

Confusing Black and White: Naqshbandi Sufi Affiliations and the Transition to Qing Rule in the Tarim Basin*

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The role of Sufi brotherhoods as a force either of resistance or of accommodation has aroused interest in a variety of imperial contexts, and the case of Qing Inner Asia is no exception. Even those with only a passing acquaintance with the history of the region will probably have heard of the “khojas,” and may be familiar with the schism between the “Black Mountain” and “White Mountain” factions in the Tarim Basin, in the south of what is now Xinjiang. These khojas were members of the Naqshbandiyya, a Sufi brotherhood (*tarīqat*) that spread from Transoxania throughout Asia and the Middle East in the post-Mongol period. Descended along two different lines from a sixteenth-century saint of Samarqand, Makhdum-i A‘zam, these khojas can hence be referred to collectively as Makhdumzada, “the sons of Makhdum.” The Black Mountain is a term commonly applied to the family of Ishāq Vali (d. 1599), also known in the literature as the “Ishāqiyya.” The “White Mountain” khojas descend from Afaq Khoja (d. 1694), and hence also take the name “Afaqiyya.” A longstanding rivalry between these two camps has been thought greatly to outweigh any rupture that took place within either of them. Indeed, this rivalry has acquired the status of a grand narrative of Eastern Turkestan’s history, stretching from the middle of the seventeenth century to the late nineteenth.

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Assuming the significance of this rivalry, scholars have expended a considerable amount of ink describing its historical origins, and seeking to describe what difference, if any, actually distinguished the “Black Mountain” and “White Mountain” communities—be it in terms of succession practice, orientation toward worldly politics, or social composition.¹ Yet despite this interest in the khojas and their role in Xinjiang, much of the local textual record capable of shedding light on these questions has been neglected. Only a few of the available Persian and Chaghatay source texts have come into wide circulation in précis translation, and scholars rarely venture back to a close reading of the originals, let alone engage with less well-known works. To some extent this is due to a problem of accessibility: the body of texts I draw on here remains entirely in manuscript form and is divided up among libraries around the world. Yet it is also a question of genre. Most of this writing consists of hagiography—a genre of which historians have tended to be wary. To be sure, there are limitations on the value of hagiographies as historical sources. Unlike in Western Turkestan, in Xinjiang there was no concurrent tradition of “official” Islamic historiography that might act as a check on these works. Yet my methodology here will not place excessive demands on this corpus. At this stage of research, simply identifying the authorship and factional affiliations of texts, and gaining some sense of a text’s standpoint toward key political events, and adjudication of the role of key individuals, is enough to improve

¹ For example, Papas, “The Shaykh Succession in the Classical Naqshbandiyya: Spirituality, Heredity and the Question of Body;” İsenbike Togan Arıcanlı, “Differences in Ideology and Practice: The Case of the Black and White Mountain Factions.” The most recent effort to ground the distinction in sociological terms is Kim, *Borderland Capitalism: Muslim Notables and the Qing Empire in Chinese Central Asia, 1759-1864*.

significantly our understanding of this period and the role of Sufi affiliations within it. Laying this groundwork will, I hope, allow us to venture into more difficult questions of interpretation, and bring this body of writing into more productive dialogue with perspectives provided by the archive and official historiography of the Qing.

My reading of this hagiographic corpus has led me to question much of the received wisdom in this field, in several respects. The first is the most basic one of identification and classification. To state my most important finding, the “Black Mountain” and “White Mountain” designations, which have come to be treated as interchangeable with “Ishāqiyya” and “Afaqiyya” respectively, were not synonyms for these terms. They instead describe a schism *within* the Afaqiyya that emerged in the wake of Afaq Khoja’s death. Much of what was previously thought of as belonging to the “White Mountain” will therefore have to be reclassified as “Black Mountain.” Making this corrective leads us to a view of the “Afaqiyya” as a considerably more diverse phenomenon than has been realized, and of the “Ishāqiyya” as a much sparser tradition—particularly from the Qing conquest onwards. This in turn requires us to revisit a series of questions about the nature of Sufi affiliations that have been built into the dominant framing. On the assumption that the Makhdumzada Sufis of the Tarim Basin recognized only a strict form of father-son transmission of spiritual charisma, terms like “Afaqiyya” or “Black Mountain” have all been treated as referring to the same kind of thing—a network of solidarity defined by loyalty to a branch of a saintly family.² The adoption of this rigid template of the genealogically centered Sufi brotherhood, I

² It is not uncommon in English-language work to encounter talk of “khoja dynasties,” and much of Chinese scholarship on the Naqshbandiyya in Xinjiang presents itself as the study of the “khoja family.” See, for example, Liu and Wei, *Xiyu hezhuo jiazuo yanjiu*.

argue, has inhibited the study of how Sufi affiliations functioned in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A more accurate picture of this religious landscape allows us to clarify the role that these networks played in the eighteenth-century transition to Qing rule, which, contrary to the reigning assumption, rested as much on Afaqi as on Ishaqi loyalties.

This article consists of four sections. In the first, I describe the scholarly tradition surrounding the Naqshbandiyya of the Tarim Basin, and the historical narrative that has emerged within it. In the second, I critique this tradition by examining more closely the internal conflict that emerged within the Afaqiyya in the first half of the eighteenth century—still an obscure period in the history of the Tarim Basin. Here my analysis consists mainly of reconfiguring elements of the story that have been introduced in the first section: the pairings of Ishaqiyya/Afaqiyya and Black Mountain/White Mountain. In the third section, I introduce a new element to this mix, by analyzing the role of a family of Makhdumzada khojas resident in the Qing capital of Beijing. The final section of the article considers some of the implications of my findings for our analysis of the construction of Qing rule of Xinjiang in the immediate post-conquest period, and of political divisions at the time of the khoja uprisings of the nineteenth century.

Fig. 1: Makhdumzada Khojas Mentioned in This Article

The Origins of a Misreading: On the Black Mountain/White Mountain Binary

By the late seventeenth century, the Chaghatayid branch of the Chinggisid dynasty, which had exercised rule in the Tarim Basin for two centuries, was in evident decline. Throughout the Tarim Basin, members of the royal family were being displaced by non-Chinggisid aristocrats of Mongol

origin (i.e. the *begs*) and prominent Sufi leaders, who were known as the “khojas” (a Persian word meaning “master”), members of an influential family originating with Makhdum-i A‘zam (see Fig. 1). The first branch of this family to achieve prominence in the Tarim Basin consisted of the sons of Khoja Ishāq Vali (d. 1599), who sought the patronage of the Chaghatayid court in the late sixteenth century.³ His line became known as the “Ishāqiyya.” A second important lineage was introduced by Makhdum-i A‘zam’s grandson Khoja Muḥammad Yusuf, and consolidated by Muḥammad Yusuf’s son Hidayatullah, better known as Afaq Khoja (d. 1694), who was active in the Tarim Basin and the Gansu/Qinghai region at the end of the seventeenth century. This branch is referred to in the scholarly literature as the “Afaqiyya.”

The period between the eclipse of the Chaghatayids and the coming of the Qing (i.e. roughly 1690 to 1755) is something of a historiographic black hole. On the assumption that the Naqshbandi khojas were now the dominant political force in the Tarim Basin, scholars tend to refer to this political interlude as the “khoja period.” The chronicle of Shah Maḥmud Churas gives some details on the events up to around 1710.⁴ Beyond this, our sources are hagiographic in nature, and two in particular have interested scholars. The first is the *Book of Guidance (Hidayatnama)*, completed

³ On Ishāq Vali’s activities in the Tarim Basin, see DeWeese, “The ‘Competitors’ of Ishāq Khwāja in Eastern Turkistan: Hagiographies, Shrines, and Sufi Affiliations in the Late Sixteenth Century” and Eden, “A Sufi Saint in Sixteenth-Century East Turkistan: New Evidence Concerning the Life of Khwāja Ishāq.”

⁴ Shah Maḥmud Churas, *Khronika. Kriticheskii tekst, perevod, kommentarii, issledovanie i ukazateli O. F. Akimushkin.*

in 1730.⁵ The second is Muḥammad Ṣadiq Kashghari's *Remembrance of the Saints (Tazkira-i 'Azizan)*, written in the 1780s for a *beg* patron.⁶ The narrative that has been pieced together from these sources holds that around 1680, with the support of an Oirat Mongol confederacy headed by the Junghars (Zunghars), Afaq Khoja displaced the reigning khan of Yarkand and ruled independently for roughly a decade. Following his death in 1694, a period of civil war ensued, involving members of Afaq's family as well as the Ishaqiyya, but which also saw efforts to restore a Chaghatayid to the throne. This instability eventually led the Junghars to intervene again. On this occasion, they installed a series of *begs*, took some of the khojas hostage, and drove the rest into exile. By around 1730 the Junghars had switched to a policy of ruling through members of the Ishaqiyya lineage, who served as the primary local intermediaries up until the Junghar civil war of the 1740s.

At the death of Galdan Tsering in 1745, a succession struggle broke out among the Junghars. This crisis presented the Qianlong emperor in Beijing with an opportunity to intervene and bring his empire's chief rival on the steppe to submission. In the wake of these campaigns, the Qing court initially employed a hands-off approach to the newly conquered territories. To administer the Muslims of the Tarim Basin, the Qing released from Junghar captivity two grandsons of Afaq Khoja—Burhan al-Din and Khoja Jahan—and provided them with military support to subdue the region. In 1755 these members of the Afaqiyya lineage laid siege to Yarkand and Kashgar and drove out the reigning Ishaqiyya khojas, but the regime that the two Afaqi khojas established was

⁵ Mir Khal al-Din Katib Yarkandi, *Hidayatnama* (Institut vostochnykh rukopisei Rossiiskoi akademii nauk MS C560, 1142/1730).

