

Reading Pace in Lucan's *De Bello Civili* and Silius Italicus' *Punica*

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ABBREVIATIONS AND TEXTS

The text of Lucan's *De Bello Civili* is from Shackleton-Bailey 2009. All translations of Lucan are from Braund 1992. The text of Silius Italicus' *Punica* is from Delz 1987. All translations of the *Punica* are from Augoustakis and Bernstein 2021.

Abbreviations of ancient authors and works follow the *Oxford Latin dictionary* for Latin and the *Oxford Classical dictionary* for Greek. Journals in the bibliography follow the conventions in *L'Année philologique*. In addition, the following list of abbreviations may be helpful.

BC Lucan, *De Bello Civili*

OLD Glare, P.G.W., ed. 2012. *Oxford Latin Dictionary*. 2nd e. Oxford.

INTRODUCTION

Speed pervades characterisation in epic poetry. To appreciate this, one need only recall the influence of the *Iliad*'s 'swift-footed' Achilles on later epics.¹ Speed cannot be separated from perhaps the most significant figure in the transition from republic to empire: Julius Caesar. Caesar emphasises his own swiftness in his commentaries, and his swift reputation led to Cicero's coinage of the term *celeritas Caesariana*.²

But speed is complicated by the negative portrayal of Caesar in Lucan's *De Bello Civili*—a text fixated on the dangers of civil war and the tyranny of sole leadership. Neither its characters nor the narrator himself can prevent Caesar's decisive victory at the Battle of Pharsalus, but they can attempt to slow him down. In doing so, *BC* offers the reader instructive *exempla* of pace drawn from Roman history. However, it could be argued that the rise of epics focussed on Greek mythology, like Valerius Flaccus' *Argonautica* and Statius' *Thebaid*, alienated Roman epic from this didactic function and cultural relevance.³ Silius Italicus' historical epic, the *Punica*, not only reinstates epic's didactic function and cultural relevance, but does so with particular attention to pace. The Caesarian dominance of Hannibal Barca and the focus on another major turning point in Roman history—the Second Punic War—naturally invites comparison with Lucan's *BC*.

This thesis analyses pace in Lucan's *De Bello Civili* and compares it to the portrayal of pace in Silius Italicus' *Punica*. Its purpose is threefold: most importantly, to establish 'pace' as a legitimate and rewarding lens for understanding epic poetry; to analyse the exemplarity of pace, including how Silius problematises Lucan's paradigms of pace; and to explore the way in which Silius was a close reader of Lucan. I do not argue that pace is, by any means, the 'only' or 'most important' aspect of either text—but I do suggest that it is a thread which underlies both texts and therefore deserves more attention in modern scholarship.⁴ In *BC*, I suggest that pace can be broken down into three 'paradigms': *celeritas* (speed), *mora* (passive inactivity), and *patientia* (endurance). Silius adds another paradigm: *cunctatio* (active delay).⁵ These paradigms are held in tension throughout both texts and are,

¹ e.g. ὤκτις Il. 19.295; πόδας ὠκτις Il. 1.58; ποδώκης Il. 2.860; ποδάρκης Il. 2.860. For Achilles as swift in the *Iliad*, see Dunkle 1997. For the influence of Achilles on other epic heroes, see e.g. van Nortwick 1980, Dominik 2023.

² Cic. *Att.* 16.10. For Caesar's speed in his commentaries, see generally Danon 2018, especially 19.

³ Marks 2010: 189. For a close reading of speed in Statius' *Silvae*, see Liney 2019.

⁴ For the study of pace in scholarship, see Section II below.

⁵ For the definitions of these terms, see Section II below.

by virtue of characterisation's exemplary role in antiquity, inherently moralised.⁶ However, that is not to suggest that a character's pace is rigid, especially in the *Punica*: often, a character will exhibit characteristics of multiple pace paradigms and the moral value of a paradigm may shift. My analysis of pace draws from theories of characterisation and exemplarity, aspects of narratology, and the nexus of *fortuna* in each text, which I will discuss before explaining my approach to pace.

I. EXEMPLARITY AND *FORTUNA*

My approach to pace in this thesis is informed by the study of exemplarity in Roman poetry, especially its closeness to characterisation. The study of exemplarity is the study of how Romans used historical or mythical figures as examples (*exempla* or paradigms) of behaviour to create ethical models worthy (or unworthy) of emulation.⁷ Such *exempla* were ubiquitous in Greece and Rome, especially in the education system—where Romans would constantly reinvent exemplary situations in *controversiae* and *suasoriae*.⁸ Exemplarity is embedded in historiography, and also in its close neighbour: epic.⁹ Quintilian recognises that the didactic value of epic poetry stems from its inclusion of exemplary figures.¹⁰ By nature, exemplarity in poetry is closely connected to the creation of character, that is, characterisation.¹¹ Seo distinguishes Roman characterisation from modern characterisation, arguing that the former does not prioritise interiority or psychologisation;¹² instead, Roman characterisation is 'a form of literary allusion' that enumerates possibilities and variations using familiar *exempla* in one newly processed character.¹³ Thus, intertextuality is an inextricable aspect of characterisation, permitting the connection between poem and exemplarity. Importantly, Seo shows that specific 'traits' of a character can be exemplary.¹⁴

Thus, this thesis argues that pace is an exemplary trait. Exemplarity (and by extension intertextuality and characterisation) is a well explored area of scholarship in *BC* and the

⁶ For exemplarity, see Section I below.

⁷ For overviews of exemplarity, see Leigh 1997: 160-72; Roller 2004; Tipping 2010: 7-8, esp. n. 21; Seo 2013: 1-15; Langlands 2018.

⁸ Leigh 1997: 166-71. See also Goldhill 1994; Skidmore 1996: 3-21.

⁹ Leigh 1997: 164-5.

¹⁰ Quint. *Inst.* 1.8.5. See also Tipping 2010: 8, esp. n. 23; Henderson 1997: 3.

¹¹ Seo 2013: 1-31.

¹² Seo notes that this has led to anachronistic critiques of ancient characters as 'flat' and 'overly constructed' (Seo 2013: 7, 15).

¹³ Seo 2013: 15-6.

¹⁴ Seo 2013: 1.

Punica separately, but less focus has been given to the comparison of both texts.¹⁵ By exploring Silius' *Punica* as in dialogue with Lucan's *BC*, this thesis contributes to the study of intertextuality. This intertextual microcosm allows pace to be explored as an exemplary trait within each character, and tracks the development of these pace paradigms across texts.

The indistinguishability of chance (*fortuna*), destiny (*fatum*), and the role of the gods (*dei/superi*) is a major issue in *BC* and the *Punica*, which I will argue interplays closely with pace in both texts.¹⁶ Much work has been done on this issue in *BC*, but less on the *Punica*.¹⁷ These terms normally have distinct and separate meanings, and Dick shows that Lucan is indeed aware of this distinction.¹⁸ However, Lucan 'is unable to decide which [of *fortuna*, *fatum*, and *dei/superi*] controls world affairs',¹⁹ such that 'it makes no practical difference whether the poet says "di/superi" or "fortuna/fatum"'.²⁰ Thus, Friedrich's conclusion that these terms refer to 'the power on which we feel ourselves dependent' is still widely accepted in *BC*.²¹ Feeney observes that whilst *BC* lacks gods as characters, it does not mean that they do not exist in the text—the narrator, who lacks a divine Muse, is simply unaware of the gods' role.²² This contrasts to the *Punica*, which *does* include the gods as characters—ostensibly simplifying *BC*'s issue of causation.

Feeney suggests that 'Silius' gods are a failure',²³ which has an element of truth to it: the gods do not intervene to prevent many disasters, most significant of all the Battle of Cannae. But they are not failures for their alleged 'sterility', 'characterful gaps', or the fact that Silius 'does not take [the gods] seriously enough as an integral part of the meaning-systems of his poem'.²⁴ Feeney's sympathy towards Lucan's vagueness surrounding this issue but hostility towards Silius is particularly jarring. Instead, I suggest that the gods' 'failure' to protect Rome in the *Punica* reveals that the narrator of that poem is just as unable to decide

¹⁵ For exemplarity in *BC* see Leigh 1997: 159-90; Seo 2013: 66-93; in the *Punica* see especially Von Albrecht 1964: 47-89; Marks 2005a; Tipping 2010; Stocks 2014: 21-3, 29-32, 219-20; van den Broek 2023: 76-8, 84-95, 127-8. For comparisons between *BC* and the *Punica* see e.g. Marks 2010; Pontiggia 2020; Feeney 1991: 250-312; Gervais, Pogorzelski, and Graham-Shaughnessy 2023; Augoustakis 2011: 183-198.

¹⁶ *OLD fortuna* 1d; *fatum* 3a, 5; *deus* 1a; *superus* 2a.

¹⁷ For *BC* see Friedrich 2010; Dick 1967; Feeney 1991: 250-301; Walde 2012. For the *Punica* see Feeney 1991: 302-312. For a full discussion of *fortuna* as a Roman concept, see generally Miano 2018.

¹⁸ Dick 1967: 236-7.

¹⁹ Dick 1967: 237.

²⁰ Friedrich 2010: 387.

²¹ Friedrich 2010: 387, adopted by Feeney 1991: 280 n. 132. Walde 2012 questions this stance but does not offer a resolution.

²² Feeney 1991: 275-6, 280-2.

²³ Feeney 1991: 302 ff.

²⁴ Feeney 1991: 311. Unfortunately, Feeney exhibits the same sort of disregard and abuse towards Silius that characterised scholarship until at least the 1970s. For the changing attitudes towards Silius, see Dominik 2010: 431-47.

whether *fortuna*, *fatum*, or *dei/superi* controls the universe as the narrator of *BC*. Thus, *BC* and the *Punica* display a similar confusion in their terminology surrounding this issue of universal governance, leading me to refer to it in this thesis as ‘the nexus of *fortuna*’, or simply ‘*fortuna*’.

I have included this discussion on *fortuna* because I will argue that analysis of pace helps the reader understand the nature of *fortuna* in each text. In essence, *celeritas* seems to maintain *fortuna*’s favour, enabling success after success; but *cunctatio* seems to forestall *fortuna* until it changes its favour, thereby permitting the successful use of *celeritas*.

II. PACE: MODERN SCHOLARSHIP AND DEFINITIONS

Discussion of pace in modern scholarship on *BC* and the *Punica* is nearly always incidental to discussion of other aspects of the text, especially characterisation or narratology. Focus is not given to pace as a theme which progresses across the text, or similarly as a lens for understanding the text. Therefore, discussions of pace are scattered around scholarly literature. This thesis seeks to draw these comments together in one place, so that pace can be used as a lens for understanding *BC* and the *Punica*, especially in relation to one another. The following discussion provides an overview of modern literature regarding the study of pace in Roman poetry, with special regard to *BC* and the *Punica*.

In terms of pace’s interaction with narratology, the recognition of narrative delay in Roman poetry and as an epic technique is well-established.²⁵ In particular, Masters shows that *BC*’s narrator purposefully slows down *BC* continuation of the civil war.²⁶ Narrative delay also has been recognised in the *Punica*—most noticeably because the years of the Second Punic War are not evenly distributed between books.²⁷ In terms of speed as an aspect of characterisation, no singular text compares all characters in the poems to find a pattern. Instead, a glance at particular moments where critics have commented on a character’s pace is required—which will be expanded upon in each section of this thesis. Caesar’s speed in *BC*

²⁵ For poetry in general, see Genette 1986; de Jong and Nunlist 2007: 1-14; de Jong 1987; de Jong 2014: 73-87; Hardie 1997: 16-17, 145-6, 148, 161. For elegy see Geue 2010. For Statius see Brown 1994: 1-29; Feeney 1991: 339-2. For the Aeneid, see e.g. Feeney 1991: 339-40. For Ovid, see Hines 2025.

²⁶ Masters 1992: 3-10, 43, 54-5, 60, 95-6, 119-22, 183. For more on narrative delay in *BC*, see e.g. Hardie 1997: 146-7; Henderson 1987: 133-44, 136; Feeney 1991: 227; Leigh 1997: 85-7; Roche 2009: 12-14; Roche 2019: 3-5.

²⁷ See especially van den Broek 2023: 5-9, 107, 111, 133-4, 141, 250. See also Tipping 2007: 226 ff; Marks 2017; Ariemma 2010: 241; Augoustakis and Littlewood 2022: 160; van der Keur 2024: 9.

is well-known, and has been linked to his destructive capability.²⁸ Pompey's response to Caesar's speed is less explored, but acknowledges his delay.²⁹ Cato's pace is hardly explored.³⁰ In the *Punica*, Hannibal's speed is well recognised, especially because of his modelling on Lucan's Caesar—but the decline in his speed after Cannae is less explored.³¹ Fabius' role as delayer of Hannibal is very well recognised, but also his momentary speed.³² Further, the speed of 'pre-Cannae' Roman leaders like Publius, Flaminius, Minucius, Varro and Paulus has also been recognised in isolation, but also in connection with Scipio's pace.³³ The speed of 'post-Cannae' Roman leaders like Fulvius, Marcellus, and Claudius Nero has also been discussed, although in less detail.³⁴ Scipio Africanus' speed is discussed at length by Marks, among others.³⁵

In order to pull these fragmented discussions together for analysis of pace as a whole, I categorise it in *BC* and the *Punica* into four main actions: *celeritas*, *mora*, *cunctatio*, and *patientia*. The distinction between these four types of pace are treated differently in each text and will be developed throughout the thesis, but it is helpful to define them here. First, *celeritas* is 'speed of movement, quickness, rapidity', which by nature requires an *action* by an *active* agent.³⁶ By contrast, *mora* is the 'time which elapses before an event takes place, loss of time, delay', something which can be inflicted upon others but is in itself inactivity: the result of *inaction* by a *passive* agent.³⁷ The infliction of *mora* on others is *cunctatio*: 'hesitation, delaying tardiness, inactivity; (*with genitive, de*) a hesitating about or delaying of (a thing)'.³⁸ Whilst ostensibly synonyms, *cunctatio* requires *action* of delay by an *active* agent, in the same way as *celeritas*—but is different in its goal: *celeritas* seeks speed to avoid *mora* whereas *cunctatio* seeks slowness to inflict *mora*. Thus *mora* stands as the intervening period in which no action, either of speeding up or delaying, occurs. Finally, *patientia* is the 'ability or willingness to endure [something]', which in the context of pace extends to the

²⁸ See e.g. Rosner-Siegel 1983: 173; Henderson 1987: 132, 145; Masters 1993: 3-9, 24, 40, 52; Roche 2009: 175, 192, 203-224, 242-3, 256-7; Matthews 2004: 23, 47, 188; Tipping 2010: 91, 153; Day 2013: 107-16, 128; Liney 2019: 362-3. For Caesar's speed outside *BC*, see e.g. Stadter 1993; Danon 2018.

²⁹ See e.g. Ahl 1976: 175; Masters 1992: 1. n. 1, 3-9; Leigh 1997: 116; Tipping 2010: 136; Roche 2019: 87, 149, 241-2.

³⁰ See e.g. McNamara 2020.

³¹ See e.g. Stocks 2014: 26.

³² See e.g. Ahl, Davis, and Pomeroy 1986: 2519-20, 2523-5, 2537; Tipping 2010: 107-12, 114, 119-20, 136-7; Stocks 2014: 122-6.

³³ See e.g. Ahl, Davis, and Pomeroy 1986: 2531-3, 2551.

³⁴ See e.g. Ahl, Davis, and Pomeroy 1986: 2536-2541.

³⁵ See generally Marks 2005a. See also Ahl, Davis, and Pomeroy 1986: 2520-1; Tipping 2010: 151; Ahl, Davis, and Pomeroy 1986: 2520-1.

³⁶ *OLD celeritas* 1a.

³⁷ *OLD mora* 1a; for the ability to 'inflict' *mora* to cause delay see *OLD* 1b.

³⁸ *OLD cunctatio* 1a.

ability to endure the actions of either *celeritas* or *cunctatio*.³⁹ Thus, *patientia* is also an *action* (of endurance) by an *active* agent—separating it from *mora*—although it is a weak action relative to the forcefulness of *celeritas* and *cunctatio*. These four categories of pace are foundational for establishing paradigms of pace in *BC* and the *Punica*, and I commonly refer to these abstract nouns with the adjectival form of a character’s name, in the same manner as Cicero used the phrase *celeritas Caesariana* to refer to Caesar’s speed.⁴⁰

III. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

I have foreshadowed that this thesis, above all, seeks to establish pace as a framework for reading Lucan’s *BC* and Silius’ *Punica*. I have also explained how this approach draws from the study of exemplarity and is interconnected with *fortuna*; and that whilst many studies have examined pace in some form, none have assessed pace as a recurrent theme in either text. That said, that this thesis does not claim to investigate every moment of pace—rather, it takes the most significant moments for the development of a character’s pace.

Chapter 1 focusses on the creation of three pace paradigms linked to Caesar, Pompey, and Cato in *BC*: *celeritas Caesariana*, *mora Pompeiana*, and *patientia Catoniana*. Section I explores the (self)destructiveness of *celeritas Caesariana* and its motivation based on maintaining *fortuna*’s approval, as well as its exemplarity within *BC*. The narrator’s negative attitude towards and delay of *celeritas Caesariana* frames it as a vice, at least in civil war. In contrast is *mora Pompeiana* in Section II, which through its inactivity and idleness, fails to inspire delay in others and to impede the dominance of *celeritas Caesariana*. The narrator’s constant lamentation of *mora Pompeiana* indicates that it is undesirable in war, but perhaps a virtue in peacetime. Whilst no paradigm of active delay exists in *BC*, section III explores *patientia Catoniana*—which teaches the reader how to endure (rather than be defeated by) the dominance of *celeritas Caesariana* to preserve the republic but is unable to overcome it. It ends discussion of Caesar’s diversion from his normative *celeritas* at Alexandria, before speculating on how these paradigms may have been further complicated by the suicide of Cato at Utica.

Chapter 2 explores the treatment of pace in the first ten books of the *Punica*, revealing that it is informed by Lucan’s pace paradigms. I have split my discussion of the *Punica* into

³⁹ *OLD patientia* 1a.

⁴⁰ See page 1 above.

halves because the narrator's attitude towards *celeritas* shifts dramatically, largely due to a change in *fortuna*. Section I explores the *celeritas* of Hannibal, which is essentially Silius' reception of *celeritas Caesariana*: it is similarly destructive, restless, and motivated by appeasing *fortuna*. Section II explores the more complex *celeritas* of the Roman leaders Publius, Sempronius, Flaminius, and Minucius. Roman *celeritas* in this section is largely based on *celeritas Caesariana*, but actually manifests in self-destruction and defeat unlike Lucan's Caesar—and as such, the narrator is clear that *celeritas* ought not be replicated by the Romans so long as *fortuna* favours Hannibal. Section III is especially important because it examines Fabius' *cunctatio*, which is an improved form of Lucan's *mora Pompeiana* and *patientia Catoniana* because it successfully wards off Hannibal and forestalls *fortuna* by actively delaying. Fabius' *cunctatio* is perhaps the paradigm most worthy of emulation for its ability to save, endure, inspire, and slow Hannibal's *celeritas*. However, the conflict between the consuls Varro and Paulus at the climactic Battle of Cannae place Roman *celeritas* and Fabian *cunctatio* in opposition. The narrator explains the catastrophic defeat at Cannae by reference to the dominance of Varro's rash *celeritas* over Paulus' ineffective *cunctatio* in a 'civil war' setting, thereby positing that *celeritas* is certainly a vice when used by Romans against Romans.

Chapter 3 explores how the pattern of pace in the *Punica* changes after Cannae in books 11-17. The cause of this change in *fortuna* is ostensibly Jupiter's divine intervention, but it is unclear whether Jupiter's intervention is the result of the effect on *fortuna* of Fabius' *cunctatio*. Section I discusses the dramatic change in Hannibal's pace after Cannae, from closely resembling *celeritas Caesariana* to instead *mora Pompeiana*. This is connected to Hannibal's sojourn at Capua, which resembles Caesar's stay at Alexandria—however, Hannibal is unable to regain his former *celeritas*, and like Lucan's Pompey, he becomes more 'humanised' as an almost tragic figure. Section II explores how the Roman leaders Fulvius, Marcellus, and Claudius Nero utilise *celeritas* similarly to the Romans before Cannae, albeit successfully now. The narrator enjoys this success, but is wary of the dangers of *celeritas*. Section III investigates the *celeritas* of Scipio Africanus, who displays the same rashness as earlier *exempla* but evolves into a unique paradigm of *celeritas* in which Scipio is aware of speed's interconnectedness with *fortuna*, and does not let its power corrupt him. Thus, the narrator praises Scipio's uniquely successful and cautious paradigm of *celeritas* but implies that its emulation will lead to the future danger of figures like Julius Caesar.

CHAPTER 1:

PACE IN LUCAN'S *DE BELLO CIVILI*

Lucan's *BC* is dominated by Caesar's speed. But using narratological delay—often dwelling on Pompey's idle slowness—*BC*'s narrator slows the narrative in a futile attempt to delay the decisive Battle of Pharsalus.¹ Pompey ineffectively leads the republican forces against Caesar until his death in Egypt, at which point Cato assumes his role. The purpose of this chapter is to establish pace paradigms of *celeritas*, *mora*, and *cunctatio* based on the characterisations of Caesar, Pompey, and Cato respectively. These paradigms are complicated throughout the text and appear in minor characters, especially Scaeva. First, I establish *celeritas Caesariana* as hyperbolically swift and destructive, idiosyncratic to Caesar, and intrinsically linked to *fortuna*'s favour. Through Caesar's portrayal as 'a pretty nasty piece of work',² the narrator shuns *celeritas*—framing it is a vice which contributes to the downfall of the republic. Unfortunately for the narrator, Pompey's pace is characterised by *mora* and its associated inactivity and idleness. Whilst the narrator ends up favouring Pompey, he laments his ineffectiveness as leader in civil war. With the futility of opposing *celeritas Caesariana* realised, Cato's *patientia* acts as an *exemplum* of its active endurance not only for his soldiers, but also the reader. I distinguish this active steadfastness from the passivity of *mora Pompeiana*, but also reveal a similar monstrosity to *celeritas Caesariana* in the crossing of the Syrtes. However, the effectiveness of *patientia Catoniana* is complicated by the likely coverage of Cato's suicide at Utica.³ These three pace paradigms will form the foundation of my analysis of pace in Silius' *Punica*.⁴

I. *CELERITAS CAESARIANA*

'Julius Caesar' and '*celeritas*' went hand-in-hand in antiquity,⁵ largely due to his military speed, expeditious literary production, and literary style itself.⁶ Whilst 'an intrinsically

¹ See originally Masters 1992: 3-10.

² Gowing 2005: 83.

³ For the potential end of *BC*, see Section III.

⁴ See Chapters 2 and 3.

⁵ Liney 2009: 362. See also Danon 2018.

⁶ Liney 2009: 362. For Caesar's *Commentarii de bello civili* as a source for Lucan, see Gowing 2005: 83-9; Ginsberg 2011.

positive trait' for the historical Caesar,⁷ Caesar's *celeritas* becomes a vice in *BC*.⁸ Lucan's Caesar is a destructive, impious, and self-aggrandising tyrant who—as the 'imperial signifier' (nominally and literally)⁹—ushers a new era for Rome defined by allegiance to one man, a *dominus*.¹⁰ This section tracks the portrayal of Caesar's *celeritas* in *BC*, especially its destructiveness, terror, motivation of appeasing *fortuna*, and the danger of its emulation.

The destructiveness of Caesar's speed is apparent from his introduction as a thunderbolt.¹¹ Rosner-Siegel has recognised Lucan's 'methodical use' of similes to sustain characterisation,¹² making this passage critical for establishing Caesar's speed as a pace paradigm (1.143-157):

sed non in Caesare tantum
nomen erat nec fama ducis, sed nescia virtus
stare loco, solusque pudor non vincere bello.
acer et indomitus, quo spes quoque ira uocasset,
ferre manum et numquam temerando parcere ferro,
successus urguere suos, instare favori
numinis, inpellens quidquid sibi summa petenti
obstaret gaudensque viam fecisse ruina,
qualiter expressum ventis per nubila fulmen
aetheris impulsu sonitu mundique fragore
emicuit rupitque diem populosque paventes
terrui obliqua praestringens lumina flamma:
in sua templa furit, nullaque exire vetante
materia magnamque cadens magnamque revertens
dat stragem late sparsosque recolligit ignes.

Contrast Caesar: he had not only
a general's name and reputation, but never-resting
energy; his only shame was conquering without war;
fierce, indomitable, wherever hope and indignation called
he moved to action, never shrank from defiling his sword,
he followed up his own successes, pressed hard upon the deity's
favour, driving back all obstacles to his high
ambitions and rejoicing to create his path by destruction.
Just so flashes out the thunderbolt shot forth by the winds through clouds,
accompanied by the crashing of the heavens and sound of shattered ether;
it splits the sky and terrifies the panicked

⁷ Danon 2018: 17-18, 27.

⁸ For the perversion of Caesar's memory in *BC*, see Gowing 2005: 83-4. Separately, Lucan's awareness of his own role in shaping the memory of Caesar has been thoroughly explored by Gowing 2005: 90-1.

⁹ Henderson 1987: 141.

¹⁰ For Caesar's characterisation in general, see Ahl 1976: 190-230; Henderson 1987: 141-51; Johnson 1987: 101-34; Narducci 2002: 187-278; Sklenář 2003: 128-51; Day 2013: 106-78; Roche 2019: 10.

¹¹ Caesar as lightning and Pompey as oak also foreshadow the 'predetermined outcome resulting from the confrontation of an oak tree and a bolt of lightning' (Roche 2009: 175).

¹² For the 'oak and lightning simile' see generally Rosner-Siegel 1983. See also Roche 2009: 193.

people, searing eyes with slanting flame;
against its own precincts it rages, and, with nothing solid stopping
its course, both as it falls and then returns great is the devastation
dealt far and wide before it gathers again its scattered fires.

