

# **EMOTIONS AND THE LIMITS OF REASON**

**THE ROLE OF THE IMAGINATION IN  
EXPLAINING PATHOLOGICAL EMOTIONS**

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**Abstract:**

The principal aim of this thesis is to inquire into what causes emotional reactions. In particular I ask whether, or to what extent, singular emotional reactions are causally explained by the reasons given for them. I am particularly interested in the limits of rational explanations that people provide when they try to justify their emotions once confronted with criticism that their emotional reaction does not fit the situation in which they occur. I explore the possibility of such rational approaches and the extent to which they succeed or fail to explain emotions. My methodology in this inquiry consists in bringing three relatively isolated domains of philosophy to bear on each other: the philosophy of emotion, the philosophy of practical rationality, and the philosophy of psychoanalysis.

I argue that the philosophical explanations available in the literature, of both rationally fitting emotions and non-rational emotions, rely much too heavily on rational capacities. Indeed reason is seen as a panacea for all one's emotional ills. In my thesis I offer two novel departures from the standard accounts: in the first place I offer a causal explanation of emotions in terms of distinctive imaginative capacities that are *independent* of reason. Drawing on Freudian insights I propose that "imaginative associations" play a crucial role in explaining both non-rational and rational emotions; secondly, I argue that reason is often the *cause* of our emotional pathologies and that overcoming the subtle rationalism in the tradition is an important advance in self-understanding.

The "associative explanation" I propose belongs to the realm of singular causation and to the hitherto ignored category of the *empirical-non-scientific*. This, in turn, helps to explain the hopelessness of the controversy surrounding the status of psychoanalytic explanations and therapy. As my thesis shows, the question "Science or philosophy?" misses the solution that it is neither of these.

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## Introduction

The principal aim of this thesis is to inquire into what causes emotional reactions. In particular I ask whether, or to what extent, emotions are causally explained by the reasons given for them. I am particularly interested in the limits of rational explanations that people provide when they try to justify their emotions once confronted with criticism that their emotional reaction does not fit the situation in which they occur. I explore the possibility of such rational approaches and the extent to which they succeed or fail to explain emotions.

My methodology in this inquiry consists in bringing three relatively isolated domains of philosophy to bear on each other: the philosophy of emotion, the philosophy of practical rationality, and the philosophy of psychoanalysis. Combining these philosophical perspectives and the task of articulating the question of the rationality of emotions involves significant conceptual difficulties, mainly to do with the distinct terminologies of each field.

The philosophy of emotion does not use the terminology of reasons or reasoning. Furthermore, the philosophy of emotion is largely concerned with the ontological question regarding what emotions *are* rather than in the causal question about *what brings them about*. The philosophy of practical rationality, which deals with the formation of attitudes in general, does not distinguish between emotional attitudes and beliefs. One of the main challenges in discussing the rationality of emotions in particular consists in bridging these terminological gaps in those two areas of Anglo-American philosophy. This is the main task of the first chapter.

The philosophy of emotion recognizes certain emotions as particularly difficult to account for. Normally we expect people to alter their emotions once

confronted with rational criticism. We expect people to stop feeling afraid, for example, if they find out that the situation to which they emotionally reacted is not in fact dangerous. In other words, we expect emotions to be sensitive to reason. But some emotions are recalcitrant to reason. The question of the emotional symptom of recalcitrance is currently unanswered in the philosophy of emotion. Except for a few philosophers of emotion, whose accounts are presented in the second chapter, the philosophy of emotion is largely disconnected from the philosophy of psychoanalysis, the field that discusses psychological symptoms in general.

Turning to the philosophy of psychoanalysis in order to deal with the question of recalcitrance is itself not a straightforward matter. The philosophy of psychoanalysis does not usually deal directly with distinctively emotional symptoms, even if emotions, as I show in the second chapter, are at the heart of the psychoanalytic account of the formation of symptoms. Furthermore, the philosophy of psychoanalysis uses distinctive psychoanalytic terminology (such as the Id, the Ego and Super-Ego). One of the main challenges in bringing psychoanalysis to bear on the question of emotions is thus to translate the psychoanalytic terminology into that of practical rationality and to apply psychoanalytic accounts of symptoms in general to the case of emotion.

Another related challenge has to do with the traditional divide between analytic and continental philosophies. The terminology I develop in the first part of the thesis relies solely on Anglo-American texts. When discussing the philosophy of psychoanalysis, however, I engage with both Anglo-American and continental texts. The thesis thus challenges the contemporary isolation of the philosophy of psychoanalysis from the rest of philosophy as well as the traditional divide between Anglo-American and continental thought.

Perhaps the most difficult methodological challenge consists in turning to Freud's original texts in order to extract insights that are relevant to the question of emotion-formation. The general attitude toward Freud today consists in an admiring skepticism that renders him essentially irrelevant. Philosophy, psychology, common culture and even contemporary psychoanalysis regard Freud as an important historical figure whose relevant insights have been assimilated and whose theories and case studies have no credence in terms of scientific evidence. "Freud bashing" by figures such Adolf Grünbaum<sup>1</sup> and recently of Frederic Crews is widely accepted.<sup>2</sup> Even in continental circles, where "Freud bashing" is considered politically incorrect, Freud is no longer seriously engaged with.

Freud famously conceived of himself as a scientist and of psychoanalysis as a natural science. He declared that "the intellect and the mind are objects for scientific research in exactly the same way as any non-human things. Psycho-analysis has a special right to speak for the scientific *Weltanschauung* [...]"<sup>3</sup> In light of Freud's self-conception, Freud has been declared a failed scientist and his psychoanalysis a pseudo-science. Alternatively, he has been conceived as an unsophisticated philosopher of psychology whose views lack consistency and coherence. This situation is a result of a chronic confusion about the status of psychoanalysis that has done significant damage to taking it seriously as an intellectual and therapeutic discipline.

I turn to Freud's texts then, in the wake of these criticisms and their aftermath. I do not use Freud as an authority or as the pioneer of a new science.

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<sup>1</sup> Adolf Grünbaum, *The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984)

<sup>2</sup> Frederick Crews et al., *The Memory Wars: Freud's Legacy in Dispute* [1995], (London UK: Granta Books, 1997).

<sup>3</sup> S. Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (1933[1932]), S.E. vol. 22, p. 159.

Rather, I read Freud's texts in order to recover certain insights that have been hitherto unappreciated and hence underexplored in this climate of Freud-skepticism. I agree that Freud's psychoanalysis is not a science, not even a social science. But I claim that an option of making sense of Freud's texts has been hitherto missed. Namely, although psychoanalysis does not qualify as a science and, as I will argue, it is not to be straightforwardly identified as philosophy, it may still have its own valuable status as something else. Getting clear on the status of psychoanalytic explanations is a philosophical matter, a task that I make a significant advance on in this thesis.

In that respect, philosophy and psychoanalysis can cooperate to solve their respective problems. The philosophical problem of recalcitrant emotions (and other emotional symptoms) requires the insights of Freudian psychoanalysis. In turn, mobilizing Freudian insights about the formation of emotions requires philosophy. Philosophy can do the necessary "ground clearing" in order to excavate the fruitful ideas from Freud's texts and clarify their status.

I do not engage in debates in Freud scholarship. Instead, my "ground clearing" methodology relies on philosophical arguments well known in the literature. My reading of Freud's text aims to clear them from two main ideologies that are widely ascribed to them. The first is Freud's reductive ambition to talk about the mind in either biological or physical terms. As I will shortly explain, I rely on arguments of the "liberal naturalists" that oppose such reductive approaches.<sup>4</sup> I will thus avoid talking about "drives" or about neurology. Instead I will always use

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<sup>4</sup> Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), *Naturalism in Question* [2004] (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), *Naturalism and Normativity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

the terminology of everyday language we normally use to speak about our mental states and in particular about our emotions.

The second feature in Freud's writings that I want to dispense with has to do with the various "agencies" Freud seems to hypothesize within the "main" or conscious agency. I will thus avoid talking about *the* unconscious, as if it was an entity rather than a quality of mental states, or the Id, Ego and Super-Ego, to which Freud as well as philosophers of psychoanalysis attribute wants and wishes and purposes they act in various ways to achieve. In other words, I want to distance myself from any homuncular view of the mind that hypothesizes "little people" within us that have some kind of rational capacity. As will become clear in the thesis, I claim that reason is the privilege of rational subjects, of people with practical identities and the capacity to engage in first-personal deliberation. In this I follow the Kantians of today (such as Richard Moran and Christine Korsgaard) who claim that reasons are either consciously thought about, or can be easily brought to conscious deliberation.

My approach is thus one of rational reconstruction of Freud's insights and a re-assessment of the status of psychoanalytic explanations. Although I deal only with emotional symptoms and not with psychological symptoms in general, I nevertheless regard this thesis as a prolegomena to a new reading of Freud's texts in general.

Causation is a central issue in the inquiry of the thesis. Traditional accounts of causation go hand in hand with physicalism. According to physicalism, everything that exists is a posit of a physical theory and obeys causal laws. Everything else, including the objects and causes studied in other sciences or the objects and causes

we talk about in ordinary language – is ontologically reducible to the objects and objects of physics, even if ordinary language cannot be translated to the language of physics.<sup>5</sup>

Everyday language thus does not pick out the relevant causal factor in the right way. It may be difficult or even impossible to articulate the causal occurrences of everyday life in the language of physics, but properly speaking, causation belongs only to the level describable by physics. Physicalism thus goes hand in hand with what has been called “causal fundamentalism,” the idea that there is a unique causal order in nature that is the task of physics to articulate. Physicalism and causal fundamentalism were once orthodoxy, and are still widely held. And until recently, it seemed that the only way to avoid these commitments was to propound some form of supernaturalism.

But one does not need to be a physicalist or a causal fundamentalist in order to be a naturalist. The most plausible form of naturalism, which I adopt, takes the plurality of the sciences at face value. Liberal naturalism takes seriously the plurality of the kinds of objects to which the various sciences are committed, as well as the plurality of various forms of explanation within the various sciences and ordinary discourse. Once we acknowledge the plurality of scientific practices, we can also acknowledge causal pluralism. As David Macarthur says:

Some of the most exciting recent work on causation suggests that we see causation as having close conceptual ties to explanation and explanatory contexts. Such an account of causation poses a significant

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<sup>5</sup> Donald Davidson, “Mental Events [1970].” In *Essays on Actions and Events* [1980], 2nd Ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 207-224.

challenge to causal fundamentalism by lending strong support to the doctrine of causal pluralism. If causal talk is always understood relative to background explanatory context the fact that there are different levels of explanation implies that there can be a plurality of complete causal explanations for the same event.<sup>6</sup>

In other words, liberal naturalism does not privilege causation at the physical level, as if physical causes are the only “real” causes. The same event may be causally explained by various explanatory practices, each of which would account for an aspect of the event that is describable in terms of that specific practice. Furthermore, I do not assume that causation must be nomological.

In this thesis, I rely on the account of causal explanation advocated by James Woodward, which makes allowance for causal pluralism and singular causation. Woodward talks about the singular “why-explanation” for the occurrence of a particular event.<sup>7</sup> When providing such an explanation, we focus on a certain description of the event or a certain aspect of that description, which we aim to explain. What we identify as a cause for that aspect is something that “made a difference for” the occurrence of the event.<sup>8</sup> Without that identified cause, the event would either have not occurred at all or would have been different in some specified respect. As Woodward says:

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<sup>6</sup> David Macarthur, “Taking the Human Sciences Seriously.” In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur, (eds.), *Naturalism and Normativity*, pp. 123-141, p. 130.

<sup>7</sup> James Woodward, “A Theory of Singular Causal Explanation,” *Erkenntnis*, vol. 21 (1984), pp. 231-262, pp. 231-232.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 236.

Singular causal explanations wear the source of their explanatory efficacy on their face – they explain not because they tacitly invoke a “hidden” law or statement of sufficient conditions, but because they identify conditions such that changes in these conditions would make a difference for whether the explanandum-phenomenon or some specified alternatives to it would ensue.<sup>9</sup>

This is an interventionalist account of causation. Namely, whenever one can ask about a particular condition the “what-if-things-had-been-different” question, one can talk about causation. And that question can be asked within a plurality of our explanatory practices using different vocabularies. As Woodward shows, this interventionalist account of singular causation suits natural scientific explanations, where we find a “generalized analogue of the explanation-making features which we attribute[.] to singular causal explanations.”<sup>10</sup> But it also fits explanations of the social sciences, where there are localized generalizations rather than nomological laws.<sup>11</sup>

Woodward’s account of singular causation, as I show in the thesis, also applies to psychological explanation at the level of commonsense everyday language. There too, we can ask and answer the “what-if-things-had-been-different” question. However, psychological events such as emotional reactions occur as a result of many factors, social and individual, that may include many details of the agent’s singular biography. The causes for each such action are singular in the sense

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<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 237.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 239.

<sup>11</sup> See James Woodward, “Explanations and Invariance in the Special Sciences,” *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, vol. 51 no. 2 (June 2000), pp. 197-254.

that they are not reproducible and do not lend themselves to laws or generalizations.

If science is a practice, which studies law-like causal relations between kinds of objects or causal generalizations (whether local or global) over classes of objects, then singular psychological causal explanations are non-scientific. This does not make them supernatural. In contrast to the orthodox view of causal fundamentalism and physicalism, contemporary liberal naturalism admits that everyday language can pick out relevant causes just as our ordinary practices assume (for example, when we explain to one another how our emotions could have been different if some other causal factor was in place).

Emotions may often be scientifically explored on various levels of description: the physiological, the social, biological and the evolutionary.<sup>12</sup> Each kind of explanation will causally explain a certain aspect of emotions. But I set aside these scientific levels of explanation. I am concerned only with the psychological level of description *at the person level*, which accounts for the particularities of the intentional content of a particular emotional reaction, where that “content” is expressed in everyday vocabulary. My aim in the thesis is to examine how those particularities of singular emotional reactions come about.

My terrain is of singular and non-scientific explanation. When it comes to human emotional life, the singular occurrences that we can and do explain in our practices are too subjective, too idiosyncratic, too dependent on the particular subject’s biography and self-image – to be generalizable across many people. In fact,

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<sup>12</sup> For discussion on scientific studies of emotions see for example: Paul D. MacLean, “Sensory and Receptive Factors in Emotional Functions of the Triune Brain.” In Amélie Oxenberg Rorty (ed.), *Explaining Emotions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 9-36; James R. Averill, “Emotion and Anxiety: Sociocultural, Biological, and Psychological Determinants.” In Amélie Rorty (ed.), *Explaining Emotions*, pp. 37-72.

even the same person may emotionally react differently to similar circumstances at various points in time.

The method of inquiry about the explanation of an emotional reaction does not qualify as scientific either, yet it is nevertheless empirical. The data for psychological explanation includes the introspectively available. Introspection is not the right method to search for objective truth, but as will explained and demonstrated in the thesis, it is a valid method for the inquiry of one's own psychological states. I therefore claim that this terrain of liberal-naturalist inquiry belongs to the overlooked category of the empirical-non-scientific.

In order to answer the question about emotion-formation, about what causes emotions, I do not inquire into the ontology of emotions, into what they *are*.<sup>13</sup> I also do not claim that by discovering what causes emotions I discover what they are; I do not reduce emotions to their causes. Instead, I rely on a commonsense understanding of emotions, which is in fact remarkably rich. Emotions are described by the emotion-type terms of ordinary language, such as anger, fear, shame, pride and guilt. Emotion-types are often associated with certain physiological feelings, some more than others. We further expect emotions to be about something, to have an intentional object, and if they do not, we judge the absence of an object as unsatisfactory.

Since the 1960's philosophers have regarded emotions as embedding judgment. For example, a subject is afraid because she judges the situation to be

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<sup>13</sup> See Paul Redding, *The Logic of Affect*. (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1999), chapter 1 for a historical review of the various ontological notions of emotions in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

dangerous.<sup>14</sup> Our ordinary practices demonstrate that we can be criticized for our emotions. We are sometimes required to justify our emotions and elicit our reasons for them. If it turns out that we are unjustified in having a particular emotion, that our emotion is somehow unfitting to the situation that gave rise to it or that the reasons we provide for our emotions are not good reasons – we are expected to change our emotional state. This shows that in our everyday practices emotions are or at least should be reason-sensitive.

In the first chapter, I explain in detail how regarding emotions as embedding judgment is equivalent to regarding emotions as embedding reason. That reason is not necessarily a good reason. It is not a reason in the sense of a proposition that stands in inferential relation to another proposition such that this inference is objectively and timelessly true. It is rather an “operative reason” or what the subject *takes* to be a consideration in favor of the emotion in question, at a certain moment in time. This operative reason – as *grasped* by the subject – is a psychological state, which causes the emotion at the psychological level of explanation, describable in terms of ordinary language. On some occasions then, the subject is aware of what she takes to be a reason for her emotion while experiencing and/or expressing that emotion.

The phenomenon I wish to critically examine is our pervasive tendency to rationalize our emotions involving cases where reasons are clear to the subject from the start and cases where reasons are retroactively elicited. These emotions are readily articulable. I call these collectively “reasoned emotions.”<sup>15</sup> Reasoned

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<sup>14</sup> See Paul E. Griffiths, *What Emotions Really Are* [1997]. (Chicago IL: Chicago University Press, 1998), Chapter 2, for a historical review of the origins as well as a critique of this account and its links with cognitive psychology.

<sup>15</sup> I thus do not discuss the very important that we do not normally explain by reasons – namely love. Arguably, love is the most important emotion that is implicitly involved in all emotions. It is

emotions such as “I am angry that John stole my car” are individuated by their intentional content, which is articulable in terms of everyday vocabulary. In this thesis, I investigate what brings about the particular details of the content of particular emotions.

The reasoned emotions I aim to explain are what George Pitcher called “occurrent emotions.”<sup>16</sup> Those are emotions that are currently experienced, namely emotional reactions to a here-and-now situation. Emotional reactions are individuated on the one hand by their intentional content, and on the other hand by the situation in which they occur. I will not attempt to explain more general or “dispositional emotions” such as “I am jealous that my colleague has a higher position than mine.”<sup>17</sup> Such emotions are individuated by their intentional content on the one hand, and by an ongoing relationship on the other hand. I will be concerned with such emotions, only insofar as they can become “occurrent” or insofar as they take part in the causal explanation of other occurrent emotions.

Occurrent emotions and their respective causal conditions are not reproducible and do not lend themselves to scientific testing. Yet, as will I try to show in the thesis, they can nevertheless be explained, that is, one can answer the “what-if-things-had-been-different” question for them. Although psychological explanations at the person level cannot be scientifically tested, I shall claim that they are introspectively available, to some extent, and that this renders them a *possible* and at times the plausible explanation.

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especially important in the process of identification through which a subject acquires practical identities, which in turn participate in the formation of all reasoned-emotions. A more comprehensive study of emotions should discuss love, but this topic lies beyond the scope of this thesis.

<sup>16</sup> George Pitcher, “Emotion,” *Mind*, New Series, vol. 74 no. 295 (Jul., 1965), pp. 326-346, p. 331.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 333

I divide “reasoned emotions” into two basic kinds: I call the first kind “operatively-rational emotions” that can, by and large, be explained by the reasons offered for them. These are emotions that are caused by the grasp of a reason, whether or not that reason is a good reason. When I say “operatively-rational emotions” I do not thus mean “successfully justified emotions.” They are “rational” only insofar as they were caused by the grasp of a reason and insofar as they can be changed through the grasp of another reason (that is, as a consequence of an endorsed criticism of the initial grasped reason). The second kind is “non-rational emotions” that were not caused by the grasp of a reason. The type of emotions that are most easily recognized as non-rational is recalcitrant emotions. These are emotions that the subject finds unjustified yet is unable to change – despite the often successful normative demand to alter emotions once the subject judges the reasons offered for them to be bad reasons.

I articulate the causal explanation for reasoned emotions in terms of two basic capacities: reason and imagination. I do not thereby revive the old-fashioned facultative psychology, which treats reason and imagination as two distinct faculties. Today, reason and imagination are often considered as intertwined in their operation, and when it comes to rational emotions (as discussed in chapter 1) this is indeed often the case.

There are many kinds of imaginative capacities discussed in the contemporary philosophical literature, and they are all described as working together with rational capacities.<sup>18</sup> Drawing on Freud’s texts, I introduce two additional imaginative capacities that I call the connective and the synthetic

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<sup>18</sup> Tamar Gendler, “Imagination”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition)*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/imagination/>>.

imagination, which I claim to be distinctively non-rational. These are associative imaginative capacities that have causal effects on emotional states and are completely independent of reason.

The notion of causal and non-rational associations of the imagination is familiar from the philosophical enterprise of David Hume. He posited associations that are: “[t]he non-rational operations of the mind, that is, those kinds of mental functioning which are explicable in terms of causes rather than reason.”<sup>19</sup>

The main difference between the associations I propose and Hume’s is that Hume’s associations, which Hume employs as a basic explanatory tool in his philosophy, are universal and are governed by principles common to all human subjects. Imaginative associations as I understand them, conversely, do not presuppose a universal Human Nature. They are, conversely, highly subjective and depend on the idiosyncratic imagination of each individual as well as their particular and irreproducible biography. They thus do not obey any laws of associations, as Hume’s associations were meant to obey.<sup>20</sup>

Hegel mocked Hume’s laws of associations. He claimed that imaginative associations are too capricious to follow any law:

The so-called *laws of the association of ideas* [...] are not laws, just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing, as to suggest a caprice and contingency opposed to the very nature of law.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Leslie Stevenson, “Twelve Conceptions of Imagination,” *British Journal of Aesthetics*, vol. 43 no. 3 (July 2003), pp. 238-259, p. 247.

<sup>20</sup> The account presented in this thesis and the methodology used bear similarities and differences to Hume’s philosophy. In future work, I shall explore these comparisons, which exceed the scope of this thesis.

<sup>21</sup> G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), §455; *Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind. Being Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*

And also:

The train of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacant-minded ideation.<sup>22</sup>

The existence of distinctively imaginative and lawless associations was thus acknowledged but also expelled from philosophical discussion whose proper realm is the realm of reason – its nature, scope and limits. Frege too argued that private associations have no place in rational inquiry, which aims for objective truth. But philosophy is also concerned with the limits of reasons. And this limitation has been encountered in the contemporary philosophy of emotions, in the attempt to explain recalcitrant emotions. The terrain of the inquiry of emotions, which belongs to the category of the empirical-non-scientific, is a terrain where distinctively non-rational imaginative associations play a crucial explanatory role.

I claim that Freud's most brilliant and revolutionary move was to take the private and lawless imaginative associations that philosophy threw away and put it in the center of inquiry into our emotional lives. In that respect, by mocking Hume's laws of associations, Hegel inadvertently discovered the lawless imaginative associations that are at the heart of psychoanalytic explanations. Similarly, Frege, who deliberately articulated his principles of inquiry so as to exclude private associations, has inadvertently provided the framework that can articulate the principles of inquiry into non-rational imaginative associations (as presented in the third chapter).

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(1830). Trans. W. Wallace, together with the *Zusätze* in Boumann's text (1845). Trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 206/262-3. Emphasis in original.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 207/263.

In fact, Freud's revolution is captured in his invention of a method of inquiry that gives voice to imaginative associations. The method known as "free association" (described in the sixth chapter) consists of one person saying whatever comes to their mind and another person listening, without any moral or social or rational judgment.

All accounts in the philosophy of psychoanalysis take recourse to imaginative associations and all practitioners use the method of free associations. But they invoke other Freudian ideas as well, such as narrative conceptions of the formation of symptoms and the consideration of symptoms as the fulfillment of unconscious wishes. As I argue in the fourth chapter, these extra claims entail homuncular conceptions of the unconscious mind, from which psychoanalysis should be cleared.

My main strategy is to see how much can be explained on the basis of the one Freudian insight that is common to all accounts, namely imaginative associations that operate unconsciously to produce the intentional content of manifest emotional symptoms. Without those additional and problematic Freudian ideas, imaginative associations retain their status as strictly non-rational, as they are not assumed to be mobilized by a quasi-rational unconscious with its own judgments, wants and purposive actions. In that respect, I appeal the principle of Occam's Razor not invoke explanatory resources beyond necessity.

Another Freudian insight I make use of in the thesis is the claim that we can learn about the normative and rational from the study of the pathological. My point of departure is not, however, the extremely mentally ill person (e.g. the psychotic). I am interested rather in the rational and normative person, who is surprised at her own non-rationality that is revealed in some of her particular emotional reactions. My claim is that we can learn something about operatively-rational emotions from

the causal explanation of the non-rational emotions of the otherwise rational and normative subjects. That is, I will claim that although operatively-rational emotions are indeed caused mainly by the grasp of operative reasons, imaginative associations also contribute to their formation.

The thesis follows a dialectic path:

Chapter 1 discusses the formation of what I call operatively-rational emotions. In this chapter, I inquire into the ontological claims of the two dominant rival accounts in the contemporary analytic philosophy of emotion: judgmentalism (e.g. Solomon) and “seeing as” accounts (e.g. Greenspan, Roberts). In order to examine how these accounts bear on the causal question, I turn to the philosophy of practical rationality (e.g. Scanlon, Korsgaard, Moran). My principal claims in this chapter are:

(1) The causal accounts implied by both dominant approaches are basically equivalent. Namely, operatively-rational emotional reactions are caused by operative reasons, by psychological states of taking something as a consideration in favor of the emotions. Operative reasons implicate social “norms of fittingness” (D’Arms & Jacobson) and the subject’s practical identity and are avowable in a manner that can make a difference to the subject’s emotional state.

(2) This rational account is rendered possible and at times plausible by empirical introspective awareness. One can be introspectively aware of taking the conclusions of one’s deliberation as an operative to reason to emote in a certain way. And, one is introspectively aware of how that process makes a difference to one’s emotional

state. Deliberation, like a reason, also has two aspects – the objectively rational reflection on the one hand, and psychological aspect on the other hand.

(3) Recalcitrant emotions cannot be explained by either of the dominant accounts. I conclude the first chapter with the claim that even operatively-rational emotions may not be caused by rational considerations alone, a claim that will be justified in the fifth chapter.

Chapter 2 considers three contemporary “seeing as” accounts that implicitly (A. Rorty) or explicitly (Lear, de Sousa) invoke Freudian psychoanalysis in order to explain pathological emotional patterns, including recalcitrant emotions. These accounts suggest developmental etiologies for dispositions to emote “un-fittingly” in certain characteristic circumstances. Crucially, these accounts rely on extended rational capacities. My main claim in this chapter is that these developmental accounts consist in the effective revival of Freud’s early account of neurosis, which traces a causal etiology to a “primal scene.” All these accounts are empirical-non-scientific. I claim that Freud’s and de Sousa’s accounts should be preferred to the other accounts, since they refer to memories, which in turn allow for introspective awareness. However, as claimed by Hacking, Ricoeur and later Freud, memories are not to be trusted. Hacking and Ricoeur suggest that symptoms are caused by distorted memories rather than by the events. Freud suggests a “regressive” causal factor, whereby memories are mobilized by a current conflict and are misleadingly seen as their primary cause. I conclude that purely developmental etiologies should be abandoned and that the “primal scene” is not as crucial as they claim. I suggest that de Sousa’s account may be both developmental and regressive.

Chapter 3 uses certain insights from the etiological accounts, while reducing even further the causal importance of the primal scene and of memories in general, in favor of unconscious emotions, which refer to memories only indirectly. Indeed, I claim that pathology partly consists in the over-emphasis of those emotions, and that they serve to symbolically capture other more general emotional issues of the subject. It is in this chapter where I begin to lay out and demonstrate what I call the “associative explanation.” I present an account of emotion-suppression by using the terminology of operative reasons developed in the first chapter. I introduce the imaginative capacities that are distinctively non-rational: the connective and synthetic imagination, which operate via “imaginative associations.” I articulate the principles of the unconscious imagination by tracing what Frege aimed at excluding from purely rational inquiry. The associative unconscious processes, which cause non-rational emotions, partly coincide with what Freud called “condensation” and “displacement” (these are what Freud “primary process” that are distinct from the “secondary processes” namely the processes of rational thought). I conclude the chapter with a criticism of the extended rational capacity assumed in de-Sousa’s account. The more precise articulation of the causal efficacy of imaginative associations is presented in chapter 5. Their introspective availability is presented in chapter 6.

Chapter 4 examines other accounts available in the literature of the philosophy of psychoanalysis that make use of condensation and displacement. These are the hermeneutic accounts of symptoms in general, which I apply to the case of distinctively emotional symptoms. I divide the hermeneutical accounts to two main groups – the historical approach (Ricoeur, Habermas) and the wish fulfillment

approach (Hopkins). My main claim in this chapter is that the hermeneutical accounts introduce further imaginative capacities that mobilize the imaginative unconscious processes of condensation and displacement. These further imaginative capacities, in turn, work in service of extended rational capacities ascribed to “*the unconscious*.” They thus unnecessarily invoke a homuncular view of the unconscious and provide an over rationalized account for emotional symptoms. In fact, the extended rationality of the hermeneutic explanation inadvertently reinforces the subject’s pathology.

Chapter 5 examines the singular causal status of imaginative associations. I turn to Freud’s causal insights from *The Interpretation of Dreams* and formulate an account for the singular causal operations of the connective and synthetic imagination. I then compare the associative explanation proposed in this thesis with contemporary “network theories” in empirical psychology (Bower). Through this comparison I answer a few objections to the associative explanation, including the question about the compatibility of associative networks with the operative-reason-explanation for operatively-rational emotion. I there claim that the associative explanation partly contributes to the explanation of operatively-rational emotions.

Chapter 6 presents the introspective availability of the associative explanation, which renders it a possible explanation and at times the plausible explanation for a symptomatic emotional reaction. I describe the empirical-non-scientific methods of inquiry used in analysis, and claim that it cannot be purely third-personal (in contrast to Robert Pippin and early Freud). Free-association identifies the unconscious emotions, which are symbolically represented in the symptom.

“Working through” enables the patient to express their hitherto suppressed emotions. The emotional-associative network is thereby expanded to include more emotions than the ones symbolically represented in the symptom. This process can be therapeutic precisely because it relieves the over-emphasis of a few emotions and the few memories to which they relate. Psychoanalytic inquiry and therapy is enabled by the patient’s rational decision to take a “rational-judgmental holiday,” whereby one first-personally accepts the limits of reason in the explanation of one’s complex emotional life.

## Chapter 1:

### **Operative Reasons: The Causal Explanation for “Operatively-Rational Emotions”**

As stated in the introduction, the emotions whose causal explanation concerns me in this thesis are those that are readily articulable by the emoting subject. I aim to explain only “occurrent” emotions, as Pitcher called them, namely singular emotional reactions that occur in a certain here-and-now situation. These emotions can be rationally reconstructed in the form of a propositional attitude such as “I am angry that p.”

In this chapter I examine the contemporary philosophy of emotion, which is largely concerned with the question regarding what emotions *are*, and examine how they bear on the causal question regarding the formation of singular emotional reactions. My methodology consists in turning to the philosophy of practical rationality that is explicitly concerned with the formation of propositional attitudes in general.

The philosophy of practical rationality groups together beliefs, intentions and emotion-attitudes. There are important and useful analogies between those various kinds of attitudes, which allow me to articulate the psychological explanation of a certain kind of emotions by appropriating the reason terminology of the philosophy of practical rationality. These are singular emotional reactions whose formation is rational in a very particular sense that will be explained in this chapter.

But the philosophy of practical rationality does not have sufficient conceptual resources to account for the formation of emotions, even when that formation is rational in a certain respect. This is due to the limitations of the analogies between

emotional-attitudes, beliefs and intentions. This chapter takes as its task to bring together the terminology of the emotion literature and the terminology of practical rationality so as to propose a causal account for a certain class of emotions, which I call “the operatively-rational emotions” (for reasons that will become clear in the first section of this chapter). By and large, these are emotions that we either judge as reasonable and fitting the situation in which they occur, or emotions that we are able to change in response to rational criticism.

In the first section, I describe the view called “judgmentalism,” according to which emotions are judgments about a certain aspect of the here-and-now situation or rather about a certain object in the situation. I articulate the causal account that is implicit in judgmentalism by recourse to the terminology from the philosophy of practical rationality.

In the second section I present three main objections against judgmentalism as an account about what emotions are, and “translate” them into objections about the causal account presented in the first section. Answering the first two objections consists mostly in refining and further explicating the judgmentalist approach. Not all objections can be answered. In particular, emotional reactions that persist despite the subject’s explicit judgment against them, namely recalcitrant emotions, are left un-accounted for.

In that section I also compare the causal account implicit in judgmentalism to the one that is implicit in quasi-judgmentalism or the “seeing as” approach. These approaches are different insofar as they propose an account as to what emotions are. They are, however, equivalent, insofar as their implicit causal account is concerned. But in this comparison I exclude three important “seeing as” accounts

that have explicit explanatory purposes. These are the accounts of Amélie Rorty, Ronald de Sousa and Jonathan Lear, which will be separately discussed in chapter 2.

In the third and last section I present Richard Moran's account of first-personal avowal and disavowal of propositional attitudes. This account presents a very specific class of emotions that fit the judgmentalist approach, namely singular emotional reactions that are reflectively endorsed in judgment. Moran's account is meant to apply to all attitudes, namely beliefs, intentions and emotions. I thus re-articulate his account in the terminology developed throughout the chapter and thus partly modify his account to apply to the case of emotional attitudes, as distinct from beliefs and intentions. I conclude this chapter with the claim that the judgmentalist approach provides a possible and at times a plausible causal account for the class of operatively-rational emotions.

I emphasize that the psychological explanation I am concerned with in this chapter and in this thesis is a singular psychological explanation for singular emotional reactions at the person level. I do *not* deal with the science of psychology that is engaged with statistical studies about how people (from a certain social niche) would react to typical situations. In other words, I aim to describe the causal story of the formation of a singular emotional reaction of *an individual subject* to a specific here-and-now situation.

## 1. The Judgmentalist Approach

In this section I present the judgmentalist account as to what emotions are, and articulate its implicit causal explanation for emotional reactions. I choose Robert Solomon as the representative of the judgmentalist approach.<sup>23</sup> His account is particularly compelling and is often referred to in the emotion literature.

In the elucidation and the elaboration of Solomon's judgmentalism, I shall refer to Charles Taylor, who holds a similar view,<sup>24</sup> and to D'Arms and Jacobson, who, although not "pure" judgmentalists, nevertheless accept and reformulate the insights of judgmentalism.<sup>25</sup>

Solomon's analogy between emotional attitudes as judgments and beliefs allows me propose an account for the formation of an emotional attitude that is akin to the formation of beliefs. I thus turn to T.M. Scanlon and examine how his arguments and terminology can be used to formulate the proposed account for emotions.

The result of this section will be a judgmentalist causal explanation for certain emotional reactions, which I call the "operative-reason-explanation." This account will be further modified and elucidated in the next section.

### A. Judgmentalism: Emotions as Judgments

Solomon's point of departure is the intentionality of emotions. Emotions are intentional, since they are normally directed at a certain person or thing or

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<sup>23</sup> However, I will claim later, that Solomon is not a "crude" judgmentalist, and that indeed, as far as I can tell, nobody is.

<sup>24</sup> It is perhaps of interest to note, that although Charles Taylor's view on emotions has in many ways anticipated current discussions on emotions, he is hardly ever referred to in the literature, with the exception of Richard Moran.

<sup>25</sup> Their approach is discussed in the appendix to chapter 3.

situation.<sup>26</sup> That is, “emotions are ‘about’ something.”<sup>27</sup> Call what the emotion is about the “intentional object” of the emotion. An emotional reaction can be articulated in the form of a propositional attitude such as “I am angry *that* John stole my car.”

Now Solomon says the intentional object of the emotional reaction is the proposition itself. As he admits, the proposition is indeed a “strange” object.<sup>28</sup> There is no need to assume an ontology of abstract objects such as propositions in order to talk of the intentionality of emotions. The emotion is directed at an actual here-and-now object (John), and the respect in which that object provokes the emotion is described by the proposition (that John stole my car). The proposition thus provides the intentional content of the attitude.

Although Solomon talks of the propositions embedded in the attitude as the intentional objects of emotions, I will regard any mention of intentional objects as simply the actual objects the emotion is directed to, and the proposition as specifying the respect in which the emotion is directed at that object (like the respect in which I am angry with John, namely that he stole my car). So, when I say the emotional state is articulable in the form of a propositional attitude, I do not mean that the attitude is toward the proposition, but only that that the emotional reaction can be rationally reconstructed to include a “that” clause.

Solomon insists that in such cases, we should not decompose the emotion into two components – the feeling or affect, which in this example is anger, and what

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<sup>26</sup> Solomon does not insist that intentionality is an essential feature of emotions. He mentions moods like melancholia and euphoria, which on the face of it do not seem to be about anything in particular. Solomon puts the question of moods aside, and concentrates instead on intentional emotions. Robert Solomon, “Emotions and Choice.” In Amélie Rorty (ed.), *Explaining Emotions*, pp. 252-282, p. 252.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 258.

the anger is about. "An emotion cannot be identified apart from its object."<sup>29</sup> The emotion-type of anger, for example, requires an object. If someone just declares that they are angry, using only a term to designate the emotion-type they are feeling without any particular object, their declaration will seem insufficient. The natural response would be to ask them what they are angry about (or, as I will emphasize shortly, *why* are they angry). In other words, one is not just angry, one is angry *that...*

Taylor makes room for a possibility where a subject experiences an objectless emotion such as "a nameless dread, or unfocussed anxiety",<sup>30</sup> in which case she would genuinely report her emotion just with a term that designates a certain affect. But in such cases, Taylor claims, the subject feels the absence of the object as an insufficiency, namely the subject feels that there is no object where there should be. "The very structure of fear is that it is of something", says Taylor. The requirement for an object is thus a conceptual matter. Indeed, all the emotion-types that appear in Solomon's examples for intentional emotions have a structure that demands objects.<sup>31</sup>

I said before that a proposition specifies the respect in which the object is the object of the emotional reaction. In other words, the object is under description. Not any description will do. Other possible descriptions such as "John stole a vehicle assembled in Youngstown, Ohio, with 287 h.p." or "someone got his fingerprints on my steering column"<sup>32</sup> are not the descriptions under which I am angry with John.

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<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 253.

<sup>30</sup> Charles Taylor, "Self-Interpreting Animals." In *Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1* [1985]. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 45-76, p. 48.

<sup>31</sup> In fact, some moods seem to demand an object. If I feel sad or happy, without awareness of what I am sad or happy about, I may also feel the absence of an object as a lack.

<sup>32</sup> Solomon, "Emotions and Choice," p. 253.

The emotion picks or addresses a specific description of John or of the situation insofar as it provokes the anger.<sup>33</sup>

Solomon notes, that in this respect, emotional attitudes are similar to beliefs. Beliefs too are directed at a certain description of the object they are about. This is true insofar as articulated or avowed beliefs are concerned. When I say I believe that the sun is shining I have an attitude of belief toward an object that is under description. However, when somebody else ascribes to me an implicit belief such as the belief that Obama is the greatest US president ever, based on the evidence that I have often spoken highly of him, I can qualify the description and say I just think he is best president in the last 50 years.

Indeed it seems that the emotional attitudes Solomon discusses are either articulated or readily articulable emotions. Articulable emotions, just like avowed beliefs, are about something that is under description. And that description, Solomon adds, is “determined by the emotion itself.”<sup>34</sup> In other words, the description of what the emotion is about is intertwined with the emotion. The emotional attitude, just like avowed beliefs, is articulable such that it *embeds* a proposition.

The analogy Solomon draws between beliefs and emotions goes further than noting that both have the structure of propositional attitudes. Emotions, he claims,

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<sup>33</sup> Solomon talks about these descriptions as equivalent insofar as they articulate the same fact, and as importantly different insofar as only one of them articulates the object of the emotion (since for Solomon, as mentioned before, the object of the emotion is the proposition itself, which ultimately describes a fact, although an affect-laden fact, as will soon be explained). However, facts themselves are also under description. Solomon should have talked about the difference between a mere state of affairs and its various descriptions, only one of which is the object of the emotion. And furthermore, the proposition embedded in the attitude is a fact (affect-laden fact), only if the proposition is true. In any case, I modify the argument such that the object of the emotion is not a description per se (affective description) or a proposition, but an actual object under description, whether or not that description indeed picks out a fact.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 253.

are normative judgments. They thus entail a belief.<sup>35</sup> For example, the emotional attitude “I am angry that you are late” entails the belief that you have wronged me. Your being late is not just a described object but also a judged object. That is, your being late is judged to be a wrong that I suffered.

Solomon gives examples: “If I do not find my situation awkward, I cannot be ashamed or embarrassed. If I do not judge that I have suffered a loss, I cannot be sad or jealous.”<sup>36</sup> These examples are very general. They do not consider a specific emotional attitude. Rather they seem to be about very general emotion-types, about shame, embarrassment, sadness and jealousy – generally.

Implicit in Solomon’s claim that emotions are judgments, are certain short characterizations of general emotion-types and their general objects. They are sometimes referred to in the literature as the “formal objects” for emotions. As Annette Baier says, “we will distinguish as many formal objects as we distinguish different emotion types.”<sup>37</sup> As an example she identifies the formal object of disgust as the unpalatable.<sup>38</sup> If there are indeed such formal objects, then the emotion-judgment consists in judging that the specific here-and-now intentional object *falls under* or belongs to the class designated by the formal object of the relevant emotion-type.

However, since Solomon talks about those judgments as normative, and since norms are more flexible than laws (as I will shortly explain), I will not use the term “formal objects.” Instead, I will follow D’Arms and Jacobson and call these short

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<sup>35</sup> It seems that Solomon uses the terms “judgment” and “belief” interchangeably.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 258.

<sup>37</sup> Annette Baier, “What Emotions Are About,” *Philosophical Perspectives*, vol. 4 (1990), pp. 1-29, p. 5.

<sup>38</sup> Baier, “What Emotions Are About”, p. 5.

descriptions of the general objects of emotions “rough-and-ready” characterizations.<sup>39</sup> I will further explicate this preference in the next sub-section.

I thus interpret the judgment Solomon is talking about to be the judgment that the particular described propositional object *fits* the general rough-and-ready characterization of an emotion-type. It is not, however, as if we first perceive the object under description and then judge it to be a particular case that fits a rough-and-ready characterization. If that were the case, we could separate the emotion-type or the affect-term (the feeling) from its intentional object, and say that the perception of the object is one thing, and the feeling another.

But Solomon insists, and I think his insistence is in tune with experience, that the emotion is intertwined with its intentional content. Although one may not know immediately what one is angry about, the emotions Solomon talks about, and the emotions I discuss in the thesis, are those for which one can relatively easily realize what they are about. The described object is thus already presented under that judgment. As Solomon says: “It is not an object *about* which one makes a judgment, but [the object] is rather defined, in part, by that normative judgment.”<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 61 no. 1 (Jul., 2000), pp. 65-90, for example pp. 67, 73, 80. Also see Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism).” In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), *Philosophy and the Emotions*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 127-146, pp. 136, 145.

<sup>40</sup> Solomon, “Emotions and Choice,” p. 258. Solomon was criticized by Robert Roberts for a similar statement of Solomon in *The Passions*, where Solomon wrote: “one does not become angry because the comment *is* offensive; the comment is offensive by virtue of being an object for anger.” Quoted by Roberts in Robert Roberts, “Solomon on the Control of Emotions,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 44 no. 3 (Mar., 1984), pp. 395-403, p. 396. Roberts’ criticism is that the angry judgment does not make a comment offensive just as the judgment “guilty” does not make the defendant a thief. *Ibid* pp. 396-397. In other words, Roberts ascribes to Solomon the claim that the anger-judgment makes the comment offensive, as if otherwise it would not be. Roberts writes: “To say that a remark about my mother is offensive because I am angered by it (in Solomon’s terms, because I judge it to be offensive) is to get things just backwards: I judge the remark to be offensive (and thus am angry) because it seems to me to meet *standards* of offensiveness and these did not originate with me. These standards arise from a tradition, or from human nature, or from I know not where; but one thing I know is that *I* did not create them. The remark *is* offensive by those standards, and I did not constitute it as such.” *Ibid* pp. 397-398, emphasis in original. But Solomon calls the judgments in

## **B. The Causal Story for the Formation of Emotions Implied by Judgmentalism: Operative Reasons as Psychological Causes**

In order to examine what is the causal story implied by judgmentalism I ask the following question: If emotions are judgments that are akin to beliefs, then how does a subject come to make that judgment? This is a psychological question. Judgments of beliefs, in general, are the result of the subject's taking certain considerations as reasons to have that belief. An emotion-judgment is thus the result of the subject's *taking* the description of the situation or of an object in the situation *as a consideration in favor of* having that particular emotion-type.

That is, if I am angry that p, it is because I take p to be a *reason* for my anger. In fact, I take p to be a good reason for my anger, and as I emote I feel justified in my reaction. The intentional content of my angry attitude is what I take to be a reason for that attitude. This may not necessarily be a good reason that would survive reflective assessment. Say I am angry that my friend was five minutes late for our meeting, my friend may ask me: "*why* are so angry? Five minutes of a delay is not a good reason to be so angry." I will discuss the nature of such psychological reasons below.

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question "normative", thus implying such standards, on which I shall soon elaborate. Also, as will be explained in the second section, Solomon recognizes that one can judge a comment offensive without getting offended. Perhaps Solomon is not so clear at times, but he could nevertheless be more charitably interpreted. "Offensive" can mean "objectively offensive," but the emotion-judgment constitutes the comment as "subjectively offensive" or "offensive – to me," whether or not the comment is objectively offensive. The analogy between an emotional judgment and a legal judgment could be differently interpreted (even if that is not what Solomon had in mind, which is rather probably what Roberts ascribes to him *ibid* p. 397). Whether the defendant stole or not is a matter of fact, just as whether or not the comment is offensive is matter of objective normative standards. But whether or not the defendant is guilty, as a matter of being actually convicted, is up to the judge, just as whether or not the comment is offensive to me is up to me. "Guilty" can also be used in two meanings: either "guilty of" doing something wrong or "guilty as charged," namely convicted. Indeed, as will be discussed in section 1B, there is a "getting it wrong" in both cases. I may be offended by a comment that does not objectively fit the standards of offensiveness, and someone may be "guilty as charged" while not being objectively guilty of any crime.

First I want to note that this analysis might seem to re-install the separation between the description of the object and the judgment that this object, under that description, fits the emotion-type. But this de-composing interpretation is avoided once we spell out how the description of the object provides the subject with a consideration in favor of the emotional attitude.

The description under which the object is the object of the emotional reaction is taken to be the reason for the emotion, exactly because that description has an *emotional significance* for the subject. Charles Taylor emphasizes the same point. He says that the object of an emotion is a description not just of the situation in general, but of our *sense* of the situation as having an emotional “import.” And it is that import that gives basis to the emotion, namely, why the subject takes the (emotionally significant) description as a reason to emote.

By ‘import’ I mean a way in which something can be relevant or of importance to the desires or purposes or aspirations or feelings of subject; or otherwise put, a property of something whereby it is a matter of non-indifference to a subject. [...] In identifying the import of a given situation we are picking out what in the situation gives the grounds or basis of our feelings, or what could give such ground, or perhaps should give such grounds if we feel nothing or have inappropriate feelings.<sup>41</sup>

The import of the situation then, is the description of what is emotionally relevant in the situation. These are beliefs about or interpretations of the situation

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<sup>41</sup> Taylor, “Self-Interpreting Animals,” p. 48-49.

that are emotionally significant to the subject, which are taken as reasons to emote in certain ways. What a subject takes to be a reason to emote is thus already emotionally laden, and so there is no strict separation between the description of the object and the emotion.

The subject would count such a description as reasons for an emotion once she judges that description, to speak like Solomon, to be a particular case of the rough-and-ready characterization of that emotion. To say it differently, for the import of the situation to provide reasons for an emotion, these reasons have to refer to certain norms about that emotion.

Taking an interpretation of the situation to be a reason to emote involves bringing the consideration under norms (as conceived by the subject, as will be explained in section 1C). That is why Solomon calls these judgments “normative.” The norms in question match certain emotion-types to certain generally-described circumstances. One such norm is that anger fits the situation of having been wronged. The rough-and-ready characterizations of the objects of emotion-types provide or rather simply are those norms. D’Arms and Jacobson call these norms “norms of fittingness.”<sup>42</sup> I will return to the issue of what kind of normativity is here involved later.

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<sup>42</sup> D’Arms and Jacobson, “Recalcitrant Emotion,” p. 132; D’Arms and Jacobson, “Moralistic Fallacy,” p. 74. For D’Arms and Jacobson, however, these norms or standards of fittingness are applied in judgment only after the emotional reaction is already present. “Crudely put, considerations of fittingness are all and only those considerations about whether to feel shame, amusement, fear, and so forth that bear on whether the emotion’s evaluation of the circumstances gets it right: whether the situation really is shameful, funny, fearsome, and so forth.” D’Arms and Jacobson, “Recalcitrant Emotion,” p. 132. However, as will be explained in the appendix to chapter 3, D’Arms and Jacobson are ambivalent on this point. For Solomon and Taylor, in any case, the reference to those norms (or rather to the way the subject conceives those norms) is already implied in the very formation of the emotional reaction, prior to any further assessment.

When I talk about the reasons that a subject takes as a consideration in favor of an emotional attitude, I am not talking about reasons as abstracted from a particular subject's psychology. That is, I am not talking about reasons that stand in an objectively valid inferential relation to other reason or true propositions. Scanlon makes the distinction between what one takes to be a reason and good reason for the case of belief, which he sees as analogous to the case of emotional attitudes (for Scanlon, as for other philosophers of practical rationality, emotions, beliefs and intentions are all attitudes that are analogical to one another)<sup>43</sup>:

There is a difference between asking what reason there is for believing that P and asking what a given person's reason for believing it was. (I will refer to the latter as the person's operative reason.) Both of these questions have to do with what I am calling "reasons in the standard normative sense." The first asks for an assessment of the grounds for taking P to be the case, while the second asks what, as a matter of biographical fact, Jones took to be a reason for believing it.<sup>44</sup>

The reasons I will be talking about in this thesis will *always* be operative reasons, what the subject takes to be a reason, "a consideration that counts in favor of"<sup>45</sup> a certain emotional reaction. The subject takes that reason to be a good reason – even if further objective scrutiny may reveal that it was in fact a bad reason. The

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<sup>43</sup> Scanlon's explicitly says that his account of reasons and reasoning is not just for belief and intentions but also of hopes, fears and other emotional attitudes like respect, anger, admiration, contempt and indignation. He calls them all "judgment-sensitive attitudes". T.M. Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 18, 19, 20, 23.

<sup>44</sup> Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other*, p. 19.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

*grasp* of an operative reason is a psychological state that causes the subject to have another psychological state, namely the emotion (or the belief).

There is no need, claims Scanlon, to suppose that this grasp of an operative reason, that this psychological state, must correspond to some other kind of state that is admissible as a cause by the scientific worldview. There is thus no need to go through the trouble and investigate how the grasp of a reason can qualify as a scientific cause. Psychological states cause other psychological states without passing through, so to speak, some “deeper” or scientific level of causation. The grasp of an operative reason to emote causes an emotion; the grasp of an operative reason to believe causes the belief; and the grasp of an operative reason to act causes the formation of an intention and thereby the action; and all these causes are at the psychological level of description. As Scanlon explains elsewhere:

The difficulty here is not a problem about how to fit the idea of reason or the relation ‘counting in favor of’ into a scientific worldview. Our beliefs about reasons, if they are beliefs, need not be caused by interaction with this relation. Nor need this relation be causally active in producing actions. It is an agent’s *acceptance* of a judgment about the reasons he or she has that does this. Such acceptance, whether it amounts to belief or not, is a psychological state, and the kind of thing that figures in ordinary psychological explanations.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> T. M. Scanlon, “Metaphysics and Morals [2003].” In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), *Naturalism and Normativity*, pp. 173-192, p. 179.

Scanlon is thus a causal pluralist, who accepts causation at the *ordinary* psychological level without the need to reduce it to a scientific causal order. Ordinary psychological explanations are causal explanations of *singular* psychological states at the psychological level of description at the person level. In other words, reasons can be causes in a relatively straightforward matter. Their grasp or subjective acceptance as good reasons (what Scanlon describes as the acceptance of a judgment about reasons in the above quote) is a psychological state that qualifies as a psychological cause. Grasped operative reasons thus cause the attitude.

The difficulty, according to Scanlon, lies elsewhere. The question is how one causally moves from grasping a reason in favor of the attitude to actually having the attitude. There appears to be a gap, so to speak, between grasping a reason to have an attitude and having the attitude.

Scanlon solves the difficulty by saying that this causal connection is a structural constraint on subjects, insofar as they are rational agents. Rational subjects are those that respond to judgments about reasons or to their grasp or acceptance of a reason as a good reason by forming the respective attitude. The attitude, in term, comes with the judgment of the subject that she has good reason for that attitude (whether or not that reason is in fact a good one in the objective sense). As Scanlon says for the case of intentions:

So, [...] to claim that someone is a rational agent is to claim that he is so constituted that when he judges himself to have conclusive reason to do something he generally responds to this judgment by forming the intention to do it (and, insofar as he is not irrational and does not

change this intention, he so acts). Moreover, these things do not just happen, but also seem to him, in the light of his judgment, to be justified.<sup>47</sup>

In other words, we presuppose that rational agents have the causal disposition for their psychology to be causally effected in the right way by their grasp of the reasons they judge to be good reasons (operative reasons). It is that causal disposition that fills in the causal gap, so to speak, between the acceptance of the judgment and the consequent formation of the relevant attitude.

The acceptance of a reason as a good reason or the grasp of an operative reason is the cause of the attitude in Woodward's interventionalist sense of cause presented in the introduction. That is, we can ask the what-if-things-has-been-different question. Take the acceptance away – and the singular emotional attitude subsides. Emotional attitudes of rational agents (just like beliefs and intentions) are thus judgment-sensitive. A rational agent will change their attitude if she changes her judgment about the reasons whose grasp has caused the attitude.

From here on, given the psychological nature of my inquiry into what causes singular emotional reactions, I will talk only about operative reasons or reasons-as-grasped. I do not thereby invoke some kind of psychologism. In other words, I do not claim that we can learn about good reasons and their objectively valid inferential relation with other reasons and thereby discover true propositions through this psychological account about operative reasons.

Reasons have their purely rational dimension, that has nothing to do with their psychological dimension with I am concerned in this thesis. As Frege said: "A

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<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 188.

proposition may be thought, and again it may be true; never again let us confuse these two things.”<sup>48</sup> It is because my inquiry is concerned with the psychological causes for a singular emotional reaction of a particular subject that I only deal with propositions that are thought by that subject and are taken by that subject to be a reason.

Before I sum-up the formula of the causal story for the formation of emotions implied by judgmentalism, I want to examine what may count as the emotional import of the situation. That is, I want to see what kind of intentional content would normally be taken as a reason in favor of an emotional attitude.

In the example “I am angry that John stole my car” my operative reason to be angry is that “John stole my car.” That intentional content, in turn, is the content of my belief that John stole my car. The reasons to believe that John stole my car may turn out to have been bad ones or based on misinterpretations. If I believe that John stole my car because I saw him drive in it, and then I find out that in fact he bought a car that looks like mine, I will change my belief that John stole my car and I will no longer be angry with him.<sup>49</sup>

But not all emotional imports borrow their content, so to speak, from a belief. Consider “I fear that there is a burglar in the house”, said after hearing strange sounds from the kitchen. I may not think that the sounds from the kitchen are ample evidence to believe there is a burglar. I merely suspect that maybe there is a burglar in the house. The operative reason for my fear is thus the content of the suspicion, not of a belief. My *reason* for this emotional attitude of fear is the *interpretation* of

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<sup>48</sup> Gottlob Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic: The Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number* [1884]. Trans. J. L. Austin [1950] (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), Introduction p. vi.

<sup>49</sup> Solomon, “Emotions and Choice,” p. 254.

the situation as possibly containing a burglar. If I then hear my partner coughing in the kitchen, and quickly infer that it is he who is in the kitchen and not a burglar, my interpretation of the situation will be undermined and so will my fear.

Similarly, if my partner puts an old fridge outside on the sidewalk for the council to pick up, and I see that it is not very stable standing up – I can fear that it will lose balance and fall (god forbid!) on a cat walking by, or on a car or a person. My interpretation of the situation involves my *imagining* that a disaster might happen (a car might cost a fortune to fix, a person could get hurt – but a cat could die!), and that imagination is what I take to be the reason for my fear, whose object is the fridge under that imaginative description.

The general causal story of the formation of emotions implicit in the judgmentalist approach is thus as follows (This causal story is in fact only the partial story implied by judgmentalism. In the second section of this chapter I will add another feature to this story in accordance with Solomon's further additions to his emotion-judgment story):

*An event causes me to have a belief (or a suspicious-attitude or an imaginative-attitude), which, in turn, causes me to have an emotional reaction by virtue of my taking the content of that belief as a reason for the emotion – that is, via bringing that consideration under the norm of fittingness (or rather the subject's conception of that norm of fittingness).*

If judgmentalism were the correct ontological account for emotions in general, this would always be the causal story that gives rise to an emotion. But we

need not accept judgmentalism as an ontological account. Instead of saying that an emotional reaction is to be ontologically identified through its intentional content and that this is always the content of a judgment, we can say, that whatever an emotion really is or constituted by, it is individuated by its intentional content. Individuation need not imply an essentialist reification. It merely indicates a way to circumscribe the experience of an emotion as a reaction to a certain intentional object.<sup>50</sup>

And so, I make the more modest claim that only *some* emotional reactions are indeed caused by the grasp of an operative reason. These are the emotions I call “operatively-rational emotions,” even if the concept of rationality I invoke here is not objective rationality that is relevant in the search for objective truth, but rather psychological or operative rationality that is causally effective in the psychology of rational agents.

Solomon’s claim that one cannot de-compose the emotion-type or the affect from its intentional object can now be understood as experiencing the emotion as intertwined with the sense of its reasons. Indeed, being angry that (or rather because) you stole my car is experienced very differently to being angry that (or rather because you cheated on me. In fact, as will be discussed later, even if an emotional attitude is not operatively-rational, it appears to embed a reason anyway and is experienced as intertwined with the sense of that reason.

Emotional attitudes that can be articulated as a propositional attitude appear to embed a reason (namely the proposition). As stated in the introduction, I call

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<sup>50</sup> D’Arm and Jacobson are worried about the existence of too many fine-grained emotions. See Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “Recalcitrant Emotion,” p. 133. Whether or not these fine-grained emotions constitute indefinitely many ontologically independent “types” is a robust ontological question that does not concern me here. Particular occurrent emotional reactions are indeed very fine-grained and are experienced as such.

these emotional attitudes “reasoned-emotions.” These emotional reactions are *experienced* as reasoned, whether or not they were actually singularly caused by the psychological state of accepting a certain consideration in favor that singular emotional reaction. That is, the subject experiences the emotional reaction as reasoned whether or not it is indeed an “operatively-rational” emotion.

Although Solomon does not use the operative-reason terminology, he basically makes the same claim.<sup>51</sup> That is, that a subject would experience her emotional reaction as reasoned and therefore justified, even if her emotion was caused by something else entirely, which for Solomon would normally be a physiological cause:

Sometimes this cause is manifest in what the emotion is ‘about’; for example, I am angry about your hitting me; your hitting me is the event which caused me to become angry. But sometimes the cause for an emotion is *not* what the emotion is ‘about.’ The cause of my anger might be too little sleep and too much coffee.<sup>52</sup>

However, as far as the emoting subject is concerned, the reason given for or embedded in the emotional reaction was also its cause. In other words, the subject believes that her grasp of the reason caused the emotion, even if that was not actually what happened. Her emotion is a reasoned-emotion (whether or not it is indeed operatively rational). The distinction between the reason given for the

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<sup>51</sup> Although the above analysis is implied in Solomon’s text, he seems to oppose the idea that reasons can be causes, mainly because he sees causal connections as “lawlike connections.” Solomon, “Emotions and Choice,” pp. 270, 276-277. That is, Solomon is a causal fundamentalist who believes that causal connections can only be described in the physical level of description. In this thesis, as stated in the introduction, I adopt the view of liberal naturalism and causal pluralism.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 256.

emotion and the actual cause of the emotion “breaks down in the first-person case.”<sup>53</sup> The emoting subject, according to Solomon, will always see the reason for her emotion as what brought the emotion about:

I can only be angry so long as I believe that what has caused me to be angry is what I am angry about. Where the cause is different from what I am angry about, I cannot know that it is.<sup>54</sup>

This implies that if I become aware that what caused my anger is not what I thought it was, namely the grasp of its reason, then I can no longer be angry.<sup>55</sup> That is to say, when the emotion is non-rational, when it was not caused by the grasp of an operative reason, then knowledge of the actual cause will be taken as a reason to revoke the reason for the emotion. The causal disposition of the psychology of a rational subject to respond to her judgments of reason in the right way will thus cause the subject to cease emoting.<sup>56</sup>

This implies, in other words, that when one has a non-rational emotion that is caused by something other than the grasp of a reason, one causal condition for this emotion is the lack of knowledge of the actual cause. Take that condition away, that is – make the subject aware of the actual cause – and the emotion will subside.

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<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 259.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 260.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 260.

<sup>56</sup> The case may be, however, that the subject will nevertheless, despite the new knowledge, find the reason she offered for her emotion a good reason, and continue to emote in the same way.

### C. Operative Reasons of Fit

The causal perspective I take in this thesis is an ordinary psychological one. And so, when I say that a certain intentional description is taken as a reason to emote by bringing that consideration under the relevant norm of fittingness, it is important to emphasize that it is the subject's *conception* of those norms that participate in the formation of the emotion. When I speak of norms of fittingness in this thesis, I will *always* refer to their conception by the emoting subject. Nevertheless, the subject did not invent the norms.

So what kind of normativity is implied in the "norms of fittingness," the rough-and-ready characterizations of emotion-types, in reference to which an emotionally-laden description is taken as a reason for an emotion? The normativity here in question depends on the emotion-type.

Some emotions, like anger and guilt involve moral concepts such as fault and responsibility. Their norms of fittingness are thus partly ethical norms. But not all norms of fittingness are normative in this strong sense. Fear, for example, which the fitting emotional response for danger, refers to prudential norms. And other emotions, like envy, jealousy and embarrassment, refer to norms in the sense of "what of we do around here," where normativity is about normality.

Yet, norms of fittingness, or rather their subjective conception, even when partly moral or prudential – provide reasons to emote that should nevertheless be called reasons of fittingness (and not moral or prudential reasons). If I am angry with my father since he has wronged me, I may have other operative reasons to mitigate my anger. I may accept that he is too old or maybe dead as a reason to believe that there is no point to be angry with him, which I would then take as a prudential reason not to be angry. I may accept that I must respect my father no

matter what and take that as a reason to believe that my anger would be disrespectful, a belief I would then take as a moral reason not to be angry with him.