⁶ Muḥammad Ṣadiq Kashghari, *Tazkira-i 'Azizan* (Bodleian Library, MS Turk D20, ca. 1785).

itself short-lived. In 1757-59 a series of events that the Qing court perceived as a “rebellion” led the Qianlong emperor to dispatch an invasion force into the Tarim Basin, and incorporate its Muslim population more fully into the empire. This renewed Qing invasion drove Burhan al-Din and Khoja Jahan across the Pamirs into Badakhshan, where they were captured and executed by the local potentate, Sultan Shah. The Qing now installed a thin imperial administration atop a reconfigured local elite of *begs* (a term that originally referred to tribal aristocrats, but by now meant “official”). The most privileged of this new cohort of intermediaries were from Hami and Turfan, and seemingly had little stake in the Ishaqiyya/Afaqiyya schism, but among those recruited from Kashgar and Yarkand were *begs* whose sympathies lay firmly with the Ishaqiyya. Meanwhile, vestiges of the Afaqiyya went into exile, where they came to constitute the primary pole of opposition to Qing rule in Xinjiang.⁷

Partisan eighteenth-century sources give a clear sense of a rivalry between the lines of Ishaq and Afaq as a feature of Tarim Basin politics. Yet in the wake of the Qing conquest, as Manchu officials started to acquaint themselves with local Muslim society, these were not the primary terms in which its fault lines were described. Instead, a narrative emerged of a rivalry between the Black Mountain (Qarataghliq) and White Mountain (Aqtaghliq) parties. It seems that Qing officials first encountered this terminology in 1785, when Burhan al-Din’s son Sarimsaq arrived in Samarqand and sought to reestablish contact with Kashgar. Through an *akhund* (a learned religious figure) from the “Black Mountain” (Ma. *Kara Tahalik, yacin alin i niyalma*) who was then living in

⁷ For these events, see Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia*; Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c. 1700-1860*.

Andijan, officials learned that people of the “White Mountain” (Ma. *Ak Tahalik*, *šanyan alin i niyalma*) were shuttling between Kashgar and Samarqand carrying gifts to Sarımsaq. When the Qianlong emperor instructed his officials to confirm this, he received conflicting descriptions of the state of affairs. Writing from Uch Turfan, Councilor Hailu (Ch. Hai-lu) asserted that the “people of the White Mountain” were simply too numerous to investigate, but that they should not all be treated as suspicious: “there are good and bad among them.” By contrast, when Shaanxi-Gansu Governor-General Fukanggan (Ch. Fu-kang-an) travelled to Xinjiang, *beg* informants told him that in Kashgar “the Aqtaghliqs (*Ak Tahalik*) are very few, and don’t get along among themselves.”⁸ Although these initial discussions did little to clarify the meaning of the divisions, the emperor came close to formulating a policy toward them in 1790, when he instructed officials gradually to disperse the White Mountain Muslims by appointing them to low-level *beg* positions outside the Kashgar oasis.⁹

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, outsiders who took an interest in Qing Xinjiang had to make sense of the same terminology. The first such account was provided by an Indian in British service, the pandit Mir Izzatullah, who visited Yarkand in 1812-13. According to Izzatullah, before the coming of the Qing, the Junghars had been ruling the Tarim Basin with the support of the Black Mountain khojas, while keeping the White Mountain khojas hostage in Ili. When the Qing provided them with an opportunity, these White Mountain khojas seized the country, but

⁸ Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan and Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin, (eds.), *Qingdai Xinjiang Manwen dang’an huibian*, 170:46; 171:67.

⁹ *Qingdai Xinjiang Manwen dang’an huibian*, 188: 279. I have been unable to determine whether or not such a policy was ever implemented.

then rebelled against their patrons, who sent an army to invade and restore the Black Mountain khojas to authority.¹⁰ Izzatullah's was a historical narrative, but the White Mountain/Black Mountain divide was equally pertinent to current events in the Tarim Basin. From the 1820s onward, a series of khoja-led incursions from the Ferghana Valley into the Tarim Basin shook Qing rule in Xinjiang. In the 1830s W. H. Wathen, Persian secretary to the Governor of Bombay, obtained information from Kashgari pilgrims on the first of these events, the rebellion of Jahangir Khoja, son of Sarīmsaq. These pilgrims told Wathen that Jahangir's holy war had failed because of the deep division of local society into White Mountain and Black Mountain factions. Jahangir was the head of the White Mountain, they said, while the Qing-appointed governor (*ḥākīm beg*) of Kashgar, Ishaq, was leader of the Black Mountain.¹¹

Next to offer an analysis of this division was Chokan Valikhanov, a Kazakh aristocrat in Russian military service. In his report from a secret visit to Kashgar in the late 1850s, he described the two parties of White Mountain and Black Mountain khojas, "distinguished not so much by the essence of their teaching but by the character and qualities of the figure standing at their head." During his time in Kashgar, Valikhanov came across a manuscript of Muḥammad Ṣadiq Kashghari's *Remembrance of the Saints* and made use of the work to furnish some historical background to this rivalry. In so doing he made explicit what was only implicit in Mir Izzatullah's account: that the White Mountain Khojas were to be identified with the sons of Afaq Khoja, while the Black Mountain referred to the line of Ishaq Vali. By reading the Black Mountain/White Mountain pairing back onto the historic conflict described in the *Remembrance of the Saints*,

¹⁰ Mir Izzet Ullah, "Travels beyond the Himalaya," 304.

¹¹ Wathen, "Memoir on Chinese Tartary and Khoten," 661.

Valikhanov rendered these terms synonymous with, and equivalent to, Ishāqiyya/Afaqīyya.¹²

Valikhanov's account of Qing Xinjiang, first published in 1861, made its way into English-language scholarship via a partial translation published in 1865.¹³ Yet his was not the only interpretation of the Black Mountain/White Mountain division available at this time. In 1862 Muḥammad Amin Yarkandi provided a narrative to British officials in India that differed in one significant way from Valikhanov's, by presenting the conflict as having arisen among the sons of Afaq Khoja by different wives.¹⁴ Yet this native informant's perspective was ignored in the earliest English-language histories of Xinjiang, which treated Valikhanov's account as authoritative. Henry Bellevue, a member of Sir Douglas Forsyth's mission to the court of Ya'qub Beg in 1873-4,

¹² Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, "O sostoianii Altıshara ili shesti vostochnykh gorodov Kitaiskoi provintsii Nan-Lu (Maloi Bukharii) v 1858-59 gg.," in *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh* (Alma-Ata: 1985), 127. These accounts differ in interesting ways on the identity of these groups. According to Wathen's informants, the White Mountain khojas were Naqshbandis, but Ishāq belonged instead to the Qadiriyya brotherhood. Valikhanov refers to the Black Mountain as the Ishāqiyya, but adopts the designation "Ishqiyya" for the line of Afaq Khoja. Space will not allow for discussion of these discrepancies.

¹³ Mitchell and Mitchell, *The Russians in Central Asia: Their Occupation of the Kirghiz Steppe and the Line of the Syr-Daria: Their Political Relations with Khiva, Bokhara, and Khokand: Also Descriptions of Chinese Turkestan and Dzungaria. By Capt. Valikhanof, M. Veniukof, and Other Russian Travellers.*

¹⁴ Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources of the Countries on the North-Western Boundary of British India*, cccxxxv- cccxxxvi.

followed Valikhanov in assimilating the Black Mountain (Karátághlúc) and White Mountain (Aktághlúc) rivalry to the earlier clash between the sons of Ishaq Vali and Afaq. Indeed, a misreading of one passage in the *Book of Guidance* led him to push the origins of the Black Mountain/White Mountain divide back as far as the early seventeenth century.¹⁵ He also provided an explanation for these terms, one that has been influential, deriving them from the Kirghiz factions to the west (Black Mountains) and north (White Mountains) of Kashgar, on whose support the rival khojas had relied at various times. Alongside Bellew's work, a second important scholarly product of the British diplomatic missions of the 1870s was Robert Shaw's epitome of the short recension of the *Remembrance of the Saints* (titled *Remembrance of the Khojas*). When Ney Elias edited and published this work in 1897, he made note of the fact that the White Mountains/Black Mountain terminology was nowhere to be found in it, but he nevertheless drew heavily on Bellew's narrative for his introduction.¹⁶ Likewise Martin Hartmann, in his 1905 study of the *Remembrance*

¹⁵ Bellew, "History of Kashgar," in *Report of a Mission to Yarkund in 1873*, ed. Sir D. T. Forsyth, 174-175. The passage in question is on fols 139b-140a of the Saint Petersburg manuscript (fols 134a-134b of the British Library manuscript), where a date that Bellew reads as 1031 AH is clearly given as 1131. Bellew also seems to have gone astray in converting *hijri* to anno Domini, since 1031 AH corresponds to 1621, but he gives instead 1618, which is a full century from 1718, to which the correct reading of 1131 AH corresponds.