Caesar's *virtus* does not know how to stand still, immediately presenting him as restlessly quick. Embedded in *sed nescia... loco* is an equine allusion to Verg. *Georg.* 3.83, which describes an *eleus sonipes* 'eager to burst forth'.¹³ Like this horse, Caesar is waiting to burst forth. The cumulative list (*acer... ruina*) reflects Caesar's ability to achieve things in quick succession. Moreover, Caesar's enjoyment of (*gaudens*) this path of (architectural) destruction establishes the central outcome of *celeritas Caesariana*: swift input inevitably brings destructive output.¹⁴ The simile of Caesar as thunderbolt (by nature rapid and destructive) epitomises this connection;¹⁵ in fact, lightning's ephemeral quality and the fact that it rages against its own temples (*in sua templa furit*) signifies that *celeritas* leads to self-destruction.¹⁶ However, in Lucan's poem where 'the word is at war with itself', the signifier usually does not lead to the signified:¹⁷ Caesar will not dissipate like a thunderbolt, but will paradoxically survive (and be victorious in) the text.¹⁸

Further, imagery of cosmic dissolution due to the thunderbolt (*aetheriis... flamma*) recalls the ekpyrosis simile at 1.72-80. Ekpyrosis (ἐκπύρωσις) is the Stoic hypothesis of cosmic conflagration at the death of the universe, but also the universe's rebirth (palingenesis).¹⁹ The allusion here hyperbolises the destructiveness of *celeritas Caesariana*, as though it brings apocalypse. But the thunderbolt similarly initiates rebirth through imagery of renewal (*revertens, recolligit*) suggesting that this 'Caesarian cycle' reflects eternal dominion by one man.²⁰ This is refined through the lion simile (1.204-12) in which Caesar

¹³ See Roche 2009: 189-90.

¹⁴ For *ruina* and architectural imagery see Roche 2009: 191-2. Cf. 2.239-46 which further illuminates Caesar's passion for destruction, linked again to his speed and path (*perdat iter... ire via*).

¹⁵ Chen 2014: 342 notes that the thunderbolt 'cements Caesar's status as an agent of destruction' but without explicitly linking it to his speed. The thunderbolt simile anticipates Alexander the Great's comparison to a thunderbolt at 10.25-38, which "establishes the similarly damning moral viewpoint adopted by the narrator in regard to both men" (Roche 2009: 192-3).

¹⁶ For Caesar and self-destruction, see Sklenář 2003: 106-7; Roche 2009: 194; Chen 2014: 343. See also Johnson 1987: 111, Caesar can 'only achieve freedom by exploding... like a parody of stoic ekpyrosis'.

¹⁷ Henderson 1987: 127-128.

¹⁸ However, as will be discussed later, the model of *celeritas Caesariana* does (seemingly) eventuate in self-destruction for those who try to replicate it, like Scaeva—revealing its idiosyncratic relationship with Caesar.

¹⁹ Lapidge 1979: 347-8. Most (e.g. Sklenář 2003; Chen 2014) do not recognise that palingenesis (the rebirth of the universe) was inseparable from ekpyrosis. For correction of this issue see Roche 2005: 61-2. For Lucan and the Stoics, see Lapidge 2016: 370.

²⁰ For 'self-renewal' and the 'Caesarian cycle', see Chen 2014: 343-347.

‘breaks down’ the delays of war quickly (*inde moras solvit belli*).²¹ Also notable here is Caesar’s terror (*populosque paventes*), underlined by plosive alliteration which mimics the sound of lightning.²² Finally, fire (*flamma*) evokes a similar connection between speed and destruction, symbolising that *celeritas* is out-of-control and requires fuel.²³ Fire is an important tool for Caesar throughout *BC*.²⁴ Thus, *celeritas* emerges as a clearly defined trait in Caesar’s characterisation in his introduction, typified by its destructiveness.

The rationale for employing *celeritas* is linked with *fortuna*. That Caesar employs swiftness to seize and maintain *fortuna*’s is seen at 2.653-660:

at numquam patiens pacis longaeque quietis
 armorum, nequid fatis mutare liceret,
 adsequitur generique premit vestigia Caesar.
 sufficerent aliis primo tot moenia cursu
 rapta, tot oppressae depulsis hostibus arces,
 ipsa, caput mundi, bellorum maxima merces,
 Roma capi facilis; sed Caesar in omnia praeceps,
 nil actum credens cum quid superesset agendum,
 instat atrox et adhuc, quamvis possederit omnem
 Italiam, extremo sedeat quod litore Magnus,
 communem tamen esse dolet;

But Caesar follows, never tolerant of peace
 and long respite from fighting, and dogs the steps
 of his son-in-law, to prevent the Fates from making any change.
 Others might be satisfied with capture of so many city-walls at first
 assault, with sudden conquest of so many citadels, the enemy dislodged,
 and with the easy seizure of Rome itself, the capital of the world
 and war's greatest prize; but Caesar fiercely presses on,
 impetuous in everything and thinking nothing done when there remains
 still something more to do: although he occupies all Italy,
 yet because Magnus remains on the seashore's edge it rankles
 that the country is shared between them still;

Caesar is impatient and relentlessly pursues Pompey to Brundisium (*premit vestigia Caesar*),²⁵ with the negative purpose clause *nequid fatis mutare liceret* revealing the appeasement of *fortuna* as Caesar’s motivation. Caesar rushes with headlong speed towards

²¹ Cf. (*rumpunt fata moras*) at 1.263. In this way, Caesar has elements of the divine (lightning) and of a beast (lion), which he uses to climb his way to the imperial apotheosis with Hell’s instruments (Hardie 1993: 68).

²² cf. 1.239; 3.80-3, 300.

²³ cf. discussion of Dyrrachium below.

²⁴ e.g. at Massilia (3.399-762), Alexandria (10.491-505). It also becomes an important tool for Hannibal and Scipio: see Chapter 2, Section I and Chapter 3, Section III.

²⁵ Fantham 1992: 209-9 emphasises, by allusion to *Ov. Met.* 3.17, that this phrase denotes ‘the dogging of relentless pursuit’.

everything (*sed Caesar in omnia praeceps... instat*)—so that eventually, by his speed which prevents *fortuna* from favouring another, he will *become* everything (*omnia Caesar erat* 3.108). This rationale recurs: he earlier summoned his cohorts and headed for Rome so that *fortuna* may not be delayed (1.392-5), and he later reproaches Antony for losing *fortuna*'s time by not acting quickly (5.490-1). Caesar's speed is insatiable²⁶—he will not be satisfied at least until Pompey leaves Italy. Thus, Caesar knows that to keep *fortuna* and therefore success on his side, he must act quickly.

Caesar meets his first actual (not narratological) delay in the civil war at the hands of the Massilians.²⁷ Masters notes that whilst Caesar's Massilian and Spanish campaigns occurred simultaneously in every other account, *BC*'s narrator draws them both into two books—delaying the narrative.²⁸ By refusing to admit and fear Caesar's army (*cumque... pauerent*, 3.300), the Massilians follow principles rather *fortuna* (*causas, non fata, sequi* 3.298).²⁹ As such, the narrator—himself fond of delaying Caesar narratologically—praises them (3.388-394):

Iam satis hoc Graiae memorandum contigit urbi
aeternumque decus, quod non impulsula nec ipso
strata metu tenuit flagrantis in omnia belli
praecipitem cursum, raptisque a Caesare cunctis
vincitur una mora. quantum est quod fata tenentur
quodque virum toti properans inponere mundo
hos perdit Fortuna dies!

Now the Greek city gained this eternal glory,
well deserving mention, that, not compelled or prostrated
by sheer terror, it checked the headlong rush of war
raging through the world and when Caesar seized all else at once
it alone took time to be defeated. What an achievement, to detain the Fates,
to make Fortune waste these days in her haste to set
her warrior in command of the entire world!

The Massilians actively delay Caesar's headlong rush (*tenuit... praecipitem cursum*) and seizure of everything (*raptisque... mora*). The Massilians actively detain and waste *fortuna* (*quantum est... Fortuna dies*); integral to Caesar's success. The narrator's exclamation clarifies this is a *conscious* delay, and by praising this, the narrator's stance against *celeritas*

²⁶ Fantham 1992: 208-9 reveals the motif of Caesar's insatiability (3.51; 10.456).

²⁷ For narratological delay in book 1, see Section III below.

²⁸ Masters 1992: 19-23.

²⁹ *OLD causa* 6a.

Caesariana is reinforced. However, Caesar still only knows one thing: speed and destruction. Soon after, although his army is hesitant to fell the first sacred tree of the Massilian grove, he wastes no time in striking the first blow (3.432-4).³⁰ This unveils another part of *celeritas Caesariana*: its tendency to require sole leadership to be effective. Caesar, as the sole leader of the ‘Caesarian’ cause, paves the way for his supporters with unwavering speed and destruction—contained within his first strike of the axe. This action also highlights Caesar’s ability to inspire *celeritas Caesariana* in others because afterwards, his army forgets their hesitancy and continues to besiege the Massilians (3.437-9). For now, *fortuna* ‘guards the guilty [Caesar]’ from this sacrilege—but the reader hopes that Caesar will pay for this *nefas* (and others) at his assassination, when *fortuna* must inevitably leave him.³¹ Whilst the narrator glorifies the Massilians for delaying Caesar, it is ultimately a minor *mora* for *impatiens* Caesar who departs to Spain (3.453-4).

Caesar is personally repulsed at the imposition of *mora* (*turpe* 5.409-10),³² exemplified by his subsequent rush to assemble his troops in book 5.³³ This, and his reliance on *fortuna*, is epitomised when he reproaches Antony for his idleness and decides to sail with the fisherman Amyclas through a mighty storm (5.497-506):

his terque quaterque
 vocibus excitum postquam cessare videbat,
 dum se desse deis ac non sibi numina credit,
 sponte per incautas audet temptare tenebras
 quod iussi timuere fretum, temeraria prono
 expertus cessisse deo, fluctusque verendos
 classibus exigua sperat superare carina.
 solverat armorum fessas nox languida curas,
 parva quies miseris, in quorum pectora somno
 dat vires fortuna minor

With these words he summoned him
 three times, four times, but when he saw him motionless,
 in the belief that he was failing the gods and not the deities him,
 he ventures through the unsafe darkness to attempt the sea
 willingly, a thing which others, though commanded, feared, in his knowledge
 that recklessness succeeds when god is well-disposed, and he hopes
 in a tiny vessel to surmount the waves which terrify the fleets.
 Drowsy night had relaxed the weary cares of war,

³⁰ For the fictitiousness of this moment, see Masters 1992: 23-29. This is enriched by the allusion to Ovid’s Erisychthon (Masters 1992: 25). This action also foreshadows Caesar’s victory over Pompey, an oak (see Section II below).

³¹ For sacrilege, see Masters 1992: 20. For *fortuna* and his assassination, see Dick 1967: 238.

³² *OLD turpis* 1a, 3a.

³³ He goes to Rome 5.347-402; Brundisium 5.403-60; Dyrrachium 5.461-503; Italy 5.504-702; Epirus 5.703-21.

a brief repose for the miserable men into whose breasts
their lesser fortune gives strength in sleep;

The iterative numerals (*terque quaterque*) convey Caesar's indignance and contrast to Antony's idleness (*cessare*).³⁴ The juxtaposition between *classibus* and *exigua*, coupled with the hyperbaton of *carina*, reinforce this hyperbolic self-belief that Caesar's tiny boat can overcome something which his whole fleet dares not attempt (*verendos*). The repeated diction of sluggishness and inactivity (*fessas, languida, quies, somno, silebant, cedentia*) associated with his army further contrast Caesar's colossal task and soldiers' idle sleep. Caesar's willingness to seek Italy (*sponte*) frames him as an anti-Aeneas, since Aeneas seeks Italy unwillingly (*non sponte*, Verg. *A.* 4.361).³⁵ His recklessness and 'absence of design'³⁶ (*temeritas*) is symptomatic of Caesar's haste, linking him to Alexander.³⁷ Matthews suggests that *fortuna minor* indicates that 'the sleep of the soldiers was sounder due to their low rank'.³⁸ But this overlooks my argument that Lucan emphasises the soldiers' inactivity compared to Caesar's activity. Instead, I suggest that this instance portrays *fortuna* as favouring Caesar because of his choice of the swiftest option—ultimately securing his success and favouring him (5.593). Despite the odds, Caesar prevails with *fortuna* accompanying, displaying that hyperbolic *celeritas* of one man overpowers the *mora* of the many resting soldiers—highlighting *celeritas Caesariana's* inclination towards sole power.

Caesar's hyperbolic speed thus far takes a toll at Dyrrachium in book 6—a peculiarly paradoxical episode. Whilst Caesar—the endlessly energetic perpetual motion machine³⁹—has quickly marched to besiege Pompey (6.13-4) and established the groundwork (6.29-46), he becomes uncharacteristically tired (*defessus Caesar mediis intermanet agris*, 6.47). Cowan notes the uncertainty as to the definition of *intermanet*, a *hapax legomenon*, with some taking it as equivalent to *in medio pernoctat* ('to spend the night in the middle (of what he was doing)').⁴⁰ If this interpretation is followed, Caesar is not being uncharacteristically 'slow'. But I argue that the strikingness in itself of the adjective *defessus* to describe Caesar indicates that he is indeed momentarily idle. It is therefore this lapse in *celeritas* which accounts for Pompey's ultimate success in breaking out. In the aforementioned boat episode, tiredness and

³⁴ Antony is also described as *morentem* (5.480) and urged not to delay by Caesar (*ne cessa*, 5.536).

³⁵ For this connection see Matthews 2004: 38.

³⁶ *OLD temeritas* 3a.

³⁷ Matthews 2004: 38-9 recalls Seneca's comment on Alexander: *cui pro virtute erat felix temeritas* (Sen. *Ben.* 1.13.3).

³⁸ Matthews 2004: 44-5.

³⁹ Cowan forthcoming on lines 6.46-7.

⁴⁰ Cowan forthcoming on lines 6.46-7.

stagnancy are associated with *mora*—incompatible with *celeritas Caesariana*. Further, Caesar’s forces run out of ‘fuel’ as they endure famine as though they are besieged—despite being besiegers (6.106-9). Disturbingly, followers of *celeritas Caesariana* like Caesar’s soldiers crave speed and the avoidance of *mora* so greatly that they will harvest fuel (in this case ‘food’) out of any possible source—even things unknown to the human palette (6.113-7).⁴¹ The failure of Caesar’s forces to deviate from their characteristic speed and instead actively delay their enemy in a siege reinforces *celeritas Caesariana* as a distinct paradigm—deviation from which is harmful, like out of fuel (famine) and therefore momentary defeat. This reveals that emulation of *celeritas Caesariana* is unsustainable for everyone but Caesar himself.

In this standalone ‘arena’ of paradox and reversal that is the Dyrrachium episode,⁴² Scaeva—committed to the Caesarian *exemplum*⁴³ and momentarily usurping Caesar’s role as synecdochic hero for the Caesarian forces⁴⁴—is present to *delay* Pompey. The fact of this *delay* rather than *speed* is captured by Scaeva’s portrayal as a wall that does not stand still (6.201-2).⁴⁵ However, likened to a swift leopard, he still shares the same destructive characteristics of *celeritas Caesariana* (6.180-3). With his eye injured, another simile compares him to a swiftly raging Pannonian bear (6.220-3), highlighting his monstrosity.⁴⁶ Whilst purportedly incompatible with Caesar’s *exemplum* of *celeritas Caesariana*, Scaeva’s explicit awareness of this appearance reconciles this contradiction: seemingly abandoning *celeritas Caesariana* by being a delaying ‘wall’, he addresses the Pompeian forces (6.233-44):

tollite et in Magni viventem ponite castris.
hoc vestro praestate duci: sit Scaeva relieti
Caesaris exemplum potius quam mortis honestae.’
credidit infelix simulatis vocibus Aunus
nec vidit tecto gladium mucrone prementem,
membraque captivi pariter laturus et arma
fulmineum mediis excepit faucibus ensem.
incaluit virtus, atque una caede reffectus
‘solvat’ ait ‘poenas, Scaevam quicumque subactum
speravit. pacem gladio si quaerit ab isto

⁴¹ A similar paradox occurs with Pompey and plague: see Section II below.

⁴² *aestuat angusta rabies civilis harena* (6.63). For Lucan’s gladiatorial imagery in *BC*, see and Ahl 1976: 82-112; Hardie 1993: 29-30; Leigh 1997: 244-5.

⁴³ Henderson 1987: 127-8; Hardie 1993: 35.

⁴⁴ Hardie 1993: 35. The theme of the one-versus-many is clear at 6.191-2.

⁴⁵ In contrast to Caesar at 1.144-5.

⁴⁶ Hardie 1993: 69.

Magnus, adorato summittat Caesare signa.
an similem vestri segnemque ad fata putastis?

Pick me up and put me down in Magnus' camp, still living;
do this for your general; let Scaeva be a model
of desertion from Caesar rather than of honourable death.'
Unlucky Aunus believed these feigned words
and did not see him holding his sword with hidden point:
and when about to lift the captive's limbs and weapons together
he received the lightning-fast sword fully in the throat.
His energy grew hot and, refreshed by a single killing,
he says: 'Whoever hoped that Scaeva was subdued must pay
the penalty; if it is peace that Magnus seeks from this
my sword, he must bow to Caesar, he must dip his standards.
Did you think me like yourselves and slow to meet my fate?

The desertion of *celeritas Caesariana* is feigned—the reality of his devotion to *celeritas Caesariana* is revealed when he thrusts his lightning-fast sword (*fulmineum... ensem*) into Aunus' throat and states that he is not slow to meet his death (*an... putastis*). Scaeva was only pretending to abandon *celeritas Caesariana*. Still, the reader is left to ponder the similarity of *celeritas Caesariana* to paradigms of delaying and endurance which Scaeva purportedly displays here.⁴⁷ The result of Scaeva's heroism here, according to the narrator in an anti-*makarismos*, is that he prepared Rome for a master (6.262), thereby deepening the causative relationship between *celeritas Caesariana* and (imperial) sole power. To underline this relationship, Lucan's Scaeva episode focusses on his portrayal as synecdochic hero, departing from historical accounts.⁴⁸ The aspect of self-destructiveness in *celeritas Caesariana* is seemingly fulfilled in this episode too: Scaeva collapses, his blood is shed, and it seems like he has sacrificed himself for Caesar (6.246-51). It appears *celeritas Caesariana* is innately self-destructive, and the narrator futilely hopes that Caesar too will fall. But Scaeva will fleetingly reappear when Caesar is on the point of defeat at Alexandria (10.542-45), signalling that *celeritas Caesariana*'s self-destructive aspect is but one of the many instances where the signified does not lead to the signifier.⁴⁹ This emulation of *celeritas Caesariana* is described as *virtus*, but labelled a *crimen* (6.147-8), reaffirming the narrator's persistence that Caesar's speed is a vice—a dangerous *exemplum* which is morally flawed in a civil war because of its destructiveness.

⁴⁷ Especially the monstrous aspect of *patientia Catoniana* in Section III.

⁴⁸ Leigh 1997: 172-175.

⁴⁹ See generally Henderson 1987.

Foreshadowed by Caesar's influence on Scaeva, perhaps the most frightening effect of *celeritas Caesariana* is its 'multiplicative' effect. After addressing his soldiers before Pharsalus, they react in this way (7.329-36):

vix cuncta locuto
Caesare quemque suum munus trahit, armaque raptim
sumpta Ceresque viris. capiunt praesagia belli
calcatisque ruunt castris; stant ordine nullo,
arte ducis nulla, permittuntque omnia fati.
si totidem Magni soceros totidemque petentis
urbis regna suae funesto in Marte locasses,
non tam praecipiti ruerent in proelia cursu.

Hardly had Caesar finished speaking, when each is drawn to his own task and hurriedly the men took up their weapons and ate their bread. They seize upon war's portents; rush on, trampling under foot the camp; take their stand in no formation, without their leader's tactics; everything they leave to Fate. If in the deadly warfare you had placed so many fathers-in-law of Magnus, so many seeking power over their own Rome, they would not be rushing into battle with such headlong speed.

Often hesitant to follow Caesar's example of *celeritas*,⁵⁰ in the final hour Caesar's soldiers embrace *celeritas Caesariana* not just to the fullest extent—but in *BC*'s theme of *plus quam*—they even surpass Caesar's *celeritas*. Firstly, the lack of description of the soldiers' eating and arming (*armaque... viris*) which is normally described in more detail,⁵¹ is a narratological choice to show that their eagerness for speed surpasses epic tradition. In the manner of the paradigm established so far, everything is left to *fortuna* rather than their individual generals' tactics (*permittuntque omnia fati*). The theme of *plus quam* is bolstered by the counterfactual (*si totidem... cursu*), with emphatic final place of *cursu* denoting speed.⁵² Roche notices that Caesar's army is often portrayed as having *praecipiti cursu*, bolstering the adjective *praeceps* as distinctly Caesarian in *BC*.⁵³ Embedded in the meaning of *ruere* is not only a sense of rushing, but also of destroying.⁵⁴ So too is the sense of rushing to one's own self-destruction.⁵⁵ This same verb described the fall of great empires like Rome in the proem (*in se magna ruunt* 1.81), highlighting the widespread consequences of this

⁵⁰ e.g. 3.432-3.

⁵¹ Roche 2019: 146-7.

⁵² For counterfactuals in *BC* and the *Punica*, see generally Cowan 2010.

⁵³ Roche 2019: 147-8. cf. 2.706, 3.390-1, 3.426.

⁵⁴ *OLD* *ruo* 7.

⁵⁵ *OLD* *ruo* 4.

mass following of *celeritas Caesariana*—‘*plus quam style*’. Naturally, the Battle of Pharsalus is the climax of the destructiveness of *celeritas Caesariana*, made even *more* climactic by the ‘faster-than-Caesar’ portrayal of Caesar’s soldiers.

Caesar will depart from the normative paradigm of *celeritas Caesariana* when he sojourns at Alexandria in book 10.⁵⁶ This section has shown *celeritas Caesariana* to be the relentless speed and hatred of *mora* that is required to maintain *fortuna*’s favour in the pursuit of sole power and complete control—with an indulgence in and embrace of its destructive consequences. It is an exemplary trait emulated by Scaeva and the Caesarian soldiers, but the narrator critiques its exemplarity in civil war because of its destructiveness to the republic.

II. *MORA POMPEIANA*

The *mora* of Lucan’s Pompey is the antithesis of the historical Pompey’s early reputation as successful, swift, and fortunate.⁵⁷ Lucan portrays him as old, mellowed, possessed by a desire to be loved, therefore occupying a ‘more moderate, fallible position between the extremes of Caesar and Cato’.⁵⁸ We have seen that at least until book 10, Caesar breaks through the boundary of *mora* (idleness) through his *celeritas*.⁵⁹ This section shows that Pompey, too, strives to break through *mora* (idleness) by actively delaying Caesar. However, it is this *active* component which Pompey fails at, resulting in his characteristic passiveness, ineffectuality, and idleness which I call *mora Pompeiana*. The delay of Pharsalus until book 7 is not the result of *Pompey* as delayer, but of the *narrator* as delayer. This section investigates *mora Pompeiana*, especially its lingering on former *fortuna*, the dawdling effect of love, idleness as a disease, its obsequiousness, and its failure. Nonetheless, at Pharsalus Pompey advocates for delaying confrontation even if his attempts are ineffectual; and after his death, this disposition shifts to Cato.

Before Caesar’s introduction as a quick thunderbolt, Pompey is introduced as an oak which is ‘ancient, static, and about to fall’;⁶⁰ thus, Pompey’s defeat at Pharsalus is foreshadowed by the predetermined outcome of the clash of lightning and oak (1.129-143):⁶¹

Nec coiere pares, alter vergentibus annis

⁵⁶ Discussed in Section III below.

⁵⁷ Roche 2019: 87.

⁵⁸ Roche 2019: 8.

⁵⁹ For boundaries in *BC*, see Bartsch 1997: 13.

⁶⁰ Rosner-Siegel 1983: 166.

⁶¹ Roche 2009: 175.

in senium longoque togae tranquillior usu
 dedidicit iam pace duces, famaepetitor
 multa dare in uolugus, totus popularibus auris
 inpelli plausuque sui gaudere theatri,
 nec reparare novas vires, multumque priori
 credere fortunae. stat magni nominis umbra,
 qualis frugifero quercus sublimis in agro
 exuvias veteris populi sacrataque gestans
 dona ducum nec iam validis radicibus haerens
 pondere fixa suo est, nudosque per aera ramos
 effundens trunco, non frondibus, efficit umbram,
 et quamvis primo nutet casura sub Euro,
 tot circum silvae firmo se robore tollant,
 sola tamen colitur.

They met not equally matched. One with years declining
 towards old age and grown milder through long experience of civil life
 had now in peace unlearned the general's part, and, seeking fame,
 was generous to the crowd, wholly driven by the popular
 winds, rejoicing in applause in the theatre he had built,
 and without restoring his strength afresh, he relied chiefly
 on his former fortune. He stands, the shadow of a great name;
 like in a fruitful field a lofty oak,
 bearing the people's spoils of old and generals'
 hallowed dedications; clinging with roots no longer strong,
 by its own weight it stands firm, and spreading naked branches
 through the air, it makes shade with trunk, not foliage;
 and though it totters, ready to fall beneath the first Eurus,
 though all around so many trees upraise themselves with sturdy trunks,
 yet it alone is venerated.

Two gladiators meet, unequally matched (*pares*).⁶² Caesar is speedy and destructive. But Pompey is an inactive general, whose *tranquillitas* has made him unready for war and instead used to peace—which is, by nature, idle in comparison. His senescence (*in senium*), a quality of which both he and Caesar are aware,⁶³ represents his lack of youthful vigour. This ‘ominous lack of readiness’⁶⁴ contrasts to his quest for fame and popularity (*famaepetitor...auris inpelli*) which are pursuits of actively engaged generals. His ability to be pushed by mere ‘winds of popularity’, despite an ostensibly firm oak, foreshadows Pompey’s obsequiousness to popular desire. The disconnect between idle reality and active desire is encapsulated by the emphatic central placement of *stat* combined with the realisation that Pompey’s grounding is

⁶² Feeney 1986: 239.

⁶³ e.g. 2.324-5; 2.550-60. See also Marks 2010: 149.

