashing are increasing and regulatory scrutiny is intensifying (KPMG, 2024).

A list of greenwashing definitions, proposed by academics and regulators, is shown in Table II-3 (see Chapter 2). As shown in this table, regulators generally define greenwashing as misleading, exaggerated, or deceptive claims about sustainability performance, with a focus on whether the overall impression is potentially misleading (e.g., ACCC, 2023a). A misleading impression can arise from various indicators including vague statements, overly technical language, and unclear scope (ACCC, 2023b; CMA, 2021; EC, 2024). In recent years, regulatory scrutiny has expanded beyond marketing materials to include sustainability reports, investment products, and corporate statements (ACCC, 2023a; ASIC, 2023a; EC, 2024). Key enforcement areas include ESG investment products (ASIC, 2023a; SEC, 2022a), net-zero commitments in the energy sector (ASIC, 2023a), and eco-friendly marketing in the consumer goods sector (ACM, 2022). As discussed in Chapter 4, regulatory greenwashing definitions have evolved in practice and through case-specific enforcement over time.

6.2.2 NLP in ESG Context

Prior climate and ESG-related textual analyses have predominantly relied on keywords and dictionary-based methods, inferring topical relevance by counting predefined terms. For example, Sautner et al. (2023) use keyword frequency to capture firms' exposure to climate-related issues, while Li et al. (2024) construct dictionaries to separately measure physical and transition climate risks. Similarly, Baker et al. (2024) apply dictionary-based techniques to analyse diversity-related disclosures in SEC filings. Although dictionary methods can reliably identify domain-relevant discussion, these methods lack contextual awareness and may become less effective when terminology is broad, ambiguous, and varying (Varini et al., 2020).

LLMs, based on transformer architectures (Vaswani et al., 2017), allow for richer contextual interpretations through semantic representation learning. Two major types of LLMs are (1) the BERT family and (2) generative LLMs (the GPT family) (de Kok, 2025). BERT is an encoder-only model trained via masked language modelling (Devlin et al., 2019), which has been widely adopted for ESG tasks requiring classification or information extraction. For

example, ClimateBERT (Webersinke et al., 2021) has been used to measure and classify climate-related narrative disclosures, including the identification of net-zero and emissions-reduction commitments (Schimanski et al., 2023a). EnvironmentalBERT has been developed to detect environmental topics and terminology in corporate reporting (Schimanski et al., 2023b). ESGBERT adapts BERT to ESG-specific corpora to support tasks such as text classification, information extraction, and sentiment analysis in sustainability reports (Mehra et al., 2022).

The recent emergence of generative models enables both comprehension and generation without task-specific fine-tuning (de Kok, 2025). Domain-adapted examples include ClimateGPT-2 for climate fact checking (Vaghefi et al., 2022), ChatClimate for retrieval-augmented climate question answering (Vaghefi et al., 2023), and CHATREPORT for analysing the alignment between sustainability reports and TCFD guidance (Ni et al., 2023). In addition to demonstrating the technical capability of generative LLMs in sustainability contexts, these studies show that model performance can be improved through different training methods and prompt design choices. For example, domain-adaptive pre-training and fine-tuning, involving further model training on sustainability-related text, can enhance domain relevance but require considerable computational resources and labelled data (Vaghefi et al., 2022). Other methods, such as retrieval-augmented pipelines and task-specific prompt engineering,[72] can improve model performance with minimal retraining, although results may be sensitive to prompt design and retrieval quality (Vaghefi et al., 2023; Ni et al., 2023). Collectively, these studies demonstrate the usefulness of LLMs in extracting, evaluating, and analysing sustainability information, while also indicating that the choice of training pipeline may impact model outcomes.

6.2.3 NLP in Greenwashing Detection

Given the demonstrated capabilities of NLP in analysing textual ESG disclosures, a growing number of studies have applied text analysis to identify various forms of greenwashing (Bingler et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2024a; Xing et al., 2024; Zhou et al., 2024). A common approach is to code or classify narrative disclosures and then compare the level of symbolic sustainability disclosure to the level of substantive actions. For example, Wang et al. (2024a) and Xing et al. (2024) train naïve Bayes classifiers using manually annotated sentences labelled

[72] Retrieval-augmented pipelines supply the model with relevant external information at inference time, while task-specific prompt engineering structures the instructions given to the model, guiding how it interprets and assesses text.

as symbolic or substantive. Zhou et al. (2024) employ a recurrent neural network to distinguish between symbolic and substantive communication in corporate environmental disclosures, identifying greenwashing where disclosure length increases while the proportion of substantive content declines.

Other studies have identified greenwashing by examining the linguistic characteristics associated with misleading sustainability claims. Kang and Kim (2022) develop a sentiment ratio metric to detect excessive optimism in sustainability reports, arguing that overly positive language is used to divert attention during reputational crises. Gorovaia and Makrominas (2025) identify greenwashing based on firms that have received monetary penalties for environmental violations. They find that positive tone, technical jargon, and vague expressions are strongly associated with these violations. Other studies have applied more comprehensive approaches by leveraging language models to combine multiple linguistic indicators into composite measures. For example, Bingler et al. (2024) fine-tune ClimateBERT to evaluate disclosures across dimensions such as climate relevance, sentiment, the presence of concrete commitments, and specificity. Texts that express opportunity or optimism without corresponding evidence of action are classified as "cheap talk," indicating potential greenwashing.

While these approaches provide systematic ways to quantify sustainability communication, they often rely on proxy indicators including tone, sentiment, or disclosure length, and are typically conducted at the company level. While these proxies can approximate certain aspects of a company's communication quality, they cannot determine whether a specific claim is greenwashing or not. In contrast, regulators provide the determinative criteria for what constitutes greenwashing. Their guidelines clearly define indicators, such as vagueness, unclear scope, and substantiation, used to assess the "overall impression". Therefore, regulatory definitions offer a more authoritative basis for assessing greenwashing claims than proxy-based measurements. Furthermore, although GPT-based models have proven effective when analysing ESG narratives based on context, there are only a limited number of academic studies using generative LLMs to detect greenwashing. Some working papers are exploring this approach but only at the prototype stage. For example, Gu et al. (2024) propose a LLM-based agentic system that evaluates greenwashing through various indicators (e.g., misconduct, lack of risk disclosure, restatement of environmental targets) and synthesises cross-referenced evidence into a dashboard for human evaluation. However, these approaches remain as proof-of-concept prototypes, with validation limited to a manually reviewed single-firm case studies.

Our study differs from these studies by training the model with greenwashing indicators and examples drawn directly from regulatory guidelines, which provide explicit criteria for determining whether a specific claim constitutes greenwashing. We draw on regulatory guidelines to develop a greenwashing taxonomy and focus on its language-based indicators.[73] This taxonomy provides a structured basis for evaluating whether a claim may mislead an information user by concentrating on indicators proposed by regulators, such as vague wording, unclear scope, and overly technical jargon. Grounding the model in regulatory reasoning serves two purposes. First, it aligns the detection task to how greenwashing is assessed in practice. Here, the key question is whether the overall impression of the claim misleads an information user after considering multiple key indicators (e.g., vagueness, unclear scope). Second, it reduces the risk of hallucinations and inconsistent judgment because the taxonomy constrains the model's reasoning to a fixed set of regulator-defined indicators. Instead of generating its own ad-hoc interpretation of what counts as "greenwashing", the model must evaluate the claim through these predefined indicators.

Accordingly, this study examines whether generative LLMs can detect greenwashing when guided by language-based indicators derived from regulatory guidelines. Specifically, it seeks to answer the following research questions:

RQ1: How effective are generative LLMs in detecting greenwashing based on language-based indicators in sustainability claims?

RQ2: How does the model's usefulness vary across different prompting strategies?

6.3 Data and Methodology

The study evaluates how effectively GPT-5-mini can identify greenwashing in sustainability claims. The central task examined is the model's ability to decide whether a claim is greenwashing (1) or non-greenwashing (0), which is a binary classification task. Depending on the prompt configuration (i.e., in the CoT settings), the model may also be required to perform an intermediate indicator-level assessment, evaluating the claim against five language-based greenwashing indicators defined in the taxonomy before reaching its final decision. This

[73] The taxonomy distinguishes between two types of indicators of potential greenwashing. First, language-based indicators, which arise from how claims are worded and presented (e.g., vague terms, ambiguous scope, or unqualified generalisations), can be assessed directly from the text. Second, evidence-based indicators occurring when a claim contradicts or lacks supporting evidence, typically require access to internal records or third-party verification. Because this study evaluates model performance using text inputs only, we focus on language-based indicators that are observable from the language of the disclosure *per se*.

indicator-level assessment is not a separate prediction task, but an internal reasoning process used only in CoT prompts. Non-CoT prompts generate only the final binary output. The methodology therefore examines how different prompting strategies, including zero-shot, zero-shot CoT, and few-shot[74] (i.e., five- and eight-shot) CoT, influence final decision performance.

The following subsections are organised as follows. Section 6.3.1 describes the data sources, including the construction of the greenwashing taxonomy and the development of the in-sample and out-of-sample testing datasets. Section 6.3.2 presents the baseline model and evaluation metrics for assessing performance. Section 6.3.3 details the experimental design, including data preparation, train–test splitting, and the construction of the four prompting configurations used to evaluate model behaviour. Section 6.3.4 explains the evaluation metrics used to assess classification performance.

6.3.1 Data Sources

While prior studies have proposed definitions or proxy measures of greenwashing, there is limited publicly available data in which greenwashing is identified according to regulatory criteria. To support an evaluation grounded in how greenwashing is defined in practice, data are manually collected from three authoritative sources. The first authoritative source covers eight regulatory guidelines published by global regulators. These are used to develop the taxonomy of language-based greenwashing indicators. This taxonomy provides the LLM with examples to learn from, and to evaluate the model's ability to correctly classify greenwashing and non-greenwashing examples after learning these indicators. This is referred to as the in-sample test. The second authoritative source encompasses UK ASA rulings. These rulings comprise a supplementary dataset that serves as the out-of-sample testing dataset to examine the model's performance in assessing real-world green claims. Finally, the third authoritative source covers award-winning or assured sustainability reports. These reports constitute a second supplementary dataset to address a lack of non-greenwashing cases from prior sources.

The following subsections describe each dataset and associated data collection procedures. It first explains how the taxonomy of language-based greenwashing indicators is developed from regulatory guidelines. Then, it shows how examples from these guidelines are compiled for the in-sample tests. After that, it explains the collection of examples from ASA rulings, forming the first out-of-sample testing dataset. Lastly, it describes the award-winning

[74] In few-shot settings, the model is provided with demonstration examples of sustainability claims, the reasoning process applied, and the correct final decision. Further details are outlined in section 6.3.3.

or assured sustainability disclosures used to construct non-greenwashing examples for the second out-of-sample testing dataset.

Greenwashing Taxonomy Developed through Regulatory Guidelines

The taxonomy of language-based greenwashing was developed through a systematic review of eight regulatory guidelines across multiple jurisdictions (see Appendix 2, as discussed in Chapter 3), including guidelines issued by the ACCC,[75] ASIC,[76] CMA,[77] EC,[78] and FTC.[79] These regulators were selected because: (1) they operate in jurisdictions among those most active in addressing greenwashing, as evidenced by the regulatory enforcement patterns identified by the Factiva search in Chapter 3;[80] and (2) they include published educational materials clearly illustrating how sustainability claims can be misleading. These guidelines serve two purposes. First, they inform the development of a taxonomy of language-based greenwashing categories and, second, they provide the greenwashing, non-greenwashing, and greenwashing revised[81] examples used for training and in-sample testing.

To construct the taxonomy, each guideline is systematically reviewed for indicators used to determine whether a sustainability claim may mislead an information user, including the description and explanations of these indicators. This process initially generated two broad

[75] The ACCC, responsible for promoting competition, fair trade, and product safety under the Competition and Consumer Act of 2010 and ACL, has issued guidance and conducted online sweeping to deter greenwashing. Recently, it accepted a court-enforceable undertaking from MOO Premium Foods in November 2023 and filed a court case against Clorox Australia in April 2024.

[76] ASIC oversees corporate affairs and financial markets in Australia under the *ASIC Act*. Since 2021, it has escalated anti-greenwashing initiatives, issuing 19 infringement notices totalling over $260,000 by July 2024.

[77] CMA is the UK's competition and consumer protection regulator, enforcing Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. It issued the Green Claims Code in 2021, which sets out six principles requiring environmental claims to be truthful, clear, substantiated, specific, and contextualised. CMA has conducted several major sectoral investigations to assess misleading environmental marketing practices by the likes of ASOS, Boohoo, and George at Asda in 2022.

[78] The EC establishes regulatory frameworks to combat greenwashing and coordinates surveillance activities across the EU. In support of the European Green Deal's goal of a climate-neutral economy by 2050, the EC conducted online sweeping addressing greenwashing practices in 2020. In March 2024, it introduced new anti-greenwashing rules, including "A Directive to Empower Consumers for the Green Transition", which complements the 2023 "Green Claim Directive".

[79] The FTC is the US federal regulator responsible for consumer protection and fair competition under the FTC Act, prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." Its primary anti-greenwashing instrument is the Green Guides, which provide guidance on how environmental claims should be substantiated and communicated. The FTC has taken enforcement actions across industry sectors including clothing, household products, and beauty products.

[80] The Factiva search in Chapter 4 (Study One) identified 43 regulatory actions related to greenwashing between 2020 and 2024 across five jurisdictions: Australia, Canada, the EU, the UK, and the US. We then reviewed the main consumer and financial regulators in each jurisdiction to check whether they had issued guidance on environmental claims. The final set of guidelines yielded are from the ACCC and ASIC (Australia), CMA (UK), EC (EU), and FTC (US). At the time we conducted this study, Canadian regulators have not yet issued a standalone guideline.

[81] Greenwashing revised means examples of greenwashing followed advice indicating how it can be revised to constitute non-greenwashing.

patterns. The first patten covers language-based indicators. These indicators relate to how claims are worded and communicated (e.g., the use of vague words such as “conscious choice”). The second pattern incorporates evidence-based indicators, which relate to whether a claim is consistent with underlying practices or verifiable data (e.g., claims of ESG screening where no screening occurs). As evidence-based indicators typically require access to internal records, operational data, or third-party verification, and as these are not available in the text-only evaluation setting of the study, we focus on language-based indicators relevant to how claims are worded and communicated. Detailed procedures to construct the greenwashing taxonomy are elaborated in Chapter 3, with the full taxonomy presented in Table III-3.

Therefore, the study consolidates recurring language-related greenwashing patterns identified across the above guidelines in terms of five major indicators, capturing the distinct ways in which wording and presentation can result in greenwashing. Each indicator corresponds to a specific communication issue (e.g., vagueness or unclear scope). Where regulators used different terminology to describe conceptually similar issues (for example, “vagueness,” “broad claims,” or “general environmental benefit”), these are treated as the same category to achieve consistency and avoid overlap.

As a result, the taxonomy contains five language-based indicators commonly recognised across regulatory guidelines. These are:

1) Vagueness – where claims rely on broad, imprecise, or undefined terms (e.g., “eco-friendly” or “sustainable”) without explanations of the specific benefit.
2) Overstating Compliance or Standard Features – where claims present basic legal compliance or ordinary product attributes as if they represent exceptional sustainability achievements (e.g., advertising trash bags as recyclable).
3) Confusing Language – where claims use technical jargon, unclear explanations, or insufficient qualifications when communicating with audiences who are not reasonably expected to understand such technical details, thereby making the claim difficult to interpret or potentially misleading.
4) Unclear Scope – where claims do not specify the boundaries of a benefit, such as whether it applies to the entire product or only part of it, or the stage of the product life cycle to which it relates.
5) Unclear Conditions – where claims omit the specific conditions under which a benefit can be realised (e.g., special disposal facilities or under lab conditions).

Detailed descriptions for each of the five categories are provided in Appendix 5. The purpose of this taxonomy is to provide an explicit structure for how the model should assess a claim – requiring the model to evaluate a claim against each of the five indicators before reaching a final decision. This step-by-step assessment ensures that the model's reasoning mirrors the logic regulators apply, first identifying whether a claim exhibits vagueness, overstated compliance, confusing language, unclear scope, or unclear conditions, and then integrating these evaluations to determine whether the overall impression is misleading. By embedding these indicators directly in the prompt, the model's reasoning process follows the pre-defined criteria rather than relying on its own unconstrained interpretation of "greenwashing."

In-Sample Testing Dataset: Regulators' Examples of Greenwashing and Non-greenwashing

The regulatory guidelines used to develop the taxonomy also include illustrative examples showing whether a sustainability claim is considered greenwashing or not, and how a misleading claim can be revised to become compliant. Accordingly, we collected example from the eight guidelines issued by the ACCC, ASIC, the EC, the UK CMA, and the US FTC. We systematically extracted all examples and classified each according to the greenwashing indicator illustrated.

Table VI-1 Panel A summarises the composition of examples drawn from the regulatory guidelines. In all, 101 examples were collected, with 83 used as greenwashing cases and 18 as non-greenwashing cases.[82] Of the five categories of language-based greenwashing comprising the taxonomy, Unclear Scope (35 cases: 30 greenwashing and 5 non-greenwashing) and Vagueness (32 cases: 28 greenwashing and 4 non-greenwashing) are the most common. This reflects regulators' focus on claims that mislead through imprecision or omission. Unclear Condition (23 cases: 14 greenwashing and 9 non-greenwashing) and Overstating Compliance or Standard Features (8 cases: 8 greenwashing and 0 non-greenwashing) are less frequent, while Confusing Language (3 cases: 3 greenwashing and 0 non-greenwashing) is the least

[82] Originally, the dataset contained 53 examples of greenwashing, 18 examples of non-greenwashing, and 30 examples showing how a greenwashing claim could be revised to become compliant. The revised examples include both the original misleading claim and a brief suggestion for improvement. However, these revisions do not provide a full alternative non-greenwashing statement. They typically offer only general guidance. For example, a revision might simply be "an acceptable claim would include a clear and prominent disclosure stating that the helmet is used" or that "the business could instead state the number of times the product can safely be reused." Constructing complete non-greenwashing claims from such guidance would require adding new language, which introduces subjective interpretation. To avoid this, we retain only the original statements from the revised examples and classify them as greenwashing. Therefore, the 83 greenwashing cases used in this study consist of the 53 original greenwashing examples and the 30 original statements from the revised examples.

common, showing that linguistic ambiguity alone is less frequently cited as the primary issue in regulatory decisions.