¹⁶ Shaw, "The History of the Khōjas of Eastern-Turkistān Summarised from the Tazkira-i-Khwājagān of Muḥammad Ṣādiq Kāshgharī," 6. A Chinese translation of Shaw's work has circulated among scholars in China for some time, but was only recently published: Ma Dazheng, ed. *Qingdai Chahetai wen wenxian yizhu*, 136-217.

of the Saints, found little use for the Black Mountain/White Mountain terminology, but did not dispute it.¹⁷

Meanwhile, the Qing school of analysis had been developing in its own, idiosyncratic direction. Discussion of the Black Mountain/White Mountain division subsided at the end of the Qianlong reign, but was revived in 1811, when officials in Kashgar intercepted a letter purporting to be from Sarımsaq's eldest son, Muḥammad Yusuf Khoja. Although Muḥammad Yusuf had written simply to “my loyal devotees, great and small” (*uluḡ uṣaq murīd muḥliṣlārim*), the translators who rendered this salutation into Chinese inserted into it the word “Aqtaghliq” (A-ke-ta-ha-li-ke, i.e. White Mountain).¹⁸ This was clearly familiar language for at least some members of Kashgar officialdom, yet in his explanatory memorials Kashgar Councilor Tie-bao broke with the discourse that had been established in the Qianlong period, and described the division of local society in Xinjiang as one of White *Hat* Muslims (*baimao* Hui) vs. Black *Hat* Muslims (*heimao* Hui). Efforts to account for this shift in terminology have so far not been persuasive.¹⁹ Tie-bao’s memorials do not resolve the question, although they do indicate that he linked Xinjiang’s “White-Hat Muslims” with the Chinese-speaking Hui of provinces to the east (who were referred to as

¹⁷ Hartmann, “Ein Heiligenstaat in Islam: Das Ende der Caghataiden und die Herrschaft der Choḡas in Kaṣgarien.”

¹⁸ Hamada, “Pekin daiichi rekishi tōankan shozō Kōkando kankei monjo kyūshu,” 87-88.

¹⁹ Some have sought to derive the word *taghliq* from Arabic *ṭāqī* > Uyghur *taqi*: “A round unembroidered velvet cap.” See Henry G. Schwarz, *An Uyghur-English Dictionary*, 164. In my own research I have encountered no evidence that the two groups were ever distinguished by dress or headwear.

“White-Hat Muslims” because of their white skullcaps). “The White-Hat Muslims of the interior all belong to these barbarians (*ju xi gaiyi zhi ren*),” he wrote anxiously to the court. “We must take careful precautions so as to secure the frontier.”²⁰ We can at least conclude, therefore, that the Qing empire’s earlier experience of dealing with its Sinophone Muslim population had an influence on the emergence of the new discourse of “hats” in Xinjiang. Tie-bao’s findings drew little immediate response, but the terminology came into wider circulation in the late 1820s thanks to the investigations that senior Qing officials Cangling (Ch. Chang-ling, 1758-1838) and Nayanceng (Ch. Na-yan-cheng, 1764-1833) conducted into Jahangir Khoja’s rebellion. These identified the White-Hat Muslims as providing the local base for the khoja-led insurgency, while the Black Hat Muslims were loyal allies of the Qing administration.

Officials in Xinjiang were evidently not unaware that locals spoke in terms of “mountains” and not “hats,” but differentiating religious schools by hat color has a long tradition in China (witness the case of Tibet), and in this case it stuck.²¹ The statecraft scholar Wei Yuan (1794-1856) made use of the terms in his account of Jahangir’s rebellion in his 1842 *Shengwuji* (Record of sacred military victories), and two years later in *Haiguo tuzhi* (Illustrated gazetteer of maritime countries) he gave them an idiosyncratic derivation, linking them via a reference in the *Tang shu* (Tang history) to a much earlier Chinese distinction between “Arabs who wear black” (*heiyi dashi*)

²⁰ First Historical Archives, *Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe*, 04-01-31-0476-002, memorial from Tie-bao, JQ16/7/12 (August 39, 1811).

²¹ Yarkand Councilor Bi-chang’s *Shoubian jiyao* (1839), for example, notes the existence of the alternative terminology of mountains. *Shoubian jiyao*, in Zhang and Zhao (eds), *Qingchao zhili Xinjiang fanglüe huibian*, vol. 17, 241.

and “Arabs who wear white” (*baiyi dashi*).²² By the 1880s, the *Shengwuji* was available to European scholars in French translation.²³ This brought Chinese talk of “hats” into contact with Europe’s existing scholarly lexicon of “mountains,” which as we have seen was already viewed as synonymous with the Ishaqiyya/Afaqiyya binary. Two syllogisms resulted: (1) “Black Hat” = “Black Mountain” = “Ishaqiyya,” and (2) “White Hat” = “White Mountain” = “Afaqiyya.” On this basis, it has become commonplace simply to translate the Chinese *baimao Hui* as “Afaqi,” and *heimao Hui* as “Ishaqi.” Chinese-language accounts of the Black Hat/White Hat conflict have been treated as evidence that the divide between an Ishaqiyya loyal to the Qing, and a dissident Afaqiyya, persisted long into the Qing period, with Kashgar usually described as a stronghold of the Afaqiyya, and Yarkand the center of the Ishaqiyya.

This framing of political conflict in Qing Xinjiang is so foundational to the historiography as to be ubiquitous, but the contributions of Joseph Fletcher and Henry Schwarz from the 1970s have had a particular influence on English-language scholarship.²⁴ Since that time, Qing historians such as James Millward and Laura Newby have carried on this line of analysis, as has İsenbike Togan in the field of Inner Asian history.²⁵ Elsewhere we find some variation in nomenclature. In

²² Wei Yuan, *Shengwuji*, 1:350-70; *Haiguo tuzhi*, 3:1082-83.

²³ Imbault-Huart, *Recueil de documents sur l’Asie Centrale*, 3-53.

²⁴ Fletcher, “The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China,” ed. Jonathan N. Lipman, in *Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia*, ed. Beatrice Forbes Manz; Schwarz, “The Khwājas of Eastern Turkestan.”

²⁵ Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia 1759-1864*; Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate*; Papas, *Soufisme et politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan*:

Japan, for example, some have preferred the term “Ishaniyya” to “Afaqiyya.”²⁶ Working with Islamic sources that only rarely make use of the Black Mountain/White Mountain terminology, Alexandre Papas has similarly avoided them in his studies of the Xinjiang Naqshbandiyya.²⁷ Yet despite these differences, scholars everywhere (including in China), have held to the same basic narrative of the Ishaqiyya/Afaqiyya schism that I have outlined.²⁸

The Afaqiyya After Afaq: A Tradition Divided

This scholarly tradition, weighty though it is, is grounded on a misconception. As a first step toward constructing an alternative, I begin here by sketching out what became of the “Afaqiyya”

étude sur les Khwajas Naqshbandis du Turkestan oriental, 71-72; Togan Arıcanlı, “Differences in Ideology and Practice.”

²⁶ For example, Shimada, “Aruti Shafuru no wataku to kan to;” Saguchi, *Jūhachi-jūkyū seiki Higashi Torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū*. The term refers to Makhdum-i A‘zam’s son, Ishan-i Kalan.

²⁷ In his monograph, *Soufisme et politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan*, 72-73, Papas gives a conventional account of the terms, but only in passing. In more recent work he avoids them entirely, e.g. Papas, “Khojas of Kashgar,” in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History* (2017).

²⁸ For a recent survey of Chinese scholarship, see Chen Yue, “Qingdai Xinjiang hezhuo yanjiu huigu yu zhanwang.” A representative work in English translation is Chen Huisheng, “A Tentative Analysis of the Struggle and Impact between the White Mountain Khwajas and the Black Mountain Khwajas in the Qing Dynasty.”

in the years following its eponymous founder's death in 1694. The collapse of Afaq Khoja's authority quickly saw a fracturing of his following, the significance of which has not been fully appreciated. The saint left behind four sons, by two wives (see Fig. 1). His first wife, the sister of a *beg* aristocrat, bore him two sons: Yahya and 'Abd al-Khaliq. His second wife was the sister of a Chaghatayid Khan, known as Khanim Padshah. Her two sons were Mahdi and Hasan. At Afaq Khoja's death, Khanim Padshah moved against the rival line and killed Yahya in Kashgar. This led to reprisals against Khanim Padshah and her family: she was killed, and Mahdi and Hasan were whisked away to India. A few years later, the Junghars took Khoja Yahya's sole surviving son Ahmad (d. 1737-8) as a hostage to Ili, where he eventually drew a local following to himself. Khoja Hasan meanwhile spent a considerable amount of time roaming between India, Afghanistan, and Bukhara, before coming to lead a circle of disciples living in the Ferghana Valley. This circle eventually grew large enough for Hasan to launch a series of raids into the Tarim Basin in the 1710s and 1720s against the Junghars.

The splintering of the Afaqiyya into these two lines gave rise to rival hagiographic traditions. That which surrounds Khoja Ahmad is represented by a lone work, the *Books of Islam (Islamnama)* (1777), centering on Ahmad's exile in Ili, the fall of the Junghars, and ending with verses of praise for Ahmad's son Burhan al-Din.²⁹ The hagiographic tradition surrounding Khoja Hasan is more extensive than that of Ahmad, and will play a more important role in my discussion. A wide range of works focus on Hasan, reflecting his activity in both Eastern and Western Turkestan. In the case of Western Turkestan, Kawahara Yayoi has identified a body of texts that bear witness to the

²⁹ Muḥammad 'Abd al-'Alim, *Islamnama* (Institut vostochnykh rukopisei Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, MS C311).

continuation of Khoja Ḥasan’s spiritual lineage in the Ferghana Valley.³⁰ From Xinjiang, we have a series of works in both Chaghatay and Persian, which describe the early signs of miracle-working that Ḥasan exhibited, his exile, his incursions into Kashgar, and his death by poison at the hands of a rival. Some of the texts extend the narrative to describe the daring mission of his disciples to disinter Ḥasan and bury him at the family shrine in Kashgar. The most extensive work in this tradition is a Persian text entitled the *Biographies of the Companions* (*Siyar al-Mukhlisin*), by Shamsuddin ibn Ali, grandson of one of Khoja Ḥasan’s close companions.³¹ A series of Turkic works with various titles stand in a family relationship to the *Biographies of the Companions*, though determining the direction of borrowing is difficult.³² More independent narratives can be found in late works such as the *Secret of the Devotees* (*Sirr al-Aḥbab*).³³

The political divisions that emerged within the Afaqiyya in the wake of Afaq’s death persisted throughout the “khoja period” until the coming of the Qing. Although the Tarim Basin

³⁰ Kawahara, “Hōja Hasan Sāhibukirān den: Ferugana bonchi ni okeru minkan shozō shiryō no kenkyū.”

