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**‘BEAR UP, MY HEART!’**

**ENDURANCE IN HOMER’S *ILIAD* AND *ODYSSEY***

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF:**

**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

**FACULTY OF ARTS**

**THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY**

**2013**

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My deepest gratitude goes to my dear friends and colleagues, especially Ronan Williams, Cecilia Cox, Sarah Drews Lucas, David A. Allinson, James Ley, and Anthony A. Hooper, for heartening and fortifying me with their wealth of encouragement, support, understanding and, most importantly, humour. I am indebted to my parents, and to my siblings Ingrid, Jeremy, Timothy, Dominic, and Bella for motivating, supporting, and sustaining me each day. This thesis is dedicated to Professor Rick Benitez, whose patience and wisdom gives me the courage to do philosophy, and to my late brother Patrick Desmond Smith, a quietly courageous soul.

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## INTRODUCTION

στῆθος δὲ πλήζας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·  
“τέτλαθι δὴ, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ’ ἔτλης,  
ἦματι τῷ ὅτε μοι μένος ἄσχετος ἦσθιε Κόκλωψ  
ἰσθίμους ἐτάρους· σὺ δ’ ἐτόλμας, ὄφρα σε μῆτις  
ἐξάγαγ’ ἐξ ἄντροιο οἰόμενον θανέεσθαι.”  
ὡς ἔφατ’, ἐν στήθεσσι καθαπτόμενος φίλον ἦτορ·  
τῷ δὲ μάλ’ ἐν πείσῃ κραδίη μένε τετηλυῖα  
νωλεμέως· ἀτὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλίσσετο ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα (Od. 20.17-24).

*He struck himself on the chest and spoke to his heart and scolded it: “Bear up, my heart. You have had worse to endure before this on that day when the irresistible Cyclops ate up my strong companions, but you endured it until intelligence got you out of the cave, though you expected to perish.”*

*So he spoke, addressing his own dear heart within him; and the heart in great obedience endured and stood it without complaint, but the man himself was twisting and turning.*

Homeric man endures by resolutely facing death, and by cautiously fleeing from it. He endures by standing his ground in battle, and by retreating from it; by steeling himself to act, and by remaining passive; by daring to stand face to face with his enemy, and by resisting the impulse to do so; and by bracing himself to suffer insults, beatings, and humiliations, from kissing the hand of the man who slaughtered countless of his sons, to sleeping on the ground of his own home while listening to the laughter of his servants as they betray him. But, most importantly, Homeric man – and in this also Homeric woman – endures by submitting to his divinely apportioned fate.<sup>1</sup> As varied as these examples are, and despite the fact that they often stand in stark opposition to one another, I argue that they each contain the same core of Homeric endurance: that is, Homeric man

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\* Unless otherwise noted, the translations of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* by Richard Lattimore have been used (with slight variations), and all definitions of Homeric terms have been taken from Cunliffe’s *Homeric Lexicon*. All Homeric Greek text has been taken from the Loeb editions.

<sup>1</sup> While women in Homer can also endure, I will refer to the endurance of ‘Homeric man,’ and use the male pronouns, both for the sake of clarity and accuracy. As will be seen in the final chapter, endurance is indeed a virtue that can be attributed to Homeric woman, however her endurance is limited to one of the three types of Homeric endurance, that is, to bearing-pain endurance.

endures (often after anguished deliberation) by choosing to check his passions either completely or temporarily, to flee from or respond to some hardship, rather than to give in to them and behave as they dictate. This endurance requires inner-strength and flexibility, foresight, patience, and humility; characteristics that range from uncharacteristic of, to profoundly alien to, the dominant ancient Greek tradition of courage, which I will call ‘the bravery tradition.’

The paradigm of courage according to the bravery tradition is that displayed by the Homeric warrior hero in his performance of great deeds on the battlefield. The Homeric warrior hero unites the spiritual or psychological strength of a ferocious and vigorous *thumos*, with *biē*, that is, great physical might.<sup>2</sup> It is through the manifestation of this internal strength in epic physical deeds that the Homeric hero seeks his ultimate goal: the achievement of undying *kleos*. This is the tradition of courage inherited by Plato; a tradition that Plato finds highly problematic. By comparison with the wealth of scholarship on the bravery tradition, examination of the endurance tradition has been understated. The objective of this thesis is to offer a thorough exposition of endurance in Homer. For a comprehensive exposition of Homeric endurance, not only must the main Homeric verb for endurance, *τλάω*, be thoroughly examined, but so too must those passages in which endurance is dramatised, passages in which the verb *τλάω* does not necessarily occur. To fully appreciate the examinations of *τλάω* and the dramatic depictions of endurance, they must be placed within the rich context of Homeric psychology.

## I

Scholarship on Homeric psychology invariably begins with a précis of Bruno Snell’s infamous thesis in *The Discovery of the Mind* that Homeric man lacks a unified sense of self and, for this reason, is incapable both of genuine deliberation and of genuine

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<sup>2</sup> I have only transliterated those Greek terms whose transliterations are well established in English. I have left all others in the original Greek.

personal decisions.<sup>4</sup> Snell arrives at this thesis by way of the lexical method of textual analysis, according to which, ‘if they [the Homeric Greeks] had no word for it, it follows that as far as they were concerned it did not exist.’<sup>5</sup> Psychological activity in Homer is denoted by a variety of terms including *thumos*, *phrēn* or *phrenes*, *ētor*, *kēr*, *kradiē*, *noos*, *psuchē*, and *prapides*; which I will refer to as ‘psychological entities.’ Rather than having a single, definitive word for ‘mind’ or ‘soul,’ Homer employed some of these psychological terms; the most important of which, according to Snell, are *psuchē*, *thumos*, and *noos*.<sup>6</sup> As Homer did not have a single, definitive word for ‘mind’ or ‘soul,’ we can conclude, contends Snell, that he had no conception of the self.<sup>7</sup> Snell argues that the multiplicity of terms for the self reveals a fragmented conception of it, whereby Homeric man’s psychological functions are divided among the mental organs.<sup>8</sup> These mental organs, as Snell calls them, are understood by the Homeric mind in terms of an analogy with physical organs, and it is this analogical basis for understanding Homeric psychology that is most revealing of its impoverished nature.<sup>9</sup> That is to say, the Homeric mind, according to Snell, was incapable of understanding the psychological in any way that a physical organ could not be; and as long as a conception of the psychological remains bounded by the physical, this conception will be a primitive one. Snell’s thesis and the lexical method by which he arrives at it have provoked a wealth of scholarship on Homeric psychology, from both supporters – who generally adopt a modified version of

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<sup>4</sup> Snell, B. (1953). *The Discovery of the Mind in Greek Philosophy and Literature* (1982 ed.). New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 15, 19-21, & 102-3. Recent scholarship on Snell’s thesis that Homeric man is incapable of personal decisions includes: Sharples, R. W. (1983). ‘But Why Has My Spirit Spoken with Me Thus?’: Homeric Decision-Making. *Greece and Rome*, 30 (1), 1-7. Williams, B. (1993). *Shame and Necessity* (2008 ed.). California: University of California Press, chap. 2. Gill, C. (1996). *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue*. New York: Oxford University Press, 29-93. Gaskin, R. (2001). Do Homeric Heroes Make Real Decisions? In D. L. Cairns (Ed.), *Oxford Readings in Homer’s Iliad* (pp. 147-169). Oxford: Oxford University Press. For a discussion of Snell’s thesis, see also Pelliccia, H. (1995). *Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 16-27.

<sup>5</sup> Snell: 1953 (1982 ed.), 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 15. Onians contends that ‘at the stage of thought when these beliefs [Homeric psychological beliefs] emerged there was difficulty in conceiving anything except material entities. μένος is apparently not an abstraction or a mere state of something else, but conceived as itself something, fluid or gaseous, which for convenience we may translate as “energy,” and which was felt inwardly much as we feel what we so name’ (Onians: 1951, 51-2).

Snell's thesis<sup>10</sup> – and critics.<sup>11</sup> The objective of this dissertation is not to contribute to the profusion of scholarship defending the richness and complexity of Homeric man's psychology from Snell and his lexical method. It will, however, follow the course set by Snell's influential study. First I look at the psychological entities, focusing on Homer's analogical conception of them; and second, I examine the Homeric deliberation and decision-making scenes, and the roles played by the psychological entities in them.

Scholarship regarding the psychological terms listed above is deeply divided. Not only do scholars disagree over more complicated questions such as what the entities denoted by the psychological terms are, and the functions of these entities, but also over the much more basic question of how to refer to them. As noted above, Snell employs the term 'mental organ,' which has been found to be problematic by a number of scholars,

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<sup>10</sup> Supporters of Snell, or of his lexical method, include: Bremmer, J. N. (1983). *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 3, 8, & 66-8; Dodds, E. R. (1951). *The Greeks and the Irrational*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 15-16; Russo, J., & Simon, B. (1968). Homeric Psychology and the Oral Epic Tradition. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 29 (4), 483-498, pp. 483-4, 486-7, & 496 (for their qualifications of Snell's thesis see 486 n. 13, and 496); and Von Fritz, K. (1943). ΝΟΟΣ and Noein in the Homeric Poems. *Classical Philology*, 38 (2), 79-93, pp. 79-81 & 88.

<sup>11</sup> Critics of Snell, or of the lexical method, include: Austin, N. (1975). *Archery at the Dark of the Moon: Poetic Problems in Homer's "Odyssey"*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 8-9, 82-5; Barnouw, J. (2004). *Odysseus, Hero of Practical Intelligence: Deliberation and Signs in Homer's Odyssey*. Lanham, Md: University Press of America, esp. 163-76; Caswell, C. P. (1990). *A Study of Thumos in Early Greek Epic*. Leiden: Brill, 6-7; Claus, D. B. (1981). *Toward the Soul: An Inquiry into the Meaning of ψυχή before Plato*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 14 & n. 13, 59; Finkelberg, M. (1995). Patterns of Human Error in Homer. *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 115, 15-28, pp. 15-16, & 22; Gaskin: 2001, esp. 29-93; Gill: 1996, esp. chapter 1; Halliwell, S. (1990). Traditional Greek Conceptions of Character. In C. B. R. Pelling (Ed.), *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature* (pp. 32-59). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 34-42; Harrison, E. L. (1960). Notes on Homeric Psychology. *Phoenix*, 14 (2), 63-80, pp. 79-80; Lloyd-Jones. (1971). *The Justice of Zeus*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2-3, 8-10; Padel, R. (1992). *In and Out of the Mind: Greek Images of the Tragic Self*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, esp. 44-8. Renehan, R. (1979). The Meaning of ΣΩΜΑ in Homer: A Study in Methodology. *California Studies in Classical Antiquity*, 12, 269-282; Sharples, R. W. (1983). 'But Why Has My Spirit Spoken with Me Thus?': Homeric Decision-Making. *Greece and Rome*, 30 (1), 1-7, pp. 1-6; Schein, S. L. (Ed.). (1984). *The Mortal Hero: An Introduction to Homer's Iliad*. California: University of California Press, 58-9; and Williams, B. (1993). *Shame and Necessity* (2008 ed.). California: University of California Press, 21-49.

including Snell himself.<sup>12</sup> While the term ‘mental organ’ could be seen to be an appropriate term for more organ or vessel-like entities such as *phrenes*, *ētor*, *kēr*, and *kradiē*, it seems less appropriate for entities such as *thumos*, *noos*, and *psuchē*, which behave more like intangible forces than organs. E. R. Dodds, E. L. Harrison, R. B. Onians, and Hayden Pelliccia adopt Snell’s ‘mental organs,’ with Onians varying slightly in his usage by deploying the term ‘organs of consciousness.’<sup>13</sup> In rejecting Snell’s terminology, Shirley Darcus Sullivan (née Darcus) could be seen to go to the opposite extreme in her employment of the term ‘faculties indeterminately corporeal.’<sup>14</sup> While this term captures the dual nature of the entities as both physical and anatomical as well as psychological and abstract more effectively than Snell’s ‘mental organs,’ her use of the term ‘faculty’ has been rejected by scholars such as Ruth Padel on the grounds that it is as ‘equally loaded and anachronistic’ as ‘organ,’<sup>15</sup> and ‘removes the vivid somatic force’ of the terms.<sup>16</sup> Padel prefers ‘mind-words’ and ‘innard-words;’<sup>17</sup> however neither of these on its own conveys both the physical and psychological force of the terms. Other suggested terminology includes David Claus’ ‘soul words,’ which he divides into ‘life-force’ words (*ētor*, *kēr*, *menos*, *psuchē*, and *thumos*) and ‘thought’ words (*phrenes* and *noos*),<sup>18</sup> and Michael Clarke’s ‘θυμός family.’<sup>19</sup> I shall employ the term ‘psychological entities,’ which gestures both to the physical and psychological, while remaining open-ended, so that we might not prejudge the entities as either predominantly physical or predominantly psychological, but allow them to reveal their multifaceted natures to us in our investigation.

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<sup>12</sup> See Snell: 1953, 15, for Snell’s discussion of certain terminological difficulties encountered when applying the term ‘organ’ to entities such as *psuchē*, *noos*, and *thumos*.

<sup>13</sup> Dodds: 1951, 16; Onians: 1951, 23; Harrison: 1960, 63; and Pelliccia, H. (1995). *Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar*. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 15.

<sup>14</sup> Sullivan: 1988, 8-9 & 52.

<sup>15</sup> Padel, R. (1992). *In and Out of the Mind: Greek Images of the Tragic Self*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 29 n.67.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 37 n.86.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 26 & 33.

<sup>18</sup> Claus, D. B. (1981). *Toward the Soul: An Inquiry into the Meaning of ψυχή before Plato*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 11, 12, & 16.

<sup>19</sup> Clarke, M. (1999). *Flesh and Spirit in the Songs of Homer: A Study of Words and Myths*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 53.

What exactly are these psychological entities? This present inquiry is limited to *thumos* and *phrenes*, the psychological entities most important for Homeric bravery and endurance. *Thumos* and *phrenes* are the locations or faculties ‘in,’ ‘through,’ or ‘by’ which Homeric man is brave and enduring. That is not to say, however, that *thumos* and *phrenes* are the only psychological entities relevant to Homeric courage. The three Homeric terms for heart – *ētor*, *kēr*, and *kradiē* – are also responsible for courage in Homer. *Kradiē* is particularly important; it is Odysseus’ barking *kradiē* that endures his anger at his maid-servants in *Odyssey* 20 in the paradigmatic example of Homeric endurance.<sup>20</sup> *Kradiē* can also be brave or daring (cf. θάρσος),<sup>21</sup> as well as enduring. *Ētor* too can be brave (cf. ἄλκιμον, θαρσαλέος), and it can also fail to be steadfast (οὐδέ ἔμπεδον).<sup>22</sup> When a character is urged to endure, it is the character’s *kradiē*, or much less frequently his *kēr*, that is invoked.<sup>23</sup> However, *thumos* is undoubtedly the psychological entity most involved in courage.<sup>24</sup> It is because of their enduring (τετληότι, τλητόν) *thumoi* that Penelope is able to wait so long for Odysseus’ return; that Odysseus is able to hold onto the belly of the sheep in the Cyclops’ cave; that Menelaus is able to wait for the Old Man of the Sea on his way home from Troy; and it is because of his enduring *thumos* – the enduring *thumos* given him by the Fates – that man endures his divine fate, even against his will (ἀεκαζόμενος).<sup>25</sup> As we will see in chapter two, it is only because of the state of their *phrenes* that these characters are able to have enduring *thumoi* in the first place.

<sup>20</sup> κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει (*Od.* 20.13); and τέτλαθι δῆ, κραδίη ... κραδίη μένε τετληυῖα (20.18-23).

<sup>21</sup> E.g., οἱ κραδίη θάρσος βάλε (*Il.* 21.547).

<sup>22</sup> E.g., ἄλκιμον ἦτορ (*Il.* 5.539, 16.209, 20.169); θαρσαλέον νύ οἱ ἦτορ ἐνὶ φρεσίν (*Il.* 19.169); οὐδέ μοι ἦτορ ἔμπεδον (*Il.* 10.93-4). For more on *ētor* see: Sullivan (1996). The Psychic Term “ētor:” Its Nature and Relation to Person in Homer and the Homeric Hymns. *Emerita*, 64 (1), 11-29.

<sup>23</sup> E.g., ἐπιτλήτω κραδίη (*Il.* 19.220 & 23.591); ἐπιτολμάτω κραδίη (*Od.* 1.353); κῆρ τετλάτω (*Od.* 16.274-5);

<sup>24</sup> E.g., ἀλλὰ ἐμέ θυμὸς ἀνῆκε πολυτλήμων πολεμίζειν θάρσει (*Il.* 7.152-3); τετληότι θυμῷ (*Od.* 4.447, 9.435 11.181, 16.37, 23.100, 23.168, 24.163); τλήμονα θυμὸν (*Il.* 5.670); θυμῷ τολμήεντι (*Il.* 10.205); οἱ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμὸς ἐτόλμα (*Il.* 10.232).

<sup>25</sup> ‘But when the blessed gods bring sad days upon him, against his will he must suffer it with enduring spirit [τὰ φέρει ἀεκαζόμενος τετληότι θυμῷ]’ (*Od.* 18.134-5).

In the first chapter, I begin an investigation into the spectrum of uses of *thumos* and *phrenes*, a spectrum so vast, and apparently with so many contradictions, that it has left centuries of scholars bewildered. The entities behave in turn like physical entities, or organs, vague places within the human body in which abstract things like pieces of information can be stored; as well as psychological functions and seats of both the passions and the intellect. *Thumos* behaves sometimes like breath, and sometimes like liquid; filling or swelling the internal organs as it boils like blood or increases like smoke. It can be an agent that acts independently of Homeric man, commanding him and debating with him, as well as a force that often needs to be restrained and subordinated. *Phrenes* is a physical organ containing *thumos* and the other psychological entities. It is an organ that can be damaged not only by spears on the battlefield, but also by passions internal to the individual. As well as being a physical organ and location within the human body, it is also an abstract faculty of cognition and deliberation within Homeric man.

What is this physical, breathy agent within Homeric man, this entity with both passionate and intellectual functions that Homer calls *thumos*? And what are *phrenes*, the pierceable, damageable, passionate and intellectual organs in which the other psychological entities are located? Is Homer confused, or contradictory, in his usage of these psychological terms, employing them here to denote the anatomical and tangible, and there to denote the abstract and metaphorical? Employing them in one passage as the seat of passion, and in the next as the seat of the intellect? Further complicating investigations into the psychological entities is the ambiguity of agent and function in *thumos* and *phrenes*. That is, *phrenes* can denote both the thinker, and what is thought; just as *thumos* can denote both that which feels, as well as that which is felt.<sup>27</sup> How are we to gain an insight into Homeric psychology by analysing Homer's psychological vocabulary, when Homer employs the same psychological terms in ways so varied, manifold, and often so seemingly contradictory?

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<sup>27</sup> See Claus: 1981, 16; and Sullivan: 1988, 7-8, & 30.

Scholars have offered a number of answers to the questions above, and suggestions as to how we may gain insight into the Homeric understanding of psychology by analysing the psychological entities. Some scholars have argued that Homer was indeed confused as to the real meanings of *thumos* and *phrenes*, and as a result he used them inconsistently throughout the epics. An influential explanation for Homer's confusion can be found in the chronological explanation of Homer's psychological terminology. According to this model – subscribed to by scholars such as Ireland and Harrison, and potentially also Sullivan<sup>28</sup> – Homer inherited the psychological terminology of the epics from centuries of oral tradition, and by the time he came to employ it, the original meanings of the terms denoting psychological entities had become clouded, and the specific functions of the entities confused.<sup>29</sup> One version of the chronological explanation is the 'organic model' of understanding the psychological entities, whereby *thumos* and *phrenes* originally denoted specific organs within the human body, but over the centuries became imbued with abstract qualities derived from the physical qualities originally thought to characterise the physical organs. Perhaps the most famous proponent of this thesis is Onians who, along with P. T. Justensen, argued that originally *phrenes* denoted the lungs, and *thumos* the breath that filled them.<sup>30</sup> More recent proponents of this organic identification of the entities include James Redfield and Jeffrey Barnouw.<sup>31</sup>

Scholars are divided over the value of attempts to discover the original meanings of the psychological terms by way of etymology in yielding insight into what they mean in Homer. Claus and Padel reject etymological analyses outright, whereas others such as

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<sup>28</sup> Padel correctly notes that while Sullivan explicitly rejects the chronological model, she implicitly endorses it (Padel: 1995, 37 n. 86).

<sup>29</sup> Harrison: 1960, 65; Ireland: 1975, 195; and Sullivan: 1988, 162.

<sup>30</sup> Onians: 1951, 24; and Justensen: 1928, 46 ff. Classen speculates that *phrenes* originally denoted particular organs, but he opts against identifying them with particular organs in Homer (2005: 58, & 64-5).

<sup>31</sup> Redfield, J. M. (1975). *Nature and Culture in the Iliad: The Tragedy of Hector* (1994 ed.). London: Duke University Press, 173. Barnouw: 2004, 103.

Harrison, Dihle, Lynch & Miles, and Onians draw upon etymology to varying degrees.<sup>32</sup> A. W. H. Adkins offers the most useful approach to etymological analyses, an approach that could be characterised as a middle-ground between those who reject etymology altogether, and those who rely too heavily upon it. While Adkins acknowledges that it is Homeric usage of the terms rather their etymologies that reveals their meaning, he contends that etymology can alert us to possible connections implicit in terms, to which we would otherwise be blind.<sup>33</sup> Still others, such as Caroline Caswell, Claus, and Sullivan, eschew many of the attempts to understand the entities mentioned above, in favour of synchronic formulaic analyses, in which they systematically and comprehensively divide the entities into their various functions – physical, passionate and intellectual – and offer an account of which function predominates in each usage of that term in Homer.<sup>34</sup> By contrast with all of the attempts to understand the entities mentioned above – chronological, organic, etymological, and functional – Ruth Padel offers a literary interpretation of the entities, focusing on how the terms are used in the Homeric epics, and how the entities behave. She contends that we can only hope to get at the psychological assumptions implicit in Homer’s psychological terms, by looking for patterns of imagery across the spectrum of their uses. The example that she gives is of *thumos* rising and filling our *phrenes*.<sup>35</sup> That is to say, in order to understand the psychological entities, we must turn our attention to the Homeric imagination.

It is clear that scholarship on Homeric psychology, and on the psychological entities, is rich and deeply divided. In the first chapter of this thesis I evaluate the main schools of thought regarding *thumos* and *phrenes*. After outlining the functional analyses of the two psychological entities offered by Caswell and Sullivan, I place Homeric

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<sup>32</sup> Claus: 1981, 7 & 13; Dihle, A. (1982). *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 177-9 n.28; Harrison: 1960, 65-6; Lynch & Miles: 4-5; Onians: 1951, 44; Padel: 1995, 37; Sullivan: 1988, 21.

<sup>33</sup> Adkins: 1970, 16.

<sup>34</sup> Caswell: 1990; Claus: 1981; Sullivan: 1988. See also Darcus, S. M. (1977). -phrōn Epithets of Thumos. *Glotta*, 55, 178-182; Darcus, S. M. (1979). A Person's Relation to φρήν in Homer, Hesiod, and the Greek Lyric Poets. *Glotta*, 57, 159-173; Sullivan, S. D. (1980). How a Person Relates to θυμός in Homer. *Indogermanische Forschungen*, 85, 138-150.; and Sullivan, S. D. (1995). *Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What Early Greeks Say*. Leiden: Brill.

<sup>35</sup> Padel: 1995, 36.

psychological vocabulary within the context of the history of its lengthy oral composition, and consider the chronological and organic models of understanding *thumos* and *phrenes*. In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the entities, I also consider their various suggested etymologies. I argue that, instead of limiting ourselves to one interpretation over another, we should draw upon all of the various avenues available to us in our investigation, remaining alive to the many possible ‘shades of meaning,’ as Padel puts it, in Homeric psychological vocabulary.<sup>36</sup>

## II

Just as scholarship on Homeric psychology must engage with Snell’s thesis concerning Homeric man’s primitive psychology, scholarship on the Homeric psychological entities must respond to Thomas Jahn’s landmark thesis concerning the functional synonymy of the psychological entities. In *Zum Wortfeld Seele-Geist in der Sprache Homers*,<sup>37</sup> Jahn argued that, except when they refer exclusively to physical entities, *thumos* and *phrenes* (along with ἦτορ, κῆρ, and κραδίη) are interchangeable,<sup>38</sup> and the choice of one over another in any given passage was determined by metrical convenience rather than semantic content.<sup>39</sup> Recent proponents of this view include Michael Clarke who, in *Flesh and Spirit in the Songs of Homer*, argues that while this does not mean that *thumos* and *phrenes* are ‘semantically identical,’ it does mean that they are ‘interchangeable labels for a single apparatus,’<sup>40</sup> that were ‘switched for the sake of metrical convenience.’<sup>41</sup> While Clarke acknowledges that certain tendencies in usage can be discerned, such as the connection between *thumos* and ‘passionate emotion,’ he argues that ‘no firm distinction’ between the two psychological entities can be drawn.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 36.

<sup>37</sup> Jahn, T. (1987). *Zum Wortfeld, Seele-Geist in der Sprache Homers*. Munchen: Beck.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., pp. 182-211.

<sup>39</sup> Jahn: 1987, pp. 212-245.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 64.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 63.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 64.

It cannot be doubted that metrical considerations play a crucial role in determining the choice of any word over another in any given Homeric passage. As we will see in the first chapter of this thesis, there is such a significant degree of functional overlap between *thumos* and *phrenes*, and they work together in such interdependent ways, that it is often difficult to discern which entity performs which function. However, despite the central role of metrical considerations, and despite the extensive functional overlap between the two entities, much scholarship, particularly recent scholarship, has challenged Jahn's contention that *thumos* and *phrenes* are completely interchangeable functional synonyms. The comprehensive functional analyses of *thumos* and *phrenes* by Caswell and Sullivan reveal differences in the ways that the two terms are used. While Sullivan hesitates to completely reject the thesis that the psychological entities are fully interchangeable, she notes that recent scholarship has moved away from endorsing that thesis to the 'less severe' thesis that though metrical considerations are crucial, particularly in the formulaic expressions in which the psychological terms tend to appear, the original choice of one term over another was determined by its unique appropriateness to the context.<sup>43</sup> Despite her hesitation, Sullivan's functional analyses reveal that while *phrenes* share emotional, intellectual and volitional functions with *thumos*, the ways in which the two entities perform these functions differ from one another, and that *phrenes* perform an additional moral function.<sup>44</sup> For example, Sullivan argues that Homeric man relates differently to *thumos* than he does to *phrenes*, and that *thumos* is a much more active entity, while *phrenes* is a much more passive entity.<sup>45</sup> Caswell goes further than Sullivan in her analysis, which reveals definite differences in the ways that the two terms are used. While *thumos*, *phrēn*, *phrenes*, *noos*, *kēr*, *kradiē*, *ētor*, and sometimes also *stēthos*, *menos*, and *psuchē* are, broadly speaking, functional synonyms, differentiation occurs side by side with functional synonymy.<sup>46</sup> That is, only certain terms are functionally synonymous with one another in specific contexts, and

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<sup>43</sup> Sullivan argues that, 'In the case of *phrēn*, it is possible to assume that, even though its position in a line may be formulaic, its presence in the formula itself was originally conceived of as appropriate' (Sullivan: 1988, 11).

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 189-90.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 148.

<sup>46</sup> Caswell: 1990, 34.

some terms occur much more frequently in certain contexts than others, such as *thumos* in the contexts of emotion and motivation.<sup>47</sup>

More recently, C. Joachim Classen and Sebastian R. van der Mije challenge Jahn's thesis, arguing that *thumos* and *phrenes* are not functionally interchangeable with respect to their intellectual, emotional, and moral functions. Van der Mije compares those instances in which the verb *πείθειν* (to persuade) has *thumos* as its object, with those in which it has *phrenes* as its object, and discovers a difference between the emotional and intellectual predispositions of the two entities as objects of persuasion.<sup>48</sup> While Classen contends that the psychological terms are interchangeable except when they are anatomically localised, his analysis of the adjectives derived from *thumos* and *phrenes* reveals a difference between the intellectual and moral functions of the two psychological entities. In particular, Classen's analysis reveals that *phrenes* are more important for morality than *thumos*.<sup>49</sup> In the second chapter of this thesis I join recent scholarship's rejection of Jahn's thesis, by focusing on the different roles of *thumos* and *phrenes* in endurance. I argue that while *thumos* and *phrenes* both participate in endurance, the ways in which each fulfills this function is unique. I defined Homeric endurance above as the checking of one's passions, either completely or temporarily, to flee from, or respond to, some hardship, rather than to give in to them and behave as they dictate. In the analysis of the paradigmatic scenes of endurance in the third chapter, we will see that the enduring agent is torn between (usually) two different courses of action. These courses of action correspond to two different impulses within the agent that can be termed the passionate impulse and the rational impulse. While I hesitate to use this terminology, as the Homeric mind did not make the distinction between the passionate and the intellectual that we take for granted today, it does best capture the differences between the impulses. The

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 50.

<sup>48</sup> Van der Mije, S. R. (2011). *πείθειν φρένα(ς), πείθειν θυμόν* – A Note on Homeric Psychology. *Mnemosyne*, 64, 447-454.

<sup>49</sup> Classen, C. J. (2005). Zu den homerischen Bezeichnungen für die Träger oder Organe seelischer und geistiger Fähigkeiten und Tätigkeiten. *Emerita*, 73, 57-71, pp. 68-9. The adjectives derived from *phrenes* are: *ἀρτίφρων*, *ἐπίφρων*, *ἐχέφρων*, *περίφρων*, *πολύφρων*, *σαόφρων*, *κερδαλεόφρων*, *ἀασίφρων*, *ἀεσίφρων*, *ἄφρων*, *ὀλοόφρων*, and *χαλίφρων* (ibid., 68-9). See also Sullivan: 1988, 276-82. The adjectives derived from *thumos* are: *γλυκύθυμος*, *εὐθυμος*, *ἐχέθυμος*, *καρτερόθυμος*, *μεγάθυμος*, *ὑπέρθυμος*, *θυμηγερέων*, *θυμολέων*, *θυμοραϊστής*, *θυμοφθόρος*, *θυμηδής*, *θυμοβόρος*, and *θυμοδακῆς* (Classen: 2005, 68 n. 42).

passionate impulse, the first of the two to arise in the agent, is that which is informed by the passions strongest within the agent at that particular moment, and urges him to act upon them. The rational impulse takes a little longer to arise in the agent; it is informed by knowledge, and urges the agent to check his passionate impulse and endure, waiting for the optimal moment to achieve his overall goal. However, that is not to say that the passionate impulse is entirely devoid of reason, and that the rational impulse is entirely devoid of passion. Rather, it is to say that passion is uppermost in the passionate impulse, and reason is uppermost in the rational impulse, at the moment of deliberation.

As *thumos* is generally conceived of as essentially passionate, and *phrenes* as essentially intellectual, it is tempting to assume that the passionate impulse can be exclusively attributed to *thumos*, and the rational impulse attributed exclusively to *phrenes*. On this view, *thumos* and *phrenes* would participate in endurance differently, with *phrenes* in some way curbing or restraining *thumos*. However, I argue in chapter two that this is a common misunderstanding of *thumos* and *phrenes* in Homer, undoubtedly stemming from Plato's later separation of *thumos* from the rational, as well as from the failure to appreciate how inextricably bound together thought and feeling are in Homer. I argue that both the passionate impulse and the rational passion-restraining impulse originate in *thumos*; that *thumos* restrains *itself*. The question then becomes: what role could *phrenes* possibly have in endurance? To answer that question, we need first to investigate the natures of *thumos* and *phrenes* as essentially passionate and intellectual respectively. To this end, I summarise and evaluate the three main ways in which scholars tend to argue for the essentially passionate nature of *thumos* and the essentially intellectual nature of *phrenes*: first, by reference to the greater frequency of *thumos* with verbs of, or in contexts of, emotion; and the greater frequency of *phrenes* with verbs of, or in contexts of, the intellect; second, by comparison of the ways in which the psychological entities participate in the same emotional and intellectual functions; and third, by analysis of the degree to which *thumos* and *phrenes* were thought of as entities independent of, and in opposition to, Homeric man.

Drawing upon the scholarship of Caswell and Sullivan, I offer a version of this third type of argument. Comparative analysis of the frequency with which *thumos* and

*phrenes* are governed by verbs of control, restraint, and endurance – such as ἔχω, and its compounds such as ἀνέχω and ἐπέχω, δαμάζω, ἐντίθημι, ἐρητύω, ἐρύκω, λήγω, παύω, and σεβάζομαι – reveals not only definite differences between the two entities, but also reveals that Homeric man related to the two entities in vastly different ways. I examine the evidence for *thumos* as the active and passion-restraining entity in endurance, and the evidence for *phrenes* as location of the *thumos*' endurance. I argue that while Homeric man's *thumos* and the thumotic passions often need to be restrained, his *phrenes* never do.

The objection could be raised that the capacity required in these situations is not endurance but self-restraint.<sup>52</sup> Self-restraint is undoubtedly a part of endurance; however, endurance involves the added element of undergoing significant suffering as a result of this self-restraint. The distinction might appear to be overly-subtle, but I argue that it is, in fact, crucial. Compare, for example, Odysseus' self-restraint upon encountering the nubile Nausicaa at her bath in *Odyssey* 6, and his self-restraint in *Odyssey* 20 upon discovering his betrayal at the hands of his maid-servants. In both of these passages, Odysseus' deliberation is denoted by the formula for deliberation (ὀρμαίνω / μερμηρίζω κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν) that I will be examining in the final two chapters. Quite apart from the fact that Odysseus' deliberation in Book 6 fails to qualify as enduring, in that it is more an uneasy speculation as to whether the natives are civilised or not rather than an anguished deliberation concerning which of two impulses to act upon, Odysseus' self-restraint in the face of numerous exposed young women does not cause him to undergo any significant danger or suffering. By contrast, Odysseus' self-restraint in Book 20 when faced with his maid-servants betrayal consists in the anguished deliberation of whether to act on his passionate impulse and slaughter the servants immediately, or act on his rational impulse and slaughter both servants and suitors when the time is best. Crucially different is the suffering that Odysseus chooses to undergo in this second example. By restraining his passionate impulse to kill, Odysseus chooses to *suffer* his

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<sup>52</sup> For literature on self-restraint, *sophrosune*, in Homer, see: Sheppard, J. T. (1920). The Heroic Sophrosyne and the Form of Homer's Poetry. *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 40 (1), 47-67. North, H. (1966). *Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge & Self-Restraint in Greek Literature*. New York: Cornell University Press. Rademaker: 2005, chapter 2.

passions of anger, humiliation, and vengefulness rather than satisfy them. Even after he decides to act on his rational, passion-restraining impulse, he is said to twist and turn this way and that with the effort (ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἐλίσσετο, *Od.* 20.24). Had Odysseus chosen to act on these passions rather than restrain them, he would not have undergone this suffering. In sum, self-restraint is necessary but not sufficient for endurance; endurance requires the added component of significant hardship undergone as a result of this self-restraint.

In order to illuminate exactly what role *phrenes* have in the endurance of *thumos*, I suggest that we follow Padel into the shadowy depths of the Homeric imagination, looking for connections and associations with which the ancient terms were imbued, in the hope that they might yield unique insight into the psychological assumptions of the Homeric mind. To this end, I analyse terms used both of the psychological entities and other more tangible entities – namely, *πυκινός*, *ἀραρίσκω*, *ἔμπεδος*, and *ἴσος* – in the attempt to unveil the way the psychological entities were imagined by the Homeric mind. In particular, I examine two passages from the *Iliad* (15.615-29, & 16.210-18) which, I argue, illustrate on the large-scale what the Homeric mind imagined to be taking place within Homeric man's psychological entities during endurance. This analysis sheds light on how the positive and negative states of *thumos* and *phrenes* were conceived of in Homer, and the effect that the state of his psychological entities had on Homeric man's behaviour.

### III

Having examined the psychological entities that endure in Homer, and the different roles *thumos* and *phrenes* perform in endurance, I turn in the third chapter to an examination of Homeric endurance. For an examination of Homeric endurance to be comprehensive, it must examine two things: first, the various dimensions of the main Homeric verb for endurance: *τλάω*; and second, the dramatisation of endurance in the decision-making scenes, in which the verb *τλάω* does not necessarily occur. Comprehensive analysis of the verb *τλάω* reveals that it denotes three different types of

endurance in Homer, which I call: ‘resolution to act endurance,’ ‘standing-one’s-ground endurance,’ and ‘bearing-pain endurance.’<sup>53</sup> We can begin to appreciate the often subtle differences between these by considering the various words commonly used to describe enduring behaviour. For example, endurance is often described with the terms: ‘prevailing upon,’ or ‘bracing,’ ‘nerving,’ ‘inducing,’ or ‘steeling’ oneself to perform some difficult action. One of the more obvious differences between ways of enduring becomes apparent when we compare such terms with endurance through ‘bearing,’ ‘undergoing,’ or ‘submitting’ to pain, and doing so with ‘perseverance,’ ‘steadfastness,’ or ‘patience.’ On the one hand we have endurance required for the performance of some daring or brave action and manifested in the performance of that action, which I call: the resolution to act.<sup>54</sup> On the other hand, endurance is also manifested in the choice of inaction over action; that is, the endurance *not* to act, but to remain passive in the face of some hardship or insult which I call: bearing-pain endurance.<sup>55</sup>

While the difference between the endurance manifested in the resolution to act and that manifested in bearing pain is obvious, closer scrutiny is required to discern the much subtler differences between bearing-pain endurance and the endurance that is invoked when we talk about remaining ‘unflinching,’ ‘staunch,’ ‘resolute,’ or ‘firm-set’ in the face of some difficulty, what I will call standing-one’s-ground endurance.<sup>56</sup> Like bearing-pain endurance, standing one’s ground can be distinguished from the resolution to act in terms of activity and passivity: the character who endures through bearing pain, endures not by steeling himself to perform some action, but by submitting to the pains inflicted on him by another, or even sometimes by himself. However, standing-one’s-

<sup>53</sup> Barnouw makes a similar distinction between ‘taking it’ and ‘staying power’ endurance, which corresponds to my distinction between bearing-pain and standing one’s ground endurance (Barnouw: 2004, 85).

<sup>54</sup> *τλάω* denotes resolution to act endurance in the *Iliad* at: 1.228; 1.543; 3.306; 4.94; 5.21; 7.151, 480; 9.373; 10.307; 17.153, 733; 18.246; 19.14; 20.421; 21.150; 24.35, 505, 519, & 656; and in the *Odyssey* at 2.82; 4.242, 271; 4.716; 5.178; 10.343, 384; 11.143, 376, 425, 475; 17.104, 456; & 23.150.

<sup>55</sup> *τλάω* denotes bearing-pain endurance in the *Iliad* at 1.586, 382, 383, 385, 392, 395, 873; 18.433; 19.308; & 24.49; and in the *Odyssey* at 1.288; 2.219; 3.209; 4.242, 271, 459; 5.222; 6.190; 8.182; 11.181; 13.307; 16.275; 18.135; 19.347; 20.18, 23, 311; 23.100, 168; & 24.163.

<sup>56</sup> *τλάω* denotes standing one’s ground endurance in the *Iliad* at 1.534; 2.299; 8.78; 11.317; 13.829; 15.164; 17.166, 490; 21.608; 22.136, & 251; and in the *Odyssey* at 14.269; & 17.438.

ground endurance only requires one to check the impulse to flee, whereas bearing-pain endurance requires one to check the impulse to respond in ways not limited to flight. These two ways of enduring can also be distinguished from one another in the following way: the enduring passivity of standing one's ground is always linked to brave activity; the hero remains passive in order to perform some brave action. By contrast, the passivity of bearing-pain endurance is not necessarily linked to brave activity; the hero bears pain when there is no other courageous response available to him. Of course, it is important to keep in mind that resolution to act, standing one's ground, and bearing pain are different manifestations of the one internal disposition of endurance, and furthermore as they are our distinctions imposed upon the epics, rather than differences explicitly recognized in the epics themselves, some degree of semantic overlap between them is to be expected.

After offering an exposition of *τλάω* and showing how the three types of endurance can be distinguished from one another grammatically, I turn to the Homeric decision-making scenes, in which we find endurance depicted dramatically. Scholarship on these scenes, and the deliberation at their core, is almost as vast and divided as that on Homeric psychology. Scholars limit their investigations into the decision-making scenes in different ways. The majority of scholarship focuses on the decision-making scenes dramatized in the form of internal monologues on the battlefield of Odysseus at *Il.* 11.404-410, Menelaus at *Il.* 17.91-105, and Hector at *Il.* 22.99-130. Anne Pippin Burnett,<sup>57</sup> Bernard Fenik,<sup>58</sup> Richard Gaskin,<sup>59</sup> Christopher Gill,<sup>60</sup> and Stuart Lawrence,<sup>61</sup> all examine these three monologues, however each scholar analyses in addition one or two further scenes. Burnett, Fenik, Gill, and Lawrence also examine Agenor's deliberation's at *Il.* 21.553-570<sup>62</sup> – with Lawrence examining Penelope's deliberation at

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<sup>57</sup> Burnett, A. P. (1991). Signals From the Unconscious in Early Greek Poetry. *Classical Philology*, 86 (4), 275-300, pp. 277-88.

<sup>58</sup> Fenik, B. (1978). Stylization and Variety: Four Monologues in the Iliad. In B. Fenik (Ed.), *Homer: Tradition and Invention* (pp. 68-90). Leiden: Brill.

<sup>59</sup> Gaskin, R. (2001). Do Homeric Heroes Make Real Decisions? In D. L. Cairns (Ed.), *Oxford Readings in Homer's Iliad* (pp. 147-169). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>60</sup> Gill, C. (1996). *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue*. New York: Oxford University Press, 69-93.

<sup>61</sup> Lawrence, S. E. (2003). Moral Decisions in Homer. *Scholium: Studies in Classical Antiquity*, 12, 27-33.

<sup>62</sup> Burnett: 1991, 280-1; Fenik: 1978, 77-81; Gill: 1996, 80-8; and Lawrence: 2003, 30 & 33.

*Od.* 19.524-9 in addition to Agenor's<sup>63</sup> – and Gaskin analyses Achilles' deliberation at *Il.* 1.188-94.<sup>64</sup> One or more of three formulas are found in these decision-making scenes, and a number of scholars limit their investigations into Homeric deliberation to one of these formulas. First, the formula for deliberation mentioned above, '[h]e deliberated in heart and mind [μερμηρίξε / ὄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν],' to which this present study is limited. Second, the formula which frequently precedes monologues, '[a]nd troubled, he spoke then to his own great-hearted spirit [ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὄν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν],' examined thoroughly by Stephen Scully.<sup>65</sup> And third, the formula that marks the point at which the character reaches his decision, '[y]et still, why does the heart within me debate on these things? [ἀλλὰ τί ἦ μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός;],' which has been analysed comprehensively by R. W. Sharples.<sup>66</sup> My own inquiry overlaps significantly with the above studies, and reference to them will be made throughout my analysis.

Deliberation in the formula for deliberation (ὄρμαινώ / μερμηρίζω κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν) is denoted by one of two verbs: *ὄρμαινώ* or *μερμηρίζω*. In the instances of this formula in Homer, *ὄρμαινώ* means '[t]o turn over, revolve, ponder, consider, debate, have in contemplation, meditate;' and *μερμηρίζω* means 'to ponder, consider, deliberate, meditate.' While the formula occurs thirteen times in the epics, I will only be examining six of these instances, as I argue that endurance is only manifested in these six. The seven instances of the formula in which endurance is not manifested in the deliberation, can be divided into two groups. Those passages in the first group lack the interior battle requisite for endurance (*Od.* 6.118, 10.151). In the passages in the second group, either the agent does not make a choice, or the voluntariness of the choice is rendered ambiguous by the intervention of a god (*Il.* 5.671, 8.169; *Od.* 4.117, 4.120, 5.424). I will therefore only be examining those instances of the formula for deliberation in which the agent experiences

<sup>63</sup> Lawrence: 2003, 32-3.

<sup>64</sup> Gaskin: 2001, 155-6 (this is a revised version of Gaskin's paper of the same name published by *CQ* in 1990). See also Rosenmeyer, T. G. (1990). Decision-Making. *Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science*, 23 (4), 187-218, for a discussion of many of the decision-making scenes mentioned above, although in significantly less detail than the studies cited above.

<sup>65</sup> Scully, S. (1984). The Language of Achilles: The ὀχθήσας Formulas. *TAPA*, 114, 11-27.

<sup>66</sup> Sharples, R. W. (1983). 'But Why Has My Spirit Spoken with Me Thus?': Homeric Decision-Making. *Greece and Rome*, 30 (1), 1-7. See also Pelliccia: 1995, 203-11.

anguished internal conflict in his deliberation, and makes a choice without mortal interruption or divine intervention.

There are six such instances in the epics: three in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 1.193, 11.411, 17.106), and three in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 5.365, 20.10, 24.235). In brief, the relevant Iliadic passages are: Achilles' deliberation over whether to act on, or restrain, his passions of *achos*, *cholos*, and *thumos* that urge him to slay Agamemnon (1.193); Odysseus' deliberation concerning whether to stand his ground strongly, or to follow his fear (cf. τᾰρβῆω) and flee (11.411); and Menelaus' deliberation whether to follow his *aidōs* and fight to save Patroclus' corpse, or to return with Ajax (17.106). The Odyssean passages each depict Odysseus' deliberation: whether he should act on his fear and abandon his besieged raft, or endure his fear and Poseidon's wrath by remaining on it (5.365); whether he should slay his maid-servants immediately as his fury impels him, or wait until the time is best for doing so; and whether he should give in to his grief and reveal his true identity to his father, or test him first (24.235).

