Exploring Re-animalisation as an Approach to Multispecies Justice: Insights and Lessons from a Farmed Animal Sanctuary in Australia

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This thesis contains material previously published in Chang, D. & Corman, L. (2023) Colonialism, Domestication, & Extinction: A Pre-Mortem for Our Ecological Futures. Animal Studies Journal, 12(2), 88-109. This material comprises portions of pp. 46-48 in section 2.4.1 where I discussed the work of Andil Gosine and Sunaura Taylor; p. 77 in section 4.1.1 where I cited the work of Ghassan Hage; and p. 141 of section 7.1 where I cited the work of Sarat Colling. I was the lead author in the published article.

This thesis also contains material previously published in Celermajer, D., & Chang, D. (2024). A Grateful Acknowledgement: Gender Theory and Multispecies Justice. In C. Taylor (Ed.), The Routledge Companion to Gender and Animals (pp. 589–600). Routledge. This material comprises a portion of p. 99 in section 5.2 where I define ecofeminism. I was the co-author in the published chapter.

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Abstract

Multispecies Justice (MSJ) is both a conceptual framework and an emerging interdisciplinary field of research engaging with and responding to exacerbating planetary crises as matters of justice. These crises would include, for example, climate catastrophes, extinction, and biodiversity loss. This thesis contributes to the ongoing investigations of MSJ by exploring re-animalisation as a practicable approach to further the aims of MSJ, and as a theoretical analysis that both enriches and constructively challenges the existing MSJ framework. Re-animalisation contests the dualistic divisions of human-animal and nature-society binaries underpinning the logics of human exceptionalism. Against the human exceptionalist logic that always prioritises human wellbeing and security at the expense and sacrifice of other animals and more-than-humans through various forms of mass violence, re-animlisation serves as an alternative logic that demands a redistribution of risks in ways that would see humans become more vulnerable in relation to more-than-humans by recognising and placing us as one amongst other animal species (Srinivasan 2022). My research draws on lessons and insights from a month-long ethnography at a farmed animal sanctuary in Australia to consider how the norms and relations of the sanctuary contest human exceptionalism and attempt to move humans towards re-animlisation. My study focuses on farmed animal sanctuaries given its relevance to MSJ. Critics of industrial animal agriculture have argued that these industries are harmful to humans, animals, and the environment, and sanctuaries challenge these industrial harms in their efforts to advocate for animals. I have also chosen to study farmed animal sanctuaries as a review of relevant literature demonstrates recent growing interests amongst scholars in examining the promises and limitations of farmed animal sanctuaries in transforming human relations with other animals.

This thesis takes up three main topics in relation to re-animalisation. First, I propose that farmed animal sanctuaries are best understood in relation to the hegemonic conditions under which they are produced as sites of conflict and resistance. Despite their negation of dominant structures that have normalised violence against animals, the liminal conditions within sanctuaries offer productive conflicts and opportunities for re-animalisation to occur. Secondly, I apply the Foucauldian concept of technology alongside anthropologist David Graeber's theory of counterpower to argue that a farmed animal sanctuary could be conceptualised as a technology of counterpower. This analysis treats the sanctuary less as an instrument or tool for social change and more as a place where a set of epistemological structures or knowledge systems govern relations and conducts amongst humans and other animals. Here, I demonstrate how the knowledge systems governing the particular sanctuary of my study demands constant mediations and negotiations on intraspecies and interspecies matters in ways relevant to re-animalisation. Third and lastly, I examine some of the foodways I had observed during my time at the sanctuary through the lens of animal resistance. I draw a number of insights and lessons that contributes to expanding the understanding of re-animalisation through my ethnographic anecdotes on how animals contest human authority in relation to food. Two key contributions from this thesis include an analysis of farmed animal sanctuaries as sites of conflict, and how sustained, productive conflicts between humans and other animals offer insights regarding the process of re-animalisation.

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I would like to thank my supervisors Dinesh Wadiwel and Danielle Celermajer for their always encouraging, engaging, and patient support and guidance throughout my PhD.

My deepest thanks to the founders of the farmed animal sanctuary in Australia who welcomed me into their home and participated in my research. The same goes to the nonhuman animal residents I have had the privilege to encounter during my visit. Learning about and learning from you all was a vital part of this thesis. My words throughout these pages can only fail to portray the complexities and richness of your lives, relations, and politics. I hope that this thesis does a decent enough job to show a glimpse of the challenges and fruitions in your daily efforts to bring about alternative worlds and relations that reflect care and liberation.

Much appreciation and gratitude for my friends and colleagues throughout different networks: fellow PhD students in the Multispecies Justice cohort; staff and scholars at the Sydney Environment Institute; Animals in Philosophy, Politics, Law, and Ethics research group at Queen's University; Australasian Animal Studies Association; North American Association for Critical Animal Studies; European Association for Critical Animal Studies; International Association of Vegan Sociologists; as well as the webs of caring relations weaved together by VINE Sanctuary in Springfield, Vermont.

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I dedicate this thesis to the memory of Sarat Colling (1984-2025), whom I wish I had the chance to know better. I am grateful for her intellectual gifts to this world.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

One of the long-standing questions guiding my intellectual pursuits is whether animals considered by humans to be highly killable and disposable have a place within emancipatory struggles articulated and shaped through human understandings of liberation and justice. And if so, where and how might such animals fit in? Elsewhere, I have contemplated these questions with regards to farmed animals (Chang and Corman 2023). As a category of animals whom humans mass produce, slaughter, and consume as food and other products, farmed animals are arguably amongst the most killable and disposable creatures on our planet. Theorising against the disposability of farmed animals, Lauren Corman and I have posited that farmed animals are in fact "sources of wisdom" and "unique knowers" with important lessons to teach humans about some of the most urgent crises that all humans and more-than-humans are collectively facing (2023, 91). In a general sense, this thesis is ultimately an elaboration on such attempts at drawing lessons and learning from a number of domesticated, rescued animals at a farmed animal sanctuary in Australia, from the humans who have acquired intimate knowledge of these rescued animals through their unwavering labours of care, and from the wild and feral animals surrounding the sanctuary, by actively participating in their lifeways.

However, before getting to any lessons and insights that I have attempted to draw from the sanctuary and its residents by participating in their day-to-day life, I will first define and clarify the connections between the three terms or concepts found in the title of this thesis, and explain how they relate to the task of learning from farmed animals. Namely, the three terms are re-animalisation, multispecies justice, and farmed animal sanctuary. Readers may be unfamiliar with these terms and uncertain as to how I connect them to each other. I will go into more detail and depth with regards to each of the stated terms in Chapter 2 (Literature Review). For now, I will briefly define these three main components in my research and clarify their connections in section 1.1 of this introduction. In the same section, I will also clarify my own position in relation to these terms and how I engage with them, as well as how they figure in the main arguments of this thesis. After defining the terms and stating the main arguments, I provide an overview of the thesis chapters in section 1.2. Before moving on to review relevant literature in Chapter 2, section 1.3 presents an autoethnographic account of how I had arrived at the central focus of this study, thereby providing what I believe to be important contextual information to

help readers make sense of my general outlook and approach to the main topics discussed in this thesis.

Before proceeding further, please note two things. First, there are different and competing definitions and parameters of the three terms, and for the purpose of introducing them, what I present in section 1.1 are general aspects of the terms that I believe to be relatively uncontroversial amongst those who engage with them. Additionally, these terms represent theories and practices that are continuously evolving, and by offering general definitions, I do not presume that I or those who engage with them have already figured out, for instance, what multispecies justice and re-animalisation look like.

Second, readers will notice the various qualifiers that I use interchangeably preceding the words ‘animal’ and ‘animals’ throughout this entire thesis, such as ‘more-than-human’ animals, ‘nonhuman’ animals, and ‘other’ animals. Qualifying ‘animals’ in such ways comes from a style of writing aimed at displacing and challenging the anthropocentrism in literature that reinforces a boundary that separates humans from other animals, or presents humans as not animals. For example, as part of what she calls linguistic or verbal activism in advancement of animal liberation, animal ethicist and philosopher Lisa Kemmerer (2006) has gone as far as coining a new term “anymal” (a contraction of ‘any’ and ‘animal’ to mean ‘any animal’, including humans) as a means to inclusively identify and position humans as one amongst all animal species, thereby breaking down the human-animal dichotomy separating us from the rest of the animal species. My decision to use the qualifiers alongside the conventional ‘animals’ where specificity is required is on one hand practical for ease of reading, and on the other hand, it is a political statement and argument central to this thesis that humans ought to belong firmly in the category of ‘animals’ according to both conventional and political understandings of that category, and this argument brings us to defining the first term.

1.1 Key Terms and Arguments

The following definition of re-animalisation is drawn from Krithika Srinivasan’s (2022) conceptualisation of re-animalisation as an approach to re-envisage the possibility of ensuring human wellbeing without sacrificing more-than-human lives and entities through mass violence and destruction. According to Srinivasan, re-animalisation is an approach aimed at “resituating

humanity as one among other animals, and relearning how to inhabit this world accordingly" (2022, 353). In this way, re-animalisation is a response to historical and ongoing processes through which many humans have come to understand ourselves as uniquely separate from the rest of the animal species and the natural world, and as exceptional and superior to all beings and entities that are more-than-human or nonhuman. Put simply, re-animalisation is a response to the idea that humans are not animals, and to the ways through which we as humans reject our own animality. The need for re-animalisation comes from the view that the rejection or disavowal of our own animality is integral to the dualistic separation between humans and the rest of nature, which constitutes at least one of the roots or foundations that serve to justify elevating human lives above all more-than-humans. The elevation of human lives above all through a logic of human superiority then further justifies insulating and protecting humans lives at all cost against anything we deem to be real or potential threats, which involves systematically sacrificing the lives of nonhuman beings and destroying nonhuman entities en masse for our own benefit. Therefore, as a means of challenging systemic violence stemming from human exceptionalism and superiority, re-animalisation ultimately demands that humans ought to embrace certain risks and vulnerabilities that are intrinsic to our existence as animals, such as exposure to diseases and natural disasters. As Srinivasan puts it, re-animalisation "requires a fundamental shift in approaches to wellbeing and justice – a shift away from logics and practices of protection–sacrifice, and towards the redistribution of the risks of earthly living in more equitable directions" (2022, 353).

Multispecies Justice (hereafter MSJ) is an emerging field of study, a theoretical framework, and a political project that considers the mass scales of harms that humans perpetrate against members of other species and our own species, as well as other more-than-human entities such as soil and waterways, to be unjust (Celermajer et al. 2020). As such, MSJ is a response to wide-ranging injustices committed against multiple, interrelated and interconnected entities and species, often through industrial systems and processes. One of the political aims of MSJ is to bring all beings and entities suffering anthropogenic harms into justice considerations. MSJ could therefore be described as an attempt at bringing about more just conditions and relations between all living and non-living entities on macro and micro scales, however justice might be conceptualised, defined, and realised. More positively, MSJ also encourages the imagining of alternative futures and realities where all beings and entities could flourish and thrive beyond

harm reduction. Theoretically, MSJ draws from and builds on a number of traditions, including but not limited to environmental justice and political ecology, posthumanism and ecofeminism, animal rights and animal liberation, as well as Indigenous philosophies and decolonial theories (Tschakert et al. 2021).

A farmed animal sanctuary (hereafter FAS) is a space, place, community, and often an organisation dedicated to the rescue and rehabilitation of animals commonly exploited in the animal agriculture industries, such as cows, pigs, sheep, goats, chickens, and ducks. Most if not all FASes operate according to a combination of animal welfare, animal rights, animal liberation, and vegan philosophies. Beyond these core philosophies, other moral, ethical, and political values and missions of different sanctuaries may sometimes diverge considerably. For the animals who have been rescued from agricultural systems and have found home at a FAS, the sanctuary will serve primarily as their permanent home until the end of their lives. Additionally, many FASes also engage in advocacy through educational programs that inform the public regarding routinised and standardised violence against farmed animals in agricultural systems, and promote vegan lifestyles as a way for individuals to divest from animal agriculture (Abrell 2021).

With the three components defined, I now move to discuss how I connect them in this thesis. The connection between FAS and MSJ is such that, if an MSJ lens views the exploitation and harms perpetrated against animals in agricultural systems as unjust, then the same MSJ lens would view FASes as one amongst a range of corrective responses to the injustices of animal agriculture, particularly those suffered by nonhuman animals. This statement is conditional because not all epistemologies or knowledge systems that shape the MSJ framework may espouse the view that farming and using animals for food in agricultural systems is necessarily unjust, nor would they consider veganism to be integral to MSJ. I will go over some of the tensions between the divergent philosophies and worldviews that shape MSJ in Chapter 2, where I discuss MSJ as one of the main theoretical frameworks informing the analyses in this thesis. For now, I simply wish to be clear that I do consider animal agriculture to be unjust in my own engagement with MSJ, and I argue that veganism at the very least deserves serious consideration within MSJ as a field and framework, even if it remains debatable as to whether veganism is integral to MSJ.

With regards to re-animalisation, following Srinivasan, I argue that it is one approach and pathway to realising the political aims of MSJ, in so far as recognising and addressing the entangled plights of humans and more-than-humans through justice frameworks would at least require contestations against human exceptionalism. In relation to FAS, this thesis demonstrates how the one sanctuary where I conducted fieldwork has produced insights and lessons pertinent to both re-animalisation and MSJ. Specifically, as we shall see in the main discussion chapters (Chapters 4-7), the ways in which the sanctuary founders attempt to uphold and enact certain obligations to multiple species and entities, as well as my own interactions with the nonhuman animal residents at the sanctuary, suggest that re-animalisation demands constant negotiations and conflicts between humans and more-than-humans, and that sanctuaries could play a unique role in facilitating this process.

Having established above the connections and overlaps between the three key elements in my research, I now present the main arguments and assertions in this thesis. I argue that re-animalisation is a relational and intersubjective process and that nonhuman animal resistance against human control constitutes an integral part of that process, meaning that the ways in which other animals contest and challenge our authority is a crucial element in promoting the possibilities of human re-animalisation. Further, I argue that animal sanctuaries can facilitate re-animalisation depending on various factors, such as the epistemological structures or knowledge systems that shape the relations and practices at the sanctuary, as well as the material and place-based conditions that make up and surround the sanctuary itself. In stating these arguments, I am neither suggesting that other aspects of human relations with nonhuman animals, such as relations and practices of care and interdependence, are of lesser importance to re-animalisation through conflict and negotiation, nor am I suggesting that re-animalisation cannot occur through a multitude of other means and situations beyond animal sanctuaries; it may be entirely possible for individuals and collectives to undertake re-animalisation by simply reading a book, watching a documentary, or engaging in any number of creative methods beyond directly encountering and engaging with other animals. Nonetheless, as we shall see in the discussion chapters, a sanctuary's capacity to sustain a form of productive conflict between humans and other animals within structures that aspire to defend and foster the lives of other animals makes for a rather unique set of conditions for the possibilities of re-animalisation.

Ultimately, my interest in re-animalisation and FASes as strategies and approaches to the pursuit of MSJ stems from a commitment to imagine emancipatory or liberated futures for human and nonhuman animals. That is to say, this thesis is a work emerging from the philosophical traditions of veganism, animal rights, animal liberation, and critical animal studies. In particular, this work is aligned with versions of the stated philosophies that espouse ecofeminist understandings of intersectionality, which views the oppression of nonhuman animals and nature as deeply entangled with different forms of oppression against humans. With this position statement, as well as how I engage with MSJ with regards to my view on animal agriculture, I proceed with the assumption and acceptance that the dominant relations between humans and nonhuman animals across the entirety of our planet is largely unjust, and that much of the systemic and institutionalised violence against nonhuman animals harm humans as well.

Taking industrial animal agriculture as the prime example, research organisation Faunalytics found that humans have slaughtered over 85 billion land animals within our global food systems in 2023 alone, according to the latest available data provided by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (Orzechowski 2025). What the immensity of the animal slaughter statistics fails to register are the mixture of violence and traumas experienced by each individual animal behind those numbers, as well as many humans labouring within animal agriculture. Lauren Corman (2024) describes the combination of these experiences as multispecies trauma, from the physical and psychological traumas suffered by human workers from injuries within industrial slaughterhouses, to the physical and psychological traumas endured by nonhuman animals from standard industrial practices, such as confinement, forced reproduction, and the severing of relational ties from parents and offspring. Similarly, in his ethnography of pork production, Alex Blanchette (2020) "articulates how struggles for [human] labor justice and dignity are inseparable from the conditions of (nonhuman) vitality with which they are intertwined" (20). Blanchette arrives at this view by looking at how meatpacking corporations have turned to micromanaging each individual worker's body "by matching it to an ideal motion or part of the [disassembly] line where it has the least chance of breaking down" in the corporations' seemingly endless pursuit to achieve maximum efficiency (2020, 199).

On the environmental side, the animal slaughter numbers alone do not capture the devastating impacts of animal agriculture, from ecological destructions to their associated biodiversity loss. For instance, on a global scale, animal feed and beef production are now

leading drivers of deforestation (Ritchie 2021) and major contributors to greenhouse gas emissions (Pathak et al. 2022; Poore and Nemecek 2018). At the same time, animal agricultural corporations are advancing initiatives to transform their industrial waste and emissions into energy sources to further accumulate capital while greenwashing their practices. Consider the hog industry in North Carolina for example, the industry has been promoting Factory Farm Gas (biogas) emitting from billions of gallons of animal waste as a form of renewable energy, all the while undermining community-led climate and environmental justice efforts, and disproportionately harming the health and lives of members in racialised, Indigenous, and low-income communities through practices such as aerosolised manure spraying from manure lagoons (Eccles 2025; Eccles and Stoddard 2025).

Having defined and introduced the key terms and arguments, as well as how I position myself in my engagements with them, I now move on to provide an overview of the thesis chapters.

1.2 Overview of Chapters

In Chapter 2, I review the main bodies of literature relevant to the topics explored in this thesis. The first encompasses literature engaging critically with FASes from across disciplines. The second covers the increasingly recognised and discussed phenomenon of animal resistance. In a somewhat genealogical fashion, I first briefly discuss how the paradigm of animal studies and animal politics have been aligned with the anti-oppressive emancipatory struggles and traditions emerging from the political Left, which then helps to make sense of how and why scholars engaging with FASes and animal resistance have situated and positioned their work in the Leftist paradigm. I then discuss literature relevant to the two theoretical frameworks I am engaging with throughout this thesis: re-animalisation, and Multispecies Justice.

A major contribution in Chapter 2 comes from my engagement with re-animalisation. Building on Krithika Srinivasan's (2022) critiques of the protection-sacrifice logic in developmentality and her argument for re-animalisation as an alternative pathway to multispecies justice and wellbeing, I home in on the problematics and politics of animalisation itself. I present a typology of animalisation that distinguishes between three types of animalisation: (1) animalisation as dehumanisation, (2) voluntary animalisation, and (3) animal-guided animalisation. The goal of producing this analytical distinction between different types of

animalisation is to disentangle the exclusive association of animalisation to dehumanisation in the mainstream discourse, thus producing the necessary linguistic precision required for more constructive and critical discussions regarding animalisation. In the concluding section of this chapter, I identify some minor gaps in the literature on FASes and discuss how I attempt to address them in this thesis by building on and engaging with existing literature.

Chapter 3 focuses on the methodological frameworks I have adopted and applied to this research. However, this chapter should also be read as a continuation of the literature review, as my research builds on and contributes to the advancement of my selected methodologies. These methodologies and theories include Politicised Multispecies Ethnography and Multispecies Participatory Action Research. I trace some of the key developments in each area and discuss how they guide my research methods and analyses. Chapter 3 ends with a summary of my research methods. Taking a less conventional approach, I present my research methods in a somewhat storied or narrative-driven fashion, describing what I have done for my fieldwork while also introducing the main participants in this study, namely the farmed animal sanctuary in Australia where I conducted fieldwork and the sanctuary's founders.

In Chapter 4, I argue that the sanctuary should be understood as a structurally-produced liminal conflict zone. I begin by arguing that liminality is a structure, and that FASes are liminal spaces. Following this, I contextualise and situate the particular sanctuary in my study within histories and structures of settler-colonialism and domestication from which it was created. In doing so, I discuss how both settler-colonialism and domestication operate through shared logics of control/discipline/management, and are synergistically interdependent on other related oppressive structures and their corresponding logics. Upon detailing the structural conditions from which the sanctuary emerges, I then return to discuss how the sanctuary as a liminal structure operates according to a logic of change that generates resistive and counterhegemonic opportunities for transformative possibilities such as re-animalisation. In relation to re-animalisation, I propose that the sanctuary as a liminal structure produces a liminal animal identity and subjectivity for all those who find themselves within the bounds of the sanctuary, meaning that regardless of what kind of animals we as humans might become, we are all liminal animals in the first instance. Overall, Chapter 4 demonstrates how the sanctuary understood as a liminal structure could play an important role in creating openings that enable re-animalisation.

Building on the analysis and argument that the sanctuary is a liminal zone encapsulating a range of conflicts, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 adopt a different lens to examine how the sanctuary could be understood as a technology of counterpower. In Chapter 5 (Sanctuary as a Technology of Counterpower: Part I), I apply Foucauldian concepts of technology and power to propose a view of the sanctuary as a place where a set of knowledge systems and a concordant field of power govern intraspecies and interspecies relations and conduct. I then combine this view with anthropologist David Graeber's (2004) "theory of imaginary counterpower" to investigate how the knowledge systems of the sanctuary operate to guard itself against myriad tendencies of hierarchical domination that could arise from potential sources both internal and external to the sanctuary. Relying primarily on data obtained through semi-structured interviews, I discuss ecofeminism and veganism as the two main distinct knowledge systems constituting the sanctuary as a counterpower technology, and examine how the knowledge systems shape the ways that the sanctuary founders interact with and relate to other humans, communities, and social movements. Whereas Chapter 5 puts more emphasis on human relations and conduct, Chapter 6 (Sanctuary as a Technology of Counterpower: Part II) turns the attention towards the effects of counterpower on human-nonhuman relations and nonhuman animals. I examine how the sanctuary as a technology of counterpower produces and appropriates specialised knowledge to manage, defend, and foster nonhuman animal life in ways that could be relevant to human re-animalisation.

Chapter 7 builds on the previous three chapters by focusing on food relations as a particular site of conflict where nonhuman animal resistance pushes back against human authority and management. I frame the discussions and narratives in this chapter within the broader considerations of issues pertaining to sovereignty, specifically human sovereignty versus animal sovereignty. To do so, I develop a framework I term 'resistive food autonomy' to discuss how humans and other animals who lack food sovereignty, might be able to resist against various forms of hegemonic food regimes. In particular, I discuss what I call 'resistive consumption' as one limited option of resistance. After defining and conceptualising resistive food autonomy and resistive consumption, I chart the foodways of the sanctuary and share a series of ethnographic accounts of contestations and negotiations over food at the sanctuary. Finally, I end the chapter by attempting to draw various insights and lessons from examples of resistive consumption at the sanctuary. Overall, this chapter argues that when the realisation of food autonomy is a near

impossibility, resistive consumption across species might be one entry point through which human sovereignty and exceptionalism could be undermined.

To conclude the thesis in Chapter 8, I summarise some of the key insights resulting from the reciprocity between re-animalisation and my data analysis. Of the key insights is a somewhat surprising finding that far from being idyllic spaces, FASes are actually places of conflict; however, I argue that this conflict is potentially productive in forcing transformative changes in human relations with nonhuman animals. Additionally, I consider how re-animalisation has been productive in seeing and recognising different forms of conflict at the sanctuary, and how some of my insights have in turn expanded the understanding of re-animalisation. Lastly, I shift away from majority of the discussions throughout this thesis and turn to consider how Alex Blanchette's (2020) conceptualisations of animality offer possible future research directions regarding FASes. In this brief section, I first summarise industrial animality and capitalist animality as Blanchette defines and describes these terms based on his ethnography within industrial pig production. I then discuss how FASes might be able to produce alternative visions of animality based on my own articulations and arguments throughout this thesis. To end the chapter, I share one last ethnographic account from my fieldwork and put it in conversation with some of Blanchette's insights and reflections in the epilogue of his book to offer a glimpse of what research on FASes through Blanchette's framework of animality might look like.

Before moving on to literature review in Chapter 2, I end the introduction with the section below to help contextualise how I have arrived at the general orientations and directions of this study.

1.3 Why Sanctuary and Re-animalisation? Tracing the Evolutions of My Research Focus

In this section, I attempt to autoethnographically contextualise my research within the recent political and ecological crises that have been shaping my work. In doing so, I trace the evolution of my thinking regarding sanctuary, one of the central topics I explore, in parallel to some of the relevant and noteworthy events that have taken place throughout my doctoral research. To this end, I follow Kathryn Gillespie's (2022) description of multispecies autoethnography as a "relational methodology" that is not only an "ethnography of the self, but the self in relation to" other species and ecologies, and to "the social, political, and economic systems of power in which" we are all embedded (2099-2100). This form of contextual,

multispecies autoethnographic writing has also been exemplified in Danielle Celermajer's (2021) book *Summertime: Reflections on a Vanishing Future*, where Celermajer reflects on her lived experiences and her relations with other humans, other animals, and more-than-humans throughout what has come to be known as the Black Summer Bushfires in Australia's 2019-2020 summer season, which was one of Australia's most calamitous bushfire seasons in recorded history. Celermajer's critical reflections on her affective responses to witnessing and surviving the destructive bushfires underscore the ways in which her intellectual work regarding multispecies justice was inextricable from the evermore destructive and frequent ecological crises taking place.

In a similar manner, the production of my thesis cannot escape the various forms of socioeconomic, political, and ecological turmoil that I have lived through over the past four years. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I was required to commence my postgraduate studies remotely in July 2021, while I lived with my family in British Columbia, Canada. That summer, another crisis hatched within the pandemic as the Pacific Northwest (PNW) region, which includes much of southern British Columbia and the city of Kamloops where I lived, was trapped under a heat dome. According to Jain et al. (2024), the PNW heat dome has been "found to be one of the most extreme heatwaves globally, and was estimated as a one-in-a-thousand-year event that would have been 150 times less likely without climate change" (1). The PNW heat dome initiated a record-breaking fire season that burnt areas totaling 3.2 million hectares (32,000km^2 or 7.9 million acres). Just 100km southwest of Kamloops, the "small town of Lytton, British Columbia [experienced] the highest ever recorded temperature in Canada with 49.6 °C," and the town was subsequently destroyed by a wildfire (Jain et al. 2024, 1). In many ways, North America had undergone its own Black Summer a year following the disasters in Australia.

Despite commencing my research in the midst of these crises, my initial research direction optimistically postulated the generative possibilities of animal sanctuaries, choosing to focus more on their positive dimensions over their limitations. Originally entitled "Decolonial Animal Sanctuaries: Prefiguring Multispecies Justice," my proposal sought to engage with a recent wave of critical works occurring at the intersection of decolonial/anticolonial theories and critical animal studies, which sought to facilitate cross-movement conversations and build affinity between the emancipatory struggles that both disciplines speak to (see for examples Robinson 2013; 2014; Belcourt 2015; Dunn 2019; Struthers Montford and Taylor 2020). My

hypothesis was that if animal sanctuaries incorporated decolonial frameworks and practices in their operations, they could potentially prefigure just multispecies relations in ways that simultaneously challenge colonial-capitalism and speciesism.

The confidence behind this early formulation of my inquiry stemmed from my own experiences and learnings from grassroots organising and activism in both Indigenous solidarity and animal liberation within the settler-colonial context of Turtle Island (so-called North America) throughout the 2010s. While I was fully cognizant of the tensions between Indigenous-led decolonial movements and animal rights/liberation, the confluence of critical literature emerging from the undercurrents of decolonial and animal movements, as well as the efforts made to build trust and relations amongst scholar-activists across said movements, engendered a surging sense that meaningful coalitions were tangible. For instance, at the end of the decade, a position statement published by The Red Nation, a coalition of Indigenous and non-Indigenous community organizers, students, educators, and activists across Turtle Island, included the following excerpt:

> "Indigenous liberation struggles have taught us that our other-than-human relatives are subjected to the same class logic as human relatives, and are policed by the carceral state to uphold the sanctity of private property over the sanctity of life. Under racial capitalism, our other-than-human relations are constantly degraded, exploited, maimed, and killed. Borders and dams scar our landscapes, disrupt human and other-than-human migration patterns, separate and displace our human and other-than-human relatives, prevent humans from having relationships with the land, and turn other-than-human relatives into commodities and objects of exploitation. We thus understand that the abolition of racial capitalism must also include the abolition of the carceral regimes of private property that oppress and cage our other-than-human relatives. We cannot secure a future where all life is free if we do not advance a struggle for the abolition of private property and the carceral regimes that keep property relations intact" (2020, 21).

Such statements that explicitly acknowledged connections between the shared sources of violence against human and more-than-human relations made clear that there were both space and appetite to advance these discussions.

My enthusiasm was further sustained when two FASes (VINE Sanctuary in Vermont, USA and Indraloka Animal Sanctuary in Pennsylvania, USA), along with the Global Coalition of Farm Sanctuaries, co-hosted the Reimagining Sanctuary virtual conference, which took place between February–March, 2022. The conference was organised around four themes: Ethics (the challenges of ethical decision-making at sanctuaries), Community (how might sanctuaries become and/or build communities according to different conceptualisations of community), Intersections (how might sanctuaries contribute to other anti-oppression causes beyond animal advocacy), and Imagination (both to promote the imagination among sanctuary visitors and to reimagine what sanctuaries can do or be). Designed specifically for members of FASes, including founders, staff, volunteers, and board members, the conference sought to engage FAS practitioners in fruitful discussions with scholars and sanctuary members who have researched these topics. Given some of my preliminary research at the time, the organisers invited me to present on the topic of how sanctuaries might participate in decolonial/anticolonial causes as part of the Intersections panel.

While it was inspiring to see the level of interest to critically reflect on FASes at the Reimagining Sanctuary conference, my participation was also a humbling experience. Hearing directly from individuals performing the necessary and demanding labour involved in operating sanctuaries and caring for rescued animals, some of the perspectives they shared regarding the struggles and challenges they regularly encountered was an acute reminder of the structural forces limiting how one might be able to reimagine and reconfigure sanctuary at all. Soon after the conference, I also received some pushback from the ethics committee at the University of Sydney regarding my project, as the committee was rightfully concerned that there were ethical issues for a project intending to research the topic of decolonisation in the settler-colonial context of Australia without consulting and engaging with any Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and organisations. The combination of these humbling realisations resurfaced some of my longstanding unease regarding whether I should even be writing and speaking about decolonisation at all, especially as someone who occupies a relatively privileged position of being a settler and an uninvited guest in settler-colonial societies, and as someone who has not fostered any real meaningful relationships with Indigenous peoples.

Nonetheless, I stayed with the impulse to explore how animal sanctuaries might offer insights to the field of MSJ and benefit cross-movement conversations, and updated my project

title to “Exploring Alignments and Tensions between Animal and Other Justice Movements through Animal Sanctuaries,” which perhaps better reflected what I had intended to study all along. Overall, the ethics application process, from preparation and submission of documents to amendments and final approval, took roughly ten months. After my fieldwork, an additional three months of correspondence with the ethics committee took place to further amend the application due to the fact that the project only ended up with one participating sanctuary, which subjected the participants to greater risks of identification. Combined, I had spent roughly a year in total to ensure that the project met ethical standards.

As the events throughout the previous paragraphs unfurled, wars and disasters persisted as part of the “new normal” of climate change and global pandemics. Days prior to the Reimagining Sanctuary conference in February 2022, Russian forces conducted a full-scale invasion into Ukraine. In July 2022, I arrived in Sydney to the aftermath of eastern Australia’s most severe flood disasters in the region’s recorded history. As I settled into life in Sydney, my first year as a student on campus saw numerous strikes and picket lines organised by staff and students as part of the National Tertiary Education Union’s campaign to demand better pay and workload management, as well as de-casualisation of staff, which reflected both an exasperating cost-of-living crisis in Sydney and the mounting antagonism produced by the corporatisation of universities. This antagonism between the university and its staff and students would soon resurface in 2024 during the international movement of campus protests in solidarity with Palestinian liberation and against the genocide in Gaza, which saw universities ultimately shutting down protests and forcibly dismantling encampments across campuses.

The truth is that I am unsure as to how much the aforementioned events, from COVID-19 to genocide in Gaza, may have affected my work beyond whatever unaddressed burnout and dread that had already existed. However, thinking about justice in an unjust world as a relatively isolating full-time job within institutions that are either complicit or indifferent to various forms of injustice probably did not help to alleviate a general sense of negativity. I found myself drifting away from the original research direction as more pessimism and skepticism took over. Admittedly, my turn towards animalisation was in the first instance a move to escape from what I felt to be failed projects in both human and animal liberation. On one hand, the dehumanisation involved in mass atrocities against humans are as rampant as ever despite the proliferation of liberal humanist ideals of human rights and shared humanity. On the other hand, the epistemic

battles around nonhuman animal subjectivity and relationality through repetitive elaborations on the complexities of other animals' cognitive, social, relational, and cultural capacities as a means to elicit human curiosity and care felt like a dead-end approach in resisting the institutionalised violence of anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism. Instead, provoking the recognition that humans are animals as a way to contest the construction of 'animal' as an inferior sociopolitical status felt like a step towards the epistemic humility that is required to incite humans into some form of political compromise with other animals, more-than-humans, and each other. At the very least, animalisation remains an underexamined topic.

I eventually found some validation and permissibility for my negative feelings in a body of work that attended to the place of spatial, affective, and political negativity in sociopolitical and geographical thought, which could be summed up as 'negative geographies' (see Harrison et al., 2021; Dekeyser and Jellis, 2021; Dekeyser et al. 2022). Centring negativity in scholarly work challenges affirmationism, which Dekeyser and Jellis define as "the inclination to embrace ontologically, politically, and/or ethically – the productive forces of inciting, sustaining, and cultivating existence" (2021, 1). The ways in which scholars engage with negativity are manifold, and for me, the expression of negativity in this thesis emerges mainly through its emphasis on conflict.

For FASes specifically, this negative focus on conflict disrupts mainstreamed representations of sanctuaries for farmed animals as places defined exclusively by positive and affirmative notions of peace, love, compassion, and harmony. However, it is important to acknowledge that constructed public images of FASes that underscore their life-affirming qualities are both rooted in reality and designed to counter the horrors prevailing over farmed animal lives in places such as farms and slaughterhouses, which are defined by normalised exploitation, death, and violence rooted in the killability of farmed animals. At the sanctuary where I conducted my fieldwork, the positive elements were ever-present despite my focus on antagonism and conflict. From sitting with and petting the cows and sheep as they contently chomped down hay on the pastures, to giving pigs belly rubs and providing medical care to injured and ill animals, the daily practices of care and affection towards other animals that the sanctuary founders and I engaged in reflect the epitome of the positive and affirmative dimensions of FASes. The norms of FASes that make rescued farmed animal residents unkillable

enable them to thrive and flourish as much as possible within the structural constraints imposed on sanctuaries.

And on a very personal level, heading straight into fieldwork immediately following a housing eviction in a city plagued by a housing crisis, with the eviction itself following immediately after a long-term relationship breakdown, it is no exaggeration to say that visiting the sanctuary was in many ways experiencing temporary refuge for myself. Synchronising my life to the slower rhythms and daily routines of the sanctuary granted me space and time to process my own anxieties about precarious futures and aching pasts. The joy and laughter shared with the sanctuary founders as we bonded over meals and TV shows helped to restore my own sense of connection and affinity. Building trust with the animal residents and being amongst them returned a sense of wonder. As the world beyond its boundaries oscillates between hope and despair, sanctuary inherently offers promises and possibilities that negate negativity. Nevertheless, as the literature review in Chapter 2 will show, my focus on conflict in relation to FASes in this thesis falls in line with much of the existing literature on FASes, which also highlight sanctuaries as always already engaged in conflicts and resistance against hegemonic regimes dominating human and nonhuman life.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review: Farmed Animal Sanctuaries, Animal Resistance, Re-animalisation, and Multispecies Justice

This chapter is an overview of the literature on farmed animal sanctuaries (FASes), animal resistance, re-animalisation, and Multispecies Justice (MSJ). With regards to the literature on FASes and animal resistance specifically, in order to make sense of the development of scholarly work on these two topics, I will first briefly provide some additional literature representing the shifting paradigms in animal politics over the past decade or so, from which research engaging with FASes and animal resistance has emerged. In a somewhat genealogical fashion, I present a partial narrative that speaks to how research on FASes and animal resistance tracks the advancement of critical approaches to animal studies. This narrative is partial both in the sense that it is incomplete, and in the sense that it is my own limited and simplified reading of certain exchanges and developments across the academic fields and disciplines engaging with animal studies. I acknowledge that no summary sweep of a large and growing literature can quite do justice to the nuance and differences between heterogenous scholarly works.

One of the critical approaches to animal studies that I take note of moves discussions about animal rights beyond a traditional view in animal ethics that categorises nonhuman animals as moral patients who lack agency. As such, this body of work emphasises the agency, subjectivity, sociality, and relationality of nonhuman animals. Another critical approach applies theoretical frameworks that have emerged from the struggles of radical emancipatory movements and apply them to analysing human-animal relations. In doing so, the second approach also attempts to move animal liberation as a political project out of its historically isolated position so as to align it with other sociopolitical movements pursuing justice, emancipation, and liberation from oppressive systems and structures. In effect, these two approaches are inseparable. Taking animal resistance as an example, demonstrating that nonhuman animals are agents capable of resisting their domination is to position them as subjects affected by oppressive systems, and it is also a call to other anthropocentric emancipatory movements to take the struggles of nonhuman animals into consideration. And as this literature review will show, much of the turn towards FASes as sites embodying forms of radical alterities and potentialities against hegemonic and oppressive structures shares the same motivation to foreground nonhuman animal subjectivities and strive for some form of solidarity between animal liberation and other anti-oppression movements. The literature covering FASes and animal resistance emerge from the

interdisciplinary fields of animal studies and critical animal studies broadly speaking, which in part constitute the "animal turn" that has been occurring across multiple arts, humanities, and social sciences disciplines over the past two decades. As such, literature engaging with FASes and animal resistance have been produced in geography, anthropology, sociology, history, philosophy, politics, and other related disciplines.

Following the review of FASes and animal resistance, I discuss the concept of re-animalisation, consider its relevance to my study, and propose three distinct processes of animalisation: (1) animalisation as dehumanisation, (2) voluntary animalisation, and (3) animal-guided animalisation. I then review the literature emerging from the still-nascent field of MSJ and consider its relevance to research on FASes.

2.1 Animal Politics: Shifting Paradigms and Critical Approaches

In the introduction to *Critical Theory and Animal Liberation* (2011), John Sanbonmatsu details a "complicated legacy of the Left" in relation to animal rights and animal liberation (13). Whereas critics of the political right viewed animal rights/liberation as an outright threat to the established orders of human society and the human species itself, historically, the Left has largely treated human violence against animals with indifference or ambivalence (Sanbonmatsu 2011, 13-14). Sanbonmatsu contends that Left hostilities towards animal liberation and the Left's refusal to consider how "speciesism as a social structure and ideology intersects with other modalities of oppression and domination" is regrettably "rooted in the psychology of speciesism itself" (2011, 19).

Animal studies scholarship since the publication of Sanbonmatsu's edited volume has heeded his urgent call to bring diverse Left movements challenging systems of oppression into coalescence (2011, 31). However, it is important to note that long before the more concerted efforts in critical animal studies to bring animals into Left spheres, ecofeminists had already been engaged in decades-long interventions since at least the 1980s to connect animal and earth liberation with resistance against patriarchy and other forms of domination (Adams and Gruen 2022; Cudworth et al. 2023). Ecofeminists emphasised the vital practices of care (Donovan 1996) and empathy (Gruen 2015) as part of an alternative relational ethics required to dismantle dualistic boundaries, and to recognise and foster interdependent relations across species. Meanwhile, feminist scholars working along the posthumanist trajectory have tended to

accentuate the subjectivities of nonhuman animals (Noske 1997; Castricano and Corman 2016), the response-abilities between humans and other animals (Haraway 2008), and to disrupt the bounded conception of the human subject to contest human exceptionalism (Gane and Haraway 2006).

The cornerstones of feminist intellectual labour helped to set the stage for the convergence between Left thoughts and movements to continue through the emerging field of critical animal studies, which applies knowledge and theoretical frameworks produced through the historical struggles of the radical Left to critique systems of oppression affecting humans, nonhuman animals, and our shared ecologies. Some of this work applies holistic approaches such as intersectional and 'total liberation' frameworks to challenge oppression, and fuses learnings from diverse forms of on-the-ground animal liberation and earth defense activism with critical scholarship (Nocella II et al. 2014; Pellow 2014). Others have engaged in much needed cross-movement conversations, bridging the gaps between disability and animal liberation (Taylor 2017; Jenkins et al. 2020), colonialism and animality (Struthers Montford and Taylor 2020), capitalism and animal oppression (Nibert 2017; Wadiwel 2023), animal and gender-based struggles (Taylor 2024), as well as speciesism and racism (Kim 2015; Ko 2019).

Concurrently, a number of scholars theorising human-animal relations from within the tradition of liberal political philosophy have advanced a 'political turn' in animal ethics (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011; O'Sullivan 2011; Cochrane 2012, 2018; Garner 2013; Garner and O'Sullivan 2016; Meijer 2019). This body of work sought to bring issues pertaining to other animals into political spheres to be deliberated through formal processes and institutions of justice and democracy, and have tended to apply positive approaches in considering the duties and obligations humans owe other animals beyond noninterference. In these ways, the politicisation of animal rights and animal ethics within liberal philosophy is distinct from and builds on moral philosophies that animal ethicists have applied to think about human duties and obligations towards nonhuman animals. These would include utilitarian animal ethics aimed at minimising harm and maximising pleasure when considering human treatment of nonhuman animals, which fixated on sentience and the capacity for pleasure and pain as the morally salient features to justify whether nonhuman animals and other subjects or entities should be included in our ethical considerations and legal protections (Bentham 1789; Singer 1975; Sebo 2023), as well as deontological rights-based frameworks that sought to replace the legal property status

imposed on animals with legal personhood rights and to abolish all forms of animal exploitation (Regan 1983; Francione 1995; Wise 2000).