³¹ Shamsuddin ibn ‘Ali, *Siyar al-Mukhlisin* (Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, Call no. 4MS BP189.7.N35.A23 1700z). My thanks to Rian Thum for sharing a digital copy of this manuscript with me. A Chinese translation of a Turkic version of this work has been given the title of *Da hezhuo zhuan*. See Ma, *Qingdai Chahetai wen wenxian yizhu*, 221-311.

³² These include the *Tazkirat al-Hidayat bi-l-Khayriyyat* (Staatsbibliothek, MS Orient. Quart. 1316); *Ḥazrat Sayyid Afaq Khwajamning Tasiralari* (sic) (Jarring Collection, MS Prov. 22); Omonbek Jalilov, *Ofoq xoja manoqibi*.

³³ *Sirr al-Aḥbab* (India Office Library, MS Turki 10).

Naqshbandiyya was by now exhibiting a strong tendency to treat spiritual succession as a genealogical inheritance, this was not as rigid a principle as is sometimes assumed. At the death of Khoja Ḥasan in 1726-7, his disciples did not simply attach themselves to the nearest member of the Afaqiyya bloodline, but instead reverted to the traditional Naqshbandi practice of succession from shaykh to leading disciple. For this reason, the *Biographies of the Companions* (as its title indicates) is as much a tribute to Khoja Ḥasan's leading disciples as to the khoja himself. According to this work, at the death of Ḥasan his disciple Mavlana Qaḏi Baba Qari "sat on the throne of guidance" for twelve years, and following him the position fell to a second of Ḥasan's companions, Mavlana Dost. At the death of Mavlana Dost, the *Biographies of the Companions* depicts the brotherhood as unable to decide on a suitable candidate to inherit the leadership, bringing the spiritual lineage to an end. Other texts in this family trace the lineage onward, however, through Ḥasan's companions Abu Naṣr al-Anvari and Mulla Majid (also known as Mulla Masjidi Oytoghi) to a man identified simply as the "sultan of the gnostics (Sulṭān al-ʿĀrifīn). This final link in the initiatic chain is identified as the "Uwaysi" of Afaq Khoja, meaning that he received spiritual guidance by communing with the saint's spirit.³⁴

While a rivalry was maturing between these two exiled wings of the Afaqiyya, the family shrine in Kashgar continued to serve as a third center of the brotherhood's activities. Sources concur that during his lifetime, Afaq Khoja appointed as shrine-keeper a certain Mavlana Saqi,

³⁴ *Tazkirat al-Hidayat bi-l-Khayriyyat*, p. 95; *Ḥaḏrat Sayyid Afaq Kh^wajamniṅ Tasiralari*, fol. 62a, which omits mention of Mulla Majid; Jalilov, *Ofoq xoja manoqibi*, 61.

making him second only in religious authority to Afaq Khoja's son Khoja Yaḥya.³⁵ When Yaḥya was killed in 1695, Mavlana Saqi took charge of what was left of the Afaqiyya in Kashgar, and the *Book of Guidance* credits him with an important role in warding off Junghar attacks. The *Biographies of the Companions* shows that this “shrine faction” was initially close to the circle of Ḥasan. Shamsuddin ibn Ali says that Mavlana Saqi was initially entrusted with the care of the child Ḥasan. While in India, Ḥasan and his retinue kept up contact with him via trading networks, but following the shrine-keeper's death the two groups seem to have drifted apart.³⁶

Thus in the 1750s, when the Qing invasion of Jungharia released Burhan al-Din and Khoja Jahan, the Afaqiyya was also represented by a community outside the Tarim Basin with its own active spiritual lineage, and a circle linked to the shrine in Kashgar. How did these various segments respond to the brewing political crisis? To explore this question, I turn first to the *Remembrance of the Saints*, much of which consists of a fast-moving narrative of the fall of the Junghars and the ensuing conflict in the Tarim Basin. The “shrine faction” is represented in this

³⁵ Yarkandi, *Hidayatnama*, fol. 184b. There is some confusion as to the spelling of this man's name. The Bodleian Library copy of the *Hidayatnama* consistently has Sāqī, but the Saint Petersburg manuscript alternates between Sāqī and Nāqī. The *Siyar al-Mukhlisin* speaks of both Sāqī and Naqī. The four copies I have examined of the *Tazkira-i 'Azizan* consistently spell his name Ṣaqī. The *Jami' al-Asrar*, a work to be discussed below, writes Sāqī.

³⁶ In one vignette set in Kashgar, Khoja Ḥasan sees Mavlana Saqi's son pass by on a fine Arab steed dressed in fancy clothes (possibly a reference to the wealth his family must have obtained from managing the Kashgar shrine) and expresses his dislike for such extravagance. ibn 'Ali, *Siyar al-Mukhlisin*, fol. 138a.

text by Mavlana Saqi's son 'Abd al-Majid. Here we read that the Ishaqiyya leader, Khoja Yusuf, against the counsel of his advisors, lent his patronage to 'Abd al-Majid: "he treated him with more intimacy than his own sons." Yusuf's critics are vindicated when, on the eve of Burhan al-Din's assault on Kashgar, 'Abd al-Majid involves himself in a plot to betray the city. The *Remembrance of the Saints* is thus hostile to the line of Mavlana Saqi.³⁷ Its attitude toward the Hasan circle, though, is very different. As the Ishaqiyya Khojas scramble to enlist support to fend off the impending invasion, they are depicted as dispatching letters to various actors outside the Tarim Basin. One of these is to the leaders of Khoja Hasan's surviving companions, Mulla Masjidi Oytoghi (mentioned above as a link in at least one Afaqi initiatic chain in Xinjiang) and Mulla Navrozi. In this letter, the Ishaqiyya invoke their common Makhdumzada ancestry with Khoja Hasan: "we are of the same body and soul as your spiritual master and guide; there is no discord between us. We are drops from the same stream, and crumbs from the same loaf of bread."³⁸ The outreach to these exiles bore fruit: Khoja Hasan's partisans arrived in Kashgar, where according to the *Remembrance of the Saints* they were instructed to assemble their disciples and man the walls. (From this we may infer that there was a constituency of Hasan loyalists already present in Kashgar when they arrived.) In this way, a significant section of the Afaqiyya threw in their lot with the Ishaqiyya resistance against Burhan al-Din and Khoja Jahan.

How did these actions look from the other side? There are very few texts known to circulate in Xinjiang during the Qing that combine the level of detail of the *Remembrance of the Saints* with a defense of the actions of Burhan al-Din and Khoja Jahan. To find such writing, we must follow

³⁷ Kashghari, *Tazkira-i 'Azizan*, fols 71a-73b, 111b-115b.

³⁸ Kashghari, *Tazkira-i 'Azizan*, fol. 92b.

the khojas into exile in Western Turkestan. As described above, the Qing invasion of the 1750s drove the two khojas into Badakhshan, where they were captured and executed. Following this, the refugees that had accompanied them traveled deeper into Afghanistan, and then north into the khanates of Bukhara and Kokand, where they organized themselves around Burhan al-Din's sole surviving son, Sarımsaq Khoja. At the close of the century, one member of this exile community, Muḥammad Amin Kashghari, set out to describe events surrounding the rise and fall of Burhan al-Din and Khoja Jahan in a Persian chronicle, to which he gave the title *Signs of the Victories (Athar al-Futuḥ)*.³⁹ Kashghari's work is incomplete, but the draft of the "book" (*daftar*) describing the Junghar-Qing transition has survived.

Much of the *Signs of the Victories* is a sectarian diatribe, in which Muḥammad Amin Kashghari sets his sights on a range of groups. The first of these, predictably enough, is the Ishaqiyya family. The second is a group of *begs* whom the author refers to as the "amirs of Turfan." The primary representative of this group is a man by the name of Khoja Yusuf, better known in Qing sources as Khojasi (Ch. Huo-ji-si). According to the *Signs of the Victories*, these Turfani amirs were a faithless group, loyal neither to their Junghar patrons, nor to Khoja Burhan al-Din, and they "confused the sultans of Islam with the infidel emperors."⁴⁰ Kashghari is also hostile toward the "shrine faction" around 'Abd al-Majid. Although 'Abd al-Majid's plotting was objectively to the benefit of Burhan al-Din, by betraying his Ishaqiyya patron he brought shame upon himself. The final group that the text polemicizes against is the circle of Khoja Ḥasan, those

³⁹ Muḥammad Ṣadr Kashghari, *Athar al-Futuḥ* (Abu Raihon Berunii Nomidagi Sharqshunoslik Instituti, MS 753, ca. 1800).