In the third chapter I examine the two passages characterised by the formula for deliberation in which standing-one's-ground endurance is depicted: one from the *Iliad* (11.411) and the other from the *Odyssey* (5.365). After offering an account of the different traditions of heroism idealised in the respective epics – the bravery of the warrior hero in the *Iliad* whose ultimate goal is the achievement of undying *kleos*, and the endurance of the mortal man, husband, and father in the *Odyssey* whose ultimate goal is *nostos* – I examine these two passages in detail. Both passages depict the endurance of Odysseus: first, his endurance of his fear when alone and surrounded by the enemy on the battlefield in *Iliad* 11; and second, his endurance of Poseidon's rage on the open sea in *Odyssey* 5. In my examination of these passages I draw attention to the salient features of the endurance depicted in them, and show how Odysseus' success in standing his ground is an external manifestation of his internal psychological disposition of endurance. By reflecting on the state of Odysseus' psychological entities – the *thumos* in his *phrenes* that is always daring, and his good and well-balanced *phrenes* – I show how Odysseus' *thumos* and *phrenes* enable him to endure in conflict with both Trojans and gods. Chapter

three draws to a close with a consideration of the actions of two more Iliadic warriors on the battlefield. First, I examine Diomedes' deliberation in *Iliad* 8, in which Diomedes must resist his blood-lust and not fight Hector, though the great Trojan taunts and humiliates him. Although the intervention of Zeus renders Diomedes' decision ambiguous, I examine this passage in order to differentiate the divine intervention involved in Diomedes' decision from that involved in Achilles' decision in *Iliad* 1 in the final chapter.

Finally, I provide an introduction to bearing-pain endurance, and a differentiation of it from standing one's ground endurance, by analysing and defending Menelaus' retreat on the battlefield in *Iliad* 17. Patroclus has just fallen in battle, and Zeus has turned the tide of battle in the Trojans' favour. Menelaus is faced with the following choice: to fight the enraged and divinely-assisted Hector for the corpse of Patroclus, who died fighting for Menelaus, facing certain failure and possible death; or to retreat and return with Ajax. While Menelaus has been widely criticised as cowardly for his choice by scholars, by comparing and contrasting his behaviour with that of Odysseus and Diomedes in *Iliad* 11 and 8 respectively, I defend Menelaus from his critics. I argue that Menelaus' behaviour here is not to be evaluated in terms of bravery, or even in terms of standing-one's-ground endurance. Rather, by consideration of the differences in the situations faced by Odysseus, Diomedes, and Menelaus, it is clear that Menelaus' retreat here constitutes bearing-pain endurance.

#### IV

Having examined standing-one's-ground endurance and offered an introduction to bearing-pain endurance in chapter 3, in chapter four I turn to an in-depth examination of bearing-pain endurance, the capacity to check the passions that urge one to react or respond to some suffering, either in the pursuit of some goal or as a response to divine fate. Four out of the six relevant instances of the formula for deliberation are dramatic depictions of bearing-pain endurance (*Il.* 1.193, 17.106; *Od.* 20.10, 24.235). It is

significant that it is only in one of these instances of the formula – at *Iliad* 1.193 – that the deliberating character fails to endure. Although this is the very first instance of the formula for deliberation in the epics, I leave my discussion of it until last due to its uniqueness.

The paradigm of bearing-pain endurance, and the most famous example of endurance in Homer, is that of Odysseus faced with his maidservants' betrayal in *Odyssey* 20. Odysseus has finally arrived back in Ithaca, only to discover that his servants have betrayed him in his absence, and continue to betray him, by fraternizing with the wicked suitors. Odysseus, sleeping on the floor of his own home disguised as a beggar, deliberates in his *thumos* and *phrenes* concerning whether he should slay the traitorous servants immediately, as his fury impels him, or bear the pain of this betrayal and endure his fury, waiting until the optimal moment for exacting his revenge. I dwell on Odysseus' endurance in this passage at length, examining the two striking metaphors used to represent Odysseus' impassioned and conflicted psychological state: Odysseus' *kradiē* as a barking bitch, raging to fight (*Od.* 20.14-16); and Odysseus as a *γαστέρ* (belly or sausage), twisting this way and that as it is being roasted over a blazing fire (*Od.* 20.25-31). These metaphors make explicit the importance of the state of Odysseus' psychological entities for his endurance in this famous passage.

The very last instance of the formula for deliberation in which bearing-pain endurance is manifested in the *Odyssey* can be found in Odysseus' reunion with his father Laertes in Book 24 (232-40). Upon seeing his aged father after so many years, the disguised Odysseus' *phrenes* are overcome with a grief that urges him to embrace his father at once. However, Odysseus is torn between this passionate impulse, and his rational impulse to first question his father, and test him (cf. *πειράω*). Odysseus' treatment of his father here seems less like endurance and more like cruelty. However, by consideration of the role that testing plays in Odyssean recognition-scenes, which are at the core of his *nostos*, and of the intention behind Odysseus' treatment of his father, I will argue that Odysseus endures here by bearing the pain of the grief, rather than giving in to it.

Discussion of the instances of the formula for deliberation dramatising endurance in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, has brought us full circle, returning us to the very first instance of the formula in the epics: Achilles' deliberation in *Iliad* 1 (188-97). Agamemnon has just uttered his fatal threat to take Achilles' prize, Briseis, and Achilles is overcome by *achos*, *cholos*, and *thumos*. Achilles *ētor* is divided between drawing his sword to kill Agamemnon as his passions urge, and curbing (cf. *παύω*) and restraining (cf. *ἐρητύω*) them. Just as Achilles is drawing his sword, Athena descends, catching Achilles by the hair, and urging Achilles not to go through with his plan. Scholars are divided as to whether it is Achilles or Athena who makes the decision not to slay Agamemnon here. It could be argued that as Achilles does not attempt to kill Agamemnon, Achilles succeeds in restraining himself. It could also be argued that it is Athena who restrains Achilles, in effect making his decision for him. However, I argue that regardless of Athena's subsequent intervention, and regardless of the fact that Achilles does not attempt to kill Agamemnon in this episode, comparison with divine intervention in the other decision-making scenes reveals that this is the only instance in which the agent had made his decision before the divinity had even arrived on the scene. With Athena's arrival, Achilles' choice has changed. No longer must he choose between acting on and restraining his passions, now he must choose between obeying and not obeying Athena. I argue that Achilles, the paradigm of the Homeric warrior hero, lacks the capacity to endure by bearing the pain of his passions rather than acting on them, and he lacks this capacity to endure because of the state of his psychological entities.

Before concluding by offering a comprehensive definition of endurance in Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, I discuss the main distinguishing features of bearing-pain endurance. First, it is the only type of endurance that can be purely passive, that is, never united with action. Second, it is the only type of endurance that can be purely moral, that is, never mixed with tactical considerations. Third, the only time the gods endure, that is, when their endurance is denoted by *τλάω*, the gods endure by bearing pain. Fourth, while

goddesses can also endure through the resolution to act,<sup>67</sup> the only endurance attributed to mortal women in the epics is bearing-pain endurance.<sup>68</sup> And, finally, of all the three types of endurance, bearing pain is the kind of endurance most frequently accompanied by references to necessity.

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<sup>67</sup> Odysseus demands that both Circe and Calypso endure by resolving to swear an oath (τλαίης ... ὀμόσσαι) at *Od.* 5.178 and 10.343.

<sup>68</sup> Women can, however, fail to endure through resolution to act endurance in the *Odyssey* at 4.716 (Penelope); 11.425 (Clytemnestra); 23.150 (Penelope).

Homer draws upon a rich multiplicity of terms to denote psychological activity in Homeric man, including: *thumos*, *phrēn* or *phrenes*, *ētor*, *kēr*, *kradiē*, *noos*, *psuchē*, and *prapides*.<sup>70</sup> This present inquiry is limited to *thumos* and *phrenes*, which are the psychological terms found most frequently in the Homeric epics, and the psychological entities most important for courage in Homer.<sup>71</sup> Scholars attempting to discover what these two entities are in Homer find themselves squarely within one of the most extensive and deeply-divided debates in Homeric psychology. Attempts to become acquainted with the entities by way of the primary sources, rather than through secondary scholarship, face a task even more vast and perplexing. The following quotations from Ruth Padel offers the most comprehensive introduction to *thumos*. *Thumos*, explains Padel, ‘is a liquid, like *cholos*, which boils in and swells the innards.’<sup>72</sup> It is ‘a thing seized, struck, gnawed, a receptacle filled, a volatile, forceful breath or liquid, an emotion and impulse (passionate anger, desire), a *place* of emotion and inner debate (“heart,” “mind”), and a force or cast of mind: “spirit,” “temper.”’<sup>73</sup> The *phrenes* are much more like physical entities than *thumos*, entities in which *thumos* and the other psychological entities are located. They are the centre of emotional and intellectual activity in Homeric man; and they are vulnerable to the passions that rise up in them and fill them like volatile vapours,

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<sup>69</sup> For *thumos* and *phrenes* in other ancient Greek writers see: Darcus, S. M. (1977). *Daimon Parallels the Holy Phren in Empedocles. Phronesis*, 22 (3), 175-190. Sullivan: 1979. Sullivan: 1995. Sullivan, S. D. (1997). *Aeschylus' Use of Psychological Terminology: Traditional and New*. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. Sullivan, S. D. (1999). *Sophocles' Use of Psychological Terminology*. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. Sullivan, S. D. (2000). *Euripides' Use of Psychological Terminology*. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. Green, C. D., & Groff, P. R. (2003). *Early Psychological Thought: Ancient Accounts of Mind and Soul*. Connecticut: Praeger.

<sup>70</sup> Contemporary readers will be surprised to discover that none of these terms denotes the brain, or an entity located in the head. For a contemporary and medical discussion of Homer on the brain, see Walshe, T. M. (1997). *Neurological Concepts in Archaic Greece: What Did Homer Know? Journal of the History of the Neurosciences: Basic and Clinical Perspectives*, 6 (1), 72-81.

<sup>71</sup> Jahn calculates that in Homer and the *Homeric Hymns*, there are a total of 816 instances of *thumos*, 379 of *phrēn* or *phrenes*, 118 of *noos*, 102 of *ētor*, 90 of *kēr*, 84 of *psuchē*, 63 of *kradiē*, and 14 of *prapides* (Jahn: 1987, 6 n. 29, quoted at Pelliccia: 1995, 15).

<sup>72</sup> Padel: 1992, 29.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 29-30.

and flow within them like liquids.<sup>74</sup> It is perhaps even less clear now, having been introduced to them, exactly what *thumos* and *phrenes* are. And it is manifestly clear that an attempt to articulate exactly what they are, is a far from straight-forward task.

The present study is aimed at enriching our understanding of endurance in Homer. As we will see in the third and fourth chapters of this thesis, endurance takes the dramatic form in the Homeric epics of decision-making scenes. In these scenes, the deliberating agent is torn between two impulses that correspond to two courses of action (or inaction), which I have termed the passionate impulse and the rational impulse. The deliberating agent endures if he is able to act on his rational impulse, checking – often only temporarily – his passionate impulse, until the optimal time to act on it. To enrich our understanding of endurance, in the next chapter I attempt to illuminate the different roles played by *thumos* and *phrenes* in endurance. Before we can do that, however, we must first answer the much more basic question: what are Homeric *thumos* and *phrenes*? In this chapter, I examine the main schools of thought regarding the psychological entities. First, I look at Caswell and Sullivan’s synchronic formulaic analyses of *thumos* and *phrenes* respectively. Second, I outline the chronological explanation for functional overlap and terminological inconsistencies in Homer’s psychological vocabulary by placing it within the context of the epics’ lengthy oral composition. Third, I consider Onians’ organic model, looking at passages in which *phrenes* are given a physical location within the human body, and considering whether the two entities can be identified anatomically or physiologically. Fourth, I examine the potential etymologies of the two psychological terms, looking for hints as to how the terms may have been understood by the Homeric mind.

### **(i) Synchronic Formulaic Analyses of *Thumos* and *Phrenes***

In *A Study of Thumos in Early Greek Epic*, Caswell distinguishes between five functions of Homeric *thumos*, drawing heavily on Joachim Böhme’s monumental study

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 21-3.

of *thumos* in *Die Seele und das Ich im Homerischen Epos*.<sup>75</sup> *Thumos*, Caswell argues, is the principle of life, the motivating force within Homeric man, the seat of the passions, and the faculties of cognition or intellect, and deliberation.<sup>76</sup> *Thumos* is both something that is breathed out at the moment of death, and a force that impels and commands Homeric man to act. It is where Homeric man feels joy and grief, where he thinks and deliberates, as well as sometimes being the very thing itself that does the feeling, thinking, and deliberating. It is clear that while Plato will later divorce *thumos* entirely from reason, conceiving of it as exclusively passionate, Homeric *thumos* was not only passionate, but was also endowed with functions of a more rational or intellectual nature. In addition to feeling passions in his *thumos*, it is also *in, with, or by* (ἀνά, ἐνί, μετά, κατά) *thumos* that Homeric man plans (cf. βουλεύω), devises or intends (cf. μήδομαι), thinks or perceives (cf. νοέω), knows (cf. οἶδα), thinks or observes (cf. φράζω), and considers (cf. φρονέω). Furthermore, it is also in *thumos* that he ponders (cf. ὀρμαίνω), debates (cf. διαλέγομαι), and deliberates (cf. μερμηρίζω).<sup>77</sup> And sometimes, as noted above, it is even *thumos itself* that is the agent of such cognition and deliberation.

In *Psychological Activity in Homer: A Study of Phrēn*, Shirley Darcus Sullivan discerns five functions of Homeric *phrenes* that overlap significantly with those of *thumos* outlined above. According to Sullivan, Homeric *phrenes* have ‘physical, intellectual,<sup>78</sup> emotional, volitional, [and] moral’ functions.<sup>79</sup> The *phrenes* are physical entities that enclose the liver (*Od.* 9.301) and the heart (*Il.* 16.481), and can be pulled out when a spear is dragged out of a soldier’s chest (*Il.* 16.503-505). They are the seat of emotion, intellect and the faculty of volition; and they are associated with Homeric man’s morality, and character. Comparison with those functions of *thumos* outlined by Caswell reveals that the two psychological entities are functionally similar in more ways than they are different. Both entities were thought to be to at least some extent physical entities that

<sup>75</sup> Böhme, J. (1929). *Die Seele und das Ich im Homerischen Epos*. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.

<sup>76</sup> Caswell: 1990, 11.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. διαλέγομαι (*Il.* 11.407, 17.97); μήδομαι (*Il.* 6.157, 14.253); βουλεύω (*Od.* 9.299, 12.58); ὀρμαίνω (*Il.* 21.137, 24.680); μερμηρίζω (*Od.* 10.50, 16.237); νόεω (*Od.* 18.228); οἶδα (*Il.* 12.228); φράζω (*Il.* 16.646; *Od.* 17.595); φρονέω (*Il.* 8.430; *Od.* 2.116).

<sup>78</sup> Under which category Sullivan subsumes the deliberative function.

<sup>79</sup> Sullivan: 1988, 38.

could be affected by food and drink,<sup>80</sup> and that were lost permanently upon death.<sup>81</sup> Both could also be temporarily lost: *thumos* is said to be gathered back into *phrēn* when one regains consciousness or strength after fainting<sup>82</sup> or being wounded,<sup>83</sup> and *phrenes* are thought to be absent from Homeric man when he acts foolishly, reprehensibly, or fails to deliberate well.<sup>84</sup> And, like *thumos*, *phrenes* also have cognitive, deliberative and emotional functions. It is also *in*, *by* or *with phrenes* that Homeric man plans, recognises, devises or intends, thinks or perceives, knows, thinks, considers, ponders, and deliberates.<sup>85</sup> And, just as *thumos* is not exclusively passionate, neither are the *phrenes* exclusively intellectual. *Phrenes* are also said to be the seat of the passions: it is also in his *phrenes* that Homeric man is angry (cf. χόλω), feels shame (cf. αἰδέομαι), fears (cf. δειδοῖκα), grieves (cf. ἄχος) rejoices (cf. χαίρω), and rages (cf. θύω; μένος).<sup>86</sup>

While it is clear that *thumos* and *phrenes* perform various functions, Sullivan warns us that it is imperative to be mindful of the fact that by distinguishing between

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<sup>80</sup> For the effect of wine on *phrenes* see *Od.* 19.122 & 21.297; for the effect of food and wine on *thumos* see *Il.* 1.468, 602, 2.431. For the effect of food and wine on *thumos* and *ētor* within *phrenes*, see Odysseus' speech at *Il.* 19.155-172. See also *Il.* 11.88-89 where the *phrenes* of the woodsman, whose *thumos* is seized by weariness, is said to long for food (ἄδος τὲ μιν ἵκετο θυμόν, σίτου τε γλυκεροῖο περὶ φρένας ἕμερος αἰρεῖ).

<sup>81</sup> *Phrenes* are said to be absent from the dead at *Il.* 23.104. See also *Od.* 10.493. *Thumos* is lost by a horse at death at *Il.* 16.468-9, and by humans slaughtered in battle at *Il.* 11.334.

<sup>82</sup> Hecuba's return of consciousness after fainting is described in terms of *thumos* being gathered back into her *phrenes* (ἐς φρένα θυμὸς ἀγέρθη) at *Il.* 22.475.

<sup>83</sup> Sarpedon's revival after being wounded in *Iliad* 5 is described in this way: 'And the mist mantled over his eyes, and the life [ψυχῇ] left him, but he got his breath back again, and the blast of the north wind blowing brought back to life the spirit gasped out in agony [κακῶς κεκαφηῖτα θυμόν]' (*Il.* 5.696-698). Hector's revival after being struck upon the chest with a rock by Ajax (*Il.* 15.249-250) is expressed in terms of gathering back his *thumos* (ἐσαγεῖρετο θυμόν, *Il.* 15.240)

<sup>84</sup> For example, hearing Priam's intention of going to Achilles' camp, Hecuba declares that his *phrenes* have departed from him (πῆ δὴ τοι φρένες οἴχονθ', *Il.* 24.201). See also *Iliad* 14.141, where Poseidon explains Achilles' joy at the slaughter of his fellow Achaeans, saying that Achilles' *phrenes* are absent (ἐπεὶ οὐ οἱ ἔνι φρένες, οὐδ' ἠβαιαί, *Il.* 14.141).

<sup>85</sup> For cognition in *phrenes*, cf. βουλευῶ (*Od.* 1.444, 4.676); γίγνωσκω (*Il.* 1.333; *Od.* 1.420); δάω (*Il.* 21.61); μῆδομαι (*Il.* 21.19; *Od.* 3.132); νοέω (*Il.* 9.600; *Od.* 1.322, 3.26); οἶδα (*Il.* 2.213; *Od.* 11.445); φράζω (*Il.* 20.115-116); φρονέω (*Od.* 14.82); ὀρμαίνω (*Il.* 10.4; *Od.* 3.151); μερμηρίζω (*Il.* 2.3; *Od.* 1.427). For cognition in both *thumos* and *phrenes*, cf. οἶδα (*Il.* 6.447; *Od.* 15.211); ὀρμαίνω (*Il.* 1.193; *Od.* 4.120); μερμηρίζω (*Il.* 5.671; *Od.* 4.117); νοέω (*Il.* 20.264); φράζω (*Il.* 15.163; *Od.* 1.294).

<sup>86</sup> For passions in *phrenes*, cf. αἰδέομαι (*Il.* 10.237); αἰδός (*Il.* 13.121-122); ἄχος (*Il.* 17.83, 19.125); δειδοῖκα (*Il.* 9.244; *Od.* 4.825); θύω (*Il.* 1.342); ἕμερος (*Il.* 11.89); μένος (*Il.* 1.103; *Od.* 4.661); νέμεσις (*Il.* 13.121-122); χαίρω (*Il.* 13.609); χόλω (*Od.* 6.147). χῶομαι (*Il.* 19.127).

these functions we are imposing our own distinctions upon the psychological entities.<sup>87</sup> While we should not necessarily join Snell in conceiving of Homeric man's psychological state in a way that it is so different from our own that it is almost unrecognisable – a conception sharply at odds with the sense of intimate and immediate familiarity we experience when reading of the emotions, dilemmas, and tragedies that befall Homeric man – nor should we go to the other extreme and underestimate the differences between Homeric man and ourselves. We should be wary of assuming that the Homeric mind made the same distinctions that we do. Padel argues persuasively that the pre-fifth-century ancient Greeks did not make the sharp distinctions that we do, or at least make them in exactly the same way that we do, between the passions and the intellect, the concrete and the abstract, the material and the immaterial.<sup>88</sup> While we might see inconsistencies where the same term used is here to denote a physical organ, and there to denote a psychological function, that is not to say that the ancient Greek mind would necessarily have seen this as inconsistent. Padel contends that '[w]e should not wish these [inconsistencies] away. They are a product of the relationship we create between our own culture and language and the want we want to understand.'<sup>89</sup> Therefore, when we are discussing the various functions of *thumos* and *phrenes*, particularly the emotional and intellectual functions, we should always keep in mind that these are our own distinctions, that *thumos* and *phrenes* were not neatly divided into five separate faculties that functioned independently of one another. Rather, to put it crudely, *thumos* functioned as a physical-emotional-intellectual-deliberative-motivational entity, and *phrenes* as physical-emotional-intellectual-deliberative-volitional-moral entity, in which one function may predominate in a specific instance, but in such a way that the other functions are not excluded.

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<sup>87</sup> Sullivan: 1988, 30.

<sup>88</sup> Padel: 1992, 21, 33-40. See also Onians: 1951, 50 & 52; and Padel, R. (1995). *Whom Gods Destroy: Elements of Greek and Tragic Madness*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 167-8. Sullivan agrees. She contends that 'in Homer, there is a blurring of the distinctions between the two types of activity, physical and psychological. His world, in fact, exists as one that is to a greater or lesser degree material. The distinctions that we draw between immaterial and material, incorporeal and corporeal, we not made' (Sullivan: 1988, 8).

<sup>89</sup> Padel: 1992, 40.

## (ii) *The Chronological Explanation*

From the above adumbration of the functions of *thumos* and *phrenes*, it would seem that the two are so functionally similar that readers would be prompted to ask why Homer had two psychological entities performing many of the same functions when one alone could potentially suffice. There are four main responses to this question: first, the chronological explanation of functional overlap and terminological confusion; second, the organic model of the psychological entities; third, the thesis of the functional synonymy of the psychological entities; and fourth, the argument that while the entities function largely as functional synonyms, particularly in epic formulae, the ways in which they perform the same functions differ significantly from one another. I will discuss the first two questions in this chapter, and return to the discussion of the final two questions in the following chapter.

In order to understand Homer's apparently pleonastic psychological terminology, it must be placed within the context of the epics' lengthy oral history. The passages in which *thumos* and *phrenes* appear in Homer are largely formulaic, and scholars suggest that the terms had quite definite and distinct functions when the formulae were originally composed, but that when Homer came to inherit these formulae many centuries later, the specific functions of the psychological terms found in them had become obscured. This not only explains the difficulties faced by current scholars in discerning the functions of *thumos* and *phrenes*, but also explains the difficulties faced in discerning exactly what meaning was ascribed to them by the ancient Greeks between Homer and the Pre-Socratics. These difficulties are compounded by the additional linguistic evolution of Homeric terms – *phrenes* in particular – that occurred between this time and that of Plato and Aristotle.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> For scholarship on the psychological entities between the time of Homer and that of Aristotle, see: Furley, D. J. (1956). The Early History of the Concept of Soul. *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, 3, 1-18. Webster, T. B. (1957). Some Psychological Terms in Greek Tragedy. *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 77 (1), 149-154. Darcus, S. M. (1979). A Person's Relation to φρήν in Homer, Hesiod, and the Greek Lyric Poets. *Glotta*, 57, 159-173. Lynch, J. P., & Miles, G. B. (1980). In Search of Thumos: Toward an Understanding of a Greek Psychological Term. *Prudentia*, 12, 3-9. Claus: 1981, 48-56. Bremmer, J. N. (1983). *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Thalmann, W. G. (1986). Aeschylus's

According to the chronological explanation, from their first appearance in the epic oral tradition to Homer's appropriation of them, the conceptions *thumos* and *phrenes* were refashioned in three interrelated ways: first, the shift from the predominantly physical to the indeterminately physical and additionally psychological; second, and thoroughly intertwined with the first, the shift from the concrete to the abstract; and third, the absorption by *thumos* and *phrenes* of some of the functions previously exclusive to the other entity. Scholars speculate that originally *thumos* and *phrenes* were conceived of as either entities that were exclusively physical, or exclusively psychological, and that over time they came to be conceived of as entities both physical and psychological.<sup>91</sup> While scholars acknowledge that *phrenes* may have first been a psychological entity and then later also a physical one,<sup>92</sup> it is generally agreed that their most likely linguistic history is the reverse.<sup>93</sup> Sullivan suggests that when these formulae were originally composed, *phrenes* were conceived of as 'predominantly physical,' having a specific physical function and a determined location within the human body, and that over time *phrenes* lost this predominantly physical connotation, and came to 'indicate chiefly a faculty indeterminately corporeal.'<sup>94</sup> Harrison agrees, contending that he ultimately

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Physiology of the Emotions. *The American Journal of Philology*, 107 (4), 489-511. Sullivan, S. D. (1995). *Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What Early Greeks Say*. Leiden: Brill.

<sup>91</sup> Padel offers the following concise summary of the chronological explanation: 'Once, in a time to which even Homer cannot carry us back, but which existed before his work, these words did have simple original concrete meanings. But society grew up, wrote literature, thought about its own thinking, and gave these words metaphoric, abstract meanings. Concrete, literal meanings "came first." More sophisticated meanings grew upon them' (Padel: 1992, 37).

<sup>92</sup> Ireland writes that: 'It may be that initially [*phrēn*] was restricted to the description of an anatomical feature and that by slow degrees this became extended to the abstract quality of 'mind' and its physical location, until this latter significance came to prevail. It may be that the process involved was quite the reverse, and that initially the word described a state of consciousness later situated within an organ imagined to be its source' (Ireland: 1975, 195).

<sup>93</sup> Sullivan acknowledges this possibility, but argues that it is the least likely of the two possibilities (Sullivan: 1988, 29). See also Harrison, E. L. (1960). Notes on Homeric Psychology. *Phoenix*, 14 (2), 63-80, esp. 65; and Ireland: 1975, 195. For an alternative point of view, see Claus: 1981, 14-16.

<sup>94</sup> Sullivan: 1988, 162. Both Sullivan (*ibid.*, 22) and Onians, in *The Origins of European Thought*, contend that the *phrenes* regained this predominantly physical connotation by the latter half of the fifth century, with the Hippocratic school, as well as Plato (*Timaeus* 70A) and Aristotle (*Part of Animals* III.10, 672 b 10), identifying the *phrenes* as the diaphragm (Onians, R. B. (1951). *The Origins of European Thought: About the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate* (1954 ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 23-4).

believes that ‘all mental terminology had this sort of physical origin.’<sup>95</sup> On this view, *thumos* would also have once been some physical entity or substance – the most influential identification being ‘breath,’ which will be examined in the following section – which came to have a psychological aspect as well, as man’s thought advanced and became more capable of appreciating abstractions.

Accompanying this shift from the predominantly physical to the indeterminately physical and additionally psychological, was the shift from the concrete to the abstract. As *phrenes* started to take on psychological functions, those qualities that were thought to characterise the physical *phrenes* became abstracted, and came also to characterise the psychological *phrenes*. I will argue in the following chapter that *phrenes* were conceived of as physical entities characterised – when in their ideal condition – by strength, balance, and structural integrity. As the ancient’s conception of *phrenes* became less concrete and more abstract, the qualities were similarly abstracted, and came to characterise the psychological functions themselves. The final evolution of *thumos* and *phrenes* is the absorption by each entity of those functions originally performed exclusively by the other entity. On this view, as the conception of the entities became less physical and concrete, and more psychological and abstract, *thumos* came to participate in some of the intellectual and deliberative functions of the *phrenes* that enclosed them, and *phrenes* came to participate in some of the emotional and volitional functions of the *thumos* that resided within them. So, by the time we find the psychological entities in Homer they are physical and psychological, concrete and abstract, and thoroughly interdependent entities whose functions almost completely overlap. I will turn to an examination of the organic model of understanding the entities, before discussing objections to both the chronological and organic models, as these objections are on largely the same grounds.

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<sup>95</sup> Harrison: 1960, 65.

### (iii) *The Organic Model*

*Phrenes* are given a physical anatomical location three times in the epics. First, Patroclus strikes Sarpedon in battle where the heart (κῆρ) is enclosed by *phrenes* (*Il.* 16.481). Second, Patroclus, ‘stepping heel braced to chest [στίθεσι] dragged the spear out of [Sarpedon’s] body, and the midriff [φρένες] came away with it so that he drew out with the spearhead the life [ψυχὴν] of Sarpedon’ (*Il.* 16.503-505). The third reference to the physical location of *phrenes* is to Odysseus’ encounter with the Cyclops in *Odyssey* 9, in which Odysseus considers stabbing the Cyclops in the chest (στῆθος) where *phrenes* hold the liver (ὄθι φρένες ἦπαρ ἔχουσι, *Od.* 9.301). *Phrenes* as a physical entity, then, is indisputably located in the chest. Within the *phrenes* reside the other psychological entities: *kēr*, *noos*,<sup>96</sup> *ētor*, and, most importantly, *thumos*.<sup>97</sup> It is for this reason that Odysseus, in the famous scene in *Odyssey* 20, strikes his chest in his battle to call his *thumos* to order upon discovery of his betrayal by his women servants. Both *phrenes* and *thumos*, then, were conceived by the ancients as being located within the chest, with *thumos* residing within the *phrenes*.

Those who subscribe to the organic model offer various candidates for *phrenes*, the main contenders being: the diaphragm [or midriff],<sup>98</sup> the lungs,<sup>99</sup> and ‘a composite of psychic entities located generally in the chest region.’<sup>100</sup> Onians contends that later identification of *phrenes* with the diaphragm or midriff in the latter half of the fifth-century, caused scholars both ancient and modern to assume that Homer shared this

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<sup>96</sup> For a comparison of *noos* and *phrenes* see Claus: 1981, 19 ff.

<sup>97</sup> E.g., *kēr* (*Od.* 18.344-345); *noos* (*Il.* 18.419); *ētor* (*Il.* 8.413); and *thumos* (*Il.* 8.202, 9.462, 10.232; *Od.* 16.73, 20.38). *Thumos* is also said to leave the limbs upon death (e.g., *Il.* 23.880).

<sup>98</sup> Green and Groff, for example, identify *phrenes* as the diaphragm (Green & Groff: 2003, 6). Sullivan notes that this has been linked to the etymological root φράσσω (to enclose) mentioned above (Sullivan: 1988, 32 n.3).

<sup>99</sup> See Jaynes, J. (1976). *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind* (1990 ed.). New York: Mariner Books, 1976, 263-4.

<sup>100</sup> Sullivan: 1988, 178 (see also 26-29). Furley agrees; he contends that of the various possible candidates for the identity of *phrenes*, he prefers the identification of *phrenes* with ‘the whole collection of organs situated roughly speaking between the intestines and the collarbone ... but without much certainty’ (Furley: 1956, 3). See also Ireland & Steel: 1975, 193-4. For other, less common, interpretations see Ireland & Steel: 1975, 188.

identification.<sup>101</sup> Onians rejects this as a ‘palpably absurd’,<sup>102</sup> anachronism, and offers a number of arguments against it, of which I will discuss three.<sup>103</sup> First, that the midriff is ‘below the heart,’ which *phrenes* are explicitly said to contain in the epics.<sup>104</sup> Second, *phrenes* are also said to contain *thumos*, and Onians argues that ‘no part of the body has less obvious claims to be the seat of the [*thumos*],<sup>105</sup> if such is in point, or indeed of the intelligence, than the midriff or diaphragm, the pink muscular sheet dividing the organs of the thorax from those of the abdomen.’<sup>106</sup> Third, while ‘diaphragm’ could make sense in *Odyssey* 9 (*Od.* 9.301), where *phrenes* are said to enclose the liver, it certainly would not make sense in *Iliad* 16, where Patroclus is said to have drawn out Sarpedon’s *phrenes* after spearing him in the chest. It would not make sense because of the anatomical impossibility that an organ as tightly strung as the diaphragm could even partially be drawn out of the body with a spear (*Il.* 16.503-505). Ireland agrees, offering the additional criticism that: ‘The fact that something as insubstantial as a thin sheet of tissue should come to occupy as important a position in the Homeric view of human anatomy as it does is hardly likely, while the possibility of it adhering to a spear drawn from a wound is equally doubtful.’<sup>107</sup>

The only identification that makes sense of all the instances of *phrenes* in Homer, contends Onians, is *phrenes* as the lungs, and *thumos* as the breath that fills them; an identification also posited by P. T. Justesen in *Les principes psychologiques d’Homère*.<sup>108</sup> The lungs, contends Onians, makes sense in the context of all three locations of *phrenes* in Homer: they are located in the chest, they enclose the heart, and pieces of them could come out as a spear is drawn out from the chest. And, while the diaphragm most directly

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<sup>101</sup> Onians: 1951, 23.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>103</sup> For Onians’ other arguments see *ibid.*, 24-8.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 28. E.g., *Il.* 16.481.

<sup>105</sup> I have inserted ‘*thumos*’ where Onians had ‘blood-soul’ for the sake of clarity. Onians writes that modern and post-Homeric writers assumed that ‘*thumos*’ meant ‘blood-soul’ for Homer (Onians: 1951, 23).

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>107</sup> Ireland: 1975, 186.

<sup>108</sup> Onians: 1951, 24. See Justesen, P. T. (1928). *Les principes psychologiques d’Homère*. Copenhagen, 46 ff. (referenced by Onians: 1951, 24 n.4).

contains the liver, ‘fitting neatly around the [diaphragm]<sup>109</sup> between it and the walls of the thorax, especially at the back and the sides, are the lungs. With the membrane of the diaphragm intervening, they too “hold the liver.”<sup>110</sup> Onians’ identification of both *thumos* and *phrenes* is endorsed by James Redfield in *Nature and Culture in the Iliad*,<sup>111</sup> but Ireland and Sullivan reject ‘lungs’ as a complete definition of *phrenes*. Ireland agrees with Onians’ rejection of the diaphragm on anachronistic grounds, contending that the identification stems ‘from an all too ready acceptance of the scholia which date ultimately from the Alexandrine period,’<sup>112</sup> that mirrored ‘classical or their own contemporary usage,’<sup>113</sup> rather than that of Homer. However, Ireland argues that ‘[Onians’] arguments suffer from overstatement, from a desire to interpret literally many cases better left to be understood in a figurative sense;’<sup>114</sup> and Sullivan agrees with him, contending that ‘[Onians’] sometimes assumes a physical meaning for *phrenes* in passages where this is unlikely.’<sup>115</sup> Ireland acknowledges that the lungs could be a valid translation for those instances mentioned above in which *phrenes* are given a physical location,<sup>116</sup> but argues against a complete identification of *phrenes* with the lungs. Ireland contends that such an identification is discounted by the fact that *phrenes*, and *thumos* within them, were conceived of as the seats of the emotions, and the lungs are situated ‘too high in the thoracic cavity to be the imagined agent of many such feelings.’<sup>117</sup>

Two of the three main contenders for the organs corresponding to *phrenes* are therefore untenable as complete identifications of *phrenes*. The final contender is *phrenes* as ‘a composite of psychic entities located generally in the chest region;’<sup>118</sup> the

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<sup>109</sup> Onians refers to the diaphragm as ‘the dome’ here; however, I have replaced it with ‘diaphragm’ for the sake of clarity (Onians: 1951, 26).

<sup>110</sup> Onians: 1951, 26.

<sup>111</sup> Redfield supports this definition (Redfield: 1994, 173).

<sup>112</sup> Ireland: 1975, 185.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 186.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 188.

<sup>115</sup> Sullivan: 1988, 25. Sullivan further criticises Onians, saying ‘Onians also tends to skip from Homer to later literature without due consideration of the differences that may have arisen in the course of time’ (Sullivan: 1988, 34 n.27).

<sup>116</sup> *Il.* 16.481, *Il.* 16.503-505, *Od.* 9.301.

<sup>117</sup> Ireland: 1975, 194.

<sup>118</sup> Sullivan: 1988, 178. See also 26-29. Sullivan cites Harrison: 1960, 65 & Ireland and Steel: 1975, 193-194, on this. For other, less common, interpretations see Ireland: 1975, 188.

identification endorsed by both Ireland and Sullivan. It is worthwhile, at this stage, to be reminded of the evidence for *phrenes* in Homer: it is a physical entity located in the chest that can, to some extent, be removed from the chest as a spear is drawn out of it; it is an entity that surrounds not only the heart (*kē̄r* and *ē̄tor*) and liver, but also *noos* and *thumos*; and it is conceived of as the seat of the emotions, as well as of the intellectual faculties.<sup>119</sup> Ireland concludes from this that ‘its [*phrenes*]’ range of occurrence suggests not a single organ but a group situated within a vaguely defined area extending from the upper chest to the mid abdomen.’<sup>120</sup> Indeed, the numerous facets of *phrenes*, and the subtleties and variations in its usage and denotation, seem best explained as the result of oral composition over many centuries discussed above, which would also offer a plausible explanation of how one term that possibly once denoted a single organ or entity, could come to denote a group of organs or entities.<sup>121</sup>

It is worthwhile turning our attention to a discussion of the potential etymologies of *phrenes*, in the hope that they might illuminate our investigation into the organic nature, or organic origin, of *phrenes*, as well as their functions. Sullivan offers the following summary of potential etymologies of *phrenes*:

These include proposed relationships of *phren* with the root *\*bhren*, meaning ‘to surround,’ or with *φράσσω* meaning ‘to enclose.’ In these two roots a physical aspect of *phren* would be suggested. Another root proposed is that of *φρυ-* (related to Sanskrit *bhur-*), with the meaning ‘to shudder’ or ‘to quiver.’ Also in this root a physical aspect of *phren* would be implied. Yet another root proposed is that of *g<sup>h</sup>hren-*, with a meaning related to ‘care’ or ‘worry.’ In this root a psychological aspect of *phren* would be suggested. Rejecting all the proposals already mentioned, P. Chantraine associates the root of *phren* with a series of other nouns that are related to parts of the body. He suggests a likely parent existing between the group of *φρήν* and that of *φράζω*, with the latter meaning ‘to

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<sup>119</sup> See Ireland: 1975, 193-4. See also: Rademaker, A. (2005). *Sophrosyne and the Rhetoric of Self-Restraint: Polysemy and Persuasive Use of an Ancient Greek Value Term*. Leiden: Brill. Rademaker does not commit to an identification of *phrenes* with a particular organ, but contends that he ‘take[s] for granted here that the term *φρένες* is used both for an organ or location in the chest ... and to describe the source, faculty and products of a wide range of mental processes, including especially ... “pondering, deliberation and reflection,” and the behaviour that is the result of such deliberation’ (Rademaker: 2005, 54 n.25).

<sup>120</sup> Ireland: 1975, 194

<sup>121</sup> See Sullivan: 1988, 178.

cause to understand' or 'to explain.' In such a root both a physical and a psychological aspect of *phren* would be implied.<sup>122</sup>

The first two potential etymologies, those associating *phrenes* with *\*bhren* (to surround) and *φράσσω* (to enclose), are most relevant to the physical identity of *phrenes*. However, they could confirm both *phrenes* as lungs which surround or enclose the heart, and *phrenes* as a composite of entities located in the chest area, which could be seen to surround or enclose any number of other organs or entities. Perhaps the third potential etymology, that associating *phrenes* with *φνρ-* ('to shudder' or 'quiver') could support the *phrenes* as lungs, as the lungs can be felt to shudder or quiver when one's breathing is affected. However, like the first two potential etymologies, the third is not definitive in identifying the organic nature of *phrenes*. The other suggested etymologies could be seen to be supportive of the psychological functions of *phrenes*, particularly the intellectual function but also the emotional function.

While none of these etymologies has been proven either definitive, or indicative of the specific meaning or organic identity of *phrenes* in Homer, they could be seen to reflect both the physical and psychological elements of *phrenes*, and the range of possible etymologies clearly parallels the broad spectrum of *phrenes*' aspects and functions.<sup>123</sup> Although the illumination offered by the etymologies is perhaps limited, this does not mean that inquiries into the etymology of Homeric psychological vocabulary is therefore rendered futile. From our examination of the potential etymologies of *phrenes* above we have been alerted to various possible connections and images – such as of *phrenes* being entities that surround or enclose other entities – that might have existed in the Homeric imagination for *phrenes*. When we venture into the Homeric imagination in the next chapter of this thesis, we will find that a number of terms used to describe *phrenes* – namely *πυκνός* (wise), *ἀραρίσκω* (well-balanced), *ἔμπεδος* (unimpaired in mind), and *ἴσος* (well-balanced) – are also used to describe the physical qualities of solidity, firmness, soundness, fineness and density of texture, and steadfastness of more tangible objects whose function is to surround or enclose. Even more significantly for this thesis,

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid., 21. For an extensive list of references for these etymologies, see 32 n.1-8. See also Dihle: 1982, 178-9 n.28.

<sup>123</sup> Sullivan: 1988, 21.

in which I argue that the *phrenes* are the location of Homeric man's internal battleground, all of these terms except one are used to describe armour and soldiers on the battlefield, the purposes of both of which are to surround or enclose for protective and defensive purposes. Sullivan's note on the root *\*bhren* (to surround), as a result becomes potentially highly significant. Sullivan notes that words for 'breastplate,' also derive from this same root, and suggests that this is perhaps significant for the location of *phrenes* in the chest region.<sup>124</sup> As we will see in the following chapter, the Homeric imagination conceived of *phrenes* as metaphorical<sup>125</sup> psychological breastplates, protecting the other psychological organs, and Homeric man himself, from both internal and external damage. While my argument does not rely on the potential etymologies discussed here, I draw attention to them here because the connections between the psychological entities and the battlefield prove to be particularly striking.

Let us now turn our attention to Onians' identification of *thumos* as the breath that fills the *phrenes*. Onians supports his argument by reference to the possible etymologies of *thumos*, and to the ways in which it behaves in Homer. Onians argues that it is clear from *thumos*' cognates, such as *θυμιάω*, 'burn so as to produce smoke' (LSJ), that *thumos* was '[e]vidently something vaporous.'<sup>126</sup> I will cite Harrison's extensive discussion of *thumos*' etymology, which includes those possible etymologies discussed by Onians.

The root *dhu-* in Sanskrit and *thv-* in Greek has a primary meaning of rapid movement, as in Skt. *dhuno* 'to agitate' and Greek *θύειν* 'to seethe,'<sup>127</sup> *θύελλα* 'storm,' and *θυιάς* 'mad woman.' Association with the rapid movement of smoke gives Skt. *dhumas* "smoke" and a second verb *θύειν* 'to turn into smoke,' i.e., 'to burn,' specifically of sacrificial offerings; words connected with the resultant smoke, such as *θυμιάων* 'to vaporise,' *θύος* 'incense,' and *θύμος* 'thyme,' a plant that gives off a fragrance comparable to incense; and words in Latin such as *fumus*, *subfio*, and *subfimentum*, which show the same sort of development. It is reasonable then to seek some connection between *θυμός* and smoke: and, since it invariably belongs to living creatures, it is also reasonable to find that connection in the idea of 'breath.' This conclusion is corroborated by the development from

<sup>124</sup> Sullivan, however, omits the ancient Greek term she is talking about here (ibid., 32 n.2).

<sup>125</sup> Again, it is crucial to be mindful of that fact that the distinction between literal and metaphorical is our own, and one that the Homeric mind did not necessarily share.

<sup>126</sup> Onians: 1951, 44 & 47.

<sup>127</sup> See Plato's derivation of *thumos* from *θύω* at *Cratylus* 419e.

the same root of Slavonic *dusa* ‘breath,’ and by comparison with the etymology of *καπνός*, which shows a similar connection between smoke and breath.<sup>128</sup>

From examination of these cognates of *thumos*, it is clear that – regardless of whether or not it retained this association by the time it comes to Homer – it is likely that at some stage *thumos* was associated with air, whether in the form of breath, vapour, wind, smoke, or all of the above; and not just air, but air that was dynamic, agitated, volatile, impulsive and perhaps even *emotional*.

The likelihood that *thumos* was associated with breath, both in Homer and at an earlier stage in its linguistic history, is increased when one examines the way in which *thumos* is used in the epics, and the ways in which it behaves. Onians contends that *thumos* is used in Homer in a multitude of ways that are suggestive of breath. It is said to be breathed or gasped out upon death;<sup>129</sup> and to be lost upon fainting, being wounded, or becoming breathless. It is said to be regained – or gathered back into *phrenes* – upon the return of consciousness, or upon realising the non-fatal nature of one’s wound, or upon catching one’s breath after physical exertion.<sup>130</sup> While Harrison finds Onians’ identification of *thumos* with breath by way of etymological analysis ‘reasonable,’ he argues that examination of the usage of *thumos* in Homer reveals that ‘by the time we meet it [*thumos* in Homer] the “breath” basis is no longer evident.’<sup>131</sup> According to Harrison, Homeric *thumos* is not simply or even basically breath, but rather ‘breath as it

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<sup>128</sup> Harrison: 1960, 65-6. See also Beekes, R., & Beek, L. v. (2010). *Etymological Dictionary of Greek* (Vol. I). Brill, s. v. ‘*thumos*’: ‘Identical with Skt. *dhūmā-*, Lat. *fūmus*, Lith. *dūmai* [pl.], OCS *dymb* “smoke”; the meaning “smoke” is preserved in – θυμιάω. On the meaning of – θυμός, see Chantraine 1933: 134. OHG *toum* “steam, vapor”, with an IE diphthong \**ou*, has been cited. Cf. – θύω 2. DELG compares – θύω 1 “rush in, rage”, because derivation from “smoke” is judged to be difficult.’ For other discussions of the etymology of *thumos*, see: Onians: 1951, 44-5. Adkins, A. W. (1970). *From the Many to the One*. London: Cornell University Press, 16-17. Lynch & Miles: 1980, 4-5. Sullivan: 1980, 138. Dihle: 1982, 177 n.28. Padel: 1992, 27. Clarke: 1999, 79-82.

<sup>129</sup> ἀποπνείω (*Il.* 4.524, 13.654); ἀΐσθω (*Il.* 16.468, 20.403); ἀσπαίρω (*Il.* 3.293) (Onians: 1951, 45).

<sup>130</sup> Onians: 1951, 44-65. For fainting see *Il.* 22.475; for being wounded see *Il.* 4.152; and for catching one’s breath see *Od.* 5.458.

