

Plato's Imaging of Man, City and God:

The Timaeus in Context



The five Platonic Solids, from Kepler's Harmonices Mundi Libri, 1619.

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Author Attribution Statement & Statement of Originality

This is to certify that the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted for any other degree or purpose. No portion of this dissertation has been separately published.

I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, and that all assistance received in preparing this thesis and all sources have been acknowledged.

Artificial Intelligence

No generative AI was used in the preparation of this dissertation.

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Γεωργίῳ καὶ Παρασκευῇ

parentibus carissimis coram Deo fabricatori et patre,

Georgio et Venerandae

To my makers before the Maker,

George and Paraskeuē

τοὺς μὲν γὰρ τῶν θεῶν ὀρῶντες σαφῶς τιμῶμεν, τῶν δ' εἰκόνας ἀγάλματα ἰδρυσάμενοι, οὓς ἡμῖν ἀγάλλουσι καίπερ ἀψύχους ὄντας, ἐκείνους ἠγούμεθα τοὺς ἐμψύχους θεοὺς πολλὴν διὰ ταῦτ' εὐνοίαν καὶ χάριν ἔχειν. πατήρ οὖν ὄψω καὶ μήτηρ ἢ τούτων πατέρες ἢ μητέρες ἐν οἰκίᾳ κεῖνται κειμήλιοι ἀπειρηκότες γήρα, μηδεὶς διανοηθήτω ποτὲ ἄγαλμα αὐτῶ, τοιοῦτον ἐφέστιον ἴδρυμα ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἔχων, μᾶλλον κύριον ἔσεσθαι, ἐὰν δὴ κατὰ τρόπον γε ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ θεραπεύῃ ὁ κεκτημένος.

The ancient laws of all men concerning the gods are two-fold: some of the gods whom we honour we see clearly [the astral gods], but of others we set up statues as images, and we believe that when we worship these, lifeless though they be, the living gods beyond feel great good-will towards us and gratitude. So if any man has a father or a mother, or one of their fathers or mothers, in his house laid up bed-ridden with age, let him never suppose that, while he has such a figure as this upon his hearth, any statue could be more potent, if so be that its owner tends it duly and rightly.

Pl. *Lg.* 930e-931a

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Abbreviations

DK= Diels, H. and Kranz, W. (1952) *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. 6th ed. Berlin.

FGrH = Jacoby, F. (1923) *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Berlin.

IG = *Inscriptiones Graecae*.

LSJ= Liddell, H.G., Scott, R., Jones, H.S. & McKenzie, R. (1996) *Greek-English Lexicon with a Revised Supplement*. 9th ed. Oxford: Clarendon.

PMG= Page, D.L. (1962) *Poetae Melici Graeci*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Syll= *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*.

The abbreviations for all Greek authors and texts cited accord with those given in the LSJ.

For Latin authors the abbreviations of the Lewis and Short Latin Dictionary have been used.

Note on Translations Provided

- The vast majority of English translations of Greek texts produced throughout this dissertation are sourced from the Loeb Classical Library. For that reason, I have only named the translator in instances where the Loeb edition is not being used or where the translation is my own. Specifically, Shorey's translation of the *Republic* will be used rather than the more recent Loeb edition.

Abstract

This dissertation addresses the question of how Plato conceived of the relationship between theology, political theory, and human transformation by examining the previously underappreciated concept of the *theoeikelon andreikelon* ("god-like image of man") in *Republic* 6.501b as the unifying framework connecting the *Republic's* political philosophy with the *Timaeus's* cosmogony. Through close textual analysis of the Greek combined with cultural contextualization—particularly regarding the Panathenaic festival setting and fourth-century sculptural revolution—this dissertation argues that *eikonopoia* provides the ontological, epistemological, and soteriological framework unifying macrocosmic cosmogony, mesocosmic political life and microcosmic human psychology. The study demonstrates three interconnected theses: first, that *Timaeus* functions simultaneously as rhapsodic poet and lawgiver, composing a new theological *nomos* (strain/law) modelled on the musico-mathematical ratios of the World Soul that replaces traditional Homeric-Hesiodic poetry; second, that the *Timaeus* discourse itself embodies an "agalmatic" (statue-like) structure simultaneously depicting the Divine Macrocosm, the tripartite ideal constitution, and the properly ordered human body-soul compound; and third—most innovatively—that the entire cosmogonic discourse operates through the dynamics of oneiromantic image-making described in *Timaeus's* account of hepatic divination (70d-72b), where rational *nous* guides sub-rational mortal elements of the soul through dream-imagery. This oneiromantic hermeneutic reveals previously unrecognized connections between the Myth of Metals, the Allegory of the Cave, and *Timaeus's* account of Chora as "cosmic mould." Ultimately the main claim of this dissertation is that Plato's political theory cannot be separated from his theology because his conception of the ideal polity is centred on the philosopher-kings acting as microcosmic 'demiurges' imitating the Demiurge's crafting of the Visible Cosmos as a living statue (*zōn agalma*, 37c) in their "moulding" and "painting" of the citizens in their care into god-like likenesses (*eikones*) of both the Divine Macrosom but also of the equally theomorphic and anthropomorphic constitution they devised, the *theoeikelon andreikelon*.

Keywords: Plato, *Timaeus*, *Republic*, theology, image-making (*eikonopoia*), *theoeikelon andreikelon*, analogism, macrocosm, microcosm, mimesis, oneiromancy, *agalmatopoia*, Demiurge, political philosophy, cosmogony, Panathenaea, soteriology.

Primary Texts: Plato's *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Republic*.

Plato's Imaging of Man, Polis and God

Introduction

This dissertation will pursue a line of inquiry that is very much underdeveloped in modern scholarship—namely Plato’s theology of image-making. This dissertation will map out the manner in which Plato constructs a unitary vision of the relational analogism between microcosmic man, the polis and the Divine Macrocosm. This three-tiered analogism between man, polity and God is the crux of Plato’s typological theology of imaging. This analogism-based theology of imaging can only be appreciated when both the *Republic* and the *Timaeus* are read together in conjunction. In designing his ideal polity Plato’s Socrates styles himself as a painter who sketches out a constitution which is a likeness of a man (*andreikelon*). This ‘man-shaped’ constitution encapsulates what Homer calls the God-like (*theoikelon*) element within humanity (*R.* 6.500e-501b). Socrates’ constitutional *zōgraphia* (painting) is directly related to the Timaeian cosmogony, for Socrates invites Timaeus to speak by expressing his desire to see his polity rendered a living *zōon* in motion (*Ti.* 19b-c). Timaeus achieves this for he concludes his cosmogonic speech by praying to the ‘God just now begotten in words though generated long ago in deed’ (*Criti.* 106a). That is to say that Timaeus successfully ‘paints out’ through the words of his cosmogony a living *zōgraphia* of the Divine Macrocosm. This living image of the Divine Macrocosm also doubles up as a delineation of Socrates’ ‘man-shaped’ political constitution. This is because, much like that *andreikelon*, Timaeus’ *eikōn* (likeness) of the All is a statue (*agalma*, *Ti.* 37c). Socrates’ and Timaeus’ jointly paint out a unitary schema that links man, polity and God in a singular ‘painted statue constructed out of words’. This unitary schema comprised of Socrates’ ideal polity ‘in the shape of’ a *zōgraphia-andreikelon* depicting the divine element in microcosmic man and

Timaeus' 'living statue' (*zōn agalma*) of the Divine Macrocosm has never been fully explored until now.

The *Timaeus* stands unique among Plato's works as the only dialogue consisting almost entirely of an uninterrupted mythic narrative containing a complete cosmogony (account of cosmic origins), theogony (account of divine origins), and anthropogony (account of human origins). Despite this remarkable status, much of the modern scholarship on Timaeus' creation myth treats it as a non-literal didactic tale.¹ The general modern tendency to focus on

¹ Ferrari (2023), 48 states that even though the non-literal interpretation was championed by the "great commentators of the last century" (*grandi commentatori del secolo scorso*) nonetheless "in recent years the literalist attitude, from which Platonic research seemed to be immune, has regained a certain vigour" (*ultimi anni l'attitudine letteralista, da cui la ricerca platonica sembrava ormai immunizzata, ha ripreso un certo vigore*). Indeed the greatest Anglophone commentator of the last century had the following to say, Cornford (1937), 27: the Demiurge "is to be taken, not literally, but as a poetical figure". Cornford (1937), 26 took the technical issue of 'creation in time' to be "bound up with the question whether the Demiurge, as such, is mythical" since "if he was not really a maker, then there was no moment of creation". Cornford is influenced here by an exegetic tradition going all the way back to Aristotle that attacks the validity of the Timaeian cosmogony on the ground that its account of 'creation in time' is inherently unfeasible and supposedly inherently contrary to the Platonic doctrine that the cosmos is eternal and un-generated (see *Cael.* 279b17–280a10, 280a27–32). Xenocrates, an important representative of the early Academy is reported as having spoken of the Timaeian cosmogony as being a mythic schema used 'for the sake of teaching', *didaskalias charin* (Xenocrates Fr 153–157 Isnardi). Does that mean Xenocrates saw the creation myth as a mere didactic fable rather than being a sacred revelation to be accepted at face value? Or is that Xenocratean testimonium that has shaped the bias against taking the Timaeian myth seriously a product of Aristotelian influence? The impact of the biased interpretative tradition started by Aristotle is so strong that it led Cherniss to argue that the creation story of the *Timaeus* was essentially merely a metaphor: Cherniss (1944), 421–431 and nn. 314, 349, 382, 385). This provoked the response of Vlastos who sought to establish that the myth was in fact intended to be taken literally: Vlastos (1965b), 401–19. See Taran (1966) on the question of literal interpretation. The argument that 'creation in time' precludes the Timaeian myth being 'literal' has been succinctly overturned by Vázquez who simply points out that even those seeking to defend the 'factual' reading have accepted a false premise of 'pre-cosmic time' that is erroneous. Vázquez rightly points out that to presume that there is some kind of 'time' prior to the point when Heaven is created and Astral Time is instituted does the text a gross injustice (this is what all modern exegetes do, non-literalists and factualists alike). The text expressly says that Time only comes into being when the Visible Heaven is completed. Time/Chronos is identified with planetary movement and with the Visible All, the astral bodies and everything that is below them that is influenced by them, the sub-lunar universe, the World of Becoming. Time qua World of Becoming is modelled on Eternity the Paradigm, the World of Being (see *Ti.* 37c–38c). Vázquez rightly points out that modern "readers of Plato erroneously assume that a succession of events implies time, but that is to impose a conception of time absent in the text", see Vázquez (2022), 111–133 generally, quote at 111. For an example of the typical reticence about the reality of the Timaeian God, see Kalkavage (2001), 111: "Timaeus' craftsman is simply postulated. There is no proof for his existence. The question is not whether there really is such a being but rather what he was looking at when he made the world...He leads us to suspect that the demiurge is a practical postulate that fills the gap of our theological ignorance". Cf. Sallis (1999), 95 who rightly understands elements of the Timaeian cosmogonic narrative as pre-chronological or extemporal.

the provisional and conjectural character of the narrative arises from the label which Timaeus himself gives to his discourse: *eikōs mythos/logos*.² The supposedly different connotations of the words *mythos* and *logos* have also received much focus. The word *mythos* is often supposed to have connotations of the fabular, the religious or even the counterfactual whereas *logos* is typically presumed to be associated with science and rationality.³ Rather than being weighed down by the alleged dichotomy between science and religion this dissertation will argue that Plato intended the *Timaeus* as a sincere religious revelation designed to replace the mythic classics of his civilization—the works of Homer and Hesiod—within his ideal state.⁴ This radical reinterpretation emerges from paying careful attention to a previously

² In asserting that Plato "would have been ready to accept most of it [the Timaeian myth] as provisionally the most likely story" Taylor (1928), ix adds that "the science of Timaeus is, in the main, pretty much what might be expected from a progressive Pythagorean contemporary of Socrates, and, that Plato has, at least, originated very little of it". Thus Taylor sees the work as an 'un-Platonic' Pythagorean scientific tractate providing a 'likely' scientific conjecture about cosmogony. For the typical reading of the *eikōs logos* as a provisional, non-dogmatic hypothesis incapable of total verification but rather only plausibility, see Santa Cruz (1997), 137.

³ Pender (2010), 219-245 and Sedley (2010), 246-258 see use of the label *mythos* as establishing kinship between the Timaeian cosmogony and the Hesiodic tradition. Burnyeat (2005), 143-145 in deciding where the Timaeian discourse sits between the two poles of the fictive/religious realm of Hesiodic myth and the 'scientifico-mathematical' *peri physeōs* tradition says that it is characterised by un-Hesiodic rationality but also free of the allegedly atheistic materialism of the Pre-Socratic *physiologoi* which Plato criticises in Book 10 of the *Laws*. Betegh (2010), 222-224 sees the term *mythos* as simply referring to a narrative and disagrees with Burnyeat on the point of the apparent religious connotations of the word. This dissertation asserts that such a dichotomisation between scientific fact and allegedly counterfactual myth is not helpful in interpreting the *Timaeus*. Instead, one is to favour the view advanced by Kalkavage (2019), 84 that the Timaeian narrative "blurs the distinction between science and myth, mathematics and poetry". Cf. Sedley (2007), 93: "the speech's outward form is largely that of a creation myth, although the register of its discourse switches repeatedly between myth, fable, prayer, scientific analysis, and philosophical argument". At any rate, the phrase when the *eikōs* label is first introduced in Timaeus' proem it is used only once with *mythos* (29d) twice expressly (29c) and once implicitly (29b: περί τε εἰκόνοσ...τοῦσ λόγουσ) with *logos*. In the cosmogonic monologue itself the word *mythos* occurs three times (59c, 68d, 69c) whilst *eikōs* occurs fourteen times (30b, 34c, 44d, 48c, 48d, 49b, 53d, 56a, 56d, 57d, 59c, 68d, 72d, 90e). There are two occurrences of *eikōs mythos* and eight of *eikōs logos*. In tabulating this data Vlastos (1995), 248-250 interprets it in light of the unhelpful dichotomy between the 'mythical' and the 'scientific'. He deems the "sober, systematic prosaic tone" of Timaeus the master astronomer (27a) "who, in Socrates' estimation has reached the highest summit of all philosophy (20a)" to contrast starkly with the allegedly counterfactual, inaccurate, or un-scientific myths told elsewhere in the Platonic corpus, particularly by Critias just before Timaeus begins his discourse. Indeed, the Greek myths of Phoroneus, Deucalion and Phaethon are all treated rather contemptuously by the Egyptian priest who instead proffers a naturalistic world-view (22a-23b).

⁴ Socrates states that as the founder of the ideal polity it is not his role to act as a poet but rather to simply set up the 'rules' (*typoi*) determining according to which the poets are to depict the Divine (*R.* 2.378e-379a). Even though Socrates expressly refuses to act as a poet he nonetheless sets up the conditions for the composition of an ideal mythic poem—the Timaeian *eikōs mythos* should be seen as the fulfilment of expectation set by Socrates in the political discourse prior to Timaeus' cosmogonic one.

underappreciated concept mentioned in Book 6 of the *Republic*: the *theoeikelon andreikelon* (501b). This dissertation takes that phrase to represent Plato's conception of an over-arching schema that unifies the Divine Macrocosm, the ideal political constitution, and the microcosmic human being into a single image or blueprint that constitutes a point of teleological, and soteriological focus for a what is effectively a political theology. This unitary, all-encompassing image or blueprint functions as a relational roadmap laying out how each stratum in the descending hierarchy of macrocosm-polity-man relates to each other. By doing this the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* implicitly explains how Being and Becoming intersect with each other.⁵

It is the process of ‘image-making’ (*eikonopoiia*) that facilitates this understanding of how Being and Becoming intersect and how it is that microcosmic man constitutes a mimetic image of the Divine Macrocosm as mediated through constitution of the ideal polity, the *theoeikelon-andreikelon*, which itself constitutes a kind *eikōn*.⁶ The Visible Cosmos, the divine World of Becoming serves as the macrocosmic likeness (*eikōn*) of the Divine Paradigm qua World of Being and Perfect Noetic *Zōon* containing all invisible, noetic animals, all Forms (*Ti.30c-d, 92c*).⁷ Human beings represent the microcosmic likeness of the

⁵ In its treatment of R.500e-501b this dissertation will speak of the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* as one compound expression even though they are technically separate in the text. Plato first has his Socrates speak of delineating (*diagraphein*) as a *zōgraphos* (painter) a political constitution in the form of an *andreikelon*. Then in reference to that *andreikelon* Socrates adds that the *zōgraphoi* are to draw from that which Homer calls the ‘God-like’ quality in humans (ἀπ’ ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοεἶκελον, 501b). As such the Homeric *theoeikelon* is technically an abstraction that is used to judge the accuracy of the painted *andreikelon*. Nonetheless hyphenation as a compound is still constructive and convenient—it serves to express how, provided it is mixed and painted correctly (συμμειγνύντες τε καὶ κεραννύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον, 501b), then the *andreikelon*-constitution should also bear the likeness the Homeric *theoeikelon*. Such then is the logic behind the convenient hyphenised compound.

⁶ In *Phlb* 29a-30b Socrates projects the microcosmic structure of man out on the cosmos. This is in a sense the reverse of what the *Timaeus* does in imposing the structure of the Divine Macrocosm onto microcosmic man.

⁷ In referring the to the Paradigm as ‘divine’ a question arises—is it the Platonic Godhead? If not, then where does the Paradigm stand vis-à-vis God? Karfik (2004), 102, 117–127, 145-146, 147, albeit with limited textual support, assumes that there are sets of noetic gods that correspond with the four elemental kinds of creatures

Generated Divine Macrocosm, the World of Becoming, the Perfect Visible *Zōon* containing all visible animals. Mediating between microcosmic man and the Divine Macrocosm is the ideal political constitution, the *theoikelon andreikelon*, which functions as a "mesocosm"—an intermediate ordering structure embodied in the astronomical clockwork of Heaven. This mesocosmic constitution provides a roadmap not only for aligning one's own individual body-soul compound with the Divine Macrocosm but also for forming a polity that functions as a cosmos-imitating superorganism.

and takes the *theoi theōn* in *Ti.41a* to be a partitive genitive with the nominative gods being the astral ones (not the anthropomorphic ones of tradition that are not expressly said to be made by the Demiurge) and the others being the aforementioned noetic gods that are identified with the Demiurge and the Paradigm. Whilst Van Riel (2013), 84 is to a degree warranted in calling Karfik's presumption that there are noetic gods corresponding to the elemental classes of visible *zōa* a "highly questionable inference" there is a passage that suggests that the Paradigm contains noetic gods that are likely to be the Forms—*Ti. 37c* calls the Visible Cosmotheos a statue of the invisible/eternal gods (τῶν ἀδιδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα). This may suggest that the Forms are Eternal, Invisible Noetic Gods within the Divine Paradigm. Whilst that is a possible construal the line is a stand-alone and could easily be deemed to fall short of clear identification of the Paradigm with the Forms if one is so inclined. It largely depends on whether one considers the Forms deities. For an excellent assessment of the possible presence of the Forms in the *Timaeus*, see Ostenfeld (1997), 167-177. Wolfson (1961), 3 differentiates between extradeical and intradeical readings of the Forms: "the Ideas have an existence external to God, either ungenerated and coeternal with God [e.g. *Ti. 28a,29a, 52a-b* and *Philebus 15b*] or produced and made by God [*R. 10.597b-d*, the famous couch passage]". Van Camp & Canart (1956), 421 & Van Riel (2013), 35 argue that despite the Forms being described as 'divine' (θεῖα) they are not to be seen as deities. Nightingale (2021), 52-53 says that "gods are divine because they continually contemplate the Forms" which "indicates that the Forms themselves must have divinity": "to be sure, Plato makes this point indirectly: we infer the divinity of the Forms by way of the gods". This statement is made when commenting on the famous chariot myth of *Phaedrus 249c* where the souls of philosophers, relying on memory, are said to get as close as possible to the very things which make God divine, these things being the *onta*, the Forms (πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνοις αἰεὶ ἔστιν μνήμη κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὧν θεῖός ἐστιν). If the Forms or the Paradigm give God His divinity, are they more divine than Him? What is He without them? Bordt (2006), 91-92 claims that the Forms do not have ontological superiority vis-a-vis the God qua Nous. Bordt (2006), 161-162 identifies the Good and God. So too Zeller (1922), 710-718, Friedländer (1928), Ritter (1923), Wilamowitz (1920), 582 and 597ff, Robin (1968), Krämer (1959), Loenen (1951), 217-37, Gerson (1990), de Vogel (1970), 210-242 and Wood (1968), 255-258 all identified the highest metaphysical principle, the Form of the Good, as Plato's impersonal, non-mythic Godhead with the Demiurge being that ultimate principle's mythic personification. Similarly Benitez (1995), 113-140, Menn (1992), 543-573, Baltus (1966), 317 ff, Halfwassen (2000), 39-62, Diès (1927), 61-67 and Karfik (2004), 119-127 also all identify the Demiurge and the Paradigm but are not as expressly anti-mythical in doing so as many of the metaphysicalising modern exegetes are. Perl (1998), 81-92 identifies the *Timaeus* Demiurge with the process of intellection (*noēsis*) and deduces that the Forms are both the content of *noēsis* as well as the object thereof. Similarly Verdenius (1954), 241-83, and Enders (1999), 131-185 interpret Plato's gods as being the Forms themselves in a state of perpetual self-contemplation. Similarly Diès (1927), 61-67 sees the Platonic gods as the Forms which are in turn contemplated by the Creator God (Demiurge) of the *Timaeus* Who is to be identified with both Divine Intellection (Nous) and the Paradigm or Model that He uses in creating the universe.

It shall be shown that astronomy, mathematics and music play a key role in the pedagogy or, for lack of a better word, ‘education system’, of Socrates’ ideal polity and in Timaeus’ correlating poem because those disciplines along with the demiurgic art of image-making (*eikonopoia*) help the philosopher-king to understand the relationship between and intersection of Becoming and Being.⁸ The process of image-making (*eikonopoia*) underpins the ontology, epistemology, pedagogy, anthropology, teleology, soteriology and theology of the *Timaeus-Republic*. As such these two texts will be treated as a unit articulating a theology centred on the dynamic of demiurgic mimesis whereby philosopher-kings imitate Nous the Demiurge’s image-making not only in order to individually divinise themselves but also to establish an ideal polity that is as God-like as possible and can impart that quality to all its citizenry.⁹

⁸ Cf. Sedley (1989), 377: ‘astronomy becomes par excellence the discipline which can bridge the gulf between sensible and intelligible worlds and enable man to transcend his own mortal existence’. See also Sallis (1999), 44-45 citing *R.528a-b* & *530d*.

⁹ This dissertation will use the capitalised ‘God’ in reference to the Timaeian Demiurge Who will be assumed to be the highest (known) deity in the Platonic corpus and will be identified as Nous (Intelligence). For the Demiurge as Nous, see Van Riel (2013), 81 with *Ti.47e-48a*. The capitalisation of ‘God’ in reference to the Demiurge may appear problematic due to the issue of potential monotheistic bias in the interpretation of Plato’s theology which was of course articulated in polytheistic context, e.g. Van Riel (2013), 66 n16: “personifications like the Demiurge in the *Timaeus*, and the divine checkers-player in the *Laws* (X, 903d) allows for a recognition of monotheistic tendencies [which]...are much weaker than commonly held in literature”. For Plato’s polytheism, see Cornford (1938-a) and (1938-b), 321-330. with Taylor (1938), 183-184 and Mueller (1936), 462-469. Rather oddly Plato alternates between the plural *theoi* and the singular *theos* throughout the *Timaeus* when describing demiurgy. Baltés (1996), 76-96 takes this to mean that the many gods acting as sub-demiurges are to be ontologically identified with the single Demiurge Nous. Karfik (2004, 115-116 argues that such a henotheistic compounding is not supported by the text and suggests instead that one is to see the plural form as referring to planetary demiurgy specifically and the singular as demiurgy on the whole. The capitalisation of God when used in reference to the Demiurge in this dissertation is not done in the spirit of an arbitrary monotheistic tendency but rather simply to emphasise the Demiurge’s role as supreme deity in a kind of henotheistic polytheist panentheism, cf. Baltzly (2010), 214: “Plato’s *Timaeus* describes a situation in which a cosmic god and a plurality of encosmic gods depend (beginninglessly) upon a creator god”. The created ‘cosmic god’ though ontologically distinct from Nous the Demiurge will nonetheless be referred to with the capital pronoun He/Him in order to properly express His importance as the single deity that constitutes the visible *eikōn* of the Noetic (Paradigm?) as per *Ti.92c* that is to be prayer prayed to (as per *Criti.106a*). This is not say that Nous the Demiurge and the Visible Cosmotheos should be totally identified—the ontological distinction between Becoming and Being must be maintained. More (1921), 22—23 cautions that identification of the World Soul animating the Cosmotheos and the Demiurge would result in pantheism that is to say total immanentism that identifies the noetic Godhead with the created world, something very un-Platonic. However, Dombrowski (2005), 129, n20 rightly notes that “More is not helpful in his suggestion that if the World Soul were God, pantheism would result” since “panentheism is an option he does not consider”. For ‘panentheism’ as an apt descriptor of Timaeian cosmotheology, see Cooper (2006), 27 & 36 & Mohr (1982), 41-48. Nous the

What This Dissertation Will Accomplish?

The fact that the opening dialogic portion of the *Timaeus-Critias* contains Socrates' synopsis of his ideal polity (*Ti.* 17c–19a) which clearly presents content from the *Republic* leads to the rather obvious conclusion that Critias' tale of Palaeo-Athens' struggle against Atlantis and Timaeus' creation-story's epistemology and ontology are indebted to and thus intended to be read in conjunction with the *Republic*.¹⁰ However, what is far less obvious and will constitute the main novel contribution of this thesis is that it is not only the expressly politico-historical tale which Critias tells which satisfies Socrates' desire at *Ti.* 19b-c to see his ideal polity animated as living, moving *zōon* but also the Timaeian *eikōs mythos*. It has not been duly noted in modern scholarship that it is not Critias' politico-historical narrative but rather Timaeus' monologue dealing with cosmotheogony and anthropogony that expressly results in a living, moving *zōon* being generated. Timaeus concludes his discourse by praying to "the God begotten earlier in deed but just now in words" (τῷ δὲ πρὶν μὲν πάλαι ποτ' ἔργω, νῦν δὲ λόγοις ἄρτι θεῷ γεγονότι προσεύχομαι, *Criti.* 106a).¹¹ This remarkable passage suggests that just as Nous the Demiurge created the Visible Cosmotheos "back then" when time was instituted, so too Timaeus has "birthed Him anew just now" through the words of his

Demiurge is identified with the World Soul that He creates by Cherniss (1944), 603-610, Cornford (1937), 39, Theiler (1965), 69-74, Carone (2005), 42-52 & Festugière (1949), 104, 146-147. On the other hand Brisson (1974), 81-84, Reale (1997), 583-712 & Proclus, *In Ti.* I 310.3–312.26 see the Demiurge as the Intellect intermediating between the Paradigm and World Soul. The exact character of the Demiurge and His relation to both the Paradigm and the Visible All and Anima Mundi that He begets is unclear. Ultimately it is not necessary to resolve these problems for the purposes of this dissertation.

¹⁰ Owen (1953/1965), 313-338; Zeyl (2000), xxvii. For treating the *Timaeus-Critias* as a unitary work defined by narrative continuity, see Clay (1997), 49-54 & Broadie (2012), 115-172. It is not universally accepted that the polity summarised by Socrates in the incipit of the *Timaeus* is the ideal polity presented in the *Republic*, e.g. Brann (1989/1990), 23: "the city Socrates recapitulates in the *Timaeus* is, in any case, not the city of the central books of the *Republic*, for, although his account is said to be complete (19a7), the philosopher kings are omitted; it is rather the 'third city' with all its notorious features". This dissertation will nonetheless take Socrates' Panathenaic discourse of the prior evening to be identifiable with the discourse of the *Republic*. This identification will be insisted on despite the two political discourses being set in different festive contexts (the Bendideia and the Panathenaea) and despite the synopsis of *Ti.* 19a being 'complete' but not including much of the detail found in the *Republic*—it is not reasonable that a synopsis of such brevity can include every single detail of the discourse, it simply provides salient features, not an exhaustive recapitulation.

¹¹ For the Cosmotheos as a God worthy of worship and not simply a shadowy *eidōlon*, see Petrucci (2023), 101-121.

discourse. This overwhelmingly significant line has received insufficient attention in modern scholarship.

The notion that a living *eikōn* of the Visible Cosmotheos freshly-generated in words could simultaneously also be Socrates' ideal polity animated as a moving *zōon* may seem strange in the abstract but it is clearly the case when one reads the text of the *Timaeus* carefully in conjunction with *R.* 6.500e-501b.¹² When Critias explains how his speech will follow on from *Timaeus'* and *Socrates'* discourses he says that he will receive the humans that will be 'generated through speech' by the former and have been exceptionally-well educated by the latter (ὡς παρὰ μὲν τούτου δεδεγμένον ἀνθρώπους τῷ λόγῳ γεγονότας, παρὰ σοῦ δὲ πεπαιδευμένους διαφερόντως, *Ti.*27b). Thus it is not only a living *eikōn* of the Visible Cosmotheos that *Timaeus* births through his speech (*logos*) but within that image is a host of humans virtually generated through speech (τῷ λόγῳ γεγονότας) who are identified with the perfectly-educated citizens of *Socrates'* ideal polity. *Critias* in telling of the exploits of *Palaeo-Athens* against *Atlantis* takes on the men that have just-now been virtually moulded by *Timaeus* and educated by *Socrates* and makes them the population of his *Palaeo-Athens*. As such the three discourses of *Timaeus*, *Socrates* and *Critias* together form a unitary 'puppet-play'.¹³ *Timaeus* moulds the puppets or *agalma*-men, *Socrates* educates them and *Critias* sets them in motion in war (cf. *Ti.*19b-c). Given then that the discourses function in such a way, *Socrates'* speech is to be seen as having virtually created a polity and implemented an education system within the *eikōn* of Visible Cosmotheos that *Timaeus* constructed through his cosmogonic *eikonopoia* (image-making).

¹² Cf. Petraki (2013), 71-94.

¹³ Cf. *Lg.*644d7–645b and the Allegory of the Cave.

This dissertation will emphasise for the first time the hitherto underappreciated fact that there is a clear analogism between Timaeus' Demiurge looking to the eternally self-same Noetic Paradigm (ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεί, *Ti.* 28a) whilst structuring the All as both an ensouled *zōon* endowed with reason (ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννοον, *Ti.* 30b) and a dodecahedral *diagraphē* (*Ti.* 55c: διαζωγραφῶν) and the philosopher-kings in Book 6 of the *Republic* that paint out the ideal polity as a *diagraphē* whilst relying on a Divine Paradigm (εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράψειαν οἱ τῷ θεῷ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι, 500e). Whilst the latter political *diagraphē* is not an *eikōn* of the Divine Macrocosm per se they are looking at the Paradigm, that which is by nature Just, Beautiful, and Temperate (πρὸς τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον, 501b) and on the basis of this Divine Model they create an image (*andreikelon*) of that which Homer called 'God-like' (*theoeikelon*) in man (501a-b). Unlike the Demiurge the philosopher-kings painting out the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* do not produce a comprehensive likeness of the Paradigm in the form of the Visible Cosmotheos but rather condense the qualities of the Divine Macrocosm into an image of the ideal microcosmic human. Socrates as philosopher-king produces an ideal constitution in the form of the divinised microcosmic man and in so doing sets up the parameters for the Timaeian cosmogonic myth which will bring that *zōgraphia* to life and expand that image of man and polity into an *eikōn* of the whole Divine Macrocosm (*Ti.* 19b-c).

The point in all this is that one needs to appreciate the typology of image-making (*eikonopoiia*) developed by Plato across the *Timaeus-Republic* in order to appreciate how this unitary political, anthropogonic and cosmotheogonic discourse constitutes the perfect exemplification of the goal articulated in the *Theaetetus*—achieving maximum possible

likeness to God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) through emulating His qualities (176a-b). No better profile of Plato's conception of God and His relation to man can be procured than by tracing out the divinising and Demiurge-imitating process of *eikonopoia* as developed in the *Republic-Timaeus*. This process of *eikonopoia* not only moulds humans and polities into perfect microcosmic and mesocosmic *eikones* of the Divine Macrocosm but the words (*logoi*) that make up such discourse collectively form a simulacrum of the Divine Macrocosm that is itself worthy of worship (τῷ...νῦν δὲ λόγοις ἄρτι θεῷ γεγονότι προσεύχομαι, *Criti.* 106a). The *logos* (discourse) is just as much the means of imaging God and moulding man in His image as it is the object of worship in its own right. This is not an un-Platonic conflation of image and archetype—rather it is a display of how the true philosopher-demiurge can produce such a reasonable likeness of the Paradigm that it can be worshipped in lieu of the Godhead Himself.

Image-Making in the Platonic Project

Whilst clearly novel in many respects this dissertation nonetheless builds upon prior scholarship. For instance Rémi Brague's groundbreaking essay "The Body of the Speech: A New Hypothesis of the Compositional Structure of Timaeus' Monologue," argues that the entire Timaeian cosmogonic monologue is structured according to the proportions of Polyclitus's Doryphorus—an idealized statue of a spear-wielding warrior.¹⁴ This agalmatic (statue-shaped) structure is not an arbitrary superimposition for Timaeus says that God created the Visible Cosmotheos as a living (*zōn*) statue (*agalma*) of the invisible/eternal gods (*aidiōn theōn*, *Ti.*37c). Should it come as a surprise then that the Timaeian discourse depicting God's creation of the All as a living *agalma* should also be itself animated as a statue and a

¹⁴ Brague (1985).

zōon? Is this not in keeping with the image-based analogism of the text which this dissertation brings to the fore?

The idea that both the discourse itself and the cosmos it describes are both ‘living *agalmata*’ is directly connected to Socrates’s desire to see his ideal polity rendered as a living creature (*zōon*) moving in warfare. The whole Timaeian discourse is a response to that prompt (*Ti.* 19b-c). The constitution of the ideal polity which itself is not merely a political structure but is also the blueprint of the All, the *theoikelon andreikelon*, is to be ‘painted’ or ‘sculpted’ and animated by Timaeus in his cosmogonic speech.

The Timaeian discourse thus becomes the realization of Socrates's desire: it is simultaneously a virtual simulation of the birthing of the divine World of Becoming (the visible Cosmotheos) and a statuary representation of both the *theoikelon-andreikelon* political constitution and the ideal divinized warrior-philosopher of that perfect city, Callipolis. The Cosmotheos, the ideal polity and the perfect human are all unified in one image, in the *eikōn* of the *theoikelon andreikelon*. Further, the discourse describing this unity itself bears the very likeness of what it describes—it depicts macrocosmic cosmogony, mesocosmic politogony and microcosmic anthropogony in the unitary image of the *theoikelon andreikelon*. Whilst at face value Timaeus’ *eikōs mythos-logos* seems only to expressly deal with the ordering of the generated macrocosm (cosmogony) and of microcosmic man (anthropogony) it also subtly contains an account of politogony, of how Socrates’ ideal polity can be animated as a living creature (*zōon*). But how is this so?

Zacharoula Petraki's recent work titled "Sculpture, Weaving, and the Body in Plato" provides a crucial foundation for understanding how image-making (*eikonopoia*) extends throughout Plato's political theory.¹⁵ The most obvious instance of this is the "Noble Lie" or Myth of Metals in *Republic* Book 3 which describes citizens being crafted as living statues from four metals (gold, silver, bronze, iron) corresponding to three social classes (415c–d). The word *typos* (mould) is used to describe the pattern that correctly-composed myths should bear, with their contents being impressed upon young citizens by the nurses who "mould" (*plattein*) their souls through sacred stories just as they shape their bodies with their hands (*R.* 377b–d). Petraki has emphasised the agalmatic significance of the word *typos* here and has connected it to a broader repertoire of sculptural imagery and diction used by Socrates in describing the education of citizens in his ideal polity in terms of moulding statues through the lost-wax technique.¹⁶ What then is the relevance to the present dissertation of Petraki's recent work on Plato's employment of a typology of *agalmatopoia* in his depiction of Socrates' education of citizens in the ideal polity?¹⁷

Though Petraki does not make the connection expressly herself, the depiction of Socrates as a sculptor (*andriantopios*) of citizens' body-soul compounds in *R.* 7.540c relates directly to the way that Timaeus' cosmogony fulfills Socrates' desire at *Ti.* 19b–c to see his ideal polity rendered a moving, living *zōon*. Thus, the typology also relates to the depiction at *Ti.* 37c of God creating the Visible Cosmotheos as a living statue (*zōn agalma*) of the eternal/invisible gods (*aidiōn theōn*) and to Brague's conviction that the Timaeian discourse itself is structured

¹⁵ Petraki (2023). For the concept of *eikōn* in the Timaeus specifically, see Grasso (2012), 353–355 & Poetsch (2019), 210–222. For *eikōn* in the Platonic corpus generally, Gonzalez (2017), 47–65 & Moore (2017), 88–106. For the *Alcibiades* and the *Symposium*, see Ford (2017), 11–28.

¹⁶ Petraki (2023) 122 & 137 with Isoc. *Euagoras* 74 and Pollitt (1974), 287–288 for mould-casting. See also Mattusch (1980), 435–444.

¹⁷ For the word ἀγαλματοποιῖα, see LSJ s.v. ἀγαλματοποιῖα with Philostr.VS1.11.2 & Porph. *Abst.* 2.49.

according to the proportions of Polyclitus' Doryphorus, a statue of the ideal warrior. The point here is that the typology of *agalmatopoiia* links the *Republic* and *Timaeus* and helps delineate the connections between microcosmic man, the intermediating 'mesocosm' of the ideal political constitution and the Divine Macrocosm all of which are unified in the concept of the *theoikelon andreikelon*, the singular *eikōn* of the All. The account of the education of the citizens in the *Republic* will be shown to be inextricably linked to the exemplary cosmogonic prose-poem of the Timaeian monologue wherein a likeness (*eikōn*) of the Theocosmos is virtually constructed in words which bears the proportions of one of the warrior-philosophers metallurgically crafted in Socrates' ideal polity. Thus, when read through the typology of *agalmatopoiia*, these two texts reveal themselves as fundamentally concerned with the same singular project rather than being separate treatises on political theory and cosmology respectively. Both texts deal with the interfacing of Being and Becoming through *eikonopoiia*, both in terms of painting (*zōgraphia*) and sculpting of statues (*agalmatopoiia*/andriantopoiia). The three enterprises of cosmogony, politogony and anthropogony and/or mythopoetic education are centred around the same dynamic of image-production (*eikonopoiia*) and are all inherently theological—all are concerned with the *theoikelon andreikelon*, the imitation of the Divine Paradigm.

The tripartite class structure of the ideal polity (philosopher-kings, guardians, workers) corresponds directly to the tripartite structure of the human soul (*nous, thymos, epithymētikon*).¹⁸ Just as a city requires thinking, spirited, and productive elements working

¹⁸ For analogism between man's soul and the polis, see *R.* Book II, 368c-369a and 435a.-d. For the tripartite body-soul compound of man, see *Ti.* 41d-47e & 69c-72d. For Socrates' first articulation of the tripartite soul, see *R.* Book IV 436 – 439. For the ideal polity's class structure and how it relates to the body-soul compound of individual humans, see *R.* 2.376c, ii.427c and 433d. See *Ti.* 17d-18b on the *Phylakes*, the martial class of the ideal polity. See *Ti.* 24a-b for Sais' class hierarchy. For Plato's tripartite soul, see *Ti.* 68e-70e & *Phdr.* 246a-257b with Barney (2016), 53-83; Whiting (2012), 174-208; Arruzza (2019), 227-250; Fletcher (2016), 397-434;

in harmony, so too must the individual souls achieve proper internal coordination.¹⁹ As Guthrie and Waterfield have argued, theology and individual psychology constitute the central focus of the *Republic*, with political theory simply being completely subordinated to those concerns.²⁰ The *Timaeus* provides the cosmological foundation for this psychological and religious project by revealing how individual human transformation participates in the same divine demiurgic activity that orders the entire cosmos. The philosopher-king's own soteriological enterprise of divinising himself through the proper ordering of the microcosm of his own body-soul compound and his subsequent establishment of a polity that embodies the ideal of the *theoikelon-andreikelon* constitution parallels Nous the Demiurge's creation and maintenance of the Divine Macrocosm qua *eikōn* of the Paradigm.

Cultural Context: Festivals, Rhapsody, and Sacred Art

This dissertation employs a crucial two-pronged methodology: close textual reading combined with cultural contextualization. This second element proves particularly important for countering the dominant "secularizing approach to Platonic philosophy" in modern scholarship that Nightingale has identified as a major impediment to the correct understanding of Plato:

“[Modern-day] philosophers tend to ignore Plato's references to Greek religious practices because these fall outside of the modern philosophical enterprise. If we elide the religious discourse in his dialogues, however, we see only one 'rational' strand of Plato's philosophy. This does not do justice to his philosophical program. Plato regularly refers to religious rituals, festivals, and mystery cults in his discussions of the soul and the Forms. To understand his philosophy, we need to locate his ideas in the context of Greek religious discourses and practices. In this book, I aim to challenge the secularizing approach to Platonic philosophy. Plato's theory of the

¹⁹ The analogism between Plato's ideal polity and his conception of man's well-harmonised body-soul compound is very well established in modern scholarship. E.g. Blössner (2007), 345-385; Waterfield (1993), p152, Annas (1999), 72-95; Uebersax (2016), 108-109; Evrigenis (2002), 590-610; Hall (1959), 149-158; Smith (1999), 31-49; Neu, (1971), 238-254; Bluck (1959), 166-168; Barker (1959), 68. Popper (1962), 76.

²⁰ Guthrie (1986), Waterfield (1993). See also Hoerber (1944).

Forms and the soul have distinct and quite prominent theological aspects. If we ignore this aspect of his philosophy, we lose an essential part of his thinking”.²¹

For this reason, the present dissertation must, along with close textual reading, also focus on cultural contextualisation so as to avoid anachronistic interpretation, something that inevitably occurs when the inherently religious diction and imagery of a Platonic text is overlooked and the modern scholar’s own secularising bias is allowed to fill the vacuum in which these now non-living texts exist.²² How then will the relevant Platonic texts assessed in this dissertation be ‘re-animated’ in their original cultural contexts? Critically both the *Republic* and *Timaeus* are explicitly set during religious festivals—the *Bendideia* (*R.* 1.354a) and a festival of Athena respectively.²³ Thus, close attention must be paid to added meaning imparted to the *Critias-Timaeus* by its festive back-drop. Critias presents the speeches that he and Timaeus will deliver as both a favour to Socrates in return for his political discourse on education in the ideal polity and as "encomiastic hymn-offerings fitting for the feast taking place in honor of the goddess" (τὴν θεὸν ἅμα ἐν τῇ πανηγύρει δικαίως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς οἶόνπερ ὑμνοῦντας ἐγκωμιάζειν, *Ti.* 21a). The festival dedicated to Athena that constitutes the cultural backdrop for the drama of the *Timaeus-Critias* and Socrates’ *Republic*-like discourse the prior day (see *Ti.* 17b) is not expressly named. Nonetheless there is good reason to presume that this

²¹ Nightingale (2021), 7-8.

²² Petersen (2017), 9-10: “the question of whether we think of Plato as an exponent of philosophy or of religion is also inextricably related to a more principal stand: should we ultimately read Plato in light of the subsequent historical development of a modern philosophical tradition detached from a religious context, or should we rather examine his thinking with an appreciation of what it was a reaction to? Our proclivity to classify him as either a philosopher or an exponent of religion is, I think, often self-revelatory in this regard”

²³ Proclus, *In Ti.*, 1.84-85 suggests that the Lesser Panathenaea on the 19th of *Thargelion* directly followed the *Bendideia* whereas as per 1.26 the Greater Panathenaea occurred every fourth year during Hecatombaeon (the main day being on the 28th). Festugière thinks that Proclus or his source has conflated the Lesser Panathenaea with the Plynteria that was held on the 25th of *Thargelion*, the confusion being due to the fact that on that day the peplos of Athena was also a central focus—it was washed in the sea along with the goddess’ cult statue, see Festugière (1966) vol.1, 55, 85, 121 & 122. Cornford (1937), 5: "neither [Panathenaic] festival, in fact, came within two months of the Bendideia. Plato probably intended the Greater Panathenaea". Cf. Bury (1929), 28 identifies the festival of the goddess mentioned at *Ti.* 21a as “the Lesser Panathenaea, held early in June, just after the Bendideia”.

feast is the Greater Panathenaea.²⁴ The traditional Panathenaic *peplos* (robe) which was presented to Athena during this festival depicted her role in the gigantomachy, showing the goddess and Zeus triumphing over the Giants²⁵. However, *R.378a-d* shows Plato's Socrates explicitly rejecting such depictions as theologically incorrect, since they portray deities at war with each other and as sources of evil. Thus it will be argued that, by virtue of their placement against the back-drop of the visual depictions of the *peplos* and the myths of the Panathenaic poetry-performances, the Timaeon cosmogony and Critias's epic are implicitly being offered as replacements for these traditional unseemly depictions of divinity. Critias emphasizes that his story "will be admirably suited to the festival of the Goddess which is now being held, because of its connection with her; and the fact that it is no invented fable but genuine history is all-important" (ὅς τῃ τε παρουσίᾳ τῆς θεοῦ θυσία διὰ τὴν οἰκειότητ' ἂν πρέποι μάλιστα, τό τε μὴ πλασθέντα μῦθον ἀλλ' ἀληθινὸν λόγον εἶναι πάμμεγά που, *Ti.* 26e). The veracity and appropriateness of these new myths for religious contexts indicates their function as genuine divine revelations. This is a radical departure from the typical hermeneutic of suspicion that dominates the modern scholarship that typically sees both the

²⁴ Cornford (1937), I n.1: "that the festival of the goddess' (Athena) mentioned at 21a and 26e is the Panathenaea is clear from the context in both places and would never have been doubted but for the unfounded notion that Socrates is supposed to have narrated on the previous day the whole of the *Republic*, or a substantial part of it, as it stands in our texts." Taylor (1928), 45 deems the *Plynteria* a more likely candidate than either Panathenaic festival. For a thorough introduction to the Panathenaea, see Neils (1992a), 14-27.

²⁵ Parker 2005: 255–256; Sourvinou-Inwood 2011: 276–80; Pinney (1988), 471. The *peplos* presented to Athena in the festival showed her victory over Enceladus, her giant-foe, see schol. on *Ar. Knights* 566a and *Suda* s.v. πέπλος. For iconography of Athena and Enceladus see Musée du Louvre, Paris, E732: Vian (1951) no.96, pl.22; Vian (1988) no.170; Vian (1988), 269. In addition to Enceladus a giant named Aster/Asterius is also said to have been defeated by Athena in the context of the Panathenaean mythology, see schol. on *Aristid. Panath.* 189, p. 323 Dindorf= Aristotle *Fr.* 637 (Rose). See also Stratt. *fr.* 73 (PCG), schol. vet. *Eur. Hec.* 467 (Schwartz); *Pl. Euthphr.* 6b-c, Origen, *C. Cels.* 6.42; Procl. *In Prm.* 1.643; schol. on *Pl. R.* 1.327a; schol. vet. *Eur. Hec.* 468, 472 (Schwartz); [Verg.] *Ciris* 21–35. Euripides himself in *Hecuba* 466-473 and *Iphigenia in Tauris* 221-224 has Titans instead of Gigantes on the *peplos*, a common conflation. For identification of Titanomachy and gigantomachy, see Vian (1952), 173; Collard (1991), 154–5. Gregory (1999), 101–102. Matthiessen (2008), 131. Kyriakou 2006: 105; Stamatopoulou 2012: 73 note 7; cf. Cropp 2000: 190. Shear (2021) 157-158 with *Ar. Knights* 565–568 for the *peplos'* ties to patriotism. Proclus *in Ti.* 1.172 notes that Critias' tale about Palaeo-Athens defeating Atlantis was well suited to the patriotism of the Panathenaea for its orations were focused on Athen's successes in the Persian war—see also Cornford (1937), 361-362.

Timaean cosmogony and Critias' story of Atlantis and Palaeo-Athens as untrue fictions.²⁶ In making this argument in favour of the serious character of the Timaean myth in light of its performance context, this dissertation is heavily indebted to Gregory Nagy's work on Plato's modelling of the relay-structure of the sequential rhapsodic performances of Homeric poetry during the Panathenaea in the speeches of the *Timaeus-Critias*.²⁷ This connection to rhapsodic tradition proves crucial for understanding Plato's broader project. Just as the Panathenaic peplos was rewoven annually with new designs, and just as Homeric poetry was "rewoven" through new performances at each festival, so too the Timaean cosmogony represents a new sacred "tapestry" composed of ideal stories that would replace problematic traditional myths while maintaining their religious and educational functions.²⁸

Chapter One—The Timaean Discourse as *Nomos*

This first chapter explores the significance of Socrates calling Timaeus' discourse a 'strain' (*nomos*) at *Ti.*29d. Timaeus' mythic prose-poem's identity as a *nomos* will be assessed in terms of its performance context, the rhapsodic *agōnes* of the Panathenaea. Given that the Timaean discourse is a response to Socrates' request at *Ti.*19b-c to see his ideal polity's constitution rendered a martial animal (*zōon*) in motion, the bivalence of the word *nomos* must be considered—it carries both the musical meaning of 'strain' but also that of 'law' or

²⁶ Rosenmeyer (1956), 165: "there is so much harping on the word truth, and the complications of the tradition that the reader is soon convinced of the fact that he is about to listen to a *pseudos*". Johansen(1998), 212: "Socrates' statement that it is by good fortune (*agathēi tuchēi*) that the Atlantis story has come up since it would be impossible to 'find others if we dismiss these [i.e. the ancient Athenians conceived as historical representatives of the ideal city]' (26e5-6) sounds suspiciously as if he thinks that he is being rather too lucky and that the story might indeed be *plastheis muthos*". cf. Morgan (1998), 101-118 who deems the Atlantis-narrative to be a 'noble lie' and interprets it in its original geopolitical context as a historiographical reflection. See also Zuckert (1996), 235, Sallis (1999), 30, McCabe (1994), 176 & Berger (2005), 471-472.

²⁷ Nagy (2002), esp. 33-69 for the influence rhapsodic performance of Homer on the *Timaeus-Critias*.

²⁸ Nagy (2002), 97 argues based on Hom. Od. 8.429 (where the word *hymnos* is used in conjunction with the word for mantle, *phāpos*, in a manner that suggests an etymological connection between the weaving of robes and of songs) that the festive "re-performance of Homer [was] equated, metaphorically with the re-weaving of the Peplos".

‘custom’ more broadly.²⁹ In the text’s cultural context, customary law and music are deeply interrelated. Plato presents Timaeus as a song-composer (*nomopoios*) and a law-giver (*nomothetēs*) simultaneously.³⁰ Further, Timaeus’ law-song (*nomos*) with its astronomical and musico-mathematical focus in describing the motions of celestial bodies and the harmonic ratios of the World Soul will be interpreted in light of Socrates’ suggestion in Book 9 of the *Republic* that the Paradigm of the ideal polity may be laid out in Heaven (ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται, 592b). Timaeus is a new kind of rhapsodic bard whose dialectical prose *nomopoia* (song-making) will not only eclipse traditional mythic poetry but will also establish a new kind of ‘law-making’ (*nomothesia*) at the same time.

Timaeus’ new mythic *nomos* will be interpreted as being intended to eclipse the traditional bards (Homer and Hesiod) by putting forward a new kind of *poiēsis* and a new theology free of the inaccuracies dominant in traditional mythopoetics. Timaeus will be styled as a rhapsode and law-maker who is exegetically adapting and reworking Homer’s conception of the god-like man (*theoikelos*) and his famed depiction of cosmic order in the description of Achilles’ Shield. Just as Homer painted an image of the cosmos condensed into typoiian artisanal artefact, a shield, so too Timaeus uses a metallurgical product in his rhapsodic depiction of the cosmos, that being the armillary sphere.

Timaeus’ account of the Demiurge’s structuring of the World Soul (*Ti.* 35a-36d) resembles the crafting of an armillary sphere and the ratios used by God in His animating of Heaven will be

²⁹ See Rocconi (2016), 71-89 on the interconnection of *nomos* qua ‘law’ and qua ‘music’ in the *Laws*.

³⁰ LSJ s.v. νομοποιός with D.L.2.104. See also LSJ s.v. νομοθέτης with Antipho 5.15, Th.8.97 and Pl.*R.*429c. For the terms use in the legal system of Athens specifically, see Decr. ap. And.1.83, IG22.140.8, D.3.10 & Lex ap.eund.24.21.

interpreted as constituting a Dorian *nomos*, a martial song of creation. God's use of the musical ratios of the Anima Mundi to war against the initial disorder of the *prima materia* (30a) by arranging it into the elemental geometric solids (*Ti.* 53b ff) is set up as a soteriological and teleological standard to be imitated by microcosmic man. Timaeus teaches that the rotational workings of man's mind, his cephalic nous-soul, which shares the same rotational structure as the World Soul animating Heaven, must be musically calibrated to follow the same ordering ratios of the Anima Mundi so that the disordered movement of his own microcosmic body-soul compound can be brought into a state of resemblance vis-à-vis the orderly Divine Macrocosm. Timaeus' role as rhapsodic song-writer (*nomopoios*), law-giver (*nomothētēs*) and city-founder is reflected in his construction through the words of his *eikōs logos-mythos* a virtual armillary sphere that replaces Homer's Achilles Shield. This demiurgic artefact depicting the macrocosm which Timaeus constructs is a new Panathenaic *peplos* that he woven by his rhapsodic strain (*nomos*) not only establishes a new custom (*nomos*) of *poēsis* but it is intended to function as a new legal system (*nomothesia*), a new constitution delineating the theology, cosmology and anthropology of Socrates' new polity.

Chapter Two—Logos and Cosmos as *Agalma*

Chapter Two of this dissertation will involve interpreting the *Timaeus* as a literary work against the cultural backdrop of the revolution occurring at that time in the visual art of sculpture. The prior chapter's identification of the ideal polity's constitution with the musico-mathematical order of Heaven is relevant to this chapter because the aforementioned sculptural revolution of the fourth century was centred on Polyclitus' Canon which essentially reduces man's anatomical structure to ratios of proportionality (as exemplified in the

archetypal statue titled Doryphorus, the Spearman).³¹ As such the demiurgic art of *agalmatopoiia* is inherently ‘uranomimetic’—that is, it imitates the heavenly harmony of the ratios of the World Soul and seeks to endow that perfection to the human body-soul compound. This chapter will vindicate Brague’s hypothesis that the Timaeian monologue is itself structured to resemble an ‘anthropomorphic’ statue, specifically Polyclitus’ Doryphorus, with the macrocosmic events of the *logos*’ narrative being arranged in such a way that they positionally correspond with the proportional distribution of the conceptually analogous parts of man’s microcosmic body-soul compound (e.g. the World Soul’s structure corresponds to the head, the Demiurge’s speech to the mouth, the account of zoogony with the genitalia etc).³² To this the dissertation will add that the tripartite structure of both the Timean *eikōs logos* and of man’s body-soul compound also corresponds to the three-tiered class structure of the ideal polity.³³ Thus the point here is that if Brague’s hypothesis is true not only does the Timaeian *logos* itself embody an *eikōn* of the Cosmotheos worthy of worship (*Criti.* 106a) but it is also an *agalma* that simultaneously depicts the optimal arrangement of man’s microcosmic body-soul compound vis-a-vis the Divine Macrocosm as well as the ideal ordering of the tripartite class-structure of the *theoeikelon andreikelon*, the ideal mesocosmic

³¹ Hurwitt (1995), 3–18. Pliny *NH* 34.56 ascribes to Polyclitus the invention of the contrapposto pose. Indeed, this is a major break-away from the rigidity of the Archaic *kouros*. For Polyclitus’ Doryphorus as the embodiment of the major shift from the crude sculpture of the Archaic Period to the distinctive realism of the classical period, see Clark (1972), 36–38, Carpenter (1960), 108 & Stewart (1990), 162. Cf. Havelock (2007), 17: “Virtually every textbook on Greek art argues that a critical turning point was reached with this statue. Reflecting the Pythagorean theories of opposites, the Doryphoros has, according to some present-day writers, almost cosmic implications. Polykleitos may have attempted in sculpture to portray numerical harmonies that could lead to an ideal conception of human nature; perhaps he sought a divine pattern that expressed the essential nature of man in Pythagorean terms. The Doryphoros displays a living chiasmic balance, in which a supporting limb on one side of the body is countered by a relaxed element on the other. Rest and movement, contraction and expansion, are exactly calibrated and resolved”.

³² Brague (1985), 82.

³³ The division of the Timaeian *logos* into three sections was established in Cornford (1937), xv–xvii and has been reiterated in Zeyl (2000), xci–xciv. The division is as follows: the Works of Reason (29d–47e), the Works of Necessity (47e–69a) and the Co-Operation of Reason and Necessity (69a–92c). The initial presentation of the tripartite soul in *R.* 4.436–439 occurs in the context of discussing analogism between the polis and the individual citizen’s body-soul compound. See Morgan (2010), 267–285 for the narrative structure of the *Timaeus*, the overall context of the *Timaeus-Critias-Hermocrates* trilogy and for the function of discourse as an ordered artefact.

political constitution. This matrix of analogisms built into the single ‘agalmatic’ *eikōn* embodied in the proportional structure of the Timaean *logos* itself is the summation of Plato’s compounded and stream-lined understanding of cosmotheology, politogony and anthropology. The Timaeian *eikōn-logos* simultaneously depicts the Divine Macrocosm, the ideal mesocosmic political constitution and an example of a microcosmic body-soul compound of a fully divinised *agalma*-citizen moulded by the education system of Callipolis. All of these layers and their analogical relationship to each other are incorporated into one comprehensive divine macro-image. This macro-image is not so much a static picture as it is living organism and a ‘process’ or ‘ongoing narrative’. First God qua Nous the Demiurge makes a visible *eikōn* of the invisible Noetic Paradigm. He then delegates the creation of man to the generated gods, the sub-demiurges (41b-c, 69c-d). Philosophic humans are then expected to reciprocate by engaging in demiurgic mimesis—first they are to mould their own microcosmic body-soul compounds into a likenesses of the Divine Macrocosm and then, turning their attention outwards, they are to act as a God-imitating *agalmatopoiōi-zōgraphi* in crafting an ideal mesocosmic political constitution (the *theoeikelon andreikelon*) which is to be made a tangible reality through an educating system that uses *eikotes mythoi* to ‘metallurgically’ shape the citizens into *theoeikela andreikela* themselves.³⁴ This dissertation will show that the Timaeian discourse itself achieves all of this as an exemplar of the soteriological discourse of *eikonopoia*. Just as the Demiurge crafts the Visible Cosmotheos as an *agalma* (37c) in Chora the gold-mould (50a-b) and ‘Wet Nurse of Becoming’ (49a, 52d: γενέσεως τιθήνην & 88d: τροφὸν καὶ τιθήνην τοῦ παντός) so too Timaeus through his *eikōs mythos-logos* is to mould the body-soul compounds of Socrates’ ideal city’s citizens into agalmatic likeness of the Divine Macrocosm (*theoeikela andreikela*) in the same way

³⁴ For the outlawing of poetry along with all mimetic arts other than that which emulates and encourages good conduct, see R.392c-392d with Murray (1996), 169.

that the mothers and nurses of Callipolis are said to mould the souls of children through myths more so than they do their bodies with their hands (*R.2.377c*).

Chapter Three—Timaeus the Oneiromancer

One of this dissertation's most important contributions involves reinterpreting Timaeus's description of his cosmogony as an *eikōs mythos/logos*—typically translated as "likely story" in ways that diminish its religious significance by making it appear to simply be a speculative narrative. Instead, the term *eikōs* should be understood as relating to the word *eikōn* (image or likeness) rather than merely pertaining to probable conjecture (*eikasía*).³⁵

The notion of image-making (*eikonopoia*) clearly lies at the heart of the cosmogony of the *eikōs mythos-logos* wherein the Demiurge makes use of the Paradigm (28a: προσχρόμενος παραδείγματι) to produce the Visible All as an *eikōn* thereof (92c). Not only that but the relationship between image and model is expressly said to define the epistemological character of exegetic accounts such as the one Timaeus himself is providing: "in dealing with a copy and its model, we must affirm that the accounts given will themselves be akin to the diverse objects which they serve to explain" (ὥδε οὖν περί τε εἰκόνοσ καὶ περὶ τοῦ παραδείγματοσ αὐτῆσ διοριστέον, ὡσ ἄρα τοὺσ λόγουσ, ὧνπέρ εἰσιν ἐξηγηταί, τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ συγγενεῖσ ὄντασ, *Ti.* 29b). Clearly, *Timaeus* seeks to imbue *eikōs* with specific meaning expressing imagistic likeness rather than simple probability.

³⁵ Cf. Grasso (2012), 353-355; Böhme (1996), 29

In interpreting the key Timaeian phrases *eikōs mythos* and *eikōs logos* as referring to a mode of discourse which assumes the character of what it describes one should keep in mind the distinction drawn in the *Sophist* between ‘eikastic art’ (which accurately reproduces model proportions) and ‘phantastic art’ (which introduces distortions).³⁶ This dissertation will show the Timaeian cosmogony to represent perfect eikastic discourse—the production of a verbal image that truly corresponds to divine reality without significant distortion despite Timaeus’ limitations as a mortal.³⁷ A particularly innovative aspect of this dissertation involves interpreting the entire Timaeian cosmogony through the oneiromantic hermeneutic that Timaeus himself provides for understanding dreams (70d-72b). This passage explains how the nous (immortal intellectual soul) controls the mortal appetitive soul by projecting images (*eidōla* and *phantasmata*) onto the liver's surface during sleep. Through this process the non-rational part of the human being partakes of transcendent truth through the intermediating shadow-puppet shows of dream images (*ἀληθείας...προσάπτοιτο*, 71d). Though Rotondaro and Brisson have examined this passage in detail, its significance for understanding the text as a whole and its connection to the Allegory of the Cave in the *Republic* has never been fully realized.³⁸ This dissertation will demonstrate that the same psychagogic dynamic of oneiric *eikonopoiia* operates at three levels: microcosmic (liver and dreams), mesocosmic (cave-education in the ideal polity), and macrocosmic (Demiurge's creation through Chora). In each case, nous (intelligence) imparts reasoning (*logos*) to sub-rational parties (either the

³⁶ Pl. *Sph.* 235e-236a. Janaway (1995), 171 in commenting on that passage explains the distinction in terms of mimesis only being truly successful when the artist understands the model correctly.

³⁷ Cf. Villela-Petit (1991), 53-90.

³⁸ Rotondaro (1997), 275-276 ff; Brisson (1974), 220-248; Gallop (1971), 187-201. For Plato on dreams and their role generally, see Rotondaro (1998); Capitani (2015) 399-416; Sheppard (2003), 203-212; Tigner (1970), 204-212; Moss (2012), 259-280. Thein (2019), 1–32 provides an excellent account of how, within the structure of the tripartite soul, the reasoning nous governs the lower irrational parts through dream imagery making use of R.9.571d–572b along with 71a–72b. See also Kalkavage (2001), 132 & 125 for observations on the connections between Chora and the hepatic oneiromancy to which this dissertation is indebted. Kalkavage (2001), 104 (with n.19) connects the occurrence of “the word *pathos* to designate our condition (and affliction) of lacking education” in the Allegory of the Cave (R.514a) to Socrates’ *pathos* to see his polity animated in *Ti.* 19b-c but sees this as characterising Timaeus as a shadow-puppeteering projectionist mis-representing the ideal polis rather than the ideal myth-maker that this dissertation takes him to be.

individual's *epithymētikon*, the bronze and iron agalma-citizens of the cave-polity or Chora) through the psychagogy of *eikonopoia* (image-making). In tracing these connections this dissertation will argue that the Myth of Metals or Noble Lie and the Allegory of the Cave depict one and the same thing, namely the mythic *eikonopoia* through which the ideal polity's citizens are moulded into *eikones* or likeness of the *theoiekelon andreiekelon*. In so doing not only with these two myths, the Noble Lie and Allegory of the Cave, be interpreted together in an unprecedented manner but they will also be shown to play a critical role in how Plato conceives of *eikonopoia* as the medium linking Being and Becoming. Further, the *eikonopoia* of both the Myth of Metals and the Allegory of the Cave will be connected to that of the Timaeon Demiurge's Who is depicted as shaping molten gold in an agalma by using Chora as a mould in *Ti.*50a-b and to the hepatic *zōgraphia* of Timaeon man's microcosmic nous that paints dream-images onto the liver during sleep (*71c*: φαντάσματα ἀποζωγραφοῖ). Indeed, the common thread uniting these passage from throughout the *Republic-Timaeus* is the theme of oneiric *eikonopoia* oneiromantic exegesis—the production and viewing of sub-rational, psychagogic dream-images during sleep that can only be interpreted rationally through use of *logismos* in the waking state (*Ti.*71e-72a). The dichotomy between the dreaming and the waking state is also related to the ontological distinction between Being and Becoming.

Thus in short, this dissertation will show how the whole of Timaeon cosmogonic discourse is centred on this dynamic of psychagogic *eikonopoia* whereby the philosopher's nous, imitating Mind the Demiurge, imparts images to the sub-rational parts of his own body-soul compound just as God imprints likenesses of the Forms in Chora. In the dreamy cave of this World of Becoming wherein we are bound Timaeus is to be seen as a charitable divinised philosopher descending from on high in order to explain how the shadowy *eidōla* before us

relate to their noetic archetypes in the World of Being. He does so as an *exēgētēs*, a hierophantic interpreter of oracular dream-revelations— the whole universe is a living painted animal (*zōon*) or sculpted *agalma* shaped by Nous within Chora in a manner directly analogous to how Timaeus' own nous has imprinted an image (*eikōn*) of that cosmogony on his liver during sleep. It can be imagined that Timaeus received his divinely inspired cosmogonic dream when he went to bed after hearing Socrates discourse the day prior to his own speech in which he then oneiromantically explains his oneiric revelation in a manner that can both psychagogically entice the lower parts of his audience's body-soul compounds through sub-rational mythic imagery but also appeal to their rationality through reasoned accounts of the metaphysics underpinning the *eikōs mythos*.

This novel reading is not totally without precedent. Both Burnyeat and Nightingale have stressed that the term '*exēgētēs*' used by Timaeus when he says that accounts are related to what they explain (ὄνπερ εἰσιν ἐξηγηταί, τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ συγγενεῖς ὄντας, 29b) is to be interpreted as a religiously charged word and that Timaeus is to be seen as a kind of hieratic exegete of oneiromancy.³⁹ Indeed the relevant LSJ entry defines ἐξηγητής as an "interpreter...of oracles, dreams or omens" (Hdt.1.78) and, specifically at "Athens, of sacred rites".⁴⁰ This is what is meant by the second step of the thesis' methodology that follows on from close textual reading, namely cultural contextualisation. The meaning of the term *eikōs mythos* is illuminated by investigating the framework of the religious culture in which the author is operating—the text cannot be understood in a vacuum.

³⁹ Burnyeat (2005), 149 & Nightingale (2021), 223.

⁴⁰ LSJ s.v. ἐξηγητής with Pl. *Euthphr.* 4d, 9a, *Lg.* 759c, 759e, 775a, D.47.68, Is.8.39, *Thphr.Char.* 16.6.

Chapter One: The Timaeian Discourse as *Nomos*

Chapter One: Introduction

This chapter examines the dual significance of Timaeus' cosmogony being called a *nomos*—both a musical 'strain' and a legal enactment. At *Ti.*29d Socrates introduces the impending monologue as a *nomos*. This term can be best translated as 'strain' or 'melody'. Indeed, that is the definition found in the LSJ: whilst the auletic *nomos* is “without sung text” (Plu.2.1133d, cf. 138b, Poll.4.79), the term *nomos* is especially used of “a type of early melody created by Terpander for the lyre as an accompaniment to Epic texts”.⁴¹ This latter meaning is what is relevant for present purposes. It should be recalled that the lyre-accompanied recitations of Homeric poetry by rhapsodes at the Panathenaea constitute the cultural backdrop of the Timaeian *nomos*.⁴² Not only is the term *nomos* of significance for framing Timaeus as a *nomopoios*, a composer of a rhapsodic 'strain' for the Panathenaea, but it also implies that he is acting as a *nomothetēs*, a law-giver—after all, he is animating Socrates' ideal political constitution as a *zōon* so he is just as much a law-giver as he is a mythic rhapsode. The dual musical and legal meaning of the term *nomos* will be the focus of this chapter. This chapter will demonstrate two key points. First, the Timaeian cosmogony was intended to be the staple myth of children's education in Socrates' ideal polity. Like Homeric epic at the Panathenaea, it was to be celebrated through rhapsodic performance. Second, the Timaeian discourse

⁴¹ LSJ s.v. νόμος.

⁴² The bivalence of the word *nomos* is expressly punned on in *Lg.* 7.799e-800a. Cf. *Lg.* 700b, 722d & 734e.

embodies in its musical schema the legal constitution of the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* polity. That is to say, the Timaeian discourse being called a *nomos* has two dimensions: (1) it functions as a musico-mythical lay for both the education of children and for rhapsodic *agōnes* of citizens during religious celebrations in the ideal polity. (2) Timaeus' discourse itself constitutes an *eikōn* of Socrates' legal constitution. Musico-poetical rhapsodising (*nomopoia*) and law-giving (*nomothesia*) are combined in Plato's Timaeus in a surprising way to breed or create a new kind of theomimetic or 'God-imitating' *poiēsis*. In this *poiēsis*, a cosmogonic poem can be a *nomos* in both senses: melody and law. It will be demonstrated that just as the Demiurge ordered the All through a mathematical harmony (a *nomos*), with the Cosmotheos embodying the ideal cosmic constitution (the *theoeikelon andreiekelon*), so too does the Timaeian creation myth function as both rhapsodic song and legal promulgation. These two identities, musical and legislative, are intimately linked. The ratios of the World Soul constitute the musico-mathematical order used by God to shape the Visible All and this same order is employed by Timaeus in his discourse animating Socrates' polity as a *zōon*. As such Timaeus' 'legal strain' (*nomos*) essentially involves him acting as a microcosmic imitator of the Demiurge, the macrocosmic *Nomopoiios-Nomothetēs*. Just as God orders the All through the harmonic ratios of the Anima Mundi so too Timaeus produces an *eikōn* of the Macrocosm and Socrates' *theoeikelon-andreiekelon* polity by making use of that same musico-mathematical order.

Timaeus' rendering of Socrates' *theoeikelon andreiekelon* a living *zōon* (Ti.19b-c) is to be viewed in light of the idea that a poem's structure should resemble what it describes. This chapter will demonstrate that Plato adapted this principle from the Homeric art of *zōgraphic*

poetics The famed Shield of Achilles (Il.18. 484-609) exemplifies this art.⁴³ Plato's Socrates and Timaeus qua rhapsodic *nomopoioi-nomothetai* are heavily indebted to Homeric poetry.⁴⁴ This debt appears both in the 'sketching out' of the *theoikelon-andreikelon* constitution and in its animation through a prose-poem the words of which 'paint' an *eikōn* of its subject matter. In the *Iliad* it is the metallurgical structure of the shield that constitutes the *mise en abyme* within the poem that leads to an appreciation of its overall structure. In the case of the *Timaeus*, a different metallurgical product plays the role of *mise en abyme*: the armillary sphere virtually constructed in the description of the World Soul animating heaven (35a-40d). This astronomico-mathematical portion of the text is critical for two reasons. First, it constitutes a *mise en abyme*—an image of the Cosmotheos within the cosmogonic poem. Second, it provides the musical *nomos* underpinning creation, since the analogous ratios used for structuring the Anima Mundi and Uranus-Cosmos embody a musical harmony.⁴⁵ Musical *nomopoiia* and legal *nomothesia* come together in the Timaeian cosmogony. Both God the Maker (*Poiētēs*) and Timaeus the mortal *poiētēs* imitating Him rely on astronomico-mathematical harmony to structure their respective *poiēmata*. Both works are 'legal constitutions': God creates Heaven and delineates therein the musico-mathematical order of the *theoikelon-andreikelon* constitution whilst Timaeus produces an *eikōn* of that demiurgic process and its outcome. Thus it is not only *nomothesia* (law) and *nomopoiia* (music) that are synthesised in the Timaeian *eikōs logos-mythos* but also *poiēsis* in both the sense of poetry

⁴³ Ford (1992), 169: "It is beyond doubt that the shield of Achilles is an ideal, even magical artifact, but it also precisely transcends the limits of any mortal construction in the same way that Hephaestus's mechanical handmaids transcend statuary...If the immense *Iliad* spans only the time that Hector lived and Achilles raged, what text could ever hope to be so vast as the shield, depicting both war and peace, encompassing the earth, sea, and stars, circumscribed only by Ocean? This is finally an uncanny making that the poet cannot hope for. The shield transcends even the limits of its plastic form: the engraved scenes incorporate motion, process, and sound...The shield is perhaps a paean to the metalworker, not the singer, and not to the beauty of his work but to its superhuman limits...these admirable artifacts are in some ways like ideal poems, they are decidedly beyond human making and even endurance". As such the Shield of Achilles is to be considered as a kind of open-challenge to subsequent poets: can anyone achieve the super-human feat of producing a vivid *zōgraphia* in words of pan-cosmic divine craftsmanship?

⁴⁴ Griffin (1980), 6: "the ancient commentators remark regularly on Homer's '**graphic**' power".

⁴⁵ For the identification of Uranus and Cosmos as Uranus-Cosmos, see *Ti.28b* & *Epin.977b*.

and demiurgic creation. *Poiēsis* in both the sense of poetry and demiurgic creation as well as law and music are all inextricably linked in the unitary cosmic schema of the *Timaeus*—this is the main point of calling the discourse a *nomos*. To understand this dual nature of the Timaeian *nomos*, we must first examine the cultural context in which *nomopoīia* (song-making) and *nomothesia* (law-giving) were intimately linked.

Cultural Context of *Nomothesia* and *Nomopoīia*

Having established the dual nature of *nomos*, this study will proceed in two dimensions. First, the Timaeian *nomos* should be seen as a kind of prose ‘rhapsodic strain.’ It presents the cosmogonic musical harmony (*nomopoīia*) used by the Demiurge to order the Visible All. Second, in doing so the Timaeian *nomos* animates Socrates’ ideal polity as a *zōon* (Ti. 19b-c). It is thus simultaneously an instance of law-giving (*nomothesia*) and an exercise in rhapsodic ‘song-making’ (*nomopoīia*). The Timaeian *nomos* needs to be interpreted in light of its traditional cultural context wherein *nomothesia* and *nomopoīia* were intimately linked. The Panathenaic rule was established by Solon.

This rule (*nomos*) mandated that Homeric poems be performed rhapsodically (*rhapsōideîn*) in relay fashion (*ex hupobolēs*).⁴⁶ Thus the apportioning (νέμειν) of poems to rhapsodes in agonistic contests during Panathenaic festive *agōnes*—the very activity that Timaeus, Critias and Socrates are partaking in when performing their ‘*nomoi*’—is itself a Solonic *nomos*. Indeed, Solon was well known in antiquity for ‘weaving’ politico-legal teachings into his own poetic compositions (καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν πολλὰ συγκατέπλεκε τοῖς ποιήμασιν, Plu. *Sol.* 3.3). Critias clearly alludes to Solon’s role as the archetypal *nomothetēs-nomopoios*. He mentions

⁴⁶Dieuchidas of Megara FGH 485 F 6=D.L. 1.57. Cf. ascription to Hipparchus the Pisistratid in *Hipparch.* 228b-c. See also Lycurg. *Against Leocrates* 102. See also Nagy (1996), 80-82 and (2002), 9-16, Davison (1955), 1-21 and Skafte-Jensen (1980), 145-149 for the Panathenaic rule.

that his story own story about Atlantis and Palaeo-Athens is derived from a Solonic poem that he performed rhapsodically in an agonistic relay-*agōn* at the *Koureotis* festival when he was a youth (20e-21b). To appreciate the importance of Solon’s *nomopoiia-nomothesia* as the cultural backdrop for the *Timaeus-Critias-Republic*, one must keep in mind two key points. First, Solon criticised the poets whose works were celebrated in festive rhapsodic performances. He accused Homer and Hesiod of lying (ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί, fr. 25 G.-P). Second, he also criticised the lack of restraint at the elite symposia at which such poems were celebrated.⁴⁷ Indeed Collins says that “Solon may be less overtly critical of Homeric performance than Xenophanes and Heraclitus, but he registers an acute awareness that the symposium is functionally a microcosm of the polis”.⁴⁸ Collins explains that “if epic poets, by means of their performative vehicle, rhapsodes, are deceptive—like Xenophanes Solon must surely have had Homer’s and Hesiod’s claims about divine misadventure in mind—they deserve as much censure as unjust leaders since both can be politically dangerous” and adds that “the only use that Solon ever had for pure hexameters, as opposed to elegy, was for his own laws—another rebuke to rhapsodes and epic tradition”.⁴⁹ As such Plato’s presentation of the Timaeian *eikōs mythos* as a Panathenaic encomiastic hymn-offering (21a) against the backdrop of Critias’ rhapsodic performance of Solonic *nomoi* at the Apaturia serves to frame it as akin to Solon’s *nomopoiia-nomothesia* which sought to replace the unseemly morality

⁴⁷ Fr. 3.7–10 G.-P.: δήμου θ’ ἡγεμόνων ἄδικος νόος, οἷσιν ἐτοῖμον/ὑβριος ἐκ μεγάλης ἄλγεα πολλά παθεῖν/οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταντα; κατέχειν κόρον οὐδὲ παρούσας/ εὐφροσύνας κοσμεῖν δαιτὸς ἐν ἡσυχίῃ. Cf. also the account in D.L. 1.59 and Plu. *Sol.* 29.6 of Solon denouncing the ψευδολογία of Thespis when he went to the latter to acquire knowledge of tragedy.

⁴⁸ Collins (2004), 157. See also Heraclitus (Fr. 30 Marcovich = 22 B 42 DK): τὸν τε Ὀμηρον ἔφασκεν ἄξιον ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ραπίζεσθαι καὶ Ἀρχιλοχὸν ὁμοίως. Here the word for slapping (ῥαπίζεσθαι) likely is a pun alluding to the *rhabdos* of the rhapsodic relay, cf. *Anacreont.* 31 (Campbell): ὑακινθίνῃ με ῥάβδω/χαλεπῶς Ἔρωσ ῥαπίζων ἐκέλευε συντροχάζειν. As such Heraclitus is criticising rhapsodic performance generally. One might object that Archilochus’ poetry is not a rhapsodic but in Clearchus Fr.92 (Wehrli) speaks of Simonides of Zacynthus reciting Archilochus’ work as a rhapsode (ἐρραψώδει). See also Pl. *Ion* 531a with Ford (1988), 302. For Xenophanes see Frr. 21 B 11 and 12 DK from his *Silloi* along with B 1.13–24 West = 21 B 1 DK = Ath. 462c–f). According to Diogenes Laertius Xenophanes rhapsodically performed his own didactic poetry as a *nomopoiōis-nomothētēs* in rhapsodic fashion (D.L.9.18: ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐρραψώιδει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ). Cf. Rudberg (1972), 282 who rejects Laertius’ testimony about Xenophanes performing his own poetry rhapsodically.