⁴⁰ Kashghari, *Athar al-Futuḥ*, fol. 124b.

who arrived from Kokand to support the Ishaqiyya khojas. For this author, the fact that Ḥasan’s companions resisted Burhan al-Din and Khoja Jahan’s bid to restore Afaqiyya authority in the Tarim Basin was a scandal. He likens the situation to a well-known story from early Islamic history, involving Muḥammad’s companion ‘Amr b. al-‘As. In the conflict between Muḥammad’s cousin and son-in-law ‘Ali b. Abu Ṭalib and the Umayyad caliph Mu‘awiya, ‘Amr rejected ‘Ali’s genealogical claim to the caliphate and sided instead with the tyrannical Mu‘awiya. Readers are invited to draw the conclusion that Ḥasan’s disciples had made a similarly disastrous decision.⁴¹

In denouncing the Ḥasan circle’s political stance, the *Signs of the Victories* exhibits two points of interest. The first is that, contrary to expectations, it is the Ḥasan loyalists, and not the Ishaqiyya, that Kashgari identifies as the “Black Mountain” faction. Throughout the work he never once applies the term to the Ishaqiyya, reserving it exclusively for the leaders of Ḥasan’s circle, whom he calls “four Black-Mountaineers with souls as dark as night.” When the Ishaqiyya mobilized in Kashgar, we read, they “took control of the Black-Mountain community and the rest of the miscreants in the province.” Here, as elsewhere, the author clearly treats the Black Mountain as a community or faction (*jamā‘a*) distinct from the Ishaqiyya. Secondly, and consistent with what we know about the Ḥasan circle’s non-hereditary model of spiritual succession, Kashghari mocks these men as Sufi upstarts. “They put on a show of sainthood and miracle-working,” he writes with disdain. “Among the refractory and inimical community of the Black Mountain (*jamā‘a-i ṭāḡiyya-i yāḡiyya-i Qarātāḡiyya*), they were ensconced in the position of spiritual deputy (*khalīfagi*), and believed themselves no less significant than Junayd and Bayazid,” two renowned Muslim mystics. Again, the only way to make sense of this passage is to appreciate that for Kashghari, the

⁴¹ Kashghari, *Athar al-Futuḥ*, fols 135b, 138b.

“community of the Black Mountain” is the Ḥasan circle: they had certainly not been inducted as deputies of the Iṣḥāqiyya.⁴²

How should we account for this usage? The term “Black Mountain” first occurs in East Turkestan hagiography in the *Book of Guidance*, in its account of the death of Khoja Ḥasan, which occurred in a place known as Black Mountain (Qaratagh).⁴³ This text dedicates a long section to denouncing the man who poisoned Ḥasan, referring to him simply as the “Black Mountain khoja” (*khwāja-i Qarātāgī*).⁴⁴ Yet the hagiographies also indicate that throughout the 1730s and 1740s, much of the Sufi community around Ḥasan continued to reside in the place of their shaykh’s death. I believe, therefore, that for people in the Tarim Basin the term “Black Mountain” shifted in meaning and came to refer to this group. In the *Secret of the Devotees*, a Turkic hagiography of Khoja Ḥasan, Ḥasan is depicted as spelling this out explicitly. As his band heads east from Bukhara, he presents his disciples a choice between taking the long road to India, and a short road

⁴² Kashghari, *Athar al-Futuḥ*, fols 136b, 138b. Mahmud Kutlukov, one of few scholars to have engaged with this work, errs in identifying these men as White-Mountaineers. “Iz istorii mezhdunarodnykh svyazei v Tsentral’noi Azii v 1755-1859 gg. (svedeniia Kashgarskikh istorikov),” in *Iz istorii Srednei Azii i Vostochnogo Turkestana XV-XIX vv*, 75.

⁴³ This is generally thought to refer the Qaratagh Valley, on the south flank of the Hissar range in what is today Tajikistan. Some accounts shift the action to a place called “Qaratal,” which is equally open to interpretation. Kawahara, “Hōja Hasan Sāhibukirān den;” Qurban ‘Ali Khalidi, *Tavarikh-i Khamsa-i Sharqi*, 89. Bellew’s statement that in Kashgar the “Black Mountain” was treated loosely as a reference to the Pamirs may well be correct.

⁴⁴ Yarkandi, *Hidayatnama*, fols 146a-163a.

to Black Mountain: “if you take this road it will be short, you will arrive in three days, but you will become Black-Mountaineers.”⁴⁵

From both “outsider” and “insider” perspectives, therefore, the *Signs of the Victories* and *Secret of the Devotees* identify Ḥasan’s circle, not the Ishaqiyya, as the Black Mountain. This is consistent with the information provided by Muḥammad Amin Yarkandi, mentioned above, but more importantly, it is consistent with the entire tradition of local Turkic-language historiography since his day. Down to the 1950s, authors in Xinjiang were unanimous in the view that the White Mountain/Black Mountain divide had originated *within* the Afaqiyya, and was not equivalent to the Afaqiyya/Ishaqiyya divide. The Tarbaghatay imam Qurban ‘Ali Khalidi, in his *Five Oriental Chronicles* (1910), depicts the situation in terms of the banners to which each side rallied. Aḥmad Khoja (father of Burhan al-Din and Khoja Jahan) carried a white banner (*aq tugh*), while Ḥasan raised a black banner (*qara tugh*). “The family of Afaq Khoja split into two groups,” Khalidi explains, “and until now, Aḥmad Khoja’s family have been known as the White Banner and Ḥasan Khoja’s followers as the Black Banner.”⁴⁶ Abla Äpändi’s *Taranchi History*, written around 1920, contains a similar narration. On the eve of the Qing invasion it describes how “the sons of Appaq (i.e. Afaq) Khoja had started to fight, dividing into White Mountain and Black Mountain.”⁴⁷ The

⁴⁵ *Sirr al-Aḥbab*, fol. 65a.

⁴⁶ Khalidi, *Tavarikh-i Khamsa-i Sharqi*, 88-89. Khalidi’s terminology of “banners” can still be met with in contemporary Uyghur scholarship.

⁴⁷ Abla Äpändi, *Taranchi tarikhi*, in *Xibei shaoshu minzu wenzi wenxian*, ed. Miao Pusheng, Gansusheng guji wenxian zhengli bianyi zhongxin, 3:15.

emerging nationalist historiography of the 1930s and 1940s presents the same picture.⁴⁸ Terminological idiosyncrasies aside, this local tradition accords entirely with the hagiographic evidence presented above. Unfortunately, the weight of Western and Chinese scholarship has since drawn Uyghur scholars into our collective error on this question.⁴⁹

Black Mountain Khojas in Beijing? The Line of Karamatullah

To recapitulate the argument thus far, the Black Mountain faction came into being as a branch of the Afaqiyya—those devotees loyal to Khoja Ḥasan, who maintained their community outside the Tarim Basin through traditional shaykh-disciple succession. In the conflict involving Burhan al-Din and Khoja Jahan, they sided with the Ishaqiyya, and mobilized support for the defense of Kashgar. Having initially lost out, they found themselves again on the winning side when the Qing expelled Burhan al-Din and Khoja Jahan in 1759. Resituating this Black Mountain/White Mountain divide within the Afaqiyya has important implications for our view of this hagiographic

⁴⁸ Polat Qadiri, *Ölkä Tarikhi*; Muḥammad Amīn Bughra, *The Autograph Manuscript of Muḥammad Amīn Bughra's Sharqī Türkistān Tārīkhi*, 1:284-286. Polat Qadiri, *Ölkä Tarikhi*. Acquainted with these works, Chen Qinglong correctly recognized that they did not treat Black Mountain/White Mountain as equivalent to Ishaqiyya/Afaqiyya, but side-stepped the issue by treating the pairings as the product of two distinct periods of religio-political conflict in Xinjiang, and ended up talking as if they were in fact equivalent terms. See his “Lun Baishandang (Aktağlık) yu Heishandang (Karatağlık).”

⁴⁹ See, for example, Haji Nur Haji and Chen Gouguang, *Shinjang Islam tarikhi*.

tradition. Among Afaqiyya texts we should now distinguish the “Black Mountain hagiography” of the Ḥasan tradition, from “White Mountain hagiography,” which must be restricted to those works that exhibit loyalty to Khoja Aḥmad, Burhan al-Din and Khoja Jahan, and heirs to this lineage such as Khoja Jahangir. Of the two traditions, the corpus of Black Mountain hagiography was clearly the more influential in Qing Xinjiang. As Rian Thum has pointed out, this family of texts (represented by works such as the *Biographies of the Companions*) was the source of most of the popular narrative not only of Ḥasan’s life, but of Afaq Khoja’s as well.⁵⁰ White Mountain texts *strictu sensu* are very few: apart from the *Signs of the Victories*, we could cite a scroll held in the Jarring collection in Lund that contains a biography of Burhan al-Din, as well as a text edited by Bahargül Hamut, the *Golden Chain (Silsilat al-Dhahab)*.⁵¹

What perspective did Black Mountain hagiography take toward the events of the 1750s? For the most part, the texts of the Ḥasan circle that I have discussed here avoid mention of the Qing conquest, but there is one revealing story in the *Biographies of the Companions* that hints at events to come and exhibits what is best described as a quietist standpoint toward the incoming non-Muslim regime. In the course of one of his raids on Kashgar, Khoja Ḥasan takes captive a Qalmaq (i.e. Oirat Mongol) diviner. The Qalmaq pleads with the khoja not to kill him, saying that he has some good tidings for him, but Ḥasan is not persuaded. With his mind-reading ability, he already

⁵⁰ Thum, *The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History*, 221.