<sup>131</sup> Harrison: 1960, 65 & 68. According to Harrison, in Homer ‘θυμός is not basically “breath” in any abstract sense, but the breath as it was affected in experience: in effect, then, abnormal breathing. Homeric man, equating symptom with cause, felt this as an entity at work inside himself whenever he panted with eagerness, choked with rage, sobbed with grief, sighs with regret, and so on: and it became the most important of all the seats of his mental life (ibid., 66).

was affected in experience.’<sup>132</sup> This affected breath was energized and fast-moving. The movement of the breathy *thumos* was denoted by such verbs as *ἀσπαίρω*, used to describe breath that was gasped or panted out in the death-struggle, as well as convulsive movements of the limbs and the throbbing of the heart; and *ἀίσθω*, which can also mean to gasp out (*Hom. Lex.*). Harrison’s argument for *thumos* as affected breath is persuasive. However, he fails to substantiate his claim that *thumos* was not also the physical breath breathed out by Homeric man. From our discussion of the many physical and psychological facets of the entities, it is clear that the same entity could be understood by the Homeric mind as both physiological and psychological.

Padel, on the other hand, agrees with Onians that the range of usage of *thumos* is suggestive of breath, but adds that the descriptions of *thumos* as increasing and collecting in *phrenes*, as filling up a person, is also suggestive of something liquid or fluid.<sup>133</sup> Just as emotions could be understood by Homeric man as the differences in one’s breath so could emotion be understood as the swelling or boiling of liquid.<sup>134</sup> Perhaps Onians would account for this by reference to his connection between *thumos* and the blood, which, he suggests, heats the thumotic breath creating a vapour.<sup>135</sup> The connection between blood and *thumos* as breath is tightened when we consider that strongly emotional nature of *thumos*, and the fact that ‘breathing is affected when there is violent emotion, and not only the breathing but the flow of blood. There is pulsation with flushing or pallor.’<sup>136</sup> Perhaps the tightening of the chest and the increased beating of the heart associated with the onset of fierce thumotic passions were imagined by the Homeric mind as a swelling of the internal organs by volatile vapours and boiling liquids. Indeed, the heating of the body associated with anger, and the cooling of the body associated with fear and cowardice, could also be explained by reference to the affect of the temperature of blood on *thumos*.

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<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.

<sup>133</sup> Padel: 1992, 28-29; see also 26, 30, & 89.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, 89.

<sup>135</sup> Onians: 1951, 47.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

Scholars such as Claus<sup>137</sup> and Padel,<sup>138</sup> however, take the novel and controversial approach of rejecting all models of understanding the psychological entities mentioned above – chronological, organic,<sup>139</sup> and etymological – except for analysis of the Homeric usage of the terms and, in Claus’ case, functional analysis. Both scholars contend that by subscribing to the rest of the above models we are projecting our own beliefs, distinctions, and semantic fields upon the psychological entities, and in doing so we are limiting their potential meanings in Homer. Early scholarship on Homeric psychology determined the path of future scholarship, limiting it by anachronistically projecting modern distinctions between the physical, emotional, and psychological on the entities,<sup>140</sup> and restricting it by deciding that the fact that the entities behave sometimes as physical organs and other times as psychological forces meant that the relationship between the entities and organs was an analogous one.<sup>141</sup> The arguments of both Snell and Onians, contend Claus and Padel, were tainted by the pervasive nineteenth-century anthropological assumption – now in disfavour – that evolutionary patterns move from the simple to the complex, from concrete to abstract, from literal to metaphorical.<sup>142</sup> This assumption is inherent in both the chronological and organic models, and it serves to undermine them. The organic model is further undermined, argues Claus, by the fact that, even had the entities once been conceived of as specific physical organs, there is little evidence in Homer that these physical referents have been retained and, if they have been, this retention is at the very best imprecise and inconsistent.<sup>143</sup> Etymological analyses face the same fate as the chronological and organic models, with Claus rejecting

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<sup>137</sup> See Claus: 1981, 7, 12-4, & 16.

<sup>138</sup> See Padel: 1992, 27 n. 60, 29 n. 66, 37 n. 86, & 36-9.

<sup>139</sup> Classen also rejects the organic model. While he speculates that *phrenes* probably designated particular organs, and acknowledges that they were sometimes given physical locations in the human body in the epics, these locations were not consistent with one another (Classen: 2005, 58.)

<sup>140</sup> See Böhme: 1929 (reference at Padel: 1992, 27 n.60); and Snell, B. (1931). Review of Böhme 1929. *Gnomon*, 7, 74-86.

<sup>141</sup> See Snell: 1953, 15 & 19-21.

<sup>142</sup> Claus: 1981, 14-5; & Padel: 1992, 38 & n. 88. Padel argues that ‘[i]t is clear that early things are not necessarily less complex than later ones. Ancient Greek is more complex than modern, for instance. ... The “original meanings” or “genetic” approach to Greek words or consciousness is now part of history, to be seen in *its* context: an expression of the nineteenth century’s desire to “explain the nearer by the farther’ (Padel: 1992, 38).

<sup>143</sup> See Claus: 1981, 14-5

them on the ground that they are ‘often vague or impossible to interpret in the light of Homeric usage,’<sup>144</sup> and Padel supporting Claus’ rejection.<sup>145</sup>

While Claus and Padel are right to reject attempts to understand the psychological entities by reference to only one of the traditional models – chronological, organic, or etymological – I suggest that Claus’ complete rejection of these models is misguided. It is true that approaching the psychological entities from a single of these perspectives can limit one’s appreciation of them; however, I contend that rejecting the models altogether similarly limits one’s understanding. Etymological analyses of the entities have not proven to be decisive, and nor have they revealed exactly how the entities were conceived of by the Homeric mind. However, they do point to potential associations that the entities may have had in the Homeric mind, and we should keep ourselves alive to these associations in our investigations of the entities. It is clearly misguided, on the grounds of our almost complete lack of evidence of how the entities were originally understood, to say that the entities were definitely conceived of as simple organs, and came, as man’s thought advanced, to be conceived of as complex abstractions of these organs. However, again on the same grounds of lack of evidence, it is imprudent to reject this possibility altogether. Padel’s approach by way of Homeric usage of the terms, and by reference to the way in which the entities behave in Homer, is undoubtedly the best way of approaching the entities if we want to avoid bringing our preconceptions along with us. Instead of rejecting the traditional models, however, I contend that we should draw upon all of them in our understanding of these elusive and mysterious entities, keeping alive the various possibilities that each model entails. This method would prove particularly valuable, if we found each method pointing to the same conclusion.

The aim of this first chapter has been to ask the apparently simple question: what are *thumos* and *phrenes*? As we have seen, there can be no simple answer to this question. The answer ‘breath’ and ‘lungs’ entirely fails to articulate the richness and depth of these entities, as do sterilized accounts of the two entities by exclusive reference

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<sup>144</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>145</sup> Padel contends that Claus ‘rightly (I think)’ rejects etymological analysis of Homeric psychological vocabulary (Padel: 1992, 37 n.86).

to their functions. However, that does not mean that our investigation has been in vain. One thing in particular has become apparent in our examination of the potential histories, etymologies, and organic identities of *thumos* and *phrenes*, and our discussion of the ways in which these two terms are used, and the way these two entities behave, in Homer. That is, that *thumos* and *phrenes* were conceived of as having very different physical natures. Onians' identification of *thumos* as breath that fills the lungs; Padel's observations concerning the ways that *thumos* behaves in Homer in ways suggestive of swelling vapour and boiling liquid; and the potential etymologies of *thumos* linking it with smoke, incense, breath, and agitation,<sup>146</sup> all agree on one thing: that *thumos* was an entity conceived of by the Homeric mind as something dynamic, vaporous or fluid, something entirely lacking in solidity. By contrast, Onians' identification of *phrenes* with lungs; Padel's observation that *phrenes* behave as fillable, damageable vessels or containers, that they are 'the folding center, folding the heart, holding the liver';<sup>147</sup> and the potential etymologies that link *phrenes* with terms meaning 'to surround' and 'to enclose,'<sup>148</sup> all offer a similar picture of *phrenes* as solid entities. Further evidence for solidity of *phrenes* can be found by examining the terms briefly mentioned above (*πυκινός*, *ἀραρίσκω*, *ἔμπεδος*, and *ἴσος*) used to praise *phrenes* as well as to denote the density, strength, and structural integrity of things like well-built houses, walls, shields, and ranks of soldiers on the battlefield. These terms, and what we can gain from consideration of the connection between them and *phrenes*, will be examined in detail in chapter 2.

We can then, at the very least, agree on this much: that the physical states of *thumos* and *phrenes* were conceived of as being opposite of one another, *thumos* as a vaporous or fluid, dynamic entity, and *phrenes* as a solid, enclosing, more static entity; except, that is, when they are in a negative state. Criticisms of characters in the epics often take the form of ascribing an iron-like nature to the psychological entities. In his dying speech Hector accuses Achilles of having a *thumos* of iron in his *phrenes* (σιδήρεος ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός, *Il.* 22.357), for refusing to promise Hector that he would not let Hector's

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<sup>146</sup> See pp. 40-41 above for the discussion of the potential etymologies of *thumos*.

<sup>147</sup> Padel: 1992, 21.

<sup>148</sup> See pp. 38-9 above for the discussion of *phrenes*' potential etymologies.

corpse be savaged by dogs. In the final chapter of this thesis, I will examine the various criticisms of Achilles' psychological entities made by Iliadic characters, arguing that at the heart of these criticisms is a condemnations of Achilles' stubbornness and his single-minded inflexibility. While ascriptions of ironness to other psychic organs such as the *ētor* can sometimes be positive (e.g., σιδήρειόν νύ τοι ἦτορ, *Il.* 24.521)<sup>149</sup> and at other times negative (e.g., *Od.* 23.172 & *Il.* 24.205), ascriptions of ironness to *thumos* are always negative (see also *Od.* 5.191).

Just as solidity is only ascribed to *thumos* when it is in a negative condition, solidity is only denied to *phrenes* when they are in a negative condition. The *phrenes* of young men, for example, are said to particularly lacking in solidity. In *Iliad* 3 Menelaus calls for Priam to make an oath, saying:

αἰεὶ δ' ὀπλοτέρων ἀνδρῶν φρένες ἠερέθονται ·  
οἷς δ' ὁ γέρων μετέησιν, ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω  
λεύσσει, ὅπως ὄχ' ἄριστα μετ' ἀμφοτέροισι γένηται (*Il.* 3.108-10)

Always it is that the hearts in younger men are frivolous,  
but when an elder man is among them, he looks behind him  
and in front, so that all comes out far better for both sides.

The *phrenes* of young men are so lacking in solidity that they are said to *ἠερέθονται*, that is, to 'turn with every wind' (LSJ). We come to the core of the Homeric conception of endurance when we inquire into the identity of these figurative 'winds' that turn the fragile or unstable *phrenes* about so. Cunliffe accurately and insightfully identifies them as the individual's 'passion[s],'<sup>150</sup> that is, the figurative winds of the thumotic passions.<sup>151</sup> When Homeric man's *phrenes* lack solidity, his thoughts and actions will be at the whim of, and controlled by, whatever passions happen to be foremost within his *thumos* at that particular moment. By contrast with the young man of vulnerable *phrenes* is the old man

<sup>149</sup> Achilles says to Priam: 'Ah, unlucky, surely you have had must evil to endure in your spirit. How could you dare to come alone to the ships of the Achaians and before my eyes, when I am one who have killed in such numbers such brave sons of yours? The heart [ἦτορ] in you is iron' (*Il.* 24.517-21).

<sup>150</sup> Cunliffe: 1963, s.v. *ἠερέθονται*.

<sup>151</sup> See Caswell (1990, 51-63) on the connection between *thumos* and winds.

whose actions result in the best (or, better) consequences because he is able to look both ‘behind him and in front.’ In reading of these two men, the young man and the old, two characters are recalled immediately to mind. First, the young and foolish Paris, the paradigmatic example of the character blown about by his passions, of whom Helen says: ‘But this man’s heart is no steadfast thing [οὐτ’ ἄρ νῦν φρένες ἔμπεδοι], nor yet will it be so ever hereafter [οὐτ’ ἄρ’ ὀπίσσω ἔσσονται] (*Il.* 6.532-3).’ And second, the old prophet Tiresias, able to see both past and future; and the only character in Homeric whose *phrenes* are said to be *empedoi* (φρένες ἔμπεδοί εἰσι, *Od.* 10.493).

As we will see in our examination of the Homeric decision-making scenes in chapters three and four, endurance is the capacity to see past, and master, one’s current passions in the pursuit of one’s overall goal. This capacity depends upon the states of one’s psychological entities, and the relationship between them. *Thumos* must be in its proper state of warm, breathy, fluid, dynamic flexibility in order to adapt to changing situations and circumstances, and to submit to the will of the gods. Ironness of *thumos*, that is, a *thumos* that is inflexible, stubborn, or unyielding, leads to behaviour that is negative on both moral and prudential grounds. More importantly, however, the *phrenes* must be solid, strong, and steadfast. If they are not, Homeric man will be at the whim of whatever passion is strongest within him at any given time. Such a character is unsteady, unreliable, and unenduring.

I will conclude this chapter by quoting Padel’s summary of the psychological entities – or ‘innard words,’ as she called them – which, I contend, offers the best articulation of the psychological entities. In Homer<sup>152</sup> and tragedy, Padel contends that:

... *phrēn*, *phrenes*, *kardie*, *hēpar*, *chloē*, *cholos*, and arguably *menos* refer to physical parts and substances that behave as physical parts and substances do behave (or as Greek mentality perceives them as behaving). Words whose physiological reference we cannot catch, like *thumos*, *psuchē*, *nous*, seem (to us at least) to pull this concreteness into their own behavioral range. *Menos*, *thumos*, *psuchē* also sometimes act like vessels filled by breath or fluid, that beat and

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<sup>152</sup> Though Padel begins this quote by attributing the account of the psychological entities to tragedy, it is clear from that her study of the Homeric entities that the same could be said of them (see Padel: 1992, 12-48).

knock and can be physically hurt by emotion. *Nous* never behaves as a fluid, but often behaves like a vessel receiving emotion or sensation. *Menos* and *cholos* are the only ones that are not occasionally treated as organs or vessels. No word has a total monopoly over thinking or feeling. Concrete physical inner organs belong with ideas of physical agency. Intellectual activity is inseparable from emotional activity.<sup>153</sup>

In our attempts to come to a more profound appreciation of Homer's psychological 'equipment' (to use Padel's term), we should not limit ourselves to thinking of them as exclusively organic, or abstract, or even confused. Rather, we should keep an open mind, and not reject outright the possibility that the entities are all of these things to varying degrees; that they might be organs and vessels, substances and forces, and physical entities with psychological functions.

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<sup>153</sup> The quote continues thus: 'When I speak of innards, I mean all this equipment of feeling and thinking. The poets treat these words fluidly as organs, vessels, liquid, breath. But I am not suggesting that tragedians "blurred" distinctions we make between mind and body, or that these words were ambiguous, or that the psychological "overlapped" the physical in Greek thought. These critical metaphors of blur and overlap would imply that the Greeks perceived two different things to blur, two meanings to slip between. If the distinctions and meanings are ours, not theirs, then there were no two things for them to blur or be ambiguous about. It is not useful to project semantic fields of our own words, like heart, soul, mind, or spirit, or talk in terms of slippage. Our own semantic fields, however, are what we have to work with' (Padel: 1992, 39).

## Chapter II: *The Much-Enduring Thumos*

In the previous chapter we were introduced to Homer's rich and manifold psychological vocabulary, and to the different schools of thought regarding the psychological entities. In the following chapters I offer a comprehensive account of endurance by analysing *τάω*, the main Homeric verb for endurance, and examining the dramatisation of endurance in the Homeric 'deliberation' or 'decision-making' scenes. In these paradigmatic scenes of Homeric endurance, the agent is torn between two impulses, one more passionate and the other more rational, and engages in anguished deliberation concerning which of the two impulses to follow, and which to restrain. Homeric deliberation in these scenes, then, is passionate as well as intellectual. I argue that Homeric endurance consists in restraining the passionate impulse, and acting on the rational impulse. In this chapter I join recent scholarship's rejection of Jahn's thesis concerning the functional synonymy of the psychological entities, arguing that while *thumos* and *phrenes* both participate in the deliberation and restraint that constitutes endurance, the ways in which they perform these functions is entirely different.

As *thumos* is generally conceived of as essentially passionate, and *phrenes* as essentially intellectual, an obvious hypothesis concerning their different roles in endurance would be that *thumos* is the origin of the passionate impulse, and *phrenes* is the origin of the rational impulse. On this view, endurance would consist in *phrenes* restraining *thumos*. In order to explain why this hypothesis is mistaken, I summarise and evaluate three ways in which scholars argue for the essentially passionate nature of *thumos* and the essentially intellectual nature of *phrenes*; first, by reference to the greater frequency of *thumos* with verbs of, or in contexts of, emotion, and the greater frequency of *phrenes* with verbs of, or in contexts of, cognition; second, by comparison of the ways in which the psychological entities participate in the same functions; and third, by analysis of the degree to which *thumos* and *phrenes* were thought of as entities independent of, and in opposition to, Homeric man. I offer a version of this third type of argument, by comparative analysis of the frequency with which *thumos* and *phrenes* are governed by verbs of control, restraint, and endurance. Finally, I suggest that in order to gain a more profound appreciation of *thumos* and *phrenes*, and the roles they perform in

endurance, we must venture into the Homeric imagination, looking for connections and associations with which the ancient terms were imbued. I offer an account of how these two entities were imagined in the Homeric mind, by analysing a number of terms – *πυκινός*, *ἀραρίσκω*, *ἔμπεδος*, and *ἴσος* – used both of the psychological entities are other more tangible entities.

### (i) *The Passionate Thumos and the Intellectual Phrenes*

Deliberation in the Homeric decision-making scenes, the dramatic form that endurance takes in the epics, is denoted by one of two verbs: *ὀρμαίνω* or *μερμηρίζω*.<sup>154</sup> While I will leave a proper examination of these verbs for the following chapter, in which I analyse the decision-making scenes at length, it is important to note at this point one of the differences between the ways in which *thumos* and *phrenes* participate in deliberation that is revealed by analysis of these two verbs. This analysis demonstrates that while both entities can be the locations or faculties of this deliberation, of the two entities only *thumos* can also be the agent of this deliberation.<sup>155</sup> There are two examples of *thumos* acting as the agent of deliberation, both of which are in the *Odyssey*. First, in *Odyssey* 16, Telemachus says that Penelope's divided *thumos* ponders in her *phrenes* (δίχρα θυμὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζει) whether to remain faithful to Odysseus, or to marry the best of the suitors (*Od.* 16.73). Second, upon his return to Ithaca in *Odyssey* 20, Odysseus confides to Athena that the *thumos* in his *phrenes* is pondering (θυμὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζει) how to take on the wicked suitors single-handedly (*Od.* 20.38). *Phrenes*, by contrast, only ever function as the location or faculty of the deliberation of the individual or his *thumos*.<sup>156</sup> However, it is clear that *phrenes* were thought of as performing a crucial role in deliberation from analysis of the frequency with which deliberation is attributed to the two entities, either as locations or faculties. Deliberation is most frequently attributed to

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<sup>154</sup> While deliberation can be denoted by other verbs in Homer, the decision-making scenes that will be addressed in this study are those characterised by the formula: *ὀρμαίνω / μερμηρίζω κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν*.

<sup>155</sup> *Ētor* (*Il.* 1.188-9) and *kēr* (*Od.* 7.82-3; 18.345; & 23.85-6) can also be the agents of deliberation.

<sup>156</sup> See Sullivan: 1988, 163.

both *thumos* and *phrenes* together;<sup>157</sup> it is only slightly less frequently attributed to *phrenes* alone;<sup>158</sup> and it is significantly less frequently attributed to *thumos* alone.<sup>159</sup> Therefore, while *thumos* often performs a uniquely active role in deliberation, *phrenes* seem to perform a role of crucial importance.

Is this the only difference in the way that *thumos* and *phrenes* participate in deliberation, both entities acting as the location or faculty of deliberation, and only *thumos* sometimes also acting as the agent of the deliberation? As noted above, in the decision-making scenes, the deliberating agent is psychologically divided between following his passionate and rational impulses. Could the difference in the ways in which the two entities participate in deliberation be that *thumos* generates the passionate impulse, *phrenes* generates the rational impulse, and the agent endures when his *phrenes* succeed in restraining his *thumos*? The short answer is: not exactly. This is a common misunderstanding of *thumos* and *phrenes* in Homer, undoubtedly stemming from Plato's later separation of *thumos* from the rational, as well as from the failure to appreciate how inextricably bound together thought and feeling are in Homer. But, most importantly, this misunderstanding stems from the fact that *thumos* is associated more with the passions, and *phrenes* is associated more with the intellect and reason in Homer. The long answer is somewhat more complicated. The passionate impulses *can* be exclusively attributed to *thumos*, but the rational impulses cannot be attributed exclusively to *phrenes*. Rather, the rational impulses *also* belong to *thumos*. That is not to say that *phrenes* have no role in deliberation, quite the contrary, they have a *pivotal* role in deliberation, but it is not that

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<sup>157</sup> Fourteen times. Both *thumos* and *phrenes* are cited as the locations for deliberation as denoted by the verb *ὀρμαίνω* four times in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 1.193, 11.411, 17.106, & 18.15), and four times in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 4.120, 5.365, 5.424, & 6.118). Both *thumos* and *phrenes* are cited as the locations for deliberation as denoted by the verb *μερμηρίζω* twice in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 5.671, & 8.169), and four times in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 4.117, 10.151, 20.10, & 24.235).

<sup>158</sup> Thirteen times. *Phrenes* is cited as the only location for deliberation as denoted by the verb *ὀρμαίνω* three times in the *Iliad* (at *Il.* 10.4, 10.507, 16.435); and twice in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 3.151, & 4.843). *Phrenes* is cited as the only location for deliberation as denoted by the verb *μερμηρίζω* once in the *Iliad* (at *Il.* 2.3); and seven times in the *Odyssey* (at *Od.* 1.427, 2.94, 10.438, 11.204, 20.41, 22.333, & 24.128)

<sup>159</sup> Six times. *Thumos* is cited as the only location for deliberation as denoted by the verb *ὀρμαίνω* three times in the *Iliad* (at *Il.* 14.20, 21.137, & 24.680); and once in the *Odyssey* (at *Od.* 2.156). *Thumos* is cited as the only location for deliberation as denoted by *μερμηρίζω* twice in the *Odyssey* (at *Od.* 10.50, & 16.237), and never in the *Iliad*.

of providing the rational and passion-restraining impulse. Rather, the capacity of the *thumos* to restrain itself, is determined by the *phrenes* that surround it.

Before elaborating on this last point, and examining the different roles of *thumos* and *phrenes* in deliberation, it is worthwhile looking more closely at the ways in which scholars generally justify their claims that *thumos* is connected more with the passions, and that *phrenes* is connected more with the intellect or reason. It is unanimous that *thumos* is an essentially passionate entity, and that *phrenes* is an essentially intellectual entity.<sup>160</sup> While most scholars tend to assume that this is the case, those who go further and attempt to justify their claims generally do so in one of three ways. First, by reference to the greater frequency of *thumos* with verbs of, or in contexts of, emotion; and the greater frequency of *phrenes* with verbs of, or in contexts of, cognition. Second, by comparison of the ways in which the psychological entities participate in the same emotional and cognitive functions. And third, analysis of the degree to which *thumos* and *phrenes* were thought of as entities independent of, and in opposition to, Homeric man. After offering a brief summary of a number of justifications of the first type, I examine examples of the second and third types of justifications in greater depth in order to

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<sup>160</sup> K. Von Fritz claims that ‘*θυμός* always designates a more passionate or emotional part or function of the soul’ (Von Fritz: 1943, 82). Clarke makes the similar claim that ‘*θυμός* ... is especially connected with passionate emotion’ (Clarke: 1999, 64). While neither Von Fritz nor Clarke offers arguments for their claims, Clarke’s omission is explained by his controversial denial that ‘firm distinction[s]’ can be drawn between the functions of the psychological entities (Clarke: 1999, 64; contra. Snell: 1953, 14). Snell interprets *thumos* as ‘the mental organ which causes (e)motion’, though he acknowledges its additional intellectual functions (Snell: 1953, 12). Snell justifies his claim about *thumos* by reference to a number of passages in which *thumos* fulfills a passionate function, and offers a brief examination of *thumos* by comparing it with other psychological entities (ibid., 10-14).

Dodds contends that ‘It [*thumos*] may be defined, roughly and generally, as the organ of feeling’ (Dodds: 1951, 16). Lynch and Miles state that, ‘As a general rule, emotions originate from the *thumos* and consequently the *thumos* is the source of non-rational motivation’ (Lynch & Miles: 1980, 5). Gaskin cites Schmitt’s contention that, unlike *noos*, the sense in which *thumos* engages in intellectual activity is restricted, and ‘given to emotionally driven distortion of facts, whereas the *noos* takes a more emotionally detached view of the overall moral significance of the agent’s situation and options’ (Gaskin: 2001, 153 n. 14). Onians states that ‘It is *θυμός* which is most often mentioned when the poet is describing emotion’ (Onians: 1951, 49). For an insightful analysis of the relation between *thumos* as breath and emotion see Onians: 1951, 49-53. Austin contends that: ‘That *thymos* and *noos* represent our basic dichotomy between emotion and intellect ... is almost universally accepted among modern scholars’ (Austin: 1983, 270 n.25). For a comparison of the intellectual natures of *noos* and *phrenes* see Jan N. Bremmer’s *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul* (1983, 61)

illustrate how intricately bound together *thumos* and *phrenes*, and passion and intellect, are in Homer, before drawing upon arguments by Caswell and Sullivan in order to offer my own version of this third type of argument.

First, scholars who argue that *thumos* is associated more with the passions, and *phrenes* with the intellect and reason, often appeal to the comparative frequency of these psychological entities with verbs of, or in contexts of, emotion and cognition. For example, Caswell states that ‘It is true that φρήν/φρένες is found more frequently in the intellectual context than is θυμός.’<sup>161</sup> She contends that *thumos* is found twice as often as *phrenes* in the context of emotion, and that of all of the occurrences of *thumos* in the *Iliad*, eighty-five percent of these are in the context of emotion.<sup>162</sup> To defend his claim that *phrenes* are essentially intellectual, Harrison cites Jansen’s estimation that approximately seventy percent of the occurrences of *phrenes* in Homer are primarily intellectual.<sup>163</sup> Claus goes further than this, analysing in detail the instances of *phrenes* in *Iliad* and *Odyssey* Books 1-12. Of these one hundred and forty-seven instances of *phrenes*, Claus contends that ‘only twenty-five are not ambiguous with “thought”, “thoughts”, or “wits.”’<sup>164</sup> Of these twenty-five that are not essentially intellectual, Claus contends that nine of these are more passionate than intellectual; he describes three of these as ‘ambiguously emotional,’ and six as denoting a ‘dispassionate pleasure of the sort that may be derived, for example, from music.’<sup>165</sup> I will look at another argument of

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<sup>161</sup> Caswell: 1990, 52. Webster agrees, stating that ‘... *phrenes*, *thymos*, and *kradie* to a large extent overlap in Homer (although *phrenes* is more often used in intellectual contexts than the other two)’ (Webster: 1957, 149).

<sup>162</sup> Caswell contends that ‘the overall use of θυμός is twice as extensive that [*sic.*] of φρήν/φρένες in this [emotional] context. ... And although the use of φρήν/φρένες is distributed fairly evenly between contexts of cognition and emotion in the *Iliad*, 85 per cent of the occurrences of θυμός are in the emotional context’ (Caswell: 1990, 34).

She further contends that *thumos* is the most important of the psychological entities when it comes to the emotional function. She states that: ‘θυμός plays the most important role in this context [i.e., emotion] of any of its functional synonyms. Its functional synonyms ἤτορ/κῆρ/κραδίη occur infrequently, and φρήν/φρένες usually appears as the location rather than the psychological element directly affected. The fact that θυμός is the constant factor in passages describing a large number of emotions suggests that it itself is the neutral bearer of emotion’ (Caswell: 1990, 50).

<sup>163</sup> Harrison: 1960, 67 n. 24. See Boehme: 1929, *Die Seele und das Ich im Homerischen Epos*, 42.

<sup>164</sup> Claus: 1981, 18.

<sup>165</sup> Claus’ analysis reads: ‘It is important ... that of a sample of 147 instances of φρήν/φρένες (*Iliad* and *Odyssey* 1-12) only twenty-five are not ambiguous with “thought”, “thoughts”, or “wits” as

this type, before returning to examine these dispassionate pleasures, or passions, in more detail.<sup>166</sup>

An illustration of just how difficult it is to argue for the essentially passionate and intellectual natures of *thumos* and *phrenes* respectively by reference to the comparative frequency of the two entities with emotions of passion and cognition, can be seen by examining Harrison's argument of this type. Harrison argues that: '[t]he impulsiveness of anger [χόλος] and courage [θάρσος],<sup>167</sup> is much less frequently seated in it [*phrenes*]; instead we find most commonly the introspection of grief [πένθος, ἄχος] and of fear [πλήσσω].'<sup>168</sup> Leaving aside for the moment the fact that Harrison subtly attributes the *impulsiveness* of anger and courage to *thumos*, and the *introspection* to grief and fear to *phrenes*, rather than the passions themselves, it is worthwhile to take a moment to investigate the comparative frequency of the passions themselves with the two entities. Examination of the passages in Homer in which χόλος and θάρσος are seated in *thumos* and *phrenes* reveals that while χόλος is indeed much more frequently seated in *thumos* than in *phrenes* (seven times in *thumos* and only once in *phrenes*),<sup>169</sup> θάρσος is, in fact,

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described. Of these exceptional occurrences four are anatomical (three of these are imprecise and ambiguously emotional), four place the θυμός or ἦτορ in the φρένες, one describes the return of consciousness to the φρήν after syncope, and four are anomalous. Of the twelve remaining uses of φρήν/φρένες only two are not in the singular, and of the ten other passages six describe dispassionate pleasure of the sort that may be derived, for example, from music – a usage which significantly distinguishes φρήν from the “life-force” words [by which he means: θυμός, μένος, ἦτορ, and κῆρ; which can be translated, he contends, as ‘life’ either in the sense of ‘“life destroyed at death” (θυμός, μένος, ἦτορ), or as the “life” component in α-privative adjectives meaning “lifeless” (μένος, κῆρ)’ (Claus: 1981, 21)] when it acts as an emotional agent not readily connected with “thoughts”. Of the 122 instances that can be regarded as ambiguous with “thought,” fifteen clearly tend to characterize φρήν/φρένες as a persistent entity by the generality of their contexts or by making φρήν/φρένες the subject of emotional states like πόνος and ἄχος, but even these are interpretable as “thoughts”’ (ibid., 18-19).

<sup>166</sup> Note that Sullivan urges caution, contending that ‘It may seem that intellectual activity occurs most frequently in *phrenes* (List III: 115 occurrences) but often this is only one aspect among others also discernable. In many cases, as we have seen, these aspects cannot be distinguished, and attempts to do so may distort the meaning of the particular verb that is found and the implications in meaning for *phrenes* themselves’ (Sullivan: 1988, 103).

<sup>167</sup> θάρσος is more properly translated as ‘boldness’ or ‘bravery.’

<sup>168</sup> Harrison cites *Il.* 2.241 & 24.171 for χόλος and θάρσος; *Il.* 1.362 for πένθος; *Il.* 8.124 for ἄχος; and *Il.* 13.394 & 16.403 for πλήσσω (Harrison: 1960, 75).

<sup>169</sup> χόλος is seated in the *thumos* seven times in the epics (six times in the *Iliad* at 6.326, 9.436, 9.675, 14.50, 14.306, and 16.206; and once in the *Odyssey* at 24.248); and only seated once in the *phrenes* (at *Il.* 2.241).

more frequently seated in *phrenes* (five times in *phrenes*, and only three times in *thumos*).<sup>170</sup> Similarly, examination of the passages in which *πένθος* and *ἄχος* are attributed to either of the two entities reveals that while *πένθος* does occur more frequently with *phrenes* than with *thumos* (ten times in *phrenes*, and only once in *thumos*),<sup>171</sup> *ἄχος* actually occurs more frequently with *thumos* (ten times in *thumos*, and eight times in *phrenes*).<sup>172</sup> The final verb discussed by Harrison, *πλήσσω*, seems a poor selection for his purposes. The term *πλήσσω* occurs in conjunction with *phrenes* in the idiomatic expression: ‘to be driven out of one’s wits or mind [ἐκ οἱ ἠνίοχος πλήγη φρένας]’ from fear.<sup>173</sup> That it does not occur in a comparable expression with *thumos* does not mean that fear, or at least fear as denoted by *πλήσσω*, is seated more often in *phrenes* than in *thumos*.

However, as noted above, Harrison is not claiming that these passions themselves are seated in *thumos* and *phrenes*, but rather that the ‘impulsiveness’ and ‘introspection’ associated with them. In this way he effectively side-steps the potential criticisms mentioned above. However, it does leave one rather perplexed. Why make the weaker point, that the *impulsiveness* and *introspection* of certain passions are associated with the entities, rather than the stronger point, that the passions themselves are attributed to the entities, choosing to substantiate the claim with impulsive passions that actually are seated more in *thumos* and introspective passions that actually are seated more in *phrenes*? Does Harrison’s choice of the weaker over the stronger point suggest that passions such as these cannot be found in Homer? While these questions do not undermine Harrison’s claim that *thumos* is essentially passionate, and *phrenes* essentially

<sup>170</sup> *θάρασος* is seated in the *thumos* three times in the epics (twice in the *Iliad* at 7.152-3, and 21.395; and once in the *Odyssey* at 1.320-321); but it is seated in the *phrenes* five times (three times in the *Iliad* at 17.573, 18.463, and 24.171); and twice in the *Odyssey* at 3.76 and 6.140).

<sup>171</sup> *πένθος* is seated in *phrenes* ten times in the epics (four times in the *Iliad* at 1.362, 18.73, 18.88, and 24.105; and six times in the *Odyssey* at 7.218, 11.195, 17.470, 18.324, 24.233, 24.423); and only seated once in *thumos* (*Il.* 22.242).

<sup>172</sup> *ἄχος* is seated in *phrenes* eight times in the epics (five times in the *Iliad* at 8.124, 8.316, 17.83, 18.446, 19.125; and three times in the *Odyssey* at 8.541, 11.195, 17.470); but it is seated in *thumos* ten times in the epics (nine times in the *Iliad* at 2.171, 3.412, 8.147, 13.86, 14.475, 15.208, 16.52, 16.55, 24.91; and once in the *Odyssey* at 18.274).

<sup>173</sup> The primary meaning of *πλήσσω* is ‘[t]o administer a blow to, strike, hit, smite, beat.’ When governed by the preposition *ἐκ*, *πλήσσω* means ‘to drive out of one’s wits or one’s mind.’ For examples of the latter, see *Il.* 13.394 and 16.403.

intellectual, they do reveal the surprising difficulty of substantiating these widely-shared assumptions about the essential natures of the two entities. I suggest that this difficulty illustrates how intricately bound together passion and thought were in the Homeric mind, a fact that can be easily overlooked or underestimated by contemporary readers of the epics.

Harrison's subsequent argument takes the form of the second kind of argument mentioned above, that is, that *thumos* can be seen to be essentially passionate and *phrenes* essentially intellectual by reference to the different ways the entities perform the same functions. Harrison argues that while both *thumos* and *phrenes* are associated with the passions, those passions that are attributed to *thumos* are more irrational and physical in nature, while those attributed to *phrenes* are more passionate and more intellectual in nature. Harrison contends that *thumos* is 'the source of irrational impulses [or passions] – of anger, desire, fear, courage, and so on,'<sup>174</sup> as well as of bodily desires, such as hunger and thirst, while *phrenes* is only cited once as the seat of these desires.<sup>175</sup> *Phrenes* are much more likely, argues Harrison, to be cited as the location of the sort of 'dispassionate' passions mentioned by Claus above. The kinds of dispassionate pleasures Harrison is talking about include: 'the contentment of the shepherd as he watches his flock (*Il.* 13.493), and the joy produced by the lyre (*Il.* 9.186-9), a song (*Il.* 1.474), or the sight of beautiful things (*Od.* 5.74).'<sup>176</sup>

While it may be indeed be the case that *phrenes* are more often cited as the location of emotions such as these, compared with passions of a more physical or irrational nature, the examples that Harrison chooses to make his point do not sufficiently substantiate it. Indeed, the examples he cites to support his claim are particularly

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<sup>174</sup> Harrison: 1960, 71.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, 75. Hunger is attributed to *phrenes* at *Il.* 11.89 (σίτου τε γλυκεροῖο περι φρένας ἕμερος αἰρεῖ). Thirst (cf. πίνω) is said to effect *thumos* at *Od.* 3.342; and *thumos* is said to demand a drink at *Il.* 4.263, 8.189.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, 75. Sullivan agrees with Harrison on this point, contending that in the passages in which *phrenes*' function is primarily emotional 'in each case some understanding or grasp of a situation also seems to be present. In this *phrenes* may be involved to some degree. In these passages the emotional aspect of *phrenes*, then, appears closely related to the intellectual. A volitional aspect is also often as present as is a moral one. These aspects are fused and remain undistinguished by Homeric man himself' (Sullivan: 1988, 78).

unhelpful. In all but one of these examples, while the emotions under discussion are indeed attributed to *phrenes*, within only a few lines these same emotions are also attributed to *thumos*.<sup>177</sup> The sole passage in which only *phrenes* are mentioned is in *Iliad* 1, where a group of young Achaeans sing hymns to Apollo, whose *phrenes* were delighted by their song (ὁ δὲ φρένα τέρπετ' ἀκούων, *Il.* 1.474). In each of the others, however, *phrenes* are first said to be delighted, but only a few lines later *thumos* is also said to be delighted (cf. γάνυμι, γηθέω, and τέρω). I will cite the remaining three passages in full to make this point, as well one additional point.

First, in *Iliad* 9, the embassy comes upon Achilles playing the lyre and singing of the deeds of warriors:

Now they came beside the shelters and ships of the Myrmidons and they found Achilles delighting his heart [φρένα τερπόμενον] in a lyre, clear-sounding, splendid and carefully wrought, with a bridge of silver upon it, which he won out of the spoils when he ruined Eëtion's city. With this he was pleasuring his heart [θυμὸν ἔτερπεν], and singing of men's fame ... (*Il.* 9.185-9).

Second, in *Iliad* 13, the army following Aeneas, Deïphobus, Paris, and Agenor is compared to sheep that:

... follow the lead-ram as they leave the pasture to drink, and make proud the heart of the shepherd [θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι γεγήθει], and thus also the heart of Aeneas [γάνυται φρένα] was gladdened within him as he saw the swarm of the host following his own leadership (*Il.* 13.492-5).

And third, in *Odyssey* 5, Hermes' arrival at Calypso's beautiful island is described in this way:

... even a god who came into that place would have admired what he saw, the heart delighted [τερφθεῖη φρεσίν] within him. There the courier Argeiphontes stood and admired it. But after he had admired in all his heart [θυμῷ] ... (*Od.* 5.74-6).

Each of these passages follows the same pattern: *phrenes* are first mentioned as being delighted (or being gladdened, or having rejoiced), then *thumos* is mentioned in the past tense as having just been affected in the same way.

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<sup>177</sup> Harrison: 1960, 75.

Instead of establishing the claim that *phrenes* are associated with less passionate and less physical passions, and *thumos* with more passionate and more physical passions, Harrison has presented evidence for a somewhat different claim. That is, that apart from the one instance in which Zeus' *phrenes* alone are delighted, both *thumos* and *phrenes* are associated with passions of an intellectual or non-physical nature. However, my main reason for dwelling at such length upon Harrison's argument is not that I reject the claim that *thumos* is essentially passionate, and *phrenes* essentially intellectual. Rather, I dwelt upon these arguments to show that substantiating one's claims about the essentially passionate nature of *thumos* and the essentially intellectual nature of *phrenes* is not as simple as one might assume. The difficulty in substantiating such claims illustrates how intricately bound together *thumos* and *phrenes* are in the performance of their functions. Indeed, their performance of the same functions is so intricately bound together that there is no contradiction in saying first that *phrenes* is affected in a certain way, and then only a few lines later that it was *thumos* that was affected. This exact nature of this interdependence will be revealed in the final section of this chapter, when we explore how the Homeric imagination conceived of, and visualised, *thumos* and *phrenes* at the precise moments in which Homeric man was engaging in deliberation.

Sebastiaan R. van der Mije offers a more persuasive account of the natures of *thumos* and *phrenes* as essentially passionate and intellectual respectively, which also takes the form of the second kind of argument mentioned above, that is, comparison of the ways in which the two entities participate in the same functions. In "πεῖθειν φρένα(ς), πείθειν θυμόν – A Note on Homeric Psychology," Mije takes the novel approach of comparing those instances in which the verb *πείθειν* (to persuade)<sup>178</sup> has *thumos* as its subject or object, with those in which it has *phrenes* as its object. Mije opposes Jahn's thesis that Homer's psychological terms are functionally interchangeable, arguing that *thumos* and *phrenes* are not interchangeable as objects of persuasion. He compares those instances in which persuasion of the entities is successful, with those in which the

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<sup>178</sup> He also examines compounds of *πείθειν*, such as *ἐπιπείθω* and *παραπείθω*, with the psychological entities. He contends that these compounds behave differently *πείθειν* from on its own, however the difference is not great (Mije: 2011, 448-9).

persuasion fails;<sup>179</sup> and concludes that by contrast with successful persuasion of *phrenes*, successful persuasion of *thumos* presupposes an emotional predisposition within the addressee towards, or even against, the course of action being urged. For example, Mije argues that by addressing Menelaus' *thumos*, Adrestus is able to persuade Menelaus not to kill him (*Il.* 6.51), because of Menelaus' emotional predisposition of tenderness or concern (cf. κήδω, 55) towards 'these men [οὔτωσ ἀνδρῶν]' (i.e., the Trojans; 57-8).<sup>180</sup> However, it is significant that Adrastus' reprieve is short-lived, as Agamemnon immediately comes on the scene and turns (cf. τρέπω, 61) his brother's *phrenes* by reminding him of the reason for the war and the harsh necessities that it dictates, which results in Menelaus leaving Adrastus to be slaughter by Agamemnon. While Menelaus was predisposed to be merciful towards Adrastus, in Mije's second example of successful persuasion of *thumos*, Penelope is not predisposed being convinced that Odysseus has genuinely returned. Nevertheless, Odysseus succeeds in persuading Penelope by proving to her that it was he who constructed their marital bed (*Od.* 23.230). This reveals, according to Mije, that Penelope's emotional commitment all along has been to remain faithful to Odysseus.

Successful persuasion of *phrenes* on the other hand, as can be seen in the swift reversal of fortune of Adrastus above, consists in persuasion of one's rational faculty. By 'rational faculty,' Mije means 'one's ability to recognize and act upon what is right and/or advantageous.'<sup>181</sup> Mije cites Athena's persuasion of Pandarus, and the persuasion of Patroclus by Achilles imagined by Hector, as examples of this. According to Mije, by persuading Pandarus' *phrenes*, Athena is able to convince him to shoot Menelaus, appealing to what he will gain by doing so (*Il.* 4.104).<sup>182</sup> Similarly, Hector imagines that Achilles convinced Patroclus not to return before he had slain Hector in battle, by persuading Patroclus' *phrenes* (*Il.* 16.842). Mije contends that 'there is no suggestion that Patroclus had to overcome an inner reluctance, and as with Pandarus, ἄφρονι ('fool')

<sup>179</sup> Successful persuasion of *thumos* occurs at *Il.* 6.51, & *Od.* 23.230; and successful persuasion of *phrenes* occurs at: *Il.* 4.104 & 16.842. Unsuccessful persuasion of *thumos* occurs at *Il.* 9.386, 9.587, 22.78; *Od.* 7.258, 9.500; and unsuccessful persuasion of *phrenes* occurs at: *Il.* 12.173; & *Od.* 1.42 f.

<sup>180</sup> Mije: 2011, 451.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, 450.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, 450.

suggests that nothing else than rational judgement (or the lack of it, in these cases) was involved.<sup>183</sup> Mije concludes that the difference between the persuasion of *thumos* and that of *phrenes* could be couched in the following way: *phrenes* are convinced or persuaded, while *thumos* is swayed or overcome.<sup>184</sup> Indeed, Mije is right in saying that neither Pandarus nor Patroclus are presented as having emotional predispositions towards particular courses of action.

The vast majority of examples, however, are of the failure to persuade *thumos* and *phrenes*. In all of the examples of failed persuasion of *thumos*, the persuasion fails because the addressee has a deeply held emotional commitment to the alternative course of action. In three of the examples, anger prevents the individual's *thumos* from being persuaded: Achilles will not be persuaded to give up his wrath at Agamemnon (*Il.* 9.386); Odysseus will not be persuaded to restrain his anger at the Cyclops, and keep him from provoking it (*Od.* 9.500);<sup>185</sup> and Phoenix tells the tale of Meleager who cannot be persuaded to rescue his embattled city (*Il.* 9.587). In the final two instances of failed persuasion of *thumos*, Calypso cannot persuade Odysseus to remain with her and be made immortal, because of his profound longing for *nostos* (*Od.* 7.258); and Hector will not be persuaded to return inside the city gates, despite his parents' entreaties (*Il.* 22.78). The emotional predispositions of the characters in these examples are manifestly clear. There are only two examples of failed persuasion of *phrenes*: Asios cannot persuade Zeus to assist him in some unspecified way in battle (*Il.* 12.173); and Hermes failed to dissuade Aegisthus from wooing Clytaemnestra and killing Agamemnon (*Od.* 1.42). While it is clear that Aegisthus was emotionally predisposed towards the said wooing and killing, it is less clear in the case of Zeus. The passage reads: 'Asios did not persuade the heart of Zeus [πειθε φρένα] whose desire it was to extend the glory to Hector [Ἐκτορι γάρ οἱ θυμὸς ἐβούλετο κῦδος ὀρέξαι]' (*Il.* 12.173-4). While Mije acknowledges this reference to an emotional commitment in Zeus' *thumos*, his rejection of it on the grounds that 'this sympathy is far from being a deep emotional involvement,' might strike the reader as

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<sup>183</sup> Ibid., 450.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid., 453.

<sup>185</sup> For Odysseus' *hubris* in this episode, see Friedrich, R. (1991). The Hybris of Odysseus. *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 111, 16-28.

somewhat *ad hoc*.<sup>186</sup> If the requisite degree of emotional predisposition is profundity, it is not clear that Menelaus' tenderness mentioned above (in the discussion of successful persuasion of *thumos*) qualifies: it is not directed towards mankind in general, which would make it a deep-seated commitment, but towards the Trojans (οὐτως ἀνδρῶν; *Il.* 657-8); and furthermore it disappears completely after a quick word from Agamemnon. Nevertheless, technically Adrastus does succeed in persuading *Menelaus* not to kill him, as it is Agamemnon who does the actual killing.