⁴⁹ Collins (2004), 157 with Plu. *Sol.* 3.

and theology of culturally established mythic poetry with a new kind of mytho-poetic mode of ‘legislating’. This Solonic precedent of combining legislative and poetic authority establishes the framework within which Plato presents Timaeus' cosmogony as both *nomos* and *mythos*.

Delphic Nomothesia and Timaeus as *Exēgētēs*

In seeking to properly contextualise the *nomopoiia-nomothesia* of the Timaeian *eikōs mythos*, we must recognise a third element: divine revelation. Musical performance and legislation were not only intimately connected in the ancient world; they were also both tied to the Oracle of Delphi. Given that Delphi's religious authority was so intimately tied to the promulgation of divine *nomoi*, it is significant that the Pythia's oracles were delivered in hexameter verse. This poetic form connects Apollo's *nomothesia* to the musical *nomopoiia* of poets like Terpander and Tyrtaeus. The Delphic oracle thus links divine lawgiving, musical performance, and poetic composition. This connection between divine revelation, musical performance, and law-giving is precisely what we see in the *Timaeus*.

The term *exēgētēs* is vital for understanding the intersection between the religious tradition of Delphic *nomopoiia-nomothesia* and the Timaeian *nomos*. Not only does Plato use that term with reference to Delphic Apollo and his oracle (R.4.427b-c) but it also occurs in Timaeus' proem where he says that discourses (*logoi*) are related to the subjects of which they are *exēgētai* (τοὺς λόγους, ὧν πέρ εἰσιν ἐξηγηταί, τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ συγγενεῖς ὄντας, 29b). Timaeus here is stating that his *nomos* is ‘of the same stock’, so to speak, as the cosmogony which it depicts. Timaeus' *nomos* ‘enacts’ the very *nomopoiia-nomothesia* through which the Demiurge ordered the All—that is why it begets a living *eikōn* of the Cosmotheos through

words for it embodies the same dynamic of divine *poiēsis* (Criti.106a). Given then the impending discourse's theological theme and that *exēgētēs* has clear hierophantic connotations, Timaeus' use of that term in introducing his *nomos* serves to subtly frame him as a divinely-inspired oracular figure.⁵⁰ The connection between divinely-inspired legislation and poetic *nomothesia* must be explored so as to appreciate the way in which Timaeus' *nomos* is both a rhapsodic musical performance and a legislative act.

The connection between *nomothesia* and oracular divine revelation, is seen in the *Republic* where Socrates' interlocutor asks "what part of legislation [νομοθεσία]...is still left for us?" to which he answers: "for us nothing, but for the Apollo of Delphi, the chief, the fairest and the first of enactments" (νομοθετημάτων, 427b). Thus, despite the apparently innovative character of Socrates' novel ideal constitution, his philosopher-kings' *nomothesia* is totally subject to the oracular authority of the Delphian Pythia and Apollo *Patrōos* in matters of religion, *R.4.427b-c*:

τὰ γὰρ δὴ τοιαῦτα οὐτ' ἐπιστάμεθα ἡμεῖς οἰκίζοντές τε πόλιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ πεισόμεθα, ἔὰν νοῦν ἔχωμεν, οὐδὲ χρῆσόμεθα ἐξηγητῇ ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ πατρίῳ: οὗτος γὰρ δήπου ὁ θεὸς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἀτρίος ἐξηγητῆς ἐν μέσῳ τῆς γῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ καθήμενος ἐξηγεῖται.

For of such matters we neither know anything nor in the founding of our city if we are wise shall we entrust them to any other or make use of any other **interpreter** than the God of our fathers.⁵¹ For this God surely is in such matters for all mankind the interpreter of the religion of their fathers who from his seat in the middle and at the very navel of the earth delivers his **interpretation**.

⁵⁰ Burnyeat (2005), 149 & Nightingale (2021), 223.

⁵¹See *Euthd.* 302d for Apollo *Patrōos* as forefather of the Athenians. Holding offices in Athens required candidates to have altars for Zeus *Herkeios* and Apollo *Patrōos* in their homes and familial funerary complexes, see Arist. *Athn. Pol.* 55.2-3, D. 57.66 & Sjövall (1931), 30-35). The rise of the cult of Apollo *Patrōos* in the late fifth century BC coincided with the establishment of phratries as a mode of civic organisation, see Plu. *Alc.* 2, Hedrick (1988), 185-210, Nilsson (1967), 556f & Farnell (1896-1909), 154, 373 n.54.

Here Socrates presents Delphi as a vital cultic site centred on the navel of the earth. From this site, divine law is issued.⁵² Shorey says that here “Plato prudently or piously leaves the details of ceremonial and institutional religion to Delphi”.⁵³ Who is the *patrios exēgētēs* here issuing laws from Delphi? Shorey opts for the capitalised ‘God’ in his translation. However, rather than Plato’s henotheistic conception of the Godhead, the primary referent seems to be a traditional deity: the Delphic Apollo.⁵⁴ How does Apollo’s status as primary *exēgētēs* of all laws (*nomoi*) pertaining to religion square with the argument made by Burnyeat and Nightingale that Timaeus’ use of the term *exēgētēs* where he says that accounts are related to what they explain (ὄνπερ εἰσιν ἐξηγηταί, τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ συγγενεῖς ὄντας, 29b) is to be interpreted as a religiously charged word and that Timaeus is to be seen as a kind of hieratic exegete?⁵⁵ Burnyeat cites this very passage (R.427b) when arguing that Timaeus is himself stylised as an *exēgētēs* of divine revelation despite the fact that here “Apollo himself is described as *exēgētēs* for all mankind of what their rituals should be...[because] readers would know that the utterance of the Pythia through whom he spoke required ἐξηγηταί to render their meaning”.⁵⁶ Thus Delphic Apollo’s status as chief *exēgētēs* does not preclude Socrates’ ideal polity having its own *exēgētai* qua religious experts. These experts interpret the sacred laws (*nomoi*) promulgated by God qua *Nomothetēs*. The oracular authority of Delphic Apollo qua Divine *nomothetēs* and *exēgētēs* is not mutually exclusive vis-à-vis human *exēgētai* carrying out law-making with God’s blessing. This made somewhat clear in Herodotus 1.65.2-5. There Herodotus says that Lycurgus’ social reorganisation of Spartan society (κατεστεῶτα κόσμον Σπαρτιήτησι) and his changing of all laws or customs

⁵² Paus. 10.16.3 and Pi. P. 4.74.

⁵³ Shorey (1937), 344 citing 540b-c, Lg. 759c, 738b-c, 828a, 856e, 865b, 914a & 947d.

⁵⁴ For the henotheism of the Timaeus and the position of the Demiurge vis-à-vis the created gods, see Ti.41a with 111

⁵⁵ Burnyeat (2005), 149 with Nightingale (2021), 223. LSJ s.v. ἐξηγητής with Pl. *Euthphr.* 4d,9a, Lg.759c, 759e, 775a, D.47.68, Is.8.39, Thphr. *Char.*16.6; Hdt.1.78.

⁵⁶ Burnyeat (2005), 149 n16.

(μετέστησε τὰ νόμιμα πάντα) are sanctioned by Delphic Apollo. Moreover, the famed *nomothetēs* is even given divine status through Pythia’s hexameter oracle: “I am in doubt whether to pronounce you man or god,/but I think rather you are a god, Lycurgus” (δίζω ἢ σε θεὸν μαντεύσομαι ἢ ἄνθρωπον/ἀλλ’ ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον θεὸν ἔλπομαι, ὦ Λυκόοργε). Similarly Diodorus Siculus describes Lycurgus acting as a Delphically-sanctioned *nomothetēs* who enacted laws on the authority of the following divinely-inspired hexameter. This Apollonian oracle from the Pythia was given in the form of ‘Terpandean’ or ‘Tyrtaean’ poetry: ‘love of money and nothing else shall destroy Sparta’ (ἀ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν ὀλεῖ, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδέν, 7.12.6).⁵⁷ Van Wees argues on linguistic grounds that it should not to be ascribed to Tyrtaeus. Instead, it should be attributed to a Terpandean citharodic *nomos* due to the apparent mixing of the Doric and Ionian dialect.⁵⁸ Terpander is the reputed inventor of the citharodic *nomos* who named the various kinds.⁵⁹ According to Clement of Alexandria Terpander was said to have set the Lacedaemonian civic laws (*nomoi*) to music (*emelopoiēse*) thus rendering them *nomoi* qua ‘strains’ as well (*Strom.* 1.16.78). The peripatetic Hieronymus of Rhodes *On Citharodes* (fr. 33 Wehrli ap. Athenaeus 14.635f) claimed that Lycurgus’ *nomothesia* as embodied in the later Great Rhetra was produced in the eighth century together with Terpander’s nomic *melopoiia*. Similarly, Plutarch, relying on Aristotle’s lost *Lacedaemonian Constitution* describes a particular amendment made to the Great Rhetra by two kings who received sanction to do so from the oracle of Delphi and who had Tyrtaeus ‘musically’ enforce it through *melopoiia*⁶⁰ Plutarch tells of Terpander, Thaletas and Pherecydes being honoured as

⁵⁷ D.S. 7.10. Diodorus’ form is presumably also preserved in Eus. *P.E.* 5.27.8 but with the last line missing. See Parke & Wormell (1956) 14, 89 with Fontenrose (1978) 115–116. For Terpander, see Gostoli (1990), 77 & 106 and van Wees (1999), 7–8. For Tyrtaeus, see Plu. *Lyc.* 1.1 with Prato (1968), 8-20 and van Hilten-Rutten (2019), 72 who speaks of how little is known about the performance-context of Tyrtaean poetry.

⁵⁸ Van Wees (1999), 4.

⁵⁹ Ps.Plu. *On Music* 4.1132d. For attribution of this testimony to Heraclides, see Gostoli (1990), 92–93. See also Fr. 157 Wehrli *apud* Ps.Plu. *On Music* 3.1132c.

⁶⁰For the historicity of this account, see Prato (1968), 63-70; Wade-Gery (1944), 1-9, Wade-Gery (1943), 62-72, Wade-Gery (1944), 115-126 & Nafissi (2010), 99.

foreigners among the Lacedaemonians because they sang and philosophised (ἀδοντες καὶ φιλοσοφοῦντες) in accordance with Lyrcurgus' Great Rhetra (*Agis* 10.3). Unlike the legislation of modern secular states, in the cultural context of the *Timaeus-Critias-Republic*, law-making (*nomothesia*) was conducted through the media of divine revelation, poetry and music. This multifaceted dynamism needs to be kept in mind when examining how Timaeus as a divinely-possessed hierophant, a rhapsodic bard, a 'musician' and a *nomopoios* all at the same time animates Socrates' ideal polity as a *zōon* (*Ti.* 19b-c).⁶¹

Having established that divine authority, musical *nomopoiia*, and legal *nomothesia* converge in the Delphic tradition, we can now understand how Timaeus' discourse participates in this same tradition. His cosmogony is simultaneously divine revelation, musical composition, and legislative enactment. By framing his cosmogony as a *nomos*, Plato links Timaeus' discourse to the tradition of Delphically-sanctioned *nomothesia*. The connection between the Timaeian *nomos* and Delphic Apollo's authority as *exēgētēs* becomes clearer when we consider Timaeus' role. He is not merely providing a philosophical account of cosmogony. He is delivering a sacred teaching that has the force of divine law. This is why his discourse is called a *nomos*. Timaeus acts an *exēgētēs* of divine truth. Timaeus is one of the few humans capable of performing a *nomos* which depicts with reasonable likelihood and accuracy the very *nomopoiia-nomothesia* of God Himself which gave the All its order.

Beginning and Ending the *Nomos* with Musicality

⁶¹ Cf. *Arist.Pr.* 19.28 which describes *nomothesia* among the Thracian Agathyrsi as being conducted through song.

Not only does the Timaean discourse open with Socrates expressly calling Timaeus' impending monologue a *nomos*, a rhapsodic strain (29d), but it also ends at *Criti.*106a-b with a prayer that is replete with musical diction and symbolism. Given then that the Timaean cosmogony is hedged in on both sides with references to musicality, it makes sense that Plato is characterising Timaeus as a Panathenaic rhapsode. Socrates praises Timaeus's proem establishing the epistemological and ontological basis of the impending cosmogonic prose-poem and encourages him to commence the discourse. Socrates does so by using phraseology that is distinctly rhapsodic (29d):⁶²

ἄριστα, ὦ Τίμαιε, παντάπασί τε ὡς κελεύεις **ἀποδεκτέον**: τὸ μὲν οὖν **προοίμιον** θαυμασίως **ἀπεδεξάμεθά** σου, τὸν δὲ δὴ **νόμον** ἡμῖν ἐφεξῆς **πέραινε**.

Excellent, Timaeus! We must by all means **accept** it, as you suggest; and certainly we have most cordially **accepted** your **prelude**; so now, we beg of you, proceed straight on with the main theme [or: **Recite for us your law-song!**]

As per the LSJ the verb *περαίνω* can simply mean to “proceed with a discourse” but it can also refer to the performance of poetry or a song specifically and thus more narrowly mean “recite from beginning to end”.⁶³ Indeed the LSJ cites *Ti.*29d as an example of the latter meaning. Critically Plato's Socrates uses this exact same verb (*perainō*) when he puns on the bivalence of the word *nomos* as meaning both law and ‘strain’ in the *Republic*: “the very law which dialectics recites, the strain which it executes” (αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ νόμος ὃν τὸ διαλέγεσθαι **περαίνει**, *R.*532e).⁶⁴ Bolded above are two cognate forms of a key verb in rhapsodic

⁶² For a profile of Plato's understanding of rhapsodic performance in his *Ion*, see Nagy (2002), 22f. As per *Ion* 530b the eponymous character won first place as a rhapsode in the Panathenaea.

⁶³ LSJ s.v. *περαίνω*. For the meaning “proceed with a discourse”, see *A.Th.*1056, *E.Med.* 701, *A.Pers.*699, *Ar.Pl.*64. For “recite from beginning to end”, see *Ar.Ra.*1170, *D.*19.245 and *Antiph.*1.6.

⁶⁴ This pun occurs as he introduces dialectic in the following terms: “it belongs to the intelligible, we may see an imitation in the progress of the faculty of vision, as we described its endeavor to look at living things themselves and the stars themselves and finally at the very sun” (ὄν καὶ ὄντα νοητὸν μιμοῖτ' ἂν ἡ τῆς ὄψεως δύναμις, ἣν ἐλέγομεν πρὸς αὐτὰ ἤδη τὰ ζῶα ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ ἄστρα τε καὶ τελευταῖον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν ἥλιον, 532a). Here Socrates is alluding to the famed Allegory of the Cave (cf. 516a-b) which will be treated later in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. What is important to note for present purposes is that the pun on the bivalence of *nomos* occurs in conjunction with a reference to the difference between vision (sense-perception) and *noēsis* vis-à-vis the ontological difference between images and the realities they depict. That is the exact same ontological and epistemological dichotomy which Timaeus explores in his proem that Socrates has just accepted when he again makes the *nomos*-pun above along with the verb *perainō* (*Ti.*29d). The bolded

paradosis, *dechomai* (ἀπεδεξάμεθά and ἀποδεκτέον). What is so rhapsodic about this diction of ‘acceptance’? Just before Socrates alludes to Timaeus’ impending *nomos*, Critias speaks of "receiving" (δεδεγμένον) the humans ‘generated in words’ by Timaeus in a manner that directly parallels the terminology of rhapsodic relay performance (*Ti.*27a-b: ὡς παρὰ μὲν τούτου δεδεγμένον ἀνθρώπους τῷ λόγῳ γεγονότας, παρὰ σοῦ δὲ πεπαιδευμένους). Nagy has shown that δέγμενος appears in the *Iliad* when Patroclus waits for Achilles to finish reciting the "glorious deeds of men" (*klea andrōn*, *Il.*9.191) so he can take up the song, thus embodying "the aesthetics of rhapsodic sequencing."⁶⁵ This dynamic of singing in relay is thus baked into the Homeric epics themselves in a meta-dramatic manner: characters in the epic sing about heroic deeds in sequence in exactly the same way that the later rhapsodes do when recounting their exploits. Diogenes Laertius records that Solon legislated rhapsodic performance in relay fashion (ἐξ ὑποβολῆς) in agonistic contexts such as the Panathenaea. Each performer began where the previous one ended (οἷον ὅπου ὁ πρῶτος ἔληξεν, ἐκεῖθεν ἄρχεσθαι τὸν ἐχόμενον, 1.2.57). When one puts the two together, it becomes apparent that Critias is acting like a singing Homeric hero or Panathenaeic bard. He waits his turn to participate in the rhapsodic relay of ‘song’.⁶⁶

It is also worth noting that Solon the Athenian law-giver (*nomothetēs*) formalises this custom by legal decree. Solonic law was very much concerned with rhapsodic performance as a key social institution. It is this same Solon whose strange story (*atopos logos*) was originally told in a rhapsodically-performed poem (*Ti.*20d). It serves as the inspiration for Critias’ own

reference to seeing animals themselves as opposed to images of them correlates with Socrates’ reference to living *zōa* and painted ones in motion in the programmatic opening of the *Timaeus* (19b-c). The whole *Timaeus nomos* is subtly being framed as a ‘shadow-puppet play’ addressing the same ideas as Socrates’ presentation of the ideal polity’s pedagogy in the Allegory of the Cave.

⁶⁵ Nagy (1996), 73.

⁶⁶ For rhapsodes memorising their material, see X. *Smp.*3.6.

account of Atlantis and Palaeo-Athens. Solon, as we have seen, was both *nomothētēs* and *nomopoios*. By tracing his story back to Solon, Critias establishes a genealogy of legislative poetry that runs from Delphi through Solon to the present gathering. Critias explains that he performed Solon's poem as a youth during the *Koureotis* festival when the tribal 'fathers' (elders) set up a rhapsodic competition (*ἄθλα γὰρ ἡμῖν οἱ πατέρες ἔθεσαν ῥαψωδίας*, 21b).⁶⁷ Thus within the back-story of the origins of Critias' impending historical epic there is express reference to mythopoetic education of youths in a festive, religious context wherein the dual-meaning of *nomos* as both 'strain' and 'law' comes to the fore—youths are incorporated into the body politic by performing the mythic lays composed by Solon the law-giver. Solon acts in dual capacity. In legislating *nomoi* (laws) determining how rhapsodes are to perform, he acts as a *nomothētēs*. In composing musical poems to be performed in festivals educating youths, he is also a *nomopoios*, a bard, a musician. Through Critias' framing-story, Solonic *nomopoiia-nomothesia* and the pedagogic rhapsodic *agōnes* of sacred festivals constitute the cultural back-drop of Timaeus' *nomos*, a song expressly intended to embody Socrates' constitutional (nomothetic) ideal. Thus the *Timaeus-Critias-Republic* trilogy should be understood as participating in the tradition of Delphically-sanctioned *nomopoiia-nomothesia*. The dialogues are not merely philosophical treatises. They are religiously-charged, legislative prose-poems that seek to establish new *nomoi* for the ideal polity. This is the cultural context in which we must understand the term *nomos* at *Ti.29d*.

⁶⁷ Collis (2001), 147 situates *Ti.21b* within a wider framework of epigraphic evidence so as to show that, in addition to the cottage industry run by professional rhapsodes as discussed in the *Ion*, "rhapsodic exchange...also took place at the non-professional level of boys' games". A second century BC inscription (CIG 2214=SIG 95) from Chios describes boys of various age-groups partaking in rhapsodic competitions as well as other similar competitions in a festive context: reading (*anagnōsis*), harp-playing (*psalmos*), lyre-playing, and foot-races (*dioulos*). An inscription from Teos (CIG 3088=SIG 960n1) listing the same kind of festive *agōnes* also includes reference to an event for older youths (*hēlika*) denominated *hupobolēs antapodoseōs*, that is, relay recitation. On this kind of relay-game, see Wilamowitz (1884), 266. See Pallone (1984) 156-166 and Gentili (1990), 174-176 for rhapsodic *agōnes* at various festivals across Greece.

In the above passage (*Ti.*29d) Socrates is not simply accepting the contents of Timaeus' proem but is, through his diction, affirming that the Timaeian *nomos* will constitute a rhapsodic continuation of his own prior discourse on the ideal polity and will in turn be followed by Critias' recitation of the story of Atlantis and Palaeo-Athens. Nagy has shown that the technical diction used in the *Hipparchus* (228b–c) by rhapsodes performing Homeric poetry at the Panathenaea, namely their 'going through' (*diiēnai*) recitals 'in sequence' (*ephexēs*) through relay-like responses to each other (*hupolēpsis*), is incorporated into the *Timaeus-Critias* in the phraseology of *Ti.*23d (*panta...hexēs dielthein*) and *Ti.*24a (*ephexēs diiēnai*).⁶⁸ Indeed Timaeus when closing his monologue in the opening of the *Critias* refers back to the *hexēs logos* (continuous discourse) that they had agreed upon (*Criti.*106b). The end of Timaeus' *nomos* is followed immediately by Critias opening his own rhapsodic performance with the verb *dechomai* (106b), the verb used for rhapsodes taking up the lead role of singing as it is passed on in relay-fashion.⁶⁹ Furthermore, the term 'proem' (*προοίμιον*) used by Socrates in the above-extracted passage has specific meaning when read in the context of rhapsodic performance. This term 'proem' in a rhapsodic context can refer specifically to a kind of hymnic introduction to a much longer epic song.⁷⁰ The *Iliad* itself was actually known to have had several different introductory *prooimia*.⁷¹ Given the

⁶⁸ Nagy (2002), 10 with n5. For *hupolēpsis* in this sense of a relay of replies, see *R.*1.331d, Herod. 1.11.5, and 1.27.4, *Ar. Pol.* V 1310a10.

⁶⁹ See Nagy (2002), 36–69 esp. 59–60.

⁷⁰ In discussing the Homeric Hymns, Shelmerdine (1995), 8 argues that, rather than being stand-alone devotionals, many of the "hymns were originally intended as preludes to the recitations of other songs, including epic narratives. That there were such introductory hymns and that they were expressly called 'proems' is in fact well evidenced in ancient literature. Thucydides 3.104 cites a portion of the Homeric Hymn to Apollo and terms it a 'proem'. So too Pindar (*N.*2.1–5) alludes to Homeric bards commencing most of their 'sewn-together odes' (rhapsodies) with a proem dedicated to Zeus (ὄθεν περ καὶ Ὀμηρίδαι ῥαπτῶν / ἐπέων τὰ πόλλ' αἰδοῖ/ ἄρχονται, Διὸς ἐκ προοιμίου). There are hymns within the Homeric corpus itself that expressly confirm their own function as proems for longer epic narratives such as *h.*31.18–19 and 32.18–20. Such hymns conclude with the typical reference to another song following on (cf. *Hes. Op.* 1–10 and *Th.* 1–115).

⁷¹ For such a *prooimion*, see *Vitae Homeri et Hesiodi*=Wilamowitz (1929), 32.16–20: ἡ δὲ δοκοῦσα ἀρχαία Ἰλιάς, ἡ λεγομένη Ἀπελλικῶντος [απελικωνος ms., corr. Nauck], **προοίμιον** ἔχει τάδε· Μούσας αἰίδω καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα κλυτότοξον. ὥς καὶ Νικάνωρ μέμνηται καὶ Κράτης ἐν τοῖς διωρθοτικαῖς (The seemingly more ancient [recension of the] *Iliad*, that called Apellicon's, has the following proem: "I sing unto the Muses and Apollo of renowned bow", as Nicanor and Crates recall in the '*Corrections*' (*Diōrthotika*), (my translation). See West

Panathenaic backdrop of the ‘feast of discourses’ (τῶν λόγων ἐστίασιν, 27b) in the *Timaeus-Critias* Plato’s use of the term *prooimion* for Timaeus’ philosophic preamble serves implicitly to frame the impending *nomos* as a rhapsodic performance of Homeric proportions.

Even without having recourse to the significance which the term *prooimion* has in the context of rhapsodic performance one can still ascertain from a plain reading of the text itself that Timaeus’ *nomos* and Critias’ tale of Atlantis are being framed as a Panathenaic rhapsodic performances. The text of the *Timaeus* expressly refers to Critias’ story told in the lead up to the cosmogonic monologue as being “chanted as it were duly and truly, in honor of the Goddess on this her day of Festival” (ἀποδοῦναι χάριν καὶ τὴν θεὸν ἅμα ἐν τῇ πανηγύρει δικαίως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς οἷόνπερ ὑμνοῦντας ἐγκωμιάζειν, 21a). Even though it is only Critias telling the tale, the plural participle ὑμνοῦντας implies that all the banqueters are jointly singing the same hymnic encomium—the discourses of Socrates, Timaeus and Critias are part of the same rhapsodic continuum. It is not only the proemic portion of the *Timaeus* that constitutes a hymn but all of the discourses woven together. As such it could be said that Socrates’ use of the term ‘proem’ (*Ti.*29d) in anticipation of the Timaeian *nomos* serves to subtly portray Timaeus as a rhapsodic bard, a new Homer or Hesiod about to commence an inspired cosmogonic song that eclipses the traditional poems and establishes a new form of *poiēsis* worthy of the ideal polity and its God.⁷² Having established the cultural and religious

(2015), 73 for Apellicon, Nicanor and Crates. The *Iliad* has several known variant incipits. See *Vitae Homeri et Hesiodi*=Wilamowitz (1929), 32.20–24, West (2003), 454–457, Pfeiffer (1968), 239, Nagy (1998), 215, 223, Nagy (2010), 110, Muellner (1996), 97. The recension beginning with ‘ἀεῖδω καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα κλυτότοξον’ is conventionally titled the ‘*Anecdota Romanum* of Osann’ (after its first editor, see Osann (1851). This recension is one of only two that were unknown to the Alexandrian scholars of Ptolemy’s library, the other being the version edited by Aristotle and owned by Alexander the Great (starts thus: ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ νάρθηκος), see Str. 13.1.27, Eustathius 1.11.5 (van der Valk), *Plu. Alex.* 8.2 and Brunelle (2017), 257–278. The *Anecdota Romanum* of Osann consists of the prologue to the D scholia in codex-recension Z. For the most recent edition, see Montanari (1979), 47–56.

⁷² The divinely inspired character of rhapsodic poetry is reflected in the oft-repeated epic phrase θεῖος ἀοιδός, see *Od.* 1.336; 4.17; 8.43, 47, 87, 539; 13.27; 16.252; 17.359; 23.133, 143; 24.439.

context of the Timaean *nomos*, we can now turn to the dramatic frame of the dialogue itself. The opening exchange between Socrates and his interlocutors reveals much about how Plato conceived of the relationship between the *Republic's* political discourse and the Timaean cosmogony.

The Programmatic Incipit of the *Timaeus* and its Significance

Now that it has been established that the Timaean *nomos* is to be interpreted as both divinely-inspired 'legislation' and as a Panathenaic rhapsodic performance the significance of the opening words of the *Timaeus* can truly be appreciated. Socrates' opening count of 'one, two, three' establishes more than a procedural roll call. The count can be seen as 'tapping out a rhythm', as it were, for the impending cosmic 'law-song'.⁷³ Not only that but this enumeration sets up the mathematical and musical framework that will structure Timaeus' entire cosmogony. The rhythmic count of the incipit will be taken in conjunction with the reference to marching in Timaeus' closing prayer (*Criti.*106a). This will be done in order to show that the whole *nomos* is in essence a kind of virtual chariot-march across the cosmos that imparts to the reader/listener knowledge of the musico-mathematical order which God uses to structure and sustain the All. It is important to recall how Timaeus first treats anthropogony. He describes the souls of mankind being mixed by the Demiurge with the same ingredients and same ratios as the Anima Mundi and being sown into astral chariots (*Ti.*41d). These astrally-embodied human souls are then taken on a 'tour' of the All by the Demiurge Himself wherein they are shown the 'fated laws' (*heimarmenoi nomoi*) delineated in Heaven (*Ti.*41e). In describing that cosmic chariot-march immediately after describing the musico-mathematical and astronomical structure of Heaven Timaeus is essentially implying

⁷³ For an excellent study of the programmatic significance of the opening count as a referenced to Plato's indebtedness to Pythagorean cosmology, see Burnyeat (1998), 305-326.

that what he has just narrated constitutes what the souls were shown by God. Given that the musico-mathematical ratios of the Anima Mundi were treated just prior (35b-c) it is fair to say that the tour involved being taught that cosmogonic and cosmos-sustaining harmony.

There is a strong degree of identification between the harmony of the Anima Mundi structured by God and shown to the proto-human astral charioteers and the Timean *nomos* which presents and embodies that very harmony. The implication is that, just as God orders the All through musico-mathematical harmony so too the man who wishes to imitate Him must emulate that cosmic 'battle song' when attempting to structure his polity and his own body-soul compound

At the opening of the *Timaeus*, Socrates counts his interlocutors and discovers that one of yesterday's company is absent while three new guests have arrived (17a-b). He then asks Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates to reciprocate for his previous day's account of the ideal polity. Specifically, he wants them to set his polity in motion and show it at war (19b-c). This request is crucial for understanding the relationship between the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*. Socrates wants to see the static constitutional *diagraphē* of the ideal polity brought to life as a moving *zōon*. This desire to see the ideal polity 'in motion' connects directly to Timaeus' subsequent description of the cosmos as a moving *eikōn* of eternity (37d). Just as the Demiurge creates the cosmos as a living, moving likeness of the eternal Paradigm, so too the ideal polity must be rendered a living entity. The Timaeian cosmogony accomplishes this by showing how the mathematical order of the cosmos provides not only the model for political organisation but also for waging war against disorder within one's own microcosmic body-soul compound. From the opening count of the interlocutors to Timaeus' closing prayer about being 'in tune', musical and martial imagery pervades the text. This imagery reveals how Plato conceived of cosmogonic discourse as analogous to both socio-military organization

and musical performance. That the Timaeian *nomos* is not only musical and legal but also ‘martial’ is significant for Socrates does request that his polity be not simply be animated as a *zōon* but one in a state of war (19b-c).

The fact that the very incipit of the *Timaeus* itself is a count, “one, two, three” (εἷς, δύο, τρεῖς, 17a) can be seen as Socrates tapping out a rhythm which he expects Timaeus to take up in rhapsodically ‘sewing’ his cosmogonic discourse into the prior political one. This counting is not merely procedural. It sets up the mathematical theme that will dominate Timaeus’ cosmogony. The absent fourth member of yesterday’s company creates an imbalance that must be addressed. This numerical imbalance mirrors the cosmic disorder that the Demiurge must order through mathematical harmony. Kalkavage claims that “by counting rather than naming his hosts, Socrates suppressed their human identity: for the purposes of a count, the hosts are just monads.”⁷⁴ This atomised understanding of the symposiasts as monads is reflected in the definition of number found in Euclid’s *Elements*, namely that multiplicity is understood as being constituted by a collection of severable units (Chap. 7 def. 2). Thus rather than being distracted by the specific characteristics of the *dramatis personae* one must focus on the idea of units being added together to form a well-ordered whole.⁷⁵ Brague, in light of the teaching in *Phaedrus* 264c that the perfect *logos* should be a well-articulated *zōon*, makes an important observation. He says, “no author anxious to write in an artful way would compose any literary work without marshalling its parts into a definite order [and] no written work should be a patchwork of disorganised elements”.⁷⁶ Indeed, this notion of orderly (cosmic) arrayment is emphasised in the incipit through Socrates’ use of the verb

⁷⁴ Kalkavage (2001), 101 n13.

⁷⁵ For the opening frame-story generally, see Regali (2012), 19–22, 106–118.

⁷⁶ Brague (1985), 53.

ἐπέταξα to describe the way he has ‘arrayed’ or ‘marshalled together’ the topics to be discussed in the wake of his own political discourse. The verb *epitattein* with the noun of *taxis* and other associated terms such as *kosmos* and *diakosmein* are not only “words in Greek for order and putting things in order”.⁷⁷ They also carry “a martial meaning [and thus] fit nicely with Socrates’ desire for a war story (19b)”.⁷⁸ Indeed, the education system of Socrates’ ideal polity is geared towards making the children of the *phylakes* ‘spectators of war’ (θεωροὺς πολέμου τοὺς παῖδας ποιεῖν, *R.467c*). Socrates’ foreshadowing desire for a moving, martial creature and his ordering of topics for discussion at the beginning of the work serve to establish an orderly military march. This like a hoplite-formation in which the following *logoi* will advance. It is as if Socrates, with his count and his designation of duties, is planning an attack as a commander counting out a rhythm for a march. Socrates is singing his army into formation, as it were. Athenaeus tells of Spartiates on campaign singing a paean of thanks-giving after dinner. They then competed for a slab of meat by singing Tyrtaean *enoplia*, marching songs. The polemarch acted as judge in choosing the winner.⁷⁹ Just as sacrificial feasting at the Panathenaea involved the presence of the gods along with agonistic poetry, so too did warfare, which, also involved sacramental meals.⁸⁰ It is unsurprising that in such a theocentric and collectivist context that the identity of the individual should take the backstage as the numinous *logoi* themselves are marshalled and unified in a divine singularity. That the military marching songs, *enoplia*, and the ranks (*taxeis*) of hoplite

⁷⁷ Kalkavage (2001), 143.

⁷⁸ Kalkavage (2001), 143.

⁷⁹ Ath.14.29=630f=Kaibel 3:391.23-25 states that the Spartiates memorised marching-songs (*embatēria*) and recite Tyrtaean poems by heart in war whilst making the corresponding rhythmic movements. Philochorus FGrH 328 F 216 that the Spartans also had the custom of performing a paean at dinner and then taking turns reciting Tyrtaean poems in a competitive relay with the polemarch adjudicating and giving a portion of meat to the winner. See also Plu. *Instituta Laconica* 16=*Moralia* 238b=3:434. For marching songs generally, see Th. 5.69, Plb. 4.20.12 & D.Chr. *Orationes* 2.59.

⁸⁰ Plu. *Lyc.* 22.2–3 describes in detail the pre-battle procedure of goat-sacrifice, garland-wearing and the performance of an aulodic Hymn to Castor followed by an aulos-accompanied paean and marching song that dictated the troops' rhythmic movement in combat and kept them calm and confident that they had divine support and were being led to victory. See Gersbach (2022), 101-102.

warfare are relevant here may seem contrived but there is actually a great deal of emphasis in the *Timaeus* on Athens' military character.

The Egyptian priest in Critias' story tells Solon that Palaeo-Athens before the great cataclysm was the best city in warfare and generally was distinguished by her legal organisation (ἡ νῦν Ἀθηναίων οὕσα πόλις ἀρίστη πρὸς τε τὸν πόλεμον καὶ κατὰ πάντα εὐνομοτάτη διαφερόντως, 23c). Critias then relays that Athena chose the land that became Athens to generate there her people (the Athenians) on account of the territory's perfectly balanced seasons (τὴν εὐκрасίαν τῶν ὥρων), which she saw as conducive to bringing forth a most wise and war-ready populace, something which accorded with her philosophic and martial character (φρονιμωτάτους ἄνδρας οἴσοι: ἅτε οὖν φιλοπόλεμός τε καὶ φιλόσοφος ἡ θεὸς, 24c-d). Socrates imitates his city's patron goddess by acting as a polemarch-symposiarch marshalling his guests' *logoi* into a battle formation. Socrates' opening count establishes the rhythmic beat for Timaeus' impending martial *enoplion* which is expressly identified as a 'virtual march' when Timaeus concludes his *nomos* (*Criti.* 106a-b):

ὡς ἄσμενος, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶον ἐκ **μακρᾶς ἀναπεπαυμένος ὁδοῦ**, νῦν οὕτως ἐκ **τῆς τοῦ λόγου διαπορείας ἀγαπητῶς ἀπήλλαγμα**. τῷ δὲ πρὶν μὲν πάλαι ποτ' ἔργω, νῦν δὲ λόγοις ἄρτι θεῷ γεγονότι προσεύχομαι, τῶν ῥηθέντων ὅσα μὲν **ἐρρήθη μετρίως**, σωτηρίαν ἡμῖν αὐτὸν αὐτῶν διδόναι, **παρὰ μέλος** δὲ εἴ τι περὶ αὐτῶν ἄκοντες εἶπομεν, δίκην τὴν πρέπουσαν ἐπιτιθέναι. δίκη δὲ ὀρθὴ τὸν **πλημμελοῦντα ἐμμελῆ ποιεῖν**.

How gladly do I now welcome my release, Socrates, from **my protracted discourse [diaporeia]** even as a traveller who **takes his rest after a long journey [hodos]**! And I make my prayer to that God who has recently been created by our speech (although in reality created of old), that he will grant to us the conservation of all our sayings that have been **rightly said [uttered in metre]**, and, if unwittingly we have spoken aught **discordantly**, that he will impose the fitting penalty. And the correct penalty is to **bring into tune him that is out of tune**.

That Timaeus' *nomos* is here conceived of as being 'sung' is reflected in the way he prays that all that was said was uttered μετρίως. This adverb primarily means 'modestly'. Thus

Timaeus is praying that he has not erred in his teaching by speaking inaccurately or with excess. He hopes that the system of cosmic law (*nomos*) he has articulated is moderate and a fair representation of reality. However, it can be argued that μετρίως carries yet another subtle meaning: that the *nomos* (strain) was sung ἐμμέτρως, ‘in metre’.⁸¹ Whilst moderation is the primary meaning, the potential musical sense serves to frame ‘sin’ and ‘inaccuracy’ in speech as a breach of harmony. That Plato intended the adverb to carry a musical meaning is reflected in how Timaeus prays for God to chastise him if he has erred. If his song has at some point been out of tune (παρὰ μέλος) God should make the out-of-tune and sinful speech melodious by rectifying all errors (πλημμελοῦντα ἐμμελῆ ποιεῖν). Timaeus prays that his cosmogonic *nomos* be purified of error by being harmonising to accord with the music of God’s truth. Man sinning in speech and deed is a violation of the cosmic harmony which must be rectified by God and brought back ‘in tune’. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that Timaeus conceives of his *nomos* as embodying a model of divine cognition that is to be imitated by man for him to succeed in his battle against disorder in his own microcosmic body-soul compound just as God does at the macrocosmic level in the body-soul compound of the Cosmotheos. In Timaeus’ closing prayer, extracted above, there are two words which both clearly refer to not just a journey on foot, but specifically a military march: *hodos* and *diaporeia*. The phrase ‘*makra hodos*’ literally means a long road or journey.⁸² However, it can have the more specific meaning in military contexts, namely that of a ‘march on the offensive during a campaign’.⁸³ So too διαπορεία can simply mean ‘journey’ and can be used in a metaphoric sense: indeed the LSJ cites *Criti.* 106a as an example of such figurative usage.⁸⁴ However, an inscription from Knidos records an injunction about the movement of troops

⁸¹ See LSJ s.v. μέτρον and s.v. ἔμμετρος with *Pl.Smp.* 197c, *Phdr.* 252b, *Arist.Rh.* 1408b21.

⁸² LSJ s.v. ὁδός.

⁸³ See Bailly s.v. ὁδός: «avec idée d'hostilité marche offensive, campagne, incursion».

⁸⁴ LSJ s.v. διαπορεία.

that uses *διαπορεία* in the specific sense of ‘march’.⁸⁵ The LSJ entry for the word *διαπορεία* notes that it can also refer to the “procession of heavenly bodies” with the Platonic *Epinomis* being the paradigmatic citation (ἄστρα τε καὶ συμπᾶσα...ἡ διαπορεία, 982c).⁸⁶ In that passage it is not only the individual planetary movements signified but also that of Uranus-Cosmos as a whole. That same Platonic text identifies Heaven, ‘Uranus’, as well as ‘Olympus’ and ‘Cosmos’ as alternative names of God, ‘the most Just’, to be worshipped in a manner different to all other divinities (hence the capitalisation as ‘God’ here in English).⁸⁷ As such the whole of the Visible Divine Macrocosm can be referred to as Uranus or Heaven because the name of the outermost, All-containing layer is used synecdochically to refer to everything contained within.

At any rate, the point in all this is that the diction of Timaeus’ closing prayer serves to frame it as both a military marching-song (*nomos*) and a complete astronomical or cosmic course of rotation. This odd depiction of the overall ‘course’ of Timaeus’ *eikōs mythos* as both a journey on foot accompanied by militaristic music and as the rotational trajectory of celestial bodies and of the cosmos at large has a very particular meaning when viewed in light of Timaeus’ account of anthropogony as ‘celestial chariot-tour’ of the All (41d-42a):⁸⁸

συστήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν διεἴλεν ψυχὰς ἰσαριθμούς τοῖς ἄστροις, ἔνειμέν θ’ ἐκάστην πρὸς ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐμβιβάσας ὡς ἐς ὄχημα τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξεν, νόμους τε τοὺς εἰμαρμένους εἶπεν αὐταῖς, ὅτι γέनेσις πρώτη μὲν ἔσοιτο τεταγμένη μία πᾶσιν, ἵνα μή τις ἐλαττοῖτο ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, δέοι δὲ σπαρείσας αὐτὰς εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάσταις ἕκαστα ὄργανα χρόνων φῦναι ζώων τὸ θεοσεβέστατον

And when He had compounded the whole He divided it into souls equal in number to the stars, and each several soul He assigned to one star, and setting them each as it were in a chariot¹ He showed them the nature of the Universe, and declared unto

⁸⁵ DGE s.v. *διαπορεία* citing IKnidos 31.3.13: μὴ προσαγέτω εἰ μὴ διαπορείας ἔνεκεν.

⁸⁶ LSJ s.v. *διαπορεία*.

⁸⁷ *Epinom.* 977b.

⁸⁸ For commentary on this passage, see Taylor (1928), 255-258. Cf. Cornford (1937) 142-143 who cites *Lg.* 904c: κατὰ τῆς εἰμαρμένης τάξιν καὶ νόμον.

them the laws of destiny,—namely, how that the first birth should be one and the same ordained for all, in order that none might be slighted by Him; and how it was needful that they, when sown each into his own proper organ of time, should grow into the most god-fearing of living creatures;

Here the Demiurge divides up the total number of human souls out of a whole, ‘freshly mixed soul-substance’ as it were. The number of human souls accords with the total number of celestial bodies and they are each ‘sown’ into one which they then ‘ride’ as an ‘astral chariot’.⁸⁹ The reason this is relevant to the closing prayer of Timaeus wherein his discourse is likened to both a martial march and the rotational course of the celestial bodies and the whole cosmos is that Timaeus here depicts the Demiurge as leading the human-souls on a ‘tour of the All’ as astral charioteers wherein He teaches them the ‘fated laws’ delineated in the body-soul complex of Uranus-Cosmos (τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξεν, νόμους τε τοῦς εἰμαρμένους εἶπεν αὐταῖς). When Timaeus’ prayerful summary of his discourse as a march and cosmic rotation is viewed in light of his anthropogonic myth presenting the freshly-mixed human souls being given a celestial chariot-tour of the ‘fated laws’ of the All it becomes apparent that the whole *eikōs mythos* is essentially a virtual re-enactment of that pan-cosmic chariot journey or *harmatodromia*.⁹⁰ Whilst Timaeus does not specify exactly what the ‘fated laws of the All’ are nor does he provide detailed description of what the astral charioteers are shown it is quite obvious contextually what this pan-cosmic *harmatodromia* consists of. The above passage opens with a reference to the Demiurge composing a whole (συστήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν). The Demiurge has just returned to the ‘mixing-bowl’ wherein He mixed the World Soul, the Soul of the All or the Whole and then poured into the same krater the remaining ‘psychic stuff’ left over from His former construction that He now uses to make human souls (καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν πρότερον κρατῆρα, ἐν ᾧ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν κεραννὺς ἔμισγεν, τὰ τῶν πρόσθεν ὑπόλοιπα κατεχεῖτο μίσγων, 41d).⁹¹ It is remarkable that

⁸⁹ For Plato’s depiction elsewhere of astral ensoulment in terms of charioteering, see *Lg.* 899a.

⁹⁰ See *Str.* 5.3.8. for the word ἄρματοδρομία.

⁹¹ This same mixing language is used of Socrates as *zōgraphos* of the *theoikelon-andreikelon* in *R.*

not only are the souls of humans presented as being constructed out of the same ‘stuff’ as the World Soul in the same ‘mixing-bowl’ but even the way Timaeus speaks of ‘assembling the whole’ (συστήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν) when speaking of the collective substance out of which human souls are divided serves to frame anthropogony as parallel to the creation of the Macrocosmic Whole, the All. Indeed when the demiurge ‘sows’ the freshly-mixed human souls into celestial bodies He is essentially incorporating them into the body-soul compound of Uranus-Cosmos. This answers the question as to what it was that the proto-human astral charioteers were shown on their chariot-tour—they complete a ‘harmatodromic’ round of the body-soul compound of Uranus-Cosmos from within. The musico-mathematical structure of the World Soul that animates Heaven and which is used by the Demiurge to ‘tame’ and order the Visible All is what is shown to the proto-human astral charioteers who are ‘marching’ and ‘rotating’ through the very body-soul complex of the Visible Macrocosm. Up until this point in the cosmogony only the planets, stars and humans have been created so the ‘fated laws of the All’ wherein all the impending ‘biodiversity’ of the World of Becoming is ‘laid out’ is found in the stars and in the musico-mathematical harmony of the order of the World Soul, the harmonic ratios of the Anima Mundi. It is of note that there was a major kind of militaristic *nomos* that was specifically associated with charioteering, the *Harmateios Nomos*.⁹² As astral-charioteers the proto-humans ‘march’ or ‘rotate’ around the whole body-soul complex of Uranus-Cosmos within which they are ‘sown’ and they do so with the accompaniment of the ‘music’ of the harmonic ratios of the World Soul which the Demiurge shows to them and presents as the ‘fated laws of nature’.⁹³ All of this is narrated by Timaeus in the *eikōs mythos* which he

⁹² See Almazova (2014), 518-538 for an assessment of the limited ancient evidence about the *Harmateios nomos*. The myth of Athena inventing the *polykephalos nomos* as told in *Pi.P.* 12.18-28 & *Nonn.* 40.227–233; 24. 36–38 in imitation of the Gorgon’s cry is worth noting given the Panathenaic context of the *Timaeus*. Cf. *Apollod.* 1.4.2, *Arist. Pol.* 1341b, *Ath.* 14.616e-f & *Paus.* 1.24 for Marsyas taking up the aulos after Athena rejected it on account of it puffing up her face and thus making her ugly.

⁹³ In presenting the souls of proto-humans as being sown into astral bodies that are themselves parts of the body of the Divine Macrocosm, an oddity arises—the planets into whose bodies the souls of proto-humans are sown are themselves the very gods to whom the Demiurge will delegate the task of creating the bodies of

prayerfully concludes by calling it a cosmic-rotation journey (*diaporeia*). Thus Timaeus' *nomos* is in essence a *harmateios nomos*' recapitulating that initial chariot-tour of the All given to the Demiurge to the astrally-incarnate souls at the dawn of Time. Timaeus lays out in his own 'rhapsodic *nomos*' the Demiurge's 'song of creation', His ordering of Uranus-Cosmos according to the harmonic ratios of the Anima Mundi which He then shows to the humans He creates as astral charioteers. Timaeus essentially re-creates that tour which the Demiurge gave to the proto-human astral charioteers and relays to his readers/listeners the same information that God gave on that pan-cosmic *harmatodromia*. Let us now turn to examining the ratios of the Anima Mundi which constitute the 'cosmogonic song' used by the Demiurge to order the All.

The Ratios and Musical Mode of the Anima Mundi

Having established the cultural and dramatic context of the Timaeian *nomos* as well as its narratological framing as a virtual chariot-tour of the cosmos, we now turn to its mathematical substance. The account of the Demiurge's structuring of the World Soul provides the musical *nomos*—the harmonic ratios—by which the Visible All is ordered.

Timaeus' account of the Demiurge's structuring of the World Soul (35a-c) is the mathematical heart of the dialogue. This passage establishes the harmonic ratios that structure both the

terrestrial humans. Thus the divinely ensouled celestial bodies are the 'chariots' into whom the freshly-mixed souls of humans are 'sown' and then those gods go on to implant these humans souls they are 'carrying' into the earthen bodies which they themselves go on to create. Given that this is the case, are human souls participants in anthropogony? That the planets specifically are themselves the gods which the Demiurge commissions to be 'sub-demiurges', that is, to carry out the creation of terrestrial life-forms is evident in the way He addresses them. That this is the case is clear when the Demiurge addresses them thus: "gods of gods, those works whereof I am framer and father" (θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, 41a). Kalkavage (2001), 28, n50 points out the *theoi theōn* here is a partitive genitive that makes it clear that the planetary gods are the referent here as they are being separated from the anthropomorphic Olympians of traditional myth who were referred to just prior (40d-e): "the Craftsman separates the whet from the chaffs, the legitimate heirs from the usurpers of the title [of 'gods']". Cf. Cornford 369 who changes the manuscript reading due to an inability to make sense of *theoi theōn*.

cosmos and the ideal polity. Despite scholarly debate about whether these ratios constitute a recognizable musical mode, their significance for framing the cosmogony as a *nomos* is undeniable

It will now be argued that the mathematical schema underlying Timaeus' account of the Demiurge's construction of the World Soul (and thus by extension of Heaven and Time) is intimately related to his fulfilment of Socrates' request to see his polity animated as a *zōon* at war. However, before that can be demonstrated it is necessary first to examine the musico-mathematical schema of the Anima Mundi. Timaeus' account of the Demiurge' structuring of the World Soul (35a-c) serves to frame the whole cosmogony as a piece of music, as a strain, a *nomos*. The Visible All is said to be animated and governed by harmonic ratios. Do these ratios of the Anima Mundi form a melody? Cornford in his commentary on 35b-c is of the opinion that there is no clearly identifiable musical mode in the scale delineated in the Anima Mundi and that even if there were, it is allegedly not a significant consideration worthy of attention.⁹⁴ Cornford's observation has some merit in a certain sense. Archer-Hind has rightly observed that the scale starts in the Dorian mode in its first half. However, it descends into an unidentifiable state of musical disorder in the latter half.⁹⁵ Nonetheless Kalkavage points out an important consideration. Since *R.3.399a* teaches that the Phrygian and Dorian modes are the only types of music permitted in the ideal polity, there is good reason to see significance in Timaeus' use of the Dorian mode. These modes have ubiquitously positive impacts on the soul. It makes sense that the cosmogony Timaeus provides in answer to Socrates' desire to see a belligerent *zōon* (19b-c) should begin with a cosmic psychogony structured as a scale in

⁹⁴ Cornford (1937), 69.

⁹⁵ Archer-Hind (1888), 108-111, esp. 109.

the Dorian mode.⁹⁶ Kalkavage claims “the scale of Timaeus is a sort of cosmic background music for Critias’ promised story about the war between Athens and Atlantis”.⁹⁷ He adds that “even apart from the designs of Critias, the world of Timaeus is one in which the war against chaos is constantly being waged”.⁹⁸ Kalkavage explains this ‘war against chaos’: “the war mode of the cosmic soul reflects the central role played by *thymos* or spiritedness throughout the dialogue[:] it is that power of the soul that reason [*nous*] uses to subdue the irrational desires [*epithymētikon*] (70a)”.⁹⁹ Thus Kalkavage argues that there are functional analogisms in the aspects of the ensouled Theocosmos and the microcosmic soul of man. This theme that will more thoroughly be explored in the next chapter of this dissertation.

The World Soul’s mathematical and astronomical structure, when contextualised in terms of Pythagorean number-symbolism, embodies a kind of musical blueprint of sacred geometry: the ‘song’ of Demiurgy. Timaeus’ description of the musico-mathematical and astronomical schema of God’s cognition as manifest in the World Soul and the visible body of Uranus-Chronos Whom the Anima Mundi animates is vital for understanding the concept of the ‘mesocosm’ mediating between the totality of the Divine Macrocosm and the microcosm of man. Socrates’ starry constitution (*R.9.592a*), the *theoekelon andreikelon*, will be identified with the musico-mathematical order of the dual-tetractys schema of ratios delineated in the Anima Mundi as well as ‘the armillary sphere’ that is generated through Timaeus’ description of Uranus-Chronos. Before discussing the notion of the virtual armillary sphere it is first necessary to turn to Timaeus’ structuring of the World Soul.

⁹⁶ Kalkavage (2001), 161.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.


⁹⁹ Ibid.

Timaeus says that God took two essences, the indivisible, eternally self-same essence (Being, the Same) and the divisible substance generated with bodies (Becoming, the Different). God mixed the two together to create a third species, an intermediary between the Same and the Different that partakes of both (ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, 35a).¹⁰⁰ After the Demiurge “with the aid of Being...had mixed them, and had made of them one out of three, straightway He began to distribute the whole thereof into so many portions as was meet; and each portion was a mixture of the Same, of the Other, and of Being” (μειγνύς δὲ μετὰ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τριῶν ποιησάμενος ἓν, πάλιν ὅλον τοῦτο μοίρας ὅσας προσῆκεν διένειμεν, ἐκάστην δὲ ἕκ τε ταύτου καὶ θατέρου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας μεμειγμένην, 35b). Thus, it is not only the overall substance of the Anima Mundi that is a tripartite mixture. Each component therein is equally tripartite: even the composite parts fractally reflect the whole’s structure. Bury rightly points out that Timaeus is informed here by “the Greek principle that like is known by like” for “Plato makes real substances out of these three abstractions [Same, Difference and the mix of the two] and puts them as plastic material into the hands of the Demiurgus for the formation of the Soul”.¹⁰¹ Implicit in this mixing then is the idea that the cognition of man through the discernment of sameness and difference is modelled on the way the ensouled Cosmotheos was made to think by the Demiurge. This macrocosm-microcosm analogism between the cognition of God and man will be discussed shortly but first it is necessary to examine the harmonic ratios delineated in the structuring of the Anima Mundi (Ti.35b-c). Even though the simplistic *tetractys*-formula “(1+2+3+4=10) is not employed by Plato” in his account of the ratios used to build the Anima Mundi (35a), it is the nonetheless

¹⁰⁰ Cf. the μέγιστα γένη of *Sph.* 244-245 with Shorey (1888), 298.

¹⁰¹ Bury (1929), 66.

the case that “Plato is really pythagorizing”.¹⁰² The ratios he provides “form the basis of a musical scale” in the form of the following Pythagorean tetractys-schema:¹⁰³



This schema is fundamental to understanding the musical structure of the cosmos. Archer-Hind explains that here "this τετρακτύς is double, proceeding in one branch from 1 to 2³, in the other from 1 to 3³".¹⁰⁴ He notes "that the sum of the first six numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9 equals the last, 27".¹⁰⁵ This double tetractys generates the harmonic ratios that structure the World Soul. It will now be argued that these numbers which make up the *tetractys* provide Timaeus with the conception of cosmic mathematical order that he needs to utilise in order to both accurately describe cosmogony and to animate the ideal polity as a *zōon* at war—two enterprises that are actually one and the same. Though Archer-Hind does not cite any ancient source, he is clearly following Theon of Smyrna who provides this double-tetractys schema.¹⁰⁶ Whilst it is not worth paying attention to the symbolic numerological exegesis provided by that late-antique author since is more likely to represent neo-Pythagorean tradition rather than authentic ancient Pythagoreanism, there is nonetheless one element of

¹⁰² Archer-Hind (1888), 107.

¹⁰³ Ibid. The above diagram is produced there. See also Sallis (1999), 71-73.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ See the relevant parts of the text of Theon in Hiller (1878), 93-94, 97-99. There the tetractys-schema of the World Soul is linked to the Pythagorean aphorism that 'all things resemble number' (ἀριθμῶ δέ τε πάντ' ἐπέουκε). See LSJ s.v. ἐπέουκα which cites this Pythagorean maxim for the definition "resemble". S.E. *Against the Logicians* 1.93-95 links the Pythagorean aphorism that 'all things resemble number' to the oath that identifies the *tetractys* as the source of everything. Sextus identifies the tetractys as the harmony that Pythagoreans believed ordered the entire universe. Further all this discussion of the *tetractys* follows on from Sextus citing Posidonius' exegesis of the *Timaeus* as teaching that it is through *logos* that one understands the nature of the All. The tetractys oath is also preserved in Aetius 1.3.8 ff (DK 58B15).

that ancient author's commentary that does warrant attention. Theon notes that the term tetractys referred to the quaternary made up by adding the first four numbers together (1, + 2, + 3, + 4=10) and identified that series of numbers (1,2,3,4) as having cosmogonic significance and a Pythagorean oath: by the one who has bestowed upon our soul the *tetractys* that contains the source and the root of eternal nature (*physis*)” (οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρα ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτύν).¹⁰⁷ This oath can reliably be taken to represent authentic early Pythagorean belief about the structuring of the Divine All according to the harmony delineated in the count ‘one, two, three, four’.¹⁰⁸ That this count (one-two-three-four) was associated with a sacred Pythagorean oath representative of the ‘root’ of the All is significant because this very same count constitutes the opening words of the *Timaeus*. In the incipit Socrates eunumerates the three symposiasts present using cardinal numbers before using an ordinal number for the missing fourth: “one, two, three,—but where, my dear Timaeus, is the fourth of our guests of yesterday, our hosts of today?” (εἷς, δύο, τρεῖς: ὁ δὲ δὴ τέταρτος ἡμῖν, ὦ φίλε Τίμαιε, ποῦ τῶν χθὲς μὲν δαιτυμόνων, τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐστιατόρων; 17a).¹⁰⁹ It is quite likely

¹⁰⁷ My translation of Theo Sm. 94 (Hiller). See also Theo Sm. 93.19– 20 (Hiller): τὴν μὲν γὰρ τετρακτύν συνέστησεν ἡ δεκάς. ἐν γὰρ καὶ β' καὶ γ' καὶ δ' ἰ'. The tetractys-oath is preserved in a great number of sources: *Carm.Aur.* 47-48; *S.E.M.* 4.2.3.9 & 7.94. 100; *Porph. VP.* 20; *Macr. Somn. Scip.* 1.6.41; *Iamb. VP.* 150.162; *Stob. Ecl.* I 10.19; *Ps.-Plu. de plac. phil.* 1.10.12; *Theol. Ar.* 4=Ast (1817), 18 & *Hippol. Haer.* VI.23.4.

¹⁰⁸ The antiquity of the tetractys oath is reflected in the reliable testimonium ascribing the belief that the tetractys was the *archē* of health to Philolaus of Croton (DK 44 A 11). Huffman 1993, 355-256 avows that this testimonium is reliable despite the objections of Zhmud (2012), 302 n56. Cf. Burkert (1972), 461 n.71 who rejects Athenagoras' testimonium concerning Lysis and the tetractys (DK 46.4). Diels (1899), 15 argues in favour of the antiquity of the Pythagorean tetractys by claiming that Empedocles' elemental tetrad ("Vierzahl der Elemente") was indebted to it. Zeller & Nestle (1920), 951 also made this suggestion though far more tentatively. For the identification of tetrad and tetractys, see also Kucharski (1952), 18 n. 2. For the connection between the cosmic harmony of the Sirens in *Pl. R.* 10, 617b and the belief that Delphic Apollo revealed the tetractys as the pan-cosmic harmony, see Delatte (1915), 259– 261 and Kucharski (1952), 75– 77 with *Iamb. VP* 82; p. 47.15– 16 Deubner (= *Ch. 3, Πυθαγόρας καὶ οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ*, fr. 106 mp): τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς μαντεῖον; τετρακτύς· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἄρμονία, ἐν ἧ αἱ Σειρῆνες. For an excellent account of how the tetractys-oath and its associated with the count ‘1,2,3,4’ plays a central role in Empedocles' cyclical cosmology and can thus be presumed to be a genuinely ancient Pythagorean doctrine Primavesi (2021), 135–182.

¹⁰⁹For the importance of this *tetractys*-incipit in flagging Pythagorean influence, see Burnyeat (1998), 15-16 & Sedley (2019), 48-49. *Iamb. in Tim Fr 3* (Dillon) interpreted the incipit count of one-two-three-four as symbolising the Divided Line and the absence of the fourth indicated this missing figure was the one capable of treating the highest epistemological and ontological category, the Intelligibles. Indeed *R.6.510b-511d* treats mathematics and geometry as the third highest class in the Divided Line, that of *dianoia*. See Dillon (2006), 21– 22 and *Procl. in Ti.* 1.19.32–20.14 for ancient commentary on the count-incipit, e.g. Dercyllides claimed thy missing fourth party was Plato since he is elsewhere recorded in the *Phaedo* as being absent on account of

given the generally mathematical character of the cosmogonic account provided by Timaeus that Socrates' opening tetractys-count functions as a kind of 'shibboleth', a subtle hint preparing the reader/listener for what is to come.¹¹⁰ Indeed as shall be demonstrated in this dissertation-chapter, Number and Ratio qua musico-mathematical harmony are the means by which both the Timaean Demiurge orders the Divine Macrocosm and by which Socrates' *oikistai-zōgraphoi* regulate their mesocosmic polity and the microcosmic human souls in their care.

The Heavenly *Diagraphē* of the Macrocosmic and Microcosmic *Zōgraphoi*

The mathematical harmonies of the World Soul find their visible manifestation in the geometric structure of the cosmos. The Demiurge completes His ordering of the Visible All

sickness (Πλάτων δὲ οἶμαι ἠσθένει, 59b). For Aristocles' belief that the missing party was Theaetetus who, according to the eponymous Platonic text (142b) had major health problems, see Horky (2013), 195 n105: "if this is right, the clever response by Socrates takes on new valence: "it's for you and your friends to fill in for him in his absence."

¹¹⁰ Indebtedness to Pythagoreanism or influence from it does not mean that the mathematical outlook of the *Timaeus* is purely Pythagorean. Indeed, in his account of the mathematical aspects of the *Timaeus* Gregory (2022), 359-389 makes a point of differentiating Plato's use of Number from prior Pythagoreanism. Sayre (2002), 172 provides a clear explanation of how Plato differed from his Pythagorean predecessors: "in contrast with the Pythagoreans for whom mathematical number is constitutive of sensible things, these numbers for Plato occupy an intermediate position between sensible things and the Forms, differing from the former in being eternal and unchangeable and from the latter in being many alike". Xenocrates, an immediate successor of Plato, believed that Number constitutes the very substance of God's soul or intellect, see Xenocrates Fr 16 (Heinze). According to Arist.*Metaph.* 987a29 the Pythagoreans conceived of the *gignomena* of the World of Becoming as existing through imitating Number whereas Plato saw them as participating in Forms. Further, as per *Metaph.* 987b20-22 the Forms and/or Numbers (the text at this point seems to conflate the two) are derived from the Great (*mega*) and Small (*mikron*) through participation in the One which both Plato and the Pythagoreans allegedly identified with the Essence of Being (*ousia*). Aristotle alleges that Plato understood the Great and the Small as a Dyad called Unlimited (*apeiron*), the 'other nature' (τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν) vis-à-vis Being out of which all numbers (with the exception of the prime numbers) were produced (987b26 and 987b33). Cf. Arist. *Metaph.* 1084a3-7. Cherniss (1945), 34-37 argues that that Form-Numbers are an Aristotelian interpretative invention. For potential identification of Number and the Forms, see *Metaph.* 987b10-13 with Gadamer (1988), 245. For the discussion of Number in the *Phaedo*, see *Phd.* 96a-97b, 100e-101a, 102b-103a. See also Renaud (2019), 362. For the 'Unwritten Doctrines,' see O'Brien (2025). The term ἄγραφα δόγματα is coined in Arist.*Phys.* 209b14-15.

through *diazōgraphia*—a term whose dual artistic and geometric meaning links cosmic creation to political constitution-making (Ti.55c).

Just as Socrates marshals and bestows order upon his fellow symposiast with his opening count so too the *tetractys*-based Dorian harmony of the Anima Mundi is used by the Demiurge to ‘musically’ tame and geometrically organise into elemental solids the initially indeterminate pre-cosmic residue that is simply moving about chaotically without *logos* (both ratio and reason are meant) and without *metron* (ἄλόγως καὶ ἀμέτρως, 53a). Timaeus says that the Demiurge shapes the All through both Forms and Numbers (διεσχηματίσατο εἶδεσί τε καὶ ἀριθμοῖς, 53b). This at the very least implies a strong degree of cooperation, participation or even identification between Form and Number.¹¹¹ At any rate, the ordering of the Visible All reaches its climax when the Demiurge devises through *diazōgraphia* (Ti.55c:

διαζωγραφῶν) a geometric solid that contains all *gignomena* and delineates the animalian constellations of the sphere of the fixed stars against which all planetary movement is observed. This solid is the dodecahedron and in constructing it the Demiurge is said to use up all the cosmic material that He had at His disposal thus bringing to completion the Visible All (ἔτι δὲ οὐσης συστάσεως μιᾶς πέμπτης, ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς αὐτῇ κατεχρήσατο ἐκεῖνο διαζωγραφῶν, 55c). In order to explain why this dodecahedral *diazōgraphia* in particular is so important in bestowing order it is necessary to first understand how Timaeus conceives of Time and Number as manifest in the motions of the celestial bodies. Timaeus identifies Time with the motions of the celestial bodies that collectively make Uranus-Cosmos and constitute a moving *eikōn* of Eternity. The stationary Paradigm, unlike its model, moves according to Number (εἰκὼ δ' ἐπενόει κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον ὄν δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν, 37d). As such Time is generated along with Heaven and motion according to

¹¹¹Schipper (1965), 66-68.

Number which imitates the Noetic Paradigm. The Dorian *nomopoiia* of the mathematico-musical order of the ratios in the structure of the Anima Mundi are embodied in Uranus-Chronos as the visible moving *eikōn* of Eternity the Invisible Paradigm. The outermost part of that *eikōn* moving according to Number, the sphere of the fixed stars, should be identified with the dodecahedral *diazōgraphia* of *Ti.55c*. That constellational dodecahedron-ball should be seen as encompassing the entire Visible All. It is vital to note that this outermost layer of the visible cosmos is adorned with animalian constellations.

Interpreting the Demiurge's *diazōgraphia* in *Ti.55c* as involving Him adorning the dodecahedral firmament with constellational *zōa* is important because doing so elucidates how the *eikōs mythos* fulfills Socrates' desire to see his ideal polity animated as a moving *zōon* and why Socrates even makes that request in the first place. Not only that understanding the constellational *diazōgraphia* of *Ti.55c* connects the *eikōs mythos* to its dramatic and cultural context, the lived experience of the Panathenaea. The reason this latter connection to the Panathenaea is significant is because Socrates' request to see his polity rendered an animal moving in warfare (19b-c) is influenced by the visuals of that festival. Those festive visuals shed light on the 'diazōgraphic' dynamic at play in the *eikōs mythos* and allow us to understand the true significance of the subtle infix 'zō' in the participle *diazōgraphōn* used of the Demiurge's delineation of the dodecahedral firmament. In order to reconstruct the visuals that Socrates and Timaeus would have experienced at the Panathenaea and appreciate how they shape the meaning of the Demiurge's *diazōgraphia* it will be beneficial to examine the

following Attic black-figure cup (circa 560 BC) depicting a Panathenaic *pompē* (procession):¹¹²




Here on the far left one sees a priest and Athena (either an idol or the goddess herself) being approached by procession of humans and sacrificial animals. First in line (from the left to right) is a bearded man with a branch, followed by a *kanephoros* (basket-bearing maiden) and then five men leading a *trittys*, a special sacrifice comprised of a bovine, a pig and a sheep.¹¹³ Next follow three musicians (two playing the aulos and another the kithara), three *thalophoroi* (ritual branch-bearers), three hoplites and then, most likely three horse-riders. Even though only one rider is visible, given the established pattern the viewer is probably supposed to imagine another two here but the painter ran out of room due to the handle). Neils ascribes significance to the trios in the procession here by suggesting that they are

¹¹² This image is given as Fig. 2. In Neils (2007), 45. The cup is from the Niarchos collection kept in Paris, photo-credit: D. Widmer 837. See Marangou (1995) 86-93. For the significance of Panathenaic prize-amphorae generally, see Neils (1992b), 29-52.

¹¹³ For the *trittys*, see Van Straten (1995), 16-17. Unlike Neils (2007), 44-45 who identifies this sacrificial scene as Panathenaic, Van Straten is of the opinion that it depicts the proceedings of a Deme festival. The specifics of the Panathenaic procession need not concern us—this dissertation's case stands regardless of the details.

likely to represent a tripartite division of the polis' citizenry.¹¹⁴ The Panathenaic sacrificial procession was not the only instance of *zōa* in motion which Socrates and Timaeus would have witnessed—as spectators they would have enjoyed a great many athletic contests involving humans and animals often engaged in martially-themed competitions.¹¹⁵ The Panathenaic *agōnes* were diverse and included the following: the pentathlon, wrestling, boxing, pankration, horse races, chariot racing, javelin on horseback, a jousting-like game called '*anthipassia*', torch-races, footraces including the *hoplitodromos*, a race wherein contestants were fully armed as hoplites and possibly even boat races.¹¹⁶

In addition to viewing a procession of *zōa* accompanied by music and marching militants (hoplites and horsemen) all of which symbolically embody the polis in their motion as well as seeing *zōgraphiai* of these very animalian processions on the prize amphorae awarded in the festive *agōnes* Timaeus and Socrates would also have witnessed a procession of celestial *zōa* overhead in the night's sky. Boutsikas notes that even though it is well known that, “like most Greek festivals, it began at sunset with a torch race... the night sky [itself] is not generally



¹¹⁴ Neils (2007), 45. This tripartite division is suggested by the three-bodied *daimon* (a serpent tail with three human torsos and heads) depicted on the Hekatompedon pediment from the Acropolis. For the political interpretation of that pediment as representing the division of citizens into three regions, the sea-shore, the plains and the hill, see Boardman (1972), 57-72 & Ridgway (1993), 286-287.

¹¹⁵ For the nature of ancient Athenian animal-interactions generally, see Smith (2021), 199-214.

¹¹⁶ Kule (2018), 177-194. For *anthipassia*, see X. *Eq.* 3.11–12.

taken into account in either historical or archaeological studies of the festival”.¹¹⁷ Indeed her reconstruction of the night sky over the acropolis during the Panathenaea shows a stellar array of animalian shapes in motion:¹¹⁸

The observation of constellational *zōa* ‘marching’ across the sky was an integral part of time-keeping. *Parapēgmata* from the fifth century make it clear that star-gazing in conjunction with reliance on a luni-solar calendar was how the Athenian sacred calendar was composed and observed.¹¹⁹ Thus it is not only the Panathenaea but festivities generally that were determined by starry heaven, for, as Parker notes, “festivals...had a proper and even ‘natural’ relation to the cycle of the stars and seasons”.¹²⁰ In the case of the *Proarktouria* the festival’s very name describes the relevant astronomical event for it was timed based on Arcturus’ heliacal rising and so too on the island of Keos, Sirius’ rising was celebrated with sacrifices to that very astral deity.¹²¹ In his study of the archaic-period Halai Skyphos which depicts hunt scenes Barnes has shown that rather than being arbitrarily grouped animals the terrestrial *zōa* are arranged in imitation of constellation-clustered that marked the change in season such that the artefact itself functioned as a kind of astronomical clock consisting of panes of animal-clusters.¹²² The point here is that visual context of the Panathenaic procession, the vases depicting those marching *zōa* and the constellation-studded sky above all influence Socrates’ framing of the Timaeon *nomos*. These above visuals are what Socrates is referring to when he likens himself to a man who, upon seeing beautiful animals (either painted or truly living) that are motionless desires to see them brought into motion, specifically exerting

¹¹⁷ Boutsikas (2011), 303.

¹¹⁸ Fig. 2 in Boutsikas (2011), 305.

¹¹⁹ Lehoux (2007).

¹²⁰ Parker (2005), 193.

¹²¹ A.R. 2.516–27 (with *scholion* to 2.498). For more references on this custom, see Thphr. *vent.* 14. Cf. Arist. *Fr.* 511, 611.27; Callim. *Fr.* 75.32; D. 4.82.1–3; Heraclid. *Pont. Fr.* 141. See also Burkert (1983), 109–16 & Davidson (2007), 207. See also Parker (2005), 479 for *Proerosia/Proaktouria*.

¹²² Barnes (2014), 257–276.

themselves in martial, athletic contests (εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἀφίκοιτο θεάσασθαι κινούμενά τε αὐτὰ.....κατὰ τὴν ἀγωνίαν ἀθλοῦντα, 19b-c). However, the Panathenaic processions and games as well as the painted vessels depicting them are not sufficient for contextualisation of Timaeus' *nomos*. As the polis congregates around the *zōa* in motion in the Panathenaic *agōnes* all of these terrestrial proceedings are imitating the celestial blueprint of Time—the constellational *zōgraphia* overhead that determines the festive calendar. Socrates' wish to see painted or living *zōa* in motion (19b-c) is not only a reference to the processions and *agōnes* of the Panathenaea he has just witnessed. It must be recalled that in his political discourse he has acted as a *zōgraphos* producing a constitutional *diagraphe* by making use of a 'divine paradigm' laid out in Heaven (*R.* 500e-501a & 529b). The terrestrial *zōa* in motion at the Panathenaea 'mirror' the constellational *zōa* moving across the sky above and this inspires in Socrates who has just heard rhapsodic poetry unworthy of his ideal polity to a yearn for a *nomos* capable of incarnating a cosmic vision of polity that accurately corresponds the celestial paradigm. Timaeus' *eikōs mythos* is coloured by Socrates' desire for a spectacle of moving animalian *zōgraphia* for he depicts Uranus-Chronos as the perfect Visible Animal containing all other visible *zōa* just as the Paradigm contains all noetic ones (30c-d). Uranus-Chronos, the perfect all-containing *zōon* is framed as a 'moving image' of stable Eternity the Paradigm, 37d in response to Socrates' Panathenaea-inspired desire to see a moving *zōgraphia* of his celestial polity (19b-c). The connection between Socrates' Panathenaea-inspired desire to see 'moving, living *zōgraphia*' and Timaeus' painting-out in words of a living, moving *eikōn* of the cosmotheos (*Criti.*106a) is obvious enough. However, the element which has thus-far escaped notice is the connection between the Demiurge's adornment of the dodecahedral firmament with stars (*Ti.*55c) and Socrates' constitution qua paradigm in heaven both of which are framed in terms of '*diagraphe*'. Further, as will be demonstrated shortly, there is also a vital connection here to rhapsodic tradition. The Homeric

Shield of Achilles which Timaeus adapts in his new rhapsodic *nomos* puts forward a uranomimetic (Heaven-imitating) vision of cosmos and polity wherein the agricultural, cultural, and martial activities of humans qua *politika zōa* are ordered by the constellations above that establish the cycling seasons. As such the ‘constellational’ dimension subtly present in the participle *diazōgraphōn* not only connects Timaeus’ cosmogony to Socrates’ ideal constitution laid out in Heaven as well as the Socrates’ desire inspired by the moving *zōa* of the Panathenaea but it also connects the *eikōs mythos* to one of the most important passages in Homeric poetry which deals with demiurgy and uranomimesis. However, before turning to Timaeus’ adaptation of that famous instance of Homeric cosmographic *ekphrasis* it is necessary to dwell a little longer on the participle *diagrāphōn* used of the Demiurge in Ti.55c.

Given then the significance of a correlation between animals in motion on earth and constellational *zōa* moving about heaven for the overall dramatic and cultural context of the Timaeus it is necessary now to closely examine the scholarship treating the use of the participle *diagrāphōn* in Ti.55c so as to be sure be sure that a conception of the Visible All as a dodecahedral ball adorned with astral-animals is really what Plato had in mind adding the ‘zō’ infix when just *diagrāphōn* would have sufficed were the Demiurge only a geometer and not also an animal-painter (*zōgraphos*).¹²³ In order to be sure that the ‘zō’ infix within the participle *diazōgraphōn* (Ti.55c) was intended to allude to frame the Demiurges’ delineation of the dodecahedral exterior of the Visible All as a constellational, animalian *zōgraphia* it will be necessary to closely examine the scholarship on this passage in order to be sure that this is truly what Plato had in mind. Bury identifies the fifth solid as the dodecahedron whilst

¹²³ See Gadamer (1974/1980), 180 on διαζωγραφήν. See also See also Proclus' remarks on this participle in Festugière (1966), 180.2.

translating the present active participle διαζωγραφῶν very loosely as ‘decorating’ and adding to following tentative interpretational remark: “how God ‘used it up’ is obscure: the reference may be to the 12 signs of the Zodiac”.¹²⁴ Cornford on the other hand is far more bold in translation (though justifiably). He renders the line thus: “there remained one construction, the fifth [geometric solid]; and the god used it for the whole, making a pattern of animal figures thereon”.¹²⁵ Similarly Taylor deems the phrase ἐκεῖνο διαζωγραφῶν to mean that the Demiurge is “broidering figures on it”, namely the constellations of the fixed sphere of Heaven, not just the Zodiacal signs of the ecliptic but all *zōa*-constellations generally.¹²⁶ Despite the convenient link between the twelve faces of the dodecahedron and the signs of the Zodiac both Cornford and Taylor do not fixate on the zodiacal signs of the ecliptic alone. Taylor says they would be better reflected by the dodecagon. Instead, both emphasise that the likeness of the dodecahedron to the sphere make it significant. By virtue of its volume and capacity to include the other solids, it is akin to the Sphere of the Fixed Stars as a whole, not just the ecliptic, thus being identifiable with the All contained therein.¹²⁷ Much ink has been spilled in modern scholarship arguing about the possible connection (or lack thereof) between the (painted?) dodecahedron of *Ti.55c* and the description of the Visible All as a painted leather ball made of twelve pieces of leather in the Pure World in *Phaedo* 110b.¹²⁸ However

¹²⁴ Bury (1929), 134 n.1.

¹²⁵ Cornford (1937), 219.

¹²⁶ Taylor (1928), 377.

¹²⁷ Taylor (1928), 377 & Cornford (1937), 219.

¹²⁸ Cornford (1937), 219 and Wytttenbach (1810), 304-307 who surveys the ancient commentaries. O'Brien (2016), 80 n5 for the opinion that the leather ball of *Phd.110b* is “the earth (not the cosmos”. Pace O'Brien, the passage is more likely referring to the earth of the Pure Land which is situated on the edge of the cosmos making the 'ball' in view the All. Sachs (1917), 47 strongly resisted connecting *Ti.55c* to the *Phd. 110b* claiming that διαζωγραφῶν is used not due to any association with a diversely painted ball but simply due to the *Timaeus* is framing the All as a living *zōon*. Similarly Kotrč (1981), 214 argues “it is not necessary that διαζωγραφῶν in the *Timaeus* mean specifically painting, or making a pattern of animal figures, or embroidering, or have any reference to astronomy [since] the context requires, in fact demands, only the meaning delineating”. Kotrč (1981), 213 argues that the verb ζωγραφῶ can simply mean “to adorn” as a “more general meaning” as opposed to the “basic meaning” of “to paint from life” citing *R.10.598b* and *Ar.Ec.996* (ὄς τοῖς νεκροῖσι ζωγραφεῖ τὰς ληκύθους). For discussion of such *zōgraphic* funerary *lekythoi*, see Sourvinou-Inwood (1996), 341 & (1986), 210-225; Grossman (2001), 72 & Picón & De Puma (2007), 142-144.

very little if any attention has ever been paid to the vital link between the embodiment of Heaven’s musico-mathematical order in the dodecahedral *diagraphē* of *Ti.55c* and Socrates acting as a *zōgraphos* and geometer. He dialectically ‘sketches out’ with his interlocutors a plan (*diagraphē*) for his mesocosmic political constitution in imitation of a divine heavenly Paradigm, the musico-mathematical order embodied in Uranus-Chronos (διαγράψειαν οἱ τῷ θεῷ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι, *R.500e*).