⁵¹ Shinmen and Sugawara, “Kashugaru Hōjake Āfākutō no katsudō no ittan: Yāringu korekushon Prov. 219 ni tsuite.” Bahargül Hamut, *Silsilat az-Zahab: Kommentierung einer čagatai-uygurischen Handschrift zu den Aqtagliq Hoğilar, einer mystischen Gruppierung in Xinjiang im 16-18. Jahrhundert*.

knows what the diviner has to say. Having dispatched the unfortunate Qalmaq captive, Khoja Ḥasan reveals the promised good news: “The Emperor [of China] (*Khāqān*) will take these cities, and at that time these devotees and disciples of yours will be safe and at peace, and will live out their days well.”⁵² Contrary to our view of the Afaqiyya as a pillar of resistance to the Qing, therefore, most of the brotherhood’s textual tradition in fact represents a network that had reconciled itself to Qing rule, and whose members were keeping their heads down, if not actively supporting the pro-Qing *begs*.

I will revisit these implications below, but first I wish to further complicate this picture by introducing a third element to the equation. To the Black Mountain and White Mountain networks of hagiographic production during the Qing we must add a third site—the imperial capital of Beijing. Scholarship has long been aware of the role of less prominent Makhdumzada lineages in the politics of this period. Chief among these was the family of Karamatullah, the younger brother of Afaq Khoja. Like the White Mountain khojas Burhan al-Din and Khoja Jahan, by the 1750s prominent members of this family had ended up hostage to the Junghars. Instead of joining in the initial assault on Kashgar and Yarkand, though, they sought refuge in the Ferghana Valley, then sided with the Qing when the emperor decided to remove the two Afaqi khojas. Karamatullah’s grandson, Ḥusayn Erke Khoja (Ch. E-se-yin), recruited a following of Kirghiz and contributed militarily to the campaign, for which he and his nephew Turdu (Ch. Tu-er-du) were made hereditary Qing aristocrats.⁵³ Wary of the role that these descendants of the Prophet might play in

⁵² ibn ‘Ali, *Siyar al-Mukhlisin*, fols 137a-137b.

⁵³ For the official Qing biographies of these two men, see Roth Li, *Manchu: A Textbook for Reading Documents*, 324-326.

the Tarim Basin, the emperor had the family brought to Beijing, where they resided in the so-called “Muslim camp” (*Huiziying*) in the Inner City, surrounding a newly built mosque.⁵⁴ There they were gradually joined by more members of the Karamatullah line, the most famous among them the woman that the emperor took as his concubine—Rong Fei, better known as Xiang Fei, or the “Fragrant Concubine” (d. 1788).

The story of the Qianlong emperor’s Muslim concubine, in both its patriotic Chinese and subversive Uyghur variants, has long aroused popular, as well as scholarly fascination.⁵⁵ Less well known is the fact that members of this family, despite their status as Qing aristocrats, also continued actively to cultivate a hagiographic tradition of their own. So far my research has identified two Persian hagiographies that originate among the Makhdumzadas of Beijing. These are the *Jeweled Necklace* (*Iqd al-Gawhar*), and the *Compendium of Secrets* (*Jami‘ al-Asrar*), both known only from single manuscripts.⁵⁶ Until now the author of these works has not been correctly

⁵⁴ On this branch of the family, see Saguchi, *Jūhachi-jūkyū seiki*, 80-89. For the Muslim neighborhood in Beijing and its mosque, see Onuma, *250 Years History of the Turkic-Muslim Camp in Beijing*, vol. 2, TIAS Central Eurasian Research Series (Tokyo: NIHU Program Islamic Area Studies, 2009).

⁵⁵ Millward, “A Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong’s Court: The Meanings of the Fragrant Concubine,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 53, no. 2 (1994): 427-458.

⁵⁶ Kafshin Khoja, *Iqd al-Gawhar* (Bodleian Library, MS Ind. Inst. Pers. 117); *Jami‘ al-Asrar* (Institut vostochnykh rukopisei Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, MS B739). Uyghur scholarship hints at a wider corpus associated with the Beijing Makhdumzadas. See Nizamüddin Hüsäyn, “Quyundin

identified, but he reveals his (admittedly, unusual) name in the final line of almost every poem in the two works: “Kafshin.” This is the signature of Kafshin Khoja (Ch. Ka-shen, Ka-she, Ka-sha etc.), son of H̄usayn Erke Khoja and thus a great-grandson of Karamatullah.

Kafshin tells us in his work that at the time of the Qing conquest he was studying in Bukhara. Only in 1764, having presumably had the opportunity to observe the situation in Xinjiang and weigh his options, did he make his way back to Qing territory. There he was met by Qing officials and sent to Beijing, where he eventually inherited H̄usayn’s aristocratic title of “duke” (Ch. *gong*). While the incomplete *Jeweled Necklace* gives us little clue as to its time and place of composition, the *Compendium of Secrets* was clearly written after Kafshin’s arrival in the imperial capital. In it he describes his encounters with Sinophone Muslim (i.e. Hui) scholars on his way through China, and mentions similar meetings in Beijing itself. Originating in the capital, therefore, the *Compendium of Secrets* eventually found its way back to Kashgar, where Russian consul Nikolai Petrovskii acquired it in the late nineteenth century.

Kafshin Khoja’s work deserves a more detailed analysis than space will allow here, so I will limit my discussion to the question of its factional affiliations. Although Kafshin was a descendant of Afaq Khoja’s younger brother and therefore strictly speaking not a member of the Afaqiyya by bloodline, his works nevertheless fall squarely within the Afaqiyya tradition. The surviving section of the *Jeweled Necklace* harks back to the common origin of the Afaqiyya and his own lineage by focusing on the life of Khoja Muḥammad Yusuf, father of Afaq and Karamatullah. The lengthier *Compendium of Secrets* is more informative as to Kafshin’s self-positioning. In it, the author

kālgān ‘Ävliya’ (Tarikhimizda ötkän ävliya Turdi Khoja toghrisida),” *Shinjang mädäniyiti* 38, no. 5 (1989): 64-73.

informs us that during his time in Bukhara he was won from madrasa studies to Sufi esotericism by one of Khoja Ḥasan's elderly disciples.⁵⁷ He also tells us that his inspiration to write the *Compendium of Secrets* came from a dream vision of Ḥasan. His work can therefore be set alongside the *Biographies of the Companions* as belonging to the tradition of Ḥasan-centered hagiography. The first half of the *Jami' al-Asrar* follows the standard line of transmission from Muḥammad Yusuf, through Afaq Khoja, to Khoja Ḥasan. In the second half it turns to biographical sketches of members of his own lesser-known branch of the family.

For the purposes of this study, the key question to ask is: Where do these Beijing Makhdumzadas fit into my revised view of the Black Mountain/White Mountain binary? Given Kafshin's evident devotion to Khoja Ḥasan, should the family of Karamatullah and its textual output similarly be considered as belonging to the Black Mountain party? Although there is no evidence that they were linked to an active chain of spiritual transmission, this was probably not necessarily the sole, or even primary, criterion for membership of the Black Mountain. Although remote from the Tarim Basin, there is some evidence that these khojas in Beijing were a source of spiritual sustenance for Black Mountain Muslims in the Tarim Basin. In his *Hamidian History (Tarikh-i Ḥamidi)*, historian Mulla Musa Sayrami neglects to give an explanation of the terms Black Mountain/White Mountain, but his usage is nevertheless revealing. In discussing the anti-Qing incursions of the nineteenth century, he says that whenever the khojas arrived from Ferghana,

⁵⁷ Kafshin Khoja, *Jami' al-Asrar*, fol. 286a. The man's name was Baba Kashif. In a concluding section of the *Siyar al-Mukhlisin* in which Khoja Ḥasan's following is classified into companions (*aṣḥāb*), deputies (*khalīfa*), begs, and Sufis, Baba Kashif is mentioned as one of the "Sufis." ibn 'Ali, *Siyar al-Mukhlisin*, fol. 197a.

there would be much rejoicing among White Mountain partisans in the Tarim Basin. Meanwhile, “the Black-Mountaineers would send gifts to the khojas in Beijing and ask for help. These khojas would bless some green tea and send it as a gift. They [i.e. the Black-Mountaineers] would call this “blessed tea” and look on it with great respect.”⁵⁸ Although by no means conclusive, Sayrami’s story is at least suggestive of the role that the Beijing Makhdumzadas played as part of a Black Mountain network of solidarity.⁵⁹

Implications for the History of Qing Xinjiang

While I have described the Ḥasan circle as “quietist” in its attitude to the Qing, Kafshin’s hagiographies served to lend sanctity to a network that was unambiguously aligned with Qing rule. This family also maintained a connection to the shrine of Afaq Khoja in Kashgar, and sent its deceased back from Beijing for burial, a practice that may well explain the erroneous belief that the Fragrant Concubine was also buried there. I would argue, then, until the end of the eighteenth century, the Qing state found itself working with a Tarim Basin coalition that was made up of two

⁵⁸ Mulla Musa Sayrami, *Tarikhi Hämidi* (Beijing: Millätlär Näshriyati, 1986), 142.