But, as D'Arms and Jacobson have shown,<sup>57</sup> such further moral or prudential considerations, that may affect my emotion (as will be discussed in sections 2 and 3), do not make the emotion any less fitting. This is why D'Arms and Jacobson distinguish fittingness from appropriateness, where the latter refers not just to reasons of fittingness but also to prudential and moral reasons (in themselves irrelevant to questions of fittingness).

Following Pamela Hieronymi, I characterize these prudential and moral reasons that are not fittingness-reasons as "extrinsic" reasons."<sup>58</sup> They are "second-order" operative reasons about whether or not the emotional attitude is somehow good to have. The norms I refer to in this section are only norms of fittingness, and the normativity implied varies according to the emotion-type.

Now, each situation that provokes anger or fear or shame is different. One might be tempted to think that if we had a full linguistic analysis of emotion-types we would be able to explain better, indeed *determine*, why a certain situation provokes a certain emotion-type.

But as D'Arms and Jacobson say:

[...] people must be allowed to have different standards of fittingness, [...] they cannot be settled by conceptual analysis or linguistic fiat. [...] [T]he specific terms in which an articulation [of the norm of fittingness] is

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<sup>57</sup> D'Arms and Jacobson, "Moralistic Fallacy."

<sup>58</sup> Pamela Hieronymi, "The Wrong Kind of Reason," *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 102 no. 9 (Sep., 2005), pp. 437-457, p. 448. Hieronymi talks about extrinsic reasons for the case of belief, but claims it applies also to emotional attitudes (with some qualification, to be discussed in chapter 3).

given are provisional, open to revision, and cannot be read in a strict or literal sense. It follows that there can be no empirical fact of the matter about whether something counts as *yours*, as *dangerous*, or as *contaminated* in the sense that determines questions of the fittingness of pride, fear, and disgust.<sup>59</sup>

The “rough-and-ready” nature of these characterizations allows them to apply to very many particular situations, and the application is normative, not determinative (not in reference to linguistic laws). That is why the term “formal object,” which implies a linguistic law that can be specified through analysis, is not a good term. It does not do justice to the flexibility of the application of such short characterizations of emotion-types.<sup>60</sup>

When D’Arms and Jacobson say that people are “allowed to have different standards of fittingness”, I take them to mean that in each situation, the “rough-and-ready” standards, widely shared within a certain linguistic community, become more specific and thus allow for some variability. I claim that the variability D’Arms and Jacobson allow is cultural or social.

Although each situation is singular, some situations nevertheless share a descriptive similarity that is more specific than the one expressed by the “rough-and-ready” standards. D’Arms and Jacobson call these more specific standards, which describe more specific emotion-types, “cognitive sharpenings”:

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<sup>59</sup> D’Arms and Jacobson, “Recalcitrant Emotion,” p. 132.

<sup>60</sup> Cp. Griffiths’ argument against conceptual analysis of formal object in Griffiths, *What Emotions Really Are*, pp. 23-24.

These are types constructed by specifying a subclass of instances of an emotion, or other affective state, in terms of some thought that they happen to share. There are indefinitely many possible cognitive sharpenings, and in some cases there are already words for these states, such as homesickness, religious awe, and resentment.<sup>61</sup>

The “rough-and-ready” standard for pride, for example, is that it fits an object that is “an achievement or advantage of [the emoting agent]; it must be in some way splendid and in some way [his] own.”<sup>62</sup> One cognitive sharpening of pride may be called “team-fan pride”, namely the pride football fans take in the victory of the team they support. The fan is proud of “his team”. But someone else, a philosopher, say, may not share that standard of fittingness. Philosophers may think that this is not “his team” in any significant way that would fit the emotion of pride.<sup>63</sup>

The difference in norms of fittingness insofar as cognitively sharpened emotions are concerned, is a difference in social or cultural norms of emotion fittingness. Within the fan-culture, it is fitting (in the sense of “what we do around here”) to be proud of one’s team. Within the cultural niche of philosophers (perhaps), it is not.

The import of the situation that provides the reasons for an emotional reaction thus has a subjective dimension. The propositional content of the import, which is embedded in the emotional attitude, describes a certain fact or an interpretation of the situation that may be available to any perceiver. But what exactly would be the emotional import intertwined with that description, depends

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<sup>61</sup> D’Arms and Jacobson, “Recalcitrant Emotion,” p. 137.

<sup>62</sup> Philippa Foot, quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 135.

<sup>63</sup> This example is taken from *Ibid.*, pp. 135-137.

on the subject's belonging to a certain culture or a certain social niche. As Taylor says for the example of shame:

Shame is an emotion that a subject experiences in relation to a dimension of his existence as a subject. What we can be ashamed of are properties which are essentially properties of a subject. This may not be immediately evident, because I may be ashamed of my shrill voice, or my effeminate hands. But of course it only makes sense to see these as objects of shame if they have for me or my culture an expressive dimension: a shrill voice is (to me, to my culture) something unmanly, betokens hysteria, not something solid, strong, macho, self-contained. It does not radiate a sense of strength, capacity, superiority. Effeminate hands are – effeminate. Both voice and hands clash with what I aspire to be, feel that my dignity demands that I be, as a person, a presence among others.<sup>64</sup>

The fact that the voice is shrill or that the hands are relatively small with soft skin are evident regardless of any social or normative point of view. But for Taylor, as a member of a certain social niche (and further as a conceiver of that niche's norms), these facts are valued as unmanly and weak, radiating fragility and lack of confidence and self-esteem. For Taylor then, as a normative social subject of a certain culture, these facts bear the emotional import of being shameful.

There are thus many cognitive sharpenings of emotion-types, and as many respective more specific norms of fittingness that are socially and culturally

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<sup>64</sup> Taylor, "Self-interpreting animals," p. 53.

dependent. This cultural-social dependence allows for variability among cultures and also among more fine-grained social niches. Moreover, since these are norms and not laws, it is quite possible that the same occasion could refer to more than one norm.

Take for example a situation where I see you have a little grain stuck in your tooth. I am wondering whether I should tell you or not. Will you feel embarrassed or will you feel relieved to know now rather than later? I cannot really know. In our social niche, embarrassment fits the occasion of having something stuck in your tooth. Perhaps it is even a cognitive sharpening of the emotion-type of embarrassment, call it “grain-in-tooth embarrassment”.

If I do not tell you, and you later see the grain in the mirror, you may have the option to think that I did not see it, since it is quite small and you did not smile much. Or you may think I surely saw it, which I in fact did, and be terribly embarrassed to have had an entire conversation with me with a grain in your tooth. If I do tell you now that you have a grain stuck in your tooth, you may feel terribly embarrassed. Or, you may feel relieved to have been told.

So being told that you have a grain in your tooth, within the social niche that cares about such things, can have two equally likely imports: the import of being embarrassing and disorienting or the import of relieving much greater embarrassment by being only slightly and briefly embarrassing.

Say I decided to tell you that you have a grain in your tooth, thinking that if it were me, I would prefer to know now rather than later. But you feel terrible. You tell your friend about what happened and she disagrees with you – she says: “don’t feel bad, at least you didn’t spend the entire conversation with a grain stuck in your

tooth. If I were you, I would feel more relieved than embarrassed. But I can see why you feel terrible.”

This kind of disagreement, which also involves seeing the reasonable point in the others’ operative considerations, is typical of reason explanation. Two people from the same social niche, aware of the same norms of fittingness, may agree on the emotional import of the situation, or in some cases, may agree to disagree.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Cp. Jonathan Lear, *Freud* [2005]. (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 2 about rational explanation for human behavior: “Each of us is acting on the basis what we think is reasonable. If we keep trying to understand the other’s point of view, we shall eventually resolve our disagreement or at least reach a point where we can ‘agree to disagree.’”

## 2. Three Objections and Consequent Modification

In the previous section I have adapted the judgmentalist view to my explanatory rather than ontological purposes. Namely, instead of insisting that emotions *are* judgments, I presented the view as the claim that emotions are individuated by their intentional content, which embeds a reason for that emotion. Emotions are experienced as reasoned, whether or not the reason they embed was indeed the operative reason whose grasp caused the emotion.

In some cases, which I call “operatively-rational-emotions” the reason embedded in the intentional content of the emotion was indeed the reason whose grasp was the psychological cause for that emotional reaction. These are the cases judgmentalism can explain. As far as causal explanation of emotions is concerned, the judgmentalist view can be called the “operative-reason-explanation” approach.

The objections found in the literature against judgmentalism are targeted primarily against the ontological claims. However, these objections are adaptable also to the manner in which I presented the judgmentalist approach. I will survey these objections as being against judgmentalism, but will keep track on how they apply to the parallel operative-reason-explanation approach. There are many objections to be found in the literature, and I will not present all of them. I examine three main objections that I find most compelling.

These objections, I will claim, are not enough to rule out the operative-reason-explanation for certain emotional reactions. What they do show is that the grasp of reasons of fittingness alone cannot comprise the causal explanation for an emotional reaction, even in the class of emotions which fittingness reason do provide (at least partly) the psychological explanation, namely in cases where

physiological factors do not carry much causal weight. The objections will demand a further causal factor, which will turn out to be the grasp of another sort of reason.

### **A. First Objection: Unemotional Judgments**

The first objection to the claim that emotions are judgments is that one can judge a situation to be fitting of a certain emotion-type, without actually having that emotion. In other words, judgments of the sort that are normally involved in emotions may be arrived at unemotionally. To say it in the operative-reason terminology, sometimes we may describe a situation such that we take the description as a reason to emote, yet we do not emote. This suggests that the grasp of an operative fittingness reason is not sufficient to cause an emotion.

Something must be “added” to the fittingness judgment in order for it to become the respective emotion. Judgmentalists recognize this difficulty and all add that whatever is judged in the case of emotions is very meaningful to us, to our well-being, our self-image, our wants and needs. Diana Fritz Cates assembles what Martha Nussbaum says in this connection:

Emotion-cognitions are ‘ways of registering [or fully acknowledging] how things are with respect to the external (i.e., uncontrolled) items that we view as *salient for our well-being*’ [...] They are ‘forms of evaluative judgment that ascribe to certain things and persons outside a person’s own control *great importance for the person’s own flourishing*. Emotions are thus, in effect, acknowledgments of *neediness and lack of self-sufficiency*’ [...].<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> These quotes are taken from Diana Fritz Cates, “Conceiving Emotions: Martha Nussbaum’s ‘Upheavals of Thought,’” *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, vol. 31 no. 2 (Summer, 2003), pp. 325-341, p. 328. My emphasis. In another review of that book, Ben Ze’ev presents Nussbaum’s view regarding

The terms “salient for our well-being”, “great importance for the person’s own flourishing” and “neediness and lack of self-sufficiency,” indicate that an emotional response depends not just on normative considerations that are language and culture dependent. Emotions are also caused by something more subjective, which depends on the wants and needs of the emoting subject. And these wants and needs are many times particular to the individual subject. Solomon too adds a factor of subjective involvement to the emotion-judgment that would make it emotional:

[...] to have an emotion requires not only a specifiable set of judgments but certain desires as well. One might make a judgment [...] in an impersonal and uninvolved way, without caring one way or the other. But an emotional [judgment] is necessarily personal and involved. Compare “What he said to me was offensive” (but I don’t care what he thinks) and ‘He offended me!’ Only the latter is constitutive of anger. (The first is a judgment about the perlocutionary act potential of a certain utterance; the latter is, in part, a judgment about my own self-esteem.)<sup>67</sup>

The relevance of certain desires or concerns to the emotion fittingness judgment was already mentioned above in reference to Taylor’s import of the situation. That import, the situation insofar as it is emotionally relevant to the

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what distinguishes an emotional evaluative judgment from a nonemotional evaluative judgment in Aaron Ben Ze’ev, “Emotion Are Not Mere Judgments, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions by Martha C. Nussbaum,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 68 no. 2 (Mar., 2004), pp. 450-457, p. 453. He criticizes Nussbaum on that issue in *Ibid.*, p. 454.

<sup>67</sup> Solomon, “Emotions and Choice,” p. 276.

subject, is what “can be relevant or of importance to the desires or purposes or aspirations or feelings of a subject [...]” (as quoted above).

Self-esteem, ultimately relates to the subject’s self-image, or – to speak like Solomon – to a judgment regarding the subject’s self-image. This self-image is comprised of the subject’s practical identities, one or more of which is implicated in the situation at hand. By “practical identity” I follow Christine Korsgaard’s definition:

[The] description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. [...] Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there is a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a man or a woman, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, a member of a certain profession, someone’s lover or friend, and so on.<sup>68</sup>

The interest or desire in question is to hold the relevant practical identity with dignity, to comply with what the subject’s sees as its demands. As a member of a football fan club, I want “my team” to win and will be proud of it when it does. To maintain my self-image of a respected teacher, I may think I should not tolerate insults from students. To maintain my self-image of a good cat-loving citizen, I feel

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<sup>68</sup> Christine M. Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 101.

the obligation not to put hazards on the sidewalk outside my house. And so forth with other roles and relationships under which I value myself.

But practical self-image is not necessarily involved in all emotions. When I fear for the cars, people and cats that may be hurt by a falling fridge, I am not necessarily thinking about my self worth. I may just directly, so to speak, be concerned about other people and cats, and feel personally involved when their well-being is under threat. Implications on one's self-image are one way of being personally involved, as Solomon noticed in later texts.<sup>69</sup>

For a judgment to be emotional one has to "take it personally", and the involvement of one's self-image is not the only way to be personally engaged with a judgment. "Taking something personally," Solomon explains, "means experiencing it as particularly important to oneself, as personally 'meaningful,' perhaps concerning a matter in which we have deep personal 'investments.'"<sup>70</sup>

The additional judgment to the fittingness judgment that is involved in an emotional reaction is thus the taking-it-personally judgment. The personal

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<sup>69</sup> When Solomon uses the term "desire" in the above quote, he is most likely referring to a desire to increase one's self-esteem which he has associated with emotions in *The Passions* [1976] (as he recounts in a later paper where he holds a modified view, Robert Solomon, "On Emotions as Judgments." In *Not Passion's Slaves: Emotions and Choice*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 92-113, p. 108). In "Emotions as Judgments" Solomon distinguishes two kinds of desires to be associated with emotions. The first is a desire for further action (Solomon mentions Jenefer Robinson who argued that the desire to be with Joe is not the cause of one's love for Joe, but part of the emotion itself, *Ibid.*, p. 105. He also mentions Aristotle's claim that anger includes the desire for revenge, *ibid.*, p. 106). This first kind of desire *emerges* from those emotions and is part of the *motivational force* of emotions, which may be a consideration in practical reasoning. But this kind of desire is not involved in the causal explanation of the initial emotional reaction. The motivational force of an emotion may be implicated in changing that emotion, but this is a different issue and will be dealt with in the presentation of the second objection to the judgmentalist account. The second kind of desire Solomon mentions is implied in the rough-and-ready characterizations of emotions. Fear involves the desire to avoid what is feared *ibid.*, pp. 106-107. Jealousy involves the desire to hold on to one's own and the (negative) desire not to lose it. *ibid.*, p. 107. Sometimes this second kind of desire is the increase of one's self-esteem, or a desire to maintain a certain self-image, as I have more weakly articulated above. But in this later paper, Solomon distinguishes the desire to increase one's self-esteem from being personally engaged, *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 104. See also Solomon's discussion about how taking personally an offensive remark is required to make the fittingness judgment emotional in *ibid.*, pp. 110-113.

engagement of the self-involvement needed to make a fittingness judgment emotional ultimately refers to a practical identity as well. I take some situation personally under a certain practical identity. It is insofar as I am a cat-nut that I am motivated to be personally involved in any matter concerning cat-welfare. Practical identities do not just implicate obligations. They also embed what we care about, what we are attached to, what we positively want for ourselves and for others.

We take such motives or desires that stem from our practical identity as reasons to emotionally engage in situations that bear on that practical identity. As Korsgaard says in the immediate continuation of the above quote: “[...] all of these identities give rise to reasons [...] Your reasons express your identity, your nature.”<sup>71</sup>

These taking-it-personally reasons are related to some extent to certain social norms (as conceived by the subject) about the practical identity they involve. But ultimately the desires to which a practical identity gives rise in a particular situation are highly subjective. Some fans will take certain football games much more personally than others. Some respectable teachers could not care less about an offensive remark from a student.

Yet taking-it-personally under a practical identity still qualifies as an operative reason. It can be up for reflection and endorsed or rejected (as will be discussed in the last section of this chapter). People can criticize us for taking some situations too personally. Sometimes we could be criticized for not taking a fittingness judgment personally enough: “How could you not be sad or at least disappointed? You’ve worked so hard for this test and you failed!”

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<sup>71</sup> Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity*, p. 101.

People can also forgive us for intense self-involvement. This is because taking-it-personally under a practical identity is intelligible to others and interpretable by them. For example, my partner thinks I exaggerate with my fridge concerns. But he knows I am a cat-nut, and understands my motives for my fear, and sweetly lays the fridge down in a position where it could not pose any possible danger.

In short, in order to emote, the fittingness judgment has to be taken personally under some practical identity. In other words, emotional reactions are caused both by the grasp of reasons of fittingness and by acceptance of desire-considerations that stem from certain practical identities, desires which we take to be reasons to make those reasons of fittingness *our* reasons to emote.

Robert Roberts claims that a judgment paired with a relevant desire does not guarantee an emotional reaction. He thinks it psychologically possible, to judge that I am guilty and to care deeply about being righteous and at the same time – not feel guilty:

My judgment that I am guilty might be a more or less remote inference from other facts, and thus my guilt might not *come home* to me in the way that it must if I am to have the emotion of guilt – and this despite the fact that I care deeply about being morally upright.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Robert Roberts, "What an Emotion is: A Sketch," *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 97 no. 2 (Apr., 1988), pp. 183-209, p. 197-8, emphasis in original. This objection was also raised by Jerome Schaffer: "One can hold precisely those beliefs and desires in a dispassionate and unemotional way. So getting emotionally worked up must involve more than just beliefs and desires." Quoted by Solomon, "Emotions as Judgments," p. 94

If the judgment is a “remote inference from other facts,” it does not sound like it is a reaction to a present situation. Such “remote inference” probably refers to a reflective engagement with some past situation or maybe a reflection about an ongoing relationship, where the person in question is not actually present. It may indeed be difficult to identify emotionally with a judgment about the past.

Although psychologically possible, it is hard to imagine how one could not identify emotionally with a judgment about an ongoing relationship. A person that is able to explicitly think, or tell her friend, that she is guilty of a wrong she has done to her beloved partner with whom she genuinely aspires to be ethically considerate, and not feel any guilt – would be self-alienated.

Such self-alienation seems pathological, but in principle it would also be possible when the facts described are not so remote. To emote the subject has to associate herself or identify with that judgment and the relevant desires or practical identity. Roberts does not think that emotions are always judgments, but when they are, “the judgment and desire turn into an emotion only when they bring me to construe *myself* and *my* situation in their terms.”<sup>73</sup>

I shall later explain what Roberts means by “construe.” For now, it is sufficient to note that this last quote is compatible with the claim that a fittingness judgment has to somehow implicate one’s conception of oneself in reference to the situation at hand in order to be emotional.

The first objection then, to put it in the terms of this chapter, is that judging some described situation as fitting a certain emotion is not sufficient to cause the emotion. Fittingness alone does not explain why one person is offended by an

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<sup>73</sup> Roberts, “Sketch,” p. 198, my emphasis.

offensive remark and another is not. To take a fittingness consideration as a reason to emote, it has to be a reason for *me*, a reason that *I* take personally.

We may have some general or statistical generalizations about how people emotionally react to certain typical circumstances, by investigating what norms of fittingness are common in what social niches. The more we circumscribe the social niche in question, the better our local generalizations would be. These would be the rough-and-ready characterizations of cognitive sharpenings of norms of fittingness.

But we cannot predict whether a *particular* person would emotionally react in a specified way in certain specified circumstances. Singular emotional reactions of particular subjects depend on too many factors, which are themselves in flux. The same person may emotionally react according to one norm of fittingness today and according to another norm of fittingness tomorrow, even if the circumstances of the reaction are very similar. More importantly, the same person may take a certain reason of fit personally today but not on another similar occasion. A person's desires that refer to their practical identity are changeable and very subjective.

Synoptically, we could perhaps predict how someone we know very well would emotionally react to a certain situation, but we cannot be certain about such predictions. Indeed, we criticize people for being inconsistent in their emotional reactions. In other words, the *singular* psychological explanation of a *singular* emotional reaction depends on too many subjective factors to be generalizable and is unlikely to be exactly reproducible. The singular causal explanation for a singular emotional reaction is empirical, since it describes the psychological states that cause that emotional reaction. However, given that science is concerned with the objective and the reproducible, operative-reason-explanation for a singular emotional reaction is non-scientific.

In passing I want to note, that all these terms “taking personally,” “identifying with,” “self-involvement,” “engagement via practical identity” – will not suffice to describe what an emotion *is*. All these ways of description will ultimately go back to “being emotional.”<sup>74</sup> This may be problematic for the judgmentalist who wants an ontological definition of emotion. But for the purposes of the enquiry into the psychological causes of an emotion, there is no such difficulty. Emotion is a phenomenon we are all familiar with and easily identify in ourselves and in others, and the above terms receive their meaning by referring to emotional experiences.

### **B. Second Objection: Meeting the Criteria of Judgment**

The second objection against judgmentalism is that emotions do not fit the criteria of judgments. This sub-section includes three arguments that relate to three different features of judgments. I will defend judgmentalism against these arguments, even if I do not think that saying that emotions *are* judgments reveals what “being emotional” *really* consists in. What I am defending, rather, is that in the operatively-rational cases discussed in this chapter, emotions are caused by the grasp of their reasons.

Patricia Greenspan claims that emotions are not judgments since fittingness is not exactly analogous to truth.<sup>75</sup> It was already explained in the previous section

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<sup>74</sup> They are not, however, “tired metaphors,” as Griffiths claims. Paul E. Griffiths, “The Degeneration of the Cognitive Theory of Emotions,” *Philosophical Psychology* vol. 2 no. 3 (1989), pp. 297-313, p. 306. These are indeed metaphors, and Griffiths is right to claim that they will not explain what “being emotional” ultimately *is*. But they are not “tired” and can be usefully un-packed as operative reasons that refer to subject’s practical identity and that causally participate in the formation of operatively-rational-emotions.

<sup>75</sup> Patricia Greenspan, “A Case of Mixed Feelings: Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion.” In Amélie Rorty (ed.), *Explaining Emotions*, pp. 223-250, p. 236. The claim that appropriateness (or fittingness) for emotion is analogous to truth in the case of belief is widely accepted in the literature. See for

that people from different social niches may have different standards of fittingness. Moreover, within a social niche, there may be more than one fitting emotional response to a given situation.

But these considerations conflict only with scientific truth that demands universal agreement. If a fact, as I take it (in alignment with the pragmatist tradition) is just a true proposition, then there are true moral propositions, aesthetic propositions and propositions about the fittingness of a certain emotion to a certain situation. The inquiry into the truth of fittingness judgment would have to regard the embedded reasons not in their subjective and psychological dimension that concerns me in this thesis, but rather in the objective sense in reference to norms (and to subject's conception of those norms). The flexibility of such norms of fit allows for more than one emotion-fittingness judgment to be true.

The further complication Greenspan adds is that it is possible that one and the same person would feel two different emotions, indeed contrary emotions, that both fit the situation. Each emotion would fit the situation for a different reason, and each of these emotions can be justified. Greenspan gives the following example:

Where I am in competition with a close friend, happiness at his winning might be adequately justified by my identification with him, and unhappiness by my concern for my own interests, even though each of these reasons would seem to count as reason *against* exhibiting the contrary emotion. Ambivalence is possible, then, in a basically rational person.<sup>76</sup>

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example D'Arms & Jacobson, "Moralistic Fallacy," p. 68, 72; Ronald de Sousa, "The Rationality of Emotions." In Amélie Rorty (ed.), *Explaining Emotions*, pp. 127-151, p. 132;

<sup>76</sup> Greenspan, "Mixed Feelings", p. 236.

Greenspan's point is about justification. She claims that such ambivalence is not accepted by the justification standards of judgment in general. In judgment, reasoning is done in reference to the "total background" of reasons for and against that judgment.<sup>77</sup> Emotions, on the other hand, can be fitting, when taking into consideration only "particular limited portions of the background."<sup>78</sup>

In other words, according to Greenspan, a judgment is true when its justification is the result of weighing all relevant reasons against each other. But an emotion is justified as fitting when "there are adequate reasons *for* it, whatever the reasons against it."<sup>79</sup> As long as it is not the same reason that yields through its grasp two contrary emotions, but rather the operative reason for one emotion is also an operative reason against the contrary emotion – the ambivalent emoting subject is still rational.<sup>80</sup>

Indeed, in practical reasoning for intentional action, a rational agent often considers reasons each of which she counts in favor of a different course of action, where the alternative actions may conflict or oppose one another. The subject may judge each reason as adequate, but the rational agent will not act in two conflicting ways. She will have to make an "all things considered" decision. As Scanlon explains:

[...] reasons can conflict in a practical sense when they are reasons for

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<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 236.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 237.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 237.

<sup>80</sup> Indeed, Greenspan claims that it would be more rational to maintain that emotional ambivalence than to reach an "all things considered" judgment and reconcile the emotional conflict. This is because of the motivational force emotions have on our behavior that is important in social interactions and because of the importance of emotions to personal well being. In the case at hand, it is important I am able to feel and express happiness for my friend, and it is equally important not to lose sight of my own interests. Rationality thus would not require the cancelation of the conflict via detached deliberation. See Greenspan's discussion in *Ibid.*, pp. 238-234.

wanting incompatible things. Often these reasons, like desires, are *pro tanto*: that is to say, they are compelling reasons unless outweighed by other, better reasons, but they can be outweighed without losing their force or status as reasons. [...] In the end I must choose one way or the other, but this need not involve deciding that one of these competing reasons did not count or was not really a relevant consideration.<sup>81</sup>

In the case of emotional ambivalence each compelling reason will produce its respective fitting emotion, and neither of them will sink into the status of a *pro tanto* reason in all things considered judgment. We could still maintain that these conflicting emotions are both judgments (that are taken personally), and each could be separately justified. Emotion-judgments are just a different sort of judgments.

Judgments of emotion fittingness are not all things considered judgments and they need not be justified all things considered. Some situations allow for more than one fitting emotion, and sometimes for contrary emotions. In the realm of emotions, it can be true that conflicting emotions are both fitting and a person may experience both, provided she takes personally both fittingness judgments.

Robert Roberts claims that emotions fail to meet another criterion of judgment, namely its stability. If it is true that a certain emotion is fitting, then we should not be able to change the emotion if its fittingness is not called into question.

[...] emotions cannot be identified with any judgments because a rational person has more options with respect to his emotions than he

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<sup>81</sup> Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other*, pp. 50-51.

has with respect to his judgments. He can control his emotions to an extent, and in a way, that it would be unfitting for a person to control his judgments.<sup>82</sup>

Roberts gives the following example: I am climbing a wobbly ladder, which is clearly dangerous, as I may fall and hurt myself. But the task is too important and is worth the risk – I am climbing to save my daughter from a burning house. I thus try to mitigate my fear.<sup>83</sup> When Roberts talks about the attempt to mitigate an emotion he is referring to William James' advice to alter "outward motions".<sup>84</sup> James' advice would be that we behave as if we are not afraid. We could take a few deep breaths, relax our muscles and continue to climb the ladder.

Solomon claims that such active change of behavior ultimately amounts to change of judgment.<sup>85</sup> In his objection, Roberts clearly talks about the fittingness judgment. Roberts argues that such a change in judgment can happen in two ways. Either the judgment is simply replaced by another or the judgment is pushed "out of my mind" and becomes a dispositional belief.

The first option would amount to denying the situation is dangerous. But that option is "epistemically irrational,"<sup>86</sup> since I know that climbing a wobbly ladder is dangerous. The second option is "practically irrational,"<sup>87</sup> since I should take account of the danger and be appropriately careful when climbing up the wobbly

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<sup>82</sup> Roberts, "Sketch," p. 198.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 198-9.

<sup>84</sup> Roberts refers in *Ibid.*, p. 198 fn. 22, to another example he gave in his "Solomon on Control." It is there, pp. 399-402 that he refers to James (and refers to Solomon's quote of James)

<sup>85</sup> Roberts quotes Solomon and discusses that claim in *Ibid.*, pp. 400-401.

<sup>86</sup> Roberts, "Sketch," p. 198.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 198.

ladder.<sup>88</sup> The judgmentalist position regarding this mitigation of fear ends up being irrational.

The fear of the dangerous wobbly ladder should not be dissipated completely, but rather mitigated. Its intensity is to be controlled – not its very existence. Roberts uses the term “mitigate,” and when he uses the expression “*cease feeling afraid*,” he immediately qualifies in brackets “or start feeling less afraid.”<sup>89</sup> Indeed, it is plausible to assume I would not completely stop being afraid in such circumstances, especially given that if I fall climbing up (or going down) the wobbly ladder, I will fail to save my daughter.

Roberts’ claim, as I interpret it, is that the degree of the danger, which in judgment would be matched to a certain fitting intensity of fear, is not a changeable factor. Mitigation of the fear should not change the relevant judgment of fittingness, if one is to be both epistemically and practically rational. In other words, given that the emotion can change without a respective change in the circumstances that justify the initial response (namely the degree of danger), the emotion is not a judgment.<sup>90</sup>

But the crude judgmentalist who identifies emotion with mere judgment of fittingness does not seem to exist in the literature. As discussed in the first objection, even the fiercest judgmentalist does not claim that an emotion is merely a judgment

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<sup>88</sup> This is, in any case, how Roberts describes the situation. I assume then, that the time pressure to get up the ladder and get the child is high enough not to wait for the fire brigade and low enough to still take the danger into consideration and climb carefully.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 199.

<sup>90</sup> Roberts’ other example in this connection, presented in “Solomon on Control,” pp. 400-401, is a lot less convincing. He there talks of anger toward a student who cannot understand the difference between Modus Ponens and Affirming the Consequent after many attempts to explain that difference to him. But in this case, calming one’s anger is only fitting the situation. Being angry at a student for not understanding does not seem, to me at least, a fitting response. In such a case, adjusting one’s emotion would be (for me, for my culture) a change of judgment: from an unreasonable judgment (this student is anger provoking) to a reasonable judgment (it’s not his fault, I should not be angry). Such cases will be discussed in the end of this chapter.

of fittingness. One must take that judgment personally in order to emote. To change the intensity of an emotion does not require a change in the judgment of fittingness. If the emoting subject succeeds in taking that judgment less personally, she can reduce its intensity.

Now there are two ways to change the taking-it-personally judgment. I will call the first way the “authentic way.” I can ask myself why I am taking the fittingness judgment personally, and check whether or not I stand behind my operative reasons, to do with my practical identity. If I find that I do not actually take the fittingness judgment personally on reflection, I may disavow the taking-it-personally judgment and stop emoting altogether. This authentic way will be discussed in the last section of this chapter.

The second way is the self-management way. I ask myself a different question: do I want to take this fittingness judgment personally? Is it somehow good for me to have this emotion? Do I have other practical identities that I value more than the one involved in this emotion? I thus ask myself a “second-order” question about my emotional reaction. This is how operative reasons that are extrinsic to fittingness can have weight in my consideration whether or to what extent I should emote.

Extrinsic questions can be causally relevant when an emotional reaction is intimately linked with intentional action. Roberts’ example is a clear case where the motivating force of my emotion becomes a consideration in practical reasoning terminating in intentional action. The question of whether or not or to what extent I should be afraid becomes intertwined with the question of whether or not or in what manner I should climb the ladder.

The practical reasoning takes the danger and its fitting fear into consideration. All things considered, among which are my practical identity as a parent and my love for my daughter implicated in this identity – I decide to climb the ladder. And so the danger and its fitting fear lose their reason-giving force with respect to the question of what to do, but “live on” with respect to another question, which in this case is how to perform the action. That is, insofar as the practical reasoning is concerned, the danger and its fitting fear are outweighed by other considerations in favor of climbing the ladder. But they “live on” with respect to how careful I am when I climb the ladder.

When the danger and its fitting fear become an operative *pro tanto* reason in my all things considered practical judgment as to how to act, I judge that I should take the fear fitting judgment less personally. In other words, my taking-it-personally judgment is now influenced by a prudential consideration that is an operative reason extrinsic to considerations of fittingness.

The evaluation of the degree of danger does not change, and the fittingness judgment that matches a certain degree of fear to this danger does not change either. There is no epistemic irrationality here. The fear in this example does not change because of change in judgment of fittingness, but due to its sensitivity to the grasp of an extrinsic prudential reason. The extrinsic prudential reason encourages me to take the danger less personally, and is effectively the expression of my practical rationality.

When I tell the rescue story after its successful completion to another person, she would ask me “Weren’t you afraid you would fall off the ladder?” I would probably answer: “Yes, I was afraid, but I had to ignore my fear as much as I could.”

It is likely, that as I remember how I felt at the time and imagine the situation, I would allow myself to re-experience the fear as more intense than it felt at the time.

What the grasp of the extrinsic prudential reason caused in this case was a deliberate and temporary alienation from the emotion. If we describe “taking it personally” as a form of judgment that is intertwined with the fittingness judgment (as Solomon does), then *that* judgment has indeed been “put out of my mind,” or suppressed, at least partially. But that change is not irrational. It is, in some sense, pathological, since it would be quite natural to be very scared in this particular case.<sup>91</sup> As Roberts’ example demonstrates, being a hero requires some temporary pathology.

But cases of adjusting the “taking it personally” causal factor do not have to be so extreme. I may be momentarily very irritated when somebody cuts in front of me on the road and immediately decide not to take it personally because “it’s not worth it” and calm down. I can be offended by a remark and quickly put aside the offence so as “not to waste brain cells.” These prudential reasons may be extrinsic to fittingness reasons but they genuinely relate to the relevant practical identity in reference to which the operative fittingness reason was taken personally in the first place. That is, I do not self-manage but authentically change my taking-it-personally judgment.

In such cases, there is no pathology. I just forget about it; I do not suppress. If “taking it personally” is a judgment, then many times there is nothing wrong about it being short-lived. When a judgment is about me and my degree of self-involvement,

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<sup>91</sup> See Solomon’s discussion on the pathology involved in dispassionate emotion-judgments, Solomon, “Emotions as Judgments”, pp. 109-110.

then *in such mundane cases* it is perfectly rational and also mentally healthy to change my mind, since I am the one who constitutes what the judgment is about.<sup>92</sup>

Extrinsic prudential reasons can sometimes (probably not very often) reduce the affect of an already existing emotional reaction. But they do not cancel the emotion altogether when it is impossible for the emoting subject to completely cease taking personally the relevant judgment of fittingness.

I tried to show how Greenspan's example of emotional ambivalence and Roberts' example of mitigation of affect are still consistent with the claim that emotional reactions are judgments of fittingness that are taken personally. Roberts' example shows that we have some after-the-fact choice as to the extent to which we take a judgment of fittingness personally. Indeed, the first objection has shown that we also have some "choice" whether we take such a judgment personally at all.

This choice is usually not made in a deliberative and reflective manner (although it can be deliberative as will be discussed at the end of this chapter). But the concept of a non-deliberative choice may sound strange. It also goes against the normal experience of emotions as being passively suffered, as something that happens to us rather than something that we do.

Indeed, this passivity is used as another way to claim that emotions do not meet another criterion of judgments, namely to be reflective and articulable and for which we are consequently responsible. Cheshire Calhoun thus claims that emotions

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<sup>92</sup> In cases that are not mundane, such self-management regarding self-involvement is much more difficult and complicated, and usually requires some form of self-alienation. In chapter 3 I will claim that such suppression can cause further pathology.

could not be judgments, since emotions are passive and involuntary and we are thus not responsible for them.<sup>93</sup>

However, it is a social fact that we do hold people responsible for their emotions. People are sometimes criticized for their emotions on the account that they are unfitting or immoral or not prudential. We are expected to have fitting emotions and even to further compromise fittingness via extrinsic moral or prudential considerations of self-management. On the other hand, it is also true that we tend to forgive people for their emotional reactions, especially if they change that reaction after criticism. Our practices thus demonstrate that we take people's emotional reactions to be to some extent up to them.

As said before, the operative-reason-explanation for emotions requires that the subject takes that operative reason personally, and that "taking personally" is to some extent up to that subject. What exactly is that extent and in what way we could speak of choice in the case of spontaneous emotions, is a complicated issue I set aside. The fact that we take emotions as criticisable suffices to say that they are not mere happenings that we passively suffer.

But how could emotions be both non-reflective and active? To account for the experience of passivity of which we are introspectively aware Solomon proposes the term "spontaneity."<sup>94</sup> Indeed, as Solomon claims, most of our judgments are not

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<sup>93</sup> Cheshire Calhoun, "Cognitive Emotions?" In Cheshire Calhoun and Robert Solomon (eds.), *What Is an Emotion? Classical Readings in Philosophical Psychology*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 317-342, p. 330.

<sup>94</sup> Solomon, "Emotions as Judgments", p. 96-97. The choice of the term "spontaneity" echoes Kant characterization of the judgments of the understanding. See for example, Emanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* [1781, 1787]. Trans. & Eds., Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A68/B93, A126, B151.

reflective, but are made spontaneously as part of our normal comportment. They are “in the midst of and an essential part of our engagements.”<sup>95</sup>

Solomon gives the example of judgments in ethics, most of which are made unreflectively in spontaneous action, when we do the right thing without thinking too much. Judgments of taste are also often made spontaneously, when we are taken by a work of art, or fascinated by someone’s beauty or enjoy a glass of wine. These ethical and aesthetic judgments are spontaneous, but are also the result of education, experience and refinement. “So too, an emotion, though spontaneous, may be the product of a lifetime of cultivation.”<sup>96</sup>

Intentional actions too, which are the resultant judgments of practical reasoning, are often done with no prior reflection. Consider my walking down the street to the shops and avoiding a branch that fell off a tree on the sidewalk. The practical reasoning “behind” this intentional action is normally done on “auto-pilot,” and the action is done spontaneously. That is to say, in ordinary circumstances the subject is not aware of her “auto-pilot” operative reasoning, but is aware of her spontaneous result, namely the intentional action. In other words, the grasp of a reason does not have to include self-awareness in order to be causally efficacious in our psychology.

Although we normally associate rational adjustment of beliefs and sensitivity to reasons with awareness, “we might wonder about the naturalness of the picture of this requirement,” as Richard Moran says in *Authority and Estrangement*.<sup>97</sup> Sometimes we are reflectively rational and are self-aware of our operative reasons.

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<sup>95</sup> Solomon, “Emotions as Judgments”, p. 96.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p 97.

<sup>97</sup> Richard Moran, *Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 110.

But many times we are only operatively rational, and our beliefs are sensitive to our operative reason without our explicit and self-aware involvement:

[...]the concept of belief is of something systematic and normatively controlled, so that having a belief involves having a network of other beliefs, which are mutually rationally supportive. [...] It may be true, even trivially true, that *I* myself cannot revise my beliefs unless I am aware of them. But my beliefs, like the flow of perceptions, interact and undergo revisions all the time without any intervention on my part. Their general rationality does not need my constant supervision.<sup>98</sup>

Indeed, it is hard to imagine what kind of life we would have if we had to explicitly reflect before every action we take. Operative rationality regulates our belief system according to rational norms such as “avoiding gross inconsistencies” and taking account of the “constant flow of experience.”<sup>99</sup> Moran further says that “[t]he force of the laws of logic is not dependent on the belief as an object of awareness at all.”<sup>100</sup>

In the case of emotions, the subject’s taking the content of a certain newly formed belief (or suspicion or imagination) to be a reason to emote in a certain way, involves bringing the content of that belief under a norm of fittingness. The force of fittingness normativity (as conceived by the subject) is too not dependent on explicit awareness. Emotional operative reasoning can work in an “auto-pilot” fashion and

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<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 110-111.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>100</sup> Moran, *Authority and Estrangement*, p. 111.

the subject would be aware only of the resultant emotion-judgment. Pre-reflectivity and spontaneity go hand in hand.

In fact, extrinsic normativity can be just as forceful. If time is of the essence, climbing up the wobbly ladder may be spontaneously decided upon with no time to momentarily experience the fitting fear and then prudentially calming it via reflective practical reasoning. The fear of the danger of the wobbliness of the ladder may be suppressed via “auto-pilot” practical reasoning.

D’Arms and Jacobson also criticize the judgmentalist approach (even if they accept that emotions are judgment-sensitive, an issue that will be discussed in the final section of this chapter), claiming that initial emotional responses fail to meet the criteria of judgments: “Since the term ‘judgment’ typically refers to critically endorsed thoughts [...] it is misleading to say that emotions constitute judgments.”<sup>101</sup>

As will be soon discussed, emotion-judgments are sometimes reflectively endorsed, and D’Arms and Jacobson allow for that. But most of the time, they are not. However, if we take emotion-judgments to be in those cases spontaneous and pre-reflective results of “auto-pilot” reasoning, as many other judgments are in everyday life, then emotions do not have to be critically endorsed to qualify as judgment.

Note, however, that emotions (just like beliefs and intentions) are *pre-reflective* and not non-reflective.<sup>102</sup> That is, they are not “dumb” or meaningless. They implicate the grasp of operative reasons that *the subject* takes to be a consideration in favor of an attitude, even if the subject is not explicitly aware of

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<sup>101</sup> D’Arms and Jacobson, “Moralistic Fallacy,” p. 67.

<sup>102</sup> The term “pre-reflective” is taken from Solomon, “Emotions as Judgments”, pp. 97-99.

those operative reasons. That is why emotional (or other) attitudes may invite reflection after their formation. Operative reasons can always be brought under reflection to which the attitudes are many times sensitive.

The criticism of the notion that emotions are personally-taken judgments largely depends on what kind of notion of judgment is referred to. It seems to me that the criticisms here presented are made in reference to an overly demanding notion of judgment, whose model is the scientific judgment. The notion criticized – of a reflectively endorsed all things considered judgment constrained by reality and norms of fittingness – is not a notion that judgmentalists about emotions hold.

For the judgmentalist, an emotion-judgment does not have to be an all things considered judgment, and need not be justified all things considered. A Judgment whose subject matter is one's own self-involvement via one's practical identity can sometimes change voluntarily in attunement with epistemic and practical rationality. And finally, judgments are not necessarily reflectively endorsed; they can be spontaneous and pre-reflective.

In terms of reasons, we can make similar claims: Operative reasons do not have to be all things considered reasons to have reason-giving force; they can be *pro tanto* reasons. Operative reasons to be self-involved in a fittingness judgment are, by and large, evaluations of importance to me or my practical identity. And these self-referring evaluations can be sensitive to operative reasons that are extrinsic to fittingness considerations, namely to prudential or moral reasons. And finally, I can grasp reasons without having to come up with them via reflection. Operative reason has its own "auto-pilot" which has been cultivated by a lifetime of experience and education.

### C. Third Objection: Recalcitrant Emotions

The third and strongest objection against the judgmentalist approach is the existence of recalcitrant emotions. These are emotional reactions that conflict with consequent reflective judgments of fittingness of the emoting subject. That is, although the emotion is experienced as a judgment of fittingness, the very same subject can easily see the emotion is not fitting.

In other words, the reason embedded in a recalcitrant emotional reaction is immediately recognized as a bad reason, as a consideration that is not in favor of that emotion. But if it was that reason whose grasp was the psychological state that caused the emotion, then recognizing it as a bad reason should change the emotion-judgment, namely cause it to cease.

Recalcitrance, however, resists subsequent operative reasons. Even if it succumbs to subsequent judgment at a given situation, it normally returns in similar circumstances. Judgmentalists would have to explain why the reflective assessment of the embedded reason as a bad reason does not prevent its return.

The examples in the literature are of what D'Arms and Jacobson call stable emotional recalcitrance, namely "[...] a standing disposition to have recalcitrant bouts of a particular emotion."<sup>103</sup> The most common examples are specific phobias, and emotions based on disavowed prejudices like contempt to or fear of people of a certain race or feelings of disgust and revulsion toward homosexuals.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> D'Arms and Jacobson, "Recalcitrant Emotion," p. 140.

<sup>104</sup> Recalcitrant jealousy, guilt, anger and shame are mentioned, but I have not found examples for them. These types of recalcitrant emotions would presumably relate to a certain relationship or a certain occasion. The only example I found for recalcitrance that is limited to a certain time and a certain relationship (not as stable as the other examples but not merely occasional either) was Calhoun's example of a woman who resents her partner even if she does not believe he is using her, in Cheshire Calhoun, "Cognitive Emotions?" However, I found this example not convincing, since its details show that this woman resents her partner for taking her for granted and for being indulgent. Indeed, the details all along Calhoun's paper indicate that this woman has good reason to resent her

In these examples the emotional reaction is a judgment of fittingness, where the relevant norm of fittingness is a belief that the subject disavows (such as: spiders, no matter of what kind, are dangerous and match the emotion-type of fear; homosexuals are immoral and abnormal and are disgust provoking). Cheshire Calhoun surveys the ways in which the judgmentalist tries to deal with such cases and shows convincingly that the judgmentalist solutions are unsatisfactory. I here present her strongest points (with some minor elaborations).

The first option to deal with cases of disavowed prejudices is to claim that the emoting subject is self-deceived. She claims to disavow the belief (the prejudiced norm of fittingness) she would like to consider as mere prejudice, but in fact, she does hold that belief. This may be the case sometimes, but Calhoun claims it is not always the case.

When a subject claims to hold a (non-prejudiced or non-phobic) belief and is able to justify that belief, and when she has held that belief for a long time, one would need some evidence to claim that she is self-deceived. But if that subject has no particular psychological motive to disavow that belief,<sup>105</sup> and if she manages not to give her prejudiced emotions motivational force in her actions, then she is “innocent of self-deception or pretense until proven guilty.”<sup>106</sup>

The second option to deal with cases of prejudiced emotions is to suppose that they reflect a belief that the subject held in her distant past due perhaps to

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partner, only that “using her” is not the right description for the reasons of resentment. I thus exclude this example. In chapter 4, I will explore in detail a case-study of an occasional recalcitrant emotion.

<sup>105</sup> Such psychological reason could be that the subject has repeatedly had bad experiences with people of the “kind” she emotes against.

<sup>106</sup> Calhoun, “Cognitive Emotions?” p. 332. Amélie Rorty argues against that option on similar grounds, further noting that there are typical ways to be “proven guilty”. She writes: “Characteristically, self-deception involves quite distinctive behavior: signs of facial malaise, frozen features, certain sorts of systematic failure in action.” Amélie Rorty, “Explaining Emotions.” In Amélie Rorty (ed.), *Explaining Emotions*, pp. 103-126, p. 115.

prejudiced parents or educational environment. The emotion thus embeds a reason the subject used to think was a good reason. In other words, the subject's "emotional responses have failed to keep pace with her revised beliefs."<sup>107</sup>

A judgmentalist that holds such an option has "sold out." If emotions do not accord with avowed norms of fittingness then in what sense are they still active and operatively reasoned judgments? Why is the subject unable to alter her emotional reaction as quickly as she can remind herself of her avowed beliefs? Such an option would deny that emotions are to some extent up to us.

The third option, which could be used both for cases of prejudiced emotions and for phobias (and perhaps also for recalcitrance that is limited to a certain relationship or situation), is to claim that the emoting subject holds both the avowed and disavowed beliefs. "Neither counts as her only real belief. Thus, an unresolved tension pervades her belief system."<sup>108</sup>

However, charity demands that we do not ascribe to people irrationality without evidence. If the subject indeed fluctuates in her avowed beliefs then we could say she holds two conflicting beliefs. But continuous emotional avowals of what she dispassionately disavows in her "cold" judgments does not count as evidence, without simply being dogmatic about her holding two conflicting beliefs.<sup>109</sup>

The last option is for the judgmentalist to concede that not all emotions are judgments that entail a belief in norms of fittingness. In other words, in some cases emotions are operatively rational and their causal explanation is given in terms of

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<sup>107</sup> Calhoun, "Cognitive Emotions?" p. 333.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 334.

<sup>109</sup> Claiming that the subject holds the contrary belief unconsciously would be subject to the same criticism. See Michael S. Brady, "The Irrationality of Recalcitrant Emotions", *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 145 no. 3 (Sept. 2009), pp. 413-430, p. 415, where he presents Greenspan's argument in this connection.

grasped reasons, and in some cases they are not.

Calhoun warns against this option, as she sees this as conceding that some emotions are not cognitive at all.<sup>110</sup> Without entering the discussion of what does and does not count as cognitive,<sup>111</sup> a discussion Calhoun does not enter either, Calhoun warns against a position which would not identify an emotion as experienced and intertwined with its intentional (conceptual or propositional) content.

Solomon's view tries to indicate a way out, even if he does not exactly articulate it as such. He says that emotions are "hasty and typically dogmatic judgments."<sup>112</sup> Namely, they assert their fittingness to the situation even when they do not fit the situation. But normally, as explained in the previous section, Solomon expects an emotion to alter according to subsequent operative reasons. That is, even if the reason embedded in the emotion is initially dogmatically taken to be in favor of the emotion, it will cease to have operative reason-giving force once recognized as a bad reason.

But maybe some emotion-judgments, like those that occur in recalcitrant emotions, are more dogmatic than others. The phobic could be afraid of spiders because she dogmatically judges them to be scary even if she reflectively judges them not to be scary. The emotion would nevertheless be experienced as intertwined with its dogmatic intentional content.

But that intentional content would not be experienced as the *reasons* for the emotional reaction, in the manner described in the previous section. Operative reasons as such are sensitive to their evaluation. Dogmatic operative reasons are,

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<sup>110</sup> Calhoun, "Cognitive Emotions?" p. 332.

<sup>111</sup> See the illuminating discussion of Remy Debes in this connection in "Neither Here nor There: The Cognitive Nature of Emotion", *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 146 no. 1 (2009), pp. 1-27.

<sup>112</sup> Solomon, "Emotions and Choice," p. 270.

effectively, no reasons at all. A recalcitrant emotion will be experienced as unreasonable. As D'Arms and Jacobson say, normally, the subject would "forego attempting to justify it rationally."<sup>113</sup> In fact, the recalcitrant emotion is left with no explanation at all. The emoting subject is likely to feel frustrated about her emotion, even alienated from it, and will excuse herself by saying that she "can't help it," as if it is not *her* who is making that dogmatic emotion-judgment.

It seems that in this dogmatic case there is no taking-it-personally judgment in any meaningful sense. In such a case there is no operative reason to take personally, in a way that points to something additional about a certain practical identity of the subject. Being dogmatic about fear of spiders does not reveal much about the practical identity of the subject (at least on the face of it), except that she has spider phobia. We may try to say that she is attached in some way to that phobic practical identity, but whatever that way may be, the phobic does not identify with it. Alienation from her own practical identity is far from a taking-it-personally judgment. Operative reasons do not cause recalcitrant emotions.

Saying that emotions are judgments, more or less dogmatic, may provide an answer to the ontological question (what are emotions?) but it does not provide a sufficient answer to the causal question (what causes emotions?). Since I want to classify emotions according to their principal psychological cause, I am happy to acknowledge that recalcitrant emotions do not belong to the class of emotions examined in this chapter, namely the operatively-rational emotions that are caused by the grasp of reasons. What causes recalcitrant emotions will be examined in chapters 2-5. For now, I will simply maintain that sometimes operative reason provides the psychological causal explanation for emotional reactions (whatever

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<sup>113</sup> D'Arms and Jacobson, "Recalcitrant Emotion," p. 130.

they are ontologically), and sometimes it does not.

#### **D. The “Seeing As” Alternative to Judgmentalism**

Motivated by the above objections, some philosophers, in the attempt to construct an ontological account that would cover all cases of emotional reactions, have adjusted the judgmentalist view to what I shall call the “seeing as” view, for reasons that will become clear shortly. The gist of the revision is summed up by D’Arms and Jacobson:

The revised theory still type-identifies the emotions by their defining propositions, and claims that certain thoughts are partly constitutive of being in an emotional state, but it loosens the requirement that these thoughts must be affirmed by the agent.<sup>114</sup>

This view is helpfully elucidated by Remy Debes. According to Debes, the “seeing as” approach includes two claims about emotions. The first is that emotions are “valuations”. These are evaluative representations in terms of emotion-fittingness, only without requirement of “assent (or dissent) to that representation in the same way judgments do.”<sup>115</sup> Roberts uses the term “construal” for that purpose. Construing, insofar as emotions are concerned, involves “dwelling on or attending to, or at a minimum holding onto”<sup>116</sup> some aspect of the situation.

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<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>115</sup> Debes, “Cognitive Nature,” p. 21.

<sup>116</sup> Roberts, “Sketch,” p. 187.

As Debes says, the “most popular tactic”<sup>117</sup> to explain that kind of attention to certain valuated features of the situation is to use the metaphor of seeing or viewing. Roberts mentions in this connection Wittgenstein’s famous example of the duck-rabbit drawing, which can be seen as either a duck or a rabbit. Seeing the duck in the drawing is not merely knowing or judging that one could see the duck, rather it involves attending to or focusing on the duck aspect of the drawing, construing it as a duck.<sup>118</sup> Similarly, as Debes explains by quoting William Lyons, “[a] man is afraid *because* he ‘sees’ the object or situation as dangerous. A man is angry *because* he ‘sees’ the situation as offensive or insulting.”<sup>119</sup>

Crucial here is the “because” in the above quote. Instead of believing or suspecting or imagining that the situation fits the relevant norm of fittingness, I see the situation as fitting the relevant norm, and my “seeing as” explains why I emote the way I do. That is to say, the construal of the situation is what I take to be a reason to emote in a certain fitting way. No matter how we verbally twist things around to try and avoid this “because”, the fact is that when someone is angry we want to know *why*.

Already at this point, it is clear that the metaphor of seeing or viewing is limited. Seeing and emoting are quite different in respect of their causal explanation. When someone reports her seeing that the snow is white, then *if* I care to explain her seeing, I will turn to a *merely* causal explanation given in physiological or physicalist terms. Seeing is not something we call reasonable or unreasonable; it is either correct or incorrect. When someone reports she is angry, conversely, I will

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<sup>117</sup> Debes, “Cognitive Nature,” p. 22.

<sup>118</sup> Roberts, “Sketch,” p. 187.

<sup>119</sup> Willain Lyons, quoted by Debes, “Cognitive Nature,” p. 22. My emphasis.

seek to explain her anger via hypothesizing her operative reasons. I can subsequently judge whether she is reasonably angry or not.

Although seeing the situation as fitting a certain emotion is short of assent, the “seeing as” or the construal is nevertheless compelling or “serious”, as Roberts says. The construal of the situation as fitting a certain emotion has the “appearance of truth.”<sup>120</sup> That is why Michael Brady says that emotions involve the “inclination to assent” to such evaluative construals.<sup>121</sup> But if the spontaneous and pre-reflective fittingness-judgment is not necessarily reflectively endorsed, as explained in the answer to the second objection above – there seems to be no difference between the seriousness of a situation-construal and a fittingness-judgment.

Indeed, emotion as a serious situation-construal is subject to the same criticism against emotion as a fittingness-judgment, presented in the first objection. After all, I can see the situation as anger provoking and not get angry. Note in comparison that I cannot see the snow as white without seeing that the snow is white. Once again, seeing is unlike emoting, and using the first as an image or a metaphor for the second does not work too well.

“Seeing as” is equivalent to “seeing” in the case of perception. There is no further operative reason that causes the seeing. But in the case of emotions, “seeing as” is not equivalent to “emoting.” This is because the emotional “seeing as” is effectively an operative fittingness reason, and as was shown in the answer to the first objection something more than fittingness is needed to emote. The “seeing as” approach provides that additional something in its second claim as explicated by Debes.

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<sup>120</sup> Roberts, “Sketch,” p. 201.

<sup>121</sup> Brady, “Recalcitrant Emotions,” pp. 421, 429.

The second claim is that these valuations are made from a “self-referential”<sup>122</sup> perspective. Namely, the valuing is such that it relates to the subject’s desires, concerns and so forth. This is why Roberts says that emotions are serious *concern-based* construals. The attention or focus involved in the construal is directed at those aspects of the situation that bear on or that are significant to the subject’s concerns. This relation the object of the emotion has to the self echoes Solomon’s “taking it personally” judgment that is required to make the fittingness judgment into an emotional reaction.

Some emotions imply a straightforward self-construal, such as guilt, shame and embarrassment. Roberts says that not all emotions are like that. In the case of anger, for example, “what is construed as offensive-and-culpably-so is not typically myself [...]”<sup>123</sup> But even in such cases, the construal becomes emotional only if it refers to the subject’s concerns.

Anger thus further requires “a concern about some dimension of the offense, and possibly a concern about some dimension of the offender.”<sup>124</sup> Similarly, fear is not just the construal of the situation as dangerous but also “requires that something *I hold dear* seem threatened.”<sup>125</sup> In other words, the subject has to take their construal personally. And indeed, Roberts’ explication of what he means by “concerns” effectively involves a number of practical identities (such as being human, a business person, a parent, a friend) – the subject’s various roles and relationships under which she values herself and her life.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> Debes, “Cognitive Nature,” p. 22.

<sup>123</sup> Roberts, “Sketch,” p. 190.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 191.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.* My emphasis

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 202-203.

When an emotional reaction is operatively-rational and is caused by the grasp of an operative reason – both approaches admit that a given situation may provide a few reasons to emote in different ways. The judgmentalist would account for the “choice” of reason in terms of what the subject “takes personally”. The “seeing as” approach understands that choice in terms of the subject’s selecting one way out of a few ways to construe herself and her situation. Each “seeing as” perspective comes with its respective reasons.

As Ronald de Sousa explains, “seeing as” also means that certain aspects of the situation are more salient than others, and those aspects are the ones that one sees as provoking this or that emotion. In that sense, “[...] paying attention to certain things is a source of reasons, but comes before them.”<sup>127</sup> This echoes the judgmentalist story as I have interpreted above, namely, that the import of the situation, the aspect of the situation that is emotionally relevant to the subject, is what is then taken as a fittingness reason. But recognizing aspects that are emotionally relevant is not in itself an emotion. “Emotionally relevant” is too vague. One has to further see the situation as or take the import of the situation as a reason to have a particular emotion-type that one judges to be fitting.

I emphasize that I am not critically assessing the “seeing as” approach as an account as to what emotions *are*. It is plausible to think that some emotions are similar to perception insofar as they can serve to give us information about the world. I may feel insulted by a comment and not understand why, and in that sense, my emotion is telling me that the comment is offensive – to me. My claims about the “seeing as” approach refer only to what it implies regarding what *causes* emotions, and I do not claim that emotions can be reduced to what causes them. Insofar as the

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<sup>127</sup> de Sousa, “Rationality of Emotions,” p. 139.

causal question is concerned, most of the “seeing as” accounts available in the literature are basically equivalent to the causal account implicit in the judgmentalist approach.

The “seeing as” approach claims to have an advantage over the judgmentalist approach in the case of recalcitrant emotions. When I have spider phobia, I see the spider as dangerous in a way that concerns me. But that concern amounts to nothing more than seeing myself as threatened by that spider. As D’Arms and Jacobson say:

We think it has not yet been adequately explained just what is meant by a construal or perception of danger. [...] if simply being afraid of something suffices to count as perceiving it as dangerous, then the claim that fear necessarily involves perception would be trivialized.<sup>128</sup>

In other words, the “seeing as” approach is not explanatory in the non-rational cases. There is not much of a point to say that I fear the situation *because* I see it as dangerous, if that “seeing as” is itself just a description of my fear. Without any further account of “seeing as”, the identification of a “seeing as” perspective with the recalcitrant emotional reaction does not say much about the emotional reaction. This trivialization is also the fault of Solomon’s implicit proposal to see recalcitrant emotions as stubbornly dogmatic judgments, as explained in the end of the answer to the third objection.

D’Arms and Jacobson thus further claim that saying that stable recalcitrance amounts to “recurring thoughts that conflict with the judgments one sincerely

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<sup>128</sup> D’Arms and Jacobson, “Recalcitrant Emotion,” pp. 130-131.

avows,” does not explain “why recalcitrance should occur at all.”<sup>129</sup> That is, the “seeing as” approach accounts for stable recalcitrance in terms of a disposition to have recurrent thoughts in certain circumstances. And so, the “seeing as” approach needs to account for this recurrence of thoughts or for this “seeing as” disposition (such as the prejudiced dispositions that are normally referred to by the “seeing as” approach, for example, to see black people as contempt-provoking or homosexuals as disgust-provoking).

D’Arms and Jacobson warn that without such an explanation for recalcitrance, the cause seems to lie in the thoughts involved in the emotion, for example, in the concept “spider” that is involved in my fear of the spider I somehow see as dangerous. “This makes emotional recalcitrance a strange sort of brute fact about certain concepts: that we tend to have recalcitrant, affect-laden thoughts involving them.”<sup>130</sup>

Note also, that without an explanation as to why or how come do I see the spider as fear-provoking despite judging it to be harmless, the seeing as metaphor for emotions fails again. “Seeing as” advocates liken recalcitrance to an optical illusion.<sup>131</sup> I know the Muller-Lyer lines are equal in length, yet I still see one as longer than the other. This is supposed to be analogous to seeing the spider as fear provoking despite knowing it is harmless.

But there is one important difference. When I find out what is the causal explanation of the Muller-Lyer illusion or what causes a hologram to look like a

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<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 142. D’Arms and Jacobson direct this objection against judgmentalism, but given the quasijudgmentalist account claims that emotions involves evaluative thoughts and therefore concepts, this objection goes against quasijudgmentalism as well. In any case, in the paper, D’Arms and Jacobson address their criticism mainly against quasijudgmentalism and point to the similarities of that approach to Judgmentalism.

<sup>131</sup> Although they reject the “seeing as” approach, D’Arms and Jacobson still want to hold the analogy between recalcitrance and optical illusion, see *Ibid.*, p. 142.

person, I can still see the lines as different in length or the hologram as a person but the “magic” is gone. I will measure myself the length of the lines in amusement, I will put my hands through the hologram in delight, but I will not touch the spider to enjoy its harmlessness or warmly hug the homosexual I cannot help finding repulsive or rush to introduce the lovely black woman to my brother.