The connection between *Ti.55c* and *R.500e* has been overlooked by previous scholarship, yet it is fundamental to understanding the political theology of the *Timaeus*. When Socrates describes the philosopher-kings as *zōgraphoi* using a divine paradigm (τῷ θεῷ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι, *R.500e*), he anticipates *Timaeus*’ description of the Demiurge as διαζωγραφῶν the dodecahedral cosmos. Both are painting living things; both are creating constitutions; both rely on mathematical harmony as their structuring principle. Critically the participle διαζωγραφῶν used of the Demiurge when completing His geometrical construction of the Visible All Uranus-Chronos (*Ti.55c*) clearly parallels the use of the verb διαγράψειαν in *R.500e*. There the *oikistai-zōgraphoi* are sketching out the ideal political constitution, the *theoeikelon-andreikelon*. Indeed, Sachs connects *Timaeus*’ use of the participle διαζωγραφῶν to the verb διαγράφειν, to ‘delineate’ (‘Linien durchziehen’) as it appears in *R.500e*.¹²⁹ The significance of this intertextual link between *Ti.55c* and *R.500e* is that the dodecahedral/spherical outer layer of Uranus-Cosmos ‘sketched out’ by the Demiurge contains the constitutional *diagraphē* used as a ‘divine paradigm’ by the *zōgraphoi-oikistai* in their virtual ‘painting out’ of the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* polity. The connection between

¹²⁹ Indeed Sachs (1917), 47 connects *Timaeus*’ use of the participle διαζωγραφῶν to the verb διαγράφειν, to ‘delineate’ (‘Linien durchziehen’) as it appears in *R.6.500e*. Cf. *R.387b* and *Lg.778a*. See also Stallbaum (1838), 231.

διαζωγραφῶν and the verb διαγράψειαν in *R.500e* (used of the *zōgraphoi-oikistai*) serves to establish a relationship of macrocosm-microcosm analogism between the Demiurge and the philosopher-kings. The latter act as microcosmic imitators of the macrocosmic *Zōgraphos* since their ideal political constitution (*diagraphē*) is simply an imitation of the dodecahedral *diazōgraphia* which God delineated when He structured Uranus-Chronos.¹³⁰ Further, the presence of the *zō*-infix in διαζωγραφῶν (*Ti.55c*) when simply διαγράφων would have sufficed clearly hints at Socrates' programmatic desire to see his polity rendered a moving *zōon* (*Ti.19b-c*). This suggests that both cosmogony and politogony (city-founding) involve 'animal-painting' and not merely geometric delineation, purely mathematical arrangement.

The semantic range of διαγράφω reveals the inherent connection between geometric delineation and legal drafting. The LSJ cites *R.500e* and *Lg.6.778a* as examples of 'mark out by lines, delineate'—both instances of Plato describing the geometric delineation of his ideal polity.¹³¹ The verb also means 'fix by written ordinance' and 'draft a law,' demonstrating that for the Greeks, geometric and legal 'drawing' were conceptually linked.¹³² One can see here the correlation between geometrical sketching and legal drafting. In addition to these political, legal and geometric meanings the word *diagraphē* also refers to exegetic accounts generally. More specifically, it refers to vivid ekphrastic descriptions that paint pictures through words.¹³³ The Timaeian *eikōs logos-mythos* is both these things: it is both a

¹³⁰Cf. use of the verb in a celestial context in Nonn.*D.18.16*: Νῦξ οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντα διαγράψασα χιτῶνι.

¹³¹ *Lg.6.778a*: τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο οἰκίσεις χρὴ διαγράφειν τῷ λόγῳ.

¹³² E.g. *Pl.Com.153.2* (διαγράφω γραμμῆν) & (*PRev.Laws43.7*: τὸ πλῆθος τὸ διαγραφέν ἀποτινέτω). See also *H.6.88* & *Plb.1.62.7* (συνθηκῶν διαγραφεισῶν) for the word's association with drafting laws. LSJ s.v. διαγράφω also gives the specifically military meaning of conscripting troops (*Plb.6.12.6* & *App.Pun.40*). The DGE also gives examples from the LXX of διαγράφω being used in contexts involving the geometrical mapping of cities, e.g. *Ez.4.1*. For the meaning in financial contexts, see Pape s.v. διαγράφειν, Hasebroek (1965), 45 n4, Von Poehlmann (1925), 511-585 and Harpocration's definition (διὰ τραπέζης ἀριθμεῖν).

¹³³ E.g. *Porph. Abst. 2.19.4-5,9-10*: καὶ Σοφοκλῆς διαγράφων/τὴν θεοφιλῆ θυσίαν φησὶν ἐν τῷ Πολυῖδῳ....τὸ ποικιλώτατον/ ξουθῆς μελίσσης κηρόπλαστον ὄργανον. Other examples of descriptive usage include *Ath. 4.3* & *4.35*, *Philostr.VS 2.2.7*, *Her. 2.1*, *Plu.Nic.23*, *Arist.EE 1230b12*, *Arist.Metaph.1054a30*, *Hp.Prog.14*,

delineation of the mathematico-musical order of Socrates ‘constitutional *diagraphē* on the macrocosmic scale and it is also an ekphrastic picture painted in words. The *eikōs logos* embodies a vivid, living *eikōn* of what it describes and in so doing it also explains the ontological and epistemological dynamics underpinning its own *eikonopoia* (cf. 29b: λόγους, ὧνπέρ εἰσις ἐξηγηταί, τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ συγγενεῖς ὄντας). Just as the Demiurge births the Cosmotheos as a living *agalma* (*Ti.*37c), so too Timaeus generates a living *eikōn* of that same Visible Godhead (*Criti.*106a) and of Socrates’ ideal *zōon*-polity (*Ti.*19b-c) through his own ekphrastic *diagraphē* that imitates God’s cosmogonic *eikonopoia*.

The failure to appreciate the connection between the *diagraphē-zōgraphia* of *R.*500e and the celestial *diazōgraphia* of the Demiurge in *Ti.*55c has several consequences. Firstly, one overlooks the (*dia*)*zōgraphic* macrocosm-microcosm analogism between the Demiurge and the philosopher-kings. Secondly it leads to an inability to appreciate the fact that Timaeus, in animating Socrates’ polity as a *zōon*, is also acting as a *zōgraphos*. He is a mythic *rhapsōdos-nomopoios* eikastically depicting the Demiurge’s cosmogonic *diazōgraphia*. He is also a *nomothetēs* animating Socrates’ constitutional *diagraphē* as a *zōon*. When one understands the participle *διαζωγραφῶν* as involving the Demiurge ‘painting’ the surface of the dodecahedron with *zōa*-constellations one can then appreciate why Timaeus would be told to paint out Socrates’ polity as a *zōon* (19b-c) despite him nonetheless providing not a political discourse but rather what is primarily an astronomically-oriented account of cosmogony and anthropogony. Thus, the connection between *Ti.*55c and *R.*500e explains the reason for Socrates’ odd command that Timaeus’ cosmogonic myth should involve ‘animal-painting’

Arist.*Mu.*391a18, Philostr.*VS* 552, Vett.Val.53.18, Ath.159a, Arr.*Epict.*3.23.35 & Origenes *Hom.*20.9 in Ier. Cf. the poetic usage in Nonn.*D.*2.206: ἡέρος ἄκρα κέλευθα διαγράψασα πεδίλω.

(*zōgraphia*). It also explains why it is that a cosmogonic myth centred on astronomico-musical harmony can be deemed to be political in nature and thus satisfy Socrates' desire to see his polity animated as a *zōon* (19b-c) despite never expressly mentioning the ideal polis and its citizenry. The reason a cosmogonic myth that never touches on political matters directly is nonetheless capable of satisfying Socrates' desire is because the constitutional *diagraphē* is subtly framed by Timaeus as identifiable with the musico-mathematical order delineated in the Demiurge's dodecahedral *diazōgraphia*. This subtle connection is sustained by the melding of animal-painting (*zōgraphia*) and constitution-sketching (*diagraphē*) in the participle *diazōgraphōn* (55c).

The interlocutors of the *Republic* in acting as city-founding philosopher-kings themselves are said to be *zōon*-painters sketching out a polity using the Divine Paradigm (διαγράψαιαν οἱ τῷ θεῷ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι, *R.*500e). Whilst one may object that, in the words of Taylor, *zōgraphos* is generally "the *vox propria* for a painter (not necessarily an 'animal painter')". There is nonetheless evidence from within the *Republic* itself that Uranus-Cosmos is an animal and that the ideal polity's constitution is to some degree identifiable with that divine *zōon*. This is evident even without recourse to the *Timaeus*. The ideal political constitution is identified with the musico-mathematical order of Heaven, and the cosmic All identified as a begotten divine *zōon* (Book 8 of the *Republic*). Socrates provides a complex mathematico-geometric schema that shows how in the ideal polity the number determining microcosmic man's procreation (the *Anthropeios Arithmos*) is to be correlated with the 'Perfect Number' (*Teleios Arithmos*) embodying the cyclical life-span (*periodos*) of the macrocosm Uranus-Cosmos (there called 'the Begotten Divine', the *Theion Gennēton*, 546b). Thus Socrates' ideal political constitution can be reduced to a mathematico-astronomical exercise of synchronising the microcosm of man with the musico-mathematical

rhythms of the Divine Macrocosm. Elsewhere, that paradigmatic polity is said to be laid out perhaps in Heaven (ἐν οὐρανῷ) for it is nowhere to be found on earth but rather resides only in *logoi* (τῆ ἐν λόγοις κειμένη, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ, *R.9.592a*). The *logoi* wherein the heavenly city resides are not only the spoken words of dialectic discourse but also the ratios of astronomico-mathematical harmony. One may object that there is no reason to read *logoi* in *R.9.592a* as referring to the ratios of Heaven’s musico-mathematical order nor to connect that passage to *R.500e* but such arguments stem from failure to appreciate the overall *eikōn* of the *theoeikēlon-andreikēlon* that is painted by the *Republic* and the importance of the wedding of the microcosmic *Anthrōpeios Arithmos* and macrocosmic *Teleios Arithmos* (*R.8.546b*). The conception of the philosopher-kings regulating the reproduction of the citizenry of their ideal polity to be optimally synchronised with the lifespan of the *Theion Gennēton* qua *zōon* (*R.8.546b*) will be addressed later on.

Right after speaking of the ideal constitution as a *diagraphē* sketched out by *zōgraphoi*-dialecticians using the Divine Paradigm (*R.6.500e* διαγράψειαν οἱ τῷ θεῷ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι) Socrates adds that the *oikistai* must, whilst working manually (ἀπεργαζόμενοι), look towards those things that are ‘in nature’ Just, Beautiful, Moderate (ἀποβλέπειν, πρὸς τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον) and implant those qualities into the citizens in their care (καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖν’ αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, 501b).¹³⁴ The means of implanting (ἐμποιοῖεν) the qualities of the Divine Paradigm is said expressly to involve mixing and blending an accurately human-coloured hue out of many pigments (συμμειγνόντες τε καὶ κεραννόντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον).¹³⁵ Whilst the

¹³⁴ The Forms are clearly identified as the model here, see *R.484c*, Shorey (1933), 458 & (1903), 37. That τὸ φύσει here relates to the Forms is clear from *R.597c*, *Phd.* 103b, *Prm.*132d, *Cratyl.* 389c-d & 390e.

¹³⁵ Cf. *R.3.401b* where Socrates uses this same verb (ἐμποιεῖν) when stating that only the poets who infuse an *eikōn* of noble behaviour their *poiēmata* will be allowed to remain in the city (τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἤθους ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἢ μὴ παρ’ ἡμῖν ποιεῖν).

primarily the meaning of the term *andreikelon* is a perfectly mixed coloured pigment that is relevant to understanding the correlation between the Demiurge acting as macrocosmic *Zōgraphos* in adorning the dodecahedral sky-ball with *zōa* (constellations) and the microcosmic *zōgraphoi* delineating the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* constitution, the general meaning is equally important for it can also mean *agalma*, statue.¹³⁶ That latter meaning establishes a further connection between the Demiurge’s construction of Uranus-Cosmos as a *zōn kai kinēton agalma tōn aidiōn theōn* (37c) and the efforts of the philosopher-kings in moulding the citizens as *andriantopoiōi* into maximally God-like (*theoeikela*) statues (*agalmata/andreikela*).¹³⁷ Indeed the meaning of statue and of coloured-pigment used in painting converge given that *agalmata* were painted. The life-likeness of the eyes was a major point of major focus in painting statues (καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὑπαλειφόμενος ἀνδρειακέλω, *X.Oec.*10.5). Typically, wooden and marble statues had painted eyes whereas coloured eye-balls were added to cavities in bronze *agalmata*.¹³⁸

It is vital to appreciate the fact that both the macrocosmic Demiurge and His microcosmic imitators, the philosopher-kings founding the ideal polity and mythically moulding its citizens, are not only acting as *zōgraphoi* but also as ‘sculptors’, *agalmatopoiōi*. When speaking of implanting the qualities of the Divine Paradigm into the citizens of the ideal polity by mixing multiplicity into unity in the *andreikelon*-pigment Socrates adds that this

¹³⁶ Not only does ἀνδρειακὸν refer to a statue in *Plu. Alex.* 72 but that mountain-statue which Stasicles proposes to build as a likeness of the god-man Alexander is also a polity: οὗτος γὰρ αὐτῷ πρότερον ἐντυχῶν ἔφη τῶν ὁρῶν μάλιστα τὸν Θράκιον Ἄθων διατύπωσιν **ἀνδρειακὸν** δέχεσθαι καὶ διαμόρφωσιν ἂν οὖν κελεύη, **μονιμώτατον ἀγαλμάτων** αὐτῷ καὶ περιφανέστατον ἐξεργάσεσθαι τὸν Ἄθων, τῇ μὲν ἀριστερᾷ χειρὶ περιλαμβάνοντα **μυρίανδρον πόλιν οἰκουμένην**. This conception of a perfect city structured as a huge *agalma* of a divine warrior-philosopher (Alexander the Great) is very much reminiscent of the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* constitution.

¹³⁷ Modern scholars do not always take *agalma* in *Ti.*37c to mean ‘statue’ but instead render it as ‘shrine’ or ‘sanctuaire’ e.g. Cornford (1937), 101, Margel (1995), 92, Brague (1982), 50.

¹³⁸ Ridgway (1999) 103–142 & Hemingway & Abramitis (2018), 116–122.

pigment/*agalma* is to be identified with what Homer denominated the ‘God-like’ part of man (ὁ δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγυγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον, 501b). Not only is Socrates’ diction of looking to the Paradigm (ἀποβλέπειν πρὸς) and making use of that model (θείῳ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι) present in Timaeus’ programmatic prologue that sets up how he will paint out Socrates’ polity as a *zōon* but Timaeus even uses the verb ἀπεργάζομαι which is a markedly demiurgic word (ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταῦτ’ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεὶ, τοιούτῳ τινὶ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι, τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἀπεργάζεται, 28a). When used specifically "of a painter" this eikastic verb means to "represent in a finished picture" and to "fill up with colour"—for these definitions LSJ cites R. 548d. The verb ἀπεργάζεται is also used of completely transforming a person into something.¹³⁹ This latter meaning is important because the *theoikelon-andreikelon* constitution is underpinned by a teleology involving the *zōgraphoi-nomothetai* and *agalmatopoiōi-poiētai* shaping individual citizens into God-like *agalmata*, *theoikela andreikela*, which are all coloured with the same *theoikelon-andreikelon* pigment.

By acting as both *zōgraphoi* and *agalmatopoiōi* the philosopher-kings create a singular super-organism out of a heterogenous multiplicity of individuals just as the one man-like colour (the *theoikelon-andreikelon* hue) is produced out of a multiplicity of pigments.¹⁴⁰ The idea of forming a singular agalmatic body out of a multiplicity of parts is found in Timaeus’ account of anthropogony—the gods fuse together the multifarious parts into a unity using

¹³⁹ E.g. X.*Smp.*8.35, Pl.*R.*381e, Plt.287a, R.566a, Phdr.272a & X.*Oec.*11.3.

¹⁴⁰ This eikastic or more specifically *zōgraphic* word occurs again at *Ti.*39e where the Demiurge is making Uranus-Cosmos as alike (*homoios*) as possible vis-à-vis the Paradigm, the Noetic *Zōon*: ὡς ὁμοιότατον ἢ τῷ τελέῳ καὶ νοητῷ ζῷῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς διαίωνα μίμησιν φύσεως. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἤδη μέχρι χρόνου γενέσεως ἀπείργαστο εἰς ὁμοιότητα ὥπερ ἀπεικάζετο...τὸ κατάλοιπον ἀπηργάζετο αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παραδείγματος ἀποτυπούμενος φύσιν). Note that the verb *apergazomai* is combined with that of weaving in *Ti.*41d where the Demiurge delegates the task of creating terrestrial humans to the sub-demiurges, the planetary gods: ἐγὼ παραδώσω: τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑμεῖς, ἀθανάτων θνητὸν προσουφαίνοντες, ἀπεργάζεσθε ζῶα.

invisibly small rivets (ἀλλὰ διὰ σμικρότητα ἀοράτοις πυκνοῖς γόμοις συντηκόντες ἐν ἕξ ἀπάντων ἀπεργαζόμενοι σῶμα ἕκαστον, 43a).¹⁴¹ Thus there is analogism between the work that the philosopher-kings do in producing the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* polity comprised of a unitary super-body made up of many individual *agalma*-men and the demiurgy of the Timaeian gods who formed the first terrestrial humans as smoothly-riveted units made up of a multiplicity of parts. At any rate, the convergence of both *agalmatopoiia* and *zōgraphia* in the activities of the philosopher-kings and in God’s demiurgy (for He shapes Uranus-Chronos as an *agalma* in 37c and a *diazōgraphia* in 55c) is vital for appreciating the mesococosmic character of the *theoeikelon-andreiekelon* constitution—it links mesococosmic *nomopoiioi-nomothetai* to the Creator of the Divine Macrocosm they are imitating. The convergence of *zōgraphia* and *andriantopoiia/agalmatopoiia* in the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* constitution is made expressly clear in Book 4 of the *Republic* (420b-c). Socrates at starts off by stating that the goal of the interlocutors in acting as *oikistai* is to mould a blessed polity (*eudaimōn polis*) not by setting apart a small few distinguished individuals but by bringing about holistic *eudaimonia* (τὴν εὐδαίμονα **πλάττομεν** οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες ὀλίγους ἐν αὐτῇ τοιοῦτους τινας τιθέντες, ἀλλ’ ὅλην, *R.4.420c*). The use of the verb **πλάττομεν** here is markedly sculptural.¹⁴² Indeed Socrates makes the element of *agalmatopoiia* abundantly clear and combines it with the *zōgraphic* application of pigment when he adds the following: “it is as if we were colouring a statue [*andrias*]¹⁴³ and someone approached and censured us, saying that we did not apply the most beautiful pigments to the most beautiful parts of the image, since the eyes, which are the most beautiful part, have not been painted with purple but with black” (ὥστερ οὖν ἂν εἰ ἡμᾶς ἀνδριάντα γράφοντας προσελθὼν τις ἔψεγε λέγων ὅτι οὐ τοῖς καλλίστοις τοῦ

¹⁴¹ Petraki (2023), 63 n15 connects *Ti.43a* with the anthropogonic demiurgy of Aristophanes’ tale in the *Symposium* where similar imagery of *agalmatopoiia* is employed, see *Smp.* 192d-e.

¹⁴² Petraki (2023), 162.

¹⁴³ The words *agalma* and *andrias* can essentially be treated as synonyms. For the use of the term *andrias* in reference to any kind of sculpture of a male in the Classical era, see Keesling (2017), 837-861.

ζώου τὰ κάλλιστα φάρμακα προστίθεμεν—οἱ γὰρ ὀφθαλμοὶ κάλλιστον ὄν οὐκ ὀστρεῖω ἐναλημιμένοι εἶεν ἀλλὰ μέλανι).¹⁴⁴ Thus the *theoikelon-andreikelon* is conceived of as a polity collectively being sculpted as a singular *agalma* and coloured with the appropriate pigments needed to give it a life-like appearance. Assumedly this same dynamic of moulding and painting takes place at the individual level too when, according to the Myth of Metals, each citizen is convinced that God moulds him into an *agalma* (ὁ θεὸς πλάττων, 3.415a), a *theoikelon-andreikelon*. The geometric and musical principles that structure the cosmos must also structure the ideal polity. Socrates explains how this cosmic order translates into political unity through the principle of ‘communion’ (*koinonia*, R.462c-e). Just as the World Soul’s parts are harmonically unified, so too must the citizens of the ideal polity experience themselves as parts of an organic whole.

The principle of *koinōnia*—the organic unity of the body politic—depends on the same harmonic ratios that structure the World Soul. Socrates likens the ideal polity to a singular human whose finger is in pain and thus, due to the unitary communion of soul and body (*koinōnia*) which is constituted in such a manner that the ruling component of the tripartite body-soul compound (nous vis-à-vis the *thymos*, *epithymētikon* and the body)¹⁴⁵ is aware that the pain of the part is experienced in the whole (πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία ἢ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν¹⁴⁶ τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ ἥσθητό τε καὶ πᾶσα ἅμα συνήλγησεν μέρους πονήσαντος ὅλη, R.462c-e).¹⁴⁷ Socrates adds that the same dynamic

¹⁴⁴ Cf. *Hp. Ma.* 290b. For the eyes in the Platonic dialogues generally, see Frede (1999), 191-209. For the painting of the eyes as the last phase in *andriantopoiia*, see Brinkmann (2008), 18-39.

¹⁴⁵ Adam (1902) vol.1, 360–361 the sovereign nous-soul governs over the other components of the body-soul compound by overseeing their harmonious cooperation as a singular, unified system.

¹⁴⁶ On this term, see LSJ s.v. σύνταξις. See also *Ti.* 24c4–7 and *Lg.* 903d.

¹⁴⁷ For the importance of this passage, see Morrison (2001), 1-24. For the soul-city analogism here, see Annas (1981), 109–152 & Schofield (2006), 253–264. On the language and syntax of this passage, see also Adam (1963) vol.1, 306. See also Petraki (2015).

whereby one part's experience is undergone in the broader whole also applies to pleasure.¹⁴⁸ Socrates states that in the city that is truly well-lawed (ἀνάγκη...τήν γε εὖνομον) when one citizens undergoes something good or evil, this is what the whole polity experiences (ἐνὸς δὴ οἶμαι πάσχοντος τῶν πολιτῶν ὅτιοῦν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ τοιαύτη πόλις μάλιστα τε φήσει ἑαυτῆς εἶναι τὸ πάσχον).¹⁴⁹ In commenting on this image of the ideal polity as a super-organism, Petraki rightly points out that “to fully grasp the dense implications of this image...we [should] consider it in parallel with the image of the philosopher-ruler as a painter of an *andreikelon* in Book Six” (R.501a–d) because “Plato uses the metaphor of painting an *andreikelon* to describe the philosopher-ruler’s imitation of the [singular] intelligible realm in the formation of the many individuals in the city as a single art body”.¹⁵⁰ In explaining how it is that the *theoikelon-andreikelon* passage (R.500e–501d) and “Socrates’ image of the city as a single body” (462c-e) are describing one and the same phenomenon Petraki states that “this ‘pictorial mixture’ for the creation of one human figure (out of many) signifies Plato’s effort to ‘tame’ the difference and diversity so characteristic of humans”.¹⁵¹ Thus in Petraki’s view Socrates’ eikastic depiction of the polity as a singular super-organism made up of many individual citizens was intended to be interpreted as Socrates himself already acting as one of the philosopher-king *oikistai-zōgraphoi* delineating the constitutional *diagraphē* and mixing the *theoikelon-andreikelon* pigment even though that is described later on in the text (500e-501b). However, what Petraki does not mention is how the same imagery of mixing is used by Timaeus to describe the difference in

¹⁴⁸For the political dimensions Plato attaches to pleasure in the *Laws*, see Peponi (2012), and (2013), 212–240. See also Botter (2018), 19–36.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. R. 464b which features eikastic diction reminiscent of the Timaeian *eikōs mythos-logos*: ἀπεικάζοντες εὖ οἰκουμένην πόλιν σώματι πρὸς μέρος αὐτοῦ λύπης τε πέρι καὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς ἔχει.

¹⁵⁰ Petraki (2023), 166 but see also 114-118 & 168.

¹⁵¹ Petraki (2023), 168. Cf. R.422e and 423a-b where Socrates claims that unity is a prerequisite for a polity to truly be such. See also Lg.739c-e where it is taught that in the ideal polity all things are shared and the collective behaves as if the multitude of individuals were actually just one being.

epistemological capacity between God and man. Timaeus speaks of preserving the likelihood of his account likening particular colours with specific pigment-mixes (δῆλα αἷς ἂν ἀφομοιούμενα μείξεσιν διασῶζοι τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον, 68d) and claims that if one sought to "make an experimental test of these facts, he would evince his ignorance of the difference between man's nature and God's" (εἰ δέ τις τούτων ἔργῳ σκοπούμενος βάσανον λαμβάνοι, τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ θείας φύσεως ἡγνοηκῶς ἂν εἴη διάφορον, 68d).¹⁵² Critically Timaeus adds that only God knows how to and is capable of mixing the many into one and to again dissolve the one into a multiplicity whereas there has never been nor will there ever be a mortal human that can do so (ὅτι θεὸς μὲν τὰ πολλὰ εἰς ἓν συγκεραννύναι καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς πολλὰ διαλύειν ἰκανῶς, 68d). How does this square up with Socrates' account of the philosopher kings mixing the perfect *theoeikelon-andreikelon* pigment and unifying the multiplicity of citizens into a singular *agalma* or *zōgraphia* (R.462c-e & 500e–501d)? Are the *zōgraphoi-oikistai* capable of achieving the God-like feat of mixing the many into one despite being mere mortals?

Could it really be that during his cosmogonic discourse that paints out and animates Socrates' ideal polity as a *zōon* (Ti. 19b-c) Timaeus could speak of the difference between God and man in terms of their capacity to mix a multiplicity of pigments into a single colour and do so in ignorance of Socrates' teaching that the designers of the ideal are to render the many citizens one *agalma* painted with the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* pigment (R. 500e–501d)? However, what is problematic is that the mixing of multicity into unity in the case of the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* constitution is centred on the proximity of God and man for there is a God-like (*theoeikelon*) component in man whereas in Timaeus' treatment of the unification of the

¹⁵² For the general understanding of colour in the *Timaeus*, see Ierodiakonou (2005), 219–233.

many into one there is instead emphasis on the allegedly unbridgeable gap between God and man (*Ti.* 68d). Given that, as shall be seen throughout this dissertation, Plato clearly portrays Timaeus as being skilled enough to successfully ‘mix the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* pigment’ and animate Socrates’ polity as a living *zōon* that is an *eikōn* of the Divine Macrocosm that can rightly be prayed to (cf. *Criti.* 106a) it would seem that Timaeus’ statement about the difference between the capacity of man and God is to be understood simply as a humble statement of limitations rather than a preclusion of the possibility of a divinised human proving himself capable unifying multiplicity into unity. But what has all this discussion of mixing pigment to do with the identification of the constitutional *diagraphē* of the *zographoi-oikistai* with that of the Demiurge in creating the dodecahedral ball of the firmament adorned with moving animalian constellations (*Ti.* 55c: διαζωγραφοῶν)?

God mixes the Anima Mundi using harmonic ratios and institutes Time through His geometric delineation and *zōgraphic* adornment of the dodecahedral firmament. This is analogous to how the ratios of the musico-mathematical order of Heaven inform the way the *zographoi-oikistai* and *agalmatopoiōi-poiētai* mix the ‘pigment’ for the painting-out of their *theoeikelon-andreikelon*. Timaeus’ use of the mixing of pigments as an image for explaining man’s status vis-a-vis God is to be seen as establishing a relationship between the Demiurge’s macrocosmic dodecahedral (*dia*)*zōgraphia* as the means of imposing musico-mathematical order and the mesocosmic *diagraphē-zōon* devised by the philosopher-kings as microcosmic demiurges. The order-imposing harmonic ratios of the Demiurge’s cosmogonic Dorian *nomopoiia-nomothesia* and the proportional mixing of ‘pigment’ for His dodecahedral macrocosmic (*dia*)*zōgraphia* (the sphere of the fixed stars and geometrical shape of the All) embodies the mesocosmic constitution that links microcosmic man to the Divine Macrocosm.

The *zōgraphoi-oikistai* and *agalmatopoiōi-poiētai* are completely dependent on the musico-mathematical order delineated in Heaven when acting as *nomothetai* and *nomopoiōi*. First they replicate that harmony in mixing the *theoikelon-andreikelon* pigment and constructing the mesocosmic agalmatic superorganism that forms a unitary body-soul compound out of a multitude of citizens. Then it is necessary to devise a mythic system of education that ‘moulds’ and ‘paints’ the body-soul compounds of individual agalma-citizens into likenesses (*eikones*) of the mesocosmic *theoikelon-andreikelon* constitution and thus, by extension, embodiments of the Divine Macrocosm’s perfect mathematico-musical order. This dissertation argues that the ideal polity’s education system is comprised of the Myth of Metals and the Timaeian anthropogonic and cosmogonic *eikōs mythos*. It shall now be demonstrated that Uranus-Chronos qua moving *eikōn* of Eternity the Paradigm (*Ti.37d*) facilitates man’s ability to conceive of the perfect political constitution and the ideal mode of mythopoetic education that can craft citizens into *theoikelon-andreikelon*, that is, God-like *agalmata*, microcosmic *eikones* of the generated Divine Macrocosm, the supreme *agalma* (*Ti.37c*). Heaven is the teacher of all things and is Himself the *zōon-diagraphē* linking Being and Becoming, the perfect *agalma* (*Ti.37c*) to be imitated by the philosophic *agalmatopoiōs-zōgraphos* who seeks to bridge these two ontological orders and create truly living, divine *zōon* through his words, a virtual *eikōn* of the Visible Cosmotheos populated within by divinised humans that have been logographically crafted into *theoikelon-andreikelon*.

Timaeus expresses the dependence of man’s discursive capacity on Uranus-Chronos when he says that, according to his *logos*, vision is the cause of the greatest boon to humanity because

if humans had not seen the stars, the sun and Heaven generally then none of what has been said thus far in the *eikōs mythos* would have been possible (ὅτι τῶν νῦν λόγων περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λεγομένων οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε ἐρρήθη, 47a). Timaeus does not simply mean that the description of the celestial bodies he has provided would not have been possible without vision but rather what he means is that the capacity for discourse and ratiocination (thought through arithmetic and ratios) would not have been conceivable.¹⁵³ Thus Socrates' request to see his polity animated as a living, moving *zōon* (Ti. 19b-c), something which Timaeus does achieve with his *eikōs logos-mythos*, also would not have been possible without astronomy. Animating the *theoeikēlon-andreieklon*, that is, sketching out the ideal polity's constitutional *diagraphe* in discourse, mixing the perfect pigment for its painting (*zōgraphia*) according to proportionate, harmonious ratios is dependent upon a correct understanding of microcosmic man's place within and relationship to the Divine Macrocosm. This relationship is conceptualised through number, the forming of discourse (*logos*) according to the harmonic ratios (*logoi*)—the conception of relationship according to (κατὰ τὸν ἀναλογισμὸν) and through analogism (δι' ἀναλογισμοῦ).¹⁵⁴ Timaeus makes it expressly clear that movement of the celestial bodies embodying time have enabled man to perceive day and night, months and the cycles and equinoxes of the year such that he can conceive of number and as a result inquire into the nature of the All (μεμηχάνηται μὲν ἀριθμὸν, χρόνου δὲ ἔννοιαν περὶ τε τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως ζήτησιν ἔδοσαν, 47a). Man's understanding of Number which in turn facilitates all reasoning and discourse is indebted to Uranus-Chronos—no greater boon was

¹⁵³ As per *Epin.* 977a the granter of this key science, mathematics, is Heaven and He is to be identified as the Supreme Godhead on account of His gifting of Number to mankind. Uranus is to be worshipped distinctly from the other deities as He is most just and is worshipped by the other gods and *daimones* (ὄν καὶ δικαιοτάτον, ὡς σύμπαντες ἄλλοι δαίμονες ἅμα καὶ θεοί, τιμᾶν τε καὶ εὐχεσθαι διαφερόντως αὐτῷ) on account of His being the 'Cause of All Good Things' (τῶν ἄλλων αἰτίον ἀγαθῶν πάντων). For an excellent account of the henotheistic religion of the *Epinomis* and the early Academy, see Bartninkas (2023), 207-248. Clement of Alexandria, *Protr.* 5.50 = Xenocrates Fr. 135 IP is particularly insightful for understanding the nature of Uranus-Cosmos as supreme deity.

¹⁵⁴ LSJ s.v. ἀναλογισμός.

even gifted from the gods to the mortal race (οὔτε ἤξει ποτὲ τῷ θνητῷ γένει δωρηθὲν ἐκ θεῶν, 47a-b).¹⁵⁵ Similarly, according to Timaeus, the ability to perceive sound was a gift from the gods given with the express purpose of facilitating discourse (*logos*) and to understand harmony (47c-d).¹⁵⁶ Timaeus says that harmony contains cognitive rotations similar to those in Heaven and the human nous and as such was gifted by the Muses not for the purpose of unreasoning (*alogos*) pleasure but rather for the orderly arrangement of one's own soul so that it is in "concord with itself" and with the Uranus-Cosmos (ἡ δὲ ἄρμονία, συγγενεῖς ἔχουσα φοράς ταῖς ἐν ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς περιόδοις, τῷ μετὰ νοῦ προσχρωμένῳ Μούσαις οὐκ ἐφ' ἡδονὴν ἄλογον καθάπερ νῦν εἶναι δοκεῖ χρήσιμος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὴν γεγонуῖαν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνάρμοστον ψυχῆς περίοδον εἰς κατακόσμησιν καὶ συμφωνίαν ἑαυτῇ σύμμαχος ὑπὸ Μουσῶν δέδοται, 47d). The diction of rotational cognition and harmony predominate here. Timaeus adds that "because of the unmodulated condition, deficient in grace, which exists in most of us, Rhythm also was bestowed upon us to be our helper [ἐπίκουρος] by the same deities and for the same ends" (47d-e). The idea that Heaven-granted number facilitates the development of man's reasoning capacity and empowers him to appreciate music which in turn has a teleological and soteriological value is not a novelty introduced by Timaeus. Indeed Socrates in his discourse on the ideal polity sees discourse (*logos*), music, mathematics and astronomy as all vitally important for the teleological goal of divinising the citizens of the ideal *theoiekelon-andriekelon* city, a super-organism statue comprised of many living statue men that individually and collectively have achieved the maximum degree of likeness achievable vis-à-vis Uranus-Cosmos.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. *Phlb.* 16c ff. *Epin.* 976c-977d teaches that without Number man would have no reasoning capacity—his ability to produce discourse and mathematical reasoning (*logoi*) that pertain to transcendent truth instead of mere sense-based opinion stems from his capacity to know one from two and three, to know even and odd numbers—true blessedness (*eudaimonia*) cannot be achieved without arithmetic.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. *Tht.* 189e–190a, *Sph.* 263e–264a & *Phlb.* 38c–39b (esp. 37b). See Long (2013), 111-116 & 138 for thought as soundless internal dialogue.

The key point of correlation between Uranus-Chronos and the terrestrial polity striving to embody the perfect constitution delineated there is the dynamic of the cyclical lifespan. Both Uranus-Chronos and the ideal polity on earth imitating the musico-mathematical *kosmos* or *taxis* delineated in Heaven cohere systatically when their ‘revolutions’ (*phorai, periodoi*) are consistent and properly ordered but undergo dissolution when irregular deviation (*parallaxis*) occurs. Rotational health and cohesion in Heaven and the earthly polity imitating Him as well as irregular deviation for the proper order of revolution occur in tandem at both levels. Thus there is correlation if not direct identification between “the cyclical perishing of the universe” and “the dissolution of the ideal state” (*R.546a*).¹⁵⁷

The correlation between cosmic and political cycles becomes explicit at *R.546a*, where Socrates describes the inevitable dissolution of even the perfectly constituted polity. There Socrates says that, as hard as it may be for the polity that has been systatically composed in the ideal manner to be ‘moved’, (that is, destabilised), corruption and destruction inevitably await all things that are generated in the World of Becoming. Not even the polity founded in perfect accordance with the *diagraphē* of Uranus-Chronos can last for all time (*χαλεπὸν μὲν κινηθῆναι πόλιν οὕτω συσταῖσαν: ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ γενομένῳ παντὶ φθορά ἐστίν, οὐδ’ ἢ τοιαύτη σύστασις τὸν ἅπαντα μενεῖ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ λυθήσεται, R.546a*). Socrates says it would be absurd for one to presume that the motion of the visible celestial bodies are always self-same and identifiable with the stable truth of the World of Being. The stars and planets must eventually undergo deviation (*παραλλάττειν*) because they are visible and have bodies

¹⁵⁷ Gee (2013), 126. Gee connects the passage to later Roman articulations of this Platonic teaching on the astronomically-determined cyclical dissolutions of the cosmos, see Luc. *Phars.* 1.70–80, 1.642–68, 1.649–51, Sen. *Q.N.* 3.28–2, Lucret. 5.92–6, Manil *Astron.* 2.119.

(530b). Here too the same point is being made, namely that *gignomena* that are visible and embodied inevitably must undergo destruction (*phthora*) and deviation (*parallaxis*) and thus cannot be identified with the eternal constancy, stability and truth of the Forms, the *onta* of the World of Being. This same diction of both destruction (*phthora*) and deviation (*parallaxis*) is found in Critias' description of the Egyptian priest's exegesis of the myth of both Phaethon explaining how deviance in the movement of the heavenly bodies circling earth periodically causes great destruction by means of fire recurringly over great periods of times (τῶν περὶ γῆν κατ' οὐρανὸν ἰόντων **παράλλαξις** καὶ διὰ μακρῶν χρόνων γιγνομένη τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς πυρὶ πολλῷ **φθορά**, *Ti.22d*). Thus the national epic that Critias is putting forth as the ideal polity's new rhapsode alongside the cosmogonic *nomopoios* Timaeus is simply a mythico-historical account of how well-founded polities initially founded in alignment with the *diagraphē* of Uranus-Chronos inevitably degenerate in conjunction with the periodic unravelling of the Visible All. Just as the periodic dissolution of perfectly founded polities such as Atlantis and Palaeo-Athens occur in conjunction with malfunctions (*parallaxeis*) in Uranus-Chronos so too the composition (*systasis*) of the Visible All by the Demiurge and of the ideal terrestrial polity His microcosmic imitators' (the *zographoi-oikistai-poiētai*) also occur in tandem. Socrates uses the same systatic diction for the composition of the ideal polity on earth (χαλεπὸν μὲν κινήθῃναι πόλιν οὕτω συστάσαν, *R.546a*) as he does for the Demiurge's assembling of Uranus-Chronos. Socrates says that the Demiurge assembled Heaven in such a manner as to convey to the human astronomer through the symmetrical musico-mathematical order of Time as manifest in the Visible Heaven just how beautiful His handiwork is (τῷ ὄντι δὲ ἀστρονομικόν... ὄντα οὐκ οἶει ταῦτόν πείσεσθαι εἰς τὰς τῶν ἄστρον φερέας ἀποβλέποντα; νομιεῖν μὲν ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα **συστήσασθαι**, οὕτω **συνεστάναι** τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, *7.530a-b*). Thus the perfect symmetry of the divisions of Time made manifest in Heaven not only convinces the

philosophic astronomer of the existence of a Creator God but also equips him with the mathematical knowledge of proportional *systasis* required to become a microcosmic imitator of Him. Though the meaning of ‘systasis’ will be more thoroughly fleshed out in the next chapter of this dissertation it should suffice now to understand that this key term expresses the idea of demiurgic arrangement of a body according to a musico-mathematical order proportionality.

The point in all this is that the ideal polity is conceived of as a singular *zōon-andrias*, the *theoiekelon-andreiekelon* is comprised of a multitude of *agalma*-citizens that are all collectively and individually made to resemble as closely as possible Uranus-Cosmos qua *zōn kai kinēton agalma tōn aidiōn theōn* (Ti.37c). The means by which this achieved is through a regime of *uranomimesis* (Heaven-imitation) whereby the breeding and general rhythm of life of the citizenry of the ideal polity is reduced to a musico-mathematical regime of control that aims to achieve the maximal degree of longevity and systatic cohesion possible in this cyclically-unravelling temporal World of Becoming. Thus the political enterprise of state-building is also an inherently theological one as the *zōgraphoi-oikistai* are labouring to ensure that the perfectly mixed ‘pigments’ and agalmatic proportions of their *theoiekelon-andreiekelon zōon-polity* is made to resemble the Begotten Cosmotheos Uranus-Chronos as much as possible on the whole as a unitary organism and severally in the body-soul compounds of tis individual *agalma*-citizens.

The mathematical harmonies that structure both cosmos and polity are not static. They are subject to cyclical processes of generation and corruption. Book 8 of the *Republic* describes the decline of the ideal polity and reveals that political degeneration is synchronized with

cosmic cycles—specifically with what Timaeus will call the Great Year. Socrates says that the leaders whom the founders of the ideal polity will train (the philosopher-kings selected out of the ranks of the *Phylakes*), despite being wise and making use of both noetic *logismos* and sense-perception (cf. δόξη μετ' αἰσθήσεως, *Ti.*28a), will not always be able 'to chance upon' or 'demiurgically craft' (both meanings conveyed in τεύζονται) the perfect number embodying the "laws of prosperous birth or infertility" for the citizens of the ideal polity (γένους δὲ ὑμετέρου εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἀφορίας, καίπερ ὄντες σοφοί, οὓς ἡγεμόνας πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λογισμῶ μετ' αἰσθήσεως τεύζονται, 546a-b). Instead, the right time or number will inevitably at some point elude the *phylakes-philosophoi* and children will consequently be begotten when they ought not to be (ἀλλὰ πάρεισιν αὐτοὺς καὶ γεννήσουσι παῖδάς ποτε οὐ δέον). The number governing infertility and generation is established just before: "not only for plants that grow from the earth but also for animals that live upon it there is a cycle of bearing and barrenness for soul and body (φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων) as often as the revolutions of their orbs come full circle (κύκλων περιφορὰς συνάπτωσι), in brief courses for the short-lived and oppositely for the opposite" (546a). Here the diction of circles, cycles and rotations is prominent and there is a pun at play that defies translation.¹⁵⁸ The words φορὰ and ἀφορία mean biological fecundity and sterility respectively but also have rotational connotations as they are linked to "revolutions of...orbs com[ing] full circle" (κύκλων περιφορὰς συνάπτωσι). Here the verb συνάπτωσι expresses the idea that a circle is perfectly linked with its end and beginning in contact when it is healthy and whole. Thus, the divine shape of the circle or sphere associated with the number-instituting, ever-cycling rotation of Uranus-Cosmos is linked to the periodical growth and decay of animals and plants of the World of Becoming. Socrates provides a complex

¹⁵⁸ LSJ s.v. φορὰ gives "that which is brought forth, fruit, produce, crop" as definition citing as examples *Arist.Pol.*1259a11, cf. *HA* 553a22,b23, *Rh.*1390b25, *D.*18.61, *D.S.*16.54 & *Aeschin.*3.234

mathematico-geometric schema that seeks to “render all things conversable and commensurable with one another” by relating the ‘Perfect Number’ *Teleios Arithmos* encompassing the cyclical life-span (*periodos*) of the Begotten Divine (*Theion Gennēton*), that is, the Visible Cosmotheos, with that of man, the *Anthropeios Arithmos* (546b). In this passage Socrates speaks of a geometric symbol of “the assimilating and the dissimilating, the waxing and the waning” (ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων) that, when situated correctly in a broader schema, “renders all things conversable and commensurable with one another” (πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν). Though there is no room here to lay out the details of this passage which has been best explained by Adam, the crux of the schema is expressed well by Taylor who approves of Adam’s exegesis with one important reservation: “personally I believe that he [Adam] is right in holding that the mysterious number described in the closing words of the passage as an θεῖον γεννητόν is (3600^2) , the number of days in a cycle of 36,000 years of 360 days each, and that it is got out of the number 216 (that of the ἀνθρώπειον γεννητόν, 'the seven-months' child')... but I see no reason to identify this period of 36,000 years with that of the ἀποκατάστασις of the heavenly bodies to which *Timaeus* refers”.¹⁵⁹ This Timaeian passage involving the overlapping of all the planets at the point from which they started moving at their varying rates of speed (ἀποκατάστασις) thus culminating the end of a Great Year is (*Ti.* 39d) is said by Bury to have most likely been given the value of 36,000 years by Plato, a conclusion he deems derivable from *R.* 546b ff which he cites.¹⁶⁰ Though Bury does not cite Adam here, he concurs with him. Even though the same phrase ‘*teleios arithmos*’ is used of the Great Year in the *Timaeus* (39d) and of the life-cycle of the *Theion Gennēton* in *Republic*

¹⁵⁹ Taylor (1928), 217.

¹⁶⁰ Bury (1929), 82. It would appear that the *teleios arithmos* representing the life-span of the *Theion Gennēton* was not known to Cic. *Att.* vii. 13. Cf. Censor. *De die natali* 9.

Book 8 it is probably nonetheless best to refrain from insisting on identification. A verdict on that matter is not pertinent to present dissertation's goal.

At any rate, Socrates goes on to say that as compliance with the correct numerical formulation of the time for optimal breeding of the citizens progressively degenerates youths become 'less musical' (ἄμουσότεροι) and the *Phylakes-Philosophoi* less '*Phylakikikoi*', less vigilant and capable of performing their function in preserving the metallurgical genera of citizens (*R.* 8.546d). The notion that over time humanity will inevitably degenerate is a central element of the *Statesman's* picture of successive alternation of two species of epochs, one of paradisaical bliss followed by one of progressive degeneration ended by cataclysmic breakdown of the whole cosmos and subsequent return to bliss. This same adjective (*amousoi*) is used by Critias in his narrative in a similar context of the periodic decline in the quality of humans over time—the Egyptian priest explains that at the appointed time, like a disease, a torrential downpour from heaven will destroy all civilised people in the lowlands leaving behind only unlettered people who are *amousoi* such that again, from the beginning, they become collectively as children not knowing anything, having to re-invent civilisation from scratch, from a state of youthful ignorance (23a-b). Timaeus uses the same word in his *logos* when he says that humankind when improperly dominated by desires becomes 'non-philosophic' and '*amousos*' on account of gluttony, no longer obeying the divine part in us, the astral nous (73a). Thus within the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* body-politic at large and within the 'polity' of the individual *agalma*-man's body-soul compound a lack of compliance with the musico-mathematical order of Uranus-Chronos causes degradation.

Returning to *R.547a*, there Socrates says that the inappropriate mixing of metals in the breeding of the citizens, silver with iron, bronze with gold, generates dissimilarity (ἀνομοιότης) and “inharmonious unevenness” (ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος), two ‘disharmonies’ that always birth war and strife (οὗ ἂν ἐγγένηται, ἀεὶ τίκτει πόλεμον καὶ ἔχθραν). This is presented as exegesis of a verse from the *Iliad*: “of this lineage, look you, we must aver the dissension to be, wherever it occurs and always” (ταύτης τοι γενεῆς χρὴ φάναι εἶναι στάσιν, ὅπου ἂν γίγηται ἀεὶ, 6.21). This dynamic of inevitable degradation in the quality of an ideal uranimetic city’s citizenry features prominently in the *Critias* (121a-c):

ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ μὲν μοῖρα ἐξίτηλος ἐγίγνετο ἐν αὐτοῖς πολλῶ τῷ θνητῷ καὶ **πολλάκις ἀνακεραυνωμένη**, τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπινον ἦθος ἐπεκράτει, τότε ἤδη τὰ παρόντα φέρειν ἀδυνατοῦντες ἡσχημόνουν, καὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ μὲν ὄραν αἰσχροὶ κατεφαίνοντο, τὰ κάλλιστα ἀπὸ τῶν τιμιωτάτων ἀπολλύντες, τοῖς δὲ ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἀληθινὸν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν βίον ὄραν τότε δὴ μάλιστα πάγκαλοι μακάριοί τε ἐδοξάζοντο εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἀδίκου καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπιμπλάμενοι. θεὸς δὲ ὁ θεῶν Ζεὺς ἐν νόμοις βασιλεύων, ἅτε δυνάμενος καθορᾶν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐννοήσας γένος ἐπιεικὲς ἀθλίως διατιθέμενον, δίκην αὐτοῖς ἐπιθεῖναι βουληθεὶς, ἵνα γένοιτο **ἐμμελέστεροι** σωφρονισθέντες, συνήγειρεν θεοὺς πάντας εἰς τὴν τιμιωτάτην αὐτῶν οἴκησιν, ἣ δὴ κατὰ μέσον παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου βεβηκυῖα καθορᾶ πάντα ὅσα γενέσεως μετείληφεν, καὶ συναγείρας εἶπεν— ...

But **when the portion of divinity within them was now becoming faint and weak through being oftentimes blended with a large measure of mortality**, whereas the human temper was becoming dominant, then at length they lost their comeliness, through being unable to bear the burden of their possessions, and became ugly to look upon, in the eyes of him who has the gift of sight; for they had lost the fairest of their goods from the most precious of their parts; but in the eyes of those who have no gift of perceiving what is the truly happy life, it was then above all that they appeared to be superlatively fair and blessed, filled as they were with lawless ambition and power. And Zeus, the God of gods, who reigns by Law, inasmuch as he has the gift of perceiving such things, marked how this righteous race was in evil plight, and desired to inflict punishment upon them, to the end that when chastised they **might strike a truer note**. Wherefore he assembled together all the gods into that abode which they honor most, standing as it does at the center of all the Universe, and beholding all things that partake of generation and when he had assembled them, he spake thus: ...

This closing scene of the incomplete *Critias* is clearly related to the conception of cyclical periods of cohesion and dissolution of uranomimetic polities brought about by the inevitable failure of the rulers to ensure that the breeding and stock of the citizenry is kept as divine as possible (121a-b). The diction of musicality used by Critias to describe Zeus’ imposition of

just punishment (δίκην αὐτοῖς ἐπιθεῖναι) upon the degraded Atlanteans who lost their divine qualities through progressive devolution is also of note. Critias says that God seeks to impose a punishment in order to render the sinful Atlanteans ‘more in tune’ (ἐμμελέστεροι, 121b-c). This would appear to be a reference to the idea that for man and polity to achieve blessedness, *eudaimonia*, it is necessary to conform to the musico-mathematical harmony of the ratios of the Anima Mundi and the order of the numbers imaging Paradigm in the motion of the celestial bodies. This same diction of ‘being in tune’ and God imposing just punishment to ensure compliance to that harmonic order of the All (δίκην αὐτοῖς ἐπιθεῖναι, 121b-c) occurs programmatically at the beginning of the *Critias* when Timaeus is ending his *eikōs mythos-logos* in prayer. There Timaeus says that if the symposiast-dialecticians have erred and spoken something ‘out of tune’ with the harmonic order of Uranus-Cosmos he prays that God impose the fitting corrective punishment justly in order to render him who is sinfully out of tune harmonious again (παρὰ μέλος δὲ εἴ τι περὶ αὐτῶν ἄκοντες εἴπομεν, δίκη τὴν πρέπουσαν ἐπιτιθέναι. δίκη δὲ ὀρθὴ τὸν πλημμελοῦντα ἐμμελῆ ποιεῖν, *Criti.* 106b). This suggests a connection between the cosmo-political outlook of the *Timaeus-Critias* and Book 8 of the *Republic* because all these discourses presume that the macrocosm, the mesocosmic polity and the microcosmic race of men periodically go through inevitable cycles of degradation in tandem.¹⁶¹ There is an analogism between the manner in which the Demiurge periodically has to let the Visible All degenerate into ‘sinfully’ un-musical movement before re-imposing a musico-mathematical state of order (πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὄρατόν...κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν, *Ti.* 30a) and the way in which the philosopher-king *zōgraphoi* must first seize a dysfunctional polity’s disordered habits of its people and scrub it clean so as to render it a tabula rasa, a very difficult task indeed (λαβόντες...ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἦθη ἀνθρώπων, πρῶτον μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν ἄν, ὃ

¹⁶¹ Adam (1902), 208-210 with his Appendix I, Pt ii §§ 5,1-6.

οὐ πάνυ ῥάδιον, *R.501a*). In both cases the ‘painter’ must periodically ‘scrub their surface’ clean in the sense of letting the macrocosm, the mesocosmic polity and even microcosmic individuals totally devolve into a-musical chaos. Only then may they b aspire to make a change through writing/painting (both expressed by *graphein*) out *nomoi* (τῶ μήτε ιδιώτου μήτε πόλεως ἐθελῆσαι ἂν ἄψασθαι μηδὲ γράφειν νόμους, πρὶν ἢ παραλαβεῖν καθαρὰν ἢ αὐτοὶ ποιῆσαι).¹⁶² Critias’ history of cyclical degeneration races and polities as well as Socrates’ astronomico-geometric system of controlling the breeding of agalma-citizens which inevitably undergo degeneration need to be viewed as analogues of Timaeus’ Visible Cosmotheos perpetually undergoing periodic decay and re-construction.

There is also evidence within Critias’ relaying of the Egyptian priest’s speech to Solon for the idea that the perfect polity on earth must be committed to cosmomimesis, that is, the imitation of the Divine Macrocosm. The Egyptian priest in Critias’ narrative presents his own polity, Sais, as an example of an ideal polity established according to the rational order (kosmos) delineated in Heaven’s *phronēsis* or rotational intelligence (*Ti.* 24b-c):

τὸ δ’ αὖ περὶ τῆς φρονήσεως, ὁρᾷς που τὸν νόμον τῆδε ὅσῃν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποίησατο εὐθὺς κατ’ ἀρχὰς περὶ τε τὸν κόσμον, ἅπαντα μέχρι μαντικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἐκ τούτων θείων ὄντων εἰς τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀνευρών, ὅσα τε ἄλλα τούτοις ἔπεται μαθήματα πάντα κτησάμενος.

with regard to wisdom, you perceive, no doubt, the law here—how much attention it has devoted **from the very beginning** to the **Cosmic Order**, by discovering all the effects which the **divine causes produce upon human life**, down to divination and the art of medicine which aims at health, and by its mastery also of all the other subsidiary studies.

What is the ‘Cosmic Order’ that gave the inhabitants of Sais and Palaeo-Athens their wisdom (*phronēsis*)? It is of course the rotational cognition of Heaven (cf. *Ti.* 40a where Uranus-Chonos' rotation, *phora*, is linked to intelligence, *phronesis*, as per the etymology presented

¹⁶² For the bivalence of *graphein*, see Lissarrague (1992), 55-70 & Jouanna (2001), 55–70.

in *Cra.*411d). Sais and Palaeo-Athens are present and historical examples of how Socrates' ideal political constitution delineated in the mathematico-musical order of Heaven can be actualised on earth.¹⁶³ This is reflected in the diction used by the Egyptian priest in describing how Sais' excellence in the arts necessary for sustaining a polity's health is due to keen awareness of the "effects which the divine causes produce upon human life" (μαντικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἐκ τούτων **θειῶν ὄντων** εἰς τὰ ἀνθρώπινα). The arts concerned here are divinely inspired prophecy (*mantikē*) and medicine (*iatrikē*). Critically Chapter Three of this dissertation will show that Timaeus is in fact a master of both of these arts for his *eikōs logos-mythos* is essentially an exercise in oneiromantic and iatromantic exegesis of how man's microcosmic nous images the Demiurge's macrocosmic *eikonopoia* during sleep by engaging in hepatic *zōgraphia* which, when interpreted correctly by a philosopher through dialectic reasoning, is the ultimate form of divine revelation. Indeed, Chapter Three of this dissertation will demonstrate that this oneiromantic dynamic underpins the whole Timaeian *eikōs logos-mythos*. At any rate, returning to the above passage, the reference here to 'theia onta' as the source of his city's advancement in the religious and medicinal arts not only shows subtle awareness of the doctrine of the Forms of the Paradigm, the invisible, noetic *onta* accessed through the numerical order (cosmos) of Heaven. The Egyptian priest goes on to describe the foundation of Palaeo-Athens by Athena-Neith in terms of it being a perfect instantiation of the heavenly constitutional arrangement, the diakosmēsis such that its citizens are wise and its seasons perfectly balanced (ταύτην οὖν δὴ τότε σύμπασαν τὴν **διακόσμησιν** καὶ σύνταξιν ἢ θεὸς προτέρους ὑμᾶς **διακοσμήσασα** κατώκισεν, ἐκλεξαμένη τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ γεγένησθε, **τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν ὥρων** ἐν αὐτῷ κατιδοῦσα, ὅτι φρονιμωτάτους ἄνδρας οἴσοι,

¹⁶³ Morgan (1998), 10 has noted that Critias' Atlantis myth is a 'charter myth' because "on the most fundamental, philosophical level the myth sets into narrative motion the paradigm of the ideal state elaborated in the *Republic*". Sallis (1999), 40 not only links Palaeo-Athens and Sais' *eunomia* and wisdom to the atopic paradigmatic polis laid out somewhere in Heaven but also comments on the importance of *topos/chōra* qua place. Sallis is of the opinion the Chora is being foreshadowed here. Sallis cities Procl. *in Ti.* 1.99, 1.129, 1.162.

24c-d). The Palaeo-Athenians were well-lawed and surpassed all in virtue (εὐνομούμενοι πάση τε παρὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὑπερβεβληκότες ἀρετῇ) being warrior-philosophers like the deity who nurtured them and arranged their polity (φιλοπόλεμος τε καὶ φιλόσοφος ἢ θεὸς). This *eunomia* is presumably not only ascribable to Athena's role in Palaeo-Athens' formation but also due to *uranomimēsis* as was the case with the other polity established by Athena, Sais, wherein the iatromantic *phronesis* of its citizenry is more clearly linked to the *phora* of Heaven. Nonetheless there is extra-Platonic evidence for Athens' original constitution being conceived as uranomimetic in Plato's time.¹⁶⁴

The point of all this discussion of the connection between the ideal polity laid out in Uranus-Chronos and that constitution's earthly incarnation is that, for Plato, the arrangement of political life on this earth of ours is not merely a secular affair. Instead, Plato's conception of politics is intimately woven into the fabric of a religion of sacred astronomy wherein the foundational *eikōs mythos* narrating the genesis of the Begotten Visible Cosmotheos is just as much a cosmotheogony as it is a politogony. There is no separation here between the natural science of astronomy, political life, theology and personal salvation. The latter consists of making the human *nous* as alike as possible to that which it beholds (Uranus-Cosmos qua

¹⁶⁴ Lex. Patm. s.v. γεννηταί (Sakellion 1877, 152)= Ath. Poi. Fr. 3= λέξεις μεθ' ιστοριῶν ἐκ τῶν Δημοσθένους λόγων in Latte (1965), 140. Cf. Harpocration & Suda s.v. γεννηταί. See also the Schol. on Pl. Ax. 371e. In the Patmian lexicographer's record of Aristotle's writings on the Athenian constitution the tribal divisions are said to have resulted from the mimesis of the seasons (*horai*) and months (*mēnes*) within the year (*eniautos*) in such a way as to produce a schema whereby the twelve month-like phratries were made up of thirty *genē* such that the total number of *genē* in the polity, 360, was the same as the number of days in the year. The text mentions two classes, the *geōrgoi* and the *demiourgoi*, which were probably supplemented by a third, the Eupatridae, for Plu. *Thes.* 25.2, relying on Aristotle as a source, tells of Theseus creating a tripartite class system for Athens (Arist. *Ath.* Fr. 2 Kenyon). The cautioning of Lambert (1993), 371 about this uranomimetic constitution having no historicity is of no concern for it being an actuality is not the point for present purposes. It is simply important to be aware that the idea of a polis imitating Uranus-Chronos was likely already established culturally in Plato's time. For the actual history of the Phratries of Athens, see the following: Traill (1986), 123; Whitehead (1986), 17-21; Fergusson (1911); Fergusson (1910), 257-284; Fergusson (1936), 144-158; Oliver (1980), 42 & 30-38; Latte (1941), col. 752; Lambert (1998), 394-403; Lambert (1993) 371-80; Sanctis (1912), 58; Bourriot (1976), 460-492; Hignett (1952), 59. See Rhodes (1981), 71-72 on the class of *dēmiourgoi*.

eikōn of the Paradigm). This is the ultimate goal set before humans by the gods, for us to return to our original astral nature by making our nous maximally Heaven-like (τῷ κατανοουμένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἕξομοιωσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, *Ti.*90d). As such not only is the ideal polity meant to imitate the Generated Divine as a unified collective but so too are the individual citizens within their own *nous*-souls. It should be recalled that Uranus-Chronos, the Visible Cosmotheos Himself is in His own right a sense-perceived Godhead worthy of worship. He is the *eikōn* of the Noetic Animal containing all noetic animals, being Himself the Perfect Visible *Zōon* containing all visible creatures (*Ti.*92c, 30c & *Criti.*106a). Given that the Divine Paradigm that the *zōgraphoi-oikistai* are to use to sketch or map out their polity is ‘in Heaven’ (ἐν οὐρανῷ, 9.592a) this means that the numerical order of Time embodied in the body of the Visible, Begotten Godhead, the *eikōn* of the Noetic World of Being is itself the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* constitution. That numerical order can be identified with the ratios of the Anima Mundi, God’s *nomos* which Timaeus relays in his own rhapsodic *nomos*. Given then that this is the case, politogony, the process of generating a polity on earth that is an *eikōn* of the Divine Paradigm of the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* constitution laid out in the stars is an inherently theomimetic enterprise—the city is to be planned according to the musico-mathematical delineated in Uranus-Cosmos.

The claim that the *Timaeus-Republic* essentially identifies the perfect political constitution with the musico-numerical order of Uranus-Chronos, the *nomothesia-nomopoiia* of Heaven, should hardly come as a surprise. Timaeus makes it clear that God conceived of granting humanity sight for the express purpose of observing Nous’ rotations as made manifest in the movements of Heaven which are to be emulated in our own rotational cognition, trying our best to make our unstable intellects as alike as possible to the unfaltering and ever-consistent intellection of God (47b-c). The main soteriological message of the Timaeian *eikōs mythos-*

logos is that man's intellective soul (his nous) currently bears the same structure of the Anima Mundi rotating Heaven (*Ti.*90c-d) and which was formerly sown in a celestial body and shown the 'fated laws' of the All (41d-e) and his ultimate goal is to return to his astral dwelling where he can enjoy his original blessed existence after having lived an optimally philosophic life as a terrestrial human who has succeeded in imitating the archetypal cognitive order made visible in Uranus-Chronos the Divine Macrocosm (42b). Given that it is deviations in the motions of the celestial bodies that cause civilisation-destroying natural disasters (22d) and human souls initially were and are destined to again be 'mounted' in or upon such stars and planets is it not fair to conclude that humanity is an integral part of Uranus-Chronos? The Visible All is sustained by a musico-mathematical order and it is the virtuous compliance with or sinful violation of the Demiurge's astronomical *nomothesia-nomopoiia* that determines the fate of the world. Viewed in light of this cosmological presupposition one can see why the ideal political constitution can be essentially identified with Uranus-Chronos. The ideal polity is conceived of in terms of the collective life of many divinised humans comprising a singular God-like agalmatic body-politic the 'harmonies' of which must be synchronised with the order displayed in the heavenly *eikōn* of the Paradigm, the latter being the object of Nous the Demiurge's own Intellection and the Perfect Noetic Animal.¹⁶⁵ Now that the relationship between the Timaeian Demiurge's delineation of the

¹⁶⁵ Though it is ultimately a subject fraught with uncertainty the possible identity of Nous the Demiurge and Paradigm is perhaps worthy of contemplation here—ultimately the answer to this question does not have a bearing on this dissertation per se but it is quite relevant to the question of how Plato conceived of the Godhead. It is possible that in making the Visible Cosmotheos as an *eikōn* of the Paradigm (*Ti.*92c) the Demiurge did so in order to make an immanent image of Himself, the otherwise noetic, invisible and transcendent Godhead? An often-overlooked detail is the fact that Timaeus not only says that the Demiurge makes the Visible All as like as possible to the Paradigm but also to Himself (πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ). Does this imply that both the Demiurge and the Paradigm are one and the same or partially identifiable in some sense? This is what Archer-Hind (1888), 345, 39 & 91 n. 12 presumes when he interprets the Timaeus panentheistically by reading *Ti.*92c as calling the Visible Cosmotheos εἰκὼν τοῦ ποιητοῦ instead εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ and identifying the Form of the Good with the Paradigm and the Demiurge. Cf. Dombrowski (2005), 60: "this interpretation, wherein God and paradigm can be intellectually distinguished but cannot be ontologically separated, enables us to better understand how, in the *Timaeus*, the cosmos is a work of art that is an image of the idea in the divine artist's mind: since this artist is mind, the divine artist is, in a way, the Paradigm. This interpretation also helps us to better understand the otherwise confusing presentation

mathematico-musical structure of Uranus-Chronos in His dodecahedral *diazōgraphia* has been thoroughly linked to the constitutional *diagraphē-zōgraphia* of the philosopher-kings seeking to establish the ideal mesocosmic *theoeikelon-andreikelon* polity an important question arises—what has all this to do with the Panathenaic background of the *Timaeus-Critias* and *Timaeus'* status as a rhapsodic *nomopoios-nomothetēs*?

Homer's Shield of Hephaestus and the (dia)zōgraphic *Nomopoiia-Nomothesia* of the *Timaeus-Republic*

in the *Sophist* of the Forms as living and thinking: they are the intellectual contents of a living and thinking divine being. Even the *Republic* is illuminated by this interpretation. The otherwise confusing effort in the *Republic* to have the Good function as a cause starts to be intelligible when the Good is seen as the most exalted content of the mind of the divine cause". Ultimately the author of this dissertation is partial to interpretations that seek to identify the Demiurge and the Paradigm and which see the Forms as divinities because there actually is under-appreciated textual support for this view in the *Timaeus*. Despite always making the Visible Cosmotheos as alike as possible to the Paradigm at one point the Demiurge is said to have willed for all things to resemble Himself (*Ti.*29e: πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ). Ritter (1931), 321 was of the opinion that the Ideas are both 'divine thoughts', a part of God's thinking (göttliche Gedanken, ein Theil des Inhalts von Gottes Denken) as well being 'laws of generation' (Bildungsgesetze) and "a part of the determination of God's creation" (ein Theil der Bestimmtheit von Gottes Schaffen). Thus is it not fair to presume that He (the Demiurge) and the Paradigm are one and the same? Nonetheless there are also valid counterarguments. Lisi (2007), 118 rightly points out that the Form of the Good in the *Republic* (and thus by extension the Timaeian Paradigm) is ontologically beyond or above Nous the Demiurge. Taylor (1928), 81 sees the Paradigm as external to the Demiurge and deems identification of the Paradigm as the Demiurge's thoughts to be an innovation of Philo Judaeus, cf. *De Opificio Mundi* 4.17-19 and 5.20-22. Ultimately this thesis will refrain from reaching a conclusion on the theological status of the Forms and the identification of the Paradigm and the Demiurge or the lack thereof for the focus will instead be on the dynamic of image-making and mimesis. Ultimately it is probably best to remain agnostic on this issue as Plato himself probably was—hence the lack of clarity in the texts themselves. Mueller (1936), 472: "if we understand the world as creation, as visible image of eternity, as outward analogy of an inner synthesis, as a symbol of the glory of the absolute ground and Being, which transcends it and in transcending contains it, we then understand the world as 'aesthetic God simile of the intelligible One (εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ θεὸς αἰσθητός)' 92c". For criticism of Archer-Hind's interpretation, see Ilievski (2022), 55. For a compelling account of the overall theology of the *Timaeus*, see Karfik (2004), 87–148. Karfik identifies many classes of divinity in the Timaeian cosmology when explaining the meaning of *Ti.*41a (*theoi theōn*). Firstly the Demiurge and Paradigm are identified jointly as God. Secondly there is the Visible Cosmos that is expressly identified as a deity (34b and in 68e, 92c). Thirdly there are the astral gods that are at the top of the hierarchy of begotten gods (39e), there being two sub-divisions of the fixed-star gods (40a–b) and the planetary ones (40b–c). These are followed by the *daemones*, the sub-demiurges of 41d–42d (it is unclear why Karfik separates them from the astral gods). Then there are the traditional gods alluded to in 40d–41a that Karfik rightly distinguishes from the astral ones whilst noting that Plato despite criticising traditional poetic depictions of the Olympians never denounces them (see esp. p139-145). Lastly humanity and all other kinds of animals are also divinities by virtue of their possession of divine souls that were once sown into the celestial bodies (41e). Upon incarnation as terrestrial animals these souls are still divine and always continue to partake of divinity, albeit in a progressively lesser degree as one descends down from birds to terrestrial beasts and then to sea creatures at the nadir (91d-92b).

The concept that a poem's structure should mirror its content—that form should reflect meaning—is not Plato's invention but rather an adaptation from Homeric epic. The Shield of Achilles (*Il.* 18.478–608) provides the paradigm for this kind of self-reflexive poetics. Just as the shield's metallurgical structure mirrors the *Iliad's* overall structure, so too the Timaeian account of the construction of Uranus and the World Soul constitutes a verbal painting of the cosmic All. This verbal painting will be shown to be a kind of ‘virtual armillary sphere’.

Before turning to Timaeus’ virtual construction of an armillary sphere it will be beneficial to place the Timaeian *nomos* within the broader cultural framework of contemporary exegesis of Homeric poetry.¹⁶⁶ Simonides of Ceos is reported by (Pseudo?)-Plutarch to have taught that poetry was ‘verbally resounding’ painting just as literal painting is silent poetry (ἡ ποιητικὴ ζωγραφία λαλοῦσα, ἡ δὲ ζωγραφία ποιητικὴ σιωπᾶσα).¹⁶⁷ This aphorism is closely connected to Homer’s ekphrastic depiction of the Shield of Achilles.¹⁶⁸ Pseudo-Plutarch calls Homer the ‘teacher of poietic *zōgraphia*’ (ζωγραφίας διδάσκαλον Ὅμηρον).¹⁶⁹ Homer’s status as archetypal painter-poet is connected expressly to his depiction of Hephaestus crafting the Shield of Achilles and depicting on it the earth, sea and sky with the luminaries and the

¹⁶⁶ For testimonies about allegorical exegesis, particularly that of Metrodorus of Lampsacus, see DL 2.11, Tatian *ad Graecos* 21, *Phld. On Poems* 2, Schol. B on the *Il.* 20.67 & Pl. *Ion* 530c (there Metrodorus is grouped with Stesimbrotus of Thasos and Glaucon). See also Califf (2003), 21–36.

¹⁶⁷ This testimonium is found in *Vita et poesis Homeri* 216= Ps.Plu. *Essay* 54B §216. See also Plu. *Gloria Atheniensium* 3 [346F] & Simonides T101 Poltera (= 47b Campbell). Cf. *De audiensibus poetis* 3 [18A], *De adulate et amico* 15 [58B], *Quaestiones Convivialis* 9, 15 [748A] & Cic. *Tusc.* 5.114. For the dating and authorship of this Plutarchian *Vita et poesis Homeri*, see Keany & Lamberton (1996), 3–10. For the link between Simonides’ aphorism and the Homeric Shield of Achilles, see Iribarren (2012), 297–299, Rispoli (1985), 99–100, Zeitlin (2001), 223–224.

¹⁶⁸ Lecoq (2010), 79 and Squire (2013), 161–162. See also Sprigath 2004 and Männlein-Robert 2007, 20–22.

¹⁶⁹ Vit. Hom. 216. See also with Iribarren (2012), 289–312. Cf. Luc. *Im.* 8 where Homer is called both the best of writers and of painters through the bivalence of the word *grapheus* (ὁ ἄριστος τῶν γραφέων). Max. Tyr. 26.5 presents Polygnotus and Zeuxis the famed *zōgraphoi* as being indebted to Homer. See also Philostr. *Im.* 10.5–20 vis-à-vis *Il.* 18.483–608. (Pseudo)-Plutarch’s diction has been seen by some scholars as being late and not representative of Simonides’ original wording. Lanata (1963), 68 claims that *poiēsis* is not attested before Herodotus and Lucas (1968), 269 n.2 argues that λαλοῦσαν is late as one would expect *legein* in Simonides. See also Wilamowitz (1913), 148–150.

plenitude of stars circling the All as a crown above cities in various circumstances (πλήθος ἄστρον στεφανούντων τὸ πᾶν καὶ πόλεις ἐν διαφόροις τρόποις καὶ τύχαις καθεστώσας).

Pseudo-Plutarch adds that there could be no demiurge more skilled than Homer for his shield depicts *zōa* that talk and move (καὶ ζῶα κινούμενα καὶ φθεγγόμενα, τίνος οὐ φαίνεται τέχνης τοιαύτης δημιουργοῦ τεχνικώτερος). This is strongly reminiscent of Timaeus being commissioned by Socrates to animate the ideal polity as a moving *zōon* (τις ζῶα καλά που θεασάμενος... ὑπὸ γραφῆς εἰργασμένα... κινούμενα, *Ti.* 19b-c). The idea that the life-likeness of the *zōa* within the demiurgic artefact that Homer's *zōographic* poetry paints into being through words is what makes him unrivaled as a wordsmith is very important. Pindar, a near contemporary of Simonides of Ceos, similarly made the point that his poems were more powerful than mute statues.¹⁷⁰ What is important about all of this information relayed in the Pseudo-Plutarchian text (it is unclear how much is purely Simonidean) is that it paves the way for understanding Timaeus as a 'new Homer' in his generation through words of an *eikōn* of the Cosmotheos that can be prayed to (*Criti.* 106a) and that embodies Socrates' ideal polity as a living, moving *zōon* (*Ti.* 19b-c). Keaney and Lamberton in commenting on this Simonidean portion of the Plutarchian essay on Homer state that "the creator of Hephaestus and the shield is assimilated to his creation and the global and comprehensive artifact of Hephaestus becomes, implicitly, the Homeric corpus".¹⁷¹ Similarly Zeitlin states that "in ps.-Plutarch's account... Hephaestus' manufacture of the shield is transferred to the poet himself as proof that the product of his *phantasia* entitles him to the highest credentials of excellence in the visual arts themselves".¹⁷² This analogism of the microcosmic human *poiētēs* with the divine

¹⁷⁰ Ford (2002), 93-99. *Pi. N.* 5.1-3 & *I.* 2.44-48. See also *Pi. N.* 3.9-17 (χώρας ἄγαλμα) & 3.1-5 (μελιγαρύων τέκτονες κώμων) with Steiner (2001) 260, 273 who rightly understands Pindar's poem as virtually constituting an *agalma*. Similarly, Kurke (2013), 156 says the following of Pindar's *agalmatopoiia*: "here, where we might expect to find a statue (*agalma*) of the athletic victor himself set up by his grateful city, we are given instead a whole chorus of moving, breathing, singing statues".

¹⁷¹ Keaney & Lamberton (1996), 27.

¹⁷² Zeitlin (2001), 224.

demiurge or artisanal maker (*poiētēs*) whose macrocosmic artefact is replicated or virtually ‘painted’ through the words of poetry is exactly the same dynamic which this dissertation identifies in the *Timaeus*. As such, provided that the Pseudo-Plutarchian is genuinely relaying information about Homeric exegesis that all goes back to Simonides’ era, this late text provides very helpful information for the contextualisation of the *nomothesia-nomopoiia* of the Timaeian *eikōs mythos* in terms of the cultural context of the rhapsodic tradition. In fact, even if all the information relayed in the Plutarchian essay were post-Platonic it would still at the very least be useful for elucidating how Plato himself may have conceived of his ideal polity’s ‘New Homer’.

Perhaps the most important information relayed in this section of the Plutarchian *de Homero* (216) for present purposes of understanding the *Timaeus* is that Homer is said to be the first and the best poet with respect to showing forth *noēmata* visually through *zōgraphic phantasia* (φαντασία τῶν νοημάτων ἔδειξεν) and virtually generating through skilfully arranged words gods, humans, places, various acts and even moulding all kinds of *zōa* through the ‘matter’ (*hylē*) of words (τῇ εὐφωνίᾳ τῶν ἐπῶν ἐκόσμησε θεούς, ἀνθρώπους, τόπους, πράξεις ποικίλας, ἀνέπλασε δὲ τῇ ὕλῃ τῶν λόγων καὶ ζῶα παντοῖα). Thus there is an analogism between the demiurgic *nomopoiios* and the divine craftsman acting as cosmic *nomothetēs*.¹⁷³ There is naturally an issue with investing too much attention in the diction of the indirect testimonium of Pseudo-Plutarch but it nonetheless seems fair to presume that Simonides did teach something like this. Further if he did then it can be assumed that it was known among the Homeric rhapsode-exegetes of Plato’s era who saw Homer’s Shield of Achilles as an exemplification of how poetic words (*logoi*) can demiurgically produce images that are not

¹⁷³ Squire (2018), 359-360: “the wordsmith ‘crafts’ through the almost physical stuff of language: like a sculptor”.

merely static but rather are living, moving *zōa*. The reason this is so significant is because the present chapter's study of Timaeus' status as a rhapsodic *nomopoiōis-nomothetēs* and *zōgraphos* will argue that Plato has Simonides' exegesis of the Homeric Shield of Achilles in mind (or something akin to it) when he proffers through the Timaeian *eikōs mythos* a 'replacement', that is, a divinely-crafted demiurgic product adorned with living *zōa*.