⁵⁹ Note that one branch of the Ishaqiyya family, that of ‘Abd al-Raḥman, was also present in Beijing. It is possible, therefore, that Sayrami had these Ishaqi khojas in mind, although this line is only traceable to 1811, i.e., prior to the outbreak of the khoja uprisings. Members of the Karamatullah line lost their last hereditary titles in the 1840s but survived in Beijing to the end of the dynasty. See Appendix C.b in Kim, *Borderland Capitalism*, 211-12.

parts. The first was the Black Mountain wing of the Afaqiyya, whose core consisted of the families of Khoja Hasan's one-time companions, but which extended in a looser fashion to the newly created Muslim aristocracy in Beijing. The second part of this coalition consisted of *begs*, some of whose families had served the Ishaqiyya during that family's dominance in the 1730s and 1740s. The immediate post-conquest settlement in the Tarim Basin thus rested much more heavily on collaboration with the Afaqiyya than has previously been thought. This helps to resolve a puzzle that scholars working within the traditional framework have confronted. If the Afaqiyya was exclusively an oppositional force, then why was the Qing not more active in repressing it? Why, for example, did the Qianlong emperor sponsor the renovation of the shrine of Afaq Khoja in Kashgar? Fletcher dealt with this question by asserting that the Qing state, "for its part, tried to maintain a distinction between the Āfāqiyya as a religious community on the one hand and the 'rebel' supporters of the Āfāqī Makhdūmzādas on the other."⁶⁰ Yet as we have seen, it did not require any policy on the part of the Qing to achieve this outcome. The Afaqiyya were already divided into Black Mountain and White Mountain factions, giving the Qing ample room to exploit in constructing a new regime in the Tarim Basin.

If, as I have argued, the Black Mountain/White Mountain division arose within the Afaqiyya, were nineteenth-century visitors to Xinjiang such as Mir Izzatullah and Chokan Valikhanov simply wrong to identify the Black Mountain faction with the Ishaqiyya? Before answering this question, we must first ask what is meant by the term "Ishaqiyya." My critique has severely weakened the evidence for the survival of anything like an Ishaqiyya brotherhood in Xinjiang from the mid-eighteenth century onwards. If references in Qing sources to "Black Hat" loyalties in nineteenth-

⁶⁰ Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China," 36.

century Xinjiang cannot be read as evidence for the presence of the Iṣḥāqiyya, what else can be? No doubt, the *Remembrance of the Saints* bears witness to a lingering sense of devotion to the Iṣḥāqiyya khojas on the part of a particular section of the *beg* elite. Muḥammad Ṣādiq Kashghari wrote this work in the 1780s at the behest of Mirza ‘Uṣman (Ch. E-si-man), who was then serving as governor of Kashgar. In it he explains that ‘Uṣman’s family members were long-standing devotees of the Iṣḥāqiyya lineage and had intermarried with the saintly family.⁶¹ Yet the work is conspicuously silent on any lasting line of spiritual transmission among the Iṣḥāqiyya down to the author’s day. Besides the *Remembrance of the Saints*, no hagiographies written in the Qing period describe the life (and death) of any Iṣḥāqiyya khojas. As with the notion of the “Uwaysiyya” in the Tarim Basin, a scholarly construct thoroughly critiqued by Devin DeWeese, we may have to abandon the habit of speaking of the Iṣḥāqiyya as an active Sufi brotherhood in Qing Xinjiang.⁶²

The coalition, or at least convergence of interests, that I am describing here was thus not one that involved rival Sufi orders occupying a similar social space or competing to initiate disciples. On this basis, we may be in a position to reconcile Izzatullah’s and Valikhanov’s reports with my findings. We could hypothesize that the Qianlong-period alliance of the Black Mountain wing of the Afaqiyya with *begs* who had a lingering allegiance to the Iṣḥāqiyya may have led to a blurring between these boundaries, to the point that the term “Black Mountain” was extended to include those who had an investment in the Iṣḥāqiyya legacy. Valikhanov’s chief error, therefore, may not have been in linking the Iṣḥāqiyya with the Black Mountain, but as treating this as a static state of

⁶¹ Kashghari, *Tazkira-i ‘Azizan*, fols 4b-5a, 61a-61b.

⁶² DeWeese, “The Tadhkira-i Bughra-khan and the ‘Uwaysi’ Sufis of Central Asia: Notes in Review of Imaginary Muslims,” *Central Asiatic Journal* 40, no. 1 (1996): 87-127.

affairs. In reality, he may have been describing the outcome of a merging of the residue of the Ishaqiyya with sections of the Afaqiyya, which came about in conditions of Qing rule in the second half of the eighteenth century.

What evidence is there for the realignment I am describing here? Let us turn again to the *Remembrance of the Saints*. Muḥammad Ṣadiq Kashghari's task here was to satisfy his patron's desire to commemorate the Ishaqiyya khojas and delegitimize the actions of Burhan al-Din and Khoja Jahan, but without pouring too much fuel on the fire of factional divisions. The text is replete with criticism of the actions of Burhan al-Din and his following, but this does not amount to a denunciation of the entire Afaqiyya. Indeed, the image of Khoja Ḥasan in the *Remembrance of the Saints* is entirely positive, and the first mention of his name is accompanied by a string of epithets of praise.⁶³ No description is given of Ḥasan's life, but he is discussed three times in the letters that occur in the second half of the work. I have already mentioned one of these: the letter summoning Ḥasan's surviving community of disciples to Kashgar. The second is a letter to a Kirghiz leader, Qubad Mirza. Here the Ishaqiyya leaders cite Qubad's father's loyalty to Ḥasan as a good reason for him to support them. As in the overture to Ḥasan's disciplines, Kashghari here depicts the Ishaqiyya khojas as positioning themselves as heirs to Ḥasan's legacy. Finally, in a letter to Khoja Burhan al-Din on the eve of his assault on Yarkand, the besieged Ishaqiyya cite precedent from one of Ḥasan's raids against the Junghars. When Khoja Ḥasan took Yarkand on this occasion, he seized the property of those who had been collaborating with the non-Muslim rule of the Junghars. Questioned as to the legitimacy of Ḥasan's actions, the leading jurisconsults of Yarkand delivered a fatwa stating that anyone lending support to an infidel army was himself

⁶³ Kashghari, *Tazkira-i 'Azizan*, fol. 30a.

an infidel and could be treated as such.⁶⁴ Clearly the import of this passage is to draw a positive contrast between Khoja Ḥasan's actions and those of Burhan al-Din. While the *Remembrance of the Saints* is without doubt antagonistic to the White Mountain khojas, therefore, it is not by any means an anti-Afaqiyya text, and in fact shows strong sympathy for Ḥasan.

If the *Remembrance of the Saints* can be thought of as reconciling the Black Mountain Sufis with the pro-Ishāqiyya *begs* in theory, references to “Black Hat Muslims” in Qing sources show this reconciliation also taking place in practice. During Jahangir Khoja's attack on Kashgar in the 1820s, the governor of the oasis was Ishaq b. 'Usman. As the son of the patron of the *Remembrance of the Saints*, Ishaq fits well the received image of the Black Mountain as the continuation of the Ishāqiyya, and as discussed earlier, Kashgari pilgrims in Bombay identified Ishaq as head of the Black Mountain party. This may have been true in a political sense, but Qing accounts state clearly that the chief spiritual authority among the Black Mountain Muslims was an *akhund* by the name of Ni'mat (Nai-ma-te), a man who inspired no less devotion than Jahangir did among the White Mountain Muslims. Who, then, was Ni'mat? During his brief reign, Jahangir captured the unfortunate *akhund* and sent him as a hostage to Kokand. In the course of pacifying the region, Imperial Commissioner Nayanceng sent a strongly-worded letter to Ni'mat's captors demanding his release, in which he highlighted the fact that “Ni'mat is a direct heir of 'Abd al-Wahid, who was once a teacher of the Prophet's descendant Khoja Ḥasan.”⁶⁵ While 'Abd al-Wahid's identity is unknown, the “Khoja Ḥasan” referred to here can only be Afaq Khoja's son. I believe we can

⁶⁴ Kashghari, *Tazkira-i 'Azizan*, fols 133a-134a.

⁶⁵ Nayanceng, *Na Wenyi gong chouhua Huijiang shanhou shiyi zouyi*, 1:9182-83; Saguchi, *Jūhachi-jūkyū seiki*, 461.

conclude, therefore, that this leading Black Mountain *akhund* derived his authority not from any links to the Ishaqiyya, but via a familial association with Khoja Hasan.

Some support for this convergence can also be gleaned from the Black Mountain hagiographies. One important scene in this corpus, which is treated in different ways, is the dangerous mission to bring Khoja Hasan's body back to Kashgar for burial in the shrine of the Afaqiyya. This took place a year after Khoja Hasan's death, and must have occurred at a time of Ishaqiyya dominance in Kashgar. The *Biographies of the Companions* describes the situation in Kashgar at this time as follows: "Some people had become Ishaqiyya, some had pledged allegiance to someone else, and some were engaging in malicious gossip (*ḡammāzī karda būd*) in service to the Qalmaqs."⁶⁶ Here, as seems realistic, the opposition of the Ishaqiyya was an obstacle to the mission. In other accounts, though, the Ishaqiyya are written out, and instead the threat is said to come exclusively from the White Mountain faction. In the *Secret of the Devotees*, the arrival of this party of Hasan loyalists prompts the "White Mountaineers" in Kashgar to denounce the "Black Mountaineers" to the Junghars.⁶⁷ It is of course possible that there were loyalists of Khoja Ahmad present in Kashgar at this time, but to describe them as the ruling group is historically implausible. I read this, therefore, as a reflection of shifting historical realities, which led the Black Mountain circle to downplay a historical conflict with the Ishaqiyya, and instead center their communal narrative on the Black Mountain/White Mountain rivalry of the Qing period.

Let us turn finally to Chokan Valikhanov, the *locus classicus* for the conflation that I have been critiquing. In actual fact, Valikhanov's account is not as straightforward as the conventional

⁶⁶ ibn 'Ali, *Siyar al-Mukhlisin*, fol. 181b.