Table VI-1 Descriptive Statistics

Panel A: Training and In-Sample Testing Examples from Regulatory Guidelines		
Categories	**Greenwashing**	**Non-Greenwashing**
Vagueness	28	4
Overstating Compliance or Standard Features	8	0
Confusing Language	3	0
Unclear Scope	30	5
Unclear Condition	14	9
Total	83	18
Panel B: Out-of-Sample Testing Examples		
Source of Examples	**Greenwashing**	**Non-Greenwashing**
ASA Enforcement Actions*	35	3
Awarded or Assured Sustainability Reports	0	270
Total	35	273

Note: Table VI-1 summarises the composition of the datasets used in this study. Panel A presents examples extracted from regulatory guidelines, classified according to the five categories of language-based greenwashing in our taxonomy. In total, 101 examples were collected, comprising 83 greenwashing and 18 non-greenwashing cases. Panel B shows the examples obtained from ASA enforcement actions and non-greenwashing sustainability reports. The ASA dataset includes 38 rulings, and the awarded or assured sustainability reports contribute 270 non-greenwashing paragraphs.

**We did not attempt to further categorise the ASA enforcement cases by specific types of greenwashing. Unlike regulatory guidelines, which explicitly organise examples under defined categories, real-world ASA rulings do not include such distinctions, especially for cases not upheld (i.e., non-greenwashing). To avoid subjective interpretation and to preserve the integrity of the original regulatory reasoning, these cases are reported in aggregate form.*

This distribution highlights an imbalance in the regulatory example dataset, with substantially more greenwashing than non-greenwashing examples. The limited number of non-greenwashing examples raises concerns that performance with respect to detecting non-greenwashing claims may be less reliable when only using this dataset, given it contains but 18 non-greenwashing examples. Therefore, this dataset is supplemented with additional out-of-sample data to better assess the model's ability to distinguish non-greenwashing claims from greenwashing ones.

Out-of-Sample Testing Dataset One: ASA Advertisement Cases

To evaluate whether the model can be generalised to the evaluation of real-world greenwashing claims, we construct a supplementary out-of-sample dataset. This dataset contains ASA advertising rulings, which provide real-world cases where environmental claims were formally assessed as misleading or not. The ASA is the United Kingdom's independent self-regulatory body responsible for enforcing advertising codes and responding to public complaints to ensure that advertisements are legal, decent, honest, and truthful (Auxtova et al., 2021). Its main regulatory focus is advertising content, particularly formats such as social media posts, websites, and paid advertisements on platforms like Google and YouTube. When a complaint is reviewed, the ASA issues a decision that either upholds the complaint (i.e., misleading claim) or does not uphold it (i.e., not misleading). While the ASA does not have direct legal enforcement authority, most advertisers voluntarily comply with its decisions (Auxtova et al., 2021), meaning its rulings effectively shape market communication standards. Thus, ASA cases are well suited for this study because they contain real-world contested sustainability claims where each ruling provides a clear outcome, being clearly classified as greenwashing or not.

Correspondingly, we manually collected rulings from the ASA website involving alleged breaches of Rule 11 (Environmental Claims). Each ruling provides: (1) a description of the advertisement and claim; (2) the complaint; (3) the company's response; and (4) the ASA's assessment result. For each case, we extracted the sustainability claim its coded outcome (upheld or not).[83]

The final ASA dataset includes 38 environmentally related rulings: 32 upheld, 3 not upheld, and 3 partially upheld. In terms of the partially upheld rulings, although some components of the complaint were rejected, the ASA identified aspects of the claim as misleading. We classify these cases as greenwashing. In total, as shown in Panel B of Table VI-1, the dataset contains 35 greenwashing cases (32 upheld + 3 partially upheld) and 3 non-greenwashing cases (not upheld).[84]

[83] Some regulatory decisions rely entirely on contradicting external evidence from investigations rather than the claim itself. These are not suitable for language-focused model evaluation. To address this, all ASA cases were manually reviewed to identify the main reason for greenwashing, Cases relying solely on external evidence, rather than the claim text, were excluded from the dataset.

[84] We did not attempt to further categorise ASA enforcement cases by specific greenwashing types. This is because ASA rulings do not assign categorical labels. With many cases involving overlapping issues, this makes it difficult to classify them without introducing subjectivity. To preserve the integrity of the regulatory context, these cases are reported in aggregate form.

Out-of-Sample Testing Dataset Two: Non-Greenwashing Claims from Award-Winning or Assured Sustainability Reports

A second source of out-of-sample testing data is sustainability disclosures drawn from reports that have either received reporting awards or undergone external assurance of their narrative content. The purpose of including this dataset is to increase the number of non-greenwashing examples available for evaluation, given the prior regulatory and ASA datasets both contain limited non-greenwashing examples. While these disclosures cannot be assumed to be entirely free of greenwashing risk, they have been subject to some form of external scrutiny, such as judging panels evaluating reporting quality or assurance providers' verifications of information communicated. Accordingly, they are generally regarded as relatively higher-quality and substantiated sustainability communications. Given the lack of publicly available datasets documenting verified non-greenwashing claims, these cases represent available, credible, and accessible sources for extracting non-greenwashing examples.

Specifically, we collected two categories of third-party reviewed sustainability reporting: (1) award-winning sustainability reports and (2) independently assured sustainability reports. Award-winning sustainability reports were selected from organisations recognised by established sustainability reporting award programs, assessing submissions against objective criteria such as transparency, specificity of performance indicators, and clarity in linking actions to outcomes. Thus, we used award lists from the PwC Sustainability Awards 2023,[85] PwC Sustainability Awards 2024,[86]and the Reuters Events Global Sustainability Awards 2025 [Sustainability Reporting Excellence & Sustainability Communication Excellence Category].[87] To receive an award, reports are reviewed by a panel evaluating the clarity and transparency of disclosures, the extent to which sustainability claims are supported by verifiable evidence, and whether the reported information is specific and decision useful. Based on this award list, we collected 28 award-winning sustainability reports providing 45 non-greenwashing examples.

[85] The PwC Sustainability Awards are an annual programme in which participating companies submit their sustainability reports and initiatives for evaluation by an independent judging pane. The panel assesses the clarity, transparency, and substantiation of reported sustainability performance across defined criteria. Awardees are available at: https://www.pwc.com/mu/en/events/sustainability-awards/awardees-2023.html

[86] Awardees are available at: https://www.pwc.com/mu/en/about-us/press-room/pwc-sustainability-awards-2024.html

[87] The Reuters Events Global Sustainability Awards recognise organisations demonstrating leadership in sustainability practice and communication, with winners selected by a review committee based on the effectiveness, evidence-basis, and stakeholder relevance of sustainability reporting and engagement. Awardees are available at: https://events.reutersevents.com/sustainable-business/sustainability-awards/finalists

Regarding independently assured sustainability reports, we collected disclosures from Australian and New Zealand companies where the 2023 sustainability report received independent assurance explicitly including the narrative content (rather than quantitative performance metrics only). In 2023, 116 Australian and New Zealand companies (152 reports) engaged in sustainability assurance (see Chapter 5). However, most assurance engagements covered only quantitative metrics such as GHG emissions, energy consumption, or waste figures. Narrative disclosures were rarely included in the assurance scope. In fact, only two reports[88] had assurance engagements explicitly requiring the assurance provider to review and assess the qualitative narrative content. Therefore, these two reports are selected as non-greenwashing examples because they offer relatively credible sustainability communications where the narrative text is externally validated. As the narrative text was reviewed by an independent assurance provider, it is less likely that language-related greenwashing, such as vagueness and unclear scope, would arise in relation to these disclosures.

From these two reports, we extracted narrative paragraphs describing actions, progress, or measurable sustainability outcomes. To ensure comparability with the regulatory dataset and to maintain an appropriate narrative length, we focused on disclosures related to commonly scrutinised sustainability topics (e.g., renewable energy use, recycling initiatives, waste reduction, and carbon emissions strategies), as identified by Study Two in Chapter 5. Sections covering multiple topics were segmented into coherent units. Broad mission or values statements were also excluded due to their inherent vagueness. As a result, we obtained 25 non-greenwashing examples from the two assured reports.

Overall, we extracted 270 narrative paragraphs from 30 companies across 28 award-winning reports and 2 assured reports, as shown in Panel B of Table VI-1. Appendix 6 provides examples collected from all the above sources.

6.3.2 Baseline LLM and Metrics

Our experiment is conducted using GPT-5-mini, a lightweight and cost-efficient variant of OpenAI's latest large language model, GPT-5. GPT-5-mini provides faster inference and lower computational costs while maintaining reliable reasoning and text classification performance. We use OpenAI's GPT-5-mini through the OpenAI API due to accessibility and cost considerations at the time of the experiment.

[88] The two reports where qualitative information is assured are (1) 2023 ESG Supplement of ANZ and (2) the Section 6 of the Operating and Financial Review within the 2023Annual Report of BHP.

For the model's hyperparameter settings, we set reasoning_effort = "low" and verbosity = "low" to obtain concise and direct outputs. The "reasoning_effort" parameter controls how much intermediate reasoning the model is encouraged to produce before generating an answer, with lower settings reducing reflective or exploratory reasoning steps. The "verbosity" parameter controls the level of explanatory detail in the final response, with lower settings limiting narrative elaboration. These settings help minimise unnecessary explanations and improve output consistency. All other hyperparameters are maintained at their default values for GPT-5 mini.[89]

6.3.3 Experiment Design and Task Pipeline

This section describes how the greenwashing assessment task is conducted in terms of data preparation, train–test splitting, and prompt construction. We implement four prompting configurations varying in the amount of guidance and contextual information provided to the model. These configurations are: (1) a baseline zero-shot prompt with no guidance; (2) a zero-shot CoT prompt requiring the model to reason through the five regulatory greenwashing indicators before making the final greenwashing-or-not decision; (3) a five-shot CoT prompt supplementing indicator-based reasoning with five greenwashing examples; and (4) an eight-shot CoT prompt that further includes three non-greenwashing examples. The subsections below describe how the dataset was prepared and pre-processed, how the train-test split was constructed to support few-shot learning, and how the four prompting configurations were designed to test the influence of reasoning structure, along with contextual examples on model performance.

Data Pre-processing and Structuring

Examples collected from regulatory guidelines often consist of a single paragraph combining the background, example claim, and explanation for why it is considered greenwashing or non-greenwashing. This step involves splitting and structuring the information into four components: (1) the claim, (2) whether it is classified as greenwashing or non-greenwashing, (3) the greenwashing category, and (4) the reasoning provided.

Train-test Split

The first task created a train–test split using the 101 examples from the regulatory guideline dataset (see Section 6.3.1). The data were divided into a 20:80 ratio for training and

[89] Changing other hyperparameters, such as "temperature", "top_p", and "logprobs", is not supported by the GPT-5 family (OpenAI, 2025).

testing. The split was balanced across both greenwashing and non-greenwashing examples, as well as across different categories of greenwashing. This procedure aims to avoid overlap between training and data testing. The 20% training subset served as a pool of examples to be provided to the five- and eight-shot prompt configurations, where the LLM learns from the examples provided in the prompt. Details of these prompt configurations are provided later in this subsection. For each prompting configuration requiring few-shot input,[90] we selected one example per relevant category from this pool. The remaining 80% of the data was used for in-sample evaluations to assess evaluation accuracy. As a result, the training dataset contains 20 examples (16 greenwashing and 4 non-greenwashing), and the in-sample testing dataset contains 81 examples (67 greenwashing and 14 non-greenwashing).

Prompt Construction and Chain of Thought

This task involves designing four prompts to evaluate how reasoning structure and contextual examples influence model performance in classifying greenwashing. Prior studies demonstrate that the performance of LLMs depends not only on their architecture and training data, but also on how tasks are formulated through prompts. Prompting refers to strategies that elicit the knowledge and capabilities acquired during pre-training by modifying input text in a structured way (Liu et al., 2023; Brown et al., 2020; Schick & Schütze, 2022). One of the most important developments in this area is chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting, which instructs the model to produce intermediate reasoning steps before giving a final answer (Wei et al., 2022). CoT prompting improves interpretability and logical consistency by allowing the model to break down complex problems into sequential reasoning steps (Jung et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2022). CoT prompting has demonstrated strong performance in arithmetic reasoning, symbolic problem-solving, and other structured reasoning tasks (Kojima et al., 2022; Shao et al., 2023). Figure 1 illustrates how CoT prompting structures reasoning as a transparent sequence of thoughts culminating in the final decision (Wei et al., 2022).

[90] Few-shot prompting refers to including examples, including desired input and output, in the prompt so the model can infer the task pattern. In this study, we use two few-shot settings – a five-shot prompt and an eight-shot prompt. Details are contained in later paragraphs of this subsection.



Figure 1: Chain-of-thought prompting enabling LLMs to tackle complex arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning tasks. Chain-of-thought reasoning processes are highlighted (source: Wei et al., 2022).

Therefore, to enhance the model's interpretive reasoning, we apply the CoT prompting approach proposed by Wei et al. (2022).

In our study, CoT prompting is implemented through a structured reasoning framework based on the five regulatory indicators identified in the greenwashing taxonomy: vagueness, overstating compliance or standard features, confusing language, unclear scope, and unclear condition. For each claim, the model evaluates the five indicators independently and provides concise reasoning for whether each indicator is present. The final classification follows a rule-based decision structure: if any of the five indicators is identified as present, the claim is classified as greenwashing (decision = 1); and, if none of the indicators are triggered, the claim is classified as non-greenwashing (decision = 0). The output is formatted in a structured JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) object comprising three fields: (1) reasoning, (2) indicator categories, and (3) binary decision. This design ensures transparency, consistency, and comparability across prompts.

Building on CoT reasoning, researchers have examined how the inclusion or absence of contextual examples influences performance. A CoT prompt including contextual examples is commonly referred to as few-shot CoT, while one without examples is called zero-shot CoT (Yu et al., 2023). Brown et al. (2020) show that few-shot prompting generally

outperforms zero-shot prompting across a range of language tasks; exposure to examples helps models better understand task intent. However, they also find that this advantage weakens or disappears in tasks requiring subtle semantic interpretation, such as identifying word senses or assessing relationships between paired statements (Brown et al., 2020).

Motivated by these findings, we test how providing examples within the prompt affects performance by introducing five-shot (five examples) and eight-shot (eight examples) prompting strategies. The key difference is that the five-shot prompts contain only greenwashing examples, whereas the eight-shot prompts include the same five greenwashing examples plus three[91] non-greenwashing examples. In both settings, the examples act as demonstrations. They show the model how to: conduct indicator-by-indicator reasoning on an input claim; identify which indicators are triggered and why; and arrive at the correct greenwashing decision based on whether any indicator is present.

Example selection is guided by the taxonomy. We deliberately select examples covering all indicator types, rather than relying on the most common categories (e.g., vagueness). This ensures that the prompting setup is not dominated by a single type of greenwashing indicator, allowing the model to learn from a diverse set of regulator-labelled cases. Consequently, four prompt configurations are developed:

1) Zero-shot prompt – where the model receives a claim and produces a classification without any guidance.

Example: For the claim "Our packaging is environmentally friendly," the model directly decides whether the claim is greenwashing.

2) Zero-shot CoT prompt – where the model evaluates a claim step-by-step against the five indicators (vague claims; overstating compliance; confusing language; unclear scope; unclear conditions) before applying the decision rule. If any one of the five indicators are present, the LLM should produce a greenwashing decision.

Example: For the same claim, the model evaluates the phase against the five indicators, identifies that the phrase "environmentally friendly" is vague (Indicator 1 = Yes), and therefore classifies the claim as greenwashing.

[91] The numbers of greenwashing and non-greenwashing examples are not balanced because only three of the five indicator categories in the regulatory dataset contained non-greenwashing examples. The remaining two categories had only greenwashing examples. Therefore, three is the maximum number of non-greenwashing examples that can be included in the prompt without providing multiple examples for a single indicator category, which could bias the model by overweighting certain indicator categories.

3) Five-shot CoT prompt – where the model is also shown five demonstration examples of greenwashing claims, one for each indicator category, in addition to CoT reasoning. These examples guide the model through the expected reasoning process. They show how a claim is determined to be greenwashing by illustrating which indicator is triggered, why it applies in a specific case, and how these assessments collectively lead to the final greenwashing decision when at least one indicator is present.

Example: Before analysing "Our packaging is environmentally friendly," the model sees examples of (i) vague claims, (ii) overstating compliance, (iii) confusing language, (iv) unclear scope, and (v) unclear conditions, each with reasoning and decisions. The model then applies the same structured logic to the target claim.

4) Eight-shot CoT prompt – where the model is shown the same five greenwashing demonstrations, plus three non-greenwashing demonstration examples, allowing it to observe both greenwashing and non-greenwashing sustainability communications.

Example: Before analysing the claim "Our packaging is environmentally friendly," the model also sees three non-greenwashing examples where the sustainability benefit is clearly defined and properly scoped (e.g., "This product's packaging film is made from 80% post-consumer recycled PET, verified by third-party certification"), in addition to CoT and five greenwashing examples.