This dissertation shall argue that Homer's Shield of Achilles is vital background for understanding the cosmomimetic *nomopoiōia-nomothesia* of Timaeus' *eikōs mythos* which 'paints' out Socrates' polity as a *zōon* by eikastically depicting the Demiurge's celestial *diazōgraphia* (Ti. 55c), that is, His delineation and zodiacal adornment of the dodecahedral All. The reason the Shield of Achilles is a vital comparandum is because Plato's Timaeus in verbally constructing an *eikōn* of the All as a virtual armillary sphere through his speech seeks to achieve exactly what Homer qua archetypal *zōgraphos-nomothetēs* did, namely the generation through words of a divinely-crafted artisanal product embodying the relationship between microcosmic man and the Divine Macrocosm through the mesocosmically-charged political organisation. Why should it be presumed that the *mappa mundi* which Timaeus crafts through his *zōgraphic* poetry is an armillary sphere specifically? Timaeus describes the Paradigm as containing all invisible, noetic creatures in a manner analogous to how the Visible Cosmotheos contains us and all visible creatures (30c-d). This conception of the Visible Cosmotheos as panzoomorphic, that is, containing all kinds of visible animals, should inform how one conceives of the Demiurge's dodecahedral, zodiacally-adorned *diazōgraphia* and Socrates' polity qua celestial *diagraphe*—the sphere of fixed stars, the outermost layer of Uranus-Chronos that consists of diverse blue-print of starry animalian forms. Indeed, when one keeps all of this in mind it is easy to appreciate why Timaeus the *nomopoiōis-nomothetēs* could best emulate the Demiurge's dodecahedral *diazōgraphia* through the virtual

construction of an armillary sphere because it is this artisanal product which most closely resembles the Demiurge's own artisanry as can be seen in the oldest surviving examples of armillary spheres from antiquity:¹⁷⁴



¹⁷⁴ The photographs of Kugel's globe are Figs.2.5-2.8 in Dekker (2013), 58, reproduced courtesy of Galerie J. Kugel, Paris—for Dekker on Kugel's Globe generally, see Dekker (2013), 59-69. The photograph and sketch of the Mainz Globe (produced in the early AD period) is given as Fig. 2.10a-b in Dekker (2013), 69, courtesy of the Römisch-Germanisches Zentralmuseum, Mainz. For the less picturesque but equally important 'Larissa Globe' that is not reproduced above, see Dekker (2013), 54-57.



2.5 side east of the vernal equinoctial colure



2.6 side east of the summer solstitial colure



2.7 side east of the autumnal equinoctial colure



2.8 side east of the winter solstitial colure

The Kugel Globe appears to be a Pre-Hipparchean constellation-globe that was likely part of an armillary sphere perhaps dating back as early as the second century BC—it depicts the constellations that had been described by Eudoxus, a member of Plato’s Academy.¹⁷⁵ Though these surviving examples of celestial maps incorporated into ancient armillary spheres are later than Plato’s era and likely more elaborate than those he knew, they nonetheless give a sense of how a metallurgical artefact of this kind neatly parallels the description of the Demiurge adorning the outermost layer of the Visible Cosmos (the sphere of the fixed stars) with a *diazōgraphia* (Ti.55c)—indeed such a sphere is likely its inspiration. Such a metallurgical artefact depicting the, ever-rotating procession of starry *zōa* that embodies Time

¹⁷⁵ Eudoxus's treatise is known from Hipparchus, see Manitius (1894). For Eudoxus' relationship with the Academy, see Lasserre (1966), 138, Krämer (2004), 5, Natali 2013, 157. See DL 8.86.4–5 for Eudoxus attending Plato’s lectures. Kugel’s Globe was found near Lake Van along with other artefacts that can be clearly dated to the second though the date of the sphere itself is contested, see Kugel (2002), 22-26 & Cuvigny (2004), 737.

(Chronos) in the body of Heaven (Uranus) can easily be connected to Homer's account of Hephaestus' Shield, a demiurgic *mimēma* that depicts constellations and showcases their influence as archetypes on the sublunar world below. The globe also relates to the Panathenaea which was calendrically calculated through the observation of animalian constellations and involved processions with terrestrial animals and equestrian games of a martial character. Socrates' request to see his starry polity rendered a *zōon* at war (19b-c) needs to be viewed in light of all these connections. Timaeus describes Uranus-Chronos both as a living organism and an artisanal object (an armillary sphere) adorned *zōgraphically* with animalian shapes and does so as a rhapsodic exegete of Homer's *imago mundi*, his Shield of Hephaestus during the Panathenaea, a festival determined by the movements of constellational *zōa* and involving equestrian games which culminated in the offering to Athena of *peplos* depicting the exploits of that goddess.¹⁷⁶ Thus Timaeus' song-offering qua virtual armillary sphere will now be examined in terms of its function in the context of the Panathenaic rhapsodic performances of Homeric poetry.

One may at this point ask, how does Timaeus' virtual crafting of a planetarium render him a rhapsodic exegete of Homer? How is this discussion of Timaeus' virtual creation of an armillary sphere related to his role as *nomopoios* and *nomothetēs*? As shall be seen shortly, there is a precedent in Homeric poetry for an artisanal object mapping out the All in miniature, namely Hephaestus' Shield. It will be demonstrated that Homer's *imago mundi* is being exegetically adapted and updated by Timaeus in his virtual production of an armillary sphere through the *logoi* (ratios and arguments) of his *nomos*. In the Homeric *imago mundi* of

¹⁷⁶ For Panathenaic equestrian events, see these two second century inscriptions: IG II² 2313; 2314; Gardiner, (1910), 236-37. These games were held in conjunction with musical *agōnes* with the *Boulē* arranging prizes and the presentation of the *peplos* Arist. *Ath.* 60.1 & 62.2. Ferguson (1911), 291-295; Moor (1975), 229-230; Sandys (1912), 238.

the Shield of Achilles (Il.18.484-488) the sun, the moon and important constellations (the Pleiades, Hyades, Orion and the Ursa Major/the Wain) are the starting point for the description of cosmic order. There follows a description of two cities: in one a wedding and a judgment are taking place (490–508) whilst the other city is besieged (509–40). This is clearly a *mise en abyme* in the sense that the plot of the Trojan cycle is essentially summarised in these images (Il. 18.510-513). Given that the shield in addition to depicting the marriage-feast and city-siege that constitute the Trojan cycle's plot also depicts various agricultural activities (541—572) as well as dancing and courting (590–606) the implication is that political life, the whole human enterprise, is conceived of as being guided by the movements of starry heaven above—the cosmological assumption of a polity 'under heaven' (*hypo ton ouranon*) perfectly aligned with the stars determining the correct rhythm of life is already articulated here. Thus by constructing a virtual armillary sphere that summarises in one image the entire theology and anthropology of his cosmogonic and anthropogonic discourse Timaeus as *nomopoios-nomothetēs* is reworking Homer's prior cosmographic *mise en abyme*. Though this has never been properly realised in scholarship to date, Zedda has drawn attention to the diction of mixing used in Timaeus' account of the Demiurge's crafting of the Anima Mundi (συνεκεράσατο, ξυναρμόπτον, δύσμεικτον, μίγνύς, διένειμεν, κρατήρ, κατεχεῖτο, 35a-b & 41d) along with the imagery of smelting, hammering out bands and mathematically measuring proportional harmonies all of which he sees as distinctly metallurgical.¹⁷⁷ Just as Homer used the metallurgical crafting of an artisanal product as means of providing a depiction of the astral ordering of the All Timaeus as the replacement-rhapsode founding a new polity and a new kind of theomimetic *poiēsis* outdoes him by

¹⁷⁷ Zedda (2000), 25-33. Is it coincidental that Pythagoras was, at least in apocryphal legend, conceived of as discovering the numerical character of harmonic intervals in music by overhearing the hammering of blacksmiths? See Iamb. VP 121. For the oldest source, see Nicomachus' account ascribed to Huffman (1993), 145–165. See also Macr. *Somn. Scip.* 2,1,8–1; Boeth. *De institutione musica* 1,10–11, Cassiod. *Inst. Div. Litt.* 2,5,1; See also Xenocrates on Pythagoras' discovery of the numerical character of intervals in music in Barker (2004), 30.

producing an *eikōn* that is a living *zōon* capable of being prayed to and thus to some extent identified with the Cosmotheos depicted therein. The connection between this metallurgical *mise en abyme* and *nomopoiia-nomothesia* is vitally important for understanding the way pedagogy, *poiēsis* and cosmotheology are conceived of in Socrates' ideal polity and fleshed out in the Timaeus zoomorphic *logos* (see Chapter Two of this dissertation).


Not only does Timaeus' virtual construction of an armillary sphere constitute a new exemplar of poetic *zōgraphia* embodying the link between rhapsodic *nomopoiia* and establishment of cosmic order through heaven-mandated *nomothesia* but it also eclipses Homer's attempts at establishing microcosm-macrocosm analogism by producing a much more compelling image. Rather than simply producing a vague image of macrocosm-microcosm analogism in the way Achilles Shield does by showing the seasonal cycles of man's existence occurring under the constellational rotations above Timaeus instead intimately connects the macrocosmic rotational intellection (*phronēsis*) of Uranus-Chronos with man's microcosm cognition. Both the Divine Macrocosm's and microcosmic man's rotational cognition are delineated in the structure of the virtual armillary sphere that he virtually crafts through the words (*logoi*) of his prose-poetry.

Timaeus' Virtual Armillary Sphere qua Mise en Abyme

Timaeus states that reliance on imitative models (*mimēmata*) is necessary to properly conduct astronomical inquiry (*Ti.*40c-d). Bury clarifies that Timaeus is referring here to "such instruments as a celestial globe or planetarium".¹⁷⁸ Timaeus claims that such an armillary


¹⁷⁸ Bury (1929), 86.

sphere would be needed if complex technical details were to be discussed (40c-d). Timaeus does not treat any such specifics so one might assume that no model is necessary. However, Zedda states that the armillary sphere “must be seen as standing in an analogical relationship both with its model, the world soul, and with the image of the world soul constructed in the mind of the person trying to understand its workings”.¹⁷⁹ Modelling plays a key mediational role in Timaeian epistemology. Further, there is some irony to Timaeus’ remark that a model would be needed. His account of the World Soul basically constructs a virtual armillary sphere, as seen below in the diagrammatic representation of the planets distributed across the bands of the Different with the Anima Mundi. Timaeus describes the way in which the Anima Mundi is constructed (36b-c). The two bands of the Same and the Different respectively are formed into rings and then positioned one inside the other like so:¹⁸⁰



¹⁷⁹ Zedda (2000), 37. Consider also the allusion to the armillary sphere in *Ti.* 40c-d.


¹⁸⁰ These depictions are from Brisson (2021), 73, his Figures 3 & 4. Cf. the rather different conception in Nikulin (2000), 113-118.



What is significant for present purposes is that these two interlaced ‘hoops’ of the Anima Mundi rotate in opposite directions. They are identified with the circuits of the fixed stars along the celestial equator and of the planets along the ecliptic (the belt adorned with the constellations of the Zodiac) respectively.¹⁸¹ In order for the Band of the Different to accommodate the rotations of the seven classical planets, it must be divided into seven corresponding circuits like so:¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ *Ti.*36c with Bury (1929), 71-72.

¹⁸²This diagram is given as Figure 5 in Brague (2021), 74.



The resemblance to an armillary sphere is undeniable. What is vital to appreciate here is that there is direct analogism between the World Soul's rotational structure and that of the immortal human soul, the cephalic *nous*. Man's cognition imitates on the microcosmic scale that of God at the macrocosmic level (*Ti.* 90c-d):

θεραπεία δὲ δὴ παντὶ παντὸς μία, τὰς οἰκείας ἐκάστω τροφᾶς καὶ κινήσεις ἀποδιδόναι. τῷ δ' ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖω συγγενεῖς εἰσιν κινήσεις αἱ τοῦ παντὸς διανοήσεις καὶ περιφοραί: ταύταις δὴ συνεπόμενον ἕκαστον δεῖ, τὰς περὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ διεφθαρμένας ἡμῶν περιόδους ἐξορθοῦντα διὰ τὸ καταμανθάνειν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἁρμονίας τε καὶ περιφοράς, **τῷ κατανοομένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιωῶσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν**, ὁμοιώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου πρὸς τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον.

And the way of tendance of every part by every man is one—namely, to supply each with its own congenial food and motion; and for the divine part within us the congenial motions are the intellections and revolutions of the Universe. These each one of us should follow, rectifying the revolutions within our head, which were distorted at our birth, by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the Universe, and thereby making the part that thinks **like unto the object of its thought, in accordance with its original nature**, and having achieved this likeness attain finally to that goal of life which is set before men by the gods as the most good both for the present and for the time to come.

Here a relationship of macrocosm-microcosm analogism is set up that has an inherently soteriological character. Man is obliged to pursue the goal set up for him by the gods who

created him. This goal is to make his *nous*, his immortal soul, his divine rotational intelligence, as alike as possible unto what should be the main object of its cognition: the totality of the All as laid out in the numerical *nomos* of the motion of the body and soul of the perfect visible *zōon*, Uranus-Cosmos. This analogism between the Anima Mundi rotating Heaven and the cognitional rotations of the human intellect is so important because this dynamic encapsulates the whole soteriology and teleology of the Timaeian *nomos*. Timaeus' God-imitating cosmogonic song is intended to help the listener/reader to return to his 'ancient nature' (κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν)

There is a key point of intertextuality with another Platonic text present in Timaeus' linking of the Divine Macrocosm's cognition to that of microcosmic man. In the *Cratylus* (411d) *phronēsis* is derived etymologically from φορά (rotation). This is vital background for understanding *Ti.* 39d-40a. There the Demiurge is said to create one elemental genus of visible animal, namely the divine fiery class that consists of the astral gods. This class of animal, the fiery astral variety, is said to be 'most beautiful' (κάλλιστον) as a result of its individual members being endowed by the Demiurge with a spherical shape that results in a high degree of likeness to the All (τῷ δὲ παντὶ προσεικάζων εὐκυκλον ἐποίει). The Demiurge places the members of this fiery genus of animals in the 'Intelligence' (*phronēsis*) of the 'Most Powerful One' (i.e. the Cosmotheos identified as the Godhead) so that the class of astral *zōa* can 'follow' Him in His rotational movement (τίθησίν τε εἰς τὴν τοῦ κρατίστου φρόνησιν ἐκείνῳ συνεπόμενον). This phraseology is significant as it should be taken as an indication that, though the Anima Mundi is created by the Demiurge to animate the body of the Visible Cosmotheos, the *eikōn* of the Invisible Godhead (Nous, the Paradigm), it is nonetheless to be identified with Him to a certain extent. That there is truly such identification in 40a is clearly suggested by the phraseology 'the Intellect of the Most Powerful' (τοῦ κρατίστου φρόνησιν).

The ‘*phronēsis*’ here must be the rotational cognition of the Anima Mundi, an identification that can be made in light of the *Cratylus*, and the superlative ‘Most Powerful’ can only be the Godhead. Surely the generated Cosmotheos cannot be said to be more powerful than the un-generated Nous the Demiurge. The meaning of ‘*kratiston*’, that is, ‘most powerful’ or ‘Almighty’ here can be deduced from the context. However, without recourse to the *Cratylus*, the meaning of ‘*phronēsis*’ in 40a is much less clear.¹⁸³

Timaeus as Rhapsodic-Exegete: The Armillary Sphere as a Re-Working of Homer’s

Shield

This dissertation argues that the *theoikeion andreikeion* lies at the heart of Timaeus’ project. As the ideal polity’s cosmogonic poet, he paints into being Socrates’ constitution as a *zōon* in a state of war for edification and entertainment of the citizenry. In so doing it will be claimed that Plato’s Timaeus is not only acting as a rhapsodic performer. He recites a song, a *nomos*, that will be ‘stitched’ into a relay-performance. He is also practising the art of rhapsodic exegesis. His whole prose poem is a commentary on the term θεοείκελος and is a re-working of the Shield of Hephaestus. There are two Homeric passages that use the key term θεοείκελος that Plato’s Socrates uses in Book 6 of the *Republic* to identify the *eikōn* of his ideal polity’s constitution as embodied in the perfectly divinised man (501b). In Book 3 of the *Odyssey* (line 416) Telemachus is described as ‘god-like’ when visiting Nestor in search of word on his father’s whereabouts (Τηλέμαχον θεοείκελον). In the opening portion of the *Iliad* during Agamemnon’s and Achilles’ dispute, the king addresses the latter hero as ‘godlike one’ (μη δ’ οὕτως ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν θεοείκελ’ Ἀχιλλεῦ / κλέπτε νόω, ἐπεὶ οὐ παρελεύσεαι οὐδέ με

¹⁸³ Bury (1929), 84. Bury cites *Cra.* 411d as a comparandum and notes that this ‘Intellect’ (*phronēsis*) of Heaven is to be identified with “the fixed stars, and their sphere which moves with the daily rotation of the spherical Cosmos”.

πέρις, 1.131-132). This latter instance wherein Achilles is addressed as *theoeikelos* is particularly important because Achilles is alluded to sixteen times in *R.*379d- 391e in a context of either criticising Homer’s heroes’ behaviour or Homer’s theology.¹⁸⁴ As such, Socrates in using this Homeric term to denominate his vision of the ideal political constitution incarnate in the perfectly divinised human and commissioning Timaeus to provide a rhapsodic poem depicting the *theoeikelon andreikelon* is in essence correcting Homer’s misapplication of the word *theoeikelos*. Homer’s depiction of gods and heroes is not conducive of educational success in the ideal polity. This becomes most apparent when one looks at how undesirable a role-model Achilles is: he is far from being an incarnation of how Plato’s Socrates conceives of the ideal polity and the perfectly divinised citizen thereof. In what way then does Timaeus’ cosmogonic *nomos* constitute a corrective exegesis on Homer’s problematic use of the term *theoeikelos* in reference to Achilles? The answer lies in Timaeus’ adaptation of the Shield of Achilles.

Timaeus in producing an *eikōn* of ‘the All’ and in making his logos bear the shape of what it describes is not original but rather is indebted to Homer’s famed ‘Shield of Achilles’. Indeed, the Shield of Achilles crafted by Hephaestus is the *locus classicus* for mythic poetry depicting the cosmos and the astral laws of fate (*heimarmenoi nomoi*) on a piece of microcosmic demiurgic craftsmanship, (*Il.* 18. 483-489):¹⁸⁵

ἐν μὲν γαῖαν ἔτευξ’, ἐν δ’ οὐρανόν, ἐν δὲ θάλασσαν,
 ἠέλιόν τ’ ἀκάμαντα σελήνην τε πλήθουσαν,
ἐν δὲ τὰ τεῖρεα πάντα, τά τ’ οὐρανὸς ἐστεφάνωται,
 Πληϊάδας θ’ Ὑάδας τε τό τε σθένος Ὠρίωνος

¹⁸⁴ See Hobbs (2000), 199-219 for Plato’s treatment of Achilles as the embodiment of the disordered *thymos*. See also Adam (1996).

¹⁸⁵ Taplin (1980), 1-21; Byre (1992), 33-42.

Ἄρκτον θ', ἣν καὶ Ἄμαξαν ἐπὶ κλησὶν καλέουσιν,
ἧ τ' αὐτοῦ στρέφεται καὶ τ' Ὠρίωνα δοκεύει,
οἷ δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο.

First he shaped the shield so great and strong, adorning it all over and binding it round with a gleaming circuit in three layers; and the baldric was made of silver. He made the shield in five thicknesses, and with many a wonder did his cunning hand enrich it. He wrought the earth, the heavens, and the sea; the moon also at her full and the untiring sun, with all the signs that glorify the face of heaven - the Pleiads, the Hyads, huge Orion, and the Bear, which men also call the Wain and which turns round ever in one place, facing. Orion, and alone never dips into the stream of Okeanos.

The fact that Homer here intends this shield to be a mimetic reflection of the arrayment of life on earth by divine providence through the intermediary of the starry patterns and motions of Heaven is unambiguous. The opening line contains the markedly demiurgic verb τεύχω and immediately after introducing the standard cosmogonic trio of earth, sky and sea, fixates on heavenly luminaries as the main starting point. This is because they contain the cosmic order imitated below on earth. Indeed, stars are said to ‘crown’ heaven, to adorn his circumference (ἐν δὲ τὰ τεῖρεα πάντα, τὰ τ' οὐρανὸς ἐστεφάνωται). This is important because just as Heaven is a ‘*stephanos*’, a ‘crown’ or ‘band’ so too is the shield itself – the microcosmic model shares the same shape as the macrocosm. The circular shape of the band of heaven and the uranomimetic shield is also reflected in the description of a city’s elders congregating in a ‘sacred circle’ (ἴατ' ἐπὶ ξεστοῖσι λίθοις ἱερῶ ἐνὶ κύκλῳ, 504). Further, Homer describes the manner in which Hephaestus “the famed god of the two strong arms cunningly wrought a dancing-floor like unto that which in wide Cnossus Daedalus fashioned of old for fair-tressed Ariadne” (ἐν δὲ χορὸν ποίκιλλε περικλυτὸς ἀμφιγυήεις, / τῶ ἴκελον οἷόν ποτ' ἐνὶ Κνωσῶ εὐρείῃ / Δαίδαλος ἤσκησεν καλλιπλοκάμῳ Ἀριάδνῃ, *Il.* 18.590-593). Not only do these lines involve a circular dance-floor being an imitation of the ‘*stephanos*’ of Heaven above and its dancers circling about in imitation of the ‘chorus’ of astral bodies (*Ti.* 40c speaks of such

astral ‘dances’, χορείας) but it also involves the remarkable likening of a human’s demiurgic creation to that of a god (in this case the human is Daedalus, an ancestor of Socrates).¹⁸⁶

The cosmographic map of Achilles’ or Hephaestus’ shield in Il. 18.484-609 can be considered the Iliadic cosmogony, an account of Demiurgic creation. Of course, the ‘genesis of all from Oceanus’ is the well-known account of cosmogony found in Homer.¹⁸⁷ That brief account, if it can be called that, is not an artisanal creation but rather an emanation followed by biological procreation much like the traditional theogony quoted by Timaeus (40e). The Shield of Hephaestus is not typically seen as a cosmogony and there is reason for that. It is not Zeus as God of gods creating here nor is it necessarily the cosmos itself being created. Why then consider the account cosmogonic? There is nowhere else in the Homeric and Hesiodic poems a representation clearly suggesting that the world was ordered as a cosmos by a Demiurge. Even though the shield is not the cosmos itself it does depict the whole cosmos and is thus a microcosmic eikon. As such the passage describes an artisanal crafting an object that contains a complete likeness of the cosmos, starting from the stars, down to cities and affairs of humans and then out towards the sea – the three strata of our world, heaven, earth, and sea. Is it such a stretch to imagine that there was a conception of a creator god underlying such an image of an artisanal deity crafting an *imago mundi*? Even if not

¹⁸⁶See Pl.*Alc. I.* 121a for Socrates’ Daedalic ancestry. Kurke (2013), 157-158 links the reference to Daedalus and dancing in *Il.*18.590–4 and the likening of human motion on the shield to the potter’s wheel in 18.599-602 to the divine astral *choroi* of *Ti.*40c and the depictions of humans as divine puppets in *Lg.*644d–645c & 803c–804c. On this connection between dance and puppetry, see Athanassaki (2018), 81-117 and Moore (2014), 111-146. The star-imitating dancers sculpted by Hephaestus on the shield are automatons in the manner of Daedalus’ moving statues that are frequently alluded to in the Platonic corpus and are expressly likened to *logoi*, see *Euthphr.*10b ff, *Hp. Ma.* 828a, *Alc.* 1.121a, *Men.*97c-98a. In Arist. *Pol.* 1253b53 Daedalus’ moving statues and Hephaestus’ ‘robotic’ creations are related to weaving. According to the *Schol.Venet.* on *Il.*18.590 and Eustathius on *Il.*18.590–606, 1166, lines 18–22 Daedalus taught Theseus the Crane Dance. Thus Daedalus was not only an *agalmatopoios* but also choreographer, see Call.*Hymn* 4.307–15; Plu.*Thes.* 21; Poll. *Onom.* 4.101. See Peponi (2015), 213-214 on the connection between the concept of *kosmos* generally and *kyklios choros* See Peponi (2015), 204-217 for mimetic and non-mimetic views of dance in antiquity.

¹⁸⁷ *Il.*14. 200 ff (Hera speaking to Aphrodite), 14.300-305 ff (Hera addressing Zeus) 14. 244 ff (Hypnos speaking to Hera).

known to ‘Homer’ himself, at the very least the conception of the Demiurge is latent here and ripe for the picking by a later thinker such as Plato.

The *Timaeus* exhibits the same ring-compositional structure found in the *Iliad*. Scholars have identified three 'narrative circles' in the dialogue, each corresponding to a different aspect of cosmogony. These circles are not merely organizational devices but structural analogues to the interlocking circles of the Same and the Different that constitute the World Soul. Timaeus' cosmomorphic *logos* resembles the shield of Achilles in one key respect, its 'circular' shape as a 'ring-composition'.¹⁸⁸ Osborne claims that the tripartite Timaeian discourse consists of “a number of circular orbits intersecting at a point but tracing a different path on a sphere”.¹⁸⁹ This model “corresponds in spatial structure to the arrangement of the circles of the Same and the Different out of which the Demiurge constructs the World-Soul”.¹⁹⁰ So too Myers makes a parallel observation in her analysis of the dialogue's structure. Noting foreshadowing in the opening programmatic count, she argues that the three narrative 'circles' of the *Timaeus* correspond to the three main sections of the cosmos described in the dialogue.¹⁹¹ The first circle describes the intelligible realm and the Demiurge's initial ordering. The second circle describes the realm of Necessity and the errant cause. The third circle describes the human microcosm and its relation to the macrocosm. These three circles intersect and overlap, creating a complex narrative structure that mirrors the interlocking circles of the World Soul.

¹⁸⁸ Myers (2021), 251-273. See Cohen (2020), 93-106 for the ethical dimension to circularity and rectilinearity in the *Timaeus*.

¹⁸⁹ Osborne (1996), 198.

¹⁹⁰ Osborne (1996), 198.

¹⁹¹ Myers (2018), 58.

The first of the three narrative circles (29d-47e) deals primarily with the Works of Reason, the second focuses on the operation of Necessity and Chora (47e-69a) and the third reconciles Reason and Necessity by showing them to be cooperating forces (69a-92c).¹⁹² Each one of the three narrative cycles covers all the ground that Critias assigned to the whole of Timaeus' discourse—the *logos* is to start from the birthing of the cosmos and end with the generation of humans (πρῶτον λέγειν ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως, τελευτᾶν δὲ εἰς ἀνθρώπων φύσιν, 27a). Thus Timaeus completes the task set for him three times.¹⁹³ This three-circled interpretation is born out of a plain reading of the text. For instance, at the end of the first narrative-cycle Timaeus says “the foregoing part of our discourse, save for a small portion, has been an exposition of the operations of Reason [τὰ διὰ νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα]; but we must also furnish an account of what comes into existence through Necessity” (τὰ δι' ἀνάγκης γινόμενα τῷ λόγῳ παραθέσθαι, 47e). Then in commencing the second cycle Timaeus says the following “taking once **again** a fresh starting point suitable to the matter we must make a fresh start in dealing therewith, just as we did with our previous subjects” (ἀναχωρητέον, καὶ λαβοῦσιν αὐτῶν τούτων προσήκουσαν ἑτέραν ἀρχὴν **αὖθις** αὖ, καθάπερ περὶ τῶν τότε νῦν οὕτω περὶ τούτων πάλιν ἀρκτέον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, 48b).¹⁹⁴ As Myers points out, here “the words *authis au* indicate that Timaeus offers a new beginning of the same account rather than the beginning of an entirely new account” since “the point at which the first account begins and ends is where the second account begins”.¹⁹⁵ The beginning of the third narrative circle makes it abundantly clear that Timaeus conceives of himself as returning again to the same starting point (69a-b):

ὅτ' οὖν δὴ τὰ νῦν οἷα τέκτοσιν ἡμῖν ὕλη παράκειται τὰ τῶν αἰτίων γένη διωλισμένα,
ἐξ ὧν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον λόγον δεῖ συνυφανθῆναι, πάλιν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἐπανέλθωμεν διὰ

¹⁹² This how Cornford divides the text, e.g. Cornford (1937), 32.

¹⁹³ Cf. Timaeus' conclusion of his third narrative cycle, *Ti.*90e.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. the use of αὖθις (again) in *Ti.*48e: ἡ δ' οὖν **αὖθις** ἀρχὴ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἔστω μειζόνως τῆς πρόσθεν διηρημένη.

¹⁹⁵ Myers (2018), 66.

βραχέων, ταχύ τε εἰς ταῦτόν¹⁹⁶ πορευθῶμεν ὅθεν δεῦρο ἀφικόμεθα, καὶ τελευτήν ἤδη κεφαλὴν τε τῷ μύθῳ πειρώμεθα ἀρμόττουσαν ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖς πρόσθεν

Seeing, then, that we have now lying before us and thoroughly sifted—like wood ready for the joiner, —the various kinds of causes, out of which the rest of our account must be woven together, let us once more for a moment revert to our starting-point, and thence proceed rapidly to the point from which we arrived hither. In this way we shall endeavor now to supplement our story with a conclusion and a crown [lit. ‘head’] in harmony with what has gone before.

The reference to travelling back to the same point from which we came hither (εἰς ταῦτόν πορευθῶμεν ὅθεν δεῦρο ἀφικόμεθα) could not be any less unambiguous. In addition to employing the artisanal imagery and diction of woodwork (ῥύλη, δυλισμένα) and of weaving (συνυφανθῆναι) Timaeus also employs a key anatomical term: κεφαλὴ, head. The artisanal imagery and diction are important as they make apparent how Timaeus is engaging in theomimetic virtual demiurgy when he is systatically articulating the parts of his *logos* together into a harmonious living *zōon* in the very same manner as the Demiurge did the components of the Cosmotheos. As Slaveva-Griffin puts it, in the case of the Timaeian discourse, “the philosophical content cannot be separated from the literary form, and the literary form cannot be understood fully without the philosophical content”.¹⁹⁷ Myers duly notes that the third narrative circle has a strong emphasis on “the connection between the human body and the universe”.¹⁹⁸ She draws attention to the fact that the head in particular is the locus of macrocosm-microcosm analogism. That which understands (man’s cephalic soul, or nous) became alike to what it contemplates (Uranus-Cosmos). This nous becomes similar to what has been set up by the gods as the goal of the best life, namely return to the original nature, namely being a divine astral being (see 40e) in the chariot-train of Nous the Demiurge Himself (90d). The soteriological and eschatological significance of the likeness between the

¹⁹⁶ Cf. Cornford (1937), 280 who oddly reads *tauton* as referring to sense-perception instead of Bury’s trans. which correctly renders it as ‘starting-point’.

¹⁹⁷ Slaveva-Griffin (2005), 312.

¹⁹⁸ Myers (2018), 68. Cf. *Ti.* 89a & 90c-d where Timaeus describes the cognitive rotations of the divine nous within us as related to those of the All, the Divine Macrocosm (τῷ δ’ ἐν ἡμῖν θείῳ συγγενεῖς εἰσὶν κινήσεις αἰ τοῦ παντός διανοήσεις καὶ περιφοραί).

microcosmic human head housing the cephalic nous-soul and macrocosmic Heaven is amplified when one considers that Timaeus' *logos* itself, by virtue of being structured as an armillary sphere, is just as much an *eikōn* of a divine astral chariot and a human head as it is of the All. Thus when Timaeus speaks of 'putting a head' (κεφαλή, 69a-b) on his discourse he not only crates the image of his discourse as an *agalma* or *zōon* receiving a head but also draws attention to the fact that the *logos* is just as much 'cephalomorphic' as it is 'uranomorphic'. As Timaeus puts it, that which understands is alike unto that which it understands (90d) and so too the *logos* resembles both Uranus-Cosmos and the philosopher's cephalic soul that seeks to imitate Him.

In addition to the three narrative circles the Timaeian *logos* is also a ring-composition in the sense that it begins with a reference to "this one Heaven-Cosmos that had been generated, unique or only-begotten' (εἷς ὅδε μονογενῆς οὐρανὸς γεγονῶς, 31b) and also closes with a reference to one Uranus, being only-begotten or unique (εἷς οὐρανὸς ὅδε μονογενῆς ὄν, 92c). That term, 'only-begotten' or 'unique', occurs only in these two passages that open and close the speech. Thus, it can be said that the *logos* begins and ends with the same spherical image of a singular all-containing Uranus-Cosmos. The account itself eikastically resembles and is akin to what it describes through its inherent circularity. Its beginning and end link up to the same point. This principle that an exegetical account should be akin to what it describes is laid down by Timaeus himself in his programmatic proem (29b). He says that *logoi* are congenitally related (*sungeneis*) to the things which they describe (ὡς ἄρα τοὺς λόγους, ὧν πέρ εἰσιν ἐξηγηταί, τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ συγγενεῖς ὄντας). Becker is of the opinion that the Homer's Achilles' Shield is a *mise en abyme*. There is analogism between one who hears or reads poetry and one who beholds a work of art. The poet creates images through *logoi* rather

than visually.¹⁹⁹ Graff defines a *mise en abyme* as "a miniature replica of a text embedded within that text: a textual part reduplicating, reflecting, or mirroring (one or more than one aspect of) the textual whole".²⁰⁰ Indeed, as Onians points out, "those who heard the description of the shield made by divine craftsman and decorated principally with representations of two cities, one of which is besieged, would have sensed correspondence with the poem made by a divinely inspired *poiētēs*, 'maker', whose subject was the fate of two settlements, the Greek camp and the besieged city of Troy."²⁰¹ He connects this to the conception of bodies of armed men themselves being conceived of collectively as a singular shield or wall of the city. He argues that thematically and structurally the poem overall as "an epic celebration of military virtues strengthened by a rigid organisation" is in its very own structure "a kind of shield" or a wall of phalanx-troops.²⁰² The correlation between the *mise en abyme* of Achilles' Shield and the overall schema of the *Iliad* can be likened to Brumbaugh's claim that the structure of the *Republic* resembles a triangular temple-pediment "filled in by balancing figures of sculpture" with the "motif of religion and cosmic justice serv[ing] as an open-and-close bracket for the entire discussion".²⁰³

"After the prologue, the first book opens with the portrait of Cephalus, who enjoys and personifies the old age of a just man. Commentators have noted that the description of Socrates' aged host, seated on his throne-like chair, wearing garlands, is clearly meant to present a visual image to the reader, as indeed it does. Cephalus is wondering about the journey of the soul from life to death; the old myths he has heard take on a new vividness; yet he at least has good hope, since he has never treated god or man unjustly. The *Republic* ends, with the myth

¹⁹⁹ Becker (1995), 4.

²⁰⁰ Graff (1987), 53.

²⁰¹ Onians (1999), 21. On the correlation between the ekphrasis of Achilles' Shield and the overall schema of the *Iliad*, see Marg (1957) & Atchity (1978), 176. See also Atchity (1975), 5-6. See Becker (1995), 1-23 on ekphrasis and the *mise en abyme* with 87-150 for detailed commentary on the Shield of Achilles.

²⁰² Onians (1999), 21.

²⁰³ Brumbaugh (1967), 664.

of Er, in a philosophic poem brought by a messenger who recounts the return of the soul from death to life. If we are to pick visual symbols to represent this thematic balance, we might imagine our triangular pediment frame with Cephalus seated in the lower left, and the goddess Necessity seated on her throne in the lower right...[Then] we can visualize two more figures of our pediment: perhaps the good poet as teacher is one, the bad poet being exiled the other [and so on]".²⁰⁴

Brumbaugh's conception of the *Republic's* overall structure as a temple pediment's frieze occupied by a series of *agalmata* not only finds support as a valid reading by comparison to the Homeric precedent of the Shield of Achilles but it also is supported by internal evidence from within the text. It is very easy to imagine the eikastic (image-constructing) portions of the dialogue as scenes on a frieze many of which have an expressly 'agalmatic' or sculptural theme. Between the enthroned *agalma* of Cephalus created in Book 1 and that of Necessity in Book 10 one encounters several key frieze-scenes. In Book 2 the theme of the entire dialogue is established by Glaucon who verbally constructs two statues, one of the just man and the other the unjust (360e-361b)—the passage concludes with Socrates telling Glaucon that his discourse has robustly polished two statues and put them forth to be judged (ὃ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὡς ἐρρωμένως ἐκάτερον ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, 361d). Thus from the very outset the discourse is expressly said to involve 'setting up' (θέντες) an *agalma* of the unjust man and then placing next to that (παρ' αὐτὸν ἰστῶμεν) a likeness of the just so that they can be tested for justice (ἵνα ἢ βεβασανισμένος εἰς δικαιοσύνην, 361b-c).²⁰⁵

The whole dialogue is conceived of as an *agōn* wherein psycho-political *agalmata* are moulded and judged for their accuracy vis-à-vis the Good. It is hardly surprising then that the

²⁰⁴ Brumbaugh (1967), 664.

²⁰⁵ Petraki (2023), 112 rightly notes that the verb βασανίζω here is noteworthy as it establishes a typological to the likening of "the young guardians' exposure to fears (εἰς δειμάτα) and pleasures (εἰς ἡδονάς) with testing gold purity" in 413-414a and by extension to the Myth of Metals (414c-415c)

discourse itself should be structured as a frieze consisting of a series of images self-reflexively treating *eikonopoia*. In Book 3 the Myth of Gyges' Ring has his ancestor discover it on a cadaver within a hollow bronze horse (ἵππον χαλκοῦν, κοῖλον) and this scene sets up the typology of many of the subsequent scenes with its focus on metallurgy/*agalmatopoia*, the dichotomy between the limitations of visible flesh and the unlimited power granted by invisibility as well as the theme of *katabasis* (καταβῆναι, 359d).²⁰⁶ Those themes get taken up in the next tableau of Book 3 (the Myth of Metals) where the citizens of the ideal polity are convinced that they were moulded as metal statues under the earth by God Himself. The same themes of image-making, the visible vis-à-vis the invisible and *katabasis* also inform the main 'frieze-segment' of Book 7, the Allegory of the Cave. In Book 8 one encounters the complex geometric schema of the "Nuptial Number" wherein the breeding-cycles of microcosmic humans is correlated with the 'life-span' of the polity and the macrocosm.²⁰⁷ Then in Book 9 Socrates and Glaucon mould in speech (*logos*) an *eikōn* of the soul (εἰκόνα πλάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς λόγῳ) of a tyrant (588b-589a).²⁰⁸ This is done to gain insight into the psychological corruption of the tyrant himself but also by extension to understand the nature of that form of governance. Through examining the individual's psychology, the lack of Justice within the tyrant's soul, one comes to see the state of his city's collective 'soul' as well. Socrates commands Glaucon to first craft an image of a multiheaded beast similar to the Chimera, Cerberus and Scylla and to then plaster on this beast-image's exterior the likeness of a human such that, for him who is incapable of seeing interiorities, he sees only the outer

²⁰⁶ For the typological significance of the Myth of Gyges, see Laird (2001), 12-29 & Destrée (2012), 109-124. The theme of *katabasis* is particularly important given that it programmatically occurs in the very incipit of the Republic. On the programmatic quality of the *Republic's* opening words, see Clay (1992), 113-129 & Burnyeat (1997), 1-20.

²⁰⁷ On the Nuptial Number of R.8.546, see Taylor (1939), 23-38. Brumbaugh (1951) 343-345 not only treats the geometric schema of the Nuptial Number of Book 8 but also links it to the Divided Line, the tripartite soul and account of the different kinds of political rule (aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny). See Appendix.

²⁰⁸ For Plato's employment of sculptural typology in this scene, see Petraki (2011), 243-254. For the scene generally but without comment on its *agalmatopoia*, see Arruzza (2019).

shell an supposes that the *agalma* is just one *zōon*, a man (περίπλασον δὴ αὐτοῖς ἔξωθεν ἐνὸς εἰκόνα, τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε τῷ μὴ δυναμένῳ τὰ ἐντὸς ὄρᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξω μόνον ἔλυτρον ὄρᾶντι, ἐν ζῶον φαίνεσθαι, ἄνθρωπον).²⁰⁹ This follows on from a mathematical conception of the *eidōlon* (distorted image) of the tyrant’s pleasure being “by longitudinal mensuration a plane number” (τὸ εἶδωλον κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμὸν ἡδονῆς τυραννικῆς ἂν εἴη, 587d). Thus the tyrant’s soul is conceived of mathematically in order to frame it within the broader mathematico-geometric schema of Book that seeks to map out the ‘life-cycles’ of different modes of governance in terms of cyclical progressive degeneration.²¹⁰ Without dwelling too much on the details of this passage it is sufficient to consider Petraki’s summary: “the tyrant’s external appearance (called an εἶδωλον, 587d) hides a secret depth, which is invisible to everyone [and so] Socrates constructs a sculptural image (called an εἰκὼν, 588b) whose aim it is to lay bare the tyrant’s deceitful and monstrous nature”.²¹¹ The point here is that the

²⁰⁹ See Hes. T. 820-821 for Typhon as the archetypal multi-headed monster that fathered of Chimera and Cerberus. Tsagdis (2016) and Cairns (2017) both treat how this mythic image of the bestial monstrosity within man is incorporated into the political psychology of the Republic—‘theriopolitics’. The depiction of the tyrant as an anthropomorphic *agalma* on the exterior with a bestial *eikōn* hidden within can be contrasted with the portrayal of Socrates as the ideal statue in the *Symposium*. There Socrates is compared to the Silenus-idols that sit in the herm-factories (ἐν τοῖς ἑρμογλυφείοις) that, despite their ugly exterior, when opened, are unexpectedly revealed to contain inside images of the gods (οἱ δικάδε διοιχθέντες φαίνονται ἐνδοθεν ἀγάλματα ἔχοντες θεῶν, 215a-b). Thus even though he is ugly on the outside Socrates has divine *agalмата* within—so too his *logoi* when opened viewed from within possess far more good sense within than others do, are the most divine, containing as they do a great number of *agalματα* of virtue and always striving to the greatest degree over all other things to constitute a goal for those seeking to be noble and good (διοιγομένους δὲ ἰδὼν ἂν τις καὶ ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γινόμενος πρῶτον μὲν νοῦν ἔχοντας ἔνδον μόνους εὐρήσει τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα θειοτάτους καὶ πλεῖστα ἀγάλματ’ ἀρετῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντας καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τείνοντας, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὅσον προσήκει σκοπεῖν τῷ μέλλοντι καλῶ κάγαθῷ ἔσεσθαι, 222a). The point here is that not only does the portrayal of Socrates as a satyr-herm containing divine *agalματα* constitute a positive contrast to the tyrant-statue of Book 9 of the *Republic* but it also shows that even in a Middle Dialogue the typology of *agalmatopoiia* that is being explored in this dissertation was already quite well-developed—the Forms are *paradigmata* to be imitated by the philosopher who moulds himself in Their likeness, who becomes ‘pregnant’ with *agalματα* modelling Them. For treatments of Alcibiades’ epiphanic encounter with Socrates the satyr-herm ‘pregnant’ with *agalματα*, see Petraki (2023), 74-104, Nussbaum (1986), Steiner (1996), 89–111, Edmonds (2000), 261–285, Edmonds (2017), 194–216, Reeve (2007), 124–146, Sider (1980), 41-56, Anderson (1992), Capra (2016), 64–83, Capra (2017), 64–83, Clay (2000), Hunter (2004) & Sheffield (2006). For elements of statuary typology in Aristophanes’ myth of Sphere-men and in Diotima’s speech see Petraki (2023), 60-69.

²¹⁰ This tyrant-*agalma* is part of a much broader and complex *agalmatic* typology wherein the aristocratic king, the oligarch and the tyrant are all lined up and compared on a geometric scale. Adam (1902), 278-282 ilinks the facts that Socrates and Glaucon place the tyrant’s soul at distance of 729 from Justice to the τρίτη αὔξη in the geometric schema of 587d-e and 546b.

²¹¹ Petraki (2023), 155. See also Poetsch (2022), 391-416.

imagery and diction of the lost-wax technique of moulding sculptures is not only used in the penultimate book of the *Republic* to explore the psychology of a despot as a reflection of the deficiency of that mode of governance. On the contrary ‘virtual’ or ‘logographic’ *agalmatopoiia*, the creation of statues ‘in’ or ‘through’ words (*logoi*) is a dynamic that pervades the whole text of the *Republic* such that it is impossible to deny that, even if the overall structure of the text is not a temple pediment per se, it is at the very least a sculptural group—the series of eikastic *mythoi* scattered at key points in the discourse constitute a parade of agalmatic *eikones*.²¹² Indeed, roughly in the middle of the *Republic* in Book 6 one finds the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* passage (501b) where Homer’s conception of the divine as manifest in the ideal man and the idea that the ideal polity’s constitution should be conceived of as a painting or *agalma* that combines multiplicity into singularity and must be implanted into the body-soul compounds of citizens. The point in all this is that the text is a dialectic treatise on Justice as manifested symmetrically in both the ideal agalmatic polity and in the body-soul compound of the perfect statue-citizen within that city. It also treats the mythopoetic pedagogy required to sustain such a polity and to mould its citizenry into likeness of its agalmatic constitution. That subject-matter is very fittingly covered in a dialogue that is itself a temple pediment, a frieze comprised of a series of agalmatic scenes that treat the mimetic *poiēsis* of *eikonopoiia* in a self-aware manner. Further Chapter 2 of this dissertation will show that the Timaeian *eikōs* logos brings Socrates’ polity to life as a *zōon* (Ti.19b-c) by structuring it as an *agalma*—thus the frieze or statue-group mapping out the ideal political discourse gets condensed into an *eikōn* of the *theoeikelon-andreikelon*

²¹²In responding to Socrates’ description of the chimaera-*agalma* within the man-shaped statue Glaucon says that such a task will require a great moulder but luckily it can nonetheless be moulded successfully because word (*logos*) is more easily shaped even than wax (δεινού πλάστου, ἔφη, τὸ ἔργον ὅμως δέ, ἐπειδὴ εὐπλαστότερον κηροῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγος, πεπλάσθω, 588d). The plasticity of the spoken word/discourse (*logos*) and its capacity to construct images better than the demiurgic arts themselves is a major focus of the *Republic* that paves the way for the *eikonopoiia* of the Timaeian *eikōs* logos.

constitution mapped onto both the Divine Macrocosm and the ideal microcosmic man. Plato clearly imitates the Homeric Shield qua *mise en abyme* when choosing to structure the *Republic* as a replica of what it describes—it is a dialogue about philosopher-king *oikistai* acting as virtual sculptors (*andriantopoiioi*) and painters (*zōgraphoi*) in crafting a series of verbal images (*eikones*) in work that Plato frames overall as a frieze-pediment or statue-group.

The idea that the *Republic* and the *Timaeus* structurally resemble what they explore is very clearly indebted to and inspired by the Homeric Shield of Hephaestus which itself bears in its structure a shape of what it describes—it is a ring composition that resembles in its very structure both the circular shield and the round, cycling cosmos.²¹³ The framing of the *imago mundi* within the circular world-containing stream of Oceanus results in a round shield that microcosmically mirrors a circular world. Edwards states that “Okeanos...surrounds the pictures on the shield as he surrounds the flat disc of the earth on which men and women work out their lives”.²¹⁴ Becker sees Hephaestus’ Shield as being an example of *ekphrasis* and claims that “the correspondence between the outer ring of the shield and the river that encircles earth establishes a strong iconicity between the world represented and the depiction of that world on the shield”.²¹⁵ Though important in his function as the shield’s rim and the cosmos’ boundary, Oceanus is not necessarily the most important element in the text’s functioning as an *imago mundi*.

²¹³ Stanley (1993), 9-13.

²¹⁴ Edwards (1991), 231.

²¹⁵ Becker (1995), 148.


Ancient exegetes saw this part of the poem as being a κόσμος μίμημα, an imitation of the cosmos (*schol. ad Arat. Phaen.* 26) by virtue of the emphasis on circularity allegedly reflecting the sphericity of the cosmos (according to Heraclitus, *Allegories* 48.7 on *Il.* 18.485).²¹⁶ Rather than dismissing such post-Alexandrian readings as anachronisms it is important to note that modern scholars also emphasise the astronomical character of Hephaestus' Shield. All the major constellations are delineated on the shield (see 18. 485-489). Generally the text does quite clearly map the heliacal risings and cosmical settings of three important constellations, namely the Pleiades (383—387), Hyades and Orion (609—617) as well as Sirius (417—419) and Arcturus (564—567) over the course of May through to November, a period wherein the ploughing, sowing and reaping depicted in the text would have actually been conducted.²¹⁷ Ní Mheallaigh not only relates the Shield to the astronomically-determined ominous days for farming activity in Hesiod's *Works and Days* (765—828) but also goes so far as to claim that "the shield must be considered the ancestor of all later planetaria".²¹⁸ There is an obvious kinship between the Homeric Shield of Hephaestus as an early proto-planetary and Timaeus' own virtual armillary sphere. In a sense Timaeus' mythic cosmogony is simply an updated reworking of Homer's cosmographic *ekphrasis*.

²¹⁶ See also Porter (1992), 91-94 esp. n.70, Hardie (1985), 11-31 & Burtin (2000, 19-20).

²¹⁷ Phillips (1980), 179-180 & Hannah (1994).

²¹⁸ ní Mheallaigh (2020), 10

Despite its anachronistic (in Homeric terms) inclusion of the complete set of Zodiacal constellations, the following depiction of Achilles' Shield from Alexander Pope's translation conveys the idea of a star-dominated and all-encompassing *imago mundi* contained by Oceanus very well.²¹⁹



Timaeus' construction of the Visible All as a constellation-adorned armillary sphere connects the animation of Socrates' constitutional *diagraphē* as a *zōon* (19b-c) to Homeric poetry by virtue of the resemblance to the ekphrastic *diagraphē* of the star-ordered cosmos on Achilles' Shield. Homer the archetypal *poiētēs* and *nomopoiios-nomothētēs* provides a cosmographic *diagraphē* (ekphrastic description) of the Visible All in the *mise en abyme* of his *Iliad* and Timaeus achieves the same thing in his account of the Demiurge creating the Cosmotheos,

²¹⁹ See Farnham (1969), 1571-1581 for Pope's sources and his understanding of the passage. The image is found in Farnham (1969), 1578 and is sourced from the British library.

the Perfect Visible Animal containing all other visible animals just as the Paradigm contains all noetic ones (30c-d). Timaeus' depiction of the Demiurge's delineation of the mathematical and celestial structure of the Visible All serves as both a synoptic model of the whole cosmogony presented in the *eikōs mythos* as well as simultaneously being a sketch or outline of the heavenly constitution of Socrates' ideal polity. Critically this construction of a 'virtual armillary sphere' as both an ekphrastic *diagraphē* (description) of the cosmos and as a musico-mathematical sketch of the ideal polity's celestial constitution also constitutes a thematic link to the Panathenaic festival's central feature, the *peplos* offered to Athena, the polis' divine patroness.

Re-Working the Panathenaic Peplos: A New Ornament for a New Theology

Timaeus' *eikōs mythos* eclipsing Homer's Achilles' Shield as the new rhapsodic ekphrastic *diagraphē* showing how man's political life fits within the cosmic order of the All is to be interpreted against the dramatic and religio-cultural backdrop of the Panathenaic *peplos*. Just as the Athenians have offered a *poikilos kosmos* (an elaborate and variegated ornament) to Athena (the *peplos*), Timaeus has just begotten in words a living *eikōn* of the ultimate 'ornament' crafted by God Himself—the Cosmotheos (*Criti.* 106a).²²⁰ The *peplos* of the Panathenaia is very much a symbol of the traditional religious and political order which is being replaced by Socrates and Timaeus as they design the ideal polity and a new mode of

²²⁰ Timaeus alludes to the outer firmament adorned with constellational *zōa* as (the *diagraphē* of 55c) as a 'veritable adornment cunningly traced over the whole' (κόσμον ἀληθινὸν αὐτῷ πεποικιλμένον, 40a). Bury (1929), 84 n3 rightly notes there is a pun at play here that cannot be translated: the word *kosmos* is being used in the sense of both 'adornment' and of 'universe'. Cf. Pl. *Grg.* 507e-508a. Cf. Pindar Fr. 194 where that poet uses a very similar phrase (*poikilos kosmos*) in describing the golden 'building' founded for sacred songs, the 'embroidered' and 'variegated' adornment pronouncing *logoi* (κεκρότηται χρυσέα κρηπὶς ἱεραῖσιν ἀοιδᾶς / εἶα τευχίζωμεν ἤδη ποικίλον/ κόσμον αὐδάεντα λόγων). Ford (2002), 125 identifies this demiurgic dynamic in Pindar as "Simonidean" and points out that it is also found in Bacchylides who conceived of his poetry as capable of embodying a 'statue of glorious reputation' (*eukleias agalma*, 1.184), a "truly deathless *agalma* [that] combines motion, sound, activity, presence, joyful festivity and glory" (see 10.10-14). Cf. Pi.O.11.13-14: κόσμον ἐπὶ στεφάνῳ χρυσέας ἐλαίας ἀδυμελῆ κελαδήσω. Cf. also Pi.N. 3.31-32 & Pi.Mx.236e.

mythic *poēsis* suitable for the rearing of its agalmatic citizenry. Both the Panathenaic *peplos* and Homer's exemplification of 'zōgraphia in words' and divine demiurgy in his account of the Shield of Hephaestus provide the inspiration for Timaeus' new *pepoikilmenos kosmos*, the living, moving *eikōn* of the Visible Cosmotheos that he generates through his *logoi*.²²¹

The *poikilia* of the Panathenaic *peplos* depicting the gigantomachy and the similar myths verbally celebrated in that festival's rhapsodic *agōnes* were rejected by Socrates and banished from his ideal polity on account of the impiety promoted (γίγαντομαχίας τε μυθολογητέον αὐτοῖς καὶ ποικιλτέον, *R.2.378c-d*).²²² Instead, poets of the ideal polity must cling closely to the *typoi* set forth by Socrates for proper *logopoīia* (ποιητὰς ἐγγὺς τούτων ἀναγκαστέον λογοποιεῖν). Timaeus' crafting of a virtual armillary sphere is to be understood as an astronomer-rhapsode providing a new cosmographic image to replace the Panathenaic *peplos* and Homer's Shield as a more beautiful artefact of 'word-smithery' embodying a more accurate theology and a more compelling model for cosmomimetic political life. Timaeus' *logopoīia* accords with the theological *typoi* of Socrates' ideal polity unlike the *peplos* and Homer. Only Timaeus' cosmogonic prose-poem can accurately image the *theoiekelon-andreiekelon*. Only Timaeus' encomiastic hymn for the Panathenaea (*Ti.21a*) can weave a new civic *peplos* worthy of Socrates' ideal polity and accurately embodying its ethos and

²²¹ For the idea that a poem can be conceived as virtually embodying a demiurgic artefact, see *Pi.O.6-4* where the poem is conceived of as erecting golden columns to support the song-temple that is about to be constructed. On this dynamic see also Fränkel (1975), 430 n.97, Kurke (1991), 189-190 & Steiner (1993), 169-170.

²²¹ Nagy (2012), 273-293 links the variegated *poikilia* of *peplos*-weaving to the metallurgy of Hephaestus' shield-crafting not only on account of the use of the verb ποίκιλλε in *Il. 18.590* but also because of the connection between Athena Ergane (Hesychius s.v. ἐργαστῖναι: αἱ τὸν πέπλον ὑφαίνουσαι) and Hephaestus in the feast of the Chalkeia. Nagy also connects the Panathenaic *peplos* to Helen weaving the martial exploits (*athloi*) of horse-taming Trojans and bronze-cloaked Achaeans (Τρώων θ' ἵπποδάμων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων, *Il.3.125-128*) and to Andromache weaving floral motifs when she was informed of her husband's death (θρόνα ποικίλ' ἔπασσε, *Il.22.437-441*). See also Parke (1977), 92-93 on Hephaestus the χαλκεύς (*Il.15.309*).

²²² Cf. the similar criticisms of traditional depictions of intra-divine conflict in Xenophanes *Fr. 1. 19-22* (Bergk) & *Pi. O.9.41-42*.

theology.²²³ Not only did Hadot put forward this interpretation prior to the present dissertation when he asserted that Plato intended the *logoi* of the *Timaeus-Critias* to be conceived of as a virtual *peplos* but further this same understanding was expounded much earlier by the text's most important ancient exegete, Proclus.²²⁴ Nagy, citing the occurrence of *hymnos* alongside the word for mantle, φᾶρος, in *Od.* 8.429 as an example, claims that the Greeks were aware of the etymological connection between the word 'hymnos' and the art of weaving and conceived of The Panathenaic rhapsodes' "re-performance of Homer [as being] equated metaphorically with the re-weaving of the *Peplos*".²²⁵ The idea that the Panathenaic *peplos* was to be seen as an embodiment of the polity and its theology is found in the *Republic*.

In exploring the identification of the heaven-delineated constitution of the ideal polity with the Panathenaic *peplos* it will become apparent that the diction of *poikilia* is particularly prominent. *Poikilia* is not only a word referring to weaving but it also applies to ornate demiurgic creations generally and is often used with reference to the scintillation of the stars adorning the 'zodiacal tapestry' of Heaven. This latter point is important given that *Timaeus*

²²³ This notion that *Timaeus* is weaving a *peplos*-constitution finds support in Scheid and Svenbro (1994), Blondell (2005), 23-75, O'Meara (2017), 87-104 have all connected Plato's use of weaving imagery in his treatment of political theory in the *Statesman* to the Panathenaic *peplos*, arguing that Plato's political theory in that text was conceived of as constitution the virtual weaving of a new robe for his polity's patron-goddess. See also O'Meara (2017), 11-84 on the *Timaeus* specifically.

²²⁴ Hadot (1983), 117. Hadot was preceded by Proclus who interpreted Critias' story of the struggle between Palaeo-Athens and Atlantis as being offered as a *peplos* for the goddess--instead of showing her triumph as an Olympian against the Gigantes in an unsavoury tale about inter-divine warfare, it now shows her children, the divine citizens of Athens qua ideal polity crushing the hubristic Atlanteans who have forsaken their divine ancestry through sinful greed and decadence, Procl. *In Ti.* I.85.13 (Diehl). Procl. *In Ti.*, I.85.10 (Diehl) interprets Athena as the embodiment of the good order that descends from the Divine Intellect into the Cosmos, and the separation that prevents cosmic opposites from ever mixing, for Athena is both 'fond of wisdom and of war' (*Ti.* 24d: φιλοπόλεμός τε καὶ φιλόσοφος. Procl. *In Ti.*, I.134.27 (Diehl) sees the Panathenaean *peplos* depicting Athena and her father Zeus' triumph in their war against the Gigantes to be a much poorer rendition of the cosmic triumph of order over disorder than that woven by Plato's *Timaeus'* *eikōs mythos*.

²²⁵ Nagy (2002), 97. Cf. the etymological connection between the Latin word *textus* and the art of weaving in Nagy (1996), 65.

as *zōgraphos-poiētēs* paints out Socrates' heavenly *peplos*-city in his living *zōon-logos* which is just as much a *pepoikilmenos kosmos* as what it depicts and embodies is, namely Uranus-Cosmos (40a). When Socrates paints out his musico-mathematical schema unifying man and Cosmotheos in Book 8 of the *Republic* he expressly likens the most beautiful of political constitutions to an elaborate robe 'embroidered most beautifully with noble habits' as a garment would be with variegated floral motifs (καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι: ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον **ποικίλον** πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι **πεποικιλμένον**, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν **πεποικιλμένη** καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο, *R.* 8.557c).²²⁶ Socrates adds that women and children, upon seeing the variegated *poikilia* of such a constitution-robe would judge it most beautiful (ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες τε καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ ποικίλα θεώμενοι, καλλίστην ἂν πολλοὶ κρίνειαν). This is not the only reference to the Panathenaic *peplos* Socrates makes when 'painting out' his ideal constitution in the *Republic*. When putting forward his theological *typoi* guiding mythic poetry and religious art in the ideal polity Socrates says that the citizens must be taught to avoid civil conflict. This can only be achieved by avoiding the reciting or depicting (literally embroidering) of gigantomachies and other such hostilities among gods and heroes vis-à-vis their own relatives (πολλοῦ δεῖ γιγαντομαχίας τε μυθολογητέον αὐτοῖς καὶ **ποικιλτέον**, καὶ ἄλλας ἔχθρας πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων πρὸς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους αὐτῶν, 2.378c). Here too Socrates does not expressly name the Panathenaic *Peplos* per se but it is clearly the underlying referent. Shorey in his note on *R.*378b cites *Euthphr.* 6b as a relevant comparandum.²²⁷ So too Adam in commenting on *R.*378b-c cites *Euthphr.* 6b-c stating that ποικιλτέον "is probably a special reference here to the πέπλος at the greater, if not

²²⁶ LSJ s.v. ποικίλλω for the definition "work in various colours" and "work in embroidery" cites as an example the description of the Panathenaic *peplos* found in E. Hec. 466-474: ἡ Παλλάδος ἐν πόλει/τὰς καλλιδίφρους Ἀθαναίας/ ἐν κροκέῳ ἐν κροκέῳ πέπλω/ζεύξομαι ἄρα πώλους ἐν/**δαιδαλέαισι ποικίλλουσ'**/ἄνθοκρόκοισι πήναις, ἢ/Τιτάνων γενεᾶν/ τὰν Ζεὺς ἀμφιπύρω κοιμίζει/ φλογμῷ Κρονίδας. Note that in addition to the reference to floral variegation and *zōa* in motion (horses yoked to a chariot) Euripides' description of the titanomachic *peplos* uses the epithet 'Daedalian'. Daedalus' significance in the present discussion will be addressed soon.

²²⁷ Shorey (1937), 180-181.

also at the lesser, Panathenaic festival”.²²⁸ In the *Euthyphro* Socrates asks the eponymous religious expert (*exēgētes*) whether he thinks there truly was war between divinities (πόλεμον ἄρα ἡγῆ σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, *Euthphr.* 6b). In doing so Socrates alludes to the *peplos* that is full of *poikilmata* depicting such intra-divine conflict which is taken up to the acropolis during the Greater Panathenaea (τοῖς μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλμάτων ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, 6b-c). Socrates also alludes to similarly inaccurate depictions of the gods by the poets and by the great painters as well as the various artisanal *poikilmata* that adorn civic sanctuaries (ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν γραφέων τά τε ἄλλα ἱερὰ ἡμῖν καταπεποίκιλται).²²⁹ In all these Platonic passages alluding to the *peplos poikilia*-diction predominates. This is important as such diction is not simply demiurgic but also links artisanal intricacy and ornamentation to Heaven, an important connection given the heavenly nature of Socrates’ ideal political constitution (ἐν οὐρανῷ *R.* 9.592a).²³⁰

Socrates uses the word *poikilma* and its verbal form in reference to Heaven as a work of art that is a visible *eikōn* of purely invisible number (*R.* 7.529c-d):

ὦδε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ **ποικίλματα**, ἐπεὶ περ ἐν ὄρατῷ **πεποίκιλται**, κάλλιστα μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἀκριβέστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδεῖν, ἅς τὸ ὄν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὐσα βραδυτῆς ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι σχήμασι φοράς τε πρὸς ἀλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόητα φέρει, ἃ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοία ληπτά, ὄψει δ’ οὐ

²²⁸ Adam (1902) vol.1., 113 citing *R.* 2.373a-c as a comparandum. There painting (ζωγραφίαν) and embroidery (ποικιλίαν) as well as those who make adornments for women (τῶν περὶ τὸν γυναικεῖον κόσμον) are pooled together with all the other *mimētai*, the *poētai*, *rhapsodoi*, *hypokirtai* and *demiourgoi* generally. See also Mommsen (1898), 107 ff. For depiction on the Parthen frieze of the robing, see Baumeister (1888), 1185. Adam adds that “the allusion to the ceremony is the more appropriate in this connexion, if, as appears to be probable, the action of the dialogue takes place just before the great Panathenaea of 410 B.C.”.

²²⁹Cf. similar diction in *Hp. Ma.* 298a.

²³⁰ Cf. *E.* Hel. 1096 (ἀστέρων ποικίλματα) & Critias *Sisyphus* 33-34 (τό τ’ ἀστερωπὸν οὐρανοῦ δέμας/χρόνου καλὸν ποίκιλμα τέκτονος σοφοῦ). This latter fragment very clearly presumes a Demiurge-like figure (*tektōn*) and is *Timaeus*-like in that it understands Uranus and Chronos as not only identifiable to some degree but also as both equally being the *poikilma* (embroidery) of a Creator Deity.

Thus,” said I, “these **sparks that paint the sky, since they are decorations on a visible surface**, we must regard, to be sure, as the fairest and most exact of material things but we must recognize that they fall far short of the truth, the movements, namely, of real speed and real slowness in true number and in all true figures both in relation to one another and as vehicles of the things they carry and contain. These can be apprehended only by reason and thought, but not by sight; or do you think otherwise?”

Shorey in translating this passage cites *Ti.40a* as a comparandum and says that "the word *ποικίλματα* may further suggest here the complication of the movements in the heavens".²³¹

All of Timaeus' teachings on the rotational cognition of Heaven are implicit in the above passage as is the idea that the visible cosmos represents an invisible order through the intermediary of number which is conveyed to man by the movement of the celestial bodies. Thus given that the text of the *Republic* presents the same cosmology as the *Timaeus* and that the constitution which that latter text turns into a *zōgraphia* is identified with the numerical order and *nomos* underlying the *poikilmata* of Heaven, it makes sense that the Timaeian discourse performed during the Panathenaea would be conceived of as 'star-sprangled' *peplos*-votive offering.²³² Here Socrates differentiates between sight-based astronomy that pertains only to the celestial bodies as *gignomena* as opposed to 'true' or 'noetic' astronomy that is concerned with the Forms. Unlike visible astronomical phenomena Forms are perceivable only through use of *logos* (ratio and the dialectic discourse) and intellection (*dianoia*). Nonetheless sight-based astronomy can lead to contemplation of transcendent noetic realities through the intermediary of abstract number. Here the diction of *poikilia* is

²³¹ Shorey (1937), 182. Cf. *Pl. Lg.5.747*: πρὸς πάντα εἶναι χρησίμους τὰς τῶν ἀριθμῶν διανομὰς καὶ **ποικίσεις**, ὅσα τε αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς **ποικίλλονται** καὶ ὅσα ἐν μήκεσι καὶ ἐν βάθει **ποικίλματα** etc.

²³² *Epin. 977b* teaches that one should observe and follow the way God (expressly called Uranus-Cosmos) adorns Himself by turning the stars in Him so as to create the passages of the seasons and offer food (ἀκολουθεῖτω δὲ ὅπη ποικίλλων αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ στρέφων ἄστρα πάσας διεξόδους ὥρας τε καὶ τροφήν πᾶσιν παρέχεται). To this is added the conclusion that "thence, accordingly, we have understanding in general, we may say, and therewith all number, and all other good things: but the greatest of these is when, after receiving its gift of numbers, one has covered the whole circuit" (καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δὲ οὖν φρόνησιν, ὡς φαῖμεν ἄν, σὺν ἀριθμῶ παντί, καὶ τᾶλλ' ἀγαθὰ: τοῦτο δὲ μέγιστον, ἐάν τις τὴν ἀριθμῶν αὐτοῦ δόσιν δεξάμενος ἐπεξέλθῃ πᾶσαν τὴν περίοδον). The participle *ποικίλλων* used here to describe the way Uranus-Cosmos bestows number and adorns Himself by rotating the stars in His body has the implication that He is Himself a work of art, an embroidered tapestry, perpetually being woven by His own cognition.

used to hint at the fact that Heaven, the visible entity that links the ontological orders of Becoming and Being, is the product of an Intelligent Artisan. Indeed, as Sedley points out that, whilst in the ideal polity’s education system “true astronomy will be attained only when the empirical content has been altogether left behind”, the Visible Heaven’s embodiment of number and logic (rational, discursive) thought nonetheless shows “how the educational starting point for our souls’ self-advancement towards philosophy has been built into the very fabric of the world by its designer”.²³³ Philosophers are not to rely solely on their visual observation of the complex music-mathematical order imbued in the movement of the celestial bodies (*poikilia*) but rather are to make use of those stars and planets as one would geometrical diagrammata, the ‘paradigmata’ used by painters or sculptors such as Daedalus and by other such kinds of demiurges (τῆ περι τὸν οὐρανὸν ποικιλία παραδείγμασι χρηστέον τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα μαθήσεως ἕνεκα, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐντύχοι ὑπὸ Δαιδάλου ἢ τινος ἄλλου δημιουργοῦ ἢ γραφέως διαφερόντως γεγραμμένοις καὶ ἐκπεπονημένοις διαγράμμασιν, 529d-e). Socrates explains what he means by likening visual astronomy to such demiurgic diagrammata: “anyone acquainted with geometry who saw such designs would admit the beauty of the workmanship (ἀπεργασία), but would think it absurd to examine them seriously in the expectation of finding in them the absolute truth”. This term for the perfection of a demiurgic work, *apergasia* along with the allusion to the mythic sculptor who constructed living statues are highly significant. Further along in the discourse Glaucon uses this same verb when he calls Socrates a sculptor (*andriantopios*) who has crafted beautiful philosopher-kings into perfect living *agalmata* (παγκάλους, ἔφη, τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιὸς ἀπείργασαι, 540c). This is clearly a reference again to Daedalus of

²³³ Sedley (2019), 57 citing *Ti.*46e-47e & 39b-c.

whom Socrates considered himself a descendent.²³⁴ Beyond this kinship they both share the same quality of practising the unique type of demiurgy that begets living *agalmata-zōa*.²³⁵

The connection between Daedalus and the perfect astronomer-philosopher poet capable of bridging Being and Becoming (Timaeus) is that both, like Homer's divine demiurge par excellence (Hephaestus), can create artisanal products that are living *zōa* through their exceptional *poikilia*, their "cunning workmanship".²³⁶ The Homeric passage cited by the LSJ entry for the definition of the verb ποικίλλω as involving "cunning workmanship" is from the Shield Achilles—there the renowned lame Hephaestus is described as 'cunningly crafting' a depiction of a *choros*, a dancing floor (ἐν δὲ χορὸν ποικίλλε περικλυτὸς ἀμφιγυήεις, *Il.* 18.590), one which expressly said to have been designed by Daedalus (593). Mayor rightly sees the life-like motion captured in the shield as being quasi robotic, either mechanically moving or magically giving the impression that it is and thus comparable to the *phantasia* ("virtual reality") created through the works of the fourth-century artist Theon of Samos "which incorporated sounds, music and lights".²³⁷ Similarly Raphael sees the shield as an "artificial world complete with motion, sound and lifelike figures".²³⁸ If such 'robotic' interpretations of the shield seem strained it is important to recall that when Thetis comes to Hephaestus to commission him to forge armaments for her son she finds him at the anvil and

²³⁴Socrates in *Alc.* I. calls himself a descendent of Daedalus and by extension of Zeus in the context of humbly explaining his own and the eponymous interlocutor's lowly stock vis-à-vis such great ancient ancestors (121a). Daedalus was representative of an archaic artistic mode that was distinct from the then-recent innovations, see *Hp. Ma.* 282a.

²³⁵*Men.* 97d has Socrates explaining the relationship of *orthē doxa* to *true epistēmē* in terms of an animated statue that runs away instead of one that is stable, chained down. See also Pritchard (2014), 14. Similarly, *Euthphr.* 11c has Socrates claim descent from Daedalus.

²³⁶LSJ s.v. ποικίλλω. cites *Il.* 18.590 and Emp. Fr. B23.1 as examples of the usage of this verb in reference to "cunning workmanship". Emp. Fr. B 23.1 is of note because it parallels Timaeus' zōgraphic zoogony, see Appendix, Fig. 2.

²³⁷Mayor (2018), 131.

²³⁸Raphael (2015), 182.

forge attended to 'robotic' *agalma*-maidens that he himself has created (*Il.* 18.410–21). These servants despite being golden *agalanta* are expressly said to move about vigorously and appear to be like living maidens (ὑπὸ δ' ἀμφίπολοι ρώοντο ἄνακτι / χρύσειαι ζῶησι νεήνισιν εἰοικυῖαι). These golden maidens are said to have nous in their chests as well as a resounding voice and strength having been taught their craft from the immortal gods (τῆς ἐν μὲν νόος ἐστὶ μετὰ φρεσίν, ἐν δὲ καὶ αὐδὴ / καὶ σθένος, ἀθανάτων δὲ θεῶν ἄπο ἔργα ἴσασιν). Given then that Hephaestus was aided by robotic *agalmata* it is not at all unlikely that the shield too was 'robotic' and displayed moving *zōa* on its surface.²³⁹ Just as Hephaestus' Shield was likely conceived of as a Daedalian 'robotic' contraption with its *zōa* in perpetual motion the *logoi* of the *Timaeus-Critias* are to be conceived of as generating a cosmic 'puppet play' of moving *agalmata-zōa*.²⁴⁰ Homer's Hephaestus' Shield, the mechanic *poikilma*-microcosm that Timaeus is aspiring to eclipse through his own virtual demiurgy, is part of a broader

²³⁹ Much modern and ancient debate is centred on whether the motion of Hephaestus' Shield and his servants is due to magic or technical acumen but this seems like a false dichotomy with no substance. E.g Edwards (1991), 195: "[The golden servants'] movement, as well as their intelligence and speech, is of course the result of magic, not machinery". The bT scholiast on Hephaestus' tripods (*Il.* 18.373) believed Hephaestus obviously knew 'mechanics' (δῆλος δὲ ἐστὶν εἰδὼς μηχανικῆν) but Bosak-Schroeder (2016), 129 prefers 'magic' as the explanation and opines that "the bT scholiast has projected the technology of his own time onto the automata of Homer's time, transforming Hephaestus from a magician into a mechanic and the automatic tripods from magical creations into works of engineering". On the alleged magic-technē dichotomy here, see Berryman (2003), 344-369; Mayor (2018), 1–32; Devecka (2013): 52–69; Tybjerg (2003): 443–466; Jonhston (2008), 473-474; Faraone (1992), 18-35 & Steiner (2001)114ff & 79ff. For the comparison between Hesiod's Pandora and the golden robot-maidens of *Il.* 18, see Steiner (2001) 116–17. Mayor (2023) also links Pandora to Talos and the Trojan Horse qua automaton. For the typical conception of the horse vis-a-vis the view that it was a life-like robot, see Gantz (1993), 641-50.

²⁴⁰ Whilst *X.Smp.* 4.55 claims νευρόσπαστα are used only for the entertainment of dullards (τοῖς ἄφροσιν) Skotheim (2022), 3-4 makes the case that puppetry played a highly esteemed role in the context of "religious festivals". In *Lg.* 644d–645c & 803c–804c humans are conceived of as divine *thaumata* (puppets) systematically assembled by the gods either in playful jest or in seriousness (θαῦμα μὲν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἠγησώμεθα τῶν ζώων θεῶν, εἴτε ὡς παίγνιον ἐκείνων εἴτε ὡς σπουδῆ τι συνεστηκός). The word used for these puppets here, *thauma*, is the same as that used in the Allegory of the Cave, *R.* 7.514b. Lightfoot (2021), 174-198 has provided an excellent novel interpretation of the Allegory of the Cave in light of a much broader typology of philosophy as *thaumatopoiia/thaumatourgia*. For the *thauma*-puppet and the modern debate surrounding the precise mechanical operation of these puppets, see Schöpsdau (1994), 237 and Schofield (2016), 135–140. On the use of *paignion*, see Jouët-Pastré (2006) & Frede (2010), 116. Annas (2011), 8 opines that Plato's *thaumata* of the gods are not puppets on strings but rather mechanically complex wind-up toys or automata. On this 'robotic' interpretation, see Berryman (2010), Nussbaum (1976), 148 & Bobonich (2002), 266. For the interpretation that sees the *thaumata* as *neurospasta*, see Moore (2014), 115, Schofield (2016), 135–136, Herzog-Hanser (1936), 161-163, Schröder (1983), 1-14. See also *Hdt.* 2.48.2.

typology of “mythical inventors (and gifted craftsmen) of metallurgy such as Telchines of Rhodes, the Idaean Dactyls in Crete, Talos the Bronze Man, Daedalus and others” such as Epeius whose Trojan Horse was considered an automaton by some in antiquity.²⁴¹ Of all such figures Daedalus is particularly important as he is Socrates’ ancestor. Socrates’ kinship to that archetypal *agalmatopoiōs* of living statues is an excellent point on which to finish this chapter of the dissertation for the next one deals how the *eikōs logos* itself embodies in its structure a living *agalma*.²⁴²

Chapter One Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the Timaeian *nomos* functions simultaneously as musical composition, legal enactment, and divine revelation. The dual meaning of *nomos* as both 'melody' and 'law' is not merely a play on words but reflects the deep structure of Platonic cosmology and politics. Just as the Demiurge orders the cosmos through mathematical harmony, so too must the ideal polity be structured according to these same divine ratios. The following chapter of this dissertation will build on what has been established here about *zōgraphia* in the *Timaeus-Republic* by exploring the ‘agalmatopoetic’ dynamic through which the constitutional *diagraphē* laid out in the ratios of Heaven’s *phronēsis* is used to mould citizens as statues (*agalmata*) so as to render them likeness (*eikones*) of the *theoeikelon andreikelon*. It will be shown how it is exactly that Socrates and Timaeus work in tandem together as *zōgraphoi-agalmatopoiōi* to mould and paint the ‘virtual’ citizens of the ideal polity which they are generating in ‘deed’ (*ergon*) through their words (*logoi*). This chapter has started to show how this process of moulding the citizens of the ideal polity into *theoeikela andreikela* is achieved by examining Socrates’ establishment of a mythic

²⁴¹ Kokolakis (1981) 106.

²⁴² Cf. *Men.*97c-98a for *logoi* being likened to Daedalus’ moving statues.

education-system and an uranomimetic breeding-program for the *agalma*-citizens of the ideal polity whereby the rhythms of their lives are integrated as perfectly as possible into the cycles of the Divine Macrocosm. Having established here in Chapter One how the ideal polity and its citizens are brought into harmony with the musico-mathematical order of Uranus-Chronos now it remains to show how it is exactly that this ‘Dorian strain’ used by the Macrocosmic Demiurge to combat disorder and used by Socrates the microcosmic demiurge to paint the perfect constitution is then used by Timaeus the *poiētēs-agalmatopoiōs* to structure a perfectly-proportioned *logos* capable of moulding its hearers/readers into God-like *agalmata, theoeikela andreikela*.

Chapter Two: *Logos* and *Cosmos* as *Agalma*

Chapter Two Introduction

Chapter Two of this dissertation will examine the Timaeian discourse as a unique instance of logographic *agalmatopoiia* in the Platonic corpus. *Logographia* refers to the art of speech-writing and so the phrase ‘logographic *agalmatopoiia*’ denotes the idea that Timaeus’ *eikōs logos* is designed in such a way that the structure of the discourse resembles that of an anthropomorphic statue (*agalma*).²⁴³ The adjective *eikōs* in the phrase ‘*eikōs logos*’ will be understood as being intimately related to the word *eikōn* such that it means ‘image-producing discourse’ just as much as it does ‘likely account’. Admittedly the Timaeian discourse is just as much logographic *zōgraphia* as it is *agalmatopoiia* for, as was seen in the prior chapter, the key term *theoiekelon andreieklon* involves painting just as much as it does sculpture. Indeed, the way the Timaeian discourse bears the proportions of the ideal human body could just as much render it a *zōgraphia* of the perfect warrior-citizen as it could an *agalma*. Both *zōgraphia* and *agalmatopoiia* apply for a painting or sketch (*graphē*) first needs to be mapped out before the sculpture can produce his *agalma* and then a *zōgraphos* must colour it with life-like hue. At any rate this hypothesis concerning the anthropomorphic structure of the Timaeian discourse will be vindicated by mapping the thematic content of the *eikōs logos* onto Polyclitus’ Doryphorus, that famed sculptor’s statue of a spear-wielding warrior that was widely held to embody the proportions of the perfect man.²⁴⁴ The phases of Timaeus’ cosmogonic narrative and the proportional sectors of the *logos* spent treating them will be

²⁴³ See LSJ s.v. λογογραφία with Pl. *Phdr.* 257e, 258b. Cf. also Pl. *Phdr.* 264b: ἡ λογογραφική (sc. τέχνη) & *Poll.* 2.121: ἡ λογογραφικὴ ἰδέα.