⁶⁷ *Sirr al-Aḥbab*, fols 86a-87b.

reading of it would have. To be sure, he is explicit in identifying the Black Mountain with the Ishaqiyya. Furthermore, in describing the Black Mountain community, he identifies its spiritual leader in his day (i.e. the 1850s) as a man who descended from “one of the shaykhs of Danyal Khoja,” possibly a reference to the Ishaqi Khoja Danyal, and thus a rare surviving Ishaqi initiatic chain. In the same passage, however, he also mentions that each year the Black Mountain Muslims sent rich gifts to their “patrons,” the khoja family of Margilan in the Ferghana Valley. As Kawahara Yayoi’s research has detailed, these Margilan khojas (or *töräs* as they styled themselves) traced their genealogy not to the Ishaqiyya, but to one ‘Abdullah Khan, a grandson of Afaq Khoja’s brother Karamatullah (see Fig. 1), making them relatives of the Beijing Makhdumzadas.⁶⁸ In providing this information, Valikhanov thus unwittingly contradicts his earlier identification of the Black Mountain with the Ishaqiyya, and furnishes yet more evidence for the capacious nature of the Black Mountain grouping.

The revision I am proposing to our view of Sufi affiliations in Qing Xinjiang will require us to look at a range of familiar events with fresh eyes, but I will limit myself to just one of these—an uprising that took place in 1815 in the village of Tashmaliq, some 40 miles southwest of Kashgar (on what is now the highway to Pakistan). This was led by a local *akhund*, Žiya al-Din,

⁶⁸ Kawahara, “Kōkando hānkoku ni okeru Marugiran no toratachi,” *Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies* 20, no. 2 (2005): 269–94. Intriguingly, Valikhanov says that this Margilan lineage originated both with ‘Abdullah and “Padshah Khan Khoja.” This is a common epithet for Khoja Ḥasan, and as Kawahara points out, the Western Turkestani narratives surrounding these two men show many similarities.

who according to Valikhanov was a member of the Black Mountain faction.⁶⁹ In 1814, Ziya al-Din married a daughter of the Beijing aristocrat Kafshin Khoja, but the governor of the oasis (the scion of a *beg* family from Aqsu) prohibited him from bringing his new wife from her residence at Kashgar's Afaqiyya shrine to Tashmaliq. This was among the reasons for the eventual outbreak of violence. Until now, the identification of the "Black Mountain" with the Ishaqiyya has led scholars to cite Ziya al-Din's marriage as evidence of a reconciliation between the Ishaqiyya and Afaqiyya. Yet in light of my critique this event now looks very different. As a Black Mountain *akhund*, Ziya al-Din was affiliated not with the Ishaqiyya but with the tradition surrounding Hasan. Geographically, this makes much more sense. Ziya al-Din's village of Tashmaliq had historically been a base of support for the khoja's raids on Kashgar; Mulla Masjidi, a leading disciple of Hasan and heir to his spiritual charisma, was from the nearby region of Oytagh, and it was in the Pamir mountains around Oytagh that Ziya al-Din made his last stand.⁷⁰ Qing official Sungyun's [Ch. Song-yun] interrogation further revealed that Ziya al-Din had been exchanging gifts with Kirghiz in the Pamirs. This reading also makes more sense in social terms. Kafshin, as we have seen, was equally affiliated with the legacy of Hasan. For his daughter to wed a man like Ziya al-Din was thus in no way out of the ordinary; it represented a union between two wings of the Black Mountain

⁶⁹ Valikhanov, "O sostoianii Altysara," 140. For an account of these events, See Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate*, 73ff.

⁷⁰ ibn 'Ali, *Siyar al-Mukhlisin* describes Shah Baqi (his name is usually written as Šābaqī) of Tashmaliq as a key local ally of Hasan in his holy wars. On Oytagh and its inhabitants, see Friederich, "'Taghlik' und 'Turkmen' bzw. 'Türk': Zu einer (einer?) wenig bekannten ethnischen Gruppe in Xinjiang."

community. In terms of Kashgari society, the marriage would probably have been a politically significant combination, and this may have been the reason that the governor sought to stymie it. The significance of Žiya al-Din’s 1815 uprising therefore, is not that it signaled an end to the hostility between the Afaqiyya and Ishaqiyya (which had already been overcome as the Black Mountain came to subsume elements with Ishaqi loyalties), but rather that it marked the decline of two sections of the Black Mountain party: the Makhdumzada aristocrats of Beijing, and the *akhunds* of the Kashgar oasis’s Pamiri periphery.

Conclusion

While they remain poor sources for understanding the events that they purport to describe, Eastern Turkestani hagiographies do offer insights into the social and political milieu in which they were created. These texts should primarily be read, that is to say, as sources for the history of Qing Xinjiang, and not of the preceding period of Junghar domination. The evidence that they provide contrasts in significant ways with the established narrative of the Qing empire’s relationship with the Muslims of the Tarim Basin. Most obviously, my criticism of this narrative considerably weakens the utility of the Afaqiyya/Ishaqiyya binary as the primary framework through which to explain events, characterize viewpoints, and classify texts. Situating the origins of the Black Mountain/White Mountain divide inside the Afaqiyya—where it belongs—renders the Afaqiyya a much more diverse entity, and at the same time calls into question the existence of the “Ishaqiyya” during the Qing. Far from a univocal corpus, the tradition of Afaqiyya hagiography represents a diverse range of text-producing networks, from the dissident exiles at the edge of the Qing empire, to the village *akhunds* of the Tarim Basin, to a hereditary aristocracy residing at the empire’s heart.

Apart from providing a better fit with the available source data, this revised account has the advantage of putting the terms that we have been working with into motion. We must recognize, I believe, that to posit a single factional divide running through East Turkestani society that was perpetuated in a stable form for two hundred years is simply ahistorical. Instead, we should be sensitive to the ways in which designations of Sufi organizations (or indeed of any social groups) shifted, changed referents, coalesced, and diverged—something entirely unsurprising given the turbulence of the transition to Qing rule in Xinjiang. A better reading of the terminology in turn gives us a clearer picture of the entities to which these designations actually refer. Qing Xinjiang was not, it turns out, riven by steadfast loyalties to two Sufi dynasties. On the contrary, the notion of reverence for a living saint was in fact something of a dividing line between the White and Black Mountain communities. Whereas the White Mountain maintained the centrality of the Makhdumzada bloodline, and in that sense fits the received image of a Tarim Basin brotherhood, the Black Mountain was a much more complicated entity. We have seen here how the term “Black Mountain” went from being a designation for an enemy of Khoja Ḥasan ca. 1730, to being a reference to his own (non-Makhdumzada) companions by the decade of the 1750s. Partly for political and partly for religious reasons, I believe that this label then came to subsume the Makhdumzada family in Beijing, and by the nineteenth century at least, to include what was left of networks loyal to the Ishaqiyya, and possibly also the *töräs* of Margilan. Although originating in an initiatic chain structured through shaykh-disciple succession, therefore, this initiatic chain seems not to have had a monopoly on religious authority within the Black Mountain, and we confront a question here as to the best terms to describe this phenomenon. The situation confirms a point that Devin DeWeese has already made in the case of Western Turkestan, that a simple one-size-fits-all model of a Sufi brotherhood derived from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries will

not fit more recent periods of Central Asian history.⁷¹ If not a straightforward “brotherhood,” though, will alternatives such as “party” or “faction” suffice? Although I have had recourse to these terms here, they seem to go too far in treating these entities as political phenomena devoid of religious significance, when the task is to come up with alternative ways to describe the meaning and function of Sufi affiliations in this period.

With greater clarity as to the interests and affiliations that inform religious writing from Qing Xinjiang, we will hopefully be in a position to engage in fresh and productive ways with these texts. This should also help us to create a more meaningful exchange between the field of Qing history and the Islamic studies approach to Xinjiang. At the most basic level, my study has shown how we can derive greater meaning from disparate references to “Black Hat” and “White Hat” Muslims in Qing narratives. More broadly, my findings prompt a range of questions as to the intersection of religion and politics on both the local and empire-wide scale. Ascribing the Black Mountain *akhunds* of the Afaqiyya a greater role in the construction of Qing rule in the Tarim Basin, for example, requires us to ask how sections of the local elite who were easily visible to the Qing state via the “*beg* system” engaged with these less visible forms of authority. Zooming out, we can now see that the Qing state was dealing not with a “local” Ishaqiyya, and an “exile” Afaqiyya, as they have been depicted, but with two networks that both extended beyond the frontiers of the empire, and continued to draw on links to India, the Pamirs, and the Ferghana Valley that they had established in the pre-Qing period. What was new in the Qing was the place

⁷¹ DeWeese, “‘Dis-ordering’ Sufism in Early Modern Central Asia: Suggestions for Rethinking the Sources and Social Structures of Sufi History in the 18th and 19th Centuries,” in *History and Culture of Central Asia/Istoriia i kul'tura Tsentral'noi Azii*, ed. Babadjanov and Kawahara.

of the imperial capital in the spiritual geography of Central Asian Islam. Alongside the shrines and Sufi lodges of the Tarim Basin, we must now take seriously the idea of Beijing as a focal point for at least some Muslims of Xinjiang. Whether or not he himself was aware of it, the Qianlong emperor's patronage of the Makhdumzada khojas had a greater religious dimension than previously realized, a fact that allows us to envisage comparisons between their role, and those of other religious elites at the Qing court, such as the Gelugpa monks of Tibetan Buddhism.

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