These variations in prompts serve two main purposes. First, they test how the model's performance changes when incorporating CoT, which aims to align its reasoning process with regulatory indicators. Second, they examine how varying degrees of contextualised examples (i.e., from no examples to multiple balanced examples) affect model performance when detecting greenwashing.

To address the possibility that model performance may depend on which specific examples are included in the prompt, we generated two additional, alternative example sets for both the five-shot and eight-shot CoT configurations. Each alternative set followed the same selection criteria described above (i.e., one greenwashing example per indicator category for the five-shot prompts and the same five greenwashing examples, plus the three available non-greenwashing examples, for the eight-shot prompts). However, they used different eligible examples drawn from the training pool. As a result, the five-shot and eight-shot CoT

configurations were run three times, using each of the three example sets. The performance metrics reported in Section 6.4 below represent the average across these runs, ensuring the results are not driven by a particular subjective choice of demonstration example. This enhances the robustness of sample selection.

6.3.4 Evaluation Metrics

Model performance is evaluated using Precision, Recall, and the F1 score. These metrics are widely used in LLM-based text classification research (e.g., de Kok, 2025; Devlin et al., 2019; Brown et al., 2020) and are particularly appropriate in contexts where class imbalance exists (Johnson & Khoshgoftaar, 2019).

Precision measures the proportion of correctly predicted positive cases among all cases predicted as positive, while recall measures the proportion of actual positive cases correctly identified by the model. These are defined as:

$$\textbf{Precision} = TP / (TP + FP)$$

$$\textbf{Recall} = TP / (TP + FN)$$

where TP represents true positives (classifying greenwashing as greenwashing), FP represents false positives (classifying non-greenwashing as greenwashing), and FN represents false negatives (classifying greenwashing as non-greenwashing). Precision decreases when the model incorrectly labels a non-greenwashing claim as greenwashing (High False Positives - FP) and Recall decreases when the model fails to flag a greenwashing claim (High False Negatives - FN). The F1 score is the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall and provides a single measure of overall classification performance that balances the trade-off between false positives and false negatives. It is calculated as:

$$\textbf{F1 Score} = 2 \times (\text{Precision} \times \text{Recall}) / (\text{Precision} + \text{Recall})$$

Two evaluation samples were used to assess both internal and external validity. The first is an in-sample test, using the same regulatory guideline dataset employed during prompting. This in-sample test evaluates how effectively the model reproduces regulatory reasoning patterns from examples it has been exposed to. The second is an out-of-sample test, which combines two external sources – the ASA advertising rulings and the sustainability disclosures from award-winning or independently assured sustainability reports. The ASA cases introduce real-world advertising claims that were independently assessed, while the award-winning/assured reports contribute higher-quality non-greenwashing disclosures.

6.4 Results

Table VI-2 reports the performance of the four prompting configurations, including zero-shot, zero-shot CoT, five-shot CoT, and eight-shot CoT, under two evaluation datasets: (1) the in-sample test using the regulatory guideline dataset, and (2) the out-of-sample test using the combined ASA and award/assured sustainability report dataset. The greenwashing assessment task and CoT reasoning procedure are identical across both settings. The only difference between the two datasets is the source of the claims being classified. Model performance is evaluated using Precision, Recall, and F1 scores, based on the model's final decision output (greenwashing or not).

In the in-sample testing, all prompting methods achieved high accuracy, with F1 scores exceeding 0.90. The eight-shot CoT configuration achieved the highest F1 score (0.9451), followed closely by zero-shot (0.9353) and five-shot CoT (0.9321). Precision (0.84-0.94) and Recall (0.93-0.99) were both strong. These results suggest that GPT-5-mini effectively reproduced regulatory reasoning patterns and maintained a balanced ability to identify greenwashing (high recall) and to avoid misclassifying compliant claims (high precision). The use of structured reasoning through CoT prompts, which asks the model to assess five indicators to form a greenwashing decision when any of the indicators is present (see Section 6.3), reduced false negatives (identifying greenwashing as non-greenwashing) from an average of 4.33 to between 0.6 and 1.4. However, this improvement came at the cost of higher false positives (identifying non-greenwashing as greenwashing), from an average of 4.33 to between 6 and 12. This may be the case because detailed reasoning has led the model to over-interpret borderline or cautious language as being misleading. When examples were added alongside CoT reasoning, false positives decreased gradually (from an average of 12 to 9 to 6.77), suggesting that examples providing contextual learning can moderate this over-sensitivity. Nevertheless, these results should be interpreted with caution, as the distribution of the testing dataset from the regulatory guidelines is inherently biased, containing only 14 non-greenwashing examples (compared with 67 greenwashing examples).[92] This imbalance likely inflates Recall and overall F1 scores by limiting opportunities for false negatives, meaning high performance reflects the model's familiarity with regulatory phrasing rather than its generalisable detection capability.

[92] The total number of examples contained in the in-sample testing dataset is 81 (67 greenwashing and 14 non-greenwashing), after the 20:80 train-test split.

Table VI-2 Main Results

Panel A: In-Sample Testing Results							
Prompt Configuration	TN	FP	FN	TP	Precision	Recall	F1
zero_shot	9.67 (1.33)	4.33 (1.33)	4.33 (4.33)	62.67 (4.33)	0.9353	0.9353	0.9353
zero_shot_cot	2.00 (0.00)	12.00 (0.00)	1.33 (0.33)	65.67 (0.33)	0.8455	0.9801	0.9078
five_shot_cot	5.00 (0.00)	9.00 (0.00)	0.67 (1.33)	66.33 (1.33)	0.8805	0.9900	0.9321
eight_shot_cot	7.33 (0.33)	6.67 (0.33)	1.00 (0.00)	66.00 (0.00)	0.9083	0.9851	0.9451
Panel B: Out-of-Sample Testing Results							
Prompt Configuration	TN	FP	FN	TP	Precision	Recall	F1
zero_shot	194.67 (1.33)	78.33 (1.33)	0.33 (0.33)	34.67 (0.33)	0.3068	0.9905	0.4685
zero_shot_cot	51.67 (14.33)	221.33 (14.33)	0.00 (0.00)	35.00 (0.00)	0.1365	1.0000	0.2403
five_shot_cot	62.33 (65.33)	210.67 (65.33)	0.00 (0.00)	35.00 (0.00)	0.1425	1.0000	0.2494
eight_shot_cot	71.33 (6.33)	201.67 (6.33)	0.33 (0.33)	34.67 (0.33)	0.1467	0.9905	0.2555

Note: Table VI-2 presents the main results for the four prompting configurations across two testing settings. Panel A reports the in-sample performance using the regulatory dataset, while Panel B reports the out-of-sample performance using ASA cases and award/assured sustainability report examples. For each configuration, the table shows true negatives (TN), false positives (FP), false negatives (FN), true positives (TP), along with the corresponding precision, recall, and F1 score. The decimal values appear because each configuration was run three times with different few-shot example selections, and the results shown are the averaged values. Values in parentheses are variances across the three different few-shot example selections.

The out-of-sample results show a different pattern. F1 scores dropped substantially across all configurations, with the zero-shot prompt performing best (0.4685) and all CoT-based configurations performing worse (0.24–0.26). Precision declined sharply, being between 0.13 and 0.31, while Recall remained extremely high (approximately 0.99 to 1.00). This divergence between Precision and Recall indicates that although it has a strong capability to flag nearly all greenwashing claims (high recall), the model struggles to correctly identify non-greenwashing claims (low precision). One contributing factor is that the out-of-sample dataset contains a higher proportion and greater variety of non-greenwashing statements, which provides more opportunities for false positives. When applied to new and more complex real-world claim structures, such as those in advertisements and corporate sustainability disclosures, the model became overly sensitive to linguistic ambiguity, frequently labelling this as potential greenwashing – even when it was not. CoT-based reasoning further amplified this issue

because its detailed step-by-step interpretations transformed minor textual ambiguities into potentially misleading conclusions.

Overall, the results indicate that GPT-5-mini performs well when reproducing regulatory greenwashing logic. However, it does not maintain the balance between Precision and Recall in more varied, real-world contexts. The consistently high Recall values across both datasets suggest that the model is effective in detecting potential greenwashing risks, however, its low Precision in out-of-sample tests indicates a limited ability to distinguish genuine greenwashing from non-greenwashing sustainability statements. Increasing the number of examples in the prompt from zero-shot to five-shot and eight-shot slightly improves Precision (from 0.1365 to 0.1425 to 0.1467) in out-of-sample testing – but only to a limited extent.

6.5 Additional Tests

6.5.1 Performance in Relation to Identifying Greenwashing Indicators

The main results reported in Section 6.4 focus on the final binary classification task. Here, we examine the intermediate stage, evaluating how accurately the model identifies a specific indicator category before determining whether a claim is greenwashing or not. Following standard practice in multi-label text classification, we report micro Precision, micro Recall, and micro F1 to evaluate overall predictive performance, as well as macro F1 to assess whether the result is robust when considering performance consistency across indicators.[93] This evaluation is conducted for all CoT-based prompts.[94] The analysis uses the same test datasets and prompts as in the main test, with the difference being in the evaluation target. Here, we assess whether the model correctly identifies indicator categories, rather than whether it reaches the correct overall greenwashing decision. Results are presented in Table VI-3.

[93] As category identification is a multi-label classification task, we report five evaluation metrics: (1) exact match accuracy, (2) micro precision, (3) micro recall, (4) micro F1, and (5) macro F1 (see Zhang & Zhou, 2013). Exact match accuracy measures whether the model correctly predicts all categories for a claim. This is a strict measurement. Under this metric, a decision is counted as incorrect if even one relevant category is wrongly included. Micro Precision indicates how well the model avoids predicting indicators that are not present. Higher micro Precision means the model is not adding extra or irrelevant indicators. Micro Recall indicates how fully the model captures indicators that are present. Higher micro Recall means the model is not missing indicators that should be detected. Micro F1 summarises overall classification performance across all indicators and is influenced by frequent categories. Macro F1 averages performance across indicator categories, giving equal weight to both common and rare categories. Macro Precision and Recall are not reported because our focus is on overall model behaviour, rather than the diagnosis of class-specific error patterns (Zhang & Zhou, 2013).

[94] Non-CoT prompts instruct the model to produce only a final classification decision and do not require it to assess any greenwashing indicators. Because they do not generate indicator-level reasoning, they are not included in this category-classification evaluation.

Table VI-3 Additional Test for Indicator Classification Accuracy

Prompt Configuration	Exact Match Accuracy	Micro Precision	Micro Recall	Micro F1	Macro F1
zero_shot_cot	6.17	28.26	91.54	43.19	38.12
five_shot_cot	19.75	37.98	88.06	53.07	50.43
eight_shot_cot	20.16	37.30	87.56	52.31	46.66

Note: Table VI-3 shows the results of the additional test evaluating category-level classification performance. The table reports exact match accuracy, micro precision, micro recall, micro F1, and macro F1 scores for three chain-of-thought prompting configurations. Micro Precision indicates how well the model avoids predicting indicators that are not present. Higher micro Precision means the model is not adding extra or irrelevant indicators. Micro Recall indicates how fully the model captures the indicators present. Higher micro Recall means the model is not missing indicators that should be detected. Micro F1 shows the balance between Precision and recall. Macro F1 averages performance across all indicators to show how consistently the model performs across both frequent and less frequent categories.

Overall performance at the indicator level is substantially lower than in the final decision task, reflecting the greater difficulty of multi-label prediction. The indicator-level classification task shows much lower exact match accuracy (6.17%–20.16%) and lower F1 performance (micro F1: 43.19–53.07; macro F1: 38.12–50.43), compared to the main result.

The five-shot and eight-shot CoT prompts perform similarly, achieving exact match accuracy of 19.75% and 20.16%, respectively, and higher micro (53.07 and 52.31) and macro F1 (50.43 and 46.66) scores than the zero-shot CoT configuration (micro F1 = 43.19, macro F1 = 38.12). This indicates that providing examples in the prompt helps the model better identify the correct greenwashing indicators.

However, micro Precision remains low (28.26–37.98) and micro Recall is consistently high (87.56–91.54), suggesting that the model tends to over-identify indicators. This pattern may help to explain why CoT prompting does not always improve the final binary classification and may result in higher false positives. As CoT requires the model to evaluate each indicator step-by-step, it can encourage more stringent assessments. When the model over-identifies indicators, the final outcome is more likely to involve classifying a claim as greenwashing.

6.5.2 Alternative Prompting Strategy

The high false positive in the main results led us to question whether limited out-of-sample performance was caused by the overly strict structure of the CoT prompt. In the main test design, the model was required to complete two fixed steps: first, classify each of the five indicators as either present or absent; and second, classify a claim as greenwashing if any indicator is present. While this structure promoted consistent reasoning, it may have made the

model too rigid and overly sensitive to minor linguistic features, reducing its flexibility when applied to more diverse or complex claims.

To address this limitation, we developed an alternative prompt design. This alternative prompt design retained the five indicators as conceptual guidance but removed a requirement to explicitly classify each indicator. Instead, the indicators were provided as soft reference instructions to inform the model's reasoning, rather than determining the outcome directly. The decision process relies on a single overall judgment balancing evidence across indicators. Three modified prompt configurations were tested: (1) instruction only, which supplied the five indicators as background guidance; (2) instruction and examples, which combined indicator descriptions with eight contextual examples; and (3) examples only, which provided eight examples without any indicator references. Examples provided in the prompts are the same eight examples used earlier but, in this setting, they are labelled only as greenwashing or non-greenwashing. They are not strictly mapped to indicator categories. Each example still includes a short reasoning explanation, but this reasoning is holistic rather than being analysed indicator-by-indicator (e.g., identifying why a claim is misleading without separately assigning each part of the explanation to one indicator). Details of the prompts employed are listed in Appendix 7.

As shown in Table VI-4, the modified prompts produced high in-sample performance across all configurations, with F1 scores ranging from 0.9565 to 0.9701. Both Precision (0.93–0.97) and Recall (0.97–0.99) remained strong, indicating that the softer structure supported accuracy while improving flexibility. The "examples_only" prompt achieved the highest F1 score (0.9701). Compared with the main results reported above, these values represent a slight but consistent improvement across all metrics, suggesting that relaxing the rigid step-by-step reasoning requirement enhances the model's adaptability without sacrificing reliability. This result implies that example-based learning promotes more adaptive reasoning and may potentially reduce the risk of over-classification observed in the more structured CoT design.[95]

Table VI-4 Additional Tests for Alternative Prompting Configurations

Panel A: In-Sample Testing Results							
Prompt Configuration	TN	FP	FN	TP	Precision	Recall	F1
Instruction_only	10	4	1	66	0.9429	0.9851	0.9635

[95] However, these in-sample results should still be interpreted with caution, as the dataset remains biased towards greenwashing examples, inflating Recall and potentially overstating model reliability in balanced contexts.

Instruction_example	9	5	1	66	0.9296	0.9851	0.9565
Example_only	12	2	2	65	0.9701	0.9701	0.9701
Panel B: Out-of-Sample Testing Results							
Prompt Configuration	TN	FP	FN	TP	Precision	Recall	F1
Instruction_only	161	112	0	35	0.2381	1.0000	0.3846
Instruction_example	141	132	0	35	0.2096	1.0000	0.3465
Example_only	134	139	0	35	0.2011	1.0000	0.3349

Note: Table VI-4 reports the results of additional tests using alternative prompting configurations. Panel A shows the in-sample performance using the regulatory dataset, and Panel B shows the out-of-sample performance using ASA and award/assured report examples. For each prompt design, the table presents the numbers of true negatives (TN), false positives (FP), false negatives (FN), true positives (TP), along with the corresponding precision, recall, and F1 score

Out-of-sample performance improved modestly but remained relatively low overall. F1 scores ranged from 0.3349 to 0.3846, with Precision falling between 0.20 and 0.24 and Recall consistently near 1.00. While these values exceed the corresponding CoT configurations reported earlier (F1 = 0.24-0.26), they remain below the zero-shot non-CoT configuration, which continues to perform best overall (F1 = 0.4685). These figures indicate that the alternative prompts slightly increased Precision compared with the CoT configurations reported earlier in the main test, suggesting a reduction in false positives. Nevertheless, persistently high Recall combined with low Precision reveals that the model continues to over-identify potential greenwashing when applied to unfamiliar claim structures.

6.6 Conclusion and Discussion

This study examines whether a generative LLM (GPT-5-mini) can detect potential greenwashing based on the linguistic features of sustainability claims. Using a taxonomy aligned with regulatory guidelines and a multi-source dataset manually collected from regulatory and other credible sources, we find that GPT-5-mini effectively reproduces regulatory reasoning when claims resemble those commonly used in regulatory examples. In such in-sample settings, the model classifies claims with high F1 scores. However, when the model is required to assess each potential greenwashing indicator before making a final judgment through CoT, it tends to over-classify non-greenwashing claims as greenwashing. This over-classification is reduced when prompting includes examples, suggesting that contextual learning helps calibrate the model's interpretation.

The model's performance declines when applied to more diverse and complex real-world disclosures. The model continues to achieve high Recall, successfully identifying most potential greenwashing cases, but its Precision falls as it increasingly misclassifies non-greenwashing claims as greenwashing. One contributing factor is that the out-of-sample dataset contains a higher proportion and greater variety of non-greenwashing statements, providing more opportunities for false positives. This pattern suggests that the model is better at signalling areas of possible concern than determining whether a claim is definitively misleading. In practical terms, the model may serve as a helpful screening tool to highlight statements warranting closer examination – but final assessments still require human evaluation and supporting evidence.

Our study makes three key contributions. First, we develop a regulation-aligned taxonomy of language-based greenwashing, providing a structured lens for understanding how sustainability claims may mislead through wording and framing. Second, we compile an annotated dataset that brings together examples from regulatory guidelines, ASA advertising rulings, and credible sustainability disclosures. Third, we provide evidence on how prompting strategies influence the effectiveness and reliability of LLMs in analysing misleading sustainability claims. We identify the configurations in which these models perform well and those in which greater caution is required.