⁶⁴ Roche 2009: 101.

only a shadow of a great name⁶⁵—creating an effect of parapsydokian. The focus on *nomina* in *BC* ‘draws attention to the absence of true substance beneath the signifier’.⁶⁶ Feeney argues that the epithet *Magnus* is ‘a promise which he has outlived and can longer fulfil’.⁶⁷ Pompey desires greatness, popularity, and to delay Caesar: but these desires manifest only as shadows: intangible and passive. Certainly, Pompey’s desire for such things is rooted in past success, but this large (*multum*) trust in former *fortuna* is misplaced as it now favours Caesar.⁶⁸ At Brundisium, dramatic irony presents Pompey as unaware of his separation from *fortuna* since he addresses *fortuna* as ashamed but not blind (2.567-8). It is clear by now that *fortuna*’s favour is required for successful combat, and Pompey lacks this.

The dissonance between desire and reality in Pompey’s personality is embodied in his likening to an oak: adorned by *old* spoils and *previous* popularity (*qualis... ducum*). However, the roots of this oak are no longer strong (*nec... haerens*) and it is ready to fall under the first soft wind (*et quamvis... Euro*)—underscoring Pompey’s ‘inactivity in the face of his competition’.⁶⁹ This line also contrasts to Pompey’s representation in Cicero’s letters, where he is described as *eo robore vir; iis radicibus*⁷⁰. This further contrasts to the paramount quality of endurance in Aeneas’ oak-simile at Verg. *A.* 4.442-6,⁷¹ introducing a sustained contrast between Aeneas and Pompey which foregrounds Pompey’s ineffectiveness at preserving the republic. This mismatch between appearance as firm but reality as fragile throughout Pompey’s introduction encapsulates the mismatch between Pompey’s *desire* to delay *celeritas Caesariana* but the *reality* that Pompey’s pace is too slow, ineffectual, and passive. Even if Pompey were effective at remaining firm, we are told that Caesar’s *celeritas* stops at nothing solid (1.155-6). Therefore Pompey’s feigned sturdiness as a firm force of delay but actual passivity, idleness, and reliance on former *fortuna* are imbued in his introduction to *BC* as an oak.

Forced by Caesar’s advancements to leave his base at Brundisium, Pompey’s troubled relationship with *fortuna* and the futility of his flight is revealed (2.699-708):

dux etiam uotis hoc te, Fortuna, precatur,
quam retinere vetas, liceat sibi perdere saltem

⁶⁵ For more on Lucan’s playfulness with Pompey’s name ‘Magnus’, see Feeney 1986.

⁶⁶ e.g. Cato’s *clarum et uenerabile nomen* (8.792) See also 8.806; 9.597 and Caesar as more than a *nomen* (1.144). Roche 2009, 185. Quote from Roche 2009: 206-7.

⁶⁷ Feeney 1986: 239-40.

⁶⁸ See Section I.

⁶⁹ Roche 2009: 206.

⁷⁰ Roche 2009: 185-6.

⁷¹ For this allusion, see Roche 2009: 188.

Italiam. vix fata sinunt; nam murmure uasto
 impulsum rostris sonuit mare, fluctuat unda,
 totque carinarum permixtis aequora sulcis
 <eruta feruescunt litusque frementia pulsant.>
 ergo hostes portis, quas omnis solverat urbis
 cum fato conuersa fides, murisque recepti
 praecipiti cursu flexi per cornua portus
 ora petunt pelagusque dolent contingere classi.
 heu pudor, exigua est fugiens victoria Magnus.

The leader in his prayers asks even this of you, Fortune,
 that you let him at least abandon the Italy which you forbid him
 to keep. The Fates hardly permit it: with roar immense
 the sea resounded as it was struck by prows, the water seethes,
 stirred up by criss-crossing wakes of so many ships.
 Then all the gates are opened by the city's loyalty reversed
 along with destiny, and the enemy, admitted within the walls,
 turning with a headlong rush along the harbour's spits, head for
 the mouth and are annoyed that the fleet enjoys the open sea.
 What shame, that Magnus fleeing is a victory too small!

Pompey's intense supplication towards *fortuna* is juxtaposed to *fortuna*'s favouritism for Caesar because of his speed only about fifty lines earlier (2.653-60). Pompey begs (*precatur*) for only one thing (*etiam, hoc, vetas*)—to leave Italy. Fantham recognises that this prayer is a play on the practice of making a vow for safe return at the beginning of a voyage—which is paradoxical because Pompey is *departing* Italy, and ironic because he will never return.⁷² But *fortuna* only barely allows it (*vix fata sinunt*), highlighting its strained relationship with Pompey. For a brief instance, *celeritas Caesariana* does not prevail with its headlong speed (*praecipiti cursu*) and so is pained (*dolent*) to endure *mora* owing to the lack of enemy at Brundisium. And so momentarily, Pompey breaks through *mora*—but the tension with *fortuna* coupled with the narrator's lamentation that fleeing is only a small victory for Pompey (*heu pudor... Magnus*) indicates that such activeness is uncharacteristic of Pompey. The narrator painstakingly clarifies that Pompey's brief glimpse of *fortuna*'s favour is incomparable to the *fortuna* which propelled Pompey to 'Greatness' (2.725-8). This is confirmed by the juxtaposition between *exigua* and *Magnus*.⁷³ In fact, Pompey avoids direct conflict with Caesar out of fear at 2.596-600. There is further irony in that fleeing (*fugiens*) is a passive activity; a mere reaction to another's activity.⁷⁴ Hence whilst seemingly a victory at

⁷² Fantham 1992: 217.

⁷³ For this pun see Feeney 1986 and Hardie 1993: 5-8.

⁷⁴ c.f. 2.575, where Pompey does not realise the difference.

Brundisium, upon closer inspection this episode establishes Pompey's struggle to win over *fortuna's* favour because of his normative *mora*.

Book 5 is dominated by Caesar's superhuman speed, but ends with Pompey sending his wife, Cornelia, to Lesbos. The narrator laments Pompey's idleness (5.727-33):

heu, quantum mentes dominatur in aequas
iusta Venus! dubium trepidumque ad proelia, Magne,
te quoque fecit amor; quod nolles stare sub ictu
fortunae quo mundus erat Romanaque fata,
coniunx sola fuit. mentem iam verba paratam
destituunt, blandaeque iuvat ventura trahentem
indulgere morae et tempus subducere fatis.

O, how much power has lawful Venus
over tranquil minds! Love made even you, Magnus, hesitant
and afraid of battle; the only thing you wished not to expose
to the blow of Fortune which was waiting for the world and Roman destiny
was your wife. His mind, made up already, is deserted
by words, and, postponing things to come, he prefers to indulge
in sweet delay and steal time from destiny.

The passive verb *dominatur* immediately establishes Pompey as a passive figure capable of being manipulated, but not able to manipulate.⁷⁵ Whilst this episode reveals 'a warmth in Pompey which is utterly lacking in either Cato or Caesar',⁷⁶ this love for Cornelia is unfortunately portrayed as a cause of his *mora*, which is characterised by hesitation and oscillation (*dubium trepidumque*). Pompey's ineffectiveness in the civil war is emphasised by the fact that he can only preserve Cornelia, not the republican cause, from *fortuna's* strike (*sub ictu / fortunae*). Importantly, Pompey drags out (*trahentem*) the inevitable, with the future participle (*ventura*) not allowing any uncertainty as to the future. The chiasmus (*indulgere morae et tempus subducere*) conjoins the indulgence in delay with the stealing of time, emphasising that Pompey is not actively delaying Caesar in any way: rather, he has been idly loving Cornelia. Whilst the pathos created by Pompey's reluctance to leave Cornelia (*mentem... destituunt*) reveals the narrator's affection for *mora Pompeiana*, the scene ultimately portrays Pompey as ineffective opposition to Caesar.⁷⁷ Thus, whereas love and hesitation may be virtues in peacetime, they are a hinderance in war such that Pompey is ashamed of himself for sleeping with Cornelia (*nam me... somnos* 5.749-50). This inactive

⁷⁵ c.f. Virg. *A.* 4.412 where Aeneas departs Dido (Thompson 1984: 210-11).

⁷⁶ Ahl 1976: 173.

⁷⁷ The narrator laments this excessive passion (Thompson 1984: 211).

way to spend the night is juxtaposed in book 5 to Caesar's activity at night in the boat episode.

At Dyrrachium, other sources present Pompey as taking initiative over a relaxed Caesar:⁷⁸ but in *BC*, the episode is framed as another illustration of how Pompey's passivity is continually provoked by Caesar's forces. Pompey is unable to press his advantage, maintaining the image of 'Caesar as mover and Pompey as moved'.⁷⁹ This choice emphasises Lucan's obsession with characterising Caesar and Pompey in terms of their pace and activity. Further, I suggest that the reversal of signifiers (Caesar as besieger, Pompey as besieged) and signified (besieger suffering hunger, besieged suffering disease) can be understood as the effect of each character's pace. As discussed already, Caesar's immense speed led him to run out of fuel and suffer hunger. But at 6.89-90, inactive air (*iners caelum*) has brought rotting disease (*fluvidae pestis*). This can easily be applied to Pompey's slow, idle movements throughout *BC* thus far. Pompey suffers disease from spending too long in *mora*, just as Caesar runs out of fuel from being too fast. Thus, the narrator warns the reader that *mora* allows for external forces to abuse and waste away one's body, warning against *mora* as a response to *celeritas*.

At Pharsalus, Pompey fails (where Caesar succeeds) to inspire his troops to delay a decisive contest, epitomising the ineffectuality of *mora Pompeiana*.⁸⁰ The narrator reveals that Pompey is called slow and afraid (*segnis pavidusque vocatur*, 7.52) by his men, and even that other peoples are protesting that the civil war has been drawn out for too long (*teneri*, 7.56-7). The republicans' concerns with Pompey's shortcomings are elucidated by Cicero in an unhistorical speech to Pompey (7.68-85):⁸¹

'hoc pro tot meritis solum te, Magne, precatur
uti se Fortuna velis, proceresque tuorum
castrorum regesque tui cum supplice mundo
adfusi vinci socerum patiare rogamus.
humani generis tam longo tempore bellum
Caesar erit? merito Pompeium vincere lente
gentibus indignum est a transcurrente subactis.

'This alone Fortune asks of you, Magnus, in return for all her many favours—that you be willing to make full use of her; we leaders

⁷⁸ Rosner-Siegel 1983: 174-5.

⁷⁹ Rosner-Siegel 1983: 174.

⁸⁰ c.f. 2.596-600.

⁸¹ Cicero remained at Dyrrachium with other Pompeians like Cato and Varro. In fact, Cicero advised Pompey to broker a peace deal with Caesar (Roche 2019: 83-4).

of your camp and your kings together with the suppliant world
prostrate ourselves and beg you to allow the conquest
of your father-in-law. Shall Caesar mean war for humankind
for so long a time? Rightly do the nations who were tamed
by Pompey racing past resent that he is slow to conquer.

Whilst it is Cicero speaking, not the narrator, the earlier praise for Cicero confirms that the narrator agrees with his viewpoint. Pompey's relationship to *fortuna* seems to have reversed since 2.699: here, *fortuna* begs Pompey to make use of her. It seems that *fortuna* wants to favour Pompey, and by begging, it is as though *fortuna* is asking Pompey to be active, which his *mora* does not permit. This deepens the reader's understanding of *fortuna* in *BC*—it seems that Caesar has usurped Pompey's former *fortuna*, but that *fortuna* still wishes to favour Pompey but cannot because of his procrastination during the war.⁸² By framing Pompey as lacking *fortuna*, Lucan challenges the historical view that Pompey was renowned for *fortuna*.⁸³ Cicero also contrasts Pompey's former speed (practically unseen in *BC*) with his current slowness in *merito... subactis*.⁸⁴ Pompey's previously conquered nations, like the reader, struggle to reconcile Pompey's current *mora* with his former *celeritas*. Cicero goads Pompey to action: the soldiers' hands brandish their weapons (7.82), they wait for the signals that are slow to sound (7.82-3), and the trumpets may even sound without his signal (7.83). The final placement of *sequatur an comes* (7.85) inverts the expected subject and object since as general, Pompey should be leading the citizens and senate into battle as comrades—not vice versa. Thus, whilst a lack of *fortuna* has been identified as a cause of Pompey's defeat at Pharsalus,⁸⁵ this lack of *fortuna* can be attributed to his *mora*.

Pompey acquiesces to Cicero's scathing words, stating in reply *nil ultra fata morabor: / inuoluat populos una fortuna ruina* (7.88-9). The use of the verbal cognate of *mora* reveals that Pompey will no longer be idle. Successful delay might permit *fortuna* to favour the republicans, but because of Pompey's acquiescence, Caesar will wreak destruction with *fortuna*'s favour. Pompey does not seem to recognise his failure, but does recognise his belief that actively delaying Caesar was the best strategy when he suggests that the bravest man is the one who can postpone (*differre*) looming events (7.105-6). Thus, with Pompey's obsequiousness, no more idleness is permitted (*nullasque moras permittere*, 7.338). Pharsalus finally befalls the narrative. Leigh notices that Pompey's acquiescence is a Livian paradigm:

⁸² For more on *fortuna*'s connection to Pompey, see Roche 2019: 70-1.

⁸³ Dick 1967: 239.

⁸⁴ e.g. Cic. *Man.* 40 and Roche 2019: 91.

⁸⁵ Dick 1967: 239.

‘an experienced general who wisely delays engagement with the enemy but who is driven to precipitate and often disastrous action by the impatience of his subordinates or of the common soldiers’.⁸⁶ A general who drags out war (*bellum trahere*) is constantly mocked in Livy.⁸⁷ Ultimately, the lead up to Pharsalus emphasises the acquiescence, slowness, ineffectiveness, and uninspirational quality of *mora Pompeiana*.

During Pharsalus, Pompey finally becomes aware that *fortuna* has abandoned him (7.666) and that it favours Caesar (7.647-8). Cowan has showed that this flight is an inversion of the traditional epic device of *devotio*: Pompey ‘is riding not *into* but *away from* the enemy’.⁸⁸ A traditional epic *devotio* involves a solitary hero rushing into the enemy line to serve the common good, bringing destruction upon them but simultaneously sacrificing himself.⁸⁹ Cowan deduces that Pompey’s inverse *devotio* was the correct choice for Pompey to minimise bloodshed, but this marks a negative shift in republican ideology since Pompey, an individual, has become more important than the community.⁹⁰ This inverted *devotio*, where the ‘best’ outcome for the republic occurs without self-sacrifice, naturally contrasts to Caesar’s purporting to offer his head as a sacrifice in the storm episode, but such sacrifice is not required.⁹¹ Thus, Pompey stops himself and his soldiers from rushing to their death (7.668-9) by being slow again. But he is not idle: his reasoning as to preventing cosmic dissolution (7.672) and to prevent Caesar from witnessing his death (7.673) clearly indicates his further intention to delay the total destruction of the republican cause. However, Pompey’s intention to delay, but the reality of his idleness, are instantly brought to mind by the narrator’s apostrophe *nequiquam, infelix... ubicumque caput* (7.674-5). Thus Pompey’s flight from Pharsalus can be read as a final attempt to delay Caesar and preserve the republic, but in fact it reveals the passivity of *mora Pompeiana*.

Book 8 begins with Pompey’s epiphany that his youthful *fortuna* abandoned him in the civil war (8.19-31). Feeney notes how this helps to ‘emancipate him from his [Great] past’.⁹² But this is not epiphanous for the narrator nor the reader, who has been aware of this throughout *BC*. Pompey’s former *fortuna* will bring him a speedy death (*celeri*, 8.30), which has seemed inevitable since the opening juxtaposition of Caesar’s speedy thunderbolt to Pompey’s stationary oak. This almost explicitly reveals the prevalence of *celeritas*

⁸⁶ Leigh 1997: 116.

⁸⁷ e.g. Livy 7.12.10-4; 4.18.1-2; 5.10.7; 5.118. See Leigh 1997: 116.

⁸⁸ Cowan 2011: 76. For Cato’s *devotio*, see Section III below.

⁸⁹ Cowan 2011: 56-57; Hardie 1993: 53-56.

⁹⁰ Cowan 2011: 78.

⁹¹ Hardie 1993: 54.

⁹² Feeney 1986: 240.

Caesariana over *mora Pompeiana*, even though it is not Caesar who kills Pompey, but the Egyptian Achilles. The narrator is sympathetic towards Pompey's *mora*, condemning *fortuna* for allowing this to happen to Rome (8.686). However, there is some hope for the reader yet, as through metempsychosis, Pompey's spirit (*manes*) settles in Brutus and Cato (9.18).

This section has established Pompey's characterisation in terms of *mora*, which is slow, passive, and ineffective in comparison to *celeritas Caesariana*. Thus, *mora Pompeiana* is dominated by *celeritas Caesariana* in *BC* demonstrating that Lucan views *mora Pompeiana* as unworthy of emulation. It lacks *fortuna*'s favour, craves popularity, fails to inspire action in others. And whilst it may be more 'human' than *celeritas Caesariana* because it permits the love of one's wife, this is undesirable in war.

III. *PATIENTIA CATONIANA*

I have foreshadowed that Lucan's narrator delays the narrative in moral opposition to *celeritas Caesariana* and its associated imperial connotations.⁹³ In this section, I suggest that the narrator longs for a paradigm of *cunctatio* to emerge, since *mora Pompeiana* is ineffective against Caesar. But such a paradigm cannot be drawn from history: instead, the narrator offers the *exemplum* of *patientia Catoniana* to show the reader how to actively endure *celeritas* without submitting to it. Cato was an especially exemplary figure in antiquity as a Stoic *sapiens*,⁹⁴ which manifests in *BC*. However, the extremity of his *patientia* positions him as a sort of 'monster' in the post-cataclysmic world after Pharsalus.⁹⁵ After reaffirming the narrator's role as delayer in *BC*, this section explores *patientia Catoniana*'s ability to challenge *fortuna*, preserve the remnants of the republic, and inspire others; but also how it, in some ways, resembles the monstrosity of *celeritas Caesariana*. It concludes by theorising how Cato's suicide at Utica might problematise the exemplarity of *patientia*.⁹⁶

Before exploring Cato's character, it is necessary to draw attention to the narrator's role in delaying the narrative: that although 'powerless... to prevent the final catastrophe, [he] has at least the power, as poet, of delaying it within his poem'.⁹⁷ Roche further adds that delay is

⁹³ See originally Masters 1992. See also e.g. 1.392-465 (catalogue of Gallic tribes), 1.522-695 (description of supernatural occurrences at Rome), 2.478-504 (Caesar delayed at Aternus), 7.1-460 (Pharsalus delayed). For more on narrative delay in Lucan, see Section II of the introduction.

⁹⁴ Gorman 2001: 285.

⁹⁵ McNamara 2020: 167.

⁹⁶ For the possible end of *BC*, see generally Stover 2008.

⁹⁷ Masters 1992: 5.

typically orchestrated by divinities in other epics, but by the narrator in *BC*.⁹⁸ Narrative delay occurs as early as the beginning of the narrative proper. Caesar, by his fast pace, *had* crossed the Alps (*Caesar cursu superaverat Alpes*, 1.183)—the pluperfect revealing this geographical limit to be ‘casually transgressed’.⁹⁹ However, before Caesar can swiftly cross the Rubicon and enter Italy, the narrator delays with the lengthy proem itself (1-183), Caesar’s speech (1.190-203), and the ecphrasis on the Rubicon river (1.213-219). This strain to delay Caesar’s inevitable *celeritas* is undermined by the conciseness of the ablative absolute (*superato gurgite*, 1.223), which shows Caesar is already across despite the narrative delay. Such narrative delay recurs even in the final moment before Pharsalus (*ut rapido cursu fati suprema morantem / consumpsere locum*, 7.460-1), wherein Caesar’s speed finally consumes Pompey’s *mora*. The narrator’s desire to delay also accounts for his ‘fanatic devotion’ towards Pompey,¹⁰⁰ who is characterised by delay, even if it fails to delay Caesar himself. Such devotion extends to the *patientia* of Cato which is built on Pompey’s *mora*, but focusses on active endurance rather than passive ineffectuality.

Cato’s *patientia* comes to the aid of the narrator too late to delay Caesar’s Pharsalian victory, but in time to preserve the the republican forces from total destruction. First, however, Cato’s *patientia* is introduced in book 2 (2.380-91):

hi mores, haec duri immota Catonis
secta fuit, servare modum finemque tenere
naturamque sequi patriaeque impendere vitam
nec sibi sed toti genitum se credere mundo.
huic epulae vicisse famem, magnique penates
summovisse hiemem tecto, pretiosaque vestis
hirtam membra super Romani more Quiritis
induxisse togam, Veneris quoque maximus usus
progenies: urbi pater est urbique maritus,
iustitiae cultor, rigidi servator honesti,
in commune bonus; nullosque Catonis in actus
subrepsit partemque tulit sibi nata voluptas.

This was the character and this the unswerving creed
of austere Cato: to observe moderation, to hold to the goal,
to follow nature, to devote his life to his country,
to believe that he was born not for himself but for all the world.
In his eyes to conquer hunger was a feast, to ward off winter
with a roof was a mighty palace, and to draw across
his limbs the rough toga in the manner of the Roman citizen of old

⁹⁸ Roche 2019: 3.

⁹⁹ Masters 1992: 1. By crossing the Alps, Caesar is portrayed as a foreign enemy despite being Roman.

¹⁰⁰ Cowan 2011: 76.

was a precious robe, and the greatest value of Venus
was offspring: for Rome he is father and for Rome he is husband,
keeper of justice and guardian of strict morality,
his goodness was for the state; into none of Cato's acts
did self-centred pleasure creep in and take a share.

Immediately, Cato's steadfastness is observed through the adjective *immota*, which does not denote idleness and inactivity, but rather the state of being 'not moved'.¹⁰¹ This contrasts to *mora*, which is idleness—passive, in the sense that Pompey can be dominated and overcome by the external force of Caesar. This steadiness is developed by the notion of preservation: Cato preserves (*servare*)¹⁰² moderation and holds to this goal (*finemque tenere*). He follows *natura*—not *fortuna*, like Caesar—positioning the two characters as dichotomous on a key issue of the text. Perhaps, if indeed Cato 'is one person whom Fortune cannot touch',¹⁰³ Caesar may not conquer him. Also unlike Caesar, who is driven by the desire for sole power, Cato is devoted to his country because of his belief in his own value (*patriaeque... mundo*). His strong *pietas* and loyalty to the republic is emphasised by the narrator's comment that he is the father and husband of the city (*urbi... maritus*). Finally, these values crescendo into his cultivative and preservative roles as *cultor* and *servator*, suggesting that preservation of the status quo is essential to *patientia Catoniana*. Further, Cato's selfless desire to maintain the republic is embodied in his longing for the opportunity to engage in a *devotio* (2.305-6): a self-sacrifice for a better outcome for Rome.¹⁰⁴ Cato's moderate characterisation contrasts to the rashness of Caesar: Cato is a thoughtful, deliberate planner compared to Caesar the hasty, rash destroyer.¹⁰⁵

However, this sort of moderation manifests in its extremity in the Syrtes in book 9, illuminating its similarity to *celeritas Caesariana* in terms of its monstrosity. Leigh notes that 'if the historical Cato marched across the desert with the pragmatic aim of joining Varus and Scipio, from all that Lucan tells us this could be nothing more than an elaborate demonstration of *virtus*'.¹⁰⁶ In this way, Lucan's treatment of the Syrtes expedition demonstrates his emphasis on the exemplarity of Cato's *patientia*, but also problematises it as an extreme ideology which has similar self-destructive effects to *celeritas Caesariana*. Cato

¹⁰¹ OLD *immutus* 1a.

¹⁰² OLD *servare* 7a, 8a, 9a.

¹⁰³ Dick 1967: 240.

¹⁰⁴ For more *devotio*, see Section II above.

¹⁰⁵ Matthews 2004: 40.

¹⁰⁶ Leigh 1997: 108; adopted by Seo 2013: 89. See also its moral justification in McNamara 2020: 169.

heads to Corcyra to save the scattered republican forces from Caesar (9.30-1), and successfully prevents their mutiny (9.292-302):

sic voce Catonis
inculcata viris iusti patientia Martis.
Iamque actu belli non doctas ferre quietem
constituit mentes serieque agitare laborum.
primum litoreis miles lassatur harenis.
proximus in muros et moenia Cyrenarum
est labor: exclusus nulla se vindicat ira,
poenaeque de victis sola est vicisse Catonem.
inde peti placuit Libyci contermina Mauris
regna Iubae, sed iter mediis natura vetabat
Syrtybus: hanc audax sperat sibi cedere virtus.

So by Cato's utterance
endurance of rightful warfare was impressed upon the warriors.
And now he resolved with war's exertion and chain of labours
to occupy their minds, not used to bearing inactivity.
First the soldiers are exhausted on the sea-shore's sands.
Their next task is against the city-walls and the defences
of Cyrene: though shut out, with no anger does he avenge himself;
the only penalty exacted from the conquered was that Cato conquered them.
Next he resolved to head for Libyan Juba's kingdom bordering
the Moors, but Nature blocked their journey by interposing
the Syrtes: yet she, his daring valour hopes, will give way to him.

The exemplarity of *patientia Catoniana* is explicitly stated (*sic... Martis*); the republicans must endure the Syrtes if they still wish to oppose Caesar. The ability to inspire such active effort is resonant with Caesar's ability to do the same, but in contrast to Pompey's ineffectiveness at inspiring his troops. Cato further leads by example as a sole leader at 9.587-8: Cato marches in front of his soldiers (*praecedit*) and shows them how to endure¹⁰⁷ hardships (*monstrat tolerare labores*). Returning to the section at hand, further similarity to the paradigm of *celeritas Caesariana* can be drawn from Cato's *audax virtus*, which paired with *impatiens virtus... Catonis* at 9.371, seems to disrupt the developing paradigm of *patientia Catoniana*. However, this is reconciled by recalling that this is merely impatience of the idleness of *mora*, which both *patientia Catoniana* and *celeritas Caesariana* seek to avoid by being active. Further, Cato challenges *fortuna* by crossing the Syrtes (*omni fortunam prouocat hora*, 9.883), which highlights his opposition against Caesar's unfettered success. The extremity of Cato's *patientia* in that his men must endure death by snakes and

¹⁰⁷ OLD *tolero* 3a.

dehydration over 300 lines (9.604-949) bolsters the appearance of Cato as a senseless monster.¹⁰⁸ This ‘lethal imitation’ of Cato’s *patientia* further distorts its worthiness as a model worthy of replication.¹⁰⁹ However, this endurance is not for the purpose of destroying the republic but rather to preserve it: separating it from being a vice like *celeritas Caesariana*.