This experiential difference rests on a conceptual difference: Knowing I see an illusion normally involves knowing what the illusion consists in, what caused it. Knowing my emotion is recalcitrant, conversely, involves ignorance of the causal explanation for the recalcitrance. It is that ignorance that sustains emotional recalcitrance. Presumably, replacing that ignorance with knowledge of the causal explanation of recalcitrance will kill its “magic.” Can the “seeing as” approach provide such a causal explanation whose knowledge would resolve the recalcitrance? As long as we do not have the causal explanation for recalcitrance, we have to hold our judgment regarding this analogy between illusion and recalcitrance.<sup>132</sup>

D’Arms and Jacobson have noted that they “suspect” the difference between judgmentalism and the “seeing as” approach, which they call “quasijudgmentalism,” is largely terminological.<sup>133</sup> They identify Solomon as a quasijudgmentalist, given the dogmatic nature of his emotion-judgments do not strictly require assent, as described above. And they say that other judgmentalists could probably be

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<sup>132</sup> D’Arms and Jacobson mention two disanalogies with perception other than the ones I argued for: “[...]the lack of dedicated emotional organs, and the fact that one need not be in the presence of the object of one’s occurrent emotions.” “Moralistic Fallacy,” p. 67, fn. 5.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67, fn. 4.

interpreted as quasijudgmentalists.<sup>134</sup> Indeed, even Martha Nussbaum says that the intentionality of emotions, what they are about, “embodies a way of seeing”.<sup>135</sup>

What I tried to show in this sub-section, is that D’Arms and Jacobson’s suspicion is largely correct. Insofar as the causal explanation for rational emotions is concerned, the judgmentalist approach and the “seeing as” approach are equivalent. The first involves reason and taking that reason personally under a practical identity; the second involves reason and certain subjective concerns. Whatever terminology is used, the causal explanation of operatively-rational emotions is a reason explanation.

Insofar as recalcitrant emotions are concerned, the “seeing as” terminology may prove to be more fruitful than the judgmentalist one, provided we can find a more rich “seeing as” explanation for recalcitrance. There are in fact explanatory “seeing as” accounts available in the literature that provide a causal explanation for “seeing as” disposition. Those are the accounts of Amélie Rorty, Ronald de Sousa and Jonathan Lear. I discuss these accounts in chapter 2.

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<sup>134</sup> D’Arms and Jacobson, “Recalcitrant Emotion,” p. 130, fn. 9.

<sup>135</sup> Martha Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 27.

### 3. Deliberative Avowal of Emotional Reactions

In this last section, I want to explore a family of cases where operative-reason-explanation is particularly forceful. These are cases that involve explicit reflection that terminate in a critically endorsed judgment. A subject may find herself reflecting on how she should emote in two kinds of circumstances.

In some circumstances, I find myself uncertain as to what to feel, while knowing I should feel something. These are usually cases where my understanding of the situation is somehow lacking or itself demands reflection. These are cases where not knowing what to think is accompanied by not knowing what to feel.<sup>136</sup>

Other circumstances are those when, following my emotional reaction I am confronted with criticism, coming either from myself or from my peers. In such cases, I may find myself encouraged to bring into question my inclination to assent my emotion-judgment and reflect whether or not my emotion is justified. My pre-reflective and spontaneous emotional reaction is now up for critical endorsement or rejection, for judgment in the demanding sense.

In what follows, I shall describe this explicit reflection and the manner in which it affects the subject's emotional. My account is based on Richard Moran's discussion in his book *Authority and Estrangement*. In the conclusion of this chapter I will claim that this family of cases (of explicitly reflective judgment) renders the operative-reason-explanation a possible and sometime even the plausible explanation for certain emotional reactions.

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<sup>136</sup> For example, I left my husband for a new love after many years of misery and frustration, which was evident to my best friend. But my friend does not seem to be happy for me. Instead, she is critical of my unmitigated happiness, saying I am either heartless or not in touch with my feelings. I am not sure whether my friend is patronizing and moralizing and perhaps even jealous, or whether she is indeed on my side and is concerned for my emotional well being and I should follow her advice and go to therapy. I am not sure what to think of her and so I am not sure how I should feel about her. Should I be upset and disappointed or should I be grateful and perhaps even guilty for my doubts?

## A. Distinctively First-Personal Rational Deliberation

When in a state of emotional uncertainty, I do not feel anything particular yet and so I am available to reflect. But when I am encouraged to reflect on an already existing emotional state, I need to make myself available, so to speak. The moment of calling my emotion-judgment into question involves a kind of “stepping back” from it, in order to examine its justification. Moran quotes Korsgaard:

[...] our capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental activities is also a capacity to distance ourselves from them, and to call them into question. I perceive, and I find myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn't dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I believe? Is this perception really a *reason* to believe?<sup>137</sup>

Moran borrows Korsgaard's metaphor of “stepping back” for the case of belief and applies it to the case of emotion. This is because, like Scanlon, Moran models emotional attitudes on the case of belief and intentional action.<sup>138</sup> Indeed, as discussed in the answer to the second objection, beliefs and intentional actions are often pre-reflective and spontaneous. In that sense, calling a belief into question is analogous to calling an emotion into question.

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<sup>137</sup> Korsgaard quoted by Moran, *Authority and Estrangement*, p. 142.

<sup>138</sup> That Moran models emotional attitudes on the case of belief is evident all along *Authority and Estrangement*. This is particularly evident in his discussion on the Transparency Condition (whereby the question “Do I believe that P?” is transparent to the question (Should I believe that P? or “Is P true?”), where he applies the same condition to the case emotion. *Ibid.*, p. 63. I will discuss the limitation of this transparency analogy later in this section. The analogy with intentions for intentional action is also evident along the book, see for example *Ibid.*, pp. 126-127, 131-132, 146.

Moran elaborates on Korsgaard's metaphor:

'Stepping back' from an impulse of mine is a metaphor of distancing, obviously; but also one of observation and bringing into view, and of separation and distinguishing (as in the sense that this impulse is one thing and I am another), and of confrontation and facing (suggesting something unavoidably in my path). But in addition, it is not only an image of the reorienting of one's *position*, for the idea of 'stepping back' also presumes a prior situation of ongoing action. Thus, 'stepping back' involves the halting of one's forward movement, the interruption of an action, suspending one's emotion in pursuit of some aim.<sup>139</sup>

When I "step back" to reassess what I should feel, I do not suddenly stop emoting. If I question my anger I can still feel my cheeks warm; if I question my guilt I haven't thereby exonerated myself. But when I question my emotion I withhold my otherwise automatic inclination to assent to its judgment. I thus suspend, at that moment, my emotional engagement with the world.

In other words, my emotional state is still a psychological fact about me, and I can testify to that fact. But I temporarily withdraw my agency from that state and its motivational force. At that moment of "stepping back" my emotion is not something that *I* do, since *I* am about to do something else, namely reflectively examine the reasons for emoting. This reorientation of my agency from direct emotional engagement with the world to reflective deliberation thus comes hand in hand with an intentional alienation from my emotional state.

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<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143. Emphasis in original.

My emotional state of mind whose motivating force and engaged expression has been suspended may still accompany me in my deliberation. At any moment during deliberation I can “check” my emotional state, and it may well be that the now alienated emotion will still be present.<sup>140</sup> But that emotion would not take part in or influence my deliberation. As Moran says:

I may not be able at the moment to ‘cast if from my mind,’ but I can bracket its role in my explicit reasoning. This is a genuine empirical difference in my state of mind, [...] an expression of a capacity that is reserved for first-personal reflection.<sup>141</sup>

I shall discuss shortly how the reflection about the justification of an emotion is first-personal. In the above quote Moran notes that the very moment of “stepping back” is an expression of a distinctively first-personal capacity. The emotion in question is *mine* to engage with, it is something that *I* do. And it is only me that can make myself withdraw from that my emotional expressive engagement in order to reflect on the justification of the emotion. In other words, it is only me that can re-orientate my agency and its current activities.

Reflection is first of all directed at the exterior situation and involves deliberation in terms of reasons of fittingness. In cases of emotional uncertainty, the

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<sup>140</sup> This kind of “checking” is very different to reflection and will be discussed at the end of this section.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 146.

“deliberative inquiry about how to feel, how to respond”,<sup>142</sup> looks to the circumstances of the situation and makes the import of the situation explicit.

In the spontaneous and pre-reflective emotional reaction the psychologically causal dimension of reason operates on “auto-pilot”. Deliberation suspends that psychologically causal process. When I deliberate, I examine reasons of fit in their objective aspect, abstracted from the subject’s psychology. Deliberation examines the rational relations between the contents of the described import of the situation and norms of fittingness.

This deliberation in terms of reasons is aimed at “making up [my] mind, coming to some settled response [I] can respect, or at least make sense of.”<sup>143</sup> That is, deliberation is aimed at the explicit and aware decision as to which objectively-considered reasons of fit I will take as my operative reasons, which would in turn be a causally efficacious psychological state. Similarly, in cases of reflective re-examination of an existing emotional state of mind, I re-approach the situation with a “deliberative spirit”.<sup>144</sup>

In what follow, I present Moran’s account of deliberation, using the terminology of fittingness reasons and taking-personally reasons, which Moran does not use. This is because Moran models emotional attitudes on beliefs. But beliefs refer to objective norms of rationality that are universally held by all rational agents, whereas norms of fittingness are more culture and subject dependent. Furthermore, reasons to believe that are accepted as true need not be taken personally so as to produce conviction. Reasons of fit, conversely, must be taken personally in order to

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<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

emote. My presentation or rather adaptation of Moran's account takes into consideration the limits of the analogy between beliefs and emotions.

Moran explains why this deliberative inquiry is of a distinctively first-personal nature. That is, my relationship with my deliberation is different to the relationship anybody else may have with my deliberation.<sup>145</sup> When I am criticized via considerations of emotion fittingness, I do not simply adopt another person's norms of fittingness and her way of applying those norms to the situation at hand.

Rather, I examine for myself the various norms of fittingness I believe in and how or whether they apply to the situation at hand and what reasons of fit they yield. Even if I aspire to interpret the situation in a normatively acceptable manner, my justifications for emoting will ultimately incorporate *my* understanding of how things are in the situation exterior to me.<sup>146</sup>

In order for my description of the situation to provide objectively valid fittingness reasons that I could then weigh against each other in objectively-rational deliberation, I have to be first personally *committed* to that description. In other words, my deliberative justifications rely on my commitment to properly understand "how things are out there."<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> Moran characterizes the distinctively first-personal through comparison with the third-personal perspective. In what follows, I sum-up and interpret Moran's positive characterizations of the first personal character of deliberation. I do not follow Moran's argumentation for his views and his manner of arriving at that characterization. I collect those positive characterizations especially from chapters 2-4 of *Authority and Estrangement*. I will then compare the Moranian articulation of the first personal perspective to the third-personal perspective. The majority of Moran's articulations of the first personal perspective use the terminology of beliefs. But since he models emotional attitudes on the case of belief, and since some of his examples are explicitly of emotions, my presentation of Moran's views will use only the terminology of emotions. The references in the footnotes will usually be in terms of belief, but they should be taken as references about emotional attitudes.

<sup>146</sup> To say it in "seeing as" terminology: The reasons that play a role in my deliberation come from what I recognize as various ways of seeing or construing the import of the situation. I do not merely adopt the "seeing as" perspective of the one who criticized me.

<sup>147</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 150.

Describing the situation “out there” and objectively arriving at normatively good reasons of fittingness is not enough. This is in contrast to deliberation about belief. When I ask myself the deliberative question “What am I to believe?” I turn to the exterior situation in order to determine what is true.<sup>148</sup> When it comes to whether or not I believe the door is open, I check the situation “out there” to see whether the door is open and I will find conclusive reason. But when I examine whether or not I should be angry I may find “out there” more than one reason of fit.

Another limitation of the analogy between deliberation in the case of belief and deliberation in the case of emotions has to do with the nature of the deliberative question. The question “What am I to believe?” is impersonal. Given it is answerable via considerations of objective truth, my answer should be aligned with the answers of other rational agents asking themselves the same question. When it comes to whether or not I believe the door is open, my checking to see whether the door is indeed open involves expecting that any other believer that would check the exterior situation for herself would end up with the same belief. The question can be articulated in an impersonal way and still have the same meaning: “What to believe?”

In the case of emotions, conversely, the question “What to feel?” sounds strange. Indeed Moran fluctuates between the impersonal formulation and the more natural formulation: “What should *I* feel?”. One cannot answer the emotional question in the name of her peers. People are allowed to have different norms of fittingness, to take personally only one or two of them, or maybe none at all. The emotional question – even in the rational and normative case discussed in this chapter – is ultimately a personal question.

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<sup>148</sup> See Moran’s discussion on Transparency in *Ibid.*, pp. 60-63.

As explicated in the previous section (in the answer to the first objection), in order to emote, the subject has to take a certain reason of fittingness personally under a practical identity. That is how *a* reason of fittingness becomes *my* operative reason. And this is how one (or sometimes more) reasons of fittingness are selected from the available reasons. Emotional attitudes are analogous to beliefs insofar as the fittingness judgment they embed is a belief. But they are not mere beliefs, as they also involve personal engagement via the subject's personal reasons that stem from her practical identity.

Moran's account, which analogizes emotions and beliefs, seems to be only about deliberation of objectively valid reasons of fit. I thus enlarge Moran's account and add that in first-personal deliberation about what *I* should feel the explicit reflection on what I should take personally. That is to say, I do not just step back from my emotion to re-examine the exterior situation. I also examine myself and my commitments to certain norms of fittingness under the relevant practical identity.

When I re-orient my agency away from my emotional state, my deliberating self can regard my emoting self as an object. I can then ask myself reflectively: why am I taking this specific norm of fittingness personally? What practical identity of mine is here in question? Should I, under this practical identity, be committed to this norm of fittingness and take personally the reason of fit (considered in the objective aspect of its content) personally? It is the taking-it-personally consideration that chooses between the available reasons of fittingness.

I am thus first-personally committed not just to the description of the "how things are out there," but also to the norms of fittingness that accord best with my practical identity. And so when my deliberation ends with a conclusion of how I should emote, I am also committed to that conclusion as a decision, as a resolution

to take a certain fittingness reason that I considered in its objective dimension as my operative reason.

Operative reasons are psychological states have causal effect on my psychology. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, rational agents have a causal disposition for their psychology to respond in the right way to operative reasons. If I am a rational emoting agent, then the end of deliberation is the emotional reaction itself, an emotion I am first personally committed to. There is no further action I must take in order to execute my decision to emote in a certain way. No further self-control is needed in order to turn the conclusion of my deliberation into the emotional reaction I decided I should have.<sup>149</sup>

The very arrival at such a decision gives rise to my emotional reaction. In a sense, my decision and my reaction are one and the same. That is, the result of deliberation is not just an objectively-valid-reason-description of how I should emote; it is the operative-reason-description under which I actually emote.<sup>150</sup>

This is what Moran means by first-personal *immediacy*. Nobody else but me will be affected in that manner by my deliberation. And nobody else but me can deliberate about how I should emote in a manner that would have this immediate

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<sup>149</sup> Moran makes this point for the case of beliefs and desires in *Ibid.*, pp. 119-120. For example: "When the desire is (already) the expression of the person's reasons, there is no *need* for exerting any control over it." He also says in regard to intention and belief, which he claims to be analogous in their process of reasoning: "In what must be the standard situation of deliberation [...] the person's conclusion *is* his belief or intention, not something he now needs to find a way to impose upon himself. Here he is not "working on" his states of mind, the way he might with respect to another person, nor is he trying to produce results in himself." *Ibid.*, pp. 131-132. As said above, Moran sees the case of belief (and also of intention) as analogous to the case of emotions.

<sup>150</sup> This is analogous to Anscombe's famous formula about intentional action as "action under description," for example in G. E. M. Anscombe, *Intention, Intention*, 2nd Ed. [1963]. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), §19. Moran makes the analogy between intentional action and belief in Moran, *Authority and Estrangement*, pp. 126-127.

effect. Deliberation is the activity of an agency that takes her reason-reflection to have constitutive (and thereby causal) power on how she shall emote.<sup>151</sup>

And so, when I deliberate how I should emote, I do not merely expect to reach a decision or a resolution with the hope that I shall manage to comply with that resolution. As Moran says:

To take oneself to be in a position to ask and answer this [deliberative] question about one's belief or intention [or emotional attitude]<sup>152</sup> is to take oneself to be in a position to *make* something true in one's answering it. [...] reflective (deliberative) questioning takes upon itself the capacity to play a constituting role in determining the psychological facts themselves.<sup>153</sup>

This first-personal capacity to form or modify my own emotions through deliberation, to be an agent that emotes under my own reflectively endorsed reason-description, is also an expression of what Moran calls first-personal *authority*. To put the point in colloquial terms, when I deliberately constitute my own emotional state of mind, I am, and nobody else is, in charge of me. What I think of a certain situation and of its emotional import is up to me, and it is "my business" what considerations of fittingness count as reasons for me.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> On the constitutive role of deliberation in formation of a state of mind see *Ibid.*, pp. 55-60. Moran here discusses the case of uncertainty of how to act, what to believe and then how to emote. The formation of emotion by deliberation in the case of emotional uncertainty is discussed in pp. 57-60.

<sup>152</sup> I added "or emotional attitude" since, as mentioned above, Moran's account on emotions is modeled on his account of beliefs.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 146.

<sup>154</sup> See for example *Ibid.*, p. 123, p. 140.

I am *autonomous* in making up my mind. Even when my deliberation was initiated by someone else's criticism, that criticism is now articulated as reasons for my consideration. I am the author of the description under which I emotionally react.<sup>155</sup> And since my description under which I emotionally react is a reason-description arrived at through rational deliberation, the authority I exercise is the authority of my reason as a rational agent over my emotions.<sup>156</sup>

Moran also speaks of first-personal *responsibility*. I am responsible for my emotional reaction, not just in the sense of accountability, given I am the author of my reaction. I assume responsibility to understand how things are and where I stand (under my relevant practical identity) in relation to them and to react accordingly.

When my deliberative inquiry has been initiated by someone else's criticism, I come to understand that criticism through deliberation. It becomes my self-criticism, and I come to own it as my reason to change my mind about the situation.<sup>157</sup> I deliberately re-examine the situation with the prospect of taking the objectively-endorsed reason as my operative reason and I am thus first-personally

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<sup>155</sup> I base this interpretation on phrases such as: "[...] the person can be seen as the author of the state of mind itself, in the sense of being the person who originates it [...]" *Ibid.*, p. 113. And also: "a resolution of which he is the author" *Ibid.*, p. 79.

<sup>156</sup> Moran claims that this authorship of the description that results from deliberation is ultimately under the authority of reason, given that deliberation is done in terms of reasons: "In belief as in intentional action, the stance of the rational agent is the stance where reasons that justify are at issue, and hence the stance from which one declares the authority of reason over one's belief and action." *Ibid.*, p. 127. Reason is a capacity all rational agents share, so in a sense, I am emotionally reacting under the authority of something that transcends me, namely my particular whims and prejudices or my sense of "convenience, fear, or fashion" *Ibid.*, p. 64. It is, nonetheless, *my* reason that engages in deliberation in reference to *my* practical identity and the personal considerations to which they give rise. And hence it is *my* authority as the rational and practical author of my emotional reaction.

<sup>157</sup> Cognitive Behavioral Therapy presumably works along these lines. The patient comes to see she was suffering from certain false beliefs about situations, distorted norms of fittingness and one or more unreasonably demanding practical identities that grossly deviate from the norm.

responsible to change my mind according to reflectively endorsed reasons (both of fittingness and of personal desire and obligation under a practical identity).<sup>158</sup>

That is to say, I do not merely react and then *explain* myself referring to various states of mind as operative reasons, say that I am angry because I believe that he has wronged me, or I am afraid because I see the situation as dangerous. Such explanatory reasons do not express that I think I am right to be angry, and that I identify with my anger. They merely describe what goes on my mind. Somebody else may be able to explain or interpret my anger in similar terms.

If I give merely explanatory reasons, I consider my anger as a psychological fact related to other facts about my states of mind. Conversely, when I deliberate, my reasons for my anger stem from my understanding of the exterior situation itself and from my finding certain norms of fittingness as relevant to my practical identity. I am committed to that understanding as it is up to me. My reasons are *justifying* reasons that *guide* my emotional reaction. I am thus responsible for my anger as justified anger. And nobody else can justify my anger for me – since my anger, to be justified, needs to stem from my commitments to the way things are and to the relevant norms of fittingness.<sup>159</sup>

The description under which I emote, the reasons that guided the formation of that description, the evaluation of those reasons and the commitments to “how things are out there” and to certain norms of fittingness as being part and parcel of my practical identity – are all mine. The first-personal commitment, immediacy, authority and responsibility that characterize my relationship to my deliberation

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<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.

<sup>159</sup> See Moran’s discussion on the difference between explanatory and justifying reasons in *Ibid.*, pp. 128-130.

also imply, each of them separately and all of them together, first-personal ownership.

## **B. Avowal and Freedom**

This first-personal capacity exercised in deliberation is “an ordinary ability to declare [myself]”<sup>160</sup>, to emote in a self-asserting manner. It is a form of *self-awareness*, namely awareness of my reflectively endorsed commitments. I am the one who constitutes those commitments and so my self-awareness requires no recourse to evidence or observation.<sup>161</sup>

It would be still misleading to say that I am right or wrong about whether or not I have these commitments. The relation between myself and my deliberately endorsed emotional reaction is categorical; I am the one that constitutes the reflective and endorsed emotion-judgment. It is up to me. I am the agency that gives rise to it, and it is “mine to retain or revoke”<sup>162</sup>. I cannot be wrong about what is categorically up to me. I can, however, reconsider my commitment to an emotional reaction and withdraw that commitment. The relevant value regarding the awareness of the descriptions under which I emote is thus *avowal* or *disavowal*.

As mentioned in the previous section, in the answer to the second objection, it is difficult to articulate the “choice” involved in spontaneous and pre-reflective emotional reactions. That is why we can feel passive in their creation, subject to their effect. But first-personal reflection in terms of reasons enables us, if all works well, to make an explicit choice. When avowal is successful, our emotional reactions

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<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86.

<sup>161</sup> Moran actually insists on the term “self-knowledge”. However, since the subject may be unaware of some crucial factors in her psychology that may have causal power on her commitments and so forth (as will be demonstrated in chapter 2), I prefer to use the term “self-awareness” that is less demanding and leaves room for unknown factors.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 89.

are explicitly our own doing. The emotion is no longer experienced as something that merely happens to us; rather it is us who “do what happens.”<sup>163</sup> Avowal enables us to emote under the description of which we are the authors.

Avowal or disavowal and the immediate effect they have on our emotions, give us the freedom to emote in a way we deliberately find justified. In other words, we do not just emote due to considerations we spontaneously *take to be* reasons, but rather, the operative reasons embedded in the avowed emotions have been explicitly assessed in their objective dimension by considering their content in reference and conformity to social norms of fittingness. That freedom is normally available to us. Its exercise is a sign of our mental health, which is effectively “rational health,” as Moran calls it.<sup>164</sup>

In alignment with the above discussion, I extend Moran’s concept of rational health beyond the avowal of reasons of fittingness. Our explicit decision to take certain considerations personally as *our* good reasons to emote – reasons we take personally – demonstrates that we identify with our avowed emotional reactions. Avowal is also avowal that we want to be the kind of person who emotes this way in these particular circumstances. We do not just take responsibility on our reasons as good reasons, but also for how they reflect on our practical identity.

At the moment of avowal, who we are, our self-image and what is meaningful to us under the relevant practical identities, is up to us. In that sense, avowal enables us to affirm or add a layer to our identity. As Korsgaard says (albeit not in the context of emotions): “[...] we give shape to our own identities and become the

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<sup>163</sup> This is to echo Anscombe’s famous formula for intentional action: “I do what happens.” See for example Anscombe, *Intention*, §29.

<sup>164</sup> Moran, *Authority and Estrangement*, p. 108. See also *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 60, 107, 136. See also preliminary comments in *Ibid.*, Preface, pp. xx-xxi, xxix-xxx

authors of ourselves.”<sup>165</sup> Avowal is not just a case of “I do what happens”, insofar as I emotive under my own description. It is also an action of self-reaffirmation, a moment where “I am what I feel.”<sup>166</sup>

### C. The Contrast with the Evidence-Based Third-Personal Perspective

This first-personal perspective of deliberation is to be distinguished from what Moran calls the theoretical or empirical third-personal perspective one can have toward oneself. Third-personal inquiry occurs when I ask myself “What *do* I feel?” and not “What *should* I feel?”. The emotional state already exists, and I ask myself – what is it?

This is a psychological question that takes my state of mind as an object of my inquiry, as if that state was one thing and I as an inquirer – another. This is why Moran describes such third-personal inquiries as “an essentially alienated relations to the self.”<sup>167</sup> The alienation involved is stronger than the one implied in the “stepping back” involved in first-personal deliberative inquiry. I do not merely detach myself from the emotion; I detach myself from any interventional role I may play in my emotional reality in general.

In other words, when I ask “What do I feel?” I objectify my emotional self and examine that object so as to see which emotion-description applies. This kind of inquiry treats my emotional state as evidence to be examined. I know I feel angry

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<sup>165</sup> Christine M. Korsgaard, “Self-Constitution and Irony: Comment on Jonathan Lear’s Tanner Lectures, Irony and Identity.” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Forthcoming).

<sup>166</sup> In terms of “seeing as”: Deliberation of reasons thus also entails considering the alternatives of how to see the situation as provoking certain emotions – in me. When I choose certain reasons over others, I also choose my relevant concerns that bear on the situation. The freedom available to us through the capacity of avowal is thus not only the freedom to consider reasons, but also the freedom for self-construal.

<sup>167</sup> Moran, *Authority and Estrangement*, p. 3. This is in contrast to the agency involved in the first personal inquiry.

since I experience the feeling empirically and may even say to myself: “Clearly I am angry”, attributing the emotion of anger to myself.

Even if only I can hear myself talking to myself, and even if only I experience this anger, my relationship to my anger is still third-personal, as long as I treat that anger as an object of my inquiry. My introspective awareness enables me to be an “expert witness,”<sup>168</sup> but my role is still that of a spectator of the emotional state.

In case I do not experience the emotion as intertwined with its description and my third-personal inquiry cannot be empirical in the straightforward sense – I can still inquire theoretically into my emotional state. That is, I may appeal to other evidence, such as certain physiological signs or certain behaviors. The theoretical third-personal perspective I can take toward my emotional state is like looking at myself in the mirror, so to speak.

If I feel that my face is becoming warm and my jaw muscles clenching I can infer that I am angry. If I also find myself shouting at someone and maybe closing my fist and even banging it on the wall, this behavior would also corroborate the inference that I am indeed angry. My friend that would see my face becoming red and tense and hear my shouting and so forth will also infer the same conclusion. Say he asked me “Why are you so angry?” and if I would shout back at him “I’m not angry!” neither of us would believe me, as all evidence goes against this declaration.

Whereas first personal deliberative inquiry is a rational search for justification of what I should feel, the empirical or theoretical third-personal inquiry looks for evidence. This evidence-based third-personal perspective, as I shall call it from now on, has thus a scientific flavor.

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<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4. I use the term “expert witness” only as a *metaphor* for introspective awareness that implies a certain privileged access one has to one’s psychological states (at least until another form of such access can be found). I do not invoke any analogy between introspection and perception.

It examines evidence against certain commonly known general rules of thumb about what emotions are linked with what physiology or behavior. When I regard myself, or others for that matter, as observable objects among other observable objects, I presuppose a kind of equalizing basis, a kind of uniformity among all rational subjects from the same social niche. The third-personal perspective assumes that we are all observable in some standard way. The goal of the evidence-based third personal inquiry is accordingly third-personal knowledge; it “terminates in a true description of my state”<sup>169</sup>. First-personal inquiry, on the other hand, terminates in either avowal or disavowal of my emotional state.

I sum-up the rational perspectives a subject can take toward her emotional state in the table below:

<b>Distinctively First-Personal Rational</b>	Rational deliberation that considers reasons in their objective dimension and terminates with taking a reflectively-endorsed reason as an operative reason.
<b>Theoretical Third-Personal “Scientific” or Evidence-Based</b>	“Looking in the mirror” for evidence that is available to all and inferring, in reference to general rules of thumb, what is my emotional state.
<b>Empirical Third-Personal Introspective “Expert Witness”</b>	Introspective awareness that takes place in time – witnessing what emotion I currently feel.

I refer to these perspectives in the following chapter of the thesis. In chapter 3, I add one more perspective one can take toward one’s psychological states and in regard to a here-and-now emotional reaction. Importantly, when I use the term

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<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

“avowal” in the thesis I *always* refer to Moran’s story of distinctively first-personal rational deliberation presented in this section (with my slight modifications that make Moran’s story more accurately applicable to the case of emotions).

## Conclusion

The operatively-rational psychological explanation for emotional reactions only works for what I called operatively-rational emotions. Most operatively-rational emotions are spontaneous and pre-reflective emotional reactions. They are caused by the grasp of an operative reason of fit that is taken personally in reference to the subject's practical identity. This explanation thus takes into account only the psychological and causally efficacious dimension of reason, to be distinguished from reasons whose content relates to other reasons via objectively valid inferential relations. In that sense, operative-rationality does not imply success in being objectively rational in the stronger normative sense. Operative reasons can be bad reasons.

For each singular emotional reaction we can ask the interventionalist question for singular causation: what if things had been different? If the subject did not have the psychological state of grasping a certain operative reason of fit – the emotional reaction would not have occurred. Indeed, the emotion subsides if the subject revokes that operative reason of fit through distinctively rational deliberation. If the emotion is recalcitrant, we can assume it was not caused by the grasp of a reason of fit. The operatively-rational explanation cannot provide the causal explanation for non-rational emotions (what is the psychological causal explanation for recalcitrance is the topic of chapters 2-5).

The second causal condition for a singular emotional reaction is the taking-it-personally factor. If a subject had not taken personally that grasped reason of fit, the emotional reaction would have not occurred. Indeed, sometimes, a subject can stop taking personally a reason of fit and thereby stop emoting. Other time, a subject may self-manage the taking-it-personally factor by recourse to extrinsic reason and

suppress her emotion. The emotion does not thereby subside. It is only “pushed away” from conscious thought. That kind of alienation is pathological. In chapter 3, I provide a more elaborate account of operatively-rational suppression and its possible pathological consequences.

The operatively-rational account for *singular* emotional reactions is thus explanatory according to Woodward’s account of singular causation, which was briefly presented in the introduction and is presupposed in the thesis. This singular psychological explanation is not, however, a scientific account and involves no causal laws or generalizations. The psychological level of explanation for the singular emotional reaction *of a particular individual* includes causal factors that are highly subjective. In particular the “taking-it-personally” factor involved in singular emotional reactions, without which there is no emotion, is too subjective and changeable to be scientifically studied.

We cannot collect evidence available from the theoretical third-personal perspective, evidence that would, in principle, be available to anybody, in order to prove the validity of a *particular* explanation for a singular operatively-rational emotional reaction to a specific here-and-now situation. Are we then entitled to say that this operatively-rational explanation, described here in general terms, can apply to certain singular emotional reactions? I will conclude this chapter by arguing for the claim that we are. The operatively-rational explanation for singular emotional reactions is rendered a possible and sometimes the plausible explanation, by using our empirical third-personal perspective on ourselves as “expert witnesses” that have introspective awareness on our psychological states.

In deliberation, I consider the *content* of my propositional attitudes. These attitudes are: my beliefs about the here-and-now situation, my beliefs about certain

norms of fittingness, my desires for a certain self-image or for the well-being of others, and my values that relate to the relevant practical identity. I consider the contents of those attitudes as reasons that stand in a logical or inferential relation to one another. In other words, in deliberation, I consider reasons in their objective dimension.

However, even if my deliberation qua bringing to light inferential relations between the contents of my attitudes is objective and in that respect *timelessly* valid, my deliberation also has a subjective psychological dimension. That is, I “listen” to myself, so to speak, weighing reasons against each other in a process that takes time. That is to say, I have introspective awareness of my process of deliberation in “real time.”

From that introspective perspective, I am an “expert witness” as I “listen” to myself arriving at a decision to take certain deliberated-upon reasons, reasons that stand in objectively valid inferential relation to other reasons, and make them into my operative reasons. Whereas in the formation of a spontaneous emotional reaction I am not explicitly aware of my grasp of an operative reason, the end of deliberation is marked by my introspective awareness of my acceptance of a reason. I am introspectively aware that I am turning a reason in its objective dimension into a subjective operative reason.

The rational person has the disposition for their psychology to be causally effected in the right way by the accepted and grasped conclusions of her deliberation. And indeed, I am introspectively aware of my taking a reason to be an operative reason, and I am immediately further introspectively aware that my emotional state has changed accordingly. In other words, I can change my psychological state and I can be introspectively aware of that change and of my

having made that change. I have thus just “witnessed,” introspectively, that my acceptance of an operative reason has caused (qua psychological state) my new modified psychological state

I emphasize that I am not giving here an analysis that reduces reasoning to a psychologically causal process. I am careful to avoid the problem of psychologism. My claim is that reasons in general and reflective reasoning in particular have two dimensions: the objective or the logical on the one hand, and the subjective and psychological on the other hand. The first is objectively-rational and the second is operatively-rational and has causal effects on our psychology.

The empirical third-personal perspective mentioned above can thus be introspectively aware not just of one’s emotional state, but also of:

- 1) The psychological dimension of rational deliberation that takes place in time. One can “listen” to oneself weighing reasons (in their objective sense) against each other.
- 2) The resolution to take a certain objectively considered reason as an operative reason.
- 3) The singular occasion where taking a consideration as an operative reason made a difference to one’s psychological state – in the right way.

So, I claim that this introspective awareness, this “listening” to one’s deliberation qua experience that takes place in time, qualifies as empirical data to which each of us has access insofar as each of us are “expert witnesses” of our own self-aware psychological processes. We are all familiar with avowal qua experience that takes place in “real time” and in particular with disavowal whereby we are introspectively self-aware of our capacity to change our own emotional state

through acceptance of operative reasons (This is not to say that avowal is infallible. As will be discussed in the next chapter, avowal may be fallible and work in the service of the subject's emotional pathologies).

The normal experience of avowal thus makes us familiar with the operative-reason-explanation as a *possible* causal explanation for singular emotional reactions. We cannot know whether a present spontaneous reaction was indeed caused by the prior grasp of the reason given for it. But we are entitled to suppose that it *may have been caused* by that taken-personally operative reason. If that spontaneous reaction seems on reflection fitting the situation and reflects well on our self-image and practical identity, then we are entitled to suppose that this reaction *probably was* caused in the manner described by the operative-reason-explanation.

I will, however, qualify this claim in chapter 5. I will there claim that even for the cases of operatively-rational emotions, the operative-reason-explanation often does not tell the whole causal story. I will claim in chapter 5 that many operatively-rational emotions are also caused by other factors, which are distinctively non-rational.

## Chapter 2:

### Developmental Etiologies of “Seeing As” Dispositions

I claimed in the previous chapter that the judgmentalist and the seeing-as approaches basically provide the same causal explanation for singular emotional reactions. That is, operatively-rational emotions are singularly caused by taking personally operative reasons of fittingness. Recalcitrant emotions, however, that are not caused by the grasp of reasons of fit, pose a problem for both approaches. In those cases, the judgmentalist approach speaks of a dogmatic non-rational judgment and the seeing-as approach of a stubborn seeing-as perspective. Both approaches thus give, as was explained in the first chapter, a merely trivial explanation for recalcitrant emotions.

In this chapter, I examine other accounts of the seeing-as approach that causally explain what brings about such stubborn perspectives in the first place. These accounts consider such stubborn perspectives as behavioral dispositions causally explained by a developmental etiology particular to the emoting subject.

By “behavioral dispositions” I do not mean “merely behavioral.” Spider phobia entails much more than a mere “pressing” on a fear “button” whenever a spider is around. The phobic can feel afraid when imagining spiders in a spider-free environment, say during a conversation she has with her therapist about her phobia. The phobic deliberately avoids places likely to contain spiders. That is, the phobia enters as a consideration in the subject’s practical reasoning.

The seeing-as developmental explanation could potentially explain a larger class of emotions I call “emotional patterns,” of which recalcitrant emotions is a sub-

class. These are singular emotional reactions across which we can trace a pattern that persists over time and conspicuously involve a repetitive characteristic. Sometimes both the emotion-type and the circumstances in which it occurs repeat themselves, such as recalcitrant fear of spiders. Other times, only the emotion-type conspicuously repeats itself, like in cases of individuals that “tend” to be, in general, angry or guilty more than others. If these emotional patterns cannot be explained physiologically, then those “tendencies” could also be considered as behavioral seeing-as dispositions (like the tendency to see situations as anger provoking).

Not all emotional patterns are pathological. Some may be perfectly normative and rational and/or not disturb the subject’s normal course of life. In fact, many if not most emotions probably figure in such patterns. Most self-reflective people ascribe to themselves emotional patterns such as: I tend to be insulted easily, or I freak-out whenever I see a cat in a remotely dangerous situation, or I am an angry driver and so forth. Even operatively-rational emotions may belong to a pattern. Whatever causes the pattern in such cases thus partly causes the subject to take personally one reason of fit over another.

The first section of this chapter introduces a different kind of a pathological emotional pattern, which is basically ignored in the emotion literature. These are non-rational emotional reactions that repeat the same emotion-type and are misleadingly avowed as fitting through first-personal deliberation by the emoting subject. The first section examines this pathological emotional pattern through the discussion and examples of Jonathan Lear.

The second section deals with stable recalcitrance through a representative example given by Amélie Rorty. That section will also present and explicate Rorty’s proposed developmental causal explanation for seeing-as behavioral dispositions.

That explanation is primarily presented for pathological emotional patterns, but is effectively applicable, as will be explained, also to non-pathological cases of emotional patterns. Rorty's account will be compared to the developmental accounts of Ronald de Sousa and Jonathan Lear. As will be shown, all these accounts rely on extended rational capacities of the emoting subject.

The third section will assess and criticize the developmental causal explanations. I will show that these accounts are very similar to early Freud's theory of neurosis. Although early Freud's neurosis were hysteria and obsession, the general structure of these psychological symptoms is the same as the one form distinctively emotional symptoms, as discussed by the etiological account.<sup>170</sup>

In the fourth section I will criticize the developmental accounts using Ian Hacking's, Paul Ricoeur's and later Freud's arguments against the developmental hypothesis. I will there show that de Sousa's account can potentially avoid this criticism. In the texts to which I refer, Freud, Hacking and Ricoeur do not discuss distinctively emotional symptoms, such as recalcitrance. Their arguments are nevertheless applicable to cases of distinctively emotional symptoms.

I will conclude the chapter with the claim that the developmental accounts rationally re-constructs an etiology that does not in effect tell the actual causal story of the formation of an emotional symptom. Although insights can be drawn from these developmental accounts as well as from their criticisms, we need a different causal explanation for emotional patterns.

In this chapter, then, I begin to examine pathological emotional reactions by invoking Freud's theories of neurosis and the philosophy of psychoanalysis. The

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<sup>170</sup> I also want to alert the reader that whenever I talk about symptoms in this thesis, I always refer to psychological and in particular emotional symptoms and never to physiological symptoms.

philosophy of psychoanalysis does not devote a separate discussion for distinctively emotional symptoms. Many times they will talk about psychological symptoms in general. This is way I allow myself, as my general methodology in the thesis, to apply the various arguments and discussions in the literature about psychological symptoms in general to the case of emotions. My examples, arguments and conclusions, however, are confined to emotional symptoms alone.

### 1. Pathologies of Avowal

The first chapter ended with Moran's discussion of avowal.<sup>171</sup> Moran claims that the capacity to first-personally and deliberately avow or disavow an emotional reaction is our way to secure and foster our mental health. However, as Jonathan Lear has demonstrated, even explicit and reflective avowal, does not necessarily indicate that the subject is free in deliberation in the manner described in the first chapter.<sup>172</sup>

The subject may be convinced she is normatively and rationally justified in her emotional reaction, yet her reflective endorsement may not be primarily guided by reason. In other words, even the clearest case of emotions as judgments, cannot ensure that the reasons involved in the emotion were indeed its primary cause.<sup>173</sup>

Lear thus talks of a "pathology of avowal",<sup>174</sup> whereby the subject's sense of having been guided by reason alone in her reflection on the situation is illusory. The typical case of pathology of avowal is an emotional reaction whose emotion-type

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<sup>171</sup> As mentioned before, I use the term "avowal" in the thesis only in Moran's sense of first-personal deliberation.

<sup>172</sup> Jonathan Lear, "Avowal and Unfreedom," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. LXIX no. 2 (Sept., 2004), pp. 448-454.

<sup>173</sup> Lear does not articulate his claim in causal terms, but my interpretation is nevertheless implied in his text.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 451.

frequently occurs in other emotional reactions of the same subject. These are cases where the specific deliberately-avowed emotional reaction is in fact an instantiation of an emotion-type pattern. In what follows I interpret and elaborate Lear's account of pathology of avowal using the terminology laid out in the previous chapter.

Lear tells about his patient Mr. A ("A" for "Avowal"), who "lived in a world of betrayal."<sup>175</sup> That is, he repeatedly felt betrayed, or had the behavioral disposition to feel betrayed. Each time he felt betrayed, the situation exterior to him provided him reasons to feel betrayed, reasons that figured in his propositional attitudes or reasoned-emotion of the form: "I feel betrayed that ....".

Mr. A was thoroughly convinced that his emotions were justified by the situations in which they arose. On each occasion, he first-personally avowed his reasons as good ones, that is, he regarded his reasoning as rational and normative. And on each occasion he assured himself that his taking these reflectively-endorsed operative reasons personally reflected well his values and endorsed practical identity.

In other words, Mr. A experienced himself as deliberating reasons and then judging which ones he should take personally. But in fact, he dogmatically construed the situation as a situation of betrayal and of himself as betrayed *prior* to any reflection. Mr. A's judgment about which reasons he should take personally, was effectively predetermined by his obstinate construal, about which there was no genuine reflection.

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<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 450.

Whereas Mr. A experienced himself as reflecting on the import of a situation exterior to him, on reasons that are independent of his particular mind, in fact, that import and those reasons were more up to him than he was willing to admit. His activity when justifying his emotional reactions was much more self-involving than objectively-rational reflection is supposed to be. Effectively, Mr. A manufactured his reasons to feel betrayed, without being aware or acknowledging of the role he played in their constitution. Lear describes the main methods by which Mr. A was able to find reasons to feel betrayed in the situation exterior to him.

The first method is interpretative. As Lear says, Mr. A “had a propensity to interpret life’s event under the aura of betrayal.” That is, if Mr. A confronted a situation whose import could be interpreted in a number of ways, one of which is as a situation of betrayal, his behavioral-interpretative disposition would pose a constraint on deliberation. Without being aware of it, his avowed deliberative choice to take personally the reasons to feel betrayed was predestined by his disposition.

Such a “seeing as” disposition does not have to be pathological. It could be what people sometimes call “character.” If I have the interpretative disposition to be amused, then I am active in finding the funny aspects in various situations. However, when I do, my experience is that those funny aspects “come to me,” or “strike me” as funny. If I find amusement in situations such that I succeed in making other people share my amusement, I am not just normative and rational, I lead a lighter and happier life than I would otherwise, and indeed I make those around me lighter and happier as well.

But some such interpretative dispositions can be more pathological than others. Those are the dispositions that distort the interpretation of the situation,

such that the interpretation is not culturally shared. In other words, the norms of fittingness used in judgment become more idiosyncratic to the emoting subject, such that they satisfy the pre-determined disposition.

When Lear says that Mr. A had a tendency for interpreting situations as having the emotional import of betrayal, he means that Mr. A's interpretations were particular to Mr. A. They were not the regular normative interpretations that would be shared by most people from Mr. A's social and cultural niche. Consider Lear's example:

Freud teaches us that emotional ambivalence lies at the heart of the human condition. Thus not only is it inevitable for us to feel ambivalently toward our loved ones, but it is inevitable for them to feel ambivalently toward us. So even with our loved ones, who genuinely love us 'wholeheartedly', there will be moments when irritation, anger, disappointment slip out and find some form of expression. Now Mr. A would wait for those moments, and then give them astonishing weight. His girlfriend's irritable outburst would reveal her 'true feelings' towards him, and the rest of her care and concern for him would be dismissed as a cover-up. Not only that, but her outburst would be experienced as a 'betrayal' because he had made himself so vulnerable. Now he could see that he had been lulled into a false sense of trust by her deceptively caring exterior; in fact, she was ready to betray him at the first opportunity.<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 450.

Strictly speaking, Mr. A did not invent the reality to which he responded. His girlfriend did have those outbursts. The question is how these outbursts should have been interpreted. Perhaps they were an expression of temporary impatience or of her own weaknesses and insecurities. Perhaps they were justified reactions to something specific that Mr. A said or did and the anger was only local in scope. In other words, the question is what emotional import these outbursts should have had. They could have been compassion provoking or guilt provoking.

Indeed, we could imagine a case where Mr. A's interpretations were fitting, namely that his girlfriend's outbursts did show her "true feelings," feelings that she normally makes a concerted effort to conceal. Some people do reveal terrible things about themselves and their relationships when angry. And some people are angry too often or too intensely to dismiss their anger as normal emotional ambivalence to be qualified accordingly. We do not know enough of Mr. A's relationship with his girlfriend to judge whether or not he exaggerated the importance of his girlfriend's outbursts.

We could imagine a scene where Mr. A deliberates over his feeling of betrayal following such an outburst and sharing that deliberation with someone he does not know too well. Without knowing much about the relationship between Mr. A and his girlfriend, perhaps the one who hears Mr. A's deliberation would agree that the feeling of betrayal is justified.

Even if we ultimately judge Mr. A's feelings as unfitting, as too dependent on his own mind, this unfittingness could take some time or prior knowledge of Mr. A's life to be recognized. Lear, Mr. A's therapist, presumably knows enough about Mr. A's life to recognize that Mr. A's interpretations are gross exaggerations.

Since Mr. A's emotional reactions were not primarily caused by reasons, but rather by his biased disposition, his emotional reactions will be insensitive to reason. Lear may try to convince Mr. A that his interpretations are unjustified by advocating another norm of fittingness from his own psychoanalytic social niche, namely that emotional ambivalence is normal and acceptable in love relationships. He may suggest that Mr. A should *see* his girlfriend's outbursts *as* an example of such ambivalence.

Mr. A may reply that unlike most people perhaps, he is not emotionally ambivalent about his girlfriend. He loves her and is loyal to her without the slightest reserve. If people are not as loyal as him, this only shows their own moral weaknesses, or that they are incapable of "true love." They should be more like him. His norm of fittingness may not be popular, but he stands behind it and "takes it personally." He has in fact many ways to justify his loyal and devoted way of being in the world. Norms are not laws; they can change. And Mr. A feels a moral obligation to serve an example for others. He hopes there is someone else out there for him, someone just as loyal and wholehearted like himself.

Lear may insist that such "true love" is a myth, an unattainable ideal that is causing Mr. A trouble. They may argue for hours, and each of them may be able to provide good reasons (considered in their objective dimension) for the norm of fittingness they advocate. It is hard to imagine what would count as "proof" that would decide if love is inevitably ambivalent or that love is either wholehearted or severely compromised. Mr. A may end the argument by saying "let's agree to disagree," and feel more justified in his belief than ever.

Reason alone will not, most probably, cause Mr. A to doubt his reasons nor stop taking them personally.<sup>177</sup> No matter how many times he will examine and deliberate over his feelings of betrayal, reason will foster rather than modify his emotional reactions. And so he could go on with his pathology and continue to avow through deliberation his feelings of betrayal in connection to his poor girlfriend.

The second method Mr. A used to manufacture reasons for his feelings of betrayal was the manipulation of the situation itself such that it could then be interpreted as reasons to feel betrayed. The very facts of the situation were largely caused by Mr. A himself. In other words, in addition to Mr. A's "seeing as" pathology he also has a "making into" pathology, namely making the world into a scene of betrayal. Lear gives an example:

Mr. B was trying to get assigned to a project that Mr. A wanted – typical rivalry at work – and yet this was a betrayal because Mr. A had earlier taken him into his confidence, had helped guide Mr. B up the ladder of success, etc.. As far as I could tell, Mr. A had genuinely helped Mr. B in the ways he described. What Mr. A did not understand about himself was that part of his motivation for helping Mr. B was so that he could later feel betrayed by him. In countless ways such as this, Mr. [A]<sup>178</sup> unconsciously sustained his own world of betrayal.<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>177</sup> Recall that when I talk of reasons as causes I refer to the grasp of a consideration in favor of an emotional attitude (operative reasons). When I say that reason would not convince Mr. A to change his mind, I mean that reasoning, in the objective sense that matters in deliberation, would not end in a resolution to take an alternative reason as his operative reason such that he would change his mind.

<sup>178</sup> The original text says "Mr. B", but that is obviously a typing mistake.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.* p. 450.

In this case, we can imagine Mr. A telling someone who does not know him very well the story about Mr. B in quite a convincing manner. Some people may agree and say that this is not how a friend should act. Others may think Mr. A was naïve to believe he could have friends at the workplace in the first place. Others yet may accept that friendships in the office have some inevitable challenges and say like Lear: “[T]he workplace is often an arena of jealousies, competitive strivings and pronounced ambivalent feelings.”<sup>180</sup>

People are allowed to have different norms in fittingness. And Mr. A’s reported situation could be judged by others as having the import of feeling betrayed, or of regretting foolish naivety, or of feeling jealous and thereby ambivalent toward Mr. B. To those who disagree with Mr. A as to which norm of fittingness applies to his situation, he could reasonably reply: “Let’s agree to disagree.” As far as the interpretative mind-dependence goes, Mr. A’s interpretative norms are synchronized with the norms of his social niche.

Lear is nevertheless skeptical about this occasion since he knows Mr. A well enough to recognize a pattern in the variety of the emotional reactions. If Mr. A was genuinely surprised by what he saw as betrayal in the workplace, he would have been more prudent in his actions so as to prevent reoccurrences of scenarios with this emotional import. It is that repetition of the emotion-type of feeling betrayed that reveals that Mr. A, in general, was a master “in fostering occurrences in which he actually would be betrayed (or, at least, severely let down).”<sup>181</sup>

It is unlikely, however, that Mr. A would be convinced by reason that he is in some way responsible for bringing about occasions of betrayal. Even if Lear pointed

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<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.* p. 450.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.* p. 451.

out to him that the repetition of this emotion-type requires some explanation that goes beyond the particularities of each situation, Mr. A would have other ways of accounting for that.

Mr. A would maintain that these situations happen to him, he is not doing them himself. After all, being betrayed is a passive experience; it is caused by others. He is not telling those who betray him what to do. They are free agents who make their own choices independently of him. Mr. A would most likely claim that he is unlucky to have met those particular people. Lear's skepticism is reasonable, but so is Mr. A's resistance to that skepticism. They can agree to disagree.

Lear thinks that Mr. A's disposition to see the world as a world of betrayal and act in ways that would make it the case that he is indeed betrayed, is the result of an unconscious motivation to feel betrayed. That is the motivation to sustain his world of betrayal. Lear's guess has the methodological advantage of claiming there is an explanation to Mr. A's emotional pattern that is not just mere meaningless coincidence.

If Lear is correct, then we can see why Mr. A's emotional reactions would not be sensitive to reason. The reasons embedded in these reactions, which stem from the import of the here-and-now situation, are experienced as their causes by Mr. A (as in Solomon's claim presented in the first section of chapter 1). However, the import of the here-and-now situations that supplied Mr. A with operative reasons was itself manipulated by Mr. A in a non-rational manner. That is to say, the significant cause for Mr. A emotional reactions was a non-rational causal factor. If the primary cause for Mr. A's emotional reaction is not operative reason, then reason is not the route to change them.

The non-rational causal factors in question are Mr. A's exaggerated interpretations and manipulations of the situations that trigger the emotional reaction, namely his "seeing as" and "making into" pathologies, or in short, his pathological behavioral disposition. The causal efficacy of these factors largely depends on their being unknown to or unacknowledged by Mr. A. Their being unconscious allows Mr. A to believe that all the causal weight falls on the exterior situation and on other people's behavior toward him. This suggests that if Mr. A were to become aware of his behavioral disposition or rather of what caused his emotional disposition in the first place, then he would break his emotional pattern.

First-personal deliberation in terms of reasons one takes personally is effectively a technique Mr. A uses to keep his behavioral disposition out of consciousness. Avowal is his way of convincing himself that objectively-reflected-upon rational and normative reasons that he is resolved to take as his operative reasons ultimately caused his emotional reactions. Mr. A is rationally apt, but freedom is not just a matter of rationality. For Mr. A, avowal is an illusion of freedom and an effective concealment of the "seeing as" disposition that keeps him unfree to choose to change his ways. As Lear says:

Reason – at least, *his* reason – conspires, as it were, to keep him in a betrayed world. He is more than willing to take responsibility for feeling betrayed – indeed, one wants to say, *that* is his problem. For Mr. A, self-conscious reflection is a manifestation of his unfreedom: for as

he reflects on his reasons for feeling betrayed, he digs himself ever deeper into a crabbed and constraining world.<sup>182</sup>

One would like to know, however, why does Mr. A has the motivation to sustain his disposition, and furthermore, why does he have that behavioral disposition in the first place, and why is he unaware of that disposition. Lear indicates that he thinks there is an unconscious emotion at work. Mr. A has repressed an occasion of having felt betrayed in the distant past, but he still feels that old betrayal today.<sup>183</sup>

But Lear does not provide more details of the case study of Mr. A. In fact, Mr. A is not a real patient of Lear. “[H]e is an amalgam of aspects of various patients,”<sup>184</sup> says Lear. I thus turn to another, more detailed, example of another “seeing as” pathology, given by Amélie Rorty. Through her example I will present her account of how such seeing-as behavioral dispositions come about. I will also compare her account to that of Ronald de Sousa.

## **2. Developmental Causal Stories for “Seeing As” Dispositions**

In this section, I will present Rorty’s account through her example and compare her account to that of Ronald de Sousa. I will allow myself to add some speculated details to the example I see as plausible. Rorty does not say whether her example is based on a real case study or whether it is fictional. For my purposes, what is important that this case a *possible* case, whether or not it is an actual case. And Rorty’s explanation of this example is to show what counts as a causal explanation

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<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 453.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 451-452.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 450, fn. 1.

for this “seeing as” pathology, rather than what actually caused the pathology of a real person.

Rorty introduces her case study as follows:

Jonah, a newswriter, resents Esther, his editor, whom he thinks domineering, even tyrannical. But as bosses go, Esther is exceptionally careful to consult with the staff, often following consensus even when it conflicts with her judgment. His colleagues try to convince Jonah that Esther’s assignments are not demeaning, her requests not arbitrary. Jonah comes to believe he was mistaken in thinking her actions dictatorial; he retreats to remarking that she derives secret pleasure from the demands that circumstances require. Where his colleagues see a smile, he sees a smirk. After a time of working with Esther, Jonah realizes that she is not a petty tyrant, but he still receives her assignments with a dull resentful ache; and when Anita, the new editor, arrives, he is seething with hostility even before she has had time to settle in and put her family photographs on her desk. Although many of the women on the secretarial staff are more hard-edged in mind and personality than either Esther or Jonah, he regards them all as charmingly endowed with intuitive insight. He patronizes rather than resents them.<sup>185</sup>

Unlike Lear’s Mr. A, Rorty’s case study Jonah was responsive to criticism. Jonah came to judge his resentment to Esther as unfitting, and he succeeded to

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<sup>185</sup> Rorty, “Explaining Emotions,” 106.

mitigate it to some extent. But although he ended up having no considerations in favor of resenting Esther, his resentment did not perish completely.

Jonah's recalcitrance shows that the grasp of an operative reason was not the primary psychological cause for his resentment, and Jonah is (eventually) aware of that. Most likely, the same kind of recalcitrance would have eventually occurred with his resentment to Anita. Jonah thus suffered from an emotional pattern such that each of the reactions of that pattern developed into a recalcitrant emotion.

As explained in the first chapter, the emotion literature usually accounts for recalcitrance in terms of a "seeing as" dispositions.<sup>186</sup> Rorty too, assumes that Jonah's emotional pattern she call a "magnetizing disposition,"<sup>187</sup> of which the subject is usually unaware. The "seeing as" pathology of Lear's Mr. A and his more active "making into" pathology would be particular forms of such magnetizing dispositions.

The normative pressure Mr. A and Jonah feel to come up with reasons that would justify the particular manifestations of their magnetizing dispositions shows again that such dispositions are not merely causal or merely behavioristic. The behavior in question is intimately linked with interpretation, with intentional actions and with practical reasoning.

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<sup>186</sup> For example, Roberts, "Sketch;" Brady, "Recalcitrant Emotions;" Calhoun, "Cognitive Emotions?" Pitcher, "Emotions." D'Arms and Jacobson disagree. Their view will be presented in the appendix to chapter 3. They also claim that non-basic emotions (or rather not "natural" emotions as they prefer to call them), that is, cognitive sharpenings, are usually not subject to recalcitrance, especially not to what they call "stable recalcitrance", which is a disposition to have a certain type of recalcitrance. D'Arms and Jacobson, "Recalcitrant Emotions," p. 140, 141. In particular, they mention resentment, which they say is a cognitive sharpening of anger, and claim it is unlikely to figure in a stable recalcitrance in *Ibid.*, p. 143. Since Rorty's case-study is a case of recalcitrant resentment, their view is not applicable here.

<sup>187</sup> Rorty, "Explaining Emotions," pp.106-107

What causes those dispositions? Some dispositions may have a physiological or merely causal explanation.<sup>188</sup> For example, some people may be particularly prone to anger because of the condition of their endocrine system. But the cases I am concerned with are not causally explained in this manner.

Some dispositions are typical of certain cultures and have been acquired during the socialization of the emoting subject.<sup>189</sup> These would be, for example, prejudiced dispositions such as to feel fear and disgust as a response to homosexuals, or fear and contempt toward black people, or disrespect to women. The magnetizing force of these prejudiced dispositions would account for their recalcitrance even when the subject has intellectually rid himself from these prejudices. In fact, the only type of magnetized dispositions for which I found an explanation in the literature (Rorty and Lear and excluded) is that of dispositions that are related to prejudices acquired through education in childhood.<sup>190</sup>

Before moving on to what causes pathological dispositions like Jonah's, I want to note in passing that in fact, culturally induced or socially learned magnetizing dispositions can contribute to the causal explanation of rational and normative emotions. What a certain subject takes personally can also be explained in terms of her emotional habits. That is, what is important to the subject, what she expects of her practical identity, may be to some extent a matter of acquired values and norms.

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<sup>188</sup> See Rorty's discussion in *Ibid.*, pp. 116-118.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107.

<sup>190</sup> See for example Roberts, "Sketch," pp. 195-197; and Calhoun, "Cognitive Emotions?" p. 337. Another type of "seeing as" dispositions that has an explanation in the literature is phobia. That explanation is different to the one that will be presented in this section and will be discussed in the appendix to chapter 3. I will there show that this other kind of explanation is insufficient.

That is, as part of a subject's socialization, she acquires "tendencies to structure experience in ways that will elicit [a] characteristic response."<sup>191</sup> In other words, magnetizing dispositions can be aligned with the norms of fittingness of the subject's social niche. The subject's particular history of socialization may account, perhaps, for her tendency to emote according to certain norms when other norms are also acceptable in a given situation.

Habits and tendencies or the values and the practical identity they reflect, are always available for first-personal reflection. One can take deliberative steps to become less dependent on one's education and social niche. We can always "step back" from our influences and take responsibility for who we are, for how we see ourselves and the people around us. In other words, we may critically examine our practical identity and see what we deliberately expect it to demand of us.<sup>192</sup> But spontaneous emotional reactions and sometimes even our "stepping back" may be causally influenced by acquired habits.<sup>193</sup>

De Sousa speaks of such seeing-as dispositions in terms of "paradigm scenarios."<sup>194</sup> These scenarios include characteristic emotional responses to certain characteristic objects. These paradigm scenarios are best understood as kind of prototypical schemas, analogous to what was called in the first chapter the rough-and-ready characterizations of certain emotion-types. A subject emotionally reacts in a certain way when she sees the here-and-now situation as similar to or as an example of the relevant paradigm scenario.

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<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, 107.

<sup>192</sup> See Korsgaard's discussion in Korsgaard, "Self-Constitution and Irony."

<sup>193</sup> One could still ask to what extent is the acquisition in question determined by the social niche. What a person identifies with, even without conscious choice, probably still enjoys some contingency, given that social norms enjoy some flexibility and variation, even within the same family. Why is that person more impressionable to some values or norms rather than others? To what extent is the person responsible for her identifications? These are complex questions that exceed the scope of this thesis.

<sup>194</sup> See for example, de Sousa, "Rationality of Emotions," p. 142

De Sousa offers a developmental explanation for such scenarios. The first emotional responses in childhood, like fear, are “genetically programmed.”<sup>195</sup> They become scenarios through teaching the child the name for the emotion-type in the relevant context, thus teaching the child that they are having an emotional reaction of a certain type. The acquisition of linguistic skills allows these basic scenarios to be “reinforced by the stories and fairy tales to which we are exposed, and later still, supplemented and refined by literature and art.”<sup>196</sup>

Some paradigms or dispositions can be revised or replaced later in life. But recalcitrance of the prejudiced kind implies that some such paradigms are resistant to reflection or that some dispositions become magnetized. In Jonah’s case, however, there was neither a physiological explanation nor a cultural-educational developmental explanation to causally account for his magnetizing disposition.

Jonah had the magnetizing disposition to resent women in a position of authority.<sup>197</sup> One could say he suffered from the prejudice that women in power are domineering and hostile. But Jonah did not believe that female bosses are inherently “bitchy,” and he did not acquire any such prejudice from his environment.<sup>198</sup> The significant cause for the magnetizing disposition should be looked for, according to Rorty, in his biography.

Jonah also suffered from nightmares and obsessive thoughts that his mother was trying to kill him. He also detested scarves and refused to wear them no matter how cold it was, and became very anxious whenever he was in the scarves section of

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<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 142-123.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 142.

<sup>197</sup> Jonah does not resent men in position of power, only women, as indicated in Rorty, “Explaining Emotions,” p. 114.

<sup>198</sup> Rorty says that “Jonah is a skeptical sort of fellow, who rarely leaps to generalizations, let alone wild ones.” *Ibid.*

department stores. In his childhood, Jonah's mother used to "swathe him in scarves that she knitted herself" from the "the itchiest wool imaginable; and when she bundled him up in winter, she used to tie the scarf with a swift harsh motion, pulling it tightly around his throat."<sup>199</sup>

Young Jonah suffered from those scarf-tying scenarios, and experienced them as something unpleasant that his mother, his female "boss" at the time, forced him to endure. In other words, he saw her as domineering and hostile. He probably did not believe his mother was trying to kill him, but he may have had a passing thought "why so harsh? Are you trying to suffocate me?" But Jonah was an obedient child, and suffered quietly and repeatedly. He never expressed his distress, for if he had, his mother may have changed her ways with the scarves. Rorty does not mention Jonah's old emotions, but it is plausible that Jonah became resentful of his mother in this connection.