This study has several limitations that should be acknowledged and that point toward potential directions for future research. First, our analysis is based on GPT-5-mini, and we do not examine the performance of alternative LLMs. Since model behaviour could vary across architectures, our findings should not be interpreted as general properties of all LLMs, but rather as evidence of how one specific model replicates regulatory assessment on greenwashing. Future work could systematically evaluate a broader set of models, such as the Gemini and LLaMA families, to explore the generalisability of greenwashing detection performance.

Second, we only compare different prompting strategies and do not adjust the model's internal parameters. Prompting is a practical and low-cost way to guide the model's reasoning, but it does not allow the model to actually learn or adapt to the specific task. In other words, the model is applying its existing general knowledge rather than developing a deeper understanding of greenwashing. Future research could explore other strategies, such as fine-tuning and reinforcement learning with human feedback, to assess whether these approaches improve model performance.

Third, our in-sample dataset collected from regulatory guidelines inherently contains a higher proportion of greenwashing examples than non-greenwashing examples. Although we mitigate this imbalance by incorporating paragraphs from awarded or assured sustainability reports, these company-level disclosures can differ from product-level advertising claims in tone, communication style, and the type of evidence expected. Therefore, we cannot assume that statements regarded as non-greenwashing in corporate reports would always also be non-greenwashing in consumer-facing contexts. Future research could further broaden the dataset by collecting both greenwashing and non-greenwashing cases from additional verified and authoritative sources, especially at the product-level.

Fourth, greenwashing can arise either from language-related issues or evidence-related issues, which requires underlying data to disprove the claim. Because this study focuses on language-based indicators, it cannot capture cases where a claim is misleading due to factual inconsistencies or contradictory evidence. Future work could link textual claims to external sources of information (e.g., progress of the initiative as described in its sustainability report, actual composition of an ESG investment portfolio) to enable the detection of evidence-based greenwashing.

VII CONCLUSION

This final chapter provides a summary and concluding remarks for the thesis. Section 7.1 revisits the motivation and research objectives. Section 7.2 summarises the research design and empirical findings from the three studies. Section 7.3 discusses the main contributions. Section 7.4 outlines the limitations of the thesis and identifies directions for future research.

7.1 Revisiting the Motivation and Research Objectives

This thesis was motivated by recent clustered regulatory actions against greenwashing. With the rapid expansion and increasing mandate of sustainability and climate-related disclosures across major jurisdictions, greenwashing has become a critical threat to credible sustainability reporting. While sustainability disclosure is intended to support information users' decision making, misleading or exaggerated claims can undermine trust in financial and consumer market. In response, regulators such as the ACCC, ASIC, the SEC, and the EC have intensified their scrutiny of ESG claims, signalling that greenwashing is becoming a central regulatory priority.

Despite this growing attention, current academic research has predominantly relied on indirect measures of greenwashing, which do not reflect from how regulators identify and sanction misleading claims in practice. Therefore, the thesis aims to examine greenwashing through a regulatory lens, guided by three main research objectives. First, to develop a theoretical framework explaining how market regulators define, interpret, and act against an ambiguously defined concept like greenwashing, and how they legitimise their authority and interventions in this space. Second, to assess whether sustainability assurance can serve as a preventive mechanism that addresses the types of claims and subject matters that regulators most frequently target in enforcement actions. Third, to evaluate whether generative LLMs, if guided by regulatory greenwashing indicators, can support large-scale greenwashing detection.

7.2 Research Design and Findings

Before conducting the three studies, the thesis collects a few unique datasets that form the basis of the subsequent studies in its literature review and methodology section. First, the thesis compiles a hand-collected global database of 69 greenwashing enforcement cases from 2015–2024, together with related regulatory materials. This database records the types of claims pursued, the subject matters at issue, and the legal or regulatory bases used in enforcement. It enables the identification of the type of sustainability claims (e.g. net zero, ESG

screening process) that regulators frequently act against. Therefore, it provides a foundation for both the regulatory enforcement analysis in Study One and the relevance score measure constructed in Study Two.

Second, drawing on eight major regulatory guidelines on environmental and sustainability claims, the thesis develops a greenwashing taxonomy that distinguishes language-based indicators (e.g., vagueness, overstated compliance, confusing language, unclear scope, unclear conditions) from evidence-based indicators. This taxonomy, which demonstrates how regulators assess misleading statements, is applied in Study Three to guide the LLM's identification of potential greenwashing in a manner consistent with regulatory reasoning.

Third, a systematic review of greenwashing measurement proxies in prior literature documents how greenwashing has typically been quantified (e.g., tone measures, disclosure-performance gaps, dictionary-based indices). The review reveals a gap between these academic proxies and regulators' assessments, which focus on whether the claim itself conveys an overall misleading impression. This gap further motivates the thesis's shift toward a regulator-grounded interpretation and measurement of greenwashing.

Three studies are conducted for the thesis. Study One develops a theoretical framework for understanding how market regulators in Australia regulate this ambiguous phenomenon. The study focuses on ACCC and ASIC as the primary empirical setting. It analyses their publicly available regulatory publications, such as media releases, guidelines, case studies, and speeches, alongside six semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders. Drawing on insights from the sociology of regulation, the study identifies four interrelated forms of "regulatory work" that enable regulators to intervene in an ambiguously defined problem. Regulators first frame greenwashing as both a problem and a domain appropriate for intervention (framing regulatory appropriateness). Greenwashing is interpreted as a form of "misleading" or "deceptive" conduct, positioning it squarely within existing consumer and investor protection mandates. Second, regulators establish alignment between greenwashing enforcement and existing legal and institutional frameworks. Third, regulators reshape the concept of greenwashing through enforcement and guidance. Over time, the scope of greenwashing is broadened beyond environmental claims to include social and governance dimensions, and emphasis shifts from managerial intent towards the accuracy and clarity of claims. Fourth, regulators are aware of their limitations and build their preparedness for emerging challenges

(building regulatory preparedness), including resource constraints, evidentiary burdens, and the technical complexity of forward-looking and science-based claims.

Study Two investigates the extent to which sustainability assurance addresses the greenwashing-related subject matters identified by regulators. Using a hand-collected sample of 140 assurance reports for 105 listed companies in Australia and New Zealand from 2023, the study captures the degree of alignment between assurance subject matters and topics observed in greenwashing enforcement cases and regulatory guidance. The analysis shows that 49.5% of assurance engagements cover at least one greenwashing-related subject matter, suggesting that assurance can be relevant to areas regulators see as high risk. However, significant gaps remain. Assurance is more commonly applied to historical, quantitative metrics, such as GHG emissions and water use, while it is much less frequently applied to forward-looking commitments (e.g., net-zero targets), product-level environmental claims, or potential sustainability-related fraud, even though these areas feature prominently in regulatory scrutiny. Regression analyses identify several factors associated with higher relevance. Engagements conducted at a reasonable level of assurance, with assurance providers with higher market share, and for companies operating in industries more exposed to greenwashing enforcement are more likely to cover regulator-prioritised topics. In contrast, the relevance of assurance declines when firms rely on internally developed reporting criteria rather than established frameworks.

Study Three evaluates whether generative LLMs (using GPT-5-mini as a case in point) can detect potential greenwashing using language-based indicators from regulatory guidelines. Building on the regulatory publications and enforcement database developed in Chapter 3, the study constructs a greenwashing taxonomy aligned with regulatory guidelines, focusing on language-based indicators (e.g., vagueness, overstated compliance, unclear scope, confusing wording, and ambiguous conditions). The testing dataset is collected from multiple credible sources, including educational examples from global regulatory guidelines, ASA advertising rulings, and third-party reviewed sustainability disclosures. The study then evaluates GPT-5-mini's performance under different prompting strategies, including simple binary greenwashing-or-not decision, CoT reasoning over each indicator before making the decision, and prompts with in-context examples. The results show that GPT-5-mini can reproduce regulatory reasoning effectively when testing examples from regulatory guidelines (i.e., in-sample testings). In these in-sample settings, the model achieves high F1 scores for the binary classification of greenwashing versus non-greenwashing. However, when the model is required

to step through each indicator using CoT, it tends to over-classify non-greenwashing claims as greenwashing. Additionally, providing examples in the prompt reduces but does not fully eliminate this over-flagging tendency. When applied to more diverse, real-world disclosures (i.e., out-of-sample testings), the model's Recall remains high (successfully identify greenwashing cases) but Precision declines, as it more frequently misclassifies non-greenwashing claims as greenwashing. The findings suggest that GPT-5-mini is better suited as an early-stage screening tool that flags potentially problematic claims than as a definitive classifier of greenwashing. In practice, effective use of such models requires human judgement, contextual information, and, where relevant, external evidence.

7.3 Main Contributions of the Thesis

This thesis contributes to the literature on sustainability reporting, greenwashing, and regulatory oversight in the following ways. First, it is among the earliest studies to examine greenwashing explicitly from a regulatory perspective. Greenwashing in sustainability reporting has been documented under both voluntary and mandatory reporting regimes (Adams, 2004; Khan et al., 2020; Rodrigue, 2014). While prior research highlights the potential role of regulatory interventions in constraining greenwashing (e.g., Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Kim & Lyon, 2015; Lyon & Montgomery, 2015; Parguel et al., 2011; Tashman et al., 2019), how market regulators define greenwashing, legitimise their actions, and build regulatory capacity to combat it remains underexplored. Study One takes an initial step in addressing this gap by investigating regulatory actions in Australia that target greenwashing across corporate disclosures, product descriptions, and advertising. The study finds that, although the term greenwashing is not universally defined (Seele & Gatti, 2017), regulators consistently frame greenwashing as misleading or deceptive conduct under existing legal mandates. In doing so, they broaden its scope to encompass ESG claims and shift the emphasis from managerial intent to the accuracy and substantiation of disclosures. This study therefore provides a regulatory lens through which greenwashing can be defined, assessed, justified, and enforced as an inherently ambiguous phenomenon. Building on these insights, the thesis constructs a novel empirical database of greenwashing regulatory enforcement cases and guidelines, which enables a systematic analysis of how regulators measure and justify greenwashing as misleading and deceptive conducts. The database documents the types of claims regulators target, the industries most frequently subject to greenwashing sanctions, and the rationales behind regulators' decisions. In this way, the database refines the existing "dictionary" of greenwashing by offering a structured, regulator-grounded interpretation of the concept.

Second, the thesis extends research on sustainability assurance by evaluating whether assurance engagements address greenwashing by assuring subject matters that regulators frequently target. While prior literature debates the credibility-enhancing role of sustainability assurance (Du & Wu, 2019; Gipper et al., 2024, 2025), little is known about whether assurance directly covers the types of claims most heavily scrutinised by regulators, such as GHG emissions, net-zero targets, and ESG investment representations. The findings of Study Two indicate that although nearly half of companies' assurance engagements (49.5%) cover at least one regulator-relevant topic, substantial gaps remain. Regression analyses further show that certain characteristics of assurance engagements, such as a reasonable level of assurance and providers with greater market share, are more closely aligned with regulators' greenwashing concerns. These findings contribute to ongoing debates regarding the scope, design, and usefulness of sustainability assurance as standard setters move toward more prescriptive assurance regimes.

Third, the thesis makes a methodological contribution by developing a regulator-grounded taxonomy of greenwashing indicators and applying this taxonomy in a novel LLM setting. Existing studies often rely on tone measures, readability indices, or disclosure–performance gaps as proxies for greenwashing; however, these approaches do not reflect how regulators assess potentially misleading sustainability claims in practice. Study Three addresses this limitation by deriving a taxonomy directly from regulatory guidelines and demonstrating how a taxonomy-guided LLM can evaluate disclosures using regulatory logic. Focusing on language-based indicators, such as vagueness and unclear scope, the findings show that LLMs can identify greenwashing at scale, while also revealing important limitations related to the model's tendency to over-identify non-greenwashing as greenwashing. These insights contribute to emerging discussions on the role of AI in textual analysis, regulatory technology, and the challenges of applying LLMs to classify corporate disclosures.

Finally, the thesis offers important managerial and policy implications. For regulators, the findings inform enforcement strategies by identifying both opportunities and challenges in regulating greenwashing and by illustrating how automated tools may support preliminary greenwashing screening. For companies preparing sustainability disclosures, the results highlight specific greenwashing indicators that should be avoided to reduce greenwashing risk and enhance transparency. The findings also suggest that sustainability assurance can play a role in mitigating greenwashing risk, while current practice shows diverse inclusion of assurance subject matters. For assurance providers and standard setters, the results are timely

in light of global developments such as ISSA 5000, offering insights into the potential, and limitations, of assurance in constraining greenwashing. Collectively, the thesis contributes to broader policy discussions on how sustainability-related disclosures should be regulated and how reporting and assurance frameworks can be designed to reduce greenwashing risk to enhance the credibility of sustainability communication.

7.4 Limitations and Directions for Future Research

While this thesis offers new conceptual, empirical, and methodological insights, several limitations should be acknowledged. These limitations also point to promising avenues for future research. First, the thesis focuses on what regulators have done to date, while not capturing how firms respond to regulatory actions. As a result, it does not directly assess the consequences of regulatory enforcement, which is an important dimension for informing future regulatory actions. Future research could examine how sanctioned firms, and their industry peers, adjust their sustainability disclosures following enforcement actions. Such analyses would help regulators better understand both the intended and unintended consequences of regulation, including the trade-off between reducing greenwashing and avoiding greenhushing.

Second, Study One focuses exclusively on the Australian context and the actions of two market regulators, the ACCC and the ASIC. Although these regulators are influential and closely connected to global regulatory developments, approaches to greenwashing regulation may differ substantially across jurisdictions. Accordingly, the findings have limited generalisability. Future studies could conduct comparative analyses across countries with different legal, institutional, and enforcement frameworks to examine how regulatory legitimacy is constructed, which enforcement mechanisms are employed, and which dimensions of greenwashing are prioritised. Such research could also explore cross-jurisdictional learning and the evolving coordination between regulators and standard-setting bodies.

Third, Study Two draws on assurance reports from a single reporting year in Australia and New Zealand, which limits time-series analysis and broader generalisability. Future research could extend the dataset across multiple years and jurisdictions, examine changes following the adoption of ISSA 5000 and jurisdiction-specific mandatory regimes, and explore causal links between assurance engagements and subsequent greenwashing incidents. Moreover, Study Two focuses on regulator-identified greenwashing subject matters, which is targeted with a risk-based enforcement strategy. This focus does not imply that other disclosure topics are free from greenwashing risk, nor that assurance over them is less valuable. In

addition, pooling firm-level assurance disclosures with product-level regulatory concerns may introduce a mechanical mismatch, given that many enforcement actions target specific products, whereas assurance is typically scoped at the entity level. The construction of the relevance score also involves interpretive judgement and weighting choices, despite extensive cross-checks and sensitivity analyses. Finally, firms that provided assurance over an entire report were excluded from the main analysis due to insufficient disclosure of assured subject matters, although robustness checks indicate that this exclusion does not alter the main findings. Future research could investigate whether greater specificity in assurance reports (i.e., specific the exact subject matters instead of claiming assurance on the entire report) enhances users' ability to assess the relevance and effectiveness of assurance engagements.