Whilst not directly caused by Cato’s *patientia*, Caesar, now without a military target, descends into *mora* at Alexandria—nearly resulting in his death. This marks a change in *fortuna*: momentarily, it is not on Caesar’s side. The narrator is silent as to whether this is because of Cato’s challenge at 9.883. Instead of a Caesar who spurns the idleness of the night and is instead active, the reader is exposed to a Caesar who wishes to prolong the night (10.169-75):

discit opes Caesar spoliati perdere mundi
 et gessisse pudet genero cum paupere bellum
 et causas Martis Phariis cum gentibus optat.
 postquam epulis Bacchoque modum lassata voluptas
 inposuit, longis Caesar producere noctem
 inchoat adloquiis, summaque in sede iacentem
 linigerum placidis compellat Acorea dictis.

Caesar learns to squander the riches of a plundered world;
 it shames him to have waged a war against his impoverished son-in-law
 and he prays for pretexts to fight the Pharian peoples.
 When exhausted pleasure set a limit to the banqueting
 and to Bacchus, Caesar starts to prolong the night with
 lengthy conversation and he addresses linen-clad Acoreus,
 reclining in the highest seat, with friendly words:

This banquet is characterised by luxury, idleness, conversation rather than action, and inactivity.¹¹⁰ In fact, Caesar proffers that he will abandon the civil war if Acoreus can offer him hope of seeing the sources of the Nile (10.192). The narrator draws out this conversation into a narrative digression, delaying the narrative at this moment where Caesar is not causing destruction. However, in this ‘safety’ of Caesar’s newfound peace (10.332-3), Pothinus and Achillas are brewing a plan to kill him (10.332-98). He undertakes an audacious (*audax*) plan which is unsanctioned by *fortuna* (10.344-5), suggesting that *fortuna* will not defend Caesar while he indulges in *mora*. In fact, Pothinus and Achillas view *fortuna* as favouring themselves (10.375-6, 384-5). Like Caesar, they recognise the importance of capitalising on

¹⁰⁸ For Cato’s monstrosity and ‘the ideal spectatorship of Cato’, see McNamara 169-71.

¹⁰⁹ Seo 2013: 20.

¹¹⁰ This invites comparison to the boat episode in book 5.

this favourable *fortuna* with speed: Pothinus urges Achilles to refrain from delay (10.395), and Achilles is as such not slow (*non lentus Achilles* 10.398). This decisiveness to immediately give the signals for attack (10.399-402) directly contrasts to Pompey's *mora*, which is a Roman paradigm unworthy of emulation. The fact that *celeritas* is 'Roman' as opposed to Eastern '*mora*' is bolstered by Achilles taking on the part of a Roman (10.419). At this point, Achilles will succeed in defeating Caesar unless *fortuna* returns to his favour (*et nisi... vincent partes* 10.420-1). Caesar finds himself in despair, resorting to an ignoble hiding place like a caged lion (10.441)¹¹¹ and even fearing attack (10.444). Thus, one momentary lapse in *celeritas* has resulted in Caesar surrounded by danger (10.478-9). However, *fortuna* returns to favour Caesar briefly, shielding Caesar from defeat. He takes hold of this opportunity and regains his former *celeritas*: he is everywhere, ordering his soldiers and partaking in defence himself (10.488-533). The reader sees a Caesar who is not idle at night as earlier in book 10, but who uses headlong speed (*praecipiti cursu*) and leaps aboard ships. Caesar seizes *fortuna* (*tempore rapto*), employing his *celeritas* to avoid danger. But *BC* ends with Caesar in dire danger again, surrounded by war (10.536-7), as he looks back at Scaeva and is seemingly about to be reinvigorated by Scaeva's own emulation of *celeritas Caesariana* at Dyrrachium. As such, in book 10 the reader sees a Caesar who has descended into *mora* straight after the drawn-out events of book 9 where Cato actively endures the Syrtes. This *mora* is catastrophic for Caesar, and equates to a momentary shift in *fortuna*'s favour.

Although fruitless in a technical sense, it is still fascinating to speculate about how *patientia Catoniana* may have developed had *BC* been finished.¹¹² Seo shows that suicide is established as an exemplary trait in Cato, implying that *BC* would cover his death at Utica.¹¹³ Perhaps, Cato's climactic suicide would have exhibited the futility of even trying to maintain one's values in the face of *celeritas Caesariana*, or perhaps this *patientia* would evolve into a form of active delay which sets Caesar on a trajectory to his assassination. Speculation aside, Lucan clearly establishes a paradigm of *patientia Catoniana* through Cato's choice to march through the Syrtes to endure rather than submit to Caesar. Thus, Cato's *patientia* is an *exemplum* for the reader to endure tyranny.

¹¹¹ Roche forthcoming: 141.

¹¹² For the likelihood of ending at Cato's suicide at Utica, see Stover 2008.

¹¹³ Seo 2013: 66-93.

IV. CONCLUSION

This chapter has established three pace paradigms in *BC*: *celeritas Caesariana*, *mora Pompeiana*, and *cunctatio Catoniana*. In order to capitalise on *fortuna*'s favour and led by a sole leader, *celeritas Caesariana* destroys everything in its path and inspires such destruction in others. Idle and passive, *mora Pompeiana* exposes its followers to danger and is ineffectual in achieving actual success. More positively, *patientia Catoniana* offers the reader an example of enduring *celeritas Caesariana* with steadfast morality, but exposes its flaws as sharing similar monstrous characteristics to *celeritas Caesariana*. Ultimately, reading *BC* through the lens of pace draws out tensions in the text (such as between *fortuna* and *celeritas* or the narrator and Caesar) and establishes pace as an underlying motif worthy of attention.

CHAPTER 2:

PACE IN SILIUS ITALICUS' *PUNICA* 1-10

In much the same way as Lucan's *BC* is dominated by Caesar's speed, the first ten books of Silius Italicus' *Punica* is dominated by Hannibal's speed. Similarly to *BC*'s narrator, the *Punica*'s narrator slows narrative progression to delay the inevitable and centripetal Battle of Cannae¹—but unlike *BC*, this attempt to slow Hannibal's progression *is* aided by the active delay of Fabius Cunctator. Given the importance of pace to *fortuna*, I suggest that the change in *fortuna* after Cannae—from favouring the Carthaginians to favouring the Romans—warrants the division of the *Punica* into two 'halves' (books 1-10 and 11-17). The purpose of this chapter is to analyse Silius' portrayal of pace in the first ten books of the *Punica*. Attention is given to whether and how Silius adapts Lucan's pace paradigms. Often, Silius' characters problematise Lucan's paradigms by combining aspects of each or even extending them into a distinct paradigm of its own, as in the case of Fabius' *cunctatio*. Much like Caesar, Hannibal 'drives the narrative' towards the Battle of Cannae through his *celeritas*.² But while *BC* lacks swift opposition to Caesar, the first ten books of the *Punica* present multiple opponents characterised by *celeritas*: Publius, Sempronius, Flaminius, and Minucius. However, it is only Fabius who succeeds with a form of active delay (*cunctatio*) which *BC* lacks. Fabius' *cunctatio* is not enough for a decisive victory, however, as evidenced by Rome's greatest defeat at Cannae. Through the internal conflict between *celeritas* and *cunctatio* at Cannae in Varro and Paulus respectively, Silius problematises pace and its exemplarity, thereby critiquing the republican political system of shared power.

I. HANNIBAL'S *CELERITAS*

The influence of Lucan's Caesar on Silius' Hannibal has been explored, but not specifically in terms of pace.³ Whilst the *Punica* lacks a central *hero*, it is incorrect to assert that it lacks a central *figure* because Hannibal, like Caesar in *BC*, dominates the text as the primary

¹ For Cannae as 'centripetal', see Ahl, Davis, and Pomeroy 1986: 2505. For narrative delay as a technique in the *Punica*, see Section I of the introduction, esp. van den Broek 2023: 8.

² Stocks 2014: 80.

³ For Hannibal's characterisation in the *Punica*, see e.g. Ahl, Davis, and Pomeroy 1986: 2511-2519; Marks 2005a: 275 n. 106; Tipping 2010: 37, 51-61, 89-92; Stocks 2014: 6-46. For the qualities of the historic Hannibal in Lucan's *BC*, see Ahl 1976: 107-12.

antagonist.⁴ Thus, the *Punica* can be read as the Roman struggle to overcome the *celeritas* of Hannibal. This section establishes Hannibal's *celeritas* in the first three books of the *Punica* as Silius' manifestation of *celeritas Caesariana* because of its (self)destructiveness, exemplarity, appeasement of *fortuna*, and hatred for *mora*.⁵

Hannibal's introduction at 1.56-69 invites comparison with Caesar's introduction at *BC* 1.143-57. While Caesar's *virtus* at 1.144 does not know how to stand still (*nescia virtus stare loco BC* 1.145), Hannibal's *virtus* knows no moral or physical boundaries⁶ (*improba virtus*, 1.58). Combined with Hannibal's lust for movement and progress⁷ (*motus avidus*, 1.56), Silius presents Hannibal as persistent and restless. Further, Hannibal's disdain for peace (*pacis despectus*, 1.58) and desire for human blood (*penitusque... sitis*, 1.59-60) reveal a similar love for (human) destruction as Caesar (e.g. *gaudensque... ruina*, *BC* 1.150). Some have argued that Hannibal's patriotic motivation (1.60-2) and influence by divine forces (*dat mentem Iuno* 1.63) position him as 'no more than human' compared to Caesar who is a 'cosmic force'.⁸ This presumes a lack of divine interference in *BC*, although Feeney has shown that the gods may interfere, but the narrator—who lacks a divine Muse—is just as unaware of divine power as *BC*'s characters.⁹ With this in mind, I suggest that the narrator's 'knowledge' of Hannibal's divine and patriotic motivations thereby portray Hannibal's destructiveness as more focussed on Rome than Caesar's. Nonetheless, simply from Hannibal's introduction, the reader is invited to compare Hannibal's lust for destruction and restlessness to the swift destructiveness of *celeritas Caesariana*.

The intensity of Hannibal's *celeritas* is demonstrated by the list of reasons for his appointment as leader of the Carthaginian army following the deaths of his father and brother (1.243-70):

primus sumpsisse laborem,
primus iter carpsisse pedes partemque subire,
si ualli festinet opus, nec cetera segnis,
quaecumque ad laudem stimulant, somnumque
negabat naturae noctemque uigil ducebat in armis.
interdum proiectus humi turbaeque Libyssae
insignis sagulo duris certare maniplis,
celsus at in magno praecedens agmine ductor

⁴ For the issue of heroism in the *Punica*, see e.g. Marks 2005a: 61-66; Stocks 2014: 53-4.

⁵ The continuation of Hannibal's *celeritas* up to Cannae is explored in the remaining sections of this chapter.

⁶ *OLD improbus* 1, 2, 6.

⁷ *OLD motus* 1a, d.

⁸ Ahl, Davis, and Pomeroy 1986: 2512.

⁹ Feeney 1991: 275-6; 280-2.

imperium praeferre suum. tum uertice nudo
 excipere insanos imbres caelique ruinam.
 spectarunt Poeni, tremuitque exterritus Astur,
 torquentem cum tela Iouem permixtaque nimbis
 fulmina et excussos uentorum flatibus ignes
 turbato transiret equo. nec puluere fessum
 agminis ardenti labefecit Sirius astro.
 flammiferis tellus radiis cum exusta dehiscit
 candentique globo medius coquit aethera feruor,
 femineum putat umentis iacuisse sub umbra
 exercetque sitim et spectato fonte recedit.
 idem correptis sternacem ad proelia frenis
 frangere equum et famam letalis amare lacerti
 ignotique amnis tranare sonantia saxa
 atque e diuersa socios accersere ripa.
 idem expugnati primus stetit aggere muri,
 et quotiens campo rapidus fera proelia miscet,
 qua sparsit ferrum, latus rubet aequare limes.
 ergo instat fatis et rumpere foedera certus,
 quo datur, interea Romam comprehendere bello
 gaudet et extremis pulsat Capitolia terris.

He was the first to undertake hard work, the first foot soldier to seize the path forward, and the first to take part if fortification work was required. He was no laggard either in the other matters which excite praise. He denied his body sleep and passed the night on watch in arms, at other times sprawled upon the ground. Standing out in his battle cloak, he competed with the tough companies from the Libyan ranks. The leader rode high up before his mighty columns to push forward his command.

Hannibal took furious rainstorms and the sky's ruin upon his bare head. The Punic troops watched, and the terrified Asturians trembled, as Hannibal passed by on his startled horse, ignoring Jupiter hurling or thunderbolts mingling in the clouds or gusts of wind shook loose fires from the sky. Nor could Sirius, the burning Dog Star, fatigue him, though he was worn out from the marching column's dust. When fiery rays cracked the scorching earth, and the glowing sun's midday heat baked the sky, Hannibal thought it unmanly to recline in the moist shade. He trained his thirst and turned his back when he saw a spring. He seized the reins and broke in battle horses that threw their riders; he loved his deadly arm's reputation. At an uncharted river, he swam past resounding boulders and urged on his comrades from the other side. He was the first to stand atop a conquered city wall's rampart. Whenever the swift fighter engaged in fierce combat on the battlefield, wherever he spread his steel, a wide path on the plain turned red. And so Hannibal pushed against fate, and he was resolved to break the treaty with the Romans, when he got the opportunity. Meanwhile, he was glad to involve Rome in his war, and he struck at the Capitol from the farthest lands.

Hannibal is the first (*primus*) to journey forward and undertake tasks quickly (*festinet*), revealing his *celeritas* and its exemplary effect on others. He is not slow (*nec... segnis*), and keeps watch during the night rather than sleeps (*noctemque uigil*)—recalling Caesar's disdain

for the *mora* of night.¹⁰ Hannibal excels (*praecedens*) the rest of his soldiery, thus quickly pushing (*praeferre*) his *imperium* forward. His love of destruction in pursuit of conquering Rome is underlined by his willingness to endure heaven's ruin (*caelique ruinam*), which recalls Caesar's likening to cosmic destruction.¹¹ This is emphasised by his ignorance of Jupiter's thunderbolts (*torquentem... fulmina*) and the sky's fire (*excussos... ignes*) when riding by on his horse (*turbato transiret equo*). The verb *transiret* implies a crossing of boundaries—another typically Caesarian trait. Instead of being *likened* to cosmic destruction like Caesar, Hannibal simply endures the destruction like a calm 'rider on the storm' in pursuit of his goals. This endurance of cosmic collapse is elaborated by way of allusion to Cato's endurance of the Syrtes desert (*nec puluere... astro*). Hannibal's refusal to rest in the shade or drink (*femineum... fonte recedit*) further alludes to Cato's crossing of the Syrtes (esp. *BC* 9.398-402). Thus, Hannibal's monstrosity is amplified not only by his connection to *celeritas Caesariana*, but also by reference to the monstrous endurance of *patientia Catoniana*. Further, Hannibal's swiftness (*rapidus*) equates to frequent (*quotiens*) bloodshed which explicitly equates his *celeritas* to destruction. The result is that Hannibal presses on fate (*ergo instat fatis*), satisfying perhaps the main rationale for *celeritas Caesariana*: that speed maintains *fortuna*'s favour. But the aggressive undertones of *instat*¹² may also suggest that Hannibal *acquires fortuna*'s favour with his *celeritas*.¹³

Hannibal's Caesarian speed manifests at Saguntum, revealed by the polysyndeton and anaphora (*nunc... nunc... nunc... nunc... aut*, 1.319-23) and Hannibal's likening to Mars 'Gradivus' (1.433-6). The choice of *Gradius* over *Mars* allows the etymological connection of *Gradius* to *gradior* ('to proceed'),¹⁴ further demonstrating the Silius' emphasis on pace in the *Punica*. This is reinforced by the god's 'screeching chariot' (*stridoribus axis*, 1.436) which creates the image of a chariot pushed to its limits by the immense speed of its driver. At the news of Murrus' success, Hannibal rushes madly (1.458-9) and, like a flaming comet, he inspires fear amongst the battlefield (1.461-3). At his sight, Hannibal labels Murrus a delay to his war with the Romans (*Romani Murrus belli mora* 1.479). Testament to Hannibal's Caesarian hatred for *mora*, he kills Murrus (1.515-17). The fall of Saguntum is a similar delay to Hannibal as Massilia is for Caesar.¹⁵ However, Hannibal is wounded because

¹⁰ e.g. *BC* 1.228-30, 4.28-5, 5.504-14.

¹¹ e.g. *BC* 1.151-7.

¹² *OLD insto* 2a.

¹³ This recalls *BC* 1.148-9.

¹⁴ *OLD gradior* 1a.

¹⁵ van der Keur 2024: 137. For his impatience at delay, c.f. 4.4-34, 4.510-11, 8.4, 10.330-1.

of the intervention of Jupiter (1.535-40) and his speed is thus slowed (*tardaue paulatim... trahens*, 1.554-5)—but he is saved from death by the intervention of Juno. This terminology of tardiness is in sharp contrast to the swift image of Hannibal that has been constructed so far, suggesting that his *celeritas* does not make him immune from injury. But it is not long before Hannibal regains his *celeritas* at the beginning of book 2 (*ocius* 2.15), such that Hannibal rushes in headlong flight (*rapido praeceps.. cursu*, 2.233) and flies on his chariot (*curruque uolat* 2.263). The epithet *praeceps* is ‘a key epithet for Lucan’s Caesar’, but Bernstein asserts that its frequent and wide usage in the *Punica* ‘does not serve to emphasize Hannibal’s rapidity’.¹⁶ I suggest the contrary: that its wide usage—for example to describe Catus (4.139), Sempronius (520), and Scipio (15.209-10) and Hasdrubal (15.519-20)—does in fact align them to Caesar and therefore to Hannibal; a conscious choice by Silius which serves to underline the (sometimes unexpected) similarity between these characters.¹⁷ Nonetheless, book 2 ends with a foretelling of Hannibal’s suicide (2.705-7) to show that his *celeritas* will ultimately eventuate in self-destruction.¹⁸

Hannibal’s interaction with his wife, Imilce, at 3.61–157 naturally invites comparison to Pompey and Cornelia at *BC* 5.727-98. Whilst the comparison does reveal a more empathetic ‘Pompeian’ side to Hannibal,¹⁹ I suggest that this comparison does not demand the immediate reading of Hannibal’s pace matching Pompey’s *mora*. Unlike Pompey, Hannibal sends his wife away early in the epic (about one-seventh of the way through, compared to halfway through in *BC*); and he moves on exceptionally quickly (*at Poenus... properato moenia gressu*, 3.158-9). Thus, whilst Hannibal is clearly a man who cares for his wife dearly (3.131-2) just as Pompey loves Cornelia (e.g. *vita mihi dulcior*, *BC* 5.739), Hannibal proceeds with *celeritas* but Pompey with *mora* (*dubium trepidumque... amor* 5.728-9). Moreover, despite the narratological delay in cataloguing Hannibal’s forces (3.222-414),²⁰ Hannibal quickly crosses the boundaries of the Pyrenees (3.442) and the Rhône (3.445-59)—without letting his elephants slow him down (3.459). This epitomises that Hannibal’s *celeritas* is at least equal to that of Lucan’s Caesar, but perhaps more effective as he paves the way for Caesar’s Alps crossing at *BC* 1.183. Hannibal’s swiftness is again accompanied by his Catonian ability to endure hardship (*nec ullo turbatus terrore loci* 3.503-4), emphasising that he is not simply a straightforward representation of *celeritas*

¹⁶ Bernstein 2018: 122-3.

¹⁷ For the elements of *celeritas Caesariana* in Romans, see Section II below.

¹⁸ Compared to Caesar’s metaphorical self-destruction which does not occur in *BC*.

¹⁹ Ahl, Davis, and Pomeroy 1986: 2513.

²⁰ For catalogues as a form of narrative delay, see Masters 1992: 4, 54-5, 62.

Caesariana. Thus, while Hannibal may appear more empathetic than Lucan's Caesar, he does not allow this empathy to detract from his hyperbolic *celeritas* in crossing the Alps.

Thus, from the first three books of the *Punica*, the reader is confronted by Hannibal's immense speed—modelled largely on Lucan's *celeritas Caesariana*. Hannibal's *celeritas* leads to destructive victory at Saguntum, exhibits a hatred for *mora*, and a desire to transgress boundaries. Further, Hannibal is aware that *fortuna* favours *celeritas*. Hannibal's speed up to Cannae will be discussed incidentally to the pace of other characters in the remaining sections.

II. ROMAN *CELERITAS*: SELF-DESTRUCTIVE SPEED

The Roman response to Hannibal's destructive and successful *celeritas* is, for the most part of books 1-10, also characterised by *celeritas*.²¹ This is especially striking in light of *BC*, in which Caesar lacks swift opposition. The swift Roman response before Cannae is led by Publius and Sempronius at Ticinus and Trebia in book 4; Flaminius at Trasimene in book 5; and Minucius at Gerunium in book 7.²² This section explores Roman *celeritas* and establishes that each episodic hero acts with a similar brand of rash and self-destructive *celeritas* which is futile without *fortuna*'s favour.²³ Thus, *celeritas* here is markedly not worthy of emulation because it gravely endangers Rome.

Hannibal first meets Roman opposition in the form of the consul, Publius, at Ticinus in book 4. While Hannibal's army may be tired (*fessa... torpentia neruos*, 4.40), he nevertheless does not want to endure such inactivity (*nequit perferre quietem*, 4.44). Although his army may not be at their full, 'speedy' potential, Hannibal presses on by enticing Gallic forces to join his army (4.49). Publius is, by contrast, swift (*uolucris... classe*, 4.51), and as consul represents the senate's rash decision to engage in war with Hannibal which was foreshadowed in the senatorial debate at 1.672-94. A great clash between two forces of *celeritas* is foretold (*magnaëque aderant primordia cladis*, 4.55), and *fortuna* is not shown to favour one particular side—instead, it simply removes the delays for the battle (*sustulerat Fortuna moras* 4.57). The dual incitement to battle by Hannibal and Scipio (*arma, uiri, capite arma, uiri!* 4.98) recalls Virgil's *Aeneid* to metapoetically mark the beginning of

²¹ The exception to this is the character of Fabius Cunctator and Paulus in Sections III and IV below. The Roman response in books 11-17 is also largely centred on *celeritas*, but this is extensively discussed in Chapter 3, Section II.

²² Varro, the final representative of Roman *celeritas*, will be dealt with in Section IV below.

²³ The self-destructiveness of the Romans in books 4-10 is recognised by Marks 2005b: 130-1.

the Roman-Carthaginian conflict in the *Punica*.²⁴ Chiasmus underscores the seemingly balanced opposition here: the outcome is uncertain. Further, Publius' *celeritas* is explicitly likened to Hannibal's, suggesting that it contains a similarly destructive capability (*ambobus uelox uirtus... concors*, 4.99-100). The battle is so hastily initiated that the Roman Catus rushes headlong (*praeceps*, 4.139) into the Carthaginian Bocus' spear, essentially presenting himself for destruction (4.142). Marks has shown that this is a self-destructive act which foreshadows Rome's own self-destruction in the first half of the *Punica* and presents the Second Punic War as a precursor to future civil war.²⁵ I extend this by suggesting that such self-destruction is predicated by Roman *celeritas*; and that in the first ten books of the *Punica* (unlike *BC*), Roman *celeritas* as a signifier of self-destruction *does* in fact lead to that destruction. Publius hurriedly rushes against the enemy (4.217-9), and even conquers the Celtic Crixus whose speed is evidenced by his *aristeia* (4.175-88).²⁶ I suggest that *aristeiai* themselves denote speed by their nature as lists of victims, often with rapid diction too. Publius is likened to a hunter who causes destruction (4.300-10), suggesting that victory for the Romans is imminent. However, Hannibal rushes in, surrounded by Fear, Terror, and Madness (4.324-5). Publius is soon surrounded (4.445-6), but determined not to yield to *fortuna* (*stabat Fortunae non cedere certus*, 4.447). However, he is wounded (4.454-5) and must be saved by his son, Scipio (4.454-71).²⁷ This rescue sets the precedent that Roman *celeritas* will be self-destructive if not for external salvation. Thus, Publius' portrayal markedly parallels the swift portrayal of Hannibal, but Scipio's momentary defeat preempts the failure of Roman *celeritas* against Hannibalic *celeritas* in the first ten books of the *Punica*.

The Battle of Trebia resembles that of Ticinus so closely that it has been labelled 'Ticinus Repeated'.²⁸ However, Roman *celeritas* is amplified even more by Publius' *aristeia* and the arrival of the other consul, Sempronius. Simultaneous with Sempronius' arrival is the increased strife of the Romans, revealing a causal connection between *celeritas* and Roman failure. Sempronius is introduced by reference to his speed as the first man to join battle (4.514-5), and likened by way of simile to the rushing Trebia (4.519-20). In this way, Sempronius is portrayed as just as self-destructive for the Roman cause as Trebia is itself.²⁹

²⁴ For the resemblance of Roman leaders and Hannibal, see Schedel 2022: 133-4.

²⁵ Marks 2010: 133.

²⁶ Marks 2005b: 131-4.

²⁷ For the young Scipio's speed here, see Chapter 3, Section III.

²⁸ Schedel 2022: 90.

²⁹ Ahl, Davis and Pomeroy 1986: 2521.

He is also granted an *aristeia* simultaneously with Hannibal at 4.525-53, demonstrating that the consul is similarly swift. However, the muddy Trebia holds back the Roman forces (4.573-84) slowing their *celeritas*, leading to defeat (4.675-89). Publius' rash *celeritas* leads him to confront the personified river Trebia (4.638-95), which is allusively modelled on swift Achilles' battle with the river Scamander at *Iliad* 21.211-382.³⁰ This allusion to Achilles' self-destructive martial rage consolidates Publius' as a Roman model of hasty self-destruction. He is only saved by the divine intervention of Vulcan on behalf of Venus (4.675-89). Even with the *celeritas* of two consuls, Rome is defeated.