Rorty does not give much detail, but says that those old scarf-tying scenes are what caused Jonah's magnetizing disposition to see women that have authority over him as domineering and hostile and resent them for that. Although his editor Esther did not tie scarves around him, by the time he was her employee, he already had the magnetizing disposition to see his female bosses as badly motivated tyrants and resent them.

De Sousa would say that this is a case of "muddled scenarios,"<sup>200</sup> where the subject fails to apply a normative paradigm scenario, a schema of characteristic emotional responses to certain characteristic objects. Instead, the subject unconsciously invokes a paradigm scenario that does not "*objectively* resemble"<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 109.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>201</sup> de Sousa, "Rationality of Emotions," p. 146. Emphasis in original.

the actual contemporary situation. Somehow the typical scarf-tying scene has become Jonah's paradigm scenario for any scene where a female authority figure tells him what to do. But Jonah is not aware that he is unconsciously muddling scenarios, and that is why his here-and-now reactions are recalcitrant.

Rorty notes that Jonah could have experienced those old scarf-tying scenes differently. Instead of experiencing that tying of the scarf as unpleasant, and the pressure of the scarf as painful, he could have felt comforted and reassured. Jonah's mother was an affectionate woman, even if a bit awkward. Sometimes she would get angry or be ambivalent in her affections. But Jonah's way of seeing those scarf-tying scenes as harsh indicates that at the time he already had another magnetizing disposition, namely to be "sensitive to the negative overtones of [his mother's] attitudes."<sup>202</sup>

That old magnetizing disposition calls for further explanation. After all, Jonah's brother had gone through the same scarf-tying scenes and did not develop the disposition to resent women in positions of authority. Jonah's brother did not experience those old scenes as expression of his mother's hostility. And so, "we have not got the significant cause in all its glory: though our explanation is fuller, it is not yet complete."<sup>203</sup> Rorty thus continues to search in Jonah's biography the significant cause for the older disposition to be on the lookout for his mother's anger and domination.

Just before Jonah's brother was born, Jonah's father went away to serve in the army. When his mother was in hospital with the newborn, Jonah was sent to stay

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<sup>202</sup> Rorty, "Explaining Emotions," p. 109.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110.

with his grandfather. The grandfather detested Jonah's mother. He saw her as "a domineering and angry woman, the ruination of his son".<sup>204</sup> During Jonah's stay with his grandfather, the grandfather conveyed his opinion, probably unintentionally, to Jonah.

Now for Jonah to be influenced by his grandfather's attitude and make it his own, a further explanation is needed. Jonah was somehow prone to that particular influence. At the time, Jonah must have felt upset to be sent away by his mother, and was probably jealous of the newborn, who got her affections at the time instead of him. Moreover, he adored his grandfather, who also played the role of a father figure during that time.

Jonah's susceptibility to his grandfather's influence does not qualify as a magnetized disposition. Magnetized dispositions are intentional in the sense that they are specific and describable. Jonah's susceptibility was only "quasi-intentional," since it functioned at the time as "patterns of focusing and salience without determining the description of that pattern."<sup>205</sup>

That is, although Jonah was to some extent upset with his mother and jealous of his newborn brother, he was probably unable to articulate those feelings as such. This is not just because he may have not been fully aware of them but also because they were actually too vague to be describable. They were a mere "mood,"<sup>206</sup> roughly describable as antagonistic, a term that would itself be unknown to young Jonah. That mood would have probably passed if not for the grandfather's influence that turned it into an intentional disposition to be alert to any hint of harshness or domination in his mother.

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<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111

Neither was the grandfather's role as someone to identify with was something young Jonah could have intended. Children often absorb the views and dispositions of their loved parental figures, and they do not do that intentionally or reflectively. It is probably a tendency determined by evolutionary considerations. It is normally "beneficial for children to tend to absorb the intentional dispositions of the crucial figures around them, even at the cost of generating confusion and conflict."<sup>207</sup>

To say it differently, magnetized dispositions are behavioral dispositions. That is, they determine what kind of describable behavior would occur in certain circumstances, whose features can be adequately described. Susceptibility, on the other hand, is not a describable pattern, even if it can evolve into such a pattern. Susceptibility does not come with a "recipe" that would articulate what emotion-type would be manifested in what occasion. It is rather a vague and often temporary proneness or sensitivity.

The causal story ends here. If for any reason we feel that the last or rather first link in the developmental chain needs further explanation, we can look for another link farther in Jonah's biography. When we cannot identify the reason for an emotional reaction via rough-and-ready characterizations, we have to look for the significant cause of the relevant magnetized disposition in the subject's biography. And if that significant cause involves another prior magnetized disposition we can continue with the same method until we arrive at a point that requires no further explanation. The causal etiology arrived at explains how the current magnetized

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<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122.

disposition came about, in such way that it conflicts with the subject's judgment of fittingness.

To say it in de Sousa's terms, when we cannot identify an emotional reaction via the normative applications of paradigm scenarios, we have to identify which other scenario is unconsciously applied to the here-and-now situation. The investigation into the development of the muddled scenario will end once the "original scenario"<sup>208</sup> has been found. In Jonah's case, the original scenario would be Jonah's vague resentment toward his mother who sent him away while in hospital with his newborn brother. That scenario became the paradigm scenario of resenting his mother and her orders, which later developed into the paradigm scenario of resenting female authority figures in general. In effect, each time Jonah resents his female-boss, he unconsciously invokes the original scenario.

Both Rorty and de Sousa would not charge Jonah with irrationality. In fact, they both see such seeing-as pathologies as more or less rationally explained, each with their own meaning to that "more or less." Rorty says:

[we] now have an account of why a reasonable person might, in a perfectly reasonable way, have developed an intentional set [that is, a magnetized disposition]<sup>209</sup> that, as it happens, generates wildly askew interpretations and reactions.<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>208</sup> de Sousa, "Rationality of Emotions," p. 146.

<sup>209</sup> Rorty defines a magnetized disposition as intentional set in Rorty, "Explaining Emotions," p. 107.

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111.

Jonah's susceptibility to adopt his grandfather's attitudes was quasi-intentional, as explained above, and thus caused his magnetized disposition toward his mother without being a reason for it. But that latter disposition had both a causal connection and a "logical"<sup>211</sup> connection to the disposition toward women in position of authority.

The term "logical" may sound strange, given Jonah's resentment of Esther is not exactly rational, nor is the seeing-as disposition that explains it an avowable belief for Jonah. In what sense is the connection between the disposition toward the mother and the disposition toward female bosses can be characterized as "logical"? Both dispositions are intentional, namely, they are describable and are about or oriented to a certain object whose description is compatible with the disposition. Their describability allows for a conceptual connection.

The first disposition to see his mother as domineering and hostile is directed at his mother; the second disposition to see female authority figures as domineering and hostile is directed at the women who have authority over Jonah. The logical connection between these dispositions is generalization: from a particular female authority figure, namely his mother, to all female authority figures.

De Sousa claims that:

[...]it must be possible to circumscribe the context of the state to such an extent that it appears 'minimally rational.' The application of this to emotions is this: in terms of the paradigm scenario alone, the emotion that fits it is by definition rational. But the "all things considered" assessment of an emotion is determined in a complicated way: first, by

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<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

determining whether the evoking situation is actually an instantiation of the paradigm, and secondly, by confronting it with other applicable paradigms and working out the relations of compatibility, incompatibility, and hierarchic dominance between the relevant scenarios.<sup>212</sup>

Jonah is emotionally reacting here-and-now according to his dominant paradigm scenario, which originally involved his mother. His here-and-now workplace scenario is not objectively compatible with that old scenario and his resentment toward Esther is thus is not rational “all things considered”. However, the very fact that we can “circumscribe the context” of the emotional reaction, namely identify the original scenario unconsciously invoked here-and-now, means that Jonah’s emotion is minimally rational.

Any emotional reaction that fits a paradigm scenario, whether or not that fittingness stands objective scrutiny, is rational by definition, at least operatively-rational, to use the terminology of the first chapter. Emotion-fittingness is a rational notion, and as long as some scenario is operatively grasped as fitting, the emotion is operatively-rational. De Sousa uses the term “minimal rationality,” I take it, in order to make clear that a grasped fittingness relation need not survive objectively-rational deliberation. The “minimally rational” cases are precisely those that do not survive objectively-valid reflection.

Would Lear look for such an original scenario or a point where the causal developmental of the magnetized disposition seems to begin? As far as I can tell, it seems he would. He talks about the goal of Mr. A’s therapy as eventually reaching a

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<sup>212</sup> de Sousa, “Rationality of Emotions,” p. 149.

stage where he would deliberately avow an emotion, namely rationally endorse it, “*in the right sort of way*”:

Roughly speaking, the avowal has to ‘grab onto’ the very emotion that has hitherto remained unconscious. It cannot merely be an expression of the very same *type* of emotion (betrayal), it has to be an expression of that very emotion.<sup>213</sup>

Lear’s guess is that this specific old emotional reaction was “some primordial parental disappointment [that] served as an occasion for the infant A to cast a mold that would shape his later experience.”<sup>214</sup> Similarly to Rorty and de Sousa, Lear would also claim that this original scene where Mr. A felt betrayed, had a causal role to play in a developmental story that ended in his disposition to feel betrayed.

Lear also holds a developmental view on emotional capacities, whereby emotion-types (that may further evolve to many cognitive sharpenings) become associated with certain norms of fittingness. These emotional capacities are also behavioral dispositions that get expressed in certain describable circumstances. Elsewhere Lear writes:

[...] an emotion such as fear has a developmental history. Babies can feel and express fear; so can adults. But in healthy circumstances the emotion develops in complexity and becomes even more integrated into a person’s rational assessment of the world. In the mature adult,

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<sup>213</sup> Lear, “Avowal and Unfreedom,” p. 452.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.* p. 451.

fear not only reaches down into bodily reactions, it reaches out to the world and *makes a claim* that it is an *appropriate* response. However, in unhealthy circumstances, this developmental trajectory can be inhibited or disrupted. The outcome will be a biologically mature adult who is expressing an infantile form of fear.<sup>215</sup>

According to Lear's approach, Mr. A's emotional capacity to feel betrayed did not go through the normative course of development. His "developmental trajectory" was inhibited due to a certain scene of "parental disappointment" in his childhood, where he felt betrayed. Presumably an adult going through the same scene would not have felt so severely betrayed. But children often judge the world in an "all or nothing" extreme manner.

The healthy course of development would entail refining this emotion, say by accepting norms of fittingness which allow for emotional ambivalence with loved-ones and colleagues, and which confine betrayal to more clear-cut circumstances. Instead, that old reaction, which was probably characterized by an "all or nothing" infantile judgment, has become his only way to feel betrayed. If in the past, say, he felt betrayed by his father, then consequently he has developed the disposition to see other people as somehow cast in the role of his betraying father. Moreover, unconsciously, he still feels betrayed by his father.

When it comes to cases like Jonah, Lear would presumably say that the scenes with the mother inhibited the normal development of a specific cognitive sharpening of resentment, namely the resentment of female authority figures. A child would resent his mother if she told him to do something he does not want to

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<sup>215</sup> Lear, *Freud*, p. 53.

do. An adult should accept that his boss assigns him with tasks he might not like. Indeed, an adult of our society should not have separate norms of fittingness to male and female authority figures. But the scenes with mother created within Jonah a strange cognitive sharpening of resentment of female authority figures that got stuck with infantile “fittingness” features.

The three variants of this developmental account basically claim that what causes an emotional reaction is a certain seeing-as disposition to emote in a certain way in certain generally described circumstances. Dispositions that are not primarily physiological have a developmental etiology, that is, they have evolved from other dispositions related to that emotion-type.

All emotional reactions, whose primary cause is not physiological, are caused by such dispositions and their respective causal etiologies. Most etiologies recount the normative process of socialization, education and refinement and yield typical norms of fittingness. Normative-rational and healthy reactions can be sufficiently explained without recourse to the etiology, unless one wants to be more precise as to why that particular subject takes certain situations more personally than others. But in cases where there is a problematic pattern of emotional reaction, one needs to look for the relevant etiology of that emotion-type in the particular biography of the emoting subject.

The three variants of the developmental account nevertheless differ in their formulation of the nature of the disposition and in the role they ascribe to the original scenario that gave rise to the disposition. I sum up the differences in the table below:

	<b>Disposition</b>	<b>The Pathology</b>	<b>The Role of the Original Scenario</b>
<b>Rorty</b>	Behavioral disposition to <i>see</i> certain typical circumstances <i>as</i> provoking a specified emotion-type.	The typical circumstances do not instantiate the norms of fittingness the subject would deliberately avow.	To causally contribute to the formation of the magnetized disposition. The there-and-then emotional reaction is <i>past</i> and does <i>not</i> get manifested now.
<b>de Sousa</b>	Emotional disposition to <i>construe</i> a here-and-now situation <i>in terms of</i> emotional paradigm scenario	The paradigm scenario does not objectively resemble the here-and-now situation	The old scenario created the muddled paradigm scenario.
<b>Lear</b>	Emotional capacities to emote according to norms of fittingness.	The specific emotion-type capacity or its cognitive sharpening operate through infantile “norms of fittingness” the subject may or may not avow in deliberation.	The original scenario inhibited the normal development of the relevant emotional capacity. The subject’s old emotion is still “alive.”

### 3. Assessment and Criticism of the Causal Developmental Accounts

The developmental accounts entail a few presuppositions. In this section I outline these presuppositions focusing on Rorty’s version. I then claim that these accounts basically revive Freud’s early theory of neurosis, with one modification. For early Freud, the disposition in question “nests” another disposition, namely the memory of the original scenes that get aroused whenever the disposition is manifested. De Sousa’s account can thus be considered Freudian insofar as the term “paradigm” can also mean “example” and not just “general schema.” In that sense, the paradigm scenario that is unconsciously invoked in pathological emotional reactions can be a particular memory.

I claim that Freudian accounts should be preferred to the other developmental accounts. However, drawing on Freud’s later self-doubts, I argue that developmental etiologies over-emphasize the formative role of the scenes in question. I will also claim that de Sousa’s account of emotional pathology can, at least to some extent, avoid this difficulty.

First, Rorty presupposes that the development of the magnetized disposition follows a “*forward direction*” of causality. That is, the assumption is that for every such disposition of a given individual there is a series of events, each of which depends on the consequences of the previous one, and played a causal role in the evolution of the resultant disposition. In other words, each event causes the way the next event in the series is perceived or seen-as. Yet in other words, each event in the series causes a modification in the individual’s (emotionally-relevant) patterns of salience.

More precisely, the first event in the series causes a quasi-intentional susceptibility to see any related event that comes next as a more precise formulation of the quasi-intentional susceptibility. That next event in the series fixes the quasi-intentional susceptibility into a more precise and describable magnetized disposition. The event after that one is already seen as an instantiation of the magnetized disposition and re-enforces it. Subsequent similar events may cause a broadening of the scope of that disposition, yet it remains unclear exactly why or how that would occur.<sup>216</sup>

Rorty further presupposes *uniformity*. All rational subjects, of a certain social niche and of similar physiological constitution, will develop the same disposition, given a certain chronology of events. This presupposition is evident in Rorty’s account, where she asks how come Jonah’s brother did not develop the same disposition having been through the very same scarf-tying scenes. Rorty explains that difference via a difference in the two brothers’ biography. Only Jonah was

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<sup>216</sup> Lear clearly shares this presupposition, given he talks of the development of emotional capacities that may be inhibited due to a certain emotionally laden event. De souze too assumes that a particular event has installed a muddled paradigm scenario that may be further developed into another muddled paradigm.

exposed to his grandfather's influence, just when he was susceptible to that kind of influence, a susceptibility that was also dependent on the particular preceding events in Jonah's life.

Effectively, given the complexity and idiosyncrasy of people's biography, the particular causal story of each disposition applies only to one person. The causal explanation of magnetized disposition is a singular explanation per singular biography. And since biographies are too particular to be shared by more than one subject, the causal story for that subject's disposition will be just as particular. The developmental causal etiology of a magnetized disposition thus belongs to the realm of singular causation that does not belong or refer to any causal generalization.

The presupposition of uniformity, whereby a "reasonable person" acquires a magnetized disposition in a "perfectly reasonable way," thus entails a third presupposition. That is, the evolution of a magnetized disposition causally depends on the chronology of *exterior* events and actions of others. The emotional reaction that we seek to explain, like Jonah's resentment of Esther, causally depends on worldly conditions. The first, is the here-and-now object of the emotion, Jonah's boss Esther, and the second is what is sometimes called in the literature the "historically layered"<sup>217</sup> object.

The historically layered object is the collection of the objects of the same emotion-type that participated in the causally connected and chronologically ordered series of events. Each object in the collection is under description, the description of the relevant import of situation, which gave grounds for the occurrence of that emotion-type. And the description under which each object is the

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<sup>217</sup> See for example, Graeme Marshall, "Overdetermination and the Emotions." In Amélie Rorty (ed.), *Explaining Emotions*, pp. 197-222, p. 203, 206; and Baier, "What Emotions are About," p. 4.

object of that emotion-type depends to some extent on the objects of that emotion-type that came before it. As Baier says: "Each object of a given emotion sort takes over from its predecessors, and what is expected of it depends on their earlier performance."<sup>218</sup>

In other words, the common features to which the collection of the objects of past occurrences of that emotion-type gives rise schematize the rough-and-ready characterization of the object for that emotion-type. Or, in yet other words, the common features of the descriptions under which those past objects were the intentional objects of that emotion-type become the paradigm scenario for that emotion-type.

One of the past objects of the historically layered object, perhaps the first one in the series was determined by a reaction that can be (perhaps) explained in evolutionary terms, such as jealousy of a newborn sibling. In that sense, the history of the layered object of a particular individual also includes elements of the species' history, that are responsible for the very first quasi-intentional susceptibility that begins the individual causal developmental story.<sup>219</sup>

If all goes well, then the historically layered object schematizes a paradigm object of a paradigm scenario that successfully represents or is objectively similar to the current or immediate object of the emotional reaction. If we want to explain variability among various rational and normative reactions, or if we want to explain cases like Jonah or Mr. A where their scenarios are not objectively similar to the current situation, all we need to do is to inquire into the subject's biography.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>219</sup> *Cp. Ibid.*

<sup>220</sup> *Cp. Ibid.* p. 6

In other words, the identification of the current object of the emotion and the identification of the past objects of that emotion, which had a formative role to play in the subject's paradigm scenario or magnetized disposition, will explain the emotional response in every case. The causal developmental account is thus an empirical hypothesis. It claims that an objective causal explanation can be found for every emotional reaction. Each event in the series actually occurred, and the causal effect it had on the patterns of salience of the subject would be expected of every rational subject from a certain social niche with an identical biography.

The developmental causal account of magnetized disposition is very similar to Freud's early account of neurosis. The original scenario, the first event in the causal story, is effectively what Freud called "the primal scene," causally responsible for his patients' neuroses. In fact, by the time Freud formally coined the term, he no longer believed in the exclusivity of "forward direction" of causality in the manner here described (this will be discussed in fourth section of this chapter).<sup>221</sup> But since the term "primal scene" seems to carry a lot of causal weight, it has become associated with his early account of the etiology of neurosis.<sup>222</sup>

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<sup>221</sup> The term "primal scene" was officially introduced in S. Freud, *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis* (1918 [1914]), S.E. vol. 17, pp. 7-122. This is the case study that has come to be known as The Wolf Man. Jean Laplanche & Jean-Bertrand Pontalis claim that the term "primal scene" is reserved for a "[s]cene of sexual intercourse between the parents[...]" Jean Laplanche & Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis* [1973]. Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith, (London: Karnac, 2006), p. 335. However, Freud actually used the term "primal scene" for the first time in a letter to Fleiss in S. Freud, Letter 61, S.E. vol. 1, pp. 247-248, p. 247. He there obviously refers to scenes of seduction. It is clear, however, that Freud regarded the primal scene as ultimately of a sexual nature. See for example S. Freud, "My Views on the Part Played by Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses (1906 [1905])," vol. 7, p. 278). I use the term "primal scene" not in strict connection to Freud's more or less specific etiologies (of Hysteria and Obsessional Neurosis), but in reference to his account of neurosis *in general*, to denote the original scenario that begins a causal etiology of any sort of symptom. Emotional symptoms thus belong to this general group. The primal scene, as it appears in the developmental etiologies à la Rorty or De-Sousa or Lear, is not necessarily of a sexual nature.

<sup>222</sup> See for example, Richard Wollheim, *The Thread of Life*. [1984] (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 137.

In the early Freudian account, the “primal scene,” the original event in the causal history of a patient, was experienced as a mental trauma. The scene was normally an event in childhood that caused the first occurrence of the current psychological symptom, which usually becomes more severe later in life. Even in his early writings on hysteria, Freud said that the trauma does not have to be one single event:

[...] it not infrequently happens that, instead of a single, major trauma, we find a number of partial traumas forming a *group* of provoking causes. These have only been able to exercise a traumatic effect by summation and they belong together in so far as they are in part components of a single story of suffering. There are other cases in which an apparently trivial circumstance combines with the actually operative event or occurs at a time of peculiar susceptibility to stimulation and in this way attains the dignity of a trauma which it would not otherwise have possessed but which thenceforward persists.<sup>223</sup>

In Jonah’s case, as explained above, the mentally traumatic event was being sent away by his mother due to circumstance surrounding the birth of his brother.<sup>224</sup> That event was “sealed” as traumatic due to his grandfather’s influence. Already in his childhood, Jonah suffered from the emotional “symptom” of

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<sup>223</sup> Joseph Breuer and Sigmund Freud, “On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary Communication [1883]” in Joseph Breuer and Sigmund Freud, *Studies on Hysteria* (1893-1895), S.E. vol. 2, pp. 3-17, p. 6. Emphasis in original.

<sup>224</sup> Was it really that traumatic? Is it comparable to genuine trauma like rape, torture or injury? I will later claim that this event, like most primal scenes of most neurotics, does not qualify as a trauma.

unnecessary resentment toward his mother, a symptom that became more severe over the years, as Jonah came to resent all the other female authority figures in his life.

For an event to qualify as mentally traumatic and cause a psychological symptom, it had to be not only emotionally distressing but also to be submitted to two conditions. The first was that the event itself was not properly experienced. That is, the affect of the emotion was somehow suppressed, not fully or not at all expressed, “[...] whether in deeds or words [...]”<sup>225</sup>

And so, suppression can result in what Freud called repression, which is the second condition under which an event can cause a psychological symptom. Certain particularly distressing details of the event and their emotional significance or the entire event are “pushed away” from normal thought processes and become cognitively isolated.<sup>226</sup> In other words, the emotional reaction and the import of the situation that gave grounds to that reaction become unavailable to memory.

In Mr. A’s case the emotionally laden childhood event was completely repressed.<sup>227</sup> In Jonah’s case, since Rorty could tell us about the first event, Jonah presumably remembered the event in what Freud would characterize as a “highly summary form [...]”<sup>228</sup> Although Jonah remembered experiencing the scarf-tying scenes as very unpleasant, he probably repressed some details and their significance as resentment provoking.

The repressed memory is not genuinely forgotten. It is still “alive” or as Freud would say “dynamic.” That is, the unconscious details of the memory may be aroused and the subject would then feel the same emotion-type that should have

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<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8. I will offer a detailed account of suppression in chapter 3.

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*, S.E. vol. 2, pp. 3, 9, 11.

<sup>227</sup> Lear, “Avowal and Unfreedom,” p. 451.

<sup>228</sup> Breuer and Freud, “Preliminary Communication,” S.E. vol. 2, p. 9.

been felt back there-and-then. Unconscious memories, similarly to regular memories, function as dispositions that can be aroused and manifested. The repressed memory is thus disposed to give rise to the old emotion-type if the right sort of trigger occurs here and now.

The trigger would be a situation where a female authority figure tells Jonah what to do, which arouses the old memory of Jonah's mother telling him to go away from her when in hospital. In other words, we could still say that Jonah has the disposition to resent female authority figures only that this disposition is now analyzed in terms of more fundamental dispositions.

The more fundamental dispositions are the repressed, unconscious memories.<sup>229</sup> These more fundamental dispositions in turn were caused by the exterior events whose respective emotional reaction was suppressed and whose memory has consequently been repressed.

The behavioral disposition thus "nests" unconscious memories whose arousal causes the arousal of the related emotion-type, which was not properly expressed there-and-then. But the subject is unaware of the repressed content during its arousal nor of the wording of the more general magnetized disposition within which those repressed memories are nested.

The subject is only aware of the manifest affect, of the emotion-type, and mistakenly uses the import of the current situation to rationalize it. That is how the

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<sup>229</sup> Now, do these nested dispositions nest in turn other dispositions and so on until one arrives at a "[...] brute or bare power without categorical ground [...]?" As Blackburn suggests in Simon Blackburn, "Filling in Space," *Analysis*, vol. 50 no. 2 (Mar., 1990), pp. 62-65, p. 64. Or, do these dispositions are "actual, categorical, properties" that ultimately refer to "states with causal powers", (namely brain states)? as in D.M. Armstrong's account in D.M. Armstrong, "Dispositions Are Causes," *Analysis*, vol. 30 no. 1 (Oct., 1969), pp. 23-26. I will not attempt to answer this question, nor to explain Freud's account on the matter. I will just suggest succinctly that Freud seemed to endorse each of these solutions at different stages of his career. The nested disposition account that ultimately nests a brute force was basically Freud's later account on drives, and the categorical disposition account ultimately referring to brain states was basically Freud's attempted reductive account, earlier in his career.

initial event and its causal relevance to the here-and-now emotional reaction remain unconscious. The patient thus “has no suspicion of the causal connection between the precipitating event and the pathological phenomenon.”<sup>230</sup>

The early Freudian version of the etiological explanation for emotional patterns also consists in an extended form of rationality. “[T]he emotional state, as such, is always justified”<sup>231</sup>, only that it is not justified by reasons that come from the reality of the here-and-now situation. The reasons for the emotional state come from the import of the situation whose memory has been repressed and is currently aroused.

All versions of the etiological explanation for emotional patterns strongly rely on the effects of the primal scene as an actual and objectively describable event. In Freud’s version, the felt emotion-type is a reaction to an unconsciously aroused memory, which is a repressed “record” of the primal scene. And it was the emotional reaction to the primal scene that caused its repression in the first place. The Freudian version thus also subscribes to the three presuppositions presented above.

Given the idiosyncrasy and the particularity of an individual’s biography, no two etiologies will be the same. Even in cases where the behavioral disposition of two individuals seems on the face it very similar, the repressed memories each disposition would nest would be different. Etiologies, as explained above, belong to the realm of singular causation.

How could we test the objectivity of an individual’s causal etiology if we do not have at our disposal other individuals for comparison? Furthermore, say we met

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<sup>230</sup> Breuer and Freud, “Preliminary Communication,” S.E. vol. 2, p. 3.

<sup>231</sup> S. Freud, “Obsessions and Phobias,” S.E. vol. 3 p. 75.

a young child that was just sent away by his mother following the birth of his brother, we would have no reason to predict he will grow up to resent his female bosses. Jonah's etiology is too particular to repeat itself in another individual. Richard Wollheim said in this connection:

A line can thus be traced from certain adult or adolescent activities to certain infantile experiences. However, the multiplicity of factors [...] make any move in the reverse direction impossible, at any rate in practice. Explanation is possible, but prediction is not.<sup>232</sup>

There is thus no option "in practice" to verify the objectivity of the etiological empirical hypothesis. The etiological accounts are causal accounts and are thus empirical; but the singular causality in question is not generalizable nor objectively testable. Given that science is concerned with the objective and reproducible, the etiological accounts are non-scientific. They thus belong to the category of empirical-non-scientific.

This is no devastating criticism if there is no other explanation available for such emotional pathologies. In fact, as explained in the end of the first chapter, a similar problem arises for operative-reason-explanation of operatively-rational emotions. However, as explained in the first chapter, the non-scientific operative-reason-explanation for singular emotional reactions has a redeeming feature that renders it more plausible.

That is the introspective awareness one can have while "listening" to one's deliberation. As explained in the conclusion of chapter 1, deliberation, although

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<sup>232</sup> Richard Wollheim, *Sigmund Freud*. (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), pp. 172-173.

objectively rational, also has a subjective and psychological dimension. In that psychological sense, deliberative avowal and in particular deliberative disavowal are psychological experiences that take place in time. The subject can thereby be introspectively aware in “real-time” of her psychological state, as she takes the conclusion of her deliberation as a consideration in favor of changing her emotional state. She is then introspectively aware that indeed her emotional state responded in the right way to her operative resolution. Avowal may not be infallible, as demonstrated in the first section of this chapter, but many times disavowal seems to work very well, as it is immediately followed by a change in one’s emotional state that is compatible with the subject’s resolution. Introspective awareness is our empirical-non-scientific method through which operative-reason-explanation for singular emotional reactions at the person level is rendered a *possible* explanation.

Can we experience the developmental accounts of Rorty, de Sousa, Lear and Freud in “real-time”? I claim that the first Rorty’s and Lear’s do not permit such an experience. Jonah may come to recognize and say to himself: “here, I resent my new female boss – again”. He could recognize the repetition in “real-time,” and he may use that repetition as evidence to make a synoptic observation: “I resent my female bosses, time and time again”.

But can he *experience* a disposition? What would that even mean? “I feel within me the disposition to resent female bosses” does not make much sense. Even if Jonah may come to be aware of this synoptic disposition, it will not be experienced under the description of a disposition. The same would hold for emotional capacities. One experiences an emotion, not an emotional capacity in general.

De Sousa’s account has a redeeming feature. One can consciously entertain a scenario and compare it to the here-and-now situation. But such a scenario would

not be schematic about characteristic emotional responses to certain characteristic objects. "Real-time" picturing of a scenario seems to involve more details than a characteristic emotional response to a characteristic object. The term "paradigm," however, suggests also a particular example and not just a general schema. Jonah's paradigm scenario may well be the memory of the original scenario that is then unconsciously muddled with the here-and-now situation. In that sense, de Sousa's account is very close to the early Freud account.

Memories of original scenarios do permit a "real-time" introspective awareness. Memories can be manifested consciously, under that description, namely as memories. Remembering is not a distinctively first-personal experience, but it nevertheless qualifies as a "real-time" experience of the subject as an "expert witness." We can imagine Jonah, resenting his female boss as she puts one more file on the pile of assignments on his desk, and at that very moment, remembering his mother tying the itchy scarf around his neck. We can imagine him shouting at his girlfriend after she asked him to wash the dishes: "You are just like mother! She always told me what to do when I least wanted it." The early Freudian etiological account and de Sousa's account (insofar as it permits a paradigm scenario in the sense of a paradigmatic example, a particular scene) should thus be preferred over Rorty's and Lear's account. None of the etiological accounts can be scientifically verified, but the memory version has a redeeming feature insofar as it is available to introspective awareness, to an empirical-non-scientific method of investigation.

The Freudian etiological explanation for singular emotional reactions that take part in an emotional pattern faces another criticism, common to all etiological accounts. All developmental etiologies strongly rely on the primal scene as the first

event that begins the causal story. The primal scene is not only the first in the chain of events, but is also considered as traumatic or at least as objectively very important at the time of its occurrence.

A few inter-related difficulties thus arise. Many times the event in question does not seem like a genuine trauma, as in Jonah's case. Furthermore, the memory of primal scene may be unconscious. Indeed, the early Freudian account basically presupposes at least the partial repression of that scene.

Freud originally thought that this primal scene could be revealed in analysis through construction or re-construction. It is "guessed" in such way that it makes sense of as many details of the patient's life and behavior as possible. Parts of it may even be remembered, before or during analysis. The construction is gradual and Freud likened it to archeological excavations and hypotheses about past times. Only that analysts have advantages archeologists do not, as their subject matter is alive and responsive and thus provides further hints during analysis.<sup>233</sup>

Freud enumerated reasons to trust the construction of primal scenes as real historical events. For example, he noted that patients would respond to such a construction with associations analogical to the constructed scene, as is evident from their word choice.<sup>234</sup> Another important confirmation for Freud was the aggravation of symptoms followed by the construction.<sup>235</sup> Freud also noted the conviction of the patient in the reality of the constructed scene, often manifested in its re-occurrence in dreams.<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> See S. Freud, "Constructions in Analysis" [1937], S.E. vol. 23, pp. 257-269, pp. 259-260.

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*, S.E. vol. 23, p. 263.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*, S.E. vol. 23, p. 265.

<sup>236</sup> Freud, *An Infantile Neurosis*, S.E. vol. 17, p. 51

Skeptics would talk about suggestion in this connection and accuse the analyst of convincing the patient that a scene the analyst fantasized has actually occurred. Freud replied:

An analyst, indeed, who hears this reproach, will comfort himself by recalling how independently of the physician's incentive many points in its development proceeded; how, after a certain phase of the treatment, everything seemed to converge upon it, and how later, in the synthesis, the most various and remarkable results radiated out from it; how not only the large problems but the smallest peculiarities in the history of the case were cleared up by this single assumption. And he will disclaim the possession of the amount of ingenuity necessary for the concoction of an occurrence which can fulfill all these demands. But even this plea will be without an effect on an adversary who has not experienced the analysis himself.<sup>237</sup>

I will not deal with the issue of suggestion in this thesis, since I regard it as a technical rather than a theoretical issue. But in any case, the reality of the constructed primal scenes is obviously difficult to prove. Freud occasionally assisted in the relatives of the patient, and at times relied on that information to verify his speculations about the primal scene.<sup>238</sup> But he later came to regret that method,

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<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*, S.E. vol. 17, pp. 52-53.

<sup>238</sup> For example, the primal scene constructed for the patient who came to be known as the Rat Man was partially verified by his mother in S. Freud, *Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis* [1909], S.E. vol. 10, pp. 155-249, pp. 205-206.

saying that relatives may censor certain details. Furthermore, the “confidence in the analysis is shaken and a court of appeal is set up over it.”<sup>239</sup>

As Grünbaum said in this connection, such appeal to extra-clinical information shows that the deficiency of the analytic setting itself to supply the needed verification. And even if one allowed for such appeal as a method of verification “[...] it will be a matter of mere happenstance whether suitable relatives are even available, let alone whether they can *reliably* supply the missing essential information.”<sup>240</sup>

The issue of the historical truth of constructed primal scenes haunted Freud in all the stages of his career. Even if the patient remembered the scene declared as primal, Freud questioned the reliability of that memory, given it was typically a memory from early childhood. Already in 1899, in his paper “Screen Memories,” Freud claimed that some early memories completely lack any historical truth, but are unconsciously constructed “works of fiction.”<sup>241</sup>

Freud claimed that usually the “remembered” scenes, no matter how distorted, include some grain of historical truth. Freud noticed that some memories synthesize various events from different times, and that some are a combination of a true event or several and fantasy, where the fantasies can date from various points in time.

Freud mentions various phenomenological features of memories that can serve to indicate whether or not the memory is of a real event. He was not skeptical about childhood memories across the board. Nevertheless, he concluded that paper as follows:

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<sup>239</sup> Freud, *An Infantile Neurosis*, S.E. vol. 17, p. 14, fn. 2.

<sup>240</sup> Grünbaum, *Foundations*, p. 263.

<sup>241</sup> Freud, “Screen Memories [1899]”, S.E. vol. 3, pp. 303-322, p. 315.

It may indeed be questioned whether we have any memories at all *from* our childhood: memories *relating to* our childhood may be all that we possess. Our childhood memories show us our earliest years not as they were but as they appeared at the later periods when the memories did not, as people are accustomed to say, *emerge*; they were *formed* at that time. And a number of motives, with no concern for historical accuracy, had a part in forming them, as well as in the selection of the memories themselves.<sup>242</sup>

As for the reality of the primal scene, Freud eventually arrived at a similar conclusion: “[...] the childhood experiences constructed or remembered in analysis are sometimes indisputably false and sometimes equally certainly correct, and in most cases compounded of truth and falsehood.”<sup>243</sup>

The most we could say about the reality of such a scene is that it *may have* happened or that it *probably has some historical truth* in it. In the case study known as the Wolf Man, where we can find the most elaborate construction of a primal scene, Freud wrote: “I intend on this occasion to close the discussion of the reality of the primal scene with a *non liquet*.”<sup>244</sup> Whether remembered, recovered or constructed, the question of the exact historical or imaginary “ingredients” of the childhood events in a causal etiology, ultimately remains an open question.

The distortion of early memories renders the construction of an objective causal etiology highly problematic, if not simply impossible. The contemporary

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<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 322.

<sup>243</sup> S. Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* Part 3: General Theory of the Neuroses [1917 (1916-17)], Lecture 23, vol. 16, p. 367.

<sup>244</sup> Freud, *An Infantile Neurosis*, S.E. vol. 17, p.60.

etiological explanations will not be able to recount the development of the relevant disposition (manifested singularly here-and-now), which directly depends on exterior events.

Freud was not discouraged by this problem, but saw its articulation as an achievement: “[it is] to the credit of psychoanalysis that it should even have reached the stage of *raising* questions as these.”<sup>245</sup> In other words, the weakness of the developmental account can (and at least partially did) turn into theoretical strength. We can retain the general insight of the contemporary developmental account, namely that the past somehow influences the present, as well as the early Freudian insight regarding the importance of memory. If we understand how memories of past events become distorted, we may learn something about how the past affects our present. The next section will discuss a certain kind of memory distortion that will cast further doubt on the developmental accounts as well as indicate the way forward to a different kind of explanation for pathological emotional reactions that take part in emotional patterns.

#### **4. When Freud Left Kindergarten: The “Regressive” Causal Role of Memory**

In this section I discuss a particular kind of memory distortion. I will not discuss primal scenes that date in early childhood and are assumed to be either unavailable to conscious memory and/or whose content has been distorted in the manner described in the previous section. I will only explore memories from later childhood onward, whose “video-recording,” so to speak, remained unchanged.<sup>246</sup> These

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<sup>245</sup> *Ibid.*, p.96. Emphasis in original.

<sup>246</sup> Freud proposes the age of 10 as a safe threshold in “Screen memories,” S.E. vol. 3, pp. 303-322, p. 303.

memories too, may go through a certain kind of distortion I call “subtitle-distortion” that will be explicated in this section.

My choice to abandon the convoluted issue of primal scene constructions is doubly motivated. First, most scenes that clearly play a part in the causal explanation of the symptoms of Freud’s patients do not date in early childhood and are not unconscious in a strong sense. The patients may remember those scenes but they do not; these memories do not occur to them. “Unconscious” or “repressed” usually merely means: “not thought about.” As Freud says, practically, -

[f]orgetting impression, scenes or experiences nearly always reduces itself to shutting them off. When the patient talks about these ‘forgotten’ things he seldom fails to add: ‘As a matter of fact I’ve always known it; only I’ve never thought of it.’<sup>247</sup>

My second motivation to suffice in those later experiences is the later Freudian claim, that particular scenes, in general, are not as important as they are seen in the developmental account. What matters is not so much the scene itself as it actually occurred, but the role it plays in memory, which is in turn causally involved in the psychological symptom, yet not in the developmental manner described by early Freud. The inquiry into the distortion of memory of later scenes whose “video-recording” stayed intact will suffice to demonstrate the doubt about the role primal scenes are meant to play in developmental etiologies. In this section, as well in the

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<sup>247</sup> S. Freud, “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through [1914]”, S.E. vol. 12, pp. 147-156, p. 148.

next chapter, I will gradually argue that it is not so important to identify the very first or primal scene and verify its reality.

Ian Hacking sounds angered when discussing developmental causal etiologies of the early-Freud style:

How come we are stuck with the very earliest, kindergarten Freud, the stock-in-trade of those prewar black-and-white psychodramas shown on late television? How come we have not even gone so far as Freud has gone by 1899 – how come we have not thought seriously about what Freud called screen memories? Why have we been so literalist, so mechanical, and imagined that an illness produced by trauma is produced at the time of the trauma, in early childhood? [...] why can't we ask whether the problem comes from the possibly repressed memory itself, much later in life, and the way in which the mind has worked on and recomposed that memory?"<sup>248</sup>

Hacking proposes one way in which a memory of an event that seems to play a causal explanatory role in an etiology can be distorted. Given the logical nature of Hacking's proposal, it is, as I shall try to demonstrate, very convincing. It will later serve me to draw further conclusions about the causal explanation for singular emotional reactions that take part in an emotion-pattern symptom.

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<sup>248</sup> Ian Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 137.

The memory distortion Hacking is concerned with does not involve explicit falsity. That is, if the event is remembered visually, as if the subject were viewing a video recording of the event in question, then the video recording is not, in itself, false. No extra details have been inserted into the scene.

However, since the scene in question involves people and their intentional actions, the subject does not remember mere visual information. “[A]ctions are not simply activities, movements that show up on video”.<sup>249</sup> Hacking refers to Anscombe’s known formula that an intentional action is under description. It is this logical feature of intentional action that allows for a distortion in memory without changing its respective “video recording.”

By the time a past event is remembered later in life, the subject has developed conceptual resources that were not available to her at the time of the event. The old event was experienced then as action under description that employed the there-and-then conceptual capacities. The manner in which the subject describes here-and-now what happened or what was done back then will thus be different to the manner in which the event was originally experienced. So, the re-description of the old actions, in a certain logical sense, distorts the content of the past event. As Hacking explains:

Old actions under new descriptions may be re-experienced in memory.

And if these are genuinely new descriptions, descriptions not available or perhaps nonexistent at the time of the episodes remembered, then something is experienced now, in memory, that in a certain sense did

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<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 234.

not exist before. The action took place, but not the action under the new description.<sup>250</sup>

Hacking emphasizes the phenomenological aspect of memory as an experience, or rather as a re-experience of the past event: “When we remember what we did, or what other people did, we may also rethink, redescribe, and refeel the past”.<sup>251</sup> It is this re-experiencing that makes the subject believe that what happened in the past was actually under this new description.

As indicated in Hacking’s words, the difference between the re-experience and the past experience can sometimes be due to re-description of past actions that includes concepts acquired only later in life. The difference can also be due to a concept that was not available to anyone at all at the time of the event. It is the latter case that is of great interest to Hacking, since the concept he is dealing with is “child abuse,” a concept whose criteria of application have an intricate history.

The issue of applying contemporary moral concepts to past events is a complex issue that may be raised in therapy. We need not turn to extreme examples where the moral concept in question did not exist at all at the time. Many of us experience a “generation gap” with our parents. In the case of emotions, we may have developed norms of fittingness that are typical to our generation and are different to the norms of our parents, which we once shared.

Some of these norms of fittingness, as explained in the first chapter, implicate moral norms, as in the case of anger. I may not have been angry in the past when my father discouraged me from going to university, saying it will make it difficult for me

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<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 249.

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*

to find a man. He said that men do not want a too-smart woman. At the time I thought he was right and that there was nothing wrong with his views and advice.

Twenty-five years later, as I encourage my own daughter to go to university, I may remember that past event and realize that my father has wronged me. His advice held me back and did not allow me to fulfill myself professionally. In fact, he was sexist toward his own daughter. I now see what I could not see back then, namely that his advice came with the emotional tone of disrespect and maybe even contempt to me as a woman that “tries to be like a man.”

I now remember that past event as a morally questionable advice that came with an insulting emotional tone. In other words, I may find myself retroactively angry. The “video-recording” of the past event may not change, but the opportunity arises for the distortion of its “subtitles.” I may look back and “realize” I was in fact angry at the time, insulted and disappointed, only that I was not able to fully comprehend my emotions back then.

But was my father indeed disrespectful at the time? Could he have seen himself as what we call “sexist”? The term itself was not widely used or accepted at the time (say in the late sixties), and my father was not a very up-to-date kind of man. He was just the average man of his generation. I may think now that there is something wrong with that generation, and indeed with my father.

If we are able to articulate our norms of fittingness and how they differ from the norms we were raised on, and if we deliberately avow our newly acquired values that they reflect, how will we judge our parents or grandparents? Will we hold them to the standards we now believe and criticize them for their past emotional reactions they felt entitled to direct at us as children? Will we forgive

them and accept that at the time they could not have meant us any harm? I leave these questions open.

Hacking seems to be concerned with the question “what did he do?” which is a question about the past event. But I am more concerned with the question about the past experience of the event. Namely, what did *I* feel back then? What kind of impact did that event had on me – then? If I then thought my father was right and concerned for me, I may have been disappointed to hear that men do not like smart women, but I would not have blamed my father for that. I may have even thought, at the time, that if other men were like my father I would not have had this problem.

Consider next how re-description of remembered scenes from childhood makes a difference mainly due to concepts that are available to the remembering adult but were not available to the child. It is in this connection that Hacking makes an explicit reference to Freud:

The old, and valuable, Freudian insight is that scenes that are recovered, whether it is in flashbacks, or through memory therapy, or through more ordinary reflective but unassisted recollection, become invested with meanings that they did not have at the time they were experienced.<sup>252</sup>

Given the sexual character of the primal scenes Hacking is interested in, namely those of sexual abuse, he refers to Freud’s claim that childhood memories

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<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 254. Hacking also makes explicit reference to primal scenes: “The idea, that the primal scene has a different meaning when experienced by the child from what it means when remembered or repressed by the adolescent, is of fundamental importance[...].” *Ibid.*, p. 249.

become sexualized in adolescence.<sup>253</sup> Hacking claims that this theory depended on the presupposition of the asexuality of children (a presupposition Freud held and then abandoned in favor of his theory of infantile sexuality).

The sexuality of the adolescent colored the past childhood event in a sexual meaning it could not have had at the time of its occurrence. Repression of the re-described event then occurred in adolescence, at the time of the re-description, since only then did it receive the meaning of something not innocent and perhaps even morally wrong. Hacking says that although the premise (namely infantile asexuality) was false, the insight about the effects of re-description should nevertheless be preserved.

To be accurate, Freud talked about the sexualization of childhood memories in puberty and their subsequent repression after the publication of *Three Essays on Sexuality* [1905], where he presented his theory of infantile sexuality.<sup>254</sup> Infantile sexuality is nevertheless different to adult sexuality; in particular, what is acceptable in a child becomes unacceptable or perverse in the adult.

Freud claimed that the childhood memory is re-modeled and consolidated in puberty, where it is colored in a mature sexual overtone, although still referring to some infantile sexuality connected in the past to the past experience. (This remodeling could also involve falsification of the “video recording” itself). The past event thus receives new mature sexual meaning and is consequently repressed in such way that could further cause a psychological symptom. Hacking’s point regarding re-description is thus still (post-kindergarten) Freudian.

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<sup>253</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 248-249.

<sup>254</sup> See for example the elaborate footnote in *Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis* [1909], S.E. vol. 10, pp. 206-208, fn. 1; and also in Freud, “My Views on Sexuality,” S.E. vol. 7, p. 274.

Hacking's logic goes astray when he claims that the "[...] retroactive redescription changes the past".<sup>255</sup> He explains:

If a description did not exist, or was not available, at an earlier time, then at that time one could not act intentionally under that description. Only later did it become true that, at that time, one performed an action under that description.<sup>256</sup>

This assertion not only goes against our common-sense realist intuitions about the past, it is also not logically consistent. If intentional action is under description, then the relevant description that correctly determines the action is the one the agent can be aware of at the time of the action. We may retroactively judge what someone did in the past as morally questionable, and we may even say that the action was indeed morally questionable at the time, whether or not the agent was aware of the relevant moral concept. But we cannot say that someone *intended* at the time to do something that falls under a newly available moral concept.

Subtitle-distortion changes the meaning of the event in memory, in particular its emotional import. If that change results in suppression of the emotional reaction to the re-described scene and in the repression of its memory, then the subject may develop a psychological symptom.

Hacking adds another insight to the Freudian insight of the re-modeling of memory. He says in connection to memories re-described by concepts that were not available in language at the time of the original event: "[...] it was not determinate

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<sup>255</sup> Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul*, p. 243.

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*

that these events would be experienced in these new ways, for it was not determinate, at the time that the events occurred, that in the future new descriptions would come into being."<sup>257</sup>

In other words, the contingency of the future development of language induces contingency on the possibilities of re-description of a certain remembered scene. Given re-description may change the emotional import of a memory so that it becomes repressed and causally contributes to the formation of a psychological symptom, the contingency in question also characterizes the potential of a memory to cause a symptom. What is indeterminate, then, is not the past event itself, but the causal power its memory may acquire together with the acquisition of further conceptual resources.

Hacking speaks of this contingency as dependent on new descriptions coming into being. New descriptions need not be entirely new concepts or words. Language is in any case in flux. In particular, emotion-type terms depend on norms of fittingness, which change to some extent from generation to generation, from childhood to adulthood. An event is thus not destined at the time of its occurrence to cause pathology. Even a sexual event in childhood, likely to be re-described in puberty is not pre-determined to be re-modeled as traumatic. The emotional significance gained by the re-description that may or may not qualify as emotionally traumatic depends on the norms of fittingness of the pubescent subject, which in turn usually depends on their social background.<sup>258</sup>

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<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 249.

<sup>258</sup> See Freud's example of two girls of the same household, one is the daughter of the landlord and the other of the care-taker, that engaged in "naughty" sexual games. The first may end up with neurosis as she was brought up on ideals of "feminine purity and abstinence" and the second, growing up in much more sexually liberated environment, can end up being an actress leading a pathology-free life. Freud, *Introductory Lectures*, vol. 16, Lecture 22, pp. 352-354.

What Hacking fails to emphasize is that the event is re-described and re-experienced with current conceptual resources at a certain moment in the subject's life. And that moment is not arbitrary. Something here-and-now triggers the memory of the there-and-then, which is then re-experienced and re-described in view of the present. Paul Ricoeur stresses that the memory's change in meaning occurs during specific here-and-now experiences:

[...] Freud discovers that the subject's history does not conform to a linear determinism which would place the present in the firm grasp of the past in a univocal fashion. On the contrary, recovering traumatic events through the work of analysis reveals that "at the time they were experiences they could not be fully integrated in a meaningful context." It is only the arrival of new events and new situations that precipitates the subsequent reworking of these earlier events. [...] generally speaking, numerous repressed memories become traumas after the event.<sup>259</sup>

Whereas Hacking refers only to conceptual resources acquired after the event as the source of their "subtitle-distortion" in memory, Ricoeur talks about "new events and new situations." Hacking's point is still relevant, since those new events and situations occur when the subject has at her disposal conceptual resources that were not available in the past. But Ricoeur adds a further crucial element: the present in light of which the past is re-experienced is another event.

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<sup>259</sup> Paul Ricoeur, "The Question of Proof in Freud's Psychoanalytic Writings." In Charles E. Reagan & David Stewart (eds.), *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work*. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), pp. 184-210, p. 191.

The new event (and not only the conceptual resources available when it occurs) somehow casts its shadow, so to speak, on the memory of the past event.

But how does this happen? How can a new event remind of an old event and serve to re-describe it? I will return to the question of here-and-now arousal of memories in the next chapter. For now I want to note that whatever “subtitle-distortion” occurs in re-description, it also depends on the current event that triggers the memory. The re-description of the memory as traumatic is thus also contingent on the particular current situation that triggered it in the first place.

Hacking and Ricoeur thus both take away the exclusivity of forward causality of events, whose memory comes up in analysis as causally connected to a psychological symptom. The emotionally traumatic import of memories may or may not be added to the original scene, and this addition depends on future events, future concepts and future norms of fittingness. But even if the event becomes traumatic only later in life, the Hacking-Ricoeur “subtitle-distortion” still says that something did happen, something that the adult finds genuinely disturbing and can thus cause a psychological symptom (like memories of child abuse, even of “mild” forms). But what about scenes like Jonah’s? Is Jonah the adult going to say that the scarf-scenes were indeed so terrible? This seems unlikely, and yet the scarf-tying scenes so clearly relate to Jonah’s scarf phobia.

It is Freud who proposes the most radical possibility for “subtitle-distortion.” In some cases, Freud claims, the here-and-now emotional pattern is primarily caused by “a current conflict,” and not at all by an invoked memory.<sup>260</sup> The current state of conflict reminds (how?) the subject of a past event. The memory of the past

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<sup>260</sup> Freud, *An Infantile Neurosis*, S.E. vol. 17, p. 54.

event thus “gives shape” (in what way?) to the patient’s symptom, as a response to the current conflict. In the Hacking-Ricoeur story, the current situation triggers a memory, whose re-description causes a psychological symptom. The radical Freudian option is that the current situation causes a pathology that connects in some way to a past memory. The memory itself does not cause the symptom. This recollection not only re-describes that past event as emotionally traumatic, but the subject also falsely accuses that past event as the cause for the current pathology.

The subject thus mobilizes the memory of the past to the current conflict. The memory is only retroactively and thus mistakenly interpreted as a cause for the psychological symptom. In such cases, Freud talked about causality not in the “forward direction,” as presupposed by developmental etiologies, but about causality in the “regressive direction,”<sup>261</sup> where the current situation mobilizes a past event to function as its cause.

But Freud was not willing to give up on the “forward” causality altogether, especially in cases where the current psychological symptom has manifested, in some form or other, in the patient’s childhood. In fact, there is no need to choose one of the two directions. Both can have causal effect, as Freud explained:

There are cases in which the whole weight of causation falls on the sexual experiences of childhood, cases in which those impressions exert a definitely traumatic effect and call for no other support than can be afforded them by an average sexual constitution and the fact of its incomplete development. Alongside of these cases there are others in which the whole accent lies on the later conflicts and the emphasis we

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<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.*

find the analysis laid on the impressions of childhood appears entirely as the work of regression. Thus we have extremes of 'developmental inhibition' and 'regression' and between them every degree of co-operation between two factors.<sup>262</sup>

The majority of cases thus combine both forward and regressive causality. It is likely that the event whose memory is mobilized to function as the cause for the symptom impressed the patient to some extent in the past. By and large, however, the patient over-emphasizes the causal importance of the remembered past event that seems somehow connected to the psychological symptom. The "subtitle-distortions" Hacking and Ricoeur talk about also serve to over-emphasize the causal importance of the past, which didn't have then the emotional significance attributed to it now. The developmental etiologies do not take account of "subtitle-distortion" and presuppose the exclusivity of forward causality. They thus also over-emphasize the causal importance of the past.

Once more, de Sousa's account promises to be more adequate. I allow myself to venture exegetically and hypothesize that de Sousa could claim that the relevant paradigm scenario, which is invoked unconsciously here-and-now, is a memory whose "video recording" has not been distorted. De Sousa could also claim that muddling scenarios is not necessarily or exclusively caused in a developmental etiology. In fact, all that matters for de Sousa's account is that the here-and-now emotional reaction is minimally rational. That is, that the here-and-now situation is unconsciously grasped as fitting a paradigm scenario, namely a memory that is the

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<sup>262</sup> Freud, *Introductory Lectures*, Lecture 23, vol. 16, p. 366.

“video recording” of some past event. I will return to this interpretation of de Sousa’s account at the end of the next chapter.

## **Conclusion**

It is undeniable that some emotionally laden memories of past events arise in analysis as somehow connected to the here-and-now emotional symptom. Sometimes, these memories are of clearly traumatic events, such as rape, torture of injury, in which case one can safely assume their forward causal power to inhibit emotional development and cause a symptom. Generally, however, this is not the case.

The inquiry into “subtitle-distortion” of memories demonstrates that past events whose content seems somehow connected to the current symptom do not rationally “justify” the emotional symptom through a developmental etiology of seeing-as dispositions. Magnetized dispositions or under-developed emotional capacities re-construct the symptom through extended notions of rationality, but they do not causally account for the emotional symptom.

An exterior observer may describe Jonah as disposed to resent women in authority or Mr. A as disposed to feeling betrayed, and that description may fit well their emotional patterns. When Sarah, the new general editor (the boss of Anita), will be introduced to Jonah, his colleagues could more or less reliably predict that he will resent her. However, if we cannot causally account for the existence of such a disposition, it would be a mistake to assume that Jonah actually has that disposition somehow engrained in him, and that this disposition is what *causes* his emotional pattern.

Exterior observers, including Jonah himself as he examines his life from an evidence-based third-personal perspective, can identify patterns of emotional behavior. And these patterns may be well described as behavioral dispositions. But this disposition in itself has no causal power. It is rather a *synoptic description* of Jonah that is more or less useful, not an empirical hypothesis about Jonah's mental constitution.

The explanation of non-pathological emotional reactions that take part in emotional patterns by invoking seeing-as dispositions that developed over time faces the same problem. Seeing-as dispositions are also supposed to causally explain why a subject takes personally one normative reason over another, such that that subject experiences the same emotion-type quite often. Namely, non-pathological emotional patterns express habits of emotional salience acquired in a developmental process of socialization that passes from one event to the next. Yet here too, the peculiarities of memory cast doubt on the exclusively "forward" causal efficacy of biographical events to create such dispositions.

Whether or not emotions *are* ways of seeing the world as provoking certain emotion-types is one question. Whether or not seeing-as dispositions *cause* emotions is another question. Insofar as the causal question is concerned, I conclude that seeing-as dispositions do not cause the subject to pick one normative reason over another but rather function as often useful synoptic descriptions.

Giving up on the exclusivity of forward causation takes the emphasis away from the primal scene, which no longer functions as the first causal step on the way to the emotional symptom. It is thus not so important whether or not the earliest memory invoked in therapy is the very first primal scene. Nevertheless, some re-

described memories of past events clearly connect with the symptom, even if not through a developmental etiology of dispositions. That connection mainly shows that patients over-emphasize the emotional importance of those scenes to the extent that they are willing to blame them for their symptoms.

A causal explanation for an emotional symptom should thus answer the following questions: What is the causal nature of the connection between those particular re-described memories and the here-and-now manifestation of an emotional symptom? How does a here-and-now event or conflict arouse a memory and serves to re-describe it? How do forward and regressive causalities work together to produce a symptom? In what way can a memory be mobilized so as to “give shape” to the emotional symptom, that is, determine its intentional content?

In the next chapter I propose an explanation for singular emotional reactions that take part in emotional patterns that partly answers and partly avoids these questions. My account will reduce the causal importance of memory as such, whether re-described or not. I will claim that the main causal weight, insofar as the intentional content of emotional symptom is concerned, falls on suppressed emotions, which only indirectly involve memory. I will also articulate how we should understand forward and regressive causality.

## **Chapter 3:**

### **The Associative Explanation for Pathological Emotional Patterns**

Pathological emotional patterns such as recalcitrance and pathologies of avowal cannot be rationally explained through taking personally a grasped reason of fittingness, for if they were they would change through reasoning. Neither can they be explained, as shown in the previous chapter, through a developmental account of seeing-as dispositions. These accounts ultimately use an extended rational explanation whereby the reaction here-and-now can be accounted for when considered in the context of the past primal scene.

The early Freudian version of the developmental account, whereby seeing-as dispositions nest memory-dispositions, indicated both the problem and the way to its solution. The memory involved in the emotional symptom has been distorted after-the-event. The causal weight thus falls on the memory, rather than on the event itself, as well as on the circumstances of the memory distortion. Freud's "regressive" causal factor put the causal weight on a here-and-now conflict, rather than on the memory. In such cases, the memory participates in the formation of the emotional symptom mainly by "shaping" the symptom, that is, by causing the particularities of its intentional content.

I claimed in the previous chapter that as long as we have some memories that can account for the "shape" of the symptom, we need not insist to find the primal scene and struggle with the problems of its verification. Memories from later childhood onwards whose distortion consists in changing the "subtitles" of their "video-recording" are normally sufficient to explain the intentional content of the

symptom. In this chapter, I reduce the importance of memory even further. Memory still matters, basically, only insofar as its import appears in the content of an emotional reaction to it that is then suppressed.

The majority of cases somehow combine both regressive and forward causality. In this chapter I aim to spell-out what exactly are forward and regressive causalities and how they cooperate so as to create a symptom. In the first section I claim that forward causality mainly consists in an original impression left by an event as well as in its rational suppression (whose mechanism will be explicated).

In the second section I claim that regressive causality consists in the arousal of suppressed emotions due to associations with a here-and-now trigger, which results in the formation of an emotional symptom. I claim that this process occurs through distinctively imaginative capacities that are altogether independent of reason. In the third section I demonstrate what I call the “associative explanation” for Jonah’s case and in the fourth section I present the method of associative explanation for pathological emotional patterns. In the fifth section I compare the associative explanations to the “seeing-as” accounts presented in the previous chapter.

### **1. The Operatively-Rational Mechanism of The Suppression of Emotional Reactions**

The account I present in this chapter agrees with one important element of early Freud’s theory of neurosis. Namely, the first condition for the formation of symptom requires the suppression of one or more emotions. The subject may suppress an emotional reaction to an actual event or to a memory of an event. Broadly speaking, suppression means that the emotion is not properly expressed or experienced. The

subject quickly decides to ignore or forget that emotion and the particular details of the event or the memory whose import gave rise to this emotion.

As explained in the previous chapter, “unconscious” practically means “not thought about” or rather “prohibited from conscious thought and reflection.” Suppression and repression of an emotion are thus practically one and the same. Successful suppression then, makes an emotion unconscious. I will thus use the terms “suppressed emotions” and “unconscious emotions” interchangeably.

In this section I suggest an account of suppression that relies on operative rationality. I will thus use the terminology of operative reasons as singular psychological causes that was developed in the first chapter. When I speak of reasons I always refer to operative reasons whose grasp is a psychological state of accepting a certain consideration in favor of a certain emotional reaction. And that psychological state makes a difference to the subject’s emotional state (I may not always write “operative” next to the term “reason” for brevity, but I always refer to the psychological aspect of reasons as operative reasons). I also remind, as explained in the first chapter, that operative reasons function as singular causes for singular emotional reactions do not refer to any causal law or generalization.<sup>263</sup>

I begin by discussing suppression of emotional reactions to a certain event. I divide them to two main kinds: suppression of operatively-rational emotions due to extrinsic reasons, and suppression of non-rational emotions due to operative reasons of fittingness. I then generalize that account to include suppression of emotional reactions to a certain memory as well.

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<sup>263</sup> For a brief reminder see the conclusion in chapter 1.

Perhaps most cases of suppression are of operatively rational and fitting emotions that the subject further judges to be somehow bad to have. Recall Roberts' example of the wobbly ladder. In order to climb the dangerous ladder and save the child, the fear of the danger had to be managed, suppressed. The rescuer had to take the reason of fit less personally in order to perform the rescue task. Taking-personally reasons of fittingness ultimately refer to the subject's practical identity. In Roberts' example the practical identity that is rationally relevant to the emotional attitude toward the wobbly ladder is simply being a human that wants to avoid harm and should thus take personally the fitting fear of wobbly ladders.

But as Roberts' example demonstrates, taking-personally judgments of fit provides the perfect opportunity to mix fittingness reasons with extrinsic moral or prudential reasons. That is, the practical identity invoked in order to decide whether or not one should take that fittingness judgment personally, may not be the one rationally relevant to the circumscribed emotional question. It may be, and indeed in Roberts' example we expect it to be, a different practical identity (in this case of a parent) that links to other related activities of the subject that are extrinsic to the "pure" emotional question, such as practical reasoning and intentional action.