Of the political turn theorists, Eva Meijer (2019) along with Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011) exemplify a particular camp that emphasises animal agency and argued for the recognition and inclusion of animals as members of political communities (e.g. citizens) with whom humans should co-author or co-shape shared societies. To some extent, such positive approaches to animal rights and liberation that construe animals as political agents and participants in co-creating societies through cooperative schemes have had significant influences from the ecofeminist ethics of care philosophies mentioned above, which produced relational approaches that underscored mutuality, interdependence, and responsibility across species.

More importantly, the impetus to advocate for the inclusion of animals in democratic processes and to treat them as subjects of justice follows from the Leftist or Left-leaning segments within the liberal political tradition, which have historically fought for the inclusion of marginalised and oppressed populations in democratic societies (Young 1990; 2000). For instance, akin to Sanbonmatsu, Donaldson and Kymlicka (2014) have attempted to address some of the anxieties within contemporary Left movements that have led them to reject animal rights, such as how animal rights campaigns might reproduce dynamics of cultural imperialism, colonialism, and racism against minority groups in Western or Global North multicultural societies. Citing the historical inclusionary struggles of the Left and more recent feminist literature linking posthumanism with postcolonialism (Deckha 2007; 2012), Donaldson and Kymlicka suggests that it is entirely possible for the Left to embrace an animal rights agenda that is postcolonial and anti-racist, and prevent the instrumentalisation of animal advocacy campaigns against marginalised minority groups (2014, 128). In short, as with critical animal studies scholars/activists working to merge animal liberation with other emancipatory radical Leftist struggles, the liberal Left has attempted to align animal rights with historical Leftist pursuits for justice and inclusion.

Mapping out in broad strokes these recent developments in animal studies, both the critical theorists and the liberal theorists examining how animal agency have come to regard FASes as important sites that enable formerly farmed animals to explore possible alternative social formations counter to the existing norms of violence against animals. These theorists consider how animal agency might potentially transform human-animal relations, as well as how

animal agency might allow the articulation of a normative claim for including animals as political subjects. As the following section will show, situating FASes within this existing Leftist paradigm of animal politics helps to elucidate why most scholars engaging with FASes conceptualise and politicise sanctuaries in ways that underline their transformative potentials through conflicts and struggles against systems of oppression.

2.2 Farmed Animal Sanctuaries as Sites of Conflict

Prior to a recent wave of scholarship that politicised FASes, these places of refuge have long given farmed animals the opportunities to challenge industrial animal agriculture's suppression of their social and cognitive complexities. For instance, illuminating the multiplicity of emotional and relational capacities of farmed animals, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (2004) draws numerous examples from FASes, where species of animals commonly held in captivity to be bred and consumed by humans have been observed to develop meaningful friendships and exhibit wide-ranging emotions, from sorrow and grief to joy and contentment. Highlighting these capacities amongst farmed animals was one of the strategies aimed at contesting an epistemic injustice resulting from hegemonic conceptions of farmed animals as unworthy of moral and ethical consideration.

In effect, what FASes have enabled farmed animals to do was to challenge the epistemic violence of speciesist knowledge systems that objectify farmed animals by suppressing their liveliness, animacy, and sentience. As Dinesh Wadiwel points out, the epistemic violence of human exceptionalism operates to smooth out violence against farmed and other nonhuman animals "in such a way that it does not appear as violence" (2015, 13). By "producing 'the animal' as an inferior entity," epistemic violence limits "any possibility of animal response and resistance" to human domination and utility (Wadiwel 2015, 35). As such, beyond simply being spaces of refuge, FASes have always already been entangled in conflicts against the oppressive structural conditions that have produced sanctuaries, and they resist by generating alternative ways that farmed animals could be known and related to.

Contestations over knowledge makes pedagogy one area where it is apparent that FASes are sites of conflict, as they are actively engaged in epistemic battles against the knowledge produced by industrial animal agribusinesses about farmed animals. As Donaldson and Kymlicka have discussed, many FASes take up the work of advocating for farmed animals in addition to

providing them refuge, and the advocacy component often takes the form of educational programming (2015, 52). One of the core educational components that many FASes offer is to organise sanctuary tours for visitors, giving members of the public a chance to meet the rescued animals, to learn about how standard practices in animal agriculture deprive farmed animals of the freedom to express their natural behaviours, to hear the animals' stories of survival and recovery from agricultural exploitation, to observe their social connections and attachments, and to generally witness and experience the stark contrast between the lives of farmed animals at sanctuaries with the lives of their counterparts in agriculture (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015, 52). Sanctuaries may also encourage visitors to adopt plant-based diets and veganism, and to support animal welfare reforms, and given that most FASes are nonprofit organisations, they may also ask the visitors to sustain the sanctuaries' work through donations (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015, 52). In the age of social media, much of the educational and public engagement work of FASes are increasingly taking place online, allowing followers of their accounts to keep up-to-date with the stories and lives of the animal residents. For example, in her analysis of the work of Saebyeogi Sanctuary in South Korea (Saebyeogi is the name of a rescued pig the sanctuary was created for), Su Young Choi (2023) has shown how the sanctuary's Instagram account creates not only a digital space for supporters to engage with Saebyeogi (both the pig and the sanctuary), it is also a political space that "regularly reminds its followers of the systemic oppression and injustice" faced by nonhuman animals and the activists fighting for them (70).

Despite these ongoing pedagogical efforts, some scholars have identified concerns and limitations to the educational impacts of FASes, which further illustrates how FASes are always operating in antagonism to institutions and structures of violence against animals. For instance, Timothy Pachirat (2018) notes that while most factory farms and slaughterhouses are securitised in order to hide their operations from public access and viewing, Fair Oaks Farms, an industrialised dairy and pig farm in central Indiana, USA, has "turned its operations into an agritourism destination" (344). Whereas Farm Sanctuary in the USA, the first and largest sanctuary in the world dedicated to rescuing and sheltering farmed animals, receives roughly 10,000 visitors per year, Fair Oaks attracts over 600,000 visitors per year (Pachirat 2018, 344). Besides the disparity in visitor numbers, Fair Oaks demonstrates epistemic violence in its normalisation of violent and exploitative standard industry practices by situating and presenting them in a fun and cheerful family-friendly atmosphere. Practices such as forced impregnation of

female animals through artificial insemination, forced separation of mother cows from their offspring, and the intensive, mechanised extraction of milk from cows are explained through interactive and visually stimulating exhibits, while texts accompanying displays of these practices rationalise them as beneficial to both the farmed animals and human consumers (Pachirat 2018, 344). In comparing Fair Oaks with Farm Sanctuary, Pachirat's example demonstrates how the epistemic contestations are deeply shaped by material conditions.

While FASes possess far fewer resources than industrial animal agriculture when it comes to affecting the general public through their own educational programs, FASes are in unique positions to work collaboratively with educators and researchers within established educational institutions, thereby contesting epistemic violence against farmed animals in more strategic and targeted ways. Kathryn Gillespie (2019) offers an example through an experimental undergraduate interdisciplinary course she taught at the University of Washington, where Gillespie engaged the students in practicing a politicised, feminist multispecies ethnography over the course of one summer at Pigs Peace Sanctuary located in Washington, USA. The multispecies ethnography that Gillespie taught was politicised in its formulation "through an explicitly feminist geographic lens," which prompted the students to reflect critically on the power relations and social hierarchies that have been embedded and taken-for-granted in human-farmed animal relations, and asked the students to "attend to embodiment and emotion as ways of knowing" (2019, 19). By pairing each student with a pig at the sanctuary, students practiced reflexivity as they bonded with the pigs, and paid attention to the embodied and relational lives of the pigs, as well as how the pigs inhabited Pigs Peace Sanctuary (Gillespie 2019, 25). Such experimental pedagogical approaches demonstrate not so much how FASes might change individual behaviours on any scale, but rather produces insights into how FASes could participate in transforming existing epistemic structures and paradigms determining what is possible to research, teach, and know about farmed animals.

Heather Rosenfeld (2021) offers similar insights in the context of veterinary care and medical knowledge, observing how FASes have had to produce their own knowledge and practices because most rescued farmed animals living at sanctuaries "have fallen out of spaces of knowledge production" in these areas. It is not so much that there is a complete lack of veterinary knowledge about farmed animals, but rather, as Sunaura Taylor (2017) remarks, industrial animal agriculture structurally produces disability in farmed animals through selective

breeding for physical traits that maximise productivity, and by confining farmed animals in restrictive and disease-prone environments (30-33). Therefore, in the agricultural context, the protection of farmed animals from disease and disability relying on medical knowledge generated through animal welfare science "is nearly always motivated by profit," and not to promote wellbeing and flourishing for the animals' own sake (Taylor 2017, 34).

Focusing on how FASes have been responding to rescued hens suffering from reproductive diseases as a result of selective breeding for increased egg production, Rosenfeld observes how staff and volunteers across sanctuaries have transposed knowledge and practices from contexts and situations external to FASes, and circulated such knowledge to address this harm. For instance, some sanctuaries practice feeding the eggs back to the hens as a way to replenish the nutrients that hens lose through their unnaturally elevated volume of egg production, while others use deslorelin, a birth control hormonal implant designed for birds to stop egg laying, thereby improving the hens' health and prolonging their lives (Rosenfeld 2021, 8, 9, 12). I will also discuss the use of deslorelin implants in Chapter 6, albeit through a different frame of analysis to discuss a biopolitical dimension of how power/knowledge operates at FASes. Nonetheless, Rosenfeld demonstrates veterinary pedagogy as yet another site of epistemic violence and resistance that FASes are enmeshed in. Donaldson and Kymlicka have likewise made the same observation that "FASes are helping to develop a whole new field of farmed animal veterinary care…designed to benefit animals for their own sake" (2015, 55). Anecdotally, there has been an increase in the number of FASes hosting externships and volunteer opportunities for a coextensively rising number of veterinary students who are interested in learning about farmed animal health and care outside industrial animal agriculture; however, these examples remain scattered and sparse.

The examples above from Gillespie and Rosenfeld gesture towards more experimental approaches at FASes aimed at exploring how we might invent radically novel ways of coexisting and cohabitating with farmed animals, which are different from established forms of advocacy aimed at promoting alternative lifestyles amongst individual humans by changing consumption patterns and behaviours. Experimental, embodied, and relational practices that human and nonhuman members of FASes enact on a daily basis have inspired scholars to theorise alternative conceptualisations of the models, roles, and functions that FASes might adopt. Guy Scotton (2017) has argued, for instance, that humans have a duty to socialise and form interspecies

friendships with domesticated animals in ways that move beyond dominant conventional paradigms of companionship, and Scotton has speculated how FASes might be spaces where humans could befriend farmed animals on more equal and respectful terms.

Consistent with the view that FASes are experimental sites, Pachirat argues that existing sanctuaries defy categorisations in terms of their models and practices, and "might be better understood as spaces for ongoing, and necessarily imperfect, practices of entangled empathy, spaces for the development of always provisional enactments of interspecies possibility written in the messy language of mutual care, affect, and embodiment" (2018, 346). Citing examples reflecting this view, Pachirat shares the work of Susie Coston, Farm Sanctuary's long-time national shelter director, as well as the work of founders pattrice jones and Miriam Jones of VINE Sanctuary. Eschewing some details for brevity, what Pachirat has learned from Coston, jones, and Jones is that as individuals who have worked intimately with rescued farmed animals for prolonged periods of time, experienced sanctuary staff such as themselves have acquired a vast body of knowledge regarding farmed animals. This enables them to respond to the preferences, desires, and aversions of individual animal residents when navigating and negotiating social arrangements at sanctuaries, such as finding balances between adequately protecting the animals for their safety while ensuring that each individual animal maintains their autonomy, adjusting social groupings of animal residents where conflicts arise, or supporting the animals to determine for themselves whether they wish to interact with humans (Pachirat 2018, 347-48).

Political theorists exploring the possibilities of including nonhuman animals in democratic decision-making and extending social membership to nonhuman animals have also been inspired by the embodied and emplaced day-to-day relations and practices of FASes. Drawing heavily from examples at VINE Sanctuary among other FASes, Donaldson and Kymlicka have argued for reimagining and reconfiguring FASes as intentional communities, where animal residents could be enabled to live as co-citizens along with their human caretakers, who would support "a rich conception of animal flourishing [through] experiments in animal agency, participation, and choice-making," and attend to the animals' "capacities for interspecies communication, trust, cooperation, and sociability" (2015, 67-68). In this way, sanctuaries become experimental multispecies communities striving for a form of interspecies democracy, demonstrating how humans might reshape our relationships with farmed animals in broader

societies beyond the sanctuary boundaries. Since informing Donaldson and Kymlicka's proposed ideas of conceptualising FASes as intentional communities, VINE's willingness to collaborate with researchers have generated further outputs in theorising interspecies democracy and multispecies communities, from the ethnographic exploration of diverse forms of nonhuman animal agency at VINE (Blattner et al. 2020) to Pablo Castelló's (2025) theorising of a deliberative zoodemocracy based on his fieldwork at VINE.

I argue that as researchers turned their gaze towards the internal dynamics of FASes, they have produced an analysis that FASes are not solely engaged in conflicts against external forces of institutionalised animal exploitation, but are in fact sites of conflicts in themselves. Because of the strong political need to support the important work performed by FASes, some animal studies scholars and members of FASes may be suspicious and critical of this framing; however, my argument based on my research is that realistically, negativity and discordance exist within FASes alongside the positive and affirmative attributes of FASes. Despite the constructive descriptions and interpretations of interspecies interactions, such as human responsiveness towards other animals through embodied acts of care, or explorations in ways to accommodate other animals' needs and preferences, the flipside is also an acknowledgment that animal residents routinely challenge human authority and may often live in conflict with each other, spawning the need for processes such as deliberations and negotiations. Donaldson and Kymlicka explicitly acknowledge conflicting positionalities within FASes when they state their concern that human decision-making may reproduce hierarchical and paternalistic relations between human caretakers and farmed animal residents within FASes (2015, 56). Ultimately, I contend that interspecies antagonism persists in FASes because these spaces do not exist outside of an all-encompassing human sovereignty according to Wadiwel's conceptualisation, whereby human sovereignty regulates "micro spheres that stretch across almost all modes of human existence" (2015, 24). That is to say, as much as FASes participate in resisting human domination of farmed animals, they do so from within the structures and conditions of said domination.

One reason to emphasise this view is that it may be too easy to imagine that FASes are isolated from the conditions of human domination of animals that pervade wider society. However, given the totalising inescapability of human sovereignty, the protective boundaries of FASes are in fact quite permeable, where much of the internal challenges are always

interactively shaped by external forces and conditions. Elan Abrell (2021) highlights these aspects of sanctuary-in-conflict in his observations of the tensions, contradictions, and paradoxes surrounding ethical and political dilemmas produced by hierarchical relationships between species, as well as the broader sociopolitical and economic structures and systems that animal sanctuaries are forced to interact with, which often compel animal sanctuaries to make certain "sacrifices" according to sacrificial logics. Broadly, some of the most significant challenges Abrell highlights include the restriction of animal agency and autonomy for the animals' own sake or for the wellbeing of the greater sanctuary communities; the political economy of the nonprofit industries that sanctuaries are forced to navigate in order to sustain themselves; as well as what Abrell terms "necro-care," where caregivers consider the killing of some animals to be necessary to promote or sustain the lives of other rescued animals, as exemplified in the feeding of some animals to rescued carnivores. In other examples, Abrell points out that "[s]anctuaries are embedded within many of the same political–economic systems of animal use that they seek to challenge, such as the animal agriculture industry and the animal entertainment industry" (2021, 18). The dependence of sanctuaries on the very same supply chains that animal industries have created for provisions of food, housing materials, equipment, and other resources such as veterinarian care and knowledge is one illustration of the limitations of individual boycotts against animal exploitation, and the need for structural transformations.

Beyond having to navigate difficult ethical challenges and dependency on agricultural industries, there are examples of other externally imposed direct harms against FASes that they have little control over. Examples include biological disasters such as endemic and pandemic spread of zoonotic diseases that threaten the lives of sanctuary animals, as well as extreme weather events and climate disasters such as floods and fires, all of which have been exacerbated by capitalist systems of extraction and production, including industrial animal agricultural systems (Eccles and Chang 2024).

On top of these harms and threats, FASes are also vulnerable against authorities that may enforce existing speciesist laws and biosecurity measures against sanctuaries. As Marie Leth-Espensen (2023) points out, "while sanctuary generally implies a place where the law does not apply or that promises legal immunity," FASes "cannot promise animals protection from the law" because "harmful, legal provisions concerning keeping domesticated animals continue to apply even after the animals have been removed from sites of exploitation" (22). In discussing

forms of trauma that FASes experience, Maria Martelli (2024) recounts the story of Cuori Liberi (meaning Free/Liberated Heart), a FAS in Pavia, Italy, which lost most of their pig residents when the African Swine Fever (ASF) spread to Northern Italy. Although some of the pigs at Cuori Liberi survived the exposure to ASF, political authorities served an order to cull the surviving sanctuary pigs in attempt to stamp out the virus and protect the pig farming industry from future exposures. In response to the cull order, groups of animal activists gathered at the gate of Cuori Liberi and formed a blockade in defense of the sanctuary and its residents. Despite the efforts of the activists, riot police violently broke through and arrested several activists, then raided the sanctuary with veterinarians, where they removed and killed the remaining pigs. Elsewhere, I have also discussed a case where the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted raids against two FASes in the United States in attempt to track down and remove several pigs rescued by animal liberation activists, and invasively collected biological samples from piglets at the sanctuaries in the process (see Struthers Montford et al. 2025). These examples of direct harms and violations against FASes further reveal the inescapable fields of conflict within which sanctuaries are entrapped.

All of the examples above exemplify how FASes have been severely constrained by and entangled within the various forms of inter-subjective, institutional, and epistemic violence that constitute human sovereignty in a war against nonhuman animals (Wadiwel 2015). In response to the limits of FASes, scholars engaging with sanctuaries have pushed towards considering how the work of sanctuaries could be connected to broader political struggles and projects that work to transform the hegemonic political and economic regimes that enable institutional violence to continue both within and external to sanctuaries, against humans and nonhumans alike. Beyond being creative experimental spaces to forge alternative lifeways with other animals, FASes have also been reconceptualised as sites of resistance aimed at influencing larger scale social transformations, in conjunction and coalition with other social justice movements.

For example, Donaldson and Kymlicka (2015) have suggested the need to consider how FASes and the animal movement more broadly might move beyond single-issue advocacy to deepen relationships with wider segments of society in order to attain institutional change for farmed animals. Timothy Pachirat (2018) urges those involved in sanctuary work to consider "[w]hat might it mean to rethink sanctuary more broadly as a site of resistance in the fight for global social justice, one that recognizes how the human–nonhuman divide authorizes violence

against all who are deemed to be less than human?" (350-51). Following Pachirat and antiracist abolitionist thinkers, Abrell posits that the "intersectional or coalitional potential of sanctuary as a form of liberatory political action and transformation could enable it to contribute to a much larger and historically longer, unfinished abolitionist political project" (2021, 193). Theorising "animal agriculture as a colonial-capitalist ruins and farmed animals as subjects of ruination," Gillespie (2022) "argues that sanctuaries for formerly farmed animals perform practical spatial and relational activities that imagine and manifest lives of flourishing for these species outside of capitalist logics and within and beyond the ruins of colonial-capitalism" (1110).

However, as R.D. (2021) argues, FASes in settler-colonial contexts could be understood as "a form of animal advocacy that functions both discursively as a settler move to innocence and materially as dispossession through the logic of *terra nullius*" (107, emphasis in original). This is because most existing FASes on stolen Indigenous lands have been "rendered tangible and operationalized only through the ongoing functions of settler colonial-capitalist relations," such as "enclosure and privatization" (R.D. 2021, 108). For these reasons, participation in more radical transformative projects such as those suggested by Pachirat, Abrell, and Gillespie would also explicitly demand that FASes attend to how they might contribute to confronting and dismantling relations of private property under settler-colonialism and capitalism. In some ways, the work that some animal sanctuaries perform, such as encouraging humans to "move away from relating to animals as mere objects treated and valued as property" and unmaking "property-based relationships with animals" by permanently removing rescued animals from the capitalist commodity chains, may already be moving in a compatible direction with other emancipatory and justice movements (Abrell 2021, 15-16, 20). Similarly, works on animal sanctuaries within critical animal geographies that explore how sanctuaries attempt to decommodify animals, or unmake animals as living commodities or lively capitals, also suggest a possible overlap with other transformative anti-capitalist and anti-colonial projects (Collard 2020; Rosenfeld 2024). In the next section, I turn to briefly look at how a body of literature exploring animal resistance complements the above calls for anticolonial and anti-capitalist solidarities by situating and positioning nonhuman animals as subjects and agents always already struggling against oppressive structures.

2.3 Animal Resistance

Unlike the literature on FASes, which mostly began to emerge after the advancement of critical animal studies and animal politics had been underway, animal resistance literature traces back to Jason Hribal's work throughout the 2000s. Most animal resistance literature to this day cites Hribal's (2003) article, "'Animals Are Part of the Working Class': A Challenge to Labour History" as perhaps the earliest formal articulation of nonhuman animals as exploited workers within capitalist systems, as well as Hribal's (2007) historical positioning of nonhuman animals within class relations. As such, the work of theorising and conceptualising animal resistance has often contextualised expressions of animal agency against human violence as forms of resistance against the appropriations of nonhuman animal labour within capitalist systems, thus aligning animal resistance with historically Left labour struggles. Examples of forms of agency in this context include violent struggles where nonhuman animals fight back against their human exploiters, but could also include nonviolent refusals such as ceasing work and cooperation with humans (Hribal 2003, 449).

Much of the animal resistance literature building on Hribal's work continues the anti-capitalist trajectory. For instance, Tim Reijsoo's (2024) historicising of animal resistance examines how colonial-capitalist industries such as zoos and circuses have developed various violent technologies and methods aimed at disciplining captive animals and prevent their escape. Sarat Colling's (2021) comprehensive overview of diverse forms of animal resistance is contextualised within contemporary material conditions and property relations shaped and reproduced by global capitalism. Out of this labour-oriented and anti-capitalist trajectory, literature that theorise animal labour and discuss animals as workers could arguably all be regarded as about animal resistance to varying extents. These would include, for example, the works of Kendra Coulter (2015) and Blattner et al. (2019) that speculate the various promises and implications for interspecies solidarity and justice through the recognition of nonhuman animals as workers and labourers throughout society. Wadiwel's argument that animals exploited in food production "were fabricated as a distinct structural class" and a labour force under capitalism (2023, 14), and his analysis of how capitalist "systems of production and exchange…parasitically feed upon the productive capacities and creativity" of the animal bodies that labour in said systems (2015, 14), further exemplify Leftist analysis of human-animal labour relations through the animal resistance framework.

However, given the overarching reach of human sovereignty in defining all human-animal relations in all spheres of life, recognitions of animal resistance have also expanded to include forms of antagonistic animal responses to humans beyond unambiguous sites, conditions, and relations of labour exploitation and value extraction (such as industrial animal farming and slaughter, or zoos and circuses) and into a variety of contact zones where humans and other animals encounter each other. This move towards more generalised notions of animal resistance sees the concept often included or framed within discussions about animal agency more broadly. For instance, Traci Warkentin (2009) situates her examination of cetacean resistance in captivity through the wider framework of animal agency. Meanwhile, Eva Meijer (2019) draws extensively on animal resistance literature in her theorising of interspecies democracy, recognising that animal resistance constitutes a key dimension of how humans might respond to the agency of other animals, and to negotiate and deliberate with other species in situations such as human-wildlife conflicts over space. This does not mean that such frameworks exist outside conditions and relations dictated by capital, but their alternative framings aim to capture other forms of interspecies contact and relations.

Another aspect of animal resistance involves investigations of how humans, whether the general public or specific segments of society, respond to witnessing forms of animal resistance. Colling observes how when animals escape from private spheres into public spheres and become visible, they interrupt the "distancing strategies" of those who consume and profit from animal exploitation and "cause a physical and conceptual rupture by occupying spaces where they are considered 'out of place'" (2021, 83). However, as Aylon Cohen (2016) cautions, expressions of animal resistance are always contextual and "remain contestable and open to interpretations" (261). Being always open to epistemic and discursive contestations means that expressions of animal resistance are not free from being appropriated by reactionary forces, from run-of-the-mill conservatives to outright fascists. One could imagine, for instance, a situation where white supremacists might delight at members of glorified animal species historically identified with masculinity and superiority, such as lions and wolves, killing Black and brown people regardless of context. In fact, Claire Jean Kim's (2015; 2017) case studies of impassioned disputes across racial, cultural, and species boundaries, such as football player Michael Vick's dogfighting charges, or the killing of Harambe, a gorilla held captive in the Cincinnati Zoo, to protect a Black

child who had fallen into Harembe's enclosure, demonstrate how such disputes can reproduce simultaneously racist and speciesist tropes rooted in hierarchical zoological and racial orders.

As such, the work of contextualising and framing acts of animal resistance inflicted on humans by nonhuman animals is part and parcel of Left engagements with animal resistance. One example of contesting potentially competing interpretations of animal resistance could be seen in Alexandra Isfahani-Hammond's (2023) analysis of public responses to a series of orca attacks against ships and boats throughout the Atlantic Ocean:

> "As I see it, public glee about wrecked surfboards and yachts hints at a certain flavor of schadenfreude. At a time marked by drastic socioeconomic disparities, white supremacy and environmental degradation, casting these marine mammals as revolutionaries seems like a projection of desires for social justice and habitable ecosystems…I believe quips about the marine mammal rebellion reflect awareness that our human interests are entwined with those of nonhuman animals. The desire to achieve sustainable relationships with other species and the natural world feels palpable to me within the memes and media coverage. And it's happening as human-caused activity makes our shared habitats increasingly unlivable" (2023).

Lastly, Lauren Corman (2017) shows how conceptions of animal resistance might challenge the animal movements' persistent tendency to "reduce nonhuman animal subjectivities to representations of suffering and victimization" while neglecting "richer versions of animal experiences beyond suffering" (252). However, even the more critical approaches that apply the intersectionality framework to highlight how the domination of animals is interlocked with other forms of oppression in mutually-reinforcing ways nonetheless tend to reproduce animals as suffering victims, precisely due to their overemphasis on oppression and domination (Corman 2017, 253-54). Responding to this reduction of complexities in animal subjectivities to a state of perpetual victimhood, Corman argues for an "including but beyond suffering approach" articulated "at the intersections of nonhuman animal liberation, critical animal studies, and cognitive ethology" (2017, 255, 265-66). The result is a call to become more "attuned to other animals' own forms of sociality, emotionality, and in some cases culturality," and to recognize animals' capacities for joy and pleasure, in ways that are "more closely aligned with other social

justice movements and associated scholarship that increasingly emphasize the agency and resistance of their subjects," thus making the movement "less about saving others but more about striving for solidarity" (Corman 2017, 261). Shifting representations of animals as powerless and voiceless victims towards animals as socially and culturally complex agentic beings through critical and anticolonial/postcolonial theories is demonstrative of a coalitional merging between the historically Leftist 'from below' approaches to animal resistance and the feminist, posthumanist emphasis on affect, embodiment, and relationality of nonhuman animal subjectivities.

I argue that broadening our considerations of animal resistance to include the complex socialities and relations of care and interdependence amongst nonhuman animals not only enriches and expands our conceptions of animal resistance, but may also move us towards embracing animal sanctuaries as embodiments of collective multispecies resistance, where the long-term labour of caring for and with other animals take place. I suggest that it may also heighten our curiosity to the lives of formerly exploited animals who have escaped and formed their own autonomous feral communities beyond celebrating just the initial escape, and give us a greater appreciation of their post-captive lives.

2.4 Re-animalisation

I apply and expand on Krithika Srinivasan's (2022) concept of re-animalisation as one of the primary theoretical lenses to analyse the data in this study. Srinivasan presents re-animalisation as a response and alternative to the 'protection-sacrifice' logics functioning in the context of development (2022, 353). Protection-sacrifice logics produce an understanding of human wellbeing rooted in forms of "zoöpolitical exceptionalisms," where human lives and health are always prioritised, even if it produces injustices through large scales of harm and violence against more-than-humans (Srinivasan 2022, 353). Some examples of such harms include the exploitation of other animals and organisms in biomedical research aimed at prolonging human lives and protecting humans against diseases, industrial agriculture's use of petro-chemicals, and large-scale resource extraction projects causing devastations in multispecies or ecological communities. Furthermore, Srinivasan points out that such problems are rooted in zoöpolitical exceptionalism for humans, and "are not restricted to capitalist regimes" or "capitalist logics of economic growth, commodification and extractivism," because conventional

strategies in development organised around natural resource extraction pervade "even community-oriented, left-leaning governments and civil society groups" (2022, 354).

In response to the crises of zoöpolitical exceptionalism, re-animalisation calls for redistributing "the risks of earthly living," such as hunger, mortality from disease, ill health, natural disasters, and risks posed by other animals, such that they would be taken on by humans, particularly those who are more socio-economically privileged and insulated against these risks, and thereby moving us beyond our "more-than-animal norms" and placing us as one amongst other animal species (2022, 363). In this manner, re-animalisation demands a radical form of human vulnerability that breaks down the nature-society divide. The prefix 're' in re-animalisation indicates the fact that humans have always been biologically animals, and that it was through the pursuit of material interests reinforced by ideological indoctrination that humans have come to separate ourselves from the rest of nature. However, Srinivasan acknowledges that re-animalisation encounters issues in relation to dehumanisation in a world where not all humans enjoy equal ethico-political status due to historical and ongoing oppressions, which sees that many humans continue to be categorised and treated as subhuman, and where 'animal' is coded with negative meanings (2022, 363-64).

To address problems related to dehumanisation, Srinivasan suggests a number of approaches to demonstrate how "*becoming and being animal*" can be achieved without resulting in "a demotion of ethico-political status" (2022, 364, emphasis in original). One such approach includes developing "grammars" to critique and contest the processes of dehumanisation without relying on referencing "being animals or animalised" as negative, which could involve challenging dehumanising practices such as torture and incarceration in and of themselves regardless of the species of those subjected to such violence (Srinivasan 2022, 364). Another approach involves shifting our imaginations of human relations with more-than-humans through alternative narratives, such as highlighting the interconnectedness and interdependence of human and nonhuman wellbeing, and focusing on how animalising humans could open up new aspects of wellbeing previously unconsidered (Srinivasan 2022, 364). In a similar manner but in the legal context, Maneesha Deckha (2023) has also argued that animalisation could be understood and embraced as "something positive and affirming" and more compatible with Indigenous legal orders that "emphasize kinship, connection, and interdependence with animals" (12). And lastly, Srinivasan emphasises that "re-animalisation needs to be carried out with attention to social

justice" by taking into account the existing inequities between privileged and oppressed humans (2022, 364). Such inequities shape the disparities in the levels of insulation from more-than-humans, the possession of and access to material resources, and the vulnerability to risks. The implication of recognising these inequities is that re-animalisation requires prioritising "divesting the privileged (humans) of their multifarious layers of insulation (from nonhuman nature) as a way of approaching justice" (Srinivasan 2022, 364).

Overall, I agree with Srinivasan's analysis as well as her suggestions for how we might respond to perspectives that view re-animalisation as a problematic endeavour. While Srinivasan states that the pursuit of human wellbeing through zoöpolitically exceptionalist frameworks and mechanisms are near-universal in the context of development, she has also nuanced this claim by referencing ecofeminist and Indigenous scholarship that exist as radically alternative ontologies that prioritise interdependence and relationality (2022, 353, 360). In my extension of Srinivasan's work by adopting re-animalisation as an analytical framework, I aim to offer some clarification that could help address positions that problematise animalisation by conflating it with dehumanisation. To do so, I distinguish between three types of animalisation to illustrate the distinct processes and dynamics I am describing, and identify which one in particular is the most relevant to my research. To be clear, while distinguishing animalisation into the typology below offers some precision in how I choose to operationalise the concept, the three types of animalisation are by no means disconnected. Quite the contrary, as will be explained below, each type of animalisation highlights the different locations of agency and forces working towards a particular outcome, but all three are in fact relationally intertwined and constantly interactive.

2.4.1 Three Types of Animalisation

The first type of animalisation I am proposing is synonymous with dehumanisation and is a process by which oppressive forces in society explicitly depict groups of humans they seek to marginalise and dominate as nonhuman animals, so as to justify violence against them. We could call this *animalisation as dehumanisation*, which is a form of animalisation/dehumanisation that occurs when some humans have been structurally and institutionally enabled to animalise others. This type of animalisation/dehumanisation finds plenty of historical and contemporary examples. Claire Jean Kim's (2015) case studies in the United States, for instance, uncovers how race and species operate as taxonomies of power utilised by white humans to categorise all nonwhite

humans and other animals along a hierarchy beneath them, with varying degrees of proximity and distance to the fully-human whites. This is consistent with what Dinesh Wadiwel terms "hierarchical anthropocentrism," understood as "a set of knowledge relations associated with the European Enlightenment, which categorised and ranked humans and animals into a 'great chain of being' and provided a rationale for downwards violence and exploitation" (2023, vii).

It is important to note that Kim pushes back against the conventional understanding of animalisation as an act by which powerful groups demote less powerful groups from the human category into the animal category, thereby taking away all the rights and privileges exclusively owed to humans; rather, Kim argues that racialised groups were always already seen as animal or animal-like, meaning that they were "never seen as fully human to begin with," and so they have never possessed the human status that could be taken away (2015, 24). This argument is supported by the abundance of evidence Kim draws on to illustrate how Black, Indigenous, and Chinese people have been "imaginatively located in the borderlands between full humanity and animality," mainly in the United States (2015, 31). However, Kim's argument is also particular to the context of her investigation, meaning that it is tied to the history of the United States, how racialised nonwhites have always been seen as less-than-human by whites since initial encounters, and how those legacies continue to impact race and species relations in contemporary U.S.

My considerations around animalisation and dehumanisation differs from Kim's in that I am primarily concentrating on the specific moments in which the act of demoting or excluding humans from the human status do in fact occur, as well as the mechanisms involved. One way to think about this is to recognise how the fact that those upholding supremacist ideologies feel the need to produce racist and speciesist propaganda depicting oppressed humans as animals in order to justify and promote violence against the oppressed actually affirms the humanity of the oppressed at the same time. Focusing on moments of dehumanisation makes sense in the contemporary context in which there is general consensus and global consciousness that all who are biologically human ought to possess a shared set of fundamental human rights, as formally and institutionally enshrined through instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nonetheless, it is important to hold on to the understanding that many humans have never been fully human in the eyes of their oppressors, as it is precisely this same awareness that

carries a radically subversive potential for re-animalisation, which brings us to the second type of animalisation.

The agency and intentionality reside within the individuals who choose to identify as animals and/or identify with other animals in the second type of animalisation. We could describe this as *voluntary animalisation*, which is the second form of animalisation I propose. There are a number of ways through which voluntary animalisation might occur. Individuals belonging to oppressed groups who have been animalised/dehumanised by oppressive forces may decide to embrace, claim, or assert their animality rather than turning away from it. Another way that one might come to identify with other animals, or identify oneself as an animal, could happen relationally through the influence of other animals and more-than-humans generally. It is often a combination of these factors (or more) that engender the turn towards embracing animality. Through their personal stories and research, environmental arts and justice scholar Andil Gosine, as well as artist and critical disability studies scholar Sunaura Taylor, show in their respective works some arguments for claiming animality and the challenges associated with this task.

In *Nature's Wild: Love, Sex, and Law in the Caribbean*, Gosine is primarily concerned with how the civilising discourses that hinge on the human/animal binary have historically been used by colonial powers to place the onus on Caribbean people, as they have similarly placed on other colonised subjects, Black people, queer people, and marginalised people in general, to prove themselves "to be *human, not animal*" (2021, 133, emphasis in original). In this context, Gosine meditates on "what possibilities both disregard to demands to prove ourselves human and our embrace of animality might produce" (2021, 12). As Gosine explains:

> The claim of 'animal' as an identity at this time is…an aspirational acknowledgment in two ways. First, it is a reach toward redemption from practices of excessive *discipline* and *production*. Second, it is a declaration of willful but not always achievable solidarity with all animals in a moment of global ecological crisis, when more than one million species are threatened with extinction – more than at any other moment in history. (2021, 143-144, emphasis in original)

Regarding this gesture of solidarity with other animals, Gosine underscores that it is not an act of benevolence; rather, it is a recognition of the need forinterdependence with other animals, "both in the grander sense of planetary connectedness on which human life depends and in the most intimate sense," such as when his dog companion Lulu lifts him from feelings of despair (2021, 144).

Nevertheless, matters of social justice remains pertinent, and Gosine is cognizant of how "[s]ome people get to embrace their animality more than others depending on the context in which they live," and how the "[p]rivileges of masculinity, able-bodiedness, class, heterosexuality, and whiteness allow some people to 'get on like animals' without consequences that could be terminal for marginalized subjects" (2021, 141). This attentiveness to the potential negative consequences of animalisation relative to one's social location is shared by Sunaura Taylor, who engages with philosopher Licia Carlson on the question of whether it is even possible for disabled people to reassert their animality (2017, 110). While Carlson believes reasserting one's animality could be a powerful act, she "urges us to remember that for many human beings an identification with animals or animality may not be possible or safe, even if it were in some way desirable" (Taylor 2017, 110). Taylor concludes from these reflections that "[s]peciesism doesn't necessarily keep people from wanting to identify as animal; dehumanisation does," and asks us to consider "how we can assert both our humanity and animality," especially for those who have been compared to nonhuman animals in negative ways, to do so "without either implying human superiority or denying our very own animality" (2017, 110).

In *Beasts of Burden: Animal and Disability Liberation,* Sunaura Taylor articulates a nuanced and critical analysis of what she sees as inseparable connections between violence and discrimination against nonhuman animals and disabled humans. Informed in part by her own animal and disability rights advocacy work spanning decades, Taylor also draws on her stories and lived experiences as someone born with arthrogryposis (a condition due to joint contracture), which often saw other humans comparing her to other animals throughout her life. Taylor shares that in her life, she has been told that she walks like a monkey, eats like a dog, possesses hands like a lobster, and resembles a chicken or penguin (2017, 104). Even though some of these comparisons have been intended as insults, Taylor maintains that to her, "identifying as animal has always felt right" (2017, 114). Beyond the fact that she has always cared about the wellbeing

of other animals since she was a child, Taylor describes being and identifying as an animal in very embodied ways, as she states:

> I feel animal in my embodiment, and this feeling is one of connection, not shame. Recognizing my animality has in fact been a way of claiming the dignity in the way my body and other non-normative and vulnerable bodies move, look, and experience the world around them. It is claiming of my animalized parts and movements, an assertion that my animality is integral to my humanity. It's an assertion that animality is integral to *humanity* (2017, 115, emphasis in original).

Taylor stresses that this embodied feeling of being an animal is not metaphorical, "not that we are *like* animals or that the *idea* of animals is integral to who we are," but the fact that we simply *are* animals (2017, 115, emphasis in original). Like Gosine, Taylor has also attributed her identification with other animals to a specific nonhuman animal: Bailey, a service dog who became physically disabled himself years after Taylor had adopted him. Together, Taylor became Bailey's service human just as Bailey became Taylor's service dog, making them "vulnerable, interdependent beings of different species learning to understand what the other one needs," caring for each other "awkwardly and imperfectly" (2017, 223).

The stories and analyses of both Gosine and Taylor portray voluntary animalisation. Against oppressive forms of animalisation/dehumanisation, a combination of critical reflections and actual interdependent relationships with other animals led each of them to embrace, claim, or assert their animality on their own terms. At the same time, it is clear that voluntary animalisation occurs through a strenuous mediation between the animalising subject responding to both dehumanising forces and the subjectivities of other animals. Here, the third type of animalisation that I am proposing places the latter, the nonhuman animals, into the focal point.

The third type of animalisation underscores the subjectivity and agency of nonhuman animals in affecting the animalisation of humans. We might name this *animal-guided animalisation*. In utilising and further developing re-animalisation as a theoretical framework, animal-guided animalisation will be the main focus throughout the rest of this thesis. I argue that animal-guided animalisation goes beyond the mere influence of individual animals, as it is a process supported by broader social norms and structures shaped by other animals. On an

individual level, animal-guided animalisation has been exemplified to some extend by the oft-cited story of ecofeminist and philosopher Val Plumwood's near-death experience of becoming prey to a crocodile while canoeing, which made her contemplate how the realisation that humans as edible and killable beings to other animals undermines the exceptionalist status of humans, as well as the ethical implications associated with this realisation (2012, 91). However, it is more difficult and thus far underexplored as to how animalisation might occur on a structural level, beyond the intersubjective encounters between individual or even groups of humans and more-than-humans.

One approach to make sense of animal-guided animalisation is to consider how power operates institutionally to enable humans to dehumanise/animalise other humans, and consider what kind of institutional and structural forces other animals would require on similar scales to animalise us. In terms of dehumanisation, those who are able to mark others as animals to violent effects must possess sufficient institutional and material privilege in order to not only drive the animalising narratives aimed at their targets, but to also generate the stigmatising impacts of these narratives on sociopolitical and cultural scales. That is to say, the social categorisation involved in dehumanisation is not a benign cosmology, but always accompanied by material force and violence. The purpose of starting with dehumanisation should not lead us to falsely assume that animal-guided animalisation simply occurs at the other end of a spectrum opposite anthropogenic dehumanisation, or that the two processes somehow mirror each other. Substantiating such assumptions would require knowledge regarding whether and how other animals might conceptually categorise humans according to in-group/out-group dynamics, and given our limited knowledge, we cannot acertain whether and how other animals might place humans and other species within a given socially constructed order, whether hierarchical or not.