The reader is confronted by another self-destructive *exemplum* of *celeritas* at Trasimene: Flaminius. But this time, there is nobody to save him.³¹ He is introduced as an inexperienced and rapacious leader, embodied by the simile of him as a sailor at the winds' mercy (4.721). I suggest that this is a metaphor for Flaminius' lack of understanding of *fortuna*—he will act selfishly and rashly without *fortuna*'s favour. Miano notes the connection between the goddess *Fortuna* and iconography of seafaring in the early imperial period,³² strengthening the argument for a metaphorical comment on Flaminius' relationship with *fortuna* here. Combined with Flaminius' impatient haste (*praeceps*, 4.718), Flaminius stands in opposition to Lucan's Cato, whose *constantia* signifies steadfastness in the face of external pressures.³³ The reader is shown that *fortuna* still favours Hannibal when Juno urges him to avoid delay (4.732); reinforcing the fact that the tactic of *celeritas* against Hannibal will only result in disaster again. Whilst it is Juno saying this, I have shown that the narrator knows all too well that this relationship between *fortuna* and *celeritas* is correct. Hannibal's *celeritas* is superior to Flaminius' because Hannibal is aware that *fortuna* is on his side, giving him reason to act with speed. This avoidance of delay manifests in Hannibal's decision not to stop to receive medical treatment for his infected eye (4.751-62), lest it disrupt his path forward (*dum ne perdat iter*, 4.756).³⁴ Hannibal's lust for *celeritas*, ultimately leading to victory through *fortuna*'s favour, is so monstrous that he offers other limbs in exchange for victory (4.756-7). While Flaminius' *celeritas* is portrayed as fickle, Hannibal's is calculated and cunning, seen in his tactical orders to Mago and Sychaeus (4.823-9).

At Trasimene, Rome's policy of *celeritas* is definitively shown to be self-destructive and linked to the ineffectiveness of the republican system of joint power: the consulship.

³⁰ See Marks 2005a: 140, especially n. 74.

³¹ Marks 2005b: 132 notes that Flaminius is 'the most self-destructive so far'.

³² Miano 2018: 151-2.

³³ *OLD constantia* 1, 2a.

³⁴ This compares to Scaeva's persistence despite injury to his eye (see discussion in Chapter 1, Section I).

Flaminius and his army hurry (5.28-9; 5.39), so quickly that Flaminius ignores the seer Corvinus' omens. Corvinus is explicit that *fortuna* does not favour the Roman side at this point (5.85-6; *improba... Fortuna loco* 5.92-3), granting Flaminius similar awareness of *fortuna* as Hannibal before Trebia. But Flaminius' arrogance does not permit the potential glory of victory be shared with his co-consul, Servilius (5.114-6). Publius and Sempronius' earlier *celeritas* may be forgiven due to their lack of awareness of *fortuna*'s favour of Hannibal, but Flaminius has no such excuse. A Caesarian hatred of *mora* is evident within Flaminius (5.186-7), and despite the narrator's effort to delay by giving Flaminius a lengthy speech (5.132-85),³⁵ battle begins. Throughout the battle, emphasis is laid on Flaminius' speed (*it medius... ruens... pandit iter*, 5.392-3) and polysyndeton (*ruitque... nunc... nunc... modo... modo*, 5.428-31) equates his speed with a love of slaughter (*amor caedum*, 5.427)—a Hannibalic trait.³⁶ Hannibal is characteristically swift and rushes headlong at an equally fast Flaminius (*praeceps ruit... nec dicto segnius*, 5. 607). This seems to have cosmic effect, as an earthquake breaks out (5.610-26). Flaminius is separated from his troops, and killed (5.656) Book 5 ends in darkness (*tenebrae*, 5.678), symbolising a Rome defeated at Trasimene. However, the threat of Hannibal marching on Rome (5.633-5) does not materialise, as Hannibal is delayed narratologically and in the main narrative by Fabius Cunctator.³⁷ Thus, Flaminius' *celeritas* ends in his own destruction and further failure for Rome—demonstrating that responding with *celeritas* to another's *celeritas* is dire if *fortuna* favours the other, as with Hannibal here.

As mentioned, the Romans do (momentarily) deviate from their policy of *celeritas* by electing Fabius Cunctator as dictator. However, Fabius' Master of Horse, Minucius, reverts to a policy of *celeritas* halfway through book 7. Fabius warns Minucius, explaining the rationale for his policy of *cunctatio*³⁸ and even forbidding him by oath from taking up arms against Hannibal (7.406-7). Thus, Minucius is even *more* aware than Flaminius of the need to avoid *celeritas* with the catastrophic defeat of Flaminius at Trasimene as *exemplum*. Nonetheless, he rushes headlong against Hannibal (*praeceps*, 7.495-6). The adjective *praeceps* clearly marks the destructiveness of *celeritas Caesariana*. The narrator shuns this as madness which only feeds Hannibal's success (*nutrire furorem*, 7.497). This notion of Hannibal 'nourished'

³⁵ Stocks 2014: 120 notices this narratological delay.

³⁶ Recall Scaeva's *morti amor* (BC 6.246).

³⁷ Narratologically through the inset narrative of Regulus (6.62-640); and through Fabius in Section III below.

³⁸ In essence, to delay Hannibal in the hope that he loses *fortuna*'s favour. See the following section for further detail.

by Minucius' *celeritas* emphasises Hannibal's monstrosity. In fact, the narrator explicitly labels Minucius as *self-destructive* through a telling alliterative phrase (7.523-4):

nec mora disiecto Minuci uecordia uallo
perdendi simul et pereundi ardebat amore.

Minucius broke up the rampart without delay. In his madness, he burned with a love of destroying and perishing, both at the same time.

The introductory phrase *nec mora* has been used of Publius, Sempronius, and Flaminius—positioning Minucius as the latest figure to fall into the '*celeritas* catastrophe'. The plosive alliteration of the gerundive *perdendi* portrays Minucius as *causing* destruction;³⁹ and *pereundi* portrays him as *suffering* destruction⁴⁰—the paradox emphasises the self-destructiveness of using *celeritas* without *fortuna*'s favour. The alliteration *ardebat amore* depicts Minucius as possessing a similar love of slaughter as Flaminius and even Hannibal. Moreover, as a gerund in the ablative case, the reader is invited to compare it to *cunctando*—positioning *celeritas*' destruction as the antithesis of *cunctatio*'s preservation. Hannibal seizes this moment, while Fabius is absent, to inflict further destruction upon the Romans (7.531). The motif of Hannibal, the '*celeritas* cannibal', recurs when Hannibal urges his men to 'sate' themselves with blood (*exsatiare, uiri, plenos rubiginis enses* 7.535). The exemplary failure of *celeritas* needs no description in the poem: before the reader knows it, Minucius has lost so much confidence that his mind has already wandered to the Underworld (7.585-6). Description of the battle only begins at the arrival of Fabius's forces at 7.588, where he successfully wards off the Carthaginians to save Minucius. This ending to the battle recalls Publius's rescue at the hands of his son Scipio at Ticinus. Therefore Minucius' failure at Gerunium becomes but the latest *exemplum* of Roman *celeritas*' self-destruction.

And so, the *exempla* of Publius, Sempronius, Flaminius, and Minucius in the first 7 books of the *Punica* demonstrate the failure of Roman *celeritas* in response to Hannibal's monstrous and superior *celeritas*. Thus Silius problematises Lucan's paradigm of *celeritas Caesariana* by implicating Roman *celeritas* with actual self-destruction. So too does Roman *celeritas* account for the defeats suffered by Rome in the Second Punic War, because at this stage, *fortuna* favours Hannibal. Marks argues that Rome's defeats, especially at Trasimene and Cannae, act as a large-scale *devotio* which ultimately lead to Rome's victory.⁴¹ Whilst

³⁹ OLD *perdo* 1a.

⁴⁰ OLD *pereo* 3a, 6a.

⁴¹ Marks 2005b: 143-44.

tempting, this view softens the sense of defeat and failure of Roman *celeritas* which the narrator stresses. Instead of a ‘virtual *devotio*’, Silius instead offers a counter-example of Roman pace in the form of Fabius’ *cunctatio*.

III. FABIUS CUNCTATOR

Fabius Maximus’ *cunctatio* is at the centre of Silius’ reading of pace in *BC* because it actively delays Hannibal, contributing to a change in *fortuna*.⁴² As a historical figure, Fabius was so closely connected to *cunctatio* that later writers grant him the cognomen ‘Cunctator’ (‘The Delayer’).⁴³ The memory of Fabius as Cunctator had been perpetuated in the Roman literary tradition since Ennius, who wrote (*Enn. Ann.* 363-5):

Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.
Noenum rumores ponebat ante salutem.
Ergo postque magisque viri nunc gloria claret.

One man restored the state for us by delaying. He would not put hearsay before our safety. Therefore now the hero’s fame shines, the more with the passing of time.⁴⁴

Here, Fabius’ *cunctatio* is portrayed as a virtue which restores the republic despite initially making him unpopular.⁴⁵ In this section I will suggest that Silius positions Fabius’ *cunctatio* as the ‘difference’ between *BC*’s negative outcome for Rome and the *Punica*’s positive outcome: Fabius’ *cunctatio* succeeds where *mora Pompeiana* and *patientia Catoniana* fails. Fabius’ *cunctatio* acts as a direct check on Hannibal’s *celeritas* which allows *fortuna* to favour the Romans eventually: at which point, the Romans may begin to use *celeritas* as a military strategy effectively again. This section traces the creation of Fabius’ *cunctatio*, which is built on *patientia Catoniana*, and how it successfully challenges Hannibal, persuades the Romans, and challenges *fortuna*.

The reader first meets Fabius in book 1 at the senatorial meeting regarding Saguntum. Fabius is portrayed as the antithesis of *celeritas* because he emerges immediately after Lentulus demands a swift war (1.677-8). At 1.679, Fabius’ *cauta mens* permits such

⁴² As such, he is worthy of close attention in this thesis.

⁴³ Stanton 1971: 49-52 shows that ‘Cunctator’ was not a cognomen for Fabius (unlike Maximus) for at least three hundred years after his death. He was, however, consistently referred to with the epithet *cunctator*.

⁴⁴ Translation and text by Skutsch 1985.

⁴⁵ For Fabius as unpopular, see Littlewood 2011: lxviii. For other source’s adoption of this view, see Tipping 2010: 107-116.

incredible foresight (*speculator... futuri*, 1.679) that he is likened to an elderly helmsman (1.687). These adjectives invite connection of Fabius to Lucan's Cato. But the noun *speculator* is the first of many '-tor' suffixed nouns used to describe Fabius in the text, underlining the fact that Fabius is an active agent, not a passive endurer.⁴⁶ Fabius' desire to conduct war without a sword (1.681) reflects his disposition which seeks to avoid unnecessary confrontation and instead proceed in a slow, cautious manner. However, the senate views this policy of caution as mere idleness (*nec... morentur*, 1.694). I suggest this use of a cognate of *mora* begins a pattern where references to *mora* tend to be used in moments of deviant focalisation—where the narrator speaks, but the focaliser is another character.⁴⁷ This is because, as will be shown, the narrator at other times (especially when praising Fabius' achievements) prefers *cunctatio*, not *mora*.

After the catastrophic failure of *celeritas*, the Romans grant Fabius dictatorial powers to preserve the republic (6.609-612). This preservative aspect, as well as his moral steadfastness in not succumbing to envy, popular opinion, or desire for plunder (6.613-615) align Fabius with Lucan's Cato and he is thus an 'anti-Pompey' figure. But the bicolon *par ingenium castrisque togaeque* (6.617) paired with his restful mind (*quieta mente*, 6.616-7) portray him as an 'anti-Caesar' too, given that Caesar shuns *quies*.⁴⁸ Paradoxically though, intertwining the aspects of war and inherently idle peace also *combines* Lucan's Pompey and Caesar. Constantly caught in the tension of epic teleology and counterfactual possibility,⁴⁹ at this point the reader might expect that Fabius will be unsuccessful at preventing the complete destruction of the republic like Cato. However, the gerund *cunctando* at 6.640 and the narrator's excessive praise for Fabius (6.638-40) lead to Fabius' equal presentation to Hannibal (*ducemque Hannibalem aequando*, 6.641). The emphatic placement of *cunctando* and its juxtaposition with *Fabius* position *cunctatio* as the driving force of Fabius' characterisation, which acts as the antithetical response to Hannibal's *celeritas*. Thus the antithesis of Lucan's Pompey and Caesar (albeit with elements of each), Fabius is established in the first six books of the *Punica* as sharing Stoic commonalities with Lucan's Cato—but unlike Cato whose stance is moral, Fabius' *cunctatio* promises successful delay.

Book 7 has been correctly identified as focussing on the differences between Hannibal and Fabius, even in terms of their policies of delay and conquest.⁵⁰ This can be refined

⁴⁶ OLD -tor.

⁴⁷ For deviant focalisation, see Fowler 1990: esp. 42-4.

⁴⁸ Tipping 2010: 117-8 recognises this 'calm mind' as a Stoic virtue, but does not extend this to Lucan's Cato.

⁴⁹ For this tension, see Cowan 2010.

⁵⁰ Littlewood 2011: lxiii.

further, by suggesting that it allegorises the central tension between *cunctatio* and *celeritas*. Since *celeritas* has defined the Romans thus far, book 7 is also about Fabian *cunctatio* versus Hannibalic and Roman *celeritas*. Fabius receives a programmatic introduction at the beginning of book 7 (7.1-19):

Interea trepidis Fabius spes unica rebus,
ille quidem socios atque aegram uulnere praeceps
Ausoniam armabat uiridique ad dura laborum
bellator senio iam castra mouebat in hostem,
sed mens humana maior non tela nec enses
nec fortes spectabat equos. tot milia contra
Poenorum inuictumque ducem, tot in agmina solus
ibat et in sese cuncta arma uirosque gerebat.
ac ni sacra seni uis impressumque fuisset
sistere cunctando Fortunam aduersa fouentem,
ultima Dardanii transisset nominis aetas.
ille modum superis in Punica castra fauoris
addidit et Libyae finem inter prospera bella
uincendi statuit, tumefactum cladibus ille
Hesperiiis lento Poenum moderamine lusit.
summe ducum, qui regna iterum labentia Troiae
et fluxas Latii res maiorumque labores,
qui Carmentis opes et regna Euandria seruas,
surge, age et merito sacrum caput insere caelo.

Meanwhile Fabius was the Romans' one hope in fearful circumstances. He rushed to arm Rome's allies and an Italy weak from its wounds. The warrior's old age flourished for hardship's challenges. Already he was moving his forces against the enemy, but his superhuman mind did not consider the javelins, the swords, or the tough horses. He went alone against so many thousands of Carthaginians and their unconquered leader Hannibal, against so many ranks, and he took upon himself the burden of all the weapons and soldiers.

If aged Fabius had not possessed holy strength and determination to resist by delaying the Fortune that favored his enemies, the Roman name would have passed through its final years. Fabius set a limit to the gods' favor for the Carthaginian side, and he declared an end for Libya's victories amid their successful campaign. Using gentle restraint, he deceived Hannibal, puffed up as he was from Italian victories. Greatest of leaders! You saved Troy's kingdom from falling a second time and Latium's unstable state and our ancestors' efforts. You preserved Carmentis' wealth and Evander's kingdom. Come now, rise up and place your holy head in the heaven you have earned.

References to Fabius as the one hope (*spes unica*), as proceeding alone (*solus ibat*), and the greatest of leaders (*summe ducum*) position Fabius as a synecdochic hero representing the

republic against the numerous (*tot... tot...*) Carthaginians.⁵¹ Fabius is quick to arm Italy (*praeceps*)—an element of *celeritas Caesariana*: this is but one attribute of his pace. He is also able to endure harshities (*dura laborum*)—an element of *patientia Catoniana*: but again, this is but one attribute of his pace. Further, his senescence (*senio*) purportedly likens him to Pompey’s ineffectiveness at delaying, but the adjective *viridi* creates a paradox that Fabius’ age has the vigour of youth.⁵² He is not presented as a *cunctator* in this moment, but a *bellator*, implying activity and aggressiveness.⁵³ So, the reader is presented with a balanced portrait of Fabius, occupying a middle ground between Lucan’s monstrous Caesar and Cato, but a middle ground that is not inactive and ineffective like Pompey. Fabius’ superhuman mind (*mens humana maior*) likens Fabius to a Stoic hero with divine wisdom, which ultimately allows him to resist hostile *fortuna* with patient endurance (*patientia*) and a calm mind (*quieta mens*).⁵⁴ This Stoic connection is reinforced by the attention to setting limits in this section (*modum... statuit; lento moderamine*) with the adjective *lentus* clearly denoting a slowness in pace which permits Fabius’ thoughtful delay. Littlewood notes how Fabius is portrayed as Stoic moral opposition in contrast with Hannibal’s *tumefactum*,⁵⁵ reminiscent of the tension between Lucan’s Cato and Caesar. The juxtaposition of *Fortunam cunctando*, reinforced by the placement of *cunctando* inside *Fortunam*’s modifying adjective *foventem* reveals that *cunctatio* is specifically able to resist *fortuna* and sway its favour.⁵⁶ The narrator’s apostrophe to Fabius (*summe... seruas*) paired with the earlier reference to the *Aeneid*’s opening line (*arma virosque gerebat*) portrays Fabius as a second Aeneas—preservative, enduring, and *pius*—and establishes book 7 as a new beginning for the *Punica*.⁵⁷ Further, Littlewood notes that the phrase *sacrum caput* is used by Lucan of Pompey (*BC* 8.677) and by Seneca of Cato (*Dial.* 2.2.3),⁵⁸ which I suggest aligns the *Punica*’s narrator with *BC*’s favouritism of Pompey and Cato who try to delay and endure Caesarian speed. Thus, Fabius’ delay seems to be built on elements of *patientia Catoniana* such as *moderatio*, and preservation—but Silius mixes these qualities with an unmistakable activeness, which contrasts to Pompey’s ineffectuality, to create a pace paradigm of *cunctatio*.

⁵¹ See also Fabius as representing his 300 ancestors at 7.62.

⁵² For the senescence of Hannibal and Pompey, see Marks 2010: 149.

⁵³ *OLD -tor*.

⁵⁴ Littlewood 2011: 37-8.

⁵⁵ Littlewood 2011: 42.

⁵⁶ *OLD fovere* 6, ‘take the side of’.

⁵⁷ See also Cowan 2007 for Silius’ use of Trojan epithets to evoke similarities to the *Aeneid*.

⁵⁸ Littlewood 2011: 43.

With Fabius' appointment as dictator (7.20-1), Hannibal is for the first time in the *Punica* anxious as evidenced by the list of rhetorical questions (*cognoscere... parem* 7.22-25). By presenting a Hannibal—who preys on youthful *celeritas* for victory—as now worried about the lack of *fervor* in Fabius' *senectus* (7.26), Silius distinguishes Fabius' *cunctatio* as a novel tactic. This freshness manifests in the first implementation of *cunctatio* (7.90-100):

Dum Roma antiquos templis indicit honores,
iam Fabius, cauto procedens agmine et arte
bellandi lento similis, praecluserat omnis
fortunaque hostique uias. discedere signis
haud licitum, summumque decus, quo tollis ad astra
imperii, Romane, caput, parere docebat.
uerum ubi prima satis inspecta in montibus altis
signa procul fulsitque nouis exercitus armis,
arrectae spes Sidonii, feruetque secundis
fortuna*e* iuuenis. uincendi sola uidetur,
quod nondum steterint acies, mora:

While Rome decreed the traditional honors for its temples, Fabius led his cautious army forward. While appearing to be lazy, he had shut off all paths for his enemy and Fortune through the art of war. He did not permit his men to depart from the battle standards into combat. He taught them obedience, the greatest honor, the power by which you, Roman, lifted your empire's head to the stars. But the Carthaginians' hopes were raised, when they first saw the Roman battle standards from far off on the high mountains and the troops gleaming in new armor. Hannibal burned with Fortune's favor. The fact that the battle lines were not yet arrayed appeared to be the only delay to victory.

Fabius seems (*similis*) to be slow in war (*arte bellandi lento*) but in reality makes progress (*procedens*) by leading his army up a mountain and closing off the paths (*praecluserat... uias*) for the Carthaginians. This is central to Silius' *cunctatio*: the appearance of slowness (associated with Pompey's *mora*) but the reality of progress (an aspect of Caesar's *celeritas*). This tactic affects *fortuna* (*praecluserat... fortunaeque*), which favours Hannibal (*feruetque... iuuenis*). Fabius teaches obedience (*parere docebat*), which seems gentler than the *exempla* of Caesar and Cato who inspire obedience often through terror, yet more firm than Pompey who fails to pass on his desire for delay to his men. Further, I suggest that the narrator's remark *uincendi... mora* is an incident of deviant focalisation: *cunctatio* is not a passive and ineffectual like *mora*, as Hannibal misunderstands. Fabius is successful in wasting Hannibal's time at 7.123-30 where Fabius watches Hannibal fall into his trap (*cassarum... cunctandi Fabius*). Through the cognate gerund *cunctandi*, Silius labels Fabius' successful change of pace as *cunctatio*. This has an acute effect on Hannibal who doubts his success at Trebia and

Trasimene had Fabius been in command (7.147-50). Hannibal does not comprehend the forethought of Fabius' *cunctatio*: he presumes Fabius is sitting idly (*sedendo*, 7.151).⁵⁹ However, Hannibal's forces are worn out (*terimur*, 7.151) and his trickery is exposed (7.153). Thus Fabius' *cunctatio* is a novel pace which Hannibal, as the paradigm of successful *celeritas* thus far in the epic, cannot overcome.

Fabius' rationale for *cunctatio* is no better explained than when he addresses his men to quell their mutiny (7.217-52). The narrator likens Hannibal's *celeritas* with Roman *celeritas* when he states that both sides' *castra* and *furores* were conquered and tamed by Fabius (7.218-9).⁶⁰ Fabius justifies his *cunctatio* by pointing out that the Senate entrusted him with Rome's last chance in a tragic war (7.221-2) instead of entrusting it to another with a hasty spirit (7.219-20). He is steadfast and will not acquiesce to his soldiers' pressure for a hurried attack (7.221). Fabius knows that *cunctatio* will preserve the soldiers' lives, and he mocks them as tired of living (*lucis piget*, 7.226) if they rush on—for they will only meet the same fate as Flaminius, who is now dead (7.229-30). By associating the speedy diction of *ruendi*, *properans*, and *praeceps* with Flaminius, Fabius distinguishes his *cunctatio* from Flaminius' fateful *celeritas*. Fabius thus shows a deep understanding of his pace policy, something which Pompey lacks. Fabius continues his address to his soldiers, now explaining the effect of *cunctatio* on *fortuna* (7.236-47):

non est, mihi credite, non est
arduus in pugnas ferri labor: una reclusis
omnes iam portis in campum effuderit hora.
magnum illud solisque datum, quos mitis euntis
Iuppiter aspexit, magnum est ex hoste reuerti.
fortunae Libys incumbit flatuque secundo
fidit agens puppim. dum desinat aura sinusque
destituatur tumidos subducto flamine uentus,
in rem cunctari fuerit. non ulla perenni
amplexu Fortuna fouet. iam copia quanto
artior et nullo Tyriis certamine quantum
detritum est fama!

It's not, believe me, it's not a difficult task to plunge into battle. In one hour, we could open the gates and spill everyone out on the battlefield. The great thing is to come back from fighting the enemy. This great gift is given only to those whom Jupiter gazes upon kindly as they march forth. Hannibal leans on his luck and trusts in a favoring wind as he guides his ship. It will be profitable for us to delay until the breeze slackens and the wind abandons the rising gulf and holds back its gale.

⁵⁹ OLD *sedeo* 7.

⁶⁰ Thus, promotion of Fabius denotes the 'containment of Hannibal's Caesarian excess' (Tipping 2010: 135).

No Fortune favors anyone with an eternal embrace. How much tighter are the Carthaginians' supplies now, and how much fame have they lost from not fighting!

Fabius is very conscious of *fortuna* when he expounds that Hannibal is leaning on *fortuna* because 'it's wind favours him' (*fortunae... puppim*). This is a pointed contrast to Pompey, who constantly thinks *fortuna* is on his side (because of his former *fortuna*) by ignoring the signs that it favours Caesar. But Fabius knows that *fortuna* does not favour anyone forever (*non ulla... Fortuna fouet*), thus justifying his proposition that it is to the Romans' advantage to delay (*in rem cunctari fuerit*).⁶¹ Fabius is also aware of the success of *cunctatio* so far in the text: Hannibal's resources and reputation have started to decline (*iam copia... famae*). This culminates with the narrator's later comment that after Trebia and Trasimene, Hannibal barely escaped Fabius let alone emerged victorious (7.378-80). In the passage at hand though, he successfully quells the mutiny and at 7.253-9 is likened to Neptune calming the storm at Verg. *A.* 1.124-6, further characterising Fabius as a semi-divine figure capable of calming the storm of Hannibal and his soldiers' destructive *celeritas*. By quelling this mutiny, Fabius is cast as Caesarian and Catonian, suggesting that his command may be just as monstrous—but the adjective *tranquilla* to describe his effect at 7.258 recalls Pompey's *mora* (*BC* 1.130). This demonstrates that Fabius contains the active characteristics and strong leadership of Caesar and the enduring steadfastness of Cato, but the desirable (albeit unsuccessful in war) quality of calmness associated with Pompey's *mora*.⁶² Thus, Fabius forestalls *fortuna* with positive outcomes: the diminishing of Carthaginian supplies and renown.

While Fabius may be positioned as the synecdochic hero of the *Punica* at this point of the narrative, he does not desire everlasting sole power like Caesar and Pompey. Instead, Fabius' *pietas* is displayed when he gives up command of his army to his Master of Horse, Minucius, while he himself heads back to Rome to inaugurate the games and holy rituals (7.380-2).⁶³ Fabius addresses Minucius, exhorting him to follow his example of *cunctatio* because of its clearly positive effects against Hannibal (7.389, 7.393-4). Fabius recognises the temptation to strive for *gloria* (7.396) through swift battle, but recognises that the only option to preserve the republic's safety is to try nothing (*nil mouisse* 7.396) and abstain from battle (*modo pugna absistite* 7.394). After Minucius' failure at Gerunium, Fabius, instead of sharing the same sentiment of his son that Minucius is a criminal who seized power by a thoughtless

⁶¹ *OLD sum* 13b.

⁶² Littlewood 2011: 121-2 summarises this as Fabius' 'calm strength of reason'.