This mix-up is also evident in some criticisms a subject may be confronted with following an emotional reaction. That is, some criticisms are extrinsic to considerations of fittingness, such as: "Why are you taking this so personally?"; or "What are you trying to achieve with this anger? It's not going to help you..."; or "Is this anger a way to treat your father?"

It is all too easy to fall into the “moralistic fallacy” or the “prudential fallacy” or the “self-image fallacy”.<sup>264</sup> In other words, considerations of practical self-management often get mixed with considerations of fittingness. I may find my anger at my father completely fitting, but my moral duty to respect him may override that fittingness. I may find a comment insulting, but my self-image as a self-confident person may have stronger reason-giving impact on my overall reaction.

A subject need not be confronted with external criticism. She may just imagine such criticism from others or simply criticize herself for her otherwise fitting emotional reactions. Sometimes, the subject’s perception of what is expected of her may be out of tune with the social and moral norms. She may be too moralistic, too prudent and have too high standards regarding her self-image. Such harsh social standards often cause the suppression of an otherwise fitting emotion. But some social norms that are widely shared in the subject’s social niche can be moralistic and the subject’s conception of them is not exaggerated.

If I decide to suppress, will I stop emoting? In other words, can extrinsic reasons genuinely override reasons of fittingness that normally have constitutive power on emotional reactions? Compare with the case of belief, from which I borrowed the distinction between constitutive reasons and extrinsic reasons. With beliefs, extrinsic reasons clearly do not have such constitutive power. For example, a subject would have to be massively self-deceived to believe that the butler did it without any evidence whatsoever, even if she has a very good prudential reason to believe the butler actually did it. Such second-order consideration could be, for

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<sup>264</sup> The moralistic fallacy, which mixes fittingness considerations with extrinsic moral consideration, is very common also in philosophical analyses of certain emotion-types, as shown by D’Arms and Jacobson, “Moralistic Fallacy.”

example, if the mob has threatened to kill her if she does not give a very convincing testimony that the butler did it.<sup>265</sup>

Hieronymi distinguishes between “content-related” reasons that bear on the question whether P, and “attitude-related” reasons that bear on the second order question whether the belief that P is somehow good to have (namely extrinsic reasons). Only reasons of the first kind are constitutive reasons that have an immediate effect on one’s beliefs.<sup>266</sup>

Hieronymi also claims that this distinction breaks down for the case of intentional action where reasons bear on the question whether to act.<sup>267</sup> When it comes to practical reasons for intentional action, none of the considered reasons can be considered constitutive. It is the subject that decides which reason should have more force than other ones and makes an all things considered judgment.

As for the question whether to emote, Hieronymi claims that this depends whether the attitude is “action-like” or “commitment-constituted”, namely belief-like.<sup>268</sup> I think we cannot make such classifications for the case of emotions. On the one hand, emotions depend on operative reasons to believe that the emotion is fitting. On the other hand, due to their involvement with practical identity, emotions have motivational force and their expression is strongly linked to action and interaction with others. It is this intermediary status of emotions – between belief and action – that allows for the distinction between reasons of fittingness and extrinsic reasons to become confused in the first place.

I will thus make an intermediary claim: Some situations are of no particular importance to the subject. Those are situation that are not particularly distressing

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<sup>265</sup> This example is taken from Hieronymi, “The Wrong Kind of Reason.”

<sup>266</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 444-445.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 450-451.

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 455.

and its circumstances are well circumscribed in the here-and-now. On such occasions, extrinsic reasons may well genuinely change the emotional reaction via an all things considered judgment, whereby reasons of fittingness may lose their constitutive power. These operative reasons would be extrinsic to fittingness considerations but will authentically change the taking-it-personally judgment.<sup>269</sup>

These are cases such as anger about a driver that cuts in front of me. In such cases I may genuinely change my taking-it-personally judgment and stop thinking about my fittingness judgment. In such mundane cases, ignoring the initial emotional reaction or deciding to forget about it will result in genuine forgetting. This kind of self-management does not involve suppression in the strong sense.

However, some situations are of importance to the subject. These are situations that are particularly perturbing or relate to ongoing relationships and other sensitivities of the subject's practical identity. In such cases, extrinsic reasons may appear through some fallacy to participate in an all things considered judgment, and fittingness reasons will appear to have lost their constitutive causal effect. But in fact, these cases are successful self-management that result in the suppression (and not the genuine forgetting) of the initial fitting emotion.

In such cases, the subject not only suppresses the emotion but also marks it as immoral or imprudent or out of step with her self-conception. The emotion is not only left un-expressed and no longer thought of, it receives the meaning of a forbidden emotion, an emotion the subject should not have. The subject alienates herself from her emotion as she suppresses it.

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<sup>269</sup> As discussed in chapter 1, section 2B, after the discussion of Roberts' example.

Some cases of suppression may have a different mechanism. These are cases where the reasoned-emotion in question is non-rational, that is, the subject's taking personally the fittingness reason did not cause the emotion. A subject who refuses to recognize her non-rationality may insist to believe that her emotion must be reason-sensitive. She will try to reason herself out of the emotion, whereas effectively her rational deliberation will end in suppressive self-management.

Consider the following example. Say I broke up with my boyfriend after a few years. My now ex-boyfriend is shattered by the break-up and I feel very guilty. Some people would claim that such guilt is fitting. They may hold the norm of fittingness that "promises of love should not be broken." Indeed, my ex-boyfriend was surprised by the break-up. He trusted I would always be there for him, as I often said I would.

As I contemplate my guilt I realize that I do not endorse it. In my reflection I discover that I have a different norm of fittingness to my religious parents, say, in this regard. I do not believe that one is guilty if one's love has worn-off. Love, I believe, cannot be promised. Indeed, I console myself with the fact that over the years I have greatly helped him with his career and social life.

Now if indeed my initial guilt was caused by a reason of fit that I later revoke, then my guilt would subside. It is possible, however, that the initial guilt was non-rationally caused. That is, when I reflected on my guilt and decided it was caused by the norm of fittingness that I acquired from my religious parents, I merely rationalized my emotion. In fact, as the case may be, a non-rational process gave rise to that guilt.

In such a case, my guilt would be insensitive to reason and remain recalcitrant. But if I am a person who values her rationality and does not allow

herself to have non-rational emotions, I may succeed to rationally suppress my recalcitrant guilt. I may think I succeeded to constitute my apparently guilt-free emotional state through my newly deliberately avowed norm of fittingness – but in fact I merely successfully self-managed my emotion by alienating myself from it, by suppressing my guilt and allowing it to maintain its recalcitrance unconsciously.

When an emotion is suppressed due to its unacceptable non-rationality, it becomes further marked as somehow impossible to have. The subject whose rationality is of great importance to her self-image believes she should never allow herself to feel or express such non-rational emotions.

Suppressed emotions, in general, receive by their suppression the meaning of forbidden emotions, they receive a suppression-stamp, so to speak, of immorality or (usually social) imprudence or danger to one's self-image. On the one hand the importance of suppressed emotions is unacknowledged, since they do not get expressed, and on the other hand their importance is over-emphasized, since their suppression grants them the new significance, often exaggerated, of somehow forbidden emotions.

Suppression of either rational or non-rational emotions may occur deliberately, but it is then less likely that suppression would succeed. When one actually engages in reflectively judging one's emotion, that conscious reflection would make it harder to forget about the emotion in question. Usually, suppression occurs spontaneously and pre-reflectively through "auto-pilot" operative reasoning. The subject is thus fleetingly aware of the emotion and perhaps also of its moralistic or prudential or self-protective suppression.

Sometimes, indeed often, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the emotional reaction in question is not to an actual event but to a memory of an event. Somehow (in ways I shall describe along this chapter), a here-and-now situation triggers a memory that then gets aroused. The subject may emotionally react – now – to that memory in ways she finds unacceptable. Memory-arousal, the emotional reaction to that memory and spontaneous “suppressive reasoning” occur in a fleeting moment of awareness.

The rational suppression of an emotional reaction to an aroused memory marks the emotion with a certain moral or prudential prohibition. The particular details of the memory, whose import gave grounds to the emotional reaction and which appear in the intentional content of the emotional attitude, become equally suppressed and marked by the later forbidden emotional reaction. The memory is not the subject matter of direct re-description. It is only insofar as the content of the memory takes part in the content of the emotional reaction that it is “infected,” so to speak, with the stamp of suppression.

Roughly speaking, this later suppression involves both forward and regressive causality. The very fact that the memory is aroused here-and-now indicates that usually, the original event left some impression on the subject at the time of its occurrence, even if it did not give rise to a problematic emotion at the time.<sup>270</sup> The arousal of the memory is regressive, namely caused by the here-and-now situation, as will be explicated in the next two sections. Regression cooperates with forward causality insofar as regression normally goes back to or arouses memories of events that left some impression at the time of their occurrence.

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<sup>270</sup> Alternatively, aroused memories are somehow connected with other memories of significant events as Freud explains in “Screen Memories.” But such memories will not give rise to a new emotional reaction the subject finds problematic enough to suppress. I thus focus here on memories of events that grabbed the attention of the subject at the time.

Suppressed emotions may haunt the subject later in life and cause a symptom. The existence of suppressed or unconscious emotions is necessary for the formation of emotional symptoms, as will be explicated in the next two sections. The forward causality involved in the formation of symptoms thus comprises two main elements: events that leave some impression on the subject at the time of their occurrence; and the suppression of the emotional reaction to those events or to the memories of those events. The emotional reaction then becomes unconscious with the added emphasis as somehow forbidden or socially dangerous.

Without emotion suppression there will be no symptom. Reasons to suppress come from the subject's general moralism and social prudence, which thus comprise a general condition for emotional symptoms. The socially characterized self-prohibitions often incorporate harsh and exaggerated expectations of oneself. Often these are expectations one ascribes to one's social niche or one's parents, sometimes falsely and sometimes not.

Note also, that the grasp of suppressive reasons is a psychological state that is a singular cause of the singular suppression. There are no psychological causal laws that would account for singular suppression. What is morally or prudentially disturbing for one person may not be disturbing for another person. What is dangerous for my self-image is not necessarily dangerous to yours. And even the same subject may suppress an emotion on one occasion and not on another similar occasion. Suppression is just as singular as the operatively-rational (or non-rational) singular emotion that it suppresses. In chapter 6, I will demonstrate how one can become introspectively aware of the psychological phenomenon of suppression.

## 2. Imaginative Arousal of Latent Emotions

The regressive causality that takes part in the formation of an emotional symptom performs two main operations: (1) the arousal of a memory of an “emotionally impressive” event during a here-and now event, which, in itself, carries some emotional weight (where that weight would be something like what Freud calls “a current conflict”); and (2) the arousal of the suppressed emotion that somehow creates an symptomatic emotional reaction. I claim that these regressive arousals of emotionally laden memories and then of suppressed emotions occur through a distinctively imaginative capacity, which associates a here-and-now trigger with those emotions and memories.

In this section I roughly describe that connective imaginative capacity. In the next section I demonstrate more accurately the operations of that capacity as well as another imaginative capacity, the synthetic capacity, which is involved in formation of a here-and-now pathological emotional reaction. I elaborate on the exact causal workings of these imaginative capacities in chapter 5. As explained in the introduction and as will become gradually clear in this chapter as well as in chapter 5, my proposal of distinctively imaginative connective and synthetic imaginative capacities draws on Freudian insights.

Suppressed or unconscious emotions are said to be latent, dormant, which also implies that they can “wake up” or become aroused. This latency may sound strange, since emotions involve affect. How can their affect cease to be felt? How can emotions escape consciousness or be ignored?

In fact, many of our emotions that are readily available to consciousness are also dormant in some sense, and may occasionally “wake up.” Consider emotion-

dispositions of the sort Pitcher talks about (as mentioned in the introduction). Usually, emotion-dispositions are individuated by a certain relationship, such as my love to my partner or my envy of a colleague.

I love my partner, but I am not always in a situation that brings that love to affective expression. When I am angry with the screaming neighbor, or when I wait impatiently for my coffee, or when I concentrate on my work, my consciousness is busy with cognitive materials other than my love to my partner and my body may be busy feeling various other affects.

Every now and again during the day, I can suddenly miss my partner and feel the affect of love. For example, I may see a man screaming at his wife on the street and by way of *reversal* remember how my partner is so sweet and calm and never screams, and how lucky I am to have a man like that. When I watch a scene in a movie and one of the characters says something similar to what my partner said to me years ago, I remember him and how much I love him.

This train of thought that leads me from the movie to the love of my partner does not qualify as a rational connection. Nothing occurs here-and-now that qualifies as an operative reason to love my partner such as “I love that he brought me flowers again” or “I love that he takes care of me when I’m miserable with a migraine.” The here-and-now triggers me to make an imaginative connection with my dispositional love.

In the movie example, I consciously find an imaginative *similarity* between the character’s line and my partner’s words on some past occasion. Such a conscious imaginative similarity will often be made under certain respects in which the connection holds: it may be some specific word that my partner often uses, or the particularly playful expression of the actor. This “being reminded” is a conscious

imaginative connection that connects the here-and-now with a dispositional or dormant emotion.

Some imaginative connections are made unconsciously. I see from a distance my boss and my colleague saying hello to one another – a perfectly mundane situation – and I suddenly feel envious again that my colleague has a higher position than mine in the office. If I am a reflective person that values self-awareness I may ask myself why do I feel envious, when nothing particular occurred today besides that “hello” that gave me reason to contemplate on office hierarchy. I may then elicit the respects in which their saying hello to one another reminds me of my inferior position. Indeed, I do not seem to recall the last time my boss seemed friendly with me. I can articulate the type of the imaginative connection: their handshake thus *symbolizes* for me the difference between my professional status and my colleague’s.

Unlike the “intelligent” conscious imaginative connections that operate under specified respects, unconscious imaginative connections operate “dumbly.” The unconscious imagination simply connects a here-and-now element with a certain emotion, without specifying the type of the connection or the respects under which it holds. The general claim is that the unconscious imaginative connection has the causal efficacy to arouse the dispositional emotion. How exactly an imaginative connection functions as a “dumb” causal connection will await chapter 5.

When I say that the imagination unconsciously connects a here-and-now trigger with a dispositional emotion and thus arouses that emotion, I do not hypothesize a “little agent” within us. The imaginative capacities that operate unconsciously do not have wants or purposes and do not act to achieve them (in chapter 4 I criticize the hermeneutic approaches for positing such unconscious “purposes”). They are, conversely, “dumb” capacities whose connections (and

syntheses) are, in themselves, meaningless.

The associatively reflective subject may notice that a connection has been made, she may engage in its articulation, and thereby give it meaning it did not originally have. This associative reflection assists in what I call the *imaginative third-personal perspective*. Through this perspective the subject regards the connections her imagination spontaneously made as a psychological activity within her she did not intentionally do. She can then regard an imaginative connection as *object*, identify the type of connection (such as similarity, symbol, reversal) and elicit the respects under which that connection holds.

This imaginative third-personal perspective is theoretical and not empirical for two reasons: first, the connection itself was made unconsciously and is therefore not available for introspective awareness; and second, the initial connection was a “dumb” connection, an inarticulate connection. I can give meaning to that connection but I thereby change its original “dumbness.”

Such associative reflection is familiar from the literary analysis of poems, for example. The various lines and words of a poem relate to one another through such imaginative literary connections, such as similarity, symbol, reversal and analogy. The poem does not announce the connections or their type, nor the respects in which they may hold.

The imagination of the poet, however, usually does not operate “dumbly” (though it may). The poet would often make such implicit connections deliberately, and most of us can either elicit the respects in which they hold or find the elicitation of another, say of a literary critic, either convincing or far-fetched. This identification of meaningful connections in a poem and the elicitation of the respects in which they hold are also made from the imaginative third-personal perspective.

The imaginative connections found in a poem will normally (even if not always) be connections that most of us can “get.” The respects under which they hold will normally refer to various connotations that are common to people within the same linguistic and social community. Conversely, the respects elicited for private imaginative associations will be normally (even if not always) idiosyncratic to the subject. They depend on the particular person’s biography and the individual emotional significance that person grants those biographical details. They are thus highly subjective and may look arbitrary to an outsider. Nevertheless, this imaginative perspective qualifies as third-personal even for private associations, since in principle, someone else may have that perspective. An analyst that knows well his patient’s biography and emotional life may also elicit the respects under which such connections hold.

The possibility to invoke the imaginative third-personal perspective and associatively reflect on such personal unconscious connections demonstrates that even if they are causally “dumb” and meaningless, they are not completely “brute” causal connections and can be given meaning. In other words, although these unconscious imaginative connections are inarticulate, they are articulable. I will discuss what kind of significance we can ascribe to the initial “dumb” connections, which falls short of meaning, in the conclusion of this chapter.

Emotional reactions to certain situations can also be considered dispositional or latent. Say I said something terribly insensitive and hurtful to my close friend years ago and felt guilty about it at the time. Every now and again something may remind of that incident and I may feel guilty about it all over again. Such an imaginative reminder, which connects a here-and-now trigger to the past

emotionally laden memory, may be conscious or unconscious, as roughly described above.

The dispositional emotions in the above examples are not normally thought of but they are not suppressed. They are what Freud called “descriptively unconscious” or “preconscious” since they can be aroused and expressed as such. Suppressed emotions are unconscious in the stronger sense that when they are aroused they cannot be expressed as such. Their original suppression, whether at the time of the event or later on, marked those emotions as prohibited from conscious thought. Their arousal can only occur unconsciously by the “dumb” connective operations of the imagination. And the aroused emotion cannot reach consciousness as such.

The aroused affect, however, is difficult to ignore, especially when it involves some bodily changes, as happens with anger or fear. Here, a synthetic imaginative capacity operates unconsciously so as to create an emotion with different intentional content that may enter consciousness. As Paul Redding explains:

An affective of emotional impulse [that is, an occurrent emotion] is *necessarily felt*, but is capable of being misconstrued by virtue of being ‘attached to another idea’ after the one to which it had been originally attached had undergone ‘repression’.<sup>271</sup>

One of my main goals in this and the following chapters is to provide a causal explanation for the particular intentional content that replaces, so to speak, the

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<sup>271</sup> Paul Redding, “Freud’s Theory of Consciousness.” In Michael P. Levine (ed.), *The Analytic Freud: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis*. (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 119-131, pp. 123-124.

content of the suppressed emotion. My main claim will be that the new 'idea' is not selected as a whole so as to replace the entire 'repressed idea' as a whole. Rather, the components of the new intentional content are selected (to some extent) separately and then synthesized into one 'idea' through their various imaginative associations to the components of the suppressed intentional content. I will describe the operations of the synthetic capacity in the next section and further elaborate on the particularities of the imaginative causality involved in such syntheses in chapter 5.

In Chapter 1, I made use of another imaginative capacity that causally effects rational emotions. I there described my imagination of the unstable fridge falling as a reason to be afraid that a cat might get hurt. Broadly speaking, the imaginative capacity there involved was "seeing with the eyes closed," thinking about something that is not present, yet possible, and toward which we can have operatively rational attitudes. Leslie Stevenson defines this ability:

[...] to imagine things that one does *not* believe to exist. In one such usage, the imagined objects are things the subject thinks *may* exist (or may have existed, or come to exist). They are conceived of as 'real possibilities', states of affairs that we may fear, worry about, plan, or hope or yearn for: [it is] *the ability to think of whatever one acknowledges as possible in the spatio-temporal world.*<sup>272</sup>

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<sup>272</sup> Leslie Stevenson, "Twelve Conceptions of Imagination," p. 241. Emphasis in original.

This imaginative capacity may be creative in the possibilities it comes up with, yet is nevertheless rationally constrained. When I think the fridge might fall and that a cat might pass by, I am employing counter-factual thought in propositional form.

Memory, too, can make an effect on one's emotion when one emotionally reacts to it. Memory involves "[t]he ability to think of something that one has previously perceived (but is not currently perceiving)."<sup>273</sup> A new emotional reaction to that memory may result in its "subtitle" distortion. Misremembering involves "[t]he liability to think of something which the subject believes to be real, but which is not real."<sup>274</sup> But if that emotional reaction is operatively rational then subtitle-distortion is constrained by operative reasons and then by suppressive reasons.

The connective imaginative capacity I began to discuss in this section arouses memories as well as suppressed emotion. In the next section I will demonstrate the operations of this capacity in further detail as well as the synthetic imaginative capacity that forms non-rational emotional reactions. These imaginative capacities, which I claim to be implied in Freud's writings, operate in complete independence from reason. In fact, I claim that principles that are the direct inverse of the principles of reason govern their manner of operation.

To articulate the principles that guide my causal enquiry into the singular imaginative formation of pathological emotional reactions, I turn to Frege's principles of enquiry of the foundations of arithmetic.<sup>275</sup> Frege's principles were to guide his study of the realm of pure reason, where no recourse to the imagination or private associations should be permitted. It is almost as if Frege formulated his

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<sup>273</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 239.

<sup>274</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 242.

<sup>275</sup> Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, Introduction p. x.

principles in order to exclude anything imaginative. The inversion of Frege's principles thus provides the main principles of the imaginative or associative explanation. In that manner, Frege, inadvertently, gives us an account of the associative imagination.

- 1) Frege's first principle is: "always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective;"

Its inversion yields the first principle of the imagination:

The imagination *always* sees the psychological in the logical or the subjective in the objective.

- 2) Frege's second principle is: "never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition;"

Its inversion yields the second principle of the imagination:

One *can* ask for the imaginative significance of a word *in isolation*.

- 3) Frege's third principle is: "never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object."

Its inversion yields the third principle of the imagination:

In imagination there is *no* important distinction between object and concept or between thing and property.

I shall demonstrate these principles and elaborate on the imaginative connective and synthetic operations in the next section, where I re-visit Jonah's case. The more precise manner in which these imaginative associations cause an emotional symptom will be discussed in chapter 5.

### 3. Associative Explanation for Jonah's Case

Jonah's emotional symptom has evolved over time: from resenting his mother to resenting his female bosses. The present symptom thus somehow relates to past events, or rather to past memories of even earlier events. The associative explanation for cases like Jonah can be diagrammatically represented by three main stratifications.

The first is *temporal*: the time of the first remembered event; the moment of its recollection and the formation of a new emotional reaction to it, immediately followed by the suppression of that emotion; subsequent moments of arousal of the suppressed emotion, which may also involve the formation and suppression of new emotions; and finally – the time of the appearance of the emotional symptom. These temporal phases can be represented linearly.

The second stratification is that of the imaginative associations involved in the arousal of memories and emotions as well as in the formation of the emotional symptom. The imaginative associations are represented by *zigzag* lines that cut across the temporal order. This aspect of the diagram represents the causal connections. The third stratification can be identified after the diagram has been drawn. These are *thematic* threads that go along the zigzag lines.

The “titles” of this diagrammatical division of stratification of the “psychical material” that is imaginatively or thematically related to the emotional symptom were proposed by Freud in his early account of neurosis. But Freud interpreted the meanings of these stratifications very differently.<sup>276</sup> I call this psychical material “associative material,” since it comes from the patient’s “free associations,” that is,

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<sup>276</sup> Freud, “The Psychotherapy of Hysteria” in Breuer & Freud, *Studies on Hysteria*, S.E. vol. 2, pp. 253-307, pp. 288-290. I will not elaborate here on how Freud conceived of each level. In general they were conceived according to his early account of neurosis.

the patient's thoughts and feelings that she expresses in therapy (I discuss free-association in chapter 6).

I structure my discussion of Jonah's case around the temporal order, and note the zigzag connections that cut across and causally "disrespect" the temporal order. I shall note the thematic thread at the end of this section and will investigate their possible contribution to the associative explanation.

The first event Jonah can presumably remember is having been sent away by his mother when she was in hospital with the newborn brother. That event had some forward causal influence insofar as it impressed Jonah. He emotionally reacted to that event with an attitude: "I am upset that mother sent me away when in hospital with my brother while my father was away."

Next there is Jonah's visit at his grandfather's. Rorty said that Jonah's grandfather unintentionally conveyed to Jonah his attitude toward the mother. But such "conveying" cannot be some mysterious transmission of undercurrent feelings. Something must have been explicitly said or otherwise expressed. If the grandfather "loathed" the mother and saw her as the "ruination of his son," it is likely that when Jonah talked of his mother the grandfather could not help some sour facial expressions or even some comments with an antagonistic tone. Even an adult that consciously wants to be careful about such negative opinions about the child's parent will sometimes slip.

Now on one such occasion attracted Jonah's attention. Say the grandfather's slip was a general comment without explicit mention of the mother. While hearing a neighbor yell at her husband, the grandfather (thinking about his daughter-in-law) said with a resentful tone: "some women always tell their husbands what to do."

This event I just imagined is not meant to be a hypothesis about what actually happened. I only hypothesize that something, whatever it was, was said or otherwise expressed. Something else could have done the same explanatory job (that is, as will immediately be explicated, imaginatively connect with the past event of being sent away). I just want to demonstrate what kind of occasion this could be and how it would function in an associative explanation.

According to the second principle above, the imagination works in fragmentary ways. Words within propositions have significance that does not depend on their place within the proposition. Jonah's imagination regards the grandfather's comment as the collection of its components. Each component can be imaginatively associated separately to various components of other mental attitudes.

Jonah's imagination associates certain terms and fragments of the grandfather's comment to certain terms and fragments from his past emotional reaction. I cannot know what Jonah's unconscious and "dumb" associations actually were. Imaginative associations are a highly subjective and idiosyncratic matter. I hypothesize certain connections just in order to demonstrate what such associations are like.

Diagram (1), which appears at the end of this section, represents the associative explanation for Jonah's case and appears at the end of this section. The temporal order goes from the top of the page to the bottom of the page. The zigzag lines that represent the hypothesized associations are not explicitly drawn, but if they were drawn, the diagram would look like a complex network of association. I did not draw the lines of the network since there are too many of them and drawing them all would compromise the intelligibility of the diagram. Instead, I colored the

associated components in the same color. Some components are more heavily connected and are thus multi-colored.

The diagram is not meant to be followed in detail, since in any case, the associations I list are merely possible ones. They may not be the one's Jonah's imagination actually made. It is meant rather as a general image that demonstrates how fragments of propositions are associated with one another.

I hypothesize that Jonah's imagination unconsciously made the following associations:

- (1) "women" → "mother", "husbands" → "me"
- (2) "husbands" → "sent me away"
- (3) "tell them what to do" → "mother"
- (4) "tell them what to do" → "sent me away"
- (5) "tell them what to do" → "me"
- (6) the grandfather resentful tone → "upset"

These associations caused the arousal of the past emotion. How many connections are needed to cause arousal and how could we know which ones were made? These issues await chapter 5.

The above associations are made "dumbly." I will now analyze them from the imaginative third-personal perspective, namely identify their type and elicit the respects in which they hold. I thus give the "dumb" associations meaning they did not initially have. Such meaning-giving would normally rely on Jonah's associations in therapy, I am again merely hypothesizing just in order to demonstrate how such meaning-giving would take place. Freud implies a similar distinction between the "dumb" unconscious associations and their analysis in his method of interpreting associations that cause dreams. He there elicits the respects in which imaginative

comparisons hold and says that “[...] this common element can only be discovered by analysis [...]”.<sup>277</sup>

(1) “women” → “mother”, “husbands” → “me”: “Women” and “their husbands” have a love relationship. Young Jonah loves his mother (and at that age, he may even want to “marry” her). Jonah’s relationship to his mother imaginatively became a bit more like marriage when the father went away. It was his chance to be “the man of the house”.<sup>278</sup> Jonah is not his mother’s husband, but the love between them is *analogous* to the love between married couples. When spelled-out, this analogy is a weak one, and strongly depends on Jonah’s subjective mental reality.

(2) “husbands” → “sent me away”: The past event put an end to the husband role Jonah imaginatively assumed. This connection is an imaginative *reversal or inversion*: Being sent away was the moment of their “divorce.”

(3) “tell them what to do” → “mother”: mother tells Jonah what to do quite generally. “Mother” is thus a *symbol* for an authority figure. We all associate “parent” with “authority figure,” but Jonah’s association is private inasmuch as it has to do with *his* mother in particular.

(4) “tell them what to do” → “sent me away”: Jonah’s mother told him what to do when she sent him away. Having been sent away thus again symbolizes mother’s authority.

(5) “tell them what to do” → “me”: Jonah, like all children, effectively tells his mother what to do all the time, that is, take care of all his wants and needs. This association thus turns Jonah into the *symbol* of domination. This association seems to put Jonah

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<sup>277</sup> S. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* [1900], S.E. vol. 5, p. 651.

<sup>278</sup> One can imagine Jonah’s father saying something like that sweetly and half-jokingly when he left: “you take care of your mother, you’re the man of the house now.” Such comments can have forward causal effect if the subject is impressed by them. Parents often say things to their children without realizing they said something impressive in that way. They will normally forget about it and be surprised if years later their daughter or son reminds them of it. “I said that? I don’t even remember.”

in the role of “some women” and his mother in the role of “husbands.” This association thus inverts or contradicts the roles associatively assigned in the previous associations. But the imagination makes logic fit its connections. It is not bothered by contradiction. This is another known feature Freud ascribes to unconscious processes: “*exemption from mutual contradiction.*”<sup>279</sup>

(6) the grandfather resentful tone → “upset”: This connection is of *similarity* in the respect of affect.

These imaginative associations cause the arousal of the past emotional reaction to the past event. How many connections should be made for such an arousal or how exactly imaginative causality works will be discussed in chapter 5. Now that the emotionally laden memory is aroused, Jonah forms a more precise emotional attitude toward that memory. He now resents that his mother told him to go away while in hospital with his brother. This is a reasoned emotion, although it may be difficult to call it “rational”, if only because Jonah is a bit too young to refer to norms of fittingness. But even if not fully “rational,” it is certainly “understandable,” however, that a child would resent a mother that needed some time off from him.

Jonah would have had a passing resentful thought such as: “my mother told *me* what to do when she sent me away.” But such resentment would immediately be suppressed for a prudential reason. Jonah does not want to resent his mother and compromise his love for her, love that he depends on. The resentful emotional reaction is then marked as dangerous to have, as prohibited. The grandfather’s comment is also marked as important, impressive.

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<sup>279</sup> S. Freud, “The Unconscious [1915]”, S.E. vol. 14, pp. 166-215, p. 187. Emphasis in original.

There is no need, on my account, to discuss whether or not or to what extent was the memory of being sent away modified or re-described at that moment (even if, according to my hypothesized version the “subtitles” of the memory effectively changed through the new emotional reaction from “sent me away” to “told me to go away”). As far the associative explanation is concerned, all that matters is that the memory was aroused and that Jonah emotionally reacted to it and suppressed that emotion. The suppressed emotion becomes latent and its future arousal will contribute to the causation of an emotional symptom. The past will influence the present insofar as the suppressed emotion has intentional content that relates to the memory of the past.

It does not matter, really, when exactly Jonah formed this emotion, but only that he has it now and has had that emotion for quite some time. In analysis, an analyst of a sort will perhaps insist to know whether or not Jonah resented his mother – at the time of the original event. But the analyst that explains associatively will only care to find out whether Jonah still resents his mother – now, no matter when exactly the emotion was formed.

Consider next the unconscious workings of the imagination during the scarf-tying scenes. Rorty does not mention the fact that some people cannot stand direct contact with certain kinds of wool. It does not have to be an allergy that would cause a visible rash; it can just be very irritating. Jonah must have experienced the touch of the scarf as unpleasant from the very first moment. His beloved mother was expressing her love and care by harshly tying around his neck an irritating scarf. That moment was in itself confusing and affectively disorientating (and would thus qualify as a “current conflict”).

I now list the imaginative connections I hypothesize that Jonah made unconsciously and “dumbly” among fragments of the experience under the description: “I don’t like that mother is harshly tying an unpleasant-feeling scarf around my neck” with the old suppressed emotion: “I resent that my mother told me to go away while in hospital with my brother.” I shall use the imaginative third-personal perspective to identify the type of connection and elicit the respects in which they hold. These respects are again idiosyncratic to Jonah’s biography and subjective emotional reactions, and can only be elicited after-the-fact. They are thus hypothesized. The associations themselves “dumbly” caused the arousal of the suppressed emotion.

“mother” → “mother”: this connection is of exact *similarity* between mother now and mother then. This connection is thus a special case of imaginative similarity that looks a lot like logical identity. But Jonah’s imagination sees the psychological in the logical, as stated by the first principle of the imagination. The identity here is a psychological identity.

“harshly tying scarf around my neck” → strangulation → “told me to go away”: the image of harshly tying a scarf around someone’s neck is *similar* to the image of strangulation or of hanging (that Jonah may have seen on TV or heard of in stories). We can all see how there is a sense in which the harsh tying of a scarf tightly around one’s neck resembles the image of strangulation and/or hanging. But this is not the normal association we make when our loved-one puts a scarf on us or tightens our tie. “Strangulation” is imaginatively *similar* to “told me to away”, in certain respects. Strangulation literally gets rid of someone and telling someone to go away is more abstractly or figuratively getting rid of someone. Strangulation also involves an

inability to speak, which figuratively *symbolizes* how Jonah was told to go away without “having a say.”

Unpleasant physiological feeling, “don’t like” → “resent”: the feeling and the affect are *similar* in the respect that they both have a negative tone.

Jonah’s old suppressed resentment is aroused but it cannot reach consciousness and be expressed as such. The synthetic imaginative capacity creates a propositional attitude that is *manifestly* a reasoned emotion: “I resent that my mother is harshly tying an unpleasant-feeling scarf around my neck.”

But this emotional attitude is not caused by taking personally the reason it *appears* to embed. The intentional content “that my mother is harshly tying an unpleasant-feeling scarf around my neck” was not selected together as whole. Rather, each component of this intentional content was caused by virtue of being associated with a few fragments of the suppressed emotion (as represented in diagram (1)). The expression of the intentional content of the old resentful attitude is thereby “displaced” into the expression of new intentional content. Effectively, in this case, the manifest elements are the trigger-elements and the manifest emotion-type is the same as that of the suppressed emotion. This is many times (but not always) the case with the formation of non-rational emotions.

In passing, I want to note that the associative material from the suppressed emotion and the here-and-now trigger participate in this process with no regard to the spatio-temporal difference between the here-and-now trigger and the there-and-then formation of the emotional reaction. The imagination is not concerned

with temporal order. It simply associates (fragments of) content.<sup>280</sup> The suppressed emotion is always there, latent and unchanged, and can be aroused regardless of its temporal index. This how I interpret Freud's insistence that unconscious processes are characterized by "*timelessness*."<sup>281</sup>

Most children would immediately complain that the scarf is unpleasant and would express their desire to take it off. But Jonah does not. The new imaginatively-synthesized resentful reaction is quickly suppressed for the same prudential reason the old resentful attitude was suppressed. Jonah regards his resentment of his mother as dangerous to their relationship.

By the time Jonah's mother ties again a scarf around his neck, Jonah knows very well that the scarf is terribly itchy. Yet he does not complain and notices that the scarf does not trouble his brother. Further imaginative associations are now made that strengthen the arousal of the old suppressed emotion.

"not complain" → strangulation → "told me to go away": not complaining is imaginatively *similar* to being strangled, in the respect of the inability to speak, of being silenced.

"not complain" → "brother not troubled" → "in hospital with brother": Jonah does not complain but he *is* troubled. The brother is not troubled. This is an association of *similarity* on the one hand (they both do not complain) and of *reversal* on the other hand. This reversal looks a lot like logical negation. But here is it a psychological "not," a frustrated, resentful and probably jealous "not." This association further connects with the component of the first suppressed emotion "in hospital with brother," an association of imaginative *similarity* idiosyncratic to Jonah, in the

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<sup>280</sup> It may also associate fragments of content with various smells, sounds and images, but such associations are not demonstrated in the thesis.

<sup>281</sup> Freud, "The Unconscious," S.E. vol. 14, p. 187. Emphasis in original.

respect that both connected items imply that, unlike Jonah, the brother can accept the mother's love.

As these scenes repeat themselves, Jonah's synthetic imagination produces the attitude: "I resent that mother is harshly tying an itchy scarf around my neck." Jonah may be aware that he resents the scarves. But his mother, the actual intentional object of the emotional attitude, is spared resentment. The resentment attitude toward his mother is suppressed and becomes latent.

Consider finally the formation of Jonah's conscious emotional symptom. We do not know much about Jonah's life, but we do know he suffered from other psychological symptoms as well. Most likely, that period in Jonah's life was marked by some emotional conflict. Perhaps even simply some general dissatisfaction at work.

Whatever this conflict was, Jonah was having trouble with the assignments he got at work. If Jonah resented Esther for giving him certain assignments, which were in fact quite normal at that work-place, plausibly Jonah was not too keen on (at least certain aspect of) his job quite generally. Receiving those assignment from a particularly considerate boss may in itself be affectively confusing, where a nice person serves him an assignment he does not was to do with a smile.

The situation under the description: "Esther gives me an assignment," in itself somehow unpleasant for Jonah, imaginatively arouses the suppressed emotions: "I resent that mother harshly ties itchy scarves around my neck" and "I resent that my mother told me to go away." I shall list the associations I hypothesize that Jonah makes unconsciously among the de-composed components of those propositions and propositional attitudes. I also elicit the respects under which they

hold through the imaginative third-personal perspective. I emphasize again, that I merely demonstrate what such associations could be and would count as an associative explanation. Jonah's associations may have been quite different and in any case, the meaning given to them could only be found in analysis.

"Esther", "me" → "mother", "me": Many of us are aware of the simile that bosses are like parents. The boss telling me what to do is, in some respects, like a parent telling me what to do; I expect from my boss not just to take an interest in my work but to care about me, to wish me well, to guide me, like a parent. My boss has other employees, other "children", of which I may be jealous, with whom I may compete on the boss's favor, similarly to a sibling dynamic around the parents. And so forth. But Jonah does not merely liken Esther to a mother under specified respects as some general metaphor for their relationship. Esther *symbolizes* for him *his* mother. According to the first principle of the imagination, the imagination sees the subjective (Jonah's mother) in the objective (Esther).

"gives me an assignment" → "told me to go away", "harshly ties an itchy scarf around my neck": All these fragments are *similar* to one another in a certain respect, namely they are activities Jonah is submitted to by a female authority figure.

These associations cause the arousal of Jonah's two suppressed resentful attitudes. Aroused suppressed emotions cannot be expressed as such, but the aroused affect of resentment is hard to ignore. Jonah's imagination thus synthesizes the manifest attitude: "I resent that Esther gave me this demeaning assignment." Each of the components of this manifest attitude "condenses" a few elements from the aroused suppressed emotions. In the diagram it can be seen that each colored component of the manifest emotional symptom relates to components of the two

suppressed emotions of the same color. The expression of the aroused suppressed emotions is thus “displaced” into the expression of the new emotion.

The component “demeaning” (indicated in Rorty’s original text) is a newly created element, which connects with “harshly” (from the emotional reaction formed in the scarf-tying scene) and with “told me to go away.” Being told to go away and submission to harshness are demeaning in some sense. But for Jonah these associations are psychologically private and relate to his subjective and specific experiences.

Jonah consciously experiences this new resentful attitude. It *appears* as an integrated whole, whereas in fact, each of its components was caused separately through various imaginative associations. The attitude *appears* reasoned, as if it was primarily caused by taking personally an operative reason of fit. According to the first principle of the imagination, the imagination confuses the psychological with the logical. Indeed, Jonah is convinced, at first, that his attitude is operatively rational and was primarily caused by reason that comes from the here-and-now import of the situation.

Jonah shares his emotions with his colleagues who disagree with him about Esther. Jonah unconsciously makes more imaginative connections that further strengthen the arousal of the suppressed emotions, for example:

“colleagues” → “brother”: It is not simply that there is a general simile between colleagues and siblings. Rather, Jonah’s colleagues *symbolize his* brother. Another idiosyncratic aspect under which the symbol holds is that the colleagues’ acceptance of Esther’s kindness is similar to the brother’s easier acceptance of the mother’s love.

Jonah is rational enough to revoke his reasons for resenting Esther. Yet on some occasions, when Esther gives Jonah an assignment, he unconsciously makes associations that arouse the suppressed resentful attitudes. It is quite likely that some of these associations may repeat themselves each time he sees Esther. Jonah's unconscious imagination may not be very original and have its own habits. But Jonah does not always resent Esther for every assignment she gives. These habits do not qualify as laws of associations. Furthermore, other associations may be newly created on various such occasions. In any case, when Jonah's suppressed emotions are aroused, Jonah cannot help feeling the affect of resentment. This recalcitrance can now be understood through the associative explanation.<sup>282</sup>

It is now clear why Jonah could not reason himself out of his resentment symptom. The resentful attitude was not caused by the grasp of reasons in the first place, but by imaginative associations to suppressed emotions that were formed and suppressed at a different time and place. The resentful pattern was insensitive to reflectively endorsed operative reason coming from the here-and-now import, since that import was not its primary cause. Non-rational emotions are not caused by the reasons given for them nor change through reasoning.

The suppressed emotions and the memories that come up in Jonah's free-associations, or rather their de-composition to their components, comprise the "associative material" that is related to the symptomatic emotional reactions (how exactly can suppressed emotions come up in association despite their suppression is

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<sup>282</sup> I do not engage in the imaginatively-causal explanation of Jonah's other psychological symptoms (his scarf-phobia and his obsessional thoughts about his mother). I believe that they can be explained in a similar manner and indeed that neurotic symptoms of otherwise rational and normative subjects can be explained by recourse to the condensation and displacement of latent emotions. I do argue for this here, since this thesis is concerned only with singular emotional reactions in general and with distinctively emotional symptoms in particular.

discussed in chapter 6). The imagination regards this material only in respect of its fragmented content without regard to its temporal indexation. The associative material, through the connections that arouse it and through the synthesis of those connections, “gives shape” to the emotional symptom, namely, picks the intentional content and the emotion-type of the symptom.

I elaborate on the synthetic processes of condensation and displacement in chapter 5, but the reader is encouraged to take a look at diagram (4) at the beginning of chapter 5 for a schematic representation of these processes. I will nevertheless remark now, that each component of the emotional symptom is associated to more than one component of the suppressed emotions. If these associations causally explain the emotional symptom, the symptom appears to be “over-explained.” I discuss this feature of the associative explanation in chapter 5.

On the thematic level of stratification, we can identify a few themes that repeat themselves in the network of associations. One theme that repeats in all temporal levels of diagram (1) is that of rejection/acceptance of love. Esther is a kind boss that consults her colleagues, and Jonah’s colleagues appreciate and like her, yet Jonah somehow cannot accept her kindness and consideration. The mother expresses love with her efforts to knit scarves for her children, and Jonah’s brother is able to accept that love, yet Jonah cannot. Finally there is Jonah’s rejection from the hospital where his brother accepts the mother’s love and full attention.

Other themes that repeat in the imaginative network are: scarf, female authority figures, resentment, peers (siblings, colleagues), and death. In themselves, these themes mean nothing. They are facts about the way Jonah’s imagination works. In analysis, the identification of such themes would assist in locating the

suppressed emotions whose arousal imaginatively causes the emotional symptom and gives it shape through condensation and displacement. These are Jonah's "nodal" emotions that his imagination is in the habit of arousing.

Nodal suppressed emotions account for the manifest emotional symptom insofar as the symptom symbolically represents them.<sup>283</sup> The subject's imagination is somehow fixated on those nodal emotions and keeps arousing them, and creating symptomatic emotions through their condensation and displacement. A full explanation, however, would also inquire into why the imagination is fixated on those nodal emotions. What makes those emotions so nodal in the first place?

These emotions were never expressed properly, and thus retained their intensity. Furthermore, their (operatively-rational) suppression makes them seem more important than they should be. This is due to the moralism and social prudence that caused their suppression in the first place. A full explanation will thus seek to spell-out the moralistic and prudential considerations that led to suppression, and will also inquire into the relevant practical identities involved in the formation and suppression of those nodal emotions. The moralism and social prudence and certain practical identities of the patient relate not only to the nodal emotions, but to the patient's general emotional life. Presumably, a patient like Jonah suppressed other emotions in his lifetime besides those nodal emotions. Why are these emotions more important than others?

The associative network reveals that some elements are over-emphasized as if at the expense of other under-emphasized elements, which hardly participate in the associations. In Jonah's case the figures of the grandfather, and in particular the

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<sup>283</sup> I use the term "symbolically" here in a very broad sense to indicate all the kinds of imaginative connections (analogy, inversion, similarity) that partake in this representation.

father, do not figure in any emotion and are spared any imaginative association. We know nothing about Jonah's relationships with the male figures in his life. Their under-emphasis is somehow responsible for the over-emphasis of the relationship with the mother.

Consider again Jonah's imaginative reaction to the grandfather's comment. Jonah identified with his grandfather's resentful tone against women who tell men what to do. He could have had a different reaction such as: "Hey, you're not saying *my* mother is a bad wife, are you?! My mother is great! I miss her so..." Yet somehow the grandfather is spared all criticism. If we knew why, we could say more about what caused the over-emphasis of those particular nodal emotions and the imagination's fixation on them.

The associative network thus shows what nodal emotions imaginatively cause the emotional symptom and also invites further associative reflection on the under-emphasized elements. Association whose point of departure is those under-emphasized elements would expose other suppressed emotions that are not symbolically represented in the emotional symptom. The network thus also invites further association in regard to the practical identities invoked in the nodal and other emotions.

The over-emphasis of certain suppressed emotional reactions to certain events does not result from the events or the memories of those events themselves. Rather, those emotionally laden memories somehow capture other emotional issues of the patient; they symbolize (in the broad sense) something more general about the subject's emotional relationships, one or more practical identities, moralism and social prudence. The fixation on these few nodal emotions indicates that other problems should be exposed and addressed.

The issue of the primal scene now seems even less relevant. Scenes or their memories, and in particular the emotional reactions to them, cause the *shape* of the emotional symptom, but they are not the main source of the patient's troubles. Exceptions are cases of severe trauma such as rape, torture or injury that have direct causal effect on the patient's emotional life. These exceptions provide a bad model for neurotic symptoms in general and for emotional symptoms in particular, where the imaginatively related events do not qualify as severe trauma.

## Diagram (1)

### Associative Explanation for Jonah's case

**Phase 1: The trigger arouses the old emotionally-laden event; new emotional response to the old event that is immediately suppressed.**

Emotionally laden event: I am upset that mother sent me away when in hospital with brother while father was away.

First Trigger: grandfather said resentfully that some women always tell their husbands what to do.

=> First Suppressed Emotion:

I resent that my mother told me to go away when in hospital with brother while father was away.

**Phase 2: Second trigger arouses the first suppressed emotion; the components of the first suppressed emotion are condensed (together with trigger-element) into the newly synthesized emotion that is immediately suppressed.**

Second Trigger: I don't like that Mother is harshly tying an unpleasant-feeling scarf around my neck.

Association: STRANGULATION

=> Second Suppressed Emotion:

I resent that my mother is harshly tying an unpleasant-feeling scarf around my neck.

**Phase 3: Further triggers further arouse the first and second suppressed emotions; suppressed-emotion-elements and trigger-elements are condensed into the newly synthesized emotion that is immediately suppressed.**

Third and Fourth Triggers: I do not complain about the scarf; My brother is not troubled by the scarf.

=> Third Suppressed Emotion:

I resent that my mother is harshly tying an itchy scarf around my neck.

**Phase 4: Fifth trigger arouses the first and the third suppressed emotions; suppressed-emotions-elements and trigger-elements are condensed into the newly synthesized symptomatic emotion.**

Fifth Trigger: Esther gives me an assignment.

=> Symptom: Reasoned-Emotion, manifestly operatively rational (pathology of avowal):

I resent that Esther gave me this demeaning assignment.

**Phase 5: A further trigger reinforces arousal of the first suppressed emotion. The trigger is also an operative reason to turn the pathologically avowed emotion into a disavowed recalcitrant emotion.**

Further Trigger: Colleagues disagree about Esther.

=> Modified Symptom: Recalcitrant Emotion

I resent that Esther gave me this assignment.

Other Symptoms:

SCARF PHOBIA

Obsessional thought: My mother is going to kill me

#### 4. The Associative Method for the Explanation of Emotional Symptoms

The reader familiar with Freud's writings will recognize the terminology used above from Freud's method of dream-interpretation.<sup>284</sup> The wording of the emotional symptom is analogous to the wording of a dream the patient reports, namely the "manifest content" to be analyzed. Freud's method was to de-compose the manifest content to various fragments or elements and use them as separate starting points for the patient's free-associations. Those associations imaginatively relate to the manifest content and comprise what Freud called the "latent content."

Some of the associations were elements from the experiences of the day prior to the dream, which sometimes showed up in the dream itself. The associations, called "dream thoughts" would converge on certain "nodal points," namely certain thoughts, emotions and memories that "radiated" more associations from them than other thoughts. The plentitude of the connections to a particular dream-thought is a sign of its importance. As Freud says: "The ideas which are most important among the dream-thoughts will almost certainly be those which occur most often in them, since the different dream-thoughts will, as it were, radiate out from them."<sup>285</sup>

A diagram can be drawn for every dream that appears in *The Interpretation of Dreams* that looks a lot like the diagram I drew for Jonah's emotional symptom.<sup>286</sup> One noticeable difference is that Jonah's diagram includes only nodal points, that is, nodal emotions (whereby many components are multi-colored). Presumably, however, if we had access to the various associations that came up in Jonah's analysis and that eventually pointed to those nodal emotions, we could add those

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<sup>284</sup> For a clear and relatively short review of Freud's method of dream-interpretation and a presentation of the relevant terminology see S. Freud, "On Dreams [1901]", S.E. vol. 5, pp. 631-686.

<sup>285</sup> Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, S.E. vol. 4 p. 306-7.

<sup>286</sup> See for example the diagram drawn by one of Lear's students in Lear, *Freud*, p. 95 for Freud's dream on the botanical monograph in Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* [1900], S.E. vol. 4, pp. 169-176.

other thoughts to the diagram and it would look more like a dream diagram. Another difference is that the trigger elements of emotion-diagrams almost invariably appear in the manifest emotional attitude, whereas the elements of the dream-day that trigger the dream-thoughts often appear as latent content.

Freud's theory of dream-formation is almost perfectly analogous to my account of the formation of emotional symptoms, which will be explicated in much further detail by making use of this analogy in chapter 5. Freud was aware of the analogy of dreams to psychological symptoms in general, and this analogy is widely accepted in the literature of psychoanalysis. My account differs as it lays the entire causal weight on the connective and synthetic imaginative capacities and their role in the processes of displacement and condensation that will also be further explicated in chapter 5 in direct analogy to Freud's discussion in *The Interpretation of Dreams*. In chapter 4 I present and criticize another account that is analogical to Freud's method of dream-interpretation.

The associative explanation for Jonah's symptomatic emotional pattern suggests a method of explanation for Mr. A's emotional pathology, which is also analogous to Freud's method of dream-interpretation. Mr. A's various emotional attitudes should be regarded as the synthetic result of the imaginative associations that also serve to condense and displace unconscious or suppressed emotions. That is, his current emotional attitudes should be decomposed to their elements: the emotion-type of feeling betrayed, the intentional object and the manifest reason for the attitude. Mr. A's various ways of manipulating situations such that they would provide reasons to feel betrayed, would also be relevant associative material.

Each element should then be considered separately. The affective component, the emotion-type of feeling betrayed, is probably connected to some

unconscious emotion, whose intentional content was suppressed. That intentional content may relate to some past experience or a memory where Mr. A felt betrayed or perhaps felt guilty for having betrayed someone. Once the network of imaginative associations is revealed and the emotional pattern can be symbolically accounted for, the associative network will also indicate which elements should be further reflected upon. The associative network would enlarge such that it will contain other emotional issues and certain related practical identities that would serve to explain the imagination's fixation on the over-emphasized emotions.

### **5. Comparison with the Etiological Accounts**

The associative explanation relies on some insights of the developmental etiologies. First, the past plays some role in the formation of emotional symptoms. Yet, the associative explanation gives a limited causal role to particular events. They affect the subject insofar as they are impressive enough for the imagination to arouse *their* memories (out of all the other memories of other events) during later events through imaginative associations.

The associative explanation still gives some role to memories. But unlike the early Freudian account for psychological symptoms, they are not here considered as the primary cause (for emotional symptoms). Rather, emotional reactions to those memories may contribute to the *shape* of an emotional symptom, insofar as they are suppressed and may be later aroused through imaginative associations to a here-and-now trigger. The suppression of emotions does not cause inhibition of emotional development as in the etiological accounts (those of Rorty and Lear). Rather, the arousal of those emotions contributes, again, to the *shape* of the manifest emotional symptoms.

Crucially, the associative explanation does not suffice in the explanation of the *shape* of the emotional symptom, namely of the particularities of its intentional content. The claim is rather, that those memories and suppressed emotions *symbolically capture* more general features in the subject's emotional life: certain emotional relationships and certain practical identities, as well as the moralism and social prudence that caused suppression in the first place. That is why the imagination is fixated on those suppressed emotions and keeps going back to them in its associations. The associative network that causally explains the shape of an emotional symptom thus invites further association so as to account for that imaginative fixation.

Unlike the developmental etiologies reason plays a limited role in the formation of the emotional symptom. Operative reason causes suppression, which is a necessary condition for the formation of symptoms. But the shape of the symptomatic emotion, its intentional content, is explained in distinctively non-rational terms, through the operations of distinctively imaginative capacities.

Examine again de Sousa's account of muddled scenarios. In Jonah's case, there are in fact two scenarios that imaginatively connect with the here-and-now situation, but this does not have to be a problem for de Sousa's account. Two or even more scenarios may be unconsciously invoked at the same time, as long as they come with the same affect. Recall that de Sousa claims that the here-and-now emotional symptom is "fitting" the "original scenario," which is mistakenly and unconsciously "applied" to the here-and-now situation. In that manner, the here-and-now emotional reaction is "minimally rational."

This "minimal rationality" is ultimately ascribed to the subject's unconscious, which sees the here-and-now, mistakenly, as "objectively similar" to or as fitting the

original scenario, and therefore emotes accordingly. De Sousa could say that this mistaken “objective similarity” is in fact a psychological imaginative similarity, caused in the way described in this chapter, namely through condensation and displacement. In fact, de Sousa must invoke these imaginative processes in order to account for the muddling of the here-and-now situation with a specific original scenario. The unconscious imagination confuses the objective with the subjective and thus sees the here-and-now not just as imaginatively and psychologically similar to the there-and-then but as objectively similar.

This explanation is seductive precisely because of the “minimal rationality” presupposed. However, on closer examination, de Sousa’s view looks like a homuncular view of the unconscious mind, whereby the unconscious has its own kind of minimal rationality. The unconscious is conceived as capable of making a quasi-rational judgment that the there-and-then emotional reaction fits, even if in an imaginatively twisted way, the here-and-now situation. The normal operative rationality is taken away from the conscious subject and is restored in an extended form of rationality at the level of the unconscious.

Reason, however, as claimed in chapter 1,<sup>287</sup> is the privilege of the conscious subject, not of the unconscious. “Auto-pilot” reasoning can, at any moment, be brought to consciousness, “stepped-back” from and deliberated upon. It is what Freud called the “pre-conscious” that is readily available to conscious thought that is in turn governed by rationality (or what Freud called “secondary processes”). Unconscious processes, on the other hand, are not readily available to consciousness, and cannot be brought to rational reflection. They are thus strictly

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<sup>287</sup> After the discussion of “auto pilot” reasoning at the end of the discussion of the second objection in the second section of chapter 1.

non-rational and governed by distinctively imaginative processes (which Freud called “primary processes”).

Note also, that there is no need to invoke this minimal rationality in order to explain an emotional symptom. Each and every component of the intentional content of the symptomatic attitude is explained, indeed “over-explained,” by the imaginative associations, as can be seen in Jonah’s example represented in Diagram (1). Imaginative associations are not connections of fittingness that apply an entire paradigm scenario to an entire description of the here-and-now scenario. They are “dumb” and meaningless connections that associate *fragments* of the intentional content of suppressed emotions with *fragments* of the intentional description of the here-and-now situation. Why add the quasi-rational explanation on top of the associative explanation, when the latter does all the necessary explanatory work? According to the Occam’s Razor principle, we should suffice in as little explanatory resources as possible.

De Sousa’s account of muddled scenarios is a rational re-construction of the associative network that is not necessary for the explanation of the emotional symptom and further presupposes a philosophically problematic homuncular view.<sup>288</sup> Furthermore, explanation in terms of an imaginatively-twisted and unconscious fittingness-judgment will not invite further association on the components of the associative network that are not symbolically represented in the symptom. Fittingness can be more or less compatible, even imaginatively-twisted fittingness. Only the associative explanation that does not spare any component

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<sup>288</sup> The problems for homuncular views are well-known in philosophy and I will not rehearse them in the thesis. I will just briefly mention the problem of regression – if the unconscious can make quasi rational judgments, and is thus very similar to a person, does the unconscious have an unconscious of its own that also makes quasi-rational judgments?

from further association will end-up reducing the over-emphasis of the nodal suppressed emotions.

Such an account, if presented to someone like Jonah, would thus not have the desired therapeutic effect. Tracing the symptom emotional reaction to a particular original scenario and declaring that scenario *the* cause for that reaction only contributes to the over-emphasis of the scenario, which is the source of the pathology in the first place. Even if regressive causality is taken into account, and the event itself is spared accusations, the *memory* of the event is now conceived as the source of all troubles. In this respect, de Sousa's account is similar to the historical hermeneutic approach to psychoanalysis I discuss in the next chapter.<sup>289</sup> I thus delay the discussion on this issue of reinforcement of pathology to the next chapter.

The etiological accounts rely on singular causation insofar as they depend on the subject's particular and singular biography. The associative explanation also belongs to the realm of singular causation in an even stronger manner. It is not only the singularity of biography and highly contingent triggers, but also the idiosyncrasy and of the subject's imaginative associations and their possible capriciousness that give shape to the symptom. Suppressive reason is just as particular and depends on the particular expectations the subject has from herself, expectations that normally change over time.

The main hypothesis of this chapter is that patients, indeed all of us, have imaginative patterns. Our imagination, in other words, has its habits, its favorite "places" (suppressed emotions, memories) it goes to in its associations. If these are

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<sup>289</sup> De Sousa's causal account is different to the causal account of the historical approach, but insofar as therapy is concerned – they can be similarly criticized.

imaginative “dispositions” they have a merely descriptive status, that is, they can be identified synoptically in analysis.

Importantly, however, the highly subjective and idiosyncratic associations themselves that connect triggers to emotions and then synthesize a manifest emotion are singular events that do not necessarily follow any noticeable pattern. But they may follow a pattern. Singular emotional reactions that appear to follow an emotion pattern, such as Jonah’s repeated resentment of Esther or his repeated resentment of female bosses in general, show that some imaginative connections do repeat themselves, like Esther→Mother or Female-Boss→Mother (where “female boss” is the description under which the trigger-component “Esther” or “Anita” may be perceived).

Some of us have frequent associations that are idiosyncratic to us. For example, I often associate “cat” with “lost” or “baby” or “love.”<sup>290</sup> These associations do not grant “cat” a new private *meaning*. Indeed they are, in themselves, *meaningless*. They are “dumb” facts about how my imaginative connective capacity works. “Cat” has for me the significance of being often connected to certain words and images, and this significance falls short of meaning. In analysis, I can give meaning to those connections, and identify the idiosyncratic respects in which they hold. In chapter 6 I discuss the effects this meaning giving may have on imaginative associations.

We also have “popular themes” that we can identify when reflecting on our imaginative associations. For example, cats play a role many times in my dreams

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<sup>290</sup> This does *not necessarily* mean that if I were to take part in an experiment in empirical psychology that asks me to quickly say what comes to my mind when I hear the word “cat” – I would reply “lost child,” “baby,” or “love”. Such an experiment forces a trigger under the description of a trigger. The triggers I discuss in this thesis are selected unconsciously from a broader here-and-now context. And these triggers are themselves de-composed to their elements that in turn get associated not just with isolated terms, but with terms that are components of a certain suppressed emotion or memory.

and associative thoughts. But this theme means nothing in itself. This theme has some significance inasmuch as its association to certain emotions indicates they are somehow important.

Imaginative patterns, idiosyncratic to each individual, play a causal role in the arousal of unconscious emotions and in the synthetic creation of a pathological emotion. If, as I claim, we all have such patterns, then what is the difference between someone like Jonah and a “normal” person? I claim there is no clear-cut difference. We all feel the pressure of suppressive reason and it poses difficulties on our emotional life. But some of us have pathologies of avowal that do not raise suspicion or criticism, either from ourselves or from our peers. Some of us ignore quite successfully time and again our recalcitrant emotions. And most crucially, although we all have emotional “issues”, some of us are less bothered by them than others.

As a final remark I want to note that in this chapter, the empirical-non-scientific associative explanation for singular pathological emotional reactions was presented in a merely theoretical manner. As I have claimed in the previous chapters, causal explanations of singular emotional reactions, which do not lend themselves to scientific investigation, require some other form of empirical inquiry. The non-scientific empirical method of inquiry I have invoked so far is the method of introspective awareness. In chapter 6, I discuss the process of analysis and describe in what manner and to what extent the associative explanation for singular pathological emotions can be rendered plausible in this way.

## **Appendix:**

### **An Alternative (or Additional) Explanation to Patterns of Recalcitrance**

I here want to consider a further alternative causal explanation to stable recalcitrance implied by D'Arms and Jacobson's general account of emotions. I return therefore to the methodology of the first chapter, whereby I consider an ontological account for what emotions are – in order to extract what that account implies insofar as the causes for the emotions are concerned.

I will claim that although D'Arms and Jacobson's account provides a significant causal factor to a certain kind of stable recalcitrant emotions, it is still insufficient for that kind, which also requires an associative explanation. Furthermore, their account will provide no explanation to cases like Jonah's.

D'Arms and Jacobson criticize the judgmentalist account insofar as it cannot explain recalcitrance, on similar grounds that were presented in the first chapter. Their criticism against the seeing-as account, which they name quasijudgmentalism, was also presented in the first chapter. That criticism awaited an explanation for stable recalcitrance. Such an explanation was in fact offered by Rorty and de Sousa and was discussed in chapter 2.

The alternative account D'Arms and Jacobson offer for emotions has a few explanatory purposes: to account for the emotional capacities we ascribe to infants and animals, who have no conceptual capacities;<sup>291</sup> to explain how emotions can be grouped to a relatively limited number of emotion-types that can then be cognitively

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<sup>291</sup> D'Arms and Jacobson, "Recalcitrant Emotion," p. 133.

sharpened; to maintain the insights of judgmentalism;<sup>292</sup> and to account for a few empirical characteristics of recalcitrance.