The purpose of starting with dehumanisation as a conceptual entry point is rather meant to assist us in coming to terms with the amount of historical and ongoing exploitation and dispossession of other humans and nonhuman animals required to allow privileged and oppressive groups to monopolise and uphold power structures that benefit them. Specific to human-nonhuman relations, this means recognising that humans could not have attained institutional privilege and self-legitimising authority without extracting tremendous amounts of value from other animals. Taking farmed animals for example, Wadiwel identifies at least three value forms in which animals appear under capitalism: consumption commodity, raw material,

and labour (2023, 1-2). Material and structural conditions that enable human supremacy or hierarchical anthropocentrism to persist would have been impossible for humans to accomplish and reproduce without the ceaseless extraction of such values from other animals, whether through consuming their bodies, profiting from their labour, and/or destroying their homes and social relations. One implication of this acknowledgement most pertinent to this thesis is that nonhuman animals cannot attain and exert such institutional forces against humans without the assistance from humans, just as humans have never actually built our human exceptionalist world on our own without often violently producing benefits by usurping other species. From this vantage point, we could then begin to try and imagine the magnitude of repair, or reparation to be more precise, that is required to enable other animals to animalise humans.

Furthermore, while sustained intersubjective engagement with other animals through various forms of encounter might be a crucial part of animal-guided animalisation, I suggest that ultimately, like animal resistance, animal-guided animalisation requires interpretations through different and sometimes competing epistemological and theoretical frameworks in order to enable humans to be guided by relations and interactions with other animals, and/or through observations of other animals. This is aptly illustrated in Alexis Pauline Gumbs' (2020) book *Undrowned: Black Feminist Lessons from Marine Mammals*. Gumbs shares an abundance of emancipatory lessons that marine mammals could teach us if were to learn from observations of marine mammals through a Black feminist lens. These lessons include practices of self and collective care, how to learn from and work through conflicts, how to resist and abolish capitalism. However, just as Black feminist lessons from marine mammals exist, one could just as easily imagine white supremacist lessons from given types of animals that white supremacists might be drawn to. In a similar manner to Gumbs, significant portions of my thesis are explorations of what lessons and insights we might be able to learn from the farmed animal residents at FASes, or how we might be guided by farmed animals, if we applied an animal resistance lens to interpreting and observing their lives. In considering animal-guided animalisation, I am also keenly aware of how this term may be mistakenly construed as an instrumentalisation of other animals similar to Animal-Assisted Therapy. Contrary to using animals for the purpose of human re-animalisation, I propose that animal-guided animalisation can and should only occur through genuinely respectful and reciprocal relations with other animals, where the interactions transpire on the animals' own terms.

By engaging re-animalisation with significant portions of my ethnographic data, this thesis demonstrates how the specific farmed animal sanctuary at which I conducted fieldwork gives us a glimpse of what human-assisted animal-guided animalisation might look like at structural and institutional levels. Re-animalisation aids as a reflexive lens, allowing me to conceptualise how I as a researcher participates in an animalisation process in my interactions with animal residents at the sanctuary, through the various roles I adopt and perform in relation to them, as well as the significance of these reflections on the promises and challenges that the FAS in my study embody in their attempts to realise more just relations with other animals and more-than-human ecologies.

2.5 Multispecies Justice

Justice theory, including Environmental Justice, has been largely anthropocentric until recently. Donna Haraway (2008) first spoke of "multispecies justice and well-being" in her influential book *When Species Meet*, where she articulates the ethical challenges in navigating and addressing multifaceted harms impacting complex webs of multispecies relations (280). Over a decade later, Multispecies Justice (MSJ) has been established by a growing number of researchers as an emergent interdisciplinary field of study aimed at tackling the exacerbating crises threatening the lives of all species on this planet. These crises include anthropogenic climate catastrophes fueled by extractive industries that continue the legacies of imperialist and colonial-capitalist projects, reaching every corner of our globalised world. The term "polycrisis" (Lawrence et al. 2024) aptly captures the linked and diverse nature of these myriad disasters, against which MSJ attempts to confront. As such, MSJ is often presented as an alternative to dominant and hegemonic justice theories, practices, and institutions failing to deliver justice and are "not up to the task of attending to the multiple dimensions and experiences of injustice in a multispecies world" (Chao and Celermajer 2023, 2).

Numerous scholars have taken initial steps in outlining the contours of MSJ. Critical of how the mainstreamed conception of climate justice often fall short due to its "persistent silencing of voices belonging to multiple 'others'" and its failure to challenge the violence of human exceptionalism, Tschakert et al. (2021) examine how MSJ might generate "truly inclusive and responsible pathways forward" along with the tools we need to "become and be otherwise," advocating for MSJ as an alternative concept that enriches the existing climate justice frame by

decentering “both the human and the individual,” emphasising at the same time the relationality and inclusivity of all beings (2021, 2-4). Whereas climate justice advocates often replicate multiple and pervasive erasures along race, class, or gender dimensions, “perpetuate structural racism and intersecting traumas” through programs that overlook the “histories of colonialism, oppression, and exclusion” that current climate emergencies are rooted in, MSJ opposes human exceptionalism and all the hierarchies entrenched within it (Tschakert et al. 2021, 3).

In contrast with mainstreamed climate justice framework, Tschakert et al. lay out “four parameters or coordinates” of MSJ: intersectional, inclusive, response-able, and cosmopolitical (2021, 5). According to these parameters, MSJ is committed to the recognition that realising justice requires attending to the “the simultaneity of identities and categories of difference and inequalities (race, class, gender, age, ability, species, and beings)” interlocked within oppressive structures, and the ways in which ecological harms are “intertwined with social injustices” (Tschakert et al. 2021, 5). Against individualism, MSJ is inclusive through its “relational ontology, ethics, and politics that acknowledges the vast relational web of co-existence within and across species” (Tschakert et al. 2021, 5). Building on Haraway’s concept of response-ability, MSJ seeks to develop “diverse ways of knowing” as a means to grapple with how we might become more response-able, or better equipped at responding to more-than-humans, which may involve “learning to attend, respond, and articulate” in ways beyond verbal communication and drawing on relational frameworks (Tschakert et al. 2021, 6). Lastly, cosmopolitics calls for picturing “a type of politics for addressing the climate emergency that encompasses diverse experiences, emotions, practices, and perspectives, and embraces both deliberation and disruption,” against “narrow technocratic and neoliberal solutions to climate change” (Tschakert et al. 2021, 7).

Consistent with these coordinates, Celermajer et al. (2021) trace the intellectual and political origins of MSJ as a research field to animal rights, environmental justice and political ecology, posthumanism, as well as Indigenous philosophies and decolonising justice theories. As shaped by these theories and epistemologies, the central features, essential themes, and research agenda for the MSJ project include four areas. First, MSJ radically rethinks the subject of justice beyond those with traditionally proffered characteristics based on the human individual. Second, MSJ demands “numerous shifts in the patterns of legal and cultural recognition” to address the status injuries resulting from misrecognition of more-than-human subjects (Celermajer et al.

2021, 128). Third, MSJ enables alternative ways of knowing and communicating, evoking recognition in ways that surpass "dispassionate modes of linguistic communication, and explores "aesthetic, affective, and embodied" ways of knowing more-than-humans (Celermajer et al. 2021,129). Fourth, MSJ aims to deconstruct and decolonise the liberal hegemony by following Indigenous approaches, "while remaining alert to the dangers of appropriation" (Celermajer et al. 2021, 129).

Despite the clear foundations, directions, and agenda for MSJ as encapsulated by the aforementioned scholars, key challenges remain for the field. Immanent to the concept and terminology of MSJ itself, every part of multispecies justice, "that is, the multi-, the species- and the justice" are subject to critique, "particularly for their implication in forms of classification and ontologies of separateness" that those working with the term seek to deconstruct (Celermajer et al. 2021, 121). Feminist posthumanist scholar Sue Reid, for example, prefers the term 'multibeing' over 'multispecies' (Celermajer et al. 2020, 507). Reid's shift to thinking through issues with 'multibeing justice' instead of 'multispecies justice' is an act of resistance against "the violent logics of colonialism and biological determinism embedded within the Linnaean term *species,*" which obscures the relationality between "organismic and elemental entities" with its strict delineations (Chao and Celermajer 2023, 12, emphasis in original).

With regards to challenges for the political project of institutionalising MSJ, Celermajer et al. (2021) present an overview of four topics requiring further examinations. The first challenge concerns the advantages and disadvantages of relying on the concepts of personhood and rights as defined and applied within the liberal tradition to advocate for the inclusion and consideration of more-than-humans. The authors suggest that while granting rights to more-than-humans or recognising their personhood within liberal states may enable their inclusion and participation in political decision-making, the same process may "risk reinscribing anthropocentric assumptions" and "replicate existing exclusions" given the logics of hierarchy historically entrenched within liberal conceptions of personhood and rights (Celermajer et al. 2021, 130). The second challenge pertains to how we might imagine new forms of deliberation and representation that are more responsive to more-than-humans and "incorporate the pluriverse in which we are immersed" (Celermajer et al. 2021, 132). Thirdly, there are concerns regarding the conflicts and exclusions that already exist or may arise, both within and between species, when attempting to enact multispecies justice. Some demonstrative cases include dilemmas in

conservation projects that designate some beings as ethically killable in order to preserve others; tensions and conflicts between animal rights groups and (often Indigenous) communities whose subsistence and cultural health rely on killing animals; as well as what different movements take to be priorities according to the urgency and immediacy of the harms they are experiencing (Celermajer et al 2021, 132-33). Lastly, a plethora of difficult questions surrounding power and strategies remain as to how MSJ could be actualised beyond aspirations and ideals, against established economic and political structures.

With the early formulations of MSJ as detailed above serving as a backdrop in my research, I take a pragmatic or practice-based approach in my application of MSJ as a theoretical framework in this thesis. This pragmatism contains two main assumptions. The first assumption entails acknowledging that the theories and epistemologies brought together by MSJ scholars are grounded or rooted in the practices and relations of real sociopolitical movements and communities that have been struggling against the forces exerting violence against them as well as the kinships and allies they care for. As Chao and Celermajer (2023) make clear in their genealogies of MSJ, "many of the intellectual traditions [they] trace…are rooted in social and political movements spurred by the relentless violence against the more-than-human" (3). This acknowledgment entails the fact that the said sociopolitical movements have concrete or tangible goals they work to achieve, and that they push clearly outlined agenda in pursuing those goals. The second assumption, however, accepts that many of the radical and transformative goals expressed by these movements are more aspirational and utopian within the constraints of existing conditions.

Taking these assumptions, I view the FAS in my study through the MSJ lens to consider how the sanctuary embody the various epistemologies and worldviews that shape MSJ. In Chapters 4 and 5 for instance, I detail how the multispecies relationships among the sanctuary's human and more-than-human residents, the sanctuary practices, and the sanctuary founders' political commitments make up some of the ways in which the sanctuary as a collective entity move towards the ideals of MSJ against the non-ideal conditions they are embedded within. In turn, this explication contributes to the growing body of MSJ research by offering a case study of how an actual multispecies community strives to realise justice for all.

2.6 Conclusion

As I had touched on above in my argument, an explicit formulation and framing of FASes as sites of conflict where humans and other animals engage in forms of antagonism as a result of cohabitating under human sovereignty has largely been avoided in existing literature. My aim throughout this thesis is to demonstrate how antagonism within FASes is not decisively negative and should not be downplayed, and that forms of conflict occurring within the unique conditions of FASes can be potentially productive and should be embraced. My interviews with the founders of the FAS I researched also reflect what Alloun and Cook (2023) describe as embodied experiences of "actually existing intersectionality" amongst the founders. By "actually existing intersectionality," Alloun and Cook refer to the ways in which activists conducting their work through the framework of intersectionality, understood as simultaneously working to oppose multiple interconnected systems of oppression (particularly within settler-colonial contexts as in both their research and in mine), must always navigate and negotiate difficult affective forces in place-based conflicts, which could lead to activists experiencing embodied, visceral affects such as fear and exhaustion depending on the sources of the affective forces. As I will show in later chapters, examining the particular FAS in my study as a site of conflict where the founders are constantly negotiating their obligations to different sets of political commitments ends up engendering forms of apprehension and responses in how they engage in intraspecies and interspecies relations. Furthermore, by thinking through the mediations of conflicts at the sanctuary through re-animalisation and MSJ, my interrogations throughout the thesis ultimately aim to theoretically expand and enrich both frameworks and approaches to human and more-than-human justice.

Chapter 3 – Methodological Frameworks and Methods

This chapter goes through the main methodological frameworks guiding the data collection methods and analyses throughout the thesis. As discussed in the review of farmed animal sanctuary (FAS) literature in the previous chapter, my selection of methodologies here follows the recent ethnographic studies that explore FASes as experimental sites of alternative relations and lifeways with farmed animals. Section 3.1 presents an overview of the more well-established frameworks of political ethnography, multispecies ethnography, and participatory action research (PAR), and how I have applied them to my ethnography at the sanctuary. In section 3.2, I take a slightly unconventional approach by presenting my research methods in a somewhat storied or narrative-driven fashion, describing what I have done for my fieldwork while also introducing the main participants in this study, namely the FAS in Australia where I conducted fieldwork and the sanctuary's founders.

As I detail in the methods section, I have taken the ethnographic approach by volunteering at the sanctuary participating in my study as opposed to employing other methods, such as distanced interviews or surveys, because directly experiencing and participating in the day-to-day life at the sanctuary enables me to observe more closely various practices and relations at the sanctuary that may reflect the sanctuary's politics. Pragmatically speaking, ethnographic research allows me to learn and partake in the sanctuary's essential practices, to build rapport with other human and nonhuman community members, as well as to offer some reciprocity to the sanctuary for offering me the opportunity to study them despite their other demanding obligations and priorities of operating a FAS.

3.1 Politicised Multispecies Ethnography and Multispecies Participatory Action Research

In this section, I discuss the methodological frameworks I apply to my research. Incorporating ethnography and PAR in a political and politicised multispecies context, the following subsections describe how the methods used in my research as understood according to the established frameworks generate a multi-method approach blending ethnographic methods (i.e. participant observation, interviews) with the collaborative methods of PAR.

3.1.1 Political Ethnography

This project is situated within the traditions and trajectories of political ethnography given the methods of the study, the topics and orientation of my research to questions relating to justice and power, the primary theoretical frameworks I have applied to engage with the data as detailed in Chapter 2, which constitute parts of the growing research legitimising animals and more-than-humans as political subjects. This thesis contributes to critical discussions about political ethnography by offering a case study to the literature of a subfield where there is now general acceptance of its diversity and interdisciplinarity.

Political ethnography as a research methodology remains open to contestation with regards to what are the core compositions of the approach. However, on a basic level, political ethnography retains the key elements of traditional ethnography. As Edward Schatz (2009) identifies in the introduction of his edited volume on political ethnography, there are two key principle that reflect its connection to traditional ethnography: (1) immersion in a community, which often involves participant and non-participant observation, and (2) "a *sensibility* that goes beyond face-to-face contact," which one could demonstrate by producing an ethnographic study through intimate "familiarity with and analysis of any collection of human artifacts" that reveal "the meanings people attribute to the world they inhabit" (5-6, emphasis in original). Schatz states that all contributors in the volume embrace the two principles to varying degrees, and argues that while some scholarship may satisfy both principles, a work would sufficiently qualify as ethnographic by satisfying only one of the two (2009, 5). These basic premises find general consensus amongst ethnographers.

However, a debate specific to political ethnography, one that is relevant to this research, concerns what the 'political' means in political ethnography. Responding to this question, Timothy Pachirat (2009) offers two distinct meanings. The first meaning of the political indicates the unique ways that ethnography could contribute to our knowledge about politics, while simultaneously challenging the "established conceptions and boundaries" of what is political (Pachirat 2009, 143-44). The second meaning concerns the reflexivity and the role of the political ethnographer, which "recognizes the embodied nature of ethnographic research and the relationships among perspective, power, and the ethnographic voice that this entails" (Pachirat 2009, 144). The significance of this second meaning is the understanding that "the ethnographic process *itself* is political insofar as fieldwork inevitably locates the ethnographer within networks

of power," which "invites—even requires—the ethnographer to account for the partiality of perspective that shapes" their voice (Pachirat 2009, 144, emphasis in original).

In their response to the same question surrounding how to define the political specifically in political ethnography, Benzecry and Baiocchi (2017) observe that despite a diversity of competing definitions, "in all of them we are still political beings, and as such bring baggage with us in terms of how we ethnocentrically predefine what counts as politics in a particular site" (243). Contrasting to both the clean slate purported by grounded theory and the critical approaches that have the tendency to privilege pre-established and pre-selected theoretical perspectives, Benzecry and Baiocchi propose an actor-centred approach that focuses instead on "the world that informants construct for themselves" (2017, 237). The actor-centred approach is determinedly relational as it asks the ethnographer to attune to the activities and social bonds through which the individual informants define and construct for themselves the meanings of what qualify as political (Benzecry and Baiocchi 2017, 237-39).

Combining Benzecry and Baiocchi's actor-centred relational approach with Pachirat's definition of the political as a process by which the ethnographer is inseparably a part of prevailing power relations affecting the research, the framework I apply to my ethnography recognises the ethnographer (i.e. myself) to be amongst the actors affecting research outcomes in an interactive manner, and requires a reflexive transparency about the partiality I impose throughout the research process. The implications of acknowledging my own political biases and the erosion of a clear demarcation between the ethnographer and informants will become clearer following the next two subsections.

3.1.2 Politicised Multispecies Ethnography

In addition to being a political ethnography, this research is also multispecies in its focus. In their overview of multispecies ethnography as an emerging field of research and writing, Kirksey and Helmreich (2010) state that "multispecies ethnography centers on how a multitude of organisms' livelihoods shape and are shaped by political, economic, and cultural forces" (545). Reviewing multispecies ethnography, Ogden et al. (2013) define its research practices as methods "attuned to life's emergence within a shifting assemblage of agentive beings" (6). According to Ogden et al., much of multispecies ethnography literature have emphasised the process of 'becoming,' where humans are understood as emergent through relations with other

organisms and entities beyond organisms (2013, 6). van Dooren and Rose (2016) offer an alternate framing of "lively ethnography" as a methodology within multispecies studies, where the aim of ethnographic storytelling is to bring the human and more-than-human worlds we encounter "into written form as ethnographies in a way that would give others vitality, presence, perhaps 'thickness' on the page and in the minds and lives of readers" (85).

With regards to the 'multispecies' aspect of multispecies ethnography, van Dooren et al. (2016) call on scholars engaging in multispecies studies to cultivate 'arts of attentiveness' through critical, creative, and collaborative approaches in both paying attention to the diverse lifeways of more-than-humans and fashioning meaningful responses to their agency. In line with this perspective, Hamilton and Taylor (2017) have proposed embodied, multisensorial methods for multispecies ethnography that are visual, auditory, and/or based on physical movements or motions. These methods are informed by feminist theory and exemplify "other-than-textual modes of research" developed to "redress the privileging of language" that continues to dominate the humanities (Hamilton and Taylor 2017, 115). By expanding the epistemic lens to other ways of noticing and processing information, these alternative methods challenge an epistemic hierarchy that places human language above other forms of communication.

Although multispecies ethnography has opened up the possibilities of doing empirical research interactively and intersubjectively with more-than-humans, the methodology has been met with numerous critiques. Hamilton and Taylor (2017) assert a need to oppose anthropocentrism and human superiority in the research process, to be critically conscious of power differentials between researchers and nonhuman subjects, and to be more inclusive of creative artistic approaches not traditionally considered ethnographic. Likewise, Matthew Watson (2016) problematises animal anthropology when the research is "not clearly designed to alter status hierarchies, including interspecies hierarchies perceived from the subject positions of privileged academic humans" (161). Echoing this worry, Kathryn Gillespie (2022) observes that conducting research with other species is a process "wrought with ethical issues because of the profound power imbalances that often subject other species to bodily and reproductive control, instrumentalization, violence, infantilization, and relational severings by humans" (2098-99). For example, María Elena García (2019) reflects through her ethnography of a Peruvian guinea pig farm that conducting multispecies ethnography within places and spaces where other animals experience overt systemic violence could impose severe limitations requiring the ethnographer to

actively inhibit feelings such as grief and sadness at the site, and in doing so, engender instead feelings of shame and guilt out of a connection of betrayal with other animals (356). Given the ways in which violent and exploitative practices define predominant relations between humans and other species, the risks of betraying and disavowing other animals during fieldwork may occur even if the research is intending to improve their lives or their living conditions (Gillespie 2022, 2099).

Responding to these worries and critiques, some scholars have begun to develop ethical guidelines for multispecies studies involving other animals. For instance, Van Patter and Blattner (2020) have proposed advancing a set of ethical principles guided by respect, justice, and reflexivity, such as non-maleficence, beneficence, voluntary participation, and a commitment to animal flourishing as a research goal when conducting non-invasive research with nonhuman animal participants. For artistic methods, organisations such as the College Art Association of America (2011) and Minding Animals (2017) have created and adopted curatorial guidelines informed by Human-Animal Studies and Critical Animal Studies for the use of or working with animal subjects. Some of the guiding commitments include a refusal to trivialise the life and death of animals, prevention of any harm towards animals, and prioritising the use of alternatives when involving animals in artistic practices.

In the context of research, the ethical interventions above form a significant basis in the move towards forging transformative relations with other animals. At the same time, ethical considerations are often limited in addressing broader structural and institutional problems afflicting more-than-humans. For this reason, Gillespie (2019) has argued for "a geographically grounded, feminist, politicized understanding of multispecies ethnography," highlighting "its transformative potential, its relational nature, and its ethical ambiguities" (17). By choosing the term 'politicised' instead of 'political' to describe ethnography, Gillespie puts emphasis on how this version of the methodology "is dedicated to *responding to* and *changing* uneven power relations that may be the subject of study, or that may emerge during the research process," in addition to producing an analysis of power between ethnographers and subjects of study (2019, 18, emphasis in original).

A politicised multispecies ethnography in this sense is no longer a methodology solely for gaining insights to help answer research questions in ways that may benefit a particular cause, but rather a container holding sets of methods, or perhaps even tools and tactics, aimed at

producing meaningful and substantive changes to the cultural, social, political, and economic forces that dictate ongoing human relations with more-than-humans. In other words, the methods themselves become avenues through which a researcher could experience and experiment with alternative relations and forms of engagement with research subjects in ways that destabilise dominant norms. Exercising the reflexivity demanded in political ethnography as detailed in the previous subsection, my selection of a politicised multispecies ethnography as a methodology originates from my own prior commitment to animal liberation, as well as social and environmental justice advocacy through both scholarship and grassroots activism over the past decade. Due to my extant commitment to push for transformative changes to better the lives of other animals, I argue that this research project exceeds the boundaries of ethnography and falls partially within the sphere of participatory action research (PAR).

3.1.3 Multispecies Participatory Action Research

Peter Reason and Hilary Bradbury's (2001) *Handbook of Action Research* has been widely cited as a seminal text in the early advancement of action research as a methodology. Some of the key characteristics of action research include (1) producing practical knowledge for the purpose of improving well-being, (2) working to produce practical outcomes and generating novel understandings that contribute to the emancipation and flourishing of communities, (3) recognising the agency of participants in collaborative sensemaking and collective action, as well as (4) acknowledging that the research process and the knowledge produced are living and evolving processes rooted in everyday experiences, and therefore "cannot be programmatic and cannot be defined in terms of hard and fast methods" (Reason and Bradbury 2001, 2). Importantly, Reason and Bradbury argue that action research entails a "participatory worldview" that "places human persons and communities as part of their world—both human and more-than-human—embodied in their world, co-creating their world" (2001, 7). Hence, even in its earliest articulations, PAR calls for a "relational ecological" approach in its intent to empower people through participation in democratised forms of research (Reason and Bradbury 2001, 9-10).

Despite this early inclusion of more-than-humans in PAR, to date, the research output generated by this methodology has been largely anthropocentric. Looking at the history of participatory research, Etmanski and Pant (2007) trace its roots to "the work and struggles of marginalized peoples, largely in the Majority World" (277). This is consistent with the political

aspect of action research as asserted by Reason and Bradbury, where a vital objective is to liberate those silenced by "class structures and neo-colonialism" as well as identity-based oppressions to solve the problems affecting their communities (2001, 9). However, a growing number of PAR, specifically those done within and collaboratively with Indigenous communities at the intersections of health, environment, and Indigenous lifeways, demonstrate the inseparable connections and relations between ecological flourishing and human wellbeing. In Canada, for example, studies conducted through PAR on how environmental pollution and toxic wastes are harming Indigenous communities (Waldron 2015; Wiebe 2016) and how Indigenous peoples are responding and adapting to climate change through traditional ecological knowledge and traditional activities (Turner and Clifton 2009; Wilcox et al. 2023; Golden et al. 2015) represent the more holistic and comprehensive types of community-based participatory research striving for environmental health justice (Masuda et al. 2010; Kwiatkowski 2011).

More recently however, researchers have begun to make the return to explore and theorise diverse forms of participatory research in more-than-human worlds. Bastian et al.'s (2017) edited volume on more-than-human participatory research considers how nonhuman animals, plants, and other more-than-human entities might be engaged with as co-producers of knowledge. Despite this more-than-human turn, the inclusion of nonhuman animals in PAR has thus far seen limited adoption within both the 'animal turn' and animal advocacy communities more broadly. An earlier exception has been Debra Merskin's (2010) proposal exploring the promises of PAR with other animals, which positions more-than-human animal species amongst the oppressed subjects that PAR intends to uplift. Merskin's argument sets out to legitimise the place of animals within PAR by following three exploratory questions:

> "1) Can PAR be used to address needs of other-than-human animals?
> 2) If so, what are the particular challenges faced in using this approach to conduct and communicate research?
> 3) What might PAR with animals look like?" (2010, 146).

Merskin's proposal relies mainly on the emerging body of literature in trans-species psychology, where ethologists and other animal scientists continue to reveal the cognitive, emotional, social, and cultural complexities from the level of individual animal subjects to inter- and intra-species

relations across larger populations (2010, 149). The reliance on trans-species psychology as the main pathway in Merskin's response to the above questions speaks to the enduring challenges pertaining to interspecies communication, and to making sense of how other animals could be understood as research collaborators. It is crucial to contextualise Merskin's article as located in the earlier period of the animal turn, which predates both the surge of literature on animal agency and animal resistance as well as the explosion of research in multispecies studies across disciplinary boundaries over the past decade. Despite preceding much of multispecies ethnography and animal studies outputs, Merskin was arguably ahead of the curve in recognising the need for pluralistic approaches in conducting multispecies research. Recognising "linguistic limitations" as "one of the greatest hurdles to conducting PAR with animals," Merskin argues for the need to include storytelling, intimate and empathic interactions with other animals, and compiling "as much information as possible from as many theoretical perspectives as possible" to "ascertain how the world might look like from the perspective of" other species (2010, 152).

The guiding questions for exploring PAR with and for animals are still as relevant today as they have been since Merskin's initial formulations, especially given the lack of uptake to use PAR within the divergent strands of animal studies. My contributions here is a continuation of Merskin's proposal in a significantly altered context of researching a FAS. In this context, paying attention to the agency of nonhuman animal residents, relying on human caretakers who possess intimate familiarity with the animals to share their interpretations of animal behaviours, and recognising animals as contributors and participants in the labour of care, advocacy, and research, are all elements of what makes this study an attempt at doing PAR with other animals. My personal ethical and political alignments with the work of FASes in general also makes this project consistent with the emancipatory and collaborative intentions of PAR. Lastly, akin to PAR studies conducted within communities that are often themselves sites of direct struggle against broader structures and institutions exerting harm against community members, I argue that FASes also qualify as 'frontline communities' directly confronting systemic violence against animals while working to realise alternative and transformative relations with other animals.

3.2 Methods

Having documented the above reflections on my research methodology and my own positionality, in this section I describe the methods undertaken for empirical research, which informs the findings in this thesis.

3.2.1 Recruitment

In accordance with the University of Sydney's Human Research Ethics Approval conditions, all participants have been anonymised, with the use of pseudonyms replacing all names, including the name of the sanctuary, names of its founders, and names of all nonhuman animal residents at the sanctuary. I refer to the three founders of the sanctuary as F1, F2, and F3 (Founders 1, 2, and 3) based on the chronological order in which I met them. All descriptions of locations have been kept deliberately vague to minimise chances of identification.

My initial recruitment strategy sought to obtain participation from two or three sanctuaries in Australia, with a preference for FASes, but inclusive of other potential sanctuaries that did not specialise in rescuing and rehabilitating farmed animals. While not expecting generalisability from such small sample sizes, I had hoped a diversity of sites could generate data that demonstrate heterogeneity of sanctuaries for comparative analysis in ethnographic research. Given the limited number of animal sanctuaries available in Australia, any publicly identifiable sanctuary was considered appropriate for recruitment. A publicly available list of FASes provided by the organisation Vegan Australia on their website was consulted to identify potential participants. Word-of-mouth through academic animal studies networks was used in conjunction during the recruitment process, relying on colleagues who may have connections to sanctuaries. After contacting seven sanctuaries, four sanctuaries replied to initial inquiries through emails. Of the four sanctuaries, one was unable to accommodate the research due to logistical issues despite initial interest, and extended communication through emails and video calls with two other sanctuaries dropped off despite their initial enthusiasm to participate. Ultimately, with only one sanctuary consenting to participate, I consulted my supervisory team and we agreed to alter our research plan to conduct an extended ethnography at this one research site.

3.2.2 Fieldwork

From September to October 2023, I spent a total of 30 days living on-site at Olive Animal Sanctuary as a volunteer. Olive Animal Sanctuary offers a live-in volunteer arrangement, allowing volunteers to stay at a guesthouse, separate from the main house where the founders live with the dogs and cats. F1 and F2 live at the sanctuary, while F3 lives in a nearby city but visits regularly. F1 and F3 both held full-time jobs outside the sanctuary work, making F2 the only founder who works at the sanctuary full-time. This meant that on a day-to-day basis, I spent the most time with F2, learning from her the various facts about the sanctuary and some of their ongoing projects, as well as basic volunteer responsibilities.

Two methods were used to collect data: participant observation and semi-structured interviews. Participant observation was conducted daily as I performed a variety of chores and tasks essential to the upkeep of the sanctuary and to ensure the wellbeing of the animal residents. These tasks largely involved preparing the meals for and feeding the animal residents. Occasionally, the founders and I delivered hay bales to the sheep and cow herds who live in the paddocks further away from the main houses, and distributed the bales on their pastures. Cleaning and refilling the animal residents' water containers and cleaning their shelters were also routine. Other occasional tasks included fencing maintenance and repair, as well as shoveling horse manure, collecting them with wheelbarrows and dumping them into heaping compost piles. Early on in my fieldwork, F2 assigned me one particular task that she thought would be of interest to my research, which was to help integrate one rooster into a larger flock. This rooster integration project would occur daily from Day 2 of my stay until the end of my fieldwork. These daily obligations allowed me to interact directly with F2 and many of the animal residents, which provided opportunities to observe and document a diversity of social interactions, behaviours, and relationships between all human and nonhuman subjects at the sanctuary. Outside volunteer work, the use of participant observation as part of ethnographic immersion carried into general everyday socialising and interactions with the sanctuary founders.

I kept a journal to document memorable highlights and notable observations each day. The journal entries also documented pertinent information I had learned through informal, casual conversations with the founders outside the semi-structured interviews. The daily journaling assisted in building continuity in ethnographic narrative. For instance, I was able to document in the journal the progressions of longer-term events, such as the rooster integration project and the gradual familiarity with other animals. Video recordings and photos were used to document

many observations to accompany the daily journal entries and to assist with recalling certain events during data analysis.

For the semi-structured interviews, the founders and I agreed to conduct them in the form of a group discussion and there were no separate individual interviews. In this manner, I interviewed the three founders together across three discussion sessions using sets of questions relevant to my initial research questions (see Appendix A for a complete list of interview questions). Each discussion session lasted approximately one hour per session. The sessions took place in the founders' home around their dinner table. The interviews were audio recorded and later transcribed.

As explained in section 1.3 of Chapter 1, the aims behind the formulation of this specific set of interview questions was the result of how the focal points of my research had shifted over time. At the commencement of my fieldwork, I was primarily interested in exploring how FASes might be sites where some of the tensions and alignments between animal and other justice movements emerge, and to learn about how sanctuaries navigate the commonalities and differences across movements. In terms of data analysis, I employed an iterative process of situating and interpreting the data within the established literature on FASes, animal resistance, and re-animalisation (Chapter 2), as well as my selected methodological frameworks discussed in section 3.1 above.

In the following chapter, I begin the main discussions of this thesis with a description of Olive Animal Sanctuary as a liminal conflict zone situated within the enduring structures of settler-colonialism and domestication.

Chapter 4 – The Sanctuary as a Structurally-Produced Liminal Conflict Zone

What kinds of animals are humans to become if we take up the task of re-animalisation? While there might be many possible answers to this difficult question, in this chapter, I narrow down the scope of this consideration in the following manner. First, continuing from the distinction between three types of animalisation as established in Chapter 2, I reiterate that this thesis explores human-assisted animal-guided animalisation, which focuses on how the agency and capacities of other animals supported by specific material conditions, as well as particular epistemological and theoretical frameworks, combine to animalise humans. As a hypothetical example, we might imagine animal-guided animalisation occurring when individual humans are compelled to come to terms with their own animal existence as they suddenly find themselves in a vulnerable position, not only in the presence of other animals, but in an environment where the norms and conditions give other animals various forms of advantage.

Second, to continue narrowing the scope of the current discussion, I rely on preestablished and politicised categories of animals instead of attempting to invent new categories to help think through what animals might humans become. Specifically, I adopt Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka's (2011) group-differentiated approach to citizenship theory that categorises animals into domesticated, wild, and liminal groups, with each category of animals holding distinct sets of rights generating unique obligations from humans. According to Donaldson and Kymlicka, whereas domesticated animals demand co-citizenship with humans, wild animals are to be respected as "their own sovereign communities," and "the non-domesticated liminal animals who live amongst us," such as wild animals inhabiting urban and suburban areas, are to be regarded as denizens outside "the cooperative scheme of citizenship" (2011, 15).

With these categories, I argue that the particular farmed animal sanctuary (FAS) where I conducted research is a liminal space, and that all humans and other animals at the sanctuary are therefore liminal animals in the first instance. This conceptualisation of FASes as liminal spaces is consistent with Donaldson and Kymlicka's (2023) more recent description of "all those who physically reside in the territory of the sanctuary—humans, formerly farmed animals, and liminal animals—as *denizens*," whereby denizenship is the political status they attribute to liminal animals as stated above (637, emphasis in original). However, dissimilar to Donaldson and

Kymlicka's analysis, I propose a less categorical and more fluid and dynamic conceptualisation of the interactions between domesticated, liminal, and wild subjects and spaces, and this conceptualisation entails two assumptions: (1) domesticated, wild, and liminal human and more-than-human subjects as well as the spaces they construct and occupy are constantly attempting to coexist or subsume others in often conflictual ways, and (2) sociopolitical institutions and structures determine our identities and statuses more so than we could dictate through our own agency. The implication of this argument is that one does not need to reside physically within a liminal territory to be considered a liminal animal, but rather by virtue of entering a liminal space, one enters into an often conflict-prone process of becoming a liminal animal (to varying degrees of success/failure).

To arrive at the view above, we first need to investigate the processes of re-animalisation in relation to domestication, liminality, and the wild understood as spatiotemporal entities and sociopolitical structures, which will explain how the formation of the 'animal' as a political identity and political status is a process shaped by space, place, and institutions. To this end, I posit that domestication, liminality, and the wild are sociopolitical structures of human and more-than-human making that privilege diverse lifeways, and not simply relational consequences of historical human and more-than-human interactions. This structural understanding of animal categories rests on Patrick Wolfe's (2006) argument and analysis that settler-colonisation is "a structure rather than an event" (390). In the first part of this chapter, I offer a reading of Wolfe's key insights and arguments from his seminal article "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native" through a multispecies lens (Celermajer et al. 2020) by engaging it with other literature that have noted the violent structural and functional entanglements between settler-colonialisation, colonial-capitalist agriculture, and domestication that have always already existed since colonial invasion.

I choose to commence my analysis with a clarification on the relationship between settler-colonialism and domestication because this sequence facilitates the interrogation of liminality in the same context in the second part of this chapter. Contextualising a discussion of the spatiotemporal and structural animal categories within specific localities and histories (the context of settler-colonialism in this case) is necessary due to the otherwise overly general and ambiguous nature of the categories. To recognise and acknowledge domestication, liminality, and the wild as structures in Australia, for instance, is to also recognise and acknowledge that the

formation of these structures cannot be separated from the historical and ongoing dynamics and occurrences of colonial violence (and resistances to it). And consider, for example, the generality of a concept such as liminality: there may be an unquantifiable number of liminal spaces being created and recreated by both domesticated and wild animals around the planet through habitation, movement, and encounters at any given moment. For this reason, contextualising the categories also conveys the required clarity and precision in these discussions. As I shall examine more closely in the second part of this chapter, liminality as produced at Olive Animal Sanctuary is unavoidably unique due to the sanctuary's political commitments to resist the damages of settler-colonialism and domestication against both humans and more-than-humans.

This chapter closes with some thoughts regarding relations and dynamics of power between liminal animals (including humans) across individual, collective, and structural scales. With the culmination of stories and analyses in this chapter, I describe the ways in which Olive Animal Sanctuary finds itself caught in a structural conflict between the hegemonic structures it attempts to dismantle and the possible futures it strives to realise.

4.1 Settler-Colonialism and Domestication as Synergistic Structures

Vignette: Driving to the Sanctuary

A train ride had brought me to an Australian small-town station where one of the Olive Animal Sanctuary founders (F1) collected me in her hatchback. Soon after I hopped into the front seat, a winding road that cut through the undulating landscape took us away from the suburbs. As I fixated on the stunning scenery emerging ahead of us, the grass-green rolling hills occupied by herds of sheep and cows within fenced properties, F1 explained to me that this region comprises numerous dairy farms.

The surroundings felt at once familiar and novel. I had been to plenty of FASes in rural areas throughout North America over the past decade, often to volunteer alongside other animal rights activists. Seeing the animal farms brought back memories of those visits in Canada and the United States, but it also reminded me of how agriculture had been instrumental in the theft and occupation of Indigenous lands in similar histories of settler-colonisation shared between these nation-states located oceans apart.

"Do you know VINE?" F1 asked me part way through the car ride.

"Yes! I've been to VINE a few times actually, and I know pattrice," I replied in matching excitement at our mutual awareness of a well-known FAS in Vermont, US, that we both admire. Another connection across the ocean.

"VINE is a big inspiration for us and we've learned a lot from them," F1 said.

VINE is an acronym for "Veganism Is the Next Evolution" and "Veganism Is Not Enough" (VINE Sanctuary, n.d.). Co-founded by pattrice jones and Miriam Jones in 2000, VINE is "an LGBTQ-led farmed animal sanctuary" guided by "an ecofeminist understanding of the intersections" between harms towards animals, humans, and the environment, working towards social and environmental justice as well as animal liberation (VINE Sanctuary, n.d.; Fletcher 2019). VINE's commitment to multiple interconnected justice causes is shared by Olive. Similar to VINE, Olive operates through philosophies that are committed to fighting against all forms of oppression.

However, something rather peculiar to Olive amongst most FASes in settler-colonial contexts is their acknowledgment of the Indigenous country where the sanctuary is situated along with an acknowledgement that Indigenous peoples in their region have never ceded the land, as well as their unambiguous declaration of solidarity with local Indigenous communities. In the section below, I elaborate on the historical connections between settler-colonialism and the expansion of animal agriculture to further locate Olive Animal Sanctuary within the dominant structures that the sanctuary emerges from.

4.1.1 Settler-Colonialism, Domestication, and the Logics of Control/Discipline/Management

What has made "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native" an influential analysis in studies of genocide and settler-colonialism were the nuances Wolfe has presented to differentiate the two forms of violence. As Wolfe notes, not only could there be "genocide in the absence of settler colonialism," but genocidal outcomes of settler-colonialism have themselves been unevenly and inequivalently manifested, for example, in the differences between the straightforward violence of frontier homicide versus the detrimental features found in the recognition of Indigenous titles and sovereignties by settler-colonial states (2006, 387). Distinctive of settler-colonialism is its tendency towards what Wolfe terms the "logic of elimination," whereby elimination does not necessarily entail biological extermination, but could also be achieved through various assimilation techniques (2006, 387-88).

Comprehending how settler-colonialism is able to accomplish elimination without extermination requires identifying both its negative and positive dimensions. Whereas the dissolution of Indigenous societies is the negative expression of settler-colonialism, replacing the territories dispossessed and expropriated from Indigenous peoples with newly constructed colonial societies is its positive dimension, which produces "positive outcomes" such as "officially encouraged miscegenation, the breaking-down of native title into alienable individual freeholds, native citizenship, child abduction, religious conversion, resocialization in total institutions such as missions or boarding schools, and a whole range of cognate biocultural assimilations" (Wolfe 2006, 388). In this positive manner, invasion and elimination are not merely "one-off (and superseded)" occurrences (i.e. events in the past), they also constitute the logic of an "organizing principal" continually reproduced through settler-colonial structures and institutions that compel repressed Indigenous populations to participate in the further structuring of settler-colonial societies (Wolfe 2006, 388, 390). As such, Wolfe terms the specific manifestation of genocide through the positive aspect of settler-colonialism "structural genocide" (2006, 403). Unlike "short-term genocides" aimed at rapid extermination, structural genocides are meant to endure spatially and temporally "over extended periods of time" as a reflection of settler/colonisers' intention to stay and occupy stolen Indigenous lands (Wolfe 2006, 403).