It is clear from the above examples in which *thumos* fails to be persuaded, that if Homeric man is emotionally predisposed for or against a particular course of action, attempts to persuade him to change his mind will not be successful. What is of particular significance for this thesis is that in all of the instances – except one – in which strong emotion prevents an individual's *thumos* from being persuaded, these emotions prevent the individual from making what is clearly the *right* decision. Although Achilles' wrath at Agamemnon at the beginning of the *Iliad* is justified, by Book 9 the degree to which Achilles is right in continuing to be wrathful is no longer clear. Hector's failure to return inside the gates, and Odysseus' provocation of the Cyclops are without doubt disastrous decisions. And Meleager's refusal to be persuaded by his family and friends to rescue them is shown to be wrong by his subsequent yielding to his wife's entreaties. The only instance in which the individual's *thumos* is prevented from being persuaded by the presence of strong emotion, and the individual as a result makes the right decision, is when Odysseus refuses to be persuaded by Calypso to remain with her and become immortal. Perhaps, all things considered, Odysseus would have been better off had he chosen immortality, however, his choice of a mortal life is certainly not one that is presented as the wrong decision in the *Odyssey*.

### (ii) *Restraint of Thumos*

Having examined two of the main ways in which scholars argue for *thumos* as essentially passionate and *phrenes* as essentially intellectual – first by reference to the

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<sup>186</sup> Mije: 2011, 450 n.3.

relative frequency of verbs of emotion and cognition with the entities, and second by reference to some of the different ways they participate in the same functions – I will now examine the third, and final, argument. The third main way in which scholars argue that *thumos* is essentially passionate and *phrenes* essentially intellectual, is by reference to the degree to which *thumos* and *phrenes* were thought of as entities acting in harmony with, or in opposition to, Homeric man. Drawing upon arguments by Caswell and Sullivan, I will argue that while *thumos* and the thumotic passions frequently need to be restrained in Homer, *phrenes* never need to be restrained.

The capacity to restrain one's *thumos* is perhaps the rarest of all qualities of the Homeric person. I use the term 'Homeric person' here instead of 'Homeric man' because this is a capacity not only also shared by women in Homer, but also, some might argue, a capacity most perfectly realised by women in Homer. While everyone has the capacity to act as his or her *thumos* directs, only a very few have the capacity to do so in situations in which one's life – or something else of significant value, such as reputation – is threatened. This is the capacity, the capacity that I call 'bravery,' that defines the Homeric hero, raising him above the common man. And, even fewer have both the capacity to do as *thumos* directs in these challenging situations, as well as the capacity to resist *thumos*' directions in these situations, to choose *not* to do as *thumos* directs. As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is this capacity that I call 'endurance.'

The degree to which *thumos* was understood by the Greeks in antiquity as being capable of opposing the individual can be seen by comparing the frequency with which verbs of control and restraint qualify *thumos* as opposed to *phrenes*. Control or restraint in Homer is denoted by a range of verbs – almost all of which also denote endurance – including: ἔχω, and its compounds such as ἀνέχω<sup>187</sup> and ἐπέχω,<sup>188</sup> δαμάζω, ἐντίθημι,<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>187</sup> While primarily a verb of endurance, a secondary meaning of ἀνέχω in the active is: 'To restrain or check' (e.g., *Il.* 23.426).

<sup>188</sup> ἐπέχω occurs infrequently with *thumos*, but never has *phrenes* as its object.

<sup>189</sup> A secondary meanings of ἐντίθημι is: to bring one's *thumos* into a specified state (e.g., *Il.* 9.639). While ἐντίθημι occurs frequently with *thumos*, it never has *phrenes* as its object.

ἐρητύω,<sup>190</sup> ἐρύκω,<sup>191</sup> λήγω,<sup>192</sup> παύω,<sup>193</sup> and σεβάζομαι.<sup>194</sup> These verbs frequently have as their direct objects *thumos*<sup>195</sup> and the thumotic passions,<sup>196</sup> but except for one passage in which *phrenes* is the direct object of *δαμάζω*, *phrenes* function only as the location of *thumos* or thumotic passions that are the object of restraint, that is, of *thumos* or the thumotic passions.<sup>197</sup>

Restraint as denoted by the above verbs can be broadly divided into external<sup>198</sup> and internal restraint. This division can be neatly illustrated by reference to the Homeric verb of restraint: *δαμάζω*. When it is used to qualify *thumos* or *phrenes* in Homer, *δαμάζω* has one of two meanings: first, ‘To curb or restrain;’ and second, ‘To overpower, get the better of, master.’ When it is used in its first sense of curbing or restraining, *δαμάζω* denotes internal self-restraint, that is, restraint imposed on a person by that same person. When found with *thumos* in this first sense, *δαμάζω* always denotes internal restraint. It is this verb that Phoenix uses in *Iliad* 11, when he urges Achilles to ‘beat down [his] great anger [δάμασον θυμὸν μέγαν, *Il.* 9.496].’<sup>199</sup> We hear echoes of Phoenix’s exhortation later in *Iliad* 18, when Achilles finally admits the necessity of

<sup>190</sup> See also the compound *κατερητύω*. Note, however, that unlike *ἐρητύω*, which can denote both internal and external restraint, *κατερητύω* only denotes external restraint (see *Il.* 9.465; *Od.* 9.31 & 19.545).

<sup>191</sup> See also the compound *κατερύκω*.

<sup>192</sup> *λήγω*: To cease, give over, desist; to cease or desist from; to cause to cease from something, put restraint upon (e.g., *Il.* 13.424).

<sup>193</sup> *παύω* occurs frequently with thumotic passions such as *cholos* (*Il.* 1.192, 9.260) and *menos* (*Il.* 1.207, 282), but never with *thumos* or *phrenes*.

<sup>194</sup> *σεβάζομαι* is a form of *σέβας*: ‘[s]ensitiveness to the opinion of others, fear of what others may think or say, shame’ (e.g., *σέβας σε θυμὸν ικέσθω*, *Il.* 18.178). See Caswell (1990, 42) on this.

<sup>195</sup> E.g., *ἐπέχω* at *Od.* 20.266; *ἐντίθημι* at *Il.* 9.639 (σὺ δ’ ἴλαον ἔνθεο θυμὸν); *ἐρητύω* at *Il.* 1.192 (ἐρητύσειέ τε θυμὸν), and *Il.* 9.635 (ἐρητύεται κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ); *ἐρύκω* at *Od.* 11.105 (θυμὸν ἐρυκακέειν καὶ ἐταίρων); and *ἴσκω* at *Il.* 9.255-6 (σὺ δὲ μεγαλήτορα θυμὸν ἴσχειν ἐν στήθεσσι).

<sup>196</sup> E.g., *λήγω* qualifies *μένος μέγα* at *Il.* 13.424; *παύω* qualifies *χόλος* at *Il.* 1.192, *χόλον θυμάλγεια* at *Il.* 9.260, and *μένος* at *Il.* 1.207 & 282; and *ἐντίθημι* qualifies *χόλος* at *Il.* 6.326.

<sup>197</sup> For verbs of restraint with *phrenes*: cf. *ἐρητύω* at *Il.* 9.462 (ἐρητύετ’ ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός), and *Il.* 13.280 (οὐδέ οἱ ἀτρέμας ἦσθαι ἐρητύετ’ ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός).

<sup>198</sup> The most obvious example of external restraint is that of the physical restraint imposed by opposing forces on each other on the battlefield; e.g., *δαμάζω* at *Il.* 11.820, and 13.687; and *ἔχω* at *Il.* 11.820, 13.687, and *Od.* 22.171.

<sup>199</sup> *δαμάζω* is used in almost exactly the same way in Odysseus’ encounter with Ajax in Hades in *Odyssey* 11, with Odysseus urging Ajax: ‘Come nearer, my lord, so you can hear what I say and listen to my story; suppress your anger and lordly spirit [δάμασον δέ μένος καὶ ἀγήνορα θυμὸν]’ (*Od.* 11.561-62).

restraining his *cholos*, and uses the same verb of restraint. Achilles declares: ‘for all our sorrow [ἐάσομεν ἀχνύμενοί] [we must] beat down by force the anger deeply within us [θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλον δαμάσαντες ἀνάγκη, *Il.* 18.113].’ In both instances, the restraint referred to is the restraint of Achilles *by* Achilles. In Achilles’ articulation of his own need for self-restraint, however, we are given privileged insight into the psychological process at work with Achilles; a process that I will argue in the final chapter is not genuinely endurance at all. Achilles talks of two passions here: sorrow and anger. Achilles’ restraint consists of the subjection of one passion, anger, to another passion, sorrow. It is, then, Achilles’ sorrow, rather than his rational impulse to endure, that restrains his anger in the sense of replacing it. *δαμάζω* in this first sense of curbing or restraining is only found with *thumos*, never with *phrenes*.

In its second sense of ‘overpowering’ or ‘mastering,’ however, *δαμάζω* is found with both *thumos* and *phrenes*. However, when used in this second sense, *δαμάζω* does not denote restraint so much as it denotes an overpowering influence of something external to the person on that person. For example, *δαμάζω* in this second sense denotes both the influence of dew and frost on Odysseus’ weakened *thumos*, and the influence of *eros* on Zeus’ *thumos*.<sup>200</sup> And, the only time that one of the above verbs has *phrenes* as its direct object, *δαμάζω* denotes the overwhelming influence of wine on the Cyclops’ *phrenes*.<sup>201</sup> It is clear, therefore, that this passage in which *phrenes* are directly qualified by a verb of restraint does not provide a counter-example to the thesis that it is only *thumos*, and never *phrenes*, that is restrained or controlled by Homeric man.

While this passage does not provide a counter-example to the thesis that Homeric man must sometimes restrain or control his *thumos*, but never his *phrenes*, Sullivan’s

<sup>200</sup> In *Odyssey* 5 Odysseus expresses the fear that the dew and frost will overcome his weakened, gasping *thumos* (δαμάση ἐξ ὀλιγηπελῆς κεκφήσι θυμὸν, *Od.* 5.468). Whether the only other instance of *δαμάζω* with *thumos* in this second sense at *Il.* 14.316 is an example of internal or external restraint, is somewhat more difficult to determine. In this passage, Zeus describes his lust for Hera in the following way: ‘For never before has love for any goddess or woman so melted about the heart inside me, broken it into submission, as now [οὐ γάρ πώ ποτέ μ’ ὦδε θεᾶς ἔρος οὐδὲ γυναικὸς θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι περιπροχυθεὶς ἐδάμασσεν]’ (*Il.* 14.315-17). A case could be made for Zeus’ *eros* being internal to him, just as a case could be made for it being external to him, particularly due to Hera’s use of a love charm. Which of the two is correct, however, will no longer concern me here.

<sup>201</sup> δαμασσάμενος φρένας οἴνω (*Od.* 9.454).

claim that Homeric *phrenes* too are often controlled by the individual looks, at first glance, like it might. Sullivan contends that out of the three hundred and seventy-nine instances of *phrenes* in Homer and the *Homeric Hymns*,<sup>202</sup> only in eleven of these (nine of which are in either the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*) does ‘a person exerts some control over [his or her] *phrenes*.’<sup>203</sup> However, from examination of these passages it becomes clear that the use of the term ‘control’ to characterise the relationship between person and *phrenes* is misleading, as Sullivan herself admits.<sup>204</sup> I will give a brief summary of these nine passages in order to demonstrate how different the individual’s relationship with his *phrenes* is to that with his *thumos*. Sullivan cites three passages from the *Iliad* as illustrating an individual’s control over his *phrenes*. First, at *Il.* 9.119 Agamemnon explains to Nestor how he came to insult Achilles, by saying: ‘... I was mad, in the persuasion of my heart’s evil [ἄσάμην φρεσὶ λευγαλέησι πιθήσας].’ Second, at *Il.* 10.45, Agamemnon says that Zeus’ *phrenes* are ‘turned from us [ἐπεὶ Διὸς ἐτράπετο φρήν].’ And, third, at *Il.* 13.394, a charioteer is said to be ‘stricken in the wits [πλήγη φρένας].’ It is clear from these three examples, that the relationship between Agamemnon, Zeus, and the charioteer and their *phrenes* is not one characterised by control. Indeed, in the cases of Agamemnon and the charioteer, the relationship seems more like *lack* of control, than one of control. In the five passages from the *Odyssey*, we find similar results. In these, Penelope and the Phaeacian women are said to have knowledge of good *phrenes* (ἐπίστασθαι περικαλλέα καὶ φρένας ἐσθλάς, *Od.* 2.117, 7.111); Clytemnestra, Eumaeus, and Amphinomos are said to use good *phrenes* (φρεσὶ κέχρητ’ ἀγαθῆσι, *Od.* 3.266, 14.421, 16.398); and, in the final instance, Eurytion’s *phrenes* are said to have been made foolish by wine (φρένας ἄσεν οἴνω, *Od.* 21.297).

It is manifestly clear from these examples that whatever relationship a person has with his *phrenes* is vastly different from the relationship between him and his *thumos*. ‘Control,’ in the sense of restraint, constraint, command, force, or domination, accurately represents the relationship between person and *thumos*. However, only if we take

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<sup>202</sup> Sullivan: 1988, 23.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, 196. Sullivan lists these passages from the *Iliad*: 9.119, 10.45, 13.394; and these from the *Odyssey* 2.117, 3.266, 7.111, 14.421, 16.398, and 21.297.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, 196.

‘control’ in its different sense of guidance, direction, supervision, or in the sense of ‘something being within one’s control,’ could the term accurately represent the relationship between person and *phrenes*. Zeus doesn’t control his *phrenes* by turning them away from the Achaeans, so much as he guides or re-directs them. Nor do Clytemnestra, Eumaeus, and Amphinomos control their ‘good *phrenes*’ by using them, so much as they choose to consult them. The same could be said of the knowledge of ‘good *phrenes*’ that Penelope and the Phaeacian women are said to have; again the relationship is not so much one of control, but rather of consultation. In the remaining passages, the ‘control’ of *phrenes* is the same as that denoted by the second meaning of *δαμάζω* discussed above, that is, that of something overpowering or overcoming *phrenes*. Just as *eros* influences Zeus’ *phrenes* in the above discussion of *δαμάζω*, so here madness influences Agamemnon’s *phrenes*, and fear influences the charioteer’s *phrenes*. And, just as wine influences the Cyclops’ *phrenes* above, so too here wine influences and makes foolish Eurytion’s *phrenes*. And, in all of these passages, the influence is not so much one of control as one of overpowering.

Comprehensive analysis of the verbs of restraint with *thumos* and *phrenes* reveals that while *thumos* and the thumotic passions are frequently restrained, *phrenes* are never restrained. Examination of the passages cited by Sullivan as examples of the relationship that Homeric man has with his *phrenes* reveals that this relationship is markedly different from the relationship he has with his *thumos*. These analyses reveal that the relationship between Homeric man and his *thumos* can be characterised by tension, conflict, and struggle, that ends in the person’s restraint of, or yielding to, *thumos*.<sup>205</sup> Homeric man’s relationship with his *phrenes*, by contrast, is characterised by more harmony and cooperation. The ideal relationship between person and *thumos* is one of master and obedient servant, or military commander and soldier. On the other hand, the ideal

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<sup>205</sup> Ibid., 118, 196. See also Sullivan: 1985, 149-50. Harrison comments on this, contending: ‘In spite of the already mentioned blurring of the lines between the emotional and the rational in the use of *φρήν/φρένες*, there can be no doubt that the rational element is in fact dominant. General usage indicates this as well as the development of *φρένες* “wisdom,” and *ἄφρων*, “foolish.” And comparison with other mental organs points to the same conclusion. For example: the irrational impulses of the *θυμός* are regularly conceived of as being in opposition to a man, so that they impel him, and he yields to them or overcomes them. But such interaction between man and his *φρήν* is lacking’ (Harrison: 1960, 74).

relationship between person and *phrenes*, is more like that of a partnership, or the relationship of leader and trusted adviser.<sup>206</sup>

At the beginning of this chapter I asked whether passionate impulses could be attributed exclusively to *thumos*, and whether rational impulses could be attributed exclusively to *phrenes*; and I offered the following answer: that both passionate and rational impulses belonged to *thumos*, and that the role of *phrenes* was not to provide the rational and passion-restraining impulse, but rather, its role is that of enabling *thumos* to restrain itself, by being in a certain state. Having examined the three different ways in which scholars argue that *thumos* is more passionate and that *phrenes* is more rational – that is, first by reference to greater frequency of verbs of emotion with *thumos* and verbs of cognition with *phrenes*; second, by reference to the different ways *thumos* and *phrenes* perform the same functions; and third, by reference to the degree to which the entities were thought of as entities independent of, and in opposition to, the individual – we can now return to my answer. After examining the evidence for *thumos* as self-restraining, I will offer an account of the role *phrenes* play in the self-restraint of *thumos*.

Like Platonic *thumos*, Homeric *thumos* often needs to be restrained; however, unlike Platonic *thumos*, Homeric *thumos* is not restrained by some entity external to it. Rather, in Homer, *thumos* restrains *thumos*. *Thumos* both impels the individual to act on his passions, and, when this impulse conflicts with another more rational impulse, *thumos* restrains itself so that the individual may act on this latter impulse. One piece of evidence for this is that out of the ten passages in which the term *δίχα*, that is, ‘divided,’ appears in the epics, this division is attributed to *thumos* four times,<sup>207</sup> and exclusively to *phrenes* only once.<sup>208</sup> It is *thumos* that is divided, torn between its passionate impulse and its rational impulse. However, the main piece of evidence for the self-restraining *thumos* can be found in *Odyssey* 9, where Odysseus speaks of a *ἕτερος θυμός* (*Od.* 9.302), that is, ‘another’ or a ‘second’ *thumos* in his narration of one of the most famous scenes of

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<sup>206</sup> For the relationship between Homeric man and his *thumos* and *phrenes* see Darcus: 1979, esp. 163 & 166.

<sup>207</sup> Division is attributed to *thumos* at *Il.* 20.32 (*δίχα θυμὸν ἔχοντες*), and at *Od.* 19.524 (*δίχα θυμὸς ὀρώρεται ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα*). It is attributed to *thumos* in *phrenes* twice at *Il.* 21.386 (*δίχα δὲ σφιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμὸς ἄητο*), and *Od.* 16.73 (*δίχα θυμὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζει*).

<sup>208</sup> *Od.* 22.333 (*δίχα δὲ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζεν*).

Homeric endurance: Odysseus' entrapment in, and escape from, the Cyclops' cave.<sup>209</sup> Odysseus and his men are trapped in the cave of a Cyclops, that has just slaughtered, dismembered, and devoured a number of Odysseus' companions; and in so doing the *thumoi* of Odysseus and his men were overwhelmed with helplessness (ἀμηχανίη δ' ἔχε θυμόν), causing them to cry out aloud to Zeus (*Od.* 9.287-95). Deliberating in his great-hearted *thumos* (μεγαλήτορα θυμόν), Odysseus takes his sword from beside his thigh and moves in closer in order to stab the Cyclops (9.299-302). This is Odysseus' first impulse; it is informed by the passions foremost within his *thumos* at that particular moment: despair, anger, revenge, and fear. However, just as he was about to plunge in the sword, Odysseus explains that, ἕτερος δέ με θυμὸς ἔρourkeν, which Lattimore translates as: 'but the second thought stayed me,' but could be translated more literally as: 'another *thumos* restrained me.' This *heteros thumos* is the realization of a certain piece of information: that the boulder blocking the cave's exit is too heavy for Odysseus and his men to move, and that if they are to have any chance of escape, they will have to wait until the Cyclops moves it.

In this passage we can see two different impulses: the first is Odysseus' passionate impulse to stab the Cyclops, and the second is his rational impulse to stay his hand and check his passionate impulse, which is informed by his knowledge that only the Cyclops can move the heavy boulder blocking the cave's exit. These two impulses correlate to two of Odysseus' goals. His passionate impulse correlates with the goal of exacting revenge on the Cyclops; and his rational impulse correlates with the goal of self-preservation. What is crucial to note, is that *thumos* is the origin of both of these impulses. Barnouw succinctly explains the self-restraining capacity of *thumos* in this way:

All too often enduring, like checking, is misunderstood as a matter of suppressing *thumos*, as if that were an inferior faculty capable only of immediate, potentially rash responses. But endurance in Homer cannot be understood as a matter of

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<sup>209</sup> For literature on this scene, see: Schein, S. L. (1970). Odysseus and Polyphemus in the Odyssey. *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, 11, 73-83. Cook: 1995, 50-2, 61-3. Pelliccia 1995, 277-81. Barnouw: 2004, 75-6, & 99-119.

holding one's *thumos* in or back or down, for it is *thumos* that endures, just as it checks and holds back.<sup>210</sup>

Odysseus endures here, not by suppressing (in the sense of permanently silencing or extinguishing) his *thumos*, but by choosing one of the two impulses of his *thumos*, according to which offers a better chance for achieving his goals at that particular time. While acting upon his first impulse would enable him to achieve his goal of exacting revenge on the Cyclops, it would also lead the deaths of himself and his men. His second impulse, by contrast, not only offers the only chance Odysseus and his men have of survival, and hence achieving his overall goal of *nostos*, it also leaves open the possibility of exacting revenge some time in the future. However, at this particular moment, it is the choice that demands the greatest internal strength from Odysseus. As we will see in the following chapters on the Homeric decision-making scenes, the agent in each of these scenes is faced with the same choice: yielding to the passions that are strongest within him at that particular moment, or restraining them as the means to a greater end.

### (iii) *Thumos and Phrenes in the Homeric Imagination*

It is indisputable, then, that Homeric *thumos* is both the source of Homeric man's passionate impulses, as well as of his rational, and passion-restraining, impulses. However, if *thumos* restrains itself, then what is the role of *phrenes* in *thumos*' self-restraint? To answer this question, we must venture into the depths of the Homeric imagination, and look for connections between terms, and patterns of imagery. We can try to get at how the Homeric imagination conceived of, or visualised, *phrenes*, by examining the words used to describe *phrenes* in the epics, and the patterns of imagery that they entail. The terms that are most revealing of how the ancients imagined *phrenes* are: *πυκινός*, *ἀραρίσκω*, *ἔμπεδος*,<sup>211</sup> and *ἴσος*. Each of these terms has both an abstract and a literal meaning, and, when the term is used to qualify *phrenes*, translators generally choose to render it using the abstract meaning. Before examining the terms themselves, it

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<sup>210</sup> Barnouw: 2004, 15.

<sup>211</sup> See Sullivan: 1988, 51-2, & 56.

is worthwhile considering a number of ways in which we could interpret the twofold meaning of these terms. Those who subscribe to the chronological explanation and the organic model will argue that both literal and abstract meanings are relevant to *phrenes*. Whether the literal meaning is merely an echo of an earlier organic conception of the entity, and is therefore perhaps to inform, but not replace the abstract meaning, or whether it is appropriate also the Homeric conception of the entity, is a somewhat more contentious question. Those who reject chronology and anatomical identifications of the entities in favour of a purely functional conception, will obviously prioritise the abstract meaning over the literal, most likely discarding the literal meaning altogether. I suggest, by contrast, that we should prioritise neither the abstract nor the literal meaning, but allow for the possibility that both abstract and literal meanings are implied when these terms are used to qualify *phrenes*. That the abstract meaning has not overtaken the literal meaning, as the physical qualities ascribed to *phrenes* became abstracted, but rather the literal meaning inheres in the abstract one. Furthermore, an in-depth analysis of these terms when used to qualify both *phrenes* and other more tangible entities, reveal striking patterns of imagery that should not be ignored.

When describing *phrenes*, *πικινός* is translated abstractly as ‘wisdom,’ ‘shrewdness,’ (*Il.* 14.294, trans., Murray)<sup>212</sup> and ‘astuteness;’<sup>213</sup> however, its primary meaning is one of literal structural integrity. When qualifying more tangible entities, *πικινός* denotes closeness in texture, density, and thickness; and it has the secondary

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<sup>212</sup> Homer. (1925). *Iliad: Books 13-24* (1999 ed., Vol. II). (G. P. Goold, Ed., & A. T. Murray, Trans.) Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, .

<sup>213</sup> Interestingly, the term *πικινός* is only ever used attributed to *phrenes* in Homer to describe the *phrenes* of gods. Zeus is said to have *πικινάς phrenas* at *Il.* 14.294, and again in the *Homeric Hymns* in the ‘Hymn to Aphrodite’ at 38. Aphrodite is also said to have *πικινάς phrenas* in this same hymn at 243. The closest other characters come is having *πικινὰ medea*, that is, ‘Counsels, arts, plans, devices, schemes,’ in their *phrenes* (*πικινὰ φρεσὶ μήδε’ ἔχοντες*, *Il.* 24.282, 674; and *Od.* 19.353).

In his translation of the *Homeric Hymns*, Martin West deviates from the common translation of *πικινάς phrenas* as wise, by rendering it as ‘subtle’ and ‘intricate’ respectively, evoking something more of its structural integrity than the more common translations mentioned above (*Homeric Hymns; Homeric Apocrypha; Lives of Homer.* (2003). (M. L. West, Trans.) Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press) Perhaps we could surmise something about *πικινός* from its exclusive reference to divine *phrenes*; namely, that the wisdom borne of structural integrity is characteristic of the most perfect *phrenes*. See Sullivan (1988: 192) on Zeus’ *phrenes*.

meaning, for references to construction, of ‘closely constructed or made, well fitted together, without breaks or interstices, affording good shelter, protection or security.’ Onians noticed that Homer uses the term *πυκνός* to denote ‘things close together or of close texture, e.g. a thicket, the twigs and branches of a tree or the stones of a wall.’<sup>214</sup> He suggests that, as the contexts in which *πυκνός* is used tell us that it is considered to be a word of praise – indeed are all the terms mentioned above are terms of praise – when it is used to describe *phrenes* it could perhaps evoke something of ‘finesse and complexity’ that the ancients ascribed to *phrenes*.<sup>215</sup> Of course, Onians identified *phrenes* as the lungs, and the finesse and density of texture denoted by *πυκνός* certainly ‘fits admirably the multitude of branching passages and veins within each lung and the intricate tracery, [of] the polygonal lobules of the outside.’<sup>216</sup> However, I suggest that we can draw upon Onians’ connection between the structural integrity of houses and *phrenes* that are qualified by the term *πυκνός*, without subscribing to his anatomical identification of *phrenes* as the lungs.

Ascribing these literal qualities of structural integrity, and complexity to *phrenes* on this basis might seem to some to be stretching the analogy. However, it gains plausibility when we consider that *ἀραρίσκω*, the second term used to qualify *phrenes* and more tangible entities, also denotes structural integrity. In fact, translations of *ἀραρίσκω* are even more evocative of this structural integrity than the translations of *πυκνός* when applied to *phrenes*. These translations include: ‘well-balanced,’ ‘sound,’ ‘fitting’ [that is, ‘fitting’ in the physical, not normative, sense of the word], and ‘well-constructed’ (LSJ).<sup>217</sup> Like *πυκνός*, the primary meaning of *ἀραρίσκω* is one of structural integrity: ‘to fit together.’ The adjectives *ἔμπεδος*, and *ἴσος* are also used to describe the positive condition of *phrenes*.<sup>218</sup> When qualifying *phrenes*, *ἴσος* means ‘intelligence’ or ‘wits, well balanced, sound, sane,’ and *ἔμπεδος* means ‘unimpaired in

<sup>214</sup> Onians: 1951, 28. For examples of such usage see *Il.* 18.320 (thicket); *Od.* 5.471 (twigs or tree branches); *Il.* 16.212 (stones).

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>217</sup> E.g., οὔτε τι λίην ἄλκιμος ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτε φρεσὶν ἦσιν ἀρηρώς (*Od.* 10.552-553). See also ἐνάσιμος.

<sup>218</sup> For *ἔμπεδος* see *Il.* 6.352; and *Od.* 18.215. For *ἔισας* see *Od.* 11.337, 14.178, and 18.249.

mind,' as well as 'well balanced.' Good balance is shared by the abstract and literal meanings of both terms, with *ἴσος* having the additional literal meanings of equality and evenness, and *ἔμπεδος* meaning 'steadfast,' 'firm-set,' 'steady,' 'secure,' and 'without intermission or break, continuously' when meant in its literal sense.

We come to a closer understanding of how the Homeric mind understood *phrenes*, when we consider that each of these terms, except for *ἔμπεδος*, was used extensively to describe soldiers and their armour on the battlefield. *είσας* a form of the adjective *ἴσος* describes the proper state of *phrenes*,<sup>219</sup> as well as the optimal state of the soldier's shield. The well-balanced shield (*ἀσπίδα πάντοσ' εἴσῃν*, *Il.* 3.347)<sup>220</sup> is a shield that the soldier can hide under for protection (*ὕπ' ἀσπίδι πάντοσ' εἴσῃν*, *Il.* 13.405); and it is a shield that is so strong (*ἀσπίδ' ἐνὶ κρατερῇ*, *Il.* 3.349) that it cannot be penetrated by the enemy's spear.<sup>221</sup> As noted above, while the term *πυκινός* can be used to denote things that are 'close in texture, dense, [and] thick' such as clouds (*πυκινὸν νέφος*, *Il.* 5.751) and thickets (*ἐν λόγμῃ πυκινῇ*, *Od.* 19.439), it, along with *ἀραρίσκω*, is a term primarily used to denote strength and impenetrability borne of structural integrity. Walls,<sup>222</sup> houses,<sup>223</sup> and ranks of infantry<sup>224</sup> are all *πυκιναί* and *ἀρηρώς*, because, though they are all made of a multiplicity of individual parts, these parts are fitted together so closely – as closely as a soldier's hand and the spear or axe grasped tightly within it<sup>225</sup> – and without any breaks or interstices, that a unified whole is created.<sup>226</sup> This unified whole has a strength and impenetrability lacking in its individual parts. This strength and

<sup>219</sup> See *φρένας ἔνδον εἴσας* at *Od.* 11.337, 14.178, and 18.249.

<sup>220</sup> See also *Il.* 5.300, and 11.61.

<sup>221</sup> 'The first of the two Alexandros let go his spear far-shadowing and struck the shield of Atreus' son on its perfect circle [*ἀσπίδα πάντοσ' εἴσῃν*] nor did the bronze point break its way through [*οὐδ' ἔρρηξεν χαλκός*], but the spearhead bent back in the strong shield [*ἀνεγνάμφθη δέ οἱ αἰχμῇ ἀσπίδ' ἐνὶ κρατερῇ*]' (*Il.* 3.346-9).

<sup>222</sup> E.g., *Il.* 16.212-213 (*τοῖχον ἀνὴρ ἀράρη πυκινόισι λίθοισι*); and *Il.* 7.339 (*πύλας εὖ ἀραρυίας*). Walls are also described as *ἔμπεδος* at *Il.* 12.12 (*τεῖχος ... ἔμπεδον*).

<sup>223</sup> E.g., *Il.* 10.267 (*πυκινὸν δόμον*).

<sup>224</sup> E.g., *Il.* 4.281 (*πυκιναὶ φάλαγγες*); for foot-soldiers see *Il.* 16.211 (*στίχες ἄρθεν*); for soldiers in rank see *Il.* 15.618 (*πυργηδὸν ἀρηρότες*).

<sup>225</sup> E.g., spears (*ἔγχος ... παλάμηφιν ἀρήρει*; *Il.* 3.338); and axes (*πέλεκυν ... ἄρμενον ἐν παλάμησι*; *Od.* 5.234).

<sup>226</sup> *ἀραρίσκω* is also used to denote the closeness of shields of soldiers in rank on the battlefield to express the closeness of the soldiers themselves (*οἱ δ' ἐπεὶ ἀλλήλους ἄραρον τυκτῆσι βόεσσι*; *Il.* 12.105). And *πυκινός* is also used to describe shields themselves (*ἀσπίδα ῥινοῖσιν πυκινῇν*, *Il.* 13.804).

impenetrability is primarily defensive and protective: walls and houses are closely constructed of stones or other building materials, in order to defend those within from external forces, such as the natural elements, as well as from enemy attack. Shields are strong and impenetrable to protect the soldier from the enemy's spear. Soldiers are packed tightly together on the battlefield to better defend themselves against the oncoming enemy; an army divided is an army conquered. However, this strength and impenetrability is not only to keep things *out*, but can also be to keep things *in*. Circe chooses a *πυκινός* pig-sty to confine Odysseus' men in *Odyssey* 10;<sup>227</sup> and Telemachus is advised to choose for his journey vessels made of animal-hide that are *πυκινοῖσιν*, because they hold their contents tightly within them.<sup>228</sup> These examples of *πυκινός* to denote containment, will be returned to shortly.

In the dearth of explicit evidence for exactly how the Homeric imagination conceived of *thumos* and *phrenes* as physical entities, as well as the relationship between the two entities, we must turn to poetic metaphor, as indeed it is only fitting to do in the examination of epic poetry. I argue that the closest we can come to an appreciation of the relationship between *thumos* and *phrenes*, and their roles in Homeric man's endurance, is through metaphor. We saw above that there was some connection in the Homeric imagination between the ideal condition of *phrenes* and structural integrity, particularly the structural integrity of defensive formations such as ranks of soldiers on the battlefield. There are two passages in the *Iliad* in which we see two of the terms discussed above (*πυκινός* and *ἀραρίσκω*) used to denote structural integrity on the battlefield. In these two passages, the activity of *thumos* and *phrenes* is explicitly compared with the activity of soldiers on the battlefield. I contend that we can see in these passages an image of how the Homeric mind visualised *thumos* and *phrenes*, as well as an image of how they imagined the relationship between the two psychological entities.

First, I will quote a passage from *Iliad* 15 which, though lengthy, offers a perfect illustration on the large-scale, of what the Homeric mind imagined as taking place on the small-scale, within the individual's *thumos* and *phrenes*, during times of external

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<sup>227</sup> Circe's pig-sty (*πυκινούς κευθμῶνας*, *Od.* 10.283).

<sup>228</sup> Telemachus' animal-hide vessel (*δέρμασιν ἐν πυκινοῖσιν*, *Od.* 2.291).

hardship and internal conflict. Zeus has decided to honour and glorify Hector in *Iliad* 15, and he drives Hector on towards the Achaean army:

καὶ ῥ' ἔθελεν ῥῆξαι στίχας ἀνδρῶν πειρητίζων,  
ἧ δὴ πλεῖστον ὄμιλον ὄρα καὶ τεύχε' ἄριστα ·  
ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὧς δύνατο ῥῆξαι μάλα περ μενεαίνων ·  
ἴσχον γὰρ πυργηδὸν ἀρηρότες, ἠύτε πέτρῃ  
ἠλίβατος μεγάλη, πολιῆς ἀλός ἐγγὺς ἐοῦσα,  
ἧ τε μένει λιγέων ἀνέμων λαιψηρὰ κέλευθα  
κύματά τε τροφόντα, τὰ τε προσερεύγεται αὐτὴν ·  
ὧς Δαναοὶ Τρῶας μένον ἔμπεδον οὐδὲ φέβοντο (*Il.* 15.615-22).

And now he [Hector] was probing the ranks of men, and trying to smash them, and made for where there were most men together, and the best armour. But even so he could not break them, for all his fury, for they closed into a wall and held him, like some towering huge sea-cliff that lies close along the grey salt water and stands up against the screaming winds and their sudden directions and against the waves that grow to bigness and burst up against it. So the Danaans stood steady against the Trojans, nor gave way.

The Achaean soldiers are tightly packed together (ἀρηρόως), creating an impenetrable line of defence. Hector tries to divide them, but, despite his fury (μενεαίνων), cannot. The Achaeans stand steadfastly (μένον ἔμπεδον) against his fury, holding him back or restraining him (ἴσχον), just as a well-constructed wall (πυργηδὸν ἀρηρότες), or a great sea cliff remains, despite the winds (ἀνέμων) that scream about it and the great waves (κύματά, κύμα) that pound it. The Achaeans are strong and impenetrable in their unity, weathering Hector's onslaught like an enduring cliff.

However, the Achaeans' endurance soon begins to waver in the face of the Hector's increasing fierceness:

αὐτὰρ ὁ λαμπόμενος πυρὶ πάντοθεν ἔνθορ' ὀμίλῳ,  
ἐν δ' ἔπεσ' ὧς ὅτε κύμα θοῆ ἐν νηὶ πέσῃσι  
λάβρον ὑπαὶ νεφέων ἀνεμοτρεφές · ἧ δέ τε πᾶσα  
ἄχνη ὑπεκρύφθη, ἀνέμοιο δὲ δεινὸς ἀήτης  
ἰστίῳ ἐμβρέμεται, τρομέουσι δέ τε φρένα ναῦται  
δειδιότες · τυτθὸν γὰρ ὑπέκ θανάτοιο φέρονται  
ὧς ἐδαΐζετο θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν Ἀχαιῶν (*Il.* 15.623-629).

But he [Hector], lit about with flame on all sides, charged on their numbers and descended upon them as descends on a fast ship the battering wave storm-bred from beneath the clouds, and the ship goes utterly hidden under the foam, and the dangerous blast of the hurricane thunders against the sail, and the hearts of the seamen are shaken with fear, as they are carried only a little way out of death's reach. So the heart in the breast of each Achaean was troubled.

Hector, fire-like, charges upon the Achaeans with the violence and fury (cf. λάβρος) of the storm-bred wave, like a dangerous and terrifying (cf. δεινός) hurricane blast. This is *explicitly* related to the psychological entities of the sailors of the metaphor in the final lines. The *phrenes* of the seamen tremble (cf. τρομέω) with fear (cf. δειδιότες), as the destructive force of the wind and waves is reaches its most fearsome, and their vessel is submerged. And the *thumoi* in the Achaeans breasts are not merely 'troubled,' as Lattimore translates *δαίζω*, but are divided, torn or rent in two, as the destructive force of Hector descends upon them.

Just like Hector himself, whose *thumos* will very soon be similarly troubled and divided as he awaits the on-set of Achilles, and who stands his ground for as long as he can before failing to endure and fleeing,<sup>229</sup> the Achaeans stand their ground temporarily before fleeing from Hector in 'unearthly terror [θεοπεσίως ἐφόβηθεν]' (*Il.* 15.637) as cattle from a 'a lion of destructive mind [λέων ὀλοόφρων]' (Trans., Murray; *Il.* 15.630).<sup>230</sup> Both Hector's *thumos* in *Iliad* 22, and the *thumoi* of the Achaeans in this passage, are divided between standing their ground, and fleeing. That is to say, two impulses divide their *thumoi*: the impulse to flee as their terror urges them, and the impulse to stand their ground, which they know is the right and courageous thing to do. The first impulse is what I have called the passionate impulse, which is informed primarily by fear in this passage; and the second impulse is what I have called the rational impulse, here informed primarily by knowledge of the heroic code, which I will discuss in greater detail in the following chapter. While the Achaeans manage to follow their second impulse, the rational impulse to remain and stand their ground, the fearful passions in their *thumoi* beat violently against the *phrenes* that enclose them, like the wind and waves that pound against the great cliff. Just as the cliff resists the destructive

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<sup>229</sup> See *Il.* 22.90 ff. for Hector.

<sup>230</sup> Murray, Trans.

force of the wind and the waves and remains unchanged, so too are the *phrenes* unchanged by the potentially destructive thumotic passions. However, as the ferocity of Hector's onslaught increases, the metaphor changes from that of natural elements versus a rock cliff, to that of natural elements versus first a ship (νηι), and finally to that of natural elements versus the ship's sail (ιστίω). The increase in Hector's ferocity is expressed through an intensification of the natural elements to states of ferocity. What were once 'screaming winds' and great waves, are now a 'battering wave storm-bred' and 'the dangerous blast of the hurricane.' As Hector's ferocity intensifies, the capacity of the soldiers to remain steadfast declines, from being initially as impenetrable and as impervious to the wind and waves as a great sea cliff, to the wind and storm-tossed ship, and, finally, to the ship's flimsy sail, blown about by every wind. This gradual demotion from the impenetrability of the great cliff to the weak and porous ship's sail, parallels the gradually undermining effect on *phrenes* of the fierce thumotic passions. And, just as the boat – or more specifically its sail – can no longer resist the destructive wind and waves, neither can the *phrenes* maintain its proper state of cliff-like strength and impenetrability, without which the *thumos* cannot resist its destructive passions, and the soldiers yield to their passionate impulse to flee.

I will quote one final passage from the *Iliad* in which we see the same terms used to qualify *phrenes* – *πυκινός* and *ἀραρίσκω* – also used to denote the structural integrity of soldiers on the battlefield. In the passages above, we saw a metaphor for the relationship between *thumos* and *phrenes*. I suggest that in this passage we see a metaphor for how the Homeric mind imagined the physical nature of the *phrenes* themselves at the very moment that the thumotic passions are aroused. We are in *Iliad* 16, and Achilles has just given a rousing, encouraging speech to his army:

Ὡς εἰπὼν ὄτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἐκάστου.  
μᾶλλον δὲ στίχες ἄρθεν, ἐπεὶ βασιλῆος ἄκουσαν.  
ὥς δ' ὅτε τοῖχον ἀνήρ ἀράρη πυκινοῖσι λίθοισι  
δῶματος ὑψηλοῖο, βίας ἀνέμων ἀλεείνων,  
ὡς ἄραρον κόρυθές τε καὶ ἀσπίδες ὀμφαλόεσσαι.  
ἀσπίς ἄρ' ἀσπίδ' ἔρειδε, κόρυς κόρυιν, ἀνέρα δ' ἀνήρ·  
ψαῦον δ' ἰππόκομοι κόρυθες λαμπροῖσι φάλιοισι  
νευόντων ὡς πυκνοὶ ἐφέστασαν ἀλλήλοισι (*Il.* 16.210-17).

So he spoke, and stirred the spirit and strength in each man, and their ranks, as they listened to the king, pulled closer together. And as a man builds solid a wall with stones set close together for the rampart of a high house keeping out the force of the winds, so close together were the helms and shields massive in the middle. For shield leaned on shield, helmet on helmet, man against man, and the horse-hair crests along the horns of the shining helmets touched as they bent their heads, so dense were they formed on each other.

It is as the thumotic passions of *menos* and *thumos* are stirred (cf. ὀτρύνω, *Il.* 16.210) within the soldiers, that the ranks of soldiers pull closer (cf. ἀραρίσκω) together. I suggest that here we could see a metaphor for the proper state of *phrenes* when the thumotic passions increase within it.<sup>231</sup>

What exactly do we mean, however, when we say that *phrenes* cannot maintain their proper state when the thumotic passions are too violent, or when they are yielded to? Caswell argues that the role of *phrenes* is to contain the *thumos*: ‘The relationship of θυμός to φρήν/φρένες is that of content to container. It is in light of this relationship that we can better appreciate why θυμός must be flexible and φρήν/φρένες close-knit, and why also the physical impairment of φρήν/φρένες results in the lack of intelligence.’<sup>232</sup> This hypothesis is certainly attractive. It would explain why *phrenes* that lost structural integrity, that ceased to be close-knit, would lose their strength and thereby fail to hold the breathy *thumos* within them. However, the two passages Caswell cites as evidence for her claim, do not sufficiently support it. First, Caswell cites Phoenix’s recollection of his failure, as a young man, to restrain himself in his father’s house. Phoenix says: ‘But now no more could the heart in my breast be ruled entirely [οὐκέτι πάμπαν ἐρητύετ’ ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός] to range still among these halls when my father was angered’ (*Il.* 9.462-3). Phoenix cannot restrain himself, so his kinsmen must restrain him instead (cf. κατερητύω, 465). Second, Caswell cites the depiction of the coward (δειλὸς ἀνὴρ, *Il.* 13.278), whose ‘heart inside him has no control to make him sit steady [οὐδέ οἱ ἀτρέμας ἦσθαι ἐρητύετ’ ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός]’ (280). However, in both instances the verb is not one of

<sup>231</sup> For the thumotic passions as increasing, see Achilles’ speech in *Iliad* 18, in which he says speaks of ‘gall [χόλος], which makes a man grow angry for all his great mind [πολύφρονά], that gall of anger that swarms like smoke inside of a man’s heart [ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθυσσιν ἀέξεται ἠύτε καπνός] and becomes a sweeter thing to him than the dripping of honey (*Il.* 18.108-110).

<sup>232</sup> Caswell: 1990, 52.

containment, but rather is the verb of restraint we encountered above: ἐρητῶ. No mention is made of containment in the definitions of ἐρητῶ listed for in either Cunliffe's *Homeric Lexicon*<sup>233</sup> or the LSJ.<sup>234</sup>

It is unclear why, when there are no grammatical differences between these instances of ἐρητῶ and other instances of the verb, that it should denote containment here, and not elsewhere.<sup>235</sup> Certainly, *thumos* is located in *phrenes* in both of these passages, and it is *thumos* that fails to be restrained in both. However, it is not clear that the reason why *thumos* fails to be restrained is that the *phrenes* fail to contain the *thumos* within them. Perhaps Caswell is relying on a parallel between Phoenix's refusal to be contained by his father's house, and his *thumos*' refusal to be contained within the *phrenes*; however, even such a parallel would be insufficient for a justification of her thesis. Sullivan rejects Caswell's theory of containment on the grounds that it too broad a generalisation, arguing that while *thumos* is most frequently located within the *phrenes*, it can also be located in other parts of the body,<sup>236</sup> and it is not the case that these are instances of a failure of containment of *thumos* by *phrenes*.

The theory of containment of *thumos* by *phrenes* would be better defended by the two instances mentioned above in which the term *πυκινός* is used to denote the structural integrity required to keep something in, rather than the structural integrity to keep something out. *πυκινός* has the secondary meanings of '[I]etting nothing escape from within, holding its contents tight, well-fenced.' The two examples of this are both from the *Odyssey*. As mentioned in above, the pig-sty that Circe uses to confine Odysseus' men in is *πυκινός*, because it allows the men, or rather, the temporary pigs, no chance of escape.<sup>237</sup> Similarly, the animal-hide vessels that Athena advises Telemachus to pack his

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<sup>233</sup> ἐρητῶ: (1) To hold back, hold in check, check, restrain, curb. (2) To get under control, bring back to discipline. (3) In mid. (a) To check oneself, come to a stand, stop. (b) To hold back from going, remain in a specified place. Cunliffe cites both of Caswell's examples (*Il.* 9.462 & 13.280) of containment as examples meaning number (1).

<sup>234</sup> ἐρητῶ: (1) Restrain, check; (2) to keep away from; (3) prevent (LSJ).