The first characteristic is that recalcitrance usually happens with what D'Arms and Jacobson call "natural emotions." These include (as a partial and provisional list): "amusement, anger, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, envy, fear, guilt, jealousy, joy, pity, pride, shame, and sorrow".<sup>293</sup> They describe natural emotions as follows:

[They] are products of relatively discrete special-purpose mechanisms that are sensitive to some important aspect of human life. Emotions evolved for their adaptive value in dealing with what psychologists have called 'fundamental life tasks,' 'universal human predicaments,' or 'recurrent adaptive situations' – especially but not exclusively social situations [footnote omitted]. These include 'fighting, falling in love, escaping predators, confronting sexual infidelity, and so on, each [of which] recurred innumerable times in evolutionary history.' [footnote omitted].<sup>294</sup>

Natural emotions are thus dispositions to emote in certain ways in certain circumstances that are the product of evolution. They thus do not inherently involve conceptual evaluation mechanisms at all. If a subject is experiencing the natural

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<sup>292</sup> Namely that in the "standard case" the emotion involves a belief. *Ibid.*, pp. 132, 137; that change in that belief will change the emotion *Ibid.*, pp. 132, 144; and that we reflect and criticize our emotions and emotions of others *Ibid.*, pp. 144-145.

<sup>293</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 138.

<sup>294</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139. They refer to Ekman, Johnson-Laird and Oatley, and Tooby and Comides.

emotion of fear in response to a tiger in the back yard, she is construing herself to be in immanent danger without recourse to concepts.<sup>295</sup>

Natural emotions are governed by a different type of appraisal mechanism, which is non-linguistic, that involves monitoring the environment for various factors relevant to the adaptation of the organism. “The fear system, for instance, can plausibly be described as monitoring the environment for threats to the organism [...]”<sup>296</sup> without invoking the concept of danger. Similarly –

Jealousy monitors the social environment for potential losses of affection of allegiance, especially (though not solely) from mates. Its characteristic appraisal is perhaps best interpreted in terms of *defection*. Again, though, the fact that this concept is part of the best articulation of the emotion’s locus of concern does not imply that the capacity for jealousy requires possession of the concept of defection – or that it can only be articulated in those terms. Similarly for anger and *slights*, shame and *disability of mine*, contempt and *disability of yours* [and so forth].<sup>297</sup>

D’Arms and Jacobson thus claim that emotional reactions are the result of two distinct evaluative systems. One is strictly emotional and explained in evolutionary terms, and the second is linguistic and can account for cognitive sharpenings of natural emotions, as well as for the criticism of emotional reactions (both natural and cognitively sharpened) via norms of fittingness. The second

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<sup>295</sup> D’Arms and Jacobson mention Paul Griffith in this connection, who catalogued the empirical reasons for doubting the involvement of concepts in such cases. *Ibid.*, p. 139, fn. 27.

<sup>296</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 139.

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 139-140.

conceptual evaluative system is also involved with natural emotions, insofar as those move us to action, which also involves beliefs and desires.<sup>298</sup>

Since these two systems are separate, “it is possible for them to diverge systematically.”<sup>299</sup> That is, one particular emotional reaction, say fear of spiders, may not operate in harmony with the linguistic or conceptual evaluative mechanism that judges that emotion to be unfitting. That accounts for the first characteristic of recalcitrance, that is, that it normally involves natural emotions. It also account for the second empirical characteristic of recalcitrant emotions, namely that they usually stable.<sup>300</sup>

D’Arms and Jacobson’s examples of recalcitrance are confined to fear. Recalcitrant fear or phobia, has “popular” intentional objects, that indeed “plausibly reflect an evolutionary preparation to be sensitive to the dangers that faced ancestral human populations: such as insects, snakes, and heights.”<sup>301</sup> According to this explanation, the significance of the past for such recalcitrant phobias is the past of the species in general, not of the emoting subject in particular.

In their paper, it is sometimes implied that the second conceptual evaluative system only goes into operation *after* the initial emotional reaction, via its consequent criticism and judgment.<sup>302</sup> Clearly, however, when it comes to cognitive sharpenings of emotions, and there are indefinitely many of those, the conceptual evaluative system operates from the very start. How otherwise could one feel spontaneously homesick or resentful?

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<sup>298</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 144.

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 141.

<sup>300</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>301</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 141. They refer to the study of Martin Seligman and Randolph Nesse.

<sup>302</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 145.

Insofar as cognitively sharpened emotions are concerned, D'Arms and Jacobson claim the following: "[...] we grant that there are affect-laden, intentional mental states – these cognitive sharpenings – that essentially involve particular beliefs or thoughts, just as judgmentalists and quasijudgmentalists claim about emotions."<sup>303</sup>

Even for natural emotions this consecutive operations of the two systems seems wrong. If phobias are the result of *divergence* of the two systems, then the normal individual, who has no problem with spiders whatsoever, has the two systems working in harmony, in such way, that the initial evolutionary fear of spiders has simply ceased to appear. The belief that spiders are harmless "immunizes" the subject from that fear.<sup>304</sup>

If the conceptual system operates only after the initial natural emotional reaction, we would have to suppose that every time we see a spider, we first fear it and then quickly push the fear aside by a fittingness judgment. Perhaps monitoring of brain activity at the very first moment we see the spider would prove that we indeed momentarily fear it. But in what sense, would such a reflex, that we do not even register when we first see the spider and that does not affect our actions still count as an emotion?

Take instead the case of extreme circumstances like an unexpected car accident or a natural disaster. In such cases the affective reflex would be felt as such, and perhaps those are the initially concept-free emotional reactions. These are rare cases. But it seems that in situations that are not extreme or sudden, concept involvement is unavoidable. The two systems, the natural and the conceptual, work

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<sup>303</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

<sup>304</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 144. D'Arms and Jacobson refer to Deigh.

together. Here is the kind of cooperation D'Arms and Jacobson have in mind for natural emotions:

Even with respect to relatively primitive emotions, which are most plausibly shared with other animals – such as fear and disgust – occurrence in the context of human mental life involves them in complex interactions with beliefs and desires. One such complexity is that human beings are evidently able to exert some measure of rational control over their emotional responses. This forces us to think critically about the emotions and try to interpret the significance of their concerns. Such interpretation is mandatory because we are not merely prone to emotional episodes as bouts of feeling; they also move us to action – indeed, that is their primary function. Furthermore, emotional evaluation insinuate themselves into more richly conceptualized system of motivation, evaluation, and intention. These tendencies make it imperative for us to reflect on our emotions and those of others.<sup>305</sup>

The intertwinement of emotional reactions with intentional action, which is under description and further involves beliefs and desire – demands cooperation between emotions and concepts. And yet the cooperation D'Arms and Jacobson imply still sounds like one system is emotional and thoughtless and the second critical and reflective. As if one always needs to reflect in order to turn a natural emotion to a conceptualized emotional reaction.

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<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 144-145.

When a woman's jealousy-system detects her man flirting with another woman at a party, it seems much more likely that she would have thoughts such as "he thinks nobody sees how he's staring at her body? Is he drunk?"; "what is she giggling about?" and most importantly "time to go home now." She may not admit to herself that she is jealous, she may not construe herself as possibly suffering defection, but her beliefs, desires and most importantly intentions to act are all centered around her jealousy.

Her state of mind can be safely logically reconstructed as being jealous that her man is flirting with another woman. She may not be able to articulate it immediately, she may have not reflected about it, but she nevertheless spontaneously judges her partner to give her reason to be jealous.<sup>306</sup> In other words, she need not reflect on her natural emotion of jealousy in order to have a propositional attitude. Her monitoring of the environment is intertwined with conceptual thought from the very start.

In fact, given that flirting is a familiar situation and concept, why not say that the woman is having the cognitively sharpened emotion-type flirt-jealousy? In non-extreme non-shocking circumstances, social situations are familiar and are conceived under description. It seems that in such situations, we could always talk about cognitive-sharpenings, where D'Arms and Jacobson concede to judgmentalism.

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<sup>306</sup> This is, to repeat the point presented in the first chapter, a feature of many judgments, not just emotion judgment. As Solomon says: "[...] one might well articulate the judgment 'my arm feels heavy', what is important is that one can and sometimes does make that judgment without articulation; indeed it is the rare case in which one does not make that judgment before articulation, perhaps even spending a moment trying to describe what it is that one has already judged to be so odd. So too one makes emotional judgments. One is offended before one realizes that one is offended. One is jealous and has to be convinced that one is indeed jealous." Solomon, "Emotions as Judgments", p. 98.

Normally, both systems are in tune, such that some natural emotions (like fear of spiders) cease to occur altogether. In the normal case, then, reasons can be the significant cause for the emotional reaction. It is only in some individuals who suffer from a particular recalcitrant emotion, which makes some evolutionary sense, that we can say that the two systems have diverged – for that specific emotion and its discrete monitoring mechanism.

But how could this account shed any light at all on Jonah’s recalcitrant resentment? Resentment is a cognitive sharpening of anger, and D’Arms and Jacobson thus claim that it is unlikely to be recalcitrant.<sup>307</sup> And what about Jonah’s scarf phobia? Scarves have played no role in the “evolutionary preparation to the danger that faced ancestral human population.”

Perhaps, then, the associative explanation should be confined to cases of recalcitrance of cognitive sharpenings and to highly idiosyncratic phobias. However, even though it seems true that evolutionary causal explanations are relevant to some phobias, they do not provide the entire causal story.

D’Arms and Jacobson’s account provides an evolutionary causal explanation for the pool of objects of (some) recalcitrant attitudes in general. It cannot explain, however, why some people are phobic and some are not. Why did their evaluation systems diverge? Even if we invoke some hereditary disposition to explain *that*, the evolutionary and physiological perspectives cannot explain why one person is afraid of snakes and another person is afraid of spiders. These perspectives will not provide fine-grained enough explanations that would account for the particularity of the stable recalcitrance of a certain individual.

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<sup>307</sup> D’Arms & Jacobson, “Recalcitrant Emotion,” p. 143.

I claim that the associative explanation can account for the particularity of the object of such common phobias. However, due to the limited scope of this thesis, I will not exemplify how this explanation works for such cases. Rather, I will choose an example where the role of the evolutionary perspective is clearly very limited. That is a case of an occasional (rather than stable) unfitting recalcitrant emotion. I will discuss this example in chapter 4.

## **Chapter 4:**

### **The Hermeneutic Approaches**

There are other causal accounts for psychological symptoms available in the literature of the philosophy of psychoanalysis that also make use of imaginative capacities. These are the hermeneutic accounts, which I divide to two main groups. I call the first approach the historical approach, mainly associated with Paul Ricoeur. The second is what I will call the instrumental-reason-extension account, and James Hopkins is its primary advocate.

Both approaches agree that in order to account for the content of a psychological symptom, we need to interpret that content as somehow symbolic of certain memories and/or unconscious emotions. They thus invoke the processes of displacement and condensation, roughly described in the previous chapter.

However, these accounts invoke the connective and synthetic imaginative capacities in a limited way. They are employed in the service of other imaginative capacities, which in turn are confined within or mobilized by rational capacities. This confinement limits the degrees of freedom of the imagination for which I argued in the previous chapter. In this chapter I claim that this rational limitation is both unnecessary and misleading. It results in over-rationalized explanations that are insufficient and involve an illusion.

The philosophy of psychoanalysis, as said in the introduction, does not usually deal directly with distinctively emotional symptoms such as recalcitrance. It discusses, rather, psychological symptoms in general. But since these philosophers talk about psychological symptoms in general, their claims apply also to distinctively

emotional symptoms with which I am concerned. However, my arguments and conclusions apply, at least in this thesis, only to emotional symptoms of otherwise rational subjects.

### **1. The Historical Hermeneutic Approach**

As explained in the previous chapter, the associative explanation does not suffice in accounting for all the components of the content of the emotional symptom. Components of suppressed emotions in the associative network that hardly connect to any other components in the network and that are not symbolically represented in the symptom invite further association.

Further association would reveal other latent emotions and would investigate the practical identities in reference to which the intentional contents of those emotions were taken personally. Further associative reflection would expose and examine the moralism and social prudence responsible for emotion-suppression in the first place. In that manner, the suppressed emotions upon which the imagination is fixated would become contextualized in a larger and more complex associative network and would lose some of their over-emphasis (this process will be discussed in detail in chapter 6).

But if we were only concerned with accounting for the details of the intentional content of emotional symptoms, we would not consider those under-connected elements of the network as points of departure for further reflection. In other words, we would not consider the imagination's fixation on few suppressed emotions as requiring explanation. Their over-emphasis would not be questioned. And so, if the only purpose is to account for the details of the manifest pathological

emotion, we would be tempted to discount some of the associative material that does not play an important symbolic role.

The temptation to discount some of the data when constructing an explanation is familiar both from the sciences and from historical explanations of a certain event. An historical explanation takes a chronicle, a collection of temporally ordered events, and makes it into a causal narrative. In the process of narration, some details of the chronicle will be left out. The selection of the details that participate in the narrative and the construction of the narrative itself, as I will soon explain, are guided by rational considerations.

The historical hermeneutical approach, associated mainly with Paul Ricoeur, takes that selective route, as its purpose is to account for the particular details of psychological symptoms. The chronicle for the historical hermeneutic approach is composed of what the patient says in analysis, in her “free associations.” These are the available “facts”, so to speak (as they are not observable facts).<sup>308</sup> Not all of the patient’s associations take part in the chronicle. The analyst-historian selects the associations that in some broad sense symbolically connect with the content of the psychological symptom. The chronicle is then re-constructed as a narrative.

The goal of analysis is thus to turn a case into a case-history. As Ricoeur says: “[...] all truth-claims of psychoanalysis are ultimately summed up in the narrative structure of psychoanalytic facts.”<sup>309</sup> The history in question, as will soon be explained, is not so much of the patient as it is the narrated history of a memory, the repressed memory of the primal scene that “returns” in the form of a psychological symptom.

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<sup>308</sup> See Ricoeur, “The Question of Proof,” p. 186.

<sup>309</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 205.

In what follows, I will first present the principles of historical narration in general, as outlined by Graeme Marshall.<sup>310</sup> I turn to R. G. Collingwood in order to identify and examine the imaginative capacities involved in historical narration. I will also articulate the rational constraints on those imaginative capacities and on the construction of a historical narrative. I will then turn to Ricoeur's narrative of a case history and explicate how it instantiates Marshall's general schema. My presentation of the hermeneutical historical approach will also turn to Jürgen Habermas, who holds a similar view to Ricoeur's. Finally I will show why this hermeneutic approach is both insufficient and illusory.

Marshall describes three interrelated determinants of the construction of a narrative. The first is the chronicle of the events from which the narrative shall be constructed. The events are selected to be those allowed by the conceptual framework of the historical narrator.<sup>311</sup>

The chronicle, most likely, is not complete. This incompleteness undermines the claim of the narrative for objective truth. Furthermore, there will always be some details in the chronicle that will be left unaccounted for by the narrative. In other words, the chronicle always "underdetermines" the narrative.<sup>312</sup> As Marshall says: "There is always something which is up for interpretation rather than the result of it, otherwise there is no possibility of disconfirmation [...]"<sup>313</sup> The possibility for disconfirmation, according to Marshall, provides a way for a narrative to be not-false.

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<sup>310</sup> Marshall, "Overdetermination," pp. 214-220. The account is a simplified version of Hayden White's account and uses different terminology (which I find more useful), as Marshall notes in *Ibid.*, p. 221, note 16.

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 214.

<sup>312</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 214-215.

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 215.

What exactly would “disconfirmation” consist in, however, is not so clear. What Marshall is implying, in light of his other arguments, is that under-determination leaves room for another narrative to account for more details and thus be preferred over another.

The second determinant is what Marshall calls the “dominance hypothesis.”<sup>314</sup> The chronicle is charted from a certain point of view according to interests of the narrator. The selected relevant aspects of the chronicle are then surveyed so as to form a conjecture of the thematic thread that will weave the chronicle into a narrative.

That thematic thread then serves to re-describe the events of the chronicle and emphasize the aspects of those events that will then be causally connected to one another in the narrative. As Marshall says: “The dominance hypothesis accounts for the selectiveness of the narrative, supplies the terms in which the events emerging as significant are to be redescribed, and thus makes explicit the aspects to be dealt with.”<sup>315</sup>

R. G. Collinwood likens this selective thematic emphasis of certain aspects of the events in the chronicle to the work of a landscape painter: “[...] he is always selecting, simplifying, schematizing, leaving out what he thinks unimportant and putting in what he regards as essential.”<sup>316</sup> Applying the dominance hypothesis on the chronicle thus implicates an imaginative schematism. Yet this imaginative capacity is still exercised within rational constraints. Recognizing general common aspects in a collection of particular events is rational, insofar as it can be justified by

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<sup>314</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 216.

<sup>315</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>316</sup> R. G. Collinwood, “The Historical Imagination [1935].” In *The Idea of History* [1946]. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 231-249, p. 236.

reason, namely by eliciting the specified respects which give rise to the thematic thread.

There could be several candidates for such a thematic dominance hypothesis, and Marshall describes the choice between them in terms of rational decision theory. The rational guiding principle for the choice of the dominance conjecture is that the more it “secures” of the chronicle, the better it is.<sup>317</sup>

The third determinant of the narrative is the “causal hypothesis.”<sup>318</sup> “The causal hypothesis structures the narrative beyond its chronological ordering.”<sup>319</sup> That is to say, the events in the chronicle now become connected to each other by adding a causal “glue” between them. This involves hypothesizing “[...] the person’s reasons, purposes or intentions [...]”<sup>320</sup> or anything else the conceptual framework of the narrator allows for.

This addition of the causal “glue” requires what Collinwood called “the historical imagination.” Collinwood talks about imaginative “interpolation”, namely, “[the] activity which, bridging the gaps between what our authorities tell us [the data, the chronicle], gives the historical narrative or description its continuity.”<sup>321</sup>

Collinwood speaks mostly on interpolating facts, but his text also implies rational-causal notions, such as imagining the intentions of certain historical figures or reasons the original reporter may have had to distort the data reported.<sup>322</sup> Intentions and reasons are rational notions that are also causal in the sense described in chapter 1. The historical imagination, constrained by the general rational structure that gives rise to intentional action, rationally-causally links

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<sup>317</sup> Marshall, “Overdetermination,” pp. 216-217.

<sup>318</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 217.

<sup>319</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>320</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>321</sup> Collinwood, “The Historical Imagination,” p. 241.

<sup>322</sup> See *Ibid.*, pp. 244-245 and p. 235 respectively.

events to one another by hypothesizing the intentions and reasons of the people involved in the constructed narrative.

To relate events causally to one another, they must somehow be related to each other in content, especially when the causes that link the events to one another are contentful reasons and intentions. Furthermore, that content has to be such that it invites, so to speak, the relevant causal “glue”. That is, the events should be re-describable such that they can receive the meaning of causes and effects.

The inter-relatedness of the contents of the events in the chronicle, which is necessary for the causal hypothesis, is ensured by the thematic dominance hypothesis. For the narrative to qualify as an explanation, therefore, the dominance hypothesis should be, at least to some extent, dependent on the causal hypothesis.<sup>323</sup> In that manner, the part of the chronicle selected to participate in the narrative is the one that can be rationally and thereby causally inter-connected. In fact, the dominance and causal hypotheses may even be identical.<sup>324</sup>

The resulting narrative thus coherently relates the events in the chronicle to one another and is ensured intelligibility. As Marshall says: “The explanatory power of any narrative lies in its consistently tying together a wealth of material, including biographical material, into a coherent whole.”<sup>325</sup> The goal is thus to turn the chronicle into a *coherent* and *consistent* whole, in other words – to rationally reconstruct the chronicle into a narrative.

I now turn to the narrative structure that Ricoeur advocates for case histories of Jonah’s kind. Ricoeur’s causal hypothesis is already a narrative, an abstract non-

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<sup>323</sup> Marshall, “Overdetermination,” p. 219.

<sup>324</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 217.

<sup>325</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 208.

particularized narrative. The particular causal story is schematically anticipated prior to the sketching of the chronicle.

Ricoeur sums up the “schema of the evolution of a neurosis”: “early trauma – defense – latency – outbreak of neurotic illness – partial return of the repressed.”<sup>326</sup> This schema, or what Habermas calls a “general interpretation” or a “generalized narrative” or a “narrative scheme”,<sup>327</sup> is indeed Freud’s guiding schema in his proposed etiologies to various neuroses.

Unlike the associative explanation I proposed in the previous chapter, which puts suppressed emotions as its focus, the narrative structure of the historical approach emphasizes the importance of the memory to which the subject emotionally reacts. The memory and its re-description, which are not so crucial for the associative explanation, are here at the center of the causal hypothesis. The primal scene thus becomes important again in this historical explanation.

The causal story is the story of a memory, from its formation to its re-description, repression, and disguised return as a psychological symptom. Effectively, the historical approach is similar to Freud’s early account of neurosis described in chapter 2, only that here “subtle distortion” is taken into account. More specifically, the causal story goes as follows:

First there was an event or rather the primal scene that at the time of its occurrence “could not be fully integrated in a meaningful context.”<sup>328</sup> Later in time another event occurs, which sheds new interpretative light on the past event. The

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<sup>326</sup> Paul Ricoeur, *Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture.* In Don Ihde (ed.) *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics* [1969]. Trans. Willis Domingo (Evanston Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1974), pp. 121-159, p. 136.

<sup>327</sup> Jürgen Habermas, “The Interpretation of a Case [1972].” In Brian A. Farrell (ed.), *Philosophy and Psychoanalysis*, pp. 43-49.

<sup>328</sup> Ricoeur, “The Question of Proof,” p. 191.

primal scene is then retroactively understood to have been emotionally traumatic. The memory is thus re-described.

The patient “defends” his consciousness from that trauma and suppresses it. That is, the patient “pushes away” from conscious thought the intentional descriptions of the situation whose emotional import is traumatic (this is in contrast to the account proposed in the previous chapter where it is the emotion that is suppressed and the memory participates in this process only insofar as its content takes part in the intentional content of the suppressed emotional attitude). The re-described memory may then become repressed, either completely or in some of its details and their emotional significance.

Then comes a period of latency, during which the patient enjoys relative mental health. Some other events may occur during that time, which further contribute to the unconscious re-interpretation of the event. Ricoeur calls this repetitive remolding of the memory in light of new event the “reworking” of the memory:

Here we see that we are far removed from the notion of a memory which would simply reproduce real events in a sort of perception of the past; this is, instead, a work which goes over and over extremely complex structurations.<sup>329</sup>

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<sup>329</sup> *Ibid.* “Unconscious re-interpretation” involves a strange picture of the unconscious as a “little person” that can engage in interpretation. This is in contrast to the account proposed in the previous chapter, where a memory may be “re-interpreted” only insofar as one *consciously* reacts emotionally to that memory and then suppresses that emotion, which includes the described import of that memory as part of its intentional content.

At some point in time the patient falls ill and her psychological symptoms represent in some symbolic way the re-worked memory. The repressed or partially repressed memory “wants” and “tries to return” to consciousness, yet the defensive “forces” of the patient cannot let that memory return in its full (re-worked) content.<sup>330</sup>

A “compromise” is reached, so to speak, and the memory only partly returns, disguised through the processes of displacement and condensation. The imaginative associative capacities are thus considered as working at the service of the memory’s activities, which are in turn caused by *its* reasons, namely the memory’s “desire” to become conscious. Instead of remembering, the patient is acting-out the reworked memory of the primal scene in a distorted form. Effectively, the patient repeats the re-described primal scene in a symbolic manner and it is that repetition which comprises her symptom.<sup>331</sup>

The causal language here, which Ricoeur characterizes as “semimetaphorical,”<sup>332</sup> tells the adventures of an anthropomorphized memory that struggles with the patient’s defensive “forces” to keep it concealed. The story is told in rational terms of intention, purposes, and motivational force of the memory itself. The causal hypothesis is thus a rationalized causal story of the birth, repression, re-working and symbolic return of a memory.

The schematic causal hypothesis determines schematically the dominance hypothesis, which is the re-worked memory itself. The memory is the thematic

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<sup>330</sup> This is in contrast to the account proposed in the previous chapter where suppression of *emotions* due to moralistic or prudential *reason*. On my account, suppression is always conscious, even if fleetingly, whereas here it is not so clear what are those defensive “forces” and how they operate to repress memories.

<sup>331</sup> This interpretation is based on Freud’s writings. See for example Freud, “Working-Through”, S.E. vol. 12, p. 150: “[...] the patient does not *remember* anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but *acts* it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he *repeats* it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it.” Emphasis in original.

<sup>332</sup> Ricoeur, “The Question of Proof,” p. 194.

thread that runs through the chronicle. In other words, the aspects of the chronicle that will comprise the narrative are those that will be judged relevant to the dominance hypothesis, to the re-worked memory, hypothesized to be symbolically represented by the symptom.

These schematic hypotheses become more specific with each patient so as to produce particular case-histories. As Habermas explains, the schematic narrative gets “filled out and become[s] a complete history,”<sup>333</sup> through the investigation of the individual chronicle. Each case-history will thus be a particularized instantiation of the general schema described above.

Habermas claims that the case-history with its detailed temporal structure is best described as the “drama” of the patient and not via purposive-rational organization.<sup>334</sup> But this is only partly correct. The patient does not intentionally form a symptom, but instead a repressed memory “intends” to return, and can make compromises with the defensive “forces” of repression. The “drama” of the patient, as demonstrated above, is effectively the “adventures” of the anthropomorphized memory, the true “hero” of the case history.

The method for revealing the particular details of each case history is also schematized by Ricoeur. The specific dominance hypothesis, the memory of the particular patient, has to be revealed through the survey of the chronicle. But the chronicle itself is only slowly revealed, through the gradual associative deciphering of the symbolic connections that conceal the memory in question.

Ricoeur characterizes that process, appropriately, as the “inverse” of dream work, that is, as the un-doing or de-tangling the displacements and

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<sup>333</sup> Habermas, “The Interpretation of a Case,” p. 44.

<sup>334</sup> *Ibid.*

condensations.<sup>335</sup> Now, that work of memory distortion is done primarily due the defensive “forces” that do not allow the memory to return in its original form. The deciphering of the symptom thus encounters the “resistance” of those forces, and interpretation has to “struggle” against that resistance in order to reveal the relevant chronicle.<sup>336</sup>

The dominance hypothesis in all its glory is only revealed after the chronicle has been gradually laid out, which is equivalent to the victory against resistance. In the end of the process “[r]emembering, [...] has to replace repetition.” The ultimate aim is to “reopen the path of memory.”<sup>337</sup> The process of narration and the road to remembrance are one and the same. As Ricoeur says:

But what is it to remember? It is not just to recall certain isolated events, but to become capable of forming meaningful sequences and ordered connections. In short, it is to be able to constitute one’s own existence in the form of a story where a memory as such is only a fragment of the story. It is the narrative structure of such life-stories that makes a case a case history.<sup>338</sup>

Now this process of remembering or of constructing the causal story of the psychological symptom is also meant to bring the symptom into an end. Indeed, if repression of the reworked memory is the primary cause for the symptom, then its exposure should eliminate the symptom.

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<sup>335</sup> Ricoeur, “The Question of Proof,” p. 195.

<sup>336</sup> Ricoeur does not say much about how the analyst is meant to “handle” resistance, but indicates it has to do, among other things, with the phenomenon of transference, *Ibid.*, p. 195. I will discuss the phenomenon of transference in the chapter 6.

<sup>337</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 190.

<sup>338</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 190.

The dominance of the re-worked memory in this narrative sounds like another version of the dispositional developmental story from chapter 2. The goal of therapy here is primarily an “epistemological inquiry”<sup>339</sup> – to know the content of the memory and its adventures.

This historical approach is thus subject to same criticism regarding the question of its validity. Ricoeur goes through concerted effort to fight this objection<sup>340</sup> and Grünbaum in turn argues against those efforts.<sup>341</sup> I will not present the Ricoeur-Grünbaum debate or the particularities of their considerations.

In connection to the question of validity, I present one argument that partly supports one aspect of this hermeneutic approach, namely the connection between a psychological symptom and the memory of the primal scene as well the consequent scenes that relate to it. The dominance hypothesis, insofar as it identifies thematic threads in the associative chronicle, is often hard to deny. A quick reminder for example: Jonah’s scarf phobia seems so obviously related to the scarf-tying scenes, as do his obsessional thoughts that his mother is trying to kill him. Many such cases, where the symptom appears to symbolize memories through condensation and displacement, can be found in Freud’s writings.

In such cases, as claimed in the previous chapter in reference to distinctively emotional symptoms, an associative diagram can be drawn that demonstrates the imaginative connections between the symptom and suppressed emotions in a strikingly convincing way. These suppressed emotions contain some memory-

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<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 195.

<sup>340</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 201-210.

<sup>341</sup> Grünbaum, *Foundations*, pp. 43-68.

details as part of their intentional content. It is in that indirect sense that a symptom symbolically relates to a memory.

Grünbaum's critique in connection to this symbolization is focused on the causal claims the historical approach makes to account for the connection:

[...] no matter how strong the *thematic affinity* between a conjectured repressed thought and a maladaptive, neurotic action, this "meaning kinship" does not itself suffice to attest the hypothesized repression is "the hidden intentionality" behind a given behavior. For thematic affinity alone does not vouch for etiologic lineage in the absence of further evidence that a thematically kindred repression actually *engendered* the behavior. [...] For the behavior in question does not in fact bespeak the existence of the repression, and hence does not justify reading the latter into it.<sup>342</sup>

When Grünbaum speaks of repression he speaks of it in the strong sense of strict unavailability to memory, and perhaps so does Ricoeur. As explained in the previous chapters, I find the appeal to strictly unavailable memories unnecessary. Suppression suffices to contribute to the causation of symptom (at least of an emotional symptom).

But even when that qualification is taken into account, Grünbaum is right. The historical approach uses "thematic affinity" to claim that the memory itself, has some kind of "intention" to speak its meaningful content, which in turn causes the symptom. This anthropomorphism of a memory is strange. Memories do not have

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<sup>342</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

wants and needs. They do not, by themselves, do anything. What can happen to them is they can be aroused. And what causes them to be aroused, as I claimed in the previous chapter, is the imagination in its connective capacity.<sup>343</sup>

When Grünbaum talks of “thematic affinity” as *mere* thematic affinity, he claims that by itself it does not prove any pseudo-mechanistic causal assumption of the existence of the forces of repressed memories, memories that engage in “returning”. He is correct. These metaphors can be disposed of and replaced by the claim of the previous chapter that the unconscious “dumb” imaginative connections are also causal connections (in a sense yet to be described in chapter 5). It is the imagination that connects the here-and-now to a certain memory (or suppressed emotion) and arouses it. And the imagination arouses the memory exactly within the capacity of making connections that can later be given “thematic” meaning.

The hermeneutic historical approach goes wrong when it turns its general insight, namely the thematic connection between the symptom and certain memories, into the one coherent story that is the *sole* cause of the symptom. But this cannot be right, not in cases where the remembered event in question is not genuinely traumatic (such as rape, torture of severe injury).

As explained in the previous chapter, in most cases, the content of the primal scene or consequent scenes does not justify the importance they receive. That over-emphasis itself requires an explanation. But the hermeneutic historical approach suffices in the *description* of the importance of the emotionally laden memory in

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<sup>343</sup> Freud describes this kind of arousal of memories through an imaginative connection of thematic affinity. For example: “[...] the event [...] aroused the memory of earlier events with a similar subject-matter and [...] thereupon a mnemonic symbol had been formed which applied to the whole group of memories.” Freud, “Fräulein Elizabeth Von R.” In *Studies on Hysteria*, S.E vol. 2, pp. 135-181, p. 173. As I claimed in the previous chapter, the nature of the similarity between the here-and-now triggering situation and a fragment of memory or an emotion can only be identified and given meaning later in analysis.

question. No explanation is offered as to why this memory has become so important in the first place. The historical explanation is thus insufficient.

The associative explanation, on the other hand, indicates where the answer to this question can be found. The imaginative network of the suppressed emotions whose intentional content relates to a memory reveals that other figures in the patient life, including the patient herself, are marginalized. They appear as poorly associated with the symptom and the emotions in the network.

The associative explanation claims that the over-emphasis of a memory or an emotion relating to one relationship is causally related to the under-emphasis of other emotional relationships. Whereas the associative explanation demands further investigation of those marginalized figures, the historical hermeneutic approach considers them as falling out of the dominance hypothesis and thus as not-to-be accounted for in the narrative.

The historical approach constrains the imaginative network within a rational framework by forcing the dominance of the reworked memory. The narrative thus effectively plays into the very pathology of the patient, namely the fixation on that particular memory or rather on the suppressed emotion that relates to that memory.

Indeed, hermeneutic narration, as Ricoeur recognizes, takes as its task a kind of remembering whose model is precisely the kind of remembering that, according to Ricoeur, caused the pathology in the first place. Immediately after Ricoeur describes how a memory becomes traumatic in light of new situations he says: "It is

this work of memory that is implied, among other things, by the notion of the story or narrative structure of existence."<sup>344</sup>

Effectively, narration during analysis further interprets that memory and its past reworkings as the cause, the sole cause, of the symptom. This re-interpretation is a form of what Freud called regressive causation. The original event may have had some forward causal power, but now the re-worked memory is further declared as the sole cause for the symptom. The narrative thus serves to further over-emphasize the importance of that memory and strengthen the pathological fixation – with one difference, namely, that the (over) emphasis is now conscious.

We can even imagine the affirmation of this narrative in “real time.” When Sarah, Jonah’s new general editor, gives him an assignment, and Jonah feels the resentment arising in him, he can say to himself: “Oh no, here I am resenting my female boss again... I’m thinking of my bossy mother again, she even wears the same kind of thick glasses! Oh that mother, She ruined my life!” Jonah may even succeed in his self-management and assuage his resentment and relate to Sarah differently, without having to go through weeks of pathologically avowed resentment.

But Jonah’s relationship with his mother as well as his past memories of her still trouble him, only that now that trouble is consciously thought about: “How could my mother have been so insensitive back then? How did she not notice my attitude changed after returning from those weeks with my grandfather? How could she not see I hated those scarves?”

Perhaps Jonah will forgive his mother for the past: “Poor mum, she was raised by insensitive parents herself who were a bit rough around the edges themselves – she is not to blame for her awkwardness and brusqueness.” Jonah may

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<sup>344</sup> Ricoeur, “The Question of Proof,” p. 191.

make peace with his memories of his mother and even improve their current relationship.

But that past or at least the memory of the past will still be very important to him due to all the troubles it has caused. This enhanced importance is unlikely to assist the imagination to change its patterns. Every now and again Jonah will mourn his bad luck: “Will I ever be completely free of my problems? Will I forever need to engage in self-management? Those few scenes, that resentful relationship with my mother, determined my whole life.”

Equipped with a causal narrative, the patient has no responsibility on his imaginative patterns. These patterns are conceived as determined by his past, and his past – from that primal scene through the further events that reworked its memory and to the symptoms – is conceived as inevitable. This inevitability is a feature of historical narratives in general. Collinwood articulates that feature of inevitability through the analogy he makes between a historical narrative and a novel:

[...] the whole aim of the novelist is to show the characters acting and the incidents developing in a manner determined by a necessity internal to themselves. The story, if it is a good story, cannot develop otherwise than as it does; the novelist in imagining it cannot imagine it developing except as it does develop.<sup>345</sup>

The associative explanation, on the other hand, leaves open the possibility that the past was not as necessary as the narrative makes it to be. The patient’s

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<sup>345</sup> Collinwood, “The Historical Imagination,” p. 242.

emotional relationships with other figures, which are missing from the narrative altogether and are under-represented in the imaginative network, may shed new light on the past.

Inquiry into the emotional relationships with these marginalized figures will explain why the primal scene and the relationship it involves became over-emphasized. And they will most likely further show that the emotional reaction to the memory in question did not have to become so important. They may even show that the patient had something to do with this over-emphasis. In other words, even if the memory was to some extent important even at the time, giving it the meaning of the sole and inevitable cause for the patient's pathology involves an illusion.

This is not to say the narrative will be disconfirmed. There is, as explained above, something right about it. The suppressed emotions and thereby also the memories involved in the intentional content of those emotions do cause the *shape* of the symptom. But the "branching out" of the imaginative network will not simply provide a more extended chronicle to be narrated. The imaginative network will always include more details that can be accounted for in a narrative.

Ricoeur may insist that all this shows is that narration must always continue to account for more and more details:

The problem of recognizing oneself is the problem of recovering the ability to recount one's own history, to endlessly continue to give the form of a story to reflections on oneself. And working-through is nothing other than this continuous narration.<sup>346</sup>

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<sup>346</sup> Ricoeur, "The Question of Proof," p. 204.

The endless continuity of the task of narration of one's past would not just be due to the fact the past keeps growing in bulk as we go on living. It would also be due to the fact that the imaginative network can "branch out" for every point in time when we narrate. But no matter how continuously we narrate and try and include more and more elements of a chronicle, the narrative will never account for all of it. As Marshall says: "No chronicle is ever complete but it would still underdetermine the narrative even if, *per impossible*, it were."<sup>347</sup>

Once the imaginative network is large enough to contextualize the primal scene and the consequent scenes, their primacy will be reduced. When that over-emphasis is removed, there is no need to keep branching out the imaginative network, at least insofar as the relevant symptom is concerned. And at that point, as I will claim in chapter 6, the patient can accept that her life is not a coherent united whole that has led to her symptom. The imaginative network should not be reduced and then elevated, so to speak, to its rational reconstruction. Its disunion and incoherence are the disillusioned truth about the patient's emotional life.

Before I move on to examine the second hermeneutic approach, I want to comment on the very limited number of examples I use to demonstrate the associative explanation – in contrast to the larger number of examples I used for the operative-reason-explanation in chapter 1.

Similarly to the operative-reason-explanation for singular emotional reactions, the associative explanation is a retroactive explanation of an already formed emotion. These explanations are causal and thus empirical, but they are not scientific, due to idiosyncratic and subjective nature of the singular causes they

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<sup>347</sup> Marshall, "Overdetermination," p. 214.

appeal to at the person level. The psychological singular causality they involve may be roughly described, but no causal laws can be formulated.

Each emotional reaction is singularly caused by highly subjective and generally unstable causal conditions. When it comes to operative-reason-explanation, the subject's selection of one reason of fit over another and in particular the subject's "taking-personally" of that reason may change from time to time. When it comes to the associative explanation, the imaginative associations involved are too idiosyncratic and erratic to conform to any causal law. Even if certain the associations of a certain may repeat themselves, they do not repeat in a consistent and reliable manner.

But even if those explanations are retroactive and non-scientific, they can still be regarded as possible explanations. Their plausibility relies on two features: They have are available to introspective awareness and they can be shown to provide good explanations for many examples (The introspectively available aspects of the associative explanation are explored in chapter 6).

Operative-reason-explanation is circumscribed within a limited set of circumstances that include the normative emotional import of the here-and-now situation and the subject's practical identity. And so, the examples of the reason-explanation are respectively short. The associative explanation, conversely, treats the here-and-now as a trigger to be connected to many other elements in the subject's mental reality through a complex web of associations. The complexity of the associative explanation makes it a long explanation.

Indeed, Freud's book that is the main inspiration for the associative explanation I argue for, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, is a very long book comprised mainly of very many examples. The scope of this thesis does not allow examining

many examples. In fact, even the details I supply here for my examples are quite partial.

## 2. The Instrumental-Reason-Extension Hermeneutic Approach

I begin this section by presenting an example I classify as occasional recalcitrance. This is a case of a lady who is jealous that her husband is having an affair with his employee, despite her disavowal of this emotion via first-personal deliberation. In fact, she is committed to the belief that her husband is not having an affair. Her son-in-law brought her to Freud's clinic.<sup>348</sup>

The "well-preserved lady of fifty-three"<sup>349</sup> spoke with her housemaid about a gentleman who was a guest in the household. He no longer lived with his wife and openly pursued a love affair. Suddenly, the lady expressed fear that something of the sort would happen to her, that her husband would be unfaithful to her. This was the first time the lady felt or expressed such a fear. Indeed, this fear was completely unjustified, as she was "most happily married"<sup>350</sup> and her husband was very affectionate with her.

The housemaid was herself in an openly jealous relationship with her old schoolmate, who managed to succeed professionally in the factory owned by the lady's husband. The professional success of the old schoolmate now employed by our lady's husband, also brought her new and desirable social status, and she was even addressed as "Fräulein".

The following day, the lady received an anonymous letter claiming her husband is having an affair with that young employee. Given the circumstances of

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<sup>348</sup> This example is from Freud, *Introductory Lectures*, Lecture 16, vol. 16, pp. 248-256.

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 248.

<sup>350</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 248.

the conversation between the lady and her housemaid and the unkind jealousy the housemaid had for her schoolmate, the lady did not believe the content of that letter. Instead she inferred that the letter was written by her housemaid and contained lies that were meant to harm the employee.

Although this inference was reasonable and most likely correct, the lady nevertheless got very upset with her husband. He laughed off the accusations, and called the family doctor to soothe his wife. Consequently, they fired the housemaid and the falsely accused employee kept her position.

But the lady could not get the idea of that alleged affair out of her thoughts. She was pacified time and again and was repeatedly convinced the story was not real. Yet every time the lady was confronted with the presence or mere mention of name of the falsely accused employee, a “fresh attack of distrust, pain and reproaches would burst out in her.”<sup>351</sup>

I classify this example as an occasional recalcitrance since our lady was not jealous in that manner beforehand, and since her jealous attacks repeated the very same attitude in the same set of circumstances. Freud describes the recalcitrance:

[The lady] knew that this document had no evidential value and she was able to give a satisfying explanation of its origin. She ought therefore to have been able to tell herself that she had no ground whatever for her jealousy, and she did tell herself so. But in spite of this she suffered as much as if she regarded this jealousy as completely justified.<sup>352</sup>

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<sup>351</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 250.

<sup>352</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 250. Freud continues this paragraph saying the lady suffered from delusional jealousy. However, the lady clearly did not believe the accusations in question. She was thus not delusional.

The lady's jealousy persisted without her authority. She did not own her emotion, and indeed it was disconnected from her other attitudes, such as the belief that her husband was not having an affair. Without first-person avowal, she could only experience her emotion empirically through introspective awareness, as a third-personal "expert witness." As Moran says, this merely empirical relation to an emotion is a relation of alienation.<sup>353</sup> Coming to Doctor Freud for help is a sign of that alienation.

Freud only had two sessions with this lady, but those sufficed for him to conclude that the lady was secretly in love with her son-in-law, the one who brought her for treatment. Freud could also see that the lady was hardly, if at all, aware of this love.<sup>354</sup> Such situations, where someone denies having a love interest that is obvious to everybody else around them, are not uncommon. Uncontrollable smiling and staring and blushing and so forth are a clear give-away.

It is not difficult to understand why such a love would be suppressed. There are quite a few obvious moral extrinsic considerations: Being unfaithful is ethically wrong; loving her daughter's husband goes against strong social taboos and would further be a terrible wrong to her daughter. There are also some related prudential extrinsic considerations: Such love would destroy her relationship with her daughter, her relationship with her husband, and plausibly the relationship between the daughter and the son-in-law; if that love is found out – it will also taint not only her name but the name of her entire beloved family.

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<sup>353</sup> Moran, *Authority and Estrangement*, pp. 33, 68.

<sup>354</sup> Freud, *Introductory Lectures*, Lecture 16, vol. 16, p. 252.

The love to her son-in-law is repressed, but it is still alive. Although that love is unavailable for explicit conscious reflection or deliberate expression, and although the relevant social and moral norms are not consciously on her mind, our lady's rational emotional capacities can nevertheless work in an "auto-pilot" mode. Just like beliefs get adjusted on "auto-pilot" so do rational emotions. Even if our lady is not aware of her love, social and moral norms automatically take care of the evaluation of that love as having further emotional import.

It is thus likely that our lady spontaneously develops rational emotional attitudes toward her secret love. They may include: Guilt that her secret love would hurt her daughter, her husband and possibly her son-in-law; Anger at herself for having transgressed such strong social taboo; Fear that her love may be found out, and also shame imagining the gaze of her family and society if such exposure would occur; Frustration that her love is impossible to realize; Jealousy that her daughter has her love-object and further guilt and shame that she has such jealous emotions toward her daughter. Given the love is repressed, all these additional rational emotions develop unconsciously. Our lady is not aware of them.

I now turn to the hermeneutical approach I call the "instrumental-reason-extension" approach, as presented by James Hopkins. Hopkins does not deal with this specific example or with any other example of recalcitrant emotions, which are the topic of my discussion here. Nevertheless, he proposes a method that is meant to apply to *all* neurotic symptoms.<sup>355</sup> I thus allow myself to apply his general method to

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<sup>355</sup> My presentation of Hopkins' account is based mainly on the following papers: James Hopkins, "The Interpretation of Dreams." In Jerome Neu (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Freud* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 86-135; James Hopkins, "Introduction: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis." In Richard Wollheim & James Hopkins (eds.), *Philosophical essays on Freud*

this case. Hopkins' interpretative account relies on two analogies, one with intentional action and the second with dreams.

When it comes to the interpretation of intentional action, we ascribe to its agent certain beliefs and desires that are the reasons (and also causes) for their action.<sup>356</sup> For example, if I see my partner opening the fridge, I can safely assume he so acts because he wants something to eat or drink and believes he will find what he desires in the fridge (and I further ascribe to him many other beliefs, such as the belief that it is colder inside the fridge than it is outside the fridge).

My interpretation is verifiable, according to Hopkins, through its coherence with the interpretations of other actions, both of my partner and of other rational subjects of the same social niche. Everybody I know opens the fridge for the same reasons. I also know that my partner is a rational and practical person that does not engage in idle staring at the fridge's contents. As Hopkins explains:

We can regard ourselves as taking each interpretive explanation as liable to confirmation or disconfirmation through coherence or dissonance with other explanations of the same kind. Each such explanation involves the attribution of desires and beliefs. [...] Where the desires and beliefs in one explanation cohere and overlap with those of others, the explanations are mutually confirming. [...] Since explanations by reasons are thus confirmed (or disconfirmed) by relation to others, giving the best account of an agent's actions

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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. vii-xlv; James Hopkins, "Psychoanalytic and Scientific Reasoning," *British Journal of Psychotherapy*, vol. 13 no. 1 (Sept. 1996), pp. 86-105.

<sup>356</sup> I will not present Hopkins' causally-fundamentalist account on how exactly reasons can be causes. Instead, I just assume the account presented in Chapter 1 about operative reasons whose grasp functions as mental causes.

requires fitting the pattern of his actions to the pattern of his motives as a whole, so as to achieve the greatest coherence.<sup>357</sup>

When it comes to the interpretation of dreams we will not hypothesize reasons in the form of beliefs and desires but rather motives and wishes. Wishes are similar to desires, but unlike desires, wishes are practically impossible to fulfill and normally the subject would not deliberately endorse them as a want. This is why wishes are normally suppressed. Staying unconscious protects the wish against “testing, frustration, and self-conflict.”<sup>358</sup> The dream is thus assumed to be an imaginative representation of the wish fulfilled. The paradigm of such interpretation would be of the dream about drinking water followed by waking up thirsty. The motive is the thirst, the wish is to drink without interruption of sleep, and the dream imaginatively represents the fulfillment of that wish. That dreams represent wish fulfillments is indeed a famous Freudian claim.

Hopkins claims that symptoms too are imaginative representations of wish fulfillments. The symptom is purposive, even if not consciously intentional. It has some mental strategic benefit.<sup>359</sup> The symptom provides an illusory and compromised pacification of the relevant wish. Imaginative wish fulfillment is thus the main imaginative capacity in this hermeneutical account and it works, as I will soon demonstrate, in the service of instrumental reason.

In order to interpret a symptom, we need to hypothesize the motives that give rise to wishes that the symptom imaginatively fulfills. We can then verify the hypothesis through interpreting other actions and symptoms of the same subject. If

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<sup>357</sup> Hopkins, “Introduction,” p. xvii.

<sup>358</sup> Wollheim, *The Thread of Life*, p. 149.

<sup>359</sup> What Lear refers to as “strategic value”, see for example Lear, *Freud*, p. 37.

those will be cogently explained by reference to the same or overlapping wishes and motives we can know that our interpretation is correct. Furthermore, if examining other people's symptoms will give rise to similar wishes that can thus be described as typical to otherwise rational subjects from the same social niche, then we can increase our confidence that we have the right causal explanation. As Hopkins explains:

So far as [symptoms and dreams] can cogently be interpreted as involving representation and wish-fulfilment, we can form hypotheses which partly explain them by relating them to desires or wishes. These hypotheses, in turn, can be tested through their coherence [or]<sup>360</sup> dissonance with the results of interpreting both actions and other putative wish-fulfillments. In addition, they may lead to further interpretations of both actions and other wish-fulfillments. These may be tested as before; and so on.<sup>361</sup>

Examine how this would work for the case of our jealous lady. Freud interprets the lady's recalcitrant jealousy along similar lines to Hopkins' account. He hypothesizes a motive behind our lady's jealousy:

If not only were she, the old woman, in love with a young man, but if also her old husband were having a love affair with a young girl, then her conscience would be relieved of the weight of her unfaithfulness.<sup>362</sup>

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<sup>360</sup> The original says "of" but I assume it is a typing mistake.

<sup>361</sup> Hopkins, "Introduction," xxvi.

<sup>362</sup> Freud, *Introductory Lectures*, Lecture 16, vol. 16, p. 252.

The lady's motive or purpose is thus to relieve the guilt of her unfaithful thoughts, and this motive yields the wish that her husband would have an affair, as means to satisfy the end. Now it may not be the case that our lady actually had that unconscious wish. For the purposes of this discussion, I just want to examine how a wish fulfillment explanation is constructed.

The lady would not endorse the wish, as is evident from her earlier conscious expression of fear that her husband might have an affair. Instead of endorsing the wish, the lady's imagination fulfills it by forming the non-rational jealous attitude, which asserts that the husband is having an affair with his employee. That imaginative wish-fulfillment is a strange means to the end, namely to relieve the guilt.

Hopkins could claim that this interpretation is cogent given that it "coheres" with another symptomatic emotional attitude of our lady. That is the fear attitude she expressed prior to the arrival of the letter, and for which she had no reason at all. Freud also says that the lady's fear was effectively an expression of that very wish, coming from that very motive.<sup>363</sup>

Hopkins could continue to claim that these interpretations of the fear-attitude and the jealous-attitude as being the fulfillment of the wish that the husband would have an affair cohere with other cases. Indeed, Freud typically interprets fears to be expression of wishes. Furthermore, cases like our lady are so common that Freud declared them a type of jealousy – "*projected* jealousy."<sup>364</sup> In

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<sup>363</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 251.

<sup>364</sup> S. Freud, "Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality", S.E. vol. 18, pp. 223-232, p. 224.

such cases, the jealous person projects her own unfaithful desires on her partner “to whom [she] owe[s] faith,”<sup>365</sup> out of the same motive, namely the alleviation of guilt.

This interpretation could also explain why the lady’s jealousy was insensitive to reason. As Freud says: “No arguments against it could, of course, have any effect, for they were only directed against the mirror-image and not against the original which gave the other its strength and which lay hidden, inviolable, in the unconscious.”<sup>366</sup>

This may sound as if the “operative reason” for the lady’s jealousy was her motive to relieve her guilt about the love to her son-in-law and as if that unconscious “operative reason” was also the psychological state that caused the jealousy. The above quote seems to claim that if only reason-arguments would have been directed at the appropriate target, our lady could have reasoned herself out of her jealousy.

The motive to relieve guilt could not exactly be considered an operative reason. That motive is not a desire that then leads to an intentional action whose description reflects the content of the motive. The motive functions as a consideration in favor of a non-rational wish, which is in turn imaginatively fulfilled. Nevertheless, in this account the motive looks like a reason, even if for an imaginatively twisted “action,” namely the symptom.

The symptom is the imaginative fulfillment of a wish, which is in turn the imaginative “means” to a certain end. That is why I call Hopkins’ account “the instrumental-reason-extension” approach, which also fits Hopkins’ insistence on using the term “coherence” in connection to such “instrumental reasons.”

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<sup>365</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>366</sup> Freud, *Introductory Lectures*, Lecture 16, vol. 16, p. 252.

Some questions can now be raised. First, why is the lady in love with her son-in-law in the first place? After all, she endorses her marriage as a happy one. As Freud noted, that love itself requires an explanation.<sup>367</sup> Freud proposed what we may call a hereditary predisposition shared by many if not all women of the same age as our lady: "The lady was at a critical age, at which sexual needs in women suffer a sudden and undesired increase;".<sup>368</sup> But if she was so sexually charged, so to speak, why couldn't she just turn to her husband to satisfy her needs? Freud continues to hypothesize:

Or it may further have been that her excellent and faithful husband had for some years no longer enjoyed the sexual capacity which the well-preserved woman required for her satisfaction. Experience has shown us that it is precisely men in this position, whose faithfulness can consequently be taken for granted, who are distinguished by treating their wives with unusual tenderness, and by showing particular forbearance for their nervous troubles.<sup>369</sup>

I thus hypothesize a few additional latent emotions our lady may have: She is frustrated that her husband cannot satisfy her sexually; She fears that she will never be sexually desired again; She is jealous that the house guest is shamelessly satisfied in his affair.

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<sup>367</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>368</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 253.

<sup>369</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 253-4.

If one wants to take the Hopkins route, one may continue to ascribe to the lady more motives and wishes, even if the above considerations include more emotions. This move is possible, indeed always possible, since, as explained in chapter 1, all emotions are partly caused by some self-referring desire, a pro-attitude that is the operative reason to take personally a reason of fit. Every emotion thus allows for the ascription of a wish. As will be immediately demonstrated, wishes of two distinct emotions can coincide.

Instead of considering the above emotions, we can ascribe to the lady the motive to feel sexually desired and satisfied. This motive is the self-referring pro-attitude due to which our lady takes personally that her husband cannot satisfy her sexually, that she will never feel sexually desired again, and that the house guest is shamelessly satisfied in his affair. The motive then gives rise to the (quite common) wish to have an affair.

This wish, which our lady would not consciously endorse, is the imaginative means to the end – to feel sexually desired and satisfied. She imaginatively fulfills that wish by choosing a love object that is impossible to attain. This strategy, to have an impossible love in order to avoid realization for various other motives is also quite typically ascribed to people.

But why did our lady not choose another impossible love object, say the brother in law or the husband of her best friend? Why was the son-in-law chosen as a love object? That particularity is still unexplained and so Freud continues to hypothesize.

Freud suspects that the lady was not attracted to her son-in-law because of his irresistible charms. Rather, he guesses, the son-in-law was chosen as her love object precisely because he was married to her daughter. In this sense, the lady's

love was itself non-rational. It may seem strange to characterize love as non-rational, given all love is non-rational. Although we can list many reasons for loving someone, we do not love them because of those reasons, and we do not expect others who may agree with those reasons to share our love.<sup>370</sup> There is one rational constraint for love, however, even if very minimal. Namely, love should be about the love object, and not motivated by current relationships to other people in our lives.

Freud hypothesizes, then, that it is the emotional relationship our lady has with her daughter that is behind the secret love to the son-in-law. Freud mentions briefly the erotic ties between mothers and their daughters that could possibly connect with our lady's love to her daughter's husband.<sup>371</sup> Our lady may have been missing her old exclusive love connection to her daughter when the daughter was young, or even a baby.

In that distant past, our lady's daughter was completely dependent on her. Our lady enjoyed the superior status of the all-powerful mother. Over the years this connection gradually became weaker. Perhaps the daughter's marriage symbolized for our lady the end of that special connection. She may be jealous that her son-in-law replaced her and now has an exclusive relation to her daughter.

Again, if one wants to ascribe to the lady a motive, one only needs to articulate a pro-attitude for these emotions. The lady can then be ascribed the motive to restore the old exclusive connection with her daughter. That motive then gives rise to the (unendurable) wish to have an affair with the son-in-law. The wish

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<sup>370</sup> Love thus poses a special challenge for an explanation, which I will not try to meet in this thesis. For discussions about the peculiarities of love in comparison to other emotions, see for example: Jerome Neu, "Jealous Thoughts." In Amélie Rorty (ed.), *Explaining Emotions*, pp. 425-463, pp. 445-446. Pitcher, "Emotions," pp. 340-342; Roberts, "Sketch," p. 202; Baier, "What Emotions Are About," pp. 12-13; Roger Scruton, "Emotion, Practical Knowledge and Common Culture." In Amélie Rorty (ed.), *Explaining Emotions*, pp. 519-536, p. 526.

<sup>371</sup> Freud, *Introductory Lectures*, Lecture 16, vol. 16, p. 254.

is a strange imaginative means to the end of restoring that old connection with her daughter. If the lady had an affair with her son-in-law she would win some imaginative competition with her daughter, thereby restoring the superior status she once had. She would also get (questionably) closer to her daughter if they were to share the same love object. Falling in love with her son-in-law is the imaginative fulfillment of this wish.

The wish fulfillment interpretative explanation for the case of the jealous lady appears in diagram (2). It can there be seen that the intentional content of each motive, the entire embedded proposition, is related to the entirety of the content of the propositional wish. And the content of each wish, as a whole, is imaginatively fulfilled by the entirety of the content of the resultant emotional propositional attitude – as a whole. This holistic feature, that connects entire propositions to one another – is a feature of operative-reason-explanation for emotions, and of rational explanations in general. The connection between the propositional attitudes is made through an extended instrumental reason that makes use of the imagination.

## Diagram (2)

### Wish Fulfillment Account for the Jealous Lady

**Latent Emotion:**

I am guilty that I have unfaithful thoughts about my son-in-law.

**Motive (resultant):**

I want to relieve my guilt.

**Wish:**

I wish that my husband would have an affair.

**Wish-Fulfillment:**

I am jealous that my husband is having an affair with his employee.

**Latent Emotions:**

I am frustrated that my husband cannot satisfy me sexually.

I fear that I will never feel sexually desired again.

I am jealous that the houseguest is shamelessly satisfied in his affair.

**Motive (pro-attitude):**

I want to be sexually desired and satisfied.

**Wish:**

I wish I could have an affair.

**Wish-Fulfillment:**

I am in love with my son-in-law.

**Latent Emotions:**

I miss my exclusive relation with my daughter.

I am jealous that my son-in-law replaced my exclusive relation with my daughter.

**Motive (pro-attitude):**

I want to restore my old privileged connection with my daughter.

**Wish:**

I wish I could have an affair with my son-in-law. (superiority, closeness)

**Wish-Fulfillment:**

I am in love with my son-in-law.

There are two main problems with the wish fulfillment account. The first is that the unconscious mind is here pictured as having wants and as producing, through its own instrumental reason, wishes it then acts to achieve. This picture thus ascribes to the subject rational capacities that are reserved for people. This is a version of the homuncular view whose challenges are famous in the literature.<sup>372</sup>

The second problem is that this account leaves some questions unanswered. It does not explain two important components of the recalcitrant jealousy – the emotion-type of jealousy and the recalcitrance of the component “employee.” Why does the lady alleviate her guilt by accusing the husband via projection in the first place?<sup>373</sup> Why not let the imagination fulfill a different wish, for example, the wish that she is not at all in love with her son-in-law? Another solution would be to fulfill this latter wish by consciously criticizing the son-in-law, to go through concerted efforts to find as many flaws as possible in him. The imaginative method of denying love by excessive criticism is quite common. Indeed, this would further cohere with the fact that many mothers-in-law are hyper critical of their sons-in-law.

And why did the lady’s attitude persist with the specification that her husband was having an affair with his young employee? The above wishes explain only the involvement of the husband having an affair in the intentional content of the attitude. They do not account for the recalcitrance of the component “employee.”

Once the letter was known to be false, why did our lady not change her intentional objects to include her husband and someone else? Some jealous people do behave like that. After their accusations are revealed to be false they would say

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<sup>372</sup> I remind the problem of regression: what about the unconscious of the unconscious? Does it also have wants and wishes? In conversation, Hopkins said that the wish fulfillment is a dumb operation. The claim in this chapter is that “fulfillment” cannot be “dumb” given it presupposes instrumental reason, which is a capacity of people, not of “systems.”

<sup>373</sup> This question is also raised by Freud, *Ibid.*, 253.

“well, maybe you’re not cheating on me with *her*, but I just know you’re cheating on me with *someone!*” Alternatively, our lady could have retreated to the non-rational fear that her husband is having an affair (without hypothesizing a particular accomplice).

The same problem arises in all the examples Hopkins discusses in his writings. Wish fulfillment is just not enough to account for all the details of the intentional content of symptoms. Hopkins seems to be aware of this problem and he has a way to solve it. But before I explain Hopkins’ strategy, I want to claim that wish fulfillment not only assumes an over-rationalized picture of the unconscious, it is not at all necessary to explain symptoms.

The associative method of explanation I proposed in the previous chapter completely explains the lady’s recalcitrant jealousy. Diagram (3) represents the associative explanation for the jealous lady. The list of the suppressed emotions that appears in the diagram may be partial or inaccurate. As I said above, the purpose here is to show what would count as a possible explanation, not to offer the actual explanation.

The diagram shows how components of the triggers associatively and “dumbly” connect with components of the latent emotions that are thereby aroused. It can there be seen, for example, that the recalcitrant component “employee” is associated with quite a few components of various emotions. The associations I hypothesized do not have to be the associations our lady actually made. Whatever associations the lady made came from her idiosyncratic and subjective imagination. But whatever they were, there would be enough of them to account for the recalcitrance of the component “employee.”

## Diagram (3)

### Associative Explanation for the Jealous Lady

#### Latent Emotions:

I am **jealous** that **my son-in-law** **replaced** me and has an **exclusive relation** with **my daughter**.

I am frustrated that **my husband** cannot **satisfy me sexually**.

I **fear** I will **never be sexually desired** again.

I am **in love with my son-in-law**. (non-rational)

I am **jealous** that **my daughter** is with **the man I love**.

I am **guilty** that **I** have **unfaithful thoughts** about **my son-in-law**.

I **fear** that my **secret love** to **my son-in-law** would be **found out**.

I am **jealous** that the **houseguest** is **shamelessly** satisfied in his **affair**

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#### **First Trigger:**

The **houseguest** is having **an affair**.

#### **First Reaction:**

I **fear** that **my husband** might have **an affair**.

#### **Second trigger:**

**Housemaid: Your husband** is having **an affair** with **his employee**.

#### **Second (recalcitrant) Reaction:**

I am **jealous** that **my husband** is having **an affair** with **his employee**.

Importantly, unconscious imaginative associations do not relate to each other through “coherence,” since they are meaningless and have many degrees of freedom. They do, however, have one obvious circumscribing constraint: they are all connected with the same one or few nodal suppressed emotions. In that sense, they are not entirely arbitrary. Furthermore, although the imagination can be erratic and create new associations all the time, most of us are not very original, so to speak. That is, our unconscious imaginative connections may and perhaps often do repeat themselves. The same trigger-elements on different occasions may imaginatively connect with the same latent-elements.