Missing in Wolfe's analysis is that the positive programs of elimination necessarily involve a logic of control/discipline/management (more on this later), which would be exercised through various governmental and total institutions. This oversight is reasonable as these considerations would have traversed beyond the scope of Wolfe's article. Another topic that Wolfe had no room to examine in depth is the relation between settler-colonialism and the more-than-human, although it is illuminating to note that animals do figure ostensibly on a few occasions in his article. In one instance, citing Charles Patterson's (2002) *Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust*, Wolfe remarks that the Nazis were informed by "techniques of Chicago cattle-yards" for their industrial mechanisms of exterminating humans (2006, 394). This assertion was part of Wolfe's broader point that the "core features of modernity" in modern genocides, such as the employment of "centralized technological, logistical and administrative capacities of the modern state," have been "pioneered in the

colonies" (2006, 393).[1] In another instance, Wolfe cites an account depicting horrific scenes where settlers backed by U.S. troops forcibly displaced Cherokee communities in the early 1800s, which saw some "cattle and other stock" owned by the Cherokee "being driven off Cherokee land" even before the soldiers had begun removing their owners (2006, 392). Stating that the cattle were at once "being driven off Cherokee land" and "driven into private ownership," Wolfe seems to suggest that the changing status of farm animals in becoming privately-owned commodity is yet another part constituting the positive dimension of how settler-colonial industries and economies came to extinguish and replace Indigenous sovereignty (2006, 392). Finally, animals and more-than-humans figure inconspicuously in the background as Wolfe describes how the expansion of settler-colonial agriculture is part and parcel of both frontier massacres and assimilation into settler-colonial lifeways (2006, 395-97).

Taken together, we can see from the above how farmed animals (and/or the exploitation of them) constitute both the negative and positive dimensions of settler-colonialism in complex ways despite having been relegated to the backdrop. For this reason, a fuller picture of settler-colonisation remains incomplete without including the domestication of more-than-humans and the general violence against them as part of the narrative. As Wolfe has already gestured towards through the examples above, I argue that, akin to settler-colonialism, domestication is also a structure in its own right, operating through its own logic, namely the logic of control/discipline/management, and comprises both negative and positive dimensions. Moreover, just as Wolfe has shown how settler-colonialism and genocide have converged in the forms of structural genocide and mass killings at the frontiers despite being conceptually and procedurally distinguishable, such is also the relation between settler-colonialism and domestication. Furthermore, I contend that in contexts where settler-colonialism and domestication converge, it is not the case that their coalescing violence is aimed deliberately at Indigenous peoples but only incidentally at more-than-humans; on the contrary, as the authors I engage with below shall demonstrate, the combined logics of elimination and control/discipline/management as enacted through settler-colonial and domesticating structures inflict forms of direct violence upon more-

[1] I note Wolfe's observations resonates with both scholarship that has linked rationalised modernity to the Shoah (e.g. Horkheimer and Adorno 2002 and Bauman 1989), and also scholarship which has argued that the colony was the test site for European totalitarianism (see for example Mbembe 2003).

than-humans and Indigenous humans (as well as non-Indigenous humans to varying extents) that are different yet interconnected.

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Vignette: Baroque's Escape

When I asked the founders of Olive during our interview how do they think the animal residents feel about living within the sanctuary space, F3 said she had noticed that one of the things the animals really seem to enjoy is the ability to get away from the humans and "to just kind of have time on their own, as an animal group." Affirming F3's observations, F2 noted that the two horses "seem to enjoy themselves when they've got quite a bit of space to run" and "they like to have a lot of land." While F3 felt that this was less so the case with the cows because "they are contained…within paddocks," F1 said facetiously that "the cows don't give a shit so long that they've got grass to eat, like, they'll just go in the grasses."

On my very last day at Olive, I woke up to the news that Baroque the cow had gotten through a damaged portion of the fence early morning and had been eating grass on the side of the public road just beyond the fence. In some ways, this has been foreshadowed on my third day at Olive, when F2 and I identified some fences that were in disrepair, which caused F2 to worry that the cows might jump the fence and go onto the road. Fortunately, Baroque is generally cooperative, and in this particular instance, it did not take much time and effort to bring him back into the sanctuary. F2 rode the quad bike with a bale of hay sitting on the back of the bike, which Baroque gladly followed. Unfortunately, F1 and I would later find Baroque once again beyond the fence when we went out to rotate the cows into another paddock in the afternoon of that same day. As the herd began to move into a fresh paddock, Baroque, still chomping on grass on the other side of the fence, attempted to follow them along the public road until a passing driver startled him with a honk of the horn. Panicking, Baroque ran onto the property of Olive's neighbours. This incident was shortly resolved when both F1 and F2 went over to help their neighbours move Baroque to a part of a shared gate along their property-dividing fence to allow him to return to sanctuary (again). Witnessing this event brought flashbacks to my first night at Olive, when F1 and F2 told me a story of how one of their neighbour's cows had once escaped

and mixed in with a local dairy/beef herd for a significant amount of time before finally being found.

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In the histories of settler-colonisation, the motivation of cows (and other farmed animals) to access land and food sources by trespassing borders and boundaries of colonial fabrication had been weaponised by settlers/colonisers to instigate and justify violence and land theft against Indigenous peoples, illustrating one facet of the compounding violence of settler-colonialism and domestication. Recounting a series of violent confrontations over land and livestock between English colonists and the Susquehannock, Wampanoag, and Narragansett peoples amongst other Indigenous peoples from the mid- to late-1600s, in what would now be Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic United States, Virginia DeJohn Anderson (2004) found that the subsistence requirements of free-ranging livestock "overshadowed every other factor driving the colonists' insatiable quest of land" (232). English colonists frequently antagonised Indigenous communities through acts of property destruction, such as by burning down fences protecting Indigenous cornfields to allow livestock to invade and destroy Indigenous crops (Anderson 2004, 224-25). As Indigenous peoples began to accept that the colonists would suffer no punitive consequences for their actions from the colonial courts, while they themselves are routinely punished according to English laws, resentment led to many from the Indigenous nations to take direct actions of economic sabotage to defend themselves from displacement (Anderson 2004, 225-26). As Anderson points out, earlier Indigenous resistance "principally directed their vengeance against colonial property, not persons," making livestock a fitting target to both undermine the livelihoods of colonisers and to materially and symbolically reject "the civilizing agenda that called for their wholesale transformation into docile cattle-raising farmers" (2004, 226). A culmination of aggressions over land and livestock would ultimately become one of the main contributing factors leading to full-blown war between the English and Indigenous nations, which continued to see livestock raids as a major part of Indigenous resistance, as well as colonisers relentlessly claiming land through animal agriculture after the wars had formally ended (Anderson 2004, 232-42).

A century later, as the now-American colonisers continued conquering land across the plains of Turtle Island (North America), the settler-colonial assault on Indigenous peoples and their food sources carried on as part of official U.S. policies. Winona LaDuke (1999) observes that throughout "the 1800s, buffalo killing was part of [U.S.] military policy, and land grabbing was part of America" (141). With the aims of extending railroads across the continent, destroying a major source of food that Indigenous peoples living across the prairies depend on, and acquiring land for animal agriculture, by the late 1800s, the U.S. Army and buffalo hunters had exterminated around 50 million bison who stood in the way of these aims, bringing them to a point of near-extinction (LaDuke 1999, 141-46). Concurrently, the US government dissolved collective Indigenous landholdings and allocated tens of millions of acres of Indigenous land to non-Indigenous settlement and agriculture, while distributing between 40-50 million pounds of beef annually to Indigenous reservations (LaDuke 1999, 142-43). The direct violence against the bison, farmed animals, and other wildlife as part of the genocidal conquest in the settler-colonial project produced traumatic legacies that continue to harm the spiritual, physical, and ecological health of affected Indigenous communities to this day, despite ongoing Indigenous-led efforts to heal themselves, the land, and the buffalo (LaDuke 1999, 146-62).

Akin to what befell the bison, similar patterns occurred in Australia between wild animals, Indigenous peoples, and settlers/colonisers. For example, in the early 1800s Tasmania, kangaroo hunting "was a driver of settler expansion" that "radically escalated conflict with Aboriginal people," occurring alongside systematic killing, dispossession, and forcible removal of Aboriginal peoples (Gelder and Weaver 2020, 36). While kangaroo populations had not been decimated, present-day state governments across Australia collectively set quotas for millions of kangaroos to be hunted and slaughtered annually, primarily to allow the commercial kangaroo industry to manage kangaroo populations to the benefit of other animal agricultural industries (Vink 2024). Emus have similarly experienced systematic culling in Australia, with the Great Emu War of 1932-34 being the most well-documented, in which farmers and soldiers killed "more than 57,000 emus in the latter half of 1934" alone (jones 2019, 8-9). At the time of writing, cattle grazing in Australia persists as a "major driver of deforestation" through the "conversion of forests and bushland to expand pastures" for cattle, generating responses from leading environmental organisations such as Greenpeace, The Wilderness Society, and the Australian Conservation Foundation to campaign against the Australian beef industry to protect

threatened and endangered native animal species (O'Callaghan 2024). Observing these similar historical patterns of colonial violence against animals in Australia alongside the escapes of cattle from their captivity in the early New South Wales colony, Probyn-Rapsey and Russell (2024) argue that it is ultimately pastoralism that operates as colonialism's tool and not the animals who were trafficked and weasponised by colonists.

It is important to note that prior to settler-colonisation, Indigenous peoples across the Americas and Australia have already developed their own forms of domestication, mainly in plant agriculture. The 'three sisters' (corn/maize, beans, and squash) have been revered as sacred plants by many Indigenous peoples and cultivated according to their traditional ecological knowledges (Klopotek et al. 2023), and researchers have shown the mixed cropping of these plants yielded significant resistance and defenses against herbivorous insects (Liao et al. 2019). In *Dark Emu* (2014), Bruce Pascoe has compiled evidence of food plants domestication by Indigenous peoples across Australia, which include cropping grains, propagating bush tomato and desert raisin, the use of selective burning to promote plant resilience, and construction of dams and irrigation systems (35-41). In the case of animals, Pascoe argues that the "Aboriginal battue system of kangaroo and emu harvesting," which involves using a combination of nets "with kilometres of brush fence in large-scale trapping or battue operations," as well as fish traps both sophisticated and extensive in size and design, collapse the distinction between game hunting and farming (2014, 41-43, 53-55). Such evidence of Indigenous agriculture and aquaculture contribute to counternarratives against the colonial discourse of European civilisational "superiority in science, economy and religion" that colonial forces often use to justify their domination or extermination of Indigenous societies (Pascoe 2014, 12).

Bringing attention to Indigenous forms of farming, domestication, and systematic killing of animals neither contradicts nor diminishes the entangled atrocities carried out against Indigenous peoples and more-than-human animals through the settler-colonial counterparts to those practices. My intention in highlighting Indigenous forms of domestication here goes to support my earlier claim that domestication stands as a separate structure with its own positive and negative dimensions as well as its own logic of control/discipline/management, and the ways in which power is expressed through domesticating structures produce drastically different outcomes for humans and more-than-humans according to the worldviews and epistemologies they emanate from. For example, Robin Wall Kimmerer (2013) has shown how reciprocity as a

value and practice underpins much of Indigenous relations with more-than-humans. Such commitments to reciprocity saw that Indigenous hunting practices (especially prior to colonisation), while arguably no less violent from the standpoint of the individual animals killed, largely do not lead to the types of extermination events that colonial hunts and culls create, and do often result in mutual thriving on a population level between species. Contrastingly, the examples earlier demonstrate the extreme results of the positive and negative dimensions to the logic of domestication when it is exercised in conjunction with settler-colonialism's logic of elimination: all beings who could not be brought under control according to Eurocentric hierarchical orderings of life as servants to colonial projects face extermination and/or elimination. Equally important, the summation of examples above demonstrate that violence in general, whether between colonisers and Indigenous peoples, or between humans and more-than-humans, are structurally produced regardless of context, but incidental and specific to the settler-colonial context, settler-colonialism and domestication (along with other oppressive structures such as capitalism, patriarchy, and ableism) have become fully interdependent and impossible to disentangle.

By first clearly demarcating domestication and settler-colonialism then demonstrating their inseparability in the settler-colonial context, this analysis also contributes to theoretical discussions about structures of domination, which tend towards a type of reductionism due to the centring of particular forms of violence. For instance, in critiquing Foucault, Agamben, and Mbembe for missed opportunities "to situate biopolitics within a broader field" and recognise how biopolitics "is founded upon the experience of violent domination of non human animal life," Wadiwel argues that "the spiritual home of biopolitics is not the concentration camp, nor the colony, but in the technologies of domestication, regulation, control and killing that are the mainstays of our relationship with animals, including the slaughterhouse" (2015, 94). Another example could be found in Ghassan Hage's (2017) argument that environmental catastrophes and globalised Western/white racism are both rooted in what he terms "generalized domestication," which Hage defines as "a mode of inhabiting the world through dominating it for the purpose of making it yield value: material or symbolic forms of sustenance, comfort, aesthetic pleasure, and so on" (87). In contrast, Indigenous standpoints would tend to ascribe primacy and centrality to decolonisation and decolonial thought as necessities in thinking interspecies or multispecies relations, especially in settler-colonial contexts (see for examples Tallbear 2011; Todd 2016).

For instance, Driftpile Cree scholar Billy-Ray Belcourt (2015) has contended that "we cannot dismantle speciesism or re-imagine human-animal relations in the North American context without first or simultaneously dismantling settler colonialism and re-theorizing domesticated animal bodies as *colonial subjects*" (3, emphasis in original). This is because "animal domestication, speciesism, and other modern human-animal interactions [in North America] are only possible because of and through the historic and ongoing erasure of Indigenous bodies and the emptying of Indigenous lands for settler-colonial expansion" (Belcourt 2015, 3). While Belcourt is undoubtedly correct, based on previous examples and the positions above, one could just as convincingly argue that the elimination of Indigenous peoples and societies from their traditional lands would have been impossible if the settlers had not extracted myriad benefits and values from the exploitation of domesticated animals.

My own contention here is that we need not prescribe so strongly a kind of primacy to any particular structure or form of domination, but could instead accentuate their relationality and interactive dynamics. Just as how some Indigenous peoples speak of the importance in recognising 'all our relations' and how ecofeminists might speak of 'the interdependence and interconnectedness of all beings and things,' we cannot ontologically exclude institutions and structures of domination, oppression, and violence from the relational lens (i.e. oppressive structures need interdependence, too). This perspective has long been exemplified through diverse approaches, concepts, and frameworks engaging with the concept of intersectionality, which Rita Dhamoon (2011) encapsulates through the term "intersectional-type" (232).

Some examples of intersectional-type concepts and approaches that have been formulated in attempt to represent and describe how different systems and processes of domination and oppression have been organised and interact include *interlocking, multidimensionality, matrix of domination, co-constitution*, etc. to name just a few (Dhamoon 2011, 232, 237). However, we could make a contingent versus necessity distinction regarding the connections between oppressive structures, and I suggest their connections could be weaker or stronger depending on context. In the weaker version, structures of violence or oppressive forces might only find themselves strategically or opportunistically in solidaristic relations to one another from time to time, but a stronger version would occur when the projects they intend to fulfill according to their logics would always remain in some way incomplete without relying on other oppressive structures and their corresponding logics. For example, Julian Go (2021) highlights three

observable tensions regarding the theory of racial capitalism, which include whether 'race' constitutes the "primary mode differentiation in capitalism," and whether the relation between race and capitalism is logically contingent or necessary (38). Regarding this point, I echo Claire Jean Kim's proposed adjustment "to think of forms of domination as synergistically related rather than 'interlocking'" (2015, 18), and I argue that the energetic *intensity* of violence produced in a given context where multiple oppressive forces converge is a salient aspect deserving more attention from structural analyses.

From this angle, it is not so much that nonhuman animal liberation is absolutely impossible to achieve (though it might be extremely difficult) in settler-colonial nation-states without also dismantling settler-colonialism. In fact, we could imagine a settler-colonial society that is free of nonhuman animal exploitation or has minimised nonhuman animal harm to the utmost extent according to settler visions of animal liberation, yet, decolonisation has failed to materialise, keeping in place settler-colonial relations with Indigenous people. It would perhaps be more accurate then to say that settler-colonialism, domestication, and other structures of domination maintain interdependent relationships in order to uphold hegemonic apparatuses that enable them to move their agenda to their logical conclusions, such that dismantling one would severely disrupt but not necessarily destroy the others. Having established how I conceive of the relationship between settler-colonialism and domestication as mutually-reinforcing and interdependent structures by engaging with the analyses and arguments of Wolfe and others, I now move to consider the features of and relationship between liminality and FASes as shaped within structures of settler-colonialism and domestication.

4.2 Liminality in Relation to Domestication and Settler-Colonialism

'Intermediate', 'transitional', and 'in-between' are three synonyms that repeatedly emerge in common dictionary definitions of 'liminal' and 'liminality'. In this sense, liminality is in itself a neutral process or condition, denoting no more than being in transition from one state to another. The definition of liminality also signifies both its spatial and temporal dimensions. The spatiotemporality of liminality could be applied to both a subject or a space, and depending on which it is applied, we might find the subject temporarily existing in an in-between space during a process of change, or the space itself could be in a state of change. I propose that this dichotomy becomes less relevant in situations where a space or place itself could be ascribed

subjectivity or recognised as a subject, such that a space/place may undergo an intersubjective, relational process of change with those who occupy it. Before we get to the details of how we might think of liminality as sociopolitical and physical structures, we could already identify the operative logic of liminality, which we might call a *logic of change*.

However, the neutrality of liminality ceases when it comes into relation with other existing structures and logics. Already at the more abstract level of logics, we could see the tensions and incommensurability between liminality in relation to the logics of settler-colonialism and domestication. This is not to say that settler-colonialism and domestication are recalcitrant to change in a general sense, given how the technologies and techniques through which their logics have been applied have evolved overtime in response to forms of resistance and in their adaptation to the changing realities brought about by other hegemonic structures they rely on (e.g. the changing stages of capitalism). Nonetheless, liminality poses as a problem for settler-colonialism and domestication when it moves in the direction of alternative modes of existence and relationality, or when it presents itself as an alternative in opposition to forms of elimination and control, which destabilises the dominant structures. In such cases, the logics of settler-colonialism and domestication dictate that instances of liminality or liminal subjects must be brought back under control or extinguished.

Under such circumstances, I argue that at the structural level, antagonism is the primary and defining feature of the relationship between liminality and the hegemonically produced contexts that it exists within, such as settler-colonisation and/or domestication. This antagonistic relationship entails that spatially and geographically, liminal spaces/places are conflict zones (see Wadiwel 2018a, 532-41) or front lines in which alternative forms of existence are struggling to take shape or come into being, while established hegemonic structures seek to either contain or destroy them. Applying this antagonistic structural analysis of the oppositional relationship between the logic of liminality and the logics of domestication and settler-colonialism to human relations with other animals, this view is consistent with Wadiwel's (2015) biopolitical conceptualisation of how institutions of human sovereignty continues an enduring war against animals by exercising forms of power and violence to dominate other animals who resist human control or elimination.

Nevertheless, on an individual and intersubjective level, I suggest that liminal situations need not always be defined by conflict, or in cases between humans and other animals, they need

not always be defined by violence. Consider a situation where a human individual encounters an animal commonly classified as pests, such a cockroach, within a domesticated space, such as the human's house. In that moment, the encounter generates a liminal condition in the form of a contact zone (see Haraway 2008, 205-46), which in turn momentarily transforms both subjects into liminal animals in relation to each other. In the face of the cockroach, human sovereignty and the dominant domesticating structure enables the human both to kill the insect or let the animal live.

There are two salient insights we could glean from this ordinary example. First, geographically, the relationship between domestication and liminality does not map on to the relationship between the metropole and the periphery in the colonial context. Even though intensely domesticated spaces/places defined as urban and suburban might be more rigidly governed through the logics of elimination and control, instances of liminality could always seep through so long as non-domesticated animals continue to transgress domesticated spaces. To describe this phenomenon in the politicised vocabulary of war and conflict, we could say that between domestication and liminality, the front lines are everywhere, which is consistent with Wadiwel's notion that human sovereignty reaches all facets of human existence to regulate human-animal relations.

The second insight based on this example is that politically speaking, there is nothing particularly revolutionary in acquiring or accessing a liminal status for the purpose of transforming human relations with other animals to one that is not defined by violence. Even if one recognises oneself as being liminal or in a liminal condition, liminality only produces a political consciousness and subjectivity that allows one to exercise some degree of agency to choose how to maneuver between the operative logics behind hegemonic structures such as settler-colonialism and domestication, and whatever logics run counter to them. In other words, liminality only produces pre-revolutionary subjectivities that may never result in revolutionary or transformative change. The obstacles preventing liminal subjects from affecting change are located, on the one hand, in how the dominant structures compel subjects to continually invest in said structures, and on the other hand, it is located in the transient spatiotemporality of liminality itself, which is often cut short and smothered before alternative modes of being and relating could be cultivated and fostered. To give a more concrete example, some activists protesting against a proposed oil pipeline may be compelled to oppose taking direct actions, and to instead

advocate against the pipeline construction through formalised channels of petitioning elected representatives in dominant political systems. At the same time, activists who have taken direct action to set up a blockade (a liminal structure) at a site where the proposed pipeline must pass through may be experimentally living in alternative lifeways outside dominant structures, but the blockade may be forcibly removed by militarised police before whatever transformative potentials such blockades may materialise or be realised.

With this in mind, we can now appreciate the importance of structuralising liminality, and envisage the ways in which structuralised liminal spaces/places serve as containers of possibilities that stretch out the spatiotemporality of liminal conditions along with the conflicts they generate. An animal sanctuary could be in this manner the embodiment of liminality as a structure. However, the sanctuary is also far from being the only example that embodies liminality in this manner. Analogously, we could think of blockades, encampments, communes, and other similar antagonistic sites of resistance to hegemonic structures as liminal structures in their own ways. At the same time, emergency shelters and refugee camps for those fleeing different forms of violence are also structured liminal spaces in exactly the way I have described. I now turn to investigate how Olive Animal Sanctuary operates as a liminal structure in their efforts to resist settler-colonialism and domestication.

4.3 Olive Animal Sanctuary as a Liminal Structure / Conflict Zone

Writer and fine art photographer Isa Leshko's (2019) monograph, *Allowed to Grow Old: Portraits of Elderly Animals from Farm Sanctuaries*, is a collection of portraits featuring elderly farmed animals taken by Leshko at numerous sanctuaries across the United States. The gripping photos of Leshko's senior animal subjects present a confronting reminder that had many of them not been rescued and given the opportunity to live to an old age, they would have been slaughtered prior to their first birthday. As Leshko notes, animals farmed for human consumption "are bred to reach slaughter weight at a younger age than ever before" (2019, 5). In the early 20th century, "chickens raised and used for meat (commonly referred to as 'broilers') lived for approximately 112 days" and "weighed 2.5 pounds" at the time of their slaughter, but in 2017, they were "slaughtered at only 47 days old, at which point they weigh 6.18 pounds" (Leshko 2019, 6). Observing this same phenomenon where "over the past fifty years broiler chickens have been genetically selected to effectively halve [their] 'growing' time," Wadiwel

argues that this is the result of an efficiency and value-maximising capitalist food production system that demands the labor time required for food animals "to produce themselves as commodities" to be minimised in order to "extract maximum surplus" (2018a, 534, 536, 540).

The elderly farmed animals featured in Leshko's portraits give materiality to the potency within the title of the project itself, that there is something inherently radical and transformative about simply allowing farmed animals to grow old in a world where human sovereignty has mandated not only that they are not supposed to reach elderly age, but actively shortens their lives to minimise cost and maximise profit. The alternate temporality that FASes afford rescued animals demonstrates the logic of change at work within the sanctuary as a politicised liminal structure responding to industrial animal agriculture. For clarity, the logic of change does not reflect the cliché of general impermanence, the idea that nothing stays static and everything is constantly changing. As a structurally-produced and institutionally-enacted logic, it entails a degree of intentionality enabling not just any kind of change, but a politicised transition towards an alternative mode of existence. Wadiwel remarks that the entire life of a food animal "is equivalent to the production cycle itself," and prompts us to think how farmed animals might experience not just capital's time, but time outside "the productive rhythms of capitalism" in which "every moment of life became a value-producing moment for capital" (2018a, 542). Through the concept of "resistant time," Wadiwel questions "what would it mean to give animals time, that is, recognize their resistance to capital's time," and how might this resonate with other "political projects that similarly aim to intervene in the politics of time" (2018a, 541, 543). FASes give us glimpses of what resistant time for formerly farmed animals might look like.

In my effort to learn more about the animal residents at Olive Animal Sanctuary, I asked the founders to share any memorable personality shifts over time that they have seen amongst individual animals. F3 noticed that "the cows in particular have changed a lot as they've gotten older." Growing through their "juvenile teenage years" to adulthood, the cows have "become much more mellow" compared to their boisterous younger days (F3). According to F1, while Polly the pig has "always been a bit naughty," she has become even more unpredictable in her temperament and behaviours as she has aged. Consistent with F3's observations cited earlier where many of the animals appear to enjoy spending time with their conspecifics away from the humans, F1 affirms this, but describes the sheep herd's preference to distance themselves from the humans as a shift over time:

> "So like, when a lot of the sheep came here when they were really young and they were all smoochy as and they would come up for pats and they would love spending time with us, but they, they just don't care anymore, like they're not interested. There's one or two who still likes to come up and say hello and get a pat, but most of them are just like they don't really want to have anything to do with us" (F1).

The fact that the sheep have grown more distant from the humans may be due to the founders' commitment to "allow the animals as much autonomy as [they] can" (F1). Juxtaposing the lives of animals at FASes and those living in tight confinement and deprivation on commercial farms, Leshko comments that sanctuary animals "are given ample space to roam freely and indulge their natural behaviours," and that "[n]othing is expected of these animals" (2019, 4). And amongst the sanctuaries Leshko has visited that offer guided tours for educational purposes, she states that "the animals determine how much (or how little) contact they have with visitors" (2019, 4). While Olive does not offer guided tours to the public (a decision that arises from the founders' respect for the animals' privacy), the degree of freedom and autonomy that sanctuary animals enjoy according to Leshko reflect the lives of animals at Olive. Through these examples, resistant time appears to be time spent according to the preferences of the animals, time that is within their control.

Resistant time is also time for rehabilitation and healing from physical and emotional traumas. Rescued farmed animals "often grapple with health problems" related to genetic manipulation in their selective breeding and the intensive confinement they have endured, such as paces of weight gain that exceed what the animals' musculoskeletal systems could handle, resulting in skeletal deformities, torn ligaments, and other physical disabilities (Leshko 2019, 6). Although health problems that develop from their genetic conditions may seem as if farmed animals could never fully escape the havoc that capital has wreaked on their bodies, many are often resilient enough to recover and enjoy extended lives once they receive veterinary medical treatment and routine care from sanctuary staff (Leshko 2019, 6-7).

According to F3, with the exception of those who had been brought to Olive at a young age, rescued adults tend to require "a period of settling in" to work out who are the members of their new community and what the social order looks like. F3 recalls a pig named Rosie who

"had a lot of food anxiety" due a starvation trauma and had struggled to figure out the feeding routine, and it "took her a little while to get comfortable with the idea that this was a home and that she was safe, that she was going to be cared for and fed." Even then, F1 remembers that Rosie never quite "integrated with the other pigs," and it was "only right towards the end of her life where her and Jedi [another pig] shared a paddock" and eventually sharing a bed when she finally bonded with another pig. Although not farmed animals, the founders pointed out that Remi the dog and Misty the cat were two other traumatised individuals whom the founders had observed the biggest changes since the two had arrived at the sanctuary. Misty was a feral cat found on the street who had a litter of kittens at the time she was rescued, and F2 suspects that Remi may have been beaten by a human. Both Remi and Misty required extensive time to eventually overcome their fears and suspicions of humans and trust that humans would care for them. The stories of individual animals overcoming relational and emotional traumas to bond with and trust others portray another facet of how resistant time could be spent to generate and repair relations.

An alternative temporality, however, constitutes only one dimension of the sanctuary as a liminal structure. Returning to situate Olive Animal Sanctuary within its settler-colonial context in Australia, considerations regarding the spatial dimension of the sanctuary complicates its emplacement. Citing a text by Lakota philosopher Vine Deloria Jr., Yellowknives Dene scholar Glen Coulthard (2014) underscores "the distinction between Indigenous place-based and Western time-oriented understandings of the world" (60). Whereas Indigenous peoples tend to attribute paramount meaning to their lands/places and make statements with lands/places as the main reference point, Western societies "tend to derive meaning from the world in historical/developmental terms, thereby placing *time* as the narrative of central importance" (Coulthard 2014, 60, emphasis in original). This distinction between Indigenous centring of space and Western centring of time has direct implications concerning resistance and struggle:

> "It is possible to argue that precisely what distinguishes anti-colonial struggles from the classic Marxist accounts of the working class is that oppression for the colonized is registered in the spatial dimension—*as dispossession*—whereas for workers, oppression is measured as exploitation, as the theft of *time*" (Kulchyski 2005, as cited in Coulthard 2014, 62, emphasis in original).

Adding to Peter Kulchyski's analysis above, Coulthard asserts that the "spatial referent" in decolonial and Indigenous thought applies to nonoppressive relations as well (2014, 62). In other words, Indigenous place-based thought and relations to the land informs both the negative dimension of resistance to colonialism and the positive dimension of survival and flourishing.

In the dialect of Coulthard's own community's language, the word 'land' is a relational term that encompasses not only its material aspect, "but also people and animals, rocks and trees, lakes and rivers, and so on" (2014, 61). The more-than-humans within this relational system are also constituents "believed to embody spirit or agency" like human beings, and all subjects, humans and more-than-humans, must reciprocally fulfil and uphold ethical obligations to each other to ensure "the survival and well-being of all over time" (Coulthard 2014, 61). Making a similar emphasis on the agentic and relational features of land according to Indigenous worldviews, Red River Métis/Michif scholar Max Liboiron (2021) adopts a distinction in their work between a capitalised 'Land' that refers "to the unique entity that is the combined living spirit of plants, animals, air, water, humans, histories and events recognized by many Indigenous communities," and an uncapitalised 'land' to denote "the concept from a colonial worldview whereby landscapes are common, universal, and everywhere, even with great variation" (6-7, footnote 19). For my purposes here, I take a common usage of 'land' to simultaneously include both Indigenous relational understandings of the term and non-Indigenous views of land as its physical and geological aspects.

The Indigenous notion of land plays a crucial part in thinking about relations within and beyond Olive as a liminal structure for both the founders and other liminal subjects interacting with the sanctuary. For the founders, their commitment to being in solidarity with Indigenous-led anticolonial causes means taking seriously the ethical and political implications of engaging with land as an agentic and relational being. Five days before the end of my time volunteering at Olive, I was present when F2 explained to a new volunteer how the founders of Olive take land into consideration. "It's like the land itself has become a person," said F2 as she told the new volunteer this was part of the reason why Olive is likely to shift towards rehabilitating native wild animals and phasing out rescuing farmed animals in the future. One of the interview questions I had for the Olive founders explores the kinds of ethical issues or dilemmas that emerge in working or interacting with the animals at the sanctuary. In response, F1 stated that

balancing between giving the animals enough freedom to use the land as they please and looking after the land itself has been a challenge:

> “So, for example, with the pigs, you know, like, they dig so much and the more they dig…the more that they've damaged the pasture for everybody else to eat. So, there's kind of that, you know, we can't let them out all the time, like we'd love it if they could go out there and just graze all day and do what they want, but there has to be periods of time when we lock them up, you know?” (F1).

F1 would go on to share other ethical challenges relating to the various ways that sanctuaries are also required to keep the rescued animals “in a kind of captivity” akin to zoos, and the times when it becomes necessary to physically restrain the animals to put them through health-related procedures. Ultimately, F2 suggests that it is “not ideal that [they] have the animals they have on this land,” to which F1 agrees. “It’s not great for the wildlife. It’s not great for the environment. It’s not great for biodiversity. I don’t know, like all that stuff,” said F2. During this segment of the interview session, the founders and I went on to have an extended discussion about this issue. This segment has been moderately edited for clarity:

> F1: This land is not designed for hooved animals, like we shouldn't have them here.
>
> Me: So, you're describing, you're talking mainly about the hilliness of the terrain or?
>
> F1: No just, the Australian continent. [Me: Oh okay]. It's not…
>
> F2: But also, the hooves compact the ground, which is not good for like earthworms, giant earthworms that we have here.
>
> F1: Just for any of the biodiversity in the soil. And you can see, we look out here every day and see the damage that the animals have done to this property and like that's partly because we were not managing it properly from the get-go, like we have allowed this pasture to get that degraded because we didn't have the appropriate fencing infrastructure

and all the rest of it. And it's going to take a really long time for that to heal, if indeed it ever does whilst we've got this many hooved animals on it, you know.

F2: It's unfortunate that the worst damage I guess is up here because the animals tend to come to the house quite a lot. The cows, for example, because they think they're going to get fed, the pigs because they're going to get fed. So, they actually ruin the areas closer to the house worse.

F1: But even the areas where we've got pigs, I mean, we've tried to contain that to a smallest part of the property as possible [F2: Yeah], but that's fucked up there.

F2: It's coming back, slowly, like…

F1: It would. It would and will come back but it's going to take time [F2: Yeah]

F2: We've done damage, but we're kind of working on that [F1: Yeah, we're]. Yeah, we're using different methods of, yeah…

F1: And I think that's one of like, a big thing for sanctuaries. Like, I mean, you know, what's more important? Like, saving a handful of animals that don't belong here? Or, rehabilitating the property to a point where native animals can come back? You know? It's a real…well, you can have both, but I don't think we can with the number of animals that we've got currently, which is why we've stopped taking in anymore large animals. Part of the reason why anyway, because we just can't sustain more on this piece of land.

Me: Yeah. And I think this is related to something that you've brought up in some of the conversations before, too, related to the shifting focus and goals of the sanctuary, is, in the future maybe doing more wild animal rehab type work. Yeah. So, this is all kind of connected with also like planting the trees and yeah. [Founders mmm in agreement].

F1: And I think also like, I want to make more connections with the local Indigenous people, and I feel like, what we do here is kind of probably a little bit in conflict with, you know, managing the land in a way that is kind of going to bring it back [F2: Traditional, yeah] to traditional sort of, do you know what I mean? Like, so it's hard. I feel like it's, I haven't sort of really gone down that path that much yet because I just don't know whether I can ethically justify what we do to, like for Indigenous people who want to actually like see the land, get, you know, returned to pre-colonised state, which we can't do that while we've got 42 acres full of animals that have, you know, come here with colonisers [Some mmms of acknowledgment from other founders and F1 sighs].

Me: Yeah, yeah. It's very, um, challenging thing to navigate, because um, initially the idea of the sanctuary, like the context obviously is challenging the surrounding bigger industries that are also doing the same kind of damage arguably to the land on a broader scale with… [F2: Absolutely]. Yeah. And so, I guess it becomes more of a question about, you know, like what is the better kind of, um, maybe 'better' is the wrong word but you know, which approach to take. It's hard to say, because the animal movement's approach has always been, you know, let's show a different way that we can live with these exploited animals, and then, the other project would be just rewilding this land and acknowledging that these animals were not really good for the local ecology, I guess, in some ways.

From this conversation, in addition to the tough balancing act between taking care of the land according to Indigenous values and the sanctuary's mission to rescue farmed animals to oppose animal agriculture, we also see a fraught politics of belonging emerge in relation to land regarding the place of farmed and other rescued animals. However, frictions also exist between rescued animals and other native wild animals, reflective of the antagonistic relationships within the liminal structure as a conflict zone for other species as well. In an earlier part of the same interview session above, I asked the founders to share any memorable interactions between the rescued animal residents of Olive with wildlife or wild animals beyond the sanctuary. Amongst a mix of more mutualistic and friendly interactions were stories of hostility: "The dogs would go absolutely bananas if there's a possum in the tree," said F1, "And one time, Houdini [the dog]

chased a wallaby into a gully, but then she hit the electric fence and freaked out and ran home, so that taught her a good lesson." The founders also mentioned that the roosters would also "go bananas" when they get scared thinking a bird flying above them is a predator, prompting them to make alarm calls. Sometimes, the magpies will swoop the dogs. Quokka the cat had been bitten by a snake and fell quite ill, and the founders suspect Polly the pig had also suffered a snake bite that took her a while to recover from.

"What other animals?" asked F1.

"The foxes?" F3 replied.

"The foxes. Remember that time Orwell [the pig] chased that fox out of the paddock?" said F1.

"Oh yeah." F2 said in amusement recalling this incident.

"Oh, okay wow," I said, as I take in the first story I have heard where a pig got the best of a fox.

"That's pretty cool," F1 said, "Um, and the foxes have eaten roosters."

"Or killed them," F2 chimed in.

According to the founders' recollections, on one occasion a fox had grabbed a goose. F1 managed to get the goose out of the fox's mouth, at which point the dogs came out and chased the fox away. According to F3, a goose named Moto had been killed by a fox. Speaking to the challenge of keeping sanctuary animals safe while respecting wild animals, F1 asserted that they were "not going to hold it against" the foxes because the foxes are "just doing what they do" and "they didn't ask to be here." Therefore, F1 concedes that there is not much the sanctuary founders could do beyond ensuring the residents are as safe as possible without harming the foxes. As an introduced species to Australia, foxes engender their own politics of belonging and exclusion in relation to a settler-colonial state that categorises them as invasive pests and actively attempts to exterminate them. Olive is certainly not alone in facing the threats posed by foxes as a sanctuary. F1 recalls "stories where other sanctuaries have had fox attacks where they've just come in and completely decimated the whole flock." In comparison, F1 considers Olive to be "pretty lucky" with regards to fox-bird relations, as such tragedies had never taken place at Olive. F1 believes this may largely be the effect of having the birds "very close to the house" and having cats and dogs to help "keep the foxes in check a little bit," as the dogs would bark when

they sense the foxes from afar, and are regularly marking their territory around the sanctuary grounds.

4.4 Conclusion

Taken together, I argue that the conflicts and antagonisms between the land, the rescued domesticated animals, and the local wild animals that Olive founders attempt to navigate and manage are all structurally rooted and produced. Viewing Olive Animal Sanctuary as a liminal structure where liminality is understood as a conflict zone in relation to settler-colonialism and domestication, I suggest that the reason why Olive cannot fully escape the internal contradictions and dilemmas arising out of their own divergent political commitments is largely because the sanctuary was created out of conditions and structures of domestication and settler-colonialism, and is still very much embedded within and constrained by these dominating structures. As a liminal structure, Olive finds itself constantly slipping back into and shifting away from domesticity and coloniality in relation to a radical alternative it is attempting to reach. The opposing polarities of oppressive structures and yet-to-be realised transformative possibilities tug at the sanctuary. This structural dynamic is reflected by the resistive agencies and subjectivities at the individual scale. The agency of Olive founders finds itself being met with the agencies and subjectivities of the land and all the other animals who become liminal in relation to each other at the sanctuary, and are drawn into the structural antagonisms the sanctuary is engaged in as a liminal structure / conflict zone. Questions remain as to how we might proceed after we become liminal animals at the sanctuary (or other liminal structures). In the next chapter, I offer a different conceptualisation of Olive Animal Sanctuary that builds on the idea of the sanctuary as a liminal structure to argue that the sanctuary is also a *technology of counterpower*, in which subjects at the sanctuary could move past the pre-revolutionary subjectivity of being liminal to adopt more politicised roles in resisting domination.

To close this chapter, I return to consider how the insights and analyses regarding settler-colonialism, domestication, and liminality as explored here might add to or alter the existing conversations regarding Donaldson and Kymlicka's theorisation of liminal animals within their group-differentiated approach to political membership for animals. In their original argument, Donaldson and Kymlicka cateogorise all wild animals who live amongst humans as liminal animals (2011, 210). Characteristic of liminal animals is the fact that they have in one way or

another come to depend on humans or environments shaped by humans, yet do not cooperate with, communicate with, or trust humans in ways that domesticated animals do. Whether living amongst humans by choice, such as the ones who "actively seek out areas of human settlement" for food, or forced to adapt to human encroachment on "their traditional habitat," Donaldson and Kymlicka see liminal animals as neither domesticated nor truly/fully wild (2011, 210).

Within the broader category of liminal animals, Donaldson and Kymlicka identify distinctive subgroups. These subgroups include "opportunists" who have skillfully adapted to survive and thrive in anthropogenic environments, but have become "dependent on humans in the non-specific sense," meaning that they may "live off of human settlement, but do not typically rely on a relationship with any specific human(s), and can often adapt to changes in human activity" (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 219-20). There are "niche specialists," who "are much less flexible" and "much more vulnerable" compared to opportunists, requiring humans to maintain and not drastically modify the environments they have adapted to (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 221-22). "Introduced exotics" make up another subgroup and have come to exist in a particular place due to deliberate human introduction "or as a by-product of human mobility and mass transportation," and these animals often find themselves competing with "native species" (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 222-23). "Feral animals" constitute the final subgroup of liminal animals, which Donaldson and Kymlicka describe as "domesticated animals and their descendants who have escaped direct human controls," such as "[e]scaped or abandoned cats and dogs" or feral farmed animals (2011, 224). Given that many liminal animals are often stigmatised by humans as 'pests' or 'invasive species' and consequently subjected to various forms of violence, Donaldson and Kymlicka propose denizenship as a safeguard to accord them "secure residency," with the expectation and demand that there would be "fair terms of reciprocity" as a condition between humans, domesticated animal citizens, and the liminal animal denizens (2011, 241).

In his critical response to Donaldson and Kymlicka's ascription of the denizen status to liminal animals, Wadiwel argues that the reason why liminal animals are denied citizenship like domesticated animals and denied sovereignty like wild animals ultimately comes down to the matter of territory:

> "Because these animals do not pay credence to the natural (or human constructed) borders of nation states, because they share human constructed space but do not express connection or allegiance to human communities, because these animals are migratory and do not have clearly demarcated sovereign territories, and because these animals may rely on human constructed habitats, they are only granted provisional membership as perpetual visitors. The effect of ascribing denizenship to these animals is that a right to full membership (either to be members of a pre-existing human community or to possess sovereignty in their own right) is denied because they are not perceived to possess a territory of their own; they are conceptualised effectively as populations without a homeland" (2015, 250).

Wadiwel's analysis suggests that while Donaldson and Kymlicka attempted to reform the Westphalian model of sovereignty and liberal conceptions of citizenship to make them more inclusive of other animals, their project "is tested as soon as the non-national, the outsider to the territory, the *denizen,* makes a claim to a right of non distinction from those who are granted citizenship rights" (2015, 251, emphasis in original).