²⁴⁴ In fact, the widely known phrase ‘Polyclitus’ Canon’ probably refers just as much to the famed sculptor’s written treatise on the proportions of the ideal human body as it does to the particular sculpture he produced as a practical demonstration of that theorisation, namely the Doryphorus. Cf. Borbein (2019), 32 and Papadopoulos (2019), 61 who instead argue that the Canon can only refer to the mathematical abstraction and the text but not the ideal sculpture itself.

shown to positionally and functionally correlate with particular corresponding microcosmic equivalents within the bodily frame of the ideal man. This is difficult to imagine in the abstract and so will be achieved through use of diagrams.

At any rate, after the contents of the *eikōs logos* have been mapped out onto the Doryphorus and shown to be a perfect match attention will briefly turn away from a close reading of the *Timaeus* in order to consider how Plato's conception of logographic *agalmatopoiia* was influenced by developments in the art of sculpture and by contemporary trends in the broader intellectual culture dealing with the mathematical idealisation of the human body. Such 'extra-textual' contextualisation will prove fruitful as it will confirm that the hypothesis concerning the 'agalmatomorphic' (statue-shaped) structure of the Timaeian discourse is not simply an arbitrary or superimposition on the text nor an over-interpretation but rather is actually quite a natural result of reading the *Timaeus* within the framework of its cultural context, both in terms of material and intellectual culture.

The Timaeian *Logos* as Polyclitus' Doryphorus

This chapter of the dissertation is heavily indebted to Brague who first put forward the interpretation of the Timaeian monologue as having an anthropomorphic shape and being structured according to the proportions of the Polyclitus' Doryphorus.²⁴⁵ Nonetheless despite being heavily indebted to Brague this dissertation goes much further than he did for beyond merely exploring the Timaeian discourse's 'agalmatomorphism' (its statue-shaped structure) it will tie this logographic feature to a much broader typology of *eikonopoiia* spanning both the

²⁴⁵ Brague (1985), 58-83.

Timaeus and *Republic*.²⁴⁶ The Timaeian discourse's agalmatomorphism will be linked to concepts explored in the prior chapter that Brague did not factor into his interpretation. The notion that the discourse bears the shape of an *agalma* takes on new meaning when viewed in light of the prior chapter's examination of Timaeus as a rhapsodic *poiētēs* conforming with the theological *typoi* established by Socrates in the *Republic* (2.379a). Indeed it should be recalled that the mothers and nurses of the ideal polity are said to mould young *agalma*-citizens (*R.2.377c*) into likenesses of the *theoikelon andreikelon* using myths that accord with Socrates *typoi*. Thus, when Brague's hypothesis concerning the agalmatic structure of the *eikōs logos* is combined with the prior dissertation-chapter's typology of shaping young *agalma*-men through use of the theological *typos* (mould) set up by Socrates' *theoikelon-andreikelon* constitution it becomes apparent that the Timaeian discourse itself is that very mould—it is the exemplary myth for producing agalmatic warrior-citizens because it bears that very shape. Further, it is also worth noting that given that Timaeus depicts the Demiurge as begetting the Visible Cosmotheos as a 'living statue' of the eternal/invisible gods, the Forms (*Ti. 37c: zōn agalma tōn aidiōn theōn*) his shaping of Socrates' polity's citizens into *theoikela andreikela* through his own statue-shaped *logos* serves to frame him as a microcosmic imitator of God the macrocosmic *agalmatopios*. Indeed, the Demiurge shapes the Visible All into an *agalma* and both Socrates and Timaeus subsequently act as microcosmic *agalmatopioi* in imitating Him—the former creates the *theoikelon-andreikelon* constitution and the latter the perfect statue-shaped *logos* that can act as a 'mould' in which the *agalma*-men of the ideal polity can be moulded into likenesses (*eikones*) of the Divine Macrocosm.

²⁴⁶ Eikonopoiia is not a term used by Plato himself but rather it is found in a late-antique Platonist, *Dam.Pr.* 341.

At any rate Brague interprets the Timaeon monologue as a response to Socrates' desire voiced in *Ti.* 19b-c in light of Plato's Socrates' teaching in *Phaedrus* 264c that a written discourse (*logos*) should be well proportioned and fully articulated like a *zōon* with feet and a head.²⁴⁷ As Brague notes, this teaching of *Phaedrus* 264c exploits the bivalence of the verb *graphein* and the noun *zōon* that can refer to both writing and painting and to an animal as well as a painting of one respectively—this semantic ambiguity allows for identification of a written description of an animal and graphic *eikōn* of one with the living creature provided the model-animal's harmonious proportions are accurately reproduced in the structure words or the imagistic likeness.²⁴⁸ It is of note that there is another lexical multivalence that is relevant here, namely the word *logos* which means single word, a discourse qua unified whole consisting of many words, an argument or reason and, significantly, a proportional ratio hence *ana logon*, analogous).²⁴⁹ All of these meanings are relevant for they all coincide in the Timaeon discourse (*logos*). The discourse (*logos*) is a unified whole comprised of words (*logoi*) arranged according to proportional ratios (*logoi*) all of which serves to subconsciously advance a particular reasoned argument (*logos*). That singular argument (*logos*) implicit throughout the whole eikastic discourse (*eikōs logos*) is as follows: since the Demiurge created the Cosmotheos as the perfect visible *zōon* modelled on the perfect invisible/noetic animal (the Paradigm), the entire world was produced through an inherently *zōgraphic* process and thus any human discourse describing/depicting cosmogony must also be a *zōgraphia* of sorts.²⁵⁰ The Demiurge is an eikastic artist Who produces the All as a likeness (*eikōn*) of the Paradigm, the *onta*, accessed only through *noēsis*. Analogously the human

²⁴⁷ Brague (1985), 53-55.

²⁴⁸ Brague (1985), 54. For the dual meaning of *graphein* as drawing/painting and writing, see *Phdr.* 275d.

²⁴⁹ LSJ s.v. λόγος. See Pleshkov (2017), 128-140 for a treatment of the analogism of *logos* (speech) and the universe in terms not only of reduction to constituent elements but also holism vis-à-vis the Paradigm.

²⁵⁰ For both the Cosmotheos and Paradigm as *zōa*, see *Ti.* 30c-d, 31a-b, 32d, 33a-b, 37d, 39d-e. Cf. Brague (1985), 56: "the structure of the speech will have to correspond to the structure of its object – the world as an animal".

cosmogonic logographer must imitate Him by acting as a *zōgraphos* endowing the qualities of the Model to his verbal-image creations. This is the same dynamic at play in the *Republic* where the city-founding *zōgraphoi* imbue their citizenry with the qualities of the *theoeikelon andreikelon* through their *logoi* that bear the imprint of the Forms which they contemplate in drawing inspiration (*R.6.501a-c*).

Brague understands the Timaeian *logos* as embodying a ζῶον ζῶου, a painted animal depicting the perfect visible living *zōon*, the Theocosmos, Who was modelled upon the Paradigm, the Perfect Invisible, Noetic *Zōon* and adds that “the structure of the speech will have to correspond to the structure of its object – the world as an animal”.²⁵¹ According to Brague the proportions of the discourse’s body as a *zōon* correspond to those of Polyclitus’ Doryphorus, an *agalma* of a spear-wielding warrior. Brague is not the first scholar to make the connection between the *Timaeus* and the sculptor Polyclitus for the Francophone scholar Picard already argued that the parallelism between the human head and Heaven in *Ti.44d* is to be viewed against the backdrop of the canon of Polyclitus and the study of human form vis-à-vis the whole of nature, a trend that arose in the 5th century and influenced the fourth.²⁵² The idea that a *logos* is ‘shaped’ to correlate with the thing it describes is not altogether foreign in the ancient world. Book 15 of the *Anthologia Graeca* contains “technopaegnia”, works whose very shape mimics the object which is the poem’s title.²⁵³ Brague, using Burnet’s (B) and Rivaud’s (R) editions, counted the numbers of lines contained in two portions of Timaeian’s *logos*, the first sector being significantly smaller, namely the early part of the speech before

²⁵¹ Brague (1985), 56.

²⁵² Picard (1939), 261.

²⁵³ See Wilamowitz (1899), 51-59 for Hellenistic technopaegnia, epigrammatic poems that bear the shape of what they describe, e.g. Pan’s syrinx by Theocritus, Vestinus’ and Doaiades’ altar and Simias the Rhodian’s Labrys, Eros’ Wings and his Swallow’s Egg. So too the Biblical Book of Proverbs is structured in such a way as to embody the structure of the “seven pillars” described as supporting the ‘House of Wisdom’ (Prov.9:1): See Skeban (1967), 468-486.

the introduction of Necessity wherein only Reason is treated and the rest of the work forms the second much larger portion.²⁵⁴ The first section is 631 (B) or 665 (R) lines long and the second sector is 1640 (B) or 1710 (R) lines long, a set of numbers that, in terms of ratios of proportionality, correlate exactly with the lengths of the head and torso of Polyclitus' Doryphorus statue as ascertained from surviving replicas of the original.²⁵⁵ His theory rests upon an understanding of the physicality of the papyrus rolls of Plato's era as opposed to codices of later times as the ancient scrolls allowed for "the proportions of the *Timaeus* [to] be ascertained with a high rate of precision...whether...on a very long single roll or more likely, on two shorter ones" because the text was structured "in columns with the same number of lines, each of these lines containing roughly the same amount of letters".²⁵⁶ When this understanding of the text's structure is mapped on to Polyclitus' Doryphorus the end-product is very persuasive not only due to the correspondence between the content of the discourse and the relevant sector of the human body but also with the functionally equivalent social classes (philosopher-kings, *phylakes*, producers) in the tripartite body politic of Socrates' ideal polity.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴ Bague (1985), 66, n33.


²⁵⁵ Bague (1985), 66 n33.

²⁵⁶ Bague (1985), 66 with Hunger (1975), 43 & Kenyon (1951), 56, 64.

²⁵⁷ Much of what follows is heavily indebted to Bague (1985), 82. The image below of the Doryphorus is sourced from Fig.1 in Babich (2006), 3. It is a modern reconstruction. Credit for the photograph: Foto Marbu/Art Resource, NY.

Before mapping the three-way correspondences between the tripartite structure of the discourse, of man's body-soul compound and of the city's class-structure it will be helpful to first display these equivalences in a table:

<u>Part of the Timaeon <i>Logos</i></u>	<u>Part of Body-Soul Compound</u>	<u>Class within Ideal Polity</u>
4. The Role of Reason	2. The Intellective <i>Nous</i>	1.The Intellective Philosopher-Kings
5. The Role of Necessity	2. The forceful <i>Thymos</i>	2.The militant <i>Phylakes</i>
6. The Co-operation of Reason and Necessity	3. The rebellious and appetitive <i>Epithymētikon</i>	3.The rowdy and desirous <i>Dēmiourgoi/Geōrgoi</i>



Cephalic *Nous*-Soul & Philosopher Kings (29d-47e)

The first section of the tripartite monologue which focuses on Reason or *Nous* the Demiurge's role in ordering and ruling the cosmos (29d-47e) symbolically corresponds with both the cephalic *nous*-soul that plays the governing role within the microcosm of man and with the class of the philosopher-kings which plays that same role in Socrates' ideal polity. Just as *Nous* the Demiurge orders the All through His intellection so too man's microcosm is ordered by his *nous* and the body politic is managed by the intellectual class, the philosopher-kings. The focus on astronomy and the rotations of the *Anima Mundi* is suggestive of the human head wherein Heaven-imitating rotational cognition (*phronēsis*) occurs.

***Thymos* of the Thorax & *Phylakes* (47e-69a)**

The second section dealing with the works of Necessity (47e-69a) corresponds positionally and functionally with the spirited *thymos* of the midriff that forcefully imposes order upon the appetitive *epithymētikon* on behalf of the *nous*, the governing principle. Thus, in terms of the ideal polity, this section symbolises the *phylakes* who, on behalf of the *nous*-like philosopher-kings, impose order upon and regulate the otherwise unruly lower class comprised of *demiourgoi* and *georgoi* who are the equivalent of the appetitive *epithymētikon* in the body politic.

The *Epithymētikon* of the Lower Torso & the Lower Class 69a-92c

The last of the three sections of the tripartite monologue that deals with the co-operation of Reason and Necessity (69a-92c) corresponds symbolically with the *epithymētikon* in the body-soul compound of man and with the class of the *demiourgoi* and *georgoi* in the ideal polity. This section of the *logos* focuses almost exclusively on human anatomy including the respiratory, circulatory, and digestive systems (77c-81e) which serve to keep the whole human organism or *zōon* in a state of bodily cohesion. In an analogous manner the class of farmers and craftsmen does the mundane but necessary work of clothing, feeding and housing the citizenry and thus upholding the 'health' and cohesion of the body politic (cf. R.371e-372b).

Here in the above diagrams the divisions of Timaeus' threefold discourse (the first narrative cycle treats Reason, the second Necessity and the third the co-operation of them both) are shown to correspond with the tripartite human body-soul compound (*nous*, *thymos* and the *epithymētikon*) and the three-tiered class system of Socrates' ideal polity (philosopher-kings, *phylakes* and *dēmiourgoi/geōrgoi*). The three-way correspondence of those three trios can be mapped onto the proportions of Polyclitius' Doryphorus so well that it can be presumed that this was Plato's intention in structuring the *logos* in the way he did so that he could produce the perfect *zōon-logos*.

By building his virtual *eikōn* of the Cosmotheos as an *agalma* of a divinised human whole tripartite body-soul compound has been optimally harmonised Timaeus conveys a deep point about the analogism linking microcosmic man, mesocosmic polity and the Divine Macrocosm. By laying the three-tiered structure of the ideal polity's social hierarchy over the individual citizen's tripartite body-soul compound and connecting both with the dynamics at play in the Visible Cosmotheos Timaeus conveys through the proportional structure of his *logos* the idea that man, polity and Divine Macrocosm function as analogous sets of interior harmonies. Just as roles are assigned in a play and each must fulfil a particular part, so too in the super-organism of the ideal polity each *agalma*-man must perform his particular function. Likewise in the individual human, each of the three parts of the body-soul compound must perform its role without burdening the overall balance and interfering with the division of powers. The same applies too in the case of the body of the Visible Cosmotheos which the Demiurge makes unageing and not subject to illness due to the perfect holism achieved by the balancing of elemental constituents as distinct wholes—healthy harmony consists of formulating unity out of multiplicity (*Ti.33a: τόνδε ἕνα ὅλον ὅλων ἐξ ἀπάντων τέλειον καὶ ἀγήρων καὶ ἄνοσον αὐτὸν ἐτεκτήνατο*). The analogism between Socrates' philosopher-king *oikistai* and the Timaeian Demiurge in their synthesising of singular wholes out of multiplicities through harmonisation can be understood in terms of the politogonic principle of 'Justice' as defined in the *Republic*. It may seem odd that 'Justice' should be the means by

which a singular body politic is formed out of a multiplicity of citizens but it is important to appreciate that Socrates defines this term in a very particular way.

Socrates' definition of justice is centred on the relationship of the part to the whole, the citizen's role in the body-politic. He defines Justice in the following way: "to do one's own business and not to be a busybody is justice" (τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ, *R.* 433a).²⁵⁸ This was the principle which, as was agreed upon from the beginning of the discourse, is to be always upheld when founding the ideal polity (ὁ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐθέμεθα δεῖν ποιεῖν διὰ παντός, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατακίζομεν) In *R.* 368c-369a Socrates frames his inquiry into what constitutes justice in terms of a dichotomy between the grand scale of the polity and the small scale of the individual's body-soul compound and teaches that there is analogism or equivalency between the two scales, that justice and injustice will have the same contours in the polis as it will within the citizen.²⁵⁹ He famously paints out this conception through the following eikastic image: "if we, with not very keen vision, were bidden to read small letters from a distance, and then someone had observed that these same letters exist elsewhere larger and on a larger surface, we should have accounted it a godsend, I fancy, to be allowed to read those letters first, and examine the smaller, if they are the same" (οἶανπερ ἂν εἰ προσέταξέ τις γράμματα σμικρὰ πόρρωθεν ἀναγνῶναι μὴ πάνυ ὀξὺ βλέπουσιν, ἔπειτά τις ἐνενόησεν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ γράμματα ἔστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι μείζω τε καὶ ἐν μείζονι,

²⁵⁸ Cf. *R.* 443c-d, 370b-c, 394e, 374a-d, *Lg.* 846d-847b. cf. *Chrm.* 161b.

²⁵⁹ This analogism has been assessed a great deal already in modern scholarship. See Blössner (2007), 345-385; Waterfield (1993), 152; Annas (1999), 72-95; Uebersax (2016), 108-109; Evrigenis (2002), 590-610; Hall (1959), 149-158; Smith (1999), 31-49; Neu, (1971), 238-254; Bluck (1959), 166-168; Barker (1959), 68; Ferrari (2003); Cairns (2017), 222. Cf. McCabe (2020), 287: "recall the difficulty about the parts of the tripartite soul—they are either inexplicably simple or themselves complex wholes: homunculi. If whole souls are collections of homunculi (and so are the homunculi), they degenerate into hopeless generosity". Bobonich (2002), 219–223 also emphasises autonomy of each of the tripartite components which he calls "agent-like parts". Similarly Barney, Brennan & Brittain (2012), 3 conceive of the components of the tripartite soul as "robustly agent-like individuals". For the potential for infinite regress in this model, see Gerson (2003) and Brown (2012).

ἔρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη οἶμαι ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον ἀναγνόντας οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ ἐλάττω, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, 368d). Here Socrates likens ‘justice’ at the small scale within man and that on the larger scale of the body-politic to the same text produced in different size fonts on different sized surfaces arguing that balancing of multiple constituents within a harmonised compound is easier to observe when magnified in scale. Socrates says that there are two kinds of Justice, that of one man, and that of a whole polity (δικαιοσύνη...ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρὸς ἑνός, ἔστι δέ που καὶ ὅλης πόλεως) and since the polis is larger than a single man (μειζὸν πόλις ἑνός ἀνδρός) there is more Justice therein making It easier to observe and understand (πλείων ἂν δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῷ μείζονι ἐνεῖη καὶ ῥάων καταμαθεῖν, 368e).²⁶⁰ Similarly Socrates teaches that one can only come to a correct psychological assessment of a man or a polis through holism: “if one knows how to observe a soul in its entirety” (ἐάν τις ὅλην ψυχὴν ἐπίστηται θεάσασθαι, *R.579e*). The point here is that Plato’s Socrates is teaching an epistemology of holism which presumes that one must first correctly perceive the nature of the whole in order to understand the character and teleological function of its constituents properly. Plato’s conception of ‘Justice’ is essentially ‘soteriological’ in the specific sense of being concerned with perpetually preserving maximal harmony and health in the individual’s body-soul compound and the polity at large. Socrates identifies Justice as both initially shaping citizens and the polity and then subsequently maintaining : “I think that this [Justice] is the remaining virtue in the state after our consideration of soberness, courage, and intelligence, a quality which made it possible for them all to grow up in the body politic and which when they have sprung up **preserves** them as long as it is present” (δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἐν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα, σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φρονήσεως, τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνοις τὴν δύναμιν παρέσχεν ὥστε ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ἐγγενομένοις γε **σωτηρίαν** παρέχειν, ἐνῆ, 433c). Thus Justice in Socrates’ ideal polity carries the sense of each constituent doing its designated

²⁶⁰ Cf. Arist. *E.N.*1094b10.

part in service of the whole is ‘soteriological’ in a manner analogous to how, as was shown earlier, Timaeus articulates a view of proportional balance in the body-soul compound of both microcosmic man and the Divine Macrocosm as vital for preservation, for salvation of both (*sōteria*). Further Socrates conceives of the truly ideal polity as ‘healthy’ and contrasts it with the disfunctional one that he calls ‘inflamed’ (ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀληθινὴ πόλις δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἥν διεληλύθαμεν, ὥσπερ ὑγίης τις: εἰ δ’ αὖ βούλεσθε, καὶ φλεγμαίνουσιν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν, *R.372e*). Thus the ideal body-politic is seen as embodying healthy balance whereas the medical imagery of swelling due to infection or disease is used to eikastically depict the state’s disorder (injustice), the failure of the constituent parts systematically comprising the whole organism to fulfil their respective subsidiary functions.

Socrates, upon mandating the demotion to a lower class of inept Phylakes incapable of performing the key task of ensuring that the polis is neither too small nor too large and does not lose her self-sufficiency and unity, adds that “the other citizens too must be sent to the task for which their natures were fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them fulfilling his own function may be not many men, but one, and so the entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a unity” (καὶ οὕτω δὴ σύμπεσσα ἡ πόλις μία **φύηται** ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλάι, 4.423c-d). As Adam puts it, "the reciprocity of services and functions between the three classes is the very foundation of Plato's city, which is far from being an undifferentiated unity" for "it is rather a ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν, the πολλά being the three divisions of the State".²⁶¹ Shorey and Adam both note the significance of the verb φύηται here pertaining to “natural growth, not an artificial contrivance” thus implying that the development of a singular body-politic out of many individuals is an organic development, the growth (*physis*) or begetting


²⁶¹ Adam (1902), vol. 1, 213

(*genesis*) of a systatically composed *zōon*, as it were.²⁶² Popper sees Plato's ideal polity as a 'super-individual', for "he describes the state not in a general way as similar to some organism or other, but as analogous to the human individual".²⁶³ That it is specifically the body-soul compound of man that best images the perfectly-composed polity accords well with the fact that Timaeus presents the interior, organic harmony of microcosmic man as the *eikōn* or *agalma* that best displays God's structuring of the Macrocosm at a smaller scale. Both the mesocosmic polity and the body-soul compound of microcosmic man imitate the Macrocosm and they both cohere by seeking to emulate harmonisation and unification of multiplicity observed in the Cosmotheos. The Divine Macrocosm, the ideal mesocosmic polity and the well-ordered, God-like (*theoikelos*) human individual are alike in so far as they are all singularities made up of harmonised multiplicities that cohere together through Justice, that is, through each constituent part within the whole playing its designated role properly.

The harmonisation and unification of the multifarious functionalities within both the the body-soul compound of both microcosmic man and the Divine Macrocosm is evident in the diagram below:

²⁶² Shorey (1937), 329. See also *ibid.*

²⁶³ Popper (1962), 76.



When conceptually correlated with the anatomy of man, Timaeus' presentation of his intellectual presuppositions concerning Nous the Demiurge and his account of the Anima Mundi (27c-36d) corresponds positionally and functionally with the brain.

The position of the eyes and the palate (*ouraniskos*) corresponds with the account of the Demiurge's creation of Uranus-Cosmos (36d-39e).

The position of the mouth corresponds with the Demiurge's speeches at 41a-d and 41e-42d.

The discussion of the disintegration and shifting about of the elements at 56c-57c, of the circulatory system at 57d-58c and of fire at 58c-59a corresponds well with the position of the heart, the guard-house of the *phylax*-like *thymos* as it were.

The account at 81c-e of how the human body deteriorates over time through aging which eventually leads to death corresponds with the position of the navel, a symbol of mortality.

At 81c-89d various kinds of sicknesses and their treatments are examined. This section corresponds positionally with the lower belly, a locus of both peptic disturbances and of regeneration through nutrition.

The treatment of sexual differentiation and reproduction as well as zoogony, all of which occurs in the context of discussing down-grading reincarnations, occurs at 90e-92c the position corresponding to that of the genitalia.

At the border between the second and third parts of the monologue (68e) Timaeus distinguishes between two types of causation—the divine and necessary. This is followed at 71a-72d by a detailed account of the liver. As such this section (68e-72d) corresponds to the midriff, the border between the organs of control and maintenance (associated with the spirited *thymos* and with the *phylakes*) and the lower intestinal region home to the appetitive *epithymētikon* and symbolically linked to the rowdy *demiourgoi* and *georgoi*.

Here the delineation of aspects of cosmogony vis-à-vis corresponding elements of man's body-soul compound make it clear in what sense the Timaeian *eikōs logos* is structured anthropomorphically.

Justice in the sense of parts playing their designated role in order to form a coherent, harmonious whole is displayed here at both the macrocosmic and microcosmic levels. The prior diagram showing the correspondences between the functionalities of the three-tiered class-structure of the mesocosmic polity and the tripartite body-soul compound of man must also be borne in mind so as to appreciate how it is exactly that the *zōon* embodied in Timaeus' *eikōs logos* is not only an *eikōn* of the Cosmotheos and the ideal man but also constitutes a political constitution. The *theoeikelon-andreikelon* is a conception of polity quite unlike any other—it is an agalmatic, zoomorphic *eikōn* of the harmonisation of multiplicity into singularity at both the macrocosmic and microcosmic levels. In linking those two it warrants the title 'mesocosmic'.

As can be seen from both of the above diagrammata the thematic content of the Timaeian *logos* as well as the general character and perspective of each of its three sections all correspond with the relevant parts of the human body-soul compound in terms of position and proportional standing vis-à-vis the whole. In Timaeus' discourse focused on the systatic composition of both the Divine Macrocosm and microcosmic man as *zōa* the cosmogonic and anthropogonic dimensions are interwoven seamlessly. The first section (29d-47e) focuses on Nous the Demiurge's designing of Heaven the locus of the Visible Cosmotheos' intellection (*phronēsis*) and it corresponds to the human head, the brain, the seat of his intellectual *nous*. The second section (47e-69a) that focuses on Chora the Receptacle that, as per 52e, keeps the Visible Cosmotheos' body in a perpetual state of motion in the manner of grain being winnowed (*ἄλλοσε ἀεὶ φέρεσθαι διακρινόμενα, ὅσπερ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν πλοκάνων*) correlates with the heart and the *thymos* that preserve the body as a whole through circulation of blood that bestows vigour. The third sector (69a-92c) that deals almost exclusively with the structuring of the human body by the sub-*dēmiourgoi* melds cosmogony and anthropogony in an obvious way for it shows how the gods bring to fruition the Demiurge's plans for the World of Becoming containing a plethora of visible creatures akin to the noetic ones in the Paradigm, the World of Being. That zoogonic diversification is achieved through down-grading

reincarnations of humans, something which is in turn facilitated through the gods structuring of the tripartite body-soul compound of man in such a manner as for malfunction of the *nous* or disharmonious predomination of the *thymos* or *epithymētikon* to result in the generation of a kind of creature that bears the elemental nature of the disharmonious part of the body-soul compound: birds from the airy *nous*/brain, terrestrial animals from the earthen *thymos*/heart and aquatic creatures from the watery bowels/*epythēmtikon* (see 91d-92b and Appendix, Fig. 1).

The two diagrammata above delineating the content of the Timaeian *eikōs logos* along the sectors of the ideal agalmatic body exemplify what is meant by the key term ‘*systasis*’. *Systasis* refers to the synthesising of multiplicity into unity through proportional analogism. The functionalities of the Divine Macrocosm, of the ideal mesococosmic polity’s constitution and of microcosmic man are all positioned along the agalmatic body of the *logos* in such a way that they all accord with the proportionality of Polyclitius’ Canon. This is clearly a fulfilment of the requirement of *Phaedrus* 264c that the ideal *logos* should be a systatically composed *zōon* that is fully articulated with proportional symmetry. Not only that but in addition to meeting Critias’ requirement that his speech start from the birthing of the Cosmos and conclude with the generation of humans (ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως, τελευτᾶν δὲ εἰς ἀνθρώπων φύσιν, *Ti.*27a) Timaeus also satisfies Socrates’ request to see his ideal polity rendered a living *zōon-zōgraphia* (*Ti.*19b-c). Timaeus’ *logos* is just as much a *zōgraphia* of Socrates’ polity as it is an *eikōn* of the Visible Cosmotheos, the ‘living statue of the eternal/invisible gods’ (*zōn agalma tōn aidiōn theōn*) which Nous the Demiurge birthed as Father (*gennēsas ho patēr*), cf. *Ti.*37c & 92c.

Not only is the Doryphorus virtually painted and/or moulded (for it can be a *zōgraphia* or an *agalma*) by the proportionality of Timaeus' speech clearly a martial man, he (the personified speech-*zōon*) is just as much an incarnation of the Divine Macrocosm, the Generated Cosmotheos as he is the constitution of the ideal polity, the *theoeikelon andreikelon*. The *Doryphorus-logos* incarnates the Generated Cosmotheos for the delineation of his anatomical structure functionally corresponds with the cosmogonic agents and processes that brought about World of Becoming as a living animalian *eikōn* of the Paradigm. The *Doryphorus-logos* also incarnates the ideal polity's constitution because the tripartite class-structure is delineated implicitly in the *agalma* that simultaneously depicts both anthropogony and cosmogony. The account of the workings of Nous the Demiurge in structuring Uranus-Chronos and man's Heaven-like head corresponds to the governing philosopher-kings in the polity, the motion of Chora and man's heart/*thymos* in making the bodies of the Macrocosm and microcosmic man correlates with the *phylakes* preserving political unity and lastly the account of man's bodily mechanics symbolically corresponds with the class of producers, the polis' farmers, doctors and craftsmen. Further the Doryphorus is the perfect image for condensing the Divine's character and the social structure of the ideal polity into the form of a human in order to produce an *eikōn* of the *theoeikelon andreikelon*. This spear-wielding, perfectly proportionate warrior is essentially an example of a member of the class of *phylakes*, the martial class controlling from whence an elite group of philosopher-kings is selected to engage exclusively in dialectic (R.7.539d-540b). Thus Timaeus' perfectly proportioned zoomorphic *logos* not only seamlessly combines anthropogony with cosmogony whilst grafting the social structure of Socrates' ideal polity into the same singular *zōon-agalma* but it does so in the exact form of one of the divinised, perfectly educated warrior-philosophers of Callipolis.

The argument that the Timaeian *eikōs logos* was intended to be understood as embodying in its structure an *agalma* and/or *zōgraphia* of a God-like (*theoikelos*) man finds support in the fact that Socrates expressly likens his painting of the ideal polity in words (cf. *R.* 6.500e) to a *zōgraphos* painting the idealised perfect man. Indeed as he ‘paints out’ his ideal polity in words Socrates specifies that it was never his concern whether or not such a city can actually be realised but rather was solely preoccupied with ensuring that his political (*dia*)*zōgraphia* was truly perfect (472d). Socrates’ then compares the realisability of the ideal polity to the painting/drawing of an unachievably perfect human—even though such an *eikōn* could be perfect, one is inclined to presume that it would not be an attainable standard among humans of flesh, such a man could not really exist (*R.*472d-e). Nonetheless Socrates does go on to claim that the ideal polity can be realised (*R.*498d-502c). The point in all this is that Socrates clearly establishes a relationship between his own ‘painting-out’ of the ideal polity and a hypothetical painter’s depiction of the perfect man. This should be taken as the conceptual background behind his request in the incipit of the *Timaeus* to see his ideal polity rendered a *zōon*, a living animal-painting (*Ti.*19b-c). That this request should be met by Timaeus procuring a *logos* that bears the shape of the *theoikelon-andreikelon*, the perfect God-like man should not come as a surprise—it is the fulfilment of the typology set up earlier by Socrates not only in *R.*472d-e but also in his definition of the ideal *logos* as zoomorphic in *Phdr.*264c.²⁶⁴ The connection to *Phdr.*264c and the Timaeian *eikōs logos* is made quite explicit in the diction of Socrates’ rhetorical question (*R.*472d):²⁶⁵

οἶει ἂν οὖν ἤττόν τι ἀγαθὸν ζωγράφον εἶναι ὃς ἂν γράψας παράδειγμα οἷον ἂν εἴη ὁ κάλλιστος ἄνθρωπος καὶ πάντα εἰς τὸ γράμμα ἰκανῶς ἀποδοῦς μὴ ἔχη ἀποδειῖσαι ὡς καὶ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα;

²⁶⁴ Johansen (2004) 17-23 expressly ties *Ti.*19b-c to *R.*472d-e. Shorey (1937), 504 expresses a view strongly divergent with this dissertation’s reading: “Plato is speaking from the point of view of ordinary opinion, and it is uncritical to find here and in 501 an admission that the artist copies the idea, which is denied in Book X. 597e ff”. See also Apelt (1912), 67, Arist. *Po.* 1461 b 14, Arist. *Pol.* 1281 b 10, Cic. *Or.* 2.3, X. *Mem.* 3.10 & Polyb. 6.47.7.

²⁶⁵ My own translation.

Do you suppose that he would be any the less a good **painter**, who, after **sketching out a paradeigma** of the **most beautiful** man and fully achieved this ‘to a tittle’ (εἰς τὸ γράμμα), should not be able to prove that it is possible for such a man to come into being?”

The archaic phrase ‘to a tittle’ (mod. ‘to a tee’) is used in my translation to express the otherwise untranslatable bivalence of *gramma* here whereby word can refer to both a sketch or drawing but also letters and a written text. Immediately after this rhetorical question Socrates poses another wherein he asserts that he and his interlocutors are creating through speech a *paradeigma*, a template or pattern for a noble polity (παράδειγμα ἐποιοῦμεν λόγῳ ἀγαθῆς πόλεως, 472d-e). The point here is that Socrates is plying on the bivalence of *gramma* here just as he does with *graphein* in *Phdr.*264c. Given that writing out a speech with letters (*grammata*) is ultimately equivalent to painting out (*graphein*) a *zōgraphia* in so far as it creates an image and also has the fully-articulated structure of a *zōon*, so too the spoken or simply noetically conceived word (*logos*) is equally ‘pictorial’ and ‘zoomorphic’. The superlative *kallistos* meaning ‘most beautiful’ used here of the *paradeigma*-painting of the ideal human is also used in the *Timaeus* to refer to the Visible Cosmotheos as the most beautiful *zōon* vis-à-vis the Paradigm (30d, 40a, 68e, 92c). This parallelism in diction is significant. *Timaeus*’ depiction of the Demiurge as the ultimate *zōgraphos-agalmatopoios* capable of bringing to life the perfect *zōon* as an *eikōn* of the Paradigm in his *eikōs logos* animating Socrates’ *zōon*-polity harkens back to the above rhetorical question. True perfection may only be attainable by God but nonetheless man as imitator of the Divine must aspire to that unattainable standard and become as ‘God-like’ (*theoeikelos*) as he can. To do so he must ‘paint out in words’ the ideal human form, an image which doubles up as the perfect political constitution, the *theoeikelon-andreikelon*.

Now it should be recalled that, as was shown in the prior chapter of this dissertation, Timaeus in acting as a *nomopoios-nomothētēs* (a rhapsodic law-maker) is producing a mythic prose-poem that is intended to eclipse Homer’s works in the ideal polity. One must at this point also recall Petraki’s vital reading of the term *typos* in Book 2 of the *Republic* where Socrates speaks of mythic stories told to children in the ideal polity constituting the ‘mould’ in which their bodies and souls are shaped (377b-d).²⁶⁶ Book 2 of the *Republic* Socrates asks what theological *typoi* should define the parameters within which the poets of the ideal city should compose their works (οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἶεν; 379a). Here the bivalence of *typoi* is such that the word refers to both typical norms or rules for depictions of the gods but also, more figuratively, refers to the ‘moulds’ in which agalmatic *logoi* should be mythopoetically cast. When asked who the poets of the ideal polity will be, Socrates simply tells Adimantus that the two of them are not poets but rather city-founders and thus for them it is only necessary to know and establish *typoi* according to which poets are to compose, not actually to be poets themselves (ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἐσμὲν ποιηταὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ’ οἰκιστὰὶ πόλεως: οἰκιστᾶϊς δὲ τοὺς μὲν **τύπους** προσήκει εἰδέναι ἐν οἷς δεῖ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς, παρ’ οὓς ἐὰν ποιῶσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον, οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητέον μύθους, 378e-379a). If the Timaeian *logos* that is structured according to the proportions of Polyclitus’ Doryphorus is just as cosmomorphic and politomorphic (bearing the hierarchical class structure of the ideal polis) as it is anthropomorphic, then it is the case that the *typos* in which Socrates’ citizens are to be ‘moulded’ is essentially the *theoeikelon andreikelon*. The ideal polity’s constitution is conceived of as an *eikōn* of the Divine Macrocosm rendered into the ‘shape’ of microcosmic man’s body-soul compound and it is precisely this form that the *logos-typos* in which young citizens will be moulded takes. Socrates says that “we should do our utmost that the first stories that [young citizens] hear should be so composed as to bring

²⁶⁶ Petraki (2023), 122.

the fairest lessons of virtue to their ears” (ὧν δὴ ἴσως ἔνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον ἂ πρῶτα ἀκούουσιν ὅτι κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀκούειν, 378e). Adeimantus then asks Socrates the following: “but if again someone should ask us to be specific and say what these compositions may be and what are the tales, what could we name?” (ἀλλ’ εἴ τις αὖ καὶ ταῦτα ἐρωτῶ ἡμᾶς, ταῦτα ἅττα τ’ ἐστὶν καὶ τίνες οἱ μῦθοι, τίνας ἂν φαῖμεν;). Socrates answers that neither of them are presently acting as poets but as city-founders (ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἐσμὲν ποιηταὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ’ οἰκιστὰὶ πόλεως). He adds that “to founders it pertains to know the patterns [**typoi**] on which poets must compose their fables [μυθολογεῖν] and from which their poems must not be allowed to deviate; but the founders are not required themselves to compose fables [ποιητέον μύθους]” (379a). Adimantus then asks what these mythic patterns or moulds which determine the mythic education of the ideal citizens are (ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἴεν;). Socrates replies that that the *typoi* (moulds or patterns) of theology should be ‘of this kind of character’ (τοιοῖδε πού τινες): “the true quality of God...must always surely [be] attribute[d] to Him whether we compose in epic, melic, or tragic verse” (οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὧν, ἀεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον, ἐάν τέ τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσιν ποιῇ ἐάντε ἐν μέλεσιν ἐάντε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ). Thus Socrates’ theological *typoi* both determine how Timaeus as the ideal polity’s nomopoios-rhapsode should depict the Divine but also how the listener/reader is to be ‘shaped’. Not only are subject and object blurred here but so too is the medium: the listener/reader is crafted into a likeness (*eikonē*) both of what the poet depicts and the *typoi* (moulds) employed by the rhapsode in his musical *eikonopoia*.

Socrates sets forth as the foremost *typoi* the fact that God is truly good (ἀγαθὸς ὃ γε θεὸς τῷ ὄντι), that He never does evil or is a cause of evil (ὃ δέ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ οὐδ’ ἂν τινος εἴη κακοῦ αἴτιον) but rather is the cause of all good deeds and happenings (αἴτιον ἅρα εὐπραγίας,

379b). Socrates then applies these *typoi* to Homeric poetry by quoting verses from Il. 24.527-532 and expressly rejecting the description therein of Zeus as cause of both good and evil. Timaeus takes up these *typoi* when he depicts God as being inherently good and wanting all things to be as alike as possible to Himself (ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ, 29e). What then has this to do with the idea of scrubbing clean the *pinax* of the city's constitution and of the characters of its people? Timaeus says that God's goodness is reflected in the absence of jealousy in Him (ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεις περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος). There is an implicit analogism between God the unbegrudging Creator making everything as alike as possible to the Paradigm (Himself) and the way Socrates describes the ideal city-founder as a *zōgraphos-andriantopios*.²⁶⁷ This implicit likeness is apparent in Book 6 of the *Republic* where it is said that the philosopher who has ample free time to turn his intelligence towards beholding the things that truly are (the *onta*, or Forms) will no longer become entrenched in human affairs that would fill him with jealousy and hostility (φθόνου τε καὶ δυσμενείας ἐμπίμπλασθαι, 500b-c). Instead the philosopher will turn his gaze towards “the things of the eternal and unchanging order, and seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids: he will endeavour to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate himself to them” (ἀλλ’ εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα ὀρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὐτ’ ἀδικοῦντα οὐτ’ ἀδικούμενα ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαί τε καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι).²⁶⁸ A philosopher who beholds the Forms will not only mould himself (*plattein*) into a likeness thereof but will also seek to bring what he sees in the World of Being down into the affairs of men in public and in private (ἂν οὖν τις, εἶπον, αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὀρᾷ μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἥθη καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία

²⁶⁷ Socrates is expressly called an *andriantopios* in *R.* 7.540c.

²⁶⁸ Cf. *Phlb.* 58d, 59a, *Ti.* 90d and perhaps *Ti.* 47a and *Phd.* 79.

τιθέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, *R.500d*). Socrates then asks rhetorically whether such a figure would be considered a ‘demiurge’ of moderation (*sophrosynē*) and justice (*dikaiosynē*) and of all public virtue (ἄρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν οἶει γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς;).²⁶⁹ Naturally the question is answered in the affirmative. The philosopher-king *oikistēs-agalmatopoios* who moulds himself and the citizens of his ideal polity into likenesses of the Divine Forms is remarkably called a ‘demiurge’. Is this not clearly a typological foreshadowing of the Timaeian cosmogony which fulfills all the requirements of Socrates for a poetic work appropriate for the education of his ideal polity’s citizens? For a rhapsodic *nomopoios* to be a *poiētēs* worthy of the ideal polity he must imitate the Maker (*Poiētēs*) by being a ‘demiurge’ capable of shaping the body-soul compounds of his readers/listeners into *eikones* of the Forms beheld within the Paradigm.

Socrates teaches that the most beautiful sight for him capable of theoretically beholding it is when one sees the virtues inside a person’s soul coinciding with those of his external physical form such that they all partake of the same *typos* (ὅτου ἂν συμπίπτῃ ἐν τε τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἦθη ἐνόντα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις καὶ συμφωνοῦντα, **τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα τύπου**, τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη κάλλιστον θέαμα τῷ δυναμένῳ θεᾶσθαι, *R. 402d*). Socrates adds that “the true musician, then, would love by preference persons of this sort”, those whose interiors and exteriors are perfectly harmonised by participation in the one *typos* (τῶν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα

²⁶⁹ Shorey (1935), 70: “for the word πλάττειν used of the lawgiver, see *R.377c*, *Lg.* 671c, 712b, 746a, 800b, *R.* 374a, 377c, 420c, 466a, 588c, etc. For the idea that the ruler shapes the state according to a pattern see *R.540a-b*. Plato applies the language of the theory of ideas to the “social tissue” here exactly as he applies it to the making of a tool in the *Cra.*389c. In both cases there is a workman, the ideal pattern and the material in which it is more or less perfectly embodied. Such passages are the source of Aristotle’s doctrine of matter and form, see *Met.* 1044a25d, *PA* 630b25-27, 640b24 f., 642a10 ff., *De an.* 403b3. Cf. also *Grg.* 503d-e, *Plt.* 306c, 309d and Shorey (1903), 31-32. Cf. Alcin. *Introductio in Platonem* ii. (Teubner vi. p. 153): ἃ κατὰ τὸν θεωρητικὸν βίον ὁρᾶται, μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἦθη.

τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ὃ γε μουσικὸς ἐρώη ἄν). The *typos* here is the *theoeikelon andreikelon* that is (1) the constitution of the ideal polity and (2) the musico-mathematical structure of Uranus-Chronos as delineated in the *(dia)zōgraphia* of the perfect, maximally divinised human citizen of Callipolis. So how then do philosopher-kings become demiurges of self-control, justice and all other civic virtues (δημιουργὸν... σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς, *R.* 500d) capable of moulding both themselves and their fellow citizens into *theoeikela andreikela*? In the previous chapter of this dissertation it was shown how ‘true astronomy’ and musico-mathematical harmony are used to bring the *agalma*-citizens into conformity with the rhythms of the ‘life-cycle’ of the Divine Macrocosmic *Zōon*. Now it is necessary to examine how it is that dialectic functions as an *agalmatopoietic* means of moulding body-soul compounds into *theoeikela andreikela* through the *typoi* forged by Paradigm-beholding philosopher-kings.

In Book 7 of the *Republic* Socrates says that certain elite *phylakes* are to be set apart to be trained to act as philosopher-kings by engaging exclusively in dialectic for an extended period of time, twice as many years (ἔτη διπλάσια) as they spent undergoing athletic and musical training ‘in the cave’ as ‘living *agalmata*’ (ἀρκεῖ δὴ ἐπὶ λόγων μεταλήψει μεῖναι ἐνδελεχῶς καὶ συντόνως μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττοντι, ἀλλ’ ἀντιστρόφως γυμναζομένῳ τοῖς περὶ τὸ σῶμα γυμνασίῳς, 539d).²⁷⁰ Socrates adds that after this period of exclusive dialectic wherein the philosopher-kings contemplate the Forms and dialectically bring forth discourses (*logoi*) moulded into Their likenesses, they will be required to descend yet again ‘into the cave’ to engage in duties of military command amongst the martial *agalma*-men of the cave-world. It

²⁷⁰ Cf. *Ti.* 18a: "And what of their training? Did we not say that they were trained in gymnastic, in music, and in all the studies proper for such men?" (τί δὲ τροφήν; ἄρ’ οὐ γυμναστικῆ καὶ μουσικῆ μαθήμασιν τε ὅσα προσήκει τούτοις, ἐν ἅπασι τεθράφθαι;).

is imperative that, despite engaging in the highest possible activity of contemplating the Forms and replicating their nature in *logoi*, these polity-managing guardians must always retain contact with the world of warfare and youthful offices so as not to lack experience in the practical, non-contemplative domain (μετὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καταβιβαστέοι ἔσονται σοι εἰς τὸ σπήλαιον πάλιν ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ἀναγκαστέοι ἄρχειν τά τε περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ὅσαι νέων ἀρχαί, ἵνα μὴδ' ἐμπειρία ὑστερῶσι τῶν ἄλλων, 539e).²⁷¹ Socrates adds that “at the age of fifty those who have survived the tests and approved themselves altogether the best in every task and form of knowledge must be brought at last to the goal” (γενομένων δὲ πεντηκοντουτῶν τοὺς διασωθέντας καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας πάντα πάντη ἐν ἔργοις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαις πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἀκτέον, 540a). The ultimate ‘goal’ (*telos*) of the divinising activity of contemplating the Forms cannot be separated from the necessity of training, educating, and ‘moulding’ the agalma-youth of the polis. Martial activity is the testing ground for the Paradigm-imitating philosopher-*oikistai*—to determine whether they have rightly perceived and accurately replicated the nature of the Forms in the agalmatic constitution (*theoikelon-andreikelon*) which they have dialectically ‘sculpted’. This is why Socrates requests that his polity be rendered not simply a living or painted *zōon* in motion but specifically a *zōon* in a state of war (*Ti.* 19b-c). Socrates wants his *theoikelon andreikelon* to be sculpted and painted dialectically in words (*logoi*) in a martial manner by an accomplished warrior-philosopher and then to be subject to proofing through warfare. The *Timaeus-Critias* must be treated as a unitary response to Socrates’ request (*Ti.* 19b-c) to see his ideal constitution rendered a *zōon* at war. Critias’ narrative of Palaeo-Athens and Atlantis involves a martial testing of the *theoikelon andreikelon* in historical real time. Socrates first devises the means by which citizens should be reared and how the polity should be mapped out so as to encapsulate correctly the nature of the Paradigm, the Forms, and to conceive of how that nature can be

²⁷¹ Cf. *R.* 519c ff.

imparted to citizens through a divinising, martial education system. Timaeus then steps in as rhapsode who ‘moulds’ the agalma-men of Socrates’ polity into a shape that accords with the *theoeikelon andreikelon*. He does this by providing an eikōs mythos that bears the very proportional ratios of a divinised warrior and tells the story of how God qua Demiurge musically went to war through His cognition against the inherently disordered *prima materia* and succeeded in begetting an orderly Cosmotheos as a living statue.

Timaeus’ *nomos* serves to mould its audience, the young civilians of Socrates’ ideal polity that are reared as living ‘metal *agalмата*’ in the ‘cave,’ into likenesses (*eikones*) of the *theoeikelon andreikelon* (conceived as the proportional template of Doryphorus). Then Critias receives the *agalma*-men virtually begotten and educated with distinction through Timaeus’ and Socrates’ *logoi* and brings these logographically generated men before the symposiasts themselves to be judged according to the *logos* and *nomos* of Solon. These men are rendered into the Palaeo-Athenians—they were unheard of prior to the Egyptian priest’s revelation of the history of the antediluvian war from the hieroglyphic archives of Sais (*Ti.27a-b*). The point here is that Critias’ *logos* is an historical war-epic into which the virtually begotten *agalma*-men of Timaeus’ *nomos* and Socrates’ political discourse are injected in order to be judged for the accuracy as *eikones* vis-à-vis the Paradigm. Indeed, Critias in speaking of the discourses (*logoi*) given by the symposiasts gives the following criterion for judgment: “the ease or difficulty with which they succeed in imitating their subjects in the opinion of onlookers” (ῥαστώνης τε περί καὶ χαλεπότητος πρὸς τὸ τοῖς ὀρῶσιν δοκεῖν ἀποχρώντως μεμιῆσθαι, *Criti.* 107b-c). The specific subject of eikastic depiction that the judgment of the *logoi* is likened to is *eidōlopoiia* of those painting human and divine bodies (τὴν δὲ τῶν γραφέων εἰδωλοποιίαν περὶ τὰ θεῖά τε καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα σώματα γιγνομένην). Thus, the *logoi* of Socrates and Timaeus are to be judged as if they are paintings depicting men and

gods. Now given that Timaeus successfully produces a living, virtual *eikōn* of the Divine Macrocosm that can be validly prayed to in lieu of Him is it not clear that his discourse must be judged favourably?²⁷² How can one be confident that Timaeus' *logos* is an accurate *eikōn* of both the Divine Macrocosm and of microcosmic man? This will be answered later but let it suffice now to simply point out that the idea that Timaeus has beheld the Paradigm and successfully produced an accurate likeness (*eikōn*) thereof just as the Demiurge did may seem at face value to be rather bold but it has precedent in Book 7 of the *Republic*. There the philosopher-kings are said to be capable of beholding the Paradigm and shaping themselves and others into likeness of it. Even though the success of Timaeus' attempt to accurately depict the Divine Macrocosm warrants further treatment it also seems reasonable to suppose that if Socrates and Timaeus can behold the Paradigm and can render themselves and others reasonable likenesses (*eikones*) of it, then it is by no means out of the question that they could actually be judged 'good painters' according to Critias' criterion of judgment.

The mental internalisation of the Forms into one's own *nous*-soul followed by the moulding of oneself and then others into an *agalma* of the Paradigm is clearly taught by Plato's Socrates in Book 7 of the *Republic* (540a-c):

καὶ ἀναγκαστέον ἀνακλίναντας τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον, καὶ ἰδόντας **τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, παραδείγματι χρωμένους ἐκείνω, καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτας καὶ ἑαυτοὺς κοσμεῖν** τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον ἐν μέρει ἐκάστους, τὸ μὲν πολὺ πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβοντας, ὅταν δὲ τὸ μέρος ἦκη, πρὸς πολιτικοῖς ἐπιταλαιπωροῦντας καὶ ἄρχοντας ἐκάστους τῆς πόλεως ἕνεκα, οὐχ ὡς καλὸν τι ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πράττοντας, καὶ οὕτως ἄλλους ἀεὶ παιδεύσαντας τοιούτους, ἀντικαταλιπόντας τῆς πόλεως φύλακας, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντας οἰκεῖν: μνημεῖα δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ θυσίας τὴν πόλιν δημοσίᾳ ποιεῖν, ἐὰν καὶ ἡ Πυθία συναναίρη, ὡς δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς εὐδαίμοσί τε καὶ θείοις.

²⁷² That Timaeus has successfully produced an accurate likeness of the Cosmotheos can be presumed since Socrates does not object to Timaeus praying to the God 'just now' begotten in words Who is identified with the One created by the Demiurge long ago (*Criti.* 106a).

We shall require them to turn upwards the vision of their souls and fix their gaze on that which sheds light on all, and when they have thus beheld **the Good Itself they shall use it as a pattern [Paradigm] for the right ordering of the state and the citizens and themselves** throughout the remainder of their lives, each in his turn, devoting the greater part of their time to the study of philosophy, but when the turn comes for each, toiling in the service of the state and holding office for the city's sake, regarding the task not as a fine thing but a necessity; and so, when each generation has educated others like themselves to take their place as guardians of the state, they shall depart to the Islands of the Blest and there dwell. And the state shall establish public memorials²⁷³ and sacrifices for them as to divinities if the Pythian oracle approves or, if not, as to divine and godlike men.”

The key phrase here is “the right ordering of the state and the citizens and themselves” (πόλις καὶ ιδιώτας καὶ ἑαυτοὺς κοσμεῖν). Though the best translation of the infinitive verb *kosmein* here is indeed ‘to order’ that rendering fails to capture the double-meaning brought about by the fact that the related noun *kosmos* refers to both order, adornment and, of course, the cosmos (cf. *Ti.* 40a). Considering then this latter meaning the infinitive verb *kosmein* can be said to mean in this context that the philosopher-kings are to ‘order’ themselves, the citizens under their care and the polity they govern in the sense of rendering them likenesses (*eikones*) of the Divine Macrocosm. One might argue that such an interpretation is strained and that imputing Timaeon cosmological conceptions of cosmotheism and eikastic likeness (*Ti.* 92c) to Socrates in the *Republic* is unwarranted. However, the Timaeon teaching that man’s body-soul compound should be rendered as like as possible to the Cosmotheos (*Ti.* 88c-d, 89a, 90b-e) is clearly presumed in the above passage of the *Republic* wherein Socrates explains how the philosopher-kings qua *zographoi-andriantopoioi* ‘cosmically’ order the citizens under their care into likeness of the ‘Good Itself which they use as a Paradigm’ (τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, παραδείγματι χρωμένους ἐκείνῳ). Use of the word Paradigm clearly establishes a link with the Timaeon cosmology as does the imagery of philosopher-kings inclining the beam-like gaze of their souls up to that which provides light to all (ἀνακλίναντας τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον). This solar imagery is clearly an allusion to the

²⁷³ Cf. *Smp.* 209e.

Analogy of the Sun (*R.* 507b–509c) where the Form of the Good’s position in the Noetic World of Being and relationship vis-à-vis man’s noesis is likened to the sun’s position in the Visible World of Becoming and its relationship with man’s sight. All this will be discussed in the final chapter of this dissertation. Let it simply suffice for now to note that Shorey in his translatory note on this passage (specifically *R.* 508b-c) says the following about it: firstly that it implies that “creation was the work of benevolent design” and secondly that “this is one of the few passages in the *Republic* where the idea of good is considered in relation to the universe, a thesis reserved for poetical or mythical development in the *Timaeus*”.²⁷⁴ Even without recourse to the above passage’s allusion to the Analogy of the Sun, the use of the term ‘Paradigm’ is in and of itself sufficient to establish a clear link to the *Timaeus*. What is the significance of Socrates’ suggestion that, provided the Delphic Oracle approves, the divinised philosopher-kings should receive cultic honours? (μνημεῖα δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ θυσίας τὴν πόλιν δημοσίᾳ ποιεῖν, ἐὰν καὶ ἡ Πυθία συναναίρη). Socrates says that they are to be worshipped as *daimones* or rather, as those who are blessed (*eudaimones*) and divine, *theoikeloι* as it were (ὡς δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς εὐδαίμοσί τε καὶ θείοις). In Socrates’ ideal polity not only are philosophic warriors to be reared as *agal mata* moulded in the template of the *theoikelon-andreieklon* constitution but further, even in death, they retain their agalmatic identity as *mnēmeia* receiving cult honours. The microcosmic citizen of the ideal polity is an agalmatic incarnation of the Forms from the cradle to the grave. The individual microcosmic *agalma*-citizen’s blessedness (*eudaimonia*) depends on the degree to which he succeeds in achieving the maximal degree of resemblance to the Divine Macrocosm, the ultimate living statue of the invisible/eternal gods (*Ti.* 37c: *zōn agalma tōn aidiōn theōn*).

²⁷⁴ Shorey (1935), 83.

Painting a Living Cosmos-Polity as an Anthropomorphic *Agalma*

It has thus-far been argued that the entire *eikōs mythos* of the *Timaeus* is to be understood as an *eikasia* not in the sense of ‘mere conjecture’ but rather that of ‘eikastic depiction’ (*eikonopoia*), specifically the production of a virtual *zōgraphia* (painting/drawing) or *agalma* (statue) that is not simply a lifeless artisanal product but rather a living organism. Such a feat satisfies Socrates’ desire to see his polity rendered a *zōon* (animal-painting) in motion (*Ti.* 19b-c). The *logos* itself embodies in its own ‘frame’ a pictorial likeness of what it describes, namely an account of both cosmogony and anthropogony, the generation of both the Divine Macrocosm and of microcosmic man, all of which is articulated against the background of Socrates’ ideal polity. Since the ideal political constitution that Socrates wants rendered a living *zōon* by Timaeus’ discourse is a *theoeikelon andreiekelon* (*R.* 6.501b), that is, an image of Divinity as reflected in the ideal human, it is not surprising that Timaeus’ account of cosmogony should be ‘shaped’ as a divinised warrior-citizen of Socrates’ perfect polis. The notion that a discourse should bear the shape of a living creature (*zōon*) is a requirement established expressly in the *Phaedrus*. At the beginning of the *Phaedrus* when Lysias’ speech on Eros is being discussed, Socrates says the following (264c):

ἀλλὰ τόδε γε οἶμαι σε φάναι ἄν, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῶον **συνεστάναι** σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε **ἀκέφαλον** εἶναι μήτε **ἄπουν**, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρόποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ **γεγραμμένα**.

But I do think you will agree to this, that every discourse must be organized, like a living being, with a body of its own, as it were, so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members, composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole.

Given that here Plato’s Socrates is of the opinion that every discourse should be organised as a complete and proportionate animal, how much more so is this the case for a *logos* such as Timaeus’ *eikōs mythos* which seeks to paint a ‘likely’ and accurate picture of cosmogony and anthropogony that brings to life Socrates’ *theoeikelon-andreiekelon* constitution to life as a

zōon?²⁷⁵ The perfect infinitive form of the verb συνίστημι used here (συνεστάναι) is quite a typical verb for literary composition, as evidenced in Aristotle's *Poetics*: συνεστάναι τὸν μῦθον (1453b). It is also a key word for poetical composition in the *Phaedrus*. There, in the context of discussing “teach[ing] the art of writing tragedies” (διδάσκων αὐτὰ τραγωδίας ποιήσιν οἶεται παραδιδόναι) Phaedrus uses two cognates of the verb συνίστημι: “they also, I fancy, Socrates, would laugh at him, if he imagined that tragedy was anything else than the proper combination of these details in such a way that they harmonize with each other and with the whole composition” (καὶ οὗτοι ἂν, ὃ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι καταγελῶεν εἴ τις οἶεται τραγωδίαν ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν τούτων **σύστασιν** πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ **συνισταμένην**, 268d). This conception of *poēsis* as *systasis* qua the correct compositional arrayment of components to form a whole (ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ) involves the same diction as the explanation of how *logoi* should systatically constitute a well-proportioned and fully-articulated *zōon* (i.e. 264c). The point then is that Plato's Socrates is identifying well-executed *poēsis* and logography both as involving systatic *zōographia*.

The compository verb συνίστασθαι is used again when Socrates says that there are certain teachers of rhetoric who, not knowing the art of dialectic (μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι), are, as a result of this pathology (ἐκ δὲ τούτου τοῦ πάθους), led to think that they have mastered the necessary preliminary understandings of the rhetorical art when in actuality they have not (τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἔχοντες ῥητορικὴν φήθησαν, 269b-c). This pathology leads them to the misapprehension "that the persuasive use of these details and the composition of the whole discourse is a small matter which their pupils must supply of themselves in their writings or speeches" (τὸ δὲ ἕκαστα τούτων πιθανῶς λέγειν τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον

²⁷⁵ For the general idea that a discourse should be a microcosmic model of the macrocosm, see Coulter (1976), 96 & 98 and the *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* 15.14 f=Westerink, (1962), 29.

συνίστασθαι, οὐδὲν ἔργον ὄν, αὐτοὺς δεῖν παρ' ἑαυτῶν τοὺς μαθητὰς σφῶν πορίζεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις). Plato's Socrates says this with the intention of making the case that the systatic composition of rhetorically persuasive *logoi* is not simply a stringing together of parts into an articulate whole but requires an intimate understanding of teleology and a soteriology of cosmically-harmonised 'health'. Socrates states that he deems rhetoric and medicine to be one and the same art aiming "to impart health and strength to the body by prescribing medicine and diet, or by proper discourses and training to give to the soul the desired belief and virtue" (τῇ δὲ λόγους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεις νομίμους πειθῶ ἦν ἂν βούλη καὶ ἀρετὴν παραδώσειν, 270b). Then Socrates asks "do you think one can acquire any appreciable knowledge of the nature of the soul without knowing the nature of the whole man?" (ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι οἶει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως; 270c). Phaedrus answers that Hippocrates the Asclepiad certainly thought so Socrates states that it is not enough simply to trust his conclusion but rather it must be proven and instantiated through their *logos*. An image thus arises of the rhetorical art of logography, along with eikastic *poiēsis* and mimetic arts generally, as all part of a singular holistic enterprise that concerns the health of the entire being—not only the internal harmonisation of the body and soul of the individual living creature (*zōon*) but also ensuring that each living creature is harmonised vis-à-vis the Theocosmos. Health in the cosmic sense of harmonising one's own body-soul compound with that of the Cosmotheos is ultimately the *telos* of the Platonic project. This teleology is incarnated best in the Timaeian *logos* that in its very 'shape' instantiates this truth, for as shall be seen, it is a proportionately harmonised whole that embodies the shape of the *theoeikelon andreikelon*, the Divine Macrocosm as manifest in the perfect microcosmic man and mesocosmic polity.

This brief foray into the treatment of logography, rhetoric and medicine in the *Phaedrus* serves to bring to the fore the key notion of ‘*systasis*’ as the proportional harmonisation of the body-soul compound of an individual *zōon* vis-à-vis the Cosmotheos. This key dynamic is what underpins the Timaeian *logos*’ animation of the Socratic polity as a *zōon* modelled on the macrocosm. Timaeus articulates a vision of soteriology centred on ‘health’ defined as not only the internal symmetry and proportionality of the human *zōon* but also his similitude to the animalian All (87c-88c). Health is conceived of as “the remedial treatment of body and mind, and the causes which **conserve** this (τὸ περὶ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων καὶ διανοήσεων θεραπείας αἷς αἰτίαις **σώζεται**, 87c). As such it could be called a ‘soteriology’ of preserving balance in the body-soul compound to achieve longevity. Timaeus adds that “all that is good is fair, and the fair is not void of due **measure**; wherefore also the **living creature [zōon]** that is to be fair must be **symmetrical** (δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν οὐκ ἄμετρον: καὶ ζῶον οὗν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐσόμενον **σύμμετρον** θετέον). Thus symmetry is put forward as the key criterion for the beauty and goodness of an animal (*zōon*), i.e. its similitude or likeness to the Paradigm. This symmetry is identified as comprising of an internal balancing of body and soul (87c-d):

συμμετριῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν μικρὰ δαισθανόμενοι συλλογίζομεθα, τὰ δὲ **κυριώτατα καὶ μέγιστα ἀλογίστως ἔχομεν**. πρὸς γὰρ ὑγιείας καὶ νόσους ἀρετὰς τε καὶ κακίας οὐδεμία **συμμετρία** καὶ **ἀμετρία** μείζων ἢ ψυχῆς αὐτῆς πρὸς σῶμα αὐτό: ὧν οὐδὲν σκοποῦμεν οὐδ’ ἐννοοῦμεν, ὅτι ψυχὴν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ πάντῃ μεγάλην ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἔλαττον εἶδος ὅταν ὀχῆ, καὶ ὅταν αὐτὸνναντίον συμπαγήτον τούτω, **οὐ καλὸν ὄλον τὸ ζῶον—ἀσύμμετρον** γὰρ ταῖς μεγίσταις **συμμετρίαις**—τὸ δὲ ἐναντίως ἔχον πάντων θεαμάτων τῷ δυναμένῳ καθορᾶν κάλλιστον καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον.

Of symmetries we distinguish and reason about such as are small, but of the most **important and the greatest we have no rational comprehension**. For with respect to health and disease, virtue and vice, there is no **symmetry or want of symmetry** greater than that which exists between the soul itself and the body itself. But as regards these, we wholly fail to perceive or reflect that, whenever a weaker and inferior type of body is the vehicle of a soul that is strong and in all ways great,—or conversely, when each of these two is of the opposite kind,—then the **creature as a whole is not fair**, seeing that it is unsymmetrical in respect of the greatest of symmetries; whereas a creature in the opposite condition is of all sights, for him who has eyes to see, the fairest and most admirable.

Here Timaeus not only conceives of the relationship between microcosmic man’s body and soul in terms of ‘symmetry’ but call it the most importance and the greatest instance of symmetry (κυριώτατα καὶ μέγιστα).²⁷⁶ What makes the symmetry between the soul and body within a living creature (*zōon*) so important and so great is because not only is proportional harmonisation of soul and body the binding agent that keeps a creature healthy and whole (*holon*) but that wholeness in turn is what endows beauty and thus likeness vis-à-vis the Visible Cosmotheos. Indeed, the Visible Cosmotheos is necessarily beautiful (28a: καλὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης) by virtue of resemblance to the Paradigm. Further that high degree of resemblance was achieved by the Demiurge working the Visible All into “the shape of a sphere, equidistant in all directions from the centre to the extremities, which of all shapes is the most perfect and the most self-similar, since He deemed that the similar is infinitely fairer than the dissimilar (ἐκ μέσου πάντη πρὸς τὰς τελευτὰς ἴσον ἀπέχον, κυκλοτερές...πάντων τελεώτατον ὁμοιοτάτον τε αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ σχημάτων, νομίσας μυρίῳ κάλλιον ὅμοιον ἀνομοίου, 33b). Thus not only is symmetry desirable in man the microcosmic *zōon* but also in the Macrocosmic Animal. Indeed, the Cosmotheos is perfect, unageing and free from illness precisely because He is the ultimate ‘whole composed out of all wholes’ (ἓνα ὅλον ὅλων ἐξ ἀπάντων τέλεον καὶ ἀγήρων καὶ ἄνοσον, 33a). This same emphasis on holism is present in the above-extracted passage—the individual *zōon* is not overall beautiful (οὐ καλὸν ὅλον τὸ ζῶον) unless it is symmetrical in the most important respect, that is, in the harmonic balancing of soul and body. It must be recalled Socrates claims that the most beautiful sight for him capable of seeing it (κάλλιστον θέαμα τῷ δυναμένῳ θεᾶσθαι) consists of “coincidence of a beautiful disposition in the soul and corresponding and harmonious beauties of the same **type** in the bodily form” (ὅτου ἂν συμπίπτῃ ἐν τε τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἦθη ἐνόητα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὁμολογοῦντα

²⁷⁶ For a study of symmetry and beauty in Plato generally, see Lloyd (2010), 455–465. For the importance of symmetry for the Timaeian Demiurge’s construction of the elemental solids that are the core ingredients of cosmogony, see Lloyd (2006), 459-474. The same teaching on body-soul symmetry is found in *R.410b-e*

ἐκείνοις καὶ συμφωνοῦντα, τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα **τύπου**, 402d). There the symmetry of body and soul is conceived of as being facilitated by their joint participation in the one ‘mould’ (*typos*). This dissertation argues that this mould (*typos*) in which soul and body are to be shaped together is the Timaeian *eikōs logos* itself which not only follows the theological *typoi* set up by Socrates for poets depicting the Divine in the ideal polity (*R.* 2.378e-379a) but it also will be used by mothers and nurses to shape the supple bodies and souls of citizens whilst they are young (*R.*2.377c). Timaeus’ cosmogonic myth proscribes that healthy symmetry between body and soul is maintained by each *agalma*-citizen through imitating the nurturer and nurse of the All (Chora) by perpetually moving his body and never letting it be at rest (ἐὰν δὲ ἦν τε τροφὸν καὶ τιθήνην τοῦ παντὸς προσείπομεν μιμηταί τις, καὶ τὸ σῶμα μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε **ἡσυχίαν** ἄγειν ἐῤ, 88d). This same emphasis on movement over stillness is found in Socrates’ programmatic description of a man beholding beautiful *zōa* (either painted or truly living) in a state of rest (ἡσυχίαν δὲ ἄγοντα) and is overcome by a desire to see them moving and athletically exerting themselves (*Ti.* 19b-c).

Socrates specifies that it is only in warfare that the polity-*zōon* will be able to display “qualities such as befit its education and training” (ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν τὰ προσήκοντα ἀποδιδούσαν τῇ παιδείᾳ καὶ τροφῇ, 19c). Now Timaeus in his *eikōs logos* not only animates Socrates *polity-zōon* by constructing a living, moving autonomous *eikōn* of the Cosmotheos (*Criti.* 106a) but he also provides the ‘mythic mould’ in which the bodies and souls of citizens of the ideal polity are to be shaped and brought into perfect symmetry. In his *typos-logos* (‘mould-discourse’) Timaeus says that the body imitating Chora the Nurse of the Visible All is not to remain still but rather is to be measuredly moving the wandering passions of the body about and bringing the parts of the body into a holistic cosmic order by positioning them correctly vis-à-vis each other (μετρίως σείων τά τε περὶ τὸ σῶμα πλανώμενα παθήματα

καὶ μέρη κατὰ συγγενείας εἰς τάξιν κατακοσμηῖ πρὸς ἄλληλα, 88e). This relates back to Socrates' passion (*pathos*) to see his polity-*zōon* in motion and at war instead of being at rest for Timaeus expressly says that the point of imitating Chora's perpetual motion is so that the correct arrayment of the parts of the body will prevent 'hostile elements' creating war within the body-compound in the form of disease (οὐκ ἐχθρὸν παρ' ἐχθρὸν τιθέμενον ἐάσει πολέμους ἐντίκτειν τῷ σώματι καὶ νόσους, 88e). The point here is that arrangement of the parts of body to be proportionally concordant with each other (εἰς τάξιν κατακοσμηῖ πρὸς ἄλληλα, 88e) is analogous to how Plato conceives of the ideal *logos* as a *zōon* with a body composed (συνεστάναι) in such a way as to have midriff and extremities that are painted so as to proportionately accord with each other and constitute a balanced whole (λόγον ὡσπερ ζῶον **συνεστάναι** σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ...μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, **πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ** γεγραμμένα *Phdr.* 264c).²⁷⁷ The word *systasis* (along with its verbal cognates) lies at the heart of what the Timaeian *eikōs logos* is seeking to achieve—the discourse maps its account of cosmogony and anthropogony onto the dimensions of the ideal agalmatic body and in so doing both meets the ideal standard of a *zōon-logos* being fully articulated and satisfies Socrates' desire to see his *theoikeion-andreikeion* constitution animated as a *zōon*. The arrangement of an animalian body so as to form a symmetrical whole out of proportionally correlated parts, that is, the dynamic of *systasis*, is the key link between the anatomy and psychology of microcosmic man, the constitution of the ideal polity and the structure of the Divine Macrocosm.²⁷⁸ The three-tiered interconnection between microcosmic man, mesocosmic polity and Divine Macrocosm is sustained by the fact that all three are

²⁷⁷ The exact same combination of 'systatic' diction with proportional concordance between constituent parts is found in Socrates' explanation of how a tragedy should be composed, *Phdr.* 268c-d: οἷμαι καταγελῶεν εἶ τις οἶεται τραγωδίαν ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν τούτων σύστασιν πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ συνισταμένην. Cf. *Arist. Po.* 1449b24-28: τὴν τῶν τοιούτων πραγμάτων σύστασιν.

²⁷⁸ The word *systasis* can be used of the of the structure of the Macrocosmic Whole (*Arist. Cael.* 280a21: ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὅλου σύστασις ἐστὶ κόσμος καὶ οὐρανός), the constitution of a city (*Arist. Pol.* 1295b28: ἡ σύστασις τῆς πόλεως) and the composition of *zōa* (*Arist. Cael.* 288b16-17: σύστασις τῶν ζώων).

jointly conceived of *zōa*, systatic compounds of soul and body within a *logos* that is itself an ideally-proportioned *zōon-agalma* functioning as the mould in which the citizens of Callipolis are fashioned in *theoeikela andreikela*.

Timaeus uses the word *systasis* when he briefly touches on cultivating symmetry between the body and soul through *paideia*: “the motion that is best for purgings and renovations of the body consists in gymnastic exercises” (διὸ δὴ τῶν καθάρσεων καὶ **συστάσεων** τοῦ σώματος ἢ μὲν διὰ τῶν γυμνασίων ἀρίστη, 89a). Whilst Bury translates *systaseis* opaquely to “renovations” Cornford instead opts for “bracing” as “συνιστάναι in this sense occurs in the medical writers”.²⁷⁹ The LSJ defines the word *systasis* as referring to the “composition, structure, constitution of a person or a thing” being used especially to refer to the arrangement of “the parts of an animal” (e.g. Arist.*PA* 646a20 & *GA* 744b28) but also of a “political constitution” (e.g. *R.*546a & *Lg.* 702d). The reason this meaning of ‘compositional arrangement’ with its application to the cohesion of both animalian and political bodies is so significant is because it is precisely that same dual meaning at play in the use of *systasis* across the *Timaeus-Republic*. Džukeska in her study of the word *systasis* points out that it is used 95 times in the Aristotelian corpus and 30 times in the Platonic corpus with roughly half of the instances of the term in Aristotle being in zoological works, “about a third in physical treatise *Meteorologica*, *On the Heavens* and *Physics*” and 14 in his *Poetics* whereas an overwhelming 66% of occurrences in Plato are found solely in the *Timaeus* whilst the “majority of the rest of the occurrences are found in his dialogues that address political and ethical questions, the *Laws* and the *Republic*”.²⁸⁰ It is an appreciation of the word *systasis*

²⁷⁹ Cornford (1937), 351, n3 & Bury (1929), 243.

²⁸⁰ Džukeska (2022), 160. The formation of a whole organism out of constituent parts in a specifically biological context e.g. Arist. *GA* 738b6-7, 777b10-12, 776b3-5, 731b10-13 & 763a12-16. In Aristotle's works on zoology, as expected *σύστασις* refers to terms such as testicles, menses, body, embryos, living creatures, cartilage, liver, cf. τῶν ὄρχεων (*GA* 717a14-15), καταμηνίων (*GA* 727b 32; 729a22), τοῦ σώματος (*GA* 728b16; 751b3-4),

equal degree of applicability to both politics and biology that facilitates this dissertation's argument that the Timaeian *logos* is shaped to image the perfectly-proportioned *agalma-zōon*. This *agalma-zōon* happens to be identifiable with Socrates' *theoikelon-andreikelon* constitution and is used as the 'mould' in which the ideal citizens are to be shaped into optimally symmetrical *eikones* of the Divine Macrocosm. Indeed, the Perfect Visible Animal, the Cosmotheos, is Himself also embodied in this very same *logos-zōon* (*Criti.* 106a). The prior chapter's claim that Socrates' ideal polity models itself on the mathematico-musical order of Heaven is to be seen as intimately connected to Timaeus' arrangement of his *logos-zōon* according to the perfect ratios of proportionality embodied in Polyclitus Doryphorus, the manifestation of Divine Order in human form (the *theoikelon andreikelon*). Indeed, the word *systasis* is used by Timaeus in his account of the Demiurge establishing the musico-mathematical 'strain' (*nomos*) of the World Soul through which the ultimately symmetrical *zōon* is ordered and sustained, the Visible Cosmotheos (*Ti.* 36d: *πᾶσα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς σύστασις*). It is this concept of proportional *systasis* embodied in the ratios of the All-sustaining and All-ordering harmony of the Anima Mundi that Timaeus also employs in structuring his *logos* as a perfectly-proportioned *zōon-agalma* that can be used as a mould in which *agalma*-citizens can have their body-soul compounds shaped into microcosmic incarnations of the Divine Macrocosm. Thus, the whole point of Timaeus' logographic *agalmatopoiia* is to find a way to facilitate microcosmic man's participation in the perfect mathematical order of proportionality that underpins the Demiurge's 'cosmogonic song'. *Systasis* is how that is achieved. The God-imitating *poiētēs* must compose a *zōon-logos* that can be used to mould the body-soul compounds of the *agalma*-men of the ideal polity in such a way that they are perfectly symmetrical and can thus live as *theoikela andreikela* in harmony with the

κυημάτων (*GA* 750b10), τοῦ ζώου (*GA* 766a24-25), ζώων (*GA* 777b11, *HA* 552b15-16; *PA* 670a19), τοῦ οὐρανοῦ (*Arist. MA* 700a5), τοῦ χόνδρου (*Arist. PA* 655a37), τοῦ ἥπατος (*Arist. PA* 677a19).

Demiurge’s *nomothesia-nomopoia*—they are rendered *emmeleis*, not *plēmmeleis*. When speaking of harmonising the *Teleios Arithmos* of the *Theion Gennēton*’s ‘life-cycle’ with the *Anthrōpeios Arithmos* governing the breeding cycle of the ideal polity’s *agalma*-citizens Socrates claims that even though the *theoikelon-andreikelon* polity that has been composed (συστᾶσαν) according to the perfect musico-mathematical order of Heaven is very hard to disturb and overturn (ὤδὲ πῶς. χαλεπὸν μὲν κινηθῆναι πόλιν οὕτω συστᾶσαν) it nonetheless despite being the optimal *systasis* (constitution) will not remain for all time but will be subject to corruption and will dissolve just as all generated things do (ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ γενομένῳ παντὶ φθορὰ ἐστίν, οὐδ’ ἢ τοιαύτη σύστασις τὸν ἅπαντα μενεῖ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ λυθήσεται, *R.* 546a).²⁸¹ The significance of these uses of the word *systasis* in reference to the ideal polis are that it is being categorised as *zōon* just like microcosmic man and the Divine Macrocosm. The ideal polity is essentially a single *zōon-agalma* with a ‘super-soul’ and ‘super-body’ that integrates the multitude of its *agalma*-citizens’ body-soul compounds into an aggregated whole, a *systasis* imitating the life-cycle of the Visible Cosmotheos.