It is the task of analysis to uncover at least some of the actual associations and to identify their type (symbol, similarity, analogy, reversal) and to give those imaginative connections meaning by eliciting the (idiosyncratic) respects under which they hold. I therefore sufficed in simply marking “dumb” connections in the diagram. The purpose of the diagram is only to show what an associative network would look like.

The aroused emotions cannot be expressed as such. The imagination thus synthesizes their various components and creates the fearful and jealous emotional attitudes (through the processes of condensation and displacement). The emotion-types of fear and jealousy comprise the dominant affect of the lady’s jealous latent emotions. Aroused affect is especially difficult to ignore, and that is why those emotion-types appear in the synthesized attitudes. In chapter 5, I will articulate that connective and synthetic process in more detail for this example of the jealous lady.

The associative explanation does not leave any manifest element unexplained. This is hardly “inference to the best explanation.” No inference is involved, only the attempt to track imaginative connections. It is not the best

explanation but the only explanation, since without those connections some elements are left unaccounted for. It is a strange kind of “only”, however, given that every manifest element is in fact “over-explained” by various associations to various latent elements. This strange feature of associative causality still awaits chapter 5.

As expected, the imaginative network raises some questions: What kind of relationship does the lady have with her husband and her daughter? What are our lady’s feelings and thoughts about her aging? The more we inquire, the more complexified the imaginative-emotional network will be, and the lady’s current active emotions would become contextualized accordingly.

No wishes appear in this imaginative diagram. The wishful pro-attitudes may be still be ascribed to our lady as what partly caused her latent emotions. The wish that the husband would have an affair does not appear in the diagram at all. Instead I hypothesized an association between the lady and the husband, an association that can be given the meaning of identification through which the projection is made.

I do not want to be dogmatic about what unconscious wishes our lady may have had, or about any of the wishes Hopkins ascribes to the subjects of his examples. Yet I am skeptical about the existence of wishes (like the wish that the husband would have an affair) that are said to *emerge* from emotions (like the lady’s guilt). This kind of wishes often appears in Hopkins’ examples.<sup>374</sup>

Consciously, an emotion may give rise to a desire. Anger, for example, may be taken as an operative reason for, a consideration in favor of a desire for revenge. But to suppose that an unconscious emotion could give rise to an unconscious desire

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<sup>374</sup> See for example Hopkins’ interpretation of the Rat Man, as not only being unconsciously angry with his father but also wishing his father harm as a result of that rage. Hopkins, “Introduction,” pp. xxx-xxxvi.

or wish would entail ascribing the unconscious a capacity to reason. As I have been implying thus far, the capacity to reason is reserved for people. Even if one can reason spontaneously and pre-reflectively on “auto-pilot” mode, the “unaware” nature of such operative reasoning is merely descriptive. At any moment the subject may bring this or that operative reason to conscious reflection. The Freudian unconscious, conversely, or rather unconscious emotions, are not readily available for conscious reflection and can only participate in unconscious “dumb” associations and syntheses.

In any case, whatever the wishes a subject may have, I claim that we should resist the over-rationalized and homuncular idea that symptoms are wish *fulfillments*. Whatever wishes our lady may have had, they would have participated in the same connective and synthetic processes of condensation and displacement. Wishes, just like emotions, would be “dumbly” connected to the trigger and synthesized into the resultant attitude. They would not be quasi-rationally “fulfilled.”

As I said above, Hopkins is aware that the wish fulfillment explanation will leave some details of the content of the symptom unaccounted for. He thus also turns to the processes of condensation and displacement to do some of the more detailed explanatory work. Hopkins claims, however, that without the wishes there would be no such imaginative associations. For Hopkins, the connective and synthetic imaginative capacities are mobilized by and work in the service of the quasi-instrumentally-rational capacity of wish fulfillment. And so, when he talks of a manifest element being connected to a few latent elements he still insists on wishes as the primary causal factor:

[I]t appears that the transformation of latent to manifest content involves something like a channeling of representation and significance, from a number of figures and situations, onto a single manifest one, *who as it were carries the wishful burden of the rest.*<sup>375</sup>

I emphasize that this “transformation” is not for Hopkins of distinctively emotional content, but rather a transformation “between latent motive and manifest realization.”<sup>376</sup> However, in such discussions, Hopkins cannot avoid mentioning the latent emotions.<sup>377</sup> Emotions are necessary for the imaginative connections that account for the particularities of the manifest content. In other words, Hopkins claims that the move from wishes to their fulfillment that passes through the condensation and displacement of emotion is a causal move. This, however, cannot be the case. Wishes or desires alone do not cause an emotion.

Desires and wishes refer to the practical identity of the emoting subject, in the lady’s case – a mother, a sexually desirous woman, a wife, a mother-in-law, an aging woman. And these practical identities are responsible for what reasons of fit the subject takes personally, in the lady’s case – that she is in love with her daughter’s husband, that she has unfaithful thoughts, that the gentleman shamelessly enjoys an affair, that she has no satisfying sex-life, that she no longer has an exclusive connection with her daughter and so forth. Without the intentional description of the emotional import that provides reasons of fit – there will be nothing to take personally. Emotions are not reducible to their pro-attitudes (this is demonstrated

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<sup>375</sup> Hopkins, “The interpretation of Dreams,” p. 112. My emphasis.

<sup>376</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111.

<sup>377</sup> See for example, *Ibid.*, pp. 112-113, 118.

in diagram (2), where a few different emotions share one pro-attitude). Furthermore, the non-rational emotion in the network, the lady's secret love, which is crucial for the jealous attitude, is itself caused by the condensation and displacement of some other emotions.

If wishes alone cannot account for the emotions whose condensation and displacement cause the jealous attitude – then wishes alone cannot account for the details of the recalcitrant emotional symptom. Hopkins' appeal to condensation and displacement of emotions is thus an “add on” move and not a causal move. He adds the condensation and displacement of emotion to “fill in the details” that wish fulfillment leaves out. But why add the imaginative associations to the wish fulfillment explanation, when the associative network can do all the explanatory work by itself? Recall Occam's Razor principle – not to multiply explanations beyond necessity.

The wish fulfillment explanation only aims to relate the contents of various propositional attitudes to one another in a quasi-rational manner. Such an explanation invokes the imaginative associations only in order to account for the details of the manifest symptom. The elements of the associative network that are under-connected and not symbolically represented in the symptom do not matter as fragments, but only as taking part in a proposition. The wish fulfillment explanation thus does not invite further associative reflection on those un-connected latent components. The riddle of the patient is solved once the wishes are identified.

Effectively, then, the wish fulfillment explanation, which puts all the causal weight on one or more wishes that are either pro-attitudes of nodal emotions or wishes that emerge from those emotions – serves to further over-emphasize these nodal emotions. And this over-emphasis, as explained before, is the source of the

pathology, of the imagination's fixation on few suppressed emotions. Exposing the wishes would not diminish this fixation, but would merely provide a new skill for self-management (further discussed in chapter 6).

## Conclusion

The two hermeneutic approaches, as well as de Sousa's account of paradigm scenarios, suffer from the same basic flaw. They will all take recourse to imaginative associations to account for the details of the symptom. But even if, in fact, the associations are all that is necessary to account for the intentional content of the symptom, all these accounts "add-on" a further reason-like explanation.

These explanations take the regulative idea of reason, the human aspiration to be rational, and impose it on our emotional reality. Effectively, they claim that our apparently non-rational behaviors and emotional reactions are still confined within rational constraints. They claim that at the causal level, the imaginative capacities that bring about our non-rational emotions still operate in a way that conforms with extended forms of rationality.<sup>378</sup>

The result is an explanation is over-rationalized picture of the unconscious that grants it extended rational capacities that on people, as rational subjects that can at any time summon their operative reasons to conscious deliberation. These explanations thus invoke a philosophically problematic homuncular view (de Sousa, Hopkins) or alternatively a strange anthropomorphism (Ricoeur).

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<sup>378</sup> I do not return to Lear's discussion of Mr. A's unconscious "techniques" to "sustain his world of betrayal" because of lack of space. I suffice in the suggestive claim, that if one is not aware of their motivations that they act to achieve, then one is self-deceived rather than suffering from genuine pathology. Unconscious processes are strictly non-rational and should be distinguished from self-deception (a topic I do not discuss in this thesis). Alternatively, if Mr. A is not self-deceived, then Lear's story is a rational re-construction that does not reflect the actual causal story.

The second problematic result is the effective reinforcement of pathology by contributing to the over-emphasis of certain suppressed emotions and the memories they relate to, an over-emphasis that is the source of pathology in the first place. The kind of self-awareness these explanations can bring about would enable the patient to exercise self-management but also to maintain an illusion as to importance of the memories, emotions and wishes that are symbolically represented in the symptom.

The disillusioned claim of the associative explanation is that the part of our emotional lives, which cannot be operatively-rationally explained, does not follow the principles of coherence and consistency. Our imagination can be mobilized by reason for some purposes and also unconsciously takes suppressed operatively-rational emotions as its associative material. But the imagination has degrees of freedom beyond rationality altogether, which have causal effects on our emotional lives. Any attempt to rationally restrict the associative imagination will be a causally wrong account that is not faithful to how we actually come to have our non-rational emotions.

## Chapter 5:

### The Singular Causation of the Associative Explanation

In chapters 3 and 4 I demonstrated the associative explanation for emotional symptoms through the examples of Jonah and the Jealous Lady. The general causal account has three basic phases:

Phase 1: suppression of emotions due to moralism, social prudence or self-image that are either imposed on the subject by (her perception of) social norms or are self-imposed. The very suppression of an emotion does not obey any causal laws and is not predictable. It is a singular event that depends on the subject's individual suppressive reasons. The emotions prior to their suppression were themselves singularly caused – either rationally as described in chapter 1 or non-rationally.

Phase 2: a here-and-now situation triggers one or more suppressed emotions through imaginative connections that “dumbly” associate components of the intentional content of the description of the trigger (trigger-elements) with components of the intentional content of the suppressed emotions. These associations are highly idiosyncratic and singular, as they depend on the imagination of a particular person and connect the trigger-elements, which are highly contingent, with the subject's particular suppressed emotions. The associations themselves are “dumb” inarticulate and meaningless, but they are articulable and can be given meaning in analysis. The suppressed emotions are thereby aroused.

Phase 3: the aroused emotions cannot be expressed as such since they are unconscious, suppressed. The synthetic imaginative capacity thus “condenses” the

various components of the latent emotions into manifest elements that appear in the consciously experienced non-rational emotion. The synthesis makes use of imaginative connections between the latent-elements and the manifest elements. Trigger-elements are often selected as manifest elements. The expression of the latent emotions is thus “displaced” into the expression of the manifest emotional attitude (for a schematic representation of this process see diagram (4))

As was demonstrated in the cases of Jonah and the jealous lady, each manifest element is associated to more than one latent element (as implied by the Freudian term “condensation”). The question that has already been raised is: is it one imaginative connection that causes the appearance of a manifest element or more than one? If it is more than one connection, what is the causal efficacy of each connection, and how many connections suffice to cause the appearance of a manifest element? The purpose of this chapter is to answer these questions.


In his writings, Freud seems to talk about such connections as “determining” the symptom. Often, as he notes the plurality of associations, he talks about the symptom as being “over-determined.” This suggests that Freud thought that these connections are *sufficient* causal conditions, and that symptoms are often caused by more than one such condition. I thus turn in the first section to J.L. Mackie’s account of causation of events to examine Freud’s implicit claim. I will show that imaginative associations should not be understood in terms of sufficient causal conditions for the appearance of a manifest element.

In the second section I propose a way to understand the causal role associations play in the appearance of manifest elements. I thus discuss phase 3 above, the phase of synthesis or condensation, drawing on Freud’s insights from *The Interpretation of Dreams*.

In the third section I examine the triggering phase, phase 2 above of the arousal of suppressed emotions, in light of the proposed account of condensation. In the fourth section I compare the imaginative network of the associative explanation with a similar contemporary account of the empirical psychologist Gordon Bower. I use that comparison to raise and deal with a few objections.


### Diagram (4)

#### Phase 1: Arousal of Latent Emotions (Connective Imagination)



- : Imaginative Association
- t.e : Trigger Elements
- l.e : Latent Elements
- e.t : Dominant Latent Emotion-Type
- e.t : Minority Latent Emotion-Type

#### Phase 2: Condensation of Latent Elements & Displacement of Expression of Aroused Latent Emotions (Connective & Synthetic Imagination)



- t.e : Condensed Manifest Element that is also a Trigger Element
- n.e : Condensed Manifest Element that is not a Trigger Element  
(may be a latent element or a newly created element)

## 1. Can Imaginative Associations be Understood as Sufficient Causal Conditions for the Formation of an Emotional Symptom?

In this section I turn to J. L. Mackie's account on causes as conditions for an event.<sup>379</sup> After my presentation of Mackie's account I will examine whether we can indeed identify certain associations as sufficiently determining a symptom. I will claim that if we do understand imaginative associations in that manner we reach an unsatisfactory causal account for symptoms. I will conclude that in order to understand the associative causation of symptom we need a different causal terminology.

Mackie says that often, when we say that one event caused another, the cause we are referring to is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. He gives the example of a short-circuit that is said to cause a fire in a certain house.<sup>380</sup> The short-circuit was not a necessary condition for the fire, since other events may have caused that fire. Neither was the short-circuit a sufficient condition, since other conditions had to hold for it to cause the fire, such as having inflammable material nearby.

Sufficiency and necessity nevertheless haunt causality in the physical (and social) world. In order to see how sufficiency and necessity characterize a certain condition, that condition cannot be considered in isolation. As Mackie explains:

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<sup>379</sup> J. L. Mackie, "Causes and Conditions," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 2 no. 2 (October 1965), pp. 245-264.

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 245.

[...] there is a set of conditions (of which some are positive and some are negative), including the presence of inflammable material, the absence of a suitably placed sprinkler, and no doubt quite a number of others, which combined with the short-circuit constituted a complex condition that was sufficient for the house's catching fire – sufficient, but not necessary, for the fire could have started in other ways. Also of *this* complex condition, the short-circuit was an indispensable part: the other parts of this condition, conjoined with one another in the absence of the short-circuit, would not have produced the fire. The short-circuit which is said to have caused the fire is thus an indispensable part of a complex sufficient (but not necessary) condition of the fire. In this case, then, the so-called cause is, and is known to be, an *insufficient* but *necessary* part of a condition which is itself *unnecessary* but *sufficient* for the result.<sup>381</sup>

Mackie calls such a condition (“the so-called cause”) – an “INUS condition.”<sup>382</sup> Events can thus be caused by a number of sets of conditions, where each condition in that set is an indispensable member. Each such set “represents a sufficient condition [...], and one that contains no redundant factors”.<sup>383</sup> In other words, the conjunction of the INUS conditions that belong to each such set is “a minimal sufficient condition”<sup>384</sup> for the event.

Mackie admits that it is unlikely that each such set would specify *all* non-redundant conditions that are together sufficient for the occurrence of an event.

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<sup>381</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>382</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>383</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 246.

<sup>384</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 246.

That is why he introduces the notion of a *causal field* that would refer to other INUS conditions that could or should be included in the relevant sufficient conjunction.

The causal field would be very hard to specify and its vagueness corresponds to “the well known difficulty that it is impossible, without including in the cause the whole environment, the whole prior state of the universe [...], to find a genuinely sufficient condition, one which is ‘by itself, adequate to secure the effect.’”<sup>385</sup>

The vagueness of the causal field is nevertheless limited. It allows for some negative definition, insofar as one could specify some facts or counter-factuals that are clearly irrelevant to causal question at hand.<sup>386</sup> The assumption of the existence of a relevant causal field, no matter how vague, nonetheless presupposes that a set of INUS conditions, which includes that field as a sub-set, can indeed be considered as a minimal sufficient condition.

Given the assumption of a causal field that grants the conjunction of INUS conditions the status of a minimal sufficient condition, we can now further claim that the disjunction of all the minimal sufficient conditions provides a necessary and sufficient condition.<sup>387</sup>

Mackie’s paper seems to claim that we do presuppose such a necessary and sufficient condition for every specific event. Although he says there is no need to be deterministic *in general*, we do presuppose that each particular event we investigate had a very complex yet nevertheless both necessary and sufficient condition.<sup>388</sup>

Freud often seems to talk about an individual imaginative connection that links a latent element to a manifest element as “the cause” of that element. If we take

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<sup>385</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 250. Mackie here quotes Bertrand Russell.

<sup>386</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 250.

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 246.

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 257; p.264.

that interpretation (imaginative connection as “the so-called cause”) seriously, we can articulate this claim in Mackie’s terminology in the following manner:

Say we ask what is the minimally sufficient condition for each manifest element, which would thereby determine that manifest element. Each imaginative connection from a latent element of a certain emotion to that manifest element is an INUS condition. We then choose one of those connections or INUS conditions as a member of the set that will comprise the minimally sufficient condition for the appearance of that manifest element.

Next we need another INUS condition, namely one imaginative connection from the here-and-now trigger to the thereby aroused emotion (whose component participate in the connection of the first INUS condition). The relevant elements of the trigger and the latent emotion may also be considered as INUS conditions. We then form a conjunction of those INUS conditions together with a causal field to get the minimally sufficient condition. The causal field for the formation of symptoms would include, for example, the possibility for arousal of latent elements and would exclude the grasp of operative reasons causes.

We could also consider the symptom as a whole. All manifest elements can be accounted by a sub-set of the plurality of identified imaginative connections, where each connection links one latent element with one manifest element. Each such subset together with the connections to the relevant trigger-elements and a causal field constitutes a minimally sufficient condition for the formation of the symptom.

In his writings, however, Freud does not choose one such minimally sufficient condition for the symptoms he analyses. Rather, he assumes that more than one such minimally sufficient condition caused the symptom. In particular, he assumes that more than one connection caused the appearance of each manifest

element. That is precisely what is implied by the term “condensation,” which refers to the combination or the accumulation of many such connections.

Each manifest element or the symptom as a whole is not just determined by imaginative connections – it is “overdetermined.” Mackie says that such a situation, where an event is caused by more than one minimally sufficient condition, may happen. There are cases, where -

[t]here are [...] two minimal sufficient conditions, both of which actually occurred. For example, lightning strikes a barn in which straw is stored, and a tramp throws a burning cigarette butt into the straw at the same place and at the same time.<sup>389</sup>

Another example Mackie gives is “of a man who is shot by a firing squad, and two bullets go through his heart simultaneously.”<sup>390</sup> These are cases of “over-kill.” If only one bullet hit the man’s heart we would say it was a non-redundant INUS cause. Given two bullets have hit the man’s heart, then each of those bullets, considered separately was redundant. It is the disjunction of the bullets that was non-redundant.

Freud spoke of the “overdetermination” of symptoms in connection to condensation of imaginative associations. He said that one should expect overdetermination when giving a causal account of symptoms: “[...] in the world of reality, which I am trying to depict here [...] an accumulation and conjunction of mental activities – in a word, overdetermination – is the rule.”<sup>391</sup>

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<sup>389</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 250.

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 251.

<sup>391</sup> S. Freud, *Fragment of an Analysis of a case of Hysteria* (1905 [1901]), S.E. vol. 7, pp. 3-122, p. 60.

The fact that Freud chose the term “overdetermination” to describe what is causally going on in the formation of symptoms, strengthens the above interpretation. Namely, that indeed each collection of connections, where each connection links a latent element to one manifest element thereby “covering” all manifest elements of the relevant symptom – is a minimal sufficient condition of the symptom.<sup>392</sup> If overdetermination in the sense of over-kill “is the rule” of the associative explanation – it is a strange rule, an implausible rule.

Examples like the ones described by Mackie are quite rare. Moreover, these examples make it difficult to answer the question: “What caused the event?” As Mackie says:

[...] we *would* ordinarily hesitate to say, of either bullet, that it caused the man’s death, or of either the lightning or the cigarette butt that it caused the fire [...]. As Marc-Wogau says, ‘in such a situation as this we are unsure also how to use the word ‘cause’.’ Our ordinary concept of cause does not deal clearly with cases of this sort [...].<sup>393</sup>

Finally, to say that we should, *in general*, expect our mental activities to provide more than one sufficient cause to any given manifest element or to the symptom as a whole goes against our causal intuitions. Recall Thomas Aquinas’ version of the Occam’s Razor principle: “If a thing can be done adequately by means of one, it is superfluous to do it by means of several; for we observe that nature does

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<sup>392</sup> The alternative interpretation whereby all connections are all INUS conditions should thus be avoided. Freud speaks of “overdetermination” too often to simply discount it.

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 251.

not employ two instruments where one suffices.”<sup>394</sup> In our theorizing of explanations for events, in this case the appearance of a manifest emotional symptom, we have similar expectations for only one minimal sufficient condition to occur.

Freud acknowledges that the overdetermination of symptoms goes against “[...] our innate craving for causality [which] declares itself satisfied with a *single* psychical cause.”<sup>395</sup> Freud warns that we should not follow that craving when it comes to the mental realm of reality. And yet overdetermination in the sense accepted in the canonical literature on causation is too hard to swallow.

I claim that Freud’s objection to this “craving” as well as his insistence on the plurality of causes can be maintained while avoiding the option of overdetermination. I base my claim on Freud’s more specific causal discussions in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, where a different kind of causality that I call imaginative or associative causality is suggested.

This associative causality, as will be shown in the next section, should not be explained in terms of sufficiency or necessity of causal conditions. Singular causal explanations such as the one the associative explanation offers do require sufficient conditions in order to explain. Recall Woodward’s quote from the introduction:

Singular causal explanations wear the source of their explanatory efficacy on their face – they explain not because they tacitly invoke a “hidden” law or statement of sufficient conditions, but because they

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<sup>394</sup> Thomas Aquinas as referred to by Alan Baker, "Simplicity", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/simplicity/>>.

<sup>395</sup> S. Freud, *Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (1910 [1909]), Third Lecture, S.E. vol. 11, pp. 29-39, p. 38.

identify conditions such that changes in these conditions would make a difference for whether the explanandum-phenomenon or some specified alternatives to it would ensue.<sup>396</sup>

I thus claim that Freud misspeaks when he talks of sufficiency and that his choice of the term “overdetermination” is misleading. For reasons that will be clear in the next section, I speak of “over-explanation” instead.

## 2. The Imaginative Synthetic Phase of Condensation

### A. Insights from *The Interpretation of Dreams*

As explained in section 4 of chapter 3, the proposed associative method for the explanation of symptoms is largely inspired by Freud’s method of dream interpretation. With one difference – symptoms are not wish fulfillments as Freud claimed in relation to dreams (and symptoms). A quick reminder of the analogy:

<b>Emotional Symptoms</b>	<b>Dreams</b>
Associative material = latent elements	Dream-thoughts = latent elements
Trigger elements	Dream-day elements
Manifest element (of the attitude)	Dream-element = manifest element

The main difference between dreams and emotional symptoms is that the trigger elements of symptoms often appear in the manifest content, whereas the dream-day elements sometimes appear in the dream but mostly are identified in free-associations as part of the dream-thoughts. Freud thus included dream-day

<sup>396</sup> Woodward, “Singular Causal Explanation,” p. 237

elements under the rubric of latent content. This difference is not so crucial, given that when considering the formation of emotional symptoms, trigger-elements also participate in the synthesis of the manifest attitude, just as dream-day elements participate in the formation of dreams.

The second difference has to do with the practical constraints of this thesis. Given the information for the examples I discuss is limited, my symptom-diagrams include a lot less associative material than would be expected. In analysis that takes a long time many more associations would be identified through the imaginative third-personal perspective. But in my diagrams, only nodal points (nodal emotions) appear, whereas in a typical dream-diagram nodal points would be recognized due to their “radiation” of many more connections than other dream-thoughts. I assume, however, that with more associative material, my symptom-diagrams would look more like a dream-diagram.

The basic associative structure of the symptom-diagrams is characterized by the rule of “overdetermination” or rather “over-explanation” as I prefer to call it. That is, every manifest element has a few latent elements connected to it. Moreover, every latent element is connected to more than one manifest element, through other latent elements and trigger elements. This structure would be perhaps more evident if I drew zigzag lines in my diagram instead of just coloring the connected elements with the same color. If those zigzag lines had been added, the “messiness” of the diagram would be more evident (but then it would be virtually impossible to make sense of the diagrams). The same associative structure occurs in dreams:

[E]ach element in the content of a dream is ‘overdetermined’ by material in the dream-thoughts; it is not derived from a *single* element in the

dream-thoughts, but may be traced back to a whole number [...] A dream-element is, in the strictest sense of the word, the ‘representative’ of all this disparate material in the content of the dream. But analysis reveals yet another side of the complicated relation between the content of the dream and the dream-thoughts. Just as connections lead from each element of the dream to several dream-thoughts, so as a rule a single dream-thought is represented by more than one dream-element; the threads of association do not simply converge from the dream-thoughts to the dream-content, they cross and interact with each other many times over in the course of their journey.<sup>397</sup>

The causal question I am concerned with in this section is how does the messy associative network, that includes latent elements (of latent emotions) and trigger-elements produces the manifest content of the resultant emotional attitude. Given the associative structure of dreams and symptoms is basically the same, we can learn about “over-determination” or rather about “over-explanation” from Freud’s insights about the associative causality in dreams. Freud’s suggestive account is the following:

[...] a dream is not constructed by each individual dream-thought, or group of dream-thoughts, finding (in abbreviated form) separate representation in the content of the dream – in the kind of way in which an electorate chooses parliamentary representatives; a dream is

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<sup>397</sup> Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, vol. 5, pp. 652-653. Because of the much higher number of dream-thoughts in comparison to dream-elements Freud called this kind of construction “condensation”. Condensation and “over-determination” are thus interrelated concepts.

constructed, rather, by the whole mass of dream-thoughts being submitted to a sort of manipulative process in which those elements which have the most numerous and strongest supports acquire the right of entry into the dream-content – in a manner analogous to election by *scrutiny de liste* [sic]. In the case of every dream which I have submitted to an analysis of this kind I have invariably found these same fundamental principles confirmed: the elements of the dream are constructed out of the whole mass of dream-thoughts and each one of those elements is shown to have been determined many times over in relation to the dream-thoughts.<sup>398</sup>

This quote includes a few guiding causal principles: First, it is not the case that we can divide the latent content into subsets, each of which causes a separate manifest element. *All* latent content as well as trigger elements cause *together* the manifest content. Given that all of the latent content is concentrated around or radiated from the nodal points, then ultimately it is the aroused nodal points that cause *together* the entirety of the manifest attitude. None of the nodal points is, in other words, redundant.

This in turn suggests another guiding principle. Although the manifest content is decomposed and the associations from each manifest element to the latent elements are considered separately, the manifest elements are ultimately connected to one another through the entirety of the latent content. In other words, the

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<sup>398</sup> Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, vol. 4, p. 284. Emphasis in original. The original translation says “scrutiny,” but it should say “scrutin”. In what follows I use the correct term “scrutin”

entirety of the manifest attitude cannot be ignored. The manifest elements are selected *together* through the “manipulative process.”

That selection is described by the metaphor: “election by *scrutin de liste*.” This metaphor suggests that the manifest content albeit composed of separate elements nevertheless comprises a unity, similarly to a parliament that is composed of individual members is still a united whole. This feature of the metaphor thus also emphasizes that the unity of the manifest content should not be ignored. Somehow the “manipulative process” has to account for this unity.

The metaphor of “election by *scrutin de liste*” further suggests that there is pre-determined number of manifest elements that could be selected, as there is a pre-determined number of seats in the parliament. The question of the number of manifest elements in a dream is very complicated, and it is unclear what constraints we could impose on that number.

However, insofar as emotional attitudes are concerned, we can talk of a limited number of “variables” they could include. At most, an emotional attitude can include three basic variables: the affect or the emotion-type, the intentional object and the description of the object (which may misleadingly *appear* as a reason). The object could be comprised of more than one component and the description of the object also may be composed of more than component. But the number of components is nevertheless limited. This constraint is involved in the “manipulative process” that creates the entirety of the manifest emotional attitude.

The “*scrutin de liste*” metaphor also implies that the “manipulative process” would result in only one combination of manifest elements, similarly to an election that results in one collection of parliament members. Freud explicitly says, however, that this is not the case in dreams. Namely, the same latent thoughts can result in

different dreams that contain different manifest elements.<sup>399</sup>

In the case of emotions, we could equally say that the “manipulative process” could produce more than one emotion from the same latent content. This was the case with Jonah’s resentment of his various female bosses, with our lady’s fear and jealous attitudes and is probably the case of Mr. A’s various betrayal attitudes. We could further say, that various symptoms of the same patient relate to latent elements that are either identical or overlapping. Jonah’s obsessional thoughts that his mother wants to kill him and his scarf phobia probably shared most of the latent content with that of his resentment attitudes (in a manner that is similar to my hypothetical diagram for Jonah’s case). I will here focus only on symptomatic emotional attitudes.

The constraint on the resultant emotional attitude as an entirety that contains a limited number of elements explains why Freud says that “those elements which have the most numerous and strongest supports acquire the right of entry into the [manifest] content.” The support and its strength obviously relate to the imaginative connections and the latent content they link to the manifest elements. But this metaphor is still only suggestive. In what terms should this “strength” be understood? What does this “election” of manifest elements consist in? Are there many elements to choose from, as there are many candidates for the parliament?

## **B. The “Manipulative” Process: Imaginative Synthesis**

The synthesis of a new emotional attitude occurs after the triggering phase. At that point then, trigger-elements are already associated with latent elements of certain

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<sup>399</sup> As Freud says: “Incidentally, it is to be observed that all dreams produced during a single night will be found on analysis to be derived from the same circle of thoughts.” Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, vol. 5 p. 661.

suppressed emotions, which are in turn aroused. The aroused emotions, in particular the aroused affect, cannot be ignored – but neither can they be expressed. This prompts the synthetic capacity of the imagination to select manifest content that can be conscious and get expressed. That manifest content would be imaginatively connected to the aroused latent emotions and thus its expression would be some kind of imaginatively distorted or “displaced” expression of those latent emotions.<sup>400</sup>

The synthetic capacity of the imagination selects the manifest content without appeal to reason. It is just as “dumb” and distinctively non-rational as the connective capacity. The synthetic capacity, however, has fewer degrees of freedom than the connective capacity, since it operates under certain constraints. The constraints I now list are those relevant to the synthesis of a new propositional attitude.

The first constraint, already mentioned above, is the limit on the number of manifest elements per attitude. The second constraint is that as many components of the latent emotions as possible would connect to as many of the limited number of manifest elements as possible. It is in that manner that the entirety of the latent content becomes connected to the entirety of the manifest attitude. This second constraint demonstrates how the synthetic capacity also makes use of and cooperates with the connective capacity.

The third constraint is that the manifest content has to be arranged as a propositional attitude. Emotional reactions of propositional form, as discussed in chapter 1, are attitudes toward the here-and-now situation. Elements of the

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<sup>400</sup> As I will claim in chapter 6, imaginatively distorted expression cannot replace expression. For an emotion to “pass” or “get exhausted” it has to be expressed in its original form.

intentional description of the here-and-now situation thus normally appear in the manifest content of the synthesized attitude. In fact, trigger-elements, which are already associated with the aroused latent content, are ideal candidates for manifest content. And indeed, many times if not always, trigger-elements appear in the manifest content. Often, the manifest content will be entirely composed of trigger-elements. But this is not always the case.

Sometimes, a manifest element will be selected that is not a trigger-element, such as “husband” in the jealous lady’s fear attitude following the conversation with the housemaid. Sometimes, then, a latent element may appear as a manifest element. Other times, a new manifest element can be created such that it imaginatively connects to as many latent elements as possible. Such was the manifest element “demeaning” of Jonah’s resentful attitude toward his boss, as explained in chapter 3.

The synthetic capacity can thus also be creative in the formation of manifest emotional attitudes. However, its creativity is limited, since at least some of the manifest elements should be components of the description of the here-and-now situation. When it comes to dreams, the synthetic capacity is much more creative. This is because dreams do not share that third constraint. They do not have to somehow relate to any here-and-now exterior situation.

The fourth and final constraint is on the pool of emotion-types from which the synthetic capacity selects the emotion-type for its manifest attitude. The pool of emotion-types corresponds to the collection of affects of the aroused latent emotions. It is the arousal of those affects that prompts the synthetic capacity to find manifest content for expression in the first place.

The dominant affect of the aroused latent emotions will be the one selected. One way to understand what makes an affect the dominant affect is quantitative.

That is, the dominant affect is the emotion-type that appears the most times in the aroused latent emotions. Another way to understand dominance would be in reference to the intensity of the latent emotions in question – the most intense affect will be the dominant affect.

The “manipulative process” is thus this associatively synthetic process. I can now articulate more precisely what “condensation” and “displacement” consist in: The synthesis of many latent elements into one manifest element through their connections to that selected element is what Freud called “condensation.” Through that process, each manifest element becomes expressively strong enough to appear in the manifest attitude. This is how the “right of entry” of a manifest element Freud mentions in the above quote can be understood. As Freud says elsewhere in connection to dreams: “It is obvious, therefore, that multiple determination must make it easier for an element to force its way into the dream-content.”<sup>401</sup>

The expressive strength of each nodal emotion is thus disintegrated to many *weakly effective* connections that depart from it. The synthetic accumulation of the weakly effective connections whose end point is the same manifest element grants that element enough total strength to appear or to be expressed in the synthesized resultant emotional attitude. In that manner, the expression of nodal emotions gets “displaced” into expressed manifest elements. Condensation and displacement thus work hand in hand.<sup>402</sup>

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<sup>401</sup> Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, vol. 4 p. 295.

<sup>402</sup> See the discussion of the connection between displacement and over-determination in Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, vol. 4 pp. 307-308. It is there that Freud also says that this process was initiated through censorship of the latent content. Indeed, as mentioned above, the normative pressure to keep ethically or prudentially questionable emotions out of consciousness causes this connective-synthetic process of the imagination’s “auto-pilot”. There is no need, however, to posit the existence of some special agency of a “censor” as Freud seems to do. There is only one agent here, and

The causal question can now be re-formulated: How many connections does a synthesized element need to qualify as strong enough so as to become manifest and take part in the consciously expressed manifest attitude? And if there is such a thing as strong enough, is there any value in being “more than enough”? Have we just moved the “sufficiency” familiar from causal conditions elsewhere?

The main difference between “sufficiency” of a causal condition and “expressive strength” of a manifest element is that strength is an additive or cumulative value. Being “strong enough” suggests there is a threshold value of strength a manifest element should have in order to appear or be expressed. But this threshold value is also an individual matter that cannot be pre-determined.

It is also possible that threshold of strength for each individual would change from time to time. If our jealous lady or Jonah would find themselves in circumstances where they feel confident and happily engaged in some project, they would perhaps be less sensitive to their aroused emotions, even in the presence of imaginatively suitable triggers. It is possible that the threshold in question is a value in flux.

If the accumulation of connections from nodal points (nodal emotions) to a manifest element surpasses the threshold value, would the further connections be redundant? When it comes to dreams, Freud says that the more connections are pointed to a certain manifest element, the more vivid that element is in the dream.<sup>403</sup> In the case of a pathological emotional attitude we could analogically say,

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activity done by its “auto-pilot” does not require any other agency. Censorship is a normative skill of rational suppression and can be exercised without explicit consciousness just like many rational and imaginative processes.

<sup>403</sup> Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, S.E. vol. 4 p. 330.

that the more connections are pointed to a certain manifest element the more persistent or recalcitrant it is.

That is, although the attitude may change with new connections to new triggers, the elements with the “strongest support” would persist. That is how the manifest elements “husband” and “affair” persisted in the change from the fearful to the jealous attitude, in the case of the jealous lady.

The term “sufficient” is thus replaced with “strong enough.” Sufficiency implies a binary value. Either a condition (no matter how complex) is sufficient to cause an event or it is not. Expressive strength on the other hand, is a cumulative value that implies a threshold value but without an upper limit. Reaching the threshold value is sufficient for the determination of a manifest element, but surpassing that threshold is not redundant, and thus the term “overdetermination” is a wrong choice of words.

This suggested causal account counts as explanatory within the Woodward’s theory of singular causation. The question “what-if-things-had-been-different” can be asked for imaginative connections as causal conditions. That is, we can ask what would happen if we change the number of associations accumulated per manifest element. The general answer the following:

Say I hold fixed a sub-set of associations to a certain manifest element whose accumulation yields the threshold value. If I take away all the rest of the associations to that manifest element would still be expressed. Taking away these association would make a difference insofar as that element would be less recalcitrant than it would have been with those extra associations. If I now add back one association at a time – each additional association would make that element more recalcitrant. If,

alternatively, now that there are exactly enough associations accumulated to yield the threshold value, I take one more association away, the accumulation of strength would be below the threshold value and that element would not be expressed.

This account is causal and therefore empirical, yet it does not lend itself to scientific testing, because the kind of causality implied is singular. Imaginative associations are too subjective and idiosyncratic to repeat themselves in a regular manner. Some associations may be plausibly said to repeat themselves, like Jonah's plausible symbolizing association between "Esther" and "Mother." But Jonah's imagination does not make that association all the time.

Our lady may associate "employee" with "daughter" quite frequently during the period of her recalcitrant jealousy. But given the over-explanatory nature of associations, she probably unconsciously makes other connections as well. And so, it is possible that even during her recalcitrant jealousy she does not unconsciously make that association in a regular way. On some jealous occasion she may associate "employee" with "son-in-law." We thus cannot assume regularity of associations.

In chapter 6 I will claim that this account has a redeeming feature insofar as it is available, at least partly, to introspective awareness. A subject can be the "expert witness" of at least one such connection in "real time" and thereby succeed to self-manage the current expression of their emotional symptom. But this account posits more than few connections per emotional symptom and not all connections and certainly not the proposed threshold can be available to introspective awareness in "real time."

It is thus a speculative account, but it nevertheless has certain virtues. If such an associative account would suffice in few imaginative connections per manifest element, then it would become difficult to explain why we do not experience non-

rational emotions all the time. That is why it is crucial for such an account to posit that each association is only *weakly effective* and that it would take an accumulation of such connections to create a symptom. This account can explain recalcitrant emotions (a longstanding problem for the philosophy of emotion) and can also explain the different degrees of recalcitrance of various components of such emotions.

Finally, this account spells-out the processes of condensation and displacement that are made use of in all psychoanalytical accounts. But unlike the hermeneutical approaches, the associative explanation suffices in condensation and displacement and does not invoke some unconscious type of another rationality. The use of distinctively imaginative and non-rational capacities avoids a homuncular view of the unconscious.

### **3. The Triggering Phase of the Connective Imagination**

The above discussion about the synthetic production of a manifest emotion can shed light on the manner in which latent emotions and also memories can become aroused due to the imaginative connections between their components and the components of a here-and-now trigger. In this section I will focus only on the triggers that imaginatively arouse latent emotions (that then get synthesized into an emotional symptom through the processes of condensation and displacement described above).

As can be seen in the diagrams for Jonah's case and for the case of the jealous lady, various elements of the triggering description of the here-and-now situation imaginatively connect with various elements of the latent emotions. In that sense,

the arousal of each latent emotion also seems “over-explained.” Triggers too thus have to be “strong enough” in order to arouse a latent emotion.

One way to spell-out “strong enough” is in terms of quantity of imaginative connections from trigger-elements to components of the latent emotion. The more associations there are – the stronger the trigger. A trigger would be even stronger if it imaginatively “over-connects” not just to one latent emotion but also to other latent emotions, where all those latent emotions are imaginatively interconnected as well.

There is another manner in which a trigger can be a strong trigger. Some triggers may themselves function as operative reasons for a new and conscious emotional reaction (this would qualify as what Freud “current conflict” in his discussion of regressive causation). In Jonah’s case, as described in chapter 3, the very first encounter with the scarf was in itself unpleasant. Jonah did not like that his mother was tying that unpleasant-feeling scarf around his neck. That inchoate affect “not like” and the general physical unpleasant feeling contributed to the strength of the trigger to arouse the suppressed negative emotion toward his mother.

The “what-if-things-had-been-different” question about the trigger can now be formulated: what would happen if the trigger for our lady’s jealousy, namely the arrival of the letter, had not occurred? The imaginative connections from trigger-elements to components of latent emotions are meant to cause their arousal and then their synthesis into a new manifest emotion. If we remove the trigger, will the symptomatic emotion not occur? Freud answers a similar question about one of the triggers of a dream, namely, an element from the dream-day:

If these chains of thought had been absent others would no doubt have been selected. [...] Or, to go a stage further, if there had been no possibility of forging enough intermediate links between the two impressions, the dream would simply have been different.<sup>404</sup>

The letter provided the context that changed our lady's fear that her husband might have an affair to the jealousy that he is having an affair with his employee. Could the fear develop into that jealousy in other ways? As can be seen in the diagram for that case, the affect of jealousy was probably already present during the synthetic formation of the fear attitude. It could be that all our lady would require to turn her fear into jealousy was a phone call from some female friend to her husband, or a failed attempt at sexual intercourse.

Also, we do not know much about the young employee and her relations with our lady and her husband. There may be thus other connections idiosyncratic to our lady that should figure in the associative explanation and appear in the diagram. It could be that these other imaginative connections would ensure that the content of the lady's jealousy would have been the same with a different trigger, say a random meeting with the young employee or with someone else that our lady's imagination would associate with that employee.

It could also be, that no further exterior trigger was necessary at all. Our lady may have been so occupied with her non-rational fear so as to re-interpret certain past events as provoking suspicion and jealousy. In that case, the letter no more than a contributing factor to be connected with and synthesized with other factors.

Or maybe the content of the jealous attitude would have been slightly

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<sup>404</sup> Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, S.E. vol. 4 p. 176.

different. Maybe another young woman would have been accused, or no specific woman at all. Maybe the jealous attitude would not claim that her husband is having an affair but rather that he wants to have an affair. Without the letter, the timing of the first jealousy attack could have been different.

Perhaps the jealous attitude would have not formed at all, and our lady would just retain her fearful attitude instead. We cannot know exactly how her emotional reality would have been different without that letter. Biographical details are not reproducible. What is clear, however, is that our lady would still be in some way fearful and/or suspicious and/or jealous in connection to her husband's romantic interests.

And what if the conversation with the housemaid had never taken place? The gentleman was in any case a guest in the household and the lady knew about his affair, regardless of the conversation. She would probably have such thoughts anyway – maybe after his departure, maybe before he even came to stay with them. And if he did not come to stay with them?

Questions about triggers can go on and on. Triggers are obviously highly contingent. They determine the timing of the formation of the non-rational emotional attitude and contribute to its content. The stronger the trigger is, the more likely is the subject liable to produce a non-rational attitude, and the more effect will the trigger have on the intentional content of the attitude.

However, presumably, if the subject is frequently around the people implicated in the latent emotions or around people imaginatively similar to those implicated in the latent emotions, it is possible that one or more of the latent emotions or even memories is already aroused. Being around those people does not exactly qualify as a trigger; it is more like a general generator of partial arousal of

the latent content. Partial arousal that does not express itself in a propositional attitude will most likely appear as an unqualified mood or anxiety.

In such cases of partial arousal the subject's imagination is more sensitive to triggers that imaginatively connect with those partly aroused latent emotions. Many triggers, even weak ones, could cause their arousal to the degree that would prompt the synthetic imaginative capacity to form a non-rational emotional attitude. In such cases, triggers would not be as important as the nodal emotions, and are perhaps less likely to participate in the content of the manifest pathological emotion. Yet they would still determine the timing of the formation of the attitude.

We cannot answer particular "what-if-things-had-been-different" questions about singular triggering events, precisely because of the singular nature of the connective imagination. Each response of the connective imagination to a trigger is a singular event in itself. Nevertheless, a general answer to the "what-if-things-had-been-different" can still be formulated.

Emotion-arousal too has a threshold value that may change from time to time. Say we hold fixed the sub-set of associations from trigger-elements to a particular latent emotion such that it reaches the threshold value. If we take one association away the latent emotion will not get aroused at that moment in time. If, alternatively, we add more associations one by one, each association from a specific trigger element that we add will make that trigger element more likely to be selected as manifest element at that moment in time.

In analysis, an associative network is constructed in order to explain what imaginatively caused the symptom. The nodal emotions are thus the first causal factors to be identified. However, as I have been arguing since the introduction of

the associative explanation, explanation of the intentional content of a symptom by the construction of an associative network is only the first step. Accounting for the intentional content of the symptom via symbolism (in the broad sense) of nodal emotions does not explain everything.

In fact, the very construction of the associative network demands its expansion. Why are these latent emotions so “nodal” in the first place? In most cases, they do not relate to memories of genuine trauma. Why are they over-emphasized in the subject’s mental reality? Why some figures or emotional relationships in the subject’s life appear in the network without being symbolically represented by the symptom? What is it about the patient’s relevant practical identities that made her take personally the various nodal emotions? And what is the subject’s moralism and social prudence that suppressed those emotions in the first place?

The investigation of those questions would on the one hand, explain why the network was hitherto limited to few nodal emotions and on the other hand, would add more imaginatively connected elements to the network, some of which will be new nodal emotions (insofar as they will be heavily connected to other element in the network, yet not symbolically represented in the initial symptomatic emotion). Will the symptom then stay the same once the network is enlarged and the symbolized nodal emotions become contextualized within a larger emotional-associative network? These issues will be discussed in chapter 6.

#### **4. Associative Networks in Empirical Psychology**

There is one more class of contemporary accounts of emotions in the literature that makes use of associative networks. These accounts were proposed by empirical

psychologists and are labeled under the general heading “network theories.” Mick Power and Tim Dalgleish provide a helpful survey of the various network theories and the objections that were raised in their connection.<sup>405</sup> They mention the British empiricist or associationist school of philosophy and also psychoanalysis. They describe Freud and Breuer’s associative network of hysteria, which I mentioned but have not elaborated on in chapter 3,<sup>406</sup> as “[...] one of the most detailed and elegant network models of autobiographical memory.”<sup>407</sup>

Power and Dalgleish claim that the most influential network theory of emotion is that of Gordon Bower. As Power and Dalgleish note, Bower’s account is the one that is the closest to Freud and Breuer’s account, whether or not Bower admits that influence. Despite and also because of the differences between the account proposed in this thesis and Bower’s, it is instructive to consider the objections that were raised to his network theory. In this section, I will present Bower’s schema for associative networks in comparison to the one I presented in the thesis and address the respective objections.

### **A. Linguistic vs. Imaginative Associations**

Bower’s network theory proposes that here-and-now experienced affect evoked by a here-and-now trigger, associatively relates to certain concepts or words and to certain emotionally laden memories. He does not have an account of the formation of emotions as resulting from such networks. Rather his network theory claims that

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<sup>405</sup> Mick Power and Tim Dalgleish, *Cognition and Emotion: From Order to Disorder* [2008], 2nd Ed. (Hove, UK: Psychology Press, 2008), pp. 73-81.

<sup>406</sup> In chapter 3, I only used Freud’s terms for the levels of diagrammatic stratification, but gave different meanings to those terms without explaining the differences with Freud’s.

<sup>407</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

certain here-and-now emotions associatively evoke certain emotionally laden memories.

The associative account I presented so far and Bower's thus go in inverse directions. I want to explain the formation of an emotion due to latent emotions (whose intentional content relates to memories) and Bower wants to explain the arousal of emotionally laden memories due to a current emotion. Nevertheless, both accounts claim for associative connections between a here-and-now emotion and an emotional memory. And furthermore, the associative explanation I presented also assumes that certain current conscious emotions can serve to trigger latent emotions (the "current conflict" of Freud's regressive causation).

The principal difference between Bower's account and the account presented in the thesis has to do with the nature of the associations in the network. Bower's associations are not imaginative. He calls them "semantic,"<sup>408</sup> and by that he means connections of meaning between entire propositions or between concepts such that the meaning of those concepts is derived from their usage by that subject and the usage witnessed by that subject on other occasions.

These associations are private in a weak sense. They are private insofar as they rely on conscious concept usage within propositions articulated by that subject or the people in the subject's community. Their meaning, although conceived in its psychological dimension, is nevertheless public, since those previous usages were made in language within sentences that were exchanged with other members of the same linguistic community. Bower thus assumes that these linguistic associations among various concepts and propositionally described memories are stable. Indeed,

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<sup>408</sup> See for example, Gordon H. Bower, "Mood and Memory," *American Psychologist*, vol. 36, no. 2 (1981), pp. 129-148, pp. 129-148, p. 135.

Bower claims that these associations are permanent fixtures, awaiting activation, which would then link certain emotions with certain concepts and emotionally laden memories.

The imaginative connections in the associative network presented in this thesis, conversely, are “dumb” connections that are created spontaneously by the connective imagination. They do not connect between concepts in a manner that takes into account their place in propositions. The imagination, as stated by the second principle presented in chapter 3, considers concepts in isolation and connects them to other isolated concepts, with no regard to the meaningful role they play in propositions. In fact, some connections may simply connect two concepts or words because they sound similar.

The imaginative associations I have been discussing are private in a much stronger sense. They are idiosyncratic to the subject’s particular imagination. These associations, which connect here-and-now continuously changing triggers with latent emotions, are in permanent flux. That is why I keep stressing that the associative causal explanations for emotional symptoms are singular. They apply to a here-and-now reaction of a particular individual at a particular time and cannot be generalized across many subjects or even across the lifetime of one subject. Associative explanations for singular pathological emotional reactions are empirical-non-scientific.

If we insist to interpret imaginative associations as linguistic associations, we would have to assume that they belong to a private language of the subject that is in permanent flux. This “private language” within which imaginative associations are made is precisely the line taken up by Jacques Lacan. That is how Lacan made sense of the plurality of imaginative connections for each manifest element in the content

of a symptom or what Freud called “overdetermination,” or “condensation.” As Laplanche and Pontalis explain:

Jacques Lacan has stressed that over-determination is a trait common to all unconscious formations: ‘... for a symptom to be admitted as such in psychoanalytical psychotherapy – whether a neurotic symptom or not – Freud insists on the minimum of over-determination as constituted by a double meaning: it must symbolize a conflict long dead over and above its function in a *no less symbolic* present conflict’ [footnote omitted]. The reason for this is that the symptom (in the broad sense) is ‘structured like a language’, and thus naturally constituted by elision and layering of meaning; just as a work cannot be reduced to a signal, a symptom cannot be the unambiguous sign of a single unconscious content.<sup>409</sup>

In other words, Lacan claims every symptom is meaningful, privately meaningful. And the meaning of the symptom consists in all the latent elements connected with the manifest elements through an associative network. That is, each manifest element has a meaning, namely the latent elements to which it is associated. And since there other manifest elements connect to overlapping latent elements, Lacan analogizes them to words with overlapping meaning, as is common in ordinary language. Each symptom is thus structured like a language, a private language of the subject at the time of the manifestation of the symptom.

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<sup>409</sup> Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, p. 293.

As I have already said, in some cases, an individual's imagination may have certain habitual connections that occur every now and again, among the many other new imaginative connections that individual's imagination constantly makes. If these imaginative associations were to be treated as linguistic associations then the private language in question would be more stable. We could then say that not just a particular symptom, but that the unconscious imagination in general, is structured like a language.

However, as I have been stressing thus far, meaning, just like reason, is the privilege of people, not of unconscious processes. To say that the unconscious has its own private language is another homuncular view. That is why I insist to talk about imaginative associations as "dumb," inarticulate and meaningless causal connections. They are the "sport of vacant-minded ideation," as Hegel said. They are, however, articulable, and can be given meaning once brought to consciousness in analysis. But they then change and their causal efficacy changes, as will be discussed in chapter 6.

In the rest of this section, I present some of the objections to Bower's linguistic associative network and examine if they also apply to my imaginative associative network.

### **B. The Empirical Objection to Bower's Associative Network:**

This understanding of the associative network as a permanent fixture motivated empirical psychologists to try and come up with a general theory that could be empirically verified. Bower thus tried to show that there is a general causal connection between happy/sad moods and the recollection of happy/sad memories while in that mood (the causal connection assumed here is also intentional, to do

with meaning, at the psychological level of description articulated in ordinary language). One such experiment appeared to confirm the theory.<sup>410</sup>

However, Bower admitted that he failed to replicate these results. He thus concluded in frustration: "The effect seems a will-of-the-wisp that appears or not in different experiments in capricious ways that I do not understand."<sup>411</sup> But if the network is understood to be an imaginative network in flux, then one should not expect any experimental consistency. The imagination is "capricious"; it is idiosyncratic and singular, that is, it can make different connections from time to time.

More specifically, there is no reason to expect a happy mood to always connect with happy memories let alone the very same happy memories. For example, I may be in happy mood and remember by way of reversal a day where I failed to achieve something. That something may somehow imaginatively relate to something in the here-and-now situation.

There is no reason to expect any causal laws or correlations regarding imaginative connections that would cut across many subjects. The psychological realm of singular causation, although empirical, does not lend itself to scientific research. The most an account of singular causation can give for a symptomatic emotion is the very general causal description of imaginative networks I have suggested. And that associative causation would manifest itself very differently from case to case.

A certain subject may have certain patterns of associations whereby she often imaginatively connects a certain trigger-component to a certain latent-

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<sup>410</sup> Power and Dalgleish, *Cognition and Emotion*, p. 76.

<sup>411</sup> Bower, quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 77.

component. The unconscious imagination may not always be very original and its patterns of associations may be found synoptically. But these associative patterns of an individual subject do not always occur and they can change from time to time in unpredictable ways.

### C. The Too-Much-Variety Objection

Others have objected to semantic network theories on the grounds that:

[...] links between nodes in such networks can be unidirectional or bidirectional, they can be excitatory or inhibitory, they have a range of labels (e.g., “has a”, “is not a”, “name”, etc.), and they represent extremely different types of concepts (e.g., “animal”, “four legs”, “disgust”). Although we acknowledge the usefulness of different types of nodes or links up to a point, a theory that gives emotion the same status as individual words or concepts is theoretically confused.<sup>412</sup>

This argument objects to the linguistic connections between individual words or concepts, not to the linguistic connections between propositions. Therefore, this objection can also be articulated in regard to the imaginative associative network that connects various components of repressed intentional content, where these are considered in isolation from the propositions in which they may take part. Indeed, it may be strange to associate a certain name with the emotion-type of disgust.

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<sup>412</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78. Power and Dalgleish refer to W.A. Woods, Power and L.A. Champion in connection to this argument.

But that “strangeness” is precisely what is to be expected from “dumb” imaginative associations that are distinctively non-rational. The connective imaginative capacity has more degrees of freedom than a rational capacity that is engaged in inferences and reasoning. These degrees of freedom were articulated in the principles of the non-rational imagination presented in chapter 3. The non-rational imagination involved in associative networks easily blends the objective with the subjective, thing and property, and most crucially it can consider words and concepts in isolation from the propositions in which they figure. That is why the connective imagination can go in many directions and indeed, as a general rule of thumb, it makes a plurality of connections.

Imaginative connections are expected to be of quite a few kinds. Those kinds would be restricted insofar as our imaginative connective capacity is restricted. The most popular connections are those that appeared in the examples presented in the thesis: analogy, similarity, symbolization, and reversal. Although my examples dealt with associations among intentional components, that is among words, the imagination may also connect images, smells and tastes. These additional degrees of freedom of the connective and synthetic imagination explain why these connections do not lend themselves to any regularity or restriction of the kind of concepts it may connect.

Emotions that result from associative networks that involve components of intentional content are not thereby given the status of words, whose meaning comes from its connection to other words (whether that meaning is public or private), as explained above in reference to Lacan’s linguistic view.

#### **D. The Compatibility Objection**

Other objections ask about the possible compatibility of associative networks with operative-reason-explanation. The very question seems to assume that associative networks do not just explain how a memory is recalled during a here-and-now emotional experience but that they also imply that memory recollection should affect one's current emotional state. I am not sure how Bower would treat such a question as his theory speaks not of the generation of emotions but of the effects already-present emotions have on memory recollections.

I will thus articulate this question in reference to the imaginative associative network I propose: Non-rational emotions are not caused by taking personally operative reasons of fit. They are caused, rather, by a singular associative network. But what about operatively-rational emotions? I claim that the associative imagination connects and synthesizes all the time. The imagination operates "dumbly" also when operatively-rational emotions are formed. How, then, do the "dumb" operations of the connective and synthetic imagination fit with the formation of operatively-rational emotions?

Each imaginative association, as was explained in the previous sections, has quite weak causal efficacy. It takes many associations to create one manifest element. Without the rule of overdetermination or rather over-explanation, we would have non-rational emotions all the time. Conversely, it takes only one taken personally reason of fit to generate a rational emotion (that is, the grasp of that reason of fit, as explained in chapter 1).

Various associations may thus accompany the grasp of a reason of fit that is taken personally, without compromising the generation of a rational emotion. When

I am angry that a friend insulted me, my imagination may unconsciously associate the here-and-now with various latent emotions that relate to memories of being insulted in the past. The here-and-now insulting individual may be associatively connected to another individual.

If there are only few such associations, it is unlikely that they would jointly be strong enough to make a difference to the intentional content of the operatively-rational emotion. They may, however, weakly contribute to what makes that grasp of the fittingness reason emotional, due to the partial arousal of latent anger. The taking-it-personally judgment that refers to my practical identity, as a friend that should be treated with respect and sensitivity, is thus probably not the only factor that makes me emote. In that sense, even operatively-rational emotions are not entirely rational (as I indicated at the end of chapter 1).

However, when the grasp of a fittingness reason forms a singular emotional reaction, it has much greater causal efficacy than the few imaginative associations that accompany that rational process. If I later deliberate against my anger and revoke the reason of fit or disavow my taking-it-personally judgment, my anger will subside. Few imaginative associations would not suffice to cause recalcitrance.

In fact, taking into account imaginative associations would explain emotional patterns of people who do not find themselves criticized for their emotions and do not turn to therapy. Some people feel betrayed more often than others without suffering from a pathology analogous to that of Mr. A. Their initial emotional reactions are partly formed by few such imaginative associations to latent emotions. These imaginative patterns make such people more sensitive, to speak synoptically, to situations of betrayal. Such "sensitivity" does not qualify as pathological when the emotions in question are normatively justified and/or sensitive to reason, and most

importantly – when these emotional patterns do not disturb or harm emotional relationships.

I believe that if we reflect on our emotional behavior we would find that most people have some emotional pattern or other. As claimed in chapters 2 and 3, reasons relating to the circumscribed circumstances in which such an emotion occurs will not explain the repetition of the emotion-type. Only the associative explanation can explain that repetition. Arguably, we could all be analyzed so as to identify latent emotions that partly participate in the formation of emotional patterns. But most of us are unlikely to turn to therapy and may not even “need” therapy. Our emotions are operatively-rational and are sensitive to reason; we are not criticized for our emotions by ourselves or by others; and we are otherwise functioning and normative members of our social niche.

### **E. The *Ad Hoc* Objection**

There is one last objection to Bower’s account that applies to the imaginative associative network account and is more difficult to answer. This is the objection raised by W.A Woods, and summed up by Power and Dalgleish: “[...] the links between nodes in such networks are treated in an ad hoc manner.”<sup>413</sup>

This is correct. Analysis and the free association that it involves occur after the emotional reaction has already been formed. It is thus quite possible that the imaginative connections found in analysis do not include all the imaginative connections that actually caused the attitude in question. Even more problematic is the possibility that the associations in the network arose in analysis for the first time and were not made by the patient’s unconscious imagination prior to the formation

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<sup>413</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

of the attitude and thus did not cause it. Freud was aware of this objection in connection to dream interpretation:

It is no doubt true that some trains of thought arise for the first time during the analysis. But one can convince oneself in all such cases that these new connections are only set up between thoughts which were already linked in some other way in the dream-thoughts. The new connections are, as it were, loop-lines or short-circuits, made possible by the existence of other and deeper-lying connecting paths.<sup>414</sup>

Freud here seems to claim that it is not so important to specify exactly what connections were made by the patient and caused the dream (or in this case, the emotional attitude). Freud's assertion that the connections found in analysis can be "loop-lines" or "short-circuits" suggests nevertheless two claims:

The first claim is that most of the causal weight rests on the nodal points, around which new connections may be constructed. Those nodal emotions are the ones that the patient ultimately needs to "work through." It is thus less imperative to know what were the particular connections that condensed and displaced those nodal emotions.

The second claim implied by the terms "loop-lines" and "short-circuits" is that whatever caused the pathological emotional reaction is representable in an associative network. The associative explanation found in therapy may be a mere explanation, told from the third-personal imaginative perspective described in chapter 3. But whatever mental activity actually led the subject to the formation of

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<sup>414</sup> Freud, *The interpretation of Dreams*, S.E. vol.4, p. 280.

the symptomatic emotional reaction was structurally similar to that explanation even if not identical to it.

That is another reason why the term “overdetermination” is misleading, since it sounds as if the plurality of associations found in analysis determined or rather straightforwardly caused the emotional symptom. It is possible that some of the associations found in analysis did play a straightforward causal role. But we should keep the pretensions of the *ad hoc* constructed network in their appropriately qualified form. This is another motivation to re-name the principle of overdetermination as “over-explanation.”

The role of the associative explanation is to identify nodal emotions and to see how these nodal emotions can affect the patient’s emotional life. Indeed, the identification of nodal emotions is not a straightforward matter, given that they are suppressed and that the patient alienated herself from them. The associations articulated in analysis may not all be the ones that originally caused the emotional symptom, but they serve to identify the nodal emotions on which the patient’s imagination is fixated. I explain how analysis and its method of “free-association” can reveal those emotions in the next chapter.

The realm of psychological singular causation, although empirical, is difficult to verify. Similarly to the operative-reason-explanation for singular reactions, the most that can be claimed about the associative explanation for a specific pathological emotional attitude is that it is a *possible* explanation, and in some cases the probable explanation. In the next chapter I will present the redeeming features of the associative explanation that can raise it, to some extent, to an analogical status of the operative-reason-explanation. That is, I will show that the associative explanation has two aspects that are available to introspective awareness: some

imaginative associations can be “listened to” in “real time” and the latent emotions themselves can be accessed and expressed through a distinctively first-personal process.

## **Chapter 6:**

### **Analysis: From Rational Judgment to Emotional Acceptance**

In chapters 3-5 I have presented the associative explanation for singular pathological emotional reactions in terms of imaginative connections to nodal suppressed emotions that cause the manifest content of an the manifest occurrent attitude. My presentation thus far was purely theoretical. In fact, the singularly causal nature of the associative explanation prevents it from being empirically-scientifically provable. In this chapter, I discuss an empirical-non-scientific method of inquiry that will render the associative explanation a possible explanation and at times the plausible explanation. This is the method of inquiry used in analysis.

In the first section, I discuss the possibility that the method of inquiry in analysis is theoretical and third-personal. This method basically consists in informing the patient of the explanation for her emotional symptom. I show in this section why this method is therapeutically ineffective. I refer in my discussion to Freud and Robert Pippin, who speak of psychological symptoms in general, and are thus meant to apply also to distinctively emotional symptoms. I apply their views and arguments to the case of emotional symptoms in particular, on which this thesis is focused.