Recently, however, Donaldson and Kymlicka have updated their analysis to directly address the issues related to territory, which also includes an update to their conceptualisations of FASes. In an earlier argument regarding the promises of FASes, Donaldson and Kymlicka (2015) proposed that sanctuaries could adopt an intentional community model that would allow humans and farmed animals to experimentally interact with each other as co-citizens, which suggests that FASes fall exclusively within the sphere of domesticated citizenship. This view has since been further developed to include sanctuaries as one amongst a number of different kinds of places (e.g. urban areas) consisting of "overlapping forms of political community" and "overlapping forms of governance" (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2023, 636).

The recognition of 'overlaps' allows Donaldson and Kymlicka to acknowledge that sanctuaries "are a particular kind of territorial community," one that is capable of being "both a thickly social membership-based community" that is "bound together by certain thick forms of interspecies sociability, with shared social norms and close social relationships of affection, care, interdependence, and cooperation" (namely between humans and domesticated animals), as well as "a thinner interspecies commons" that serves as a "home to various liminal animals, such as

wild turkeys, rats, skunks, deer, foxes, and myriad other animals" (2023, 636). By using this thick and thin relational distinction, Donaldson and Kymlicka at once retains the categorical separation of membership between domesticated and liminal animals, while securing a shared 'homeland' for liminal animals. This approach allows sanctuaries to simultaneously be domestic and liminal spaces, and domesticated animals can be both citizens and denizens in the sanctuary without contradiction. Recognising that "liminal animal denizens" can have diverse relations with the "'citizen' members of the sanctuary" ranging from cordial to hostile, Donaldson and Kymlicka suggest that "the creation of specific practices to maintain the peace or at least establish a modus vivendi" would be required (2023, 637). In this manner, sanctuaries made up of a messy overlap of communities could produce a sense of "communal self-determination that starts from interdependence and overlap, not separation and independence" (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2023, 637).

Without weighing in too conclusively regarding how the power dynamics might evolve over time between the overlapping communities at places such as sanctuaries, my perspective regarding the updated arrangement Donaldson and Kymlicka have construed is that liminal animal denizens would probably remain more vulnerable and excluded in the shaping of liminal interspecies commons in relation to humans and domesticated animals unless the underlying structural conflicts as discussed throughout this chapter are brought to the fore. The process of eliciting and tackling the often-suppressed structural antagonisms must go beyond the commitment of humans (who are likelier to be the ones 'managing' conflicts) to become more responsive to liminal animals, and arrive at structural transformations that truly subvert power relations between humans and more-than-humans. In the following chapter, I look at how Olive Animal Sanctuary exists and operates as a technology of counterpower that promotes the elicitation of concealed conflicts between humans and other animals.

Chapter 5 – Sanctuary as a Technology of Counterpower: Part I

The previous chapter discussed the historical contexts in which Olive Animal Sanctuary operate, which details how the sanctuary understood as a liminal structure is produced in response and in relation to other dominant hegemonic structures, such as colonial-capitalism and domestication. In my analysis, I described liminality as generative of conditions that could facilitate the process of re-animalisation, as well as how the sanctuary understood as a liminal structure sustains these conditions. In this chapter and the following chapter, I turn to describe Olive Animal Sanctuary as 'a technology of counterpower', whereby the sanctuary's epistemic groundings inform its practices to shape intraspecies and interspecies relations and conduct in ways that offer insights for re-animalisation (or animal-guided animalisation to be precise). Whereas the previous chapter contemplated how the historical, structural, and spatiotemporal conditions shaping the sanctuary might promote the possibilities of re-animalisation for humans, I now turn to examine the role that knowledge systems, ideologies, or philosophies might play in re-animalisation. Here, I understand knowledge systems to be bodies of knowledge that could be institutionalised and operative in governing sociopolitical conduct and relations. As such, knowledge systems could be understood as forms of power, or co-constitutive of power, insofar as they are integral to productive, disciplinary, and regulatory mechanisms in shaping social norms.

I begin this chapter by defining both 'technology' and 'power' according to the Foucauldian theory of power, which I merge with anthropologist David Graeber's definition of counterpower. Throughout this rest of this chapter, I trace the key knowledge systems that shape practices at Olive, namely ecofeminism and veganism, by weaving together interview and journal entry data with theoretical and conceptual analyses. I demonstrate how these knowledge systems constitute the sanctuary as a form of counterpower and how counterpower shapes the conduct and considerations amongst Olive founders in accordance with ecofeminism and veganism. Overall, this chapter involves a heavier focus on the lived experiences and politics of the human members at the sanctuary (i.e. the founders).

In Chapter 6, Sanctuary as a Technology of Counterpower: Part II, I build on the analysis in this chapter to examine the relations and direct interactions with nonhuman animals. Continuing with analysing knowledge systems, I first look at how farmed animal sanctuaries (FASes) produce and appropriate specialised knowledge that would shape forms of conduct

aimed at benefiting and improving the lives of their nonhuman animal residents. Following that, I present brief ethnographic accounts to illustrate how, despite being counterhegemonic, counterpower nevertheless governs life and relations at the sanctuary in coercive and disciplinary ways. However, I argue that the productive dimension of counterpower at Olive fosters the life of animal residents in ways that force human members of the sanctuary to negotiate their safety and vulnerability in relation to other animals. In the concluding section of Chapter 6, I reflect on both chapters and discuss how the analysis of counterpower might be relevant to re-animalisation.

5.1 Technology, Counterpower, and the Knowledge Systems of Olive Animal Sanctuary

Tracing Foucault's usage of 'technology' throughout his philosophical career, Michael C. Behrent (2013) identifies an ambivalence in "at least two main ways" that Foucault has employed the term (55). The two ways include "a negative use of the term 'technology' – seen as a form of social and political control that should be subject to critique – and a distinctly positive" or neutral usage "shorn of latent moral values," which offers a "critical methodology" for analysing "how power shapes human conduct" (Behrent 2013, 56). In both approaches, Behrent emphasises that Foucault's concept of technology, which is often synonymous to 'technique' and used interchangeably in French, "refer not to tools, machines, or the application of science to industrial production, but rather to methods and procedures for governing human being" (2013, 55).[2] Another salient feature of Foucault's thoughts on technology relates to his anti-humanism or anti-essentialism. Rejecting "the claims that technology risks violating some fundamental human essence," Behrent notes that Foucault experimented with the concept of technology in ways that freed his philosophy from the metaphysical assumptions of humanism (2013, 68). Thus, Foucault's concept of technology

> "could refer to the impersonal, systemic, and integrated character of epistemological structures, thus emancipating the problem of knowledge from the analysis of consciousness; to the practical procedure by which power aspires to mold individual

[2] Behrent also notes that Foucault has used the French term 'dispositif' to a similar effect of technology, which is "alternately translated as 'apparatus,' 'machinery,' or 'deployment'" (2013, 87).

> behavior, thus freeing power from questions of foundation and legitimacy; and finally, to the practices, exercises, and routines by which one constitutes one's own selfhood, liberating, in this way, the concept of individuality from metaphysical notions of subjectivity and interiority" (Behrent 2013, 68).

Understood in these ways, the Foucauldian concept of technology is particularly useful for envisioning the sanctuary less as an instrument or tool for social change and more as a place where a set of epistemological structures, and a concordant field of power, govern relations and conduct between humans as well as between humans and other animals. This is crucial to the process of animal-guided animalisation as mentioned in the theoretical frameworks section in Chapter 2, where I argue that the ramifications of the process are decided by which epistemological frameworks we use to engage with and interpret the agency, sociality, and relationality of other animals. By electing to examine anthropogenic epistemic structures rather than the consciousness and subjectivities of other animals, Foucauldian technology also allows us to investigate what lessons we could learn from other animals without being bogged down with considerations of how other animals might qualify as 'teachers' or co-producers of knowledge.

With respect to counterpower, I apply anthropologist David Graeber's (2004) "theory of imaginary counterpower" to my analysis of some evident tendencies and conduct of Olive Animal Sanctuary. Graeber's admittedly "somewhat complicated argument" consists of several parts in its description of counterpower (2004, 24). To summarise, Graeber observes that in egalitarian societies (or societies that strive to be as egalitarian as possible), counterpower is principally "rooted in the relation between the practical imagination required to maintain a society based on consensus" and "the spectral violence which appears to be its constant, perhaps inevitable corollary" (2004, 35). As a "predominant form of social power" in egalitarian societies, counterpower "stands guard over what are seen as certain frightening possibilities within the society itself: notably against the emergence of systematic forms of political or economic dominance" (Graeber 2004, 35). In practice, counterpower materialises through "institutions of direct democracy, consensus and mediation," which are "ways of publicly negotiating and controlling" internally tumultuous dynamics and transforming them into various "social states" or "forms of value" that a given society deems most desirable (Graeber 2004, 35).

Furthermore, within societies that are exceedingly unequal, imaginary counterpower is often defined "against certain aspects of dominance that are seen as particularly obnoxious," and counterpower "becomes revolutionary" when it attempts to completely eradicate such forms of dominance from social relations (Graeber 2004, 36). Lastly, Graeber asserts that imaginary counterpower serves as "an imaginative well" that is institutionally responsible for creating "new social forms" and/or revalorizing or transforming old ones (2004, 36). During the occurrence of revolutionary radical transformations, Graeber argues that imaginary counterpower is what enables the "popular ability to innovate entirely new politics, economics, and social forms," making it "the root of what Antonio Negri has called 'constituent power,' the power to create constitutions" (2004, 36).

The anthropological path through which Graeber arrives at his conceptualisation of imaginary counterpower is worth noting, as they are based on research of relatively egalitarian societies: The Piaroa who live along the Orinoco river in South America, the Tiv in central Nigeria, and the Malagasy people whom Graeber himself has studied. Leaving aside the compelling and important details of each case study here for brevity, Graeber observes that what each of the three peoples and other egalitarian societies have in common, or what they demonstrate, is a "peculiar fact" that it is often the most peaceful and egalitarian societies "which are also the most haunted, in their imaginative constructions of the cosmos, by constant specters of perennial war" (2004, 25-26). The "enormous emphasis" that these societies tend to place on building and sustaining communal consensus seems to frequently animate an "equally elaborate reaction formation, a spectral nightworld inhabited by monsters, witches or other creatures of horror" (Graeber 2004, 25). There is a sharp contrast between the tumultuous cosmological content of these societies and their actual social processes aimed at reaching consensus through mediation (Graeber 2004, 29-30). In this way, such egalitarian societies are constantly surrounded by invisible and imaginary worlds that are "literally battlegrounds," reflecting how "the endless labor of achieving consensus masks a constant inner violence," or perhaps "the process by which that inner violence is measured and contained" (Graeber 2004, 26).

Although none of my experiences and observations suggest that Olive Animal Sanctuary possesses and operates on any cosmological content remotely similar to the spectral worlds of societies that Graeber cites, I nonetheless find his definition and examples of imaginary counterpower productive in examining how the knowledge systems (or counterpower) of Olive

replicate many of the processes and dynamics presented above. As I shall show in the following subsections, there exists a constant apprehension and vigilance amongst the Olive founders as they navigate between the metaphorically "spectral" anti-oppressive and egalitarian ideals that the key knowledge systems governing Olive demands, and the actual social processes or practices of the founders that are largely defined by mediations and negotiations. These knowledge systems contain both a negative impulse that guards against existing and potential forms of domination, as well as a positively productive reservoir for imagining and building alternative sociopolitical realities. Based on how the founders of Olive describe their political values and beliefs as well as their advocacy work, the sanctuary operates according to at least two discernable knowledge systems: ecofeminism and veganism. Since divergent parameters and definitions of each philosophy exist and they may not all be compatible with one another depending on their frameworks, I summarise in the following sections the particular strands of ecofeminism and veganism I believe to be most closely aligned with those that constitute Olive, and offer examples to illustrate the enactment of these knowledge systems.

5.2 Ecofeminism

As alluded to in Chapter 4, Olive upholds a type of general ecofeminism similar to VINE Sanctuary, and many other sanctuaries, which recognises the interconnections between the injustices affecting oppressed humans, other animals, and the broader more-than-human world. Ecofeminist scholars have argued that this ecofeminism is premised on the basic assumptions that the logics of "oppressions such as those based on race, class, gender, sexuality, physical abilities, and species" reinforce one another and sanction "the oppression of nature" (Gaard 1993, 1) and that ecofeminists seek to address "the various ways that misogyny, heteronormativity, white supremacy, colonialism, and ableism are informed by and support pernicious anthropocentrism" (Adams and Gruen 2022, xxi). Furthermore, ecofeminists more broadly reject reason and emotion as dualistic oppositions, embrace "embodied and affective relations as a mode of ethical understanding" when engaging with humans and more-than-humans, and think "contextually on issues and conflicts within and across species" (Celermajer and Chang 2024, 593).

Olive's ecofeminist ethos was reflected in a segment of my interview with the founders where we discussed their identities and politics. When I asked Olive founders whether they

identify as part of any socially and politically marginalised groups, all three founders were nuanced and sensitive to the various ways in which they may be considered marginalised or privileged according to different identity categories. For instance, while the founders acknowledge that they could be considered marginalised based on their gender and sexuality as well as their neurodiversity, two of the founders also acknowledge their white racial privilege, and all three felt that they occupy positions of relative financial privilege.

Subsequently, I asked the founders whether they have felt that their identity experiences shaped their sanctuary work in any way. F2 responded that perhaps "subconsciously," they "chose to do this because of [their] feeling of marginalisation and their empathy for others who are marginalised." F3 expressed that having "come from deep within the working class" is "something that speaks to the work [they] do at the sanctuary, such as having "a kind of class consciousness in terms of the way [they] approach" the financial aspects of running a sanctuary. When I asked for elaboration, F3 clarified that their "attitudes to ownership and property is very communal" and that the founders have "often talked about the fact that [they] have communal assets that are for the benefit of the sanctuary community" in ways that they "wouldn't necessarily have" had they come "from different backgrounds with different political beliefs and associations towards property." F3 then invited others to add their thoughts regarding this point, to which F1 shared that their commitment to a communal approach where everyone "contribute in different ways" that they are "best able to" helps to prevent potential conflicts around divisions of property and labour. F1 expressed an understanding of this communal approach as "kind of a queer concept" in the sense that the founders have formed a "chosen family" and are "queering the space" of the sanctuary; despite still being "constrained and constricted by…legal frameworks," they have found ways to operate the sanctuary in ways alternative to what has been formally stated according to legally-binding documents. As such, F1 spoke to how their queer identity and experiences are "definitely a part of what [they] do" and that they are "definitely not mainstream" in their approach to operating a sanctuary.

Another attribute of ecofeminism can be observed in Olive's relational approach in their effort to build community and advocate for animals. Despite describing herself as "not somebody who naturally…flocks to people," F3 stated that her "idea of who belongs in the community is broad, and she has been actively challenging herself to think about community as "becoming

larger rather than smaller." Expanding on this point, F3 described a change in her idea of community from the earlier days of establishing the sanctuary to the present day:

> "I think when we moved to the sanctuary, my idea was that we would create a community with the animals that are here and with people who wanted to come. And I'm now thinking like we need to broaden that community to not just these resident animals, but you know, other animals, and other humans and humans around us, and humans who don't think like us and who don't believe in our, you know, in our values or our mission" (F3).

F3 shared that she has been "a bit humbled" by the people around their immediate community and their neighbours, "in terms of how welcoming they have been" and how "helpful and ready" the neighbours are willing to "just drop everything" and assist when emergencies occur. F3 claims that whereas her "own ego" thought that she was going to turn her new rural community vegan, what in fact had happened was the community has turned her "into a more accepting sort of person."

To be clear, F1 believed that there were legitimate reasons for the sanctuary founders' "defence mechanism" that made them "more insular" in Olive's earlier days because they had heard numerous "stories of other sanctuaries…having really bad time with their neighbours…getting into conflict and stuff." According to F1, "one sanctuary had some animals killed," and another "had people on her property with guns" shooting kangaroos and other animals. However, as time went on, F3 has seen how the improvement in relations between Olive and the surrounding community has also benefited animals in noteworthy ways:

> "And we have like seen examples of where, you know, us being here in this space has been, has obviously made an impact on the community, like when um, our neighbours needed to, like had to move and they wanted to rehome some sheep and they wanted to rehome some pigs and stuff, they came to us. And, I feel like, you know, it's kind of validating to think they value our input into that process, enough to come to us as a first protocol" (F3).

One of the examples that the founders shared to illustrate how the local community has come to value the work of Olive was how horses Caper and Hobert became sanctuary residents. According to the founders, somebody had found the two horses roaming freely and seemingly lost on the roads near the sanctuary, so the person brought them to Olive trusting that the sanctuary would take care of the horses. F3 states that this example suggests a recognition amongst the locals that Olive is "a safe space for animals" and that this form of impact is not always measurable.

Furthering this point on building trust and relationship within their community, F2 mentioned the founders' involvement as committee members of the community hall (the Hall) in their rural locality as an example of a creative way to find common ground with other community members, "rather than worry so much about the differences between" themselves and other local residents. During my time volunteering at Olive, F1 and F2 attended a committee meeting for the Hall. F2 shared that in the meeting, the Hall committee members planned for an upcoming community event, and one of the committee members offered to provide a meat pack for a raffle prize:

> "…a little joke was made about [how] it wouldn't be very good for us because we are vegan and I just thought that that was very interesting that it was able to be kind of out in the open…" (F2).

F2 clarified that it was "a friendly joke" and the committee member who had made the comment was not "joking on the vegans." This story prompted F1 to add that the founders have seen sincere effort amongst other committee members of the Hall to be inclusive to the founders' vegan lifestyle. For example, F1 mentioned that the other committee members had gone out of their way to provide snacks for the meeting that they thought were vegan, but it turned out that the items contained eggs despite being labelled dairy-free and gluten-free. F1 and F2 were quick to reassure other committee members that they did not actually have to provide vegan snacks, and offered to bring food to share at future meetings. However, the other committee members apologised and insisted that they wished to learn how to be more accommodating.

For F1, the willingness of other committee members of the Hall to acknowledge their differences while still being hospitable spoke to the significance of the founders' labour in

building meaningful long-term relationships and trust with the local community, and how other community members have reciprocated. The care and interdependence reflected in how Olive founders and members of their surrounding community have supported and relied on each other are examples that speak to an ecofeminist relational approach.

Another aspect of Olive's ecofeminism emerges in the connections the founders make between different justice causes. Following from the conversation surrounding the founders' participation at the Hall, I asked the founders whether they have in the past been or are currently involved in any other advocacy for different justice causes beyond their animal sanctuary work, such as climate, food, environmental, or other social justice campaigns. Additionally, I asked the founders how they felt about other justice causes and movements in relation to animal advocacy and the sanctuary more specifically, and whether they saw any meaningful connections between them. The founders' responses demonstrate yet another key characteristic of ecofeminism: the recognition of interconnections between different forms of oppression. Although all three founders expressed care and support for other justice causes, they have also indicated limited direct participation in any ongoing campaigns, citing the amount of labour and attention required in prioritising the sanctuary as well as their geographical remoteness as main obstacles:

> "The only thing that I'm kind of actively involved in at the moment outside of the sanctuary is our local Hall committee, which is you know, is mainly for us around building community with local community. Um, but I'm not actively involved in other, you know, specific campaigns or anything at the moment. I just, I don't really have the capacity to be, especially when we're so, I feel like we're very um, disconnected from it out here. It's hard to get to rallies and it's hard to kind of be actively involved in stuff" (F1).

While F1 would usually attend "a lot of rallies" in support of other causes prior to living at the sanctuary, she recalls being stuck at the sanctuary and missing out on a recent rally supporting transgender rights that F2 and F3 did attend. F1 explains that despite having "fantasies about…being involved in other things…there's not always a lot left in the tank to do that stuff," especially if the founders would have to travel to the nearest major city to offer time and support in person.

For F3, who does not live fulltime at the sanctuary, her contribution to anti-war and anti-nuclear advocacy were examples that immediately came to her mind in response to the questions above. Moreover, F3 has been involved in "campaigns to do with the eradication of violence against women and queer stuff," although she downplayed the significance of this gender justice work, stating that "it's not really even activism, like we're having a stall at [name of a festival]" with the organization of her employment to raise awareness on related issues. By drawing on professional work as part of her activism, F3 prompted F1 to include work-related advocacy as well. F1 stated that she has been involved in several committees at work relevant to environmental sustainability as well as diversity, equity, and inclusion, but like F3, she is unsure whether she would "call it activism." Meanwhile, as the only founder who works fulltime at the sanctuary, F2 was in the early days of initiating a project to support and advocate for prisoners. F2's initiative demonstrates the founders' support for prison justice, prison abolition, and solidarity with incarcerated people, which in turn represents an ecofeminist political position within the animal movement that is critical of the shared logics in the captivity of other animals and imprisonment of humans (see for examples Gruen 2014; Gruen and Marceau 2022; McNeill 2022).

As a result of the founders' capacities and the location of the sanctuary being limitations preventing them from participating more actively and directly in other advocacy causes, the founders focus instead on conducting their sanctuary work and contributing to their local community in ways that they feel align with and help to advance the goals of related causes. F3 thinks that the connections between their sanctuary work and other causes exists more so "on a philosophical level" and that "the causes and things that [they are] involved in are really complementary to what [they are] doing at the sanctuary." One example of this philosophical alignment through the sanctuary's work is reflected in the founders' efforts to care for the land. A portion of this example appeared in the interview segment in the Chapter 4, where the founders expressed concerns relating to the damages that the farmed animal residents have brought to the land occupied by the sanctuary, and where the founders had acknowledged their own inexperience in land management as a factor in causing the damages. Another aspect of the founders' land care surfaced during that section of the interview when I mentioned that the founders had been restoring the land through tree planting at the sanctuary.

On Day 3 of my time at Olive, F2 had shown me their tree planting project as part of a more extensive tour visiting the larger paddocks further away from the main house at Olive. These paddocks are mostly occupied by the cow and sheep herds, and resemble the hilly pastures of the surrounding landscape I had witnessed on the car ride to the sanctuary. On our walk, F2 had shown me the trees and shrubs the founders have been planting to help restore and reconnect the waterways and gullies that had been severed and damaged by agricultural land use. F2 told me it would take approximately 20 years for the vegetation to mature, and that this was part of a larger regional collaborative project with other stakeholders to repair the interconnected catchments and waterways throughout the region. Caring for the land in addition to the animal residents exemplifies an enactment of connecting what the founders are able to accomplish at the sanctuary to the goals of other movements and causes:

> "obviously [we've] got connections to like the climate movement and [Aboriginal] land rights and stuff like that, but…we're not actively kind of engaged in those struggles I don't think, but like I'm kind of always thinking about how do we look after this bit of land that we've got" (F1).

In seeing the connection between land care and Aboriginal land rights, F1's comment above hearkens back to the same section of the interview in Chapter 4 where the founders' concerns for land have in large part been shaped by Indigenous worldviews. However, in this separate conversation exploring Olive founders' relations and connections with other movements, the founders were able to share and expand on attempts at acting in solidarity with Indigenous peoples and communities, which I detail in the following section.

Overall, I argue that the ecofeminist dimension of Olive Animal Sanctuary as evinced by the founders' views and approaches examined above demonstrate the care, humility, and openness or vulnerability required in the process of re-animalisation, insofar as these attributes are directed towards challenging human exceptionalism and attaining justice. Firstly, the founders' sensitivity and awareness towards positions of privilege and marginalisation proves crucial in their efforts to act in solidarity with those who may be deemed expendable according to the logics of protection-sacrifice or human exceptionalism. Secondly, the founders' relational approaches to building community through the Hall committee, and their support for other

causes in their immediate surroundings, such as the tree planting project, reflect the humility and vulnerability required to recognise and practice interdependence. These attributes not only exemplify transformative tendencies, they also work against the tendency of zoöpolitical exceptionalism to enforce insulation against anything that might be perceived as risks.

5.3 Olive Founders' Sympathies and Support for Indigenous-led Anticolonialism

Definitionally, the ecofeminist position that Olive espouses would potentially encompass a position that respects the land as an agentic and relational entity consistent with Indigenous worldviews, and would recognise and support Indigenous self-determination against enduring settler-colonial structures. As highlighted in Chapter 4, the commitment amongst the founders of Olive Animal Sanctuary to Indigenous worldviews regarding land has led them to note numerous ethical challenges they face in balancing their care for the land and the farmed animal residents. In practice, Olive founders have also taken part in land restoration projects and have continued to explore better ways to balance the needs of the animal residents and the health of the land that Olive occupies. Nonetheless, different political positions and ideologies exist amongst Indigenous peoples and their allies when it comes to approaches and strategies for resisting and transforming colonial structures; therefore, it is important to locate a more precise political stance that Olive founders support prior to discussing its significance to the conduct and governance of the sanctuary.

However, my attempt to get a more exact description of the politics of Olive Animal Sanctuary led to a rather humbling moment for myself as a researcher when I asked the founders directly whether they could describe their political beliefs and values, or ideologies and political leanings. F1 was critical of the question or the way I had construed it for a couple reasons. First, F1 felt that exchanges on political views, especially in the context of research, tends to assume a "type of academic language" and usage of terms that "are not particularly meaningful" to those who are not academics. This would include, for example, the numerous -isms of political philosophies and ideologies. Relatedly, F1 asserted that what the founders say and do "might not necessarily be easily translatable" to such formal terms and concepts, that those terms may not necessarily capture the complexities of their politics, and those labels "kind of put people in silos…and make it difficult for people to have good conversations when they're all sitting in a camp" of their own. F2 offered a helpful suggestion that instead of labelling their politics, they

could, for instance, share how they believe society should be run and what type of political system they would like to see. Agreeing with F2, I then pivoted with a suggestion that perhaps it would also help to identify certain things that they are against, to which F2 named colonisation and capitalism as things they oppose. This conversation would then segue into the aforementioned parts in the previous section where the founders discussed how they are positioned outside the mainstream and their belief in building community.

F2's statement that the founders are opposed to colonisation and capitalism nonetheless remains vague with regards to their approach and alignments in terms of their sympathies to Indigenous-led anticolonial struggles. However, in the same part of the interview where F1 drew connections between Olive's work and the work of climate and land rights movements, F1 had also mentioned that the founders have always thought about how they could "involve the local Indigenous people in some way" in their sanctuary work, and that Olive founders have always "just thought that [they] need to have it written into [their] wills that [the land they own] gets given back to" Indigenous people. Despite this intention, F1 acknowledges that returning the land that Olive currently occupies was only something that the founders have "sort of briefly talked about before, but haven't really kind of actually done anything about." Nevertheless, additional information that Olive founders have provided as we continued the interview suggests that F1 has understated the founders' efforts with regards to land returns.

After my question inquiring connections between movements, I followed up on the founders' aspiration to work with Indigenous communities and organisations, and asked them directly whether they know of any local Indigenous groups and organisations, to which they responded through the following exchange:

> F2: Not local to here, no. There's some, kind of, more [name of region] way and then there's like, um [F1: East] [name of region], but not in this area.
>
> F1: It's like when you look at the map of the um, the [F2: Nations] nations, we sit at the convergence of four of them. And from what I've been able to gather from the research that I've done, nobody, none of them really have a strong claim on where we're at. [F2: Yeah]. So, we're kind of in a little bit of a no-man's land. Um, and like, I kind of got to a point with the research where I was like, "Well fuck, I don't know where else to go," like

I’m not sure where to go now. Um, and so I sort of, I just kind of put it on the side for a while but yeah, it's something that we need to look further into because there's kind of competing, not competing, but there are various claims on sort of the areas around where we are. It’s all a little bit ambiguous…

F3: It’s also really hard because this area was really, really brutally colonised. [F1: Yeah].

F2: That’s right. But I think the main reason this area kind of isn't of much interest is because, um, you know, there's no river system, like there's no, um, yeah. In this area we're kind of up the top of hills and so there's no rivers or streams or anything like that.

F1: Probably not a place where they settled [F2: No], more of a transitory kind of, yeah.

F2: Yeah, it's more down, like I said, [name of region] where it's much more flattened, close to the water, um, we know active kind of [F1: There’s a lot of stuff] yeah, that's a lot of um, stuff happening.

F1: Cultural heritage stuff going on down there. Yeah.

F2: And then like [name of town] is probably the only other kind of, and then there's up in the mountains [F1: In the mountains, yep]. But yeah, no one's really doing much around here.

F1: …but I do want to make connections with the, there's a couple of, um, Indigenous [F2: Land councils] land council groups that are more kind of towards [name of a local government area].

F2: Yeah, there's a lot of activity around there. That's the thing. We are kind of near [an area] but not close enough, and there's heaps of activity around [an area].

Me: Yeah. So then I'm guessing that local institutions don't really have, haven't really done much in terms of like acknowledge, country acknowledgments and stuff, like they wouldn't even know where to begin essentially? [F1: Nah. That's right]. Okay.

F1: We wanted to do something with the Hall. We want to have some kind of, we'll probably get an acknowledgment plaque of some sort. But again, it's finding out that information, and…

F3: It's hard to know who to acknowledge. [F1: Yeah, exactly]. Which nation.

This exchange shows that despite practical challenges, the anticolonial sympathies at Olive has guided the founders to take considerable and meaningful actions in their solidarity with Indigenous peoples, such as by researching which First Nations constitute the traditional owners of the land they reside on as an initial step to participate in possible land returns in the future. While Olive founders had discussed an eventual transfer of their land back to traditional Indigenous owners, it remains unknown whether this outcome could be actualised. Nonetheless, the founders' stated intention to return the land to Indigenous governance, even as an aspiration, suggests that they may lean towards rejecting colonial institutions and structures as much as possible whilst affirming the legitimacy of Indigenous sovereignty. Arguably, this critical position acknowledges and respects Indigenous sovereignty, and at the same time views the settler-colonial state as illegitimate. As settlers, Olive founders' willingness to return land to Indigenous governance constitutes a form of critically-considered "political deference" (Peter 2023) in relation to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.

Olive's deferential approach to settler-Indigenous relations as demonstrated by the founders' long-term aspirations to collaborate with local Indigenous communities, the research they have done to acknowledge the traditional owners of the land they occupy, and their intention to return land to Indigenous governance all constitute solidaristic political strategies and positions amongst settlers. These political strategies continue to emerge and evolve against enduring colonial structures. The fact that these strategies and positions are reflected in recent literature further evince their emergent nature. For instance, Olive's support for Indigenous-led anticolonial struggles is one that would likely reject the colonial politics of recognition in favour

of supporting Indigenous self-recognition (Coulthard 2014; Watson 2015), and would support the growing Indigenous-led movements that views reconciliation processes initiated by settler-colonial institutions as political dead-ends that further erode Indigenous sovereignty (Cherry 2025). In these ways, my view is that Olive founders are aspiring to align more closely to the growing Indigenous-led international 'Land Back' movements demanding return of lands to Indigenous governance (Pieratos et al. 2020; Scobie et al. 2021; Pol 2022).

In sum, I suggest that Olive founders' willingness to support resistance against colonialism from a settler position aligns with the aims of re-animalisation. Firstly, to the extent that both anticolonialism and re-animalisation seek to overcome exclusionary ontologies that justify the logics of protection-sacrifice, the founders' aspirations to both respect and heal the land in accordance with Indigenous worldviews, as discussed in Chapter 4 and in the section above, exemplify this alignment. Secondly, as I had mentioned in the literature review, Srinivasan also looks to ecofeminism and Indigenous worldviews for ontological alternatives emphasising interdependent relations as oppositions to zoöpolitical exceptionalism (2022, 360), meaning that these alternatives may be integral to the prospects of re-animalisation.As such, Olive founders' deferential trust in returning the land to Indigenous governance shows their willingness to pursue and support alternatives to colonial and zoöpolitically exceptionalist forms of governance.

5.4 Veganism

The very first question I asked Olive founders in our formal interview was what brought them to FAS work, and all three founders named veganism as the main driving force. There were of course other influences that cropped up along the way. For instance, F2 remarked that the founders had been inspired by volunteering at other sanctuaries and wanted to help animals in more direct and practical ways. F3 commented that the founders had also sought a different lifestyle outside of the city, one that would bring them more direct connections to the land and opportunities to know rescued animals "more on an individual level." However, none of these factors would have taken place had veganism not been the catalyst. More importantly, when I asked the founders whether their initial motivation for adopting veganism was animal-focused or perhaps more holistic, involving health and environmental concerns, all three founders

unequivocally affirmed that it was primarily their care for animals that led them to become vegan.

The centrality of veganism to FASes cannot be overstated even if it might be obvious and unsurprising. This is because as veganism becomes increasingly commonplace and popular, diverse definitions and understandings of veganism have emerged. Through a social media survey, North et al. (2021) identified a number of themes demonstrating divergence and disagreements over participants' definitions of veganism, such as whether it was a diet or a lifestyle, how absolutist veganism must be in practice, whether it was a form of or a part of social justice, and how essential is animal rights to veganism. These divergences echo the major topics concerning veganism that Eva Haifa Giraud (2021) covers in her detailed overview of the theories, practices, and politics of veganism, including the influence of intersectional politics on veganism, contentions over purity politics and imperfection pertaining vegan identities and practices, the centrality of animal subjectivities in vegan advocacy, as well as challenges to veganism within capitalist food systems. Nevertheless, a striking feature that most common definitions of veganism agree on is the aim of challenging and ending animal exploitation, which involves rejecting the consumption and usage of any product obtained from nonhuman animals "as far as is possible and practicable" (The Vegan Society n.d.) and boycotting all activities involving harming and exploiting animals, such as in sports and entertainment. In this manner, regardless of differences amongst individual perceptions and opinions, veganism finds a natural affinity with animal rights and animal liberation philosophies that seek to abolish all forms of nonhuman animal exploitation.

What might be less immediately clear is how veganism fits with Olive's anticolonial sympathies and ecofeminism. The existing tensions between these bodies of knowledge have been articulated by prominent ecofeminist Val Plumwood. By making a distinction between ontological ethical veganism, which deems animals as not food and not edible, versus contextual ethical veganism, where all animals including humans are considered edible and that the ethical decision to consume animals should be dependent on context, Plumwood (2000) argues that ontological ethical veganism ought to be rejected because it is imperialist and racist towards Indigenous peoples who do practice culturally-significant animal use, and that it alienates humans from an inherently predatory natural world.

Plumwood's argument has generated critical responses. For example, Richard Twine (2022) has shown how 'contextual' is itself a highly contested concept that is posited differently amongst ecofeminists (240-44). In one respect, Twine cites philosophers such as Deane Curtin and Marti Kheel for recognising and arguing that while there are contextual limitations to practicing veganism, there remains a need to critique "the compulsory nature of norms of animal consumption as universals," and therefore they advocate for vegetarianism/veganism as an ideal approach that Twine suggests is "not far from universalistic," meaning that they espouse an "ecofeminist ethic of care [that] argues against the consumption of animals" under most circumstances (2022, 236, 243-44). In another respect, Plumwood's call for contextual veganism is an "anti-vegan stance" that limits itself to opposing industrial animal agriculture but not all forms of animal use and consumption because, as Twine argues, Plumwood has "incorrectly framed veganism as precluding [the] possibility" of situating humans in ecological relations where humans and other animals are all deemed edible (2022, 241).

Alternatively, but in a similar vein, Kelly Struthers Montford and Chloë Taylor (2020) argue that "Plumwood's contextual ethical veganism is not contextual enough" in current settler-colonial contexts, where industrial animal agriculture dominates as the main animal-based food source for Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples alike, and has largely displaced subsistence hunting (129). In defence of ontological ethical veganism, Struthers Montford and Taylor argue for a "contextual, relational, and ontological veganism" framework that helps to move considerations regarding veganism beyond the edibility of animals, and enables us to simultaneously accept all animals, including humans, as ontologically edible, while still politically and strategically ontologise animals as 'not food' as a tactic to contest and dismantle interconnected structures of domination enacting violence against animals and oppressed humans (2020, 148).

Corresponding to such theoretical debates on veganism, contemporary vegan landscape has also seen drastic transformations given the labour of social justice advocacy undertaken by marginalised peoples, which has brought more gender, class, racial, and cultural diversity to Global North vegan movements that had been largely dominated by privilege. This shifting landscape finds reflection in the literature by the growing publication of anti-oppressive Black, Indigenous, and People of Color / People of Global Majority vegan voices (see for examples Singer 2021; Feliz Brueck 2019). Syl Ko and Aph Ko (2017), as well as A. Breeze Harper and

Omowale Adewale along with the contributors to their edited volumes, *Sistah Vegan* (Harper 2010) and *Brotha Vegan* (Adewale 2021), articulate a range of perspectives on Black Veganism. Similarly, Mi'kmaq scholar Margaret Robinson (2013) and Māori scholar Kirsty Dunn (2019) have advanced forms of Indigenous veganism by exploring and demonstrating how veganism aligns with their respective decolonial practices and worldviews.

The overview above of complex and critical positions on veganism demonstrate that, far from being irreconcilable, a synthesised knowledge system integrating an ecofeminism that is critical of colonialism with veganism can be perfectly coherent on both theoretical and practicable grounds. However, beyond the compatibility and alignment of the knowledge systems, what I explore below is how Olive's veganism, which is infused with anti-oppression politics, actually governs the sanctuary as a form of counterpower.

The primary conceptual frame I apply in my analysis here is what Giraud (2019) calls "an ethics of exclusion." Interrogating a variety of activist practices that engaged experimentally with alternative ways of relating to other species and alternative forms of social organisation, Giraud observes that it was often necessary for the activists to "contest, or exclude," certain relations that prevent these alternatives from emerging or "coming into being" (2019, 175). In this material sense, exclusion "is not intrinsically negative or something that shuts down agency, but more akin to the affirmative politics of distancing and alterity" (Giraud 2019, 175-76). This conceptualisation of exclusion is consistent with the vegan policies of most FASes. While most FASes do not exclude individuals on the basis of whether they identify as vegan or practice veganism, and many may even actively encourage non-vegans to visit or volunteer as part of the sanctuaries' advocacy strategy, it is common for sanctuaries, including Olive, to request that visitors and volunteers do not bring animal food products to consume on sanctuary grounds, and request those who are planning extended stays at the sanctuary, such as live-in volunteers who reside on-site, to commit to practising a vegan diet during the entirety of their stay. By excluding the normalised relations of violence and exploitation against animals outside the sanctuary while promoting and upholding veganism within the sanctuary boundaries, sanctuaries exercise exclusion as an approach to realise alternative relations formed upon ideals and ethics of veganism and animal rights/liberation.

Interestingly, apart from the necessary exclusion of animal exploitation that FASes perform as part of their veganism, Olive's counterpower, in the form of its synthesised anti-

oppressive knowledge system, has also led them to defend their animal residents by imposing different kinds of exclusions that other more mainstream sanctuaries may not agree with. Starting with the more straightforward exclusion, the founders explained during the interview that they are critical of what they have perceived to be problematic practices relating to the relationship between social media culture and vegan animal advocacy. F1 states that at some point around five years prior to the time of my visit, the founders "made a conscious decision to come off social media" because they had found it to be a "toxic space" contributing to a kind of voyeurism that is intrusive to the privacy and lives of animal residents, and they have noticed a dynamic in which the animals have seemingly become re-instrumentalised by animal activists, who turn volunteer opportunities into photo opportunities with animals as a means to bolster their own credibility in activist communities and spaces:

> "We used to do a monthly working bee so that people could come and you know, help out, and you know, have some direct interactions with the animals but, it was just, we got so disillusioned with it because it was basically people would just come and take selfies with the animals and they would, you know, then they'd go and post it all over, like, facebook and instagram and go, 'Look how good I am. I was at the sanctuary and I did all this work,' which then, they usually didn't do any work, but they post all their selfies. And it was like, it felt ick, it felt really ick that, like, you know, the animals were just being used as kind of like, you know, brownie points for them on their social media, and we started to think about how much of an intrusion that was on the animals' lives and stuff like that" (F1).

F2 saw this social media behaviour amongst activists/volunteers as stemming from a type of "saviour mentality" that the founders rejected, and that it was draining and hard to balance "education and voyeurism." F1 went on to mention that this disillusionment with social media had contributed to Olive shifting their goals and strategies to focus less on engaging with the vegan animal advocacy movement and more on building relationships and trust with their local community.

In a somewhat intricate manner and in relation to social media, another form of exclusion that Olive exercises is directed at once towards three interconnected elements within vegan

animal advocacy: some of the activists within the movement, a particular animal rescue tactic and philosophy that these activists promote, and the farmed animals still living in exploitative conditions within industrial animal agriculture. To explain, in addition to the use of rescued animals for self-promotion by activists on social media, another problem the founders saw was a sudden resurgence of animal rescues (in the form of open rescues[3]) throughout the 2010s:

> "And one of the other things I see…happening alongside [the social media issue] as well, is that we kept getting, um, you know, animal activists who, it was like, there was…an explosion in this open rescue thing, where open rescue became this thing that everybody was doing, and we just kept getting inundated with people who just go out and like rescue animals left, right, and centre, and then have absolutely no intention of taking responsibility for those animals for the rest of their life. And they were just like inundating sanctuary with requests to take these animals and it was like, they, those people have no idea, A). what is involved in caring for those animals for the rest of their life, often, they're sick, injured, you know, all that stuff. And B). the emotional toll it takes on sanctuaries to have to say 'no' all the time. Like, that's really fucking hard. And so, all of that was going on and I think that was just, all of that stuff just became…And then, you know, then you get into arguments with people on social media who have no fucking clue what it's like to run a sanctuary or what it is to care for a sick animal, you know. And, all of that stuff was just the thing that just made us kind of…just pull back, you know, because it was just doing our heads in, wasn't it? And you can't, you can't be

[3] Pioneered by Australian animal liberationist Patty Mark in the 1990s, open rescue is a form of nonviolent direct action involving "the act of trespassing onto spaces of animal exploitation (typically an intensive farm), documenting the condition of the animals, providing them with aid, and drawing attention to the problem through publicity, media coverage, and arrest" (Villanueva 2018, 146). Open rescue is termed as such due to the fact that open rescuers willingly expose their identities during their illegal actions, which "deviated from methods of property damage and sabotage" practiced by other militant segments of the animal liberation movement that were often more covert (Villanueva 2018, 146). The impact of open rescue relies on "a public and visible militancy" that "could be used alongside other political techniques, such as lobbying or legal prosecutions" (Villanueva 2018, 150). For more detailed discussions of open rescue see Villanueva, G. (2018). *A Transnational History of the Australian Animal Movement, 1970-2015* (1st ed. 2018.). Springer International Publishing and Milligan, T. (2017). Gandhian Satyagraha and Open Animal Rescue. In A. Woodhall, & G. Garmendia da Trindade (Eds.), *Ethical and Political Approaches to Nonhuman Animal Issues* (pp. 227–246). Springer International Publishing AG.