<sup>235</sup> Caswell: 1990, 43.

<sup>236</sup> Sullivan, S. D. (1993). Review: A Study of *Thumos* in Early Greek Epic by Caroline Caswell. *Phoenix*, 47 (3), 264-6, p. 266.

<sup>237</sup> πυκινούς κευθμῶνας (*Od.* 10.283).

provisions in before leaving Ithaca in *Odyssey* 2, are also *πυκνιοῖσιν*, because they hold their contents tightly within them.<sup>238</sup> Nonetheless, the vast majority of uses of *πυκνινός* denote strength through structural integrity for the purpose, not of containment, but rather for the purposes of defence and protection, most especially defence on the battlefield. This suggests that the primary function of *phrenes*, the metaphorical psychological fortress, is defensive. *Phrenes* defend the individual in two ways. First, by guarding the psychological entities within them from external forces. And second, by protecting the psychological entities, including themselves, from the destructive influence of the internal forces of the extreme passions.

Homeric man, as Sullivan contends, is a nexus of internal and external forces, and the boundaries between which are not clearly demarcated.<sup>239</sup> I contend that the *phrenes* are at the heart of this nexus between the internal and external, that they are the point of communication and inspiration between gods and man, the point where that which originates within man, and that which originates outside of him, merge, becoming one in a way that is altogether foreign to Homer's contemporary audience. *Phrenes* are not merely the nexus between inside and out, but they are Homeric man's psychological fortress, protecting him from both external, as well as internal, destructive forces. It is starting to become even clearer then, why it is of such paramount importance that Homeric man's *phrenes* are in their strong, tightly-knit, steadfast condition. The stronger Homeric man's *phrenes*, the greater is his protection from destructive forces. By external destructive forces, I mean those that originate outside Homeric man's *phrenes*. These include: wine, which holds (cf. *ἔρχομαι*, *Od.* 18.331) and overcomes or weighs down (cf. *βαρέω*, *Od.* 19.122) *phrenes*; *atē*, which strikes *phrenes* (*ἄαζω*, *Od.* 21.301); and the gods, who may harm (cf. *βλάπτω*),<sup>240</sup> remove (cf. *αἰρέω*, *ἐξαιρέω*),<sup>241</sup> destroy (cf. *ἄλλυμι*),<sup>242</sup> and who – along with mortals<sup>243</sup> – deceive one's *phrenes*.<sup>244</sup>

<sup>238</sup> *δέρμασιν ἐν πυκνιοῖσιν* (*Od.* 2.291).

<sup>239</sup> Sullivan: 1988, 81. Sullivan here echoes Snell's famous claim that in Homer, 'Mental and spiritual acts are due to the impact of external factors, and man is the open target of a great many forces which impinge on him, and penetrate his very core' (Snell: 1953 (1982 ed.), 20).

<sup>240</sup> *Il.* 15.724; *Od.* 14.178, cf. 23.14.

<sup>241</sup> *Il.* 6.234, 9.377, 18.311, 19.137.

<sup>242</sup> *Il.* 7.360, 12.234.

When Homeric characters charge one another with having *phrenes* that are, or have been, intoxicated, harmed, removed, destroyed, or deceived, they are referring primarily to the destruction of that individual's decision-making capacity. Here we see the final function of *phrenes*: the moral function.<sup>245</sup> Both Achilles (*Il.* 9.377) and Agamemnon (*Il.* 19.137), for example, cite removal of *phrenes* (φρένας εἴλετο / ἐξέλετο) as the cause of Agamemnon's fatal decision to take Briseis from Achilles. It is similarly Athena's removal of the Trojans' *phrenes* (φρένας εἴλετο) that causes them to foolishly assent to Hector's plan to remain outside the city walls and fight Achilles, rather than retreat inside and await the optimal time for fighting (*Il.* 18.254-84). This latter plan was suggested by 'the careful [πεπνυμένος]<sup>246</sup> Polydamas who – just like the old man used as a foil to the young men of unstable *phrenes* (ἠερέθονται, *Il.* 3.108) discussed in the previous chapter – is the only one amongst them who 'looked before and behind him [ὄρα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω]' (*Il.* 18.249-50).<sup>247</sup> Hector has a history of failing to see the wisdom in Polydamas' advice; in *Iliad* 12, upon hearing Polydamas' suggestion that they remain rather than fight (*Il.* 12.216), Hector claimed that the gods must have destroyed Polydamas' *phrenes* (φρένας ὄλεσαν, *Il.* 12.234).<sup>248</sup> In all of these examples, destruction of *phrenes* most undermines the character's decision-making capacity, and destruction is manifest in the character's words and deeds.

<sup>243</sup> E.g., Hector taunts the fatally wounded Patroclus, asking him whether Achilles persuaded Patroclus' foolish *phrenes* with his words (φρένας ἄφρονη πεῖθε, *Il.* 16.842).

<sup>244</sup> E.g., Athena deceives the *phrenes* of the foolish Panadarus by persuading him (φρένας ἄφρονη πεῖθεν) shoot Menelaus and thereby break the truce (*Il.* 4.104). See also *Od.* 13.327, where Odysseus suspects Athena of deceiving him with her words (ἐμάς φρένας ἠπεροπέυσης). See Sullivan: 1988, 144-150.

<sup>245</sup> See Classen: 2005 on this.

<sup>246</sup> For scholarship on πεπνυμένος, see: Heath, J. (2001). ΠΕΠΝΥΜΕΝΟΣ: Growing into an Epithet. *Mnemosyne*, 54 (2), 129-57.

<sup>247</sup> 'So spoke Hector, and the Trojans thundered to hear him; fools [νήπιος], since Pallas Athena had taken away the wits from them [φρένας εἴλετο]. They gave their applause to Hector in his counsel of evil, but none to Polydamas, who had spoken good sense before them' (*Il.* 18.310-14). Polydamas, who was superior to Hector in words, advised temporary retreat inside the city walls until the best was optimal for fighting Achilles. Hector, however, who was superior to Polydamas in deeds, rejected Polydamas' advice in favour of immediate action (*Il.* 18.252). Hector later realises his fatal folly in not following Polydamas' counsel.

<sup>248</sup> The only other example of damaged *phrenes* is in *Iliad* 7, where Paris objects to Antenor's suggestion that they return Helen to Menelaus and Agamemnon (*Il.* 7.350-1), saying that a god must have destroyed his *phrenes* (φρένας ὄλεσαν, *Il.* 7.360).

However, an individual's *phrenes* are not only vulnerable to being damaged by external forces, but can also be damaged by forces internal to the individual. I will use the example of Agamemnon's *phrenes* mentioned above to illustrate the destructive effect of excessive thumotic passions on *phrenes*. When Agamemnon makes the fatal decision to take Briseis from Achilles in *Iliad* 1, his *phrenes* are described as having been filled and blackened by *menos* (μένεος δὲ μέγα φρένες ἀμφὶ μέλαιναί πίμπλαντ', *Il.* 1.103-104).<sup>249</sup> Agamemnon will later blame his poor decision on Zeus' removal of his *phrenes*,<sup>250</sup> as we saw in the preceding paragraph. But he will also blame it on yielding to the excessive thumotic passions in his *phrenes*, specifically yielding to the blinding and fierce *atē* that the gods sent to overcome his *phrenes* (φρεσὶν ἔμβαλον ἄγριον ἄτην, *Il.* 19.88). The excessive thumotic passions in Agamemnon's *phrenes* have damaged (ἄάω, *Il.* 9.119) them, and rendered them destructive (ὀλοός, *Il.* 1.342), and weak or wretched (λευγαλέος, *Il.* 9.119).<sup>251</sup> Agamemnon's decision-making capacity has been undermined because, as Achilles insightfully explains, by raging in his destructive *phrenes* (ὀλοῖησι φρεσὶ θύει) Agamemnon has lost the capacity to 'look behind and before him' (*Il.* 1.342-343).<sup>252</sup> It is this ability to 'look behind and before' oneself that is central to Homeric endurance. To be fully in control of his actions, Homeric man needs to be able to abstract himself from the present, and from the passions that are uppermost within him in the present, and have the presence of mind to consider both past and future in his decision-making.<sup>253</sup>

<sup>249</sup> At *Il.* 1.103-4 Agamemnon's *phrenes* 'filled within filled black to the brim with anger from beneath [μένεος δὲ μέγα φρένες ἀμφὶ μέλαιναί πίμπλαντ']'. At *Il.* 19.88 Agamemnon blames the gods for this: '... yet I am not responsible but Zeus is, and Destiny, and Erinys with mist-walking who in assembly caught by heart in the savage delusion [φρεσὶν ἔμβαλον ἄγριον ἄτην] on that day I stripped from him the prize of Achilles' (*Il.* 19.86-89).

<sup>250</sup> This is seconded by Achilles at *Il.* 9.377 where he says that 'Zeus of the counsels has taken his [Agamemnon's] wits away from him [ἐκ γὰρ οἱ φρένας εἴλετο μητίετα Ζεὺς].'

<sup>251</sup> The line at *Il.* 9.119 reads: ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀασάμην φρεσὶ λευγαλέησι πιθήσας. This is the very opposite of what *phrenes* in their proper state are supposed to be. *Phrenes* are meant to be protective and defensive, not destructive.

<sup>252</sup> Achilles says: οὐδέ τι οἶδε νοῆσαι ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω (*Il.* 1.343).

<sup>253</sup> For other passages in which excessive thumotic passions in *phrenes* undermine an individual's decision-making capacity, leading to reprehensible behaviour, see *Il.* 8.360 (Zeus), 24.114 (Achilles), and 24.135 (Achilles).

*Phrenes*, then, are vulnerable to external forces, such as divine interference, and internal forces, such as excessive thumotic passions. Internal and external forces merge in Homeric man's *phrenes*, as we saw clearly in Agamemnon's seizure of Briseis, in which his passions both originate in his *phrenes*, and are put there by the gods. The stronger Homeric man's *phrenes*, the less vulnerable he is to being deceived by gods or other people, and the greater the capacity for the *thumos* within him to restrain his thumotic passions. The presence of excessive thumotic passions in *phrenes*, particularly when they are yielded to rather than restrained or controlled, damages the *phrenes* in some fundamental way. This damage is not necessarily permanent, however, as it is possible for the *phrenes* of good men to be healed (ἀκεσταί τοι φρένες ἐσθλῶν, *Il.* 13.115).

The proper physical states of *phrenes* and *thumos* are thus the opposite of one another. In its proper physical state, *phrenes* are firm, rigid, and unbending; while *thumos* in its proper state is the opposite of this, that is, flexible, malleable, yielding, and bendable. It is only when it is in a negative state that *thumos* is attributed strength, such as when it is ascribed the solidity of iron.<sup>254</sup> When in their negative states, *phrenes* and *thumos* undermine the individual's decision-making capacity, and result in behaviour both prudentially and morally reprehensible. We saw this above in the example of Agamemnon's *phrenes*, and, after examining a number of the Homeric decision-making scenes in the next chapter, I will look at Achilles' *phrenes* and *thumos* in the final chapter of this thesis, and examine the roles they play in his actions and decision-making. What is required for good actions and decision-making, is some ideal tension or balance between one strong, solid, and close-knit entity, and the other hot,<sup>255</sup> vaporous, energetic entity. From a consideration of these qualities of *phrenes* and *thumos*, and from the fact that *thumos* is located within *phrenes*, it is understandable that the relationship between them be seen as one of containment of *thumos* by *phrenes*. One can imagine that when in their proper states, the energy-filled breath of *thumos* cannot break beyond the bounds of the strong, dense, closely-knit *phrenes*; but that when *phrenes* lack this strength and tensility,

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<sup>254</sup> σιδήρεος ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός (*Il.* 22.357).

<sup>255</sup> *Thumos* and *phrenes* are often objects of the verb *λαίνω*, translations of which include 'To gladden, rejoice, cheer, comfort, placate,' (e.g., θυμός ἰάνθη, *Il.* 23.597-8; μετὰ φρεσὶ θυμὸς ἰάνθη, *Il.* 23.600). However *λαίνω* also has a primary meaning of 'To warm, heat.'

they no longer able to contain the excesses of *thumos*, which then burst forth from the widening gaps in the weakening *phrenes*. However, the role of *phrenes* is more passive than this. Rather than *phrenes* restraining *thumos* by actively containing it, it seems that the active *thumos* draws on the strength and steadfastness of the surrounding *phrenes* in order to restrain itself.

Ἡρακλέα Διὸς υἱὸν αἰέσομαι, ὃν μέγ' ἄριστον  
γεῖνατ' ἐπιχθονίων Θήβης ἐνὶ καλλιχόροισιν  
Ἀλκμήμη μιχθεῖσα κελαινεφεῖ Κρονίωνι •  
ὃς πρὶν μὲν κατὰ γαῖαν ἀθέσφατον ἠδὲ θάλασσαν  
πλαζόμενος πομπῆσιν ὑπ' Εὐρυσθέος ἄνακτος  
πολλὰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἔρεξεν ἀτάσθαλα, πολλὰ δ' ἀνέτλη •  
νῦν δ' ἤδη κατὰ καλὸν ἔδος νιφόεντος Ὀλύμπου  
ναίει τερπόμενος καὶ ἔχει καλλίσφυρον Ἥβην.  
χαῖρε ἄναξ Διὸς υἱέ • δίδου δ' ἀρετὴν τε καὶ ὄλβον.

*Of Heracles the son of Zeus I will sing, far the finest of men on earth, born in Thebes of the beautiful dances to Alcmena in union with the dark-cloud son of Kronos. Formerly he roamed the vastness of land and sea at the behest of King Eurystheus, causing much suffering himself and enduring much; but now in the fair abode of snowy Olympus he lives in pleasure and has fair-ankled Hebe as his wife.*

*I salute you, lord, son of Zeus: grant me status and fortune.*

*Homeric Hymn to Heracles the Lionheart*<sup>256</sup>

### (i) *Endurance and Deliberation*

In the previous chapter I briefly defined Homeric endurance as the voluntary suffering of some significant hardship, in a way that is contrary to one's most immediate passions, and doing so either as a means to achieving some further end, or as the only virtuous choice one has in the face of divine fate.<sup>257</sup> I gave a number of examples of ways

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<sup>256</sup> Homer. (2003). *Homeric Hymns; Homeric Apocrypha; Lives of Homer*. (M. L. West, Trans.) Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press.

<sup>257</sup> Scholarship on endurance in Homer includes: Whitman, C. H. (1958). *Homer & the Heroic Tradition*. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 175-8. Lloyd-Jones. (1971). *The Justice of Zeus*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 28-30. Fränkel, H. (1975). *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy*. (M. Hadas, & J. Willis, Trans.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 87-93. Brooks, C. (1977). The Heroic Impulse in the "Odyssey". *The Classical World*, 70 (7), 455-456. Flaumenhaft, M. J. (1982). The Undercover Hero: Odysseus from Dark to Daylight. *Interpretation*, 10 (1), 9-41. Schmid, W. T. (1985). The Socratic Conception of Courage. *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 2 (2), 113-29, pp. 113-4. Pucci, P. (1987). *Odysseus*

in which Homeric man endures, such as through action and inaction; through standing his ground in battle and retreating; through steeling himself to fight, as well as submitting to, his enemy; and, most importantly, through submitting to his divinely apportioned fate. Despite the differences between these examples, and despite the fact that they often stand in stark opposition to one another, I argued that they are all examples of endurance because they all share the same core of Homeric endurance. Having examined *thumos* and *phrenes*, the psychological entities involved in Homeric endurance, we can now make our definition of this core of Homeric endurance more precise. Homeric endurance lies in the battle to subjugate one's passionate impulse to one's rational and passion-restraining impulse, choosing to suffer, rather than avoid, some significant hardship. By 'significant hardship' I mean something that threatens what is most valuable to the agent, such as his life or reputation. In the previous chapter, we saw that *thumos* is the source of both the passionate and rational impulses, and it endures by choosing to suffer by restraining, rather than satisfying, its passionate impulse. We also saw that *thumos*' capacity to endure is determined by the state of the *phrenes* that enclose it. Strong, steadfast, and structurally sound *phrenes* enable *thumos* to endure. Endurance, then, is the realization of the internal disposition of psychological, and ambiguously physical, strength and integrity, enabled by a harmonious relationship between *thumos* and *phrenes*.

The most famous instances of endurance in Homer, those of Odysseus in *Iliad* 11 and *Odyssey* 20, are paradigms of standing one's ground endurance and bearing pain endurance respectively. I will offer a brief summary of these before returning to examine

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*Polutropos. Intertextual Readings in the Odyssey and the Iliad.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Williams: 1993, 38-41. Schmid, W. T. (1992). *On Manly Courage: A Study of Plato's Laches.* Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 112-4. Beye, C. R. (1993). *Ancient Epic Poetry: Homer, Apollonius, Virgil.* London: Cornell University Press, 193-4. Alvis, J. (1995). *Divine Purpose and Heroic Response in Homer and Virgil.* Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 85-135. Cook, E. F. (1995). *The Odyssey in Athens: Myths of Cultural Origins.* New York: Cornell University Press, esp. pp. 49-65. Finkelberg, M. (1995). Odysseus and the Genus 'Hero'. *Greece & Rome*, 42 (1), 1 - 14. Cook, E. (1999). "Active" and "Passive" Heroics in the "Odyssey". *The Classical World*, 93 (2), 149-167. Dova, S. (2000). Who is μακάτατος in the "Odyssey?". *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 100, 53-65. Barnouw, J. (2004). *Odysseus, Hero of Practical Intelligence: Deliberation and Signs in Homer's Odyssey.* Lanham, Md: University Press of America, esp. pp. 85-98.

them in greater detail in the relevant sections. In *Iliad* 11, Odysseus finds himself alone on the battlefield surrounded by advancing Trojans. His *thumos* is divided between his fearful impulse that urges him to flee, and his rational impulse that reminds him that it is only the coward that flees. Just like every warrior hero in the *Iliad*, Odysseus' overall goal in the *Iliad* is the achievement of undying *kleos*, that is, fame. In order to endure in this episode, Odysseus must restrain his fearful impulse, enduring rather than acting on his fear, in the pursuit of his goal. This is the paradigm of standing one's ground endurance: all the warrior needs to do in order to stand his ground on the battlefield is to resist the passionate impulse to flee. However, standing one's ground is not limited to the battlefield, as we will in *Odyssey* 5, when Odysseus stands his ground on his besieged raft, resisting his fearful impulse to abandon it. In *Odyssey* 20, we see the paradigmatic example of bearing-pain endurance. Having finally returned home to Ithaca, Odysseus discovers that his maidservants have betrayed him by fraternizing with the wicked suitors. His *thumos* is divided between the *menos* that urges him to fight and kill the servants immediately, and the knowledge that if he were to yield to his passionate impulse, his opportunity to revenge himself on both his servants and the suitors would be lost forever. Odysseus must restrain his passionate impulse, and endure, rather than satisfy, his *menos* in the pursuit of his overall goal. In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus' overall goal is different from that in the *Iliad*. The achievement of *kleos* has been replaced by *nostos*, that is, home-coming. This is the paradigm of bearing-pain endurance: in order to endure, the Homeric character voluntarily submits to a certain hardship, checking the impulse to respond.

In these paradigmatic examples of Homeric endurance, endurance takes the dramatic form of what have come to be called the 'decision-making scenes.' Odysseus' decision-making in both of these passages is characterised by what I will call 'the formula for deliberation:' one of two verbs of deliberation – *ὀρμαίνω* or *μερμηρίζω*<sup>260</sup> – in conjunction with the phrase *κατὰ θυμόν καὶ κατὰ φρένα*. In the instances of this formula in Homer, *ὀρμαίνω* means to 'turn over, revolve, ponder, consider, debate, have in contemplation, meditate;' and *μερμηρίζω* means 'to ponder, consider, deliberate,

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<sup>260</sup> See Pucci (1987, 69-75) on the *μερμηρίζω* deliberation scenes.

meditate.’ As we saw in the previous chapter, while both *thumos* and *phrenes* have a deliberative function, *phrenes* is most particularly associated with deliberation in Homer. Evidence for this can be seen in by comparing the frequency with which *ὀρμαίνω* and *μερμηρίζω* occur with *thumos* and *phrenes*. *μερμηρίζω* is found most frequently with *phrenes* alone as the location of the deliberation;<sup>261</sup> then with both *thumos* and *phrenes* as the locations of the deliberation;<sup>262</sup> and least frequently with *thumos* only at the location,<sup>263</sup> and with *thumos* in *phrenes* as the agent of the deliberation.<sup>264</sup> *ὀρμαίνω* is found most frequently with both *thumos* and *phrenes* as the locations of the deliberation;<sup>265</sup> then with *phrenes* alone as the location of the deliberation;<sup>266</sup> and least frequently with *thumos* alone at the location.<sup>267</sup> I will examine a number of the decision-making scenes characterised by this formula,<sup>268</sup> analysing each in terms of its manifestation of either standing one’s ground endurance, or bearing-pain endurance, and using it as a focal point for my discussion of that dimension of endurance. However, before examining the scenes, I will offer an analysis of the main Homeric verb of endurance in Homer: *τλάω*.

## (ii) *Τλάω: Daring and Enduring*

As I stated above, which of the three types of Homeric endurance a specific instance of the verb *τλάω* denotes, can be determined grammatically. Although the noun form of *τλάω*, *τλημοσύνη*, does not occur in Homer, I will use it for the sake of clarity, when the sentence requires a noun rather than a verb. Bearing-pain endurance and the

<sup>261</sup> Eight times, at: *Il.* 2.3; and *Od.* 1.427; 2.94; 10.438; 11.204; 20.41; 22.333; 24.128.

<sup>262</sup> Six times, at: *Il.* 5.671; 8.169; and *Od.* 4.117; 10.151; 20.10; 24.235.

<sup>263</sup> Twice, at: *Od.* 10.50; 16.237.

<sup>264</sup> Twice, at: *Od.* 16.73; 20.38. ἦτορ (ἐν στήθεσσι) also functions as the agent of deliberation once, at: *Il.* 1.189-9.

<sup>265</sup> Eight times, at: *Il.* 1.193; 11.411; 17.106; 18.15; and *Od.* 4.120; 5.365; 5.424; 6.118.

<sup>266</sup> *Phrenes* is the location of the deliberation six times in the epics. It appears alone as the location at: *Il.* 10.4; 10.507; 16.435; and *Od.* 3.151; 4.843, and it appears as the location of the deliberation of *kēr* once, at *Od.* 18.345. *Kēr* appears alone as the agent of the deliberation twice at *Od.* 7.82-3; and 23.85-6.

<sup>267</sup> Four times, at: *Il.* 14.20; 21.137; 24.680; and *Od.* 2.156.

<sup>268</sup> *Iliad* (*Il.* 1.193, 11.411, 17.106), and three in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 5.365, 20.10, 24.235).

resolution to act endurance correspond to Liddell and Scott's two main definitions of *τλάω*. Its primary meaning is to 'suffer [or] undergo hardship, disgrace etc,' which corresponds to bearing-pain endurance.<sup>269</sup> *Τλάω* in this first sense is found in Homer in its absolute form, and commonly in the imperative. It can be translated as 'hold out, endure, be patient, [and] submit.'<sup>270</sup> The secondary meaning of *τλάω* is: 'to dare or venture' to do something in a way that is 'contrary to one's feelings,' or to 'have the courage, hardihood, effrontery, cruelty, or the grace, charity, patience, to do anything.'<sup>271</sup> *Τλάω* according to this secondary definition is found governing the infinitive of a verb of action; however it can also be found independently of the verb in its participle form.<sup>272</sup> While Liddell and Scott distinguish between two main dimensions of endurance, I distinguish between three, dividing this secondary meaning of *τλάω*, 'to dare or venture,' into two: to dare or venture *to act*, which corresponds to resolution to act endurance, and to dare or venture *not to act*, which corresponds to standing one's ground endurance. These two ways of enduring can be distinguished from one another grammatically. When *τλάω* governs a verb of *action* – such as *ἔρχομαι* (to come or go),<sup>273</sup> *κατέρχομαι* (to descend),<sup>274</sup> *θωρήσσω* (arm for battle), or *λόχος εἶμι* (to go on an ambush),<sup>275</sup> – it denotes

<sup>269</sup> *τλάω* denotes bearing-pain endurance in the *Iliad* at 1.586, 382, 383, 385, 392, 395, 873; 18.433; 19.308; & 24.49; and in the *Odyssey* at 1.288; 2.219; 3.209; 4.242, 271, 459; 5.222; 6.190; 8.182; 11.181; 13.307; 16.275; 18.135; 19.347; 20.18, 23, 311; 23.100, 168; & 24.163.

<sup>270</sup> LSJ cites the following examples from the *Iliad*: 1.586; 2.299; 5.385; 5.392; 11.317; 18.433 (submission to); and 19.308. And these examples from the *Odyssey*: 1.288; 2.219; 4.447; 13.307; 20.18; and 20.23.

<sup>271</sup> LSJ cites the following examples from the *Iliad*: 1.228; 5.383; 7.480; 21.150; 24.35, 505 and 519. And these examples from the *Odyssey*: 5.362; and 20.311 (in participle form).

<sup>272</sup> For example at *Il.* 5.383; *Od.* 5.362.

<sup>273</sup> E.g., *τλαίη ἐλθέμεν* (*Il.* 10.307-308); *ἔτλης ἐλθέμεν* (*Il.* 24.519); and *τλαίη ἐλθέμεν* (*Il.* 24.565).

<sup>274</sup> E.g., *ἔτλης κατεθέμεν* (*Od.* 11.475).

<sup>275</sup> Achilles rebukes Agamemnon in this way: 'Never once have you taken courage your heart [*τέτληκας θυμῷ*] to arm [*θωρηχθῆναι*] with your people for battle, or go into ambush [*λόχονδ' ἰέναι*] with the best of the Achaians' (*Il.* 1.226-8).

the resolution to act.<sup>276</sup> When *τλάω* governs a verb of *inaction* – such as *μένω* (remain or wait),<sup>277</sup> or *ἵστημι* (make a stand or stand firm)<sup>278</sup> – it denotes standing one’s ground.

*Τλάω*, then, can mean both daring and enduring. When *τλάω* denotes the resolution to act, it is generally translated as ‘daring,’ or ‘bravery.’ Contemporary readers might be struck by the unification in Homeric endurance of what we generally see as two sets of related oppositions. We tend to oppose bravery and endurance, understanding each, to a certain extent, in opposition to each other. We further oppose activity and passivity, and understand bravery as essentially active, and endurance as essentially passive. The Homeric conception of endurance, however, is much broader and more dynamic than contemporary conceptions of it. It includes endurance through remaining passive in the face of some suffering; however, unlike contemporary conceptions of endurance, it is not limited to such passivity, but extends also to the endurance required to perform some difficult action. Pierre Chantraine’s exposition of the etymology of *τλάω* in the *Dictionnaire étymologique* reveals that this unification of daring and enduring can be found in its root *τλα-* or *τλη-*. Pietro Pucci cites Chantraine’s contention that ‘the root *τλα-* *τλη-* means, “to take upon oneself,” whence, on the one hand, “to put up with [endure, support]” and on the other, “to take responsibility for.”’<sup>290</sup> The former, Pucci argues, has connotations of ‘enduring’ and ‘suffering,’ while the latter has connotations of ‘resolving,’ ‘daring,’ and ‘feeling confident.’<sup>291</sup> We can see here in Chantraine’s exposition of *τλάω* the element of voluntariness that I stated above was essential to Homeric endurance. Homeric man endures by *voluntarily* taking something upon himself; and he does this either through activity or passivity.

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<sup>276</sup> *τλάω* denotes resolution to act endurance in the *Iliad* at: 1.228; 1.543; 3.306; 4.94; 5.21; 7.151, 480; 9.373; 10.307; 17.153, 733; 18.246; 19.14; 20.421; 21.150; 24.35, 505, 519, & 656; and in the *Odyssey* at 2.82; 4.242, 271; 4.716; 5.178; 10.343, 384; 11.143, 376, 425, 475; 17.104, 456; & 23.150.

<sup>277</sup> Standing one’s ground endurance is denoted by *τλάω* governing the verb *μένω* in the *Iliad* at 1.534; 2.299; 8.78; 11.317; 13.829; 15.164; 21.608; 22.136, 251; and in the *Odyssey* at 14.269.

<sup>278</sup> Standing one’s ground endurance is denoted by *τλάω* governing the verb *ἵστημι* at *Il.* 17.166 (οὐκ ἐτάλασσας στήμεναι); *Il.* 17.490 (τλαῖεν ἐναντίβιον στάντες μαχέσασθαι); and *Od.* 17.438 (ἔτλη στήναι).

<sup>290</sup> Pucci: 1987, 46.

<sup>291</sup> *Ibid.*, 46 (see also pp. 45-57).

However, even when *τλάω* denotes resolution to act endurance, crucial differences can be discerned between this action and typically brave action. As noted above resolution to act endurance is denoted by *τλάω* governing a verb of action. The verbs I listed above as examples – *ἔρχομαι*, *θωρήσσω*, *κατέρχομαι*, and *λόχος εἶμι* – denote actions that are typically thought of as brave. However, these are rare forms of resolution to act endurance. Out of fourteen instances of *τλάω* denoting the resolution to act in the *Odyssey*, none denote action indistinguishable from brave action. And, out of the eighteen instances in the *Iliad*, however, only four denote action that is indistinguishable from bravery: arming oneself in battle, or going on an ambush; daring to shoot an arrow; and daring to stand up to an enemy in battle.<sup>292</sup> Comprehensive analysis of *τλάω* reveals that resolution to act endurance is the internal strength required to do a range of difficult things, particularly off the battlefield. Resolution to act endurance is the courage to go (*ἔρχομαι*, *κατέρχομαι*)<sup>293</sup> somewhere that one's life is threatened. It is the courage required to look (*ὄράω*, *ιδέσθαι*) someone in the eyes,<sup>294</sup> to speak (*εἶπον*) the truth to them;<sup>295</sup> to reach out and touch the face of your sons' killer. I suggest that both bravery and endurance is required to perform these actions; that it takes both the bravery of the dynamic thumotic passions, as well as the internal steadfastness of endurance.

In “‘Active’ and ‘Passive’ Heroics in the ‘Odyssey,’” Erwin Cook addresses this opposition between active and passive heroism, arguing that they are two dimensions of the Homeric hero.<sup>296</sup> He cites the passage from the *Homeric Hymn to Heracles*, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, as succinctly articulating this twofold-heroism of the Homeric hero. In this hymn, Heracles is described as a hero who ‘did many reckless

<sup>292</sup> *Il.* 1.226-8 (οὔτε θωρηχθῆναι ... οὔτε λόχονδ' ἰέναι ... τέτληκας θυμῶ); 4.94 (τλαίης ... ἐπιπροέμεν); 17.733 (ἔτλη ... δηριάσασθαι); 21.150 (ἔτλης ἀντίος ἐλθεῖν).

<sup>293</sup> *Il.* 10.307 (τλαίη ἐλθέμεν); *Il.* 11.475 (ἔτλης ... κατεθέμεν); 24.519 (ἔτλης ... ἐλθέμεν), 565 (τλαίη ... ἐλθέμεν).

<sup>294</sup> *Il.* 3.306 (τλήσομ' ... ὄρασθαι); *Il.* 9.373 (τετλαίη ιδέσθαι); *Il.* 19.14 (ἔτλη ... εισιδέειν); *Od.* 11.143 (ἔτλη ἐσάντα ιδεῖν οὐδὲ προτιμυθήσασθαι).

<sup>295</sup> *Il.* 1.543 (τέτληκας εἶπεῖν); *Od.* 11.143 (see fn. 295); *Od.* 17.104-6 (ἔτλης ... εἶπέμεν). For *τλάω* and different verbs of speech, see *Od.* 2.82 (ἔτλη ... ἀμείψασθαι); & *Od.* 11.376 (τλαίης ... μυθήσασθαι).

<sup>296</sup> Cook, E. (1999). "Active" and "Passive" Heroics in the "Odyssey". *The Classical World*, 93 (2), 149-167.

things [ἀτάσθαλα], and endured [ἀνέτηλ] many<sup>297</sup> Cook contends that the ‘traditional hero thus emerges as a “Man of Pain,” in both an active and passive sense.’<sup>298</sup> The heroic Man of Pain is called on to use the warrior’s *βίη* to actively inflict pain for the benefit of his community,<sup>299</sup> but he must also use the trickster’s *μητις* to passively endure pain.<sup>300</sup> The typical Iliadic warrior excels in the former, but not in the latter. Odysseus excels in both because he is able to act unhesitatingly on his *βίη*, but he is also able to use ‘the trickster’s *μητις* to restrain the hero’s *βίη*.’<sup>301</sup> For example, when Odysseus endures in the Cyclops’ cave by temporarily restraining his impulse to kill the Cyclops, Odysseus is the passive hero. However, when the time is right for acting on his impulse, Odysseus the active hero exacts his revenge and blinds the Cyclops. Odysseus’ ability to act in this way makes him a unique hero in the *Iliad*; the typical Iliadic warrior’s psyche, by contrast, is typified by his inability to do the same. For example, had it been Achilles, always the active hero, who was stuck in the Cyclops’ cave, it is highly doubtful that he would have been able to restrain his impulse to kill the Cyclops.

It is tempting to follow Cook in articulating the difference between bravery and endurance as the difference between the active and the passive. On this view, bravery would be the active form of courage, manifested in deeds; and endurance would be the passive form of courage, manifested in passivity. I hesitate to characterise endurance as passive because, although endurance may appear passive from the perspective of an onlooker, as we saw in the first and second chapters, *thumos* and *phrenes* are far from passive during the individual’s struggle to endure. Rather, the struggle to subjugate one thumotic impulse to another is very much an active one, requiring great strength on the part of the *phrenes* and great flexibility on the part of the *thumos*. This internal battle is given physical form in *Odyssey* 20 with two startling metaphors that I will discuss in detail in the following chapter. Odysseus’ *kradiē* is a barking dog that he struggles to bring into submission, striking himself on the chest and reproaching his bitch-like heart.

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<sup>297</sup> Ibid., 149.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid.

<sup>299</sup> Ibid.

<sup>300</sup> Ibid., 154.

<sup>301</sup> Ibid.

In his effort to subdue his *kradiē*, Odysseus twists this way and that (ἐλίσσεται ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, *Od.* 20.17-24), like a *γαστέρ* (a belly or sausage) that a man turns about while he is roasting, the belly being just as eager that it be cooked quickly (μάλα δ' ὄκα λιλαιέται ὀπτηθῆναι) as the man roasting it (*Od.* 20.25-28).

However, keeping in mind the internal activity involved in remaining externally passive, the distinction between active and passive heroism as corresponding with bravery and endurance is useful in illuminating the role of endurance in the action of the epics. As we will see in the decision-making scenes to be analysed below, active and passive heroism are separated and united in various ways in Homeric endurance. Endurance through resolution to act, is obviously the most active of the three types of Homeric endurance. Standing one's ground endurance could be differentiated from bearing-pain endurance in terms of the relationship between active and passive heroism in them. Standing one's ground endurance necessarily unites active and passive heroism, with the enduring character remaining passive as the enemy approaches, so that he may launch into action, fighting the enemy bravely, once it arrives. Bearing-pain endurance *can* unite active and passive heroism, but the union is not necessary. For example, Odysseus remains passive when confronted with the maidservants' betrayal in *Odyssey* 20, so that he may actively slaughter both them and the suitors when the time is right. However, the active and passive need not be united in this way in bearing-pain endurance. For example, the only way in which mortal women may endure in Homer, and the main way in which goddesses endure, is through bearing-pain endurance. Penelope bears the pain of Odysseus' absence, and bears the pain of her indecision regarding whether to continue to wait for Odysseus, or to marry the best of the suitors; but she does not endure as a second option, waiting until the moment is right to act, but she endures in the only way available to her. This is the endurance of both gods and mankind of their divine fate. They do not passively endure, reluctantly waiting until the time is right to actively fight Zeus, but they endure as they only virtuous way of responding to their divinely apportioned lot. This discussion will be returned to in the final chapter.

Having examined in depth the psychological entities involved in endurance, we can now understand why Homeric bravery and endurance were so closely related to one another, so closely, in fact, that they could be denoted by the same terms. [That is not to say, however, that it is up to the whim of the translator whether she translates a specific instance of *τλάω* as bravery or as endurance. As I will discuss shortly, which of the three types of endurance a specific instance of *τλάω* denotes, can be determined grammatically.] I will briefly outline the differences between bravery and endurance – or between the resolution to act and both bearing-pain and standing one’s ground endurance – here, returning to the discussion towards the end of this chapter.

Bravery and endurance are two different responses to the same thumotic passions. The bravery of the Homeric hero consists first, in having a *thumos* in its proper state, that is, a flexible *thumos* that can be filled, stirred, and aroused by thumotic passions such as *alkē*,<sup>302</sup> *menos*, *cholos*, *tharsos*, eagerness (cf. *μενοινάω*), and *thumos* (that is, ‘*thumos*’ when it denotes a passion rather than an entity or a location for a passion). Second, the hero’s bravery consists in the internal disposition to respond immediately and without hesitation to these thumotic passions that urge him to act in situations to pursue or defend those things that are most important to him. And third, the Homeric hero’s internal disposition must be matched by his external qualities: he must have great strength and fighting prowess in order to effectively act on his thumotic passions and achieve the end to which they impel him. The Homeric hero’s endurance also consists in each of these, but has one further prerequisite. The enduring hero must also have a great and flexible *thumos*, the capacity to respond bravely and without hesitation to his thumotic passions, as well as the strength and prowess to achieve his ends (that is, unless this enduring hero is an old man, or a woman, but this will be discussed more fully later in this thesis). However, he must also have the capacity *not* to act as his *thumos* urges him, and to endure the pain of not acting on his passions. For this he requires not only *thumos* in its proper state, but also *phrenes* in their proper state. Another way of putting this is: in order

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<sup>302</sup> *ἀλκή*: ‘Prowess in defense or offence, mettle, courage, spirit; showing of fight, resistance; prowess displayed in action, deeds of prowess, fighting.’

to be enduring, you must first be brave; but being brave doesn't mean that you are enduring. Bravery is necessary but not sufficient for endurance.

(iii) ὄρμαινω / μερμηρίζω κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν:

*The Decision-Making Scenes*

While the formula for deliberation occurs thirteen times in the epics, only in six of these is endurance manifested in the deliberation. In the remaining seven instances of the formula, the deliberation fails to demand endurance for one of two reasons. Either the deliberation lacks the interior battle requisite for endurance (*Od.* 6.118, 10.151), or mortal interruption or divine intervention prevents the agent from making a decision or renders the voluntariness of the decision ambiguous (*Il.* 5.671, 8.169; *Od.* 4.117, 4.120, 5.424). Those of the former group are passages in which Odysseus has recently arrived on foreign land, and his deliberation concerns either what the natives are like, or what he should do. First, in *Odyssey* 6, Odysseus is awakened by the cries of Nausicaaa and her handmaidens as they play by the river. Odysseus ponders in his *thumos* and *phrenes* (ὄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, *Od.* 6.118) whether the natives are violent and inhospitable or godly and hospitable.<sup>303</sup> While Odysseus' deliberation certainly concerns something significant, that is, whether or not his life is in danger, it does not demand endurance because he is not torn between conflicting impulses, but rather considers various potential states of affairs. Internal division, which is often also denoted by terms such as *δίχα* and *διάνδιχα*, both on their own and in conjunction with *μερμηρίζω*, is central to Homeric endurance. I will dwell upon this internal division in greater depth after completing the summary of those decision-making scenes in which endurance is not manifested. In the second example, Odysseus has just arrived on Circe's island in

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<sup>303</sup> The passage reads: 'Now the princess threw the ball toward one handmaiden, and missed the girl, and the ball went into the swirling water, and the all cried aloud, and noble Odysseus wakened and sat up and began pondering in his heart and spirit [ὄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν]: "Ah me, what are the people whose land I have come to this time, and are they violent and savage, and without justice, or hospitable to strangers, with a godly mind? ... But come now, I myself shall see what I can discover. So speaking, great Odysseus came from under his thicket ...' (*Od.* 6.115-28).

*Odyssey* 10, and he ponders in his *thumos* and *phrenes* (μερμήριξα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, *Od.* 10.151) whether to investigate himself, but decides that it would be better to return to his ship, have dinner with his companions, and then send them to investigate.<sup>304</sup> Unlike in the first example, in which Odysseus' deliberation concerns two potential states of affairs, in the second example, Odysseus' deliberation concerns two potential courses of action. However, in neither of these examples is the deliberation characterised by an interior battle. Rather, in the first example, it is a passionate deliberation concerning the hospitality of the natives; and in the second example it is a dispassionate weighing of alternative courses of action.

Similarly excluded from consideration are those of the latter group, that is, those instances of the formula for deliberation in which the character is prevented from making a choice by mortal interruption, or whose choice is rendered ambiguously voluntary as a result of divine intervention. There are four instances of the formula for deliberation within this group. In *Odyssey* 4, noticing that Telemachus weeps at the mention of Odysseus' name, Menelaus ponders in his *thumos* and *phrenes* (μερμήριξε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, *Od.* 4.117) whether to wait for Telemachus to name Odysseus as his father, or ask him outright. As he was pondering in his *thumos* and *phrenes* (ὄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, *Od.* 4.120), Helen enters and remarks on the likeness of their guest to Telemachus before Menelaus has had a chance to choose between the two courses of action.<sup>305</sup> In the last three instances of the formula for deliberation, a god

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<sup>304</sup> Odysseus says: 'Then I pondered deeply in my heart and my spirit [μερμήριξα δ' ἔπειτα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν], whether, since I had seen the fire and smoke, to investigate; but in the division of my heart this way seemed best to me, to go back first to the fast ship and the beach of the sea, and give my companions some dinner, then send them forward to investigate' (*Od.* 10.151-155).

<sup>305</sup> '[Menelaus] spoke, and stirred in the other [Telemachus] the longing to weep for his father, and the tears fell from his eyes to the ground when he heard his father's name, holding with both hands the robe that was stained purple up before his eyes. And Menelaus perceived it, and now he pondered two ways within, in mind and spirit [μερμήριξε ... κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν] whether he would leave it to him to name his father, or whether he should speak first and ask and inquire about everything. While he as pondering these things in his heart and his spirit [ὄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν], Helen came out of her fragrant high-roofed bedchamber' (*Od.* 4.113-21). Helen says to Menelaus: 'My heart tells me to speak, for I think I never saw such a likeness, neither in man nor woman, and wonder takes me as I look on him, as this man has a likeness to the son of great-hearted Odysseus, Telemachus ...' (*Od.* 4.140-4).

inspires or influences the character's choice of one course of action over another. In *Odyssey* 5, as the shipwrecked Odysseus is deliberating in his *thumos* and *phrenes* (ἄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, *Od.* 5.424), debating whether he should swim to the shore of jagged rock or continue swimming in the hope that he will find a more hospitable shore, Athena inspires him to hold fast to a rock until the wave passed.<sup>306</sup> In *Iliad* 5, as he is deliberating in his *thumos* and *phrenes* (μερμήριξε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, *Il.* 5.671) whether to fight Sarpedon or kill some Lykians, Athena turns or directs Odysseus' *thumos* (cf. τρέπω) towards the latter option (*Il.* 5.676).<sup>307</sup> And in *Iliad* 8, Diomedes deliberates in this *thumos* and *phrenes* whether to fight Hector, or to refrain from fighting Hector, however Zeus warns Diomedes against doing so with thunder and bolts of lightening (τρις μὲν μερμήριξε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, *Il.* 8.169).

While I do not want to argue that these are *not* instances of voluntary choices on the part of Odysseus, that divine intervention in an individual's action or decision-making completely negates the autonomy or responsibility of that individual, a proper justification of my position would be extensive and lies beyond the scope of this thesis.<sup>308</sup> So I will leave these passages to one side, as instances of ambiguously voluntary choices, noting only that these are the only three instances of the formula in which a god influences the agent's choice in this way. There are two other instances of the formula for deliberation in which a god intervenes (Achilles in *Iliad* 1, and Odysseus in *Odyssey* 5), but I will argue in my analyses of these passages that the intervention is crucially different, and does not detract from, or render ambiguous, the voluntariness of the agent's choice. Although Zeus' intervention in Diomedes' deliberation in *Iliad* 8 does render Diomedes' decision ambiguous, I will examine this episode in the section on endurance

<sup>306</sup> 'Now as he was pondering this in his heart and spirit [ἄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν], meanwhile a great wave carried him against the rough rock face, and there his skin would have been taken off, his bones crushed together, had not the gray-eyed Athena sent him an inkling, and he frantically caught hold with both hands on the rock face, and clung to it, groaning until the great wave went over' (*Od.* 5.424-429).

<sup>307</sup> Odysseus 'pondered two ways within, in mind and in spirit [μερμήριξε ... κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν], torn between pursuing and fighting Sarpedon, or killing a number of Lykians. Athena steers Odysseus' anger towards the Lykians, 'as it was not the destiny of great-hearted Odysseus to kill with sharp bronze the strong son of Zeus' (*Il.* 5.671-76).

<sup>308</sup> See Dodds: 1951, chapter 1; Williams: 1993 (2008 ed.), chapter 3; and Gaskin: 2001, esp. 154-7.

on the battlefield for two reasons: first, in order to draw out certain significant similarities and differences between this episode and other instances of deliberation on the battlefield; and second, by contrasting Zeus' intervention in Diomedes' deliberation with Athena's intervention in Achilles' deliberation in *Iliad* 1, I will argue that Achilles is the only character who, after deliberation denoted by the formula for deliberation, chooses to follow his passionate impulse and act, rather than obey his rational and passion-restraining impulse and endure. I will, therefore, only be examining those instances of the formula for deliberation in which the agent experiences anguished internal conflict in his deliberation, and makes a choice without mortal interruption or divine intervention. There are six such instances in the epics: three in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 1.193, 11.411, 17.106), and three in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 5.365, 20.10, 24.235). Although Achilles' deliberation is the first instance of the formula for deliberation in the epics, I will leave my discussion of it until last due to its uniqueness.