Fourth, Study Three evaluates only a single model (GPT-5-mini) and relies exclusively on prompting-based strategies, without fine-tuning or reinforcement learning. The findings should therefore be interpreted as evidence relating to a specific model configuration rather than to LLMs more generally. Future work could compare multiple proprietary and open-source models (e.g., the Gemini and LLaMA families), explore fine-tuning or reinforcement learning with human feedback, and assess how these approaches affect model robustness, interpretability, and bias. The dataset used in Study Three also has inherent constraints. The in-sample regulatory guideline dataset is skewed toward greenwashing examples, and although supplemented with awarded or assured sustainability disclosures, differences in tone, audience, and evidentiary expectations mean that non-greenwashing statements in corporate reports are not fully comparable with consumer-facing advertising claims. Expanding the dataset to include more balanced greenwashing and non-greenwashing cases from additional authoritative sources, particularly at the product level, would strengthen future analyses. Finally, the study focuses on language-based indicators of greenwashing and cannot fully capture cases in which claims are misleading due to underlying factual inconsistencies or contradictory external evidence. A direction for future research is to integrate textual analysis with external data sources, such as project-level performance data, investment portfolio compositions, or verified life-cycle assessments, to facilitate the detection of evidence-based greenwashing.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Full List of Regulatory Greenwashing Cases between 2015 and 2024

Code	Used in Study No.	Region	Time	Regulator	Company Name	Topic of The Green Claim	Greenwashing Subject Matter	Reason	Industry	Description
1	3	U.S.	11/2024	SEC	INVESCO ADVISERS, INC	ESG Policy	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	The SEC charged Invesco Advisers with misleading investors about the percentage of its assets under management that were "ESG-integrated" (claiming 70–94 % when many assets were in passive ETFs that did not consider ESG factors) and noted the firm lacked a written ESG integration policy
2	3	U.S.	10/2024	SEC	WisdomTree Asset Management Inc.	Negative investment screen	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	The SEC charged WisdomTree with misstatements and compliance failures relating to three ETFs marketed as incorporating ESG factors. The firm represented that the funds would exclude companies involved in fossil fuels and tobacco, but in fact they held companies with coal mining, natural gas extraction/distribution, and/or involved in tobacco retail.
3	3	Italy	9/2024	Italian Competition Authority	Shein (Infinite Styles Services CO)	Claim of 'green' fibres	Clarity of ESG Policy; Recyclability	Vagueness	Textile and Clothing	The Italian Competition Authority has opened an investigation into Infinite Styles Services Co., examining whether environmental claims on Shein's website, particularly in sections such as "#SHEINTHEKNOW", "evoluSHEIN" and "Social Responsibility", are misleading or incomplete "green" claims
4	3	U.S.	9/2024	SEC	Keurig Dr Pepper Inc	Recyclability	Recyclability	False Claims, unclear condition	Consumer Good	The SEC charged Keurig for making inaccurate and incomplete statements in its annual reports about the recyclability of its K-Cup beverage pods. The company claimed they could be effectively recycled but failed to disclose that two major recycling firms told it they would not accept the pods or that commercial recycling was not feasible.
5	3	Hungary	8/2024	Hungarian Competition Authority	Coca-Cola HBC Magyarország Kft	Product Recyclability	Recyclability	No evidence	Consumer Good	The Hungarian Competition Authority has launched proceedings against Coca-Cola HBC Magyarország Kft. and related entities on suspicion that claims such as "Recycle me, I am a 100% recyclable PET bottle" and "100% recyclable" on Naturaqua mineral water and soft-drink bottles, because the company is unlikely to have sufficient evidence to justify the environmental benefits of the bottles
6	3	Hungary	8/2024	Hungarian Competition Authority	Fonte Viva Kft	Recycled Plastic	Waste management	No evidence	Consumer Good	The Hungarian Competition Authority has opened proceedings against Fonte Viva Kft., suspecting that labels and advertising for Fonte Natura mineral waters using phrases such as "100% recycled PET bottle", "100% rePET", because the company is unlikely to have sufficient evidence to justify the environmental benefits of the bottles

7	3	Hungary	8/2024	Hungarian Competition Authority	Szentkirályi Hungary Kft.	Recycled Plastic	Waste management	No evidence	Consumer Good	The Hungarian Competition Authority has launched proceedings against Szentkirályi Hungary Kft., suspecting that its "Get in the Cycle" campaign and claims such as "Collect selectively!", "100% recyclable", and "Bottle to bottle, 50% rePET" on Szentkirályi mineral waters and flavoured drinks may mislead consumers about recyclability and recycled content, because the company is unlikely to have sufficient evidence to justify the environmental benefits of the bottles
8	1, 3	Australia	8/2024	ASIC	Mercer Superannuation (Australia) Limited (Mercer)	negative investment screen	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	The ASIC has found that Mercer claimed its seven "Sustainable Plus" investment options excluded companies involved in alcohol, gambling, and carbon-intensive fossil fuels, even though the options held investments in companies operating in those industries. The claims were made on Mercer's website.
9	1, 3	Australia	6/2024	ASIC	LGSS Pty Ltd (trustee of Active Super)	Investment restriction list	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	The ASIC has found that Active Super claimed it would not invest in industries such as gambling and tobacco, but the fund held indirect exposures to these industries through pooled investments. The claims appeared across: (1) website and social media statements, (2) its sustainable and responsible investment policy, (3) the annual Impact Report website, (4) product disclosure statements, and (5) public statements by a senior executive on behalf of Active Super.
10	1, 3	Australia	5/2024	ASIC	Fertoz Limited (Fertoz)	Reforestation Project Carbon Restoration	Reforestation	No evidence	Farming	The ASIC has found that Fertoz made inaccurate statements about the progress and timeline of its reforestation project by asserting it would secure partners or funding and begin planting by the end of 2023, despite already ending discussions with potential partners and lacking concrete plans or funding to meet these milestones. The claims were made in a presentation update published on the ASX.
11	3	EU	4/2024	Consumer Protection Cooperation Network	20 airlines	CO2 emissions; Sustainable Fuel; net-zero greenhouse gas emissions (GHG)	Net Zero; Carbon neutral, low emissions	Vagueness	Transportation	The Consumer Protection Cooperation Network has found that 20 major airlines made misleading environmental claims, including statements about sustainable flying, carbon neutrality, and climate-friendly ticket options that lacked substantiation or relied on carbon offset schemes likely to mislead consumers.
12	1, 3	Australia	4/2024	ACCC	Clorox Australia Pty Ltd	Recycled Ocean Plastic	Waste management	Exaggerated claim	Consumer Good	The ACCC has alleged that Clorox claimed its Kitchen Tidy Bags and Garbage Bags were made from 50% recycled "ocean plastic," even though the plastic was sourced from communities up to 50 kilometres from the shoreline rather than from the ocean. The claims appeared on the product packaging.
13	1, 3	Australia	3/2024	ASIC	Vanguard Investments Australia Ltd	ESG exclusionary screens	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	The ASIC has found that Vanguard claimed investments in its "Ethically Conscious Global Aggregate Bond Index Fund" had undergone ESG screening, when approximately 74% of securities had not been assessed against ESG criteria. The misleading statements appeared in: (1) 12 product disclosure statements, (2) a media release, (3) statements on Vanguard's website, (4) a Finance News Network YouTube interview, and (5) a presentation at a Finance News Network Fund Manager Event published online.

14	3	U.K.	3/2024	CMA	ASOS, Boohoo and George at Asda	Responsible edit Ready for the Future' George for Good	Clarity of ESG Policy	Vagueness	Textile and Clothing	The CMA secured formal undertakings from ASOS, Boohoo and George at Asda following an investigation into their environmental claims. The regulator found that their marketing of eco-ranges (e.g., "Responsible Edit", "Ready for the Future", "George for Good") used vague and broad language, did not always provide clear supporting information about materials or processes.
15	1, 3	Australia	2/2024	ASIC	Melbourne Securities Corporation Limited	Negative screening process	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	The ASIC has found that Melbourne Securities claimed its fund avoided investments in fossil fuels, although the investment strategy allowed investments in companies deriving up to 33% of revenue from excluded activities, including fossil fuels. The claims were made in its Product Disclosure Statements.
16	3	EU	2/2024	Consumer Protection Cooperation Network	Zalando	Recycled material, clarity of sustainability policy	Clarity of ESG Policy; Waste management	Vagueness	Textile and Clothing	The Consumer Protection Cooperation Network has found that Zalando used vague and unsubstantiated sustainability claims on its online platform, including broad terms such as "sustainable" or "eco-friendly," and applied environmental labels without clear criteria or evidence.
17	1, 3	Australia	12/2023	ASIC	Northern Trust Asset Management Australia Pty Ltd	Carbon Emissions Exclusion Screen	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	The ASIC has found that Northern Trust claimed its fund excluded companies based on carbon-emission and management score thresholds, but the fund included companies that should have been excluded under the stated policy. The claims were made in its Product Disclosure Statements.
18	3	U.K.	12/2023	CMA	Unilever	Recyclability, and 'natural' looking images and logos	Recyclability	Vagueness	Consumer Good	The CMA announced a formal investigation into Unilever's "green" claims for household products such as cleaning goods and toiletries, expressing concern that the claims may be overstating how green certain products are through the use of vague and broad claims, unclear statements around recyclability, and 'natural' looking images and logos
19	1, 3	Australia	12/2023	ASIC	Morningstar Investment Management Australia Limited	ESG Policy. To exclude investments	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	The ASIC has found that Morningstar claimed its fund had no exposure to weapons based on Sustainalytics research, even though the fund held exposure through an ETF that invested in weapons manufacturers. The claims were made in: (1) the Product Disclosure Statement and (2) the ESG Policy published on Morningstar's website.
20	1, 3	Australia	11/2023	ACCC	MOO Premium Foods Pty Ltd (MOO)	Recycled Ocean Plastic	Waste management	Exaggerated claim	Consumer Good	The ACCC has found that MOO claimed its yoghurt tubs were made from "100% ocean plastic," although the plastic resin was collected from coastal areas in Malaysia rather than directly from the ocean. The claims appeared on: (1) product packaging, (2) social media, and (3) the company's website.
21	3	U.S.	9/2023	SEC	DWS Investment Management Americas, Inc. (DIMA)	ESG integration policy	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	The SEC charged DIMA for making misstatements about its ESG investment-process while also failing to implement reasonably designed anti-money-laundering (AML) controls for the mutual funds it advised
22	1, 3	Australia	4/2023	ASIC	Future Super Investment Services Pty Ltd	Move investment out of fossil fuels	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	The ASIC has found that Future Super claimed it had moved nearly $400 million out of fossil fuels, a figure equal to its total holdings, implying—without basis—that all funds under management had been invested in fossil fuels and were now fossil-fuel-free. The claims were made on the fund's Facebook page.

23	1, 3	Australia	12/2022	ASIC	Diversa Trustees Limited (Diversa)	Negative screening process	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	The ASIC has found that Diversa claimed its Cruelty Free Super (CFS) option avoided investments in companies involved in activities such as pollution and carbon-intensive operations, even though exclusions were narrower and applied more limitedly than the CFS website suggested. The claim appeared on the product's website.
24	1, 3	Australia	12/2022	ASIC	Black Mountain Energy Ltd (BME)	Net zero	Net Zero; Carbon neutral, low emissions	No evidence	Oil and Gas	The ASIC has found that Black Mountain Energy made statements about achieving net-zero carbon emissions and producing carbon-neutral natural gas through "Project Valhalla," despite lacking plans, allocated funding, emissions modelling, or feasible approaches to meet the stated goals. The claims were made in: (1) an Investor Presentation on the ASX, (2) an Investor Update on the ASX, and (3) a Good Oil Conference presentation published on the ASX.
25	1, 3	Australia	12/2022	ASIC	Vanguard Investments Australia Ltd	exclude (negative investment screen) MSCI Index	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	The ASIC has found that Vanguard claimed its fund used an exclusion screen preventing investments in companies with significant tobacco-related business activities, although the fund could still invest in companies selling tobacco products. The claims were made in its Product Disclosure Statements.
26	3	U.S.	11/2022	SEC	Goldman Sachs Asset Management, L.P	Proprietary ESG questionnaire	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	The SEC charged GSAM with failing to consistently follow its stated ESG investment policies. The firm marketed certain funds as ESG-focused even though its processes did not match its published ESG strategy.
27	1, 3	Australia	10/2022	ASIC	Tlou Energy Limited	Carbon neutral Low emissions Clean energy	Net Zero; Carbon neutral, low emissions	No evidence	Oil and Gas	The ASIC has found that Tlou made claims about carbon neutrality, solar power capacity, and low emissions without conducting the necessary research, modelling, or feasibility studies. The company lacked approvals, infrastructure, and concrete plans to implement the clean-energy features it promoted. The claims were made in: (1) an Operational Report published to the ASX and (2) a presentation on Tlou's business operations published to the ASX.
28	3	U.S.	9/2022	SEC	Compass Minerals International Inc.	Financial risks of mercury contamination	Waste management	selective disclosure	Mining	The SEC found that Compass misled investors by saying a new technology upgrade at its main salt mine would lower costs, when in fact costs rose. It also failed to timely disclose risks from mercury contamination in Brazil
29	3	Netherlands	8/2022	Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM)	H&M	More-sustainable materials Conscious Choice	Clarity of ESG Policy	Vagueness	Textile and Clothing	The ACM found H&M used sustainability-terms such as "Conscious" and "Conscious Choice" without clearly substantiating what those claims meant, or providing clear benefit information.
30	3	Netherlands	8/2022	Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM)	Decathlon	Guaranteeing excellent use characteristics Ecodesign	Clarity of ESG Policy	Vagueness	Textile and Clothing	The ACM found that Decathlon made general sustainability claims, such as "Ecodesign" and "Environmental labelling system", without clearly specifying what they meant or how products benefited the environment.

31	3	U.S.	7/2022	SEC	Health Insurance Innovations (HII)	consumer satisfaction	Consumer satisfaction	False Claims	Health	The SEC charged HII with misleading investors about customer satisfaction and complaint rates for its health insurance products. HII told investors in earnings calls and investor presentations that HII's consumer satisfaction was 99.99 percent. In reality, HII tracked tens of thousands of dissatisfied consumers.
32	3	Norway	6/2022	Norwegian Consumer Authority	H&M	Higg Index (Certification)	Clarity of ESG Policy; ESG Policy Implementation	Invalid Certification	Textile and Clothing	The Norwegian Consumer Authority has warned H&M that using Higg MSI data to market garments with specific environmental benefits is likely to be misleading and unlawful, because the index's global average figures do not adequately substantiate product-specific claims about reduced environmental impact.
33	3	Norway	6/2022	Norwegian Consumer Authority	Norrona	Higg Index (Certification)	Clarity of ESG Policy; ESG Policy Implementation	Invalid Certification	Textile and Clothing	The Norwegian Consumer Authority has concluded that Norrona's marketing of organic cotton garments using Higg MSI scores to claim large reductions in environmental impact is misleading and therefore prohibited, because the index's global average figures do not adequately substantiate product-specific claims about reduced environmental impact.
34	3	U.S.	5/2022	SEC	BNY Mellon	ESG Quality Review	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	The SEC said BNY Mellon misled investors by claiming that all holdings in certain funds went through an "ESG quality review," when many holdings had not.
35	3	U.S.	4/2022	SEC	Vale S.A	Dam Safety	Safety	False Claims	Mining	The SEC charged Vale for making false and misleading ESG disclosures about the safety of its dams before the Brumadinho dam collapse. Vale assured investors of compliance with environmental and safety standards while knowing of serious deficiencies.
36	3	U.S.	8/4/2022	FTC	Kohl's Inc.	100% Bamboo Sustainable Bamboo eco-friendly	Material used in production	False Claims	Textile and Clothing	The FTC has charged that Kohl's falsely marketed dozens of rayon textile products as made of "bamboo" and claimed they were produced using environmentally friendly processes, when in fact bamboo was converted into rayon using toxic chemicals that generate hazardous pollutants.
37	3	U.S.	4/2022	FTC	Walmart	eco-friendly sustainable renewable 100% Bamboo	Material used in production	False Claims	Textile and Clothing	The FTC has charged that Walmart advertised rayon textiles as "bamboo" and made eco-friendly claims about those products, despite the manufacturing process actually involving toxic chemicals and resulting pollutantions.
38	3	U.S.	2/2022	SEC	Wahed Invest LLC	compliant with Islamic, or Shari'ah law,	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	The SEC charged Wahed with making misleading statements: it claimed to offer proprietary funds when none existed; promised to rebalance accounts but didn't; and failed to adopt proper compliance procedures to assure Shari'ah compliance.
39	3	Canada	1/2022	Competition Bureau Canada	Keurig Canada Inc	Product Recyclability	Recyclability	False Claims, unclear condition	Consumer Good	The Competition Bureau has found that Keurig Canada made false or misleading claims that its single-use K-Cup pods could be widely recycled in Canada, even though recycling facilities in many provinces did not accept them. Keurig also misrepresented the environmental impacts of the pods' disposal.

40	3	German	12/2021	Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)	Deutsche Bank AG	ESG integration policy	ESG Policy Implementation	False Claims	Asset Management	BaFin has imposed an administrative fine on Deutsche Bank AG for misleading statements that investments would help counteract climate change through targeted advertising and contribute towards achieving climate goals, without providing details or evidence
41	3	U.S.	12/2021	SEC	Nikola Corporation	hydrogen technology (in vehicles)	Net Zero; Carbon neutral, low emissions	Exaggerated claim	Transportation	The SEC found that Nikola misled investors about technological advancements, in-house production capabilities, hydrogen production, truck reservations and orders, and financial outlook. It exaggerated the readiness of its zero-emission and hydrogen technologies.
42	3	U.S.	3/2021	SEC	GO ECO Manufacturing, Inc.	Misappropriated Green Investment	Management Fraud	False Claims	Asset Management	The SEC charged Tra Jay Scarlett (The sole owner of GO ECO) with falsely claiming to operate an eco-friendly drink bottling company and misappropriating funds. The company claimed to have a significant product and environmentally-friendly operations, which were never true.
43	3	U.S.	9/2020	SEC	Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V.	Product (vehicles) emissions EcoDiesel	Net Zero; Carbon neutral, low emissions	Selective disclosure	Transportation	The SEC charged Fiat Chrysler with misleading investors about its compliance with emissions regulations. The company's disclosures suggested strong environmental compliance even though internal reviews showed limited audit scope and unresolved issues.
44	3	U.S.	9/2020	SEC	Bounty of the Ocean	investment in eco-friendly desalination plant	Management Fraud	False Claims	Asset Management	The SEC charged Verley Lee "Rocky" Sembritzky Jr. (the promoter of a purported Kenyan desalination plant investment) with defrauding investors by claiming to have an operational, eco-friendly desalination technology that could deliver large returns. The technology was not proven or commercially viable.
45	3	Italy	1/2020	Italian Competition Authority	Eni S.p.A. (Appeal succeeded)	Green Diesel	Net Zero; Carbon neutral, low emissions	No evidence	Oil and Gas	The Italian Competition Authority has fined Eni €5 million for misleading advertising of its "Eni Diesel+" fuel, finding that the campaign overstated the product's environmental benefits and reductions in emissions compared with conventional diesel
46	3	U.S.	9/2019	FTC	Truly Organic Inc.	"100% organic" nor "certified organic"	Material used in production	False Claims	Beauty	The FTC has alleged that Truly Organic advertised bath and beauty products as "100% organic," "certified organic," and vegan when many products contained non-organic ingredients
47	3	U.S.	7/2019	FTC	Lights of America	Light output or brightness Product lifetime Energy savings	Energy efficiency	Exaggerated claim	Consumer Good	The FTC has charged that Lights of America overstated the light output, longevity, and equivalence to incandescent bulbs of its LED light bulbs
48	3	U.S.	11/2018	SEC	PDC Capital	Investment in environmentally friendly production facility	Management Fraud	False Claims	Asset Management	The SEC charged PDC Capital and its principal with misusing funds raised through the EB-5 visa program. Although marketed as investments in environmentally friendly or "green" projects, the funds were diverted for personal and improper uses.
49	3	U.S.	4/2018	FTC	Benjamin Moore & Co., Inc	Volatile organic compounds (VOCs)	Material used in production	No evidence	Consumer Good	The FTC has alleged that Benjamin Moore marketed certain paints as emission-free or "zero VOC" and safe for children and schools without adequate substantiation