> emotionally, psychologically invested in that shit and still have enough, whatever is required to take care of the animals that are in your care, you know, because that's taxing enough as it is. And then when you've got all that other shit going on, it's like, nah, you have to make a choice" (F1).

Agreeing with F1, F3 added that one of the issues for her in relation to the explosion of open rescues revolved around risk and safety:

> "…one of the things that turned stuff around for me, was this idea of safety and the fact that I felt for a period, although it's calmed down now, but I felt for a period that open rescue was making it really unsafe for us to operate as a sanctuary in this, in this community, because this is a community that's very embedded in animal agriculture. And whilst I disagree with [the way activists use animals on social media], we have to live here. And, animal activists who come into these spaces and rescue animals, don't have to live here. And that like made me feel like I had to put my own safety and the safety of this community that we've created here with the animals that already live here, ahead of that, of being able to interact with the animal activist community. And so, it kind of really shifted for me at that stage, because up until that point I think I had this idea that, 'We were all in it together,' and that made me realise that actually animal activists, a lot of the time when they are rescuing animals, they're not thinking about the rest of that animal's lifetime, and how, those who have to care for those animals are impacted by the activities of open rescue. And not to say that I'm against open rescue, I'm actually very pro open rescue, it's just, you know, the way that, the way that it's being done, it was just, it like, I felt like it put us at risk, and I felt like it put other sanctuaries at risk…and I felt like that was, you know, something that we couldn't afford" (F3).

More precisely, F1 and F3 went on to clarify that this risk was to a large extent financial. Given that Olive is almost entirely self-funded by the founders and rely little on fundraising and donor support, and that involvement in activities considered criminal or illegal could put their careers at risk, F3 stated that whether she "felt maybe rightly or wrongly that [their] very livelihood…was at risk," the illegality of open rescues and related criminal liability was "a very real concern."

This fear was also amplified by the fact that the founders had witnessed numerous sanctuary closures for various reasons, some financial, throughout their time operating Olive. F1 recalled that in Olive's early days, they "had to take in quite a number of animals from other sanctuaries that had to shut down because of financial difficulty," and the founders had "said right from the get-go, that [they] would never put [themselves] in a position" where they had to shut down due to financial reasons. This point regarding financial sustainability relates to the overall sustainability of the sanctuary, which affects the exclusion of farmed animals outside the sanctuary.

Unlike sanctuaries that would never refuse to take in rescued animals, or would accept animals who may be too sick and unwell, even if these decisions push the sanctuaries beyond their capacities into unsustainable conditions, Olive has learned to firm its boundaries over time:

> "I think in terms of the animals, like, we, um, our focus is to provide, um, a sustainable space for the animals that we have taken in. We've really shifted the focus away from taking in like lots and lots of animals and saving everybody because we just can't, it's not sustainable. And I think that sets us a little bit apart from other sanctuaries, whose focus is to just rescue every single animal and you know, rehabilitate animals that, sometimes in my opinion, really probably shouldn't be, because they are just so unwell and it's so stressful for those animals to be put through that stuff and ultimately a lot of them die anyway. And they use so much resources on, you know, and I feel like that stuff really kind of, it gets clicks, like it gets clicks on social media. But I'm not sure about the value of that sort of thing, really. Like a lot of it is preaching to the converted. A lot of it is getting the attention of people who are already vegan or that are inclined to give them money. Do you know what I mean? Um, and I, I don't think that we're, we're not aligned with that kind of activity and we don't want to be… I think we sort of were in that mindset a little bit to start with, which is why we ended up with so many animals. Um, too many animals for the property to sustain, you know." (F1).

Here, we see the entirety of the interconnections between the founders' critiques of the re-instrumentalisation of rescued animals on social media, certain practices of other activists and sanctuaries, as well as the sustainability and wellbeing for the rescued farmed animal residents at

Olive, as basis for excluding certain entities and elements of the vegan animal advocacy movement. Yet, these exclusions remain consistent with veganism in that the exclusions are meant to defend Olive's rescued animal residents against other subtler forms of exploitation and instrumentalisation within the vegan movement itself, to safeguard these animals' autonomy and privacy, and to ultimately ensure the long-term sustainability of Olive itself.

5.5 Conclusion

Olive Animal Sanctuary's embodiment of a coherent epistemic structure that incorporates veganism with an ecofeminism that is critical of colonialism demonstrates a radical departure from the mainstreamed animal movement in the shift of their priorities, such as relationship building with their immediate community across political and ideological differences, as well as land restoration and Land Back to Indigenous governance. As a technology of counterpower, Olive guards itself against various hierarchical and oppressive tendencies and forces, whether material or spectral, stemming from colonial-capitalist structures that the sanctuary actively resists. These include nonprofit industry approaches to animal advocacy that may subject rescued animals to pernicious forms of instrumentalisation, and other safety concerns that threaten the very existence of the sanctuary itself. This chapter has shown how Olive as a technology of counterpower governs the conduct of the founders largely with regards to intraspecies affairs (relations and interactions with other humans) in ways that demonstrate strategies and contestations against zoöpolitical exceptionalism and the logics of protection-sacrifice. Rather than operating the sanctuary in ways that may reproduce zoöpolitical exceptionalism and human exceptionalism, Olive founders openly engage in contestations, compromises, and negotiations with other human actors, using conceptual frameworks and practices such as ecofeminism, anti-colonialism and veganism, to resist zoöpolitical exceptionalism and human exceptionalism. These strategies and contestations shift – albeit subtly – knowledge and power relations between humans, and as I shall discuss, between humans and animals. In the next chapter, I consider the implications of the knowledge systems discussed above for relations and interactions with other animals.

Chapter 6 – Sanctuary as a Technology of Counterpower: Part II

In the previous chapter, particularly the final section on veganism, we could see how the knowledge systems of Olive Animal Sanctuary demand certain considerations regarding the lives of its nonhuman animal residents beyond ensuring their wellbeing. While the sanctuary animals now live free from the direct exploitation of animal agriculture industries, the founders remain attentive to the autonomy, privacy, and perhaps a sense of dignity of the animal residents, even in relation to vegan animal activists who proclaim to respect animals. As a technology of counterpower, Olive responds defensively by excluding relational dynamics that could lead to forms of re-instrumentalisation or re-exploitation of the animal residents. In this chapter, I turn the attention towards the effects of counterpower on human-nonhuman relations and nonhuman animals. I examine how the sanctuary as a technology of counterpower produces and appropriates specialised knowledge to manage, defend, and foster nonhuman animal life in ways that could be relevant to human re-animalisation. This chapter investigates how counterpower interacts directly with the nonhuman animal residents at the sanctuary, and considers its protective and productive dimensions that aim to foster the biological and social lives of the animals at Olive. In the first section (6.1), I begin by looking at how various bodies of knowledge both generated and appropriated by members of farmed animal sanctuaries (FASes) have become incorporated into the epistemological structures of sanctuaries, and how they function to inform practices of care and rehabilitation aimed at benefiting rescued farmed animals. 6.1 offers various examples of specialised, species-specific knowledge that continue to shape current sanctuary practices. Upon establishing some background to the epistemological aspects of counterpower in animal rehabilitation and care, 6.2 consists mainly of ethnographic data and reflections, where I offer an example of my own participation in a method to integrate a rooster into the flock in adherence to the specialised knowledge developed for this task, as well as other examples where I discuss how counterpower operates to privilege the lives of farmed animals in a more general manner. I then conclude this chapter with some reflections on the connections I observe between counterpower and re-animalisation.

6.1 Knowledge Production and Appropriation by Farmed Animal Sanctuaries

As I continue to discuss how Olive's knowledge systems govern human relations with other animals at the sanctuary in this section, it is important to note that on an individual level, the exclusionary mechanism against certain behaviours discussed in the previous chapter does not emerge from a place of moral high ground. That is to say, while Olive founders are critical of individual behaviours and practices that may reproduce harmful relationalities in direct and indirect ways, ultimately, they recognise how these tendencies stem from broader hegemonic sociopolitical, economic, and cultural structures affecting most people, including themselves. Therefore, the epistemic structures of the sanctuary demand consistency and accountability amongst the founders in their own relationships with the animal residents as well.

For instance, when I asked the founders regarding how they take the animals' perspectives and interests into consideration in decision-making processes at the sanctuary, F1 stated that when they "had to make a big decision" regarding a particular animal, they "would always physically go and talk about the thing around…where the animal was present." F3 commented that the animals' presence "keeps you accountable" because it means that it is "much harder to make a decision against their interests," or act in ways that would be "noticeably against what they would want because they're right there." According to F2, while the founders do not "literally ask the animals" what they want, the founders try to think about what are the "values and motivations" of each individual animal, based on what the founders have noticed and learned about them. When I asked F2 whether this knowledge about the animals' preferences and personalities come from having spent a lot of time getting to know them, F2 confirmed, and added that they have learned to make important decisions in the animals' presence from VINE Sanctuary.

In their analysis of the various "dimensions on which representation can occur" for sanctuary animals, Donaldson and Kymlicka (2015) mention being in proximity to the presence of the animals as a model of representation practiced by VINE (67). Akin to what has been described by Olive founders, Donaldson and Kymlicka suggest that while the animals "cannot articulate their views in discussion," their presence serves as "a reminder, and a check, on human deliberation" (2015, 67). According to VINE co-founder pattrice jones, being in "physical proximity to animals like those you're thinking about" assists in preventing human decision-makers from treating other animals as abstractions (jones 2014, as cited in Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015, 67). This practice of being in the presence of other animals performed by Olive

and VINE is one example where counterpower attempts to safeguard animals against human sovereignty.

As Wadiwel argues, human sovereignty, or "the absolute right of the human" to dominate nonhuman life, limits "the ground for enacting an individual ethics" because it precedes all ethical decisions and considerations affecting other animals (2015, 42). Nonetheless, making a range of ethical decisions involving animal residents is an inevitable part of operating a sanctuary. This task has been made extra difficult due to the fact that much of the human knowledge regarding farmed animals has been produced for the purposes of using and exploiting the animals, meaning that relatively little is known in terms of how we might rehabilitate farmed animals and provide them the best opportunities at flourishing. Looking at chickens for example, Heather Rosenfeld (2021) notes how rescued chickens living at sanctuaries "fall out of spaces of veterinary medicine," resulting in members of sanctuaries having to develop their own medical knowledge and care practices, often by transposing knowledge and experiences from other contexts (8). As such, FASes have had to generate knowledge and develop their own resources, which sanctuary founders, staff, and volunteers would circulate across their networks. Olive's adoption of the decision-making practice developed by VINE illustrates one such instance of a sanctuary incorporating a specific practice into their epistemological structure.

"The Rooster Project" initiated by VINE Sanctuary is another example of how a sanctuary has produced knowledge from the ground up. As the first sanctuary to rehabilitate roosters rescued from cockfighting, VINE has developed specific methods for that task, which sanctuaries worldwide have since adopted (VINE Sanctuary, n.d.). VINE's expertise in tending to roosters began when founders pattrice jones and Miriam Jones rescued their very first animal, a rooster they came across in a roadside ditch; they named the rooster Viktor Frankl, and consider Viktor to be a co-founder of the sanctuary (VINE Sanctuary, n.d.). Although Viktor was an "escapee from the poultry industry" and not a victim of cockfighting, rescuing Viktor would set VINE on a path to liberate more roosters from both cockfighting and agriculture, and to learn more about these birds (VINE Sanctuary, n.d.). Today, part of VINE's educational work includes dispelling harmful myths and stereotypes that associate roosters with views that conflate masculinity and maleness with violence and aggression. Understanding that roosters are by and large cooperative social animals who only behave aggressively out of fear, VINE has developed a protocol for integrating roosters into rescued flocks at sanctuaries. A brief version of the

protocol explains that unsocialised roosters suffering from trauma could be assisted through three phases of rehabilitation that involves relaxation, learning by observation, and supervised socialising (VINE Sanctuary, n.d.). The protocol for integrating roosters will be particularly relevant in one of my ethnographic accounts in section 6.2 where I share my own experiences attempting to integrate a rooster at Olive. Before getting to the next section, I will first discuss The Open Sanctuary Project as another key example of how networks of FASes have come to produce, appropriate, and circulate knowledge to defend and foster the lives of animal residents.

In 2015, Shaleen and Shilpi Shah founded The Open Sanctuary Project after struggling to obtain reliable and compassionate information to assist them in founding their own FAS in the United States (The Open Sanctuary Project, n.d.). Since then, The Open Sanctuary Project has become an independent research organisation aimed at developing and sharing resources to ensure that existing animal sanctuaries and individuals looking to set up sanctuaries would have access to essential tools and information that enable them to thrive. The Open Sanctuary Project's comprehensive database contains all things animal sanctuary related, including general animal care, species-specific resources, considerations around land and facilities, governance and organisation for nonprofits, and educational programming. The impressive depth and breadth of The Open Sanctuary Project's open access database culminated from years of research by the organisation's team members, which includes consultations with "sanctuary, animal advocacy, and nonprofit experts across the world" (The Open Sanctuary Project, n.d.).

Particularly noteworthy to The Open Sanctuary Project's approach is their commitment to both compassion and transparency regarding their sources, which includes identifying and disclosing whether the sources of their information are compassionate or non-compassionate:

> "The Open Sanctuary Project regularly researches and publishes articles with the intention of providing the most compassionate care for animals in a sanctuary or home environment. While we would prefer that all information comes from sources such as fellow sanctuary founders and caregivers as well as veterinary journals, due to the current state of animal agriculture and the general attitude of animals being viewed solely as commodities for human benefit, much of the research available on a wide variety of topics comes exclusively from non-compassionate sources" (Griffler, 2018).

As Mckenzee Griffler, the executive director of The Open Sanctuary Project, goes on to explain, a non-compassionate source indicates that "the body publishing the information…advocates for or condones the use of animals or substances that come from their bodies for human benefit" (2018). Examples would include horse care resources originating from and advocating for horse racing, chicken care resources promoting human consumption of eggs from hens, or animal care resources for particular species that facilitate their breeding and exploitation (Griffler, 2018). Griffler asserts that The Open Sanctuary Project does not condone the views of non-compassionate sources regarding animals despite finding "elements of compassionate care" from them (2018).

By researching non-compassionate sources to construct a knowledge base intended for the compassionate care of rescued sanctuary animals, I argue that The Open Sanctuary Project demonstrates how sanctuaries (or the organisations supporting sanctuaries in this case) subversively appropriate knowledge that would subsequently shape a range of human conducts involved in administering the lives of sanctuary animals. Numerous examples exist to illustrate how scientific knowledge and techniques developed by animal agriculture to maintain the health of farmed animals for the purpose of maximising value extraction have been adopted and deployed by FASes to simply improve the health of the animals for the animals' own sake. However, I will only focus on one example here to illustrate the extent to which counterpower as a form of biopower operates to optimise the health of sanctuary animals: the use of Suprelorin implants to manage the reproductive health of hens.

According to The Open Sanctuary Project:

> "Suprelorin is a brand name implantation system for deslorelin acetate. Administered under the skin, this rice grain-sized implantation prevents specific hormones from being released in a hen's body, which prevents eggs from being produced. It is similar in function and concept to a human's implant-style birth control system" (Hess and Griffler, 2018).

Through generations of selective breeding for traits that maximise egg production, hens exploited in the egg industry now produce an unnaturally excessive volume of eggs to the detriment of their health, including the potential to develop fatal reproductive diseases, such as

"oviduct impaction, Egg Yolk Peritonitis, prolapse, or ovarian cancer" (Hess and Griffler, 2018). Some sanctuaries had begun treating the hens with Suprelorin implantations, giving the hens breaks from the taxing cycles of egg production, allowing them to heal from health problems caused by frequent egg-laying, and anecdotes from rescuers and caregivers suggest that implanted hens could live significantly longer, healthier lives compared to non-implanted hens (Hess and Griffler, 2018). The Open Sanctuary Project's webpage on Suprelorin comprehensively details topics ranging from the monetary cost of implantation, how to administer the treatment, what caregivers could expect from changes in hens after implantation, signs indicating that the Suprelorin is wearing off and when to re-implant, the use of Suprelorin in other domesticated and farmed bird species, as well as reasons against the use of Suprelorin that care providers should consider.

For the purposes of my analysis and argument, there are two key takeaways from the Suprelorin example. First, this example demonstrates both FAS knowledge production and appropriation. The Suprelorin article acknowledges that compiling this resource would have been impossible "without the pioneering work, research, and shared knowledge of compassionate chicken advocates" from a number of animal advocacy and sanctuary organisations (Hess and Griffler, 2018). At the same time, the article also appropriates a non-compassionate source, citing a scientific study by Eusemann et al. (2018) entitled "Influence of a Sustained Release Deslorelin Acetate Implant on Reproductive Physiology and Associated Traits in Laying Hens," which was conducted by authors whose institutions are affiliated with animal husbandry and agriculture industries. Secondly, Suprelorin implantation serves as a marked example of a biopolitical dimension to counterpower, where the logics of health management, life preservation, and life extension are applied to remedy the health injustices that animal agriculture has imposed on rescued farmed animals. Nevertheless, just as all forms and relations of power entail resistance, the specific practice of Suprelorin implantation has not gone uncontested by animal rescuers and caregivers:

> "Some caregivers have expressed concern that suppressing a chicken's reproductive system is not fair to chickens, or is further manipulation of their bodies. As a counterpoint to this, some respond that 'layer' chickens did not have any say in having

their bodies produce far too many eggs than what is ‘natural’ or safe for their bodies” (Hess and Griffler, 2018).

Despite acknowledging critical perspectives on Suprelorin use, The Open Sanctuary Project ultimately recommends that individual sanctuaries should decide whether to use Suprelorin according to their philosophies of care, among other considerations such as product availability and veterinary support (Hess and Griffler, 2018).

Given that there are no rescued hens at Olive Animal Sanctuary, the Suprelorin example and its ethical dilemmas do not apply to their practices. Nonetheless, I have gone at length to highlight Suprelorin usage as a striking portrayal of counterpower’s biopolitics, where the management of animal health and life goes beyond other protective measures, such as predator-proofing animal shelters, optimising animal health through diets, ensuring psychological and physical wellbeing of animal residents through environmental enrichment, and use of veterinary services and medication to treat injuries and general illnesses. While the sanctuary’s logics of promoting animal health and life disrupts human domination of other animals in contexts of exploitation, the specific knowledge and conduct involved in managing nonhuman animals shows that human sovereignty remains largely intact. Having shown how sanctuaries as technologies of counterpower operate to prioritise the life and safety of their nonhuman animal residents, I extend this analysis to my ethnographic accounts in the following section, before discussing their implications for re-animalisation and the challenges of contesting human sovereignty in the conclusion of this chapter.

6.2 Navigating and Resisting Counterpower: A Brief Ethnography

In this section, I merge the analyses throughout Chapters 5 and 6, and extend them to interpret a number of my ethnographic accounts detailing interactions with other animals at Olive Animal Sanctuary. The stories here exhibit how Olive’s anti-oppressive epistemological structures constituted by ecofeminism and veganism, as well as the production, appropriation, and application of specialised knowledge in counterpower’s biopolitical management of nonhuman animal life, all contribute to governing intraspecies and interspecies relations and conducts. In particular, the sanctuary as a technology of counterpower generates norms and

conditions demanding that humans negotiate certain risks and vulnerabilities for all sanctuary residents.

I begin with an example where both F2 and I had to negotiate our safety in relation to Caper the horse. One of the daily tasks I had taken on as part of my volunteer work at Olive was feeding Caper and Hobert, two closely bonded horses who arrived at the sanctuary together. Normally, the two horses would share the same diet. However, during my time at Olive, Hobert was on a special diet with medication. The special diet was designed for weight gain and pain management in order to help Hobert recover from a hoof injury and significant weight loss caused by the injury. I will provide more details of my interactions with Caper and Hobert during feeding in the next chapter, where I discuss the food politics at Olive. For now, the relevant part from the horse feeding experience was that F2 and I had to separate the horses during their meals because Caper, who was on a regular diet, would attempt to steal the high-calorie food mixed with medication intended for Hobert. As F2 and I experimented with different feeding methods and arrangements to prevent Caper from stealing Hobert's portions, Caper often got agitated and impatient as his feeding was delayed. On one occasion, as I attempted to lead Caper away from Hobert with his container of food, Caper bucked in dismay as he trotted along next to me, momentarily kicking his hind legs into the air

I was not overly concerned with Caper's bucking at the time despite having known that horse kicks could be fatal. Perhaps this was because Caper always came across to me as good-natured and calm, an approachable horse who was happy to receive pets. Maybe a part of me just refused to believe that horses who have been socialised with humans and well-cared for at a sanctuary would genuinely want to hurt humans providing them food. Regardless, F2 would soon after experience Caper bucking during feeding just as I did. Returning to the main house from feeding the horses one day, F2 concernedly exclaimed to both F1 and I that Caper was jumping and kicking as she tried to feed him. F1 matched F2's astonishment in response and said worriedly that Caper "could kill someone like that." Apparently, F1 and F2 had never seen Caper behave like that before, but then again, as far as I was aware, Caper had also never required separation from Hobert during feeding until Hobert got injured, so this was a new development for everybody. Fortunately, the risk of being kicked by Caper soon became a non-issue when we finally established a workable feeding routine, where Caper would receive his meal first, and we would instead lead Hobert away as Caper was eating.

Despite resolving the issue, what stood out to me was the fact that Caper simply got away with behaving in a manner that was potentially dangerous to humans and he suffered no repercussion. In a world where nonhuman animal lives have been institutionally made disposable and systemic violence against them have been normalised and legitimised, the disproportionality between recognising the potentially fatal risks posed by Caper and the human responses to further accommodate him cannot be overstated. Rather than punitive actions, the feeding situation with Caper and Hobert became one where the humans had to find alternative methods to meet the demands of the horses, and a successful outcome was never guaranteed.

To be absolutely clear, I am in no way suggesting that Olive founders did not care about human safety at the sanctuary; quite the contrary, it was obvious to me that volunteer safety was a top priority for the founders. Indeed, within days of arriving at the sanctuary, the founders had advised me to be extra mindful of specific animal residents for the sake of my own safety. There was Jedi the pig, who may accidently gouge you with his tusks if he gets too close to you. Baby, the only sheep amongst a herd of twenty-seven who is inclined to tackle humans, who just so happens to be the only sheep with horns on his head. Rowdy the cow, whose size, rambunctiousness, and sometimes unpredictable temper create a dangerous combination, given that cows could also charge and buck like horses. On Day 3, F2 and I walked around the sanctuary as she gave me a tour of the broader areas beyond the houses and introduced to me the cows, sheep, and pigs who spend most of their time on the pastures. During our walk, F2 instructed me that yelling “stop” is usually an effective way to stop the cows from doing whatever it was we needed them to stop doing. One of the pigs, Orwell, could sometimes get a little too excited and aggressive when approaching humans. In the event that this occurs, F2 recommended that picking up a stick to gently tap on Orwell’s nose would help deescalate the situation without hurting him. For every possible scenario where animal residents may risk injuring humans, all of F2’s instructions were to be firm and defensive, but never aggressive in return. Luckily, I never had an unpleasant encounter with the aforementioned animal residents, as most of them lived and roamed the more distant pastures, and I preferred to respect their spaces and keep my distance.

However, of all the notorious animal residents the founders had warned me about, Mayhem, a rooster aptly named after a Norwegian black metal band, was by far the one whom I feared the most. In the 1990s, Norwegian black metal was known to be a scene “famous for

misanthropy…and violence" (Olson 2008, 3). While it may be unfair to project human understandings of violence onto a rooster through naming, Mayhem's eagerness to attack humans completely unprovoked was undeniable. On top of that, Mayhem's preferred method of violence is to stealthily stalk humans and rip his spurs into human flesh once he has closed the distance, making his attacks difficult to anticipate and defend. During the month of my stay at the sanctuary, Mayhem attacked F1 and F2 at least once each on separate occasions. Mayhem ripped through F2's hoodie one day as she was returning to the house, but luckily she did not suffer physical injuries. The same could not be said for F2 when Mayhem ambushed her while she was hanging laundry on the outdoor clothesline. I recall F2 returning to the house after the attack, and she was visibly upset as she tended to a bleeding leg wound.

I had made a commitment to myself at the beginning of my fieldwork that there was no way that I would let my guard down wherever Mayhem could reach me. By wearing tall gumboots and carrying a leaf rake to protect myself for the vast majority of the time I spent moving around the sanctuary's outdoor spaces, I managed to follow through on this commitment, and ultimately left the sanctuary unscathed by Mayhem. Whenever I caught Mayhem stalking me, I simply extended the rake towards him, which effectively deterred him from attacking. I had worn the gumboots so much so that I had developed frictional alopecia for the first time in my life, temporarily losing a ring of hair on each leg where my calves constantly rubbed against the top edges of the boots.

Unlike me, F1 and F2 have seemingly accepted the risk of harm imposed by Mayhem to a much greater degree, as they go about their daily tasks around the sanctuary without constantly watching their backs for the rooster. At one point, F2 showed me that it was often enough to get Mayhem to back off by simply hovering our bodies over him; after all, adult humans are giants amongst roosters. F2's hovering method was consistent with the assertive yet nonviolent approach she practices with all the animal residents known to pose certain risks. Despite witnessing the effectiveness of hovering above Mayhem and receiving F2's well-intentioned reassurances, I trusted nothing and no one but my chosen protective gears. Reflecting on Mayhem, I doubt that I would have ever been able to hit him in self-defense if he did actually attack me. This is partly due to my commitment to behave nonviolently towards other animals according to vegan values, but mostly, my flight response takes over far more often than fight

response in physically confrontational situations; in the end, my preventive measures paid off and I count myself lucky that I never had to find out how I would actually respond to Mayhem.

I felt less alone in my fear of Mayhem when I discovered that F3 was scared of many animal residents at the sanctuary. Throughout our conversations, F3 has reiterated that her fear of other animals stems from the awareness that they could inflict serious injuries whether intentionally or not, especially the larger animals. In spite of this, F3 has made a commitment to challenge how her perceptions of the animals have been affected by her fear:

> "I think one of the things that I've learnt is that like, you always know that each animal has their own personality and way of being and stuff like that. But one of the things that I've learned is that species, you can't kind of, generalise species-wise. And so, particularly for me, because I'm so scared, especially of the large animals, I have to keep reminding myself that just because Rowdy scared me one time doesn't mean that Rowdy is gonna scare me every time, and it doesn't mean that all the cows are going to try and get me. Not that Rowdy tried to get me, but you know what I mean? Like that idea that you have to take each individual every day as they come, it's something that I'm still constantly learning. I'm not there yet, but I'm getting there" (F3).

In this way, F3 demonstrates that when humans negotiate their safety in response to animal residents, there are affective and epistemic elements where emotional labour is required to confront our knowledge and assumptions regarding other animals.

However, I argue that F3's dedication to overcome her fears and transform how she relates to other animals could also be interpreted as an outcome produced by a disciplinary mechanism of the sanctuary as a technology of counterpower. What we see are both an overlap and a transition from a technology of counterpower to what Foucault terms "technology of the self" (1981, 660, as cited Behrent 2013, 91). What the term signifies is a "particular kind of self-fashioning or way of living" that emerges from technologies of power, and an understanding that subject formation is always "constituted by and through power relations" (Behrent 2013, 90). Behrant suggests that "in practice, technologies of power and the self often overlap and support one another," or that the productive aspect of power makes self-discipline, self-management, and self-regulation the effects or consequences of power technology (2013, 90-91). Furthermore, a

technology of the self can be produced through practices cultivated by oneself, such as when F2 taught me how to respond nonviolently to other animals despite the risks they may pose. Taken together, the examples above offer glimpses of how counterpower can be exercised on the human self both from the outside and within. As Behrent notes, akin to "power and knowledge, the self is the contingent outcome of the dynamic interplay of forces, strategies, and technologies" (2013, 92). This contingency is worth emphasising given that roosters like Mayhem, horses like Caper, and cows like Rowdy may well have been violently put down with little to no considerations by humans if this set of relations had existed within power structures that counterpower resists. Having discussed how the sanctuary as a technology of counterpower operates on regulating human conduct in relation to other animals, I now turn to the aforementioned rooster integration project to show how counterpower might operate on nonhumans.

After settling in at Olive Animal Sanctuary, Day 2 of my fieldwork began with volunteer orientation. F2 guided me through the basic daily tasks: how to clean the shelters of animal residents and how to feed them, freshen their water and wash the assortment of containers they drink from, how to cook a batch of vegan dog food in the stock pot on a weekly basis for the three dogs, and how to give medication to the animals who need them. Aside from these tasks which are ordinary to most animal sanctuaries and shelters, the founders had assigned me a longer-term project they thought could make for an interesting experience as part of my research: integrating a rooster with the rest of the flock.

It was unclear to me when Tony the rooster had arrived at the sanctuary, but at the time of my arrival, he had not been able to live peacefully with the rest of the flock formed by over a dozen other roosters. As a result, Tony spends most of his time in a separate enclosure away from the flock. F2 explained to me that it takes time for rooster flocks to work out their social order, but they do often manage to reach a point of stability. Consistent with my own observations, F2 noted that whenever Tony is given the opportunity to spend time interacting with the other members of the flock, he promptly challenges them to a fight. Tony would get in the face of the other roosters, crow loudly, and perform a pre-fight dance involving quick tapping steps around them to signal his intent to attack. Most roosters tend to avoid fighting Tony, moving away from him whenever he gets too close, except for Vic.

Despite being physically smaller, Vic is the only rooster who is keen to clash with Tony at every opportunity. On one occasion during their conflict, Vic even attempted to ambush Tony by hiding and waiting in the bushes outside Tony's enclosure, ready to pounce the moment we let Tony out. In a discussion with the founders about Vic, F1 felt that Vic has perhaps taken it upon himself to be a sort of peacekeeper amongst the roosters, and goes after Tony for disturbing the peace. I told F1 that F2 and I had a similar interpretation, where we felt that maybe Vic has his own sense of justice. This conversation took place on Day 4 after I had observed Vic breaking up a fight between a couple other roosters, appearing to take on the role of an intervenor. Regardless of the roosters' intentions and our interpretations, one of the reasons that roosters fight is to establish their positions on a hierarchical pecking order, and neither Vic nor Tony were willing to end their hostilities until one of them cements himself as the more dominant.

Guiding me through the process of integrating roosters, F2 showed me how we would allow Tony to leave his enclosure for a couple of hours on average each day, then keep a close eye on him and Vic as they rushed into combat. The repetitive integration method entails allowing Vic and Tony to fight for brief moments, separating them before either one gets injured, keeping them separate for several minutes, then allowing them to resume their fight before separating them again. Over time, this approach allows the roosters to decide who is more dominant while minimising bodily harms. According to F2, this approach to rooster integration could take up to weeks before the roosters finally come to terms with each other.

The quickest and most effective way to enforce a timeout in their fight is to physically grab Vic or Tony and temporarily confine one of them in a coop that is empty during the day. However, given that roosters are almost impossible to catch if they run away when you attempt to catch them, as both of them did, the best moment to grab them was actually during the fight when both roosters were focused solely on attacking each other. As Tony and Vic fixated on each other, F2 demonstrated the speed and decisiveness required to reach down and grab Tony with both hands, making sure both his wings were firmly clasped to prevent an otherwise fierce flapping of protest, as she lifted to cradle Tony against her body, wrapping her arm around his wings to secure them.

It was Day 5 when I caught Vic for the first time and Day 9 when I finally caught Tony. Unlike F2's proper method, I preferred to hold the roosters rather awkwardly during relocation,

with my hands covering their wings as I lifted them into the air, keeping my arms extended out front such that the roosters faced forward away from my body (picture Rafiki holding baby Simba on the Pride Rock in The Lion King, but far less elegant). I chose this method of holding the roosters at a safe distance away from my body rather than cradling them due to the fear that the roosters may peck or scratch if I held them directly against me. In any case, I became a competent enough rooster-catcher to consistently catch and separate them.

Although the progress of integration felt slow, observable changes took place as the days went by. On Day 3, rather than rushing into fights, Tony and Vic took turns chasing each other around the coops and sheds. Day 6 saw a significant development when the roosters voluntarily avoided direct physical violence while maintaining proximity and visual contact. This occurred as Vic and Tony each occupied one side of a coop that was internally separated by a mesh wall, which allowed the roosters on either side to see each other without being able to access the other side. That afternoon, Vic and Tony spent an hour and half pecking at each other through the mesh without actually making much contact, until they finally fought at dinner when everyone came out during feeding. Vic and Tony broke a time record of not fighting for 15 minutes despite both being out and about on Day 8, partly because Tony shifted to target other roosters that day, and at one point they occupied different elevations, with Tony pacing and perching on a wooden railing while Vic circled beneath him on the ground. On Day 10, I experimented with a new tactic of separating Vic and Tony without temporary confinement by using my leaf rake to enforce a distance between them, occasionally herding one of them away from the other with the rake. With this tactic, I managed to prevent them from making direct contact for almost an hour despite both of them being out in the open, before one fight finally broke out.

More of the same would continue for another week, with the two roosters sometimes fighting and sometimes keeping themselves apart. Day 15 saw Tony attempting two fights with a different rooster, whom Tony quickly yielded to in both fights. F1 managed to keep Tony out with the flock during dinner on Day 17, although the two roosters were far from being on good terms. Vic finally began to yield to Tony on Day 22, where we saw him run away from Tony. The very next day, Vic swiftly lost the fight and did not bother Tony for the next two hours. From that day forward, Vic began to avoid Tony entirely, but Tony's integration still had long ways to go. While Tony now has more opportunities to socialise with the other roosters without Vic attacking him, he had not managed to get along with any other roosters, and no established

groups within the flock had accepted him. I received an update from F2 regarding Tony about ten days after I had left Olive, which was a bit unexpected as I was no longer collecting data at that point. I texted F2 with an update about how much I had been enjoying this band she got me listening to, and she shared in passing that there had been no fights at all amongst the roosters since I left, until Vic and Tony both tried to attack another rooster on the day we texted. Nonetheless, given the relative peace that had occurred after my departure, I held out hope that Tony would eventually find his place within the flock.

Between the confinement and policing of roosters, there were certainly disciplinary aspects to the goal of achieving harmony amongst the flock. The founders were also critically self-aware of the disciplinary methods involved. On several occasions, F1 had wittily referred to the flock as "gen pop," short for general population of inmates inside prisons, which accurately implies that Tony was subjected to solitary confinement in a segregated housing unit until he could be integrated. For myself, I had also playfully taken part in acknowledging some of the coercive actions involved in rooster integration, as I sometimes announced to F2 that I was off to be the "rooster cop" prior to policing the fights between Vic and Tony. In any other context beyond the sanctuary, spending hours of a human life each day to help a rooster find acceptance in a flock may seem absurd. As horrible as this thought might seem, it had occurred to me that if humans had simply disappeared Tony, it is unlikely that any of the other roosters would even miss him. Yet, rooster integration is an entirely logical consequence produced by the sanctuary as a counterpower technology. Not only does the sanctuary defend and foster the biological life of nonhuman animals, it also goes above and beyond to facilitate the flourishing of social life amongst its nonhuman residents.

6.3 Conclusion

Throughout Chapters 5 and 6, I have examined how the knowledge systems of Olive Animal Sanctuary constitute a form of counterpower. These knowledge systems include ecofeminism, veganism, and bodies of knowledge produced and appropriated by FAS organisations aimed at fostering the lives of rescued farmed animals. Together, the sanctuary as a technology of counterpower governs various forms of conduct and negotiations in human-nonhuman relations within and beyond the sanctuary, which are aimed at countering hierarchical and oppressive tendencies and dynamics. For instance, the vigilance with which the founders

guard the animal residents against what they viewed as re-instrumentalising actions by other vegan animal activists, the apprehensive practice of making decisions in the presence of other animals that guards the animals against the founders themselves, and the founders' move towards building trusting relationships with their local communities, are consequences produced by the epistemic structures of the sanctuary. At the same time, counterpower fosters nonhuman animal life in ways that compel humans to compromise with certain risks posed by other animals. In the rooster integration example, counterpower also demands vulnerabilities amongst other animal residents in taking on the hostility and disturbances brought about by the one rooster being integrated, and involves degrees of discipline and coercion from humans who facilitate the integration.

In terms of re-animalisation, a study of the sanctuary as a technology of counterpower reveals a messy, not-so-straightforward relationship between FAS and re-animalisation as distinct political projects. In one regard, the demands of counterpower for humans to take on direct risks and vulnerabilities from other animals offer critical insights to the possibilities and challenges of re-animalisation at micro, intersubjective scales. However, the sanctuary as a whole certainly operates according to a logic of protection and life extension for its residents that may come at a cost to other subjects and entities beyond the sanctuary, as demonstrated by the appropriation and use of non-compassionate sources of knowledge by The Open Sanctuary Project.

For Olive specifically, applying the analysis of this chapter to the discussions in Chapter 4 regarding how the founders negotiate the safety of Olive residents while respecting the needs of wild foxes reveals that counterpower's logic of protection need not extend to sacrificing predatory animals beyond the sanctuary through direct violence. Yet, as we will see in the next chapter regarding the food politics of the sanctuary, like many other animal sanctuaries, Olive cannot avoid practicing what Elan Abrell calls "necro-care" (2021, 152), a type of violent care where humans sacrifice some animals to foster the lives of others, such as feeding farmed animals to rescued cats. Furthermore, the epistemic element of counterpower that is critical of settler-colonialism has led the founders to entirely different considerations for the sanctuary as a whole. These considerations include possible futures where the land occupied by the sanctuary could be returned to Indigenous governance in the longer term, as well as phasing out the rescue of farmed animals and transitioning to rehabilitating native wild animals alongside land

restoration in the shorter term. It remains unclear and unpredictable as to how these alternatives might align or misalign with re-animalisation with regards to challenging zoopolitical exceptionalism and human sovereignty.

Regardless, counterpower as exemplified through Olive Animal Sanctuary is ultimately circumscribed by the physical boundaries of the sanctuary, and re-animalisation aims at broader scales of social reconfigurations. Towards the end of my interview with Olive founders, I asked them how they might imagine the future of Olive Animal Sanctuary and animal sanctuaries more generally. F3 responded that she would "like to think about the future where sanctuary spreads as a concept rather than a physical space," where "each of the spaces that we inhabit" could be a sanctuary, where sanctuaries are created "through relationships, and through our interactions, everywhere, without needing a physical space for sanctuary." Applying the analyses in this chapter to interpret F3's comment, her view suggests that counterpower could ideally become institutionalised throughout society rather than being confined to administer particular spaces. Ultimately, I propose that reframing sanctuary considerations as a question of power/knowledge as I have attempted to do in Chapters 5 and 6 opens up further questions relevant to re-animalisation, such as how counterpower might operate to put down or undermine the resistance of humans to radically alter our relations and conduct to other animals under human sovereignty.

Chapter 7 – Animal Resistance Lessons for Re-animalisation from the Foodways of Olive Animal Sanctuary

A key consideration regarding re-animalisation that I have established throughout the previous chapters of this thesis concerns what factors and conditions may be required to enable humans to make concessions or compromises against our self-legitimising authority we exercise against other animals. By examining some of the contestations and negotiations over food consumption and access to food at Olive Animal Sanctuary, this chapter takes multispecies food relations or food politics as an entry point to further the aforementioned consideration regarding re-animalisation. Multispecies food relations or food politics offer crucial insights to re-animalisation in at least two regards. First, as established in the introduction and literature review, the production and consumption of farmed animals as food for humans through animal agriculture is a major site and example of human-animal conflict, and animal agriculture is also where zoopolitical exceptionalism's logics of protection-sacrifice has been applied. Second, I argue that human control of food production and consumption for both humans and domesticated animals reveal relations of power and authority between species on micro (intersubjective) and macro (institutional/structural) levels.

With the two connections between food relations and re-animalisation in mind, this chapter is in part an attempt to imagine alternative food politics for human and nonhuman animals living within conditions where the degree of autonomy that can be exercised over food production and consumption have been systemically constrained; it is an attempt to imagine how humans and other animals might participate in alternative foodways that could produce mutually emancipatory outcomes in alignment with the aims of re-animalisation. I begin in Section 7.l by clarifying the concepts of food autonomy and what I call resistive consumption, and discuss their relevance to the running theme of re-animalisation throughout this thesis. To do so, I take food sovereignty as an entry point into this discussion in 7.1, not to put forward a claim for the exercise of food sovereignty by humans and other animals in FASes or elsewhere, but to illustrate how food autonomy might be considered a component of food sovereignty, or a practice of resistance that could be exercised to agitate for food sovereignty. Following that, I combine ethnographic narratives and critical analysis to map out the foodways of Olive Animal Sanctuary in Section 7.2. In the next two sections (7.3 and 7.4), I describe the many instances of resistance that various animal residents at the sanctuary perform in relation to food. Finally, in

Section 7.5, I derive a number of lessons from the aforementioned stories of animal resistance that I believe could be instructive in considering the practicalities and challenges relating to the project of re-animalisation on both micro (intersubjective) and macro (structural) levels, which involves confronting human sovereignty in the face of possible animal sovereignties.

7.1 Defining and Conceptualising Food Autonomy and Resistive Consumption

Picking up on the story of Caper the horse bucking dangerously in agitation over the serving of his breakfast and dinner, Caper's general excitement in response to food is not at all a tendency unique to himself, but rather the norm for most animal residents in relation to the sought-after foods that humans provide. Particularly with domesticated animals, those who have lived with dogs and cats would be familiar with their enthusiastic anticipations for their meals to be served. With regards to relations between animals and food more generally, the reality that many other animals opportunistically take food from humans and from each other, or harmoniously share food with one another, are also in themselves unremarkable. An overflow of examples and evidence across media, from social media to nature documentaries, show wild and domesticated animals either eating together, or stealing and demanding food from humans and each other. In this context, the numerous stories relating to food at Olive in this chapter reflect this mundane reality between humans, animals, and food.