Before launching into the analysis of standing one's ground endurance, I will briefly discuss the element of internal division that is central to endurance in Homer. In the previous chapter we saw how the Homeric mind imagined *thumos* and *phrenes* when the thumotic passions were aroused, and how it imagined the relationship between the two entities during times of external adversity and internal conflict. Drawing upon this previous discussion, I would now like to reflect upon a metaphor for Homeric man's divided and conflicted psychological state during anxious deliberation. In his analysis of a particular type of speech in Homer, speech that is said to be *κερτομέω*, that is 'heart-cutting,' Michael Clarke offers the following metaphor as depicting Nestor's internal division:<sup>309</sup>

ὥς δ' ὅτε πορφύρη πέλαγος μέγα κύματι κωφῶ,  
ὄσσομένον λιγέων ἀνέμων λαιψηρά κέλευθα,  
αὐτως, οὐδ' ἄρα τε προκυλίνδεται οὐδ' ἐτέρωσε  
πρὶν τινα κεκριμένον καταβήμεναι ἐκ Διὸς οὔρον,  
ὥς ὁ γέρων ὄρμαινε δαϊζόμενος κατὰ θυμὸν  
διχθάδι, ἢ μεθ' ὄμιλον ἴοι Δαναῶν ταχυπῶλων,  
ἦε μετ' Ἀτρεΐδην Ἀγαμέμνονα, ποιμένα λαῶν (*Il.* 14.16-22).

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<sup>309</sup> Clarke: 2001, 335.

As when the open sea is deeply stirred to the ground-swell but stays in one place and waits the rapid onset of tearing gusts, nor rolls its surf onward in either direction until from Zeus the wind is driven down to decide it; so the aged man pondered, his mind caught between two courses, whether to go among the throng of fast-mounted Danaans or go in search of Atreus' son Agamemnon, shepherd of the people.

In this passage the swelling ocean and the tearing gusts of wind are *explicitly* said to depict Nestor's internal conflict. Nestor has just seen the Achaeans in retreat, with the Trojans behind them, and he is divided between entering battle himself and going to find Agamemnon.

At the end of the previous chapter we looked at the flame-like Hector charging upon ranks of Achaeans in *Iliad* 15, and I argued that this passage offered us an image of how the Homeric imagination visualised the aroused thumotic passions, as swift screaming winds (λιγέων ἀνέμων λαιψηρά) and waves (κύματα),<sup>310</sup> and the effect that they had on *phrenes*. As Hector's fury increased, the capacity of the Achaeans to withstand it decreased. Initially their endurance was compared to a great sea-cliff weathering wind and waves. However, as Hector's fierceness intensified, the metaphor changed from wind and waves versus a sea-cliff, to storm-bred waves and terrifying hurricane blasts versus the flimsy sail of a boat. As the fearful thumotic passion of the Achaeans grew stronger, the capacity of their *phrenes* to maintain their proper condition was undermined, until they fled from Hector in terror. In this passage, Nestor's psychological state is also compared to the great sea (πέλαγος μέγα) and swelling waves (κύματι κωφῶ); waves that are awaiting the same swift screaming thumotic winds (λιγέων ἀνέμων λαιψηρά). However in this passage we see a crucial difference. Nestor's thumotic waves are dramatically suspended in this passage, wavering momentarily between swell and break. This is the internal strength at the heart of Homeric endurance, the internal strength required to suspend the force of one's passionate impulses, even just for a second, in order to deliberate over the morally or prudentially better course of action. It is because Nestor has this internal strength that his thumotic waves do not crash against, and submerge his *phrenes*, as they did to the Achaeans in *Iliad* 15. Rather, they

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<sup>310</sup> See pp. 74-6 above.

await a *ὄψροσ*, ‘a fair wind, [or] a favourable breeze’ from Zeus to guide them in one direction or another.

As we will see in the examination of the decision-making scenes in the next section of this chapter, internal psychological division is central to endurance. In each of the scenes, the agent is torn between at least two courses of action. Different impulses divide his *thumos*: one impulse being more passionate, and the other being more rational. The agent endures if he is able to follow whichever impulse costs him the most, in the short-term at least, to follow.

#### (iv) *Standing One’s Ground Endurance*

I will commence my examination of endurance in the decision-making scenes by looking first at standing-one’s-ground endurance. Despite the fact that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* glorify different heroic traditions, I have chosen to analyse all the scenes in which a particular kind of endurance is manifested together, rather than look at the Iliadic and Odyssean scenes separately, in order to most clearly illuminate the endurance within them.<sup>311</sup> First, I offer an outline of Iliadic heroism, and examine standing one’s ground endurance in the *Iliad*. Second, I analyse standing one’s ground endurance in the *Odyssey*, differentiating Odyssean from Iliadic heroism. Finally, I offer an introduction to bearing-pain endurance, which will be developed in the following chapter.

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<sup>311</sup> Scholarship on the different traditions of heroism in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* includes: Whitman: 1958, 175-8. Lloyd-Jones: 1971, 28-31. Frankel: 1975, 87-89. Nagy, G. (1979). *The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry* (Rev. 1999 ed.). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 43-58. Rutherford, R. B. (1986). The Philosophy of the Odyssey. *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 106, 145-162. Cook: 1995, 28-32. Pucci: 1987, 45 ff. Dova, S. (2000). Who is *μακάτατος* in the "Odyssey?." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 100, 53-65. Marks, J. (2005). The Ongoing Neikos: Thersites, Odysseus, and Achilles. *The American Journal of Philology*, 126 (1), 1-31. Gainsford, P. (2008). Achilles' Views on Death: Succession and the Odyssey. *Classical Bulletin*, 84 (2), 7-26.

The deliberation of warriors on the battlefield is characterised by the conflict between acting in accordance with heroic morality, articulated by the heroic warrior code, and acting out of self-interest aimed at self-preservation. A succinct articulation of the heroic code can be found in Sarpedon's speech in *Iliad* 12. Sarpedon asks Glaucus:

“Γλαῦκε, τί ἤ δὴ νῶτι τετιμήμεσθα μάλιστα  
ἔδρη τε κρέασίν τε ἰδὲ πλείοις δεπάεσσιν  
ἐν Λυκίῃ, πάντες δὲ θεοὺς ὧς εἰσορώωσι;  
καὶ τέμενος νεμόμεσθα μέγα Ξάνθοιο παρ’ ὄχθας,  
καλὸν φυταλιῆς καὶ ἀρούρης πυροφόροιο.  
τῷ νῦν χρῆ Λυκίοισι μέτα πρώτοισιν ἐόντας  
ἐστάμεν ἠδὲ μάχης καυστείρης ἀντιβολῆσαι,  
ὄφρα τις ὄδ’ εὔτη Λυκίων πύκα θωρηκτῶν ·  
‘οὐ μὰν ἀκλέεες Λυκίην κάτα κοιρανέουσιν  
ἡμέτεροι βασιλῆες, ἔδουσί τε πίονα μῆλα  
οἴνον τ’ ἔξαιτον μελιθδέα · ἀλλ’ ἄρα καὶ ἵς  
ἐσθλή, ἐπεὶ Λυκίοισι μέτα πρώτοισι μάχονται.’  
ὦ πέπον, εἰ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμον περὶ τόνδε φυγόντε  
αἰεὶ δὴ μέλλοιμεν ἀγήρω τ’ ἀθανάτω τε  
ἔσσεσθ’, οὔτε κεν αὐτὸς ἐνὶ πρώτοισι μαχοίμην  
οὔτε κε σὲ στέλλοιμι μάχην ἐς κυδιάνειραν ·  
νῦν δ’ ἔμπης γὰρ κῆρες ἐφεστᾶσιν θανάτοιο  
μυρίαί, ἅς οὐκ ἔστι φυγεῖν βροτὸν οὐδ’ ὑπαλύξαι,  
ἴομεν, ἢ ἐ τῷ εὖχος ὀρέξομεν, ἢ ἐ τις ἡμῖν” (*Il.* 12.310-328).

Glaucus, why is it you and I are honoured before others with pride of place, the choice meats and the filled wine cups in Lykia, and all men look on us as if we were immortals, and we are appointed a great piece of land by the banks of Xanthos, good land, orchard and vineyard, and ploughland for the planting of wheat? Therefore it is our duty in the forefront of the Lykians to take our stand, and bear our part of the blazing of battle, so that a man of the close-armoured Lykians may say of us: “Indeed, these are no ignoble men who are lords of Lykia, these kings of ours, who feed upon the fat sheep appointed and drink the exquisite sweet wine, since indeed there is strength of valour in them, since they fight in the forefront of the Lykians.” Man, supposing you and I, escaping this battle would be able to live on forever, ageless, immortal, so neither would I myself go on fighting in the foremost nor would I urge you into the fighting where men win glory. But now, seeing that the spirits of death stand close about us in their thousands, no man can turn aside nor escape, let us go and win glory for ourselves, or yield it to others.

In this passage, Sarpedon articulates the privileges and burdens of being a hero. The hero uses his great valorous strength (ἵς ἐσθλή) and fighting prowess on the battlefield, and is

honoured (cf. τιμάω) above all for doing so. If there were any way for the hero to achieve immortality off the battlefield, Sarpedon tells us that he would unhesitatingly choose it. However, the closest a Homeric hero can come to achieving immortality is by winning *kleos*, undying fame, for himself (and his father); and he wins this *kleos* by heroic deeds on the battlefield.<sup>312</sup> It is because this is the only way to win *kleos*, and glory – denoted here by the term εὔχος and elsewhere by the term *kudos* – that the hero must (cf. χρῆ) take his place among the foremost in battle.

In seeking to achieve *kleos* on the battlefield, the hero seeks a form of immortality, in the form of songs sung of his great exploits after his death. Achilles chooses death in battle over a long life, in order to achieve this undying *kleos* (κλέος ἄφθιτον, *Il.* 9.413). While the hero is alive, he is evaluated by the members of his community, for whom he fights, in terms of *timē*. In “Values, Goals, and Emotions in the *Iliad*,” A. W. H. Adkins contends that the acquisition of *timē* is the heroic warrior’s primary goal. *Timē*, Adkins explains, is ‘status-conferring goods,’<sup>313</sup> such as those material advantages noted by Sarpedon above: choice meat, filled wine cups, great pieces of land, orchards, vineyards, and ploughlands.<sup>314</sup> It is *timē* that is at the heart of Achilles’ quarrel with Agamemnon. In that dispute we see how the Homeric hero’s values, goals and emotions can conflict. The hero’s values derive from the heroic code, which is constituted by the following maxims: the *agathos* (good) warrior must fight bravely; defeat is *aischron* – shameful;<sup>315</sup> the warrior hero must take his place in the forefront of battle (*Il.* 12.315-16); the hero must stand his ground strongly if he is to be best in battle (*Il.* 11.409-10); only the coward flees (*Il.* 11.408); and death over dishonour (*Il.* 22.104-10).

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<sup>312</sup> As James Redfield notes, *kleos* can be won by sacking a city (*Od.* 9.264); retrieving the corpse of an important warrior (*Il.* 17.16); or by stealing the armour belonging to the warrior the hero has just slaughtered (*Il.* 17.131), or by stealing famous horses (*Il.* 5.273). But it can also be won off in battlefield in games (*Od.* 8.147-148) (Redfield: 1994, 32).

<sup>313</sup> Adkins, A. W. H. (1982). Values, Goals, and Emotions in the *Iliad*. *Classical Philology*, 77 (4), 292-236, p. 297.

<sup>314</sup> For a selection of scholarship on this vast area of inquiry, see: Long, A. A. (1970). Morals and Values in Homer. *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 90, 121-139; Gagarin, M. (1987). Morality in Homer. *Classical Philology*, 82 (4), 285-306; and Finkelberg, M. (1998). *Timē* and *Aretē* in Homer. *The Classical Quarterly*, 48 (1), 14-28.

<sup>315</sup> Adkins: 1982, 292.

The Achaean hero's goals in the *Iliad* are first, his personal goal of winning *timē* for himself, and second, his shared goal of defeating Troy. Achilles' goals of winning *timē* and defeating Troy clearly conflict with one another in his dispute with Agamemnon. Achilles' emotions add a further dimension to this conflict. The hero has an abundance of strong emotions in his *thumos*, such as *aidōs* (fear of disgrace), *alkē* (valour), *cholōs* (rage), *menos* (fury, spirit, might, or strength), *tharsos* (daring), and *thumos* (anger); emotions that he is able to act unhesitatingly, and successfully, upon with his *biē* (strength, or might). However, the hero's powerful emotions are a two-edged sword, while they may impel the hero to act bravely, they may also impel him *not* to act bravely, when, for example, they are caused by a threat to that hero's *timē*. By taking his prize Briseis, Agamemnon has reduced Achilles' *timē*, causing Achilles *ἄχος αἴνον* (bitter sorrow), and rousing his *cholōs*. Even when Achilles finally admits that he should return to the battlefield, he admits that it is the overwhelming nature of his *cholōs* that prevents him from doing so.

We are given privileged access to the internal machinations of the Homeric hero, and his questioning of the heroic code, in the Homeric monologues. As Stephen Scully in "The Language of Achilles: The Ὀχθήσας Formulas" contends: "The themes expressed in soliloquy – fear of death, the terror of facing impending assault alone, the vacillation between the desire for personal escape and the commitment to social responsibility – are private thoughts in the Homeric world and unsuitable for public utterance."<sup>317</sup> The deliberating monologues of Odysseus and Menelaus that I will examine below, are both characterised by the formula for deliberation (ὀρμαίνω / μερμηρίζω κατὰ θυμόν καὶ κατὰ φρένα), and the 'ὀχθήσας formula,' that is: 'Deeply troubled, he spoke to his own great-hearted *thumos* [ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὄν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν].' Scully cites Adkins' interpretation of the term ὀχθήσας in "Threatening, Abusing and Feeling Angry in the Homeric Poems," as denoting the tension between the societal obligations of the hero, and his concern for his personal welfare, which results in the hero's 'distress, frustration

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<sup>317</sup> Scully: 1984, 18.

and anger.’<sup>318</sup> In the monologues of Odysseus and Menelaus we see ‘a momentary weakening, or questioning, of heroic temper,’<sup>319</sup> by these heroes, as they endeavour to confirm their adherence to the heroic value - it is only the coward that flees - in their deeds.

Sharples and Lawrence call those considerations that concern the character’s adherence to the heroic code, and decisions to act in accordance with it, ‘moral;’<sup>320</sup> and Lawrence calls the considerations of self-preservation, ‘tactical.’<sup>321</sup> The deliberation of Homeric characters lies at various points on the spectrum between the moral and the tactical, from the purely tactical to the purely moral. Lawrence cites Achilles’ deliberation at *Il.* 1.188-221, mentioned briefly above, as an example of a purely tactical (or ‘prudential’ as Adkins terms it)<sup>322</sup> consideration, as there Achilles debates whether or not to slay Agamemnon, without recourse to the heroic code.<sup>323</sup> An example of purely moral deliberation, contends Lawrence, can be found in Penelope’s deliberation in *Odyssey* 19. Penelope’s *thumos* is divided (δίχα θυμός, *Od.* 19.524) between remaining (μένω, *Od.* 19.525) and staying faithful to Odysseus, or leaving and marrying the best of the suitors.<sup>324</sup> The deliberation of warriors on the battlefield in the *Iliad* lies between the purely tactical and the purely moral, in the combination of tactical and moral considerations.

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<sup>318</sup> Ibid., 14. Adkins, A. W. H. (1969). Threatening, Abusing, and Feeling Angry in the Homeric Poems. *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 89, 7-21, p.15.

<sup>319</sup> Scully: 1984, 15.

<sup>320</sup> Lawrence: 2003, 30; Sharples: 1983, 2.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>322</sup> Adkins: 1982, 296.

<sup>323</sup> Lawrence: 2003, 28 n.3. Lawrence also cites Odysseus’ deliberation at *Od.* 20.1-30, between killing the traitorous maid-servants immediately, and waiting until the optimal time for doing so, as an example of purely tactical deliberation (ibid.,).

<sup>324</sup> Ibid., 32. Penelope says: ‘... my mind is divided and starts one way, then another [ἐμοὶ δίχα θυμός ὀρώεται ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα]. Shall I stay here [μένω] by my son and keep all in order, my property, my serving maids, and my great high-roofed house, keep faith with my husband’s bed and regard the voice of the people, or go away at last with the best of all those Achaians who court me here in the palace, with endless gifts to win me?’ (*Od.* 19.524-9).

(iv) *Standing One's Ground Endurance*

The paradigm of endurance in the *Iliad* is the warrior hero standing his ground on the battlefield.<sup>325</sup> The most famous example of this is Odysseus' internal monologue in *Iliad* 11, when he finds himself alone on the battlefield surrounded by Trojans.

Οἰώθη δ' Ὀδυσσεὺς δουρικλυτός, οὐδέ τις αὐτῷ  
Ἀργείων παρέμεινεν, ἐπεὶ φόβος ἔλλαβε πάντας.  
ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὄν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν·  
“ὦ μοι ἐγώ, τί πάθω; μέγα μὲν κακὸν αἶ κε φέβωμαι  
πληθὺν ταρβήσας· τὸ δὲ ρίγιον αἶ κεν ἀλώω  
μοῦνος· τοὺς δ' ἄλλους Δαναοὺς ἐφόβησε Κρονίων.  
ἀλλὰ τί ἦ μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός;  
οἶδα γὰρ ὅττι κακοὶ μὲν ἀποίχονται πολέμοιο,  
ὃς δέ κ' ἀριστεύησι μάχῃ ἔνι, τὸν δὲ μάλα χρεὼ  
ἑστάμεναι κρατερῶς, ἦ τ' ἔβλητ' ἦ τ' ἔβαλ' ἄλλον.”  
Ἴηος ὁ ταῦθ' ὄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν ... (II. 11.401-11)

Now Odysseus the spear-famed was left alone, nor did any of the Argives stay beside him, since fear had taken them all. And troubled, he spoke then to his own great-hearted spirit: “Ah me, what will become of me? It will be a great evil if I run, fearing their multitude, yet deadlier still if I am caught alone; and Kronos' son drove to flight the rest of the Danaans. Yet still, why does the heart within me debate on these things? Since I know that it is the cowards who walk out of the fighting, but if he is to win honour in battle, he must by all means stand his ground strongly, whether he be struck or strike down another. While he was pondering these things in his heart and his spirit ... .

Odysseus' choice is simple: to follow his fearful impulse to flee (φέβομαι), or to obey his rational impulse to stand his ground strongly (ἑστάμεναι κρατερῶς). Odysseus' passionate impulse to flee is informed by his fear (ταρβήσας) at being so vastly outnumbered. In this passage, contends Adkins, ‘we are faced with the stark realities of Homeric ἀρετή. The ἀγαθός must be *successful* in defending the group with which he is identified; ... and this is interpreted as entailing, among other things, that one must never retreat: there is no question of discretion being the better part of valour.’<sup>326</sup> Odysseus'

<sup>325</sup> In the *Odyssey*, the two instances of *τάω* denoting standing firmly on the battlefield occur in Odysseus' recollections from the Trojan War of soldiers lacked the *τλημοσύνη* to remain and fight in battle (*Od.* 14.269; 17.438).

<sup>326</sup> Adkins: 1969, 15.

rational impulse is informed by his knowledge (cf. οἶδα) of this heroic code, in the form of the precept: it is only the coward (cf. κακοῖ) that flees. Odysseus is vexed or perplexed in spirit (cf. ὀχθέω), and his deliberation (cf. ὄρμαινω) is anguished because the two most important things to him in the *Iliad* – his heroic honour and his life – are under threat, and depend entirely on the choice that he makes. In order to endure and act in accordance with the heroic code, Odysseus must resist his passionate impulse to flee, and remain where he is. The essence of standing one’s ground endurance lies in the choice of inaction over action. When a warrior is conflicted by fear between fleeing and standing his ground, standing his ground is always the virtuous choice.

Of the three different types of Homeric endurance, standing one’s ground endurance is most frequently denoted by a verb of inaction, either in conjunction with *τλάω*, or on its own. In the above passage, Odysseus’ endurance is not denoted by *τλάω* but rather by the verb of inaction *ἵστημι*, which in passages such as these means to ‘stand firm, show a bold front.’<sup>327</sup> Standing one’s ground can also be denoted by the verb *μένω* (to ‘remain,’ ‘wait,’ ‘await the attack of,’ ‘stand up to,’ ‘to await the foe, stand firm,’ ‘stand one’s ground’); which occurs both in, and not in, conjunction with the verb *τλάω*. It can also be denoted by one of its compounds, such as: *ὑπομένω* (‘remain where one is, stay behind,’ ‘to await the onset of (an attacking foe), stand up to (him),’ or ‘to await the foe, stand firm, stand one’s ground’); and *παραμένω* (to ‘remain *with* (a person), keep (him) company,’ or ‘to stand *by* in the fight’). In the above passage, Odysseus’ endurance, even before he has made his decision to remain, or begun his deliberation, is highlighted by the failure of his fellow soldiers to stay beside him (οὐδέ παρέμεινεν) out of fear (φόβος). Another compound of *μένω*, *ἐπιμένω*, does not denote standing one’s ground in Homer, but rather, it denotes remaining or waiting when one is eager to do otherwise.<sup>328</sup> *Ἐπιμένω*, then, denotes bearing-pain endurance; bearing the pain of one’s eagerness to leave, or of one’s eagerness to fight (in Achilles’ case), rather than acting on them.

<sup>327</sup> For other passages in which *ἵστημι* denotes standing one’s ground endurance see: *Il.* 15.297, 618, 666. For other verbs denoting standing one’s ground endurance see *ἵσχω* (e.g., *Il.* 9.352).

<sup>328</sup> E.g., *Il.* 19.142; *Od.* 1.309, 4.587.

As we saw in the previous chapter, the capacity of Homeric man to check his passionate impulse and follow his rational impulse instead, depends upon the state of his psychological entities. The wicked suitors in the *Odyssey* might accuse the disguised Odysseus of having been absent (φρένες οὐδ' ἠβαιαί, *Od.* 21.288) or distracted (φρένας ἐκπεπαταγμένος ἐσσί, *Od.* 18.327) *phrenes*, but the fact that Alcinoos considers that he and his fellow suitors are sound in *phrenes* (ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἤραρεν ἡμῖν, *Od.* 4.777), gives us an idea of the accuracy and reliability of his evaluative powers. Odysseus is the paradigm of the much-enduring (πολύτλας) character. He is both brave and enduring. The *thumos* in his *phrenes* is said to be always daring (cf. τολμάω *Il.* 10.232); and his *phrenes* are good in a moral sense (cf. ἐσθλός),<sup>330</sup> and well balanced (cf. ἴσος, *Od.* 11.337). Odysseus is able to endure by standing his ground alone on the battlefield when surrounded by soldiers, because his *phrenes* are in their proper state and are therefore able to assist his *thumos* in restraining its fearful impulse.

Odysseus endures here temporarily, in order to be brave. He endures, not by quelling his passionate impulse, but by resisting it until the situation changes and it is replaced by a different passionate impulse, and then acting on that impulse. Continuing on from the passage from *Iliad* 11 quoted above,

ἼHος ὁ ταῦθ' ὄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,  
τόφρα δ' ἐπὶ Τρώων στίγες ἤλυθον ἀσπιστάων,  
ἔλσαν δ' ἐν μέσσοισι, μετὰ σφίσι πῆμα τιθέντες.  
ὥς δ' ὅτε κάπριον ἀμφὶ κύνες θαλεροὶ τ' αἰζηοὶ  
σεύονται, ὁ δέ τ' εἴσι βαθείης ἐκ ξυλόχοιο  
θήγων λευκὸν ὀδόντα μετὰ γναμπτῆσι γένυσσιν,  
ἀμφὶ δέ τ' αἴσσουνται, ὑπαὶ δέ τε κόμπος ὀδόντων  
γίγνεται, οἱ δὲ μένουσιν ἄφαρ δεινὸν περ ἔοντα·  
ὥς ῥα τότε ἄμφ' Ὀδυσῆα δίφιλον ἐσσεύοντο  
Τρῶες· ... (*Il.* 11.411-20)

While he was pondering these things in his heart and his spirit the ranks of armored Trojans came on against him, and penned him in their midst, but made thereby a wound in their ranks, as when closing about a wild boar the hounds and the lusty young men rush him, and he comes out of his lair in the deep of a thicket

<sup>330</sup> *Od.* 11.367. Cunliffe cites, 'In [a] moral sense, good, of right feeling' as the meaning of φρένες ἐσθλῶν.

grinding to an edge the white fangs in the crook of the jawbones, and these sweep in all about him, and the vaunt of his teeth uprises as they await him, terrible though he is, without wavering; so closing on Odysseus beloved of Zeus the Trojans rushed him.

As the situation changes, so too does Odysseus' psychological state. The Trojans have now encircled Odysseus, but in doing so, somehow they have brought upon themselves their own destruction (μετὰ σφίσι πῆμα τιθέντες, *Il.* 11.413). Lattimore translates this as, '[they] made thereby a wound in their ranks;' while Murray translates it more literally as, 'setting on themselves their own ruin.' If Lattimore's interpretation is right, and, indeed it is certainly arguable that by spreading themselves out in order to encircle Odysseus they have created a gap in their ranks, this could account for the change in Odysseus' psychological state from one of distress and internal conflict (ὄχθήσας, *Il.* 11.403), to a state similar to that of a wild boar (κάπριον, *Il.* 11.414). Regardless of how exactly the Trojans have brought this πῆμα, destruction,<sup>332</sup> upon themselves, the situation has undoubtedly changed. First, it was Odysseus who awaited the Trojans' onset; second, the Trojans are like lusty young men rushing upon a wild boar; and third, it is Odysseus as the wild boar, who advances upon the Trojans awaiting his onset, though he is terrible (δεινόν). While young men are characteristically θαλεροί – 'Lusty, in prime of vigour' – they typically lack the foresight that comes with age. Perhaps it is the gap in their ranks that seals their destruction; perhaps, it is their recklessness and imprudence in rushing (σεύωνται, *Il.* 11.415) upon a cornered wild boar; perhaps the latter causes the former.

Before examining the deliberation of two other warrior heroes in battle in the *Iliad*, I will turn briefly to the *Odyssey*, in which we find the only other instance of deliberation characterised by the formula for deliberation in which the character – again Odysseus – chooses to stand his ground. In *Odyssey* 5, Odysseus has just left Calypso's island on a raft, and is faced with the rage of Poseidon, who sends great waves to drown Odysseus.

αὐτὰρ ὁ μερμήριξε πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς,

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<sup>332</sup> The meaning for this instance of πῆμα cited by Cunliffe is: 'Bane, mischief, destruction, evil, woe, misery.'

ὄχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς δὴν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν·  
 “ὦ μοι ἐγὼ, μή τίς μοι ὑφαίνησιν δόλον αὔτε  
 ἀθανάτων, ὃ τε με σχεδίης ἀποβῆναι ἀνώγει.  
 ἀλλὰ μάλ' οὐ πῶ πείσομ', ἐπεὶ ἐκάς ὀφθαλμοῖσιν  
 γαῖαν ἐγὼν ἰδόμεν, ὅθι μοι φάτο φύξιμον εἶναι.  
 ἀλλὰ μάλ' ὧδ' ἔρξω, δοκέει δέ μοι εἶναι ἄριστον·  
 ὄφρ' ἂν μὲν κεν δούρατ' ἐν ἀρμονίησιν ἀρήρη,  
 τόφρ' αὐτοῦ μενέω καὶ τλήσομαι ἄλγεα πάσχων·  
 αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν δὴ μοι σχεδίην διὰ κῦμα τινάξῃ,  
 νήξομ', ἐπεὶ οὐ μὲν τι πάρα προνοῆσαι ἄμεινον.”  
 ἦρος ὁ ταῦθ' ὤρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,  
 ὥρσε δ' ἐπὶ μέγα κῦμα Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχων ... (*Od.* 5.354-66).

Now long-suffering great Odysseus pondered two courses, and troubled he spoke then to his own great-hearted spirit: “Ah me, which of the immortals is weaving deception against me, and tells me to put off from the raft? But no, I will not do it yet, since I have seen with my own eyes that the shore, where she said I could escape, is still far away from me. But here it what I will do, and this seems to me the best way. As long as the timbers hold together and the construction remains, I will stay with it and endure through suffering hardships; but once the heaving sea has shaken my raft to pieces, then I will swim. There is nothing better that I can think of.” Now as he was pondering these ways in his heart and spirit, Poseidon, shaker of the earth, drove on a great wave ... .

It may be objected that this episode should be excluded from my examination on the grounds of divine intervention, as the goddess Ino appeared immediately before Odysseus' deliberation, giving him an immortal veil to tie about his breast, and advising him to jump off the raft and swim (*Od.* 5.346-50).<sup>333</sup> However, while he takes the immortal veil, Odysseus decides against following her advice, in favour of remaining on the raft. The instances of the formula for deliberation in which divine intervention occurs are excluded only when that intervention prevents the character from making his own choice. It is clear as Odysseus rejects the course of action recommended by the goddess, he has made his own choice.

<sup>333</sup> See Pucci: 1987, 64-5 on this scene. For an interpretation of this scene as an important part the reintegration into society necessary for Odysseus' *nostos*, see Kardulias, D. R. (2001). *Odysseus in Ino's Veil: Feminine Headdress and the Hero in "Odyssey" 5*. *TAPA*, 131, 23-51. See also Barnouw: 2004, 60 & 71.

Faced with divine wrath, Odysseus faces the following choice: to abandon his raft, as the goddess urges him, or to remain on his raft. The waves and winds sent by Poseidon to batter Odysseus are so fearsome, that ‘Ὀδυσσῆς λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ,’ that is, Odysseus’ knees give way and the ‘vital forces’ of his *ētor* are suspended (cf. λύω, *Od.* 5.297).<sup>334</sup> It is fear of Poseidon’s rage that urges Odysseus to abandon the raft; indeed, when Odysseus finally does abandon the raft, Poseidon leaves Odysseus to the open sea and returns to his palace at Aegae (*Od.* 5.380-1). But Odysseus’ reason tells him that his chances of survival are slightly better if he remains on his raft for as long as it holds together, even though it means that Odysseus will still face Poseidon’s rage. As Lawrence would put it, Odysseus’ deliberation is a purely tactical one. Deeply troubled (cf. ὀχθήσας, *Od.* 5.355) Odysseus deliberates in his *thumos* and *phrenes*, and resolves to act as his rational impulse directs him, to remain and endure (μενέω καὶ τλήσομαι, *Od.* 5.362) his fear on the raft, rather than act as it urges him. By doing so, Odysseus proves his words in his deeds. Before he left Calypso’s island, Odysseus articulated his goal of *nostos*, and declared that he would endure sufferings on the sea in order to achieve it. Odysseus says:

εἰ δ’ αὖ τις ῥαίησι θεῶν ἐνὶ οἴνοπι πόντῳ,  
τλήσομαι ἐν στήθεσσιν ἔχων ταλαπενθέα θυμόν ·  
ἦδη γάρ μάλα πολλὰ πάθον καὶ πολλὰ μόγησα  
κύμασι καὶ πολέμῳ · μετὰ καὶ τόδε τοῖσι γενέσθω (*Od.* 5.221-224).

And if some god batters me far out on the wine-blue water, I will endure it, keeping a stubborn spirit inside me, for already have I suffered much and done much hard work on the waves and in the fighting. So let this adventure follow.

Odysseus proves himself the paradigmatically enduring hero. Even in the most trying conditions, Odysseus stays firm in his resolve by managing to keep his head. The goddess Ino remarks on this when she says to Odysseus that despite Poseidon’s rage, Poseidon has not managed to destroy (cf. καταφθίνω, *Od.* 5.341) Odysseus, who seems ‘not lacking in good sense [δοκέεις δέ μοι οὐκ ἀπινύσσειν]’ (*Od.* 5.343).

<sup>334</sup> Cunliffe cites as the correct meaning for λύω in this context: ‘To break up or dissipate (the vital forces), to break up, dissipate or suspend the vital forces or the strength in (the limbs the heart, etc.), to cause (the limbs, etc.) to give way or collapse. ... [b]y strong emotion, [such as] fear.’

Like Odysseus, Diomedes and Menelaus also find themselves alone on the battlefield, and their deliberation is similarly expressed in the formula for deliberation. Although, as I mentioned above, the voluntariness of Diomedes' decision is rendered ambiguous by Zeus' intervention, I will examine Diomedes' decision-making scene for two reasons. First, in order to draw out some illuminating similarities and differences between the deliberation of Diomedes and that of Odysseus in *Iliad* 11 and Menelaus in *Iliad* 17. Second, in order to set up my argument, which will be developed in the following chapter, that Achilles is the only character who fails to endure after deliberating.<sup>335</sup>

In *Iliad* 8, Zeus has turned the tide of battle in the Trojans favour and none of the Achaeans except for Diomedes stands his ground. Nestor remains (ἔμιμνε, *Il.* 8.80), but involuntarily (οὐ τι ἐκὼν, *Il.* 8.80) as his horse has been wounded. The Achaeans' failure to stand their ground is denoted first by the verb *τλάω* governing the verb of inaction *μένω* (οὐτ' τλήη μίμνειν, *Il.* 8.78), and second by *μένω* on its own (οὔτε μενέτην, *Il.* 8.79). Taking Nestor into his chariot, Diomedes charges towards Hector, but Zeus sends a warning in the form of thunder and lightening to Diomedes, warning him against doing so. Nestor, afraid in his *thumos*, exhorts Diomedes to turn his horses about and flee, warning him of the futility of trying to thwart, check, or curb the purpose of Zeus (Διὸς νόον εἰρύσσαιτο, *Il.* 8.143).<sup>336</sup> He replies:

“ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, γέρον, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες.  
 ἀλλὰ τόδ' αἰνὸν ἄχος κραδίην καὶ θυμὸν ἰκάνει ·  
 Ἔκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων ·  
 ‘Τυδεΐδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο φοβεῦμενος ἴκετο νῆας,’  
 ὧς ποτ' ἀπειλήσει · τότε μοι χάνοι εὐρεῖα χθών” (*Il.* 8.146-150).

“Yes, old sir, all this you have said is fair and orderly. But this thought comes as a bitter sorrow to my heart and my spirit; for some day Hector will say openly

<sup>335</sup> That is, when it is denoted by the formula for deliberation.

<sup>336</sup> Nestor's words are: ‘Son of Tydeus, steer now to flight your single-foot horses. Can you not see that the power of Zeus no longer is with you? For the time Zeus, son of Kronos, gives glory to this man; for today; hereafter, if he will, he will give it to us also; no man can beat back the purpose of Zeus, not even one very strong, since Zeus is by far the greatest’ (*Il.* 8.139-144).

before the Trojans: ‘The son of Tydeus, running before me, fled to his vessel.’ So he will vaunt; and then let the wise earth open beneath me.”

Diomedes has already endured by standing his ground when none of the other Achaeans remained steadfast. However, he is now called upon by Zeus *not* to stand his ground, an action altogether contrary to the heroic code. Diomedes is a fierce warrior, and one who would rather die than act contrary to the heroic code. Diomedes is forced to harmonize his deeds here with his words uttered earlier in the *Iliad*. In *Iliad* 6 Diomedes shivers at the sight of Hector and retreats (cf. ἀναχάζομαι, 600), urging his men not to be eager to fight with divinities but to retreat (cf. εἶκω, 606) from the Trojans, as Hector is fighting with Ares by his side.<sup>337</sup>

As Nestor turns the chariot about, Hector taunts Diomedes saying that Diomedes has brought disgrace upon himself (cf. ἀτιμάω, *Il.* 8.163), comparing him to a woman and a cowardly puppet or doll (κακὴ γλήνη, *Il.* 8.164). And Diomedes:

... διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν,  
ἵππους τε στρέψαι καὶ ἐναντίβιον μαχέσασθαι.  
τρὶς μὲν μερμήριξε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,  
τρὶς δ’ ἄρ’ ἀπ’ Ἰδαίων ὄρέων κτύπε μητιέτα Ζεὺς  
σῆμα τιθεὶς Τρῶεσσι, μάχης ἑτεραλκέα νίκην (*Il.* 8.169-171).

... pondered doubtfully, whether to turn his horses about and match his strength against Hector. Three times in his heart and spirit he pondered turning, and three times from the hills of Ida Zeus of the counsels thundered, giving sign to the Trojans that the battle was turning.

Scully notes that Diomedes’ deliberation here is unique. It is denoted by *μερμηρίζω*, but the either/or construction that typically follows this verb has been omitted.<sup>338</sup> Instead, we are only given access to ‘one half of the hero’s mind,’ that is, his impulse to turn about and fight Hector, which he contemplates doing three times, with Zeus warning him each

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<sup>337</sup> The passage reads: ‘Friends, although we know the wonder of glorious Hector to be a fighter with the spear and a bold man of battle, yet there goes ever some god beside him, who beats off destruction, and now, in the likeness of a man mortal, Ares goes with him. Come then, keeping your faces turned to the Trojans, give ground backward [ἀλλὰ πρὸς Τρῶας τετραμμένοι αἰὲν ὀπίσω εἴκετε], nor be we eager to fight in strength with divinities [μηδὲ θεοῖς μενεαινέμεν ἴφι μάχεσθαι]’ (*Il.* 5.601-6).

<sup>338</sup> Scully: 1984, 16.

time against doing so.<sup>339</sup> This partial depiction of Diomedes' internal machinations, contends Scully, emphasizes Diomedes' enthusiasm and 'shows that this hero even in the moment of reflection is not constrained by the terror of war or the fear of death.'<sup>340</sup>

In order to make sense of Diomedes' behaviour in this episode, I will divide it into four periods. First, at the beginning of the scene, Diomedes has endured by standing his ground in battle. Second, Diomedes takes Nestor into his chariot (105-112) and they charge towards Hector, intending to fight him (116-117). Up until this point, Diomedes has not deliberated, nor has he experienced any internal conflict. There is only a passionate impulse in Diomedes' *thumos*, and that passionate impulse urges him to fight Hector. Diomedes, being a fierce and brave warrior, unhesitatingly acts on this passionate impulse and charges towards Hector, despite the fact that Hector is a warrior significantly his superior. Third, as Diomedes is advancing towards Hector, Zeus intervenes, sending lightening and thunder to warn Diomedes against fighting Hector (132-136) and Nestor turns the chariot about (157-158). With Zeus' intervention the situation has changed; an additional element has been introduced into the situation, and a corresponding impulse has arisen in Diomedes' *thumos*. Diomedes is now conflicted between fighting Hector on the one hand, as his passionate impulse impels him and as the heroic code demands, and obeying Zeus on the other, as his rational impulse urges him, a prospect that causes him bitter pain (αἰνὸν ἄχος) in his *kradiē* and *thumos* (147). As the choice is not between fighting and self-restraint, but between fighting and obeying Zeus, Diomedes' eventual decision has been rendered ambiguous. Fourth, now facing away from the battle, with his back towards the Trojans (the same position that he only a few lines previously called Odysseus cowardly for assuming (93-96)), Diomedes deliberates three times, whether to turn his horses around and fight Hector, with Zeus warning him each time against doing so (167-171). Diomedes deliberation, denoted first by *διάνδιχα μερμήριζεν* (167) and then by the formula for deliberation (169), occurs after Zeus' intervention (132-136). This latter point is crucial to my argument that Achilles is the only character to choose to act on his passionate impulse, rather than on his rational impulse, after deliberation. Achilles'

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<sup>339</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid., 15.

decision-making scene also involves divine intervention; however, unlike Diomedes' deliberation which occurs *after* Zeus' intervention, Achilles not only deliberates *before* Athena's intervention, but he has already made his decision before she has even arrived on the scene. This will be returned to, and developed, in the following chapter.

We are not told exactly what Diomedes did after being warned by Zeus, however, we do know that he did not turn around and fight Hector. Therefore, we can conclude that Diomedes chose to obey Zeus. The next we hear of Diomedes is when Zeus has turned the tide of battle back in the favour of the Achaeans and Diomedes is at the forefront of the charge, and the first to slaughter a Trojan (*Il.* 8.253-256).<sup>341</sup> Like Odysseus, who remained passive until the time was right to perform brave actions, Diomedes remains passive until the time is right to do what he wanted to do from the beginning of the scene: kill Trojans. It is interesting to note that the heroic code enters into the deliberation of Odysseus and Diomedes (and also of Menelaus as we will see next) in different ways. Odysseus' passionate impulse was informed by his fear at being so vastly outnumbered;<sup>342</sup> while his rational impulse urged him to stand his ground in accordance with the heroic code. While Odysseus' rational impulse is aligned with the heroic code, and he endures by acting in accordance with it, it is Diomedes' *passionate* impulse that is aligned with the heroic code, urging him to fight Hector, and he must obey Zeus by acting contrary to it.

#### (v) *An Introduction to Bearing-Pain Endurance*

While Odysseus had to choose between standing his ground and fleeing, and Diomedes had to choose between fighting and obeying Zeus, Menelaus must choose not only between fighting and not fighting, but between fighting and *fleeing*. Patroclus has

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<sup>341</sup> 'Then, may as the Danaans were, there was no man among them could claim he held his fast horses ahead of the son of Tydeus to drive them once more across the ditch and fight at close quarters, but he was the first to kill a chief man of the Trojans ...' (*Il.* 8.253-256).

<sup>342</sup> Odysseus' words were: 'It will be a great evil if I run, fearing their multitude [φέβομαι πληθὸν ταραβήσας], yet deadlier still if I am caught alone; and Cronos' son drove to flight the rest of the Danaans.'

just died, and Menelaus, in his attempt to retrieve Patroclus' corpse, has killed Euphorbos, 'the best man of the Trojans' (*Il.* 17.80-1). When Hector learns of this he advances towards Menelaus 'with a shrill scream' (*Il.* 17.88).

ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὄν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν ·  
“ὦ μοι ἐγών, εἰ μὲν κε λίτω κάτα τεύχεα καλά  
Πάτροκλόν θ', ὅς κεῖται ἐμῆς ἔνεκ' ἐνθάδε τιμῆς,  
μή τίς μοι Δαναῶν νεμεσήσεται, ὅς κεν ἴδηται ·  
εἰ δέ κεν Ἔκτορι μοῦνος ἐὼν καὶ Τρωσὶ μάχωμαι  
αἰδεσθεῖς, μή πῶς με περιστήωσ' ἓνα πολλοί ·  
Τρῶας δ' ἐνθάδε πάντας ἄγει κορυθαίολος Ἔκτωρ.  
ἀλλὰ τί ἦ μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός;  
ὀππότε ἄνῆρ ἐθέλη πρὸς δαίμονα φωτὶ μάχεσθαι  
ὄν κε θεὸς τιμᾶ, τάχα οἱ μέγα πῆμα κυλίσθη.  
τῷ μ' οὐ τίς Δαναῶν νεμεσήσεται, ὅς κεν ἴδηται  
Ἔκτορι χωρήσαντ', ἐπεὶ ἐκ θεόφιν πολεμίζει.  
εἰ δέ που Αἴαντός γε βοὴν ἀγαθοῖο πυθοίμην,  
ἄμφω κ' αὐτίς ἰόντες ἐπιμνησαίμεθα χάρμης  
καὶ πρὸς δαίμονά περ, εἴ πως ἐρυσαιίμεθα νεκρὸν  
Πηλεΐδῃ Ἀχιλλῆι · κακῶν δέ κε φέρτατον εἶη.”  
Ἦος ὁ ταῦθ' ὄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν ... (*Il.* 17.90-106).

Deeply troubled, he [Menelaus] spoke to his own great-hearted spirit: “Ah me; if I abandon here the magnificent armour, and Patroclus, who has fallen here for the sake of my honour, shall not some one of the Danaans, seeing it, hold it against me? Yet if I fight, alone as I am, the Trojans and Hector for shame, shall they not close in, many against one, about me? Hector of the shining helm leads all of the Trojans here. Then why does my own heart within me debate this? When a man, in the face of divinity, would fight with another whom some god honours, the big disaster rolls sudden upon him. Therefore, let no Danaan seeing it hold it against me if I give way before Hector, who fights from God. Yet if somewhere I could only get some word of Aias of the great war cry, we two might somehow go, and keep our spirit of battle even in the face of divinity, if we might win the body for Peleid Achilles. It would be our best among evils. Now as he was pondering this in his heart and his spirit ... .

Like the decision-making scenes of Odysseus and Diomedes, Menelaus' deliberation is characterised by the formula for deliberation (ὄρμαινε / μερμήριξε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν). Like Odysseus' monologue, Menelaus' monologue is additionally characterised by the formula ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὄν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν that introduces the

monologue, as well as the formula ἀλλὰ τί ἤ μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός that marks the point at which Menelaus reaches the decision to retreat and return with Ajax.

Menelaus' retreat in this episode has been widely criticised as cowardly. In "The Heldenotod in Homer: One Heroic Ideal," R. Renehan suggests: 'For a striking example of truly unheroic conduct, see Menelaus' rationalizations for abandoning the corpse of Patroclus and fleeing before Hector to save his own life.'<sup>343</sup> Fenik, Lawrence, and Scully criticise Menelaus' retreat by contrasting it with Odysseus' decision to stand his ground.<sup>344</sup> Scully contends that while Menelaus' monologue has a number of features in common with that of Odysseus, it does not share Odysseus' resolution of 'heroic valor.'<sup>345</sup> Bernard Williams suggests that Odysseus' advancement towards the Trojans and Menelaus' retreat 'represents their different identifications.'<sup>346</sup> Fenik compares four battle monologues from the *Iliad* arguing that while they are 'highly stylized'<sup>347</sup> and conventional, they are also unique to the individual and his situation, and offer an insightful portrait of hero's character. Odysseus' monologue, the shortest of the three, is 'a speech of blank sobriety, spare and unembellished,'<sup>348</sup> in which 'his chances of success carry no weight and are not even mentioned.'<sup>349</sup> Furthermore, Odysseus' consideration of retreat is less a consideration of a possible course of action for Odysseus, than it is a consideration of the impossibility of such a course of action. Menelaus, on the other hand, considers retreat to be a genuine possibility, and it the only one of the four warriors who chooses retreat over standing his ground.<sup>350</sup> Fenik articulates Menelaus' conflict in

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<sup>343</sup> Renehan, R. (1987). The Heldenotod in Homer: One Heroic Ideal. *Classical Philology*, 82 (2), 99-116, p.111 n.35.

<sup>344</sup> See also Burnett: 1991, 279-80; and Gill: 1996, 78 ff.

<sup>345</sup> Scully: 1984, 15.

<sup>346</sup> 'What happens in both cases is that the character pulls back from a course of action he has been considering in favour of a course of action with which he is more identified. The courses of action in the two examples are by no means the same: in one Odysseus advances, in another, Menelaus retreats – but that difference indeed represents their different identifications' (Williams: 1993 (2008 ed.), 38).

<sup>347</sup> Fenik: 1978, 73.

<sup>348</sup> *Ibid.*, 71-2.