⁶³ Marks 2010: 134-5 notes that 7.512 alludes to *BC* 1.132, positioning Minucius as influenced by 'popular favour' like Pompey; showing that this is a 'bad decision'.

democratic vote (7.539-42), reacts with characteristic calmness. Fabius does not blame the republican system (7.551-2), calls it a crime to be angry at one's country (7.555), and encourages his son to put aside this anger (7.664). Ultimately, Fabius decides to use speed (*celeremus*, 7.565) to rescue Minucius and his army. In one respect this underlines Fabius' *pietas* towards his men; in another it reminds the reader that Fabius is not restricted to *cunctatio*—but will rush when the situation demands it as here, and as we shall see in book 10, when *fortuna* permits it.⁶⁴

While Lucan's Caesar, Pompey and Caesar can only *successfully* engage in strategy within the confines of their respective pace paradigms, Fabius' *cunctatio* is not so confined. Fabius is extremely capable of using *celeritas* to achieve military success (7.567-79):

Primus claustra manu portae dictator et altos
disiecit postis rupitque in proelia cursum.
non grauiore mouent uenti certamina mole
Odrysius Boreas et Syrtim tollere pollens
Africus, obnixa cum bella furentia torquent:
distraxere fretum ac diuersa ad litora uoluunt
aequor quisque suum; sequitur stridente procella
nunc huc, nunc illuc, raptum mare et intonat undis.
haud prorsus daret ullus honos tellusque subacta
Phoenicum et Carthago ruens, iniuria quantum
orta ex inuidia decoris tulit. omnia namque
dura simul deuicta uiro, metus, Hannibal, irae,
inuidia, atque una fama et fortuna subactae.

Fabius the Dictator's hand was first to smash the gate's barrier and its high doorposts and rush his way into battle. The Thracian north wind and the African southwest wind that can lift the Syrtes sandbars do not start battle with a greater effort than his, even when they push against one another and engage in raging combat. Each wind tears the sea apart and rolls his own part of it to a different shore. The sea torn this way and that follows the roaring gale, and its waves crash like thunder. No honor, not the conquest of Africa or the collapse of Carthage, could contribute as much glory to Fabius as this injustice, born from envy. For the man had overcome all hardships at once and had conquered fear, Hannibal, anger, envy, rumor, and Fortune all together.

The initial placement of *primus* emphasises Fabius as quicker than the rest of his army, and the violent diction *rupitque* aligns Fabius with the destructiveness of *celeritas Caesariana*. The smashing of the gate is a metaphor for Fabius finally dismantling his policy of *cunctatio*, instead favouring *celeritas*. Now is the violent clash between two forces of *celeritas*—Hannibal and Fabius'—and it is so destructive that the event is likened to the cosmological

⁶⁴ See Chapter 3, Section II.

clash between the winds Boreas and Africus.⁶⁵ Such a comparison to a mighty storm recalls the antagonism of Seneca's Atreus and Thyestes (*Thy.* 111-12, 124) and the clash between Lucan's swift Caesar and slow Pompey, representing the South and East winds respectively.⁶⁶ The clash is further likened to a clash between two Caesars with the thunder imagery (*stridente procella... intonat undis*). Silius' narrator views Fabius' effort to save Minucius' army and prevent the total destruction of Roman forces as on par with the conquest of Africa and the fall of Carthage (*haud prorsus... ruens*)—linking Fabius to Scipio Africanus.⁶⁷ The narrator extols Fabius for overcoming fear, Hannibal, anger, envy, Hannibal's reputation, and *fortuna* all at once, thereby confirming the veracity of Fabius' own rationale for *cunctatio*. But here, it is not *cunctatio* but rather *celeritas* which Fabius displays, begging the question of why Fabius did not engage in swift battle against Hannibal earlier. The answer is that the period of *cunctatio* was necessary to wear Hannibal down—but the period was cut short by Minucius' rash attack. Fabius enjoys a traditional epic *aristeia* (7.598-616) where polyptoton (*Thurin et Buten et Narin et Arsen*) and lengthy lists confirm Fabius' immense *celeritas* on the battlefield, making him an *exemplum* (7.617) of *celeritas* for his military speed and valour. Fabius rejoices with the number of soldiers alive (*numerato milite laetus* 7.730), as opposed to those dead in the Carthaginian side—showing an innately preservative and humane nature in Fabius. His momentary *celeritas* was for the purpose of saving the republic: not victory. This separates him from the same self-destructive *celeritas* of Publius, Flaminius, and Minucius. Instead, Fabius' *celeritas* is characterised by an unwillingness for personal gain and glory, embodied in his republican *pietas* towards the gods, his country, and his men.

In typical Caesarian fashion, Hannibal cannot bear the idleness imposed on him (*impatiensque morae*, 8.3) by Fabius' overall policy of *cunctatio*, calling Fabius his only enemy (8.3).⁶⁸ Ariemma notes that *mora* is 'an ingredient' of *cunctatio*,⁶⁹ but I specify this by suggesting that this is only in so far as *mora* is what is inflicted upon Hannibal by Fabius' active delay; in this sense, *cunctatio* weaponises *mora*. The overall effects of *cunctatio*, foreshadowed in Fabius' speeches, are realised at the beginning of book 8. Hannibal longs for *fortuna*'s help (*exspectandi uiri fata* 8.5; showing that *fortuna* momentarily favours the Romans), the Carthaginians lack supplies (8.12-3), and the war's feverish pace has been

⁶⁵ Littlewood 2011: lines 214-5 notes that Fabius is likened to *Odrysius* (Thracian) *Boreas* through the alliance between Aeneas's Trojans and the three Thracian descendants of Boreas.

⁶⁶ *BC* 2.454-60, noted by Littlewood 2011: lines 214-5.

⁶⁷ See Chapter 3, Section III.

⁶⁸ For Hannibal's intolerance of delay, see e.g. 4.4-34, 4.510-11, 8.4, and 10.330-1.

⁶⁹ Ariemma 2011: 242.

slowed down (8.12-3). The narrator suggests that the war is over, despite the combat not being finished (*quamquam... hostem* 8.14-5). However, Juno's intervention in sending Anna Perenna to lead Hannibal to Cannae in order to face Varro shifts *fortuna* back in favour of Hannibal before Cannae (*huc Trebiae rursus et Thrasymenni fata sequentur*, 8.38).

Thus, Fabius' *cunctatio* builds on Lucan's *patientia Catoniana*, but extends Cato's *moral* steadfastness into the *action* of steadfastness, which is active delay. Fabius is the first Roman general to succeed over Hannibal, but due to the 'constraints' of the republican system, Fabius is only dictator for a brief period until 8.216-7. Fabius has an acute awareness of his policy of active delay—its success, effect on *fortuna*, and preservative quality. However, when *fortuna* permits it (which will occur at 10.592), this policy ought to be discarded in favour of *celeritas*.⁷⁰ Thus, Silius' Fabius is the Cunctator which Lucan's narrator so desperately desires in *BC*, but is instead faced with Pompey's ineffective *mora* and Cato's philosophical (rather than practical) *patientia*.⁷¹

IV. CELERITAS CONTRA CUNCTATIO: A CLASH OF CONSULS AT CANNAE

Fabius' successful policy of *cunctatio* purports to signify a change in Roman policy away from the self-destructive *celeritas* of Publius, Sempronius, Flaminius, and Minucius. But the reader is aware that the *Punica* is teleologically fixed to include the famously destructive Battle of Cannae.⁷² Silius presents Varro as the embodiment of Roman *celeritas*—an *alter Flaminius*⁷³—in opposition to his fellow consul, Paulus, who embodies Fabius' *cunctatio*. But the catastrophic disaster of Cannae is explained by way of Paulus' *failure* to instil a policy of *cunctatio* in the Romans and Varro. Instead, Paulus becomes as ineffective at stopping the *celeritas* of Varro as Lucan's Pompey, thereby characterising Paulus in terms of *mora* rather than *cunctatio*. This section explores the clash between these two conflicting consuls' pace—but importantly, how this is problematised by Varro's Pompeian flight from battle and Paulus' *un-Pompeian devotio*. I pay special attention to the Cannae books (8-10) as a microcosm for republican (joint) leadership, seek to (re-)establish the self-destructiveness of *celeritas*

⁷⁰ See Chapter 3, Section II.

⁷¹ Thus, the *Punica*'s narrator shares 'Fabius' preference for patient opposition to aggression... the strategy of caution is superior to that of dynamism' (Tipping 2010: 132).

⁷² For more on teleology in Roman epic, see Cowan 2010.

⁷³ Ariemma 2011: 244 notes that 'Livy indicates that enlightened political thinkers of the day saw Flaminius and Varro as more or less the same person or, rather, saw the one as the reincarnation of the other'. This same stance is present in the *Punica*. See also Marks 2005b: 132.

without *fortuna*'s favour, highlight the demagogic quality of *celeritas* (which stems from *celeritas Caesariana*), and emphasise the ultimate dynamic destructiveness of Hannibal.

From the moment Varro becomes consul in book 8, he is framed by the same sort of rash *celeritas* as Flaminius in book 5.⁷⁴ His seizure of the consulship from the people (8.243) reveals his selfish rapacity, and this is equated with his hurrying to prepare Rome for destruction (*festinans... admouet urbi* 8.245). He caters to the plebs and barks at the senate (*infima... senatum* 8.249), reinforcing the popularity of *celeritas* as a strategy. But Silius has shown the reader that the leaders most worthy of emulation, like Fabius, focus on the *correct* strategy under the circumstances, even if it means short-term unpopularity. This incredible popularity makes Varro favoured more than Paulus, and with such power stemming from his popularity he becomes the sole decider of Rome's fate (*fati foret arbiter unus* 8.251). The narrator's lament that Latium would be ashamed of Varro (*quo... puderet* 8.251) emphasises the narrator's stance against unchecked *celeritas*. Varro's misunderstanding of Fabius' *cunctatio* is revealed again in a moment of deviant focalisation before he gives a speech to the senate: he is keen to blame Fabius for what he views as *mora* (8.263), and the imperatives and swift diction in Varro's speech to the senate (8.261-77) position him as vehemently against Fabian *cunctatio*. This lust for speed likens him to the enemy, Hannibal, and therefore to Lucan's Caesar—a character connection which Tipping is hesitant to make for Varro, instead only suggesting that Varro's character 'strongly evokes civil war'.⁷⁵ The narrator refers to this speech as violent and reproachful⁷⁶ (*increpuit*, 8.278) and proceeds to compare him to an untrained charioteer (8.279-3):

impellitque moras: ueluti cum carcere rupto
auriga indocilis totas effudit habenas
et praeceps trepida pendens in uerbera planta
impar fertur equis: fumat male concitus axis,
ac frena incerto fluitant discordia curru.

He pushed aside the delays, just like an untrained charioteer who lets loose the reins entirely when the barrier is removed at the races. He leans forward, feet unsteady with fear, whipping the horses wildly, unable to control them as they drag him along. The axle smokes as he accelerates too fast, and the tangled reins slide as the chariot loses direction.

⁷⁴ Silius' emphasis on Varro's similarity to Flaminius distinguishes him from other sources (Marks 2005b: 132).

⁷⁵ Tipping 2010: 37.

⁷⁶ *OLD increpo* 4.

Varro's contempt for delay (*impellit moras*) and headlong speed (*praeceps*) positions him in a Caesarian light as a harbinger of internal discord—here between himself and his co-consul, Paulus. Varro, as an untrained charioteer (*indocilis... auriga*), invites comparison to the simile of Flaminius as a sailor at the mercy of *fortuna's* winds. The sailor was portrayed as ignorant and lacking control, and so too is this charioteer who does not control his horses, but is rather dragged along by them (*trepida... equis*). Thus, Varro's *celeritas* is unrestrained and impossible for even himself to control, a direct contrast to Hannibal's tactical, controlled (yet destructive) *celeritas*. This contrasts to later Romans who use *celeritas* successfully in the latter half of the epic.⁷⁷ Thus, Varro is an *alter Flaminius* (8.310)—another disaster of *celeritas* waiting to happen.

On the other hand, Paulus follows Fabius' warnings.⁷⁸ Paulus explicitly recognises through the statement *nec me unica fallit / cunctandi ratio* (8.329-30) that he understands that Fabius' policy is of *cunctatio* rather than *mora*, a mistake which the other Roman leaders and Hannibal have made. He agrees to follow this *exemplum* (8.328-30). Books 8-10 as a microcosm for civil war are brought to light by Paulus' comment that it is as though one consul has been given to Italy, the other to the Carthaginians (*consul datus alter... alter Poenis* 8.332-3). It is Roman *cunctatio* pitted against Hannibalic *celeritas* embodied in Paulus and Varro respectively. But where Fabius succeeds in persuading his men, Paulus fails like Pompey.⁷⁹ However, unlike Pompey's reverse *devotio*, Paulus will sacrifice himself for the republic (8.345-8). This selflessness aligns with the model of Lucan's *patientia Catoniana*, positioning Paulus as a Catonian *exemplum* of how to deal with overwhelming *celeritas*; that is, if all else fails, commit suicide honourably.⁸⁰ This *exemplum* contrasts with Silius' paradigm of Fabius' *cunctatio*, which Silius has shown offers a way out of *celeritas* without self-destruction—even leading to victory.

The Romans march on to Cannae from Rome, but not without a lengthy catalogue of Roman forces (8.349-621). This sort of narratological delay is typical of Silius' narrator in the first ten books of the epic.⁸¹ It confirms that the narrator is opposed to Hannibal's *celeritas* and desires to delay Cannae. Just as book 7 is lengthened to reflect the delay of Fabius, the narrator forestalls the epic action 'as if Silius has himself adopted Fabius' delaying tactics'.⁸²

⁷⁷ Varro's charioteer simile will be compared to Scipio's chariot simile in Chapter 3, Section III.

⁷⁸ On Fabius and Paulus' relationship, see Leigh 2004: 178-89.

⁷⁹ For further discussion of Paulus and Pompey, see Marks 2010: 138-40.

⁸⁰ For the trajectory of *BC* to include Cato's suicide, see Chapter 1, Section III.

⁸¹ For delay in book 9 especially, see Fabbri 2022: 197. For inset narratives as a delaying device, see Van den Broek 2024.

⁸² Ariemma 2011: 241.

Thus, by delaying the narrative so much before and during Cannae, the narrator of the *Punica* resembles that of *BC* closely—albeit the *Punica*'s narrator is helped in this endeavour by Fabius. Book 9 begins by contrasting Varro and Paulus in terms of their pace, but focalised through Varro: Varro reproaches Paulus for his perceived sluggishness and inactivity⁸³ (*segnitiae*, 9.6), which is balanced by Varro's desire to call the battle sounds (*modo acris... uelle* 9.6-7). The narrator villainises Varro by likening him to Hannibal, who has a similar desire to rush the battle (*properi*, 9.8). The divide between the consuls is further laid out in their opposing speeches. Varro says (9.32-7):

et pugnae signum expectate petendae.
dux sibi quisque uiam rapito, cum spargere primis
incipiet radiis Gargana cacumina Phoebus.
pandam egomet propere portas. ruite ocius atque hunc
ereptum reuocata diem.' sic turbidus aegra
pestifero pugnae castra incendebat amore.

Don't wait for the customary signal for beginning combat. Each man should seize the way for himself as his own leader, as soon as the Sun begins to spread its first rays over Mount Garganus' peak. I myself will quickly throw open the gates. Rush swiftly and get back this lost day." Thus Varro, disturbed in his mind, set the sick troops on fire with deadly passion for combat.

The imperatives and jussive subjunctives (*expectate*, *rapito*, *incipiet*, *ruite*) create an atmosphere of urgency, exhorting the soldiers to rush with no delay. This is emphasised by the swift diction *propere* and *ruite ocius*. The narrator shows his disapproval for Varro's speech through the plosive alliteration *pestifero pugnae*, likening this *celeritas* to a disease. By contrast, Paulus is portrayed in a distinctly Pompeian manner since he stands as though he is already defeated, which contrasts to his previous energy to embody and inspire *cunctatio* (*at Paulus... stetit* 9.38-40). He says (9.46-55):

cladi parce obuius ire.
dum transit diuum furor et consumitur ira
Fortunae, nouus Hannibalis, sat, nomina ferre
si discit miles nec frigidus adspicit hostem.
nonne uides, cum uicinis auditur in aruis,
quam subitus linquat pallentia corpora sanguis,
quamque fluant arma ante tubas? cunctator et aeger,
ut rere, in pugnas Fabius quotcumque sub illis

⁸³ *OLD segnitia* 1, 2a.

culpatis duxit signis, nunc arma capessunt.
at quos Flaminius — sed dira auertite, diui!

Don't go to meet destruction. Until the gods' rage passes and Fortune uses up its anger, it is enough if the new soldiers merely learn to endure Hannibal's name and aren't cold with fear when they see the enemy. When his forces are heard in nearby fields, don't you see how quickly the blood leaves their pale bodies, how their weapons drop before the battle trumpets? Yet you think Fabius is a delayer and weak in battle: as many men as he led under these battle-standards that you blame, they still wield their weapons. But those whom Flaminius... but gods, turn aside terrible omens!

While his speech begins the imperative *parce*, Paulus descends into preemptive grief and defeat by breaking off mid-sentence (*Flaminius—*). Paulus again explains the rationale for *cunctatio* as being to forestall *fortuna* until it favours the Romans (*consumitur ira / Fortunae... sat*), allowing no excuse of unawareness for Varro. Part of that rationale is distinctly Catonian, as discussed—that the soldiers simply endure Hannibal's name and learn not to fear it (*nomina... hostem*). Paulus breaks off, signifying weakness and a lack of resolve which resembles *mora Pompeiana*. Whilst Paulus may understand the policy of *cunctatio* much more than Pompey understands his own desire to delay in *BC*, Paulus realises that it is fruitless when Varro's *celeritas* overtakes his men (9.37). The narrator forestalls description of the Battle of Cannae further by spending roughly 100 lines describing the patricide and suicide of Solymus (9.66-177). This digression heightens Cannae's atmosphere of civil war between Romans. The episode concludes with a dire warning for Varro: *FUGE PROELIA VARRO* (9.175) inscribed in blood, which doubly acts as another warning for Varro to cease his engagement in the battle and foreshadows Varro's later retreat which will ultimately align him with Pompey's apparent cowardice in fleeing Pharsalus. Thus, before the Battle of Cannae begins, Varro and Paulus are presented as antithetical in terms of pace in order to underline the internal discord of the Romans.⁸⁴ This focus on civil animosity simultaneously alludes back to *BC* and foreshadows the actual civil wars that will take place after Cannae.

Varro's *celeritas* is no match for Hannibal's supreme *celeritas* which has *fortuna* on its side. Through the counterfactual at 9.417-8, the narrator reinforces Hannibal's *celeritas* because had he not arrived in a sudden whirlwind, the Romans would have pushed forward. Hannibal recognises Varro in the battlefield as an *alter Flaminius* (9.422), reinforcing the

⁸⁴ This contrasts to Marks 2005b: 133, who suggests that Paulus is similarly characterised by the same rash haste as the other Roman leaders.

connection that Roman *celeritas* in the first ten books of the *Punica* is consistent. Like Publius and Minucius, Varro is saved from Hannibal's hands by Scipio who paradoxically rushes with *celeritas* too (*rapido subitam... Scipio*, 9.428-30).⁸⁵ Book 9 closes with Paulus mocking the failure of Varro's *celeritas* through the verb of motion *ire* (9.633-5).⁸⁶ Paulus directly correlates the people's support for Varro and the destruction at Cannae (9.636), which, paired with the narrator's constant support for Paulus and Fabius, seems to imply that the republican democratic voting system and shared consulship are causes of this Roman defeat. This is consolidated by the narrator's later comment that if Rome had a second Paulus, Cannae would not have been so disastrous (10.9-10). Nonetheless, like Fabius who actively delays but rushes when the situation demands it, Paulus' rushes into the middle of the enemy (*acrius... hostes* 9.643).

Paulus' necessary swiftness extends to book 10, marking the transition of Paulus from a Pompeian character who cannot persuade his army to withhold battle into a Catonian paradigm of sacrificial suicide. This is marked by Paulus' *devotio* (10.1-326) which has been comprehensively treated by Cowan.⁸⁷ Cowan argues that Paulus' decision to die has the immediate result of causing detriment to the Roman cause—the opposite effect of a *devotio*—but there is the lingering sense that 'the republican Paulus is reacting against the monarchical tendencies which underpin the decision of... Pompey' and that 'other figures arise to save the city'.⁸⁸ Applying this argument to the portrayal of Paulus' speed, I suggest that Paulus' decision to rush into a *devotio* (for his decision to do so is surrounded by diction of speed)⁸⁹ is not only a reaction against the monarchical qualities of Pompey, but also against Pompey's *mora*. Instead, the narrator aligns Paulus with the (hypothetical) *devotio* of Cato: suicide as a means of escaping tyrannical *celeritas* when faced with no other options. Cato's *exemplum* does not 'save the Roman people from the yoke of servitude' as Cowan correctly asserts, but it does offer the reader a method of dealing with inevitable *celeritas*. Paulus' *devotio* is in direct contrast to Varro's flight (10.55-6). Metellus-Juno proposes that Varro is saving himself to save the republic (*ad meliora reseruat*, 10.56), but the reader is distrustful of Juno as the divine protector of Hannibal. Instead, the reader sides with Paulus' words that Varro is a great coward (*pauidissime*, 10.65). By the end of Cannae, it is therefore

⁸⁵ For more on Scipio's intervention, see Chapter 3, Section III.

⁸⁶ This also creates ring composition, as Varro accuses Paulus of being idle at the beginning of book 9 (Fabbri 2022: 199 n. 7).

⁸⁷ See Cowan 2011: 78-93.

⁸⁸ Cowan 2011: 93.

⁸⁹ See the paragraph above, and also e.g. *uelocius inde... citatior ibat* 10.10-11; *cum capream uenator... insequitur cursu* 10.18-9; *ocius... ruet* 10.280-1.

Varro who is likened to the ineffectuality and failure of *mora Pompeiana* by his flight from battle; and instead Paulus is portrayed in a Catonian light to offer the reader a means of escape when faced with superior and inevitable *celeritas* like Hannibal's. Thus, the final act of Roman *celeritas* as embodied now by Varro is swift, but swift in the passive sense of fleeing. In this way, the flight of Varro establishes that the Roman response of *celeritas* in books 1-10 is ultimately characterised by failure and passive flight, rather than active destruction against the enemy like Hannibal's *celeritas*.

V. CONCLUSION

And so, pace appears to be as integral—if not more integral—to the *Punica* than *BC*. By reading the *Punica* through the lens of pace, the failure of the Romans in the first ten books is accounted for by way of their self-destructive emulation of Lucan's *celeritas Caesariana*. Further, analysis based on pace also explains Fabius' momentary success and forestalment of *fortuna*. This reading also confirms Silius as a close reader of Lucan's *BC*, especially in terms of the portrayal of pace. That is not to suggest that Silius' characters fit one pace paradigm perfectly: Fabius' *cunctatio* shares a common foundation with *patientia Catoniana*, and Fabius also displays a similarly destructive *celeritas* to Caesar; Varro and Paulus represent *celeritas* and *mora* respectively, but oscillate between closeness to Caesar, Pompey, and Cato. Whilst Rome is defeated at Cannae, there is an indication that *fortuna* may still switch to favour Rome.⁹⁰ Ultimately, only Fabius' *cunctatio* is deemed worthy of emulation by the narrator, and *celeritas* is condemned for causing Rome's greatest defeats.

⁹⁰ See Chapter 1, Section I.

CHAPTER 3:

PACE IN SILIUS ITALICUS' *PUNICA* 11-17

While the first ten books of the *Punica* are dominated by Hannibal's *celeritas*, in books 11-17 this speed subsides to make way for the emergence of Roman *celeritas*—ultimately embodied by one man, Scipio Africanus. The lead up to Rome's disaster at Cannae in books 4-10 covers only two years of historical events; whereas the lead up to Rome's victory at Zama covers fourteen.¹ Underlying this temporal shift is a change in the narrator's attitude towards pace, which is informed by a change in *fortuna* owing to divine influence and Fabius' *cunctatio*.² So informed, this chapter seeks to account for and explore this change in the dynamics of pace in books 11-17 of Silius' *Punica*, with further attention to whether and how Silius adapts Lucan's models of pace. In doing so, I argue that Silius problematises Lucan's paradigms significantly, which reinforces the *Punica* as a close reading of and comment on pace in *BC*. First, I discuss Hannibal's shift from *celeritas* to *mora* after Cannae which manifests at Capua, after which he cannot regain the vigour of his former *celeritas*; then I discuss the successful use of Roman *celeritas* after Cannae, but also its similarities to its former self-destructiveness; finally I examine the pace of perhaps Silius' most complex character, Scipio Africanus, who offers a fine-tuned *exemplum* of *celeritas* which evolves from the reckless *celeritas* of 'pre-Cannae' Romans into an informed, cautious, but maximally destructive *celeritas* by the Battle of Zama.

I. HANNIBAL'S *MORA*

That a significant change in Hannibal's characterisation occurs around halfway through the *Punica* is well documented.³ This section argues that this change can be pinpointed to a precise moment in the aftermath of Cannae, and further that it extends into Hannibal's characterisation in terms of pace: he shifts from resembling *celeritas Caesariana* to *mora Pompeiana*. The focus of this section is on identifying the cause of Hannibal's change of pace and *fortuna*, his subsequent descent into luxury and idleness at Capua, and his new

¹ van den Broek 2023: 8.

² See Section I below.

³ Ahl, Davis and Pomeroy 1986: 2516-18; Cowan 2007: 1; Marks 2010: 146; van de Keur 2024: 31.

ineffectiveness in battle. The effects of his *mora* extend into his battles with the Romans for the rest of the narrative, which will be discussed in the final two sections.