However, despite interactions over food and subsistence often exemplifying both contact and conflict zones between humans and other animals, interspecies food politics have thus far seen limited examination through the consideration of food sovereignty. While ethical issues relating to animals and food have become increasingly politicised, such as through the framework of justice, Wadiwel's (2015) analysis that human sovereignty precedes animal ethics remains true in most discussions on food justice and food politics with respect to other animals. For instance, in *Just Fodder: The Ethics of Feeding Animals* (2022) as well as *Food, Justice, and Animals: Feeding the World Respectfully* (2023), philosopher Josh Milburn offers in-depth treatments of nearly all major and pressing topics regarding the morality, ethics, and politics of animals and food. In *Just Fodder*, Milburn tackles the ethical challenges found in the tension between humans upholding veganism and animal rights while feeding some animals to carnivorous animals, and Milburn suggests that scavenging roadkill and animal industry waste, feeding eggs produced by companion chickens, and cellular agriculture may help resolve the

problem of carnivory (2022, 21-49). Milburn further argues that whether and how humans ought to uphold various normative obligations to feed other animals are decisions dependent on the types of human-animal relations, such as whether the animals in question are family, neighbours, thieves, refugees, or strangers in relation to humans (2022). In *Food, Justice, and Animals*, Milburn turns his attention to our food systems and advocates for approaches to human food production and consumption that he argues to be more just and consistent with animal rights, such as allowing the farming of non-sentient animals, relying on plant-based meats, the promotion of cellular agriculture to produce cultivated meat and dairy, as well as establishing the necessary conditions to ensure that egg farming is compatible with animal rights for chickens (2023).

In citing Milburn, my intent is not to single out his work for critique, but to simply note that Milburn's approach is representative of most ethical deliberations surrounding food and animals in several ways. First and most importantly, the legitimacy of human sovereignty is assumed, in which humans are the adjudicators that debate and ultimately decide what are the ethical ways not just for humans to produce and consume food, but how we ought to intervene in other animals' food consumption as well. Here, the way I understand human sovereignty aligns with Donaldson and Kymlicka's (2025) critique of human sovereignty, where they view it as a form of "political wardship" in which humans assert the right to govern other animals based on a view that other animals are incompetent in governing themselves (26-28). To be fair, this assumption may be warranted for the pragmatic need to address humans, given the fact that our food production systems create by far the gravest harms on all interspecies relations across the planet. Nonetheless, in such ethical considerations, other animals figure as moral patients for whom humans must make ethical decisions on their behalf. Secondly, where the subjectivities, agency, and labour of other animals are recognised, animals, namely domesticated and farmed ones, largely figure only as producers of food used or exploited by humans, and/or as dependents requiring human assistance in procuring food. There are a number of exceptions in the literature that illustrate other animals securing their own food in resistive ways against the domination of anthropogenic food systems and structures, which I shall engage with below, but before advancing further, I will first briefly define food autonomy as I apply it in this chapter.

Here, I take La Via Campesina's definition of food sovereignty as a starting point in discussing food autonomy in the multispecies context. At the 1996 World Food Summit,

members of La Via Campesina, an international solidarity movement comprising "millions of peasants, landless workers, indigenous people, pastoralists, fishers, migrant farmworkers, small and medium-size farmers, rural women, and peasant youth from around the world," coined the term "food sovereignty" (La Via Campesina, n.d.). According to La Via Campesina:

> "Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts the aspirations and needs of those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of the next generation. It offers a strategy to resist and dismantle the current corporate trade and food regime, and directions for food, farming, pastoral and fisheries systems determined by local producers and users" (La Via Campensina, n.d.).

There are several things to note regarding this definition of food sovereignty in applying it to the multispecies context.

First, adopting La Via Campesina's definition of food sovereignty, like adopting other emancipatory concepts arising from social movements, requires overcoming its anthropocentrism when we apply it to examine the lives of other animals. Wadiwel (2018b) has explicitly contested the property status of animals within food sovereignty movements and contemplated how anti-capitalist struggles within food production might be altered if we recognised farmed animals as labourers, as well as whether alliances between animal liberation movements and food sovereignty movements might be possible. For the purpose of this chapter and in the context of this thesis, I acknowledge that many animals are interpellated as food in the above definition provided by La Via Campesina, but I also take for granted that there are certain parts of the definition that are straightforwardly applicable to other animals once we bypass its anthropocentrism. Specifically, building on established knowledge, we can safely assume that there exist types of food that are appropriate for every species that enable them to maintain their health and flourish. We can also accept that other animals are generally competent in their ability to identify what they could and would prefer to eat, meaning that they do in some sense define what is food for themselves. Other animals' interest regarding food is also certainly an

intergenerational matter. Additionally, due to human domination, many animals' foodways are now entangled within the dictates and impacts of global capitalist markets and controlled by corporations on the macro level, and likely controlled by individual humans on the micro level.

Secondly, to realise food sovereignty according to La Via Campesina's definition is a tall order even for humans, and arguably, the majority of humans fail to realise the collective right to food sovereignty. That is, even if the majority of human species are relatively food secure due to the sheer abundance of food resulting from the overproduction of capitalist food systems, most of our foodways from production to consumption are firmly controlled within corporate supply chains, and are susceptible to whatever crises corporate food systems might generate or fail to defend themselves against. While the foodways of many wild animals have now become impacted by anthropogenic systems, wild animals who do not opportunistically or dependently rely on human-produced food arguably possess a much greater degree of self-determination in relation to their food sources compared to most humans and domesticated animals.

The two points above regarding the lack of food sovereignty amongst humans and other animals vis-à-vis the global capitalist food regimes bring us to the third point, which is that the existing conditions and experiences of being collectively food unsovereign shared between species creates an opening to rethink interspecies relations entirely through the sovereignty framework. Like other overlapping areas of conflict imposed by global capitalism, such as housing and habitat, or labour and exploitation, I argue that food sovereignty gives us one angle or entry point to address broader intersubjective, institutional, and epistemological forms of violence against animals rooted in human sovereignty (Wadiwel 2015), as well as their corresponding forms of violence against humans. To be clear, given that food sovereignty is a matter of collective rights and not a matter regarding individual consumption, I do not mean to suggest that individuals and collectives practicing what I describe as resistive consumption in later parts of this chapter could attain food sovereignty through alternative consumption practices. Quite the contrary, my adoption of food sovereignty as a framework in this chapter is only meant to elucidate the underlying relations between many humans and domesticated animals to food, and to emphasise the lack of autonomy or self-determination in relation to food production and consumption for most humans and domesticated animals.

Nonetheless, we might still question the relevance of food sovereignty for most humans and animals in the first place. That is to say, struggles for food sovereignty makes sense for those

belonging to the movement, from peasants to Indigenous peoples and from migrant farmworkers to farmers. We could quite easily understand why those on the frontlines of food production or those directly harvesting and producing the food they subsist on would be deeply concerned with control and autonomy through the food sovereignty framework.[4] For those not engaged in food sovereignty movements, it is unclear whether food sovereignty is relevant to our day-to-day lives so long as we have access to sustenance, regardless of who or what entity controls production and dictates what we eat. Much as we might care about the ethics and politics of food production, such as labour practices and environmental harm, or the quality of our food and its related health impacts on the humans and animals who consume them, sovereignty may be an unnecessary step too far when such matters could be resolved through reforms.

Although a debate regarding the necessity of food sovereignty for most people is beyond the scope of this chapter, the critique nevertheless demands an answer as to why sovereignty is important. Briefly, I offer a couple of preliminary responses. First, as stated earlier, I am quite willing to concede that food sovereignty for everybody, human and nonhuman, is idealistic under existing conditions and may be both unnecessary and unattainable. As opposed to something that could be fully realised, food sovereignty in this regard becomes more of a guiding ideal to strive for and a visionary political project to organise around as one pathway to facilitate reforms within food systems. Secondly, I propose that struggles for food sovereignty must be understood relationally, in that average consumers who may not require conditions of sovereignty for themselves would still be obligated to act in solidarity with those in the food sovereignty movement given our interdependence and entanglements. These two thoughts remain consistent when we apply it to the multispecies context, where humans ought to take seriously the

[4] It is important to note that food sovereignty is itself a disputed framework amongst activists, practitioners, and academics engaging with food movements. Participants in food sovereignty movements debate over topics such as the place of long-distance trade, how food-deficit regions might attain self-sufficiency, the possibilities of urban food production, who or what entity might administer and authorise food sovereignty, and the challenges of pluralism (for more in-depth discussions on these questions and topics, see Edelman, M., Weis, T., Baviskar, A., Borras, S. M., Holt-Giménez, E., Kandiyoti, D., & Wolford, W. (2014). Introduction: Critical Perspectives on Food Sovereignty. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, *41*(6), 911–931). Such disputes reveal that movement participants' attachment to food sovereignty as a political framework is contingent and results from its historical success in "galvanizing a broad-based and diverse movement around the need for radical changes in agro-food systems," and critics are skeptical that food sovereignty "as a set of demands, principles, policies, reforms, and rights" could be transformative "without identifying the profound structural changes needed in the capitalist economy and the liberal state for food sovereignty to feasibly exist" (Edelman et al. 2014, 912, 927).

interdependence between all species and their shared ecological communities for survival, nourishment, and flourishing, as well as the ways in which other species express forms of resistance over food, and how our foodways and food systems impact their lives. To this end, I argue that for humans and nonhuman animals who are highly unlikely to ever become food sovereign due to the domesticated conditions they exist in, the animal resistance framework is productive in guiding said humans/animals towards what I call resistive consumption.

As shown in my review of literature on animal resistance, most examinations of how animals resist tend to feature examples where the immediate survival of the animals hang in the balance, such as animal escapes from captivity, or animals fighting back against individual humans and technologies directly threatening their lives. In contrast with these more negative forms of resistance, relatively less has been said regarding positive and productive conceptions of how animals resist, such as enriching and prolonging their own lives through subsistence. Returning now to the aforementioned exceptions where there has been some acknowledgement of how other animals procure food for themselves in resistive ways against anthropogenic capitalist food systems, I begin with Lauren Corman's (2011) look at how freegans and raccoons have been socially and culturally vilified in the North American context. In her article, Corman observes how human freegans and urban raccoons "transgress both capitalism and a cultural taboo" by transforming edible items classified as garbage, trash, or compost into food (2011, 43). Through their urban foraging and scavenging, freegans and raccoons benefit from the excesses and surplus of the capitalist economic system through actions that would be considered theft, and particularly for human freegans, their disregard for consuming items typically categorised as "waste and dirt" also "tend to inspire a unique type of public disgust" (Corman 2011, 44). Although Corman's analysis considers how human and nonhuman freeganism exemplifies a form of resistive consumption within the underbelly of capitalism, her article ultimately focuses more on what the sociopolitical and cultural vilification of freegans and raccoons says about the entanglement of class, race, gender, and animality within dominant Western capitalist societies, and focuses less on the implications of her analysis with regards to contestations over food.

In another example, Sarat Colling (2021) details the story of a herd of cows living in the northwestern coastal region of Italy who have come to be known as "rebel cows" (73). Local residents initially introduced these cows in the mid-1990s as a means to reduce fire risks by directing the cows to graze on flammable vegetation in surrounding areas. As funding for the

project depleted, local authorities began rounding up the cows for slaughter, but a few cows managed to evade being captured and remained feral. Having escaped slaughter, the rebel cows became an autonomous herd, gaining the sympathy of some locals despite regularly raiding their vegetable gardens when the herd experienced food scarcity over winters. Although some residents have grown fond of the rebel cows, the herd continued to live under the official order of extermination, and poachers posed a constant threat to their lives. The cows have learned to adapt to these threats by remaining in elevated mountainous areas through daylight, entering the villages for food only in darkness, and members of the herd have even taken on the role of lookouts to keep others safe when they graze. In these ways, the resistive form of consumption demonstrated by the rebel cows could be described as twofold. First, unlike farmed animals who have been made to eat and grow in order to produce value for humans through their labour (Wadiwel 2023, 95), the rebel cows demonstrate a form of consumption and metabolism primarily for their own sake. Secondly, by invading the vegetable patches contained within private properties, the rebel cows also demonstrate how animals resist certain anthropogenic institutions and structures that engender conflict between humans and other animals with regards to food access.

The examples above from Corman and Colling are consistent with Kendra Coulter's (2016) analysis on animals and subsistence work. Coulter presents a helpful distinction between different types of work that animals take on, which includes subsistence work for self and others, voluntary work for others, and work that has been mandated by humans primarily to benefit humans in both not-for-profit and for-profit contexts (2016, 60). Coulter's recognition that "animals, especially in the wild, engage in subsistence work" is quite significant in the first instance, as she goes on to state the following:

> "…subsistence is the type of animal work that involves the least direct contact and interactions with humans and people have not asked for or mandated this work. There is little evidence to suggest that these animals should explicitly be called 'workers,' but this kind of subsistence labor should nevertheless be acknowledged as such; we certainly identify people's subsistence work as work. If interested in identifying the breadth of work done by animals, subsistence work

in the wild ought to be noted and studied to some degree" (2016, 60).

Despite this important recognition of animals' subsistence labour, I argue that Coulter's repeated emphasis on characterising animals' subsistence work for themselves as mainly a feature of wild animals with minimal engagement with humans is a common tendency and fallacy within animal studies literature, which enacts a problematic erasure of subsistence labour that domesticated animals, or animals living within structures of domestication, undertake for themselves.

Considering the urban raccoons and the rebel cows, featuring these animals in examples of resistive consumption is consistent with the view that it is mostly animals who maintain a kind of distanced wild and feral autonomy from humans who perform subsistence work for themselves. This is particularly troubling given how, as Coulter notes in her own arguments, domesticated animals involved in interspecies work, such as service dogs, therapy dogs, and dogs used by the police, military, and search and rescue are always performing a range of communication work with humans, as well as performing the often invisible internal emotional labour in response to human needs (2016, 71-73), which might prompt us to question why such forms of labour would not equally apply to subsistence in the domesticated setting. Without much in terms of scholarly evidence, I suspect that domesticated animals have largely been left out of discussions regarding subsistence work for several compounding reasons. First, dominant society does not only vilify those who scavenge and beg, but devalues such work to a point where these forms of labour would not even be recognised as "real work." Secondly, given domesticated animals' real and perceived dependency on human feeding, knowing that these animals have been adequately provided for may lead humans to dismiss their wish for more food as greed or rapacity, traits that are also disparaged by dominant society. Thirdly, in relation to the second point, humans who provide food for domesticated animals in relations of care may find it difficult to accept that their dependents would wish to challenge the adequacy of their paternalistic care, and so they deny this reality to some extent. Combined, these human biases elide the fact that many domesticated animals are routinely scavenging the kitchen floors, glaring up at humans by the dinner table, exhibiting excitement and appreciation or performing trained behaviours to demonstrate obedience and civility for treats and meals, and even outright 'stealing' when the opportunity presents itself, all of which requires labour.

I emphasise this point not so much because unrecognised subsistence work for domesticated animals constitutes some kind of injustice in itself, but more significantly, the lack of recognition speaks to an assumed human sovereignty over animal subsistence, or an assumption that matters pertaining control, autonomy, and self-determination in relation to food is irrelevant and inconsequential for domesticated animals. It would therefore be difficult to imagine or discuss alternative and resistive foodways with emancipatory potentials for humans and other animals unless we also highlight and include domesticated animals' subsistence labour. Taking the subsistence labour of domesticated animals into consideration, I also emphasise here that my analysis of the food practices within Olive Animal Sanctuary in the subsequent sections is primarily concerned with the power relations they reveal. That is to say, I am specifically interested in contestations over autonomy and control in relation to food production and consumption for both humans and other animals (i.e. food autonomy) and what humans might be able to learn from the resistive consumption amongst nonhuman animals. Taken together, what we might call 'resistive food autonomy' is the specific activity I am interested in, and I propose that this may be an active way for groups – human or animal – to agitate for food sovereignty. In sections 7.3 and 7.4 of this chapter, I present stories that showcase the various ways in which animal residents at Olive Animal Sanctuary demonstrate resistance in relation to food. In the next section, I will first contextualise the foodways of Olive by mapping the food sources of animal residents.

7.2 Mapping the Food Sources of Olive Animal Sanctuary

In a nearby town from Olive, F1 and I pulled up into the parking lot of an agricultural supply store. We had arrived to pick up some food for the chickens and horses. Inside one of the warehouses laid stacks upon stacks of tear-resistant bags and plastic containers filled with purpose-made feed and supplements for typical farmed animals. After taking some time to browse, F1 selected a 20kg bag of premium pellets for the roosters, along with a bag of high-fat horse supplement designed for weight gain, which we have been feeding Hobert the horse to help him regain the weight he had lost due to his hoof injury. Such pellets for both horses and birds typically contain a mix of grains and oils. Purchasing feed from the agricultural supply store exemplifies many sanctuaries' dependency on animal agricultural supply-chains to obtain food, animal housing materials, various farming equipment, and other resources such as veterinary

services, all of which are embedded within the animal agricultural networks. As Elan Abrell notes, sanctuaries are often "embedded within many of the same political-economic systems of animal use that they seek to challenge, such as the animal agriculture industry and the animal entertainment industry" (2021, 18).

However, not all food supplies within the industry networks are directly corporate controlled. As the stashes of hay began to dwindle during my time volunteering at Olive, F2 browsed various classified advertisement online to find the best deals from local hay farmers. Eventually, F2 settled on buying from a couple who lived in the same region and offered delivery. On Day 21 of my stay at Olive, a rather windy Sunday, the couple dropped off a truckload of hay. Olive founders had friends who visited that weekend and volunteered to tidy the shed, sweeping up loose hay and rice husks in preparation for receiving the fresh bales. As we all helped to move the hay bales into the storage shed and loaded some of them onto a truck bed to bring to the cows, Caper stood casually next to the truck bed to snack, gnawing morsels of hay straight out of the bales.

Despite the inescapable reliance on the animal agriculture industry and its networks to obtain and access some supplies and resources, the food sources for Olive animal residents are rather diverse. After visiting the agricultural supply store with F1 as mentioned, we drove to a nearby grocery store in the same town, where a store staff met us at the rear loading bay and gave us boxes of vegetable scraps for free. The pigs at Olive in particular enjoy the leafy greens from the store just as much as they enjoy dandelion leaves and grassy weeds that crop up around the sanctuary. F1 and F2 had shown me how they would rip the dandelion leaves and weed grasses out of the earth and feed them to the pigs, who would then munch on them with delight. As for the grocery stores, it is not uncommon for them to donate damaged or excess produce and scraps to animal rescues and sanctuaries. Such donations may be up to the discretion of individual businesses, but sometimes it may be part of the official sustainability policies and food waste reduction goals of specific companies. At VINE Sanctuary for instance, residents receive a "twice-weekly distribution of new and interesting castoffs from Hannaford," a supermarket chain in the U.S. with a location near VINE (Blattner et al. 2020, 8, 14). While VINE has established a good ongoing relationship with their local Hannaford, it is also part of Hannaford's official aim to achieve zero food waste by diverting the unsold food from their nearly 200 stores across the U.S. away from landfills to charities and farmers (Hannaford, n.d.).

For Olive, one bakery in the nearby town is also part of a chain that has implemented a policy mandating all franchisees to donate their surplus bread to various community groups and charities across Australia. This particular bakery overproduces so much bread on a daily basis that they have arranged a sign-up list for farmers and other locals to pick up the leftovers every single day of the week at the end of day. Olive founders told me that many farmers have signed up to collect the surplus bread to feed their farmed animals. On my first Saturday at Olive, which happens to be their weekly bread collection day, F1 and I drove with a car full of empty garbage bags to the shopping centre in town where the bakery was located. Upon arrival, the friendly bakery staff directed us towards the shelves filled with loaves and rolls for our taking. In total, F1 and I filled at least ten garbage bags worth of bread, which we had to wheel out to the car with three shopping carts. Prior to leaving the shopping centre, F1 stopped by the supermarket and bought some wet food packets for the rescued cats, which would be fed to the cats alongside their Purina animal-based dry kibbles.

Upon returning to the sanctuary, we hauled the hefty garbage bags into the bread storage room inside the house, removing a few loaves for ourselves in the process. F2 and I both liked the loaves sprinkled with sea salt flakes so we set a couple of those aside. The rest of the bread would mostly become part of the two main meals for the pigs each day, with each meal consisting of five loaves and rolls split into roughly fist-size chunks, mixed into a bucket along with chopped up bananas and apples for breakfast, as well as chopped carrots for dinner. Due to the sheer volume of bread Olive receives, much of the bread would often become mouldy before we could get through feeding them to the residents. On two of the days during my month of stay at Olive, F2 assigned me the task of processing a substantial amount of mouldy bread, salvaging what we could before composting the rest.

The fruits and vegetables for the pigs come from a produce wholesaler in another neighbouring town, which also doubles as a health food store. One morning, I had the chance to visit the produce wholesaler with F1 to replenish fruits and vegetables for the pigs. I was pleasantly surprised that, despite being a rural business in a region dominated by animal agriculture, the store also carried an impressively wide selection of vegan specialty foods, including plant-based meats, pre-made vegan meals, and vegan desserts. We left with cardboard trays of produce and handfuls of vegan chocolate bars.

In terms of the food provided by humans, the dogs and pigs share more or less the same food sources as the humans due to their omnivory. The dogs eat plant-based homemade meals that are batch cooked in stock pots every two days, consisting of brown rice, potatoes, legumes, and vegetables. In addition to store-bought and donated items, most of the animal residents also eat directly from the land. The pigs would spend their days rooting for whatever they could find in the soil around the sanctuary, the roosters would also dig and peck the grounds for invertebrates, and the cows, sheep, horses, and geese would graze on grass. The founders also grow some of their own food in a vegetable garden at Olive. Interestingly, F2 told me that many animal residents enjoy eating each other's feces, a fairly common behaviour or practice known as coprophagia. I had certainly observed the dogs going after horse manure and rooster droppings when they are scavenging the sanctuary grounds during their daily outdoor time, and F2 says that wild birds such as rosellas, corellas, cockatoos, and magpies also partake in eating the feces of sanctuary residents when they visit. In some ways, these observations of animals consuming each other's waste resonate with the resistive consumption of animals who forage on the remains or waste of capitalist production.

The overview above demonstrates how the animal residents at Olive are provided with an ample variety of foods that meet their nutritional needs, and how some of the residents are enabled to further explore and harvest what they find edible directly from the land. The salient point I wish to make here is that to some extent, it seems reasonable to expect that the animal residents would become somewhat indifferent and calm in their responses to food, given the fact that every animal resident is well-fed through predictable and repetitive feeding schedules and routines. However, as we have already seen with Caper the horse, such expectations could not be further from reality. Meal times have proven to be the most clamorous times at the sanctuary, and although feeding animal residents is an overall safe chore, it is also one amongst few tasks that poses the most potential danger for humans. An instance that illustrates the potential risks comes from feeding the pigs. For the first ten days at Olive, I either fed the horses and chickens while F2 fed the pigs, or I shadowed F2 as she fed the pigs in order for me to gain more confidence. It was not until the eleventh day when I managed the feed the pigs on my own. Starting with the pigs, stories in the next two sections portray forms of resistance that Olive animal residents perform for subsistence.

7.3 Food Fight: Resistance and Contestations during Feeding Time

Feeding the pigs is a routine involving specific steps that took practice to get a hang of. Holding a bucket filled with bread and produce in one arm, the way to feed the pigs involves throwing the food in order to send the pigs chasing after them in directions we wanted them to go. There are multiple reasons that necessitate this approach. When feeding Jedi the pig, we had to lead him away from us because we must traverse roughly thirty metres across his paddock in order to reach the paddocks of three other pigs. Allowing Jedi to come up too close to the food bucket could be both potentially dangerous for the human and result in Jedi taking the entire bucket for himself. While the founders and I believed it would be extremely unlikely for Jedi to intentionally injure humans, the risk of being accidentally gouged by his tusks in his excitement for food was very real, as experienced first-hand by one of the founders. As we sent chunks of bread, fruits, and carrots flying into the air, Jedi would sprint after them, giving us plenty of time to open and close the gate upon entering his paddock, then exit by straddling over mesh wired fencing on the other side. Jedi's impressive speed and efficiency meant that we often had to toss the food items multiple times in different directions as we walked, while he quickly devours the food and makes a return towards the bucket.

Using food to direct the pigs was also necessary for separating the pigs during feeding for their own safety and for distributing fair shares between them, particularly with pigs Spooky and Betty who dwell in the same paddock. Despite having bonded, Spooky is rather ruthless when it comes to taking food from Betty, whose obstructed vision and limited mobility puts her at a disadvantage in competing for food. To ensure that Betty has enough to eat, the approach was to throw Spooky's portions further down the paddock to lead her away, while dropping off Betty's share right in front of her at the gate. Similarly, Polly the pig tends to repeatedly knock her snout against the gate when she sees us coming with food, so we would quickly place some food in front of her and throw the rest of her portion away from the gate and fencing to curtail her knocking behaviour.

Returning now to the story of horses Caper and Hobert, the similar manner of negotiating the animals' movements with food to ensure appropriate distributions of meal portions also applies to them. As mentioned in recounting my trip to the agricultural supply store with F1, Hobert has been put on a special weight-gain diet as his hoof injury has caused him to lose a concerning amount of body mass. I have come to call Hobert's high-fat supplement "horse

kibbles" given their resemblance to jumbo bags of dry kibbles for dogs and cats in both their individual brownish pellets and the overall aesthetics of their packaging. Horse kibbles are unsuitable for Caper, whose weight has shifted considerably in the opposite direction as he has taken advantage of Hobert's weakened state to feast on Hobert's meal. F2 informed me that Hobert was actually the more dominant of the two horses when he was healthy, and would often eat extra out of Caper's portions instead. However, the regular diet for both horses is drastically different from the weight-gain diet. Whereas the horses usually get fed only chaff and hay, Hobert's recovery diet includes the addition of rice bran oil into a bucket mix of chaff and horse kibbles to boost caloric density, with veterinary prescribed analgesic and anti-inflammatory granules sprinkled into the mix to manage hoof pain. Caper would inevitably become unhealthy if he continued to feast on supersized meals laced with pain medication, and so we came up with a feeding strategy to separate the horses.

Caper and Hobert each receive a bucket of food twice a day. I would prepare both buckets in advance on the elevated deck of the guesthouse where the horse feed is stored and where the horses could not reach and interfere with meal preparation. The horses would often gather just below the deck as soon as they sense their meals being prepared, and watch intently as I filled their buckets. Given that Hobert moves quite a bit slower, my initial approach was to simply serve Caper first and draw him some distance away from Hobert, then quickly run back to the deck and deliver Hobert's bucket. This feeding method proved to be a failure, as there were times when Hobert managed to catch up to Caper to eat out of the same bucket while ignoring the high-calorie one intended for him, or times when Caper somehow inhaled his food so quickly that he ends up going after the high-calorie bucket before Hobert could finish.

To remedy these problems, F2 and I decided to try luring Caper into a smaller paddock first, then close the gate on him and serve Hobert after Caper has been temporarily confined. This method was also ultimately unsustainable as Caper protests his captivity intensely once he finishes eating. After roughly a week and half of trial and error, I finally managed to consistently feed the horses with little drama, by first leading Caper away, then convincing Hobert to enter a temporary enclosure some distance further down the sanctuary property instead. It could be due to his diminished energy to make complaints, or perhaps it was the satisfaction that his food was finally protected from Caper's intrusions so that he could eat in peace, but for whatever reason, Hobert did not seem to mind spending time in the enclosure nearly as much as Caper.

Furthermore, while Caper does hover over the fence and lurk around the enclosure when Hobert is eating, he has never attempted to break in. There were a few occasions when the process did not go as smoothly, when Hobert became distracted by Caper's eating, and I had to present Hobert's bucket of foodstuff right up to his face in order to convince him to follow me to the enclosure, pleading with him to pick up the pace under the looming pressure that Caper could catch up if we did not hurry. Nonetheless, the overall success of developing a routine with feeding the horses became a source of pride for me as a volunteer, since this was one of the main daily chores I had been tasked with upon my arrival. On some level, my ability to manipulate the horses with food to achieve what were ultimately paternalistic aims for the horses' own benefit gave me a sense of winning against them in a harmless game.[5]

To a lesser extent in terms of risks to the physical safety and the wellbeing of human and animal residents, feeding the roosters echoes the same story of demands and negotiations as above. The way to feed the roosters entails filling a one-litre plastic container with their pellets, and grabbing the pellets in small handfuls at a time to scatter them around some of the common areas where the roosters hang around. At Olive, the large 20kg bag of chicken pellets sit in a galvanised bin inside one of the main sheds where the geese and some of the roosters sleep at night. To avoid getting swarmed by the roosters as I fetched their food, I would close the glass sliding door behind me upon entering the shed to prepare the pellets. A few roosters would usually attempt to follow me into the shed and watch me attentively through the glass when they realised I was there to feed them. The moment I stepped back outside with their container of feed, the roosters would swarm me. Clutching both my trusty leaf rake for fending off Mayhem and the container of chicken feed in my left hand, I would disperse the pellets liberally around the sanctuary to spread out the flock, making sure that every bird got a fair amount to eat, and to keep them from coming after me or going at each other. While most roosters remain convivial

[5] While I describe human decisions and goals as paternalistic in this context, I also acknowledge that paternalism may not be an entirely fair characterisation of the relational dynamics at play, and that paternalism does not fully capture or reflect a background of massive (and intergenerational) interference resulting in highly constrained conditions imposed on human-animal relations. That is to say, in the abstract, one might say that respecting the animals' autonomy would mean allowing them to choose their own food, yet, these decisions are messier when the animals' patterns of movement and the types of food available to them have become radically out of keeping with the conditions under which they developed their eating behaviours.

during their meals, some do give others the occasional wing flap or peck when going after pellets in the same area.

Lastly, with regards to the cows and sheep who mostly graze the pastures, feeding these residents involves much less interaction. Once the herds see fresh bales of hay being cut loose and dispersed into roughly apportioned piles in a given paddock, they tend make their own way towards the hay. Similarly, when the herds have to be rotated in order to rest the paddocks they have grazed for some time, they typically do not require much convincing to move to a recovered pasture.

Nonetheless, there were several instances I have observed where food has been used as a kind of encouragement to achieve extrinsic aims even with the cows and sheep. For instance, on Day 14, I accompanied F1 and F2 as they made their way to the cows to administer parasite prevention treatment. F1 carried a two-litre bottle of cydectin, a chemical to be topically poured or squirted onto the cows to control any internal and external parasites they may be exposed to. The timing of this parasite treatment was made to coincide with pasture rotation so as to make the process easier, allowing F1 to apply the cydectin while the cows were distracted by fresh grass to chew on. While I would not say that the cows absolutely detest the chemical, most of them visibly attempt to move away from F1 as soon as she sneaks up on them to apply the cydectin, even as they were busy chowing down the renewed grass. F1 said that cows avoid cydectin mostly due to its petrol-like smell. On this day in particular, every cow received their dose of cydectin except for Rowdy because F1 said “he looked like he was in a bit of a mood,” and we had observed him being a bit aggressive towards Baroque the cow earlier that day. Fearing that Rowdy may injure her, F1 would eventually attempt to apply cydectin on Rowdy again on Day 21, when the local farmers delivered new bales of hay as mentioned earlier. The cows were visibly excited when we brought them the hay, as it had been at least a couple of weeks since they last enjoyed this more nutrient-dense fodder. This time, F1 skillfully, albeit apprehensively, snuck up behind a hay-munching Rowdy, then poured a line of cydectin down his back to the applause of those of us spectating on the other side of the fence.

The cows and sheep do occasionally receive bread as well, sometimes as bargaining chips to get them to move to certain areas, such as when F2 brought a bucket of bread to the cows to facilitate pasture rotation on Day 9. Other times, however, the cows and sheep receive bread simply as treats. On Day 17, F2 and I worked on building a watering hole in one of the paddocks

frequented by the sheep herd, which involved digging a rectangular pit to fit a repurposed bathtub that would sit flush with the surface of the ground (there were several of these bathtub watering holes around the sanctuary to ensure the residents stay hydrated). Given that there is always excess bread to distribute and we were already making our way to visit the sheep, F2 decided to bring them a bucket of bread.

What was interesting in feeding bread to the cows and sheep was that in both cases, most individuals initially appeared to be disinterested in the bread. With the sheep, at first, only a few of them made their way over to the small piles that F2 had scattered along the fence, while the rest of the herd watched with hesitation from a distance. Similarly, with the cows, only Rowdy and Baroque dashed towards the bread straight away when F2 began throwing them over the fence, while the rest observed with questioning looks from further up the hill. It was only when the first sheep and cows had begun to eat that the rest eventually followed suit. Even as more individuals began to eat, there were a few who did not care for the bread at all. At one point, I directly offered a piece of bread to a sheep only be to be received with a puzzled look, as the sheep turned away and focused on grazing grass and hay instead. F2 believes this was due to the fact that bread is not typically in their diet and the herds only receive them irregularly, and many are also not used to being hand-fed by humans. In any case, bread is quite apparently of considerably less value to the cows and sheep as it is to some other animals at the sanctuary. As I stood amongst the herd of sheep munching on bread and grass, a raven swooped down low and landed on a nearby branch, patiently waiting for an opportunity to collect some bread.

7.4 Opportunism: Food Theft and Commensality at the Sanctuary

Scenes of local ravens swooping down to snatch bread from the pigs and other sanctuary residents were frequent occurrences during my time at Olive. On Day 6, I managed to capture videos of ravens skillfully flying around in forceful winds, landing in the paddocks to pick up pieces of bread during pig feeding, then rapidly ascend back up to the trees. The ravens kept a close eye on the feeding, positioning themselves on tree branches and fence posts, ready to take anything the pigs might miss. While I was never quite able to identify the individual ravens, their familiarity with the sanctuary feeding routines and the quickness with which they respond to the presence of bread, as shown during the irregular bread delivery to the sheep, suggests to me that they must be amongst the resident wild birds that Olive founders had mentioned during our

interviews. According to F2, she noticed that it has actually taken the ravens a while to learn the bread routine. F2 notes that in the past she would often put the pigs' food in shallow buckets that served as bowls, but she has been throwing their food a lot more, and maybe the local birds have caught on to that. Amidst the trees towering over sanctuary grounds were a multi-generational family of magpies, as well as other wild native birds such as rosellas, kookaburras, and cockatoos. During my fieldwork, I had also observed ducklings tailing their parents making their way through the sanctuary, and they visit annually according to F1. Significantly, none of the rescued sanctuary residents seem to mind the wild birds touching down to get some food.

While I had highlighted in Chapter 4 some of the hostilities between rescued animal residents and the wild or feral animals around Olive to portray the aspects of the sanctuary that make it a conflict zone, there are also many instances of non-hostile if not convivial relationships amongst them. When I asked the founders to recall some of the memorable interactions between rescued animal residents and wild animals, they brought up that some of the aforementioned birds would often sit on the cows' backs, and occasionally take a ride on the pigs, too. F2 clarified that when the cows and pigs are eating, they disturb the ground and bugs come up, giving the birds a chance to eat the insects. And while the previous section showed examples of animal residents competing for food, the reality is that they also harmoniously share food more often than not, especially when there is plenty to go around for everyone. There are several pigs known to get along with the sheep and cows, and the founders have given them access to roam the larger paddocks with the other ungulates each day. Oftentimes, the pigs would partake in chomping down some hay when the bales are delivered, eating peacefully alongside the sheep and cows.

I argue that the examples above where animal residents and local wild animals share food or otherwise benefit each other could be productively understood as forms of commensality both between the sanctuary residents themselves and with the local wild and feral animals. My discussions of commensality or commensalism here follows Bénédicte Boisseron's (2018) definition of the term as she applies it to her analysis of interspecies relations and anticolonial cultures in the Creole context. Boisseron notes that in "ecological terminology, commensalism refers to a class of relationship in which two organisms mutually benefit without adversely affecting each other" (2018, xxiii, 92). Building on this ecological sense of the term, Boisseron interprets commensalism as "an organic philosophy built on the act of sharing without being

owed and taking without being indebted since the various organisms share a table with no strings attached" (2018, 92). By understanding commensalism more sociologically and politically, a commensal animal for Boisseron is one who "does not abide by a dichotomy of private-public space" (2018, xxiii). In these ways and more, Boisseron sees commensalism as a form of both interspecies and intraspecies relationship "that carries an anticolonial, antihegemonic, and anti-anthropocentric resonance" (2018, 107). Importantly, Boisseron distinguishes commensalism not only from negative terms such as "freeloading," where the assumption is that something is owed despite being free. Commensalism is also "opposed to a potlatch economy," in which she argues the expectations of "exchange and reciprocity" resemble attributes of debt, gratitude, and "the pressure to return" that underlie "the premises of colonization, husbandry, and domestication" (2018, 94, 100). In commensality, "one species gives, or rather lets the other take, without expecting to benefit from this transaction" (Boisseron 2018, 106).

Adding to Boisseron's analysis of commensality for the purpose of my discussion, it is also critical to underscore the aspects of opportunism in commensality. In one regard, animals only enter commensal relations when some individuals involved opportunistically access available food and other resources initially obtained or made available by others. Yet, this initial act through which some animals take advantage of others (or rather a situation created by others) becomes generative of commensality as an alternative way of being and relating amongst the animals in question. Refraining from becoming overly abstract, my point is simply that, in the context where existing anthropogenic and anthropocentric structures control and impact food access and availability for all human and nonhuman animals, commensality as a form of resistive consumption that is built on alternative foodways exemplifies how opportunistic actions and behaviours can produce further emancipatory opportunities. I emphasis this point here because, as we shall see in the next section, whereas capitalism and its mutually-reinforcing structures and ideologies are cannibalistic or self-consuming, opportunistic consumption as an anti-oppressive practice can become regeneratively self-preserving. Commensality, of course, is not the only form of opportunistic consumption at the sanctuary.

Early morning on Day 8 before dawn, I was woken up by a loud clanging noise coming from the deck just outside the entrance of the guesthouse. Upon opening the door to investigate, I immediately saw the galvanised bin containing horse kibbles tipped over near the top of the stairs, with its lid fallen to the side and kibbles spilling out of the bag and bin. I immediately took

a photo of the bin not just for data, but to report to the founders that someone had broken into the bin. While we never managed to prove with clear evidence, F2 was quite confident that Houdini the dog must have been the culprit and that she would have targeted the horse food during the early morning outing for the dogs to go to the toilet. Regardless, from that point on, the horse kibbles were removed from the deck and stored safely inside the guesthouse.

We had good reasons to suspect that it was indeed Houdini who broke into the bin based on her track record of being an accomplished escape artist. The main house occupied by the founders, dogs, and cats has a small yard just below the deck, which serves primarily as the toilet for the dogs. The founders were certain that Houdini was breaking out from the yard, and were concerned due to instances where Houdini had jumped into neighbouring public and private spaces. On Day 13, F2 and I began a small project to fix up the mesh wire fencing in the yard to prevent Houdini from escaping. However, up to that point, no one had been able to pinpoint exactly where along the fence Houdini was exiting the yard, so we did our best to patch up openings under the shed where she may have been able to leap through. Three days later, F1 finally saw where Houdini was breaking out from, allowing F2 and I to complete Houdini-proofing the fence.

The Houdini-proofed fence resulted in only limited effectiveness in stifling her boundary crossings, as a week later, on the very eventful Day 21, the founders continued discussions regarding how to prevent Houdini from going onto the road or the neighbours' properties during the daily outdoor time where the dogs get to wander around the sanctuary. Incidentally, earlier that day, the dogs took full advantage of human absence and treated themselves to loads of bread. While the founders, their visiting friends, and I were busy organising the hay delivery and transporting them to the cows, unbeknownst to us, the door to the bread storage room had not been fully shut. Even when we returned hours later, we had not noticed anything unusual apart from how the dogs all seemed exceptionally quiet and relaxed on the sofa. A few moments passed, and F2 noticed that the door to the bread room had been left ajar and she immediately connected the dots, exclaiming that the dogs had gotten to the bread. It was then when we noticed how much Houdini's abdomen had expanded as she lay comfortably subdued on the sofa, and I suspected that Houdini likely ate the most bread out of the three dogs. Given that Remi is a senior dog who has physically slowed down quite a bit, and Berry has not been nearly as daring as Houdini, I asked F2 whether Houdini often takes the blame for whatever antics the

dogs get up to. F2 confirmed with no hesitation that Berry and Remi definitely hide behind Houdini all the time.

I argue that Houdini's acts of taking horse feed by breaking into the bin and taking bread from the storage constitute a form of theft. In characterising Houdini's actions as theft, I am keenly aware that this is to some extent an anthropocentric and anthropomorphic interpretation of her actions, or a projection of human social norms and concepts. Contrastingly, were such opportunistic feeding behaviours to occur in the wild, as when some animals take and consume other animals' eggs for instance, they would be labelled "egg predation" in ecological terms. Nonetheless, I am intentionally describing Houdini's actions as theft because they have taken place in an interspecies context where the natural-social dichotomy has already materially and conceptually collapsed, which makes it appropriate to apply sociological terms to understand human-nonhuman relations. Furthermore, my understanding of theft here follows an analysis within the field of critical criminology, where scholars have argued that crimes and criminals within contexts of structural oppression are often institutionally constructed for the purposes of social control. For instance, Viviane Saleh-Hanna (2020) has shown how within the context of European colonialism, crime is a concept that is dependent on "institutionalized constructions of dangerousness…as defined by colonial renditions of race, gender, sexuality, ability, class, nation, and so forth" (1). The colonial constructions of these social categories and their associated imaginaries of danger then serve to anchor various forms of criminalisation and punishment aimed at social control.