Despite the above-extracted passage (87c-d) discussing symmetry of soul and body in a manner reminiscent of the education system of Socrates’ ideal polity where children’s souls and bodies are both moulded in conjunction through myths (*R.* 2.377c) it is nonetheless preceded by Timaeus stating that one can learn to avoid evil and choose its opposite through diet, studies and other preoccupations but that such a topic is for another discourse (τις δύναται, καὶ διὰ τροφῆς καὶ δι’ ἐπιτηδευμάτων μαθημάτων τε φυγεῖν μὲν κακίαν, τὸναντίον δὲ ἐλεῖν: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ τρόπος ἄλλος λόγων, 87b). Cornford explains this reference to

²⁸¹ The implication here is the just as inevitably even the perfect *systasis* of the ideal polity is subject to dissolution as are all *gignomena*, so too is the *Theion Gennēton*. Cf. *Ti.* 41a-b where it is asserted even though it would be an evil act to dissolve the beautiful and well-composed Cosmotheos, He nonetheless is a construction bound together through *systasis* and as such can be dissolved in the manner of all *gignomena* (τὸ μὲν οὖν δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν, τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἀρμωσθέν καὶ ἔχον εὖ λύειν ἐθέλειν κακοῦ).

another discourse addressing rearing and education in the following terms: “this is not the place to pursue further the topic touched upon in the last sentence—the corrupting influences of an ill-governed society and the reform in education needed to correct them” since “that belongs to a moral and political work like the *Republic* [whereas] the *Timaeus* is a physical discourse”.²⁸² Cornford’s strict separation between the political and moral discourse of the *Republic* and the *physiologia* of the *Timaeus* is problematic as it implies that there is no connection between the two discourses and between the polity and man’s body-soul compound—in fact the opposite is true. This problematic tendency to separate the two texts is exactly what the present chapter and indeed this entire dissertation is trying to correct. The *Timaeus* and the *Republic* need to be read in conjunction as building upon each other in order to be properly understood and strict separation occludes the overall holistic picture that they jointly paint of God, cosmos, polity and man all being intimately intertwined in the one schema of the *theoeikelon andreikelon*. Rather than taking the reference to another discourse here to signify strict separation it should be taken instead to be a clear intertextual allusion at a critical point in the *eikōs logos*. It is at this point towards the end of Timaeus’ *logos* where he is dealing in great detail with the symmetry of the body-soul compound of microcosmic man in an *agalma*-shaped discourse animating Socrates’ *theoeikelon-andreikelon* constitution that one would expect to see a clear link between the *Timaeus* and the *Republic*.

After the above-extracted passage (87c-d) Timaeus goes on to give an example of asymmetry being problematic by explaining that excessively long legs (ὑπερσκελῆς) are not only ugly but can create practical problems such as more frequent falls (87e). This specific bodily disproportionality is then used as a launching point for reflection on the balancing of the body

²⁸² Cornford (1937), 349.

and soul within the one animalian compound. Timaeus defines a *zōon* as a compound of soul and body and claims that when the former is more powerful than the latter she shakes the whole physical frame and fills it with diseases (ζῶον ὃ καλοῦμεν, ὡς ὅταν τε ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχή κρείττων οὔσα σώματος περιθύμως ἴσχη, διασειούσα πᾶν αὐτὸ ἔνδοθεν νόσων ἐμπίμπλησι). Likewise, problems arise when a body is too large and powerful vis-à-vis the limited, weak intellect (*dianoia*) that grew united to it (σῶμά τε ὅταν αὖ μέγα καὶ ὑπέρψυχον συμκρᾶ συμφυῆς ἀσθενεῖ τε διανοία, 88a). Indeed when "the motions of the stronger part [the body] prevail and augment their own power, but they make that of the soul obtuse and dull of wit and forgetful, and thereby they produce within it that greatest of diseases, ignorance" (αἰ τοῦ κρείττονος κινήσεις κρατοῦσαι καὶ τὸ μὲν σφέτερον αὔξουσαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς κωφὸν καὶ δυσμαθὲς ἀμνήμὸν τε ποιοῦσαι, τὴν μεγίστην νόσον ἀμαθίαν ἐναπεργάζονται, 88b). Thus regardless of whether there is asymmetry due to predominance of the soul over the body or vice-versa, such imbalance undermines *systasis*, the proportional balance of a *zōon*'s inner harmony. Timaeus presents a kind of health-soteriology centred on the balancing or harmonisation of body and soul as a dyad (μία δὴ **σωτηρία** πρὸς ἄμφω, μήτε τὴν ψυχὴν ἄνευ σώματος κινεῖν μήτε σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς, ἵνα ἀμυνομένω γίγνησθον ἰσορρόπω καὶ ὑγιῇ, 88b-c). He goes on to develop a pedagogical regime whereby it is not sufficient for an individual to engage only in intensive intellectual study, mathematics and astronomy, but he must also give the body the movement and exercise it is due through gymnastics (τὸν δὲ μαθηματικὸν ἢ τινα ἄλλην σφόδρα μελέτην διανοία κατεργαζόμενον καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀποδοτέον κινήσιν, γυμναστικῇ προσομιλοῦντα). So too the individual who is adept at moulding (*plattēin*) his body must also give the soul the movement it is owed through philosophy (τόν τε αὖ σῶμα ἐπιμελῶς **πλάττοντα** τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναποδοτέον κινήσεις, μουσικῇ καὶ πάσῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ προσχρώμενον). It is only through this proportionate balancing of soul and body in education that one can be made truly good and beautiful (εἰ μέλλει δικαίως τις ἅμα μὲν

καλός, ἄμα δὲ ἀγαθὸς ὀρθῶς κεκλιῆσθαι). This moulding of the body-soul compound so that it is beautiful and good must be seen in light of what was discussed earlier in this chapter, the idea that the ideal polity's agalmatopoietic and plastic pedagogical regime seeks to mould its citizens into *eikones* of the Divine Paradigm through the intermediation of the *theoikelon-andreikelon*. Timaeus caps his description of internal harmonisation of the body-soul compound by stating that the balancing of all constituent parts of the microcosmic person must be treated in terms of mimesis of the Form of the All (κατὰ δὲ ταῦτά ταῦτα καὶ τὰ μέρη θεραπευτέον, τὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἀπομιμούμενον εἶδος, 88c-d). Timaeus' soteriology and pedagogy of simultaneous exercise of the psyche and body is totally congruent with the education system of Socrates' ideal polity in the *Republic*.

In the *Republic* the education of the *agalma*-men is centred on the harmonisation of body and soul, the cultivation of interior psychosomatic symmetry. Socrates describes God giving the two arts of music and gymnastics to man for the sake of the *thymos* and the philosophic *nous*-soul being co-adjusted and harmonised through tightening and loosening. This motion has as its 'incidental side-effect' (*parergon*) the balancing of soul and body (*R.3.411e-412a*).

Socrates adds that "he who best blends [κεραυνύντα] gymnastics with music and applies them most suitably to the soul is the man whom we should most rightly pronounce to be the most perfect and harmonious musician, far rather than the one who brings the strings into unison with one another".²⁸³ Glaucon responds with the word 'εἰκότως'; that is, the likening of the *zōgraphos-oikistes* coordinating the education of *agalma*-citizens to a musician harmonising strings is deemed a 'fitting and likely' (*eikōs*) *logos*. Socrates then states that such a 'master musician' capable of harmonising the body-soul compound of microcosmic

²⁸³For the connection between music and virtue, see *Phd* 61a, *La*.188d. Cf. the etymology of Muses and Music in *Cra*.406a as being derived from *mōsthai*, to engage in philosophic searching.

man is required by the ideal polity act as a ‘supervisor’ (*epistatēs*) to ensure the city’s preservation, its *sotēria* (οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡμῖν, ὃ Γλαύκων, δεήσει τοῦ τοιούτου τινὸς ἀεὶ ἐπιστάτου, εἰ μέλλει ἡ πολιτεία σώζεσθαι;). Socrates provides the means through which such a master-musician supervisor imposes such harmonising *kosmos* on the ideal polis: laws (*nomoi*) in the form of ‘moulds’ employed in the education and rearing (οἱ μὲν δὲ τύποι τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς οὔτοι ἄν εἴεν, 412b). Only when citizens are young and ‘soft’ can they be moulded in such a way as to receive the ‘stamping impress’ of the design intended for them (νέω καὶ ἀπαλῷ ὄτωσιν; μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται, καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος ὃν ἄν τις βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι ἐκάστω, 377b). This process of moulding the body-soul compounds of citizens into likenesses of the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* constitution is the microcosmic analogue of how the Timaeus Demiurge impresses Forms into the Chora like a stamp in wax for the genesis of *gignomena* (Ti.50d).

In educating the citizenry the philosopher-king *agalmatopoiōi* engage in demiurgic ‘*systasis*’, the assembling of multifarious parts of the body-soul compound into a single harmony. This conception of *systasis* as the symmetry between soul and body is related to how Plato’s Socrates describes the ideal *logos* in the *Phaedrus*. A discourse (*logos*) is not merely a cluster of disembodied words but rather is to be conceived of as a true *zōon*, a symmetrical and harmonised body-soul compound. The ideal *logos* should be composed (συνεστάναι) as a *zoōn* with a body that is neither headless nor footless but rather has a torso and extremities which are painted or drawn or written (γεγραμμένα) and proportionate vis-à-vis each other and the whole that they jointly constitute (*Phdr.*264c). Just as the ideal discourse must be systatically composed (συνεστάναι) with interior symmetry so as to form a well-proportioned whole so too Timaeus’ soteriology of health involves the human individual achieving maximal symmetry in his body-soul compound so that he can in turn be a beautiful *zōon*

himself and can optimise his likeness to the Whole, the All, the Divine Macrocosm. The *eikotes mythoi* with which nursing mothers are to mould (R. 377c) the agalma-citizens into likenesses of the Paradigm are thus to be conceived of as perfect *zōon-logoi* which, by virtue of their intrinsic systatic harmony, impart the proportional template of the *theoikeilon-andreikeilon* to the body-soul compound of the citizenry. This means that the very proportions of Timaeus' *logos* mathematically embody the soteriological message he is trying to convey. Though it is the diction of symmetry that dominates the above-extracted Timaeian passage (87c-88c), the idea of *systasis* in the specific sense of assembling a proportionate and whole *zōon* is discernible. The central dynamic that is universal to all art, all mimesis, is the concept of harmonic composition (*systasis*) of the whole through properly articulating its parts. Indeed, cognates of the compositive verb συνίστημι occur 64 times in the *Timaeus* in essentially exclusively Demiurgic contexts.²⁸⁴ This serves to frame Timaeus the logographer and rhapsodic *poiētēs* as imitator of God the Maker, (the *Poiētēs*). In his account of the Demiurge's composition of the Cosmotheos as a harmoniously whole *zōon* he ensures that his animalian *logos* itself bears the same systatic dynamism such that the reader's/hearer's body-soul compound can be proportionately moulded into a microcosmic likeness of the macrocosmic All. The diction of *systasis* features prominently alongside the key term 'living creature' (ζῷον, 30c-31a):

τίνι τῶν ζῳων αὐτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα ὁ συνιστὰς συνέστησεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν μέρος εἶδει πεφυκότων μηδενὶ καταξιώσωμεν —ἀτελεῖ γὰρ εἰκόδς οὐδέν ποτ' ἂν γένοιτο καλόν—οὗ δ' ἔστιν ἄλλα ζῳα καθ' ἓν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια, τούτῳ πάντων ὁμοιότατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τιθῶμεν. τὰ γὰρ δὴ νοητὰ ζῳα πάντα ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὸν ἔχει, καθάπερ ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἡμᾶς ὅσα τε ἄλλα θρέμματα συνέστηκεν ὁρατά. τῷ γὰρ τῶν νοουμένων καλλίστῳ καὶ κατὰ πάντα τελέῳ μάλιστα αὐτὸν ὁ θεὸς

²⁸⁴ Other than occurrences in 30c, 30d,31a which are extracted above, other instances are 29e; 32b; 32c; 35a; 36b; 36d; 37e; 41d; 45c;48a; 53b; 53c; 54a; 54c; 54d; 54e; 55a; 55c; 56d; 57b; 57c; 58b; 60c; 60d; 61a; 66c; 66d; 69c; 71b; 71d; 72e; 73e; 74d; 75a;76e; 78a; 78c;78e; 81b; 81e; 82b; 83a; 83d; 89a; 89c; 91a. the specifically demiurgic character of the word is plain in Pl. Lg. 858b where the word *systasis* is used in reference construction workers selecting the stones they will be assembling to make the desired structure (καθάπερ ἡ λιθολόγος). Cf. the word's occurrence in Arist. *Cael.* 280a11-23 & Pl. *Smp.* 187c.

ὁμοιωσαι βουληθεεις ζῶον ἐν ὁρατόν, πάνθ' ὅσα αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν συγγενῆ ζῶα ἐντὸς ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ, συνέστησε.

This being established, we must declare that which comes next in order. In the semblance of which of the **living Creatures** did the Constructor [συνιστάς] of the cosmos construct [συνέστησεν] it? We shall not deign to accept any of those which belong by **nature** to the category of “**parts**”; for nothing that **resembles** [ἔουκός] the **imperfect** would ever become fair. But we shall affirm that the Cosmos, more than aught else, resembles most closely that **Living Creature** of which all other **living creatures**, severally and generically, are portions. For that **Living Creature** embraces and contains within itself all the intelligible **Living Creatures**, just as this Universe contains us and all the other visible **living creatures** that have been **fashioned** [συνέστηκεν]. For since God desired to make it **resemble** [ὁμοιωσαι] most closely that intelligible Creature which is fairest of all and in all ways most **perfect**, He constructed it as a **Living Creature**, **one** and visible, containing within itself all the **living creatures** which are **by nature akin** to itself.

This passage should be seen in light of *Phdr.*264c where it is said that a *logos* should be systatically composed as a *zōon* (λόγον ὡσπερ ζῶον **συνεστάναι**). These passages share diction of *systasis* and the common theme of the holism of a *zōon* and they play on the bivalence of ‘*zōon*’ referring to both a living organism that arose from sexual reproduction and an artisanal product, a painting of an animal that was obviously produced asexually.²⁸⁵ As seen in the above passage, Timaeus combines the Demiurge’s asexual identity as Artisan, mimetic *Poiētēs* and ‘Compositor’ (συνιστάς) with his identity as ‘biological father’ for His creation is not a lifeless *agalma* (cf.37c) but rather an organic living being (cf. 28c: ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός). The biological diction of begetting in the above Timaeian passage—γένος, φύσις, συγγενής (congenital) and θρέμμα—is combined with derivatives of ὁμοιος, εἰκός and συνίστημι that relate to non-biological, artisanal *poēsis* and image-production (*eikonopoīia*) through imitation of a model. Systatic *zōgraphia* is thus framed as an asexual mental demiurgy that involves harmonising proportions in order to virtually ‘paint’ or ‘sketch out’ a *logos-zōon*; this representation is nonetheless conceived of as a living creature which is typically the product of biological reproduction. This paradoxical marriage of asexual artisanship and biological reproduction in systatic composition serves to frame

²⁸⁵ Bague (1985), 54-55.

Timaeus' logography as an inherently divine enterprise. By virtue of his 'birthing' of a *logos* that is both a crafted virtual *agalma* of the Cosmotheos and a divine, living *zōon* in its own right Timaeus is a microcosmic *poiētēs* and father analogous to the macrocosmic *Poiētēs* and Father (28c).²⁸⁶

Earlier it was noted that it would be necessary to return to the question of how one can be sure that Timaeus succeeded in producing an accurate picture of both the Divine Macrocosm and of the ideal microcosmic man in his *eikōs logos*. Before examining the accuracy of the *zōon-eikōn* 'painted' by Timaeus through the words of his discourse it is necessary to turn to the criterion of judgment put forth in the *Critias* by the eponymous character who says the following in response to Timaeus' discourse which has just been completed (107b-e):

μίμησιν μὲν γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἀπεικασίαν τὰ παρὰ πάντων ἡμῶν ῥηθέντα χρεῶν που γενέσθαι: τὴν δὲ τῶν γραφῶν εἰδωλοποιίαν περὶ τὰ θεῖα τε καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα σώματα γιγνομένην ἴδωμεν ῥαστώνης τε περὶ καὶ χαλεπότητος πρὸς τὸ τοῖς ὀρῶσιν δοκεῖν ἀποχρῶντως μεμιμησθαι, καὶ κατοψόμεθα ὅτι γῆν μὲν καὶ ὄρη καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ ὕλην οὐρανόν τε σύμπαντα καὶ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ ἰόντα πρῶτον μὲν ἀγαπῶμεν ἂν τίς τι καὶ βραχὺ πρὸς ὁμοιότητα αὐτῶν ἀπομιμεῖσθαι δυνατὸς ἦ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἅτε οὐδὲν εἰδότες ἀκριβῆς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, οὔτε ἐξετάζομεν οὔτε ἐλέγχομεν τὰ γεγραμμένα, σκιαγραφία δὲ ἀσαφεῖ καὶ ἀπατηλῶ χρώμεθα περὶ αὐτά: τὰ δὲ ἡμέτερα ὁπόταν τις ἐπιχειρῇ σώματα ἀπεικάζειν, ὀξέως αἰσθανόμενοι τὸ παραλειπόμενον διὰ τὴν αἰεὶ σύνοικον κατανόησιν χαλεποὶ κριταὶ γιγνόμεθα τῷ μὴ πάσας πάντως τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀποδιδόντι. ταῦτόν δὴ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους ἰδεῖν δεῖ γιγνόμενον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν οὐράνια καὶ θεῖα ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ σμικρῶς εἰκότα λεγόμενα, τὰ δὲ θνητὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπινα ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάζομεν. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ παραχρήμα νῦν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρέπον ἂν μὴ δυνώμεθα πάντως ἀποδιδόναι, συγγιγνώσκειν χρεῶν: οὐ γὰρ ὡς ῥάδια τὰ θνητὰ ἄλλ' ὡς χαλεπὰ πρὸς δόξαν ὄντα ἀπεικάζειν δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι.

The accounts given by us all must be, of course, of the nature of **imitations and representations**; and if we look at the **portraiture** of divine and of human bodies as executed by **painters**, in respect of the ease or difficulty with which they succeed in **imitating** their subjects in the opinion of onlookers, we shall notice in the first place that as regards the earth and mountains and rivers and woods and the whole of heaven, with the things that exist and move therein, we are content if a man is able to **represent** them with even a small **degree of likeness**; and further, that, inasmuch as we have no exact knowledge about such objects, we do not examine closely or

²⁸⁶ Cf. *Phaedrus* 275e where a *logos* is said to always need the help of its father (τοῦ πατρὸς αἰεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ). Cf. also 257b (Λυσίαν τὸν τοῦ λόγου πατέρα) and 275a (πατὴρ ὢν γραμμάτων).

criticize the **paintings**, but tolerate, in such cases, an inexact and **deceptive sketch**. On the other hand, whenever a painter tries to **render a likeness** of our own bodies, we quickly perceive what is defective because of our constant familiar acquaintance with them, and become severe critics of him who fails to bring out to the full all the points of similarity. And precisely the same thing happens, as we should notice, in the case of discourses: in respect of what is celestial and divine we are satisfied if the account possesses even a small **degree of likelihood**, but we examine with precision what is mortal and human. To an account given now on the spur of the moment indulgence must be granted, should we fail to make it a wholly fitting representation; for one must conceive of mortal objects as being difficult, and not easy, to represent satisfactorily.²⁸⁷

Critias' claim that the *eidolopoia* of painters reproducing divine and human bodies (τῶν γραφέων εἰδωλοποιίαν περὶ τὰ θεῖά τε καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα σώματα γιγνομένην) differs depending on the whether the subject is divine and thus incapable of being known accurately or human and thus familiar seems to be at odds with the whole concept of the *theoikelon andreikelon* that this dissertation is preoccupied with. Plato's Socrates' teaches that the ideal political constitution is to be 'painted' with the shape and hue of the God-like man. Thus the whole point of the Republic-Timaeus is that the 'gap' between God and man can be bridged through philosophic demiurgy, *eikonopoia*. Indeed this dissertation argues that the Timaeian *logos* is structured according to the proportional ratios of man's body-soul compound and as such constitutes a zōgraphic and/or agalmatic eikastic depiction of a divinised man. If that is the case and Timaeus' *logos* constitutes a zōgraphia/agalma of the *theoikelon andreikelon* which successfully shows how the Divine can be manifest in human form, then Critias' claim that humanity's lack of familiarity with divinity impedes their capacity to assess depictions of the gods does not actually hold water.

Critias' commentary on depictions of divine and human bodies is not made as a bona fide argument but is part of a sly ploy to put down his adversary rhapsode in an agonistic context.

²⁸⁷ Cf. *Lg.* 668e-669a where a man is said to judge the beauty of a painting or sculpture of a man through his familiarity with human proportions, a knowledge he is said to have of all animals.

Indeed, Critias says “what I must somehow endeavour to show is that the discourse now to be delivered calls for greater indulgence because of its greater difficulty” (107a-b). Critias is seeking to set up parameters by which his own discourse can be given greater leniency, presumably because he is aware that Timaeus’ was exceedingly good and will be hard to match. However, rather than conceding that this is the case Critias instead says the following: “it is easier, Timaeus, to appear to speak satisfactorily to men about the gods, than to us about mortals” (107b). The reason for this is, apparently, due to our ignorance of the gods: “for when the listeners are in a state of inexperience and complete ignorance about a matter, such a state of mind affords great opportunities to the person who is going to discourse on that matter; and we know what our state is concerning knowledge of the gods” (ἡ γὰρ ἀπειρία καὶ σφόδρα ἄγνοια τῶν ἀκούοντων περὶ ὧν ἂν οὕτως ἔχωσιν πολλὴν εὐπορίαν παρέχεσθον τῷ μέλλοντι λέγειν τι περὶ αὐτῶν: περὶ δὲ δὴ θεῶν ἴσμεν ὡς ἔχομεν). This is at odds with both Socrates’ teaching on the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* and Timaeus’ understanding of microcosmic man’s rotational cognition (*phronēsis*) resembling closely that of Uranus-Chronos. Indeed, the whole point of the Socrates framing the ideal political constitution as a *theoeikelon-andreikelon* (R.501a-b) and then commissioning Timaeus to animate that polity and its citizenry through an ‘agalmatomorphic’ mythic discourse (Ti. 19b-c) is that, unlike Critias, Socrates believes that the Divine can be made manifest within the properly ordered human’s body-soul compound. In the case of a ‘properly moulded’ agalmatic philosopher-king he is truly *theoeikelos*, that is, he is an accurate likeness of God and as such can perceive that he resembles (the Divine) and can properly produce an accurate painting (*zōgraphia*) or statue (*agalma*) of Him in his own likeness.

There is an irony that despite humbly asserting in his proem that he and those judging his discourse have a mortal human nature (τε οἱ κριταὶ φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην ἔχομεν) and thus can

only accept a ‘likely account’ of cosmotheogony without pursuing anything further (29c-d) Timaeus nonetheless concludes by worshipping the living *eikōn* of the Cosmotheos that his completed discourse has begotten (*Criti.* 106a). The same speaker who emphasises his limitations as a mortal stressing that only God can perfectly mix colours (*Ti.* 68d) nonetheless paints out the *theoiekelon-andreikelon* itself for not only do Timaeus’ words generate an *eikōn* of the Cosmotheos but they also incarnate Socrates’ ideal polity as a *zōon*. Timaeus is a paradoxical blend of a humble and limited mortal man but also a divinised philosopher capable of successfully imitating the Demiurge to the degree that he can ‘through words’ beget an *eikōn* of the Cosmotheos and virtually ‘paint out’ Socrates’ ideal polity as a living *agalma* (this will be addressed in Chapter 2). This same combination of feigned humility whilst executing a God-like feat is found in Socrates’ interaction with his interlocutors in the *Timaeus*. Despite having laid the foundation for Timaeus’ God-generating *eikōs logos* in his political discourse the prior night by relaying the contents of the *Republic* and thus tracing out (*diagraphein*) and painting with skilfully-mixed pigments the *theoiekelon-andreikelon* constitution Socrates nonetheless speaks in a self-deprecating manner about his lack of capacity. Socrates says that he is not even capable of sufficiently praising the ideal city (*Ti.* 19d). Socrates continues by explaining his inability to *zōgraphically* animate his ideal *zōon*-polity in terms of the tension between words (*logoi*) and deed (*ergon*), 19d-e:

καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν: ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν εἴληφα καὶ περὶ τῶν πάλαι γεγονότων καὶ περὶ τῶν νῦν ὄντων ποιητῶν, οὐτι τὸ ποιητικὸν ἀτιμάζων γένος, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον ὡς τὸ μιμητικὸν ἔθνος, οἷς ἂν ἐντραφῆ, ταῦτα μιμήσεται ῥᾶστα καὶ ἄριστα, τὸ δ’ ἐκτὸς τῆς τροφῆς ἐκάστοις γιγνόμενον χαλεπὸν μὲν ἔργοις, ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον λόγοις εὖ μιμεῖσθαι. τὸ δὲ τῶν σοφιστῶν γένος αὖ πολλῶν μὲν λόγων καὶ καλῶν ἄλλων μάλ’ ἐμπειρον ἤγημαι, φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή πως, ἅτε πλανητὸν ὄν κατὰ πόλεις οἰκήσεις τε ἰδίας οὐδαμῆ διωκηκός, ἄστοχον ἅμα φιλοσόφων ἀνδρῶν ἢ καὶ πολιτικῶν, ὅσ’ ἂν οἶά τε ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ μάχαις **πράττοντες ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ** προσομιλοῦντες ἐκάστοις **πράττειεν καὶ λέγοιεν.**

Now in this inability of mine there is nothing surprising; but I have formed the same opinion about the poets also, those of the present as well as those of the past; not that I disparage in any way the poetic clan, but it is plain to all that the imitative tribe will imitate with most ease and success the things amidst which it has been reared,

whereas it is hard for any man to imitate well in **action** what lies outside the range of his rearing, and still harder in **speech**. Again, as to the class of Sophists, although I esteem them highly versed in many fine discourses of other kinds, yet I fear lest haply, seeing they are a class which roams from city to city and has no settled habitations of its own, they may go wide of the mark in regard to men who are at once philosophers and statesmen, and what they would be likely to **do** and **say**, in their several **dealings** with foemen in war and battle, both by **word** and **deed**.

Socrates is at pains here to make it clear that he is not outright denouncing the mythopoetic enterprise and mimesis but rather has reservations about the capacity of poets to depict the Divine well and to endorse truth and virtue if that was not a part of their rearing.²⁸⁸ Similarly Socrates appreciates the skill of the Sophists in discourse but desires a more stable and healthy alternative—a kind of philosopher-warrior who excels in both word and deed. This dichotomy between deed (*ergon*) and word (*logos*) is tremendously important. It can be asserted with great certainty that Timaeus attains to this status as archetypal philosophic warrior-poet for when he prays to the *eikōn* of the Divine All that his discourse has generated he emphasises that his *logoi* have acquired the same power as the Demiurge's deed, His cosmogonic *ergon*, for Timaeus' own words have re-birthed that very same Cosmotheos (*Criti.* 106a).

After downplaying his own political and military experience he praises that of Timaeus thus insinuating that he is cut out for the task ahead—he is a philosopher-warrior capable of excelling in word and deed. Socrates says that Timaeus is from a well-lawed polity, Italian Locris and says that he second to no one there in wealth and stock (Τίμαιός τε γὰρ ὅδε, εὐνομοτάτης ὦν πόλεως τῆς ἐν Ἰταλία Λοκρίδος, **οὐσία καὶ γένει** οὐδενὸς ὕστερος ὦν τῶν ἐκεῖ, 20a). Here there is an important ontological and epistemological double-meaning at play. The phrase οὐσία καὶ γένει does not only mean that Timaeus is wealthy and of good

²⁸⁸ For poetry as mimesis see *R.* 392d & 579e ff.

stock but it also foreshadows the fact that he is uniquely equipped to fulfil the role of *zōgraphos-poiētēs* capable of animating the ideal polity as a *zōon* because he is capable of understanding both Being (*ousia*) and Becoming (*genesis*) and the relationship linking the two. Reydams-Schils rightly notes that Socrates' playing down of his own military experience is obviously ironic here but points out that it is part of a wider aporetic self-awareness which is actually his great strength—he is always seeking answers from other and is willing to humble himself even if those others prove disappointingly incapable of providing sturdy epistemological foundations be they *physiologoi* such as Anaxagoras (*Phaedo* 97b-99c) or the divinely inspired *poiētai* who know not what they say (ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντιες καὶ οἱ χρησμοδοί, *Ap.* 22a-c).²⁸⁹ Reydams-Schils adds that “the awareness of his limited, yet significant experience is not the only feature that separates Socrates from the poets and sophists: unlike them, he does have his own way of aligning his words and deeds...one between painting, or depiction, and living reality, which is subsumed under a second opposition, between rest and motion”.²⁹⁰ This means of marrying word and deed in an uncanny manner is hinted at in *Ti.* 19b-c:

ἀκούοιτ' ἂν ἤδη τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἦν διήλθομεν, οἷόν τι πρὸς αὐτὴν πεπονθῶς τυγχάνω. προσέοικεν δὲ δὴ τινί μοι τοιῷδε τὸ πάθος, οἷον εἴ τις ζῶα καλὰ που θεασάμενος, εἴτε ὑπὸ γραφῆς εἰργασμένα εἴτε καὶ ζῶντα ἀληθινῶς ἠσυχίαν δὲ ἄγοντα, εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἀφίκοιτο θεάσασθαι κινούμενά τε αὐτὰ καὶ τι τῶν τοῖς σώμασιν δοκούντων προσήκειν κατὰ τὴν ἀγωνίαν ἀθλοῦντα: ταῦτόν καὶ ἐγὼ πέπονθα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἦν διήλθομεν. ἡδέως γὰρ ἂν του λόγῳ διεξιόντος ἀκούσαιμ' ἂν ἄθλους οὓς πόλις ἀθλεῖ, τούτους αὐτὴν ἀγωνιζομένην πρὸς πόλεις ἄλλας, πρεπόντως εἰς τε πόλεμον ἀφικομένην καὶ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν τὰ προσήκοντα ἀποδιδούσαν τῇ παιδείᾳ καὶ τροφῇ κατὰ τε τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις πράξεις καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διερμηνεύσεις πρὸς ἐκάστας τῶν πόλεων

And now, in the next place, listen to what my feeling is with regard to the polity we have described. I may compare my feeling to something of this kind: suppose, for instance, that on seeing beautiful creatures, whether **works of art** or actually **alive** but in **repose**, a man should be moved with desire to behold them in **motion** and vigorously engaged in some such exercise as seemed suitable to their physique; well,

²⁸⁹ Reydams-Schils (2011), 349-50. For Socrates' military experience, see *Smp.* 219e ff & 221a ff with Proclus in *Ti.* 1.62.15-21)

²⁹⁰ Reydams-Schils (2011), 350.

that is the very feeling I have regarding the State we have described. Gladly would I listen to anyone who should depict in words our State contending against others in those struggles which States wage; in how proper a spirit it enters upon war, and how in its warring it exhibits qualities such as befit its education and training in its dealings with each several State whether in respect of military actions or in respect of **verbal** negotiations.

Here in this programmatic passage Socrates sets up three sets of polarities that underpin the whole ‘banquet of *logoi*’ that comprises the *Republic-Timaeus-Critias* (27b: τὴν τῶν λόγων ἐστίασιν). The three polarities are lifeless works of art vis-à-vis living *zōa*, the tension between words and deeds and lastly the opposites of movement and stillness. The only other important polarity not expressly mentioned here is the tension between singularity and multiplicity though it is implicit in Socrates’ commissioning of Timaeus the cosmogonic and anthropogonic *poiētēs* to animate his polity and the entire All as one *zōon*. For Socrates the ideal polity is centred on the balancing of polarities, particularly the tension between word and deed and between the one and the many: “the figure of a man ‘equilibrated’ and ‘assimilated’ to virtue’s self perfectly, so far as may be, in **word and deed**, and holding rule in a city of like quality, that is a thing they have never seen in **one** case or in **many**” (R. 6.498e: ἄνδρα δὲ ἀρετῇ παρισωμένον καὶ ὁμοιωμένον μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τελέως **ἔργῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ**, δυναστεύοντα ἐν πόλει ἐτέρα τοιαύτη, οὐ πάποτε ἐωράκασιν, **οὔτε ἓνα οὔτε πλείους**). Excellence cannot be limited to dialectic but must manifest in action and so too virtue cannot only be individual but must be manifest at in the *polis-zōon* as a whole.

It is not only the perfect mixing of multiplicity into singularity that constitutes the hallmark of God-like *zōgraphia-agalmatopoiia* nor is it simply a matter determining whether the *zōgraphia* produced through words corresponds to what it is supposed to be eikastically depicting. Rather success in *eikonopoiia* is truly achieved through producing through words and proportional ratios (*logoi*) a work of art that is not simply an inanimate or life-like unity

but rather is genuinely an autonomous living being. This latter kind of *zōgraphia-aglamatopoiia* bridges the two distinct ontological orders of Being and Becoming in the same way that the Demiurge's creation of the Visible Cosmotheos qua *Eikōn* of the Noetic does (92c). The tension between lifeless works of art and living *zōa* is particularly important and is obviously related to the dichotomy of motion and stillness for *zographiai* and *agalamta* are typically motionless whereas living creatures move. It may even have been an interest of the historical Socrates given that Xenophon (*Mem.* 4.3.2-18) has his Socrates put forward this same dichotomy between inferior artists who produce lifeless works of art and those who are superior by virtue of their begetting living *zoa* endowed with intelligence (πότερα σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀπεργαζόμενοι εἶδωλα ἄφρονα τε καὶ ἀκίνητα ἀξιοθαυμαστότεροι εἶναι ἢ οἱ ζῶα ἔμφορνα τε καὶ ἐνεργά).²⁹¹ That both Socrates and Timaeus successfully achieve this and have also overcome the inherent deficiency of words vis-à-vis actions by producing an eikastic mode of discourse that actually begets autonomous truly living *zōa-agalmata* is not only expressed at the end of Timaeus' *logos-mythos* (τῷ δὲ πρὶν μὲν πάλαι ποτ' ἔργῳ, νῦν δὲ λόγοις ἄρτι θεῶ γεγονότι προσεύχομαι, *Criti.* 106a). It is already expressed shortly after the programmatic passage of *Ti.*19b-c when Critias lays out the order of speeches (see 27a). Critias says that Timaeus is to speak first beginning with the begetting of the cosmos and ending with the generation of the nature of man (πρῶτον λέγειν ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως, τελευτᾶν δὲ εἰς ἀνθρώπων φύσιν). Critias, addressing Socrates, then adds that he will give his discourse after Timaeus receiving from him the humans begotten through his *logos* and educated excellently by Socrates (ἐμὲ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον, ὡς παρὰ μὲν τούτου

²⁹¹ See also X. *Mem.* 3.10.1-8 where Socrates interrogates the *andriantopoiios* Cleiton about making *agalmata* resemble more closely genuinely living creatures. Cf. Hipp. *de Victu* 21: ἀνδριαντοποιοὶ μίμησιν σώματος ποιέουσιν πλὴν ψυχῆς, γνώμην δὲ ἔχοντα οὐ ποιέουσιν. Goldhill (2010), 173-175 for Socrates developing "a new political culture of viewing" by dialoging with artists and appropriating their ideas. For the idea of unattainable perfection in sculpture and painting, see *Philemon* (New Comedy) Fr 72: οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδριαντοποιός... ὅστις ἂν πλάσαι κάλλος τοιοῦτον κτλ.

δεδεγμένον ἀνθρώπους τῷ λόγῳ γεγονότας, παρὰ σοῦ δὲ πεπαιδευμένους διαφερόντως).

This means that Timaeus' words generated virtual humans making his *logos* essentially identifiable with the demiurgic *ergon* of the gods that created humans. So too the education system of the ideal polity that Socrates pictured in his words has generated perfectly trained citizens, *agalma*-citizens that are living *erga* begotten through *logoi*. In the Myth of Metals Socrates conceives of a mythic education-system wherein children are convinced that they are living metallic *agalmata* crafted directly by God when in reality it is the *zographoi*-philosophers painting out this fiction (3.415a):

ἐστὲ μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀδελφοί, ὡς φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς
μυθολογοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς πλάττων, ὅσοι μὲν ὑμῶν ἱκανοὶ ἄρχειν, χρυσὸν ἐν τῇ
γενέσει συνέμειξεν αὐτοῖς, διὸ τιμιώτατοί εἰσιν: ὅσοι δ' ἐπίκουροι, ἄργυρον: σίδηρον
δὲ καὶ χαλκὸν τοῖς τε γεωργοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς

While all of you in the city are brothers, we will say in our tale, yet **God in fashioning** those of you who are fitted to hold rule **mingled** gold in their generation,¹ for which reason they are the most precious—but in the helpers silver, and iron and brass in the farmers and other craftsmen.

This is vital background for Critias' receiving of men crafted virtually by the Demiurge in Timaeus' *logos* and then educated by Socrates in his political discourse. Just as God the Demiurge is both Father and Maker (τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα, *Ti.28c*) thus combining biological begetting and artisanal creation in bringing forth a Cosmotheos that is both a *zōn agalma* (*Ti.37c*) and a living *zōon* (τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῶον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν, *Ti.30b*) so too the *zographoi-oikistai* in mixing the *theoeikelon-andreiekelon* constitution's divinising essence into the citizens they mould them into living *agalmata* and act in such a way their *logoi* and *mythoi*, their discourses and tales are effectively equated with the demiurgic *ergon* of God Himself. Indeed, the *zōgraphoi-agalmatopoiōi* devising the myth-moulds (*typoi*) in which the citizens' souls and bodies will be shaped (οἱ μυθολογοῦντες) are identified with God the Sculptor (ὁ θεὸς πλάττων) in this passage—another instance of the one and the many

being reconciled whilst overcoming the tension between deed and word as well as that between lifeless artisanal product and truly living creature.

Now that the structure of the *eikōs logos* has been thoroughly examined as has its use as a *typos* for the moulding of *theoeikela andreikela*, of God-like agalma-citizens, there nonetheless remains yet another important task. This dissertation's argument about the agalmatomorphic structure of the *eikōs logos* and its use as a *typos* for moulding citizens needs to be further bolstered by examining how novel developments in statue-production and art theory in Plato's era influence the conception *agalmatopoiia* of the *Timaeus-Republic*.

Cultural Backdrop of *Andriantopoiia*

In contextualising the *agalmatopoiia* of the *Timaeus-Republic* it is vital to keep in mind that the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC were marked by a major shift in the material culture of Athens, particularly the 'demiurgic' and 'eikastic' domain of image production. What did this shift consist of? Onians explains that an "increase in demand for consumer goods" led to a boom in the number of and scale of image-producing workshops: "craftsman-owners needed increasingly to delegate responsibility for production and the only way to maintain standardisation in such circumstances was to rely less on a few good assistants working independently and more on less qualified artisans working from models".²⁹² Interestingly there are iconographic depictions of the kinds of techniques employed by mass-production workshops. These depictions are self-referentially displayed as decorative motifs on items produced in those very factories through those very methods. A great example of

²⁹² Onians (1999), 98.

this is the fifth-century red-figure “Foundry Cup” by the eponymous Foundry Painter which shows naked slaves casting and assembling statues whilst clothed over-seers look on:²⁹³



Critically on this same cup, the Foundry Cup, there are depictions of *paradigmata*, painted images on square canvases used as models by the craftsmen (*dēmiourgoi*). These *paradigmata* are hanging from the bull-horns on the wall and the *dēmiourgoi* have recourse to these models in their image-production (*eikonopoiia*):²⁹⁴



²⁹³ Onians (1999), 73, Figure 53.

²⁹⁴ Onians (1999), 99. The image produced is given as Onians' Figure 81.

Given then that there are material remains attesting to an economic change in Plato's era whereby *agalмата* were being mass-produced by *dēmiourgoi* relying on *paradigmata*, would it be unreasonable to suppose that the cosmogony of the *Timaeus* was inspired by this development? It seems reasonable to suppose that Timaeus' account of a Demiurge relying on a Paradigm (28a: προσχρόμενος παραδείγματι) to construct the Cosmotheos as an *agalma* (37c) is simply a projection of this new manufacturing procedure onto the macrocosm. Indeed Onians argues that "the entire model for the [Timaeian] account is the operation of a highly organised workshop" and that "without an understanding of this development in industrial production Plato is unlikely ever to have come up with his remarkable theory", namely that of the Forms as well as the *eikōs mythos* of God as a Demiurge using a Paradigm to craft the cosmos as an *agalma* (*Ti.*37c).²⁹⁵ In making this argument Onians cites the key programmatic line wherein it is said that the city-founders (*oikistai*) of Socrates' ideal polity, the philosopher-kings, can only succeed in 'sketching out' a blessed polity if they, acting as *zōgraphoi*—or 'animal-painters' (cf. *Ti.* 19b-c), rely upon the Divine Paradigm (ὥς οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλως εὐδαιμονήσειε πόλις, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράψειαν οἱ τῷ θεῷ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι, *R.*500e). Thus Onians makes his argument that the Theory of the Forms and the cosmogony of the *Timaeus* are both interconnected and jointly influenced by contemporary developments in the demiurgic production of statues by using the same passages that this dissertation relies on for its arguments. Onians is not unique in this regard. Petraki has made a similar argument for contemporary trends in statue-production influencing Plato but has focused specifically on the Myth of Metals (*R.*3.415a–d) and the general typology of educating and rearing *phylakes* as if they are bronze sculptures cast in moulds (τύποι παιδείας καὶ τροφῆς, *R.*412b). She says that "the inference from Plato's use of technical language is that Socrates takes a negative mould (*typos*) from a single model (*paradeigma*) and creates

²⁹⁵ Onians (1999), 98.

reproductions of the same guardian form.”²⁹⁶ She adds that “the value of the lost-wax technique lies in the repeatable reproduction of exact replicas of the same model [and thus] its appropriation in the dialogue suggests that all the city-guardians will embody the same fundamental features, the same *aretai*”.²⁹⁷ Thus Petraki situates Plato’s typology of moulding citizens as *agalmata* against the backdrop the then-novel developments in casting methods. The production of bronze statuary through the use of moulds is attested from very early on, the Geometric period, but this early method was that of direct lost-wax.²⁹⁸ Haynes explains this primordial technique as involving a wax figurine first being created and being totally coated in clay with the exception of a small perforation so that when the clay exterior is baked all the wax melts and drains out through the whole—this makes room for molten bronze to be poured inside which cools and hardens such that the *agalmatopios* then “breaks open the mould to release the casting, which will be an exact replica of the wax model but marginally smaller owing to the contraction of the bronze”.²⁹⁹ Now in fourth century the indirect lost wax method rose to prominence and it had a major advantage over the older approach-- the original model (*paradeigma*) was not lost during the procedure but rather remained the same.³⁰⁰ This new process is termed ‘indirect’ because it adds an extra step to the more archaic methodology that preserves the prototype, the original model (*paradeigma*)—the model, typically made of clay, would be used to shape plaster moulds of parts of the *paradeigma* which would then be used to create wax impressions.³⁰¹ Those wax impressions of the various parts of the whole model would then be assembled into a unity, an “inter-model” that was then “cored, invested and cast”.³⁰² It is this latter methodology

²⁹⁶ Petraki (2023), 142.

²⁹⁷ Petraki (2023), 142.

²⁹⁸ Haynes (1992), 24–30 & 76–80.

²⁹⁹ Haynes (1992), 24.

³⁰⁰ Mattusch (1980), 437-438.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Mattusch (1980), 437.

whereby the model (*paradeigma*) remains the same without alteration but a likeness (*eikōn*) is nonetheless produced but of a different substance which is likely to have inspired the Timaeian cosmogony wherein the Cosmotheos is an *agalma* (37c) that perfectly replicates the Paradigm’s all-containing quality (30c) but nonetheless is of a different substance as the totality of Visible Becoming and not Invisible Being (92c). In the same way Petraki argues that the indirect lost wax technique was used by Plato to explore “the philosophical concept of participation [of *gignomena* in the Forms] by visualising the guardian class as embodying the abstract qualities that feature in contemporary discussions on the symbolism of bronze statues”.³⁰³ Thus the earlier-discussed typology of *agalmatopoiia* whereby the philosopher-kings acts as a demiurge of self-control, justice and all other civic virtues (δημιουργὸν... σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς, *R.* 500d) by using the Paradigm to cosmically order himself, his polity and its citizens (παραδείγματι χρωμένους ἐκείνω, καὶ πόλιν καὶ ιδιώτας καὶ ἑαυτοὺς κοσμεῖν, *R.* 7.540a-b) is all indebted to a then-novel method of *agalmatopoiia*, the indirect lost wax technique. Indeed, the idea that the philosopher-kings repeatedly using a single model to craft many *agalma*-men that are as close as possible to identical to each other and the Paradigm is very much reminiscent of the indirect lost wax technique.³⁰⁴

³⁰³ Petraki (2023), 142-143. Cf. *R.* 414a (ἡ ἐκλογή εἶναι καὶ κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ φυλάκων, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δι’ ἀκριβείας, εἰρήσθαι).

³⁰⁴ Cf. Onians (1999), 98-99 who argues that Plato’s employment of the term *typos* in the *Republic* is indebted to contemporary use of moulds and provides an example in his Figure 82a and 82b, a fifth century *typos* (mould) for a gorgon-faced roof-tile accompanied by a modern cast produced through reliance on it:



So much for the influence of then-novel techniques of statue-manufacturing on the *Timaeus-Republic*—but what of innovations in terms of art theory? If developments in the material culture of *eikonopoiia* served as an inspiration for Plato in his formulation of a typology of *eikonopoiia* in the *Timaeus-Republic*, would not contemporary trends in intellectual culture dealing with the theorisation of and depiction of the human body also have been equally influential?

Man as the Measure of All Things—Polyclitus' Canon and Simonides' Square-Man

Having thus examined the impact of statue-production techniques on Plato's typology of *agalmatopoiia* and his construction of an ideal *eikōs logos* bearing the proportions of the perfect anthropomorphic statue used to 'mould' its reader/hearer in its likeness, it will be profitable now to briefly examine the then-contemporary trends in intellectual culture pertaining to the measurements of man's body. Doing so will situate Plato's ideas in their cultural context and show that he is not necessarily as novel or innovative as he is sometimes presumed to be but rather is simply working within an already established intellectual culture of theorising about the human body. Indeed, the notion that the mathematico-musical order embodied in the proportions of the human frame is a kind of link between the World of Invisible Ideas and the Visible World of Phaenomena had already been established by Polyclitus' Canon, his delineation of the perfect proportional harmony as manifest in the Doryphorus, the statue of the perfect spear-wielding warrior. The intersection of the ontological and epistemological orders of Being and Becoming or the Noetic and the Visible in Polyclitus' Doryphorus is expressed well by Squire:

“From the very beginnings of Greek monumental sculpture, outward physical form incorporated an assumed inner intellectual ideal. *Kalokagathia* was one compound way of expressing the formula, whereby being physically handsome (*kalos*) was inseparable from being ethically upstanding (*agathos*). In the minds of later Roman

writers, it was Polyclitus – that sculptor from Argos – who was judged to have epitomised the quality. Understanding the body as a perfect equation of abstract proportions – a sort of musical harmony turned flesh (or at least bronze) – Polyclitus was said to have shown how each body-part was commensurable with every other.”³⁰⁵

The point here is that when one is familiar with the theoretical background to Polyclitus’ Canon one can appreciate the strong degree to which Plato is indebted to it in his conception of the embodiment of the perfect mathematico-musical order of Heaven in the *theoikelon-andreikelon* constitution and in the perfectly-proportioned agalmatomorphic *zōon-logos*. It is important to note that just prior to explaining how Polyclitus’ Canon was intended to correlate the visible human frame with the invisible notions of moral goodness and perfect harmony Squire mentions that “it was a contemporary of Polyclitus named Protagoras who declared that ‘man is the measure of all things [*pantōn chrēmātōn metron*]”.³⁰⁶ Brague makes mention of Protagoras in his assessment of the Timaeian *logos*’ embodiment of the proportional harmony of Polyclitus’ Canon when he says that his “most famous saying (man as the measure of all things) might not be utterly foreign to the sculptor’s undertaking”.³⁰⁷ The relationship between Polyclitus’ Canon and Protagoras’ maxim is significant because in Plato’s eponymous work (the *Protagoras*) he not only draws this very same connection but also ties those two thinkers to Simonides’ conception of mythopoetic *agalmatopoiia* as a means of rendering men into ‘noble’ likeness of the ideal sculptural body.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁵ Squire (2011), 8.

³⁰⁶ Squire (2011), 8.

³⁰⁷ Brague (1985), 62. See also Picard (1939), 261. Galen summarises the function of Polyclitus’ Canon in a way that renders it similar to Protagoras’ famous maxim for he says that the Doryphorus presents ‘everything in relation to everything’ (*panta pros panta*, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* 5.448). Philo Mechanicus in his *Syntaxis* (4.1-2) states that perfection is reached incrementally (*para mikron*) through numbers. See also Plu. *Moralia* 86a & 636c with Borbein (1996), 84-86.

³⁰⁸ Protagoras’ famous maxim is that man is the measure of all things, both of how things are and how they are not (πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, DK80b1). For scholarship on Simonides’ *Ode to Scopas*, see Porter (2010), 459-462; Scodel (1996), 69-71; Most (1994); Carson (1992); Schuettrumpf (1987); Gentili (1988), 647-71; Vernant (1991); Dickie (1978); Svenbro (1976), 141-172; Babut (1975); Budelmann (2018), 216-217; Easterling (1974), 41-43; Donlan (1969); Parry (1965); Gentili (1964); Adkins (1960), 165-167, 196-197, 355-359; Woodbury (1953). Cf. also the playful treatment of the ‘squared’ nature of man in *Plt.* 266b.

Simonides' conception of the perfect 'squared' *agalma*-man warrants examination (*Prt.* 339b) given that Polyclitus' Doryphorus may very well be the referent, the perfect agalmatic body constructed out of squares:³⁰⁹

ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν,
χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου
τετυγμένον.

For a man, indeed, to become good truly is hard,
In hands and feet and mind foursquare,
Fashioned without reproach.

It is interesting that perfection in squareness is not only found in the hands and feet, anatomical members, but also in the more abstract mind (*nous*). Anderson states that “the idea of correct proportion ‘in hand and foot’ (χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ) suggests that the ‘squareness’ of Simonides’ man is not only figurative of an equable ‘mind’ (καὶ νόῳ), but literally refers to the orthogonal positioning of limbs.”³¹⁰ The passive participle τετυγμένον derived from the markedly ‘demiurgic’ verb τεύχω serves to convey the idea that the man seeking to become ‘good’ (*agathos*) is, already in Simonides’ understanding, perceived of as a statue being moulded.³¹¹ The good man’s physicality is to be sculpted into four-square perfection along

³⁰⁹ Simonides Fr. 37.1.1. Oddly the quotation and brief discussion of Simonides’ *Ode to Scopas* is often quartered off by modern scholars as a digression and a self-contained treatment of the problem of deception arising from imitative art (cf. *R.* 599b–d). See Carson (1992), 110–130; Beresford (2009), 185–220; Trivigno (2013), 509–543; McCoy (1999), 349–367. Plato’s appropriation of the Simonidean ‘square man’ is related to Polyclitus’ Doryphorus because Pliny (*NH* 34.55) records that Polyclitus’ Doryphorus statue was described by Varro as “*quadratus*”, the Latin equivalent of *tetragōnos*. Onians (1999), 40 points out that despite the limitations of our fragmentary sources informing us about the famed sculptor “what is certain is that Polykleitos constructed the statue using an elaborate system of *summetriai*, mathematical proportions, which governed the relation of all the parts to the whole, and that he wrote a treatise entitled the Canon or Rule in which these were all described”—critically he adds that “the essential geometry of the proportional system of the Canon as revealed in the Doryphorus was indeed **a scheme of squares**”.

³¹⁰ Anderson (2023), 127. See also Gentili (1988), 255, Demos (1999), 22 ff & Svenbro (1984), 134.

³¹¹ The demiurgic verb τεύχω occurs in the *Iliad* where Hephaestus’ Shield is said to have oxen crafted from gold and tin on its surface (αἱ δὲ βόες χρυσοῖο τετεύχατο κασσιτέρου τε, 18.574). As such, just as Homer established the tradition of ekphrastic virtual demiurgy in his *poiēsis* so too Simonides’ use of the verb serves

with his rational soul, his *nous*—this process of *agalmatopoiia* is not purely mental nor purely physical but rather involves squaring of both body and soul (χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόφ τετράγωνον). This shows that the dynamic of moulding the body-soul compound of citizens which lies at the heart of the *Timaeus-Republic* had already to some extent been fleshed out by Simonides. It is worth recalling that this same Simonides speaking of demiurgically rendering men ‘noble’ likenesses of the perfect agalmatic body constructed out of squares was also reported to have come up with the ‘zōgraphic’ conception of *poiēsis* in reference to Homer’s Shield of Achilles, the idea that poetry is *zōgraphia* in the form of resounding words (τὴν δὲ ποίησιν ζωγραφίαν λαλοῦσαν).³¹² Thus it is likely that the *Ode to Scopas* was intended to function much like the Timaeian *eikōs logos* in that it ‘paints’ a virtual *zōgraphia* of what it describes, one which ‘shapes’ the body and soul of the listenerer/reader. Thus Plato’s conception of the ideal constitution as a template of musico-mathematical order in the shape of an anthropomorphic *agalma* that is to be used as a mould (*typos*) for the fashioning of maximally noble humans is not really a novelty per se but rather is derived from contemporary intellectual culture of mathematical, moral and aesthetic theorisation of the ideal human body. There is indeed a reason that identifying Protagoras’ maxim, Polyclitus’ Canon and Simonides’ *Ode to Scopas* as interrelated culturally-established precedents for Plato’s conception of perfecting humanity through musico-mathematical *agalmatopoiia* is so important.

The fact that the mathematically perfect human form had already been conceived of as a kind of microcosmic measure of all things and that Simonides had suggested shaping people into

to frame the moral edification of youths as mythopoeitically as andriantopoiia in a manner analogous to Plato’s conception of agalmatopoetic paedagogy in the *Timaeus-Republic*.


³¹² Plu. *Gloria Atheniensium* 3.

likenesses of such an ideal through a kind of pedagogy that perfects both soul and body serves to affirm that this dissertation's re-construction of Plato's theology and soteriology centred on *agalmatopoiia* is affirmed as being a valid interpretation of the *Timaeus-Republic*. This affirmation comes from the fact that such culturally-established precedents show that this dissertation's *agalmatopoiia*-centred is not an arbitrary superimposition onto the *Timaeus-Republic* or an over-laboured and strained overinterpretation but rather is simply a natural way of reading these Platonic texts against the backdrop of their original cultural context. Whilst the idea that man's body is a 'measure of all things' may seem strange to modern sensibilities when one views the world through a fourth-century BC lens and thus inhabits the realm of cubits and feet the suggestion that the ideal discourse should be 'sculpted' according to the proportions of the ideal anthropomorphic agalma becomes far less outlandish. Indeed material evidence from the Classical Period shows that the human body was widely recognised as delineating an internally proportional system of measurement which was depicted in works of art that were not purely aesthetic but also had a practical, metrological function. In this anthropometric art man is understood as a self-referential *metron*, a compound of different but nonetheless harmonised parts that can be applied to the outside world so as to relativise that external cosmos to fit the internal proportional order (*kosmos*) of man's frame:³¹³



³¹³ Fig. 3 in Squire (2011), 8. Here Squire alluding to Protagoras' famous maxim says that "anthropometric systems of measurement make man the literal measure of all things".

The above fifth-century marble relief from Lycia displays several anthropometric units and their proportional relationship, namely a *daktylos* (finger), the foot (seen suspended above the bicep), a σπιθαμή (the length from the thumb to the little finger), the palm (παλαστή/παλαιστή), the closed fist (seen as an indent at the wrist above), the πυγμή (the space between the elbow and the knuckles, the cubit (πῆχυς) as the length from end of the middle finger to the elbow and the fathom, i.e. the span of one's extended arms (ὄργυια).³¹⁴ The above fifth-century Lycian anthropometric relief can be correlated with the slightly later example from Samos which Papadopoulos has correlated with the Vitruvian man:³¹⁵



³¹⁴ For the δάκτυλος as a measure, see Hdt.1.60 and Alc.41. For the παλαστή see IG12.372.35, Cratin.133, IG22.1665.10, 1666 A67,70, al. (iv B. C.), 11 (2).287 A95 (Delos, iii B. C.), CIG2860.14 (Delos), Phryn.264, PLit.Lond. 183, Hp.Nat.Mul.33, Arist.HA606a14, PCair.Zen.484.11 (iii B. C.), Plb.1.22.4. For the σπιθαμή see EM647.34, Hdt.2.106, Hp.Mochl.38, Hes.Op.426, Pl.Alc.1.126d, Arist.HA606a14, Pol.1302b38, Chrysipp.Stoic.2.47. For the πῆχυς see Poll.2.158, Hdt.1.178, Sch on Luc.Cat.16 and Ar. Ra.799. For ὄργυια the Greek fathom, see Il.23.327, Od.9.325, X. Mem. 2.3.19 and Hdt.2.149.

³¹⁵ Fig. 4a & 4b in Papadopoulos (2019), 55. For the relationship between Polyclitus' Canon and the Vitruvian Man, see Anderson (2023), 121-136. For the Samos-relief, see Dekoulakou-Sideris (1990), 445-451 esp. 446n3. See also Jones (2000), 75-77, with fig. 4. For anthropometric ties with Egypt art, see Iversen (1955), 19-26.

The above diagram displays the dimensions of the Vitruvian man vis-à-vis the hand, foot, arm and *kanōn* of the Samos relief in order to show the relationship between that anthropometric relief and the Vitruvian conception of the ideally proportioned man which is itself of Polyclitan provenance.

The above anthropometric relief and the degree to which it correlates with the theorisation of the ideal man's intrinsic bodily proportionality preserved in Vitruvius' writings shows that the kinds of ideas promoted in Polyclitus' Canon were widely known in the Classical Era since they were incorporated into reliefs that essentially functioned as *paradeigmata* both for taking measurements generally but also for creating perfectly proportioned and consistently identical *agalмата*. The point here is that the general idea of embodying in an *agalma* the perfect musico-mathematical harmony, the very concept which underpins the intertwining of the Divine Macrocosm, the mesocosmic political constitution and microcosmic man's body in the *eikonopoia* of the *Timaeus-Republic* was not simply elitist intellectualism far removed from daily life but rather was a dynamic incorporated into the daily work of slave-craftsmen (*dēmiourgoi*). Indeed the two anthropometric reliefs above are very similar to the depiction on the Foundry Cup not only of *paradeigmata* hanging from the wall in the form of square paintings but also of agalmatic human body parts, namely heads, arms and feet (see above).

Given then how prevalent sculpture and anthropometry were in the material culture of Classical Greece it should not come as a surprise that an intellectual culture appropriating this physicality into its moral speculation should arise. *Protagoras* 339b quotes from Simonides' *Ode to Scopas* a description of the idea that one can demiurgically shape a man into a noble sculpture without defect (ἀνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον). Anderson claims that "it is hard not to read this seeming allusion to Polykleitos, reinforced by the apparently unrelated mention of the sculptor twice elsewhere in the dialogue, as an indirect response to the Protagorean notion

of man as the measure”.³¹⁶ Though it is well known that Plato uses this aphorism ‘man is the measure of all things’ in the *Theaetetus* to explore relativism, that is not its only meaning.³¹⁷ Indeed beyond its use in sophistic relativism the maxim can also be made to have both anthropometric and even theandric meaning (that is to say it can be wielded to suggest that microcosmic man is a universal measure due to his resemblance to the Divine Macrocosm, the ultimate standard).³¹⁸ At any rate Anderson is confident that Plato’s Socrates “follow[s] Simonides in reading Polykleitan sculpture not as a representation of Protagorean relativism, but of an independent...unachievable physical and ethical ideal”.³¹⁹ Similarly Onians claims that “Polykleitos’ *tetragōnoi* statues, like Pythagoras’ *mathēmatikoi* men, were young males reduced as far as possible to mathematical constructs, ‘wrought square’ by their teachers or trainers, as Simonides would have said”.³²⁰ The point here is that Simonides’ *Ode to Scopas*, Polyclitus’ Canon, Protagoras’ maxim and reports about Pythagoreanism when put together attest to there being a broad interest in the mathematical theorisation of the ideal agalmatic human body as both a standard of perfection and universal measure.³²¹

³¹⁶ Anderson (2023), 127. Polyclitus is expressly referred to twice in Plato’s *Protagoras*, see *Prt.* 311c & 328c.

³¹⁷ For this well known meaning, see *Tht.* 151e-152a & 161d with Aristot. *Metaph.* 1011a19–20 & S.E. *M.* 7.60.3. Zaborowski (2017), 23 sees the aphorism as putting forward “epistemological relativism and psychological individualism”. Cf Berkel van (2013), 62 who has argued that “Protagorean relativism as we know it may be an invention of Plato’s[...] more likely to be part of a Socratic/Platonic program than of Protagorean thought”. Similarly Caizzi (1978), 11–35 claims that it is very difficult to untangle Plato’s influence from the original teaching of the Sophists themselves in instances such as these. At various point in the *Theaetetus* the physical form of man is contrasted with that with that of lower animals, namely pigs and baboons (161c) and with the highest animalian race, the gods (162c, cf. *Lg.* 716c4–5) whilst also pointing out that there are many contrasts between particular human individuals (161d). Thus relativism is expressly tied to bodily characteristics in the text. According to Di Lanzo (2015) 273, already in Heraclitus relativism is a consideration – sea water may be clean for fish but for man it is undrinkable and destructive—making him a forerunner of Protagoras (see Heraclitus Fr DK 22 B 61, B 9, B 13, B 82, B 79, B 61). There is no denying that the relativism found in the phrase by Plato is not totally alien to its original meaning, e.g. *Tht.* 183b-c with von Fritz (1946) 22–23.

³¹⁸ It can certainly be re-worked for theological purposes as in *Lg.* 4.716c: ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἶη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ πού τις, ὡς φασιν, ἄνθρωπος: τὸν οὖν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ προσφιλεῖ γενησόμενον, εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι. Here Plato is adapting Hom. *Od.* 17.218: ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον. Cf. also Protagoras’ maxim in *Cra.* 386a ff.

³¹⁹ Anderson (2023), 127.

³²⁰ Onians (1999), 41.

³²¹ As far as Pythagorean theorisation of the body is concerned, a noteworthy mention is the Pythagorean Eurytus, a follower of Philolaus, who, as Betegh (2013), 89 puts it, “carried on his teacher’s project of establishing connections between things and numbers by a strikingly elementary method”. This method, as per

The *tetragōnos* man of Simonides' poem quoted in the *Protagoras* is related to both Pythagoreanism and the Doryphorus. James A. Towle in his commentary on that dialogue not only made those connections but also connected the square-man to the *tetractys*: “meaning is derived from the use of the Pythagoreans, with whom the number four (τετρακτύς) and the square were symbols of the permanent, perfect, divine”.³²² Others have also made the connection between Polyclitus' conception of the mathematically idealised agalmatic body and the Pythagoreanism.³²³ The word τετράγωνον had a positive charge and was not purely physical but also metaphysical; this is reflected in the fact that it occurs in the Pythagorean table of opposites alongside good and beautiful phenomena (Arist. *Met.* A.5.986a22–6).³²⁴ Further, in Aristotle's *Rhetorica* calling a noble man ‘square’ (*tetragōnos*) is said to be a well-established metaphor conveying the fact that both such a man and that shape are ‘perfect’ (οἷον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον μεταφορά, ἄμφω γὰρ τέλεια, 3.11.1411b25-26). Similarly Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics* says that a virtuous man “will bear changes of fortunes most nobly, and with perfect propriety in every way, being as he is ‘good in very truth’ and ‘four-square without reproach’ (τὰς τύχας οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντη πάντως ἐμμελῶς ὃ γ’ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου, 1100b20-22). Aristotle's use of the adverb ἐμμελῶς here is interesting given how that same kind of diction

Archytas involved determining the number of a horse or a man (Archytas in Theophr. *Metaph.* 6a18–22) and Ar. *Metaph.* N.5, 1092b9–13). Eurytus would outline the shape of said creature with pebbles and then pose the question of how many points in the pebble outline are required in order to define a human and horse respectively. For the main ancient testimonium about this psephometric' theorisation of the body, see Alex. *Aphr. in Metaph* 837.9-1 in McKirahan, (2011), 135. See also Arist. *Metaph.* A.8, 990a27–29, Guthrie (1962), 274 & Netz (2014), 175.

³²² Towle (1889), 109-110 citing δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις (sc. τὸ τετράγωνον) εἰκόνα φέρειν τῆς θείας οὐσίας, Proclus *in Euc.* As produced in Boeckh (1883), 155-156.

³²³ Anderson (2023), 127-128; Raven (1951), 147-152. See Brague (1985), 64: “if Polyclitus was influenced by Pythagorean arithmetical mysticism, such an influence is obvious in Timaeus, who comes from Locri, a stronghold of Pythagoreanism”.

³²⁴ Lloyd (1966), 48–65.

is found throughout the *Timaeus* wherein, as was seen in the prior chapter of this dissertation, God is said to govern the All through the mathematical order of the martial Dorian strain of the Anima Mundi that combats the opposing force of sinful, amusical disorder (*plēmmeleia*). Given all that has been said of the culturally-established notion of the ‘square-man’ embodying mathematical perfection and functioning as a universal measure it is clear that such theorisation of the human body influenced the conception of the ideal microcosmic man embodied in the *theoeikelon andreikelon* first delineated in the *Republic* and then animated as a living *zōon-agalma* in the Timaeian *eikōs logos*.

Chapter 2 Conclusion

This chapter argued that the Timaeian *eikōs logos* should be seen as an embodiment of the ideal discourse which, as per *Phaedrus* 264c, is to bear the appearance of a fully-articulated *zōon*. The bodily functions of the ideally proportioned man, Polyclitus’ Doryphorus, were mapped onto the structure of Timaeus’ cosmogonic discourse and were found to correspond thematically with phases in the account of the birthing of the Divine Macrocosm such that the *eikōs logos* was found to be just as much a ‘statue’ (*agalma*) of microcosmic man as it is an *eikōn* of the Cosmotheos. This examination of the Timaeian *logos*’ proportional structure was followed by an effort to contextualise the typological *agalmatopoiia* of the *Timaeus-Republic* against the broader cultural backdrop mathematical, moral and aesthetic theorisation of the ideal human body and the material culture of statue production. The reason why this foray into cultural context was warranted is because it not only shows that Plato’s ‘political theology of *eikonopoiia*’ is indebted to the revolution in statue-production and advances in the understanding of the ideal body’s mathematical proportionality but it also serves to bring to light the manner in which Justice is truly embodied in the *theoeikelon-andreikelon*

constitution. It should be recalled that Justice is defined in Socrates' ideal polity as involving each part of the agalmatic body-politic doing its own function and not interfering in the domain of another (τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ, *R.* 433a). Despite this strict separation of functionalities there is nonetheless an odd dynamic at play unifying the top and the bottom of the social hierarchy that is easily overlooked if the *Timaeus-Republic* is not set against the backdrop of the contemporary practice and theory of *agalmatopoiia*.

Nous the Godhead and the philosopher-kings who imitate Him are all depicted as acting as *agalmatopoiioi* and *zōgraphoi* even though such *dēmiourgoi* constitute the lowest class in the ideal polity's social hierarchy. This is a remarkable fact that is rarely commented upon. It is odd that Nous the Godhead and the philosopher-kings are identified with the same word (*dēmiourgos*) that was used of naked slaves forced by overseers to assemble statues in workshops (as seen above in the Foundry Cup). However, it is important to realise that such slave-*dēmiourgoi* work to mindless reproducing a blue-print designed by a master craftsman without actually having any understanding of the mathematics of proportionality employed by the Polyclitus-like *dēmiourgos* that devised the model (*paradeigma*). Both the mindless slave and the master craftsman who designed the perfectly proportioned model are both equally denominated *dēmiourgoi* even though they are in fact quite different. So too in Socrates' ideal polity both God the Maker and Father as well as the philosopher-kings who behold abstract Ideas and produce a Paradigm (the *theoiekelon-andreikelon* constitution) are referred to as *dēmiourgoi*, the very same word used for the lowest class. Thus despite the clear stratification of social roles in the ideal polity there is still an over-all unity reflected in the fact that the highest and lowest classes are both equally referred to as *dēmiourgoi*, even if though the lowest and highest classes are nonetheless demiurgic image-makers of two very

different kinds. The craftsmen are unreasoning slaves whereas the philosopher-kings create perfectly-ordered templates through their use of dialectic, mathematical reasoning (*logismos*) and their understanding of proportionality.³²⁵ Despite this difference both the highest and lowest classes can still be said to both participate in the same divine activity of demiurgy even if one be of the intellectual kind and the other be of the slavish, unreasoning sort. This peculiar synergy between reasoning and unreasoning demiurgy will be explored in the final chapter of this dissertation but in a very different context. The final chapter of this dissertation will examine how the human *nous* engages in oneiric *eikonopoia* on the liver's surface during sleep in order to psychagogically guide the unreasoning elements of the soul into carrying out its designs (*Ti.70d-72b*). It is vital to appreciate the meaning behind the odd analogism between slave-demiurges copying the well-reasoned templates of master-demiurges and the human *nous* demiurgically producing *eikones* on the surface of the liver in order to psychagogically guide the unreasoning parts of the soul. The point of this analogism is that demiurgic *eikonopoia* is an activity that unifies the 'highest' and 'lowest' functionalities, the reasoning and the unreasoning. Indeed, the final chapter of this dissertation will show how demiurgic *eikonopoia* facilitates not only cooperation between reason and sub-rationality but also how it links the two distinct ontological and epistemological orders of Being and Becoming. Whilst the intermediary role that demiurgic *eikonopoia* plays between Being and Becoming has already been seen in the case of the philosopher-kings who behold the Forms of various civic virtues and demiurgically work

³²⁵ For Socrates' characterisation as a lowly *dēmiourgos*, specifically an *agalmatopoiōs*, consider his purported descent from Daedalus see *Alcibiades I* 121a. Diogenes Laertius (2.5.19) relates that the third-century historian Douris of Samos wrote of Socrates slaving away as a lowly stone-working slave who crafted the robed *agalmata* of the Charites on the Acropolis. Laertius claims that this alleged fact constitutes the historical background to the following epigram from Timon's *Silloi*: ὄθεν καὶ Τιμωνα ἐν τοῖς Σίλλοις εἶπεῖν: ἐκ δ' ἄρα τῶν ἀπέκλινεν ὁ λαξός, ἐννομολέσχης, Ἑλλήνων ἐπαιδός, ἀκριβολόγους ἀποφήνας, μυκτὴρ ῥητορόμυκτος, ὑπαττικὸς εἰρωνευτής, Timon Fr 25 Diels. Cf. S.E. *Against the Logicians* 7.8. See Collins (2013) for Socrates' relationship with the *dēmiourgoi*.

them into the body-soul compounds of the ideal city's *agalma*-men (R.500d) now that intermediation will be examined in a totally different context—that of dream-images and oneiromancy.

Chapter Three: Timaeus the Oneiromancer

Chapter Three Introduction

This final chapter of the dissertation will argue that the Timaean cosmogonic myth is to be understood as the result of a divinely inspired dream-vision being subject to rational exegesis. Even though Timaeus never expressly claims that his discourse is based on a divinely-inspired dream he certainly does give his *eikōs mythos* a religious tone by opening and closing with prayer (*Ti.*27c-d & *Criti.*106a). Further Timaeus does use a religiously charged term when he claims that *eikotes logoi* are related to the subject-matter they explain (ὄνπερ εἰσιν ἐξηγηταί, τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ συγγενεῖς ὄντας, 29b). Both Burnyeat and Nightingale argue that, taken in conjunction with his opening and closing prayers, Timaeus' use of the word *exēgētēs* in his programmatic proem (29b) should be interpreted in light of its religious meanings, namely that of priest who gives tours and explanations of sacred precincts to pilgrims and that of a hierophantic interpreter of divine messages.³²⁶ The relevant entry in the LSJ defines the terms as referring to "exegete, expounder, interpreter, especially of oracles, dreams, or omens" (citing *Hdt.*1.78).³²⁷ Despite the lack of an express identification of the *eikōs mythos* as a dream-vision within the text of the *Timaeus* itself there is nonetheless good reason to presume that Timaeus' account of hepatic *eikonopoiia* and its oneiromantic exegesis (*Ti.*70d-72b) is intended to apply to the cosmogonic discourse on the whole. This is because Timaeus' explanation of how man's nous 'paints' *eikones* on the surface of the liver in order to pacify the unruly rebellion of his *epithymētikon* mirrors at the microcosmic level the same dynamic at play at the macrocosmic level where Nous the Demiurge 'imprints' Forms into

³²⁶ Burnyeat (2005), 149 & Nightingale (2021), 223. For the meaning of 'temple-guide' see *Paus.*5.15.10 & *SIG* 1021.20.

³²⁷ LSJ s.v. ἐξηγητής. For the term's use of religious experts more broadly, see *Pl. Euthphr.* 4d, 9a, *Lg.*759c, 759e, 775a, *D.*47.68, *Is.*8.39 & *Thphr.Char.*16.6. The term is also used as a title for priesthoods, see *IG* 3.241 & 267 & *Lys.*6.10. See also *R.*427c where Delphic Apollo himself is called the πάτριος ἐξηγητής of matters of religion.

Chora the ‘mould’ (50d) so as to order the All and overcome the irrational and un-musical motion that would otherwise predominate but for His *eikonopoiia* (cf. *Ti.*30a).³²⁸ The analogism between the way dream-images are painted upon the liver by man’s microcosmic nous and the way Nous the Demiurge shapes the Visible All through Choric *eikonopoiia* that is expressly likened to the dream-state (52b) cannot merely be a coincidence. Indeed, when the correspondence between Nous the Demiurge’s choric image-making and microcosmic man’s nous’ oneiric *zōgraphia* on the surface of the liver are viewed together with the exploration in the *Republic* of the intersection of Being and Becoming and those ontological orders’ correspondence to the state of waking and sleeping it becomes apparent that the typology of *eikonopoiia* that this dissertation has been tracking can only be properly understood when one comes to understand the universal significance of *Ti.*70d-72b. Timaeus’ account of hepatic *eikonopoiia* and its oneiromantic exegesis functions as a hermeneutic shedding light on how Plato conceives the interrelation between Being and Becoming as well as sub-rationality and reason.

Chora—Creation as a Dream

Timaeus presents the ontological and epistemological instability of the Visible World of Becoming in expressly oneiric terms.³²⁹ The relationship between this unstable realm and the stable Paradigm—including Timaeus’ account of *onta* imprinting their characteristics on

³²⁸ Isar (2009), 96-109 in many ways pre-empts elements of this dissertation’s position by viewing the liver as a microcosmic equivalent of Chora. She focuses on the dynamic of health and sickness when studying the correlation between cosmogonic chorology and oneiromancy.

³²⁹ For an excellent recent re-appraisal of the character of Chora free from the problematic influence of Aristotle and the post-Aristotelian exegetical tradition, see Van Riel (2020), 169–186. He makes clear the oft-forgotten fact that there is no clear theory of ‘matter’ in the *Timaeus*—instead the focus is on the geometric structure. See also Claghorn (1954), 6.

gignomena—is described through the language of 'dreaming'. This is evident in the way

Timaeus introduces Chora (52a-d):

τρίτον δὲ αὐτὸ γένος ὃν τὸ τῆς χώρας αἰεὶ, φθορὰν οὐ προσδεχόμενον, ἔδραν δὲ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν, αὐτὸ δὲ μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἀπτὸν λογισμῷ τινὶ νόθῳ, μόγις πιστόν, πρὸς ὃ δὴ καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦμεν βλέποντες καὶ φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί που τὸ ὄν ἅπαν ἐν τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά, τὸ δὲ μήτ' ἐν γῆ μήτε που κατ' οὐρανὸν οὐδὲν εἶναι. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα καὶ τούτων ἄλλα ἀδελφὰ καὶ **περὶ τὴν ἄυπνον καὶ ἀληθῶς φύσιν ὑπάρχουσαν ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὀνειρώξεως οὐ δυνατοὶ γυγνόμεθα ἐγερθέντες διοριζόμενοι τάληθές λέγειν, ὡς εἰκόνι μὲν, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐφ' ᾧ γέγονεν ἑαυτῆς ἐστίν, ἐτέρου δὲ τινος αἰεὶ φέρεται φάντασμα**, διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ἐτέρῳ προσήκει τινὶ γίγνεσθαι, οὐσίας ἀμωσγέπως ἀντεχομένην, ἢ μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν αὐτὴν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ ὄντως ὄντι βοηθὸς ὁ δι' ἀκριβείας ἀληθῆς λόγος, ὡς ἕως ἄν τι τὸ μὲν ἄλλο ἢ, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, οὐδέτερον ἐν οὐδετέρῳ ποτὲ γενόμενον ἐν ἅμα ταῦτόν καὶ δύο γενήσεσθον.

And a **third Kind is ever-existing Place**, which admits not of destruction, and provides room for all things that have birth, itself being apprehensible by a kind of **bastard reasoning by the aid of non-sensation, barely an object of belief**; for when we regard this we **dimly dream** and affirm that it is somehow necessary that all that exists should exist in some spot and occupying some place, and that that which is neither on earth nor anywhere in the Heaven is nothing. So because of all these and other kindred notions, **we are unable also on waking up to distinguish clearly the unsleeping and truly subsisting substance, owing to our dreamy condition, or to state the truth** — how that it belongs to a copy — seeing that it has not for its own even that substance for which it came into being, but fleets ever as a phantom of something else—to come into existence in some other thing, clinging to existence as best it may, on pain of being nothing at all; whereas to the aid of the really existent there comes the accurately true argument, that so long as one thing is one thing, and another something different, neither of the two will ever come to exist in the other so that the same thing becomes simultaneously both one and two.