To pinpoint the moment where Hannibal's descent into *mora* begins—which coincides with the structural change in *fortuna*—it is first necessary to look back to Jupiter's divine influence in book 1, and how it compares to the aftermath of Cannae in book 10. In response to Venus' complaints about the suffering of the Romans, Jupiter states that the Romans have lost their hardiness and now sit idly in silence (3.578-80), with their *virtus* tainted by inactivity (*desidiae... senescit*, 3.581). Thus, Jupiter permits Hannibal's conquest as a 'test'⁴ for Rome (*spectare paro*, 3.574). This senescent idleness echoes *mora Pompeiana*, implying that just as Caesar 'tests' Pompey's *mora* in *BC* and succeeds, Hannibal will 'test' Rome's *desidia* in the *Punica*. Not only does this imply that if the Romans overcome the 'test', Jupiter will protect them again; it also reveals the centrality of the tension between speed and slowness in the *Punica*. Fabius emerges as the Roman solution to Jupiter's 'test'. However, I suggest that the narrator is ambiguous as to whether Fabius' human agency or some divine interference is the cause of the change in *fortuna*. This is encapsulated by Jupiter's comment to Juno and Venus at Cannae that 'the turning point of the conflict is not far off' (*nec... metae*, 10.549), which shows that Jupiter is aware of a change in *fortuna* but silent as to its cause or timing. Whilst not explicitly marked, I suggest that the turning point of *fortuna* occurs at the same moment that Hannibal refuses to proceed further, abandoning his characteristic *celeritas*. Here, idle sleep overcomes Hannibal bringing *quies* (10.351-6)—something which his *celeritas* did not permit before Cannae. Sleep (Somnus) himself warns Hannibal not to advance on Rome. But the reader expects Hannibal to ignore such warnings, just as he ignored Jupiter's divine thunderbolts (1.255-7). However, after being encouraged by his brother Mago to proceed to Rome, he reacts thus (10.377-87):

celatis superum monitis clausoque pauore
uulnera et exhaustas saeuo certamine uires
ac nimium laetis excusat fidere rebus.
tum spe deiectus iuuenis, ceu uertere ab ipsis
terga iuberetur muris ac signa referre,
'tanta mole' inquit 'non Roma, ut creditur, ipsa,
sed Varro est uictus. quonam tam prospera Martis
munera destituis fato patriamque moraris?
mecum exsultet eques; iuro hoc caput, accipe muros
Iliacos portasque tibi sine Marte patentes.'
Dumque ea Mago fremit cauto non credita fratri,

⁴ OLD *specto* 6b.

Hannibal concealed the gods' warnings and locked away his fear. He used his wounds as his excuse and the fierce contest that had exhausted his strength, as well as the danger of trusting too much in success.

Hannibal cast down young Mago's hope, just as if he had ordered him to turn back from Rome's very walls and withdraw his battle standards. "So our great effort has not defeated Rome, as even Rome itself believes, but only Varro?" Mago said. "What fate makes you abandon such a favorable gift of war and hold your country back? Let the cavalry charge with me. By my head I swear it: you will receive Rome's Trojan walls and gates lying open for you without a fight." Mago shouted these words at his cautious brother, who did not believe them.

Only about 50 lines after the conclusion of his most successful battle, Hannibal is presented as wounded (*uulnera*), exhausted (*exhaustas*), and making excuses not to carry on (*excusat*). This moment contrasts especially with his earlier refusal to take a break to treat his infected eye (4.751-62). His hesitancy to build on further success (*nimum... rebus*) further contrasts to his characteristic drive for progress at every opportunity (1.268-70). Further, his dismissal of Mago's hope (*spe*) as though he were ordering him to turn back from Rome (*ceu... referre*) is incompatible with his former hyperfixation on conquering Rome as quickly as possible. Mago's rhetorical questions mimic the disbelief of the reader at Hannibal's change of heart, and correctly realises the missed opportunity to press victory (*tanta... moraris?*). The verbal cognate of *mora* explicitly charges Hannibal with inactivity and idleness. Mago's use of the jussive subjunctive and imperative (*exsultet, accipe*) frames Mago in terms of Hannibal's former *celeritas*, which opposes Hannibal's new *mora*. The narrator labels Hannibal as cautious (*cauto*), aligning him with his enemy's approach to pace, Fabius. Crucially, this coincides with Fabius' declaration that it is time to abandon *cunctatio*—Rome must now act swiftly with *celeritas* (*non ulla relictæ est, / credite, cunctandi ratio. adproperamus*, 10.594-5).⁵ Thus, this moment after Cannæ can be labelled as the turning point of Hannibal's pace in the *Punica*, which also doubles as the turning point of *fortuna*.

Instead of marching on Rome, Hannibal sojourns at luxurious Capua—an episode which invites comparison to Aeneas' stay at Carthage (*Aen.* 1-4) and Caesar's at Alexandria (BC 10) Each of these episodes symbolise distraction from war, inactivity, and cupidity—all attributes of *mora Pompeiana*.⁶ Upon arriving at Capua, Hannibal is celebrated for his past successes (11.129) which preempts his own Pompeian infatuation with his past *fortuna* and accomplishments (11.212-8). However, Hannibal does not conform to Lucan's paradigm of

⁵ See Section II below.

⁶ The link to Aeneas is reinforced by allusion to the *Aeneid*'s opening lines (*arma Hannibalemque uolunt*, 11.133).

mora Pompeiana completely. Hannibal still displays the appearance of *celeritas* and its associated terror, rage, and cruelty in his attitude towards the Roman loyalist, Decius (11.218-24):

suffuderat ora
sanguis et a toruo surgebant lumine flammae.
tum rictus spumans et anhelis faucibus acta
uersabant penitus dirum suspiria murmur.
sic urbem inuectus, toto comitante senatu
et uulgo ad spectanda ducis simul ora ruente,
effundit cunctam rabiem irarumque procellas.

Blood suffused Hannibal's face, and flames rose in his fierce eyes. Then he grimaced and foamed at the mouth. Gasping from deep within his panting throat, he gave forth a dire roar. The whole Senate accompanied him as he proceeded through the city. The crowd rushed to see the leader's face as he poured out all his rage and storms of anger.

The diction in this section evokes imagery of a climactic battle fuelled by *furor* (*suffuderat... sanguis, surgebant lumine flammae, spumans et anhelis faucibus*). The crowd rushes around him as he pours out this anger—but this imagery does not find itself in any sort of battle; instead it is just ineffectual anger directed at one man. Later, Hannibal is even likened to thunder (*tonat*, 11.233) which evokes Caesar's thunderbolt simile. The initial placement of *tonat*, compared to the final placement of *dictis* (11.234) bolsters this atmosphere of irony—Hannibal is attacking Decius with words, not with military might. This portrayal of ineffectuality differs from Pompey's ineffectual leadership in *BC* because Hannibal's leadership is fuelled by anger. This ineffectuality is also seen when he is likened to a bull (16.4-10), who rushes alone in the woods—causing terror, but not actual destruction.

Hannibal is shown for the first time in the *Punica* to relax at a banquet with a relaxed breast and peaceful expression (*sedato pectore... serenos*, 11.259-60). Much like Caesar at the banquet in Alexandria, Hannibal asks questions long into the evening and marvels at the Capuans' riches (11.267-85). The narrator is aware that this indulgence is uncharacteristic of Hannibal (*ignotam*, 11.281-2). Hannibal's loss of vigour and *fortuna*'s favour is epitomised when Venus sends her Cupids to Capua (11.420-26):

ipse etiam, adflatus fallente Cupidine, ductor
instaurat mensas dapibus repetitque uolentum
hospitia et patrias paulatim decolor artis
exuit, occulta mentem uitiantem sagitta.
altera iam patria atque aequo sub honore uocatur

altera Carthago Capua, intactumque secundae
fortunae ingenium uitia adlectantia quassant.

Tricky Cupid even breathed on the commander Hannibal himself. He renewed the banquet tables once more with feasting and sought the willing Capuans' hospitality again. Hannibal degenerated little by little. He put off his father's arts of war as Cupid's hidden arrow poisoned his mind. Already he was calling Capua a second homeland and a second Carthage held in equal honor. Alluring vices shook his mind which had remained thus far untouched by favoring Fortune.

The Capuans' luxury is unchecked as the banqueting continues to the next day, which causes Hannibal to lose vigour (*paulatim... exuit*). Tipping argues that this victimises and invites sympathy for Hannibal because he is at the mercy of Venus just like Dido in *Aen.* 2.⁷ Instead, I suggest that this reinforces the passivity of Hannibal after Cannae; he no longer avoids sleep or indoor refuge as before, but has placed himself in a situation of vulnerability because of his *mora*. The juxtaposition of *Carthago Capua* likens the two cities in terms of their luxury and wealth. Thus *fortuna* has shifted away from favouring Hannibal at Capua, and he seems to have repeated the mistake of Lucan's Caesar by sojourning at a luxurious city.

The effect of Hannibal's winter stay at Capua is clear: he does not have the same physical energy⁸ for *celeritas* as before (12.15-6). The narrator is explicit as to the causes of this: luxury, laziness, and sleep (12.18-20). The Carthaginians' weapons have become heavy, and lack their characteristic 'hissing' sound (*stridoribus*, 12.22-6) which recalls the hissing of a swift chariot.⁹ Hannibal attempts to resume his military action by taking Naples, but fails (12.39-50):

tota mole uias frustraue inglorius ausi
pulsauit quatiens obstructas ariete portas.
stabat Cannarum Graia ad munimina uictor
nequiquam et caetae mentis consulta probabat
euentu, qui post Dauni stagnantia regna
sanguine Tarpeias ire abstinuisset ad arces.
'en, qui nos segnes et nescire addere cursum
factis iactastis, quod uobis scandere nuper
non acie ex ipsa concessum moenia Romae,
intrate atque epulas promissas sede Tonantis
his, quae Graia manus defendit, reddite tectis.'
taliam iactabat famaepudore futurae,

He failed hugely in his daring attack and his attempt to assault

⁷ Tipping 2010: 62.

⁸ *OLD* *vigor* 1a.

⁹ c.f. 1.436.

the barred gates with a battering ram. The victor of Cannae stood before the Greek fortifications, accomplishing nothing. And the outcome justified his cautious deliberation to stop from going against Rome's Tarpeian citadel after he covered Daunus' fields with pools of blood.

"Look!" Hannibal said. "You, soldiers, talked about me as someone who is slow-moving and does not know how to increase his efforts after victory, because I did not allow to you to climb Rome's walls just now straight after the battle at Cannae. Enter this city, which a group of Greeks defends, and make in this place the banquet you promised on Jupiter the Thunderer's seat." He tossed these words at them.

Hannibal was worried about his future reputation.

His attack is ineffective and to no avail (*frustra*). The juxtaposition of *Cannarum Graia* encapsulates Hannibal's descent from active *celeritas* at Cannae into to passive *mora* at Naples, emphasised by the final placement of *nequiquam*. The adjective *cautae* recalls Mago's earlier accusation, but here the narrator attributes this typically Fabian and Catonian adjective to Hannibal. This purports to align Hannibal with Fabius' *cunctatio* which would present Hannibal in a heroic light, but I suggest that this comment is focalised through Hannibal, who is about to speak. Instead, the reference to his failure at Naples as justification for his decision not to march on Rome presents a Hannibal who is looking for excuses rather than taking effective action. Just like Pompey before Pharsalus, Hannibal notes that his soldiers call him slow (*segnes*) and incapable of speeding up (*nescire addere cursum*), and by the end of his speech he worries about his reputation (*fama*). Combined with his inability to incite his troops for battle, this distinctly recalls Pompey's obsession over his past and concern with his own popularity. As though 'double-checking' his adverse *fortuna*, he turns to the neighbouring port to challenge this *fortuna* (*laccessere... fortunam*, 12.61-2). But this, as with his remaining battles in the *Punica*, are but vain attempts at restoring his successful *fortuna* at Cannae (*reuocate in pectora Cannas*, 12.82). Afterwards, falling back into the sort of *mora* which led to his ineffectiveness, Hannibal becomes ashamed of this inaction (*inertis... stare pudebat*, 12.104-5).¹⁰ This presents his as more self-aware than Pompey, who does not realise that *fortuna* does not favour him until late in *BC*. This is confirmed by the counterfactual at 12.150-1, showing his desire to resume war against the gods. Nonetheless, Hannibal descends into *mora* again as he beholds Campanian sights (*miratur*, 12.157) just as Aeneas, idle at Carthage in book 2, tours Carthaginian sights.

¹⁰ I disagree with van de Keur 2024: 31 that Hannibal is unaware of these changes, but I do not think this changes the conclusion that Hannibal is portrayed with a tragic quality.

Thus, after *fortuna*'s change just after Cannae, Hannibal is increasingly characterised by *mora Pompeiana*. However, his self-consciousness and anguish at this change in *fortuna* and pace distinguish him from Pompey's ignorance—thereby portraying Hannibal's *mora* as tragically helpless. This *mora* will finally enable the Romans to use *celeritas* successfully.

II. ROMAN *CELERITAS*: VICTORIOUS SPEED

Whereas *celeritas* led to numerous Roman defeats in books 1-10, in the remainder of the *Punica* it becomes a successful policy for the Romans as exemplified by Fulvius, Marcellus, and Claudius Nero. As such, books 11-17 become a sort of repetition, although replayed differently.¹¹ The narrator no longer explicitly criticises Roman *celeritas*, demonstrating a change in attitude towards *celeritas* after Cannae. I suggest that *fortuna*'s aforementioned abandonment of Hannibal, which leads to his inactivity and idleness, accounts for this different approach to *celeritas*. In this way, Silius' newly positive portrayal of *celeritas* begins to deviate from Lucan's negative, self-destructive, and monstrous *celeritas Caesariana*. However, the tendency of *celeritas* to rely on these singular heroic (synecdochic) individuals foreshadows Rome's imperial future—but the narrator is ambivalent as to whether this is beneficial for Rome. Thus, this section examines how *celeritas* is initially used defensively by Marcellus at Nola and Fulvius at Rome, but becomes a key offensive weapon for Fulvius at Capua, Marcellus in Sicily, and Claudius Nero at Metaurus. This *celeritas* prefigures Scipio Africanus, discussed in the next section.

Rome's first use of *celeritas* since Cannae comes when Hannibal, frustrated with his changed *fortuna* and trying to regain his lost *celeritas*, attacks Nola. But the reader is first introduced to Marcellus' pace when he interrupts Fabius' speech in reply to the Capuan envoys (11.97-108). Marcellus is *impatiens* (12.98), possesses thunderous anger (*fulminea... ab ira*, 12.99), and accuses Fabius of sluggish endurance (*lenta... patientia*, 12.100) for listening to the Capuans' demands. This attitude is characteristic of earlier Roman *celeritas*, implying that under this leadership Rome is still on a trajectory for complete destruction. The critique of *patientia* may also be understood as a critique of Lucan's Cato, who teaches the reader how to endure *celeritas* but could not overcome it.¹² Silius seems to suggest that, at least from Marcellus' point of view, *patientia* is an insufficient response to *celeritas*—instead,

¹¹ van de Keur 2024: 31.

¹² See Chapter 1, Section III.

cunctatio should be used when *fortuna* is lacking, and *celeritas* with *fortuna*'s favour. But Marcellus' arrival with aid at Nola in book 12 marks a new beginning for Rome, achieved through his exhortation *capite arma, uiri* (12.129). His list of commands in the imperative (12.172-8) exemplify his speed and active leadership. At this sight, Hannibal loses faith in his army, recalling Pompey's lack of hope before Pharsalus. Unlike former Roman leaders, Marcellus is aware that *fortuna* favours the Romans and that *celeritas* must be used to capitalise on this opportunity (*perge, age, fer gressus! dexter deus horaque nostra est*, 12.193). He is correct, as Juno prevents Hannibal from rushing to what would be his death in single combat with Marcellus (12.201-3). Marcellus' *celeritas* is so destructively successful that by throwing his spear, he nearly kills Hannibal (12.259-64). Faced with a near-death experience, Hannibal orders his army to flee (12.264-5). This newfound danger can be understood as a result of Hannibal's *mora* at Capua, which closely resembles the danger which Caesar encounters while besieged at Alexandria.¹³ However, Hannibal's choice to retreat rather than fight on contrasts to Caesar's ability to regain his *celeritas*. Marcellus' triumphal success is recognised by the Romans (12.273-80), in comparison to Hannibal who outwardly blames his men for being defeated by Capua's riches (12.286-8). Hannibal compares this loss to his victory at Trebia against Publius (12.285), inviting the reader to compare them: it seems that all that has changed is *fortuna*'s favour and Hannibal's descent into *mora*. The Roman policy is still *celeritas*.

This victory at Nola re-establishes Rome's confidence in its policy of *celeritas*. Instead of a Rome divided by pace policy—as with Varro and Paulus at Cannae—the republic acts together using its whole body and all its limbs (12.318) to rush into war (*ruit belloque ministrant*, 12.310). This image of the republic working collaboratively and deliberately to quickly prepare for war suggests that *celeritas* is only an effective policy with total harmony of body, or otherwise—in the case of Marcellus—with one guiding leader acting as its head. The narrative is now progressing so quickly that book 12 has so far covered conflicts at Capua, Naples, Cumae, Puetoli, Nola, Sardinia, and Tarentum. This contrasts to the slow progression from Ticinus to Trebia to Trasimene all over the course of two books (4-5). Now, Hannibal turns back to Capua but finds that it is already besieged by Roman forces (12.449-62) and that the consuls Fabius the Younger and Claudius Nero have rushed to Capua to face Hannibal (12.479-95). In response, Hannibal marches on Rome displaying attributes of his former *celeritas* (*Instincti glomerant gressus*, 12.518; *Poenus... tempus*, 12.558-61)—

¹³ See Chapter 1, Section III.

evoking a sense of fear in the reader and at Rome, as though it was unclear who *fortuna* favours (*quidnam Fortuna minetur*, 12.541-57). Through the counterfactual *ni... relicta* (12.570-1), the narrator creates the appearance that Hannibal will be successful, if not for Fulvius' swift return to Rome (*magno turbine*, 12.570). Fulvius carries *fortuna*'s favour with him (12.600), evident in the fact that Jupiter conjures great storms to ward off Hannibal (12.605-63). Hannibal even tries to forestall this *fortuna* with *cunctatio* (*cunctantem et uana*, 12.662), but this desperate attempt is unsuccessful. Ultimately, Hannibal retreats to the Tutia River because of Juno's interference (12.701-28), which is labelled as slow (*segne*, 13.1) in the first word of the next book.¹⁴ This enables Fulvius to continue with his swift leadership by taking Capua.

The Romans continue with *celeritas* after defending Rome, led by Fulvius and Marcellus. Hannibal's influence and dominance in the *Punica* now subsides as Rome's *celeritas*—backed by *fortuna*—overshadows Hannibal's ineffectuality.¹⁵ At Capua, Fulvius follows his words with action (13.104) and the narrator's polysyndetic list (*nunc... nunc... hic... hic*, 13.104-10) encapsulates his speed. Fulvius need not exhort his men to pursue *celeritas* as they are self-motivated (13.186-90). The Romans successfully take Capua, and from here the narrative shifts to Marcellus' external campaign in Sicily.¹⁶

The narrator's invocation of the Muses at the beginning of book 14 marks another new beginning in the *Punica* as the war shifts outside Italy (14.1-10). This marks a new beginning for Roman *celeritas* in the narrative too: *celeritas* becomes a markedly positive trait, through the portrayals of Marcellus, Claudius Nero, and Scipio. These figures use *celeritas* against a foreign enemy, which through the lens of this thesis can be understood as a critique of Lucan's Caesar, who uses speed against fellow Romans. Marcellus' *celeritas* is exemplified as the battle begins (14.119-30):

incumbit bello ac totam per proxima raptim
 armorum effundit flammato pectore pestem.
 non aliter Boreas, Rhodopes a uertice praeceps
 cum sese immisit decimoque uolumine pontum
 expulit in terras, sequitur cum murmure molem
 eiectionis maris et stridentibus adfremet alis.
 prima Leontinos uastarunt proelia campos,
 regnatam diro quondam Laestrygone terram.
 instabat ductor, cui tarde uincere Graias

¹⁴ The pun on Tutia and *tutus* meaning 'safe' signifies Hannibal's cowardice.

¹⁵ Thus Hannibal dominates the first twelve books of the *Punica*, his "anti-Aeneid" (van de Keur 2024: 31).

¹⁶ For the intervening episode of Scipio in the Underworld, see Section III below.

par erat ac uinci turmas. ruit aequore toto
(femineum credas maribus concurrere uulgum)
et Cereri placitos fecundat sanguine campos.

With an enflamed heart, Marcellus turned his attention to fighting and quickly spread in all surrounding areas the war's pestilence. Likewise, the north wind, when it flies down headlong from Mount Rhodope's top and with the tenth wave pushes the sea on land, it pursues with a crash the massive waters spewed out from the ocean and rages with hissing wings.

The first battle devastated the fields of Leontini, a city once inhabited by the savage Laestrygonians. The Roman general Marcellus pressed on, since he thought that to delay conquering the Greek troops was the same as defeat. He rushed through the battlefield (you would think men were fighting women) and made the plains that Ceres loved rich with blood.

Marcellus' destructive speed is evident in the adverb *raptim* and the simile *non aliter... alis*, likening him to Boreas (the North Wind). The reference to the 'tenth wave' emphasises the mass destruction of Marcellus.¹⁷ But the adjective *praeceps* gives Marcellus a Caesarian element, which also resembles earlier leaders like Flaminius and Varro. His speed is further conveyed by the shrieking wings of the wave (*stridentibus... alis*), the participle *stridentibus* recalling the sound of Varro's swift chariot.¹⁸ His speed is so hyperbolic in contrast to his enemy that it is as if men were rushing against women (*femineum... uulgum*). Further, his impatience at slowness (*tarde... turmas*) echoes that of Lucan's Caesar, and thus Hannibal, Flaminius, and Varro. However, Marcellus is presented differently from these negatively portrayed figures: before attacking Syracuse, he is shown to wage war unwillingly and to have avoided taking up arms for a long time (*ad bella... sibi*, 14.295-7). Combined with his earlier awareness that *fortuna* favours him,¹⁹ Marcellus is shown to possess Fabius' skill at spotting opportunities and not rashly engaging in battle. That is not to suggest that elements of Lucan's *celeritas Caesariana* and of the earlier examples of self-destructive *celeritas* (including Hannibal) cannot simultaneously exist in Marcellus: they do, but his *exemplum* offers a more tactical, controlled alternative.²⁰ Hannibal's former determination to proceed despite injury manifests in Marcellus' ability to overcome plague to defeat Syracuse (14.580-639); but his decision not to plunder the city and gloat in his own glory (14.641-64) distinguishes the two uses of *celeritas*. Silius extends this mercy and lack of greediness into a praise of Domitian at 14.684-8, further solidifying Marcellus' *celeritas* as a positive attribute.

¹⁷ For 'the tenth wave' as the most destructive, see Matthews 2004: 200.

¹⁸ c.f. 8.279-3.

¹⁹ c.f. 12.193.

²⁰ In this way, he is a 'proto-Scipio': see Section III below.

However, Marks has noted that the narrator's delay by using digressions in book 14 suggests the narrator does not see Marcellus' *celeritas* as purely positive.²¹ Finally, Marcellus' awareness of the danger of his own power (14.670-3) and his willingness to share power with Crispinus before he dies (15.347-51) further aligns him with Fabius' same republican qualities. Thus, Marcellus marks a distinct separation from the former *exempla* of *celeritas* in the *Punica*, albeit with some of the same destructive qualities.

Continuing the focus on Rome's swift victories and Hannibal's suppressed role in the narrative, the narrator shifts to Claudius Nero's hyperbolic *celeritas* at the River Metaurus. His opposition is Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal, whose passivity in fleeing from Scipio in Spain (15.471-92) characterises him in terms of *mora*.²² This is in contrast to Claudius Nero who is urged by personified Italy to swiftly pursue Hasdrubal at Metaurus (*surge, age, fer gressus*, 15.552-9). Again, the reader is introduced to an *exemplum* of Roman *celeritas* (15.569-76):

et penna et fulmine et undis
hibernis et Achaemenio uelocior arcu
euolat. hortator sibi quisque: 'Age, perge, salutem
Ausoniae ancipites superi et, stet Roma cadatne,
in pedibus posuere tuis,' clamantque ruuntque.
hortandi genus acer habet praecedere ductor:
illum augent cursus adnisi aequare sequendo
atque indefessi noctemque diemque feruntur.

Nero flew by these territories faster than wings and thunderbolts and winter floods and Parthian arrows. Each man urged himself on: "Come, proceed, the uncertain gods have placed upon your feet Italy's safety and whether Rome should stand or fall." They shouted and rushed on. The general was eager to lead in front of the army, a sort of exhortation. In an effort to catch up with his pace, the soldiers accelerated their march and without any exhaustion they advanced day and night.

Claudius Nero's intense speed is demonstrated by the comparative adjective *uelocior* and the polysyndeton *et penna et fulmine et undis*. His swiftness is hyperbolic and seems more destructive and quick than a thunderbolt (*fulmine*). This is reinforced by the imperatives *age* and *perge* which immediately result in the exhortation of his troops who now rush and accelerate their march (*ruuntque, noctemque diemque feruntur*). Claudius Nero leads the army as the first man (*praecedere*), setting the example for his soldiers to match (*augent*

²¹ Marks 2017: 462.

²² For Hasdrubal as a 'double' for Hannibal in book 15, see Marks 2010: 146.

cursus). He joins forces with the other consul, Livius Salinator (15.577-600)—which Hasdrubal notices, leading to his decision to attempt to delay the battle (*cunctandi restare dolum Martemque trahendi*, 15.610). However, Hasdrubal loses his way in the darkness and retraces his steps, showing an ineffectiveness in delaying (15.612-25). Combined with his speed in fleeing (*nec... fugae segni*, 15.611), this consolidates the Pompeian characterisation of Hasdrubal, especially in terms of the ineffectiveness and passivity of Pompey's *mora*. In response, the Romans rush like a torrent, a storm, a thunderbolt, and the winds (15.711-14). Livius too is portrayed as swift on his horse (15.724-6). In this way, the battle at Metaurus is a sort of microcosm for the conflict between Lucan's Caesar and Pompey. It also foreshadows the conflict between Hannibal, now characterised by *mora*, and swift Scipio.²³ The former connection is consolidated by Claudius Nero's beheading of Hasdrubal at 15.805-8—suggesting that Silius condemns Pompey's use of *mora* in the civil war as an ineffective weapon destined for defeat. Moments before he beheads Hasdrubal, Claudius Nero is described as rushing crazily (*ruit ocius amens*, 15.782), aligning his pace to that of Flaminius and Varro. The same sort of wisdom that is present in Marcellus does not manifest in Claudius Nero,²⁴ implying that *celeritas* ought to be used by the 'right' leader like Marcellus or even Fabius: not a rash and 'crazy' leader like Flaminius, Varro, or Claudius Nero.