In the second and third sections, I discuss the psychoanalytic methods of free-association and “working-through” nodal emotions, which render the associative explanation a possible explanation with therapeutic potential. Both methods involve a distinctively first-personal change of stance: from the rationally-judgmental stance to the emotional stance of acceptance. Here, too, although the

discussion may plausibly apply to the analysis of psychological symptoms in general, my claims are circumscribed to distinctively emotional symptoms.

### 1. Can Therapy Be Third-Personal?

Similarly to Moran, Robert Pippin argues for the importance of the rational first-personal deliberation in normative judgments and for its distinction from any evidence-based and theoretical third personal perspective, such as the biological-evolutionary perspective or the social sciences. He claims that Freud advocates the same kind of distinction and that therapy ultimately aims at the reinforcement of deliberative capacities:

Freud's famous remark about psychoanalysis, and the third-personal, explanatory stance it seems to encourage persons to adopt toward their own motivations, provides another fine example of what I'm trying to suggest. His remark, in effect, confirms the distinction we have been discussing, if one is actually to take up the position of, as we say, leading one's life: "*wo Es war, soll Ich werden*" (what was It [or Id] should become I [or Ego]). Such an "I," or ego, must make an evaluation of herself and the attitudes that she should take up toward herself and others. Something is going *wrong* – haywire – if these determinations are the result of the "It," or id. Psychoanalysis tries to "cure" precisely what goes wrong when a subject experiences her own deeds as not

hers, as the product of psychological forces outside her intentional control.<sup>415</sup>

In the thesis I have deliberately avoided using the terminology of “It” or “Id” and “I” or “Ego”. Quite a bit of “ground clearing” would be needed in order to make sense of this terminology and avoid its traditional homuncular understanding as separate agencies within the subject. When Pippin talks of the *I* he talks about conscious reflective reason that operates in deliberation.

When Pippin talks about the alienation the person feels in regard to her psychological symptoms, he basically talks about the incapacity of the patient to deliberately avow their psychological symptoms. For the case of emotional symptoms, Pippin’s assertion would refer to recalcitrant emotions (and not pathological emotions that involve an illusory deliberative avowal).

When Pippin mentions the unconscious *It* that causes pathology, he speaks of “psychological forces outside [the subject’s] intentional control. The context of his paper makes it clear that by “psychological forces” he speaks of something natural that can be scientifically studied from an evidence-based and theoretical third-personal point of view.

According to Pippin, the main goal of analysis is to acquire third-personal knowledge of what caused the patient’s psychological symptom. Once the patient is aware of that, the symptom will lose its grip on the patient. Recall Solomon’s claim that once I know that too much coffee and too little sleep physiologically caused my

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<sup>415</sup> Robert B. Pippin, “Natural and Normative,” *Daedalus*, vol. 138 no. 3 (Summer, 2009), pp. 35-43, p. 39.

anger I can no longer be angry.<sup>416</sup> In order to release myself from an emotion that was not primarily caused by the grasp of an operative reason – I need to know what caused it. Once I do I can restore my first personal deliberative capacities and change the relevant fittingness judgment or taking-it-personally judgment through deliberative avowal (in the manner discussed in the last section of chapter 1).

This was Freud's view of analysis in the beginning of his career. He believed that if the patient learned from the analyst about the causes of her psychological symptoms, if she acquired this theoretical evidence-based third-personal knowledge, then the symptom would subside. Freud recounts this method after he had already abandoned it:

Now it would as a rule be very easy for a doctor experienced in analysis to guess what mental impulses had remained unconscious in a particular patient. So it ought not to be very difficult, either, for him to restore the patient by communicating his knowledge to him and so remedying his ignorance. One part at least of the symptom's unconscious sense could be easily dealt with in this way, though it is true that the doctor cannot guess much about the other part – the connection between the symptoms and the patient's experiences – , since he himself does not know those experiences but must wait till the patient remembers them and tells them to him.<sup>417</sup>

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<sup>416</sup> See the end of the discussion about the operative reasons as psychological causes in the first section of the first chapter. Recall that a reason is psychologically causal insofar as it is the psychological state of accepting a consideration in favor of an emotional reaction.

<sup>417</sup> Freud, *Introductory Lectures*, Lecture 18, pp. 280-281.

Say, then, for a case of emotional symptom, that the relevant emotional experiences have been somehow exposed by or inferred from the patient's free associations, and the analyst was able to construct the relevant associative network. The analyst would then inform the patient that her emotional symptom was caused by her unconscious emotionally laden memories and the associative unconscious processes.

The first difficulty Freud encountered using this method was that the patients refused to believe his explanations:

It is as though the patient were saying: 'Yes, that's all very nice and interesting, and I'll be very glad to go on with it further. It would change my illness a lot if it were true. But I don't in the least believe that it *is* true; and, so long as I don't believe it, it makes no difference to my illness.'<sup>418</sup>

If the patient does not believe the analyst's explanations she cannot gain new theoretical third personal knowledge and the symptom would remain unchanged. According to this early Freudian method, the same method implied in Pippin's above quote, Freud kept failing to cure his patients just as a medical practitioner would fail to cure his patient from her anger as long as that patient does not believe that indeed her anger was caused by too much coffee and too little sleep. This sounds as if all that is needed is for the patient to believe the theoretical information conveyed to her about the psychological "nature" in her.

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<sup>418</sup> Freud, *Introductory Lectures*, Lecture 19, vol. 16, p. 290.

However, as was explicated in chapters 3-5, what causes an emotional symptom does not, in fact, qualify as “nature” or “psychological forces” that can be studied from an evidence-based third-personal perspective. Aroused latent emotions and unconscious imaginative associations are not mere “nature,” and their causal influence on the patient’s psychology is not analogous to coffee and fatigue and their physiological effects on certain physiologically-caused emotions. The subject is alienated from her latent emotions, but these emotions were originally her conscious reactions and it was her operative extrinsic reasons that suppressed them in the first place. Unconscious imaginative associations are “dumb” and inarticulate but they are not completely “brute” nature, insofar as they are articulable and can be given meaning and thereby, as will be discussed in the second section of this chapter, their causal efficacy on the patient’s emotional state can change.

One of the main points in chapters 3-5 was to show that the third-personal perspective involved in the associative explanation is not primarily an evidence-based theoretical perspective of the scientific sort. Some theoretical reliance on evidence is necessary, such as behavior that can indicate the existence of latent emotions like the lady’s love to her son-in-law, and the free associations spoken in analysis. However, such theoretical evidence, available in principle to everyone (and to the patient that “looks in the mirror”), is useful insofar as it participates in the construction of an imaginative associative network. The main theoretical third-personal perspective involved in analysis is the imaginative one that is used to identify imaginative connections and elicit the respects in which they hold.

But even if the knowledge an associative explanation yields is not scientific knowledge about the patient’s “nature” as Pippin says, but rather psychological, subjective and non-scientific – we could still ask the same question: How would

knowledge of the associative network affect the patient? Is imaginative and theoretical third-personal knowledge of oneself enough?

Even if the patient thoroughly believes the analyst's theories about her latent emotions and imaginative associations, the patient would not be helped. Theoretical third-personal knowledge makes no difference to the emotional symptom. This is because the strictly theoretical third-personal perspective is an alienating perspective whereby the subject examines her identified nodal emotions as an object.

One of the principal causal conditions for the formation of emotional symptoms is the patient's alienation from her nodal emotions. These emotions were suppressed through an operatively-rational process, and a fleeting conscious decision to alienate herself from them. Therapy, therefore, in order to make a difference to the symptom, has to include the removal of that causal condition. In other words, the patient has to de-alienate herself from her nodal emotions. Only the patient can de-alienate herself from her nodal emotions. It is something she has to *do*, and nobody else can do it for her. As will be explained in the third section of this chapter, this de-alienation requires a distinctively first personal perspective.

And, indeed, Freud realized he had to give up the method of informing the patient theoretical knowledge. Just after he describes that method and how it is meant to work, Freud says:

If only that was how things happened! [...] there are different sorts of knowledge, which are far from equivalent psychologically. [...] If the doctor transfers his knowledge to the patient as a piece of information, it has no result. [...] The patient knows after this what he did not know

before – the sense of his symptoms; yet he knows it just as little as he did. Thus we learn that there is more than one kind of ignorance [...] But our thesis that the symptoms vanish when their sense is known remains true in spite of this. All we have to add is that the knowledge must rest on an internal change in the patient [...]<sup>419</sup>

Freud did not have the terminology of third and first personal perspectives one can take oneself. But he seems to be touching upon that distinction without naming it as such. Freud's consequent change of technique reflects his move from encouraging the patient to take a third-personal perspective on herself (as described in Pippin's quote above) toward prompting the patient to take a first-personal perspective instead.

In the beginning of his career Freud's main goal in analysis was to help the patient recall the memories that were symbolically represented in her psychological symptom and encourage her to express her emotions about those memories. Freud noticed that patients – instead of recalling those memories or articulating the nodal emotions that relate to those memories – repeated those remembered scenes or acted out those emotions with the analyst: “[...] a whole series of psychological experiences are revived, not as belonging to the past, but as applying to the person of the physician at the present moment.”<sup>420</sup> Freud discovered what he called the phenomenon of *transference*.

In fact, transference is an imaginative connection of symbolism whereby the analyst symbolizes someone else – the intentional object of at least one latent

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<sup>419</sup> Freud, *Introductory Lectures*, Lecture 18, p. 281.

<sup>420</sup> Freud, *Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*, S.E. vol. 7, p. 116.

emotion. The trigger is the analysis itself. Free association approaches nodal emotions and arouses them in analysis. These nodal emotions are then imaginatively connected to the analyst such that the resulting imaginative synthesis yields an emotional attitude toward the analyst.

Transference is a form of “resistance” to therapy, to the exposure of the relevant nodal emotion in its original form, as it can shift focus away from free association. Transference qualifies as resistance also insofar as it indulges in a newly created emotional symptom (namely the unfitting reaction to the analyst). That new symptom symbolizes the same nodal emotions<sup>421</sup> that have caused the initial symptom that brought the patient to analysis. It is as if the patient avoids the analysis of her symptom by creating a new one that reinforces the concealment of the same nodal problematic issues.

But transference is a special kind of resistance that can be therapeutically beneficial. Usually the patient pathologically avows her transference-emotion and does not regard it as non-rational. But unlike most pathologies of avowal, “transference neurosis”<sup>422</sup> is easier for the patient to recognize as such. The analyst’s job, according to Freud, is to explain to the patient that the psychological cause of her emotions toward to him is not operatively-rational; that the analyst’s here-and-now behavior does not provide the patient with operative reasons to emote. The analyst is supposed to explain to the patient that her emotional reaction is an emotional symptom caused by transference.

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<sup>421</sup> Freud would talk about emotionally laden memories rather than latent emotions. The difference is important insofar as the causal claims go, but it is nevertheless subtle and could be read back in to Freud’s texts. The intentional content of latent emotions often relates to certain memories, and in that sense, the emotion “contains” memories, so to speak.

<sup>422</sup> Freud, “Working-Through”, vol. 12, p. 154.

The strange setting of analysis, “a piece of real life”<sup>423</sup> on the one hand and a sterile detached environment on the other hand, shows the patient that she is indeed transferring. If the analyst keeps a neutral relation to the patient, as advised by Freud,<sup>424</sup> it becomes more difficult to sustain the emotional reaction as justified.

This does not mean that transference stops once it was named and the patient recognized it as such. Transference-emotions remain recalcitrant. Analysis turns into a “playground”<sup>425</sup> that allows the patient to express her recalcitrant feelings and become “acquainted”<sup>426</sup> with them, as expressions of resistance. At the same time, given the strange analytic situation, she keeps free-associating. This “working-through” the transference resistance, Freud claimed, results in the awakening of the relevant memories and the exposure of the emotional relationship that gave rise to the transference in the first place.

Those would be the same nodal emotions that gave rise to the original symptom. But instead of arriving at them by free association disconnected in time and place from the actual symptom, they are now exposed in an obvious relation to the transference-symptom. The patient would then realize “first hand” that these nodal emotions cause symptomatic behavior via imaginative connections.

How exactly does this “first hand” realization work, and how can it be therapeutic requires further explanation. But since I do not want to claim that transference always has to take place for a therapeutic outcome (although some analysts do claim that, Lacanians in particular), I will not use the phenomenon of transference to articulate how therapy works and the kind of awareness that is

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<sup>423</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 153

<sup>424</sup> S. Freud, “Observations on Transference-Love (further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis) (1915 [1914])”, vol. 12 pp. 159-171, p. 166.

<sup>425</sup> Freud, “Working-Through”, vol. 12, p. 154.

<sup>426</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 155.

involved. Also, recall that in any case, exposing the nodal emotions that are symbolized in the symptom is not in itself therapeutic. Therapy, as I have been implying since chapter 3, consists in making those emotions less nodal – less important.

Instead of elaborating on the phenomenon of transference, I just want to identify the insight involved in Freud’s move away from providing third-personal knowledge of an associative network to the method of “working through” resistance. The move involved is away from an intellectual or theoretical stance to an *experiential* stance that somehow combines both free association and the awakening of memories and latent emotions.

## **2. The First Phase: Deciphering the Emotional Symptom**

As I have been implying in chapter 3-5, the therapeutic associative explanation of an emotional symptom involves two main phases. The first is to identify the nodal emotions that are condensed and displaced into the symptom itself. These are the over-emphasized suppressed emotions on which the unconscious imagination is fixated. The second phase involves making the nodal emotions less nodal. It is only then that the over-emphasis of those emotions is eliminated, and the imagination can become less fixated on them.

In practice, these “phases” are most likely intertwined. I will nevertheless maintain that at least conceptually, these phases have different aims and achieve different kinds of awareness. I also assume only one emotional symptom for simplicity, even if often a patient usually suffers from more than one psychological symptom and new symptoms may arise during analysis. In the Freudian spirit, I describe the process as the gradual removal of “resistances.” In this section I

describe the first phase, namely the manner in which the nodal emotions that are symbolically represented in the symptom are identified.

### **A. Free-Association and the Acquisition of the Imaginative Theoretical Third-Personal Perspective**

It is the imaginative third-personal perspective *of the patient* that identifies the nodal emotions. However, as I shall explicate in this section, it can only do that via “real time” introspective awareness, and that awareness in turn is possible only through a distinctively first personal stance (which is not introspective, but deliberative).

The acquisition of an imaginative third-personal perspective is not a straightforward matter. The patient must overcome her resistance against that very perspective. Most of us consider ourselves rational thinkers. Thinking at all, we’d like to believe, entails forming propositions that stand to each other in an inferential relationship. Somehow, the patient has to accept that she also thinks associatively, and that her associations affect her emotional life.

The very first resistance encountered has to do with the very activity of free association in analysis. This may sound strange since in fact, we free-associate every now and again in our everyday life, some of us more often than others. I can sit at café by myself, watching the world go by, and “stare,” without occupying my mind in solving any kind of problem or answering anybody’s question or formulating views. But I do not actually think of nothing at all. People go to meditation courses in their community yoga center or even travel to India to acquire the skill of no-thinking. Even during meditation people usually prevent themselves from thinking by

repeating a mantra or imagining what they are told to imagine or concentrating on their various organs.

When I free associate as I “stare,” thoughts and ideas and memories come to my mind in no logical order. I do not direct my thought, but it “comes to me” in its “auto-pilot” mode. As I pay my bill and leave the café I will normally hardly remember anything that came to my mind during that time. I will just remember having a relaxing “time out” staring at the world go by. We have a skill to ignore thought that does not come in propositional and inferential form.

Although we sometimes free associate absent-mindedly while listening to music or waiting for the bus, it is not something we do out loud or in front of somebody else. Speaking is usually done deliberately, intentionally, reasonably. When we speak we normally have some content to convey or a point to make and we articulate ourselves by speaking in propositions that make sense.

Analysis is thus a strange environment, where the one and only rule the patient is meant to obey is:

[...] to put himself into a state of quiet, unreflecting self-observation, and to report to [the analyst] feelings, thoughts, memories – in the order in which they occur to him. At the same time [the analyst] warn[s] him expressly against giving way to any motive which would lead him to make a selection among these associations or to exclude any of them, whether on the ground that is too *disagreeable* or too *indiscreet* to say, or that it is too *unimportant* or *irrelevant*, or that it is *nonsensical* and need not be said. [The analyst] urge[s] him always to follow only

the surface of his consciousness and to leave aside any criticism of what he finds, whatever shape that criticism may take [...]<sup>427</sup>

Free from the directedness of reasonable thought, associations may indeed be embarrassing to share. Even listening to our own voice uttering those free associations is strange. We are forced to acknowledge that we have thoughts that do not connect with one another rationally. And, some of those thoughts may be a bit mean and even morally questionable or not accord very well with the way we see ourselves.

Whereas silent and private free association is easily ignored and forgotten, vocal free association that has an audience exists, so to speak, as something “out there” to be noticed. What is normally an “auto pilot” fleeting thought or idea is now suspended and attended to. The patient listens not only to her passing thoughts but also to her pauses, her “taking back” or qualifications of certain thoughts. In other words, free association in analysis vocally exposes not only the “auto-pilot” imagination moving from one thought to another but also the censoring reason that works to alienate the patient from the associations that she finds normatively acceptable.

The decree of analysis to vocalize thoughts thus exposes and suspends the rational mechanism of suppression, which otherwise would be fleeting and easily forgotten. This suspension effectively changes the experience of suppression. When a patient pauses before vocalizing a thought or feeling or memory, she is facing an explicit decision – to say or not to say, to hear or not to hear, to be heard or not to be heard.

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<sup>427</sup> Freud, *Introductory Lectures*, Lecture 19, p. 287.

Whereas normally suppression is done on “auto pilot” mode, it now becomes intentional. Even if the patient does not articulate to herself the reasons to suppress, one general reason is nevertheless consciously explicit: the passing thought is somehow disturbing. If the patient takes that general reason as a reason not to express that passing thought – she not only suppresses that thought, she endorses that suppression. Analysis thus familiarizes the patient with the very fact of suppression.

It is the fact of censoring associations, which is apparent in speech, that eventually makes the patient realize, reasonably, that those associations are not arbitrary; if they were, why would reason censor them? If associations were not indicating something important about *me*, why would reason go against them?

This understanding has two results. Intellectually, recognizing resistance as such makes the patient more curious about where her associations would lead. More importantly, emotionally, the patient begins to care about those associations that reason discards. The patient gradually realizes that as long as she clings to the judgmental normative reason, her associations will be resisted.

The patient is also aware that the analyst encourages the removal of this resistance, that the analyst is interested in and cares about the patient’s uncensored associations. The analyst is not a judgmental audience and the analytic situation, although “a piece of real life” is also a “playground,” where expressing indiscrete even immoral and troubling thoughts has no damaging effect. The relationship with the analyst is different to the relationships outside of analysis, where one obeys the normative pressure to maintain a certain image and be careful not to express immoral thoughts and emotions. The norms that govern everyday relationships do

not apply to the analytic situation. In particular, the analytic situation is meant to relieve the patient of the weight of moralism and social prudence.

And so the patient decides that judgmental and suppressive reason does not belong in analysis. The patient listens to her speech that is vocally “out there” and forms a new attitude toward it, toward the dominance of suppressive reason that appears in her articulations. She is now against those qualifications, “taking back”s and pauses. This is a distinctively first personal disavowal of the relevance of critical reason. Note that judgmental reason is not only responsible for suppression of emotions and of certain thoughts but also for perfectly fitting disavowal of certain emotions and thoughts.

This is a reasonable decision, yet it is a reasoned decision against judgmental reason itself. Nobody else but the patient can decide for her to disregard judgmental reason as much as possible while free-associating. Indeed, the patient is the only one that can stop taking critical reasons as operative reasons to censor and halt her own associations. This is a negative version of the distinctively first-personal deliberation Moran talks about. The patient takes her own resistance during free association and her growing intellectual curiosity about and emotional care for her associations as a reason to put judgmental reason aside. What the patient deliberately avows is the decision to set aside considerations of endorsement insofar as her speech in analysis is concerned.

This is not usually a once and for all decision. During analysis the patient will feel herself resisting her associative thought time and again, by pausing, wanting to censor, rehearsing worked-out views as a way to give up associative thought in favor of deliberate speech, and so forth. Each time the patient would have to acknowledge that she is critical about her associative thought and that this criticism

is irrelevant in analysis. And each time she can make the decision to put that rational and normative resistance aside, taking responsibility for the immediate effect this decision would have, namely giving voice to the hitherto resisted association.

As mentioned above, this removal of resistance is crucially dependent on the emotional attitude the patient begins to have toward the resisted associations, namely caring about those associations. The emotionally laden decision to give voice to associations that judgmental reason works to suppress thus also involves assuming responsibility on the associations that will be expressed as the immediate result of setting reason aside. By “assuming responsibility” I mean taking the associations in question to be a part of the subjectivity of the patient. Even if those associations “come to” the patient, the patient de-alienates herself from them. No matter how un-endorsable they are normatively and rationally, the patient will decide to *take ownership* of them rather than suppress them.

Effectively, this first-personal decision to remove a particular resistance and voice a particular association involves a change in the stance the patient takes toward her association. She decides to set aside the rational-judgmental stance that judges according to norms of what makes sense, what is relevant and what is appropriate or fitting. Instead, the patient adopts the *emotional stance of acceptance*. She accepts that *her* thought can be associative without being rational, or proper or endorsable by reason in the normative sense. This stance of acceptance cares about and attends to the associations said. The alienating stance of judgmental reason is thus replaced by the stance of acceptance that has an emotional tone of self-care.

This change of stance also has a positive result. Leaving reason aside enables the patient to consider her associations as imaginatively connected. The patient

does not just listen to a voiced thought and then to another thought and then another. She learns to identify thematic affinities within the various associations. The patient can then identify connections as symbols, similarities or reversals and elicit the respects in which these connections hold. By doing that, the patient takes an inarticulate “dumb” connection that caused one thought to follow another, names it and spells it out in a way that becomes meaningful and comprehensible to her. In other words, although the patient did not make that connection intentionally, she now makes it her own.<sup>428</sup>

Through this process, the patient acquires two interrelated skills. The first is to identify and then reject judgmental reason so as to allow caring attention to her associations (thoughts, memories and emotions). The second is to identify and articulate imaginative connections between those associations, to give them meaning and take ownership of them. The acquisition of the “right kind” of imaginative third-personal perspective thus goes hand in hand with the first-personal overcoming of resistance.

It is also possible to acquire the “wrong kind” of an imaginative third-personal perspective. One can imagine a resistant version of this process to do with the very vocalizing of free associations. The patient may fool herself that her resisting judgmental reason is simply mistaken – there is nothing to resist in the first place. It is as if the patient said to herself: “In any case, those associations aren’t *mine*, they come from my *It*, from that part of myself that isn’t me (my normatively

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<sup>428</sup> The analyst may be involved in this process, but somehow that involvement must allow genuine ownership. Some analysts hardly say a word for years! Others are deliberately super involved so as to cause transference. Since I leave questions of psychoanalytic technique aside, I allow myself to articulate this process as if the patient is the one engaging in this process, and the analyst’s function is to be the kind of listener that induces a moralism-free and social-prudence-free environment.

and rationally endorsed self) anyway. I might as well give voice to that strange other that lives in me, and try and see how *It* works.”

Such an attitude to oneself does not involve a change of stance. It is the same rationally judgmental self that has now changed her interest and technique. Instead of criticizing associations and alienating them through their suppression, the patient has now rationally convinced herself there is no point to criticize a foreign (or strictly “natural”) part of herself in the first place. Instead, she is now rationally and merely intellectually curious. She now wants to learn about that part of her that is not her and yet causes an emotional symptom.

Clearly this intellectual interest that does not come hand in hand with emotional acceptance and self-care will not be therapeutic. It only reinforces rational alienation, and it is exactly that alienation that gives the nodal emotions the causal efficacy they have in the first place. The theoretical imaginative perspective that makes the various connections among the associations explicit is in this case *strictly* third-personal, and can be equally taken by the analyst.

Lear’s patient, Mr. A, has not acquired any of those skills. Stuck in his pathology of avowal, he is not willing to give up the stance of judgmental reason. Given Lear gives no details about Mr. A’s past or presently unendorsed emotions, one can only imagine, that even in therapy Mr. A is not genuinely free-associating at all. Instead, he engages in rational deliberation on his troubles in life caused by his bad luck and his own superior ethical standards.

## **B. Identification of Nodal Emotions and Self-Management**

If the above process takes place, then the associative road to the identification of nodal emotions gradually opens. Given the over-explanatory nature of the

associative network of an emotional symptom, the patient's associations approach the nodal emotions time and again from various imaginative connective directions. Jonah's associations will repeatedly lead him to the scarf-scenes, to his stay with his grandfather and to the scene where he was sent away from his mother. The jealous lady's associations will repeatedly approach her sexual life, her relationship with the son-in-law and her relationship with her husband and daughter.

Outside of therapy daily experiences begin to have a new dimension. Due to the training of expressing free associations in analysis, it becomes more difficult to ignore passing thoughts and emotions. The jealous lady visits her husband at work and sees the young employee walking by. She immediately feels jealous again: "Look at her so smiley and content, what did *she* do last night with my husband?" But then our lady remembers that her husband was at home with her the night before, and no sexual activity has taken place. Our lady further thinks: "No sexual activities have taken place for a long time."

Prior to analysis our lady would have succeeded to temporarily self-manage her jealousy by taking what she knows about her husband's activities as an operative reason to let go of the jealousy, at least until the next time she feels jealous. She would have quickly ignored her passing thought about the inexistent sexual life she has with her husband, since she does not like to admit to herself that she is sexually frustrated in that relationship.

But our lady has been trained in analysis to give voice to her passing thoughts, and so she now "listens" introspectively to the passing thought about her sexual life. Our lady is not just self-managing her jealousy through reason. She is now thinking, even if vaguely, about her sexual life with her husband, and gets into a general sour mood.

The patient's associations approach the nodal emotions not just in the analytic situation. Outside of analysis, as the patient is experiencing the very symptomatic emotional reaction that brought her to therapy, she is introspectively aware, in "real time," that her imagination connects the here-and-now reaction to other emotional issues.

As time goes by, the patient's (rationally) notices through "real-time" introspection that her imagination is quite limited in the places it leads to. Her imagination connects her symptom to thoughts and emotions that involve recurrent figures, relationships and memories, which are also familiar from the thought she vocally articulates in the analytic situation. The patient "gets the hang of" her own imagination. She learns how her imagination works and what are its patterns.

Although the lady does not admit that she is indeed sexually frustrated, she says that she does not care about sex any more. She jokes saying she has been in "sexual rehab" for a long time now. But her theoretical imaginative perspective is convinced she "must be" frustrated, even if she cannot avow that emotion via first-personal deliberation. In that manner, our lady is effectively identifying the nodal emotions and the many associative routes that connect those emotions with her emotional symptom.

Analyst and patient, with their imaginative third-personal perspective, have found the solution to the riddle of the symptom. The nodal emotions have been exposed and named in a theoretical third-personal manner. Their imaginative connections to the here-and-now emotional symptom have been made in abundance. Outside of analysis a new method for self-management becomes possible.

As Jonah resents that Anita just gave him an assignment, he thinks to himself “Why does she give me these irritating assignments all the time? I feel suffocated in this office!” Given that Jonah has been discussing the itchy suffocating scarves from his childhood in analysis, he cannot help remembering the scarf-tying scenes at that moment.

Trained in analysis he quickly realizes that he just made an imaginative connection. He is now thinking that the assignment somehow reminds him of those scarves from childhood. Jonah has become convinced in analysis that he blames his mother for submitting him to those scarves. He can now identify a further imaginative connection between his here-and-now resentment of Anita and his memory of the scarf-scenes: “I am not resenting Anita, I resent my mother.” Jonah can now identify this connection and elicit the respects under which it holds. He realizes that Anita is a poor symbol for his mother. He understands that this imaginative connection is too far-fetched to be taken as a reason to resent Anita. In fact, Anita is quite a nice boss; everybody says so.

At that moment, Jonah stops resenting Anita and starts thinking about his mother – and he is introspectively aware of that. In fact, he is introspectively aware that through his associative reflection, to which he “listened” in “real time,” he has managed to stop his current resentment. In other words, Jonah is introspectively aware that identifying imaginative connections and eliciting the respects under which they hold makes a difference or causes the emotional symptom to go away (for now).

Jonah cannot be aware of an inarticulate “dumb” connection that causally contributed, among many other connections, to the formation of his symptomatic emotion. But he can nevertheless take away that connection by articulating it and

giving it meaning, and thereby make a difference. It is this phenomenon, familiar to any person who has gone through analysis, which renders the associative explanation a possible explanation.

Furthermore, on some singular occasions such as the one described above, the associative explanation is the plausible explanation. These are cases where 1) one identifies and articulates an imaginative connection between a component of one's symptomatic reaction and a component of a nodal emotion, and 2) assesses the meaning-given connection to be far-fetched and takes that assessment as an operative reason to stop emoting, and 3) changes the current psychological state in the right way, namely stops pathologically emoting here-and-now.

Note that these "dumb" and meaningless connections do not qualify as "fittingness" connections between a paradigm scenario and the here-and-now situation. The articulation of these connections does not qualify as an "all things considered" judgment that overrides an unconscious judgment. The unconscious does not engage in judging. Unconscious imaginative connections are not even type-identified as similarities, symbols or reversals. They connect "dumbly." Talking in de-Sousian terms does not reflect what is causally going on. What happens here is not the exposure of a paradigm scenario, but the elimination of one or two specific "dumb" imaginative connections as causal conditions (assignment→scarf; Anita→mother) through their articulation.

It is all too tempting to stop here and give the nodal emotions further importance as *the* cause of the emotional symptom. Analyst and patient can construct an etiological narrative. Jonah can go on with his life with the belief that his relationship with his mother has ruined his life, and manage his symptomatic

emotions accordingly. The jealous lady can control her jealousy – she now knows that it is the relationships with her daughter and her husband that cause her problems.

At least they are aware of their issues and are able to recognize when these issues cause them to have unreasonable emotions. Whenever they experience such an emotion, they can quickly assist in the new third-personal skill they have for “real time” imaginative introspection and reasonably manage their reaction. The graduate patient can time and again free herself from the nodes that determine her behavior and rethink the situation via rational deliberation.

This sounds like Pippin’s idea of therapy quoted above. The patient’s problem is that his capacity to deliberate rationally here-and-now emotional reactions is compromised by “psychological forces outside her intentional control,” namely her identified unconscious emotions. Once the patient is third-personally aware of *It’s* forces her rational *I* becomes free again to deliberately steer her actions and emotional reactions.

Unfortunately, that self-management has to take place time and again, and each time this will ultimately amount to thinking again about those issues. Singular imaginative connections can only be singularly taken away, which will make a difference only to the singular here-and-now emotional reaction. But there is nothing the patient can do about *that*. These are her nodal emotions and introspective awareness will not change their initial causal imaginative effect, given that this effect is the work of the *It*, not of the rational *I*.

Recall the famous formula of Octave Mannoni: “Yes, I know very well... but still...”<sup>429</sup> In this context the phrase reads as: “Yes, I know very well that my emotional symptom is caused by those nodal emotions that are only imaginatively connected to my symptom. *I know* that I should not have those emotional reactions and indeed I can manage them better – I don’t “buy” my emotional symptom in the way that I used to; it doesn’t fool me any more. *But still* – these nodes have determined my unconscious imaginative patterns and thus my emotional life and there is nothing I can do about *that*. *I can manage but not change It.*”

In other words, although *I* deliberately disavow the effects of *It*, *It* is just as important as it always was. Reason, yet again, works in favor of pathology and resistance. The nodal emotions are intellectually and introspectively recognized as the symbolic source of the emotional symptom. Yet the patient is still alienated from them. She sees them as that “pathogen” inside her coming from that foreign *It*, for which her reasonable *I* is not and cannot be responsible, just as she is not responsible for physiological problems with the endocrine system. All *I* can do is third-personally recognize *It*, put it in its place and move on to first-personal rational deliberation.

### **3. The Second Phase: “Working-Through” Nodal Emotions**

Moran’s idea of therapy is closer to my view than Pippin’s, whereby nodal emotions have to be dealt with first-personally, rather than merely become third-personally known as the causes of the psychological symptom. Moran rightly claims that if the

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<sup>429</sup> Octave Mannoni, “Je sais bien, mais quand même [1963]” in *Clefs Pour L’Imaginaire ou L’autre Scène*, (Paris, France: Editions du Seuil, 1969), pp. 9-33. My translation. That article is mostly about religious and mystical beliefs that persist despite their deliberative disavowal, through the ascription of those beliefs to others. The formula is, however, applicable here as well, and indeed, as Russell Grigg says (in conversation), in all cases where there is an issue of using reason in order to avoid assuming responsibility.

patient merely believes she has a certain emotion from a third-personal perspective, she is still alienated from this emotion, and that alienation is the source of her pathology.

For Moran, the third-personal perspective in question is evidence-based and not imaginative. But the point still holds. Moran's view of de-alienation, however, is still rationalistic. Moran tells of a person "who feels betrayed or deprived of something by another child", and has only third-personal knowledge of this emotional attitude "through the eliciting and interpreting of evidence of various kinds."<sup>430</sup> But, according to Moran, she is still alienated from that emotion since she is not capable of avowing or disavowing it through rational deliberation of the reasons that come from the relevant situation "out there". As Moran explains:

The person might be *told* of her feeling of betrayal, and she may not doubt this. But without her capacity to endorse or withhold endorsement from that attitude, and without the exercise of that capacity making a difference to what she feels, this information may as well be about some other person, or about the voices in her head. From within a purely attributional awareness of herself, she is no more in a position to speak for her feeling than she was before, for she admits no authority over them.<sup>431</sup>

Alienation thus amounts to detachment from her sense of the reasons that either support or undermine the nodal emotion in question and/or the incapacity to

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<sup>430</sup> Moran, *Authority and Estrangement*, p. 85.

<sup>431</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93.

deliberatively avow or disavow the reasoned emotion. It is in connection to this account that Lear warns against the pathology of avowal. Lear warns against the possibility that the patient would come up with reasons in deliberation in order to avow that hypothesized nodal emotion. The danger is that those reasons actually serve other imaginative interests to avow an attitude with the relevant emotion-type, but not the attitude that is indeed the nodal emotion that actually caused the psychological symptom. Deliberative avowal, in other words, would not assure us that indeed we have identified the correct nodal emotion in the first place. Lear thus suggests another option:

The avowal has to come about *in the right sort of way*. Roughly speaking, the avowal has to ‘grab onto’ the very emotion that has hitherto remained unconscious. It cannot merely be an expression of the very same *type* of emotion (betrayal), it has to be an expression of that very emotion.<sup>432</sup>

But clearly Moran was referring to the actual nodal emotion and not a “pretend” nodal emotion. He may not have described how that specific emotional attitude is “grabbed onto,” but avowal or disavowal is nevertheless what is at stake. Lear’s option thus does not seem so different, given that he too says that eventually therapy is about avowal or disavowal of the nodal emotion.

But what if the emotion in question was not a reasoned emotion in the first place? What if the emotion is recalcitrant to judgment? – Avowal or disavowal would not get very far in such a case. What if that emotion is operatively-rational and

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<sup>432</sup> Lear, “Avowal and Unfreedom,” p. 452.

fitting but extrinsically immoral or imprudent? – If rational deliberation is the way to “grab onto” the emotion with the purpose of either avowing or disavowing the emotion, it is more than likely that the extrinsic reasons whose grasp psychologically caused its suppression in the first place would do the same suppressive job on this occasion as well.

The process of de-alienation begins with the patient’s dissatisfaction with her “*I know very well... But still*” condition. The rational patient will notice that although she can successfully manage her symptom, her recourse to the same nodal emotions has become some sort of cliché she turns to every time she wants to stop feeling a symptomatic emotion. Although invoking the cliché works, the symptom nevertheless keeps reappearing, even if momentarily. Whereas before the patient felt an achievement as she “got the hang of” her imagination, now she begins to bore herself with her fixations. The rational patient thus becomes dissatisfied with the associative explanation achieved so far and starts to question why did those nodal emotions have become so formative of her emotional life in the first place.

But unlike the hermeneutic explanations, that seal the explanation when the symptom is deciphered, the associative explanation shows the route out of the cliché. Trained in associative reflection the patient would begin to wonder about those elements in her associative network that have not yet received much attention in analysis, given that they are hardly connected to anything else and are not symbolically represented in the symptom. These would be, for example, certain figures in the patient’s life. The patient could become intellectually curious about those under-connected elements and care about their involvement in her life.

In order to see what makes these nodal suppressed emotions so central, and why certain components within them are under-connected in the network, these emotions require further articulation. Thus far, the patient has believed in a theoretical third-personal way that she indeed has these emotions, but they were merely named or described in very general terms. But in order to be further articulated, the patient needs to get “acquainted” with them, that is, express them. But the patient cannot express an emotion she is alienated from. Expression requires de-alienation.

The patient is by now familiar with the psychological fact that alienation means “resistance.” Her *“I know very well... But still...”* condition, which involves seeing the nodal emotions as “pathogens,” is the resistance she now needs to remove. Experienced in the removal of the resistance involved in free-association, the patient knows what de-alienation entails. It entails taking a “judgmental holiday.” But only reason can give itself that judgmental holiday. Only the patient can make the distinctively first-personal decision to leave judgmental-reason aside.

The patient thus decides to consider those nodal emotions without any intention to deliberately avow or disavow them. She will not question whether or not they are justified. The patient decides to leave rational judgment aside and adopt instead the stance of emotional acceptance. Nobody else can change that stance but the patient herself. The patient deliberately avows to put considerations of avowal out of the way. Here, again, the removal of the *“Yes, I know very well... but still...”* resistance – is a negative version of Moran’s story of avowal. It is nevertheless just as distinctively first-personal as the kind of avowal Moran talks about.

The patient's avowal to set judgmental reason aside entails taking responsibility on the immediate effect this change of stance would have. This is a different kind of responsibility than the one that comes with judgment. The patient is not going to take any rational authority on the emotion she is now going to allow herself to express and articulate. Accepting an emotion without judgment means to let herself express an emotion that is probably either not rationally justified or not moral or imprudent or that would reflect on her self-image in ways she may not rationally endorse. Effectively, the patient rationally decides to allow herself to feel or talk about an emotion she has never allowed herself to properly express before.

In *Love and its Place in Nature*, Lear makes the distinction between *holding* oneself responsible and *accepting* responsibility.<sup>433</sup> It is the first kind of responsibility, the one that comes together with blame, guilt and shame, that the patient has to put aside. The immediate effect the patient endorses is the patient's assuming the responsibility of the second kind: "[...] as she is able to cease *holding* herself responsible for her emotions, she is able to *accept* responsibility for them: that is, she is able to acknowledge them as hers".<sup>434</sup>

The ownership in question thus consists in accepting the emotion for what it is – *her* emotion. And this de-alienation or acceptance is possible through the emotional stance of self-care, or as Lear might say – self-love. In other words, the patient decides to care about and attend to and like her emotion, even if her judgmental reason will not like it. The responsibility here in question is the responsibility that comes with ownership – to care for and attend to what is owned.

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<sup>433</sup> Lear, *Love and its Place in Nature*, pp. 65-66.

<sup>434</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66. And after that, according to Lear, the patient can *hold* herself responsible for that accepted emotion. For Lear, unlike the picture of therapy presented in this chapter, this acceptance ultimately enables first-personal deliberative avowal or disavowal of the emotion "in the right way." Note also, that Lear's much longer and more detailed discussion of acceptance, talks about the acceptance of wishes, desires and drives, and not about emotions. See *Ibid.*, pp. 168-177.

According to Moran, first-personal deliberative avowal of an emotion is successful if my deliberation ends with a resolution to emote in a certain way, such that this resolution makes an immediate difference to my emotional state in the right way. In other words, deliberative avowal is successful if the content of an evidence-based third-personal report or inference of an emotional state is equivalent to the content of the first-personal deliberative resolution to emote a certain way.<sup>435</sup>

I want to suggest that a similar “equation” happens in this case too, when the patient first-personally and deliberately avows to put aside consideration of deliberative avowal. The perspectives one takes on oneself that participate in this “equation” are not the ones that take part in judgmental deliberation. Here it is the content of a hypothesized emotion articulated from the imaginative third-personal perspective on the one hand, and the content of a first-personally accepted emotion on the other hand. Once the emotion is accepted, the task of expression or articulation or “working-through” the emotion begins.<sup>436</sup>

The first articulation of such accepted nodal emotions may not be very surprising, since the imaginative third-personal perspective already made it available or it least pointed in that direction. Before the acceptance of an emotion, that emotion was mainly indirectly “dealt with” through identifying the various connections it has to other nodes and to the manifest emotional symptom. The emotion itself did not receive much attention. But caring acceptance and ownership

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<sup>435</sup> Moran articulates this equation in terms of transparency in *Authority and Estrangement*, p. 63. Whether or not the term “transparency” qualifies for the case of emotion is a discussion I leave aside.

<sup>436</sup> As Lear notes, Freud noticed that articulation is quite enough to count as “working-through” an emotion. Lear, *Love and its Place in Nature*, p. 34. In other words, an expression of an emotion does not usually involve a burst of affect. The emotion is expressed slowly, in words, exhausting its affect gradually through articulation.

have the positive effect of further articulation and association. Many times, acceptance of a nodal emotion will involve the task of articulation of their reasons, whether or not these are good reasons.

Exposing imaginative connections between components of a symptomatic emotional reaction to nodal emotions is somewhat impersonal. This is due to the “dumbness” of the connections of the “auto-pilot” imagination that are introspectively *observed* and then made sense of through articulating the respects in which they hold. Articulating reasons, conversely, is much more personal – these were operative reasons that were taken personally, sometimes too personally, sometimes rejected on moral or prudential grounds.

In that sense, Moran is right. “Working-through” nodal emotions does involve getting a sense of their reasons. There is, however, a crucial difference. For Moran, a reason should be first-personally *my* operative reason only if I exert my rational authority over it and endorse it objectively as a good reason. But according to the account of resistance-removal I have been presenting in this chapter, accepting a nodal emotion entails leaving the deliberative and judgmental stance aside. The reasons are mine in a different sense. The reasons are mine insofar as I care about them; I embrace them. Even if I do not rationally or morally or prudentially endorse them, I am emotionally positive about them – I like them, so to speak.

Talking about reasons regardless of whether they are good or bad reasons sounds strange to philosophers. Even the adaptation of judgmentalism into operative-reason-terminology in chapter 1, might make a philosopher feel uncomfortable, since reasons that are considered in their psychological-causal dimension may be bad reasons. But at least judgmentalism can allow for operative reasons to change according to consequent judgment. Operative reasons are always

up for assessment – except in analysis. In analysis, operative reasons are articulated without the prospect of judgment.

Some nodal emotions may be recalcitrant, such as anger, guilt and shame (much easier to suppress than phobias). Yet the patient would still be able to articulate “manifest reasons” for them, which are bad reasons. Indeed, as discussed in the thesis, their persistence indicates the emotions were not formed by the grasp of those reasons. Rather, these nodal recalcitrant emotions were associatively formed in the first place.

Under normal circumstances the patient would have immediately judged as unfitting and suppress them in order to maintain her self-image as a rational person. But the emotional stance of acceptance allows the patient to accept that those manifest reasons are her reasons. Given that reflection on those reasons does not aim at judgment, the patient can continue to free-associate, departing from that bad reason. The emotional relationships involved in those manifest reasons would be further explored.

Some nodal emotions may have perfectly good reasons of fittingness, but the patient never let herself reflect on them, given they were censored by extrinsic moral or prudential reasons. The patient would also articulate her suppressive reasons, and learn to accept that she is not morally perfect or the polite and dignified person she wanted to be. The patient learns to accept herself and like herself despite what she would normally judge as faults. Given that the articulation of reasons is not directed at judgment, the patient can continue to associatively reflect on those moralistic or prudential reasons, which may in turn be imaginatively connected to other emotional experiences.

Some reasons (whether of fit or suppressive reasons) may involve other figures and emotional relationships that have not received much attention prior to the acceptance of this emotion. Given that the articulation of reasons does not aim at judgment, the patient can continue to associatively reflect about those other figures. The patient will then “branch out” her associative network and move on to speak of those other emotional relationships as well as other emotionally laden memories to do with those figures.

Other reasons may have to do with the patient’s practical identity and the desires or wishes to have that identity – in reference to which the patient took personally this or that operative reason of fit. The exposure of those taking-personally-reasons will give the patient the opportunity to associatively reflect on that practical identity. How did this practical identity come about? Who are the figures in the patient’s life that the patient has identified with as part of the construction of that identity? What other emotions are imaginatively linked to those wishes and desires?

The issue of practical identity is very important in analysis and I will have to suffice in raising it without further discussion. What is important for my purposes is to note that the acceptance of a nodal emotion makes it “branch out” into further important issues, some to do with other emotional relationships and some with the relevant practical identity that becomes, in itself, another important issue for associative reflection.<sup>437</sup>

Before I conclude I present below a table of the various perspectives one can take toward oneself during analysis:

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<sup>437</sup> For discussion of practical identities in analysis see Jonathan Lear, “Irony and identity: Tanner Lectures explore the difficulty of becoming human”, *Harvard Gazette* (Nov. 2009).

<b>Evidence-Based Theoretical Third Personal ("Scientific")</b>	<p>"Looking in the mirror" for evidence that is available to all and inferring, in reference to general rules of thumb, what is my current emotional state. (like inferring the jealous lady's love to her son-in-law)</p>
<b>Imaginative Theoretical Third Personal</b>	<p>Considering various articulated thoughts, emotions and memories as imaginatively-connected. Identifying the imaginative-connection (similarity, symbol or reversal) and eliciting the respects under which this imaginative connection holds. These respects would be very subjective and many times involve the subject's idiosyncratic biography.</p>
<b>Empirical Third Personal Introspective Awareness</b>	<p>A. Introspective awareness that takes place in time – witnessing what emotion I currently feel B. "Listening" to one's own thoughts and private associations as they take place in "real time." One becomes better at such "listening" given one actually listens to one's own voice free-associating in analysis.</p> <p>One can be introspectively aware of:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Suppression or judgment while being expected to give voice to one's free-associations in analysis.</li> <li>2) Passing thoughts during or after the manifestation of a symptomatic emotional reaction.</li> <li>3) One's own identification of an imaginative connection between a here-and-now symptomatic emotion and one's passing thoughts. One can then listen to oneself eliciting the respects under which this connection holds and finding them far-fetched.</li> <li>4) One's taking the meaning-given connection as a reason to stop emoting, and the singular effect this has on one's emotional state –to stop symptomatically emoting here-and-now.</li> </ol>
<b>Distinctively First Personal Rational "mirror-image" of Deliberative Avowal Removing Judgmental Resistance</b>	<p>One can first-personally and deliberately avow to set aside rational considerations of judgment. This involves a change of stance: from the rational-judgmental stance to the emotional stance of acceptance.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) In regard to giving voice to free-associations.</li> <li>2) In regard to the articulated expression of an emotion and its operative reasons.</li> </ol>

## **Conclusion: The Possible Effects of the Expression of Accepted Nodal Emotions via Articulation**

The articulation of the un-judged and cared-for reasons for the nodal emotion in question may thus have a few effects. First, the emotion itself is now articulated and worked-through. Part of the over-emphasis this emotion hitherto had was due to the fact it was never properly expressed. Now that it has been articulated and worked-through, its impact will have been, to some extent, exhausted. Even if working-through the emotion does not end its life, it will nevertheless reduce its intensity, its urgency, and its facility for powerful arousal via here-and-now triggers.

Secondly, the nodal emotion is no longer judged or scolded or expelled by judgmental reason as an emotion the patient should alienate herself from. Much of the hitherto over-emphasis of that nodal emotion was a consequence of that alienation, of its harsh assessment as un-endorsable, un-likable. But now that the patient has accepted that she may have un-justified or unpleasant emotions and still like herself having them – the nodal emotion loses some of the importance it hitherto had.

Thirdly, the nodal emotion has now been contextualized within an enlarged associative network, which now includes more emotions. The nodal emotion has lost its status as a main focal point of the patient's emotional life. The nodal emotion, even if still important, is no longer over-emphasized at the expense of the under-emphasis of other important elements in the patient's emotional life. It now becomes possible for the imagination to stop its fixation on this one or few nodal emotions.

If this process takes place, the patient's judgmental reason continues to abandon itself and to remove the resistances it poses. What were hitherto alienated nodal emotions of an associative network that symbolically explained an emotional symptom, become an accepted and worked-through part of a larger and more complex associative network. The therapeutic hope is that the removal of the over-emphasis of certain nodal emotions will also remove the symptom that was caused by that very over-emphasis.

And so, during this process of working-through resistances, the focus is taken away from the emotional symptom that brought the patient to therapy in the first place. Working-through more emotions in more directions in an enlarging associative network shows the patient how her emotional life cannot be summed-up by one narrative or one unifying thread.

If there is any "consistency" to be found, it is the over-arching acceptance of the associative network as the complex and always partial map of one's emotional life. Due to its "branching out," it becomes more difficult to say that the associative network explains the emotional symptom. It seems to have left the symptom behind and move on to exploring further emotional concerns.

Whereas the jealous lady came to Freud in order to finally be genuinely convinced that her husband is not having an affair with his employee, after analysis that conviction becomes irrelevant. If Jonah originally wanted to be convinced that he truly does not have any reason to resent Esther or Anita, that conviction is no longer an issue. The patient has moved away from those fixations and is now living in a richer emotional world. If there is any "conviction" involved in the ongoing construction of the network, it is the conviction that reason cannot and need not explain the richness of one's emotional life.

I have described two phases of analysis as consecutive: one of symbolically deciphering the manifest emotional symptom and one of “spreading out” the importance of few nodal emotions into a larger and more complex emotional network. In practice, these phases probably blend into each other at various stages. Yet they can still be separated conceptually. Whereas the “first phase” concludes in getting the hang of one’s imaginative patterns, the “second phase” results in getting a better hang of oneself in a much broader sense. Whereas the “first phase” decomposed the initial problematic emotional attitude, the second phase moves on to other issues. And once those are worked-through and the imagination (hopefully) breaks its patterns, the initial emotional symptom has dissolved. Therapy thus does not end with an explanation of the symptom, but rather with no symptom to explain.

Stanly Cavell describes the process of psychoanalytic therapy in connection to his discussion on Wittgenstein’s method in the *Investigations*:

The more one learns, so to speak, the hang of oneself, and mounts one’s problems, the less one is able to *say* what one has learned; not because you have *forgotten* what it was, but because nothing you said would seem like an answer or a solution: there is no longer any question or problem which your words would match. You have reached conviction, but not about a proposition; and consistency, but not in a theory. You are different, what you recognize as problems are different, your world is different.<sup>438</sup>

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<sup>438</sup> Stanly Cavell, *Must We Mean What We Say?* [1969]. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 85-86.

## Conclusion:

In the first chapter of the thesis I examined contemporary accounts in the philosophy of emotion as to what emotions *are* in order to see what they implicitly claim as to the causal question, namely what causes emotion. In order to proceed in my causal inquiry, I translated the contemporary accounts that speak in terms of judgment or “construal” into the terminology of reasons, as used in the philosophy of practical rationality. I concluded that both rival accounts, judgmentalism and quasijudgmentalism (or “seeing as”) basically imply the same causal account, namely that emotional reactions are caused by the grasp of fittingness-reasons that the subject takes personally in reference to her practical identity. I called emotions caused in this manner “operatively-rational emotions,” even if their reason-as-grasped may, objectively speaking, be a bad reason, because such emotions can change if the subject’s revokes that grasped-reason in consequent first-personal deliberation.

My inquiry into the rationality of an emoting subject has been focused only on its subjective and psychological dimension. I have not discussed reasons in the sense of timelessly good reasons for propositions that are objectively true in reference to norms of rationality. I was concerned only with operative reasons or reasons as grasped by the subject and the possibility that subject has to become aware of her operative reasons and endorse or revoke them. The inquiry into a subject’s emotional life is a subjective inquiry about the subject’s thought processes that lead her to emote in a certain way – not an inquiry into the objective truth or normative validity of that subject’s way of thinking.

I then turned to the more detailed discussion of non-rational emotions, namely emotions that were not caused by the subject's grasping a certain reason or taking it as a consideration in favor of that emotion. The first kind of non-rational emotions are emotions that are insensitive to the subject's disavowal of their respective reasons. These are recalcitrant emotions, widely recognized in the emotion literature. The second kind of non-rational emotions are emotions that appear as if they were caused by grasped reasons and they may even be avowed, but in fact they were not formed in this subjectively-rational manner.

After presenting and criticizing the "seeing as" developmental accounts for non-rational emotions in the second chapter, I proposed what I called the "associative explanation" in the third chapter. According to the proposed account, emotional pathologies are caused by the arousal of suppressed emotions through distinctively imaginative connections. These suppressed emotions are expressed in a distorted manner in a manifest attitude. The components of the manifest content of the pathological emotions result from the distinctively imaginative synthesis of the components of the suppressed emotion. I further elaborated on the causal operations of the connective and synthetic imagination in the fifth chapter.

The associative explanation I proposed allows for the explanation of non-rational emotions at the person level, and in particular of recalcitrant emotions that have posed a long-standing problem for the philosophy of emotions. The associative explanation is compatible with the operative-reason-explanation and can thus contribute to the understanding of operatively-rational emotions whose emotion-type repeats itself on many occasions. In other words, it can explain why some people are angry or guilty more often than others.

In this thesis, I explored the associative explanation only insofar as it applies to distinctively emotional symptoms. This might seem to pose a problem for my invocation of the relevance of the philosophy of psychoanalysis, which does not focus its inquiry on emotions, even if all accounts mention emotions and discuss them to some limited extent. However, in my view, the involvement of emotions in psychologically symptomatic behavior and the existence and effects of suppressed emotions are at the very heart of psychoanalytic thought, inquiry and therapy.

Indeed, the associative explanation is a promising method that can be applied to all neurotic symptoms of otherwise rational and normative subjects such as obsessional neurosis. This is mainly due to the fact that all neurotic symptoms plausibly stem from the effects of suppressed emotions. If we regard symptoms in general as an imaginatively distorted form of expression of suppressed emotions, we could use the associative explanation to account for other symptoms as well – without the need to take recourse to narratives and wish fulfillments that imply philosophically problematic homuncular views of the unconscious mind. I thus see this thesis as a prolegomena to the defense of the possibility of psychoanalysis as a method of a particular kind of self-awareness that may be (hopefully) of therapeutic benefit.

A major conceptual advance suggested by the thesis is to challenge the traditional conception of the empirical as facts that must lend themselves to scientific investigation. Besides the scientifically explorable, the category of the empirical includes the introspectively available. Operative reasons qua causal factors in one's psychology as well as imaginative associations that cause emotional reactions are too subjective, too idiosyncratic, too dependent on the subject's biography, practical identities, moralism and social prudence – to be generalizable

across many subjects or even across a lifetime of one subject. This does not make these causal factors any less causal or any less real.

Nor is empirical inquiry limited to scientific inquiry. Singular emotional reactions, spontaneous speech and even private thoughts, which are not controllable or reproducible in laboratory conditions, are part of the empirical data for the investigation of our emotional lives. One can be introspectively aware of the process of rational deliberation and “listen” to oneself, so to speak, as one examines various considerations and decides which considerations they take to be good reasons for a certain emotional reaction. One is also self-aware as one takes oneself to be able to change one’s state of mind through that deliberative process. As one reaches a resolution, one can be introspectively aware of how one’s state of mind has changed as a consequence of that deliberative process. This process takes place in time and the ability to “listen” to it is an introspective ability to collect data on the manner in which we are able to change our current emotional state.

Reasoning has a causal dimension that takes place in time, and it is that dimension that I have been dealing with in the thesis. But although my main interest consists in the causal effects that reasoning has on our psychology I have not thereby reduced reasoning to a causal process. In other words, I have been careful to avoid the problem of psychologism that reduces the rational to the merely causal. During the deliberation itself, one considers the *content* of one’s propositional attitudes in their logical relation to one another. From the logical point of view or from the perspective of content, the subject considers her deliberation as timelessly valid. In order to “sow” together the logical and the causal dimensions of deliberation we need to presuppose that rational subjects have a causal disposition

for their psychology to be causally effected in the right way by the conclusions of their deliberative reasoning.

Just as the process of deliberation can be introspectively witnessed and qualify as empirical data in psychological inquiry, so can the process of identifying imaginative associations and eliciting the respects in which they hold. When one has an emotional reaction to a here-and-now intentional object and “listens” to one’s own associative thoughts about a different object, one can identify an imaginative connection between the two objects. When one realizes that the analogy or similarity between the two objects is far-fetched and does not qualify as a reason to emote – one takes that judgment to be a consideration in favor of abandoning one’s emotional reaction. Here, again, one can “listen” to one’s own thought process and be introspectively aware of how one’s emotional reaction is sensitive to considerations that involve imaginative associations. This experience of introspective awareness that takes place in time also qualifies as empirical data.

The philosophical criticisms against introspective awareness as something to rely on in reasoning are not relevant in this particular empirical inquiry into one’s emotional life. When the purpose is not logical inquiry or investigation of the objectively true description of the world but rather the inquiry into one’s own capacity to monitor and change one’s emotional state – introspection is a valid tool of inquiry.

By speaking in the ordinary psychological language of reasons and imaginative associations as causes, I make available a novel solution to the vexed problem of the status of psychoanalytic explanations. Psychoanalysis has chronically suffered from critical skepticism about the status of its claims, since the time of its inception in Freud’s great works. It has repeatedly been critically assessed either as

an under-developed philosophical psychology or, and more prominently, as a pseudo-science. Recently this criticism has been carried out by the famous “Freud basher” Frederic Crews, which has had a significant effect not only on intellectuals in the academic world but also in the popular culture. From the perspective of this thesis, psychoanalysis and its associative explanations fall within the newly discovered category of the *empirical-non-scientific*. Hence, psychoanalysis is neither science nor philosophy, but the “cousin” of both.

Given the associative explanation accounts for singular events, whose causes are themselves singular, highly subjective and idiosyncratic – psychoanalysis cannot be a science, since science is concerned with the objective and reproducible. But since the associative explanation traces suppressed emotions and imaginative associations that causally affect our emotional state – it is, like science, empirical. Since it is empirical, psychoanalysis is not philosophy, if we understand philosophy as a purely conceptual inquiry. The perspective of this thesis thus provides a new line of defense for psychoanalysis that also makes sense and takes account of its criticisms.

Psychoanalysis and philosophy nevertheless relate to each other insofar as they bear something like a contrary relation to reason. The conceptual basis for psychoanalysis is as if the other side, indeed the dark side, of philosophy. The imaginative, private and distinctively non-rational associations, which philosophy expelled from its domain of rational inquiry for objective or logical truths, are precisely what psychoanalysis uses in its inquiry of the formation of symptoms.

However, philosophy and psychoanalysis bear a certain similarity insofar as they both fight against something that might be called “rationalism,” which we can understand in general terms as an over-reliance on reason in understanding

ourselves and our place in the world. As Kant has famously shown, reason can lead itself to illusions and contradictions. As Lear has shown reason (that is, first-personal deliberative avowal) can mislead us to believe that our emotional reactions are more rational than they actually are (that is, emotional reactions may appear as if they were caused by the grasp of the reason they embed even if their formation actually followed a different and non-rational path).

As I have shown in the thesis, operative reasons and in particular suppressive reasons associated with moralism and social prudence constitute a plausible source of pathology. Furthermore, the widespread hermeneutical psychoanalytic accounts, which claim to provide a non-rationalistic account for the formation of symptom, do not avoid the temptation to bring back rationalism through the “back door,” by ascribing some extended form of rationality to “*the unconscious.*” Here too, reason is on the side of pathology.

As I have explained in the fourth chapter, these rationalistic explanations give the illusion of a “cure,” which in effect reinforces the pathology. Their identification of the “pathogen,” whether it is a memory or a wish, merely serves to entrench the imagination’s fixations. The intentional content of the relevant suppressed emotions relates to those memories and declaring those memories as *the cause* for the symptom reinforces the over-emphasis of those emotions. The ascribed wishes are either pro-attitudes of the suppressed emotions or wishes that may emerge from those emotions. Declaring those wishes as *the cause* of the symptom thus contributes to the over-emphasis of the suppressed emotion. It is that very over-emphasis of suppressed emotions that leads to the imagination’s fixation upon them and creates the pathology.

As I have argued, it is all too easy to sum-up a patient by identifying one or a few wishes and memories. A subject's emotional life cannot, and should not, be explained in terms of one "primal scene" or a few other events. Recourse to such scenes will invariably give us a too simple and an overly rational – and thereby very seductive – explanatory story. But this story will not do justice to the emotional life of a subject that is much more complex and less rational than we tend to think.

Recall the frequent mention of "rosebud" in Orson Welles's *Citizen Kane*. "Rosebud" is the last word Kane uttered before he died and presented in the film as the key to deciphering the mystery of Kane's life. The film appears to take as its task to discover the meaning of this key and solve the mystery. The viewer feels that if she only knew what "rosebud" referred to, if she only knew what experience in that complex man's life somehow had to do with that "rosebud," she could solve the riddle of this man's motivations and emotional relationships.

At the end of the movie, the viewer is finally exposed to the object, a sled from Kane's childhood that carries the name "rosebud," crammed together with so many other objects collected throughout Kane's life. The viewer feels disappointed; is that it? Is that all there is as an explanation for this great man's life? What the film demonstrates is how the explanation of a person's life cannot be reduced to one item, to one scene, or even to one short period in one's life.

It is true that our imagination becomes fixated on certain suppressed emotions and thereby to certain memories or pro-attitudes. It is also true that whatever the imagination is fixated upon is symbolically represented in the symptom we want to explain and causes the symptom through the associative processes of condensation and displacement. However, a crucial feature of the associative explanation is that these scenes whose content participates in the

intentional content of the trouble-causing suppressed emotions are not in themselves *the* cause of the symptom. Rather, they somehow symbolically and imaginatively capture other more general problematic issues of the subject's emotional life: her ongoing emotional relationships, self-conception and practical identities, and the moralisms and social prudence that govern her relations to others.

The associative explanation for pathological emotions calls for the further exploration of those other issues of the subject. And it is only through the subject's recognition of the limits of their rationality that this further reflection can be perused. Similarly to philosophical inquiry, psychoanalytic inquiry into one's own emotional reality can explore the limits of reason through reason itself. One can rationally and first-personally decide to take a "judgmental holiday," to take a break from rational criticism and judgment, and set aside suppressive or rather moralistic and prudential reason. In that manner, one can continue accept the complexity of their normatively-imperfect emotions and thereby intervene and give oneself the opportunity to make a difference to one's emotional life.

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