This passage is crucial for understanding Chora's intermediary status. It follows on from the presentation of the *onta* as 'the first genus' (translated into the terminology of the *Republic*, these would be the Forms). This unbegotten and indestructible genus neither flows into anything else nor receives anything into itself and is totally invisible and incapable of being perceived through the senses—it can only be accessed through *noēsis* (ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, οὔτε εἰς ἑαυτὸ εἰσδεχόμενον ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν οὔτε αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλο ποιῖον, ἀόρατον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἀναίσθητον, τοῦτο ὃ δὴ νόησις εἴληχεν ἐπισκοπεῖν, 52a). The second genus is that of the *gignomenon*, perceived by senses, generated, perpetually being moved or circulating, begotten in a particular place and then destroyed from thence, being conceived of

through opinion formed through the senses (αἰσθητόν, γεννητόν, πεφορημένον αἰεί, γιγνόμενον τε ἔν τινι τόπῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπολλύμενον, δόξη μετ’ αἰσθήσεως περιληπτόν). But the “third Kind [*genos*] is ever-existing [*on*] Place”. Here, both in terms of diction and ontology, Chora paradoxically weds Becoming [*genesis/genos*] and Being [*ousia/to on*], which are normally juxtaposed (γένος ὄν τὸ τῆς χώρας αἰεί).³³⁰ Oddly Timaeus asserts that Chora the Receptacle is inaccessible not only to the senses used to perceive *gignomena* but also to the pure *noesis* used to access the *onta*. Instead, the Receptacle can only be approached through a kind of ‘bastardised’ reasoning accompanied by a state of unconsciousness (αὐτὸ δὲ μετ’ ἀναισθησίας ἀπτόν λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ).³³¹ What is the means of understanding something that cannot be neatly categorised among the sense perceived *gignomena* or the *onta* of *noesis*? Chora is said to be a thing ‘barely believable’ (μόγις πιστόν). Timaeus says that when we try and examine the Receptacle we, in a state of confusion and awkwardness (*atopia*), fall

³³⁰On the three kinds, see Reynolds (2008), 87-104 & Miller (2003), 37 ff. Johansen (2015), 885-886 assesses the introduction of the three kinds (48e-52d) in terms of that passage's tripartite structure corresponding to its ontology. Oddly Miller (2003), 61–62 & 197–213 differentiates between Chora and the Receptacle as two different members of the Third Kind rather than treating them as one and the same. Ruben (2021), 1-21 provides an excellent account of how the use of the terms *genos* and *chōra* in Critias' speech in the opening of the Timaeus (20d-26e) serves to establish typological links between the historico-political tale of Atlantis and Palaeo-Athens and Timaeus' cosmogonic chorology. The term ‘chorology’ was coined by Sallis who uses it to describe the unique initiatory mode of discourse commenced at 52a when Chora is introduced, see Sallis (1999), 113-124. For noteworthy accounts of Chora generally, see Cornford (1937), 161–77; Brisson (1994), 175–266; Algra (1995), 76–92; Johansen (2004), 92–136; Broadie (2012), 173–242 & Zeyl (2010), 117–130. See Zeyl (2000), lvi–lxi for an exposition of the traditional interpretation vis-à-vis the important revisionist treatment of 49c-50b in Cherniss (1954), 113-130. Sattler (2012), 159–195 challenges the typical understanding of the Receptacle as either space, matter or a combination of the two. Instead, Sattler understands the Receptacle as the metaphysical grounds for mathematical and physical space. See Nakamura (2022), 239-265 for another criticism of the ‘traditional’ interpretation. For an example of interpretations that mixes matter and space in understanding the Receptacle, see Johansen 2004, 117–36 & Harte (2010), 134-138. See Buckels (2016), 303-328 for a criticism of the ‘traditional’ view that Chora is an ontological substrate. For a ‘contents-oriented’ approach to the Receptacle, see Broadie (2003), 171-190. See Arist. *Ph.*4.2 with Algra (1995), 121–191 for Aristotle's interpretation of Chora. For Plotinus' treatment of Chora, see *En.* II.4.[12].2-5 and III.6[26].7-19 with Karfik (2022), 93-105. For Calcidius' unduly materialist interpretation of Chora, see Bobovnik (2024), 1-24. Shaw (2012) 103-129 esp. 120 on Iamblichus' theurgy and its relationship to Timaeus' chorology, e.g. *Iamb. Myst.* 233.6–13 which speaks of worshippers receiving (*chōrēsai*) the gods in ritual receptacles (*hypodochas*). C.f. also *Myst.* 238.15–239.2 which speaks of prayer widening the soul's *hypodochē* in order to receive the gods. Such theurgic interpretation is interesting in that it parallels this dissertation's emphasis on the typology of *eikonopoia* and oneiric inspiration.

³³¹ Cf. LSJ s.v. ἀναισθησία.

into a dream-like state (ὄνειροπολοῦμεν)³³² and struggle to imagine how Chora can be placeless and yet still exist, for we (wrongly) conflate existence with place.

This placelessness (*atopia*) has important parallels in the *Republic*. Each thing that exists must necessarily have a place (*topos*) and must occupy *chōra*, space (ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί που τὸ ὄν ἅπαν ἔν τινι τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά, 52b). Nonetheless Timaeus describes Chora as being neither on earth nor within Heaven (μήτ' ἐν γῆ μήτε που κατ' οὐρανὸν οὐδὲν εἶναι, 52b). This is comparable to the way Socrates says in the *Republic* that the ideal polity that he and his interlocutors are founding resides in *logoi* yet is nowhere on earth and only might be, **perhaps**, somewhere in Heaven, thus suggesting that the ideal polis may not even quite exist there (ἐν ἧ νῦν διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένη, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι. ἀλλ', ἧν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται, *R.* 9.592a-b).³³³

The significance of this parallelism is that just as the ideal political constitution is conceived of as an atopic musico-mathematical order conveyed by Heaven's motion but not contained there is a 'mould' used to shape both individual citizens into perfect *agalмата* and the collective body politic into an *eikōn* of the *theoikeion-andreikeion* so too the Demiurge employs Chora as an atopic 'mould' in which He forges His *agalma*, the Divine Macrocosm (*Ti.* 37c with 50a-e). Both moulds—Socrates' constitution in which his ideal *agalma*-citizens are to be shaped and Chora through which the Demiurge begets the agalmatic Cosmotheos—are marked by their ontological and epistemological 'in-betweenness'.

³³² For examples of the use of this verb elsewhere, see *Ar.Nu.* 16, *D.* 4.49 & *Luc.Merc.Cond.* 20.

³³³ Sallis (1999), 30 makes this same connection between the *Timaeus* and *R.* 592b in the context of the relationship between the Paradigm of Being and the city "made in its (the Paradigm's) image...capable of being established on earth, a city exposed to the forces of ἔρως and lineage, of exteriority and alterity, materiality and scarcity".

Timaeus's association of this *atopia* with dreaming is not mere poetic flourish. This chapter will argue that the dream-state's epistemological and ontological peculiarity matters vitally. Dreams, like Chora herself, function as intermediaries between Becoming and Being. The atopic liminality of dreams and Chora, if understood correctly, provides insights into how the World of Becoming relates to the Paradigm of which it is an *eikōn*. This positive reading of the dreaming-state as an ontological and epistemological intermediary seems at face value to be at odds with how Timaeus describes dreaminess. Atopic dreaminess is described in the above-extracted passage in a negative way by contrasting it with the “unsleeping and truly subsisting substance” (περὶ τὴν ἄπυνον καὶ ἀληθῶς φύσιν ὑπάρχουσαν, 52b). We are unable to perceive and describe the truth about the atopic dream-state even when having awoken from oneiric slumber due to its lasting impeding effects (ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὄνειρώξεως οὐ δυνατοὶ γινόμεθα ἐγερθέντες διοριζόμενοι τάληθές λέγειν, 52b). Thus rather than appearing as a link between Being and Becoming the atopic dreaminess of Chora is initially presented as obscuring the truth. Indeed, Timaeus says that this truth which dreaminess occludes is that the Visible All is only a likeness or copy of True Being that “has not for its own even that substance for which it came into being, but fleets ever as a phantom of something else” (ὡς εἰκόνι μὲν, ἐπεὶπερ οὐδ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐφ’ ᾧ γέγονεν ἑαυτῆς ἐστιν, ἑτέρου δέ τινος ἀεὶ φέρεται φάντασμα). The word φάντασμα is markedly oneiric and has the connotation of deceptive distortion contrary to truth. Thus, rather than being an intermediary, the dreaming-state seems simply to refer to the negative situation where one erroneously takes the ever-changing *gignomena* to be constant and thus treats this dream-world as truly existing and being the totality of reality instead of properly realising that it is only an *eikōn* of True Being. Such a reading leads to the typical view that the *eikōs mythos* is limited to mere conjecture due to its unstable subject-matter—it is supposedly only a discussion of unstable Becoming. However,

as seen above in the passage introducing Chora, the *eikōs mythos* hints at there being a degree of cross-over between the two ontological and epistemological orders.

The *Republic* provides essential context for understanding oneiric imagery. There, the dream-state describes those who are caught up solely in Becoming and have lost sight of Being. This is particularly evident when Socrates in Book 7 of the *Republic* perfects and caps his discussion of education by placing the dialectic art as the “coping-stone” above all other subjects in pedagogy (ὥσπερ θριγκὸς, 534e-535a).³³⁴ This follows on from the warning that Glaucon, in acting as *nomothētēs* in matters of education along with Socrates (νομοθετήσω...μετά γε σοῦ, 534e), if ever he should rear in deed the youths whom he is now teaching in speech (*logos*), should not let them be ‘unreasoning’ (*alogoi*) like the diagrams of geometers if they are to rule over the state with respect to the matters of greatest importance (ἀλλὰ μὴν τοὺς γε σαυτοῦ παῖδας, οὓς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις τε καὶ παιδεύεις, εἴ ποτε ἔργῳ τρέφοις, οὐκ ἂν ἐάσαις, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμιάς, ἄρχοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει κυρίους τῶν μεγίστων εἶναι, 534d). The distinction between true philosophers and dreamers becomes explicit when Socrates defines the dialectician and contrasts him from the unphilosopher ‘oneiric man’. The man that can rightly be called a dialectician must be capable of providing an account (*logos*) of the true essence or Being of each thing (διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας) as opposed to the unphilosophic dreamer who is described thus (534b-d):

ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχη διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἀφελὼν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιὼν, μὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατ’ οὐσίαν προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται, οὔτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φήσεις εἰδέναι τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα οὔτε ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ’ εἴ πη εἰδῶλου τινὸς ἐφάπτεται, δόξῃ, οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐφάπτεσθαι, καὶ τὸν νῦν βίον

³³⁴ Cf. θριγκὸς in Eur.*Herc. Fur.* 1280, Aesch. *Ag.* 1283 & *Phileb.* 38c-d ff.

ὄνειροπολοῦντα καὶ ὑπνώττοντα, πρὶν ἐνθάδ' ἐξεγρέσθαι, εἰς Ἅιδου πρότερον ἀφικόμενον τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθεῖν;

the man who is unable to define in his discourse and distinguish and abstract from all other things the aspect or idea of the good, and who cannot, **as it were in battle**, running the gauntlet of all tests, and striving to examine everything by essential reality and not by opinion, hold on his way through all this without tripping in his reasoning—the man who lacks this power, you will say, does not really know the good itself or any particular good; but if he **apprehends any adumbration [eidōlon] of it**, his contact with it is by opinion, not by knowledge; and **dreaming** and dozing through his present life, before he awakens here he will arrive at the house of Hades and **fall asleep for ever?**"

First of all, the reference to the dialectic champion having to pass through a 'battle' of tests (ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιόν) in order to ensure that he has rightly attained to true knowledge (episteme) of Being through noesis and not mistaken it with the sense-perceived doxa formed from *gignomena* is reminiscent of Socrates' request at *Ti.* 19b-c to see his polity rendered a *zōon* at war.³³⁵ In making that comparison, the question arises, does Timaeus in his monologue achieve true knowledge of the Good or does he only attain to a mere *eidōlon*, a deceptive simulacrum (εἴ πη εἰδώλου τινὸς ἐφάπτεται)?³³⁶ Is Timaeus in his monologue an adept dialectician or is he dreaming and sleeping (ὄνειροπολοῦντα καὶ ὑπνώττοντα) in a state of confusion that leads onto the ultimate sleep in accursed Hades instead of a blessed afterlife? (εἰς Ἅιδου πρότερον ἀφικόμενον τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθεῖν;). Firstly, as Shorey in his notes on the translation of the above passage (*R.* 534b-d), specifically the sentence addressing the dialectician's "running the gauntlet of all tests", states the following: "it imports little whether the objections are in his own mind or made by others [since] thought is a discussion of the soul with itself...and when the interlocutor refuses to proceed Socrates sometimes continues the argument himself by supplying both question and answer".³³⁷ Thus Timaeus' *eikōs mythos* being a monologue does not mean that he *ipso facto* failed to act as a true

³³⁵ For the struggle to sustain knowledge instead of mere opinion, cf. *Pl. Tht.* 160d, *Phlb.* 45a, *Lg.* 966a-b, *Phdr.* 278c & *Sph.* 259b-c.

³³⁶ For the significance of *eidōlon* here, cf. *R.* 532b with *Ep.* 7.342b.

³³⁷ Shorey (1935), 207. For thought as internal dialectic, see *Tht.* 189e, *Phlb.* 38e & *Sph.* 263e. For Socrates finishing off dialectic exchanges with his own monologue, see *Grg.* 506c ff. See also *Phdr.* 278c, *Prm.* 136d-e & Shorey (1903), 17.

dialectician. The question then is whether he attained to true knowledge of Being and an understanding of how the Paradigm relates to the *gignomena* or whether he is instead merely a dreamer who cannot see past the *eidōla* and *phantasmata* of the World of Becoming.³³⁸

Timaeus demonstrates dialectical awareness in his account of Chora. He recognizes that *gignomena*, as deceptive *phantasmata*, nonetheless depict higher realities beyond themselves (Ti.52c: ἐτέρου δέ τινος ἀεὶ φέρεται φάντασμα). This awareness marks him as a dialectician, not a mere dreamer. After all, rather than only discussing Becoming and thus being limited only to mere opinion (*doxa*) as many modern interpreters suggest, Timaeus also examines *gignomena* as *eikones* in their relation to the *onta* they depict, something totally different to the unreasoning geometers who mistake their diagrams for the higher realities they depict.

The dream-state also occurs in Book 5 of the *Republic* in essentially the same context where Socrates is drawing the distinction between those who can rightly be called philosophers (ὀρθῶς προσείποι φιλοσόφους) and those who are merely “the lovers of sounds and sights [φιλήκοοι καὶ φιλοθεάμονες] delight[ing] in beautiful tones and colours and shapes and in everything that art fashions [δημιουργούμενα] out of these [whilst] their thought [διάνοια] is incapable of apprehending and taking delight in the nature of the beautiful in itself” (476b). Socrates then adds the following question: “[he] who believes in beautiful things, but neither believes in beauty itself nor is able to follow when someone tries to guide him to the knowledge of it—do you think that his life is a **dream** or a waking?” (ὄναρ ἢ ὕπαρ, 476c). To this Socrates adds the following clarifying question: “is not the **dream state**, whether the man is asleep or awake, just this: the **mistaking of resemblance for identity**?” (τὸ ὄνειρώττειν ἄρα οὐ τόδε ἐστίν, ἐάντε ἐν ὕπνῳ τις ἐάντ’ ἐγρηγορῶς τὸ ὁμοίον τῷ μὴ ὁμοίον

³³⁸ Cf. Shorey (1935), 208: “For Platonic intellectualism the life of the ordinary man is something between sleep and waking”. See also *Ap.*31a.

ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἡγῆται εἶναι ὃ ἔοικεν;). Socrates also asks the contrary about the one who “is able to distinguish that self-beautiful and the things that participate in it, and neither supposes the participants to be it nor it the participants—is his life, in your opinion, a waking or a **dream state**?” (ὁ τὰναντία τούτων ἡγούμενός τέ τι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ δυνάμενος καθορᾶν καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα, καὶ οὔτε τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτὸ οὔτε αὐτὸ τὰ μετέχοντα ἡγούμενος, ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ αὖ καὶ οὗτος δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν;). Unsurprisingly the answer is of course that such a man is ‘awake’ (ὕπαρ).³³⁹ Socrates then goes on to identify the wakeful capacity of him who can noetically attain to the Good as being truly worthy of the title of ‘knowledge’ as opposed to the dreamer whose perception is only opinion, *doxa* (οὐκοῦν τούτου μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς γινώσκοντος γνώμην ἂν ὀρθῶς φαῖμεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ δόξαν ὡς δοξάζοντος;). This identification then leads to speculation about an ontological category that is between Being and not-Being (εἰ δὲ δὴ τι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, οὐ μετὰξὺ ἂν κέοιτο τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αὖ μηδαμῆ ὄντος;). This intermediary status directly parallels Chora's position between the ontological orders, as discussed above (52a-d). Thus, rather uncannily, just as is the case in the passage above where Timaeus introduces Chora, so too in the *Republic*, an ontological and epistemological status between the orders of Becoming and Being is brought up alongside the distinction between dreaming and waking.

³³⁹ Cf. *Lg.* 800a where just after identifying music and law the speaker asserts that the ancient *nomothetai* must have agreed with that sentiment since they chanced upon the same idea when he came up with the bivalent term *nomos* that refers to both: “one of them may have divined it [the link between music and law] vaguely, as in a dream by night or a waking vision (καθ' ὕπνον δὲ οἷόν ποῦ τις ἢ καὶ ὕπαρ ἐγρηγορῶς ὠνειρώξεν μαντευόμενος αὐτό). It is interesting that chancing upon a correct conception without use of dialectic ratiocination is conceived of in terms of a divinely inspired dream or waking possession.

The Myth of Metals & Chora as Womb-Mould

The Myth of Metals, it must be recalled, is the anthropogonic myth told to all the youths of the ideal polity and as such is essentially the foundation of their pedagogy. Thus all of the typology of *agalmatopoiia* that was explored thus far in this dissertation, the moulding of citizens into *eikones* of the *theoikelon-andreikelon*, is to be conceived of in light of the centrality of that mythic fiction. Socrates says it is first necessary to convince the philosopher-kings and then the *Phylakes* that they were metallurgically crafted underground before convincing the *hoi polloi* that is so (3.414d). The city-founders state that they will tell the addressees of the myth that they are all brethren moulded directly by God Himself and that those most worthy of honours and who are most capable of ruling have gold mixed into their stock (φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς μυθολογοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς πλάττων, 415a). Those who shall be members of the military auxillary class, the *epikouroi-Phylakes* shall be said to have silver mixed into their statue-stock whereas the craftsmen (*demiurges*) and farmers shall be made of bronze and iron (σίδηρον δὲ καὶ χαλκὸν τοῖς τε γεωργοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς). Incredibly, this ideal mythic education-system whereby all the citizens are 'duped' into believing they are moulded directly by God and that they have a metal-based stock which assigns their social class is expressly said by Socrates to be experienced as a 'dream' by the citizens of the ideal polity. Specifically Socrates says that he and his 'city-founding' interlocutors would rear the citizens under their care to think that everything they underwent in the subterranean forgery wherein they were educated was merely a dream-sequence (ὡς ἄρ' ἃ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὺς ἐτρέφομέν τε καὶ ἐπαιδεύομεν, ὥσπερ ὄνειρατα ἐδόκουν ταῦτα πάντα πάσχειν τε καὶ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτούς, ἧσαν δὲ τότε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὑπὸ γῆς ἐντὸς πλαττόμενοι καὶ τρεφόμενοι, 414d-e).³⁴⁰ Not only does the word for 'dreams' (*oneirata*)

³⁴⁰ Cf. *Lg.* 746a where the moulding of a city and its citizenry out of wax is likened to dreams (σχεδὸν οἷον ὄνειρατα λέγων, ἢ πλάττων καθάπερ ἐκ κηροῦ τινα πόλιν καὶ πολίτας). Here again the imagery of artisanal moulding as well as the motif of dreaming occur in the same context of realising an ideal polity.

occur here but even the verb meaning ‘to seem’ (ἐδόκουν) has oneiromantic connotations. Adam deems it important to note that the verb *dokein* also occurs in Aesch. *Pers.* 188 where the context is also clearly that of dreaming.³⁴¹ Other passages of the *Republic* that will be discussed soon address the shared nature of dreams and mere opinion (*doxa*) in the context of education and epistemology.

Another parallelism between Chora and the Myth of Metals is identified by Kalkavage: “the results of sexual generation are ultimately incalculable: worthy souls will sometimes spring up among the unworthy, and vice versa [so] the guardians must reshuffle misplaced souls in a way that resembles the Receptacle’s reshuffling of the four kinds (52e–53a)”.³⁴² Despite the brevity of Socrates’ synopsis of his discourse on the ideal polity from the prior night it is uncanny just how much typological detail he manages to fit in.³⁴³ For instance, Socrates in summarising *R.* 415b–c and 459d ff speaks of the philosopher-king *phylakes* covertly sending off citizens who initially appear to be of bad character to ‘another city’ whilst ensuring that they are nonetheless monitored there in case some prove worthy of being ‘brought up’ anagogically (*anagein*) to the realm of philosopher-king *phylakes* who would then lower from among their own rank and district those who are unworthy in order to make room for this ‘coming up’ (τὰ δὲ τῶν κακῶν εἰς τὴν ἄλλην λάθρα διαδοτέον πόλιν: ἐπαυξανομένων δὲ σκοποῦντας ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀξιούς πάλιν **ἀνάγειν** δεῖν, τοὺς δὲ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀναξίους εἰς τὴν τῶν **ἐπανιόντων** χώραν μεταλλάττειν, 19a). Here ἐπανιόντων does not simply refer to ‘returning’ to the station from whence they were demoted. It also has anagogic connotations for they are

³⁴¹ See Adam (1902), vol.1, 194.

³⁴² Kalkavage (2001), 105.

³⁴³ Carone (2005) 24–25 rightly notes that it is odd that Socrates’ synopsis despite apparently lacking no vital details (19a–b) leaves out much of the distinctive content of the *Republic*. Nonetheless despite this observation Carone still rightly concludes that the *Timaeus* is clearly taking “the long philosophical curriculum established in the *Republic*” and is projecting it onto “a wider cosmological background”.

being raised up from the cave-forgery below where the *agalma*-men are educated to the governing acropolis.³⁴⁴ Thus even though the Myth of Metals and the Allegory of the Cave are obviously absent from Socrates' brief synopsis of his discourse on the ideal polity in the incipit of the *Timaeus*, the 'topography' of the cave-forge (*chōra*) wherein the citizens are shuffled about and led up and down is clearly present.

The mixing of biological and metallurgical language in the Myth of Metals finds its cosmological parallel in *Timaeus*'s description of Chora as both womb and mould. The same combination of biological and metallurgical imagery that underpins the birthing and/or manufacture of the ideal polity's *agalma*-men is used to explain how *gignomena* are shaped within Chora. Just as Socrates moulds his citizenry out of molten metal in a womb-like subterranean forge so that they all think they are autochthonous brethren, so too the Demiurge shapes all the *gignomena* that make up the Visible Cosmotheos as an *agalma* (37c) within the cosmic 'womb-mould' Chora as a goldsmith (*Ti.* 50a-c). Nonetheless despite choosing to employ the patently asexual, artisanal image of pouring molten gold into a mould *Timaeus* makes a point of expressly establishing a connection between the Demiurge's choric *agalmatopoiia* and biological reproduction in order to establish a typological connection with the Myth of Metals. The whole point of the Noble Lie is that it is supposed to convince citizens that they are perfectly moulded *agalmata* and not biologically reproduced organisms. The *Timaean* cosmogony obfuscates the boundary between biological reproduction and asexual demiurgy in an analogous way. The Demiurge is both the archetypal *Agalmatopoiios* and Father—He 'begets' the Cosmotheos as a 'living, moving statue' (37c) thus combining parenting and non-reproductive *einokopoiia* in the same paradoxical way Socrates describes

³⁴⁴ For ἐπανέρχομαι in the sense of not simply 'return' but to come up out of a lower region to a higher one, see, X. *HG* 4.8.35 (εἰς ὄρη) & Anacr. Fr 385 PMG: ἐκ ποταμοῦ ἵπανέρχομαι.

his *agalma*-citizens as being both ‘moulded and nursed’ (πλαττόμενοι καὶ τρεφόμενοι, R.414d-e). The parallelism between the Myth of Metals and Timaeus’ cosmogonic *agalmatopoiia* reaches its peak when, just after likening Chora to a mould in which molten gold is poured in order to take on various shapes, Timaeus shifts from this asexual metallurgical imagery and diction to that of sexual reproduction (50c-d):

ἐν δ’ οὖν τῷ παρόντι χρὴ γένη διανοηθῆναι τριττά, τὸ μὲν γιγνόμενον, τὸ δ’ ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται, τὸ δ’ ὅθεν ἀφομοιούμενον φύεται τὸ γιγνόμενον. καὶ δὴ καὶ προσεικάσαι πρέπει τὸ μὲν δεχόμενον **μητρί**, τὸ δ’ ὅθεν **πατρί**, τὴν δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων φύσιν **ἐκγόνῳ**.

For the present, then, we must conceive of three kinds,—the Becoming, that “Wherein” it becomes, and the source “Wherefrom” the Becoming is copied and produced. Moreover, it is proper to liken the Recipient to the Mother, the Source to the Father, and what is engendered between these two to the Offspring.

The ‘three kinds’ which Timaeus is referring to here are Becoming, Being and Chora which all existed before Uranus-Cosmos was begotten (*Ti.* 52d). Being, the Paradigm is identified with the Father in the sexual analogy, Becoming with the Progeny and Chora with the Mother. Thus, here the cosmogonic process that was only moments ago conceived of in terms of the asexual, artisanal image of molten gold taking on various shapes within a mould is now eikastically depicted (προσεικάσαι) in terms of *physis*—biological conception. This transition from *agalmatopoiia* to conception and gestation parallels Socrates’ mixing of the diction of biological nourishment and of metallurgical moulding in the Myth of Metals where the sexually-produced citizens are virtually rendered asexually-manufactured statues (πλαττόμενοι καὶ τρεφόμενοι, 414d-e).³⁴⁵ The first three occurrences of the word *chora* in the *Timaeus* are found in Socrates’ synopsis of his speech on the ideal polity and in Critias’ Atlantis story (19a, 22e, 23b). In these instances, the word refers to the country, the land, the earth. The autochthonous *agalma*-men of the ideal city are sons of *chora* (the country, the

³⁴⁵Cf. *Prt.* 320d where very similar chora-like language is used to describe the gods moulding creatures inside the earth (τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον). Cf other anthropogonic passages in the Platonic corpus, e.g. *Smp.* 191c, *Plt.* 272a, *Ti.* 42d & *Plt.* 269a ff.

earth), metallurgically moulded within her in a manner analogous to how all the *gignomena* within this Visible Cosmotheos, the World of Becoming are formed as *ektypōmata* of the Forms within Chora. Thus, there is also an element of biological begetting in the Myth of Metals too—the point of moulding the men under the earth (ὕπὸ γῆς ἐντὸς πλαττόμενοι, 414d-e) is so that they conceive themselves as brethren, sons of the same mother, chora, their country. At any rate, the above passage depicting the Paradigm as the Father, Chora as the Mother and Begotten Cosmotheos as their ‘child’ immediately follows Timaeus telling the reader/listener to “imagine that a man were to model all possible figures out of gold, and were then to proceed without cessation to remodel each of these into every other” (εἰ γὰρ πάντα τις σχήματα **πλάσας** ἐκ χρυσοῦ μηδὲν **μεταπλάττων** παύοιτο ἕκαστα εἰς ἅπαντα, 50a-b). Timaeus explains that if one were to ask what each object was, the safest answer would be to simply say it is gold (ἀσφαλέστατον εἰπεῖν ὅτι χρυσός). Here the ‘plastic’ diction is very much reminiscent of God moulding the *agalma*-men in the Myth of Metals (ὁ θεὸς πλάττων, 3.415a) as well as resembling Socrates’ account of the theological and mythopoetic pedagogical moulding of youths in his ideal city. It is to be recalled that a word for mould (*typos*) is used of the kinds of myths that the nurses and mothers of the ideal polity are to use to plastically shape (*plattein*) the body-soul compounds of the *agalma*-men in their care (*R.* 377b-d). Such *typos*-oriented diction occurs in Timaeus’ explanation of Chora (50d) as does the imagery of nursing for throughout the *eikōs mythos* the Receptacle is expressly called the ‘Nurse’ of all Becoming (49a, 52d & 88d). Timaeus’ likening of Chora to a mould in which molten golden is plastically shaped is from the outset subtly framed in the same typological terms as Socrates’ pedagogical moulding of his city’s *agalma*-men—there is a subtle microcosm-macrocosm analogism linking the philosopher-king and the Demiurge as *agalmatopoiōi* relying on moulds to intermeditate between the noetic World of Being and the visible World of Becoming.

The point of Timaeus' metallurgical image of gold taking on various shapes but nonetheless remaining the same substance is to express the ontological constancy of Chora the Receptacle in the performance of Her intermediary role in linking the two ontological orders of Being and Becoming. All the shapes begotten of the mould into which the molten gold was poured are *gignomena*, temporary begettings and not true *onta* (ὅσα τε ἄλλα σχήματα ἐνεγίγνετο, μηδέποτε λέγειν ταῦτα ὡς ὄντα). Chora receives all things but never takes on any of their shapes as they enter Her (δέχεται τε γὰρ αἰεὶ τὰ πάντα, καὶ μορφήν οὐδεμίαν ποτὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν εισιόντων ὁμοίαν εἴληφεν οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς, 50b-c). Instead, Chora always remains the same—She is laid out 'in nature' as a mould for the All, always being moved by and being 'indented' by the Forms that enter and consequently appearing different at different moments but nonetheless always retaining Her original nature (ἐκμαγεῖον γὰρ φύσει παντὶ κεῖται, κινούμενόν τε καὶ διασχηματιζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν εισιόντων, φαίνεται δὲ δι' ἐκεῖνα ἄλλοτε ἄλλοιον, 50c). Throughout the process of *agalmatopoiia* the *ekmageion* (mould) remains intact and unchanged 'in nature' (φύσει). Here the diction of both being 'laid out' (κεῖται) and the dative φύσει warrant examination. Firstly the noun φύσει in the dative case serves to express the fact that Chora is a mould (*ekmageion*) by 'nature'—this quality is intrinsic, not something acquired. Whilst this word (φύσει) could be easily overlooked it establishes an important link between Chora and the typology of *agalmatopoiia* that this dissertation is tracing in the *Republic*.

It is to be recalled that when Socrates describes the philosopher-kings acting as *zōgraphoi* and *agalmatopoiioi* in first devising the *theoikelon-andreikelon* and moulding citizens into likenesses of that very agalmatic constitution he says that they are to look to the things that

are ‘in nature’ or ‘by their very nature’ (φύσει) just, beautiful and moderate and to implant those qualities into the *agalma*-men (ἀποβλέπειεν, πρὸς τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον...καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖν’ αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, 501b). Thus there is a lexical and conceptual correspondence between Chora being a mould (*ekmageion*) by nature (φύσει) and the Forms of Justice, Beauty and Temperance that have those qualities by their very nature and are used as *paradeigmata* for moulding the *agalma*-men into *theoeikela andreikela*, god-like statuary likenesses of the constitution itself. Now it is important to note that there is a key difference between the things that just, beautiful, and moderate ‘by nature’ and Chora that is a mould by nature—the former are expressly Forms that belong to the World of Being whereas the Receptacle is atopic, not clearly belonging to either of the two ontological orders but rather mediates between them. Now it is important to understand that the Forms of Justice, Beauty and Moderation that the philosopher-kings are to keep their gaze are not analogous to Chora the ‘mould by nature’. Instead they are akin to the *onta* that always enter and exit the Receptacle imprinting or moulding (τυπωθέντα) imitations (*mimē mata*) therein in an amazing and inexplicable way which will be addressed later—namely through oneiric eikonopoia (τὰ δὲ εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ μιμήματα, τυπωθέντα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τρόπον τινὰ δύσφραστον καὶ θαυμαστόν, ὄν εἰς αὐθις μέτιμεν, 50c). Thus in the case of Socrates’ plastic shaping of the *agalma*-men the analogue of Chora the atopic ‘mould by nature’ is actually the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* constitution itself. One must recall that it is atopic and just as Chora is ‘laid out’ (κεῖται) as a placeless mould situated ambiguously between Being and Becoming ‘by nature’ (φύσει, *Ti.* 50c) so too the ideal polity’s constitution is ‘laid out’ in words and ratios (*logoi*) that do not exist anywhere on earth (ἐν λόγοις κεκμηνη, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι) instead possibly being laid out in Heaven (ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται, *R.* 9.592a-b) just as Chora was laid out as a mould even before Heaven was generated (*Ti.* 52d). Thus just as the Timaeian Demiurge begets the Visible

Cosmotheos within the ‘womb-mould’ of Chora that atopically exists prior to the generation of Heaven so too when the philosopher-kings impersonating God mould citizens into likenesses of the Forms they do so through the placeless mould (*typos*) of agalmatomorphic or zoomorphic discourses (*logoi*) that take on the dimensions of the atopic ideal political constitution.

Neutral receptiveness is yet another quality shared by Chora and the mould (*typos*) of the ideal *theoeikelon-andreieklon* constitution in which Socrates’ *agalma*-men taken shape.

Timaeus employs *typos*-diction when describing Chora’s receptive neutrality: “if the stamped copy is to assume diverse appearances of all sorts, that substance wherein it is set and stamped could not possibly be suited to its purpose unless it were itself devoid of all those forms which it is about to receive from any quarter” (**ἐκτυπώματος** ἔσεσθαι μέλλοντος ιδεῖν ποικίλου πάσας ποικιλίας, τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἐν ᾧ **ἐκτυπούμενον** ἐνίσταται γένοιτ’ ἂν παρεσκευασμένον εὔ, πλὴν ἄμορφον ὃν ἐκείνων ἀπασῶν τῶν ιδεῶν ὅσας μέλλοι δέχεσθαι ποθεν, 50d-e). The thing that receives into itself all genera must itself be outside of form (πάντων ἐκτὸς εἰδῶν εἶναι χρεῶν τὸ τὰ πάντα ἐκδεξόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ γένη, 50e). The reason for this is because if She was “similar to any of the entering forms, on receiving forms of an opposite or wholly different kind, as they arrived, [She] would copy them badly, through obtruding [Her] own visible shape” (**ὅμοιον** γὰρ ὃν τῶν ἐπεισιόντων τινὶ τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας τά τε τῆς τὸ παράπαν ἄλλης **φύσεως** ὅπότε ἔλθοι δεχόμενον κακῶς ἂν **ἀφομοιοῖ**, τὴν αὐτοῦ παρεμφαῖνον ὄψιν, 50e). This quality of neutral formlessness with its attendant capacity to best receive the particular design imparted by the Demiurge from the Paradigm is the macrocosmic parallel to the way the microcosmic demiurge Socrates mandates that the polis in his care and the ethics of its citizens need to be totally scrubbed clean, reduced to a fresh canvas, a *carte blanche* (ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἦθη ἀνθρώπων, πρῶτον μὲν καθαρὰν

ποιήσειαν, R.501a). The point here is that just as Chora must be formless in order to facilitate the begetting of *gignomena* so too the polity and citizens in Socrates' care must be formless and totally receptive so that they can become likeness of the *(dia)zōgraphia*-constitution that he has devised as a *zōgraphos-oikistēs* beholding the Forms, the Paradigm. Indeed this image of the *zōgraphos-oikistēs* scrubbing clean the *pinax* that is both the polity and the character of its citizens occurs right at the moment that Socrates introduces the design of the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* constitution, the mould (*typos*) in which the multiplicity of citizens are to be moulded into a singular agalmtic body by the ideal mythic *logos* that bears proportions of the God-like man and implants that schema into the body-soul compounds of the *agalma*-men (τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιῶεν, 501b). For a city to be rendered a *theoeikelon-andreikelon* and for its citizenry to receive that structure and be moulded in its likeness there needs to be a total absence of conflicting imagery and the body-politic and all the body-soul compounds that constitute it must be totally neutral and receptive just as Chora is vis-à-vis the *onta* whose likenesses the Demiurge imprints therein. The idea that the *agalma*-citizens and the ideal polity itself are to be rendered a *carte blanche* 'coloured in' by the philosopher-kings acting as *zōgraphoi-oikistai* finds a neat parallel in the way Socrates is portrayed himself in the *Timaeus* as a 'passive receptacle' ready to receive the *Timaeus eikōs logos*.

Diction related to the verb *dechomai* permeates *Timaeus*' description of Chora (50c-e) and is incorporated into the alternative title 'Receptacle' or *Hypodochē* (49a & 51a) and is also found in Plato's description of Socrates' uncharacteristic passivity and neutral receptiveness in the *Timaeus*.³⁴⁶ Indeed, early in the programmatic opening of the text. Socrates announces

³⁴⁶ Cf. McCabe (2016), 1 describes the different but nonetheless complimentary depictions of Socrates that are familiar to readers of the corpus: on the one hand he is an agnostic questioner and then on the other he is an

that he is ‘cosmically adorned’ and is the most eagerly ready of all those present to ‘chorically receive’ the festive gifts of the impending discourses, the Panathenaic dinner-party *logoi* (τὰ τῶν λόγων ξένια, πάρεμιί τε οὖν δὴ κεκοσμημένος ἐπ’ αὐτὰ καὶ πάντων ἐτοιμότητος ὣν δέχεσθαι, 20c). It is telling that word meaning ‘adorned’ also has ‘cosmic connotations—Socrates is *kekosmēmenos* in festive garb eagerly awaiting to chorically receive into his body-soul compound the impending *eikōs logos* that will itself prove to be both a living *eikōn* of the *kosmos* (*Ti.*92c & *Criti.*106a) and of the *theoeikelon andreikelon*. Similarly, Socrates, speaking for himself and the other symposiasts, announces that they all ‘accept and receive’ with eagerness Timaeus’ proem (τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξάμεθά σου, 29d). This diction of passive reception is used within the closing lines of the proem itself at a key point—Timaeus concludes his preamble by emphasising his limitations as a mortal seeking to provide an account of cosmogony says that we are to accept his myth as a ‘likely account’ (ὥστε περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους, 29d). Timaeus also uses this same diction of passive reception in reference to his own receiving of the doctrine that God made all things as alike unto Himself as possible from certain unnamed wise-men: “this principle [*archē*], then, we shall be wholly right in accepting from men of wisdom as being above all the supreme originating principle of Becoming and the Cosmos” (ταύτην δὴ γενέσεως καὶ κόσμου μάλιστ’ ἂν τις ἀρχὴν κυριωτάτην παρ’ ἀνδρῶν φρονίμων ἀποδεχόμενος ὀρθότατα ἀποδέχοιτ’ ἂν, 29e-30a). In all these instances the *eikōs mythos* and its doctrines are not simply passively received. Just as Chora receives in a state formlessness without containing residue of former Ideas when receiving new ones (ἄμορφον ὃν ἐκείνων ἀπασῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν ὅσας μέλλοι δέχεσθαί ποθεν, 50d-e) so too Socrates and the other symposiasts, as well as even Timaeus himself and the readers/listeners, are to be imagined as

“otherworldly philosopher who sees truth and reality outside the cave and has knowledge to rule authoritatively within it”. However, the silent and passively accepting Socrates of the *Timaeus* does not neatly fit into either of these typical presentations.

cartes blanches scrubbed clean in order for the agalmatomorphic *zōon-logos* to enter their body-soul compounds and mould them in its own likeness. The idea that passive reception of the *eikōs mythos* and its doctrines is ‘choric’ has already been put forward by Kalkavage: "[Socrates'] silence is like the receptacle we hear about in Timaeus' speech: it provides the receptive space or chora for all the stories and images to come".³⁴⁷ However despite noticing this same parallel Kalkavage's interpretation of this typological connection is very different to that advanced in this dissertation:

"He assumes the attitude of one of the cave dwellers in the *Republic*, one who is enthralled by the image-opinions cast by cunning projectionists. Having set up the whole test with his speech of yesterday, Socrates can now sit back, enjoy and learn from the spectacle that he has set in motion. The cunning desire of Socrates allows us to see what happens when men of a worldly or practical character get their hands on a certain version of the city of the *Republic*. The silence and receptivity of Socrates would then have a double function: to signal the appropriate withdrawal of philosophic inquiry from proceedings devoted to glorification or flattery, and to make a receptive space for the designs of men who think of truth in terms of doing and making".³⁴⁸

Here Kalkavage opines that Socrates' passive choric reception of Timaeus' monologue is essentially a trap—Timaeus who is a practical man, both a politician and an astronomer (27a) is supposedly baited into exposing his ignorance by a silently derisive Socrates.³⁴⁹ In noting the parallel between Socrates' desire to see his polity rendered a *zōon* in motion and the moving *zōa* of the allegory of the cave Kalkavage presumes that the analogism serves to frame the Timaeian *eikōs mythos* in a negative light. That in turn leads to a hermeneutic of suspicion whereby Socrates' choric passive receptiveness is seen as a trap to induce Timaeus to supposedly fall victim to the shadow-play of his own *eikonopoiia* and mistake his own cosmogonic *doxa* for truth, thus becoming a prisoner in the cave of his own construction.

³⁴⁷ Kalkavage,(2000), 2.

³⁴⁸ Kalkavage (2001), 104.

³⁴⁹ Similarly Zuckert (2011), 331 challenges the "traditional understanding" that the *Timaeus* is "a sequel to the *Republic* which shows the cosmological basis of Plato's politics" and instead argues that "contrast between Timaeus' monologue and the silently listening Socrates dramatizes the philosophical differences between investigations of 'the human things,' like those conducted by Socrates, and attempts to demonstrate the intelligible, mathematically calculable order of the sensible natural world, like that of Timaeus".

Indeed Kalkavage says “in his description of the cave, Socrates uses the word *pathos* to designate our condition (and affliction) of lacking education (514a) [and] it is the same word he uses here in the *Timaeus* to describe his desire for the city in motion (19b)”.³⁵⁰ Whilst this dissertation also concurs that Socrates’ choric passivity and unusual desire to witness *zōa* in motion should be interpreted in light of the Allegory of the Cave the idea that *the eikōs mythos* merely an un-philosophic *doxa* that mistakes shadow-puppetry for truth will not be accepted. Instead the connection between the *eikōs mythos* and the Allegory of the Cave as well as Socrates’ passive reception of Timaeus’ speech will be interpreted positively as showing how oneiric *eikonopoiia* is used to link Being and Becoming and assist the nous triumph over the *pathē* of the *epithymētikon*.

The Myth of Metals and the Allegory of the Cave

The connection between the Myth of Metals, the Cave Allegory and Chora rests on their shared oneiric imagery and pedagogical function. The Myth of Metals and the Allegory of the Cave are both describing one and the same reality, namely the rearing of *agalma*-men in a mythic dream-world wherein they believe the fiction that they are metallic *agalmata* produced asexually. Shadowy *eidōla* are used in Socrates’ cave-polity to pacify rowdy unphilosophic *agalma*-men on the one hand and to psychagogically guide the philosophic ones on the other hand, equipping them with an understanding of *eikonopoiia* so they can make sense of the ‘real world’ above when they ascend out of the dream-cave. This is analogous to how the *zōgraphia* of man’s nous on his liver during sleep has two functions—it both pacifies the unphilosophic *epithymētikon* bound in the ‘cave’ of the torso whilst those same shadowy *phantasmata* provides the waking mind with divinely-inspired imagery that it

³⁵⁰ Kalkavage (2001), 104, n19 citing R.7.514a ff.

can interpret in order to relate the World of Becoming to its model, the Paradigm (70d-71a & 71c-d). The point in all this is that oneiric *eikonopoiia* has a dual function—both pacification of the disorderly and sub-rational elements at the macrocosmic, mesocosmic and microcosmic level but also enhancement of the waking intellectual faculty’s ability to understand the link between Becoming and Being that is divinely revealed through the dream state. The typological links that will be traced in this chapter between Timaeus’ account of both the Demiurge’s oneiric, choric *agalmtopoiia* and of microcosmic man’s hepatic *zōgraphia* vis-à-vis the *eidōlopoiia* of Socrates’ cave-polity’s education system will show that there is a unitary system of cosmogony, theology, politogony, ontology, epistemology and mythopoetic pedagogy in the *Timaeus-Republic*. That unitary system is centred on a dynamic of oneiric *eikonopoiia* as means of simultaneously pacifying and psychagogically guiding the sub-rational whilst facilitating the rational explanation of the relationship between Becoming and Being, between dreaming and waking.

Hepatic Oneiromancy and the Allegory of the Cave: Psychagogic *Eikonopoiia*

This chapter’s account of the unifying oneirology (dream-theory) of the *Timaeus-Republic* is centred on the dichotomy between psychagogy at the sub-rational level though oneiric *eikonopoiia* and the rational (or *logos*-based) oneiromantic exegesis of those same divinely-inspired dream-images produced by the mind during sleep. The key lies in understanding how Timaeus describes the liver's role in divine communication. Timaeus’ account of why the divine sub-demiurges creating the human body placed the liver where they did provides direction (70d-71a):

τὸ κράτιστον καθ’ ἡσυχίαν περὶ τοῦ πᾶσι κοινῆ καὶ ἰδίᾳ συμφέροντος ἐῷ
 βουλευέσθαι, διὰ ταῦτα ἐνταῦθ’ ἔδοσαν αὐτῷ τὴν τάξιν. τὸ δὲ δὴ σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν
 ἐπιθυμητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ὄσων ἐνδειαν διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἴσχει φύσιν, τοῦτο εἰς
 τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν τε φρενῶν καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν ὀμφαλὸν ὄρου **κατόκισαν**, οἷον **φάτην**

ἐν ἅπαντι τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ τῆ τοῦ σώματος τροφῆ τεκτηνόμενοι: καὶ κατέδησαν δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐνταῦθα ὡς **θρέμμα ἄγριον, τρέφειν** δὲ συνημμένον ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ τι μέλλοι ποτὲ θνητὸν ἔσεσθαι γένος. ἴν' οὖν αἰεὶ νεμόμενον πρὸς **φάτνη** καὶ ὅτι πορρωτάτῳ τοῦ βουλευομένου κατοικοῦν, **θόρυβον καὶ βοῆν** ὡς ἐλαχίστην παρέχον, τὸ κράτιστον καθ' ἡσυχίαν περὶ τοῦ πᾶσι κοινῆ καὶ ἰδία συμφέροντος ἐῶ βουλεύεσθαι, διὰ ταῦτα ἐνταῦθ' ἔδοσαν αὐτῷ τὴν **τάξιν**.

And all that part of the Soul which is subject to appetites for foods and drinks, and all the other wants that are due to the nature of the body, they planted in the parts midway between the midriff and the boundary at the navel, fashioning as it were a manger in all this region for the feeding of the body; and there they tied up this part of the Soul, as though it were a creature which, though savage, they must necessarily keep joined to the rest and feed, if the mortal stock were to exist at all. In order, then, that this part, feeding thus at its manger and housed as far away as possible from the counselling part, and creating the least possible **turmoil and din**, should allow the Supreme part to take counsel in peace concerning what benefits all, both individually and in the mass,—for these reasons they stationed it in that position.

This passage describes the gods structuring of the anatomy of man's torso in such a way as to mitigate the mortal soul's potential for negative influence on the whole organism. Rather than resembling what one might expect of an account of man's anatomy and psychology the diction and imagery here instead seem more fit for describing the construction of a pen to house a wild beast. Timaeus' vocabulary here deliberately mixes artisanal and biological registers. The gods are depicted as if fashioning a feeding-trough as carpenters (τεκτηνόμενοι φάτνην) when they are actually anatomically and psychically structuring the human torso. Thus the wood-work involved in constructing an animal's pen is conflated with the biological growth of the *zōon* itself. This fusion of the diction and imagery of asexual artisanal creation and biological growth is an important theme that will be traced throughout this chapter. It is to be viewed in light of the Noble Lie wherein sexually-produced citizens are convinced they are metallurgically-forged *agalмата*. One should also notice the bivalence of τρέφειν as meaning not only 'nourish' or 'feed' but also 'to rear', and by extension 'to educate'.³⁵¹ Indeed, Socrates in speaking to his *agalmatopoiios-oikistēs* interlocutor refers to his own children whom you rear and educate now in word, *logos*, but soon in deed, *ergon* (τούς γε

³⁵¹ Cf. R. 534d: τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις καὶ παιδεύεις. See also LSJ s.v. τρέφω.

σαυτοῦ παιῆδας, οὐς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις τε καὶ παιδεύεις, εἴ ποτε ἔργῳ τρέφοις, *R.7.534d*). The reason this is important is because the sub-demiurges are not merely designing a system of nourishment but also one of education and training within the body-politic of each human individual that is being virtually constructed in this anthropomorphic *eikōs logos*. That the above passage is typologically connected to the Allegory of the Cave should not come as a surprise. The mortal appetitive part of the soul, the *epithymētikon*, is described as being bound (κατέδησαν) in the cavernous part of the torso in a manner akin to the prisoner-citizens of the cave-polity. Indeed, those prisoners are described as oneirically ‘atopic’ (ἄτοπον...λέγεις εἰκόνα καὶ δεσμώτας ἀτόπους, *R.7.534d*). Just as the nous of each individual human paints *eidōla* on the surface of the liver in order to pacify the rowdy *epithymētikon*-beast bound in the torso (φαντάσματα ἀποζωγραφοῖ πράότητός τις ἐκ διανοίας ἐπίπνοια, *71c-d*) so too in the ideal polity’s cave-foundry the *agalma*-men are pacified and educationally directed through a shadow-puppet show. The philosopher-kings act as *eikonopoioi* by carrying various items over a wall before a flame, namely agalamic likenesses of humans (ἀνδριάντας), *zōa* made of wood and stone and other such artisanal products (ἄλλα ζῶα λίθινά τε καὶ ξύλινα καὶ παντοῖα εἰργασμένα, *7.514b-15a*). Not only are these *andriantes* here reminiscent of the *agalma*-men themselves who are the bound cave-prisoners moulded by the philosopher-kings who are also the shadow-play projectionists but further the *zōa*-puppets are reminiscent of painted animals Socrates desires to see in motion in the programmatic opening of the *Timaeus* (*Ti.19b-c*). This typological link between the animal-puppets in motion in the Allegory of the Cave and in Socrates’ request that spurs on Critias and Timaeus has not been properly noticed in modern scholarship.

The political dimensions of this anatomical description become apparent through Timaeus’s vocabulary. The diction above of *taxis* (‘ordering’) has political connotations—though here

Timaeus is discussing the positing of parts within the individual human's body-soul compound he is nonetheless using the language of establishing constitutional order (cf. Arist.*Pol.*1271b40) and social organisation in classes (e.g. *X.Mem.* 2.1.7).³⁵² Similarly the term *(kat)oikēsis* used of the cavernous dwelling-chamber of the *epithymētikon* is reminiscent of *oikistai*, city-founders who arrange where people live.³⁵³ Further the focus on the 'turmoil and din' (θόρυβον καὶ βοήν) produced by the bound *epithymētikon*-beast, whilst primarily referring to the bothersome *borborigmoi* of the ever-desiring stomach it also has connotations of political unrest—the lowest section of the individual's body-compound in its rowdiness threatens the overall 'justice', the balance of the whole body-politic in a manner analogous to the demiurges and farmers revolting against the philosopher-kings.³⁵⁴

The correspondence between the organisation (*taxis*) of the ideal polity and the psychological and anatomical arrangement (*taxis*) is an intended built-in feature. This is clear in Timaeus' description of the psychosomatic 'political' structure of the human chest (*Ti.*69e-70c):

ἄλλην τοῦ σώματος οἴκησιν τὸ θνητόν, ἰσθμὸν καὶ ὄρον διοικοδομήσαντες τῆς τε κεφαλῆς καὶ τοῦ στήθους, αὐχένα μεταξὺ τιθέντες, ἵν' εἴη χωρὶς. ἐν δὴ τοῖς στήθεσιν καὶ τῷ καλουμένῳ θώρακι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς θνητόν γένος ἐνέδουν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν ἄμεινον αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ χειρὸν ἐπεφύκει, διοικοδομοῦσι τοῦ θώρακος αὐτὸ τὸ κύτος, διορίζοντες οἷον γυναικῶν, τὴν δὲ ἀνδρῶν χωρὶς οἴκησιν, τὰς φρένας διάφραγμα εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτῶν τιθέντες. τὸ μετέχον οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνδρείας καὶ θυμοῦ, φιλόνικον ὄν, κατώκισαν ἐγγυτέρω τῆς κεφαλῆς μεταξὺ τῶν φρενῶν τε καὶ αὐχένος, ἵνα τοῦ λόγου κατήκοον ὄν κοινῇ μετ' ἐκείνου βία τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κατέχοι γένος, ὅπότε ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως τῷ τ' ἐπιτάγματι καὶ λόγῳ μηδαμῇ πείθεσθαι ἐκὸν ἐθέλοι: τὴν δὲ δὴ καρδίαν ἄμμα τῶν φλεβῶν καὶ πηγῆν τοῦ περιφερομένου κατὰ πάντα τὰ μέλη σφοδρῶς αἵματος εἰς τὴν δορυφορικὴν οἴκησιν κατέστησαν, ἵνα, ὅτε ζέσειεν τὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ μένος, τοῦ λόγου παραγγείλαντος ὥς τις ἄδικος περὶ αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι πρᾶξις ἐξωθεν ἢ καὶ τις ἀπὸ τῶν ἔνδοθεν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὁξέως διὰ πάντων τῶν στενωπῶν πᾶν ὅσον αἰσθητικὸν ἐν τῷ σώματι, τῶν τε παρακελεύσεων καὶ ἀπειλῶν αἰσθανόμενον, γίγνοιτο ἐπήκοον καὶ ἔποιτο πάντα, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς πᾶσιν ἡγεμονεῖν ἐῶ.

³⁵² Cf. *taxis* in the sense of a lawgiver's enactment in Pl. *Plt.*305c: τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου τάξιν.

³⁵³ Cf. Th. 2.15, Th.2.16, Arist.*Pol.* 1275a8, Arist.*Mete.*363a3. See also Hdt.3.102: ποιέεσθαι οἴκησιν ὑπὸ γῆν.

³⁵⁴For *Thorybos*-diction being used to convey a sense of fear (*deos*), see App. *B. Civ.* 3.34-38.

they planted the mortal kind apart therefrom in another **chamber** [*oikēsis*] of the body, building an isthmus and boundary for the head and chest by setting between them the neck, to the end that they might remain apart. And within the chest—or “thorax,” as it is called—they fastened [**bound**] the mortal kind of soul. And inasmuch as one part thereof is better, and one worse, they built a division within the cavity of the thorax— as if to **fence** off two separate chambers [*oikēsis*], for men and for women—by placing the midriff between them as a **screen** [**diaphragma**]. That part of the soul, then, which partakes of courage and spirit, since it is a lover of victory, they [**made to dwell; κατόκισαν**] more near to the head, between the midriff and the neck, in order that it might **hearken to the reason**, and, in conjunction therewith, might forcibly **subdue the tribe** of the desires whensoever they should utterly refuse to yield willing **obedience to the word of command from the citadel of reason**. And the heart, which is the junction of the veins and the fount of the blood which circulates vigorously through all the limbs, they appointed to be the **chamber** [*oikēsis*] **of the bodyguard**, to the end that when the heat of the passion boils up, as soon as reason passes the word round that some unjust action is being done which affects them, either from without or possibly even from the interior desires, every organ of sense in the body might quickly perceive through all the channels both the injunctions and the threats and in all ways **obey** and follow them, thus allowing their best part to be the leader of them all.

The main point to focus on here is the prominence of *oikēsis*-diction and the political dynamic at play in Timaeus’ account of beastly *epithymētikon* being forced by the guard-house of the heart (δορυφορικὴν οἴκησιν) positioned closer to the head (ἐγγυτέρω τῆς κεφαλῆς) so as to directly receive commands thence from the acropolis-citadel of the nous and make the unruly *epithymētikon* obey the reasoned command of the governing cephalic soul (ὁπότε’ ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως τῷ τ’ ἐπιτάγματι καὶ λόγῳ μηδαμῆ πείθεσθαι ἐκὸν ἐθέλοι). Timaeus’ depiction of the heart, the organ most associated with the *thymos*, the spirited part of the mortal soul, as a dwelling of spear-wielding sentinels, *doryphoroi* (δορυφορικὴν οἴκησιν), is clearly a reference to the silver military class of ancillary guardians (*epikouroi-phylakes*) who serve the golden philosopher kings as ‘guard dogs’ keeping the lowest class in check (R.3.416a: τρέφειν κύνας ἐπικούρους ποιμνίων). Indeed, in the Myth of Metals Socrates says the following of the *phylakes-doryphoroi*: “let us arm these sons of earth and conduct them under the leadership of their rulers” (ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτους τοὺς γηγενεῖς ὀπλίσαντες προάγωμεν ἡγουμένων τῶν ἀρχόντων, 3.415d). He then adds that the *phylakes-doryphoroi* should look for a place in the city to set up camp (στρατοπεδεύσασθαι) that is high enough to

function as a vantage point from whence they can control insurrections of the lowest class of the citizenry when they refuse to obey the laws and also from whence they can, as loyal shepherd-dogs, guard the flock from external wolves (415d-e). Socrates uses *oikēsis*-diction expressly when he says that the *doryphoroi-phylakes* should live in military dwellings, not those of bankers or money-changers (οικήσεις...στρατιωτικός γε, ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστικός, 415e). One can clearly see how this dissertation's previous chapter are relevant here—the structure of the individual's body-soul compound and that of the *theoikeion-andreikeion* polity are deeply intertwined and this informs Timaeus' account of anatomy. The nous in the cephalic citadel function as the philosopher-kings, the *thymos* and heart as the guardhouse of the *phylakes* and the bound animal is to be equated with the lowest class of demiurges and farmers. But what has this to do with oneiromancy and the Allegory of the Cave? There is a striking and deliberate parallel terminology in the above passage (69e-70c). The reference to a wall (διάφραγμα) separating the domain of the cephalic nous-soul and the mortal soul, the philosophic citadel from the barracks and precinct of craftsmen and farmers, so to speak, is also significant.³⁵⁵ This is because almost the exact same word used for the dividing wall between the nous-soul and the bound-beast that is the mortal appetite soul is used of the divider between the bound cave-captives and the philosopher-kings qua puppeteer-projectionists (*thaumatopoiōi*) who, from their position on high behind the wall create those

³⁵⁵Timaeus also frames this diaphragmatic division between the reasoning and unreasoning parts of the soul in terms of the structure of the smallest social unit within the polis, the *oikos*, a building which is divided along the on lines of gender. The male and female living quarters of the tradition Greek home to the different parts of the soul: the upper domain of the *andrōn*, the sympotic room of male philosophical discussion being unsurprisingly assigned to the nous and the *gynaikōnitis*, the female quarters, to appetitive and impulsive mortal soul. For the structure of the *oikos*, see Ault (2007), 259–265, Pomeroy (1991), 263-268 & Lisa (2010). For the word γυναικωνίτις, see Lys.1.9, Men.519, Ph.1.107. For the ἀνδρῶν, see Hdt. 1.34. Additionally, it is worth briefly noting that this mapping of the structure of the gender-divided *oikos* onto the human body-soul compound is analogous to how Timaeus frames his whole cosmology in terms biological procreation, the relationship between mother, father and progeny. At the microcosmic level the human nous functions and the *andrōn* vis-à-vis the *gynaikōnitis* of the mortal soul whereas at the macrocosmic level Nous the Demiurge acts from above as a masculine Father imparting orders to the Mother Chora below (προσεικάσαι πρέπει τὸ μὲν δεχόμενον μητρὶ, τὸ δ' ὄθεν πατρὶ, *Ti*.50d). Indeed, correspondence between Timaeus' chorology and his hepatic oneiromancy as well as the Myth of Metals will follow shortly.

shadowy *eidōla* without revealing themselves (μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τῶν δεσμοτῶν ἐπάνω ὁδόν, παρ’ ἣν ἰδὲ **τειχίον παρφοδομημένον**, ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς πρὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόκειται τὰ **παραφράγματα**, ὑπὲρ ὧν τὰ θαύματα δεικνύασιν, *R. 7.514b*). The significance of this parallelism becomes apparent when one examines how the liver plays a key role in the taming of the unruly bound beast, the *epithymētikon-thremma*, by functioning as a screen for the nous’ oneiric shadow-puppet projections (71a-72b). Indeed the ‘socio-political’ language of ‘abodes and dwellings’ (*oikēseis*) is applied by Timaeus to his account of why the Demiurge placed the liver within the zone of the body inhabited by the *epithymētikon*: “God devised and constructed the form of the liver and placed it in that part’s abode” (τούτῳ δὴ θεὸς ἐπιβουλεύσας αὐτῷ τὴν ἥπατος ἰδέαν συνέστησε καὶ ἔθηκεν εἰς τὴν ἐκείνου **κατοίκησιν**, 71a-b). This socio-political diction of ‘dwelling’ serves to frame the human body-soul compound as a polity occurs in Timaeus’ explanation of the ‘psychagogic’ function of divinely-inspired dream visions. He says that the oneiric *eidōla* that appear on the liver during sleep cause “the part of the soul planted round the liver to be cheerful and serene, so that in the night it passes its time sensibly, being occupied in its slumbers with divination, seeing that in reason and intelligence it has no share” (ἰλεῶν τε καὶ εὐήμερον ποιοῖ τὴν περὶ τὸ ἥπαρ ψυχῆς μοῖραν **κατωκισμένην**, ἔν τε τῇ νυκτὶ διαγωγὴν ἔχουσαν μετρίαν, μαντεία χρωμένην καθ’ ὕπνον, ἐπειδὴ λόγου καὶ φρονήσεως οὐ μετεῖχε, 71d). This is to be seen as analogous to how the individuals in the cave incapable of ever making the ascent to true *logos*, dialectic, are to be kept enraptured in the shadow-puppetry of the cave—the divinely-inspired mythology of the dream-world constructed by the Noble Lie which they always inhabit without ever rising to the station of a philosopher-king who learns the truth and himself becomes an external administrator of the cave-polity. The torso-cavity wherein the *epithymētikon* is subjected to the psychagogic ‘shadow-puppet show’ of the nous’ hepatic *eikonopoia* is ‘topographically’ and ‘functionally’ analogous to the way the philosopher-

kings descend to the cave-polity to act as projectionists for the *epithymētikon*-like citizens in their care, the cave-prisoners.

Not only does Timaeus description of the nous' *eikonopoia* on the surface of the liver in the cave-like cavity of the torso resemble the way the philosopher-kings create a subterranean mythic dream-world for the *agalma*-citizens 'bound' in the cave-polity but it also resembles the Demiurge's choric image-making as well. The liver is conceived of by the divine sub-demiurges as a concession to the inherently unreasoning and even anti-rational nature of the *epithymētikon*: "they knew that it would not understand reason, and that, even if it did have some share in the perception of reasons, it would have no natural instinct to pay heed to any of them but would be bewitched for the most part both day and night by images and phantasms" (εἰδότες δὲ αὐτὸ ὡς λόγου μὲν οὔτε συνήσειν ἔμελλεν, εἴ τέ πη καὶ μεταλαμβάνοι τινὸς αὐτῶν αἰσθήσεως, οὐκ ἔμφυτον αὐτῷ τὸ μέλειν τινῶν ἔσοιτο λόγων, ὑπὸ δὲ εἰδώλων καὶ φαντασμάτων νυκτός τε καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν μάλιστα ψυχαγωγήσοιτο, 71a).

There is analogism here to the way the philosopher-kings use sub-dialectic *eidōla* and *phantasmata* in the shadow-puppetry of the cave to direct and educate the *agalma*-citizens who are not yet or may never be capable of participating in pure dialectic. Keeping rowdy bronze and iron *agalma*-men pacified with shadow-puppetry or temporarily deceiving those with potential to later rise out of the cave to become philosopher-kings.³⁵⁶ There is also resemblance to the Demiurge's use of choric *eidōlopoia* to convey His Ideas to the Visible All that is totally disordered and 'un-musical' when left to its own devices (30a). Both the prisoners of the cave and the Visible All are sub-rational and rowdy but can be made to

³⁵⁶ For psychagogy in the *Phaedrus* see Asmis (1986), 153-172. Asmis (1986), 156. notes that the term can refer to the necromantic summoning of souls and often has connotations of deception but upon citing *Ti. 71a* as involving 'beguiling the desiring part of the soul via images' goes on to explain that Plato uses the term to refer to constructive form of rhetorical persuasion rather than mere beguilement.

indirectly partake of pure reason through oneiric *eidōlopoiia*. Phantastic *eidōlopoiia* is not only used to psychagogically guide the unreasoning part of man during sleep and to ensure that the polity at large coheres by sedating rowdy *agalma*-men with shadow-puppetry but it is also the means through which God controls the base, unreasoning *pathos* of the Visible All. The intellect (*dianoia*) pacifies the *epithymētikon* by sending forth a ‘breeze’ that paints calming *phantasmata* (φαντάσματα ἀποζωγραφοῖ πραότητός τις ἐκ διανοίας ἐπίπνοια, 71c).³⁵⁷ Timaeus says that during sleep the “power of thoughts which proceed from the mind” approach the liver which chorically receives these ‘ideas’ as if it were a mirror, taking these ‘impressions’ (*typoi*) and rendering them *eidōla* (ἵνα ἐν αὐτῷ τῶν διανοημάτων ἢ ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ φερομένη δύναμις, οἷον ἐν **κατόπτρῳ δεχομένῳ τύπους** καὶ κατιδεῖν εἶδωλα, 71b). These images are used to threaten (ἀπειλῆ) and intimidate the bound *epithymētikon-thremma* by causing sadness and vexation (φοβοῖ μὲν αὐτό... λύπας καὶ ἄσας παρέχοι, 71b). Here the comparison to a mirror receiving *typoi* is markedly choric—ideas enter a space and imprint images that bear some relation to the noetic substance and retain some characteristics but are nonetheless substantively different. Thus the same epistemology and ontology of *eikonopoiia* that is present in the Allegory of the Cave and in Timaeus’ chorology is also implicit in his description of hepatic oneirology.³⁵⁸ All three of these accounts, that of the cave, of Chora and hepatic oneirology are all focused on the intermediation between model and *eikōn* and between Being and Becoming. Further in all these cases that intermediation is understood in terms of oneiric *eikonopoiia*.

³⁵⁷ Ustinova (2017), 9–10 links the term *epipnoia* (lit. 'breath') to the diction of inspiration, *katochos*, *entheos* and *enthousiasmos*, "engoddedness".

³⁵⁸ See Ustinova (2009), 9-11 on the status of caves in the Greek religious mind.

There is a risk that, in focusing unduly on the ‘pacifying’ or even ‘deceptive’ psychagogic function of oneiric *eikonopoia* one can overlook the critical role it plays in not only subjugating the unreasoning part of the body-soul compound but also in assisting the intellect to gain insights that it would not otherwise be capable of on its own. This is related also to the manner in which undue stress on the imprisoning and deceiving elements of the Allegory of the Cave without properly noting its anagogic and pedagogic dimension distorts its meaning—the main point of that eikastic myth is to turn the soul away from images to their true archetypes.³⁵⁹ In the same way, a quality of oneiric *eikonopoia* which has not yet been duly appreciated is the fact that it facilitates man’s capacity to understand the relationship between *gignomena* and *onta* with a degree of clarity not achievable to human intellection alone. This is because in the divinely-possessed state of dreaming where the nous ‘retires’ from its normal governing station man gains a boon that he does not normally enjoy—*eikones* sourced directly from the Divine. Timaeus makes an important distinction between the terms *mantis* and *prophētēs*. The former term refers to divinely-possessed individuals who are incapable of explaining the visions they see or prophecies they utter whilst the latter word should be reserved for those who are interpreters of phantastic visions and utterances made through oracular riddles (τῆς δι’ αἰνιγμῶν οὔτοι φήμης καὶ φαντάσεως ὑποκριταί, 72b).³⁶⁰

³⁵⁹ Cf. Ledbetter. (2017), 121-138 who shows that the Allegory of the Cave is essentially a self-conscious rhetorical exercise whereby Glaucon and the reader/listener are essentially ‘guided out’ of the cave themselves as they listen to Socrates’ exegesis of his own eikastic myth.

³⁶⁰ The term *hypokritēs* also has the additional meaning of an exegete in the context of rhapsodic poetry which is of note given the Panaethenaic context of the Timaeian *logos*. For ὑποκριτής being used of interpreters in an oneiromantic context, see Luc.Somn.17. As per Gonzales (2013) 296ff the terms ῥαψωδός and ὑποκριτής were both used for the bard (ἄοιδός) performing mythic poetry in relay fashion as an entertainer and educator at sacred festivals, (the very context of the *Timaeus-Critias*, the *agōnes* of the Panathenaea) but specifies that the ὑποκριτής and his activity (ὑποκρίνεσθαι) has the connotation not only of ‘hypoleptic performance’ of rhapsodic poetry but also of exegesis of the kind performed by interpreters of divine messages. Cf. Patzer (1970), 650f who differs from Gonzales in not accepting the connection between rhapsodic performance and mantic exegesis, arguing that the term only applies to the latter, to “Träume, Orakel und Vorzeichen”, dreams, oracles and omens. See also Zucchelli (1962) 17n26 & 36–37. The Platonic Lexicon of Timaeus the Sophist, though a late source, nonetheless attests to the cross-over between the rhapsodic and mantic *hypokritai* for Ὀμηρίδαι are defined as ‘those who hypocritically interpret/perform Homer’ (οἱ τὰ Ὀμήρου ὑποκρινόμενοι ῥαψωδοί) and as the “*hypokritai* of epics” (ὑποκριταὶ ἐπῶν), Tim. Lex. ο 308 and ρ 374 =Bonelli (2007), 160 & 166, cf. 479–480 & 544). See also Zucchelli (1962), 26–27. Similarly, Poll. 5.154 defines ‘interpreter’ (ἑρμηνεύς

The distinction is important because *manteis* and dreamers are cut off from the rational faculty whereas, as Timaeus notes, echoing the Delphic maxim, self-knowledge belongs only to the sound of mind (71e-72a). The same applies to dreamers and ecstatic *manteis* experiencing divinely inspired imagery—they are to awaken first from the vision and regain their waking reasoning faculty before providing oneiromantic exegesis on the meaning of the dream. Thus hepatic oneiromancy along with all other forms of mantic possession (including that of the *poiētai*) are sub-rational modes of divinely inspired *eikonopoia* that can only be correctly interpreted through the use of *logoi* by the waking nous when it returns to its proper cephalic station after momentary displacement during the visionary experience.³⁶¹

Nonetheless the images produced through sub-rational divine revelation, be it waking or sleeping, play a vital function in spreading the divine truth of Being even the parts of the cosmos incapable of or opposed to reasoning, to *noēsis*. A major preoccupation for the sub-demiurgic gods is rectifying the basest element of our mortal soul, the *epithymētikon-thremma*, by ensuring that it is somehow reconciled with and connected to the transcendent truth of Being despite lacking the requisite reasoning faculty needed (κατορθοῦντες καὶ τὸ φαῦλον ἡμῶν, ἵνα ἀληθείας πη προσάπτοιτο, 71d-e). This is achieved through their devising of an anatomical ‘oracle’, the liver (κατέστησαν ἐν τούτῳ τὸ μαντεῖον, 71e). Thus, the

καὶ ἐρμηνευτής) as the *hypokritēs* of language (γλῶτταν συμβάλλων, γλῶτταν ὑποκρινόμενος, γλώττης ὑποκριτής) whilst also referring to *hypokritai* as interpreters of divine signs (τερῶν ὑποκριταί, 7.188.4) as well as mentioning oneiromantic *hypokritai* (ὄνειράτων ὑποκριταί, 7.188.8–9). Cf. Patzer (1970), 643n1 for the (unconvincing) claim that Pollux 5.154 is an “artificial hyper-Atticism”. That the cross-over between rhapsodic and oneiromantic *hypokritai* was not a late feature of the language is reflected in the fact that the verb ὑποκρίνομαι is used in the *Iliad* itself to describe how a *mantis* expounds upon the divine signs he knows well in his soul and the peoples listen to him and obey him (ὥδέ χ’ ὑποκρίναίτο θεοπρόπος, ὃς σάφα θυμῷ / εἰδείη τεράων καὶ οἱ πειθοίατο λαοί, 12. 228–229). See also Lesky (1956), 473 on *Od.*15, 170 and Else (1959), 84–85 & 101–102n93 for the great antiquity of the role of the rhapsodico-mantic *hypokritēs*.

³⁶¹Cf. *Ion* 533d-534e where Socrates explains that Ion the Homeric rhapsode (and all other good poets) must necessarily be out of their minds when possessed by muses in the same way that Corybantes are when they dance. He famously likens the effect they have in drawing others into that state to a magnet attracting rings. See Gonzales (213), 219ff for divine possession of Homeric bards.

reconciliation of the base and unreasoning part of the mortal soul with the transcendent truth of Being is established through the construction of an anatomical locus for divine revelation.

Timaeus explains that in order to properly interpret a divine message one must first return to the state where his *nous* has returned to its proper cognitive rotation (*phronēsis*). Only then can he rationally examine the things spoken whilst in the waking state of divine possession as a *mantis* or noetically interpret the *eikones* he recalls upon waking from the enthused state of dreamy sleep (συννοῆσαι μὲν ἔμφορος τά τε ῥηθέντα ἀναμνησθέντα ὄναρ ἢ ὕπαρ ὑπὸ τῆς μαντικῆς τε καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικῆς φύσεως). The noetic verb συννοῆσαι in conjunction with the adjective ἔμφορος are juxtaposed against divine possession, both waking *manteia* and oneiric inspiration during sleep. The use of *logismos*, reasoned cognition that leads to true understanding (*noēsis*), is something that can only occur when not divinely inspired. Despite the mutual exclusivity of *logismos/noēsis* and oneiric or mantic divine possession there is nonetheless a positive co-dependency. *Nous* gains something from receiving the sub-rational divine *eikones* that arise from it ceasing to be in total control.³⁶² Likewise the sub-rational part of man fed by divine possession also benefits from being given logical or noetic explanation when the dream or mantic frenzy ceases to predominate. The point of mantic possession during dreamy sleep is not only for the subjugation and psychagogic guidance of the *epithymētikon-thremma* which cannot directly participate in *logos* and *phronēsis* (μαντεία χρωμένην καθ' ὕπνον, ἐπειδὴ λόγου καὶ φρονήσεως οὐ μετεῖχε, 71d). The odd process of temporary suspension of *phronēsis* in order to receive divinely revealed images that are subsequently interpreted through reason ultimately results in an overall degree of insight that

³⁶² For Platonic texts treating divine possession positively, see *Apol.* 33c; *Ion* 536d, 542a; *R.* 366c–d, 493a; *Phdr.* 244a–245b & *Lg.* 719c–d.

could not have been gained by waking reason alone.³⁶³ The things said or remembered during waking or sleeping mantic possession as well as the divinely inspired *phantasmata* seen must all be examined through ratiocination (*logismos*) so that the meaning can be discerned and it can be identified for whom impending, past or present ills or boons are intended (καὶ ὅσα ἂν φαντάσματα ὀφθῆ, πάντα λογισμῶ διελέσθαι ὅπη τι σημαίνει καὶ ὅτω μέλλοντος ἢ παρελθόντος ἢ παρόντος κακοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ, 72a-b). This last point is tremendously important—through the temporary suspension of reasoning faculties insights about the past, present and future are gained that would not have been possible to attain solely through *logismos*. There is a net benefit that arises from the synergy of reason and sub-rational divine *eikonopoiia* that surpasses what can be accomplished through reason alone.³⁶⁴

The maximal degree of understanding possible for mankind and the ability to link Becoming and Being is achieved not through reason alone but through the synergy of both the oneiric *eikonopoiia* of sub-rational divine possession and the rational exegesis of those images. Just as the individual human gains unique insights through the temporary suspension of *phronēsis* during the divine possession of dreamy sleep or mantic enthusiasm, so too the polity is benefited by the philosopher-kings putting aside pure dialectic and astronomy to engage in sub-rational, oneiric mythopoesis. Indeed the philosopher-kings must on occasion leave their acropolis and descend into the cave-polity below in order to ‘paint out’ captivating divinely-inspired myths that not only pacify rowdy citizens but also bring about insights that would not have been possible without such sub-rational oneiric *eikonopoiia*. That is the point of the Allegory of the Cave—it not only shows how oneiric *eikonopoiia* can sedate, pacify and

³⁶³*Phdr.* 245a-b speaks of possession and mania from the Muses (ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχή τε καὶ μανία) as always surpassing in quality the poetry of those that are of sound mind and solely reliant on technical skill (ἐκ τέχνης). See Janaway (1995), 161.

³⁶⁴See Büttner (2011), 111–129 for a comprehensive overview of Plato’s stance on divine possession.

entrap base souls but it also shows how the shadow-puppetry of myth can be examined rationally so as to gain insights that cannot be gleaned by reason alone. That is also how the *eikōs mythos* is to be interpreted—Socrates suspends his dialectic capacity momentarily in order to descend like a nous during sleep into the hepatic cave of Timaeus’ divine revelation. Timaeus does not only provide an oneiric shadow-play in his animation of Socrates’ ideal polity as a moving *zōon* but he also explains the meaning of his *eikonopoia* by using his waking *logismos*. Timaeus is not only simply an enthused *mantis* but also a *prophētēs*, an oneiromantic *exēgētēs* capable of expounding the meaning behind the divine *eikones* he procures. The whole Timaeian *logos* is the autonomous ‘exegesis’ of a rational *prophētēs* applying his waking reasoning (*logismos*) the the oneiromantic *eikonopoia* of a divinely inspired dream-vision, an *eikos mythos*.