50	3	U.S.	4/2018	FTC	ICP Construction Inc.	Volatile organic compounds (VOCs)	Material used in production	No evidence	Consumer Good	The FTC has alleged that ICP Construction claimed some of its paints were free of emissions and VOCs and safe for sensitive environments without adequate substantiation
51	3	U.S.	4/2018	FTC	YOLO Colorhouse, LLC	Volatile organic compounds (VOCs)	Material used in production	No evidence	Consumer Good	The FTC has alleged that YOLO Colorhouse marketed its paints as emission-free and VOC-free without adequate substantiation
52	3	U.S.	4/2018	FTC	Imperial Paints, LLC	Volatile organic compounds (VOCs)	Material used in production	No evidence	Consumer Good	The FTC has alleged that Imperial Paints promoted Lullaby and ECOS paints as "zero VOC" and emission-free and suitable for nurseries without adequate substantiation
53	3	U.S.	4/2018	SEC	EnviroBoard	Investment in environmentally friendly production facility	Management Fraud	False Claims	Asset Management	The SEC alleged that EnviroBoard made misleading claims to investors about its green building technology and financial prospects, overstating the commercial viability and environmental benefits of its products.
54	3	U.S.	12/2017	FTC	Moonlight Slumber	Organic and free of volatile organic compounds (VOCs)	Material used in production	No evidence	Consumer Good	The FTC has found that Moonlight Slumber advertised baby mattresses as organic, plant-based, and free of VOC emissions, and displayed a "Green Safety Shield" seal, without scientific evidence substantiating them
55	3	U.S.	9/2017	SEC	Green Box	Use their funds for an eco-friendly recycling process	Management Fraud	False Claims	Asset Management	The SEC charged Green Box and its CEO with defrauding investors by falsely claiming the company had patented green recycling technology when it did not. Funds raised for the supposed "eco-friendly" recycling process were instead misused for personal and unrelated expenses.
56	3	U.S.	5/2017	FTC	Volkswagen	Clean diesel Cheating in emission test	Management Fraud; Net Zero; Carbon neutral	Deceptive manipulation	Transportation	The FTC has charged that Volkswagen deceptively marketed certain diesel vehicles as low-emission "clean diesel" cars meeting strict environmental standards, while the cars used defeat devices that caused much higher NOx emissions in real-world driving.
57	3	U.S.	3/2017	FTC	ECM BioFilms	Biodegradability of plastic	Waste management	False Claims	Consumer Good	The FTC has concluded that ECM BioFilms made false and unsubstantiated claims that its plastic additive would make treated plastics biodegradable within certain timeframes in landfills, when evidence did not support such biodegradability claims.
58	3	U.S.	12/2016	FTC	California Naturel	All-natural sunscreen	Material used in production	False Claims	Beauty	The FTC has alleged that California Naturel sells supposedly "all natural sunscreen" on its website, though the product contains Dimethicone.
59	1, 3	Australia	9/2016	ACCC	Volkswagen	Low emission Cheating in emission test"	Management Fraud; Net Zero; Carbon neutral	Deceptive manipulation	Transportation	The ACCC has found that Volkswagen made false representations about compliance with Australian diesel emissions standards by failing to disclose 'Two Mode' software that produced lower NOx emissions during laboratory testing but higher emissions in real-world driving. Volkswagen also made misleading representations when applying for its vehicles to be listed on the Government's Green Vehicle Guide.

60	3	U.S.	7/2016	FTC	Beyond Coastal	Natural Sunscreen	Material used in production	False Claims	Beauty	The FTC has alleged that Beyond Coastal promoted its sunscreen products as “all natural” even though they contained synthetic ingredients
61	3	U.S.	7/2016	FTC	ABS Consumer Products	All-Natural Shampoo Coconut Shea All Natural Styling Elixer	Material used in production	False Claims	Beauty	The FTC has alleged that ABS Consumer Products markets haircare products on its own websites and at Walmart.com. It makes “all natural” claims for products including “Coconut Shea All Natural Styling Elixer” and “Jojoba Monoi All Natural Shampoo.” In reality, the products contain a range of synthetic ingredients such as Polyquaternium-37, Phenoxyethanol, Caprylyl Glycol, and Polyquaternium-7.
62	3	U.S.	7/2016	FTC	Erickson Marketing Group	Natural Face Stick	Material used in production	False Claims	Beauty	The FTC has alleged that Erickson Marketing Group uses its website to promote “all natural” products such as the “Natural Face Stick,” which contains Dimethicone, Polyethylene, and other synthetic ingredients.
63	3	U.S.	7/2016	FTC	Trans-India Products	All Natural Hand and Body Lotion All Natural Moisturizing Shower Gel.	Material used in production	False Claims	Beauty	The FTC has alleged that Trans-India Products markets “All Natural Hand and Body Lotion” and “All Natural Moisturizing Gel” both directly and through third-party websites including walgreens.com and vitacoast.com. The lotion contains Dimethicone, Ethyhexyl Glycerin, and Phenoxyethanol. The gel contains Phenoxyethanol.
64	3	U.S.	12/2015	FTC	Nordstrom, Inc.	Bamboo Long Sleeve Tee	Material used in production	False Claims	Textile and Clothing	The FTC has charged that Nordstrom falsely marketed rayon clothing, including “bamboo” long-sleeve tees, as bamboo
65	3	U.S.	12/2015	FTC	Bed Bath & Beyond Inc	Aden + Anais Bamboo 3-Pack Muslin Swaddles” and “Bamboo Blend Napkins	Material used in production	False Claims	Textile and Clothing	The FTC has charged that Bed Bath & Beyond mislabeled and advertised rayon textile products as being made of “bamboo”
66	3	U.S.	12/2015	FTC	J.C. Penney Company, Inc	Bamboo Socks.	Material used in production	False Claims	Textile and Clothing	The FTC has charged that J.C. Penney falsely labeled and advertised rayon apparel such as “bamboo” socks as made of bamboo
67	3	U.S.	12/2015	FTC	Backcountry. com, LLC	Bamboo Crew Sock	Material used in production	False Claims	Textile and Clothing	The FTC has charged that Backcountry.com misrepresented rayon textiles (including “bamboo” crew socks) as bamboo products
68	3	U.S.	11/2015	FTC	Nice-Pak Products	Flushability of wipes	Waste managemen t	False Claims, unclear condition	Consume r Good	The FTC has found that Nice-Pak falsely advertised certain moist wipes as “flushable” and safe for sewer and septic systems without adequate evidence that they would break down quickly enough to avoid plumbing and wastewater problems.
69	3	U.S.	11/2012	SEC	BP	Oil spill flow rate	Safety	False Claims	Oil and Gas	The SEC charged BP with misleading investors by significantly understating the flow rate of oil from the Deepwater Horizon spill in its securities filings

Appendix 2 Regulatory Guidelines for Defining Greenwashing

We establish the greenwashing taxonomy by reviewing, summarizing, and reconciling the greenwashing categories based on the eight regulatory guidelines across multiple jurisdictions.

1. Making environmental claims: A guide for business (ACCC, 2023)
1. Greenwashing by businesses in Australia – findings of ACCC's internet sweep (ACCC, 2023)
2. Green marketing and the Australian Consumer Law (ACCC, 2011)
3. Information Sheet 271 (INFO 271) – How to avoid greenwashing when offering or promoting sustainability-related products (ASIC, 2022)
4. Empower Consumers for the Green Transition (EC, 2024)
5. Green Claims Directive (EC, 2023)
6. CMA guidance on environmental claims on goods and services (CMA, 2021)
7. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims (FTC, 2012)

Appendix 3 List of 238 Distinct Assurance Subject Matters Collected from the Assurance Reports in Study Two

Category	Assurance Subject Matters
GHG Emissions	Scope 1 Emission, Scope 2 Emission, Scope 3 Emission, Scope 1 Stationary Combustion, Scope 1 Fuel combustion, Scope 1 Mobile combustion, Scope 1 Fugitive emissions, Scope 1 refrigerant losses, Scope 2 Electricity consumption, Scope 2 Steam consumption, Scope 3 1.Purchased goods and services, Scope 3 2.Capital goods, Scope 3 3.Fuel and energy related activities, Scope 3 4.Upstream distribution and transportation, Scope 3 5.Waste, Scope 3 6.Business travel, Scope 3 7.Employee commuting, Scope 3 8: Upstream Leased Assets, Scope 3 9: Downstream transportation and distribution, Scope 3 10: Processing of Sold Products, Scope 3 11: Use of sold products (Customer emissions), Scope 3 13.Downstream leased assets, Scope 3 14.Franchises, Scope 3 15: Investments, Emissions from Employee Working From Home, Group air travel, Category 1: Direct emissions and removals, Category 2: Indirect GHG emissions from imported energy, Category 3: Indirect GHG emissions from transportation, Category 4: Indirect GHG emissions from products used by organization, Category 5: Indirect emissions associated with the use of products from the organisation, Category 6 Indirect emissions from other sources, Reduction of GHG emissions (GRI 305-5), GHG Emission Intensity, Emission Intensity of Total Revenue, Controlled Generation Intensity, Carbon Offset & Credit, Carbon Neutrality, Carbon Footprint, Carbon Intensity/carbon intensity movement, Decarbonisation
Other Emissions	NOx emissions
Energy	Clean Transportation (EV, Fleet), Total Electricity Consumption, Renewable Electricity, Total Energy Consumption (GRI 302), Total Energy Generation, Energy Intensity/Energy Intensity movement, Energy efficiency, Energy rating, Renewable Energy Consumption, Renewable Energy Generation, % of Renewable Energy over Total Energy Consumption, Renewable Energy investment/initiatives, Controlled Renewable & Battery Capacity, Phase out of oil, gas, thermal coal exposures, Fuel Consumption, Gas Consumption, Gas Efficiency, Natural Gas Efficiency, Hydrocarbon Production/Methane, Flared gas, Stationary LPG
Water	Water Source, Produced water, Water Consumption (=water withdrawal-water discharge), Water efficiency, Water intensity, Wastewater diverted to beneficial land application, Water stewardship progress and practices, Water rating
Environmental Incidents	Environmental Regulatory Reportable Incident, Environmental Incidents, Community Environmental Complaint, Environmental Prosecution, Extreme Weather, Natural Disaster, Public Policy Shift
Waste recycling and materials	Recyclable Packaging, Recyclable Plastic, Recyclable Paper and Cardboard, Total recycling/Recycling rate (%), Cardboard Waste, Organic Waste, Clinic Waste, Waste Generation (GRI 306-3), Waste diversion, Waste diverted from disposal (GRI 306-4), Waste directed to disposal (GRI 306-5), Waste Going to Landfill, Waste Going from Landfill, Waste Going to Recycle/Recycled waste, Waste Management, Waste Intensity, Landfill Gas, Tailing, Sustainable Raw Material/Material Sourcing, Materials used by weight or volume (GRI 301-1), Recoverable Oil
Green Investment and Initiatives	Green Bond/Environmental Financing, Climate Bonds' Proceeds Use Policy and Procedure, Climate Bond-funded Project's Evaluation and Selection Process, Climate Bond-funded Projects' Environmental Performance Information, Climate Bonds Proceeds' Management Policy and Procedure, Climate Bonds Proceeds' Use and Eligible Investments Reporting Procedures, [Insurance Companies Only] Underwriting - Gross Written Premium (GWP) from Mining and Fossil Fuel Power Generation Activities, Green Revenue Percentage, Green Energy Asset, Environment-related Collaboration, Ethical Investment/social impact investment (GRI 201), Low carbon investment, Financed emission, Proactive Engagement Followed by Commitment to Change, Completion of Environment-related Review, Climate change solutions exposure, Sustainability Fund
Customer	Number of Customers, Number of Customer Complaint, Customer care, Number of Customers in Customer Care Program (Program can have any name), Debt Level of

	Customers in the Customer Care Program (Program can have any name), Customer Loyalty (NPS), Digitally active customers, Indigenous Customer, Cost of Consumer Sustainability Awareness
Employee Safety	Employee or/and Contractor TRIFR/TIFR (GRI 403), Employee or/and Contractor LTIFR, Employee or/and Contractor injuries/injury rate/work-related ill health, Employee or/and Contractor Fatality, Safety-related Worker's Compensation, Health Safety and Environment (HSE) Risk Control, Safety Hazard/safety events, Safety Near Miss, Critical Safety Incident Frequency Rate/numbers, Occupational Illness/Days Away from Work Injury Frequency Rate (DAWIFR), Safety Index, Safety Fines/Prosecutions
Employee Engagement, Diversity & Inclusion	Total workforce, Employee Headcount, Total Hours Worked, Employment Status, Employee composition, Employee Age, Contract Type (Permanent/Fixed Term, Full Time/Part Time, etc), Employee Background Region, Indigenous Employment, Employee Turnover (GRI 401-1), New Hire (GRI 401-1), Talent Retention, Employee Absenteeism, Return to work rate following parental leave, Parental Leave, Breach of Code of Conduct, Training for Code of Conduct/Compliance, Employee/Trainees Training, Mental Health Training, Cultural Awareness Training data, Indigenous Training, Employee Human Right Training, Employee Yeas of Service, Employee satisfaction, Employee Inclusion , Employee Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreements, Employee Care Program, Employee Engagement, Human Right, Votable Meetings Where Proxy Votes Cast, Vote against Management Recommendation, Number of whistleblower disclosures, Generational Diversity, Diversity (except women) of Board, Diversity (except women) of Leadership, Diversity (except women) of Non-leadership, Women on Board of Directors, Women in Executive, Women in Management, Women as Professional, Women In General, Ratio of basic salary, women to men/Gender Pay Gap, Pay Parity (except gender), Remuneration Ratio
Supplier	New suppliers that were screened using social criteria (GRI 414-1), Supplier Human Right Due Diligence, Operations and suppliers at significant risk (GRI 408-1), Supplier Sustainability Rating, Supplier Governance, Local Supplier, Supply chain management, Supplier diversity, Ethical Sourcing, Supplier Relation
Community	Community Contribution, No/Low Alcohol Products, Cultural Heritage & Indigenous, Disability Employment, Humanitarian Aid, Cash and stock donations, Employees volunteered
Data Security and Privacy	IT Incident, Privacy Incident, Data Privacy, System Privacy Assessment, Cybersecurity Training
Product Safety	Safety-related Product Recall, [Agricultural Companies] Food Safety
Business Ethics	Responsible business, Business Integrity
Regulatory Compliance and Risk	Environmental Fines/Penalties, Climate resilience, Regulatory Audit, Incidents of non-compliance concerning the health and safety impacts of products and services (GRI 416-2), Governance and Risk Management, Credit Risk, Administrative Penalty (fines, direction notice, infringement notice)
Economic and Financing	Climate-related Price Fluctuation, Economic Value Generation, Economic Value Distribution, Digital economy, Economic Performance
Land and biodiversity	Land management, Commercial property management, Biodiversity, Afforestation/Tree (Re)planting
Others	Whole non-financial report, Partial annual report/non-financial report with reference outside the assurance report, Whole GHG statement, Number of Patients, Number of Examinations, % of Patient Incidents of Total Examinations, Added Sugar Removal from Food Product, Total R&D Investment, Plasma Donor Survey, Conflict-free Gold Standard Compliance, Hospital accreditation, Never Event, Rate of Unplanned Readmission within 28 Days, Rate of Unplanned Return to Theatre during Same Admission, Rate of Hospital Acquired Staphylococcus Aureus Bacteraemia

Appendix 4 Variable Definition in Study Two

Variable	Definition	Source
Dependent Variables		
RelevanceScore	The total relevance score for company *i*.	Manual Collection
RelevanceScore_Res	The residual from the regression of the total relevance score (*RelevanceScore*) on the total number of subject matters assured (*NumSubjectMatterAssured*).	Manual Collection
RelevanceScore_Res_NoIndustry	The residual from the regression of the total relevance score (*RelevanceScore*) on the total number of subject matters assured (*NumSubjectMatterAssured*), without applying industry-weighting adjustment.	Manual Collection
Independent Variables		
LevAssur	A binary variable that equals 1 if the assurance provided is entirely reasonable, and 0 otherwise.	Manual Collection
ProviderMarketShare	The number of sustainability assurance reports issued by an assurance provider across Australia and New Zealand. in FY2023 over the total number of assurance reports issued in FY2023. When multiple providers are involved, the maximum value is used.	Manual Collection
CriteriaOwn	A binary variable that equals 1 if the applied criteria include company self-developed reporting criteria, and 0 otherwise.	Manual Collection
RiskyIndustry	A binary variable that equals 1 if the sector experienced more than one greenwashing case in the past three years (2022-2024), and 0 otherwise.	Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium
Control Variables		
NumSubjectMatterAssured	The total number of subject matters assured.	Manual Collection
LnNumSubjectMatterAssured	The natural logarithm of the total number of subject matters assured.	Manual Collection
ESGScore	Environmental, social, and governance performance score.	Refinitiv
Size	The natural logarithm of total assets.	SIRCA
ROA	Return on assets measured by earnings before interest scaled by total assets less outside equity interests.	SIRCA
GrowthAsset	Firm growth measured by changes in total assets scaled by beginning total assets.	Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium
Lev	Total liabilities divided by total assets.	Compustat
InstitOwnership	The percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors.	SIRCA
Country_dummy	A binary variable that equals 1 if the company is primarily listed in Australia, and 0 if the company is primarily listed in New Zealand.	SIRCA
Crosslist	A binary variable that equals 1 if the company is listed in both ASX and NZSE, and 0 otherwise.	SIRCA

Appendix 5 Greenwashing Taxonomy and its Descriptions (Language-based Indicators Only)

Indicator	Description
Vagueness	Greenwashing due to vagueness arises when companies use imprecise or ambiguous language to communicate their environmental practices or products. Such claims often lack specific, measurable, or verifiable information, making it difficult for consumers to assess their validity. A claim can be flagged as vague if it fails to clearly articulate whether it addresses specific ESG benefits, what those benefits are, or how they are achieved. For example, phrases like “eco-friendly", “green", or “sustainable" are frequently used without clear definitions or standards. The potential vagueness issue has been discussed in almost all the regulatory guidelines.
Overstating Compliance or Standard Features	Greenwashing due to overstating compliance or standard features arises when firms advertise compliance with mandatory environmental regulations or features that offer no real environmental benefit. This type of greenwashing involves exaggerating the environmental merit of a product, service, or business by highlighting compliance with basic legal requirements, industry norms, or standard features – as if they were special environmental achievements. Even if technically accurate, such claims mislead consumers by suggesting that the company or product is superior in terms of sustainability, when in fact it is merely fulfilling routine obligations. This issue has been discussed in regulatory guidelines by the ACCC, EC, and CMA.
Confusing Language	Greenwashing due to confusing language arises when firms use technical jargon, scientific terminology, or unclear wording that average consumers may not easily understand. Regulators suggest companies should use clear, plain, and commonly understood language, and that any necessary qualifications or disclosures should be presented in a way that is easy for ordinary consumers to notice and comprehend. Confusing or poorly explained language can mislead consumers about the environmental benefits of a product or service. This issue has been discussed in regulatory guidelines by the ACCC, ASIC, CMA, and FTC.
Unclear Scope	Greenwashing due to unclear scope arises when businesses fail to clearly define the scope of their environmental claims, leading information users to wrongly believe that the claimed benefits apply more broadly than they do. It includes two common patterns: (1) omitting clarification about the life cycle stage to which the claim applies (e.g., production, use, disposal) and (2) failing to specify the proportion of the product, packaging, or process to which a green attribute applies. Such practices risk misleading consumers into overestimating the sustainability performance of a product, service, or business. This issue has been discussed in regulatory guidelines by the ACCC, EC, CMA, and FTC.
Unclear Conditions	Greenwashing due to unclear conditions arises when businesses fail to disclose the specific conditions under which an environmental benefit can be realised, such as a need for specialised infrastructure, proper disposal methods, or location-specific facilities. Claims like ‘recyclable,’ ‘biodegradable,’ or ‘compostable’ may be technically accurate in ideal (e.g., lab) conditions but are misleading if such conditions are unlikely to be met in normal consumer use or in most regions where the product is sold. For example, ‘recyclable’ claims are misleading if the local recycling infrastructure is inaccessible. This issue has been discussed in regulatory guidelines by the ACCC, CMA, and FTC.