Thus, Rome's use of *celeritas* after Cannae is successful in warding off Hannibal from Rome and leads to a quick succession of aggressive victories. Whilst Marcellus exhibits a more restrained form of *celeritas* than others, elements of the self-destructiveness and lust for combat which was present in the earlier Roman leaders still persists. If *fortuna* had not changed to favour the Romans after Cannae, Silius seems to suggest that Rome would not be so successful because of their continued *celeritas*.

III. SCIPIO AFRICANUS

Understanding Silius' Scipio Africanus is central to understanding the approach to pace, especially *celeritas*, in the *Punica*. Over the course of the *Punica*, Scipio evolves from the rash and self-destructive *exemplum* of *celeritas* embodied in Flaminius and Varro into a more restrained form of *celeritas* informed by Fabius' caution, awareness of *fortuna*, and *pietas*.²⁵ In this way, Scipio refines and magnifies Marcellus' *celeritas*. However, Silius questions the

²³ See Section III below.

²⁴ Ahl, Davis, and Pomeroy 1986: 2541 suggest this extends to the absence of Marcellus' generosity, too.

²⁵ For Scipio as representing the evolution of Rome in the Second Punic War, see Marks 2010: 141.

proximity of Scipio's *celeritas* to the earlier *celeritas* of Hannibal and his Roman predecessors, and even to Lucan's *celeritas Caesariana*. This section begins by identifying Scipio's youthful temerity at Ticinus and Cannae; before exploring his education on the tension between policies of *celeritas*, *mora*, and *cunctatio* during his *Nekyia* in book 13 and his quasi-psychomachic encounter with Voluptas and Virtus in book 15.²⁶ Finally, the clash of Scipio's *celeritas* with Hannibal's (partly recovered) *celeritas* at Zama is examined in terms of the changed *fortuna* since Cannae, suggesting that Scipio's *celeritas* is perhaps closer to Hannibal's than the reader would like—questioning whether it ought to be emulated.

The reader first meets a young Scipio at Ticinus. His ultimate victory over Hannibal is foreshadowed by the battle's augury, wherein a swift eagle wards off a violent hawk which has killed fifteen frightened doves before touching Scipio's helmet (4.105-19). Both seers align Hannibal with the hawk and the Romans with the doves, Venus' favourite birds.²⁷ I suggest that the fifteen doves represent the fifteen years (counting inclusively) between Ticinus (218 BCE) and Scipio's arrival in North Africa (204 BCE), emphasising Scipio's role as Rome's salvation—but that there will be significant losses. Scipio is shown to be so fast by nature that he is fighting as a premature boy (*puer*, 4.426), who seeks to transcend the boundaries of his youth (4.426-7).²⁸ He has Jupiter's divine protection, who orders Mars to teach him how to dare, but also how to save his father (4.429-8). This shows Scipio's preservative motivations, which align him with Fabius' *cunctatio* rather than the destructive motivations of Roman (and Hannibalic) *celeritas*. Scipio's *choice* of self-destruction (suicide) contrasts to the ignorant rush of Flaminius' self-destruction.²⁹ Further, Scipio's immense *celeritas* is captured by the phrase *Gradium passibus aequat* (4.460), presenting him as Hannibal's equal in speed.³⁰ In the catalogue of Roman forces at Cannae, Scipio is again shown to be swift (8.551-61) and possessing a 'pleasant awe' (*gratus... horror*, 8.561)—suggesting that this 'controlled power', which I suggest extends to his controlled speed, likens him to Augustus for whom *festina lente* ('make haste slowly') was a motto.³¹ During Cannae, Scipio selflessly turns Varro's imminent danger upon himself (*excepta*³² *in sese*, 9.429) by rushing swiftly and bringing safety (*rapido... salute*, 9.428). This preservative use

²⁶ For the 'education' of Scipio, see Marks 2005a: 113-61; van de Keur 2024: 31-2, 133-61.

²⁷ Ahl, Davis, and Pomeroy 1986: 2544.

²⁸ For Scipio as *puer* see Marks 2005a: 38.

²⁹ Marks 2010: 141-2.

³⁰ For the name 'Gradius' as denoting speed and the connection to Hannibal, see page ____.

³¹ For *gratus... horror* and Augustus see Tipping 2010: 164. For Augustus and *festina lente*, see Tipping 2010: 134.

³² I agree with the choice of Augoustakis and Bernstein 2021: n. 14 to prefer Shackleton-Bailey's emendation *excepta in sese* for Delz's *incepta in sese*.

of *celeritas* recalls Fabius' rescue of the rash Minucius. Briefly, at Capua, Scipio rushes with 'impetuous daring' (*ruit... insatiabilis agmen*, 13.216-7), reminding the reader of his similarity to Varro.³³ Thus, before he takes on a main narrative role, Scipio is presented as young and rash in his *celeritas*, but often able to use it to preserve rather than destroy.

The didactic purpose of Scipio's *Nekyia* is well-established,³⁴ and I argue that this extends to education on pace—especially through the ghosts of his mother, Pomponia, his (mortal) father, Publius, and of Alexander the Great. Marks asserts that Pomponia encourages Scipio to be swift,³⁵ but I argue here that it is not so much an exhortation to *celeritas*, but rather a warning against *mora*. As an *exemplum* of the passivity of *mora* because she was raped by Jupiter while asleep (e.g. *requiem somnos, languentia lumina somnus*, 13.638-41), Pomponia warns Scipio not to follow her example. The application to Scipio is consolidated by Jupiter's appearance to Pomponia as a snake which recalls Hannibal's likening to a snake.³⁶ Thus, her advice is not so much 'be swift' but 'do not hesitate' (*nec... dubites*, 13.635); do not be idle while the snake, Hannibal, still lives. If Pomponia is an *exemplum* of the dangers of *mora*, then Publius' ghost is an *exemplum* of the dangers of *celeritas* and the need for elements of Fabius' *cunctatio*. Publius is terrified at the thought of Scipio repeating his own mistake of rash self-destruction (13.667-70) and urges Scipio to moderate his *celeritas* (*Martis moderare furori*, 13.670). Publius did not do this at Trebia (*adde modum dextrae*, 4.666)—Publius urges Scipio not to make this same mistake. Thus Publius' advice recalls Fabius' policy of *cunctatio*, particularly its cautiousness. Scipio's rash *celeritas* up to this point is strengthened by his resemblance in this interaction to Achilles being warned by his father, Peleus, to tame his hasty anger.³⁷ Whilst Publius and his brother depart from Scipio happily (13.703-4)—which Marks has argued suggests that 'Scipio's Achillean side symbolically departs with them'³⁸—this is somewhat undermined by the appearance of Alexander's comments.

Alexander explicitly shuns caution and slowness, instead urging active daring (*turpis... audendo... pigra*, 13.772-4). The story of Scipio's birth already resembles Alexander's birth, aligning the two 'heroes', a connection which is consolidated by Scipio's complaint that Homer cannot sing of Roman deeds as he did of Achilles' deeds (13.785-91).³⁹

³³ Marks 2005a: 133 n. 51.

³⁴ Marks 2005a: 113-65, especially 140 n. 73.

³⁵ Marks 2005a: 139-40.

³⁶ e.g. 12.6-14, 55-9.

³⁷ *Il.* 9.252-60. For this connection, see Marks 2005a: 141-2.

³⁸ Marks 2005a: 142.

³⁹ Marks 2005a: 142-6.

This is modelled on Alexander's visit to the tomb of Achilles at Sigeum.⁴⁰ While Marks suggests that this connection to the tyrant, Alexander, need not carry negative connotations even when read in light of Lucan's critiques (*BC* 10.26-7),⁴¹ I suggest that when read through the lens of the morality of *celeritas*, Scipio's connection to Alexander relates him to the negative *celeritas Caesariana*, and thus to Hannibal's portrayal in the *Punica*.⁴² Further, the echoes of Achilles in Alexander's *celeritas* also recalls the Achillean qualities of the tyrant Hieronymus (14.93-5) and the pro-Carthaginian Philip V of Macedon (15.291-2),⁴³ thereby marking the *celeritas* of Alexander and Caesar as dangerous *exempla* which must not be followed. Thus, in his *Nekyia*, Scipio is confronted by embodiments of *mora*, *cunctatio*, and *celeritas*; and his captivation by *celeritas* portrays him as dangerously close to tyrants.

Scipio's choice of which pace to follow is further narrowed to a choice between inactivity and activity in the quasi-psychomachic encounter between personified Voluptas and Virtus.⁴⁴ I suggest that many of Voluptas' attributes are shared with the notion of *mora*, especially with the *mora* of Hannibal at Capua, such as: her focus on luxury and riches (15.23-5), her emphasis on peace without war (15.32-45), and her focus on senescence and comfort (15.53-4).⁴⁵ By contrast, Virtus shares attributes of *celeritas* like the (selfish) pursuit of *gloria* above the health of the republic (15.78-88), vigilance at night (15.109-10), and total destruction of the enemy (15.119-20). Further, Voluptas notes her effect of delaying Scipio (*demoror*, 15.124) before warning him that Rome will inevitably yield to her. Scipio chooses to follow Virtus, thereby choosing to avoid the *mora* which contributed to Hannibal's decline at Capua. This extends to a rejection of the sort of ineffectuality of *mora Pompeiana*. Marks notes the parallels between Scipio and Hercules in this episode, suggesting that while Achilles was a suitable model for the young and rash Scipio, and Alexander a model for maturation, Hercules 'combines and adds to the virtues of both while eschewing their vices'.⁴⁶ However, since Hercules is also at times a model for Silius' Hannibal,⁴⁷ I more cautiously suggest that whilst Scipio is a combination of speed and delay, seeds of destructiveness, selfishness, and tyranny still linger. Whilst these seeds are perhaps dormant

⁴⁰ See Marks 2005a: 145, especially 145 n. 84; Tipping 2010: 172-4.

⁴¹ Marks 2005: 146-7.

⁴² c.f. *BC* 10.268-75.

⁴³ Tipping 2010: 174.

⁴⁴ For a full discussion of this episode, see Marks 2005a: 148-61. For Voluptas as embodying 'idleness', see Marks 2010: 142.

⁴⁵ For Hannibal's *mora* and its connection to Capua, see Section I above.

⁴⁶ Marks 2005a: 161.

⁴⁷ Marks 2005a: 160, especially 160 n. 136.

in the *Punica*, their presence reminds the reader that Scipio's *celeritas* paves the way for despotic figures like Lucan's Caesar.⁴⁸

Now that Scipio has undergone 'education' in pace, the attributes of this informed version of *celeritas* become clear: to rush destructively against the enemy using self-restraint, caution, and the backing of *fortuna*. The arrival of this matured *celeritas* corresponds with an omen of Jupiter's cosmic thunderbolts (15.137-48), demonstrating his power of destruction, divine heritage, and speed. But Scipio's closeness to a thunderbolt cannot be read without reference to Lucan's Caesar or Silius' Hannibal, both of whom are shown to thunder or be likened to a thunderbolt.⁴⁹ However, the fact that the Romans choose Scipio as leader (15.146-7), rather than Scipio usurping power like Lucan's Caesar, indicates that Scipio will not be a tyrant. The fact that Scipio chooses *celeritas* is evident in his request that Neptune offer him speed for his fleet (15.157-62). This speed is checked by Fabian self-restraint, as urged by Publius while telling Scipio to invade New Carthage with cautious bravery (*cauta virtute*, 15.186). This is reinforced by Publius' warning to stay away from hesitation and not be slow (*absiste... ancipita... nec segnis*, 15.190-1). However, Scipio's desire to rule while wearing 'Carthaginian purple' robes (15.205), suggests he is may partly be motivated by self-aggrandisement. But the narrator is ambivalent as to Scipio's republican versus proto-imperial role with the following simile (15.208-13):

Praegreditur celeratque uias et corripit agmen
pernici rapidum cursu camposque fatigat.
sic, ubi prosiluit Pisaeo carcere praeceps,
non solum ante alios, sed enim, mirabile dictu,
ante suos it uictor equus, currumque per auras
haud ulli durant uisus aequare uolantem.

He went out first and accelerated his course, carrying his quick troops at high speed and wearying the fields in their passing. Likewise, when a horse jumps forth headlong from its starting-place at Pisa, it marches victorious not only before other horses, but also, an astonishing thing to say, before the horses in its own chariot. Hardly anyone can follow the flying chariot's course with their eyes.

Scipio is likened not to a charioteer, but one if its horses (*sic... equus*). He travels at such headlong speed (*praeceps*) that he beats the other chariots, but almost paradoxically he is in front of the horses in his own chariot (*non solum... equus*). This paradox can be explained as

⁴⁸ Whilst Marks 2005a: 257-65 suggests that Silius has not formally begun its decline, I suggest that there are certainly elements of its future destruction.

⁴⁹ See Chapter I, Section I and Chapter 2, Section I.

a metaphor for Scipio leading the republic: he is still equal to and requires the support of his citizens ‘as horses in the same chariot’, but sets an example for them by leading in front with his speed.⁵⁰ Notably, he does not break away from the chariot and his fellow horses, but restrains himself. However, the (Caesarian) adjective *praeceps* indicates the potentiality for self-destruction and loss of restraint—suggesting that there is little preventing Scipio from indulging in this tyranny if he so chooses. This simile demands comparison with Varro’s simile as an inexperienced (*indocilis*) charioteer at Cannae.⁵¹ While both similes exhibit an intolerance of delay and a love of speed, Scipio’s simile presents him as restrained, experienced, and successful (*uictor*) compared to Varro as rash, self-destructive, and inexperienced—conveying ‘how swiftness as a leadership quality is marked earlier and later in the epic generally’.⁵² Scipio captures New Carthage in only one day or fifty lines (15.251-2), and is praised for his restraint in conquering (15.274-5). Later, he hastily puts Hasdrubal to flight (*age... ire... rue*, 15.444-6). Thus, in his invasion of New Carthage, Scipio employs *celeritas*—but not the same sort of *celeritas* as his Roman predecessors. Instead, his *celeritas* is characterised by restraint, caution, and controlled destruction.

Meanwhile, Hannibal is slowly regaining his former *celeritas* at Bruttium, but is again forced into *mora* (*ac stare negata / cogebatur ope et senio torpescere rerum*, 16.13-4). He is likened to a *sacrum caput* (16.17) kept safe by his name only, echoing the ineffectuality of Lucan’s Pompey.⁵³ This contrasts to Scipio’s overwhelming *celeritas*, which is nourished by *fortuna* (*nutribat Fortuna*, 16.29).⁵⁴ Scipio confronts Hanno, who is also quick and strong in battle, but the counterfactual at 16.33 shows his inferiority to Scipio’s *celeritas*. This reinforces the motif that *celeritas* is only a successful strategy with *fortuna*’s favour. In fact, Scipio is shown to rejoice at the enemy rushing swiftly at him (*laetus... cursu*, 16.81-2), echoing Hannibal’s similar enjoyment of destruction. Despite showing the propensity to be as powerful as Hannibal or even Caesar, Scipio’s refusal of kingship in Spain at 16.275-301 exemplifies his self-restraint. He even educates the Spaniards on the Roman custom of ‘refusing to endure kingship’ (16.283-4). This could be viewed as a critique of Cato’s *patientia* in *BC*—suggesting that active action in the form of either Scipio’s *celeritas* or Fabius’ *cunctatio* is the only suitable response to tyranny. Demonstrating his *pietas*, Scipio

⁵⁰ Thus I differ from Marks 2005a: 43 in his view that Scipio’s horse ‘[does not need] the other horses in his team’.

⁵¹ See Chapter 2, Section IV.

⁵² Marks 2005a: 43.

⁵³ Marks 2010: 147.

⁵⁴ This recalls Hannibal’s same nourishment by others’ *celeritas* in Chapter 2, Section I.

returns to Rome to initiate the funeral games in honour of his father (16.275-591).⁵⁵ Later, he returns to Rome to be elected consul and the senate debates whether Scipio should transfer the war to Africa (16.592-700). Fabius urges extreme restraint, arguing that Italy is now freed from the threat of Hannibal (16.613-4) and that further outreach by the Romans may leave Rome vulnerable to surprise attack (16.618-20). Instead of condemning and discrediting Fabius' advice like Minucius and Varro did earlier, Scipio shows a careful understanding of *cunctatio* in his careful reply: he addresses Fabius as *Cunctator* (16.674), recognising its success (16.672-4), and shows an awareness that it has pushed Hannibal into senescent *mora* (16.687-8). Scipio argues that *fortuna*—in the form of *sors* (16.670)—and the gods have approved of his attack. This argument is successful as it recalls Fabius' earlier advice to Paulus to delay unless *fortuna* favours the Romans.⁵⁶ The senate is particularly swayed by Scipio's appeal that *fortuna* has ordained his conquest (*fatoque uocante*, 16.698), and permit him to go to Africa (16.698-700). Thus, Scipio is the first Roman leader to show full awareness of the rationale and design of Fabius' *cunctatio*, which informs his *celeritas* and separates it from the *celeritas* of other Romans before Cannae.⁵⁷

Just as Hannibal's *celeritas* reached a climax at Cannae, so does Scipio's at Zama. On his way, Scipio burns the camp of perfidious Syphax. In this episode, the deadliness and speed of the fire signifies the absolute power and destruction of Scipio's *celeritas* (*impiger... rapidam... ignes... propellunt... turbine... rapidis*, 17.82-102).⁵⁸ The allusion to the opening lines of the *Aeneid* (*arma uirosque / corripit*, 17.102-3) mark Scipio's African conquest as a new beginning for Rome's history, one which is polluted by the death and destruction of fire. Hannibal reemerges as a central figure in book 17, and the reader is constantly reminded of his likeness to Pompey's *mora*: he is the 'head' of a truncated Carthage (17.149-57), revels in his past successes (17.292-308), and is reluctant to leave Italy (17.211-21).⁵⁹ This clash between Hannibal's *mora* and Scipio's *celeritas* at Zama then recalls the clash of Pompey's *mora* and Caesar's *celeritas* at Pharsalus. Unlike Pompey, Hannibal desperately tries to be effective by trying to sail back to Italy but is stopped by Neptune's storm (17.218-91). In fact, Tipping notes that at Zama (17.432-78), Hannibal becomes an example of 'resilience in adversity', which I suggest likens Hannibal to *patientia Catoniana*. The Battle of Zama

⁵⁵ For discussion of Silius' funeral games in the context of epic, see Lovatt 2010. There is much scope to view the funeral games, especially the footrace and the chariot race, as allegories for pace in the *Punica*—but unfortunately, thorough examination is beyond the scope of this thesis.

⁵⁶ c.f. 8.324-6 .

⁵⁷ This further contrasts to Caesar's lack of design (*temeritas*): see Chapter 1, Section III.

⁵⁸ c.f. 8.324-6 .

⁵⁹ For the likeness of Hannibal to Pompey when leaving Italy, see Ahl, Davis, and Pomeroy 1986: 2516-7.

begins, and Scipio is portrayed with imagery of fire and the images of his father, Publius (*ardenti radiabat... flammam... uomebat*, 17.395-8)—which recast Scipio in terms of Publius' rash *celeritas*. Scipio's closeness to fire is made clearer by the simile at 17.502-8 (*haud secus... Vulcania*), which emphasises fire's speed (*rapidusque... uolucris*, 17.505-6).⁶⁰ By nature, fire lacks the design and self-control which has recently accompanied Scipio's *celeritas*, suggesting that it may not be very dissimilar from that of his predecessors, or even Hannibal or Lucan's Caesar. This hint of a possible lack of control is developed into a dangerous resentment of *cunctatio* when Scipio attempts to confront Hannibal (17.509-12):

Verum ubi cunctari taedet dispersa uirorum
 proelia sectantem et leuiori Marte teneri,
 omnes in causam belli auctoremque malorum
 uertere iam uires tandem placet.

But then Scipio became sick of delaying by pursuing soldiers' dispersed bands and by being slowed down through lighter fighting. And he finally decided to turn all his resources against the war's cause and the author of evils.

The verb *cunctari* is cognate with *cunctatio*, and Scipio's express tiredness of this policy reveals that he may have lost the Fabian self-restraint that he earlier adopted. Thus, his *celeritas* now more closely resembles the rashness of Varro and Flaminius. This is confirmed by the fact that such a swift confrontation would delight Scipio (*iuuat... ferre gradum*, 17.518-9), which recalls the love of death of Varro, Hannibal, and Lucan's Caesar. However, because Hannibal is forced into inactive, passive flight by Juno (17.532-604), Scipio is deprived of this contest. Thus, Scipio's *celeritas* reaches a climax at Zama but in this moment, his *celeritas* loses its restraint and caution—suggesting that Silius views *celeritas* as inextricable from its rashness and capability of self-aggrandisement.

Ultimately, Silius portrays Scipio's restrained *celeritas* in a positive light compared to the rashness and self-destructiveness of the Roman leaders in books 1-10, and more restrained than the Roman leaders in books 11-17. This distinguishes his *celeritas* from other *exempla* of pace in the *Punica*. But Silius is aware that this *celeritas* still contains dangerous potential, of a similar kind that will will make the *celeritas* of Lucan's Caesar so powerful in civil war.

⁶⁰ c.f. Caesar and fire: *BC* 3.399-762; 10.491-505.

IV. CONCLUSION

Thus, reading books 11-17 of the *Punica* through the lens of pace reveals a significant change in the narrator's approach from books 1-10, now that *fortuna* has sided with the Romans. While once Hannibal used *celeritas* effectively and the Romans ineffectively, now Hannibal descends into *mora* at Capua and the Romans become successful. Scipio's pace is a compilation of other characters' *celeritas*, ultimately becoming incredibly powerful but self-restrained. However, elements of the destruction of *celeritas Caesariana* seep into Scipio's portrayal, suggesting that *celeritas* will be a dangerous quality in the hands of a tyrannical leader. Thus, Silius is reluctant to endorse any form of *celeritas* as worthy of emulation, even though it does here lead to victory over Hannibal.

CONCLUSION

Above all, this thesis has been a close reading of pace in Lucan's *De Bello Civili* and Silius Italicus' *Punica*. It has shown that pace is an exemplary trait of characterisation in *BC* with which the *Punica* engages through the creation of its own characters. Further, the underlying use of narrative delay in both texts has revealed the two narrators to be closely invested in the portrayal of pace. Whilst both texts are dominated by similarly swift antagonists, they offer different ways of coping with this *celeritas*. *BC* lacks a successful pace paradigm which can wrestle *fortuna*'s favour from *celeritas Caesariana*: the utter failure of *mora* leaves *patientia* the only response besides total submission to Caesar. The *Punica* problematises *celeritas* significantly because it is used by the protagonists *and* antagonists, suggesting that it can be a positive trait when restrained. Whilst similar in exposing the ineffectuality of *mora*, the *Punica* builds on Lucan's *patientia* to form *cunctatio*, which directly forestalls unfavourable *fortuna* and saves Rome from defeat. Thus, Silius emerges as a close reader of pace in Lucan.

Chapter 1 explored the development of *celeritas Caesariana*, *mora Pompeiana*, and *patientia Catoniana* across *BC*. It showed that *celeritas Caesariana* is innately destructive—especially when emulated by Scaeva and the soldiery at Pharsalus—and is successful because it does not allow time for *fortuna*'s favour to sway. Used in civil war, it destroys the republic and results in many Roman casualties. By contrast, *mora Pompeiana* is idle, passive, and ineffectual, offering almost no actual resistance against *celeritas*. Therefore, it is ineffective in a war where *fortuna* favours the enemy. As an active form of endurance against the inevitable dominion of Caesar after Pharsalus, *patientia Catoniana* offers republicans and the reader an example moral defiance of Caesar's anti-republican principles. Whilst the narrator tries to slow down *celeritas Caesariana* narratologically, it cannot prevent Caesar's success.

Chapter 2 demonstrated that Lucan's pace paradigms are indeed models for each characters' pace in the *Punica*; and that the narrator is equally as invested in delaying the description of Roman disasters. It focussed only on the first ten books of the *Punica*, where *fortuna* mostly favours Hannibal while he inflicts continuous defeats on the Romans. It began by exploring the close similarity of Hannibal's *celeritas* to *celeritas Caesariana*, in effect condemning *celeritas* as a tool of the enemy. However, it was identified that Publius, Sempronius, Flaminius, and Minucius were also characterised in terms of *celeritas*—with special emphasis on its self-destruction without *fortuna*'s favour. The existence of Fabius' *cunctatio* distinguishes the *Punica* from *BC*, since *cunctatio* actively delays the onslaught of

Hannibal's *celeritas* and brings vast success to the Romans. As such, Silius teaches that *cunctatio* is the only effective form of pace against *celeritas* when one lacks *fortuna*'s favour. Finally, I explored how the juxtaposition of Varro as *celeritas* and Paulus as *cunctatio* accounts for the disaster at Cannae, and how this further presents *celeritas* as a vice.

Chapter 3 showed that a distinct change in the narrator's approach to pace occurs in books 11-17 of the *Punica*, and that this is tied to *fortuna*'s abandonment of Hannibal after Cannae and his subsequent sojourn at Capua. First, it established that Hannibal is no longer characterised by *celeritas*—instead, he resembles *mora Pompeiana* as he descends into luxury and idleness at Capua. This was shown to permit Fulvius, Marcellus, and Claudius Nero to use *celeritas* successfully with *fortuna* now favouring Rome. Whilst successful, this *celeritas* nevertheless contained many of the same negative qualities of former Roman leaders, such as its rashness and rapacity. Silius' most complex portrayal of *celeritas* was Scipio Africanus, whose speed evolved from youthful rashness into a distinct paradigm of informed, restrained *celeritas*. However, this restraint was problematised by his fiery attributes at Zama—which can be understood as Silius' awareness that *celeritas* is inherently dangerous.

Ultimately, this thesis has drawn attention to the value of pace as a framework for reading *BC* and the *Punica*. I hope to have shown that such a framework enriches the reader's interpretation of these historical epics, and should be applied to other Latin and Greek texts, especially epic poetry. Pace is inherently moralised as an exemplary trait, and the narrator himself is directly involved through narratological delay.

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