Consonant to Saleh-Hanna's analysis, my argument is that Houdini's food-taking actions could be construed as theft precisely because they could be considered 'criminal' in how they disrupt an established order where humans have decided that she should not be allowed to freely access bread and horse feed whenever she wishes. Through her acts of resistance within a structurally-produced species hierarchy where humans ultimately make most decisions regarding control and access to food and other resources despite being an anti-oppressive animal sanctuary, Houdini emerges as a 'criminal' within this regime. Applying a human-constructed crime category such as theft to Houdini's actions is appropriate not only because they could be seen as disruptive, threatening, and dangerous to an existing human-dictated social order, Houdini has also engendered forms of control on the part of humans in response to her actual and potential resistive actions.

Another example that further illustrates this dynamic of theft, criminality and control involves an episode where a few sheep ate replanted trees in a paddock that they were not supposed to enter. On Day 19, when F1, F2, and I went to fill the newly installed tub with water for the sheep, three of the sheep crossed into another paddock and began nipping the leaves off several young trees and saplings. Given that the survival of these trees is integral to the founders' tree planting project, F1 and F2 rushed over, and with outstretched arms, they gently but assertively herded the sheep out of the paddock. However, the very next day, the sheep were given access to Spooky and Betty's paddock while the two pigs were out roaming the larger pastures. A large evergreen sat inside the paddock and one sheep happily ate its low-hanging leaves completely unopposed by humans. The disparity between the two events demonstrate how opportunistic consumptions only qualify as a kind of "wrongdoing" when they transgress the control of food under human sovereignty, and it is in this fashion the that the sheep's targeting of the young trees could also be read as a kind of theft and crime.

Before moving on from this section, I will briefly consider a potential challenge that my interpretations of the animals' boundary-breaking and food-seeking behaviours, or my attributions of sociopolitical concepts to them, may be erroneous or incomplete, and that there may be other primary motivating factors to their behaviours I have failed to account for. One such factor might be that the animal residents are really performing such actions and behaviours out of boredom, regardless of whether they actually desired or needed more food. In this story, it is perhaps the thrill and fulfillment that the animals derive from some level of competition or challenging human control that inspire their actions, and that food just happens to be an item that allows them to achieve this. In such scenarios, control and access to food might take a backseat to other more pressing issues for animal resistance. While I do believe and accept that many of the animal residents may experience boredom, my argument is that, even if it were the case that boredom is the primary cause of their resistive acts, this fact alone takes nothing away from the underlying food relations exposed by the animals' responses to boredom. In short, it can be both true that the animal residents are bored and that their resistive consumptions nevertheless speak to their lack of control over food. In the end, whether it is boredom or a lack of self-determination over food for the animal residents, both conditions are rooted in human sovereignty.

7.5 Animal Resistance Lessons for Re-animalisation from Resistive Consumption

Vignette: A Lesson in Abundance, Scarcity, and Resistance from Pig Feeding

On Day 27, F1 and F2 explained to me and the new volunteer that in their view, most FASes tend to overfeed their rescued pigs. According to F1 and F2, many humans do not believe there are issues with feeding large portions of food to pigs due to human stereotypes that depict pigs as plump in size. Therefore, it is in large part the biased human perceptions and beliefs reproduced in popular representations of pigs that allows this overfeeding practice to persist. Additionally, the founders stated that pigs tend to be calmer when they feel full, which suggests that overfeeding the pigs indirectly benefits human workers and visitors at sanctuaries by having calmer pigs to interact with. However, the founders note that wild pigs do not possess such rotund body conditions, which leads to the question of how overfeeding might be impacting the health of many rescued pigs. Health concerns aside, what I find intriguing is that this relational dynamic between the pigs and their material conditions seems consistent with humans and other animals, where abundance (or overabundance) tends to pacify, while scarcity, whether real or artificial, could lead to more desperate forms of resistance.

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My aim in this final section of the chapter is to glean some lessons from the food-related stories that I have shared above and discuss their relevance to re-animalisation. Akin to how Alexis Pauline Gumbs (2020) applies a Black feminist lens to draw specific lessons from marine mammals for emancipatory social movements and the human species as discussed in the literature review, I am interested in whether viewing the foodways at Olive Animal Sanctuary through an animal resistance lens might offer anything instructive in a similar manner. What I mean by foodways at Olive here includes the entirety of all food relations and practices I had been able to observe and discuss through sections 7.2 to 7.4.

However, one of the challenges with this approach of attempting to produce certain lessons by simultaneously engaging with the agency and performances of both human and nonhuman animal subjects is the difficulty in maintaining cognizance of the differences between human-nonhuman subject positions, while necessarily conflating to some degree human and

nonhuman animal agency and resistance.[6] For instance, as I had stated in the previous section regarding my description and interpretation of Houdini's actions as 'theft', I argued that the application of this sociological term was appropriate because the actions had taken place within an interspecies context where the dichotomous boundary of nature-society has already materially and conceptually disintegrated. To state more explicitly, I argue that to accept that humans and other animals are capable of learning from each other involves both the understanding that there are already significant overlaps between the actions and practices that humans and other animals regularly perform, and the understanding that the ways humans and other animals perform such actions are different; therefore, attempts to weave human and nonhuman animal agency and resistance into a more seamless discussion is less a conflation than an acknowledgement of shared capacities. To give some straightforward examples, we know that other animals communicate, but they communicate differently from humans; we know that other animals raise and nurture their young offspring, but they may do so in ways different from humans. Nonetheless, it is important to first parse through the distinctions of different forms of agency and subjectivities at play before I move to draw lessons from the foodways at Olive in the rest of this section.

To begin, let us consider how a different framework might be more suitable than animal resistance in discussing human and nonhuman agency in food politics. One might suggest that, for example, the new materialist concept of actancy enables us to better make sense of the various human and nonhuman actions they perform surrounding food at the sanctuary. Here, I take Jane Bennett's (2010) definition and discussions of "actant" as paradigmatic in this regard. Citing Bruno Latour's definition, Bennett states that "an actant is a source of action that can be either human or nonhuman; it is that which has efficacy, can *do* things, has sufficient coherence to make a difference, produce effects, alter the course of events" (2010, viii, emphasis in original). According to Bennett, "[a]n actant is neither an object nor a subject, but an 'intervener'," which she likens to the Deleuzean concept of a "'quasi-causal operator'" within an assemblage that happens to be "in the right place at the right time" to make a difference, or to become "the decisive force catalyzing an event" (2010, 9). Bennett goes on to state that "[a]ctant

[6] Following my discussions of animal agency and resistance in section 2.3 of the literature review, my understanding of agency here refers to the structurally constrained capacity for individuals and collectives to act, and resistance here refers to actions that are performed or exercised to contest forces of violence and oppression.

and operator are substitute words for what in a more subject-centered vocabulary are called agents" (2010, 9). An attribution of actancy to things, or a recognition of actancy in things that we would normally consider to be objects devoid of subjectivity would thus allow us to engage with them as entities possessing agentic forces. In this manner, actancy as a framework aims to dismantle the hierarchical/vertical subject-object dichotomy where the object is always below the subject; instead, Bennett attempts to "present human and nonhuman actants on a less vertical plane" (2010, ix), thereby flattening the differences to achieve more horizontality.

While the actancy framework and the way it aims to challenge hierarchy or the objectification of things is potentially useful in understanding food networks in ways that include food as actants, I circumscribe my analysis to the intersubjective engagements between only human and nonhuman animals with regards to power/resistance. Applying the framework of actancy could be quite generative particularly in discussing food relations and food politics, especially if the aim is to consider how food stuffs are themselves actants shaping or co-shaping those who consume them (in fact, Bennett has an entire chapter dedicated to precisely this form of analysis in her book). However, such analysis remains beyond the scope of this thesis, and in a largely strategic manner, I am only interested in the political agency and resistance of human and nonhuman animals, and an examination of this particular political relation does not address the implications of including the things being consumed by both human and nonhuman animals as subjects.

Having established the clarifications above with regards to how I intend to discuss human/animal resistance and why I reject the actancy framework, this section continues with a more narrative-driven approach in its analysis. I begin with a story that details my own political dispositions at the intersection of anti-oppression and food activism to show how my thinking on resistance has evolved before I launch into what lessons we might draw from the sanctuary animals.

Years ago, when I was much more active on social media amongst a network of friends who cared deeply about and fought for social, ecological, and animal justice, an amusing question made the rounds that asked whether it would be vegan to "eat the rich" or eat billionaires. Being the edgy leftist vegan social justice warrior who has never fully bought into nonviolence as an absolute principle, I immediately jumped on the bandwagon that declared eating the rich was not only consistent with veganism, but the morality of veganism may even

demand that we ought to eat the rich. This line of thought echoes folk singer and labour organiser Utah Phillips' often-cited assertion that "the earth is not dying, it is being killed, and those who are killing it have names and addresses." It seemed entirely coherent that if the aim of veganism was to minimise suffering and bring about justice for all, then individuals perpetrating mass violence and destructions would need to be held accountable. As some have considered "eat the rich" to be perhaps too metaphorically violent, alternatives such as "compost the rich" have been promoted as a more productive approach to indirectly cannibalise the wealthy with an added flair of ecological sensitivity. Despite having developed a more nuanced opinion in response to the witty question regarding whether vegans should consume the rich, much of my original sentiment remains intact to this day.

Reflecting on the term *omnicide*, meaning "the killing of all," Danielle Celermajer asserts that to shine "an accusatory light on an evil killer is both easy and relatively satisfying," but it is much more unsettling to recognise that omnicide "is not an event but a condition," and that mass killings of all beings is the normalised "secretion of this human world" (2021, 185-86). In this view, while we might place greater responsibilities on certain individuals in positions of authority and influence within political and economic systems that are destroying the world, such as politicians and corporate CEOs, each and every individual who participates in and benefits from systems of violence is ultimately complicit and responsible as well. Given that omnicide is the killing of all, our participation in destructive systems necessarily entails killing ourselves in the process. In this way, Celermajer's concept of omnicide fits well with Nancy Fraser's (2022) discussions of *cannibal capitalism*, where the cannibal is Fraser's preferred metaphor to describe how the capitalist system and society consumes all of us and itself.

Fraser offers several meanings in defining cannibalism and shows how these definitions are fit to describe the processes through which hegemonic systems engender "a tangle of looming threats and realized miseries" across the planet (2022, xiii). The first and most common understanding of cannibalism is "the ritual eating of human flesh by a human being" (Fraser 2022, xiii). Fraser notes that this first meaning is laden with a long history of anti-Black racism in which European imperialists applied "an inverted logic" of cannibalism that placed "Black Africans on the receiving end of Euro-imperialist predation" (2022, xiii). In this context, Fraser admits that there is "a certain satisfaction in turning the tables" in her work by depicting the capitalist class as cannibals who feed off everyone else (2022, xiii). For her second definition,

Fraser points out that "'to cannibalize' means to deprive one facility or an enterprise of an essential element of its functioning for the purpose of creating or sustaining another one" (2022, xiii-xiv). This is reflected in how capitalism's economy engorges itself by consuming the substance of "the system's non-economic precincts," such as families, communities, habitats, ecosystems, state capacities, and public powers (Fraser 2022, xiv). Similarly, cannibalism as an astronomical event occurs when one celestial object "incorporates mass" from other celestial objects "through gravitational attraction," which Fraser finds to be "an apt characterization of the process by which capital draws into its orbit natural and social wealth from peripheral zones of the world system" (2022, xiv). Lastly, "the ouroboros, the self-cannibalizing serpent that eats its own tail," is also a fitting representation of how the capitalist system devours "the social, political, and natural bases" sustaining the system itself and everyone on the planet (2022, xiv).

Cannibalism as a form of consumption lends itself well to the focus on food and consumption in this chapter. If one accepts that existing dominant systems are omnicidal and cannibalistic, the first lesson that we may be tempted to draw from the contestations over food amongst the sanctuary animals is to envisage ways through which we might cannibalise the system that is trying to cannibalise us. Perhaps the stories of theft and commensality teach us that under conditions in which state subsidies are bolstering the corporate-controlled food systems that are killing the planet, targeting and stealing from corporate entities and sharing the plunders could be forms of resistance that contribute to dismantling said systems. However, the didactic lesson of "stealing from the rich to establish another system of distribution" does not quite get at an insight more relevant to re-animalisation. In a similar vein to Corman's observations of the cultural vilification of raccoons, human freegans, and their shared food reclamation practices, I suggest that our first lesson should be a rather pedestrian one, namely the recognition that as animals ourselves, humans who have been institutionally or structurally deprived of food or experiencing scarcity already do participate in food theft, commensality, and other forms of resistive consumption under existing conditions.

Taking resources from those who control and privatise them to share with those who have been excluded or denied access to them is not new to humans. On a broader scale, one example of commensality could be seen in the work Food Not Bombs (FNB), an international movement made up of local, autonomous, all-volunteer chapters working to recover vegan and vegetarian food that would otherwise be discarded by various businesses, and serve the food for free to their

local communities (Food Not Bombs, n.d.). As Eva Haifa Giraud notes, FNB's "food sharing tactics are purposively performative" in the way they "actively contest legislation (such as no-loitering, antisocial-behavior, and no-begging laws) designed to exclude homeless populations from central, urban public spaces" (2019, 90). Additionally, FNB's use of gleaned foods and the way they bring visibility to both homelessness and waste reflect an anti-capitalism that foregrounds the contradiction of poverty and hunger within conditions of food waste and abundance (Giraud 2019, 90). Insofar as FNB's tactics destabilise the dominant socioeconomic, political, and legal orders, they are commensurate to how animal theft and other contestations over food trouble the established order at the sanctuary. One potentially generative exercise following this analysis might be to document other similar forms of multispecies resistive consumption beyond the sanctuary taking place across the world and to politicise them through similar terms and frameworks.

Following the recognition that many humans already perform resistive consumption like other animals, the second lesson is to grasp and accept how this form of resistance is severely constrained by oppressive hegemonic structures and systems that it is working to undermine and transform. For instance, FNB states that its chapters procure food by building relationships and making arrangements with local businesses such as grocery stores, bakeries, and produce markets, and they do not participate in dumpster diving (Food Not Bombs, n.d.). Similarly, Olive assists their local bakery and grocery store in reducing food waste by accepting the leftovers and scraps. The issue here is that collaborative arrangements designed to salvage the waste and excesses of capitalism, however worthwhile, are ultimately unable to halt the paces and scales of the system's overproduction. Such collaborative efforts may even assist companies and corporations in a form of greenwashing when they advance a profit-driven agenda. In this regard, Giraud has observed how food activism could be co-opted to foster neoliberal policies and agenda, whereby community food initiatives are used to replace welfare programs, justify funding cuts, and compensate for austerity measures (2019, 92).

Another issue related to oppressive systems and structures concerns the standpoints and social locations of those who engage in resistive consumption. Giraud has drawn attention to "uneven relations between the activists sharing food and the people consuming it" in her discussions of food activism (2019, 92). Citing an instance of power asymmetry that emerged in an FNB chapter in Orlando, U.S., during a time of intensified legislative crackdowns against

FNB chapters across the nation, Giraud notes that "activists wanted to maintain the protests while homeless people were not able to risk arrests" (2019, 92). Likewise, as Corman points out, oppressed humans who practice freeganism will take on greater risks and potentially suffer more severe consequences than those who occupy positions of privilege (2011, 47). Citing the reflections of a dumpster-diver in the United States who contrasted his experiences as a Black male to his white companions, Corman notes that Black freegans are not only exposed to greater risks of violence from police and security, the threat of violence and stigmatisation against them are also compounded by and rooted in a history of racism and white supremacy, in which Black people have been dehumanised through comparisons to racoons and other nonhuman animals (2011, 45-48). Meanwhile, the raccoons themselves are labelled as pests and targeted for extermination, while various deterrence strategies, such as raccoon-proof bins, are deployed against them (Corman 2011, 28-30).

I take these critical considerations regarding the limitations, risks, and challenges of resistive consumption within oppressive systems amongst both humans and other animals and apply them to think through re-animalisation according to the events I had experienced and documented at Olive. However, given that re-animalisation is a response to existing crises that largely demands humans to take on the labour of making ourselves less controlling of and more vulnerable to various risks as a means to upend human exceptionalism, my reflections here focus mainly on my own difficulties in relinquishing authority and privilege in relation to other animals at the sanctuary.

Specifically, reflecting on the episode where I came across the toppled bin of horse food that one morning, one question that has come up for me was why did I have to be such a bootlicker to the sanctuary's established order in the way that I snitched on Houdini, assuming it was her who had broken into the bin? Reviewing the photo of the toppled bin, there was no significant loss of horse kibbles and the minor spillage could have easily been tidied up. It would have made relatively little difference to me and the horses if I had kept quiet and allowed this occasional theft to continue, regardless of who the culprit might be. The horses would receive their share of food per usual, the founders would buy more feed when it runs low, it may have taken the founders some time before they even notice the quicker depletion of horse kibbles, and within weeks, I would no longer be at the sanctuary upon completing my fieldwork. Yet, despite these rather trivial consequences and over a decade of proclaiming myself to be some kind of

radical "ally to the animals," it was so effortless and thoughtless for me to report the theft to the founders and take actions to prevent it. It was correspondingly all too easy to justify these measures in the name of the greater good of the sanctuary, fairness for other residents, and even the health of the thieving animal.

Finding myself once again embodying human sovereignty as in the examples relating to roosters from the previous chapter, I suppose the lesson here is that we ought to carefully contemplate what commitments would be required of humans to truly enact re-animalisation as well as deferring to the sovereignties of other animals, whether for food or other matters. In his conclusion in *The War against Animals*, Wadiwel cites Foucault's proposal of *desertion* as one counter-conduct that could help etch "a new set of truths that enable recognition of animal sovereignties" and bring about the possibility of truce with other animals (2015, 276-77). Despite recognising how internal attempts within the vegan movement to police and enforce ethical purity could limit the radical potentials of vegan practices, Wadiwel argues that vegan practices retain a tactical merit: as a form of desertion, veganism performs insubordination to human sovereignty, a refusal to participate in the violence and exploitation of other animals, and veganism could "invent new unimaginable pleasures" that refute the idea that desertion requires personal sacrifice (2015, 278-80).

Nonetheless, the examples of human sovereignty operating at an already-vegan sanctuary demonstrate the limitations of veganism as a form of desertion in subverting human sovereignty. While desertion alone would sufficiently qualify as a form of treason to a nation-state or sovereign in the context of war, and deserters who are caught would suffer severe punishments, it would be an entirely different type of betrayal to one's sovereign were one to join its enemies instead. As such, one final crucial lesson for re-animalisation that the sanctuary animals have guided me towards is the need to deliberate the potential sacrifices that would be required of humans in changing our allegiance to assist the animals in their seditions against the established orders of human sovereignty and human exceptionalism. I now move to this deliberation in the concluding section below.

7.6 Conclusion: Becoming 'Hostile Herbivores' and Reframing 'Earthly Risks'

Interweaving ethnographic narratives and critical analysis throughout this chapter, I have provided an overview of the resistive foodways at Olive Animal Sanctuary amongst its residents.

I have then derived a number of lessons from the resistive foodways I have found to be informative and instructive to re-animalisation and an alternative understanding of animal sovereignty. Continuing from the final lesson above with respect to potential sacrifices humans may have to embrace in order to aid other animals in sabotaging human sovereignty, activists taking illegal direct actions to support and defend other animals is of course a well-established form of resistance that exemplifies a switch of allegiance against humans within animal liberation movements. Unfortunately, the risks and consequences of direct actions are often too steep a price to pay, making this form of resistance difficult to scale up. In the context of addressing food systems and consumption within the magnitude of human domination of farmed animals through animal agriculture, as well as animal agriculture's role in destroying the lives of wild animals and their habitats, my interest is in whether a balanced tactic merging Wadiwel's suggestion of a pleasurable desertion and the seemingly inevitable risks and sacrifices required in dismantling omnicidal and cannibalistic systems could be found in some form of resistive consumption as a counter-conduct beyond veganism.

I argue that since animal agriculture is an inescapable target in the process of transforming food systems, consuming plant-based foods is a form of resistive consumption that is both essential yet not enough, as more needs to be done to quite literally bite back against the systems that are devouring human and more-than-human worlds. I have shown how the sanctuary animals' theft, commensality, and their general combativeness over food should guide humans to reflect on our own investment and complicity in upholding human sovereignty to the detriment of other animals' autonomy, self-determination, and sovereignty, and to also motivate us to actively assist other animals in practices of resistive consumption that some humans either already engage in or would be forced to perform under similar circumstances and conditions that other animals find themselves in. With these ideas in mind, I am less interested in the project of turning more humans in this world into ethical vegans, regardless of how important and urgent that project may be. Instead, arriving at these insights for re-animalisation through the animal resistance framework, I am much more interested in how humans could become what I would describe as "hostile herbivores," or plant-consuming animals who would be willing to engage in consumption practices that are antagonistic to oppressive systems and structures in whatever creative ways imaginable, and accepting whatever risks and punitive repercussions these actions may entail. Becoming hostile herbivores is in this way a call to both vegans and non-vegans to

not only embrace the "vegan killjoy" figure described by Richard Twine (2014) via Sara Ahmed, where vegans affectively challenge the normalised, dominant joys and pleasure of consuming animals and animal products, but to go beyond that and embrace being a killjoy in response to all violent and destructive systems and norms.

One conceivable way that may embolden humans to take on the numerous punitive legal, political, cultural, social, and financial risks and backlashes involved in resistive forms of consumption that aims to undermine the oppressive systems is by reframing what Krithika Srinivasan (2022) terms "earthly risks," which she argues must be redistributed amongst humans in the project of re-animalisation. By earthly risks, Srinivasan means the numerous "hazards and vulnerabilities that are part and parcel of being planetary life," such as hunger, mortality from disease, ill health, natural disasters, and other animals, all of which humans, especially those of us with more privilege, insulate ourselves from (2022, 335, 356, 363). However, I contend that in the current historical moment, it is impossible for us to detach these earthly risks from the anthropogenic and anthropocentric systems that generate many of them. Examples of how earthly risks are inseparable from human industrial activities include those identified in the introduction, such as climate disasters, zoonotic pandemics, as well as mass habitat and biodiversity loss. The existing situation is one in which some of the most destructive planetary crises, whether climate disasters, hunger, and pandemics are rooted in speciesism, colonialism, capitalism, and other mutually reinforcing oppressive systems and ideologies. This implies that the call on those with more privilege to make ourselves more vulnerable to earthly risks is precisely one and the same in calling on us to make ourselves more vulnerable in fighting the systems that are killing the planet, as well as the institutions defending these systems. To put it bluntly, whether we embrace the risks of getting killed by earthly risks or the systems that are killing us by producing more earthly risks in the process of generating value and profit, such risks are ultimately inescapable for humans and other animals alike.

Chapter 8 – Conclusion: Re-animalisation, Conflict, and Alternative Animalities

This concluding chapter to the thesis contains two sections. First, in Section 8.1, I provide a summary and overview of the key findings with respect to re-animalisation, the guiding conceptual framework throughout this thesis. The insights in 8.1 include a discussion of the somewhat unexpected outcome of interpreting the farmed animal sanctuary (FAS) as a site of conflict through the re-animalisation lens, as well as how my research has contributed to enriching our understanding of re-animalisation as a theory and political project. I recapitulate and highlight how some of my fieldwork examples illustrate the possibilities and difficulties of attempting to put re-animalisation into practice. As such, 8.1 discusses some of the key extrapolations and projections I have derived from this thesis.

Following this, Section 8.2 turns to my speculations of a possible future research direction regarding FASes and re-animalisation, which is to connect these two topics to the concept of animality. Here, I first briefly explain why animality is relevant and important to FASes and re-animalisation, then I move to engage with Alex Blanchette's theorisation of animality. After summarising Blanchette's conceptualisation of animality and discussing how FASes might produce an alternative animality according to his theory, I bring two ethnographic accounts from my fieldwork into conversation with a portion of Blanchette's work.

8.1 Summary: The Promises and Challenges of Re-animalisation through Conflict

Perhaps against our intuition, and against mainstreamed depictions of FASes as idyllic places of peace and harmony, my study has suggested that it is conflict that defines a considerable portion of sanctuary life. However, conflict can be productive, and transformative. My findings in this thesis have shown conflict within and surrounding FASes to be a process of negotiating relations of power and new norms, and I have argued that such conflicts could potentially be productively transformative of human-animal relations. As such, we could think of the FAS as a site that has been constructed to potentially enable a form of productive conflict that helps shift human-animal relations. Both the conflicts amongst the nonhuman animal residents themselves, as well as the conflicts arising from the animal residents challenging human authority, management, and governance, have revealed various promises and challenges

to enacting re-animalisation and/or undermining zoöpolitical exceptionalism and human sovereignty.

Throughout the thesis, I have applied different frames of analysis that spotlight the numerous forms, dimensions, and scales of conflict surrounding Olive Animal Sanctuary. These include the broader historical conflicts of the sanctuary as a liminal structure produced within structures of settler-colonialism and domestication, to the intraspecies and interspecies conflicts produced by the sanctuary understood as a technology of counterpower, and finally, the examples of animal resistance amongst animal residents played out within the food politics of the sanctuary. In all of these conceptualisations of the sanctuary as a site of conflict, re-animalisation as a theoretical framework has been an anchor that orients my interpretations of the data towards seeing and recognising the variety of antagonisms at play, and how humans and other animals mediate and navigate these conflicts. I posit that re-animalisation according to Srinivasan's theorising has been a productive framework in examining multispecies conflicts and their related power relations surrounding the sanctuary precisely because re-animalisation has been conceptually formulated as a response to addressing ongoing conflicts of mass violence that humans have imposed on other animals and more-than-human entities through the logics of protection-sacrifice. Reciprocally, ethnographic accounts throughout this thesis have also expanded the understanding of re-animalisation by considering some of the promises and challenges that individuals and collectives may encounter in undertaking the task of re-animalisation. Different aspects of Olive Animal Sanctuary discussed throughout this study show us what re-animalisation might look like in practice.

The shifting directions in my research as discussed in the introduction helps to illustrate the influence and effects of applying re-animalisation theory to my analysis. Chronologically, I did not explore re-animalisation and adopt it as a main guiding framework until after I had completed my fieldwork. In hindsight, it was somewhat unexpected that conflict emerged as a core theme when I engaged with the data through the re-animalisation lens. Given that my research aim was initially to explore the tensions and alignments between animal and other justice movements as I ventured into my fieldwork, I had anticipated certain frictions and challenges in cross-movement relations with regards to aims, priorities, strategies, and values to surface, especially with the knowledge that animal advocacy has historically been met with skepticism and suspicion in progressive and radical Left movements. While some of those

tensions and alignments did arise, such as how Olive founders navigate balancing land care with animal wellbeing as well as their attempts at aligning their sanctuary practices with other movements they support, re-animalisation helps to make sense of the surprising amount of frictions concerning relations internal to the animal movement and internal to the sanctuary itself.

Some of the conflicts internal to the animal movement in relation to the sanctuary were in part due to Olive founders' critical perspectives on movement strategies and their reflexivity regarding their own positions, which led them to critique certain practices of other sanctuaries and other animal activists more broadly. However, re-animalisation helps to make sense of these critiques if we were to understand the work of Olive Animal Sanctuary as counter-conducts aimed at challenging the zoöpolitically exceptionalist logics of protection-sacrifice aimed at benefiting humans. Olive's commitment to protect its animal residents from potential instances of becoming instrumentalised is demonstrative of a refusal to sacrifice the animals for extrinsic purposes, whether it was building community amongst activists or for fundraising. I argue that this is to some extent an attempt, however limited, at subverting the protection-sacrifice logics, in which the protection of nonhuman animals has been prioritised over whatever benefits humans may derive through their interactions with the animal residents, as well as how nonhuman animals beyond the sanctuary, such as those still within animal agricultural systems, might benefit from human exposure to sanctuary animal residents.

In a more positive direction, re-animalisation elucidates how the logic of protection is operative and constitutive of Olive's counterpower, which fosters the lives of animal residents in ways that compel humans to negotiate their safety and vulnerabilities by adapting to certain risks imposed by the agency and autonomy of other animals. This dynamic could be observed in the examples where other animal residents might pose physical harms and risks towards the humans at Olive, including myself, and how we have in turn committed to responding nonviolently by either accepting the risks to varying degrees, or by sufficiently protecting oneself without imposing harms against the animals.

However, as Srinivasan cautions, part of re-animalisation is also aimed at contesting the tendency for humans to selectively 'shore up' the ethico-political status of certain nonhuman entities and beings according to zoöpolitical exceptionalism, while continuing to sacrifice those deemed to be lesser in the process (2022, 357). Following this concern, we might question

whether sanctuaries in many ways selectively shore up the lives of their animal residents at the expense of other animals considered to be outside the scope of their immediate ethical obligations and care. The various forms and dimensions of sacrifices taking place at animal sanctuaries that Abrell (2021) investigates, such as the practices of necro-care, have shown that shoring up the lives of some animals while sacrificing others definitely occurs at many animal sanctuaries. Despite their best efforts, Olive is not beyond such structurally-imposed ethical dilemmas, such as feeding packets of animal flesh to rescued cats. At the same time, Olive founders' commitment to both respect the presence of foxes and to protect the sanctuary residents against fox predation by constructing predator-proof animal housing exemplify the type of negotiation and compromise that the process of re-animalisation may demand. Furthermore, given that re-animalisation entails recognising our interdependence with and responsibilities to surrounding ecologies beyond just our relations to other animals, I argue that Olive Animal Sanctuary also exemplifies an instance of humans negotiating the security of our domesticated lifeways by taking the wellbeing of the land and surrounding ecologies into ethico-political considerations.

Another insight relevant to re-animalisation pertains to what I have called animal-guided animalisation. Consonant to my considerations of this animalisation process in Chapter 2, the examples of navigating risks and vulnerabilities vis-à-vis other animals throughout this study have shown that animal-guided animalisation involves not only sustained intersubjective engagement with other animals, but that the process also requires epistemic scaffolding to enable humans to be guided by other animals. Specific to this study, I have shown how the ecofeminist and vegan ideologies constituting the epistemic structures of Olive Animal Sanctuary understood as a technology of counterpower operate in ways that compel humans to dwell in mediated conflicts with other animals, and I have also shown how adopting animal resistance as an interpretive frame allows us to recognise how sanctuary animal residents exercise their agency to contest human authority. Together, ecofeminism, veganism, and animal resistance not only shape the norms in human-animal relations at the sanctuary, they also allow us to respect other animals as subjects from whom humans could learn important lessons pertinent to re-animalisation and multispecies justice.

Given that I have only engaged with one FAS, this research is severely limited in the extent to which the interpretations, arguments, and analysis I have made could be generalised

beyond the contexts of their undertaking. However, my view is that along with witnessing the positive and affirmative aspects of sanctuaries, antagonism should not be downplayed when we examine the radical potentials and transformative possibilities of sanctuaries. And finally, the overall practice of applying re-animalisation theory to think and work through interspecies conflicts at animal sanctuaries produces insights for the pursuit of multispecies justice.

8.2 Speculations of Future Research Direction: Farmed Animal Sanctuaries and Animality

Having summarised key insights and findings above, I now shift to consider another frame of analysis relevant to FASes and re-animalisation, namely the concept of animality. A study of animality through FASes is a possible future research directionrelevant to this thesis because a remaining question regarding the transformative potentials of both FASes and re-animalisation concerns what kind of animals might humans and other animals become, and I propose that an engagement with animality may guide us towards certain conceivable directions and answers. In particular, I apply Alex Blanchette's conceptualisation of animality in *Porkopolis: American Animality, Standardized Life, & the Factory Farm* (2020) to think about how sanctuaries might be able to produce animalities that are not only alternatives to humanity, but alternatives to other forms of animality as well. To explain, central to Blanchette's work is a pivotal distinction he makes between 'animals' and 'animality'. Taking pigs for example, the term 'animals' refers to the "actual porcine organisms," whereas 'animality' refers to "expressions of the entirety of the pig as a 'single unit'" (Blanchette 2020, 26).

To give readers an example of "capitalist animality," Blanchette recounts meeting an executive of an agribusiness corporation that specialises in pork production, who sought to create a "barcode of the future" to be attached to their pork products (2020, 23). The executive explained that scanning such a barcode would reveal details of everything that goes into the creation of their product. The barcode is in this way a "managerial technology" reflecting the executive's goal to achieve a "full vertical integration" of the pigs owned by his company, meaning the top-down control of everything in relation to the pigs, "from prelife to postdeath" (2020, 21-28). More specific examples of what would be owned and controlled through full vertical integration, or "full corporate ownership of the hog," would include every item extending from the production of the food to be consumed by the pigs, to "the very appetites and biology of the end consumer" of the pigs (2020, 21). In this sense, the barcode and the ideal of

full vertical integration are expressions of the capitalist animality of the pig, or "the total assemblage of things that make up present-day hogs in their actual flesh" (2020, 21).

In a similar manner, what Blanchette terms "industrial animality" of the pig would include every discernable moment in the industrial processes of pork production, from perhaps the most intensely intimate contacts between the workers and the sows they artificially inseminate, the pigs they kill, and the carcasses they handle and slice, extending to the workers' social lives, kinship networks, and communities beyond the factory farms and meatpacking plants. Importantly, Blanchette posits that the aspiration of industrial/capitalist animality to achieve totality, or the total knowledge and control "across every moment of the modern hog's existence," is both an impossibility and always subjected to contestations (2020, 25). As Blanchette shows throughout his ethnography, "each site on the route from pigs to pork is one where different visions of animality emerge and oppositional notions of who can claim privileged knowledge over actual animals begin to take shape" (2020, 26).

With regards to FASes, insofar as they make up sites where farmed animals can arrive through diverted routes on their way to becoming meat, Blanchette's analysis opens up the possibility that sanctuaries can and do in fact produce alternative visions of animality. And here, I tie this possibility for sanctuaries to counter industrial/capitalist animality back to Blanchette's example of the barcode. Within the aesthetics of animal liberation activism, one imagery frequently reproduced in activist circles depicts the barcode as a jail cell or cage, its black lines the enclosing bars, and the bars would be bent and widened to create an opening, which allows various species of animals to escape from the barcode. In thinking about animality, this imagery prompts us to contemplate a number of intriguing questions. What forms of animality might emerge once the farmed animals have escaped or been rescued from industrial/capitalist animality? What forms of animality might sanctuaries and their human and nonhuman residents produce beyond a 'sanctuary animality'? How far would such alternative models of animality stretch in its relationalities and spatiotemporalities? What kinds of totalities might sanctuaries aspire to achieve? To what extent could horizontally integrated networks of sanctuaries counter the fantasy of full vertical integration in the logics of corporate agribusinesses?

Studies on FASes, including my own, have already gestured towards numerous possible answers to these questions. Elan Abrell's detailed ethnography of animal sanctuaries in *Saving Animals* (2021) is exemplary of a cohesive work investigating alternate prelife-to-postdeath

trajectories of rescued animals. Nonetheless, there remains much to be said about sanctuaries and alternative animalities, from the human-nonhuman animal initimacies of rescue and care, to the rituals and practices of grief and mourning when rescued animals die (DeMello 2016), as well as the possibility that sanctuaries may ultimately be subsumed/consumed by industrial/capitalist animality. To refrain from ending this thesis on such a bleak note, I will share one final ethnographic account from my fieldwork at Olive to imagine alternative postdeath futures of nonhuman sanctuary residents, and bring this narrative into conversation with some of Blanchette's observations and analysis on the current postdeath realities for many farmed animals.

Examining the current and future state of industrialism as well as the possibilities of deindustrialisation, Blanchette discusses two contrasting examples of postdeath existences of farmed animals produced by models of industrial/capitalist animality, and reflects on what they say about the intraspecies and interspecies relations in our epoch. Beginning with the industrial chicken, Blanchette notes that some geologists working on determining whether the planet has entered the Anthropocene from the Holocene epoch have begun to consider how the wide-spread industrial chicken skeletons could potentially become a "globally distributed key fossil index taxon of the Anthropocene" (Bennett et al. 2018, 8, as cited in Blanchette 2020, 241). That industrial chicken skeletons could be studied as a key trace of human activities defining an entire epoch is due to various factors, such as "their distinctive osteopathologies" resulting from rapid growth rates, the "surging exportation of both animal carcasses and industrial animal-rearing systems from Euro-American locales," as well as their potential to be preserved "in the anaerobic conditions of landfills—or in graves following disease-induced mass culls" (Blanchette 2020, 241).

Rather than simply seeing the "mass-fossilization of poultry" as an indicator of a "unified humanity's anthropocentric 'domination' of the planet," Blanchette argues that one of the main stories we should read from "the mass deposits of swollen chicken skeletons" is about intraspecies and interspecies labour exploitation "*through* capitalist animal biology" within industrial production (2020, 242, emphasis in original). In any case, Blanchette further argues that industrial chicken skeletons ultimately indicate more so the infancy of industrialism in its display of "how industrial technics have come to coordinate avian life and death," and that they inadequately represent the state of industrialism today (2020, 243). Here, Blanchette offers a

striking contrast between the unmissable presence of chicken skeletons against the "relative absence of intact hog bones in the earth's crust" (2020, 243). Unlike chicken bones, the invisibility and disappearance of industrial hog skeletons tell a different story, one about how the industrial/capitalist ambition to extract value from every possible part of the hog results in their bones enveloping us "in a totalizing yet diluted way," in the bone fertilisers in potted plants, in concrete roadways, in glues that bind household objects, and the drugs inside medicine cabinets (Blanchette 2020, 243).

Somewhere beyond becoming fossilised in mass graves and being completely disappeared from totalising forms of value extraction, I believe FASes could offer alternative postdeath narratives for farmed animals that depart from the two normalised outcomes of industrial/capitalist animality.

On Day 18 at Olive Animal Sanctuary, I was informed by F2 that a rooster named Miller had died in one of the barns, and that she and F1 had buried him the previous night while I cooked dinner. I was unfamiliar with Miller as he spent most of his time in a barn that I rarely accessed, and knowing that sickness and death are part and parcel of sanctuary ecologies, I was not particularly surprised by the news, despite feeling sorry for Miller, Olive founders, and other sanctuary members and residents who may have bonded with Miller. Two days later, when some of the founders' close friends came to visit the sanctuary, the hobby of geocaching came up in one of the conversations. Geocaching is a treasure-hunting game involving the use of maps and GPS devices to locate and uncover various hidden items, which typically includes a logbook in a protective bag that allows participants to record their access as proof of their successful discovery.

Perhaps it was due to the immediacy of the two events (Miller's death and burial followed by the geocaching banter), a thought occurred to me that it would be interesting to think of sanctuaries as future geocaches of some sort, holding animal remains and other remnants of sanctuary artifacts as objects to be discovered. In the earlier days of my postgrad journey, I had also briefly considered researching "failed" animal sanctuaries that had to cease their operations to study what remains of such sites, so the idea that traces and relics of animal sanctuaries may persist against forms of erasure had always been in the back of my mind. In light of Blanchette's discussions of disappearing hogs and the enduring subterranean strata of chicken skeleton, we might imagine future geologists and archaeologists happening upon a different kind of skeletal

record, a multispecies burial site in which various species of domesticated/farmed animals (and maybe even humans) had seemingly been buried in proximity to each other with care and intent. Perhaps upon closer investigation, the researchers uncover signs and objects indicative of ceremonial practices that suggest these animals had been treated with reverence and respect in life and death. How might the researchers interpret these excavated data? What stories and narratives might the researchers piece together from a yet-to-be-named animality expressed through every interconnected site and moment encapsulated by the farmed animal sanctuary?

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Appendix A: Interview Questions

Questions for basic facts about the sanctuary if publicly unavailable:

(1) How many animals live here at any given time (approximately if no exact numbers)? What species of animals live here?

(2) What is the mission of the sanctuary? What kinds of activities does the sanctuary engage in?

(3) How is the sanctuary organisationally structured? Are there board members, paid staff, etc.? How many?

Questions about the history of the sanctuary and relation to surrounding areas:

(1) Could you tell me about the history of the sanctuary, how it was created, the motivations behind it, and how the sanctuary has developed and changed over time?

(2) Is there any reason why this specific place was chosen for building the sanctuary?

(3) What can you tell me about the place the sanctuary sits on? For example, the history of this land and surrounding areas.

General questions:

(1) What brought you to animal sanctuary work?

(2) Is your work at the sanctuary full-time? Do you have other occupations?

(3) In terms of your personal identity, do you identify as a part of any socially and politically marginalised groups? If yes, do you feel that your identity experiences have shaped your sanctuary work in any way?

(4) Have you in the past been / are you currently involved in other advocacy causes, such as climate, food, environmental, or social justice? What about other social or political issues?

(5) How do you feel about other movements in relation to animal advocacy, and animal sanctuaries more specifically?

(6) In your view, how do animal sanctuaries fit in with the broader animal advocacy movement?

(7) Do you have any particularly memorable stories you could share, like about an animal, or an interesting experience from working at the sanctuary?

(8) What is the relationship like between the sanctuary and surrounding communities?

    a. Does this sanctuary have any relations with Aboriginal organizations?

(9) How would you describe the relationship between animal sanctuaries in Australia? For example, are there formal or informal networks where members of sanctuaries connect and engage in discussions, share resources, etc.?

    a. Are there other sanctuaries that you may be dialoguing with about issues around decolonisation and other justice issues?

(10) How would you describe the process of hiring staff or recruiting volunteers? For example, are there specific attributes you look for, work experiences and expertise, or referrals based on trusting relationships, etc.?

(11) What do you feel are some of the biggest challenges in animal sanctuary work? What are some challenges specific to this sanctuary?

(12) Do you find sanctuary work to be fulfilling or rewarding? If yes, how?

(13) Do you feel like there are unique aspects to this sanctuary compared to others, and if so, how would you describe it?

(14) If you were to imagine the future of this sanctuary, or animal sanctuaries more generally, what would that look like? In the near future? In an ideal future?

Questions about the animals:

(1) How would you describe the relationships at the sanctuary? Between the animals and the humans, but also between the animals themselves?

(2) In your experience, what have been some challenges that animals face during their time at the sanctuary? For example, do you recall any animals experiencing any kind of struggles while living here?

(3) Have you observed any behaviours or activities from the animals that would indicate joy and flourishing? Do they do anything they find rewarding or enjoyable?

(4) Are there any interactions between the rescued animals at the sanctuary with wildlife or wild animals beyond the sanctuary?