Appendix 5 outlines the language-based greenwashing indicators used in the study. These indicators are developed from eight key regulatory guidelines published by ACCC, ASIC, CMA, EC, and FTC. The taxonomy is applied at the claim level and focuses on communication rather than verifying the evidence of underlying sustainability performance.

Appendix 6 Greenwashing and Non-greenwashing Examples for In-sample and Out-of-Sample Testings

Dataset	Source	Greenwashing	Non-greenwashing
In-sample	Regulatory Guidelines	A company supplying consumers with electricity makes claims in advertisements, such as billboards, with the headline: 'Go 100% green with us – you'll save money and the planet with the UK's cheapest and greenest energy supplier.' This appears above a graphic which shows an image of the sun shining on a green leaf motif. Underneath is, '[company name]: the eco-friendly energy provider. To switch, call xxxxxxxxxx or go to www.xxxxxxxx.co.uk.' The advert contains nothing else.	A company uses 100% non-renewable energy to manufacturer all parts of its product but powers the assembly process entirely with renewable energy. The marketer advertised its product as "assembled using renewable energy,"
Out-of-Sample	ASA Rulings	A paid-for X (formerly Twitter) post for TotalEnergies, seen on 21 May 2024, featured an introductory caption that stated, "Uncover how TotalEnergies' electricity start-up accelerator program has supported start-ups like Nash Renewables". A video embedded in the post detailed TotalEnergies' work with the company NASH Renewables and included images of wind turbines and people working in an office. A voice-over, from NASH Renewables' co-founder, stated, "[There are] more options to design one particular wind farm than […] atoms in the universe. So, with NASH, it's trying to figure out through algorithms what the optimal way to build a wind or solar farm is […] Getting the stamp of TotalEnergies for this new way of thinking, of course, brought our company massively forward." On-screen text then stated, "THE ROADS TO CARBON NEUTRAL […] A SPECIAL PRESENTATION BY", followed by the TotalEnergies logo and the text "Pioneers for 100 years".	A paid for Google ad for Ford seen on 16 August 2023 featured the claim, "New All-Electric Explorer – Redefining Adventure. The ultimate all-electric SUV is here. The Explorer. Redefine the meaning of adventure. The ultimate exploration vehicle – Find out more & discover the range of features. Zero-emissions driving. Fast charging. Driver Assistance Tech".
	Award-winning Reports	N/A	In line with our decarbonisation strategy, we are committed to being carbon neutral and increasing our renewable energy usage by 10% by 2030. This is our first step to diversifying our energy mix, increasing energy security, growing our use of cleaner energy and proactively contributing to the global ambitions

			of combating climate change. Furthermore, we have committed to our targets and voluntarily participated in sustainable finance initiatives since the official launch of the Green Finance Taxonomy with the National Treasury. Significant power cuts in South Africa during the year negatively impacted our business. However, Absa's resilience profile remains fit for purpose – using both natural gas and back-up diesel generation to continue business operations. This resulted in increased carbon tax liability and utility costs. We strive to maintain operations by transitioning to a low-carbon business and reducing our reliance on fossil fuels. We have five solar plant installations (4 corporate and 1 retail site) and an additional two retail branches that collectively use clean wind energy that is 'wheeled' through a municipal grid network as part of a power purchase agreement we hold with a local energy trader, contributing 1% (7.3 GWh) to our total energy consumption. The installation of additional solar photovoltaics panels on two corporate sites will be completed in the first quarter of 2023. At the same time the bank is rolling out solar PV installations at the retail branch networks as part of a resilience strategy and decarbonisation of our electricity supply. We expect our renewable energy consumption to increase in the year 2023 above our target of 5% during this period.
	Assured Reports	N/A	Improving GHG emission measurement is essential to quantifying the GHG emission reductions in our value chain, as our current Scope 3 emission estimations may not reflect or track the impact of some of the actions we are taking now to progress towards our long-term goal. We do not anticipate significant reductions in our reported Scope 3 emission inventory in the medium term, in part due to the way we currently estimate Scope 3 emissions, which is generally not supplier- or customer-specific and therefore would not reflect the GHG emission reductions they achieve. We are seeking ways to improve the availability of data. For example, in shipping we have had early successes in developing a carbon accounting and decision support system tailored to ship chartering (DNV's Veracity data platform). In other areas, we aim to progressively improve Scope 3 measurement capability and we intend to partner with our GHG emission intensive customers and suppliers to address these challenges. We are preparing cradle-to-gate life cycle assessments of some of our products, starting with nickel and metallurgical coal, with an aim to complete these in FY2024 in order to meet customer requests and growing market expectations.

Appendix 6 shows examples we used to build our dataset. All examples focus on the same topic (renewable energy and decarbonisation claims). The in-sample examples come from regulator guidelines and show both greenwashing and non-greenwashing cases. The out-of-sample examples come from ASA rulings and award-winning or assured reports. The non-greenwashing examples from sustainability reports are longer because these reports naturally provide more explanation and background. To keep the full context of these cases, we retain the full disclosures.

Appendix 7 The Four Prompts Applied for Testing

Zero-shot

You are a sustainability disclosure analyst trained in identifying greenwashing practices using regulatory guidance. Analyze the following claim and classify it as either Greenwashing (1) or Non-Greenwashing (0). Return your answer as valid JSON only, containing two fields:
{
"decision": 0 or 1
"reasoning": explanation for the classification
}

Claim: "{Claim}"

Zero-shot CoT

You are a sustainability disclosure analyst trained in identifying greenwashing practices based on regulatory guidance. Your task is to evaluate whether a claim constitutes greenwashing. The decision of greenwashing or not is based on the appearance of five potential indicators. I will give you instructions to learn from. Let's do it step by step.

Step 1: Evaluate the Claim Against Five Greenwashing Indicators (Reasoning)
For each indicator, Answer Yes (1) or No (0) by anaylzing does this indicator apply? Provide a brief explanation of your reasoning.
Claim: "{Claim}"

Indicators:
1. Vague claims: The claim lacks clarity or precision, using broad or ambiguous language without specifying the sustainability aspect addressed.
2. Overstating Compliance: The claim highlights benefits that are legally required, irrelevant, or minimal, without clarifying they are standard compliance.
3. Confusing Language: The claim uses unclear or overly technical wording rather than simple, commonly understood terms.
4. Unclear Scope: The claim does not specify whether the benefit applies to all or part of a product, service, brand, or activity, or omits key life cycle stages.
5. Unclear Condition: The claim depends on conditions (e.g., recyclability, biodegradability) that are not clearly disclosed or unlikely to occur in normal use.
Output for Step 1:
"reasoning": {
  "Indicator 1": "...",
  "Indicator 2": "...",
  "Indicator 3": "...",
  "Indicator 4": "...",
  "Indicator 5": "..."
},
"category": [Indicator1 (1/0), Indicator2(1/0), Indicator3(1/0), Indicator4(1/0), Indicator5(1/0)]

Step 2: Final Decision
Based on your indicator evaluations: If any of the five indicators are answered Yes, classify the claim as Greenwashing (1); If none of the indicators apply, classify it as Non-Greenwashing (0). Then explain your decision by referencing the relevant indicators.
Output for Step 2:
"decision": 0 or 1

Note: Combine Step 1 and Step 2 into a single JSON object. No extra explaination. Output format should be: { "reasoning": { }, "category": , "decision": }

Five-shot CoT

You are a sustainability disclosure analyst trained in identifying greenwashing practices based on regulatory guidance. Your task is to evaluate whether a claim constitutes greenwashing. The decision of greenwashing or

not is based on the appearance of five potential indicators. I will give you instructions to learn from. Let's do it step by step.

Step 1: Evaluate the Claim Against Five Greenwashing Indicators (Reasoning)
For each indicator, Answer Yes (1) or No (0) by anaylzing does this indicator apply? Provide a brief explanation of your reasoning.
Claim: "{Claim}"

Indicators:
1. Vague claims: The claim lacks clarity or precision, using broad or ambiguous language without specifying the sustainability aspect addressed.
2. Overstating Compliance: The claim highlights benefits that are legally required, irrelevant, or minimal, without clarifying they are standard compliance.
3. Confusing Language: The claim uses unclear or overly technical wording rather than simple, commonly understood terms.
4. Unclear Scope: The claim does not specify whether the benefit applies to all or part of a product, service, brand, or activity, or omits key life cycle stages.
5. Unclear Condition: The claim depends on conditions (e.g., recyclability, biodegradability) that are not clearly disclosed or unlikely to occur in normal use.
Output for Step 1:
"reasoning": {
  "Indicator 1": "...",
  "Indicator 2": "...",
  "Indicator 3": "...",
  "Indicator 4": "...",
  "Indicator 5": "..."
},
"category": [Indicator1 (1/0), Indicator2(1/0), Indicator3(1/0), Indicator4(1/0), Indicator5(1/0)]

Step 2: Final Decision
Based on your indicator evaluations: If any of the five indicators are answered Yes, classify the claim as Greenwashing (1); If none of the indicators apply, classify it as Non-Greenwashing (0). Then explain your decision by referencing the relevant indicators.
Output for Step 2:
"decision": 0 or 1

Note: Combine Step 1 and Step 2 into a single JSON object

Here are some examples for your reference:
Example 1:
Claim: A company selling household cleaning products uses the term "green" and "clean" in its product package such as "simple green, clean the planet" However, they provide no additional information on why their products are considered clean or how they minimize environmental harm.
Output:
{
  "reasoning": {
    "Indicator 1": "Uses broad, ambiguous terms ('green', 'clean the planet') with no specifics on environmental attributes or performance.",
    "Indicator 2": "Does not highlight legally required or trivial benefits; no compliance claim made.",
    "Indicator 3": "Language is simple; not overly technical.",
    "Indicator 4": "No explicit part/whole ambiguity beyond the vagueness; the misleading element is primarily the lack of specificity.",
    "Indicator 5": "No conditional claim (e.g., recyclability/compostability) stated."
  },
  "category": [1, 0, 0, 0, 0],
  "decision": 1
}

Example 2:

Claim: Claiming that a particular brand of bottled water is gluten-free or claiming that paper sheets do not contain plastic.
Output:
{
"reasoning": {
"Indicator 1": "Not vague, as claims are specific but irrelevant to sustainability impact.",
"Indicator 2": "Highlights attributes that are legally expected/irrelevant/minimal (e.g., water is inherently gluten-free), overstating compliance or benefit.",
"Indicator 3": "Language is straightforward; not technical.",
"Indicator 4": "No ambiguity about which product part the claim applies to.",
"Indicator 5": "No undisclosed conditions involved."
},
"category": [0, 1, 0, 0, 0],
"decision": 1
}

Example 3:
Claim: A manufacturer advertises on their packs of washing machine detergent that consumers can “save water and help the planet by reusing greywater in your garden”. “Greywater” is water that has been used by a household’s laundry and bathroom. Reusing greywater to irrigate gardens is a common way to preserve water resources. However, not all greywater is suitable to be reused to irrigate gardens. The packaging has a prominent disclaimer “See ingredients list for whether our greywater can help your garden grow.” All the ingredients are clearly listed, including a certain bleaching agent which is suitable for soil and grass, but not for plants
Output:
{
"reasoning": {
"Indicator 1": "Not vague, the claim gives a clear message about greywater reuse.",
"Indicator 2": "Does not emphasize legally required or trivial benefits.",
"Indicator 3": "The language and presentation are confusing, as the headline suggests broad safe reuse but the critical limitations are only clear if consumers carefully interpret the ingredients list.",
"Indicator 4": "Scope is not the main issue; the confusion arises from wording and presentation rather than part versus whole coverage.",
"Indicator 5": "No undisclosed condition beyond the confusing way the information is presented."
},
"category": [0, 0, 1, 0, 0],
"decision": 1
}

Example 4:
Claim: putting “made from recycled material” on a product when only a part of the product (such as the packaging) is made from recycled material
Output:
{
"reasoning": {
"Indicator 1": "Wording is clear but incomplete rather than vague.",
"Indicator 2": "No minimal/legally required benefit is being overstated explicitly.",
"Indicator 3": "Language is not overly technical.",
"Indicator 4": "Fails to specify that only the packaging is recycled, creating a part-vs-whole ambiguity about the product.",
"Indicator 5": "No undisclosed conditions like recyclability/composability."
},
"category": [0, 0, 0, 1, 0],
"decision": 1
}

Example 5:
Claim: Nationally marketed lawn and leaf bags state “compostable” on each bag. The bags also feature text disclosing that the bag is not designed for use in home compost piles. Yard trimmings programs in many

communities compost these bags, but such programs are not available to a substantial majority of consumers or communities where the bag is sold.
Output:
{
"reasoning": {
"Indicator 1": "Claim 'compostable' is specific rather than vague.",
"Indicator 2": "Does not emphasize legally required/trivial benefits.",
"Indicator 3": "Language is simple; not technical.",
"Indicator 4": "Scope is the whole bag; issue is not part-vs-whole.",
"Indicator 5": "Compostability depends on facility access that is not available to a substantial majority, making the condition unlikely for typical use."
},
"category": [0, 0, 0, 0, 1],
"decision": 1
}

Eight-shot CoT

You are a sustainability disclosure analyst trained in identifying greenwashing practices based on regulatory guidance. Your task is to evaluate whether a claim constitutes greenwashing. The decision of greenwashing or not is based on the appearance of five potential indicators. I will give you instructions to learn from. Let's do it step by step.