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid.*, 72.

<sup>350</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

terms of the moral and the tactical, saying: ‘Heroism and expediency seldom recommend the identical course.’<sup>351</sup>

The most scathing criticism of Menelaus is that offered by Lawrence. The deliberation of Menelaus and Odysseus both concern tactical and moral considerations, but while Odysseus decides ‘to be brave,’<sup>352</sup> Lawrence contends that Menelaus decides to ‘to play it safe.’<sup>353</sup> According to Lawrence, Menelaus resolves the tension between the moral and the tactical ‘by convincing himself that there is after all no conflict at all,’<sup>354</sup> by appealing to divine will, which Lawrence condemns as ‘a convenient (though spurious) tactic for avoiding responsibility,’<sup>355</sup> which ‘has the odour of a rationalisation.’<sup>356</sup> While the consequences of flight were non-specific for Odysseus, and he nonetheless refused them, the moral implications of flight for Menelaus are manifestly clear to him – he will not only be acting contrary to the heroic code, but he is additionally abandoning a warrior who died for him – and yet he willingly chooses them.<sup>357</sup> He concludes that Menelaus’ retreat under these particular conditions is ‘outrageous, ... contemptibly feeble and might be paraphrased: “If I behave badly, I hope no one will see it, and if they do I hope they will not condemn me for it.”’<sup>358</sup>

However, while Menelaus is not a warrior as fierce as Diomedes, or as enduring as Odysseus, he is nonetheless a great hero whose actions in this episode, I argue, are not cowardly. In order to properly evaluate Menelaus’ behaviour, we have to note the differences, not only in the behaviour, but also in the situations faced by the three heroes. All three heroes contemplate fighting and retreating, but the situations in which they contemplate these, and the choices available to them, differ from one another significantly. All three have winning *kleos* in battle as their overall heroic goal, however only Menelaus has an intermediate goal as well. Menelaus’ intermediate goal here is the

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<sup>351</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>352</sup> Lawrence: 2003, 29.

<sup>353</sup> Ibid.

<sup>354</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>355</sup> Ibid.

<sup>356</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>357</sup> Ibid.

<sup>358</sup> Ibid.

retrieval of Patroclus' corpse and the armour of Achilles that Patroclus was wearing when he died. Menelaus is faced with two options: to fight alone for the corpse and armour, or to return with Ajax. Only the latter option offers Menelaus any realistic chance of achieving his goal; and the former presents the additional negative factors: the risk of almost certain death for Menelaus, and the futility of fighting against a warrior who has the divine on his side. I suggest that Menelaus' rejection of his impulse to fight for Patroclus' corpse, constitutes bearing-pain endurance, and that had Menelaus chosen instead to act upon it, his behaviour would have been reckless not brave.

The situations and choices faced by Odysseus, Diomedes, and Menelaus, are altogether different from one another. Odysseus' only goal is that of the warrior hero, winning *kleos* on the battlefield, and his choice is between flight and standing his ground on the battlefield. His passionate impulse impels him to flee, while his rational impulse, informed by the heroic code, urges him to stand his ground. Only the latter option offers him any opportunity of achieving his goal, and therefore his choice of acting in accordance with the heroic code is simple. Diomedes' situation and decision are more difficult. He too has the goal of winning *kleos* in battle but, unlike Odysseus, neither of the courses of action available to him offers a chance of achieving that goal. If he tries to achieve it, as his passionate impulse informed by the heroic code impels him, he will be disobeying Zeus; if he does not try to achieve it, and obeys his rational impulse not to fight, he will be branded a coward. But it is Menelaus who faces the most difficult decision of the three. He too has the heroic goal of winning *kleos* in battle, but this goal is frustrated by another more immediate goal of retrieving Patroclus' corpse and Achilles' armour. Like Diomedes, whose passionate impulse was aligned with the heroic code, Menelaus' passionate impulse of *aidōs*, which urges him to fight for the corpse of a warrior who died for the sake his *timē*, rather than his impulse *not* to fight and to return with Ajax, is clearly also aligned with the heroic code. However, it is only by quelling his passionate impulse to fight, and following his rational impulse not to fight and to return later, thereby risking earning a reputation for cowardice, that Menelaus stands any chance of achieving either of his goals.

In “Do Homeric Heroes Make Real Decisions?” Gaskin not only defends Menelaus’ retreat in this episode, but he argues that it is more praiseworthy than Odysseus’ standing his ground. Gaskin contends that Odysseus acted on the heroic value that only the coward retreats, articulating his adherence to this heroic value in terms of the *aidōs* he would feel if he did not stand his ground.<sup>359</sup> Menelaus also considers this heroic value, and through his deliberation he realises that ‘*aidōs* is not the morally relevant category in his situation.’<sup>360</sup> The morally relevant factor, is that Hector is fighting with divine assistance; and by realizing this ‘Menelaus achieves a moral sophistication and insight in advance of acting.’<sup>361</sup> Gaskin concludes: ‘Menelaus in effect uses one moral norm (only fools fight the gods) to discount the course of action recommended by another norm (only cowards retreat); the sophistication of his reasoning derives from the fact that, to a man of Menelaus’ standing and temperament, the second of these norms carries considerable weight. It is no small achievement that he is able to withstand its allure.’<sup>362</sup>

I argued above that Menelaus’ behaviour constituted bearing-pain endurance, and that had Menelaus chosen instead to act upon his passionate impulse and fight for Patroclus’ corpse, he would have been acting recklessly, not bravely. Many contemporary readers will undoubtedly share my evaluation, as well as Gaskin’s praise for Menelaus’ resistance to the allure of the norms of the heroic code. However, to some extent both evaluations are potentially beside the point. Both Gaskin and I could be criticised for evaluating behaviour in the *Iliad* from the standpoint of entirely different cultures, separated from each other by over two millennia. The only relevant question is: how can we evaluate the behaviour of Iliadic characters from the values internal, not merely to the Homeric epics, but more specifically from the values internal to the *Iliad* itself? Certainly Menelaus’ behaviour is morally praiseworthy by the standards of the *Odyssey*, which promotes the conception of heroism as endurance, but could it be evaluated as morally praiseworthy from the perspective of the *Iliad*, whose conception of heroism is that of the

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<sup>359</sup> Gaskin: 2001, 159.

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>361</sup> *Ibid.*, 160.

<sup>362</sup> *Ibid.*

warrior hero? I will attempt to answer this question by offering three arguments: first, that retreat in the *Iliad* is acceptable when one's enemy is being assisted by a god; second, by examining the simile with which Homer chooses to describe Menelaus' retreat; and third, by examining Menelaus' retreat within the context of *Iliad* 17, as well as within the context of Menelaus' character.

First, as Mark W. Edwards notes his commentary to the *Iliad*, 'Overt divine aid to the enemy is an acceptable reason for retreat.'<sup>363</sup> Not only does Agamemnon advise retreat under such conditions, but so too does the wise Nestor (*Il.* 8.139-144), Aeneas (*Il.* 20.97-98), and even the fierce Diomedes (*Il.* 5.601-606), although he struggles to do so when he lands in such a situation in himself *Iliad* 8.<sup>364</sup> Second, it is clear that Homer does not evaluate Menelaus' behaviour here as cowardly from the simile he chooses to describe Menelaus' retreat. As Fenik states: 'Two things take the measure of the men: their performance against Hector and the similes.'<sup>365</sup> It is not an animal such as a fawn, dove, or deer – animals conceived of as weak or cowardly in Homer – that Homer chooses as a simile for Menelaus. Rather, Homer chooses to compare Menelaus as he is retreating to a 'great bearded lion.'<sup>366</sup> Following directly on from Menelaus' monologue quoted above is the following simile:

ἼΗος ὁ ταῦθ' ὄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,  
τόφρα δ' ἐπὶ Τρώων στίχες ἦλυτον · ἦρχε δ' ἄρ' Ἐκτωρ.  
αὐτὰρ ὃ γ' ἐξοπὶσω ἀνεχάζετο, λεῖπε δὲ νεκρόν,  
ἐντροπαλιζόμενος ὥς τε λῖς ἠυγένειος,  
ὄν ῥα κύνες τε καὶ ἄνδρες ἀπὸ σταθμοῖο δίωνται  
ἔγχεσι καὶ φωνῇ · τοῦ δ' ἐν φρεσὶν ἄλκιμον ἦτορ  
παχνοῦται, ἀέκων δέ τ' ἔβη ἀπὸ μεσσαύλοιο  
ὥς ἀπὸ Πατρόκλοιο κίε ξανθὸς Μενέλαος (*Il.* 17.106-13).

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<sup>363</sup> Edwards, M. W., & Kirk, G. S. (Eds.). (1991). *The Iliad: A Commentary: Vol. 5, Books 17-20* (Vol. V). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 73 n. 98-101.

<sup>364</sup> Ibid.

<sup>365</sup> Fenik: 1978, 89.

<sup>366</sup> Animals associated with cowardice or weakness in the *Iliad* include: cattle (*Il.* 5. 161; 11. 172; 17. 62); deer (*Il.* 10. 361); fawns (*Il.* 4. 243; 15. 579; 22. 189); sheep or goats (*Il.* 5. 556); stags (*Il.* 1. 225; 3. 24; 11. 113, 475; 13. 102; 15. 271; 16. 158); jack-daws and starlings (*Il.* 16. 583; 17. 755)

Now as he was pondering this in his heart and his spirit meanwhile the ranks of the Trojans came on, and Hector led them; and Menelaus backed away from them and left the dead man, but kept turning on his way like some great bearded lion when dogs and men drive him off from steading with weapons and shouts, and in the breast of the lion the strong heart of valour freezes, and he goes reluctant away from the fenced crowd. So fair-haired Menelaus moved from Patroclus.

Menelaus is ‘great bearded lion’ who, though greatly outnumbered by men with weapons and dogs, keeps turning around (ἐντροπαλιζόμενος) on his way, reluctant to retreat (ἀέκων). Fenik concludes from this simile, as well as the animal similes used later in the scene in which Ajax and Menelaus retrieve Patroclus’ corpse, that Menelaus ‘is not by any means the worst fighter – he sometimes show a spirit beyond his strength – but he is not the man to rescue Patroclus either. The similes make that clear.’<sup>367</sup> Menelaus is not the man to rescue Patroclus here, and he knows he that he is not. Had he attempted to fight for Patroclus’ corpse, knowing that he wasn’t the man to do it, and that he faced failure, his behaviour would have been reckless, not courageous. Menelaus’ psychological state is compared to that of a lion whose ἄλκιμον ἔτορ in his *phrenes* has frozen or solidified (cf. παχνύω). Menelaus’ ἔτορ has frozen because he has chosen to quell the heated passions that urge him to fight, rather than act upon them.

Third, once we place this episode within its context in *Iliad* 17, as well as in the context of Menelaus’ character in general, it is clear that Menelaus cannot be justifiably criticised as cowardly. Scenes in which an individual endures are typically preceded or followed by scenes in which that same individual performs deeds of great bravery, or narrations of the individual’s performance of brave deeds at some other time.<sup>368</sup>

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<sup>367</sup> Fenik: 1978, 89. See also p.89 for a full summary of the animal similes used for Menelaus here.

<sup>368</sup> For example, in *Iliad* 4 Agamemnon rebukes the Achaeans for waiting passively on the battlefield, having not yet hear the battle cry. He mistakes their passivity for cowardice, asking Menestheus and Odysseus why they ‘stand here skulking aside, and wait for the others [καταπτώσσοιτες ἀφέστατε, μίμνετε δ’ ἄλλους;]?’ when they should ‘stand among the foremost fighters, and endure [ἔστάμεν] [their] share of the blaze of battle’ (*Il.* 4.340-1). Odysseus defends himself by reference to his past and future acts of bravery in battle; saying ‘How can you say that, when we Achaians waken the bitter war god on Trojans, breakers of horses, I hang back from fighting? Only watch, if you care to and if it concerns you, the very father of Telemachos locked with the champion Trojans, breakers of horses. Your talk is wind and no meaning’ (*Il.* 4.351-5). Agamemnon proceeds to rebuke Diomedes in a similar fashion (*Il.* 4.370-400) and, while

Menelaus' endurance is sandwiched between two passages in which Menelaus is unambiguously brave. Immediately prior to his monologue Menelaus' slaughter of the Trojan Euphorbus is described in terms of 'a wind suddenly in a great tempest [ἐξαπίνης ἄνεμος σὺν λαίλαπι πολλῇ] descending upon [a noble sapling] wrenches it out of its stand and lays it at length on the ground' (*Il.* 17.57-8). Menelaus is so fierce in battle, that not one of the Trojans dares in his *thumos* (οὐ τιμι θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἐτόλμα, *Il.* 17.68) to face him; all fear Menelaus as they would a hill-reared lion that 'in the confidence of its strength [ἀλκι] ... snatches the finest cow in a herd' and savages it, breaking its neck, and gulping down its blood and innards (*Il.* 17.61-5). This is not the description of a soldier lacking in bravery, but rather one whose *thumos* is filled with strong passions that he unhesitatingly, and successfully, acts upon. Perhaps if Menelaus had been deceiving himself in his internal monologue, and had never really intended to return with Ajax, then Lawrence's evaluation might have been justified. However, as Menelaus' monologue shifts back to narrative, Menelaus immediately seeks out Ajax, and with him he returns directly to the battlefield to save Patroclus, standing fast (ἐστήκει, *Il.* 17.139) beside Ajax, to whom the simile of lion has shifted.<sup>369</sup> From an outsider's perspective Menelaus' behaviour is certainly ambiguous. However, in the light of Menelaus' manifest bravery before and after his retreat, which reveals the heroic capacity to act on his thumotic passions without hesitation; and in the light of the fact that Menelaus is one of the very few Homeric characters whose *phrenes* are praised (Menelaus is said to be lacking in neither *phrenes* nor beauty [οὐ τευ δεύμενον, οὐτ' ἄρ φρένας οὔτε τι εἶδος, *Od.* 4.264]); we can conclude that in this passage Menelaus exhibits the same endurance that he less ambiguously exhibits in his encounter with the Old Man of the Sea in *Odyssey* 4.<sup>370</sup>

From the perspective of one of his fellow soldiers on the battlefield, Menelaus' retreat in *Iliad* 17 may be indistinguishable from cowardice. However, it is only from the

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Diomedes refuses to answer him, Sthenelus defends the both of them by reference to the time they stormed Thebes (*Il.* 4.404-10).

<sup>369</sup> 'So fair-haired Menelaus moved from Patroclus, but turning stood fast [στή] when he had got back to the swarm of his companions and looked all about for huge Aias, the son of Telamon, and soon saw where he was' (*Il.* 17.113-6).

<sup>370</sup> Menelaus and his companions first wait for the Old Man with an enduring *thumos* (τετληότι θυμῷ, *Od.* 4.447), and then hold onto him as he struggled and shape-shifted, also with an enduring *thumos* (τετληότι θυμῷ; *Od.* 4.459).

limited perspective of one of these characters at that particular moment in *Iliad* 17 that Menelaus' behaviour could be mistaken for cowardice. By contrast, we are able to view Menelaus' behaviour from a much broader standpoint. We are given privileged access to his anguished internal machinations, which reveal Menelaus' reluctance to abandon Patroclus' corpse, even temporarily. We know that Menelaus' expressed intention to return with Ajax is genuine from the fact that Menelaus returns immediately to the battlefield after locating Ajax. We are also given access to Homer's evaluation of Menelaus' behaviour, in the form of the animal simile – a great bearded lion – he chooses to compare Menelaus with as Menelaus is retreating. By comparison with Odysseus standing his ground in *Iliad* 11, Menelaus' retreat could be seen as less praiseworthy from the perspective of the Iliadic warrior hero. However, that does not mean that it could be justifiably deemed cowardly from that same perspective. The heroism of the *Iliad* is that of the warrior hero performing brave deeds, while the heroism of the *Odyssey* is that of the man enduring countless pains. However, that does not mean that bravery is not valued in the *Odyssey*, and that endurance is not valued in the *Iliad*; rather, it means that they are secondary traditions of heroism in the respective epics. Endurance through retreat when one's enemy is being assisted by a god is frequently deemed to be acceptable in the *Iliad*. It is certainly not the hero's first choice, but nor is it a cowardly choice. Indeed, as we discover in the *Odyssey*, it was endurance, not bravery, that ultimately won the Achaeans the Trojan war. It is manifestly clear, then, that Menelaus' retreat in *Iliad* 17 cannot justifiably be deemed as cowardly.

οὐδὲν ἀκιδνότερον γαῖα τρέφει ἀνθρώποιο,  
πάντων ὅσα τε γαῖαν ἐπι πνεῖει τε καὶ ἔρπει.  
οὐ μὲν γάρ ποτέ φησι κακὸν πείσεσθαι ὀπίσσω,  
ὄφρ' ἀρετὴν παρέχωσι θεοὶ καὶ γούνατ' ὀρώρη'  
ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ καὶ λυγρὰ θεοὶ μάκαρες τελέσωσι,  
καὶ τὰ φέρει ἀεκαζόμενος τετλήοτι θυμῷ·  
τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων  
οἷον ἐπ' ἡμᾶρ ἄγησι πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.  
καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ποτ' ἔμελλον ἐν ἀνδράσιν ὄλβιος εἶναι,  
πολλὰ δ' ἀτάσθαλ' ἔρεξα βίῃ καὶ κάρτεϊ εἴκων,  
πατρί τ' ἐμῷ πίσυνος καὶ ἐμοῖσι κασιγνήτοισι.  
τῷ μὴ τίς ποτε πάμπαν ἀνήρ ἀθεμίστιος εἴη,  
ἀλλ' ὅ γε σιγῇ δῶρα θεῶν ἔχοι, ὅττι διδοῖεν (*Od.* 18.130-42).

*Of all creatures that breathe and walk on the earth there is nothing more helpless than a man is, of all that the earth fosters; for he thinks that he will never suffer misfortune in future days, while the gods grant him courage, and his knees have spring in them. But when the blessed gods bring sad days upon him, against his will he must suffer it with enduring spirit. For the mind in men upon earth goes according to the fortunes the Father of Gods and Men, day by day, bestows upon them. For I myself once promised to be a man of prosperity, but, giving way to force and violence, did many reckless things, because I relied on my father and brothers. Therefore, let no man be altogether without a sense of righteousness, but take in silence the gifts of the gods, whatever they give him.*

Having examined standing one's ground endurance in the previous chapter, we can now turn to our analysis of bearing-pain endurance. In this chapter I examine the final three instances of the formula for deliberation. First, I look at the paradigm of bearing-pain endurance: Odysseus' endurance of his maidservants' betrayal in *Odyssey* 20. Second, I examine the final instance of the formula in the epics, in Odysseus' reunion with his grieving father Laertes in *Odyssey* 24. Third, I examine the very first instance of the formula in the epics, in *Iliad* 1, and the only instance in which the deliberating agent, Achilles, chooses his passionate rather than his rational impulse and thereby fails to endure. I argue that by illumination of Achilles' psychological entities, we can see that Achilles lacks the capacity to endure. Having concluded our examination of the instances

of the formula for deliberation, I briefly outline the resolution to act endurance, and differentiate it from bravery. This inquiry concludes with an examination of the five distinctive features of bearing-pain endurance. First, it is the only type of endurance that can be, in Cook's terms, purely passive, that is, never united with action. Second, it is the only type of endurance that can be, in Lawrence's terms, purely moral, that is, never mixed with tactical considerations. Third, the only time the gods endure, that is, when their endurance is denoted by *τλάω*, the gods endure by bearing pain. Fourth, while goddesses can also endure through the resolution to act,<sup>398</sup> the only endurance attributed to mortal women in the epics is bearing-pain endurance.<sup>399</sup> And, finally, of all the three types of endurance, bearing pain is the kind of endurance most frequently accompanied by references to necessity.

### (i) *Odysseus' Barking Heart & Heart-Cutting Words*

It is clear from the previous chapter that the behaviour of Odysseus and Menelaus cannot be distinguished from one another in terms of bravery and cowardice, but rather in terms of the different ways they manifest the same internal disposition of endurance. Both choose temporary passivity over activity, Odysseus enduring by standing his ground and Menelaus enduring by bearing pain, in order to perform brave actions when the time is right. The most famous example of bearing-pain endurance, and also the most cited example of Homeric endurance in general, is that of Odysseus in *Odyssey* 20. Odysseus finally arrives home disguised as a beggar, only to find his women-servants betraying him by fraternizing with the suitors. Bedded down on the ground in the forecourt of his own home, Odysseus hears the women's laughter as they go to the suitors' beds, and:

τοῦ δ' ὠρίνετο θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισι ·  
πολλὰ δὲ μερμήριξε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,  
ἥε μεταίξας θάνατον τεύξειν ἑκάστη,

<sup>398</sup> Odysseus forces both Circe and Calypso to endure by resolving to swear an oath [*τλαίης ... ὁμόσσαι*] at *Od.* 5.178 and 10.343.

<sup>399</sup> Women can, however, fail to endure through resolution to act endurance in the *Odyssey* at 4.716 (Penelope); 11.425 (Clytemnestra); 23.150 (Penelope).

ἢ ἔτ' ἑῷ μνηστῆρσιν ὑπερφιάλοισι μιγῆναι  
ὔστατα κει πύματα, κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει (*Od.* 20.9-13)

But the spirit deep in the heart of Odysseus was stirred by this, and much he pondered in the division of mind and spirit, whether to spring on them and kill each one, or rather to let them lie this one more time with the insolent suitors, for the last and latest time; but the heart was growling within him.

Having arrived home, Odysseus must endure sufferings both physical, such as being beaten by the suitors, and mental, from the humiliation of being mocked and betrayed by his own servants while sleeping on the floor as a beggar in his own palace, to having to look on impassively as the suitors attempt to seduce his wife.<sup>400</sup>

In this famous scene, Odysseus' psychological state is illustrated with two of the most startling metaphors in Homer. Odysseus' *thumos* in this scene is stirred, roused, agitated, troubled, or touched (cf. ὀρίνω), and his *kradiē* barks or bays (cf. ὑλακτέω), like a dog.

ὥς δὲ κύων ἀμαλῆσι περὶ σκυλάκεσσι βεβῶσα  
ἄνδρ' ἀγνοήσασ' ὑλάει μέμονέν τε μάχεσθαι,  
ὥς ῥα τοῦ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει ἀγαιομένου κακὰ ἔργα (*Od.* 20.14-16).

And as a bitch, facing an unknown man, stands over her callow puppies and growls and rages to fight, so Odysseus' heart was growling inside him as he looked on these wicked actions.

Just as the bitch, facing an unknown man, barks and is eager to fight to protect her puppies, so too does Odysseus' *kradiē* bark at the maid-servants' *kaka erga*. The passion aroused in Odysseus by these *kaka erga* is denoted by the verb *ἀγαιομαι*, which means, to 'be offended or hurt at [something],' or to 'be indignant at [something]' (LSJ). In "Odysseus' Barking Heart" Gilbert Rose examines the simile and what it reveals about Odysseus' internal state.<sup>401</sup> Rose argues that 'resentment' is not the passion expressed by

<sup>400</sup> For scholarship on this scene, see: Pucci: 1987, 72-5. Russo, J. (1968). Homer against His Tradition. *Arion*, 7, 275-95. Barnouw: 2004, 125-6.

<sup>401</sup> Rose, G. (1979). Odysseus' Barking Heart. *TAPA*, 109, 215-230. Sullivan suggests that Odysseus' *thumos* and *phrenes* perform slightly different roles in this episode. Odysseus explains

the bitch-simile, as Russo in “Homer Against His Tradition” argued, presumably translating ἀγῆομαι in this way, but rather ‘the sole internal state expressed by the bitch-simile is fury.’<sup>402</sup> Indeed if we take the simile to extend from the beginning of line 14 to the end of line 15, the verb ἀγῆομαι does not occur until the focus is shifted from the bitch back to Odysseus in line 16.<sup>403</sup> Any resentment or indignation, therefore, is Odysseus’ and not the bitch’s.

Rose additionally rejects the idea that the simile also expresses self-restraint.<sup>404</sup> He argues, ‘The simile ends, after all, with the words, “and she is eager to fight” (15), and only at line 23, after his self-admonition, do we learn that Odysseus has decided not to attack. While it is not inappropriate to stress Odysseus’ self-control in most of his scenes in the second half of the poem, it is simply irrelevant to the simile.’<sup>405</sup> Rose is right in saying that the simile *itself* does not express restraint; rather, the simile only represents one half of Odysseus’ *thumos* in order to emphasize the fierceness of Odysseus’ passionate impulse to fight. However, Rose is not right in saying that self-control is ‘simply irrelevant to the simile.’<sup>406</sup> The comparison of Odysseus with the bitch is not a comparison of self-restraining agents, but rather it is a comparison of the objects of the self-restraint. The bitch lacks the capacity of self-restraint when her young are threatened; the only thing that could force her to restrain her fierce protective urges would be the command of her master. Odysseus, by contrast, is his own master. He is both agent and object of his restraint.

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to Athena that while the *thumos* in his *phrenes* is pondering (μερμηρίζων) how best to kill the suitors, Odysseus ponders a greater thing in his *phrenes* (ἔτι καὶ τόδε μείζον ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζω). This ‘greater thing’ is Odysseus’ self-preservation. Sullivan offers the following analysis of the scene: ‘*thumos* appears to ponder a particular question: the killing of the suitors. When, however, Odysseus wishes to express what is of highest concern, namely his own safety, he uses the verbal expression in the first person: “I am pondering in my *phrenes*.” ... In this passage *phrenes* serve as a location for thought that deals with a pressing problem’ (Sullivan: 1988, 88). See Halliwell (1990: 38 ff.) for a rejection of such attempts to try and attribute a specific function in this scene, on the grounds that such attempts ‘produce a confusion which is not present in the scene itself’ (ibid., 39).

<sup>402</sup> Rose: 1979, 226 n. 34; see Russo: 1968, 292-4.

<sup>403</sup> The entire simile, then, is: ὡς δὲ κύων ἀμαλῆσι περὶ σκυλάκεσσι βεβῶσα ἄνδρ’ ἀγνοιήσασ’ ὕλαει μέμονέν τε μάχεσθαι.

<sup>404</sup> Rose: 1979, 226.

<sup>405</sup> Ibid., 226-7

<sup>406</sup> Ibid., 226.

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθοι ·  
 “τέτλαθι δὴ, κραδίη · καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ’ ἔτλης,  
 ἦματι τῷ ὅτε μοι μένος ἄσχετος ἦσθιε Κύκλωψ  
 ἰφθίμους ἐτάρους · σύ δ’ ἐτόλμας, ὄφρα σε μήτις  
 ἐξάγαγ’ ἐξ ἄντροιο οἰόμενον θανέεσθαι.”  
 ὧς ἔφατ’, ἐν στήθεσσι καθαπτόμενος φίλον ἦτορ ·  
 τῷ δὲ μάλ’ ἐν πείσῃ κραδίη μένε τετληυῖα  
 νωλεμέως · ἀτὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλίσσετο ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα (*Od.* 20.17-24).

He struck himself on the chest and spoke to his heart and scolded it: ‘Bear up, my heart. You have had worse to endure before this on that day when the irresistible Cyclops ate up my strong companions, but you endured it until intelligence got you out of the cave, though you expected to perish.’ So he spoke, addressing his own dear heart within him; and the heart in great obedience endured, and stood it without complaint, but the man himself was twisting and turning.

As a master would deal with his impassioned dog, Odysseus chides (cf. καθαρός) his *ētor*, rebukes (cf. ἐνίπτω) his *kradiē*, and strikes (cf. πλήσσω) himself on the chest, commanding his *kradiē* within to endure (τέτλαθι). And, just as an obedient dog would obey his master, so too does Odysseus’ *kradiē* obey him and remain enduring, though he twists and turns about with the effort.

Though he has succeeded in bringing his barking *kradiē* into submission, Odysseus’ continued effort to endure is expressed by way of a particularly memorable metaphor:

ὧς δ’ ὅτε γαστέρ’ ἀνήρ πολέος πυρὸς αἰσθομένοιο,  
 ἐμπλεῖην κνίστης καὶ αἵματος, ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα  
 αἰόλλη, μάλ’ ὅκα λιλαίεται ὀπτηθῆναι,  
 ὧς ἄρ’ ὁ γ’ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἐλίσσετο, μερμηρίζων  
 ὀππως δὴ μνηστῆρσιν ἀναιδέσι χεῖρας ἐφήσει  
 μοῦνος ἐὼν πολέσι. σχεδόθεν δὲ οἱ ἦλθεν Ἀθήνη  
 οὐρανόθεν καταβᾶσα · δέμας δ’ ἦικτο γυναικί · (*Od.* 20.25-31)

And as a man with a paunch pudding that has been filled with blood and fat, tosses it back and forth over a blazing fire, and the pudding itself strains hard to be cooked quickly; so he was twisting and turning back and forth, meditating how, though he was alone against many, he could lay hands on the shameless

suitors. And at this time Athene, descending from the sky, came close to him, and wore the shape of a lady.

There are two fascinating things about this second metaphor. First, the fact that Odysseus' internal battle to subjugate his passions is compared to a roasting belly or sausage filled with blood and fat.<sup>407</sup> This is a remarkably appropriate metaphor, for it describes what the eye can see, the continuous turning of the sausage, as well as the internal elements of the sausage that the eye cannot see, the blood and the fat, which could be seen as analogous to the elements internal to Odysseus that are also sizzling and spitting. What makes this metaphor the work of genius, however, is the fact that there are two levels of agency in this metaphor. Not only does the man turning the sausage want the sausage to be roasted quickly, but the sausage *itself* yearns (cf. λιλαιομαι) to be cooked. Clearly, the sausage represents Odysseus; but who represents the second level of agency represented by the sausage-roaster? This brilliant metaphor intertwines mortal and divine plans, and the sausage cooker represents the divine overseer of Odysseus' plan, Athena, who arrives on the scene immediately after the metaphor draws to a close.

Odysseus' choice is clearly defined: to spring on the maid-servants and kill them immediately, as his passions of fury and indignation impel him, or to bear the pain of their betrayal, and let them lie with the suitors one last time, as his rational impulse reminds him that he must. Odysseus' rational impulse evokes memories of another time in which he had to endure through bearing pain, when he and his men were trapped in the Cyclops' cave, and Odysseus had to endure his pain at the Cyclops' slaughter of his men rather than act on it. In both episodes Odysseus' life depends on his capacity to endure, and in both episodes, not only does Odysseus' rational impulse suggest the better plan, but it suggests the *only* plan that offers him any chance of securing his goal. In *Odyssey* 5, Odysseus needed to bear the pain of the Cyclops' slaughter of his men, rather than satisfy it by killing the Cyclops, if he and his men were to stand any chance of escaping from the cave. In this episode, Odysseus must endure his anger at the servants' betrayal and endure his fury at hearing their laughter, if he is to stand any chance of securing his

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<sup>407</sup> See Katz, J. T. (1999). Homeric Hymn to Hermes 296: τλήμονα γαστρὸς ἔριθον. *The Classical Quarterly*, 49 (1), 315-319.

goal, restoring the integrity of his household, which requires that he exact revenge not only on the servants but, more importantly, on the suitors. Just like in the Cyclops' cave, and just like in all of the decision-making scenes discussed above, Odysseus does not silence his passion completely, nor does he reject outright the course of action that it recommends. But rather, he masters it temporarily, and puts off its preferred course of action, until the optimal time for its performance. Just as Odysseus stood his ground in battle before attacking the Trojans like a wild boar, so too does Odysseus bear pain before attacking the suitors like a lion. After the slaughter of the suitors, Eurycleia enters the hall, and:

εὔρεν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆα μετὰ κταμένοισι νέκυσσιν,  
αἵματι καὶ λύθρῳ πεπαλαγμένον ὧς τε λέοντα,  
ὃς ῥά τε βεβρωκῶς βοῶς ἔρχεται ἀγραύλοιο ·  
πᾶν δ' ἄρα οἱ στήθος τε παρήϊά τ' ἀμφοτέρωθεν  
αἱματόεντα πέλει, δεινὸς δ' εἰς ὅπα ιδέσθαι ·  
ὧς Ὀδυσσεὺς πεπάλακτο πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὑπερθεῖν (*Od.* 22.401-6).

There she found Odysseus among the slaughtered dead men, spattered over with gore and battle filth, like a lion who has been feeding on an ox of the fields, and goes off covered with blood, all his chest and his flanks on either side bloody, a terrible thing to look in the face; so now Odysseus' feet and the hands above them were spattered.

Like the scenes of endurance characterised by the formula for deliberation discussed above, Odysseus remains passive so that he may act more successfully when the time for action is preferable.

The very last instance of the formula for deliberation is in Odysseus' long-awaited reunion with his father Laertes.<sup>408</sup> Is it, perhaps, one of the Odyssean scenes that scholars have found most difficult to explain. Odysseus' first sight of his father after a twenty year absence is described the following passage:

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<sup>408</sup> See Russo, Fernandez-Galiano, & Heubeck (Eds) (1992, 387-388, n.235-40) for support for Barnouw's view. Russo et. al. contend that this passage is one of three types of decision-making scenes, characterised by the use of 'μερμήριζα with infinitive, where there is hardly any question of deliberation since *μερμήριζα* simply means "I came to the decision" (ibid., 388 n.235-40).

τὸν δ' ὡς οὖν ἐνόησε πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς  
γῆραϊ τειρόμενον, μέγα δὲ φρεσὶ πένθος ἔχοντα,  
στάς ἄρ' ὑπὸ βλωθρὴν ὄγχην κατὰ δάκρυον εἶβε.  
μερμήριξε δ' ἔπειτα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν  
κύσσαι καὶ περιφῦναι ἐδὸν πατέρ', ἠδὲ ἕκαστα  
εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἔλθοι καὶ ἴκοιτ' ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν,  
ἢ πρῶτ' ἐξερέοιτο ἕκαστά τε πειρήσαιτο.  
ᾧδερερὲ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιονρδίῃαι,  
πρῶτον κερτομίσις ἐπέεσσιν πειρηθῆναι (*Od.* 24.232-40).

Now when much-enduring great Odysseus observed him [Laertes], with great misery in his heart, and oppressed by old age, he stood underneath a towering pear tree and shed tears for him, and deliberated then in his heart and his spirit whether to embrace his father and kiss him and tell him everything, how he was come again to his own dear country, or question him first about everything, and make trial of him. In the division of his heart this way seemed best to him, first to make trial of him, and speak in words of mockery.

But why would Odysseus treat, or rather maltreat, his father in such a way? As there is no longer any reason for him to conceal his identity – indeed, Odysseus is no longer even physically in disguise – Odysseus' treatment of his aged and suffering father strikes the reader as wantonly cruel. What could be Odysseus' reason for his behaviour in this episode, which is at the very least harsh and at the worst merciless and needless? Could there be some hidden, but detectable, motivation behind Odysseus' words? Could the explanation for Odysseus' bizarre behaviour be that this scene, like entire final book of the *Odyssey* in which it occurs, is, as some argue, not authentic but a later amateur interpolation?<sup>409</sup> Or, could his behaviour be explained as an artistic choice on the part of the poet to arouse as much emotion in his audience as possible, by delaying recognition in order to create as much suspense as possible?<sup>410</sup> Does this scene reveal less about Laertes, or the father-son relationship, and more about the cost for Odysseus of living for so many years by deceit and trickery, so that he struggles to leave behind his disguises

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<sup>409</sup> For a rejection of this thesis, see: Wender, D. (1978). *The Last Scenes of the "Odyssey"*. Leiden: Brill, 45-52. For a rejection of this thesis on formal grounds, see: See Gainsford, P. (2003). Formal Analysis of Recognition Scenes in the "Odyssey". *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 123, 48 n.23. See also Scodel, R. (1998). The Removal of the Arms, the Recognition with Laertes, and Narrative Tension in the Odyssey. *Classical Philology*, 93 (1), 9, & n. 20 for further references.

<sup>410</sup> Proponents of this argument include: Erbse, H. (1972). *Beiträge zum Verständnis der "Odyssee"*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 101-2 (reference at Scodel: 1998, 9 n. 22); Wender: 1978. 59-60

and fabrications, even when they are no longer necessary?<sup>411</sup> Is the answer much simpler: is Odysseus just being heartless, and there is no more to say about the passage?<sup>412</sup> Or is the answer much more complex: is Odysseus' treatment of his father carefully tailored to his father's current bereaved and despairing psychological state, and intended to somehow draw his father out of it?<sup>413</sup>

I will argue that the most plausible explanation of Odysseus' treatment of his father is this final explanation above: that Odysseus is attempting to draw Laertes out of his self-imposed apathy. However, before pursuing this argument, let us first examine Odysseus' psychological state in this episode. Upon seeing his father for the first time in twenty years, Odysseus is deeply distressed, and stands apart from him under a tree and weeps (δάκρυον εἶβε, 234). His first impulse, which is clearly passionate, is to 'embrace his father and kiss him and tell him everything.' His second impulse is to 'question him first [πειρήσαιτο] about everything, and make trial of him,' which he decides is *κέρδιον* (better) in the pursuit of his end, is clearly rational. Putting questions of Odysseus' cruelty and his goal in this episode aside for the moment, it is clear that Odysseus chooses to follow his rational rather than his passionate impulse, and endure his grief, rather than satisfy it immediately. Just like the other decision-making scenes addressed above, Odysseus does not completely reject his passionate impulse, but waits until the optimal moment to follow it. After testing his father, and witnessing Laertes' overwhelming grief, Odysseus' *thumos* is 'stirred, roused, agitated' (cf. *ὀρίνω*) and he follows his passionate impulse, embracing his father passionately and finally revealing his identity to him.<sup>414</sup> We know that before Odysseus had seen his father, he had resolved to make trial of him (*πειρήσομαι*, 238); and we see Odysseus confirm his words in his

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<sup>411</sup> See Focke, F. (1943). *Die Odyssee* (Vol. Stuttgart). Berlin: Tubinger Beitrage zur Altertumswissenschaft 37, 378 (reference at Scodel: 1998, 9 n. 23); and Wender: 1978, 56-7.

<sup>412</sup> For discussions of Odysseus' supposed cruelty here, see: Gainsford: 2003, 48 & 55; Scodel: 1998, 9; Wender: 1978, 57 & 59-60; and Woolsey, R. B. (1941). Repeated Narratives in the *Odyssey*. *Classical Philology*, 36 (2), 179-80.

<sup>413</sup> Alfred Heubeck, in his commentary on *Odyssey* 24, offers an argument of this type, arguing that Odysseus' aim is to penetrate 'the wall of apathy with which his father has surrounded himself' (Russo, J., Fernandez-Galiano, M., & Heubeck, A. (1992). *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey, Books XVII-XXIV* (Vol. 3). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 393 n.280-301, see also 389-9 n. 244).

<sup>414</sup> On *ὀρίνω* in psychological contexts, see Clarke: 1999, 102 n. 110.

deeds in this scene, carrying through his plan even when it becomes almost unbearable to do so. Like every other Homeric agent – except one – whose deliberation in *thumos* and *phrenes* is anguished and whose decision is unambiguously voluntary, Odysseus chooses to endure his passions rather than satisfy them.

But why does Odysseus need to test his father in the first place? Again, let us place Odysseus' deliberation within the context of his overall goal in the *Odyssey*: *nostos*. Reunion with his father, and restoration of familial integrity, is at the heart of Odysseus' *nostos*. Gainsford has insightfully noted that there are three different kinds of restoration that constitute the 'nostos-narrative' in the *Odyssey*: 'geographical, political and familial' restoration.<sup>415</sup> Although Odysseus has finally arrived home at Ithaca, and although he has already taken care of the suitors, Odysseus still must restore his relationships with his family members. There is general agreement among scholars, such as Gainsford,<sup>416</sup> Murnaghan,<sup>417</sup> and Scodel,<sup>418</sup> that before this can familial restoration can be achieved, Odysseus needs to restore Laertes to his proper role: that of the hero. Laertes at the beginning of *Odyssey* 24, is as far from being a hero as one can imagine. When Odysseus first sees his father, Laertes is:

τὸν δ' οἶον πατέρ' εὔρεν εὐκτιμένη ἐν ἄλωϊ,  
λιστρεύοντα φυτόν· ῥυπόωντα δὲ ἔστο χιτῶνα  
ῥαπτὸν ἀεικέλιον, περι δὲ κνήμησι βοείας  
κνημίδας ῥαπτὰς δέδετο, γραπτῶς ἀλεείνων,  
χειρῖδας τ' ἐπὶ χερσὶ βάτων ἔνεκ'· αὐτὰρ ὕπερθεν  
αἰγείην κυνέην κεφαλῇ ἔχε, πένθος ἀέξων (*Od.* 24.226-31)

... alone in the well-worked orchard, spading out a plant, and he had a squalid tunic upon him, patched together and ugly, and on his legs he had oxhide gaiters fastened and patched together, to prevent scratching, and gloves on his hands because of the bushes, and he was wearing a cap of goatskin on his head, to increase his misery.

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<sup>415</sup> Gainsford: 2003, 54.

<sup>416</sup> Ibid., 55.

<sup>417</sup> Murnaghan, S. (1987). *Disguise and Recognition in the Odyssey*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 31.

<sup>418</sup> Scodel: 1998, 13. Scodel argues that Laertes needs to be returned to his former heroic status specifically so that Laertes can act as an ally against the suitor's families (Scodel: 1998, 10).

Indeed, Laertes' appearance in this passage is much closer to an animal than it is to a hero. The crucial term in this passage is ἀέξω. While the primary meaning of this verb is 'to increase, enlarge, strengthen,' in this context it means 'to cherish or foster' one's grief. Laertes' πένθος is not just *mega*, is it excessive, even by Homeric standards.<sup>419</sup> After praising the state of orchard in which he finds Laertes, Odysseus pretends to mistake Laertes for an ill-kept slave. Indeed, Laertes is a slave, but not in the way that Odysseus pretends. By cherishing his grief in this way, Laertes has enslaved himself to his passions.<sup>420</sup>

I suggest that the key to understanding Odysseus' treatment of Laertes lies in his self-expressed intention to 'speak to him in words of mockery.' The adjective here is κέρτομιος, from the verb κερτομέω, to 'mock, jeer at,' which means 'heart-cutting' or, as Clarke persuasively argues, 'heart-dividing.'<sup>421</sup> Drawing on his arguments for the Homeric mind's image of extreme passions as psychological division, Clarke argues that words that are κέρτομιος are those designed to 'temporarily confuse the person addressed, to put them in a situation where they are subject to conflicting emotions and do not know

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<sup>419</sup> The reader is reminded of the excessive grief of another father also in the final book of an Homeric epic, this time Priam's grief in *Iliad* 24. Achilles' exhortations to Priam to endure his grief are called to mind, along with his references to the bereaved mother Niobe and her manifold sufferings (*Il.* 24.602 ff.).

<sup>420</sup> This is also clear from the description of Laertes we heard in *Odyssey* 11 from Odysseus' mother's shade in the underworld, in which the same verb ἀέξω is used. While Penelope waits for Odysseus 'with enduring heart [μένει τετηότι θυμῷ],' Laertes 'remains [μῦναι], on the estate where he is and does not go to the city. There is no bed there nor is there bed clothing nor blankets nor shining coverlets, but in the winter time he sleeps in the house, where the thralls do, in the dirt next to the fire, and with foul clothing upon him; but when the summer comes and the blossoming time of harvest, everywhere he has places to sleep on the ground, on fallen leaves in piles along the rising ground of his orchard, and there he lies, grieving, and the sorrow grows big within him [μέγα δὲ φρεσὶ πένθος ἀέξει] as he longs for your homecoming, and harsh old age is on him' (*Od.* 11.187-196).

<sup>421</sup> Clarke, M. (2001). 'Heart-Cutting Talk: Homeric κερτομέω and Related Words. *Classical Quarterly*, 51 (2), 329-338, p. 335. For other scholarship on κερτομέω, or the word family to which it belongs, see Hooker, T. J. (1986). A Residual Problem in *Iliad* 24. *Classical Quarterly*, 36, 32-7; Jones, P. V. (1989). *Iliad* 24.649: Another Solution. *Classical Quarterly*, 39, 247-50; Clay, J. S. (1999). *Iliad* 24.469 and the Semantics of κερτομέω. *Classical Quarterly*, 49, 618-21; and Lloyd, M. (2004). The Politeness of Achilles: Off-Record Conversation Struggles in Homer and the Meaning of "Kertomia". *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 124, 75-89. See also Thornton, A. (1970). *People and Themes in Homer's Odyssey*. Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 116-9, esp. 116 for in κέρτομιος this context.

how to respond, whether because of fear or doubt or for some more complex reason.<sup>422</sup> This state sounds exactly like that experienced by the characters in the scenes of deliberation that we have looked at so far. To put it another way, words that are *κέρτομιος* are those intended to cause psychological division within the addressee. That is not to say that such speech is essentially cruel; indeed, Alex Gottesman argues that between intimates speech characterised by *κέρτομία* can be ‘playful,’ and ‘a form of affection.’<sup>423</sup> Perhaps, by attempting to rouse in his father first anger by comparing him to a slave (257), then ancestral pride by referring to Laertes’ patronymic (270),<sup>424</sup> and finally overwhelming grief (315-7), Odysseus is trying to draw his father out of his state of apathy into a state of passionate internal conflict, in which he can make the decision – a decision that requires courage – to leave his life of passivity behind and embrace his old life of heroic activity. Regardless of whether one accepts this argument or not, the fact is that Odysseus *does* draw his father out of his apathy and he *does* restore Laertes to his heroic status. Gainsford noted that ‘it is Laertes who makes the only kill in Book 24 and, uniquely in the *Odyssey*, his victory is honoured with the formula *δούπησεν δὲ πεσών, ἀράβησε δὲ τεύχε’ ἐπ’ αὐτῶι* (24.525 “he fell with a crash, and his arms clattered upon him”).’<sup>425</sup> By enduring his grief rather than satisfying it by testing his father and speaking to him in heart-cutting words, Odysseus attempts to restore his father to his proper role in pursuit of *nostos*.

## (ii) *Achilles*

The only instance of the formula for deliberation in which the character chooses to follow his passionate impulse rather than his rational impulse after deliberation is the first instance of the formula in the epics: Achilles’ deliberation in *Iliad* 1. Agamemnon

<sup>422</sup> Clarke: 2001, 335.

<sup>423</sup> Gottesman, A. (2008). The Pragmatics of Homeric Kertomia. *Classical Quarterly*, 58 (1), 1-12, p. 11).

<sup>424</sup> See Scodel: 1998, 12-3.