Timaeus says that *phronēsis* is bound during sleep when dreams are being experienced (ἀλλ’ ἢ καθ’ ὕπνον τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως πεδηθεῖς δύναμιν, 71e). The reference to binding here is reminiscent of the Allegory of the Cave but rather than the *epithymētikon-thremma* being imprisoned this time it is the cephalic nous. The point here is that during sleep the nous vacates the cephalic citadel from where it normally guides the whole body-politic. The nous leaves its seat of governance in order travel down into the torso-cave wherein it ‘breathes’ out a ‘gust of divinely-inspired intelligence’ which paints *phantasmata* on the surface of the liver that calm down the tumultuous *epithymētikon-thremma* (φαντάσματα ἀποζωγραφοῖ πρότερός τις ἐκ διανοίας ἐπίπνοια, 71c). Without vacating the head during sleep the nous would not be able to impart divine wisdom to the *epithymētikon-thremma*. Now this vacating of the cephalic citadel may not appear to be in the nous’ best interests but it is in the best interest of the *epithymētikon* and the whole *zōon*: the body-politic does not thrive by each part disproportionately pursuing its own gratification at the expense of others but rather by

embodying Justice in the sense of playing its particular role in service of the whole. This same dynamic is at play in the Allegory of the Cave. The philosopher-kings must leave their acropolis (the city's 'head') where they engage in pure dialectic and astronomy in order to descend into the cave where the unenlightened lower-class *agalma*-men dwell (the city's 'torso-cavity'). In the cave they act as shadow-puppeteers in the sense that they generate moving *zōa-eikones* by authoring and performing *eikotes mythoi* that not only entertain and sedate the rowdy *ho polloi* in order to prevent rebellion but also empower them to indirectly partake of *logoi* despite not being capable of dialectic and noetic beholding of the Forms. There is a negative and positive duality in the nous' hepatic *eikonopoiia* within the individual's body-politic just as there is in the shadow-puppetry of the philosopher-kings in the polis. In addition to positively imparting *logismos* indirectly through the *eikones* painted upon the liver-screen for the *epithymētikon-thremma* through the intellectual breeze of nous' hepatic *zōgraphia* (71c) the nous also plays a negative psychagogic role. Nous' divinely-inspired oneiric *eikonopoiia* not only directs the bound beast towards the Good but also suppresses its destructively oriented will.³⁶⁵ The negative role of nous' hepatic *zōgraphia*

³⁶⁵ Cf. the Hippocratic *de Victu* 4.86 for a somewhat parallel account of the soul that is dispersed throughout the body during the day gathering in the torso during sleep to experience dream-visions. There is a textual ambiguity at this point in the text which makes it unclear whether, when the body is still in sleep the parts of the soul are 'awake' and 'alert' or is 'crawling' when managing the parts of the soul fathered in its *oikos* (Οκόταν δὲ τὸ σῶμα ἡσυχάζῃ, ἢ ψυχὴ κινεουμένη καὶ ἐγρηγορέουσα* [or: ἐπεξέρπουσα] τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος διοικεῖ τὸν ἐσωτῆς οἶκον). For the issues of textual criticism here, see Shcherbakova (2018), 80, Diels (1910), 146–147, Jones (1931), 475 and Joly and Byl (2003), 219. Not only does this text's conception of dreaming as involving the parts of the soul gathering in the torso parallel Timaeus' oneirology but this same text describes an oneiromantic dynamic whereby humans can gain access to the invisible through the visible by appreciating that demiurgic arts were taught by the 'mind of the gods' and for that reason artisanal activity is inherently 'theomimetic' (Οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι ἐκ τῶν φανερῶν τὰ ἀφανέα σκέπτεσθαι οὐκ ἐπίστανται· τέχνησι γὰρ χρεόμενοι ὁμοίησιν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει οὐ γινώσκουσιν· θεῶν γὰρ νόος ἐδίδαξε μιμεῖσθαι τὰ ἐσωτῶ, 1.11). The Hippocratic author describes leather-workers (σκυτέες) as microcosmically imitating the way the Divine Nous divides parts out of the Whole and forms wholes out of parts (ἐκ τῶν ὅλων μέρηα διαιρεῖται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν μερέων συντιθεμένων ὅλα γίνεταί, 1.15). This is in turn related to the way doctors in needling and cutting out rotten flesh from patients bring about health (κεντεόμενοι τε καὶ ταμνόμενοι τὰ σαθρὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ἰητρῶν ὑγιαίνονται). He goes on to describe various human arts (*technai*) and their mechanical analogues in the realm of human anatomy (1.13–24). The point is that, as per *de Victu* 1.10.3, the human body is an imitation or model of the Whole, of the universe (ἀπομίμησιν τοῦ ὅλου). It seems likely that this text or at least similar Hippocratic literature influenced the *Timaeus*—cf. *Phdr.* 270c where Hippocrates' epistemological holism is alluded to. For the late fifth to mid-fourth century dating of the text, see Bartoš (2014), 544. The editors of the text place it on the cusp of the fifth and fourth centuries, see Jones (1929), xliii with Joly & Byl (2003), 44–49. The

involves terrorising and threatening the bound *epithymētikon-thremma* with fearful bitterness in order to bring its rebellious nature into submission through intimidation (φοβοῖ μὲν αὐτό, ὁπότε μέρει τῆς πικρότητος χρωμένη συγγενεῖ, χαλεπὴ προσενεχθεῖσα ἀπειλῆ, 71b). So too the role of the philosopher-king *phylakes* in the ideal polity is twofold, they mildly psychagogically guide through *eikotes mythoi* but they also use force to suppress rebellion.

The nous's hepatic imagery serves two functions, one positive and another negative: the nous paints on the liver either positive *eikones* accurately and conveys the essence of *logoi* to the unreasoning *epithymētikon-thremma* or it conjures up negative *phantasmata* that terrorise and deceive. This same dichotomy between the distortional *phantasmata* that entraps perception in the fleeting, unreal dream-world of Becoming and angogic *eikones* that psychagogically direct the bound beast-soul towards higher *logoi* has been identified by Kalkavage in a rather different context, namely in discussing the dreaminess provoked in our souls when contemplating Chora's *atopia* (Ti.52b-c). Kalkavage makes the distinction between two modes of *eikonopoiia*, namely *phantasia* and *eikasia*: "the *phantasia* associated with [Chora]

editors of the text place it on the cusp of the fifth and fourth centuries, see Jones (1929), xliii with Joly & Byl (2003), 44–49. This reflects the older consensus: Consensus on dating the text to around late fifth/early fourth century, see also Teichmüller (1876), Diels (1901), Hankinson (1991). Sisko (2006), 6 n5 claims that "there is little doubt that *Peri Daitēs* was written about a half-century prior to the writing of the *Timaeus*" which he states was obviously "written late in Plato's career, most likely some time after his third visit to Sicily (362 BC) and (obviously) prior to his death in 346 BC. Jaeger (1943), 33ff dated the *de Victu* to the middle of the fourth century. West (1971), 365–388 sees the *De hebdomadibus* and the *De victu* as contemporary fifth/fourth century texts but it is placed in the first century A.D. by Mansfeld (1971). The *De Victu* is, at least for modern expectations, a somewhat 'un-Hippocratic' (if that is a valid conception) in that it incorporates of prayer and theology. For prayer, see *De victu* 4.87, 4.89 4.91. For ascription of cosmic order to gods, see Vict 1.11 Indeed the text apotropaic invocation of deities as well as oneiromancy and the idea that the dead interface with the living, see Kudlien (1977) 274; Nörenberg (1968) 78; Longrigg (1993) 230–1 n. 1 and 4-5.; Jouanna (1969) 15–16. The text's religious elements lead Mansfeld (1980), 341–363 and Lloyd (1991) 194–223 to question the texts authenticity although Smith (1979), 44–60 insists it is a genuinely Hippocratic composition. It is interesting to note that the references to gods are mainly found in the oneiromantic section of the work, Book 4. For the relatively distinct character of Book 4, see Joly (1960), 171. Nonetheless there is no reason to suspect that this distinctness is a product of interpolation—the text is an organic whole, see Diller (1959), 39–56 & Jouanna (1998), 161–174. See Eijk (2004), 188–189 for the unusually 'irrational' and 'religious' character of the *De Victu*. See Kouloumentas (2021), 73–88 esp. 76 for the cosmogony-anthropogony of the Hippocratic text *On Flesh* which may also have influenced the *Timaeus*.

induces dreams and blurs the distinction between the sensed and the intellected” whereas “*eikasia*, by contrast, is the faculty by which we are awakened from our dreaminess [and] come to regard images as images and thus begin our ascent to Being”.³⁶⁶ Despite the helpfulness of this dichotomy which Kalkavage identifies, his conclusion about the status of the *eikōs mythos* as *phantasia* instead of *eikasia* cannot be accepted: “but the imagination employed in telling likely stories does not treat its image-objects as hypotheses and stepping stones that point ‘upward’ to that nature”.³⁶⁷ This dissertation seeks to argue that Timaeus’ *eikōs mythos* engages in *eikasia* and not *phantasia* even though it does to a large extent consist of what can be treated as a sub-rational and divinely-inspired dream-vision. The reason Timaeus’ phantasmagoric *eikōs mythos* can still rightly be deemed *eikasia* is because (besides the obvious connection in the name) it does not simply paint an *eikōn* of the Cosmotheos and the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* constitution in order to engross the viewer in the ever-shifting *phantasmata* of Becoming but rather constantly relies on dialectic reasoning (*logos*) in its procurement of *eikones* in such a way that they anagogically lead up to Being.

Divided Line and Epistemological Gradation

To understand how the *eikōs mythos* functions as *eikasia* rather than *phantasia*, we must examine the Divided Line (R.6.510b–511c).³⁶⁸ Further, it can be argued that Timaeus’ *eikōs mythos* does not solely operate at the level of *eikasia* for it also touches upon the noetic *onta* as well. Thus it can also be argued that the account reaches to the upper level of *dianoia* in the schema of the Divided Line. Ashbaugh and Johansen correctly explain *Ti.29b-c* in terms of a quadripartite model of proportionality: there are the things that are constant (*onta*),

³⁶⁶ Kalkavage (2001), 125 n53.

³⁶⁷ Ibid citing R.6.510b-51c, the Divided Line.

³⁶⁸ For a helpful overview of the Divided Line, see Stocks (1911), 73-88.

accounts treating *onta* that are consequently stable, *gignomena* that are themselves likenesses (*eikones*) of *onta* and then accounts treating such *gignomena*-likenesses that are themselves likenesses thereof.³⁶⁹ Many scholars have noted that there is a strong semblance between Timaeus' epistemology as laid out in the preamble of his monologue (27c-29d) and that of the famed 'Analogy of the Divided Line' (R.509d–511e).³⁷⁰ Indeed Burnyeat says "the proportion [of 29c3] makes everyone think of the *Republic*, rightly I am sure" but adds that "you will not find quite this proportion [...] in any of the places where proportions are set out in the *Republic*".³⁷¹ Indeed, in the *Republic* one finds the following quadripartite system of *analogia*: "opinion [*doxa*] is concerned with Coming-to-be [*genesis*], intellection [*noēsis*] with Being [*ousia*]; and as Being is to Coming-to-be, so intellect is to opinion, and as intellection is to opinion, so knowledge is to belief and thought to imaging" (καὶ δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν· καὶ ὅτι οὐσία πρὸς γένεσιν, νόησιν πρὸς δόξαν, καὶ ὅτι νόησις πρὸς δόξαν, ἐπιστήμην πρὸς πίστιν καὶ διάνοιαν πρὸς εἰκασίαν, 534a). In *Ti*.29c 'truth' (ἀλήθεια) holds the place of 'knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη) in the model of R.534a.³⁷²

³⁶⁹ Ashbaugh (1988), 24-25 & Johansen (2004), 50.

³⁷⁰ Taylor (1928), 74; Cornford (1935), 29; Owen (1965), 337; Osborne (1996), 187; Brisson (2001) 230; Mourelatos (2010) 232.

³⁷¹ Burnyeat (2005) 152.

³⁷² As Burnyeat (2005) 152 puts it, 'truth' is placed "on the side of mind rather than the objects of mind [and] it therefore has to refer to a cognitive state rather than a cognised state". See also Szaif (1996) 61-7 who draws a parallel with the Stoic use of ἀλήθεια as a term to describe the systematic knowledge of τὸ ἀληθές. Note that Szaif's reading of *Ti*. 29c is based on the assumption that it is an allusion to the *Republic*. Is Burnyeat's interpretation correct? Runia (1989) 441 n18 calls the distinction at 29b-c a "logological" division'. Runia is probably more correct in seeing Timaeus' conception of ἀλήθεια and πίστις as involving two types of *logoi* or discourses rather than seeing these terms as standing for cognitive states as Burnyeat does. Bryan (2021), 168-169 also disagrees with Burnyeat's interpretation of Timaeus' truth' (ἀλήθεια) as a cognitive state but nonetheless notes that "that there is some connection between the epistemologies of the *Timaeus* and *Republic*" and sets this against the backdrop of the "clear and deliberate allusions to the *Republic* from the outset of the *Timaeus*" such as "Socrates' paraphrase of the political discussions of the previous day [17c -19a] and his request that his companions present the figures from his story in action [19b-c]". See also Rowe (2003) 26-29.

If one melds the Timaeian schema with the four analogous gradations of *R.534a* those four classes can be split down the middle with the upper half involving stable knowledge (*epistēmē*) in the terminology of the Divided Line and truth (*alētheia*) in the wording of Timaeus' schema of 29b-c. The lower half involves *doxa* (opinion) in the terminology of the Divided Line and *pistis* (mere conviction or trust) in the wording of Timaeus' prologue. A key interpretive question concerns the status of the *eikōs mythos*. Does it only attain to the status of *doxa* (as typically assumed) or does it reach the higher levels of *dianoia* or even *noēsis*?³⁷³ Santa Cruz convincingly argues for the latter, Timaeian *eikōs mythos* should not be identified with *doxa* in the Divided Line's schema as is usually the case but rather with *dianoia*.³⁷⁴ That means that the Timaeian myth should not be seen as mere opinion based on unstable sense-perceived data but rather a higher mode of cognition much closer to true knowledge (*alētheia/epistēmē*) than *doxa*. Indeed a critical point about the Timaeian monologue that is too often overlooked is that it does not only treat inconstant *gignomena* but also comments (assumedly with some accuracy) on the eternally ever-same *onta*. Indeed, Timaeus describes the Paradigm as the Noetic Animal containing all noetic animals in a manner analogous to the way the Visible Cosmotheos contains all visible animals (30c). Thus, the *eikōs mythos* treats stable *onta* just as much as it does unstable *gignomena*, focusing on the analogous relationship between them. The Timaeian discourse should not be limited only to the level of mere probability, conjecture (*eikasía*) and opinion based on un-substantiable trust (*pistis*). Instead given that it relates correct information about mathematical ratios (*logoi*) and about *onta* and even frames the Visible All as an *eikōn* vis-à-vis the Paradigm, the *eikōs logos* very clearly has elements of both *dianoia* and *noesis*. In other words, the epistemology of the *eikōs mythos* spans whole of the Divided Line and should not be limited to just the lower half of it.

³⁷³ Howald (1922), 67 reads πίστις as synonymous with εἰκώς thus implying that the Timaeian discourse is ranked above mere conjecture (*eikasía*) but is nonetheless below *dianoia* and *noesis*—it is just *doxa*.

³⁷⁴ Santa Cruz (1997), 133-136; Runia, (1997), 101-118.

On the contrary it explains how the subjects of each half of the line (the *gignomena* and the *onta*) are related to each other. As will be seen later, it does so through oneiric *eikonopoia* and its oneiromantic exegesis.

The proem of the *eikōs logos* wherein Timaeus establishes the ontological and epistemological dichotomy between *gignomena* and *onta* as well as the Visible All's relationship to the Paradigm must be viewed in light of the Divided Line. Timaeus is clearly 'indebted' to the Divided Line within the dramatic context of the Timaeus and he is not altering the schema just because of a slight difference in terminology (pace Burnyeat). In his account of the Divided Line Socrates differentiates between the Visible World (*to horōmenon*) and the implicitly invisible Noetic Realm (*to noumenon*, 509d ff). Socrates then proceeds to divide the category of *horōmenon* into the subcategories of images (*eikones*) and their visible originals, a distinction made on account of the former's unclearness (*asapheia*) and the latter's comparative clarity (*saphēneia*). In progressing from his discussion of the subcategories of the Visible Realm (*to horōmenon*) to those of the Invisible Noetic World (*to noumenon*) Socrates poses the following question: "would you be willing to say...that the division in respect of reality and truth or the opposite is expressed by the proportion: as is the opinable to the knowable so is the likeness to that of which it is a likeness?" (ἢ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν αὐτὸ φάναι...διηρῆσθαι ἀληθεία τε καὶ μῆ, ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστὸν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ ὃ ὁμοιώθη;). This question linking the discussion of the epistemological sub-categories of the Visible World to those of the Invisible Noetic Realm displays the key dynamic underpinning the whole schema, namely the comparison of *eikones* with their models or originals (*paradeigmata*). However, in identifying the two halves of the Divided Line with the ontological and epistemological dichotomy of Timaeus' prologue a problem arises. Trabattoni point out that "Plato draws a very close link between *logos* and *doxa*" and

that “the knowledge founded on *logos* inherits the intrinsic fallibility of *doxa*, to which *logos* is connected, thereby considerably altering the clear-cut epistemological dualism outlined in the passage from the *Timaeus*”.³⁷⁵ Thus it is important to realise that *logoi* and *logismoi* do not *ipso facto* belong to the epistemological categories of *dianoia* or *noēsis* as they can err—instead they can have the inconstancy of the sense-perception (*aisthēsis*) that is directed at ever-changing *gignomena*.³⁷⁶

The reason examination of the Divided Line warrants attention in a chapter that seeks to explore Timaeian oneiric *eikonopoiia* as the link between Becoming and Being is because, as Lee has duly noted, *dianoia* on the Divided Line acts as the “intermediate faculty” linking the sense-world of Becoming to the noetic realm of Being. Critically Lee connects that intermediation to the ‘Dreaming Argument’ in the *Republic*.³⁷⁷ Socrates seeks to differentiate the true philosophers from artisans (τοὺς τῶν τεχνυδρίων φιλοσόφους) despite conceding that they are similar (ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις, 5.475e). Socrates argues that those who are truly philosophers are the people that relish in theoretically beholding truth, noetic Being (τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας...φιλοθεάμονας, 475e). He distinguishes these true philosophers who engage in noetic *theōria* in order to behold Truth in the World of Being from those who enjoy spectacles in the World of Becoming and who engage in practical, demiurgic arts (φιλοθεάμονάς τε καὶ φιλοτέχνους καὶ πρακτικούς, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτῶν περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, οὐς μόνους ἄν τις ὀρθῶς προσείποι φιλοσόφους, 5.476a-b). He clarifies that those who delight in the sounds and sights of this World of Becoming, that espouse beautiful voices, hues and shapes and all things demiurgically manufactured *ipso facto* have a *dianoia* that is incapable of

³⁷⁵ Trabattoni (2016), ix.

³⁷⁶ For *aisthēsis*, see Silverman (1990), 148 & Frede (1987), 3-8.

³⁷⁷ Klein (2025), 143. For the ‘Dream Argument’, see Klein (2025), 44-46. Cf. the epistemological treatment of dreams in *Tht.* 201d-202c, see Meyerhoff (1958), 131-138.

‘seeing’ (*idein* in the noetic sense of the *eidē*, Forms) then nature of the Good and espousing it (5.476b οἱ μὲν που...φιλήκοοι καὶ φιλοθέαμονες τάς τε καλὰς φωνὰς ἀσπάζονται καὶ χροᾶς καὶ σχήματα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δημιουργούμενα, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἢ **διάνοια** τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπᾶσασθαι). The use of the term *dianoia* here makes it clear that the Divided Line is informing this discussion, indeed the issue of the interaction between the multiplicity of Becoming and singularity of Being is expressly addressed: “in respect of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and all the ideas or forms, the same statement holds, that in itself each is one, but that by virtue of their communion with actions and bodies and with one another they present themselves everywhere, each as a multiplicity of aspects" (καὶ περὶ δὴ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν περὶ ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἕκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον, 476a). The contrast is not only between Being’s singularity (πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν...ἐν ἕκαστον εἶναι) Becoming’s multiplicity (φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι) for there is also the added element of the cognates *phantasmata* and *phainomena* which refer to the deceptive, unreal images of dreams.³⁷⁸ Indeed at this point Socrates turns to the distinction between waking and sleeping, the dream-state and true reality that was discussed earlier with the passage being extracted in full. He establishes that the dream state, whether one is awake or asleep, involves one mistaking that which is ‘similar’, the *gignomenon* or *eikōn* with that which truly is itself, the Form (τὸ ὄνειρόπτειν ἄρα οὐ τόδε ἐστίν, ἐάντε ἐν ὕπνῳ τις ἐάντ’ ἐγρηγορῶς τὸ ὁμοίον τῷ μὴ ὁμοίον ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ ἡγήται εἶναι ὃ ἔοικεν, 476c). One’s *dianoia* in the waking state is epistemologically at the level of *gnōsis*, true knowledge, whereas in the oneiric state it is merely *doxa*. This dream-waking distinction directly illuminates Timaeus's

³⁷⁸ For singularity and multiplicity, see Fine (1995), but see also Dancy (1984). For the problem of infinite regress, see *Prm.* 131e–132b.

oneiromantic framework (*Ti.* 71a-72b). Further, given then the clear link between Timaeus' epistemological and ontological prologue and the Divided Line and how that relation ties into the dichotomy between dreaming and waking, it would be fair to assume that the theology, politogony and anthropology of the *Timaeus-Republic* are also intimately connected to the *eikonopoiia* of dreams. This becomes particularly apparent when one examines the analogism between the Allegory of the Cave and Timaeus' account of hepatic *zōgraphia* during sleep and oneiromantic exegesis through use of waking *logismos*.

Anagogic Psychagogy in the *Eikonopoiia* of the Allegory of the Cave

The Allegory of the Cave parallels the Divided Line in depicting epistemological ascent from Becoming to Being. Socrates even explains the symbolism of his analogy in express terms so there can be no misunderstandings: this Visible World of Becoming is to be likened to the subterranean prison and the light behind the wall and the puppets that creates the shadow-*phantasmata* that bewitch the prisoners is to be identified with the visible sun whilst the journey to the open country above is identified with the anabasis to the noetic realm where the soul beholds the Forms (τὴν μὲν δι' ὄψεως φαινομένην ἔδραν τῆ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου οἰκῆσει ἀφομοιοῦντα, τὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς τῆ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμει: τὴν δὲ ἄνω ἀνάβασιν καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν τόπον τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνοδὸν, 517b). Typically interpretation of the Allegory of the Cave focuses on the supposedly exclusively negative character of the shadowy *eidōla* that keep the prisoners' attention locked into eikones of Becoming instead of their real archetypes in the World of Being above. However, that standard reading, whilst it is certainly true, nonetheless removes the Allegory of the Cave from its original pedagogical and epistemological context and thus fails to account for the positive functions of the shadowy *eidōla* created by the puppeteers.

Understanding the positive role of the puppeteers requires examining the cave's social structure. At face value the shadow-puppeteers do not have the appearance of pedagogues or benefactors but rather of prisoner wardens. Indeed, the cave dwellers are referred to as prisoners (δεσμώτες) repeatedly (e.g. 514b, 515a, 516e, 519d) and are said to have had their legs and necks in bonds (ἐν δεσμοῖς) since childhood, stuck in a position whereby they can only look forwards, incapable of moving their heads about (514a-b). How can the projectionists be pedagogue-benefactors if the cave-dwelling agalma-men were reared in such conditions? If the puppeteers are pedagogues endowing the cave-dwellers with an education that will be the basis for their ascent and which will equip them with capacity to properly identify and engage with the Truth when they encounter it, why are their pupils bound? This dissertation will show that the answer to this question lies in the class structure of the Myth of Metals and in the analogism between the prisoners in the cave and the bound *thremma-epithymētikon* within the torso-cavity of individual humans.

In greater detail than what is briefly synthesised in *Ti.* 19a Socrates explains in the Myth of Metals how the balance between social classes is to be achieved in the ideal polity through the correct assignment of individuals to metallic races. Socrates says that God gives as the primary commandment to the ideal polity's rulers "that of nothing else are they to be such careful guardians and so intently observant as of the intermixture of these metals in the souls of their offspring" (3.415b). To this Socrates adds that "if sons are born to them with an infusion of brass or iron they shall by no means give way to pity in their treatment of them, but shall assign to each the status due to his nature and thrust them out among the artisans or the farmers" (416b-c). Likewise "if from these there is born a son with unexpected gold or

silver in his composition they shall honour such and bid them go up higher, some to the office of guardian, some to the assistanceship [*epikouria*]”. This management of metallic breeding is obviously related to the *anthrōpeios arithmos* and *teleios arithmos* of 546a-46d which was discussed in the previous chapter of this dissertation. This is the manner in which the breeding of citizens is to be optimally synchronised with the Cosmotheos' cycles which cannot perpetually be successfully achieved due to inevitable degeneration in both macrocosm and microcosm. The mathematico-astronomical manipulation of human breeding is directly connected to the Myth of Metals; Socrates plainly alludes to the races of Hesiod alongside those in ‘our’ (i.e. his interlocutors’ and his own) ideal polity, namely those of gold, silver, bronze and iron (546e-547a). But what has all this to do with the prisoners in the cave being chained? Imprisonment in the cave is primarily intended only for the bronze and iron men, the lowest classes who, like their equivalent in the body-politic of man’s anatomy, the *epithymētikon-thremma*, are totally lacking in capacity for reason and thus must be bound and sedated through shadow-puppetry. It will be argued that Socrates does not intend for this to be a malicious arrangement but rather one that brings about the best outcome for the bronze and iron castes and the polity as a whole. Precautions are taken to ensure that all those bound in the cave are worthy of that fate. Any of those dwelling in the above-world that are found wanting are sent down to the dream-cave of shadow-puppetry. Socrates cannot intend the artisans and farmers of his ideal polity to be literally chained in a subterranean chamber; instead, this is the experience (*pathos*) that they will be made to live out under the influence of the *eikotes mythoi* moulded into their souls by the *oikistai* and *poetai* acting as *agalματοipoioi-nomopoioi*. Additionally, it shall be demonstrated that the *eikōs mythos* of the cave not only is instrumental in controlling the lowest classes, but it also serves to facilitate the education of the *phylakes*. This is because in producing the agalmatic puppets that are modelled on the truly existing *onta* and creating shadowy *eidōla* of those *eikones* in turn in

the cave the *phylakes* become masters of *eikonopoiia* and oneiromantic exegesis; the ability to explain how dream-like images are formed and how they relate to Forms is the crux of what it means to be a philosopher who is maximally God-like (*theoeikelos*). Thus, the *eikōs mythos* of the cave of shadow-puppetry is a means both of controlling the troublesome lower classes and of deifying the silver and golden agalma-men who in their mastery of *eikonopoiia* as *andriantopoiioi-thaumatopoi* (agalmatic puppeteers) become perfect microcosmic instantiations of the macrocosmic *Agalmatopoi*os, Nous the Demiurge Himself.

Whilst the shadowy *eidōla* do function as *phantasmata* that can entrap the prisoner's attention solely in Becoming and cause him to mistake mere shadows for *onta* themselves nonetheless they can also simultaneously function as *eikones* that can later empower the prisoner to later recognise particular Forms when/or if he makes an ascent to the world of Being. That is to say that, in what remains of this chapter, it will be argued that the Allegory of the Cave shows that the shadowy *eidōla* projected within the liver-like dream-cavern are both negative *phantasia* and positive *eikasia* at the same time. For the prisoners, the *eidōla* are only *phantasmata* that keep them sedated and prevent them from noetic ascent. On the other hand, in the case of the shadow-puppeteers, their relationship with the *eidōla* is very different; it is not one of enslavement and disordered misidentification at all. They are implicitly portrayed as having knowledge of the truly extant *zōa* of the above-world; for how else would they be able to produce *eikones* or *agalmata* of them in stone and wood (ζῷα λίθινά τε καὶ ξύλινα καὶ παντοῖα εἰργασμέν, 515a)? These truly existing animals of the above-world are, in Timaeian terms, the noetic animals contained in the Paradigm (e.g. νοητὰ ζῷα πάντα ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὸν ἔχει, *Ti.* 30c). The puppeteers (*thaumatopoi*oi) in making their *eikones* are presumably aware of the true nature of the animals of the above-world and aware of the fact that the agalmatic animal-puppets that they construct are one step removed

from the truly living *zōa* whilst the shadowy *eidōla* they create upon the liver-cave's wall are three steps removed. Indeed the 'conversion' from the cave-shadows to the 'idols' creating those very shadows and then to the flame and the sun (μεταστροφή ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἶδωλα καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καταγείου εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἐπάνοδος, 532b) is facilitated by the intermediation of "phantasms created by God in water" (τὰ ἐν ὕδασι φαντάσματα θεῖα καὶ σκιὰς τῶν ὄντων, 532c).³⁷⁹ As Shorey explains, these images encountered in water in the world above are 'divine', "θεῖα, because [they are] produced by God or nature and not by *hoi polloi*: man with a mirror or a paintbrush".³⁸⁰ This conception of the demiurgic creations of humans being of lower ontological value than those of God is famously put forward in Book 10 of the *Republic* in the famed 'Couch Problem' (R.596c-598d).³⁸¹ There Socrates distinguishes between God qua archetypal institutor of the 'Form of Couch' as opposed to the human couch-maker (*klinopoios*) who makes a couch relying directly on the Form as opposed

³⁷⁹ Sallis (1998), 397-410 in the context of discussing the *phantasmata* of dreamy Chora makes a link to R.516b where water-reflections (*phantasmata*) are distinguished from the True Sun itself 'in its own place' (*chōra*).

³⁸⁰ Shorey (1935), 199.

³⁸¹ In this passage Plato's Socrates is seeking to define mimetic art vis-à-vis the Forms. For thorough commentary on this passage see Murray (1996), 189-208. Perhaps the most important scholarly treatment of this passage is Cherniss (1932), 233-242 where interpretations that identify the Forms as God's thoughts and that identify God and the Forms are staunchly opposed on the grounds that such readings are allegedly discordant with the rest of the corpus. Cherniss shifts focus away from the relationship between God and the Forms and instead insists that the focus should be limited exclusively to passage's immediate context of criticising mimetic art. This is rather odd given that God is expressly identified as a Demiurge producing an artefact by relying on a model both in the Couch Problem and the Timaeon Myth—thus He is the archetypal mimetic artist. For treatments of the apparent discrepancy between the teaching of Book 3 that poetry and all mimetic art should serve to shape citizens into lovers of beauty and truth (R.401d-402) vis-a-vis the condemnation of all imitative poetry in Book 10 (10.595a) except for encomiastic hymns (607a), see, Belfiore (1984), 121-146, Brownson (1920) 88-94, Gould (1964), 70-91, Sörbom (1966), 129-151, Partee (1981), 1-22, Nehamas (1982), 47-78. The best solution for the apparent contradiction is put forward by Tate, (1928) 16-23, Tate (1932), 161-169, namely that there are two species of mimesis, a good and a bad variety, with the former being endorsed and the latter approved. Cf. Jaeger (1943), 215 & Collingwood (1925), 163-164 and Nehamas (1982) 47-78 all approach the difference between the mimesis in Books 3 and 10 in terms of the different goals of the two books. Oddly Moss (1971), 533-542 argues against reconciling the different stances towards mimesis in Books 3 and 10. Atkins (1934), 48-51 & Annas (1981), 336-344 both argue that Books 3 and 10 irreconcilably contradict each other and they even accuse Plato of not having a consistent theory of mimesis but simply putting forward incoherent arguments. Greene (1918), 56, Gilbert (1939), 1-19 and Crombie (1962), 147 all seek to avoid the apparent contradiction by asserting that only some of the comments about mimesis were truly intended whereas others were not—a very selective and unconvincing approach. Oates (1972) and Verdenius (1962) explain away the apparent contradiction by examining Plato's aesthetic theory. See Nettleship (1901), 341 and Else (1972) for the claim that Book 10 presents a different on mimesis because of its later date of composition, i.e. Plato's theory of mimesis was evolving and changing drastically over time.

to the painter (*zōgraphos*) who relies on the man-made couch of which he produces an imitative depiction.³⁸² Thus this epistemological and ontological assessment of degrees of removal from the Forms or noetic *zōa* in mimetic art is already present in the Allegory of the Cave.

The *thaumatopoi* are not only ζωογλύφοι but they also make *agalmata* of men (514c: ἀνδριάντας) such that they can rightly be called *andriantopoi* and thus be identified with the philosopher-king *phylakes* who establish the polity in words as *oikistai* and the *poiētai* who mould them into *theoeikela-andreikela*, microcosmic *eikones* of the Divine Macrocosm.³⁸³ Just as the projectionists or agalmatopoetic puppeteers must be identified with the philosopher-kings and *phylakes* so too the prisoners must necessarily be identified with the lowest classes, the farmers and demiurges who, in terms of the microcosmic body-politic of man, are the equivalent of the *epithymētikon*, the irrational soul of the rumbling belly that cannot partake of reason. The philosopher-kings and *phylakes* know the truly existing animals and astral bodies observable above the cave and can thus make *eikones* of them directly from the Forms, the noetic *zōa* themselves, relaying only third-hand shadows to the farmers and demiurges who are incapable of the noesis required to attain to the World of Being beyond the dream-cave of Becoming. Critically, just as the ideal state is portrayed as having social mobility in the sense that unworthy *phylakes* can be downgraded to the slavish rank of farmer or artisan and the worthy demiurge can be up-graded from his lowly station and rise up as a philosopher-king *phylax* in the body-politics' cephalic citadel, so too in the Allegory of the Cave a prisoner with an inherent inclination towards and capacity for anagogic ascent can

³⁸² For the alleged usage of the verb *mimeisthai* with different meanings throughout the *Republic*, see Vicaire (1960), 221-225, Schaper (1968), 42-48, Brownson (1920), 92-93, Cornford (1941), 324 n.1, Havelock (1963), 20-26.

³⁸³ For ζωογλύφος see AP12.56 & 57. Cf. R. 7.517d: περὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί.

suddenly find himself unchained and able to turn around, if he so desires. Socrates does not expressly say how unbinds the cave-escapee in his narrative but it is fair to presume that *phylakes* monitoring the prisoners can discern which of them have proven themselves capable of ascending from the *eidōla* of Becoming to the beholding of the noetic *zōa* of the above world and thus unchain them.

The gold and silver *Phylakes* keeping the majority of demiurges and farmers bound in the cave of this dream-world of Becoming are not doing so maliciously. Most of the bronze and iron demiurges and farmers who are inherently incapable of philosophising due to their deficient ‘bronze and iron stock’ must be kept in the cave viewing only *eidōla* and considering them to be the full extent of reality because it is not their place to behold the true living *zōa* above nor to make *eikones* and *phantasmata* thereof. In fact, most of the bronze and iron men in the cave are incapable of the noesis required for those tasks and if they perchance have that capacity then they are not truly bronze and iron but rather gold or silver and should be elevated from thence. Further, the unphilosophic bronze and iron men are very emotionally labile and are destructively appetitive. Unlike the gold and silver *phylakes* these demiurges and farmers are not in control of their passions and due to their lack of the reasoning capacity, can easily be led astray by evil demagogues. As such these bronze and iron men are in need of guidance but, like the *epithymētikon-thremma* they cannot be guided directly with *logoi* for they lack capacity for reasoning (*logismos*). As such, just as the nous uses the *eidōla* and *phantasmata* of his hepatic *zōgraphia* to frighten the rowdy *epithymētikon-thremma* into submission and prevent its unbridled rule over the rest of the body-soul compound which would harm the health of the human organism overall, so too the polity’s Justice, its holistic balance, is sustained by each metallic class performing its function exclusively and not interfering unduly in the business of others. Thus the unphilosophic

bronze and iron men, the farmers and demiurges are kept from the task of governance since they are unfit to rule. This is for their own good and for that of the polis. Nonetheless leeway is still made for those in the cave that might have such potential for *noēsis* and deserve to be given a chance to ascend to the above-world.

Just as the *eidōla* painted by the nous upon the liver are both negative and positive, consisting of both frightening *phantasmata* designed to intimidate *thremma-epithymētikon* but also calming *eikones* that direct towards the Good, so too the *eidola* of the cave do not only function negatively as intimidating *phantasmata* or seductive distractions keeping the irrational farmers and demiurges imprisoned. The *eidōla* of the cave also perform the positive function of conditioning and preparing some of the irrational bronze and iron *ho polloi* for later participation in noesis, something of which they did not seem initially to be capable of. The escapee who is unchained by the philosopher-kings and chooses freely to makes his ascent to the Above-World of Being is assisted there by his familiarisation with those very shadowy *eidōla* which captivated him within the dream-cave. Through registering the degree to which those shadowy moving *zōa* in the Cave of Becoming correlate with the noetic ones of the Above-World of Being the escapee comes to realise the nature of reality.

Familiarisation with phantasmata first before learning how they are procured and then what they are ultimately based on is a multi-step process that requires awareness of the different classes of images, their epistemological and ontological status as well as their relationship with each other. The ability to wake from the dream of unreality and then understand that the dream-world is comprised of a series of images with varying degrees of removal from True Being is something that only comes about through an awareness of the *eikonopoiia* underpinning the Demiurge's organisation of the All. This understanding of the graded system of eikastic likeness linking becoming and Being This is what the ideal polity's

education system is all about. The system is designed and managed by the golden philosopher-kings who teach the silver *phylakes* to produce *agalmata* and *eikones* of the Forms, shadow-puppets, which then create *phantasmata* and *eidōla* for the bronze and iron *hoi polloi* who cannot partake of reasoning. It is the gold and silver classes that are educated in *eikonopoiia* and *agalmatopoiia* for they are taught how images are produced and what they are based, perhaps starting in the cave but quickly being released and shown how the system works whilst the totally sub-rational bronze and iron individuals are left behind. The sorting process of determining one's metallic birth consists of assessing the individual's capacity or lack thereof to understand the system of graded eikastic likenesses vis-à-vis their ontic paradigmata. This identification of an eikastic likeness' degree of removal from the Forms and the ability to understand the connection between Becoming and Being defines not only epistemology in the ideal polity but also ontology in the Divine Macrocosm. Further, this dissertation identifies that eikonopoietic awareness with oneiromantic exegesis for the nous' ability to create different kinds of hepatic images for different purposes and to then interpret those sub-rational *eikones* through use of *logoi* is directly akin to how the philosopher-kings as masters of *eikonopoiia* control the *hoi polloi* by keeping them imprisoned in the cave of shadow-puppetry.

The shadowy *phantasmata* are far removed from noetic *zōa*. Yet they retain sufficient eikastic likeness to serve as accurate *eikones* that correspond to and 'lead up to' specific *onta* in the above-world is suggested by the manner in which the shadowy *eidōla* facilitate the recognition of particulars in the world above. In other words, without having seen *eidōla* of *zōa* first in the cave, what sense would the escapee be able to make of the real ones above? Socrates emphasizes that successful viewing requires habituation (*συνηθείας δὴ οἶμαι δεοῦτ' ἄν...εἰ μέλλοι τὰ ἄνω ὄψεσθαι*, 516a). The escapee cannot immediately focus his attention on

the truly extant *zōa* themselves as he will be overwhelmed by the light (πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔλθοι, αὐγῆς ἂν ἔχοντα τὰ ὄμματα μεστὰ ὄραν οὐδ' ἂν ἐν δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν). Instead, he is to initially focus on the shadows and water-reflections, the *eidōla* of the true *zōa* as opposed to the living creatures themselves. Only after acquainting himself with their shadows, their *eidōla*, can he progress to viewing the *zōa* themselves progress to the actualities (καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιὰς ἂν ῥᾶστα καθορᾶ, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι τὰ τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰδῶλα, ὕστερον δὲ αὐτά, *R.516a*). Then after seeing all the things on the surface of the above-world the escapee is finally ready view the celestial bodies (ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανὸν νύκτωρ ἂν ῥᾶον θεάσαιτο, προσβλέπων τὸ τῶν ἄστρον τε καὶ σελήνης φῶς, ἢ μεθ' ἡμέραν τὸν ἥλιόν τε καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου, *516a-b*). After that the cave-escapee can ascend to the final and ultimate theoretic experience, beholding the ‘sun itself’ no longer in water-reflections or the *phantasmata* projected on other surfaces but can instead witness the ultimate source of vision in its own place (*chora*) and see it as it truly is (τελευταῖον δὴ οἶμαι τὸν ἥλιον, οὐκ ἐν ὕδασι οὐδ' ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἔδρα **φαντάσματα** αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ δύναται ἂν κατιδεῖν καὶ θεάσασθαι οἷός ἐστιν, *7.516b*). Here Socrates is obviously referring back to the Allegory of Sun (*507b–509c*).³⁸⁴ The obvious interconnectedness of that allegory with that of the cave and the Divided Line should make it all the more probable that the Myth of Metals and the Timaeian *eikōs mythos* would also form part of the same unitary mythic schema even if the latter two have, until now, not been so readily connected. It shall be shown that the centrality of epistemological and ontological gradation to the education system of the ideal

³⁸⁴ Cf. Gkatzaras (2017), 71-83 who correlates the Allegory of the Sun with the *Timaeus* but claims that the Form of the Good is “independent from the Demiurge and his Paradigm” (p.71). Despite drawing this distinction Gkatzaras nonetheless emphasises the similarities between the Demiurge and the philosopher-kings.

polity is intimately connected to dream-visions and their oneiromantic exegesis—it is in that mantic art that one finds the key to making the transition from Becoming to Being.

Socrates begins narrating his dream-like vision of the cavern with an eikastic imperative: “compare our nature in respect of education and its lack to such an experience [**pathos**] as this: picture men dwelling in a sort of subterranean cavern etc.” (ἀπείκασον τοιούτω πάθει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας. ἰδὲ γὰρ ἀνθρώπους οἷον ἐν καταγείῳ οἰκῆσαι³⁸⁵ σπηλαιώδει, 514a). Thus, from the very beginning the Allegory of the Cave is about education. Not only that but the use of the term *pathos* here in reference to the state of the prisoners within the cave watching a shadow-puppet play is of not given that the same word (*pathos*) occurs when Timaeus asks to see his polity animated as a *zōon* in motion. This is hardly a coincidence—the whole Timaeian *eikōs mythos* and the Allegory of the Cave are to be understood as parallel eikastic dream-sequences.³⁸⁶ The Allegory of the Cave is framed from the outset as an eikastic enterprise as well for Socrates uses the imperative command ‘to picture’ (ἀπείκασον) in such a way as to encourage his interlocutors and the text’s readers/listeners to mentally depict the dream-world of the cave in their own minds. Indeed Glaucon calls Socrates’ Allegory of the Cave an *eikon* specifically one characterised by *atopia*, the same feature that defines the dream-like Chora (ἄτοπον, ἔφη, λέγεις εἰκόνα καὶ δεσμώτας ἀτόπους, 515a). Socrates in reply states that the *atopia* of the image is appropriate as it is like unto us (ὁμοίους ἡμῶν)—thus he meta-narratologically injects himself and his interlocutors as well as the reader/listener into the world of the cave. Given then that the Allegory of the Cave is itself an *eikōn* that explains how eikastic *eikonopoia* functions by

³⁸⁵ Note here too that *oikēsis*-diction that was prevalent in the Timaeus’ treatment of the liver.

³⁸⁶ Same connection is made by Kalkavage (2001), 104 with n.19. Kalkavage (2001), 132 also describes *Ti.* 72b in terms of the “projecting [of] movie-like images” onto the liver.

delineating an ontological and epistemological hierarchy and showing how to progressively ascend from each stage to the other in the hierarchy the only thing that needs to be demonstrated in order to establish a stronger connection to Timaeus' oneiromantic exegesis is that Plato's Socrates intended his cave-*eikōn* to be understood as a dream-vision.

Having established the Cave as eikastic pedagogy, we can now examine its oneiromantic nature. It will be argued that the Allegory of the Cave is intimately related to the pedagogical *ergon* that it is to manifest in the embodied ideal polity. That is to say that just as this dissertation argues that the Timaeian *eikōs mythos* as well as Socrates' Myth of Metals and his Allegory of the Cave are all oneiric *eikones* which, when assessed oneiromantically through dialectic reasoning (*logoi*), reveal the link between Becoming and Being. Not only that but these eikastic myths are also intended to practically function as the mythopoetic means of rearing citizens in the ideal polity and thus sustaining the city's Justice, its balanced cohesion as a unified *theoikelon-andreikelon* comprised of a multiplicity of internally harmonised *agalma*-citizens. The agalmatic cave-prisoners of the ideal polity are reared hearing Timaeian mythology such that they are naturalised into a dream-world from which they are either taught to escape through the art of philosophic *eikonopoiia* (mastery of the Divided Line) and oneiromantic exegesis. Such mastery empowers the philosophic agalmatic cave-prisoners to ascend out of the oneiric state in which the city's eikastic mythology entraps them. These philosopher-kings rise from the mythic dream-cave into the true waking reality of the World of Being. They are few. The un-philosophic *hoi polloi* are unwittingly trapped in that dream-world (if they are dangerous and unphilosophic and thus need to be pacified). The ideal polity's eikastic mythology is constructed in this way because it is for the best—the philosophic few can only ascend from this wretched world and improve it in so doing if they come to see it as a dreamy *eikōn* of the True World of Being whilst on the other hand the un-

philosophic reprobates need to be sedated by the shadowy, oneiric *eidōla* that the liberated philosopher-kings themselves produce once they have mastered the anagogic and systatic art of *eikonopoia*. The art of oneiric *eikonopoia* is anagogic in that it helps them ascend and then orient their polity ‘upwards’ towards the Paradigm. It is ‘systatic’ in that its pacifying, psychagogic imagery produces political unity—it brings the multitudes of rowdy cave-imprisoned craftsmen, farmers and *phylakes* into conformity with the designs of the philosopher-kings and thus makes a single *theoikelon-andreikelon* polity out of many *agalma*-citizens. What remains of this chapter shall argue that ontology and epistemology of oneiromantic exegesis is central to the soteriological enterprise of divinising individuals and sustaining a maximally God-like political super-organism through the *eikonopoia* of Socrates’ and Timaeus’ *eikotes mythoi*.

The Myth of Metals and Cave Allegory share the same teleological goal, as evidenced by their emphasis on civic unity. The narrative that all citizens are equally sons of *chōra*, the earth of their country, leads them to care more for each other and their polity than if they had not been moulded by the *eikōs mythos* of the Noble Lie (ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο... ἐγώ, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ ἀλλήλων κήδεσθαι, 3.415d). Socrates speaks of instituting a divinely inspired oracle stating that the ideal polity would be destroyed when an iron or bronze *agalma*-man becomes a *phylax* guarding her (ὡς χρησιμοῦ ὄντος τότε τὴν πόλιν διαφθαρήναι, ὅταν αὐτὴν ὁ σιδηροῦς φύλαξ ἢ ὁ χαλκοῦς φυλάξῃ, 3.415c). Thus the divine authority of a mythic oracle set up by Socrates ensures the perpetuation of Justice in the *Theoikelon-Andreikelon* polity—that each *agalma*-man within the ‘super statue’ of the body politic will act according to his metallic station and not overstep that boundary and cause imbalance in the intricate musico-mathematical harmony sustaining the systatic health of the *zōon*-polis.

In the agalmatopoetic mythology of the ideal polity the incorrect assignment of metal-men to governance is brings about an apocalyptic unravelling of the polis just as conversely the correct arrangement of the city’s metal-men and healthy relationships between them is what sustains Justice in the polis. When the Myth of Metals is read in conjunction with the Allegory of the Cave it becomes apparent that the sub-rational iron and bronze men imprisoned in the cave are both socially inept and lacking in self-awareness—not only they are incapable interfacing properly with each other but they also cannot engage in introspection. The following question posed by Socrates about the cave-prisoners is answered in the negative: “tell me do you think that these men would have seen **anything of themselves or of one another** except the shadows cast from the fire on the wall of the cave that fronted them?” (τοὺς γὰρ τοιούτους πρῶτον μὲν **ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ ἀλλήλων** οἶει ἄν τι ἑωρακέναι ἄλλο πλὴν τὰς σκιὰς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ αὐτῶν τοῦ σπηλαίου προσπιπτούσας;). Thus self-knowledge and understanding of one’s fellow man is implicitly at the heart of the education-system of the *phylakes*, the silver and gold agalma men for those are the qualities which separate them from the bronze and iron men of the cave. Socrates’ emphasis on the lack of capacity for introspection and interpersonal awareness among the cave-prisoners is aimed at conveying an important truth: those incapable of noetically beholding Forms are also unable even to properly understand themselves and their fellow citizens. Further it is that lack which makes the bronze and iron agalma-men so dangerous and the gold and silver so important for sustaining order in the body-politic, For a *phylax*, a silver agalma-man to become a *theoikeion andreikeion* he must engage in introspection and reflect on his relationship with his fellow citizens—these inward and outward preoccupations within the system of *eikonopoia* that fires the shadow-puppetry of the dream-cave of the World of Becoming are necessary supplements for the noesis of a philosopher-king. The Cave

Allegory with its emphasis on the problems posed by a lack of introspection and relational awareness relates back to the earlier-discussed passage where Socrates states that it is easier to observe Justice at the microcosmic level within man's constitution than in larger entities (εἰ ἐν μείζονί τινι τῶν ἐχόντων δικαιοσύνην πρότερον ἢ ἐκεῖ ἐπιχειρήσαιμεν θεάσασθαι, ῥᾶον ἂν ἐν ἐνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ κατιδεῖν οἷόν ἐστιν, *R.*434d). Socrates concludes his discussion of Justice by coming back to the same starting point which has now been affirmed: "at the very beginning of our foundation of the state, we chanced to hit upon the original principle and a sort of type of Justice" (ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν κατὰ θεόν τινα εἰς ἀρχὴν τε καὶ **τύπον** τινὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης κινδυνεύομεν ἐμβεβηκέναι, 443b-c). Significantly this completion of the discourse on Justice is presented as a 'perfected dream that has been perfected' (τέλεον ἄρα ἡμῖν τὸ **ἐνύπνιον** ἀποτετέλεσται, 443b). Here the choric diction of *agalmatopoiia* (*typos*) occurs in proximity to an oneiric image.

Socrates mixes this oneiric diction with that of demiurgic *eikonopoiia* when he speaks of the *eidōlon* of Justice (εἰδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης 443c) they have moulded involving the leatherworker 'by nature' engaging only in that craft and practise nothing else just as the carpenter or stone-mason too should limit himself only to building (τὸ τὸν μὲν σκυτοτομικὸν φύσει ὀρθῶς ἔχειν σκυτοτομεῖν καὶ ἄλλο μηδὲν πράττειν, τὸν δὲ τεκτονικὸν τεκταίνεσθαι, 443c). It is not merely coincidental that the word that can refer to both the dreamy shadow on the cave wall and the agalmatic puppet that makes such a shadow (*eidōlon*) is paired with a reference to two demiurgic professions in a context that is talking about Justice as the *theoeikelon-andreikelon*, the conception of the body-politic as a statue exhibiting the Divine as manifest in human form which is a single image comprised of a harmonised multitude of individual *agalma*-men. Immediately after mixing oneiric and demiurgic diction Socrates expressly relates the notion that artisans should only practise their art to the way and not

meddle in the affairs of others to how the just man will not let the parts of his soul interfere with each other (443d). The ‘Justice’ produced by properly synthesising the three components of the tripartite soul is conceived of in terms of the harmonisation of the lowest, the highest and the mean notes in a scale (συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ ὄρους τρεῖς ἀρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης, 443d). Just as the body-politic is a single *theoeikelon-andreikelon* formed out of the harmonic integration of a multitude of *agalma*-men so too each ‘just’ or properly ordered individual has “linked and bound all three [parts of his soul] together and made of himself a unit, one man instead of many, self-controlled and in unison” (πάντα ταῦτα συνδήσαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἓνα γεγόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σῶφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον, 443d-e). The attentive reader/listener is constantly tracking the presence of demiurgic, oneiric and mathematico-musical diction and imagery and is noticing that these elements coalesce when speaking of the *theoeikelon-andreikelon* polity as a single body-soul compound, an agalmatic *zōon* constructed in the ‘dream-world’ of discourse wherein Being and Becoming meet. The way the philosopher-kings construct this perfectly-harmonised *agalma* in words that links the singularity of Being to the multiplicity of Becoming parallels the oneiric *eidōlopoiia* of the Allegory of the Cave and of the Timaeian Demiurge’s choric *eikonopoiia*.

Immediately after completing his narration of the *eikōs mythos* of the Allegory of the Cave Socrates states that he is inquiring into how the ideal kinds of citizens can be bred and anagogically directed up to the ‘light’ [of Being] just as certain mythological figures were said to come up from Hades to the gods (τίνα τρόπον οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐγγενήσονται, καὶ πῶς τις **ἀνάξει** αὐτοὺς εἰς φῶς, ὥσπερ ἐξ Ἄιδου λέγονται δὴ τινες εἰς θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν, R.521c). Socrates makes it clear that the kind of study underpinning the education system of the Allegory of the Cave and the Divided Line must be of the sort that hauls an individual up

from *gignomena* to the *onta* (μάθημα ψυχῆς ὀλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν, 521d).

Even though Socrates does not expressly describe the role that oneiromantic exegesis plays in this anagogic process, it shall be argued that the dichotomy between dreaming sleep and waking *logismos* is a major theme underlying his discussion of education and ontology in the ideal polity.

Chora and the Hepatic Oneirology

The analogism between Chora and the cave-wall and human liver on which *eikonopoia* occur is worth noting. In all three of these cases there is a receptive surface receiving images projected from an external intelligence. These ‘moulded’ or ‘reflected’ images in all three cases have a psychagogic and a plastic function—they calm perturbation and endow shapeliness. The cave-prisoners are educated through the shadow-puppet show of the cave and are thus moulded into *theoeikela-andreikela* by that process. So too an individual’s turbulent *epithymētikon* is pacified and shaped by hepatic dream images and so too the inherently un-musical and disordered Visible All (30a) is brought into order through Chora being imprinted with Ideas (50d). In all these cases there is an explicit link to dreaming and the associated interfacing of reason and sub-rational, psychagogic *eikonopoia*. Timaeus uses a markedly oneiric verb (ὄνειροπολοῦμεν, 52b) when he speaks of awakening from the dream-state induced by Chora. Upon awakening from the choric dream-state one returns to the truth of the ‘waking nature’ by discerning that the Receptacle only bears *phantamasta* and *eikones*, not the truly existing *onta* (τὴν ἄπνον καὶ ἀληθῶς φύσιν ὑπάρχουσιν ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὄνειρώξεως οὐ δυνατοὶ γινόμεθα ἐγερθέντες διοριζόμενοι τὰληθῆς λέγειν, ὡς εἰκόνι μὲν, ἐπεὶπερ οὐδ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐφ’ ᾧ γέγονεν ἑαυτῆς ἐστίν, ἑτέρου δὲ τινος αἰεὶ φέρεται φάντασμα, 52b-c). This is directly comparable to how the shadows on the cave wall in Socrates’ polity

and the images painted on the liver are ‘un-real’ oneiric *eidōla* only vaguely corresponding to their ‘real’ archetypes. Timaeus’ use of the oneiric word *phantasmata* in reference to the unstable and ‘un-real’ images borne by Chora serves to connect the Receptacle to the liver qua oneiric shadow-play screen. This markedly oneiric word for an ‘unreal’ image, *phantasma*, also occurs in Timaeus’ treatment dreams. It occurs in conjunction with another markedly choric term, *aphomoiōma*, ‘likeness’ (cf. 51a: ἀφομοιώματα). Timaeus speaks of the internal fire powering the human eye as being still during light peaceful sleep but explains that during dreams it moves about (in a manner akin to ever-shifting Chora the winnowing-sieve, 52e) leaving behind traces of movement that imprint as *phantasmata* and likenesses *homoiōmata*. These ‘imprintings’ made by the eye-ball’s fire during sleep are then remembered after waking (πολλῆς μὲν ἡσυχίας βραχύνειρος ὕπνος ἐμπίπτει, καταλειφθεισῶν δέ τινων κινήσεων μειζόνων, οἷαι καὶ ἐν οἷοις ἂν τόποις λείπωνται, τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα παρέσχοντο ἀφομοιωθέντα ἐντὸς ἔξω τε ἐγερθεῖσιν ἀπομνημονευόμενα φαντάσματα, *Ti.*45e-46a). This then leads to a discussion of the combination of external and eternal fire-light in mirrors that produce *eidōla* (τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν κατόπτρων εἰδωλοποιίαν κτλ.). This same diction and imagery is used by Timaeus of the nous that imprints or moulds *eidōla* on the surface of the liver during sleep to create dream-images that are used to psychagogically guide the appetitive, unthinking soul that dwells in the torso (ὑπὸ δὲ εἰδώλων καὶ φαντασμάτων νυκτός τε καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν μάλιστα ψυχαγωγῆσοιτο, 71a).³⁸⁷ In describing how the nous paints images on the liver Timaeus uses terminology that is both equally sculptural and two dimensional (*eidōla, typoi*) and describes the liver as a ‘receptacle’ using the same participle (*dechomenon*) that is used of Chora (e.g. 50b, 50d, 52d, 57c) which is combined with an allusion to the *eidolopoiia* of mirrors (ἐν αὐτῷ τῶν διανοημάτων ἢ ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ φερομένη δύναμις, οἷον ἐν κατόπτρῳ δεχομένῳ τύπους καὶ κατιδεῖν εἴδωλα, 71b).

³⁸⁷Cf. *Phdr.*261a: ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων.

This connection between mirrors and oneiric *eidōla* imparted by man's nous is likely to have macrocosmic resonances in Timaeus' *eikōs mythos* given that many modern scholars have readily likened Chora to a mirror (even though the text never expressly calls the Receptacle a mirror, the implicit analogism is quite clear).³⁸⁸ Thus just as man's microcosmic nous creates *eidōla* that resemble the contents of his *logismoi*, so too Nous the Demiurge creates the Visible All by imprinting His Ideas in Chora the cosmic mould (50d). The correspondence between Timaeus' Chorology and his account of hepatic oneirc *eikonopoiia* further solidify the fact that the whole cosmogony of the *eikōs mythos* is essentially oneiric. When Timaeus 'paints in words' Socrates' *zōon*-polity and produces an *eikōn* of the Cosmotheos through the shadow-puppetry of his speech that imprints chorically in the soul of the listener/reader he is essentially imitating the Demiurge's choric *eikonopoiia*. The point here is that just as the dream-like Chora was needed at the macrocosmic level to intermediate between Being and Becoming, so too in the microcosm of man's body-soul compound oneiric *eikonopoiia* plays a key role in coming to understand how the ontological orders of Being and becoming relate to each other.

The Oneirology of the Republic

The notion that oneiromantic exegesis, the rational explanation of sub-rational dream-imagery serves as the epistemological and ontological link between the two orders of Being and Becoming is patently clear in Socrates' description of the philosopher-kings as 'anagogic

³⁸⁸ E.g. Cherniss (1965), 377; Cornford (1937), 194; cf. Mohr (1980), 145. On the choric character of the mirror, see Merker (2006), 79-92. Lee (1966), 353-360 speaks of the fleeting dreamy *gignomena* that take shape through the mirror-like medium of Chora as 'non-substantial images'. Jelinek (2015), 14-15 cautions against likening Chora to a mirror due to the Receptacle having several distinctly non-mirror-like qualities such as appearing 'liquified' when receiving water and fiery when receiving fire (51b) and constantly moving, being likened specifically to a sieve (52d-e). For a strong argument against identifying Chora with a mirror, see Kung (1988), 167-178.

pedagogues'. Socrates addresses his interlocutors as philosopher-kings and makes it clear that the ability to participate in both the World of Being and of Becoming and to account for their complex interrelation is a key component of their role as governors and pedagogues (520b-d). They must, despite having beheld the Forms, descend to their compatriots who are tied to *gignomena* and mere *doxai* and must anagogically direct those captives of the World of Becoming who have capacity for *noēsis* to rise to their original station wherein they can behold the World of Being. As can be seen from *Republic* 520b-d extracted below, the distinction between dream-like shadow-play of *eikōs mythos* and the self-knowing anagogic *logismos* of the dialectic of waking nous is at the heart of Socrates' description of the role of philosopher-kings:³⁸⁹

ὕμας δ' ἡμεῖς ὑμῖν τε αὐτοῖς τῇ τε ἄλλῃ πόλει ὥσπερ ἐν σμήνεσιν ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας ἐγεννήσαμεν, ἄμεινόν τε καὶ τελεώτερον ἐκείνων πεπαιδευμένους καὶ μᾶλλον δυνατοὺς **ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν**. καταβατέον οὖν ἐν μέρει ἐκάστῳ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων. καὶ συνεθιστέον τὰ σκοτεινὰ θεάσασθαι: συνεθιζόμενοι γὰρ μυρίῳ βέλτιον ὄψεσθε τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ γνώσεσθε ἕκαστα **τὰ εἶδωλα ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὄν, διὰ τὸ τἀληθῆ ἔωρακέναι καλῶν τε καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν πέρι**. καὶ οὕτω ὕπαρ ἡμῖν καὶ ὑμῖν ἡ πόλις οἰκήσεται ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄναρ, ὡς νῦν αἱ πολλαὶ ὑπὸ **σκιαμαχούντων** τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιαζόντων περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν οἰκοῦνται, ὡς μεγάλου τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος. τὸ δὲ που ἀληθές ὧδ' ἔχει: ἐν πόλει ἧ ἥκιστα πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν, ταύτην ἄριστα καὶ ἀστασιαστότατα ἀνάγκη οἰκεῖσθαι, τὴν δ' ἐναντίους ἄρχοντας σχοῦσαν ἐναντίως.

But you we have engendered for yourselves and the rest of the city to be, as it were, king-bees and leaders in the hive. You have received a better and more complete education than the others, and you are more capable of **sharing both ways of life**. Down you must go then, each in his turn, to the habitation of the others and accustom yourselves to the observation of the obscure things there. For once habituated you will discern them infinitely better than the dwellers there, and **you will know what each of the 'idols' [eidōla] is and whereof it is a semblance, because you have seen the reality of the beautiful, the just and the good**. So our city will be governed by us and you with **waking minds**, and not, as most cities now which are inhabited and ruled darkly as in a **dream** by men who fight one another for **shadows** and wrangle for office as if that were a great good, when the truth is that the city in which those who are to rule are least eager to hold office must needs be best administered and most free from dissension, and the state that gets the contrary type of ruler will be the opposite of this.

³⁸⁹ For other examples of Plato contrasting the waking and sleeping state (ὕπαρ & ὄναρ) see *R.* 476c, *Phdr.* 277d, *Phlb.* 36e & 65e, *Pit.* 277d & 278e, *Tht.* 158b, *R.* 574d, 576b, *Ti.* 71e, *Lg.* 969b, also 533b-c.

Here the imagery and phraseology is very much reminiscent of the Timaeus account of the liver as the locus of oneiromantic vision whereto the human nous *descends* from its position heaven-beholding position to paint anagogic *eikones* for the benefit of the bound mortal captive of the lower-torso cavity, the *epithymētikon*. The role of the philosopher-king pedagogues in the ideal polity is akin to that of the cephalic nous within the microcosm of man's body politic. Timaeus says that the cephalic nous is a heavenly plant and not an earthly one (φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλὰ οὐράνιον, 90a). The nous leads us back to our celestial origins in proximity to the Forms, the locus whence our souls descended to incarnation, to genesis (πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ συγγένειαν ἀπὸ γῆς ἡμᾶς αἴρειν... ἐκεῖθεν γάρ, ὅθεν ἡ πρώτη τῆς ψυχῆς γένεσις ἔφυ) and in so doing rectifies the whole body-politic and orients towards the Good (ὀρθοῖ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, 90a-b). When Socrates in the above passage says that the philosopher-kings must descend into the abode of the cave-captives and adjust to beholding the shadows (**καταβατέον**... εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων συνοικήσιν καὶ συνεθιστέον τὰ σκοτεινὰ θεάσασθαι) the diction of catabasis and of *oikēsis*, dwelling, is reminiscent of the *Timaeus* where the nous descends to the 'district' inhabited by the mortal soul that dwells around the liver in order to make it clam and content (71d: ἰλεὼν τε καὶ εὐήμερον ποιοῖ τὴν περὶ τὸ ἦπαρ ψυχῆς μοῖραν **κατωκισμένην**).³⁹⁰ The cephalic nous, like the philosopher-kings, partakes of both worlds, to use Socrates' phraseology (ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν): the Above World of Reality and the Lower World of Dream-like Shadows. The *nous* is obligated during sleep to descend from its typical *noēsis* in order to engage in *eikonopoia* for the sake of the lower soul in its care.

³⁹⁰ Cf. 539e and *Lg.* 803b-c. Cf. Burnet (1908), 89-90: "it was he alone, so far as we know, that insisted on philosophers descending by turns into the cave from which they had been released and coming to the help of their former fellow-prisoners." Stewart (1905), 252, n. 2 claims that Plato had in mind the Orphic κατάβασις εἰς Ἄϊδου. On that Orphic text, see Lobeck (1829), 373, Edmonds (2015), 261-279 & Edmonds (2004).

Socrates uses the strikingly oneiric image of 'battling over shadows' to depict governors of a polity that are removed from the Forms and are entangled solely in the unreal 'dream-world' of Becoming. He refers to those who consider ruling to be a great boon and who struggle against each other in competition for office as 'battling one another's 'shadows' (σκιαμαχούντων τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιαζόντων περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν οἰκοῦνται, ὡς μεγάλου τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος). Those are the rulers of a dream-like city wherein the *phantasmata* of Becoming reign supreme and the governors have lost sight of the Forms. The allusion to warring for shadows (σκιαμαχούντων) occurs again when Socrates describes rabid demagogues engendering the reasonless masses (literally impregnating) with eros for contention, likening the resulting conflict and ignorance of the Truth to Stesichorus' account of how the Helen sought in the war at Troy was only a phantasm and not the real woman (καὶ ἔρωτας ἑαυτῶν λυτῶντας τοῖς ἄφροσιν ἐντίκτειν καὶ περιμαχίτους εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης εἰδῶλον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Τροίᾳ Στησίχορος φησι γενέσθαι περιμάχητον ἀγνοία τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, 586c).³⁹¹ These 'shadow-fighting' individuals oppressing their fellow citizens are the exact opposite of the *agalma*-men of the Myth of Metals who co-exist peacefully precisely because they were reared to believe that were all equally crafted directly by God from metal in the same subterranean 'cave-forge' (415c–d). There is a great irony involved here—the 'Noble Lie' whereby citizens are led to believe in a metallurgical anthropogony that does not accurately reflect the biological facts of this realm is ultimately supremely truthful and good for it is most conducive of Justice being properly manifested in both the individual and the polis at large. Not only that but through the eikastic Myth of Metals, *agalmatoipoiōi-poiētai* demiurgically craft a unifying narrative of equal for all the *agalma*-men by creating the impression that they were all equally moulded by God. This mythic

³⁹¹ Cf. Stesichorean legend that the real Helen remained in Egypt while only her phantom went to Troy, *Phdr.* 243a–b, *E.Hel.* 605 ff., *El.* 1282–1283, *Isoc.Hel.* 40 & 64.

dynamic is also analogous to how the sub-demiurges of the Timaeian *eikōs mythos* crafted terrestrial humans in imitation of how the Demiurge created them (μιμούμενοι τὸν σφέτερον δημιουργόν, 42e) and how the Demiurge gave one common, equal birthing to the first nous-soul humans by sowing them all in organs of Time, astral bodies (41e). The point in all this is that Socrates and Timaeus in their respective eikastic anthropogonic myths are painting out fictions that are impossible to verify but that fact does not detract from the truthfulness of the enterprise because their logographic *zōgraphia-agalmatopoiia* contributes to the actualisation of the highest truth—the correlation of the *gignomena* in this dreamy World of Becoming with the Forms of the World of Being and the attainment of Justice in the polity at large and within individual man’s body-politic. There is a necessity in giving the appetitive mortal soul its dues and letting psychagogic *eidōlopoiia* take place in its sub-rational realm. The net-outcome of appeasing the mortal soul’s desire for ‘oneiric shadow-puppetry’ is beneficial for the whole ‘polity’ of the individual *agalma*-man’s body-soul compound. The rational faculty of nous must always be capable of discerning through *logismos* (dialectic and ratiocination) that within the sub-rational *eidōlopoiia* of the dream-state there is a divine message that can be oneiromantically interpreted in such a manner as to gain insight about the relationship between Becoming and Being. That insight is then be used by the philosopher-kings to create an optimally harmonious balance (Justice) within both the individual’s body-soul compound and the polity at large. Thus, the philosopher-kings’ role as oneiromantic *exēgētai* is essentially one and the same as what has already been said about the soteriological enterprise of divinising *agalmatopoiia* in Chapter 2. The philosopher-kings qua collective ‘nous of the body-soul politic’ cease their exclusive dialectic and philosophic pursuits to venture down into the ‘cave-torso of *theoikelon-andreikelon* polity’ where the craftsmen, farmers and *phylakes-epikouroi* dwell in order to ‘paint’ into reality the dream-world of the Myth of Metals. In the dream-world of the Myth of Metals and the Allegory of the Cave the

philosopher-kings not only act as oneiric *eikonopoioi* but even impersonate God the Creator Himself (ὁ θεὸς πλάττων, 3.415a). They need to stop engaging in pure dialectic and astronomy in order to become ‘divinely possessed’ as it were with the capacity to ‘act as God’ in constructing a mythic dream-world that can then be subject to rational review when the Philosopher-Kings exit the oneiric cave and ascend back to their acropolis-observatory. This is analogous to how each man’s mind vacates its ‘cephalic acropolis’ each night to paint a shadow-puppet show each night on his liver in order to domesticate the *epithymētikon-thremma* through oneiric imagery. The cessation of pure, exclusive philosophising in order to engage in oneiric myth-making is just as essential for cohesion (Justice) in the body-politic as sleep and waking evaluation of dreams are for the maintaining of health in the individual human’s body-soul compound. The key dynamic at play here is the interplay between the sub-rational, oneiric *eikonopoiia* of *eikotes mythoi* and the noetic *logoi* of dialectic—both work in tandem to bring about the optimal overall outcome both for microcosmic man and mesocosmic polity. This is analogous to how Nous’ and Necessity’ cooperation in Chora’s sub-rational, oneiric *ektypōsis* of the Demiurge’s noetic Ideas bring about the optimal overall outcome at the macrocosmic level.³⁹²

As per Socrates, the ability of philosopher-kings to discern eikastic likenesses, the dreamy *eidōla* of this World of Becoming, from the Forms on which they are modelled is on account of their having beheld the Forms of the Just, the Beautiful, the Just and the Good, the Ultimate Truths (τὰ εἰδῶλα ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὄν, διὰ τὸ τἀληθῆ ἑώρακέναι καλῶν τε καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν περὶ, 520c). Thus viewed in light of the earlier discussion in Chapter 2 of Justice as being observable in the self-regulation of the body-soul complex, the philosopher-kings

³⁹² Cf. LSJ s.v. ἐκτύπωσις citing Aesar. *ap. Stob.* 1.49.27 for the definition "modelling in relief".

are those whose immortal souls have beheld Being and who have tamed their *epithymētikon* and psychagogically redirected it to support the *nous*' correctly oriented teleology rather than letting base desires overpower reason. The achievement of good governance internally, the realisation of Justice in one's own body-soul complex allows for it to then be 'exported' to others in the polis. This political dynamic of philosopher-kings descending from their astronomical-observatory acropolis where pure dialectic and contemplation of the Forms occurs in order to enter the dream-cave in order to help the bound captives therein directly parallels the way, within the psychosomatic microcosm of man, the *nous* vacates the head during the time of reasonless sleep in order to travel down to the torso-prison of the bound beast, the *epithymētikon*, in order to impart *logismos* indirectly, mantically, through the *zōgraphia* that produces eikastic dream-imagery (71c-d). As is clear in Socrates' above use of the words ὕπαρ and ὄναρ his contrast of the waking and sleeping state is deeply embedded in his discussion of the link between the Worlds of Being and Becoming as well as the relationship between the sub-rational and cognising components of the polis' and the individual human's organism.³⁹³ It is no coincidence that Timaeus contrasts the exact same words that Socrates does in the above passage (ὄναρ and ὕπαρ) when he describes the dynamic underpinning the hierophantic exegesis of both eikastic dream-visions as well as those resulting from divine possession in waking hours (71e).

Chapter 3 Conclusion

The inherently religious nature of Plato's conception of education and political life is evident in the way life in this Visible World of Becoming is framed as a fleeting dream-vision, a

³⁹³ The same contrast is found in *R.* 476c, 533b-c, 574d, 576b *Phdr.* 277d, *Phlb.* 36e, 65e, *Plt.* 277d, 278e, *Tht.* 158b, *Ti.* 71e, *Lg.* 969b.

cave-wall decorated with the captivating moving *eidōla* of *zōa* (cf. 52b-c on Chora: ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὄνειρώξεως). Rather than simply being a dystopia that entraps the soul in mistaking *phantasmata* for realities there is a slither of hope for those who are philosophic—they can master the art of oneiromantic exegesis and come to understand whence the dreamy *eikones* of this realm come and how to ascend to that higher, truer, better World of Being.

Timaeus is to be seen as the hierophantic master poet and oneiromantic exegete capable of not only satisfying the base, bestial *pathos* of Socrates' bound *epithymētikon-thremma* to see his polity rendered a shadow-play of moving *zōa* at war but in so doing anagogically guides the mortal soul's unreasoning and irrational desire (εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἀφίκοιτο, 19b) into service of a much higher goal, namely the construction of a system of oneiric *agalmatopoiia-zōgraphia* that can be interpreted through *logismos* in such a way as to optimally harmonise one's own interiority and establish ideal Justice in one's polity so that the ultimate telos of existence can be achieved—namely the sustaining of a maximal degree of God-likeness at the microcosmic, mesocosmic and macrocosmic levels for as long as possible before the inevitable cycle of decay commences and a fresh start is required.

Dissertation Conclusion

This dissertation has outlined a radically new approach to reading the *Timaeus* in conjunction with the *Republic*. Not only does the study of these two texts' interrelation serve to elucidate their meaning but it also leads to a better appreciation of how Plato conceived of the relationship between the Divine Macrocosm, the mesocosmic polis and microcosmic man. So much of what has been established in this dissertation is essentially without precedent in modern scholarship. Even though some elements of the typology of *agalmatopoiia* examined

here have already been identified in recent scholarship no one has ever drawn together all the eikastic diction and imagery in the *Timaeus* and the *Republic* in such a way as to construct a coherent profile of Plato's theology and soteriology of *eikonopoiia*. This dissertation's novel contributions can be summarised in three key points. Firstly, it has been demonstrated that *Timaeus* is a divinely inspired rhapsode and oneiromantic hierophant who manages to produce a cosmogonic and anthropogonic myth that eclipses the poetry of Homer and Hesiod in theological merit by painting an accurate picture of both the Divine and of man in his perfect and divinised state. Secondly, the fulfilment of Socrates' request to see his ideal polity animated by *Timaeus*' *eikōs logos* as a *zōon* at war has been framed in terms of the discourse's embodiment of the *theoikelon-andreikelon* constitution of *R.6.501b* and its consequent function as a kind of 'mould' in which *agalma*-citizens can be shaped into *theoikela andreikela* themselves. Thirdly the famed Myth of Metals and Allegory of the Cave have been comprehensively connected to the Chorology of the *Timaeus* and its account of the psychagogy of hepatic *eikonopoiia* and the oneiromantic exegesis of the *eidōla* produced through such divinely-inspired revelations (*Ti.70d-72b*). In exploring the status of the *Timaeus*' *eikōs mythos* as a sub-rational dream-vision interpreted through waking rational exegesis the dichotomy between the sub-rational dreaming state and the reasoning waking state was shown to parallel the relationship between the ontological and epistemological orders of Becoming and Being. By concluding with an exploration of how Plato conceived of divine revelation and the rational exegesis of such inherently sub-rational oneiric imagery the dissertation paves the way for a new appraisal of *Timaeus*' *eikōs mythos*. All the prior discussion of a new kind of rhapsodic mythopoesis capable of generating a living *eikōn* of both the *Cosmotheos* and the *theoikelon-andreikelon* constitution that moulds the body-soul compound in its likeness is to be viewed through the prism of oneiric *eikonopoiia* and rational hierophantic exegesis. Instead of being merely unstable conjecture, the *eikōs mythos*

is a divine revelation that has been subject to rational explanation by a wise hierophant-rhapsode. The *eikōs logos* allows the careful reader/listener to come to understand how it is that the dreamy World of Becoming relates to the Paradigm of Being. One achieves such understanding by mastering the divine art of *eikonopoiia*. It is only by becoming a skilled dialectical *zōgraphos-agalmatopoiios* that one can bridge the ontological and epistemological divide between Being and Becoming and then take action to try and make not only his own microcosmic body-soul compound, his fellow citizens and his whole city but even the entire macrocosm the best possible likeness of the Noetic Animal that it can be.

In providing these novel insights this dissertation has provided a fresh perspective on Plato's 'political theology of *eikonopoiia*', a soteriology centred on God-like philosopher-kings imitating the Demiurge's bestowal of musico-mathematical order on the Visible All by first crafting themselves into likenesses (*eikones*) of the Divine Macrocosm and then by devising the *theoikelon-andreikelon* constitution and the perfect *eikōs mythos* which they can use as *typoi* in which to mould the *agalma*-citizens of their polis just as God begat the Visible Cosmotheos as the perfect 'living statue' (*Ti.37c*) through Chora the 'mould'.

Appendix

Fig. 1:

Brumbaugh (1951) 343 provides the following geometric schema that shows how the epistemological categories of the Divided Line, the divisions of the tripartite soul and the types of governance all coalesce together:





Fig. 2:

The following diagram shows how the sinful mismanagement of a part of the body-soul compound leads reincarnation as a particular kind of animal (*zōon*). In so doing it shows how each sector of microcosmic man’s body-soul compound corresponds to a macrocosmic element. The man who exercises his cephalic nous-soul correctly returns to his original state as an ensouled astral body (42b) whereas the astronomically -oriented man who is foolish is reincarnated as a bird (91d). As such the head is associated with fire and air since stars and birds are fashioned from those elements. So too the *thymos* is associated with earth because the unphilosophic man who neglects Heaven is reincarnated as an earthen tetrapod, a creature that crawls on the earth from which it is fashioned (91e). Lastly the *epithymētikon* is associated with water because those who live only for base desires are reincarnated as aquatic life-forms (92b). When these connections are mapped onto the human frame, a peculiar *zōgraphia* arises:



Could it be that the theoeikelon-andreikelon was conceived of as such a ‘painting’ as this?

Given that the Paradigm and the Visible All are ‘panzoomorphic’ in that they contain all

visible and invisible animals respectively (*Ti.30c-d*) perhaps when one ‘paints’ the Divine Macrocosm in the form of a microcosmic man they produce the above schema. There may even be parallels with the following cosmogonic fragment of Empedocles wherein painters act as microcosmic demiruges by producing an *eikōn* of all the different animalian life-forms by imitating God the macrocosmic *Zōgraphos*:

D60 (B23)= Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 160.1–11:

ὡς δ’ ὅποτεν γραφέες ἀναθήματα ποικίλλωσιν
ἀνέρες ἀμφὶ τέχνης ὑπὸ μήτιος εὖ δεδαῶτε,
οἷτ’ ἐπεὶ οὖν μάρψωσι πολύχροα φάρμακα χερσίν,
ἀρμονίη μείζαντε τὰ μὲν πλέω, ἄλλα δ’ ἐλάσσω,
Ἐκ τῶν εἶδεα πᾶσιν ἀλίγκια πορσύνουσι,
δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἠδὲ γυναῖκας
θῆράς τ’ οἰωνούς τε καὶ ὕδατοθρέμμονας ἰχθῦς
καὶ τε θεοὺς δολιχαίωνας τιμῆσι φερίστους·
οὕτω μὴ σ’ ἀπάτη φρένα καινύτω ἄλλοθεν εἶναι
Ἰθνητῶν, ὅσσα γε δῆλα γεγάασιν ἄσπετα, πηγῆν,
ἀλλὰ τορῶς ταῦτ’ ἴσθι, θεοῦ πάρα μῦθον ἀκούσας
As when painters colour many-hued sacrificial offerings,
Both men, by reason of their skill, very expert in their art,
They grasp many-colored pigments in their hands,
Then, having mixed them in harmony, the ones more, the others less,
Out of these they compose forms similar to all things,
Creating trees, men, and women,
Wild beasts and birds, water-nourished fish,
And long-lived gods, the greatest in honours:

In this way may your mind not succumb to the error that it is from elsewhere [**scil. than from the four elementary roots**]

That comes the source of all the innumerable mortal things whose existence is evident,

But know this exactly, once you have heard the word of a god.

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