Step 1: Evaluate the Claim Against Five Greenwashing Indicators (Reasoning)
For each indicator, Answer Yes (1) or No (0) by anaylzing does this indicator apply? Provide a brief explanation of your reasoning.
Claim: "{Claim}"

Indicators:
1. Vague claims: The claim lacks clarity or precision, using broad or ambiguous language without specifying the sustainability aspect addressed.
2. Overstating Compliance: The claim highlights benefits that are legally required, irrelevant, or minimal, without clarifying they are standard compliance.
3. Confusing Language: The claim uses unclear or overly technical wording rather than simple, commonly understood terms.
4. Unclear Scope: The claim does not specify whether the benefit applies to all or part of a product, service, brand, or activity, or omits key life cycle stages.
5. Unclear Condition: The claim depends on conditions (e.g., recyclability, biodegradability) that are not clearly disclosed or unlikely to occur in normal use.
Output for Step 1:
"reasoning": {
"Indicator 1": "...",
"Indicator 2": "...",
"Indicator 3": "...",
"Indicator 4": "...",
"Indicator 5": "..."
},
"category": [Indicator1 (1/0), Indicator2(1/0), Indicator3(1/0), Indicator4(1/0), Indicator5(1/0)]

Step 2: Final Decision
Based on your indicator evaluations: If any of the five indicators are answered Yes, classify the claim as Greenwashing (1); If none of the indicators apply, classify it as Non-Greenwashing (0). Then explain your decision by referencing the relevant indicators.
Output for Step 2:
"decision": 0 or 1

Note: Combine Step 1 and Step 2 into a single JSON object

Here are some examples for your reference:
Example 1:

Claim: A company selling household cleaning products uses the term “green” and “clean” in its product package such as “simple green, clean the planet” However, they provide no additional information on why their products are considered clean or how they minimize environmental harm.
Output:
{
  "reasoning": {
    "Indicator 1": "Uses broad, ambiguous terms ('green', 'clean the planet') with no specifics on environmental attributes or performance.",
    "Indicator 2": "Does not highlight legally required or trivial benefits; no compliance claim made.",
    "Indicator 3": "Language is simple; not overly technical.",
    "Indicator 4": "No explicit part/whole ambiguity beyond the vagueness; the misleading element is primarily the lack of specificity.",
    "Indicator 5": "No conditional claim (e.g., recyclability/compostability) stated."
  },
  "category": [1, 0, 0, 0, 0],
  "decision": 1
}

Example 2:
Claim: Claiming that a particular brand of bottled water is gluten-free or claiming that paper sheets do not contain plastic.
Output:
{
  "reasoning": {
    "Indicator 1": "Not vague, as claims are specific but irrelevant to sustainability impact.",
    "Indicator 2": "Highlights attributes that are legally expected/irrelevant/minimal (e.g., water is inherently gluten-free), overstating compliance or benefit.",
    "Indicator 3": "Language is straightforward; not technical.",
    "Indicator 4": "No ambiguity about which product part the claim applies to.",
    "Indicator 5": "No undisclosed conditions involved."
  },
  "category": [0, 1, 0, 0, 0],
  "decision": 1
}

Example 3:
Claim: A manufacturer advertises on their packs of washing machine detergent that consumers can “save water and help the planet by reusing greywater in your garden”. “Greywater” is water that has been used by a household’s laundry and bathroom. Reusing greywater to irrigate gardens is a common way to preserve water resources. However, not all greywater is suitable to be reused to irrigate gardens. The packaging has a prominent disclaimer “See ingredients list for whether our greywater can help your garden grow.” All the ingredients are clearly listed, including a certain bleaching agent which is suitable for soil and grass, but not for plants
Output:
{
  "reasoning": {
    "Indicator 1": "Not vague, the claim gives a clear message about greywater reuse.",
    "Indicator 2": "Does not emphasize legally required or trivial benefits.",
    "Indicator 3": "The language and presentation are confusing, as the headline suggests broad safe reuse but the critical limitations are only clear if consumers carefully interpret the ingredients list.",
    "Indicator 4": "Scope is not the main issue; the confusion arises from wording and presentation rather than part versus whole coverage.",
    "Indicator 5": "No undisclosed condition beyond the confusing way the information is presented."
  },
  "category": [0, 0, 1, 0, 0],
  "decision": 1
}

Example 4:

Claim: putting “made from recycled material” on a product when only a part of the product (such as the packaging) is made from recycled material
Output:
{
  "reasoning": {
    "Indicator 1": "Wording is clear but incomplete rather than vague.",
    "Indicator 2": "No minimal/legally required benefit is being overstated explicitly.",
    "Indicator 3": "Language is not overly technical.",
    "Indicator 4": "Fails to specify that only the packaging is recycled, creating a part-vs-whole ambiguity about the product.",
    "Indicator 5": "No undisclosed conditions like recyclability/composability."
  },
  "category": [0, 0, 0, 1, 0],
  "decision": 1
}

Example 5:
Claim: Nationally marketed lawn and leaf bags state “compostable” on each bag. The bags also feature text disclosing that the bag is not designed for use in home compost piles. Yard trimmings programs in many communities compost these bags, but such programs are not available to a substantial majority of consumers or communities where the bag is sold.
Output:
{
  "reasoning": {
    "Indicator 1": "Claim 'compostable' is specific rather than vague.",
    "Indicator 2": "Does not emphasize legally required/trivial benefits.",
    "Indicator 3": "Language is simple; not technical.",
    "Indicator 4": "Scope is the whole bag; issue is not part-vs-whole.",
    "Indicator 5": "Compostability depends on facility access that is not available to a substantial majority, making the condition unlikely for typical use."
  },
  "category": [0, 0, 0, 0, 1],
  "decision": 1
}

Example 6:
Claim: An automotive dealer, automobile recycler, or other qualified entity recovers a serviceable engine from a wrecked vehicle. Without repairing, rebuilding, re-manufacturing, or in any way altering the engine or its components, the dealer attaches a “Recycled” label to the engine, and offers it for sale in its used auto parts store.
Output:
{
  "reasoning": {
    "Indicator 1": "Not vague. The label 'Recycled' is clearly understood in this automotive context as 'used.'",
    "Indicator 2": "Does not exaggerate legally required or trivial benefits.",
    "Indicator 3": "Language is simple and clear.",
    "Indicator 4": "Scope is clear, the entire engine is labeled.",
    "Indicator 5": "No hidden conditions are implied."
  },
  "category": [0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
  "decision": 0
}

Example 7:
Claim: A manufacturer makes a package from laminated layers of foil, plastic, and paper, although the layers are indistinguishable to consumers. The label claims that “one of the three layers of this package is made of recycled plastic.” The plastic layer is made entirely of recycled plastic.
Output:
{
  "reasoning": {

```
    "Indicator 1": "Not vague. The claim specifies exactly which layer contains recycled content.",
    "Indicator 2": "Does not emphasize irrelevant or legally required benefits.",
    "Indicator 3": "Language is clear and non-technical.",
    "Indicator 4": "Scope is disclosed, the recycled content applies to one layer only, which is stated.",
    "Indicator 5": "No undisclosed conditions affect the claim."
  },
  "category": [0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
  "decision": 0
}
```

Example 8:
Claim: A manufacturer markets yard trimmings bags only to consumers residing in particular geographic areas served by county yard trimmings composting programs. The bags meet specifications for these programs and are labeled, “Compostable Yard Trimmings Bag for County Composting Programs.”
Output:

```
{
  "reasoning": {
    "Indicator 1": "Not vague. The label clearly specifies compostability within county programs.",
    "Indicator 2": "Does not highlight irrelevant or minimal benefits.",
    "Indicator 3": "Language is simple and understandable.",
    "Indicator 4": "Scope is precise, the bags are marketed only in areas with matching programs.",
    "Indicator 5": "No undisclosed conditions. Composting is available where sold."
  },
  "category": [0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
  "decision": 0
}
```

Instruction Only

You are a sustainability disclosure analyst trained in identifying greenwashing practices based on regulatory guidance. Your task is to evaluate whether a claim constitutes greenwashing.

The analysis is informed by five typical types where greenwashing commonly occurs. These types are provided for reference only. Use them to structure your thinking, then give one overall reasoning and a final decision.

Claim: "{Claim}"

Reference types of potential greenwashing:
1) Vague Claims
This arises when a claim lacks clarity or precision and could be understood in different ways by different consumers, which can make a product, service, or business appear more environmentally beneficial than it is. Vagueness can appear at three levels: (a) generic claims that are not specified to environmental, social, or governance aspects; (b) claims where the benefit is unclear, for example describing something as “environmentally friendly” without indicating whether the impact relates to climate, biodiversity, or another area; and (c) claims that do not explain how the benefit is achieved, for example describing energy as “clean” without identifying the source. Vagueness is less concerning when supported by measurable data, specific practices, or quantified outcomes that provide clarity and reduce multiple interpretations.

2) Overstating Compliance
This arises when a claim highlights something that is legally required, trivial, or irrelevant as if it were a special environmental achievement. It is most concerning when the presentation would make consumers believe the business has gone beyond reality by presenting standard obligations or minimal actions as major environmental benefits. It is less concerning if any trivial reference is clearly harmless and not positioned as a special benefit.

3) Confusing Language
This arises when a claim uses unclear wording, technical jargon, or very complex terms that the average consumer cannot easily understand. It is most concerning when confusing wording hides important limitations or qualifications. It is less concerning if the wording is slightly technical but remains clear in context.

4) Unclear Scope

This arises when a claim could likely lead consumers to believe that an environmental benefit applies to the entire product, service, business, or lifecycle, when in reality it applies only to part. The key question is whether the absence of clarification would materially mislead consumers into thinking the benefit is broader than it is.

5) Unclear Condition
This arises when the validity of a claim depends on conditions that are not disclosed and that are unlikely to be met in normal use. Conditions may relate to infrastructure, consumer access, or special processes. Not every claim implies hidden conditions. If the conditions required for the claim to be true are commonly met in practice, there is no concern. It becomes concerning when undisclosed conditions would materially affect whether the claim can be realised by most consumers.

Decision rule:
Make a balanced judgment based on the overall impression on a reasonable consumer. Consider the presence and materiality of any of the reference types, the availability and clarity of substantiation, any disclosed qualifications and their prominence, and whether the claim would likely mislead in a meaningful way. Only classify as greenwashing if the overall impression is materially misleading.

Output format:
Return a single JSON object only, no extra text:
{
  "reasoning": "one concise paragraph that explains why this is or is not greenwashing",
  "decision": 0 or 1
}

Instruction and Example

You are a sustainability disclosure analyst trained in identifying greenwashing practices based on regulatory guidance. Your task is to evaluate whether a claim constitutes greenwashing.

The analysis is informed by five typical types where greenwashing commonly occurs. These types are provided for reference only. Use them to structure your thinking, then give one overall reasoning and a final decision.

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This arises when a claim lacks clarity or precision and could be understood in different ways by different consumers, which can make a product, service, or business appear more environmentally beneficial than it is. Vagueness can appear at three levels: (a) generic claims that are not specified to environmental, social, or governance aspects; (b) claims where the benefit is unclear, for example describing something as “environmentally friendly” without indicating whether the impact relates to climate, biodiversity, or another area; and (c) claims that do not explain how the benefit is achieved, for example describing energy as “clean” without identifying the source. Vagueness is less concerning when supported by measurable data, specific practices, or quantified outcomes that provide clarity and reduce multiple interpretations.

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This arises when a claim highlights something that is legally required, trivial, or irrelevant as if it were a special environmental achievement. It is most concerning when the presentation would make consumers believe the business has gone beyond reality by presenting standard obligations or minimal actions as major environmental benefits. It is less concerning if any trivial reference is clearly harmless and not positioned as a special benefit.

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This arises when a claim could likely lead consumers to believe that an environmental benefit applies to the entire product, service, business, or lifecycle, when in reality it applies only to part. The key question is whether the absence of clarification would materially mislead consumers into thinking the benefit is broader than it is.

5) Unclear Condition

This arises when the validity of a claim depends on conditions that are not disclosed and that are unlikely to be met in normal use. Conditions may relate to infrastructure, consumer access, or special processes. Not every claim implies hidden conditions. If the conditions required for the claim to be true are commonly met in practice, there is no concern. It becomes concerning when undisclosed conditions would materially affect whether the claim can be realised by most consumers.

Decision rule:
Make a balanced judgment based on the overall impression on a reasonable consumer. Consider the presence and materiality of any of the reference types, the availability and clarity of substantiation, any disclosed qualifications and their prominence, and whether the claim would likely mislead in a meaningful way. Only classify as greenwashing if the overall impression is materially misleading.

Output format:
Return a single JSON object only, no extra text:
{
"reasoning": "one concise paragraph that explains why this is or is not greenwashing",
"decision": 0 or 1
}

Examples for reference:

Example 1
Claim: An agriculture company labels its fertilizer as “safe for the environment.” The packaging does not explain what this term means in practical terms.
Output:
{
"reasoning": "The phrase ‘safe for the environment’ is vague and unsupported, creating multiple possible interpretations and a heightened risk that consumers overestimate the environmental benefit. No clarifying details or measurable support are provided, so the overall impression is materially misleading.",
"decision": 1
}

Example 2
Claim: Claiming that a particular brand of bottled water is gluten free or claiming that paper sheets do not contain plastic.
Output:
{
"reasoning": "The claim highlights attributes that are irrelevant or expected for the product and presents them as if they were special environmental benefits. This overstates compliance or trivial attributes and risks misleading consumers about environmental merit.",
"decision": 1
}

Example 3
Claim: A manufacturer advertises on their packs of washing machine detergent that consumers can “save water and help the planet by reusing greywater in your garden.” The packaging has a prominent disclaimer “See ingredients list for whether our greywater can help your garden grow.” All the ingredients are clearly listed, including a certain bleaching agent which is suitable for soil and grass, but not for plants.
Output:
{
"reasoning": "The headline invites consumers to reuse greywater to help the planet, but the only limitation is communicated through an ingredients list that relies on technical chemical names. Most consumers cannot interpret that wording to understand that the product is unsafe for plants, so a material qualification is effectively hidden by confusing language.",
"decision": 1
}

Example 4
Claim: A company claims that an electric vehicle produces zero emissions.

Output:
{
"reasoning": "Without context, ‘zero emissions’ can reasonably be taken to cover the whole lifecycle. Since it is only true for tailpipe emissions when driving, the scope is unclear and likely overbroad, which could materially mislead consumers.",
"decision": 1
}

Example 5
Claim: A business claims that its products are “recyclable.” The claim depends on consumers meeting strict requirements that do not reflect normal consumer use, such as taking the products to an industrial recycling facility.
Output:
{
"reasoning": "Recyclability depends on conditions that most consumers cannot meet in normal use, and those conditions are not clearly disclosed. This creates a materially misleading overall impression.",
"decision": 1
}

Example 6
Claim: An automotive dealer, automobile recycler, or other qualified entity recovers a serviceable engine from a wrecked vehicle. Without repairing, rebuilding, re manufacturing, or altering the engine or its components, the dealer attaches a “Recycled” label to the engine and offers it for sale in its used auto parts store.
Output:
{
"reasoning": "In this context ‘recycled’ communicates that the engine is used and re employed, which aligns with consumer understanding. There is no exaggeration, unclear scope, or hidden condition, so the overall impression is not misleading.",
"decision": 0
}

Example 7
Claim: A company claims that an electric vehicle produces zero emissions when driving.
Output:
{
"reasoning": "The scope is clearly limited to the act of driving and does not imply production or charging phases. The claim is precise and understandable, so the overall impression is not misleading.",
"decision": 0
}

Example 8
Claim: A marketer states “This product may not be recyclable in your area” or “Recycling facilities for this product may not exist in your area” when facilities are available to slightly less than a substantial majority of consumers. If facilities are available only to a few consumers, the marketer states “This product is recyclable only in the few communities that have appropriate recycling facilities.”
Output:
{
"reasoning": "The claim transparently discloses availability conditions and does not exaggerate the benefit. Qualifications are clear and prominent, so the overall impression is not misleading.",
"decision": 0
}

Example Only

You are a sustainability disclosure analyst trained in identifying greenwashing practices based on regulatory guidance. Your task is to evaluate whether a claim constitutes greenwashing.

Claim: "{Claim}"

Output format:
Return a single JSON object only, no extra text:
{

"reasoning": "one concise paragraph that explains why this is or is not greenwashing",
"decision": 0 or 1
}

Examples of reasoning and decision for reference:

Example 1
Claim: An agriculture company labels its fertilizer as “safe for the environment.” The packaging does not explain what this term means in practical terms.
Output:
{
"reasoning": "The phrase ‘safe for the environment’ is vague and unsupported, creating multiple possible interpretations and a heightened risk that consumers overestimate the environmental benefit. No clarifying details or measurable support are provided, so the overall impression is materially misleading.",
"decision": 1
}

Example 2
Claim: Claiming that a particular brand of bottled water is gluten free or claiming that paper sheets do not contain plastic.
Output:
{
"reasoning": "The claim highlights attributes that are irrelevant or expected for the product and presents them as if they were special environmental benefits. This overstates compliance or trivial attributes and risks misleading consumers about environmental merit.",
"decision": 1
}

Example 3
Claim: A manufacturer advertises on their packs of washing machine detergent that consumers can “save water and help the planet by reusing greywater in your garden.” The packaging has a prominent disclaimer “See ingredients list for whether our greywater can help your garden grow.” All the ingredients are clearly listed, including a certain bleaching agent which is suitable for soil and grass, but not for plants.
Output:
{
"reasoning": "The headline invites consumers to reuse greywater to help the planet, but the only limitation is communicated through an ingredients list that relies on technical chemical names. Most consumers cannot interpret that wording to understand that the product is unsafe for plants, so a material qualification is effectively hidden by confusing language.",
"decision": 1
}

Example 4
Claim: A company claims that an electric vehicle produces zero emissions.
Output:
{
"reasoning": "Without context, ‘zero emissions’ can reasonably be taken to cover the whole lifecycle. Since it is only true for tailpipe emissions when driving, the scope is unclear and likely overbroad, which could materially mislead consumers.",
"decision": 1
}

Example 5
Claim: A business claims that its products are “recyclable.” The claim depends on consumers meeting strict requirements that do not reflect normal consumer use, such as taking the products to an industrial recycling facility.
Output:
{

"reasoning": "Recyclability depends on conditions that most consumers cannot meet in normal use, and those conditions are not clearly disclosed. This creates a materially misleading overall impression.",
"decision": 1
}

Example 6
Claim: An automotive dealer, automobile recycler, or other qualified entity recovers a serviceable engine from a wrecked vehicle. Without repairing, rebuilding, re manufacturing, or altering the engine or its components, the dealer attaches a “Recycled” label to the engine and offers it for sale in its used auto parts store.
Output:
{
"reasoning": "In this context ‘recycled’ communicates that the engine is used and re employed, which aligns with consumer understanding. There is no exaggeration, unclear scope, or hidden condition, so the overall impression is not misleading.",
"decision": 0
}

Example 7
Claim: A company claims that an electric vehicle produces zero emissions when driving.
Output:
{
"reasoning": "The scope is clearly limited to the act of driving and does not imply production or charging phases. The claim is precise and understandable, so the overall impression is not misleading.",
"decision": 0
}

Example 8
Claim: A marketer states “This product may not be recyclable in your area” or “Recycling facilities for this product may not exist in your area” when facilities are available to slightly less than a substantial majority of consumers. If facilities are available only to a few consumers, the marketer states “This product is recyclable only in the few communities that have appropriate recycling facilities.”
Output:
{
"reasoning": "The claim transparently discloses availability conditions and does not exaggerate the benefit. Qualifications are clear and prominent, so the overall impression is not misleading.",
"decision": 0
}