<sup>425</sup> Gainsford: 2003, 55. See *Il.* 4.504 where this heroic formula is used for Odysseus’ victim on the battlefield.

has just insulted Achilles, threatening to take Briseis (*Il.* 1.184-87). Achilles' *ētor* is divided:

ᾠς φάτο · Πηλεΐωνι δ' ἄχος γένετ', ἐν δέ οἱ ἦτορ  
στήθεσιν λασίοισι διάνδιχα μερμήριζεν,  
ἦ ὃ γε φάσγανον ὄξυ ἐρυσσάμενος παρὰ μηροῦ  
τοὺς μὲν ἀναστήσειεν, ὃ δ' Ἀτρεΐδην ἐναρίζοι,  
ἦε χόλον παύσειεν ἐρητύσειέ τε θυμόν.  
ἦος ὃ ταῦθ' ὤρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,  
ἔλκετο δ' ἐκ κολεοῖο μέγα ξίφος, ἦλθε δ' Ἀθήνη  
οὐρανόθεν · πρὸ γὰρ ἦκε θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη,  
ἄμφω ὁμῶς θυμῷ φιλέουσα τε κηδομένη τε.  
στῆ δ' ὀπιθεν, ξανθῆς δὲ κόμης ἔλε Πηλεΐωνα  
οἶφ φαινομένη · τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐ τις ὄρατο. (*Il.* 1.188-98).

And the anger came on Peleus' son, and within his shaggy breast the heart was divided two ways, pondering whether to from beside his thigh draw the sharp sword, driving away all those who stood between and kill the son of Atreus, or else to check the spleen within and keep down his anger. Now as he weighed in mind and spirit these two courses and was drawing from its scabbard the great sword, Athene descended from the sky. For Hera the goddess of the white arms sent her, who loved both men equally in her heart and cared for them. The goddess standing behind Peleus' son caught him by the fair hair, appearing to him only, for no man of the others saw her.

Achilles' choice here is clear: he can either act on his passions of *achos*, *cholos*, and *thumos* that urge him to draw his sword and kill Agamemnon, or he can curb (cf. *παύω*) and restrain (cf. *ἐρητύω*) these passions.<sup>427</sup>

It may be objected that the intervention of Athena disqualifies this from inclusion in my list of relevant instances of the formula for deliberation.<sup>428</sup> For example, Rosenmeyer, in "Decision-Making," cites this passage as an example of divine intervention whereby the divinity 'in effect [makes] the decision for the agent.'<sup>429</sup> Similarly, psychologist Julian Jaynes in *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind*, contends that 'Athene ... takes control of the action and tells

<sup>427</sup> See Sullivan (1988: 85) on the activity of Achilles' *thumos* and *phrenes* in this passage.

<sup>428</sup> See pp. 94-7 above.

<sup>429</sup> Rosenmeyer: 1990, 192.

Achilles what to do.’<sup>430</sup> However, it is clear that there is a crucial difference between the divine intervention in this passage, and that in those instances of the formula for deliberation discounted above because the intervention either removed the agent’s choice or rendered its voluntariness ambiguous. For example, while the shipwrecked Odysseus in *Odyssey* 5 is deliberating whether to swim to shore immediately or to swim on in the hope of finding a more hospitable shore, Athena takes the decision out of his hands, putting the idea in his *phrenes* to hold fast to a rock as Poseidon sends a great wave to drown him (*Od.* 5.427). Similarly, in *Iliad* 5, Odysseus is deliberating whether to fight Sarpedon or kill some Lykians, when Athena turns his *thumos* (cf. *τρέπω*) towards the latter option (*Il.* 5.676). Zeus’ intervention in *Iliad* 8, in which he warns the deliberating Diomedes not to turn about and fight Hector, veers somewhat from the pattern. Unlike in *Odyssey* 5 and *Iliad* 5, in which the divine intervention occurs *after* deliberation, and guides the agent towards choosing one of alternative courses of action already outlined by the agent, the divine intervention in *Iliad* 8 occurs *before* Diomedes’ deliberation, in fact, it is only because of Zeus’ warning that Diomedes deliberates at all.

The divine intervention in Achilles’ decision-making is crucially different from those examples of divine intervention outlined above. Not only does Athena arrive *after* Achilles’ deliberation, she arrives after Achilles has already made his choice. Let us look again at the exact moment of Athena’s intervention:

ἦος ὁ ταῦθ’ ὄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,  
 ἔλκετο δ’ ἐκ κολεοῖο μέγα ξίφος, ἦλθε δ’ Ἀθήνη  
 οὐρανόθεν ...  
 στῆ δ’ ὄπιθεν, ξανθῆς δὲ κόμης ἔλε Πηλεΐωνα (*Il.* 1.193-97).

Now *as* he weighed in mind and spirit these two courses and *was drawing* from its scabbard the great sword, Athene descended from the sky ... and caught him by the fair hair.

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<sup>430</sup> Jaynes contends that it is only after Achilles’ deliberation, or ‘after this vacillating interval of increasing belly sensations and surges of blood, as Achilles is drawing his mighty sword, that the stress has become sufficient to hallucinate the dreadfully gleaming goddess Athene who then takes control of the action (1:188ff.) and tells Achilles what to do’ (Jaynes: 1976, 259).

Athena descent is denoted by ἦλθε, the aorist of ἐρχομαι. Athena descends as Achilles is deliberating, denoted by the imperfect ὄρμαινε, and as he is drawing, denoted again by an imperfect, this time ἔλκετο (cf. ἔλκω) his great sword from its scabbard. Scully notes that the formula ‘ὄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν’ is generally followed by the term τόφρα, ‘meanwhile.’ However, this term is absent from the description of Achilles’ deliberation; as Scully explains, ‘rather, Achilles is already drawing his sword, ready to slay the king.’<sup>431</sup> What concerns us here is not whether Achilles was able to follow through with his intention to kill Agamemnon, but whether or not he made the decision to do so before he was stopped. Achilles’ choice was between drawing his sword and restraining his passions; the fact that this is exactly what Achilles chose to do – to draw his sword – makes it clear that Achilles did indeed choose to act on his passions rather than restrain them. Had Athena not descended, and caught Achilles by the hair, it is fair to assume that Achilles would have continued what he had started, and attempted to kill Agamemnon.

Achilles’ initial choice was between drawing his sword and killing Agamemnon on the one hand, and restraining his passions on the other. However, with Athena’s arrival on the scene, the situation has changed, and so too has Achilles’ choice. Athena urges Achilles put a stop to (cf. πάω, *Il.* 1.207) his *menos*, and restrain himself by obeying her and Hera (σὺ δ’ ἴσχεο, πείθεο δ’ ἡμῖν, *Il.* 1.214), promising him great rewards. Achilles’ choice, then, has clearly changed: it is no longer a choice between killing Agamemnon and restraining his passions, but it has become a choice between killing Agamemnon and obeying Athena. Achilles replies to Athena: ‘Goddess, it is necessary [χρή] that I obey the word of you two, angry though I am in my heart [μάλα περ θυμῷ κεχολωμένον]. So it will be better [ἄμεινον]’ (*Il.* 1.216-217). Scully contends that: ‘*Ameinon* signifies Achilles’ acceptance of the goddess’ command (1.217). The comparative is in answer to a new question (whether or not to obey the goddess) and not to his original indecision (whether or not to slay Agamemnon).’<sup>432</sup> Williams similarly recognises this, contending that: ‘[t]he goddess has done more than help [Achilles] to see

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<sup>431</sup> Scully: 1984, 18.

<sup>432</sup> *Ibid.*, 18-9 n.16.

that one course of action is better than the other in terms he was already considering; in this case, she has given him an extra and decisive reason, which he did not have before, for thinking that it is better.’<sup>433</sup> Gaskin contends that we can see from Athena’s appeal to Achilles to restrain himself and obey her and Hera, that Athena ‘does not force him into line,’ but rather urges him to listen. He argues that, ‘There is no compulsion in this: Achilles could disobey if he wished, but chooses not to;’ and he cites the example of Odysseus at *Odyssey* 5.333 ff. choosing not to take the goddess’ advice as evidence of this.<sup>434</sup>

I contend that the reason that Athena had to intervene in *Iliad* 1, was because Achilles lacked the capacity to endure by bearing the pain of his passions rather than acting on them. As mentioned above, Scully noted that Achilles’ formula for deliberation lacked the customary *τόφρα* (meanwhile) which generally follows such formulae. Scully contends that ‘[t]his variation from the norm suggests Achilles’ vigor of mind which cuts short the hesitation obvious in such thinking.’<sup>435</sup> I suggest that a more accurate way of expressing this same point, is that Achilles’ ‘vigour of passion’ cut short his contemplation of not killing Agamemnon and curbing his anger. Achilles is the paradigm of the Homeric warrior hero. His *thumos*, at least at the beginning of the *Iliad*, is in its proper hot, fiery, breathy state. The greatness of Achilles as a hero lies in the vigorousness of his heroic passions, and the swiftness with which he acts heroically upon them, which results in brave and successful deeds. In “Convention and Individuality in *Iliad* 1,” Mark W. Edwards notes additional variations on the norm in this passage, in order to convey the vigorousness of Achilles’ passions, and the urgency of the situation. Not only is the customary *τόφρα* absent, but so too is the elaborate description that usually attends descriptions of divine intervention. Edwards contends that, ‘the crisis is acute, and Athena loses no time – not only does she dispense with sandals, similies, and

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<sup>433</sup> Williams: 1993 (2008 ed.), 30.

<sup>434</sup> Gaskin: 2001, 155. Gaskin also cites the example of Aegisthus choice at *Odyssey* 1.32-43 to disobey the gods, though Hermes has warned him of the consequences of doing so. Gaskin concludes that: ‘as these examples show, divine interventions can stop short of annexing the individual’s autonomy: the god puts some options before the individual, gives advice, but leaves the final decision to that individual’ (Gaskin: 2001, 155). See also Adkins: 1982, 296.

<sup>435</sup> Scully: 1984, 18.

so on, but she brusquely shoves aside the patient old epithet and bursts into the verse at the C caesura; and the verse actually concludes ἤλαε δ' Ἀθήνη ... The effect on the audience must have been striking.<sup>436</sup> Equally as striking, observes Edwards, would be the effect on the audience of Athena's grasping Achilles by the hair, before addressing him as is usual in such type-scenes. Edwards contends that '[n]owhere else does a visiting deity take a comparable liberty in attracting a hero's attention, but Athena has no time to spare, and once again the poet uses a physical action to illustrate a powerful emotion.'<sup>437</sup>

Achilles' tragedy is that he learns this lesson too late. While Achilles exhorts Priam in *Iliad* 24 to endure, telling him to 'bear up, nor mourn endlessly in your heart, for there is not anything to be gained from grief for your son; you will never bring him back; sooner you must go through yet another sorrow' (*Il.* 24.549-51), it is not until we meet him again in Hades in the *Odyssey* that Achilles himself learns the value of a life of endurance. When Odysseus meets the shade of Achilles in *Odyssey* 11 Achilles bemoans his lot, saying: 'I would rather follow the plow as thrall to another man, one with no land allotted him and not much to live on, than be a king over the perished dead' (*Od.* 11.489-91). There are two instances of *τλάω* denoting the failure of a mortal to endure by bearing pain, and that mortal is Achilles. The first such instance is at *Iliad* 19 when the grieving Achilles refuses to eat before battle. He says to his companions: 'I beg of you, if any dear companion will listen to me, stop urging me to satisfy the heart [φίλον ἦτορ] in me with food and drink, since this strong sorrow [ἄχος αἰνὸν] has come upon me. I will hold out till the sun goes down and endure [μενέω καὶ τλήσομαι], though it be hard' (*Il.* 19.305-8). Although Achilles characterises his actions as enduring, it is clear from the context of his words in *Iliad* 19, that his refusal to eat is the opposite of enduring.

It is in *Iliad* 19 that the two Homeric traditions of courage, the bravery tradition and the endurance tradition clash as their respective exemplars, Achilles and Odysseus, come head to head. Achilles has finally received his replacement armour, and he urges

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<sup>436</sup> Edwards: 1980, 13, see also 9-11 for the standard divine visitation type-scene.

<sup>437</sup> *Ibids.*, 14.

Agamemnon to command the army to immediate hostile action to avenge Patroclus' death, as the *menos* in his chest urges (*Il.* 19.202). Odysseus, however, urges Agamemnon to wait, and allow the soldiers to eat, which will renew their *menos* and *alkē* (161), and enable them to fight all the more fiercely when they do go to battle. While the soldier's *thumos* might be eager to fight (θυμῷ γε μενοινάα πολεμίζειν, 164), only if he has had a proper meal will the *ētor* in his *phrenes* remain bold (θαρσαλέον, 169) and will his limbs not grow weary (cf. γάμνω, 169-170). Agamemnon, having previously urged Achilles to wait (cf. ἐπιμένω, 142) despite his eagerness for war (ἐπειγόμενός περ Ἴαρος, 142), decides in favour of Odysseus' suggestion, and he repeats his command to Achilles to remain (cf. μένω, 189) despite his eagerness (ἐπειγόμενός περ Ἴαρος; 188-189). It is at this point that Achilles swears that he will not eat until he has avenged himself on Hector; which he repeats in the passage we are examining at *Il.* 19.308. Achilles tells us that his passions are *menos* (202), and ἄχος αἰνὸν (307), and Odysseus and Menelaus recognise Achilles' eagerness (cf. μενοινάω, 164; cf. ἐπείγω, 189); it is these passions that urge Achilles to fight. However, Achilles does not endure by refusing to eat because he is forbidden to act upon them. The only way Achilles could endure in this situation would be if he restrained his passionate impulses, and followed the more rational path of eating in order to preserve his strength. By yielding to his passionate impulses, Achilles fails to endure his grief at Patroclus' death and his eagerness to fight Hector.<sup>438</sup>

In the second instance of *tláō* denoting the bearing-pain endurance of a mortal in the *Iliad*, and in the final instance of bearing-pain endurance to be examined, Apollo offers a succinct articulation both of bearing-pain endurance itself and of Achilles' failure to endure. In *Iliad* 24 Achilles continues to dishonour Hector's corpse, and Apollo berates the gods, calling them 'hard' (cf. σκέτλιος) and 'destructive' (cf. δηλήμων) for not having the *tlhmosúnē* to save (οὐκ ἔτλητε σαῶσαι) Hector from Achilles' wrath (*Il.* 24.33-35).

ἀλλ' ὄλοῦ Ἄχιλῆι, θεοί, βούλεσθ' ἐπαρήγειν,

<sup>438</sup> In *Iliad* 24 Achilles' mother Thetis recognises Achilles' failure to endure by not eating. She says to him: 'My child, how long will you go on eating your heart out in sorrow and lamentation, and remember neither your food nor going to bed?' (*Il.* 24.128-9).

ὧ οὐτ' ἄρ φρένες εἰσὶν ἐναΐσιμοι οὔτε νόημα  
 γναμπτὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι, λέων δ' ὡς ἄγρια οἶδεν,  
 ὃς τ' ἐπεὶ ἄρ μεγάλη τε βίη καὶ ἀγήγορι θυμῷ  
 εἷζας εἶς' ἐπὶ μῆλα βροτῶν, ἵνα δαῖτα λάβησιν ·  
 ὡς Ἀχιλεὺς ἔλεον μὲν ἀπώλεσεν, οὐδέ οἱ αἰδῶς  
 γίγνεται, ἦ τ' ἄνδρας μέγα σίνεται ἠδ' ὀνίνησι.  
 μέλλει μὲν πού τις καὶ φίλτερον ἄλλον ὀλέσσαι,  
 ἢ ἐ κασίγητον ὁμογάστριον ἢ ἐ καὶ υἷόν ·  
 ἀλλ' ἦ τοι κλαύσας καὶ ὀδυράμενος μεθέηκε ·  
 τλητὸν γὰρ Μοῖραι θυμὸν θέσαν ἀνθρώποισιν.  
 αὐτὰρ ὃ γ' Ἔκτορα δῖον, ἐπεὶ φίλον ἦτορ ἀπηύρα,  
 ἵππων ἐξάπτων περὶ σῆμ' ἐτάροιο φίλοιο  
 ἔλκει · οὐ μὴν οἱ τό γε κάλλιον οὐδέ τ' ἄμεινον.  
 μὴ ἀγαθῷ περ ἐόντι νεμεσσηθέωμέν οἱ ἡμεῖς ·  
 κωφὴν γὰρ δὴ γαῖαν ἀεικίζεις μενεαίνων (II. 24.38-54).

No, you gods; your desire is to help this cursed Achilles within whose breast there are no feelings of justice, nor can his mind be bent, but his purposes are fierce, like a lion, who when he has given way to his own great strength and his haughty spirit, goes among the flocks of men, to devour them. So Achilles has destroyed pity, and there is not in him any shame; which does much harm to men but profits them also. For a man must some day lose one who was even closer than this; a brother from the same womb, or a son. And yet he weeps for him, and sorrows for him, and then it is over, for the Destinies put in mortal men the heart of endurance. But this man, now he has torn the life from great Hector, ties him to his horses and drags him around his beloved companion's tomb; and nothing is gained thereby for his good, or his honour. Great as he is, let him take care not to make us angry; for see, he does dishonour to the dumb earth in his fury.

The destinies, Apollo tells us, have given mortals an enduring *thumos* because loss and its attendant grief is a part of every mortal life. Even the grief of those whose loss is much greater than that of Achilles – and later in this same book Achilles himself will give an example of such grief, when he exhorts Priam to endure his grief and eat by reminding him of the grief of Niobe over the loss of her twelve children<sup>439</sup> – comes to an end.

<sup>439</sup> Achilles says to Priam: 'Now you and I must remember our supper. For even Niobe, she of the lovely tresses, remembered to eat, whose twelve children were destroyed in her palace, six daughters, and six sons in the pride of their youth ... But she remembered to eat when she was worn out with weeping' (II. 24.601-13).

However, what is most important about this passage for the present inquiry, is Apollo's reference to Achilles' psychological entities.<sup>440</sup> In the second chapter, I argued that an individual could only endure when his psychological entities were in their proper state. Only when his *phrenes* were firm, balanced, and tightly-knit, could his *thumos* be in its proper state, that is, hot, airy, flexible, and yielding. I will paraphrase Apollo's criticism of Achilles in order to bring the relevant elements into sharper relief. Apollo blames Achilles' failure to endure on the state of his *phrenes*. Achilles' *phrenes* are not *ἐναΐσιμοι*, 'well-balanced' or 'fitting.' While Achilles' *phrenes* are praised as *μεγάλας φρένας* (mighty, *Il.* 9.184), Achilles' *phrenes* are most frequently criticised, by Apollo above as not being well-balanced, as well as being absent (οὐδ' ἠβαταί, *Il.* 14.141). Achilles' *thumos* in his *phrenes* are ironlike (σιδήρεος, *Il.* 22.357), savage (cf. ἄγριος, 24.41), and arrogant (ἀγήγορι θυμῷ, 24.42). Indeed, as we heard in the first chapter, *phrenes* of young men are typically not sound and, while Achilles is not a very young man, neither is he as old as Odysseus.<sup>441</sup> Apollo associates this negative state of Achilles' *phrenes* with the unbending (cf. γναμπτός, 24.41) nature of his νόημα (purpose), that is, revenge for the death of Patroclus. Endurance requires a degree of flexibility, which might initially sound strange as we often think of endurance as exactly the opposite of flexible; as single-mindedness or doggedness in pursuing one's goal, in being uncompromising and refusing to give in. However, it is clear from the above examples of endurance, that Homeric endurance often requires significant flexibility. Odysseus, Diomedes and Menelaus must adapt to the contexts in which they find themselves. While their commitments to their goals remain the same, these characters are able to adapt their behaviour according to their ever-changing contexts, according to the which course of action available to them at that time and in that specific context, will offer them the better chance of securing their goal.

Apollo contends that far from having an enduring *thumos*, Achilles has an ἀγήγορι θυμῷ (42), an arrogant *thumos*. His psychological state is characterised by the wildness,

<sup>440</sup> For Achilles' *phrenes*, see Sullivan (1988) 57-8, 147, & 192-3.

<sup>441</sup> See Telemachus' *phrenes* *Od.* 18.215 & 220; see also Paris' *phrenes* *Il.* 6.352. For Achilles' age, see: Breslove, D. (1943). How Old Were Achilles and Neoptolemus? *The Classical Journal*, 39 (3), 159-161.

savagery, or fierceness (cf. ἄγριος, 41) of the lion.<sup>442</sup> However, it is not the fact that Achilles has the *thumos* of a lion<sup>443</sup> that is the problem. Achilles' *thumos* is unable to endure because he *yields* (cf. εἶκω, 43) to his great strength (μεγάλη τε βίη, 42) and arrogant *thumos* (ἀγήνορι θυμῷ, 42). Used in this way, the verb εἶκω means 'to yield, give way [to].'<sup>444</sup> Significantly for this thesis, it is a verb that is often used in the context of giving ground – or failing to stand one's ground – on the battlefield. In terms of the internal battleground of endurance, by giving way before his thumotic passions, Achilles yields control to them. Unable to stand his ground in the face of his passions, Achilles relinquishes his self-control to them, becoming their slave.

The hero's inability to endure is not caused exactly by the abundant possession of qualities such as *biē*, *menōs*, *cholos*, *kartos*, and *sthenos* that impel the hero to perform acts of bravery. Rather, the hero's inability to endure is caused by the abundant possession of those qualities, which, *left unchecked*, have reached a state of excess. This distinction between the abundant and the excessive possession of manly qualities corresponds with Barbara Graziosi and Johannes Haubold's distinction between proper and excessive masculinity in "Homeric Masculinity: ΗΝΟΡΗ and ΑΓΗΝΟΡΗ."<sup>445</sup> Graziosi & Haubold offer an analysis of three related terms in Homer: the noun ἠνορέη, the adjective ἀγήνωρ, and the abstract noun ἀγηνορή that is derived from ἀγήνωρ. *Hvopēh* denotes positive qualities such as '[m]anliness, valour, mettle, prowess,' and is etymologically connected with 'άνήρ,' that is, man.<sup>446</sup> *Agēnōr*, primarily means 'manly, bold, courageous,' but also has a pejorative sense, denoting the excessive or arrogant exhibition of these qualities, translations of which include 'headstrong' and 'arrogant' (LSJ). It is this term ἀγήνωρ that Apollo uses to criticise Achilles' *thumos* at *Il.* 24.42 and

<sup>442</sup> See also *Il.* 9.629.

<sup>443</sup> *Il.* 7.228.

<sup>444</sup> εἶκω: 'To yield, give way, allow play to (a feeling, a defect of character, a personal quality, a circumstance).'

<sup>445</sup> Graziosi, B., & Haubold, J. (2003). Homeric Masculinity: ΗΝΟΡΗ and ΑΓΗΝΟΡΗ. *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 123, 60-76.

<sup>446</sup> LSJ s.v. ἠνορέη, Dor. ἀνορέα, ἠ, (άνήρ) poet. word for ἀνδρεία, *manhood*, *prowess*.

excepting Achilles' postive self-application of the term at *Il.* 9.398,<sup>447</sup> ἀγήνωρ is always predicated of Achilles in this latter, negative sense (*Il.* 9.699, 20.174, 24.42).<sup>448</sup>

To illustrate my point, it is helpful to look at the other instance in the *Iliad* where ἀγήνωρ' cognate noun ἀγνηνορία is predicated of wild beasts. In Book 12, Hector's confrontation with the Argives is described in this way:

ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἄν ἔν τε κύνεσσι καὶ ἀνδράσι θηρευτῆσι  
κάπριος ἢ ἐ λέων στρέφεται σθένει βλεμεαίνων ·  
οἱ δέ τε πυργηδὸν σφέας αὐτοὺς ἀρτύναντες  
ἀντίοι ἴστανται καὶ ἀκοντίζουσι θαμειᾶς  
αἰχμᾶς ἐκ χειρῶν · τοῦ δ' οὐ ποτε κυδάλιμον κῆρ  
ταρβεῖ οὐδὲ φοβεῖται, ἀγνηνορία δέ μιν ἔκτα (*Il.* 12.41-6, emphases added).

As when among a pack of hounds and huntsmen assembled a wild boar or lion turns at bay in the strength of his fury, and the men, closing themselves into a wall about him, stand up to face him, and in spite of this the proud heart feels not terror, nor turns to run, *and it is his own courage that kills him.*

When left unchecked, those very qualities that make a man or animal brave, lead inevitably to their destruction. The wild beast in the above quote faces the hounds and huntsmen, though vastly outnumbered, because he lacks the capacity to turn and run. The beast has a courageous and spirited *thumos*, however, he has these qualities in excess, and it is this excess that prevents the beast from running. Similarly, when Apollo bemoans Achilles' lack of endurance, he compares him to a wild beast, whose ἀγνηνορι θυμῷ impels it to devour flocks of men. As we saw in the paradigmatic examples of endurance above, although he is a proud hero, Menelaus was able to check his proud impulses in order to act in accordance with the will of the gods. Lacking the capacity to check his

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<sup>447</sup> At *Il.* 9.398 Achilles' says that his θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ was often eager to take a wife.

<sup>448</sup> At *Il.* 9.699 Diomedes criticises Achilles, describing him as ἀγήνωρ. And at *Il.* 20.174 Achilles' *menos* and his θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ drive him (cf. ὀτρύνω) to fight Aeneas. Is it clear from the accompanying metaphor that ἀγήνωρ denotes a negative state of *thumos*. In this metaphor, Achilles is compared to a destructive (cf. σίντης) lion, that foams at the mouth, whose ἄλκιμον ἦτορ groans (cf. στένω) from within his κραδίη (see Edwards: 1991, 310 n.168-9 on ἦτορ as 'spirit,' and κραδίη denoting 'heart' in this passage). This lion is both destructive of others and of himself; 'he lashes his own ribs with his tail and the flanks on both sides as he rouses himself to fury for the fight, eyes glaring, and hurls himself straight onward on the chance of killing some one of the men, or else being killed himself in the first onrush' (*Il.* 20.170-3).

impulses – of pride, anger, and grief – like the wild beast whose *ἀγηνωρία* kills him, it is Achilles' *ἀγήνορι θυμῷ* that leads inevitably to his own demise.

### (iii) Gods, Women, and Fate

Bearing-pain endurance lies in the capacity to check the passions that urge one to react or respond to some suffering, either in the pursuit of some goal, or as a response to divine fate. Menelaus bore the pain of attracting the *nemesis*, the righteous indignation, of the Danaans and potentially earning a reputation for cowardice by retreating rather than fighting for the corpse of one who died for the sake of his own *timē* in *Iliad* 17, so that he could retrieve Patroclus' corpse when his chances of success were better. Odysseus bore the pain of his troubled *thumos*, troubled by the passions of indignation, fury, and the eagerness to exact revenge on the servants and suitors, so that he could take his revenge when his chances for success were better. And he bore, rather than acted on, overwhelming grief at seeing his aged and suffering father, so that he would not reveal his true identity, in the pursuit of his goal of restoration of his household. In all of these examples the passivity of endurance is united with the activity of bravery. Both endurance and bravery are involved in the achievement of a specific goal, but endurance is subordinate to bravery, it is only ever chosen as a second choice, when one's impulse to act bravely cannot be chosen. However, endurance is not always joined to bravery in this way, sometimes Homeric man endures not to be brave, but as the only courageous choice he has.

As outlined in the previous chapter, when the verb *τλάω* is used to denote bearing-pain endurance, it is found in its absolute form, and commonly in the imperative. There are five main distinguishing features of bearing-pain endurance as denoted by *τλάω*. As noted above, the endurance of gods in Homer is almost exclusively bearing-pain endurance,<sup>449</sup> and it is the only type of endurance attributed to mortal women in the

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<sup>449</sup> Odysseus demands that both Circe and Calypso to endure by resolving to swear an oath, that is, through resolution to act endurance (*τλαίης ... ὁμόσσαι*) at *Od.* 5.178 and 10.343.

epics.<sup>450</sup> It is the only type of endurance that can be purely passive and purely moral. And, finally, of all the three types of endurance, bearing pain is the kind of endurance most frequently accompanied by references to necessity.

Of the forty-one instances of *τέλω* in the *Iliad*, ten denote bearing-pain endurance, and all but two of these<sup>451</sup> denote endurance by the gods of sufferings inflicted on them both by mortals and by other gods.<sup>452</sup> Five of these nine occur in *Iliad* 5 in Dione's consolation of Aphrodite after Diomedes wounds her in battle. Dione says to Aphrodite: 'Have patience, my child, and endure it, though you be saddened [τέτλαθι, τέκνον ἐμόν, καὶ ἀνάσχεο κηδομένη περ]. For many of us who have our homes on Olympos endure things from men [τληῖμεν ... ἐξ ἀνδρῶν], when ourselves we inflict hard pains on each other [χαλέπ' ἄλγε' ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισι τιθέντες]' (*Il.* 5.382-384). She consoles Aphrodite, telling her that Ares had to endure (τληῖ) being kidnapped by mortals (*Il.* 5.385); and both Hera and Hades had to endure (τληῖ) being shot through the breast with arrows by mortals (*Il.* 5.392, 395). However, the gods also have to endure pains inflicted on them by one another. Thetis had to endure many grievous woes in her *phrenes* given her by Zeus (ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἧσιν ἀνέσχετο κήδεα λυγρά, *Il.* 18.430), including submitting (ἔτλην, *Il.* 18.433) to marriage with a mortal against her will. But most commonly, in the *Iliad*, the gods have to 'endure [τετληότες] the most horrible hurts, by each other's hatred, as [they] try to give favour to mortals' (*Il.* 5.873-874). An example of this can be seen in *Iliad* 1 when Hera, having quarreled with Zeus over Achilles, must bear the pain and endure the distress of Zeus' wrath (τέτλαθι ... καὶ ἀνάσχεο κηδομένη περ; *Il.* 1.586). These are examples of what Cook would term purely passive, and what Lawrence would term purely moral, endurance. The gods' endurance is not tactical, they do not endure by remaining passive in order to act at a later time, rather they endure through accepting their god-given lot. Accepting one's fate is the essence of bearing-pain endurance, and, as we have seen in these examples, the gods are not exempt from fate, but they too must accept their lot and they submit, as man must, to Zeus' will.

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<sup>450</sup> Women can, however, fail to endure through resolution to act endurance in the *Odyssey* at 4.716 (Penelope); 11.425 (Clytemnestra); 23.150 (Penelope).

<sup>451</sup> *Il.* 19.308; 24.49.

<sup>452</sup> *Il.* 1.586, 382, 383, 385, 392, 395, 873; 18.433; 19.308; & 24.49.

On the battleground of the *Iliad*, endurance through standing one's ground and through the resolution to act are the most frequently manifested forms of endurance. However, as we leave the *Iliad's* battleground behind, and move towards the domestic and enchanted realms of the *Odyssey*, bearing-pain endurance takes over as the most frequently manifested form of endurance. In the *Odyssey*, twenty-six of the forty-one instances of *τλάω* denote bearing-pain endurance.<sup>453</sup> Bearing-pain endurance is no longer monopolized by the gods, but is manifested only by mortals. In the *Odyssey* we also see bearing-pain endurance in a character's pursuit of his goal. The prime examples of this are in the narrations of Helen and Menelaus of what 'that strong man'<sup>454</sup> endured and accomplished [οἷον τόδ' ἔρεξε καὶ ἔτλη καρτερὸς ἀνὴρ] (*Od.* 4.242, 271).<sup>455</sup> First, Helen tells us that Odysseus endured by bearing the pain of flagellating himself and disguising dressing as a beggar, in order to perform the brave deed of infiltrating Trojan lines, and slaying a bunch of Trojans on his way back (*Od.* 4.240-258).<sup>456</sup> Second, Menelaus tells us of Odysseus heroic feat inside the Trojan horse, where he not only endured himself, but restrained the passionate impulses of Diomedes and Menelaus as well (*Od.* 4.266-289).<sup>457</sup>

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<sup>453</sup> *Od.* 1.288; 2.219; 3.209; 4.242, 271, 447, 459; 5.222; 6.190; 8.182; 9.435; 10.52, 53; 11.181, 350; 13.307; 16.37, 275; 18.135; 19.347; 20.18, 23, 311; 23.100, 168; 24.163.

<sup>454</sup> *Ὀδυσσεὺς ταλασίφρονός* (*Od.* 4.241, 270).

<sup>455</sup> On how the stories of Helen and Menelaus grant us insight not only into the character of Odysseus but also into the characters of the narrators themselves, see Olson, D. S. (1989). The Stories of Helen and Menelaus (*Odyssey* 4.240-89) and the Return of Odysseus. *The American Journal of Philology*, 110 (3), 387-94.

<sup>456</sup> Helen says: 'I could not tell you all the number nor could I name them, all that make up the exploits of enduring Odysseus [ὄσσοι Ὀδυσσεὺς ταλασίφρονός εἰσιν ἄεθλοι], but here is a task such as that strong man endured and accomplished [ἀλλ' οἷον τόδ' ἔρεξε καὶ ἔτλη καρτερὸς ἀνὴρ] in the Trojan country where you Achaeans suffered miseries [πάσχετε πῆματ' Ἀχαιοί]' (*Od.* 4.240-3).

<sup>457</sup> Menelaus tells how Helen tried to trick the Achaeans inside the Trojan horse into revealing themselves by imitating the voices of their wives. He says that 'Diomedes and I started up, both minded to go outside, or else to answer your voice from inside, but Odysseus pulled us back and held us, for all our eagerness [ἀλλ' Ὀδυσσεὺς κατέρυκε καὶ ἔσχεθεν ἱμένω περ]. Then all the other sons of the Achaeans were silent: there was only one, it was Antiklos, who was ready to answer, but Odysseus, brutally squeezing his mouth in the clutch of his powerful hands, held him, and so saved the lives of all the Achaeans until such time as Pallas Athene led you off from us' (*Od.* 4.282-9).

We saw in the discussion of bearing-pain endurance in the *Iliad* above, that the majority of instances of *τλάω* denoting this kind of endurance in the *Iliad* refer to the endurance of gods – Aphrodite, Ares, Hera, Hades, and Thetis – of sufferings inflicted on them by mortals as well as by each other. In our extensive examination of endurance in Homer, this is the first time that the enduring characters have been female. Out of the forty-one instances of *τλάω* in the *Iliad*, only in five of these is the endurance denoted manifested by a female character, and all of these female characters are goddesses.<sup>458</sup> The goddesses' endurance is all purely passive and purely moral. In the *Odyssey*, nine out of the forty-two instances of *τλάω* denote the endurance, or lack thereof, of female characters. Of these nine, four denote the bearing-pain endurance of mortal women. First, Penelope is said to bear the pain of her grief waiting for Odysseus with an enduring *thumos* (μένει τετληότι θυμῷ, *Od.* 11.181).<sup>459</sup> Second, to the disguised Odysseus' request for an old woman to wash his feet, an old woman who has endured in her *phrenes* as much as him, Penelope replies that she has one such woman, Eurycleia, who, while she has little strength, has *pukina phrenes*.<sup>460</sup> In the final two, Penelope is rebuked for her enduring *thumos*, for not going immediately to Odysseus when he reveals his true identity. It is for this reason that Telemachus rebukes Penelope for her hard *thumos* (cf. ἀπηνής, *Od.* 23.97), her enduring *thumos* (τετληότι θυμῷ, 23.168) and for her *kradiē*, which he says is harder than stone (κραδίη στερεωτέρη ἐστὶ λίθοιο, 23.100).<sup>461</sup> Penelope defends herself, replying that the reason she does not go to Odysseus is the *thumos* in her

<sup>458</sup> *Il.* 1.586; 5.382, 383, 392; & 18.433.

<sup>459</sup> For the endurance of Penelope, see: Foley, H. P. (1995). Penelope as Moral Agent. In B. Cohen (Ed.), *The Distaff Side: Representing the Female in Homer's Odyssey* (pp. 93-115). New York: Oxford University Press; and Fredricksmeyer, H. C. (1997). Penelope "Polutropos:" The Crux at *Odyssey* 23.218-24. *The American Journal of Philology*, 118 (4), 487-497.

<sup>460</sup> Odysseus says that he won't let anyone wash his feet 'not unless there is some aged and virtuous woman [γρηγύς ἔστι παλαιή, κεδνά ἰδυῖα] whose heart has had to endure as many troubles as mine has [ἴ τις δὴ τέτληκε τόσα φρεσὶν ὄσσα τ' ἐγὼ περ]' (*Od.* 19.347). And Penelope replies: 'I do have one woman, whose thoughts are prudent [πυκινὰ φρεσὶ] ... and she shall wash your feet, though she has little strength for it [ὀλιγηπελέουσα περ ἔμπης]. Come then circumspect [περίφρων] Eurycleia ...' (*Od.* 19.353-357)

<sup>461</sup> Telemachus rebukes Penelope: 'My mother, my harsh mother with the hard heart inside you [ἀπηνέα θυμὸν ἔχουσα], why do you withdraw so from my father, and do not sit beside him, and ask him questions and find about him? No other woman, with spirit as stubborn as yours [τετληότι θυμῷ; 23.168], would keep back as you are doing from her husband who, after much suffering came at last in the twentieth year back to his own country. But always you have a heart that is harder than stone within you [σοὶ δ' αἰεὶ κραδίη στερεωτέρη ἐστὶ λίθοιο]' (*Od.* 23.100).

chest is astonished (cf. τέθηπα, 23.105). Odysseus echoes Telemachus' words, rebuking Penelope for her hard *kēr* (κῆρ ἀτέραμνον, 167), her enduring *thumos* (τετληότι θυμῷ, 168), and the iron *ētor* within her *phrenes* (σιδήρεον ἐν φρεσὶ ἦτορ, 172).<sup>462</sup>

Mortal women in Homer can only endure by bearing pain. Of course, they can fail to endure in other ways, such as through the resolution to act. Of the five remaining instances of *tláō* denoting endurance of women in the *Odyssey*, three of these denote the failure of women's endurance through the resolution to act. Two of these denote Penelope's failure to endure: in *Odyssey* 4 Penelope is so overcome by grief upon learning that Telemachus has left that she is said to lack the *tlhmosónē* to sit on a chair (ἔτλη δίφρῳ ἐφέζεσθαι, *Od.* 4.716); and in *Odyssey* 23, it is speculated that, hearing the din from within the palace, someone outside would think that the hard-hearted (σχετλίη, *Od.* 23.150), Penelope lacked the *tlhmosónē* to keep house for Odysseus (οὐδ' ἔτλη εἶρυσθαι, *Od.* 23.151), and had married the best of the suitors. And finally, the shade of Agamemnon tells Odysseus in *Odyssey* 11 that, even while he was dying, Clytemnestra turned away from him and even lacked the *tlhmosónē* to close his eyes and mouth (ἔτλη ἐλλείν, *Od.* 11.425). As mentioned above, the only female characters who can endure in any other way than through bearing-pain in either the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*, are goddesses, who can endure through the resolution to act. Calypso (*Od.* 5.178) and Circe (*Od.* 10.343) resolve to swear oaths (τλαίης ὁμόσσαι) to Odysseus that they are not devising evil against him, and they both do so. However, as Odysseus demands that they swear these oaths to him, the endurance of Calypso and Circe is rendered somewhat ambiguous. Nevertheless, it is without doubt that the only way Homeric women can endure is through bearing-pain, and while Homeric goddesses mainly endure also by bearing pain, it is possible that they could also endure through the resolution to act.

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<sup>462</sup> Odysseus says to Penelope: 'The gods ... have made your heart more stubborn [κῆρ ἀτέραμνον] than for the rest of womankind. No other woman, with spirit as stubborn [τετληότι θυμῷ] as yours, would keep back as you are doing from her husband who, after much suffering, came at last in the twentieth year back to his own country. Come then, nurse, make me up a bed, so that I can use it here; for this woman has a heart of iron within her [σιδήρεον ἐν φρεσὶ ἦτορ]' (*Od.* 23.166-172).

Of all the three types of Homeric endurance, bearing-pain endurance is the endurance most frequently accompanied by references to necessity.<sup>463</sup> In the *Odyssey*, we hear numerous variations on this theme of divine fate, which are often accompanied by exhortations to endure, the most poignant of which is Odysseus' in *Odyssey* 18, with which this chapter began. Odysseus speaks of the supreme helplessness of man who, when he is young and the gods bestow blessings upon him, does not look to past and future to guide his actions. Such a man does many reckless (ἀτάσθαλος) things in his youth, yielding to (εἴκω) his *biē* and strength (κάρτος, *Od.* 18.139), under the fatal misapprehension that he will never suffer in the future. The lesson the wise soon learn, however, is to take the gifts of the gods in silence (σιγῇ δῶρα θεῶν ἔχοι), be they good or bad (142). Achilles' offers the most succinct articulation of these divine gifts in *Iliad* 24. He urges Priam to endure his grief (ἄνσχεο, 549), telling him that 'There are two urns that stand on the door-sill of Zeus. They are unlike for the gifts that they bestow: an urn of evils, an urn of blessings' (*Il.* 24.527-528); and he urges Priam to endure his grief. Nausicaaa and Telemachus also articulate man's endurance of his fate, and both expresses the necessity of this endurance with the term *χρή*.<sup>464</sup> Nausicaa's articulation of divine fate is closest to that of Achilles' in the *Iliad*. She says to Odysseus: 'My friend, since you seem not like a thoughtless man [οὔτ' ἄφρονοι], nor a mean one [οὔτε κακῶ], it is Zeus himself, the Olympian, who give people good fortune, to each single man, to the good and the bad, just as he wishes; and since he must have given you yours, you must even endure it [σὲ δὲ χρή τετλάμεν ἔμπης]' (*Od.* 6.187-190). Telemachus similarly expresses the necessity of enduring one's fate when he says: 'the gods have spun out no such strand of prosperity for me and my father. Now we must even have to endure it [νῦν δὲ χρή τετλάμεν ἔμπης]' (*Od.* 3.208-209).

<sup>463</sup> E.g., *Od.* 3.209; 6.190; & 13.307.

<sup>464</sup> Athena's exhortation to Odysseus to endure his sufferings upon returning to Ithaca is expressed in terms of necessity with the term *ἀνάγκη*. While Odysseus endures by bearing pain, his endurance is tactical, it is in pursuit of his goal of avenging himself on the suitors and restoring his household. Athena says that she has come to Odysseus 'to tell you all the troubles [κῆδε] you are destined [αἴσα] to suffer [ἀνασχέσθαι] in your well-wrought house; but you must, of necessity [ἀνάγκη], endure all [τετλάμεναι], and tell no one out of all the men and the women that you have come back from your wanderings, but you must endure much grief in silence [ἀλλὰ σιωπῇ πάσχειν ἄλγεα πολλά], standing and facing men in their violence [βίαις ὑποδέγμενος ἀνδρῶν]' (*Od.* 13.306-310)

When his enemy is bearing down upon him in battle, the hero stands his ground in order to fight bravely. When action would result in death, the hero bears the pain of passivity, waiting until the time for action is best. However, when Zeus takes from the urn of evils, rather than the urn of blessings, the hero does not bear the pain of these evils in order to perform some great deed in the future, but he submits to Zeus' will with an enduring *thumos*, because this is the only virtuous choice he has.

## CONCLUSION

Homeric man's passions rise up within his *thumos*, stirring and filling it like fierce winds and heavy ocean swells. As his thumotic passions are aroused, the multiplicity of intricate parts fitted closely together that make up sound *phrenes* pull even more tightly together, like a rank of soldiers standing shield against shield, the *phrenes* holding or supporting the *thumos* within them. As the potency of the thumotic passions intensifies, the *phrenes* strive to withstand the destructive force of the passions. As long as the *phrenes* resist their force, like the rock-cliff weathers the fierce storm winds, they remain undamaged. However, should the passions reach a state of excess, they undermine *phrenes* like hurricane winds and storm-bred waves battering a ship's sail; eventually submerging the ship entirely. As long as Homeric man's *phrenes* are not overcome in this way by the force of his passions, he is able to endure, bearing the pain of his passions rather than acting upon them. However, should his thumotic passions submerge his *phrenes*, Homeric man is unable to stand his ground, and fails to endure.

The crucial point in this process is the moment when the passions are aroused in Homeric man, the moment when the winds begin to stir and the waves begin to swell. Extraordinary psychological strength is required to be able to pause at this point, and engage in deliberation concerning the morally or prudentially superior course of action. Those like Nestor, with *phrenes* in their ideal condition of strong, solid, tightly-knit, steadfastness, are able to suspend the force of their passions at this point, to pause between the swell and the crash of their thumotic waves. In the decision-making scenes that we have examined, the first impulse to arise within Homeric man is the passionate impulse. Only the greatest heroes in Homer are able even to pause long enough before acting on their passionate impulses for the slightly delayed rational impulse to surface. And only a very few of these heroes are able to act upon their rational impulse, bearing the pain of their passions rather than yielding to them. Endurance is the capacity to act upon one's rational and passion-restraining impulse, a capacity that requires Homeric man to abstract himself from the present, and from his passions, and to have the presence of mind to consider both past and future in his deliberation.

Bravery and endurance are two different responses to the same thumotic passions. In order to be brave, Homeric man's *thumos* must be in its proper state of breathy, dynamic, flexible, vigorousness. It must be a *thumos* that can be filled, stirred, and aroused by the Homeric warrior's fierce thumotic passions. The hero's bravery consists in the union of external strength, might, and fighting prowess, with the internal psychological disposition to act without hesitation upon his fierce passions, in the situations in which the things that are most important to him are threatened. The hero's endurance consists in all of these things, but has one further prerequisite. He must have the capacity to act unhesitatingly and successfully upon his passions, as well as the capacity not to act as his *thumos* urges him, and the psychological strength and integrity to bear the pain of restraining his passions. In order to be enduring in Homer, the hero must first be brave. However, very few brave heroes are able to endure.

There are three different manifestations of the same internal disposition of endurance: standing one's ground, the resolution to act, and bearing-pain endurance. Homeric man endures his fear and restrains the impulse to flee by standing his ground in order to perform some imminent brave action. He endures through having the resolution to perform actions that require both bravery and the internal strength of endurance. While both of these manifestations are necessarily united with action, bearing-pain endurance can be united with action, but the union is not necessary. Homeric man may bear the pain of passivity in order to perform some brave and daring action when the time is optimal. However, when Zeus takes not from the urn of blessings but from the urn of evils, the hero does not bear the pain of these evils in order to perform some great deed in the future. Rather, the hero takes what is offered him in silence, submitting to Zeus' will with an enduring *thumos*.

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